# **Opportunities and Challenges for New and Peripheral Political Science Communities**

# A Consolidated Discipline?

Edited by **Gabriella Ilonszki Christophe Roux**

# Opportunities and Challenges for New and Peripheral Political Science Communities

Gabriella Ilonszki • Christophe Roux Editors

# Opportunities and Challenges for New and Peripheral Political Science Communities

A Consolidated Discipline?

This publication is based upon work from COST Action ProSEPS CA 15207, supported by COST (European Cooperation in Science and Technology). COST (European Cooperation in Science and Technology) is a funding agency for research and innovation networks. Our Actions help connect research initiatives across Europe and enable scientists to grow their ideas by sharing them with their peers. This boosts their research, career and innovation. www.cost.eu

*Editors* Gabriella Ilonszki Department of Political Science Corvinus University of Budapest Budapest, Hungary

Christophe Roux University of Montpellier (CEPEL-CNRS) Montpellier, France

#### ISBN 978-3-030-79053-0 ISBN 978-3-030-79054-7 (eBook) https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-79054-7

© The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s) 2022. This book is an open access publication.

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# Contents




# Notes on Contributors

**Erkki Berndtson** is Senior Lecturer (Emeritus) in Political Science at the University of Helsinki (Finland). His research interests include history of political science and the politics of higher education.

**Davor Boban** is Associate Professor at the Faculty of Political Science at the University of Zagreb (Croatia). He has taught courses on the political systems of Central European and post-Soviet states at the University of Zagreb. He was a visiting researcher at the University of Warsaw (Poland) in 2009, the University of Indiana in Bloomington (USA) in 2011, and Taiwan National University and Soochow University, both in Taipei (Taiwan), in 2020. He also delivered lectures and carried out research during his visits to universities in Azerbaijan, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Ukraine, and Russia. His articles on the politics and political systems of Central European and post-Soviet states have appeared in many publications. He won the National Science Award of the Republic of Croatia for 2017 for his work *The Russian Political System*.

**Tatsiana Chulitskaya** is Senior Researcher at the Faculty of Political Science and Diplomacy, Vytautas Magnus University (Lithuania).

**Dangis Gudelis** is Associate Professor of Public Administration at Mykolas Romeris University (Vilnius, Lithuania).

**Eva Marín Hlynsdóttir** is Associate Professor in Public Policy and Governance at the Faculty of Political Science, University of Iceland. Her research mainly focuses on various aspects of subnational government in the Nordic region, such as local government and governance sustainability and capacity, and the interaction between politics and administration at the local level. Her most recent publications are *Gender in Organizations: The Icelandic Female Council Manager* (2020) and *Subnational Governance in Small States: The Case of Iceland* (Palgrave Macmillan, 2020).

**Gabriella Ilonszki** is Professor Emerita of Political Science at Corvinus University of Budapest (Hungary) and Doctor of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences. Her research felds include comparative political studies with a Central and East European focus. Her most recent publications comprise two edited volumes: *Coalition Governance in Central Eastern Europe* (co-edited with Torbjörn Bergman and Wolfgang C. Müller; 2019) and *Opposition Parties in European Legislatures. Confict or Consensus?* (coedited with Elisabetta De Giorgi; 2018).

**Dobrinka Kostova** is Professor of Public Policy at the Bulgarian Academy of Sciences in Sofa. Her main research interests include the felds of elite studies, public policy and gender relations. She has published 8 books and more than 70 articles to date.

**Darina Malová** is Full Professor of Political Science at Comenius University (Faculty of Arts, Department of Political Science) in Bratislava (Slovakia). She studied philosophy at Comenius University. In 2009 she established the Centre of Excellence for Social Innovation at Comenius University, which studies new ideas and good practices, including deliberative democracy, social and gender equality, in Slovakia and the European Union. She specializes in Slovak and Central European politics and European integration, focusing on the Eastern Enlargement of the EU, and her research interests include democratization; transition; political institutions; nationalism; and gender, ethnic, and minority issues. Her works have been published in a number of edited volumes and academic journals, including *West European Politics*, *Problems of Post-Communism*, *Political Psychology*. Recently, she contributed to the volume *Towards a Segmented European Political Order: The European Union's Post-Crises Conundrum*, edited by Jozef Bátora and John Erik Fossum (2020).

**Irmina Matonyte**̇ is Professor of Political Science at General Jonas Žemaitis Military Academy of Lithuania, Vilnius. Her research interests include human security, public policies (local, national and European level), the attitudes of elites, public opinion, and the development of social sciences in the post-communist region.

**Christophe Roux** is Professor of Political Science at the Faculty of Law and Political Science of the University of Montpellier (France), where he is a research affliate at the CEPEL (Centre for Political and Social Studies: Health, Environment, Territory), a joint research unit of the University of Montpellier and the French National Centre for Scientifc Research (CNRS). His research interests mainly deal with South European politics and regional nationalism. He recently co-edited the handbook *Science politique* [Political Science] (Brussels, Bruylant, 2019, 3rd ed., with E. Savarese).

**Serghei Sprincean** is *Doctor* Habilitat in Political Sciences, lead researcher and scientifc secretary of the Institute of Legal, Political and Sociological Research (Chisinau, Moldova). He is the author of over 200 scientifc publications on human security in transitional and post-soviet societies, on the role of interest groups, pressure groups and civil society in decisionmaking, and on the correlation between morality and politics, and between politics and bioethics and human rights.

**Ivan Stanojevic**́, PhD is Assistant Professor of Political Economy at the University of Belgrade (Serbia), Faculty of Political Science. His felds of interest comprise the political economy of European monetary integration, game theory, and public choice.

**Aneta Világi** is Assistant Professor of Political Science at the Faculty of Arts, Comenius University in Bratislava (Slovakia). She studies Slovak politics and Slovakia within the context of European integration. Her work on Euroscepticism and anti-democratic politics draws on qualitative feldwork and social science experiments in Slovakia. She has written on a range of topics, including Slovakia's national and European elections and ethnic minorities in Slovakia.

# List of Figures


# List of Tables


#### xiv List of Tables


# Introduction: The Then and Now of Political Science Institutionalisation in Europe—A Research Agenda and Its Endeavour

*Gabriella Ilonszki and Christophe Roux*

This volume aims to analyse the institutionalisation process undergone by political science in Europe in recent decades. It refects a part of the research conducted within the framework of the COST Action 'ProSEPS' (Professionalization and Social Impact of European Political Science) that started in late 2016.1 'A part', indeed, since it is the result of the work of

1COST Action CA15207 (Professionalization and Social Impact of European Political Science) (2016–2021). It originally comprised a total of 103 people from 42 countries, including those with a Eurasian basis (such as Russia and Turkey), and took into account non-European observers (USA, Canada). See https://www.cost.eu/actions/CA15207/ (retrieved on September 11th, 2020).

G. Ilonszki

Department of Political Science, Corvinus University of Budapest, Budapest, Hungary e-mail: gabriella.ilonszki@uni-corvinus.hu

C. Roux (\*)

© The Author(s) 2022 1

University of Montpellier (CEPEL-CNRS), Montpellier, France e-mail: christophe.roux@umontpellier.fr

G. Ilonszki, C. Roux (eds.), *Opportunities and Challenges for New and Peripheral Political Science Communities*, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-79054-7\_1

the frst of four working groups (WGs) assigned thematic tasks within the context of the Action.2 In this introduction, we briefy introduce the research project and then identify key questions we believe need addressing within our thematic frame. Finally, we offer a series of insights together with an overview of the different chapters comprising this volume.

# 1 ProSEPS and the Working Group on the State of Political Science in Europe

The main tasks of WG13 were (1) to contribute, in the early phase of the project, to the identifcation of political scientists across Europe—a tentative 'census' subsequently built on by national teams in 2017–2018; (2) to contribute to the general online survey jointly edited by WG3 and WG4, distributed among European political scientists in 2018–2019 and (3) to provide updated information about the situation of the profession on the continent, in particular by generating reports (mostly of a qualitative nature) based on a questionnaire distributed among the Action's participants (2018–2019).

In regard to the frst point, Action participants quickly realised just how challenging a comparative study of the state of the discipline in Europe was. Despite the widely acknowledged process of continental integration driven by the European Union (EU), the academic landscape has been, and still is, characterised by a great variety of traditions, institutions and resources—and not simply due to the fact that not all European states are EU member states. Understanding the category 'political science' means dealing with a discipline which has been variously labelled (political science or political sciences, political science or political studies and political science or 'politology') and which has variable relationships with a variety of subfelds, each independent to a lesser or greater degree (international relations, public policy, public administration, political economy, political sociology, research methods and political theory are some of the best examples of such); these sub-felds are sometimes included as a branch of

2WG1 dealt with the state of political science, WG2 with internationalization, WG3 with media visibility and WG4 with the policy impact of political scientists. Decisions regarding the Action as a whole were managed by its Core Group and its General Assembly.

3The group (chaired by Gabriella Ilonszki and vice-chaired by Christophe Roux) has held seven meetings, either alone or with the other working groups across Europe. Its last meeting, due to be held in Valencia, Spain, in March 2020, had to be cancelled due to the COVID-19 crisis.

political science, while in other cases, they purport to be independent from it and intersect with other neighbouring disciplines. These relationships are no mere formality. While they are often based on a functional rationale and are the result of organisational considerations, they can signifcantly impact political science in terms of teaching, research focus and methodology. Moreover, the potentially, and necessarily, evolving interconnections between them hint at the overall formation/transformation of political science per se. Under these circumstances, the mere defnition of what a political scientist is proves to be much more challenging than it might seem at frst sight. The enduring national peculiarities lead us to underline the continued relevance of the fundamental questions posed by Klingemann ('How many political scientists are there in Europe? How many institutions are there to employ them? There is no easy answer to these questions') (Klingemann, 2008, p. 375) and his consequent conclusion ('political science is unable to provide quantitative data about even basic indicators such as students or academic staff') (Klingemann, 2008, p. 392). While during our research we did our best to fnd reliable information, these diffculties are encountered even before we get to the comparative European level: in a number of countries, such information is not readily available.

While a great deal of information has been gathered over the course of our project, a number of limitations and diffculties have had to be dealt with. First of all, a COST Action, while representing a valuable tool for networking and cooperation, does not directly fund research. Our study of the discipline has been conducted with no such fnancial support, and this has severely limited our efforts. Moreover, it also deals with a feld that has been explored by a very limited number of scholars. Therefore, it is diffcult to identify scholars within each European country who possess experience of research into the discipline: political science is certainly what they practice but is not what they study. There is also a degree of divergence among the national political science associations operating in Europe: they differ considerably not only in terms of their activities (in certain rare cases, they are not active at all, and in other cases, they do very little) but also in terms of their production of regular information about the (national) profession.

Therefore, the ProSEPS scholars basically had to start from scratch and establish criteria with which to identify political scientists in Europe. This was not an easy task, but after much discussion, it was agreed that political scientists were to be identifed on the basis of national legal criteria, insofar as such are available (e.g. national accreditation schemes and ministerial defnitions/regulations), or if offcial/legal criteria do not exist, then on the basis of the combination of the following: (1) institutional affliation (e.g. member of a department of political science), (2) possession of a PhD in political science and (3) research experience or having taught courses in political science. These groups are not necessarily exclusionary. But the point is clear: academic qualifcations, professional experience and working environment together provide the basis for the establishment of the group of political scientists.4 These criteria establish transparent selection markers which may sound excessively broad; however, an overly narrow defnition of 'political scientist' would have led to the exclusion of actual political scientists who are not affliated to a political science department. Bearing in mind that the population of political scientists was not defned for its own sake but was the basis for a survey, a more inclusive approach was preferred here.

National delegates were then tasked with identifying political scientists in their own countries. While in some fortunate cases this information can be quickly and easily found, in others the task proved to be more complicated (sometimes very much more complicated). The lack of any clear-cut disciplinary boundaries in the institutional organisation of academic departments, the existence of private actors with no obligation to divulge their practices and the lack of transparency, or poor quality, of online resources were among the obstacles to what may have seemed a simple undertaking at frst sight. At the individual level, asking political scientists questions about their affliation or status could raise privacy issues. After careful examination, a tentative frst census of European political scientists was developed by the network in 2017–2018. This census, based on an integrative perspective (meaning that litigious cases tended to be included rather than excluded), resulted in an estimated fgure of just over 11,000 political scientists. Two countries (the UK and Germany) account for almost half of the population (more than 2100 and just over 2000, respectively), and the number of political scientists is around 1000 in both Russia and Turkey (Capano & Verzichelli, 2019, pp. 6–7). However, the data it

4A broad approach was suggested, that is to consider membership in departments/institutes of political science, political studies, international relations, public administration, public policy, political theory (and also, eventually, departments / faculties / schools or institutes of neighboring institutions like European studies, law, area studies, geography, economy, sociology, psychology, management, communication, history, environmental and health sciences and so on).

relies on should be treated with caution due to the aforementioned diffculties, especially when being used for comparative purposes.

The data used also relied on the ProSEPS online survey, which was mainly conceived and conducted by WG3 and WG4 between March 2018 and January 2019 (see Real Dato & Verzichelli, 2019, Brans et al., 2019), although it benefted from the efforts of all Action members, including WG1 and WG2 (see Engeli & Kostova, 2019). Accordingly, the 52-question survey dealt with political scientists' media visibility (written press, radio and television networks and online news) and their political consultancy/policy advisory services. Some questions addressed the ideas that political scientists themselves have of their own role in public debate and related activities, while others tried to assess the self-declared importance of internationalisation (in terms of publications, conference attendance, funding and linguistic practices); others still aimed at grasping the main subfelds that political scientists taught. However, the resulting data were diffcult to interpret since less than 21% of interviewees completed the questionnaire.

Finally, a third source is offered by the answers to a questionnaire tentatively dealing with 'the state of political science in Europe' (labelled in a purposely loose manner). The questionnaire was discussed by WG1 members and benefted from output from WG2 in its section on internationalisation. It was circulated among national experts from late 2018 onwards, when it was submitted, in its fnal version, to a meeting held in Sarajevo. Answers, taking the form of a series of national reports, were gradually received up until early 2019 (Ilonszki & Roux, 2019). Thematic sections addressed a number of different issues: the structuring of the political science community, the structure of political science education programmes, the features of political science research, the visibility of, and prospects for, the discipline and its internationalisation.

The gradual 'awakening' of the discipline was confrmed: whilst early attention was often devoted to political issues in some countries, through traditional institutions (chairs, academies and the like), the rise of political science as a discipline took place at various different moments during the course of the twentieth century, and in particular in the latter half thereof in conjunction with the emergence of mass higher education and advanced social science research in most Western countries, and at a later point after the fall of authoritarian rule—elsewhere (i.e. in most of Southern and Eastern Europe). In addition to the differences in the pace of political science's emergence, Europe also displays a considerable diversity of situations in terms of the different dimensions (education, research, institutions and resources) we need to explore in order to understand the current situation and its underlying dynamics. Once again, the considerable diffculty experienced in accessing information and establishing a valid comparison was evident. Although our group of scholars began producing preliminary data on this topic (Ilonszki & Roux, 2019), such data must be considered as a raw material requiring careful interpretation.

These questions were extensively discussed by the members of WG1 representing Austria, Belarus, Croatia, the Czech Republic, Finland, France, Hungary, Iceland, Lithuania, Malta, Moldova, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Serbia and Spain. As the list of countries suggests,5 most of the countries represented were latecomers or enjoyed peripheral status within the profession, despite the fact that many have impressive record in terms of academic achievement in the feld. Consequently, the considerable interest of the country representatives in the focus of WG1's specifc theme, namely the institutionalisation of the profession, was clear. WG1 was called upon to propose a joint undertaking regarding some of the trickiest questions concerning institutional development that in one way or another were important to all of us. This common interest matured into the idea of the present volume. While in the end not all the countries are represented in this volume, research is ongoing with those countries as well. Special thanks should go to our colleagues from the countries that have not provided authors for this book, as their input has nevertheless provided invaluable for the development of the project.6

This is precisely how work started on this book. We chose to reframe the generic query into a more thorough research question concerning the institutionalisation of political science as an academic discipline: this required responding to a threefold challenge—empirical, theoretical and comparative—by embracing a cross-national undertaking based on a specifc theoretical framework.

5We only regret that we were not able to systematically include representatives from large academic communities (Germany and the United Kingdom frst and foremost, but also countries such as Poland, the Netherlands and the Scandinavian countries).

6We would like to thank Miguel Jerez and Marcelo Camerlo their contributions in regard to Spain and Portugal, respectively.

# 2 Understanding the Institutionalisation of Political Science in Europe's 'Periphery'

The following pages provide some insight into the diffculties academia faces, and the approaches and solutions it offers, when it analyses the institutionalisation of political science as an academic discipline in Europe in recent years.

The term 'institutionalisation' is commonly used but rarely defned. As DiMaggio and Powell (1991, p. 1) observe, 'scholars who have written about institutions have often been rather casual about defning them; institutionalism has disparate meanings in different disciplines; and even within organization theory, "institutionalists" vary in their relative emphasis on micro and macro features, in their weightings of cognitive and normative aspects of institutions, and in the importance they attribute to interests and relational networks in the creation and diffusion of institutions". In our search for a preliminary defnition, we can start with Lanzalaco's view that an 'institution' is the result of an 'institutionalisation' process, that is when social relations and behavioural models "a) are differentiated from other behavioural models and types of social relations…, b) acquire an intrinsic value… [and] c) are depersonalised" (Lanzalaco, 1995, p. 65).7 While differentiation and depersonalisation can be seen as properties of the institutionalisation process, we believe that the acquisition of intrinsic value is more an outcome of the process than a defnitional component of such. The concept effectively embraces the process by which political science became a separate discipline within European academia, with its own name, its durability and its own procedures for establishing the standards of scientifc recognition, knowledge transmission and personnel training, hiring and promotion. Moving on from this general defnition to how it can be applied to political science, we believe it requires complex considerations that exceed the scope of this introduction: consequently, these are developed separately in Chap. 2 (Ilonszki, this volume).

This simple conceptual underpinning has the advantage that it helps us organise our research. Of course, this is not the frst time the discipline has been studied. Indeed, in Europe, its study gradually accompanied the global development of the discipline at the end of the twentieth century, and political science has been the object of a series of cross-national

<sup>7</sup>We would like to thank Giliberto Capano for having drawn our attention to this reference.

'pan-European' overviews over the last two or three decades. Taking into account also the most recent studies made since the beginning of this century, some of these analyses have been made (mainly on the basis of an informative country-by-country approach) from a continental perspective (Boncourt et al., 2020; Klingemann, 2008; Krauz-Moser et al., 2015), while others have focused on Western Europe (Klingemann, 2007) or Eastern Europe (Eisfeld & Pal, 2010; Kaase et al., 2002; Klingemann et al., 2002). To a certain degree, these volumes, together with all the articles published in this regard in academic journals, are themselves a sign that a process of discipline building has been successfully completed in recent decades. This comes as no surprise if we consider certain emblematic national cases such as that of the USA, the tentacular aspects and global infuence of that nation's political science community. Furthermore, the study of American political science can depend upon consolidated scholarship and benefts from the contribution of a powerful association and from the clear commitment of political scientists to monitoring their own discipline. Nevertheless, we should keep in mind that while the discipline's refection on its own being is not new to the American political science community, more recently it has also become a form of selfdefense: when in 2009 a US senator proposed cutting funding to political science, claiming it to be a worthless ("good for nothing") feld, this was a wake-up call to political scientists who were called on to refect on the discipline's new tasks in a changing world. This is probably something that European political science should also think about: mere academic performance is not enough to make political science an acknowledged, institutionalised discipline. At the same time, it should be said that European political science is much more diversifed than its US equivalent. In Europe, national political science associations appear less well-organised, and this lack of self-focus is indicative of the discipline's degree of institutionalisation. Notwithstanding the substantial differences between the political science strongholds of North-Western Europe and other those of other parts of Europe, it was highly indicative that when asked if political science was acknowledged and recognised discipline in their country, almost all respondents, from Iceland to Bulgaria and from Portugal to Lithuania, 'agreed' or 'strongly agreed' that this was so.8 How can such an agreement be accounted for, despite the evident differences in the strength of the discipline among such countries?

<sup>8</sup>ProSEPS WG1 National Reports. Only Malta is the exception to the rule.

These challenges and diffculties explain why we chose the middle ground between updating the customary country-by-country report ('what about political science in your country in 2020') and a prospective European overview that would prove rather diffcult and demand resources we do not have. In studying political science's institutionalisation, our territorial focus here is clearly on Europe, although the cases selected for this volume do not cover the entire continent, indeed far from it. This is not only because the resources available to us did not allow us to do so. In addition to our WG membership, and to the partners concerned, the refections shared with the other members of the working group led us to a growing conviction: rather than exploring the more obvious European success stories, we should turn our attention to the more peripheral cases and examine the diffculties political science actually faced in such countries. A valid concern raised some time ago but still an issue today is the question of whether these countries would simply 'commute' from one periphery to the other (Fink-Hafner, 2002) or manage to establish their own place in European political science.

We use 'peripheral' in a Rokkanian sense (Rokkan, 1999) to refer to those territories which appear to be severely deprived of a variety of resources that tend to be concentrated in core areas. Indeed, a striking feature of the development of political science in Europe has been its uneven nature, with it being most successful, as previously mentioned, in North-Western Europe9 (the United Kingdom, Germany, Scandinavia and the Netherlands), the centre for the various political science associations' initiatives on the continent. If we are to understand the obstacles that the institutionalisation of political science has had to overcome and that it continues to face, we believe that we are more likely to gain insights into this question by looking to the margins rather than the core.

As a consequence, this book deals with a number of national cases that in the main encompass Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) together with Iceland and Malta—two small (in terms of population), insular, quite recently independent European countries located at the fringes (northern and southern, respectively) of Western Europe. It means that most of our cases were latecomers emerging from the post-Communist

<sup>9</sup> In large countries such as France (Boncourt, 2015; Smith, 2020) and Italy (Capano and Verzichelli 2010, Marino & Verzichelli, 2020), the situation of political science in recent years is described rather positively, albeit with certain signifcant challenges still to be overcome.

democratisation process in the 1990s, where the development of political science was delayed accordingly. This shows that political science has a 'symbiotic relationship with democracy' (Keohane, 2009, p. 363). Most of our attention is then devoted to the most recent decades, culminating in a portrayal of the profession as it stands in or around the year 2020.

This time period is very special, as for most of the countries covered here (the CEE countries) these were decades of signifcant transformation after the fall of the Berlin wall. This specifc historical event can be seen as the point of departure for an institutionalisation process which, as one may have expected perhaps, should have involved several successive sequences of 'innovation, diffusion and legitimation' (Lawrence et al., 2001, p. 626), whereby the discipline would have been 'created', spread and anchored in the higher education and research landscape. However, as we now know, several important factors intervened in the meantime. CEE as a whole underwent a process of political change comprising (1) the creation of several new independent states (sometimes in violent confict as in the case of the break-up of Yugoslavia); (2) democratic transition, in the case of both old and new states, which was affected by a signifcant political heritage and, in the long run, the persistence of authoritarian trends and (3) dealing with the infuence of external factors such as globalisation, the effects of Europeanisation for EU member states (especially following the advent of the Bologna process) and the international weight of traditional actors such as Russia. At the economic level, a period of economic growth was accompanied by a modifcation of structures (the development of a market economy and the rise of the private sector) which have been mostly further affected, over the last decade, by the effects of the so-called Great Recession that hit Europe in the 2010s, not to mention the consequences of the more recent Covid-19 crisis which could not be included in our analysis. In other words, the context within which European political science has evolved, which has only been very briefy sketched here for reasons of space, has proven to be unstable and potentially highly problematic for the development of the discipline.

The chapters comprising this volume look at how Europe's political scientists have addressed these various political and economic challenges. In our network's underlying spirit of cooperation, we have added further features to this endeavour: we have chosen to avoid the common countryby-country structure of other analyses and have encouraged the contribution of comparative chapters on thematic issues. As Gelman says, 'most political scientists still believe that Europe as a political entity is more than just a conglomerate of various countries, and the same statement is relevant for political science in this part of the world' (Gel'man, 2016, p. 568). Indeed, this is the underlying approach we have adopted here, despite apparent country variations, when addressing the task of identifying the similarities and differences, developmental patterns and trends, sources of constraints and opportunities that characterise our profession. Nevertheless, we are well aware of the limitations to this undertaking, most notably the more nuanced presentation of their performance, that is, the contribution of these countries to the feld. At the same time, it can be rightly argued that frst we have to explore how the fundamental analytical components of stability, identity, legitimacy, autonomy and reproduction have been achieved in the process of institutionalisation of political science in the latecomer and peripheral countries dealt with here. On that basis, future research can examine whether the appraisal of their performance—that is, their general focus on the management of existing systems of government, insofar as they are self (nation)-centred and institution-oriented, while critical theories are almost absent (Eisfeld & Pal, 2010, p. 15)—is still valid or whether a more nuanced and more varied picture evolves over time.

Indeed, politics and political science change quickly, as shown by the different rankings of our cases and by our grouping of the countries, compared to how they were grouped in Eisfeld and Pal's volume (2010 introduction). The Balkan States (Bulgaria and Romania) and the Visegrád countries (the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, and Slovakia) are now grouped together in Chap. 5, as they now seem to be facing similar challenges in the process of institutionalisation. The post-Yugoslavia chapter (Chap. 4) includes more cases now due to the understanding that the relevance of political science has broadly increased. The post-soviet republics are now placed together with two Baltic states (post-Soviet republics themselves) in Chap. 3 in order to examine and explain the different trajectories concerned.

Altogether, in addition to the introductory and conclusive chapters (Chaps. 1, 2 and 9), this volume contains six thematic chapters where the authors aim to establish the fundamental aspects of political science's institutionalisation on the basis of country comparisons. These chapters, in addition to the specifc knowledge of the country experts involved, also build on the methodological input of the COST project as mentioned above, comprising the questionnaire, the survey and the political science database.

Table 1.1 (appendix of this chapter) offers an illustration of this endeavour. It consists of a list of 30 of contextual features for the development of

#### 12 G. ILONSZKI AND C. ROUX


#### **Table 1.1** Indicators of development of political science and context of higher education and research in selected European countries



#### **Table 1.1** (continued)


(*continued*)


#### **Table 1.1** (continued)

Source: Elaborated on various sources by Ivan Stanojević and with the help Tatsiana Chulitskaya, Irmina Matonyte and Aneta Világi ̇

Note on sources: 1. The number of institutions. Representing the number of institutions of higher education that teach political science. Source: country reports provided by the member of the COST Action CA15207. 2. The number of political scientists. Representing the number of political scientists in a country in line with the defnition adopted within the COST Action CA15207. Source: a survey conducted by the members of the action. 3. The number of female political scientists. Representing the number of female political scientists in a country in line with the defnition adopted within the COST Action CA15207. Source: a survey conducted by the members of the action. 4. The number of political sciences and civics students in tertiary education in 2017. Source: Eurostat [educ\_uoe\_enrt03] (https://appsso. eurostat.ec.europa.eu/nui/show.do?dataset=educ\_uoe\_enrt03&lang=en accessed on 07.02.2020). 5. The number of female political sciences and civics students in tertiary education in 2017. Source: Eurostat [educ\_uoe\_enrt03] https://appsso.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/nui/show.do?dataset=educ\_uoe\_ enrt03&lang=en accessed on 07.02.2020). 6. The number of doctoral students of political science in 2017. Source: Eurostat [educ\_uoe\_enrt03] (https://appsso.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/nui/show. do?dataset=educ\_uoe\_enrt03&lang=en accessed on 07.02.2020). 7. The number of female doctoral students of political science in 2017. Source: Eurostat [educ\_uoe\_enrt03] https://appsso.eurostat.ec. europa.eu/nui/show.do?dataset=educ\_uoe\_enrt03&lang=en accessed on 07.02.2020). 8. Intramural R&D expenditure (GERD) in all sectors (business enterprise sector, government sector, higher education sector and private non-proft sector), presented as a percentage of gross domestic product (GDP). Source: Eurostat [rd\_e\_gerdtot] (https://appsso.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/nui/submitViewTableAction.do). 9. Intramural R&D expenditure (GERD) in the higher education sector, presented as a percentage of gross domestic product (GDP). Source: Eurostat [rd\_e\_gerdtot] (https://appsso.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/nui/ submitViewTableAction.do). 10. Tertiary education expenditure. Spending on tertiary education as a percentage of GDP. Source: OECD (https://data.oecd.org/eduresource/education-spending.

(*continued*)


#### **Table 1.1** (continued)

htm#indicator-chart accessed on 07.02.2020). 11. Long-term funding trends. The higher education systems under review follow various long-term funding trajectories over the period 2008–2017. However, several groups of systems that follow similar patterns can be identifed: 'sustained growth', 'sustained decline' and 'improving patterns'. This categorisation is relative since the scale of variation may differ signifcantly across various countries and throughout the period. Source: Bennetot Pruvot, Enora, Thomas Estermann & Valentina Lisi. 2019. "Public Funding Observatory Report 2018". European University Association: 8. https://eua.eu/downloads/publications/eua%20pfo%202018%20report\_14%20 march%202019\_fnal.pdf accessed on 07.02.2020). 12. Long-term fnancial and demographic pressures. Different trends in public funding and student enrolment for the systems with data in place for the period 2008–2017. 'Frontrunners' and 'growing systems under pressure' mean that both number of students and funding are increasing. In frontrunner countries, the increase in funding is outpacing the increasing number of students. On the other hand, in growing systems under pressure, the increasing number of students is outpacing the increase in funding. Countries 'in transition' have increased funding, but the decreasing number of students. 'Shrinking systems' and 'declining systems under pressure' have both declining levels of funding and the number of students. In the shrinking system countries, the number of students is decreasing faster than the level of funding. Contrarily, in declining systems under pressure, the trends are the opposite. Finally, we have 'systems in danger' in which the number of students is increasing, while the level of funding is decreasing. Source: Bennetot Pruvot, Enora, Thomas Estermann & Valentina Lisi. 2019. "Public Funding Observatory Report 2018". European University Association: 12. https:// eua.eu/downloads/publications/eua%20pfo%202018%20report\_14%20march%202019\_final.pdf accessed on 07.02.2020). 13. Public funding to public universities and GDP growth. Comparing the average real GDP growth rate and the average real funding growth rate over the period 2008–2017 makes it possible to identify some general patterns: Investment above economic growth—refers to the most 'committed' systems, which increased their investment in public universities at a larger scale than their current economic growth. Investment below economic growth—refers to countries which seem to have some unused margin for manoeuvre, as the investment level remains lower than GDP growth over the period. Investment despite economic decline—countries that have proved their commitment to investing in higher education despite the overall economic decline during the period. Disinvestment despite economic growth—countries reduced funding for universities despite the overall positive GDP growth. Disinvestment greater than economic decline—this group is characterised by funding cuts against the economic decline. Source: Bennetot Pruvot, Enora, Thomas Estermann & Valentina Lisi. 2019. "Public Funding Observatory Report 2018". European University Association: 16. https://eua.eu/downloads/ publications/eua%20pfo%202018%20report\_14%20march%202019\_fnal.pdf accessed on 07.02.2020). 14. Long-term developments in university staff. Different groups of systems according to the changes in the number of students and staff (academic and non-academic) over the period 2008–2017. Source: Bennetot Pruvot, Enora, Thomas Estermann & Valentina Lisi. 2019. "Public Funding Observatory Report 2018". European University Association: 20. (https://eua.eu/downloads/publications/eua%20 pfo%202018%20report\_14%20march%202019\_fnal.pdf accessed on 07.02.2020). 15. New doctorate graduates. Normalized country performance in 2018 relative to that of the EU in 2018. Source: Hollanders, Hugo, Nordine Es-Sadki & Iris Markelback. 2019. "European Innovation Scoreboard". European Commission. 16. Population with tertiary education. Normalized country performance in 2018 relative to that of the EU in 2018. Source: Hollanders, Hugo, Nordine Es-Sadki & Iris Markelback. 2019. "European Innovation Scoreboard". European Commission. 17. International scientifc copublications. Normalized country performance in 2018 relative to that of the EU in 2018. Source: Hollanders, Hugo, Nordine Es-Sadki & Iris Markelback. 2019. "European Innovation Scoreboard". European Commission. 18. Most cited publications. Normalized country performance in 2018 relative to that of the EU in 2018. Source: Hollanders, Hugo, Nordine Es-Sadki & Iris Markelback. 2019. "European Innovation Scoreboard". European Commission. 19. Foreign doctoral students. Normalized country performance in 2018 relative to that of the EU in 2018. Source: Hollanders, Hugo, Nordine Es-Sadki & Iris Markelback. 2019. "European Innovation Scoreboard". European Commission. 20. Overall innovation score. The performance of European and neighbouring countries' innovation systems. Source: Hollanders, Hugo, Nordine Es-Sadki & Iris Markelback. 2019. "European Innovation Scoreboard". European Commission. 21. Horizon 2020 EU net contribution. Contribution of the EU to the Horizon 2020 participants in the country, in millions of euro. Source: European Commission. (https://webgate. ec.europa.eu/dashboard/sense/app/93297a69-09fd-4ef5-889f-b83c4e21d33e/sheet/a879124bbfc3-493f-93a9-34f0e7fba124/state/analysis accessed on 07.02.2020). 22. Horizon 2020 participations. The number of organisations participating in Horizon 2020, per country. Source: European Commission. (https://webgate.ec.europa.eu/dashboard/sense/app/93297a69-09fd-4ef5-889fb83c4e21d33e/sheet/a879124b-bfc3-493f-93a9-34f0e7fba124/state/analysis accessed on 07.02.2020). 23. Public funding to public universities. Presented as a percentage of GDP. Source: "Public Funding Observatory—Country Sheets". European University Association. March 2019. (https://eua. eu/component/attachments/attachments.html?id=2057 accessed on 07.02.2020). 24. The funding trends. The change between the current level of funding compared to the level in 2008. Depending on data available, the start and the end year may vary. Please see the publication for more details. Source: "Public Funding Observatory—Country Sheets". European University Association. March 2019. (https://eua.eu/component/attachments/attachments.html?id=2057 accessed on 07.02.2020). 25. Student numbers. The total number of university students (all degrees, FTEs) in 2017. Depending on data available, the year of the latest number may vary. Please see the publication for more details. Source: "Public Funding Observatory—Country Sheets". European University Association. March 2019. (https://eua.eu/component/attachments/attachments.html?id=2057 accessed on 07.02.2020). 26. Student demographics. The change in the number of students from 2008/9 to 2016/17. Depending on data available, the start and the end year may vary. Please see the publication for more details. Source: "Public Funding Observatory—Country Sheets". European University Association. March 2019. (https://eua.eu/component/attachments/attachments.html?id=2057 accessed on 07.02.2020). 27. University staff. Total number of academic and non-academic staff employed. Depending on the country, the number may represent a different group of universities included (i.e. only public universities or all universities). Please see the publication for more details. Source: "Public Funding Observatory—Country Sheets". European University Association. March 2019. (https://eua.eu/component/attachments/ attachments.html?id=2057 accessed on 07.02.2020). 28. Academic staff demographics. The change in the number of people employed as academic staff between 2008/9 to 2016/17. Depending on data available, the start and the end year may vary. Please see the publication for more details. Source: "Public Funding Observatory—Country Sheets". European University Association. March 2019. (https://eua. eu/component/attachments/attachments.html?id=2057 accessed on 07.02.2020). 29. Non-academic staff demographics. The change in the number of people employed as non-academic staff between 2008/9 to 2016/17. Depending on data available, the start and the end year may vary. Please see the publication for more details. Source: "Public Funding Observatory—Country Sheets". European University Association. March 2019. (https://eua.eu/component/attachments/attachments. html?id=2057 accessed on 07.02.2020). 30. Country status. *Freedom in the World 2019* evaluates the state of freedom in 195 countries and 14 territories during calendar year 2018. Each country and territory is assigned between 0 and 4 points on a series of 25 indicators, for an aggregate score of up to 100. These scores are used to determine two numerical ratings, for political rights and civil liberties, with a rating of 1 representing the most free conditions and 7 the least free. A country or territory's political rights and civil liberties ratings then determine whether it has an overall status of free, partly free or not free. Source: "Freedom in the World 2019″. Freedom House. (https://freedomhouse.org/sites/default/fles/ Feb2019\_FH\_FITW\_2019\_Report\_ForWeb-compressed.pdf accessed on 08.02.2020). 31. Political rights and civil liberties change in 2019. Freedom in the World Aggregate Score. Source: "Freedom in the World 2019″. Freedom House. (https://freedomhouse.org/sites/default/fles/Feb2019\_FH\_ FITW\_2019\_Report\_ForWeb-compressed.pdf accessed on 08.02.2020)

political science in the 16 countries under scrutiny in the book. It provides some basic information about the discipline and it adds important contextual factors demonstrating the academic environment in which political science operates. One can observe two substantial features—one is diversity between the countries and the other the challenges that virtually each country must face. As to the former particularly in terms of long-term demographic and fnancial perspectives, the country differences are huge. For example, Belarus and Serbia are clearly under threat, and with the exception of Croatia and Iceland, university student and staff numbers tend to decline. While funding, international connectedness, and academic performance indicators again show country differences in most countries, they are the expressions of constraints. These shortcomings and even failing patterns will provide the background of the institutionalisation of political science in the comparative chapters of the book.

# 3 Plan of the Book

The book is organised as follows. Chapter 2 by Gabriella Ilonszki offers a theoretical framework with which to address the issue of institutionalisation. Rather than using the work in a loose metaphoric manner, she has anchored our refections on the discipline to the broader debate so that our work may beneft from those insights provided by the various institutionalist traditions. This allows us to build a basis for the empirical elements that the other chapters are based upon. In Chap. 3, Tatsiana Chulitskaya Dangis Gudelis, Irmina Matonyte and Serghei Sprincean shed light on the transformation of the profession in post-Soviet Belarus, Estonia, Lithuania and Moldova. This is perhaps the chapter that most clearly shows how context infuences institutionalisation opportunities as well as the very existence of the discipline. Chapter 4, written by Davor Boban and Ivan Stanojević, focuses on the case of former Yugoslavia: how the different parts of a once-united country, that subsequently gave rise to separate nation states, has managed the development of political science? Have shared traditions led to lasting similarities? Or have the separate paths followed by each new state produced signifcant differences? The authors claim that Yugoslavia, where early institutional innovation was more important than in other parts of Communist Europe, has resulted in the second scenario for the following reasons, which they carefully analyse here: a lack of fnancial resources, the infuence of Europeanisation, the existence of authoritarian trends and the importance of private institutions in some areas, all of which have combined to produce a fragmented landscape whose further development is rather unpredictable. As a partial rejoinder, in Chap. 5, Aneta Világi, Darina Malová and Dobrinka Kostova assess the situation of political science in six countries where it appears to be under attack as such. They show that after an initial phase of development, the situation slowly worsened and political scientists, along with other academics, were attacked for who they are—or rather for what they are depicted as being and doing. In Chap. 6, Eva Marín Hlynsdóttir and Irmina Matonyte analyse the institutionalisation process in 'small states' (Estonia, Malta, Iceland and Slovenia). The underlying observation they make is that the lack of resources, often indicated as a key factor limiting the development of the discipline, is not always just a matter of geographical location. Size, mostly in terms of population, is an interesting issue. In Chap. 7, Gabriella Ilonszki, Davor Boban and Dangis Gudelis look at the question of relevance by comparing Hungary, Croatia and Lithuania. They show that changing legitimacy is a major factor in how the profession becomes relevant. In Chap. 8, Erkki Berndston tackles the issue of internationalisation. This chapter demonstrates that although there are currently several active European political science associations—the European Consortium for Political Research (ECPR), the European Political Science Association (EPSA) and the European Confederation of Political Science Associations (ECPSA)—the latecomer political science communities have a limited presence of. The book's concluding chapter (Chap. 9 by Christophe Roux) looks at the general trends that emerge from the work of the book's authors and underlines the importance of the challenges ahead.

# References


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# The Institutionalisation of Political Science in ECE: The Grounding of Theory

*Gabriella Ilonszki*

# 1 Introduction

The goal of this chapter is to establish a theoretical framework regarding the institutionalisation of political science as an academic discipline, by building on the experiences of 16 selected countries. There is substantial literature dealing with the question of institutionalisation, but the concept itself is rarely defned, or it is used in a loose manner with regard to how a discipline becomes established. The present chapter tries to rectify this not only by creating the aforesaid theoretical framework but also by linking it to concrete evidence from the selected latecomer and/or peripheral political science communities. A common theoretical frame, sound evidencebased research, and a comparative approach will hopefully contribute to the literature on the institutionalisation of our profession. Furthermore, while the question in itself of how this academic feld is being developed is a challenging one, our focus might provide some insight into the institutionalisation of disciplines in general.

G. Ilonszki (\*)

Department of Political Science, Corvinus University of Budapest, Budapest, Hungary e-mail: gabriella.ilonszki@uni-corvinus.hu

<sup>©</sup> The Author(s) 2022 25 G. Ilonszki, C. Roux (eds.), *Opportunities and Challenges for New and Peripheral Political Science Communities*, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-79054-7\_2

The country case selection is justifed on several grounds, as explained in Chap. 1. Within this group, in the large majority of cases, political science only became an established discipline in the 1990s. However, it does not necessarily follow that they followed identical pre- or postdemocratisation paths, and thus similar patterns of institutionalisation of the discipline. In some countries, political science had been established to some extent during the communist period (Croatia and Poland). Other countries are still struggling to establish the profession (Belarus and Moldova), while others still, due to their size and geographically remote position, are rightly classifed as 'latecomers' as well, even though they seem to be following West European patterns with regard to the development of the discipline (Malta and Iceland). These differences within the selected group of cases represent an important comparative asset. Also, the performance and academic visibility of these countries still lags behind that of the 'older' cases, which contributes to the problem of institutionalisation: what brings success and what accounts for and aids performance? Does the latecomer and/or peripheral status of such countries itself provide an explanation?

There are three clearly defned problem areas concerning the state of political science in these countries that go beyond their geographical location and exacerbate the problem of the discipline's institutionalisation. These are the problems of catching up, integration and relevance.

The frst one speaks for itself: how can the latecomers catch up with the Western forerunners? From an internal point of view, this is what Hankiss has called the 'catching up neurosis' (Hankiss, 2002, p. 19), that is, the question of whether these countries are ready to offer proper political science on the basis of what they have. From an external perspective, the problem seemed a more practical one. While Klingemann (2008) argued that '… after the breakdown of Communist regimes, Central and Eastern Europe is catching up' (Klingemann, 2008, p. 389), he also admitted that 'more information is needed about the institutionalization of political science in Central and Eastern Europe' (Klingemann, 2008, p. 379; see also Klingemann et al., 2002). It is commonly understood that political science is a science of democracy, in the sense that democracy is both a required framework for, and the focus of attention of, political science. As Easton et al. (1995) argue: 'political science does exist in non-democracies, but their nature has been transparently different' (p. 3). Nevertheless, can the democratic requisite account for the success or failure of the profession in real terms? Thirty years after the democratic breakthrough in many formerly communist countries, it seems that the initial creation and growth of the profession have not been accompanied by a similar degree of institutionalisation, and thus will not automatically lead to the discipline catching up with that in other Western countries. Both systemic aspects—that is, the state of democracy—and pragmatic aspects—like the availability of human and fnancial resources—can be considered to provide an answer to the frst question.

Secondly, how can the latecomer and/or peripheral political science communities be integrated into the more established ones? Catching up and integration are two distinct phenomena and as such need to be examined separately. Catching up focuses on the comparative aspect, that is, on whether levelling prevails in the process of institutionalisation; integration, on the other hand, refers to how patterns of cooperation develop. Naturally, the two concepts are interconnected, as internationalisation and partnership require equal standing of those involved. Nevertheless, even within Western Europe, political science is not integrated fully: common standards prevail in regard to certain key aspects, particularly professional training and education, while differences continue to exist in terms of performance, visibility and resources (Meny, 2010). We would expect this to be true of our selected country group. It is easier, and even required by EU policy governing EU member states, to develop common standards in training and education; other aspects of integration, however, depend on more nuanced opportunities arising at the country level (Plesu, ̧ 2002).

Finally, how relevant is political science in the countries under consideration? It could be said that the issue of relevance has been a persistent problem for political science since it frst appeared as an accepted academic discipline in educational institutions; in other words, there has always been this problem of how to talk about and explain politics while not acting as a demagogue or prophet (Weber, 1918). In more recent times, the main question became that of how to be a useful, practice-oriented profession capable of going beyond the mere promotion of 'good citizenship and better government' (Ricci, 1984, p. 70). This issue emerged more forcefully when external demands began to increase. Educational managers, policy-makers and politicians want returns for 'their' investment, and as such they tend to dispute the relevance of political science. The political science profession in the West repeatedly put forward requirements for a relevant science capable of addressing a broad audience, of ensuring quality performance, of promoting civic culture, and of connecting research to the extra-educational realm (for a conclusive summary, see Stoker et al., 2018). These relevance requirements presuppose a well-established, properly functioning, resourceful science. How can relevance be acquired by the members of the latecomer country group?

Initially, with the process of democratisation, it seemed that political science automatically and immediately became relevant; that is, it could talk to people and they could listen to it. However, a 'bottleneck' soon appeared. While politicians in general do not like to hear the truth, during the pre-democratic period, this was even more so, and consequently, practice-oriented research and education were not well developed. Moreover, in some new democracies, political scientists tend to refrain from any engagement with politics as a result of former negative experiences. At the same time, institutional constraints on academia increase in the latecomer country group as well, and the 'expectation gap' (Flinders, 2018) widens here too. Overall, while this debate mostly appears within a 'Western context', it has similar implications in our selected country group. The way in which different patterns in this regard develop remains to be seen.

With these three main issues forming the background, in the following sections, we shall frst establish the institutionalisation concept supporting the comparative approach adopted in the book, followed by the suggested institutionalisation frame. In the last section, we shall discuss the potential implications of this framework for the institutionalisation of the East Central European (ECE) country group.

# 2 Approaching the Institutionalisation Concept

This section will introduce the major defnitional issues that frame the concept of the institutionalisation of political science. Whether a discipline is institutionalised revolves around three issues: the process, that is, how institutionalisation develops; the outcome, that is, which properties appear indispensable if a discipline is to be institutionalised; and lastly, what contextual factors are essential in infuencing either process or property. After presenting the dilemma of the concept of institutionalisation itself, we shall then outline its context-driven substance.

# *2.1 The Dilemma: Process and Property*

The dilemma of concept building is that it is not enough to defne an outcome demonstrating that a discipline has been institutionalised, as the process of institutionalisation has equal value in understanding whether the discipline is institutionalised or not. The two cannot be separated: the processes will lead to certain institutional outcomes that we call properties, while the outcome will have an impact on how the process continues, as institutionalisation is constant (Peters, 1999, p. 67). Even a settled, well-functioning discipline needs to respond and adapt to new challenges, and thus, the process leading to a certain outcome should and would continue. For example, we can argue that institutional stability is necessary for a discipline to function properly, but stability is not a static property and thus the process of adaptation will continue in order to achieve a renewed, transformed stability. The process resulting in this institutionalised outcome and regularly shaping it becomes part of the concept: the process of institutionalisation and the outcome of this process are closely intertwined, and inform us of the institutionalised nature of a profession.

Paradoxically, while institutionalisation is a widely used concept, it is nevertheless not easy to grasp. As DiMaggio & Powell observe (1991) 'scholars who have written about institutions have often been rather casual about defning them; institutionalism has disparate meanings in different disciplines' (p. 1). This vagueness is not accidental: it is not only due to the presence of several schools in the feld but also due to the complex nature of the concept. The institutionalisation of a discipline requires similar and different analytical approaches as the 'general' concept of institutionalisation (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983); therefore, we should adopt here the general concept fexibly. We are going to follow a deductive approach based on a critical review of the literature (Brady, 2001; DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; Eisenstadt, 1968; March & Olsen, 1984; North, 1991; Pierson, 2000; Peters & Pierre, 1998; DiMaggio & Powell, 1991).

Despite the complexity of the concept, a review of the literature shall enable us to establish which features—we shall call them properties—are indispensable for a settled, duly functioning discipline, and which institutionalisation properties are required if political science is to be considered institutionalised. In view of the relevant literature, we have selected those properties that embody institutional outcomes that are essential if the profession is to enjoy a healthy existence. As for the relevant, indispensable institutional outcomes, the properties of *stability*, *identity, autonomy*, *reproduction and legitimacy* have been defned and will be introduced in detail in Sect. 2.3. These are the features that embody a well-institutionalised science: one that should have stable existential patterns, a clear academic identity and profle; one that should be able to independently defne its own rules and norms while getting external agents to accept them, and be able to ensure its own reproduction and to establish and maintain a legitimate position in the smaller or larger outside world.

As mentioned above, the same properties of institutionalisation can have different connotations in different subject matters. This does not exclude them from the 'property list', but simply signifes that although institutionalisation theories can be applied throughout different subject matters, the measurement and implications of the properties may operate differently. For example: Huntington (1965), writing on political development, mentioned stability as a property which makes a political system well-institutionalised. In keeping with other writings, we shall also regard stability as a property of institutionalised political science. Without this feature, it is diffcult to imagine that this feld of science (or indeed any science) can accommodate and adjust to diverse external challenges and can envisage valid prospects for the future. Nevertheless, while Huntington claims that the more complicated the organisation, the more highly institutionalised it is, that is 'complexity produces stability', from the perspective of our science this is not necessarily the case. More complexity might be a source of fragmentation—as when new subfelds within the feld of political science (such as international relations, gender studies or methods) eventually aim to establish their own separate institutional framework (departments, research centres, programmes, etc.) and thus challenge the original stability.

Paradoxically, while institutionalisation properties seem to be constant, in the sense that they are recurrently mentioned and accepted by the institutionalisation literature irrespective of their subject matter, they bear a powerful degree of internal dynamism. The dynamism of the concept emerges in the connection between institutionalisation properties and the process of institutionalisation. The process qualifes institutionalisation while being part of it. For example, whether the institutionalisation process is incremental or occurs as a breakthrough, is top down or bottom up, whether there are many or few actors involved in the process—and ultimately who they are—will all be decisive aspects of institutionalisation and will add to the property itself. Using the 'stability' example once again: under the assumption that for the purposes of stability, dynamic adjustment potentials are inevitable and incremental changes tend to promote adaptive steps, it seems important to establish whether the process represents a breakthrough or is one of incremental change. Political science institutions may be more stable and more resilient if they are the result of a number of adaptive steps in a longer process. The process, even if not as enjoyable as March & Olsen claim (1984, p. 741), is certainly at least as fundamental as the property itself to an understanding of the institutionalised nature of a profession. The process and the property are diffcult to completely separate. In connecting the institutionalisation process with given institutionalised positions, the diffculty lies in the fact that both are dynamic: the former genuinely so and the latter due to its inherently composite nature.

Even a well-institutionalised science has to adapt due to internal and external demands and requirements; that is, it constantly changes in response to new challenges. These new challenges will trigger the transformation of the institutionalised framework. This process can be described as a series of discrete events or as a continuum of learning and adaptation; the way in which the process is more easily grasped is once again telling about institutionalisation. This mirrors Peters' approach (1999), according to which: 'In some ways the process of institutionalisation appears to be a two-step process. First, there must be some conscious decision to create an organization or institution for a specifc purpose. The second stage appears to be then to fashion the institution over time' (Peters, 1999, pp. 32–33). A few fundamental changes could imply different institutionalisation patterns and outcome from those produced by several incremental changes developing along a continuum. Indeed, the process often seems to be more interesting and more important to an understanding of institutionalisation than the outcome itself. In addition to the institutionalisation dilemma, that is, the delicate and complex relationship between process and property, there is also a third question, namely that of whether context is of functional importance to the formation of an institutionalised discipline. In other words, whether context impacts the process of institutionalisation and the development of properties.

#### *2.2 The Context: Structures, Norms and Agents*

The second set of conceptual questions concerns the fundamental rationale of institutionalisation: why does it happen in the way it does and what contextual factors we should consider as explanations for its occurrence? The assumption that institutional change and transformation, and institutionalisation per se, can be explained in functional terms, and that it represents a straightforward, one-way process, falls short of reality. In principle, institutions are created to fulfl certain goals; however, new aspects could well trigger a re-interpretation of how to achieve a goal, due to the transformation of the context. An example could be how one of the profession's fundamental goals, that of establishing a clear identity for itself and thus making the profession visible, can be re-interpreted as a new context takes shape following the restructuring of universities for fnancial reasons or in consideration of other policy goals. The aim of establishing separate political science departments might be given up if identity can be ensured by means other than that of exclusive, functionally separate academic units. This example illustrates how context offers an adaptive interpretation that goes beyond a direct functional approach (Pierson, 2000). Rather, the complex consideration of structures, norms and agents—as context—may account for institutional change.

The profession itself can be rightly regarded as a context which infuences its own institutionalisation as such. According to the typology formulated by Hodgson (2006), science is particularly *agent sensitive*, and we can rightly assume that political science, with its ethos-prone, self-refective attitudes, is a clear case of an agent-sensitive science. Political science literature has identifed several other features of the profession which may have an effect on its institutionalisation, namely the rural quality of political science (the small number of agents and organisations); its nature as a soft science (having no strict scientifc method); its pure science features (having no practical application); and its divergent/variegated character (its unclear specifc identity; Becher & Trowler, 2001; Capano & Verzichelli, 2016). This approach, however, deserves further consideration. For one, these specifcities change over time: in the past 20 years or so, the number of political science schools, students and academic staff has increased, although the country group under consideration here is varied in this regard: time period differences and country differences can be observed within this group. Moreover, the discipline's development in terms of its methodological skills and its practice-oriented focus would appear to challenge some of the aforementioned features of the political science profession.

At the same time, in other respects, the nature of the profession does indeed matter and has implications on its institutionalisation: in particular, political science's 'inception conditions', that is its connectedness to democracy and its strong ethos. On these grounds, political science is more exposed to changing context than most other academic felds. In the more established, 'older' political science communities, the ethos debate seems to accompany the relevance debate mentioned above: that is, the question of establishing the tasks of our science, and how it can perform new tasks. The institutionalisation of political science is affected by context due to its openness, and to some degree vulnerability, to the broad societal–political context. Only in extreme cases can we imagine that a linguist or an art historian will be affected by the "expectations" of decision-makers or their political clientele. This is not true of political science, where such expectations are important, and in new democracies, political change or democracy defcits could have consequences for its institutionalisation potential.

Finally, time is an important, complex aspect when trying to understand institutionalisation, not only in the sense described above (*when* does institutionalisation start) but also with regard to the length of certain momentums and how these are situated and structured in and over time. This leads us back to the understanding of institutionalisation as a process. The triggering events, the incremental or fundamental changes, that have defned the development of political science, should be clearly set out. Situating these steps in time will provide information about institutionalisation and will be a cure for the problem of circularity, a frequently raised criticism of institutionalisation theory (Peters & Pierre, 1998). Connecting changes (including types of changes) to time will mean that causal explanations of institutionalisation will be clear, and causal sequences can be introduced. Otherwise, with no clear time perspective, the process of institutionalisation will remain blurred, while causes, consequences and corrective steps will remain unidentifed, and consequently, it will be impossible to properly assess the state of institutionalisation.

In addition to the profession itself and the time frame, a large number of external conditions infuence the institutionalisation of professions. These external conditions are the institutions themselves, not only structures or organisational units, but also norms, procedures and behaviour (North, 1991). Ranging from legal provisions to the organisation of higher education, diverse structures determine the developmental route of a discipline; however, these are built on norms and rules, and their interconnections cannot be distinguished. The structures are established by different *actors* who interpret structural transformation and norms as well, since 'Human actions, social contexts, and institutions work upon each other in complicated ways' (March & Olsen, 1984, p. 742). To reiterate the starting point of this section: this is context per se.

# 3 Institutionalisation—Properties, Indicators and Measures

As explained in the above sections, institutionalisation is achieved in the form of certain outcomes/properties. Table 2.1 illustrates this framework in the form of the fve properties based on a review of the literature, namely stability, identity, autonomy, reproduction and legitimacy. The table then presents the indicators of the existence of said properties, followed by the measures by which the relevance/degree/presence/absence of the indicator can be demonstrated. These indicators defne the institutionalisation properties in their ideal forms, while the measures reveal the advancement of said indicators. Potentially, this framework can help


**Table 2.1** Properties and indicators of institutionalisation

Source: Author's own framework. Thanks to V. Anghel for her initial input

describe real cases and make comparisons possible either between cases or in regard to one case at different periods of time.

Below, we briefy introduce the question of how to apply the properties and the indicators for the purposes of analysis.

#### *3.1 Stability*

Stability is a crucial property: stability and how stability is acquired and maintained are essential, as without stable patterns it is impossible to work out adaptation strategies, prospects are uncertain, and uncertainty can undermine the healthy working of the discipline. Only a stable framework can ensure that those inside feel safe, that prospects are visible, and that the necessary adaptive steps can be considered. Stability does not imply a rigid, unchanging framework, however. Uncertainty—whether political uncertainty at the systemic level or simply a shortage of information about the policy and structural changes that impact the profession's prospects undermines stability and affects the entire institutionalisation process. Stability cannot be expected or guaranteed if the agents concerned are uncertain about the time frame of their planned setup or if the new setup can be easily changed by external actors (Pierson, 2000).

Stability is dynamic, has an inherent liveliness and contains a constant process of adaptation to new challenges. If the profession fails to adapt and to respond to new demands, then its institutionalised character will be threatened. This also implies that a mere collection of static data will not provide a correct picture of how stable or institutionalised the profession is. The measures should be dynamic and should be interpreted comparatively. For example, in a small country where there is no room for a large number of educational units or PhD programmes, if political science's academic reproduction remains safe and is not challenged by imponderable changes, then the feld can be rightly regarded as institutionalised. While size and growth are often regarded as fundamental components of institutionalisation (Becher & Trowler, 2001, p. 14), they do not equate to it.

There are a number of measures that can be used to demonstrate whether stability has been achieved. These include the lifetime of institutions, the frequency of structural reform in higher education, and in particular, the impact of such reform on the existence of political science as an academic discipline. Within this framework, the transformation of the university per se can be a measure of stability: that is, a measure of whether it promotes the stability of political science in academia at all. The stability or fuctuation of student numbers will also affect stability. We should bear in mind, however, that these measures are not always independent variables, as will be the case with other measures as well. For example, student numbers are not simply a question of demographics: they can be promoted/curtailed by tuition fee policies, by the comparative advantages/ disadvantages of other academic subjects and the aura surrounding the profession itself. This confrms our observation regarding the importance of time to our understanding of the profession's level of institutionalisation: it is important to establish whether student numbers fuctuate due to demographics (in which case corrective measures can be introduced, and consequently, the stability and institutionalised nature of the profession would persist) or due to unfavourable, or even unpredictable, policies that appear to threaten institutionalisation.

#### *3.2 Identity*

Regarding the profession's identity, the basic expectation is that the distinctiveness of the profession be established in organisational, academic and personal terms. From the organisational perspective, this would require academic units that are visible and distinct from adjacent disciplines, or political science associations that are based on the norms of the profession and are able to demonstrate its identity. Identity will elevate the prestige of the discipline and will promote its further progress. Academic identity will also contribute to the self-esteem of the insiders, that is, of political scientists themselves. Group identity would give the discipline and the persons involved a higher status (Larson, 2018).

Nevertheless, as a previously mentioned example shows, distinctiveness can be achieved through diverse measures and not only by means of separate organisational units. The process of identity formation does not exclude cooperation with other disciplines. On the contrary, very often, patterns of cooperation are clear signs that a particular discipline is needed and acknowledged by other felds. In a changing environment where new competitors or shrinking resources at university level arise, the profession's identity itself will change. Careful consideration is required, however, to establish whether fundamental aspects of the profession's focus, goals and performance have remained intact. A number of quantitative indicators can be used as measures: what patterns are there in separation from, or cooperation with, other social sciences; how do political science associations operate; and how can the visibility of the profession be improved and how can it be more easily identifable for a broader audience? These measures—indeed these questions—arise strongly in the case of most latecomer political science communities: in some places, political science has been established from scratch, separate from other academic units; in other places, it has formed within, or connected to, an established academic discipline; and in others, it has taken the place of former ideologically loaded university units. These different starting points could have had an impact on identity formation, since despite the longer timeframe, the conditions for the discipline's formation have a lasting impact on the identity of the profession even in the by now established political science communities.

Of the aforementioned indicators, national associations have a special role to play in identity formation as they can establish a common ethos and communality. Nevertheless, occasionally a profession does not take advantage of this potential for collective action. The reason for this could be their small size together with individual competitive strategies having a potentially negative impact on identity formation or the dividedness of the community, which again might be a cause for concern in newly democratising countries. The country differences will illustrate how political scientists value potential collective action, and can see the advantages in promoting the status of the profession in this way. Furthermore, the identity of the national association may tell us something about the identity of the profession itself: is it exclusively an organisation for political scientists as such, or does it include supporters and interested agents, like journalists or members of other professions? These types of difference provide an indication of the profession's identity ambitions, although these ambitions may change over time. It should come as no surprise that our country group is characterised by a large range of diverse associations, due to the recent formation and (re)-interpretation of political science's professional identity. The combination of norms, agents and structures jointly infuences institutionalisation in terms of this particular property as well.

#### *3.3 Autonomy*

Autonomy as a property of institutionalisation is possibly the most diffcult to operationalise, since the ideal of independence in important aspects of the profession's functioning is fundamentally curtailed by external agents and the context in general.

Ideally, autonomy means that the profession can independently decide to establish its own felds of research, to incorporate new subfelds into a given academic unit, and to have a say in promotion and hiring procedures. Overall, the profession should have infuence over, and be able to work out, standards governing its own institutional and individual functioning. While the measures seem to be obvious and identifable, the implementation and functioning of this institutionalisation property is highly controversial. On the one hand, the rules governing the operation of an academic discipline have become less personalised, and clear patterns have been recently established; this process has contributed to the institutionalisation of the discipline, with personal decisions and personal dependencies having been replaced by set patterns. This clearly outlined self-government, on the other hand, has been fundamentally infuenced, although not formally curtailed, by the transformation of universities as such. Universities have become increasingly dependent on external stakeholders, and these stakeholders have different ideas and preferences regarding institutional performance, expediency and effciency (Aarrevaara & Dobson, 2013). This impacts funding, which is one aspect of autonomy: without clear, secure funding, neither education nor research can fourish. The transformation of the university system started back in the 1960s and was accelerated by the advent of mass higher education. Many years ago, Wilensky (1964) pointed out that in order to preserve the autonomy of universities, their governance should remain in the hands of scientists—although he made no mention at the time of the (dysfunctional) role of managers in university governance—and that the scientists themselves should be in a strong market position. The situation is a paradoxical one: while the decisional independence of the profession, and in wealthier countries its healthy funding seem to prevail, even large entities are struggling to preserve their autonomy. These problems are clearly visible in the case of several new academic communities: the role of private institutions was particularly problematic following the democratic transition; a shortage of funding remains an issue everywhere and is often characterised by declining trends; and evaluation requirements are becoming more stringent despite the unfavourable conditions or are being established without the say of the academic community in several countries.

#### *3.4 Reproduction*

The reproduction of a discipline and the indicators regarding this property, as with institutionalisation properties, consist of organisational and individual aspects, both of which call for a certain homogeneity, otherwise the profession's reproduction will be of an uneven character. Organisational theory claims that institutionalisation necessarily points to homogenisation: in the initial stages of their life cycle, organisational felds display considerable diversity, but as an institution becomes gradually established, homogenisation follows (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983, pp. 148 ff.): the constituting units assume similar forms, as the same claims, tasks, ambitions and requirements drive them in the direction of isomorphism. Homogeneity will ensure similar standards in working conditions and other opportunity structures.

Thus, we would argue that a well-spread and organisationally homogeneous discipline will contribute to the healthy reproduction of both the organisational units and their personnel. The academic feld is strengthened if the various institutions are competitive. A good number of academic units (this number of course depends on the size of the country)—offering similar quality and thus being equally attractive to different potential audiences—will ensure the homogeneity of reproduction. The profession's organisational and personal homogeneity are intertwined, and they both sustain the reproduction of the profession. For example, a fairly well-institutionalised profession should produce a suffcient number and quality of staff spread evenly across the different institutions concerned.

Overall, on the basis of several developments ranging from global science to the Bologna process, the spread of mass education and globalisation, the expectation is that institutionalisation would point to homogeneity. However, both the broad international academic literature and reports on the state of the discipline in some more recent political science communities, express concerns in this regard (Kwiek, 2016). Homogenisation seemed more evident a generation ago, when institutional development 'followed a snakelike process' with lower-ranking institutions following the higher ranking ones, just as a snake's body follows its head. From the 1980s onwards, however, institutional diversifcation became the dominant trend (Becher & Trowler, 2001); several institutions have not followed the pattern of those leading the way, and this may well imply academic quality concerns in terms of the reproduction of the profession. We have reason to believe that in the country group examined here, similar problems prevail (Ghica, 2014). The proliferation of new institutions, particularly during the early years of democratisation, has not resulted in the homogeneity of institutions. More recently, decreasing funding and interest in a number of countries has exacerbated the problem of uneven organisational development, which undermines not only the reproduction of the discipline but also its institutionalisation as such.

Reproduction should also prevail in individual terms. If, for any reason, personnel reproduction is not guaranteed, then this could threaten the institutionalisation of the profession. The number of staff and their attributes, career patterns, PhDs and felds of activity, can act as a measure of the processes of reproduction in this regard. This individual component of reproduction is a sensitive issue in most of the countries examined in the following chapters, and it relates to how this academic feld can professionalise; that is, how a stable body of members can be established within the profession's working norms. The patterns of reproduction of personnel are often mixed in these countries. This may be the result of generational change, which is consequential both for reproduction and homogenisation, and seems to be particularly relevant in the selected group of countries considered here. A new generation with a sound education and different experiences will possibly offer different answers to the various aspects of institutionalisation than those offered by previous generations; they will possibly perceive the profession differently and show that institutionalisation requires the past to be forgotten for good (Pierson, 2000). At the same time, the reproduction of personnel is often problematic in some countries, where insuffcient opportunities within the country force individuals to emigrate in search of employment. In the absence of either institutional or personal reproduction, the political science profession as such will be under threat.

#### *3.5 Legitimacy*

Legitimacy can be regarded as the most complex property of institutionalisation and is the one with the most pronounced external component: the justifcation for, and general acceptance of, the discipline is constructed externally and will peak in its legitimation. While it is not the last stage of institutionalisation as understood in the everyday use of the word, given that the properties of institutionalisation are not arranged in a hierarchical order, nevertheless when legitimacy is achieved this implies that the profession is fully acknowledged by all the major actors concerned.

This framework includes formal/legal recognition, public recognition and recognition by the decision-makers. When the legal/formal opportunities are provided, the public recognises the profession as a result of its performance and availability, and the decision-makers acknowledge this by providing favourable conditions, then political science as a profession can be considered to have achieved legitimacy. In other words, when there is no longer any questioning of whether the profession is necessary or not, then it can be regarded as legitimate.

Despite this seemingly 'easy' defnition and measurement, it does not follow that legitimacy is uniform. It might well be that different external actors hold different views: an important clientele, namely the student body, might have more favourable views than government decisionmakers. The interaction of the different actors and the coming together of their diverse perspectives will establish different legitimacy patterns. In return, the response of the profession in terms of type of performance and type of infuence it will favour, will impact its legitimate standing.

We should recognise the fact that indicators are not irremovably separated, and occasionally some of their measures coalesce. For example, collective action is defned as one indicator of the profession's identity, and the national association of political scientists may be used as a measure of such collective action. At the same time, the professionalisation of the discipline appears to be an indicator of performance, suggesting (among other things) that the profession's working rules be taken as a measure of said professionalisation. Clearly, a properly functioning national association should also serve as a measure of the discipline's degree of professionalisation, given that it formulates the norms and rules of professionalisation. We expect that despite the occasional complexity, the general framework demonstrates the possible processes leading to institutionalisation. We intended to apply a measure just once in the framework, even though a more substantial (and lengthier) qualitative analysis may prove that the same measure can function either directly or indirectly. For example, funding is a direct measure of autonomy, since fnancial support (if guaranteed) ensures the autonomy of the profession. At the same time, funding may also appear as an indirect measure of external recognition, and recognition will likely infuence the conditions of the profession's foundation. All of this shows that there is plenty of room for the further development of the suggested framework. More specifcally, the measures shown in the table could be broadened so as to make the framework more explicit. The country chapters in the volume will certainly broaden this perspective and will establish a basis for a further, more extensive and more complex institutionalisation framework for our profession.

# 4 Theory and the Selected Country Cases

In the previous sections, the potential relevance of the problem of institutionalisation to the selected country group has been repeatedly mentioned, and institutionalisation has been problematised bearing in mind the specifc conditions of the countries in question. This section will go a step further and put forward some specifcities that may require consideration in order to fully understand institutionalisation and the state of the discipline. Formation conditions, potential starting points, stability concerns and the issue of "regionality" should all be specifcally considered.

Thirty years after the process of democratisation began, observing the state of the discipline in the selected ECE country group, it might be worth considering whether the conditions under which the discipline was established in those countries are still valid. DiMaggio and Powell (1983) claim that institutionalisation occurs in three manners. Firstly, it can be coercive, when external actors, often in the form of the State, require the creation or transformation of certain institutions. Secondly, institutionalisation can be built on normative grounds, when the main aim is to settle norms and rules. In this case, the momentum often comes from insiders. Finally, institutionalisation can be mimetic, that is, it may consist in copying, in an attempt to follow apparently useful and advantageous former institutional structures and practices. These three ways in which institutionalisation is achieved are arguably present, in a complex way, in all aspects of institutionalisation. What function do these options have in the selected country group, and how do they possibly refect the state of the discipline? The formation, and subsequently the development, of the discipline is likely structured by the triggers of this process.

External pressures are not necessarily related to actual actors: major shocks or crises can challenge the existing framework and encourage a new institutional setup, and such shocks can bring about positive outcomes. With regard to political science as a discipline, systemic change could be considered to be a positive shock that brought about opportunities to establish political science as an academic discipline. This external shock was a trigger and opportunity for the foundation of the new academic discipline. Thus, it can be argued that in the main, mimetic changes were the ones that impacted the formation of the discipline. Although there might be country differences in this regard, depending on the existence of a preparatory phase prior to the democratic 'shock', or on the presence of institutional entrepreneurs capable of actively infuencing the process, mimetic changes can be widely expected. In contrast, institutionalisation generated from inside, when the very participants and agents formulate institutionalisation demands, often in order to establish norms and rules, was possibly a rare occurrence. The understanding of these two types of pressure and their corresponding strength, remains an issue in the unfolding of the institutionalisation of political science in these countries. Are mimetic changes still decisive, and if so, how have they infuenced—if at all—the developmental trends of these countries ever since? And even more importantly: what has structured more recent developments and the institutionalisation process itself? Indeed, this latter question augments our framework: we can duly expect a more institutionalised discipline if the internal actors 'take over'. This is not simply an addendum to the autonomy of institutionalisation, since it refers to, and covers, the entire logic of the development of the discipline, that is, the route it intends to follow.

As for the formation issue, in addition to the type of change (mimetic or internally driven), the relevance of the starting point is also important. 'The process of institutionalisation always takes off from several fxed starting points … and from the concrete organizational structures in the preceding situation' (Eisenstadt, 1968, p. 415). Careful consideration needs to be given to what can be regarded as the decisive starting point. We need to identify those episodes and processes whose consequences persist and continue to infuence the institutionalisation of our time (Peters, 1999, p. 67). Otherwise, if not properly selected, the relevance of an 'imaginary' starting point will remain unclear and will not help our understanding of institutionalisation. This point is particularly important regarding this particular group of countries: to what degree, and in what ways, can the institutional take-offs during, and even before, the communist period be regarded as starting points? Generally, very little attention is paid to the pre-communist tradition or potential starting points at that time: they are no longer regarded as relevant. This is an important message in regard to the state of the profession, although it should be said that this is the case even in the more established communities: the 'relevance date' is getting closer and closer. The development of our science has accelerated, and this has not favoured the new entrants.

As for the potential legacy of the communist period, particularly in Poland and Yugoslavia, its evaluation is a controversial issue (Meny, 2010, p. 25). With regard to the starting points, a keener focus on the academic aspects rather than on the institutional ones, together with a deeper analysis, would provide a better understanding of the potential role of the starting momenta. Has this provided a context for the institutionalisation of the profession in some countries that differs from that in others? Previous research has revealed a large variation in the presence of political science during the communist period. At one extreme, possibly the most developed form of political science was to be found in Poland, which had several centres of research that were also well integrated into the international (Western) political science community (Sasinka-Klas, 2010). In Yugoslavia, on the other hand, political science-related institutions served to demonstrate the liberal inclinations of the Tito regime, while their academic output was questionable. The situation was the most meagre in the Soviet Union and, of our country cases, in Romania, Bulgaria, and the Soviet Republics of Moldova, Belarus and the Baltic states. These differences, however, are rarely evaluated in a concrete manner, and even less so from the perspective of the on-going institutionalisation, and the current state, of political science. One rare example is the conclusion reached by Gebethner and Markowski that this well-developed institutional 'past' did not help the take-off of the profession in Poland, and its development was not as visible as in countries where the profession had 'started from scratch' (Gebethner & Markowski, 2002). Careful attention needs to be paid to the question of whether legacy is an asset or a burden, and most importantly, in either case how legacy has affected the more recent development of political science. Have these potential take-off points lost their signifcance while new opportunities and constraints exercise a more fundamental impact on the institutionalisation process?

The starting point and the starting conditions both matter not only from the perspective of the past (the potential impact of legacies on institutionalisation patterns and opportunities), but also with regard to certain prospects: what kind of institutional adjustment appeared on offer and feasible at the "starting point"? In the 1990s, the newly democratising countries joined the European profession during a phase in which the main frameworks of political science had already been defned: that is, the main research questions, methodological tools, even structures of international cooperation, had been established. In our selected ECE cases, the absence of a previous, lasting academic legacy in the feld of political science, together with the rapid pace of democratic transformation, did not offer much room to refect on, or indeed reconsider, these frameworks. Most actors simply adjusted to the then-dominant themes, schools of thought and methods. As democracy was accepted as a permanent feature of the future landscape, so was political science accepted as a given without having to go back to its fundamentals. The political science communities of the newly democratic countries understandably had not been able to participate in the main formative period of the discipline during the 1960s and 1970s, which were the years that really transformed the profession (Rose, 1990). We could argue in general that this initial situation may have a lasting impact on the formation of political science. Given that the initial institutional decisions made tend to stick (North, 1991), can we then assume that the frst patterns of adjustment will also persist? The time dimension potentially matters in the process of institutionalisation not only with regard to momentum (when the new countries joined the political science academia in the more established ones), but also with regard to the speed of institutionalisation, and this is again a specifcity of the ECE country group. In the older academic communities, the discipline frst developed over a much longer time period. In contrast, in our chosen group of countries, the shortage of time simply added to the diffculties encountered. After its initial formative steps, political science had to face challenges that were either unknown to the countries with a wellestablished political science discipline, or if they did exist then they did not overlap with one another in time, and it was possible to refect on them subsequently in several stages. For example, in the ECE countries, the enormous increase in student numbers was accompanied by the entry of market forces into the sphere of higher education. The institutionalisation tasks had to be dealt with in a 'compressed period of time': paradoxically, academia faced the free world of opportunities and established patterns and adjustment requirements at one and the same time.

A further particularity is the persistent instability witnessed in most of the countries examined here. Although the proposed theoretical approach aims to be dynamic and incorporate the broad context, and although political science, indeed any science, is never static forever, it is inevitable that in order to establish a degree of institutionalisation of the profession, a certain minimum stability of context is required. On the contrary, however, the evolution of political science in the selected ECE country group has been taking place within the context of constant, profound diffculties and, at times, of real crises. The post-transition years were turbulent for all of the countries concerned. A couple of countries went into war in the frst years of their new regimes; furthermore, the external world, mainly in the form of EU accession and what this implied in terms of ambitions in higher education, and also what it offered in terms of academic opportunities, represented substantial challenges. Altogether, stability was diffcult to achieve in such circumstances. This leads us back to a previous point, namely that in uncertain times we can expect to see mimetic changes in institutional development, as those inside are rarely in a position to make informed decisions, or we can expect to witness external triggers coming from external agents and decision-makers. Is it in any way justifable to expect to see similar institutionalisation processes and particular outcomes under these conditions, as those witnessed in more established political science communities? The book's comparative chapters, when focussing on these issues, will refect on the impact of external overload, be this due to a lack of stability or to other local or national characteristics.

The question remains as to whether the institutional development of political science is driven more by the growing internal triggers formed within, and by, the profession, or by inherited triggers, or even by evolving external triggers, and can we expect to see country differences in regard to such? A brief examination of this question already shows that country differences will be as numerous as country similarities. The function and role of the profession, as opposed to those of external triggers, in handling instability will very much depend on the local state of the feld when a new crisis (the source of instability), or fresh impetus from external agents, presents a challenge to the discipline. The profession's response may well depend on how far the institutionalisation process has gone, and how deeply the properties in question are embedded. For example, a profession with a stronger identity will be able to force through corrective measures for the sake of the profession, and will be more capable of infuencing institutional development in its own interest. On the other hand, a profession that for some reason is later in developing and is lagging behind in the institutionalisation process, will probably handle the recurring challenges increasingly less effectively.

These assumed, and often noted, differences within the country group, lead us to the question of the extent to which we can regard the post-communist countries as an entity, and whether it is justifed at all to regard those countries' post-communist features as their *differentia specifca*. Without doubt, in terms of the state of political science, they all shared some common ground, that is, they all re-emerged from a period in which they were governed by a political regime that did not permit the development of political science as such, or only allowed it to exist under substantial constraints. Overall, the communist region had been regarded as a unifed entity before its political transformation in 1989–1990, although substantial differences among such countries already existed at that time. The different starting points of the discipline should not be neglected, and the following decades were no less diversifed. As Eisfeld and Pal (2010) argue, frst 'The variety of transition from communism, different in ideological and institutional consequences, clearly affected the evolving political studies discipline (p. 11) and later the "hybridisation" of these regimes pushed them toward less homogeneity internally', hybridisation meaning diverse departures from the democratisation process or the regimes' democratic credentials. Although eventually they challenge this assumption regarding the possible correlation between democratic departures and political science approaches (p. 15), a decade later we can duly claim that their original viewpoints regarding the differences between countries and the connection between the regimes' political inclinations and political science opportunities, are justifed. It remains to be seen how these developments continue to affect political science as an academic discipline. Is politics an infuential factor in the institutionalisation opportunities present in ECE? Was there a decisive democratic threshold after all, or are there new thresholds that academia should re-cross? The chapters in the present volume will examine whether the institutionalisation process and the state of the discipline display integrative patterns, or whether divergence prevails. Based on this analysis, their prospects of catching up, integration and becoming a relevant science—which are the issues raised at the beginning of this chapter—will also be examined in a comparative manner.

# References

Aarrevaara, T., & Dobson, I. R. (2013). Movers and Shakers: Do Academics Control Their Own Work? In U. Teichler & E. A. Höhle (Eds.), *The Work Situation of the Academic Profession in Europe: Findings of a Survey in Twelve Countries* (pp. 159–181). Springer. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-007-5977-0\_8


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# From Scientifc Communism to Political Science: The Development of the Profession in Selected Former Soviet European States

# *Tatsiana Chulitskaya, Irmina Matonyte, Dangis Gudelis, and Serghei Sprincean*

# 1 Introduction

In this chapter, we explore the trajectories of the evolution of political science in four former Soviet Socialist Republics after the collapse of the USSR in 1990–1991. We focus on two Baltic states: the Republic of Lithuania (hereinafter Lithuania) and the Republic of Estonia (hereinafter

T. Chulitskaya (\*)

I. Matonyte General Jonas Žemaitis Military Academy of Lithuania, Vilnius, Lithuania e-mail: irmina.matonyte@lka.lt

D. Gudelis

© The Author(s) 2022 51 G. Ilonszki, C. Roux (eds.), *Opportunities and Challenges for New and Peripheral Political Science Communities*, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-79054-7\_3

Faculty of Political Science and Diplomacy, Vytautas Magnus University, Kaunas, Lithuania

Faculty of Business and Public Governance, Institute of Public Administration, Mykolas Romeris University, Vilnius, Lithuania e-mail: dgudel@mruni.eu

Estonia) which were incorporated into the USSR in June 1940 and which by 2020 have become full-fedged members of the EU, NATO and the OECD; the Republic of Moldova (hereinafter Moldova) which in 1940 became a part of the USSR and re-established its independence in 1991, although a part of its territory (Transnistria) has been under the de facto control of the separatist government since 1990; and, fnally, the Republic of Belarus (hereinafter Belarus), the legal successor to the Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic (Byelorussian SSR), which gained its independence in 1991 and since the mid-1990s has been involved in a process of integration with Russia. Since the spring of 2020, Belarus' society has been heroically trying to overthrow the existing dictatorship and to liberalize the country. These four case studies provide a good basis for testing several hypotheses relative to the developments of political science (hereinafter PS) in former Soviet republics and for a nuanced comparison of its institutionalization patterns. In the four country cases, we pay special attention to the context of democratization and to the effects of path dependencies.

The fall of the communist regime in Central and Eastern Europe, and the disintegration of the USSR, established signifcant premises for the development of democracy, of a free market and of civil society in the four countries concerned. Amidst the sweeping changes, Estonian, Lithuanian, Moldovan and Belarusian scholars from the social sciences and humanities, who had been previously involved, willingly or unwillingly, in teaching scientifc communism and Communist Party (hereinafter CP) ideology and other related disciplines such as scientifc atheism, political economy, dialectical materialism and so on were given the opportunity to explore new areas of research, particularly in the feld of political science. The *Perestroika* period (1985–1990) and the subsequent political liberalization of four former Soviet republics created a unique opportunity for the emergence and institutionalization of PS as an academic discipline. On the one hand, there was a window of opportunity for PS to make a fresh start as a feld of academic research with its own professional community. On the other hand, the newly emerging PS institutions and their staff had to cope with all kinds of challenges arising from the political, economic, social and cultural problems of the time and needs to deal with them on an individual level.

S. Sprincean

The Institute of Legal, Political and Sociological Research, Chisinau, Republic of Moldova

To promote and facilitate these transformations, numerous initiatives have been launched by external actors (the European Union's educational programmes such as TEMPUS, Open Society organizations, the programmes sponsored by the US and European governments, targeted projects of the Western universities and various European foundations, and so on). Despite the impetus and assistance provided by external stakeholders, towards the convergence of the newly launched PS institutions towards the Western standards in the early 1990s, the development of PS in Estonia, Lithuania, Moldova and Belarus differed perceptibly from one country to the other in its scope and intensity, its teaching and topics of research, its level of internationalization and its orientation in terms of international cooperation.

The similar nature of PS institutionalization in the post-Soviet countries could be accounted for by their common points of departure. In the USSR Russian was the "language of international communication" and many academics, who were later to become Estonian, Lithuanian, Moldovan, or Belarusian political scientists, graduated or completed postgraduate studies in felds such as scientifc communism, philosophy, history and law, many of them doing so at the leading universities in the Soviet Union, such as Moscow State University, Leningrad State University, Shevchenko State University (Kiev), Rostov State University and the Belarusian State University (Minsk). Studying at those universities gave such students prestige, recognition and professional networking opportunities, and substantially contributed towards enhancing their future careers. Even though the sub-cultures and institutional design of their workplaces in Soviet Tallinn, Vilnius, Chisinau or Minsk were characterized by certain idiosyncrasies, these Soviet scholars shared many common features deriving from their education, reinforced through Soviet propaganda and surveillance, and put into practice through centrally planned research programmes and professional events.

In 1990, the four Soviet republics had to break away from the highly centralized authoritarian state. During the process of post-Soviet transformation, the former Soviet republics have increasingly diverged mainly due to the specifc nature of their respective political and social dynamics. Lithuania and Estonia have pursued pro-European policies and displayed a strong desire to join the EU and NATO culminating in their full membership of both in 2004. Moldova and Belarus, on the other hand, have followed different political trajectories for internal and external reasons, the most important of which being: *strong* Russian *geopolitical pressures;*  *the weakness of their respective civil societies; and the considerable degree of Sovietisation inherited from the USSR*. According to *Levitsky* and *Way* (2010, p. 537), "consolidated democracies" were thus established in the Baltic States, while the *political and social evolution of Moldova led to the establishment of a* "defective democracy", *and developments in Belarus resulted in a* "competitive autocracy".

As pointed out in Chap. 2, the evolution of democratization can be considered an important factor shaping the institutionalization of PS. The present chapter focuses on Soviet legacies and path dependencies as factors infuencing the institutionalization of PS in the four countries concerned here. As long as political science is appreciated as the science of democracy (Eisfeld et al., 2019, p. 199), its identity and autonomy are particularly important.1 In other words, PS as an academic discipline must not depend on the whims of the State, and its professional community has to be able to defne and follow its own internal rules, norms and ethical principles.

The analysis of the institutionalization of PS in post-Soviet countries reveals the increasing social impact of political science and its institutions on democracy. Alongside the intellectual developments seen in academia, the democratizing countries' respective governments have embraced a normative pro-democratic approach to domestic and foreign policies. A pluralistic national environment promotes academic freedom. PS can manifest itself in non-democratic surroundings, but it will take very specifc forms and perform narrow functions serving the ruling elites when doing so. The institutionalization of PS as a discipline, in this context, is an important indicator of a country's democratization and of its sustainable future development.

In this chapter, we analyse the process of PS institutionalization in the period before the 1990s and after the collapse of the USSR. We examine the formation of post-Soviet PS in Estonia, Lithuania, Moldova and Belarus, and in doing so we offer references to the relevant Soviet experiences and practices and explore the different, but also in some respects similar, trajectories of the discipline's development in these countries. We

1According to the operational defnition of institutionalization introduced in this volume, political science is institutionalized when it meets fve specifc requirements, namely: it is a relatively stable discipline; it has an identity of its own; it has a fair amount of autonomy when it comes to establishing its internal rules and norms; it can reproduce (and is also able and willing to internationalize); and it is accepted as a legitimate discipline. Of these fve components of institutionalization, there shall be no detailed examination of political science's reproduction and legitimation in the present chapter.

specifcally focus on Belarus as an extreme case of the development of political science in a non-democratic environment. In particular, we investigate the similarities and differences in the current state of the discipline in those four countries, by analysing the formation of its identity and the establishment of its autonomy. In the concluding section, we briefy refect on the current challenges faced by PS in these four countries.

We base our analysis on an institutional approach, and we actively use the descriptive method while exploring the Soviet period and the four country-cases. For each case, we analyse comparable indicators and examine the most prominent features. We realize that when analysing PS developments in post-Soviet countries, one has to deal with several constraints including the lack of information on the local predecessors (institutions and prominent fgures) of PS during the Soviet period in Estonia, Lithuania, Moldova and Belarus, and the limitations on open sources when it comes to post-Soviet Belarus.

# 2 The Soviet Period: The Ideological and Intellectual Trajectories of Political Science

The very concept of "politics" in Soviet times had a dual meaning and performed a dual social function. On the one hand, politics was not a topic that could be freely discussed, whereas on the other hand, it was present in all spheres of public life, including higher education, and it provided guidelines for all public activities. Highly specifc institutional and intellectual approaches to PS were grounded in this dualism of "politics" within the former Soviet Union.

From a chronological perspective, Smorgunov (2015, p. 125) distinguishes between two periods in the development of PS in the USSR. The frst, from the 1920s to the 1950s, was a period of *cryptopolitology* during which political research was undertaken under the name of other disciplines recognized by the Soviet regime, such as history, jurisprudence and Marxist philosophy. The second period, from the mid-1950s to the mid-1980s, was a period in which "political research became an occupation not secret but also not yet fully recognized" (Il'yn, 2001; Vorob'ev, 2004).2

<sup>2</sup> It should be mentioned that during the frst (pre-WWII) period there were also original developments, paving the feld of political science research and teaching in Estonia, Lithuania, Moldova and Belarus caused by important political events (proclamation of national independence, in particular).

The importance of an ideologically "proper" education had already been established in the USSR during the early years of Soviet power. In fact, as early as the 1920s/1930s, the syllabuses and curriculums of the humanities and social sciences emphasized the ideological underpinnings of socialist society (Shevchuk, 2014). In 1925, "An introduction to Marxism-Leninism" became a mandatory course present in all higher education programmes in the USSR. In 1938, a guidebook entitled "A brief course in the history of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU)" was published. The book was a major work of reference in all disciplines for almost twenty years, up until the XXth Congress of the CP of the USSR in 1956 (when the process of *destalinization* started). In 1939, a special All-Union Order on Higher Education Affairs (in Russian, *Vsesojuznii komitet po delam vyschei shkoly*) introduced obligatory courses in the History of the CPSU, Political Economy and Philosophy. The main idea behind the new courses was the unifcation (and the overcoming of any decentralization) of CP propaganda and education among the Soviet republics, designed to avoid any heterogeneity of such (Saprykina, 2016).

After WWII, the propagandistic, highly ideological unit in the social sciences and humanities continued to be developed in the USSR. In 1956, Soviet universities began teaching the History of the CPSU instead of Marxism-Leninism, while new subdivisions within the universities' departments of Marxism-Leninism were established. In the late 1950s, subdivisions of the history of the CPSU, of political economy and of philosophy were created in many universities (Opiok, 2019).

In 1962, Mikhail Suslov, a leading CP theoretician and member of the USSR *Politburo*, offcially proclaimed that the political theory of communism would henceforth be called "scientifc communism" (*nauchnyi kommunizm*), thus in effect establishing a new discipline (Theen, 1971) as an additional and mandatory part of all higher education (hereinafter HE) programmes in the USSR. The old "Bible" of the Communist party's history—the handbook *A Brief Course of CPSU history*—was criticized and abandoned. In 1960, a new handbook entitled *CPSU history* by Boris Ponomarev was published, and this was to become the main reference work in Soviet HE courses (Saprykina, 2016).

The establishment of scientifc communism as a separate academic discipline was accompanied by the reviewing of the entire social science-humanitarian sector of HE. In 1974–1975, an obligatory state exam in scientifc communism was introduced as a requirement for the completion of a student's higher education (Nemcev, 2016). Thus, greater space was given over to scientific communism and other ideologically related subjects during the late Soviet period, and this was true for the entire period of study in any HE institution in the USSR.

When Gorbachev came to power in 1985 and the period of *Perestroika* started, departments of scientifc communism, together with other social science-humanitarian departments in Soviet universities, were faced with a number of signifcant challenges. Changes in the CP's general line required those at universities to engage in a certain "revisionism" of established Soviet dogmas. However, a lot of HE staff members were signifcantly involved in divulging communist propaganda. In 1989, the Head of the USSR State Committee of People's Education, Yagodin, issued an Order "On the Rebuilding (*perestroika*) of Social Sciences Teaching in the HEIs of the Country": this order required universities all over the country to introduce new courses in Social-Political History of the 20th Century, Philosophy, Political Economy and the Problems of the Theory of Contemporary Socialism (Opiok & Sugako, 2010). In the late 1980s to early 1990s, the frst courses in political science as such were introduced in all Soviet republics.

Together with a highly ideological system of HE in the Soviet Union, there were also educational programmes specially designed for the CP elite. Fifteen 'higher party schools' were established at central and regional levels in 1946. Initially, attendance of such schools lasted for two years, but this was subsequently extended to three years (covering the period 1954–1956) and then to four years (1956–1990) (Gvozdeva, 2010). The CP schools taught and trained senior party professionals who were to work and/or worked in the party apparatus, in factories or in power structures (party committee instructors, secretaries of Komsomol i.e., communist youth organizations, trade union chairpersons and so on). The curriculum of these schools included economics, management studies and statistics, as well as subjects related to the political sciences, such as social process management, Marxist philosophy, scientifc atheism, political economy, scientifc communism, the history of the communist labour movement, the history of the USSR, international relations, foreign policy, political–economic geography and the construction of the CP (Samoškaite, ̇ 2013).

During the entire Soviet period, there were CP schools operating in Vilnius (Lithuanian SSR), Chisinau (Moldavian SSR) and Minsk (Belarusian SSR). However, in 1956, a decision was made by the Central Committee of the CPSU, with the proclaimed aim of network optimization and the improvement of the quality of education, which stopped students from being admitted to higher party schools in certain cities, including Tallinn (Estonian SSR).

Specialized CP research centres also existed. Institutes of party history which were brunches of the founded in 1948 Institute of Marxism-Leninism (IML) under the Central Committee of the CP of the Soviet Union played an important role in the Soviet social science research system. The employees of these institutes translated into their respective national languages, and commented on and published, the documents of the CP of the USSR, as well as conducting research into the local and national history of the communist party. Those institutes tasked with researching into and documenting the party's history also supervised the CP archives in the Soviet republics.

In terms of content, PS in the post-Soviet countries developed on the basis of various intellectual and organizational traditions existing during Soviet times (Smorgunov, 2015, p. 125). The frst and overarching such tradition was Marxist-Leninist socio-political theory, which served as a basis for the activities of "scientifc communists". The second was the allpervasive criticism of the bourgeois ideology underlying Western political science and liberal-democratic politics. The third was related to regional studies (of different polities and regions of the world). The fourth encompassed the analysis of constitutional orders, institutional designs and descriptive sociological and ethnographic data. The ffth originated from synergies with Soviet sociologists.

The frst intellectual tradition, focusing on scientifc communism, consisted in the investigation of class struggle, socialist revolution, the development of socialism and the construction of communism. Soviet authorities used "scientifc communism" as a synonym of Marx and Engels' "scientifc socialism", although the former placed the emphasis on Lenin's theory and on the doctrines of the CP of the Soviet Union. The publications of the specialists in scientifc communism purportedly addressed the problems of power, social relations (social engineering), political culture, the history of Marxist theory and revolution. However, in reality, scientifc communism justifed the rule of the CP, state violence and other repressive practices and the existence of certain institutions (including the KGB, labor camps, etc.) in the USSR.

The second tradition concerned the Soviet propaganda heavily criticizing the bourgeois world and capitalist worldviews. Many researchers were involved in criticizing Western ideologies, in attacking the alleged bourgeois counterfeiters of history, and social institutions (Smorgunov, 2015). While access to foreign authors and academic publications was generally not easy to obtain, Soviet social researchers nevertheless refected on such writings (insofar as they were accessible). An important element of refection in this case was to "*present their texts as critiques from a Marxist-Leninist perspective*" or to discuss Western ideas "*in the sense of their contradiction to Marxist-Leninist philosophy and incompatibility with the position of dialectical materialism as the only true philosophical doctrine*" (Dudchik, 2017, p. 106). In the fnal years of the USSR's existence, criticism of foreign authors was toned down somewhat, and Soviet writers even demonstrated a certain acceptance of Western theories.

These two disciplinary currents, that is, the active promotion of scientifc communism and the criticism of Western ideas, under variable structural designs (in departments of history, scientifc communism, political economy, the history of philosophy, atheism, the history of the Soviet Union communist party, etc.) were present in practically all HE institutions within the USSR and constituted the guiding principles of all teaching and research.

The third PS intellectual tradition emerged in those Soviet academic institutions that studied different countries and regions of the world. It was less ideologically grounded and more oriented towards empirical research, than the aforementioned traditions. Several specialized research institutions, most of which were established in or after 1956, gave rise to this tradition (Galkin, 2010). Furthermore, there were a series of "sectoral" institutes (for example, the Institute of the International Labour Movement (IMRD)). These institutes proliferated during the Khrushchev years, and in Brezhnev's period, they conducted studies that were of importance to policymaking. They employed numerous researchers conducting specialized studies resulting in classifed information. Selected experts from these institutes were also members of various ad hoc committees set up by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the KGB in order to study particular problems or monitor important events (Kitrinos, 1984). All these institutes were based in Moscow, and as a rule, their leading scholars were graduates from Moscow or Leningrad universities, almost all of whom were Russian nationals.

The fourth intellectual tradition was promoted by legal scholars, who analysed the constitutions of different countries from an institutional perspective. In 1960, the Soviet Association of Political (Public Administration) Sciences (in Russian, *Sovetskaja associacija politicheskih*  *(gosudarstvovedchenskih) nauk, SAPS*) was established, and from then on Soviet academics were involved in the IPSA's activities, albeit to a limited extent (Irkhin, 2016, p. 203). As was the rule in the Soviet system's hierarchical organization of society, the members of the Association who had Western contacts were mainly academics from Moscow and Leningrad. Not surprisingly, when the IPSA held its 1979 Congress in Moscow, the Soviet Union's participants, numbering 2603 (Irkhin, 2016, p. 205), were all from the Russian SFSR, with none from the other Soviet republics. At the same time, however, in 1980, divisions of the SAPS were established in several Soviet republics, namely the Latvian SSR, the Kazakh SSR, the Uzbek SSR, the Kyrgyz SSR, the Tajik SSR and the Turkmen SSR. Attempts were also made to bring together individual members of the association in the Soviet republics of Transcaucasia and Estonia (Smorgunov, 2015).

The ffth intellectual tradition which fed the community of political science researchers in the USSR is associated with sociological research and the activities of the Soviet Sociological Association (Smorgunov, 2015). Greenfeld (1988) observes that Soviet sociology was always very close to political science and public administration research. Although Soviet sociologists adopted some of the methods of Western sociology, sociology itself was an administrative tool of the Soviet government rather than a science per se (Greenfeld, 1988). In the early Soviet period, there were restrictions on sociological research, although these were relaxed to a certain extent in 1956. The Soviet Sociological Association was established in 1957, and sociology itself was recognized as a fully fedged branch of the social sciences. Political sociologists carried out empirical studies in the domains of public opinion, social behaviour and political culture. Specialized sociological research institutes were established in all four of the Soviet republics examined here.

Summing up, PS did not exist as a separate academic discipline in the USSR before 1990. Political education was fragmented, and research was conducted under a series of different disciplinary labels (scientifc communism, philosophy, history, regional studies, law and sociology). The most important function of all these disciplines was to provide Soviet citizens with an education based on sound ideological grounds. However, certain institutional developments (the Soviet Association of Political Science, the historical archives and inventories, the specialized laboratories and divisions of social research, etc.), together with the educational and

<sup>3</sup> 18% of all participants at the IPSA's 1979 Congress.

research methods adopted by Soviet scholars specializing in various aspects of the social sciences, formed the basis for the development of post-Soviet political science. The collapse of the USSR and the dissolution of the centralized system of HE and research served as a starting point for the development of political science in the newly established, sovereign, post-Soviet nations of Estonia, Lithuania, Moldova and Belarus.

# 3 The Organizational Units of PS as an Academic Discipline

This section provides an overview of the development of PS as an academic discipline during the breakthrough years (1985–1991) and traces that development up to the end of the 2000s. This period started with a series of radical socio-political changes brought on by Gorbachev's *glasnost'* and *perestroika*, the "national awakening" movements, and the restoration of independence in Estonia, Lithuania, Moldova and Belarus. In Estonia and Lithuania, widely supported social movements led to the country regaining its independence in the spring of 1990. The eventual dissolution of the Soviet Union marked the birth of several new independent states, including Moldova and Belarus.

The following years brought a series of no less challenging, albeit less spectacular, changes to political and civic life, including that of academia. In the beginning, a lack of experienced political scientists and specialized political science units represented the major problem. When scientifc communism as an academic discipline vanished from the universities, and PS was able to emerge out into the open, its initial manifestations appeared within "old" disciplines such as law, philosophy, history and sociology.

In Estonia, political science's formative period was closely interconnected with intellectual infuences from the West, and the University of Tartu represented a major platform for political science's development. The University of Tartu became a hub of comparative political studies and international relations. In 1992, the University established a new School of Social Sciences, and the frst chair was held by Rein Taagepera who had taught at the University of California-Irvine.4 The next step was the creation of an interdisciplinary three-year BA programme for sociologists, public administration scholars and political scientists. It took several more

<sup>4</sup>Taagepera was appointed Joint Professor of Political Science (*üldpolitoloogia* in Estonian) at the University of California-Irvine and the University of Tartu.

years (until 1995) to establish the Department of Political Science, to appoint the frst professor of political science (Kaido Jaanson, a historian and political scientist specialized in Estonian-Scandinavian relations in the early twentieth century) and to create a self-standing BA curriculum at the university. Another direction taken by PS was that developed at Tallinn University (known at the time as the Tallinn Pedagogical Institute), where political studies and research focused on the feld of public administration.

In Lithuania, PS as an academic discipline was promoted by historians, lawyers, philosophers and sociologists who became political scientists. This diverse group of intellectual entrepreneurs launched new study programmes, periodicals and regular conferences, as well as translated and published numerous books and articles dealing with politics. The very term "scientifc communism" became pejorative. The community of political scientists came together around the Institute of International Relations and Political Science at Vilnius University, which was established in 1992 (Jakniūnaite & Vinogradnaite ̇ , ̇ 2010, p. 178). The lectures on different subjects within the feld of political science were taught in other departments of the humanities and social sciences faculties. For example, in Klaipeda University political science was taught in the Department of ̇ History and Sociology of the Faculty of Human and Natural Sciences up until 1993. Upon the initiative of the Lithuanian diaspora from the USA, Vytautas Magnus University (VDU) was re-established in 1989 in Kaunas.5 VDU cherished the spirit of the "liberal arts", unheard of in Lithuania up until then. Its bachelor PS degree programme was launched by established American and Canadian scholars of Lithuanian origin together with young Western researchers (from the USA and Norway in particular).

In Moldova, PS was developing on the institutional and intellectual grounds of scientifc communism, and knowledge and human resources were imported from neighbouring Romania. In 1989, the University of Moldova's Department of Scientifc Communism was renamed the Department of Political Science and Socialist Theory, while the Department of the History of the Communist Party of the USSR became the Department of Political History. As in other post-Soviet republics, also in Moldova, there was a lack of teaching staff initially, and consequently, former professors of scientifc communism, law and other social sciences

<sup>5</sup>The Soviet authorities had closed it in the 1950s and divided it into specialized institutes of technical science, agriculture and medicine.

started teaching PS. Given the lack of personnel, the PS faculties began to recruit new staff, most of whom were graduates from universities in Romania (Gorincioi, 2010). In Moldova, fercely disputed issues of political and cultural identity impacted the situation in terms of the language of instruction at the universities. After the establishment of PS as a discipline, the courses (as in other academic disciplines) were taught in one of two languages: Romanian (2/3) and Russian (1/3). In the late 1990s, the frst ever PS textbook in Moldova was published in both of the aforesaid languages (Moshneaga & Saca, 2004).

PS in Moldova exists within the troubled political situation the country fnds itself in, with an ongoing, unresolved confict in Transnistria. De facto governed by pro-Russian separatists, this territory has its own University (Pridnestrovian State University—PSU) which as a result of the Transnistria war is based in the premises of the former Taras Shevchenko State University of Tiraspol, removed to Chisinau in 1992, which has its own Institute of Public Administration, Law and Social Sciences. However, as is the case with all social infrastructure within the region (de Waal & von Twickel, 2020), PSU has been beset by problems regarding the quality of education, due to very limited funding and outdated materials.

PS emerged in Belarus within the context of the deconstruction of Soviet social sciences (history, philosophy and sociology) and scientifc communism (Antanovich & Liahovich-Petrakova, 2009), and under external infuences from both the West and Russia. The frst institute of PS in the country was created at the Minsk Higher Communist Party School, which after 1990 was renamed the Institute of Political Science and Social Governance of the Communist Party of Belarus (CPB). However, the Institute had a short life and was closed in 1991 after the activities of the CPB had been banned by the Supreme Council of BSSR. At the Belarusian State University (BSU), PS only replaced the existing ideologically biased Soviet disciplines in formal terms, whereas the majority of teaching staff and some course content remained the same as before.

In 1991, after the establishment of the frst PS department at the BSU (initially within the Philosophy-Economics Faculty before being subsequently transferred to the Law Faculty), the design and content of the frst PS degree programme were taken from the Moscow State University (MSU) curriculum (Naumova, 2010). At the same time, western infuence and programmes for the promotion of democracy impacted the formation of PS in Belarus.

In the early 2000s, PS departments (either specifcally designed for the teaching of political science or together with other social sciences) were created in all of Belarus' state universities. During that period, PS also appeared in the curricula of the country's private universities. While as a rule Belarus' private universities simply reproduced/copied the curriculum of the BSU, there was one important exception to this rule: in 1993, the Franco-Belarusian Faculty of Political and Administrative Science was set up at the private European Humanities University (hereinafter the EHU). The EHU was funded by diverse international donors, and the Franco-Belarusian Faculty itself received fnancial support from the French Embassy in Belarus. The EHU had a reputation of being an island of academic excellence, promoting liberal democracy and being supported by various Western organizations (Naumova, 2010). With the exception of the EHU, the quality of PS programmes at Belarusian private universities was perceived, in the public's eyes, to be lower than that of the country's public universities. However, this scepticism was not so much the result of any underperformance, but rather the consequence of the general negative attitude towards the private sector in a country where the public sector dominated all spheres of public life.

Further development of PS in Belarus mainly depended on the increasingly non-democratic tendencies and authoritarian leadership of Alyaksandr Lukashenka. The national PS community's reaction was twofold. On the one hand, academic PS continued to develop in state-run universities, where the ideological and political components of loyalty to the regime were cultivated. On the other hand, a number of independent centres of political analysis and think tanks were created (usually with the support of Western donors). The split between these two communities deepened over time. The offcial form of PS exists within the heavily centralized national policy in the sphere of higher education. Think tanks have a somewhat broader scope; however, their existence depends on Western donors. The efforts made to promote and consolidate a common platform for Belarusian think tanks, by the Belarus Research Council (BRC) established in 2012, with substantial fnancial support from foreign donors (in particular, from USAID), ceased after 2016. However, owing to diverse internal and external developments, the gap between the two PS communities in Belarus has been bridged to a certain extent since 2014, and a new type of "hybrid" think tank has emerged with support from both government authorities and Western donors (Chulitskaya, 2021).

The political elites in Belarus have signifcantly interfered in higher education. One of the clearest cases of such interference was the closure of the EHU in 2004.6 Initially, Belarus' non-democratic authorities considered PS to be too general, and even unnecessary. However, with the strengthening of the nondemocratic regime, the authorities changed their attitude and followed the Soviet example by starting to promote PS as a tool of non-democratic education and indoctrination. In the mid-1990s, the Belarusian Ministry of Education included PS as an obligatory core curriculum course in all undergraduate programmes offered by the country's state-run universities. In keeping with Soviet tradition, in 2003 Lukashenka demanded that a system of ideological education be put in place. Consequently, state-run universities developed and introduced a special course in state ideology. As a result of these changes, the PS departments had to reformulate the entire design of their PS curricula, and this process was not completed until 2008. With all the bureaucratic changes in the teaching of PS and the lack of professional prospects for PS graduates in an authoritarian political system, the BSU and other state-run universities offer PS BA programmes providing graduates with a dual degree in political science and law. The second of the two subjects is more appealing to students, who see it as more "useful" in terms of career prospects.

Among the four post-soviet countries examined in this chapter, PS only started anew in Estonia. It is worth noting that, as previously mentioned, the CP's higher school of studies in Tallinn ceased functioning in 1956. During Soviet times, the Estonian community of scientifc communists was fragmented and weak. Therefore, as Pettai (2010) states, political scientists took advantage of this "backwardness" to create a new discipline practically from scratch, and this new discipline had the chance to become quickly internationalized and open to new developments.

In Lithuania, Moldova and Belarus, PS frst appeared in the offcial education system within the framework of "traditional" disciplines such as philosophy, history, law and sociology. In Moldova and Belarus, scientifc communist organizational units played an essential role in the formation of PS. In Lithuania, Western infuences were quick to manifest themselves, in terms not only of the liberal political science education offered by universities but also of new institutional ventures undertaken. In Moldova,

<sup>6</sup>Later on, the EHU was reopened "in exile" in Lithuania, but in its *de facto* guise it became a different institution, without PS being a leading discipline despite its declared mission including "civic education".

PS was established on the basis of the country's existing university departments, and of personal professional networks and Moldova's cultural affnity with neighbouring Romania. However, political turmoil in the country affected the sphere of HE, with the introduction of two languages for teaching purposes (Romanian and Russian), and the corresponding different socio-cultural traditions, and the existence of a separate system of education in the disputed region of Transnistria.

In Belarus, as in Moldova, the institutional foundations of PS were represented by Soviet social sciences and scientifc communism. Unlike in Estonia and Lithuania, an emergent PS in Belarus and Moldova experienced not only Western but also Russian, infuence (pressure). While in the early 1990s, the development of PS in Belarus followed similar patterns to those observed in Moldova, subsequently the deterioration in the political situation in Belarus led to a return to previous Soviet legacies. Offcial PS at the country's state-run university became an obligatory (but practically meaningless, in the students' eyes) subject, while an additional course in state ideology (a version of scientifc communism) was developed. Some of the oppositional-minded political scientists left their university posts to work for think tanks which at least provided them with opportunities to carry out applied research. Alternative opportunities to get a PS education at a private university were ended when the only such university (the EHU), sustained by Western sponsors, was closed in 2004.

The formative period of PS varied across the four countries as a result not only of their differing national politics, economy and social sphere but also of their respective foreign policies and international relations. While Estonia and Lithuania's pro-European foreign policy promoted Western values in relation to institutional developments in all areas of public life (including academia), the vectors of Moldova's foreign policy vacillated, while Belarus attempted a balancing act between East and West (albeit gravitating more towards Russia). Consequently, Estonia and Lithuania followed a characteristically western-type type promoted internationally by the IPSA, that recognized "PS as a science of democracy". In Moldova, PS received a certain pro-Western input with additional opportunities for education, science and research being made available following the signing of the Association Agreement with the EU in 2014. However, geopolitical shifts and the unresolved confict in Transnistria have perceptibly destabilized PS in Moldova. Different geopolitical paths have had an effect on international scientifc cooperation and the internationalization of PS education. While Estonia and Lithuania are actively involved in diverse socially and academically important international scientifc projects (with academic institutions and social partners from the EU, the USA and other countries), Moldova and Belarus fuctuate in terms of their chosen partner—sometimes this is Russia and at other times it is the EU—and underperform in terms of their research output (Mazepus et al., 2017).

# 4 Political Science: An Independent Profession or Not?

As postulated in Chap. 2 in regard to the profession's identity, the basic expectation is to establish diverse organizational entities, including academic units and political science associations, that are based on the norms of the profession and are proof of political scientists' professional identity. In the previous section, we briefy discussed the very frst organizational structures created to host the nascent political science in the four post-Soviet European countries examined here. The inventory of initial structures, and the accounts of their further development, clearly show that national and international political factors have a substantial impact on the identity of political scientists comprising a specifc professional body.

In post-Soviet Estonia, Lithuania and Moldova, PS became a clearly identifable, visible academic discipline distinguishable from other neighbouring disciplines. In this respect, the development of PS in Estonia was the swiftest. The Lithuanian experience proved more variegated, as it included a wider range of stakeholders from previous Soviet times (including higher education institutions), as well as a plethora of Western sponsors. In Moldova, while the organizational units marking PS as a separate academic discipline emerged smoothly, the identity of the PS community quickly proved to be rather unsubstantial. In Belarus, the short-lived crystallization of PS was interrupted by the fusion of political science and law; this organizational amalgam was a further precursory sign of the ideologization and political instrumentalization of PS as a discipline within the country, marking a shift towards authoritarian rule. The "oppositional/ alternative" think tanks, although to some extent contributing towards building and maintaining PS' professional identity, at the same time had to fght to survive.

However, as Chap. 2 points out, a clear identity is needed for the beneft of the self-esteem of political scientists themselves. Thus, the selfidentifcation of the academic community and the development of the profession's "mission and vision", have together enhanced the institutionalization of the profession. The process and requirement of identity formation do not exclude cooperation with other disciplines. On the contrary, multi-disciplinary approaches and openness in academic terms, are not detrimental to the identity of contemporary PS. In this section, we ask the following questions. What are the boundaries of PS as a discipline, and what are its lines of separation from, and patterns of cooperation with, other social sciences and the humanities? How are PS doctoral programmes organized? How do political science associations operate, if at all? Is PS visible in the media and at public events? What prestige and career prospects do PS graduates enjoy?

While the identity of PS substantially depends on the public's perception of the discipline, mostly based on the presence of political scientists in the media and at public events, in Estonia and Lithuania the future development of political science will be one of its growing complexity. In neoliberal Estonia, a premium is placed on political (and social) science as a whole being more clearly performance-orientated (quantifable in terms of the number of publications, the project budgets awarded, the partnerships with other actors established, etc.). Typically, strategic priorities encourage PS subfelds to break off from PS and establish new organizational units. On the other hand, in terms of student recruitment, the universities are under pressure to consolidate with adjacent felds, which means that PS could get incorporated into the general category of the "social sciences". The creation of the School of Governance, Law and Society at Tallinn University in 2015 is a sign of such a trend. When it comes to the visibility of political scientists within the country, their focus on academic excellence rather than public promotion means that their public presence is of a rather limited character.

In Lithuania, political scientists are very visible in the public sphere, commenting on public affairs in the mass media and participating in various forums. Even a very popular comedy show "Dviracio ̌ žinios"7 has two distinctive characters (*mice politologists*) who comment on domestic politics and international affairs. The neoliberal reform of student enrolment together with efforts to consolidate the national HE system are shaping the PS community in Lithuania. The Institute of International Relations at Vilnius University (TSPMI) leads the feld in terms of student

<sup>7</sup>Which started as a radio show in the early 1990s, later became a commercial TV program, and since 2020 it has been produced by the country's public TV broadcaster.

enrolment and public visibility. It is followed by Vytautas Magnus University (VDU), located in the town of Kaunas, which is less appealing to students and scholars than the capital city. The Military Academy of Lithuania is expanding, especially in terms of the number of students (*cadets*) admitted to the Academy. Other universities (Klaipeda, MRUNI, KTU and EHU) are shrinking in terms of PS student numbers and of the quality of their PS programmes. Lithuanian universities run several interdisciplinary programmes (at BA or MA level), where PS is combined with communication studies, public administration, management or economics.

In Moldova, political scientists complain of political "decision-makers" lack of interest in non-speculative, scientifcally argued opinions. Political scientists are scarcely visible in the public sphere, with the exception of those political experts who are able and willing to act as political advisors and designers of PR campaigns. In fact, in Moldova in 2020, the universities, including their departments of PS, are bereft of students. At the same time, the research units (institutes, centres, sections and sectors) have seen a decline in the number and the fnancing of research projects (funding has dropped from 0.5% to 0.18% of GDP in the last fve years). Practically deprived of students and public funding, PS departments are struggling to survive.

In non-democratic Belarus, political scientists from the state-run universities, unlike their Soviet predecessors working at CP schools, are hardly ever-present in the media or at public events. On rare occasions, the authorities get academics to appear on propagandistic TV shows or write newspapers articles, in order to demonstrate their approval of questionable decisions on domestic or foreign issues. Representatives of oppositional/alternative think tanks are quite active in the oppositional media. However, both the media themselves and the aforesaid experts are in most cases marginalized by the authorities. Political science, public administration and international relations exist as separate academic disciplines, and they are concentrated in different faculties or even universities.8 From an institutional point of view, these disciplines (branches) are separated from each other, and their representatives (with the exception of a restricted group of "pure" political scientists) do not see themselves as "political scientists", or their activities as "political research" (Chulitskaya, 2021).

<sup>8</sup>For instance, the main HE institution specialized in public administration is the Academy of Public Administration under the Aegis of the President of the Republic of Belarus.

The remaining separate PS organizational units (PS departments) are closely interconnected with law or (in some cases) with economics, as mentioned above, and this causes tension between the representatives of both disciplines. The representatives of law as an academic discipline do not recognize political science's standing as "a science"; furthermore, the two disciplines battle for the dwindling number of students seen in the country in recent years.

When it comes to the topics of PhD dissertations in Estonia, at both Tallinn University and the University of Tartu there has been a mix of international relations (regional geopolitics), comparative politics (party research as well as ethnic relations) and public administration (policy studies). These domains have remained relatively constant, whereas political theory has been less well represented. Furthermore, PS departments in Estonia tend to demand high standards from their teaching staff and researchers. Thus, they tend to recruit researchers (initially of Estonian origin, later of diverse origins) who have been awarded their PhDs abroad (primarily in the USA, but also in Germany, France and Finland).

In Lithuania, all doctoral dissertations in the feld of PS are grouped together into one category, that of the Doctor of Social Sciences. PhD topics sometimes relate to other social science felds, such as economics, sociology, management and administration, philosophy or law. The topics covered by PhD dissertations have signifcantly expanded and evolved over the three decades. The frst PhDs in PS in Lithuania were awarded in 1993 (concerning theories of international political integration) and in 1996 (concerning the development of the party system in Lithuania). There are certain differences between the topics covered by dissertations submitted to the two separate PhD Committees of Vilnius University and Vytautas Magnus University (jointly with Kaunas University of Technology, Klaipeda University and the Military Academy of Lithuania). Dissertations ̇ submitted by PhD students at Vilnius University tend to focus on international relations, foreign policy and EU studies. While the VDU doctoral school focuses more on public policy, political campaigns, public administration and security studies. In 2000–2009 (pre- and post-EU accession) the topic of the EU dominated PhD dissertations, while since 2010 dissertations have started focusing on broader issues of international relations, area studies and defence policy, in particular in relation to Russia.

In Moldova, the topics covered by PhD dissertations tend to be rather diversifed, although according to national records, from 2005 till 2020 the majority of dissertations have belonged to the thematic group entitled "Theory, methodology and history of political science; political institutions and processes". The second, smaller group of dissertations, have addressed the "Theory and history of international relations and global development". Content-wise, over the last decade topics such as migration, European integration and national security have also been dealt with, whereas during the previous decade, geopolitics, international relations and political institutions in the process of democratization were analysed (NCAA of Moldova 2020).

In Belarus, PS doctoral studies (*aspirantura*) (since Soviet times an unchanged university qualifcation) exist as a standalone programme supervised by the Higher Attestation Commission (HAC). The PS *aspirantura* programmes are run under three thematic labels: "Political Institutions, processes and technologies"; "Theory and Philosophy of Politics, History and Methodology of Political Science" and "Political Problems of International Relations, Global and Regional Development".

When it comes to building and fostering the identity of political science, national PS associations represent a suitable indicator of the strength of the PS community in a given country. Estonian political scientists formed a short-lived Association of Political Science in the early 1990s. However, members of a small and internationally highly mobile community of Estonian political scientists soon ceased to believe in the need to engage in collective action or collective interest representation. Rather, Estonian political scientists prioritize institutional, not individual, membership of international PS entities (e.g. institutional membership of the European Consortium for Political Research, of the European University Institute, etc.).

In 1991, scholars from Vilnius and Kaunas established the Lithuanian Political Science Association (LPA). The LPA was one of the frst from Central Eastern Europe to join the IPSA in 1994. The LPA is a selfgoverning organization representing the interests and ethics of political scientists in Lithuania. The LPA currently has around 70 members, including lecturers at Lithuanian universities, politicians, journalists and representatives of other professions. The LPA's annual conferences (usually held in November) attract interest not only from the PS community but also from a wider audience including leading national media fgures as well as European, national and local politicians. There is also the Lithuanian Public Administration Training Association, which was established in 1998 and which regularly holds thematic conferences and seminars. In addition, there are a number of civic organizations that bring together political scientists and representatives of the humanities and other social sciences. The presence and activity of such inter-disciplinary forums is an additional sign of their professional vitality and social relevance. For example, the Lithuanian Santara-Šviesa association (founded in the USA during the Cold War) organizes annual conferences where political scientists, along with other intellectuals and artists, give presentations and refect on current public affairs.

The Association of Moldovan Political Scientists (AMPS) was set up in 1992 when it launched the professional journal *Moldoscopie*. In 2004, a rival entity, the Foreign Policy Association of the Republic of Moldovan (FPARM) was registered. However, the activities of the two professional associations, founded by lecturers at the Moldova State University, were of a certain intensity during their early lives only. *Moldoscopie* was renamed *Revista Moldoscopie* and is currently published by a private university—the Constantin Stere University of Political and Economic European Studies. FPARM is specialized in international relations. It should be said that the national community of political scientists of Moldova is divided on the question of (geo) political preferences. For example, the Association of Historians and Political Scientists "Pro Moldova", established in 2014, has supported President Igor Dodon in the 2016 presidential elections, together with the Eurasian geopolitical direction taken by the country's development. The pro-Russian association was established by a narrow group of politically engaged researchers (most of them Russian speakers), who departed from the general line of Moldova's PS community. In fact, the "Pro Moldova" illustrates the scale of corruption of political scientists by politics; that is, it reveals the substantial impact of the pressure exerted by politicians on the academic community in general and on political scientists in particular.

The Belarusian Association of Political Sciences (BAPS) was established in 1993 and formally still exists today. However, the Association performs almost no public activities. Until about 2018 another association also existed in the country, namely the "Belarusian Academy of Political Sciences"; however, this second association only really existed on paper. The situation of Belarus' PS associations demonstrates the lack of professional unity and the weakness of professional communication among political scientists, in Belarus.

The identity of PS is shaped by the job prospects and places of work of political science graduates from Lithuania, Estonia, Moldova and Belarus. According to the experts, the most common areas of employment for PS graduates in Lithuania and Estonia are public administration, the governing institutions of the EU and other international organizations. PS graduates are also visible in Estonia and Lithuania's national parliaments, local councils and mass media. In Moldova, most political science graduates fnd jobs in the mass media, different types of NGOs and the political or electoral consultancy sector.

In Belarus, the situation is not as clear, since PS departments do not gather (or do not share) data on their alumni. The graduates may fnd jobs in public administration as well as in business enterprises. CSOs or think tanks employ some of the graduates, while others follow academic careers, either in Belarus or abroad. However, the majority of such graduates take up careers that are not related to political science (business, art, etc.). Having a dual degree, for a considerable number of PS graduates become lawyers. It should be noted that thirty years after the fall of communism, in Belarus the practice inherited from the Soviet times, that is, the socalled frst-job mandatory placement (*objazatel'noe raspredelenie*), still exists. Graduates are expected to work for two years at the workplace designated following their graduation.

An analysis of the four components of PS' identity (a clear separation of PS from other academic subjects, the activities of professional PS associations, visibility in the media and at public events, and fnally, the favourable job prospects of PS graduates) reveals the different situations in the four post-Soviet countries examined here. In Estonia, the identity of PS derives from the existence of an island of professional excellence, highquality PhD programmes and research, and a limited presence in the public sphere. In Lithuania, the discipline thrives at the educational, research and public presence levels. Political scientists are often important political observers who improve the standards of political debate and who are also experts advising on the country's public affairs. Due to their prestige, PS graduates from both EU countries—Estonia and Lithuania—have relatively good career prospects in diverse professional felds.

In Moldova, the situation is much grimmer. The establishment of PS' identity is hampered by at least two factors. Firstly, the precarious economic situation and demographic crisis which has led to a deterioration in the quality of teaching and research and to a fall in student numbers (not only in the feld of PS). Secondly, national politicians have interfered in the agenda of the professional PS community, with the purpose of promoting the interests of specifc political fgures and parties.

Although PS programmes are formally run at diverse academic levels (including that of PhDs) and at several HE institutions, PS in Belarus is not really established as a separate academic discipline. Political scientists are not considered as representing any specifc professional category. PS is confned to its own narrow community and boasts neither positive public visibility nor encouraging career prospects for graduates. Typically, PS in Belarus is placed in the "custody" of law faculties and lawyers' communities (which themselves have to abide by the dictates of the authoritarian regime and go along with the absence of the rule of law).

# 5 Measuring the Autonomy of Political Science

Chapter 2 emphasizes the fact that autonomy is an internally driven property and that the autonomy of the profession is inherently related to the autonomy of individual "professionals". To achieve autonomy the profession requires decisional independence in several areas, such as making decisions concerning enrolment, promotion and hiring, concerning relevant professional activities and their priorities, the inclusion (or exclusion) of various subfelds and so on. Overall, the profession should be able to defne and apply standards of institutional and personal performance. Evidently, in the governance of a complex contemporary academic sector, the rules establishing what PS, as an academic discipline, is supposed to do, achieve and perform, is substantially infuenced by the broad—and changing—socio-political environment. However, PS can maintain its relative autonomy if the university itself boasts professionalism, that is, if those at the top of the academic structure are also part of the profession. In addition, the autonomy of PS is enhanced if political researchers are in a good market position and can be independent, if they do not have to run for different clients or accept patronage positions. In other words, in order to duly measure the autonomy of PS, both its institutional and individual components must be considered.

Therefore, in this section, we examine the autonomy of PS in Estonia, Lithuania, Moldova and Belarus using a series of empirical indicators. These indicators include the fnancial resources available measured by the share of national GDP allocated to research in general; the rules governing the allocation of funding to PS units and PS research projects; the degree of control over who is to be considered a political scientist (upon their entry to the PS community), and over their performance. The decisional autonomy of PS as a discipline manifests itself at different levels. At the highest level, we can measure the degree to which universities or research institutes are independent from the government in general. At the middle level, we should observe whether PS faculties and departments are independent from their respective universities' administrators (e.g. whether PS staff can shape the content of courses or research projects) and from their various social partners. Also, the presence and scope of public agencies regulating HE and research activities and including (or otherwise) representatives of PS communities (such as Research Councils or Academies of Science) should be taken into account.

The share of national GDP allocated to research in the four post-Soviet European states is a good proxy, as higher values of this indicator point to better conditions for research funding, which in turn contributes to the greater fnancial autonomy of researchers (in any academic feld). In Estonia, the share of research funding as a percentage of GDP in 2018 stood at 0.8%. It had fallen from 1% in previous years due to infation and overall stagnation. In Lithuania, the value of this indicator is also 0.8%. Lithuanian politicians acknowledge the problem, and regularly promise to increase the said share. In Moldova, it stood at 0.2% in 2019 and the recent trend is towards a further decrease in that fgure (Cuciureanu & Minciună, 2019). In Belarus, the share of national GDP allocated to research in 2018 was 0.61%. The share had been decreasing since 2010 when it was 0.67% of GDP (Belstat, 2019).

With regard to the funding of PS research, the situation in the four countries is no less problematic. In Estonia, the situation had deteriorated when the so-called institutional research grants were replaced by individual project grants in 2015. This step led to ferce competition among scholars and to a general decrease in the amount of money allocated for research. EU support is promoted as an alternative source of funding; however, EU grants require research to offer a practical contribution to either policy-making or society as a whole, which is seen as an obstacle by scholars interested in cutting-edge academic research. The Estonian Research Council (ERC) is a special public agency dealing with the allocation of research funds.

In Lithuania, most public research funding (including EU structural loans) is allocated by the Research Council of Lithuania (RCL). The RCL makes decisions on the selection of research projects, researcher internships and the funding of academic events. Political scientists are chairs of several RCL committees, and outstanding PS researchers are frequently recruited as experts. Under a series of competitive national schemes, PS research has a comparatively signifcant likelihood of receiving funding. For example, during the 2015–2020 period the RCL has allocated around 8,300,000 euros to 90 research team projects in the social sciences and humanities. Of these, 10 projects have been in the feld of PS (either as the main or a secondary research feld), and their share of the aforesaid total funding amounts to 8.3% (around 700,000 euro).9

In Moldova, the National Agency of Research and Development (NARD) is the national institutional structure in charge of competitionbased funding for research and innovation which provides funding to all research areas. Alternative forms of funding are rare, and the bulk of fnancial resources is allocated to budgeted institutional projects undertaken by teams of researchers. During the 2015–2019 period, around 330,000 euros were allocated, in each of those years, to 14 research projects in PS (as a main or secondary research feld). The funded research projects include institutional thematic projects, bilateral research projects (conducted jointly with similar institutions in Italy, Belarus and Romania), and projects for young researchers, while grants were also awarded to fund the organization of international conferences and the publication of scientifc monographs. The largest institutional thematic projects (with annual budgets ranging from 10,000 to 120,000 euro) address issues of European integration and its different aspects that are of particular pertinence to Moldova. Smaller projects (with an annual budget of 4000–9000 euro) address issues of governance, public administration and regional development (Expertonline Moldova).

In Belarus, there are two major channels for the funding of science and research: through specifc institutions (institutional support), and via governmental programmes (Kazakevich & Goroshko, 2019). The total funds available (for all areas of research) amount to about 2–4 million euros per year. Following the Soviet model, the Belarusian National Academy of Sciences (NAS) dominates the feld of science and research. The NAS receives funds from the state budget and distributes them through the Belarusian Republican Foundation for Fundamental Research (BRFFR). The BRFFR allocates these resources for a two-year period in accordance with offcially designated and approved national research priorities, through so-called open calls for tender (in reality, no genuine competition between projects is actually possible). In general, the activities of the

<sup>9</sup>This information was provided by the administrator of the RCL to one of the co-authors of this chapter.

BRFFR are not transparent, and no information is provided regarding the amounts or recipients of grants. Noteworthy is the fact that the NAS itself is one of the main grant recipients (Kazakevich & Goroshko, 2019). Apart from the state budget, there are almost no other sources of funding for PS research in Belarus. Alternative think tanks totally depend on international funding.

As to the rules governing the allocation of funding to academic units, Estonia has adopted a clear top-down performance-based scheme of budgeted funding from the Ministry of Education and Research to the universities, and subsequently to the individual research groups concerned. In Lithuania, the Ministry of Higher Education, Science and Sport is responsible for the funding of the country's universities; funds are distributed based on performance evaluation. Further schemes for the intra-university allocation of funds depend on the universities' internal policies. Moldova also complies with the principle of the autonomy of universities and follows similar patterns to Estonia and Lithuania in terms of resource allocation to universities. As regards the funding in Belarus, all state-run universities receive money from the national budget. HEIs further distribute receipts according to their priorities. Financially, faculties heavily depend on university administrations, which set the rules of the game (Chulitskaya, 2021).

Summing up, we may conclude that when it comes to the allocation of funding, in three of the four countries (Estonia, Lithuania and Moldova) the institutional schemes are pretty straightforward: top-down, performance-based principles of funding distribution from the ministries to the universities prevail. Belarus also has a top-down system of resource allocation; however, the principle of performance evaluation is not applied. Although Belarus has a national agency of research management (BRFFR), its tenders are mainly focused on natural and exact sciences, while the humanities and social sciences (including PS) are somewhat neglected.

The decisional autonomy of PS could also be measured by the degree of control over the members of academia when they enter the profession (i.e. who is accepted as a political scientist), the performance stage (i.e. individual or institutional level evaluations) and promotion (i.e. tenure track requirements or other upward career arrangements). We adhere to the postulate, presented in Chap. 2, that the greater the degree of external control over higher education and research institutions, the more limited their autonomy. When comparing the four post-Soviet European countries in terms of the degree of control exercised by PS institutions at the entry stage, what we see is that in all four countries the requirements for political scientists are set at faculty or department level. However, in Belarus, there are also governmental regulations in place. Individual performance is evaluated at both department and university levels in Lithuania and Belarus, although in the latter case this evaluation is of a rather formal nature. In Estonia, the task of individual evaluation is assigned to university departments, while in Moldova it is conducted at the university level. The institutional performance of the universities is evaluated by governmental institutions in Lithuania, Moldova and Belarus. Meanwhile, in Estonia, institutional performance assessment is conducted internally at the university level. The promotion of political scientists is supervised at department and university levels in Lithuania and Belarus. In Estonia, the rules governing the promotion of political scientists (as well as academics from other academic felds) are set at the university level. In Moldova, such rules are set by the government.

The Estonian and Lithuanian higher education sectors are dominated by result-based accountability. Higher education and research institutions are free to choose which study or research programmes to pursue, but study programmes must meet certain quality criteria (set and monitored by the national centres for quality assessment in HE). Individual and institutional research performance is measured by the number of scientifc articles published in prestigious journals and by prestigious publishing houses. In Estonia, internationally acknowledged English language outlets are prioritized. In Lithuania, publications in the Lithuanian language and on "Lithuanian themes", together with publications in prestigious Western journals, are both encouraged. Accountability in teaching and research in Estonia and Lithuania is guaranteed by a mechanism of competition among national and international universities. The national universities are encouraged to achieve higher standards by operating in an environment where they must strive to attract more students (both from within the country and from abroad) and to receive more funding for research. It should be noted that such mechanisms of accountability do not signifcantly diminish the autonomy of universities and research institutes. However, there is another way of ensuring the accountability of studies and research; this is implemented in Belarus and, to a partial degree, in Moldova as well, and involves limiting the freedom that universities and research institutions have to decide which study or research programmes are to be pursued. In such cases, the ministries responsible for HE and research impose plans on universities and research institutes regarding which courses are to be offered, the number of specialists to be trained and the areas in which research is to be conducted. Estonia and Lithuania are characterized by better accountability assurance measures, which leads to the greater autonomy of their universities and research institutes. On the other hand, accountability assurance is more centralized in Moldova and Belarus, resulting in the limited autonomy of universities, and in particular of research institutes.

To sum up, in Estonia, the PS profession (just like other academic professions) enjoys the highest degree of decisional autonomy in regard to the recruitment and promotion of its members. In Lithuania, the political science community, like other academic communities, enjoys a rather lower degree of autonomy. However, the identity and prestige of PS in Lithuania are very strong, and this allows PS to thrive despite its somewhat limited autonomy. In Moldova, the decisional autonomy of the PS profession is signifcantly curtailed by economic shortages, although these are mitigated by special research funding which is of crucial importance for Moldova's statecraft. The situation in the separatist region of Transnistria (the Tiraspol University) is even more diffcult, since the entire region is confict-ridden and underfnanced, and is not only in the HE domain. In Belarus, state surveillance and control of PS in public universities are allpervasive. It is questionable whether PS can be considered an academic discipline, practiced openly, in Belarus in 2020. PS as such exists in private institutions (think tanks), but these are very dependent on external funding and unstable human resources. The case of Belarus gives rise to a rather provocative question: could political science disappear as such in the future, to go back to being something resembling the scientifc communism of former Soviet times?

# 6 Conclusion

Compared to the situation in Western countries, PS as an academic discipline in the four former USSR countries (Estonia, Lithuania, Moldova and Belarus) is something of a latecomer. In these countries, it only emerged in 1990 after the fall of communism, the complete disintegration of the USSR and the changes in the system of education. Thirty years later, the four post-Soviet European states examined here boast PS as a national institutional construct and professional practice. However, PS, which in the four countries in question began life from the same impoverished basis (that of "scientifc communism" and ideologically biased system of education) in the 1990s, took rather diverse trajectories and currently faces frequent country-specifc challenges. The four countries have quite different *political sciences* from the point of view of the identity, autonomy and future prospects of the discipline. Democracy, pro-Western geopolitical settings and the shorter period of *Sovietisation* contributed to the faster, more sustainable development of the discipline in two Baltic States (Estonia and Lithuania). In Moldova, on the other hand, its uncertain geopolitical orientation and a series of serious internal political conficts (including the unresolved confict in Transnistria and the country's demographic and economic crises) have led to the weak identity of political science and to questionable prospects for its further institutionalization. PS fnds itself in the most precarious situation in authoritarian Belarus: in that country, this academic discipline exists within a hostile political environment and under a hierarchical system of governance.

In Estonia, we observe a tendency towards the growing complexity of PS as an academic discipline. In Lithuania, PS tends to absorb and incorporate subfelds of increasing diversity. In Moldova, PS as an academic discipline has undergone a process of fragmentation closely interconnected with the decrease of students and public funding. The prospects for PS in Belarus are still unclear, as it currently does not have any clear subfelds, and risks further marginalization and decline. In Belarus, PS as an academic discipline crucially lacks autonomy, while the PS community is split between those who support and those who oppose, the current regime (Lukashenka). The non-democratic leader of the country de facto imposes his own outdated pro-Soviet vision of the system of ideological education which vividly interferes with PS developments. The tiny window of opportunities for the different paths of the discipline's development may open in case of liberal political changes.

In Estonia, political developments since the 2000s (neoliberalism with elements of ethno-democracy) have led to the retrenchment of PS. Demographic decline has further aggravated this situation. Changes in the tuition fee system for Estonian-language education, launched by the centre-right party *Pro Patria*, have resulted in the loss of opportunities to earn additional revenue from tuition fees. The country's university administrations have had to downsize their departments and study programmes. At the same time, the reform of HE has prompted some disciplines, including PS, to become more international and recruit more students and researchers through English-language study programmes and cuttingedge research projects.

HE system reforms and changes have also had an impact on PS in Lithuania. One of the most important innovations in the feld of HE is the thorough implementation of unifed standards of research assessment and a universal system of evaluation of the quality of study programmes. The Lithuanian policy of standardizing the evaluation of educational quality has had a generally positive effect on PS, as it has raised the quality of education and furthered the internationalization of PS study programmes. Similarly, the enhanced role of the National Research Council of Lithuania (RCL), which allocates funding for research, including in the feld of PS, has also had a positive impact.

In Moldova, the reforms carried out at the national level have had a rather negative impact on PS. As a result of the control exercised by the newly established National Agency for Research and Development (NARD), PS is now experiencing direct political pressure. As a result of the organized in 2018 by the NARD competition for scientifc projects, since January 2020 around 40% of social science units (including PS) have received no share of budget funding. This situation resulted in a strike by the professional community at the beginning of 2020, while at the same time social scientists faced severe critics and accusation of being politically engaged agents from the prime minister. A new impetus of pro-Western developments in Moldova is expected after the election of pro-EU Maia Sandu—who has training in management and political science, obtained in Moldova and the USA—to the position of the president of the country in autumn 2020. However, experts envision that in the upcoming years, state funding of PS may be reduced even further and the prospects of PS maturation as an academic discipline might not improve signifcantly.

Belarus is the extreme case among the four analysed countries, in terms of the degree of political interference in HE. The Belarusian system of higher education has been constantly subjected to change; however, since the Soviet period, no full-scale reforms have ever been implemented. The conditional inclusion of Belarus in the European High Education Area (EHEA) in 2015 has not produced any improvement in this situation; the universities lack any degree of autonomy, and academic freedoms are regularly violated. PS is supposed to produce political socialization and authoritarian propaganda, just as "scientifc communism" did decades ago in the USSR. However, due to the lack of any professional identity, comprehensive study programmes and career prospects for graduates, PS in Belarus has never been, and is still not, capable of playing such a role. The split of PS professional community became especially vivid during the 2020 anti-Lukashenka protest movement when a minor part of faculties' staff (the Faculty of International Relations of BSU in particular) and many of those in think tanks publicly expressed their support of pro-democratic changes, while the majority of political scientists at public universities remain silent.

To conclude, currently despite all of the challenges and diffculties Estonia and Lithuania are faced with, they are getting closer to the Western patterns of "PS as a science of democracy", they are actively involved in international research projects and their PS communities are viable concerns. In Lithuania, political scientists experience great publicity and are active not in the professional research and expert activities but in the politics as such.

In Moldova, while PS is a clearly identifed academic discipline and professional community is involved in international cooperation, political interference in academia and geopolitical uncertainties together with internal (frst of all) demographic and socio-economic challenges mean that the road ahead is likely to be a diffcult one. In Belarus, PS is split between state-run universities and alternative think tanks, and the PS community is heavily infuenced by the country's Soviet past and by the current hostile, authoritarian political environment. International cooperation in the feld of research and education in PS with the western partners is non-essential and Russia is still the most popular partner for the public universities.

# References


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# The Institutionalisation of Political Science in Post-Yugoslav States: Continuities and New Beginnings

*Davor Boban and Ivan Stanojević*

# 1 Introduction

The politics of those states that emerged after the break-up of Yugoslavia has been widely covered in the media and in the literature. Wars, interethnic violence, political transitions, and the establishment of undemocratic regimes in this region have been divulged to a worldwide audience. However, the scientifc discipline dealing with politics in these states is much less well known. The aim of the present chapter is to rectify this situation somewhat by investigating the institutionalization of political science in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia, Serbia, and Slovenia since the

D. Boban (\*)

Faculty of Political Science, University of Zagreb, Zagreb, Croatia e-mail: dboban@fpzg.hr

I. Stanojević

Faculty of Political Science, University of Belgrade, Belgrade, Serbia e-mail: ivan.stanojevic@fpn.bg.ac.rs

<sup>©</sup> The Author(s) 2022 87

G. Ilonszki, C. Roux (eds.), *Opportunities and Challenges for New and Peripheral Political Science Communities*, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-79054-7\_4

inception of this particular discipline in the 1960s. Although some country case studies are available, regarding Slovenia and Croatia in particular, there is no comprehensive comparative analysis available. We do not claim that this chapter addresses everything; however, we do believe it is the frst comparative study of the institutionalisation of the discipline in these states.

Our goal is to reveal the similarities and differences between the discipline in the four countries in question. We wish to establish why the institutionalisation of political science in these post-Yugoslav states produced different outcomes in terms of stability and autonomy. We have chosen these aspects of institutionalisation since they offer the opportunity to examine patterns not only in the post-1990 decades in relation to the four countries but also over the longer time period: that is, the status of political science in Yugoslavia prior to 1990, compared to that of the posttransition period. We expect to fnd traits of possible autonomy during the Yugoslav period, in terms of the profession's internal decision-making, while the external constraints on the profession often changed as the regime itself changed. We believe that the analysis of the position of political science during the autocratic Yugoslav period might be indicative of the state of political science in several current regimes that cannot be regarded as democratic, such as that of Belarus.

In the following two sections we will try to establish how political science was institutionalised during two different historical periods—the Communist Yugoslav period frst and the post-communist post-Yugoslav period thereafter. In view of the aforementioned frst three decades, we assume that 1990 was not the discipline's 'Year Zero'; furthermore, the four republics already displayed differences during the autocratic period, which subsequently contributed to the discipline's later development in different directions after the fall of Communism.

Our concluding remarks serve principally as a guideline for further research in the feld. If we manage to answer the chapter's research question, namely how political science persists and develops to different degrees under autocratic and democratic regimes, this could aid our understanding of the autonomy of political science under Communist and post-Communist political systems, as well as in some contemporary authoritarian states.

# 2 The Foundation and Development of Political Science During the Communist Yugoslav Period, 1948–1990

The development of political science in Yugoslavia during the Communist period lasted from 1948 to the frst multi-party elections held in 1990. Our aim is to investigate three aspects of such development, namely the causes of this process; the kind of autonomy political science institutions acquired during this period; and the legacy that the new independent states inherited, which could explain their differences during the post-1990 period.

#### *2.1 Conception of Political Science*

Political science in the former Yugoslavia was neatly interwoven with the goals and interests of the political regime. After Yugoslavia's split from the Soviet Union in 1948, not even the reconciliation of Tito and Khrushchev in 1955 could bring Yugoslavia back into the Soviet bloc. Prpić claims, that at that time Yugoslavia had two options: to become part of the West and thus risk bringing about the fall of the Communist regime or to proclaim its 'original' version of Communism in contrast to Stalinism (Prpić, 2002, p. 58). Only the latter option would have preserved the regime, and so a unique ideology of Socialist self-management that rejected the Soviet model was established. The Communist Party—SKJ1—declared, in its 1958 Program, its intention to develop social science in order to contribute towards this aim (Fink-Hafner, 2002a, p. 358; Grdešić, 1996, p. 406; Pavlović, 2010, p. 251, 2018; Smiljković, 2018; Vujacič ́, 2013; Zajc, 2015, p. 478). This decision permitted the subsequent conception of political science, although its development turned to be a gradual, multidimensional process, with the political regime having a substantial impact on Yugoslavia's academia.

Although several institutions were established immediately after the end of WWII, mainly to educate party offcials on political issues, such as the School for Journalism and Diplomacy (1948–1952/1953), the

<sup>1</sup>The Communist Party of Yugoslavia (*Komunisticka partija Jugoslavije* ̌ , KPJ) changed its name in 1952 to become the League of Communists of Yugoslavia (*Savez komunista Jugoslavije*, SKJ). The SKJ had branches with similar names in every republic, such as the League of Communists of Macedonia (SKM), and so on.


**Table 4.1** The genesis of political science institutions in Yugoslavia

Source: Authors' own research fndings

Institute of Social Sciences (1948–1953), and the Party's Higher School 'Djuro Djaković' (1945–1954) (Pavlović, 2018), these were not true predecessors of political science. In contrast to these schools, the regime's intention with the 1958 Program was to provide higher quality education to politicians and others who were destined to work in government, the administration and other areas of political and social life (Smiljković, 2018; Benko, 2011, p. 20). It also aimed to foster a research of the Yugoslavian 'self-management' system and to offer insightful ideas for its further development. Table 4.1 shows the genesis of this institutional development in Sarajevo, Zagreb, Belgrade, and Ljubljana, respectively, the capital cities of the four Yugoslav Federal Republics—Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Serbia, and Slovenia—analysed here.

Firstly, Colleges of Political Sciences2 were established in the capital cities of the three Yugoslav federal republics in the early 1960s and subsequently transformed into Faculties of Political Sciences. Only the Faculty of Political Sciences3 in Zagreb, set up in 1962 (*Fakultet politickih nauka* ̌ , hereafter FPZG),4 was established without previous existence of a College

2For decades, the term 'political science' was used in its plural form ('political sciences'). This was not only the case of Yugoslav and post-Yugoslav institutions, but of other European institutions too. Other examples include the *Wydział Nauk Politycznych i Studiów Miedzynarodowych* ̨ in Warsaw, where 'Nauk Politycznych' means 'political sciences'.

<sup>3</sup> It was present in the plural form, and still is, in the names of university departments in four states. Nevertheless, in more recent times the English version of their names usually comprises the singular form—political science.

<sup>4</sup> In 1992 it was renamed *Fakultet politickih znanosti u Zagrebu* ̌ , FPZG. The term 'nauka' in its name was replaced by the word 'znanost', a synonym which is more often used in modern Croatian. In this chapter, we use the acronym FPZG for the entire period examined here, so as to avoid confusion with the faculties of political science in Yugoslavia and in post-Yugoslav states, which were given the same name and acronym—*Fakultet politickih nauka* ̌

and from the very beginning was a university department of political science, frst one in Yugoslavia, and probably in the entire Communist world, although the College of Political Sciences in Belgrade was the frst academic institution of its kind in Yugoslavia.

Within a couple of years, in addition to the FPZG, a scientifc journal *C*̌ *asopis Politicka misao* ̌ [Political Thought] began publication, together with a book series *Biblioteka Politicka misao* ̌ [Political Thought], both products of the FPZG.

There were major differences between the Colleges and Faculties in terms of the enrolment process, study programs, and autonomy. First, the Colleges only enrolled party offcials, at least in the case of the frst three entry cohorts, as was the case of Ljubljana's College (Benko, 2011, p. 20); in doing so, they retained 'elite' status, whereas Faculties were open to all high-school graduates (Č upić, 2018; Pavlović, 2010, p. 251; Prpić, 2002, p. 51). Secondly, the length of study programs differed, from three years at Colleges to four years at Faculties. Finally, the Faculties enjoyed some independence in setting their curriculum, with courses established by their staff rather than by Party organs (Prpić, 2002, p. 51). Their academic curricula included theories related to politics and political science as well as theories concerning practical social, partisan, and statecraft issues; however, their study felds still had to meet the ideological requirements of the Communist Party (Č upić, 2018).

#### *2.2 The Building of the Discipline*

The initial period was important for the subsequent development of the discipline, but it was not enough for its success. Both external factors (outside of academia) and internal factors (staff working at institutions) contributed to its further development and accounted for some of its diffculties. These factors were often interconnected, and in the following decades, it became clear that the 'status and development of political science could indeed be used as an indicator of the democratization process in the country: the more freedom for research and teaching, the more liberal was the political situation—and vice versa' (Grdešić, 1996, p. 407).

(FPN). Only Ljubljana had a Faculty of Sociology, Political Science, and Journalism (*Fakulteta za sociologijo, politicne vede in novinarstvo* ̌ , FSPN). In this chapter, we use the acronym FDV for the whole period analysed here. This institution changed its name to the Faculty of Social Sciences (*Fakulteta za družbene vede*, FDV) in 1991.

A major internal problem in the 1960s was staff expertise. At that time, professors, lecturers, and researchers had not been trained as political scientists. Consequently, the study programs of new institutions offered courses that only partly concerned political science, and generally in conjunction with other social sciences and humanities, including philosophy, economy, law, sociology, and history. Nevertheless, as Table 4.2 shows, with a concrete curriculum, this study feld incorporated a number of acknowledged areas of political science and offered a broad outlook.


**Table 4.2** Courses comprising the temporary political science programme at the FPZG Zagreb in the academic year 1962–1963

Source: Smailagić, 1964, pp. 116–117, translated from Croatian to English by the authors

One way to foster the development of the discipline was to accept the examples and new tendencies of countries with a certain tradition of political science, particularly western countries. Offcials from the College in Ljubljana had already established contacts with Uppsala University in Sweden and a higher school for administration and political science in Paris during the 1960s, and were trying to use their experience for the beneft of the Ljubljana School (Benko, 2011, p. 21).5 These contacts were limited however.

Despite achievements, there was a limited degree of autonomy due to the fact that the presence of Marxist ideology in all research and teaching was something that impacted the whole academic community, leaving no room for alternative views on the part of individual political scientists. Nevertheless, it was in fact possible to fnd ways of criticising the country's political and social situation without necessarily being expelled from the university. Such criticism was mainly aimed at certain social and political situations, without actually questioning the essential being of the Yugoslav regime, self-management, or Marxism as such. The battle fought by some (but not all) internal actors against external repression is well illustrated by an article published in 1964 in the journal *Politicka misao* ̌ by a lecturer working at the FPZG. He argued that the foundation program and the temporary study plan at this Faculty should '[a]bandon-ideological concepts and open the way for a scientifc approach to establishing and developing political studies as a separate academic feld of human science' (Smailagić, 1964, p. 116; the authors' translation).

One way of overcoming external, largely ideological pressures was to conduct empirical research into the real problems affecting politics and society. In this regard, the situation varied across faculties. The FPN in Sarajevo, for example, conducted three empirical projects during the mid-1960s, including one entitled *The democratization of the electoral process in 1965* (Filandra, 2011, p. 39), which was something unexpected in a Communist autocracy. From the very beginning, the FPZG's task was also to conduct 'periodical empirical research in the feld of socio-political life' (Smailagić, 1964, p. 114). Papers based on empirical research were published in journals like *Politicka misao* ̌ (*Political Thought*) and *Teorija in praksa* (*Theory and Practice*).6 Some even boldly exposed the true

<sup>5</sup>The author does not mention the original French name of this institution.

<sup>6</sup>Articles are available at https://hrcak.srce.hr/politicka-misao and https://www.fdv.unilj.si/revije/znanstvene-revije/teorija-in-praksa. Both journals were established in 1964.

character of 'democracy' in the Communist system7; however, due to the lack of funding and to inexperience in empirical research, most papers tended to be of a descriptive and philosophical nature. In Slovenia, political scientists conducted some empirical research that contrasted with offcial views, together with debates about issues of relevance at that time, such as citizens' rights and freedoms (Zajc, 2015, p. 479). Nevertheless, Bibic argues that Slovenian political science's 'main defcits…were to be ̌ seen in its excessively normative stand as to political reality and in terms of prevailing ideological and normative premises, a rather too limited empirical research performance, and a relative absence of attention to certain important areas of study' (Bibic, ̌ 1996, p. 428). The FPN in Belgrade developed along different lines from the other three faculties, and a clear decline in its status can be observed. Furthermore, the failure of market reforms in Yugoslavia, and especially in Serbia, in the early 1970s, also had a detrimental effect. The Yugoslav federal government ousted the 'liberals' from the Serbian government, and restricted the autonomy of the university.8 This turn of events impaired the development of empirical disciplines and effectively put an end to empirical research in political science in Serbia until the fall of Communism (Pavlović, 2010).

The discipline's autonomy heavily depended on the political situation in each Yugoslav republic, since the degree of political openness and the level of political freedom in republic varied signifcantly. The political systems of the six Yugoslav republics9 and two autonomous provinces10 were generally organised on the same principles, but political practices were not

7Zvonarević, Kljaić, and Šiber were employees of the Institute for Social Research in Zagreb who in 1966 published an article in *Politicka misao* ̌ based on their study of voters' knowledge of candidates in the local elections held in Zagreb in 1965. The authors used questionnaires and interviews, and one of their conclusions was that: 'More than half of the voters (52%) asked to name at least one candidate from the electoral list was unable to do so. This clearly shows that voters did not choose in the full sense of the word between the proposed candidates, but formally responded [acted] to fulfl their "civic" duty' (p. 86; translated by the authors of this chapter). The article reveals a degree of freedom available at that time, with this particular research project's fndings indirectly criticising the electoral process in Yugoslavia under the Communist regime. The researchers in question did not have to face any consequences for that the publication of their conclusions. On the contrary, Šiber was later appointed Professor at the FPZG.

8For more details, see (Đukić, 1990).

<sup>9</sup> In addition to our four cases, there were a further two republics concerned: Macedonia and Montenegro.

10Vojvodina and Kosovo.

identical, and in some cases were substantially different. This affected the degree of authoritarianism in each part of Yugoslavia, and consequently different levels of freedom of speech, research, and teaching existed at the various universities. In Slovenia, the situation was better than elsewhere due to this republic's greater openness to the West (Zajc, 2015, p. 478); however, even Slovenia did not enjoy anything like the levels of freedom seen in the West. The 1970s were called 'the leaden years' for good reason.

Limited liberalization started after Tito's death in the 1980s, and this was refected in academia too, albeit with mixed results. Eye-catching achievements and increasing uncertainty prevailed in equal measure. Widespread public discussions were conducted in the 1980s regarding two books published by professors working at the FPZG in Zagreb, and engendered considerable interest. The volumes in question were *Sistem i kriza* [The System and Crisis] by Jovan Mirić and *Nacela federalizma* ̌ *višenacionalne države* [The Principles of Multinational State Federalism] by Zvonko Lerotić. Book *Interesi i ideje u SKJ* [Interests and Ideas in the League of Communists of Yugoslavia] was published in 1989 by a group of lecturers at the FPZG on the basis of their empirical research. It was based on research of interests and ideas of the delegates at The First Conference of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia in 1988 conducted by group of professors and assistants from the FPZG. The FDV in Ljubljana witnessed a decline in the number of students and professors of political science during the 1980s, due to a lack of interest in the discipline and owing to the fact that a number of professors left the FDV to work in other faculties (Fink-Hafner, 2002a, pp. 359–360). The FPN in Belgrade did not produce any signifcant books or other publications that could be said to have made any signifcant contribution to the discipline's development (Pavlović, 2010). A similar situation prevailed at the FPN in Sarajevo. We can conclude that political science experienced a number of ups and downs during this period. Its development followed different lines at the four faculties in question. The greatest achievements were the establishment of the discipline, the fact that some empirical research could be conducted into Yugoslavia's political institutions, and into religion and ethnicity, particularly in BiH, and the training of a new generation of political scientists who were to join the academic staff at the four faculties. Some of them even spent some time at Western universities, where they studied non-Marxist ideas and got to know the state of the discipline in the West.

# 3 The Institutionalisation of Political Science During the 1990–2020 Period: The Shift Towards Greater Divergence

The foundation of new independent states in 1991–1992, followed by wars and the formation of autocracies/hybrid regimes/defective democracies in the following decade, hindered the institutionalisation of political science and led to increased diversifcation of the discipline among the new states. Four republics declared independence in 1991 and 1992, while Serbia and Montenegro initially formed a joint republic which lasted until Montenegro declared independence in 2006. The Ten-Day War in Slovenia in June-July 1991 was very different from the lengthy wars fought in Croatia (1991–1995), BiH (1992–1995), and Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, joint state of Serbia and Montenegro (1998–1999), with the latter also being involved in wars in Croatia and BiH, and Croatia being involved in the war in BiH. Slovenia had been the most economically advanced republic in communist Yugoslavia, and has remained so until the present day, becoming a member of the EU and NATO in 2004. The other three states struggled with transition and achieved different levels of political, economic, and social development (see Table 4.3).

The development of political science after 1990 was a multidimensional process, ranging from the establishment of new subfelds to the incorporation of new academic staff. Under the above-mentioned conditions, state funding was not at all suffcient.

Above, we observed several differences between the four seminal faculties during the communist period. We presume that in the post-Communist period, when external factors impacting the four states have increasingly diverged, these differences will have become even greater. In order to establish what differences have emerged among the four states and why, we will focus our analysis on the measures of stability and autonomy presented in Table 4.4.

#### *3.1 Stability*

#### *Institutions and Students*

Probably the easiest way to understand the patterns of divergence is in terms of the number of higher education institutions and their respective dynamism. The liberalization of higher education in the 2000s brought an


**Table 4.3** Economic and demographic developments since 1990

Source: for GDP per capita for Croatia, Serbia, and Slovenia in 2019: *Eurostat* (https://ec.europa.eu/ eurostat/databrowser/view/sdg\_08\_10/default/table?lang=en), for Bosnia and Herzegovina in 2019: *The World Bank* (https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.PCAP.CD?end=2018&locations=BA &start=2016). For all in 1990: *Country economy* (https://countryeconomy.com). We have used the EUR/USD exchange rate from 31.12.2019

HDI: The United Nations Development Programme (http://hdr.undp.org/en/countries) accessed on 29.08.2020—Gini index: The World Bank estimate (https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SI.POV. GINI) accessed on 29.08.2020

For Freedom house index The Freedom House Country Status https://freedomhouse.org/sites/ default/fles/2020-02/ABRIDGED\_FH\_FITW\_2019\_Report\_FINAL.pdf (accessed on 29.08.2020)



Source: Authors' own framework.

a Funding is intrinsic to all measures end of the state monopoly in this sector. A raft of new political science institutions sprung up in all of the post-Yugoslav states, including Kosovo, Montenegro, and North Macedonia, although to a lesser degree in Croatia and Slovenia. There is still only one faculty of political science in the latter two states, both dating back to the Communist period, together with one private institution of higher education in Croatia which offers degrees in international relations and diplomacy. In contrast, Serbia has 4, and BiH has 12, faculties or departments teaching political science or selected subdisciplines thereof (see Table 4.5). Some of them offer study programs covering only one or two sub-felds of political science, mostly international relations which in these four states is widely regarded as a sub-feld of political science.

The proliferation of new institutions can place the institutionalisation of a discipline at risk. While a larger number of institutions and students presumably sustains the discipline in terms of its visibility and performance, such proliferation can also be a handicap if it does not meet proper legal and professional standards. So, a more careful analysis is required of the background to such proliferation and of how it relates to academic and teaching standards.

The frst aspect directly relates to the roots of the rise in the number of new institutions and of students in the new millennium. Such an increase could be the result of governmental policy, rising living standards, labour market demand, or even proft factors. While all these aspects are important, ultimately what matters most is money. Tuition fees are of a mixed nature: they are totally or mostly public in the case of state-owned institutions, while there is no public funding for students' tuition fees in private institutions. Thus, the latter are keen to enrol the highest possible number of students and the least number of tenured professors. The FPN in Belgrade has the largest share of fee-paying students at both BA and MA level. The FPN in Sarajevo follows come in second place at MA level11 (see Tables 4.6 and 4.7). There is an enormous difference between the four states with regard to the MA level: public funding of MA students in Croatia and Slovenia differs considerably from that seen in Belgrade and

11The University of Sarajevo, and therefore the FPN Sarajevo, reached a kind of compromise with the Government that saw a step back being taken in terms of autonomy in 2019. This compromise gives university professors the status of government offcials, and all the benefts that go with such status. The problem is that the Government now has the right to decide on study programmes at university and on the number of students to be enrolled for each programme.


**Table 4.5** Institutions of political science and its subfelds in the four post-Yugoslav states in 2020

Sources: Websites and authors' personal contacts

a It has a three-level programme in international relations and diplomacy, while its postgraduate doctoral programme is run jointly with the University of Zadar


**Table 4.6** Quotas for students enrolled in the frst year of the respective program in 2018/2019 at four seminal faculties for all study programs

Sources: The institution's websites



a Population without Kosovo in 2018. Source: *Statistical Offce of the Republic of Serbia*.

bA share of students enjoy free education; others pay 1000 KM for undergraduate and MA programmes. Sources: *Obavještenje za upis 2018/2019 godina* and *Konkurs za upis kandidata na interdisciplinarni studij III ciklusa (doktorski studij) iz oblasti društvenih nauka u akademskoj 2018/2019. godini*, *Odluka o davanju saglasnosti na visinu participacije cijena usluga, upisina i drugih troškova studija Univerziteta u Sarajevu, te fakulteta i akademija u njegovom sastavu*

c The FPZG considers EU citizens as domestic students. Sarajevo. At the same time, it should be mentioned that only Belgrade offers public funding to PhD students, albeit only a handful, whereas in the other three countries, PhD students have to pay for their studies.

The second issue concerns teaching standards, which might also affect stability. The sharp rise of new institutions in BiH and Serbia has raised questions about the quality of education. It is similar to the situation in the 1960s when it was easy to enrol students into new colleges and faculties, but it was diffcult to enrol skilled staff to teach the programmes. This is a major problem, with some private institutions coming over as 'diploma printers' where students can easily obtain a degree if they just pay the tuition fees and put in minimum effort. While these diplomas are not widely cherished in the labour market, they meet legal requirements for those seeking jobs in state entities or agencies. Some of these institutions do not last though, which qualifes the stability argument as a property of institutionalisation.

Concerns regarding the educational standards do not mean that there is no legal regulation of higher education in these states. For instance, a law (*Zakon o visokom obrazovanju*) regulates higher education in Serbia as well as the foundation of its institutions. A National Accreditation Body works on accreditations, controls the quality of higher education institutions, and evaluates study programmes (Art. 14). However, this body was suspended from the European Association of Accreditation Bodies because of the lack of reaction to cases of plagiarism in Serbia, which also involved certain high-ranking politicians, and in 2020, it still has not been readmitted to this association. Uncertain legal regulations also persist in BiH. For example, one can fnd working and updated websites of universities seemingly operating as active institutions, that do not appear on the List of Accredited Higher Education Institutions of the country's Agency for the Development of Higher Education and Quality Assurance.12 Mention could also be made of the Governments' policies regarding the country's universities, which in some cases were of an authoritarian character, albeit based on existing law. One of the worst things that happened from the point of view of political science and academia in Serbia was the adoption of the Higher Education Law in 1998 (also called the Šešelj's

<sup>12</sup>*List of Accredited Higher Education Institutions*, http://hea.gov.ba/Home. aspx?template\_id=51&pageIndex=1

law13), which aimed to abolish university autonomy and place academics under government control (Skrozza, 2004). It was not until the fall of Milošević in October 2000 and the start of a second phase of transition in Serbia, that Šešelj's Law was abolished.

The rising number of institutions—particularly those established on uncertain foundations—might well raise concerns about the quality of the curriculum as well. An analysis of the study programmes of a number of traditional and newly established institutions14 reveals two basic problems. The frst concerns the composition of the programmes. If the curriculum is diluted by the inclusion of courses from other disciplines, and the number of political science courses is limited, then the programme necessarily becomes 'soft', and its students will get a lower quality of education than their counterparts in study programmes based on well-defned political science curricula. The second problem is that even if the curriculum consists of courses that are nominally the same as, or similar to, the ones offered by esteemed, high-ranking departments of political science, an analysis of their actual content and of what students are in fact provided with would appear to paint a completely different picture: namely one of low-quality teaching, the non-concurrence of classes with the subjects presented in the syllabuses, and lecturers who are not qualifed to teach their assigned courses or indeed are asked to teach too many courses.

#### *Structural Reforms*

The above-mentioned problems concerning the proliferation of new institutions rightly leads to the assumption that structural (internal) reforms are a more important factor in the institutionalisation of the discipline than is the increasing number of institutions. Probably the most important reforms relate to curricula. Curricula reforms were introduced in two distinct periods: the post-Communist 'pre-Bologna period' 1990–2005/2006, and the 'Bologna period' after 2005/2006. The former period was characterised by an almost completely autonomous, intrainstitutional shift from Marxist and 'self-management' ideology to a more diversifed, non-ideological model and the prevalence of internal actors

13Vojislav Šešelj is the leader of the nationalist Serbian Radical Party. Back in the day he was vice-president of the Serbian Government, and was later convicted by the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia.

14Unfortunately, again for the lack of space, we cannot include them in this chapter; however, they can be found on the institutions' own websites.

(inside academia) over external ones (those outside academia, like state agencies or ministries). The latter period, on the other hand, was characterised by a change in the study programme system, along the lines of the European agreement.

Reforms in the four major faculties during this period were characterised by the political, social, and economic situation in which they operated. The FDV in Ljubljana was in a better position than the other three faculties. The introduction of democracy in Slovenia in 1990 opened the way for signifcantly greater academic freedom, and was accompanied by a substantial change in curricula in 1991 and 1992 (Zajc, 2015, p. 480). This was performed autonomously by the FDV (Zajc, 2010, p. 282), where the common social science core of the frst two years of undergraduate study was replaced by specifc political science courses (Fink-Hafner, 2002b, p. 279). The Faculty also changed its name from the Faculty of Sociology, Political Science, and Journalism to the Faculty of Social Sciences (*Fakulteta za družbene vede*, FDV). Although the foundation of political science institutions in the 1960s was stimulated by the regime's needs, Fink-Hafner argues that new the advent of curricula and research at the beginning of the 1990s was encouraged by the need to build a new Slovenian state following the dissolution of Yugoslavia (Fink-Hafner, 2002a, p. 362).

The three other major faculties were marked by the wars their respective countries were involved in during the 1990s, and this made structural reforms more precarious at that time. For example, although the city of Zagreb was mainly spared from the destruction of war, the academic year 1991–1992, which saw the worst of the fghting in the war in Croatia, was basically lost in the case of the FPZG. A number of students and teaching staff were called to arms, no regular classes were held, and the submission and defence of fnal theses (degrees or PhD) was conducted against the backdrop of air-raid sirens. The frst major reform was introduced in 1992, when one of the three study programmes was abolished, this being a remnant of Yugoslav communist doctrine focusing on social mobilization in the case of war (entitled: Total People's Defence and Social Self Protection). The second partial reform that was introduced abolished the courses based on Marxist ideology and established new political science courses. Although this process was not an easy one, it eventually proved rewarding, and the pre-Bologna reforms before 2005 saw continual change, leading to the establishment of new courses and subfelds that had not exist previously, such as the public policy course introduced in around 2000.

The FPN in Sarajevo found itself in the worst situation of the four. The beginning of the war in Spring 1992 represented a major turning point for political science, but in a negative way. Nevertheless, the war did not prevent the FPN in Sarajevo operating, and it continued its activity under war conditions for more than three years, until the beginning of the new academic year in Autumn 1995 and the signing of the Dayton Peace Agreement. Moreover, in the academic year 1994/1995, in grave wartime conditions, the FPN launched a new MA program entitled 'Bosnia-Herzegovina in the Contemporary World' which both domestic and (some) foreign students enrolled in (Filandra, 2011, pp. 36–37). However, it was not it until 2005 that it could implement the most ambitious reforms in the Faculty's history (Filandra, 2011, p. 54). The FPN retained all of its study programmes, with the exception of 'Total People's Defence' dating from the Communist period (this was similar to the one mentioned with regard to the Zagreb Faculty), and remained the only public school of political science in the country until the establishment of the FPN in Banja Luka in 2008.

After 1990, the FPN Belgrade abolished ideological courses such as 'The Basics of Total People's Defence' (*Osnove opštenarodne odbrane*), and the curriculum was improved by the introduction of new courses such as: Local Self-Governance, the Science of Organization and Management, Models of Political Decision Making, Political Culture, Political Anthropology, Middle Eastern and Mediterranean Studies, European Relations and Regional Economic Integration, and Gender Studies (Č upić, 2018). Although the curriculum was modernized, overall academic development was signifcantly disrupted by the wars and the international isolation of Serbia, then part of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.

The second period of curricular reforms, which started in 2005/2006,15 was marked by the top-down Bologna reform. During this process, external factors proved more important than that in the frst period, and the reforms were more far-reaching. Decisions on reform at European level were implemented at national levels, with each institution's limited autonomy shaping its respective programmes.

We can conclude that after the fall of Communism and the break-up of Yugoslavia, there were differences in the establishment and stability of the four states' higher education institutions and student numbers; these were

<sup>15</sup>The Bologna process was adopted in Serbia as from 2006 and in the other three states from 2005 onwards.

affected by government decisions and fnancing patterns and also by the different political trajectories of the countries concerned. The differences between Slovenia and Croatia on the one hand, and Serbia and BiH on the other hand, were particularly signifcant. In terms of internal development, especially in terms of curricular changes, similar developments can be observed but with different time dynamics: frst there was a shift away from courses and programmes bounded by ideology, and secondly a shift towards Bologna standards and expectations.

#### *3.2 Autonomy*

During Yugoslav Communism, political science enjoyed somewhat limited autonomy overall. While in some periods, new courses and subfelds were introduced, albeit under strong state and party control, hiring was not characterised by this limited autonomy. The two themes we shall focus on in this section concern hiring and promotion and establishment of new subfelds after 1990. We shall try to fnd the similarities and differences among the four states in question.

#### *Hiring and Promotion*

Following the beginning of the democratisation process in 1990, faculties were granted the power to hire teaching staff who could contribute to the development of new subfelds and courses without ideological prerequisites. Although this year marked a critical juncture in terms of the breaking of ideological chains, reform continued to be hindered by external and internal factors.

One of the major external constraints on reform was state funding for the hiring and promotion of academic staff. The severe economic crisis affecting three states (but not Slovenia) was the result of a combination of war and transition in the 1990s. Very limited state budgets for science and higher education made it diffcult to hire new staff. All staff salaries, provided by the Ministries of Science and Universities, have depended on the will of the State to fnance the work of academics. After the end of the wars, and following an increase in government revenues and budgets, the situation began to improve; however, hiring and promotion still depended on the availability of State funding, and on the willingness of new scientists to come to teach in these institutions. After a decline in the number of students and professors in the 1980s, the arrival of new academic staff after 1990 took a number of years (Fink-Hafner, 2002b, p. 289). Slovenia, with the highest per-capita GDP of all the post-communist states, and lower spending on national defence, meant that in the 1990s state funding of higher education, from the very beginning of the post-Yugoslav period, was much better in that country than in the other three states analysed here. The FPZG in Zagreb only improved its position after 2000. New state budgets in 2000 and 2001 provided funding for more than 2000 new teaching and research posts at Croatian universities, including around 20 at the FPZG. This enabled the said Faculty to replenish its staff numbers, and many of the existing staff had been made professors by 2020. The FPN in Belgrade and the FPN in Sarajevo did not experience this critical juncture. Virtually no new staff were hired during the 1990s, years characterised by international sanctions against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and by the war in BiH and the grave economic situation resulting from this war. The FPN in Sarajevo still only employed 10 professors and lecturers, together with 4 assistant lecturers and researchers, in its Department of Political Science, in May 2020 (see Table 4.8).

Internal factors that have infuenced staff renewal and the development of subfelds originate in academia, frst of all in regard to the availability of new staff. Until the proliferation of doctoral education in the 2000s, PhD degrees were mostly awarded to scholars who were already employed at universities. Consequently, new professors were not available '*on the market*'. So, the institutions had to employ teaching and research assistants who would only become professors at some later point in time. The last decade, however, has seen a shift towards the employment of new lecturers from among PhD graduates. This process has been accompanied by the occasional additional input: for example, at the FPN Belgrade, teaching staff were partially upgraded through the hiring of former students who had received their MAs and PhDs abroad.

A further factor to be considered in the context of hiring and staff renewal concerns the danger of pouring 'new wine into old bottles'. Newly hired staff have encountered internalized norms and procedures that had been previously established over the years by existing professors. Normally, they interiorise with such norms and procedures (Goodin & Klingemann, 1996, p. 11), although this implies the danger of path dependency, which could seriously hinder the development of the discipline. This problem was especially salient after 1990, when not only did staff with new ideas have to be hired, but the existing academic staff were also required to adapt to a new, democratic environment which supported free thinking and free speech, and to be ready to help change the curricula **Table 4.8** Departments and chairs at the four major faculties, and the number (in parentheses) of professors and assistants who were full members of those faculties in May 2020


Sources: The websites of the four faculties and the authors' knowledge of the number of professors employed and of the faculties' structure

a Members of this department enjoy the status of lecturers, not of professors or assistants

bMembers of this department enjoy the status of lecturers, not of professors or assistants

and research topics.16 In other words, it was not only necessary to introduce *fresh blood*: the existing *old blood* had to be prepared to participate in the process of change as well. The time factor proved to aid this process in part, as over the course of the subsequent three decades, many professors and lecturers retired and were replaced by younger, sometimes internationally educated, colleagues.

Promotion in all four states is governed by a series of laws and regulations. This process has become increasingly closely regulated, and stricter requirements are now in place. Promotion is required to be performed in the case of each professor/lecturer every fve years at public universities, but in some cases, this procedure is blurred. The University of Sarajevo does not have fully regulated standards of promotion in terms of an academic's publications, and it is much easier to achieve promotion there than in the other three major faculties in question. This is criticised as constituting a closed intra-institutional process that negatively impacts the staff selection and quality.

#### *New Subfelds*

The introduction of new subfelds can follow as a result of external requirements (like the Bologna process), but may also be connected to staff development. Research in new felds, by new staff, and the introduction of new sub-felds to the curriculum, are often correlated. The major faculties continued to be central to this process, since they had developed their staff capacity over a period of decades. Furthermore, as mentioned above, promotion criteria also oblige professors and lecturers to publish and do research. This is the case at state universities, whereas academics hired by private universities do not have such an obligation. Consequently, the latter are less motivated to conduct research and publish works and do not contribute to the development of new or existing subfelds to the extent that their counterparts at state institutions do. As a result, the new private institutions founded after 2000 have been mostly oriented towards education rather than research. They may offer courses from different subfelds, but research work has not been important to them since it does not bring

16Nominally at least, that is. Slovenia was the only such country that began the transition to a liberal democracy from the very start, while Croatia went through a period in which a hybrid regime, or in the best case, a defective democracy, was in place. Serbia in the 1990s was subject to a new authoritarian system under Milošević, while Bosnia-Herzegovina experienced a long war followed by a chaotic period of state building.

in any profts. There have been some exceptions, like the FPN in Banja Luka founded in 2008, that also conduct research, but this could be accounted for by the fact that this institution is part of the public, statefunded University of Banja Luka.

Funding is necessary not only for salaries, but also for research, and thus for substantial curriculum development. Research and development expenditure in the four states is highest in Slovenia and lowest in BiH (see Fig. 4.1). Research activity in Serbia suffers from the structural problem of research funding in general. Between 2004 and 2017, annual funding fuctuated between around 0.3% and 0.9% of GDP. In Croatia, annual research and development expenditure was below 1% of GDP during the whole 2003–2017 period, except in 2004 when it stood at 1.03% (*Croatia—Research…*). In 2018, the Croatian Science Foundation provided only around 8 million euros in funding for all scientifc research in Croatia. The University of Zagreb also has some funds, but these amount to around 4–5 thousand euros per project per year. European funds are also available in theory, although it is very diffcult to obtain them, and all approved projects have only concerned questions of Croatian politics and society, or in certain rare cases, an analysis of Croatia from a comparative perspective. As Fig. 4.1 shows, there has been a decline in the position of

**Fig. 4.1** Research and development expenditure (% of GDP) in the four states. (Source: *Bosnia and Herzegovina—Research and development expenditure*, *Croatia—Research and development expenditure*, *Serbia—Research and development expenditure, Slovenia—Research and development expenditure*)

the most advantaged country in this regard, that is Slovenia; nevertheless, funding there is still substantially higher than in the other three states. State funding of research in political science in Slovenia stood at 316,254€ in 2010, 415,928€ in 2011, 316,065€ in 2012, and 367,908 € in 2014 (Zajc, 2015, p. 483). Finally, research in BiH today is a precarious activity. Despite not being in the worst situation in the region (when compared, e.g. with Kosovo), BiH's government does not offer political scientists any real opportunity to carry out expensive research projects, with only 0.2% of GDP earmarked for research and development (*Bosnia and Herzegovina—Research…*).

In an environment where funding for scientifc research is scarce or literally non-existent (in some felds), it is very diffcult to achieve any progress. This is particularly the case with comparative politics, as national science funds or ministries of science are generally not inclined to fnance something that is not directly connected to their respective countries. Such preconditions are ripe for maintaining the 'rural'17 status of certain political science subfelds, or even for their future disappearance altogether. On the other hand, this might enhance the visibility of the feld in national politics and make research in political science more applicable. For example, the media in both Slovenia and Croatia occasionally present the results of research projects published in scientifc journals concerning Slovenian and Croatian politics.

The paucity of state funding, which was, up until the 2000s, probably the only form of funding of research in political science in the four states, has been mitigated to a certain extent in recent years by EU funding. These funds are more competitively structured than national funds and are mostly available to political scientists in the two member-states Croatia and Slovenia, and only occasionally to political scientists in BiH and Serbia. Furthermore, foreign and international funds have been made available for the mobility of students and staff, such as Fulbright and Erasmus funds.

Clearly, research funding and new staff are closely related to the emergence of new sub-felds. Nevertheless, occasionally 'older' staff have been the forerunners in establishing new subfelds, as at the FPZG Zagreb where courses in comparative politics have been established.18 Assistants

18For instance, Prof. Branko Caratan, who previously taught a course in contemporary socialism, started to develop a course in comparative politics, Prof. Štefca Deren-Antoljak

<sup>17</sup>Becher and Trowler's classifcation of scientifc disciplines into rural and urban (Becher & Trowler, 2001) is about the number of experts of a particular scientifc discipline: if this number is considerable, discipline is seen as urban and vice versa.

who were awarded their MA and PhD degrees at the Central European University in Budapest or at Western universities, brought new ideas back to their home Faculty. Their input in terms of methodology has proven particularly valuable. The Faculty has also established research centres, although their activity is still low key, and they are not a structural basis for research, but rather they represent the individual activity of professors and assistants. The main Croatian journal specialized in political science is the Faculty's *Politicka misao* ̌ , which was supplemented in 2004 with the journal *Anali Hrvatskog politološkog društva* [Annals of the Croatian Political Science Association], which represented the main forums for research initiatives.

As in the case of the FPZG, international cooperation with, or visits to, foreign universities by the academic staff of the FDV in Ljubljana, started in the communist period; this aided the transformation of the discipline to a more western model, through the importation of ideas from those western institutions, and their adoption in research at the FDV (Bibic, ̌ 1996, pp. 428–429). In Ljubljana, research activities are clearly centred around fve departments (Political Theory, Political Science Research, International Relations, Administrative-Political Processes and Institutions, and Defence Research Centre), while the Faculty's journal *Theory and Practice* is still the most important Slovenian journal for political science.

In Serbia, especially in the 1990s, political science research was 'largely reduced to political sociology, comparative politics (in both of which political scientist hardly took part) and political theory. Research in political economy… and international relations was practically non-existent during that period' (Pavlović, 2010, p. 255). Academics were not ready to quickly adapt to the new circumstances, and sociology took the lead from political science in regard to research into the process of democratic transition. It has even been argued that this was not only a period of stagnation, but one of signifcant decline (Džuverović, *National Report on the State of Political Science (PS)*, p. 2). Research was often more relevant 'outside' the parent institution (see, e.g. V. Goati's observations as noted by Pavlović, 2010, p. 254).19 This situation has improved since 2000, and as

occasionally published case-study papers on the political systems and politics of selected countries, while Prof. Mirjana Kasapović lectured students and published papers on the question of political parties and elections in Croatia.

19One of them is Goati's book *Izbori u SRJ od 1990. do 1998.: volja grad* ̵ *ana ili izborna manipulacija* whose relevance was such that it was used for teaching purposes at the FPZG at a time when publications from the FPN in Belgrade were not.

with the abovementioned country cases, the Faculty established several centres thereafter, and also began publishing a journal *Godišnjak Fakulteta politickih nauka Univerziteta u Beogradu* ̌ [The Yearbook of the Faculty of Political Science at Belgrade University], which now publishes two issues per year, with papers in Serbian, English, and Russian.

It seems that by now, as a result of several changes made, the situation is probably more similar than before in the most important faculties analysed here, with the sole exception of the FPN in Sarajevo. All four faculties have study programmes in political science, comprising courses in all subfelds of the discipline. The number of courses within each subfeld, and number of teaching staff working in their political science subunits, are indicative of the state of discipline, and the latter fgures are shown in Table 4.8. Most other institutions, including the state-owned FPN in Banja Luka, do not possess a similarly developed structure. While FPN in Banja Luka is structured differently, its four study programmes, one research institute, and relatively large staff of 33 professors and 10 assistants guarantee stable, well-developed educational patterns.

We can conclude that the four states display one major similarity and at least two major differences in regard to hiring, staff promotion, and the foundation of new sub-felds. The one similarity is that the laws in these states do not establish the same obligations for public and private universities with regard to the hiring and periodical promotion of staff. These laws do not concern political science specifcally, but all disciplines or groups of disciplines. The differences are more substantial, however. The frst of these concerns the hiring of new staff. The major institutions in Croatia, Serbia, and Slovenia have larger numbers of professors compared to all other institutions concerned with political science or its sub-felds in these states. This enables these three major faculties to achieve such a concentration of political scientists that they can develop existing sub-felds and establish new ones, making them fagship political science institutions in their respective nations, unlike the FPN in Sarajevo in BiH. The institutional Balkanization witnessed in BiH has negatively affected the development of the discipline, by scattering political scientists across several new institutions. The small number of professors at the FPN in Sarajevo has resulted in experts having to deal with various different sub-felds. Furthermore, low legal requirements for promotion in BiH has not encouraged professors to publish. Consequently, the rule 'publish or perish' does not operate in BiH. Finally, we may conclude that different legal requirements affecting the autonomy of the discipline, represent a greater impetus to the institutionalisation of political science in Croatia, Serbia, and Slovenia than is the case in BiH.

# 4 Conclusion

Rather than reiterating the numbers and summarising the details and the nuances, both as similarities and differences among the four country cases, we would like to formulate two general observations that might have broader signifcance as well. One concerns the connection between political science and democracy; the other regards the norms and values that political science is expected to adhere to.

Political science today is seen by many as the 'science of democracy', with its perceived purpose being that of promoting and contributing to democracy. What, then, is the role of political science in non-democratic countries? Can it still be the 'science of democracy', and is it a *real* political science at all? In the case of our four states, the feld was established in Communist Yugoslavia in the early 1960s because of the autocratic regime's need for self-legitimation. Nevertheless, it gave professors and researchers at the newly founded faculties a certain degree of freedom in curriculum creation, teaching, and research, and this 'crack' in the regime's control was enough for the institutionalisation of the discipline to begin. Although far from the academic freedom enjoyed in the West, it enabled political scientists to slowly develop new academic felds and felds of research. There were several setbacks during this period, but many active participants at the institutions in question played a vital role in the discipline's institutionalisation. This sent out an important message to those political science communities where the state of democracy was, and continues to be, a serious problem.

Political science during the post-Communist period has freed itself from the ideological burden of Marxism and socialist self-management; however, different new values in teaching and research replaced old values. As a rule, the new political regimes have not seen political science as a source of analysis of politics that can be used in everyday political life, but instead have mainly left the discipline and the faculties up to their own devices. Nevertheless, the staff working in these political science institutions often have personal experience of the diffcult times and tragedies that the rest of Europe has been spared. Some new personal values and attitudes saw the light of day during the 1990s, a period of brutal confict and the dissolution of the federal state, together with the emergence of new worldviews. Political scientists were not isolated from such events, and thus, it is not surprising to see the occasional return of normative judgements, pronounced biases or 'having answers before raising questions',20 or the rejection of any critical interpretation of new facts and scientifc inferences altogether. Being emotionally burdened with belonging to a state, ideology, ethnic group, and/or own family tradition can make the unbiased search for new truths diffcult. Under these circumstances, there are two particular things that should be promoted: on the one hand international cooperation, and on the other the importing of new knowledge, which implies quality training with a strong international and comparative focus, which would help existing biases be superseded.

The frst multi-party elections in 1990 were the basis and pre-condition for the discipline to transform itself on the basis of Western models. Nonetheless, wars, economic crises, and new forms of authoritarianism during the following decade offered only limited opportunities for such transformation. Only the period after 2000 offered greater freedom of speech, except in Slovenia whose democratic transition was more successful in the 1990s; more opportunities for an increased student population; and the opportunity to establish new institutions of higher education. Accessibility to international funds, the exchange of students with foreign universities, and more opportunities for young scientists to study at the best universities in the West, have all contributed towards improving the quality of education and research. Political science has also become more readily accepted within academia, and no more suggestions of its faculties being abolished have been forthcoming.

The problems that contemporary political science has in the countries examined here, and the roots of the differences among these countries, are in many ways related to the environment in which the discipline exists. An analysis of stability and autonomy has led us to conclude that fnancial resources, legal regulation and policies matter signifcantly. The combination of the legal regulation of higher education and the availability of funding, accounts for the major differences seen among the four states. At

<sup>20</sup>This part of the sentence is taken from philosophy. The Croatian philosopher Branko Bošnjak criticized the work of St. Thomas Aquinas and the value of his philosophy, because Aquinas had the answers before raising the questions.

the same time, political scientists and their institutions are also responsible for using the opportunities they have for the development of political science.

**Acknowledgement** The authors would like to acknowledge and thank Professor Gabriella Ilonszki from Budapest's Corvinus University, Professor Dušan Pavlović from the University of Belgrade, Associate Professor Damir Kapidžić from the University of Sarajevo, and Assistant Professor Jasmin Hasić from the Sarajevo School of Science and Technology, for their invaluable comments and information regarding the state of political science in the former Yugoslavia and in the posttransition states.

# References


Zvonarević, M., Kljaić, S., & Šiber, I. (1966). Neki aspekti izbora za općinske skupštine u Zagrebu 1965 [Some Aspects of Election for Municipal Assemblies in Zagreb 1965]. *Politicka misao, 3* ̌ (1–2), 75–86.

#### Other References


on Giving Consent to the Amount of Participation in the Prices of Services, Enrolment and Other Costs of Studies at University of Sarajevo and its Faculties or Academies]. Retrieved August 29, 2019, from https://www.unsa.ba/sites/ default/fles/dodatak/2017-10/odluka%20o%20visini%20participacije.pdf


**Open Access** This chapter is licensed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/ by/4.0/), which permits use, sharing, adaptation, distribution and reproduction in any medium or format, as long as you give appropriate credit to the original author(s) and the source, provide a link to the Creative Commons licence and indicate if changes were made.

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# Political Science in Central European Democracies Under Pressure

*Aneta Világi, Darina Malová, and Dobrinka Kostova*

# 1 Introduction

In most parts of Central and Eastern Europe (CEE), in recent decades political scientists have faced similar tasks and challenges in establishing political science (PS) as an academic discipline. Firstly, for many of them it was necessary to distance themselves from the communist legacy; secondly, they had to adapt to international (Western style) academic standards; and thirdly, they sought to gain academic independence and public recognition. The development of political science in these various countries has been characterised by national specifcities as well. This is why comparing them is a useful approach that could bring fruitful

A. Világi (\*) • D. Malová

Department of Political Science, Faculty of Arts, Comenius University in Bratislava, Bratislava, Slovakia e-mail: aneta.vilagi@uniba.sk; darina.malova@uniba.sk

D. Kostova

Department of Public Policies and Social Changes, Bulgarian Academy of Sciences, Sofa, Bulgaria

<sup>©</sup> The Author(s) 2022 119

G. Ilonszki, C. Roux (eds.), *Opportunities and Challenges for New and Peripheral Political Science Communities*, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-79054-7\_5

cross-national insights into national patterns. This chapter examines the challenges six CEE democracies (Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Romania and Slovakia) have faced in the development of political science over the last three decades. It also aims to contribute to a better understanding of the theoretical frame and the institutionalisation of political science as an academic discipline in Europe. In particular, we shall explore the institutionalisation of the discipline by focusing on its two principal characteristics: stability and legitimacy.

In this chapter, we show that political science as a new social science in the CEE region has acquired a relatively stable position. The discipline has gained autonomy and managed to form its own identity, and has shown a capacity to cope with several challenges that have arisen. However, some of the structural reforms, including the commodifcation of higher education (HE) and the proliferation of political science at universities and other teaching institutions, have recently undermined the stability it had previously gained, as it progressively suffers from a loss of public recognition. We argue that the oversimplifed, technocratic approaches of governments in recent years have impaired the legitimacy of the social sciences, and of political science in particular. This common trend is observable in all of the selected countries, albeit with certain variations from one country to another.

Over the last decade, the whole CEE region has experienced a degree of democratic backsliding, and even countries once perceived as 'consolidated democracies', such as the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and (after 1998) Slovakia, have shifted towards becoming 'defective democracies' (a classifcation primarily attributed to the political regimes in Bulgaria and Romania, even after their accession to the European Union (EU)) (Eisfeld & Pal, 2010). We have also observed an interesting development regarding the debate on political science as an academic discipline. In a situation of increasing democratic backsliding, certain serious attempts to lessen its legitimacy have been made, mainly by populist governments. We believe that political science as a 'vested discipline' concerned with democratic principles might be perceived as an obstacle to a democratic U-turn in those countries. The weakened legitimacy of the discipline might subsequently infuence the overall institutionalisation of political science, as it could undermine its stability, understood as two possible, basic types of stability as defned by Sven Ove Hansson and Gert Helgesson's (2003). Their analysis shows that there are two basic types of stability: the frst concerns constancy (the actual absence of change), while the second regards resilience (the ability of a system to cope with perturbation).

First, we introduce the historical context that shaped the institutionalisation of political science in CEE before, and shortly after, the collapse of the communist regimes. In this regard, we consider the selected countries' transition to democracy as a decisive starting point. We recognise that there were differences among the previous regimes (particularly in view of the 'controlled liberalization'1 witnessed in Poland and Hungary). Yet the very essence of communist rule did not permit political science to achieve full autonomy in any of the countries under Soviet tutelage. Therefore, we treat all of the countries in the same way, and we take as our starting point the collapse of the previous regime. We then look at the current state of the discipline, and particularly at two of the key proprieties of institutionalisation: stability and legitimacy. We consider these two properties as the most relevant in regard to the recent phase of institutionalisation over the last decade in CEE. This focus refects the de-legitimisation efforts of the political elite and the industrialist lobbies, targeting social science teaching programmes, in particular those concerning political science. Our approach touches on the public debate concerning the relevance of political science and thus connects to Chap. 7 in this volume to some degree. We look for the indicators of stability in the number of institutions providing higher education in political science, their durability in terms of the number of students enrolled in the discipline and the structural changes affecting political science. As the overall trends indicate a worsening of political science performance, as shown by the declining number of students, we look at specifc cases to reveal the ways in which governments interfere in public discourse and set up institutional arrangements designed to lessen the legitimacy of social sciences, and of political science in particular. Finally, we argue that the institutional stability of individual organisations (the political science profession, departments, research institutes and associations) had been established by the end of the 1990s; however, the proliferation of teaching units since the turn of the new millennium, where the sole focus was on proft rather than on educational and professional goals, has undermined the overall quality of the discipline and has challenged its hard-earned public recognition. The chapter is based mainly on expert assessments (*PROSEPS National Reports on the State of the Discipline*) and

<sup>1</sup>For more detailed argument, see Gebethner and Markowski (2002) and Arató and Tóth (2010).

quantitative empirical data gathered within the context of the COST Action CA 15 207 *PROSEPS—Professionalization and Social Impact of European Political Science*.

# 2 The Context of the Institutionalisation of Political Science in CEE

The history of political science in CEE is a complicated one. In the early years of the twentieth century, the unspecifed feld of political science was dominated by political philosophy (normative political theory) and 'old' institutionalism (formal–legal analysis). Then shortly after World War II, when Stalinist orthodoxy and Marxist ideology took over all aspects of political life in the CEE, academic life followed the same path, leaving no room for any independent study of politics. Departments of (scientifc) Marxism-Leninism swiftly replaced the political science chairs2 that had been established in the early post-war period (1944–1948), and the party's regular congresses defned the theoretical and methodological approaches to be followed by the social sciences. Partially deviant cases of the penetration of communist ideology into political science were those of Poland (from the 1960s) and Hungary (from the 1980s). Political science in these two countries witnessed a kind of controlled liberalisation, involving the abolition of mandatory courses in Marxism-Leninism, and a regulated openness to international infuences (e.g. access to Western literature in the feld, participation at the IPSA World Congress in 1979). Though the short-lived Prague Spring of 1968 introduced similar changes in the former Czechoslovakia, the new non-Marxist study programs including political science quickly vanished soon after the country's occupation that same year.

It was only after the collapse of the regime in the early 1990s that political science gained impetus as a new academic discipline focusing on new phenomena such as the democratic political order. Some scholars have perceived political science as a vested discipline immersed in democratic ideals, projected towards the promotion of democracy (Ágh, 1991; Huntington, 1988). Political science in CEE also inherently aims to help

<sup>2</sup>As previously stated, political science chairs in some countries like Poland or Romania dates back even further, to the inter-war period. In the former Czechoslovakia, an independent School of Political and Social Sciences was founded in October 1945 (Holzer & Pšeja, 2010). In Hungary, political science chairs were frst established in 1944 (Ágh, 1991).

mould active citizens committed to support for democracy. It is supposed 'to help citizens prepare themselves for various possible futures' (Hankiss, 2002, p. 22). Otherwise, 'perplexity, distrust, fear and intolerance' may overwhelm large segments of society (ibid., p. 20), making them strike out against democratic principles and practices. Thus, the development of political science in these countries was closely connected to the democratic developments seen in the region over the last 30 years. Political science has aimed to explain how historical experiences, memories and political cultures shape the political debate, and their implications in terms of the degree of consensus/dissent with regard to the future of democracy in each country and its European integration, among citizens and political elites, as well as between them. In other words, at the early stage of the process of democratic transformation, the challenge for political science was to reinvent politics in order to cope with the new system of governance, which was characterised by an extraordinary discrepancy between the socialist past and the challenge of democratic development. Political science was expected to have the capacity to scientifcally explain the democratisation process, and to serve educational purposes at the same time. From the very beginning political science was tasked with a dual role: (a) to build the capacity to scientifcally explain the democratisation process; and (b) to serve educational purposes.

This twofold role was self-imposed by political scientists themselves, and also something that the public expected of it to a certain degree. Nowadays, however, because it deals with politics, political research—or rather the way it is portrayed in the mainstream media—is often criticised by politicians, and therefore some of them perceive the very existence of the discipline as a challenge. Since the early 1990s, the educational and scientifc community is longer indifferent to public scrutiny. And it is this increased relevance of opinion which constitutes the structural background for the growing importance of both the previously unknown diversity of ideas, and the reaction to three decades of changes, that have marked the development of political science. That is why, compared to other social sciences, the impact of political science in the CEE countries examined here has been considerable over the last 30 years, due to the need to explain and promote the democratisation of society. Political scientists have been regularly adopting public stances in the media and participating at seminars and conferences targeting the broader public (informal civic education). Political science students and graduates have even been participating directly in politics.3

In this context, the frst characteristic feature of political science in the CEE region has been its focus on the management of the new political regime (Eisfeld & Pal, 2010). In return, the role of political science and political scientists in the promotion of new democratic principles has contributed towards recognition of its purpose and justifcation and has furthered general acceptance of the discipline and its legitimacy. At the same time, the establishment of new political systems has infuenced the profling of the discipline to some extent. Political science has focused on explaining the day-to-day functioning of the new system and new political institutions. The emphasis has been on current politics and policy-making (offering expertise, monitoring and normative comparison with Western standards), rather than on any fundamental theoretical contribution (Arató & Tóth, 2010; Barbu, 2002; Gebethner & Markowski, 2002; Rybár, ̌ 2010; Szabó, 2002).

The second specifc feature of the newly established political science has been the common perception of democratisation in terms of the acceptance of Western political values and standards. It has considerably infuenced the development of the discipline (Kostova & Avramov, 2010). The transfer of knowledge and methodological standards has been conducted through cooperation networks of scientists and, more importantly, through the translation of seminal works4 which have infuenced education and research in the feld.

However, despite these efforts, political science in the CEE region is far from being on an equal footing with its Western equivalents. Structural and personnel diffculties have signifcantly hindered the development of political science in Central Eastern European countries. Immediately after

<sup>3</sup> Some examples of this are as follows: Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán, who briefy studied political science at Pembroke College, Oxford in 1990; Iveta Radicová, Slovak ̌ Prime Minister (2010–2012), was a professor at Comenius University in Bratislava and Slovak Minister of Defence (2006) Martin Fedor graduated from this department, too; Dana Prudíková, State Secretary at the Czech Ministry of Education, Youth and Sports (since 2015), graduated in political science from Masarykova University in Brno; Mariya Gabriel, Bulgarian EU commissioner, graduated from the Institut d'Etudes Politiques de Bordeaux; and so on.

4For example: *The Theory of Democracy Revisited* by Giovanni Sartori; *A Theory of Justice* by John Rawls; *Democracy and Its Critics* by Robert Dahl; *Sociology of Politics* by M. Duverger or *Totalitarianism* by Hannah Arendt.

the fall of Communism, the main constraints on the professionalisation process (in addition to funding issues) concerned the low degree of knowledge transfer mainly resulting from a lack of active foreign (namely English) language skills, which hindered the full internationalisation of teaching and research. In the mid-1990s this situation changed thanks to special scholarships, the opening of borders and the close contacts that followed, which together resulted in an improvement in the professional and linguistic knowledge of political scientists in the CEE countries. It fuelled international cooperation focusing on research topics suggested, as well as funded, by Western scholars and institutions. It led to an improvement in political science curricula.5 A further positive factor was the availability of visiting scholarships available at Western universities (in EU member states and the USA), sponsored by foreign governments (e.g. the Fulbright Program) and/or private foundations (e.g. Andrew W. Mellon Foundation, Open Society Institute) or EU programmes (e.g. TEMPUS). Although there are nowadays a number of well-developed political science programmes at all levels of higher education in CEE, the scientifc expertise, methodological training, research infrastructures and fnancial conditions are not suffcient to 'catch up' with Western academia and to prepare competitive research projects within the European Research Area. This is analysed in detail in Chap. 8.

# 3 The Stability of Political Science in CEE: Virtually No Change or Weak Resilience?

Institutionalisation is perceived as a process by which certain properties or outcomes are obtained. As Gabriella Ilonszki points out in her chapter in this book, the stability of the profession is a key property of institutionalisation. Therefore, we frst focus on this attribute of institutionalisation. The vast literature on the institutionalisation of politics and political organisations (for a review, see Ilonszki in this volume) tells us, however, that the evolution of—the very path towards—the stabilisation of any

5For example, the Department of Political Science at the Faculty of Arts, Comenius University in Bratislava (Slovakia), has participated in several projects targeting an improvement in political science curricula. It has worked with the University in Manchester on the introduction of human rights and regional comparative studies; with the University of Groningen on the introduction of security studies; and with Leipzig University on the incorporation of political symbolism into PS curricula.

organisation or phenomenon, including professions and academic disciplines, cannot be taken for granted. In this regard, individual countries, regions and time periods differ substantially in terms of the degree of stability of political science's development as a discipline and profession, although some common, albeit rather general, traits are observable.

Firstly, political science was established as one of the outcomes of democratisation. Only in a democracy is it possible to have autonomous, independent social sciences free of the infuence of government and/or party ideology.

Secondly, from the point of view of the institutionalisation of political science in the CEE states, the discipline seems to be impacted by a series of countervailing factors. The region's proximity to Western Europe, its relatively high level of education, these nations' membership of the European Union, and the demand for experts in politics and democratic procedures, are all assumed to foster political science institutionalisation. However, the legacies of Communism, overall economic volatility, a lack of fnancial and organisational resources for education, and the shortage of well-trained professionals (political science teachers) are likely to hinder the very same processes.

Thirdly, we are currently faced with a peculiar sequence of political science developments requiring a certain caution concerning stabilisation. While by the end of the 1990s, some of the properties of institutionalised political science, such as the persistence of individual departments, and the identity and autonomy granted by the new, or renewed, national associations were already in place in CEE, and as such contributed to the discipline's stability, their reproduction and legitimacy linked with the discipline's resiliency, have not been fully tested yet.

Finally, we argue that the legal and structural changes seen in higher education after the turn of the millennium, and initiated by EU membership, have in fact undermined the emerging internal stability of political science, and have gradually hindered reproduction and led to the questioning of political science's legitimacy by those outside the discipline, that is, by certain politicians. The main driver behind this trend has been an over-simplistic understanding of labour market needs, and, somewhat paradoxically, the efforts made to introduce transparent fnancing of public higher education and research.

In these conditions, measuring stability is not a simple task, since stability in terms of the discipline's endurance is a dynamic, rather than static, variable. Therefore, we need data for the indicators of stability, such as the number of political science chairs in a given country, the number of political science programmes available, and the discipline's professional organisation; and we need to interpret them in terms of their rise or fall; however, this is only one part of the problem. Another matter is the need to analyse the very process of institutionalisation, which we understand as resilience, i.e. the capacity of the discipline to face up, and adapt, to its challenges engendered by changing structural factors, such as governmental policies, socio-economic development and demographic trends (Hansson & Helgesson, 2003). In the next section, we shall focus on the indicators of stability, namely on those institutions where political science is taught, and student numbers, within the context of structural reforms and demographic trends, and their impact on the durability of the discipline in the area.

### *3.1 Higher Educational Institutions in the Field of Political Science: A Review of Institutional Trends Over Time*

In CEE the system of higher education (HE) has been shaped by various structural reforms since the early 1990s. Despite the fact that such reforms differ somewhat from one country to the next, it is possible to draw certain similarities among the 'V4' countries (Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic and Slovakia), Bulgaria and Romania. Crucial reforms have impacted the fnancing of HE institutions and accreditation processes and have subsequently impacted political science as a discipline. Major structural reforms of higher education in the selected countries can be examined in line with the institutionalisation processes analysed by Di Maggio and Powell (1983). For these authors, the institutionalisation impetus, and the source of legitimacy, for change, come about in three ways: they can be *coercive*, that is, imposed by external actors (frequently a state or an international organisation); they can be *normative*, when the driving force for change is to settle certain norms and rules that diverge from those previously used (usually from within the institution), and they can be *mimetic* when the level of uncertainty is high, and institutions tend to mirror the path taken by other institutions (mainly when the practices concerned are seen as useful and advantageous).6 We argue that our sample of countries is characterised by three phases of institutionalisation, all of which took place in a mixed manner: the frst, **the emancipation phase**,

<sup>6</sup>For more details, see also Chap. 2 of this book.

occurred in a mimetic, partly normative way; this was followed by **the proliferation phase**; and then the third, **regulatory phase** occurred, with both second and third phases being initiated by government policies. While the proliferation phase led to an enormous increase in the number of political science departments, study programmes and students, the regulatory phase has led to a fall in student numbers and the de-legitimisation of the discipline. The latter two periods can be defned as predominantly coercive, with mimetic imprints in the case of the proliferative phase, and normative factors characterising the third phase.

During the frst period, which was shortly after the fall of Communism (early 1990s), changes affecting education, including political science in higher education, were implemented within the framework of a complex transformation of society. The development of political science in the CEE region had entered an introductory, **emancipation phase** of the process. Many universities transformed their social sciences programmes at that time. Thus standard 'Western' programmes were introduced, including political science as a new discipline in most cases. Political science was (re) established usually within the offcial education system. The main pattern consisted in a reform of the existing units (in most cases labelled 'Departments of Scientifc Socialism/Communism'), as the cases of Hungary, Poland, Slovakia, Romania and Bulgaria, or in the establishment of new units, as happened in the Czech Republic. Universities used personnel from disciplines less tainted by scientifc socialism, such as sociology, philosophy, history or law,7 and/or *émigrés* and external experts, mainly arriving from the United States and the EU under the TEMPUS programme.

A rather specifc path for the launching of political science was followed by Poland, and to a degree also by Hungary and Bulgaria. In these three cases, institutions providing education in political science were established prior to 1989. In Poland, compulsory courses in political science were introduced in the mid-1960s for all students at all universities. Consequently, political science was acknowledged as a separate academic discipline, and as early as 1964 (at the University of Poznan) political

<sup>7</sup>This is clearly evident from the professional background of the 'founders' of the discipline in each country, namely: Prof. Semov—sociology (BG); Prof. Kucera—philosophy and his ̌ tory (CZ); Prof. Bihari—law and sociology and Prof. Ágh—philosophy (HU); Prof. Danecki—sociology (PL); Prof. Barbu—history and philosophy (RO); Prof. Kusý—philosophy (SVK).

science departments were created offering full four-year curricula. Similarly, in Hungary the frst chair in political science was created in the 1980s at the 'Department of Political Theory' at Corvinus University, Budapest, while the Bulgarian 'Department of History and Theory of Politics' at Sofa University was established in 1986. However, it is important to note that academic staff were recruited from among lecturers of Marxism-Leninism, and partly served the Communist Party's goals (*PROSEPS National Reports*, 2019a, c, d). As the Communist regime did not allow the discipline to develop as an independent entity, we shall treat all countries in the same way, and take as our starting point the collapse of the previous regime.

The early 1990s marked a new beginning for political science in all of the countries concerned. According to the *PROSEPS National Reports*, within fve years of the collapse of Communism, at least three public universities were providing an academic programme in political science in each of those countries.8 Symptomatic of this period of political science institutionalisation was the rather prompt transformation of previously existing Departments of Marxism-Leninism, into departments of political science and/or *politology*. Due to the lack of any regulatory framework that could have set out strict rules for the accreditation process shortly after the collapse of the communist regime, HE intuitions followed the clever pattern of renaming previously existing departments. In most cases, the core staff in such departments remained the same. In the words of Di Maggio and Powell, this should be considered a *normative* period in the case of the leading institutions (those instituting their frst chairs in political science), as the main goal was to introduce academic programs in line with Western professional standards and goals (PROSEPS National reports, 2019a–f). We would argue, however, that at the same time, *mimetic* methods were adopted whereby other faculties, including the newly established ones, mirrored the steps of the leading universities. However, as a consequence of further regulation and increased competition, many of such departments which were *politological* 'only by name', subsequently disappeared. On the other hand, almost all leading national institutions with a chair in political science (with the exception of Romania) have proved their credentials, and continue exist to the present day (for the list, see Table 5.1).

<sup>8</sup> See also Eisfeld and Pal (2010) or Kaase et al. (2002).


*Country*

*First chair in political Number of HE Name of frst Current Membership*

*English title of frst Current* 

**Table 5.1**HE institutions, professional organisations and political science periodicals


*Country*

*First chair in political* 

*Number of HE* 

*Name of frst* 

*Current* 

*Membership*

*English title of frst* 

*Current* 

*status*

*professional* 

*journal*

*professional* 

*status*

*organisation*

*institutions with a* 

*programme in* 

*political science* 

*(1990s/2000s)*

*science*

Source: PROSEPS National reports on the State of Political Science (2019a–f), Eisfeld and Pal (2010) and Krauz-Mozer et al. (2015) aAccording to Ghica (2014), the attempt to re-establish a professional organization in early 1990 (Romanian Political Science Association) proved an institutional fasco, and the organisation failed to meet expectations. Nor did the Romanian Political Science Society established with the same purpose in 1999–2000 bRomanian authors disagree over what was the frst professional periodical. Some of them consider only pre-review periodicals as worth mentioning (e.g. Mingiu-Pippidi, 2010), while others object to such periodicals as they are perceived as the personal property of actual scholars (e.g. Ghica, 2014)

During this phase, other institutions were established which were also important for the development of the discipline, namely the professional organisations representing political scientists in the country, and the professional journals concerned with political science. While political science journals managed to prove their durability (with publication still ongoing), the history of the professional organisations has been rather more unpredictable. In some cases, such as Bulgaria, Poland and Hungary, these organisations are well-established and have been active for almost forty years. In others, especially those of Romania and Slovakia, the professional organisations were only active for a limited period, slipping into a period of 'hibernation' shortly after being established. Nevertheless, at that specifc time (the early 1990s), the emergence of these organisations helped political science gain recognition as an autonomous, fully fedged discipline.

The second phase of development of political science could be labelled as the **proliferation phase**, and was seen from the late 1990s onwards. It was characterised by the liberalisation and commodifcation of education as imposed from above by central government in certain countries. As Kašcák and Pupala ( ̌ 2014) point out, the systematic changes in education saw a shift towards privatisation, in place of the centralistic, collectivistic traditions of the former Communist regime's education system. The authors stress the fact that education reforms have been signifcantly infuenced by 'perpetual neo-liberalisation', a 'feature of government education discourse' (Kašcák & Pupala, ̌ 2014). This discourse focuses on simplistic interpretation of economic 'competitiveness' in education, which is perceived as a mere 'commodity' in a distorted market (public institutions fnanced by the State; private ones by students' fees, with access to additional state funding, including European funds). All HE institutions are defned as providers competing for 'customers' (students) and resources (funds/projects).

In the late 1990s, governmental reforms opened the education sector to private HE institutions in most CEE countries; these were obliged to obtain State authorisation, including the accreditation of their programmes by a State accreditation board. The over simplistic liberalisation and commodifcation of the educational sector increased the number of HE institutions, and accordingly the number of political science chairs. As Fig. 5.1 shows, there was a signifcant rise in the number of such institutions (which almost doubled) offering political science (PS) programs in the Czech Republic, Hungary, Romania and Slovakia. The mushrooming of

No. of higher education institutions with political science program

**Fig. 5.1** Number of HE institutions with a political science programme. (Source: PROSEPS National Reports on the State of Political Science 2019a–f; Krauz-Mozer et al., 2015 & GUS, 2019)

new public and private institutions offering political science programmes was most spectacular in Poland. While during the 1990s, thirty HE institutions provided PS programmes, of which 17 were non-public, in the academic year 2009/10 the number reached its peak, with 84 schools (56 private) providing courses in political science (Krauz-Mozer et al., 2015; Sasinska-Klas, 2010). According to the most recent fgures, there are now 52 HE institutions offering political science programmes in Poland (GUS, 2019).

At the same time, this was a period when governmental reforms changed the fnancing of higher education. The system of annual lump sum allocations per public HE institution was replaced by fnancing rules based on the number of students and/or teaching staff. As the allocation of State funding was almost exclusively based on student numbers, and failed to refect research performance or the quality of teaching in a given HE institution, there was little incentive for institutions to build an outstanding academic reputation (also in regard to research work).

The launching of private universities and colleges, and the allocation of funding based on the number of students and/or staff in case of public HEIs had a signifcant impact on the institutionalisation of political science. Many private, and some of the public, HE institutions of course adopted proft-seeking strategies. The emphasis on the principle of 'quantity' in regard to the substantial increase in students and teachers, proved key during this period. In terms of the increase in numbers, this model was justifed. In terms of the quality of teaching and research, it does not appear so.

We consider this period of institutionalisation as *coercive* in keeping with Di Maggio & Powell's classifcation (1983). The main impetus to various HE institutions to adopt their strategies and implement changes came from the governmental reforms that introduced certain opportunities (e.g. concerning education) as well as constraints (e.g. concerning research). Additionally, the proft-seeking strategies adopted by some HE institutions (e.g. the introduction of part-time studies of political science, and increasing the number of PS students) were *mimetically* followed by others HE institutions competing at the same education market. Looking at quantitative indicators only, this period led to unprecedent massifcation and commodifcation in CEE, since at that moment the number of students and of HE institutions offering political science programmes, reached its peak.

The last phase—the **regulatory phase**—followed the change in the political discourse regarding education during the frst decade of the 2000s. With the introduction of the Lisbon Strategy (2000) at EU level, discourse has focused on competitive education as a way of building a knowledge society and economy, and has transformed the perception of education's value. Over the last two decades or so, leading politicians' technocratic approach to education has dominated public and media discourse. In several CEE countries, politicians have systematically favoured those academic programmes of a technical and high-tech nature, over the social sciences and humanities, claiming that they better ft labour market demands. The last phase—the regulatory phase—began at various times, depending on the country, over the period 2010–2015 when the tightening of HE regulation was debated and attempted in the majority of CEE countries. The initiative for such regulation came mainly from industry, which wanted higher education to be regulated so as to favour the technical and natural sciences. The reason for the need to regulate the choice of study programmes and the number of graduates in different professions in particular, was seen as the labour shortage in the automotive industry, which had become a very important sector in the CEE due to the infow of direct foreign investments. The shortage was a consequence of the decrease in the total number of students on the one hand, and increased demand for professionals and skilled workers in those felds related to automobile production, on the other. Since 2000, the automotive industry has played a key role in the economies of the V4 countries and Romania, and has been crucial for their development. At the same time, this sector has been one of the largest employers in the V4 countries, accounting for 2–3% of the entire labour market. Since 2010, employment in the automotive sector in CEE has grown constantly, and at a faster rate than in the EU28 (Debkowska et al., ̨ 2019). As this industry requires an increasingly sophisticated and educated workforce, there has been a signifcant push for educational programmes with a technical focus at secondary and tertiary levels, especially over the last decade. Using the above-mentioned facts, infuential automotive lobbyists have used their leverage to push for changes in educational policies. Furthermore, as Fig. 5.2 shows, there has been a fall in the birth rate in CEE since 1970s, with the sharpest drop over the period 1996–2000, which corresponds to an age cohort entering university in the years 2014–2018.

Current development of HE in most CEE countries is changing the system of institutional and programme accreditation and fnancing. There is a tendency to change the emphasis from a consideration of student number, to other, more qualitative criteria (research and publication outputs) when it comes to the fnancing of HE institutions. In many cases, this shift has affected study programmes in the social sciences, including

**Fig. 5.2** Development of total fertility rate (1960–2018). (Source: Eurostat, 2020)

political science. In most cases, the changes to the higher education funding system have allowed governments to prioritise study programmes and to (indirectly) infuence the subjects taught. The allocation of State funding is based on three pillars: the evaluation of the curriculum, scientifc activity,9 and the number of students who have found jobs pertaining to their studies. One very important factor infuencing curriculum evaluation is the assessment of the subject feld by the Ministry of Education, which decides whether a subject is to be considered a priority or otherwise. This procedure results in greater fnancial support for students of the prioritised felds. For example, in Slovakia and the Czech Republic, the governmental prioritisation of technical and natural sciences has resulted in a *ministerial fnancial allowance methodology* that increases funding for such study programs, as well as the entity of additional student allowances10 in these felds. In the case of Slovakia, in 2019 the political science coeffcient for the fnancial allowance per student was 1.0 (the lowest one). The equivalent coeffcient was 1.48 for IT engineering and 3.23 for architecture.11 In the Czech Republic in 2019, the coeffcient for state budget distribution to HE institutions was set at 1.0 (the lowest one) for political science and international relations (and many other social sciences and humanities), compared to 2.8 for chemistry and materials science, and to 2.25 for mathematical engineering.12 Therefore, if a university has a study programme in mathematical engineering with 250 students, it impacts the entity of state subsidies, since the standard allowance per student is multiplied by a coeffcient of 2.25. When compared this to a study programme in political science with 250 students, in this case, the allowance per student remains at the basic level (based on a coeffcient of 1). This encourages HE institutions to promote study programmes providing greater

9Budget allocation refects two scientifc outputs: publications and research projects. There are various coeffcients based on the quality of publications which are included in the formula for calculating the allocation per given HE institution. The same applies to research projects. Decisions regarding such coeffcients lie with the Ministry, and the coeffcients are usually adjusted on an annual basis.

<sup>10</sup> Social and merit stipends, for example. However, in some cases, prioritised study programmes are also now eligible for motivational stipends.

<sup>11</sup>*Methodology of allowance allocation from state budget to public HE schools in 2019*, viewed on 20.2. 2019 at: https://www.minedu.sk/data/att/14159.pdf.

<sup>12</sup>*Nove stanovené keofcienty ekonomické nároc* ̌ *nosti* ̌ [*New coeffcients of fnancial demands*]. Available 10.12.2019 at: https://www.msmt.cz/vzdelavani/vysoke-skolstvi/ nove-stanovene-koefcienty-ekonomicke-narocnosti-1.

fnancial resources for the institution's coffers. Further information on how research is prioritised can be found in the appendix to Chap. 1.

The impact of the above-mentioned tendencies and regulations is refected in the number of PS students and of HE institutions providing PS programs. We will examine student numbers in more detail in the next section. As far as regards the impact on HE institutions, Fig. 5.1 shows a downward trend. With the exception of Bulgaria, the number of HE institutions offering political science programmes in all other countries has fallen. However, the overall number of HE institutions is still higher than it was in the 1990s. Government incentives for the promotion of quality rather than quantity (the opposite was the case during the proliferation period) are not systematic, however. Furthermore, more serious risks are associated with governmental attempts to boost certain HE study programs at the expense of others.

The governments in the CEE region are imposing new rules on higher education which clearly test the stability of our discipline.

The institutional transformations in a given period are again twofold, as seen from the perspective of Di Maggio and Powell (1983). The *normative* aspect is present in the initiative from within to adopt qualitative measures and follow a modern (EU or Western) path of education and research. The *coercive* aspect is present vis-á-vis many HE institutions that have had to change their coping strategies. Since the beginning of this regulatory phase, HE reforms have been based on educational ranking and fnancial constraints and have had a serious impact on the social sciences and humanities. In a certain way, this period has challenged and tested the endurance of political science as a discipline.

#### *3.2 Students of Political Science: From an Explosion in Numbers to Their Recent Decline*

During the proliferation phase of the discipline's development in CEE (late 1990s–2000s), there was a signifcant increase in the number of students studying political science.

As Table 5.2 shows, the number of students enrolled in political science signifcantly increased at frst, but then substantially declined thereafter, except in the Czech Republic: this exception is probably due to the appeal of Czech universities and cities to foreign students (from EU and non-EU countries alike). In some cases, the initial increase in numbers was incredible: as in the Czech Republic for example (where numbers almost

#### 138 A. VILÁGI ET AL.


**Table 5.2** Number of students in political science programmesd

Source: The PROSEPS National Reports on the State of Political Science 2019a–f; Krauz-Mozer et al. (2015), GUS (2019); Hungarian Educational Database (2020)

a Data only available for 2013

bData only available for 2006

c Data only available for 2017

dStudents specialising in politology, international relations, public policy and administration are considered as PS students

quadrupled), or in Poland where the number of political science students peaked at a record 55,674 in the academic year 2004/05, compared to the fgure for 1993/4 which stood at a mere 8713 (Krauz-Mozer et al., 2015). In Slovakia and Romania, the number more than tripled, while in Bulgaria the number of PS students more than doubled.

The reasons for such an increase may be found in several structural factors, and also in certain personal factors. As already mentioned above, the liberalisation of the educational market had increased the number of HE institutions offering political science programmes. At the same time, the fnancial incentives resulting from by governmental funding of HE institutions based on enrolment numbers, led to the proliferation of enrolment in public HE institutions.

However, the proft-seeking strategies of HE institutions are only one side of the story, that is, the supply side. The other aspect, the demand side, concerns the perception of political science as an attractive academic subject area. The successful development of political science in CEE countries has contributed to the consolidation of democracy, thanks to the establishment of important research and teaching facilities that have actively participated in the analysis of contemporary problems, and in explaining and teaching people how democracy works. After the period of democratic consolidation, the increased relevance of political scientists' opinions, as expressed in the media, supported the relevance of political science as a whole. Students who chose political science as a future profession perceived it as something 'fancy' offering various career opportunities, and relatively easy to study even part-time. The other factor contributing to this proliferation concerns the transformation of the public administration in most post-communist countries. As state employees have to hold a university degree, the study of political science was often perceived as a means of self-improvement, or as a very easy degree option. Such factors, together with the signifcant numbers of young people,13 contributed to the boom in the number of political science students.

However, over the last decade (i.e. since 2010), the number of political science students, which is an indicator of the discipline's stability, has declined. As Table 5.2 indicates, the drop in numbers has been quite signifcant. For example, in the case of Poland, where PS students had remained at around 55,000 in the period 2004–2009, the numbers started to drop rapidly over the following decade and were down to 25,054 by the academic year 2011/2012 (Krauz-Mozer et al., 2015). Slovakia saw an even greater reduction in political science student numbers, which shrank to almost one-ffth of the previous fgure. In other countries (with the exception of the Czech Republic), the drop was less dramatic, but still persists.

One possible explanation for such a decline in numbers could be the overall demographics of the region. The fertility rate fell from 1992 until around 2000, and increased only slightly thereafter (see Fig. 5.2). This decrease impacted the university student population in the period 2010–2018, and may have infuenced enrolment in political science.

With fewer young people available for tertiary study enrolment,14 the fertility argument would seem a plausible one (see also EACEA, 2018, pp. 25–26; Santa, 2018; Krauz-Mozer et al., 2015). However, the loss of students is evident not only in real numbers, but also in the share that political science students represented of the total population of university students (see Table 5.3). The CEE countries examined here reveal a

<sup>13</sup> See Fig. 5.2: the rate of birth in the late 1980s–mid-1990s had a signifcant impact on the 18–19 age cohort at the beginning of the new millennium.

14Looking at the entire period from 2010 to 2015, the total number of students enrolled in tertiary education was lower in 2014/15 than in 2009/10 in the countries examined here. The decrease was most pronounced in Romania (45.8%), but in other countries like Slovakia, the Czech Republic, Poland and Hungary, the decrease was also signifcant, ranging between 20% and 30% (EACEA, 2018).


**Table 5.3** Share of political science students among university students

Source: Authors calculations based on data from the PROSEPS National Reports on the State of Political Science 2019a–f; GUS (2019) and Hungarian Educational Database (2020)

a Data available for 2013

bData available for 2017

smaller share of students choosing to study political science in 2018 compared to 2009. The exception of the Czech Republic might be partly accounted for by Czech universities long-term strategy of attracting foreign students from other CEE countries. Thus, the Czech HE institutions apparently have capitalised on the language and cultural proximity to Slovakia, and the number of PS students has remained stable. The question is: why is political science not as attractive as it used to be a decade ago, in most cases?

Alongside the fall in the number of students for demographic reasons and due to a signifcant number studying abroad, another important factor accounting for such decline is that of the greater regulation of tertiary education to bring it into line with labour-market demand. Educational managers, policy makers, and politicians who want to achieve returns on public moneys, have disputed the relevance of various professions, including that of political scientists. Spreading distrust towards the discipline may well have lessened the appeal of political science, while fuctuations in student numbers represents a potential threat to further stability and legitimacy, that is, to the overall institutionalisation of political science.

In the next section, we shall provide a few examples demonstrating that similar patterns prevail. This has been demonstrated by the expert assessments (PROSEPS project) surveys as well.

# 4 Political Science: A Discipline Under Pressure?

In CEE there are indications of persisting tendencies towards the erosion of political science's legitimacy as an educational program and discipline over the last decade (since 2010). Such tendencies are not generalised or identical in all of the countries examined in this chapter, but they are present to a greater or lesser extent in most of them. We identifed three main strategies of discursive deterioration: (1) the prioritisation of labour market demands; (2) the prioritisation of technical disciplines; and (3) a disregard for political science (as a science) for political reasons. In some countries, as we shall show below, such discursive downgrading preceded signifcant political decisions that have worsened the recognition, status and/or fnancing of political science.

The increase in the unemployment rate among younger people shortly after the 2008–2009 fnancial crisis, led to a debate on 'useful' versus 'useless' felds of study in the Czech Republic, for instance. One of that country's right-wing populist MPs (*Úsvit—Národní koalice*) gave the following opinion of the humanities: 'Certainly we do not need so many historians, sociologists, political scientists…I think there are many people of such profession and have troubles to fnd a job…What we need are the felds that have added value and bring fnances to economy. These are disciplines that produce something, they bring added value' (Hajducková, ̌ 2017).

A crucial tendency to favour technical subjects over others, and to denigrate the social sciences, especially political science, was also evident in the Slovak Republic. The Minister of Labour and Social Affairs (SMER-SD), during his annual briefng on the issue of unemployment, repeatedly presented political science, along with pedagogy, psychology and economy, as the educational felds characterised by the highest rates of unemployed graduates (Pravda, 2019; SME, 2015). The portrayal of political science as of little use is something that the prime minister for nine years, Róbert Fico (SMER-SD), did systematically in the media According to Fico, the Slovak education system produces an 'enormous amount of political scientists, lawyers and social workers who are unemployable in the job market' (TASR, 2014). In his address to high school students he said: 'you can study useless political science, you can study useless international relations, you can study whatever is so popular today, but I guarantee you, you won't be able to fnd a job' (Denník, 2017). Moreover, he considers it 'a mistake if somebody is eager to study political science or international relations. We have thousands of such people. Who would need an organiser of spare time with a university diploma?!' (Pravda, 2018) Populist politicians backed by an industrial lobby stress the idea that Slovakia is the most industrial country in the EU, which is why it needs technically skilled people. Technical education at secondary and tertiary levels has been a key priority for recent governments, and this has been extensively divulged to the public via the media (e.g. Hospodárske noviny, 2015; Pravda, 2018; RTVS, 2017; SME, 2016; TA3, 2014; TA3, 2017; TASR, 2014).

In some cases, the importance of technical skills has been translated into policy actions. *The National Employment Strategy of the Slovak Republic to 2020* (Ministry of Labour, Social Affairs and Family of the Slovak Republic, 2014) offered specifc support for the technical and natural sciences within the Slovakian education system. As we stated above, this has led to a new ministerial approach resulting in increased subsidies for such technical and technological disciplines, together with a special motivation stipend provided to students enrolled in these programmes. In 2019, the Czech Ministry of Education, Youth and Sports introduced a pilot project integrating technical education into the curriculum of the country's elementary schools.15 The aim of the project is to combine both the traditional approach to learning manual skills and the use of modern technologies (applied IT). The term 'support to *engineering thinking*' is also used in this context.16

In the case of Bulgaria, until 2016 the approach to higher education had been a liberal one; however, the Ministry of Education declared this a failure as the country's open borders led to a brain-drain on the one hand, and students unable to fnd jobs commensurate with their studies and training on the other. According to the government, only 10% of students choose academic discipline that is seen as valuable for economic growth of the country. The Minister of Education (a member of the conservative, populist GERB party), stated that the country has 'no need for new centres for the teaching of political science or law. We have a need for

<sup>15</sup> Schools for children in age of 6–14 years.

<sup>16</sup> https://www.msmt.cz/novinky-ve-skolnim-roce-2019-2020?highlightWords=pilotn% C3%AD+ov%C4%9B%C5%99ov%C3%A1n%C3%AD+technika.

engineering and technical education centres'.17 These types of arguments are fairly common in Hungary as well. Together with Hungarian politicians' public denigration of political science as a discipline worth studying, the professionalism of the discipline, in the eyes of the public, is also being questioned elsewhere (Koper, 2017). An academic analysis of the profession stated that in in case of the Czech Republic, 'hardly anybody in the general public perceives political science as a science worthy of the name' (Holzer & Pšeja, 2010, p. 113). Even if this conclusion might sound somewhat exaggerated, we found sound, valid reasons why the public's perception of political science has been portrayed in a negative light in the majority of the countries under scrutiny. Firstly, the above authors pointed to the popular perception of political scientists as people offering analysis and observations designed to ft specifc political requirements. Secondly, they observed that political scientists generally acknowledged as leaders in the feld of research, hardly ever participate in public debates or appear in the mass media (Holzer & Pšeja, 2010). The combined impact of such perceptions can lead to political science's role being downgraded to that of a pseudoscience providing only opinions and observations. One of the most recent examples of this attitude towards political science is a social network post by a Slovak MP (candidate of Ľ SNS): '…the biggest pseudoscience in human history: political science. People who fnish [such study] usually don't know anything, they act as windbags who pretend to know world better than others'18 He responded to criticism from a political scientist who had labelled his political party as one of moderate fascists or religious extremists, and potentially linked with tendencies toward democratic backsliding in Slovakia. The depiction of political science as a pseudoscience is quite common in online debates. The roots of such discursive strategies go back to the communist period. Political science was offcially banned as a 'bourgeois pseudo-science' shortly after the communists gained power in the CEE region (Ágh, 1991; Malová & Miháliková, 2002). The current instrumental use of this kind of portrayal of political science by politicians, especially when they are faced with critical analysis, serves the purposes of de-legitimisation.

Another example of the tendency to de-legitimise political science as a discipline and feld of research is the recent battle against 'gender

<sup>17</sup> Interview with the Minister of Education and Science, 14 June 2019.

<sup>18</sup>Available online at: https://www.facebook.com/107752747505118/posts/1440024 57213480/ [posted on 28 May 2020; accessed 30 July 2020].

ideology' in the CEE region. Conservative populist politicians perceive gender studies as part of a 'gender ideology', that is a systematic attempt to erode conservative values and traditional ways of living in the CEE region. Needless to say, 'gender studies' is a scientifc term that is accepted by all those studying the relations between men and women.

Hungarian Prime Minister Victor Orbán declared the battle against liberal democracy and liberal values, including 'gender craziness' (*gendero*̋*rület*), to be 'a mission of our generation' for the next 15 years.19 In this battle, his administration has progressively taken control over public media and academia by systematically weakening their autonomy. The Hungarian Academy of Sciences has been deprived of its research institutes, including its Social Science Research Centre which comprises political science research. The new organisational framework is under strict government control, and applied research is expected to be the new direction it will be going in. Governmental (party) functionaries have descended on public universities, controlling them tightly. Private higher education institutions have partly escaped such control, though not entirely. The public's attention has probably focused in the main on the government's attempt to evict the privately funded Central European University (CEU) from Hungary, which was broadly discussed even beyond Hungary's borders. The CEU declares itself to be an institution 'committed to promoting the values of open society and self-refective critical thinking',20 which is not in line with the 'illiberal democracy' as the regime defnes itself. In 2017, Parliament passed a law setting out conditions that threatened to render the CEU's continued presence in the country illegal. The government denied the CEU's accreditation for the purposes of granting US degrees in Hungary, which led to it eventually moving to Vienna. In addition to the attack on the CEU, a campaign was waged against the new Gender Program at the Social Sciences Faculty of Eötvös Lóránd University via government-friendly media. As a form of response, the government decided to set up a program of Family Studies at Corvinus University Budapest. As has happened in other CEE countries, conservative forces have labelled 'gender studies' as a gender ideology harming the traditional values of Hungarian society by promoting anti-family values. The rival

<sup>19</sup>*Prime Minister Viktor Orbán's speech at the 30*th*Bálványos Summer Open University and Student Camp*, 27 July 2019, Tusnádfürdő.

<sup>20</sup> https://www.ceu.edu/about/our-mission.

programme of 'family studies' is expected to be much more in keeping with the present government's ideology.

In this regard, political discourse and/or national policies do harm academic freedom, and force political scientists to work under pressure. In some cases, the government can even put undue pressure on international research projects. An example of this is the Bulgarian project 'Forum for gender-balanced model at school: the Bulgarian case', which was included in the frst phase of UNESCO's Programme 2018–2019. The goals of the project were misrepresented, with its critics accusing it of peddling 'gender ideology' and 'brainwashing students'. The actual goal of the project was to analyse teacher competence and motivation in order to uphold, and teach students, the principles of gender equality in accordance with the spirit of UNESCO's Gender Equality Action Plan (2014–2021) and its Major Programme 2 'Education'. These goals were in accordance with Bulgaria's National Strategy for 'Encouraging Equality between Men and Women' (2016–2020) and the 'Law on Equality between Women and Men' as published in the State Gazette (Issue 33, 26.04.2016).

Instead of supporting these policies, the Bulgarian Ministry of Education and Sciences, in a slanderous media campaign, demanded the proposal be terminated. Obviously, as on other occasions, the term 'gender' is the scarecrow term designed to mobilise popular support. Over the course of several months, the term was presented to Bulgarian society in a manipulative way. The Ministry, instead of going something about the attack on political scientists, asked them to give up the proposed project. This raises the question as to whether, from now on, anyone who dares to do research on gender themes such as equality, discrimination, violence, inequality, and so on will be ostracised. At a time when we speak of 'Science and education for smart growth', the project has been presented as a mortal threat to Bulgaria's schools, with 'gender agents' endangering the lives of Bulgarian students.

In our view, this is a very serious case of censorship in which academic freedom is suppressed. The academic community has to have the freedom to select research felds in compliance with academic standards and ethical norms. By adopting various different approaches, political scientists contribute towards the critical assessment of political alternatives. The attack on this project has provided a new opportunity to argue that scientists should participate actively in policy debates, both as professionals possessing relevant knowledge and as educated citizens, rather than being simply burdened with academic work.

# 5 Conclusion

By comparing these six CEE countries, one important fnding that has emerged is that there are substantial fundamental similarities and similar developmental trends, in political science across the six countries in question. Moreover, the same concerns prevail in regard to the state and development of political science within this group of countries. In this chapter, we have examined the current state of the discipline, and in particular the two key proprieties of institutionalisation: stability and legitimacy. We have looked at specifc cases in order to establish the ways in which governments interfere in public discourse, and set up institutional arrangements impacting the institutionalisation of political science as a discipline. Our analysis spanning three decades suggests that political science as a discipline has been stable over time, in terms of its endurance and/or constancy. However, our fndings also indicate that its resilience over time is still rather weak, that is: its capacity to face and adapt to external challenges (imposed by governments) and changing structural factors has proven rather weak, as its legitimacy has been increasingly tested by political elites and lobbies of industrialists.

The (re)launch of political science as an academic and scientifc discipline after the collapse of Communism in 1989 was followed by the quest for an institutional framework comprising chairs in political science, academic journals and professional organisations. In most cases, the initial phase of this institutionalisation process was completed by 1995. In the late 1990s, the governmental push for the liberalisation of the educational sector had resulted in an increase in the number of HE institutions, and accordingly in the number of political science chairs. We have referred to this phase of institutionalisation as the 'proliferation phase', consisting in the establishment of private HE institutions and the allocation of educational funds based on the number of students and/or staff. This phase led to the adoption of proft-seeking strategies by many HE institutions. The model of public funding favoured education over research, and led to an increase in PS student numbers. The appeal of political science as a relatively new discipline was also a contributing factor.

After 2010, discussions were held and attempts made regarding the adoption of further regulations. These efforts were a consequence of the fall in the total number of students due to demographic change and a signifcant exodus of students to foreign countries. As a consequence, attracting more students required considerable effort, and more often than not the strategy adopted was either that of improving the educational offer, or offering a very easy path to the desired diploma or degree. Regulations were introduced as a necessary step towards improving the quality of higher education in the region. Favouring quality (with the emphasis on research) over quantity (to the latter having been targeted during the proliferation period) is not such a bad thing. However, there are greater risks associated with the governmental attempts to boost certain HE programs at the expense of others that have accompanied the changes in the rules. Politicians' discursive strategies aimed at promoting specifc academic disciplines, has been an additional factor in the reduction in PS student numbers.

The education debate in the countries concerns has focused on competitiveness bolstering education with a natural science and technical focus. This approach could signifcantly affect the social sciences, and political science in particular, by reducing their role in, and appeal to, society (by contributing to their de-legitimisation). In our opinion, to date political science has managed to remain stable in terms of dynamic continuity (persistence and development) but has not seen any signifcant growth. However, the intervention of governing institutions in the policies adopted by educational institutions could have negative effects on political science, as falling student numbers could lead to the discipline being less involved in scientifc research, international cooperation and innovation.

# References


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#### Primary Sources


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# The Institutionalization of Political Science in Small States: A Comparative Analysis of Estonia, Iceland, Malta, and Slovenia

*Eva Marín Hlynsdóttir and Irmina Matonytė*

# 1 Introduction

In general, theories of political science, international relations, and public administration are based on general principles. Hence, a small country is assumed to be simply a smaller version of a large country, and while traditionally ignoring size as an independent variable, differences between small and larger countries are often traced back to differences in political regimes, administrative structures, or cultural differences. More recently, researchers have focused on the following questions among others: the importance of scale, as in Thorhallsson's (2006, 2019) studies of small

I. Matonytė

© The Author(s) 2022 153

E. M. Hlynsdóttir (\*)

Faculty of Political Science, University of Iceland, Reykjavík, Iceland e-mail: evamarin@hi.is

General Jonas Žemaitis Military Academy of Lithuania, Vilnius, Lithuania e-mail: irmina.matonyte@lka.lt

G. Ilonszki, C. Roux (eds.), *Opportunities and Challenges for New and Peripheral Political Science Communities*, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-79054-7\_6

states in the context of EU decision-making; public administration (Randma-Liiv & Sarapuu, 2019); education in small states (Godfrey Baldacchino, 2011); and the state of democracy in small states (Corbett & Veenendaal, 2018). The aim of this chapter is to add to this increasingly robust series of small studies by exploring the institutionalization of political science in higher education in small states, through a comparison of Estonia, Iceland, Malta, and Slovenia. As the concept of institutionalization has been explored more fully in the opening chapter of this volume, here we will concentrate on the concept of size.

What constitutes "small" or "large" is highly relative and often valueladen. Thorhallsson (2006, p. 8) outlines six characteristics that are helpful when defning small states: fxed size, sovereignty size, political size, economic size, perceptual size, and preference size. The frst, which relates to the sizes of the population and territory, is the most common indicator used to defne the size of countries and the one that will be used in this discussion. However, there is no fxed population benchmark, and various authors have used the indicator in different ways. Randma-Liiv and Sarapuu (2019) point out that the cutoff point is usually set somewhere between one million and three million, while countries with populations below 100,000 are often categorized into a subgroup of microstates. In the European context, there are 12 countries with a population of between 100,000 and three million. The four countries chosen for this study are situated at opposite ends of this scale, with Iceland frmly at the lower end with a population of 350,000, followed by Malta with 460,000 inhabitants. Estonia lies toward the other end of the scale, with around 1.3 million people, as does Slovenia with its population of two million. Iceland and Malta both belong to the separate research feld of island studies, which frequently overlaps with small-state studies (Godfrey Baldacchino, 2004).

In addition to population size, the concept of sovereignty size is useful in this context, as it refers to the state's ability to maintain some form of minimum state structure and to actively participate in international politics (Thorhallsson, 2006). This concept thus refers to both the internal and external capacity of a given state, although in this context, it will only refer to the state's internal capacity to formulate and implement independent policies in higher education, specifcally within the domain of political science. As the introduction to this volume explains, the specifc nature of the profession of political scientist is important as it is closely connected to statecraft, and is underpinned by strong ethical assumptions. Due to its dependency on democratic governance and its normative vocation, political science is subject to changes in both national and international contexts more than any other academic feld.

Our aim is to explore how size affects the capacity of four small European states to institutionalize political science within their higher education systems. However, what we see is that small European states defy their "smallness" and tend to create and nurture their own national political science establishments. The question of how they achieve this is the focus of this chapter. In particular, we are interested in how small states—while still embracing internationalization—stabilize and reproduce political science at the level of national universities, and which factors drive, enable or, on the contrary, inhibit or prevent, the institutionalization of political science in small states.

# 2 Political Science and Higher Education in Relation to Size

In the globalized world of high technology and innovation, higher education is increasingly seen as the most important indicator of a country's vitality and robustness. The traditional view of the small-state approach to higher education has been that the delivery of higher education and cutting-edge research at home is both unachievable and inappropriate (Baldacchino, 2011). Studies of the development of small states' higher education show that small states were often seen to be better off by contributing to the establishment of regional institutions, due to their lack of fnancial, administrative, and intellectual resources. From that perspective, they were advised to harness the technological possibilities of distance learning, often provided by internationally reputable academic centers, and encouraged to partner with global "heavyweights" in the research feld. Historically, this has meant that many small states did not have universities until very recently—for example, not until 1992 in the case of Cyprus, and not until 2003 in that of Luxembourg (Crossley et al., 2011; Baldacchino, 2011). On the other hand, if they had established local universities, these often did not offer post-graduate courses, as in the case of the University of Iceland, until the turn of the last century. In many cases, this resulted in a brain drain, as the best and brightest students left the country to get a better education, and many never returned. This stands in contrast to the current philosophical and epistemological thinking underlying the rationale of higher education, whereby no compelling reason exists to prevent even the smallest state from having a full-fedged national university, since investing in higher education is increasingly viewed as a prerogative for increased productivity and competitiveness (Urbanovic & Wilkins, ̌ 2013). The imperatives of being competitive on a global scale, and at the same time being domestically relevant, in the case of political science generate specifc tensions, if not resistance, and political science communities in small states are particularly susceptible to such tensions.

Political science as a separate academic discipline is a relatively new phenomenon; it was only after World War II that political science achieved this status. In this regard, it was a latecomer compared to other social sciences such as sociology and psychology. Earlier approaches to political science mostly concentrated on teaching civil servants to navigate between the two spheres of politics and administration (Goldsmith & Goldsmith, 2010; Klingemann, 2008). Furthermore, political science in Central and Eastern Europe since World War II has followed a different trajectory, mainly focusing on Marxist-Leninist thought prior to the fall of the Berlin Wall and the decline of the corresponding communist regimes. Klingemann (2008) claims that the processes of democratization during the latter half of the twentieth century provided fertile ground for the development and inclusion of political science in higher education. The teaching of political science in universities is currently viewed as an instrument of civic education, designed to counteract political apathy and low election turnover (Sloam, 2008). Furthermore, Eisfeld (2019) suggests that in the twentyfrst century, political science's need to be useful to the citizens whose lives and civic engagement are affected by economic, cultural, and political constraints encourages the discipline to be partisan—that is, to suggest and discuss possible ways of attaining a society consistent with democratic rights and obligations, and the hope of a meaningful life (p. 193).

Originally, the institutionalization of political science in this context, understood as the launching of new, autonomous organizational entities (Klingemann, 2002), met a certain resistance from the old faculties. Klingemann (2008) argues that in Western Europe, resistance was more commonly found within older universities than in the newly established private or polytechnic universities. Furthermore, he points out that the same pattern may be observed in post-communist Central and Eastern Europe. In his paper on political science in Europe, Klingemann (2008) states that of the seven smallest Council of Europe member states, only Iceland and Cyprus had established political science as a separate academic discipline. The institutionalization of political science, in this context, is observed from the point of view of "autonomy and identity," with a focus on the main areas of teaching and research and on the leading theoretical approaches adopted (Klingemann, 2002). He also points out that Estonia and Slovenia had an established political science program, whereas information about Malta was not available. In the present work, to reiterate the defnition employed in the aforesaid volume, the institutionalization of political science as an academic discipline is understood in broad terms: it refers to political science as a relatively stable discipline with an identity of its own, a fair amount of autonomy, capable of self-generation, willing to be internationalized, and accepted as a legitimate professional category (that of social scientists) by society at large. This raises the question of the relevance of studying political science's institutionalization within small states.

In an increasingly globalized world, the internationalization of higher education is a fundamental question of the strategies adopted in higher education policy-making. Altbach and Knight (2007) defne internationalization as "the policies and practices undertaken by academic systems and institutions—and even individuals—to cope with the global academic environment" (p. 290). Internationalization may be achieved using a pragmatic or an ideological approach, depending on the preferences of individual institutions or systems (Crosling et al., 2008). There are fve broad strategic categories of internationalization: "the recruitment of international students, student and staff mobility, international partnerships, including joint programmes of study, international collaboration for research, entrepreneurship or development and internationalization of the curriculum" (adapted from Maringe, 2010, by Urbanovic & Wilkins, ̌ 2013, p. 378). In regard to academic mobility, this may be broken down into a few different sub-categories, such as cross-border supply, as in at-adistance education without the physical presence of students, or staff actually moving from one place to another; consumption abroad, where students move from one country to another to study; commercial presence, such as branch campuses or joint ventures; and fnally, the presence of teaching staff on site as academic staff temporarily move to other countries to provide services abroad (Altbach & Knight, 2007).

Crossley et al. (2011) point out that cross-border higher education providers constitute an important mechanism in many small states. However, it has also been pointed out that small states' public administration is especially weak in regard to evaluation, planning, and quality assurance (Sarapuu & Randma-Liiv, 2020). This poses specifc challenges concerning quality assurance schemes in smaller states' higher education systems (Crossley et al., 2011).

Urbanovic and Wilson ( ̌ 2013) argue that the focus of internationalization in higher education has made higher education institutions more homogeneous, which is one of the focal issues of the Bologna Declaration (Wächter, 2004). They further argue that higher education institutions in small states are more likely to mimic successful institutions in larger countries, thus providing legitimation for their courses of action. Small states actively pursuing an internationalization strategy include the three Baltic states of Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia, all of which have achieved a 10% rate of inbound international students (Chankseliani & Wells, 2019; Urbanovic & Wilkins, ̌ 2013).

Furthermore, Klingemann (2008) argues that political science has been more easily institutionalized in northern Europe than in southern Europe. Although he does not explicitly state which countries are considered to comprise "northern Europe," it may be argued that Iceland and Estonia belong to that area whereas Slovenia and Malta lie in the south. Based on this, we would expect to see the highest degree of institutionalization of political science in Iceland, followed by Estonia, a corresponding lower level of institutionalization in Slovenia, with Malta bringing up the rear. However, there is controversial evidence concerning the question of whether the legacy of the former communist regime aids or hinders the institutionalization of political science in the countries concerned (Eisfeld & Pal, 2010). Finally, although all the countries belong to the "small" states category, there is a considerable size difference between them. Size may substantially impact their individual capacity to institutionalize political science, mainly in relation to the concept of sovereignty size, as in an individual state's capacity to implement and formulate higher education policies.

# 3 Key Aspects of the Institutionalization of Political Science in Small States: Stability and Internationalization

The Bologna Declaration has made a signifcant contribution to the institutionalization of political science. One of the main aims of the Bologna Process is to make European higher education more homogeneous and globally competitive (Wächter, 2004). Furthermore, it aims to remove barriers and create a common framework for European scholars, by encouraging mobility and cross-continental cooperation (Reinalda & Kulesza, 2006).

However, a clear defnition of political science as a unifed discipline within the European context is problematic. First, there are pressures created by the Bologna process (Klingemann, 2008). The core curriculum shared across Europe has brought forth issues relating to such conformity. Although Goldsmith and Goldsmith (2010) suggest this is not a problem at the undergraduate level, this may become a serious problem at the postgraduate level. Analyzing European tendencies, Capano and Verzichelli (2016) decried the rural quality of political science due to its small numbers and its nature as a soft science with no strict scientifc methods or practical applications. This view is contested in the introductory chapter to this volume, and the argument is made that over the past couple of decades, the number of political science schools, students, and academic staff in Europe has increased considerably. Moreover, methodological skills and a practice-oriented focus have become more prominent, particularly in Central and Eastern European countries which have successfully caught up internationally within a relatively short space of time, thus leveling the process of institutionalization. However, in small states the choice of research topics and methods, driven by the idiosyncratic considerations of a limited number of aspirants, might contribute not so much to a strengthening of the discipline, or to innovation within the discipline, as to its further rural widening.

The second problem lies in the level of differentiation of the discipline, as many of its sub-felds, such as international relations and public administration, constitute separate disciplines (Klingemann, 2008). In small countries, a high level of fragmentation of the discipline may hinder the institutionalization of political science due to reduced economies of scale (see also Baldacchino, 2011; Crossley et al., 2011). The third problem identifed by Klingemann (2008) concerns the question of "who is a political scientist?" The establishment and recognition of professional standards, mainstreaming career paths and promotion, as well as the guiding principles of the reproduction of political science communities in small states, are challenged by the attractiveness (or prestige) of teaching posts at national and foreign universities, the multiplicity of international projects for professional cooperation, and last but not least, the global mobility of political scientists.

Finally, the institutionalization of political science at the national university level also needs to deal with problems of collective representation and collective action, which in small states might be further aggravated, again, by limited fnancial and human resources. Previous research on small states has revealed a tendency for specialists in these states to be "jacks of all trades," as they are required to contribute to a much larger and more varied range of subjects than their counterparts working in larger states (Randma-Liiv & Sarapuu, 2019). Contrary to the classical views held by Huntington (1965), Ilonszki argues, in the introductory Chap. 2 to the present volume, that more complexity within the discipline might lead to its destabilization and de-institutionalization. In small states, this is a highly plausible trend, since not only does growing complexity sustain informal ways of operating, but strong contenders may use their personal status and establish their own separate departments, research centers, and/or new programs, thus exacerbating the fragmentation of the discipline.

Here, some theoretical references and refections about stability as an institutional property, and a property of political science in general, are appropriate. Firstly, the resource-dependency theorists claim that "organizational stability is achieved through the exercise of power, control, or the negotiation of interdependencies for purposes of achieving a predictable or stable infow of vital resources and reducing environmental uncertainty" (Oliver, 1991, p. 149) Secondly, institutional stability depends on the complexity of the constraints defning the institution (North, 1989). Changes in the bargaining power of existing organizations necessarily lead to alterations in the institutional framework; for instance, a decline in the effectiveness or prestige of an organization would weaken its ability to contribute to the maintenance of the larger institutional structure (North, 1993). Thirdly, institutional anchors and constraints are either formal or informal. Formal constraints are understood to be those rules that regulate various issues and eventually "solve" problems. Informal constraints such as routines, actors, and attitudes are no less important. The relationship between formal and informal rules infuences stability, and in the case of discrepancies between the two, the resulting tension negatively affects stability (North, 1993, p. 20).

The institutional capacity to adapt is essential for stability. Yet a question arises as to what the stability of institutions means—a lack of external changes or an internal institutional transformational capacity? In addressing this question, Hansson and Helgesson (2003) distinguish between two types of stability: the frst, covered by the notion of constancy, refers to the actual absence of change; the other, covered by the notions of resilience and robustness, refers to the way in which a system copes with disturbances. These two concepts can neither be confated nor defned in terms of the other, but when combined they cover all major uses of the term "stability"—not just in the social sciences, but also in the natural sciences and engineering.

Lawrence et al. (2001) take into account another aspect of stability and measure stability in terms of the length of time that an institution remains legitimate. However, they warn that if we concentrate only on the temporality of organizational units, we are in danger of missing more nuanced aspects of institutional stability. Institutional stability and the pace of change depend on complex mechanisms. The authors include among such mechanisms the infuence, force, discipline, and domination used by social agents to sustain or hinder the institutionalization process. Each of the mechanisms produces a distinctive pattern of institutional maintenance, and their combination results in complex institutional practices. Lawrence et al. established two major modes of stabilization: episodic forms of power, which refer to relatively discrete, strategic acts of mobilization initiated by particular actors; and systemic forms of power, which emerge and manifest themselves through routine, ongoing practices. For the purposes of the present chapter, pertinent examples of systemic forms of power include quality assurance processes and professional promotion schemes embedded in routinized systems that do not require repeated activation. Instances of episodic power are important in launching certain organizational initiatives, decisions to maintain or abolish undertakings, etc.

In sum, in this chapter, we address the issue of stability as a quality of social institutions (and more specifcally, of the academic discipline of political science) that helps to maintain and reproduce those institutions and that provides the opportunity for change, as well as for adaptation to the evolving national and international environment(s). Regarding internationalization, in this chapter, we defne it rather narrowly and focus mostly on the international networking (performed domestically and through cross-border mobility) of political scientists in small European states. A thorough account of the policies and practices of national political science communities and its establishments, employed to cope with the global academic environment, is clearly beyond the scope of current research.

As pointed out in the previous section, internationalization is particularly important in the case of small states, as it has a quality dimension as well as a geographical one. Internationalization takes place both domestically and internationally: domestically, it involves creating an international curriculum and teaching in a language that is attractive to foreign students or staff; external internationalization, on the other hand, involves setting up joint programs or cooperating with external institutions. It is essential that both internal and external actions are of international quality (Urbanovic & Wilkins, ̌ 2013). Thus, research on the internationalization of higher education tends to include one or all of the following categories (Crossley et al., 2011; Urbanovic et al., ̌ 2016): (1) the recruitment of international students; (2) student and staff mobility; (3) international partnerships, including joint programs of study; (4) international collaboration for research; and (5) entrepreneurship or the development and internationalization of the curriculum (adapted from Maringe, 2010, by Urbanovic & Wilkins, ̌ 2013, p. 378).

# 4 Country Profiles

As mentioned in the introductory chapter, this volume focuses on postcommunist countries as latecomer democracies and scrutinizes the patterns of the process and the context of the institutionalization of the political science discipline in Central and Eastern Europe during the frst two decades of the twenty-frst century. In relation to this debate, this chapter offers two small states, Iceland and Malta, as control cases, thus transcending the old–new democracy debate. Arguably, Estonia and Slovenia are successfully homogenizing and catching up internationally, in a relatively short space of time. Estonia and Slovenia implemented important reforms and specifc education projects in the feld of political science—a particularly sensitive discipline in the countries under regime change. In the post–Cold War era, this has been a specifc aim of Western organizations and governments in order to foster democracy in their political systems and promote democratic administration and public policymaking within these states (Eisfeld, 2019, p. 85).

The choice of country cases for this chapter is far from arbitrary. The four countries selected—Estonia, Iceland, Malta, and Slovenia—are situated in different parts of Europe and have different cultural–historical roots; they represent both old and new democracies. The differences in their institutional organizations and historical backgrounds should help establish whether any relationship exists between sovereignty size and the development of political science in higher education, in Europe's smaller states.

Currently, higher education in Estonia is structured along Western lines. Its most important academic institutions include the following: The University of Tartu, founded in 1632; Tallinn Technical University, founded in 1918 and rebranded as TalTech in 2018; and Tallinn University, founded in 1919. The University of Tartu is the only classical university in the country and is the largest and most prestigious university in Estonia. It is the only university with a separate department of political science. TalTech, on the other hand, is the only university with a department of public administration, while Tallinn University focuses on the interdisciplinary study of governance, law and society.

In Iceland, there are seven universities, of which three have more than 1000 students. The largest is the University of Iceland, which was established in 1911. It is the only Icelandic university with an established political science faculty. Political science was frst taught as a part of the social science program in the early 1970s. A separate political science faculty was established in 2008. The Faculty of Political Science is part of the School of Social Sciences. Although of a small size compared with other university faculties, it is of average size within the context of the School of Social Sciences, which is the largest school at the university.

The University of Malta is one of the oldest small-state universities in existence. Unlike the other three countries examined here, there is no established department of political science in Malta. Political science subjects are taught within programs offered by four other departments and institutes: the Department of Public Policy, the Department of International Relations, the Institute for European Studies, and the Mediterranean Academy for Diplomatic Studies.

The oldest and most prestigious university in Slovenia is the University of Ljubljana, established in 1919. The institutional foundation of political science was part of a political decision made by the former socialist government in 1961. The school in question was renamed the Higher School of Sociology, Political Science and Journalism in 1968, and subsequently became a part of the University of Ljubljana in 1970. Following Slovenian independence in 1991, this school was transformed into the Faculty of Social Sciences, with a separate Department of Political Science. In addition to the Political Science Department, the University of Ljubljana also has a Faculty of Administration (originally established as a separate institution in 1956). There are several universities in Slovenia; however, only the University of Ljubljana teaches political science at all three academic levels (BA, MA and PhD). Table 6.1 provides a short overview of the respective situation of higher education and political science in the four countries concerned.


**Table 6.1** Profle of universities teaching political science

(*continued*)


**Table 6.1** (continued)

Source: Authors' own collection on the basis of Websites from Malta: https://www.um.edu.mt; Iceland: https://english.hi.is/; Slovenia: https://www.unilj.si/university\_in\_numbers\_2018/study/number\_of\_students\_enrolled\_in\_2018; Estonia: https://www.ut.ee/en; https://www.tlu.ee/en; https://www.ttu.ee/en

As is evident, Estonia has integrated political science into its higher education system most extensively, with political science being taught at three higher education institutions. It also has the highest number of political scientists identifed for the Proseps project, totaling 50, followed by Slovenia with 40 and Malta and Iceland with 25 each. Slovenia and Estonia have much larger institutions and more students than either Iceland or Malta. All four countries have foreign students accounting for a sizable portion of their student body, ranging from 7% in Slovenia to 14% in Malta. The percentage of foreign students has risen rapidly in all four countries in the past few years. Information on the precise numbers of political scientists as a percentage of academic staff is scarce: in the case of Estonia, the available information indicates that there are 30 political scientists employed by the University of Tartu, whereas no information is available regarding the country's other universities. The University of Iceland employs 14 political scientists, while the University of Ljubljana has 54. The case of Malta is an anomaly, as political science is not taught as an independent program, and academic staff with backgrounds in political science are scattered throughout Malta University.

# 5 Analysis

This chapter is divided into two sections: the frst focuses on institutional stability, and the second concentrates on the internationalization of political science in four small states. Our sources of empirical information include PROSEPS country reports, produced by national experts on the basis of a jointly agreed-upon template, covering the last two decades; the PROSEPS survey, conducted in spring 2018, which collected individual data mostly focused on the experiences of political scientists in Estonia, Iceland, Slovenia, and Malta over the last three years; and also some secondary sources (national statistics, international rankings, etc.). We employ two sets of empirical indicators of stability, namely the constancy and resilience of institutional entities (chairs, departments, programs, political science journals, and associations), and solid trends in the enrolment of students (at BA and MA levels). Using these indicators, we identify factors that stabilize or destabilize political science as a university discipline in Estonia, Iceland, Malta and Slovenia.

#### *5.1 Stability*

While assessing the stability of political science in the four selected countries, we focus on the last two decades, namely the period from 2000 to 2019. However, we feel it necessary to start with some observations regarding the formative periods concerned. The formation of political science as a full-fedged university discipline in Estonia and Slovenia only came about in the 1990s, after the collapse of the Soviet system and of the Republic of Yugoslavia (Eisfeld & Pal, 2010). Meanwhile, the established democratic regimes in Iceland and Malta have permitted and encouraged the more extensive and consolidated development of political science compared to the former communist countries. This *notwithstanding,* during the period under research (2000–2019), in all four cases national political scientists view political science as a science of democracy.

*Malta*. As of 2019, the University of Malta does not have a department or chair explicitly mentioning political science in its title. Instead, there are a number of professorship positions associated with the teaching of courses in political science-related subjects. Researchers working within the domains of public administration, European studies and international relations are to be found in four different departments. At the University of Malta, the frst department with the term "policy" in its name was the Department of Public Policy, set up within the Faculty of Economics, Management and Accountancy in 1978.

It was only after the end of the Cold War that the building of political science as an academic discipline picked up the pace. In 1990, the Mediterranean Academy for Diplomatic Studies was created, followed soon afterwards, in 1991, by the European Documentation and Research Centre (renamed the Institute for European Studies in 2012). In 2001, the Department of International Relations was set up; this department falls within the Faculty of Arts, whereas the Institute for European Studies and the Mediterranean Academy for Diplomatic Studies are independent entities. The frst PhD was completed at the Institute for Public Administration and Management in 2009, while both the Department of Public Policy and the Institute for European Studies awarded PhDs for the frst time in 2016.

In terms of social demand, political science has seen positive developments in Malta: over the last two decades, the number of students enrolled in BA and MA political science programs has been stable, with a slight upward trend in numbers. However, the degree of institutionalization of the discipline is still rather weak. A fully-fedged political science program of study (or even one simply labelled this way) is still lacking, and there are no political science faculties, departments, institutes or centers. Political scientists in Malta do not have their own national political science journal, nor has any political science association established in the country yet. It may sound paradoxical that a political science degree course does not exist in a country in which society is so deeply and pervasively penetrated by politics and one where election turnout is almost universal (Carammia & Pace, 2015).

Malta is one of the founding members of the European Higher Education Area. Joining the Bologna process was arguably not a huge challenge for Malta, at least in terms of institutional adaptation. The Maltese educational system largely refects the English model on which the Bologna system is modeled (Gatt, 2013). As a result, Malta tends to score high or very high on most of the Bologna scoreboard indicators, with the sole exception of two quality assurance indicators, which is something the university is currently addressing.

**Iceland**. Social sciences were added to the academic programs at the University of Iceland in Reykjavík in the late 1960s. Soon after a BA degree in political science was launched, international cooperation was initiated, and the frst empirical study of the Icelandic political system was produced. The frst chair of political science was established in 1970, the second in 1974, and the third in 1988. These chairs were assigned to the Department of Social Sciences from 1970 to 1976, then the Faculty of Social Sciences from 1976 to 2008, and have been part of the Faculty of Political Science since 2008. Following the end of the Cold War, the late 1990s and early 2000s witnessed a substantial expansion of political science at the University of Iceland. The number of students and staff rose considerably, and the university introduced MA and PhD programs in political science.

In around 1990, the University of Iceland obtained the right to appoint its professors without the prior consent of the Ministry of Education (previously, the Ministry could appoint professors who were not the university's choice for the post). At that time, the public funding of universities was specifcally linked to the number of students enrolled. This meant that as the number of political science students (and programs) rose, funding for the discipline also increased.

A separate Faculty of Political Science—a subject frst taught as part of the social science program—was established in 2008. The Faculty runs one BA program in political science and several MA programs: a Public Administration MPA program (since 1997), an MA in International Relations (since 2005), a post-graduate diploma in Small State Studies (since 2009), and since 2015, an MA in Media and Communication Studies as well as an MA in West Nordic Studies. Finally, it offers courses in Gender Studies at both MA and PhD levels. Only the University of Iceland offers full programs in political science. However, some political science-related courses are offered at two other universities (the University of Akureyri and the University of Bifröst), as they have professors on their staff with a political science background.

The frst PhD in political science was awarded by the University of Iceland in 2001, and this PhD program still exists. Since 2001, 11 PhDs in political science and six PhDs in gender studies have been awarded under this program. Iceland's own political science journal (the *Icelandic Review of Politics and Administration*) was launched in 2006 and is being published regularly since then. It has an international editorial board and a double-blind peer review system; articles are in English and Icelandic, and two issues are published a year.

The Icelandic Political Science Association was founded in 1995. It is a small association, but one that has a reputation for holding interesting events, such as discussions on domestic and international elections and topics relevant to a domestic audience. It is an active member of such political science associations as the international IPSA and the Nordic NoPSA, and it organizes biannual national conferences. The association admits not only established scholars but also students and boasts around 600 members, with active members accounting for around half of the total membership. The association often teams up with authors and supports meetings to discuss new publications within the feld of political science. The association also presents an annual award for the best BA thesis and the best MA thesis in political science.

These developments in political science as a university discipline in Iceland are sustained by the stable popularity of political science studies, both among Icelanders and foreign students. Since the early 2000s, the number of students enrolled in political science–based BA programs has doubled (from fewer than 200 to more than 300), and the number of those enrolled in political science–based MA programs rose from a few dozen in the early 2000s to around 350 by 2018. However, it should be pointed out that in Iceland, during the years after the fnancial crisis of 2008, the number of students increased substantially across disciplines and programs: it had risen to almost 20,000 by 2013, although numbers have dropped by a few thousand in more recent years.

Iceland has adhered to the Bologna system; relatively small adjustments were needed in the Icelandic setting, and reforms based on the Bologna system seem to have strengthened political science rather than weakened it. Furthermore, as pointed out before, the recession of 2008 did not result in any large-scale reforms of political science, or the social sciences in general, in Iceland.

**Estonia**. In Estonia, which was formerly the smallest of the Soviet republics, political science started off life as a new discipline, practically from scratch, when Gorbachev's *Perestroika* began, with interest in politics growing exponentially as a consequence of this political sea-change. In 1988, an Institute of International and Social Studies was set up at the Estonian Academy of Sciences; in 1989, the Department of Philosophy and Political Science was established at the University of Tartu; in 1990, the Estonian School of Diplomacy was set up to train foreign service personnel; and in 1991, a Chair of Social Theory was founded at the Tallinn Pedagogical Institute.

The truly formative period began in September 1992, when Professor Rein Taagepera (b. in Tartu in 1933; fed to the West after World War II) arrived from the University of California-Irvine to set up a new School of Social Sciences at the University of Tartu (Pettai, 2010). Since 1995, the University of Tartu has had a Department in Political Science running a fully fedged BA program in political science. At Tallinn University (known at the time as the Tallinn Pedagogical Institute), political science as an academic discipline developed more slowly and tended to focus on issues of public administration. The blossoming of political science during the 1990s and into the 2000s was followed by its gradual consolidation during the 2010s. In Tartu, three separate units dealing with political science—the Department of Political Science, the Department of Public Administration, and the European College—merged to form the Johan Skytte Institute of Political Studies in 2015, though steps in this direction had already been taken as early as 2008. Most of the scholars making up the public administration sub-feld at Tartu moved to Tallinn Technical University in 2007 and 2008, where they now work in the Ragnar Nurkse Department of Innovation and Governance. At Tallinn University in 2015, the previous Institute of Political Science and Governance merged with sociology and law to form a broad unit called the School of Governance, Law and Society.

In Estonia in 2019, four higher education institutions (all public) taught political science: the University of Tartu, Tallinn University (formerly the Tallinn Pedagogical University), Tallinn Technical University (since 2018, TalTech), and the Estonian School of Diplomacy. Political science departments at private universities in Estonia, albeit of a less wellestablished nature, have also existed. These include the Eurouniversity, which after more than 20 years of existence is set to lose its teaching rights in 2020, and Audentes, founded in the late 1990s, which in 2008 merged with Tallinn Technical University (Pettai, 2010). The frst political science PhD program got underway at the University of Tartu in 2000, with three students enrolled. The program encompasses all sub-felds of political science: political theory, international relations and comparative politics. The program has been successful up until now: by early 2019, 18 researchers had been awarded their PhDs after successfully completing this program.

*Politica* (in English, *Politics*) is an academic journal specializing in political science, founded in 1999 at the University of Tartu. As of 2019, it will publish one issue a year, mostly in Estonian. *Acta politica Estica* (in English, *Political Affairs in Estonia*) is an annual collection of articles (mostly in Estonian) that has been published since 2004 by Tallinn University. The publication *Studies of Transition States and Societies* (STSS) was established in 2009 by Tallinn University, and two to three issues appear per year, in English, indexed in Scopus. Its prestige among Estonian political scientists is moderate since although it is open access, it has not been ranked particularly highly by the national political science assessment system. Despite being formally established in the early 1990s, Estonia's political science association has never been active.

Notwithstanding these positive developments and the universities' efforts to attract foreign students, the number of students enrolled in BA and MA programs in political science in Estonia has fallen over the past two decades. The same trend is observable across all study programs at Estonia's universities, and it is mostly attributable to demographic and generational changes: the population is aging, cultural attitudes are changing, and young Estonians are increasingly going abroad, to the West, to study.

Furthermore, over the last decade, national political developments in Estonia have led to the further retrenchment of political science. In 2011, a center-right political party (Pro Patria) revised the fee system for Estonian-language education, and universities were deprived of the opportunity to earn additional income through student fees. Such circumstances forced universities to downsize. At the same time, certain subjects (including political science) became increasingly international through the establishment of English-language study programs.

**Slovenia.** Of the former Yugoslavian states, Slovenia had the most fexible communist regime for extended periods, and Slovenian social sciences remained more open to Western ideas than elsewhere in the former Yugoslavia (Eisfeld, 2012, p. 93). What was originally a political project of the ruling Communist Party of Yugoslavia in the late 1960s, the School of Political Science in Ljubljana was subsequently transformed into the School of Sociology, Political Science and Journalism, and was given greater freedom in regard to its teaching and research. In 1970, it was renamed the Faculty of Sociology, Political Science and Journalism, and became part of the University of Ljubljana. The University of Ljubljana is the only Slovenian higher education institution with a political science department. While there are other institutions that offer political science courses (for instance, the School of Advanced Social Studies in Nova Gorica), or even run MA programs in political science (the University of Primorska), they do not have their own political science departments, and they recruit lecturers from other departments and universities to teach their courses.

The University of Ljubljana established its PhD program in political science in 1965. In 2008, the University of Ljubljana established an interdisciplinary program in the humanities and social sciences, whereby students were able to choose their feld of specialization (political science or its sub-disciplines, such as policy analysis, European studies or international relations). Since 1964, Slovenian political scientists have had their own journal (*Teorija in praksa*; in English, *Theory and Praxis*), although it also covers other disciplines such as sociology and economics. The journal has always been highly reputed in socialist countries and among leftleaning Western academics. Currently, in 2019, the Faculty of Social Sciences of the University of Ljubljana publishes six issues annually, predominantly in English; the journal is indexed in Scopus.

The Slovenian Political Science Association was established in 1968 and remains active to this day. It currently boasts around 200 members, and regularly holds national conferences. It is an active member of political science associations such as the international IPSA and the regional CEPSA (Central European Political Science Association).

The Slovenian higher education system has undergone several reforms over the years. Most recently, the Bologna Process and the global economic crisis of 2008 triggered the most signifcant changes. The Bologna Process has been fully implemented since 2005 and has led to the revision of the organizational and teaching paradigms of Slovenian universities' political science programs. During the second wave of reforms (prompted by the economic crisis of 2008 that led to reduced state spending on the nation's public universities), the changes made were more substantial; since 2018 a new 3 + 2 + 3 formula has been applied, establishing programs of three years for undergraduates, two years for postgraduates (Master's degree students) and three years for PhD scholars. The changes in the formula have not only led to fewer political science courses (cuts being mostly justifed on the grounds of fnancial savings) but have also had a negative impact on student enrolment in undergraduate and graduate programs, especially in the feld of political theory and policy analysis (public administration).

The Great Recession following the global fnancial crisis in 2008 resulted in very different scenarios for the two countries most severely hit, namely Iceland and Slovenia. Malta experienced no real crisis, just a slowdown for a few years, and there was no noticeable impact on university life. In Estonia, austerity policies were introduced; however, they had no dramatic impact on higher education, as the country enjoyed a substantial budget surplus that went towards cushioning the immediate effects of the fnancial crisis. In the case of Slovenia, reforms driven by the need for substantial fnancial savings were implemented. This resulted in fewer courses being offered, and some subjects, such as political leadership, comparative public administration and federalism studies, were removed from the curricula altogether. In contrast, the Icelandic case saw a large infux of students into the country's universities, as unemployed people were encouraged to use their spare time to achieve higher levels of education. Thus, the number of students increased exponentially, but without any corresponding growth in the number of teaching staff. The teacher-student ratio consequently rose considerably during this period. However, the crisis did not result in any cuts in the courses in political science on offer, and the number of students has decreased in recent years. It may be argued that in the case of Iceland, the crisis strengthened the position of political science within higher education, while in the case of Slovenia it weakened it; while no clear and immediate effects can be observed in the cases of Malta and Estonia.

As institutional stability also equates to the ability of institutions to react to a changing environment, the four cases demonstrate divergent levels of adaptability. In Estonia, political reforms (widely embraced neoliberal targets and recent surges in populism), and in Slovenia, profound changes in the national higher education system (implementation of the Bologna system and budget cuts following the 2008 economic crisis), have had negative effects on the development of political science. Student enrolment in political science degree courses in Estonia and Slovenia has declined since 2010, compared to Malta and Iceland where it has remained relatively stable. Indeed, in Iceland political science has blossomed, particularly as a consequence of the 2008 crisis, although developments since 2019 have been rather less positive.

#### *5.2 Internationalization*

We assess the level of internationalization in both inward/inbound and outward/outbound terms. In regard to the former, we shall focus on the recruitment of international students and staff, while in regard to the latter, our focus will be on international networking (international publications, cross-border mobility, and research projects) with foreign partners. We identify factors that increase or decrease the internationalization of political science in Estonia, Iceland, Malta and Slovenia. (For a broad picture about internationalization, refer to Chap. 8 in this volume.)

While assessing the internationalization of political science in the four selected countries, we focus on current trends and situations as observed in 2018, since these are refected in expert reports and evaluations as well as the PROSEPS survey conducted in 2018. The challenges of adopting the Bologna system, however, shall be dealt with in the section on stability. The Bologna-system issues are clearly genuinely connected to the question of internationalization, where the Bologna system has played, and continues to play, a major role, as shown by the need to introduce programs in English aimed at international students, and the increased emphasis on professional cooperation with academic partners from abroad, for example.

With regard to the internationalization of political science in the four countries in question, a few country-specifc factors should frst be outlined. In Malta, the majority of political scientists obtained their PhDs from foreign universities (mostly located in the UK), and English has long been the offcial language at the University of Malta, not only for teaching but also for administrative meetings at all levels. In Iceland, there is no state policy aimed at increasing the percentage of international students at the university level. However, there are incentives, for example, built into the national research grant schemes that engender international cooperation through the recruitment of inbound PhD candidates, faculty mobility, etc. In the autumn of 2019, the Programme of International Relations within the Department of Political Science switched wholesale to the English language. PhD dissertations in political science in Iceland are presented in Icelandic or English, depending on the nationality of the external examiners and/or supervisors. In Estonia, the synergy of incoming foreign scholars and internationally oriented researchers at the University of Tartu had led to a complete transition to English-language teaching at both PhD and MA levels in political science, by the year 2015. Staff in the Department of Political Science in Tartu had become very international, with more than 12 different nationalities present. In Estonia, PhD dissertations in political science are written and presented in English. In Slovenia, according to the national legislation, all programs taught at the public universities must be taught in the Slovenian language; only then can they also be offered in parallel English classes. Such English-language ventures include MA programs in political theory, policy analysis and public administration. In addition, there are some joint interdisciplinary MA degree programs (developed and delivered with partner universities from abroad) that are offered in English, such as Comparative Local Development and Human Rights and Democratization. At the PhD level, almost all lectures are given in English, as foreign professors contribute signifcantly to the curriculum. PhDs in political science in Slovenia can be presented and in either Slovenian or English. As Table 6.2 shows, a sizable proportion of students are foreign; however, there is little information about the share of foreign students in relation to individual subjects. It can be said, however, that all four states are pursuing a process of internationalization by increasing foreign student numbers. Information regarding the proportion of foreign members of staff at individual universities is most robust in relation to Estonia, which seems to be strategically increasing foreign academic staff numbers Information regarding this matter was not available in the case of the other three states.

In terms of international networking, the PROSEPS 2018 survey fndings provide a snapshot of the patterns of the internationalization of political scientists in the four countries in question (see Table 6.2). Clearly, the small numbers of respondents in Estonia, Iceland, Slovenia, and Malta does not permit any broader generalizations to be made. However, the results of the survey, combined with the country experts' insights, are instructive.


**Table 6.2** International networking of political scientists from Estonia, Iceland, Malta and Slovenia

Sources: (PROSEPS Survey 2018 data and expert evaluations). Percentages of YES answers in relation to selected variables contained in Q26, 27, 29 and 30

Political science researchers from the four states actively publish abroad, and they mainly use English for the purposes of professional communication. Each year, every second researcher from Estonia, Iceland, Malta, and Slovenia publishes at least one article in a journal outside his/her own country and/or a chapter in a book published by an international publishing house. Slovenian and Estonian political scientists tend to publish with international co-authors, while Icelandic and Maltese researchers are less internationalized in terms of co-authored academic publications. English is the *lingua franca* of political scientists in Estonia, Iceland, Malta, and Slovenia. In Iceland and Slovenia, every third political scientist also publishes their research in a different foreign language (most often in German). Only a small percentage of political scientists in Malta and Estonia publish in a "third" language (respectively, in Italian and Russian).

The responding researchers from the four small countries in question are internationally mobile. The more active of them participate in international conferences, either presenting papers or acting as discussants. They are also strongly engaged in international research projects. On this account, Malta lags behind the other three, as only every fourth political scientist participated in joint projects between 2015 and 2018, compared with two-thirds of Estonian researchers engaged in similar endeavors.

International mobility with a prolonged physical presence abroad scores lower. However, every second Maltese and Slovenian political scientist has recently spent more than two weeks working abroad. Estonian and Icelandic researchers are less inclined to engage in cross-border mobility involving longer stays abroad. The remoteness of Iceland and its "islandness" (isolation factor) contribute to this. Only a few researchers from Iceland report being active, and having prominent positions, in joint international academic projects. By comparison, practically every second political scientist from Slovenia has engaged in at least one highly prestigious international activity, such as being: a partner or subcontractor in a research project funded by an international institution such as H2020, ERC or COST; a reviewer of project applications funded by international or another country's institutions; or an editor of an international peerreviewed journal. Estonian and Maltese colleagues are moderately entrepreneurial and successful in such international ventures.

Every third researcher from Iceland, and every second one from Malta, has declared that he/she did not spend any time working abroad—meaning doing research or teaching—between 2015 and 2018. The proportion of exclusively "sedentary" political scientists in Estonia and Slovenia is less than one-ffth. When asked "Have you ever worked in any contracted research or teaching position in another country?", the responses of political scientists from two post-communist democracies noticeably differed from those of their colleagues in Malta and Iceland (both older Western democracies). In Estonia and Slovenia, only one in four political scientists acknowledged an opportunity for a lengthy professional stay abroad over the course of their entire career, compared to one in two political scientists in Iceland and Malta. Interestingly, German universities are listed as host institutions by the respondents from all four countries. The United Kingdom is also a popular choice for periods of foreign working, especially among Maltese academics. Russia, a former center of political-ideological interest, is visited by Estonian and Slovenian political scientists. Staying in neighboring countries forms another pattern: Estonians go to Finland, Icelanders to other Nordic countries, Maltese academics go to Italy, and Slovenians to Austria. However, the limited number of respondents prevents us from making broader generalizations. The United States and China are apparently the two most attractive non-European host countries, systematically attracting political scientists from all four of these small European states.

Domestic cultural and political contexts are also refected in the different patterns of international mobility displayed by political scientists from small countries. On the one hand, the Slovenian political science community is very strongly integrated internationally (Eisfeld, 2012, p. 93), while in the Slovenian system academics need to go abroad if they want to further their careers. On the other hand, Iceland is a remote island, its political science community is famed for promoting strong domestic concerns, and there are no university-level rules of international mobility for individual career advancement. Meanwhile, Estonian and Maltese political science researchers do not enjoy the benefts of strong collective professional associations and institutional practices consolidated "under one roof"; their international mobility and networking decisions are mostly taken individually and are less contingent on national traditions. As mentioned (see Table 6.1), in Estonia at least three universities teach and carry out research in political science; in Malta, different components of the political science program are scattered across numerous university departments.

# 6 Discussion and Conclusion

An analysis of the developments of political science departments, schools and faculties in the four countries shows clear signs of path dependency, as observed by North (1991). With variable trajectories, the founding chairs of political science programs in Iceland, Estonia and Slovenia reveal temporal institutional stability; they adapt and continue their activities. In Malta, where there was no institutional unit labelled "political science" during the inception phase, none of the organizational units had acquired that label by early 2020.

As to the trends anticipated in the introductory chapter regarding the proliferation of private institutions, which could undermine the stability of political science, such developments have been observed in Estonia, which for a brief period experimented with private institutions. However, by early 2020 private ventures in the feld of political science in Estonia had either vanished or had been incorporated into well-consolidated public universities. None of the other small states has ever engaged in the privatization of political science programs. Slovenia has refrained from doing so probably due to the limited entity of its national market and the geographical and cultural proximity of Croatia and Serbia, where such private ventures were, and still are, abundant (see the chapter on the post-Yugoslav/Balkan cases in this volume). Iceland and Malta have not "gone private" in the feld of political science due to their lengthy, continuous development of the discipline, and of public university education in general.

Instances of more energetic "catching-up" with international projects are noticeable among post-communist Estonian and Slovenian political scientists, who are very open to international academic initiatives, and who actively pursue joint projects. Meanwhile, the data show that scientists from Malta and Iceland, working over a more extensive period (as their political science programs were initially developed that much longer ago), internationalize in a less frenetic manner and are more concerned with individual original work and bringing single-authored insights to the table.

As to the effects of previous political legacies, post-communist political scientists as a whole have less professional experience working abroad than their peers from the older democracies. The historical factor also means that the former "colonial masters" of such small states signifcantly impact the internationalization of those states' current political scientists. However, the fgures as such need to be complemented by more detailed, in-depth research into the "colonial" effects on small states' political science communities and their agendas.

As regards the modes of stabilization distinguished by Lawrence et al. (2001), empirical data reveal that in Iceland and Estonia, institutional stabilization is mostly pursued through normative strategy: that is, through the professionalization and standardization of political science teaching and research using performance-based assessment methods. Elements of mimetic stabilization can be found in Slovenia, especially in relation to the implementation of the Bologna system. The Slovenian and Icelandic political science associations have adopted good practices in terms of normative strategy, which contribute to the social prestige and legitimacy of the discipline, and in different ways express a clear professional ethos both domestically and internationally. In Malta, normative, albeit shallow, stabilization trends are apparent, though the situation is rather stagnant, with no consolidated university departments or political science associations having emerged. In Estonia, the preservation of ailing national political science journals published in Estonian reveals coercive stabilization based on the political considerations of national decision-makers, that perpetuate various institutional arrangements whose meaningfulness has been questioned by professional political scientists. The issue raised in the introductory chapter to this volume, concerning the length of time that institutions within the same feld, each characterized by a diverse type of stabilization logic, could co-exist, remains unanswered.

Lawrence et al.'s (2001) differentiation between episodic and systemic forms of power exercised in the process of institutionalization, is embraced in our study of these four small states. On the one hand, in Estonia we observe numerous strategic acts of mobilization: for instance, the launching of a western-style political science curriculum by the outstanding political scientist Rein Taagepera, or the highly personalized decision to maintain (or abolish) specifc private establishments operating in the domain of political science. On the other hand, in Slovenia, we witness several systemic, ongoing practices adopted by organizations, such as internationalization or professional promotion schemes, embedded in routinized systems that do not require repeated activation. The ailing quality assurance system witnessed in Malta in relation to the Bologna Process is yet another example of a systemic form of power. In the case of Iceland, new programs tend to be launched episodically, mostly driven by highly motivated individuals.

The "tests" of Iceland and Malta compellingly demonstrate that "older" cases do not necessarily mean the more successful development—in terms of institutional performance and presence—of national political science programs and communities. Political science in latecomer Estonia, which has developed more in the breakthrough than the incremental mode, internationally ranks noticeably higher than it does in Malta and is relatively better acknowledged than in Iceland. As the introduction points out, "in some ways the process of institutionalization appears to be a twostep process. First, there must be some conscious decision to create an organization or institution for a specifc purpose. The second stage appears to be then to fashion the institution over time" (Peters & Pierre, 1999, pp. 32–33). The evidence from these four countries suggests that in the domain of political science, the more promising projects are those launched from the top (as in Estonia), or those which, after a brief phase of modest initiatives, gain impetus (as in Iceland or Slovenia), rather than those based on slow, incremental undertakings over a longer period of time, as in Malta. The examples of Malta and, to a certain extent, of Slovenia reveal that a strategy involving numerous stakeholders could be effciently employed during the second stage when political science as an academic discipline is fashioned over time. Indeed, as anticipated in the introduction, the process of adaptation is more important to understanding the process of institutionalization than the outcome itself.

With regard to the threat of de-institutionalization, political science in all four countries experiences such a threat mostly in relation to student enrolment (demographic decline plus competition from other, more fashionable disciplines such as communication studies, economics or lifesciences. New societal and economic demands, such as economic pressures to increase the effciency and social impact of research, are substantial in Estonia and Slovenia, but less so in Malta and Iceland. Political (partisan) pressures on political science communities are not reported as being so signifcant in any of the four small, consolidated European democracies.

Taken together, the four cases reveal different levels of institutionalization of political science, which in both Iceland and Estonia is highly stable, as a result of a combination of healthy resilience and a good capacity to adapt and innovate. The level of institutionalization in Slovenia is slightly lower; its resilience is weakened by negative external factors (especially the economic downturn), and as the relatively unsuccessful implementation of the Bologna system demonstrates, its capacity to adapt is weak. Malta exhibits the lowest level of institutionalization of political science of the four countries concerned, and in keeping with Hansson and Helgesson (2003), the trends and patterns of empirically observed stability in Maltese political science should be seen as illustrating constancy and stickiness rather than resilience and robustness.

These observations are in line with Klingemann's (2008) belief that political sciences have attained a higher level of institutionalization in northern Europe than in southern Europe. This conclusion is supported by several "control" variables identifed in this chapter. Iceland and Malta are islands, and also are very small states in terms of population; both boast frmly established democracies, and during the Cold War neither belonged to the communist sphere. Moreover, both share similar histories of "colonialization" dating back to before the modern nation-state era, with their national independence only having been achieved after World War II. Meanwhile, Estonia and Slovenia are substantially larger "small states", in terms of population, with relatively new democratic systems and sharing a similar history of occupation, by ideologically driven Russian (Soviet) imperialism in the case of Estonia, and homemade versions thereof in the case of Slovenia. The crosscutting north-south scale parsimoniously reveals the distinct levels of the institutionalization of political science in small European states. However, recently observed negative developments of political science in Estonia, mostly the result of negative demographic trends and of populist political decisions, somewhat contradict the idea of the "happily anchored North" and demonstrate that institutionalization is a never-ending process. The north-south axis is also pertinent in understanding the rather less institutionalized internationalization of political scientists in Malta and Slovenia (south) compared to their colleagues in Iceland and Estonia (north), where the internationalization of political scientists is more frequently channeled via distance cooperation, with a stronger emphasis on institutionalized partnerships and cooperative projects, and less reliance on interpersonal and informal actions.

The Slovenian case confrms that the legacy of the previous nondemocratic regime might work not only as a hindrance to but also as a positive catalyst for the institutionalization of political science (Eisfeld & Pal, 2010). The political science institutions inherited and successfully maintained from socialist times (university departments, specialized journals and traditions, and organizational frameworks of collective action within the political science community) in twenty-frst century Slovenia have been helpful overall. Post-communist Estonia, starting from scratch having discarded practically all of the political science-related structures established in Soviet times, has fared even better than Slovenia in terms of the institutionalization of political science. The empirical evidence clearly sustains the belief that the former communist states' undemocratic past has not necessarily led to the post-communist reincarnation of those countries along identical paths of democratization and institutionalization. However, in the political science communities of both of the former communist-led countries examined here, almost thirty years after the fall of the Berlin Wall, strong feelings continue to be expressed regarding the "time lost under communism," the "compressed time" perspective and the urge to "catch up" with the West, as witnessed in the patterns of hyper-active internationalization. The "heavy-duty" outward internationalization witnessed in Estonia and Slovenia differs from the more relaxed, betterpondered outward internationalization seen in Malta and Iceland.

The four small states differ considerably in terms of sovereignty size. Malta, an EU member, is a very small polity, and it has little incentive (small capacity) to assert and develop its own fully fedged and institutionalized tradition of political science, and no genuine nation-state interest in doing so, even though politics penetrate its society to the extent where its election turnout is almost universal. Iceland, dwelling since World War II on its clear identity as a civic nation, and playing an important role not only regionally but also globally, displays a much greater interest and a stronger capacity to develop and consolidate political science within the country. Estonia is not only four times larger than Iceland or Malta, in terms of population, but also more vigilant in regard to its sovereignty, due to the inherent confict between its democratic ideals and its relationship with Russia. Therefore, it is unsurprising that the development of political science in Estonia is, for better or worse, regarded as an issue of national interest. Finally, Slovenia, with a population of around two million, located in a relatively secure geopolitical environment as a member of both the EU and NATO and with no aggressive immediate neighbors, is less affected by sovereignty size in terms of the development of political science within the country.

Overall, the fndings show that small states can develop stable, internationally well-entrenched political science institutions at the university level. Sovereignty size is not the only decisive factor; path-dependent institutional practices also help account for the development of political science in small states. We would argue that the smallness of the state provides mixed blessings for the development and institutionalization of political science. However, our analysis of four cases demonstrates that smallness is an advantage rather than a burden, more a source of resilience and robustness than of constancy and rigidity, and a catalyst for openness and ingenuity rather than for retrenchment and umbrage.

**Acknowledgments** We would like to thank the following colleagues for their helpful comments and insights: Ólafur Th. Harðarson, Professor at the University of Iceland's Faculty of Political Science; Marcello Carammia, Senior Researcher at the University of Catania; Simona Kukovic, Assistant Professor at the University of Ljubljana; and Vello Andres Pettai, Professor at the University of Tartu.

# References


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# The Bumpy Road to Relevance: Croatia, Hungary and Lithuania in Perspective

*Gabriella Ilonszki, Davor Boban, and Dangis Gudelis*

# 1 Introduction: Our Questions and Cases

The emergence and introduction of political science in Europe's new democracies was accepted as a natural given within the context of democratisation; however, how far our selected countries have travelled down the road to relevance—a common theme in the well-established political science communities—remains largely unexplored. This gap needs to be bridged for two main reasons: it seems that now the newcomer countries'

G. Ilonszki (\*)

D. Boban Faculty of Political Science, University of Zagreb, Zagreb, Croatia e-mail: dboban@fpzg.hr

D. Gudelis

© The Author(s) 2022 189 G. Ilonszki, C. Roux (eds.), *Opportunities and Challenges for New and Peripheral Political Science Communities*, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-79054-7\_7

Department of Political Science, Corvinus University of Budapest, Budapest, Hungary e-mail: gabriella.ilonszki@uni-corvinus.hu

Faculty of Business and Public Governance, Institute of Public Administration, Mykolas Romeris University, Vilnius, Lithuania e-mail: dgudel@mruni.eu

academia face similar challenges and constraints to those in the 'West'; at the same time, however, certain differences concern the institutionalisation of political science, which is still an important, often open question in some of the latecomer political science communities. We shall operationalise relevance on the basis of the 'Western' debate on the relevance issue, while we shall argue that certain additional aspects should also be considered when we explore relevance in our cases. We fundamentally accept that 'Relevance in its narrow sense means addressing issues that lay citizens care about, or should care about…/and/Relevance in its broader sense means bringing new and useful knowledge to a problem that citizens care about' (Gerring, 2015, p. 36). In concrete terms, this means how the profession relates to multiple publics, be they 'normal citizens' listening to a political science commentary, the student body, or decision makers, and the profession appears to be more relevant the more these relationships are widespread and refexive. It is more diffcult to judge relevance in terms of the quality of the knowledge base that the profession creates and provides to such audiences. This chapter will focus on the concrete dimensions of relevance, leaving quality judgements for later research.

We shall develop these different undertakings in regard to the experiences of three new members of the political science community, namely Croatia, Hungary and Lithuania, as they vary in certain important respects. Firstly, does it matter that Croatia has a longer history of political science education; do proto-political studies place political science in a different relevance frame in Croatia than in Hungary or Lithuania? Furthermore, given the different political histories of these countries, we can reasonably assume that their academic communities adopt different perspectives on engagement with the non-academic world. In Croatia, empirical research frst emerged in the 1960s, and despite the fuctuating autocratic control of the state and society, some research was conducted about political behaviour and the political system. At the other end of the scale, during the Soviet period in what is now the Lithuanian Republic, a nonindoctrinated approach to the political world was impossible, and anyway there was nobody listening. Hungary could be placed somewhere in between these two, with its 'soft dictatorship' of the 1970s and 1980s (Linz & Stepan, 1996) during which economists and sociologists were able to impact public discourse based on their empirical research, whereas political science as such was totally absent. We can also expect that the political experiences of the public would affect the way they engage with


**Table 7.1** Some institutional aspects of political science in Croatia, Hungary and Lithuania

a For the research purposes of the COST project, political scientists were defned as follows: those that have a PS PhD, and/or publish in the feld of PS, and/or have a PS position at a university or research unit

political science/scientists. Lithuania had to fght for its independence, and organised civil movements played a very important role in this process. Systemic change consisted mainly of an elite compromise in Hungary without any great public engagement, while in Croatia, a painful war of secession was followed initially by a hybrid regime: both situations do not seem to favour political interest on the part of the public.

Furthermore, the country cases reveal the differences in the dimensions of the profession among the countries concerned. Croatia possesses just the one political science institution, the Faculty of Political Science (FPZG) at the University of Zagreb, that offers undergraduate courses and a PhD degree (with two PhD programmes); Hungary offers 8 MA programmes and 6 PhD programmes (either as stand-alone programmes or as joint programmes with other social science felds), while Lithuania boasts fve higher education institutions offering 13 MA programmes in the political science feld (including public policy, politics and media studies, history and politics1) together with 2 PhD programmes (see Table 7.1). Finally, it remains to be seen whether the recognised differences between developmental patterns in Northern and Southern Europe (Klingemann, 2008)

<sup>1</sup>Public administration study programmes are not included here.

are observable in our cases with regard to how political science is engaged with its broad context.

Table 7.1 shows some aspects of the institutional reality to be found in the three countries concerned, which (among others) will play a role in the bolstering of the relevance of political science in these countries.

With the above questions in mind, in Sect. 2 we shall develop our approach to relevance by focusing on potential institutionalisation differences between East and West, and between our chosen cases. In Sect. 3 we shall analytically deconstruct the concept of relevance through the experiences of the selected countries and present evidence on the usefulness/ applicability of these dimensions. In the conclusive Sect. 4, we aim to establish whether political science can be regarded as relevant in our three countries, and if differences exist, how they can be accounted for. The analysis is based on two sources: the desk top research carried out by the authors, and the country reports and survey results of the COST project.

# 2 Variations: West and East

The debate over the relevance of political science in the West has been going on as long as political science has existed (Stoker, 2010; Stoker, 2015). From its ethos as being the scientifc embodiment and interpreter of modern times—and of democracy in particular—to the more current concerns over its usefulness and practicality, the relevance of political science has often been questioned and analysed. Many years ago, Wilensky argued that what distinguishes a science from a profession is that the latter has clients (Wilensky, 1964, p. 141). This understanding continues to be valid: a profession is expected to provide a well-defned service and engage with the clients, unlike mere disciplines 'which might have clients—if at all—as the whole society', in Wilensky's words.

This relevance debate went through two substantial upheavals in the West, albeit each rooted in different challenges. In the frst wave of change during the 1960s and early 1970s, a fourishing profession raised questions about its appointed tasks and missions, which seemed to be changing not only due to the increasing knowledge base and professionalisation of the discipline, but also due to the changing social and political world in which the traditional devotion to democracy seemed outdated (Ricci, 1984). The second sea-change was witnessed in the new millennium, and on this occasion the external driving factors were more explicit. They originated from a variety of different sources: from the introduction of market principles in higher education following the growth of the student body, to the introduction of effciency demands related to the transformation of the university per se. In this regard, Flinders (2013, 2018) argues that the demands on the profession have increased so greatly that the question of the relevance gap (that is, political science does not offer enough) should be replaced by the theme of the expectation gap: in an increasingly demanding context, the profession is under stress.

While the two periods of the 'relevance discussion' were characterised either by a focus on normative or pragmatic expectations in regard to the role of political science, they both share the belief that political science should be somehow engaged with the external environment. The normative approach (see, e.g. Eisfeld, 2011) challenges political science on the grounds that it has lost its critical approach to the main problems afficting our societies, and does not respond to the most pressing problems. The pragmatic approach (see, e.g. Stoker, 2010), on the other hand, claims that a more pragmatic orientation and more practical outcomes are rightly expected from political science.

Both approaches are clearly understood in our countries, and the two focal points of the Western debate, that is the normative and pragmatic approaches, appear in compressed forms in the emerging political science communities of the newcomer states. Moreover, there are two additional dimensions that are important in our specifc cases: identity formation, and the achievement and preservation of legitimacy, which relate relevance to the central theme of this volume, namely certain aspects of institutionalisation. This will infuence how a profession can and does become relevant.

#### *2.1 Seeking Identities*

Identity will determine how the profession posits its place, how the profession sees itself and how it acts accordingly—in close interaction with external demands and through internal debate. This identity formation is important as it will impact the way the profession relates to different agents: is it going to be open or is it going to be self-contained? The formation of the profession's identity has clearly followed different trajectories in the countries concerned here.

Discussions about the relevance of political science have been on-going in Croatia for 60 years. During the communist period of political science (1962–1990), these discussions were held by academics and by the ruling elite alike. In the view of the country's academics, the identity and autonomy of their discipline was the major concern (see Chap. 4 in this book by Boban & Stanojević). Although political science institutions were established by the 'regime', political scientists were depicted by one prominent communist politician as 'omniscient ignoramuses', and there was constant fear at the Zagreb Department of Political Science that the Department could be abolished. The discipline also suffered from poor public visibility, as was to be expected in an autocratic regime: political scientists were not called upon by the media to contribute towards open public debate, but continued to live in their own realm cut off from society. The post-1990 years saw more openings for the discipline, but during the frst decade of that period the profession was largely engaged with its own development and self-reorganisation, including curriculum change. After 2000, the discipline became to take on its own identity through heated debates held at the Zagreb department. Since then, the presence of political scientists in the media has grown, although a lack of connectivity between political scientists and practitioners remains. Overall, there have been more debates about the internal development of the discipline than about its connections with the general public and the political sphere. The major 'relevance concerns' have regarded the decreasing number of potential students and the problems related to employment opportunities.

The Hungarian trajectory of political science's role and relevance can be divided into three periods. Indeed, the corresponding debate started even before political science had been recognised as an academic discipline. Certain members of Hungary's departments of scientifc socialism advocated change in the curriculum, with some limited success at that time. Furthermore, the Association of Political Science (which was founded in the early 1980s) offered an arena for such discussions. In those early years, the main concern was how the profession could manage to stay as far away from politics as possible. This anti-politics concern is indirectly related both to the normative and pragmatic approaches, as defned above, and is rooted in the experience of the communist regime where science could only fourish if it left the political world well alone. During the second period, this self-isolation seemed to diminish, and overall a value-free science got precedence; the issue of relevance has emerged once again as a result of the developments witnessed during the past decade of illiberalism. Political science's standing has been challenged, and the feld has become divided: on the one hand there are political scientists who are relevant insofar as they are visible and seem to be well connected to the media and the political sphere, and as such they can provide practical advice to those requiring it. On the other hand, however, there are those who remain mainly silent and are expected to meet considerable expectations at university level, as pointed out by Flinders (2018). There can be no doubt that political scientists in Hungary know a lot about relevance, either as a pretext or as illusion, even if they do not talk about it very much.

The issue of political science's relevance has been of critical importance since the very establishment of the discipline in Lithuania during the years of national revival (1988–1990) and following the restoration of the country's independence in 1990. In the autumn of 1988, an open discussion was held on the status and teaching of ideological academic subjects such as the History of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, and Scientifc Communism. Initially, the debate took place in the departments of Vilnius University and among its students; however, within a few months it had spread to all of Lithuania's higher education institutes. Discussions led to the reform of the social sciences and the establishment of political science as an academic discipline, whose curriculum, as the reformers argued, would consist of a mixture of law, civic education and the political history of Lithuania (Krupavicius, ̌ 2002, p. 289). Thus, the formation of political science received impetus from the need for a scientifc discipline which could study the political processes operating in society and contribute to the process of civic education and democratic transformation broadly perceived by the academic community at that time. The identity of the discipline and its relevance to society remained an important research topic (Krupavicius, ̌ 2002, p. 293). For example, the Lithuanian Political Science Association (LPSA) organised a conference on the status of political science in Lithuania in 1999. Other themes dealt with at the LPSA's annual conferences included important issues such as democracy, interest groups, political culture, public administration, security policy, and so on. From 1995 to 2000 public administration departments and study programmes were established in several of Lithuania's universities. Public administration and public policy were perceived as branches of political science, and as such they focused on the improvement of policy-making processes; they were thus perceived as more relevant than other branches of 'pure' political science. At the same time, as Lithuanian political scientists, especially those of the younger generation, became familiar with political science research in the West, thus advocating value-free form of political science also found its place in academia. However, the view that political science should somehow contribute towards society and improve political processes still prevails among Lithuanian political scientists, and their role and mission as such are recognised by the country's media, political parties and government. Political scientists regularly comment on political events (elections, etc.) in the media, work for 'think tanks' and consultancy frms doing policy-oriented research and take part in working groups established by government institutions. A good example of the relevance of political science in Lithuania is the ongoing project 'ManoBalsas.lt' (My Vote),2 which was started in 2008 by a team of political scientists from various Lithuanian universities, who developed an online-based tool for rational voting. The tool gathers responses from politicians and voters to questions of importance to society, and measures the correspondence of their political beliefs, thus providing support for the electoral choice.

This brief overview shows that the role of political science, and its engagement with different actors, has been an issue in our countries. These considerations concerning the relevance of the profession appear to be closely connected to the identity aspects of institutionalisation. Both the normative and the pragmatic approaches have been adopted at different moments in time, and to different degrees, in the countries concerned. In Croatia the debate is still on-going, in Hungary it has re-emerged, whereas in Lithuania, it has been settled for good. Generational change (particularly in Croatia and Hungary) and political change (in Hungary) have a clear impact on this. In Hungary, a divided profession is also divided on the question of which form of relevance it is focused on (the normative or the pragmatic). In Lithuania the trend reveals the profession's tendency towards pragmatism. In Croatia, a small, self-contained political science community is mainly concerned with the pragmatic aspects of engagement, particularly in the realm of education, in order to gain and maintain legitimacy.

### *2.2 Legitimacy in Question*

While the development of political science's identity will infuence the profession's normative and pragmatic approaches to relevance, and its engagement with diverse actors, in the case of the more recently established political science communities the legitimacy question may also be decisive. Only a legitimate discipline can make its voice heard both socially and politically, that is, be seen as relevant. Thus the formal frst steps like policy decisions and legal documents, legitimising the profession, were of

<sup>2</sup>Mano balsas Lt, https://www.manobalsas.lt/index/index.php.

fundamental importance. However, legitimacy also needs to be preserved, and this shall be the second aspect examined in this section.

The three main institutions in Croatia dealing with the regulation of science and higher education are the Ministry of Science, the Agency for Science and Higher Education (AZVO)—an independent body in charge of accreditation and re-accreditation—and the universities themselves. Unlike in Hungary and Lithuania, the discipline has been called 'political science' in Croatia (to be precise, political sciences or *politologija* politology)3 since its inception in 1962, and has remained accepted under this name during the post-communist period, which differentiates it somewhat from the other two cases. The FPZG has sole authority to grant BA, MA and PhD degrees, and also enjoys the exclusive right to organise the process of academic promotion for all political scientists in the country.

In Hungary, the legitimacy of the profession was established soon after the democratic transition. The Hungarian Accreditation Committee (MAB), initially set up in 1992 before taking its current form in 1994, was an independent (non-governmental) body comprising the leading members of academia. The MAB was responsible for formulating criteria and accrediting all academic programs and professorial nominations. The process was highly competitive, and several institutions—including established large universities—tried to launch political science programmes which were not always successful, were accepted temporarily, or were indeed rejected and the whole process has/had to be started again (Rébay & Kozma, 2005).

In Lithuania, the accreditation of study programs was not introduced until 2002; however, several legislative acts had contributed towards establishing a system of accreditation before then. Government provisions introduced in 1993 regulated the control and certifcation of higher education institutions, and in order for such an institution to be certifed, its study programmes, study methods and measures had to meet the established requirements. The provisions in question established that the list of study areas and felds proposed by a higher education institution had to be approved by the Conference of Rectors of Lithuanian Higher Education Institutions and by the Research Council of Lithuania. The same regulations stipulated that every fve years, and if necessary more often, the

<sup>3</sup>This word is not commonly used in English, although Philippe Schmitter does use it in one of his papers. https://www.eui.eu/Documents/DepartmentsCentres/SPS/Profles/ Schmitter/Politics-as-a-science.pdf.

Government of the Republic of Lithuania was to form an expert commission to assess the level of higher education in the country. The frst commission tasked with monitoring performance was formed by the Lithuanian Government's Decree of October 20, 1994. At that time, higher education institutions' performance in the feld of social sciences was evaluated as one of the lowest of all scientifc felds.

Very similar patterns are observable in all three countries, which is not surprising given that the process was conducted in accordance with international standards and adaptation/adjustment requirements. The only real difference is the time dynamics of implementation of such provisions: they were introduced early and quickly in Hungary, but more slowly and following a more complex procedure in Lithuania; Croatia, on the other hand, saw a combination of continuity and new institutional requirements.

In the longer term, the legitimacy of a discipline is not built on formallegal requirements only. Its status may well be confrmed or challenged by simple things, like the remarks of a decision-maker such as those of the Croatian communist party leader mentioned above. To preserve legitimacy, performance-related factors have to be taken into account, (even though expectations can be forcibly set by external actors), as formulated in the 'Western debate'. On the other hand, the legitimacy of the profession may be challenged on normative grounds. Whichever of the two represents the main form of pressure—(abusive) external expectations or the aura of unsafety—they could fail to sustain the relevance of the discipline. We would argue that as the profession develops, the legal component of said recognition should decrease, while evaluative and supportive measures should increase, as clear signs of the discipline's continued legitimacy. In Croatia, the process of accreditation is conducted regularly every fve or six years at university departments, to ensure the quality of research and education. So far, all re-accreditation of political science programmes in Croatia has taken place at the FPZG. There have been attempts to establish one BA and one MA study programme in political science at two other universities, but these have proven unsuccessful. At the time of writing this chapter the most recent accreditation is just going on. The former re-accreditation procedure conducted at the FPZG was in 2014 and resulted in the reduction in student numbers, as the accreditation criteria required the FPZG to have a student–staff ratio of less than 30:1. In Lithuania, the newly established Centre of Quality Assessment in Higher Education4 (1996) was tasked with evaluating the country's higher education institutions, and the evaluation process was subsequently developed in several stages. The system for the evaluation of study programmes was completed in 2002, with the establishment of the procedure for the accreditation of higher education study programmes on the basis of their assessment.5 Political science programmes at Vilnius University, Klaipeda ̇ University and Vytautas Magnus University were evaluated by external experts from the Center of Quality Assessment in Higher Education and received their offcial accreditation in 2008.6 Another step towards strengthening the profession's legitimacy was taken with the offcial recognition of political science as a separate study area within the broader feld of the social sciences. The legislation approving the classifcation of academic disciplines and sub-disciplines, including political science,7 set out a list of sub-disciplines comprised within the political science feld, including Political Theory, Public Policy and Administration, European Union Studies, Regional Policy Studies, International Relations, Comparative Politics, and Military and Peace Studies. A few years later, a team of experts (political scientists from Lithuania's major universities) prepared a description of political science as an area of study, setting out requirements for study programmes in this area, and this was subsequently approved by the Center of Quality Assessment in Higher Education (2014).8 Contrary to the aforementioned patterns of increased quality

4The Center of Quality Assessment in Higher Education under the Ministry of Higher Education and Science as the major government institution responsible for quality assessment of studies and recognition of qualifcations was established in 1995.

5LR švietimo ir mokslo ministro isakymas Nr. 1194 De ̨ l Sprendimu ̇ ̨ del i ̇ vertintu ̨ ̨ aukštojo mokslo studijų programų priemimo tvarkos patvirtinimo [Order of the Minister of Higher ̇ Education and Science of the Republic of Lithuania No.1194 on Approval of Adoption Procedure of Decisions on Evaluated Higher Education Study Programs], 2001-08-13, Valstybes ̇ žinios, 2001-08-22, Nr. 72-2550.

6LR švietimo ir mokslo ministro isakymas Nr. I ̨ SAK-570 De ̨ l Auk ̇ štojo mokslo studijų programų akreditavimo [Order of the Minister of Higher Education and Science of the Republic of Lithuania No.1194 on Accreditation of Higher Education Study Programs], 2008-03-03, Valstybes ̇ žinios, 2008-03-20, Nr. 33-1201.

7LR švietimo ir mokslo ministro isakymas Nr. V-222 De ̨ l studiju ̇ ̨ kryptis sudaranciǔ ̨šakų sarą šo patvirtinimo [Order of the Minister of Higher Education and Science of the Republic of Lithuania No.222 on Approval of the List of Branches within Study Areas], 2010-02-19, Valstybes ̇ žinios, 2010-02-23, Nr. 22-1054.

8Politikos mokslų krypties aprašas [The Description of area of political science studies], Vilnius: SKVC, 2014. politica https://www.skvc.lt/uploads/documents/fles/ Kokyb%C4%97s%20u%C5%BEtikrinimas/krypciu\_aprasai/Politikos%20mokslu%20studiju%20krypties%20aprasas.pdf.

control, and in Lithuania in particular of nuanced prescriptions, Hungary saw growing government infuence open the way for less clearly outlined policies after 2010. The Hungarian Accreditation Committee (MAB) has been reorganised—and is now dominated by government nominees. The minister in charge of the Government Education Offce (OH) often overturns even the decisions taken by the new MAB. In fact, the MAB's membership of the European Association for Quality Assurance of Higher Education (ENQA) has been temporarily rescinded due to concerns over its independence and funding. While external evaluation continues, higher education institutions need to put their own quality insurance schemes in place, which is concerning given that universities are constrained by the government's policy decisions.

While all the three countries in question have been members of the ENQA, it would seem that membership conceals a variety of different accreditation practices. In Hungary, early and strict accreditation criteria are being replaced by opaque, politically motivated provisions. Accreditation in Croatia is independent from governmental infuence, and the AZVO is responsible for the whole process, including the fnal recommendation made by the Minister of Science or by her/his deputy. In Lithuania, the higher education evaluation and accreditation system is well developed and is not constrained by government.

The legitimacy of a profession is re-confrmed by the authorities by means of several measures, not only the legal-offcial processes. One seemingly strange, but fundamental, aspect is the allocation of public funding. While the shortage of research funding is generalised, there are nevertheless considerable differences among the three countries. There is almost no research money available in Croatia, with the sum of 200–300 euros provided for a handful of research projects by the University of Zagreb. In Hungary the fagship national research foundation tends to fnance 2 or 3 political science research projects per year (with an average budget of around 50,000 euro for each 3- or 4-year project), and this has not risen at all over the past two decades. In Lithuania, on the contrary, since 2009 the country's Research Council has been implementing the programmebased competitive funding of research, and each year it issues more than 30 calls for the submission of project proposals from a list of 40 national and international programmes on average. The funding portfolio includes top-down schemes with pre-defned research topics, such as the National Research Programs, as well as bottom-up schemes. Research projects in the feld of political science may receive funding from diverse national research programmes, like 'Welfare Society', the 'Lithuanistics development'9 program, 'Researchers teams projects', the 'Lithuanian-Polish international cooperation program DAINA, 'Needs-based research projects', and others. For instance, during the period 2015–2020 the Research Council of Lithuania has allocated around 8,300,000 euros for 90 'Research team projects' in the humanities and social sciences. Of these, 10 projects have been in the feld of political science (as a main or secondary research feld), accounting for an 8.3% share (around 700,000 euros) of the total funding provided for this particular research programme (considered to be the most prestigious such programme and the one giving the highest quality research results and resulting in the best academic publications). Consequently, political science research has quite a good chance of obtaining funding, as many of these programmes are in some way related to policy-oriented research. However, the competitive research funding system is a complementary measure, and does not ensure security for the profession, since average salaries for teaching and research staff in Lithuanian universities are among the lowest in Europe.10 The three countries' research-funding capacities depend on several factors; consequently, no automatic conclusions may be drawn about how legitimate a profession is seen as, on this basis. Still, the differences are clear for all to see and funding shortage is visible, particularly in Croatia.

# 3 Relevance: Concepts, Evidence and Attitudes

Having seen the contextual differences and the legitimacy-based foundations of the profession, in this section we shall (de)construct and operationalise the relevance concept, largely building on Flinders' (2013) approach. The three dimensions to be taken into consideration in doing so are related to three potential felds of engagement, which we shall call: *knowledge provision*, *social presence* and *practical impact*. We are going to

<sup>9</sup> https://www.lmt.lt/en/science-policy-implementation/lituanistics-development/2551.

10Lietuvos ūkio sektorių fnansavimo po 2020 m. vertinimas: Mokslas, technologijos ir inovacijos [Financing of Lithuanian economic sectors after the 2020 Assessment: Science, Technology and Innovation], 2019, p. 8, http://www.strukturiniaifondai. lt/lt//dokumentai//lietuvos-ukio-sektoriu-finansavimo-po-2020-metu-vertinimas/ mokslas-technologijos-ir-inovacijos-5-priedas?type=versions.

develop some measures of the three and also examine the attitudes of the three countries' political science communities to such felds of engagement.

When considering the question of *knowledge provision*, we shall identify what kind of political science we provide to our students, and the way that the curriculum has developed. Has the curriculum become more pragmatic? Are there courses that refect on the problems of our time and of our countries? Similar questions can be raised when identifying PhD topics and observing the profle of the national political science journal or of other publications. *Social presence* will describe engagement with the public, and how political science acts in this realm. Are research fndings divulged to a general audience, including the activities of political science associations. *Practical impact* will reveal the degree of engagement with decision-makers. How widespread and acknowledged are these practical activities?

In keeping with the above framework, we shall examine the three aspects of relevance below. Before doing so, however, it is interesting to examine how the respondents in the aforementioned COST project survey conducted in 2018, indicated their level of agreement with the statements concerning the relevance of the discipline (see Table 7.2).


**Table 7.2** Agreement with the statements concerning the relevance of political science

The responses were coded using the 4-item Likert scale (from 4—fully agree to 1—fully disagree). The table presents mean values calculated for the answers given by respondents from Croatia, Hungary and Lithuania. The answers can be connected to the relevance frame as described above. The statement 'Political scientists should provide evidence-based knowledge and expertise outside academia, but not be directly involved in policy-making' refers to the 'Knowledge provision' dimension. This statement resulted in the highest level of agreement among Lithuanian political scientists, while fewer of their colleagues from Croatia and Hungary agreed with it. The level of agreement with the second statement 'Political scientists have a professional obligation to engage in public debate' measures 'Active presence'. The political scientists from Croatia expressed the strongest support for this statement, while Hungarian political scientists were the least supportive. The statement 'Political scientists should become involved in policy making' could be associated with the 'Practical impact' of relevance. The survey revealed that respondents from Croatia were the ones who agreed with this statement the most, while their colleagues from Lithuania were less supportive, and Hungary's political scientists were even less so. The fourth statement is directly related to the third: 'Political scientists should refrain from direct engagement with policy actors' (this fourth statement being formulated in the opposite way i.e. negatively—to the other three statements). This was met by the lowest level of agreement from all three groups concerned (the differences between the groups were not statistically signifcant), thus confrming their support for policy engagement, subject to the aforementioned country differences. There seems to be support for being present in the public realm and also in political practice, albeit with clear country differences; Hungarian respondents were less open to such involvement than their Lithuanian and Croatian counterparts.

After viewing the attitudes of the responding political scientists, we shall examine the three aspects of relevance, and offer some concrete evidence in addition to occasional reference to the attitudes of political scientists.

#### *3.1 Knowledge Provision*

As specifed above, we shall frst examine how we are to establish whether political science creates and provides knowledge that can be regarded as relevant, as this will depend 'upon judgements about which directions will provide the greatest value-added for society' (Gerring, 2015, p. 47). Although we are not qualifed to make such a judgment here, on the basis of an analysis of external demand and the considerations of the political science community, we shall try to establish the potential relevance of knowledge provision.

#### a) How can education be relevant?

A frst, albeit indirect, measure is the number students, since it is one of the things that shows whether society 'accepts' political science and fnds the knowledge provided by this feld useful or/and interesting, or indeed whether the labour market opportunities for political scientists are promising or not. Are we going forwards or backwards in this regard?

Table 7.3 includes the number of students enrolled in political science programmes at BA and MA levels in 2012 and 2019, including all programmes bearing the term 'political science' (or 'politics', 'policy', 'public governance')11 in their title. The COST data revealed that the decline of the student body is most clearly evident in the CEE countries, and our countries are no exception in this respect.

In Hungary, there has been a decline in student numbers throughout the entire higher education system, political science being no exception to the rule. In 2020, the overall number of applicants to higher education institutions was one-third less than it had been in 2019, which is similar to the trend in political science. The proportion of enrolment in MA programmes compared to that in BA programmes fell from around 40% in 2012 to around 20% in 2019. There are accredited political science programmes that are depopulated, as no students apply for admission. In


**Table 7.3** Number of students enrolled in political science programmes at BA and MA levels

Source: PROSEPS database

<sup>11</sup> Students enrolled in public administration study programmes are not included in the numbers.

Croatia, the abolishment of tuition fees ten years ago prevented most faculties from earning income from this source, and consequently there was a decline in the number of students particularly because accreditation prescribes a rigid student–professor ratio, as mentioned above. This has a positive impact on the quality of education, but engenders other problems. More specifcally, the decreasing number of BA students over the years has produced a smaller pool of potential MA-level candidates. Moreover, BA graduates now can study for their MA at other universities in Europe. Finally, the decision of the FPZG whereby only students with a BA in political science can enrol in a MA programme in political science, has also resulted in a smaller number of potential MA students. In Lithuania, the overall number of students, as well as the number of political science students at both BA and MA levels, has also been decreasing for demographic reasons such as lower birth rates and emigration. The numbers of students enrolled in BA and MA programmes fell by nearly one half between 2012 and 2019. The reduction in the numbers of students enrolled in public administration programmes has been even more dramatic: those enrolled in public administration BA programmes decreased by almost 90%, from 666 in 2012 to 73 in 2019; and the numbers of students enrolled in MA programmes fell by two-thirds, from 297 in 2012 to 101 in 2019. Universities had to adapt: certain study programmes had to be closed; the numbers of teaching staff in political science departments had to be reduced, thus increasing the insecurity of the profession. The correlation between the BA and MA fgures in particular reveals the recognised prospects of the discipline—indeed its relevance in the eyes of the students, and potentially their families who even if they do not have to pay tuition fees still have to support the students fnancially. In Lithuania (as opposed to Hungary and Croatia), MA programmes in political science (and public administration) have become more popular than BA studies, as they attract not only graduates from high schools but also professionals with job experience (civil servants). This represents relevance per se.

In addition to demographic trends and government policy, we should also consider the possibility that decreasing numbers might be the result of declining interest: what does political science offer to students? What kind of subjects are included in the curriculum? Have there been any changes in this regard? In Hungary, constant attempts were made to develop the programmes' practical aspects so as to ensure better job opportunities for students, through courses in methodology, public relations and political communication. Nevertheless, methodology courses are not strongly present in most programmes, but compared to the early years there has been tempering of the political philosophy approach to courses and to the curriculum as a whole (Arató & Tóth, 2010). A more empirical form of political science has clearly emerged. As political science departments and programmes are relatively small in terms of the academic staff employed, there is a tendency to establish larger units incorporating several previously separate units/programmes. While a broader knowledge base might increase the decisional freedom of students, as they can select from a larger range of courses, there are concerns that the profle and identity of political science will diminish within such larger units.

In Croatia, given the single institution pragmatic considerations (the availability of teaching staff for each feld) and functional ones (ensuring that recently qualifed political scientists with BA and MA degrees can fnd jobs) have been carefully balanced. With the advent of the Bologna process, new courses were introduced in all areas of political science, and new staff have been hired possessing the expertise required to establish courses that had not previously existed. The diversifcation of the subjects on offer gives students a wider choice of courses and specialisation, depending on their interests. This also renders the discipline more recognisable among the other social sciences and humanities. The political science curriculum has changed since the beginning of the Bologna process, with the introduction of new courses in all major felds covered by the discipline, particularly in area studies, EU studies and studies on democracy. This represents a radical departure from the normative approach to the curriculum prior to 2000, when there were a great many courses in political philosophy and theory.

In Lithuania, the curriculum was impacted by the national higher education reform implemented in 2010–2012. The reform created a new system for the allocation of funding to universities, based on the so-called student's basket principle, that is, with the best students receiving full state funding for their studies in their chosen feld. The reform also increased the autonomy of universities by implementing changes in university governance such as the election of university rectors by university boards comprising representatives of various stakeholder groups, and greater discretion in regard to the use of university property. These market-based institutional changes strengthened the competitive environment within the higher education sector, creating incentives for universities to treat students as their customers, and to invest in advertising and other marketing activities in order to attract them. Thus, new study programmes were created with catchy titles, and the curricula of existing study programmes were transformed in order to meet perceived student needs. On the one hand this trend had a negative effect, especially on the quality of higher education in the social sciences, as universities had an incentive to drop diffcult subjects such as statistical analysis in order to ensure greater student satisfaction. On the other hand, it contributed to the increased internationalisation of the study process as universities, due to diminishing national demand, were forced to look for ways of attracting foreign students (e.g. by creating joint study programmes with foreign universities or by offering their own study programmes or separate subjects in English).

Lithuania has a long tradition of cooperation between departments of political science and politicians and government offcials, in regard to both research and education, especially among those universities located in the capital city. When the departments organise conferences and other events (e.g. roundtable discussions on relevant policy issues), politicians and government offcials (ministers, deputy ministers, civil servants, etc.) are also invited as presenters or participants. Professors also sometimes invite politicians or representatives from the government to give lectures in their own courses. In Croatia, guest lectures are occasionally delivered by foreign diplomats, although rarely by politicians. The professors themselves are not particularly willing to invite politicians to give lectures since they believe that politicians' knowledge of politics is of a limited quality, whereas their practical knowledge and experience is not taken into account. In Hungary, practice-oriented events (meetings with, and learning from, politicians and men/women of practice) have generally disappeared from the sphere of university education over the past decade. It has become increasingly diffcult to reach out to politicians, and even to carry out research that would involve their input. This is a major relevance issue: politicians' knowledge and its critical evaluation cannot be channelled into research and education.

Despite achievements such as the stabilisation of BA and MA programmes, the profession continues to be beset by problems relating to the issue of relevance: decreasing student numbers seems to be a common problem; the increasing incorporation of political science into larger programmes could raise identity concerns, although as mentioned above it does not necessarily imply the diminishing relevance of the feld. The marketisation of higher education studies and the introduction of certain fashionable and 'superfcially relevant' programmes would negatively affect the quality of education.

Similar patterns prevail in all three countries with regard to PhD programs, although this is not directly related to education as such, but concerns the development of the profession. Lithuania's frst political science PhD programme was set up in 1992, the frst one established in Hungary dates from 1993. In Croatia, the frst Bologna-type programme started in 2010 in comparative felds followed through by other sub-felds in 2010. Table 7.1 shows the number of PhD degrees which has been characterised by two important features: on the one hand, PhD dissertations largely concern important, or should we say, topical themes, which is a sign of professional relevance, with a proliferation of international and EU topics, together with the appearance of diverse policy themes; on the other hand, most PhD graduates have not been able to fnd a position in academia, although they can easily fnd employment in bureaucracy, government think tanks, or NGOs.

#### *3.2 Publication Performance*

The matter of publication performance is linked to our question in two respects: publications offer the profession the opportunity to prove that it is very much present, that it delivers and thus deserves its place in academia. One survey has found that the majority of university academics are more interested in research work than in teaching (Teichler, 2014, Table 7.2); thus, the expectation to publish seems to be correlated to the research-orientated views of academics themselves. At the same time, a substantial number of those working in academia do not publish at all (Kwiek, 2015) and it is often diffcult to reconcile teaching and research (Turk & Ledić, 2016). The COST survey portrays a more nuanced picture.

As Table 7.4 shows, a large proportion of respondents (around 40–50 per cent) have never published anything jointly with an international coauthor, while a smaller, but still relatively signifcant, proportion (oneeighth in Croatia and Lithuania and around one-third in Hungary) reported that they had never published in a peer-reviewed international journal. These fgures that relate to the international component of relevance, and given the increasing international publication trends (Jokić et al., 2019), are signifcant.12 While in Hungary the entire academic sector has seen a decline in publications (Polónyi, 2018), a more recent study

<sup>12</sup>We would like to thank Stjepan Mateljan from Institute for Social Research in Zagreb who introduced us to the co-authorship network connecting our three countries. Although


**Table 7.4** Regarding your publishing record, please indicate whether in the last three years you have published

Source: PROSEPS Qs. 26 and 28

of political science publication trends provides a more positive picture, with a substantial increase observed over the past three decades (Molnár & Ilonszki, 2021). The journal of the Hungarian Political Science Association—Politikatudományi Szemle—has been the profession's fagship publication since its foundation in 1992 and has become a quality journal that uses a double-blind review procedure. It seems that the 'relevance debate' was more often covered by the journal during its early years, and mainly concerned the profession, its relation to politics, or the quality and focus of publications. For example, the offcial report of the

this network has yet to attract any signifcant number of members, this chapter will certainly contribute towards remedying this situation.

Political Science Committee of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences warmly welcomed the fact that publications were beginning to move away from public journalism to a more science-based focus (Balogh, 1999). There is no systematic information available regarding the readership of the journal outside of the political science academic community, but it may extend beyond that community. Although mere examples cannot represent scientifc truth, one of this chapter's co-authors can confrm that after publishing an article on ministers she got a letter from a former minister disagreeing with the categories described in the article, including his own alleged position. The never-ending argument among political scientists about the language used in academic journals is a recurrent one: the argument is that the Hungarian language used in the journal should be maintained in order to ensure its local connectedness.

In Croatia, the frst political science journal 'Politicka misao' (Political ̌ Thought) was founded in 1964, and is published by the FPZG. During the communist period, the Marxist theoretical, critical and normative approaches prevailed. After 1990, and following changes to the FPZG staff's expertise, the profle of the journal improved and the peer review process is now expected to be similar to that of the Annals (published by the Croatian Political Science Association since 2004, and also connected with the FPZG in terms of its editorial staff). Until a few years ago, the contributors to Politicka misao were mostly professors at the FPZG. Since ̌ new rules governing academic staff promotion discourage publication in so-called 'in-house publications', the FPZG's professors have generally refrained from publishing in these 'in-house journals', and have thus been encouraged to publish elsewhere, including in foreign journals. Since 2016, Politicka misao has published four numbers per year: two or three ̌ numbers in the Croatian, Serbian, Bosnian and Montenegrin languages (depending on the native language of the author); and one or two issues in English. There is also an academic journal—Politicke Perspektive ̌ (Political Perspectives)—which is jointly published by the FPZG, the Faculty of Political Science of Belgrade University and the Political Science Association of Serbia.

In Lithuania, the frst issue of the political science journal Politika (later renamed Politologija) was published in 1989. Since 1992, 'Politologija' has been affliated to the Lithuanian Political Science Association and published by the Institute of International Relations and Political Science (IIRPS) at Vilnius University. Until 2017 'Politologija' had been publishing articles in Lithuanian only. Other important political science journals include 'Public Policy and Administration', 'Lithuanian Foreign Policy Review', 'Baltic Journal of Law and Politics', 'Agora' and 'Politikos mokslų almanachas'. The journal 'Public Policy and Administration', founded jointly by Mykolas Romeris University and Kaunas University of Technology in 2002, has the highest SJR index (0.409) of all these journals and is included in the Scopus database. Furthermore, political science articles are occasionally published in the journals of other social science felds, such as 'Transformations in Business and Economics', 'Creativity Studies', 'Information Sciences', 'Philosophy & Sociology'. As in the other two countries, the performance evaluation system which is used to regularly assess the research performance of individual scientists and academic units, encourages political scientists to publish.

#### *3.3 Active Social Presence*

Several questions in the Survey focus on political scientists' perceptions of the connections between the profession and the public, and the ways in which they try to connect to a broader public. It is not easy to account for the potential differences. For example, on a scale of 0 to 10, where a value of 0 means that 'the participation of political scientists in public debate is not recognised at all for career advancement', while a value of 10 means that it is 'very much recognised and relevant' (COST survey question No. 6), the lowest score, 3.88, is that recorded in Croatia while the highest is that of Lithuania with a value of 6.28, while Hungary is ranked in between, at 4.95. It would seem that the academic-university context (in terms of the perceived importance of engaging with the public) is a clear incentive to participation in public debate. At the same time, there is no substantial difference between the countries in terms of respondents' acceptance of the fact that an active social presence is part of an academic's professional duties. In response to the statement 'Political scientists should engage in public debate since this is part of their role as social scientists', average agreement measured on a scale of from 1 (fully disagree) to 4 (fully agree) ranges from 3.15 in Hungary to 3.63 in Croatia.

Table 7.5 indicates the types and the frequency of such engagement. The frequency of engagement was measured on a scale from 1 (less than once a year) to 5 (once a week). The table shows that in all three countries, the mean response to the statements about contributions to TV programmes, radio broadcasts, newspapers and magazines (including


**Table 7.5** Please specify the average frequency of

Source: PROSEPS Q 2b

electronic media and news portals) were close to '3' (at least once every three months).

Survey answers seem to confrm the fact that of the three countries, Lithuania is the one in which political scientists most openly engage with the public. Policy scholars in particular see communication with the media as their core activity, and pay less attention to research work and the production of scientifc publications; but as we have seen, this openness is due largely to a university-academic framework that is expected to support this type of activity in the name of career development. Political scientists are invited onto television and radio programmes, regularly publish comments on important topics (the adoption of socially important laws, the issue of presidential and governmental reports, corruption scandals), and also provide their assessment of political events on social media.

This contrasts with the situation in Hungary. The presence of political scientists in the written media is particularly weak in Hungary, and this is possibly related to the lack of press freedom in the country. The public media are characterised by a strong degree of political selection, with clear preference being given to the advocates of the current regime. In Croatia, a few political scientists, generally professors from the FPZG, engage with the media; in the main, they are experts on Croatian politics, and sometimes on comparative politics and international relations. Questions of political theory or public policy only rarely fnd their way into the media. The media clearly display an interest in this type of cooperation, which is also of value to the discipline, as it helps the profession, and its sole institutional entity (the FPZG) gain public recognition. Moreover, Croatia's political scientists are not often appointed as policy advisors, and their media participation appears to be a substitute for such in terms of their exercising any potential infuence. Of course, media participation also helps improve the public visibility of those political scientists concerned.

Our information regarding how the public sees the presence and work of political scientists, is more limited. In Hungary this 'refexive engagement' has changed substantially over the past three decades. During the course of democratisation there was initially a genuine interest among the public in political commentary; the new feld of interest, the new knowledge and the unprecedented information were appealing. Indeed, political science responded to the public's thirst for knowledge and information. Subsequently, a division began to emerge: political analysts and political scientists became increasingly separated from each other despite the presence of the former group in academia. In the new millennium, new institutional opportunities followed by political events lent this divide positional, and then political, features. Quite a few think tanks were formed which were able to offer new perspectives and more practiceoriented knowledge. The universities were not the ones who met this new demand for the provision of more practical knowledge to society. Increasing political division meant that advocacy think tanks13 became advantageously positioned in the media under government surveillance, while in the few remaining media not controlled by government, other experts or other think tanks play this part of the relevance game. Nevertheless, it cannot be said that the public is not aware of this controversial world. A number of well-known publishing houses have brought out political science books written by Hungarian authors. The Political Science Research Centre of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences is particularly active in the feld of publication—and as its members focus on current themes, often on concrete empirical bases, this invites media attention, mainly in the online media.

In Croatia, political science books are mainly published by professors from the FPZG, and they can easily fnd publishers; however, there is almost no public discussion of these works. In Lithuania, political

<sup>13</sup>Advocacy think tanks have concrete policy goals and want to infuence public opinion accordingly.

scientists generally present their research fndings and scientifc monographs in the media. Regular surveys of the public's trust in political parties, state institutions and politicians are conducted, and political scientists are invited to comment on the results of these surveys. Major news portals have special sections where policy scholars regularly comment on current policy issues. Unlike politicians, who usually express their party's position on various political issues, political scholars have a reputation as experts who are expected to make objective, impartial assessments. There is widespread trust in the competence and non-political bias of political scientists in Lithuania.

An obvious choice of actor capable of designing a strategy aimed at increasing relevance, would be the national associations (Flinders, 2018, p. 597). However, this is not necessarily what happens, and in any case is not always easy to pursue. For example, the Hungarian association of political scientists has changed from being a politically engaged actor comprising important players in the country's democratic transition, present in person to being a relatively closed, professionally integral organisation, in keeping with the broader view of the profession. This new role has served to distance the profession from politics as such, and more recently has also served to defend the institution against the toxic political atmosphere and potential divisions within the profession. This does help the profession's relevance, and apparently serves the unity thereof. The Croatian Political Science Association was established in 1966, but its activities have always had a low public profle, existing as it has in the shadow of the FPZG. This low public profle can probably be accounted for by the fact that it exists in a small country which does not possess the potential membership needed to create a large organisation dedicated to political science. Nevertheless, in the last couple of years, thanks to a more active leadership and a changing membership due to the increasing number of PhD graduates involved, the association's profle has been enhanced. Since 2017, the association has held yearly conferences and round tables are being held. Annual conferences of the national associations are a consolidated event in all three countries, and yet these conferences rarely receive any broad attention from the media.

#### *3.4 Practical Impact*

There can be many aspects to the practical impact of political science: from the personal to the institutional, from the invisible to the visible, and from the temporary to the permanent, just to name the more obvious dimensions of this connection between political science and its impact on people and institutions. Here we shall focus on the personal–individual attitudes and activities of political scientists in our respective countries, just as the previous section focused on the different institutional patterns of practiceoriented public engagement in the media.

The main patterns discerned are as follows: a number of politically involved think tanks in Hungary; university-based policy advisory activity in Lithuania and hardly any visible practice-oriented advisory capacity in Croatia. As for the personal impact of political science, an extreme and rarely observed example is that political scientists in person are appointed to important policy-making positions quite often: in Hungary, frst the Minister of Culture and now the mayor of Budapest, both belong to the political science academia; in Croatia, government ministers and the mayor of the capital city have political science degrees, and the former President of the Republic had an MSc in political science; in Lithuania, alumni of various political science and public administration programmes, as well as former professors, have been appointed to various important positions in central and municipal government and the Seimas (e.g. the Deputy Ministers minister of Education, Science and Sport; the former Minister of Internal Affairs, etc.). While in countries with more established political science communities this might be a regular practice, in our countries it is reassuring to see that our—new—profession gives credibility to, and sustains, one's career even if it is sometimes diffcult to perceive any real impact or pragmatic connection.

Moreover, quite a number of advisors and public offcials working in the country's ministries and in other bureaucratic positions, have a political science degree, although again we do not know how they use their particular knowledge, or whether they have a different focus than the majority of those working in such jobs, which are largely held by members of the law profession in all three countries. As for the type of practical advice in the COST survey (Q 13), respondents could choose from the different channels that they tend to use to provide policy advice and/or consulting services. It was found that face-to-face discussion enjoyed prominence, followed by workshops with a non-academic audience, and then by mail/post to the actor or organisation. This indicates a preference for personalised connections (other options included publications, research


**Table 7.6** How often, on average, during the last three years, have you engaged in any of the following advisory activities with policy actors (policymakers, ministry offcials, interest groups, political parties, etc.)?

Source: PROSEPS Q 8

reports, policy briefs, traditional media articles, blog pieces or items posted on social media, training courses and phone connections).

Table 7.6 shows the frequency with which political scientists engage with policy actors in an advisory capacity. This frequency was measured on a scale from 1 (never) to 5 (at least once a week), and shows that political scientists from Lithuania act in an advisory capacity more frequently than their colleagues from Hungary and Croatia. However, the mean value, indicating the level of engagement in advisory activities in all three countries, is closer to either 3 (at least once a year) or 2 (less frequently than once a year).

In this regard, once again Lithuania tops the ranking, while Hungary lags behind in all aspects of advisory activity. In Lithuania, political scientists are invited, as experts, to participate in working groups formed by Parliamentary committees and commissions, the Government, ministries or other public administrative institutions, which prepare draft bills and strategic documents. When ministries and other public administrations tender for policy analysis services and the preparation of public policy recommendations or other expert advice, such tenders are sometimes won by political scientists (they can submit proposals either in their capacity as university teachers, or as experts from business or public institutional teams). Some policy scholars have set up public 'think tanks' specialising in public policy analysis and policy advice. Researchers in the feld of public administration are also actively involved in conducting in-service training seminars for civil servants. A Public Governance Competence Center has been established by the Ministry of the Interior at Mykolas Romeris University. The Research Council of Lithuania funds research projects aimed at providing practical guidance to public policy makers (many of these projects are funded by general research programmes, although there are also special programmes that fund research into policy recommendations, policy issues and policy evaluation, e.g. the Need Research Projects). For example, in 2020 the Research Council of Lithuania provided funding for research projects aimed at assessing the policy decisions made in response to the COVID-19 pandemic crisis.

# 4 Towards Relevance?

In the introduction we foresaw differences between the country cases examined here. Indeed, despite several similar challenges, a number of important country differences have emerged.

In each country, the legitimacy and the identity of the profession are of paramount importance to how the profession performs in terms of knowledge provision, in societal engagement and in providing pragmatic advice. Legitimacy-related issues in particular are tied closely to the question of relevance: uncertainties and constraints lessen the potential relevance of political science. The formation of the new profession's identity started last in Croatia, paradoxically due, in the main, to the prior existence of a proto-political science during the communist period, and subsequently due to Croatia's belated arrival as a member of the democratic group of countries that emerged after the troubled initial decade following the break up Yugoslavia. In Croatia, the profession aims to ensure its relevance by taking numerous concrete steps mainly in the sphere of education, although the singularity of the institutional framework appears to constitute something of a hindrance. In contrast, the 'open feld' inherited from Soviet times in Lithuania would seem to provide political science with considerable relevance. A more open and competitive academic feld has given Lithuania the advantage over the other two countries concerned. The singularity of the institution in Croatia cannot be accounted for by the mere size of the country: the population of Croatia is 4 million, whereas that of Lithuania is only 2.8 million. Internal initiatives (from within the discipline) together with external policy decisions, seem to contribute to this more competitive, more relevance-oriented environment in Lithuania.

Generally speaking, the policy and political aspects of the achievement of legitimacy, have an impact on the relevance of the profession both in the positive and the negative sense. From the positive perspective, we have found evidence that in Lithuania there are strong policy incentives that encourage both the social engagement and the pragmatic relevance of the profession. On the contrary, when policy and political pressures divide the profession and undermine its credibility, the profession's relevance is seriously harmed, as is the case in Hungary. We should not forget that the pace of institutionalisation also appears to affect the degree to which the profession is able to preserve its relevance: very rapid institutional changes in Hungary have often preceded the profession's internal formative steps and established premature trajectories, as opposed to the slower institutional development witnessed in Lithuania. A north–south divide in terms of relevance, with the north ahead of the south, can also be observed. In this respect, perhaps the aura of a Baltic region with support from Scandinavia plays a role, whereas in the two 'southern' country cases, troubled political developments appear to have left their mark on the profession. The political impact on this divide is clearest in Hungary, although this divide might also be due to the relatively larger size of the community and to an open academic market where the provision of practically relevant services is mostly in the hands of advocacy think tanks. This was particularly clear in the attitudes of the surveyed political scientists: Hungarian political scientists working in the country's universities were more hostile to a practice-oriented political science than their colleagues from Croatia, and even more so from Lithuania. The information provided in this chapter information is based on the authors' own critical expert analysis and the profession's survey results. While the survey answers are the least nuanced of the two sources, we think that the information they provide tends to coincide.

Generally speaking, we can rightly claim that gaining relevance is not a straight road as deviations or even blind alleys may be encountered along the way. If, as we noted in the introduction, relevance means refecting on, and responding to, societal questions, then becoming relevant requires the profession to constantly adjust. Furthermore, we may also conclude, in general, that the three main aspects of relevance have not been achieved to the same level within the same country: one can be more pronounced than the other(s), although we can duly expect a degree of adjustment as the three aspects are basically interconnected and will infuence one another. We have also found that the development of relevance is a twoway process: government and university policies act as the external context, while the profession's interests, commitment and ambitions constitute the internal force marking the way forward.

# References


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# The Adaptation of New Countries to Existing (Old) Institutional Frameworks

# *Erkki Berndtson*

# 1 In Search of European Political Science

Political science is a relatively young discipline. As an independent academic subject, it only emerged in Europe after the Second World War. Moreover, up until the 1990s, political science was mainly a preserve of Western Europe. The discipline began to develop in Central and Eastern Europe only after the 1989/91 political upheavals. Because of its uneven development and different historical trajectories, the institutionalisation of political science in Europe is still a work in progress. There are strong political science communities in Western Europe, whereas the discipline remains weak in many Central and Eastern European countries.

Unfortunately, we still do not have a clear overall picture of the state of the discipline in the various European countries. This is due to several factors. As Martin J. Bull (2007) has noted, existing state-of-the-art studies are not based on suffcient comparable data. It is diffcult to fnd even basic numerical indicators for comparison, such as the age, gender, and

E. Berndtson (\*)

University of Helsinki, Helsinki, Finland

<sup>©</sup> The Author(s) 2022 223

G. Ilonszki, C. Roux (eds.), *Opportunities and Challenges for New and Peripheral Political Science Communities*, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-79054-7\_8

international profles of scholars or their areas of specialisation.1 Most studies focus on single countries only, and *European* is too often understood from a parochial perspective. This does not facilitate an understanding of the discipline from a *pan-European* perspective. Among the few comparative studies (Stein, 1995; Boncourt, 2007, 2008; Klingemann, 2007a, 2008), only Hans-Dieter Klingemann's, 2008 article attempts to cover all European countries. The situation is partly the result of a language problem. For better or for worse, English has become the new *lingua franca* in political science. Many studies written in other languages remain unknown to the wider political science community. Furthermore, the current pace of change of higher education systems is so rapid that many country reports on the state of political science are already out of date by the time they get published.

Recognising these diffculties does not mean that we cannot try to build a coherent picture of European political science. As Hans-Dieter Klingemann has remarked, "if we do not want to just add another lamento we need to have courage to start somewhere" (Klingemann, 2007a, p. 18). The present article follows the same line of reasoning. Going beyond single-country studies, this article analyses the institutionalisation of political science as a discipline from the perspective of European political science organisations. In doing so, it pays special attention to the Central and Eastern European countries, as these are still under-represented in European political science cooperation frameworks.

The concept of European political science needs to be clarifed here. It is important to understand the difference between political science in Europe on the one hand, and European political science on the other. European political science differs, for example, from American or Japanese political science (cf. Brintnall, 2004, p. 2), since Europe is not a single nation but consists of different political science communities, each with its own methodological approaches and research interests (although some countries are intellectually closer than others). Different individual country studies present a view of political science in Europe. European political science, on the other hand, refers to the collective action of political science communities interacting with one another within a common framework.

1The COST project PROSEPS "Professionalization and Social Impact of European Political Science" (https://proseps.unibo.it/, accessed June 15, 2020) is, in fact, the frst systematic attempt to collect data for the purposes of these indicators.

The easiest way to defne European political science would be as a "geographically circumscribed discipline" (Bull, 2007). However, a simple geographical defnition is problematic, as it does not take into account the political and cultural context of the discipline. Thus, it may be a good idea to adopt Hans-Dieter Klingemann's suggestion that European political science could be defned by using the European Higher Education Area (EHEA) as a criterion (Klingemann, 2008, p. 370). To be a member of the EHEA, a country must be a party to the European Cultural Convention, and must pursue the objectives of the Bologna Process within its higher education system. This means that contemporary European political science is a "Bologna circumscribed discipline". European-level higher education policies bring separate political science communities together, as these policies frame the conditions for research and teaching. As Hans-Dieter Klingemann has noted, "[t]he political effort to harmonize Europe's higher education has deeply affected all academic disciplines" (Klingemann, 2007a, p. 15). This development requires European political scientists to work together.

Using this criterion, the European academic community can be considered as comprising forty-eight national systems, including those of Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Kazakhstan. If we add a further two countries that are not party to the Bologna Process—Monaco and San Marino—we get a grand total of ffty countries. However, Monaco and San Marino, just like the other European micro-states (Andorra, the Vatican State, and Liechtenstein), do not offer political science programmes in their higher education institutions. Consequently, as things stand, we can narrow European political science down to forty-fve countries.

These forty-fve political science communities represent different levels of institutionalisation. At the general level, the institutionalisation of a discipline requires specifc structures by means of which a discipline's intellectual products are disseminated, its standards maintained, and new recruits introduced to its practices. These structures include departments, undergraduate and graduate programmes, journals, scholarly societies, and the `invisible college' of colleagues working on related problems and theories (Cairns, 1975, p. 203). As the theoretical chapter of the present volume argues, an ideal type of a fully institutionalised discipline refers to its stable and legitimate structures with means to maintain and strengthen them. The discipline should also have a clear identity and autonomy in relation to other disciplines. In addition, the institutionalisation of the discipline requires that it must be recognised internationally. As the chapters in this book show, the degree of institutionalisation of political science varies from one European country to another.

When political science was institutionalised as a discipline in Western Europe, it was helped by international organisations such as the International Political Science Association (IPSA) and the European Consortium for Political Research (ECPR).2 As Martin Bull points out, "[t]o exist as a community, European political science should be characterized by cross-national interactions and communication through European journals and other media, and it should have cross-national organisations which promote and facilitate these interactions" (Bull, 2007, p. 430). In that respect, international associations have a major role to play. At the national level, they lend legitimacy to a given discipline. At the international level, they offer a common platform for scientifc activities. It would seem, however, that European cross-national organisations do not currently promote and facilitate European political science successfully. Resolving this problem is vital if European political science is to develop more fully.

# 2 The Institutionalisation of Political Science in Western Europe: The Role of International Political Science Organisations

In order to discuss international cooperation in the feld of political science, UNESCO organised a conference on research methods in September 1948 in Paris. A declaration made after the conference stated that it is natural and justifed for political science to evolve within national frameworks, as historical traditions, educational structures, philosophical concepts, political systems, and social structures mould the discipline (see Coakley & Trent, 2000, p. 16). The aim of cooperation is not to put an end to the intellectual diversity of the study of national subjects, or to the variety of methods (juridical, historical, philosophical, sociological, psychological, and statistical) employed, to be replaced by a single conception of political science (Coakley & Trent, 2000, pp. 14–8). However, it was

<sup>2</sup>This has also been noticed in Central and Eastern Europe. For instance, one Hungarian scholar, Attila Ágh, has pointed out in regard to Hungary, that "[i]n the professionalization of Hungarian political science, international institutionalization, such as contacts with IPSA, APSA and ECPR, can play a dominant role" (Ágh, 1995, p. 214).

seen as necessary to learn from others in order to broaden one's horizon, to facilitate mutual understanding, and to avoid isolation and prejudice.

The conference led to a report consisting of forty-nine articles describing the state of political science around the world (UNESCO, 1950). In the *Introduction* to the report, Massimo Salvadori identifed fve existing national traditions in the study of politics, "[a] national criterion, adopted on the basis of the material assembled in this volume, would perhaps enable us to distinguish fve main types of political science. These are in alphabetical order, the American, British, French, German and Soviet Schools of thought" (Salvadori, 1950, p. 9; see also Coakley & Trent, 2000, pp. 3–4).

John Coakley (2004, p. 172) has further elaborated these types. The American approach was characterised by an openness to methodologies from the other social sciences. The British approach had been embedded in moral philosophy, but had slowly started to assert its independence. The French approach was rooted in the Roman law tradition, while the German approach had originated in constitutional and administrative law and evolved into a systematic study of the state. The Soviet approach, on the other hand, was based on Marxism–Leninism.

There were two main questions dividing these traditions and refecting their different intellectual roots: (1) can politics be studied as a separate feld of research?; and (2) can politics be studied scientifcally, that is, using the same methods adopted in the natural sciences? The American approach emphasised the scientifc study of politics as an independent discipline, and it also believed in the possibility of using rigorous methods to study social phenomena.

British scholars in particular were sceptical about both of the aforesaid goals. British authors emphasised that "[i]n political theory we must give a prominent place to the history of political ideas" (Robson, 1950, p. 294) and "nearly all English thinkers are agreed that you cannot understand any system of government or, indeed, any political idea, without knowing its historical background, origin, and growth" (Robson, 1950, p. 306). The British understanding of the study of politics is also clear from the decision to call the British association the *Political Studies Association*, and not the Political Science Association (Grant, 2010, pp. 16–23).

French scholars agreed with their British counterparts "that political science can be studied only in the larger framework of the social sciences" (Salvadori, 1950, p. 8), albeit for different reasons. Lazare Kopelmanas pointed out that the term "political science" was familiar to scholars in the English-speaking world, but did not refer to a clearly defned scientifc discipline in France, where the study of politics was seen as part of "political sciences", since "practically all of the social sciences could be qualifed, at least in certain aspects, as political sciences" (Kopelmanas, 1950, pp. 647–8). Politics was not perceived as a separate discipline. On the other hand, political parties, public opinion and elections were often studied from a sociological perspective using empirical methods (Goguel, 1950, p. 503). In addition, the French higher education system has been marked by its duality since 1945, that is, its division into universities and "*Grande Ecoles*" (see Blondiaux & Déloye, 2007, p. 137). At French universities, the study of political science has been mainly assigned to the universities' law faculties, where in the late 1940s political institutions were viewed from a legal, rather than a sociological, perspective, albeit with certain important exceptions (Duverger, 1950, p. 370). The empirical study of politics was given freer rein at the country's *Instituts d'Etudes Politiques* (IEPs), the frst seven of which were established in 1945 as interdisciplinary social science institutions.

German scholars were also divided on the two issues. The old German *Staatslehre* tradition had been discredited after the War, and the German study of politics was a highly fragmented discipline at the time. According to Klaus von Beyme, it consisted of four main schools: (1) the normative school of Freiburg, which extended to Munich; (2) the early mainstream school of political science established by traditional liberal institutionalists; (3) the method-conscious behaviourists concentrated in Cologne and Mannheim; and (4) political scientists of a Marxist persuasion (Beyme, 1982, p. 170). Given that some of the returning émigré scholars introduced the ideas of American political science into Germany, this rendered part of German political science responsive to the idea of the scientifc study of politics, especially among method-conscious behaviourists. Such ideas also favoured the establishment of political science as an independent discipline.

The Soviet approach differed in many ways from the Western approaches. In principle, it could accept the idea of the scientifc study of politics (from the perspective of historical materialism).What it could not accept, however, was that political science constitutes an independent academic discipline, for the simple reason that Marxism–Leninism already accounted for the workings of politics.

The four different European approaches to political science refected the state of the study of politics in Europe after the Second World War. It was also assumed that other European countries were followers of these intellectual traditions. It is important to understand the initial state of the study of politics in Europe, as seventy years ago there was no political science discipline as we now understand it. However, the project concerning methods in political science led to the founding of the International Political Science Association (IPSA) in 1949, which then played a major role in the institutionalisation of the discipline. American political scientists were key players in this process (together with European scholars who went to stay in American universities as visiting scholars (Daalder, ed., 1997), hence the introduction of the "American approach" in Europe.

The establishment of the IPSA has been vital for the development of political science as a separate academic discipline. Without the IPSA, the European study of politics could have remained rooted to national traditions for a considerable time longer. The International Political Science Association's foundation also required national political science associations to be set up in Europe (Boncourt, 2009). It is important to remember that the IPSA came frst, with most national associations established some time thereafter.3 This development then facilitated the establishment of separate political science departments in European universities. In the 1950s, political science began to be established as a discipline in the major nations in Western Europe (France, Germany, UK), in the Nordic Countries (Denmark, Finland, Norway, Sweden), and in the two Benelux countries (Belgium, the Netherlands). However, even in these countries, its legitimacy was often questioned. For a number of reasons, this development was not as rapid in Italy (for cultural and political reasons),4 Ireland

3At the time of the 1948 UNESCO conference on the study of methods, there were only four national associations in existence: the American Political Science Association (founded in 1903), The Canadian Association (1912), the Finnish Association (1935), and the Indian one (1938). When the IPSA Constitution was drafted, it was decided that it would come into effect only when at least four national associations had joined the organisation as collective members. As the Finnish Association was not interested in becoming a member at that time, one more association was needed. Accordingly, the 1949 founded French Association became the fourth founder member of the IPSA. Other national associations were then to follow (UK 1949, The Netherlands 1950, Belgium 1951, Germany 1951; see Table 8.1).

<sup>4</sup> "In post-World War II Italy…Marxists, old Liberals, and Catholics inspired by the social doctrine of the Church, dominated the stage, and were equally suspicious of empirical disciplines such as political science", and "The anti-political science academic component was a tri-partite coalition of axiological philosophers, Kelsenian law professors and historians preaching neo-idealistic historicism" (Freddi & Giannetti, 2007, p. 257).

(for cultural reasons),5 or Austria and Switzerland (because of the dominance of law), although political science gained ground in these countries as well during the course of the 1960s. Its delayed emergence in Switzerland has been accounted for as follows: "[i]t was considered unacceptable that politics which was everybody's affair would become that of a few specialists…and [u]ntil very recently, law was considered a discipline both necessary and suffcient for a good understanding of Swiss politics" (Wemegah, 1982, p. 327).

Furthermore, the development of political science as a separate academic discipline was halted in Greece, Portugal, and Spain due to the authoritarian political systems in place in those countries up until the mid/ late 1970s. On the other hand, in the cases of Iceland, Cyprus, Luxembourg, and Malta, the late development of political science in these countries can be partly accounted for by the delayed development and the limited entity of the higher education sector itself (e.g. Agapiou-Josephides, 2007, p. 78). In Iceland, the frst university was founded in 1911, in Cyprus in 1990, and in Luxembourg in 2003. All of them now have their own political science departments. The one exception is the University of Malta, which was founded in the sixteenth century, but has no political science department to date (although there are departments of public policy and international relations).

Following the recognition of political science as a clearly identifable discipline in Western Europe, its development continued with the founding of the European Consortium for Political Research (ECPR) in 1970. This would not have been possible without the initial impetus offered by the IPSA, with its idea of political science as an independent academic discipline. The setting up of national political science associations also strengthened the position of the universities' political science departments.

The backbone of the ECPR was represented by the universities in those countries where political science had developed during the 1950s and 1960s.6 The ECPR offered political scientists (as department members) a new platform for cooperation. A good example of this is that of Nordic countries. Scholars had been cooperating unoffcially since 1964, which

5Although the frst Politics chair was founded already in 1908 at the University College, "[p]olitical science remained underdeveloped as a university subject during the inter-war years", as "the college's origins as a Catholic university long remained visible" and "areas considered 'sensitive' by the Catholic church (such as education, philosophy and politics) were especially prone to clerical infuence" (Coakley & Laver, 2007, p. 244).

6The ECPR's membership is based on institutions.

had led to the frst Nordic political science conference being held in 1966, and to the launching of the yearbook *Scandinavian Political Studies* that same year. After the establishment of the ECPR, it was felt that cooperation should be based on more solid foundations. In 1975, the Nordic Political Science Association (NOPSA), composed of the national political science associations of Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway, and Sweden, was founded. One of its objectives was the coordination of the Nordic countries' activities in the IPSA and the ECPR.

The ECPR has been instrumental in the development of the discipline also in those Western European countries where political science was a latecomer.7 Italian and later Spanish universities, in particular, took a keen interest in the ECPR's work. While the IPSA had introduced American political science to Europeans, during its early development, the ECPR also adopted the American model (see Blondel, 1997, pp. 116–7). As to the impact of the American model in Europe, Hans-Dieter Klingemann (2007a, p. 14) points to the argument put forward by Ken Newton and Joseph Vallès, whereby "[t]o take up the behavioural approach in the 1960s and the 1970s was to distinguish political science from law, philosophy, history and economics. This helped to build up independent departments of political science in the universities" (Newton & Vallès, 1991, p. 236).

The main purpose of the ECPR was initially to enhance Europe-wide comparative and empirical research. The Consortium began with eight members in 1970. In the intervening ffty years, it has grown into an organisation with over 300 members.8 As its membership has increased, the Consortium has become more open to different philosophical and theoretical traditions.9 The nature of the ECPR has also changed. In its activities, it emphasises scientifc standards and practices which have

7The ECPR did not accept members from socialist countries, because political science could not be conducted freely in those countries. Its policy differed from that of the IPSA which encouraged Central and Eastern European political scientists to participate in its activities, in the belief that this was a way of introducing Western political science into these countries.

<sup>8</sup> In June, 2020, the ECPR had 270 European members (out of a total of 317 members, the remaining forty-seven being non-European members; https://ecpr.eu, accessed June 10, 2020).

9To the extent that a number of European political scientists, favouring quantitative research methods and formal modelling, decided to establish the European Political Science Association (EPSA) as a form of protest in 2010 (Boncourt, 2017).

developed within Western academia during the last thirty years (peer reviews, the impact of journals, high-quality workshops, cooperation with the best universities in the world, the awarding of prizes to outstanding researchers, a Code of Conduct, and a Gender Equality Plan). All of these are of course worthy principles. However, they may not leave much room for political scientists with less experience in Western (often Anglo-American) social science practices to participate in the ECPR's activities.

# 3 Indicators of the State of Political Science in Europe

The early history of European political science helps to explain why political science is still dominated by West European countries. On the other hand, even in Western Europe, there are only two strong political science communities, namely the ones in Germany and in the UK. In order to create a truly European political science, it is important to analyse the reasons for this situation and to fnd ways of strengthening the discipline in those countries where political science has remained largely undeveloped.

The following table offers a concise summary of the development of political science in Europe and of its current state. Eight indicators offer background information for the analysis in the article. Together they describe the level of institutionalisation of political science, its strengths, stability, legitimacy, identity, autonomy, and internationalisation. The indicators are: 1) the year in which political science was frst afforded a chair or a programme in a given country; 2) the current number of political scientists in a country; 3) the number of political science institutions in a country; 4) the number of ECPR members in a country; 5) the year a national political science association was founded; 6)the number of members of a national political science association; 7) membership of the International Political Science Association (Yes/No); 8) membership of the European Confederation of Political Science Associations (Yes/No).10

<sup>10</sup> Information about the frst political science chairs/recognised programmes is based on the country reports, prepared in the project "Professionalisation and Social Impact of European Political Science", PROSEPS (https://www.proseps.unibo.it, accessed June 15, 2020), and on the articles published in Klingemann, ed., (2007b). The number of political scientists is based on PROSEPS data (Action/Deliverables). The number of political science institutions is based on the PROSEPS country reports, except in the cases of Poland, Russia, Belarus, and Ukraine (in italics), where fgures are based on Eisfeld and Pal, eds. (2010b). ECPR membership is based on the ECPR's website (https://ecpr.eu, accessed June 10,

Table 8.1 gives a rough overall picture of the development and present state of political science in Europe. At the same time, it must be said that some of the fgures are skewed. There are interpretative and conceptual problems concerning the nature of political science which often make it diffcult to compare the state of the discipline in different countries. Political scientists differ in the ways they see the discipline, as is refected in surveys regarding political science. One example is the year in which the frst political science chairs/ programmes were established. If a university had a Professor of Politics in the seventeenth century (for instance, Swedes often refer to a professorship in eloquence and government at Uppsala University in 1622, as being the world's frst professorship in political science), can that be counted as a Chair in Political Science? It would seem not, as a distinction has to be made between political science as an academic discipline and the study of politics in general. Politics has been studied, and can be studied, under different disciplinary labels, such as history, constitutional law, sociology, social policy, urban planning, and so on. Furthermore, the European roots of the study of politics can be traced back to ancient Greece (or indeed earlier), and politics has been taught at European universities since the Middle Ages (see Schüttemeyer, 2007, pp. 163–4), when it was studied as part of the courses in philosophy, constitutional law, and history.

In fact, political science as a separate academic discipline is in many ways an American invention, consisting of the idea of the scientifc study of politics conducted within independent political science departments. What has given the study of politics special status in the United States (compared to Europe) is the institutional structure of American universities. One important innovation was the creation of a system of departments, compared to the traditional single-chair systems. These departments were interposed between individual professors and the university itself (Wittrock, 1985, p. 25). This offered more opportunity for the recognition of new disciplines, political science being one of them. Another important event was the founding of the *American Political Science* 

<sup>2020).</sup> Information regarding the foundation of national political science associations and their membership is based on the PROSEPS country reports, Klingemann (2008, p. 378), and Eisfeld and Pal ((2010a), pp. 30–1). Figures for membership of the IPSA and the ECPSA have been gleaned from the associations' respective websites (https://www.ipsa.org/; https://www.ecpsa.org/, accessed April 29, 2020).


234


*First* 

*Political* 

*Political Science* 

*ECPR* 

*Political Science* 

*Members*

*IPSA/*

*ECPSA*

*Association*

*Members*

*Institutions*

*Scientists*

*recognised*

Source: Author's own collection *Association* (APSA) in 1903, which offered political scientists a new identity.11

That would explain why, when the IPSA was founded in the late 1940s, the general opinion held in Europe was that "[p]olitical science, as a distinct branch from speculation concerning political phenomena or the history of these phenomena, is of fairly recent development, more recent, certainly, than other social sciences such as law, political economy and sociology" (Salvadori, 1950, p. 1).

The distinction between political science as a discipline and the study of politics in general is linked to the problem of subdisciplines. When political science began to develop in Europe following the Second World War, it was customary to include international politics and public administration as part of the discipline. When the International Political Science Association was founded in 1949, it was agreed that political science embraced four areas, namely: (1) political theory; (2) political institutions, including the public administration; (3) parties, groups, and public opinion; and (4) international relations (Coakley, 2004, p. 179). Today there are still some political science departments whose courses include the study of international relations and/or public administration; however, these felds can also be the concern of specifc departments established for their teaching and research. This is particularly the case of many administrative science departments, which have completely cut their ties with political science. Moreover, there are some subjects which may be part of a political science department, but which often have their own dedicated departments (e.g. EU Studies). One new development has seen the creation of interdisciplinary units where political science is one subject among several others. This variety of institutional arrangements makes it diffcult to count the exact number of departments and individual scholars concerned, especially when political scientists themselves perceive the discipline in several different ways. Although there are no simple solutions to these problems, it is important to acknowledge their existence when comparing political science in different countries. Ultimately, any comparison requires qualitative analysis.

11The idea of an autonomous research feld is still the main factor determining political science's status as an academic discipline. The scientifc study of facts is also a key factor, although nowadays "scientifc study" does not necessarily equate to the imitation of the natural sciences.

# 4 The State of Political Science in Central and Eastern Europe

Interpretative and conceptual problems are also evident when analysing political science in the Central and Eastern European (CEE) countries. Most political scientists agree that modern political science can only develop in a democratic environment, as the discipline is dependent on free scientifc argumentation and communication among scholars. In authoritarian systems, it is diffcult for political science to study politics in a critical manner (see, for example, Salvadori, 1950, pp. 8–9). This is one of the reasons why political science was not able to develop in the former socialist countries.

However, the relationship between political science and democracy is complicated. As David Easton, John G. Gunnell, and Michael B. Stein have argued, if we assume that democracy is a precondition for the existence of political science, how do we distinguish the effect of general social changes on the discipline from the specifc effects of political regimes? Furthermore, how do we distinguish the effects of different aspects (institutions, operational rules, and ideologies) of diverse democratic regimes on political science? (Easton, Gunnell and Stein, 1995, pp. 8–9).

That is why certain elements of political science were also able to exist under socialist regimes, albeit in a limited or propagandistic manner. Political science had already been recognised as a discipline in the 1960s in the former Yugoslavia (Serbia 1960, Bosnia and Herzegovina 1961, Slovenia 1961, Croatia 1962), Albania 1965 and Poland 1967 (see Bibic, 1985; Wiatr, 1995).

Scholars were not free to study everything, but could still enjoy a certain intellectual autonomy. Poland is an interesting case, as the discipline of political science was established by the Communist Party mainly for propaganda reasons; however, at the same time, political sociology was able to develop more freely, and this was often critical of political conditions within Poland. Polish political sociologists were also able to cooperate with Western political scientists on international projects. For example, in the 1960s, Polish political sociologists (and Yugoslavian scholars) participated in the "International Studies of Values in Politics" project, together with Indian and American social scientists. It was "the frst comparative empirical political research ever run in the Communist country" and "started a long series of the local power and government studies" (Tarkowski, 1987, p. 14). In that sense, political science did not start from scratch following the 1989/91 revolutions, given that CEE scholars had already had contacts with Western scholars before then, through the IPSA for example.

Political science can exist under authoritarian regimes, but is often compelled to narrow its scope. European socialist countries are not the only example of this phenomenon. For example, the study of politics was introduced at the *Universidad Complutense de Madrid* when Franco's regime was in place in the 1950s; however, the political science curriculum in that specifc case was limited, and "[t]o avoid political controversy the dominant approach to the subject was legalistic and constitutionalist" (Etherington & Morata, 2007, p. 325). The same tendencies can be seen today in existing authoritarian political systems. The PROSEPS country report on Russia states that as politics has become more authoritarian, "[s]ome universities close PS departments or merge them with Public Administration".

When political science began to develop in Central and East European countries in the 1990s, there were a number of problems to be solved concerning, among other things, higher education facilities and academic staff. Political science as a discipline had to gain legitimacy and compete with other disciplines for resources. In addition, during the socialist period, disciplines such as Scientifc Communism were staffed by Marxist scholars. When some of these old disciplines changed their names to political science, the question of how to treat those people occupying old teaching and research positions, had to be asked. The present article is not the appropriate place for an analysis of the complex development of higher education policies in these countries. Suffce it to say that practices have varied from one country to the next. In some countries, Marxist scholars lost their jobs (e.g. in the former GDR), whereas in other countries they have managed to hold onto their posts (e.g. in Moldova).

The latest overview of the state of the discipline with a specifc focus on Central and Eastern Europe, is already a decade old (Eisfeld and Pal, eds., 2010b), and it is evident that many things have changed since then.12 However, some factors hindering the development of political science, such as autocratic political tendencies, have persisted, and indeed have become even stronger (in Belarus, Russia, Moldova, and also Hungary

12More recent articles on political science in Central and Eastern Europe can be found in Krauz-Mozer, Kulakowska, Borowiec, Scigaj, eds., (2015b), which includes articles from twenty-seven Eastern and Western European countries. However, even this collection of articles is already partly outdated.

and Poland). It seems that Eisfeld and Pal's (2010a, p. 25) conclusion that the "cohesion of the discipline and a high quality of research are lacking in almost half of the countries included here" remains valid. This does not mean that political science as a discipline has not developed in Central and Eastern Europe in recent years (see the country analyses in Krauz-Mozer, Kulakowska, Borowiec and Scigaj, eds., 2015b); however, even the editors of this book note that "[i]t seems that political science in Central and Eastern Europe still lacks a discussion of changes occurring in how we construct the criteria of scientifcity, especially in relation to social sciences" (Krauz-Mozer, Kulakowska, Borowiec and Scigaj, 2015a, p. 11).

As argued in this article, in order to become fully institutionalised, an academic discipline must become an integral element of the international scientifc community. This has been a problem for many universities and individual scholars in Central and Eastern Europe. It seems that only a few institutions participate fully in international cooperation. Even the Central European Political Science Association (CEPSA) founded in 1994 (and currently with eight member countries, namely: Austria, Croatia, Czech Republic, Hungary, Lithuania, Poland, Slovakia, and Slovenia), "does not seem to work as a very strong catalyst of Central/East European convergence" (Eisfeld and Pal, 2010a, p. 32). Much of political science research in Central and Eastern Europe is country-specifc, and there seems to be little cooperation even between scholars with a shared historical background, such as those from the former Yugoslavia or Czechoslovakia (Jokic et al., 2019, p. 505).

The participation of Central and Eastern European political scientists in the conferences of the ECPR, the main pan-European political science organisation, also indicates that participation in international conferences is still rare or tends to be limited to scholars from just a few universities. There are only thirty-nine ECPR members from Central and Eastern European countries.13 This situation seems to refect participation trends also at the individual level.

Table 8.2 gives information on participation at some of the most recent ECPR Conferences (General Conferences and Joint Sessions of Workshops). The conferences held in 2019 are the latest ones at the time of writing. Given that the General Conference was held in Wroclaw and the Joint

<sup>13</sup>However, some of the countries are well represented in the ECPR, especially the Czech Republic (7 members out of a total of 9 institutions, Hungary (5 members out of 8 institutions), and Estonia (2 institutions, but 3 members).


#### **Table 8.2** Participation in selected ECPR conferences

Source: Author's counting of conference programmes (https://www.ecpr.eu/, accessed April 29, 2020)

Note: It must be pointed out, however, that the fgures represent the participation of universities, and not the participation of Central and Eastern European scholars, as these may also be working for West European universities (and vice versa), there are Western scholars working at Central and Eastern European universities. The fgures differ from the offcial fgures (in parenthesis). This is due mainly to cancellations and no-shows. However, as the offcial statistics do not offer separate information on CEE participants, information taken from printed conference programmes is used instead

Sessions were held in Mons, for comparative reasons, the Oslo 2017 Conference and the Warsaw 2015 Joint Sessions were added to the Table together with the frst ever General Conference held in Canterbury in 2001. That year, few of the Central and Eastern European scholars attended the General Conference. Oslo, on the other hand, is an expensive venue for a conference, which may account for the low levels of participation in 2017. However, one would have expected more Central and Eastern European participants to attend the 2019 Wroclaw Conference (112 of the 355 participants came from Polish universities it should be said).

The same trend can be seen also in regard to the Joint Sessions of Workshops. Furthermore, Western scholars act as important gatekeepers for the acceptance of who is to submit papers at a conference. In Warsaw, there were twenty-fve workshops with forty-eight workshop directors and co-directors, forty-fve of whom were from Western universities, and only three from Central and Eastern Europe. In Mons, there were ffty-one directors and co-directors, fve of whom were from Central and Eastern European universities.

Low conference participation rates can probably be accounted for, in part, by the high ECPR Conference fees.14 The general tone in the

14Currently, the ECPR offers annual membership to Central and Eastern European institutions at half the price (€ 1205) that Western European institutions pay (€ 2410). Nevertheless, € 1205 is still a high price for many CEE institutions. Furthermore, participation in conferences requires funds, which many Central and Eastern European scholars do not possess.

PROSEPS country reports is that "resources for research are scarce" (Slovenia), "funding shortage has been a huge problem" (Poland), "the fnancial conditions are limited" (Bulgaria), and so on. The Lithuanian report states that "participation in conferences is required…Yet, rarely, institutions have funding, or if they have, these funds are not big". Language may also affect participation, as the ECPR only uses English in its activities. Older political science communities with more members also control the agenda of conferences, which may make it more diffcult for scholars from new countries to get accepted as workshop directors or even as paper givers. Moreover, the research interests of Central and Eastern European political scientists do not always coincide with those of Western scholars (for example, according to the PROSEPS country reports, research felds such as social movements, gender politics, the political economy and, surprisingly, electoral behaviour, are not well represented on research agenda).

Participation in the ECPR's activities is only one indicator of course. However, it is easy to fnd other examples of the under-representation of Central and Eastern European scholars in European political science.15 In the study on articles published by CEE political scientists and indexed in the Scopus database during 1996–2013, it was found that the number of articles was almost negligible in 1996 and remained so up to 2006. After this there was an increase, but it was mainly due to the indexing of one Polish (2006) and two Lithuanian (2011) journals in the Scopus database (Jokic et al., 2019, p. 496).

CEE scholars are also under-represented in European funding schemes. Although Central and Eastern European universities have been able to participate in many programmes supporting internationalisation and academic mobility (EU funding, such as Erasmus and COST; Fulbright scholarships; bilateral agreements), most of these programmes are not directly linked to research. They foster networking among scholars and the adoption of foreign research models. These of course help to enhance research, but the problem is that they do not form any coherent platform for political science as a discipline. Although these schemes have helped

15Unfortunately, a study of all forms of international cooperation, such as publishing in international journals, degrees taken in foreign universities, fnding permanent or temporary positions in foreign universities, research and teaching exchanges, participation in international projects, and research funding from international sources, is not possible within the context of this article.

the development of political science, it seems that even the Bologna Process has been more important among Central and Eastern European political scientists with regard to disciplinary identity, than any of the aforesaid schemes.

Actual research funding would make a more important contribution towards the development of political science, but such funding often goes to Western scholars. An important indicator is the distribution of those grants awarded by the European Research Council (ERC). Between 2007 and 2019, the ERC distributed 235 Starting Grants in the panel "Institutions, Values, Beliefs and Behavior" (the panel representing sociology, social anthropology, political science, law, communication, and social studies of science and technology).16 However, only four such starting grants were given to young scholars from Central and Eastern Europe. The same trend can be seen also in regard to Consolidator and Advanced Grants. Between 2013 and 2019, of 96 Consolidator Grants awarded, none was given to Central and Eastern Europe. Between 2008 and 2018, of 103 Advanced Grants, only one went to a scholar in that part of Europe.17

The limited entity of research funding (and the low participation rates at international conferences) can be partly accounted for by the fact that many departments, especially in Eastern European countries, do not yet represent consolidated academic units. For instance, while there is a clear potential in Russia and Romania for the development of political science as an academic discipline, political obstacles and internal rivalries have hindered this development. If ECPR membership is used as an indicator of international orientation, then it should be pointed out that ten countries have no ECPR members at all (Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Moldova, Ukraine, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro, North Macedonia, and Albania). Although there is no direct link to EU membership, one could argue that the said membership seems to indirectly foster European cooperation within all social arenas, including that of political science.

Therefore, Central and Eastern European political science communities should not be treated as constituting a single block. Although this book

<sup>16</sup>As many grants were given to interdisciplinary projects, it is diffcult to say how many political scientists were involved.

<sup>17</sup>The information about ERC funding can be found at ERC´s website (https://erc. europa.eu/projects-fgures/statistics, accessed April 29, 2020).

and the chapters within follow a somewhat different design (see Chap. 1), there are grounds for dividing them into at least fve separate groups (cf. Eisfeld and Pal, 2010a, p. 25):


Although there are differences within the aforementioned groups, it may be argued that political science has been developed to the greatest degree in the Baltic countries (especially Estonia and Lithuania), in the Central European countries (Poland, the Czech Republic, Hungary), and in some of the former Yugoslavian states (Slovenia and Croatia). In that sense, the situation of political science in Central and Eastern Europe is not as grey as it may seem. However, the under-representation of CEE countries in European political science remains a problem. There is no simple explanation for this situation. How political science will develop in these countries depends very much on country-specifc factors such as the structure of universities, intellectual traditions, available resources, and the political climate. On the other hand, it is important to note that outside support is sadly missing at present.

# 5 The Fragmented Field as an Obstacle to the Adaptation of New Countries to the Existing (Old) Institutional Frameworks

During its development in Western Europe, political science was coordinated and strengthened by the IPSA and the ECPR. There were political reasons for this. The IPSA was initiated by Americans in order to strengthen democracy and bolster America's global infuence following the Second World War. The ECPR, on the other hand, was established by West European scholars who wanted to make empirical research more rigorous, along the lines of American behaviouralism. While one may disagree with the motives of the founders of the IPSA and the ECPR, this is of little relevance from the current perspective. History has always produced unintended consequences. Contemporary political science is a methodologically and theoretically open academic discipline. In order for this to happen, political science needed the IPSA's and ECPR's endeavours.

The problem is that the IPSA and the ECPR have failed to respond to current-day demands. From a European perspective, the ECPR should have been a key player of course. It should have paid greater attention to the problems of political science in Central and Eastern Europe. It should have more clearly acknowledged the fact that higher education has become market-oriented and that there is now increased competition between universities as they each attempt to raise their ranking. Furthermore, it should have focused more on the European Commission's growing interest in higher education and research following the signing of the Maastricht Treaty in 1992, which infuenced member states' national agendas (Goldsmith & Berndtson, 2002).

As the ECPR failed to take the initiative in these matters, two new pan-European political science associations have tried to address the problems of the changing academic context: the Thematic Network in Political Science (TN, 1997–2001)/ European Political Science Network (epsNet), (2001–2009); and the European Confederation of Political Science Associations (ECPSA, 2007–). The frst of the two to enter the feld was the Thematic Network in Political Science, which was set up in 1997 with funding from the European Commission, and was coordinated by Sciences Po in Paris. It was a result of the Commission's interest in furthering cooperation between European scholars (Thematic Network Action under the Socrates Programme), and the interest of some French political scientists (mainly in Sciences Po) to make the French discipline more outwardlooking (Topf, 2007). In the beginning, its main focus was on Western European political science. The starting point was a conference on "The State of Political Science in Europe" held in Paris in April 1996. All participants were from Western Europe, and they presented papers about the state of political science in their respective countries (Quermonne, dir., 1996). It was after this conference that the Thematic Network was founded.

However, there was considerable opposition to the setting up of the Thematic Network, as many political scientists in the countries where the discipline was already well-established were satisfed with the ECPR, and felt that the Thematic Network was an unnecessary complication. Several attempts were made to establish a working relationship between the two organisations. It was proposed that the ECPR (initially modelled on the Inter-University Consortium for Political and Social Research, Ann Arbor, 1962–) should carry on with research and research training, as before. The Thematic Network, on the other hand, would concentrate more on matters of teaching, professional development and lobbying of the European Union. Although this division of labour would have made sense, as the ECPR had not done much with regard to teaching and was not interested in lobbying, relations between the organisations remained lukewarm.

The Commission's funding for the Thematic Network was for four years only. After this, the network was expected to be transformed into a permanent association, if it wanted to continue operating as an organisation. There was a consensus among those who had worked in the TN and on its projects, that there was a need for a new European political science association designed to address problems which the ECPR had avoided tackling. Accordingly, the European Political Science Network (epsNet) was founded in 2001 to continue the TN's work.18 At the same time, the epsNet began to take an interest in European political science as a whole, with its president, Hans-Dieter Klingemann, taking on the task of getting Central and Eastern European political scientists to join the network. Annual conferences, for instance, were regularly held in Central Europe (Krakow 2002, Prague 2004, and Budapest 2006).

However, the epsNet's problem was that it lacked funding. Following its establishment, it managed to continue the work of the old Thematic Network, thanks to additional fundings for its projects from the European Union. However, this funding ended in 2005, after which the organisation had to be fnanced by other means. It was hoped that the epsNet could attract more members and solve its fnancial problems partly through membership fees. To this end, it adopted a system of collective membership (departments), individual membership, doctoral membership, and associate membership (mainly scientifc associations). In order to attract

18The epsNet was established as a scientifc association under French law. According to its Constitution (epsNet 2001), its objectives were: to promote cooperation in the teaching of political science; to enhance the visibility of the discipline and the profession; together with political science associations and other organisations, to provide a forum for the discussion of issues relating to the discipline; to provide a periodic review of the discipline; to strengthen the links between the academic community and the labour market; to stimulate the exchange and mobility of staff and students; to provide members with information on the profession; and to offer specifc services to members.

more members, membership fees were kept low or even waived (in the case of doctoral students and associations) so that a lot more people would be encouraged to join. Departments already paid high ECPR fees, and it was felt that collective members were not willing to fund epsNet, accordingly. Moreover, as one of the epsNet's key goals was to attract more scholars from Central and Eastern Europe, it was acknowledged that departments and individual scholars in these countries could not afford high membership fees, hence the reduced fees.

The strategy proved unsuccessful, however, and membership numbers remained low. In June 2003, (epsNet, 2003), there were thirty-eight collective members from West European universities and eleven from Central and Eastern Europe. There were also ffty-nine individual members from Western Europe and ffty-one from Central and Eastern Europe. An interesting thing was that the epsNet was able to attract more individual doctoral students in Central and Eastern Europe (56) than in the West (34). Considering all membership categories, while France had the most members (41), it was followed by three Central and Eastern European nations— Poland (32), Hungary (24) and Slovakia (20)—–ahead of Germany (16) and the UK (14) (espNet 2003).19 This indicates that the epsNet was able, to a certain degree at least, to appeal to scholars in Central and Eastern Europe.

However, despite the fact that the TN and the epsNet had run a number of projects (e.g. state of the discipline; political science in Europe after Bologna; doctoral studies in Europe; EU virtual learning; training workshops for young university teachers), had organised yearly conferences, published research reports and a net-journal, their activities gradually began to wane. In 2009, the epsNet joined the ECPR, becoming one of the latter organisation's networks. This did not alter the situation, however, and although epsNet has never been offcially dissolved, it has not conducted any activities since joining the ECPR.20

The short (unsuccessful) history of the epsNet is more complicated however, since fnancial reasons were not the only factors leading to the network's demise. Poor administrative decisions and inter-personal

<sup>19</sup>Athough the fgures seem low, it should be said that when staff of collective members were taken into account, the epsNet's membership comprised around 1000 individual scholars.

<sup>20</sup>The epsNet has only had one direct effect on the ECPR. In 2011, a few people who had previously been active in the epsNet's governance, set up a Teaching and Learning Politics standing group for the ECPR. Theirs was a private endeavour, however.

problems also contributed to this outcome. This is why some of the members of the epsNet's last Executive Council began to organise cooperation between national political science associations in Europe. The idea of establishing an "Association of European Political Science Associations" was already being mooted in 1998. Concrete proposals were also made as to how this could be done, and a number of informal meetings of representatives from national political science associations were held to discuss the state of European political science (Furlong, 2007). It was not until 2007 however, that this cooperative idea was put into practice with the founding of the European Confederation of Political Science Associations. This Confederation now boasts nineteen members (see Table 8.1), but it still appears beset by the same problems that the epsNet had. It has tried to organise a number of projects, but they have failed to be completed. It is interesting that the International Political Science Association (IPSA) seems to attract more European members than the ECPSA (see Table 8.1), despite the ECPSA's very low membership fees.21

The establishment of the epsNet and the ECPSA reveals the need to do something about the organisational structure of European political science. This has turned out to be diffcult to achieve, however.22 Even the ECPR has not developed as well as it should have; its membership has tended to remain stationary for several years, and indeed has even declined in certain countries. Furthermore, the ECPR's 270 European members represent only a minority of all political science institutions in Europe.23

<sup>21</sup> See the ECPSA's website (http://www.ecpsa.org/index.php/publications/8-basicpage/18-standing-orders).

<sup>22</sup> In addition, the European Political Science Association divides European political scientists further and hinders the overall development of the discipline. It must be noted that EPSA's membership consists mainly of West European and American scholars. In 2013, their share of members was 96.5%, while the share of Central and Eastern European scholars was 1.3% (Boncourt, 2017, p. 22).

<sup>23</sup> See Table 8.1. According to the PROSEPS country reports, there are at least 614 political science institutions in Europe, of which 519 are in Western Europe and 95 in Central and Eastern Europe. However, the data are missing for Azerbaijan, Armenia, Belarus, Bosnia, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Poland, Russia, Belarus, and Ukraine. If the data from Eisfeld and Pal, eds., (2010b) concerning Poland (83 institutions), Russia (67), Belarus (51), and Ukraine (51) are added, the number of European political science units rises already to 866. It is, of course, diffcult to say how comparable the data are. As noted earlier, it is challenging to compare political science units because there are large independent departments as well as different kinds of social science (or law) units, where political science has only a minor position.

West European membership has developed unevenly, with 157 members from the UK, Germany, the Nordic and Benelux countries, representing over half of its European membership. This means that the countries where political science began to develop under the IPSA, and was strengthened by the founding of the ECPR, remain the Consortium's core nations.

European scholarly associations should enhance the development of political science, making it a fully institutionalised European political science. However, the problem is that the epsNet has ceased to exist and the ECPSA is not functioning particularly well, while the ECPR is still dominated by Western political scientists and is not ready to make any major changes to its activities. Furthermore, the EPSA is mainly a Western European/American organisation. The current feld of European political science is organisationally fragmented, which makes it diffcult to enable new countries to adapt to existing institutional frameworks, and to create an institutionalised pan-European political science discipline. New measures are needed to resolve this problem.

# 6 Is it Possible to Identify <sup>a</sup> Common Interest of European Political Science?

In spite of the under-representation of Central and Eastern European political scientists in European-level cooperative schemes, there are clear signs that they are interested in participating to a greater extent (McGrath, 2008). The now defunct epsNet is a good example of this. The division between West and Central-East European political science is also not evident in the ECPSA, since of its current nineteen members, nine are from West European countries and ten from Central and Eastern Europe.

As Thibaud Boncourt (2017) has argued, the emergence of European scientifc associations (including those pertaining to political science) can be best explained by looking at the competing interests (in terms of scientifc paradigms and academic institutions) of the key players behind the establishment of these associations. As noted above, this is evident in the cases of the IPSA and the ECPR. However, although different interests always affect behaviour, sometimes the establishment of scholarly organisations drives from the pursuit of common interests. The important question is: does European political science currently share a common interest?

In the 1990s, European political scientists began to discuss new strategies for European political science, as it was felt that something had to be done given the new political situation. One of the proposals made was to establish a new European Political Science Association.24 On November 28, 1998, the ECPR and the Thematic Network in Political Science organised a meeting in Paris with selected members of national associations and university departments. Before the meeting, a policy paper was distributed for discussion, and was signed by the then Chair of the ECPR Executive, Mogens Pedersen, and the Co-ordinator of the Thematic Network in Political Science, Gerard Grunberg (Pedersen & Grunberg, 1998). The paper recognised the fact that, "at present there is no European political science organisation in the sense of the American Political Science Association". It was felt that there was "a clear need for a European body that looks simultaneously at teaching issues, research and professional matters", and that there was a need to transform existing organisations into one European-wide organisation, "a European body that looks at teaching issues, curricula, standard qualifcations, credit transfer etc." Although the meeting did not come to any decisions, its communiqué stated that, "[t]he meeting concluded that the existing organizational structure is in need of thorough discussion by all European political scientists".

As the policy paper pointed out, European issues and European integration demanded greater attention; for example, universities needed to be more aware of the job market's demand for their students. Moreover, European Commission funding of research, teaching and mobility was on the increase and a single pan-European organisation would more likely attract such funds for the development of European political science. It was also felt that a single association would give the profession a higher profle in Europe, and would be a worthy partner for both the APSA and the IPSA.

Nonetheless, this initiative failed to bring about any changes. One of the reasons for this was that there was strong opposition within the ECPR to the establishment of a new organisation. Consequently, it may be overly optimistic to think that a completely new European political science organisation could be created in order to replace the existing organisations. Over the last two decades, various attempts to render European political science more cooperative and effcient have shown that relations between scholars and organisations are complicated when it comes to establishing political science policy. Europe is still too heterogeneous an

<sup>24</sup>As it has been noted, the EPSA has now been founded, but for different reasons.

entity, characterised by too many competing interests. If something new is to be created, it should be based on the existing organisations.

Given that the ECPR is the leading European political science organisation, it should rethink its role and take greater responsibility for leading European political science in a new direction. It should adopt a more prominent role in regard to teaching issues (instead of having only one standing group devoted to such), and in representing the profession at the European level. More importantly still, it should pay greater attention to Central and Eastern European countries and try to get them involved in European cooperation. One small frst step could be that of making the editorial boards of the ECPR's journals more representative (see Table 8.3).

It is hard to comprehend why Central and Eastern European scholars are so vastly under-represented on the editorial boards of these journals. Thirty-eight US scholars and an additional thirty scholars from other countries outside of Europe are members of these boards. One would think that having a more balanced European representation would broaden the journals' vision, and at the same time would help the ECPR become a truly European organisation. As was pointed out earlier, the ECPR has not managed to increase its membership in recent years, despite the fact that there are some 600 European institutions that could become members, but have failed to do so to date. The problem is that the ECPR



Source: Author's own counting from the ECPR's website (https://www.ecpr.eu/), accessed, June 15, 2020

Note: The *Political Data Yearbook* includes members of the International Advisory Board and the Editorial Board, the *European Journal of International Relations* includes members of the Editorial Committee and the International Advisory Board, the *Political Research Exchange* includes Associate Editors and Editorial Advisory Board

appears to have become an academic business corporation advocating the ideology of the current market-oriented academia. It would do well to regain some of that early spirit it had aimed at expanding the realm of political science in Europe (see Rose, 1990).

At the same time, one important question remains, namely "[h]ow do different local political sciences diffuse and infuence each other?" (Brintnall, 2004, p. 2). This is an important question, and concerns power relations within a potential single European political science organisation. Dominant political science communities infuence weaker ones more than vice versa. A single European political science organisation could lead to the further strengthening of these power relations. Furthermore, a single organisation would probably lead to the English language becoming even more dominant in scientifc communication. However, although the question of power is an important one, at the same time it is legitimate to ask what the alternatives may be. Power can also be power-to or power-with, rather than just power-over. It is up to political scientists as scholars to decide whether they are advancing their own interests (cf. Boncourt, 2017) or they are acting for the common good.

One solution would be to get the ECPR and the ECPSA to acknowledge that they need each other. The frst step would be to strengthen the role of the ECPSA, since as an organisation it is currently weak and not a particularly appealing prospective partner for the ECPR. The problem is that most national associations are in fact weak (see Table 8.1), and fail to contribute very much to the work of the ECPSA. However, it would be easy to implement simple measures to make the ECPSA more relevant to the European political science community. Firstly, the ECPSA could operate mainly as a clearing house, divulging information about European political science. Each national association, on the other hand, could offer its services, insofar as possible, to other related associations. This would offer European political scientists a better opportunity to participate also in those conferences conducted in languages other than English. The ECPSA, as an umbrella organisation, could also encourage non-English speaking scholars to see themselves as part of the broader European political science community. The ECPR, on the other hand, would still be the main European political science organisation, but could beneft from working with the ECPSA. This would offer it a channel through which to reach a wider public of European political scientists, as the Confederation represents more European political scientists through its national associations than the ECPR does through its membership. In this sense, potential developments should be given priority over the existing situation.

A stable and legitimate political science with a clear identity and autonomous status, requires favourable political conditions (democracy) and economic conditions (resources), at the very least. International scholarly associations cannot directly infuence these factors to any great degree. By offering a platform for scholars in countries where the discipline is undeveloped or under threat, international organisations can, however, help scholars in their struggle to enhance the discipline. Wider pan-European cooperation among political scientists would beneft everyone, and would hopefully lead to a fully institutionalised form of European political science in the future.

# References


#### Websites


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# Conclusion: A Discipline Viewed from the Fringes—Opportunities Taken and the Risk of Deinstitutionalisation

# *Christophe Roux*

# 1 Introduction

The initial task we undertook when deciding to write this book was an ambitious one when compared to the existing literature. We wanted to analyse the institutionalisation of political science as an academic discipline on the basis of a genuinely detailed theoretical framework that would enable us to explore the European situation by tackling it from the 'fringes' (mostly Central-Eastern Europe) rather than from the core; and in doing so, we have opted for comparative chapters rather than the more common country-by-country exploration. This fnal chapter places the previous ones into a comparative perspective and draws a number of conclusions about some of the fndings the authors have put together. To do so, it frst relocates the discussion about political science's institutionalisation within the framework of the literature on academic disciplines. It then highlights

C. Roux (\*)

University of Montpellier (CEPEL-CNRS), Montpellier, France e-mail: christophe.roux@umontpellier.fr

<sup>©</sup> The Author(s) 2022 257

G. Ilonszki, C. Roux (eds.), *Opportunities and Challenges for New and Peripheral Political Science Communities*, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-79054-7\_9

the major trends that emerge from the empirical analyses set out in the book: on the one hand, it offers a documented analysis of the discipline's development from the 1990s onwards; on the other hand, it looks at certain aspects that are of concern regarding possible precursors of the discipline's deinstitutionalisation.

# 2 Political Science's Institutionalisation

# *2.1 Political Science as a Specifc Field*

I do not intend to repeat here the refections on institutionalisation already provided in Chap. 2 (by G. Ilonszki), which offers a thorough discussion of the concept and its operationalisation. The institutionalisation of political science is achieved when the discipline acquires a certain intrinsic value and meets the key requirements (identity, autonomy, stability, reproduction capacity and legitimacy) identifed in the said chapter. Institutionalisation thus allows political science to be distinguished (a key element in this process) in terms of the two categories ('science' and 'political') referred to in the discipline's name.

First, as a (social) *science*, political science offers its own approach to politics, which involves the utilisation of specifc intellectual tools and the pursuit of specifc goals. It gathers data on observable facts, relies on conceptual frameworks, and follows methodological standards in order to uncover evidence supporting explanations/interpretations, in a cumulative search for knowledge that is as objective as possible. This activity is pursued in the specifc institutional setting of higher education and research1 (metaphorically 'the academy'). This setting displays specifc organisational patterns, norms, resources, practices and beliefs, all of which are partly shared by various countries but are also characterised by signifcant national idiosyncrasies. In this sense, political scientists everywhere differ from the politicians, opinion-makers, or journalists who, each in his or her own way, offer specialised knowledge and views of politics. Political scientists are not immune to interaction with these other actors operating in the sphere of politics: frstly, because political scientists operate independently from within higher

<sup>1</sup> It is important to entangle the two facets of academic activities (teaching and research) since one specifcity of this sector is that scholars collectively teach the knowledge they produce themselves, even if these two types of activities sometimes rely on different institutions (see, for instance, the role of academies devoted to research vs. universities for teaching in the East-European tradition, e.g. Mongili, 1992).

education and research institutions that are shaped, to varying degrees, by the policy-makers in question; and secondly, they deal with a topic—politics and political processes—in regard to which any citizen can have his or her legitimate say in a democracy.

To fulfl its mission, the format taken by political science is that of an academic discipline. Although the term 'discipline' does not merit any extensive discussion for our purposes, its meaning needs to be addressed for the sake of clarity; the reason being that the term 'discipline' is very commonly used in the academic profession without ever being defned as if it were obvious. This may be because academics writing mostly for other academics think that readers need no conceptual introduction to the matter. It is also, perhaps more importantly, because the notion of academic discipline, when carefully taken into consideration, actually appears to be more fuzzy than it seems at frst. The concept 'is not altogether straightforward in that…it allows room for some uncertainties of application' in the words of Becher and Trowler (2006, p. 41; see also Krishnan, 2009). It appears as a contingent category: as Whitley (2000, pp. 6–7) points out, 'the academic discipline as the basic unit of social organization of knowledge production is itself historically variable… University-based disciplines are therefore only one type of knowledge production unit which unifed reputational networks, employment structures, and training programmes in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries in many countries'. In turn, this fuzziness has an impact on the very notion of discipline, which as Trowler (2014a, pp. 1722–1723) warns, may convey an excess of 'essentialism' in that 'the category "discipline" does not have a set of essential characteristics which are all necessarily present in every instance. Secondly… each individual discipline has no essential "core characteristics" either, in the sense of being all present and identifable at all times' (see also Trowler, 2014b). Mostly, it is because 'the sociological characteristics of disciplines often outweighed their epistemological characteristics; longevity, research funding history, and political *savoir faire* were found recurrently to take precedence in the academic world over the ability of a given discipline to validate knowledge or solve problems' (Donald, 2002, p. 7).

So, to put it simply, academic disciplines are indeed artefacts. These artefacts are sometimes even given ideal-typical defnitions: 'a specifc body of teachable knowledge with its own background of education, training, procedures, methods and content areas' according to Berger (1970, p. 24); 'a body of knowledge with a reasonable logical taxonomy, a specialized vocabulary, an accepted body of theory, a systematic research strategy, and techniques for replication and validation' to quote Donald (2002, p. 7). As artifcial as they are, they have been taken seriously when it comes to organising the way knowledge is produced and divulged in higher education and research. This is particularly true of political science—almost a newborn discipline when compared to some of the others which boast early roots in traditional university settings. As Berger observes (1970, pp. 23–24): 'the "disciplinary" framework is relatively new in the history of Western science and teaching…. [and] only those sciences which appeared recently, the so-called social science group (economics, psychology, sociology, anthropology, etc.) set themselves up immediately as "disciplines"'.

To put it more precisely: the history of European political science has been, to a great extent, that of its struggle to become a discipline 'like the others' (and once this has been achieved—if at all—to maintain this status just like the other disciplines). Despite the premises laid down during the nineteenth century, European political science only really emerged as a result of the impetus provided by UNESCO in the late 1940s. At that time, political science institutions had been established before any robust epistemological conception of the discipline had been provided (Boncourt, 2009). Political science was founded as 'a science without scientists' (Gaïti & Scot, 2017), to use an expression employed to depict the French situation until the late 1960s, but which is applicable to many, if not all, other national cases. It only gradually gained substance, together with an epistemological and methodological basis, through a 'learning through experience' process which accounts for much of the fuidity of the discipline's shifting borders.

As a result, political science claims to be the one discipline whose *raison d'être* is to deal specifcally with *politics*, and this is the second source of its differentiation from other disciplines. It differentiates itself from other academic disciplines that are, at one and the same time, its neighbours, sources of inspiration and rivals in the quest for legitimacy and in the struggle to obtain the limited resources available within the academy. Philosophy, history, law and sociology are the most obvious examples of such other disciplines which, as several chapters of this volume show, come under the all-embracing, cross-disciplinary label of 'scientifc socialism' in Central and Eastern Europe. Political science thus struggled, and continues to struggle, to preserve its own identity. Gaining the same status of discipline, 'like the others', implies another characteristic feature of the institutionalisation process, that is, depersonalisation, refecting the organisational needs of any academic discipline. Indeed, just like other academic disciplines, political science relies not on one or a few individuals, but on the existence of an active community of scholars working in centres of higher education and research; furthermore, there may also be cases of self-mobilisation, such as the creation of associations (often on a national basis and possibly within the framework of international cooperation). This 'communitarian' character of the discipline is a pre-condition for the enforcement of scientifc standards. The division of labour and the various facets of academic activity entail the work and judgment of more than a few individuals. This would suggest that for an academic discipline to be strongly institutionalised, it requires a 'critical mass' of scholars, and this is a persistent issue in the cases covered here, as it also is in many other European countries.

#### *2.2 Institutionalisation as a Specifc Challenge for Political Science*

The epistemological and sociological aspects of political science are not independent features. They mutually infuence each other. Moving away from the general concept of discipline to the discussion of the variety of, and differences between, disciplines is a way to tackle this issue which, in turn, affects part of the transformations it is currently undergoing.

Taken together, academic disciplines cover a vast array of knowledge without sharing the same characteristics. This point, which is made here following a series of discussions among the authors, has been touched upon only briefy herein. I would like to remind readers here of the most important things leading to a better understanding of the current challenges faced by political science.

In a seminal work that was to become highly infuential (Stoeckler, 1993; Trowler, 2014b; Simpson, 2017), Anthony Biglan (1973) empirically identifed three main differences among disciplines. He distinguished between life and non-life,2 hard and soft,3 and pure and applied4 disciplines. The second and third categories, which are the most important, were echoed by David Kolb (1981) under different labels in his distinction between 'concrete' and 'abstract' disciplines, on the one hand, and between 'active' and 'refective' disciplines, on the other hand. Though originally thought of as forming a continuum, these categories became widely used as opposing poles of a threefold division.

In another infuential work, Tony Becher and Paul Trowler (2006), following on from Becher (1994), underlined the fact that these dimensions, although important, only covered the cognitive aspects of disciplines. They claimed that a robust typology also needs to take into account the social dimension of disciplines, that is, the kinds of interaction among scholars. This led to a further two dimensions being identifed, that is the 'urban' compared to the 'rural',5 and the 'convergent' as opposed to the 'divergent'.6 The cognitive and social dimensions of academic disciplines are summed up in Table 9.1 below.

Following the same authors, these characteristics, when combined, can help us better understand the differences between disciplines in terms of the nature of knowledge, as summed up in Table 9.2. 7

2Life disciplines are "concerned with life systems" while non-life disciplines "deal with inanimate objects" (Biglan, 1973, p. 202).

3Hard disciplines 'have well-developed theory, universal laws, causal propositions, they are cumulative and have generalisable fndings' while soft disciplines 'have unclear boundaries, relatively unspecifed theoretical structure, are subject to fashions and have loosely defned problems' (Trowler, 2014c, p. 3).

4Applied disciplines 'are regulated by external infuence to some extent (for example by professional bodies such as ones regulating lawyers or engineers) and are more applied within the professions and to problems of various sorts; economic, medical, physical or social' whereas pure disciplines are 'self-regulating and not directly applied to the professions or problems in the outside world' (Trowler, 2014c, p. 3).

5Urban disciplines are 'characterized by intense interaction and a high people-to-problem ratio' while rural disciplines 'have bigger territories, less interaction and a lower people-toproblem ratio' (Trowler, 2014c, p. 3).

6Convergent disciplines 'have uniform standards in research practice and a relatively stable elite', whereas divergent disciplines 'sustain more intellectual deviance and frequently experience attempts to shift research standards' (Trowler, 2014c, p. 3).

7This broad picture does not account for all academic disciplines, such as the arts and other creative subjects, thus, refecting a potential difference between 'creative' and 'empirical' disciplines; such disciplines are not forgotten, but purposely discarded, by Biglan (1973, p. 202) as being empirically unimportant, and as such are not included even if they are taught at university level.


Source: Adapted from Trowler (2014c) and Biglan (1973)



Source: Becher and Trowler (2006, p. 36)

How does political science ft into this fragmented landscape? In their analysis of the Italian case, Capano and Verzichelli (2016) positioned political science as a 'soft-pure'8 discipline—thus belonging to the 'humanities and pure social science' grouping—with 'rural' and 'divergent' characteristics.

As a 'soft-pure-divergent' discipline, political science is more exposed to overt criticism than others. The specifc skillset that political scientists claim to possess, and the soundness of their analysis, can be more easily questioned by the general public because of the very nature of the knowledge they produce. This is a situation that physicists, astronomers, chemists and biologists are less likely to fnd themselves in, if at all. Moreover, due to its specifc object—politics, about which any citizen may have a say in a democracy—this questioning is even truer; even in the feld of the humanities and social sciences, scholars specialised in Japanese literature or medieval history, for example, are not going to be, or are less likely to be, challenged by citizens or politicians with regard to their writings. Of course, there is nothing new about this situation. However, we paid less attention to it in 'normal' times. Changing contexts—such as the 'Great Recession', rising 'populism', or the COVID-19 pandemic—may question issues which up until now were considered resolved.

The 'rural' character of political science is not evident everywhere in Europe, although apart from a couple of substantial exceptions (the United Kingdom and Germany), it tends to be the case, and this is true not only in Central and Eastern Europe. This question is a diffcult one to handle since we need to know how many political scientists are active, and how they compare to those working in other disciplines. The frst item of

8These differences do not only deal with the substance of knowledge in each branch. As Neuman et al. (2002) have shown, they have implications for teaching and learning: the nature of curriculum, the way students' work is assessed, the main cognitive purposes pursued by each discipline or set of disciplines, the patterns of the collective behaviour of teaching staff, the types of teaching method or the implicit requirements for students to succeed. Belonging to the 'soft pure' family of disciplines, political science largely follows the features identifed by Trowler (2014b, p. 20) in this regard: a 'reiterative', 'spiral' and 'holistic curriculum whose educational purposes aim at acquiring 'a broad command of intellectual ideas' and 'fuency of expression'; with 'student-centred' teaching methods to explore ideas based on discussions conducted within small groups; with time-consuming teaching preparation, a predominance of face-to-face teaching with smaller classes and limited use of information and communication technology; with a learning process in which students 'need to think laterally, read copiously and have good powers of expression, critical thinking, fuency, creativity'; fnally, with assessment practices requiring 'judgment' and being partially 'intuitive'.

information proved diffcult to obtain, and thus raises considerable problems when comparing situations in different nations, due to the variety of norms and practices in place in each domestic academic system; the second item went beyond the resources at our disposal. Nevertheless, the general impression given is one of a small community of political scientists often struggling with problems of personnel. Academic units with too narrow a workforce can be accused of being unsustainable. For example, a too 'small' department may be seen as no longer capable of carrying on its teaching and research. While having a small structure may represent a temporary situation during a phase of institutional development, should such a situation persist, this may force the discipline to justify its existence should resources become scarce. Why does an academic department remain small? Can this be seen as evidence of its lack of appeal? Is it reasonable to keep on providing resources (premises, personnel, and so on) in a competitive context? These questions are not merely conjectural. Of course, on the other hand, the varying impact of size depends on the organisational context in which political science operates. Academic disciplines are also part of a multidisciplinary setting, such as a university and its cross-disciplinary subdivisions. This sometimes means having to deal with organisational rules that may operate as constraints running counter to the process of institutionalisation. Bearing in mind the great diversity of national situations, in a number of cases, there are formal rules that political scientists have to comply with rather than choose from, and when universities are affected by the increasingly frequent institutional changes witnessed in recent times, it is not always easy for a relatively small discipline (like political science) to have its say and safeguard its own interests. This is not a new situation, but it is one that means that the institutionalisation of political science as an academic discipline has been perhaps more challenging than that of others.

To sum up then: (a) political science is a relatively young, small discipline which has little power as far as organisational issues are concerned; (b) the nature of its knowledge (mostly soft-pure-divergent) perpetually leaves it open to overt criticism, which is both a sign of good health and also a source of exposure; (c) this feature, which is shared with other social sciences, is exacerbated by its focus on politics: in other words, an academic analysis may challenge and even upset politicians and citizens alike. For all of these reasons, even when political science develops successfully, we should not forget that its existence is never a given, but is always fragile. Recent years have proven this: after almost two decades of noticeable growth in the countries under scrutiny, political science seems to be encountering a number of serious challenges.

# 3 Political Science on the European Fringes: Seizing Opportunities

The observations coming from different parts of Europe's periphery (as defned in the introduction) unsurprisingly all point to the remarkable development of political science since the 1990s. This recent process invites comments and raises a number of questions.

First of all, the emergence of political science in peripheral Europe reveals the combined importance of two macro-historical events for institutionalisation, namely to the establishment of independent statehood, and the process of democratisation. Accession to independent statehood is indeed an often taken-for-granted premise for disciplinary development. Bearing in mind the specifc countries examined in this volume, a substantial number of cases are concerned. They represent the outcome of a process of independence from existing nation states, as in the case of Iceland's independence from Denmark in 1944, and Malta's independence from the United Kingdom in 1964. Or they are the result of the demise of political unions at the end of the Cold War in the 1990s. This was the case, albeit in different forms, of the collapse of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (giving rise to the independent states of Lithuania, Estonia, Moldova, and Belarus), of Czechoslovakia (resulting in the Czech Republic and Slovakia), and the federation of Yugoslavia (resulting, as far as the cases covered in the book are concerned, in what are now the independent states of Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Serbia). While independent statehood matters, it is not *per se* the necessary condition for the development of political science: countries yet to gain their independence in the mid-twentieth century were able to beneft from the broader framework to which they belonged. What it does offer is the opportunity to establish an autonomous national environment for higher education and research, and within that environment, for political science. However, since these independent states derive from the break-up of broader unions, they are logically of a smaller size. All of the countries analysed here are of a medium or small size, which is not without consequences as the study of small states by Hlynsdóttir and Matonyte in Chap. 6 shows. Even in earlier democratic settings, smallness inhibited the development of political science for many years. And while political science in Iceland developed dramatically in the 2000s, this has not been the case with Malta, which appears a noticeable exception (it has no political science department as such, no political science journal, and no political science association).

As already mentioned in the introduction, regime change on the other hand (meaning democratisation in the cases, and for the period, covered here), appears an obvious, foreseeably powerful, factor opening the way for initiatives in this feld. The political opening process witnessed in the early 1990s, paved the way for the forceful development of political science, to that the point where the subsequent decades (1990s and 2000s) appear to represent, to quote Világi, Malová and Kostova, a 'golden age' for Central-Eastern Europe9 (see Chap. 5). The aforesaid authors not only emphasise the fact that the label 'political science' became increasingly used while older labels were abandoned, and that new, appealing teaching programmes were introduced at all levels (BA, MA, and PhD). They also mention the broad implications of this political transformation. Democratisation not only allows political scientists to conduct independent research without being suspected of doing something seditious; nor does it only foster opportunities for the circulation of ideas, references, exchanges for the beneft of those political scientists willing to 'catch-up' with the most dynamic sections of the global scientifc community (meaning mostly the English-speaking mainstream), possibly in keeping with the pan-European dynamics cited by Erkki Berndston in Chap. 8. It also offers an opportunity for political scientists to actively participate in the democratisation process within civil society, by observing, studying, and often publicly expounding, the events and processes emerging in the 'new Europe'. Thus the critical role played by the collapse of international communism in this entire process of democratisation cannot be underestimated.

The previous shapes of these more recently democratised states sometimes leave institutional and cultural legacies that may impact the structuring of the discipline. However, as the case of the former Yugoslavia

<sup>9</sup>Unfortunately there is no room here for a comparison of Eastern and Western Europe; in Western Europe, the same period in recent history also witnessed the substantial development of political science.

analysed by Boban and Stanojević (see Chap. 4) shows, a shared past does not necessarily mean that newly established states will follow the same paths. These authors shed light on the differences, in terms of formal regulation (with different approaches to the organisation of higher education), fnancial capacity (partly refecting the state of the corresponding domestic economies), and organisational patterns (with signifcant differences in terms of the space given to private institutions), that have emerged in recent decades. This is even truer of those countries previously part of the USSR: the four countries studied by Chulitskaya, Gudelis, Matonyte, and Sprincean (Chap. 3) display diverging trajectories. The case of Estonia appears, all things considered, something of a success, benefting as this country did from a positive national environment, and from the input of one prestigious scholar from the Estonian 'diaspora' returning from the US. The same is true of Lithuania, which successfully completed the process of institutionalisation of political science. The two other states in question, on the other hand, have had to cope with a more complex situation that in fact refects the importance of the two aforementioned features (territorial independence and democratisation). On the one hand, Moldova is affected by the territorial issue of Transnistria and its politicisation both within and outside the nation; on the other hand, Belarus continues to be suffocated by an authoritarian regime that has inhibited the development of political science within the country.

This emergence of political science as an academic discipline, since the 1990s, in the countries examined in this volume, raises a number of questions.

First, in retrospect, it raises the question of Communism's impact and legacy in the case of those countries directly concerned (that is, all of the countries examined save Iceland and Malta). On this point, the authors concerned actually express rather divergent views. In the Soviet republics, the Communist regimes prevented the development of political science as an independent academic discipline. The label 'political science' did not exist as such in those countries, and any social sciences were mostly a form of Marxist discourse designed to legitimise a regime and to control its citizens. Historical materialism, it was said, 'is far from being the only social science… But what distinguished it from… [other] disciplines is that it is the most general science of society' (Gleserman & Kursanov, 1968, pp. 40–4110). That particular concept of an all-encompassing science was designed as one of the tools to be used for the purposes of humanity's purported progress. As a consequence, it had to be subordinated to this ultimate goal. In the absence of political science as such, contributions to *de facto* political studies appeared limited and fragmented up until the 1990s. Beyond the Soviet Union, but still in Eastern Europe, the situation, as depicted by Világi, Malova and Kostova (Chap. 5), appears very similar: early pre-WWII attempts at academic refection on politics were smothered by the 'mould-encrusted' departments of scientifc socialism present in those countries, which inhibited the emergence of any form of political science. However, the same authors point to certain nuances, with limited periods (in the 1960s) of controlled 'liberalisation' in both Poland and Hungary, which appeared to be echoed (according to Boban and Stanojević) in the former Yugoslavia during that same period. The picture portrayed is mostly one of a confrmation of the state of things (Ghica, 2020, p. 166). Unfortunately, we did not have the necessary resources to investigate two further issues that these contributions have drawn our attention to. The frst such issue is the degree of substantial autonomy academics could have enjoyed during the less repressive moments in their respective countries' recent history, and the intellectual outcomes of such moments of autonomy. Secondly, regardless of what was written in that period, what was the *organisational* impact of the creation of departments devoted fully or partially to the study of politics? How important for the development of the discipline was the timing of their creation? It is thus clear that there is still room for further inquiry into the possible connection between these fundamentally different historical phases.

Another line of research could have followed on from the description of the unsurprising growth of political science from the 1990s onwards. However, a lack of resources prevented the authors from offering a detailed account of this transformation focusing on the manner in which political science has developed since then. The collapse of the Communist regime, representing a 'formal' legal and constitutional change in those countries concerned, resulted in political studies moving towards a more

10Though the fnal reference list mentions the English edition, I have used a French edition of this Russian book which has been translated into several languages. As a consequence, the page numbers are taken from the French edition I used, and may differ from the English edition.

'Westernized' (an overly succinct term for what is actually a somewhat complex reality) conception of the discipline; East European political scientists were no longer obliged to toe the party line, and this in itself represented a substantial change in political science in Central and Eastern Europe. Of course, the authors do mention various organisational changes made; however, this implied the process of acquiring a new body of knowledge, set of methods, familiarity with new literature (perhaps not completely unknown to some, but in part not written in their native languages). Above all, as Boban and Stanojević point out, this also entailed 'previous' political scientists 'converting' to a 'new' political science. Unfortunately, once again we were not able to collect detailed information about this process, and thus the following questions remain unanswered: how are new criteria for academic excellence defned—basically, who would be a 'good' / employable political scientist? What would his/her expected skillset comprise? Which actors establish said skillset? Incidentally, it should be noted that the impact of Europeanisation on this process is rarely analysed. While the EU has been instrumental in reshaping the landscape of higher education and research, its impact appears as a contextual feature establishing organisational constraints and providing funding opportunities. Nevertheless, this issue has yet to be documented in any detail.

A further important aspect that is still debatable concerns the degree of institutionalisation achieved by political science at the point of its peak development at the turn of the current century. As a matter of fact, a very interesting feature of this developmental phase, as the authors reveal, is the non-linear, non-homogeneous, incomplete nature of the process' outcome. There are several tangible signs of success of course, such as the development of classes in different key subfelds, the creation of academic units, the hiring of academic staff, the emergence and continued existence of journals and books, and the development of research programmes partly funded by the EU. The presence of a democratic framework (Belarus being the most signifcant exception) has indeed provided signifcant opportunities. However, as several chapters of the present work lucidly point out, there have been limits to this process: limited funding capacities, the non-linear progression of student enrolment, the incomplete achievement of generalised higher standards of scientifc research, a lack of linguistic competence, and as Berndtson points out in his chapter, limited internationalisation, are all mentioned as persisting inhibiting factors. The role of those private higher education institutions present is cited as a negative factor since it implies that proft is preferred to academic quality. Even when the organisational aspects of the discipline seemed reinforced, through compulsory political science classes and curricula, this is not necessarily a sign of a stronger discipline, as the case of Belarus clearly shows: the resurgence of an authoritarian political agenda gave rise, in state-run universities, to the instrumental use of political science as a tool of 'indoctrination'—just like before the fall of the Berlin Wall—and as a further means of dividing academics along ideological lines.

Of course the 'catching-up' viewpoint should not be seen here as a reliable means of comparison: even in Western Europe (subsequently characterised by something of a North-South divide), the perceived satisfaction with the consolidation of the discipline coexists with disappointment regarding several aspects of academic work (e.g. the discipline's recognition, institutional development, and funding). However, in the absence of a systematic comparison, both quantitative and qualitative, of different parts of Europe, we are left with a 'glass half full' view of Central and Eastern Europe: in other words, much has been done, but much also remains to be achieved. A more robust, in-depth inquiry into the actual degree and nature of intra-European differences, in terms of the discipline's degrees of institutionalisation, still seems necessary. This impression of limited achievement is exacerbated by the analytical insights provided by the examination of the last decade or so since the so-called Great Recession, which raises concerns about the possible deinstitutionalisation of the discipline.

# 4 Political Science from the 'Great Recession' to Democratic Alteration: The Perils of Deinstitutionalisation

The essays covering the most recent period—mainly the decade following the so-called Great Recession that gradually emerged subsequent to the 2008 economic and fnancial crisis—tend to portray a darker picture than the light-grey landscape seen during the previous phase in the discipline's history. In that post-2008 period, the development of political science seemed to be not only limited but even actively contained (and sometimes even countered) within the broader context of political change in Europe. This raises the question of the possible deinstitutionalisation of political science—a notion that needs to be properly defned here. Leaving aside the case of Iceland, an island located in the richest part of Europe, and that of Malta for the reasons given above, the next section will focus on the Central-Eastern European zone.

### *4.1 Grasping Deinstitutionalisation*

The process of deinstitutionalisation, just like that of institutionalisation, merits specifc consideration given that despite a 'growing rise of interest in how institutions are created, we still know relatively little about [that] process' (Dacin & Dacin, 2008, p. 327). Deinstitutionalisation can be defned as 'the process by which the legitimacy of an established or institutionalized organizational practice erodes or discontinues' (Oliver, 1992, p. 564), that is, as merely 'the converse of institutionalization' (Philips & Ventresca, 2008, p. 374).

In an article published in the feld of management studies, Canadian scholar Christine Oliver suggests a basic scheme for understanding any deinstitutionalisation process. Deinstitutionalisation appears when the 'taken-for-granted-ness' of a given set of practices is called into question. She identifes factors of deinstitutionalisation as a set of 'pressures' falling into three distinct categories: the political, the functional, and the social. These three types of pressure operate as factors *generating* deinstitutionalisation. They are then reinforced by a fourth factor: this is organisational *entropy*, that is, the (counterintuitive) tendency of any institution to disaggregate rather than preserve its own stability, despite the institutional setting, due to actual behaviour that goes against the organisation's goals and principles. On the other hand, however, these pressures can be mitigated by a ffth factor consisting of organisational *inertia*. The maintenance of the status quo may be pursued for a variety of reasons (coordination requirements, the desire for predictability, psychological reluctance when faced with change) which favour institutional stability.

The combination of these factors tends to provoke the 'dissipation' ('a gradual deterioration in the acceptance and use of a particular institutionalized practice') or the 'rejection' ('a more direct assault on the validation of a long-standing tradition or established activity') of an institution (Oliver, 1992, p. 567). These factors establish the dynamics culminating in the deinstitutionalisation process itself, later translated into the 'erosion or discontinuity' of practice. The whole process can be summarised as shown in Fig. 9.1 below.

I do not intend to adopt this sequential framework as such since its ftness for our purposes is somewhat arguable. First of all, the way the main

**Fig. 9.1** Oliver's deinstitutionalisation process scheme. (Source: Oliver [1992, p. 567])

categories ('political',11 'functional',12 'social'13 pressures) were originally labelled is not always clear. Whilst these perhaps deliberately loose labels may aid a successful cross-organisation analysis (as was the author's original intent), this may become a problem insofar as only one particular type

11Political pressures essentially de-legitimise organizational practices. Internally (at the within-organization level), they include 'a growth in the criticality or representation of organizational members whose interests or beliefs confict with the status quo; increased pressures on the organization to adopt innovative practices'. Externally (at the environmental level) they include 'a reduction in the dependence on the institutional constituents that have encouraged or enforced continuing procedural conformity with their expectations' (Oliver, 1992, p. 568).

<sup>12</sup> 'Functional' pressures refer to 'technical or functional considerations that tend to compromise or raise doubts about the instrumental value of an institutionalized practice' (Oliver, 1992, p. 571). De-institutionalisation may be 'the consequence of changes to the perceived utility or technical instrumentality of these practices, rather than the result of interest mobilization or redistribution in organizational powers'. These changes are predicted 'to occur when institutional constituents in the environment withdraw the rewards associated with sustaining an institutionalized organizational activity; when social and economic criteria of organizational success begin to confict signifcantly with one another; and when the organization experiences an increase in its technical specifcity or goal clarity'. They may also be linked to 'environmental changes' when 'intensifed competition for resources and the emergence of dissonant information or unexpected events in the environment that directly challenge the advisability of sustaining an institutional activity'. The very sense of the institution is criticized on economic and technical grounds, rather than on 'political' grounds.

<sup>13</sup> 'Social' pressures refer to those where organizations 'are neither pro-active agents of deinstitutionalization nor centrally intent on abandoning or rejecting particular institutional traditions' (Oliver, 1992, p. 575). They include 'increasing normative fragmentation within an organization as a by-product of other organizational changes (increasing workforce diversity, high turnover…); disruptions to the organization's historical continuity (such as mergers); changes in state laws or societal expectations that prohibit or discourage the perpetuation of an institutional practice; and structural changes to the organization or the environment within which the organization resides that disaggregate collective norms and values' (Oliver, 1992, p. 575), for example geographical fragmentation.

of organisation, such as political science as an academic discipline, is concerned. Moreover, there is the risk that the categories may overlap. As we will see, something presented as a 'functional' pressure may be the reformulation of a 'political' pressure in disguise; the very same can be said about 'social' pressures, which need to be channelled through a political/ administrative decision-making actor or set of actors in order to become effective. As a consequence, whilst Oliver's contribution is a stimulating attempt to clarify the concept of deinstitutionalisation, and to disentangle its constitutive dimensions, her labels need to be rearranged.14 I will limit myself here to considering the generating factors of deinstitutionalisation in Central and Eastern Europe.

As far as 'causal' mechanisms of deinstitutionalisation are concerned, I suggest it is possible to identify a tentative, non-exhaustive set of factors that may be at work in relation to the discipline. This belief is based on a series of convergent observations set out in various chapters of the present work. They signal a number of diffculties political science is facing nowadays in the countries under scrutiny. While none of the authors actually suggests that the very existence of political science as such is at risk, they have gathered enough information suggesting that the discipline may be affected, at the very least, by 'antecedents of deinstitutionalization' (Oliver, 1992). This volume also shines some light on other important aspects which would also point to the deinstitutionalisation process analysed by Oliver. They comprise a series of pressures concerning policy reforms, and other direct ideological pressures within the context of a growth in 'illiberal' democracies.

#### *4.2 Functional Pressures: The Lack of Financial Resources*

Financial resources are indispensable if institutions are to work. In recent years many academic institutions have been faced with challenges in this

14The same can be said about the possibility of drawing a clear-cut line between internal (intra-organisational) and external (organisation-environment) levels. The extent to which an academic discipline can be considered as an organisational unit is not easy to grasp. In fact, an academic discipline does not take one single formal shape, especially when one considers all aspects of academic activity (teaching, research and the divulgation of research fndings among the general public, administrative services, etc.). On the contrary, it consists of a set of embedded actions and institutions whose organisational features vary across dimensions and from one national context to another. They are characterised by varying degrees of autonomy.

regard. However, an improvement accompanied the development of the discipline from the 1990s onwards. Basic domestic public funding was supplemented by the adoption of contract-based research through European programmes (e.g., Horizon, 2020 and its predecessor framework-programmes) and national programmes, either public (often), private, or a mix of both. This paved the way for more ambitious research programmes on the one hand, but it also prioritised competitive rules over the distributive principle on the other. In this game, the opportunities given to political scientists have been rather unevenly distributed since overall, Central and Eastern European scholars are more often participants in, rather than coordinators of, European projects. The 'discovery' of this new type of funding does not regard CEE only: in Western Europe as well, not all countries were familiar with these competitive schemes.

The so-called Great Recession created a situation of fnancial stress that affected many states, with higher education and research being particularly impacted by the consequent reduction in public spending: in fact, higher education and research rely heavily on public funding, as the COST national reports show. When this circumstance has not led to automatic budget reductions, it has nevertheless increased competition for funding. Again, this situation goes beyond the bounds of Central and Eastern Europe, where there have been many cases of cuts in funding, together with notable exceptions in some countries (Poland and Lithuania for instance) (EUA, 2017, 2020). Signs of short-time recovery were observed before the COVID-19 crisis hit the continent at the European level (EUA, 2020), albeit with considerable disparities among countries. It is too soon to gauge the real impact of the current pandemic (Autumn, 2020), although there are good reasons to be worried. The current situation further exemplifes the broader challenge faced by higher education and research. Marek Kwiek (2017) convincingly reminds us of the situation universities have been facing for years: they have moved gradually from an age of relative abundance in the post-war decades, to a situation of permanent austerity in which higher education and research is only one contender for public resources among many legitimate, powerful ones, especially as far as welfare state provisions (public health and pension systems) are concerned. As a consequence, in a game strongly infuenced by international organisations (the OECD, the World Bank, the IMF), the higher education sector cannot expect its needs to be automatically satisfed. The COVID-19 crisis, whose damaging effects are being tentatively contained by European states through massive funding, is likely to exacerbate this predicament. In turn, the consequences of this transformation are likely to have repercussions on the competition for resources within the academy. Despite the fact that a social science like political science has relatively limited needs compared to hard sciences, the sword of Damocles remains.

This constraining context is more fully understood when considering two other sources of pressures that the present authors have identifed: policy and political pressures.

### *4.3 Policy and Political Pressures: Why Political Science?*

I feel comfortable with dropping the notion of 'social pressure', which may sound too vague and fuzzy. I would prefer to talk about 'policy pressures', even though this is not an unproblematic label, and is proposed here in a tentative manner only. It aims to indicate the set of external rules that derive from the pressures coming (in part at least) from outside academia. These may refect, or be advocated in support of, societal needs. This regards, in particular, the growing need for political science, like other social sciences and the humanities, to prove its 'social utility', its capacity to provide students with the required knowledge and skills to enter the job market and its positive economic and social impact on markets and society as a whole. The very wording of the latter sentence illustrates the shift in focus of higher education and research in recent decades.

Several chapters of the present work shed light on the situation of political science in Central and Eastern Europe. The authors concerned do not take the discipline's appeal for students for granted. If political science was relatively successful at frst, it was for a series of reasons that included instrumental calculations. On the one hand, it may have benefted from a fashionable image and met students' desire to gain a better understanding of politics and society in the new pluralistic landscape. On the other hand, however, studying political science was seen as a way of obtaining a degree without too much diffculty. Demand was not that strong, given that Central and Eastern Europe has been a demographically depressed zone since the 1980s—with limited exceptions such as Poland and Lithuania (Adveev et al., 2011). Nonetheless, young people have been seen as an object of contention, and political science (along with other disciplines including law) has been accused of depriving certain sectors seen as key for the economy (the automotive industry for instance) of the necessary workforce. Hence the lobbying actions and higher education policy instruments designed to strengthen support for those sectors to which political science is seen as unable to contribute.

Such technical disputes should not be too sharply dissociated from the way the authors have addressed another issue, namely the fact that political science is targeted as a political inconvenience. They have documented the rise in ideological pressures refecting authoritarian trends that are affecting higher education and research as well. It has been suggested that the current period is marked by a global wave of 'autocratization' which has not spared Europe, affecting as it has Hungary and Poland frst and foremost (Sata & Karolewski, 2020), but also other areas of Central and Eastern Europe (Cianetti et al., 2018). This phenomenon has been largely fuelled by democratic erosion, that is, when leaders "legally access power and then gradually, but substantially, undermine democratic norms without abolishing key democratic institutions" (Lührmann & Lindberg, 2019, p. 1105). Academic freedom in research and teaching in general, and in political science in particular, is likely to become increasingly fragile in such a context. Several authors agree that this threat is not only a potential one. The attacks on political science have taken different forms in the 2010s but were not totally unprecedented. Sometimes these attacks have consisted in a frontal assault on political science as such, due to its alleged political commitments. Scientifc neutrality is alleged to be a cover up for propaganda through academic channels. For instance, the labelling of a party as populist, nationalist, or extremist, or of the state of the regime and its exposure to authoritarianism, becomes a pretext to criticize it. In other cases, societal issues are at stake, as shown by the way gender studies are considered and even counter-attacked. Sometimes the attacks are also of an indirect nature: instead of criticising academics on ideological grounds, the critical discourse undermines the relevance of disciplines such as political science, which are depicted as needless and ill-suited to satisfying the economic priorities of the job market. All the features that Albert O. Hirschman (1991) listed years ago in his analysis of reactionary discourse are recognisable here. Using Hirschman's terms, political science and similar disciplines would, respectively, render the economic dynamic of societies more fragile (jeopardy), weaken its underlying societal values (perversity), and appear as both useless and resource-consuming activity (futility). All these elements are likely to weaken several dimensions of the institutionalisation process identifed by Ilonszki in Chap. 2: they undermine the discipline's legitimacy from without, they question its autonomy, they make its identity more fragile; and this, in turn, could damage its stability and reproduction. All of these features could be seen as pointing to actual antecedents of deinstitutionalisation. However, they occur in a similar way to that in which authoritarian trends develop, that is gradually mirroring democratic erosion: the academic construction is attacked one piece at a time rather than suffering a massive shutdown. Is this situation specifc to Central and Eastern Europe? It is perhaps more a matter of intensity than of nature since Europe as a whole has shown signs of concern on that front (Paternotte & Verloo, 2020).

# 5 Conclusion

The picture emerging from our inquiry into the diversity of European political science, and in particular into its institutional settings, offers a more nuanced view of the discipline's development than was previously held. If the development of political science in Europe in the long run has been successful, this is only so to a limited extent. The state of the discipline cannot only be accounted for by examining the more privileged area of North-Western Europe. The exploration that the authors have made in this collection of essays offers a more realistic view of the state of political science. It tells us not only about its success but also about its limits and accompanying threats. Once again, it should be underlined that this task has been accomplished without fnancial support. The authors in question have managed to produce data notwithstanding the situation in which they found themselves characterised by the strikingly poor monitoring of the discipline in general. It can only be hoped that this book will have further contributed towards bridging the information gap in this feld, which at the present period in time could prove invaluable.

# References


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