War at the Margins

Indigenous Experiences in World War II

Lin Poyer

UNIVERSITY *of* HAWAIʻI PRESS

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Cover art: Soldiers of the New Guinea Infantry Battalion crossing stream in New Guinea en route to attacking a Japanese position, July 1945. Courtesy of Australian War Memorial. Photo by Terry Gibson.

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In memory of all our families, may the trials of the past bring us to a future of greater freedom and peace.

CHAPTER 1

Empires, Nation-States, and Global War at the Margins

As Matsuko Soram and I walked along an overgrown trail edged with concrete ruins on the island of Toloas in Chuuk (Truk) Lagoon, she pointed to a set of crumbling walls and steps, all that remained of her childhood home. I had come to Chuuk to record the memories of Micronesians who lived through World War II on the islands. Matsuko's father had been a policeman for the Japanese civil government in the early 1940s, when Toloas was an Imperial Japanese Navy base. A shipping fleet had filled the now-empty harbor, and houses, offices, workshops, and an airbase crowded the island when, on February 17–18, 1944, Allied bombers targeted it. Matsuko recalled that day:

> In the morning at 3:00 a.m., that's when the group of airplanes came. The planes that came first didn't drop bombs; they just strafed. My house was on top of a hill, so when I looked down, I saw a lot of the Japanese soldiers in the sea, they were floating, they were dead.
>
> After that, we started to run to the caves (bomb shelters). But you know what? Some people wanted to watch, but the Japanese soldiers came and chased them away. It was the first time we had seen guns and those things, that's why we wanted to watch, but (the soldiers) chased them away.
>
> When the war got more difficult, they brought us together, the people from Toloas. We stayed in one place. The days went on and on, and the war got even worse. They said we were going to be moved away from Toloas. . . . They took away our farms, our food, our trees, and our land. They really made us suffer.

Toloas is no longer an urban center. Devastated by eighteen months of bombing, never rebuilt when US occupying forces chose a different island for their headquarters, it is now a quiet rural hamlet, still littered with the detritus of war. Like the island, the people of Chuuk, too, found their lives reshaped by global conflict.

My work for the past two decades has dealt with Micronesians' memories of the Pacific War. Historians have produced libraries of books on that war's military strategy, on air, naval, and land battles, on the experiences of leaders and ordinary soldiers and sailors—even, more recently, on the meaning of battle sites to Japanese and Americans today. But historians had little to say about the people who lived on those strategically vital islands: how they survived, whether they took sides, what they thought and suffered, and how war changed them and their children and grandchildren. To address this, I collaborated with Suzanne Falgout and Laurence M. Carucci on two volumes combining oral and documentary history, *The Typhoon of War* (2001) and *Memories of War* (2008).[1] Our work paralleled that of researchers in Southwest Pacific islands, describing the profound transformations generated by global war: the devastation of invasion and bombing, of course, but also food shortages, forced labor, relocation, martial law, and shifts in colonial power, gender roles, religion, and family structure.

The islands of the Pacific are not the only Indigenous lands on which the Second World War was fought. In the hills of Southeast Asia, British and Japanese wooed village elders to recruit guerrillas for jungle warfare. Sámi reindeer herders in Finland and Norway guided refugees across frozen landscapes, and Sámi men served in the armies of four nations. Aboriginal Australians patrolled the north coast and rescued downed pilots in the deserts only they knew well. The Imperial Japanese Army recruited Aboriginal Taiwanese to serve in New Guinea, where their survival skills kept their comrades alive in a retreat across unfamiliar territory. Even in South America, the inhabited continent least directly touched by the war, Allied demands for rubber pushed development into the Amazon rainforest. Most Americans know the story of how Navajos gave the US Marines an unbreakable code, but this is not an isolated case: Native languages, knowledge of landscape, and bushcraft were all deployed by warring armies. The combatant powers found images of Indigenous peoples useful as well, as propaganda and as proof of the rightness of their cause and the reach of their flags.

War at the Margins offers a broad comparative view of the impact of World War II on Indigenous communities. The aim is not a comprehensive survey of their experiences, which would require an encyclopedic effort. Rather, I use selected cases to trace how these groups emerged from the trauma of war to lay foundations for their twenty-first century role as new players on the political stage. Today, insights from indigeneity contribute to international discourse in politics, law, human rights, spirituality, and sustainable development.

FIGURE 1.1. Matsuko Soram and Lin Poyer on Toloas, Chuuk, Federated States of Micronesia.

Studying Indigenous Wartime Histories

Telling the story of World War II began before hostilities ended and has never ceased. Libraries bulge with volumes of military, diplomatic, and political histories, with memoirs and biographies of soldiers and statesmen. By the end of the century, awareness of the passing of the wartime generation propelled the collection of oral histories from survivors worldwide. World War II histories continue to flow, but those written today differ from the top-brass-heavy military and archival approach of the first postwar decades. A modern comprehensive history integrates personal diaries, letters, and oral accounts. Even military histories often include such broader topics as ethnic, gender, race, and class analysis, sexuality, and the environmental consequences of war. Given the vast expansion in research, one might wonder . . . is there anything left to say about World War II?[2] But of course there is, partly because we have not yet heard everyone's story of this shared global experience, and partly because such a transformative era holds lessons for the modern world.

In this book I describe military activity at the "edges" of states, the sparsely inhabited areas where self-governing mostly tribal communities lived under loose

engagement with central authorities.[3] Using examples from different regions, I show how military activity altered their relationship with national and colonial governments and majority populations, and how it opened paths eventually taken by Indigenous Rights activists in following generations. These small communities—which sometimes played outsized roles—have unique stories that deserve to be on library shelves.

While my argument is partially informed by my own research in Micronesia, this book relies on secondary sources for its comparative reach. This is made possible by the expansion of Indigenous Studies, growing ranks of Indigenous scholars, and new approaches to global history. One of the pleasures of my task has been discovering a wealth of new publications on Canada's First Nations, Native Americans, Aboriginal Australians, Pacific Islanders, Sámi, Nenets, Taiwanese Aborigines, Ainu, Nagas, Kukis, and many others. Research has matured from the early phase of salvaging these "lost" or "forgotten" histories in the 1960s and 1970s, to integrating Indigenous experiences into broader narratives of World War II and exploring specific topics in detail.[4]

The most important change has been the addition of Indigenous people's own voices. I have relied on the work of such scholars throughout this book. Where documentary sources are scarce, as in war-destroyed zones or largely non-literate communities, only the fragile web of personal and family tales holds memories. Educational projects, films, and online sites, many initiated by Indigenous communities, have increased the number and accessibility of oral histories and unpublished information.

Another addition has been imperial, colonial, and transnational histories—three related but not identical approaches—supplementing nation-focused studies. Empires, by definition, encompass peoples differing in language, culture, and appearance.[5] In World War II, the United Kingdom, France, the Netherlands, Belgium, the Soviet Union, and the United States (among the Allies), and Germany, Italy, and Japan (as the Axis) drew on populations throughout their domains for troops and labor. The response to wartime demands revealed both the strength and weaknesses of colonial control. Support for the British Empire was immediate in many regions, but even enthusiastic responses included a sense of local goals. Japan's empire conscripted militias and labor battalions as it occupied new territory in East and Southeast Asia; Germany did the same in Europe. The French Empire split, between the Vichy government (established in June 1942 after Germany occupied northern France) and the Free French movement, which based itself in colonies as a claim to legitimacy and a source of troops and income.[6] The lives of Africa's and Asia's colonial soldiers and civilian laborers

have finally received much-needed scholarly attention and overlap in some ways those of Indigenous communities discussed here.[7]

With the foundations laid by Indigenous Studies and imperial/colonial history, the time is ripe to look at what is distinctive about Indigenous wartime experiences. A worldwide overview risks being superficial or can seem to deny the uniqueness of each community. But one reason Indigenous Studies can make broad comparisons is that historically, the theory and operation of colonial regimes was global, producing striking parallels. In World War II, both Allied and Axis empires dealt with those at their "edges" in response to similar demands of politics and strategy. Ken Coates's *Global History of Indigenous Peoples* (2004) offers a brief but insightful treatment of World War II, admirably combining generalizations with specific examples. With a tighter focus, R. Scott Sheffield and Noah Riseman's *Indigenous Peoples and the Second World War* (2019) compares Canada, the United States, New Zealand, and Australia to reveal patterns in military service, home front life, and postwar policy changes, while respecting the particularities of each group.[8] To understand the histories of Indigenous peoples in World War II, we must begin by examining the modern meaning of the category.

About Indigenous Peoples

Using the term "indigenous peoples" to talk about World War II is anachronistic to some degree—not because the term was unfamiliar at that time, but because it has since come to have a more specific meaning in contemporary scholarly, political, and legal discourse. We no longer use "Indigenous" (especially if capitalized) in its general sense of a population native to a region. Not all who consider themselves natives of a place are "Indigenous" in this relatively new sense, which emerged most visibly on the international scene in the 1980s.

Historians of the Indigenous Rights movement trace its emergence from broader human rights efforts at the start of the twentieth century. Efforts to improve the status of particular groups go back further, with advocacy groups often led by non-Natives, but these were scattered efforts—and many focused as much on assimilation as on protection. After World War I, the League of Nations took an interest in monitoring the status of these special minorities. A specific political/legal category emerged in Latin America, where concepts of *indigenismo* have long formed an important element of political action.

World War II released a flood of human rights activity, from the 1941 Atlantic Charter's promise of self-determination to the United Nations' 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights. This laid the groundwork for numerous

postwar conventions and treaties. Civil rights activism and attention from international organizations, such as the International Labour Organization's 1957 Convention on Indigenous and Tribal Populations, set the stage for the emergence in the 1980s of a global Indigenous movement claiming distinctive rights in the national and international arena and bringing the term into wide use. In 1982, the UN established a Working Group on Indigenous Populations, which grew rapidly as an extra-national forum; the outcome was UN General Assembly approval of the Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (UNDRIP) in 2007. Later came UN declarations of a Year, two Decades, and an annual Day of the World's Indigenous People. Today, many organizations are involved with Indigenous rights locally, regionally, and globally.[9]

At this point, the category of "Indigenous peoples" has become a familiar part of international life. But a glance at any listing of Indigenous peoples will show that it includes a wide variety of groups, living in quite different circumstances. As Ronald Niezen noted in 2003, it is odd to have a global movement that is all about cultural difference![10] How can the concerns of Sámi of northern Europe, Ainu of Hokkaido, Navajo of the US Southwest, Igorot of Luzon, San Bushmen, and hundreds of others be addressed through a uniform process? And that is even before considering the national politics of Norway, Finland, Japan, the United States, the Republic of the Philippines, and Botswana. The intersection of cultural diversity with national and international politics makes the category problematic. Since the start of the Indigenous Rights movement, legal scholars and political scientists have parsed how these communities differ from ethnic minorities or historical colonial majority populations.

Defining Indigenous communities is not only difficult; it is, at this point, highly charged politically. The United States, Canada, New Zealand, and Australia were among those who protested UNDRIP, fearing a threat to national sovereignty. Once a group has official Indigenous status, either within the nation-state context or in international law, new expectations and sanctions may apply. For that reason, a government may prefer to avoid classifying a group as "indigenous," or may reject the category completely, arguing for example that all its citizens are equally native to the land. Activists, on the other hand, might see Indigenous status as a way to promote human rights and protect land, languages, and culture by drawing on a transnational legal framework. Defining who is Indigenous is so contentious, in fact, that UNDRIP did not attempt a definition.[11]

As a result, defining indigeneity has largely developed through dialogue among self-identifying groups, national governments, international agencies, and NGOs. While no single definition exists for all situations, common

elements include: a strong affiliation with a home territory; a history of colonial settlement or occupation; distinct political, economic, and social institutions; and a desire to maintain community cultural identity, which might include language, ceremonial activities, subsistence activities, and other customs.[12] Briefly, we can think of Indigenous communities as those historically "at the margins" of nation-state power, either as internal colonies in settler states (like Native North Americans or Aboriginal Australians) or as small-scale self-governing communities at the edges of large peasant-agricultural societies (like the "hill tribes" of upland Southeast Asia). Most have been subsistence horticulturalists, pastoralists, or foragers in the past and, in many cases, into the present. These communities seek to maintain their territory, culture, language, and lifeways, despite attacks and pressure from outside authorities or nearby majority populations. This does not necessarily mean they want to separate from surrounding nation-states (though some do), but that they limit or resist assimilation, seeking to be themselves in the context of modern global politics.

For our purposes, we can shortcut debates over definitions, as we focus on how these groups related to the contending powers before, during, and immediately after World War II. While Indigenous peoples did not form a legal category then, they of course did exist, both within the national boundaries of major powers and at the frontiers of colonial authority. By the mid-twentieth century, they had been largely pushed to the margins of arable land, living in relatively inaccessible or economically undesirable areas. They were often stigmatized as "uncivilized," "backward," or "primitive" to imply their inferiority to the majority of citizens or colonial subjects. But during World War II, it was often those very qualities of marginality that made them valuable allies or dangerous enemies.

Empires, Nation-States, and Global War at the "Margins"

Indigenous homelands of mountains, tundras, jungles, and deserts might have been at the margins of state control, but during the war some became centers of conflict. This is nothing new. The wide swath of history shows that frontier communities have always had a role to play in ancient and modern empires. Roman or Zulu, Inca or French, expanding empires swallowed bordering chiefdoms and tribes; communities were absorbed or destroyed by conquest or fled to less accessible lands. In the modern era, the colonial wars of the sixteenth through nineteenth centuries, spurred by competition for political and commercial hegemony, marked the final stages of exploring "to the ends of the earth" as the victors portioned out the inhabited continents. The wars of the

mid-twentieth century, in another orgy of international rivalry, brought the most remote borderlands into the emerging global order. Even if a tribal community had managed to avoid or survive the devastation of enslavement, epidemics, massacres, loss of land, and forced assimilation—even if they managed to maintain some protective isolation—the last century's conflicts ended that forever. In particular, as historian Ken Coates (2004) points out, the Second World War transformed remote Indigenous homelands that had previously been largely ignored by the industrial nations. In a way, that war was the final stage of globalization: the point at which even the most isolated or marginalized groups became engaged with the most powerful imperial states in a global event.[13]

Many minority groups and impoverished or disenfranchised populations suffered during World War II. Wartime burdens on minorities or colonial subjects were magnified by discrimination, political powerlessness, or deliberate genocide. Focusing on Indigenous communities does not mean that I think they suffered more than others. Rather, I wish to investigate how their experiences were distinctive, and how that distinctiveness affected their postwar position and laid the foundation for modern developments. A clear causal chain cannot always be forged between the war years and the emergence of the Indigenous Rights movement decades later. However, a case can be made for how the circumstances of war shifted governments' stances on Indigenous legal status, altered longstanding racist views, and changed Indigenous peoples' own perceptions of their identity and potential futures.

Bigger Questions: Beyond the War

What is the value of looking at Indigenous experiences during World War II? Military historians would note the importance of a few key encounters: global war is about the clash of empires, yet small-scale tribes and villages played crucial roles at times. Along the Kokoda Trail of Papua New Guinea, at the Battle of Kohima in northeast India, during the US invasion of the Solomon Islands—at these turning points, among others, Indigenous action was pivotal.

But there is a wider significance to studying communities that have not been fully absorbed into the social and cultural hegemony of states. Anthropologists have traditionally studied such groups to learn about humanity—not because they are "closer to nature," but because of the benefits of examining social organization and cultural ideas at a manageable scale. In the first half of the twentieth century, as anthropology began to learn how societies worked and what culture was, we benefited greatly by being able to study small communities, even

to pretend, intellectually, that they were isolated or self-contained. They weren't, of course, and with global war even the possibility of isolation disappeared.

If anthropology's first century was spent learning from small-scale societies how all human societies function, the lessons are different in the twenty-first century. Today, we look at tribal societies because they demonstrate alternative ways of life to the dominant economic and political order. This is especially important now, when nation-states hold every inch of six continents, yet the problems they generate are coming to seem equal to or worse than the advantages they confer, and when national borders are no barrier to economic and environmental crises. During World War II, national and imperial governments and armies crossed paths with tribal communities in the pursuit of war aims. They had to accommodate Indigenous difference to achieve their military goals.

It is that difference that interests us here. How can we use the study of Indigenous experiences in World War II to teach us about future choices? What can we learn about how patriotism intersects with cultural identity; about how citizenship can be understood in a complex, migrating, global polity; about the meaning of borders and of loyalty and of war itself? By telling stories of Indigenous wartime life, I hope to show that we can understand these concepts in new and potentially useful ways. No one (yet) questions the persistence of states—indeed, the postwar world embraced the global hegemony of the nation-state system—yet tribes and chiefdoms, too, survived and even flourished after the war. To understand this, and to see how this resilient persistence might turn out to have lasting value for humanity's political future, we need to understand the transformative war years from this different perspective—to look at the conflict from the point of view of a Sámi reindeer-herder, a Naga porter, a Xingu rubber-tapper, as well as from the point of view of the powerful warring nations.

Overview of Book

A global overview reveals the enormous range of World War II activities and its impacts on these communities. But, while the range of their involvement is clear, what do we know about their motives and goals? Chapter 2, "Military Service, Citizenship, and Loyalties" examines how Indigenous groups and the nations employing them in war understood their respective positions. Were Indigenous people citizens? Did colonial subjects have a duty of loyalty? Who was obliged, or allowed, to fight?

Chapters 3–10 are the descriptive heart of the book, exploring Indigenous lives during the war years, in military roles when war came to their homelands

(chapter 3), or when they served in faraway battles or when foreign soldiers flooded into their territory (chapters 4 and 5). Whether deployed at home or abroad, Indigenous distinctiveness persisted in military service. Combatant powers used their skills on the battlefield and also used images of "primitive" peoples in propaganda (chapters 6 and 7). Chapters 8 and 9 explore non-combat effects of war. Indigenous peoples, like others across the globe, suffered from relocation, forced labor, militarization, and disrupted economies. Those near front lines endured invasion, bombing, and occupation, as foreign armies advanced and retreated around and over them. The war both built and destroyed Indigenous homelands, and logistics affected even areas far from combat (chapter 10).

When the war ended, it often seemed that these groups had gained few benefits from their suffering and service. States continued to discriminate against, dispossess, and disempower them, but decolonization and other postwar changes eventually increased their political role (chapters 11 and 12). Chapter 13 looks at how the war is remembered by Indigenous groups, and how the combatant nations commemorate (or fail to remember) their involvement. The final chapter considers how Indigenous citizenship, military service, and political autonomy appear now on the world stage, as the demands of World War II fade, replaced by new questions about how to organize global political life.

A final caution: This is not a history of World War II by any means, nor can I attempt to include all Indigenous communities affected. I focus on places and times that particularly illuminate the Indigenous experience, especially those that resonate into postwar circumstances. As a result, campaigns or battles or situations that are well-described in general histories of World War II may get short shrift. The goals of Indigenous actors were often not those of the major combatants. For many Indigenous communities, this was a fight between foreigners, and local war memories are not necessarily valued or preserved. There are many gaps in our knowledge, and paths still to be explored by new generations of scholars.

In order to understand the context of Indigenous wartime experiences, we need to understand how combatant nations employed them and to recognize their own motives and decisions about participating. My focus throughout this book is on Indigenous agency—how people responded to conditions of war in accordance with their own values. Small in numbers and politically separate from majority populations, the goal of Indigenous communities has always been to retain their autonomy. We begin, then, by asking why Indigenous peoples fought and why armies recruited them. What motivated engagement in national or imperial war, for those at the margins?

CHAPTER 2

Military Service, Citizenship, and Loyalties

At the time of the Second World War, many Indigenous people (by our modern definition) were not tightly integrated into national or colonial bureaucracies. Their legal position in terms of citizenship or military service was sometimes unclear even to the authorities. This chapter looks at how Indigenous peoples became engaged in fighting this international conflict. It also introduces the communities whose experiences are more fully described in later chapters. We begin with the situation of citizens within combatant nation-states, then turn to more problematic questions of "loyalty" for imperial subjects in war zones. A final section considers the many reasons that motivated Indigenous military service.

Indigenous Peoples from the Viewpoint of Nations and Empires: Citizenship and Service

The link between citizenship and military service is longstanding but not transparent. In a "citizen army" the state's legitimacy depends on its members' willingness to defend it. In the United States, service in World War II catalyzed civil rights struggles of African Americans, Japanese Americans, and Native Americans—as they had served equally, they should be able to live equally. In imperial armies, though, colonial soldiers served not as citizens but as subjects—often pressed soldiers or mercenaries hired to police borders or quell resistance. In modern armies, too, the link between citizenship and service is by no means straightforward. In 2009, thirty-eight nationalities other than United Kingdom served in the British Army; US forces include many noncitizens, such as green card-holding immigrants and recruits from several Micronesian countries.[1] Ambiguity escalates in the modern world, as armies recruit outside home nations, fund factional militias, and outsource military activities to private contractors.

Indigenous Citizens as Soldiers: Ainu, Sámi, Māori

Where citizenship and service are linked, the question of who is allowed or required to enlist has been crucial to issues of Indigenous status. We begin with three groups, Ainu, Sámi, and Māori, whose citizenship was established by the time of World War II. How did their Indigenous identity intersect military service?

Ainu. Ainu are the Indigenous inhabitants of the islands of Japan. When the nation established its modern borders in the late nineteenth century, Ainu lived in the northern islands of Hokkaido, Sakhalin, and the Kurils primarily as hunters, gatherers, and fishers, pushed to marginal areas as their lands were invaded by Japanese settlers from the south. Ainu on Hokkaido had undergone a long process of acculturation, becoming citizens by 1898, with men liable for military conscription. In the colony of Karafuto (southern Sakhalin Island), Ainu—but not the smaller Native groups, Uilta and Nivkh—gained citizenship by 1932–1933. A nascent Ainu political movement strengthened legal rights with a revised Ainu Protection Act in 1937, but activism soon withered under the strain of war.[2]

A dual vision of Ainu as loyal citizens, but also different, persisted in wartime. Ainu men served in imperial forces throughout the China-Pacific theater in World War II. Ainu leader and memoirist Shigeru Kayano describes how, as a young man, he was as eager as other Japanese to volunteer for sacrificial service.[3] Yet even as Ainu marched as patriots, the government perpetuated images of difference and homefront tourism catered to a public eager to view them as exotic and primitive. The apparent paradox of how Ainu could be both true citizens and exotic "others" reflected a broader problem—how to create a shared identity as the empire expanded. Distinct cultures might be celebrated as art or tourist attractions, but all were expected to integrate as imperial subjects. Military service was a step along this path. For Ainu, the challenge lay in being loyal Japanese while holding to their own customs despite acculturative pressure.[4]

Sámi. Sámi are Indigenous people living in arctic regions of Sweden, Norway, Finland, and Russia's Kola Peninsula; their cross-border homeland is called Sápmi. (The older ethnic term "Lapp" is no longer used.) A flexible and mobile economy of reindeer herding, fishing, fur trapping, and some farming kept many Sámi relatively separate from the emerging Nordic nations until the nineteenth century. Whereas Ainu had been incorporated into Japan as its frontier expanded across their territory, Sámi found their homeland split by four states as northern Europe's national borders hardened.

MAP 2.1. Location of some Indigenous communities discussed in the text

Though the countries in which they live had different assimilationist policies, Sámi men served in the armed forces in all of them. In 1897, Norway extended conscription to Sámi citizens. In Russia, Sámi served in the tsar's army and in World War I, with contending forces of the Russian Revolution, and then with the Soviet Army. After Finland became independent in 1917, Sámi men were eligible for the draft but in practice were exempt until 1933.[5] Because they are a cross-border population, some Sámi during World War II found themselves fighting one another, as part of Finnish, Soviet, or Norwegian armies. Sámi territory was a field of combat from the Finnish-Soviet Winter War of 1939–1940 through Germany's surrender in May 1945. World War II did not change Sámi citizenship status, but it did change their position in national policy. Wartime evacuations and postwar reconstruction transformed the isolated region and reconfigured Sámi relations with fellow citizens and governments.

Māori. Māori had become British subjects in 1840 with the signing of the Treaty of Waitangi, but they experienced ongoing discrimination and government failure to abide by the treaty's provisions of land rights and self-rule.[6] Political autonomy had been linked with military service in World War I, when some Māori opposed sending men to fight British wars overseas while grievances at home were ignored. Nonetheless, approximately three thousand enlisted, serving in Gallipoli and Europe, receiving numerous medals, and suffering nearly 15 percent casualties.[7]

In the Second World War, Māori leaders saw war service as a way to gain approval for greater self-government. About sixteen thousand Māori (out of a population of one hundred thousand) enlisted in New Zealand forces. Māori leaders requested a separate combat unit, and the 28th (Māori) Battalion of the New Zealand Army was announced in October 1939. Some seven thousand men served in the battalion, which saw distinguished action in North Africa, Italy, and Greece.[8]

Māori were exempted when conscription began in June 1940, but there was no shortage of volunteers for the Māori Battalion, which remained all-volunteer. Its four companies were organized along broadly tribal lines, acknowledging Indigenous social organization, and Māori eventually filled most command roles. The battalion's symbolic power was tremendous, raising a positive public profile for Māori and boosting their identity and confidence. Māori goals were made clear in a 1943 pamphlet by statesman Sir Apirana Ngata, "The Price of Citizenship," which emphasized that Māori support for the British cause would aid the struggle not only for social and economic equality, but also for political autonomy.[9]

Contested Citizenship and Military Service: United States, Canada, Australia

Like Sir Apirana Ngata, other Indigenous leaders saw military service as "the price of citizenship" and used it as leverage for improved status. But those in power do not always agree that service entitles people to full citizenship rights. War's demands might simply consume all available manpower, as in the USSR. There, Indigenous Siberians, who had previously been largely exempt from conscription, were fully mobilized after 1939.[10] Or minorities might find themselves—as African Americans did—"fighting on two fronts"—fighting for the nation in the military, but also for full rights at home. As to citizenship itself, while governments usually saw it as a reward or privilege, it could look different from an Indigenous point of view. Native American (Anishinaabe) scholar Duane Champagne describes Indigenous peoples as those who did not necessarily consent to be citizens but were defeated or encompassed and made citizens by fiat. The United States, Canada, and Australia all instituted military conscription in 1941, but differences in government-Indigenous relations led to different outcomes.[11]

Native Americans. The question of whether Native Americans could or should serve in the military had long been settled. Indians had served with—as well as fought against—US armed forces since the country first formed (and before). At the time of World War I, nearly half of Native Americans in the United States were not citizens, and so were exempt from conscription. Still,

some eight to twelve thousand enlisted, and patriotic speeches and US flags became common at Indian events. Proofs of loyalty did not mean assimilation, however, as shown by the many returning veterans who took part in victory dances and purification ceremonies. In 1919, Congress allowed veterans to petition for citizenship, and in 1924, based partly on the argument that war service deserved reward, the Indian Citizenship Act extended it to all Indians born in the United States (though six states still denied them voting rights).[12]

The question of conscription re-emerged with the Selective Service Act of 1940 ("the draft"). Most cooperated with the law, but resisters emphasized Native autonomy. Some Seminoles claimed they had never made peace and were still technically at war with the United States. The Six Nations of the Iroquois Confederacy sued in court to protect their sovereignty. Iroquois men willingly volunteered, but rejected Washington's right to conscript them, arguing that they had never consented to citizenship. Other tribes that organized resistance for different reasons included Hopi, Tohono O'odham (Papago), Ute, and Yakima. In the end, courts ruled that the Citizenship Act of 1924 and the Nationality Act of 1940 trumped treaty claims. All Native American men were required to register.[13] Questions about sovereignty did not hinder patriotic support. In all, about twenty-five thousand Native American men served (along with nearly eight hundred women), a great number in proportion to the total population. On some reservations half or more of the men volunteered. As one Sioux commented, "Since when has it been necessary to conscript the Sioux as fighters?"[14]

The topic of separate Indian units, discussed in World War I, was revived but again rejected. Recruits were integrated into white units (African Americans were assigned to segregated units, and the 442d Regimental Combat Team was formed for American men of Japanese descent).[15] Though Native Americans reported less discrimination in the armed forces than African Americans, they did not merge into the crowd. Their appearance, and often their religious customs, set them apart. As we will see in chapters 4 and 7, their identity became both a protection and a danger in combat.

As had happened in World War I, several Indigenous nations declared war on the Axis powers independently from the US government. Jemez Pueblo did so soon after Pearl Harbor; Ponca and Osage, Sioux, Chippewa, and Dakota followed suit. The Six Nations formally declared war in June 1942, even while they contested the federal government's right to draft their men. National publicity portrayed these displays of loyalty as a sign of assimilation, but while the act of declaring war expressed sincere emotion, it also emphasized tribal sovereignty.[16]

First Nations. In Canada, a legal line between "treaty Indians" or "status Indians" (those living on reserves governed by historical treaties) and those considered to be regular citizens shaped conscription issues. In World War I, non-citizen Natives were exempted from service in foreign wars, though more than 3,500 volunteered with the Canadian Expeditionary force, some in all-Indian units. Their visibility on European battlefields promoted rights at home, though veterans' programs often discriminated against them. In 1917, the Military Voters Bill extended the vote to Indian soldiers without requiring them to lose treaty status.[17]

In World War II, though, First Nations were included in compulsory training and home defense, a shift that surprised and angered many, especially given treaty agreements and their lack of civil rights. Canada began conscription in mid-1941. The government initially promised not to conscript anyone for overseas service, but that policy changed in November 1944 when combat losses had to be made up from home defense troops. As in the United States, some Native communities—including Iroquois—opposed conscription, especially for service abroad. Exceptions were then made for members of certain tribes (depending on treaties) who could not be compelled to serve overseas, though they could and did volunteer. Inuit in Canada were exempt from compulsory service but could enlist.

Support for the war was strong despite such disputes. "Treaty" Indian enlistments amounted to 3,090 (of an estimated 136,000 population). Mary Greyeyes (Cree, Muskeg Lake Reserve), the first Indigenous recruit in the Canadian Women's Army Corps, received much publicity, and Oliver Milton Martin, a Mohawk World War I veteran, became the first Indian to attain the rank of general. Debate about separate all-Indian battalions extended to the start of the war, but the decision was made for integration, though some units had large proportions of First Nations recruits. Most served in the infantry; the Royal Canadian Air Force and Royal Canadian Navy began the war with racial bars, later rescinded. Despite integration, recruits experienced discrimination; for example, in how the pay and dependents' allowances of status Indians were handled through Indian Agents. After the war, "treaty" veterans were given the right to vote in federal Canadian elections. (Other "status" Indians did not receive the federal franchise—without losing their treaty rights—until 1960.)[18]

Aboriginal Australians. At the time of the war, Indigenous Australians were not full citizens, but neither did they have a defined status under treaties. (Like other Australians, they were British subjects until the 1948 establishment of Dominion citizenship.) In Australia's federated government, legal powers retained

by the six states meant that conditions for Aboriginal Australians varied a great deal. Despite some efforts to improve their status, they were legally and socially marginalized in a caste system. Military service of roughly a thousand Aboriginal Australian men during World War I did not improve conditions. Most veterans were excluded from benefits and their role dropped from public memory.[19]

At the start of World War II, the existing Defence Act exempted non-Europeans from service. While the Act did not prohibit volunteers, regulations stipulated that only those "substantially of European origin or descent" were to be enlisted, so volunteering was not straightforward. The variety of state laws allowed some to enlist while others were turned away. Legally, a person of some Aboriginal descent was either subject to a state's Aboriginal Protection legislation—therefore exempt from national service—or had to petition for exemption from it, abandoning Aboriginal identity. As in Canada, and in the United States before 1924, one could either be a national citizen or a member of the Indigenous community, but, legally, not both. In practice, the "substantially European" standard was hard to enforce, and manpower needs later in the war widened enlistment, though the Defence Act policy did not change until 1949.[20]

In all, an estimated three thousand Aboriginal and part-Aboriginal Australians and Torres Strait Islanders served in regular forces, out of a total population under eighty-five thousand; an equal number were military laborers. More than a thousand fought with the Second Australian Imperial Force (the volunteer overseas service of the Australian Army) in New Guinea and North Africa.[21]

Aboriginal Australian servicemen and women experienced little discrimination (certainly much less than in civilian life), and enjoyed opportunities for training, travel, and mateship. As Tim Japangardi, a Walpiri man, recalled, "friends and friends. . . . Everybody was fighting, and working hard . . . good fun always." Among the best known were Leonard Waters, the first Aboriginal Australian fighter pilot in the Royal Australian Air Force and Reginald "Reg" Saunders, MBE (Member of the Order of the British Empire), the first Aboriginal Australian commissioned army officer. Saunders, who enlisted in 1941, served in the Middle East, Greece, Crete, New Guinea and (in a later war) Korea.[22] The positive experiences of many enlistees highlighted persistent discrimination in civilian life and stimulated postwar political activity.

In contrast to Aboriginal Australians, most men of the Torres Strait Islands (between Australia and New Guinea) were enlisted during the war. The Torres Strait Light Infantry Battalion, formed to patrol Australia's north coast and islands, consisted of about 740 Islanders and some fifty mainland Aboriginal men. Although the battalion was a unit of Australia's Torres Strait Force,

Islanders were paid at about one-third the regular scale. They were treated like a colonial army—the army compared their pay with that of the Royal Papuan Constabulary rather than with Australian soldiers. While the army's idea might have been to maintain a segregated force, like colonial troops in Papua and New Guinea, in fact the men often worked alongside other Australians and Malays, making the pay disparity evident and grating, leading to a brief strike in December 1943. The next year the pay was raised, but only to two-thirds the normal rate with a small dependents' allowance.[23]

When historians describe the Torres Strait battalion as being like a unit of a colonial army, they refer to colonial subjects serving in an army led by metropole officers, rather than citizens serving in a national military. But many places where the war was fought on Indigenous homelands lay beyond effective central government control, and the issue was not one of citizenship or enlistment in regular forces, but simply of survival as hostilities engulfed them. In these places, questions of identity and loyalty became matters of life and death.

Empires from the Point of View of Indigenous Peoples: The Question of Colonial Loyalties

World War II did not occur in a timeless void. Its violence links, in many parts of the world, with conquest and oppression long before, and continuing conflicts long after. This is starkly evident across much of Southeast Asia, where the end of the Asia-Pacific War became the beginning of independence struggles. As a result, "collaboration" and "resistance" look very different in Europe and in colonial Asia.[24] In Europe, Nazi collaborators in occupied areas were seen as traitors and were punished or executed after the war. While the same was true in parts of Asia, in other places collaboration with Japanese—who presented themselves as liberators from colonialism—was seen as resistance to British, French, or Dutch rule. Some "collaborators" became national heroes, even heads of newly independent countries. These men saw European colonial powers as their main enemy, and Japanese alliance as a route to independence. Indigenous people, too, balanced their own goals with the demands of foreign combatants. In short, governments might describe a person or group as "loyal" or "disloyal," but reality was more complicated.

Questions of Loyalty in the Japanese Empire

Conscription into imperial military forces began in Japan's home islands, expanding to colonies as war went on. People in Okinawa, Korea, and

Karafuto—including Indigenous people—were considered Japanese nationals by annexation, though without full citizenship rights. Islanders in Japanese-held Micronesian islands were Japanese subjects, but legally aliens.[25]

Taiwan's Aboriginal "Takasago" enlistees. The majority population of Taiwan descends from immigrants from the Chinese mainland. The Austronesians who had lived on the island for millennia before that were in part absorbed into these newcomers, but the eastern highlands remained largely an area of Aboriginal tribes. When the Qing dynasty ceded Taiwan to Japan in 1895, Japan fought a colonial war to integrate the island's Chinese and Aboriginal residents into the empire.

As Taiwan was pacified, commercial and military interests encroached on Indigenous lands. Forced relocation and harsh policing triggered armed resistance. The largest was the October 1930 Wushe Rebellion, when several tribes coordinated an attack killing more than 130 Japanese. The violence shocked Japanese at home; aggressive retaliation by colonial authorities—deploying overwhelming force, heavy artillery, and even poison gas, killing at least seven hundred Aborigines (including many who committed suicide)—shocked them even more and caused a shift in attitudes. Oppressive policies and exploitation did not vanish, but the goal changed to acculturation.[26]

With the onset of war, Japan's overall colonial policy of assimilation hardened into intense "imperialization" (*kōminka*) to foster sacrificial service. In Taiwan, that meant replacing Chinese language, names, customs, and attitudes with an all-encompassing Japanese identity. For Aboriginal Taiwanese, whose identities were tribal rather than Chinese, *kōminka* sought to focus loyalty directly on the emperor, on Japan. From March 1942, Indigenous men were recruited for labor and later for military service in the Takasago Volunteer Corps (*Takasago giyūtai*) and other special units. They were included in compulsory drafts in Taiwan in late 1944 through 1945.[27]

Takasago enlistees were motivated by the patriotic pressure of *kōminka,* and enlistment was an attractive, rare path to advancement for Indigenous men. Cultural motives also played a role. Takasago service drew on young men's identity as warriors, and many tribal values were compatible with "the Japanese spirit." Veterans make this link explicitly; as Buyan Nawi said, "Since ancient times, Tayal men have faced death in battle resolutely, and we would never feel sad about it. When I joined the Fifth Giyutai and was ready to go to war, the whole tribe threw a big farewell party for me and the dancing continued till daybreak. I made my decision to do great deeds for Japan and the Emperor. We Tayal people have always been brave. We have never been fearful of going to war. We regard

it as honorable." Walis Piho spoke of a special motivation: to "erase the stain of treachery and regain our honor" in the wake of the Wushe Rebellion, in which one of his ancestors had participated and been executed as a rebel.[28]

Takasago veterans kept their commitment to the emperor and "the Japanese spirit" not only throughout the war, but for decades after, despite disappointment in the postwar Japanese government's failure to acknowledge their service.[29] When in the 1990s they spoke with Japanese researchers (in fluent Japanese), they emphatically restated that—as an Amis veteran named Yoshikawa said, "'We *were* Japanese at the time during the Great East Asia War! We volunteered for the war from our heart. The sufferings in battles, even death, were undertaken by us willingly!'" One author who visited the home of Pirin Suyan and his wife was amazed to find it decorated in Japanese style and that the couple spoke Japanese with each other. Pirin Suyan told him, "I am a Japanese, and will be until I die." A late appreciation of Aboriginal Taiwanese commitment emerged from the Indonesian jungle in 1974, when the last Imperial Japanese Army straggler was found—and turned out to be a member of the Amis tribe.[30]

Imperial Japan's Micronesian subjects. Japan first took control of Micronesia (apart from the US Territory of Guam, and the British-held Gilbert Islands) as a League of Nations mandate after World War I, intending to prove itself a colonial power equal to Europeans and to use the islands' economic and strategic potential.[31] Islanders benefited from basic schools, health care, and a growing economy, but faced limits on their education and civil rights. Over time, immigration by Japanese, Okinawans, and Koreans made them "strangers in their own land"—of the islands' 1940 population of more than 132,000, about 81,000 were foreign.[32]

In the mid-1930s, Tokyo refocused from economic to military development, first using naval and air bases in the region to support imperial expansion, later turning them into an outer line of defense for the home islands. After thirty years of Japanese governance, Micronesians felt themselves part of the empire, despite ranking below East Asian immigrants. Support for Japan soared in the first years of war, as Islanders took part in patriotic displays, donated money, and volunteered labor. As noncitizens, Island men could not enlist in the army or navy, though two small volunteer units of military labor from Pohnpei and Palau were sent to New Guinea. Others worked in police forces or in quasi-military roles, as ship crews, harbor pilots, air raid lookouts, or other tasks.[33]

Construction of bases and large troop deployments stressed resources, but also brought excitement and, at first, an economic boom. But the war turned against Japan in mid-1943. American submarines cut off shipping, a long period

of Allied bombing began, and overpopulated garrison islands faced starvation. As conditions grew desperate, so did forced labor, military supervision, suspicion, and mistreatment escalating to torture and executions. By the time of US invasion, starting early in 1944, Micronesians were alienated from any previous loyalty, and in several places even feared that the Japanese military intended to massacre them.

Questions of Loyalty in the British Empire

Two other regions with large Indigenous populations, the highlands of Southeast Asia and the islands of the Southwest Pacific, became key battlegrounds in the Asia-Pacific War. In both areas, people's lives were upended by Japanese invasion and occupation, and by Allied guerrilla resistance followed by counter-invasion. British expectations of loyalty from long-time subjects were countered by Japanese claims of liberation from European rule. More immediately, people's lives depended on how they responded to the demands of whichever army occupied their land at the moment.

Burma/India borderlands. Mainland Southeast Asia can be understood as two populations: large, dense lowland societies depending on rice cultivation along major rivers, organized as states since prehistory; and highlanders living by swidden farming (rotating small gardens cut from forest) and trade—the village-based horticultural societies called "hill tribes" or now sometimes "Zo" peoples, referring to the entire highlands region (Zomia).[34] British policy formalized the upland/lowland distinction with separate bureaucracies. In Burma, the British colonial army from the late nineteenth century preferentially recruited men from the Karen minority and from hill tribes including Kachin, Kuki, and Naga, partly because they were cheaper, partly due to ideas about "martial races" and stronger pro-British feeling among these groups. This recruitment pattern affected the course of the war and Burma's postwar politics.[35]

Japan invaded Burma from the south in December 1941, rapidly pushing British forces into retreat. By May 1942, the Imperial Japanese Army (IJA) was approaching the mountain homelands of Kachins, Chins, Nagas, Kukis, and others along Burma's northern and western borders. In April 1942, Burma Frontier Service officer Norman Kelly met with Chin chiefs and elders to ask for their aid in raising levies to oppose the Japanese, in a meeting that reveals how they saw the situation.

In his opening speech, Kelly laid out the dangers and asked Chins to supply men and weapons to defend their homes. In response, the chiefs recounted their support of previous British requests (for example, for Labour Corps service in

World War I). They were willing to defend their land with no pay beyond supplies and ammunition but did not want to serve under British Army control and wanted to stay in their home areas. In return, they asked the government to confirm their land rights, reduce taxes, guarantee they would keep or be paid for their guns after the war, offer compensation and pensions, and bring news about relatives fighting elsewhere with the Burma Rifles. By the end of the meeting, Kelly obtained commitments for hundreds of recruits—and on his part, agreed to voluntary enlistment, how and where the levies would operate, and how supplies and compensation would be distributed.[36] Kelly's effort to gain cooperation in the fight against Japan was not simple conscription, but negotiations between village chiefs and the British government. Chins were willing to work and fight, but under their own terms.

British accounts of war in the Burma/India highlands praise the loyalty of these hill tribes, but the situation was far from clear-cut.[37] Some sensed advantage in aiding the Japanese or saw it as the only reasonable course of action; others simply tried to avoid the fighting. As Japan took control of the Chin Hills, British guerrilla officers had to continually monitor the "loyalty" of individuals, chiefs, and villages, since Chins were making their own decisions about dealing with incoming Japanese, retreating British, or both.[38] In fact, given the area's history of rebellions against British control, it is reasonable to ask: why did most upland people ally with them even at the risk of Japanese reprisals? Historian Pum Khan Pau argues that they feared greater suffering under Japanese rule, and even more from the nationalist Burmans who accompanied the Japanese advance. Also, Christian missionaries had over several generations built an educated, Western-oriented, English-speaking elite that played an influential role.[39] Leaders valued past British support for their independence from the lowlands and had personal ties with Frontier Service officers like Norman Kelly or other Westerners who had worked in the area for decades. But British officials knew that local aid could not be taken for granted.

Across the Burma/India border, the hill tribes of Northeast India also had a history of opposing lowland control, fighting British oversight, and internecine warfare. Resistance to colonial incursion was fierce and long-lasting, including a Kuki rebellion in 1917–1918 and a Naga uprising in 1931. British officials were kept busy with persistent conflict among villages and clans, sending out punitive expeditions even during World War II.[40]

Ursula Graham Bower had been studying Naga culture in India's northeastern hills since 1937 when, in mid-1942, the British military called on her to organize border surveillance for Japanese activity. Naga cooperation was essential since they knew the territory and their villages were located at strategic points. Bower

found some Naga support for the plan (especially from men who had served with British forces in World War I or in the Assam Rifles), but others opposed helping the rulers who had run punitive raids against them. As in Kelly's meeting with Chin leaders, debate centered on the history of the colonial relationship, a desire for weapons, and especially the demand that men not be taken from their homes. In one village, people recalled that porters they had sent to serve in the Lushai War had died of cholera—fifty years before, but not forgotten. Bower's assistant, Namkiabuing, profoundly upset, said to her: "'I was in the village today, and heard what they're saying. They say this isn't our war, and we ought to leave it alone—we aren't [Japanese], we aren't British; we're Zemi [Nagas]. What's it to do with us?' There was dire trouble in his face. 'We've been together now, you and I and the others, for two years now; we are like a family. How can I leave you?—What about my children? Oh, my sister, my sister, I'm being pulled in two! Which way shall I go?'"[41]

As we see in the next chapter, Naga played a crucial role in the Battle of Kohima, where the Japanese attack on India was repulsed. British General (later Field Marshal) William Slim lauded "the gallant Nagas whose loyalty, even in the most depressing times of the invasion, had never faltered. Despite floggings, torture, execution, and the burning of their villages, they refused to aid the Japanese in any way or to betray our troops. Their active help to us was beyond value or praise." Reflecting this loyalty, Naga veteran Rhizotta Rino said decades later, "Why did we fight for the British? They were our protectors. They were here before the Japanese and they protected us. We had to help them!"[42]

But others chose to ally with the invaders. The IJA was accompanied by the Indian National Army (INA), thus linking its aims with India's independence, the promise of self-determination, and claims of shared Asian brotherhood. Historian Jangkhomang Guite estimates that six thousand Kukis in Manipur helped the Japanese. Their goal was freedom from British rule. Dozens of villages and chiefs mobilized labor, supplies, guides, interpreters, propaganda, and intelligence for the invaders, who offered money, official appointments, and a promise not to harass cooperating villages. Guite suggests that, like nationalist leaders elsewhere in Southeast Asia, Kukis saw Japanese power as potentially liberating.[43] Songs—some still sung today—give evidence of popular support, like these lines praising the sound of Japanese planes (originally published in *Indian Historical Review,* vol. 37.2, 2010):

> From the horizon of Burma plain;
> The Japanese plane floats its sweet note;
> Like the sweet note of the bamboo flute;

Japanese plane hums in the sky above;
When the Japanese plane floats its sweet note;
The depressed farmer forgets the sadness;
Like the sweet melody of the watermill;
The Japanese plane floats its sweet note.[44]

After the war, the British barred those Kuki known to have sided with the IJA/INA from claiming military pensions, and seventy were charged for disloyal actions. On the other hand, after Indian independence, 148 Kukis received INA pensions—that is, India recognized wartime help to the INA as freedom fighting and loyalty to the new nation.[45] Who is a patriot or a traitor changes with the flow of time.

New Guinea and the Solomon Islands. The large island of New Guinea was at the time politically divided as Dutch New Guinea in the west, and in the east, Papua (an Australian territory) and New Guinea (an Australian-administered League of Nations mandate).[46] New Guinea held perhaps a million people, about six thousand of them Europeans. Most Islanders lived in villages, subsisting from gardens, fishing, hunting, and cash from selling copra. Many men worked as indentured labor on plantations, in mines, at trading firms, or as domestic workers.

Japan invaded at the start of 1942, taking the town of Rabaul on the nearby island of New Britain and establishing beachheads along New Guinea's north coast and in the Solomon Islands. Encountering little resistance at first, Japanese forces pushed inland across the Owen Stanley mountains toward Port Moresby. The advance was stopped by the end of 1942, but Japan controlled areas of northern and western New Guinea and parts of New Britain and Bougainville until the end of the war.

Throughout the Southwest Pacific campaign, Japanese and Allies (Australians, British, Americans, Dutch) vied for the assistance of Islanders for labor and supplies, knowledge of local territory, and news of enemy movements. Japan intended to make its dominion permanent and sent occupation personnel to follow victorious armies. Many Islanders, at least at the start, were neutral, more concerned with survival than with taking sides; as historian Hank Nelson said, "they had to obey whoever was present and holding a gun."[47] Villagers in the Upper Markham Valley understood Australian rule had been imposed on them and backed by force, and so was Japanese. "'You have guns; you have aeroplanes and bombs,' they say [to Australian anthropologist Kenneth Read]. 'The Japanese have all these things as well. It is only we who have nothing. Is it for us to fight guns with spears? If we are told to work, we work. What else is there for us to do? We are not many, nor are we as strong as you are.'"[48]

The situation in the British Solomon Islands Protectorate (BSIP) was less ambiguous. Most of its population of about ninety-five thousand, who lived by fishing, gardening, and plantation wages, assisted the Allies. More than eight hundred men enlisted in the British Solomon Islands Defence Force, and the Labour Corps enrolled more than 3,700 by July 1944. Solomon Islander historian Anna Annie Kwai cites many motives for siding with the Allies, including obligations to traditional leaders, the importance of Christianity, anti-Japanese propaganda, the language barrier with the Japanese, and penalties imposed by stay-behind British officials.[49]

Allied records include many examples of Islanders' loyalty to the Allies in New Guinea and the Solomon Islands, even under Japanese occupation and in the face of violent reprisals—loyalty shown not only by soldiers, but also by guides and porters in combat situations, village leaders, and civilians who carried out dangerous intelligence missions or rescued downed sailors and airmen.[50] While their assistance to Allied forces is beyond dispute, Islanders also saw in it a chance to improve their postwar situation, and some prominent veterans later became leaders in anticolonial movements.[51]

But in places where Japanese occupation extended into months and then years, the emperor's soldiers built up local support. Indiscriminate Allied bombing and strafing of villages created more. Some Islanders fought alongside Japanese troops, supplied information, or turned in Allied servicemen to them. Individuals pragmatically assessed the shifting fortunes of war: their lives depended on predicting the victors. Once US ships began delivering tens of thousands of combat troops and mountains of equipment and supplies, Japanese found it far harder to recruit labor or other help.

What of the inverse of the "loyalty question"—were the colonial powers loyal to the people of New Guinea and the Southwest Pacific islands? Complacent Australian and British authorities had done little to prepare for invasion. The first attacks early in 1942 caused hasty European evacuation, followed by loss of effective government, confusion, wild rumors, looting, and the abandonment of plantations, leaving thousands of employees on their own.[52] Local people saw this quick disappearance as desertion. Combined with an overwhelming display of Japanese strength, "white flight" tore away European claims of superiority and began the wartime transformation in attitudes toward colonial rule.

Evaluating "Loyalty" and "Treason"

Southeast Asia and the Southwest Pacific were among the areas where the outcome of the conflict was closely contested for months, indeed years. Both Allied

and Japanese commanders needed to gain local cooperation and if possible, deny it to the enemy. Both rewarded helpers and were willing to punish or execute those working for their adversaries. Residents were forced to obey whichever power occupied their lands, under threat of their lives and with both sides claiming ultimate victory (see chapter 8).

Under these circumstances, the ambiguity of accusing non-citizens of collaboration challenged the victors. Australian authorities knew the situation was problematic for New Guinea people; postwar compensation for damage or injury did not judge claimants' allegiance. But during the war, in 1943 and 1944, Australian military courts sentenced and hanged thirty-four men for violent crimes, including ten hanged for treason, charged with handing over white civilians or servicemen to Japanese who killed them, or otherwise cooperating with the enemy. The Australian government had not approved the army's actions and intervened to stop them.[53]

Why They Fought

Individual motives for Indigenous enlistees were as varied as for any volunteers. Describing why men from Busama Village joined the New Guinea Infantry Battalion in 1944, anthropologist Ian Hogbin found many reasons, none reflecting ideological commitment to the Allied cause: "Some men joined to carry on the warrior traditions of their fathers, some for adventure, some for the high pay, some for the glamour of a uniform, some to see the world, some because their friends had already done so, some as an escape from unhappy domesticity."[54] Personal motives, cultural attitudes, legal obligations—all intersected to shape individual responses. Certainly patriotism was among the motives, but it was patriotism informed by Indigenous identity. As Aboriginal Australian Army officer Reg Saunders said, he was fighting for Australia, not Britain. "Australia is my country. I don't owe any allegiance or loyalty to the Queen of England. They tried to bloody destroy me, and my family, my tribe, my people . . . my loyalty was purely Australian."[55]

Communities, too, engaged for various reasons. For some, military service was seen as leverage for civil rights, an argument made for Māori in "The Price of Citizenship" pamphlet and the demand for an all-Māori battalion; and in Fiji, where Ratu Sir Lala Sukuna, who led the effort to recruit Indigenous Fijians, said, "Fijians will never be recognized unless our blood is shed first." [56] Ainu felt that war service reduced discrimination by the Japanese majority: "No one said then, 'You are an Ainu,' or 'Ainu cannot serve in the Army.' Our Ainu fought

side by side with Japanese soldiers and were imprisoned in Siberia with them."[57] Indigenous people in Australia, Canada, and the United States had had limited results from their loyalty in the First World War; the Second produced better outcomes in many cases but offered no sure end to racism. In the French Pacific colonies, when Kanaks from New Caledonia and Tahitians joined European settlers in volunteering for a Pacific Battalion, colonial governors argued for citizenship for those who served with Free French forces, but this was rejected as "premature," to be discussed after the war.[58]

"Loyalty" for tribal peoples might apply more to persons than abstract polities. Some responded to calls to come to the aid of King George or to fight enemies of Japan's emperor. Others felt a duty to individuals. Chin Hills men were ready to fight under their own chiefs or the well-known Frontier Service officer Norman Kelly but did not want to be put under anonymous British Army command. Great Britain benefited from the war work of many colonial officials, businessmen, anthropologists, and missionaries with local knowledge, language skills, and family ties, giving it a crucial edge over Japan in Southeast Asia and the Southwest Pacific.[59]

Treaty obligations were a less personal but often compelling form of loyalty. Six Nations Iroquois, who served in large numbers, viewed themselves as bound by historical treaties to offer military assistance to Great Britain as allies to the Crown.[60] Many Chins referred to an 1891 treaty that called on them to render aid to Great Britain in times of war. French authorities in Indochina held oath ceremonies for highland tribes in 1941, and again in 1946.[61] Even without a formal treaty, Fijian chiefs pledged aid to Britain as reciprocity for government assistance, and some Solomon Islanders felt the same. Fijian scholar Asesela Ravuvu describes the obligation of Fiji's chiefs to show loyalty for past British protection; "not to do so would have been a shameful and unforgivable breach of custom." Men enlisted, in turn, out of respect for their chiefs: "'The chief commanded, we acted.'"[62]

More immediately, those in combat zones fought to protect their homes. The government may have seen Aboriginal Australians on the north coast as ready labor, but they saw their surveillance role as self-defense.[63] Hill tribes in the Philippines fought anyone entering their territory, Allied or Japanese. In the Burma highlands, resistance to British colonial intrusion became alliance to resist Japanese incursion—or, for Kuki, alliance with Japanese to oust British rule. Native Americans, too, discussed war service as defense of their land—both their tribal territory and the US homeland.[64] For governments to misread loyalty

to a homeland as a generic national patriotism is to miss an important element of Indigenous service.

Both Allies and Japanese rewarded loyal service and bravery. Indigenous enlisted men were eligible for regular awards (such as Aboriginal Australians Tim Hughes and Clive Upright and thirteen Papua and New Guinea soldiers, who received Military Medals as members of the Australian Army[65]). Foreign armies rewarded those attached to them, like the American Silver Stars awarded to Solomon Islander Jacob Vouza for bravery at Guadalcanal, and to Gilbert Islander Fred Narruhn, an interpreter for the US Army in the Tarawa invasion. Separate categories were created for those in colonial units and irregular forces. In New Guinea, hundreds of Loyal Service Medals were awarded, a category created especially for "native" service.[66]

Officers commanding Indigenous troops realized that their soldiers' actions, however heroic, were less likely to receive recognition. After one action in the Chin Hills, levy commander Lieutenant Colonel Balfour Oatts recommended awards for his Haka fighters, in particular Hleh To, who had volunteered for a dangerous mission, "held his ground to the end to enable his comrades to escape, and had died in an heroic manner with all wounds in front." Oatts wrote out a citation for the Victoria Cross. "Nothing came of it unfortunately. I would have liked the Chins to have a V.C. and what a man can do to earn one Hleh To had surely done—nor was he the only Chin to give his life heroically in the British cause."[67] A few Indigenous soldiers did receive the VC in World War II, including Te Moananui-a-Kiwa Ngarimu of the Māori Battalion and Sefanaia Sukanaivalu of the Fiji Infantry Regiment (chapter 4).

Governments may have interpreted battlefield heroism, military service, and other signs of loyalty as proof of assimilation, but war experiences actually increased many communities' confidence in their own futures. Some of those experiences were shared with other citizens and colonial subjects, but others were unique. The next chapters focus directly on Indigenous lives during these years: in combat on their territory or far from home, when their abilities were weaponized, and when they suffered collateral damage from large-scale war. We will return to the topics of citizenship and sovereignty in the final chapters.

First, we follow the tides of war to the shores of Indigenous homelands.

CHAPTER 3

Combat in Indigenous Homelands

INDIGENOUS RIGHTS ARE INTRINSICALLY linked with land. Communities define themselves in terms of a homeland, and sovereignty and self-determination often depend on control of land and natural resources. War, too, centers on command over territory. By the mid-twentieth century, many Indigenous populations lived in relatively inaccessible or less productive areas—places where they were "at home" and the combatant powers were not. When front lines crossed their territory, local knowledge became a strategic resource. Indigenous soldiers fought on their own land, defending their homes, providing expertise to foreign armies, and gaining experience, confidence, and new ideas that would shape postwar futures.

This chapter begins with northern Europe, then turns to Asia-Pacific battlegrounds. As we examine these complicated conflict zones, keep in mind that this is not a general history of the war, but a look at what happened to certain Indigenous peoples during it.

Arctic Europe: Sámi

War first touched Sápmi, the Sámi homeland, when the USSR invaded Finland at the end of November 1939 (the Winter War). As citizens of both countries, Sámi faced other Sámi across battlefronts. That war ended in March 1940, with Finland agreeing to relinquish certain border areas (including Sámi lands in Petsamo) to the USSR. Just weeks later, a new conflict reached western Sápmi, when Nazi Germany invaded and occupied Norway. The following year, the German Army launched attacks on the USSR from northern Norway and Finland. Caught between two aggressive powers, Finland opted for cooperation with Berlin, allowing Germany to use Finnish territory and joining in the attack on the Soviet Union to recover lost territory in the Continuation War (June 1941–September 1944). Most of the USSR-Finland border was an active front

for three years, from the German Army's invasion of the USSR in June 1941 to its retreat in 1944, and again there were reports of Finnish and Soviet Sámi firing on each other.

During those three years, German troops remained in Sámi homelands, in northern Finland as allies and in Norway as an occupying force. In September 1944, Finland signed an armistice with the USSR that required it to expel German troops, at that point numbering more than two hundred thousand. In this final phase of war in Sápmi—called the Lapland War (September 1944–April 1945)—Finnish infantry drove the German Army across northern Finland into Norway, where it remained in control until the end of the war. The destructive retreat required hasty evacuation of tens of thousands of civilians and had lasting effects on Sápmi (chapters 8 and 10).

By the time of the Winter War, Sámi men who were Finnish citizens were conscripted into regular forces, valued for their abilities in wilderness and winter conditions. Finnish Sámi losses were few in number but in the same proportion as the nation as a whole. Three men earned commissions, others held non-commissioned officer status, and soldiers and reindeer herders were honored with service medals. In Norway, Sámi fought in the regular army against invading Germans in spring 1940, and they aided the resistance during Nazi occupation, as when brothers Jonar and Bengt Jåma guided an American unit to sabotage a railway line. Sámi fishermen were well-positioned to gather intelligence on naval operations. Sámi smuggled escapees from Nazi prison camps along reindeer migration routes and guided other refugees to neutral Sweden, as did another set of brothers, Mikal and Paulus Utsi.[1]

On the USSR side of the border, men from Sámi, Komi, Nenets, and other Indigenous groups in the northwestern arctic served in the Soviet army. At least a quarter of some eight hundred soldiers sent to the front from the Sámi area of Lovozero on the Kola Peninsula never returned, and many civilians were killed as well. Nenets and other herders were conscripted along with their reindeer and equipment into provision and transport units that supplied meat and hauled the wounded, weapons, ammunition, and food, rescued pilots, and even towed downed planes; reindeer sledging was the only transport possible in some areas. Sámi herder Galkin recalls that during the Red Army's advance into Norway, "we harnessed all the deer we could and ran with the rest of the Army, swimming the deer across countless rivers and streams, floating ourselves across on cape-tents stuffed with moss. It was a great *[sic]* to be chasing the enemy. Sometimes we even caught isolated German soldiers by lasso!" Sámi skills were so essential that other soldiers were told to protect them even if it endangered their own lives.[2]

In Norway and Finland, publicity about Sámi, especially their military service and losses during the destructive German retreat, fostered public sympathy for a postwar push for Sámi rights. But war and its aftermath hardened the national borders that split Sápmi, cutting off Sámi in the USSR from communities and kin to the west until the 1980s.

Southeast Asia

The war in Asia began as Japan expanded its empire to control Manchuria in 1931. It widened into war with China in 1937, then into what is commonly called the Pacific War in December 1941, when Japan launched strikes against US, British, Dutch, and Australian territories. The Allied empires, already at war with Germany and Italy in Europe, the Middle East, and North Africa, had few resources to spare for their Asian holdings. Japan succeeded spectacularly through the first half of 1942, occupying enemy colonies in Southeast Asia and forming alliances with independent Thailand and the Vichy administrators of French Indochina.

Japanese occupation of Malaya was complete with the February 1942 surrender of Singapore. In Burma, the Imperial Japanese Army (IJA) forced British and Chinese Nationalist forces to retreat to India (March–May 1942).[3] In the Philippines, Filipino and US forces fought until their May 1942 surrender at Corregidor. Japan's invasion of New Guinea and the Solomon Islands and air raids on northern Australia in the first half of 1942 marked the empire's southernmost reach. Allies had little choice but to organize clandestine resistance until they could mount counterinvasions. Over the next three years, they recruited Indigenous peoples in sabotage, espionage, and guerrilla activity behind Japanese lines. Local assistance was, as it always is, key to success in guerrilla warfare.

Malaya

In the uplands of British Malaya, small groups of Orang Asli (the "original people," a general term for the many Indigenous tribes of the Malay Peninsula) lived by hunting, gathering, fishing, swidden gardens, and trade in forest products. Japan never securely held these forests, which remained a site of resistance—not only by British-led irregulars but also by Chinese Communists who had fought colonial rule before the war and would continue to do so long after. British and Communists agreed for a time to cooperate in anti-Japanese activities. Orang Asli were caught between the three forces, all seeking help with intelligence, food, and labor.

Before the Japanese invasion, in 1941, the British had set up a reconnaissance network in the hills along the Thai border. H. D. "Pat" Noone, an anthropologist who had married into the Temiar people and served as first Protector of Aborigines in Malaya, brought Temiar into the network. After British defeat, Noone went into the highlands to live with his wife's people. He and other agents organized Orang Asli assistance and liaised with Chinese Communists. British special forces, Communist guerrillas, Japanese occupation troops, and lowland farmers escaping the Japanese pressed into the forest, bringing Orang Asli unprecedented contact with outsiders and entangling them in a conflict that continued into the postcolonial/Cold War era (chapter 7).[4]

India-Burma

After forcing British and Chinese armies out of Burma by May 1942, the IJA paused at the edge of the highlands. It settled into governing occupied territory in alliance with Burmese nationalists whose focus was Burman ethnic identity and Buddhist religion. Instead of recruiting hill tribes, as the British had done, the IJA supported a new majority-Burman army—the Burma Independence Army (BIA)—further sharpening highland/lowland antagonisms.[5]

Even as the IJA solidified collaboration with lowland Burmese, Allied agents were setting up behind-the-lines resistance. In retreat, the British disbanded regular tribal battalions, but veterans were integrated into irregular "levy" units forming a defensive screen around Japanese-held territory. In north Burma it was Kachin Levies; to the east, Karen Levies; in the northwestern hills, Chin Levies supported by the Burma Frontier Force; and in the Upper Chindwin and Naga Hills of the India-Burma border it was the stay-behind "V" Force supported by the Assam Rifles, and intelligence-gathering "Z" Force. Levy recruits, including village headmen, police, and retired soldiers, were primarily used for patrol duties, though many saw action when front lines crossed their territory.[6]

Over time, British and American special units mounted numerous operations in Burma. British SOE (Special Operations Executive, Force 136) worked with Karens. "Chindits" were British Army Long Range Penetration Groups infiltrating behind Japanese lines. The US Office of Strategic Services (OSS, predecessor to the CIA) organized Detachment 101 in 1942 and the US Army formed a special operations unit the following year. The region became crowded with activity, Allies competed for local help, and enlistees came and went as battle lines shifted.[7] Japanese authorities responded forcefully, with reprisals against civilians and a build-up of their own intelligence system supported by Burmese allies.

The importance of ethnic minorities and hill tribes to the Allied cause won praise at the time and is not forgotten in modern histories, where they are credited with a key role in stymieing the Japanese advance.[8]

Karen, Shan, and Kachin. Karens are a large minority living mainly in eastern Burma and the Irrawaddy Delta. Long-standing links with colonial authorities and Christian missions set many Karen apart from the majority Burmans, and they were seeking a path to a separate state under British protection. Burman-Karen tension intensified during the war; violent BIA attacks on Karen and other minorities harmed relations in ways that persisted long after its end. Karen men had served in the British Army for generations. They readily volunteered for regular units and Chindits and served as officers and soldiers in the Northern Kachin Levies and with other guerrillas, forming a large and important element of anti-Japanese activity.[9]

Karen homelands were surrounded as the IJA advanced through lowland Burma, but the invasion slowed at the foothills of Shan and Kachin territory. While Karens and Kachins were largely pro-British and anti-Japanese/anti-Burman, Shan views were less uniform. Shan leaders in January 1940 passed a resolution of loyalty to Great Britain and gave generously to British war efforts, but Japanese successes forced them to accommodate the new rulers, whom they persuaded to withdraw from the Shan States of eastern Burma in return for an oath of loyalty. Many fought alongside the Allies, but Shan engaged with both sides, seeking primarily to preserve their own security and autonomy. They emerged from war with a keen awareness of vulnerability; after four years of suffering, the Shan political scientist and activist Chao Tzang Yawnghwe wrote, they "were determined not to become anyone's dependents or subjects."[10]

Kachin in Burma's north and northeast hills were historically pro-British, having links with the British Frontier Service, Christian missionaries, and the British Army. Many men were already serving in regular units at the start of war. Home-based resistance grew as Japanese patrols violently intruded on their territory. Kachin mounted their own guerrilla activity and worked with Allied special operations, notably British SOE and Northern Kachin Levies, and US Detachment 101. By war's end a large proportion of the community, some twelve to thirteen thousand Kachin, were fighting; boys as young as ten or twelve guided foreign guerrillas through familiar territory. In the last phases of war, Kachin joined Allied armies pushing the enemy south. They served largely as scouts and irregulars, but also played a role in the Battle of Myitkyina (March–August 1944), the culminating battle of the Japanese retreat from northern Burma.[11]

Kachin aid to Allies was widespread and consistent. Running one of the first Chindit expeditions, Bernard Fergusson found protection, material help, and accurate intelligence on enemy movements in every Kachin village. Detachment 101 depended on leaders like Zhing Htaw Naw, praised as having "the 'courage and cunning of a tiger,'" who commanded 150 guerrillas supplied and trained by the American unit. Kachin women also supported the resistance, though less is recorded about their activities. Hka Shan Rawng, whose brother was killed by the Japanese, cut her hair short and fought with a levy company until she was disenrolled after a medical examination revealed her secret.[12]

For their part, the Japanese at first saw Kachin as potential allies, but that faded as war went on. When Sergeant Tokuhei Miura's platoon ran a reconnaissance mission in Kachin territory in early 1943, he thought the Kachin did not see them as enemies and were willing to fight the English. But at the Battle of Myitkyina in March 1944, Miura experienced a horrifying atrocity when his commander blamed local people for colluding with the enemy and Muira was forced to take part in a mass execution of villagers, a massacre that stunned and distressed him.[13]

Chin Hills. Japanese generals saw the roadless Chin Hills of Burma's northwest highlands as an impassible barrier, delaying their invasion of India but also protecting them from British attack, until the first Chindit expedition from India struck behind their lines and showed that the mountains could be crossed. The IJA's subsequent decision to push the offensive to India through Chin territory in 1943–1944 made the region a battlefield en route to the pivotal contest at Imphal-Kohima.[14]

A close look shows how Chins fought on their home territory.[15] After the British retreat, only one regular unit remained in the Chin Hills: the Chin Hills Battalion of the Burma Frontier Force, consisting of about 1,300 men. To build defenses, the deputy commissioner declared a levy and called on local civilians to enlist (at the April 1942 meeting with Norman Kelly described in chapter 2). Levies were structured "with an eye to tribal custom"; that is, with men protecting their own villages. Until supply lines were established, levies used their own rifles, some of them antique flintlocks, or made do with makeshift weapons. Their role was harassment and ambush; they were not expected to engage in intensive combat. Meanwhile, the British began building a road into the Chin Hills from their base in Imphal (chapter 10). The road allowed a British Army division to occupy Tedim, a Chin village along a six-thousand-foot-high ridge, overwhelming the 150 villagers with "four mule companies, a mounted reconnaissance regiment, jeeps, ponies and carriers." They held Tedim

from November 1943 until forced to withdraw in March 1944 ahead of a Japanese advance that brought shelling and combat right into Chin villages.[16]

With little manpower and light weapons, stopping the IJA was impossible, but defenders had the advantage of intimate knowledge of terrain and a tradition of warfare. Lieutenant Colonel Lewis Balfour Oatts, a British officer with Chin Levies, describes creating a line of defense when the IJA neared Haka lands. Some two thousand men immediately responded when he called out the levies, spread over 150 miles. Oatts described Hakas as "good fighting men" and "the most battle-worthy natives I have ever met" but lamented that they were "quite untrained and undisciplined." As he got to know them, he saw that the way they fought was shaped by local history rather than abstract rules. "In the defence of their territory the Hakas had many generations of experience behind them, and accordingly knew where to go and what to do without my telling them. I had picked out the features of tactical importance on the map, but the Hakas knew them already."[17]

British forces planned a fighting retreat toward India, drawing the Japanese to Imphal, where—hampered by a long supply line—they would be vulnerable. As the British withdrew, they evacuated villages, destroying food stores and livestock to deny them to the enemy. Villagers fled into the forest, or if they stayed, faced Japanese demands for food and labor (chapter 8). Levy officers came to expect "piecemeal defection" during the withdrawal, as soldiers left to protect their families. Even as British-led units retreated, some chiefs had already established contact with the advancing Japanese.[18]

Some 1,200 Chin Levies with twenty officers continued to operate behind enemy lines, supported by villagers until air drops could be set up.[19] One who stayed behind was the man Norman Kelly called "the most famous" "cloak and dagger boy" of Z Force, Major Sam Newland, son of a Chin mother and British father. He had served as a sergeant in the Indian Defence Force, studied forestry at Edinburgh University, and joined the Burma Forest Service before enlisting in Z Force and returning to the Chin Hills in October 1943. Newland was widely known, making it easy for him to recruit an intelligence network and encourage resistance despite enemy pursuit. For his work during the war, he was awarded the DSO (Distinguished Service Order). Other individual Chins were also recognized: for example, Zahu, a village headman who recruited 250 villagers for British levies and fought with them, was awarded an MBE and a Burma Gallantry medal.[20]

After successful invasion of the Chin Hills, the IJA, supported by the Indian National Army (INA), established divisional headquarters at Tedim. The Japanese established their own Chin Defence Army of about two hundred men,

ran an intelligence service, and appointed local officials. Some joined the new order willingly, even deserting the Chin Hills Battalion to serve the IJA; some remained neutral; others used the cover of collaboration to protect Chins and feed information back to the British. Vum Ko Hau (who had worked for Norman Kelly) and Pau Za Kam (headman of Tedim) both held senior positions in the Chin Defence Army and worked at Japanese headquarters, but at the same time communicated with British-run Chin Levies and their own Chin resistance organizations.[21]

By mid-1944, as manpower demands for the invasion of India pressured the Japanese, conditions in the Chin Hills deteriorated and resistance flared. Even villagers who had not supported the levies began to rebel as the tide turned.[22] After defeat at Imphal-Kohima, surviving IJA and INA troops escaped through the Chin Hills to the Burma plains, pursued by British forces—a horrific retreat during monsoon season that caused tens of thousands of casualties, not only from combat but also from illness and starvation. As villages were recaptured, civilians returned from forest shelters and refugee camps. By mid-November 1944, the Chin Hills was declared free of Japanese, and most levies went home, though some continued alongside the regular army.[23]

In lowland Burma, Aung San and other nationalist leaders shifted their stance near the end of the war to build a new anti-Japanese coalition, reaching out to groups who had been fighting them all along. The BIA—which had cooperated with the IJA and even attacked and occupied Karen and highland areas—turned against the Japanese in March 1945 and helped force them out of Rangoon by May. But Karens and hill tribes did not forget the behavior of Burmese allied with and supported by Japanese power, and it solidified their resistance to lowland domination (chapter 11).

Nagas and the battles of Kohima and Imphal. The war first affected Nagas when the 1942 retreat of British and Chinese armies from Burma to India precipitated a flood of refugees across the border, causing food shortages and disease, including a dystentery epidemic that killed thousands of Nagas. Local people joined in to help with the emergency, building camps and evacuating the ill or wounded.[24] Their crucial role, though, came two years later in the Imphal-Kohima battles.

In December 1942, Ursula Graham Bower set up the V Force network of Naga and Kuki scouts watching the border for the first signs of invasion. This unit, run by the so-called “Queen of the Nagas,” became one of the most widely told stories of the war.[25] After eighteen months of vigilance, they reported sighting fifty enemy soldiers in March 1944. Bower recalls that she and her 150 scouts

were armed only with "one Service rifle, one single-barrelled shotgun, and seventy muzzleloaders." V Force sent more weapons and supplies, with orders to report as long as possible. The group set up beacons and runners, and for three weeks lived ready to flee at any moment.[26] The border intrusion was the start of the linked battles of Imphal and Kohima (March–July 1944), the turning point of the war in Southeast Asia. Imphal, Manipur's capital, lies in the Manipur River Valley south of the Naga Hills. Kohima, northwest of Imphal, lay on the main supply route for Allied forces at Imphal. The sprawling battle stretched across Indigenous homelands along the Burma-India border. It was close and hard-fought, with heavy losses on both sides.[27]

The smaller battle of Kohima, which more directly affected Naga people, lasted sixty-four days. A Naga village was situated adjacent to Kohima, and Naga (and other) villages occupied nearby hills. Because of the long history of interclan conflict, hill tribe villages were sited and built with attention to defense (ditches, walls, narrow approaches, and clear fields of fire). This made many of them tactical goals, destroyed as they were fought over. Both armies also got food from villages, used them to house wounded, and sought labor and information from residents. Japanese were at a disadvantage, since they were strangers and had to rely on English-language phrasebooks to communicate. The British benefited from long-standing personal relationships, especially on the part of Deputy Commissioner Charles Pawsey, who was well known among local Nagas.[28]

Naga help was essential to the British for combat, for labor, and for intelligence. Among regular troops at Kohima and surrounding areas were Nagas, along with men from other hill tribes. Naga Havildar [sergeant] Sohevu Angami recalls that he first became aware of the enemy's arrival when a Kuki comrade was shot. Hill tribe men enlisted in the First Assam Regiment, Assam Rifles, Naga Levies, and other units received many military citations including Military Crosses. Civilian Nagas also fought, ambushing Japanese foraging parties and other soldiers. Hundreds of men and women did military labor—often under fire—digging trenches, evacuating wounded, carrying supplies, interpreting, and guiding patrols. Hilly terrain limited the use of vehicles, requiring mules and human carriers along with air drops. Though they were noncombatants, carriers and guides were in the line of fire, and were killed, shot, beaten, and robbed of their loads by Japanese patrols.[29]

Naga police constables and civilians also contributed valuable intelligence, evaluating routes for marches and supplementing patrol reports. Pawsey several times argued against acting on official intelligence when local people were giving

him different, more accurate information. Nagas could infiltrate Japanese lines, and several conducted dangerous spying missions. Perhaps most surprising to the British, they did this work consistently despite the dangers of combat and the threat of Japanese reprisals and did not ask for—and often refused—payment.[30]

What of those who did not support the Allies? Guite reminds us that the "dominant historiography" of tribes loyally aiding the British needs to be corrected, especially regarding Kuki, who were hostile to the colonial regime before, during, and after the war. Many who at first joined V Force, Chin Hills Battalions, or other Allied units eventually left or shifted to fight with the IJA or INA.[31] British officers spoke of cooperation with Japanese as "treachery" or "pusillanimous conduct" or "giving in" or playing a "double game,"[32] but as we saw in chapter 2, Indigenous communities pursued their own goals. Hill tribes in Burma and Northeast India were (and are) consistently seeking autonomy.

Battlefield Islands

The Indigenous peoples of the islands of the Southwest Pacific, Southeast Asia, and the Central Pacific occupied three different theaters of war. In August 1942, the Allied counterattack on Japanese-held areas in the Southwest Pacific began with the Battle of Guadalcanal and moved through the Solomon Islands and New Guinea. In island Southeast Asia (including Timor, Borneo, and the Philippines), Allied guerrillas mounted anti-Japanese resistance in anticipation of eventual counterinvasion. The US Navy-led Central Pacific offensive began with the recapture of the Gilbert Islands in November 1943, followed by attacks on Japan's Micronesian territories. Few Micronesians were engaged in military roles, but in the Southwest Pacific and Southeast Asian islands both sides enlisted Islanders for war.

New Guinea: Soldiers and Carriers

Japan attacked the Southwest Pacific simultaneously with assaults on Southeast Asia. The islands were scarcely defended; the January 1942 invasion was swift and overwhelming. Nearly all civilian Europeans fled, and the small Australian infantry and police detachments were immediately overrun or disbanded for their own safety.[33] Japanese forces sped through the Bismarck Archipelago and the northern Solomon Islands (New Britain, Bougainville, and nearby islands), landing in March along New Guinea's north coast at Salamaua, Lae, and Finschhafen, and in Dutch New Guinea. Tens of thousands of troops and workers built Rabaul (New Britain) into a major air and naval base.

But the southward rush proved too great a reach; by mid-1942 the tide began to turn. The Battle of the Coral Sea (May 1942) blocked Japan from naval



MAP 3.1. The Pacific Islands. Reproduced with permission.

invasion of Port Moresby, and Allies repulsed landings at Buna and Milne Bay in battles that lasted through the rest of the year. The main link across the Owen Stanley Range of eastern New Guinea was the Kokoda Trail, a steep track that became a war zone from July–November 1942 as Australian forces repelled Japanese efforts to reach Port Moresby by land. By late 1942, the Japanese were in retreat. Most of New Guinea remained in Allied control, though combat continued on the north coast and on some islands for the next three years, trapping civilians between shifting front lines (chapter 8). In March 1942, Papua and New Guinea civil affairs were merged under the Australian military government as ANGAU (Australian New Guinea Administrative Unit), which managed labor and production for the war effort. The Allied cause strengthened as American industry funnelled resources into the area. Japanese supply lines, in contrast, were strangled by US Navy control of sealanes. Troops were forced to reduce rations drastically, then to survive on their own, planting gardens and living on what they could extract from local villages.

Japan sent more than three hundred thousand men to New Guinea and nearby islands, where over half died, more from sickness and starvation than combat.[34] At least a million Americans and nearly half a million Australians, as well as New Zealanders, Dutch, Fijians, Tongans, and others made up the Allied forces in the region. (Australians were the major presence in Papua and New Guinea, with US bases and operations along the coast and dominating the Solomon Islands campaign.) They were also helped by Islanders in combat roles.

Unlike men in Burma or other Southeast Asian colonies, Papua and New Guinea men had not been recruited into imperial armies before the war, but they had been enlisted as police. The Royal Papuan Constabulary (RPC), initially dissolved in the face of invasion, was soon reconstituted, first for policing in non-combat areas but later also as combat infantry, scouts, and spies. Some three thousand policemen took on military roles and another 955 were medical orderlies, winning both military and civilian awards for bravery and service.[35]

The Papuan Infantry Battalion (PIB) was founded in 1940 as a unit of the Australian Army. Colonial whites and the civil administration had initially resisted enlisting Indigenous men for combat, due both to racist devaluation of their capacity and fear that it would be harder to control a trained and armed population after the war.[36] Despite such opposition, combat units were formed, and many Islanders served with valor. PIB were among the first Allied troops to encounter the Japanese and fought alongside Australians in Kokoda and later campaigns.[37] PIB success led to the formation of two New Guinea Infantry Battalions (NGIB), which were combined with PIB in November 1944 as the Pacific Islands Regiment (PIR). More than 3,500 Papua and New Guinea men served in

the PIR, earning a reputation as skilled and effective fighters. But enlistees also experienced and protested discrimination in rations, uniforms, pay, and pensions, and discipline problems contributed to PIR demobilization at the end of the war.[38]

These units worked primarily at patrolling or ambushing and harassing the enemy, often in association with Australians or Americans. PIR received eleven battle honors along with many awards for individual servicemen, a number of whom took on dangerous tasks entering Japanese areas disguised as civilians. Lance Corporal Bengari, for instance, masqueraded as a porter to report details of military dispositions in Salamaua. Bengari later received a Military Medal after a second undercover reconnaissance. Sergeant William Matpi became well known for his combat abilities; his Distinguished Conduct Medal citation indicated that he had personally killed more than one hundred Japanese.[39]

Japanese commanders also recruited, trained, and deployed Islanders in military units and used them as guides, scouts, and informants. Impressive early victories and local resentment of European rule won them support, notably in northeastern New Guinea and parts of Bougainville. After the Allies gained strength, though, more village leaders cooperated with them or requested arms to mount their own anti-Japanese guerrilla activity.[40]

Among those best known for assisting Allies was Paramount Luluai (chief) Golpak of New Britain, who, at great personal cost, ran an escape line for downed airmen and protected European coastwatchers. One of them recalled Golpak reassuring him, "I've got the Japanese captain in my pocket and there's no need to worry about them." But conditions grew more dangerous. At one point, "Golpak fled into the bush with two airmen he was sheltering. His loyal followers were tortured and killed, his son-in-law Bubu executed, his daughter Nowamon raped and Pamar was appointed to his office. Yet he never lost his nerve, kept ahead of his hunters and continued to exert influence over his people on behalf of the Australians."[41] Some double agents survived for long periods, like Kiroro on north Bougainville, who "became the confidant of the Japanese commander" and forwarded information to the Allies for three years. Reverend Usaia Sotutu, a Fijian missionary who had lived for twenty years on Bougainville, refused a Japanese offer of safe conduct, sent his wife and children to safety, and risked his life to assist the Allies.[42]

The largest use of New Guinea's people was not as soldiers or spies, but as military porters. Historians at the time, and increasingly since, recognize supply carriers as key in enabling Allied forces to fight and move across difficult terrain lacking transportation infrastructure. Japanese operations, in contrast, came to be limited by a lack of such support.[43] Japan brought tens of thousands of recruited and forced laborers and POWs to New Guinea, but this could not

FIGURE 3.1. Soldiers of the New Guinea Infantry Battalion crossing stream in New Guinea en route to attacking a Japanese position, July 1945. (Australian War Memorial, Ref. No. 018919, photographer Terry Gibson).

compensate for a lack of local labor for tactical moves, which became one cause of military failure. (Wartime labor is described more fully in chapter 9.)

Carrying to the front lines was the most dangerous work, apart from that of scouts, guides, and soldiers themselves. The job entailed hauling food, ammunition, and other supplies, evacuating wounded, and much other labor—in the battle of Sanananda in late 1942, porters hauled tanks across creeks in the swampy ground. Among the more than two thousand deaths of Allied laborers in New Guinea, at least forty-six were killed by enemy fire, and ninety-one were wounded. Several men acting as "boss boys" of carrier lines received Loyal Service Medals.[44] When they could, carriers fled danger, escapes that military reports characterized as "desertions," but porters in combat zones inevitably came under fire. In a January 1943 Australian raid on Mubo in northeastern New Guinea, the officer responsible for the four hundred porters supporting three hundred Australian soldiers objected to taking them close to the fighting. The commander's response: "They'll have to stay."[45]

Solomon Islands: Coastwatchers and Battles

Most of the European administrators, planters, and missionaries in the British Solomon Islands Protectorate evacuated in the face of invasion, but Resident Commissioner William Marchant and five other officials stayed, recruiting a network to report enemy movements. The local constabulary, hastily formed into the Solomon Islands Defence Force (SIDF), at first with fewer than two hundred men, scattered to their homes, joined the coastwatchers, or went into hiding on the island of Malaita, which became the center of Marchant's phantom government and an SIDF training site.[46]

The Japanese took the colonial capital of Tulagi and north Guadalcanal in early May 1942 and remained unopposed for more than three months. They established the new order quickly, contacting headmen, claiming victory, and promising rewards while demanding labor. Despite intense pursuit, coastwatchers ran an effective clandestine intelligence system.[47] In New Georgia, New Britain, and the Solomons, about a thousand Islanders operated under mostly European leaders who depended on local people for supplies, spying, and scouting, and—vitally—to protect them from discovery. As Marchant commented, "Clearly, if the natives were to prove disloyal, the whole project was suicidal."[48] Training scouts in surveillance and combat was straightforward—many had been policemen—though limited by lack of weapons until they could capture more. Civilians, especially village headmen, also supplied information and other

support. Women took part in close-to-home action; for example, keeping a Japanese patrol busy with a meal while alerting nearby scouts.[49]

Many stories recount Islanders' bravery in infiltrating Japanese activities. One scout described a landing party's equipment in such detail that he was asked how he did it: "I wanted to know exactly what they'd got, so I helped them unload it." Steven Vinale Zaku describes a ruse in which a few men would don tattered clothes and pretend to encounter Japanese by accident, chatting with them until they got the information they wanted. Gumu, a scout with Martin Clemens, took subterfuge further, going to work for a Japanese officer so he could steal a charging motor needed for Clemens's radio. On Santa Isabel, headman Mostyn Kiokilo of Buala village repeatedly visited the Japanese base at Suavana to offer fruits and vegetables (wearing a coconut-frond visor and a loincloth, pretending not to speak English), established friendly relations with the commander, and brought back reports that identified bombing targets. Scouts could also use apparent civilian roles for sabotage, as when a man sent to work as a porter for the Japanese "accidentally" smashed a radio he was carrying. Still, not all coastwatcher-Islander interactions were heroic or even cooperative. District Officer and SIDF Major Donald Kennedy was famously harsh to his men, and civilians' willingness to help varied, with some showing hostility and looting coastwatchers' supply caches.[50]

Japanese occupation forces also built intelligence networks, run by military police, but lacked the advantages of local familiarity and shared language. The longer the Japanese remained in control with no sign of a military response, and the more effectively they cultivated good relations, the harder it was for Allied agents to operate.[51] People living near Japanese bases got to know the men stationed there. When a plane ditched near Baolo village on Santa Isabel, James Sao and others hosted the crew overnight, then paddled them back to the Suavana base, where the Japanese filled their two canoes with food, clothing, and other gifts. Sao and others visited the base several times, noting that "The Japanese were good people too. They didn't make all sorts of trouble. They were just young men."[52]

Yet overall, most Solomon Islanders assisted the Allies, increasingly so after offensives began and Allied strength became evident. The Battle for Guadalcanal was the first major counteroffensive. It began with eleven thousand US Marines landing on Guadalcanal and Tulagi on August 7, 1942, and grew to a massive engagement, killing 23,800 Japanese and 1,660 Americans, and eventually sending more than 124,000 Americans to the islands. Solomon Islanders were involved with this battle from its start. Three young men who had been at school in Fiji volunteered to accompany Americans ashore. Martin Clemens came in from his coastwatching post to join the US Marine beachhead at Lunga and was given the job of organizing scouts and guides. At one point, he and his

men were issued weapons and ordered into the defense line, but for the most part they operated outside the perimeter, scouting, guiding US Marine and Army patrols, and ambushing small parties of Japanese.[53]

As in all wars, much bravery was anonymous, but a few men became known heroes. The most famous Solomon Islander scout was Sergeant Major (later Sir) Jacob Vouza, a policeman who had retired in early 1941, but offered his services when war broke out, joining the SIDF. Working under Clemens, Vouza organized scouts in his home area on Guadalcanal. He was awarded the British George Medal and American Silver Star after being captured and tortured by Japanese to reveal the positions of American troops, which he refused to do. He freed himself and despite grievous wounds returned to US lines, offering valuable intelligence to the Marines.[54] A statue memorializing him stands in the capital of Honiara (chapter 13).

The SIDF—eventually enlisting more than eight hundred men—expanded into what Americans called the South Pacific Scouts, technically a British unit including British, New Zealand, Fijian, Tongan, and Solomon Islands soldiers working with US forces throughout the Southwest Pacific campaign.[55]

In *Bikfala Faet/The Big Death,* a dual-language collection of oral histories, several SIDF men tell their stories, including George Maelalo of Malaita. He joined the SIDF at the age of eighteen, and with twenty-two other Solomon Islands men trained with Fiji Commandos on Guadalcanal, then took part in landings on New Georgia and Bougainville. Only seven of the twenty-three survived to return home. Maelalo recounts his naïveté at the start of war when the district officer recruited him along with a friend, Frank Maomaasi (who was later killed). He describes the hard work of training, the fear and novelty of war, conditions of camp and battle. "It was a good life in some ways; very bad in other ways." When two men (Lio from Ulawa, Selo from Kawara'ae) died in a night bombing, the others were called to see their bodies; "One by one we said, 'What can I say? I may be next.' We said, 'Let us bury them. That is all we can do.'" On Bougainville, Maelalo took on a dangerous mission to disable a Japanese radio installation—an effort in which US and Australian soldiers had already been killed: "one day some men came to camp and asked if anyone wanted to volunteer to go up there, to give his life to save us. I thought, 'My goodness, the Australians have gone the Americans have gone. What good can we Solomon Islanders do? Now we must represent ourselves in the face of this challenge.'" Maelalo volunteered and succeeded. After three years of fighting, he returned home, but like other combat veterans, he did not easily leave the war behind. He found it hard to adjust to life in his village, and became a seaman, a career he pursued for the next eighteen years.[56]

Southeast Asia Battlefield Islands

The islands of Southeast Asia, from the Philippines west to Sumatra, include some three hundred ethnic groups, among them many tribal peoples in island interiors who, at the time, were only marginally linked with Dutch, British, Portuguese, or American colonial authority. Japanese occupiers sought to absorb the majority populations of these islands into the empire through Japanization programs, integrating local elites and labor into the war effort. Some nationalist leaders resisted the Japanese, as they had resisted other foreign control; others saw collaboration as a route to independence. But Japanese power seldom reached far into the interior mountains and forests where many Indigenous groups lived. Here, Allies tried to build covert intelligence and guerrilla networks, with varying success.[57]

Philippines. The Philippine Islands, a US possession since 1898, was transitioning to independence when war began. The archipelago held a majority Filipino population and many small-scale tribal communities, most in the mountainous interiors of larger islands. Unlike the hill tribes of Burma and India, recruited for British military service, Indigenous men had not been recruited by the United States (though Filipinos had been). But they were affected by more than four centuries of conflict: the Spanish conquest of the islands, the Spanish-American war, the US war against Filipino independence (1899–1902), and ongoing opposition to central government. In these wars, the interiors of the larger islands served as a refuge and support system for resisters.

Japan attacked the Philippines on December 8, 1941. The joint Filipino-American Army fought until defeat at Corregidor the following May. Japanese occupation, lasting to July 1945, focused on urban and heavily populated areas. The hard-to-access island interiors became sites of anti-Japanese activity by Allied guerrillas (Americans, Filipinos, Australians) and Communists (Hukbalahap), and also of raids by "bandits" and by mountain tribes with their own goals.[58] Occupation forces in turn used local antagonisms, persuasion, threats, and eventually intimidation, torture, and execution to pursue guerrillas.

Memoirs of US officers describe how, at the start of Japanese occupation, Americans and Filipinos who escaped into the hills found safety with tribal communities. For the most part guerrilla leaders worked with Filipino troops, but some recruited and fought with Indigenous men. US Army Lieutenant Donald Blackburn and Major Russ Volckmann in late 1942 made their way (with the help of Igorot guides) to Ifugao province, "headhunter country," where they got help from "native chiefs" such as Timicpao and Kimayong to set up a guerilla

network. Henry Clay Conner lived with Agta ("Negritos") for nearly three years and organized a unit of several hundred guerrillas. Australian Major Rex Blow and US Army Lieutenant Colonel Wendell Fertig worked with Moros, Moslem groups in the southern Philippines.[59]

Like Burma, the Philippines had had an independence movement for decades before World War II. Some Filipinos saw collaboration with Japan as a path to that goal, while some minorities saw loyalty to the United States as a way to protect themselves against domination by the Filipino majority. The occupiers faced a confused situation, unsure whom to trust or how to set up army and police forces without indirectly arming anti-Japanese guerrillas.[60] As an example of the complexity, historian Yoshiaki Yoshimi tells the story of Akiyoshi Fujioka, a member of a six-thousand-man force sent to the island of Jolo in October 1944 to confront the American army, but also facing Moro people defending their homes with US-supplied weapons. Moro might be represented in history books as anti-Japanese or as pro-Japanese, but it would be more accurate to say they sought freedom from any outside power.[61] They had fought the Spanish; they fought the Americans; they fought the Japanese; and today they continue to fight control by Manila.

Borneo. Japan conquered Borneo in its rapid offensive of December 1941–January 1942. The IJA occupied British areas in the north of the island, and the Japanese Navy set up a civil administration in southern Borneo (part of the Netherlands East Indies), supported by those who saw them as liberators from Dutch rule. The north saw greater resistance, including an October 1943 revolt by Chinese and Indigenous groups, followed by deadly reprisals and tightened security. Among the occupation government's civil defense plans was a North Borneo Volunteer Corps that recruited more than a thousand youths from various tribes for a two-year training course. Dayaks in particular were recruited for policing and intelligence work. But Japanese power did not extend far into Borneo's interior, where Allied agents, parachuted in and supplied by air, built a resistance network.[62]

One of the best-known guerrilla operations was Major Tom Harrisson's Z Force that recruited a thousand Dayaks, Ibans, Tagals, Muruts, and others, part of a wider behind-the-lines effort in interior Sarawak (northwest Borneo) in 1945, in preparation for the Australian invasion of June.[63] The more the Japanese occupation authorities alienated the tribes by demanding supplies and limiting trade, the more willing Ibans and others were to join the resistance. The usual stereotypes attended these fighters: that they were individualistic, difficult to control, "untrustworthy"—all, historian Alan Powell says, characteristics

needed for effective guerrilla warfare. True, untrained tribesmen fled in the face of a firefight, but their own tactics of felling trees on passing boats or picking off patrols with poison darts were effective and their local knowledge was invaluable.[64] Borneo's interior tribes are among the most visible Indigenous combatants in English-language war reporting; chapter 7 considers why foreigners found them fascinating.

Sakhalin Island and War's End

Perhaps the last place where front lines crossed Indigenous homelands was the island of Sakhalin on the contested USSR-Japan border. The USSR declared war on Japan on August 8, 1945, and three days later launched a massive land, sea, and air offensive. The invasion of Sakhalin overwhelmed the unprepared Japanese, who surrendered on August 23. Most inhabitants were repatriated to Japan over the next years, but Ainu, Nivkh, and Uilta were, of course, already at home, and those who remained faced dramatic changes under Soviet collectivization and assimilationist policies as Sakhalin was integrated into the USSR (chapter 11).[65]

While Ainu served in regular forces, Japan classified men of smaller Indigenous groups as "natives" (not citizens, therefore not subject to conscription), but both Japan and the USSR used them to patrol along the border.[66] A Uilta man named Dahinien Gendanu, born in 1926 in southern Sakhalin, was called up for Japan's secret service in August 1942. Overjoyed at becoming a Japanese soldier, he served loyally in challenging missions on the border, sometimes against other Uilta. Despite their service, Tokyo declared these recruits not officially Japanese, ineligible for evacuation when the USSR occupied Sakhalin. Soviets arrested Uilta and Nivkh men for "espionage" and sent them to labor camps, where some forty to fifty died. Surviving prisoners were only gradually repatriated—some not until twenty years later. After more than seven years as a Soviet POW, Gendanu arrived in Japan in 1955, but Tokyo rejected his application for a military pension, saying he had been a civilian employee, not a Japanese soldier.[67]

Throughout war zones, Indigenous military roles in their own territory ranged from enlistment in regular forces, to portering during battles, to unofficial use of civilians as spies. But this is only part of the story of Indigenous combat. In the global strategy of war, thousands of Indigenous men, like Joseph Medicine Crow, whose story is told in the next chapter, spent their formative years fighting or working far from home.

CHAPTER 4

War Far from Home

Serving Abroad

SOMEWHERE IN GERMANY, EARLY spring, 1945. A young Crow (Apsáalooke) infantryman and his unit pursued a group of mounted SS officers to a farmhouse where the Germans pastured their horses for the night. Early the next morning, as they prepared to attack the farmhouse, the Native American soldier proposed freeing the horses so the enemy couldn't use them to escape. Choosing a tall sorrel for himself, Joseph Medicine Crow led the little herd into nearby woods, where he couldn't resist circling around the stolen horses, singing a Crow praise song.[1]

Indigenous soldiers like Joseph Medicine Crow were not unique in serving far from home. The war moved millions of troops and laborers around the world. In this chapter, we look at fighting abroad from two perspectives. First, for Native North Americans, combat in foreign battlefields publicized their patriotism and fulfilled their own traditions. Second, the service of Indigenous troops in British, French, and Japanese imperial forces committed them further to the central government, while also highlighting their distinctiveness.

First Nations and Native Americans Serving Abroad

All Canadian Indian men were liable for conscription, but the wording of treaties meant that certain groups were exempt from overseas posting. Nonetheless, many First Nations and Métis (Indigenous Canadians of Native and European descent) did serve abroad in both Asian and European theaters, and more than two hundred died in the war. They won praise from commanding officers and awards for valor. Among the best known was Thomas George Prince, of the Brokenhead Band of Manitoba, who was awarded a Military Medal for action at Anzio beachhead and a US Silver Star in southern France.[2]

In the United States, Native American servicemen were posted overseas as a matter of course. Of the roughly twenty-five thousand who served in World War II, five hundred were killed in action and more than seven hundred were wounded. Several held high rank, including Major General Clarence L. Tinker (Osage), a bomber pilot killed in action at Midway, and Admiral Joseph J. Clark (Cherokee), who commanded aircraft carriers in the Pacific. US Marine Ira Hayes (Pima, Akimel O'odham) served in Vella Lavella and Bougainville and was one of the men in the famous photograph of the flag raising at Iwo Jima. American Indians received at least seventy-one Air Medals, thirty-four Distinguished Flying Crosses, fifty-one Silver Stars, forty-seven Bronze Stars (Joseph Medicine Crow received one of them), and five Medals of Honor—three earned in Italy and two in the Pacific War.[3]

Though fighting abroad, these servicemen saw themselves as defending their homelands. Native American patriotism has a territorial focus, made explicit by Utah Shoshone when they passed a tribal resolution to defend their country—but not Europe—in the event of foreign invasion.[4] Peter MacDonald (later Navajo tribal chairman) recalled Marine boot camp talks directed at Navajo recruits: if the Japanese come over here, you'll have to fight on your home ground, wouldn't you rather fight them overseas? "Naturally we didn't want to bring the war home to our families. It was better to be a part of the military, to travel across the ocean, to hunt the Japanese away from our land. Thus the white man's war became our war as well."[5]

Though Native North Americans shared the fight with fellow citizens, their view of war was distinctive. Medicine Crow's memoir, *Counting Coup,* recounts how his community interpreted his experiences. At the welcome dance following his discharge in 1946, elders asked him to recite his actions in Europe. After recounting how he led a party to retrieve boxes of dynamite, disarmed a German soldier in hand-to-hand combat, and stole horses, the elders explained the significance of these coups and declared him a war chief. He was given a new name and an honor song, linking him with past and future generations of Crow warriors.[6]

Ceremonial Support, Continuity, and Renewal

Songs, ceremonies, prayers, and dances sent recruits to war, protected them while they were gone, and welcomed them back, renewing generational links and traditional practices. Before they left home, Canadian Indians from the Prairie provinces sought advice and blessings from World War I veterans who had served abroad. Navajo servicemen were sent off with a Blessing Way ceremony, and Ojibwe (Anishinaabe) with Spring Drum gatherings. War inhibited

some ceremonial life because of the shortage of men at home, but it could also increase religious activity, as when Zuni officials used the draft classification 4-D (for clergy-in-training) to request deferments for men who then took on permanent ritual duties.[7]

Many Native Americans carried protective amulets, corn pollen, tobacco, peyote, or medicine bundles into battle; they offered prayers and reflected on prophetic dreams; they used war cries and battle paint in combat.[8] Others followed Christian practice, or mixed Christian and traditional ways. Journalist Ernie Pyle reported Indians improvising ceremonial dances before the Okinawa invasion; a Navajo man was then reassured by a rainbow arcing over the convoy. Before landing at Peleliu, Navajo codetalker Joe Hosteen Kelwood recalled that his uncle had advised him to offer pollen to the Pacific Ocean, "Mama Water," who would protect him. Worried the commander would refuse permission, he hid the pollen in chewing gum and spat it into the sea as he boarded a landing craft.[9]

Joseph Medicine Crow was raised as a Christian, "But I still believed in traditional sources of spiritual power," which he called on during the war—like a special eagle feather he inherited. "Before a battle, I would put the feather inside my helmet. In addition to carrying the feather, I recited certain prayers and painted myself with a red lightning streak and red ring. . . . When I was under fire, I felt much better because of my special spiritual 'medicine.'" He passed the feather to a cousin, a B-25 machine-gunner who carried it in Africa and Europe, and a Crow soldier later took it to Korea.[10]

Chester Nez's memoir *Code Talker* recalls how Navajo beliefs infused his war experience as a US Marine. As the chaplain blessed the men on deck before the Guadalcanal landing, Nez held a small buckskin medicine bag his father had sent him and said his own prayer: "I pinched some corn pollen from my medicine bag, touched my tongue, my head, and gestured to the east, south, west, and north, then tucked the bag back into the pants pocket of my fatigues." He kept his medicine bag in his pocket during the horrific landing: "Navajo belief forbids contact with the dead, but we waded through floating bodies, intent on not becoming one of them. *Close your mind,* I told myself. I tried not to think about all those dead men, their *chindí* [dangerous spirits] violently released from this life. *I am a Marine. Marines move forward.* I tried to make myself numb."[11] Non-religious customs also comforted. Medicine Crow's mother sent pemmican to him in Germany, and Nez describes Navajo buddies making fry bread on Guam, melting lard in a helmet over a butane stove.[12]

Like Native Americans, other Indigenous men took their culture into combat. Ainu soldiers carried talismans, made by relatives and imbued with prayers,

made of a fox tooth and of mountain-elm barkcloth rubbed with ashes from the fireplace. An Ainu woman named Beramonkoro Sunamura said, "'When my son left home to serve in that horrible war, he put a small inau [a wooden staff with attached curled shavings] that his father made for him into a little sack. He carried it on his person all through the war and he, too, returned home unharmed, one of the only three survivors of his troop.'"[13] Some Siberian Orochen reindeer herders credit their survival to performing rituals at a special rock art site before joining the Soviet Army. Māori Battalion chaplains as well as soldiers used traditional prayers and rituals on the battlefield and after returning home.[14]

Homecoming feasts, dances, and ritual also renewed war-related traditions. Memoirs by Joseph Medicine Crow, Brummett Echohawk (Pawnee), and Hollis Stabler (Omaha, Umonhon) describe ceremonies in which they received new honor names. Some returnees felt (or their families and communities felt) the need for purification. Zuni men were cleansed with cedar bark at the edge of the reservation; one veteran's mother, meeting him in Gallup, refused to touch him until he had undergone the ritual. The importance of ritual for reintegrating combat veterans seems clear, but in that era of strong assimilationist pressure it also showed commitment to one's culture.[15]

Chester Nez spent five months in a naval hospital in San Francisco with what would today be diagnosed as PTSD. As he put it, "The war had climbed inside my head." At home on the reservation, he was disturbed by memories, especially of the Japanese corpses he had waded through in the bloody surf of island invasions. To restore balance, his family arranged an Enemy Way, designed for those who had touched enemy dead. It required an item from an enemy (called a "scalp" in the ceremony), which was available because some Navajo soldiers had sent home hair or clothing from dead Japanese for such use.[16] Ceremonies were not a cure-all; many veterans rejected such traditions, others went through them only to please relatives, and the cynicism of war itself could crush beliefs; but many found them valuable.[17]

Like ceremonies in World War I, but involving many more people, World War II rites linked generations and renewed practices on the edge of loss. When, in 1942, Standing Rock Sioux held their first Battle Sun Dance in half a century, returning soldiers danced alongside veterans of older wars; the audience included Henry One Bull, who had participated in the Battle of the Little Big Horn. Kiowa men who qualified as warriors by counting coup revived moribund warrior societies. Plains women's groups held their own activities to prepare men for war, invoke sacred powers to protect them, and honor returnees. Once veterans were acknowledged as warriors, the community marked their new status in public events.[18]

Memories of World War II and commitment to tribal culture are fused in modern ceremonial. The influence of the war years can be seen today in powwows and other social events that recognize veterans, the use of flags and patriotic symbols, the popularity of war songs, and honors for men and women in current or recent military service.[19]

Public Attention to Native Service

Publicity about Native Americans' war service shaped the way fellow citizens viewed them, with media stories that highlighted both loyalty and difference. The pattern had been set in World War I, when journalists delighting in stereotypes tagged Native speakers (even those with high school or college educations) with broken English and expressed amazement at their use of modern technology—but also applauded their patriotism.[20] World War II recycled the formula, praising Indians' service while repeating hackneyed images, as in an official photo showing "Dan Waupoose, a Menominee chief, kneeling with a rifle and wearing a feathered headdress for a U.S. Navy photographer in 1943."[21] Feature stories on individuals like Sioux US Army Ranger Samuel (Sampson) One Skunk trotted out the usual clichés, but also noted his many awards, including a Silver Star and a Legion of Merit. Bill Mauldin's famous cartoons of hard-bitten GIs Willie and Joe were inspired in part by Sergeant Rayson Billey, a Choctaw in Mauldin's infantry division.[22] Canadian newspapers offered similar coverage, shifting over the war years from insulting, patronizing views of Indians to representing them as loyal, brave Canadians, offering a new image of their First Nations compatriots to a public steeped in old stereotypes.[23]

In Al Carroll's sardonic comment, "Outside of the campaign that killed Custer, no other war in American history left so many indelible images of Natives put to canny use by white propagandists."[24] Indian imagery was deliberately deployed at home and abroad, helped along by the Bureau of Indian Affairs director John Collier's desire to promote his organization.[25] Heroes like Ira Hayes and Medal of Honor recipient Ernest Childers were brought home for war bond tours. The media loved to report dances, ceremonies, and tribal "adoption" of famous outsiders—Eleanor Roosevelt, General Douglas MacArthur, Wendell Willkie, and even Josef Stalin were given tribal honors. News media publicized displays of loyalty such as Southwest tribes' agreeing to discontinue use of the traditional swastika in arts. A poster promoting the Alaska Territorial Guard (chapter 6) showed three armed men—white, Inuit, and Indian—backed by US and Alaskan flags (figure 4.1).[26] Morale-boosting publicity emphasized Native American loyalty as proof of assimilation without recognizing its other

FIGURE 4.1. "Alaska Territorial Guard," by Magnus "Rusty" Colcord Heurlin (University of Alaska Museum of the North, UA1969–007–001; gift of Senator Ernest Gruening).

meanings, as when coverage of tribal declarations of war failed to note their significance as statements of sovereignty.[27]

Elsewhere in the world, too, official publicity displayed images of Indigenous people to a public insatiable for news. Showing their integration into the war effort made two propaganda points: that even the people most marginal to the nation supported the war, and that cultural assimilation was progressing as intended. A staged photo of a women's knitting group at an Australian Aboriginal government mission encapsulated this dual message, paying tribute to the women's loyalty in knitting scarves, socks, and mittens for servicemen and also congratulating the Aborigines Welfare Board on its successful assimilation program. Similarly, a 1938 Japanese film showed Ainu women in traditional dress assembling comfort packages for soldiers alongside other patriotic Japanese women.[28]

Military and civilian leaders were quick to praise Indigenous support of the war as evidence of universal patriotism, and most thought it demonstrated a desire, or at least willingness, to be subsumed into the majority culture. This was far from the truth, as we see from how wartime confirmed and renewed tradition—and even where it was true, attitudes toward assimilation changed in postwar decades. Hoist by their own propaganda petard, nations that had benefited from the patriotism of Indigenous peoples during the war had to deal with their demands for greater equality, inclusion, and recognition after it (chapter 12).

Serving Far from Home in Imperial Forces

When Alfred "Bunty" Preece, a Chatham Islander who was the last surviving officer of the Māori Battalion, was buried in March 2018, the Italian song included at his funeral was a poignant reminder of the war's international reach.[29] New Zealanders fought for Great Britain in all theaters of war. The 28th (Māori) Battalion alone suffered 680 deaths and 1,712 wounded in overseas service. It became New Zealand's most-decorated battalion, receiving seven Distinguished Service Orders, thirteen Distinguished Conduct Medals, twenty-four Military Crosses, fifty-one Military Medals, and the first Māori Victoria Cross, awarded posthumously to Second Lieutenant Te Moananui-a-Kiwa Ngarimu for bravery against German forces in Tunisia.[30] Māori in other units also distinguished themselves. Among the best known is Porokoru Patapu (John) Pohe, a bomber pilot who flew more than twenty missions over Europe until his plane went down and he was captured. He was one of the tunnelers who took part in "The Great Escape" from Stalag Luft III in March 1944, and was among those executed by the Gestapo after being recaptured.[31]

FIGURE 4.2. Māori Battalion *haka* performed during ceremonial parade, Egypt, June 1941. Identified men are (left to right), John Manuel, Maaka White, Te Kooti Reihana, Rangi Henderson. Of these four, only Te Kooti Reihana survived the war (see Soutar 2008). (Department of Internal Affairs, War History Branch, Alexander Turnbull Library, National Library of New Zealand, Ref. No. DA-01229-F).

As we saw in chapter 2, Māori leaders' goal in supporting the war was not to further assimilation, but to bolster the struggle for autonomy. The effort, especially the achievements of the Māori Battalion, impressed the government and the public, which became familiar with its motto, "*Kia Kaha*" ("stay strong") and other Māori combat traditions. The battalion performed *haka* in formal contexts (a famous photo shows it in Egypt at a ceremony for the King of Greece, figure 4.2) and at least once in battle. Homecoming ceremonies for the battalion, funeral rituals for the dead, and especially a months-long series of activities culminating in the awarding of Lieutenant Ngarimu's Victoria Cross to his parents showcased Māori cultural revival. Though more Māori served in the regular armed forces, the well-publicized Māori Battalion has dominated historical memory to become an important symbol of both New Zealand and Māori identity.[32]

Patricia Grace, a major contemporary Māori writer, creates the experiences of a young man in the Māori Battalion in *Tu* (2004). In this novel we see soldiers in North Africa and Italy applying Māori culture in new contexts, as they etch their rifle stocks and paint their faces with traditional tattoo designs, use *haka* chants and songs, and combine chants and Christian prayers to honor their dead. In Vatican City, they slip *tiki* (greenstone pendants) from home into boxes of rosaries to be blessed by the Pope. They compare Italian culture to Māori (both appreciate music and performers). As they ponder lessons from elders and worry about kinsmen, the characters reflect the common experiences of all soldiers and also their uniquely Māori viewpoint. Grace's novel shows how the war era continues to resonate for Māori today.

British military forces drew recruits from throughout the empire, sending many Pacific Islanders to faraway war zones. Fijians served across the globe, including in the Royal Air Force, as infantry in North Africa, and as merchant seamen. The Fiji Defence Force served as home militia, and after chiefs requested a Fijian unit be sent overseas, it supplied commando units for the Allies in the Southwest Pacific.[33] The troops Americans called "South Pacific Scouts" included several regular units of Fiji infantry and Fiji Commandos, plus attached units of Solomon Islands Defence Force and the Tonga Defence Force. Alongside US Marines, they fought in numerous engagements on island battlefields. Fijians received many military decorations, including a Victoria Cross (posthumous) awarded to Corporal Sefanaia Sukanaivalu for bravery in action on Bougainville in November 1942.[34] Lieutenant Henry Taliai, an officer with the Fiji Commandos, died on New Georgia in April 1943, the first Tongan killed in action in the war. Two Tongans won US Silver Stars and British military medals in the Southwest Pacific, and six served with the New Zealand Expeditionary Force in Egypt.[35]

French Pacific Islands also raised colonial units for service abroad, in addition to home defense formations. De Gaulle's Free French organized a Pacific Battalion to fight in Africa and Europe. By the end of 1943, home militia in French territories and Pacific Battalion volunteers totaled 1,200 Europeans and 1,500 Melanesians; Tahitians and New Caledonians fought in North Africa, Italy, and southern France.[36]

Indigenous people in the Japanese Empire also were sent overseas. Ainu men fought as members of the regular army and navy throughout China, Southeast Asia, and the Pacific Islands. The Battle of Okinawa (April–June 1945) included IJA units with significant Ainu representation; an estimated thirty-one Ainu died there. A war memorial commemorates Ainu soldiers who protected local

residents from Japanese troops, reflecting a sense of connection between Ainu and Okinawan cultures.[37]

Takasago-Giyutai, Indigenous Taiwanese military/labor units (chapter 2), were recruited for overseas service beginning in 1942. Eight corps were dispatched, along with other "special volunteers" units, perhaps a total of five to eight thousand youths. They served in the Southwest Pacific, initially in transport and supply but later in combat. Officers praised their patriotic service, especially in the desperate conditions of the starving Japanese Army in New Guinea near war's end. Detail on these units is scarce, partly due to lack of documentation, destruction of records, and official secrecy, but also because Indigenous identity was masked behind Japanese names and further hidden when returnees were assigned new Chinese names and faced condemnation as "traitors" in postwar Taiwan—a silence not lifted until the 1980s and 1990s, when new research began to reveal this wartime history.[38]

From Japanese Micronesia, a few small groups of volunteer non-combatants were sent to aid the Japanese advance. About twenty volunteers from Pohnpei were selected to supervise work gangs in New Guinea; they arrived in August 1942, as fighting was underway. Only three survived to return home a year later.[39] Ubai Tellei joined the group from Palau, motivated by patriotic education and confidence in Japanese victory. When Allied troops invaded their work areas, some of the Palauan men decided to remain with local people, while Tellei and others followed retreating Japanese troops as the empire's perimeter contracted.[40]

As we saw with Sámi in Finland and the USSR, some groups sharing an Indigenous identity ended up on opposing sides of the conflict. Chamorros on Guam and on the Marianas Islands to the north shared language, culture, and family ties, but were split by US-Japanese control. Japan's colonial administration in the Northern Marianas had employed local Chamorros from its start, following common imperial policy. After Japan invaded Guam on December 8, 1941, intending permanent occupation, authorities brought some seventy-eight Chamorros from Saipan and Rota as interpreters and police assistants. Their interactions with Guam's Chamorros varied, from simply doing their duties properly, to abuse and exploitation. But even those who were sympathetic or who had kin on Guam were trapped by the fact that the two groups of Chamorros were "enemies" by reason of global war.[41] Their actions reverberated after the war, intersecting other tensions between Guam and the Northern Mariana Islands (chapter 11).

Phillip Mendierra (Menjo Kyukichi), from the island of Rota in the Northern Marianas, was one of these assistants. The son of a village headman who

had immigrated from Guam, he completed the five-year schooling allowed for Islanders, with its emphasis on patriotic education. As he recalled his feelings at the time, "We would like to become Japanese soon, and also have a go at becoming soldiers." He began working for the police in 1941, and in February 1944 went to Guam as a civilian staff member of the secret service. He wore civilian clothes and criticized the Japanese military to gain trust to conduct his duties, which included searching out anti-Japanese activities and tracking down escaped POWs. In the US invasion on July 21, 1944, he fled to the jungle, was captured but avoided execution, and returned to Rota.[42]

A consistent theme for those deployed abroad is that their sense of patriotism was engaged, while their Indigenous identity never disappeared and was often accentuated. That was the experience of Jakov Oktavov, a Sámi soldier with the Soviet Army in Norway, where he was amazed to meet other reindeer herders: "I was so surprised. Just think, Lapps like me living in Norway. I would never have believed it."[43] Being overseas offered new experiences and insights to Indigenous servicemen. It did the same for their compatriots, the millions of other men and women sent abroad to pursue the war. When foreign soldiers were stationed in Indigenous lands—as we see in the next chapter—local people learned more about the world's major powers, and the troops' homefront public came to know unexpected allies on distant battlegrounds.

CHAPTER 5

Strangers in the Homeland

THE VORTEX OF COMBAT zones caught up an immense variety of people, pulling troops and labor from globe-spanning empires into Indigenous homelands. The China-Burma-India (CBI) theater was famously multicultural. British Chindit columns, for example, included Englishmen, Scots, Gurkhas, Sikhs, Kachins, Karens, West Africans, and East Africans, among others. In the Bougainville campaign, where Aboriginal Taiwanese were among the forty thousand Japanese and auxiliaries killed, Allied personnel included African American and white US troops and New Zealand, Australian, Fijian, and Papuan and New Guinean units—and the Japanese also held Indian POWs on the island. Such a mix was found wherever war concentrated manpower.[1]

Civilian populations were exposed to all this variety during the years of war in their homelands as they were drawn into labor, trade, friendship, or sexual relationships. Such associations had long-lasting effects on formerly isolated peoples. This chapter takes a closer look at two consequential fields of interaction—Germans in Sápmi and Australians and Americans in the Southwest Pacific. A final section considers civilian-military sexual interaction.

German Troops in Sápmi

The large German Army presence in Sápmi rapidly altered everyday life. The situation was most oppressive in occupied Norway, where Germans were seen as invaders and relations with civilians were tense. Sámi reindeer herders benefited from mobility and the fact that the military valued their deer, but those living as fishermen and in settled villages lacked such protection. Occupation troops used Norwegians and Norwegian Sámi as forced labor; brutality and rape harmed Norwegian and Sámi women. Nazi racial ideas judged Sámi as non-"Aryan" and rejected support for children of mixed unions. Sámi responses varied from fleeing into the mountains or across the border to Sweden, to quiet evasion of

FIGURE 5.1. Germans photographing Skolt Sámi in Petsamo, April 1942. (SA-kuva 81953). Seitsonen, Herva, and Koponen (2019) discuss this and other German photographs of Sápmi.

German demands, to active service with the Norwegian resistance, or to cooperation with the occupiers.[2]

Relations were better in Finnish Sápmi, where Germans viewed Sámi rather like tourists, seeing them as exotic and "people of nature," and valuing their reindeer-herding and survival skills. The two hundred thousand soldiers, plus some thirty thousand German prisoners, outnumbered the combined Finnish and Sámi population of fewer than 150,000. High wages expanded the cash economy, and German investment and prisoner labor improved roads and infrastructure. Troops settled even in small villages, bringing roads, telephones, and sea transport to previously isolated areas. Near the front, German bases invited air raids, but also meant protection from attacks by Soviet partisans. Northern Finland was under military command, but civilian life was still administered by Finnish authorities. Still, the three-to-four-year long presence of large numbers of soldiers, prisoners, and forced laborers had an overwhelming impact on the rural region as people traded with and worked for Germans and had friendships with them. The economic stimulus of the large German presence, plus existing local resources, ensured adequate sustenance in the war years. But like Sámi in Norway, people observed German harshness to their

own soldiers and were aware of the prison camps. Soldiers' takeover of schools and assembly halls upset everyday life and hampered education. And after the war, households that had been too friendly with the occupiers were tainted with that reputation.[3]

Sámi in Finland and Norway were most profoundly affected by the forced evacuations in autumn 1944, ahead of the German Army's retreat, which sent most of the population south to live among the majority population (chapter 8). In Finland, civilian evacuation went smoothly, in part because of German help. In Norway, in contrast, many Sámi and Norwegians sought to evade evacuation, fleeting into the countryside in the hope of waiting out the war. In either case, the German presence had changed the trajectory of Sámi life.

Strangers in the Southwest Pacific Islands

Though German occupation changed Sápmi's infrastructure and economy, the greater change came from Sámi interaction with fellow citizens during the evacuation period. In the Southwest Pacific, though, it was association with foreigners that was transformative. Many wartime newcomers to British and Australian island territories were not entrenched in colonists' racial views and had little interest in propping up their sense of superiority. War unsettled old certainties: after being so quickly routed by Japan, "white masters" were no longer seen as invincible, and Islanders glimpsed new political options on their horizon.

The Japanese offered one such option, especially where troops stayed for several years. Japanese stationed in the Wewak area of New Guinea took pride in friendships with Islanders. They saw themselves as different from racist Europeans, though they too thought of local people as "primitive" and wished to enlighten them. Soldiers shared meals with their workers and showed less prejudice than white colonials. Some Island men were appointed to positions supervising Japanese soldiers and Asian laborers, a rare occurrence under Australian rule. One young lieutenant, Yukio Shibata, set up a school in Wewak that changed the life of Michael Somare—then a child—who later became the first prime minister of independent Papua New Guinea. Japanese brought other strangers to the islands as well, including thousands of POWs from British Indian forces, as well as Chinese, Malayans, Indonesians, and other laborers.[4]

On the Allied side, too, there were new options. In New Guinea, J. K. McCarthy wrote, "War was not only a great destroyer but a great teacher."[5] For people who had known only a few Europeans, foreign soldiers offered numerous learning opportunities. Australian and American troops, casual and friendly,

tended to ignore colonial rules of racial hierarchy, and meeting African Americans who were as wealthy and skilled as whites was an eye-opener. The most important lesson was that the old patterns of racial interaction were not universal—despite colonial efforts to maintain them. Even the vocabulary was different: the newcomers called Island men "Sport" (Australians) and "Joe" (Americans) instead of or at least in addition to pejorative terms. Reciprocal use of friendly terms like these marked a dramatic change from the "Sir" and "Master" addressed to Europeans before the war, though those did not disappear.[6]

Discussing race relations in New Guinea in wartime, Australian anthropologist (and Lieutenant Colonel) Ian Hogbin describes how colonial whites tried to enforce the color bar despite the changed circumstances. Some ANGAU officers insisted on such absurd rules as segregating drinking water tanks or forbidding New Guineans to ride in jeeps beside Europeans, except on army business. Hogbin himself was criticized for letting a servant ride with him in a staff car to catch a plane—he should have ordered a separate truck, despite the waste of gas.[7] Military personnel were to be guided by the Australian Army's booklet, "You and the Native," which advised servicemen to respect the "native" and not underrate his intelligence, but also to preserve the social gap crucial to white prestige. Troops were warned not to fraternize (no "Promiscuous bathing, including frolicking together in the water"!).[8]

But soldiers went their own way. Australians tended to champion the underdog, admired the work of carriers and stretcher bearers, shared food and cigarettes, and even learned to speak Tok Pisin.[9] Villagers in the Markham Valley vividly contrasted prewar Europeans (whom they called "English" regardless of nationality), with Australians. Australian soldiers welcomed men into a slit trench during the fighting at Wau (the prewar "English" would have turned a local man out) and posted night sentries to protect carriers ("The English would not have cared"). Sergeant Major (later Sir) Pita Simogun commented, "Before the war I knew only two or three white men as friends. With the war I have got to meet the real Australian, who has treated me as a man and a friend."[10]

Media coverage also changed views of Australians at home. More than five hundred thousand Australians were sent to the New Guinea region, out of a total population of seven million, which meant that most Australians knew someone who had served there. The public became familiar with the islands' geography through battles at Kokoda, Buna, Salamaua, Bougainville—names that entered Australia's collective national memory.[11] News reports offered a new, positive view of Papua and New Guinea people, starting with appreciation for the carriers who supported the fighting on the Kokoda Trail and cared

FIGURE 5.2. Private George C. ("Dick") Whittington being helped by Raphael Oimbari after fighting at Buna airstrip, December 1942. (Australian War Memorial, Ref. No. 014028, photographer George Silk).

for wounded men. A poem and a famous photograph cemented this image. "The Fuzzy-Wuzzy Angels" was a sentimental and patronizing but popular rhyme praising stretcher-bearers; the photo was of Raphael Oimbari leading the bandaged, blinded Australian Private George Whittington (figure 5.2).[12] Regis Stella, Papua New Guinea novelist and scholar, cautions that the "fuzzy wuzzy angel" feel-good image "is nevertheless belittling" as it denigrates the

men's appearance and judges them in white terms.[13] But the publicity forced the Australian public to recognize the strength and capacity of these men and to acknowledge their service.

The friendly attitudes of ordinary soldiers contrasted with those held by colonial officials and settlers, many of whom took positions in the wartime military administration. Most wanted to preserve the racial hierarchy, seeing any egalitarian tendency as a threat to the supremacy they expected to continue after the war. They saw danger in the way some servicemen treated Islanders as equals, undermining obedience to white authority. The worst danger, they thought, came from those who did not know the region—especially Americans.

By war's end, 5.3 million Americans had served overseas, making an impact in all parts of the world at war, but especially on islands and in other Indigenous regions, where small populations and a limited economy made even a "friendly occupation" disruptive. Americans abroad were noted for their generosity, friendliness, and work ethic—but also for profiteering, willingness to disregard local laws and customs, pursuit of women, and the racism of white Americans.[14] In the Southwest Pacific, though, Islanders' association with Americans was largely positive, even inspirational.

Fraternization and Politics in the Southwest Pacific

Like colonial authorities, military brass was wary of problems that could arise from fraternization with civilians, but the scale of deployments made it hard to control. In the New Hebrides (now Vanuatu), which held a peak of sixty-five thousand troops, Islanders met Americans through work in the labor corps or at informal chores like laundry, in the busy souvenir trade, at dances, cinemas (Espiritu Santo held forty-three screens at one time), church services, and even pig hunts that took officers into mountain villages.[15] Such frequent and casual contact differed greatly from the limited and formalized prewar interactions Islanders had had with white officials, plantation managers, or missionaries.

British and Australian authorities tended to fear such informal contact and blamed Americans for inciting resistance to colonial rule—which seems to have been true, at least in some places. The British Solomon Islands Protectorate (BSIP) had certainly seen discontent with British rule before the war, but interaction with Americans focused it; the war, Anna Annie Kwai writes, "laid a foundation for political education."[16]

The colonial order in the BSIP, as elsewhere, had reified racial hierarchy by segregation and by distinctions in clothing, food, and housing. In wartime, British officers in charge of the Solomon Islands Labour Corps (SILC) policed these

"sumptuary codes," insisting for example that workers wear lavalavas instead of trousers and shirts.[17] US servicemen rejected such petty rules, along with those against fraternization. They invited Islanders to visit in their tents and share meals. Some went further, championing workers in disputes, offering new models of resistance. As SILC sergeant Jonathan Fifi'i recalls, "Our [British] officers tried to forbid us from visiting Americans, but when we told the Americans of this they told us not to worry about it, so we kept on going. When an American had finished eating he would wash his plate and give it to me and tell me to go stand in the line for food. One time a Labour Corps officer saw this and told me I couldn't eat that food. A man named Kirsh told him 'Go fuck yourself!'"[18] Officers in charge of the SILC saw "a dire threat to white authority" in such interactions and tried to forestall it by urging the American authorities to limit pay and control casual interaction, and even by confiscating goods given as gifts or payment. In the end, such efforts were futile. It seems that the more the workers interacted with US troops, the more critical they became of colonial treatment.[19]

Not everyone drew the same lesson from working on US bases. While Malaitan men in the SILC gained confidence in their ability to govern themselves, spurring postwar anticolonial movements, Santa Cruz Islanders drew the opposite conclusion. Overwhelmed by the scale of personnel and matériel at the Guadalcanal base, they realized that the world was much greater than they had realized, with the result that they accepted the return of British rule and rejected antigovernment activity.[20]

In fact, one challenge facing Islanders as they grasped the scope of the war was to make sense of what they were learning. People rethought their worldview to integrate foreigners and explain their technology and wealth. Santa Cruz Islanders reworked myths, adding in a local deity's travel to the United States. Men from Vanatinai (Louisiade Archipelago) employed at the Milne Bay base had such good experiences with white and African American soldiers there that they believed they must be kinsmen, leading to the idea that the spirits of their own dead turn white and go to the United States. After the war, colonial authorities and missions were kept busy suppressing energetic social/religious/political movements inspired by wartime experiences but drawing on prewar ideas about the source of wealth ("cargo cults"). Some were fantasies, like the claim that Americans secretly built an underground town on Guadalcanal where they buried equipment and weapons, but others such as the John Frum movement in the New Hebrides and Maasina Rule in the Solomons became important precursors to independence (chapter 11).[21]

How did Americans view Islanders? A study of wartime journalism and popular histories found that they were scarcely mentioned except occasionally as

guides or carriers, in contrast to civilians in Europe, who were a vivid presence in war reporting and histories—"For the GI, the Pacific had 'natives,' while Europe had 'civilians.'" That white Americans were oriented toward Europe makes sense in terms of history and culture, but it was also a matter of race. The Pacific was more of a "race war" than was the war in Europe—not only in the contest between European and Japanese, but in terms of the Allies themselves.[22] British colonial racism, "white Australia" racism, and American racism institutionalized in the military, all deployed into the Pacific Islands along with the troops.

African Americans in Indigenous Homelands

Even more than other US soldiers and sailors, the presence of African Americans made an impact on Indigenous communities, especially in the Southwest Pacific. The United States at the time was a segregated society, as much in the military as in civilian life. Black units were restricted to support and construction activities until late in the war, which meant they spent long deployments as neighbors of Islanders and often employed local labor.[23] For example, five hundred of the Americans sent to build an airfield and base on Aitutaki (Cook Islands) were African American; up to four thousand Islanders were hired to work there. On Efate (New Hebrides)—with a prewar population of about three thousand—the majority of the fifteen thousand US servicemen were African American.[24]

Though discrimination, segregation, and straight-out racism was endemic in the US military, it was not so obvious to Island onlookers, who knew little about Americans at all. In their eyes, African Americans seemed equal to whites in their military kit and their abilities. They were literate, they drove and repaired complex machinery, they were skilled at carpentry and other demanding tasks.[25] Because sumptuary rules symbolized and cemented racial hierarchy, it was important that Black and white Americans owned the same clothing and equipment, lived in the same conditions, and that, despite official segregation, the servicemen, and sometimes Islanders, would eat together.[26] Furthermore, those who worked for them also in many cases ate the same food as the troops, lived in the same kind of barracks, and wore US-issued clothing. The contrast with treatment by white settlers or ANGAU personnel was stark. Thomas Nouar recalled working for African American soldiers of the 24th Infantry Regiment on Efate; "when they called out, they didn't say—they called us 'brother.' Brother, their brothers. They didn't say that we were no good. They liked us, and because of this our hearts were happy with them. Eh, the Americans!'"[27]

Islanders saw African American soldiers ignore antifraternization rules and stand up to white ANGAU officers in support of workers. Islanders themselves

FIGURE 5.3. Original caption: "34th CB's ["Seabees," US Navy Construction Battalion] trading with natives from Malaita. Left to right: native; Percy J. Hope, MS2c; Lilton T. Walker, S1c; two natives; Jack Kelsen SC1c." Solomon Islands, September 1943 (Naval Photographic Center, National Archives photo no. 520630).

became more assertive in knowing their rights and expressing their grievances—exactly what those who hoped to maintain the old order did not want to see. ANGAU administrators "feared the effect that well-dressed, well-paid and educated Black Americans might have on native populations."[28] Indeed, Jonathan Fifi'i confirms that his experiences in the SILC shaped his political activities as a founder of Maasina Rule (chapters 9, 11).

Elsewhere in the Pacific, wherever African Americans were stationed, white military officials tried to restrict contact with local populations, sometimes with a fanatical zeal that mystified civilians. US Army command argued about where to station African Americans, and policed their sexuality with particular fervor, often to the surprise and dismay of their hosts and Allies.[29] Where both Black and white US troops were in place, as in Tonga, Americans' "paradoxical racial outlook" was on display: Americans were annoyed that British and New Zealanders excluded Tongans from gentlemen's clubs, yet the US units had separate bases, recreational facilities, and duties. (The nearly two thousand African

Americans of the 77th Coast Artillery from California got along well with the nonsegregationist Tongans.)[30]

Australia's and New Zealand's own racial habits were unsettled by US policies and personnel. Australia had a complicated relationship with American servicemen stationed there, and even more so with African Americans. Of the nearly one million Americans who came through Australia in World War II, one hundred thousand were African Americans. Government resistance to their deployment, despite Canberra's request for protection while its own men were serving abroad, contrasted with the often-positive attitudes of ordinary Australians. Many found a friendly reception from a public who appreciated their defensive role, but "white Australia" protected its exclusivity. In Western Australia, where African American sailors made up only a small number of the US servicemen stationed there, they attended public dances and a navy club and dated white women, but in cities such as Brisbane, interactions were more tense despite segregated facilities.[31] African American men fraternized with white Australian women, and about fifty marriages brought white wives to the United States. They also fraternized with Aboriginal Australians—segregated clubs for African American troops included Aboriginal women as staff and dance partners—but US immigration barriers mostly blocked bringing them home as wives.[32] Oodgeroo Noonuccal's parents hosted African American and white US servicemen in their Stradbroke Island home, and she knew two women who married African Americans. "There was always this wonderful feeling between the black Americans and the Aboriginals . . . always," she recalled. "They were welcomed into our homes."[33]

The presence of African Americans in Australia offered new ideas to Aboriginal Australians and also gave white Australians a chance to rethink racial attitudes. Like Pacific Islanders, Aboriginal Australians saw a new model of Black men, and white Australians' racial perceptions were challenged as they encountered well-educated and well-paid African American mechanics, truck drivers, and bulldozer operators. For their part, African Americans were sympathetic toward Aboriginal Australians, but saw them as quite different from themselves, especially those living in rural areas (where most African Americans were posted)—they had more in common with those they met in the cities, like Oodgeroo Noonuccal's family.[34]

While New Zealand forces were largely stationed in the Middle East, tens of thousands of Americans came to New Zealand, both for defense and as a respite from Pacific battlegrounds. European and Māori New Zealanders hosted the men and Māoris gave cultural performances at camps and hospitals. Civilian

relations were largely positive, but there was hostility between New Zealand and US troops, and where Māori soldiers were present so was American racism. A 1943 riot outside the Allied Services Club in Wellington started when white soldiers from the southern US objected to Māoris and whites drinking and socializing together. Another brawl in April 1944 in Fremantle, Western Australia, involved hundreds of US Army soldiers in transit and Māoris on shore leave en route to the Middle East; many were injured, and Americans killed two Māoris. Certainly, Māori Battalion men on home leave "were not about to put up with racist remarks from white U.S. Marines and sailors." Māori elders intervened to calm things, and social events were held to increase cultural understanding. But even good relations came with racial overtones: white New Zealand women who married servicemen could emigrate to the United States, but racial exclusion/antimiscegenation laws made that rare for Māori women.[35]

The global movement of millions of servicemen and women and laborers built up a stockpile of novel interactions. Mateship, shared hardship and combat, recognition of courage and loyalty, and simple everyday familiarity with different kinds of people—all affected postwar reality. For women, the presence of strangers at war had an additional dimension.

Sex and Love in Wartime

As soldiers and sailors deployed around the world, sexual activity changed wherever they went. Women's involvement with these strangers ranged from battleground rape to sexual slavery to paid sex work to romance and marriage. Recent studies have examined official and unofficial prostitution in all theaters and sexual activities of soldiers abroad, though information about Indigenous women's experience remains scarce.[36]

The drive to recognize and compensate survivors of Japanese military brothels has drawn attention to the varied forms of wartime prostitution (military and civilian, official and unofficial, willing or pressured or forced), sexual violence by troops, and consensual sex.[37] Overseas Japanese brothels for expatriates and the military existed from the start of the century, but after 1937 premises for military and police use were established in occupied regions. At first these were staffed by Japanese, but over time women from Korea, Taiwan, and other colonial and occupied regions were drawn and forced into work. As is the case for military brothels in general, one intention was to reduce rape, though sexual violence still occurred.

Indigenous women were a minority of those involved in the system. In Japanese Micronesia, for example, the military brothels in Chuuk and Saipan employed women brought from Japan or elsewhere in the empire.[38] Official brothels were less common at the edges of empire and at active fronts, and apparently were not set up in occupied areas of the Solomon Islands, eastern New Guinea, the Gilbert Islands, or the Aleutian Islands. Japanese authorities regulated interaction with civilians in occupied areas and knew the danger of raising hostility by mistreating women (this is one reason they set up the military brothel system). But certainly some Indigenous women were forced into sex work, though in small numbers, as in East Timor, around the large base at Rabaul, and on Guam.[39]

Allied militaries did not match the Japanese organized system of brothels, but the presence of huge numbers of troops transformed sex work wherever they were stationed or in transit. The "first strange place" many US servicemen in the Pacific theater visited was Hawai'i, where sexual and personal relationships readily crossed racial lines.[40] Before the war, Honolulu's bar and prostitution district served the small but regular military trade. When Hawai'i became a major base and transit point, hundreds of thousands of soldiers and sailors passed through Oahu. Honolulu's wartime brothels were staffed mostly by white women from the mainland, though there were also local women, as ethnically diverse as Hawai'i itself. Under martial law, the military, police, and civilian officials agreed on how to manage prostitution in Hawai'i; it was illegal but regarded as necessary and acceptable until September 1944 when the police finally got military agreement to shut down the brothels.[41]

Elsewhere in the Pacific, private establishments operating near US bases drew in local women, a situation complicated by American racism. Both African American and white US servicemen used the Māori-run brothel in Wellington, New Zealand, but in New Caledonia, US military objection to interracial sex caused trouble. African American troops were prohibited from the mostly white-staffed licensed brothels, so they used unofficial prostitutes, which put them at risk of being charged with rape. American officials wanted New Caledonia to set up a separate facility for African Americans, staffed by Kanak women—a suggestion that French colonial authorities adamantly rejected, saying that Americans should bring African American women from the US if their prudishness could not handle sex between races. In Australia, both white and Aboriginal Australian women worked in informal brothels set up by the US military, apparently with some racial segregation of service.[42]

In a militarized environment, sexual encounters became potentially dangerous, as interaction slid from willing to coercive to violent. Rape occurred as a weapon of war, as a civil crime, and in the guise of commercial transactions. Despite Allied propaganda, there seems to have been a low incidence of rape by Japanese soldiers in New Guinea, at least as long as discipline held; the situation elsewhere varied with local commanders and conditions of war.[43] Allied forces also dealt with rape accusations—sometimes entangled with racial issues, as in charges against African American soldiers in New Caledonia and New Guinea and against Pacific Islands Regiment men—or, often, failed to deal with them. Faced with the flood of American servicemen into Kiriwina (Trobriand Islands), the local ANGAU officer complained that, "It was impossible to get anyone to take rape seriously on Kiriwina in 1943. It was a war situation. Normal law and order seemed unimportant, because everybody expected to be killed soon anyway. In any case the Americans would not accept the word of a native against their own people."[44]

Although rape is a weapon of war and a consequence of racism and indifference, and prostitution accompanies all armies, intimate relationships were also a part of the picture. For the most part Japanese troops were under orders to avoid social contact with local women, but alliances certainly happened. In Micronesia, where there had been Japanese-Islander marriages before the war, consensual relationships occurred with soldiers, too. In the worst periods of bombing, starvation, and military control, sex could be pressured in exchange for protection and support. Tamotsu Ogawa spent three years on New Britain, where he claimed it was the women who were attracted to and made sexual advances to the Japanese soldiers. In some occupied areas, Japanese officers formed relationships with women and their families to enhance local ties, as on Bougainville. This could have the opposite effect: in inland Borneo, a Tagal leader's daughter mistreated by a senior Japanese officer provided information to Allied guerrillas and her story incited anti-Japanese animosity.[45]

Like some Japanese in occupied territories, Allied guerrillas who lived for long periods with Indigenous communities might form family bonds—or those with family bonds might become guerrillas. Dennis Rosner, who served with the Kachin Levies, married a Kachin woman and settled permanently in Myitkyina after the war. American Henry Clay Conner, who lived with Negritos in the Philippines for nearly three years, learning the language and organizing several hundred guerrillas, married the chief's sister and had a son.[46] In colonial Malaya, H. D. Noone's marriage to a Temiar wife preceded the war, but he relied on her family and community as he pursued clandestine work during Japanese occupation.

Guerrillas operated far from official oversight, but where troops were concentrated military commanders worried about sexual violence, venereal disease, prostitution, and interracial relationships, whether of Germans with Sámi, African Americans in Polynesia, or white Americans in New Guinea. In the Pacific theater, US Army commanders' preoccupations about racial mixing affected deployment planning.[47] Servicemen's own preconceptions shaped behavior: Americans stationed on islands that matched the 1930s Hollywood stereotypes of the "sexualized South Seas" of Polynesia—romanticized in the 1949 musical *South Pacific*—seem to have had more sexual interaction than those sent to New Guinea or the Solomon Islands.[48] But memoirs include positive romantic images of Melanesian women, too. The diary of Captain Hyman Samuelson, a white officer of the 96th Engineers, is very complimentary about the "beautiful figures" exposed when young New Guinea women danced in the moonlight, but he always notes the imprudence of going beyond casual flirting because of the color bar controlling race relations.[49] Residents also worried about these relationships. On Kiriwina in the Trobriand Islands (and many other places), well-paid Americans upset patterns of intimacy by giving cash and generous gifts to sexual partners, making it impossible for local men to compete.[50] The relative wealth of US soldiers and sailors, their sheer numbers, cultural differences in the significance of gifts and of sexual acts, war's unsettled conditions—all gave rise to behavior that could not be regulated by traditional family and community patterns.

"Love," Judith Bennett and Angela Wanhalla comment, "is something historians rarely speak of"—yet certainly some wartime relationships involved love, not just sex. After the United States took charge of defense of the Pacific region, Americans staffed bases on large islands and tiny atolls. When the "tsunami of young men" flowed across the ocean and entered their world, women had the chance to gain new experiences and income from domestic work and sales of food and handicrafts. Many local men were gone, travelling for military service or labor. Add in alcohol, gambling, cigarettes, movies, dances, a ready supply of imported food and goods, along with the fact that the foreign servicemen were young, lonely, flush with cash and eager to socialize, and you can see how young Islanders living near US bases experienced two to four years of excitement, which ended as quickly as it began.[51]

No matter how positive or intimate the relationships were, they ended abruptly when men were transferred or bases closed. Soldiers moved on, leaving only memories—and, in the case of Americans, about four thousand fatherless

children throughout the Islands. Servicemen could not marry without permission from commanding officers, which was rarely granted for marriage to Islanders. Immigration and antimiscegenation laws prevented many women from entering the United States. Barriers against these unions contrast with assistance given to men bringing "war brides" from elsewhere, even when those brides (German, Italian, Japanese) were from a former enemy population.[52] War separated families in other ways, too. Japanese and Okinawans who had emigrated to Pacific Islands and formed families there were separated at the start of war when Allied territories interned enemy civilians, or when, as across Micronesia, they were repatriated at its end.[53]

It was not just with "strangers at war" that sex and love took place. The war re-ordered social relationships within communities and increased interaction among them. Young Fijians returning from the front "were welcomed home with traditional ceremonies, gifts and feasts" and in some cases the traditional offer of young wives, some unwilling.[54] On the homefront, Indigenous people moved far from home to work in war industries, fostering racially mixed and (in North America) inter-tribal relationships (chapter 9). And, lest it seem that wartime increased sexual activity, we should note that it also broke families apart, killed husbands and wives and lovers and children, isolated men and women from one another, and depleted time and energy.

No matter how far away soldiers travelled, they brought their existing cultural ideas with them. In the next chapter, we turn to how images and realities of the "other" shaped military action. Indigenous cultures have histories of conflict; fighting itself was not new to them. What was unprecedented was the scale and nature of industrial war. As we will see, men familiar with small-scale wars had something to teach the major powers about how to fight.

CHAPTER 6

Deploying the "Primitive"

Images and Realities of Indigenous Soldiers

WHETHER ON THEIR OWN territory or abroad, Indigenous distinctiveness persisted in military service. Combatant powers used their skills in combat and their images in propaganda. Racist stereotypes stigmatizing them as "primitive" and "savage" to serve colonial interests had to be rethought in light of war aims. When their skills were needed, Western and Japanese ideas about them took on practical importance. This chapter and the next consider how both realistic and inaccurate views of Indigenous soldiers shaped how they were deployed in battle and represented at home.

The Idea of "the Primitive"

The term "primitive" has long been a weapon wielded by powerful nation-states and empires ("civilizations") against Indigenous peoples, especially those in tribal societies. The labels "primitive" or "savage" rightly arouse concern today, yet we need to recognize how they were used in the context of World War II.

Modern states require clear borders and a well-defined national identity. People living at the borders ("frontiers") can be seen as problematic. Central governments try to absorb marginal communities through assimilation policies, but those policies also emphasize differences. Defining these distinctive subjects as "backward" or "primitive" is a common tactic, giving a sort of explanation for why they are different but still within the nation. It is, however, a mistaken one: every society, large or small, has its own unique history; all are living in the present-day; we are all "modern," though our cultures differ. But the idea of a primitive population (not the actual people, but the *idea* of a group as "primitive") helps the majority solidify its own identity.[1]

Japan, like other colonial powers, claimed its position as a modern, civilized nation by governing those it defined as less civilized. Ainu, the first outsiders to be absorbed into Japan's modern borders, were legal citizens by the time of World War II, yet propaganda—like US and Canadian news stories featuring Native soldiers (chapter 4)—highlighted their difference to emphasize national unity. One Ainu leader, Takeichi Moritake, criticized these displays in 1934; as historian Tessa Morris-Suzuki explains, even while Ainu served in the army, "they were simultaneously being shown off to visiting members of the armed forces as though they were some backward colonized tribe."[2] Similarly, the civilized/savage dichotomy anchored Japan's relationship with Taiwan's Aborigines. Imperial tourism encouraged visits to Taiwan to see "the primitive life of the aborigines." The tribes had historically practiced headhunting, and that image of them was common, especially after the Wushe Rebellion. Colonial policies pacifying such "savagery" testified to Japan's "civilized" standing as a modern nation.[3]

Western nations also built their self-identity in part on contrast with "primitive" others, offering a facile framework for viewing tribal societies. During wartime, the contrast permeated public media, often symbolized by differences in appearance or material goods such as weapons. British officers liked to mention the old flintlock rifles Kachin and Chin levies used, for which they made their own bullets and gunpowder.[4] Antique weapons fit the stereotype of hill tribes being less than modern, but from the foreigners' point of view, any technology was by definition exotic in the hands of Indigenous peoples. If they used ancient technology (Punan blowpipes in Borneo), that was exotic; if they used old technology (the Chins' flintlocks), that was exotic; if they used new technology (bicycles, up-to-date rifles, radios), that too was seen as exotic. Foreigners delighted in what they saw as incongruities, as when a British officer commented on Kachins "up in the country where no one has ever seen a car or a wheelbarrow, but where they can tell a transport [plane] from a fighter without looking up." In reality, cutting-edge technology was equally amazing to regular servicemen: when British soldiers at the Battle of Kohima in March–April 1944 had their first look at a bulldozer brought in by the Royal Engineers they "gazed at it in amazement." The first time Japanese troops on New Britain saw bulldozers was when the invading Americans built an airstrip overnight.[5]

Foreign views of "primitive" tribal allies mixed romanticism, fear, and pragmatism. Charlton Ogburn, Jr., a US Army officer working with Kachin in Burma, says his men found them to be "friendly, open-faced, natural-mannered, smiling. An unspoiled people, one would have called them a generation ago, with fine, aristocratic features and unusual charm." His phrasing may be patronizing—but in the end, he acknowledged that the Americans "never, if possible, moved

without Kachin guides." Australian Z Force officer Roland Griffiths-Marsh lauded the Ibans in his Borneo unit as "superb fellows of magnificent physique. To see an Iban stalking through the jungle was a revelation: jet black silken hair, sleekly tightened over the head and done up in a bun with a bone dagger, their sole apparel a loin cloth. To me, they were the acme of savage warriorhood."[6] Journalism, photography, and memoirs repeat the trope of Indigenous allies as on one hand friendly and loyal, and on the other, "primitive" and dangerous.

Wild Places . . . Wild People?

It was not only the people whose strangeness created the sense of difference and danger in unfamiliar battlegrounds—it was also the setting. Indigenous participation was most salient when war was fought on their territories. Many of these lay at the edges of well-settled areas, "frontiers" formally within empires and nations but little known to them: highland Southeast Asia, interior New Guinea, the North American and European arctic, Australia's north, African deserts. Armies drew a link between perceived hostile environments and racial ideas about people living there: Indigenous people and environments were both seen as untamed.[7]

The fact that combat zones were marginal to the warring nations meant not only that their geography and climate, flora and fauna were unfamiliar, but also that they seemed truly alien. Disease, climate, terrain, and combat made the "jungle" landscapes of Southeast Asia and the Southwest Pacific islands a challenging, even horrifying place for Australian, American, British, and Japanese soldiers.[8] ("Jungle" referred to both tropical and highland forest; it usually simply meant heavily vegetated, sparsely populated areas.) After early defeats in Burma, the British Army developed special training to address the problem of fighting in surroundings where observation and maintaining contact was difficult and disorientation common.[9]

The mountainous Burma/India border did offer especially difficult battlegrounds, and some areas were indeed remote, marked "unsurveyed" on maps. James Scott points out that upland Southeast Asia held much "friction of terrain" for pre-modern armies; not until the late twentieth century could militaries operate there during monsoon season.[10] General Renya Mutaguchi, who arrived in Burma to lead Japan's 15th Army in March 1943, studied the geography with an eye to invading India. When his chief of staff objected that it was impossible to supply an offensive through that territory, Mutaguchi sacked him for a more docile replacement. The IJA later suffered massive losses when forced to retreat through the hills in monsoon rains after defeat at Imphal. Staff Sergeant

Yasumasa Nishiji drew sketches of the horrors, finding words inadequate. "In increasing numbers our soldiers fell, physically emaciated and crippled, yet mentally alert. I had heard the locals saying that they exiled their serious offenders to this region in the knowledge that the environment would surely kill them."[11]

Combatants on Southwest Pacific island battlegrounds might have competed for the honor of worst fighting conditions. Maintaining supply lines was difficult, maps were wrong or nonexistent, the climate was hot and wet, soldiers hated the terrain and jungle. Malaria, dengue fever, scrub typhus, dysentery, and skin infections threatened, as did danger from falling trees, lightning, crocodiles, and slips on muddy tracks or while crossing rivers.[12] As Japanese veteran Masatsugu Ogawa commented, "All battlefields are wretched places. New Guinea was ghastly. There was a saying during the war: 'Burma is hell; from New Guinea no one returns alive.'"[13]

Allied and Japanese militaries equally fought the land; to some extent the war's outcome depended on how well they did so.[14] Yet the environments that desperately challenged modern militaries were familiar homes to inhabitants. They handled such conditions every day; foreigners saw them as extraordinarily grueling. But official and popular histories and memoirs often erase inhabitants from combat zones, making it seem as though soldiers operated in wilderness, even while they were fighting through villages and gardens.[15] When their skills were needed, though, residents were no longer invisible. Conducting battle in these places demanded local expertise and labor—"weaponizing indigenous peoples"—that is, using their distinctive skills and knowledge as part of the machinery of war.[16]

The Practical Value of Local Knowledge in Military Operations

The irony of colonial powers needing the cultures that they had long denigrated and sought to destroy has deep historical roots.[17] As they colonized already inhabited lands, invading Europeans and Asians simultaneously disparaged and relied on Indigenous skills and technologies. In wartime, practical needs could override chauvinism, albeit temporarily or reluctantly. Whatever racist or patronizing notions combatants held about "primitive" people, in actual conditions of war their abilities were put to practical use.

Territorial Knowledge

From a military point of view, the most valuable qualities of local people were their knowledge of the environment and their "bush skills." (Perhaps even more valuable was simply that they supplied cheap labor where that was needed; see

chapter 9.) As Norman Kelly said when awaiting invasion of northwestern Burma, "The Chins knew every footpath and hillock and there was little chance of the Japanese remaining undetected once they had entered the Chin Hills."[18] The most obvious uses of such information were in reconnaissance and guiding. As chapter 3 showed, combatants relied heavily on guides, essential where roads or even maps were lacking. The imbalance in knowledge gave residents a certain power—not only to negotiate employment, in a limited way, but also—in a limited way—to try to manage situations, for example by directing soldiers toward their own enemies or away from kin or allies.[19]

Appreciation for territorial knowledge abounded wherever front lines crossed Indigenous lands. Japan recruited Nivkh and Uilta men for reconnaissance along the border with the USSR. In eastern Greenland, dogsled patrols of Danes and Greenlanders located German meteorological posts. German, Soviet, Finnish, and Norwegian militaries valued Sámi guides in arctic forests and tundra. Setting up the Alaska Territorial Guard, "Muktuk" Marston admitted there was no time to train Inuit as soldiers, "But better than years of formal drill and all that goes to make an efficient military force was the indisputable fact of their complete and exact knowledge of our vulnerable coastline." In the Southwest Pacific, Solomon Islanders knew the local reefs, channels, and tides to estimate travel time and plan efficient and clandestine movement.[20]

A well-publicized use of local knowledge was in search and rescue. Shipwrecks and air crashes in inhospitable areas often could not be survived without local help, from the young San herder in the eastern Kalahari Desert (now Botswana) who arranged for the rescue of Royal Air Force flyers from a nearby training base, to the Inuit hunters who found and cared for US airmen stranded in Greenland. In the Sahara Desert, Allied rescuers "struck bargains with the Arabs" to help with searches. Aircrews in northern Australia carried instructions for dealing with the Aboriginal people who could save their lives, like the Yanyuwa people who rescued a lost and nearly dead American pilot, then choreographed a dance to commemorate the event.[21] Some rescues took massive effort. In February 1945, a Nyishi man (northeast India) took three days to run some sixty miles to a tea plantation to report a rescued American with a broken leg, the only survivor of his aircrew. The recovery team had to parachute in, then trek to the village. A lengthy effort to recover three survivors of a May 1945 crash in Dutch New Guinea's Beliem/Grand Valley drew international publicity to the isolated valley and its helpful Yali and Dani people.[22]

Stories of rescues by "friendly natives" follow a pattern, as survivors' initial fears are replaced by gratitude. During the Solomon Islands campaign, Islanders

handled the recovery of more than six hundred Allied airmen and sailors. They also rescued Japanese and delivered them to Allies, or in some cases returned them to their own base.[23] Servicemen remember both the exotic (to them) vision of their rescuers ("They appeared straight out of 'National Geographic' wearing nothing but loin cloths with bones through their noses, wild-eyed, bushy haired and carrying spears. They seemed as surprised as we were.") and also how the Islanders saved them, fed them despite their own scarcity of food, hid them from the enemy, and shared Christian church services.[24] The most famous Solomon Islands rescue came in August 1943 when Biuku Gasa and Eroni Kumana, working under Royal Australian Navy Sub-Lieutenant and coastwatcher Arthur Evans, found John F. Kennedy and his PT-109 crew.[25]

Another major rescue site was the China-Burma-India (CBI) border, where Allies flew regular missions over "the Hump" of the Himalayas to supply Chinese Nationalists. Histories of the CBI record hundreds of accounts of Kachin, Chin, Naga, and others rescuing lost airmen—often at risk of their own lives, since Japanese were also searching for the crews.[26] As in the Southwest Pacific, negative stereotypes pair with sincere appreciation: "The primitive people [Nagas], dark and dangerous, existed among mud and filth, and a variety of crawling life, especially fleas"—but as one rescued airman said, also of the Nagas, "Their hospitality and consideration for my comfort was boundless."[27] Hundreds of planes crashed in these mountains. One OSS officer claimed that Nagas and other hill people were "getting rich" by looting crashes—an overstatement, but certainly people used the salvage for tools, weapons, and metal. Rescues were a source of income, often paid in silver rupees, from rewards and from wages paid to carry for or guide recovery parties.[28]

The most famous CBI rescue account comes from American journalist Eric Sevareid, who was en route to China when his transport plane went down. He and twenty other survivors were found and cared for by Nagas for two weeks until a British-led team reached them. Sevareid told his story several times, first in his brief dispatch to United Press, opening with this sentence: "Burmese jungle headhunters, every one a primitive killer, saved our lives. . . ." He retold it in newspapers, magazines, including, a *Readers' Digest* story titled, "Our Good Friends, the Head-Hunters," a radio drama, and a 1946 book.[29] Sevareid's account is a curious mix of a man seeing this new world through stereotypes of "the primitive," yet being perceptive enough to adjust his vision as he learns more. He speaks of the Naga in uncomfortable stereotypes: "So these were the famous Nagas! . . . None of us had ever seen a Naga before, but it was well known that

many of them were merciless head-hunters."[30] He repeatedly calls them "savage" and rolls out the usual stereotypes of splendid male physiques, clothing, knives, and spears. Yet he also speaks of men as individuals (he saw few women) and comes to like them; he speaks of certain men as "intelligent" and having "magnetic charm." Sevareid's story was widely publicized, no doubt boosted by its "headhunter" sensationalism—but we can also see his sympathy for Nagas, reaffirmed in the 1976 introduction to his reissued book, in which he criticizes India's government for its response to the Naga fight for autonomy.

Naga scholar Dolly Kikon recounts a more recent event that reveals the persistence of primitivist stereotypes. In the 1960s, when Naga insurgents first brought down an Indian Air Force plane, the pilots "were terrified by the possibility of being captured by the headhunting Nagas." But when the parachutes touched down, the Naga guerrillas who surrounded them immediately said, "Your identification numbers, badge and squadron please . . . you are our prisoners of war" and cited the Geneva Convention.[31] The "headhunting Nagas" had become a modern resistance army. As we will see in chapter 11, technology and politics change, but desires for autonomy persist.

"Bush Skills"

At the time of the war, many Indigenous people made their living by small-scale farming, hunting, fishing, gathering, and trading forest products. Intimately familiar with their land, they excelled in rural skills. Many could find their way through forest, desert, or tundra that looked trackless to outsiders; they could shoot, trap, and fish, stalk animals or humans, and notice subtle clues of sight, sound, or smell; they were also often in superb physical shape, strong and able to travel far on little food and to handle extremes of temperature they had grown up with.

"Bush skills" were recognized as a military virtue, and in some cases, quite ordinary skills held value, since they were honed to a particular environment—Chin men able to cross the area's dangerous rivers, Naga with the practice and endurance to traverse steep trails, Kachin who foraged for wild foods, or Tongan fishermen operating in home waters.[32] A point as seemingly minor as knowing which firewood burned without smoke could be lifesaving where newcomers lacked even basic familiarity with local resources. Australians stationed in New Britain at the start of war had no geographic training, so were lost when they fled the Japanese invasion. One desperately hungry group was literally lying in a garden: "The men were actually starving in a native food garden because nobody had taught them how to recognize tapioca."[33]

Everyday crafts gained value. Foreign observers were impressed at what British officer Harold Braund called the "sheer wizardry" of Kachins' speedy constructions of thatch and bamboo buildings. In interior Borneo, Dayaks helped an RAAF pilot fix his small plane, using their skill in bamboo construction to repair struts and fuselage. Where logistics failed, Indigenous technology was especially prized, as in upland Borneo where Z Force turned to spears and blowpipes when arms and ammunition grew scarce—one of Harrisson's platoons had eight rifles, five hand grenades, and ten blowguns. Indigenous knowledge could be appreciated even when the people themselves were absent. Japanese occupying Attu used the *barabaras* (underground houses) of Aleuts on Attu and followed the model in some of their own housing in that dangerous climate.[34]

Environmental knowledge meant acting with confidence in familiar surroundings. A common phrase in memoirs of officers who worked with Indigenous guerrillas or guides is that they had an "instinctive" knowledge or ability to move through the jungle, that they were "natural experts in jungle warfare," "among the greatest bushmen in the world."'[35] An Allied Intelligence Bureau unit in Borneo travelled for two hours unaware they were followed by some thirty Punans, until they revealed themselves, and Solomon Islands scouts on Guadalcanal regularly shadowed Japanese patrols. Japanese were equally appreciative. An IJA medical officer reported that "[Major] Yamamoto [at Buna, December 1943] praised the Takasago's [Aboriginal Taiwanese] expertise in jungle combat, their great spiritual strength, their fine-tuned senses of hearing and sight, their alertness in detecting enemy movements and airplanes, and their sharpshooting skills. In jungle combats in the South Seas, they demonstrated an ability several times greater than that of the Japanese soldiers . . . ."[36]

Praise might slip into fantasy. Kachin knowledge at times "seemed supernatural"; they were "masters of junglecraft, giving them what seemed to the Americans as an almost superhuman power to read the jungle."[37] In reality, their abilities were not due to any mystical qualities but to long-practiced skills and a trained eye. The fact that superb bush skills worked best on one's home turf became evident when people left it. After Braund's Chin Levies chased Japanese into the Gangaw Valley, he realized that their sense of direction in the Chin Hills was not instinctive but based on recognition of local landmarks. They began to get lost and Braund had to ensure that an officer with a compass led patrols.[38]

Military Appreciation of Homegrown Skill

Official recognition and publicity of useful skills helped change attitudes toward people who had been dismissed as "uncivilized." Among Allied troops, New

Guineans quickly became well-regarded as guides and intelligence agents, and incoming soldiers were given a pamphlet of instructions indicating the value of local people's bushcraft. Fijian commandos were praised for their expertise in jungle reconnaissance and were asked to train other troops.[39] Sámi knowledge of arctic navigation and survival was an acknowledged asset to all armies in the region. Sámi soldiers in Norway's Alta Battalion, accustomed to cold weather and mountains, brought along their own gear, including shoes of sedge-grass and fur; it was said, "of all the fighting men the Germans came up against in the north, they most feared 'those with hair on their feet'."[40]

Armies valued marksmanship, another homegrown skill, and quickly grasped the practical and intimidation value of Indigenous riflemen. The Soviet Army recognized the hunting and tracking skills of men from the arctic and subarctic. Khanty from western Siberia served as scouts, snipers, and ski patrol messengers. Yakuts "were said to be the Red Army's best marksmen because of their skill, as hunters, in shooting their quarry in the eye."[41] The link between hunting and war seems obvious, but it involves more than a good eye and good aim—it also needs camouflage, tracking, patience, reading the landscape and one's prey. Papua New Guinea historian August Kituai points out that police in New Guinea made their greatest contributions in guiding and intelligence rather than regular soldiering, because they "combined traditional fighting and hunting skills with modern forms of warfare."[42]

Patronizing or racist attitudes at times prevented militaries from making full use of the human resources available. Regular staff tended to resist irregular forces to begin with, an attitude intensified by racial prejudice. The US Army ignored and even harassed the Alaska Territorial Guard, which had large Inuit and Indian enrollment.[43] In Burma, the Japanese "found it difficult to see the Nagas and allied tribes as anything more than illiterate primitives"—their lack of caution allowed Naga workers to steal an operational map from a commander's tent, proving helpful to the British at Imphal and Kohima.[44] In the Southwest Pacific, scouts recast such assumptions about their naiveté into a weapon (chapter 3). Solomon Islands coastwatcher Sergeant Bill Bennett recounted how he tricked two Japanese soldiers who were passing around their loaded weapons to show off to villagers—Bennett examined a gun with pretended curiosity before turning it on the soldiers.[45]

Home Guards

Indigenous skills were also valued in homefront defense. In the North American arctic and subarctic, Canadian and US militaries formed special units to

leverage local knowledge and skills such as dog-sledding and cold weather survival. In northern Australia, sparsely settled and little known by whites, army patrols relied on Aboriginal Australian guides. Homefront deployment made Indigenous service visible to majority populations, and in these two cases led to their permanent postwar integration into military forces (chapter 14).

North America. The threat of Japanese invasion of Alaska and Canada's western coast and islands prompted local civil defense measures. In a Canadian initiative that drew nearly ten thousand volunteers, the Pacific Coast Militia Rangers (PCMR) was formed from 1942–1945 to manage grassroots coastal defenses and assist the Royal Canadian Mounted Police. Indians living in reserves along Canada's west coast volunteered in large numbers, attracting praise and publicity. (The Rocky Mountain Rangers, a reserve infantry regiment of the Canadian Army, also included two First Nations companies.) The PCMR later gave rise to the modern Canadian Rangers, established in 1947. The Rangers today run arctic "sovereignty patrols" (literally showing the Canadian flag), as well as search and rescue and emergency services, and also contribute to Indigenous cultural preservation and community development.[46]

The United States organized similar specialized units in Alaska. Besides enlisting in regular forces, Indigenous people were most involved with the Alaska Territorial Guard (ATG), which included several thousand Indians, Aleuts, and Inuit among its roughly twenty thousand men, women, and children. A smaller elite unit, the Alaska Scouts (Alaska Combat Intelligence Platoon), formed in November 1941 and included Aleuts and Inuit among the skilled outdoorsmen recruited for the Aleutian campaign.[47]

The ATG encouraged political education and organization, amplifying changes introduced by the large US Army presence in Alaska. Iñupiat leader John Schaeffer (who joined the Eskimo Scouts in 1957 and later became Adjutant General of the Alaska National Guard and chairman of the Alaska Federation of Natives) credited the ATG with being an "incubator" for Native leadership. The ATG was disbanded in 1947, but in 1949 the Alaska Legislature re-established the Alaska National Guard. It took on Cold War roles, including village-based surveillance units that trained with the regular National Guard and army. These have fostered village leadership, economies, and social life, and are widely supported. By the 1990s, about 1,500 Yu'pik, Iñupiat, and Athabascan Natives served in Scout battalions of the Alaska Army National Guard.[48]

Northern Australia. Fears of invasion of north Australia spiked when Japan invaded New Guinea and nearby islands, and after the first bombings of Darwin and Broome in February and March 1942. An effort was made to fortify Darwin, but limited manpower could not monitor the north's extensive coast and

islands.[49] The navy's coastwatching network included Aboriginal Australians, but though the army also needed their skills for reconnaissance it was stymied by its policy of not recruiting Aboriginal Australian soldiers. A sort of solution was to engage their services without formal enlistment in two special units. (Torres Strait Islanders were enlisted in the army's Torres Strait Force, chapter 2.)

In August 1941, the army asked anthropologist and RAAF officer Donald Thomson to develop a "Northern Territory Special Reconnaissance Unit" manned by Arnhem Land men. Thomson's official personnel consisted of six Solomon Islanders, two white NCOs, a Torres Strait Islander soldier, and one Aboriginal Australian, Raiwalla. The eventual roster of fifty-one spent sixteen months from February 1942 training and patrolling parts of Arnhem Land, until the threat of invasion waned. Those not formally enlisted were paid only in tobacco and trade goods—a bargain for the government—but received no wages and were not eligible for veterans' benefits. (Not until 1992 were survivors and families awarded medals and back pay.)[50] Years after the war, when historian Noah Riseman talked with Yolngu veterans, he contrasted the views of white Australians—who for the most part saw the men's war work as cheap labor and a way to protect Australia—with the Yolngu's own views: they saw themselves not so much as serving the Australian Army, but as allies protecting their own lands.[51]

A second unit using Aboriginal skills was the 2/1st North Australia Observer Unit (NAOU) led by anthropologist W. E. H. Stanner, a surveillance force of 465 white Australian soldiers, fifty-nine Aboriginal men, and some women, who made months-long patrols of the northern bush and coast by foot, horseback, and boat. The Aboriginal Australians worked as un-enlisted workers and guides. NAOU's long patrols could not have succeeded without them, a fact acknowledged by the white men. "You always felt safe when you had an Aborigine with you," recalled Des Harrison, "You knew that you wouldn't starve." Alan Kearney said, "The Aboriginal guides were great blokes. We had a lot of trust in them and on most patrols they were leading us." Yet racial hierarchy is also evident, with the Aboriginal Australians treated poorly and paid poorly, sometimes only in tobacco and clothing or goods. The NAOU disbanded in late 1943 as the need to defend northern Australia abated. Its modern descendant, NORFORCE, is one of three Army Regional Force Surveillance Units (RFSUs, see chapter 14), which recruits Aboriginal Australians for service in areas crucially requiring local knowledge.[52]

Guerrilla Warfare

The challenges of difficult, largely unmapped terrain and the need for hunting and tracking skills combined in guerrilla warfare, especially in the Asia-Pacific theater. While the Japanese Army had some training in jungle fighting,

evidenced by their early success in Malaya, Burma, and New Guinea, Allies were caught unprepared. The British Army of the time was much less willing than the Japanese to use unconventional tactics, take advantage of local circumstances, or live off the land.[53] Balfour Oatts, who led Chin Levies, tells a story from his prewar years in the British Frontier Force: After leading a punitive expedition against Naga villages, he reported to the commander, describing his "encounters with headhunters armed with spears and bows and arrows . . . At the end of my discourse the General dismissed me a little abruptly: 'Humph! All very interesting. No military lessons—none. Thanks for coming—'day.'"[54] In fact, much of the war in Burma was fought in small irregular actions, using those same local people as auxiliaries. There were indeed lessons in how Naga fought, but it took years for the Allies to learn them.

Those lessons helped shape modern guerrilla warfare. Kachin, for example, used their own tactics of stealth and surprise against Japanese incursion. Allied infantry working with them learned this new way of fighting and integrated it with their own. Kachin excelled at staging ambushes; they moved through the forest, not only along established paths; they staged the corpses of sentries to frighten the enemy. As they joined British or US units and benefited from additional training, weapons, and supplies, their methods developed, and they got even better at ambushes and booby traps such as pits and tripwires. "The Kachin," in one OSS officer's assessment, "were simply ideal guerrilla fighters."[55]

As behind-the-lines operations expanded, tactics were systematized and improved, and training schools established. OSS sent Kachin Rangers to a camp at Nazira (Assam, India) where they studied espionage, communications, weapons, and Japanese military organization.[56] In turn, Indigenous soldiers served as teachers. Kachin men instructed Allied soldiers in survival and warfare. Naga taught "jungle craft" to Chinese and OSS personnel at Nazira, where the course ended in a three-day hike capped by a Naga headman hosting a dinner and party to familiarize them with hill tribe culture. After victory at Imphal-Kohima, Ursula Bower, her Naga assistant Namkia, and fifteen ex-scouts taught at a jungle training school. In the Southwest Pacific, American officers and NCOs trained with Fiji Commandos.[57]

Allied armies may have begun World War II skeptical of unconventional tactics, but their appreciation grew rapidly and fed into later wars. American officers who fought alongside Indigenous guerrillas in the Philippines, Burma, and elsewhere helped lay the foundations for special forces in the Korean War and Vietnam.[58] Changes that British and Australian armies made to confront the Japanese served them well in postwar counterinsurgency fights, starting

with the Malayan Emergency. Innovations during North African campaigns—the Long-Range Desert Groups, SAS (Special Air Service, formed in 1941 as a British commando unit), and Ethiopian patriots—contributed to British special forces. The biography of Orde Wingate, organizer of the Chindits and a founding figure in guerrilla warfare, embeds him in the long history of British military interaction with Indigenous people. Wingate was fourth generation British Army; his father had fought Nagas. Wingate led Sudanese and Ethiopian irregulars earlier in his career before he recruited Burma hill tribes as Chindit allies. During the Malayan Emergency, Wingate's Chindit second-in-command Michael Calvert advised on counterinsurgency and in July 1950 established the Malayan Scouts, which became part of the revival of the British SAS.[59] In this way, Indigenous warfare entered the regular military's armamentarium.

Use of Indigenous Languages

Invading and colonial armies have always used local languages in their operations; Indigenous languages were more systematically weaponized in twentieth century wars. In World War I, the US Army experimented with battlefield communications in Europe, using Choctaw, Comanche, Sioux, and other languages on a small scale.[60] The idea was expanded in World War II, with more than a dozen languages.

The US codetalker program is the best-known use of Indigenous languages in that war, but not the only one. Canadian Indians at the Battle of Normandy passed radio messages in Cree, though Canada had no formal codetalker program. Moroccan troops in Europe used a tribal language for radio transmissions. The Māori Battalion used their own language among themselves and added a code for further security on the battlefield. In New Guinea's Sepik District, Australian-employed sentries could call openly from ridge to ridge, since Japanese did not understand them. Scouts on Vella Lavella (Solomon Islands) wrote reports in their own language to protect captured messages, and on Bougainville two white settler coastwatchers radioed in the Kavieng language they both knew. Servicemen and women in many places used home languages to communicate—and still do, no doubt.[61]

In US forces, Navajo, Hopi, Comanche, Oneida, Chippewa, and Meskwaki speakers trained for communications, and these and other languages were also used informally on battlefields. Comanches made up the initial organized codetalking unit—the first radio message from the Normandy beaches on D-Day was in Comanche.[62] The largest program was the Navajo Marine codetalkers in the Pacific theater. In his memoir, Chester Nez recalls that only after basic

FIGURE 6.1. Original description: "Corporal Henry Bake, Jr., (left) and Private First Class George H. Kirk, Navajo Indians serving with a Marine Signal Unit, operate a portable radio set in a clearing they've just hacked in the dense jungle close behind the front lines." Bougainville, December 1943. (USMC, National Archives photo no. 593415).

training did the first group learn why they had been recruited. "I read expressions of shock on every face. A code based on the Navajo language? After we'd been so severely punished in boarding school for speaking it?" Certainly the recruits realized the irony. The Navajo-base code was first used in combat on Guadalcanal, and despite initial skepticism, was judged a success, cutting the time needed to send and receive messages from four hours to two and a half minutes.[63]

By war's end, all but thirty of the 450 Navajo codetalkers saw action.[64] Besides the shared danger of combat, they suffered the added strain of being irreplaceable, always needed for the next invasion: first Guadalcanal, then Bougainville, Guam, Peleliu, Angaur. From 1942 to 1945, Nez was allowed no leave. It is no surprise that he spent time recovering in a hospital after returning home. Navajos also faced the problem of looking different from their white comrades. Harry Tsosie was shot by an American who mistook him for a Japanese one night, and Nez and three other codetalkers were held at riflepoint by a sentry on Angaur. Navajo soldier Joe Kieyoomia had the inverse problem: he was taken prisoner

on Bataan and tortured and interrogated by Japanese who were certain he could interpret the code—but, though he recognized the language, he had not trained as a codetalker and the extra layer of coding made it incomprehensible.[65]

Codetalkers were used to a lesser extent in Korea and initially in Vietnam—in fact, several sons of Peleliu veterans served as codetalkers in Vietnam.[66] But the program was largely forgotten and remained invisible to the public until computer encryption made it obsolete and the information was declassified in 1968. The men received wide recognition over the next decades, with national honors, movies—and, in 1999, a Mattel GI Joe codetalker action figure voiced by veteran Sam Billison. The codetalkers' history has helped publicize all Native American World War II service.[67]

Codes in Navajo or Comanche truly were unbreakable, and Ibans and Kachins excelled as guides and guerrillas because they did indeed know their home territory and how to fight in it. But praise was not necessarily based on accurate knowledge. As the next chapter shows, a different consequence emerged when the image of the "primitive"—rather than the reality of Indigenous skills—took precedence. Cultural stereotypes of "warrior races" entered into military decisions, sometimes causing great harm.

CHAPTER 7

"Martial Myths" and Native Realities

THE IDEA OF "MARTIAL races"—judging ethnic groups in terms of their "fighting qualities"—was refined in the context of the nineteenth century British Army in India and later expanded to colonial armies across Asia and Africa.[1] The "martial myth" denoting men of some groups as warriors (such as Native Americans, Māori, or Kachins) and others as peaceloving or passive (Orang Asli, Aboriginal Australians) is a residue of colonial wars. Whether Indigenous people fought the intruders, withdrew into the jungle or desert, or were unable to mount significant resistance in the face of overwhelming invasion, their response was judged in histories written by the victors.[2] Those judgements echoed through the decades to shape their World War II experiences, and they still shape how national militaries engage with these groups as recruits, allies, or enemies.

The colonial perception of Indigenous warriors appears in another form in military heraldry featuring tribal images. The practice predates World War II, though that war added new examples, such as Māori Battalion symbols and the "crossed head-hunting swords" on postwar Chin Rifle badges.[3] A few North American units carried (and still carry) Native names and symbols because of histories of Indigenous enlistment—such as the Canadian Army's Algonquin Regiment and the US Army's 45th Infantry ("Thunderbird") Division[4]—but other uses are disconnected from actual Indigenous presence, for example the two-dozen-plus "tribal-class" destroyers built for British and Commonwealth navies between 1937–45 with such names as the *Athabaskan*, *Arunta*, *Maori*, *Bedouin*, *Eskimo*, *Zulu*, *Iroquois*, and *Haida*. Tracing Native imagery in US armed forces, Al Carroll argues that the fact that Native Americans are the only ethnic group whose symbols are systematically used reflects the public's sense of both admiration and guilt.[5] The custom recognizes Indigenous fighting ability, while subordinating it to national control.

Native Americans on the Front Lines

The stereotype of Native Americans as courageous, even reckless fighters, based on the image of the nineteenth century Plains Indian warrior, left real Native Americans vulnerable to dangerous deployments. Canadian Indians, too, whose World War I excellence as snipers, scouts, and in raiding parties had been noted, were again used in these hazardous roles in World War II. The "warrior" image proliferated, with media and commanders lauding their "natural" fighting ability, acute senses, wayfinding, and other traits.[6] Fantasy admiration for "innate" skills could have lethal results when men were given risky assignments, leading to heavy casualties as well as many awards for heroism. For example, one of the select teams parachuted in to attack Normandy's cliffs on D-Day consisted of thirteen Southwestern Indians, chosen based on stereotypes of Indian rock-climbing skills, balance, and courage. Only two lived through it.[7]

Tom Holm (a Creek/Cherokee scholar and Vietnam veteran) calls this the "Indian Scout Syndrome," and it persisted through later wars, with Native Americans disproportionately assigned roles such as long-range patrols or "walking point" (taking the first, most exposed position). Indians often tried to live up to such heroic images, which could put them in even greater peril.[8] In Holm's interviews with Vietnam War veterans, "Most American Indian infantrymen stated flatly that they were ordered to walk point time and again because of white stereotypes"—for example, that they had especially good eyesight, so were sent into tunnels, or that they were at home in the forest, even if they had grown up in a city. Obviously, such abilities are not innate; the idea that putting an Indian on point as a "tactically sound maneuver. . . would be laughable," Holm says, "had it not been so dangerous for the men who had to do it."[9]

Of course, sometimes rural-reared men did in fact have greater skills or self-confidence in certain situations. When US Navy aircrewman Oliver Rasmussen survived a July 1945 crash on Hokkaido, he used lessons learned growing up on the northern Wisconsin Chippewa Reservation to stay alive and free until the end of the war.[10] Paratrooper Earl Ervin McClung (Colville Tribes) with the 82nd Airborne in Normandy, recognized the "syndrome" named by Holm: "I was a first scout. Being an Indian and from a reservation you were automatically a first scout. . . . They had been trying to kill us for two hundred years so why change it?" But he also said he volunteered for patrols to protect his comrades, because he thought he could do a better job.[11] Certainly Native American

soldiers received praise for their service, and many were singled out for honors. But the pressure to perform according to historical stereotype was dangerous.

These ideas followed individual Native Americans into their units, where they generally felt well-integrated, though their identity was invariably marked by the nickname "chief."[12] Like other ethnic nicknames of the time, calling a man "chief" linked his military role with his identity. But did this reflect admiration and respect, or the opposite? "I didn't mind the nickname 'Chief.'" Chester Nez recalled. "We didn't think of it as a slur. We knew we were well respected as fighting men. We laughed and joked with our fellow Marines, giving back as much as we took." Joseph Medicine Crow recalls the time he was told to retrieve a box of ammunition atop a hill loaded with land mines and under German mortar fire: "The CO [commanding officer] said, 'Well, Chief'—he always called me Chief—'I guess if anybody can get through, you can. Get six men and go up there.'" But the use of "chief" also highlights the fact that most of their comrades had never met an Indian before and knew little or nothing of tribal identities. When Hollis Stabler heard about the Normandy invasion on the radio: "They mentioned the name Omaha Beach. I said, 'Omaha Beach?' I was thinking, '*Well, I'm an Omaha Indian!*' But of course, no one knew I was an Omaha Indian. The entire time I was in the army, *no one ever asked me what tribe I was from*, except other Indians of course, so I just kept silent. They always called me Chief . . . ." [italics in original].[13]

If most Americans were ignorant of the facts of Native American history and identity, all were familiar with the stereotypes, the story of the Western frontier retold in schoolbooks, novels, and popular films. That story had its own implications for Americans at war.

"Frontier" Metaphors

Recall the account in the previous chapter of when American journalist Eric Sevareid met the Nagas who rescued him and other plane-crash survivors. Sevareid's first impulse on seeing the group of men approaching was to raise his hand in a peace gesture and say "How," as if he were in a 1930s Hollywood Western. His description of Nagas begins with mental references to Native Americans, though later (after spending time with them), he notes that they "Certainly have nothing in common with Indians of the plains."[14] Indeed, why should they? For no reason except a general frame of "the primitive" or "the savage" which, for American Sevareid, was rooted in images of Native Americans of the Great Plains at the height of the Indian Wars.

Perhaps the pervasiveness of this theme in popular culture explains why Native American references are applied to Indigenous fighters around the globe. The official US Army history of the China-Burma-India theater describes Kachins as "a great fighting stock" and "expert woodsmen" who "reminded some of those Americans who worked with them of the American Indian in his greatest days." It was not only Americans who carried this metaphor into tribal encounters. A battalion commander remarked about Aboriginal Australian Army officer Reg Saunders's excellent bush and jungle skills in New Guinea: "He was made to order for this type of fighting; he moved silently, like a Red Indian, and his inherent knowledge of the bush made him a tremendous asset." Germans shared the stereotype—Hitler warned his eastern front that Soviet soldiers fought like Indians.[15]

"Indian Wars" symbolism continues in modern conflicts. Tom Holm's work offers many examples from the Vietnam War. A Seneca veteran recounted: "When I got to the bush, my platoon sergeant tells me and the guys I came in with that we were surrounded. He said: 'The gooks are all out there and we're here. This is Fort Apache, boys, and out there is Indian country.' Can you fuckin' believe that? To me? I should have shot him right then and there. Made me wonder who the real enemy was."[16] The metaphor's timeline extends to later military operations. The "Kit Carson" program used in Vietnam (employing former Viet Cong as scouts for US infantry) was suggested for Iraq, where, Al Carroll notes, "The Second Iraq War marks the fifth war in U.S. history where war supporters have invoked the image of the enemy as 'Indians' and have used Wild West imagery."[17]

Indeed, the ongoing relevance of nineteenth century wars goes beyond metaphor. An argument has been made for direct historical links among patterns of frontier imperialism worldwide. Army officers fighting Native Americans in the late nineteenth century studied European expansions in Africa and Asia to find procedures for containing tribes. Recycled Indian Wars strategies then travelled with the US Army to the Philippines, where they were used to control "frontier" tribal groups in the highlands and then in the war against Philippine independence—in fact, many officers and men who fought in the Philippines were veterans of the Indian Wars. Filipino patriots called on the same model, saying they would withdraw to the mountains and fight as Indians did if necessary.[18] Aspects of American policy and rhetoric in Vietnam echoed the Philippines conflict, a further link in the chain. Connections between their own history and imperialism abroad were not lost on Native American leaders, who became increasingly concerned with US foreign policy during the Cold War era.[19]

The Japanese Empire drew on the same conceptual model of an expanding frontier. By classifying both Ainu and Taiwan's Aborigines as *dojin* or "savages," Tomonori Sugimoto explains, the two groups "became commensurable not only with each other but also with other indigenous peoples all over the world." Japan's nineteenth century Ainu policy was modeled in part on Western colonialism and US Indian policy, combining dispossession and legal control with assimilationist education and social welfare. Ainu policy then became a model for policies imposed on Taiwan and Korea, as when the colonial government looked to the way Hokkaido and Karafuto had Japanized Ainu names, for a similar task in Korea.[20]

These historical links center on the cultural idea of the frontier, which is not only a place where nations seek to expand their borders but also a place of violence, where combat does not follow the lawful customs of war. The "wild people" of these "wild places" cast fearful shadows, images used as weapons in the field and in the propaganda war. But, in the brutality of battle, is there a difference between "primitive" and "civilized" war? The presence of Indigenous people on World War II's front lines offered a symbolic focus to men struggling with that question.

Transgressive Practices in a Savage War

In the "wild places" new to Allied and Japanese servicemen, primitivizing stereotypes acted as shorthand to describe unfamiliar peoples, and soldiers scared themselves with stories of nearby savagery. The official US Army history of the 1943–1944 attack on Rabaul describes Islanders this way: "The native inhabitants [of these islands] are Melanesians, most of them barely beyond the Stone Age. Cannibalism and headhunting were suppressed only recently . . .." In East New Britain, a downed American pilot so feared going into hiding with local people that he contacted the Japanese instead. An OSS Detachment 101 training was held in the Naga Hills, described as a place where, "The terrain was rough and the Nagas still practiced headhunting"; the group must have felt let down when the supposedly bloodthirsty Nagas called in the civil authorities, who surrounded the trainees as suspected spies. Japanese soldiers were influenced by the same images. Fujioka Akiyoshi's field artillery company succumbed to a Moro surprise attack soon after landing on Jolo in the Philippines in October 1944: "Fujioka wrote that dead soldiers had their weapons, clothing, gold teeth, and raw livers plucked from them. Thus did he come to regard the Moro people as 'a fiendish race' of 'natives' (*dojin*)."[21]

Such fear could be a useful weapon. The heavily Native American US Army "Thunderbird" Division was used to intimidate unruly Nazi POWs in Italy, an assignment aided by rumors of Native American soldiers taking scalps.[22] Journalists highlighted how Māori Battalion bayonet attacks frightened German and Italian troops. The Kachin practice of cutting off ears of the dead to record the number killed had an added advantage of terrorizing Japanese soldiers.[23]

In Europe, the image of the "savage" particularly harmed colonial troops, like the Tirailleurs Sénégalais prisoners murdered by German soldiers who felt "hatred and fear" of them—a precursor, historian Raffael Scheck argues, to the barbarization of the Wehrmacht and SS that led to larger-scale massacres of Jews, Slavs, and others later in the war.[24] On the Allied side, the "savage" image pervaded the contemporary press and the later historical treatment of Moroccan Goumiers. These ethnic units of the Free French Army, made up of Berbers from the Atlas Mountains, fought as Allies in North Africa and through Europe. US Army officer Edward Bimberg encountered Goumiers in Corsica in January 1944, where they "looked like something out of the *Arabian Nights*" with their djellabas, horses, and "vicious-looking knives." They were "perhaps the most effective mountain infantry of World War II—and certainly the most colorful"—and they were also notorious. As with other irregulars, commanders' praise of their skill and hardihood were balanced by complaints of poor discipline and unreliability. Stories circulated of them slicing off ears and slashing the throats of sentries, even taking heads as trophies. Crimes against civilians in Italy perpetrated by a few men badly harmed their reputation despite battlefield success. Historian Driss Maghraoui writes, "This paradoxical view of the *goumiers* as both 'good' soldiers and 'savage' fighters became a standard characteristic of their representation."[25]

The idea that Indigenous soldiers were more "savage" than Westerners or Japanese is sadly ironic, considering the scale and ferocity of two world wars. But in specific locales, the savage/civilized dichotomy shaped military decisions. Anthropologist Simon Harrison argues that it gave rise to the idea that reprisals in kind were allowable when confronting "savage" enemies, a justification for actions not acceptable in "civilized" European warfare.[26] Balfour Oatts declined to attend Chin ceremonies for taking Japanese heads but did not discourage it: "Had we been fighting a civilized enemy it would have been another matter and I certainly should not have allowed it. The [Japanese], however, had introduced bestial practices into war as part of their stock-in-trade . . . ." As to IJA or INA men, "I did not mind how many of their heads were chopped off, so long as I

did not have to do it myself."[27] Oatts's serene conscience has its roots in what Harrison describes as a colonial-era "division of labor" between European and tribal soldiers—essentially, outsourcing savagery to others, who did things that European soldiers were "unwilling or forbidden" to do. This let the European military "preserve a distinction between civilization and savagery, while at the same time violating it."[28]

The reality of war, however, dissolved assumptions about who was savage and who was civilized. Recall General Sir William Slim's praise of the "gallant Nagas" serving at Kohima, speaking of them as "gentlemen" who often refused payment for their loyal service (chapter 2).[29] On the other hand, modern war makes the signs of savagery—torture, mutilation, genocide, rape—all too visible. In a story from Guadalcanal, after vicious hand-to-hand fighting, US Marines cut off three Japanese heads and put them on poles facing the enemy. When the Regimental Commander saw the heads, he said, "Jesus, men, what are you doing? You're acting like animals." One replied, "That's right, Colonel, we are animals. We live like animals, we eat and are treated like animals—what the fuck do you expect."[30]

Headhunting and Cannibalism

Headhunting, the archetypal symbol of savage warfare, was not limited to Indigenous fighters. The Japanese used beheading as a method of execution, some African colonial troops were rumored to decapitate enemies, and American soldiers took Japanese skulls and other trophies. Head-taking symbolism was understood by all parties and was used for deliberate effect: According to Balfour Oatts, a British official in Burma was "packed off to the United Kingdom" after he encased half a dozen Japanese heads in oil drums and sent them to the commander as a critique of military inaction.[31]

One can hardly exaggerate the fascination of both Westerners and Asians with headhunting, a shortcut term for everything encoded in the "primitive" stereotype. War-era writing usually presents it as an incomprehensible custom, but in the decades since scholars have developed a more sophisticated understanding.[32] Taking heads in war or for sacrifice has a long history across the arc of Southeast Asia's tribal cultures, and foreigners turned the practice to their own purposes. Allied officials paid Nagas for heads of Japanese paratroopers, and decapitated Japanese bodies were found during the battle of Kohima. The OSS even planned—but never implemented—mobilizing Naga guerrillas, capitalizing on their past as headhunters (described in a memo headed "Assam Headhunters, Immediate

Utilization of," 14 April 1944).[33] The Japanese also benefited from the custom. Tokuhei Miura, searching a village in Burma, "encountered an inhabitant dangling the freshly severed heads of two Englishmen" and Tom Harrisson described how, when Tagal people of inland Borneo handed over four downed American airmen to Japanese, they were given a reward and allowed to keep the heads.[34]

Timor and Borneo also saw a limited revival of the practice, which had been suppressed under British and Dutch rule. Ibans allied with Tom Harrisson in Borneo saw killing Japanese as different from prewar practice, but elders still conducted the appropriate head-taking rituals. When a landing field was built to supply Z Force, men brought Japanese "fresh heads" to Harrisson's headquarters to boost the airstrip's spiritual power.[35]

In the Philippines too, US and Filipino guerrilla officers employed Indigenous groups with headhunting traditions. Lieutenant Donald Blackburn (whose unit's nickname was "Blackburn's Headhunters") was protected by Igorots in north central Luzon and enlisted them as reliable and successful guerrillas. Blackburn found decapitated Japanese corpses at the site of a battle in which Igorot played a role, and in one action, "a company of headhunters" captured a truck convoy and brought back all the trucks and a bulldozer, along with six heads, explaining that Blackburn had asked for proof of enemy killed. Where this tradition existed, it did not exist only for tribesmen. One of Lieutenant Ed Ramsey's Filipino guerrillas displayed the heads of two Japanese on a captured jeep; he apologized to Ramsey, saying that Japanese had captured his brother and tortured him to death. Ramsey replied that he would square things with the general, "but that nothing like this must ever happen again. 'We're not guerillas anymore,' I added. 'This is the American army now, and they don't understand these things.'"[36]

Like headhunting, cannibalism was a fixed image in the minds of foreigners deployed to the Southwest Pacific. The "ready-made stereotype of Islanders"[37] persisted through and beyond the war years, resistant to the reality of Islander lives. It is true that forms of cannibalism, like headhunting, had historically been part of some island cultures, but in World War II, factual charges of cannibalism accrue more often to starving Japanese.[38] Taiwanese Aboriginal Takasago volunteers—men the Japanese public had characterized as headhunting savages—were horrified by the cannibalism by imperial troops that they saw or heard about in New Guinea. Anthropologist Chih-huei Huang argues that the inversion of power between Japanese and themselves—especially Japanese stooping to cannibalism—confirmed the Indigenous men's sense of being truly Japanese in virtue. They served as low-ranking porters in the first part of the war, but in

the straitened times near its end even officers had to depend on the Takasagos' survival skills. Cannibalism revealed the same upset, in a moral sense.[39]

Trophy-Taking

Trophy-taking is another practice not uncommon on the battlefield, but when applied to body parts (rather than, say, flags or weapons), especially by an enemy, soldiers and the public saw it as barbaric. Simon Harrison describes US servicemen collecting souvenirs of Japanese dead as part of the "race war" aspect of the Asia-Pacific War (taking body trophies was less common on European battlefields). Trophies—even skulls—were given as gifts to families, friends, and others, an act Harrison links with European and American custom of keeping or selling body parts from lynchings or criminal executions as a form of racialized justice or retribution.[40]

Trophy-taking continued despite directives banning it. Immediately after—and even during—the Battle of Peleliu, US Marines stripped enemy dead of flags, sabers, and pistols, took snapshots of the dead, pulled out their gold teeth, and severed ears or other body parts. Rear-echelon servicemen risked their lives to get souvenirs and souvenir-hunters hampered the work of collecting documents and weapons from dead enemies.[41] E. G. Sledge's memoir describes how "The men gloated over, compared, and often swapped their prizes. It was a brutal, ghastly ritual the likes of which have occurred since ancient times on battlefields where the antagonists have possessed a profound mutual hatred. . . . It wasn't simply souvenir hunting or looting the enemy dead, it was more like Indian warriors taking scalps."[42] But here again the "Indian" metaphor misleads. Scalping in its original cultural context had a particular purpose, including use in ceremonies. In World War II, some Indian combatants took a personal token such as a piece of clothing from enemy dead as a requirement for cleansing rituals—like the Enemy Way held for Chester Nez (chapter 4).[43] Trophy-taking by non-Indian soldiers arose from a grimmer source.

Trophy-taking and body counts intersect in unsettling ways that confuse any savage/civilized distinction. During the postwar Malayan Emergency (see below), British forces retrieved bodies of Communist dead for identification. The military had argued for taking just heads and hands, but government nixed that idea because of the propaganda risk. British-employed Dayak trackers from Borneo sometimes decapitated enemy dead, until publicity about their activity, especially rumors that they were permitted or even rewarded for it, drew protests. The propaganda risk was realized when *The Daily Worker* (a Communist

newspaper in Britain) in 1952 published shocking photographs of British servicemen posing with severed heads and with dead bodies and body parts in a parody of game-hunting photos.[44]

Such trophy-taking, Harrison says, seems to recur with new generations and new wars— fading from public memory after the Pacific War, re-emerging in Malaya and later in Vietnam, and again among US troops in Iraq and Afghanistan. Even where trophy-taking is prohibited and punished, Harrison argues, it is likely to recur in Euro-American militaries, so long as "war, hunting and masculinity" link in a repeated, though seldom explicit, cultural pattern.[45]

Post-World War II Deployment of Indigenous Combatants

As mention of Dayaks working with British troops in the Malayan Emergency indicates, militaries continued to deploy Indigenous people for their knowledge and skills after World War II. Many anticolonial independence fights and Cold War conflicts recruited them or trespassed into their territory, which is often located along borders and offers a hard-to-access refuge for insurgents and site for guerrilla warfare (chapter 11).

There is a pattern of Indigenous experience in these postwar situations, which echoes their involvement in World War II, and can be seen during the Malayan Emergency—the British term for the 1948–1960 conflict with Communists, among the earliest of postwar Southeast Asian conflicts fueled by decolonization. Orang Asli in Malaya's forests and highlands suffered from the destructive campaigns fought across their territory, which served as a base for insurgents. As in the Asia-Pacific War, both sides recruited Orang Asli allies and brought troops into their homelands; British and Commonwealth forces imposed disruptive policies including forced resettlement and destruction of gardens. World War II personnel continued in this new war, including British Army officers who had served with Indigenous guerrillas in Southeast Asia.[46] And, as in the previous war, the Orang Asli goal was to survive the violence that foreigners forced on their homelands.

Other Indigenous groups were drawn into nationalist and Cold War conflicts that followed World War II in Asia and Africa. Aborigines were among the Taiwanese recruited by the Kuomintang for the fight against the Communist Party in mainland China; some were stranded there as the Nationalists retreated. The Dutch rebuilt their colonial army to fight Indonesian independence, recruiting soldiers from ethnic groups that had served in it before the war and adding new ones, such as Toraja men in the Celebes. French counterinsurgency in Algeria

and Indochina used Indigenous forces.[47] Armed struggles for independence in southern Africa from the 1960s through the 1980s entangled politically marginal groups who had little ideological commitment to either side. Facing the southern African desert, the kind of "wild place" discussed at the start of this chapter, insurgents and counterinsurgency leaders made the practical choice to foster local expertise (San, Shangaan, Pygmy). The South African Defence Force used San Bushmen as trackers and soldiers, incorporated them into special forces, and employed them in covert operations.[48] Their treatment resembles the way British used Indigenous trackers and soldiers in Malaya and Kenya, French in Indochina and Algeria, Americans in Vietnam and Laos, and Portuguese in Angola, Guinea, and Mozambique. The use of Indigenous forces has become a standard part of counterinsurgency strategy worldwide.

It is abundantly clear, though, that even when Indigenous people have no role in combat, they are in danger when foreigners' conflicts spill across their territories.[49] In the next chapter, we turn to how World War II affected civilian life as the contending powers fought across Indigenous lands.

CHAPTER 8

Collateral Damages

Civilian Life in Wartime

INDIGENOUS COMMUNITIES EXPERIENCED MUCH more during wartime than combat. Like other civilians across the globe, they endured displacement, foreign occupation, and shortages of food and goods; they were drawn or forced into labor and suffered violence and mistreatment; a generation of youths lost normal life and schooling and those who survived gained new knowledge and skills. While it would be impossible to discuss all these topics, this chapter indicates the scope of non-combat impacts of relocation, economic disruption, and militarization, especially in combat zones.

Displacement and Relocation: Out of Harm's Way, Sometimes

Where there was enough time and authorities thought it feasible, both Allies and Axis evacuated civilians from potential battlegrounds. In Western Egypt, the majority of some thirty thousand coastal Bedouin were moved in 1940 ahead of the North African campaign. In Australia, parts of the north coast were evacuated after air raids early in 1942, scattering people far from home. In northeast India, as the Japanese Army marched through Naga villages and British forces shelled and bombed them, people took refuge in less-affected areas. War in the Pacific spread waves of displacement across islands as rapidly shifting front lines disrupted life. In the Solomon Islands, Abel Recka recalled, "It was as if we were standing in the fire. We didn't know what would happen tomorrow. We didn't know where was mother, where were the children. Running around like chickens, looking for a rock to shelter us."[1]

Some did not wait for orders to evacuate, but simply escaped ahead of invading armies. Orang Asli in Malaya's forests fled efforts to conscript their labor or resettle them throughout World War II and then the Malayan Emergency; some

lived "on the run" for two decades.[2] It was US bombing of a nearby Japanese base that drove Nasioi of Bougainville out of their village, "living in the bush 'olsem [like] wild pigs.'" Refugees fleeing bombing or invasion intruded on Indigenous lands, as in Ceylon (Sri Lanka) and the Philippines, where civilians and army stragglers from the coast fled to island interiors, home to mountain tribes.[3]

Military construction caused displacements, as facilities were built and abandoned and built again in new locales (chapter 10). In Papua and New Guinea, Japanese and Allied army maneuvers caused numerous relocations; an estimated sixty-one thousand people were displaced for Allied installations alone.[4] Even indirect military presence could displace the vulnerable. In southern Africa, two British Royal Air Force flight cadets disappeared in the Kalahari Desert in 1943. San camped near the crash site were tried for murder. They were exonerated, but the government disarmed and removed hundreds of San from their traditional lands in the area.[5]

Decisions not to evacuate could also cause harm, leaving unprepared civilians to face invasion and undermining trust in a government that failed to protect them. Australia evacuated Europeans and Asians from the Torres Strait Islands—even the Protector of Islanders went south—but remaining Islanders lived under Australian Army rule and the threat of attack. In New Guinea and the Solomon Islands, the hasty departure of administrators and businessmen stranded tens of thousands of contract laborers at plantations or goldmines. They had to make their own way home, work for the Japanese, or find another way to survive until war's end.[6] Authorities may have thought the marginality of Indigenous people would protect them, as in the Andaman Islands, where British officials evacuated other residents ahead of Japanese invasion in March 1942. Perhaps the assumption was correct; a man named Loka set up a spy network during the occupation—"He being a tribal no body could reasonably suspect his activities."[7] But Indigenous people in contested territory suffered fully from the dangers of war.

When people were relocated "out of harm's way" of bombs or a battlefield, it does not mean no harm was done to them. Even the most benign relocation meant leaving familiar environments, and most wartime relocations were not benign. Those evacuated ahead of combat returned home to ruins and faced devastating psychological and economic losses. The next sections look more closely at consequential relocations from three combat zones: Sápmi, the Aleutian Islands, and Peleliu.

Sápmi

Sámi, especially in Finland and Norway, underwent several evacuations as front lines rolled across their homeland. In the Winter War, when the USSR attacked

Finland (November 1939), residents of Petsamo on the northeast border were taken to safer areas for several months. After Finland allied with Nazi Germany, the three-year-long Continuation War dislocated those living along the contested USSR-Finland border. The largest movement came when the September 1944 armistice obliged Finns to drive out the German Army (Lapland War), forcing evacuation of civilians living between the retreating army and its base in northern Norway.

In Finland, the Lapland War altered relations between local people and the German soldiers with whom many had formed amicable ties. The evacuation notice ordered people to leave immediately, taking only what they could carry; they had to kill, sell, or abandon livestock and property. With the help of German Army trucks and personnel—still seen as friendly at the start of their withdrawal—northern Finland was cleared in just over a week, an enormous achievement in the sparsely settled, roadless region. About 2,000 Sámi were among the 168,000 civilians who left, either to join other Sámi in neutral Sweden or to less familiar Ostrobothnia in southwest Finland. In northern Norway, though, many people evaded evacuation, distrusting Nazi orders and fearing new dangers. Norwegians, including Sámi, packed up and buried possessions, slaughtered reindeer and other stock, and fled—but about a third of the seventy-two thousand inhabitants hoped to wait out the German retreat, overwintering in forest or mountain hideouts to avoid the soldiers who continued to search for them.[8]

The evacuation, coming after years of other wartime stresses, separated and impoverished families. One Sámi villager recounted his losses: his mother had died before the war, his father died of illness as a refugee in Ostrobothnia, one sister's family was murdered by Soviet partisans attacking across the border, another sister had walked the family's cows to Sweden and stayed there to marry, a brother had taken his reindeer into the Lapland hills—leaving this fourteen-year-old and his younger brother to weather the evacuation with the help of other kin.[9]

Though the experience of Sámi evacuees who spent the 1944–1945 winter in southern Finland was difficult, even traumatic for some, it increased Sámi-Finnish interaction and changed postwar life. Many Sámi had never been to the south and spoke little Finnish. The unfamiliar landscape and farming lifestyle was disorienting, and prejudices of southern Finns made for a rough start. Refugees suffered from illness and high infant mortality. Nonetheless, many remembered Finns as hospitable hosts, sharing scarce food and treating evacuees well. Over time prejudices diminished and people adjusted. Older Sámi found solace in religious activities; the young enjoyed socializing and dances, and a

few married Finns. Many had some schooling in Finnish and quickly learned more, but language remained a problem for elders and brought home to Sámi the need to become fluent. *Birget,* the Sámi attitude of uncomplainingly coping with unavoidable change that had gotten them through the German occupation, helped them survive evacuation.[10]

During that evacuation winter, Sámi learned much about Finnish life, including practical knowledge about agriculture and economics that proved useful after the war. Finns in turn gained some appreciation of Sámi culture. For the first time, a large group of Sámi lived in one place, and they began to perceive themselves as a distinct group. This led to the founding in spring 1945 of Finland's first organization by and for Sámi, the Sámi Liitto, which immediately enrolled two hundred members. Formed to deal with evacuation and war damage, later advocating for economic and cultural goals, Sámi Liitto asserted their war service, demanding equal status for Sámi language and culture, "not out of pity but because Saami have earned it."[11]

Aleutian Islands

The people of the Aleutians saw their home become a battleground in June 1942. At the time, most Aleuts lived in small communities subsisting by hunting, fishing, trapping, and seasonal wage work, and had little communication with the mainland. Fortification of the Alaska coast began in 1941, with a US base at Dutch Harbor. Alaska became a defensive area, closed to travel and subject to censorship and blackout. Japan bombed Dutch Harbor on June 3–4, 1942, then invaded Kiska and Attu. Kiska held only ten US Navy personnel (two were killed, the others sent to Japan as POWs), but Attu's village of forty-two Aleuts was overwhelmed by 1,200 Japanese soldiers who occupied it for three months. In September, they removed the Attu people to Hokkaido where they lived as prisoners for the rest of the war, their fate unknown to relatives in Alaska.

The US government quickly evacuated Aleuts from the other Pribilof and Aleutian Islands. People on Atka were told to leave while breakfast was still on the table and clothes still in closets; a demolition crew then burned the village. The several hundred people in the Pribilofs were moved in a similar rush several days later. Like Sámi evacuees, Aleuts took only what they could carry. Hunting, fishing, and trapping equipment, boats, livestock, furniture—all had to be abandoned. A lack of planning and discord between military and civilian authorities led to improvised transport and housing for refugees, and racism added to the stress (for example, white civilians were allowed to stay on Unalaska but the military wanted Aleuts removed). Civilian and military officials even fought afterward about who should pay evacuation costs.[12]

Conditions in the hastily arranged relocation camps in mainland Alaska were poor, with inadequate accomodations, deficient diet, lack of medical care, disorganization, and overall neglect by the American government that had relocated the evacuees. They coped with hardships and homesickness by working available jobs, organizing their camps, and grappling with the many agencies competing to manage their lives.[13]

At war's end, the return of Aleutian and Pribilof Islanders was delayed by money issues, racism, and ongoing military-civilian squabbles. Most were not allowed back until April 1945, by which time as many as a quarter had died from tuberculosis, pneumonia, or other diseases. Even then, they were not necessarily allowed back to their original homes, and four villages were never permanently resettled. Homecoming was sobering. They had lost many personal possessions to Japanese attack, hasty evacuation, and US military use of their property. Distressingly, much of the destruction was by American soldiers and sailors, who looted souvenirs, vandalized Aleut homes, and even stole icons from churches.[14]

Last to return were the Attu internees held in Japan since September 1942. Crowded into a house in Otaru on the west coast of Hokkaido, nearly half died from illness and starvation. They kept up morale by celebrating the Russian Orthodox church calendar, resisting when they could, and keeping alive their desire to return and bring home the cremated remains of their dead. The twenty-five survivors returned to the United States months after war's end but were never allowed back to Attu; they were relocated elsewhere in the Aleutians.[15]

Scarred by their exile, Aleut elders seldom spoke of the war years, and the United States had its own reasons for silence. Only in the 1980s was this history acknowledged. But the evacuation changed Aleuts' relationship with the government. Despite separation and suffering, they kept their religious faith, worked together, and learned to protest effectively. Like Sámi, they became more aware of their place in the national order. For some, the experience turned into a decades-long fight for redress from the United States and Japan. Activists doggedly pursued reparations long after the end of the 1951 War Claims Commission, and in the 1980s succeeded in gaining a compensation trust, an apology from the US government, and public discussion of the racialized evacuation.[16]

Peleliu

After US victories at Saipan and Tinian in western Micronesia in mid-1944, Tokyo tightened its defensive ring closer to the home islands. Units stationed in the Palau Islands were left without reinforcement, subject to Allied blockade and bombing. The town of Koror on the largest island of Babeldaob, the capital of prewar Japanese Micronesia, was largely destroyed. Paluans and Japanese on Babeldaob

were struggling to survive starvation and continual air attack by the time the US Marines invaded the nearby small island of Peleliu in September 1944.

Peleliu Island had been changed by war well before then. From 1936 to the early 1940s, Japan sealed off the area to build an airfield and extensive fortifications. After the first air raids in March 1944, the military took over Peleliu's villages; civilians sheltered in caves and on the tiny Rock Islands, where they lived for five months. As bombing intensified, Japanese authorities asked Palauan chiefs to take in people from the outlying islands. The district of Ngaraard in northern Babeldaob volunteered to accept the thousand refugees from Peleliu and Angaur. In late August, two weeks before the US invasion, Peleliu's population was shuttled to Babeldaob, where they lived for the rest of the war—and most of them for much longer. Peleliu people today still commemorate the generosity of those in Ngaraard who harbored them.[17]

As the refugees crowded in with host families, Babeldaob, too, was under fire. Palauans sought safety in caves or camped in forests near their gardens. After securing Peleliu, the United States used its airfields to strafe and bomb Babeldaob every day and sometimes at night for the next year. Public life, from funerals to schools, ceased. Work had to be done after dark or between air raids; fishing was especially hazardous; Japanese commandeered food; hunger was constant. An estimated 150 to 225 Palauans died (of all causes) in the seventeen months Palau was under attack.[18]

Shortages and Starvation

Many Indigenous communities lived at the end of the import chain even under normal conditions, due to their geographic peripherality and lack of infrastructure. War disrupted imports, local markets, agriculture, and industry. The Chin Hills, where combat flowed back and forth for years, had imported much of its rice from lowland Burma; during the war, the food supply was severely damaged. Essential items supplied by trade for hundreds of years—salt, cloth, oil, iron—grew scarce. Colonial officer and levy leader Norman Kelly constantly pelted his superiors with demands for "salt for the Chins," a commodity he regarded as essential to retaining their alliance.[19]

Farther east, in Kachin country, the Northern Kachin Levies recruited so many young men that the labor shortage depressed rice crops. This, and Japanese destruction of villages, left many impoverished. Allies paid soldiers' wages in cash but there was nothing to buy with the silver. Late in the war, conditions were so bad that the Americans of OSS Detachment 101 had to support the

families of soldiers they recruited. As the IJA-INA retreated, Detachment 101 took on civil affairs roles until the British Civil Affairs Service returned, setting up policing, medical care, headmen's councils, and price controls, and parachuting in salt, that essential supply.[20]

Global logistics disturbed local economies, as combatant nations prioritized the war. Throughout the Pacific Islands, military needs hindered shipping, such as the copra exports on which small-scale island economies depended for income. Restrictions on imports, in turn, limited the militaries' ability to pay labor where items such as sailcloth, fishhooks, tools, and tobacco were more useful than cash.[21] One reason the Japanese struggled to keep porters was that they could not pay in desirable imported goods—especially compared to the avalanche of American supplies. In Borneo's interior, nomadic Punan foragers who normally had little to do with any colonial administration were motivated to fight Japanese because the occupation interrupted their access to tobacco and iron. Where local help was crucial, local forms of pay had to be ready: coastwatchers in the Southwest Pacific islands got twist tobacco, knives, calico, and beads in their supply drops; opium became part of the airdrops to guerrillas in Burma; sixty Torres Strait Islanders working for the Australians collected gold lip shells and cowries needed to pay laborers in New Guinea.[22]

Where trade ceased not just for months but for years, people wrestled with the lack of imported goods. Rural and Indigenous communities had the advantage, compared to urban populations, in being able to revive crafts and processes still familiar at least to elders to help deal with shortages. Micronesians resumed the use of plant leaves for soap and coconut oil for lamp fuel, but cloth was harder to replace. They retailored Japanese clothing, revived time-consuming traditional fiber arts, and repurposed mosquito netting, tarpaulins, canoe sails, or hospital bandages; women even at times traded sex with soldiers for clothing. Women in highland Sulawesi revived the arduous craft of barkcloth production. When a Japanese plane ditched off Santa Isabel (Solomon Islands), James Sao and some other men asked to cut out the cloth curtains in the plane's windows to use for clothing, before the crew blew up the wreck.[23] Parachutes were valuable resources, which guerrilla officers in highland Southeast Asia used as strategic gifts. Food was dropped with white parachutes; orange, red, and blue ones identified weapons and ammunition. Oreno Kikon, a Naga woman who worked at camps for Allied wounded, recalls asking friendly soldiers for the colorful parachutes, from which she sewed bedcovers, tablecloths, children's clothes, and scarves.[24]

The most dangerous shortage was of food, where markets were interrupted and people could not farm due to evacuation, bombing, invasion, loss of grain

stores and plow animals, or the absence of able-bodied men. In Pacific Island battlegrounds, the concentrated presence of tens of thousands of soldiers severely strained resources. Allied forces imported most of their food, but the Japanese expected to supplement rations from captured supplies or by buying or confiscating food. Units landing on New Guinea's north coast for the overland attack on Port Moresby were immediately sent to gather villagers' taro, sweet potatoes, pumpkins, coconuts, and pigs. Planners estimated they could extract 10 percent of local production without causing starvation, but the fourteen thousand troops in place in August–November 1942 were far more than the area could support. By the latter part of the war, Japanese and villagers alike suffered from the cumulative effects of months and years of hard labor, bombing, and food shortages. With supply lines cut, soldiers planted their own gardens, immediately targeted by Allied air attacks that also hit villagers' plots. To survive, Islanders cut small garden plots deep in the jungle, foraged wild foods, and if possible, stole from Japanese—a deadly game, since punishment was harsh or fatal. On many islands, the ruin of gardens and tree crops curtailed food supplies even into the postwar years, causing malnutrition, illness, and death. Population declines on Bougainville, New Britain, and New Ireland point to perhaps twenty thousand indirect victims of war on those islands.[25]

In garrisoned Micronesian islands blockaded by the US Navy, Japanese troop numbers far exceeded supplies, causing malnutrition and then starvation for soldiers and the Islanders trapped with them. Palau's wartime population consisted of about 29,700 Japanese soldiers and sailors and 14,300 settlers and conscript laborers, overwhelming the 5,500 Palauans and 200 other Micronesians. Chuuk Lagoon's roughly ten thousand Islanders shared the small land area with some thirty-eight thousand troops plus foreign civilians and military laborers. With resupply blocked, all had to be fed from local resources and dwindling stockpiles reduced by constant air-raid damage. Japanese officers politely sought help from chiefs, but also confiscated food and conscripted agricultural labor. In the final months of war, relations that had once been friendly or neutral in some places became desperate in the face of starvation.[26]

Militarization and Occupation: Life between the Lines

Some Indigenous communities in theaters of war could avoid the conflict. Sámi herder Jonar Jåma said he saw little of war as he herded his reindeer along the Norway-Sweden border and crossed to buy coffee, sugar, and flour in neutral Sweden. In interior Borneo, Meratus Dayaks watched Japanese columns march

across their lands and tried to avoid contact, skirting the main trails and offering food and promises of help to appease soldiers of any side who visited them. Many of the hundreds of inhabited islands in the Southwest Pacific were not invaded but were isolated from trade and colonial governance for the duration of war.[27]

But avoidance was not an option near front lines and where martial law was imposed on civilian populations. Wartime regulation even of travel and social activities dominated life in places that had previously had relatively little government oversight. In rural Australia, fears of invasion and suspicion of Aboriginal Australian loyalty led the army to seek to control Indigenous civilians' employment and movements. Onerous restrictions were not lifted until July 1943, but even then the army prepared plans to round up and intern people in case of invasion.[28] In most occupied areas (even in places of "friendly" occupation), martial law forbade or regulated traditional activities, such as ceremonial feasts or seasonal events. Japanese authorities, suspecting Christian activity as disloyal, imprisoned or executed foreign missionaries, or replaced them with Japanese Christians; eventually Christian gatherings were banned completely, though believers often gathered in secret. Roman Catholic catechist Peter ToRot, a Tolai man, conducted services in Japanese-occupied New Britain despite the danger, and died (or was killed) in prison in Rabaul; he was beatified in 1995.[29]

Civilians on contested ground faced a dangerously unstable situation. In the worst cases, where vying armies demanded their aid, they had to choose which side to serve and how best to do so while protecting themselves. Below is a closer look first at the Chin Hills, then at several Pacific Islands where people lived "between the lines" of combat for months or years.

Living between the Lines: Chin Hills

The Burma-India highlands had been governed before the war by a civilian Frontier Service. After the British retreat, the colonial civil government re-formed at Simla, India, but in fact the border hills were under military rule. As the IJA advanced through the Chin Hills in March 1944, officials tried to prepare people for war. Norman Kelly told headmen they would have to evacuate when the Japanese invaded, remove food and livestock, destroy bridges, and hinder the enemy with ambushes and traps; he warned that once villages were empty, Allied forces would bomb and shell them. Preparations continued to the last minute: forming a home guard, digging air-raid trenches, addressing shortages of rice, salt, iron, cloth, and lamp oil—recognizing that if the British did not retake the hills quickly, the lack of essential trade goods would cause people to turn to the enemy. As the Japanese approached, many villagers withdrew to the safety of the forest.

The IJA quickly established itself in key villages and strategic points and called on Chins to join them, threatening reprisals against villages that failed to obey.[30]

Chins were now trapped between the two armies, which leapfrogged along the few passable tracks—as General Slim said, at one point the Tedim (Tiddim) Road was "a Neapolitan ice of layers of our troops alternating with Japanese."[31] Intelligence reports told the British that Chins were "loyal to the Government," but were not prepared to risk their lives to help it. Sokte and Siyin chiefs petitioned to remove British troops from their villages to avoid Japanese reprisal, even offering a personal escort to see officers safely to India. Levy officers struggled to recruit soldiers and labor, pleaded with higher-ups for airdrops of food, salt, and medicine, courted chiefs and headmen, and kept up morale with village-to-village "flag marches" covering hundreds of miles.[32]

The IJA countered not only by running their own patrols but also by offering rewards for turning in enemies. When a Z Force officer asked a headman what he was going to do about a posted notice offering a reward for them, "'Nothing,' replied the headman. 'We don't want to give you away.' And then added quite seriously as an afterthought, 'And if we did, what would be the good? We should be no better off as they would pay us in Japanese notes which are rubbish!'" The IJA took harsh measures to hunt down British agents, imprisoning or torturing Chins to extract information. Mong Nak, chief of a small village near an unsuccessful levy ambush, brought gifts to the Japanese at Haka to forestall reprisals, but was imprisoned, tortured, and forced to lead them to a levy position. He was released after promising loyalty when the camp was found empty. Like the British, Japanese also used persuasion. Sam Newland reported on a February 1944 meeting in Haka at which they treated chiefs and elders to a feast of boiled beef, soup, and rice and an IJA major gave a speech decrying foreign exploitation and urging cooperation with Japanese "brothers." Newland's informant on this was a young Haka chief hired by the Japanese as an interpreter—who also supplied Newland with intelligence.[33]

It was hard for local people to evaluate the situation. The British spread stories of Japanese atrocities, but they heard different reports from itinerant traders and others who had dealt with them. "Asia for Asians" promises of independence attracted some, but demands for food and livestock and executions of suspected British loyalists caused disaffection.[34] Some headmen reached out to the invaders as soon as they arrived; some (sometimes the same ones) offered intelligence to the Allies. As we saw in chapter 2, many Kuki sided with the Japanese and the INA. War exacerbated their sense of oppression, as the British recruited or conscripted thousands of men for work, refugees and laborers brought new diseases,

crop failure and loss of livestock were severe, and lack of imports cancelled the value of improved wages. Given the situation, Kuki could see the arrival of IJA-INA forces as a promise of freedom.[35] But whichever side the hill people chose—or if they simply tried to escape the conflict—what was clear to everyone was the danger to their persons, their labor, and their property.

Living between the Lines: Papua and New Guinea

At its peak in the Southwest Pacific, Japanese control extended across Dutch New Guinea and much of northeastern New Guinea, the Bismarck Archipelago, and the Solomon Islands. The overwhelming invasion and the hasty departure of British and Australians gave the impression of certain and permanent victory. The myth of white superiority dissolved when Europeans fled in confusion, plantation managers abandoned indentured laborers, and the victors humiliated white prisoners.[36] All this lent impetus to the initial phase of Japanese occupation.

The new rulers retained much of the existing colonial framework, appointing village headmen and enforcing discipline, paying for goods and labor, and taking care not to harass women. They dismantled white authority and Christianity, spread propaganda, and set up Japanese-language schools (as in Wewak, chapter 5). Home media carried uplifting stories with photos of smiling children in school and workers wearing caps decorated with the rising sun. Like Europeans, their racial ideas categorized villagers as "primitive," but they saw them as friendly and generous and thought of themselves as liberating them from European oppression.[37]

The war's ideology was irrelevant to most people facing the reality of invasion, nor was this New Guinea's first regime change. As a Madang Province man said, Australians had pushed out the Germans, Japanese pushed out the Australians, then Americans and Australians pushed out the Japanese. "It is beyond us. We can do nothing. When a *kiap* [colonial officer] tells us to carry his baggage we have to do it. When a German told us to carry his baggage we had to obey. When a Japanese told us to carry his baggage we had to do it. If we did not we might be killed. All right, there it is. . . . that's just how it is, that's life."[38]

Initial landings in force on New Guinea's north coast and islands overwhelmed the small European presence, and the construction of the hundred-thousand-man base at Rabaul (New Britain) cemented Japanese power. The large island of Bougainville was strongly held by sixty-five thousand troops, who quickly built airfields and naval bases and forged relationships with Bougainville people. But there was no unanimity in such decisions, and the

foreigners' war magnified internal conflicts. Intervillage rivalries and Christian sectarianism intersected Japanese and Allied aims, as villages, clans, and individuals took sides, often with tragic results and long-lasting pain.[39]

In places, the invaders were able to retain goodwill throughout most of the war. Kaliai villagers on New Britain recall no atrocities or rapes and little or no confiscation during two years of occupation. They worked for the Japanese, but it was not forced labor; the Japanese evacuated them to safety during Allied air raids.[40] Around Buna (eastern New Guinea)—where the May 1942 invasion marked the start of the Kokoda campaign—some Orokaiva people worked for and with Japanese and turned over European civilians and Allied soldiers to them. Embogi Agena, a leader of one of the groups that delivered two Anglican women missionaries to execution, was among at least twenty-one Orokaiva men hanged by the Australian Army after it recovered the territory, despite the questionable legality of executing Islanders for treason (chapter 2).[41]

It would be hard to exaggerate the danger for civilians caught between the two armies, subject to demands and punishment from both sides. The Markham-Ramu Valley and Sepik areas were "effectively a no-man's-land." Historian Hank Nelson describes the situation in Morobe District (northeast New Guinea), where people were trapped between Australian troops inland and Japanese coastal bases: "Both sent reconnaissance, foraging and fighting patrols through the intervening country, both demanded cooperation with themselves and banned assistance to the enemy. Both called airstrikes against hostile villages (not always accurately), shot men working with enemy troops and used other forms of violence to stiffen support."[42] Such dilemmas could not be resolved: when Australians ambushed a Japanese unit guided by six New Guineans, and the surviving Japanese fled, abandoning their guides, the Australians shot them: "We could not—dared not—tolerate local natives guiding Japanese."[43]

After the battles of the Coral Sea and Midway (May–June 1942), Allies expanded air and sea superiority and began to press back the enemy on land. With their supply lines cut, Japanese troops faced desperate conditions. Describing his unit's horrific retreat across the mountains from Finschhafen in 1943, Masatsugu Ogawa recalled friendly reponses in villages they passed (a skilled linguist, he conversed in Tok Pisin). The Japanese had nothing to give villagers at this point, "Yet their kindness lasted to the very end of the war." But relations elsewhere worsened as the military position deteriorated and Japanese made onerous demands for labor and goods, plundering gardens and killing those who resisted. A captured diary entry from November 1943 says, "In order to win we are not pacifying the natives, but are forcing to work at the point of a gun. I don't know

when they will revolt. It is just like having a bomb under you while you are working."[44] Reports from this phase of war reveal extreme punishments, rapes, reprisal killings, cannibalism, and other atrocities. Even suspicion of collaboration led to death, as in the Timbunke massacre (July 1945) where Japanese killed nearly a hundred people in reprisals for presumed aid to the enemy. As the Japanese weakened, Islanders killed soldiers in retaliation or in response to Australian Army payments.[45]

Civilians on the other side of the lines, in Allied-held areas, experienced the inverse: conditions improved as the campaign progressed. Still, military needs transformed their lives. Civil rule was superseded by the Australian Army, with Papua and New Guinea administrations combined in April 1942 when ANGAU formed to manage civilian affairs (as in Burma, many colonial officials were given military rank). Besides supporting combat, ANGAU was tasked with civil policing, governance, and producing food and essential materials—all exacerbated by intensive labor recruitment (see chapter 9), floods of refugees, diseases, and food shortages. Most formal schooling ended, since the female Christian missionaries responsible for much of it had been evacuated, though New Guineans in some places worked hard to keep schools open even under difficult conditions.[46] Propaganda encouraged loyalty through radio broadcasts, leaflets, and trips to Australia for local leaders. As Allies reclaimed territory, people appreciated the return of stability and medical care—but the welcome was short-lived, as ANGAU conscripted men for labor despite their families' need to repair destroyed gardens and homes.[47] The total loss of Papua New Guinea lives is unclear; one estimate is at least fifteen thousand killed by military action and tens of thousands more by starvation or sickness.[48]

As an example of life between the lines, Lieutenant-Colonel (and anthropologist) Ian Hogbin told the story of Busama village on the Huon Gulf, which he studied soon after the Japanese had been driven out. They had landed at nearby Salamaua in March 1942, and for the first months there was little trouble; they paid for supplies and only occasionally used labor. But at the start of 1943, Allied forces drew near and the Japanese drafted men to carry supplies to the front lines. "The natives faced danger on both sides—if they ran away they were shot by the Japanese, and if they advanced our [Allied] fire confronted them. Several lost their lives . . . ." Allied air raids devastated the coast. Busama village was destroyed; its six hundred people moved inland to live in huts, their belongings and livestock gone. After eighteen months of Japanese occupation, Australians recaptured Busama in the drive to retake Salamaua. They in turn hired workers to help with clean-up and to build a convalescent camp. Then

ANGAU conscripted nearly all able-bodied men as carriers for the next phase of war. Remaining villagers were tasked to make thatch for the military. People had no time to cultivate gardens; livestock and fishing canoes and nets had been destroyed; they survived on sago, a famine food, and scanty army rations. Subsistence was so impaired that supplemental rations were needed until the start of 1946. It took six years for life to return to normal as people recovered, rebuilding on their old village site in mid-1947.[49]

Central Pacific Islands under Japanese Occupation

Japan held parts of the British Gilbert Islands for nearly two years. As elsewhere, occupation meant strict security and Japanization policies. After an August 1942 US raid on a seaplane base on Butaritari (Makin), an apparent reprisal bombing of the tiny village of Keuea killed forty-eight Islanders and wounded thirty others. In mid-1943, men were conscripted for labor as fortifications were built. Most Islanders were evacuated from danger zones before the US invasion of November 1943, but on Tarawa, those who remained could not escape the battle that killed more than 4,700 Japanese and a thousand Americans. After US victory, Islanders joined mopping-up patrols to guide, interpret, carry gear, and bury the dead. Civil servants who had hidden their uniforms, official records, and the portrait of King George VI that had hung over the district officer's desk brought them out again. But civilian British rule did not return; rather, the islands were held under US military administration and used as a base to push the offensive into Japanese Micronesia.[50]

Japan also occupied the British-controlled phosphate islands of Nauru and Ocean Island (now Banaba) in mid-1942, after most Europeans and many Chinese had been evacuated. Allies never reinvaded these islands, but neutralized enemy garrisons by blockading and bombing until they surrendered in October 1945. On both islands, Japanese used Islander and imported Asian labor for phosphate mining and other work. As food shortages worsened, they shipped thousands of men, women, and children from Ocean Island to Nauru, and from both islands to Tarawa, Kosrae, and Chuuk, where they were set to work in agriculture or other tasks. As British subjects (that is, civilian internees) they were given lowest priority for scarce rations. Of the 1,200 Nauruans sent to Chuuk, 461 died of malnutrition, illness, Allied bombing, and mistreatment.[51]

Conditions remained desperate for the more than four thousand people still on Nauru—Japanese troops, Asian labourerers, Chinese, and nearly 1,500 Islanders from across the region. In July 1943, the Japanese murdered forty-nine leprosy patients; another sixty Islanders died from bombings, malnutrition, illness,

accidents, or were executed for stealing food or other crimes. After most Ocean Islanders had been removed, nearly 150 young men retained for labor were massacred in August 1945—after the end of war. The testimony of the only survivor, Kabunare Koura, led to war crime trials in which fourteen Japanese were found guilty and the commander was hanged.[52]

After the war, Banabans and Nauruans were repatriated from scattered exiles. Some seven hundred Banabans, with Gilbert and Ellice Islanders, went to Rabi in Fiji, an island purchased for them by the British Phosphate Company, where they struggled to rebuild their lives. Only after mining ended in 1979 has a small community resettled Banaba. Nauru's reunited population, too, was reduced and in poor health, but rejected resettlement. Instead, they turned their experience of hardship into a drive for self-reliance. Over the postwar decades, they fought for control of the phosphate industry and a way to stay at home. Nauru became independent in 1968.[53]

Living between the Lines: Guam

An American territory since 1898, Guam held at the start of war only a small contingent of US Navy, US Marines, and Guamanian Insular Force Guards. Military planners held no hope of defending the island; they evacuated most US citizens, leaving Islanders nearly unprotected when Japan invaded on December 8, 1941.

Lacking resources for armed resistance, Guam's people evinced strong passive defiance throughout the two and a half years of occupation. Japan immediately garrisoned the island with fourteen thousand soldiers, but the bulk of the troops left after a few months and a small civil administration took charge. Worried about Guam Chamorros' American affiliations, officials managed the population with identity registrations, economic controls, and use of Chamorro investigators from Saipan and Rota (chapter 4). Soon Guam had Japanese schools, Japanese priests for the Catholic churches, and an intensive propaganda program. Despite strict security, Islanders had some success in hiding radios and protecting escaped US sailors, but executions and harsh intimidation at the start had been effective in quelling active opposition. After Japan's imperial strategy shifted to defense in mid-late 1943, Chamorro men were conscripted for construction and women for agricultural work. The Japanese military returned in strength in March 1944, replacing civilian rule.

American planes bombed Guam heavily from February 1944. Japanese authorities gathered people into interior camps, perhaps to protect them, perhaps to ensure they did not help the enemy. Islanders who had maintained a

stealthy resistance eagerly awaited the US return, which came in July 1944. As invasion neared, mistreatment increased, including killings, rapes, and several massacres—altogether, some seven hundred Guam islanders were killed. When Merizo village men learned of massacres there, a few days before the invasion, they attacked Japanese soldiers, making Merizo the first village to be liberated. Active resistance was now possible, and Chamorro men joined Americans as guides and fighters.[54]

The United States turned Guam into an advance base to press toward Japan, rapidly rebuilding harbors, airfields, and other facilities destroyed by bombing and invasion, and adding more. By late 1945, Guam's 212 square miles held more than 160 installations with more than two hundred thousand personnel, overwhelming the 21,838 Chamorros. Military landholdings, employment, and governance have dominated the island ever since. The massive initial land takeover was scaled back after the war, but nearly 30 percent of Guam remains under military control. Japan's invasion of Guam altered US views of the island and changed its future—from being a barely recognized American fringe territory to a focus of strategic interest, which continues to the present day.[55]

Living between the Lines: Japan's Micronesian Islands

After Japan withdrew from the League of Nations in 1935, it began military construction in Micronesia, with the Marshall Islands eventually fortified as the empire's eastern edge, Chuuk as host of a major Imperial Japanese Navy base, and installations on many other islands, in some cases displacing entire communities. Islanders at first supported the emperor's cause, buoyed by decades of familiarity and Tokyo's initial success. But the current of war reversed, and in September 1943 the islands' role shifted to become a defensive bulwark for Japan. Civil officials were replaced by military. Troops poured in to garrison certain islands, imposing tight new security, labor demands, and rationing.

After victory at Tarawa, fighting pushed into prewar Japanese territory, starting with the US invasion of the Marshall Islands in January–February 1944. Japan drew its defensive line ever closer to the home islands, stalling attackers with heavily fortified positions that were gradually abandoned as the perimeter shrank. As the war was fought over and through Micronesia, physical destruction was traumatic and longlasting. Major land battles took place on Kwajalein, Enewetak, Saipan, Tinian, Guam, and Peleliu; islands not invaded were bombed and blockaded. In most cases, authorities evacuated Islanders ahead of battle, though the geography of Kwajalein and Enewetak Atolls left civilians in the midst of combat. Two hundred or more Micronesians died at Kwajalein, where some

men employed by the Japanese fought alongside them. On Enewetak, Islanders were interspersed with Japanese defenders. Trapped during the battles, some were able to surrender safely to landing parties; others were killed or injured.[56]

Using bases built on the conquered islands, US forces isolated and bombed remaining Japanese installations. While neighbors of the new American facilities were appreciating peace and plenty, those on bypassed islands suffered ever-greater food scarcity and harsh security that led to the arrest and torture of suspected Allied sympathizers; Korean workers and Marshallese on Mili Atoll were executed after a rebellion. Air raids pounded garrisoned islands month after month. Pohnpei, for example, suffered an estimated 250 bombings between February 1944 and August 1945. A Pohnpei woman in a farm labor group remembers the daily rhythm set by the bombers: workers started at 5:00 a.m., paused to hide in their bunkers and eat breakfast during the 8:00 a.m. air raid, then returned to the rice fields after the all-clear sounded.[57]

Marshall Islander John Heine recalls how his youth was shaped by the progress of war. When it began, he was a schoolboy of about nine years old, seeing Japanese flags and hearing *banzai*s as he walked around Jabwor town. Then security tightened. A group of Japanese searched his house; “They took my father. That was the last I saw of him for three months.” They later detained his mother for a month. He himself was conscripted for labor. He escaped during an air raid, hiding in the bush for eleven months until—after US forces secured Kwajalein and Majuro—he could swim out to a landing craft. He then volunteered to serve as a scout to help round up surrendering Japanese.[58]

Saipan was the first central Pacific Island where Americans had to deal with large numbers of civilians. It had been developed under Japanese rule, with an urban center at Garapan and an immigrant population of some twenty to twenty-five thousand Japanese, Okinawans, and Koreans far outnumbering the fewer than five thousand Islanders (Chamorros and Carolinians/Refaluwasch). Invading US forces had to decide whether to consider Islanders as enemy combatants, since they were neither Japanese citizens nor soldiers, and it was not clear how they would respond after three decades of incorporation into the Japanese Empire.[59] During the Battle of Saipan (June–July 1944), local Chamorros guided and in some cases fought alongside imperial soldiers. But for the most part, Islanders—who had assisted and obeyed the Japanese in defensive preparations—simply hid and sought safety. Vicente Camacho recalled, “That was the worst time of all. If we turned to the left there were enemies, if we turned to the right, there were enemies. No matter where we turned, up, down, east, west, it was enemies everywhere.”[60]

American military policy distinguished "natives" from enemy civilians, though they were often intermingled and to US troops often indistinguishable. The victors detained civilians in stockades along the beach until permanent camps could be set up, with Chamorros and Refaluwasch interned apart from East Asians. Soon some Islanders were working for the Americans as scouts and as camp guards. The battle, and diseases in the internment camps, left some ten to twelve thousand civilians dead, including almost a thousand Micronesians.[61]

After the battles of Saipan, Guam, and Tinian, the Allies controlled the region by August 1944, but bombing and mopping up continued. American forces did not reach some islands until months after the war ended. To Micronesian Islanders, these "new chiefs" were a nearly unknown quantity—as the Islanders were unknown to the Americans, who rushed to draft civil affairs plans and struggled with their new colonial role. Inverting the loss of "white prestige" when the Japanese invaded European colonies, in Micronesia it was the Japanese who lost face. Seeing the formerly powerful Japanese disarmed, stripped naked, and shipped off or interned as POWs, and noting the strength, wealth, and friendliness of Americans quickly transformed attitudes. Still, Micronesians struggled through a long period of adjustment. The deportation of civilian Japanese and Okinawans deprived the islands of skilled tradesmen and businessmen and split the many intermarried families. The Islanders had lived through generations of foreign rulers: Spanish, German, Japanese, and now American. From their perspective, international arrangements were transitory and beyond their control; they had no option but to deal with each successive regime. Victory put Micronesians under US occupation until the end of the war and under US Navy Military Government for years after it.[62]

Because the term "occupation" is most often used to refer to German or Japanese control of invaded lands, we may forget that Allies also occupied conquered or reconquered territory. Martial law, whether by defenders or enemy invaders, regulated civilian life with new and unfamiliar strictures and conditions. Wherever civilians came under—or even near—military rule by Allies or Axis, the greatest impact came from war's unending demand for labor.

CHAPTER 9

Working at War

Wartime demands for manpower went far beyond military service. Industry exploded to produce goods needed to conquer, govern, and defend territory. Constructing military infrastructure consumed millions of work-lives. Airfields essential to modern war had to be built wherever troops operated—which meant Chimbu in Highland New Guinea, tribesmen in upland Borneo, and Kachin in Burma felled trees, stamped down grass, and graded land so planes or airdrops could reach fighting units.[1] Combat itself required civilian labor, like the two hundred thousand Naga carriers on the India-Burma front.[2] Men, especially young men, did the bulk of war labor, but women's lives changed too, as some earned wages (often for the first time) and others shouldered more tasks as men left for war. This chapter looks at how Indigenous people were drawn into labor demands of armies in combat zones and of industry on the homefront.

Japanese Wartime Labor

The Japanese Empire's use of labor ranged from urging patriotic citizens to take factory jobs to the infamous brutality of forced labor and POWs near the end of the war. As the armed services absorbed more able-bodied men, agricultural and industrial needs in the home islands turned recruitment into coercion. The 1938 National General Mobilization Act gave the government power over the empire's civilian labor. By February 1944, Japanese men aged 12–60, students, unmarried women, and widows aged 12–40 had to register for work.[3] Ainu were incorporated into the national workforce, but in Taiwan the colonial system organizing Chinese-speaking households for labor did not apply to most Aboriginal Taiwanese. It was the Japanese-run youth corps that recruited 4,500 Aboriginal men for military labor, and later as Takasago volunteers.[4]

As the empire expanded, the need for labor grew. We lack accurate accounts of the number and fate of workers used by the Japanese military; certainly they

numbered in the millions and often suffered horrific conditions. At the start of the Southeast Asia war, Japan's invasion of European colonies shut down commercial exports, and plantation workers were repurposed for military construction, factories, and food production. The new government replaced unions with "patriotic associations" to mobilize labor, incorporating some Indigenous groups. Initial wages meant to attract recruits devolved into pressured and then forced work paid with worthless scrip or not at all. As in Japan, eventually women and schoolchildren were encouraged or required to work. Workers were sent where they were needed, moving large numbers—literally millions—to meet demands for mining, agriculture, and construction of railways, airfields, and ports.[5]

Indigenous people were among hundreds of thousands of "coolie" laborers called *romusha* that Japanese took from Indonesian islands from 1942 to 1945. *Romusha* worked at first for pay, then as unpaid and eventually forced laborers under appalling conditions. Recruiting was handled through local headmen and pre-existing Dutch colonial systems of communal labor and by taking advantage of unemployment caused by economic disruption. In Borneo, Dayaks worked in mines, oil fields, and the gardens that fed coastal towns. Iban longhouses around the Bintulu airfield (Sarawak) were obliged to send men for weeks of heavy construction work; their absence crippled agriculture at home. Hundreds of Indigenous people from western (Dutch) New Guinea were employed. Twelve hundred built an airfield on Wakde Island on the north coast, suffering from limited rations and Allied air raids. Of four hundred Manokwari (West Papua) people sent into the mountains to grow sago in June 1944, half were dead of disease and starvation by November.[6]

Allied Labor in the Pacific War

Much more is known about laborers employed by Allied forces. For the most part, they had adequate or even good conditions and pay, though at times workers were coerced and mistreated. In the Pacific War, Allies benefited from pre-existing French and British colonial systems of indentured and contract plantation labor, and in some societies chiefs directed recruitment.[7]

Those living at the fronts were drawn into work immediately. After the Battle of Tarawa, men were employed to bury Japanese dead, then to unload supply ships needed for the invasion of the Marshall Islands. After these hasty arrangements, workers were still needed for salvage, laundry, mess, and other tasks, and the Gilbert and Ellice Islands Labour Corps formed at the end of November 1943. More than 1,500 men were recruited from throughout the archipelago

by the end of February 1944, organized by islands or villages, each electing its own sergeant and cook. Men signed on to serve for a year anywhere in the Pacific. The United States requested a unit for Guadalcanal, where 400 worked as stevedores. Another 140, mostly Ellice Islanders, were employed at the US base on Funafuti.[8]

Labor at large bases drew men from surrounding areas. In the New Hebrides, a thousand men were brought from Tanna to work at Bauer Field on Efate—"essentially the entire male able-bodied work force of the island"—and signed for three-month contracts, though many stayed longer. Some tasks were familiar from plantation labor, but the extensive use of machinery and night shift work were new, as was the level of danger. Men died or sickened from disease, injury, and overwork; frequent air-raid warnings caused stress and fear; they were affected by seeing the dead and wounded returning from battles in the Solomons.[9]

Working with Americans was a striking change from employment under Australian, British, French, Dutch, or Japanese. One Gilbert Islander said, "We fed the Japanese, the Americans fed us."[10] Colonial authorities tried to control wages, tasks, and interactions, but US officials (and many ordinary servicemen) often resisted these efforts. At Noumea (New Caledonia), American officers insisted on taking over management of the labor camp to improve food, medical care, and sanitation. In the New Hebrides, Thomas Nouar recalled the low-quality food French and British authorities were feeding workers ("Fiji taro and rotten bananas, woody manioc. People nearly died the hunger was so bad"; "stinking salt meat"). After his complaint reached American officers, conditions improved. From the US point of view, hiring local labor even with inflated wages cost much less than assigning American servicemen to the work.[11]

Living near bases gave some women, children, and disabled or elderly men a chance to earn wages or make money from laundry, chores, or handicrafts. But for many, the war's main impact was to increase their workload by taking men away from home. In Malaita (Solomon Islands) over-recruitment left only 5 to 10 percent of able men in some places, causing such a serious food shortage that a group of Kwara'ae women marched to government headquarters to demand their return. The disappearance of civic government further increased domestic burdens; Torres Strait Islander women took on education and medical roles when white employees evacuated.[12]

Islanders exercised their own options as far as possible. People responded to news of good jobs, sometimes making long trips to sign on.[13] But dissatisfied workers protested or left. Solomon Islands Labour Corps men organized strikes in response to low wages and battle conditions. Some conscripts ran away; in

New Guinea, men escaped from both Japanese and ANGAU work details. The scale of labor and the movement of workers offered chances to compare wages, conditions, and attitudes, leading people to rethink relations with colonial regimes and shaping postwar politics.

In short, military operations required manpower far beyond soldiers, and this was even more true in many Indigenous homelands—areas with little infrastructure, where a lack of roads, railways, airfields, wharves, or oil pipelines meant that logistics depended on mules, reindeer, canoes, and human carriers. In the Southwest Pacific and the Burma/India hills, civilian labor was crucial to prosecuting the war.

Labor under Combat Conditions: New Guinea

In the New Guinea campaigns of 1942–1945, labor demand was "insatiable"—for construction, stevedoring, farming, and most critically for porterage. With trails unsuitable for motor vehicles or pack animals, moving armies along coasts and through mountains required enormous manpower.[14] As we saw in chapter 3, Japanese and Allied armies competed for carriers and commanders acknowledged their essential role in Allied victory.

The strain of such work was phenomenal, especially in the first phase of the war before airdrops were possible. The Australian Army's Kanga Force harassing Japanese around Lae-Salamaua in September 1942 were maintained entirely by human carriers. Supplies were sent by boat and canoes from Port Moresby around the north coast, then forty men a day hauled fifty-pound loads on a seven-day trek along the rough Bulldog Road, with perhaps another four-day carry to the forward area. Warrant Officer Peter Ryan described a long patrol inland of Wau in which he, another officer, and fourteen policemen were supported by seventy carrier-loads, mostly food or trade goods used to buy more food en route. Combat troops required constant resupply. For Australians fighting on the Kokoda Trail, "to supply a relatively small force up the line, 3,000 carriers, each hauling forty pounds of supplies, required an eight-day trip."[15] After hauling ammunition and supplies to the front, the men turned stretcher-bearers on the return trip. Their compassion and skill in maneuvering the wounded along steep, muddy, almost impassible trails entered the lore of the war in the Southwest Pacific (chapter 5).[16]

On Peter Ryan's patrol early in the war (1942), he paid carriers a shilling and a razor blade for each man and a strip of calico for the women: "These were substantial presents in those days of scarcity, and the natives were delighted."[17] But the scale of needs soon called for a more robust organization. Most labor

was managed by ANGAU, which at its peak had a European staff of more than two thousand and employed more than forty thousand Islanders as carriers, stretcher-bearers, seamen, police, medical orderlies, and many other types of workers. Women also worked at bases and in gardens, and occasionally as porters, though this was not officially allowed. Using local labor had been part of European colonial life from its start, and ANGAU's system built on the prewar pattern of plantation contracts.

Recruitment was voluntary at first, but in June 1942 new rules let ANGAU conscript labor. As demand escalated, recruiters' methods became harsher. One officer ordered flogging for men who refused to reenlist. Initial contracts were for three to six months, later extended to two years, with required renewal. Monthly pay was more than plantation labor, but less than good prewar skilled wages. Camps provided housing, clothing, and food, and conditions improved with Allied success, eventually exceeding prewar standards. As war in New Guinea finally eased through 1944, demobilization began, first freeing older men, fathers of large families, and those longest employed. It took another year for construction demands to drop. Only after August 1945, as civil administration returned, did conscription end.[18]

The demand for labor made the purported limit of conscripting 25 percent of men in a village untenable; some villages lost 80 to 100 percent of their fit men to ANGAU.[19] Papua New Guinea scholar John Waiko gives an example of how recruitment emptied a small community of Binandere villages in Oro Province (population 2,500). Of 354 adult males, 110 were recruited as laborers and carriers, and another fifty-six enlisted as police or soldiers. Such intensive recruitment concerned ANGAU officers who had worked in civil administration before the war, who knew the impact of the loss of men's labor at home. Some officers tried to object "by reports, protests, warnings, by masterly inactivity" and in at least one case risking court martial by refusing recruitment orders.[20]

An Australian Army order to district officers in August 1942 declared that military needs come first, "even if a temporary sacrifice of native interests is involved."[21] To official eyes, this justified a level of recruitment and treatment that went beyond military necessity. Journalist Osmar White accompanied carriers on the Kokoda Trail and described overwork and suffering from cold and altitude, especially for men from the lowlands. The medical officer worried more about the condition of the carriers than of wounded soldiers; "sick wastage" of carriers on Kokoda peaked at 30 percent.[22] On the Bulldog Road supplying Kanga Force early in the war ("passes as high as 10,000 feet and rainfall up to 200 inches a year"), a thousand men carried 22.5 kilogram loads for seven days; after eating a tin of

meat on the first day to save its weight, they lived on dry biscuits and boiled rice.[23] Fatigue accumulated as men toiled month after month without a break, hauling supplies to the front and wounded to the rear. Some ANGAU staff abused workers, controlling them through beatings and punishment; others tried to ameliorate conditions even if it meant bucking regulations. At least 2,024 Allied laborers are recorded as dying of various causes—certainly an incomplete figure.[24]

Labor demands also inflicted psychological distress, separating men from families and communities for long periods. Ian Hogbin once took a message from children in Busama village to their father working in the kitchen at the Lae Officers' Club, who "burst into tears and, sobbing into his pots and pans, begged me to intercede for his release."[25] Loss and separation bore creative fruit in an outpouring of song and poetry. John Waiko translates a song by Gavide, a Binandere woman commemorating her son's departure for war work. It expresses not only her grief, but as Waiko points out, awareness that his departure benefits only foreign armies, leaving her bereft:

War has come
The young men are leaving
To defend alien land.
The foreigners will be saved.

What has called
The young men away
To become enemy victims?
The conquerors will be happy.

The mother is deserted
Lonely without her son
A barren beggar
Abandoned to heartache.

The mother who lost blood
Has become a barren beggar.
The one who bore him
I am a lonely beggar.[26]

Certainly Allied use of labor was far less criminal than mistreatment by Japanese, especially in the last desperate months of war, but it was not without fault. Ian Hogbin in a 1944 report criticized ANGAU's Native Labour Officers as unconcerned with Native welfare and sometimes brutal or dishonest. His report

led to forming the Native War Damage Compensation Committee in October 1944. But despite the number of deaths, the 1946 decision denied compensation to families of civilian workers. Dissatisfaction over lack of compensation and wage claims by Papua New Guinea carriers continued long after the war.[27]

As late as the 1990s, Australian and PNG governments were still making efforts to recognize and compensate carriers. Raphael Oimbari (the Orokaiva man leading wounded Australian soldier George Whittington in George Silk's famous photo) visited Australia in 1992 for the fiftieth anniversary commemorations and complained of feeling exploited and unappreciated. Recognition of civilian workers' roles has grown since then. Oimbari was awarded an OBE (Officer of the Order of the British Empire) in 1993, and his memory is honored in Port Moresby's war memorial.[28]

Labor under Combat Conditions: Solomon Islands

In the Solomon Islands, labor service had a more definite political impact. From the start, this campaign vacuumed up labor. Coastwatchers like Martin Clemens relied on Islanders not only to keep them hidden, but also to feed them and help when they shifted their secret camps. Clemens hired 190 porters when he first moved his headquarters inland on Guadalcanal; the heavy radio alone required twelve to sixteen carriers. Meanwhile, Japanese demanded labor for airstrip construction and other tasks. When US forces landed in August 1942, Clemens came out of hiding and took charge of labor (as well as scouts and guides) for the US Marines defending the beachead, a job that grew as the number of able Americans dwindled due to casualties, malaria, and a 24/7 workload. Unloading gasoline drums was a familiar task to local men, but they also had more dangerous jobs, evacuating wounded and carrying supplies to the front line. Clemens quickly enrolled more than two hundred men, housed in tents within the camp perimeter, where their first task was to dig foxholes to protect themselves from air raids and naval shelling.[29] The American beachhead soon absorbed all nearby manpower. As the campaign progressed, a formal unit was needed.

The Solomon Islands Labour Corps (SILC) was established in December 1942 and recruited nearly four thousand men by 1944. Isaac Gafu of Malaita was among the first enlistees. He was recruited, terrifyingly, into the midst of battle on Guadalcanal: "When the Americans killed Japanese soldiers they would just leave them lying in the bush. You could see heaps of the dead bodies of Japanese soldiers. And we were so afraid. We had not seen war before." He was amazed by the scale of operations, the crowds of soldiers, ships coming and going, trucks rushing along, the fast-paced, dangerous labor. SILC men loaded and unloaded ordnance and cargo, built and repaired airfields, did laundry, constructed wharves, and

guarded supply depots. They were often in active combat zones, carrying supplies for advancing troops. Despite the Marines' care for their safety, Gafu says,

> The war, however, was very intense. Evenings, morning and nights we were dumbfounded by everything that was happening. Guns and bombs were constantly exploding. Sometimes the Americans and Japanese fought very close to where we were staying. The Japanese would shoot at the Americans and the Americans would shoot back at the Japanese. We lived in constant fear.[30]

While working under combat conditions was overwhelming, a different aspect of SILC became more consequential: the contest between Islanders seizing new opportunities and the desire of British colonial officials to maintain the status quo. Tension arose early on, when several hundred Guadalcanal workers were dismissed in November 1942 for making what were considered "extravagant" demands about pay and conditions. (Malaitans were brought into SILC the next month to replace them.) On the other hand, British officials resisted US demands that labor be made compulsory, fearing that would create insurmountable resistance to SILC, and recruitment remained voluntary. In general, American commanders used local resources and labor as needed without concern for postwar conditions (Japanese did the same), while British kept the future in mind—insisting on maintaining markers of white superiority, but also warding off exploitation. Over time, though, British efforts to sustain the prewar racial hierarchy dissolved in the face of military necessity and the Islanders' interactions with servicemen (chapter 5).[31]

Research on Maasina Rule, an anticolonial movement centered on Malaita, identifies SILC as an important stimulus to political action.[32] Jonathan Fifi'i (a Maasina founder, later a legislator and cultural activist) has explained how SILC affected him. Though young, he spoke English, and so was made leader of his section. On Guadalcanal, they unloaded cargo, cut timber to build storehouses, carried supplies, guns, and ammunition for patrols, helped the wounded, and buried the dead. Good treatment by Americans sharpened their critique of British attitudes, like humiliating clothing regulations. Forbidden to wear shirts, men who earned promotion or medals had nowhere to display their awards: "We sergeants were given a piece of khaki that had three stripes painted on it" to tie onto their bare arms. "I was ashamed to wear it like that, so I would just carry it around in my hand."[33]

Besides such invidious rules, British SILC officers tried to prevent the men from keeping American gifts or eating in their chow lines or visiting with them—"but when we told the Americans of this they told us not to worry about it, so we kept on going." Fifi'i recalled the day British officers searched their tents and confiscated their possessions while they were at work: "When we arrived back at our camp we objected, but they said those things were not for us boys but were only for white men. We saved this episode in our memories." Some men sought revenge, but Fifi'i persuaded them against violence. Yet the oppression wore on them, "It's something that happened each day all the time." They complained to Americans, who told them to resist. "They would encourage us and say, 'Struggle, they may kill you, they may torture you, they may do all kinds of things to you but don't give up. Keep going.' That was the beginning of Maasina Rule." Fifi'i goes on to say, "After the war we had courage, whereas prior to the war we would always just give in."[34] Maasina Rule became an important postwar political movement in the Solomons (chapter 11).

Labor under Combat Conditions: India/Burma

Carriers were also key to fighting the war in the mountainous Burma/India borderlands, at least until roads were built—and those required massive hand labor (chapter 10). The British Army had recruited labor here for a century. Naga veterans of the British Labour Corps in Europe during World War I helped form the Naga Club in 1918, to which one might trace modern political activism.[35] Naga labor joined the war in Burma early on: US General Joseph Stilwell hired several Nagas when he met a group by chance near the end of his much-publicized retreat from Burma to India. Stilwell's Shan and Kachin porters readily handed over their loads to the Nagas and headed home, saying the trail was too steep for them and they were afraid of the "headhunters."[36]

Naga and other hill tribes provided aid when tens of thousands of soldiers and refugees from the Japanese invasion of Burma poured into northeastern India in the first half of 1942.[37] Dolly Kikon describes how a Naga couple, Luke and Oreno Kikon, helped set up medical camps for troops. As British forces built up in Manipur, Nagas worked on tasks such as maintaining roads and erecting bamboo and thatch hospital buildings.[38] They were laborers, guides, and carriers (as well as soldiers) in the battles of Imphal-Kohima. Japanese approaching those battles also needed porters and guides; they got them by pressing labor from the hill tribes. IJA Divisional War Correspondent Yukihiko Imai explains, "As soon as we reached a village we caught the women and children and locked them up.

We then asked the men folk to guide us to the next village, promising to release their families as soon as they had done so. This was the only way we could get guides or labour to help with the transport."[39]

Allied guerrilla units operating behind Japanese lines also needed carriers. When two Z Force officers left India for the Chin Hills in February 1943 before the Imphal-Tedim road was usable, they required forty porters and more than a week for the trip. Guerrillas in Malaya and Burma were provisioned in part by airdrops, with supplies hand-carried from airstrips to the scattered units. In Malaya, Force 136 SOE used Orang Asli to haul airdropped supplies. For example, for one job, thirty to forty Orang Asli were among the hundred porters recruited.[40] With so many men gone as soldiers or laborers, women often portered in the Burma-India highlands. Fellowes-Gordon comments that, "Whenever we [Northern Kachin Levies] got coolies to help us with our loads, we found half were women. These girls, some as young as twelve or fourteen years, did a marvelous job, delivering rations and ammunition to the most forward positions, occasionally being themselves involved in ambushes."[41]

British officers with the Northern Kachin Levies found it a constant chore to dragoon civilians to move rations and ammunition from airdrops, and eventually found a solution: payment in opium. Opium was a long-standing commodity in Burma, good currency where silver was heavy to carry and often useless. Guerrillas using opium for pay and to buy supplies greatly increased its availability and laid the foundation for much future violence in the region.[42]

Labor on the Allied Homefront

Like citizens and colonial subjects around the world, Indigenous people worked for the military even where the war was not "hot." Nations expanded both armies and home labor pools as the scope of conflict grew. People who had been marginal to industry—because of distance from factories, discrimination, a preference for subsistence over wage labor—now were seen as untapped manpower. War industries pulled Indigenous workers from rural to urban areas, but even those who stayed home were pressured to produce more. In Japan, Shigeru Kayano recalled how, as a young man, he and his family, like other Ainu, made charcoal early in the war. "We worked hard, urged on by such slogans as 'Charcoal is indispensable for tempering cannons' and 'The soldiers at the front in cold, cold Manchuria depend on the charcoal you produce.'"[43] Allied nations, too, depended on a greatly expanded homefront labor force.[44]

New Zealand

Māori members of Parliament set up the Maori War Effort Organization (MWEO) in 1942, separate from the government's Native Department and thus both a training ground and a showcase of Māori autonomy. The MWEO began with the task of recruiting soldiers but extended to address the Māori work force, food production, housing, and other issues. It coordinated more than three hundred tribal committees, registering workers for factories and encouraging agriculture. Māori men were not drafted for military service, though many volunteered, but from January 1942 they could be directed to essential industries. The movement of thousands of rural Māori to cities offered new experiences and brought closer association with white New Zealanders. MWEO's management of enlistment and civilian workers impressed both government and the public, but structural change did not happen quickly despite Māori leaders' efforts to maintain and extend the autonomy gained during wartime (chapter 12).[45]

North America

Canada and the United States also drew their full populations, including Native communities, into wartime production. With so many Canadian men in military service, it was easier for Indigenous civilians to get hired in construction, railroads, farming, fishing, ranching, and logging. Greater employment, servicemen's dependents' allowances, and higher wages improved family finances. War service and jobs drew First Nations men and women from isolated rural areas into greater contact with one another and the national community, as did the intrusion of military construction and installations into Indigenous lands in northern and western Canada (chapter 10).[46]

In the United States, where at least twenty-five thousand Native Americans joined the armed forces, another forty thousand left reservations to work in factories and military facilities (about twelve thousand of these were women). Those at home increased farming and livestock production, and with men gone, women took on more and more diverse duties. Federal nondiscrimination rules for new war jobs propelled employment, though prejudice persisted. New York reservation numbers dropped as people moved for work: Rochester became an urban center for Iroquois in war industries; Senecas and Tuscaroras built warplanes in Buffalo and worked in aluminum plants and gypsum mining. The army hired 1,500 Navajos to build a supply depot at Fort Wingate in 1942, then thousands more Navajo and Hopi to build and operate the Navajo Ordnance

Depot in Arizona. A new Naval Supply Depot in Utah bused in hundreds of Pueblo, Navajo, Shoshone, Ute, Arapaho, and Sioux. Los Alamos Laboratories hired Indians from nearby pueblos. Thousands of Native Americans moved to the West Coast for work, forming communities in Los Angeles and San Francisco. In Alaska, the US Army contracted with two Native-owned canneries and with a Native co-op employing three hundred women and children to make cold weather clothing for construction crews—sealskin trousers and boots, reindeer parkas, moosehide moccasins.[47]

Overall, the war economy increased tribes' cash income, despite federal cuts to Indian Affairs and to New Deal programs. But rationing and shortages hit the rural homefront hard. On South Dakota Sioux reservations, where nearly two thousand enlisted, those at home struggled with loss of the CCC and other aid programs.[48] For Chippewa in northwestern Wisconsin, who relied on hunting and fishing along with wages from federal programs such as WPA and CCC, the shutdown of these programs was only partly compensated by men enlisting or getting defense industry jobs, and it was hard for fathers to leave or move their families for work in cities.[49]

This was also a time when Congress considered eliminating the federal treaty relationship with Native American nations, "terminating" tribes, a political project that began in 1937 and continued through and after the war (chapter 12). In part it was Indians' success on the homefront as well as in military service that encouraged this idea. The desire to save money on tribal and BIA appropriations combined with a widespread belief that Indians were ready to assimilate, supported by publicity about their patriotism. In the end, the assimilation argument proved wrong. Despite claims that wartime experiences would hasten migration from reservations and merge Native Americans into the general population, in fact most workers and veterans returned home after the war, and in many ways the war years deepened tribal feeling.[50]

Australia

We have seen how the Australian Army's need for manpower over the course of the war dissolved barriers to Indigenous enlistment. War-spurred industries also needed workers, drawing Aboriginal Australians along with others into cities, where many stayed, making a larger (and, eventually, more politically active) urban presence. But defensive preparations centered in the sparsely populated north, where labor was at a premium.

The north had been relatively ignored by the national government before the threat of Japanese invasion highlighted its vulnerability. Then, war brought

roughly a hundred thousand servicemen to the area, who had little prior knowledge of Aboriginal Australians and no interest in maintaining the exploitative prewar pastoralist labor system. New airfields, roads, and increased coastal ship traffic, along with wartime employment, ended the isolation of Indigenous people that mission stations and government policy had maintained across the North.

From the army's point of view, northern Australian Aboriginal labor was indispensible. For the workers, military employment offered a novel and much better experience than previous farm, ranch, or domestic work. We saw in chapter 6 how the military used Aboriginal Australian skills in reconnaissance. Beyond this, the army offered a wide range of jobs: not only general labor, but also butchering, sanitation, mechanics, stevedores, drivers, deck hands, pilots, mess stewards, welders' assistants, hospital work—training men in fields previous barred to them. Women had opportunities too, though limited by racial and gender rules. Over time, the army became the largest employer of Aboriginal Australian labor in the Northern Territory, ran camps for workers and their families, and improved standards to the point that it became impossible to re-establish the exploitative status quo ante.

Living in supervised workers' camps was a very different experience from prewar missions or ranch settlements. Army camps, built in Darwin and along the north-south road to Alice Springs, offered schooling, health care, organized sports and education, and sympathy for Aboriginal culture, including walkabout leave. The camps had negative impacts, too—problems from naively mixing people from different places, and increased prostitution, sexual abuse, and venereal disease, as women's lives were less strictly supervised than in mission-run reserves. White pastoralists contested army initiatives, concerned that such treatment would interfere with their control of a cheap labor force after the war. Indeed, Aboriginal workers did not forget this experience of relative equality and good treatment, both by individual white Australians and by the army's management, and these memories played a role in postwar political action.[51]

War's voracious appetite for labor affected Indigenous peoples everywhere. As we will see in the next chapter, even those very far from combat found its demands pressing on them.

CHAPTER 10

Building and Destroying the World through War

Writings by and about Indigenous communities often signal historical eras with the phrases "before the war" and "after the war," recognizing the conflict as a marker of dramatic change in material conditions and everyday life.[1] Allied and Axis giants competed through worldwide military construction and resource extraction, combat zones suffered massive destruction, and postwar decisions rebuilt many areas but left others in ruins. This chapter considers how Indigenous lives and environments were enhanced, destroyed, restored, and neglected—or some combination of these—by years of war.

Global Infrastructure for Global War

The extent of facilities built to prosecute World War II is astonishing. The world's productive capacity was transformed; roads, airports, mines, factories, and every sort of military apparatus took shape across the globe. Ken Coates points out that many Indigenous lands had remained beyond centralized rule or commercial development because it was too costly to push across challenging landscapes of desert, sea, and tundra. War changed that, forcibly intruding into previously isolated areas.[2]

War gave many places their first airports, some still in use. The Guadalcanal airfield begun by Japanese and finished by Americans (Henderson Field) later became Solomon Islands' Honiara International Airport; wartime airfields in Vanuatu (New Hebrides), Samoa, Kiribati (Gilbert Islands), and Tonga are now those nations' airports. The modern capital of Nunavut Territory in Canada, Iqaluit (formerly Frobisher Bay), originated from the US airbase built for the North America-Europe airplane staging route.[3] The German Army built Ivalo Airport in northern Finland in 1943, then destroyed it during their retreat in 1945; it was rebuilt in 1950. A Royal New Zealand Air Force site in Fiji became in 1968 a campus for the University of the South Pacific. Military hospitals became civilian hospitals.

Across Micronesia, schools, businesses, and families still use Japanese-built military facilities. Much military construction was dismantled or abandoned to decay, but in some places, it laid the foundation for postwar economies.[4]

War demands commandeered territory even far from the front lines. American and Canadian military bases and training areas annexed a significant amount of Indigenous land. It was usually leased, sometimes bought, sometimes offered readily, sometimes acquired only after acrimonious debate or lawsuits. In the United States, Sioux lost the most land, the army appropriating more than 340,000 acres of the Pine Ridge Reservation in early 1942 for an aerial gunnery range, forcing removal of residents. Compensation was delayed until 1956; the air force used the Pine Ridge Air Gunnery Range until the mid-1970s; cleanup continues. Historians estimate wartime losses of Native American land—some permanent—as high as one million acres. Military use of Native land continues to the present, as does the effect of abandoned weapon storage and test sites.[5]

In Canada, participation in the British Commonwealth Air Training Plan put sites on several Indigenous lands, including a flying school at Tyendinaga Mohawk Territory.[6] As in the United States, control of appropriated territory did not necessarily revert to First Nations after the war. The Chippewa Kettle and Stoney Point band in Ontario lost land to an infantry training center in 1942. The government retained the property, later turned into a provincial park; only in 2016 did Chippewa regain the land, and compensation, after years of tension and the killing of a protestor.[7]

In retrospect it is easy to criticize such appropriation, but at the time the public praised Native communities for allowing the nation to use their land. Specific cases were more nuanced. In negotiations for a Canadian flight training school on Six Nations of the Grand River, Iroquois opinions were mixed. The Six Nations were already enlisting and doing war work, but those who petitioned against the landtaking saw volunteering as different from compelled patriotism (chapter 2). Viewing themselves as "allies of the Crown, not subjects" with a distinguished history of military service, petitioners insisted that government reciprocate by respecting treaty rights. Historian P. Whitney Lackenbauer's analysis of the debate shows that both those who supported military needs and those who foregrounded treaty rights were equally Indigenous and equally patriotic.[8]

Targeting the Arctic

The entire Arctic was altered, as bases and resource extraction sites populated the thinly settled region from North America to Scandinavia to Siberia, and naval convoys and air transport opened it to global forces.

Before the war, the Canadian government had paid little attention to the roughly 13,600 Inuit living in small communities across the far North. At the time, Canada did not provide health care or education for them directly but gave funds to religious organizations and commercial companies for the purpose. This changed after the United States and Canada installed bases for Lend-Lease aircraft staging routes. (Lend-Lease planes built in the United States were flown to the USSR via a northwest route through Canada and Alaska, and to Europe via eastern Canada and Greenland.) The bases offered medical care and mail service, but also disrupted subsistence and trapping and increased illness and deaths from transient personnel. More consequentially, servicemen and construction workers who visited Inuit villages criticized living conditions, education, medical care, and exploitation by traders. Unflattering news coverage provoked an official investigation. In 1945, the government recognized Inuit as Canadian citizens for access to health and welfare programs and put Indian and Inuit health care under its own bureaucracy.[9]

Canada's neglect of Inuit was further highlighted when Greenland (a Danish colony) became part of the North Atlantic Lend-Lease route and Allied personnel could compare the two administrations, noting the better education and integration of Greenland Inuit. After the Nazi occupation of Denmark, Greenland's administrators cooperated with the United States and Canada, signing a defense agreement that led to military construction, including large US airbases at Narsarsuaq and Kangerlussuaq (both now civilian airports). Personnel flooded in and hospitals and roads appeared, along with electricity, a radio station, and mail-order catalogues. German surrender in Denmark in May 1945 restored the colonial link, but wartime changes sparked the desire for more local control. Military development and modernization continued with the US Thule Air Base (built 1951–1953, still in operation). Denmark's 1953 constitution acknowledged the altered status of Greenland's twenty thousand people. The island moved toward greater self-government in the 1970s and became an independent country within the Kingdom of Denmark in 2009.[10]

The USSR's arctic regions, too, were transformed. The government had sought to sovietize the nation's reindeer herders, hunters, trappers, and fishers from the time of the Communist Revolution. But difficulties of geography and culture meant that many groups had not yet been assimilated, such as, in Siberia, Tungus (Ewenkis and Ewens), Koraks, Chukchis, Yukagirs, Itelmens, and Yakuts. Programs to sedentize and Russify nomads and collectivize their economies continued through the war years, changes that weakened cultural identity and increased Soviet control. Some herders resisted collectivization to the point

of destroying their herds or enduring arrest and imprisonment.[11] In the USSR's northwest arctic, some Nenets rebelled in 1943, pressed by such policies and by wartime demands for men and reindeer at the Finland front, and fled into the tundra with their herds. The Soviet response killed Nenets leaders, imprisoned participants, and destroyed families and communities.[12]

Siberia experienced dramatic change when, after the German attack on the European front in mid-1941, the USSR dismantled and relocated more than three hundred large industries there, along with hundreds of thousands of skilled workers. Demand rose for the area's timber and minerals. Development drew some Indigenous people into growing cities and wage labor markets and pushed others into more isolated areas. At the same time, war battered traditional subsistence. Reindeer herds were depleted by military requisition and to feed industrial workers. In the Yamal Nenets Region, herds were reduced by 37 percent; Ewenki and Ewen farther east in Yakutia lost 68 percent of their animals in the first eighteen months of war.[13]

Through the 1940s to 1950s, economic dislocation and repression caused severe hardship for Indigenous Siberians. Soldiers' absence increased the homefront workload, additionally strained by high production demands, requisition of vehicles and horses, and pressure to donate money, food, and labor. In the Altai Mountains, women and children were reduced to eating moles and gophers, yet still had to meet agricultural quotas. Nenets women took over reindeer herding, fishing, and hunting. Nivkh and Nanai met fishing quotas by crewing poorly maintained vessels with women and old men. Poverty and food shortages added to suffering. James Forsyth concludes that the cost of the war effort was "disproportionately high" for non-Russian Siberians, the contribution of their small populations a poor balance for the destruction wreaked on their communities.[14]

Allied Pacific Bases

The United States built or enlarged hundreds of installations across the Pacific, from vastly expanding Oahu's facilities to major new sites in New Zealand, New Caledonia, and Tonga, to small bases dotted across the ocean, like the airfields (still in use) on Cook Islands' tiny Aitutaki and Tongareva Atolls.[15] Close to the fighting, invasion, and counterinvasion forces dwarfed local populations. In Bougainville, sixty-five thousand Japanese who dominated the island population of about fifty thousand were matched from November 1943 with a roughly equal number of Allied troops.[16] The forty thousand New Hebrides residents were outnumbered by US troops—predominantly African American—building and manning defenses, a hospital, fleet anchorage, and other facilities, peaking

in 1945 at fifty thousand Americans on Espiritu Santo, another fifteen thousand on Efate (prewar population of three thousand), and tens of thousands more passing through.[17]

Bases ebbed and flowed with the war, whipsawing nearby communities. Nissan Island, east of Rabaul, population about 1,500, was garrisoned by about a hundred Japanese. In February 1944, more than 5,000 New Zealand and US troops landed and within a few weeks the island held 16,400 soldiers. Then combat moved north, and by year's end Nissan was again only a small post, this time in Allied hands.[18] Rapid build-ups and shut-downs were equally disruptive. On French colonial Bora Bora, 4,000 US servicemen at a fueling station spent several uneventful years socializing with the 1,300 Tahitians. The base's abrupt closure in June 1946 meant the loss of food, medical care, imports, and cash, and left behind 130 children of American fathers.[19]

Larger temporary bases left deeper footprints. By the end of 1942, Fiji had some forty thousand US, New Zealand, and Fijian troops on Viti Levu, which was first a staging point, later a rest and recovery area. Bases, defenses, roads, and hospitals took land from Fijian villagers and Indo-Fijian tenant farmers, and residents faced increased security, censorship, and civil defense preparations.[20] Tonga, an independent nation governed by Queen Sālote, hosted a US base at Tongatabu, which at its peak held ten thousand US personnel, with thousands more in transit through this "liberty port," giving Tongans an unprecedented economic boost. The military presence improved agriculture, roads, water system, piers, and an airport. It also created social problems, as farm work was neglected and youths challenged sexual and religious mores. The war inflated economic expectations and altered cultural norms.[21]

High wages and training opportunities at American bases changed the outlook of a generation. Hiring Samoans to help build Faleolo Airfield on Upolu (now Samoa's international airport) gave young men an independence that challenged the authority of the traditional chiefly *matai* system. In American Samoa, even as some men took advantage of new chances to join the US military, chiefs questioned how Samoan custom might align with US law.[22] The American base at Noumea in New Caledonia upended the local economy and offered Kanaks new and well-paid employment. European residents and colonial authorities worried about inflation and whether the United States had long-term plans to take over the island. It did not—but Kanaks' wartime experiences led to changes in island governance and, eventually, in relations with France.[23]

In Japanese-held islands, too, people saw waves of construction and destruction: the Japanese built airbases and fortresses, which were destroyed by Allied

invaders, who then built their own facilities. In its Micronesian mandate, Japan accelerated infrastructure construction in the mid-late 1930s, removing entire communities to make way for airfields and harbors, then for military installations. By mid-1941, the area held eleven naval air bases: four in the Marianas, four in the Caroline Islands, and three in the Marshall Islands. More hurried construction came in 1943, when the islands became the empire's eastern defensive perimeter.[24] After destructive battles, victorious US forces rebuilt enemy bases (as on Kwajalein and Peleliu) or built new ones (as at Ulithi, a US Navy base 1944–1945). Airfields on Guam, Saipan, and Tinian supported attacks on Japan—the August 1945 *Enola Gay* atomic bombing of Hiroshima launched from Tinian—and Guam was heavily rebuilt for military use, cementing its influence on civilian life. The army base at Kwajalein and permanent impacts of nuclear testing at Enewetak and Bikini (1946–1958) still govern US relations with the Republic of the Marshall Islands. Today, US military use of land—and protests against it—continue in Hawai'i, Guam, and the Northern Mariana Islands.[25]

The decades following World War II again altered the geopolitics of military bases, as some were repurposed for the Cold War and others abandoned or turned to civilian use. Since then, militarization of Indigenous lands has ebbed and flowed with international politics. Today, superpowers continue "friendly occupations" by holding basing rights across the globe, some impacting Indigenous lands.[26]

Roads to Everywhere

Like some airfields, roads put into formerly roadless areas had long-lasting impact. Those built in the Sámi region during German Army occupation (to support operations and link with German bases in Norway) reached settlements that had lacked such access and were later overhauled by the Finnish government for ongoing use.[27] Elsewhere, despite the huge construction effort, roads too costly to maintain fell to footpath status (like the Bulldog-Wau Road, now track, in Papua New Guinea), or disappeared completely. Large-scale road projects that particularly affected Indigenous communities were those in the Burma-India hills and the Alaska-Canadian Highway.

Burma: Tedim Road and Ledo Road. No motor roads crossed the Chin Hills of Burma before the war. The British turned a bridle path between Imphal in India and Tedim (Tiddim) into a military road, an essential link with army units posted in Chin lands. Construction of the 265-kilometer road started from both ends in late 1942; the first Jeep got through in May 1943. It was an enormous task given the steep slopes, climate, vegetation, and lack of machinery.[28]

Building a road through mountainous terrain—from the Tedim end, entirely by hand—required prodigious labor. Besides soldiers and workers from India, some five thousand people of the northern Chin Hills—men, women, and children—worked on roadbuilding.[29] By November 1942, Norman Kelly estimated that the Tedim and Falam area had provided eleven days' work for every household. As they had organized combat units, Chin organized labor according to home villages, with headmen recruiting crews. Chief Pum Za Mang, for example, received a King's Service Medal for supplying porters to carry rations and "coolies" for roadcutting. We saw in chapter 2 how the relentless drive for labor pushed Kuki to affiliate with Japanese. Labor demands piled onto other hardships—food scarcity, shortages of essential goods, and constant fear of attack. After eighteen months of heavy road work, Deputy Commissioner Noel Stevenson wrote to British headquarters in New Delhi that the Chin were near the limits of endurance.[30]

The larger, better-known project was the Ledo Road connecting India with China. With Japan occupying lowland Burma, Allies had to supply Chinese Nationalist forces by air over the Himalayas. The Ledo Road was to enable ground transport from northeast India (the town of Ledo) to the Burma Road and thence to Yunnan in south China.[31] Work began in December 1942; the first truck convoy got through January 1945. An estimated fifty to eighty thousand men and women labored on the road. Under the Allied division of responsibility in the region, the US Army took over construction and supplied fifteen thousand soldiers, mostly African American engineering battalions. British authorities provided manpower: Indian Army pioneers, labor units from across India, tea plantation labor, and contract workers, including many tribal men and women. The China-Burma-India war zone was noted for diversity, and this was apparent on the Ledo Road: Europeans, Chinese, Gurkhas, white and African American US soldiers, Indians of every background, and hill tribe villagers interacted, not only at work but also at the parties, movies, and dances organized as part of labor management. The two-year-long project brought into the hills tens of thousands of foreign troops and workers, unfamiliar machinery, wage labor, and a world of new goods, foods, and interactions.[32]

Alaska-Canadian ("ALCAN") Highway. The other hemisphere's major new military road was the Alaska Highway from Dawson Creek, British Columbia, to Delta Junction south of Fairbanks, built from March to October 1942. Fears of Japanese invasion and the start of Lend-Lease flights to the USSR focused attention on this sparsely populated area of primarily First Nations and Inuit settlements. Construction went far beyond the highway itself—a

five-hundred-mile oil pipeline, air, water, and land transportation systems and support facilities of every kind were built. The population of Whitehorse in Yukon, headquarters for US Army Northwest Service Command, swelled from three hundred to more than twenty thousand.[33]

This invasion by a friendly power changed Canada's Northwest, where the small Native population of the Yukon had previously dealt mostly with missionaries, police officers, and fur traders. The largely roadless "bush" where people lived from hunting, gathering, and trapping, hardly known to the Canadian government, was flooded by more than forty thousand US Army Corps of Engineers soldiers (many of them African American) and Canadian and American civilian workers. First Nations people had some employment, especially at first as guides and packers for crews laying out the road and pipeline—jobs seen as suited to "Native" skills—though seldom on permanent crews. The Canadian government rejected the US policy of racial disparity in pay, so those who were hired earned regular wages.[34]

The population influx brought a wave of epidemics, especially damaging to Natives who had little immunity because of previous isolation. Military and contractors offered medical aid, which (as in Greenland) highlighted the Canadian government's previous neglect. Interaction varied—those not in the highway's path could avoid newcomers if they wanted to—but were both positive (friendships, shared hunting and fishing) and negative (disrupted subsistence, access to alcohol). Native women faced additional stresses. There were romances with servicemen and workers, but also abuse, prostitution, and rape, and women and children were often abandoned when fathers left.[35]

Construction on such a large scale also affected the natural environment. Work crews hunted and fished for recreation, leading in some areas to overexploitation. Military use of resources was unregulated, and at the time there was limited knowledge about the impact of pipeline and highway construction in permafrost or muskeg or of extensive timber-cutting or fuel spills. The damage prodded the Canadian government to fund scientific research on the Northwest, creating awareness of a fragile ecosystem. While positive in one sense, later environmental protections restricted Native people's access to traditional land use. It was wartime overexploitation that led to establishing the Kluane Game Preserve in 1942, which barred Native people from generations-old hunting grounds; it later became Kluane National Park and is part of a UNESCO World Heritage Site.[36]

When the United States transferred the highway and other facilities to the Canadian government in 1946, the Yukon had gained extensive if rough transportation and communication systems, a new regional center at Whitehorse,

and increased government attention. New federal aid rules combined with a slump in fur prices drew Indigenous people into settlements. After the war, the region's economy developed further, national programs expanded, and the Cold War extended the military presence. Canada's Cold War concerns about security and sovereignty reflected not only worry over Soviet intentions, but also aftereffects of US encroachment in World War II.[37]

Supplying the Resources for War

Infrastructure and production demands over years of war required colossal changes to the world's economies—not only vastly increased production, but also shifts in where and how goods were produced and distributed. Trade in key resources fluctuated with the currents of victory, forcing nations to adjust under intense pressure, in a "global chess game" (as Ashley Jackson writes of the British Empire).[38] When control of productive areas slipped from Allied to Axis or vice versa, the impacts sifted down to workers on the front lines of farms, mines, forests, rivers, and seas, including Indigenous peoples whose lands held important resources.

The best-documented ripple effect of commodity demands was in Europe's African colonies, which supplied Allies with gold, industrial diamonds, uranium, cotton, cocoa, and many other products. Much of the continent was subjected to tight economic management, coerced labor, and high production quotas, causing socioeconomic changes that merged with postwar politics to promote independence. We know less about the impact on small tribal and band communities, but production pushed far into the countryside and forest and brought previously marginal areas into use. The drive to tap wild rubber trees, for example, may have affected Pygmies and others living in Africa's tropical forests, though its greatest impact occurred in the Amazon Basin.[39]

Japanese conquest of Dutch and British territories in Southeast Asia cut off the Allies' primary sources of the two essential commodities of rubber and cinchona (for quinine), along with petroleum, hemp and sisal (for rope), and strategic minerals. As the Japanese made use of resources from their expanding empire to pursue the war, Allies rushed to develop substitutes, while increasing production in Africa and South America.[40]

War's chief effects on South America came from military construction and demand for key commodities.[41] Indigenous communities were most affected by increased mining of Bolivian tin, by the search for cinchona in Peru and Ecuador, and by Allied rubber production in the Amazon.[42] Rubber was essential to

war; everything from tires for mechanized armies to raincoats depended on it. Japanese occupation of Malaya and the Dutch East Indies in the first months of 1942 cost the Allies more than 90 percent of their rubber supply; until synthetics could be developed, natural rubber remained a prized resource.[43]

The American plan to deal with the shortage included conservation and research on synthetics, but it was cooperation with Brazil that transformed the Amazon in the "Battle for Rubber." The United States poured money into the industry and Brazil's government used the opportunity to extend control over the region.[44] Brazil recruited roughly thirty thousand workers for new or expanded rubber estates and offered draftees the choice between rubber plantations or the front lines. The influx of mostly male outsiders impinged on Amazonian communities, and marriages with local women expanded the mixed Brazilian-Indigenous *caboclos* population.[45]

The "Battle for Rubber" displayed processes seen elsewhere—attracting government and commercial attention, building infrastructure, increasing the cash economy, and also depleting resources and causing loss of autonomy and safety to Indigenous communities. American technical experts and others travelling in the area during this time describe a violent and often lawless situation, where some groups fought the intrusion of rubber estates (as did Kayapo in the Xingu region), and plantation managers sometimes hired and armed one community to attack others. Some Indians were willing to sign on as tappers, and those in areas of scarce labor could negotiate good terms, but in places far from the partial shield of Catholic missionaries or the Indian Protection Service, estate owners enslaved and exploited them.[46]

After synthetic rubber production increased, demand for Amazonian rubber declined. But the impact of the "War for Rubber" continued to affect resource use and labor and ethnic relations, paving the way for aggressive development of the Amazon by Brazil's subsequent governments aiming to "civilize" and settle the region, countered by growing environmental protests.[47] Protection of the Amazon is now an international political concern, with Indigenous peoples contributing significantly to activism.

Quinine also became a high priority. The 1942 Japanese takeover of Dutch Java, with its cinchona plantations and the largest quinine factory in the world, and German possession of the world's main supplier of processed quinine in Amsterdam, left the Allies unprepared for war in malarial zones. The United States began to study native species in the Andes for possible cultivation (though cinchona was native to the region, it had not been an important export since the nineteenth century). Botanists sent to Colombia, Peru, and Ecuador hired

Indian carriers and bark cutters to carry samples to laboratories. In two years, they shipped some 12.5 million pounds of cinchona for Allied use, until development of synthetic quinine.[48]

The Amazon and the Andes are two of many areas where war-driven assessment of Indigenous territorial resources drew attention to them. While in some cases this had positive effects (bringing money, political leverage, or improved infrastructure), in others Native lands became more vulnerable. Combatant powers amassed a great deal of information that guided wartime use and later served postwar planning. In the United States, authority over Indian reservations shifted to the War Resources Council, confronting tribes with pressure from the federal government during the war and from commercial entities afterward. Outside interest in Indian resources fueled Congress's haste to terminate federal guardianship. In Canada and Alaska, strategic mineral exploration offered an opportunity for investors. The first detailed maps of Papua New Guinea were made for the war, and military resource surveys gave postwar governments data that accelerated commodification of timber, fishing, and agriculture.[49] Indigenous lands were newly vulnerable to private and government development projects in the postwar era of reconstruction and economic expansion.[50]

Destruction

When front lines crossed Indigenous territory, destruction was direct, brutal, and long-lasting. In the European war, some care was taken to preserve cultural and historical treasures, and money was spent to rebuild those countries, but few Indigenous lands saw such attention.[51] Contested areas in the path of invasions and retreats suffered major and permanent damage, notably in Sápmi, the Burma-India hills, and Micronesia.

Invasion and Retreat: Sápmi

Following invasions, occupation, evacuations, and above all, the scorched-earth German retreat of winter 1944–1945, Sápmi, the Sámi homeland, was devastated. After the Finnish-Allied armistice of September 1944, the German Army withdrew through northern Finland and Norway, deliberately leaving a trail of ruins to slow the Finnish and Russian advance. The destruction included military assets—bridges, roads, buildings—but also despoliation that amounted to vengeance, smashing and burning boats, blowing up telephone poles and milestones, slaughtering herds of reindeer. Destruction patrols moved along roads, so the most accessible places suffered the most, with some areas 80 to 90 percent

destroyed. Houses not burned were later wrecked or looted by deserters, escaped prisoners, or refugees. In the end, nearly fifteen thousand buildings in Finland's Lapland Province were destroyed, more than 40 percent of existing buildings. When Sámi evacuees returned in the summer of 1945, they met only ruins.[52]

The return was slow and difficult, delayed by the lack of housing and hazardous travel, with roads in bad shape, bridges destroyed, and some areas heavily mined. Mine-clearing went on throughout summer and fall. Still, in Aanaar (Inari) county forty-five people died from mine explosions in 1945, and the danger persisted for decades. Finnmark (northern Norway) was mined even more densely than Finland, and the Germans had mined waters there too, making fishing hazardous.[53]

The war badly depleted reindeer herds across Sápmi. When young men left for military service, underguarded herds became vulnerable to thieves, disease, predators, and poaching. Military quotas took up to a third of some herds; some 220,000 reindeer in northern Finland were killed for food. Too, reindeer were killed during military operations. Asked for his worst memory of the Arctic front, one Nenets man in the Soviet Army immediately said, "The worst was that our reindeer got shot. It was terrible. When German planes came, we hid and were not seen but our reindeer kept standing and were bombed and shot." Redrawing the Finland-USSR border cost the Skolt community about 3,500 head of large reindeer, affecting the genetics of the remaining herds. Loss of pasture and poor weather caused further harm. It took ten years for herds to recover to prewar levels.[54]

Wartime losses impoverished many Sámi, yet the very thoroughness of destruction created an opportunity for rebuilding (see below) that altered the course of Sámi life.

Invasion and Retreat: Burma/India Borderlands

The Burma-India hill country saw two invasions and retreats: first, withdrawal of British and Chinese forces as the Japanese invaded; then, after the Imphal-Kohima battles, their retreat, pursued by Allied armies. On the India border, Manipur and Nagaland were devastated by the same sequence of events. Food supplies, livestock, housing, and possessions were exhausted or ruined first by the flood of refugees and soldiers withdrawing from Burma, then by Allied build-up, then by the Japanese advance and the battles of Imphal-Kohima. In the hills, British troops retreating ahead of the Japanese emptied villages, burned crops, and took livestock to deny them to the enemy. IJA/INA soldiers were told to rely entirely on themselves, to find supplies and carriers along the way. During the advance, they kept order and generally paid for rice or other goods.

But discipline broke down during the battles and in retreat, leading to harsher action. Several thousand Nagas fled to British-organized refugee camps, but those who remained were at the mercy of soldiers and bandits.[55]

The battles of Imphal and Kohima left that area of Manipur wrecked, with weapons and corpses strewn across the landscape, diseases unchecked, and houses and food sources destroyed. It did not then return to normal but became a staging ground for hundreds of thousands of Allied troops supplying China and mounting the counterinvasion of Burma through 1944–1945. Seven years after the battle, the Indian Parliament was still being asked to address the huge number of weapons in the area, the belief that most were "understood to be in the possession of tribal people and communists" generating a police drive to collect them. As in Malaya and northern Burma, the war in Nagaland caused disruption and militarization that contributed to postwar violence (chapter 11).[56]

Invasion and Retreat: Pacific Islands

New Guinea also saw two invasions and two retreats—first the retreat of European colonials and the invasion of Japanese, then the reverse. In most places the Japanese advance was uncontested, though Australians leaving Wau destroyed bridges, roads, airfield, and gardens, drove out cattle and pigs, and burned the town. Greater damage came later, when Allied counterinvasion brought air and ground combat. Bombing, strafing, and napalm intended for the Japanese also struck New Guineans' villages and gardens. By war's end, many towns, plantations, and other resources had been destroyed.[57]

Aerial and ground warfare destroyed the major Japanese towns in Micronesia—Jaluit in the Marshall Islands, Toloas/Dublon in Chuuk, Kolonia on Pohnpei, Garapan on Saipan, and Koror in Palau, as well as Hagåtña/Agana on Guam. Sachuo Siwi described the destruction of Chuuk's urban and military center, after two days and a night of bombing:

> [W]hat could I say? I can't say anything that would really describe the scene at the time. Everywhere I went, I saw dead people just lying around everywhere. Sometimes I'd find an arm or a leg or even a head separated from the body—people were dying out in the open, a messy death. There were no more clusters of buildings, even the offices weren't there anymore. The school building wasn't damaged, but the teachers said that school should be closed at that time. It was no use having school, for it was a time of trouble. So that was it for the first air raid. People were very pitiful. That's what it was like.[58]

Micronesia's Japanese-built colonial infrastructure of shipping, roads, power plants, and commercial agriculture was demolished. Vegetation was stripped, timber and food trees cut, taro pits drained, animals slaughtered, reefs shattered. War debris littered land and sea. Peleliu, for example, suffered irreversible damage after Japanese construction of defenses in depth, intensive bombardment, and more than two months of ground combat. When residents were allowed to return in mid-1946, the five villages they had left behind had disappeared. The land was denuded, scraped to bare coral, everything so destroyed that people could not even locate the sites of their old villages or the boundaries of the plots that governed land rights and lineage history. In most of Micronesia, wartime loss of infrastructure and capital goods was recovered only after decades, and in some places never.[59]

Large-scale war laid waste to fragile island landscapes. Coastwatcher Ian Downs describes how construction of the massive US base at Manus (Admiralty Islands, PNG) had simply obliterated it: "Whole villages, coconut groves, trees, grass and gardens had gone. When I went ashore I could feel the broken houses, the crushed trees and the torn roots of tormented jungle screaming under my feet."[60] Atolls, with their tiny land base and people's dependence on tree crops and reef resources, were particularly vulnerable. Dredging reshaped channels and shorelines. Building roads, airfields, and wharves destroyed acres of garden and precious taro pits and damaged reefs and lagoons. Judith Bennett's comprehensive *Natives and Exotics* inventories Pacific Islands war damage, as land, timber, coral, sand, and other resources were taken for military use with little attention to the future or the needs of Islanders.[61] Betio Island in Tarawa Atoll, where Japanese centered their defenses, saw its landscape and productivity—coconut trees, taro pits, fisheries—so completely destroyed by construction and combat that Betio people were never able to renew traditional subsistence.[62]

Losses were seldom compensated. Great Britain paid for destroyed trees and gardens but not personal property, and the plan to seize Japanese assets as compensation offered little in territories where Japan had invested little. The sum of environmental harm inflicted on the Pacific region was not fully recognized until years or decades later, when time revealed the long-term impact of explosives, chemicals, and oil spills, the spread of non-native plants, animals, and diseases, and the enduring problem of toxic debris.[63]

Remnants of War

As victorious Allies surveyed the world after V-E Day and V-J Day, they assessed the task of dealing with war's detritus, from leftover K-rations and building

supplies to leaking shipwrecks and unexploded bombs. Whether useful goods or dangerous ordnance, vast amounts of matériel had to be dealt with. Sometimes that meant simply leaving it in situ. For a decade after Aleuts returned to their ruined homes, they were able to salvage materials from abandoned military buildings in Dutch Harbor and the islands. But US property in foreign areas required more diplomatic handling. Six months after war's end, the Alaska Highway was turned over to Canada as agreed, and the Canol pipeline and refinery shut down. Leftover equipment and materials were hastily shipped south, turned over to the Canadian government, sold, or destroyed.[64]

In the Pacific Islands, war's abrupt end left a still-growing military stockpile. The United States began closing South Pacific operations in March 1945, with all equipment declared surplus in October 1945. While troops were repatriated quickly, the profusion of matériel was more problematic due to lack of personnel, shipping cost, and rapid deterioration in tropical climates. Some was salvaged for re-use, sold, or donated to local people or colonial administrations, but much was just abandoned or destroyed, leading to complaints both of wastefulness and environmental harm, as when machinery was dumped into coral pits or shoved off wharves.[65]

At the huge deserted American base on Manus Island, J. K. McCarthy (an Australian working on New Guinea's postwar reconstruction) saw "hundreds of Quonset huts, warehouses, dockyards, wharves, ice factories, power houses, water works, trucks and aircraft engines"—most of which the United States was selling to China, though Australians had acquired some. McCarthy managed to obtain Quonset huts for schools and housing in Madang but was frustrated that the Australian War Disposals Commission sold much of its stockpile rather than use it for rebuilding. Locals were equally frustrated, as they watched goods burned or buried or collected for sale by Europeans instead of being shared with the Islanders who had helped fight the war.[66]

Islanders had little input into official decisions to deal with surplus, but they accepted gifts or scavenged what was useful, and many lived for decades (some still do) amid the ruins. In 1966, New Britain's Gloucester airstrip was still edged with wrecks of planes, the road with abandoned armored personnel carriers, and the beach with bones of landing craft. For decades, war scrap was an export commodity. In the New Hebrides, salvagers removed tons of scrap metal in the 1950s and 1960s; only since Vanuatu's 1980 independence were laws passed to limit export of war relics, which now have tourism value (chapter 13).[67]

Despite repeated efforts, cleanup from World War II is not complete anywhere, not even in the most intensely cleared areas of Western Europe, where

bomb squads routinely deal with unexploded ordnance. Combat residue litters every war zone, but Indigenous lands have had less thorough clearing than more populated areas. Across the Pacific Islands, damage and death from leftover weaponry continued for decades and still occasionally take limbs or lives. Explosives were discovered as people cleared or burned undergrowth for gardens, fishermen suffered death and maiming when they lobbed grenades into shallow waters, and the simply curious also suffered, like two children on New Britain who took screwdrivers to a beached sea mine. The Royal Australian Navy trained a PNG Defense Force team to clean up bombs, mines, and shells at scale through the 1950s—and in smaller amounts long after that, as the explosives deteriorated dangerously.[68] In the 1980s, militias in Melanesia's internal conflicts dug up old armaments. On Peleliu, wildfires in a 1998 drought set off unexploded ammunition. Requests for clean-up continue: the United States removed mustard gas from Solomon Islands in 1991, and at century's end the prime minister was still asking (but not getting) help from the former combatants to clean up oil and heavy metals seeping from hundreds of sunken ships and planes in Iron Bottom Sound. After Palau's president requested help from the United Nations in 2009, Canada, Germany, Australia, and New Zealand provided funds for clearing dangerous ordnance. While some visitors might see World War II debris as collectibles or a part of heritage, people who live with it—like those on Peleliu—see it as "a particularly lethal form of litter."[69]

A final enduring physical impact to consider is how the siting of facilities affected postwar political geography. The British Gilbert and Ellice Islands colonial center on Ocean Island (Banaba) was ruined in the war, and Tarawa, where the US military made its base, became the new capital. The decision to headquarter the combined Papua and New Guinea administrations at Port Moresby made it the eventual capital of the new nation. American bombing destroyed Japan's urban zone (Toloas/Dublon) in Chuuk Lagoon; rather than rebuild it, the US Navy put its headquarters on Wene/Moen Island, which became the center for what is now Chuuk State of the Federated States of Micronesia. Koror, Palau, was demoted from its role as Japan's colonial capital when the United States put Trust Territory headquarters in Guam (later moved to Saipan). When the British Solomon Islands Protectorate administration returned, it transferred its headquarters from the old site of Tulagi to Honiara on Guadalcanal, where the US base at Henderson Field provided useful infrastructure including an airport, roads, and a hospital.[70]

As victorious nations sorted out the aftermath of war, bureaucracies began to deal with legal demands for compensation. This complex topic has had different

implications in Europe and in the Asia-Pacific region, reshaped over the decades by treaties, changing international relations, fluctuating official attention, and historical reinterpretations. In the first postwar years, the world's focus was on rebuilding Europe and East Asia, not on the colonies and other areas where Indigenous peoples struggled to get noticed for basic needs, much less for war damage compensation. International politics dominated compensation decisions. Japan was required to pay compensation only by loss of its assets in occupied or colonial territories, not by direct payment. New Zealand and Great Britain deliberately did not file claims against the United States for damage from military activities in Western Samoa, the Cook Islands, and the Gilbert and Ellice Islands Crown Colony, to avoid encouraging ongoing US involvement there.[71]

Indigenous areas had great difficulty accessing compensation. Most people lived far from paperwork and offices and far from the attention of policymakers. They had little access to resources for filing claims, even to literacy in many cases, and bureaucrats didn't understand their claims when they did make them (how much was a ceremonial pig worth? an ancestral temple? a handhewn canoe?). Action was more effective where prewar colonial administration was quickly reconstituted, as in Nagaland and New Guinea. Australia, spurred by rethinking its attitude toward New Guinea and appreciation for Islanders' war work, sent assessors to each district early in 1945, with a focus on deaths, property losses, and the value lost to war labor. By the 1960s, Australia had paid out more than two million pounds (though the relatively generous program has been since overshadowed by critiques of limited pay and pensions for carriers, soldiers, and police). But in the New Hebrides it was mostly French and British settlers—not the Melanesian majority—who filed claims. Even Guam's literate and politically connected leaders have endeavored for decades to get adequate attention to war claims from the US Congress. Aleuts have been more successful, gaining expertise as they petitioned the US government for compensation and pursued larger claims against Japan; hearings and negotiations extended through the 1980s until a reparations act was finally signed addressing individual claims and a compensation trust. World War II reparations claims, including those from Indigenous communities, continue in the new century.[72]

Reconstruction . . . Or Not

The Marshall Plan funded the rebuilding of Western Europe, including Germany, and Allied occupation of Japan oversaw reconstruction there. In both cases, the political shifts of the Cold War emphasized rebuilding these former

enemies into allies. Decisions about restoring Indigenous homelands depended on more local factors—on rulers' perceptions of the people, their role during the fighting, and new national priorities. Two contrasting cases—the people of the former Japanese-held Micronesian islands, and Sámi of Finland and Norway—show how these factors could produce very different results.

The war in Micronesia was physically devastating for many islands, stressful and damaging for most people. Its end brought welcome peace, relief supplies, medical aid, and a dramatic change in political context, as the United States insisted on retaining the islands under a special arrangement with the new United Nations. Managing civilian life was the task of US Navy Civil Affairs units and Military Government, as the United States debated how to make this region an "American lake" without triggering charges of imperialism; that is, to ensure an exclusive military zone and promote Americanization. High-level geopolitics mattered less to local people than the challenge of dealing with unfamiliar rulers, a new language, new ideas about democracy that had to be fitted to existing political structures, and a "colonial" administration that had neither the capacity nor the interest to rebuild an effective economy. The United States did little to compensate Islanders or help them recover from war damage. Reparations were delayed by decades and limited in scope. For example, Palau submitted claims valued at $47.7 million, but received $5.75 million from the Micronesian Claims Commission (Pohnpei still pursues its claims). More troubling than lack of compensation was the realization that the new rulers had no intention even of restoring the level of economy and services available under Japanese rule—much less improving on it.[73]

The economic constraint of US policies was not evident at first, as people near new US bases at Majuro, Kwajalein, Guam, Saipan, Tinian and elsewhere took good-paying jobs. But bases were costly, and soon the United States began to shut them down. Peleliu lost wages and access to food and imports when the base there closed in May 1948. Remaining facilities, such as Kwajalein, became less welcoming to Islanders. In Guam and the Northern Marianas, military plans outweighed civilian priorities.[74] The islands' only value to the United States was their strategic location, and Washington's interest was to secure that at the least cost.

In Sápmi, by contrast, destruction cleared the ground for deliberate social and economic development. Given the impact of the sequence of wars, German occupation, mass evacuations, the scorched-earth retreat, and postwar reconstruction, it is not unreasonable to say that the war years both destroyed and rebuilt Sápmi. At first, returnees lived in cellars, tents, or barracks, subsisting on

game, fish and berries, bartering for staples, and taking occasional wage work. Gradually, government aid, compensation payments, and international aid organizations helped people rebuild. By 1952, Finland's Lapland Province had nearly returned to prewar conditions—though with many modifications to Sámi life.[75]

In both Finland and Norway, public awareness of Sámi wartime experiences encouraged government attention to the region. In Finland, new agricultural methods were introduced, and the cash economy flourished. Destroyed areas were rebuilt with new infrastructure and government services, drawing more Finns to the area. Finnish-style houses, furnishings, and clothing began to replace Sámi style, especially among youth. The changes both accelerated Finnicization and offered new avenues for Sámi to participate in the national order.[76] In Norway, the postwar government hoped to alter Sámi settlement, concentrating people in towns, but families rebuilt their homesteads before the government could act. Over time, reconstruction, schooling, and the expanding welfare state helped integrate Sámi into Norwegian life.[77]

In a short story by Sámi writer John Gustavsen (1996), a Sámi family sails home to northern Norway from wartime evacuation. En route, they imagine the plentiful fish, hares, ptarmigan, and berries they will enjoy, in contrast to the hardships of the refugee camps. At last, they reach the Finnmark coast: "They knew these waters, every point and every mountain peak. Now the landscape was stripped, there were only ruins to behold. The war had ravaged the land severely." But, though it was the middle of the night, people crowded the temporary dock to welcome them.

"Katinka Juliussen was the first one to drag herself up on to the dock, motherly and grand. Many are those who remember her first words: 'The war is over!'"[78]

CHAPTER 11

Indigenous Status in the Postwar World

THREE THOUSAND MEN OF the Chin Levies attended the victory celebration in Haka. They created a "stirring and romantic" sight riding in and another vivid scene when the long-haired men danced in crimson silks, ornaments, and feathers. King George VI praised the courage and loyalty of the hill tribes in his October 1945 message to the people of Burma and promised special attention to protect their position.[1] But that was not to be. For many Indigenous people, the postwar world was not one of freedom to express their own cultures and determine their own lives, despite the rhetoric and promises of wartime.

After the devastation of World War II, "The ridiculous empires break like biscuits" (in the words of poet Roy Fuller[2]) and the world rebuilt its political order. Any expectation of global peace, though, was short-lived. The Cold War immediately realigned victorious powers into new alliances and enmities. Across Southeast Asia, the anti-Japanese war segued into a war against returning colonial powers, or an anti-Communist war, or a pro-Communist war, or a messy combination of all three. Though the immediate prospect for self-determination for Indigenous communities seemed dim, political turmoil offered avenues for activism and laid groundwork for the eventual emergence of a global Indigenous Rights movement. This chapter and the next look at how war-affected Indigenous people fared in the first postwar decades: those dealing with abruptly redrawn borders, those in decolonizing nations, and veterans in combatant nations whose struggle was one of internal decolonization.

New Borders and New Fractures

Redrawing international borders affected several transnational communities. More than two hundred Skolt Sámi were among the civilians uprooted from Finland's northeastern district of Petsamo after a 1944 agreement ceded it to the USSR. At war's end, they had to choose whether to remain in Finland or return

to a home now under Soviet rule. Most stayed, pulled by wartime allegiance, pushed by Soviet collectivization of reindeer herds. The Finnish government relocated them several times—some lived as refugees for a decade—and the older generation never ceased to mourn their lost pastures. “It was a land of plenty,” Matti Fofanoff recalled, “Now we walk down an unknown path, poor, with no land, no homes, and no reindeer.”[3]

Other Soviet borders also changed or hardened. Along the China-Mongolia periphery, where peoples such as Hezhe, Buryat, and Nanai had moved freely for centuries, international tension curtailed cross-border travel during and after the war.[4] The Soviet takeover of Sakhalin and the Kuril Islands in August 1945 displaced Ainu, Nivkh, and Uilta. About half of southern Sakhalin’s 1,300 Ainu were “repatriated” to unfamiliar Hokkaido. The USSR concentrated the roughly 2,500 Indigenous people remaining on Sakhalin into reindeer-herding or fishing collectives and brought in settlers from across the USSR and eastern Europe. By the 1990s, Indigenous people comprised less than 1 percent of Sakhalin’s population. The hard Japan-USSR border kept families and friends apart until the dissolution of the USSR in the 1990s.[5]

Militarization of frontiers waxes and wanes, and Indigenous communities must deal with higher-level decisions indifferent to their concerns. Postwar tightening of the Finnish-Norwegian border impeded Sámi kin and community ties and altered economic activities. Cold War construction of the Distant Early Warning (DEW) line in Canada’s Arctic disrupted life and closed Bering Strait cross-border travel, separating families and stopping trade for four decades. In Taiwan, internal and international politics have churned Indigenous policy: Taipei viewed Aboriginal identity as negative when the postwar Kuomintang regime sought recognition as China, and as positive when later leaders emphasized an Austronesian identity for independent Taiwan. Other recent examples are Russia-Japan tensions over the southern Kurils, militarized borders enmeshing tribes spanning India-Myanmar-China, porous US borders at Guam and the Northern Marianas, and the 1986 Chernobyl radioactive cloud that obliged Sámi to kill thousands of reindeer.[6] Map lines may be irrelevant to the physical reality of pollution, pandemics, or climate change, but they remain as important as ever to nation-states and as stressful for transnational groups.

Decolonization: From a World of Empires to a World of Nation-States

European and Japanese empires began war with every intention of retaining their colonies far into the future. But such complacency, like empires themselves,

quickly crumbled ("like biscuits" indeed), and within a few decades decolonization transformed Africa, Asia, and the Pacific Islands. Japan's colonies became independent or were reassigned in quasi-colonial arrangements. The Philippines became independent with American approval, but France, Britain, the Netherlands, and Portugal fought to keep their possessions, with devastating impacts on Indigenous communities in combat zones.

Why did European empires collapse at this time? The metropoles were weak, exhausted, and ambivalent about the future of overseas colonies. The new international environment frowned on imperial projects; the war had been fought and won under flags promising equality and freedom. The United Nations took charge of former colonies, requiring trustee nations to guide them toward self-determination. The cost of political and economic development of colonies began to outweigh their value. Change did not happen without violence in many places. But acquiescence to foreign rule had evaporated; maintaining it required an ever-expanding force deployed against people fighting on their home ground and in the face of growing international disapproval.[7]

Indigenous Status in the New Nations of Southeast Asia

Japanese invasion and occupation were crucial factors in shattering the old regimes in Southeast Asia, empowering nationalist leaders, encouraging anticolonialism, and training militias that fed into postwar armies. Japan's victories showed the fallacy of claims of white superiority, and the occupation years broke "colonial continuity" making it harder to renew European rule.[8] Conditions at the end of war made it all but inevitable that political change would entail violence. The India-Burma border hills were left "awash with weapons" as villagers gathered up arms and ammunition, and the same was true of many other areas.[9] The result was a series of negotiations, resistance, and separatist campaigns that roiled the region for decades and continue to shape internal and global politics.

As the global war ended, anti-Japanese resistance segued into independence fights, then into pro/anti-Communist conflict as the Cold War exploited local ethnic issues. Much of the Cold War across Southeast Asia was fought through Indigenous lands and involved Indigenous soldiers and civilians.[10] The anti-Japanese alliance of British with Communist guerrillas in Orang Asli territory in Malaya dissolved into the Malayan Emergency. In Burma, Communists affiliated with Karen, Shan, and Kachin separatist groups. In the Philippines, the Communist-led Hukbalahap turned from fighting Japanese to resisting Manila in an insurgency that lasted through the early 1950s. In Vietnam, the Communist Viet Minh claimed power, and opposition to Japan slid without pause into war against the French. Indonesia, too, fought a war of

independence against the Netherlands—indeed, even while the surrendered Japanese Army was still in place—and this too was shaped by ethnic and pro/anti-Communist politics. International concern about the Dutch colony of western New Guinea had less to do with the interests of the people there than with internal Dutch politics and Cold War diplomacy.[11] Through all these conflicts, and into present-day struggles, Indigenous communities have sought autonomy—as they have done for centuries—under conditions that allied them with larger-scale movements such as Communism and Islamism, global drug cartels and arms dealers, fervent nationalism and superpower politics, as they pursued their own goals.

Burma. The war in Burma exacerbated rifts between majority Burmans who had mostly affiliated with the Japanese, and the Karens and hill tribes who fought beside the Allies. Late in the war, when Burmese leaders realized they would not achieve independence under the Japanese, who were clearly losing, they formed an anti-Japanese coalition, and in March 1945 nationalist leader Aung San led the renamed Burma army to join the British. But all sides remained aware of who had supported Japan and who had resisted from the start.

After Allied victory, Great Britain restored civilian colonial rule but immediately faced demands for independence from Burmese nationalists and from minorities, especially Karen, who did not want to be subordinated within a Burman-majority nation. There followed two years of tense negotiations between the British governor, seeking to slow the drive to independence and continue separate administration for the Frontier Areas, and nationalists led by Aung San seeking a fast track to independence of a united Burma.[12] Aung San sought inclusion, appointing people of diverse backgrounds to his administration and signing an agreement early in 1947 with Shan, Kachin, and Chin leaders (the Panglong Agreement), but this could not be sustained after his assassination later that year. In the end, London disengaged from Burma quickly, with a settlement that shortchanged minority interests.

In describing the failure to secure the future of those who had served the Allied cause, historians and memoirists use words like "abandonment" and "betrayal," asserting that Britain "scuttled" from Burma as from India, with devastating consequences.[13] Karen, especially, had expected that their long history of military service and wartime sacrifices would ensure support for an independent state. Perhaps the idea was the result of misunderstanding, or perhaps Allies used misleading promises to secure assistance.[14] Most historians conclude that Britain had intended to protect minorities, especially Karen and Kachin who had done so much in the war, but in the end backed off, needing to maintain

good relations with nationalists. There is blame also for Burmese politicians whose rush to independence short-circuited negotiations, as well as for Karen leaders who depended too much on British support and resisted compromise.[15] The result, in any case, was a postwar Burma at war with itself.

Insurgencies followed hard on formal independence in 1948, with first Karens, and then some Kachins, Mons, Shans, Chins, Pa-O, Wa, Rohingya (Muslims of the Arakan region), and others resisting the new government, fights entwined with communism, opium politics, mutinies, and border security. The army itself split, as the history of "ethnic segmentation" in colonial and wartime recruitment affected the new nation's armed forces, which relied on veterans. Half of its initial officers—including Lieutenant General Smith Dun, the national army's first commander-in-chief—were Karen. The ranks of Karen divided, with some (and some Kachins) joining the rebels. Not until the end of 1949, only after ethnic cleansing and massacres of Karen, did the new regime establish dominance, but conflict continued through the coup of 1962 and into the turbulent politics of the next decades.[16] Regional insurgencies have fought the central state ever since, interspersed with cease-fires and negotiations. Indigenous minorities still experience repression and violence and still seek the autonomy and benefits promised them during World War II.[17]

India. Indigenous groups of northeast India also sought new statuses, as the border region split between India and Pakistan. Naga, Lushai, Kuki and others in the northeastern hills saw possibilities of independence or at least greater autonomy. As in Burma, the British colonial policy of separate frontier administrations had bolstered cultural and religious distinctions. Naga argued that they had no historical affiliation with India and sought separate political status.[18] But here too, in the end, the area was folded into the new nation.

Naga leaders established a National Nagaland Council to press for independence before and after Indian independence in August 1947, while New Delhi focused on securing its new national identity within firm borders. Nagas held a plebiscite in 1951, boycotted India's first parliamentary election the following year, and sent a delegation to London in the 1960s to argue for independence. Resistance became insurgency. India's response escalated to repression and occupation by the national army in 1956–1958, with some 1,400 Naga deaths. The Armed Forces Special Powers Act of 1958 militarized the region. During this era, from 1956 to 1963, people again took refuge in the jungle as villages were burnt and fields abandoned.[19]

The creation of Nagaland state in 1963 offered some autonomy, but violence continued, killing thousands more. Decades of negotiations, particularly since

the 1990s, have sought resolution. The fact that the highland communities cross so many borders—India, Myanmar, Bangladesh, China—along with violent factionalism—exacerbates tensions.[20] Naga scholar Dolly Kikon analyzes how "primitivizing" images described in chapter 6 are still used to stereotype Nagas, hampering India's ability to envision ways of interacting with them as citizens. Critics point out that describing the situation as "ethnic conflict" misleadingly suggests that it is inexplicable or natural, rather than acknowledging the region's complex politics and history. Northeast India is a place of intense discussion of what autonomy and self-determination for Indigenous communities within a nation-state might look like.[21]

Hill tribes elsewhere in Southeast Asia continue to be affected by repercussions of the war. On the border of Burma/Myanmar and Yunnan (China), Wa people had been relatively isolated by geography, resistance, and a reputation for headhunting, but during and after the war their lands were drawn into conflict by the Burmese Communist Party and the Chinese Civil War; later, and into the present, by illegal drug production and Myanmar's efforts to govern the region.[22] In the Chittagong Hills, on what is now the Bangladesh-Myanmar border, British rule had sheltered Chakma tribal people from encroachment by the Bengali majority. But the 1947 India-Pakistan partition allotted the Chittagong Hills to Pakistan, which in 1964 abolished their protected status. Bangladesh's independence in 1971 produced another unsympathetic national ruler. Today these communities seek to maintain their culture as citizens of Bangladesh, while the national government resettles Bengalis in their territory and discounts claims of Indigenous identity, resulting in violence and militarization.[23]

Malaya. The Chinese Communist Malayan National Liberation Army gained strength, arms, and prestige by its anti-Japanese resistance. After Allied victory, the Communists resumed their anti-British guerrilla war, a conflict that lasted until 1960. As in World War II, Orang Asli were entangled in a struggle in which they had no stake but were useful to both sides for information, food, and as porters and guides (chapter 7).

National independence did not improve Orang Asli status. Needs of the small Indigenous population were overshadowed by the interests of ethnic Malays and Chinese, by British efforts to negotiate a federated Malayan state, and by the anti-Communist fight. A 1954 Aboriginal People's Act to protect people and territory began to address issues at the federal level. Malaya's independence in 1957, then the creation of Malaysia in 1963 (adding North Borneo, Sarawak, and Singapore, which later left the federation), brought more Indigenous groups under central control. Today, the roughly 150,000 Orang Asli seek to preserve

their lands and resources from commercial development and to protect traditional lifeways from assimilation, sedentization, and Islamization, asserting their rights as both citizens and Indigenous peoples of Malaysia.[24]

Vietnam/French Indochina. The Vichy French government of Indochina cooperated uneasily with Japan through most of the war. As elsewhere in Southeast Asia, the highlands became a site of anti-Japanese guerrilla activity. Diverse highland tribes (whom the French grouped as "Montagnards") were drawn first into the anti-Japanese war, then into anti-colonial conflicts. In March–April 1945, Japan dismantled the French regime and set up puppet rulers in Cambodia, Laos, and Vietnam. That August, Japanese surrender opened a power vacuum. The Communist Viet Minh, which had fought for years against both French and Japanese, already had a functioning government and links with tribal groups in the mountains of northern Vietnam. Ho Chi Minh declared the independent Democratic Republic of Vietnam on September 2, 1945.[25]

Conflict escalated when DeGaulle determined to reassert French control with British support. The United States at first opposed this, but fear of the spread of Communism led Truman's administration to favor the French return. After negotiations failed, the French-Vietnamese War began, lasting until Viet Minh victory at Dien Bien Phu. This was the "First Indochina War," 1946–1954, and a precursor to the Vietnam War (the "Second Indochina War," 1955–1975) more familiar to Americans. The Geneva Accords of July 1954 divided Vietnam into two zones, intended as a temporary situation until general elections would be held. Instead, the war turned long and harrowing, with more than half a million victims and great devastation.

Viet Minh and French both sought recruits and assistance from highland villagers, and from 1961, the United States and its allies built their own connections. (Of the many Indigenous peoples in this region, Americans are most familiar with Hmong, Lao, Mien, and others who assisted US troops and later came to the United States as refugees.) In an echo of the anti-Japanese war, US special forces enlisted interpreters, soldiers, spies, and guides in the highlands between Laos and Vietnam. Villages suffered displacement, ground attacks, and bombing by both sides. The conflict also affected Indigenous groups in the rest of former French Indochina (Laos and Cambodia).[26] As in the Malayan Emergency, World War II veterans provided expertise for this new conflict. For example, US Army Captain Donald Blackburn, who had set up a guerrilla regiment in the Philippines with assistance from Ifugao and other tribes, used that experience to organize special forces in Vietnam with Indigenous soldiers led by Green Berets.[27]

As elsewhere in this region, the end of combat did not mean the end of Indigenous struggle. The long period of violence—with competing powers courting highland elites and fielding ethnic military units—helped consolidate a more unified highland identity. After the war and into the present, mountain tribes have continued to resist assimilationist policies imposed by lowland majority Vietnamese.[28]

Pacific Islands' Postwar Status

The political situation was different in the colonial Pacific, where Indigenous people constituted majority populations. Australia's war experience reshaped its policy in Papua New Guinea, but that country did not become independent until 1975. Most British Pacific Islands proceeded to independence more slowly than the Southeast Asian nations. French territories gained some degree of self-governance but became more fully integrated into the metropole. Japan's Micronesian islands first came under US rule, then developed different forms of independence or affiliation with the United States. (On Pacific Islands decolonization and postwar regional politics, see Bennett and Poyer (n.d.).)

Papua New Guinea. European settlers' obsession with trying to uphold white prestige in the islands had been prescient. New experiences did indeed alter what was possible: as people saw white "masters" flee or succumb to triumphant Japanese; as Allied and Japanese soldiers relied on local expertise for success and even survival; as African Americans offered a vision of a different way to be Black; and as soldiers and carriers found "mateship" in shared hardships. War made change inevitable, but independence came more slowly. Parts of New Guinea and battleground islands had been devastated. Some areas had no civil governance; others were suddenly deprived of resources supplied by foreign bases. As elsewhere, rosy promises made in the heat of war created expectations of prosperity and freedom that were later disappointed.[29]

For veterans, war had introduced new possibilities, but the postwar world offered few paths to achieve them. The Pacific Islands Regiment disbanded, returning men to villages that lacked resources and a colonial order that reimposed racial barriers. James Sinclair, a patrol officer in 1949 in the Markham Valley, noted the disenchantment about wartime promises and resentment at the "shabby treatment" of veterans, who had little demobilization pay and no pensions.[30] Most veterans lacked the means to make major improvements, but several made an impact as postwar leaders: Sir (formerly Sergeant) Pita Simogun, BEM, and Sergeant Gabriel Ehava Karava, MM, were active in economic development and national political life. Former Rabaul policeman Sir Paliau Maloat

led a reform effort on Manus, and coastwatcher Yali Singina played a role in an anticolonial millennial ("cargo cult") movement.[31] But most felt that their labor for foreigners who promised freedom and a better life had been poorly rewarded. When political ferment did come in the 1960s and 1970s, it was led by a younger generation.

War's impetus for transformation did act on Australians, however. The electorate, more aware and appreciative of New Guineans, proved willing to support more generous funding for health and welfare, education, damage compensation, agriculture, and industry. The Native Labour Ordinance was revised to raise pay, reduce work hours, and limit indenture to one year (the indentured labor system itself was not abolished until the end of 1950). The UN granted Australia trusteeship of the joint Territory of Papua and New Guinea in 1949 and set it on a path to eventual independence. Despite these changes, Canberra's politics and settlers' commercial interests continued to dominate, slowing Indigenous development.[32]

After dissolving Islander battalions at the end of war, Australia re-formed a defense force for Papua New Guinea in 1950, bolstering it in response to conflict in Indonesia/West Papua. The Pacific Islands Regiment name was kept as a tribute to the World War II unit, and many early recruits were veterans. (It also had a Ladies' Auxiliary, with joint Australian and Islander presidents.) The first Indigenous officers were commissioned in the 1960s. After independence in 1975, the PIR became the nucleus for PNG's Defence Force.[33]

Solomon Islands. In contrast to Australia, Great Britain felt less connection with the war in its Southwest Pacific colonies. War crippled British rule on invaded islands, first when civil administration dissolved at the Japanese advance and then with the overwhelming American presence. Over time, the islands edged gradually but inexorably away from the empire.[34]

Discontent with British rule had long simmered in parts of the Solomon Islands, but wartime experiences and interaction with Americans focused and directed it. An important driver was Maasina Rule, which began on Malaita in September 1943 as a modest political initiative to set up Native Councils, but its goals and geographic reach expanded as it developed a more organized structure. Some noted war heroes, including Jacob Vouza, became Maasina leaders. Jonathan Fifi'i (chapters 5 and 9), who was arrested and imprisoned for Maasina activity, went on to a long political life, including a seat in the National Parliament and an MBE in 1981. Colonial authorities saw the effort as subversive and attempted to quash it, imprisoning members by early 1948, but men like Fifi'i

saw it as the start of the path to independence, which came in 1978.[35] Though Maasina Rule was the most well-organized reform effort, many veterans became postwar leaders in church, education, or government in their communities.[36]

The transfer of British Solomon Islands Protectorate headquarters from Tulagi Island to Honiara on Guadalcanal (chapter 10) also had long-term consequences. At the time it made sense to benefit from the US-built facilities at Henderson Field for reconstruction and commercial activity, but the result was a surge of migration from other islands to the growing urban center, economic and political imbalance, and decades later, inter-island violence. Tension, especially over land rights, led to confrontation between Guadalcanal and Malaita people in 1998. The violence was constrained by a joint Australian-Pacific Islands security contingent that stayed for more than a decade.[37]

Fiji. World War II had a different effect in Fiji, strengthening ties of Indigenous Fijians—though not Indian Fijians—with Great Britain. More than 6,300 Fijian men served in the Fiji Defence Force. In contrast, only 264 Indian Fijians enlisted. Largely leasehold farmers, they could not easily leave home; they disagreed about supporting the war, objected to unequal pay and treatment, and felt much more ambivalent about Britain as a colonial power. For its part, the British colonial government disbanded the single platoon of Indo-Fijians and did a poor job of recruiting them (some of the discouraged volunteers went to New Zealand and enlisted in Māori regiments). Many Indo-Fijians supported the war effort through fundraising and other activities, but the gap in military service resonated in later political struggles.[38]

Enlistment gave Fijian men new experiences through discipline, travel, and interaction with New Zealand and US soldiers. Demobilization sent soldiers back to their villages, but as elsewhere, failed to consider how the war had raised aspirations.[39] Assuming village life would re-absorb them, the government offered praise but disappointingly little material help. But, as Ratu Sir Lala Sukuna and other chiefs had intended, support for Great Britain did bring tangible rewards. Postwar reforms protected Fijian ownership of land, the chiefly hierarchy, and a separate village-based legal system for Fijians. By default, Indo-Fijians made inroads into business and higher education. They also began to outnumber Indigenous Fijians in population. Strain between the two groups grew, exacerbated by the war-laid background of military training and the availability of weapons.[40] As British rule ended, how Fiji would manage its internal diversity remained unclear. Negotiations among British, Indian Fijians, and Indigenous Fijians led to independence in 1970, but a series of coups and constitutional crises (1987–2007) marked the struggle to build a unified government.

World War II also laid the foundation of Fiji's modern military, shifting it from local defense to an expeditionary force, including service in the Malayan Emergency. Historian Brij Lal points out that Fijians' record in Malaya was impressive, but gained Fijians little in economic or political power, while Indo-Fijians used those years to progress in education and civic fields.[41] The military continued to be dominated by Indigenous Fijians, eventually giving them an active role in coups. Today, Fiji has a large army for its small size, one that has not only been involved with internal struggles, but also contributing to UN peacekeeping missions worldwide.

French Pacific. French Pacific Island colonies expected that Free French victory would bring them greater self-rule or even independence. But postwar governments misread their wartime support as loyalty to France's empire (rather than to local circumstances) and tightened links with the metropole. Yet France's 1946 constitution recognized overseas French as citizens, and revised laws allowed greater autonomy over time, including representation in France's National Assembly.[42]

In New Caledonia, the large US base had introduced better wages and conditions for workers, along with new ideas, and Kanak veterans returning from the Pacific Battalion expected France to honor promises of greater political rights.[43] Authorities revised policy, repealing forced labor laws and the *indigénat* (a set of laws that codified inferior status for colonial subjects). New Caledonia became a French overseas territory (rather than a dependency) in 1946, with citizenship for all residents by 1953. The extension of local control was later retracted, binding the territory more closely to France. Throughout these changes, Kanaks suffered economic and political marginalization, only gradually gaining a political identity that in the 1980s became the nationalist Kanaky movement.[44] Since then, negotiations and agreements, along with protests and violence, have enhanced the island's political autonomy. Independence referenda in 2018, 2020, and 2021 voted for continued affiliation with France, but the issue remains alive.

In Tahiti, social reform and independence efforts gained ground immediately after the war. Pouvanaa a Oopa, a leader of the movement, was a veteran of the World War I Pacific Battalion and a Free French supporter in World War II. Despite being arrested for political activities, he continued his efforts when he was elected to the National Assembly in 1949. But the Gaullist government after 1958 resisted moves toward autonomy, and French Polynesia's politics became entangled with France's interests in nuclear testing and oceanic Exclusive Economic Zones. Economic dependence has since deepened links with

the metropole. While independence remains a topic of discussion, there is no widespread agreement or clear path to that end.[45]

Micronesia. Micronesians had not been Japanese citizens, and were not to be American citizens, either, but in a sort of limbo under United Nations supervision. The UN created the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands as a "strategic trust" to allow the United States to retain exclusive use of the former Japanese Mandate, a response to Cold War concerns. Even after the US Navy ceded control to the civilian Department of the Interior in 1951, military interests dominated.

Rebuilding their lives and dealing with new rulers occupied Micronesians in the first postwar years, and the adult generation—educated and trained in Japanese schools—struggled with their abrupt loss of status.[46] Not until the 1960s and 1970s did a new generation envision greater autonomy. As the Trust Territory ended after 1978, the various island groups gradually reached independence (Republic of the Marshall Islands, Federated States of Micronesia, Republic of Palau), or closer affiliation with the US (Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands, CNMI).

Political negotiations between Micronesians and Americans were shadowed by both parties' memories of war. The United States wanted guarantees of access in exchange for compensation and promises of security. Island leaders, aware of the costs of war, sought to determine how their islands might be involved in future conflicts. During Palau's independence negotiations, these memories spurred activist Gabriela Ngirmang to oppose military use of her home: "I experienced World War II here in Belau [Palau], so I know that war brings destruction. During the fighting we hardly had any food. I saw people starve, and many died. And, at the end of the war, Peleliu and Angaur were really devastated. All of Koror was burning. Bringing in the U.S. military would mean we'd become a target again in someone else's war."[47]

Ngirmang saw that the military in Hawai'i had taken much of the best land and worried the same would happen in Palau. Independence negotiations were delayed for two decades as Palauans struggled with US demands for nuclear access and military use of a sizeable land area.

Generations and governments change. In 2020, Palau's leaders invited the United States to increase its military presence in the archipelago. The Republic of the Marshall Islands, CNMI, and Guam also hold significant US facilities. Too, Japan, China, and Taiwan have courted the new nations. Fluctuating geopolitics reminds Micronesians that their strategic location is both leverage for their political and economic survival, and a source of real danger.[48]

Guam. As soon as Guam was retaken, the US Navy resumed control of civilian life and Guam became a major base for pressing toward Japan. While the suffering of the war years had been devastating, the American decision to make Guam the next forward base brought longer-lasting consequences. Guam's installations remained active through the Korean and Vietnam wars and into the present, with a renewed emphasis in recent years in response to troop withdrawals from Japan and Okinawa and US-China tensions.

The Guam Organic Act of 1950 gave residents US citizenship and civilian governance, though the Navy remained influential. The first Chamorro governor was appointed in 1962. Guamanians gained the right to elect their governor in 1968 and a non-voting representative to Congress in 1972. During negotiations to end the US Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands in the 1970s, Guam recognized that its own status was sadly out of date. The formerly Japanese-held Northern Mariana Islands, which the United States regarded as strategically important in the Cold War, became a US Commonwealth with more rights than Guam—a contrast that many in Guam felt undervalued their loyalty and sacrifice. The US-CNMI agreement spurred the Guam Legislature's efforts to revisit its political status and encourage Chamorro cultural renewal.[49]

Memories of war reverberate through current concerns about identity and political status on Guam. The trauma of invasion and suffering under Japanese occupation created a strong sense of affiliation with the United States, manifested in vocal patriotism and a high rate of military service. Any discussion of Guam's politics or Indigenous autonomy grapples with the island's strategic role.[50] It is difficult to negotiate for greater sovereignty when US security interests are seen as paramount, and in fact many Chamorros and others on Guam depend on and support US forces stationed there. Only in recent decades, as the wartime generations' vivid memories recede, have concerns about military use of land, environmental destruction, the impact of immigration, and support for Chamorro cultural identity cast a more critical eye on US affiliation.

Nuclear testing in the Pacific. Use of the island Pacific for testing new weapons extended the reach of war into new generations of trauma. The US intention to use its new holdings in Micronesia included exploding more than sixty-six atomic and hydrogen bombs in the Marshall Islands. Pacific nuclear and thermonuclear tests occurred from 1946 to 1996, conducted by the United States (Bikini and Enewetak in the Marshall Islands, 1946–1958, and on uninhabited Christmas and Johnson in 1962), Great Britain (Christmas and Malden in the Northern Line Islands, and in Australia, 1952–1963), and France, the last to end Pacific Island testing (Moruroa and Fangataufa in the Tuamotus,

1966–1996). The "nuclear-free Pacific" lobby developed in the 1970s, building through the early 1990s.[51] The physical consequences of nuclear explosions have persisted through generations, but so too have the social and political consequences of the leadership and activism generated during the testing era.

Whether in newly independent nations or in territories dealing with metropole control, Indigenous World War II veterans brought to the postwar world their communities' longstanding desires for self-rule, and also their own enhanced appreciation of modern war and current geopolitics. These intersecting realities informed the next generations of Indigenous leadership. In the combatant nations too, young Indigenous men and women returning from war saw new opportunities and dangers on the postwar home front, examined in the next chapter.

CHAPTER 12

Indigenous Veterans in Combatant Nations

During decolonization, certain Indigenous groups fought for autonomy within emerging new nations or to gain independence for their own homelands. But most of the world's Indigenous peoples were and are embedded in existing nation-states, including the major combatant states of World War II. We saw in chapter 2 that governments believed wartime service would assimilate these distinctive populations into the national order. Did it?

Ainu

When young Shigeru Kayano reported for Japan's draft, he was assigned to manual labor at an air base in Hokkaido, where he endured a frightening air raid and bombardment. He was at work on August 15, 1945, when Second Lieutenant Shimura called the men together to announce the end of war. "My only thought then was that although Japan could not have lost, maybe, just maybe, I would be able to go home alive." Given a blanket and his uniform, he returned to Nibutani village in Hokkaido, now scarred by the absence of men who had died or gone missing. "The hardships were great for those who were left."[1]

The home islands of Japan, stunned and destroyed by defeat, were occupied by Allied forces from surrender in August 1945 until April 1952. During these years, Ainu rights initiatives that had paused in wartime briefly revived with the 1946 establishment of the first Ainu-wide association. Despite an offer of independence raised by the US commander in Sapporo—which the Ainu as loyal Japanese turned down—in general occupation authorities spared little attention for Japan's minorities. Some policies even harmed Ainu, notably a land reform in which they lost more than 30 percent of their land to Japanese farmers renting it.[2] The goal of Ainu leaders, at this point and for decades after, was to eliminate discrimination and promote full integration into mainstream Japanese society. Despite their efforts, Ainu fell behind in social and economic measures and continued to be

"folklorized" and marginalized by tourists, scholars, and the government, a view resented by Ainu veterans who had served alongside fellow citizens.

Herbert Passin, an anthropologist serving with US occupation forces, visited Hokkaido in December 1947. He found Ainu youth ashamed of their culture and Ainu villages exploiting stereotypes for tourism. When Passin held a party for elders so he could hear traditional songs and stories, some young veterans angrily intervened. One said, "You are deliberately getting them drunk to make them do those barbaric songs and dances. We would like you to stop immediately. It's an insult to us. You are making a spectacle of us, treating us as barbarians." He spoke of the war as proof of their Japanese identity. "I am as good a Japanese as anyone else here. I served in the army and several of my friends, from this very village, died in the war. The only difference is that my ancestors spoke a different language. But that doesn't make me different from other Japanese."[3]

It would be two decades—and a new generation—before Ainu political goals shifted from assimilation to protecting cultural uniqueness. Only after activists linked with the growing international Indigenous Rights movement did they challenge Japan's government and public to acknowledge cultural diversity. In 1980, Japan told the UN that the nation held no minorities. But in 1987, Ainu participated in the UN Working Group on Indigenous Peoples for the first time, and in 1993 Shigeru Kayano's hometown of Nibutani, center of many Ainu activities, hosted an international Indigenous conference. The 1997 Ainu Cultural Protection Act acknowledged diversity, though it failed to protect them as a distinct community. International pressure encouraged the Japanese Diet's official 2008 recognition of Ainu as Indigenous, and younger generations have looked beyond borders to create a transnational Ainu culture. Japan continues to struggle with how to engage differences within the scope of being Japanese. New Ainu policy legislation in 2019 used the language of international Indigenous Rights, but activists criticized it as a face-saving measure that not only fails to bolster self-determination and resource rights, but also leaves power over Ainu in the hands of Japanese politicians.[4]

Sámi

Postwar boundary changes gave each national Sámi community different experiences. The USSR border had the greatest impact, isolating those in the Kola Peninsula from other Sámi until the 1990s. Conditions there in the first postwar decades were harsh. Like reindeer-herding societies in Siberia, those on the Kola Peninsula (Komi and Nenets, as well as Sámi) came under Soviet policies

of amalgamating settlements, collectivizing herds, and enforcing assimilation. Many Sámi villages were razed, and residents centralized in Lovozero (a Sámi center today). Encroachment on Sámi lands by militarization of the western Kola Peninsula, industrialization, and an influx of Russian laborers forced them to abandon traditional reindeer herding practices, and increasing wage labor reduced the importance of fishing and hunting territories.[5]

Sámi in Finland and Norway also found life much changed. The business of reconstruction and new ease of travel brought southern immigrants into Sápmi. Norway-Finland border stations set up in the 1950s reduced cross-border interactions. The cash economy expanded, with wage labor jobs (comfortable for young men who had served in the army), novel crops and agricultural techniques, and commercialization of fishing and reindeer herding.[6]

In Finland, all things Finnish became more desirable. People spoke less Sámi in public and purchased more clothing and other manufactured goods. But not all Sámi followed suit, and some became advocates for their own culture. Sámi scholar Veli-Pekka Lehtola's mother Biret-Ánne Pieski not only lived a reindeer-herding life but also took up reindeer racing and worked for a Sámi language magazine. By the mid-1950s, she was writing to reproach youth for being ashamed of their identity, giving an example from her experience in a doctor's waiting room. "A young Sámi hissed at another, reddening, 'Don't you dare speak Sámi to me; they will notice we are Lapps [Sámi]!'" On the other hand, traditional clothing worn on festive days and Sundays became a symbol of identity. Returning from a church service in Aanaar (Inari) village, Lehtola's aunt Biret-Máret "was trailed by a whole group of German tourists following her like a *doahki,* a herd of reindeer, all the way to Biret-Ánne's kitchen, their cameras aimed to snap 'genuine Lapps.'"[7]

The younger generation in Finland grew up under new laws requiring even those in remote areas to attend school. By the 1950s, students were sent to boarding schools, a powerful force for assimilation and a traumatic experience for many. Oula Näkkäläjärvi described his experience: "I, myself, lived in one and know that the boarding school is the most unsuitable institution a child could ever land in. I still feel horror when I think of that time. . . . The perpetual feeling of fear most undoubtedly leaves the residents with psychological damage." The boarding school experience, though now recognized as cutting off a generation from its culture, also cultivated the next generation of activists who recognized the need to organize for Indigenous rights at national and international levels.[8]

In Norway, reconstruction of war-damaged areas of Troms and Finnmark, schooling for nomads, a growing cash economy, and the expanded welfare state

drew Sámi more closely into national society. From the early to mid-twentieth century, ethnic registration figures show drastic drops in numbers of Sámi, as discrimination and social stigma discouraged self-identification. But, while the prewar policy of aggressive Norwegianization continued to an extent, war had recast attitudes. In 1959, the law forbidding the Sámi language in schools was repealed, and discrimination decreased, though slowly.[9]

Sámi in Finland faced less intense assimilation pressure than in Norway or Sweden and were less limited by policies linking ethnic identity with subsistence. Swedish policy focused on maintaining Sámi identity as herders, and Norway's rhetoric, too, defined their life as not "modern." Finnish activists sidestepped this polarization and were able to change and integrate without abandoning their culture—though Sámi in all three countries were disadvantaged by a lack of infrastructure, limited education, isolation, and other problems. On the other hand, the legal equality of Finnish Sámi meant the government took no special measures to protect their lifeways, especially reindeer herding, which depended on territory and natural resources.[10]

Rapid social change is usually seen as destructive of Indigenous culture (and it often is), but Sápmi's accelerated postwar changes actually stimulated a sense of Sámi identity.[11] Across northern Europe, reactions to Nazi racist supremacist ideologies and the 1948 UN proclamation of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights raised awareness of minorities. Shared experiences of war and relocation created links with majority citizens and strengthened Sámi appreciation of their own culture. While some associations had existed before the war, more of them emerged—and more were led by Sámi themselves—after it: Sámi Liitto was formed in 1945 to assist war refugees in Finland; in Sweden, the 1945 Sami-Ätnam ("Lapp culture society") was succeeded by the National Federation of Swedish Lapps in 1950.[12] Such organizations gained political momentum from the 1960s, after establishment of the Nordic Sámi Council in 1956. Activists began to use international human rights discourse to argue for Sámi rights. Not until the 1970s, though, were assimilationist policies halted, then reversed.

In Norway, opposition to damming the Alta River in Finnmark (1979–1980) sparked political action.[13] The government appointed a Sámi rights commission in 1980. Norway's Sámi Parliament was established in 1987 and has gained power since, now having a significant say over land and water rights to the 96 percent of Finnmark owned by the state.[14] Postwar improvement in employment and living standards, better transportation (roads and snowmobiles), and reforms to education and language standards energized Sámi life. The "Sámi Renaissance" of Norway and across northern Europe transformed attitudes toward

cultural heritage and made concrete innovations in political organization and use of natural resources.[15] Sámi political and cultural success has made them a force in global Indigenous rights.

The public shift in attitude and immigration to urban centers has also spread and encouraged Sámi culture. Today about seven thousand Finnish Sámi, a third of the total, live outside the homeland, and Helsinki is an important Sámi center. In Sweden, self-identification as Sámi has increased radically; in the 1970s, only about two thousand people—reindeer herders—were officially listed as Sámi; under today's broader self-definition, some twenty thousand identify as Sámi.[16] With Sámi identity no longer stigmatized—in fact, even appreciated—more people are inclined to claim it.

Indigenous Siberians

In the USSR, the war interrupted Soviet plans to settle and assimilate nomads and reorganize traditional subsistence into state-run collectives, but these were renewed and largely completed by the late 1950s.[17] While Native Siberians saw some improvement in health, education, and material conditions in the postwar decades, they were overwhelmed by immigrants and held ever-less cultural autonomy or control over their lands. Russians in the 1960s to 1980s constituted 95 percent of Siberia's population. Cold War-era installations further militarized northeastern Siberia. Despite this, a 1970s revival of interest in traditional culture helped preserve it within Soviet conventions—touristified and frozen in time, but also reflecting a genuine interest and pride in distinctive art forms.[18]

The lives of Yupik and Chukchis along the far northeastern Siberian coast through the 1950s and 1960s were especially impoverished by collectivization of Chukchi reindeer herds and coastal fishing, Russian takeover of walrus hunting and whaling, and forced resettlement into larger towns. Young Chukchi and Yupik came to speak Russian and prefer town jobs and a Soviet Russian lifestyle over traditional lifeways. Concerned over rapid cultural loss, some began recording their folklore and teaching their children Indigenous languages.[19]

Similar processes affected the roughly fifty thousand Indigenous people in Siberia's Western Arctic. Despite immigration, the concentration of the Yakut population helped maintain their language and identity. Many smaller groups (Samoyeds, Nenets, Enets, Selkups, Komis, Khantys, and others) who moved north to escape wartime development maintained at least a partially nomadic life and mostly avoided collectivization until after the war. Tungus reindeer

herders, Ewens and Ewenkis, evaded it until the early 1960s by fleeing to remote pastures, though most eventually were settled in state-run farms. Shamanism and other traditions continued away from Communist Party eyes, though mandatory Russian-language boarding schools endangered these languages and cultures.[20]

The situation of Indigenous people in Siberia took another turn after political reforms in 1988, when a freer press shocked the public with the facts of what had happened during Soviet industrialization. Despite claims that nomadism had been eliminated and that former nomads were comfortably housed, in fact many still lived in substandard conditions. Relocations and the Russification of youth had devastated economic and social life, and unemployment reduced many to poverty, alcoholism, and poor health, and in some locales there was radiation damage from 1950s and 1960s nuclear tests. Conditions further changed in the 1990s as the dissolution of the USSR reduced economic support for Indigenous regions, though a high birthrate and slowed immigration has increased the Indigenous population.[21]

In the new Russian Federation, Siberia's future depends less on national policy and more on local government and commercial interests. Indigenous groups were able to tap into the global Indigenous Rights movement in the late 1980s, though in Russia it has been less a grassroots project than one led by Moscow intellectuals. The work of urban activists, though, has had little impact on people living in the tundra, struggling with the basics of life under unstable local governance.[22] While some forty peoples are officially recognized as "indigenous" in Russia, and attention to Indigenous rights is written into the constitution and legislation, there are few actual safeguards for their lands, languages, cultures, and other communal rights.

Indigenous Peoples in the Anglophone Countries

During World War II, homefront publics in the United States, Canada, New Zealand, and Australia had become aware of Indigenous military service, and Indigenous people had expectations based on it. The problem was, as Sheffield and Riseman explain, the two groups held different views of what that service meant. White reformers felt guilty about past mistreatment in the face of Indigenous loyalty and sacrifice and wanted to reward them (as they saw it) with greater integration. Many Indigenous people, however, saw their service as arising from their own motives, and wished to maintain cultural distinctiveness while gaining civil equality. Initially, the government and majority opinion won

out: in all four countries, postwar reforms leaned toward assimilation.[23] Yet in all these societies, too, Indigenous veterans met with the bigotry that had been less pervasive in the military. The bitterness of returning to a racist world unchanged by war caused many personal tragedies, but also served as a springboard for a new generation of political activism.

United States

The US Nationality Act of 1940 and later court cases affirmed Native Americans' citizenship and Selective Service obligations (chapter 2). But war did not dissolve Native cultures into the great American melting pot. In fact, the opposite was true—Native Americans validated their right to exist within the framework of American life. Yet if military service was not assimilative,[24] it was, for many, transformative. During his US Marine training, Peter MacDonald (later Navajo Tribal Chairman) met illiterate whites and realized his own potential: whites' power came not from any natural superiority but from education, which he too could access. "For the first time since my initial involvement with Anglos I realized that I was not inferior, I was more than a filthy savage with no future. I did not know where I was headed or what I might do with the rest of my life. I just knew that I had more choices than I had ever imagined."[25]

Victory and demobilization sent many veterans and war workers back to reservations, where they found hardship and limited opportunities. Congress had cut BIA budgets and reservation facilities were in bad shape. The drop in income after years of good employment stressed families that had come to depend on wages or military dependents allowances. Veterans' benefits were technically equal, but those living on reservations had difficulty accessing them. Veterans felt unappreciated; their people seemed uninterested in their experiences and ideas.[26] And, despite publicity about Indians' war service, they still met with discrimination, and laws limiting alcohol use and voting remained in place. Chester Nez had returned from service in the US Marines where he was "respected and treated as an equal" only to be jeered at by a civilian clerk in Albuquerque, who said, "You're not a *full* citizen of the United States, you know. . . . You can't even vote."[27]

In sum, the tired old prejudices of being seen as "not citizens" though they were tax-paying veterans looked and felt quite different to those who had fought far from home in the name of freedom.[28] The war years had hastened assimilation in some ways: through military service, relocation for war work, increased cash income, and greater integration with national culture. But it also energized cultural distinctiveness through positive publicity, servicemen's and women's

pride in their heritage, and revivals of ceremonial life.[29] War highlighted the question of how Native Americans wanted to live within the United States.

A new generation of leaders began to address that question. Even before war ended, the first nationwide Indian-organized group, the National Congress of American Indians, met in Denver in November 1944. Fighting and working alongside other Indians had expanded the sense of Native identity, even if that meant always being called "chief" or dealing with comrades ignorant of tribal identity. Hollis Stabler (Omaha) served abroad for nearly three years, in Morocco, Tunisia, Sicily, Anzio, and France, meeting Indians from other tribes along the way. He found "a bond" with an Indian nurse and exchanged gifts with a Sioux sailor: "He was an Indian, and so was I. We recognized that 'brotherhood.'"[30] Politically minded veterans who used the GI bill for higher education developed a philosophy of pan-Indian solidarity and tribal self-determination that nurtured the next generation of activism; increased ceremonial and social activities like powwows helped spread these ideas.[31]

The need for national coordination was pressing, for Congress was moving to terminate federal services, dissolve tribal sovereignty, and absorb Indians as ordinary citizens. It created the Indian Claims Commission in 1946, which had the positive goal of compensating Indians for injustices but was also intended to proceed with termination and assimilation. The push for tribal termination came from various sources, including the public's desire to reward Indian loyalty, Cold War discourse that cast assimilation as "freedom," the government's desire to save money, population growth in the West that drew attention to tribes' potentially lucrative natural resources, and the wish of some Native Americans to end Washington's control and void their status as wards. Using the rhetoric of granting Indians the rights and freedoms they had fought for, the BIA budget was cut, relocation to cities was encouraged, and legislation in 1953 allowed the dissolution of tribal-federal relationships.[32]

Military service was used to argue for both sides of the termination fight. Had it proved Indians were now fully assimilated, ready to be "freed" from federal oversight? Or did war service show Indians could be full citizens while retaining their distinctive cultural and political status? Tom Holm praises the Indian contribution to World War II—"a magnificent gesture worthy of a great people"—but notes that it was no coincidence that tribal termination followed. The national "reward" for Indian loyalty was assimilationist policies that harmed Indigenous communities. The wider public did not see that Indians had had their own reasons for serving, arising as much from their tribal identity as from American patriotism.[33]

Indian resistance to termination began in late 1943 and continued as legislation moved through Congress. By 1958, pushback ensured that tribes could not be terminated without their consent, and eventually the policy failed altogether. Though some tribes and bands lost federal standing, termination did not achieve its goals of assimilation and shedding federal responsibility. Instead, Native Americans' political capacity deepened rapidly in response to the threat, igniting the 1960s tribal sovereignty drive. The young men of World War II came to the fore to lead protests in the 1950–1970s, joined by veterans of later wars. The American Indian Movement included many Korea and Vietnam combat veterans. Today, Native Americans continue to offer disproportionate service in US forces, honoring warrior traditions and turning military experience into homefront leadership.[34]

Canada

Canada's returning First Nations veterans realized a similar situation: bitterness at ongoing discrimination, but also sensing possibilities for political action. Those serving abroad were attuned to the racism they would face at home. When an officer commended Sergeant J. F. St. Germain, a Métis man, for his actions in battle in Italy, he answered, "Here the boys call me 'the Saint,' but back in Canada, I'll be treated just like another poor goddam Indian. I hope I get killed before it is all over." St. Germain was killed in action, but those who made it home met dispiritingly familiar scenarios: prejudice, Department of Indian Affairs red tape, laws against voting or being served alcohol.[35] Like Native Americans, returning veterans had become used to being able to walk into a bar overseas; they were used to interacting freely and equally with comrades; they saw a vivid contrast between their war service as Canadians and the constraints of status restrictions and poor conditions at home.

But Indian policy was on the national agenda, in large part—as in the United States—due to recognition of Native patriotism. Government and press investigations of reserve conditions reminded the nation of Native war service, as did political reformers. Improvement became possible with a more receptive public.[36] Veterans' benefits were an obvious place to start. White soldiers had been rewarded after World War I by being allowed to buy Indian reserve land, but a repeat of that was rejected. The World War II Veteran's Land Act was more helpful, including Indians in settlement subsidies and loans. Veterans also had access to money for education and credit for building a house or starting a business. (As with military pay, there were problems with bureaucrats controlling benefits paid through the Native Affairs office.) And, as after World War I,

treaty Indian veterans were given the right to vote in federal elections without losing their status, and some became politically active.[37]

The question in Canada was a variant of that in the United States and elsewhere: Must Indians give up their distinctive cultural traits and separate legal status in order to be full citizens?[38] The issues were not new, but First Nations people were newly empowered to speak for themselves, as in the 1946–1948 Special Joint Senate and House of Commons Committee to Reconsider the Indian Act, though their voices had little impact at the time. Like the US Congress, Canadian policymakers saw treaties as obsolete and Indians as ready to become regular citizens, while in fact First Nations were just beginning to assert their rights to distinctive cultures in enduring communities, assertions based on treaty rights. Canada's federal commitment to assimilation, despite Indians' increasingly assertive stance, did not budge until widespread protests followed the government's 1969 White Paper proposing the elimination of treaties and treaty status.[39]

Despite little immediate improvement, awareness of First Nations military service did affect the policy work of 1943–1950 and established the right of Natives to participate in public discussions about their own future. Perhaps most important, wartime publicity gave non-Native Canadians a positive image of First Nations, an essential precursor to change, and boosted the confidence of veterans and their communities in public political action.[40]

New Zealand

Māori leaders had urged enlistment and support for the war as "the price of citizenship," and after war's end they were ready to call in the IOU. The Māori Battalion's homecoming was a public statement, welcomed by large crowds and Māori ceremonial, and the many funerals and commemorations brought communities together. Discrimination persisted, especially in cities, but the "social legacy" of serving and working together and the admiration of many Pakeha for their Māori comrades smoothed change. The well-publicized success of the 28th Battalion and veterans' self-confidence made it possible for them, at least, to insist on equal treatment in pensions and benefits (which had not been the case in World War I).[41]

Did wartime sacrifice win equality for Māori in their homeland? The government reduced inequities in public accomodations, language, and welfare benefits. Drinking laws were revised and rhetoric changed—"Māori" replacing "Native" in official usage. Still, overall, in New Zealand as elsewhere, the postwar years were an era of assimilation policies. The Māori War Effort Organization

had proved its effectiveness in managing military recruitment, labor, food production, housing, and other economic issues in Māori ways under Māori leadership. Leaders argued for continuing its role, but the government and the Native Department wanted to regain control. The resulting Māori Social and Economic Act of 1945 has been described as a compromise. It did not provide for the kind of independence that the MWEO had shown to be successful, but it did force the Native Department to increase Māori input and consultation. The war altered, but did not transform, relations, and Māori continued to seek autonomy that Wellington remained reluctant to grant.[42]

World War II also boosted Māori involvement in New Zealand's military. Enlistment has grown ever since, reaching (in 2012) 30 percent of the New Zealand Defence Force (about twice their share in the population). Despite debate about maintaining a separate unit, integrated service in subsequent conflicts (Korea, Malaya, Vietnam) and the shift in generations reduced demand for it. (The final meeting of the Māori Battalion Association, formed in 1958, was held in 2012.) In 1978, Major-General Brian Matauru Poananga became the first Māori to be chief of the army's general staff. New Zealand's bicultural philosophy has led to the military, especially the army, increasingly by the 1990s integrating Māori language and cultural elements such as the now globally familiar *haka*.[43]

Australia

As we saw in chapter 6, war unsettled Australian racial habits. Aboriginal communities benefited from the high labor demand, contact with less-prejudiced whites from southern Australia affected attitudes of both groups, and interaction with African Americans also revised stereotypes. North Australia underwent striking changes as military control replaced missions, pastoralists, and the Native Affairs bureaucracy. The army relocated Aboriginal Australians without regard to tribal boundaries, increasing interaction and building shared identity. In the south, labor shortages drew workers to urban jobs, and they stayed after the war, despite renewed hiring discrimination, segregation, and unwelcoming city governments.[44]

Like Native Americans and Canadians, Aboriginal Australian and Torres Strait Islander veterans returned home to entrenched racism and were struck by the contrast with relatively good treatment in uniform.[45] War brought a few policy changes: extension of the federal franchise to Indigenous veterans (a temporary 1940 measure, made permanent in 1949), some expanded social welfare, adjustment of state rules about "exemption certificates" that offered citizenship rights in exchange for abandoning Aboriginal life. (In this, Australia was like

Canada: a person could not be both full citizen and "treaty" Indian, could not hold both citizen and Aboriginal status.[46]) Veterans received benefits but had to deal with double bureaucracy, and—as in Canada—sometimes the money was controlled by Native Affairs. Torres Strait Islander pensions were one-third of standard, as their salaries had also been low. Those with the surveillance units in northern Australia had never been officially enrolled, so were not eligible for benefits. Not until the 1980s and 1990s were reparations for unpaid and underpaid Indigenous veterans seriously addressed.[47]

Because states, rather than the national government, controlled Aboriginal Australian policy, military service had less influence on civil rights. The 1948 Nationality and Citizenship Act created Australian citizenship (previously all were British subjects) but inequalities remained at the state level. War raised veterans' expectations, but unless they sought an exemption, most were subject to state laws restricting their travel, property, marriages, association with whites, and use of alcohol—a continuing thorn for ex-servicemen, as it was in the United States and Canada.[48] In North America, an appreciative public may have wished to see Native people merge into the general population, but postwar assimilation policies in Australia met greater resistance. Racial exclusion at some Returned Servicemen's League clubs drew particular protest; RSL had actively supported Indigenous citizenship rights until its politics veered in the mid-1950s. Even as postwar protests and international pressure furthered civil rights, white communities persisted in segregating housing and town facilities. Only in the 1960s did governments remove racial exclusions and extend the franchise; even then exclusion continued until anti-discrimination laws were implemented.[49]

Discrimination drew many veterans into political activism. Oodgeroo Noonuccal, who served in the Australian Women's Army Service, became a leading Aboriginal activist and writer. Captain Reg Saunders, MBE, the first Aboriginal Australian commissioned officer, spoke out on Aboriginal affairs after his army career, and in the 1960s served as liaison officer for the new Advisory Council for Aboriginal Affairs, though he struggled with the lack of opportunity in his own postwar life.[50] Despite the long delay in lessening discrimination, we can trace its beginnings to the war years. Noonuccal credited that time as "instrumental in helping to build the conditions for an Aboriginal political movement in post-war Queensland." What Torres Strait Islanders call "army time" is an important historical marker for them, too, offering insights into citizens' rights and underpinning later political developments.[51]

As to the military itself, the army's color bar was reinstated after the war—Reg Saunders was denied his wish to volunteer for the British Commonwealth

occupation force in Japan—but in 1951 the Australian Defence Force repealed the policy after opposition by both Aboriginal and white veterans. Postwar national service training (1951–1972) exempted Aboriginal men, but they continued to enlist. The first Aboriginal Australian graduated from Australia's Royal Military College in 1987. In recent years, Aboriginal Australians have not served in large numbers, but have responded to special reserve units in the North (chapter 14).[52]

In World War II, as in previous wars, armies, nations, and empires saw military service as a path to assimilation for Indigenous recruits. Many recruits did see it as a way to prove loyalty and hoped it would lead to better treatment and increased civil rights. But they also saw enlistment or war work as a way to be true to their own traditions and a promise of their own freedom. Achieving both goals depended not only on what Indigenous people actually did but also, crucially, on how the public remembered their actions. In Australia, Aboriginal service—apart from that of a few famous individuals such as Reg Saunders and Len Waters—was not integrated into the nation's memory. This failure, Robert Hall writes, blocked the chance to leverage patriotic service into civil rights gains.[53] In the next chapter, we look at how public memories of World War II include or exclude Indigenous participation and at how Indigenous communities themselves remember the war.

CHAPTER 13

The Pasts and Futures of World War II for Indigenous Communities

After the traumatic years of conflict, it seemed Indigenous people had gained little from their suffering and service. Governments continued to discriminate against and disempower them, and veterans returned to the same disheartening racism they had faced before the war. Yet by the end of the century, Indigenous Rights emerged as a global movement, offering new options for self-determination and cultural diversity. That achievement depended, in part, on wider awareness and public remembrance of Indigenous peoples' lives and their contributions in the war.

Memories of War

Memory studies examine how communities recall, forget, debate, and commemorate the past. In Germany, forced denazification prescribed how World War II should be memorialized. Japan, in contrast, has been criticized for failing to confront its war legacy.[1] Victorious nations face their own challenges. Most French citizens supported the Vichy government—though the Resistance dominates preferred public memory—making it hard to forge a consensus account. Finland's changing alliances also challenge public history, though discussion became easier after the fall of the USSR. Great Britain's war anniversaries are complicated by a narrative not so much about victory as about the dissolution of empire. In China, emphasis on commemorating the civil war (lasting until 1949) overshadowed the Anti-Japanese War, which is only recently receiving officially approved attention. Taiwan's war memory is inevitably entangled with East Asian international politics. In the United States, contested representations at Pearl Harbor and the "history wars" over the Smithsonian Institute's plans for an *Enola Gay* exhibit revealed generational and political splits over how to represent the Pacific War.[2]

Former colonial populations hold their own, often quite different attitudes. India and Southeast Asian nations have been less interested in World War II history than in their own era of independence. Across Micronesia, foreigners' history is less important than sacred sites that embody local and legendary pasts. Papua New Guinea stopped celebrating Australia's Anzac Day after 1973—then-Chief Minister Michael Somare said it "had no relevance" as the nation approached independence; instead, they should remember the soldiers of all nations who died there. The country has yet to formulate a shared national narrative of the Pacific War, though the July 23 date chosen for Remembrance Day, honoring military service, marks the Papuan Infantry Battalion's first action in 1942.[3] Many Indigenous people echo the refrain that "this was not our war"—though Native Americans, First Nations Canadians, Māori, and Taiwan's Aborigines disagree; for them, World War II is part of their own tribal as well as national history.

For some, the global conflict was just one phase of historical violence affecting them. Hill peoples of Southeast Asia see a sequence of aggression from the lowlands, from ancient states seeking slaves, through colonial invasions, World War II, independence and Cold War conflicts, and current insurgencies. To Nenets veterans of the Soviet Army's reindeer units, service in the Great Patriotic War was just one in the long series of Russian demands on them. Marshall Islanders saw the Pacific War as the start of a much broader conflict that proceeded from their islands' invasion beaches, through western Micronesia, then to the nuclear tests, postwar militarization, the Korean and Vietnam conflicts, then to the Middle East.[4]

Whatever their interpretation, each culture has its own ways of remembering. Combatant nations recount history in books, films, holidays, parades, and monuments; for many Indigenous communities, history's lessons are passed on in oral archives of song, dance, and shared recollections. For Micronesians of Pohnpei, war memories offer a warning and guide to dealing with powerful foreigners. In Burma, Shan stories of how holy sites were protected from US bombs instill Buddhist beliefs, good morals, and regard for local spirits.[5]

Personal links are another framework for memory. US Army pilot Fred Hargesheimer was one of the downed airmen rescued by Golpak in New Britain; in 1961 he began to raise funds for a school at Ewasse (one of the villages that had protected him), now "The Airman's Memorial School." American veteran and Bahá'í Alvin Blum settled in the islands after the war, became a businessman there, and with Jacob Vouza formed the Solomon Islands War Veterans' Association. Nearly half a century after New Zealand's 14th Brigade had been

FIGURE 13.1. A British and a Naga veteran stand together at the 75th anniversary commemoration of the Battle of Kohima, Commonwealth War Graves Cemetery, Kohima, India, April 2019. (Courtesy of Kohima Educational Trust, photograph copyright Robert May.)

stationed in the Solomons, New Zealanders in a RAMSI peacekeeping unit benefited from the goodwill left in their wake. Solomon Islands scholar David Welchman Gegeo comments that aid from Seabees after Cyclone Namu in 1986 renewed good feelings about Americans. Their work habits, egalitarian attitude, generosity, and willingness to criticize officers seemed familiar to older Islanders: "They said, 'That's just the way those Joes behaved in the war.'"[6]

Veterans of the war in Southeast Asia also maintained connections, despite political upheavals (figure 13.1). Australian guerrillas who fought in East Timor made efforts to stay in touch with those who had helped them, through the troubled postwar decades and through Timor-Leste independence. Aging veterans set up scholarships, urged compensation, and pressured the Australian government in negotiations with Timor-Leste over contested offshore oil rights.[7] Even into the early twenty-first century, British and American ex-servicemen were trying to aid Kachins with economic development projects and other support. British survivors of the Battle of Kohima at their final reunion in 2004 established the Kohima Educational Trust for Naga children. Gordon Graham, awarded

a Military Cross at Kohima, was among those who wanted to repay the "debt of honour" incurred by Naga help in the battle. "When he approached a Naga friend with this idea, the immediate response was 'you have not forgotten us.'"[8]

Where Axis troops had lived amicably for long periods, postwar visits let memories adjust to reordered international relations. Germans who had been stationed in northern Finland returned in the 1950s and 1960s and reconnected with villagers who had lived near their bases. Japanese veterans also nurtured memories, though travel bans prevented contact in some areas. After the United States eased travel restrictions on Micronesia, veterans and families came to battle sites to raise monuments and hold funeral services, and repatriated settlers returned to seek out family or friends.[9] In 1969 and 1970, veterans and the Japan-Papua New Guinea Goodwill Society visited Sepik villages friendly to occupiers. Michael Somare reunited with his childhood acquaintance, then-Lieutenant Shibata, in the 1980s—in later years, both men spoke of the inspiration of their shared experience. Kokichi Nishimura was the sole survivor of his fifty-six-man platoon during the Kokoda campaign; in 1979 he returned to PNG and he dedicated the rest of his life to repatriating Japanese remains, along with educational and economic development work.[10]

As time passes, official decisions about how the past should be commemorated reflect more contemporary concerns. Most Micronesian calendars include the celebration of "Liberation Day" marking the shift from Japanese to US rule.[11] But in Guam and the Northern Mariana Islands, Chamorro historians Vicente Diaz and Keith Camacho describe two very different tales of this holiday. Guam's July 21 Liberation Day marks the 1944 US invasion, ending Japanese occupation and restoring American rule. The celebrations quickly became popular; by the late 1940s, Liberation Day events were a salute to Guam's patriotism and an argument that its people deserved full citizenship.[12] Northern Marianas Chamorros, though, had to rethink their past as they transitioned from being part of the Japanese Empire to becoming a US territory. Their "Liberation Day"—July 4—marks the 1946 date when Islanders were released from the camp where they had been interned since the June 1944 invasion. The US military chose the holiday's date and name to launch a narrative of loyalty to the United States. But Marianas Chamorros did not necessarily see the invasion as "liberation" from familiar Japanese rule, and the celebration fizzled after 1947, not to be revived until 1958. People struggled with difficult memories, gradually softening pro-Japanese attitudes and accepting affiliation as a US Commonwealth in 1978. By the fiftieth anniversary, public memory spoke more clearly in "the language of American loyalty." Sixty-four Northern Marianas men who served as US Marine scouts

were recognized as US veterans in January 2000, and memorials now draw wide support, though problematic history (such as the Chamorros employed by Japanese occupiers on Guam) is not addressed. In Camacho's words, history "is as much about forgetting as it is about remembering."[13]

Holidays and parades are fairly easy to remold as generations pass. But war's physical legacies—cemeteries, battlefields, and monuments—constitute concrete reminders and international entanglements. The landscapes of battle and resting places of fallen soldiers link homefronts with their distant wars, requiring transnational negotiation of historical meaning.

Battlefields and Cemeteries

Long after the guns fall silent, battlefields and cemeteries remain sites of concern for combatant powers and for those living near them. Europe still holds many American dead, but the remains of most who died in the Pacific War were eventually returned to hometown graves or US military cemeteries. At Tarawa, nearly 1,700 Americans were buried at forty-three temporary sites; these were later consolidated and remains repatriated, but records were incomplete, and many bodies were lost. No records were kept for the roughly 4,700 Japanese and Koreans buried in pits or left in sealed bunkers. American dead on Tarawa are still being found and if possible identified, and Japanese too, have been recovering remains there since 1952.[14] British and Australian custom was to inter their dead near where they had fallen, so many war graves are now in independent nations, some on Indigenous territory. India and Southeast Asian countries hold many military cemeteries where Indigenous soldiers and sailors are buried alongside comrades. Japanese cremated their dead and sent ashes home when possible, but there are also Japanese cemeteries across Southeast Asia. After Allied victories, enemy dead were usually buried, but bodies of more than a million Japanese were never recovered for their families. Delegations have collected bones for funeral rituals throughout the islands and Southeast Asia since the 1950s. Until protections were put in place, "bone-collecting" was uncontrolled, resulting in indiscriminate gathering of human remains and damage to historical sites.[15]

Local people, too, have concerned themselves with those buried on their lands. In Tonga, Queen Sālote had each grave of a temporary US cemetery covered in flowers for a memorial on May 30, 1945.[16] Care at battlegrounds took a different form, as people living nearby often helped with burials. After the Battle of Tarawa, Gilbert Islanders handled the decomposing bodies of Japanese dead, while Americans buried their own. On Guadalcanal, Jonathan Fifi'i

carried American dead from the battlefield: "We carried them to the place that we call a burial shrine. If it was our language they would call it a *ba'eniibari*, for burying those killed in battle. And we carried many dead men there."[17] On Peleliu, the remains of more than a thousand Americans who died there were repatriated in 1947, but Palauans still experience their presence:

> Older locals on the island described how, in the years immediately after the battle, all of Peleliu was visibly full of the foreign dead. They could be seen in their hundreds, everywhere, shadowy figures in uniforms standing silently either alone or in groups, on the beaches, in the forest and hills, on the roads and in the buildings, even right next to you in the store.

The spirits are less often seen in recent times, but their presence is still felt, foreign dead who "were not wanted, nor did they want to be there."[18]

Burials of war dead on Indigenous land preserve sentimental ties between residents and combatants, but also reflect international politics. The American cemetery on Tarawa became a tool in the debate over longer-term involvement in the region before the United States focused on its Micronesia trusteeship (and removed its dead from the British-held island). In Finland, a cemetery for German soldiers was established in 1963 near Rovaniemi, a town largely destroyed in the war. Too, many Indigenous servicemen who died in foreign lands remain far from home. Fiji has discussed repatriating soldiers from Rabaul War Cemetery in PNG (where Victoria Cross awardee Corporal Sefanaia Sukanaivalu is buried). In 2012, a Māori leader called for repatriating Māori remains from Libya after attacks on New Zealand graves in military cemeteries there. In the same year, an Aboriginal Australian delegation held a ceremony at Bomana War Cemetery near Port Moresby (PNG) to return the spirits of six Aboriginal Australian soldiers to their homeland. And, while Indigenous servicemen may be buried in military cemeteries and included on rolls of honor, many laborers have no fitting memorial, perhaps only an unmarked grave along the trail where they carried supplies for soldiers.[19]

Monuments

Papua New Guinea's impressive Coastwatchers Memorial Lighthouse rises over Madang as a local symbol and tourist attraction. It was dedicated in 1959 in memory of European and Islander coastwatchers who died in the war.[20] But even when there is general agreement on the desirability of a structure—as for the lighthouse, or the US World War II Memorial in Washington, DC—its

form and meaning may not be settled. Studies of the "political heritage of war" describe how monuments become contested symbols as public memories shift.[21]

The situation is complex at sites where bygone empires seek to remember their battles, but now-independent former colonial subjects see a different history. In northeast India's Manipur State, the British view of the Imperial Japanese Army and the Indian National Army as "invaders" has been replaced in public memory by an INA War Memorial complex honoring them and their local supporters as liberators. In Timor-Leste, histories of Portuguese colonialism, Japanese occupation, anti-Japanese resistance, and the struggle against Indonesian control vie for remembrance. A Portuguese monument to victims of Japanese occupation memorializes Portuguese soldiers and officials, not the estimated sixty thousand Timorese who died. Tributes to the roughly two hundred Australian guerrillas who operated with civilian assistance in 1942–1943 are also problematic. War memories continue to affect international relations. Australian support for Timor-Leste's independence was framed in part by a sense of indebtedness for aid to the Australian guerrillas; in 2010, Timor-Leste's prime minister accused Australia of sacrificing Timorese lives to Japanese invasion.[22]

In Micronesia's battlegrounds, postwar attention from Japan contrasted with Americans' relative lack of interest in marking their historical claims. After the US lifted travel restrictions in 1962, Guam's tourist business grew, with Japan as the largest market, forcing residents to rethink public commemoration. When a Japanese group dedicated a site for a peace memorial in 1967, criticism of the lack of a major US memorial prodded creation of the already-proposed War in the Pacific National Historical Park. Established in 1978, the park has its own historiographical problems. It celebrates the story of Guam's patriotism and liberation from Japanese occupation, but also calls to mind the increasingly contested control of the island by the US military. The park's design focused on foreigners: the history of Spanish, American, and Japanese occupations of Guam. Only in 1996 was the Memorial Wall of Names dedicated, the first federal acknowledgement of Chamorro experience.[23]

In the Northern Mariana Islands, Japanese, Korean, and Okinawan memorials far outnumber the few monuments to US actions. The proliferation of markers at Marpi Point on Saipan indicates the economic value of Asian war tourism, helped by Chamorros' personal relationships and familiarity with Japanese language and culture. It was not until the fiftieth anniversary of World War II that American Memorial Park, a small park in Garapan, was developed as a monument. In 2004, the park added a memorial to the 932 Chamorros and Carolinians who died during the war.[24]

Despite the intensity of war in the Southwest Pacific islands, Americans have erected few memorials there, either, reflecting minimal strategic interest in the area until the 1980s saw a burst of competition over historical memory on Guadalcanal. In 1984, Japan donated a peace memorial on a hill overlooking Honiara; at the battle's fiftieth anniversary in 1992, the United States gave a memorial costing $500,000. Then Japan built Guadalcanal's airport terminal, donated a large sculpture to commemorate its dead, and suggested renaming Henderson Field to Honiara International Airport, setting up a diplomatic flurry. Solomon Islanders saw the competition as simply wasteful. The local lack of reverence was apparent when in 2008 vandals tried to steal the Japanese peace memorial to sell the bronze for scrap.[25]

But Solomon Islanders have also rethought how memorials reflect Islanders' roles. A bronze sculpture of Sir Jacob Vouza erected in 1992 by the American Battle Monuments Commission met criticism as largely a foreign effort representing a limited ("loyal native") view of Islanders—for example, it shows Sergeant Vouza not in uniform but wearing a *lavalava* and holding a machete, more like a plantation laborer than a soldier. Criticism of the Vouza statue led to a local effort to raise a new monument. Dedicated in August 2011, the "Pride of Our Nation" statue by Solomon Islands artist Frank Haikiu shows two Solomon Islander Scouts, an Islander radio operator, and a white coastwatcher. Intended to memorialize Islanders' war service and contribute to national unity after a period of civil conflict and foreign intervention, the statue poses Islanders alongside a European in the same heroic tableau, offering a new vision of history as well as a public site of remembrance for official rituals.[26]

Fiji's National War Memorial in Suva, established in 1999 on the site of World War II artillery batteries, carries a different message. It focuses on the history of Fiji's military, created first for home defense, then for service with Allies in the Southwest Pacific, then as the modern Republic of Fiji Military Forces. The RFMF is now both a powerful national institution and an ongoing link with Great Britain and the international order: several thousand Fijians serve in British armed forces, and more than fifteen thousand have served as UN peacekeepers. In 2013, Fiji held a "conventional" commemoration at the National War Memorial for the seventieth anniversary of the departure of soldiers to the Solomon Islands, but the legacy of the war in Fiji is less conventional. War memories have in the past highlighted ethnic tensions among Fijians, Fiji Indians, and Europeans, and more recently have sought to convey national unity. They resonate with the army's prominent role in postwar politics and other current issues.[27]

Like Solomon Islands, Kiribati (Gilbert Islands) has had to manage foreigners "battling for memorials" on Tarawa.[28] A monument to twenty-two British subjects executed by Japanese was erected even before the end of the war; a memorial to US Marines not until 1968. After Kiribati independence in 1979, Cold War concerns drew foreign aid from the United States and also Japan, which built its own memorials in the 1980s and 1990s. Strains between Kiribati and foreign views were inevitable, especially as population growth crowded the US memorial at Betio, invasion beaches and other sites were used as trash dumps, and population pressure at one point led the government to try to reclaim the land of the Japanese memorial, though it pulled back to preserve foreign aid. The United States renewed its presence with an impressive ceremony at Betio in 2003.[29] Few of the many monuments acknowledge Islanders, though one raised by Keuea Village commemorates the forty-eight victims of the 1942 Japanese bombing there. Like late additions to parks in Guam and the CNMI, a 2002 Coastwatchers' memorial erected by Australia and New Zealand mentions Islanders, and there are plans to inscribe the names of Kiribati people who died on its reverse face.[30]

Combatants see battlegrounds as scenes of victory or patriotic sacrifice. But the local memory is more likely to be one of destruction, as on Peleliu, which, as we saw in chapter 10, is still scarred by battle. Though that battlefield is not an important site for Palauans' own history, they must deal with outsiders' interests in it. Americans wish to preserve the memory of sacrifice and victory, while Japanese want to move on from painful sacrifice and loss. Both build memorials on Palauans' land and extract souvenirs from it; Japanese visitors gather and cremate bones assumed to be Japanese and take soil home to bury in the empty grave boxes given to families during the war. Preoccupied with their own pasts, the two sides pay little attention to current inhabitants. Islanders value their own traditional history, but as Antonio Tewid said of US and Japanese markers, "They are their monuments, not ours. They are not Palauan, so we're not interested in them." But people do want to maintain the battlefield out of respect, for tourism, and for diplomacy. Both Japan and the United States provide foreign aid to Palau, so the government must politely manage their differing desires.[31]

Monuments built by foreigners are long-lasting, everyday presences on the landscape of people who may feel no attachment to what they symbolize. Still, the facts that former combatants remain interested, that war ruins are slow to decay, and that battles are indelibly inscribed in national histories, means local people must deal with memories held by foreigners, as well as their own. Where interpretations of conflict are ambivalent and contested, preserving remains

becomes complicated.[32] There is also the possibility for those memories to become economic resources.

War Tourism and "Dark Tourism"

In the first postwar decades, visits to battlefields and cemeteries were dominated by veterans and by relatives and comrades of the dead. Such visits continue, but a wider fascination with sites of war and other tragedies has gained attention as "dark tourism." As World War II becomes more history than lived horrors, its sites have come to the forefront of dark tourism, from pilgrimages to battlefields and Nazi concentration camps to wreck diving in Bikini Atoll nuclear testing area (now a UNESCO World Heritage site). Across Southeast Asia, cemeteries and battlegrounds attract Japanese, British, and Australian visitors.[33] Ironically, war itself created "pre-adaptations" for tourism. Military infrastructure undergirds modern visitor facilities, and soldiers' appetites for souvenirs and local color presaged a tourist economy.[34]

In fact, it is largely thanks to tourism that many sites are now preserved. In the first postwar decades, commercial scrap sellers and military cleanups eliminated much matériel; natural decay and clearing for local use further depleted it (chapter 10). Now, their tourist value encourages action to catalogue, protect, and monetize sites, often with aid from former combatant nations.

World War II sites need protection if they are to survive as visible history, but host nations must balance foreign interests with their own needs, the cost of preservation with the relics' economic potential. Shipwrecks and downed planes anchor dive tourism but require careful management to protect both wrecks and fragile coral reefs nearby. In the sea and on land, scavengers and visitors filch souvenirs, degrading and gradually destroying heritage. At Peleliu, looters have dug through or backhoed sealed caves; restoration hobbyists and museums have scavenged aircraft parts; even dangerous ordnance has been taken. Residents are not immune to the wish to turn (what to them is) junk into cash. Efforts to protect Peleliu battlefield by enhancing its financial value include guided tours and a museum opened in 2004 with the support of Palau's government. American and Micronesian federal agencies, private entities, and NGOs collaborate with Chuuk State to protect and develop Chuuk Lagoon, once a Japanese Imperial Navy base and now a world-famous diving site. In Vanuatu, two small family-run museums display relics, and a South Pacific World War II museum on Espirtu Santo benefits from cruise ship visits—economic initiatives that also help preserve local memories.[35]

Solomon Islands turned to tourism to rebuild its economy after the recent conflict era. Before the coup of June 2000, more than fifteen thousand foreign tourists visited annually, but the years of violence slashed that number to fewer than five thousand, most interested not in war history but in diving and adventure travel. After regaining stability in 2006, the nation hoped to revive tourism with help from Australia. Landowners charge small fees to visitors to view what are essentially outdoor museums of war equipment, though there is a gap between the kind of display tourists expect and local views of the foreigners' war. But the US-built infrastructure of war—roads, wharves, and airfields—remains in use, and the growth of tourism itself is in part a legacy of the half-million souvenir-seeking soldiers, sailors, and marines who once passed through the islands.[36]

The Kokoda Trail across Papua New Guinea's Owen Stanley Range, where in 1942 the Australian Army blocked the Japanese attack on Port Moresby, is also a modern site of tourism and commemoration. Three thousand Papua and New Guinea men worked as carriers on the track, and more as soldiers, but it is Australians who see it most vividly as their heritage, raising the question of PNG's obligation to protect the trail for the interests of erstwhile rulers. Kokoda is a symbol of national pride for Australians but has limited significance for PNG, where it is seen as part of local history rather than a national narrative. Canberra has fostered its tourism potential not only out of historical interest, but also to support the PNG government and promote Australian interests there. Tens of thousands of Australians and others have trekked the Kokoda Trail, generating tens of millions of dollars for local communities and the nation of Papua New Guinea, but also creating problems—including, in a sad echo of the war, mistreatment of hired carriers and guides by trekkers.[37]

Oro Province (at the northern end of the Kokoda Trail) holds other sites of potentially lucrative but troubling tourism. The Australian Army execution of twenty-one Orokaiva men in 1943, and a deadly 1951 volcanic eruption, offer dark tourism resources that cannot be exploited without raising moral issues. Embogi, a local leader hanged for treason, was responsible for turning over Anglican women missionaries who were killed by the Japanese (chapter 8); he also offered significant help to Australians. Today those events are being reconsidered: Was Embogi an enemy collaborator, or an anti-colonial resister? How should such tragedies be memorialized? And who is to benefit from commercializing them?[38]

It is difficult to project the future of war tourism. Waterloo Battlefield in Belgium has been a popular draw since 1815, but tourism, like public memory, changes over time. In the Pacific Islands, large-scale tourism began in the 1960s

with large-capacity jets and packaged tours—many in the Southwest Pacific initially set up for veterans.[39] But as the American, Australian, New Zealand, and Japanese war generation grew old, stopped traveling, and died—and the Islander war generation too, passed on—Pacific tourism responded. Today's sightseers are more interested in a tropical paradise than in the tropical hell of war, though a small, specialized industry continues. On the other hand, Nagaland's Kohima area and Finland's north are seeing a modest growth of interest in the remains of war.[40]

Seeing Indigenous People in National War Memories

In the homelands of the former combatant powers, public war memory plays a different role for Indigenous citizens. Recognition of their service can be a strong argument in the fight for civil rights, but only if memories persist.[41] We have seen that governments showed gratitude for Indigenous assistance at key points in the war, sentiments that helped revise attitudes and policies. But public memory can also erase history. The service of tens of thousands of African soldiers on French battlefields in both world wars has been expunged or forgotten; for many Indigenous peoples, similarly, recognition has been long delayed.[42]

Those who were enlisted in regular armed forces received commensurate recognition at the time. Papuan and New Guinean soldiers of the PIB and NGIB are named on the "Roll of Honour" at the Australian War Memorial, as are forty-six ANGAU scouts who died.[43] But these official honors, while representing equal sacrifice, also entail an assimilative edge. It may have been an honor when the names of nineteen Palauan men who died abroad in the Japanese emperor's service were inscribed on a monument at the Shinto shrine in Koror. But in more recent times, representatives of Indigenous Taiwanese tribes have protested the uninvited inclusion of another group of imperial subjects, Aboriginal Taiwanese war dead, in Japan's Yasukuni Shrine.[44]

In recent decades, public memory in the major combatant nations has become much more inclusive, supported by both government and grassroots. In New Zealand, the Te Rau Aroha Museum commemorating Māori military service opened in February 2020 at the Waitangi Treaty Grounds—the theme of its main exhibit is "The Price of Citizenship." In Hokkaido, Japan, a movement called *minshūshi* "people's history" has made visible the experiences of Ainu and Uilta.[45] In a common phrasing, the "forgotten" soldiers and victims and events of the war are increasingly being remembered and preserved.

Public memory in the Russian Federation continues the Soviet practice of vigorous commemoration of the Great Patriotic War. Indigenous people are

FIGURE 13.2. Memorial to reindeer fighting brigades, Naryan-Mar, Nenets Autonomous Okrug, Russia. Photograph by Stephan Dudeck. See discussion in Dudeck (2018).

included with other minorities in the national narrative of cooperation to achieve victory. A monument in Murmansk dedicated to ski and reindeer battalions acknowledges these special units. In Naryan-Mar, capital of Nenets Autonomous Okrug, one of the three war memorials displays a herder in traditional clothing flanked by a reindeer and a herding dog (figure 13.2). Its erection in 2012 marked official recognition of Nenets' patriotic sacrifice and also offered a place of mourning for soldiers' families.[46]

In Canada and the United States, attention by scholars and family researchers has boosted knowledge of Indigenous World War II service. The Canadian armed forces participate in commemorative events focused on Aboriginal peoples. Canada erected a National Aboriginal Veterans Memorial in Ottawa (2001) near the National War Memorial, and names of Indigenous heroes have been attached to streets and military installations, declaring that the "forgotten warriors" of national militaries were "no longer forgotten."[47] Declassification of the US codetalker program in 1968 opened an era of public recognition for those men and all Native veterans. Native American codetalkers were awarded Congressional Medals in 2000 and 2001; a bronze statue of Creek Medal of Honor recipient Ernest Childers was unveiled in his Oklahoma hometown in 2009.

Indigenous military associations revived, and veterans became more visible in parades and commemorations. Al Carroll's discussion of the controversy over renaming an Arizona mountain to honor Army Specialist Lori Piestewa (Hopi), killed in Iraq in 2003—the first Native American woman killed in combat while serving in the US military—reminds us, though, that even acknowledged service does not erase racism.[48]

In Australia, the "digger legend" is a key symbol of national identity. Originating in World War I, identifying special qualities of Anzac and especially Australian soldiers, this public memory has expanded to acknowledge the Indigenous role in the country's wars. Historian Robert Hall's deliberately titled 1989 book *The Black Diggers* helped lay the scholarly foundation for this appreciation. Acknowledgement of Aboriginal Australians, Torres Strait Islanders, and South Sea Islanders as Australian citizens led to awareness of their absence in the "sacred sites" of war memorials.[49] The nation's yearlong fiftieth anniversary program in 1995 helped the public re-evaluate its history.[50] Indigenous veterans are now recognized in Anzac Day parades, ceremonies, and memorials, The Australian Department of Veterans' Affairs honors Indigenous service annually since 2007 during Reconciliation Week. In 2016, a bronze statue was raised to honor Tiwi man Matthias Ulungura, who captured the first Japanese prisoner on Australian soil. Remembering the war has created new cultural intersections, for example, European-descent Australians have adopted the Aboriginal Australian ritual practice of burning eucalyptus leaves as a memorial at Anzac sites in North Africa and Thailand. Indigenous defense of Australia against European invaders can also be seen as part of the nation's war history, though integrating this resistance as part of the national narrative is controversial.[51]

In Japan, postwar avoidance of war history left colonial and Indigenous peoples who had been part of the empire unrecognized and uncompensated. Only in the 1970s and 1980s did acknowledgement of Japan's colonial and military past allow minority soldiers to speak out, as in the publication of Uilta veteran Dahinien Gendanu's memoir, and other accounts of Ainu, Taiwanese, and Micronesian war experiences.[52] Openness to these topics was spurred in part by the 1974 appearance of the last Imperial Japanese Army soldier, an Indigenous Taiwanese man whose Amis name of Suniyon had been replaced with the Japanese "Nakamura" when he was drafted in 1943. Realizing that the last IJA holdout was Indigenous Taiwanese opened discussion of colonialism and imperialism that had been missing from Japan's public memories.[53]

Worldwide, new generations of writing about the war are redressing previous misrepresentation or neglect of Indigenous participation. The publication

of memoirs and preservation of oral accounts foregrounds Indigenous voices. Museums and archives make recollections more widely accessible by including photos and interviews on websites and inviting the sharing of tribal and family history. In many ways, then, and after much effort by Indigenous veterans and scholars, the public memory of World War II has become more inclusive. But it is possible to take this further. Integrating Indigenous histories can broaden familiar understandings of that era and push beyond the borders of national narratives. Sámi historian Veli-Pekka Lehtola takes up this idea for Sámi history, noting how a transnational perspective reveals how Sámi leaders in Finland benefited from discussions in Norway, Sweden, and beyond. Tracey Banivanua Mar's study of decolonization in Pacific nations similarly argues for a transnational view of independence movements. In the broadest view, Solomon Islander scholar David Welchman Gegeo emphasizes the value of studying World War II truly as a *world* event, rather than a history of the contending powers.[54]

History serves the needs of the present. Any study of Indigenous pasts leads us to inquire into the current actions of Indigenous communities on the world stage. Involvement in the war engaged Indigenous ideas about identity and political status. Human rights and civil rights campaigns opened dialogue and demanded change, a process that continues. These communities lived through the worst that empires and nations can offer—total war—and emerged more determined than ever to live autonomously. But is that possible in a world dominated by nation-states? In the final chapter, we look at how relationships between central governments and Indigenous citizens offer new options for the twenty-first century.

CHAPTER 14

Beyond Nation-States

IN THIS WORLDWIDE CONFLICT, Western and Asian powers employed and at times depended on tribal people to fight their wars. In a few places, their participation steered campaigns—Kachins and Karens in Burma, Nagas at Imphal, Navajo codetalkers on island battlefields, guides and porters in the Southwest Pacific. Indigenous efforts did not change the outcome of World War II. But their work did affect combatants' views of them, and the war altered global politics. Even as the reality of that era fades into the past, wartime service remains meaningful in the effort to protect and advance Indigenous communities.

Military Service and National Citizenship

Military service has long been a symbolic lens through which empires and nations judged Indigenous people. In the United States and Canada, World War II settled lingering questions about Native citizenship and loyalty. In Finland and Japan, Indigenous men served alongside other citizens; in Burma and India, hillsmen were recruited for ethnic units; in New Guinea, racially charged debates preceded the enlistment of Island soldiers. In other places, Native peoples were ignored, exempted, or even forbidden to enlist.

Differing approaches to service influenced postwar outcomes. In New Zealand, respect for the Māori Battalion and MWEO's well-organized civilian mobilization strengthened Māori standing and political capacity; today, New Zealand/Aotearoa seeks to be a bicultural nation partnering Indigenous and settler identities. In contrast, Australia resisted integrating Indigenous men into its armed forces even after the war, and state laws forced them to choose between cultural identity and full citizenship. Japan incorporated Ainu and Aboriginal Taiwanese men in Imperial service, but later embraced an ethnically homogeneous self-image that pressed for assimilation and allowed historical amnesia to erase colonial soldiers. Sámi men faced other Sámi across the front lines; this did

not hinder postwar commitment to the transnational community, but the wish to avoid a recurrence led some young Sámi in Norway and Sweden to argue for renewing their historical exemption from service.[1]

Today, Indigenous men and women serve in militaries worldwide. Some serve in ethnic units, some in units centering on home territories and local skills. They may have a higher per capita enlistment rate than the general population (as do Native Americans in the US military), or make up a large part of national armies (New Zealand) or special forces (Taiwan, Malaysia), or take specialized roles such as surveillance on tense frontiers (India). Immigration and naturalization debates often use service as a marker of loyalty, viewing it, indeed, as "the price of citizenship." On the other side of the coin, in too many places, armies still fight Indigenous people's efforts to hold land and civil rights, as in the violent contests of majority settlers with tribal people in the Chittagong Hills, West Papua, or the Amazon forests.

"Deployment" of Indigenous expertise—as guides, sources of intelligence, and advisors in challenging environments—remains salient in modern armies. Two innovative programs that use Indigenous skills in what governments still regard as "wild" country are the Canadian Rangers and Australia's Regional Force Surveillance Units. While Indigenous citizens of these countries can now enlist in any branch, the special units accommodate Indigenous lifeways and make use of their particular skills in home landscapes.

The Canadian Rangers build on the Pacific Coast Militia Rangers of World War II, tasked with surveillance of the nation's coasts and far north (chapter 6). When the new Rangers formed in 1947, recruitment aimed at men with bush skills—trappers, loggers, miners, and fishermen. Indigenous people were only included after some disagreement. But as technology and economy changed the Arctic, fewer non-Indigenous men had the requisite skills; by the 1980s, Indigenous people made up the majority of Canadian Rangers. The reserve unit's flexibility offers a way for those in remote areas to serve, and one in which their experience and traditional knowledge are valued. Canada's desire to confirm control of its north inevitably involves the Indigenous people who dominate the small population there.[2]

In a similar outreach, the Australian Army in the 1980s created three Regional Force Surveillance Units (RFSU), enlisting Aboriginal Australian and Torres Strait Islanders in northern Australia. Like Canadian Rangers, RSFUs are reserve forces, often training in home communities and accommodating local culture. Aboriginal soldiers make up 60 percent of one infantry regiment, NORFORCE (North-West Mobile Force), publicizing positive images

of Indigenous Australians taking on border enforcement and surveillance. The units acknowledge historical links with the World War II era, reflecting the ongoing need for reconnaissance in sparsely settled regions. Enlistees share family traditions of service, and some communities trace good relations with the army to World War II experiences.[3]

Military service is one facet of citizenship, a complicated status that exists in productive tension with Indigenous desires for cultural coherence and autonomy. As we have seen, the war years strengthened Indigenous identities in many cases. Even more important, the political earthquakes of the postwar world offered new potential for international recognition of the rights of minority and Indigenous communities.

World War II and Self-Determination

Historically, Indigenous Rights activism originated well after World War II, with increasing visibility and success after the 1970s. But I have argued for viewing the war era as a precursor—not in the sense of a direct historical link, but in opening a "space" for Indigenous rights.[4] Debates over Native American or First Nations enlistment honed legal arguments about sovereignty and citizenship. Interaction with foreigners and a wider range of neighbors enhanced political consciousness. Recruitment itself integrated diverse ethnic or local affiliations into a broader identity, as in Papua New Guinea, highland Vietnam, and the India-Burma border.[5] Wartime experiences simultaneously integrated Indigenous communities more fully into national and global societies and stimulated awareness and defense of traditional culture.

At a larger scale, the conflict sharpened the world's sense of the danger of the racist and nationalist ideologies that had fueled it. International negotiations laid out new futures for colonies and minorities, starting with the 1941 Atlantic Charter advocating self-determination and continuing through the organization of the United Nations and decolonization plans. The Allies had explicitly fought against racism and could not back off from that position.[6] Ideals were codified over the next decades through conventions such as the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the 1966 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.

Yet the needs of Indigenous people—not yet recognized as a distinct category—too often remained invisible on the world stage. Improved civil rights for other minorities or independence for former colonies did not consider their unique qualities. An important thesis of activists is that Indigenous people are

not simply individual citizens like all others, but are also members of traditional communities that, in themselves, hold collective rights—rights to land and resources, to their own language and cultural practices.

Wherever Indigenous people act as a political community, rather than solely as individual citizens, there is tension between self-determination and national citizenship. Because the postwar world defined self-determination in terms of nation-states, many conflicts take the form of a drive for separation. Indeed, sovereignty is a goal for many Indigenous communities. Native sovereignty continues to be a legal, cultural, and political issue in the United States; Iroquois and Navajo nations' passports reflect their intention to build citizenship polities. The 1999 creation of Canada's Inuit-majority Nunavut Territory follows decades of discussion on how to address Native land claims and self-determination within a federal system. Ethnic states within Myanmar and India are attempts to contain demands for autonomy, though independence remains the aim of some groups.[7] Indigenous demands for sovereignty as nation-states or as separate polities within a federation are not likely to subside.

But not all Indigenous groups seek independent sovereignty. They wish instead to retain a corporate identity in the context of existing citizenship. In the past, some countries insisted that individuals seeking civil rights trade their group identity (as Ainu, "treaty Indians," or Aboriginal Australians) for a culturally alienated identity as atomized individual citizens. This meant, in reality, adopting majority culture—assimilating. While many refused to make the trade, it was not until the late twentieth century that ways to counter this demand became clearer. Indigenous leaders, scholars, and activists have sought paths to accommodate Indigenous distinctiveness within national and international orders, a topic we can address only briefly here.[8]

New Models of Citizenship

In the twentieth century, empires that seemed rock solid dissolved, and the new global order reformed largely on the basis of nation-states bound by international agreements. The decades since have shown that nation-states too can break apart through conflict or can initiate new unions. Indigenous peoples have offered their own critique of the postwar political order, suggesting innovations in how we view citizenship.

For modern nation-states, two problems stand at the forefront of relations with Indigenous peoples. Externally, nation-states are committed to sovereignty and to controlling their territory. They want no competing "sovereignties"

within their lands; they want firm borders, not fuzzy ones; they resist entities such as the UN, ILO, or international advocacy groups interfering with what they see as their own national affairs. Internally, those affairs center on the rights and responsibilities of citizenship. Liberal democracies and human rights activism have struggled for centuries to attain equal treatment for individuals. But Indigenous Rights invokes a different concept of identity, focusing beyond the individual to membership in a corporate community, arguing that land rights, traditional livelihood, language, religious practices, and customs also should have legal standing, and that an Indigenous culture forms an entity adding up to more than the sum of its "equal citizens." Language and tradition are not maintained by individuals, but by a cooperating, living community, and in many cases cultural survival depends on land or other resources held in common.

Individual equality under the law, in this argument, is insufficient to the needs of Indigenous communities. The quest for civil rights has come to be seen as only one part of Indigenous citizenship, and in fact, paradoxically, it can work against Indigenous interests. Arguments that sound fair—such as that each citizen should have equal rights and only equal rights—discount profound distinctions caused by histories of invasion, settlement, and dispossession, which cannot simply be set aside. The language of "equal rights" can even be used as a weapon, ignoring historical reality that has created significant inequalities. In Australia, persistent white hostility toward Aboriginal people takes a new guise as political parties oppose Indigenous land rights, reparations, or self-governance, using the claim of "equal rights" to ignore historical harms. In Guam or American Samoa, treating Islanders as "regular" US citizens risks them losing control of their land and the ability to maintain their language and culture in the face of immigration or outside investment. Issues of self-rule and land rights must be considered through something more than the formal equality of individual citizens, which in practice conflates citizenship with homogeneity or cultural assimilation.[9]

Increasingly, Indigenous peoples seek ways to be culturally secure in a homeland that remains within the national body—to be citizens with a difference, creating new models, such as biculturalism, differentiated citizenship, or a transnational community.

Biculturalism: Aotearoa New Zealand

A "bicultural" nation proposes citizenship that incorporates Indigenous and settler identities in the same polity. This means experimenting with ways to intertwine Māori and Pakeha culture ("a love affair as well as a power struggle," Māori scholar Georgina Stewart calls the historical relationship[10]), while

also paying attention to land rights and economic issues. Its roots lie in the history of British-Māori interaction and the deliberations of late nineteenth and early twentieth century leaders about the future of their shared country. Sir Apirana Ngata's prewar advocacy of Maoritanga (Māori language and culture) and the impact of World War II—especially urbanization of many Māori and widespread praise for their military service—shifted the nation's ideas of Māori-European relations. In the 1970s and 1980s, focus on the 1840 Treaty of Waitangi centered attention on treaty rights, and Maoritanga came to be seen as a basis for national unity.[11]

Biculturalism is no easy answer. It can be criticized as a white attempt to absorb Māori culture, and problems arise in reconciling democracy based on individual rights with adjustments to ensure the vitality of Indigenous language and lifeways. Biculturalism developed through legal and cultural channels through the 1990s, then waned, became entangled with questions of multiculturalism and self-determination, and now is one element of an active discussion about New Zealand's identity.[12] Despite (and because of) the arguments, biculturalism is an example of a creative approach to citizenship that combines Indigenous rights with the international consensus on the sovereign rights of nation-states.

Differentiated Citizenship and Its Costs: Canada, Australia, Russia

Nation-states seldom budge on their core interests in sovereignty, so another route has been to seek greater autonomy within the national order. A key choice is between unitary and differentiated citizenship: that is, should Indigenous peoples have the same status as fellow-citizens, or might citizenship within a nation be varied in an acceptable way?

In the postwar years, the Canadian government explicitly addressed this question when it tried to create unitary citizenship and dissolve the special status of treaty Indians.[13] Assimilation had been the goal since coercive legislation began in the 1940s, when treaties began to be seen as a cost rather than an alliance with Native nations, and the government's intention—like the US tribal termination effort—was to shed its Indian Affairs responsibilities. But First Nations resisted efforts to destroy their communities and asserted the treaty rights that mark them out as a different, though loyal, kind of citizen. Through the 1960s, and most dramatically in 1969 when the government tried to dismantle the Indian Act and terminate treaty status, they repeatedly rejected efforts to assimilate them as "equal" citizens. Instead, they proposed to be regarded as "citizens plus"—the title of a 1970 document by the Indian Chiefs of Alberta, defining them "as people who possess 'the normal rights and duties of citizenship' but also

'certain additional rights as charter members of the Canadian community.'"[14] What this might mean in practice has led to innovations in citizenship rights and duties. The Canadian Rangers (above) is an example, its Indigenous members described as "citizen-soldiers plus" who combine national military service with their own territory and identity.[15]

Canada's optimistic "citizen plus" idea contrasts with the protracted effort to integrate Aboriginal Australian identity with citizenship, with one historian saying that most white Australians would consign the continent's Indigenous peoples to the status of "citizen minus."[16] The war years forced some changes, at least for veterans, but often Aboriginal Australians who wanted full citizenship had to abandon their Aboriginal identity. Removing discriminatory language in the federal constitution and centralizing federal power to legislate for Aboriginal affairs in 1967 helped, but the long struggle for basic civil rights shows the strength of racist headwinds. After advances late in the twentieth century—notably the 1992 Mabo v Queensland decision recognizing Native land title—efforts to reach justice have had variable success. In part, this is because it is evident that Aboriginal Australian culture—like all Indigenous life—depends not only on individual rights, but also on shared territory, subsistence, and community to sustain language and culture.

Differentiated citizenship may be intended to protect Indigenous lifeways, but it can bring significant costs. The form of citizenship set up by the USSR and continued after perestroika was not based on the equal legal status of individuals, but on a hierarchy of rights and privileges determined by one's "national" identity. Indigenous cultures were defined as following a static traditional lifestyle: those who wanted the legal benefits of "indigenous" status had to align with official criteria, even if that meant reorienting their lives to fit an outdated model. For example, Soiot people, who had stopped reindeer herding in 1963, had to take it up again and to reinvent their lost language. In the words of anthropologist Brian Donahoe, people were "fossilizing themselves in the amber of tradition" to qualify as indigenous.[17]

But without the protection of differentiated citizenship, small Native populations find it hard to defend their interests, a problem faced by those in the Chukotka region (Siberia's far northeast). When the USSR dissolved, central policies protecting Indigenous cultures evaporated and local officials turned to more pressing and lucrative priorities. The new democracy was dominated by the Russian majority, which had little interest in Indigenous concerns. When unemployment and privatization ramped up, infrastructure crumbled, and inequality soared, Indigenous people were among the hardest hit by poverty and

alcoholism. Without federal intervention to protect their unique status, they suffered from being the most powerless among politically "equal" citizens.[18]

In a 2003 discussion of citizenship and indigeneity, Canadian political scientist Alan Cairns offered a sobering reminder of the chasm between Indigenous desires for autonomy and the interests of the nation-state. After World War II, the international community offered encouragement and guidance for colonies to become independent, but there is no broad support or clear path forward for Indigenous desires for autonomy, land rights, and cultural protection. Nation-states see citizenship rights as the way to accommodate Indigenous demands; Indigenous peoples see citizenship as pressure to assimilate. The impasse is exacerbated by practical issues of the diversity of Indigenous communities and the very small size of many.[19] Given this reality, might paths to the future lie at least partly outside the nation-state system? Citizenship rights are an important avenue for innovation and negotiation for Indigenous communities. But equally or more important, for some, is innovation in transnational links—what Tracey Banivanua Mar, speaking of Pacific Islanders, called "transnational non-state alternatives."[20]

Indigenous Transnationalism: Sámi

Sámi have been leaders in collaborating across borders to devise new ways to interact with governments, manage resources, and express and maintain their culture.[21] While there was some recognition of a unified Sámi identity before World War II, cross-border cooperation began in earnest soon after it. The first Sámi conference representing all Nordic countries was held at Jokkmokk in Sweden in 1953. In 1956, the Nordic Sámi Council became a forum for Sámi of Norway, Sweden, and Finland (when Kola Sámi in Russia joined in 1992, it was renamed Sámirađđi, the Sámi Council).[22] Over the next decades, especially after Norway's Alta River Dam protests, activism increased at home and in the global Indigenous Rights movement. Sámi parliaments were established in Finland (1973), Norway (1989), and Sweden (1993), with different rights and responsibilities in each country. In Russia, Kola Peninsula Sámi efforts to form Indigenous political bodies have struggled with federal and provincial policies and concerns.[23] Sámi have also taken on a prominent role in international organizations focusing on minority and Indigenous rights and on the Arctic, including the Arctic Council (founded 1996), and the UN's Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues (2000).[24]

Sámi have a flag, a national anthem, and a national day shared across the four countries of Sápmi.[25] The greatest successes have been cultural preservation,

language revival, and limited self-rule. National governments have been less accommodating of rights in land and resources. Only Norway has ratified ILO Convention 169 and recognized Sámi as Indigenous people, giving them a significant role controlling land and water use in Finnmark.[26] Sámi have "dual citizenship" as Norwegians and members of the Sámi polity: Sámi identity is seen as being about ancestry, kinship, and self-identification, whereas Norwegianness is seen as formal citizenship, language, and the national political and legal framework.[27]

Perhaps such a concept of overlapping identities offers a model for new relationships between nation-states and Indigenous communities. In Southeast Asia, Pum Khan Pau describes initiatives drawing Zo highlanders from Burma, Bangladesh, and India into alliances and cross-border projects. The "border not only divides but also unifies" through dialogues reviving ties among transborder people. Other examples are the Arctic and Amazon regions, where the need to manage resources and politics, especially under conditions of climate change and development pressure, requires coordination across borders (such as the Inuit Circumpolar Council) to ensure Indigenous involvement.[28]

Indigenous Rights and the Global Order

As explained in chapter 1, Indigenous status is a new entry in the international legal and political order, though by no means a new identity. As Indigenous communities press for recognition of their unique situation, they have taken their argument beyond borders to form transnational alliances and to appeal directly to the UN, in fact bypassing nation-states. Persistent attention in postwar decades—the 1957 International Labor Organization Convention on Indigenous and Tribal Populations, the World Council of Indigenous Peoples (1974–1996), the 1995 UN International Decade of the World's Indigenous People, the UN Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues (2000), the 2007 UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (UNDRIP)—confirm advances in how Indigenous peoples are seen on the global stage, as they carve out a position distinct from other minorities and argue for protection beyond equal citizenship rights.

The war era foreshadowed the dual concerns of citizenship and sovereignty essential to today's Indigenous Rights movement. These tensions may in turn foreshadow a broader global transition—seen also in regional alliances, multinational corporations, and international institutions—that will take us beyond the centuries-long dominance of familiar nation-states into new political structures.

World War II dissolved empires, toppled colonial regimes, and made way for newly independent nations, but the desire for autonomy devolved, and continues to devolve, to ever smaller units, challenging us to re-imagine the world's order. The new century is rocking nations with never-ending demands for political, economic, cultural, and religious freedoms and with crises of pandemics, wars, nuclear security, climate change, and economic inequality—challenges that require the twin responses of greater local autonomy and greater international cooperation. Indigenous Rights activism encapsulates this seeming contradiction. Each Indigenous community is unique in its territory, its language and culture, and its history. Yet Indigenous peoples seek recognition and support in the international arena as a unitary legal category, creating Indigeneity as a transnational status.

That an identity so closely linked to specifics of territory, culture, and ancestry can exist on a global scale divorced from those particulars is a paradox with the potential to alter how we think about political borders.[30] Just as decolonization and the protection of minorities caused head scratching for those writing postwar international law, the Indigenous Rights movement today challenges the taken-for-granted world of nation-states. Ironically, "traditional" Indigenous communities are the ones pushing the envelope of politics in the twenty-first century as they rethink how best to manage our increasingly integrated and entangled globe.

State-organized societies, "civilizations," have always regarded the tribes and small communities at their margins with distrust, fear, and misunderstanding. Modern empires built wealth by exploiting resources and labor as they expanded; as a result, Indigenous peoples were pushed to or isolated at the frontiers of imperial power. In these relatively (but never completely) isolated areas, or encapsulated within settler states, they stubbornly maintained crucial aspects of their identity and social organization. Global war engulfed every region with violence and transformation. At its end, the world rebuilt its political order—this time, with an emphasis on nation-states, a concern for universal human rights, and a new concept of self-determination.

Over time, the tension between these ideas has produced modern fractures, one of which is the desire of Indigenous peoples to press for more room for their existence—for protection for their lands, preservation of their languages, space for their cultures and customs and ways of governing themselves. They desire not to become states, but to maintain a kind of existence that has persisted at the edges of states, beyond states—and, perhaps, to offer the best of that small-scale, resilient, community-centered way of life as an option for the world's future.

NOTES

Chapter 1

1. Field research was funded by NEH grant #RO-22103–90, “World War II in Micronesia: Islander Recollections and Representations,” with Suzanne Falgout and Laurence M. Carucci. Matsuko Soram’s recollection is from a 02/13/1991 interview by K. M. Mefy, translated by Minda Oneisom; Poyer (2008) describes Chuukese wartime experiences.

2. In 2015, British historian Richard Overy gave a talk at King’s College titled, “Writing the History of the Second World War: Anything More to Say?”—as he shows, the answer is yes.

3. The term “tribe” is not precise and can be criticized as pejorative (e.g., Holm 2007, 148, n. 12); I use it in the anthropological sense to indicate the relative political autonomy and economic self-sufficiency of these societies.

4. Thanks to this foundational work, historians have begun to integrate Indigenous experiences into broader scale World War II studies—notable examples are Christopher Bayly and Tim Harper on the Southeast Asian theater, *Forgotten Armies* (2005) and *Forgotten Wars* (2007), and Fergal Keane’s *Road of Bones* (2010) on the Battle of Imphal. Riseman (2014a) discusses “the rise of Indigenous military history,” seen in conferences and publications such as Riseman (2017) and Savard and Lackenbauer (2018).

Note that the names used for Indigenous peoples, here and throughout this book, are my best effort to use terms generally used by the communities themselves, balanced by the historical differences in terminology and spelling dating to the World War II era.

5. The relationship between empire and ethnicity is complex—empires have destroyed local identities, manipulated them, or even invented new ones for their own purposes; see Darwin (2010). Chippewa scholar Danika Medak-Saltzman (2015) analyzes the distinctive position of Indigenous peoples in comparative studies of empire and ethnicity.

6. See Jackson (2006) on the British Empire in World War II. Recent studies show the complexity of responses, e.g., in India (Barkawi 2017; Bose 2006, 122–147; Khan 2015). Owino (2018) reviews reasons for war support in British Africa. On the split in French colonies, M. Thomas (1998, 5–7, 70–98). Colonial officials and settlers vied to affiliate with Vichy or Free French, and most decisions were made with little reference to local non-European opinion. See Kundrus (2014) for debate on whether Nazi Germany acted as an empire.

7. Imperial and military historian Ashley Jackson (2017, 230–234) emphasized that a full account of World War II must include the role of colonial troops and labor, small campaigns as well as major battles, infrastructure and supply lines, the homefront impact in colonies as well as combatant nations, and how the entire globe was linked in prosecuting the war. Jackson and others have outlined the key role Africans played, as

soldiers, military laborers, and producers of needed agricultural and mineral exports (see Byfield et al. 2015 and Owino 2018 for recent overviews). More than a million African men served in the war, from British, French, Italian, and Belgian colonies and South Africa—including US President Barack Obama's grandfather (a Luo man) who was a cook in the King's African Rifles in Ceylon and Burma, 1942–1943 (Killingray 2010, 1-2, 8).

8. Coates (2005) and Fox (2012) discuss the potential and challenges of comparative Indigenous history. Shared language and imperial histories have encouraged comparisons of Indigenous experiences in British settler colonies in wartime, as in Winegard (2012) on World War I; for World War II, Sheffield and Riseman (2019). Riseman's earlier *Defending Whose Country? Indigenous Soldiers in the Pacific War* (2012a) compares New Guinea, Aboriginal Australian, and Navajo roles. Judith Bennett's comprehensive *Natives and Exotics* (2009a) examines World War II's impact across the Pacific Islands, as do Lindstrom and White (1990), White and Lindstrom (1989), and reviews by Firth (1997a) and Bennett and Poyer (n.d.). Poyer and Tsai (2018) compare Ainu, Aboriginal Taiwanese, and Micronesian wartime experiences in the Japanese Empire. I set out initial ideas and arguments for this book, a global comparison, in Poyer (2017). I do not deal with war-related artistic and literary works, but this is another topic of comparative studies, e.g., Schulze-Engler (2018), Tierney (2010).

9. On the history of the Indigenous Rights movement, Lightfoot (2016), Minde (2008), Morgan (2011), Niezen (2003), Rowse (2011).

10. Niezen (2003, 1–3).

11. On UNDRIP, see Castan (2010), Meyer (2012). Questioning indigeneity in Africa, Hitchcock and Vinding (2004), Hodgson (2009); in Asia, Baird (2016), Dvorak and Tanji (2015); in Oceania, Gagné and Salaün (2012). Among many discussions of how Indigenous peoples might be defined since UN Special Rapporteur Jose Martinez Cobo's study on discrimination against them in the 1970s, see note 9 cites as well as Anaya (2009), Coates (2004, 1–15), Corntassel (2003), Keal (2003, 6–16), Merlan (2009), and Sissons (2005, 7–35). Gerharz, Uddin, and Chakkarath (2018) explores the concept of indigeneity as a political resource.

12. A commonly cited definition of "Indigenous" identity in international law is the 1996 statement by James Anaya (2004, 3), former UN Special Rapporteur on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples:

> Today, the term *indigenous* refers broadly to the living descendants of preinvasion inhabitants of lands now dominated by others. Indigenous peoples, nations, or communities are culturally distinctive groups that find themselves engulfed by settler societies born of the forces of empire and conquest. . . . They are *indigenous* because their ancestral roots are embedded in the lands in which they live, or would like to live, much more deeply than the roots of more powerful sectors of society living on the same lands or in close proximity. Furthermore, they are *peoples* to the extent they comprise distinct communities with a continuity of existence and identity that links them to the communities, tribes, or nations of their ancestral past.

13. Coates (2004, 203–229) makes the point that, while Indigenous histories often focus on nineteenth century encounters, it was World War II and its immediate aftermath that have had the greatest impact on Indigenous lands and lives, as strategic movements, infrastructure construction, and rapid technological development dissolved the protection of isolation.

Chapter 2

1. On "citizen armies" and states, Enloe (1980); colonial soldiers, Barkawi (2017, 5–6); minorities in national militaries, Young (1982); British Army, Ware (2010). O'Connor and Piketty (2020) offer a historical view of "foreign fighters" in national armies. Nathan Fitch's film *Island Soldier* (2017) describes Micronesians in the modern US military.

2. Ainu history, Godefroy (2019), Irish (2009), Kojima (2014), M. Mason (2012), Morris-Suzuki (1994, 1998a, 1998b, 2001), Yoshimi (2015, 127–133). Japan regained southern Sakhalin (renamed Karafuto) after the Russo-Japanese War in 1905. In Soviet-held north Sakhalin, Indigenous groups faced repression and shifting policies toward traditional life during the 1930s Stalinist era (B. Grant 1995, 108–112).

3. Kayano (1994, 83–84).

4. Tourism, Ruoff (2010) Morris-Suzuki (2014); Ainu identity under acculturation, Howell (2004), Morris-Suzuki (1998b). Ainu and Ryukyu/Okinawans, colonial populations of longest standing, were seen as successful models of assimilation. Japan annexed Ryukyu in 1879, men were subject to conscription in 1898 and given voting rights in 1911 (Morris-Suzuki 1998b; Siddle 1998). Japan's government now recognizes Ainu, but not Ryukyu, as Indigenous (in accordance with international conventions); Ryukyu activists continue to argue for Indigenous status in the face of persistent discrimination.

5. Sámi history and assimilation policies, Lantto (2010), Lehtola (2004), Minde (2003), Salvesen (1995). Sámi in Sweden were not drafted until the 1950s (Evjen and Lehtola 2020, 29).

6. Māori and European New Zealanders (Pākeha) were equally British subjects; all New Zealanders became citizens in January 1949, after the British Nationality Act of 1948 instituted British citizenship and Commonwealth nations followed suit.

7. Gaffen (1985, 74–75), McGibbon (2000), Winegard (2012, 230).

8. Māori enlistment and 28th Battalion, Cody (1956), Gardiner (1992), McGibbon (2004, 153–154), Sheffield and Riseman (2019, 216–227), https://28maoribattalion.org.nz/.

9. Hill (2004, 184–209), Orange (2000).

10. Forsyth (1992, 347–349). Indigenous peoples of the USSR's northwestern Arctic—Komi, Nenets, Sámi, and others—were first conscripted for the Winter War against Finland in 1939 (Dudeck 2018). Vallikivi (2005, 22 n. 10) describes how the 1939 law ending exemption for Indigenous northern peoples was meant to further assimilation as well as military goals.

11. Champagne (2013). Sheffield and Riseman (2019, 201–233) compare status and conscription issues in these British settler nations, along with New Zealand.

12. World War I service, Barsh (1991), Holm (1997, 134–140), Krouse (2007), Rosier (2009, 42–70), Tate (1986), Zissu (1995). The Citizenship Act included those in the Territory of Alaska. Native Hawaiians, along with all of Hawai'i's residents, had been made US citizens by the 1900 Organic Act; they served in regular US forces, e.g., https://history.army.mil/html/topics/apam/hawaiians.html.

13. Responses to the draft, Bernstein (1991, 22–39), J. Franco (1999, 41–72), Hauptman (1986a, 3–14), Rosier (2009, 93–96), Sheffield and Riseman (2019, 224–227), Townsend (2000, 81–124). Carroll (2008, 116) and J. Franco (1999, 190–202) point out that citizenship legislation was aimed at enforcing conscription, not at guaranteeing civil rights or protecting Native interests.

14. "Since when," Townsend (2000, 62). Native American enlistment, Bernstein (1991, 40), Carroll (2008, 1–15), J. Franco (1999, 61–66), Holm (1981, 2007), Meadows (1999, 398–401; 2002), Townsend (2000, 61–80, 126, 177). Native Americans have also been war resisters. Winona LaDuke (2013) describes draft protests and opposition to US military policies. Her father Vincent Eugene LaDuke, Sun Bear, was a Korean War conscientious objector.

15. Discussion of segregated Native American units, Holm (2007, 137–140), Rosier (2009, 91–93). Some units had large Indian enlistment—notably, elements of the 45th ("Thunderbird") Division, initially made up of National Guardsmen from Arizona, Colorado, New Mexico, and Arizona (Whitlock 1998, 20). Pawnee veteran and artist Brummett Echohawk's (2018) memoir vividly describes his experiences as a Thunderbird fighting in southern Europe. Tate (1986, 437) comments that in 1981, the US Marine Corps enlistment of an all-Navajo platoon caused no dissent but was rather seen as a point of pride.

16. Sovereign war declarations, J. Franco (1999, 67), Hauptman (1986a, 6–9), Holm (1981, 74; 2007), Townsend (2000, 112–124, 127). Tate (1986) describes these for World War I.

17. World War I service, Dempsey (1999), Gaffen (1985), Winegard (2012).

18. Gaffen (1985, 39–73, 67–68, 79–80), Sheffield (2004), Sheffield and Riseman (2019, 219–220, 228–231); Poulin (2007) on servicewomen, including Mary Greyeyes. General Martin, Winegard (2012, 202) and https://www.veterans.gc.ca/eng/remembrance/those-who-served/aboriginal-veterans/native-soldiers/magistrate. Lackenbauer and Sheffield (2007) reviews historiography of Native Canadians in both world wars.

19. Broome (2002) offers a succinct history of Aboriginal Australians' legal status and how the racial caste system controlled prewar life. World War I, Riseman and Trembath (2016, 6–9), Scarlett (2015), Sheffield and Riseman (2019, 223–224), Winegard (2012). Winegard (pp. 261–263) concludes that, other than Māoris, Indigenous people in British Dominions received little benefit for their World War I service.

20. On the struggle to enlist, Hall (1980; 1997, 8–31); also Chesterman and Galligan (1997, 86, 113–114), J. James (2010, 377–380).

21. Hall (1995, 195; 1997, 60).

22. Tim Japangardi, 1977 interview by Peter Read, in Powell (1988, 249–50). Reg Saunders, H. Gordon (1962), Grimshaw (1992). Though Saunders is often cited as the

first Aboriginal Australian commissioned officer, Winegard (2012, 199) mentions two serving before World War II.

23. Beckett (1987, 61–86), Hall (1995, 30–35, 50–51; 1997, 32–59), Sheffield and Riseman (2019, 220–221). The underpayment was partially rectified in 1983, when the government repaid $7.4 million to about eight hundred veterans and their heirs (Riseman and Trembath 2016, 10; Shoemaker 2004, 37 n. 59).

24. See discussions in Goto (2003, 266–291), Sato (1998, 121–137), Yellen (2019).

25. On the organization of the Japanese Empire, Duus, Myers and Peattie (1996), Myers and Peattie (1984), Sand (2014); Kratoska (2002b, 2005) on minorities in colonies and occupied areas; Poyer and Tsai (2018) on Ainu, Aboriginal Taiwanese, and Micronesians in wartime.

26. The rebellion and aftermath are described in Ching (2001, 133–173), Simon (2007), Tierney (2010, 28–77); it is shown in the film *Warriors of the Rainbow: Seediq Bale* (Wei 2011).

27. On *kōminka,* Ching (2001, 89–132), Huang (2001, 224–225), Peattie (1984a, 41–42); on conscription in Taiwan, Y. Chen (2001), Huang (2001), Shimomura (2006), Ts'ai (2005).

28. Reasons for serving, Ching (2001, 171–172); "the Japanese spirit" *yamatodamashi,* "soul of the Yamato people," Huang (2001, 245–246). Buyan Nawi and Walis Piho, Huang (2001, 229–230, 248, from Eidai Hayashi [1998], *Testimonies: Takasago Volunteers* [*Shogen: Takasgo-Giyutai*), Tokyo: Sofukan).

29. Japan supported its home-island veterans, but Takasago and other Taiwanese were not only ignored when they requested compensation through the 1990s—they were denied it on the grounds that they were not Japanese, which seemed to many a betrayal. On postwar politics and Taiwanese veterans, Y. Chen (2001).

30. Yoshikawa, Huang (2001, 238–239, from Takashi Ishibashi [1992], *Illegitimate Sons of the Old Colony: Soldiers of the Takasago-Giyutai Today [Kyushokuminchi no otoshiko: Taiwan "Takasago-Giyuhei" wa-ima],* Tokyo: Soshisha); Pirin Suyan, Huang (2001, 242–243, from Hayashi, *Shogen*); Huang (2001) presents and analyzes interviews of Taiwan Aboriginal veterans by several Japanese authors. IJA straggler, Trefalt (2003, 160–178), see chapter 13.

31. The United States captured Guam in the Spanish-American War (1898), and Germany purchased the Northern Mariana, Palau, and Caroline Islands from Spain the following year. Germany's defeat in World War I resulted in the transfer of these territories to Japanese rule under a League of Nations mandate. The Gilbert Islands (now the Republic of Kiribati, geographically within Micronesia), was during World War II in the British Gilbert and Ellice Islands Colony.

32. *Strangers in Their Own Land* is the title of Hezel's (1995) history of colonial Micronesia; see also Peattie (1984b, 1988). Population figures from E. Chen (1984, 269–270).

33. Micronesian war service, Poyer, Falgout, and Carucci (2001, 66–72). Eighty young Palauan men trained in 1944–1945 for suicide attacks against American forces, though they were never used in that capacity (Murray 2013; 2016, 110). Camacho (2008,

217) estimates that Japanese authorities sent about seventy-five men and three women from Saipan and Rota to assist with the occupation of Guam (see note 53, below, and chapter 4).

34. "Zomia," Willem van Schendel's term taken up by Scott (2009), reflects broad cultural similarity across the region; see Jonsson (2014) for a critique of the term. Pau (2018a, 2019) notes the complex nomenclature for hill tribes and uses "Zo" to comprise groups of Chin, Lushai (Mizo), and Chin Hills Kuki. Two large minorities, Arakanese Muslims (Rohingya) and Karens, who also allied with Great Britain to resist Japanese rule in Burma, were not geographically peripheral, though distinct in religion, culture, and language from the Burman majority.

35. Bayly and Harper (2007, 16–23), Pau (2019), Selth (1986, 485–490).

36. Kelly (2003, 40–58).

37. Sadan (2013a, 254–261; 2013b) offers nuance to the historical habit of seeing Kachin simply as loyal to the Allies rather than actively protecting their own homes (see chapter 3). Pau (2018b, 2019) analyzes the various wartime conditions and alliances of the hill tribes. Official British and US histories written immediately after the war, though, were emphatic in praise of Karen, Kachin, Chin, Naga, and Lushai loyalty, e.g., Owen (1946).

38. Assessing local loyalties, for example, Evans (1964, 193), Kelly (2003, 185–196, 202–203).

39. Pau (2014).

40. Keane (2010, 36–43), Lyman (2016, 158), Oatts (1962), Parratt (2005).

41. Naga village debates, Bower (1950, 181–192, Namkiabuing, p. 167). Like Chin and other hill tribes, Naga were also recruited for regular British Indian Amy units and local levies, and as military porters, guides, and interpreters (Chasie and Fecitt 2020).

42. Slim (1956, 341); Rhizotta Rino, Keane (2010, 294).

43. The INA was formed in 1943 with Japanese support, initially from Indian prisoners of war captured in Malaya, later with volunteers from across Southeast Asia, Barkawi (2017), Bose (2006, 136–147), Lebra (2008). It was not only Kuki who saw the INA as an avenue to greater independence. Men in other hill tribes, including Naga, also joined, including Angami Zapu Phizo, later a leader of the Naga National Council and of the movement to separate from India (Koerner 2008, 193). Chasie and Fecitt (2020) discuss reasons for Naga assistance to British and/or Japanese.

44. Guite (2010, song, p. 301) used by permission.

45. Barkawi (2017, 109–117), Guite (2010, 295–296), Khan (2015, 247). Most of the charges against the seventy accused of assisting IJA/INA forces were dismissed for lack of evidence; eight were tried, and those found guilty were given prison terms (Guite 2010, 296–298).

46. The Territory of Papua, formerly German, was an Australian League of Nations mandate; the Territory of New Guinea was a British territory under Australian control. Allies administered them as a single unit during the war, and they were merged in 1949 as the Territory of Papua and New Guinea, an Australian UN trusteeship; Papua New Guinea (PNG) became independent in 1975. The island's western half (formerly Dutch

New Guinea, now Papua or West Papua) is since 1969 within the borders of Indonesia. I use the geographic term "New Guinea" to refer to the entire island during the war.

47. Nelson (1980a, 254).

48. Read (1947, 101).

49. Kwai (2017, 51–74).

50. Powell (2003, 223–228) offers many dramatic examples.

51. Akin (2013, 381–382 n.3); Akin suggests the complexity of a claim of Island "loyalty."

52. Clemens (1998, 57–61), D. McCarthy (1959, 49–50).

53. Postwar compensation, Inglis (1969, 520–521); Army courts and executions, Inglis (1969), Laracy (2013), Nelson (1978a; 1980a, 254–255), Newton (1996), Powell (2003, 206–223), Stead (2018). Residents of Australian-administered Papua were technically British subjects and could be charged with treason; those in the Territory of New Guinea fell under the League of Nations, and could not (Hogbin 1951, 11 n. 1). Regardless, most spoke little English, had little understanding of the law, and were faced with situations in which both sides could be ruthless (Nelson 1980a, 254–255). As historian Hugh Laracy (2013, 241) asks, "Loyalty to whom? To what? Why? At what cost?" Laracy (2013) and Kwai (2017) describe how George Bogese, the first Solomon Islander Native Medical Practitioner, was tried for collaboration after the war and sentenced to four years in prison—a punishment which, Kwai (p. 64) suggests, can be seen as a demonstration of the return of colonial control.

Similarly, Camacho (2008; 2011, 156–160; 2019) discusses the legal and moral complexities of nationality, loyalty, resistance, and collaboration by Chamorros in the Japanese Mandate of Micronesia. As Japanese subjects, Saipan and Rota Chamorros assigned to work in occupied Guam could not really be said to have "collaborated" with the enemy, but the Americans conducting postwar trials on Guam struggled with how to define the status of those accused of war crimes (Camacho 2019; see also chapter 4).

54. Hogbin (1951,12).

55. Hall (1995, 64). Reg Saunders and other Aboriginal Australians mention prior family military service as motives for enlistment (also a common motive for Native Americans). In Papua New Guinea, too—Sinclair (1992, ix) gives the example of the Boino family: Sergeant Boino served three years with ANGAU (Australia New Guinea Administrative Unit) before retiring, then re-enlisted in the Pacific Islands Regiment (see chapter 3). Three of his children and a grandchild were in the PNG Defence Forces in the 1990s.

56. Fiji, Lal (1992, 119–120). In World War I, a hundred Fijians went to Europe as a Labour Detachment, but Fijians were not allowed to enlist in regular forces. Ratu Sir Lala Sukuna, who was at Oxford at the time, went so far as to join the French Foreign Legion in order to fight; later, as high chief, he played a key role in organizing Fiji's World War II support (Bennett 2009a, 134; Lal 1992, 118–119; Ravuvu 1974, 5–6).

57. Ainu, "No one said . . .," Hilger (1971, 199).

58. Kanaks, Munholland (2005, 65).

59. Anthropologists, G. Gray (2006), D. Price (2008), Shimizu and van Bremen (2003). For example, British scholars called on to organize Indigenous guerrillas in Southeast Asia include H. D. "Pat" Noone in Malaya, Ursula Bowen with the Naga, Tom Harrisson in Sarawak, and H. N. C. Stevenson and Edmund Leach in Burma. Japanese ethnologists did less front-line work but supplied expertise. Like the Allies, Japan made use of their nationals who were businessmen and immigrants in target areas (e.g., Iwamoto 1999).

60. Hauptman (1986a, 3), Lackenbauer (2004, 185). Some Vietnam War-era Native American enlistees, too, were motivated by their nations' treaty obligations (Holm 1996, 118, 175).

61. British 1891 Chin treaty, Kelly (2003, 340 n. 4); Indochina, Hickey (1982, 369, 393).

62. Fiji, Ravuvu (1974, "not to do so," p. 12, "The chief," p. 65 n. 25). Indigenous Fijians supported the war, and many volunteered to serve, but Fiji's immigrant Indian community was less enthusiastic—a response its leaders later saw as a mistake that hurt postwar demands for equality (chapter 11). Solomon Islanders, Kwai (2017, 70–71).

63. Riseman (2012a), Riseman and Trembath (2016, 93).

64. Rosier (2009, 84–93).

65. Hughes, of the Narannga Aboriginal community of South Australia, was a "Rat of Tobruk" and served in Libya, New Guinea, and Borneo; he was awarded a Military Medal (MM) for actions at Buna (Hall 1995, 20; vwma.org.au). Clive Upright of New South Wales was awarded the MM for actions in combat in New Guinea (Hall 1995, 20; www.awm.org.au). Griffin, Nelson, and Firth (1979, 98) describes praise for Pacific Islands Regiment service and mentions the thirteen MM recipients but notes that despite "extravagant promises of rewards" veterans saw few changes or new opportunities after they returned home (chapter 11).

66. Vouza at Guadalcanal, see chapter 4; Narruhn at Tarawa, McQuarrie (2012, 160); Loyal Service medals, Powell (2003, 227–228). Powell (pp. 224–227) cites awards reports of bravery by civilian scouts and spies for Allies in the Southwest Pacific; McQuarrie (2012 Appendix G) lists medal recipients for the Gilbert Islands; Braund (1972) and Kelly (2003, 301) on honors for Chin Levies; Evans (1964, 223) for Z Force; Sacquety (2013, 225–226) on Detachment 101 awards for Kachin guerrillas.

67. Oatts (1962, 149).

Chapter 3

1. Sámi war service in Finland and Norway, Evjen and Lehtola (2020, Jåma brothers, p. 38), Lehtola (2015; 2019, 29–34), Nickul (1950), Vorren and Manker (1962, 152–153); Mikel Utsi, Armstrong (1979). Sweden was officially neutral, but in late December 1944, the 1,442 ski troops airlifted to guide USSR units in Norway were mostly Swedish Sámi trained as police, https://www.laits.utexas.edu/sami/dieda/hist/wwii.htm.

2. Sámi in USSR, Dudeck (2018), Evjen and Lehtola (2020), Gorter-Gronvik and Suprun (2000), Kent (2014, 61–62), Lehtola (2019), Took (2004, 258–259), Turunen et al. (2018). Galkin, "we harnessed" in Took (2004, 265); protecting Sámi soldiers, Took (2004, 258).

3. Reference to "the British" masks the diversity of these troops. The Indian Army formed the bulk of British forces in Burma, and African soldiers played a significant role in Chindits and in the 1944 counterinvasion. British personnel were by far a minority of General Slim's army by the end of war in Burma (R. Callahan 2017, 130). Japanese forces, too, were recruited and conscripted from throughout that empire.

4. Jackson (2006, 405–461) outlines the war in British Southeast Asia. On Orang Asli in the guerrilla war, and Noone, Bayly and Harper (2005, 266–268, 344–350), Bayly and Harper (2007, 491–493), F. Chapman (1949), Holman (1984), Leary (1995), Noone (1972). Temiar in surveillance network, Noone (1972, 88) and Shennan (2007). British lost contact with Noone in November 1943; it was not until well after the war that his brother Richard concluded he had been killed by two Temiar men, perhaps because of concerns about the danger his military work brought to the community.

5. Bayly and Harper (2005, 2007) and Jackson (2006, 351–404) provide overviews of the Burma-India hills during the war. On British and Japanese recruitment and the BIA, Bayly and Harper (2005, 82–85; 2007, 16–17, 74), D. Guyot (1966), J. Guyot (1974), Lebra (1977). Certainly there were also many lowland Burmese who assisted the Allies, including in dangerous roles as agents behind Japanese lines.

6. Donnison (1956, 10–14), Jackson (2006, 375–386). British prepared for possible invasion along the India/Burma border; thus, people in the Lushai Hills were affected by militarization and labor demands, though combat did not reach their homelands (McCall 1949).

7. British and US special operations, Bayly and Harper (2005, 204–206), Bierman and Smith (1999, 241–376), Duckett (2018), Hargreaves (2013), Sacquety (2013), Selth (1986), Webster (2003). The plethora of units in Kachin country led to conflicts as British and US officers competed for recruits and information and Chinese soldiers moved across the fuzzy border (Bayly and Harper 2005, 352–353; Duckett 2018, 105–126; Selth 1986, 500–501).

8. Evaluating the Burma-India hills situation, Bayly and Harper (2005, 83) write that, "It was the stubborn resistance of their inhabitants and the aid they gave the Allied armies that were to be crucial in blocking the further advance of the Japanese."

9. Karen and Burmese-Karen relations, C. Christie (1996, 62–64, 91), Kratoska (2002a), Silverstein (1980, 44–49); see also sources on the BIA, note 5. Major H. P. Seagrim, officer of a Karen unit of Burma Rifles, stayed behind to organize early resistance but gave himself up to forestall reprisals and was executed along with several Karen comrades (Morrison 1947).

10. Shan, Bayly and Harper (2005, 231–232), Ferguson (2018), Hilsman (1990, 170), Selth (1986, 490–491), Tzang Yawnghwe (1987, 83–88, "were determined," p. 86). By

an agreement with Japan, Thailand invaded and controlled part of the Shan States in eastern Burma from May 1942 until the end of the war (Strate 2015, 119).

11. Kachin, Bayly and Harper (2005, 352–354), Dunlop (1979), Fellowes-Gordon (1957), Hilsman (1990), Lintner (1997), Peers and Brelis (1963), Sacquety (2013), Sadan (2013a, 254–306), Selth (1986, 497). Evaluating British and US special operations in Burma, Hargreaves (2013) concludes that Detachment 101 was among the most successful and valuable (cost-effective) operations.

12. Fergusson (1951, 183–211); Zhing Htaw Naw, Sacquety (2013, 53–54, photo, p. 94) and Dunlop (1979); Hka Shan Rawng, Fellowes-Gordon (1957, 82–83).

13. Miura's account is in Yoshimi (2015, 173–176).

14. Katoch (2016, 8–10), Romanus and Sutherland (1953, 232–233), Swinson (1968, 120–121).

15. Kelly (2003) and Oatts (1962) offer close looks at action in the Chin Hills. Bayley and Harper (2005) and Jackson (2006) situate combat here in the context of the Southeast Asia war.

16. Chin Hills Battalion, Kelly (2003, 63–64), Oatts (1962, 33). Chin Levies, "an eye to tribal custom," Braund (1972, 214); intensive combat not expected, Braund (1972, 195, 204–206) and Kelly (2003, 165); equipment, Evans (1964, 128); "four mule companies" and British in Tiddim, Evans and Brett-James (1962, 47–48, 115–121); shelling Chin villages, Brett-James (1948), Kelly (2003, 167–180).

17. Oatts (1962, 72–73).

18. For "piecemeal defection," Braund (1972, 222); Japanese looting and contact with villagers, Evans (1964, 131–132, 191, 193).

19. Stay-behind levies, Braund (1972, 231–234), Kelly (2003, 232–241), Oatts (1962, 144), Pau (2012; 2014, 673–677).

20. For "most famous," Kelly (2003, 202); on Newland, Evans (1964, 24–52, 143–144, 190–204); Zahu, Evans (1964, 126–146).

21. Japanese civil affairs, Oatts (1962, 142); Chin response to Japanese, Braund (1972, 247–248), Evans (1964, 202), Kelly (2003, 249). Vum Ko Hau and Pau Za Kam, Pau (2014, 677–678) and Kelly (2003, 249). Pau (2018b) details the Chin response to both British and Japanese efforts to recruit their support.

22. Increased resistance, Kelly (2003, 256–260, 238–239), Oatts (1962, 142–144).

23. Braund (1972, 240–242), Kelly (2003, 249), Pau (2012).

24. Bayly and Harper (2005, 203), Bower (1950, 169–179), Khan (2015, 101–102, 159–160).

25. Bower herself commented on how she was "built up as a propaganda tool" (Bayly and Harper 2005, 204). She tells her story in *Naga Path* (1950); also Bayly and Harper (2005, 384–387), Chasie and Fecitt (2020, 154–163), Keane (2010, 50–55), J. Thompson (2009, 209–212). Nagas served elsewhere in V Force as well; Captain Ralengnao Khathing, former headmaster of Ukhrul School, was awarded an MBE for military intelligence duties with that unit (Chasie and Fecitt 2020, 230, 249–250).

26. Bower (1950, "one Service rifle," p. 206).

27. Imphal-Kohima battles, R. Callahan (2017), Evans and Brett-James (1962), Katoch (2016), Keane (2010), Swinson (1967, 1968).

28. Chasie and Fecitt (2020, 84–86), Lyman (2016, 225), Swinson (1967, 14, 89, 117–118). Pawsey was credited with maintaining Naga support and was later knighted for his service at Kohima.

29. Sohevu Angami, Keane (2010, 217); Naga soldiers, military awards and civilian service, Chasie and Fecitt (2020), Keane (2010), Khrienuo (2013), Swinson (1967), J. Thompson (2009). As one example, Jemadar Ünilhu Angami of Khonoma, a Naga Levies officer, received a Military Cross for his patrol work and as headman of the Naga Porter Corps in particular for raising three thousand Naga porters to enable British action at Aradura Spur (Chasie and Fecitt 2020, 216–217, 224). Military need for porters, Moreman (2005, 135).

30. Naga information, Keane (2010, 212–223), Swinson (1967, 119); value of Naga intelligence, Colvin (1995, 33–41), Keane (2010, 294–296); refusing payment, Keane (2010, 295), Slim (1956, 342). Colvin (1995, 38) names two Naga constables, Bishnudhoj Angami and Veeheyi Angami, captured and shot while on intelligence work during the battle. Chasie and Fecitt (2020) includes Naga personal accounts and details of award citations.

31. Guite (2010, "dominant historiography," p. 302). Public memory in India now sees them as patriots fighting for freedom from colonial rule (Guite 2011, see chapter 13).

32. Phrases from Kelly (2003, 195–196) and Bower (1950, 210).

33. New Guinea scholar August Kituai (1998, 326–329) interviewed Sasa Goreg, a policeman in Rabaul, who describes escaping with his unit and burying their guns, uniforms, and equipment before being released from service and told to make their way home. J. K. McCarthy met some of the disarmed police as they left Rabaul ahead of the advancing Japanese, "bitter, sullen men" resentful that the government had prevented them from fighting (J. McCarthy 1963, 195–196).

34. Griffin, Nelson, and Firth (1979, 80–81).

35. Royal Papuan Constabulary, Kituai (1998, 171–203), Powell (2003, 228–240), Riseman (2012a, 142–148). Sixty-eight RPC men died, twenty-eight of them killed in action. And, though ANGAU was an administrative unit, forty-six of its scouts died in the war (Sinclair 1990, 297).

36. Powell (2003, 236–240), Sinclair (1990, 212–213, 273).

37. First encounter with Japanese, July 30, 1942, Williams (2012, 50). The Kokoda campaign included Islanders as both carriers and PIB soldiers, sometimes in the same fight (D. McCarthy 1959, 127–128, Nelson 2006a, Tracey 2017). Early recruits came from RPC ranks; Byrnes (1989, 5, 201–202) lists initial PIB recruits of June 1, 1940, with "Sergeant Samai" as the first.

38. Exact enlistment is not clear. Sinclair (1990, 122–131) estimates 3,800 Papuans and New Guineans fought with PIR as regular soldiers; thirty-eight PIR men killed in action, thirteen died of wounds, ten missing believed killed, ninety-eight wounded (see also Byrnes 1989, 269; Firth 1997a, 300–301; Griffin, Nelson, and Firth, 1979, 97–98). On the history of PIB, NGIB, and PIR, Byrnes (1989), Sinclair (1990, 1992), Tracey (2017); discrimination and discipline, Griffin, Nelson, and Firth (1979, 97–98), Nelson (1980b),

Powell (2003, 236–240), Riseman (2012a, 149–156). PIR was re-formed in 1951, and after independence (1975) became the nucleus of the Papua New Guinea Defence Force. The initial PIB enlisted both Papuans and New Guinea men, but after one NGIB was formed, the decision was made to split units, with New Guinea men transferred or recruited into NGIB. Postwar units, however, integrated men from throughout the now united Territory of PNG to foster a sense of shared identity (Sinclair 1990, 215, 273–274).

39. Bengari's and Matpi's stories, and other valorous actions by PIR, in Sinclair (1990).

40. Guerrilla actions, Feldt (1946, 183–195, 232–235), Powell (1996, 251–260); on East New Britain, Stone (1994, 225–256).

41. Golpak, "I've got the Japanese," Nelson (1982, 197); "Golpak fled," (Powell 1996, 245); also Feldt (1946, 241), Stone (1994, 156–157, 255 n.10). A memorial to Golpak was dedicated in East New Britain in 1961.

42. Kiroro, "became the confidant," Powell (1996, 257); Sotutu, Feldt (1946, 103), Griffin, Nelson, and Firth, (1979, 84), Ravuvu (1974, 43–56). Powell (2003) and individual memoirs offer many other examples of Islanders' support of Allies at great personal cost.

43. Bradley (2008, 72). As an example of scale of manpower needed, the Australian plan for an attack on Buna, written in October 1942, called for 3,900 carriers to support 7,000 troops (D. McCarthy 1959, 260).

44. Powell (2003, 191–240). Downs (1999) describes conditions and dangers facing Islanders who worked as carriers for the all-white New Guinea Volunteer Rifles. Hauling tanks, Brune (2004, 57).

45. Bradley (2008, 93–94).

46. Akin (2013), Firth (1997a, 300), Kwai (2017, 1–13), G. White et al. (1988, 178, 197–199).

47. Coastal surveillance set up before the war by the Royal Australian Navy became part of the Allied Intelligence Bureau (coordinating operations in the Southwest Pacific). McQuarrie (2012, 33–43) describes the Gilbert and Ellice Islands network, run by New Zealanders with local help, which gave many islands their first radio links and training. After Japan invaded the Gilberts, New Zealanders were captured or surrendered rather than subject Islanders to reprisals, and were executed (McQuarrie, p. 114). Feldt (1946) on Southwest Pacific coastwatching focuses on Europeans but includes Islanders, as does Horton (1970); later work such as Kwai (2017) adds more of Islanders' points of view and memories. Pinfield (2021) argues the military importance of the Islanders' coastwatching and intelligence gathering role on Bougainville for the Guadalcanal campaign.

48. Three coastwatcher officers in the Solomons were mixed-race men: Hugh Wheatley, Harry Wickham, and Geoffrey Kuper (Kwai 2017, 16–20). Riseman (2012a, 138–141) estimates 850 to 1,040 Islanders trained and deployed under coastwatchers. "Clearly," Great Britain Colonial Office (1946, 12).

49. Women, Kwai (2017, 49).

50. "I wanted to know," in Great Britain Colonial Office (1946, 19); Steven Vinale Zaku, G. White et al. (1988, 155); Gumu, Clemens (1998, 160–161); Mostyn Kiokilo, G.

White et al. (1988, 149–174); smashing radio, Feldt (1946, 230). On Donald Kennedy, Boutilier (1989), Laracy (2013, 211–228), G. White et al. (1988, 133–148). Michener (1951, 186) recounts a story crediting a Solomon Islander—coastwatcher Paul Mason's unnamed cook—with discovering the timing of Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto's April 1943 inspection flight in the region, allowing US planes to intercept it. Mason sent the man to work for the Japanese in Kieta (Bougainville) and he returned with the news.

51. Allied intelligence difficulties, Powell (1996, esp. pp. 83-86).

52. G. White et al. (1988, 167–172).

53. Guadalcanal, Bennett (2016d), Great Britain Colonial Office (1946, 23–25), Kwai (2017). On the activities of Clemens's scouts, Clemens (1998).

54. Clemens (1998), Kwai (2017, 25–26), Richter (1992). Clemens (pp. 209–212) describes being with the badly wounded Vouza when he came through the American lines. After recovering, Vouza continued as a scout. He later became a leader in the anticolonial Maasina Rule movement, was arrested by British authorities in 1947, and went on to serve in several political and civic positions (Richter 1992, http://www.solomonencyclopaedia.net/biogs/E000730b.htm).

55. Kwai (2017, 65), Millett (1998, 23–26), Newell (2016, 41–43), G. White et al. (1988, 177–178). As the informal term "South Pacific Scouts" suggests, historical references to these international guerrilla units can be unclear, e.g., Miller (1959, 76 n. 15).

56. G. White et al. (1988, 175–196).

57. Bayly and Harper (2005), de Jong (2002), Jackson (2006, 405–461), Powell (1996). Cleary (2010) details the unsuccessful Australian guerrilla effort in East (Portuguese) Timor. It began with strong support from interior tribes, but effective Japanese response set villages against one another and caused great destruction and harm.

58. Powell (1996, 260–261), Schmidt (1982).

59. Blackburn and Volckmann, Guardia (2010, 2011), Harkins (1955), Volckmann (1954); Conner, Lapham and Norling (1996, 94–95); Blow, Ross (1989); Fertig, Holmes (2015). Fertig was joined by Lieutenant Colonel Edward McClish, a Choctaw Indian, who had been organizing guerrillas on Mindinao (Townsend 2000, 132–133). It seems that Australians brought Papua New Guinea military workers (or troops?) to the Philippines, https://postcourier.com.pg/png-heroes-buried-philippines-remembered/.

60. Lebra (1977, 143).

61. Yoshimi (2015, 194–200). Fujioka's story presents Moro as anti-Japanese; Powell (1996, 260–261) is an example of viewing them as pro-Japanese. Kawashima (2002) describes the resistance of Maranao, a Moro group on Mindanao, to Japanese occupation.

62. Japanese occupation of Borneo, Gin (2011, recruitment, pp. 63–64); Dayaks, Lebra (1977, 133–134). Allied and Japanese militaries used Dayaks as guides and trackers—roles they continued after the war, after independence, and in fact into the present (chapter 7).

63. Feuer (1996, 113–134), Gin (2002; 2011, 132–138), Griffiths-Marsh (1990), Harrisson (1959), Heimann (1999, 173–231), Jackson (2006, 438–446), Powell (1996, 266–314). Harrisson, an anthropologist, later became curator of the Sarawak Museum. "Dayaks" and "Ibans" (often called "Sea Dayaks" in war literature) are general terms

for the varied population of roughly 250,000 living along rivers between Borneo's coast and central highlands; the highland population of some thirty thousand encompasses a number of Indigenous groups (Heimann 1999, 252).

64. Powell (1996, 296, 300). As to Indigenous fighters withdrawing in the face of superior firepower, Leary (1995, 152) notes that journalists covering the postwar Malayan Emergency "trivialized" Orang Asli actions by their choice of words: in a loss, British Security Forces "bravely fell back" or "took up stronger positions," whereas the tribesmen were reported as "fleeing in superstitious terror" or similar dismissive phrasing.

65. Forsyth (1992, 352–355), Stephan (1971, 142–178).

66. Sasaki (2003), Yoshimi (2015, 295 n. 205).

67. Gendanu, Yoshimi (2015, 129–132). Uilta and Nivkh POWs, Irish (2009, 204), Morris-Suzuki (1996; 1998b, 176–177). Gendanu later became an activist for Indigenous rights and cultural preservation on Sakhalin. In 1995, Gendanu's niece Lyuba Nakagawa and another Indigenous woman, Yushin Kim, travelled to Tokyo to request a memorial and compensation for Nivkh and Uilta wartime suffering, but were unsuccessful (Morris-Suzuki 1996).

Chapter 4

1. Medicine Crow (2003, 114–117).

2. On Indigenous Canadians' overseas service, Gaffen (1985), Lackenbauer and Mantle (2007), Sheffield and Riseman (2019), Summerby (2005). Gaffen (1985, 40–57) and Summerby (2005, 21–33) contain many instances of valor awards, including Prince's.

3. Townsend (2000, 150); Bernstein (1991) also lists distinguished Native American servicemen. Since they were classified as white in integrated units, and some were not enrolled in a tribe, accurate numbers are not known. The US Department of Veterans' Affairs lists five Native American Medal of Honor awardees in World War II: Second Lieutenant Van T. Barfoot (Choctaw), Second Lieutenant Ernest Childers (Muscogee [Creek]), First Lieutenant Jack C. Montgomery (Cherokee), Private First Class John Reese, Jr. (Cherokee), and Commander Ernest Edwin Evans (Cherokee/Creek). The first three fought with the 45th Infantry ("Thunderbird") Division in Italy (Whitlock 1998), Reese in the Philippines, and Evans at Leyte Gulf. Tinker Air Force Base in Oklahoma is named after Major General Tinker.

4. J. Franco (1999, 63), Holm (2007, 146–147).

5. MacDonald (1993, 60).

6. Medicine Crow (2003, 120–121). Joseph Medicine Crow became an historian, educator, author, and tribal leader; among other honors, he was awarded the US Presidential Medal of Freedom in 2009.

7. Prairie Indians, Gaffen (1985, 70); Navajo and Zuni, Adair and Vogt (1949); Ojibwe, shortage of men, Ritzenthaler (1943).

8. Examples in Adair and Vogt (1949), Carroll (2008, 118–122), Echohawk (2018), J. Franco (1999, 119), Gaffen (1985, 47), Holiday and McPherson (2013, esp. pp. 76–95), Meadows (1999, 2002), Sheffield and Riseman (2019, 130), Townsend (2000, 141). Holm (1996, 166–167) describes Native American soldiers in Vietnam continuing traditions valued by warriors.

9. Pyle, Townsend (2000, 137–138); Kelwood, Price et al. (2013, 202).

10. Medicine Crow (2003, 103–106).

11. Nez (2011, 10–11, 16). Navajos were particularly affected by cultural rules against dealing with the dead. US Marine Paul Blatchford's war experiences inured him to the fear; after the war, he took on the task of handling burials at home (Gilbert 2008, 58).

12. Medicine Crow (2003, 105); Nez (2011, 186–187). Similarly, families of Māori Battalion Company C soldiers dried local specialties such as seaweed and fermented corn to send overseas (Awatere 2003).

13. Hilger (1971, 106), also Kojima (2014, 111) on Ainu prayers for soldiers.

14. Orochen, Brandišauskas (2017, 234); Māori, Awatere (2003), Gardiner (1992, 151).

15. Medicine Crow (2003, 119–123); Echohawk (2018, 214-215), Stabler (2005, 125); Zuni, Adair and Vogt (1949, 549–550). Sheffield and Riseman (2019, 237–270) discuss homecoming for Indigenous Native Americans, Canadians, Australians, and New Zealanders. Other rituals dealt with those who did not come home. Private First Class Clarence Spotted Wolf (Standing Rock Sioux), who died near Luxembourg in December 1944, left a detailed request for his burial ceremony, commemorated in a well-known painting by Potawatomi artist Woody Crumbo, "Spotted Wolf's Last Request," showing the young warrior, holding aloft a US flag, ascending from a flag-draped traditional burial scaffold (Perry 2009, 131–132).

16. Nez (2011, 142, 223–224, "war had climbed," p. 215). Townsend (2000, 141) comments that whites took items from battlefields as souvenirs; Indians needed them for cleansing rites (see chapter 7). Navajo veteran Samuel Holiday addressed recurring problems in the years after the war, eventually undergoing three Enemy Way ceremonies (Holiday and McPherson 2013, 181–207).

17. Carroll (2008, 118–122). Holm (1996, 192–193) discusses how ceremonies helped some Native American Vietnam veterans return to civilian life in the 1960s and 1970s.

18. Revivals of warrior societies and ceremonies, Carroll (2008, 129–130), Holm (1981, 75), Howard (1951), Meadows (1999), Nash (1985, 136–140). Howard (1951) describes a 1947 Dakota victory dance that honored veterans of former wars as well; it included a naming ceremony for a Women's Army Corps veteran.

19. Powwow revival, Meadows (1999, 341–343). War songs recall events such as D-Day or the Bataan Death March, recognize war mothers, honor the US military, praise veterans, and lament their hardships and sacrifice; examples in Carroll (2008, 11–13, 123–129) and Meadows (1999).

20. Barsh (1991), Sheffield (2004), Zissu (1995).

21. Stereotypes, Townsend (2000, 135); "Dan Waupoose," Bernstein (1991, 45).

22. One Skunk, Stabler (2005, 77–78); Mauldin, DePastino (2008).

23. Sheffield (2004) documents the shift, arguing that the changed imagery and awareness of Indigenous military service allowed public support for postwar reform to First Nations policy.

24. Carroll (2008, 115).

25. J. Franco (1999, 120–148). On Collier and BIA publicity, Hauptman (1986a, 7–9) and Rosier (2009, 72–73, 84–93). Nazis also used Native Americans for propaganda, either to disparage US racism or in an unsuccessful effort to attract Native American support (J. Franco 1999, 1–39; Rosier 2009, 73–77; Townsend 2000, 31–60).

26. Swastika, Townsend (2000, 127); publicity photo of Hopi, Apache, Navajo, and Papago representatives signing the ban, Bernstein (1991, 20). ATG poster, Gruening (1969, 6); the poster was created by Swedish-American artist and ATG officer Magnus C. "Rusty" Heurlin.

27. J. Franco (1999, 120–148), e.g., for Iroquois, Hauptman (1986a, 6–9).

28. Australian knitters, Harman (2015, 239); Ainu women, Kojima (2014, 111).

29. Coughlin (2018).

30. Orange (2000), Soutar (2000), Winegard (2012, 265). Cody's (1956) official history and Gardiner (1992) detail the Māori Battalion's service from the time it was sent to England during the Battle for Britain to combat in Greece, Crete, Libya, Egypt, and Italy; see also https://28maoribattalion.org.nz/. Cook Island men and Samoans in New Zealand joined the Battalion and other New Zealand forces after their governments declined to form overseas units (Anderson 2016, 244; Bennett 2009a, 138). Biography of Lieutenant Ngarimu, https://teara.govt.nz/en/biographies/5n9/ngarimu-te-moananui-a-kiwa. Then-Captain Arapeta Awatere (2003, 157–173) recalls seeing him "double" during the battle, a sign of impending death.

31. McGibbon (2004, 187–191).

32. Gardiner (1992), Sheffield and Riseman (2019, 138–142). Use of *haka* on Crete, Sheffield and Riseman (2019, 129), citing Māori historian Monty Soutar's (2008, 148–149) history of the Battalion's C Company; also Awatere (2003) on *haka* as entertainment, morale-building, and fitness for Māori and Pakeha troops. Gardiner (2007, 74–88) reviews the history of *haka* in the New Zealand military and in the Second World War VC award events.

33. Bennett (2009a, 134–138), Great Britain Colonial Office (1946, 37–41), Lal (1992, 108–135), Ravuvu (1974, 5–17, chiefs' request, p. 19). The first Fijian fighter pilot (a nephew of Ratu Sukuna) Sergeant Isikeli Doviverata Komaisavai, trained in Canada, served in the RAF, and died of illness in England in 1944; https://michaeljfield.tumblr.com/post/128309292098/fijis-forgotten-wartime-fighter-pilot-michael.

34. Firth (1997a, 300–304); Ravuvu (1974, pp. 30–42 on Solomons, pp. 43–56 on Bougainville); Ready (1985, 69–71, 186–196); numbers, Lal (1992, 117). Corporal Sukanaivalu https://www.cwgc.org/find-war-dead/casualty/2166745, Griffin, Nelson, and Firth (1979, 84–85), Ravuvu (1974, 43–56).

35. Bennett (2009a, 135), Great Britain Colonial Office (1946, 53–61), Hixon (2000, 128).

36. Munholland (2005, 61–83), Firth (1997a, 301).

37. Siddle (1996, 144–145). Figal (2001, 62) describes the monument's inscription, "provided in 1966 by Teshi Yoshiji, an Ainu veteran of the 24th Regiment." Perhaps this is the man Yoshimi (2015, 128–129) names as Teshi Toyiji, sent to Okinawa in August 1945, where he rescued orphans, convinced a group of nurses not to commit suicide, and returned the dead to their homes—"memorable deeds" that showed a sense of connection between his own Ainu culture and Okinawans.

38. Huang (2001) outlines the Takasago program. Yoshimi (2015, 146) tells the story of a Taiyal man, Awi (Matsuoka Tsuneo) who at eighteen joined a Takasago unit in 1943 as a naval civilian worker. He worked in the Philippines and Rabaul before being reassigned to the army on Bougainville, where Taiwanese Aborigines were put into the front line. Anthropologist Futuru C. L. Tsai gathered accounts of Amis who worked in Palau, New Guinea, and the Philippines, and has produced two films about their New Guinea links (2011, 2017). See Poyer and Tsai (2018) for additional sources on Takasago oral histories.

39. Higuchi (1991), Nero (1989), Peattie (1988, 301–302), Poyer, Falgout, and Carucci (2001, 68–72).

40. Tellei (1991). Palauans were among the most loyal Japanese subjects in Micronesia (Koror was the Mandate capital). Scores of men volunteered, and the names of nineteen who died were inscribed on Koror's Shinto shrine (Murray 2016, 112–114). Falgout, Poyer, and Carucci (2008, 110–117) includes songs from Palau and Pohnpei commemorating the work groups.

41. Camacho (2008; 2011, 136–145; 2019), Rogers (2011, 160). In postwar US war crimes trials on Guam, accused Rota and Saipan Chamorros who had worked for the Japanese were determined to have no nationality; nine who were found guilty were sentenced as civilians, not as POWs (Camacho 2019, 89-115).

42. Yoshima (2015, 132–133). Camacho (2008, 2011) presents other personal histories of Chamorro interpreters and police assistants during the war and on Guam; also Camacho (2019) on Guam war crimes trials involving them.

43. Evjen and Lehtola (2020, 41 n. 29).

Chapter 5

1. CBI diversity, Dunlop (1979, 316). Among the two thousand Allied troops who died on Bougainville were fifty-four Papua and New Guinea soldiers and forty-two Fijians, Nelson (2005, 189–190, 194–195).

2. Ericsson (2015a, 150–151), Evjen and Lehtola (2020), Lehtola (2015, 129), Seitsonen, Herva, and Koponen (2019), https://www.laits.utexas.edu/sami/dieda/hist/wwii.htm. Evjen and Lehtola (2020, 37) give the example of a Sámi family split by allegiance, the father joining the Norwegian Nazi party and two sons fleeing to Sweden to join the Norwegian police troops that re-entered Norway at the end of the war.

3. German views, "people of nature," Evjen and Lehtola (2020, 26), also Lehtola (2019, 40); Finland, Lehtola (2019, 35–42), Nyyssōnen (2007), Vorren and Manker (1962, 153–157). Seitsonen (2021) and Seitsonen and Koskenen-Koivisto (2018) describe the largely

positive relations between civilians, including Sámi, and German soldiers. Evjen and Lehtola (2020) compare Sámi life under German occupation in Norway and Finland.

4. Japanese attitudes, Saito (1991); Somare and Shibata, in Shaw (1991). Stone (1994, esp. pp. 147–162) describes life in Rabaul and East New Britain under Japanese rule. Interactions with POWs and Asian workers, Griffin, Nelson, and Firth (1979, 96), Khan (2015, 295). Kahn (2015, 295). Both Japanese and Allied attitudes are discussed in Bennett and Poyer (n.d.).

5. J. McCarthy (1963, 214–215).

6. Change from "Sir" and "Master," Kwai (2017, 79). Australians and Americans used racial slurs from their home countries, but also used casual terms, such as the American "Joes" or "good Joes" (Inglis 1969, 515; Lindstrom 1989, 410; Mead 1956, 170; Zeleneitz 1991, 6-9).

7. Hogbin (1951, 276–289). The depth of the white habit of segregation in the years leading up to war is seen in the Australian administration's plans for Rabaul, that in case of bombardment Europeans, Asians, and New Guinea servants were to take shelter in separate gullies (Nelson 1978b, 179).

8. Powell (2003, 200–202); the booklet was written by anthropologist F. E. Williams.

9. Griffin, Nelson, and Firth (1979, 89–91), Hogbin (1951, 287), Nelson (2006b). Peter Pinney's three volume "narrative memoir" of Australian soldiers on Bougainville (1988, 1990, 1992) based on his wartime diary, gives an intimate and unsparing account of their interaction with and ideas about Islanders: as scouts, guides, porters, comrades (in the PIB), refugees, sex objects, and victims of the Japanese occupation forces and of British colonialism. New Zealand soldiers shared the Australians' relatively sympathetic outlook to Islanders, e.g., on Fiji (Ravuvu 1974, 24) and on Vella Lavella in the Solomon Islands (Newell 2016, 190–193).

10. Read (1947, "The English . . ." p. 108); Simogun, in J. McCarthy (1963, 215). Sir Pita was awarded a British Empire Medal (BEM) for his wartime service as a coast-watcher and guerrilla leader.

11. Population figures and impact on Australians, Griffin, Nelson, and Firth (1979, 85), also J. McCarthy (1963, 214–215).

12. The poem was written in October 1942 by Bert Beros of the Royal Australian Engineers. The George Silk photo, taken in 1942 near Buna, is often reproduced as a symbol of comradeship. On the "fuzzy wuzzy angel" trope and its impact in Australia, Griffin, Nelson, and Firth (1979, 88–91), Inglis (1969), Nelson (1978b), Newton (1996), Powell (2003, 240), Reed (1999), Rogerson (2012).

13. Stella (2007, "belittling," pp. 110–111). Stella also notes how war literature acknowledged the physicality of New Guinea bodies, for example, Hungerford's 1952 novel *The Ridge and the River* "eroticized the native male carriers" (p. 148)—a new, challenging image of Island men. Hungerford's novel of an Australian Army unit on Bougainville (where he served) is a vivid account of soldiers' daily life, with guides and carriers very much a part of the story.

14. US troops in Indigenous areas, Coates and Morrison (1991, 206–215). African Americans, largely in engineer and support units, had a particular impact, with major roles in building roads, airstrips, and bases, not only in the Pacific Islands, but also, e.g.,

the Al-Can Highway in North America and Burma's Ledo Road (Booker 2008, 76–83; see chapter 10).

15. Lindstrom and White (1990) explores a range of Islander-serviceman interactions through wartime photographs. Efate, Lindstrom (1991, 49; 2015, 162–166).

16. Kwai (2017, 76).

17. See "sumptuary codes," Lindstrom (1991, 53). Isaac Gafu pointed out that the laborers' distinctive clothing made it easy for Americans to identify them, since African Americans wore US uniforms (Gegeo and Watson-Gegeo 1989, 209). It also signaled their civilian identity to attackers (Morriss 1996, 224 n. 14). There are reports of servicemen giving Islander men uniforms to "pass" as US troops and enter base facilities (Akin 2013, 142).

18. Fifi'i (1991, 42).

19. Akin (2013, 135–144, "dire threat," p. 141), Gegeo and Watson-Gegeo (1989, 364–366), G. White et al. (1988). One reason "Yankees" could afford to be generous, and careless of colonial rules of behavior, was that they had no long-term political responsibility in the region, a point made by Counts (1989, 203) in reference to US troops on New Britain.

20. Davenport (1989, 257–278).

21. Santa Cruz, Davenport (1989, 273); another example from Tanna, Lindstrom (1989). Vanatinai, Lepowsky (1989). On "cargo cults" inspired by war, Firth (1997a, 316–319); Guadalcanal tales, G. White et al. (1988, 213).

22. Zeleneitz (1991, "For the GI," p. 11, racial aspect of Pacific War, pp. 12–15), see also Dixon (2018, 1–20), Dower (1986).

23. African Americans' global deployment shifted perspectives in many places. For an overview of African Americans in the Pacific War, see Dixon (2018); in the US Army in World War II, Booker (2008); at home and abroad during the war, Wynn (2010). Desegregation orders for the US military came in 1948; integration was not completed until 1954 (R. James 2013). On African Americans' views of Pacific Islanders, Brawley and Dixon (2012, 125–142) and Dixon (2018, 76–77, 208–210).

24. Cook Islands, Anderson (2016); Efate, Lindstrom (2015, 162–166); other Southwest Pacific examples are the 93d Infantry Division (Jefferson 2008) and the 96th Engineers (Colored) (Samuelson 1995).

25. E.g., in New Hebrides, Lindstrom (1991, 52); Solomon Islands, Akin (2013, 128–140), Gegeo and Watson-Gegeo (1989), Kwai (2017, 80-81).

26. The social and political impact of sharing meals and goods is examined for several Island groups in White and Lindstrom (1989).

27. Lindstrom (1989, 412).

28. Robinson (1981, "feared the effects," p. 173). That interaction with African Americans increased political awareness is confirmed for many island areas (for example, Counts 1989; Hogbin 1951, 288; Nelson 1980a, 258–259; Zelenietz and Saito 1989). PIR soldiers objecting to discriminatory treatment and uniforms compared themselves to African Americans (Nelson 1980b, 212). Banivanua Mar (2016, 126–133) considers the impact of war, including interaction with foreign troops, in Pacific decolonization. Attitude change could flow in the other direction too: white American GI Bill McLauglin comments that his respect for Fiji Battalion field artillery spotters assigned to his unit on Bougainville made him reassess prejudice based on skin color (Cline 2002, 242).

29. This was true around the world, see Coates and Morrison (1991, 210–211).

30. Weeks (1987).

31. US troops in Australia, Barker and Jackson (1996), Potts and Potts (1985); African Americans, Brawley and Dixon (2002), Dixon (2018, 136–175). Saunders and Taylor (1993, 1995) explain how US military and Australian civilian authorities sought to segregate and police African Americans. John Killens's 1968 novel *And Then We Heard the Thunder* portrays African American GI experiences in Australia.

32. Brawley and Dixon (2002), Hall (1995, 121–125), Saunders and Taylor (1995, 344–346), Sheffield and Riseman (2019, 185–187). The chef at the Townsville military club for African American soldiers "recruited three Aborigines whose 'very pretty faces and very charming manners', the director recalls, did wonders for morale" (Potts and Potts 1985, 110). Potts and Potts (1985, 368–370) describe efforts to restrict movement of Aboriginal Australian women living on Queensland reserves and to limit servicemen's access to them.

33. Hall (1995, 125).

34. Brawley and Dixon (2002, 630), Dixon (2018, 160–174), Hall (1995, 52–54; 1997, 75–77), Potts and Potts (1985, 404), Shoemaker (2004, 33). Walker and Walker (1986, 19–31) describe interaction of white NAOU recruits (see chapter 6) with African American truck drivers, whose speed and skill greatly impressed them.

35. Gardiner (1992, 135–136), Sheffield and Riseman (2019, 162–200), Wanhalla and Stevens (2016, 202–227), Zimmerman (1946). Fremantle, Barker and Jackson (1996, 215–218); "were not about to," Petty (2008, 12).

36. Some examples in different theaters: Chou (2008), Ericsson (2015b), L. Grant (2014, 90–111), Roberts (2013). See Bennett and Wanhalla (2016b, 11–17) on how "archival power" renders Pacific Island women hard to see during the war—they are seldom mentioned in military archives, and secrecy and censorship surrounded sexual fraternization.

37. Recent treatments of military brothels, Hata (2018), Norma (2016); Y. Tanaka (2018, 87–121) on rape and prostitution during and after the war.

38. Micronesian military brothels, Hicks (1994).

39. Locations of brothels, Hata (2018). Examples of Indigenous women forced into sex work, Chou (2008), Hastings (2011, 417), Hata (2018, 152, 261). On East Timor, Cleary (2010, 113). On Rabaul brothels, Hicks (1994, 120), Nelson (2008), Stone (1994). Noriko Sekiguchi's 1989 film *Senso Daughters* interviews PNG women who describe sexual exploitation by Japanese soldiers. Guam, Camacho (2011, 44, 145–156), Rogers (2011, 160).

40. *The First Strange Place* is the title of Bailey and Farber's 1992 study of race and sex in wartime Hawai'i.

41. Bailey and Farber (1992, 101). Hawai'i came under US martial law from Pearl Harbor until late 1944 (Scheiber and Scheiber 2016, prostitution law, pp. 73–75).

42. New Zealand, Bennett, Leckie and Wanhalla (2015, 219); New Caledonia, Creely (2016, 89–90), Dixon (2018, 121–122), Henningham (1994, 26–27), Munholland (2005, 142–172); Australia, Saunders and Taylor (1993).

43. E.g., Hogbin (1951, 8 n. 1), Nelson (2008), Shaw (1991, 229), but see Richmond (2003, 39–42). Riseman (2010a, 173) on attitudes to sex and rape by Allied servicemen in PNG; Yoshimi (2000, 30, 78–80) on rape by Japanese personnel in Southeast Asia and the islands; Stone (1994, 123-146) on sexual interaction around Rabaul with both Japanese and Australian soldiers; Camacho (2011, 44, 145–156) on rape, voluntary relationships, and prostitution on Japanese-occupied Guam. Aboriginal Taiwanese women were victimized by Japanese stationed in Hualian (Chou 2008). Branche and Virgili (2012) reviews scholarship on rape during wars; Enloe (2014, 134–176) on women's interaction with military bases worldwide, including sexual activity.

44. African Americans in New Caledonia and New Guinea, Creely (2016, 89–90), Dixon (2018, 126–128); PIR men, Nelson (1980b), Sinclair (1990, 207); "It was impossible," Saville (1974, 146). Nelson (1980b, 208) says the response of PIR officers to charges of rape by the soldiers was "restraint bordering on indifference."

45. Military-civilian relations in Japanese Micronesia, Poyer, Falgout and Carucci (2001, 215–220); Tamotsu Ogawa, in Cook and Cook (1992, 280); Bougainville, Richmond (2003, 261); Borneo, Harrisson (1959, 297).

46. Rosner, Lintner (1997, 99); Clay, Lapham and Norlin (1996, 101–102).

47. Bennett and Wanhalla (2016b), Dixon (2018, 95–135).

48. American media images of the "sexualized South Seas" are described in Brawley and Dixon (2012). *South Pacific* was based on US Navy veteran James Michener's *Tales of the South Pacific* (1947), inspired by his wartime experiences.

49. On Americans' sexualized Pacific stereotypes, Bennett (2009a, 30-40), Brawley and Dixon (2012), Dixon (2018). In New Guinea, Samuelson (1995, e.g., p. 116). Prewar Japanese culture had also built a romantic and sexualized image of the Pacific world that embodied imperial expansionist desires (Dvorak 2018, 61–91).

50. Saville (1974, 144–146).

51. Bennett and Wanhalla (2016b, "Love," p. 23, "tsunami," p. 27); chapters in this volume discuss social and romantic interactions in various Pacific Islands. Mageo (2001) considers Samoan women's romances with US servicemen as an era of change for their sexuality. The level of interaction across the Pacific region varied greatly. In contrast to some areas, opportunities for Solomon Islands women to socialize with Americans were limited, despite the presence of more than 124,000 US personnel stationed there (Bennett 2016d).

52. Bennett and Wanhalla (2016b, 18–22), Bennett, Leckie and Wanhalla (2015), Sheffield and Riseman (2019, 185–187). Bennett and Wanhalla (2016a,b) discuss children of these unions who remained in the Pacific Islands. Indigenous North American servicemen were able to bring home white or Japanese brides, as some Canadian Métis men did from Great Britain (Sheffield and Riseman 2019, 186).

53. Bennett (2009b), Dvorak (2018, 151), Poyer, Falgout, and Carucci (2001, 300–301). Among Micronesian families split by war was that of Tosiwo Nakayama, later the first president of the independent Federated States of Micronesia. Nakayama's Japanese father worked for a trading firm; US repatriation forced him to leave his Chuukese wife

and their children. Nakayama's youthful experiences of the war-caused regime change shaped his view on the importance of Micronesian political autonomy (Hanlon 2014).

54. Ravuvu (1974, 57).

Chapter 6

1. Morris-Suzuki (1994, 1998a,b) makes this argument for the way Ainu policy has shaped national identity, defining Japan's core as "modern" and the periphery as backward. Scott (2009, 324–337) makes a similar case for lowland–highland relations in Southeast Asia. See also Fiskesjō (2006, esp. pp. 29–31) on how post-revolutionary China constructed itself as a "civilizing" central state, assigning ethnic minorities the role of "primitive" or "barbarian" contrast.

2. Morris-Suzuki (1998b; 2014, "they were simultaneously," p. 56).

3. Imperial tourism, Ruoff (2010, "primitive life," p. 8). Ching (2001) analyzes the civilized/savage dichotomy applied to Taiwan; pacifying "savagery" p. 160; also Eskildsen (2002, 2019). Tierney (2010) explores savage imagery in "the trope of the headhunter," which continued to shape policy even in Taiwan's postwar Kuomintang government.

4. E.g., Braund (1972, 214–215), Kelly (2003, 29–30), Evans and Brett-James (1962, 43), Sacquety (2013, 102). Pau (2017) reviews the history of firearms in the Chin Hills.

5. See "up in the country," Fellowes-Gordon (1957, 11); "gazed at it in amazement," Swinson (1967, 79); New Britain, Tamotsu Ogawa in Cook and Cook (1992, 280).

6. Ogburn (1956, 103–104), Griffiths-Marsh (1990, 336).

7. Farish (2013) shows this connection explicitly for Alaska, as does Zeleneitz (1991) for Melanesia. Europe's far north has also been envisioned as wild, unpopulated, and mysterious (Seitsonen, Herva, and Koponen, 2019), as has the North African desert, where Bimberg (2002) describes Toubou (Tibbou, Teda) and Tuareg guides and combatants with Free French irregulars and the British Long Range Desert Group.

8. Bennett (2009a, 11–27, 49–71), Bergerud (1996, 55–118), Stella (2007, 85–88), Zeleneitz (1991). Those with eyes to see recalled a different landscape: despite challenging terrain, Chindit commander Fergusson (1951, 218) described a section of Kachin land as "without doubt the most beautiful country one had ever seen" and a serviceman who became an artist recognized the beauty of the Southwest Pacific islands (Bergerud 1996, 87–88).

9. Barkawi (2017, 131–146), Moreman (2005).

10. Areas marked "unsurveyed," Fergusson (2015 ([1946], 40); Scott (2009, 40–63); on challenges to movement, e.g., Evans and Brett-James (1962, 46–47).

11. Mutaguchi and chief of staff, Swinson (1968, 120–121); "In increasing," Tamayama and Nunneley (2000, 200).

12. Bergerud's first chapter, tellingly titled "The War Against the Land" (1996, 55–118) details conditions; Bennett (2009a, 49–71) on environment and disease; see also

Zeleneitz (1991, esp. pp. 3–5). As Zeleneitz points out, negativity about the Southwest Pacific landscape shaped views about the people who lived there: "As the land was alien, primitive, and unknown, so too were its people" (1991, 5).

13. Masatsugu Ogawa, "All battlefields," in Cook and Cook (1992, 276).

14. This argument is made by military historian Kaushik Roy (2018).

15. Speaking of Solomon Islanders, Zeleneitz (1991) concludes that Americans did not "see" these civilians in a cultural sense; also Lindstrom (2001) on images of Islanders revealed through wartime photographs. Historian Hiromitsu Iwamoto (2006a) notes a similar absence of New Guineans in Japanese war memoirs. Seitsonen, Herva, and Koponen (2019) discuss the absence of residents in some German representations of Finnish Lapland.

16. See "weaponizing," Riseman (2012a, 26; also pp. 224–225).

17. Sheffield and Riseman (2019, 133–161) on the history of "mobilizing Indigeneity."

18. Kelly (2003, 137).

19. Commanders unfamiliar with the territory were often oblivious. Bimberg (2002, 32) gives an example from North Africa in which Toubou guides diverted a Free French column from the area where their friends and relatives lived.

20. Nivkh and Uilta, Morris-Suzuki (1996), Yoshimi (2015, 129–132); Greenland, Schuurman (1976, 37–54); "But better," Marston (1969, 42–43); Solomon Islanders, Gegeo (1988, 11).

21. San, Hitchcock et al. (2017, 21); Greenland, Balchen, Ford, and La Farge (1944); "struck bargains" in Sahara, La Farge (1949, 200); Australia, Hall (1995, 40–41, 59 n. 68); Yanyuwa, Sheffield and Riseman (2019, 158–160).

22. Nyishi, Underbrink (2010, 159–171, 189–246); Beliem Valley, Zuckoff (2011).

23. Horton (1970), Kwai (2017, 26–29), Newell (2016), G. White et al. (1988, 152).

24. Newell (2016, 11–17, "They appeared," p. 11).

25. Horton (1970, 202–206), Kwai (2017, 26–29), Newell (2016, 204–207); the men's own account is Gasa and Kumana (1988, 85–95). Kennedy kept the coconut husk on which he wrote his SOS on his desk in the Oval Office; it is now in the Presidential Library and Museum in Boston (Kwai 2017, 28 n. 8).

26. La Farge (1949, 201–205), Peers and Brelis (1963, 25–132). Underbrink (2010) and Diebold (2012) recount rescue stories, many including help from local people across the region.

27. Underbrink (2010, 48, 74).

28. See "getting rich," Smith and Clark (1945, 65–66). Examples of use of salvage and rescue income, Nicholls (1970, 94), Underbrink (2010, 131–140, 170, 216).

29. "Burmese jungle," Schroth (1995, 218); Sevareid (1995 [1946]). Retellings of Sevareid's story are in Schroth (1995, 211–220), Lyman (2016), and Webster (2003, 131–142), which all employ "primitive" stereotyping, though recent accounts include more information about Nagas.

30. Sevareid (1995 [1946], "So these were," p. 269).

31. Kikon (2009, 94–95); see also Lintner (2015, 71).

32. Chin, Evans (1964, 227); Kachin, J. Thompson (2009, 198), Tongans and other fishermen, Bennett (2009a, 91–96). Dunlop (1979, 215) describes OSS agents learning from Kachin how to climb steep hills without becoming exhausted. In the Solomon Islands, W. M. Chapman ran a crew of white Americans who knew nothing about coral reef fishing, and Melanesians "who, fortunately for the success of the venture, knew all there was to know about such activities, but who, by an accident of birth, were regarded by the authorities as ignorant savages" (W. Chapman 1950, 6).

33. Firewood, Gegeo (1988,11); Australians in New Britain, "The men were," McCarthy (1963, 202).

34. Kachin "sheer wizardry," Braund (1972, 150); fixing plane, Heimann (2007, 240); spears and blowpipes, Harrisson (1959, 265–266); eight rifles, Heimann (2007, 212); *barabaras,* Handleman (1943).

35. E.g., Bennett (2009a, 137), Bergerud (1996, 113), Miller (1959, 269), Ramsey and Rivele (1990).

36. Punans, Powell (1996, 299); Guadalcanal, Clemens (1998). Yamamoto statement by Major Masami Suzuki is cited in Huang (2001, 226, from Choshyu Kadowaki, ed. [1994], *The Takasago-Giyutai of Taiwan: The Spirit Never Dies (Taiwantakasago-Giyutai: Sonokokoroniwa Imamonao),* Tokyo: Akebonokai,).

37. See "seemed supernatural," Hilsman (1990, 124); "masters of junglecraft," Sacquety (2013, 7).

38. Braund (1972, 260).

39. New Guinea, Kituai (1998, 191); Fijian commandos, Newell (2016), Ravuvu (1974, 27, 30–42).

40. Sámi expertise, Lehtola (2019, 29–34), Nickul (1950, 53); Germans, https:/www.laits.utexas.edu/sami/dieda/hist/wwii.htm; Norway, Vorren and Manker (1962, 152–153, "of all the fighting men," p. 152).

41. Skills, Sergeyev (1956, 509); Khanty, Balzer (1999, 128–130); Yakuts "were said to be," Bobrick (1992, 455).

42. Kituai (1998, 201).

43. Marston (1969, 187–208).

44. Bayly and Harper (2005, 386).

45. Keithie Saunders (2013, 286). Bennett, who was awarded a Military Medal, later became a founder and officer of Solomon Islands Broadcasting Corporation (Gegeo 1988, 11; http://www.solomonencyclopaedia.net/biogs/E000387b.htm).

46. Gaffen (1985, 68), Lackenbauer (2007, 2013); see also chapter 14.

47. ATG, Marston (1969), Sheffield and Riseman (2019, 153–158). Alaska Scouts, Cohen (1981, 95–97), B. Garfield (1995, 169–170), Marston (1969), Sheffield and Riseman (2019, 153–158). Colonel Lawrence V. Castner led the unit; his father, Joseph C. Castner, had formed the Philippine Scouts forty years before, showing continuity in use of Indigenous skills in imperial wars. On the military situation in the Aleutians and Alaska, B. Garfield (1995), Hays (2004).

48. John Schaeffer, Zellen (2009, 131–135); politics and postwar Scouts, Hendricks (1985), Marston (1969, 131–140, 209–218), Zellen (2009, 125–180). The large US Army

presence in Alaska forced desegregation and other changes despite the racism of some officers and men: Governor Gruening (1969, 7) appealed successfully to President Roosevelt to protest the exclusion of "Native" girls from Alaska's USOs, and Nome's movie theater was integrated when a mixed-race woman named Alberta Skenk, on a date with a white soldier, broke the ban on separate "Eskimo" and "white" seating. (The local GIs later helped elect her Queen of Nome.) (Marston 1969, 131–138)

49. In 1936, the Northern Territory held about 16,800 Aboriginal Australians and 3,800 Europeans (Powell 1988, 10).

50. Hall (1995, 35–45; 1997, 85–112), Powell (1988, 251–252; 1996, 187–188), Riseman (2012a), Kay Saunders (1995); medals and back pay, Riseman (2010b, 181). Thomson and Mulvaney (1992) is Thomson's official report. Powell (1988) is a comprehensive history of the war years in northern Australia.

51. Riseman (2008, 2010b, 2012a).

52. NAOU, Walker and Walker (1986, Harrison and Kearney quotes, p. 138), also Powell (1988, 104–108); NORFORCE, Riseman and Trembath (2016, 149–156).

53. Examined in Moreman (2005). The British Indian Army had expertise in "hill warfare" or "frontier warfare" based on nearly a century of fighting tribes on India's north and east; their non-mechanized, off-road expertise proved useful in the wider war (Moreman 1998, 179–183). Brigadier A. Felix Williams, who set up V Force on the India-Burma border, had spent fifteen years on the North-West Frontier (Keane 2010, 46–50). Historian Jeremy Black (2004) discusses the need for imperial armies to re-learn lessons about tribal and colonial wars.

54. Oatts (1962, 39).

55. Teaching US troops, Peers and Brelis (1963, 146); Kachin traps, Webster (2003, 50–51); "simply ideal," Sacquety (2013, 8). Farnan (2019) assesses the Kachin role in OSS and SOE operations.

56. OSS camps, Sacquety (2013, 147–138); Nazira, Romanus and Sutherland (1956, 37).

57. Teaching Chinese soldiers, Romanus and Sutherland (1953, 348); Naga headman's dinner, Hilsman (1990, 143); Bower and scouts, Bower (1950, 237; Namkia was awarded a BEM in 1945), J. Thompson (2009, 301); Fiji Commandos, Ravuvu (1974, 24–25).

58. Hargreaves (2013) on the role of British and US World War II guerrilla units in the development of special forces; K. James (2016) for Australia. Accounts of US officers who organized guerrillas in the Philippines and later played roles in US Army and CIA special operations in Korea, Vietnam, and the Cold War include Guardia (2010, 2011), Holmes (2015), Lapham and Norling (1996). Despite helping "invent" modern guerrilla warfare, these men did not necessarily agree on its later use. Hilsman (1990, 288) argued against US intervention in Vietnam—where, he says, lessons learned in Burma were not applied. Sacquety (2013, 223–224) discusses how OSS's World War II experience did and did not transfer to postwar military and intelligence operations.

59. North Africa, SAS origins, Grob-Fitzgibbon (2011, 141–145), Jackson (2011, 71), Moreman (1998, 185–186); on Wingate, Bierman and Smith (1999), Webster (2003).

60. World War I, Barsh (1991), Meadows (2002, 27–34), D. Price (2008, 288), Townsend (2000, 143–150). Between the wars, German agents tried to learn about Native American languages (J. Franco 1999, 64; Meadows 2002, 65; D. Price 2008, 288 n. 25).

61. Cree at Normandy, Gaffen (1985, 47); Moroccans, Bimberg (1999, 125 n. 5); Māori, Awatere (2003, 5–6); New Guinea, Powell (2003, 128); Solomons, Feldt (1946, 23, 115).

62. Meadows (2002, 2009), Sheffield and Riseman (2019, 142–148), Townsend (2000, 143–150); Echohawk (2018) contains examples of battlefield use. The codetalker story of patriotism and intercultural harmony has an "underside" of exploitation of Indigenous culture (Riseman 2012a, 171).

63. Riseman (2012a, 176–186); on training, Nez (2011, 101–115). Holiday and McPherson (2013) offer insight into how Navajo used cultural beliefs and myths to understand the war and their role as codetalkers.

64. Townsend (2000, 143–150).

65. Nez (2011, 166, 199–200); Kieyoomia, Gilbert (2008, 47–48). Personal recollections also in Gilbert (2008), Holiday and McPherson (2013), Paul (1973), Rogers and Bartlit (2005), Tohe (2012); see N. Price et al. (2013, 244 n. 10) for online sources of veterans' accounts.

66. N. Price et al. (2013, 244 n. 10).

67. Declassification, Riseman (2012a, 207–213); GI Joe, Carroll (2008, 122), Rogers and Bartlit (2005, 135), and http://www.toymania.com/news/messages/324.shtml; publicity, Sheffield and Riseman (2019, 145–148).

Chapter 7

1. Barkawi (2017), Enloe (1980), Streets (2004). The "martial races" idea undergirded British and French ethnic units such as Gurkhas, King's African Rifles, and Tirailleurs Sénégelais. See Schaffer (2013) on how racial ideas have shaped the development of modern militaries worldwide. Bargh and Whanau (2017) explore how the concept affects Māori (and others) employed in the current private military industry.

2. The British idea of Orang Asli as peaceful slowed the eventually successful formation of Indigenous units in the Malayan Emergency (see note 46 below). Inglis (1998, 444–451) discusses how Australia has begun to recognize Aboriginal Australians' defense of their homeland.

3. Chin badge with "crossed head-hunting swords," Oatts (1962, 198). New Zealand armed forces use of Māori cultural elements predates World War II but increased after it (McGibbon 2000, 303).

4. For example, the 45th Infantry Division's insignia changed from the swastika-like "hooked cross" to the Thunderbird (also a Southwestern Indian symbol) in 1939. The 45th's large Native American contingent displayed their culture in parades and ceremonies (Whitlock 1998, 26–27). The crest of Bill Mauldin's Oklahoma National Guard Unit, 180th Infantry (now Cavalry) displays a bonneted Native American profile head above triangle arrows, and its motto is in Choctaw (DePastino 2008, 60–61; Whitlock 1998, 20–21). Carroll (2008, 62–85) discusses Native American names and symbols in heraldry. Unlike sports mascots, which are for the most part offensive, most military uses are seen as honorable.

5. Carroll (2008, 79–81).

6. US, Townsend (2000, 130–137) and in World War I, Barsh (1991, 288–291); Canadians, Dempsey (1999, 83). Sheffield (2017a) discusses "Indigenous exceptionalism" in Canadian, US, Australian, and New Zealand militaries, and cautions that rejecting the "martial myth" should not prevent us from recognizing distinctive cultural attitudes toward warfare. Echohawk's memoir (2018) offers many examples of how Indian military history and culture served Native Americans on European battlefields.

7. Townsend (2000, 136).

8. Holm (1981, 71; 1996, 137–141, 151–156; 1997; 2007, 138–139; in World War II, 1996, 105). Living up to the image, Smith in Stabler (2005, 49).

9. Holm (1996, 150–151, "would be laughable" p. 152).

10. Norton (2001).

11. Sheffield and Riseman (2019, 135–137, McClung quotes p. 137). Like McClung, Australian Reg Saunders wanted to patrol "because I thought I had the better eyes and I had the better chance of getting away"; he attributed his sharper senses to his upbringing: "don't forget I am an Aborigine so I had good eyes and good senses" (Hall 1995, 78–79).

12. Townsend says most took the name as a compliment (2000, 138–140; also Rogers and Bartlit 2005, 130), but Carroll (2008, 5–11) says it is white imagination that construes "chief" as a compliment rather than an insult. White friends recall Ira Hayes as having a mixed response to the epithet (Hemingway 1988, 3, 42–43).

13. Nez (2011, 203), Medicine Crow (2003, 110), Stabler (2005, 96). Bernstein (1991, 172) notes, "Indians who served in the military grew accustomed to being called 'Chief' and being expected to don a Plains war bonnet regardless of their tribal culture."

14. Sevareid (1995, 279).

15. See "a great fighting stock," Romanus and Sutherland (1956, 36); Saunders, in H. Gordon (1962, 112); Hitler, Townsend (2000, 136). Native American servicemen in Australia found residents "fed on a diet of wild-west stories" fascinated by them (Potts and Potts 1985, 193). Persisting into later wars, Holman (1984 [1958]) several times refers to Orang Asli men (but never Malays) as "braves" in the Malayan Emergency.

16. Holm (1996, 129–168, "When I got," p. 129).

17. Carroll (2008, 200); also see Rosier (2009, 242–253, 276–282) on extending the metaphor.

18. Rosier (2009, 12–40). Richard Drinnon in *Facing West* (1997) traced US imperialism through the Indian Wars, the Philippine-American War, and Vietnam. Civilian policy was also linked: BIA director John Collier's 1930s reforms of US Indian policy were shaped in part by debates over British policy in Africa (Hauptman 1986b), and the Collier approach travelled to Guam and other Micronesian islands under US control after World War II (Townsend 2000, 194–214). Kramer (2006, esp. p. 214) says US Indian civil affairs policy was explicitly examined and rejected as a model in the Philippines—though "civilized"/"savage" distinctions (lowland Christians/highland tribes and Moros) proved useful as part of divide-and-conquer governance.

19. Rosier (2009, 99–108).

20. Sugimoto (2013, "became commensurable," p. 38); relationship between Japanese and Western imperialisms, Eskildsen (2019); Ainu policy modeled on US Indian policy, Medak-Saltzman (2010), Tsutsui (2015); Korea, Siddle (1996, 145).

21. "The native," Miller (1959, 23); pilot, Stone (1994, 156); "The terrain," Peers and Brelis (1963, 64), and the story is also in Dunlop (1979, 135); "Fujioka wrote," Yoshimi (2015, 196).

22. Atkinson (2007, 493), Carroll (2008, 119–120), Echohawk (2018, 165-167), Townsend (2000, 136–137).

23. Māori, Sheffield and Riseman (2019, 14); Kachin, Keane (2010, 401), Peers and Brelis (1963, 153–154), Webster (2003, 54–56). Chindit Brigadier Michael Calvert (1996, 195) mentions paying Kachins a rupee for each enemy right ear. Regular troops also took body parts as trophies (see chapter section titled "Trophy-Taking").

24. Scheck (2006, "hatred and fear," p. 19); see also Harrison (2012, 124–125).

25. Goumiers, Bimberg (1999, "looked like," p. xii, "perhaps the most," p. xiv), Maghraoui (2014, "paradoxical view," p. 576); rumors and discipline issues, Atkinson (2007, 529–530, 557–558), but note Maghraoui's critique of this image.

26. Harrison (2012, 28–29).

27. Oatts (1962, 146).

28. Harrison (2012, 123). Harrison's full analysis is valuable for this topic.

29. Slim (1956, 341–342).

30. Bergerud (1996, 412), from interview with Ore Marion, 1st Marine Division, USMC.

31. Oatts (1962, 107). The unease with which British officers viewed headhunting is evident in the darkly humorous tone of memoirs that mention it (e.g., Braund 1972, 212–213; Fergusson 2015 [1946], 32; Oatts 1962).

32. E.g., Harrison (2012), Hoskins (1996), Røkkum (2018). Japanese interest is described in Tierney (2010). Fiskesjö (2006, 2014) describes modern Chinese fascination with Wa headhunting past.

33. Paratroopers, Dunlop (1979, 131); Kohima, Chasie and Fecitt (2020, 215), Swinson (1967, 90, 101–102); OSS, Sacquety (2013, 234 n. 2).

34. Tokuhei Miura, "encountered," Yoshimi (2015, 173–174); Harrisson (1959, 241). At the Imphal-Kohima battles, Japanese troop were told Nagas were headhunters and cannibals to curb soldiers' wish to escape (Keane 2010, 326).

35. Heimann (2007,135–140, bringing heads to Harrisson, p. 246). Griffiths-Marsh (1990) describes numerous instances of how head-taking affected guerrilla operations in Borneo.

36. Blackburn, Harkins (1955, 277–278, 311); Ramsey, Ramsey and Rivele (1990, 314–315).

37. Zeleneitz (1991, 6).

38. Firth (1997a, 309–310). Y. Tanaka (2018, 123–148) discusses war crimes trials involving cannibalism by Japanese soldiers and mentions cannibalism by Papua and New Guinea soldiers, though these were not discussed at the trials. Cannibalism was also reported from starving Japanese garrisons in Micronesia (Poyer, Falgout, and Carucci 2001, 171, 174, 179; Poyer 2010).

39. Huang (2001), Tsai (2010). Tierney (2010, 158–160) discusses how this inversion is represented in postwar Japanese literature.

40. Harrison (2012, 129–140). An infamous photo in *Life* magazine May 22, 1944, of a young white woman writing a letter to thank her US Navy boyfriend for the gift of the cleaned skull at her elbow, drew complaints from Americans and castigation from Japan (Dower 2012, 40; Weingartner 1992). On skull trophies, Harrison (2006), Weingartner (1992).

41. Sledge (1981) describes trophy-taking at Peleliu, starting on the invasion beach. Price, Knecht, and Lindsay (2015) report souvenir hunting by US troops on Peleliu until 1947; in fact, it still continues by battlefield visitors. After the Battle of Tenaru on Guadalcanal, Martin Clemens (1998, 211) describes US Marine souvenir hunters interfering as he and scouts searched the field of seven to eight thousand Japanese dead for useful documents. On the concept of "dark souvenirs" more generally, see Cave and Buda (2018).

42. Sledge (1981, 120).

43. Carroll (2008, 120), Nez (2011, 223–224), Rogers and Bartlit (2005, 128–130), Townsend (2000, 141). Captured German uniforms and equipment, along with swastika flags, were used in a mock battle, counted coup on, and ridiculed at a 1947 Dakota victory dance (Howard 1951).

44. Dayaks, Grob-Fitzgibbon (2011, 112); photos, Bayly and Harper (2007, 455–456), Carruthers (1995, 110–116), Harrison (2012, 157–158). Communists were also accused of mutilating the dead and using body parts for identification.

45. Harrison (2012, 187–196).

46. Malayan conflict, Bayly and Harper (2007, 443–456, 474, 491–493); also on Orang Asli and Dayak roles and links with World War II, Grob-Fitzgibbon (2011), Holland (1985, 41–42, 103–112), Holman (1984), Leary (1995), Noone (1972), Shennan (2007), Stubbs (1989). In 1956, Richard Noone raised a small Orang Asli unit, Senoi Praaq. The British stereotyped Orang Asli as too timid and peace-loving to fight (Leary 1995, 140–159), but the Senoi Praaq operated effectively through 1960; their success, Noone comments, was "for reasons that should have been plain as a pikestaff" since they "were jungle people operating in their own terrain" (Noone 1972, 201). Williams-Hunt's 1952 *An Introduction to the Malayan Aborigines*, written to assist security forces, concludes with advice on how to interact with, interrogate, and employ Aborigines for guiding, labor, and to set booby traps. World War II veteran officers, e.g., Shennan (2007, 135–136).

47. Taiwan Aborigines, Tsai (2010); Indonesia, de Moor (1999, 66–67); Algeria, Gortzak (2009). Indigenous Central and South Americans have also been involved in and victims of regional conflicts.

48. Lee and Hurlich (1982), Stapleton (2015, 302–317).

49. This continues to be true today, for example, as Pygmy peoples of the Congo Basin have been enslaved, tortured, exploited, and killed by those fighting regional wars surrounding their homelands: https://www.culturalsurvival.org/publications/cultural-survival-quarterly/indigenous-peoples-and-violent-conflict-preconceptions

Chapter 8

1. Western Egypt, Behrendt (1985, 45); Australia, J. James (2010, 389–404), Powell (1988, 249, 262–265); Naga relocations, Chasie and Fecitt (2020, 71); Abel Recka, Kwai (2017, 82).

2. Scott (2009, 358 n. 85, 198–199). Scott (pp. 64–97) points out that the hill people of Southeast Asia have a long history of evading intruders.

3. Nasioi, "living in the bush," Ogan (1972, 76); Ceylon, Jackson (2006, 51–52); Philippines, e.g., Dowlen (2001), Yoshimi (2015, 189–194).

4. PNG numbers, Mair (1970, 201); PNG relocations, e.g., Bennett (2009a, 139–148), Kituai (1998, 168–171), Robinson (1981), Saville (1974, 168–178).

5. Hitchcock et al. (2017).

6. Torres Strait, Beckett (1987), Hall (1995, 135–153, 184–185; 1997, 32–59), Osborne (1997); abandoned workers, Nelson (1978b).

7. Lall (2000, "He being a tribal," p. 45).

8. Hunt (2014), Kent (2014, 59–63), Lehtola (2015; 2019, 45–78), Nickul (1950). Evjen and Lehtola (2020) on relations with German soldiers. Lehtola (2019) describes the evacuation in detail, with many personal accounts. Even apart from evacuation, German occupation altered Sámi mobility, as reindeer herders changed cross-border herding patterns (Sillanpää 1994, 55; Whitaker 1955, 26–27, 69).

9. Seitsonen and Koskinen-Koivisto (2018, 429).

10. Evacuation experiences are detailed in Lehtola (2015, 2019), see also Nickul (1950); on *birget* in wartime, Evjen and Lehtola (2020).

11. Lehtola (2021, "not out of pity," p. 50), Nickul (1950, 59). On Sámi Litto history, Nyyssōnen (2007).

12. Kohlhoff (1995) details these evacuations; also B. Garfield (1995), Madden (1992), R. Mason (2015), Oliver (1998), Sepez et al. (2007); interviews with evacuees on the US National Park Service site, https://www.nps.gov/aleu/learn/historyculture/unangax-aleut-experiences.htm.

13. Kohlhoff (1995, 88–134), Madden (1992).

14. Kohlhoff (1995, 136–164).

15. Golodoff (2015), Irish (2009, 255–256), Kohlhoff (1995, 87, 106–107, 131–134), Oliver (1998). Attu was used for a LORAN station 1961–2010, then abandoned.

16. Kohlhoff (1995, 169–187); public recognition of history, Sepez et al. (2007).

17. Peleliu people's experiences, Murray (2016).

18. Murray (2016, 100–117); also on Palauans' war experiences, Aoyagi (2002), Nero (1989).

19. Donnison (1956, 10–12); "salt," Kelly (2003, 144).

20. Kachin conditions, Fellowes-Gordon (1957, 38); Detachment 101, Sacquety (2013, 56, 173–178, 265 n. 14).

21. Bennett (2009a, 115–132). Regnault and Kurtovich (2002) comment that French Pacific territories supported the Free French less from ideology than from Allies' better access to supplies and trade outlets.

22. Punan, Harrisson (1959, 266); coastwatchers, Feldt (1946, 71, 75); opium, Hilsman (1990, 165–166); shells, Hall (1997, 32–59).

23. Micronesia, Poyer, Falgout, and Carucci (2001, 187–190); Sulawesi, Aragon (2002); Santa Isabel, Zaku et al. (1988, 167–168).

24. Parachutes, Braund (1972, 220–221), Hilsman (1990, 165), Peers and Brelis (1963, 212–213); Oreno Kikon, Kikon (2009, 89–91).

25. IJA policy, Richmond (2003, 162–220); New Guinea 1942, Williams (2012, 105–107, 171–184). Effects of destruction and food shortages, Bennett (2009a, 86–90, 175–176); population declines, Nelson (2005, 195–196), Powell (2003, 191–240), Stone (1994, 162 n.4).

26. Food shortages in Japanese Micronesia, Poyer, Falgout, and Carucci, (2001, 169–187, 208–234); Palau, Murray (2016, 100, 105–108); Chuuk, Poyer (2010).

27. Jonar Jåma, Evjen and Lehtola (2020, 34); Meratus Dayaks, Tsing (1996). In the Southwest Pacific, Nidu in the Santa Cruz Islands (Davenport 1989) and Vanatinai in the Louisiade Archipelago (Lepowsky 1989) are examples of the isolation and lack of information about the war on islands that were not sites of military action.

28. G. Gray (2006, 2019), Hall (1995, 45–51; 1997, 113–133), J. James (2010, 405–418), Loeffel (2015, 139–144), Kay Saunders (1994, 1995).

29. ToRot, Stone (1994, 270–272).

30. Kelly (2003, 98, 184–189). Assigned a military rank, Kelly acted as both a civil and a levy officer (pp. 147, 157).

31. "Neapolitan ice," Slim (1956, 301); see Evans and Brett-James (1962) on the confused fighting during British withdrawal.

32. Kelly (2003, Sokte and Siyin chiefs, 98, "loyal to the government," pp. 213–214; "flag marches," Braund (1972, 217), Kelly (2003, 175–176)).

33. Examples are from Evans (1964, "Nothing," p. 99, Mong Nak and courting chiefs, pp. 134–135, 197, Newland, pp. 199–200). Chasie and Fecitt (2020, 59–79) describe Nagas' similar experiences under Japanese occupation, with initial good relations soon overcome by demands for food and labor and arbitrary treatment, and as Nagas' own living conditions and safety deteriorated during the Battle of Kohima.

34. Pau (2014, 679–682).

35. Guite (2010).

36. Inglis (1969), Iwamoto (2000).

37. Japanese occupation and attitudes, Bennett and Poyer (n.d.), Firth (1997a), Iwamoto (2000, 2006a,b), Nelson (1980a), Richmond (2003, 254–273), Riseman (2012a, 109–118), Saito (1991), Shaw (1991, 227–228), chapters in Toyoda and Nelson (2006); Japanese media, Iwamoto (1999, 129–131). Zeleneitz and Saito (1989) compares Kilenge (New Britain) war recollections as gathered by American and Japanese researchers, in a sort of "Rashomon effect" (Heider 1988).

38. Burridge (1960, 12).

39. Bougainville, Feldt (1946, 69–73, 138–145), K. James (2012), Nelson (2005), Ogan (1972). Nelson writes that divisions caused by war in Bougainville, including men fighting for both sides, caused long-term repercussions; "ceremonies of compensation and reconciliation for sides taken and things done continued until the late 1980s"

(Nelson 2005, 196). Pinney's books (1988, 1990, 1992) give a close view of the complex, dangerous, and bitter situation on the ground in Bougainville.

40. Counts (1989, 195).

41. Embogi and the hangings at Higatura/u, Close-Barry and Stead (2017), Nelson (1978a; 1982, 198–200; 2007a, 85–86), Powell (2003, 206–209), Tongia (2014). There are other cases of official (though not necessarily legal) executions of Islanders for treason by both Allies and Japanese. See discussion in chapter 2, and Powell (2003, 206–223), Stone (1994, 147–162).

42. Markham-Ramu and Sepik, Powell (2003, 209–216, "effectively," p. 210); "Both sent," Nelson (1980a, 254).

43. O. White (1945, 161). Feldt (1946, 137, 140–141), Inglis (1969, 517), and Powell (1996, 254, 259) give examples of Allied Intelligence Bureau agents and coastwatchers executing Islanders for aiding Japanese. Allen (2006) describes the stress in the East Sepik, with both ANGAU and Japanese killings of New Guinea people.

44. Masatsugu Ogawa, in Cook and Cook (1992, "Yet their kindness," p. 273). Of seven thousand men assigned to Ogawa's 79th Regiment, 20th Division in New Guinea, only sixty-seven survived. Masatsugu Ogawa was the only survivor of his 261-man company. "In order to win," Richmond (2003, 264).

45. Timbunke, Firth (1997a), J. McCarthy (1963, 216–217), Powell (2003, 208–209), Richmond (2003, 270–273); retaliation, Nelson (1980a, 253–254). Stone (1994) details Japanese war crimes in Rabaul and East New Britain.

46. Schools closing, Mair (1970, 225–226). Winter (2020) describes heroic efforts of people on the Huon Peninsula to keep schools running.

47. Powell (2003) is a detailed study of ANGAU's operations: tasks, pp. 92–139; conscription in reclaimed areas, p. 215. Propaganda, Powell (1996, 315–356).

48. O. White (1965, 137). The death toll is hard to estimate. About 150,000 Japanese died in PNG, and nearly 12,000 Allied soldiers were killed. Nelson says populations in Bougainville, the Gazelle Peninsula and parts of the Sepik "declined dramatically" during the war, most from disease and malnutrition (Nelson 1982, 200–201). Elsewhere (2005, 195–196) he estimates a population decline on Bougainville (1940–1950) of perhaps as much as 25 percent. Allen (1983) estimates similarly high wartime losses for the inland Aitape area of the Sepik. Medical resources moved with troops, but so did diseases such as dysentery and malaria (Bennett 2009a, 49–71; Mair 1970, 236–237; Nelson 1980a, 252-253; Powell 2003, 191–240).

49. Hogbin (1951, 12–19, "The natives faced," p. 10). Other detailed studies of wartime village life are Ogan (1972) on the Nasioi of Bougainville, Read (1947) on the Markham Valley, Robinson (1981) on three villages around Port Moresby and Lae, and Winter (2019, 2020) on the Huon Peninsula. The film *Angels of War* (Pike, Nelson, and Daws 1982) encompasses history and memories of the war years in Papua New Guinea.

50. McQuarrie (2012) gives a full account of the Gilberts (now Kiribati) in wartime; see also Marama and Kaiuea (1984); civil servants, Great Britain Colonial Office (1946, 94–95). The wealth of American supplies and good relations with military authorities led some i-Kiribati (Gilbertese) to request US sovereignty and marked a change in attitudes to British rule (Marama and Kaiuea 1984, 96–97).

51. Ocean Island/Banaba, McQuarrie (2012, 187–207), Poyer, Falgout, and Carucci (2001); Chuuk, Poyer (2010). Nauruan women sent as enemy internees to Chuuk were exploited by Japanese soldiers there (Y. Tanaka 2018, 181–200).

52. Nauru, McQuarrie (2012), Pollock (1991), Poyer, Falgout, and Carucci (2001), Y. Tanaka (2018, 181–200).

53. Banaba, McQuarrie (2012, 194–196); personal accounts in Sigrah and King (2001); Katerina Teaiwa (2005) on the complexity of the Banaban relocation, which Julia Edwards (2014) examines for insights into modern climate-change relocations. Nauru, Pollock (1991).

54. Guam, Camacho (2011, 40–51), Firth (1997a, 300), Higuchi (2013), Palomo (1984, 1991), Poyer, Falgout, and Carucci (2001, 38–40, 162–165), Rogers (2011). In an afterword to Jose Torres's (2015) memoir of the massacres and uprising at Merizo, Chamorro historian Michael Lujan Bevacqua analyzes the cultural narrative of the island's war experience. Camacho (2019) explores the legal and political complexities of identity and loyalty revealed in the Guam war crimes trials.

55. Hattori (2001), Palomo (1984, 1991), Quimby (2011), Rogers (2011, 190–205).

56. Poyer, Falgout, and Carucci (2001, 117–168); Enewetak, Carucci (1989); Kwajalein, Dvorak (2018).

57. War years in Japanese Micronesia, Falgout, Poyer, and Carucci (2008), Hezel (1995), Peattie (1988), Poyer, Falgout, and Carucci (2001); Pohnpei, Falgout (1989).

58. Heine (1991, "they took," p. 113).

59. Poyer, Falgout, and Carucci (2001, 236–275).

60. Camacho (2011, 51–56; "That was," VT Camacho interview, cited p. 55). Oral histories of Islanders on Saipan, Petty (2002), Soder and McKinnon (2019).

61. Hughes (2011) analyzes American treatment of civilians during and immediately after the battle; see also Astroth (2019). Camacho (2011, 59–82) discusses US management of civilians (including Japanese-Chamorro families) on Guam and the Northern Marianas.

62. End of war and transition to US, Hezel (1995), Peattie (1988), Poyer, Carucci, and Falgout (2016), Poyer, Falgout, and Carucci (2001, 230–314). Nero (1989, 127–130) describes altered attitudes to Japanese on Palau.

Chapter 9

1. Chimbu, Firth (1997a, 307), Griffin, Nelson, and Firth (1979, 92), https://www.pacificwrecks.com/airfields/png/goroka/index.html; Borneo, Heimann (2007, 214, 222, 229–231).

2. Bayly and Harper (2005, 425) describes the huge labor force raised by British contractors in India during the war, noting that "the impact of the demand fell very unequally on the poor, the 'tribal' groups such as the Santals of Bengal and the Garos of Orissa or the Nuniyas of Bihar" along with Nagas.

3. Kratoska (2005, 3–21).

4. Ts'ai (2005, 101–126).

5. Kratoska (2005, 11–19). With limited documentary sources due to the destruction of records, Kratoska's review of Japanese labor depends on war crime trial testimonies and oral histories.

6. *Romusha,* Sato (2003); Dayaks in Borneo, Raben (2005, 206–207); Ibans, Gin (2002, 140); western New Guinea, Raben (2005).

7. See Bennett and Poyer (n.d.). See Bennett (2009a, 133–154) for an overview of Islander labor in the Pacific War.

8. Bennett (2009a, 142), Great Britain Colonial Office (1946, 89), McQuarrie (2012, 166–171), Marama and Kaiuea (1984).

9. Lindstrom (1991, 50–53, "essentially," p. 50). Bauer Field is now Bauerfield International Airport, Vanuatu.

10. McQuarrie (2012, 177).

11. Thomas Nouar, Lindstrom (1989, 403; 1991, 50); US viewpoint, Bennett (2009a, 141).

12. Allied and Japanese soldiers' purchases stimulated the handicraft market (Panakera 2007). Kwara'ae women, Akin (2013, 147), Gegeo (1991, 31); Torres Strait Island women, Osborne (1997), Reed (1999, 166–167).

13. A Tikopia canoe carrying people sailing to New Hebrides for work was lost at sea (Bennett 2009a: 141).

14. Powell (2003, 55–91) reviews the "insatiable" demand for labor in the New Guinea war.

15. Kanga Force and Bulldog Road, Bradley (2008, 70), P. Ryan (1960, viii, 125–156), Sinclair (1990, 122–131); carriers in Wau and Salamaua campaigns, Bradley (2008, 2010); "to supply," Bergerud (1996, 109–110); details on Kokoka carriers, Brune (2004), D. McCarthy (1959), Nelson (2006a).

16. Johnston (2015, 218–299, 305) recounts the importance and heroism of stretcher-bearers with Australian forces.

17. P. Ryan (1960, 156). Ryan does not explain who the women were, or what jobs they did.

18. Powell (2003, 55–91). Powell (2003) is a comprehensive study of ANGAU; also on civilian labor, Bennett (2009a, 139–148), Mair (1970), Nelson (1978b), Riseman (2012a, 118–130), Robinson (1981).

19. Bennett (2009a, 143–144). Sometimes more than 100 percent were taken, when unfit men were pressed into lighter duties (P. Ryan 1969, Sinclair 1990, 297).

20. Binandere, Waiko (1991, 9); "by reports," Mair (1970, 200).

21. P. Ryan (1969); "even if," from "Edited extracts from Angau by Peter Ryan" in Sinclair (1990, 297).

22. O. White (1945), "sick wastage," Mair (1970: 199, 236). Some 1,200 New Guineans were with the Japanese in the Kokoda battle (Griffin, Nelson, and Firth 1979, 97); Nelson (2007a, 79–85) details the origins and experiences of Kokoda carriers and residents. See Pilger (1993) on the role of carriers in Kokoda medical evacuations.

23. Firth (1997a, "passes as high," p. 308), Griffin, Nelson, and Firth (1979, 96).

24. Powell (2003, 191–200). "Angau" long remained a term of opprobrium for those who exploit or bully others (e.g., Mead 1956, 185; Lepowsky 1989, 220–221). The first

English-language novel by a PNG writer, Sir Vincent Serei Eri's *The Crocodile* (1970) describes ANGAU officers who mistreat and steal from carriers.

25. Hogbin (1951, 12–14, "burst into tears," p. 13).

26. Gavide's song, Waiko (1986, 31), used by permission. Pacific Islanders remember the war in traditional art forms, including song and dance; see Falgout, Poyer, and Carucci (2008), Lindstrom and White (1993).

27. Hogbin report and compensation, Powell (2003, 191–240). Nelson (1978b, 184) cites the death of forty-six indentured civilian laborers from wounds and 1,962 from other causes (1942–1945)—a high toll, but Nelson points out that the prewar administration had accepted high death rates of indentured labor. Also see Riseman (2010a, 2012a) on treatment and mistreatment of PNG labor.

28. Compensation, Rogerson (2012); Oimbari, recognition, Newton (1996), Reed (2004, 138–143, 191 n.80). Port Moresby memorial honoring stretcher-bearers, based on the Oimbari photo, https://theconversation.com/lest-we-forget-the-png-soldiers-who-served-in-australias-military-28813/; Stead (2017) discusses the complexity and ambiguity of how such recognition by PNG's former colonial rulers is shaped by power relations.

29. Clemens (1998, first move, p. 121), Kwai (2017, 40–43).

30. Gafu's account, Gegeo and Watson-Gegeo (1989, "When the Americans," p. 360) and G. White et al. (1988, 197–215, "The war, however," p. 209); see also Fifi'i (1989).

31. Recruitment, "extravagant" demands, Akin (2013, 133–134); British-US differences, Akin (2013), Bennett (2009a, 148–154), Kwai (2017, 46–47), Mead (1956, 179–184), G. White et al. (1988, 130).

32. Akin's (2013) study of Maasina Rule shows the role of war in shaping it, especially Malaitan Labour Corps men's interaction with US troops; also Laracy (1983).

33. Fifi'i (1991, 41). Differentiated uniforms contributed to unrest in New Guinea armed forces also, when Australian officers ordered NCOs in the newly formed NGIB to wear bar chevrons on laplaps rather than insignia on shirts (as in the PIB, following Australian Army practice); experienced soldiers saw it as a deliberate insult (Sinclair 1990, 274–275).

34. Fifi'i (1988; 1991, quotations pp. 41–44). Kwara'ae (Malaita) elders interviewed in the 1980s recalled that the idea of political independence originated in conversations with US servicemen (Gegeo 1988, 12). Fifi'i (1989) details how wartime observations and interactions, especially with African Americans, shaped foundational ideas of Maasina Rule.

35. Chasie and Fecitt (2020, 83–84), Kikon (2009, 91), Syiemlieh (2014, 5).

36. Dorn (1971, 201–227).

37. Helping refugees, Bayly and Harper (2005, 184), Goodall (2011), Khan (2015, 101–102), Kikon (2009, 89–90). Many Nagas volunteered aid, but British officials also forced villagers to porter for refugees (Goodall 2011, e.g., 146, 210–211). India's tea planters organized work groups to assist refugees, employing—along with Indians—people from many hill tribes, including Garo, Khasi, Pnar, Abor, and Mishmi, dozens of whom died in the work (Tyson 1945).

38. Work in Manipur, Evans and Brett-James (1962, 35, 38, 243, 333).

39. Swinson (1967, 35–36). P. Ryan (1960, 215) describes doing something similar to get carriers and food near the end of a difficult Kanga Force patrol in New Guinea.

40. Z Force trip, Evans (1964, 136–137); SOE airdrops, Shennan (2007, 98).

41. “Whenever we,” Fellowes-Gordon (1957, 82–83). Use of women porters by Z Force, Evans (1964, 136–137); by OSS, Dunlop (1979, 141).

42. Opium as pay, e.g., Fellowes-Gordon (1957, 41), Hilsman (1990, 165–166), Lintner (1997, 96), Romanus and Sutherland (1956, 37), Sacquety (2013, 53).

43. Kayano (1994, 80).

44. Sheffield and Riseman (2019, 162–200) compare the “totalizing impact” of war on the homefronts for Indigenous peoples in New Zealand, Canada, the United States, and Australia.

45. On MWEO and Māori civilian war work, Hill (2004, 184–227), McGibbon (2004, 153–154, 213–214), Orange (1987, 2000).

46. Gaffen (1985, 67–71), Sheffield and Riseman (2019, 191–193).

47. Civilian war work, J. Franco (1999, 80–96), Nash (1985, 136, 152), Townsend (2000, 176–192); Iroquois, Hauptman (1986a, 3–5); Southwestern tribes, Nash (1985, 135–136, 139); Pacific Coast, Nash (1985, 40), Sheffield and Riseman (2019, 174–175); Alaska, J. Franco (1999, 80–96), Townsend (2000, 191–192).

48. Overall economic impact and Sioux, Nash (1985, 135–139).

49. Ritzenthaler (1943).

50. War and termination, Bernstein (1991, 89–111), J. Franco (1999, 205–208), Townsend (2000, 186, 194–214); war increased tribal ties, J. Franco (1999, 94).

51. Aboriginal Australian labor and workers’ camps, J. James (2010, 381–388), G. Gray (2019), Hall (1995, 45; 1997, 134–161, 183–184), Morris (1992), Powell (1988, 242–267; 1996, 166–188), Riseman and Trembath (2016, 12–13), Kay Saunders (1995), Shoemaker (2004, 32); missions and military labor demands, Riseman (2007).

Chapter 10

1. Historians of colonial Africa and Southeast Asia warned against seeing the war as a scene shift in a movie or a *deus ex machina* for culture change (e.g., Crowder 1984, 1; Killingray and Rathbone 1986, 1). The cautions stimulated research into precisely *how* the war years changed life in the colonies, though there are fewer studies addressing Indigenous communities.

2. Coates (2004, 208).

3. An Inuk man, Nakasuk, helped select the site; the base became the center of postwar development in the region (Eno 2003; Sheffield and Riseman 2019, 192–193).

4. Coates (2004, 207–212); Ivalo Airport, https://www.tunturi-ilmailijat.net/efiv_en.htm; USP, Lal (1992, 117).

5. Pine Ridge/Badlands Aerial Gunnery Range, https://www.nps.gov/articles/000/aerial-gunnery-range.htm. Native Americans’ wartime land losses, Bernstein (1991,

64–88), J. Franco (1999, 98–118), Rosier (2009, 96–99), Sheffield and Riseman (2019, 212–215), Townsend (2000, 190–191); ongoing military use, LaDuke (2013).

6. Canadian military use of Indigenous land is detailed in Lackenbauer (2007, pp. 64–114 on the BCATP). Tyendinaga Mohawk Territory land had been used for flight training in World War I. First Nations Technical Institute now operates an aviation training program there for First Nations, Métis, and Inuit students; https://fnti.net/.

7. See https://www.thestar.com/news/canada/2015/09/19/chippewa-first-nation-celebrates-return-of-ipperwash-land.html; Lackenbauer (2007, 115–143).

8. Lackenbauer (2004) analyzes this debate, arguing that it is important to recognize diverse Indigenous views; "allies of the Crown," p. 185.

9. Duffy (1988, 12–22, 51–95, 198).

10. Duffy (1988, 96–97), Schuurman (1976), Zellen (2009, 143–148); on Greenland self-government and Inuit sovereignty, Kuokkanen (2017), Shadian (2014).

11. Forsyth (1992, 321–346), P. Gray (2005, 93–96).

12. Dudeck (2018), Golovnev and Osherenko (1999), Gorter-Gronvik and Suprun (2000), Vallikivi (2005). Nenets scholar Roza Laptander (2014) discusses oral histories of the rebellion and its consequences.

13. Herd reductions, Forsyth (1992, 349–350), Vallikivi (2005).

14. Balzer (1999, 128–129), Forsyth (1992, 347–361, 370), B. Grant (1995, 108–112), Sergeyev (1956, 509), Wiget and Balalaeva (2011, 31–34), Vallikivi (2005); "disproportionately high" cost, Forsyth (1992, 351).

15. Cook Islands, Anderson (2016). Local impact of Japanese and US bases in Micronesia, Poyer, Falgout, and Carucci (2001); Bennett and Wanhalla (2016a) on central and Southwest Pacific Allied bases.

16. Griffin, Nelson, and Firth (1979, 79), Nelson (2005).

17. Bennett (2016b), Lindstrom (2015, 162–166).

18. Griffin, Nelson, and Firth (1979, 94–95).

19. Bennett (2016a).

20. Bennett (2009a, 158–159), Lal (1992, 108–135), Leckie and Durutalo (2016), Ravuvu (1974).

21. Hixon (2000, 115–130), Weeks (1987); also Bennett (2016c), Scarr, Gunson, and Terrell (1998).

22. R. Franco (1989). The question of whether those born in American Samoa have birthright US citizenship, and whether they want it, remains active in courts. Some Samoans argue that it could undermine tradition, land ownership, and self-determination.

23. Bennett (2009a, 139–148), Creely (2016), Henningham (1994), Munholland (2005).

24. Peattie (1988, 230–256) on Japan's fortification of a League of Nations Mandate; also Hezel (1995), Poyer, Falgout, and Carucci (2001, 40–50, 75–116) on Japanese military construction; Poyer (2008) on Chuuk.

25. Guam, Quimby (2011, 361), Rogers (2011). On militarization of Pacific islands and resistance to it, Davis (2015); Guam, Alexander (2015), Hattori (2001), Na'puti and Bevacqua (2015); Hawai'i, Kajihiro (2009).

26. Coates (2004), Duffy (1988, 22, 201–205); extra-national military basing since World War II, Cooley (2015), Lutz (2009).

27. Lehtola (2015, 129), Seitsonen, Herva, and Koponen (2019) on German roadbuilding.

28. Kelly (2003, 26), Pau (2012). The western section was motorable, followed by seventy-three miles of mule track to the Manipur River, then thirty-five miles "jeepable" and up the three-thousand-foot long "Chocolate Staircase" with forty hairpin turns in seven miles (Evans and Brett-James 1962, 44–45). Today, the Tedim Road links highland communities across the India-Burma border from Manipur through the Chin Hills to Kalemyo (Kalay), though only the India side is maintained for traffic (Pau 2012, 776).

29. Pau (2012, 780–781).

30. Kelly (2003, 125, 135–137, 152–153); Kuki, Guite (2010, 306–308); Stevenson, Kelly (2003, 185–186).

31. Mule caravans linked the Yunnan-Burma-India borderlands until the construction of roads (Ma and Ma 2014). During World War II, China's Nationalist government's relocation to Chunqing increased the importance of southwest China. After Allies decided to attack Japan from the Pacific rather than from China, the land route lost its key strategic value. But at the time the road was seen as crucial, and great effort was expended to complete it. Sections are still in use (Webster 2003, 328, 335).

32. Anders (1965), Khan (2015, 259–266), Romanus and Sutherland (1953, 306–307), Webster (2003, esp. pp. 149–150, 272). Many African American units worked on the Ledo Road and their members met tribal people. One GI, Herman Perry, under stress of war killed a white officer and escaped to live with Naga for several months. Koerner (2008) details his story, including the difficult living conditions and racism for African American soldiers working on the road.

33. Cohen (1981, 32–69).

34. The impact of the US "army of occupation" is described by Canadian historians Ken Coates and William Morrison (1992, 2005, 2011). The work was done largely by African Americans of the US Army Corps of Engineers, comprising 25 percent of Northwest Service Command (Cohen 1981, 14–31).

35. Coates and Morrison (1992, 80, 124–157; 2005, 249–250). The Canadian government bent regulations to make the abandoned children eligible for Indian status.

36. Coates and Morrison (1992, 84–85, 92; 2005, 62–64, 246–248).

37. Coates and Morrison (1992, 200–242; 2005, 263), Lackenbauer (2013, 57–60).

38. Jackson (2006, 44–49); "global chess game," Jackson (2011, 73).

39. Dumett (1985, esp. p. 405), Jackson (2006, 49, 176–180, 213–228). Jennings (2015) on French West Africa is an example of a recent study of resource extraction and labor demands on colonial populations. On rubber tapping in Africa, Clarence-Smith (2015). It is likely that intensified production and labor recruiting reached groups such as Hadza, San, and Pygmies/Twa, at least those in contact with colonial authorities, but there is as yet little research on this.

40. Dumett (1985, 381–382), Hartsfield (1953), Marshall (1995); Japanese empire, Tarling (2001, 218–251). Aragon (2002) describes how Japanese reopening of a mica mine affected villagers in highland Central Sulawesi.

41. Latin American war experiences, Leonard and Bratzel (2007); Caribbean, Eccles and McCollin (2017).

42. Hartsfield (1953), Rosier (2009, 77–84). The wartime history of Indigenous Bolivian tin miners' workers' rights struggles—as increased demand led to strikes, global competition changed production, and the end of war reduced employment—is also part of South America's World War II story, not dealt with here.

43. S. Garfield (2013, 50), X. Wilkinson (2009, 82).

44. In addition to rubber, the US government and private industry also sought timber, tin, and other resources in South America, especially the Amazon; Colby (1995, 106–193), S. Garfield (2013), X. Wilkinson (2009).

45. Slater (2002, 20, 23 n. 47), X. Wilkinson (2009, 82–189). At war's end, Brazil's government largely abandoned the rubber soldiers, despite promises that they would be returned home. Perhaps as many as fifteen thousand died, and others fled to cities or merged into the Amazon's *caboclo* society. Those who died were, in fact, like combat soldiers, as the minister for Economic Mobilization testified in a postwar inquiry. Wilkinson comments that they would have had a better chance of survival in combat; the Brazil Expeditionary Force in Italy lost 457 soldiers (X. Wilkinson 2009, 188–189, 249–304).

46. X. Wilkinson (2009, 190–248, 316–317).

47. S. Garfield (2013, 222–226), X. Wilkinson (2009, 190–252, 208, 284–298).

48. Smocovitis (2003), X. Wilkinson (2009, 238).

49. US reservations, J. Franco (1999, 99–115, 118 n.40); Canada and Alaska, Cohen (1981); PNG, Griffin, Nelson, and Firth (1979, 85); Pacific Islands, Bennett (2009a, 219–240).

50. As discussed in Coates (2004, 211–221).

51. A point made by Karen Hesse in reference to destruction of Aleuts' homes and treasures by US soldiers in *Aleutian Sparrow* (2003), an evocative children's verse account of the relocation. Micronesians felt the same distress as the new US administration ignored their war losses. "There would be no Marshall Plan for the ravaged islands of Micronesia. Embittered Palauan observers have skewered Western assumptions that in Europe war destroyed priceless treasures of civilization, while in the Pacific it wrecked only a few thatched huts" (Murray 2016, 131–132). Compensation in these areas, and many others, was long-delayed and inadequate.

52. Hunt (2014), Lehtola (2015, 134; 2019, 78–91), Lunde (2011), Nyyssōnen (2007, 77–78). See Seitsonen (2021) on the landscape of war construction and destruction in Finnish Lapland.

53. Lehtola (2019, 131–148). In eleven days of postwar mine clearing in May 1945, some sixty-one thousand mines were dug up in northern Norway, killing nearly thirty of the German soldiers assigned to the task (Evjen and Lehtola 2020, 42).

54. Evjen and Lehtola (2020), Lehtola (2015, 129, 135; 2019), Nickul (1950, 59), Turunen et al. (2018). "The worst," Gorter-Gronvik and Suprun (2000, 133).

55. Chasie and Fecitt (2020), Keane (2010, 196–296), Khan (2015, 246–248), Parratt (2005, 91–93), Yoshimi (2015, 178–180).

56. Katoch (2016, 39–45, "understood to be," p. 43); Keane (2010, 363–365), Swinson (1967, 115–116). Chasie and Fecitt (2020, e.g., pp. 95–96) discuss how military

training and left-behind weapons contributed to postwar Naga nationalist resistance to Indian control.

57. Impacts of war on Pacific Islands, Bennett and Poyer (n.d.). Wau, Bradley (2008, 52–54); New Guinea destruction, Feldt (1946, 154), Griffin, Nelson, and Firth (1979, 95, 105), Mair (1970, 202) Stanner (1953); Bougainville, Nelson (2005, 193–194).

58. Poyer (2008, 228).

59. Poyer, Falgout, and Carucci (2001, 315–326); Peleliu, Murray (2016, 118–141), N. Price et al. (2013). Poyer (2008) describes the destruction on Chuuk after nearly two years of blockade and bombing, including the mid-February 1944 raid that left Chuuk Lagoon littered with shipwrecks that now form its major tourist attraction.

60. Manus, "Whole villages," Downs (1986, 148).

61. Bennett (2009a, esp. pp. 97–114).

62. Bennett (2009a, 114, 168–170; 2012), McQuarrie (2012, 115–124, 198–200); Betio, Highland (1991, 109–112).

63. Bennett (2009a, summary of damage, pp. 198–218). Studies of war's environmental impact is a new field, e.g., Tucker and Russell (2004).

64. Aleutians, Sepez et al. (2007); Canada, Coates and Morrison (1992, 200–217; 2011, 65–66).

65. South Pacific, Bennett (2009a, 179–197), Bennett and Poyer (n.d.).

66. J. McCarthy (1963, 226–227, "hundreds of," p. 226). Sinclair (1992) says the United States sold its assets on Manus after two years of unfruitful negotiations with Australia over possible joint operation of the base. Local frustration, Akin (2013, 143).

67. Gloucester, Counts (1989, 189); scrap, Bennett (2009a, 193–195); Vanuatu, Lindstrom (2015, 166–168). James Michener (1951) revisited Espiritu Santo a few years after the war and described the contrast of life at the time of the huge US base and postwar life amidst its ruins.

68. Bennett (2009a, 202–208); New Britain, Counts (1989, 189, 200); PNG/RAN clean-up, Sinclair (1992, 19–22): "The total quantity destroyed in the four years from 1 January, 1951, alone was almost unbelieveable—1,700 tons of bombs, 35 million rounds of light ammunition and 5 million artillery and mortar shells." In 1972, 10,774 items were disposed of (pp. 20–21).

69. Militias, Bennett (2009a, 208); Peleliu, Murray (2016, 118–141); Solomons, Bennett (2009a, 209); Palau, Shuster (2013); "a particularly lethal," Peleliu, N. Price, Knecht, and Lindsay (2015, 217). Mitchell (2020) describes pollution of Pacific Islands by military use and toxic materials storage.

70. Tarawa, McQuarrie (2012, 202–203); Port Moresby, Griffin, Nelson, and Firth (1979, 87), Mair (1970, 16–19); Chuuk, Poyer, Falgout, and Carucci (2001, 256); Honiara, Kwai (2017, 88–90).

71. Bennett (2009a, 157–178) reviews war compensation issues for Pacific Islands.

72. New Hebrides, Bennett (2009a, 165–168); British relief and compensation for Nagas, Chasie and Fecitt (2020, 96–98); Australia, Bennett (2009a, 173–177), Griffin, Nelson, and Firth (1979, 106–107), Hogbin (1951, 19–23), Nelson (2006c); Guam, https://guamwarsurvivorstory.com/index.php/latest-news/40-the-war-reparations-saga-why-guam-s-survivors-still-await-justice; Aleuts, Kohlhoff (1995, 169–187).

73. Early relations with US, Poyer, Falgout, and Carucci (2001, 230–314); "American lake" discussions, H. Friedman (2006); democratization and economy, Hanlon (1998), Hezel (1995), Poyer, Carucci, and Falgout (2016); Palau, Murray (2016, 135); Pohnpei, Turner and Falgout (2002).

74. Poyer, Falgout, and Carucci (2001, 270–275); Peleliu, Murray (2016, 126–135); Guam and former Japanese Marianas, Camacho (2011, 77–82); H. Friedman (2001, 2007) on military and diplomatic history of initial US occupation.

75. Lehtola (2019, 179–187).

76. Ingold (1976), Lehtola (2015, 2021), Nickul (1950), Nyyssōnen (2007, 74–179), Vorren and Manker (1962, 167).

77. Selle, Semb, and Strømsnes (2013, 713–714), Thuen (1995, 71–74).

78. This selection titled "The War is Over!" is from John Gustavsen's 1978 short story collection, *Lille Chicago* ("Little Chicago"). The story was translated by Roland and Martin Thorstensson and reprinted in Gaski (1996, 193–213).

Chapter 11

1. Chin celebration, Oatts (1962, 196–197, "stirring and romantic," p. 196); King George VI, Kelly (2003, 306).

2. "The Middle of a War," Fuller (2012, 20), used by permission.

3. Fofanoff, Lehtola (2021, 46). Skolt Sámi (Sä'mmlaž) evacuees, Ingold (1976), Lehtola (2004, 66–67; 2015, 132–133; 2019, 153–177), Mazzullo (2017), Nickul (1950, 59–60; 1971).

4. Japanese invasion forced Hezhe in northeast China away from the rivers they depended on for subsistence, causing starvation (Sasaki 2016, 178–182). Buryats left inner Mongolia after Japanese occupation limited transborder travel, returning only after the 1960s (Konagaya 2016).

5. Morris-Suzuki (1994, 1999, 2001) traces the history of these borderlands. On Soviet Sakhalin, Forsyth (1992, 352–355), B. Grant (1995, xii, 1–17, 93–108), Morris-Suzuki (1996; 1998b, 176–177), Sasaki (2003), Stephan (1971, 192–194), Urbansky and Barup (2017); Japan-Russia/USSR border, Irish (2009, 270–285), Morris-Suzuki (1999), Paichadze and Seaton (2015).

6. Finland-Norway, Lehtola (2019, 187–191); Taiwan, P. Friedman (2018), Ku (2012), Simon (2007, 2010), Sugimoto (2017), Vickers (2007); Arctic Cold War, Coates (2004, 217–220); Southeast Asia borderlands, Han (2020), Lintner (2015), Pau (2018b); US Pacific border, Camacho (2012); Sámi, Coates (2004, 223), Lehtola (2004, 73), Stephens (1987).

7. Decolonization in the context of World War II and its endings, Clarke (2007), Crowder (1984), Holland (1985), Jackson (2006), M. Thomas (1998).

8. C. Christie (1996, 1–26), Drea (2009, 252), Holland (1985, 38–47), Lebra (1977, 167–170), Narangoa and Cribb (2003); Spector (2007) on East and Southeast Asia at war's end; "colonial continuity," Tarling (2001, 257).

9. Across Burma, plentiful weapons heightened the danger of disorder at war's end, e.g., Christie (2000, 111); "awash with weapons," Katoch (2016, 42); on inadequate

demilitarization for Kachin, Anderson and Sadan (2016); for Chin, Hilsman (1990, 225–226); for Naga, Chasie and Fecitt (2020, 95–96). Arms evaded official controls in every war theater; e.g., Allen (2006) describes East Sepik (New Guinea) armed resistance to the reimposition of Australian rule. Fifi'i (1989, 58) recalls that Malaitan men in the SILC smuggled home several hundred rifles in false-bottomed boxes.

10. C. Christie (1996, 16–23). This was true not only in Southeast Asia; the Communist Party in New Caledonia sought to organize Indigenous Kanaks during and immediately after the war, though it was quickly smothered by Christian missions and the colonial administration (Kurtovitch 2000).

11. Communists in Burma, Fergusson (1962), Lebra (1977, 161), Lintner (1996); Indonesia, Coté and Akagawa (2015), de Moor (1999). On Indonesia/West Papua, Holland (1985, 86–93), Nguyen (1998).

12. On war's end in Burma, overviews in Bayly and Harper (2005; 2007, 302–470); also C. Christie (1996, 64–76), D. Guyot (1966), Lebra (1977, 63–64), Nguyen (1998), Sadan (2013a, 254–306), Selth (1986, 493–496, 506–507), Silverstein (1980, 50–63, 84–92).

13. Ideas of "abandonment" of the hill tribes appear in British veterans' memoirs (e.g., Fergusson 1951, 208) and continue into modern histories (Bayly and Harper 2007, 304; Chasie and Fecitt 2020; Pau 2014, 2019; Selth 1986; Tzang Yawnghwe 1987, 86–87). The feeling of abandonment was not only political but economic, as improvements failed to reach the uplands. Shelby Tucker (2001, 335) speaks of Kachin insurgents in 1990 still hoping for the wonderful postwar life promised to them by the British and Americans during the war, then by the British after it, then by Aung San at Panglong.

14. See e.g., misunderstanding, Tzang Yawnghwe (1987, 86–87), misleading promises, Selth (1986, 501–503).

15. C. Christie (1996, 79–80; 2000), Walton (2008).

16. "Ethnic segmentation" of armies, M. Callahan (2003), J. Guyot (1974), Sadan (2013b); Smith Dun's memoir of war and postwar service, Dun (1980). Chindit veteran Fergusson (1962) and Kachin Levy officer Fellowes-Gordon (1971) describe some Kachin experiences in the rebellion. Sadan (2013a) details Kachin political and military developments. Thawnghmung (2012) describes "silent minorities" of Karen (and other groups) who opt not to take up arms, but to accommodate with the Myanmar government and preserve cultural identity in other ways.

17. Bayly and Harper (2007, 307–314, 380–470) and Lintner (2015) review the history of insurgencies seeking autonomy. On more recent conditions, in addition to sources cited above, see also Hoffstaedter (2014) on Chin refugees, Sharples (2017) on Karen refugees, and Ferguson (2016) on Shan residents, migrants, and exiles.

18. Bayly and Harper (2007, 297–298), Lyman (2016, 231), Syiemlieh (2014). Keane (2010, 440) quotes Naga legislator and activist Rano Mese Shaiza, who "carries the sense, common among many of the older generation, of having been abandoned by Britain. 'When the British left they left us to India. But we are Nagas. We are not Indians,' she said." Chasie and Fecitt (2020, 91–92) also emphasize the deeply felt sense of betrayal and abandonment by Britain despite Naga assistance during the war.

19. Keane (2010, 439–442), Kikon (2009, 96–97). Naga British/Indian Army veterans of World War II found themselves pressured by both Naga nationalists and Indian authorities; Chasie and Fecitt (2020) discuss their postwar situation.

20. Lintner (2015); also Jacobs (2012), Kolås (2017), Meetei (2014), Parratt (2005), Syiemlieh (2014, 35).

21. Kikon (2009); "ethnic conflict" critique, Kikon (2009), Kolås (2017). Sadan (2015) offers a similar critique of using ethnicity or a pat colonial historical narrative to misunderstand the current Myanmar-Kachin conflict.

22. Winnington (2008 [1959]) describes postwar interaction of Wa in Yunnan with the Chinese Communist government; Wa are now an official ethnic minority in the PRC. Fiskesjö (2013) surveys Wa studies. Han (2020) and Lintner (2015) review the troubled postwar history of the entire India-Burma-China-Thailand uplands.

23. Bangladesh, Arens (2011), Uddin (2019), Yasmin (2014).

24. E.g., Dentan et al. (1997), Endicott (2015), Idrus (2010).

25. The Vichy-Free French contest shaped French Indochina's World War II role. For summaries, Brocheux and Hémery (2009, 345–361), C. Christie (1996, 82–106), Hickey (1982, 321–384), Holland (1985, 44–46), Marr (1980, 1995), M. Thomas (1998, 191–221).

26. Impacts of Vietnam War, C. Christie (1996, 21–22), Condominas (1977 [1957]), Hanks and Hanks (2001, 25–28), Hickey (1982, 385–437; 1993), Lee and Hurlich (1982, 339–340), Noone (1972, 150).

27. Guardia (2011, 167–177).

28. E.g., Hickey (1982, 385–386, 429–437; 1993), Michaud (2000).

29. Conditions at end of war, Powell (2003, 245–254; Stanner 1953); promises and expectations of improvement, Hogbin (1951, 288), Inglis (1969, 523–524), Lawrence (1964, 124–139). In Australian veteran T. A. G. Hungerford's 1952 novel of war in Bougainville, *The Ridge and the River,* Corporal Shearwater discusses the end of war with a local guide, who asks if he can go to Australia with him. Shearwater has to say no, ashamed by the realization that the Islanders will get nothing as a return for their loyalty and service.

30. Sinclair (1990, "shabby treatment," p. 284). PNG veterans, Nelson (1978b; 1980a, 258–259; 1980b). As a comparison, the role of World War II veterans in decolonization has been extensively discussed for Africa; their political role varied greatly across the continent; see Headrick (1978), overviews in Ofcansky (1997), Owino (2018), and Melasuo (2019, esp. pp. 379–382).

31. Simogun, Allen (2012); Karava, Nelson (2007b); Paliau reform, Kais (1998), Schwartz and Smith (2021); Yali, Hermann (2002), Lawrence (1964); Firth (1997a, 316–319) on postwar millennial/political movements.

32. Postwar changes, Bennett (2009a, 150–151), Firth (1997a, 320), L. Grant (2014, 219–226), Griffin, Nelson, and Firth (1979, 85–87, 102–122), Mair (1970, 21, 204–207), Nelson (1980a, 260–261), Powell (2003, 241–256), Stanner (1953), O. White (1965, 138–158). MacWilliam (2013) is an extended study of Australia's postwar development program in PNG.

33. Sinclair (1992) details PNG's postwar military. Besides PIR, an initially all-white militia inheriting the NGVR mantle formed as the PNGVR; it became multiracial in 1964, had its first PNG officer in 1971, and was discontinued after independence.

34. Jackson (2006, 518–520), McIntyre (2014) on decolonization of British Pacific; Banivanua Mar (2016) offers an Indigenous-focused examination of Pacific decolonization and independence. On British Pacific Island dependencies after the war, see Stanner (1953) for details on destruction and postwar rehabilitation and policies in Fiji and Western Samoa, as well as PNG.

35. Akin (2013, 150–258), Kwai (2017, 75–91). Characterizations of Maasina Rule, John Frum, and similar movements as "cargo cults" similarly denigrate their serious political intent, but researchers such as Akin (2013), Firth (1997a, 316-319), Laracy (1983), and Lindstrom (1989; 1991, 53–56; 2015) describe them more accurately as political movements in response to wartime change. Banivanua Mar (2016, 118–151) notes the impact of war and the transnational aspect of these autonomy movements, and the colonial powers' consistent underestimation of them.

36. Though here, too, there was disappointment: "At a conference in Honiara in 1987, numerous Solomon Islands veterans publicly expressed misgivings at the readiness with which they had given their youthful loyalties to the Allies and admitted to some bitterness at how little it had benefited them" (Laracy 2013, 241).

37. On the 1998–2003 troubles and the 2003–2017 occupation by RAMSI, Regional Assistance Mission to Solomon Islands, Kwai (2017, 6, 88–90).

38. Lal (1992, 119–124), Mayer (1963, 67–75), Ravuvu (1974, 7–11, 58–62).

39. Ravuvu (1974, 17–29, 61–62).

40. Lal (1992, 108–163).

41. Lal (1992, 149–158). Teresia Teaiwa (2015) discusses the history and cultural meaning of Fijian women's military participation.

42. Firth (1997a, 319–320, 339), Fisher (2013), M. Thomas (1998).

43. Munholland (2005, 227).

44. Chappell (2013), Firth (1997a, 319–320), Henningham (1994), Thompson and Adloff (1971, 267–289).

45. Firth (1997a, 338–355), Fisher (2013), Thompson and Adloff (1971, 26–37).

46. Poyer, Falgout, and Carucci (2001, 230–314; 2010), Poyer, Carucci, and Falgout (2016). H. Friedman (2001) on plans to bind the region to US interests.

47. Quoted in Wilson (1995, 171–172).

48. Petersen (1998, 2001); examples of how war memories affect political views, Dvorak (2018) on Kwajalein, Falgout (1989) on Pohnpei, Nero (1989) and Wilson (1995) on Palau, Camacho (2011) on CNMI.

49. Diaz (2001), Maga (1984), Quimby (2011, 362–377), Rogers (2011), https://www.guampedia.com/guam-commonwealth-act//.

50. See Chamoru scholars Michael Lujan Bevacqua (2017) on Guam's strategic role and resistance to militarization, Tiara Na'puti (2014) on testimony to the UN opposing militarization and colonialism, and Michael P. Perez (2005) on Americanization and Chamorro identity.

51. Firth (1997b). Firth says the key to understanding the Pacific's nuclear history depends on "two central facts" (p. 324): that test sites were remote from home populations of testers and that Islanders were political subordinate. The United States also conducted three underground nuclear tests at Amchitka Island in the Aleutians. Indigenous peoples of the USSR were among those affected by the hundreds of Soviet nuclear tests carried out from the 1950s.

Chapter 12

1. Kayano (1994, 85). Shigeru Kayano (d. 2006), whose memoir *Our Land Was a Forest* includes the war years, became an Ainu cultural and political leader, the first Ainu elected to Japan's Parliament, and an important figure in the revival of Ainu culture and activism. War experiences shaped other postwar Ainu leaders as well, notably Tadashi Kaizawa (recalled in his 1993 memoir *Ainu waga jinsei* [*Ainu: My Life*]).

2. Godefroy (2019), Irish (2009, 204–205), Koshiro (1999, 100), Siddle (1996, 145–151).

3. Passin (1982, 145–172, "You are deliberately," p. 163).

4. Postwar Ainu identity and activism, Godefroy (2019), Irish (2009, 191–215), Koshiro (1999, 215–216), M. Mason (2012, 145–179), Morris-Suzuki (1999, 2014, 2018), Siddle (1996; 2003, 447–449; 2008), Sjöberg (2007), Tsutsui (2015). On younger Ainu and transnationalism, Kojima (2014, 115 n. 13). See Morris-Suzuki (1998a, 174–184) on revival of Okinawan and Ainu identity from the 1970s.

5. Kola Peninsula, Kent (2014, 64–76), Lantto (2010, 554), Lehtola (2004, 70–85), Took (2004, 92, 251–255, 269–321), Wheelersburg and Gutsol (2010). Gorter-Gronvik and Suprun (2000) traces a direct connection between the war and post-Soviet cross-border links: Nenets reindeer soldiers accompanied the Soviet Army liberating Norway's eastern Finnmark; Sámi there remembered them and reached out to the Nenets Autonomous Area after perestroika.

6. Changing residence pattern, Whitaker (1955, 31–33, 102); economic changes, Lehtola (2004, 52–55; 2019; 2021), Turunen et al. (2018).

7. Lehtola (2019, "A young Sámi" and "genuine Lapps," p. 202; 2021).

8. Lehtola (2015, 140; 2019, 211–220, Oula Näkkäläjärvi, "I, myself," p. 215; 2021). An exception, Sámi Christian Folk High School established in Aanaar/Inari in 1953, taught in the Sámi language and trained many future leaders.

9. Lehtola (2019, 227–228), Minde (2003), Paine (1960), Selle, Semb, and Strømsnes (2013, 713–714), Thuen (1995, 29–30), Vorren and Manker (1962, 154, 157).

10. Nyyssōnen (2007) compares Sámi identity and activism in these three countries, esp. pp. 65–73, 108–111; also Minde (2003, 121–122); Swedish Sami policy, Lantto and Mörkenstam (2008). A key element of modern Indigenous Rights claims is the need to protect communal resources to preserve distinctive cultures (see chapter 14).

11. The argument is made by Eidheim (1997, 41–45).

12. Postwar political organizations, Nickul (1971, 75), Salvesen (1995, 137–138), Sillanpää (1994, 55), Vorren and Manker (1962, 153–167, "Lapp culture society" and other organizations, pp. 162-164).

13. Lehtola (2004, 70–85), Minde (2003), Selle, Semb, and Strømsnes (2013, 714–715).

14. Semb (2010, 76–79).

15. Eidheim (1997, 38–41), Lehtola (2019, 227–228), Nyyssōnen (2007).

16. Kent (2014, 66–67).

17. Slezkine (1994, 337–385). Pastoral nomads such as Tuvans and Buryats were also incorporated into the USSR and affected by collectivization, sedentization, and assimilation programs, and by immigration from Russia and Ukraine (Forsyth 1992, 373–379).

18. Balzer (1999), Forsyth (1992, 351–392), Sablin (2014, 547–549), Wiget and Balalaeva (2011). P. Gray (2005) describes how Soviet/Russian policy on small ethnic groups celebrates "culture" in public events and parades it to international visitors but fails to help them economically or politically.

19. Forsyth (1992, 366–372).

20. Yakut, Forsyth (1992, 379–381); smaller Western Arctic groups, Forsyth (1992, 385–389); Tungus, Forsyth (1992, 381–389); Nenets, Golovnev and Osherenko (1999).

21. Coates (2004, 217–220); Forsyth (1992, 399–400, population growth, pp. 403–404).

22. P. Gray (2005, 30–36, 213–219).

23. Sheffield and Riseman (2019) comprehensively compare the wartime and postwar experiences of Indigenous people in these nations; pp. 271–300 make the argument about differing interpretations of Native war service. Sheffield (2017b) focuses on veterans' policies.

24. As argued, for example, in Carroll (2008, 5–11).

25. MacDonald (1993, 63).

26. Postwar conditions, Hauptman (1986a, 9, 13); benefits, Sheffield and Riseman (2019, 257–269); for example, Zuni leaders resisted new ideas (Adair and Vogt 1949) and Coast Salish discounted veterans' service (Sheffield and Riseman 2019, 250).

27. Nez (2011, 217). Native Americans could not vote in New Mexiso state elections until 1948. Other Native American veterans report similar experiences and feelings, e.g., Holiday and McPherson (2013, 181–207), perhaps partly compensated by later recognition and publicity for codetalkers (pp. 208–224).

28. J. Franco (1999, 193–200), MacDonald (1993, 72–77), Riseman (2012a, 207–213), Sheffield and Riseman (2019, 251–252), Townsend (2000, 224), C. Wilkinson (2005, 104).

29. On this dual impact of the war, see Bernstein (1991), Meadows (2002, 37–40), Nash (1985, 128–152), Townsend (2000, 215–228).

30. Stabler (2005, 94, "He was an Indian," p. 111).

31. Bernstein (1991, 131–158, 172–175), Cowger (1999), Hauptman (1986a, 1–2, 205, 239), Meadows (1999, 189–198). War and the GI bill accelerated the development of Indigenous leaders. Among the Navajo codetalkers, for example, Sam Billison received a PhD in education, Carl Gorman became a well-known artist, and Dean Wilson a tribal judge (Gilbert 2008, 60).

32. Termination, Bernstein (1991, 89–111, 159–177), Cowger (1999), Holm (1981, 76–79), Sheffield and Riseman (2019, 283–285), Townsend (2000, 194–214).

33. Holm (1981, “magnificent gesture,” p. 69). On termination plans and rhetoric linked with war, J. Franco (1999, 207), Hauptman (1986a, 1–2), Holm (1981, 75–79), Rosier (2009, 109–160), Townsend (2000, 154–160).

34. Holm (1996, 178–179); also Carroll (2008, 135–136, 147–172), Sheffield and Riseman (2019, 275).

35. St. Germain, Gaffen (1985, 44). Alcohol laws changed postwar, providing for all-Indian Royal Canadian Legion branches on reserves that voted to allow alcohol (Gaffen 1985, 71).

36. Lackenbauer (2007, 177–178), Sheffield (2004, 93–94, 132).

37. Gaffen (1985, 71–73), Sheffield and Riseman (2019, 257–269).

38. Sheffield (2004, 137) succinctly presents these options in the postwar Canadian context.

39. Sheffield (2004, 175), Sheffield and Riseman (2019, 291).

40. Sheffield (2004, 179–180). Shadian (2014) describes how post-World War II and Cold War focus on the strategic Arctic shaped Canada’s federal Inuit policy and affected Inuit in both Canada and Alaska.

41. Homecoming, Gardiner (1992, 180), Sheffield and Riseman (2019, 247–249). Māori Battalion’s Colonel Arapeta Awatere (2003, 188–189) spent two months travelling the country to attend *tangi* (funeral rites) for the men he had lost. On the “social legacy” of the war for Māori, McGibbon (2004, 213–214); pensions and benefits, Alves (1999, 38–39).

42. Hill (2004, 184–227), McGibbon (2004, 213–214), Orange (2000, 237–341). Māori veteran officer Awatere (2003) described his postwar welfare work under the Act as a continuation of war service.

43. Bargh and Whanau (2017), McGibbon (2000), Scoppio (2018), Sheffield and Riseman (2019, 288, 307), Winegard (2012, 265–266). Major General Poananga, https://teara.govt.nz/en/biographies/5p32/poananga-brian-matauru. Bargh and Whanau (2017) discuss Māori in the private military industry, including the the image of them as “warriors” and as particularly skilled at interacting with local people in countries of operation.

44. Curthoys (2000, 134), Shoemaker (2004, 69–74).

45. Hall (1995, 29, 84), but see Riseman (2013) on racism in the Australian armed forces.

46. Broome (2002, 174–175), Curthoys (2000), Shoemaker (2004, 33–34).

47. Reed (2004, 145–147), Sheffield and Riseman (2019, 257–269).

48. Indigenous veterans and alcohol prohibitions, Sheffield and Riseman (2019, 251–252). The symbolism of alcohol laws as a marker of restricted citizenship and in relation to military service deserves comparative study. For Papua New Guinea, Sinclair (1992) describes how the 1963 lifting of alcohol prohibition helped integrate the Pacific Islands Regiment, and says it was a significant issue for the sense of PNG people as full citizens—but I wonder if this was true for women?

49. Curthoys (2000, 135–137), Sheffield and Riseman (2019, 295–299); RSL, Curthoys (2000), Sheffield and Riseman (2019, 293); postwar assimilationism, Broome (2002), Haebich (2008).

50. Noonuccal, Hall (1995, 119), http://adb.anu.edu.au/biography/noonuccal-oodgeroo-18057; Reg Saunders, H. Gordon (1962), Grimshaw (1992), Hall (1995, 85–87), Curthoys (2000).

51. Noonuccal, "instrumental," Hall (1995, 120); Torres Strait Islanders, Beckett (1987, 100–105), Hall (1997, 57–59). Riseman (2014b) shows how racial ideas of assimilation and integration have intersected Aboriginal Australian military service from the Boer War through Vietnam.

52. Saunders, H. Gordon (1962, 136); colour bar, Hall (1995, 85); national service, Sheffield and Riseman (2019, 224); 2012 figures, Winegard (2012, 266).

53. Hall (1997, 191).

Chapter 13

1. Recent reviews of public war memory in Germany and Europe, Messenger (2020), Taylor (2011); in Japan, Conrad (2014), Dower (2012), Hashimoto (2015), Y. Tanaka (2018, xv–xxviii). Chirot, Shin, and Sneider (2014) compare German and Japanese memorialization. Chapters in Fujitani, White and Yoneyama (2001) describe the complexity of Asia-Pacific war memories at the fifty-year mark; studies of the sixtieth and seventieth anniversaries show how internal and international politics affected commemorations throughout Asia (Twomey and Koh 2015, Yang and Mochizuki 2018).

2. France, Hastings (2011, 637); Finland, Kinnunen and Kivimäki (2012); Great Britain, Watson (2015); China, Lary (2011), Mitter (2020); Taiwan, Lan (2013); Pearl Harbor memorial, including Indigenous Hawaiian perceptions, White (2016); *Enola Gay* controversy, http://digital.lib.lehigh.edu/trial/enola/resources/.

3. India, Khan (2015, 295–321); Southeast Asia, Wang (2000); Micronesia, Poyer (1992). Somare, "had no relevance," Sinclair (1992, 146); PNG holidays and remembrance, Nelson (2007a). Ritchie (2017) describes an oral history project to put Islander voices at the center of PNG's wartime history. Naga views of the war as not part of their own history have been changing with greater foreign attention to the Battle of Kohima (Chasie and Fecitt 2020, 19–20).

4. Southeast Asian uplands, Scott (2009); Nenets, Gorter-Gronvik and Suprun (2000, 139); Marshall Islands, Carucci (1989).

5. Pohnpei, Falgout (1989); Shan, Ferguson (2018). Other examples of the persisting impact of Pacific War memories in Falgout, Poyer, and Carucci (2008, esp. pp. 34–36), Lindstrom and White (1989), Poyer, Falgout, and Carucci (2001, 347–355; 2004; 2010), White and Lindstrom (1989); Puas (2021) offers a Micronesian scholar's perspective.

6. Hargesheimer, https://edu.pngfacts.com/education-news/school-with-odd-name; Blum and Vouza, Keithie Saunders (2013, 285); RAMSI, and other Solomon Islands postwar links, Newell (2016, 224, 231); Seabees, Gegeo (1991, "They said," p. 34).

7. Cleary (2010, 331–351).

8. US veterans' efforts, Sacquety (2013, 227–229). Kohima, Chasie and Fecitt (2020, 122–124), Lyman (2016, 232–235); "When he approached," http://kohimaeducationaltrust.net/about

9. German visits to Finnish Lapland, Seitsonen and Koskinen-Koivisto (2018). Japanese and Okinawan visits to Micronesia, Iitaka (2015), Poyer, Falgout and Carucci (2001, 339–340). Dvorak (2018, 87–91) describes "Nan'yō nostalgia" (holding to colonial memories) in two Japanese communities whose residents were repatriated from Palau and Saipan, but few younger Japanese know of Japan's historical links with Micronesia.

10. Murik, Shaw (1991); Nishimura, Happell (2008).

11. Liberation Day and war remembrance in Micronesia, Falgout, Poyer, and Carucci (2008, 26–32); e.g., on Pohnpei, Turner and Falgout (2002). On many islands, the holiday celebrations do not directly address World War II events. See also Dvorak (2018, 153–156) on Kwajalein, which in the 1990s renamed "Liberation Day" as "Memorial Day," focusing more on war's losses. The Christmas season ritual of Enewetak (Marshall Islands), though, explicitly integrates the story of war, US occupation, and relocation for atomic bomb testing (Carucci 1997).

12. Camacho (2011), Diaz (2001). Woodward (2013) analyzes literary representations of Guam's wartime experience in the context of US colonialism and modern geopolitics.

13. Camacho (2011, 127–135, "the language of American loyalty," p. 131; "is as much about forgetting," p. 160). McKinnon, Ticknor, and Froula (2019) describe a program sponsored by the US National Endowment for the Humanities to involve Islander veterans and their families in discussion of the CNMI's "difficult heritage" of war. The CNMI now celebrates July 4 as Independence Day.

14. Tarawa, McQuarrie (2012, 209–218).

15. Japanese missions, Trefalt (2016), also Bennett (2009a, 279–280); on cross-cultural misunderstanding on these missions, Toyoda (2006); in the Marshall Islands, Dvorak (2018); Northern Marianas, Camacho (2011, 116–123).

16. Tonga, Bennett (2009a, 270), Hixon (2000, 129).

17. Japanese relationships to cemeteries and battlefields in Southeast Asia, M. Cooper (2006, 2007); Tarawa, McQuarrie (2012, 155); Guadalcanal, "We carried," Fifi'i (1988, 223–224). Dvorak (2018, 157–166, 237–240) describes the ongoing connection of Japanese families of Kwajalein's war dead with that atoll.

18. Peleliu, N. Price et al. (2013, "Older locals," p. 226; "were not," p. 228). Herva (2014) describes the subtle "haunting" and "magic" of German matériel found in Finnish Lapland; Dvorak (2018) on social and supernatural interaction with ruins on Kwajalein and other Marshall Islands battlegrounds. Mageo (2001) describes the possession of a young Samoan woman by the spirit of a crashed US Marine pilot who symbolizes the wartime era of change.

19. US interest in British Pacific, Bennett (2009a, 275–277; 2012, 92–95); Fiji, Leckie (2015, 25); repatriation from Libya, https://www.odt.co.nz/news/national/call-repatriate-maori-war-dead-overseas; Bomana War Cemetery, Scates (2013, 249). A poignant photo in Nelson (1982, 198) shows the grave of one unknown Papua New Guinea war worker, a simple white cross inscribed "NATIVE BOY."

20. Sinclair (1992, 194). It commemorates forty-three European and sixty PNG coastwatchers. Yauwika, a coastwatcher who served in Bougainville, attended the dedication ceremony. Commander Eric Feldt's ashes were cast into the ocean here after his death in 1968.

21. Gegner and Ziino (2012, "political heritage," p. 1). Lowe (2020) examines recent political complexities of World War II monuments in several countries. Bennett and Poyer (n.d.) discuss the many issues of war memory in the Pacific Islands dealt with in this chapter.

22. Manipur, Guite (2011); Timor-Leste, Leach (2015); Australian sense of debt, Cleary (2010), K. James (2016, 54).

23. Camacho (2011, 97–104). Park critique, Herman (2008), Camacho (2011, 186 n. 11).

24. In 1978, more than four thousand Japanese a month came to Saipan—demolition experts, businessmen, honeymooners, and others (Manchester 1979, 274). Besides the many Japanese markers, Manchester mentions a Chamorro memorial to 490 Islanders who died in the battle on Saipan but remarks on the absence of US monuments to their more than 16,500 dead. Japanese tourism and Memorial Park, Camacho (2011, 120–135, 187–188 n. 25), https://www.saipantribune.com/index.php/932-chamorros-carolinians-perished-during-wwii/.

25. Kwai (2017, 88–90), Bennett (2009a, 283–287); vandalism, G. White (2015, 194).

26. Statues, Kwai (2017), G. White (1995, 2015). Lindstrom (2001, 122–126) discusses how Vouza is represented in published photographs. Compare the memorial raised in honor of Kachin comrades by Detachment 101 veterans at the US Embassy in Yangon (Rangoon) (Sacquety 2013, 111).

27. Meaning of Fiji memorial, Leckie (2015, "conventional" ceremony, pp. 19–21).

28. Tarawa, "battling for memorials," Bennett (2012). A monument to Korean dead was installed at Betio Memorial Peace Park in November 1991 (McQuarrie 2012, 209–218).

29. Bennett (2012, 102–104) discusses how Tarawa memorials are affected by geopolitics.

30. Keuea, McQuarrie (2012, 229–235); coastwatchers' memorial, Bennett (2012, 102–103), https://nzhistory.govt.nz/media/photo/tarawa-coast-watchers-memorial.

31. Murray (2016, Antonio Tewid, "They are," p. 212); N. Price et al. (2013, 229–240). On Micronesian war landscapes and memorials, Falgout, Poyer, and Carucci (2008, 32–34). Okinawa, too, struggles with how to portray the battle of April–June 1945, especially violence against Okinawans by Japanese forces. Public memory is further complicated by disputes over the continuing US military presence and Ryukyu people's effort to define a distinct Indigenous identity, which means repositioning their wartime role vis-à-vis Japan (Figal 2007, 2012; also Ishihara 2001).

32. As in public debates over whether German Army remains in northern Finland should be protected as heritage or cleared away as "war junk" (Seitsonen 2021, Seitsonen and Koskinen-Koivisto 2018), or whether the site of a "comfort station" where Japanese troops raped Aboriginal Taiwanese women should be memorialized (Chou 2008).

33. Dark tourism, Foley and Lennon (2000), C. Ryan (2007). Japanese battlefield tourism, M. Cooper (2006, 2007); Australians, Scates (2013), Weaver (2013); war tourism in the Pacific Islands, Reeves and Cheer (2015) and other chapters in Carr and Reeves (2015). O'Dwyer (2004) analyzes personal photographs from 1944–1945 Saipan and Tinian, using Teresia Teaiwa's (1994) concept of "militourism," which has generated much critical analysis of the links between tourism and war. More generally on war and tourism, Butler and Suntikul (2013), Logan and Reeves (2009).

34. Handicraft sales boomed wherever large numbers of soldiers were based; for example, Germans in Finland bought reindeer products and fur clothing from Sámi (Evjen and Lehtola 2020). On war and handicrafts in the Pacific Islands, Akin (1989), De Burlo (1989), Panakera (2007), Poyer, Falgout, and Carucci (2001, 271–272, 302–303); US troops' appetite for battlefield souvenirs and local "curios," Bennett (2009a, 243–267). War shaped tourism in other ways as well, for example, as traditional dances entertained troops. Adria Imada (2012) discusses how deployment of Hawaiian luau and hula as entertainment for hundreds of thousands of troops and defense workers prepared the way for expanded tourism.

35. Peleliu, N. Price, Knecht, and Lindsay (2015); underwater resources, Browne (2019), Emesiochel et al. (2017); Chuuk, Strong (2013); Vanuatu, Lindstrom (2015); on salvage, wrecks, and tourism in East New Britain (Rabaul), Stone (1994, 362–473) and in Solomon Islands, Panakera (2007, 136–139); Espiritu Santo's South Pacific World War II Museum, www.southpacificwwiimuseum.com; Spennemann (2006) covers a range of World War II heritage preservation and tourism issues across Micronesia. Looting or "treasure hunting" of military sites remains a problem of heritage also in Finland's Lapland, another "marginalized" region (Herva et al., 2016). More broadly on the archaeology of twentieth century conflicts, Schofield, Johnson, and Beck (2002).

36. M. Cooper (2007), Kwai (2017, 90), Panakera (2007), G. White (2015, 197–200, 212 n.8). Similarly, Coates and Morrison (2013) describe how World War II and Cold War projects in Canada's Northwest—especially the Alaska-Canadian Highway and airfields—contributed to tourism there, as did wartime publicity about the region.

37. On the Kokoda Trail (also called "Kokoda Track"), Beaumont (2016), Bennett (2009a, 285–287), Brawley and Dixon (2009), Inglis (1998), K. James (2017), Lynn (2017), Nelson (2006a, 2007a), Scates (2013, 230–253). Recent plans, https://www.thenational.com.pg/legislation-for-new-entity-to-manage-kokoda-underway/. Mistreatment of modern guides/carriers, post by Charlie Lynn, www.pngattitude.com/2019/01/09.

38. Embogi, Nelson (1982, 198–199), Newton (1996). See Close-Barry and Stead (2017), Stead (2017, 2018) on rethinking these events and the moral challenge of war tourism for Oro Province.

39. A classic of veterans' tourism is US Marine veteran William Manchester's *Goodbye, Darkness* (1979), combining a history of the battles with a travelogue of postwar conditions; Manchester visited with local veterans, including (soon-to-be Sir) Jacob Vouza on Guadalcanal.

40. Generational shift in tourism, De Burlo (1989), Nishino (2017), Panakera (2007), Yamashita (2000). Kohima, Chasie and Fecitt (2020, 125–134); Finnish Lapland, e.g., Seitsonen and Koskinen-Koivisto (2018), S. Thomas, Seitsonen, and Herva (2016).

41. Hall (1997, 191) made this connection for Aboriginal Australian military service.

42. Colonial forces were historically erased from the liberation of Europe, in a "whitening" (*blanchissement*) of the French Army (Mann 2006, 20–22; Maghraoui, 2014), and German massacres of French colonial troops in 1940 were lost or hidden in national memory (Scheck 2006, 162). British officials hijacked and "whitened" the April 1941

entrance to Addis Ababa, first reached by two companies of the King's African Rifles, wanting a white South African unit to enter the capital first (Hastings 2011, 299).

43. Sinclair (1990, 284, 297).

44. Palau, Murray (2016, 112–113); Yasukuni Shrine, Poyer and Tsai (2018), Simon (2006), N. Tanaka (2004).

45. Te Rau Aroha, https://www.waitangi.org.nz/discover-waitangi/te-rau-aroha/. On *minshūshi*, Morris-Suzuki (2015), Seaton (2015, 2016).

46. Murmansk, Evjen and Lehtola (2020, 40). The Naryan-Mar statue was dedicated in 2012 (Dudeck 2018). Vallikivi (2005) points out that the hegemonic national narrative of the Great Patriotic War makes it hard for Nenets to engage with their own history of the 1943 uprising that resisted its demands on their small community.

47. Canada, Lackenbauer and Sheffield (2007, "no longer forgotten," p. 226), also Sheffield and Riseman (2019, 305–306).

48. The Childers statue is by Apache artist Allen Hauser (Whitlock 1998, 405–406). Carroll (2008, 207–222) describes racist objections to memorializing Piestewa by changing the offensive "Squaw Mountain" name. "How her life is depicted shows that anyone thinking participation in the military will win Natives acceptance from non-Natives is in for a brutal shock" (Carroll, p. 206). The name change to Piestewa Peak was made official in 2008.

49. Hall (1997); also Hall (1995), Riseman (2015). On Indigenous presence and absence at war memorials as "sacred sites"—the term echoes places of spiritual significance to Aboriginal Australians—see Inglis (1998, 441–451).

50. "Australia Remembers" events, Curthoys (2000, 140), Inglis (1998, 412–483), Reed (1999, 2004). Riseman (2012b) describes how Indigenous service is represented in the creative arts. Inglis (1998, 348–411) documents greater inclusiveness of war memories and memorials. Attention to Indigenous wartime experiences can be seen on ANU, Australian War Museum, and University of Queensland AustLit websites.

51. Ulungura, Riseman and Trembath (2016, 121). An annual Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Commemoration Ceremony is held on Anzac Day at the Australian War Memorial, https://www.awm.gov.au/commemoration/anzac-day/atsivsaa. Eucalyptus leaves, Scates (2013), "the burning of gum leaves is said to heal the land and assert a sense of Australianness," p. 251. On resistance to memorializing European invasion as national history, Inglis (1998, 441–451), Scates (2017).

52. Yoshimi (2015, 242–243).

53. Trefalt (2003, 160–178).

54. Lehtola (2015, 140–142); Banivanua Mar (2016); Gegeo (1988).

Chapter 14

1. Sámi exemption, Lehtola (2019, 228–230).

2. Lackenbauer (2007, 2013) on the Canadian Rangers. Canada has used Indigenous residence in lightly populated areas to serve sovereignty, in 1953 forcibly relocating a group

of Hudson Bay Inuit 1,200 miles north to Ellesmere Island in part to confirm national claims (McGrath 2006 recounts their tragic story). Barry Zellen has linked a territorial military with greater Arctic sovereignty in the idea of a specialized Inuit force based on World War II-era militias (Zellen 2009, 17–27, 49, 125–180). Besides Rangers, other Canadian armed forces programs encourage Indigenous engagement (Scoppio 2007).

3. J. James (2010, 375), Riseman and Trembath (2016, 144–156); on NAOU links with NORFORCE, Walker and Walker (1986, 178–182). Besides NORFORCE, the other two RFSUs are the 51 Far North Queensland Regiment (30 percent Torres Strait Islander and Aboriginal Australians) and the Pilbara Regiment. Australian Army Indigenous initiatives, https://www.army.gov.au/our-people/army-indigenous-community.

4. Poyer (2017). This useful image comes from Robert Gordon's study of Namibia, where nationalism arose not from war per se—most Namibians worked in South Africa, far from combat—but: "What the War did was to create a space in which Namibians were forced to use their own initiative" (R. Gordon 1993, 162). For many Indigenous communities, too, the war "created a space" for new identities and political options.

5. Pau (2018a, 13–14) remarks that the colonial use of ethnic categories to organize military enlistment and labor in the India-Burma border region "served as a glue that cemented nationalistic fervor"; "Either as enemy or ally of their colonial masters, Zo people used such opportunities to build relationships among themselves" (p. 13).

6. Plesch and Weiss (2015) point out that—although history tends to focus on the military prosecution of World War II—idealism and its embodiment in humanitarian and multilateral agreements were also essential in bringing it to a close. The anti-fascist war and decolonization embedded anti-racism in international discourse.

7. Rÿser (2012) discusses Indigenous options from independence to various forms of autonomy within a nation-state; see also Singh (2018). Bens (2020) analyzes the "indigenous paradox" of seeking sovereignty by way of existing legal structures, in North and South America. In Myanmar, Dunford (2019) contrasts how hill tribes have used the international status of Indigenous peoples to further their goal of autonomy, but the state itself sees definitions of indigeneity as a way to limit citizenship rights of other minorities.

8. Some scholars go further, suggesting that Indigenous self-determination offers new ideas to reformulate global politics, and that Indigenous claims based on histories of conquest challenge the very legitimacy of state authority (for example, Ivison 2020, Keal 2003, Lightfoot 2016, Mörkenstam 2015, Muehlebach 2003, Shadian 2014).

9. Equal rights as a "weapon," Curthoys (2000, 140–141); Australia, Chesterman and Galligan (1997, 193–222), Curthoys (2000), Pitty (2009); Guam, Quimby (2011); American Samoa, R. Franco (1989), Mannion (2018). O'Sullivan (2020) discusses Indigenous rights and self-determination in the context of liberal democracies.

10. Stewart, "a love affair," (2018).

11. Sissons (2000) on Ngata's ideas and the history of biculturalism.

12. As examples of these recent debates, Lightfoot (2016, 141–168), O'Sullivan (2020).

13. In the postwar years this took the form of merging Indian Affairs with federal management of immigrants, "Canadianizing" both (Bohaker and Jacovetta 2009). The

focus was on treaty Indians; other Indians and Métis were considered ordinary citizens, and Inuit affairs were handled separately until 1966.

14. Bohaker and Jacovetta (2009, 458, n. 89, citing *Citizens Plus* [Indian Association of Alberta, 1970])

15. See "citizen-soldiers plus," Lackenbauer (2013, 23). The "citizens plus" idea is explored in detail by Alan Cairns in a 2000 book of that title. Canadian political philosopher John Ralston Saul (2014) argues for seeing the current Indigenous movement as a positive good for the entire Canadian public, offering a chance to rethink civic life.

16. See "citizens-minus," Mercer (2003). *Citizens without Rights* is the title of a book by Chesterman and Galligan (1997, 3); see also Chesterman (2005) on the Indigenous Australian struggle for civil rights and its intersection with Indigenous rights.

17. USSR and Russia, Donahoe (2011), P. Gray (2005). Soiot "fossilizing themselves," Donahoe (2011, 413); see also King (2011, 41–81) on Koryak identity and government policy. As Slezkine (1994, 385) put it, "The future of the circumpolar peoples seemed to lie in the past." Berg-Nordlie (2015) discusses how Soviet, then Russian, minority policies have affected Sámi.

18. P. Gray (2005, especially pp. 181–182). Golovnev and Osherenko (1999) describe Nenets political and economic life in the post-Soviet era, including involvement in international Indigenous interest groups such as the Arctic Council, WCIP, and the World Reindeer Herder's Association. In the Pacific context, O'Sullivan (2018, 2020) has argued that differentiated citizenship might benefit self-determination for Māori and Indigenous Fijians.

19. Cairns (2003); Meyer (2012) is similarly cautious about the limits of nation-state flexibility.

20. Banivanua Mar (2016, 224).

21. Kent (2014, 77–78). Sillanpää (1994) analyzes how Sámi self-determination changed as their status shifted from internal minorities to a globally recognized international Indigenous community; Nyyssōnen (2007) reviews how the writing of Sámi history has changed along with those ethno-political developments.

22. Kent (2014, 75–76). The conference gathers every four years to discuss various topics, from language to natural resources to global Indigenous issues, http://www.saamicouncil.net.

23. On Sámi activism on the Kola Peninsula, Berg-Nordlie (2015), Overland and Berg-Nordlie (2012). Russian Sámi are involved in the Arctic Council and the Inuit Circumpolar Conference (Kent 2014, 66, 71–76).

24. Eidheim (1997) describes how Sámi changed from being an ethnically unselfconscious population to a well-organized, self-aware, transnational community over a few decades.

25. Eidheim (1997, 36–59), Kent (2014, 69–71), Nyyssōnen (2007, 214–216), Semb (2010, 76–79).

26. Sweden's national policy does not offer Sámi differential rights in land ownership or use (Lantto 2010, 551–552). Saglie, Mörkenstam, and Berg (2020) compare the

development of Sámi parliaments and self-determination in Norway and Sweden. In Russia, many Sámi who fled repression on the Kola Peninsula before and during the war were absent when perestroika opened a chance to claim land rights. Instead, Russian and foreign commercial interests brought new threats to Sámi rights and lifestyle (Took 2004, 299–321). Chapters in Koivurova et al. (2021) review current issues in Indigenous arctic self-governance and resource use.

27. Lantto (2010, 551–552), Selle, Semb, and Strømsnes (2013, 724–725); overlapping political identities, Semb (2010, 101).

28. Zo, Pau (2018a, 13–17, "border not only," p. 17); Arctic examples, G. Christie (2011), Shadian (2014), Zellen (2009).

29. J. Franco (1999, 152).

30. The emergence of globalized Indigenous identity, recognizing each community's uniqueness, is discussed in Niezen (2003). Anishinaabe political scientist Sheryl Lightfoot's 2016 *Global Indigenous Politics: A Subtle Revolution* argues that the analysis and development of the concept of self-determination by the global Indigenous Rights movement has the potential to reconfigure the international legal order in a significant way (see also sources in note 8, above).

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