## **Sustainable Development Goals Series**

# **Japan's Peacekeeping at a Crossroads**

Taking a Robust Stance or Remaining Hesitant?

Hiromi Nagata Fujishige Yuji Uesugi Tomoaki Honda

## Sustainable Development Goals Series

The **Sustainable Development Goals Series** is Springer Nature's inaugural cross-imprint book series that addresses and supports the United Nations' seventeen Sustainable Development Goals. The series fosters comprehensive research focused on these global targets and endeavours to address some of society's greatest grand challenges. The SDGs are inherently multidisciplinary, and they bring people working across different felds together and working towards a common goal. In this spirit, the Sustainable Development Goals series is the frst at Springer Nature to publish books under both the Springer and Palgrave Macmillan imprints, bringing the strengths of our imprints together.

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Hiromi Nagata Fujishige Yuji Uesugi • Tomoaki Honda

# Japan's Peacekeeping at a Crossroads

Taking a Robust Stance or Remaining Hesitant?

Hiromi Nagata Fujishige Aoyama Gakuin University Tokyo, Japan

Tomoaki Honda Chukyo University Nagoya, Japan

Yuji Uesugi Waseda University Tokyo, Japan

ISSN 2523-3084 ISSN 2523-3092 (electronic) Sustainable Development Goals Series ISBN 978-3-030-88508-3 ISBN 978-3-030-88509-0 (eBook) https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-88509-0

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*To the members of the International Peace Cooperation Study Group*

## Preface

We, the three coauthors of this book, do not necessarily confne the scope of our research interest to Japan's peacekeeping policy. Each of us has also worked in other issue areas, such as regional security in Asia, hybrid peacebuilding, and the security-development nexus. Nonetheless, it is also true that Japan's efforts for international peace and security have always been at the core of our common academic interests.

In particular, two of us, namely Fujishige and Uesugi, have traced this topic for nearly three decades, since the time of Japan's frst military dispatch in the 1990s. We both belong to what one might call the "frstgeneration academics" in the study of Japan's peacekeeping policy. We have a direct memory of the era when the overseas military dispatch was strictly prohibited and the national policy was drastically transformed to endorse it. Our frsthand experience of witnessing this paradigm shift has driven us to investigate Japan's peacekeeping policy.

One of the main incentives behind this book is to transfer our memories and experiences as the "frst generation" to the younger generations. For example, one of the coauthors of this book, Honda, belongs to the "second generation" that takes overseas military dispatch for granted. Moreover, in the future, the "third generation" will emerge: they will have no direct memory of a large-scale troop contribution to a UN mission, since such overseas military deployment *en masse* was terminated in 2017. It is the authors' sincere desire to write down what we have observed and pass it on to the younger generation.

More essentially, we are also motivated to publish this book because Japan's peacekeeping policy now stands at a crossroads. In its history of large-scale troop contributions from 1992 to 2017, Japan's peacekeeping policy had sought a quantitative expansion of its contribution, but it is obvious that this method is already outdated since the withdrawal of the engineering force from South Sudan in 2017. Why has this change occurred? What will be the new course ahead of us? We are facing numerous questions as the historical course of a quarter of a century of military deployment to UN peacekeeping operations draws to a close and we consider the new era beyond the termination of large-scale troop contributions.

This book has given us a perfect opportunity to scrutinize these questions. One thing we can say for sure is that recent changes of course in Japan's peacekeeping policy should be regarded within the global trend of international peacekeeping, although Japan still has its own national caveats. We would argue that this is not the mere revival of the old antimilitarism. Bearing this in mind, this book not only examines Japanese peacekeeping but also pays heed to the wider trend of international peacekeeping to offer a comparative point of view. In this regard, we hope and believe that this book will be useful not only for those who are interested in Japan's foreign/security policy but also for readers with an interest in international peacekeeping issues.

Tokyo, Japan Hiromi Nagata Fujishige Tokyo, Japan Yuji Uesugi Nagoya, Japan Tomoaki Honda

## Acknowledgments

This book is deeply indebted to a variety of earnest and generous sources of support. First of all, special thanks should be given to the members of the International Peace Cooperation Study Group. This is a unique professional gathering of more than 200 Japanese peacekeeping experts with a wide range of backgrounds: offcials from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of Defense, and the Cabinet Offce, military personnel, governmental and nongovernmental development aid workers, UN offcials, think-tank members, businessmen, and, of course, academics, including ourselves. The group was initially launched in 2005 to discuss the Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT), which was an attempt at civilmilitary cooperation in the international support of Afghanistan after the 9/11 terrorist attacks. Since then, the activities of the study group have continued for 17 years, while the focus of study has changed every few years. Likewise, the members change frequently. The line-up of administrative members has also changed from time to time. Among the three coauthors of this book, Uesugi is the only remaining founding member, while Fujishige joined in 2006 and Honda has attended since 2009.

It is an entirely voluntary group without any formal institution or funding, but this has allowed fexibility of this gathering. The lack of formality has contributed to the inclusion of professionals with different positions and backgrounds, especially encompassing both military and civilian members. The group has thus served not only for study purposes but also as an invaluable opportunity to develop the basis for civil-military cooperation in Japanese peacekeeping. The group holds meetings several times a year and some 20–30 professionals usually attend each time. Discussions and communications with the members have given us unmeasurable knowledge and deepened our understanding of the theories and practices of peacekeeping-related issues. We would never have been able to publish this book without the members' sincere and serious involvement in the group.

So far, the group has examined topics such as civil-military cooperation in statebuilding, Security Sector Reform (SSR) in peacebuilding, and the "All Japan" approach (the Japanese version of civil-military cooperation), and has published the outcomes of these joint studies as four books in Japanese. Among them, the book titled *Kokusai Heiwa Kyoryoku Nyumon* [*Introduction to International Peace Cooperation*], which was published by the Minerva Shobo in Kyoto in 2018, has direct relevance to this book. The 2018 book was published as a textbook, especially for undergraduate students, but it contains rich and extensive substance, covering 10 chapters and 17 columns, contributed by 16 authors in total.

While being proud of the quality of the 2018 book, we soon became aware of the necessity to update it. The 2018 book was drafted mostly in 2017, which was the year when the Japanese peacekeeping contingent withdrew from South Sudan, and it therefore hardly mentioned the subsequent developments and considerations after the withdrawal. With this motivation in mind, we decided to fully rewrite the 2018 book into an English academic book to include the latest updates to events and to share the outcome beyond Japan. For this purpose, we limited the number of authors of the new book to three in order to complete the rewriting process in English as soon as possible. During this process, we referred to numerous new sources and materials and restructured the organization of the book. As a result, it has been remodeled entirely as a new book. In the meantime, the coauthors of this book have learned a lot from the 2018 book and this learning has laid the foundation for the new book. Hence, we would like to express our gratitude to the contributors to the 2018 book.

We also owe much to the following individuals for their sincere assistance with this book. First, Masahiro Kurosaki, associate professor of National Defense Academy of Japan, provided specialist legal knowledge to help us to ensure the accuracy of the legal discussion in this book. Second, we also would like to thank Masayasu Tsuzuki, research fellow in Security Study Unit of Institute of Future Initiatives at the University of Tokyo (the former deputy counsellor, national security secretariat, cabinet secretariat, the Government of Japan), for helping us to deepen our understanding of Japan's legal system on peacekeeping. Third, Daiki Inoue, who expects to receive his frst degree from Hosei University (Tokyo) soon and to commence his postgraduate study from fall 2021 at Master in International Affairs program of Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies in Geneva, has not only been primarily in charge of editing this book but also assisted our research. He also made all tables and fgures inserted in this book. Fourth, Kazushige Kobayashi, from the Centre on Confict, Development and Peacebuilding of the Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies, Geneva, helped us to translate the titles of Japanese books/articles into English. Fifth, three undergraduate students of Aoyama Gakuen University (Tokyo), namely Makishi Kamimura, Risako Otsuka, and Michiha Yamamoto, also kindly assisted with editing this book. Our gratitude is also extended to our editors, Anne-Kathrin Birchley-Brun, Ruby Panigrahi, and others at Palgrave Macmillan/Spring Nature. We are also very grateful to the two anonymous reviewers of the book proposal. Their candid comments gave us important indications as to how to restructure this book. Last but not least, we also offer special thanks to Ann Williams and Farrah Hawana for making the language of this book more readable.

This book has been written under the extraordinarily challenging circumstances of the COVID-19 pandemic, which has necessarily affected the authors' ways of living and working, but we have negotiated this rocky road and reached the end, thanks to the various supports mentioned above. This reminds us of a famous aphorism, originating from Shakespeare's well-known work: "All's Well That Ends Well."

This book was supported by JSPS KAKENHI Grant Number 19H01461.

July 2021 Tokyo and Nagoya Hiromi Nagata Fujishige Yuji Uesugi Tomoaki Honda

## Praise for *Japan's Peacekeeping at a Crossroads*

"This carefully researched book offers fascinating insights into three puzzles: why Japanese governments expanded their contributions to UN peacekeeping since the early 1990s; why Tokyo withdrew its military engineers from South Sudan in 2017; and what this means for future (limited) Japanese engagement in UN and other peace operations."

—Stephen Baranyi, *University of Ottawa, Canada*

"This book is the most comprehensive review to date of Japan's post-Cold War peacekeeping history. It explains how Japan's postwar constitution, and the tensions between its domestic and international politics infuenced its peacekeeping policy. It should be essential reading for everyone who wants to understand Japan's contribution to UN peacekeeping."

—Cedric de Coning, *Norwegian Institute of International Affairs, Norway*

"Japan's Peacekeeping at a Crossroads is a timely examination of the trajectory of Japanese contributions in this area of global security. The volume analyses Japan's changing international strategic and domestic motivations to engage in peacekeeping. It takes a fresh and critical approach and flls an important gap in the extant literature."

—Christopher W. Hughes, *University of Warwick, UK*

## Contents



## About the Authors

**Hiromi Nagata Fujishige** is an associate professor at the School of International Politics, Economics and Communications of Aoyama Gakuin University, Tokyo, Japan. Fujishige holds a PhD from School of Oriental and African Studies (SOAS), University of London, on Japan's security policy. She is an expert in Japan's peacekeeping policy and has widely published in the feld. Along with the other authors, she has presided "Japan Peacekeeping Study Group," which consisted of more than 200 Japanese peacekeeping experts (e.g., diplomats and the other government offcials, the military offcers, the UN offcials, NGO workers, and academics) for nearly 15 years. She is working on the comparative study of Japanese and Canadian peacekeeping policies.

**Yuji Uesugi** is Professor of Confict Resolution and Peacebuilding at the School of International Liberal Studies and the Graduate School of International Culture and Communication Studies, Waseda University, Tokyo, Japan. Uesugi holds a PhD in Confict Resolution from the University of Kent at Canterbury. His felds of expertise and research interest include hybrid peacebuilding in Asia, UN peace operations, security sector reform, and regional security in the Asia-Pacifc.

**Tomoaki Honda** is an associate professor at the Faculty of Liberal Arts and Sciences at Chukyo University, Nagoya, Japan. Honda holds a PhD in Media and Governance from Keio University, Kanagawa, Japan. He specializes in Japan's foreign policymaking process, specifcally international peace cooperation policy. His book (in Japanese) titled *Seeking for Peacebuilding: The Challenges and Outcomes of Japan's Peacekeeping* (published in 2018) earned the Award of Excellent Book from Japan Association for International Security.

## Abbreviations




## List of Figures


## List of Tables


## Introduction: The Pursuit of "Integration" and "Robustness" in Japan's Peacekeeping Policy

## 1 The Gaps Behind the Discontinuity in Japan's Peacekeeping Policy

This book explores Japan's peacekeeping policy, with particular focus on its military contribution to United Nations Peacekeeping Operations (UNPKOs). It examines the evolution of Japan's peacekeeping contributions from the early postwar period until the early 2020s. It was nearly three decades ago that the *Act on Cooperation with United Nations Peacekeeping Operations and Other Operations* or the Peacekeeping Operations (PKO) Act was enacted. The law enabled the Government of Japan (GoJ) to contribute personnel from the Self-Defense Forces (SDF), Japan's national armed forces, to the UNPKOs. The SDF consists of three forces: the Ground Self-Defense Force (GSDF), which is equivalent to an army; the Maritime Self-Defense Force (MSDF), equivalent to a navy; and the Air Self-Defense Force (ASDF), which is an air force. In this book, frequent reference will be made to the Japan Engineering Groups (JEG) that is, the military engineering corps in the GSDF.

Although Japan has advocated United Nations (UN)-centrism as one of the three pillars of its postwar diplomacy (MoFA, 1958; Kuriyama, 2016, pp. 21–23),1 it was initially very reluctant to deploy its personnel, especially SDF members, to a UNPKO (Shoji, 2015; Kato, 2020; Fujishige, 2017). Despite obtaining UN membership in 1956, Japan had never contributed troops to any UNPKOs until 1992, when the PKO Act was established. The new legislation allowed the GoJ to make its frst personnel contribution, including the SDF contingent, to the United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC) from 1992 to 1993. Japan has since deployed troops to various places within the UN framework, including Mozambique, the Golan Heights (Syria), East Timor (Timor-Leste), Haiti, and South Sudan (Cabinet Offce, n.d.-a). However, since the withdrawal of some 300 engineering troops from the United Nations Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS) in May 2017, Japan has not contributed any new SDF contingents to a UNPKO in recent years, aside from a small number of staff offcers remaining in South Sudan (Cabinet Offce, 2015, n.d.-a). Why has Japan discontinued its quarter-century history (1992–2017) of military contribution to UNPKOs around the globe? Is there any possibility that it will be resumed?

To respond to these questions, we will pay special heed to understanding Japan's motivation to catch up with the trends of "integration" and "robustness" in the UNPKOs. At the outset, Japanese peacekeepers embarked on the new enterprise as cautious novices, heavily preoccupied with satisfying national legal caveats. Through frsthand feld experience, however, they gradually realized that there were gaps between their domestic legal requirements and the on-the-ground reality of UNPKOs. Following its involvement with the UNTAC, Japan's peacekeeping policy was primarily concerned with reducing these gaps, with the objective of catching up to the "global" standard of behaviors in UNPKOs. Underneath Japanese policy lies a basic assumption that more personnel (military) contribution is necessarily more desirable (The IPC Panel, 2002). Bearing this in mind, Japan keenly sought to catch up with the early 1990s international trend to expand the latitude for "more active" military contribution.

While Japan was chasing these trends in recent decades, the quality and purposes of UNPKOs changed dramatically and quickly. A Japanese international law scholar noted, "There has emerged a diremption between the assumed model of participation in the UNPKO under the Japanese statutes and a new vision for peacekeeping, which has been sought by the UN after the Cold War" (Sakai, 2016, p. 21). This transformation made it very diffcult for the GoJ to continue to follow the trend of UNPKOs, which have been increasingly deployed in dangerous places and more frequently accompanied by the use of force. Presumably, this trend led to the termination of Japan's troop contribution to South Sudan in 2017, although the GoJ has never confrmed its true motivation (Cabinet Secretariat et al., 2017). It also seems very unlikely that the GoJ will restart such contributions, at least in the foreseeable future. To dissect the question of what has brought Japanese peacekeeping to an impasse, we will carefully examine how Japan's efforts to follow the international tides of "integration" and "robustness" have shaped its peacekeeping policy over the last few decades and why Japan's challenges have reached their limit. Finally, we will briefy consider the change of course in Japan's peacekeeping policy after the 2017 suspension of troop contributions.

## 2 The Contemporary "Integration" and "Robustness" Trends in UNPKOs

#### *2.1 Classic Peacekeeping*

Before we discuss Japan's peacekeeping policy, let us provide an overview of the recent evolution of "integration" and "robustness" as dominant trends within UNPKOs. Traditionally, classic UNPKOs originated in the Cold War era and were mostly carried out by unarmed or light-armed military personnel playing only limited roles, such as monitoring ceasefres between states. Although the UN Charter includes no mention of UNPKOs, the United Nations Secretary-General (UNSG) Dag Hammarskjöld, who held offce from 1953 to 1961, once defned classic peacekeeping as an operation of "UN Charter Chapter Six and Half" that is, a measure that falls between a pacifc settlement under Chapter VI and military sanctions under Chapter VII (Bring, 2011). In 1958, Hammarskjöld also identifed the three principles of classic peacekeeping (UNSG, 1958), which would later be conceptualized as the classic version of three principles: consent from *all* concerned parties, neutrality, and the use of force only for self-defense purposes.

#### *2.2 The Rise of "Integration" in the UNPKOs*

After the end of the Cold War, the increase of civil wars radically transformed the nature of UNPKOs, giving rise to two distinctive features: "integration" and "robustness." On the one hand, the UNPKOs became increasingly involved in the reconstruction of confict-affected countries under the statebuilding mandate, authorized by a United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR). Rebuilding collapsed statehoods considerably expanded the range of UNPKOs' duties, which soon covered not only traditional cease-fre monitoring (peacekeeping) but also diverse civilian-oriented tasks, such as election observation, support for refugee repatriation, and institution support for local governments (peacebuilding). By encompassing various issue felds, the comprehensive UN missions now cover both peacekeeping, primarily conducted by uniformed personnel (military and police), and peacebuilding, mainly carried out by civilians. This book refers to the trend of uniting peacekeeping and peacebuilding as "integration," in which civil-military cooperation has been developed.

The origin of "integration" can be dated back to the multidimensional (or multifunctional) peace operations in the early 1990s (Inoue, 2018, pp. 25–26; Doyle et al., 1997). As typically seen in the case of UNTAC, multidimensional missions included various activities, ranging from the military's truce monitoring and the UN police's provision of advice to the local police, to civilian activities such as election supervision. Around the same time, UNSG Boutros Boutros-Ghali advocated the concept of "postconfict peacebuilding" in his controversial policy paper on peacekeeping reform, widely known as *An Agenda for Peace* (UNSG, 1992). The multidimensional UNPKOs in the 1990s, however, soon revealed faws, such as a narrow concentration on elections, infexibility in scheduling, and weak coordination mechanisms. To overcome these shortcomings, the concept of "integration" appeared in the 2000 *Brahimi Report* (UNSG, 2000), the highly infuential peacekeeping reform recommendations written by UNSG Kof Annan's advisory group chaired by the Algerian former Minister of Foreign Affairs Lakhdar Brahimi.

The prototype for an integrated mission was embodied in the United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET) from 1999 to 2002. In line with the idea of "integration," UNTAET was assigned comprehensive mandates, encompassing a wide range of civilianled peacebuilding activities (e.g., police and judicial reforms, institution building, election monitoring, and infrastructure development), as well as traditional peacekeeping duties conducted by both the military and the police. In particular, it was emphasized that peacekeeping and peacebuilding efforts should be integrated into a unifed scope of operations. Following this logic, the prefx "post-confict" was removed from Boutros-Ghali's term "post-confict peacebuilding." It is now simply called "peacebuilding" to indicate the need to embark on it in parallel with peacekeeping. In 2005, the United Nations Peacebuilding Commission was established to improve the practice of peacebuilding (UNDPO, n.d.-c), further promoting the trend of "integration."

From the mid-2000s onward, it became common to describe the newly established UNPKOs as "Integrated Missions," as seen in the case of the United Nations Integrated Mission in Timor-Leste (UNMIT), established in 2006. These integrated missions attach high value to coordination, since "integration" inherently involves a multiplicity of actors. This trend was typifed by the rising focus on the "One-UN" approach since the mid-2000s to reduce silos among various agencies under the UN framework (United Nations, n.d.). Moreover, the conception of "integration" covers not only the UN agencies but also various external actors, such as humanitarian and development agencies, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), and business and local civil societies. To promote smooth coordination, the Special Representative of the Secretary-General (SRSG), who is the head of each UNPKO on site, is now granted more authority (de Coning, 2010).

Parallel to the rise of "integration," the concept of "robustness" has also emerged, encouraging peacekeepers to apply more determined, highintensity use of force under Chapter VII of the UN Charter. With the increase in civil wars after the Cold War, a cease-fre agreement is easily jeopardized, and lingering violence often steals the lives of ordinary citizens. To address this issue, the aforementioned policy paper, *An Agenda for Peace*, proposed another new concept in 1992: "peace enforcement." This meant that when there was outright aggression, peacekeepers were allowed to take the use of force beyond the self-defense purposes delineated under the UN Charter Chapter VII, even without consent from the concerned parties (UNSG, 1992, para. 44). The United Nations Operation in Somalia II (UNOSOM II) in the early 1990s was a representative case of such "peace enforcement." However, it ultimately resulted in failure after UN peacekeepers were involved in hostilities against indigenous militias.

#### *2.3 The Rise of "Robustness" in the UNPKOs*

Following the fasco in Somalia, the momentum for "robustness" temporarily slowed, as Boutros-Ghali's follow-up policy paper to *An Agenda for Peace* dejectedly admitted the failure of his previous ambitious initiative (UNSG, 1995). In the mid-1990s, atrocities against humanity, such as the genocide in Rwanda in 1994 and massacre in Srebrenica in Bosnia and Herzegovina in 1995, reaffrmed the necessity for more defnitive use of force, especially to protect civilians. From the late 1990s onward, armed enforcement measures authorized under Chapter VII of the UN Charter would often be "outsourced" to (a) voluntary state(s) for the purpose of civilian protection, which is typically referred to as "humanitarian intervention." Meanwhile, the UN itself also gradually invented a milder form of enforcement action, namely the concept of "robust" peacekeeping, which typically goes hand-in-hand with the notion of "Protection of Civilians" (PoC). "Robust" peacekeeping is entitled to resolute use of force under the UN Charter's Chapter VII, but it takes on more modest characteristics in comparison with peace enforcement.

In the 2000s, the rise of "robustness" inevitably remodeled the three classic principles of UNPKOs into a new form (Shinoda, 2018, pp. 49–50). In 2008, the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (UNDPKO), which is now called the UN Department of Peace Operations (UNDPO), and the UN Department of Field Support (UNDFS), which is currently2 called the UN Department of Operational Support (UNDOS), published a joint policy paper widely known as *The Capstone Doctrine* to confrm these changes (UNDPKO & UNDFS, 2008). First, "robust" peacekeeping requires consent from *major* concerned parties. It falls between the requirements of classic peacekeeping, which demands consent from *all* concerned parties, and peace enforcement, which requires *no* consent. This implies the existence of those who do not accept the UN's presence in a host nation, especially at the local level. The UNDPO notes, "Universality of consent becomes even less probable in volatile settings, characterized by the presence of armed groups not under the control of any of the parties, or by the presence of other spoilers" (UNDPO, n.d.-a), meaning that contemporary peacekeepers are often supposed to work under hostile and unstable conditions.

Second, the concept of "impartiality" was also introduced, implying that the UNPKO is no longer neutral in the sense that it keeps away from any warring parties equally. Rather, the UNDPO compares the roles of peacekeepers today to those of referees in sports because they "will penalize infractions, so a peacekeeping operation should not condone actions by the parties that violate the undertakings of the peace process or the international norms and principles that a United Nations peacekeeping operation upholds" (UNDPO, n.d.-a). In other words, "robust" peacekeeping would take a decisive attitude against those who violate the UN's principles and rules, typically expressed in UNSCRs and peace agreements.

Third, peacekeepers tasked with the new mandate of "robust" peacekeeping are often allowed to "use all necessary means" under Chapter VII of the UN Charter. The "robust" peacekeepers are frequently allowed to use force themselves in order to "deter forceful attempts to disrupt the political process, protect civilians under imminent threat of physical attack, and/or assist the national authorities in maintaining law and order" (UNDPO, n.d.-b). Nevertheless, the use of force in "robust" peacekeeping is limited only to the tactical level for the purposes of self-defense and defense of the mandate.

Theoretically, "robust" peacekeeping is clearly differentiated from peace enforcement, which tasks the use of force at strategic level on the condition that is authorized by the United Nations Security Council (UNSC). Being situated between classic peacekeeping and peace enforcement, the nature of "robust" peacekeeping is sometimes depicted as being between "forceful" and "non-forceful" measures (Kiriyama, 2019, p. 149). In actuality, however, it is highly dubious whether such a strict distinction can be made, especially between "robust" peacekeeping and peace enforcement. Since the armed peacekeepers would need to respond to the changing degree of violence on site, it would be extremely diffcult for them, when facing imminent danger, to judge whether their conduct falls within the scope of "robust" peacekeeping or exceeds it.

Thus, in recent years, UNPKOs abandoned the stance of noninterference and began to virtually impose peacekeepers' involvement in armed conficts in order to implement the UNPKO goals or, more specifcally, for the purpose of PoC. In 1999, the United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMIL), which was tasked with a limited PoC mandate under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, served as a test case for "robust" peacekeeping (UNSC, 1999). The UNAMIL mandate was followed by the 2000 *Brahimi Report*, which confrmed the global shift toward "robustness" in peacekeeping. From the 2000s onward, most newly established UNPKOs have been found in Africa, such as in Liberia, Côte d'Ivoire, the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), South Sudan, and Mali (UNDPO, n.d.-e). These operations have been characterized by "robustness," increasing the frequency of the use of force, especially for the purpose of defense of the mandate, and exposing peacekeepers to higher risk. As a result, in the twenty-frst century, UNPKOs have seen an acute rise in fatalities, not only among civilians but also among uniformed personnel (Henke, 2018), as the *Cruz Report* warned in 2017 (dos Santos Cruz et al., 2017).

Inevitably, skepticism emerged concerning the excessive emphasis on "robust" peacekeeping even in the professional and academic circles that were close to the UN, most famously represented by the High-Level Independent Panel on Peace Operations (HIPPO), which was commissioned by UNSG Ban Ki-moon and chaired by José Manuel Ramos-Horta, the former president and prime minister of East Timor. The outcome of their examination was published in 2015 as the *HIPPO Report*, which highlighted the limits of a military approach and instead emphasized the supremacy of politics in confict resolution (UNSG et al., 2015). Nevertheless, the *HIPPO Report* also reaffrmed the necessity of forceful measures for the purpose of PoC, refecting the bitter truth of the recent UNPKOs.

One could say that "integration" and "robustness" are two sides of the same coin. Both schemes have evolved to address the *problematique* of confict-affected countries. From a practical perspective, however, they have developed distinct approaches. On the one hand, "integration" is a more civilian-oriented approach that has boosted civil-military collaboration, combining peacekeeping and peacebuilding efforts. On the other hand, "robustness" has encouraged bold, intensive use of force to protect civilians and the peacekeepers themselves under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, albeit only for purposes of self-defense and the defense of the mandate.

## 3 Japan's Setbacks in Pursuit of "Integration" and "Robustness"

From the 1990s onward, as seen earlier, the nature of UNPKOs had gradually transformed into a complex aggregation of "integration" and "robustness" (Uesugi, 2018, pp. 5–6; Fujishige, 2018, pp. 230–232). This inevitably widened the gap between the international direction of UNPKOs and the domestic legal framework for Japan's peacekeeping policy, which was under strict legal and political constraints. The discrepancy motivated Japan to chase the trends of "integration" and "robustness." Under the frm constitutional ban on the use of force, Japan was unable to fully conform to the international trend for "robustness." However, it slowly and cautiously relaxed the requirement for the use of weapons, as seen in the three amendments to the PKO Act in 1998, 2001, and 2015 (Cabinet Offce, n.d.-b). These revisions relatively expanded the permitted range for "the use of weapons" by SDF peacekeepers (the PKO Act makes a clear distinction between "use of force" and "use of weapons"—for more details, see Chap. 2).

A series of amendments fnally resulted in the addition of a partial security duty, commonly known as the "coming-to-aid" duty (*kaketsuke-keigo*), which was newly included in the amendment to the PKO Act in 2015 (see Chaps. 2, 3, 4, and 8).3 Law was revised as part of the omnibus Legislation for Peace and Security (hereafter, Peace and Security Legislation), which included amendments to ten existing laws, as well as the enactment of a new law. Even though the addition of the "coming-to-aid" duty was a step forward, representing a qualitative change from the previous hesitation, Japanese peacekeepers are still considerably restricted and unable to exercise full-fedged "robustness."

To meet the trend of "integration," meanwhile, the GoJ had become keener to utilize the merit of its logistic support capability, especially with respect to the JEG. The GoJ dispatched the JEG as part of their frst dispatch of troops to UNTAC, because the original PKO Act prohibited the SDF from assuming a security-related role. As the JEG's high-quality work gradually gained a good reputation within the UN, the GoJ began to regard this engineering capability with pride, recognizing it as a valuable asset to compensate for its otherwise low-profle presence in securityrelated works (Fujishige, 2021). Meanwhile, in recent years, there has been increasing attention to the utility of engineering capacity in the UNPKOs, not only to support statebuilding but also to facilitate the UN's activities: for example, to improve local transportation through road restoration and to prepare accommodation for the UN peacekeepers. Japan's increasing self-confdence in its engineering capacity corresponds well with this international tendency (Boutellis & Smith, 2014; Williams, 2005).

Later, to maximize the advantage of its engineering capability, the "All Japan" approach, which is the Japanese way of civil-military cooperation, gradually evolved. More specifcally, it combines the peacekeeping efforts by the SDF personnel with Japan's Offcial Development Assistance (ODA) to provide direct aid to local populations. The GoJ was very eager to utilize the merit of the JEG, especially in combination with the "All Japan" approach (Uesugi et al., 2016), because it complemented Japan's economic and technological strength and was recognized as a useful substitute for its limitation in "robustness." For this reason, the GoJ focused more on "integration," through which they could make use of their high-quality engineering capability, while also concurrently chasing the trend of "robustness" to a limited extent.

Despite Japan's attempt to follow the trends of both "integration" and "robustness," the reality of UNPKOs has changed much more rapidly and radically. First, the number of UN missions with a "statebuilding" mandate, which is most suitable for the "All Japan" approach, has been greatly reduced during the last decade or so. At this moment, among existing UNPKOs, only the United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) is primarily focused on statebuilding. However, UNMIK only has limited functions, especially concentrating on police roles, because it is being operated in close partnership with the Kosovo Force (KFOR), which is run by the member states of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) (UNDPO, n.d.-d). Meanwhile, most of the recently established UNPKOs, especially in Africa, such as in Mali and the DRC, have been tasked with the PoC mandate. This changed focus from statebuilding to PoC in UNPKOs has made it extremely diffcult for the GoJ to fnd a suitable destination to utilize their engineering capacity and employ the "All Japan" approach.

The GoJ attempted to overcome this thorny problem in the deployment to South Sudan by intermingling the measures for "integration" and "robustness" within the same scope of JEG duties. Since 2012, the JEG has joined UNMISS mainly to undertake civil engineering works under its statebuilding mandate, predominantly in combination with the "All Japan" approach. Given the outbreak of *de facto* civil war at the end of 2013, however, the UNSC switched UNMISS's mandate from statebuilding to PoC. Meanwhile, in the second half of the 2000s, the GoJ sought to expand the allowed range of SDF peacekeepers' use of weapons in the pursuit of "robustness" (see Chap. 3) by fnally adding a limited security role, namely the "coming-to-aid" duty, to the amended PKO Act in 2015 (see Chap. 4). The GoJ then added the "coming-to-aid" duty as a part of the JEG's duty in November 2016. Although "coming-to-aid" duty had been included in the PKO Act a year earlier, it was considered to be a highly demanding assignment that concurrently implied two very different roles for the JEG—that is, construction work in line with the "integration" mandate alongside a minimal security task as a partial adaptation to "robustness."

This attempt ultimately resulted in failure when the GoJ suddenly withdrew the JEG in May 2017, only six months after the frst assignment of the "coming-to-aid" duty. Why did the GoJ abandon its concurrent pursuit of the two duties assigned to the JEG in the UNMISS? The GoJ has kept silent about the true intention behind its withdrawal. Presumably, however, the disclosure of previously hidden JEG daily reports, which had mentioned the *de facto* fghting in South Sudan, triggered the decision to withdraw. If fghting actually occurred on site, this could violate the stipulation of the PKO Act and eventually the constitutional ban on the use of force. However, the truth may be much more complicated. This issue will be investigated in depth in Chaps. 8 and 9.

## 4 The Widespread Hesitation in the Global North Toward Personnel Contribution

To explain the reason behind the sudden withdrawal from South Sudan, some might view the termination of the contribution of the SDF contingent simply as a retreat to Japan's long-established reluctance in military affairs (Tatsumi, 2017). We would take a different view, however, arguing that the withdrawal should be understood in context and beyond mere reversion to anti-militarism. More importantly, the cessation of troop deployment needs to be considered in the context of the changing division of labor between the Global North and the Global South in recent years. Indeed, not only Japan but also most of the Global North, including traditional "UNPKO-friendly" countries such as Canada, have become increasingly hesitant to contribute their troops to UNPKOs, especially as large-scale contingents. In the meantime, the majority of UN peacekeepers today are sourced from the Global South, such as Ethiopia, Nepal, and Rwanda (UNDPO, n.d.-b). Japan's suspension of its military contribution should be regarded as being in line with widespread hesitation among the Global North countries, rather than as a phenomenon peculiar only to Japan.

With the mounting danger in recent UNPKOs, countries in the Global North have shifted gear by reducing or terminating their troop contributions, and instead, are beginning to search for alternative measures. In the frst half of the 1990s, for example, the United States (US) made large troop contributions, mostly to Somalia and Bosnia and Herzegovina. At the apex of its contribution in 1993, the US deployed more than 4000 personnel abroad (UNDPO, n.d.-b). In the mid-1990s, however, the US sharply reduced the size of its troop contributions to a dozen personnel at most. From 1999, it further shrank this scale to the deployment of only a handful of personnel. It has contributed no troops since May 2017 (UNDPKO, 2017), which happened to coincide with Japan's withdrawal of the JEG from South Sudan. In the meantime, since 2005, the Americans have provided a huge amount of fnancial aid to train peacekeepers worldwide under the framework of the Global Peace Operations Initiative (GPOI) (US Department of State, n.d.). For example, the GPOI has sponsored the Khaan Quest, which provides training to peacekeepers from around the world. More than 30 countries participated in the most recent Khaan Quest, held in 2019 (US Embassy in Mongolia, 2019). Likewise, Canada has scaled down its military contribution considerably but has sought alternatives, for example, providing air transportation in support of the UNPKOs in Africa.

As seen above, reluctance to contribute personnel, especially large-scale troops, to UNPKOs has become a common feature in the Global North. The inverse relationship between the decrease in personnel commitments and the increase of danger in the recent UNPKOs will be further discussed in Chap. 9. We, therefore, regard the discontinuity of Japan's troop deployment in this global context, rather than as a revival of its old antimilitarism. Likewise, Japan and the other states in the Global North share a common agenda in seeking alternative ways to compensate for the reduced personnel contribution to UNPKOs. We will touch upon this issue in Chap. 9 while summarizing Japan's recent efforts since the withdrawal of the JEGs from South Sudan in 2017.

## 5 The Structure of the Book

In this book, we will focus mostly on Japan's military contribution to UNPKOs, although we will extend our consideration to review the deployment of personnel in contexts other than the UNPKOs where necessary. The book consists of eight chapters. Following this introductory chapter, Chap. 2 will present an overview of the historical course of Japan's peacekeeping from the early postwar era to 1992, when the PKO Act was established. In the frst half, it will provide a brief account of the traditional hesitation toward overseas military deployment, while the second half will be dedicated to clarifying why and how the 1992 PKO Act was enacted against the *de facto* national ban on overseas military dispatch. Chapter 3 will examine the evolution of Japan's peacekeeping policy from 1992 to 2012, immediately before the return of Prime Minister Shinzo Abe for his second premiership. The chapter will review Japan's experiences in the UNPKOs and in non-UN operations. It will then set out how Japan sought to catch up with both "robust" peacekeeping and "integration" by 2012. Chapter 4 will examine the more recent developments under the second Abe administration, with a particular focus on the period from 2012 to 2017.4 We will pay special attention to Prime Minister Abe's ambitious reforms in security policy, such as the 2015 Peace and Security Legislation, since this has changed the course of Japan's peacekeeping.

The next four chapters will be dedicated to examining the major cases of Japan's military contribution to the UNPKOs, namely Cambodia, East Timor, Haiti, and South Sudan. These examples have been selected in light of their relevance to Japan's efforts to conform to the trends of "integration" and "robustness." Chapter 5 will focus on its participation in UNTAC, which was Japan's frst military contribution since the early 1990s. Here we will see how the GoJ, as well as Japanese peacekeepers, began to recognize the gaps between their national legal system and the current shape of UNPKOs. Chapter 6 will address the case of East Timor from 2002 to 2004 to see how the "All Japan" approach emerged in the feld alongside recognition of the need for more security-oriented tasks. Chapter 7 will mainly examine the military deployment to Haiti from 2010 to 2013. Here we will examine how the "All Japan" approach was promoted under conditions of complex crisis, impeded by both natural disaster and armed confict. Chapter 8 will examine the case of UNMISS from 2012 to 2017 to see how the "All Japan" approach was further refned in the deployment to the young nation of South Sudan. It will outline how the second Abe administration tried to unite "integration" (construction work) and "robust peacekeeping" (the "coming-to-aid" duty) in the unifed scope of JEG duties, albeit only to a limited extent. Finally, Chap. 8 will briefy examine recent developments after the withdrawal of the JEG from South Sudan, especially in comparison with the trends of the other states in the Global North. Chapter 9 will wrap up discussions by tracing the quarter-century evolution of Japan's peacekeeping, with special attention to the concepts of "integration" and "robustness," as well as to Japan's search for a new direction after the withdrawal of the JEG from UNMISS in 2017. This book will conclude by drawing attention to possible future issues.

### *5.1 Summary of Chap. 1*

This introductory chapter has begun by setting out the research questions: why has Japan's troop contribution been discontinued since the withdrawal of the engineering unit from South Sudan in 2017? Is there any possibility that Japan will resume its contribution? We hypothesize that it is very unlikely that Japan will restart its troop contribution to the UNPKOs; however, this should be regarded not as the revival of traditional anti-militarism but rather as being in line with the common hesitation among Global North countries toward such personnel contribution. To support this hypnotical argument, the chapter has introduced the concepts of "integration" and "robustness" in the recent trends of UNPKOs. The former denotes the increasing emphasis on civil-military cooperation, especially to support statebuilding, while the latter encourages a "robust" use of force by peacekeepers, particularly for the purpose of PoC mandates. Japan attempted to follow these international trends, but the changes occurred much more quickly in the UNPKOs. This made it very diffcult for Japan to pursue these trends under various national caveats and resulted in the withdrawal of its troops in 2017.

## Notes


ministers six times in total. When he resigned in September 2020, he was presiding over his fourth cabinet with the second reshuffing. However, this book refers the entire period from Abe's return (December 2012) to his second resignation (September 2020) as the second Abe government (or administration), since his reign continued seamlessly during this period of time.

## References (In English)


troops. United Nations. https://peacekeeping.un.org/sites/default/fles/ may17\_4.pdf


#### References (In Japanese)


**Open Access** This chapter is licensed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/ by/4.0/), which permits use, sharing, adaptation, distribution and reproduction in any medium or format, as long as you give appropriate credit to the original author(s) and the source, provide a link to the Creative Commons licence and indicate if changes were made.

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## The Historical Background to Japan's Peacekeeping Policy from the Early Postwar Era to the Establishment of the PKO Act 1945–1992

## 1 The Taboo Against the SDF's Deployment to the UNPKOs During the Postwar Era

## *1.1 The Rise of Anti-militarism and the Controversial Birth of the SDF in 1954*

Since the Cold War era, the GoJ has attached much value to its relationship with the UN (Tanaka, 1997, pp. 207–201), but personnel contribution to the UNPKOs was not realized until the early 1990s. Behind this reluctance was a climate of deep-rooted anti-militarism in postwar Japan (Sado, 2015, 2017). Soon after the end of the war, Japan was demilitarized. In late 1945, the US-led Supreme Commander of Allied Forces, which occupied Japan after World War II, disbanded the Imperial Japanese Army and Navy almost completely (Yamagata, 2020).1

In 1947, the new constitution, or the Constitution of Japan (hereafter, "the Constitution"), which came into effect in 1947, institutionalized Japan's demilitarization. Notably, Article 9 laid the foundation for Japan's anti-militarism after World War II:2

Article 9 (1) Aspiring sincerely to an international peace based on justice and order, the Japanese people forever renounce war as a sovereign right of the nation and the threat or use of force as means of settling international disputes.

(2) In order to accomplish the aim of the preceding paragraph, land, sea, and air forces, as well as other war potential, will never be maintained. The right of belligerency of the state will not be recognized.

Prime Minister of Japan and His Cabinet (1947)

First, Article 9 (1) declares that Japan will "renounce war as a sovereign right of the nation and the threat or use of force as means of settling international disputes." For this purpose, Article 9 (2) stipulates that "war potential will never be maintained." From these clauses, it was unclear whether Japan had relinquished even the right of national self-defense, although this was authorized by Article 51 of the UN Charter.

In the early postwar era, however, Article 9 was generally understood as the complete demilitarization of Japan, which meant that postwar Japan would not retain any armaments even for the purpose of national selfdefense. This view seemed credible, since Prime Minister Shigeru Yoshida (1946), a famous conservative politician,3 clearly denied Japan's right of national self-defense. Immediately after the promulgation of the Constitution, according to Japanese historian Takamine Kawashima (1997), a signifcant proportion of the Japanese population was initially perplexed or unsupportive of this extreme policy of Japan's demilitarization. By the 1950s, however, Article 9 gradually took deep root in Japan's political culture, nurturing the inclination toward anti-militarism—that is, a very strong aversion against the military as well as against war.

Behind the gradual rise of anti-militarism, a hidden rearmament was in progress. In 1950, the US government suddenly ordered the GoJ to rearm itself because most of the US occupation forces now had to be relocated to the Korean Peninsula to cope with the outbreak of the Korean War. This resulted in Japan's surreptitious rearmament under the guise of the "National Police Reserve (NPR)" (Kowalski, 2013; Kusunoki, 2017). From the perspective of its organizational structure, it appeared obvious that the NPR was an armed force, but Yoshida (1950) insisted that it was a police force. This made it unclear whether Japan was rearmed or not. To respond to continuing pressure from the US for a more substantial rearmament, the GoJ remodeled the NPR into the National Safety Forces in 1952 and then upgraded it to the SDF in 1954. Now it seemed certain that the SDF was indeed capable of national self-defense. If so, the Constitution must have entitled Japan to the right of national self-defense, but Yoshida kept this nebulous. Such an ambiguous situation necessarily raised doubt as to whether the creation of the SDF was compatible with the Constitution.

### *1.2 Admitting the Constitutionality of the Right of National Self-Defense*

This problem was resolved in December 1954, fve months after the establishment of the SDF, because the new government under Prime Minister Yukio Hatoyama, another infuential conservative politician, changed the interpretation of the Constitution. The Hatoyama government admitted Japan's right of national self-defense and also declared the constructional legitimacy of the SDF (Omura, 1954). Even after this, however, the skepticism persisted as to the legitimacy of the SDF, combined with widespread hatred against the military and war. The left-wing parties, such as the Japan Socialist Party (JSP) and the Japan Communist Party (JCP), utilized the public aversion against the SDF to mobilize political support for themselves (Hara, 2000; Tachibana, 1983).4 As a result, these antimilitary parties considerably restricted the range of SDF roles in the postwar era.

The Hatoyama government's announcement in December 1954 also clarifed the allowed range for the use of force by the SDF. Secretary-General of Defense Sei'ichi Omura (1954) made the following statement at the House of Representatives (the Lower House):

[T]he Constitution does not deny [Japan's] right of national self-defense. […] [T]he Constitution renounces war but does not renounce resistance through national self-defense. […]. Upon facing an armed attack to our country, the use of force as a means to defend national territory does not violate the Constitution.

This new government's offcial standpoint rests on Article 51 of the UN Charter, which entitles each sovereign state to the right to national self-defense while strictly banning the "use of force" for any other purpose (UN Article 51). Based on this clause, the Hatoyama government now announced that the Constitution permits the minimal use of force only when Japan's territory is under armed attack (Mori, 2019, pp. 2–3). On the other hand, the use of force for any other purpose is strictly forbidden (Hayashi, 1961). The GoJ still maintains this offcial interpretation today.

This rather simple offcial doctrine did not cause a particular problem during the postwar era, since no such case arose in which the SDF members actually faced the need to use arms for anything other than national self-defense. Once the GoJ began dispatching the SDF abroad from the 1990s onward, however, this simplistic stipulation encountered new questions, for example, as to whether the SDF's acts of protecting themselves would constitute the use of force, banned by the Constitution. This necessitated the GoJ to articulate more detailed legal logic about this issue (see Chaps. 3 and 4).

#### *1.3 The Taboo Against Overseas Military Dispatch*

In the meantime, distrust toward the SDF persisted, fueled by concern that it might be used for aggression against neighboring counties again. To prevent this, the House of Councilors (the Upper House of the Diet) adopted a resolution in June 1954, a month before the creation of the SDF, to ban its overseas dispatch (House of Councilors, The National Diet of Japan, 1954). Although this resolution had no formal legal force, the legislature's will was respected and it formed a *de facto* ban on the overseas dispatch of the SDF. From the time of its establishment, the geographical sphere of the SDF's activities was thus strictly limited within Japan's territory, even though the Constitution has no specifc stipulation forbidding military deployment beyond national boundaries. The adoption of this resolution, as political scientist Akihiko Tanaka (1997) points out, refected the political atmosphere, in which overseas military dispatch was regarded as "the root of all evils" in light of a bitter memory of prewar Japan (p. 180). As a result, the possibility of any military contribution to a UNPKO was completely excluded from its policy options (Kato, 2020). The taboo against military dispatch abroad was thus frmly embedded at the core of anti-militarism under the single-party dominance of the ruling Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), which was formed by the union of two conservative parties in 1955.

Despite the GoJ's professed UN-centrism, the troop contribution to UNPKOs was not an exception under the *de facto* ban on overseas military dispatch. When the UNSG Dag Hammarskjöld asked the GoJ to contribute SDF troops to UNPKOs in Lebanon (UN Observation Group in Lebanon: UNOGIL) in 1958, the GoJ immediately declined these requests, fatly justifying its response by stating that overseas military deployment would never be available as an option (Hatakeyama, 2018). In February 1961, when the UNPKO was being operated in the Republic of Congo (United Nations Operation in the Congo: ONUC), the Japanese Ambassador to the UN, Koto Matsudaira, asserted that the GoJ should dispatch the SDF to the ONUC ("Kongo he jiei-tai," 1961). This invited acute criticism from the anti-military camp. One of the JSP Diet members, for example, harshly condemned Matsudaira's assertion as follows: "I can never forgive it because it precisely embodies the change to the Constitution for the worse."

To be precise, as seen earlier, the Constitution does not have a specifc stipulation to proscribe overseas military contribution. On the contrary, one could argue that the SDF's participation in a UNPKO could be compatible with the Constitution in light of its preamble: "We desire to occupy an honored place in an international society striving for the preservation of peace" (Prime Minister of Japan and His Cabinet, 1947). Whatever the truth was, Matsudaira's statement brought a ferce backlash. Prime Minister Hayato Ikeda (1961) accused Matsudaira's statement as a subtle attempt to give the impression that the overseas deployment of the SDF was becoming realized. The Matsudaira incident had an unintended impact by further fortifying the taboo against overseas military dispatch (Tanaka, 1997, p. 214).

Meanwhile, the Matsudaira statement also brought an unexpected byproduct by opening the possibility for the contribution of the SDF to a UNPKO in the future. Immediately after Matsudaira's statement, Director-General of Cabinet Legislation Bureau Shuzo Hayashi (1961) articulated that the GoJ could not deploy the SDF to a UNPKO because the SDF Act included no such provision, even though the Constitution did not outlaw overseas military dispatch. In other words, it could become possible if a new law were ever adopted for this purpose in the future. However, in those days, overseas troop deployment was simply out of the question (Tanaka, 1997, p. 214).

In 1980, the GoJ developed the legal logic toward overseas military dispatch. Previously, any type of military dispatch outside of the country was called *kaigai-hahei* (the overseas deployment of armed forces), but a new category of the *kaigai-haken* (overseas dispatch) was introduced. On the one hand, according to the GoJ, *kaigai-hahei* aims at the use of force and was, therefore, not allowed under the Constitution. On the other hand, *kaigai-haken* is to send the SDF abroad for purposes other than the use of force. According to the government interpretation in 1980, the new category is not prohibited by the Constitution, but still cannot be carried out without a law for this purpose (Asagumo Shimbunsha, 2021, p. 700). The introduction of the new concept of *kaigai-haken* reconfrmed that new lawmaking in the future might enable the GoJ to contribute the SDF to a UNPKO.

In the 1980s, however, overseas military dispatch was still out of the question, even if it was not for the purpose of the use of force. In 1987, Prime Minister Yasuhiro Nakasone of the LDP attempted to dispatch the MSDF's minesweepers to the Persian Gulf because the US sought assistance from Japan to clear the sea mines laid in the Iran-Iraq War ("Nakasone-shusho ho-bei," 1987). However, this plan soon vanished in smoke, since Chief Cabinet Secretary Masaharu Gotoda emphatically opposed Nakasone's initiative, asserting the "an ant's hole" theory—a small step toward overseas military dispatch would develop into a largescale aggression, just the same as in the prewar era (Kurashige, 2019). This incident attests how frmly the taboo against overseas military dispatch was established in postwar Japan (Fujishige, 2021, pp. 124–125).

## 2 The Establishment of the PKO Act

## *2.1 The Gulf War and the First Overseas Dispatch of the SDF*

In 1990, Iraq's invasion of Kuwait marked a turning point for Japan's peacekeeping policy. Around that time, Japan was at the apex of an economic boom, commonly known as the "Bubble Economy," which had emerged from the mid-1980s to the early 1990s. Given its self-confdence in its economic strength, Japan longed to attain status as an international leader. The Gulf Crisis suddenly blew away this naïve wish. The US expected its allies to mobilize support, including military contributions, to liberate the besieged nation from its hostile neighbor, Iraq. However, this expectation was totally unacceptable to the GoJ. Initially, Prime Minister Toshiki Kaifu, another LDP politician, tried to focus on making a huge fnancial contribution, as well as a small number of civilian personnel contributions. This only resulted in fury from US policymakers, however. Domestically, the LDP's Secretary-General Ichiro Ozawa, whose political power overwhelmed Kaifu's, pushed the prime minister hard for the deployment of the SDF in tandem with the US government. To cope with the dual pressures, the GoJ hinted at the possibility of overseas deployment in 1961, as mentioned earlier, if a new law could be made for this purpose.

Hence, the GoJ hurriedly attempted to enact a new law in the autumn of 1990 in order to be able to deploy the SDF as part of the US-led multinational coalition forces. But the 1990 bill was soon scrapped. At that time, the ruling LDP had lost its majority in the Upper House and needed to woo support from the moderate opposition parties, namely the Buddhist *Komeito* Party and the Democratic Socialist Party (DSP), which had split from the JSP. Both of these parties were, however, reluctant to support the controversial bill. Moreover, the lawmaking process was troubled with ferce anti-military resistance, especially from the JSP and the JCP, as well as insuffcient time and manpower for thorough preparation.

The aborted bill, however, had the effect of renewing the GoJ's legal logic concerning the contribution of troops to a UNPKO. While tabling the bill at the Diet in October 1990, Director-General of Cabinet Legislation Bureau Atsuo Kudo articulated that the Constitution did not prevent the SDF from joining a UNPKO unless it accompanied the use of force. Even though the bill was soon abandoned, Kudo's (1990) articulation held the hope of another lawmaking.5 At the time, it was also confrmed that the SDF contribution must avoid any danger of constituting the use of force.

Early the following year, US-led multilateral forces swiftly swept away the Iraqi forces from Kuwait within two months, but Japan had no presence in this joint military action. Outrage against Tokyo grew in Washington and acute criticisms were widely circulated, accusing Japan of "checkbook diplomacy" and a policy response described as "too little, too late." Moreover, to the GoJ's great shock, the Kuwaiti government did not mention Japan when it ran a full-page advertisement in the *Washington Post* in March 1991 to thank the countries that had contributed to its liberation. Even if this oversight was the result of a technical error, it was unsurprising that such international criticism and disregard was perceived in Japan as a serious blow. Lastly, the German action had a determinative effect. Just like Japan, Germany contributed no troops during the Gulf War, but it dispatched minesweepers to the Persian Gulf as soon as the war was over. This made the GoJ feel that it had lagged behind. It was at this time that Japan fnally realized the importance of a military presence in claiming the status of a full-fedged member of international society.

This realization spurred the GoJ to take prompt action. In April 1991, a month after the end of fghting, they dispatched the MSDF's minesweepers to the Persian Gulf. This decision was made based on an expanded interpretation of the existing SDF Act, which required no additional legislation. This marked the frst overseas dispatch of the SDF since its foundation in 1954. Within Japan, the anti-military opposition harshly condemned the GoJ for this belated military dispatch, while the majority of public opinion unexpectedly supported it ("Sokai-tei-haken," 1991).

#### *2.2 The Enactment of the PKO Act*

The "defeat in diplomacy" (Miyagi, 2016, pp. 8–17) nurtured new norms of "International Contribution," which motivated the GoJ to attempt another lawmaking to deploy the SDF to UNPKOs (Fujishige, 2021, pp. 133–172). Learning from the bitter lesson of the previously failed lawmaking, the new bill was prepared in a more cautious manner with much larger manpower. More importantly, Ozawa had already reached a rough agreement with the two moderate oppositions, namely *Komeito* and the DSP, to secure the majority at the Upper House (The Three-Parties Agreement). Furthermore, the public opinion predicted a more favorable result for this new lawmaking. According to the *Asahi* survey in June 1991, more than 70 percent of people supported the contribution of the SDF to a UNPKO ("Jiei-tai-kaigai-haken," 1991). Although the antimilitary opposition camp still resisted the new law without compromise, its chance of enactment seemed much greater this time (Fujishige, 2021, p. 149).

In September 1991, the new bill was submitted to the Diet. The GoJ intended to complete this legislation as soon as possible in order to contribute to the SDF from the start of the UNTAC in February 1992 (see Chap. 5). The new lawmaking, however, met ferce resistance from the anti-military opposition. Despite the Three-Party Agreement, the two moderate oppositions were still not entirely cooperative and demanded the insertion of more constraints on the SDF's roles into the new bill. In November 1991, the premiership was passed from Kaifu to another LDP politician, Kiichi Miyazawa. Prime Minister Miyazawa himself was rather reluctant toward the overseas military dispatch, but he pledged to Ozawa, who supported his election as prime minister, that he would enact a new law to deploy the SDF to a UNPKO (Ozawa, 1991). Obliged to fulfll his promise to Ozawa, Miyazawa railroaded the bill through the Lower House in November 1991, with support only from *Komeito*. Although the bill was passed, the hard measures invited harsh criticism not only from the anti-military opposition but also from the media and public opinion ("Cha-no-ma kara-mo," 1991; "PKO-hoan kyoko-saiketsu," 1991; "PKO-kyoryoku-hoan," 1991). The moderate parties also stiffened their attitude.

Consequently, the Miyazawa government was unable to complete the lawmaking in time for the beginning of UNTAC. Despite some setbacks, the GoJ tenaciously persevered with the lawmaking process to pass the bill at the Upper House. Not to repeat the mayhem at the Lower House, the Miyazawa government patiently focused on recovering the commitment from the two moderate parties. Thanks to these persistent efforts, the Miyazawa government fnally regained the support of the moderate parties at the price of conceding to their demands to add more restrictions in the new law (see below). Once they had secured the support of the *Komeito* and the DSP, the success of the lawmaking was assured. Even though the anti-military camp, especially the JSP, continued with its useless resistance, employing the so-called ox-walk tactics, the bill fnally passed the Lower House in June 1992. This marked the establishment of the PKO Act. At this point, public opinion still showed a mixed response, fuctuating between pro- and anti-deployment positions ("PKO kyoryoku-ho," 1992), but the GoJ nevertheless undertook immediate preparations to dispatch SDF peacekeepers to Cambodia (see Chap. 5).

#### *2.3 The Insertion of Strict Constraints into the PKO Act*

To win the support of the two moderate opposition parties, as mentioned earlier, the GoJ had to insert additional stringent constraints into the PKO Act, namely the Five Principles for Deployment (hereafter, the Five Principles), the "freeze" or suspension on the dispatch of Peacekeeping Forces (PKF), and a requirement for advance approval for the PKF's deployment when the "freeze" was removed in the future. First, the Five Principles, which were inserted to meet the demand of the *Komeito*, had the most extensive impact to constrain the freedom of Japan's peacekeeping policy. The original Five Principles read as follows:


(GoJ, 1992: MoFA, n.d.)

These Five Principles aimed to eliminate the risk that the SDF might become entangled in the use of force, even if it seemed highly questionable that following these extremely strict regulations would be possible on the ground. In particular, the frst three items entailed a very thorny problem because the stipulations rested on the assumption of the classic type of UNPKO. When the PKO Act was passed in June 1992, however, *An Agenda for Peace*, the radical peacekeeping reform recommendations, was published in the same month and the UNPKO had already set out drastic changes that embraced both "robustness" and "integration" (see Chap. 1). The gap embedded a structural diffculty into the PKO Act to make it very hard for the SDF peacekeepers to cope with the reality in the feld.

Another tricky issue was seen in the ffth item of the Five Principles, which authorized the "use of weapons" only for "self-preservation" (Fujishige, 2021, pp. 155–156).6 Both the "use of weapons" and "selfpreservation" were unique policy jargon in Japan. First, the concept of "use of weapons" was introduced to allow the SDF peacekeepers to use arms to a minimal degree for self-protection, while avoiding the danger of the use of force. Second, the notion of "self-preservation" is close to the common concept of "personal self-defense" and, therefore, is generally considered as a natural or inherent right to self-protection, which is applicable to all human beings (Koizumi, 2004). In other words, the SDF personnel were naturally entitled to "the use of weapons only for the protection of oneself and others (oneself, SDF members who are at the same scene as oneself)" (MoD, 2019) and this would not constitute the use of force. While the PKO Bill was examined in 1991, the GoJ (1991) defned the "use of weapons for self-preservation" as follows:

The "use of force" in Article 9 (1) in the Constitution is a concept related to the use of physical power, including the "use of weapons," but the "use of weapons" does not necessarily constitute the use of force, which is prohibited by the clause above. For example, it should be regarded as the natural right to protect oneself and the other SDF members who are at the same scene as oneself, and therefore the minimal "use of weapons" for this purpose is not equivalent to the "use of force," prohibited by Article 9 (1).

Importantly, the GoJ interpreted that the use of physical power in the UNPKOs could constitute the use of force, which is banned by Article 51 of the UN Charter and, accordingly, by Article 9 of the Constitution. Although the UN peacekeepers' use of physical power is described as the "use of force," it is usually distinguished from the "use of force," proscribed by Article 51 of the UN Charter. From the GoJ's point of view, put another way, the "use of weapons" by the SDF peacekeepers escape a risk of constituting the "use of force," banned by the UN Charter and the Constitution and, therefore, it became necessary for the government to fabricate a legal logic to circumvent the possibility of the "use of force."

Under such a backdrop, the GoJ dare to coin the term "selfpreservation." The essence of "self-preservation" is similar to the general concept of "self-defense," which appears in the Three Principles of UNPKOs (UNDPO, n.d.), but the two concepts differ in scope. The Japanese concept of "self-preservation" is narrowly confned to the direct protection of the SDF personnel themselves (as well as their fellow SDF peacekeepers working together), which can be legitimized as a natural right. Meanwhile, the global standard of "self-defense" is more broadly interpreted. The exact nature of the concept of "self-defense" in the UNPKOs is an intricate question because the notion can be interpreted in different ways on different occasions (Cox, 1999). At least, it seems certain that the international notion of "self-defense" can be extended beyond the limited scope of "self-preservation," such as the protection of those who are not SDF personnel but are located at the same scene, or even to somebody who is some distance away, or what Japanese call "coming-toaid" duty (see Chaps. 3, 4, and 8). The GoJ had to introduce these stringent restrictions to be compatible with their peculiar interpretation that the Japanese peacekeepers' use of weapons might constitute the "use of force." In this way, the range of acts for the SDF peacekeepers was constrained by the GoJ's excessively stringent interpretation of the "use of force" (see Chaps. 3 and 4).

To avoid such a risk, the permitted range of the use of weapons for the SDF peacekeepers was restricted to "self-preservation" rather than the common notion of "self-defense." The gap between the uniquely Japanese notion of "use of weapons for self-preservation" and the international standard of "use of force for self-defense" would generate problems for the SDF peacekeepers on the ground. It was highly problematic because the scope of the concept of "self-preservation" was narrower than that of "self-defense" in the UNPKOs, prohibiting to reach the extent of "use of force." Nevertheless, the original Five Principles of 1992 would be maintained until 2015, when the ffth item was amended (see Chap. 4).

The second restriction was the "freeze" or suspension of the PKF's main duties (see Chaps. 3 and 4). Here lay Japan's peculiar distinction between the "main" and "rear-area" duties for peacekeepers: the former denotes security-related duties, usually carried out by infantry, while the latter means logistical assistance off the front line. In the original PKO Act enacted in 1992, the PKF's main duties were "frozen," restricting the range of the SDF's activities to logistic support only. This restriction was, again, added as a concession to the *Komeito*'s request, since there was a risk that the deployment of an infantry would constitute the use of force. With the suspension of PKF main duties, the SDF peacekeepers would be assigned only logistic support roles, such as engineering, medical care, transportation as well as unarmed military observer roles. Finally, the third restriction established the prerequisite of prior approval from the legislature before dispatching the PKF to fulfll its main duties when the "freeze" was eventually removed. This regulation was inserted to concede to the DSP's request. Even though the "freeze" on the PKF's main duties was removed in 2001, as we will see later, an infantry has, to this day, never been contributed to a UNPKO (see Chaps. 3 and 4). The insertion of these stringent constraints, especially the Five Principles, seriously widened the gap between Japan's domestic legal requirement and the international standard.

## 3 Summary of Chap. 2

In postwar Japan, staunch anti-militarism, and especially a *de facto* national ban on overseas military dispatch, prohibited any deployment of the SDF abroad. Under such a restriction, military deployment to a UNPKO was simply out of the question. During the Gulf War in 1991, however, Japan faced international criticism concerning its lack of military contribution. This humiliating experience made Japan realize the cruciality of military contribution for international peace and security, resulting in the frst overseas deployment of the SDF (minesweepers) to the Persian Gulf in April 1991. The momentum for the GoJ continued until the PKO Act was enacted in June 1992. This was an epoch-making lawmaking to institutionalize the SDF's overseas dispatch, but it was formed under a series of strict constraints (e.g., the Five Principles and the "freeze" on the PKF's main duties) to minimize the danger of the SDF's use of force.

## Notes


## References (In English)


UNDPO. (n.d.). *Principles of peacekeeping*. United Nations Peacekeeping. Retrieved June 22, 2021, from https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/principlesof-peacekeeping

#### References (In Japanese)


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## The Evolution of Japan's Peacekeeping Policy 1992–2012

## 1 Japan's Past Performance Within the Narrow Version of International Peace Cooperation

With the ironclad restrictions, the original PKO Act very narrowly defned the possible scope of the SDF's activities only to logistical support, such as engineering, transportation, and medical care (see Chap. 2), while also permitting Japan to dispatch individual unarmed military observers. On the ground, however, these rigorous constraints would cause serious gaps between the Japanese legal system and UNPKO practices. Here, we will review Japan's participation not only in the UNPKOs but also in related activities, because the PKO Act permits a wider range of activities under the framework of International Peace Cooperation (IPC). For this reason, the GoJ usually refers to the statute as the IPC Act, rather than the PKO Act. In addition to the narrow version of IPC, solely resting on the PKO Act, there is also a broader version that is based not only on the IPC Act but also on other laws. In this section, we will outline both the narrow and the broader version of IPC.

The term "IPC" is a peculiar piece of jargon coined by the GoJ. Simply put, IPC denotes a set of Japanese efforts to support international peace, especially in confict-prone states. In the narrow sense, the concept of IPC covers the activities resting on the PKO Act, mainly under the jurisdiction of the International Peace Cooperation Headquarters (IPCH) in the Cabinet Offce. Meanwhile, Japan's Ministry of Defense (MoD) also uses the term in a broader sense beyond the scope of the PKO Act. In this book, we will pay more attention to the narrower version of IPC because it is a more conventional understanding of the concept that keeps the UNPKOs at its core. In this chapter, we will also briefy look at the broader version, as it is also relevant to some extent in our examination of Japan's participation in the UNPKOs.

## *1.1 Past Performance Under the Narrow Version of the IPC Concept*

To start, let us review in more detail the narrow version of IPC, which rests on the PKO Act (Cabinet Offce, n.d.-c) (Table 3.1).1 The IPCH, as well as Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MoFA), adheres to the narrow version (Cabinet Offce, n.d.-b; MoFA, 2013). First, the statute allows both personnel and material contributions. The former is divided into three categories: UNPKOs and related others, international humanitarian assistance activities, and international electoral monitoring. (In the 2015 amendment to the PKO Act, the internationally coordinated operations for peace and security were added as the fourth category of narrow IPC but here we will focus on the three categories before 2015.) The frst two are mainly carried out by SDF personnel, while the third is basically carried out as a short-term civilian mission. Uniformed civilians, such as the police and the coast guard, can also participate in narrow IPC-related duties. In other


**Table 3.1** Classifcation of the narrow and broader versions of IPC

a "PKO" refers to United Nations Peacekeeping Operations, "Humanitarian Operations" to international humanitarian relief operations, "Election Monitoring" to international election observation operations, and "Internationally Coordinated Operations" to internationally coordinated operations for peace and security

Cabinet Offce (n.d.-c.), Authors' creation

words, although civilian personnel can act as Japanese peacekeepers under the PKO Act, this book will focus on the SDF peacekeepers unless otherwise specifed (Cabinet Offce, n.d.-a, n.d.-d, n.d.-f).

Under the narrow defnition of IPC, potential military contribution had been confned either to the category of a UNPKO or to very limited cases that were categorized as "international humanitarian assistance." Under this related category, so far there has been one case of deployment of SDF ground forces in 1994 to Zaire, now called the DRC (see below for more details). However, there have been four additional cases of SDF deployment under the same "international humanitarian assistance" category, all involving the ASDF. In these four cases, the ASDF delivered humanitarian supplies to refugees in East Timor, Afghanistan, and twice in Iraq. So, in practice, we can regard the narrow version of IPC as similar or nearly identical in type to SDF deployment to a UNPKO.

In September 1992, three months after the enactment of the PKO Act, the frst personnel contribution was made when three civilian electoral observers were dispatched to the United Nations Angola Verifcation Mission II (UNAVEM II). Since then, civilian electoral observers have been dispatched twelve times so far under the categories of UNPKOs and international electoral monitoring assistance (the latter was added to the PKO Act in the amendment in 1998; see Appendix A). Later in the same month, a large-scale Japanese delegation represented by a 600-man JEG battalion joined UNTAC (see Chap. 5).

Following UNTAC, the GoJ continued to dispatch military personnel to the other UN missions in rapid sequence. From May 1993 to January 1995, SDF peacekeepers were sent to the United Nations Mission in Mozambique (ONUMOZ). A 50-man team was engaged in transportation duties and a few staff offcers were sent to the feld headquarters of the UN mission. It was the frst time that Japan had contributed staff to the feld headquarters of a UNPKO, since there was no staff contribution to UNTAC (see Chap. 5). From September to December 1994, the GoJ dispatched an SDF team of approximately 200 people to the former Zaire to distribute emergency relief to Rwandan refugees in response to a request from the Offce of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). The SDF team engaged in medical care, epidemic prevention, and water supply in the city of Goma, located at the border with Rwanda.

From February 1996, the GoJ dispatched a 40-staff transportation unit, as well as a few staff offcers, to the United Nations Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF) in the Golan Heights in Syria. UNDOF was established during the Cold War in 1974 and was assigned a classic ceasefre monitoring mandate between Syria and Israel. The SDF's dispatch to UNDOF lasted 17 years, marking the longest duration in the history of Japanese peacekeeping. The longer-term participation in UNDOF served as a "PKO School" (Nishida, 2020), providing a useful opportunity for SDF members to get used to working as peacekeepers. Their deployment was maintained until January 2013, when local security was rapidly undermined due to the outbreak of internal confict in Syria. From 2002 to 2004, the GoJ dispatched another large-scale JEG of some 600 SDF members and a few staff offcers to support the independence of East Timor (see Chap. 6).

In the second half of the 2000s, greater emphasis was placed on a broader conception of IPC (see next section) while no additional deployment was made to a UNPKO. In the frst half of the 2010s, the GoJ resumed new SDF deployments to the UNPKOs in Haiti and South Sudan. From 2010 to 2013, the SDF were sent to Haiti after the great earthquake, both as part of a Japan Disaster Relief (JDR) team and as peacekeepers (see Chap. 7). In January 2012, the GoJ deployed the SDF to UNMISS to support the newly independent South Sudan. However, the GoJ suddenly withdrew the JEG from South Sudan in the spring of 2017 while leaving a small number of staff offcers in place (see Chap. 8).

## *1.2 Past Performance Under the Broader Version of the IPC Concept*

In this section, we will summarize the GoJ's activities based on the broader defnition of IPC. Because the MoD represents this view, as seen earlier, the broader version of IPC focuses solely on the SDF's activities (MoD, n.d.) (Table 3.2). It allows for a much wider range of activities than the narrower defnition, resting not only on the PKO Act but also on other legal statutes (Fig. 3.1). The broader version of IPC is composed of four categories: frst, UNPKOs and the other related activities, such as international humanitarian assistance; second, any operations under temporary special measure laws (temporary statutes), such as humanitarian assistance in postwar Iraq or a 2001 refueling mission in support of the US-led War on Terror in Afghanistan; third, international emergency assistance based on the *Act Concerning Dispatch of the Japan Disaster Relief Team*


**Table 3.2** The broader version of IPC

a "PKO" refers to United Nations Peacekeeping Operations, "JDR" to international disaster relief activities, "Anti-piracy operations" to anti-piracy activities off Somalia and the Gulf of Aden

MoD (n.d.), Authors' creation

**Fig. 3.1** Classifcation of the narrow and broader versions of IPC. \*"PKO" refers to United Nations Peacekeeping Operations, "Humanitarian operations" to international humanitarian relief operations, "Election monitoring" to international election observation operations, and "Internationally coordinated operations" to internationally coordinated operations for peace and security, "JDR" to international disaster relief activities, "Anti-piracy operations" to anti-piracy activities off Somalia and the Gulf of Aden. (Source: Cabinet Offce, n.d.-c, MoD, n.d., Authors' creation)

(hereafter, the JDR Act); and, fourth, anti-piracy operations off the shores of Somalia and in the Gulf of Aden.

Here we will mainly focus on the second, third, and fourth categories, since the frst category (UNPKO deployment) already overlaps with the scope of narrow IPCs. Let us begin with the second category. During the 2010s, the GoJ considerably expanded the scope for a broader version of IPC by enacting a set of special legal measures to assist the US-led multinational force. First, in November 2001, the GoJ decided to dispatch MSDF fueling vessels to the Indian Ocean to support the US-led War on Terror in Afghanistan (Hasegawa, 2018a). Japan previously had no law for this purpose, but Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi pushed the adoption of the *Act on Special Measures Against Terrorism* through the legislature just a month after the 9/11 attacks. Amazingly, there was little criticism either from the opposition or from the public, even though the law allowed the SDF to assist in combat-oriented operations, albeit from a remote area. This activity was maintained for nearly ten years, until the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ), which had come to power the previous year, discontinued it in January 2010 (for more details, see below).

Following the US attack on Iraq in March 2003, Koizumi enacted another temporary statute, the *Law Concerning the Special Measures on Humanitarian and Reconstruction Assistance in Iraq*, in August of the same year, to deploy SDF personnel to Iraq. The dispatch to Iraq provoked controversy in Japan regarding the dubious legitimacy of the US preemptive strike logic and increasing insecurity in postwar Iraq (Hasegawa, 2018b).

In particular, the latter point was a political hot potato, not only because practical danger existed for the SDF personnel but also because there was concern about violating the ban on exercising the right of "collective defense." Simply put, this right allows a state to use force to aid an ally under Article 51 of the UN Charter, but it has been a very controversial problem in Japan (see Chap. 4; Shinoda, 2016). The GoJ upheld an awkward position concerning Japan's exercise of the collective defense right: it argued that this was outlawed in the Constitution, even though Article 51 of the UN Charter prescribes collective defense as a state's inherent right (UN Charter art. 51).

Given the GoJ's self-imposed constraint, serious doubt was cast from the anti-military opposition parties as well as from part of civil society as to whether the SDF's humanitarian and reconstruction work in Iraq violated the ban on the exercise of collective defense (Commission on the Constitution: The House of Representatives, 2004). The skeptics arose because the SDF's activity in Iraq was carried out as part of a US-led military operation and it was ambiguous whether fghting was truly over even after the US announcement of the end of combat situation in May 2003. To avoid constituting the situation of "collective self-defense," Koizumi devised the delicate rhetorical logic of differentiating a "combat zone" from a "non-combat zone," although it seemed unrealistic to make such a distinction from the feld in post-2003 Iraq ("Koizumi-shi," 2018).

In the end, Koizumi resolutely deployed the GSDF to Iraq from January 2004 to July 2006 (Hasegawa, 2018b). Once deployed, the GSDF was mostly engaged in the reconstruction of infrastructure, but also provided medical care and water supplies. Because the deployment was completed without any fatalities, public opinion turned in favor of the SDF's mission in Iraq ("Jiei-tai-tettai no," 2004; "Iraku-hitojichi-jiken," 2004). In sum, this "temporary law" category, exemplifed by the deployments to the Indian Ocean and Iraq, has been regarded as the centerpiece of the broader version of IPC. Nonetheless, it was not an easy policy option because additional legislation was required for every deployment until the so-called general law, or the International Peace Support Law, was enacted in 2015 as a part of the larger Peace and Security Legislation (see Chap. 4). The "general law" here means a statute to deploy the SDF to take part in multinational military operations outside of the UN framework. Previously, the GoJ had to enact a temporary law each time deployment was necessary.

Emergency disaster relief represents another important component in the broader IPC. The JDR Act allows the GoJ to dispatch an emergency disaster relief team at times of natural and other disasters abroad. When originally established in 1987, the law was applied only to civilian agencies, such as the Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA), and to nongovernmental civilians, such as medical personnel and other experts (see Chap. 7; Nakauchi, 2011). In 1992, concomitant with the enactment of the PKO Act, the JDR Act was amended to include the SDF as part of JDR Teams (Nakauchi, 2011, p. 5). Since its frst dispatch to Honduras, which was hit by a great hurricane in 1998, the SDF has participated in JDR Teams a total of 20 times until 2020 (see Appendix B). Since Japan has historically suffered from various types of natural disasters, such as earthquakes and typhoons, the SDF has accumulated much experience in disaster relief and regards its expertise as a unique strength. Besides, military dispatch for disaster relief is much less controversial than deployment to confict-affected countries.

In the late 2000s, an anti-piracy operation to protect commercial ships and oil tankers off the shore of Somalia and around the Gulf of Aden was also added as a part of the broader IPC. This deployment was initially based on the SDF Act, but later rested on the Anti-Piracy Law established in September 2009. In 2011, the GoJ constructed an SDF base in Djibouti to station transportation aircraft (P-3s). This was the frst ever overseas military base for postwar Japan.

## 2 Japan's Efforts to Catch Up with the International Trends of "Robustness" and "Integration"

#### *2.1 Moves Toward "Robustness"*

The stringent constraints on the range of authorized activities often forced SDF members to exceed the stipulations of the PKO Act without permission to do so, which actually happened in Cambodia, East Timor, and elsewhere. In the former Zaire in 1994, for instance, the GSDF transportation team unexpectedly rescued Japanese NGO workers who were under attack ("Jiei-tai, hatsu-no," 1994). This was justifed under the name of a "transportation" mission but invoked criticism. It looked especially problematic because, before the incident, a senior executive of the Japan Defense Agency, which would be remodeled into the MoD in 2007, professed that the SDF were not assigned to rescue NGO personnel in a distant place ("NGO-kankei-sha," 1994). Excessively narrow restrictions also caused confusion and misunderstanding between the Japanese and UN sides. The accumulation of such experiences gradually motivated the GoJ to relax requirements on the use of weapons in particular and loosening the suspension of the PKF's main duties, albeit to a limited extent and also very slowly.

Examples of excessively strict restrictions were seen not only in the requirements on the use of weapons, but also in the equipment allowed for the SDF peacekeepers. In the frst military dispatch to the UNPKO in Cambodia, the JEG personnel were only equipped with pistols and rifes, whereas the *Khmer Rouge* was armed with heavy weapons (see Chap. 5). Fortunately, limited armaments did not cause any casualties in the SDF component in Cambodia or later in Mozambique. In the former Zaire in 1994, however, this caused a heated debate as to whether or not deployed SDF personnel should be equipped with machine guns. Eventually, the GoJ decided in favor of doing so due to serious insecurity on site ("Ruwanda-nammin-kyusai," 1994).2 Thereafter, it became common for the SDF peacekeepers to carry machine guns alongside pistols and rifes when dispatched as a unit on the ground. This reduced debates over equipment, but the problem of excessive constraints on the use of weapons still remained, as we will see below.

#### *2.2 Limited Relaxation of the Requirements for the Use of Weapons*

In Japan's peacekeeping policy, the limits on "robustness" were mostly related to the ffth of the original Five Principles: SDF personnel are permitted to use weapons only to the minimum extent necessary to protect themselves or for self-preservation (see Chap. 2; GoJ, 1992). Problematically, the Japanese terminology of "self-preservation" very narrowly defned the scope solely to the protection of SDF personnel themselves (each specifc individual and his/her colleagues at the same scene; see Chap. 2). On the other hand, the concept of self-defense in the UNPKOs extends to the protection of fellow peacekeepers, even those contributed from other countries, as well as other relevant personnel even if located in a distant place (see Chap. 2; The Security Experts Panel, 2008, p. 12) or what is referred to as the "coming-to-aid" duty in Japanese usage. In this way, understandings of the range of "self-defense" in the global UNPKO standard, which naturally covers the "coming-to-aid" duty, are much wider than the scope of "self-preservation."

Nonetheless, the Japanese legal system concluded that the "coming-toaid" duty would too far exceed the scope of self-preservation and therefore would not allow this duty to be performed by SDF peacekeepers. As a result, deployed Japanese military personnel had to employ subterfuge, such as in the example of *de facto* patrols in Cambodia being recategorized as "information gathering" when Japanese civilians needed immediate security provision by SDF personnel (see Chap. 5). The difference between the Japanese legal system and the UN standard of interpretation regarding the use of arms was highly problematic, partly because the gap perplexed the SDF peacekeepers in practice and partly because it confused the UN side and fellow peacekeepers from other countries.

In 1998 and 2001, therefore, the GoJ slightly relaxed the scope of selfpreservation to loosen the requirements on the use of weapons for SDF peacekeepers, while not revising the Five Principles themselves. First, the 1998 amendment of the PKO Act changed the evaluative criteria for the use of weapons (Cabinet Offce, n.d.-d).3 In the original PKO Act, established in 1992, each individual SDF peacekeeper was supposed to fre at his/her discretion because the SDF member who fred would personally bear responsibility. This contradicted ordinary military regulations for fring weapons and would be impossible for the SDF peacekeepers to implement in practice. For this reason, the 1998 amendment centralized the authority to fre a weapon by authorization dependent on a commander's explicit order. But this was a very minor change and the scope of selfpreservation itself remained unchanged in the 1998 amendment.

The 2001 amendment attained a more substantial change. It expanded the scope of self-preservation to allow SDF peacekeepers to use "weapons only for the protection of oneself and others", namely, oneself, SDF members who are at the same scene as oneself, or those under the supervision of oneself (Cabinet Offce, n.d.-e; MoD, 2019, p. 256).4 This amendment would allow the SDF peacekeepers to extend their rescue mission to non-SDF personnel, such as NGO staff, as long as they were in the same location. This added mission was justifed under the category of "self-preservation": If the SDF personnel left somebody in the same place under an attack, it was very likely that danger would pose a direct threat to the SDF personnel themselves. In the meantime, "coming-to-aid" duty was not yet allowed, since it was still diffcult for the GoJ to place them within the scope of self-preservation. Even if somebody in a remote location was facing an imminent threat, it would not directly threaten the safety of the SDF personnel, and therefore, according to the government's interpretation, this would not be a matter of self-preservation. Although the 2001 amendment slightly relaxed the allowed range for the use of weapons for the purpose of self-preservation, this still did not reach the global standard of self-defense, which naturally covered the "coming-toaid" duty. (The 2001 amendment also removed the "freeze" on the PKF main duties, but we will examine this later in this section.)

At the turn of the twenty-frst century, the range of authorizations for Japanese peacekeepers' use of weapons was expanded to some extent, as seen above, but the revisions were made only within the scope of selfpreservation. Around the same time, on the other hand, the *Brahimi Report* in 2000 endorsed the UN shift toward "robustness" (see Chap. 1). As a result, the UN expanded the authorized scope of peacekeepers' use of force not only for self-defense, but also for the defense of the mandate (see Chap. 1). If a UN peacekeeper is tasked with the PoC mandate, for example, s/he would be allowed to use force beyond the scope of self-defense if necessary to defend the given mandate.

Consequently, the gap between Japan's requirements for the use of weapons, which was strictly restricted to self-preservation purposes, and those found in the UNPKOs still remained, or had even grown larger. The shifts toward "robustness" in UNPKOs had considerably enlarged to authorize the use of force by UN peacekeepers beyond the range of selfdefense to also cover the "defense of the mandate." In other words, Japan's efforts to relax the range for the use of weapons did not exactly match the robust turn at the international level. While the UNPKO's standard for the use of force had already transcended the self-defense purpose and reached the range of defense of the mandate, the Japanese standard had not yet reached even the extent of self-defense at the global standard.

#### *2.3 Removing the "Freeze" on the PKF's Main Duties*

The other obstacle against the trend toward "robustness" was related to the PKF's main duties. The 2001 amendment fnally lifted the "freeze" on the PKF's main duties since the 9/11 attacks and generated the possibility of setting up a UNPKO in Afghanistan, although this was not realized after all (see Chap. 6). Even after the removal of this "freeze," however, the GoJ has never dispatched infantry forces mandated with the PKF's main duties in practice.

Behind this hesitation lay the outdated nature of the original PKO Act. The statute defned the PKF's main duties in line with the classic truce supervision duties, such as disarmament monitoring, patrol in a buffer zone, and arms disposal (see Chap. 2; MoD, 2002). However, by the time the suspension of these PKF main duties was removed in 2001, the trend of UNPKOs had already evolved toward "robustness" (see Chaps. 1 and 2). This made it very diffcult for the GoJ to assign SDF peacekeepers with PKF main duties even after the removal of the "freeze." Moreover, the deployment for the PKF main duties requires advance approval from the Diet, which would be extremely challenging for the GoJ. In this way, Japan was further left behind in the international trend of "robustness," which paid more attention to the defense of the mandate (see Chap. 4).

### *2.4 The Recommendations on the Relaxation of the Requirements for the Use of Weapons*

In the late 1990s, with rising scrutiny concerns about China and North Korea, Japanese eyes were increasingly diverted toward the issues of regional security and the alliance relationship with the US (see Appendix C), while the political slogans of "International Contribution" gradually declined. Unexpectedly, the 9/11 terrorist attacks in 2001 drew Japan's attention back to peacekeeping, or more broadly, to IPC issues (Fujishige, 2021).

Boosted by renewed attention to the policy feld, as seen earlier, Prime Minister Koizumi achieved the partial relaxation of the restriction on the use of weapons in 2001. He commissioned the Experts Panel for International Peace Cooperation (hereafter, the IPC Panel) in June 2002, under the chairmanship of Yasushi Akashi, the former SRSG of UNTAC (see Chap. 5). Its examination was concluded at the end of 2002, yielding the policy paper as an outcome (The IPC Panel, 2002).

The panel released its policy recommendations about six months later (The IPC Panel, 2002). With heightened attention to the problems of fragile states around that time, the policy paper mostly emphasized issues related to statebuilding and peacebuilding,5 which was in line with the trend of "integration," However, it also included recommendations concerning "robustness," albeit to a lesser extent. The IPC Panel called for the further expansion of the permitted range of the use of weapons for SDF peacekeepers with an eye toward further closing gaps between Japanese law and relevant international standards. This demand was echoed by the Experts Panel on Reconstruction of Legal Basis for Security (hereafter, the Security Experts Panel), which was established in April 2007 during the frst Abe administration (Cabinet Secretariat, 2007). Eventually, however, the growing demands for "robustness" would be realized only after the return of Prime Minister Abe at the end of 2012 (see in Chap. 4).

#### *2.5 Moves Toward "Integration"*

Here we will see Japan's shift toward "integration." In Cambodia, the JEG in Cambodia had already embarked on the prototype of the "All Japan" approach, for example, by providing direct support to the local population and leaving behind all used materials upon departure (Honda, 2017; see Chap. 5). It was only after the late 1990s, however, that attention to "integration" became more noticeable in Japan. An increasing interest in the nexus between peacebuilding and development at the international level gave the GoJ the momentum to pursue Japan's version of "integration." The development aid actor took an initiative.

In 1999, a JICA report titled *The Implementation Situation of ODA Mid-term Policy* indicated an emerging interest in peacebuilding as part of the international development agenda (MoFA, 2000). In the same year, JICA and the UNHCR agreed to develop a partnership, especially to assist people in war-torn nations (UNHCR, 2019). Two years later, JICA published a more detailed policy paper, *Research Study on Peacebuilding* (JICA, 2001), which encouraged the connection of Japan's development aid with peacebuilding. Later in the same year, the 9/11 terrorist attacks unexpectedly encouraged JICA's involvement in peacebuilding, or more broadly, in the IPC policy. This restored the GoJ's motivation to support confict-affected nations, such as Afghanistan and East Timor, because the anarchic situation of Afghanistan was serving as a hotbed for Al Qaeda.

The report presented a comprehensive view of IPC, putting greater emphasis on peacebuilding rather than peacekeeping (The IPC Panel, 2002). The paper urged utilization of Japan's ODA as part of peacebuilding efforts. It also encouraged a "seamless" approach, encompassing everything from confict prevention, peace consolidation, and statebuilding to post-confict reconstruction and development assistance. In doing so, it was also strongly recommended that IPCH developed a wide range of collaborations with civilian actors, such as JICA, various NGOs, and private businesses. In the 1990s, IPC had been almost equivalent to Japan's military contribution, but this concept gradually broadened from the 2000s onward, overlapping with the international trend of "integration." The JICA side also supported this move, especially under the leadership of Sadako Ogata, who had been the former head of the UNHCR before becoming the head of JICA in 2013 (MoFA, 2002, 2014).

In parallel, the partnership between the ODA and the JEG was developed in Iraq and in East Timor, gradually shaping the "All Japan" approach (Honda & Uesugi, 2016, p. 162; Kawaguchi & Sakaemura, 2016). Once established in the frst half of the 2000s, this approach was eagerly promoted by the GoJ, partly because it was an easier policy option with less risk of involvement in fghting, and partly because it was more suitable to utilize Japan's strength in engineering capability. From 2010 to 2012, the DPJ administration began contributing the JEG to the two UNPKOs, namely, Haiti and South Sudan, where the "All Japan" approach was carried out as the central piece in the activities of Japanese delegation. The second Abe administration, which returned to power at the end of 2012, would succeed the "All Japan" approach, especially in South Sudan (Hanatani & Urakami, 2016). We will trace this development in the next chapter.

## 3 The Decline of Anti-militarism in the Political Scene and Public Opinion

We will briefy discuss here how anti-military constraints had declined following peacekeeping participation during the period under review in this chapter. To this end, we will present two points: the changing political environment and the shift in the public opinion.

The early 1990s, when the frst Japanese peacekeepers were sent to Cambodia, were also a time of tremendous domestic political turmoil in Japan. In August 1993, immediately before the return of the JEG from Cambodia, the LDP's single party dominance (known as the 1955 System) was fnally terminated. Surprisingly, the following year, the LDP returned to power with a previously unimaginable political partnership with the anti-military JSP. The JSP's participation in the 1994 coalition government ironically led to the fatal decline of anti-militarism. Under the 1955 System, the JSP had been the largest opposition party representing the anti-military camp. After joining the coalition government in 1994, the party's size continued to shrink, even after it had left the governing coalition in 1998. The JSP was renamed the Social Democratic Party (SDP) in 1996, but this name change did not halt the party's steady marginalization in Japanese politics (Fujishige, 2021).

Meanwhile, the DPJ was founded in 1998 and rapidly grew to become the largest opposition. As a farrago of politicians with a wide range of backgrounds, from the left to the right, the DPJ took a more fexible stance toward the military issue. Although the DPJ sometimes opposed the SDF's activities abroad, as seen in the cases of the Indian Ocean and Iraq, these were more or less tactical objections. While in power from 2009 to 2012, the DPJ basically projected an overall positive attitude toward Japanese involvement in UNPKOs, as long as it occurred within the UN framework. Their willingness was illustrated by DPJ decisions to dispatch Japanese personnel, including the SDF, to the UNPKOs in Haiti and South Sudan in 2010 and 2012 (see Chaps. 7 and 8).

The shift in public opinion also accelerated the decline of anti-militarism, especially concerning IPC-related activities. According to the Cabinet Offce's public opinion poll on the SDF and defense issues in 1994, for example, 22.3 percent of respondents answered that the SDF should put more emphasis on IPC-related works, while only 6.5 percent positively evaluated the SDF's actual performance in IPC (Cabinet Offce, 1994) (Fig. 3.2). Considering the timing of this survey, one year after the completion of UNTAC, it seems likely that this experience of SDF deployment gradually changed public opinion favorably toward IPC-related activities. In early 2012, a few months before Abe's return to power, a similar survey showed that 43.5 percent of the respondents agreed that the SDF should place more emphasis on IPC-related works, while 48.8 percent gave a high opinion of the SDF's actual performance in the feld. This comparison clearly illustrates that anti-military public resistance considerably declined regarding SDF participation in UNPKOs and other IPC works (Cabinet Offce, 2012).

Two elements drove this relatively rapid change in public opinion. First, the deployment to Cambodia signifcantly increased the SDF's media exposure. The image of hardworking and friendly SDF troops operating in

Those who expect more emphasis on IPC-related works

Those who positively evaluate actual performance in IPC

**Fig. 3.2** Public opinion poll on the SDF's activities. (Cabinet Offce, 1994, 2012, Authors' creation)

an unstable Cambodia was widely reported by Japanese media, providing an opportunity for the SDF to regain the spotlight after a long period in the shadows. Second, anti-military oppositions argued that the SDF's overseas deployment would deteriorate relations with Japan's Asian neighbors. In reality, however, the SDF was more often welcomed by neighboring countries, which effectively undermined the validity of anti-military arguments (Fujishige, 2021; see Appendices C and D).

## 4 Summary of Chap. 3

This chapter traced the historical course of Japan's peacekeeping policy from 1992, when the PKO Act was established and the frst SDF contingent was dispatched to Cambodia, to 2012, immediately before the return of Prime Minister Abe. After providing an overview of the evolution of the narrow and broader versions of IPC policy, we examined how the GoJ reacted to the trends of "robustness" and "integration." As regards "robustness," the strict constraint on the SDF peacekeepers' use of weapons became a focus for controversy because the gap between the Japanese national caveats and the UN standard was gradually understood through frsthand experience in Cambodia, Rwanda, East Timor, and elsewhere. For this reason, the PKO Act was amended twice, in 1998 and 2001, but the revision remained to the minimal extent and the "coming-to-aid" duty was still excluded. Meanwhile, the trend of "integration" ft well with Japan's strength in engineering capacity, leading to the formation of civilmilitary cooperation called the "All Japan" approach. With this historical development over two decades, the traditional anti-militarism slowly but steadily declined.

## Notes

1. In addition to personnel contribution as the narrow IPC, the PKO Act prescribes "material cooperation," which is to provide necessary materials for the narrow IPC activities mentioned above. In 2018, the amendment to the PKO Act also authorized "material cooperation" even in the absence of a cease-fre agreement, when an international organization, such as UNHCR or the International Organization for Migration (IOM), organizes international humanitarian activities. During the period from 1992 to 2013, such "material cooperation" was carried out 19 times, not only to places where the SDF peacekeepers were deployed but also to other locations, such as Kosovo, Afghanistan, Sudan, Sri Lanka, and Palestine. In the "material cooperation" to Sri Lanka in 2009, for example, relief supplies for refugees, such as tents and water supply containers, were provided to humanitarian assistance activities run by the IOM.


## References (In English)


#### References (In Japanese)


building]. *International Relations*, *2017*(186), 186\_97-186\_112. https://doi. org/10.11375/kokusaiseiji.186\_97


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## Recent Developments in Japan's International Peace Cooperation Under the Second Abe Government 2012–2020

1 Reforming Japanese Security Policy, 2013–2015

## *1.1 The National Security Strategy and the Other Signifcant Changes*

Shinzo Abe, the president of the ruling LDP, was frst inaugurated as Japan's prime minister in 2006, succeeding Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi. However, due to health problems, Abe was forced to resign just a year later. Following Abe's 2007 resignation, the LDP government experienced political instability and was soon replaced by the DPJ in 2009. The DPJ government also faced internal challenges and weak public support, which led to Abe's second premiership at the end of 2012. After his return to power, Prime Minister Abe enjoyed a frm political basis and remained in power for nearly eight years, until September 2020. Domestic political stability provided Abe with considerable latitude to push through ambitious (as well as controversial) reforms in Japan's security policy.

During his frst term, Abe had already attempted to reconsider Japan's security policy by commissioning the frst Security Experts Panel in April 2007. However, he stepped down from power in September 2007 before the frst panel submitted their outcome report in June 2008 (see Chap. 3). Soon after returning to power, Abe commissioned the second round of the Security Experts Panel in February 2013, resulting in the release of an updated version of the policy recommendations in May 2014. Abe's bold reform of Japan's security policy framework took place along the blueprint outlined by the Security Experts Panel's recommendations in 2008 and 2014.

We will present here the three major features of Abe's ambitious reforms of Japanese security policy. First, as soon as he returned to power, Abe began to formulate a comprehensive national security policy framework. This was published a year later in December 2013 as the "National Security Strategy" (MoFA, 2013). The National Security Strategy presents a series of fundamental principles, not only narrowly for defense policy but also more comprehensively for Japan's security policy. It was the frst time that the GoJ had articulated such explicit principles for the entire vision of its security policy, uniting various issue domains in both military and nonmilitary affairs into a single strategic space of security policy.1 Almost concurrently, the National Security Council (NSC), which is the ministerial organization on security affairs, and the National Security Secretariat (NSS), the administrative body to support the NSC, were established.

At the core of the set of policies presented by the National Security Strategy was an idea called "Proactive Contribution to Peace," which is based on the principle of international cooperation. This new concept offers an expansive understanding of Japan's security policy. Assuming that Japan's security policy is clearly connected with the stability of the Asia-Pacifc region and, more broadly, with that of international society, the National Security Strategy declares its clear commitment to its alliance with the US, as well as with larger international security. By interpreting the concept of "security" in a comprehensive sense, rather than in the sense of narrow national defense, the National Security Strategy also clearly articulates an intent to combine military and nonmilitary measures. A similar catchphrase—"International Contribution"—was often heard in the frst half of the 1990s, but this was more exclusively focused on Japan's contribution to multinational activities, such as the dispatch of the SDF to UNPKOs. In contrast, the 2013 version advocated a sweeping vision that encompassed national, regional, and international security. It emphasized alliance relations both with the US and with other friendly states within the multilateral framework. Moreover, it proposed to create close linkages between military tools and development aid in providing overseas assistance. Under the second Abe administration, Japan's peacekeeping policy would be situated within this grand design of expanded national security as a whole rather than in the narrow context of supporting the UN.

To implement the extensive renovation of security policy laid out in the National Security Strategy, two key policy papers were revised: one for defense policy and the other for development aid. Concurrent with National Security Strategy adoption in December 2013, the National Defense Policy Guidelines (NDPG) (MoD, 2020),2 which had last been revised in 2010, was also updated to integrate defense policy into the allinclusive national security framework. Two years later, in February 2015, the Development Cooperation Policy Outline was also issued. Unlike the preceding document (The ODA Policy Outline, last revised in 2003; MoFA, 2015),3 which had narrowly focused on development issues, this new charter of 2015 aimed to incorporate development aid as a part of the national security policy framework.

This new policy goal expanded the scope of "Development Cooperation" from its narrow focus on socioeconomic aid to a more holistic vision that also covers political issues such as peacebuilding, governance, and human rights (MoFA, 2015). It also exhibited the intent to connect public fnancial resources and activities with those of various actors outside the government, namely UNPKOs, NGOs, and private businesses. These efforts confrmed Japan's motivation to pursue greater "integration," as typically seen in the promotion of the "All Japan" approach, combining the SDF's peacekeeping efforts (*inter alia*, the JEG's construction works) and Japan's ODA programs in order to provide direct assistance to the local population (see Chap. 3).

#### *1.2 Amending the Offcial Interpretation of the Right of Collective Defense*

After the National Security Strategy, Abe's next target was to create a legal force to guide the new grand vision of security policy. Although the comprehensive security policy reform package included amending the PKO Act, Abe mostly aimed to enhance the alliance partnership with the US. In those days, concerns were rising about the unstable strategic environment in the neighborhood, especially involving China and North Korea. The intensifcation of security threats in the neighborhood had made Japan keener to strengthen its alliance partnership with the US. Nevertheless, those efforts ran the political risk of being perceived by the anti-military opposition and the public as violating the constitutional ban on the exercise of collective defense rights (see Chap. 3). Since 1972, the GoJ had held this offcial position concerning collective self-defense rights: "Japan, as a sovereign nation, has an inherent right to collective defense under international law, but the restrictions imposed by Article 9 of the Constitution are such that the government cannot constituently exercise this right" (Sakata, 2013, p. 64, as cited in Mori, 2019, p. 4).

The Abe government changed the interpretation of the Constitution in July 2014 to permit the exercise of collective self-defense rights, albeit with some reservations (MoD, n.d.). The activation of the collective selfdefense right considerably expanded the scope for broader IPC, especially with regard to the adoption of the International Peace Support Act, which will be further discussed later in this chapter.

## *1.3 The Move Toward "Integration" Under the Second Abe Administration*

The second Abe administration also emphasized a move toward "integration" as expressed in the National Security Strategy and in the Development Cooperation Charter (Uesugi et al., 2021). The Abe government not only promoted the "All Japan" approach along these lines, but also intended to utilize the SDF's engineering capability, as expressed at the Leaders' Summit on Peacekeeping in New York, in both 2014 and 2015 (Cabinet Secretariat, 2015). Abe clearly expressed his will not only to dispatch the JEG to the feld, but also to provide training for military engineers from African countries in order to facilitate the rapid deployment of peacekeepers. The JEG also took the initiative in 2015 of publishing the frst-ever UNDPKO manual for its engineering forces sent to UNPKOs, which was updated in 2020. A large part of these efforts toward greater "integration," however, was set back by the JEG's abrupt withdrawal from South Sudan in 2017 (see Chap. 8). The GoJ, therefore, had to focus on activities other than its personnel deployment (see Chap. 9).

## *1.4 The Impact of Peace and Security Legislation on Japan's Peacekeeping Policy*

In May 2015, Prime Minister Abe submitted the Peace and Security Legislation bills to the Diet to establish a legal foundation for his review of security policy from 2013 to 2014. Abe's very ambitious intent to sweep away a whole set of long-standing agendas in security policy, however, raised suspicion and caution from the Japanese public, with accusations from remnants of the anti-military camp calling them the "war bills" (The Central Committee of JCP, 2015). However, just four months later, the Abe administration pushed the bills through the Diet rather easily, as the LDP-led ruling coalition occupied over two-thirds of the legislature. The Peace and Security Legislation was enacted in September 2015 and came into effect in March 2016.

The Peace and Security Legislation comprised ten legal amendments and one new law. As part of this wholesale legal renovation, the amended PKO Act and the new International Peace Support Act were most closely tied to Japan's peacekeeping and IPC-related policies. The following sections will examine their impacts in closer detail.

## 2 Amendments to the PKO Act4

#### *2.1 Overview of the 2015 Amendments*

The PKO Act had been previously amended twice, in 1998 and 2001, but these changes remained minimal and only within the scope of selfpreservation (see Chap. 3). Even after these revisions, a considerable gap remained between Japanese policy and the international trend of "robustness." To address these remaining problems, the PKO Act was amended a third time as a part of the Peace and Security Legislation in 2015.

Three important policy changes were made as a result of the third amendment to the PKO Act. First, the provisions on the use of weapons by the SDF peacekeepers were relatively relaxed by adding the "comingto-aid" duty, which is the JEG's very limited security role, mainly to protect Japanese nationals at a distant location and the "providing protection to the local population" (hereafter, "provision of protection") duty, which denotes the infantry's mission to protect the local population, properties, and so on. These are especially crucial in having expanded the permitted range of weapons use for the "execution of missions (*nimmu-suiko*)" purpose beyond the scope of self-preservation.5 This was the frst time that the PKO Act had included the stipulations to authorize the use of weapons for "execution of missions" (for more details, see below). Moreover, the "joint defense of a camp" duty was added to expand the permitted range for the use of weapons within the category of self-preservation. Furthermore, the amendments to the PKO Act in 2015 also introduced the following new activities, namely the "internationally coordinated operations for peace and security," Security Sector Reform (SSR)-related activities, and the preventive deployment of the SDF before an armed confict breaks out (see below for more details).

## *2.2 Defning the "Use of Force" in the Japanese Legal Framework*

Before examining the details of newly added roles, it is necessary to scrutinize the defnition of "use of force" in light of the constitutional framework. As we have seen so far, the Constitution clearly prohibits the use of force, and hence, the allowed range of activities for the SDF peacekeepers has been strictly constrained to avoid the use of force (see Chaps. 2 and 3). When the bill for the PKO Act was discussed at the Diet in September 1991, the GoJ clearly differentiated the "use of force" from the "use of weapons" allowed for the SDF peacekeepers in the PKO Act:

In general, the "use of force" in Paragraph 1, Article 9 of the Constitution denotes an act of fghting as part of an international armed confict by [Japan's] physical and personnel organizations, while the "use of weapons" in Article 24 in the [PKO] bill is defned as the use of frearms, explosives, bladed weapons, and other machines, implements, and devices that are aimed to hurt or kill people or to destroy things as a means of armed fghting […]. (GoJ, 1991)

This clarifes the details of "use of weapons," but the defnition of "use of force" seems more abstract and somewhat unclear, especially concerning the meaning of "international armed confict." Later, a more precise defnition of "international armed confict" was provided. In 2002, the GoJ defned "international armed confict" as "a situation in which *state or quasi-state organizations* have a disagreement over a specifc issue, stick to their own opposing positions and are not willing to concede [emphasis added]" (Koizumi, 2002).

Combined with the 1991 defnition, mentioned above, this offcial defnition in 2002 clarifes a very important point: that the SDF's use of weapons will be regarded as the "use of force" when they do so against a "state or quasi-state organization" as an adversary party. The term "state organization" can be straightforwardly understood as a political entity that is entitled to the status of a sovereign state. But what is a "quasi-state organization"? In 2003, Director-General of Defense (equivalent to the Minister of Defense)6 Shigeru Ishiba (2003) articulated the concept of a quasi-state organization as an organization that fulflled all or some of the three requirements of a state (territory, people, and political system) and could serve as an independent agent in an international armed confict, albeit without international recognition as a formal sovereign state. According to him, the Taliban in Afghanistan exemplifed a quasi-state organization, while a much smaller-sized group would not fall into this category. While acknowledging this as his own personal view, Ishiba also stated that it would be impossible to defne exactly what a quasi-state organization would be, and the issue of whether an actor could be regarded as a quasi-state organization or not would depend on the interpretation of a given situation. In short, this meant that it was virtually left as a political decision to determine whether or not a situation would be regarded as the "use of force," leaving a risk of arbitrary use.

### *2.3 Use of Weapons for "Self-Preservation" and "Execution of Missions"*

Next, let us examine the distinction between the use of weapons for "selfpreservation" and the "execution of missions" purposes. The differentiation is very confusing but the Director-General of the Cabinet Legislation Bureau, Yusuke Yokobatake (2015), articulated the differences as follows:

The use of force in Paragraph 1, Article 9 of the Constitution is […] an international armed confict by [Japan's] physical and personnel organizations or, specifcally, the conduct of hostilities as part of an armed confict generated between [or among] state or quasi-state organizations. […] Article 9 of the Constitution allows our country to use force only to the minimum extent necessary under an unavoidable situation to defend our country. The use of force beyond this or for other [purposes] is not permitted. […] [The GoJ] has decreed that even an adversary party is a state or quasi-state organization, the use of weapons for self-preservation as the natural right and the protection of armament and the other [equipment of the SDF] does not constitute the use of force, which is prohibited by the Constitution. […] [The GoJ] has also decreed that […] the use of weapons for "execution of missions" or for "coming-to-aid" duty would constitute the use of force if an adversary party is a state or quasi-state organization and this would generate a problem related to the Constitution.

In other words, if it is a case of self-preservation, then SDF personnel's use of weapons will not constitute the use of force (Nakatani, 2015); hence, the SDF peacekeepers are allowed to use weapons regardless of whether the adversary party is a state or a quasi-state organization. Put another way, SDF personnel are now automatically allowed to use weapons under this category because self-preservation has been recognized as a natural right that applies to all humanity.

In contrast, in the case of the "execution of missions" purpose, an SDF member is permitted to use weapons only when assigned a specifc duty: either "provision of protection" or "coming-to-aid" duty. The use of weapons for "execution of missions" exceeds the range of self-preservation, but it would be permitted "only if a state or quasi-state organization does not appear [at the scene where the SDF personnel operate] as an adversary party" (Yokobatake, 2015). The GoJ thus excludes the (theoretical) possibility of confronting a state or quasi-state organization, or more essentially the use of force in an international armed confict, in relation to the use of weapons for the "execution of missions" purpose.

Moreover, the GoJ expects that the "execution of missions" duty would accompany only the limited use of weapons for police-like activities, such as the rescue of Japanese nationals with consent from a host nation, even if the SDF personnel use arms beyond the "self-preservation" purpose (MoFA, 2014).7 This reasoning also aims to minimize the extent of the use of weapons even if it goes beyond the range of "self-preservation."

#### *2.4 The Revision to the Fifth of the Five Principles*

To avoid the danger of situations constituting the use of force, which is banned by the Constitution, SDF personnel would be assigned tasks for the "execution of missions" purpose, either for "provision of protection" or "coming-to-aid" duties, only when the absence of a state or quasi-state organization as an adversary party could be confrmed. For this purpose, the GoJ would assign these tasks to the SDF personnel only on the condition that consent for the conduct of the UNPKO as well as Japan's participation in such operations could be consistently maintained by the host nation as well as by other concerned parties (Nakatani, 2015). Furthermore, the GoJ will make a fnal decision on whether such consent and acceptance are constantly maintained based on the deliberation of the NSC.

Here lies the hypothetical premise that there will be no danger of the SDF peacekeepers being involved in an armed confict if all warring parties, either state or quasi-state organizations, give consistent consent for the conduct of a UNPKO as well as for the SDF's deployment to the feld. Along this line, the Abe administration inserted this requirement (the existence of consistent consent from major concerned parties regarding the deployment of a UNPKO as well as the participation of a Japanese contingent in the mission) as the ffth of the revised version of the Five Principles as a prerequisite to allow the SDF to use weapons for the "execution of missions," namely the "provision of protection" and "comingto-aid" duties (MoFA, 2014, 2016): The ffth item of the new Five Principles reads as follows:

The use of weapons shall be limited to the minimum necessity for the protection of the lives of personnel dispatched, in principle. *When the consent for acceptance is deemed to be consistently maintained, the use of weapons in defense of the mission mandate is allowed in accordance with specifc requirements* [emphasis added]. (MoFA, n.d.)

It goes without saying that this stipulation was introduced to make sure that SDF personnel tasked with "execution of missions" would never be involved in an international armed confict, avoiding the use of force against a state or quasi-state organization. Nonetheless, it is highly questionable whether such a premise can be maintained in the feld. In an internal war, which represents the major type of armed confict today, political will and power, as well as the chain of command, are often fragmented and changeable. Under such political and hierarchical instability, the level of consent to the presence of peacekeepers changes frequently. Hence, it could be even fctional to assume that such constant consent can be made in the circumstance where the cotemporary UNPKOs are being deployed. As a result, the addition of this stipulation entailed the risk of widening the gap between the Japanese national legal requirement and the reality of UNPKOs, as we would actually see in South Sudan (see Chaps. 1 and 8).

### *2.5 Three Types of UNPKO for the Application of the New Five Principles*

With the 2015 amendment to the PKO Act, the categorization of three types of UNPKO was newly inserted into the application of the Five Principles (Table 4.1). The introduction of types (b) and (c) relatively loosened the requirement to fulfll the Five Principles, as it would suffce to satisfy only three (Principles 2, 4, and 5).8 In particular, type (b) was


**Table 4.1** Three types of UNPKO for the application of the new fve principles

The 2015 PKO Act (2015, art. 3, i), Authors' creation

employed to endorse the contribution of the SDF to South Sudan (see Chap. 8).

## *2.6 The Relaxation of Weapons Use Requirements: The "Provision of Protection" Duty*

Just like the PKF's main duties, the ban upon which had been lifted in 2001, the "provision of protection" duty would be basically assigned to infantry troops that specialize in combat missions. In 2015, the "provision of protection" duty was added mainly because the "PKF main duties," which focused on the classic way of peacekeeping (e.g., truce monitoring and patrol), had already become outdated in the contemporary UNPKOs (see Chaps. 1 and 2). The GoJ defnes the "provision of protection" duty as the task of providing security to the local population with "the use of weapons to the extent necessary to protect the lives, bodies, and properties of the local population, affected people and other populations requiring protection, or to repel obstructions to the execution of their duties" (Nakatani, 2015). The addition of the "provision of protection" duty intended to catch up with the recent trend of infantry roles in a UNPKO, such as robust peacekeeping for the purpose of PoC. Indeed, the purpose—providing protection to the locals—seems very similar to the PoC mission in the UNPKOs, which falls into the category of the "defense of the mandate" task (see Chap. 1). According to the GoJ, however, the concept of "execution of missions" differs from the notion of "defense of the mandate" in the UN standard: the former strictly excludes the possibility of using weapons against a state or quasi-state organization, in order to avoid the use of force, while the latter has no such restriction (Kishida, 2015a). For this reason, as mentioned above, the new Five Principles demand consistent consent from all concerned parties to avoid the possibility of a state or quasi-state organization existing as an adversary party in the feld where the SDF peacekeepers operate.

In practice, it seems very unlikely that the GSDF infantry would be deployed for the "provision of protection" duty. This is not only because it could be highly dangerous and is deemed politically too risky for the GoJ, but also because, as we will see later, this task will require offcial consent from the Diet prior to dispatch, which could be very hard to obtain. Indeed, the Japanese infantry corps has still never been dispatched for peacekeeping missions, despite the removal of the "freeze" on the PKF's main duties in 2001. In sum, there exists only a slim chance that Japan's infantry will ever be assigned to "provision of protection" duty, at least for the foreseeable future.

### *2.7 The Relaxation of Weapons Use Requirements: The "Coming-to-Aid" Duty*

The "coming-to-aid" duty denotes the task of coming to the aid of individuals related to the UNPKO (or other mission), other than the SDF personnel themselves in the same contingent, who are at a distant location where they are under attack or are facing imminent danger, in response to an urgent request for protection. As seen earlier (see Chap. 3), the amendment to the PKO Act in 2001 authorized the use of weapons under the "self-preservation" category to protect those other than the SDF personnel themselves if these people are at the same scene as the SDF members or are under their supervision. If these people are located at a distance from the SDF, according to the GoJ's interpretation, the logic of "selfpreservation" cannot be applied. For this reason, the "coming-to-aid" duty, as well as the "provision of protection" duty, would be deemed to fall under the "execution of missions" category. Unlike the "provision of protection" duty, however, the "coming-to-aid" duty does not require offcial consent from the Diet prior to dispatch because it is an emergency operation and needs prompt action. This makes the "coming-to-aid" duty more feasible than the "provision of protection" duty.

The "coming-to-aid" duty is basically assigned to an SDF unit other than the infantry corps—usually the JEG. The engineering corps, which is primarily assigned for the "coming-to-aid" duty, is categorized as combat support within the military. Their intended role is to assist the combatoriented forces, made up of infantry forces, by developing a conducive environment on the ground. In other words, the engineers are not particularly well-suited to direct combat-oriented duties, although they do have the basic fghting skills and necessary equipment to prepare for an emergency. An infantry force basically assumes a combat and securityrelated role; an engineering force may engage in these tasks, but only when infantry troops are not available.

Even when assigned to "coming-to-aid" duty, therefore, the JEG remains expected to primarily engage in construction and infrastructure development while preparing for the use of weapons in an emergency. In the meantime, security duties, especially the PoC mission, would basically be the responsibility of the infantry forces of a host nation and/or a UN mission. Nevertheless, if these infantries cannot provide security when UN-related or other personnel are in imminent danger, then the JEG empowered with the "coming-to-aid" duty would be allowed to use weapons to rescue them even if they are found in a remote location (Cabinet Secretariat et al., 2016). To do so, the JEG is permitted to use weapons beyond self-preservation, but only to the minimum extent required and as a temporary emergency measure.

In these cases, the JEG are directed to save those who are in need of protection when in an emergency, such as personnel of the UN, other international organizations, and NGOs, as well as any Japanese nationals with close relations to the relevant Japanese delegation (Ishikawa, 2015).9 A case ftting this description actually occurred in the former Zaire in 1994 and East Timor in 2002 (see Chaps. 3 and 6). In the meantime, the protection of the local population goes beyond the scope of "coming-toaid" duty. So far, there is only one precedent of an engineering unit ever being assigned a "coming-to-aid" duty during the period from December 2016 to May 2017: the UNMISS example. In practice, the JEG withdrew from the young African nation in 2017 before actually performing that "coming-to-aid" duty, which means that there is no empirical case in this category. We will examine this issue again in Chaps. 8 and 9.

#### *2.8 Catching Up with "Robustness"?*

Seemingly, the Abe government added these two new tasks to the PKO Act in the 2015 amendment as a nod toward the trend of "robustness" in the UNPKOs and in line with previous expert recommendations. In fact, the inclusion of these two duties for the "execution of missions" purpose brought some formal changes to the PKO Act, in the sense that it now went beyond the previous focus on self-preservation. Nonetheless, it is highly doubtful to what extent the introduction of these new duties has actually reduced the gap in "robustness" between the Japanese legal system and global UNPKO trends.

The infuence of policy recommendations by the IPC Panel in 2002 and the Security Experts Panel in 2008 and 2014 (see Chap. 3) was clearly behind the 2015 amendments to the PKO Act. These three expert committees all expressed serious concerns about the wide gap in "robustness" between Japan and the rest of the world, and strongly demanded that the GoJ follow the trends of UNPKOs. Their policy paper (2008) criticized the gap between Japan's position and the international standard as follows:

Japan applies standards that are far different from *international standards* on the use of weapons. Consequently, the SDF participating in UNPKOs has to act in accordance with standards that are different from those applied to the units of other countries, even though they are engaged in joint operations. This makes it diffcult for the SDF to participate actively in UNPKOs [emphasis added].10 (pp. 12–13)

The quotation above clearly illustrates high motivation on the part of Japanese experts, such as academics and former UN offcials, to conform to the "international standard" (in "robustness") by seeking to maximize the size of its personnel contribution as much as possible. Bearing the common motivation of "catching up with the international trend," the three panels' reports, especially those published in 2008 and 2014, called for the addition of the "coming-to-aid" and "provision of protection" duties (Prime Minister of Japan and His Cabinet, 2002, para. 2–8; The Security Experts Panel, 2008, p. 13, 2014, pp. 37–38). For example, the 2008 report urged the inclusion of the "coming-to-aid" duty as follows:

[I]f the SDF does not come to the aid of units or personnel from other participating countries that are in danger and in need of help, solely because the SDF is not allowed to use weapons in such cases under Japan's unique standards, this is contrary to common sense and may be criticized by the international community. (p. 13)

The report also called for the addition of the "provision of protection" duty as follows: "[I]t is necessary to allow the SDF to use weapons […] to remove obstructive attempts against its missions in accordance with UN PKO standards."

Gradually encouraged by the trends in the UNPKOs via the expert recommendations, the "provision of protection" and "coming-to-aid" duties were added in the 2015 amendments to the PKO Act. These amendments allowed the SDF peacekeepers to use weapons for the "execution of missions" purpose, which would go beyond self-preservation. In actuality, however, it remains highly questionable to what extent the addition of new tasks under the "execution of missions" purpose has reduced the gap in "robustness" between Japan and the general standard in the UNPKOs.

A gap emerged between the international standard on the use of weapons, as claimed by the panel, and the Japanese peculiar standard, as adopted by the 2015 amendment (Kurosaki, 2017). The difference originated from the discrepancy between the panel's recommendations and the stipulations in the 2015 amended PKO Act. First, the panel asserted that the "coming-to-aid" duty should be included as a "self-preservation" type because this understanding is commonly held in the UNPKOs. If categorized as a self-preservation type, the "coming-to-aid" duty would never constitute the use of force and would thus be exempt from the constraints regarding relations with state and quasi-state organizations. In reality, the Abe government categorized it as an "execution of the missions" type, and consequently, the requirement to avoid encounters with state and quasi-state organizations as adversary parties strictly restricted the JEG's leeway for performing "coming-to-aid" duties.

Second, and more essentially, the panel also demanded that the "use of weapons" for the UNPKOs not be equated with the "use of force," prohibited under Chapter 51 of the UN Charter. If this were the case, the peacekeepers' "use of weapons" would not violate the Constitution, even if categorized as an "execution of the mission" duty. The 2014 report (The Security Experts Panel, 2014) insisted as follows:

[T]here is no country that interprets the use of weapons recognized by the international standards of UNPKOs as use of force in international relations prohibited under the U.N. Charter. Therefore, the use of weapons by the SDF should be regarded as not constituting the use of force prohibited under Article 9 of the Constitution, even if the weapons are used for socalled "*kaketsuke-keigo*" [the "coming-to-aid" duty] or to remove obstructive attempts against its missions [the "execution of missions" duty] in accordance with relevant international standards, regardless of whether or not the attacker is a mere criminal group or "a state or 'quasi-state organization.'" (p. 38)

Despite the panel's strong demand, Prime Minister Abe fatly refused this recommendation because this was a very sensitive issue relating to the interpretation of Article 9 in the Constitution. On May 15, 2014, the same day when the Security Experts Panel's second report was released, Abe (2014) held a press conference and candidly declined the panel's recommendation as being incompatible with the GoJ's offcial standpoint.

Instead, the Abe administration adopted the unique Japanese interpretation, instead of the international standard view, that the "provision of protection" and "coming-to-aid" duties would constitute the use of force, if directed against a state or quasi-state organization as an adversary party (Kurosaki, 2017). Due to this unique interpretation, as stated above, the unique Japanese category of "execution of missions," which would cover both "provision of protection" and "coming-to-aid" duties, allowed only a much smaller range for the use of weapons for peacekeepers in comparison with the international standard of the "defense of the mandate."

Prime Minister Abe commented on the addition of the "coming-toaid" duty as follows: "[It] has made it possible for the SDF to come to the aid of Japanese nationals and NGOs in a manner that is *very close to the relevant international standards*" (emphasis added) (Kurosaki, 2017, p. 200). The phrase "very close to the relevant international standards" implied that the "coming-to-aid" duty essentially differed from the international standards, excluding the use of weapons against a state or quasistate organization as an adversary party. Moreover, as seen earlier, the GoJ clearly differentiated Japan's peculiar category of the "execution of missions" from the international standard of the "defense of mandates."

Needless to say, the GoJ introduced these distinctions to eliminate the possibility of an unconstitutional use of force (Kishida, 2015a) because the anti-military camp was very critical of the use of weapons beyond the scope of "self-preservation," with serious concern about Japan's leaning toward "robustness" (Inoue, 2015). We can assume that closing the gap in "robustness" might not have been unimportant for Abe, but his top priority was to smoothly enact the entire Peace and Security Legislation while reducing the risk of infaming the anti-military opposition. As a result of this compromise, which contradicted the Security Experts Panel's recommendations, the addition of new roles that went beyond selfpreservation reduced the "robustness" gap only to a limited extent.

In practice, meanwhile, it is very doubtful whether such a distinction can be made in the feld. The recent UNPKOs are often operated in an uncertain with blurred boundaries, in which it might be extremely diffcult to differentiate between state and non-state actors. Even though new duties were added beyond the scope of self-preservation, a considerable gap remained between the Japanese standard on the use of weapons under the "execution of missions" category, and the international standard of use of force for the defense of the mandate (see Chap. 1). This limit has generated practical diffculty for the GoJ in deploying the SDF for the "coming-to-aid" duty (as well as the "provision of protection" duty) and, presumably, developed in the troop withdrawal from South Sudan in 2017.

## 3 Introducing the Other New Roles

### *3.1 The Joint Defense of a Camp*

The 2015 amendment to the PKO Act also relaxed the use of weapons under the "self-preservation" category: the joint defense of a camp. While deployed to a UNPKO, an SDF contingent often shares their camp with (a) fellow peacekeeping unit(s) contributed from other countries. Previously, the PKO Act did not allow the SDF personnel to actively protect an adjacent camp, even if it was under armed attack. The 2015 amendments to the PKO Act enabled the SDF to jointly protect camps under attack (Cabinet Secretariat, n.d.). The protection of a joint camp falls into the traditional category of self-preservation and the SDF personnel would be allowed to use weapons even against a state or quasi-state organization.

### *3.2 The Internationally Coordinated Operations for Peace and Security and the Other Additions to the Amended PKO Act*

The original PKO Act envisaged three types of activities, namely UN peace operations, international humanitarian relief operations, and international supervision of elections (see Chap. 3). The 2015 amendments subsequently added a fourth category, namely "internationally coordinated operations for peace and security." These are operations that are similar to a UNPKO but take place outside the UN framework. To qualify as an internationally coordinated operation for peace and security, an operation needs approval in the form of a UNSCR or a UN Economic and Social Council resolution, or to receive a request from an international institution, such as one of the UN-related agencies (e.g., the UNHCR) or a regional organization (e.g., the European Union), or from concerned governments. This change was made in response to the recent increase in peace operations outside the UN framework. Under the new arrangement, Japan is now allowed to dispatch the SDF to support non-UN-affliated operations; for example, military personnel have already been dispatched to a non-UN peace operation in the Sinai Peninsula since 2019 (see Chap. 9).

#### *3.3 Policies Related to SSR*

The amendment of the PKO Act in 2015 was also notable for introducing assistance to SSR: capacity-building support for fragile or confict-affected states that specifcally targets the reform and reconstruction of securityrelated institutions, ranging from armed forces, the police, and the judiciary to civilian oversight bodies, such as parliaments and bureaucracies. In recent years, SSR has attracted increasing attention in UN peace operations where establishing post-confict security is by far the top priority.

Japan has little experience of working on SSR in the context of IPC, partly because there was formerly no provision for it in the PKO Act. However, Japan does have a record of similar support both within and outside the UNPKO framework, as demonstrated by its assistance with police reform in East Timor, through which it introduced community policing to the young nation (see Chap. 6). That said, Japan has so far been involved in only a limited number of cases, such as the East Timor example and also through bilateral arrangements with Indonesia, the Philippines, and elsewhere (National Police Agency, n.d.).

#### *3.4 Adopting the International Peace Support Act*

In the omnibus Peace and Security Legislation reform package, the International Peace Support Act was the only entirely newly enacted law. This is the "general law," or the "permanent law," for the overseas dispatch of the SDF (see Chap. 3), especially to join a non-UN multinational force with UNSCR authorization. In principle, the SDF could only be dispatched abroad under the PKO Act and the JDR Act. When dispatching the SDF abroad for other purposes, the GoJ had to enact a new law each time, as seen in the case of the Special Measures Law against Terrorism in 2001 and the Special Measures Law on Humanitarian and Reconstruction Assistance in Iraq in 2003 (see Chap. 3). Enacting a law, however, takes time, and this delay prevented Japan from responding to urgent calls to dispatch the SDF abroad. To overcome this problem, the GoJ had sought to adopt a general law, which was fnally achieved by the International Peace Support Act. The new law now allowed the SDF to be dispatched in support of foreign military forces and other personnel in a non-UN multinational force whenever they are in "situation that the international community is collectively addressing for peace and security" (Mori, 2019, p. 7).

The International Peace Support Act allows the GoJ to participate in multinational forces outside of framework of UNPKOs without a new lawmaking each time. At the same time, however, the statute leaves many restrictions in place to avoid being involved in the use of force in a foreign country. Most critically, the new law requires prior consent from the Diet before the deployment of the SDF. This requirement would make it very diffcult for the GoJ to deploy the SDF, even without the need for another new lawmaking. Even if not impossible, the stipulation would necessarily delay the deployment process. Moreover, although the new law permits the SDF to assist its allies only outside of the specifc area in which combat actions are taking place and expects them to concentrate on rear-end support, such as logistics supply and transportation, it is still questionable whether it is realistic or feasible to maintain this distinction under volatile conditions.

## 4 Summary of Chap. 4

This chapter has examined how Japanese peacekeeping and related policies have recently changed under the second Abe administration, from 2013 to 2020. During this period, the GoJ largely caught up with the international peacekeeping trend of "robustness" in terms of the legal framework, such as the 2015 amendments to include the "provision of protection" and "coming-to-aid" duties in the PKO Act. Yet, in reality, it remains very diffcult and politically risky for the GoJ to assign such expanded duties to SDF personnel. Therefore, the "robustness" gap between Japan and the rest of the international society remains considerable in practical terms. Meanwhile, the second Abe administration also paid careful attention to the international peacekeeping trend of "integration," prioritizing the "All Japan" approach above all. Reforms during the second Abe term expanded the leeway for Japan to dispatch its personnel to non-UN missions under the category of "internationally coordinated operations for peace and security" and with the new International Peace Support Act.

## Notes


from the *Komeito*, the collation partner of ruling LDP. Characterized with the moderate anti-military inclination the Buddhist party tends to seek tighter regulations on the SDF's roles (see Chap. 2). Among the three types, the third item, the preventive deployment was hinted by the UN Preventive Deployment Force, deployed in Macedonia from 1995 to 1999. But this was only one existing case of preventive deployment as a part of UNPKOs and it seems very unlikely that another similar operation will be established in the future. According to the former government offcial, meanwhile, it could be theoretically possible to apply this type when the SDF is deployed for the emergency disaster relief purpose and if it may be succeeded to the deployment of UN peacekeepers, as it actually happed in Haiti in the 2010s (see Chap. 7; M. Tsuzuki, personal commutation, July 9, 2021).


## References (In English)


#### References (In Japanese)


Armed Aggression, (11), (statement No. 194)]. The 156th Diet. https:// kokkai.ndl.go.jp/#/detail?minId=115615053X01120030604&spkNu m=194&single


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## Cambodia: Japan's First UNPKO Contribution

## 1 The Cambodian Civil War and the Paris Peace Agreement

Although Cambodia became independent from France in 1953, the 1970 coup plunged Cambodia into a civil war that lasted for more than two decades. In the late 1970s, the *Khmer Rouge* (the Pol Pot-led radical communist faction) seized the country to establish a regime of terror. Even worse, the civil confict gradually developed into a proxy war between China and Vietnam, resulting in the Vietnamese incursion of Cambodia. This eventually led to the collapse of the China-sponsored *Khmer Rouge* regime in 1979, although internal confict continued between the pro-Vietnam Heng Samrin faction and the tripartite anti-Vietnam alliance, including the remnants of the *Khmer Rouge*, the Prince Sihanouk royalist faction, and the anti-communist Son Sann faction (Country Watch, n.d.).

In 1989, the end of the Cold War led to the withdrawal of Vietnamese troops and added momentum to fnally conclude the civil war that had raged in Cambodia for two decades. In 1990, Japan hosted a Cambodian peace conference in Tokyo, which ultimately led to the signing of a negotiated "Paris Peace Agreement" in 1991 (United States Institute of Peace, 2000). The peace agreement involved Cambodia's four major warring parties, namely the *Khmer Rouge*, *Heng Samrin*, *Sihanouk*, and *Son Sann* factions, as well as 19 concerned countries. It laid the foundation for postconfict statebuilding anchored in a general election for a new government as well as the creation of a UN transitional authority, or UNTAC, which was charged with implementing the election. The four signatory parties agreed to a permanent cease-fre and made disarmament commitments while also accepting that these plans would be overseen by UNTAC.

Having been reluctant to participate from the very beginning, the *Khmer Rouge* virtually withdrew from the peace agreement soon after it was signed. Due to their substantive retreat from the peace process, Cambodia was again dragged into violence even while the formal peace agreement remained intact. During the mission's one-and-a-half-year duration, the *Khmer Rouge* continued to threaten UN peacekeepers and civilians working for UNTAC. Despite the *de facto* collapse of the ceasefre agreement, UNTAC continued to be operated to implement the general election on time, widening the gap between the legal framework and the harsh reality on the ground.

## 2 International Legitimacy of UNTAC

## *2.1 Statebuilding Under the UN Transitional Authority*

To implement the Paris Peace Agreement, UNTAC was established in February 1992 following UNSCR 745 under the leadership of the SRSG Yasushi Akashi, a high-ranking Japanese UN offcial. UNTAC was one of the most representative examples of multifunctional PKOs in the 1990s (see Chap. 1). It was assigned a very ambitious role as a transitional authority supporting the foundation of a new Cambodian government. To achieve this, UNTAC was mandated with various duties for both restoring peace and running the civilian administration (e.g., refugee repatriation support). UNTAC's most important task was to conduct a general election safely and on time in May 1993. To carry out its multipurpose assignments, UNTAC was established as the largest multifunctional peacekeeping mission ever, staffed by nearly 20,000 uniformed personnel (including both military troops and civilian police) and several thousand civilians (UNDPO, n.d.).

#### *2.2 The Challenges in Implementing the Cambodian General Election*

Despite high aspirations, UNTAC was troubled by the *Khmer Rouge*, which continued to resist the peace accords. Facing increasing insecurity, UNTAC stepped into higher-risk duties beyond its authorized mandates. In other words, peacekeepers—both troops and civilian police offcers—were unexpectedly assigned more dangerous tasks without prior preparation and with no legal basis. Tensions continued to escalate ahead of the upcoming general elections, which were scheduled for May 1993. Increasing insecurity and public anxiety motivated UNTAC to act even in the absence of a new authorized mandate. More peacekeepers—both military and police personnel—were assigned to combat the security threats posed by the *Khmer Rouge*. Not surprisingly, the number of peacekeeper fatalities soared, risking damage to UNTAC's overall credibility. Regardless, the general election was held without serious disturbances (Findlay, 1995), and a new government was subsequently formed. Despite numerous challenges, UNTAC achieved its most important goal, and this success enhanced trust from international society.

## 3 Political Background to Japan's UNTAC Participation

#### *3.1 Momentum Toward "International Contribution"*

This section considers the topic of Japan's personnel contribution to Cambodia. The 1991 Gulf War rapidly instilled a sense of humiliation in Japan, both in the government and in society, because many Japanese believed that Japan's lack of military contribution to the multinational force was being derided by international society (see in Chap. 2). In truth, it was not clear to what extent the world really noticed the lack of Japan's military presence, aside from the furious US government. However, this bitter memory left the so-called Trauma of the Gulf, or the political obsession with contributing troops for international peace and security, which was quickly encapsulated in the political catchphrase "International Contribution." This was not an offcial term adopted by the GoJ, but was often heard in more casual usage, such as in journalism and informal political discussions. The phrase was not precisely defned and vaguely implied a wide range of commitment and cooperation to the international society, yet it was generally understood that the concept included military deployment to support international peace and security.

Against this backdrop, the GoJ, led by Prime Minister Kiichi Miyazawa, devised a frm solution of enacting a new law to authorize SDF dispatch to UNPKOs. Despite vocal anti-military resistance both in the Diet and from society, the PKO Act was fnally passed in June 1992 (see Chap. 2). The GoJ was determined to immediately contribute the Japanese peacekeepers to a UN mission. It was considered vital to exhibit to the international society that Japan had taken a step forward under the political catchphrase of "International Contribution" (see Chap. 3). For this purpose, UNTAC had been envisaged from the beginning of the lawmaking process as the frst destination for SDF deployment to a UNPKO. When the PKO Act was fnally passed, UNTAC had already been operational for four months, which motivated the GoJ to begin urgent preparations to dispatch the SDF to Cambodia.

## *3.2 Strengthening Japan's Political Role in Southeast Asian Diplomacy*

The motivation behind Japan's participation in UNTAC can also be understood from the perspective of Southeast Asian diplomacy. Since the advocation of the "Fukuda Doctrine" in 1977, the GoJ had attached great value to its relations with neighboring Southeast Asian countries (Kano, 2020, pp. 9–13). Since the announcement of the "International Cooperation Initiative" in 1988, the GoJ had a strong incentive to support peace initiatives in developing countries, especially through diplomatic efforts. With the combination of these elements, the GoJ became actively involved in the Cambodian peace process by hosting a peace conference in Tokyo in June 1990 (MoFA, 2007; Kuriyama, 2016, pp. 189–191; Murakami, 2001; Murakami, 2007, pp. 131–138). Along the same lines, the GoJ was strongly motivated to enhance its assistance to Cambodia by contributing personnel, including the SDF, as part of UNTAC.

## 4 Legal Foundations of Japan's Participation

## *4.1 The GoJ's Insistence on Upholding the Five Principles for Participation*

While the Japanese delegation was deployed to Cambodia, it seemed highly doubtful that the stringent Five Principles were being fulflled in the feld (see Chap. 2). It was almost inevitable that domestic controversy would be provoked over whether it would be appropriate to dispatch the SDF as part of the UNTAC mission. The GoJ, however, insisted that the conditions in Cambodia met the prerequisites necessary to allow SDF deployment according to the Five Principles.

First, as seen above, a cease-fre agreement had been made among the four warring parties prior to the establishment of UNTAC. Second, those parties had also consented to the deployment of the SDF. Third, the scope of the SDF's operations in Cambodia was narrowly restricted only to logistical support, such as engineering works, and unarmed cease-fremonitoring services. Fourth, SDF peacekeepers were allowed to use weapons only to the minimum extent needed for self-preservation. Fifth, Japanese troops were to be deployed to the Cambodian city of Takeo, which was in a relatively safe area in the south. Despite satisfying these fve conditions at the beginning of the dispatch, however, the local situation grew increasingly volatile. Greater insecurity jeopardized these prerequisites, which threatened to violate the Five Principles, meaning that SDF peacekeepers might have to immediately withdraw from Cambodia.

#### *4.2 Problems Related to Tight Restrictions on Weapons Use*

The "use of weapons" issue entailed another diffcult problem. The PKO Act authorized a decision to fre at the discretion of each individual SDF member, despite the fact that military personnel are generally supposed to fre only under the orders of a commander. This inherent contradiction perplexed the SDF personnel in the feld, thereby raising a necessity for law amendment (see Chap. 3). Another restriction was imposed on SDF peacekeepers regarding the use of weapons. The concrete details of weapons carried were not mentioned in the law. Instead, these would be determined by the Diet on a case-by-case basis, as a part of the inevitable process of drafting the "Implementation Plan" that would defne the details for the deployment (see Chap. 2). When the dispatch to Cambodia was decided, the Diet permitted SDF personnel to carry only light weapons, such as sidearms and automatic rifes (Cabinet Offce, 1992). This measure was taken to reduce the risk of involving the SDF in direct fghting, but it seemed doubtful that the arms permitted would be suffcient to protect troops when the *Khmer Rouge* was equipped with heavy weapons, including rocket artilleries, mortars, and tanks.

The frst military contribution to the UNPKO was a huge political challenge for the Miyazawa government. To avoid criticism from the anti-military camp, the government was very cautious that the deployment to Cambodia would be compatible with Japanese legal requirements. The question of compliance with the Five Principles in particular was so concerning that Miyazawa repeatedly stressed the importance of taking an extremely careful stance toward Cambodia, in light of the fact that it was Japan's frst participation in a UNPKO ("Tesaguri no PKO shita-shirabe," 1992). Moreover, with the "freeze" on the PKF's main duties (see Chap. 2), the GoJ was unable to send an infantry force and instead placed the JEG as the centerpiece of the Japanese delegation (Kuriyama, 2016, p. 194).

Albeit under these restrictions, the GoJ was highly motivated to marshal their best possible efforts in their UNPKO debut. The Implementation Plan for Cambodia expressed the GoJ's willingness to respond as much as possible to all UN requests and "to proactively make the largest possible personnel contribution" (Cabinet Offce, 1992). As a result, the GoJ decided to dispatch a large-scale delegation composed of more than 700 peacekeepers, including not only military personnel but also civilian members, to UNTAC. The delegation consisted of 600 engineering forces, eight unarmed military observers, 75 civilian police offcers, and 41 civilian election observers (Cabinet Offce, 1993).1 The engineering unit represented the largest element of the Japanese peacekeeping team.

## 5 Overview of Japan's Activity in UNTAC

#### *5.1 The JEG's Activities in Civil Affairs Support*

The largest part of the Japanese delegation (i.e., the JEG, the unarmed military observers, and the civilian police offcers) arrived in Cambodia between September and October 1992, while the electoral observers were scheduled to arrive the following spring, immediately before the general election. At that time, UNTAC's military section upheld a policy of providing safety and support to election observers (Murakami, 2017). All engineering units that contributed to UNTAC were ordered to provide surveillance and logistics assistance to support the upcoming general election, while also urgently repairing infrastructure. The Japanese side curtly declined to do so, however (Ground Staff Offce, 1995a, p. 226).

The reason for this was twofold: First, security-related tasks, or "PKF main duties" to use the Japanese term, were "frozen" in the PKO Act at that time (see Chap. 2). Second, the Implementation Plan allocated the engineering unit only to construction and other logistic works, such as transportation and storage. Election assistance was not included as a part of their formal role. For these reasons, the GoJ insisted to UNTAC that it was impossible to task the JEG with electoral assistance, especially if this was a security-related duty. The justifcation based on the Japanese legal constraints inevitably displeased the UNTAC side, but the JEG initially stuck to civilian engineering duties.

At the outset and as planned, the JEG focused on the repair of main supply roads and bridges in Takeo. Most notably, the JEG rebuilt National Highway Routes 2 and 3, which were the main trunk lines in the region. The road repair not only facilitated UNTAC activities but also improved transportation to help the local people to travel to their polling stations for the upcoming election. Contributed as a part of the UN framework, the JEG was theoretically supposed to work for UNTAC, but they aimed to build a close relationship with the local population (Oyama & Akiho, 2020, p. 108).

For these purposes, the JEG planned to engage in civil affairs support, or direct assistance to the residents, which they called "another PKO" ("Kokusai-koken eno tabidachi," 1992). In sum, the Japanese side regarded the engineering activity more as reconstruction assistance to the local society rather than logistic support for peacekeeping (Honda, 2017). Put another way, the JEG's work took on characteristics closer to peacebuilding during their frst deployment to the UNPKOs. As intended, JEG members successfully developed friendly relationships with local people, going shopping and sightseeing together, for example, or being invited for meals (Oyama & Akiho, 2020, p. 110). On leaving Cambodia a year later, moreover, the JEG "presented" their used materials to the locals ("Jiei-tai ga tesshu e," 1993). Although their true intention was reportedly to reduce the burden of transporting them back to Japan, the Cambodian side highly appreciated their donations, including prefabricated accommodation, medical materials, and dynamos ("Jiei-tai no takeo-shukueichi," 1993). These successful experiences in civil affairs support would later develop into the "All Japan" approach (Uesugi et al., 2016).

#### *5.2 The Expansion of JEG Duties Without a Formal Mandate*

When the Japanese contingent started their activities in autumn 1992, meanwhile, the *Khmer Rouge* was further escalating security concerns. Earlier, in June of that year, they declared that they would abrogate the agreement of disarmament. In October, they also proclaimed that they would boycott the general election and blew up two bridges crossing over a main roadway in the Central Kampong Thom Province. Later in the same month, bombardment was exchanged between the *Khmer Rouge* and the Cambodian government's forces in the same province. The extremists also launched rocket guns against a residential area near the capital city. In the following month, the *Khmer Rouge* threatened to attack UNTAC. It was now obvious that the Asian nation was deeply embroiled in violent instability, but the GoJ kept denying that the cease-fre agreement had already been lost.

Meanwhile, UNTAC asked the GoJ to assign the JEG additional logistics roles, such as water supply and refueling for UNTAC contingents. Although not mentioned in the original plan, the GoJ endorsed the SDF's new tasks in December 1992. In early 1993, UNTAC again requested that the GoJ assign more responsibilities to the JEG. In response to this, in February 1993, the GoJ additionally assigned the medical assistance role to the JEG. The GoJ also expanded the geographical range of their construction work. This endorsement was possible because the additional duties were not related to the PKF's main duties and were allowed under the existing Implementation Plan. In this way, the JEG gradually took on greater roles to cope with the reality on the ground, while still shying away from election assistance. In March 1993, the second engineering team arrived in Cambodia on rotation. By that time, the local situation had become even more tense, as the general election in May of that year was drawing near. Nevertheless, the GoJ still insisted that the cease-fre agreement was being maintained.

## *5.3 The Loss of Japanese Personnel in a Tough Security Environment*

Under such unstable circumstances, two Japanese personnel lost their lives to alleged assaults by the *Khmer Rouge*. On April 8, a young UN volunteer, Atsuhito Nakata, was shot dead in the Kampong Thom Province. Although he was not part of the Japanese national delegation, his violent death was a great shock for Japan. This tragic event inevitably increased vigilance on the Japanese side. Later that month, the GoJ demanded that UNTAC enhance security measures to protect Japanese civilian police offcers.

Despite these efforts, another tragic incident occurred on May 4. A team of fve Japanese civilian police offcers were assaulted near a village called Ampil, located on the northwest edge of Cambodia, while they were patrolling the neighborhood (Hatate, 2018). Although they were being escorted by the Dutch infantry unit, one of the Japanese policemen, Inspector Haruyuki Takata (promoted to superintendent after his death), was killed by gunfre. The *Khmer Rouge* was assumed to be responsible for his murder. This horrifc event shook the Japanese government and society. Since the decision was taken to contribute to UNTAC, Japanese eyes had been mostly on the JEG at the expense of other components of the Japanese delegation, such as the police. Having received the tragic news, Chief Cabinet Secretary Yohei Kono frankly admitted: "We [the GoJ] focused only on the SDF and were not concerned enough about the civilian police offcers" (*NHK-supesharu*, 2016).

In fact, Japanese civilian police offcers were facing a much more challenging situation in Cambodia than the JEG, who were at least armed (albeit only with light weapons) and acted as a large-scale unit. From October 1992, a total of 75 Japanese civilian police offcers were deployed to 29 locations all over Cambodia. They assumed the responsibility of advising and supervising the Cambodian police force. Unlike the JEG, located in the relatively stable Takeo, the civilian police personnel were deployed to different locales and environments, including highly dangerous areas under heavy *Khmer Rouge* infuence. Ampil was one of these danger zones. Moreover, following the general custom of UN civilian police, the Japanese police were unarmed while on duty and usually worked in small teams. Japanese civilian police offcers were often perplexed by UNTAC's excessive requests beyond the offcial mandates, particularly in rural areas such as Ampil, where the local police often did not function as expected or were virtually nonexistent. In such cases, it was necessary for the UN civilian police to compensate for the incompetence of the local police by engaging in dangerous tasks, such as patrols, without a formal mandate. These concerns culminated in the death of the civilian police offcer. Fortunately, there were no more fatalities after Takata, but the killing of a civilian police offcer highlighted the stark danger of participation in UNPKOs.

The tragic death of the civilian policeman necessarily raised concerns that the cease-fre had already collapsed, putting huge pressure on the GoJ to bring the entire Japanese delegation home. However, the GoJ never admitted the violation of the truce despite having faced such an emergency. Instead, the GoJ resolutely declined the idea of withdrawal from UNTAC, insisting that the Five Principles remained intact. Because the deployment to UNTAC was the frst memorable milestone in Japan's peacekeeping policy, the GoJ was determined to accomplish it in spite of a seriously unstable local situation. As Prime Minister Miyazawa stated, "Let us hang in there to complete the half-fnished job" (Takeuchi, 1994). With such an adamant political resolution, the gap between offcial legal assumptions and the brutal reality on the ground grew ever larger.

## *5.4 The Assignment of* **de facto** *Security Duty to the JEG*

With increasing insecurity on site, the JEG was eventually assigned to electoral assistance duties in April 1993 to meet UNTAC demands in preparation for the upcoming election the following month. Although the Implementation Plan did not technically authorize electoral assistance, the GoJ opted for a fexible interpretation of the Plan and decided to assign them this duty. The JEG consequently assumed a variety of electoral support tasks, ranging from transportation and storage of foodstuffs to the construction of voting stations. Entering into the election-related mission under UNTAC now exposed the JEG to a greater threat of *Khmer Rouge* attack. Meanwhile, Japanese electoral observers were scheduled to arrive shortly thereafter, raising an acute question of how to protect them.

To cope with this pressing situation, the GoJ decided to assign the *de facto* security-related mission to the JEG. On May 13, the GoJ declared that it would assign the engineering forces to engage in "patrol" duty in areas where Japanese electoral observers would be deployed. This immediately invited criticism because "patrol in a buffer zone" was part of the "frozen" PKF main duties. No matter how the GoJ tried to justify this decision, it appeared to be a patrol in practical terms. The anti-military opposition camp sharply derided this as a haphazard decision, but the government remained determined to task the JEG with protecting the electoral observers, even if this virtually broke the prohibition on securityrelated tasks. Prime Minister Miyazawa maintained that the mission would be considered as "information gathering" for the construction works that constituted the JEG's formal mandate ("Kambojia deno Jiei-tai," 1993). However, it seemed obvious that the government's real intention was to use the armed engineering unit to protect the unarmed electoral observation unit.

#### *5.5 The JEG's Provision of Security for Japanese Electoral Observers*

On May 17, a few days before the prime minister's remarks, the Japanese electoral observers arrived in Cambodia as scheduled. The team comprised 41 civilian personnel and was assigned to monitor voting and counting of ballots. All team members were deployed to various counties in the Takeo Province, with one being allocated to each polling station to supervise voting and counting. With the election fast approaching, security concerns were rising around the country and even in Takeo, which was perceived a relatively safe city in comparison with the other places under the *Khmer Rouge*'s strong infuence.

On May 21, the JEG escorted observers to their polling stations and also visited them regularly to bring food and water. By carrying rifes, the JEG essentially embarked on a security mission, albeit in the name of "information gathering." The JEG also engaged in other electoral support duties, such as delivering materials and meals. One of the observers expressed a feeling of relief, saying, "The SDF's presence makes us feel safer" ("Ho-jin-senkyo-kanshi-in," 1993). Other members of the electoral team, however, were more critical about the SDF's *de facto* patrol, with one stating, "We only saw them for at most fve minutes in the daytime. The most dangerous time of day for us was at night, so we asked them to come at night if they were going to make an 'actual patrol'" (Shinoda, 1994, p. 259). This critical comment cast doubt as to whether their *de facto* patrol was actually useful in improving the safety of electoral observers. In other words, the SDF's *de facto* patrol raised questions not only concerning its legal legitimacy, but also in terms of its actual performance.

More seriously, the security provision for the electoral observers highlighted the delicate problem of the strict constraints on the use of weapons in the original PKO Act. The use of weapons by SDF peacekeepers was permitted only for self-preservation. This constraint excluded the possibility of protecting civilians in distant places, except in rare cases where an urgent danger also directly threatened SDF personnel (see Chap. 3). Realistically, it would be diffcult for armed SDF personnel to overlook a call for rescue by non-armed personnel. Exploiting a legal loophole, the Ground Staff Offce ordered JEG peacekeepers in Cambodia to prepare to risk diving into a dangerous situation to gain closer proximity to civilians, just to then be able to legally use their weapons in the name of self-preservation, even though this never happened in practice (Ground Staff Offce, 1995b, p. 87). This is the origin of the "coming-to-aid" duty problem (see Chaps. 3 and 4). Fortunately, such a situation was improbable in practice, but the question remained unresolved. A similar issue reemerged later during Japanese peacekeeping participation in the former Zaire and East Timor (see Chaps. 3, 4, and 6).

The election was due to begin on May 23, 1993, and continue until May 28 of the same year. As these dates approached, tension and vigilance mounted. The GoJ became increasingly nervous about not only the safety of civilian personnel but also of the JEG. On May 22, 1993, the day before the frst vote was cast, the JEG were additionally tasked with the transportation of ballot boxes, which could be highly dangerous because the *Khmer Rouge* might attempt to despoil them.

In the end, the general election was held successfully all over Cambodia. The turnout rate was very high, exceeding 70–80 percent in most provinces and sometimes even surpassing 90 percent ("Kambojia-so-senkyo," 1993). There were some armed attacks against UNTAC forces but no fatalities. The delivery and counting of votes were also carried out without serious trouble. Prince Sihanouk's party won the election. In September 1993, a new constitution was promulgated, and the Kingdom of Cambodia was reconstructed, thereby terminating the operation of UNTAC. In light of this accomplishment, UNTAC operations were generally regarded as a success despite the loss of more than 70 UN personnel.

## 6 Japan's Efforts in Cambodia and Its Challenges

## *6.1 Gaps in the Existing Legal Structure*

As novice peacekeepers, the Japanese delegation in Cambodia discovered numerous problems through frsthand experience on the ground. One of the most signifcant was the gap between theoretical legal assumptions and the empirical reality in Cambodia, especially local insecurity. These fssures were seen at two levels: the gap between offcially assigned tasks and the practical roles imposed while on the job without a legal basis, and the gap between the offcial judgment on the operational environment and the reality of local instability.

Japanese civilian police offcers encountered the frst serious gap between the offcial duties and the practical roles given in the feld. As seen earlier, the UN civilian police personnel were only supposed to work unarmed to advise and supervise the local police forces, on the assumption that the local police already functioned properly. Nonetheless, local policing capacity was virtually nonexistent, especially in rural areas, and the Japanese civilian police had to engage in *de facto* policing duties, such as patrolling. A quarter of a century later, it was shockingly revealed that in this tense situation, some Japanese police offcers had personally purchased automatic AK-47 rifes (Hatate, 2018). Needless to say, this was in violation of the PKO Act, but circumstances were fraught with tension and it was too dangerous for them to work unarmed.

Second, the gap between the offcial assessment of the operational environment and the reality of local insecurity also grew more salient. The GoJ decided on the dispatch to Cambodia on the grounds that the cease-fre agreement was made at the Paris Peace Agreement in 1991. In practice, the *Khmer Rouge* soon dropped out of the agreement and much of Cambodia had already reverted to a *de facto* civil war situation when the Japanese delegation arrived there. Yet, the GoJ frmly upheld its position that the cease-fre was maintained because if the truce had been broken, then the Five Principles demanded the Japanese delegation's immediate withdrawal. For the GoJ, it was out of the question to withdraw from this fagship enterprise, which was intended to represent Japan's frst military contribution under the political goal of "International Contribution." Underneath this political determination, the gap between peacekeeping law and practice continued to grow.

#### *6.2 Altered SDF Roles to Protect Japanese Nationals in the Field*

In increasing insecurity, the JEG unexpectedly had to assume a *de facto* security role to provide protection to the Japanese civilian electoral observers. This entailed a huge problem both legally and practically. In light of legal legitimacy, it was highly problematic for the SDF to assume a new task without a legal basis. It was particularly so not only because the addition of the *de facto* security task lacked a formal mandate, but also because such a duty was suspended under the Japanese legal system.

Related to these points, there was a more intricate problem regarding the permitted range for the use of weapons. Under the original PKO Act, SDF peacekeepers were allowed to use weapons exclusively for selfpreservation (see Chaps. 3 and 4). Under this rule, the engineering unit would not be allowed to fre to protect civilians even if they were located in the same place as the SDF personnel. Fortunately, the SDF personnel on the *de facto* patrol duty never encountered this situation, but it left a serious future agenda as to whether the GoJ should relax the constraint on the use of weapons specifcally for the protection of civilians. Awareness of this issue would lead to the addition of the so-called "coming-to-aid" duty in the amended PKO Act in 2015, after 22 years (see Chap. 4).

#### *6.3 Other Outcomes and Lessons Learned*

Among the various works carried out by the Japanese delegation to UNTAC, the engineering forces left the most visible achievements. By the end, they had built approximately 100 kilometers of roads and paved 10 kilometers, and also repaired 40 bridges. This opened up routes for the return of more than 300,000 refugees, enabling them to participate in the 1993 elections. Further, more than 800 tons of water were supplied to UNTAC personnel, along with 8000 kiloliters of fuel and approximately 1000 medical cases for frst aid (Ground Staff Offce, 1995a, p. 173). When social infrastructure had been seriously damaged due to the civil war, the JEG's support made a considerable contribution to facilitating UNTAC activities while also leaving a positive impact on the local society. Later, Japan's ODA continued to provide infrastructure development support to Cambodia, exemplifed by the restoration of National Highway Route 1.

From this experience, the GoJ realized that JEG-focused deployments to a UNPKO would provoke little political controversy (Cabinet Offce, 1997). The JEG also established a friendly relationship with the locals in Takeo. For example, a study by Oyama and Akiho (2020), which is based on their feld research, testifes that locals and SDF personnel exchanged gifts as farewell tokens when the Japanese troops were about to leave.

In the meantime, the Japanese delegation also understood the importance of deploying staff offcers to local UN mission headquarters on site for the purpose of information gathering, for coordination among concerned parties, and for the delivery of their own requests to the UN (Honda, 2018). While in Cambodia, SDF peacekeepers saw that UN headquarters personnel from other countries prioritized their own countries' troops when assigning work. The JEG could not expect such favorable treatment, having no Japanese staff assigned to the headquarters. Having learned from this lesson, the GoJ would dispatch staff offcers in subsequent deployments to the later UNPKOs in Mozambique, the Golan Heights, East Timor, and South Sudan.

#### *6.4 Summary of Chap. 5*

Before the SDF's deployment to Cambodia, Japanese government and peacekeepers had been primarily preoccupied with the observance of the PKO Act. Once dispatched, Japanese personnel, especially the JEG and civilian police offcers, soon faced the bitter truth that UNPKOs differed in practice from the theoretical assumptions made by the Japanese legal system. This gap made it very hard for them to adhere to the legal mandates and stipulations in the PKO Act. The belittlement of the law was attributed to both the UN side and the GoJ. On the one hand, the UN side repeatedly demanded expansion of the range of activities for Japanese personnel, even without a formal mandate to do so. On the other hand, the GoJ had never admitted the collapse of the cease-fre and maintained the presence of Japanese peacekeepers on site despite the mounting danger on the ground. In light of the grim local reality in Cambodia and repeated requests from the UN, Japanese peacekeepers, especially the JEG and the civilian police offcers, were gradually assigned more demanding roles, despite the GoJ's initial declaration of support for caution and adherence to the law.

## Note

1. Each Japanese military observer formed a cease-fre-monitoring group with their counterparts from various countries. They had to act unarmed, with only body armor, under tense circumstances, but they completed their missions without any fatalities.

## References (In English)


#### References (In Japanese)


in intelligence gathering in Cambodia: Prime Minister emphasizes that intelligence gathering activities are within the legal limits of the PKO Act]. (1993, May 21). *Yomiuri Shimbun (evening ed.)*, p. 2.


between interveners and local populations at deployment sites]. *Journal of International Development Studies, 29*(2), 105–120. https://www.jstage.jst. go.jp/article/jids/29/2/29\_105/\_pdf


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## East Timor: Adapting to "Integration" and Responding to "Robustness"

## 1 Events Precipitating the 1999 East Timorese Crisis

## *1.1 The Indonesian Invasion and Confict over Independence*

East Timor comprises the eastern half of the island of Timor, which is situated between Australia and Indonesia. It had been under Portuguese colonial rule for nearly four centuries. Following the 1974 Carnation Revolution, Portugal promised the East Timorese that it would hold an election and allow independence in four years. While waiting for these promises to be fulflled, however, a pro-independence communist force known as the "Revolutionary Front for an Independent East Timor" (FRETILIN) unilaterally declared independence in 1975. This declaration invited a military incursion from Indonesia, a regional power that owned the adjacent West Timor and was determined to stop the communist expansion into its territory. In response, FRETILIN called for support from international society, and the UN General Assembly adopted several resolutions calling for self-determination in East Timor. In the context of the Cold War, however, the US and its allies ignored this pressure because they did not favor the creation of another communist country. This tacit approval allowed Indonesia to carry out the annexation as a *fait accompli*.

© The Author(s) 2022 103 H. N. Fujishige et al., *Japan's Peacekeeping at a Crossroads*, Sustainable Development Goals Series, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-88509-0\_6

## *1.2 East Timor's Independence and International Society*

Even after *de facto* annexation, FRETILIN continued its armed struggle, but international society paid only limited attention to this issue until the late 1990s. The 1997 Asian Financial Crisis fnally led to the collapse of Indonesia's authoritarian regime the following year. In desperate need of international fnancial support, the new democratic regime of Indonesia announced its willingness to permit a referendum on East Timor's autonomy. However, Indonesian forces secretly supported a pro-Indonesia militia in East Timor, which represented the pro-integration faction preferring to remain under Indonesian control.

## 2 International Legitimacy

## *2.1 Achieving State Construction*

In June 1999, UNSCR 1246 authorized the establishment of the United Nations Mission in East Timor (UNAMET) to support the independence referendum scheduled on August 31 that year. Despite the diffculties posed by pro-Indonesian forces, voter turnout in the referendum was extremely high, with an almost 99 percent participation rate (Cabinet Offce, 1999). The referendum resulted in an overwhelming victory for the pro-independence camp, with 78.5 percent of votes cast in favor (Cabinet Offce, 2001, p. 1). Ignoring these results, pro-Indonesia militias further intensifed their campaign of destructive acts, such as killing ordinary people and destroying buildings and infrastructure. To stop the violence, 1264 on September 15, 1999, UNSCR authorized deployment of the Australian-led multinational force, called the International Force East Timor (INTERFET). Chapter VII of the UN Charter was invoked to authorize INTERFET to use force to restore peace and security.

Within a month, INTERFET had swiftly recovered public order, and on October 25, 1999, UNSCR 1272 established UNTAET to uphold East Timor's independence. Similar to UNTAC, UNTAET was designed to be a transitional administration until a national government was established. As an ambitious enterprise to create an entirely new state, UNTAET assumed a wider range of responsibilities, including full authority over legislative, administrative, and judicial duties as well as security-related tasks under Chapter VII of the UN Charter (UNSG, 1999).1 It was a fullfedged integrated mission that has been described as the "UN's Kingdom of East Timor" (Chopra, 2000) due to its immense governing authority. In the meantime, the UN regarded this as a chance to redeem international trust, which had been lost in the mid- to late 1990s due to back-toback UNPKO failures, notoriously in Somalia, Rwanda, and Bosnia.

To bear these heavy duties, UNTAET was authorized with the maximum strength of 9150 military personnel as well as 1640 civilian police offcers and was also staffed with international and local civilian personnel (UNDPKO, 2002). During its three-year term until May 2002, UNTAET paved the way for independence by establishing laws and administration, rebuilding the destroyed infrastructure, and facilitating the return of refugees. Public security and order gradually stabilized under UN control.

In May 2002, the Democratic Republic of Timor-Leste declared formal independence.2 Accordingly, the UN provisional governing authority was closed and replaced with the United Nations Mission of Support in East Timor (UNMISET) in order to assist the young nation until it could stand alone (United Nations, n.d.). The UN presence was now downsized but still played a considerable role in developing local administrative capacity and maintaining public security. UNMISET was terminated three years later in May 2005, and all uniformed personnel (troops and police) were withdrawn and replaced by a small civilian presence called the UN Offce in East Timor (UNOTIL) to continue capacity-building support.

#### *2.2 Retrying State Construction*

Sadly, violence recurred just a year later, in spring 2006, when a group of soldiers complaining about their poor treatment launched a mass protest. This soon descended into large-scale violence involving both the Timorese armed forces and the police. After UNSCR 1690 was adopted on June 20, 2006, an Australian force was deployed to recover security, followed by the subsequent military force deployment by Portugal, Malaysia, and New Zealand. Once public order was restored, which took a month or so, another UNPKO was authorized under UNSCR 1704, which passed on August 25, 2006. UNMIT reestablished a larger UN presence including uniformed personnel in East Timor, tasked with supporting state construction, maintaining public order (e.g., through UN interim policing mechanisms), and providing training and capacity building to the local police. UNMIT's term was extended several times until 2012, when the UN became confdent that local government could act without UN support.

## 3 The Political Background of Japan's Participation

### *3.1 The Increasing Commitment to East Timor in Japanese Diplomacy*

During World War II, the Imperial Japanese Army occupied East Timor for three and a half years, but postwar Japan showed little interest in the nation. Having emphasized its commitment to Southeast Asia, Japan prioritized the relationship with regional great powers (see Chap. 5). To placate Indonesia, the GoJ had been very reluctant to support the various UN General Assembly resolutions calling for self-determination in East Timor until the late 1990s (Ohno, 2017).

After the implementation of the East Timorese referendum was decided in the middle of 1999, the GoJ became increasingly supportive of UN efforts to assist East Timor's independence, including the participation in the UNPKO. This change was motivated in part by Japan's desire to win a permanent seat on the UNSC (MoFA, 1999). Moreover, it appeared diplomatically diffcult for Japan to decline participation in a UNPKO in Asia while other countries outside the region expressed strong support for East Timor ("Seifu, chosa-dan haken e," 1999). Furthermore, a political rationale existed to justify assistance to the independence of a new nation, especially when the East Timorese communicated the expectation that Japan would commit to a UN mission in East Timor ("Chokusetsu-tohyo, nihon kyoryoku o," 1999). Lastly, Japan also had economic interests in the offshore gas felds located in East Timor's territorial waters (Li, 2014).

With the increasing global attention to East Timor, and especially after the violent upheaval in August 1999, the GoJ beefed up its support to the nation. In December 1999, Japan hosted an international conference in Tokyo to mobilize multinational support for East Timor and pledged a three-year fnancial assistance plan with a budget of USD 130 million (MoFA, 2015). Even after the initial three-year period, the GoJ continued to provide generous development assistance to the newly independent nation.

The GoJ also secured executive seats for high-ranking Japanese offcials in the local headquarters of two UNPKOs in East Timor to demonstrate its strong commitment to East Timor, even while declining to immediately contribute troops to UNTAET (see below for more details). At frst, a JICA senior offcial, Akira Takahashi, was appointed as special advisor on Development and Humanitarian Affairs to UNTAET's SRSG. Later, a high-level UN offcial and Japanese national, Sukehiro Hasegawa, served as Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary-General (DSRSG) of the UNMISET from 2002 to 2004 before being promoted to SRSG in May 2004.

## *3.2 Decision-Making for the Contribution of the Uniformed Personnel*

The GoJ initially dispatched three civilian police offcers to support UNAMET in supervising the referendum (see below for more details). Once pro-Indonesian forces destabilized East Timor in the aftermath of the referendum in August 1999, the INTERFET was assigned a combat mission under Chapter VII of the UN Charter. Altogether, 30 states participated in the INTERFET, not only from the Asia-Pacifc region but also from other regions. However, Japan was unable to contribute troops, since participating in an ongoing war would violate its Constitution. Instead, the GoJ dispatched three C-130H transport aircrafts in November 1999 to West Timor for emergency aid delivery (MoD, 2000). This was in response to a UNHCR request after many East Timorese civilians had fed into West Timor to escape the violence. After the air transportation was terminated in February 2000, Japan did not dispatch troops to UNPKOs until February 2002.

Although UNTAET was founded in October 1999, Japan was initially reluctant to contribute peacekeepers, because the local situation appeared incompatible with the Five Principles ("Higashi-teimoru-shien," 1999). Doing so would require an amendment to the PKO Act, which would be a very controversial and time-consuming business. Around that time, meanwhile, the GoJ was already preoccupied with enacting another highly controversial law (the so-called Japan-US Defense Guidelines Legislation; hereafter, the Guidelines Legislation) to fortify the alliance relationship with the US (Shoji, 2014, p. 4).

Not surprisingly, the Guidelines Legislation invited an acute antimilitary political crisis, and the GoJ had to maneuver to ease resistance. Such complicated domestic political calculations sacrifced the need for the proposed amendment to the PKO Act because the GoJ was very reluctant to add another moot point in addition to the already disputable Guidelines Legislation.

Unlike the early 1990s during the UNTAC experience, the GoJ was no longer obsessed with making military contributions to a UNPKO. Of course, it was still preferable to do so, if possible, but the political catchphrase "International Contribution" had become a secondary consideration in comparison with the immediate need to fortify the alliance relationship. If the SDF deployment to East Timor did not require legal amendments, then the GoJ would probably have been more willing to do so at an early time. However, the necessity of revising the statute reduced the GoJ's momentum to contribute Japanese peacekeepers to UNTAET.

By mid-2001, the tide turned. In April 2001, Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi visited East Timor to confrm that local security had gradually improved. In August, the Force Commander of the UNTAET military section and East Timorese Foreign Minister Ramos-Horta articulated expectations for SDF participation ("Higashi-teimoru eno jiei-tai-sanka," 2001; "Jiei-tai-PKF no sanka," 2001). In November 2001, the GoJ fnally released a plan to deploy the SDF to East Timor. In the end, the SDF participated in UNTAET and UNMISET from March 2002 to June 2004. When UNMIT was established in 2006, the GoJ resumed the deployment of the uniformed personnel, but only of civilian police offcers and not the SDF.

Koizumi's decision in favor of military contribution to East Timor was backed by public opinion. According to a January 2000 Cabinet Offce public opinion poll, almost 80 percent of people responded favorably when asked if they supported SDF participation in a UNPKO (Cabinet Offce, 2000).3

### *3.3 Growing Interest in Peacebuilding and Support to Fragile States*

In parallel with Japan's increasing commitment to East Timor at the end of the 1990s, Japan's aid policy became more willing to add peacebuilding as one of their development agendas (see Chap. 3; JICA, 2002). Unexpectedly, the surprise 9/11 terrorist attacks in 2001 highlighted the risks of leaving fragile states unattended, which further increased pressure on Japan. But the GoJ could not legally deploy troops to the US-led "War on Terror" in Afghanistan and therefore needed to put more emphasis on civilian-led peacebuilding. For these reasons, the JICA played a lead role in forming Japan's way of "integration" and the UNPKOs in East Timor were a perfect opportunity to connect statebuilding and confict resolution efforts. Besides, such civilian-led peacebuilding was compatible with the focus on the SDF side, that is, the active use of the JEG.

## 4 The Legal Foundation of Japan's Participation

When UNTAET was founded in October 1999, several legal constraints delayed Japanese decision-making regarding the dispatch of the SDF to East Timor. On the one hand, a cease-fre agreement was not yet concluded when UNTAET was launched. Even though the pro-Indonesia militia had declared disarmament in October 1999, some armed remnants were still posing a threat from their West Timor safe haven. These security concerns risked violating the prerequisites laid out in the Five Principles. On the other hand, very strict restrictions on the use of weapons for Japanese military personnel would confict with those on the UN side, especially when UNTAET was tasked with enforcement duties under Chapter VII of the UN Charter. To avoid these problems, amendments to the PKO Act would be required, particularly the lifting of the "freeze" on the PKF's main duties and relaxation of restrictions on weapons use (see Chaps. 2 and 3).

The PKO Act had already been amended once in 1998, but this was a very minor change that merely centralized the authority in the Japanese peacekeeping contingent to fre weapons by order of a commander (see Chap. 3). To reduce the gap between Japanese legal constraints and international UN standards, the GoJ was already considering amending the PKO Act, but had only proceeded at a snail's pace. In the meantime, security and order in East Timor gradually improved, especially after the leader of remnant militias had been arrested in October 2000 (*Timor militia leader*, 2000). Accordingly, the GoJ was considering a decision to dispatch troops by mid-2001, although the PKO Act had not yet been amended at that time.

In September 2001, the GoJ took a favorable turn for the deployment to deploy the JEG to UNTAET, concluding that the local security and the existence of a cease-fre agreement in East Timor satisfed the current PKO Act ("Higashi-teimoru eno PKO-haken," 2001). Put another way, the GoJ decided that military deployment to the UN mission to East Timor would not require an amendment to the PKO Act so long as they stuck to noncombat missions. After approving deployment based on its fexible interpretation of the law, the government concurrently announced its intention to formally amend the PKO Act in the next Diet session ("PKO-ho-kaisei ni iyoku," 2001).

Surprisingly, the PKO Act was amended just a month later as an unintended consequence of the 9/11 terrorist attacks. Although this never happened, the GoJ anticipated a new UNPKO in Afghanistan and therefore rushed to amend the law. The amendments expanded the range of actions allowed for Japanese peacekeepers by removing the "freeze" on the PKF's main duties, for example, and allowing the use of weapons for the protection of nonmilitary personnel deployed alongside the SDF (see Chap. 3 for more details; Cabinet Offce, n.d.). From a legal point of view, it suddenly became possible for Japan to dispatch an infantry troop abroad, now that the PKF main duties had been restored and weapons restrictions had been relaxed to some extent. Even after the 2001 amendment, however, the GoJ stuck to logistic support, such as engineering and medical care, in light of restrictions on the use of weapons remaining even after the amendment and the public's preference to avoid combat missions.

## 5 Overview of Japan's Activities in East Timor

#### *5.1 The Contribution of Uniformed Personnel*

In November 2001, the GoJ fnally announced the dispatch of Japanese peacekeepers to take part in the UNPKO in East Timor early the following year ("Higashi-teimoru-PKO," 2001). In March 2002, the frst major part of the Japanese delegation arrived to join UNTAET. When UNMISET was launched two months later, the Japanese delegation continued their work until June 2004. As in the case of UNTAC (see Chap. 5), the JEG constituted the largest part of the Japanese delegation (maximum strength 680). Having internalized the lessons from Cambodia, this time staff offcers were also deployed (maximum strength ten).

The case of East Timor was also noteworthy in that female SDF members were included as Japanese peacekeepers for the frst time. Seven women were deployed among the SDF personnel sent to UNTAET and UNMISET, thereby marking the frst dispatch of female peacekeepers. They worked as liaison offcers (MoFA, 2003) and medical offcers (UNIC Tokyo, 2014). Nonetheless, only seven female peacekeepers were deployed, out of 680 JEG troops. As the ratio of female military personnel itself tends to be very low in the SDF (it was less than fve percent in the total SDF personnel in the early 2000s), around the time of East Timor deployment (MoD, 2020), the deployment of more female peacekeepers remained a continuing agenda in Japan's peacekeeping policy.

#### *5.2 The JEG's Performance*

In the Japanese delegation to East Timor, the JEG played the most central role. The JEG was primarily responsible for developing the main supply roads on the island of Timor and improving the transportation network that connected East Timor cities and facilitated UNPKO mobility (Ishizuka & Lloyd, 2008). The repaired roads were high quality and facilitated more rapid emergency responses, as well as the smooth transport of necessary goods. The JEG also repaired UN offces and living facilities for civilian staff and troops from other countries, along with local facilities such as markets, schools, irrigation canals, waste treatment plants, and airfelds. After UNMISET was launched in 2002, the JEG was also responsible for dismantling facilities when the UN presence was being downsized.

The JEG also operated a water station in the camps in order to supply water to other UNPKO troops and personnel, as well as to NGO workers. Given the constant water shortage, this was an invaluable contribution to the UN mission. The JEG also worked to provide security reinforcement work on UN-related facilities as counterterrorism measures.

#### *5.3 Construction Work Under the "All Japan" Approach*

In East Timor, the JEG developed a closer partnership with civil affairs support staff and began offering direct support to the local population as a form of development aid (Uesugi et al., 2016). To assist statebuilding in East Timor, UNMISET requested that contributing countries utilize their troop capability for the beneft of the locals (Tanabe, 2004). Although the direct support to the local people was not originally anticipated, the JEG still built and repaired public facilities, such as schools, athletic grounds and playing felds, and restored small roads and bridges for the local residents.

As part of its efforts, the JEG also cooperated with Japan's ODA on what would later be called the "All Japan" approach (see Chaps. 2 and 3). In particular, the JEG cooperated on civil engineering work for the "Recovery, Employment and Stability Programme for Ex-Combatants and Communities in Timor-Leste" (RESPECT), a GoJ-funded project to support disarmament and demobilization (Ishizuka & Lloyd, 2008, p. 130). The project aimed to assist the integration of former FRETILIN soldiers into the local society by providing job training and employment opportunities, such as roadbuilding or forestation.

Another example of civil-military cooperation can be seen in the JEG's assistance to a United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) project to restore bridges. The partnership with multilateral aid agencies helped the JEG to procure materials for restoration, as the JEG themselves were unable to obtain the materials needed for their civil affairs work. The JEG also developed informal partnerships with NGOs. On days off, for example, JEG troops participated in a tree-planting project run by a Japanese NGO working in East Timor (Honda, 2018).

## *5.4 Capacity-Building Support Under the "All Japan" Approach*

The "All Japan" approach was also introduced for the purpose of capacity building. After completing their duties, the JEG planned to leave behind equipment in East Timor, such as construction vehicles, materials, and temporary container housing, just as they had done in Cambodia (see Chap. 5). However, the local use of such donated materials required the training of local people because East Timor had almost no civil engineers to operate heavy equipment or conduct maintenance inspections. To avoid the donated equipment ending up unused and in anticipation of their withdrawal, the JEG also trained local personnel in the technical operation and maintenance of heavy equipment.

The joint works between the JEG and multilateral aid agencies contributed to the reconstruction and development of East Timor in various ways, including donation of many high-quality, diffcult-to-obtain civil engineering materials and the training of over 100 civil engineers (Honda, 2018, p. 147). Moreover, these activities also unexpectedly saved time and energy for the Japanese contingent because the trained local personnel could then engage in parts of the JEG's tasks. Furthermore, by donating equipment, the JEG reduced the expense that would have been involved in its repatriation to Japan.

Following the JEG's withdrawal, the JICA and Japanese NGOs succeeded in training the locals in machine operation and maintenance, with the goal of enabling the East Timorese people to plan and carry out the construction themselves. The East Timorese government was then able to lease the donated equipment to local private companies. As East Timor had previously had only limited numbers of its own engineers and construction businesses, the joint work between the JEG and Japan's ODA enhanced local capacity to build infrastructure in preparation for UN withdrawal.

#### *5.5 The Rescue of Japanese Civilians*

The JEG in East Timor unexpectedly had to assume security-related duties, again highlighting the serious gap between Japan's legal constraints and on-site demands for peacekeepers. In December 2002, the local police fred at some 500 anti-government demonstrators in the capital city, Dili, killing some of the protestors. Outraged crowds rampaged in the capitol, setting fre to houses and looting local stores ("Higashi-teimoru, demotai-500-nin," 2002). The roads and bridges were full of angry citizens, and many parked cars were torched. The local police continued to fre into the tumultuous crowds, hurting more citizens.

The violent mobs also assaulted Japanese nationals in Dili, raiding a Japanese restaurant, for example. Besieged in a chaotic situation, Japanese residents in East Timor sought rescue from the JEG. Although the PKO Act contained no stipulation to protect civilians at that time, six members of the JEG immediately set out to rescue them in two trucks. In the end, the engineering teams rescued 41 civilians, including 17 Japanese nationals and 24 from seven other countries (Grand Staff Offce, n.d., p. 171).

#### *5.6 Police-Related Activities*

In East Timor, the GoJ resumed the police deployment to the UNPKOs. To minimize security risks, however, the GoJ limited the number of deployed police offcers to just three and restricted their deployment to the headquarters in Dili (MoFA, 2007). This is a sharp contrast with the experience in Cambodia, where 75 police personnel were deployed to various different places across the post-confict nation. Such caution resulted from the government's anxiety not only about the safety of police personnel, but also about the future of Japan's peacekeeping efforts: if another police offcer were harmed in a UNPKO, both public opinion and Japanese police hesitation would ensure that the GoJ would be never able to dispatch them again (Shoji, 2014, p. 9). As feared, a pro-Indonesian uprising occurred after the referendum at the end of August. Fortunately, however, Japanese personnel had already left for home in early September (Cabinet Offce, 1999).

Subsequently, no police personnel had been dispatched to either UNTAET or UNMISET, but two police offcers were later deployed to UNMIT, which had been established in August 2006 in the wake of the recurrence of violence earlier that year. In February 2007, the frst pair of Japanese police offcers was dispatched for a half-year term by rotation, followed by a second pair. As the statebuilding of the newly independent country had once met with setbacks in 2006, such as the police's desertion of their duties, the Japanese police offcers mainly engaged in support to reconstruct the local police: for example, advising them and training senior local police offcers (Cabinet Offce, 2008). Japanese police personnel also made a textbook for training of the local police. This time, the Japanese police offcers enjoyed a relatively safe environment.

## 6 Outcomes of Japan's Efforts and Related Challenges

#### *6.1 Resonance with "Integration" and the Emergence of the "All Japan" Approach*

The JEG's achievements in East Timor ft the policy recommendations of the 2002 IPC Panel (see Chap. 3; The IPC Panel, 2002). Their report emphasized the importance of the close partnership that developed between the ODA and Japan's engineering peacekeepers in East Timor, which would be later called the "All Japan" approach. This represents an important move toward greater "integration" in Japan's peacekeeping.

The joint bridge restoration project between the JEG and the UNDP exemplifed a successful case of the "All Japan" approach in East Timor. The UNPKO provided no budget for the repair of small bridges used only by local residents, but the JEG was able to use the fnancial resources provided by the GoJ via the UNDP (Honda, 2018, p. 146). The outcomes of the "All Japan" approach in East Timor drew international praise, as expressed in an interim UNSC report of October 2003. In this paper, UNMISET SRSG Kamalesh Sharma acclaimed that the JEG's activities had built a foundation for eventual UNPKO withdrawal and the longterm rebuilding of East Timor (UNSC, 2003, p. 4).

Not surprisingly, these "successful" experiences in the "All Japan" approach motivated the GoJ to further develop collaboration between the JEG and donor agencies outside the UNPKO framework for mid- and long-term reconstruction. Traditionally, overseas military deployments had been subject to controversy in Japan's political discourse. Combined with the ODA, peacekeeping was now a much more acceptable enterprise for the majority of Japanese people—assuming that the focus remained only on logistical support.

#### *6.2 A Knotty Question Related to the "All Japan" Approach*

Meanwhile, a prickly question had arisen with regard to the "All Japan" approach (Honda & Uesugi, 2016). Was the JEG's achievement in civil affairs support in cooperation with the ODA motivated by the desire to support a UNPKO, or was it simply to enhance Japan's national interest? This dilemma bewildered JEG personnel in East Timor. In principle, Japanese peacekeepers were deployed not to serve the local population directly, but rather as part of the UNPKO, as prescribed in the PKO Act. Yet expanded "All Japan" approach could divert the JEG's efforts and attention outside of the UNPKO. This concern arose in practice during the JEG's joint work with the UNDP. The aforementioned RESPECT initiative, for example, tasked JEG personnel with monitoring construction sites to provide careful supervision of the ongoing activities. Nonetheless, RESPECT was not a part of offcial UNPKO-related duties; nor did it conform to Japan's PKO Act. This made it diffcult for the JEG team to have its personnel stationed on-site to participate in RESPECT (Honda, 2018, p. 149).

As in the case of the bridge restoration, the Japanese side justifed their commitment to this non-UNPKO business by explaining that such additional activities would increase local support for the UNPKO. Resting on this logic, the JEG asserted that the bridge repair was ultimately intended to serve the UNPKO, rather than just the local population. Yet, no matter how the JEG attempted to vindicate their engagement in work outside the UNPKO framework, their legitimacy looked questionable in light of both the UN mandate and the PKO Act.

### *6.3 The Question of Protecting Japanese Nationals*

Japanese participation in UNPKOs in East Timor highlighted restrictions remaining in the PKO Act, especially relating to the protection of Japanese nationals in the feld. Although Japanese civilians in East Timor faced imminent danger during the violent demonstrations and riots at the end of 2002, the PKO Act included no stipulation allowing the JEG to protect their compatriots. Consequently, the JEG had to rescue Japanese NGO workers in an emergency situation under the name of "transportation," in the same way that had happened in the former Zaire in 1995. A similar problem was also seen in the JEG's *de facto* patrols in Cambodia, which were made on the fimsy pretext of "information gathering." These bitter experiences would lead to the addition of a "coming-to-aid" duty to the PKO Act in 2015 (see Chap. 4).

We can say that the deployment to East Timor rested on a false assumption that public order had already been restored and personnel safety was assured. As a result, the Japanese legal system was not prepared for times of emergency, especially when Japanese citizens were seriously threatened. This forced the Japanese peacekeepers on the ground to act even without a formal mandate to do so, just as occurred in Cambodia and the former Zaire (see Chaps. 3 and 5).

More fundamentally, the narrative style of the PKO Act itself imposed overly stringent constraints on the actions of Japanese peacekeepers (Honda, 2018). As it was written in the form of a positive list, the law clearly stated what they were allowed to do. As a result, it was very diffcult to do anything that was not explicitly mentioned. This strictly limited the SDF's fexibility in responding to unexpected events not foreseen when the law was enacted.

In the meantime, the 2001 amendment to the PKO Act enabled the GoJ to dispatch an infantry force to assume the PKF's main duties, but this task had been designed for the classic cease-fre-monitoring task and no longer ft contemporary UNPKOs deployed under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, as in the case of East Timor. Moreover, it was still extremely diffcult for the SDF to play such a role, as the use of weapons to protect civilians was not yet allowed. The solution to this problem had to wait for another amendment of the law in 2015 (see Chap. 4).

#### *6.4 Changing Roles for Police Personnel*

In East Timor, the GoJ resumed the police deployment to the UNPKOs, but they also devised a very cautious deployment plan that concentrated a small number of police offcers in the capital, Dili. This seemed to correspond to changes in UN police deployment. Previously, all of the police peacekeepers were considered to be "civilian police" in the sense that all of them were supposed to act unarmed. By contrast, a trend toward armed police forces in UN peacekeeping began at the end of the 1990s, with the emergence of Formed Police Units of 200–300 police personnel. Formed Police Units are in charge of dealing with crowd control and maintaining public order. Meanwhile, the regular unarmed police personnel became known as the Individual Police Offcers tasked with providing capacity building and training to local police counterparts. A Formed Police Unit is usually contributed from the Global South, while Individual Police Offcers tend to be contributed from the Global North. In recent years, the various roles of UN police personnel have been divided into two general categories: a larger armed wing imposing security and order, and a small unit of advisers conducting training, which mirrors the division of troop contribution in the UNPKOs.

Bearing this division in mind, Japan's police deployment to East Timor exactly fell into the second category of Individual Police Offcers. Although the police offcers deployed to UNAMET faced insecurity following the referendum, those for UNMIT achieved overall success. With this positive result, the Japanese police were widely expected to be deployed to future UNPKOs, but since then, no other police peacekeepers have been dispatched (as of March 2021). This question will be revisited in Chap. 9.

#### *6.5 Summary of Chap. 6*

The personnel deployment to the UNPKOs in East Timor advanced the move toward greater "integration" in Japanese peacekeeping, developing the "All Japan" approach. There are two main reasons behind this. First, from the end of the 1990s, the GoJ became increasingly interested in peacebuilding and in the "seamless" assistance that combines peacekeeping and peacebuilding, especially triggered by the 9/11 terrorist attacks. Second, the case of East Timor focused on statebuilding, which was a perfect ft for the GoJ's desire to enhance peacebuilding efforts. Meanwhile, questions arose about how it might be possible to simultaneously support UN peacekeeping missions while also deepening direct collaboration among Japanese development agencies.

In relation to "robustness," another challenge appeared with regard to the protection of Japanese nationals located in confict sites. Despite the amendments to the law in 1998 and 2001, the JEG personnel in East Timor did not yet have the legal authority to conduct such "coming-toaid" duty. Further expansion of scope for the use of weapons, especially for "coming-to-aid" duty, would be addressed later as part of the Peace and Security Legislation in 2015 (see Chap. 4).

In East Timor, we also observed some new positive developments, such as the frst deployment of female peacekeepers and Japanese police engagement in the institutional development and training of local police. Nevertheless, the number of female personnel was very limited and there has been no subsequent police contribution.

## Notes


## References (In English)

Chopra, J. (2000). The UN's kingdom of East Timor. *Survival, 42*(3), 27–40.


#### References (In Japanese)


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## Haiti: The Development of "Seamless" Assistance from Disaster Relief to UNPKOs

## 1 The Complex Crisis in Haiti

Haiti occupies the western side of the island of Hispaniola in the Caribbean Sea. The country was initially colonized by Spanish settlers and later came under French control. Although Haiti achieved independence as early as 1804, it suffered from repeated rebellions and divisions and eventually caused a US military occupation in 1915 that lasted nearly two decades. Even after the US withdrawal in 1934, Haiti was continuously trapped in a vicious circle of military coups and dictatorships, as well as its weak economy.

Following Jean-Bertrand Aristide's controversial inauguration as the democratically elected president in 1991, Haitian domestic politics fell into further confusion in the acute rivalry between the pro- and anti-Aristide forces. In February 2004, an anti-government uprising forced President Aristide to fee the country. The UNSC authorized the deployment of the US-led Multinational Interim Force (MIF) from the beginning of March (United Nations, 2004), as a short-term military deployment for the rapid recovery of public order. After the recovery of temporary security by the MIF, the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH) was established three months later. Even after the deployment of the UN mission, Haiti remained in chaos, not just because of continuing political instability and economic stagnation but also due to a series of severe natural disasters, such as three consecutive great hurricanes in 2008.

© The Author(s) 2022 123 H. N. Fujishige et al., *Japan's Peacekeeping at a Crossroads*, Sustainable Development Goals Series, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-88509-0\_7

Even more seriously, a magnitude 7.0 earthquake rocked Haiti on January 12, 2010, affecting more than three million people, or nearly a third of the entire population (JICA, n.d.). According to the available records, the disaster victims included almost 222,000 dead and more than 300,000 wounded. This struck a fatal blow to the already weak governance system and infrastructure of the country, further harming public order.

In cases of complex crisis, where a large-scale natural disaster occurs during or soon after an armed confict, the loss of public order can easily become a major issue, making these situations very different from regular emergency disaster relief. The international personnel who arrived in Haiti immediately after the 2010 earthquake were therefore concerned about two concurrent challenges, namely the damage from the natural disaster and serious violent disorder. Following the great earthquake, chaos in the country was further intensifed, with ongoing damage to infrastructure, government paralysis, and rioting and plundering of aid by refugees. Consequently, the US military was deployed alongside MINUSTAH and tasked with maintaining public order in the disaster zone.

## 2 International Background

## *2.1 International Support to Haiti*

As seen above, Haiti has been almost perennially in turmoil since its independence in the early nineteenth century. To cope with the anti-Aristide uprising in 2004, the MIF was initially deployed under UNSCR 1529 to establish and maintain public safety and the rule of law. It was obvious, however, that Haiti needed more long-term assistance to rebuild itself, not only to improve the situation for its own population but also to prevent the massive outfux of refugees to the neighboring countries, including the US. As a result, UNSCR 1542 in 2004 was also passed, establishing MINUSTAH. The UNPKO inherited a "robust" mandate from the MIF to secure a safe and stable environment in Haiti, but it was also an integrated mission designed to engage in statebuilding. In other words, MINUSTAH took on the characteristics of "robustness" and "integration" simultaneously.

#### *2.2 Post-earthquake Restoration and Reconstruction*

The 2010 earthquake not only damaged local facilities and the population, but also sacrifced approximately 100 UN workers in the collapse of the MINUSTAH Headquarters. International momentum to support Haiti's reconstruction increased soon after the earthquake. A week later, on January 19, UNSCR 1908 was adopted to renew the mandate for MINUSTAH: its maximum strength was increased by 3500 (an additional 2000 military and 1500 police personnel) to stabilize the nation. Accordingly, MINUSTAH's mandate was switched to one of emergency restoration and reconstruction.

Massive amounts of foreign emergency aid poured into Haiti after the earthquake; however, the international society doubted the Haitian government's ability to monitor and distribute that aid (Uesugi, 2018, p. 193). The Haitian Prime Minister Jean-Max Bellerive and the former US President Bill Clinton therefore created the Interim Haiti Reconstruction Committee (IHRC), with both acting as joint chairpersons (Clinton, 2010). Furthermore, the Haiti Relief Fund (HRF) was created by Haiti's Ministry of Finance and the World Bank to manage the huge amounts of reconstruction aid and to disperse these funds to reconstruction companies.

## 3 Political Background to Japan's Participation

#### *3.1 Haiti as an Earthquake Disaster Zone*

Since Japan itself historically suffered from a number of earthquakes, exemplifed by the Great Hanshin-Awaji (Kobe) Earthquake in 1995, both the GoJ and broader society had high incentive to assist Haiti after the earthquake.1 The Japanese public had high expectations not only for the dispatch of a civilian assistance team, but also for military deployment. In the Cabinet Offce's 2009 survey asking the public to provide a *raison d'etre* for the SDF, nearly 80 percent of the respondents chose disaster relief as their answer, followed by 70 percent who chose national defense and just over 40 percent who chose IPC (Cabinet Offce, 2009).

Bolstered by strong public support for the purpose of disaster relief, the GoJ dispatched two successive medical contingents based under the JDR Act: frst a civilian medical team, followed by an SDF medical unit. When the SDF medical unit departed, the Japanese Red Cross Society (JRCS) took over medical assistance to Haiti. Following this initial phase of medical support, SDF peacekeepers were deployed to MINUSTAH under the PKO Act. The GoJ's decision on the military contribution to MINUSTAH raised little disagreement, since they were mandated for restoration and reconstruction after the earthquake.

## *3.2 The DPJ Administration*

The decline of anti-military opposition in Japan also facilitated the GoJ's rapid decision to deploy the SDF to post-disaster Haiti. The LDP stepped down from power in 2009 and was replaced with the DPJ government, with Yukio Hatoyama as the prime minister. This contributed to further weakening of anti-military resistance both at the Diet and in society. This decline was not only because the DPJ itself took a positive stance toward the UNPKOs, but also because the primary anti-military political force, the SDP, was now a part of the DPJ-led coalition government under Hatoyama's premiership. This made it diffcult for the anti-military party to uphold its persistent objections against SDF overseas deployment. Consequently, anti-military opposition from society was much less visible when the SDF deployment to MINUSTAH was decided. The formation of the DPJ government thus shrank domestic opposition to SDF overseas deployment and created a political environment that allowed the fastestever deployment decision to be made.

#### *3.3 Consideration of the US Ally*

The alliance relationship with the US also reinforced the GoJ's decision regarding the personnel deployment to Haiti. Prior to the 2009 change in government, the DPJ had stated that it would cut off Japan's refueling support in the Indian Ocean, which had provided indirect assistance to the "War on Terror" in Afghanistan (see Chap. 3). The DPJ insisted that the legal basis of refueling support was unclear in terms of UNSCRs and its effectiveness as a counterterrorism measure had not yet been verifed ("Indo-yo kyuyu," 2009). As pledged, the refueling activity was terminated on January 15, 2010, soon after the DPJ took power. While the new ruling party fulflled its promises, it was also concerned that the end of refueling support might harm Japan's alliance relationship with the US. The inception of the Hatoyama-led DPJ government also caused an imbroglio in the ongoing relocation issue of US Futenma Air Station in Okinawa, and Hatoyama's unreliable attitude seriously disappointed the US side ("Futemma-isetsu," 2010). Given these concerns, the GoJ took its support to Haiti, which the US had traditionally regarded as its "backyard," as a prime opportunity to repair relations with the US.

## 4 Legal Foundations of Japan's Participation

## *4.1 The Division of Labor Between the JDR and SDF Acts*

In the case of Haiti, as mentioned above, both the civilian and SDF medical contingents were empowered under the JDR Act, while SDF peacekeepers represented by the JEG were deployed under the PKO Act. Generally speaking, the GoJ assumes that the PKO Act deals with cases related to armed confict, while the JDR Act covers situations after natural and human-induced disasters, such as the collapse of a large-scale building or a crude oil spill (Wada, 1998, pp. 27–30, pp. 37–41). However, neither law anticipates a situation of complex emergency, which posed a considerable challenge to the GoJ regarding how it might combine the JDR and PKO Acts to cope with Haiti's emergency. As a result, both statutes encountered the gaps between their legal assumptions and the reality of the disaster-affected nation.

## *4.2 The Deployment of JDR Medical Contingents*

As discussed earlier, the GoJ dispatched both the civilian medical team and the SDF medical unit under the JDR Act. According to national law, the GoJ can potentially dispatch four different types of JDR team: a rescue team, a medical team, an expert team, and an SDF unit (Nakauchi, 2011, pp. 7–8). The medical team is a civilian body mainly comprised of medical professionals who are registered and trained by the JICA. Meanwhile, the SDF unit could assume various roles, such as rescue and the transportation of relief goods, but was also supposed to work unarmed under the JDR Act. In Haiti, the SDF team focused on medical assistance.

Although there was basically no legal limit to the application of the JDR Act for emergency relief to Haiti, two problems arose regarding the deployment of the civilian medical team: the delayed dispatch and the issuance of security provision. First, the civilian medical team did not arrive at the disaster-affected site until January 17, fve days after the earthquake. This arrival was relatively late, considering that the time limit for lifesaving under a disaster is usually estimated at 72 hours. In comparison, the emergency rescue teams from the US, China, and the European countries arrived within a day or two ("Haichi e kakkoku-enjo-tai," 2010). The reason for this initial delay was twofold. First, the GoJ's decision-making was hamstrung by the fact that the Haitian government, which was still reeling from the severe earthquake, could not promptly make a formal request for emergency relief. Given the security concerns in Haiti, the GoJ opted for a cautious approach by sending an advance survey team before making their decision regarding the deployment of a civilian medical team (Secretariat of JDR Team, 2011). As seen below, the dispatch of an advance survey team before the deployment of the civilian medical team proved useful to facilitate the JDR's works, but it also caused some delay in the deployment of the civilian medical team.

Second, the unexpected reality of the complex emergency raised the practical question of security provisions to protect the civilian team. Needless to say, the civilian medical contingent carries no weapons, but under the JDR Act, as explained earlier, the SDF medical unit was also sent unarmed. This legal stipulation left a problem of how to protect the civilian JDR team under circumstances of complex emergency. Eventually, Sri Lankan peacekeeping forces provided protection to the JDR civilian medical team (Secretariat of JDR Team, 2011). Even though the civilian contingent completed their work without facing any impending security threat, the Haitian experience highlighted the limits of the JDR Act, especially regarding the protection of Japanese nationals when insecurity existed in a disaster-affected area.

#### *4.3 MINUSTAH Deployment*

In light of this legal basis, the JEG deployment to MINUSTAH was more problematic. As seen already in previous chapters, fulfllment of the Five Principles is a prerequisite before any military contribution to a UNPKO becomes legal. Unfortunately, no cease-fre agreement existed in Haiti because the leader of one of the warring parties, President Aristide, remained in exile. Determined to contribute the JEG to MINUSTAH, the GoJ devised a legal loophole by arguing as follows: the armed groups in Haiti were informally organized and therefore an armed confict was nonexistent, even if there was some insecurity on site ("Haichi-PKO ni jieitai," 2010). Considering the anarchic situation in Haiti, this political rhetoric was criticized as sophistry, but it nevertheless enabled the GoJ to dispatch the JEG as a part of MINUSTAH. The similar logic would also be applied to maintain the military contribution to South Sudan under *de facto* civil war conditions.

## 5 Overview of Japan's Activities

Japan provided various forms of assistance to Haiti, ranging from military deployment to aid through international organizations and the provision of emergency supplies by NGOs. In this section, we will concentrate in particular on the activities of JDR medical assistance and the deployment of JEG peacekeepers to MINUSTAH.

## *5.1 The Activities of the Medical Components Under the JDR Act*

Soon after the earthquake, the GoJ deployed frst the civilian medical team and then the SDF medical team under the existing JDR Act. Initially, as seen earlier, the GoJ's response was relatively slow due to a lag in the Haitian government's request for assistance and the need to send a survey team in advance to assess local security conditions. The day after the earthquake (January 14), this advance survey team left for Haiti to prepare the ground for the medical deployment under the JDR Act, since the GoJ had concerns about the volatile local security environment. Afterward, a JICA offcial, who had served as the head of the civilian medical team, gave a positive assessment of the performance of the advance team in selecting an appropriate venue for their work (Secretariat of JDR Team, 2011, p. 9). At frst, the advance survey team examined the possibility of deploying the civilian medical team to the capital city of Port-au-Prince. This idea was quickly abandoned, however, partly because insecurity in the metropolis was too serious and partly because emergency relief teams from other countries had already arrived there. Instead, the decision was made to dispatch the civilian medical team to Léogâne City, approximately 40 km west of Port-au-Prince. Léogâne had also suffered from serious damage, with an estimated 3000 dead and 10,000 wounded (Secretariat of JDR Team, 2011, p. 8). Moreover, about 90 percent of the city's buildings had collapsed. Nevertheless, Léogâne had several advantages that made it suitable for the deployment of JDR medical teams, such as the city's relative safety, security provision by the nearby Sri Lankan peacekeepers, and the availability of water and electricity (Secretariat of JDR Team, 2011, p. 15). In addition, no other countries had yet based their medical assistance there. Although the dispatch of this advance survey team initially delayed the Japanese deployment, their work in Léogâne proved useful in facilitating the effcient start-up of subsequent JDR activities.

On January 16, three days after the earthquake (Japan time), the GoJ chartered a private jet to transport the civilian medical team to Miami. As the ASDF happened to be participating in a joint exercise at the US Homestead Air Reserve Base in Florida, their C-130H transportation aircrafts carried the team from Miami to Port-au-Prince (MoD, 2010a). The JDR Act, amended in 1992, already endorsed such civil-military cooperation for the purpose of disaster relief (see Chap. 3), but this was the frst example of such cooperation occurring in practice. After dropping off the medical team, the same ASDF transport plane returned to the US with 34 Haitian earthquake victims on board in order to provide them with immediate medical care. The civilian medical team, comprising 26 members, began to provide assistance in a nursing school in Léogâne on January 18. They were the frst medical team to arrive in Léogâne and treated 534 people in total in the frst eight days (JICA, n.d.). After this period, medical assistance was taken over by the SDF medical unit, which was made up of approximately 100 personnel. The SDF medical team inherited the medical material and tents from the civilian team (Urakami & Saito, 2016, p. 173). Over a roughly three-week period, starting on January 23, the SDF medical unit treated 2954 people in total (Joint Staff Offce, 2010). Upon completion of the SDF medical unit's activities on February 13, medical care assistance was entrusted to the JRCS's medical team, which took over the following day. Both the civilian and military JDR medical contingents focused on providing emergency medical support, such as the treatment of external injuries, while JRCS personnel mainly took care of patients with chronic diseases. This initiative not only promoted collaboration between the civilian and military medical teams under the JDR framework, but also enhanced the practical implementation of collaboration between the governmental and nongovernmental assistance teams. The fortifed cooperation with the nongovernmental humanitarian organization in Léogâne expanded the scope of the "All Japan" approach, which had originally concentrated on the feld of infrastructure development and restoration.

#### *5.2 The Military Dispatch to MINUSTAH Under the PKO Act*

Following the deployment of medical assistance teams under the JDR Act, the GoJ contributed the JEG to MINUSTAH with unprecedented speed. The minimal political controversy surrounding deployment for purposes of emergency relief also facilitated the quick deployment of JDR personnel.

Upon the adoption of the aforementioned UNSCR 1908 on January 19, the UN requested on the same day that the GoJ dispatch the SDF to MINUSTAH with the following contributions: an infantry unit for security, an engineering corps to remove debris and repair roads, and a largesize transportation helicopter (MoD, 2010b, p. 4). In response to this request, on January 25, the GoJ expressed its will to dispatch the JEG. Two days later, an SDF survey team few to the disaster site, followed by the February 5 adoption of the "Haiti IPC Operations Implementation Plan," which determined the details of the SDF deployment to MINUSTAH (Cabinet Offce, 2010).

To support post-disaster reconstruction, the JEG again constituted the largest part of the Japanese delegation (Cabinet Offce, 2010, pp. 3–5). Among the 350 members who comprised the JEG contingent, approximately 190 were directly placed under the MINUSTAH mission, while the other 160 were deployed outside of the UN framework as support personnel tasked with assisting the JEG personnel within MINUSTAH (Uesugi, 2018, pp. 199–200). These separated JEG personnel had various tasks, and particularly important among them was coordination with civilian organizations, such as the Japanese embassy and the JICA in Haiti. The combined deployment of UN personnel and the support personnel initially emerged in the GSDF deployment to Iraq and developed as one of the main engines to facilitate civil-military cooperation.

Alongside the large-scale engineering force, two staff offcers and fve liaison offcers were also deployed to MINUSTAH Headquarters to facilitate smooth communication between the JEG side and the UN side (see Chaps. 3, 5, and 6). Albeit outside the formal deployment to the MINUSTAH, the MSDF and ASDF transportation forces also operated to support the JEG peacekeepers.

Under emergency conditions after the earthquake, the decision was made to deploy the JEG at the earliest possible opportunity. In consequence, the frst set of SDF peacekeepers arrived on site on February 8, only four weeks after the earthquake. This was an extraordinarily rapid deployment, since it usually takes several months, at least, to dispatch an engineering corps with the capacity to deliver heavy equipment to the site. This time, the GoJ swiftly chartered a Ukrainian "Antonov," the largest transport plane in the world, and transported heavy machines by air. Its frst fight transported four pieces of heavy equipment, such as shovelloaders, and arrived on February 11, 2010 (*Juki ga haichi tochaku*, 2010).

In total, the JEG delivered 150 vehicles, including 40 pieces of heavy equipment (e.g., bulldozers and hydraulic excavators), to the feld. Because the deployment was based on UNSCR 1908, the JEG focused above all on their restoration and reconstruction duty, which had been newly tasked to MINUSTAH. Once deployed, the JEG mainly operated in and around Port-au-Prince, which had been most seriously hit by the earthquake, while MINUSTAH originally focused more on the "robust" mandate. In Haiti, Japanese engineers carried out more than 200 tasks, such as the removal of a huge amount of rubble and the construction and repair of camps for internally displaced people (IDPs) (Cabinet Offce, 2013a). They also repaired roads leading to the border with the Dominican Republic (Cabinet Offce, 2013b).

#### *5.3 The Development of the "All Japan" Approach*

In addition to the offcial support to MINUSTAH, the JEG also provided direct assistance to the local population through close collaboration with Japan's ODA, or the "All Japan" approach (see Chaps. 3 and 6). Having learned from previous experience, the "All Japan" approach in Haiti was carried out in a more elaborate manner. By deploying its staff offcers to MINUSTAH Headquarters, the Japanese side could incorporate expanded "All Japan"-related works into the UN enterprise. With MINUSTAH approval, the JEG carried out construction works intended for use by local residents. When the JEG rebuilt the Sigueneau tuberculosis sanatorium as a part of MINUSTAH duties, for example, the Japanese embassy contributed ODA funds, using grant aid called the Cultural Grant Assistance (MoFA, 2018), to build a well and to donate an X-ray machine. Engineering work under the MINUSTAH framework and funding from Japan's ODA were also combined to restore an orphanage in Malpasse.

The "All Japan" approach also enhanced collaboration between the JEG's tasks and parallel NGO works also funded by Japan's ODA. In the reconstruction of a school for blind children, for instance, the JEG frst dismantled the damaged building and removed debris, before a Japanese NGO, namely Japan Association for Aid and Relief (AAR), constructed a new building. To connect the JEG, deployed as UN peacekeepers, with the NGO works, AAR frst made a request to the MINUSTAH Headquarters for help; then, the UN side tasked the JEG to work as AAR had requested.

Peace Winds Japan (PWJ), another Japanese NGO that had begun to assist Haiti immediately after the earthquake, also established close cooperation with the JEG. PWJ provided the local population with emergency goods, such as tents and rubble removers, and encouraged the residents to clean up their neighborhood, but the playground used for rubble collection soon grew full. PWJ considered arranging the removal of this rubble by a private company, but the NGO soon found that the JEG could clear the site free of charge. As in the case above, PWJ asked MINUSTAH Headquarters to assign this task to the JEG (Urakami & Saito, 2016, p. 175).

To foster closer relations with the local community, the JEG further expanded the range of civil affairs support, such as the provision of medical and hygiene education and the exhibition of Japanese culture, including *sumo* wrestling, *karate*, and calligraphy. Japanese peacekeepers operated in Haiti for nearly three years and withdrew at the end of 2012. At the request of the Haitian government, before their fnal departure, the GoJ donated their second-hand heavy equipment (e.g., bulldozers), as well as their used modular accommodation buildings, to the local community.

## 6 Outcomes of Japan's Efforts and Related Challenges

#### *6.1 A Collaborative Structure to Enable "Seamless" Assistance*

From the end of the 1990s onward, the GoJ emphasized the importance of "seamless" support to fragile states (see Chap. 3). We can say that the deployment to Haiti served as a meaningful test case to develop such "seamless" assistance by fostering civil-military partnerships in practice. This was possible in Haiti partly because civil-military cooperation was smoothly formed through the emergency medical assistance just after the 2010 earthquake, and partly because the SDF peacekeepers were tasked with a restoration and reconstruction mandate that displayed high affnity with the work of their civilian counterparts.

In Haiti, civil-military collaboration was remarkable in that it developed in two distinct modes, that is, a "subsequent collaboration" and a "simultaneous collaboration" mode. First, the subsequent partnership mode is a partnership where a civilian organization, newly arriving on site, takes over assistance from a military organization that has been operating so far, or vice versa, and continues with the existing activities in succession. This mode was developed in the initial phase of emergency medical support, when the JDR civilian team handed over control of medical provision to the SDF medical unit, which was succeeded in turn by the JRCS team when the SDF was withdrawn. Upon completing the early medical assistance phase, the SDF peacekeepers still carried on with Japan's support to Haiti, although a change in venue from Léogâne to Port-au-Prince prevented them from handing over directly from disaster relief to peacekeeping.

Second, the simultaneous collaboration mode is defned as a partnership where a civilian organization works in parallel with a military organization. This approach also emerged to consolidate the "All Japan" approach between the JEG peacekeepers and the ODA. In Haiti, governmental and nongovernmental partnerships were also strengthened, as seen in the cases of SDF cooperation with the JRCS and Japanese NGOs. In the meantime, "seamless" assistance in Haiti was also promoted by the unintended coincidence of the availability of ASDF transportation aircraft in Florida, which was the frst case of such civil-military cooperation under the JDR Act. This collaboration happened to work well on this occasion, but it also highlighted the necessity of prior preparation ahead of such a joint operation.

Despite the challenging circumstances of a complex crisis, Haiti consequently became a successful case with previously unseen efforts enhancing civil-military cooperation. If similar collaboration is to be implemented in the future, then the SDF's mandate under the JDR Act needs to be expanded to include the work of rubble removal and damaged building dismantlement, reconstruction of roads and damaged facilities, and construction of new facilities.

#### *6.2 The Gap Between Existing Legal Structures*

The Haitian experience demonstrated the limits of the existing legal structure in responding to complex crises, since neither the JDR Act nor the PKO Act anticipated such a complicated situation. In particular, since the JDR Act did not expect to deploy personnel to a confict-affected country, the dispatch of the civilian team to Haiti raised questions regarding how to protect civilian personnel when a disaster occurs in a war-torn location. Indeed, there have been other cases of confict-prone countries struck by natural disaster, such as Indonesia and Sri Lanka, which were both hit by an earthquake off Sumatra in 2004 (Uesugi, 2018, pp. 204–205). Likewise, security situations could be worsened while disaster relief aid is being provided, as a JDR civilian medical team once experienced in the Philippines in 2013 when the great typhoon Haiyan (also known as Yolanda) hit the Southeast Asian nation (Yoshitomi, 2018, p. 208). In the case of Haiti, as mentioned earlier, Sri Lankan peacekeepers provided security to the Japanese civilian teams, but such protection might not always be available. When deployed under the JDR Act, meanwhile, the SDF are supposed to work unarmed and are thus unable to provide protection to their Japanese civilian counterparts.

A similar problem regarding the protection of civilian personnel could happen not only to the civilian JDR members, but also to the civilian staff of NGOs. Throughout JDR medical assistance, for example, the SDF medical unit was sharing its base with an international NGO, called "World Wide Village" (MoD, 2010c, p. 5). Even if the NGO came under attack, unarmed SDF personnel deployed as a JDR team would have no means of protecting the civilian staff (Uesugi, 2018, pp. 204–205). This proved another limit of SDF deployment under the JDR Act, especially when plunged into the situation of a complex emergency, as in the case of Haiti (Uesugi, 2018, p. 204).

Fortunately, no serious security-related incidents occurred during the deployment of Japanese personnel in Haiti, but the experience highlighted the necessity of considering the issue of security provision during this deployment under the JDR Act. In addition, the need to expand the SDF's role in JDR-related activities was also highlighted. Considering these elements, it is necessary to investigate how the SDF's roles can be more actively utilized in order to enhance Japanese capacity in disaster relief.

## 7 Summary of Chap. 7

The case of Haiti was a unique experience for Japanese peacekeepers operating in conditions of complex crisis, in which the problems of a natural disaster and an armed confict overlapped. This led to the frst case of Japan invoking the JDR Act to deploy both a civilian JDR team and the SDF medical unit, while also authorizing a military deployment to a UN mission under the PKO Act. The peculiarity of the legal situation formed several distinct features in Japan's support to the earthquake-hit country. First, following the initial JDR works, the SDF peacekeepers were sent to Haiti very promptly, with few objections to the military contribution to MINUSTAH, even though it seemed questionable whether the ground situation fulflled the Five Principles. This proved that a disaster-related case could more easily garner political and public support for SDF deployment to a UNPKO. Second, the complex crisis promoted new forms of civil-military cooperation, as well as governmental and nongovernmental collaboration. In particular, the "All Japan" approach was implemented smoothly in Haiti, drawing from the previous experiences in East Timor, Iraq, and elsewhere. This achievement exactly corresponded with the larger international trend of "integration" in UNPKOs.

As for "robustness," despite acute instability in Haiti, the SDF did not encounter severe security threats and no serious problems regarding "robustness" emerged during the deployment to MINUSTAH. In the meantime, the protection of civilian personnel in a complex crisis appeared as an important agenda item for the future, since neither the JDR Act nor the PKO Act was designed to cope with such situations.

## Note

1. In 2011, the year after the Haitian earthquake, Japan was also hit by another great earthquake in the northeast region, accompanied by a huge tsunami and the breakdown of a nuclear power plant in Fukushima. The disastrous experience of Great East Japan Earthquake further strengthened Japan's disaster consciousness, both at the government level and in society.

## References (In English)


#### References (In Japanese)


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## South Sudan: The SDF and "Protection of Civilians"

## 1 Background to the Conflict in South Sudan

In 1956, Sudan gained independence from joint Egyptian and British colonial rule. Since then, Sudan has remained in a serious situation of continuous confict between the north and the south of the country, where political divisions emerged between local communities of Arab and African origins, between farmers and nomads, and between Muslims and Christians (Uesugi, 2018, p. 209). Following two civil wars, the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) was concluded in 2005, thereby founding the United Nations Mission in the Sudan (UNMIS). In January 2011, a referendum was held to determine whether the South should secede from Sudan. The outcome was clear, with 99 percent of the votes being in favor of the independence of the South (*South Sudan referendum*, 2011). In July of that year, South Sudan became independent as the youngest sovereign state in the world.

Concurrently, the UNMISS was established to support statebuilding in the young state. In December 2013, however, a ferce power struggle between President Kiir (from the largest ethnic group, the Dinka) and Vice President Machar (from the second largest tribe, the Nuer) escalated into an armed clash (Young, 2019). Before independence, Kiir-led forces and Machar-led forces had joined a united resistance force against Sudan, namely the Sudan People's Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A). Following the creation of South Sudan in 2011, the SPLM was divided, in 2013, into the Kiir-led SPLA and the Machar-led "Sudan People's Liberation Army-in-Opposition" (SPLA-IO) (Oyama, 2020). The outbreak of *de facto* internal armed confict forced many citizens to fee their homes as refugees and IDPs.

In August 2015, a subregional organization in East Africa—the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD)—brokered a peace agreement (Agreement on the Resolution of the Confict in South Sudan: ARCSS) between the Kiir and the Machar factions (IGAD, 2015). In April 2016, a transitional government was formed, restoring Machar as vice president. However, neither side was satisfed with the ARCSS, and disagreements again slid back into violent armed confict in July 2016 (Inoue et al., 2020). Since this armed clash forced Machar to fee the country, the SPLA-IO camp became increasingly fragmented, further complicating the entangled relations among the warring parties. Under such unstable conditions, concerns grew rapidly regarding the possibility of genocide. The IGAD again mediated a new phase of peace talks, and the Revitalized Agreement on the Resolution of the Confict in South Sudan (R-ARCSS) was signed in September 2018 (IGAD, 2018). In February 2020, another transitional government was established, restoring Machar as the frst vice president, but deeply rooted political struggle and chronic insecurity still linger in the nation today (Idris, 2018).

## 2 International Legitimacy of UNMISS

### *2.1 The Focus on Statebuilding*

When established in July 2011 under UNSCR 1996, UNMISS represented both "integration" and "robustness" (UNSC, 2011). UNMISS was designed to be a full integration mission with special attention to statebuilding, economic development, government support, and SSR (hereafter, we will collectively refer to them as statebuilding). UNMISS's mission also succeeded the "robust" mandate of UNMIS, emphasizing PoC that had been assigned to its UNMIS predecessor under Chapter VII of the UN Charter. UNMISS thus took on the dual nature of "integration" and "robustness." During the frst two years, however, UNMISS put more emphasis on statebuilding because the local security situation was relatively stable despite spontaneous violence. To implement the mandates above, UNMISS had 7000 military personnel, 900 civilian police offcers, and a few thousand civilian personnel.

#### *2.2 The Focus on the PoC Duty*

The outbreak of *de facto* civil confict in December 2013 steadily worsened public order and created a massive humanitarian crisis. This made UNMISS shift its focus from statebuilding to its PoC duty, such as providing protection and humanitarian support to civilians. One of the major tasks was to shelter the IDPs in UN bases, which would later be called the PoC sites (United Nations, 2016). To switch UNMISS's mandate to suit the PoC purpose, UNSCR 2155 in 2014 allowed UNMISS to expand the strength of its uniformed personnel to 12,500 troops and its Formed Police Unit (FPU), an armed police force contributed to a UNPKO (UNPOL, n.d.),1 to 1323 personnel, while downsizing the civilian presence (UNSC, 2014). The new mandate tasked both uniformed (military and police) and civilian UN personnel with operating the PoC sites and maintaining security to provide humanitarian assistance.

Under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, uniformed personnel were now authorized by UNMISS to take "all necessary means" (i.e., the use of force) against any parties, including the government-controlled SPLA, to defend the peace agreement and to protect civilians. This new authorization placed UN peacekeepers at higher risk of attack by local armed forces. In August 2016, following the reemergence of large-scale violence, UNSCR 2304 was adopted to further enhance the "robustness" of the mission. It increased the maximum size of UNMISS to 17,000 military personnel, including 4000 Regional Protection Forces (RPFs), which were put in place to safeguard public order in the capital, Juba (UNSC, 2016).

#### *2.3 UN Peacekeepers' Negligence of Their Duties*

Despite the expanded mandate and strength, the UNMISS could not properly fulfll its PoC mandate. When armed clashes resumed in July 2016, many civilians, both the international personnel and the local population, sought help from the UN peacekeepers in vain. In November of the same year, an independent special investigation shockingly revealed the appalling facts; for example, a Chinese peacekeeping battalion abandoned some of its defensive positions at the PoC site in the midst of attacks. Additionally, a Nepalese FPU did not stop the IDPs from looting inside UN House (UNSG, 2016, p. 4). Moreover, the government's SPLA often acted as a perpetrator in armed clashes in South Sudan. For instance, they assaulted dozens of UN civilians and humanitarian aid workers in their residential accommodations in Juba and committed various appalling acts/crimes, such as murder, looting, intimidation, and sexual violence (UNSG, 2016, p. 4). The international personnel immediately called for help from the UN peacekeepers located nearby, but no rescue came.

On the one hand, these outrageous disclosures necessarily damaged the credibility of this UNPKO, especially in terms of the "robust" mandate for the PoC purpose. On the other hand, however, some justifcations could be found to explain this negligence. There was already a risk that UNMISS peacekeepers might be perceived as one of the warring parties if they executed military sanctions against local combatants. Next, and not surprisingly, the persistent caution and hesitation of troop-contributing countries intensifed. Their hesitation was not just due to the traumatic 1993 Mogadishu incident where peacekeepers were brutally murdered in Somalia. It was also due to the acute rise in the number of fatalities in the recent UNPKOs, as the *Cruz Report* would later warn in 2017 (see Chaps. 1 and 9). Caution was especially pronounced when the size of a governmental armed force overwhelmed that of UN peacekeepers, as was the case in South Sudan (Kiya, 2019). Finally, South Sudanese forces were equipped with heavy weapons, including mortars, rocket-propelled grenades, helicopter gunships, and battle tanks (*South Sudan: Killings, rapes, looting in Juba*, 2016), while UN peacekeepers are usually equipped only with light arms (Berman et al., 2017, p. 9). These considerations underscored the structural problems and limitations that face contemporary UNPKOs.

## 3 Political Background to Japan's Participation

#### *3.1 Supporting the US*

The consideration given to its US ally was one of the GoJ's main incentives leading to the deployment of an SDF contingent to South Sudan. Just as in the case of Haiti, the DPJ government was facing the need to strengthen its alliance relationship with the US in order to make up for the abrupt termination of refueling support in the Indian Ocean in 2010 (see Chaps. 3 and 7; Uesugi, 2018).

The independence of South Sudan was a cherished goal of the US government, mainly for two reasons. First, support for South Sudan was important for Washington as a part of its global counterterrorism efforts. Sudan was suspected of being a base for the international terrorist group Al Qaeda, which was in charge of the 9/11 attacks in 2001. With this backdrop, the US began working in earnest toward a resolution of the Sudanese problem, placing considerable pressure on Sudan to allow a referendum on independence in South Sudan. Second, the prospect of eventual US withdrawal from Afghanistan and Iraq with very limited counterterrorism success motivated the Bush administration to push for South Sudanese independence as a means to leave its historical legacy. For these reasons, the US had a keen interest in supporting the independence of South Sudan. This in turn motivated the DPJ government to support the new African nation in the hope of pleasing the US ally.

#### *3.2 Supporting Confict-Affected Countries*

Since the end of the 1990s, and especially after the 9/11 terrorist attacks, the GoJ had become increasingly eager to support war-torn countries (see Chaps. 3 and 6). For this reason, the GoJ had already begun its support to Sudan even before the arrival of the DPJ government in 2009. Following the 2005 signing of the CPA, Japan provided various types of support to facilitate peace between North and South Sudan. At the Oslo donors' meeting in April 2015, for example, the GoJ pledged to provide the fnancial assistance of a total sum of USD 100 million both to the North and the South (MoFA, 2005).

Although JICA had already begun to provide infectious disease prevention support to children in Sudan as early as 2003, it expanded the range of supports after the signing of the CPA in 2005, for example, supporting food aid, demining and the Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) of ex-combatants (MoFA, 2021a). Since civil construction works, such as road restoration, were also carried out in tandem with international organizations such as the work of the World Food Programme (WFP),2 JICA had already accepted the experience of infrastructure development in Sudan, even before the independence of South Sudan in 2011 and the subsequent deployment of the JEG in 2012. Under the PKO Act, two SDF personnel were also dispatched to the UNMIS feld headquarters in Khartoum to assist with the fulfllment of the CPA from 2008 to the independence of South Sudan in 2011 (Cabinet Offce, n.d.-c).

## *3.3 Utilizing Japan's Engineering Capability for Peacekeeping*

A request from the UN also paved the way for the GoJ to dispatch the SDF to South Sudan. In 2010, a year before the independence of South Sudan, UNSG Ban Ki-moon asked the GoJ three times to contribute the SDF helicopters to South Sudan, but the GoJ declined to do so, given the high risk of danger to the SDF personnel (Handa, 2018). In August 2011, immediately after its independence, Ban Ki-moon made another request to Prime Minister Naoto Kan of the DPJ-led government to contribute a 300-man JEG contingent to South Sudan, while highly praising the JEG's role in infrastructure development in Haiti (see Chap. 7) at the same time (UNIC, 2011).

JEG contribution sounded more feasible in comparison with previous requests for dangerous air transport provision. Moreover, the GoJ had become more interested in utilizing its engineering capacity for the IPC purpose (see Chaps. 3 and 4). Nevertheless, the Kan government remained cautious toward the proposed JEG deployment to South Sudan, partly because the JEG was already deployed to Haiti at that time (see Chap. 7). The political tides turned when Yoshihiko Noda, another DPJ politician, succeeded to the Japanese premiership in September 2011. While visiting the UN Headquarters immediately after his inauguration, Noda pledged to Ban Ki-moon that he would deploy two staff offcers to UNMISS. He also promised to dispatch an advance survey team to examine the possibility of eventually contributing the JEG ("Minami-sudan e riku-ji 2-ri," 2011).

UNMISS seemed to be an ideal destination to take advantage of potential JEG contributions in the context of the early 2010s. Around that time, few UNPKOs had focused on statebuilding duties and UNMISS was almost the only statebuilding-oriented mission to take advantage of the JEG's engineering skills. On the other hand, contributing the JEG to UNMISS would necessarily raise legal questions regarding whether or not the volatile situation in South Sudan upheld the Five Principles. It was very diffcult for the GoJ to decide what to prioritize: meeting UN demands or risking the violation of Japanese legal requirements.

## 4 Legal Basis of Japan's Participation

#### *4.1 The PKO Act*

In November 2011, the Noda government decided to deploy a 300-person JEG contingent to UNMISS, concluding that the local situation met the criteria of the Five Principles (*Minami-sudan-PKO*, 2011). For this purpose, the three types of UNPKO for the application of the new Five Principles, freshly inserted in the 2015 amendment, were used to determine whether the local conditions satisfed the Five Principles or not. For South Sudan, the second item, (b), was applied: Operations conducted with the consent of the host nation when an armed confict has been concluded and warring parties have ceased to exist and the consent from a host nation and warring parties concerning the acceptance of such operations (see Chap. 4). The GoJ insisted that item (b) was applicable, mainly because the aforementioned CPA, the peace agreement between the North and the South of Sudan, was concluded in 2008. Even from a practical point of views, moreover, it was not too irrational to apply item (b) to the situation of South Sudan in the early days after it had gained independence. Indeed, the local situation was relatively stable for the frst two years from its independence in July 2011 to the outbreak of *de facto* civil war in December 2013.

The logic of "the nonexistence of an armed confict" was previously employed in Haiti (see Chap. 7) before the 2015 amendment to the PKO Act. Now it was possible for the GoJ to apply the same reasoning to South Sudan, but it had a frmer legal basis, resting on item (b). If this item was applicable, the GoJ could make a decision about deployment more easily because it would suffce if only the second, fourth, and ffth items of the Five Principles were met, evading the necessity to fulfll the frst ("Agreements on a ceasefre have been reached among the Parties to Armed Confict") and the third ("The operations shall be conducted without partiality to any of the Parties to Armed Confict").

On the other hand, the application of item (b) also meant that the SDF dispatch was now under a tighter legal constraint. As long as the façade of "nonexistence of an armed confict" could be maintained, item (b) reasonably legitimized the military deployment to South Sudan. Once local security was rapidly lost, especially from the end of 2013 onward, however, it grew increasingly diffcult for the GoJ to maintain such a sophistic logic. Indeed, South Sudan was not free from security concerns even soon after the independence (United Nations, 2011). Following the outbreak of *de facto* civil war in 2013, moreover, very serious insecurity soared in the young country. In this situation, it seemed highly questionable that the basic assumption of item (b)—that is, the nonexistence of an armed confict—was true. However, the GoJ employed sophistry to claim that, frst, armed confict was nonexistent, according to the GoJ's own defnition (see below); second, there were therefore no warring parties or a cease-fre agreement; and third, the frst of the Five Principles (i.e., the existence of a cease-fre agreement) did not need to be met (Fujimura, 2011).

The GoJ maintained such devious logic even after power shifted from the DPJ to the LDP at the end of 2012. The second Abe administration continued to insist that strict adherence to the Five Principles was being upheld, even after the outbreak of *de facto* civil confict in South Sudan in December 2013 and the recurrence of armed clashes in July 2016. The GoJ never admitted the existence of an armed confict in South Sudan until the end of JEG deployment in May 2017. Reliance on such tricky logic further expanded the gap between the Japanese legal system and the reality of UNPKOs.

#### *4.2 The Controversial Defnition of an "Armed Confict"*

In particular, the GoJ's rhetoric around the JEG's deployment to UNMISS highlighted the inexplicability of the GoJ's defnition of an "armed confict." In 2002, the GoJ defned the term as follows: "an armed confict in Article 9 of the Constitution refers to the situation in which a state or quasi-state organization has disagreements, do not concede to each other and are opposed" (see Chap. 4; Prime Minister of Japan and His Cabinet, n.d.).

According to this limited defnition, a situation of prolonged intensive violence would *not* be considered an "armed confict" unless "state" or "quasi-state" organizations were involved. The defnition of these terms, especially that of a "quasi-state" organization, is highly contested and may be subject to arbitrary interpretation. In 2003, as seen earlier, the GoJ defned the term "quasi-state organizations" as those that satisfy all or some of the three requirements of a state or that can be actors in an intentional confict, albeit with formal recognition from the other states (see Chap. 4; Ishiba, 2003). In the armed clashes of July 2016, however, heavy weapons, such as tanks and helicopter gunships, were used and some 300 people were killed in just four days, yet the GoJ never admitted that this was an armed confict (Fuse & Miura, 2018).

Behind this argument lay the question of whether or not the Macharled SPLA-IO was equivalent to a quasi-state organization. After the July 2016 armed clashes, Minister of Defense Tomomi Inada (2016) clearly refused to classify Machar's faction as a quasi-state organization: "Mr. Machar […] has fed the country and has not been able to return to South Sudan. [It is] not a systematic organization nor an established control (over territory). Therefore, [it is] not an armed confict."

Nevertheless, it was very diffcult to sustain such a disingenuous logic in reality. First, the Machar-led SPLA-IO, which was formerly part of the government-led SPLA, was neither a scattered guerrilla force nor an unorganized militia but instead kept a certain level of chain of command as an organized armed force (Oyama, 2020). Moreover, they had effectively controlled some geographic areas, especially in the northeast areas of South Sudan where the Nuer tribes made up the majority (Fuse, & Miura, 2018). Furthermore, the SPLA-IO under Machar was one of the formal signatories in two IGAD-sponsored peace agreements, that is, ARCSS in 2015 and R-ARCSS in 2018. Considering these factors from both a legal and a practical point of view, it seems very likely that Machar's armed faction should indeed be defned as a quasi-state organization and as one of the warring parties. If so, then the situation in South Sudan deserves to be classifed as an armed confict, even according to the GoJ's peculiar defnition of the term.

From the ground, it seemed hard to follow the GoJ's offcial position of denying the existence of an armed confict. In the midst of the fghting in 2016, for instance, one of the JEG personnel stationed in Juba muttered: "This is absolutely 'out,' isn't it?" (Oyama, 2020). In the Japanese usage, the term "out" here has a specifc connotation, which originally comes from baseball terminology, to suggest that something is unsuccessful, invalid, or against a rule. In other words, this candid comment from an SDF member in the feld implied that the situation in Juba did indeed seem to be an armed confict, and, if so, this clearly violated the Five Principles. Regardless of how the political logic contradicted reality, however, the GoJ has never, to this day, accepted the reality of an armed confict in South Sudan (MoFA, 2021b). After all, until the withdrawal of the JEG in May 2017, the government had never abandoned its reasoning based on the allocation of item (b).

This sophism caused persistent public skepticism regarding the legitimacy of the JEG presence in South Sudan. This was particularly the case since the 2015 Peace and Security Legislation was prepared in parallel with the JEG's deployment to South Sudan. This legislation primarily aimed at fortifying the bilateral alliance relationship with the US in order to strengthen Japan's national defense capability in East Asia. When both the Japanese government and the public became increasingly preoccupied with national defense in and around its territory, the peacekeeping issue was more or less thought of as a marginal issue within the Peace and Security Legislation's broader remit. Meanwhile, US alliance fortifcation primarily meant improving preparedness for the future, which would not be accompanied by immediate tangible action. By contrast, the 2015 amendments to the PKO Act were expected to refect immediately upon the JEG's ongoing tasks in South Sudan. This raised the possibility that the JEG might use weapons for the purpose of "coming-to-aid" duty, which was very likely to provoke controversy related to the constitutional ban on the use of force. This is why newly added roles for JEG peacekeepers attracted more attention, provoking a heated debate about their legitimacy.

## 5 Overview of Japan's Activities on the Ground

### *5.1 Before the Crisis of December 2013*

The frst set of JEG corps arrived in South Sudan in early 2012. In total, 11 sets of JEG forces were assigned, with half-year cycles of rotations over fve years from 2012 to 2017. The frst four teams had the maximum strength of approximately 330 people, while the size of units dispatched later was expanded to 410 men at maximum (Cabinet Offce, 2020). The engineers engaged in facility renovations in the UN camps and also the construction and restoration of public facilities and infrastructure, such as roadbuilding in Juba to support UNMISS-related activities.

The frst two years, from 2012 to 2013, when UNMISS put the greatest emphasis on statebuilding, served as the golden era of the "All Japan" approach (more details below). When the JEG arrived at the beginning of 2012, JICA had already begun operations on site, which facilitated a quick start to civil-military cooperation, not only regarding construction duties but also direct support to the local population. Throughout this initial period, the JEG often communicated with miscellaneous locals who expressed thankfulness (Oyama, 2020). One of the JEG offcers later praised himself: "It was indeed an activity for the people of South Sudan."

#### *5.2 After the Crisis of December 2013*

The outbreak of *de facto* civil war in December 2013 unexpectedly interrupted the JEG's ongoing activities, especially in terms of the "All Japan" approach. Given the sudden onset of fghting, more than 10,000 locals rushed toward the UNMISS camp for protection, which forced UNMISS to open up their camp and provide shelter. According to one of the SDF offcers, the JEG constructed toilets and built tents within the UN base for the IDPs (Handa, 2018, p. 112). At that point, the duties of UNMISS personnel, including the JEG, were virtually transformed from statebuilding to PoC, although it took half a year for the UNMISS mandate to formally switch (UNSC, 2014). Accordingly, the JEG's main focus had shifted to PoC-related activities, such as remodeling part of the UN camp to become a PoC site and fortifying the UN facilities. The JEG also provided water, quarantine facilities, and healthcare support to the IDPs.

Given these drastic on-site changes, it became much more diffcult for the JEG to focus on implementing the "All Japan" approach. Their civilian counterparts, such as the JICA staff and Japanese NGO workers, had to evacuate outside of South Sudan and did not return until 2014. The same situation would happen again in the wake of recurrent armed violence in 2016. Moreover, the worsening local security situation made it dangerous even for the armed JEG to operate outside of the UN compound, especially immediately after the outbreak of armed clashes in 2013, and again later in 2016. Following the outbreak of *de facto* civil war in December 2013, therefore, the JEG operated more frequently within and around UN facilities.

However, the JEG sometimes operated outside of the UN camp even after the 2013 crisis—to restore the roads, for example—but it basically focused on assisting UNMISS's PoC mandate rather than on civil affairs support, that is, direct assistance to the locals. As a result, the JEG had fewer opportunities to communicate with the locals (Oyama, 2020). Greater emphasis on the PoC mandate thus substantively altered the nature of the JEG's work; yet the Japanese government and media continued to highlight UNMISS's statebuilding mandate instead, as if nothing had changed. To illustrate the GoJ's intention, interactive events with the locals were still carried out even after the crises in 2013 and 2016 (such as JEG visits to orphanages and various sports events; Kiya, 2019).

Additional features were also highlighted in the wake of the crisis in 2013. First, deteriorating security highlighted the issue of protecting Japanese nationals on site. In the crisis of July 2016, for example, an automobile carrying four JICA personnel was shot in the city center of Juba ("Minami-sudan de," 2016). Although fortunately nobody was injured, the incident again accentuated the long-standing issue of protecting Japanese nationals in an emergency abroad (Oyama, 2020). The question of the JEG's land transportation capacity to evacuate Japanese nationals from South Sudan in a potential emergency was also discussed, although this was never realized in practice. Second, the GoJ continued to provide support to the local police in South Sudan, even under conditions of insecurity and after the large-scale violence in 2016. In partnership with the UNDP, for example, the GoJ renovated three community aid posts for the Joint Integrated Police so that they could provide regular patrols and rapid responses (UNDP, 2017).3

## 6 Outcomes and Challenges of Japan's Activity

#### *6.1 The "All Japan" Approach*

As far as the frst two years were concerned, the "All Japan" approach was carried out in a more elaborated manner than in earlier cases (Hanatani & Urakami, 2016). We can point out two distinctive features here. First, the interagency collaboration system was developed in South Sudan. While preparing for JEG deployment to UNMISS, a tripartite intragovernmental meeting among the Cabinet Offce, the MoFA, and the MoD/SDF was held in Tokyo to examine how the "All Japan" approach might be implemented in South Sudan (Hanatani & Urakami, 2016, p. 185). Once the JEG arrived in the feld, the Cabinet Offce, the Japanese Embassy in Juba, the JICA, and the JEG regularly held "ODA-PKO Liaison/ Coordination Meetings" on site. In this way, the 3-D (Diplomacy, Development and Defense) partnership was constituted in both Tokyo and Juba to facilitate the "All Japan" approach in South Sudan. Moreover, NGOs sometimes attended these routine ODA-PKO feld coordination meetings for information-sharing purposes.

Second, some 30–40 SDF personnel were also contributed to run the "Coordination Offce for Local Support" in Juba. As the "uniformed *corps*  *diplomatique*" (Handa, 2018, p. 82), they were tasked with investigating local benefciaries' needs and connecting with them as part of UN duties and then encouraging the UNMISS side to assign this work to the JEG. A senior JICA offcial in Juba highly praised their coordinating function as follows: "When levelling the ground, it usually takes time for us to choose a constructor and for them to actually begin their work. If we ask [the coordination offcers], the SDF will do it very quickly and free of charge" (Handa, 2018, p. 83).

At frst, this coordination function had been located outside of the UN framework, but it was absorbed within the JEG from the end of 2013 onward. This scheme was a device to avoid the criticism that the JEG worked outside of the UN framework, as had happened in the preceding cases, such as in East Timor (see Chap. 6). For this purpose, the coordination offcers were also located outside of the UN framework in Haiti, which proved useful in connecting the "All Japan" approach with UN tasks (see Chap. 7). In South Sudan, this method was further enhanced.

Thanks to these efforts, the "All Japan" approach achieved quite a few positive results in South Sudan for the frst two years. Outcomes included, for example, construction of a community road, ground leveling for a water purifcation plant, cleanup of the riverport, and the expansion of a waste repository, which were all carried out in Juba (Hanatani & Urakami, 2016, p. 197; MoD, 2017; Embassy of Japan in South Sudan, 2017). In addition, nonconstruction assistance was also provided under the "All Japan" approach: for example, to clean up a community road and to provide vocational training for the local youth. Some challenges also arose, such as overcoming the differences among concerned agencies and obstacles to institutionalizing the collaboration scheme.

#### *6.2 The Rising Necessity of the Joint Defense of a Camp*

The occurrence of large-scale fghting in 2013 and 2016 highlighted the impending danger surrounding the JEG in South Sudan. Under these chaotic conditions, violence touched not only the locals but also UN personnel. In the 2013 armed clashes, thousands of locals fooded into UN Tongping, the UN base where the JEG was stationed, which was very dangerous for the peacekeepers (Oyama, 2020). In fact, two Indian peacekeepers were killed in attacks by Nuer armed groups because Dinka citizens were sheltering inside the UN base (Fuse & Miura, 2018).

During this emergency, UNMISS ordered its troops on December 23, 2013, to tighten various defensive security measures, such as the construction of a watchtower and a gate. The JEG carried out most of these measures, except for "cooperation for shooting," which meant to fre in unison with fellow peacekeepers from other countries in the shared base camp (Handa, 2018). The GSDF's internal records, which were published a year later, commented on the "cooperation for shooting" measure as follows:

The "cooperation for shooting" aims to prevent of intrusion by armed groups into the UN Tongping base. To increase the effectiveness [of the cooperation for shooting], mutual assistance is essential among the neighboring contingents. Nevertheless, it would constitute the use of force, which the Constitution bans, and therefore the cooperation for fring with the troops from the other countries was considered as impractical [for the SDF]. But a lawmaking in the future may make it possible [for the SDF] to corporate with the troops from the other countries [in this issue]. (Handa, 2018, p. 113)

In the recurrence of large-scale violence in July 2016, anti-government forces began to shoot at the UN Tongping base from higher foors of an adjacent building. To stop this misconduct, the Bangladeshi engineering team began to fre back at them (Oyama, 2020). In the midst of this confusion, the JEG locked themselves in the camp. Fortunately, there were no fatalities among the Bangladeshi and Japanese engineers after this incident, but it left a serious concern for the Japanese side: should the JEG be allowed to just hide themselves while their fellow engineers actively fght to defend their common base?

Before this question actually arose in July 2016, the 2015 amendment had already added the "joint defense of a camp" duty to the PKO Act. The amended PKO Act now authorized SDF peacekeepers to use weapons for the joint defense of a camp (see Chap. 4). However, during the armed turmoil in July 2016, the JEG had not yet been tasked with this new duty. At that time, the JEG was not yet permitted to use weapons to defend the base they shared with fellow peacekeepers and thus had no other options except to stay hidden. Four months later, the "joint defense of a camp" duty was offcially assigned to the JEG, along with the "coming-to-aid" duty, as part of the 2015 amendment to the PKO Act.

From a legal point of view, this amendment allowed the JEG to use weapons in joint defense of a camp alongside peacekeepers from other countries. Practically, however, it remained uncertain whether or not they could actually perform such a duty. Unlike the "coming-to-aid" duty discussed earlier, the "joint defense of a camp" duty was authorized under the category of self-preservation, thereby allowing the JEG to use weapons even against a state or quasi-state organization (see Chap. 4). This ran the risk of dragging the JEG into full-scale active combat, which could exceed its capacity and provoke political controversy.

Even after the "joint defense of a camp" duty was assigned, meanwhile, there was still a discrepancy between the practical and detailed regulations to determine when to fre (Rules of Engagement: ROEs) between the UN standard and in Japan's peculiar legal frameworks. To carry out the PoC mandate, UNMISS allowed its uniformed peacekeepers (both military and police) to use lethal force preemptively, but SDF peacekeepers were not allowed to use weapons in such a way, even in joint defense of a camp. The Japanese ROEs permit SDF peacekeepers to fre only in a restrained and gradual manner. The different ROEs would prevent a joint action between the SDF and the fellow UN peacekeepers from other countries, even after having introduced the authorization for joint defense of a camp (Oyama, 2020).

#### *6.3 The Assignment of the "Coming-to-Aid" Duty*

Following the amendment to the PKO Act in September 2015, the "coming-to-aid" duty was also assigned to the JEG in November 2016. This task was highly controversial, not just because such missions would allow the JEG to use weapons beyond the narrow scope of self-preservation (see Chap. 4), but also because the large-scale armed clashes had recurred in South Sudan only four months earlier. The new duty attracted public attention both in Japan and outside the country. Foreign media reports sometimes confused the "coming-to-aid" duty with full-fedged security duty. When the "coming-to-aid" duty was assigned in November 2016, for instance, the front page of a local paper in Juba reported, "Japan's rescue mission peacekeepers arrive in Juba" (Oyama, 2020).

In reality, however, Abe's intention was much more modest and limited. When assigning the "coming-to-aid" duty to the JEG, the Abe government issued a document titled "The fundamental point of view concerning the addition of a new task" (Cabinet Secretariat et al., 2016). From this document, we can see how the recurrence of violence in Juba in July of that year led to the GoJ's decision to assign such "coming-to-aid" duty. First, the document emphasized that order in South Sudan should be maintained by the local police and armed forces, supplemented by UNMISS's infantry force. Then, it clarifed that although the SDF contingent in South Sudan was an engineering force, which was not in charge of security missions as its primary duty, the GoJ had dared to assign them this "coming-to-aid" duty to prepare for an emergency if the UN infantry unit was not available and the NGO personnel and others were in imminent danger (Cabinet Secretariat et al., 2016, p. 1). This text was written in a hypothetical manner, but it obviously assumed a situation that had actually happened four months earlier in Juba, as seen above in this chapter.

Indeed, this view was reconfrmed by Abe's words in March 2017 when the GoJ announced the withdrawal of the JEG from South Sudan. He stated that it was necessary to take all possible measures, including the assignment of "coming-to-aid" duty, since Japan already had the legal system in place and the SDF was there (Abe, 2017). He concluded, "I judged that the assignment of 'coming-to-aid' duty was natural in light of our experience of [the armed clash in Juba] in July."

Next, the document also expressed concern for the safety of Japanese nationals in Juba and concluded, "It would be impossible for the SDF to do nothing when they exist in the feld and possesses the capacity to rescue" (Cabinet Secretariat et al., 2016, p. 2). Furthermore, it pressed the importance of a legal framework to authorize the "coming-to-aid" duty, mentioning the earlier bitter experience in East Timor: in these cases, the SDF personnel had to perform *de facto* "coming-to-aid" duty in East Timor as well as Zaire without a formal mandate (see Chaps. 3 and 6).

In sum, we can say that the Abe government decided to assign the "coming-to-aid" duty partly due to concerns for the safety of Japanese nationals in Juba and partly due to the intention to resolve the gap between the reality of UNPKOs and the national legal constraints. In the meantime, the GoJ reaffrmed that the JEG could perform only "as an emergency and temporary measure" (Cabinet Secretariat et al., 2016, p. 1) and their target of protection was restricted to international personnel, especially the Japanese nationals. One of the observers noted, "[T]he Abe government assigned a new mission, *kaketsuke-keigo* [the 'coming-to-aid' duty], to the SDF, *in spite of* military clashes and the worsening security situation in South Sudan" [emphasis added] (Akimoto, 2018, chap. 7). The truth was that Abe did so *because of* increasing insecurity there, albeit only very cautiously.

Despite such a restrictive and circumspect decision, the "coming-toaid" duty was often regarded as a sign of Abe's military ambition, especially by observers outside Japan. Presumably, it was not only because the legal logic was too complicated but also because such a concept did not exist outside of Japan, causing serious misunderstanding among foreigners. This risked causing serious confusion once the "coming-to-aid" duty was actually performed, due to the gap between international expectations and what the domestic legal framework allowed the JEG to do. One of the most serious problems related to the "coming-to-aid" duty was that the JEG were prohibited from using weapons against a state organization, even though the SPLA was often responsible for disturbing the peace. Even if the SPLA attacked the international personnel, as had actually happened, the JEG would not be able to fre against them: doing so would constitute the use of force.

#### *6.4 The Sudden Withdrawal of the JEG*

In March 2017, the Abe government abruptly announced that the JEG would withdraw from South Sudan by May of that year. To contextualize this decision, the GoJ referred to the deployment of a new regional force, intended to strengthen the PoC ability, and emphasized political progress in ongoing stabilization efforts before articulating the following reason for withdrawal:

The JEG had been deployed [to the UNMISS] for more than fve years, which marked the longest contribution of a [Japanese] engineers' unit. They accumulated the greatest achievements in our IPC to date, exemplifed by the road restoration in and around the capital, Juba. The situation allowed us to close their engineering activities in Juba. […]. We judged that our country should shift our emphasis from the JEG's engineering activities to the support of South Sudan's self-reliance. (Cabinet Offce, 2020, p. 5)4

This offcial clarifcation seemed not just nebulous but even contrived, since it did not mention local insecurity. It seemed almost certain that security concerns lay at the heart of this decision, which posed a dilemma for the GoJ. On the one hand, if the GoJ admitted the existence of insecurity on site, it would contradict the existing offcial explanations. On the other hand, if the JEG remained deployed in South Sudan, they might face an unpredictable situation compelling them to use weapons under the new duties authorized by the amended PKO Act.

In light of this dilemma, the sudden disclosure of the JEG's hidden daily reports directly resulted in the GoJ's decision to withdraw with haste. These secret reports, which the GoJ had initially insisted did not exist, were frst discovered at the end of 2016 and their contents were disclosed in February 2017 (Fuse & Miura, 2018). This disclosure was the fnal political blow that terminated the JEG's deployment to South Sudan, partly because such suppression seriously damaged public trust toward the Abe government. But it was also because the covert diaries confrmed the reality of daily "fghting" in South Sudan even though the government had continued to deny the occurrence of such fghting.

What would have happened if this disclosure had not occurred? This counterfactual question will continue to puzzle historians for decades. From a hypothetical point of view, it seems likely that the Abe government would still have terminated the JEG's UNMISS deployment sooner or later, because this deployment had almost reached an impasse, in terms of both "integration" and "robustness" in 2016 and 2017. While dispatched to South Sudan, the addition of two new tasks, namely the "coming-toaid" and "joint defense of a camp" duties, marked certain qualitative developments in Japan's pursuit of "robustness." In reality, as seen above, it was never easy for the JEG to carry out these duties while serious security concerns lingered in South Sudan. The questions related to "robustness" entailed particularly diffcult problems, potentially causing both practical diffculties (e.g., the loss of Japanese personnel) and legal questions (e.g., the JEG's excessive use of weapons beyond the constitutional ban on the use of force). These problems would be too politically risky for the Abe government, especially when it aspired to amend the Constitution. We will revisit this issue in Chap. 9.

On the other hand, the JEG's activity also remained low in "integration," especially following the 2014 shift in UNMISS's mandate from statebuilding to PoC. The JEG had been proud of its engineering support: not only its high-quality construction work but also its considerable assistance to the local population through the "All Japan" approach. Following the outbreak of armed confict in 2013, the JEG's work was largely confned under the PoC mandate and to mission support within the UN camp. In this regard, it might be true that the GoJ concluded that there was little scope left for the JEG to carry on in South Sudan.

## 7 Summary of Chap. 8

Initially, the JEG deployment to UNMISS seemed like an ideal example of "integration," combining the use of Japan's sophisticated engineering capability with the "All Japan" approach for the purpose of statebuilding. From the end of 2013 onward, however, as local security conditions deteriorated, the nature of UNMISS increasingly shifted toward "robustness." This widened the gap between the JEG's initial expectations regarding its role in "integration" and the actual demands on site, which were dogged by the call for "robustness." In the meantime, the two new tasks, added by the 2015 amendments to the PKO Act, slightly pushed the JEG's role toward "robustness." Nevertheless, the newly added missions expanded the leeway of SDF peacekeepers only to a limited extent and the Japanese peacekeeping framework was still left far behind and struggled to cope with the very intensive UN demands for "robustness" in South Sudan. The situation became even more complicated because the GoJ never acknowledged the existence of armed confict in South Sudan. All of these elements eventually became too politically complex, resulting in the JEG's sudden withdrawal from UNMISS in May 2017.

## Notes


ammunition, and other military-related equipment as parts of "material cooperation" in the PKO Act (see Chap. 3) and partly because the Three Principles of Japanese Arms Export, established in the late 1960s, did not allow such transfer at that time. Upon request from South Korea via UNMISS, however, the GoJ approved it as an exception on the grounds of urgency and humanitarian concern (Kutsunugi, 2015). This became the frst case of "material cooperation" on the transfer of ammunition. The following year, the ban was remodeled as the "Three Principles on the Transfer of Defense Equipment and Technology," relatively relaxing the restriction on the transfer of military-related equipment and technology.

4. In addition, the arrival of a UK engineering contingent in June 2016 as a part of UNMISS might also have facilitated the GoJ's decision to withdraw the JEG. Upon departure in May 2017, the JEG donated all used equipment and leftover material, valued at approximately USD 24 million.

## References (In English)


#### References (In Japanese)


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## Conclusion: Japan's Search for a New Direction in Peacekeeping

## 1 The Trajectories of Japan's Peacekeeping Policy

## *1.1 Overview of Japan's Peacekeeping Policy*

This book has considered the evolution of Japan's peacekeeping policy, with special heed to a quarter-century period of troop contribution to the UNPKOs from 1992 to 2017. A main hypothetical assumption of this book was that Japan's peacekeeping policy had evolved in pursuit of "robustness" and "integration" to follow international trends in UNPKOs with the hope of making a more "proactive" contribution to these UNPKOs. By the late 2010s, however, Japan's efforts had reached a deadlock, in terms of both "robustness" and "integration," resulting in the 2017 termination of troop contributions.

With this in mind, Chap. 1 reviewed the evolution of Japan's peacekeeping policy and the changing global trends in UNPKOs that developed in parallel. It highlighted the deep gap between the Japanese legal system and the international UNPKO trends and how this motivated the GoJ to try to catch up with the "global standard." This introductory chapter also pointed out that recent years have seen the rise of widespread hesitation toward troop contribution to the UNPKOs among the countries of the Global North. In doing so, it indicated that the discontinuity of Japan's troop contribution should be regarded in the context of this common trend in the Global North. In Chap. 2, we mapped the historical background of Japan's peacekeeping policy from the early postwar period to 1992, clarifying how anti-militarism, especially the *de facto* national ban on overseas military dispatch, had prevented the postwar Japan from contributing troops to the UNPKOs. The chapter then showed how the changes around the end of the Cold War drastically pushed Japan to enact a highly ambitious PKO Act in 1992. Next, Chap. 3, which covered the era from 1992 to 2012, articulated Japan's actual performance under the narrow and broader IPC frameworks, the moves and challenges toward "integration" and "robustness," and the decline of anti-militarism. It also examined the constraints embedded in the statute, represented by the Five Principles. Chapter 4 then focused on more recent developments under the second Abe administration, paying special heed to the impacts of the Peace and Security Legislation in 2015. After providing an overview of Abe's wholesale reform of security policy, the chapter paid special attention to the pursuit of "robustness" and "integration" during this period.

The latter half of this book presented selected case studies of Japan's peacekeeping experience, especially those examples with high relevance to the national pursuit of "robustness" and "integration." Chapter 5 analyzed Japan's frst ever military contribution to a UNPKO, which was in Cambodia from 1992 to 1993. In this case, both the GoJ and Japanese peacekeepers on site were perplexed by the harsh empirical reality of the UNPKO, creating challenges that culminated in the loss of two Japanese personnel. This bitter experience led to the subsequent pursuit of "robustness" in future peacekeeping policy, particularly in terms of the protection of Japanese nationals on the ground. At the same time, national moves toward greater "integration" also emerged, after the JEG's successful engineering contribution to the Cambodia operation.

Chapter 6 examined the case of East Timor in the early 2000s, which was an experience of peacekeeping while also building a new state. Emphasizing core statebuilding activities, this case further advanced the pursuit of greater "integration," especially by employing the "All Japan" approach. While in East Timor, a security incident occurred, forcing the JEG to engage in the *de facto* rescue of Japanese nationals during mass demonstrations, which simultaneously reaffrmed the need to adopt greater "robustness" in Japanese peacekeeping policy.

Chapter 7 evaluated the case of Haiti in the early 2010s, which occurred under conditions of complex crisis that combined natural disaster with serious insecurity, accompanied by a violent political confict. When the great earthquake in 2010 triggered the GoJ's assistance to Haiti, a more sophisticated version of multilayered civil-military cooperation was seen than in the earlier cases, such as East Timor, further enhancing the trend of "integration." Although serious security concerns existed in Haiti, especially in the post-earthquake confusion, the Japanese civilian medical team was able to safely complete their mission. Regardless, the Haitian experience raised important questions concerning how to protect civilian aid workers in insecure conditions.

Lastly, Chap. 8 investigated the case of South Sudan from 2012 to 2017. For the frst two years, when UNMISS primarily concentrated on statebuilding, the JEG was able to focus on civil construction work, which created positive outcomes toward "integration." With the outbreak of *de facto* civil war at the end of 2013, however, UNMISS's mandate was eventually switched to the PoC. Serious insecurity on the ground inevitably made the GoJ face up to the pressing need for greater "robustness" of its peacekeeping forces. Concurrent with on-site changes, the 2015 Peace and Security Legislation also amended the PKO Act to include the partial relaxation of restrictions on the use of weapons by SDF peacekeepers. In fall 2016, the JEG was assigned these two newly added security-related duties, namely the "coming-to-aid" and "joint defense of a camp" duties. However, the JEG was abruptly withdrawn from South Sudan half a year later, before performing these new duties. Since then, the GoJ has contributed no subsequent troops to any UNPKO, although the deployment of a small number of staff offcers to UNMISS is still maintained to this day.

#### *1.2 Japan's Peacekeeping Policy at a Crossroads*

Since its UNPKO debut in 1992, Japan has cautiously sought to catch up with global trends in UNPKOs, namely concurrent trends toward greater "robustness" and "integration," in order to reduce the gap between the Japanese legal system and international standards. This is the basis of common assumptions that more "proactive" troop deployment, especially in terms of quantity, would be a desirable national policy goal. The dual pursuit of greater "robustness" and "integration" evolved together to eventually construct a uniquely Japanese way of peacekeeping. After a quarter century, however, both trends had reached their limits, resulting in the abrupt termination of peacekeeping troop contributions in 2017.

From the analysis in the preceding chapters, we can say that Japan's peacekeeping policy now stands at a crossroads. In the early days of the second Abe administration, it seemed that moves toward both greater "robustness" and greater "integration" were well promoted. In line with the trend toward "robustness," the 2015 amendment to the PKO Act as part of the Peace and Security Legislation expanded the scope for the use of weapons beyond the narrow self-preservation purpose, commonly known as the addition of the "coming-to-aid" duty. In line with the trend toward "integration," on the other hand, the Abe administration promoted the "All Japan" approach, which combined peacekeeping efforts with development aid in Haiti and South Sudan. Despite these efforts and achievements, the JEG withdrew from South Sudan in May 2017. Why have these efforts reached a stalemate? We will consider these questions below.

## 2 The Consequences of Japan's Dual Pursuit of "Robustness" and "Integration"

## *2.1 The Consequence of the Pursuit of "Robustness"*

From the outset, the pursuit of "robustness," particularly in terms of relaxation of the use of weapons, was the central concern in the evolution of Japan's peacekeeping policy. The use of weapons had always been an exceptionally intractable problem for the GoJ, since this could constitute a situation of the use of force, which is banned by the Constitution. With the initial adoption of the PKO Act in 1992, the GoJ had already imposed extremely strict constraints on the use of weapons for any future SDF peacekeepers. As a result, the range of authorized weapons use permitted to SDF personnel was much narrower than the global standard practiced in various UNPKOs. Japan's self-imposed restrictions were put in place almost entirely to satisfy domestic legal requirements and to defuse the anti-military political opposition, as well as the very strong reluctance within the SDF to expose its personnel to danger. These restrictions generated serious gaps between Japan's national caveats and the general standards in the UNPKOs: gaps that were soon highlighted in Japan's actual experience of military contributions in Cambodia, East Timor, and elsewhere. This raised calls in Japan to relax overly stringent legal constraints and instead try to follow changing trends toward greater "robustness" at the international level.

In this context, the PKO Act was amended in 1998, 2001, and 2015 to loosen the limits on the use of weapons gradually, albeit only to a minimal extent. Most notably, the new "coming-to-aid" duty was introduced under the amendment to the PKO Act that occurred as part of the all-inclusive Peace and Security Legislation in 2015. This new rescue duty provoked much controversy, partly because it would allow the SDF peacekeepers to use weapons beyond the narrow scope of self-preservation and partly because it was actually assigned to the JEG in the highly volatile South Sudan in November 2017. After the subsequent half year of rising domestic pressure and political criticism, and also triggered by the disclosure of a hidden JEG report, the GoJ withdrew the JEG from South Sudan in May 2017 without ever performing the "coming-to-aid" duty in practice.

In retrospect, how should we evaluate the GoJ's pursuit of "robustness" throughout its quarter-century history of peacekeeping? To begin answering this question, we can point out that, from the beginning, the GoJ was not very enthusiastic regarding the move toward greater "robustness," or at best remained a hesitant pursuer of this larger trend. Two main factors facilitated the relaxation of restrictions on the use of weapons: the call for a more "proactive" personnel contribution, especially in quantity; and the need to reduce the confusion of SDF peacekeepers on the ground. First, the relative weight of the peacekeeping issue in Japan's security and foreign policy had been to some extent declining. In the frst half of the 1990s, the GoJ had a strong incentive to promote participation in the UNPKOs under the political slogan of "International Contribution." From the mid-1990s onward, however, both the GoJ and domestic public opinion had become increasingly concerned about regional stability in its neighborhood and preoccupied with the bilateral alliance relationship with the US. Commitment to the UNPKOs remained important to show Japan's willingness to cooperate with the UN, but this priority had been somewhat marginalized in comparison with the renewed attention to national security.

Second, from the GoJ's point of view, the use of weapons in peacekeeping had always been a highly challenging problem that risked inviting ferce anti-military criticism. Notwithstanding the decline in anti-militarism over the last few decades, the ban on the use of force remains resolute, because it is frmly institutionalized in the Constitution. Although traditional anti-military parties currently occupy only a marginal status in the Diet, they might regain public support whenever an issue arrives at the very delicate point of potentially infringing on the Constitution. This was typically seen in the case of a large-scale opposition campaign against the Peace and Security Legislation in 2015. Put another way, the "use of weapons" in peacekeeping could be too politically risky an agenda for the GoJ, potentially weakening its political power. Given these reasons, the GoJ had not necessarily been willing to relax restrictions on the use of weapons in peacekeeping. Even when they did relax the rules, they did so only to a minimal extent.

This was particularly the case in the controversy surrounding the 2015 amendment to the PKO Act. The addition of new tasks, especially the "coming-to-aid" duty, caused much debate in Japan, since it marked a qualitative departure in Japan's peacekeeping policy by allowing the use of weapons beyond the scope of self-preservation to the new category of "execution of missions" (see Chaps. 3 and 4). From an international point of view, the UN standard typically allows what the Japanese call "comingto-aid" duty as part of the broader right to self-defense. For this reason, the policy recommendations of expert panels in 2002, 2008, and 2014 demanded that "coming-to-aid" duty should be legalized as an aspect of self-preservation (Chaps. 3 and 4; The Security Experts Panel, 2014, p. 29). If so, the addition of "coming-to-aid" duty would mean the expansion of the allowed range for self-preservation to the extent of the global standard of "self-defense."

Nonetheless, Prime Minister Abe declined this diffcult job and compromised by authorizing the "coming-to-aid" duty not as part of selfpreservation but under the category of "execution of missions." In other words, even after the addition of the "coming-to-aid" duty, Japan's standard for the use of weapons in peacekeeping still remained distant from that found in the UNPKOs. Moreover, even the range of the newly added "coming-to-aid" duty was much narrower than that of similar activities at the international level, prohibiting the use of weapons against a state or quasi-state organization as an adversary party.

If the "coming-to-aid" duty were legitimized for the self-preservation purpose, the SDF's use of weapons for the "coming-to-aid" duty could be allowed whatever their target, including a state or quasi-state organization, because it rests on the natural rights of human beings. In reality, the "coming-to-aid" duty was legalized under the category of "the execution of missions," which meant that the SDF would not be allowed to use weapons against a state or quasi-state organization as an adversary party (see Chaps. 3 and 4). Under the confusion of post-confict countries, however, it would be extremely diffcult to make a clear distinction among state, quasi-state, and non-state organizations. To avoid the danger of violating the constitutional ban on the use of force, therefore, the allowed range for the JEG's use of weapons for "coming-to-aid" duty was confned to a limited extent. In a nutshell, the relaxation of restrictions on the use of weapons in Japan's peacekeeping was still much more limited in comparison with the "robustness" found in the UNPKOs.

#### *2.2 The Consequences of the Pursuit of "Integration"*

Unlike the rocky road that Japan's (reluctant) pursuit of "robustness" had traveled, the pursuit of greater "integration" had developed along a much more favored path. Focus on the engineering capability based on the "All Japan" approach was a perfect ft for Japan's requirements and abilities in peacekeeping. It not only was a safer option among the various types of troop contributions, but also enabled the GoJ to make maximum use of Japan's world-renowned engineering skills and economic power. It permitted the GoJ to avoid the political risk of inviting anti-military criticism while also making its unique contribution to the UNPKOs. In contrast to the pursuit of "robustness," which had varied between willingness and reluctance, a wider consensus existed in favor of advancing "integration" within the GoJ, on both the civilian and the military side. Moreover, both the UN and host nations had highly praised the JEG's construction works.

Overall, thus, Japan's move toward "integration" developed well. In the earlier cases, such as in Cambodia and East Timor, practical challenges were recognized, such as the need to include training provision for heavy machinery operators and mechanics following the donation of used equipment to host nations. The question of how the "All Japan" approach could be situated within the UN framework also appeared as a future agenda item. By accumulating on-site experiences, answers to this question were gradually found: for example, by bringing coordination SDF offcers to the feld, as typically seen in Haiti and South Sudan (see Chaps. 7 and 8). Technically, these coordinators were situated outside of the UN framework, but they worked closely with the SDF peacekeepers and facilitated communication with the UN feld headquarters and the Japanese contingent. This scheme proved useful to establish a local development agenda, founded by JICA and its collaborators, as a part of UN duties. This helped the SDF peacekeepers to carry out the "All Japan" approach with tasking from the UN side.

In the meantime, the JEG could not entirely free itself from demands for greater "robustness," as particularly seen in Cambodia, East Timor, and South Sudan (see Chaps. 5, 6, and 8). The case of South Sudan especially highlighted the bitter reality of contemporary UNPKOs, among which few statebuilding-focused missions existed. Contemporary UNPKOs are often mandated with both "integration" and "robustness." In reality, as seen in UNMISS, the urgent concerns for the PoC mostly monopolized the practical attention of personnel on site. Coping with imminent danger is usually a top priority and it is therefore not easy to promote statebuilding activities in conditions of insecurity. This changing trend in the UNPKO had made it very diffcult for the GoJ to maintain its personnel deployment for "integration," based above all on the "All Japan" approach.

## 3 The Other Possible Explanations for the JEG's Sudden Withdrawal from South Sudan

As seen above, we argue that the termination of Japan's troop contribution to the UNPKOs should be attributed to the stalemates in the GoJ's pursuit of both "robustness" and "integration." Besides, however, we can also point out several plausible explanations behind the Abe government's sudden decision to withdraw the JEG only half a year after it had been tasked with the "coming-to-aid" duty. As mentioned earlier, we do not yet have concrete evidence to answer this question, although we can reasonably assume that the divulgation of the daily reports was just a direct trigger.

Even a without tangible evidence, we may conjecturally suggest several possible reasons. First and the foremost, it seemed politically too risky for the Abe administration to maintain the JEG in the highly dangerous South Sudan with such a limited security duty, especially after the situation had been infamed by the scandal surrounding the disclosure of daily reports. The addition of a "coming-to-aid" duty provoked heated debate only within the inward legal logic and it achieved a minor catch-up in terms of "robustness" at the international level.

Presumably, it was true that Abe was severely concerned about serious insecurity in South Sudan, especially following the recurrence of largescale violence in July 2016. Meanwhile, the PKO Act was amended in September 2015 and came into effect in March 2016. Originally, the GoJ was motivated to include the "coming-to-aid" duty in the 2015 amendment, based on the bitter experience in Zaire and East Timor, where the SDF had to perform the *de facto* "coming-to-aid" duty without a formal legal basis (see Chaps. 3 and 6). Needless to say, it was by no means undesirable that the military personnel would perform an unassigned task, while it would be practically very diffcult to neglect a call for help from the Japanese personnel on site. This was the fundamental motivation behind the legalization of "coming-to-aid" duty in the 2015 amendment to the PKO Act.

While the Abe government was preparing for the amendment of the PKO Act as part of the Peace and Security Legislation, however, the security situation in South Sudan rapidly deteriorated. From this timing, we may reasonably surmise that the Abe government gradually changed its principle in the inclusion of "coming-to-aid" duty from just preparing for a future possibility to planning for an actual application to the JEG in South Sudan.

This shift was reinforced by the return of armed fghting in Juba in July 2016, three months after the 2015 amendment came into effect in March 2016. On the one hand, it was necessary to protect the Japanese nationals in South Sudan. On the other hand, the JEG existed in Juba and the "coming-to-aid" duty had already been legitimized when violence resurfaced in Juba. So, why not? In this way, the "coming-to-aid" duty was added in the 2015 amendment to the PKO Act partly to reduce the gap between the reality of UNPKOs and the national caveats. Moreover, with increasing insecurity in South Sudan, the assignment of the "coming-toaid" duty to the JEG in Juba became a practical agenda.

This does not necessarily mean, however, that Abe was particularly eager to assign "coming-to-aid" duty to the JEG. Indeed, Shinichi Kitaoka (2021), who played a leading role in the examination of the Security Experts Panels in 2008 and 2014, retrospectively commented as follows:

Some criticized that the [Abe] government was trying to deploy the SDF all over the world, but this was complete fabrication […]. Rather, the Abe Cabinet was very cautious about [participation in] the UNPKOs, to the extent that they could be described as timid. (p. 2)

This contradicts the stereotyped understanding of Abe's posture in military and security policy, but Kitaoka's articulation supports the fact of the sudden withdrawal of the JEG from South Sudan, only a half year after the assignment of "coming-to-aid" duty.

Why, then, was Abe so cautious toward the PKO issue, despite his eager posture, as typifed in the political slogan of "Proactive Contribution to International Peace"? It was probably because he was trying to avoid political risk in order to prioritize the realization of his cherished policy agendas, epitomized by the amendment to the Constitution. If the JEG personnel were injured and/or killed, or used weapons beyond the allowed range, this would have severely undermined the power basis of Abe's government, ruining his long-standing political ambitions: what Abe called "The Departure from the Post-war Regime," which was the all-inclusive reformation of Japan's existing political, economic, and social system, the basis for which was constructed soon after World War II (Abe, 2017).

The conservative politicians, including Abe, had long desired to implement such drastic reforms because they were dissatisfed with the existing postwar system, whose formation was led by the US occupation force. In particular, the amendment to the Constitution was regarded as the centerpiece among the various reform agendas because a large part of the supreme law was drafted and enforced by the Americans (Koseki, 1998; Winkler, 2011).1 Despite the conservatives' discontent, the majority of Japanese politicians and public opinion frmly supported the Constitution, especially regarding Article 9. This made the amendment an almost untouchable issue. As a result, the Constitution has never been amended.

When Abe returned to power at the end of 2012, however, he was blessed with an ideal opportunity to accomplish the amendment, since the ruling coalition occupied an overwhelming majority at the Diet: support from more than the two-thirds of the legislature was a prerequisite for the government to advance the procedure for the constitutional amendment (Prime Minister of Japan and His Cabinet, 1947, art. 96). Under such a situation, we can reasonably assume that Abe was inclined to prioritize this signifcant agenda of constitutional amendment, leaving the peacekeeping issue aside, even though he was ultimately unable to complete the amendment. Presumably, this was the true reason behind the withdrawal of the JEG in 2017, although this hypothetical argument must be confrmed by future historians.

We may also surmise the other possible reasons. One conceivable reason could be relatively close to the GoJ's offcial explanation for the withdrawal: the JEG had almost completed their assignments and there was not much left for them to do, and hence, it was an appropriate time for them to go home. This reasoning appears plausible because the GoJ initially intended to use the JEG for the "All Japan" approach, but this momentum was soon weakened with the outbreak of *de facto* civil war at the end of 2013, and was further lost due to another armed clash in 2016. It was particularly so because most of the Japanese development workers and the other civilian personnel, who were supporting the statebuilding of South Sudan, had to leave the young country following the armed clashes in 2013 and 2016. Given the switch of mandate from statebuilding to the PoC purpose, the JEG mostly engaged in the construction of PoC sites, but this was more or less an emergency relief operation and was not a long-term task to be maintained for several years. If so, one may regard the withdrawal in 2017 as a result of the lost momentum.

Alternatively, it might be possible to attribute the withdrawal, at least in part, to the regime change in the US at the beginning of 2017. Presumably, the GoJ decided to deploy the JEG to South Sudan partly out of consideration for the US ally, to boost their enterprise of supporting the independence of South Sudan (see Chap. 8). In January 2017, however, the US administration was taken over by President Donald Trump, who showed little interest in the UNPKOs. As a result, the GoJ's interest in the troop contribution to South Sudan had probably declined.

Another possible explanation could be that the GoJ had been disappointed at the hopeless future of South Sudan. At least partially, it seems true that the GoJ initially seemed to be pleased to support the self-reliance of the youngest country, but the trajectory of South Sudan's frst decade has been mostly characterized by "confict and hardship" (Sullivan, 2021). It would not be surprising if the GoJ had become skeptical about the extent to which its support was actually contributing to the self-reliance of the newly independent country.

Domestically, one might question whether Abe's own political scandal had affected the decision to withdraw, because a press conference relating to the so-called *Moritomo Gakuen* problem was held on the same day (March 10, 2017) as the press release about the JEG's withdrawal from South Sudan. Whatever the truth was, it seems almost certain that the decision to withdraw was made at the top political level, presumably by Abe himself, because it remained frmly confdential until the day of the press release.

## 4 Japan's Shift to Capacity-Building Support

Since the withdrawal of the JEG from South Sudan in spring 2017, the GoJ has thus far not deployed any new SDF contingents to a UNPKO. Neither have there been any signs of the GoJ seeking to make another SDF troop contribution, at least in the near future. Most of the UNPKOs are currently being operated in dangerous circumstances, mostly in Africa, and this makes it very diffcult to satisfy the stringent stipulations of the PKO Act. Moreover, the UN's budget retrenchment for peacekeeping in recent months has led to successive closures of UNPKOs, such as those in Haiti, Côte D'Ivoire, Liberia, and Darfur (UNDPO, n.d.-a). The reduction in the whole scale of UNPKOs has made it even more diffcult for Japan to fnd a suitable destination for its contributions.

Importantly, this challenge is not unique to Japan. In general, the countries in the Global North tend to share a similar problem of fnding appropriate destinations for personnel contributions (see Chap. 1). As a result, many of them have shifted their focus from large-scale troop contribution, which is usually more dangerous, to the deployment of a small number of staff offcers and individual experts, or to the provision of support outside of UNPKOs. Meanwhile, the countries in the Global South mostly share the burden of deploying large troop contingents to dangerous locations. During the last decade or so, the GoJ has placed increasing emphasis on capacity-building support, as clearly mentioned in the NDPG and the Mid-term Defense Program in 2009 and 2013 as well as the NSS issued in 2013. Under this framework, the MoD has provided various defense-related training and education (e.g., international maritime law, hygiene, vehicle and vessel maintenance, and bomb disposal) to the 15 Asia-Pacifc countries (e.g., Indonesia, Uzbekistan, and Laos) and to a regional organization (Association of Southeast Asian Nations: ASEAN) (MoD, n.d.-a). In this line, the MoD has provided bilateral peacekeeping/IPC-related capacity-building support (e.g., engineering, maintenance of water purifcation plants, humanitarian assistance, and disaster relief) to these countries, including Cambodia, Thailand, Papua New Guinea, and Mongolia. These experiences have guided the GoJ in their search for a new direction. Accordingly, Japan has gradually changed its course from direct support, such as the contribution of the JEG, to indirect support, as exemplifed by capacity-building training for peacekeepers contributed from developing countries.

The shift appeared as early as 2015 when the GoJ began to train military engineers from African countries in partnership with the UN Department of Operational Support under the multilateral framework of the Triangular Partnership Programme (TPP) (United Nations, 2021). This was based on Prime Minister Abe's pledge at the 2014 Leaders' Summit on Peacekeeping (see Chap. 4; MoFA, 2014). Following the JEG's withdrawal from UNMISS in 2017, the GoJ has been expanding the geographical and topical range of its capacity-building support. In 2019, for example, Japan began providing engineering training for peacekeepers, not only in Africa but also in Asia. In the same year, training provision for medical care was also added under the TPP framework. The frst medical training on the use of frst aid on site was provided in the UN Regional Support Center in Entebbe, Uganda (MoFA, 2019). In the early 2020s, a month-long engineering training course, with a special emphasis on a "Training of Trainers" component, was held in Vietnam for military personnel from various South and Southeast Asian countries (MoFA, 2020a).

In the same way as other advanced nations, Japan thus began to compensate for its shortage in personnel contributions to UNPKOs by instead providing its knowledge and expertise. This meant a clear departure from the traditional assumption underlying Japan's peacekeeping policy. The termination of JEG deployment to UNMISS in 2017 represented a virtual "death sentence" for existing assumptions about, and methods within, Japan's catch-up-oriented peacekeeping policy: to slowly and cautiously follow the trends of "integration" and "robustness" in the hope of making a more "proactive" contribution to UNPKOs. This incremental approach no longer works today, bringing Japan to a crossroads while raising the need to reconsider its entire UNPKO involvement. Accordingly, the GoJ changed course to primarily concentrate on indirect support contributions, especially capacity-building support to Global South peacekeepers.

## 5 The Remaining Need for Personnel Contribution

#### *5.1 Ongoing Personnel Contribution from the Other Advanced Countries*

The situation discussed earlier does not necessarily mean, however, that the GoJ has completely abandoned the notion of future dispatch of military personnel. In general, the Global North countries contribute small numbers of highly qualifed, well-educated personnel to provide knowledge, skills, and management, mainly at feld headquarters. Meanwhile, the Global South countries tend to make large troop contributions, mostly of infantry, albeit not at a quality equivalent to those from the Global North.

No matter how dominant this demarcation is in practice, the Global North is not entirely free of the ethical problem of shirking dangerous duties that then fall upon those from less wealthy nations. Moreover, the military contribution to the UNPKOs not only fulflls practical duties on site but also could have a diplomatic impact to highlight the political commitment of troop-contributing countries to international peace and security. Furthermore, military deployment on the ground is also very important in providing frsthand feld experience to the military personnel. For these reasons, the nations in the Global North are still confronting the necessity for "Boots on the Ground."

The Global North countries have not fully retreated from personnel contribution to UNPKOs. We can identify three current forms of military contribution from advanced states. First, small numbers of staff offcers and/or experts (e.g., a judicial specialist), or even force commanders, are sent to UN missions. Arguably, this is the commonest form of personnel contribution from the Global North, since these posts are suitable for utilizing their knowledge and expertise and are usually tasked in a safer environment. Second, some states in the Global North restrict their troop contributions only to safer UNPKOs. Italy, for example, is making a largescale contribution of nearly 1000 military personnel to the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) (UNDPO, n.d.-b), where the security situation is relatively stable. Third, parts of the Global North, especially European states, are deploying troops to the UNPKO in Mali, the UN Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA). For instance, Germany has sent more than 400 troops to Mali. This is an exceptional case, however, since Mali is located at the core of the Sahel region, which is often regarded as a hotbed of violent extremism that poses a direct threat to Europe. MINUSMA has a highly combatoriented nature geared toward tackling violent extremism, while it is also assigned as an integrated mission.

Japan, too, still recognizes military personnel contributions as a token of its commitment to international peace and security. For this reason, even after the JEG's withdrawal in 2017, it has maintained the deployment of four staff offcers to UNIMSS. In fact, the GoJ has shown interest in deploying additional staff offcers to the UNPKOs, but it remains diffcult to fnd an appropriate mission for this purpose. On the one hand, staff offcer posts are mostly full in the safer UN missions, as is also the case for troop contributions in safer destinations, such as Lebanon and Cyprus. On the other hand, the large-scale UN missions that may have vacant posts are mostly located in unstable locations around francophone Africa, such as in Mali, the DRC and the (Central African Republic) CAR. Although deploying staff offcers seems to be one optimal policy option for the GoJ, the chance of this happening in practice seems slim destination in practice, especially because the deployment of staff offcers to feld headquarters usually goes hand-in-hand with troop contribution

Neither the second nor the third option mentioned above is suitable for personnel deployment from Japan. Other contributing states have already taken the preferable posts in relatively safe missions (the second option), while the GoJ has shown little interest in the deployment to MINUSMA (the third option), presumably given the combat-prone characteristics of the mission, as well as its lack of direct relevance to Japan's national security. In short, it seems diffcult, if not impossible, for the GoJ to increase its personnel deployment within the UN framework.

### *5.2 Japan's Personnel Deployment to Non-UN Peacekeeping Operations*

Given the diffculty of making the additional personnel deployment to UNPKOs, the GoJ has searched for alternatives, that is, making an SDF contribution to a non-UN mission. Since 2019, the GoJ has dispatched two staff offcers to the Multinational Force and Observers (MFO) in the Sinai Peninsula (MoD, n.d.-c). Since 1982, the MFO has been operated as a non-UN peace operation to monitor a cease-fre between Egypt and Israel (MFO, n.d.-b). As of July 2021, 13 states are contributing troops to the MFO, among them the US, Norway, Fiji, and Columbia (MFO, n.d.-a). This dispatch is carried out as an "internationally coordinated operations for peace and security," which is a new category added to the amended PKO Act as part of the Peace and Security Legislation in 2015.

Other than that, there may be future possibilities of involvement in non-UN operations in other regions, again as an "internationally coordinated operations for peace and security." In Asia, for example, there is a precedent for non-UN peace operations in the Philippines. Since 2004, the International Monitoring Team (IMT) has been deployed to Mindanao to monitor the cease-fre between the Philippine government and the Muslim secessionist armed group known as the "Moro Islamic Liberation Front" (MILF). The IMT is made up of willing governments, mainly from the Muslim countries in the region (i.e., Malaysia, Indonesia, and Brunei), but also from other regions (i.e., Norway) as well as the EU. The IMT has operated outside of the UN framework, albeit with UN authorization under Chapter VIII of the UN Charter, which prescribes the partnership between the UN and regional arrangements.

Since 2006, Japan has also been involved in the IMT by contributing civilian personnel. More specifcally, the JICA has contributed civilian experts to the IMT to facilitate the peace process. Previously, this kind of personnel contribution was restricted to civilian deployment, exemplifed by the JICA experts, as seen above. Now that the "internationally coordinated operations for peace and security" have been formally institutionalized as part of the 2015 Peace and Security Legislation, it has become technically possible for the Japanese government to contribute not only civilians, but also military personnel. In March 2021, the GoJ retreated from the IMT, but instead deployed a former SDF offcer to Mindanao with diplomatic (civilian) status to promote the DDR program for excombatants. This example implies that the deployment of retired military personnel with good skills and knowledge might be the optimal substitute for a troop contribution by the GoJ.

Legally, meanwhile, the International Peace Support Law, which is the only new law made within the package of Peace and Security Legislation (see Chap. 4), enables the GoJ to contribute the SDF if an international or multinational force is formed in the future, similar to an operation similar to the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), that is, the US-led coalition force to stabilize Afghanistan. In reality, however, it seems very unlikely that this would happen, partly because the prior consent from the Diet was imposed to operationalize the law (see Chap. 4) and partly because the US, which had led the most of multinational military operations from the 1990s to the 2010s, has recently become more and more reluctant to organize such an international operation.

## 6 Concluding Thoughts: Other Possible Alternatives and the Future Agenda

In conclusion, we have confrmed that Japan's peacekeeping policy has reached a crossroads, symbolized by the abrupt termination of the UNMISS troop contribution in 2017. Throughout approximately a quarter-century history from 1992 to 2017, SDF personnel contributions to UNPKOs served as a centerpiece in Japan's peacekeeping. With the stringent constraints embedded in the PKO Act, or more essentially in the Constitution, the GoJ faced repeated challenges to its military contribution and formed a restrained posture in Japan's peacekeeping policy. This created an assumption that Japan should make a more "proactive" contribution to the UNPKOs. To achieve this, the GoJ tried to pursue the international trends of "robustness" and "integration," albeit slowly and cautiously. Here lies an ever-developing premise: if it continues with its efforts to follow these trends, Japan will eventually be able to catch up with the international trend. The examination in this book has proven that the old premise above has become outdated. In other words, it is time to seek a new direction in Japan's peacekeeping policy beyond the pursuit of "robustness" and "integration."

All in all, what future prospects can we envisage? At this moment, we can at least say that the shift in Japan's peacekeeping (or more broadly in the IPC policy) from "quantity" to "quality" is highly unlikely to change in the foreseeable future. But this could be a favorable opportunity for Japan's peacekeeping policy to escape from the old obsession with more "proactive" military contribution and to be more fexible in the search for a new direction.

At the end of this book, we will briefy examine some future prospects. First, it seems almost certain and rational that Japan will place the greatest emphasis on capacity building in its peacekeeping/IPC policy, although this has been suspended since spring 2020 due to the COVID-19 pandemic. While waiting until it becomes possible to resume the program, it is recommended to consider how the current scheme can be improved. In particular, the current TPP framework faces challenges as a multinational scheme, in which each participant country has different needs and varying qualities of personnel. It would, therefore, be useful to develop a more detailed educational program to fexibly accommodate the demands of trainee countries.

Capacity-building support can be carried out in various forms other than the TPP. As seen earlier in this chapter, for example, the MoD has provided bilateral peacekeeping-related training, mainly to the Asian countries. Bilateral assistance often has an advantage in that it can provide tailor-made support to ft the needs of the recipient country, while UN-involved TPP has the merit of making a direct contribution to the UN. Given the different scopes and characteristics, it would be benefcial to develop bilateral capacity building along with the multilateral TPP framework. In addition, it would be highly advisable to expand the scope of bilateral capacity-building support to countries beyond the Asia-Pacifc region, especially in Africa.

The other possibility is to reinforce both fnancial and human support with regional peacekeeping training centers, again, especially in Africa. Since 2008, the MoD has deployed SDF peacekeeping instructors to African countries, such as Egypt, Mali, and South Sudan, as well as Asia, including India and Indonesia (with 33 deployments in total, involving 38 personnel; MoD, n.d.-b). In recent years, the MoD has most frequently deployed instructors to Ethiopia. In addition, the IPCH has also contributed civilian lecturers to those peacekeeping centers (Cabinet Offce, n.d.).

Overall, these educational supports provide only one-off lectures or short-term lecture courses. It would be more desirable to provide more intensive training courses. In addition, it would also be highly benefcial to expand the training assistance in West Africa, where most of the UNPKOs are being operated today. For instance, through collaboration with the Kof Annan International Peacekeeping Training Centre in Ghana, along with the existing ties with the Ethiopian International Peacekeeping Training Center, the GoJ's provision of training could cover both East and West Africa.

In the meantime, police-related activities in Japan's peacekeeping/IPC policy have been in constant decline since the capacity-building support to the East Timorese police in the early 2000s (see Chap. 6). The reluctance of Japanese police in the peacekeeping/IPC policy feld is often attributed to the "trauma of Cambodia," in which a Japanese police offcer was killed on duty (see Chap. 5), while the Japanese police have engaged in capacitybuilding support to adjacent countries and also to those that are not in the immediate aftermath of armed confict, such as Indonesia, within a framework of development aid (JICA, n.d.). The Japanese police prefer capacity-building support, especially toward the Asian countries (not immediately after armed confict), exemplifed by Indonesia, not only because they are concerned about security but also because peacekeeping/ IPC-related tasks are not major concerns in the Police Act (Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications, n.d.).2 That said, a legal amendment would be required to expand their role in the peacekeeping/IPC feld: for example, to deploy individual police offcers to support the capacity building of local police in the UNPKOs.

Apart from capacity building and training support (as well as fnancial assistance), as pointed out above, it is still desirable to maintain SDF deployment—particularly of the JEG—in some form, albeit not through large-scale contribution. In this regard, it seems most feasible to make more contributions under the framework of "internationally coordinated operations for peace and security." For this purpose, searching for a new destination, in addition to the current participation in the MFO, could be an option, but it might also be useful to pay attention to Japan's registration for the UN Peacekeeping Capability Readiness System (PCRS). According to the MoFA (2020b), the GoJ has registered the PCRS in four areas: the engineering force, military observers, staff offcers, and strategic air transport (international transportation between logistics hubs). Among them, the fourth item, which was most recently added in May 2020, attracts attention, since there is a high demand in the recent UNPKOs for the provision of air transport capability (Novosseloff, 2017). Short-range air transportation above confict-affected areas could be potentially dangerous, but longer-range transportation between international logistics centers is generally a safer option.

In this regard, air cooperation with Canada could be useful, particularly in Africa. As mentioned, Canada is one of the Global North countries that have recently taken a constrained posture toward personnel contribution to the UNPKOs. To compensate for this, Canada has recently contributed air assistance to MINUSMA in Mali and to the UN Regional Service Centre Entebbe (RSCE) in Uganda. Although Canada's provision of air assistance is connected to their personnel contribution to Africa (dozens of individual police offcers, staff offcers and experts to Mali, the DRC and South Sudan), Japan may be able to provide additional air transport capability to compensate when the Canadian air assistance is not available—for example, in rotation (M. Tsuzuki, personal communication, July 9, 2021).

Related to this, it would also be worthwhile examining the possibility to utilize the SDF's base in Djibouti. The threat of Somali piracy, which was the original reason for the construction of the base, has become much less visible in recent years, but the location of this African nation has signifcant strategic importance. In fact, the NDPG in 2018 emphasized the importance of "stable, long-term use of the facility for regional security cooperation and other activities" (MoD, 2018, p. 18), which refects the GoJ's will to utilize the Djibouti base even after the necessity for counterpiracy has largely declined. One of the possibilities could be to use the Djibouti base as the strongpoint for the above-mentioned air transportation service in Africa. If this mechanism were established, it could be utilized not only for assistance to the UNPKOs but also in times of emergency evacuation of Japanese nationals in Africa and the Middle East (M. Tsuzuki, personal communication, July 9, 2021).

In the meantime, it may not be entirely impossible to contribute the SDF to the relatively safer posts or UNPKOs. For example, UNIFIL is an exceptional UNPKO in the sense that it has maritime capability (UNDPO, n.d.-c). Japan's maritime ability might usefully contribute to this (M. Tsuzuki, personal communication, July 9, 2021). Moreover, as said earlier, the positions of staff offcers tend to be full, but missions sometimes have vacancies, to which the GoJ could contribute. Furthermore, the GoJ could also contribute civilian experts, especially to support judicial reform in the UNPKOs.

Last but not least, it should be remembered that the Global North, including Japan, can focus on quality-oriented activities because the Global South accepts the large-scale and dangerous roles, especially in Africa. Japan must consider seriously how to mitigate their burdens, particularly concerning the safety of personnel on site, as the *Cruz Report* warned in 2017.

As seen so far, there are still various prospects for Japan's future peacekeeping, or more broadly, for its IPC policy, but these ideas would be never realized without political will and public support to endorse the "future investment." As repeatedly pointed out in this book, the Japanese government and public have been more attracted to regional and national security issues, but this does not entirely extinguish the importance of peacekeeping and IPC issues in the longer term.

Myopic reductions in political and fnancial investments in this area could undermine Japan's longer-term strength and preparedness for crisis. Very recently, the GoJ's reduction in budgetary and political support to the vaccination industry has caused a serious delay in the development of a national vaccination program for COVID-19 ("'Iryo-senshin-koku' no hazu," 2021). To avoid such failures, it is critical to nurture long-term prospects and encourage the GoJ to invest for the future, in terms of both fnancial and human resources. We now conclude this book with the hope that it will make at least some contribution to bringing about such positive change.

## Notes

1. In the initial days of the second Abe administration, there seemed to exist a high possibility that the amendment could be achieved, but Abe gradually lost his power due to a series of political scandals (e.g., the incident of the "Cherry Blossom Viewing Party" and the educational institute Moritomo Gakuen scandal), as well as the poor response to COVID-19. Given these backlashes, Abe's health condition rapidly deteriorated in summer 2020. He eventually resigned in September 2020, although it was originally expected that he would remain in power until September 2021 when his term as the president of the ruling LDP would expire.

2. The Police Act envisages international cooperation more specifcally in relation to criminal justice, such as international criminal investigation and communication with the International Criminal Police Organization (Article 23 (2) 1, 2) while also mentioning international emergency relief, which is a part of broader IPC (Article 5 (4) 11).

## References (In English)


#### References (In Japanese)


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## Appendix A: The List of Actual Performances in Japan's Narrow International Peace Cooperation (As of July 2021)















\*1. "PKO" refers to United Nations Peacekeeping Operations, "Humanitarian Operations" to International Humanitarian Relief Operations, "Election Monitoring" to International Election Observation Operations (established based on the Amendment Act 1998), and "Internationally Coordinated" to Internationally Coordinated Operations for Peace and Security (established based on the Amendment Act 2015)

\*2. Dispatch period begins at the time of the personnel's departure from Japan and ends at their re-entry into Japan.

Cabinet Offce, http://www.pko.go.jp/pko\_j/operations/operations.html accessed on July 15, 2021. Authors' creation

## Appendix B: The List of Actual Performances in Japan's Broader International Peace Cooperation (As of July 2021)











## Anti-piracy Activities off Somalia and the Gulf of Aden



<sup>(</sup>continued)





<sup>(</sup>continued)

MoD, https://www.mod.go.jp/j/approach/kokusai\_heiwa/, accessed on July 15, 2021. Authors' creation

## Appendix C: The Result of Opinion Poll on Expectations for SDF Activities (1994–2018)

Source: Cabinet Offce, authors creation

© The Author(s) 2022 217 H. N. Fujishige et al., *Japan's Peacekeeping at a Crossroads*, Sustainable Development Goals Series, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-88509-0

## Appendix D: The Results of Opinion Poll on SDF's Participation in UNPKOs and Opinion Poll on IPC Activities

© The Author(s) 2022 219 H. N. Fujishige et al., *Japan's Peacekeeping at a Crossroads*, Sustainable Development Goals Series, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-88509-0

Source: Cabinet Offce, https://survey.gov-online.go.jp/y-index.html, accessed on July 15, 2021. Authors creation. The surveys in 1994, 1997, 2000 and 2003 asked similar questionnaries on SDF's participation in UNPKOs while those in 2006, 2012, 2015 and 2018 more broadly asked questions on IPC activities. For this reason, the two graphs were created separately. The graph on the opinion poll on IPC activites does not include the 2009 survey as it had no relavant question on IPC activities

## Index1

#### **A**

Abe, Shinzo, 12, 13, 14–15n4, 50, 53, 54, 61–79, 155–158, 166, 170, 172–176, 184–185n1 Abe administration, 13, 50, 52, 62, 64, 65, 69, 75, 78, 79, 148, 166–168, 172, 184n1 Abe Cabinet, 173 *Act Concerning Dispatch of the Japan Disaster Relief Team*, 42 *Act on Cooperation with United Nations Peacekeeping Operations and Other Operations*, 1 *Act on Special Measures Against Terrorism*, 44 Advanced countries, 177–179 Advanced nations, 177 Advanced states, 178 Advance survey team, 128–130, 146 Afghanistan, 41, 42, 44, 49, 51, 54n1, 67, 108, 110, 126, 145, 180 Africa, 7, 10, 12, 176–178, 181–184

Agreement on the Resolution of the Confict in South Sudan (ARCSS), 142, 149 Air Self-Defense Force (ASDF), 1, 41, 130, 131, 134 Akashi, Yasushi, 50, 86 AK-47 rife, 97 Akira Takahashi, 106 "All Japan" approach, 9, 10, 13, 50–52, 54, 63, 64, 79, 91, 111–115, 117, 130, 132–134, 136, 150–153, 158, 159, 166, 168, 171, 172, 174 Alliance, 50, 62, 63, 85, 107, 108, 126, 144, 150, 169 Al Qaeda, 51, 145 Amendment, 8, 9, 40, 41, 48, 49, 54n1, 55n3, 55n4, 65–78, 89, 107–110, 116, 118, 147, 150, 154, 155, 159, 167, 168, 170, 172–174, 182, 184n1 Ampil, 92, 93 *An Agenda for Peace*, 4, 5, 30

1Note: Page numbers followed by 'n' refer to notes.

© The Author(s) 2022 221 H. N. Fujishige et al., *Japan's Peacekeeping at a Crossroads*, Sustainable Development Goals Series, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-88509-0

Annexation, 103, 104 Anti-government, 113, 154 Anti-militarism, viii, 11, 12, 14, 21–24, 32, 52–54, 123, 165, 166, 169 Anti-military, 23, 25, 27, 28, 33n4, 44, 52–54, 63, 64, 75, 76, 80n8, 87, 89, 94, 107, 126, 168, 169, 171 Anti-Piracy Law, 46 Anti-piracy operations, 43, 44, 46 "An ant's hole" theory, 26 Arab, 141 Aristide, J.B., 123, 128 Armament, 22, 46, 67 Armed confict, 7, 13, 66–69, 124, 127, 128, 135, 142, 147–150, 158, 159, 182 Armed forces, 1, 22, 25, 77, 118n1, 143, 144, 149, 156 Armed group, 6, 128, 153, 154, 179 Article 51 of the UN Charter, 22, 23, 31, 44 Article 9, 21, 22, 33n2, 174 Article 9 (1), 21, 22, 31 Article 9 (2), 22 Article 9 of the Constitution, 31, 64, 66, 67, 75, 148 Asia, vii, 106, 177, 179, 182 Asian Financial Crisis, 104 Asia-Pacifc, 62, 107, 176, 181 Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), 176 Atrocities against humanity, 5 Australia, 103 Authoritarian regime, 104 Autonomy, 104

#### **B**

Bangladesh, 154 Ban Ki-moon, 8, 146 Bellerive, Jean-Max, 125 Bilateral assistance, 181 Boots on the Ground, 178 Bosnia, 105 Bosnia and Herzegovina, 5, 11 Boutros-Ghali, Boutros, 4, 5 Brahimi, Lakhdar, 4 *Brahimi Report*, 4, 7, 48 British, 141 Broader Version of the IPC, 39, 42–43, 45 Brunei, 179 Bubble Economy, 26 Buffer zone, 49, 94 Bureaucracies, 77 Bush administration, 145 Business, 5, 51, 63, 107, 113, 115

## **C**

Cabinet Offce, 2, 8, 39–41, 48, 53, 89, 90, 98, 104, 108, 110, 114, 125, 131, 132, 145, 150, 152, 157, 159n3, 182 Cabinet Offce public opinion poll, 108 Cambodia, 13, 29, 46, 47, 50, 52–54, 85–99, 110, 112, 113, 116, 166, 168, 171, 176 Cambodian civil war, 85–86 Cambodian government, 86, 92 Cambodian peace conference, 85 Cambodian peace process, 88 Cambodian police force, 93 Canada, 11, 12, 183 Canadian, 183 Capacity building, 105, 112–113, 117, 175–177, 181, 182 *The Capstone Doctrine*, 6 Caribbean Sea, 123 Carnation Revolution, 103 Casualties, 46

Ceasefre, 29, 128, 147 Central African Republic (CAR), 178 Central Kampong Thom Province, 91 Chapter 51 of the UN Charter, 74 Chapter VI, 3 Chapter VII of the UN Charter, 5–8, 104, 107, 109, 116, 142, 143 Checkbook diplomacy, 27 Chief Cabinet Secretary, 26, 93 China, 50, 63, 85, 128 Chinese peacekeeping, 143 Christians, 141 Citizen, 5, 113, 116, 142, 153 Civil Affairs, 90–91, 111, 112, 115, 133, 151 Civil engineering, 10, 111, 112 Civilian administration, 86 Civilian election observer, 90 Civilian electoral observer, 41, 97 Civilian medical team, 125, 127–130, 167 Civilian organizations, 131, 134 Civilian police, 86, 93, 96, 117 Civilian police offcer, 86, 90, 92, 93, 96, 99, 105, 107, 108, 142 Civilian protection, 6 Civil-military collaboration, 8, 134 Civil-military cooperation, 4, 9, 14, 54, 112, 130, 131, 133, 134, 136, 150, 166 Civil-military partnership, 133 Civil societies, 5, 44 Civil war, 3, 5, 10, 85, 97, 98, 129, 141, 147, 148, 151, 159n3, 167, 174 Classic Peacekeeping, 3, 6, 7 Classifcation of the Narrow and Broader Versions of IPC, 43 Clinton, Bill, 125 Coalition, 27, 52, 65, 174, 180

Coalition government, 33n4, 52, 126

Cold War, 2, 3, 5, 21, 33n4, 42, 85, 103, 166 Collective defense, 44, 64 Collective defense right, 44, 63–64 Collective self-defense, 45 Collective self-defense right, 64 Columbia, 179 Combat zone, 45 "Coming-to-aid" duty (kaketsukekeigo), 9, 10, 13, 14n3, 31, 47, 48, 54, 65, 67–69, 71–76, 78, 80n9, 96, 98, 116, 118, 150, 154–158, 167–170, 172, 173 Communist, 85, 103 Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA), 141, 145, 147 C-130H, 107, 130 Confict prevention, 51 Confict resolution, 8, 108 Constitution, 21–25, 27, 31, 44, 64, 66–68, 74, 75, 96, 107, 154, 158, 168, 169, 174, 180 Constitution of Japan, 21 Cooperation for shooting, 154 Coordination Offce for Local Support, 152 Côte D'Ivoire, 7, 176 Counter-piracy, 183 Counterterrorism, 111, 126, 145 COVID-19, 181, 184, 185n1 *Cruz Report*, 7, 144, 184 Cultural Grant Assistance, 132 Cyprus, 178

### **D**

The Democratic Republic of Timor-Leste, 105 The Departure from the Post-war Regime, 174 Darfur, 176 Defense of mandates, 71, 75

Defense of the mandate, 7, 8, 49, 71, 75, 76, 79n5 Defense of the mission mandate, 69, 79n5 Demilitarization, 21, 22 Demobilization, 111 Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ), 33n4, 44, 51, 52, 61, 126, 144–146, 148 Democratic regime, 104 Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), 7, 10, 41, 178, 183 Democratic Socialist Party (DSP), 27–29, 32 Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary-General (DSRSG), 107 Developing countries, 88, 176 Development, 4, 5, 13, 51, 52, 54, 55n5, 61–79, 98, 108, 118, 123–136, 142, 145, 146, 158, 166, 171, 174, 184 Development aid, 51, 62, 63, 111, 168, 182 Development assistance, 51, 106 Development Cooperation, 63 Development Cooperation Charter, 64 Development Cooperation Policy Outline, 63, 79n3 Dictatorship, 123 Diet, 27, 28, 33n4, 49, 55n2, 64–66, 71, 72, 78, 87, 89, 110, 126, 169, 174, 180 Dili, 113, 117 Dinka, 141, 153 Director-General of Cabinet Legislation Bureau, 25, 27 Director-General of Defense, 66, 79n6 Disarmament, 49, 86, 91, 109, 111 Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration of ex-combatants (DDR), 145, 180 Disaster relief, 43, 45, 46, 80n8, 123–136, 176

Disaster relief aid, 135 Disaster victim, 124 Division of labor, 11, 127 Djibouti, 46, 183 Dominican Republic, 132 Dutch, 93

#### **E**

Earthquake, 42, 45, 124–133, 135, 136n1, 166 Earthquake victims, 130 East Africa, 142 East and West Africa, 182 East Asia, 150 East Timor, 2, 8, 13, 41, 42, 46, 51, 54, 72, 77, 96, 98, 103–118, 136, 153, 156, 166, 168, 171, 172, 182 East Timorese, 103–104, 106, 107, 112 East Timorese Foreign Minister, 108 East Timorese government, 112 East Timorese police, 182 Education, 133, 176 Egypt, 179, 182 Election, 4, 28, 77, 85–87, 90–92, 94–96, 98, 103 Election monitoring, 4, 43 Election observation, 4, 43 Election observers, 90 Electoral observation, 94 Electoral observer, 41, 90, 94–97 Emergency aid, 107, 125 Emergency disaster relief, 45, 80n8, 124 Emergency relief, 41, 127–129, 131, 185n2 Emergency relief operation, 175 Employment, 112 Ethiopia, 11, 182 Ethiopian International Peacekeeping Training Center, 182

Europe, 178 European Union (EU), 77, 179 Evolution, 1, 3, 12, 13, 39–54, 165, 168 Ex-combatants, 145, 180 Execution of missions (*nimmu-suiko*), 65, 67–69, 71, 73–76, 79n5, 79n7, 170 Experts Panel for International Peace Cooperation, 50 Experts Panel on Reconstruction of Legal Basis for Security, 50

#### **F**

Fatalities, 87, 93, 96, 99n1, 144, 154 Female peacekeeper, 110, 111, 118 Female SDF member, 110 Fiji, 179 First Abe administration, 50 Five Principles, 29, 30, 32, 33, 34n6, 47, 48, 68–71, 79n8, 88–90, 97, 107, 109, 128, 136, 146–149, 166 Five Principles for Deployment, 29 Florida, 130, 134 Force commander, 178 Formed Police Unit (FPU), 117, 143, 159n1 Fragile state, 50, 108–109, 133 France, 85 Freeze, 29, 32, 33, 48, 49, 71, 90, 109, 110 French, 123 FRETILIN, 103, 104, 112 Fukuda Doctrine, 88

### **G**

Genocide, 5, 142 Germany, 27, 178 Ghana, 182

Global North, 11–13, 117, 165, 176–178, 184 Global North countries, 11, 14, 177, 178, 183 Global Peace Operation Initiative (GPOI), 12 Global South, 11, 117, 176, 177, 184 Golan Heights, 2, 42, 98 Goma, 41 Gotoda, Masaharu, 26 Governance, 63, 124 Government of Japan (GoJ), 1–3, 9–11, 13, 14n3, 21–31, 33, 34n6, 39, 41, 42, 44–49, 51, 54, 55n5, 62–64, 66–68, 70, 71, 73, 75, 76, 78, 79, 79n5, 87–90, 92–94, 96–99, 106–110, 113–117, 125–133, 144–149, 151, 152, 156–159, 159–160n3, 160n4, 165–172, 174–184 Governmental and nongovernmental collaboration, 136 Governmental and nongovernmental partnerships, 134 Great East Japan Earthquake, 136n1 Great Hanshin-Awaji (Kobe) Earthquake, 125 Ground Self-Defense Force (GSDF), 1, 45, 46, 71, 131, 154 Ground Staff Offce, 90, 95, 96, 98 Guidelines Legislation, 107 Gulf Crisis, 26 Gulf of Aden, 43, 44, 46 Gulf War, 26–28, 32, 87

#### **H**

Haiti, 2, 13, 42, 52, 80n8, 123–136, 144, 146, 147, 153, 166–168, 171, 176 Haitian government, 125, 128, 129, 133

Haiti IPC Operations Implementation Plan, 131 Haiti Relief Fund (HRF), 125 Haiyan, 135 Hammarskjöld, Dag, 3, 24 Hasegawa, Sukehiro, 107 Hatoyama, Yukio, 23, 126, 127 Hayashi, Shuzo, 23, 25 Heavy equipment, 112, 132, 133 Heavy machinery, 171 Heavy machines, 132 Heavy weapons, 46, 89, 144, 148 Heng Samrin, 85 High-Level Independent Panel on Peace Operations (HIPPO), 8 Honduras, 45 Horta, Ramos, 108 Hostility, 5, 67 House of Councilors, 24, 33n4 House of Representatives, 23, 33n4, 45 Humanitarian, 5, 41, 43, 44, 54n1, 143, 160n3 Humanitarian aid, 144 Humanitarian assistance, 41, 42, 55n1, 143, 176 Humanitarian crisis, 143 Humanitarian intervention, 6 Humanitarian organization, 130 Human rights, 63 Hurricane, 45, 123

## **I**

Ikeda, Hayato, 25 Impartiality, 6 Imperial Japanese Army, 21, 106 Implementation Plan, 55n2, 89, 90, 92, 94 Independence, 42, 103–106, 118n2, 123, 124, 141, 144–148, 175 India, 182 Indian Ocean, 44, 45, 52, 126, 144

Indian peacekeeper, 153 Individual Police Offcers, 117, 159n1, 182, 183 Indonesia, 77, 103, 104, 106, 135, 176, 179, 182 Infantries, 32, 49, 65, 70–72, 90, 93, 110, 116, 131, 156, 177 Information gathering, 47, 94, 95, 98, 116 Infrastructure, 4, 45, 72, 90, 98, 104, 105, 113, 124, 130, 145, 146, 150 Integrated mission, 4, 5, 104, 124, 178 Integration, 1–14, 30, 33n3, 46–52, 54, 55n5, 63, 64, 79, 103–118, 124, 136, 142, 158, 159, 165–172, 177, 181 "Integration" mandate, 10 Interagency collaboration, 152 Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), 142 Interim Haiti Reconstruction Committee (IHRC), 125 Internally displaced people (IDP), 132, 142, 143, 151 International community, 74, 78 International contribution, 87–88 International Contribution, 28, 50, 62, 97, 108, 169 International cooperation, 62, 185n2 International Cooperation Initiative, 88 International electoral monitoring, 40, 41, 55n3 International emergency assistance, 42 International Force East Timor (INTERFET), 104, 107 International humanitarian assistance activities, 40, 55n3 International humanitarian relief operations, 43, 76

International law, 2, 64 Internationally coordinated operation for peace and security, 77 International Monitoring Team (IMT), 179, 180 International NGO, 135 International organization, 54n1, 72, 129 International peace, vii, 21, 33, 87, 178 International Peace Cooperation (IPC), 39–40, 61–79 International Peace Cooperation Headquarters (IPCH), 39, 40, 51 International Peace Support Act, 64, 65, 77–79 International Peace Support Law, 180 International security, 62 International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), 180 International society, 25, 27, 62, 79, 87, 88, 103, 104, 125 International supervision of elections, 77 IPC Act, 39 IPC Panel, 2, 50, 51, 73, 114 IPC policy, 51, 54, 181, 182, 184 Iran-Iraq War, 26 Iraq, 26, 41, 42, 44, 45, 51, 52, 78, 131, 136, 145 Ishiba, Shigeru, 66, 67, 148 Island of Hispaniola, 123 Island of Timor, 103, 111 Israel, 42, 179 Italy, 178

### **J**

Japan Association for Aid and Relief (AAR), 132, 133 Japan Communist Party (JCP), 23, 27, 33n4

Japan Defense Agency, 46, 79n6 Japan Disaster Relief (JDR), 42, 43, 127–129, 131, 134–136 Japan Engineering Groups (JEG), 1, 9–13, 41, 42, 46, 50–52, 63–65, 72, 74, 90–99, 109–116, 118, 127–129, 131–133, 145–159, 159n3, 160n4, 166–178, 182 Japanese Ambassador to the UN, 25 Japanese civilian electoral observer, 97 Japanese civilian police, 92, 93, 96, 97 Japanese electoral observer, 94–96 Japanese embassy, 131, 132 Japanese government, 93, 99, 150, 151, 180, 184 Japanese nationals, 54, 65, 68, 69, 72, 75, 92, 97–98, 107, 113, 116, 118, 128, 152, 156, 166, 173, 183 Japanese NGO, 46, 112, 116, 132–134, 151 Japanese peacekeeper, 2, 9, 13, 31, 34n6, 41, 48, 52, 88, 99, 108, 110, 115, 116, 133, 135, 166 Japanese peacekeeping policy, 166 Japanese personnel, 52, 92–94, 99, 114, 135, 158, 166, 173 Japanese police, 93, 113, 114, 117, 118, 182 Japanese police offcer, 97, 114, 182 Japanese Red Cross Society (JRCS), 125, 130, 134 Japanese way of peacekeeping, 167 Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA), 45, 51, 106, 108, 112, 124, 127, 129–131, 145, 150–153, 159n2, 171, 180, 182 Japan Socialist Party (JSP), 23, 27, 29, 33n4, 52 Japan's peacekeeping, 113, 114, 171, 180, 181

Japan's peacekeeping policy, vii, viii, 1–14, 21–33, 39–54, 62, 64–65, 93, 111, 165–168, 170, 177, 180–182 Japan-US Defense Guidelines Legislation, 107 JDR Act, 45, 78, 125, 127, 129–131, 134, 135 JDR civilian medical team, 128, 135 JEG peacekeeper, 95, 129, 131, 134, 150 Job training, 112 "Joint defense of a camp" duty, 65, 76, 153–155, 158, 167 Joint Integrated Police, 152 Juba, 143, 144, 149, 150, 152, 153, 155–157, 173 Judicial reform, 4, 184 Judiciary, 77

## **K**

Kaifu, Toshiki, 26, 28 *Kaigai-hahei*, 25 *kaigai-hahei* (the overseas deployment of armed forces), 25 *Kaigai-haken*, 25, 26 *Kaigai-haken (*overseas dispatch*)*, 25 *Kaketsuke-keigo*, 9, 14n3, 75, 156 Kan, Naoto, 146 Khaan Quest, 12 Khartoum, 145 *Khmer Rouge*, 46, 85–87, 89, 91–97 Kiir, 141, 142 Kingdom of Cambodia, 96 Kitaoka, Shinichi, 173 Kof Annan, 4 Kof Annan International Peacekeeping Training Centre, 182 Koizumi, Junichiro, 30, 44, 45, 50, 61, 66, 108 *Komeito*, 27–29, 32, 80n8

Kono, Yohei, 93 Korean Peninsula, 22 Korean War, 22 Kosovo Force (KFOR), 10 Kudo, Atsuo, 27, 34n5 Kuwait, 26, 27 Kuwaiti government, 27

## **L**

Laos, 176 *Law Concerning the Special Measures on Humanitarian and Reconstruction Assistance in Iraq*, 44 Leaders' Summit on Peacekeeping, 64, 176 Lebanon, 24, 178 Legislation for Peace and Security, 9 Léogâne City, 129, 130, 134 Lethal force, 155, 159n3 Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), 24, 26–28, 33n3, 52, 61, 80n8, 126, 148, 185n1 Liberia, 7, 176 Light arms, 144 Light weapons, 89, 93 Local police, 4, 93, 96, 97, 105, 113, 114, 117, 118, 152, 156, 182 Lower House, 23, 28, 29

## **M**

Machar, 141, 142, 149 Malaysia, 105, 179 Mali, 7, 10, 178, 182, 183 Malpasse, 132 Mandate, 3, 4, 7, 10, 14, 42, 49, 86, 87, 91–94, 97, 99, 115, 116, 124, 125, 133, 134, 142–144, 151, 155, 156, 158, 167, 175

Maritime Self-Defense Force (MSDF), 1, 26, 27, 44, 131 Matsudaira, Koto, 25 Media, 28, 53, 54, 151, 155 Medical team, 127, 130 Miami, 130 Middle East, 183 Mid-term Defense Program, 176 Military, vii, viii, 1–4, 8, 11–13, 22–28, 32, 33, 39, 41, 45–48, 51, 52, 62, 64, 72, 77, 78, 80n9, 86, 87, 89, 90, 97, 99n1, 103, 105, 108–110, 115, 118n3, 123–126, 128–132, 134, 136, 142, 143, 147, 155–157, 159n3, 166, 168, 171, 173, 176–178, 180, 181, 183 Military coup, 123 Military sanction, 3, 144 Militia, 5, 104, 109, 149 Mindanao, 179, 180 Minesweepers, 26, 27, 33 Minister of Foreign Affairs, 4 Ministry of Defense (MoD), 30, 39, 42, 46, 48, 49, 63, 64, 79n6, 107, 110, 130, 131, 152, 153, 176, 179, 181–183 Ministry of Finance, 125 Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MoFA), 1, 30, 40, 51, 62, 63, 68, 69, 88, 106, 110, 113, 132, 145, 149, 152, 176, 177, 183 MINUSTAH Headquarters, 125, 131–133 Miyazawa, Kiichi, 28, 29, 87, 89, 90, 94 Mogadishu, 144 Mongolia, 12, 176 Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF), 179 Mozambique, 2, 47, 98 Multidimensional (or multifunctional) peace operations, 4

Multidimensional UNPKO, 4 Multifunctional peacekeeping, 86 Multifunctional PKOs, 86 Multilateral aid agencies, 112 Multilateral forces, 27 Multinational coalition forces, 27 Multinational force, 44, 78, 87, 104, 180 Multinational Force and Observers (MFO), 179, 183 Multinational Interim Force (MIF), 123, 124 Multinational military operations, 45, 180 Murayama, Tomiichi, 55n2 Muslim, 141, 179

#### **N**

Nakasone, Yasuhiro, 26 Nakata, Atsuhito, 92 Narrow version of international peace cooperation, 39–42 National defense, 125, 150 National Defense Policy Guidelines (NDPG), 63, 79n2, 176, 183 National government, 104 National Highway, 91 National interest, 115 National Police Reserve (NPR), 22 National Safety Forces, 22 National security, 62, 63, 169, 179, 184 National Security Council (NSC), 62, 68 National Security Secretariat (NSS), 62, 176 National Security Strategy, 61–64 National self-defense, 22 Natural, 156 Natural and human-induced disasters, 127

Natural disaster, 13, 45, 123, 124, 135, 166 Natural right, 30, 31, 67, 68, 170 Navy, 1 Nepal, 11 Nepalese FPU, 143 Neutrality, 3 A new form, 6, 136 New York, 64 New Zealand, 105 1955 System, 33n4, 52 9/11 attacks, 44, 49–51, 108, 110, 117, 145 Noda, Yoshihiko, 146, 147 Non-armed, 95 Noncombat, 109 Non-combat zone, 45 Non-governmental, 45, 130, 134, 136 Nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), 5, 46, 48, 111, 112, 116, 132, 133, 135, 151, 156 Non-interference, 7 Nonmilitary, 62, 110 Non-SDF, 48 Non-state, 76, 170 Non-UN, 13, 55n3, 77, 78, 179–180 Non-UN missions, 79, 179 Non-UNPKO, 115 North and South Sudan, 145, 147 North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), 10 North Korea, 50, 63 Norway, 179 Nuer, 141, 149, 153

### **O**

ODA-PKO feld coordination meetings, 152 ODA-PKO Liaison/Coordination Meetings, 152 The ODA Policy Outline, 63, 79n3 Offcial Development Assistance (ODA), 9, 51, 63, 98, 111, 113–115, 132, 134 Ogata, Sadako, 51 Okinawa, 127 Omura, Sei'ichi, 23 "One-UN" approach, 5 ONUC, 25 Oslo, 145 Overseas dispatch, 24–28, 33, 78 Ox-walk tactics, 29 Ozawa, Ichiro, 26, 28

## **P**

Papua New Guinea, 176 Paris Peace Agreement, 85–86, 97 Parliament, 77 Partiality, 30, 147 PC Headquarters, 182 Peace accords, 86 Peace agreement, 6, 85, 86, 142, 143, 147, 149 Peace and Security Legislation, 9, 13, 45, 64–65, 76, 77, 118, 150, 166–169, 173, 179, 180 Peacebuilding, vii, 4, 5, 8, 50, 51, 55n5, 63, 91, 108–109, 117 Peace conference, 88 Peace consolidation, 51 Peace enforcement, 5–7 Peacekeeper, 5–8, 12, 14, 32, 34n6, 42, 47–49, 64, 69, 74, 75, 86, 87, 90, 96, 99, 107, 113, 114, 144, 153–155, 159n3, 176, 177 Peacekeeping, viii, 2, 4, 6, 8, 9, 50–52, 62, 70, 71, 76, 78, 79, 91, 97, 115, 117, 134, 146, 150, 165–184 Peacekeeping Forces (PKF) main duties, 29, 32, 33, 46, 48, 49, 70, 71, 90, 92, 94, 109, 110, 116

Peacekeeping Operations (PKO) Act, 1, 6, 8–12, 21–33, 39–42, 45, 46, 48, 49, 54, 54n1, 63, 65–67, 69, 71, 73, 74, 76–78, 87–90, 95, 97–99, 107, 109, 110, 113, 115, 116, 126, 127, 131–132, 134, 136, 145, 147–148, 150, 154, 155, 158, 159, 159–160n3, 167, 168, 170, 172, 173, 176, 179, 180 Peacekeeping reform, 4, 30 Peace operation, 4, 76, 77, 179 Peace process, 6, 86, 88, 180 Peace Winds Japan (PWJ), 133 Persian Gulf, 26, 27, 33 Personal self-defense, 30 Personnel contribution, 2, 11–12, 14, 21, 26, 41, 54n1, 73, 87, 90, 169, 176–180, 183 Philippine government, 179 Philippines, 77, 135, 179 PKO Bill, 30, 66 PKO School, 42 PoC mandate, 7, 10, 14, 49, 143, 151, 155, 158 PoC mission, 71, 72 Police, 4, 10, 22, 40, 77, 79n7, 87, 93, 105, 113, 114, 117, 118n1, 143, 155 Police Act, 182 Police offcer, 113, 114, 117, 182, 183 Police peacekeeper, 117 Pol Pot, 85 Port-au-Prince, 129, 130, 132, 134 Portugal, 103, 105 Portuguese, 103, 118n2 Post-confict peacebuilding, 4 Post-confict reconstruction, 51 Postwar era, 12, 21–24 President, 8, 61, 123, 185n1

Prime Minister, 8, 12, 13, 22, 23, 25, 26, 28, 44, 50, 54, 61, 64, 75, 87, 94, 95, 108, 126, 146, 170, 176 Principles, 70 Private business, 51, 63 Private company, 112, 133 Proactive Contribution to International Peace, 173 Proactive Contribution to Peace, 62 "Protection of Civilians" (PoC), 6–8, 10, 14, 49, 70–72, 98, 135, 136, 141–159, 167, 172, 175 "Providing protection to the local population", 65 "Provision of protection" duties, 65, 68–76, 78 Proxy war, 85 P-3s, 46 Public opinion, 28, 29, 45, 52–54, 108, 113, 169, 174 Public opinion poll, 53

### **Q**

"Quasi-state" organization, 66–69, 71, 74–76, 148, 149, 170

### **R**

Ramos-Horta, José Manuel, 8, 108 Rearmament, 22 Recovery, Employment and Stability Programme for Ex-Combatants and Communities in Timor-Leste" (RESPECT), 111, 115 Referendum, 104, 106, 107, 113, 117, 141, 145 Refugee, 4, 41, 55n1, 86, 98, 105, 124, 142 Regional organization, 77, 176

Regional Protection Forces (RPFs), 143 Relief goods, 127 Republic of Congo (RoC), 25 Revitalized Agreement on the Resolution of the Confict in South Sudan (R-ARCSS), 142, 149 Revolutionary Front for an Independent East Timor" (FRETILIN), 103, 104, 112 Right of collective defense, 63–64 Right of national self-defense, 22–24 Right to self-defense, 170 Right to self-protection, 30 "Robust" mandate, 124, 132, 142, 144 Robustness, 1–14, 30, 46–50, 54, 65, 73–76, 78, 79, 103–118, 124, 136, 142, 143, 158, 159, 165–172, 177, 181 "Robust" peacekeeping, 6–8, 13, 70 Rule of law, 124 Rules of Engagement (ROEs), 155 Rwanda, 5, 11, 41, 54, 105 Rwandan refugee, 41

## **S**

Sahel region, 178 School, 111, 130, 132, 159n2 SDF Act, 25, 27, 46, 55n4, 127 SDF medical team, 129, 130 SDF peacekeeper, 9, 10, 29–32, 34n6, 41, 46–50, 54, 54n1, 55n4, 65, 66, 68, 71, 74, 89, 95, 97, 98, 126, 127, 131, 133, 134, 136, 154, 155, 159, 167–169, 171 SDF personnel, 9, 30, 31, 40, 44, 47, 48, 55n2, 67–69, 71, 76, 79, 79n7, 89, 95, 97, 98, 110, 135, 145, 146, 152, 156, 168, 180

SDF survey team, 131 "Seamless" approach, 51 "Seamless" assistance, 117, 123–136 "Seamless" support, 133 Second Abe administration, 13, 52, 62, 64, 78, 79, 148, 166, 167, 184n1 Second Abe Government, 15n4, 61–79 Secretary-General of Defense, 23 Security Experts Panel, 47, 50, 61, 62, 73–76, 170, 173 Security Sector Reform (SSR), 65, 77, 142 Self-Defense Forces (SDF), 1, 2, 9, 11, 21–28, 30–33, 41, 42, 44–46, 48, 52–54, 62, 66, 68–78, 80n8, 80n9, 87–89, 93, 97–98, 108–110, 116, 125–128, 130, 131, 134–136, 141–159, 168, 170–173, 175, 179, 180, 182, 184 Self-determination, 103, 106 Self-preservation, 30–32, 47–49, 65, 67–68, 71–76, 89, 95–97, 155, 168–170 Self-protection, 30 Self-reliance, 157, 175 Sharma, Kamalesh, 114 Sigueneau, 132 Sihanouk, Prince, 85, 96 Simultaneous collaboration, 134 Sinai Peninsula, 77, 179 Social Democratic Party (SDP), 33n4, 52, 126 Socioeconomic aid, 63 Soldier, 105, 112 Somalia, 5, 11, 43, 44, 46, 105, 144 Somali piracy, 183 Son Sann, 85 Southeast Asia, 106

South Sudan, viii, 2, 7, 10–14, 42, 52, 64, 69, 70, 76, 98, 129, 141–159, 167–169, 171–175, 182, 183 South Sudanese independence, 145 Sovereign nation, 64 Sovereign right, 21, 22 Sovereign state, 23, 66, 67, 141 Spanish, 123 Special Advisor on Development and Humanitarian Affairs, 107 Special legal measures, 44 Special measure laws, 42 Special Measures Law against Terrorism, 78 Special Measures Law on Humanitarian and Reconstruction Assistance in Iraq, 78 Special Representative of the Secretary-General (SRSG), 5 SPLA, 143, 149, 157 Srebrenica, 5 Sri Lanka, 54–55n1, 135 Sri Lankan peacekeeper, 129, 135 Sri Lankan peacekeeping, 128 Statebuilding, 9, 10, 14, 50, 51, 55n5, 85, 86, 108, 111, 114, 117, 124, 141–143, 146, 150, 151, 158, 159, 166, 167, 172, 175 Statebuilding mandate, 3, 10, 151 State organizations, 66–69, 71, 74–76, 148, 157, 170 State or quasi-state organization as an adversary party, 66 Sub-regional organization, 142 Subsequent collaboration, 134 Subsequent partnership, 134 Sudan, 141, 145 Sudan People's Liberation Army-in-Opposition" (SPLA-IO), 141 Sudan People's Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A), 141

Sumatra, 135 Supreme Commander of Allied Forces, 21 Syria, 2, 42

#### **T**

Takata, Haruyuki, 93 Takeo, 89, 91, 93, 95, 98 Taliban, 67 Territorial waters, 106 Terrorist, 145 Thailand, 176 Three classic principles of UNPKOs, 6 3-D (Diplomacy, Development and Defense), 152 Three-Parties Agreement, 28 Three principles of classic peacekeeping, 3 Three Principles of UNPKOs, 31 Three requirements of a state, 67 Three Types of UNPKO, categorized in the revised PKO Act, 70 Timorese armed force, 105 Timor Leste, 2, 118n2 Tokyo, 27, 85, 88, 106, 152 Tomomi, Inada, 149 Traditional peacekeeping, 4 Training of Trainers, 177 Transitional administration, 104 Transitional authority, 86 Transitional government, 142 Trauma of the Gulf, 87 Triangular Partnership Programme (TPP), 176, 177, 181 Troop, vii, viii, 1–3, 9, 11, 12, 14, 24, 25, 27, 53, 70, 72, 76, 85–87, 89, 98, 105–112, 117, 143, 154, 165–167, 171, 172, 175–180 Truce, 4, 49, 70, 93, 97 Trump, Donald, 175 Typhoon, 45, 135

#### **U**

Uganda, 177, 183 Ukrainian "Antonov", 132 Unarmed, 3, 32, 39, 89, 90, 93, 94, 96, 97, 99n1, 117, 127, 128, 135 UN-centrism, 24 UN Charter, 3, 5–8, 31, 44, 74, 75, 104, 107, 109, 116, 142, 143, 180 UN Charter Chapter Six and Half, 3 UN civilian police, 93, 96 UN Department of Field Support (UNDFS), 6 UN Department of Operational Support (UNDOS), 6, 176 UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (UNDPKO), 6, 12, 64, 105 UN Department of Peace Operations (UNDPO), 5–7, 10, 11, 31, 86, 159n1, 176, 178, 184 UN Economic and Social Council resolution, 77 UN feld headquarters, 171 UN General Assembly, 103 UN General Assembly resolution, 106 UN Headquarters, 98, 146 UN House, 143 Uniformed civilian, 40 Uniformed personnel, 4, 7, 86, 105, 107–108, 110–111, 143 UN infantry, 156 United Nations (UN), 1, 2, 5, 6, 8, 9, 21, 34n6, 45–49, 52, 54, 62, 71, 72, 77, 79n5, 90, 91, 96, 98, 99, 105, 106, 109, 111, 113, 123, 125, 131, 132, 143, 146, 148, 150, 151, 153, 155, 158, 159, 169–171, 176, 179–181 United Nations Angola Verifcation Mission II (UNAVEM II), 41

United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), 112, 114, 115, 152 United Nations Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF), 41–42 United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), 41, 51, 54n1, 77, 107, 159n2 United Nations Integrated Mission in Timor-Leste (UNMIT), 5, 105, 108, 114, 117 United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK), 10 United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL), 178, 184 United Nations Mission in East Timor (UNAMET), 104, 107, 117 United Nations Mission in Mozambique (ONUMOZ), 41 United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMIL), 7 United Nations Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS), 2, 10, 11, 13, 42, 72, 141–144, 146–148, 150–159, 160n3, 160n4, 167, 172, 176, 177, 180 United Nations Mission in the Sudan (UNMIS), 141, 142, 145 United Nations Mission of Support in East Timor (UNMISET), 105, 107, 108, 110, 111, 114 United Nations Operation in Somalia II (UNISOM II), 5 United Nations Operation in the Congo (ONUC), 25 United Nations Peacebuilding Commission, 4 United Nations Peacekeeping Operations (UNPKOs), 1–14, 21–26, 28, 31, 32, 39–43, 47,

	- 131–133, 136
	- 130, 144–145, 150, 169,
	- 174, 175, 179, 180

**V** Vice President, 141, 142 Vicious circle, 123 Vietnam, 177

#### **W**

War, 3, 5, 10, 21–23, 27, 33n3, 69, 107, 141, 147, 148, 151, 159n3, 167, 174 War bills, 64, 85 War on Terror, 42, 44, 108, 126 Washington, 27, 145 West Africa, 182 West Timor, 103, 107, 109 World Bank, 125

World Food Programme (WFP), 145, 159n2 World War II, 21, 33n4, 106, 174 World Wide Village, 135

#### **Y**

Yokobatake, Yusuke, 67, 68 Yolanda, 135 Yoshida, Shigeru, 22, 23

### **Z**

Zaire, 41, 46, 47, 72, 96, 116, 156, 172