**IMISCOE Research Series**

## Pragna Rugunanan Nomkhosi Xulu-Gama *Editors*

# Migration in Southern Africa IMISCOE Regional Reader

**IMISCOE Research Series**

Now accepted for Scopus! Content available on the Scopus site in spring 2021.

This series is the offcial book series of IMISCOE, the largest network of excellence on migration and diversity in the world. It comprises publications which present empirical and theoretical research on different aspects of international migration. The authors are all specialists, and the publications a rich source of information for researchers and others involved in international migration studies. The series is published under the editorial supervision of the IMISCOE Editorial Committee which includes leading scholars from all over Europe. The series, which contains more than eighty titles already, is internationally peer reviewed which ensures that the book published in this series continue to present excellent academic standards and scholarly quality. Most of the books are available open access.

Pragna Rugunanan • Nomkhosi Xulu-Gama Editors

# Migration in Southern Africa

IMISCOE Regional Reader

*Editors* Pragna Rugunanan Department of Sociology, Auckland Park Campus University of Johannesburg Johannesburg, South Africa

Nomkhosi Xulu-Gama Department of Sociology, Upper Campus University of Cape Town Rondebosch, South Africa

ISSN 2364-4087 ISSN 2364-4095 (electronic) IMISCOE Research Series ISBN 978-3-030-92113-2 ISBN 978-3-030-92114-9 (eBook) https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-92114-9

© The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s) 2022. This book is an open access publication. **Open Access** This book is licensed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits use, sharing, adaptation, distribution and reproduction in any medium or format, as long as you give appropriate credit to the original author(s) and the source, provide a link to the Creative Commons license and indicate if changes were made.

The images or other third party material in this book are included in the book's Creative Commons license, unless indicated otherwise in a credit line to the material. If material is not included in the book's Creative Commons license and your intended use is not permitted by statutory regulation or exceeds the permitted use, you will need to obtain permission directly from the copyright holder.

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This Springer imprint is published by the registered company Springer Nature Switzerland AG The registered company address is: Gewerbestrasse 11, 6330 Cham, Switzerland

*Pragna Rugunanan I dedicate this book to Anil, Meeren and Nikhil, with deep love, always Nomkhosi Xulu-Gama I would like to dedicate this book to my children, Mikhosi, Zanda and Libo Ngiyanithanda bafethu*

### **Foreword**

I recall that it was in October 2018 when we had the frst conversation between the Chris Hani Institute (CHI) and Professor Pragna Rugunanan from the Sociology Department at the University of Johannesburg (UJ) regarding possible research and broader intellectual collaboration. We met fortuitously at Wits University, in a workshop on the future of the labour project. Our conversation immediately drew in the subject of migration, which was a common research and intellectual interest of both UJ colleagues and CHI researchers. We agreed that, while there was a lot of research and literature in the body of knowledge on migration, our own individual experiences with the subject brought to the fore the dominance of 'the North' over both research and theory, and the dearth of theorising migration from a South-South perspective.

From that conversation, we began formulating the idea of collaborating, which culminated in a workshop in July 2019. The workshop brought together a number of Southern scholars on migration and related disciplines. At the workshop, numerous papers were presented within the broad theme of Southern perspectives on migration. Furthermore, we beneftted from Emeritus Professor Edward Webster's harmonisation of key points from the different workshop sessions, the crafting of possible research programs and institutional arrangements needed to build scholarship on migration from Southern perspectives.

This book is an output from this inaugural workshop, but it is also the frst of a series of our intended research collaborations towards building nascent scholarship in Southern studies of migration. While the book advances novel perspectives and knowledge on Southern studies in migration, it also has an intentionally Africanist contextual framework in thinking, experiencing and researching migration.

Migration is inextricably linked to historical developments that have produced our present experience and knowledge of southern Africa. From as far as Tanzania to the southern tip of South Africa, the historical roots of migration continue to feature in languages, surnames and clan names as well as cuisines, refecting a tapestry of infuences ranging from Bantu to Indian, Arabic and European cultures. What we today call the Southern African Development Community (SADC) has even stronger migration linkages, as mainly men migrated to mines in Kimberley and the Rand in South Africa over the turn of the twentieth century. The discovery of diamonds and gold heightened migration in South Africa, characterised by a confuence of an internal migrant labour system, recruitment of migrant workers from neighbouring colonies, and European migration into mining towns in search of the promise of better work prospects. At the turn of the twentieth century, mining capital even brought migrant labour from China. In the Natal colonies, on the other hand, there was Indian indentured labour from the 1860s, later followed by Indian merchants and petty bourgeoisie settling in Natal.

The roots of current migration trajectories in the region can be traced to the apartheid regime and its massive incursions on the region, destabilising legitimate independent governments, seeking to force these countries to isolate anti-apartheid movements operating in exile, from Mozambique all the way up to Angola. Some of these incursions included sponsoring rebel forces, resulting in protracted civil wars as well as the economic collapse of these countries. Other push factors for regional migration into post-apartheid South Africa (in particular) and Botswana include the negative effects of structural adjustment programs (SAPs), poor governance by post-colonial ruling elites, and violent contests for state power that have produced civil wars, genocide and consequent dislocation of scores of affected people.

The challenge of climate change manifests in unpredictable changes in weather conditions, droughts in many parts of the region, repetitive cyclones and fooding in Mozambique, and the threat of mutative diseases following the global Covid-19 pandemic, pointing to continuing push factors for people to relocate either in search of mere survival or to escape political repression and ethnic cleansing, or for better prospects of life for themselves, their families and their posterity. These have been the main push factors for migration dating from early human civilisation.

This book edition is a beginning of a conversation to bring Africa in particular and the South in general to the forefront of knowledge production on the movement of people, and theorising it from perspectives from the Global South. We are indeed anticipating engaged discussions, but more so development of scholarship that will not only produce research and knowledge on migration but also inform struggles for a liberatory understanding and political action on migration, frst in the SADC region, and then broadly in the South.

Chris Hani Institute Sithembiso Bhengu

### **Acknowledgements**

We wish to acknowledge the timeous contributions of the authors of this volume and for taking part in the frst round of internal review. Our sincere appreciation is due to Emeritus Professor Edward Webster for his thought-provoking and probing questions during the conceptual phase of the colloquium and his summation at the end, which paved the way for this edited compilation. Thank you to the University of Johannesburg for hosting the 2-day colloquium in July 2019, and the Chris Hani Institute as well as the National Research Foundation of South Africa for partly funding the colloquium. We also acknowledge the fnancial contribution of the Faculty of Humanities at the University of Johannesburg for editorial services. Any opinions, fndings, conclusions or recommendations expressed here are those of the authors, and the funders do not accept any liability in this regard. We are truly grateful to Claire Ceruti for editing this manuscript and for her meticulous attention to detail. Thank you to Mavhungu Ramavhoya for her assistance in the editing process. Last but not least, a deep appreciation goes to our families, for the many stolen hours that culminated in this edited volume. This manuscript was put together at the height of the Covid-19 pandemic, and the emotional, mental and physical strain on individual contributors cannot be taken for granted nor generalised. We are thankful for the resilience of all who contributed to this project.

### **Contents**



### **Contributors**

**Kezia Batisai** is an associate professor in the Department of Sociology at the University of Johannesburg.

**Christine Botha** is a research associate of the Global Change Institute, University of the Witwatersrand, and is a candidate architect at 1 to 1 Agency of Engagement and Hoven Design.

**Betty Chiyangwa** is a doctoral candidate in the Department of Sociology at the University of Johannesburg.

**Steven Lawrence Gordon** is a senior research specialist at the Developmental, Capable and Ethical State research division within the Human Sciences Research Council. He is also a research associate of the Faculty of Humanities, University of Johannesburg.

**Samukele Hadebe** is a senior researcher at the Chris Hani Institute and a research associate of the Department of Sociology at Rhodes University.

**Anthony Kaziboni** is the director of research at the Institute for the Future of Knowledge at the University of Johannesburg.

**Grace Khunou** is a professor in sociology and director of Scholarship Transformation in the Department of Leadership and Transformation at UNISA.

**Aisha Lorgat** is a researcher at the Chris Hani Institute and doctoral candidate at the University of Cape Town.

**Johannes Machinya** is a postdoctoral research fellow at the Wits Institute for Social and Economic Research (WISER), under the research program *Regions2050: Mobile spaces, porous borders, and pathways of regionalization.* He holds a doctorate in sociology from the University of the Witwatersrand.

**Musawenkosi Malabela** is a researcher at the Chris Hani Institute and is a doctoral candidate in the Sociology Department at the University of the Witwatersrand.

**Biniam Misgun** is a lecturer in the Department of Economic History and Development Studies at the University of KwaZulu-Natal.

**Tebogo Mogoru** is a researcher at the Chris Hani Institute.

**Kearabetswe Mokoene** is a doctoral candidate in the Department of Sociology at Wayne State University, United States.

**Khangelani Moyo** is an independent researcher and research associate of the Global Change Institute, University of the Witwatersrand.

**Caroline Muyaluka Azionya** is a lecturer in the Department of Strategic Communication at the University of Johannesburg.

**Sibongile Ruth Nhari** is in the Durban University of Technology Writing Centre (Alan Pittendrigh Library) and is a doctoral candidate at the University of KwaZulu-Natal.

**Anna Oksiutycz** is a senior lecturer in the Department of Strategic Communication at the University of Johannesburg.

**Chioma Joyce Onukogu** is a senior research associate in the Department of Sociology at the University of Johannesburg, and research associate at the African Centre for Migration and Society at the University of the Witwatersrand, Johannesburg.

**Pragna Rugunanan** is a professor in the Department of Sociology at the University of Johannesburg.

**Karabo Sitto** is a lecturer in the Department of Strategic Communication at the University of Johannesburg.

**Nomkhosi Xulu-Gama** is a senior lecturer in the Department of Sociology at the University of Cape Town.

### **Abbreviations**



### **List of Figures**


### **List of Tables**


### **Chapter 1 Introduction**

**Pragna Rugunanan and Nomkhosi Xulu-Gama**

### **1.1 Introduction**

It is the main contention of this book that there is a decisive and urgent need for migration research from a southern African perspective. The chapters in this book contend that South-to-South migration will dominate migration trends, leading to an increase in migration *within* the Global South and *to* the Global South. The predominant literature on the Global South adopts theoretical and methodological scholarship rooted in South-to-North migration. While there is an emerging body of knowledge in the sociology of migration within the Global South (Landau & Bakewell, 2018; Batisai, 2017; Rugunanan, 2016), here we assert that there is a noticeable absence of theorising migration *from* the Global South *about* the Global South. We build on Segatti's (2011) assessment that the migration literature has ignored population mobility and international migrant workers in Africa and, in particular, southern Africa.

In view of the efforts to centre theories from the South (Connell, 2007, 2009), and the decolonial movement in South Africa (Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2018; Mbembe, 2004, 2017), this volume contributes to an emerging scholarship calling for a redefning of how we view and theorise migration in the Global South. To engage in widespread theoretical reconceptualisations about African migration, the contributions in this book pose the following questions: who is migrating, to which countries, and what are causes of migration? In addition, the contributions interrogate whether the migration is a renewed form of circular migration, how southern African migration infuences transnationalism, the continuities and discontinuities of

P. Rugunanan (\*)

N. Xulu-Gama

Department of Sociology, University of Johannesburg, Johannesburg, South Africa e-mail: prugunanan@uj.ac.za

Department of Sociology, University of Cape Town, Cape Town, South Africa e-mail: nomkhosi.gama@uct.ac.za

P. Rugunanan, N. Xulu-Gama (eds.), *Migration in Southern Africa*, IMISCOE Research Series, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-92114-9\_1

remittances sent to places where migrants originate, and how migrants are received in the countries of the South.

In South Africa specifcally, migration in the twentieth century consisted of two main types: (1) immigrants, exclusively white until the mid-1980s, arriving primarily as "family class" migrants from Europe, with women accompanying their working spouses and (2) migrants, primarily black and male, from Botswana, eSwatini, Lesotho, Malawi, Zimbabwe and Mozambique, who were permitted temporary entry into South Africa under bilateral agreements. Although temporary migration was male-dominated, women later followed their spouses or travelled on their own to South Africa. Early studies on migration in South Africa focused on the migrant labour system, and were situated within neo-classical economic theories of migration. In the 2000s, the emphasis shifted to the impact of immigration and permanent migration. The current emphasis appears to be on the negative stereotypes of immigrants, xenophobia, and policy implications from a human rights and regional perspective (Landau, 2009; Posel, 2003).

A primary reason for migration to South Africa is its relative political stability and economic prosperity. This view is confrmed by an extant body of literature in South Africa (Rugunanan, 2016; CDE, 2008; Landau & Gindrey, 2008). Migrants search for and make informed choices about their destination. The Global South and South Africa, in particular, have become preferred destinations. This view supports the new economics of labour migration theory, which purports that the decision to migrate is based on government initiatives and multinational corporate investment decisions that offer the potential to economically diversify and develop new labour market skills. For many migrants, their choice to migrate is not only driven by the search for ostensible individual freedom and opportunities, but also the hope that such freedom and opportunity would provide for migrant worker families and possibly economic interests in their countries of origin.

Therefore, this book ultimately proposes to explore and interrogate the existing defnitions of a 'migrant' with a view to conceptualise a defnition which speaks to the complexities, envisioning a more inclusive southern African region. We investigate the various levels of migration, moving from the local (rural to urban and urban to rural) to cross-border migration; middle-class versus working-class migrant; household livelihoods; livelihood procurement vs. wage earning; social capital (networks) and how migrants make meaning of their circumstances in a 'foreign' space, among other avenues of inquiry. The importance of the history of migration and generational change is also missing from recent studies of migration in South Africa. While migrants of the 1950s faced conditions similar to those facing migrants today, the biggest difference is that men dominated the process of population mobility1 in the region. The feminisation of migration has elevated the importance of women migrating within southern Africa, and the role of children has become an important dynamic within this space.

<sup>1</sup>For the purposes of this book, the terms migration and population mobility are used interchangeably.

The historical unfolding of cross-border migration2 in southern Africa is complex and unpredictable; the infuences are both locally induced and internationally exacerbated. Although cross-border migration intersects with local mobility, it clashes more than it converges. There has been a reconfguration of the way we understand geographical spaces (productive and reproductive spheres; inbound and outbound) and identities, and what we understand as (paid and unpaid) work. Labour migration particularly, both local and cross-border, has contributed to 'new forms of labour', continuing to exert pressure on existing workers as well as the South African labour movement. The feminisation of labour, organising and mobilising migrants, and the precariousness of mobile populations are some of the immediate challenges that confront us as a society and as scholars in developing a sociology of migration.

### **1.2 Key Contributions of the Book**

This book begins by proposing new ways of theorising migration in the southern African region, arguing that dominant western perspectives do not fully ft the dynamics of South-to-South migration. The majority of the book comprises empirical perspectives from different parts of southern Africa. The book recognises the interweaving of gender and class as crucial in analysing migration processes. In a novel way, rather than allocating specifc chapters to address each of these social issues, we blend them together across the chapters in varying dimensions to highlight the intersectionality of migration. This is one way of elevating the complexity of labour migration. The migration processes cannot be categorised as those of either low skilled or highly skilled migrants; rather, the everyday lived experiences of migrants refect a different and complex reality. In the feld of migration, it is a norm that scholars research either rural-urban/urban-rural migration or international migration, assuming that there are no similarities or relationships between the two. This book, however, incorporates the two types of migration, rural-urban and international migration, and examines their shared complexities and challenges. We give serious consideration to the presence of children in population mobility in the region. Children have been largely ignored by migration scholars, as well as the complicated positions that women with children fnd themselves in throughout the migration processes. This book examines South African policy and legislation on migration, refugees, asylum seekers, workers and workers' rights. We use case studies of the application of policy to examine where it is applied accordingly. The key contribution that the book makes is bringing a Southern-theory focus to the sociology of migration.

<sup>2</sup>We use the term cross-border migration and international migration interchangeably.

### **1.3 Theoretical and Methodological Processes That Brought the Book to Life**

One of the foundational aims of this collaboration was to give prominence to African voices engaged in South-to-South migration. The recently established sociology of migration research collaboration between the Department of Sociology at the University of Johannesburg and the Chris Hani Institute embarked on a two-day colloquium, with approximately 30 delegates, on 1 and 2 July 2019 as an initial step in a long-term programme to develop and consolidate a South African and a Global-South centred body of knowledge on migration and its sociological implications.

The colloquium aimed to bring together academics working in the area of migration studies and to begin the discussion, aiming to develop a comprehensive, up-todate sociology of migration that is focused on identifying different research interests to further the development of research on migration in southern Africa, from a theoretical, conceptual and methodological level and with a Global South perspective, focus or orientation. One of the initial goals of the colloquium was to produce a peer-reviewed edited book based on presentations at the colloquium, to consolidate the emerging strands in the sociology of migration scholarship in southern Africa. One of the longer-term goals is to envision relevant institutional formations for broader research collaboration across southern Africa and a home for a sociology of migration.

We accept Posel's (2003) recommendation that further research explaining patterns of migration through case studies and ethnographic approaches is necessary, with a southern African perspective. While much of the research on migration in South Africa has been quantitative, this book's approach uses mainly qualitative methods that provide greater fexibility and also offer deeper insights into communities of migrants across southern Africa. Methodologically, the majority of these chapters are based on primary data collected at different times, and on research projects based in countries of southern Africa.

### **1.4 Structure of the Book**

The book is divided into six parts.

**Part I** begins by proposing new ways of theorising migration in the southern African region, by elucidating how Western forms of theorising fail to capture the differences and complexities of South-South migration. The last quarter of the twentieth century has witnessed a change in the direction, pace and nature of migrant populations, with Asia, Africa and Latin America replacing Europe as the major area of origin (Arango, 2000). Mbembe (2017: 9) pre-empts our argument when he claims: "Europe is no longer the centre of gravity of the world." This key insight underpins the crux of the book's pronouncement that the scholarship of South-South migration has often ignored intra-African migration, despite the increase in North African migration to southern Africa.

**Batisai's** thought-provoking chapter lays the conceptual groundwork for part one of this edited volume, which calls out the obsession of migration literature for its 'Asian biases', where the focus of Asian migration has either been amongst Asian countries or to the Global North. While an extensive body of literature on migration in Africa exists, it is often through the conceptual gaze of Northern theories and literature, and she challenges these universalistic overtones when examining migration in southern Africa. Making a strong argument for interrogating what it means to be 'foreign', and debunking the concept of a black African migrant in Africa, Batisai convincingly calls for a "conceptual renegotiation of the meaning of Africanness and African identities."

**Rugunanan's** chapter argues for the development of a retheorising of migration from the Global South with emphasis on South-to-South dynamics. Her chapter on the fows of South Asian migrant workers to South Africa demonstrates that insuffcient attention has been given to why migrant workers migrate from less-developed countries to developing countries, which culminates in new(er) geographies of growth.

**Hadebe** uses the Economic Structural Adjustment Programme (ESAP) in Zimbabwe to explain precisely the argument that large-scale labour migration erupted as a result of neoliberal capitalist practices, giving rise to competition between nationals and foreigners, often resulting in xenophobic violence that destabilises working class solidarity.

**Part II** of the book examines the legislation and policy frameworks governing migration. Here we seek to question why, despite having one of the most progressive constitutions in the world, signifcant anti-immigrant sentiment persists in South Africa.

**Gordon** demonstrates that despite developing progressive migration policy and legislation in South Africa, implementation remains fraught with anti-immigrant sentiments amongst the populace at large. One of the failures of the South African government, evidenced by recurring and violent xenophobia, he argues, is the lack of a coherent immigration integration policy. He questions why a young democracy such as South Africa has struggled to develop meaningful policy.

**Moyo and Botha** engage with the South African state's policy practices for refugees and asylum seekers. The chapter traces the evolution of the decision-making timeline when reviewing the policy landscape, whilst examining the migration infrastructure or lack thereof for refugees and asylum seekers.

Extending the discussion on legislation and policy, **Xulu-Gama, Nhari, Malabela and Mogoru** embrace the South-South migration framework to situate their chapter about foreign national migrant workers and worker education programmes at the workplace. This chapter is based on research by the Chris Hani Institute (CHI), focussing on worker education and worker control. Trade unions in South Africa have been criticised for their neglect of organising migrant workers and in particular unskilled and semi-skilled migrant workers. This chapter provides some insight into a body of research largely ignored in the South African landscape on migration.

**Part III** reveals the crucial interplay of policy and legislation juxtaposed against internal migration and regional mobility. The focus on internal migration in South Africa has lapsed in recent decades. Since the Abolition of Infux Control Act in 1986 and the advent of democracy in South Africa in 1994, the lens of migration studies has shifted to a focus on international migration into the country. The case studies on internal migration show how the rural and urban landscapes in South Africa have changed the spatial segregations in South African towns and cities.

The case study by **Azionya and Oksiutycz** showcases an interesting nexus where internal and cross-border migration overlap in informal settlements. The chapter captures the views of the participants in the informal settlement of Zandspruit, a culturally rich melting pot, populated by internal and cross border migrants. The chapter is a good refection of the failed promise of South Africa to its citizens and migrant population.

**Xulu-Gama** uses feminist standpoint epistemology as a way of validating the experiences of women in the migration feld when men have traditionally been given preference. Xulu-Gama makes an important contribution by showing the similarities between rural-urban and cross border migrant women, an aspect of research often ignored in the southern African context.

In **Part IV**, a neglected area of research in the southern African space is a focus on mothers and children as migrants.

**Mokoene and Khunou** demonstrate how young mothers in historically migrant families are forced by circumstances to become internal migrants and how their search for work interfaces with South Africa's social security system, through the child support grant. The chapter is a reality check on how cycles of poverty are reinforced in rural areas by the lack of employment prospects in urban areas.

**Onukogu** examines, more broadly, children as participants in international migration. She considers second generation immigrant children who embrace an alternate migration trajectory. The chapter foregrounds a conceptualisation of second generation from a South African perspective. It applies resilience theory to explain the challenges the children face and the protective factors that provide support and promote resilience among the children.

Extending the discussion on second generation immigrant children, **Chiyangwa and Rugunanan** study crucial development issues at the intersection of migration and education for second generation migrant children in the rural context of South Africa and how they access education. Using a relational approach, the chapter found that second generation Mozambican migrant children strongly valued access to education.

In **Part V**, the discussion on second generation migrant children brings to the fore notions of identity politics in migration studies.

**Sitto** provides insight on voluntary economic migrants seeking new professional opportunities. Adapting to the host country contexts requires that migrants reconsider "social representation barriers arising from acculturation schismogenesis". The chapter considers how migrants reconstruct their identities within transnational places whilst building a new social reality. The issue of identity and social realities is not the same for all migrants to South Africa, the destination of choice. While migrants are drawn to the country because of its strong constitutionalism and respect for human rights, the repeated upsurges in xenophobic violence against certain groups of migrants raise questions about the issue of migrants' identities.

**Kaziboni** explores how intra-African migration and xenophobia are related in a post-apartheid state. The chapter demonstrates that discrimination and oppression are manifest in covert and overt experiences of xenophobia. He claims that xenophobia is rooted in South Africa's racist past, and further contends that immigrants are surviving in a "post-apartheid apartheid" South Africa.

Continuing with the concept of identity, **Misgun** explores the tactics and strategies of integration of Ethiopian migrants in South Africa, examining how they make sense of and construct their social identities as African migrants. By problematising integration, Misgun contextualises sameness and difference, movements and moments in the unfolding and recreation of their identities in these transnational social spaces.

**Part VI** of the book expands on worker rights and new forms of work.

**Machinya** scrutinises the work practices of undocumented Zimbabwean migrant daily-wage workers in eMalahleni, South Africa. Rising unemployment in South Africa is detrimental to documented and undocumented migrants. Machinya's chapter examines how the Zimbabwean day labourers develop a series of work habits guided by values of hard work, trustworthiness and reliability "just to get by".

**Lorgat** contends that international human rights are not inclusive of undocumented migrants, but the demand for their inclusion is made on a pragmatic and human rights basis. Trade unions in South Africa have been unsuccessful in accessing and organising atypical workers, many of whom are migrants. Lorgat engages with trade union representatives in the construction sector in Cape Town to interrogate trade unions' responsiveness to migrants' rights claims.

### **References**


**Open Access** This chapter is licensed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits use, sharing, adaptation, distribution and reproduction in any medium or format, as long as you give appropriate credit to the original author(s) and the source, provide a link to the Creative Commons license and indicate if changes were made.

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### **Part I Theorising Migration from a Southern Perspective**

### **Chapter 2 Retheorising Migration: A South-South Perspective**

**Kezia Batisai**

### **2.1 Situating a South-South Theoretical Perspective**

Literature reveals that very little conceptualisation has been done on South-South migration with a particular focus on African migration, despite an increase in the movement of people, goods, services and capital within and across the continent (Batisai, 2016a, 2017; Aleshkovsky, 2016). For instance, the number of South-South migrants approximately balances the number of South-North migrants, as almost half of all reported migrants move between countries located in the Global South (Aleshkovsky, 2016; Batisai, 2016a; Nawyn, 2016). Where scholars such as Deshingkar et al. (2014) have explored South-South encounters, the focus has been on gendered realities of migration between and within Asian countries. Other scholars have analysed the South-South migration patterns through which countries in the Global South serve merely as stepping stones enroute to global cities in the Global North (George, 2005; Sassen, 2003). These migration patterns have produced 'Asian biases' as scholars focus on migration between Asian countries in the Global South or from Asian countries in the South to the Global North (Europe and the USA, but not Japan, Singapore or Hong Kong). Broadening the conceptual scope beyond the Global North and its Asian biases, this chapter's gaze is on the realities of migration within and between African countries.

This chapter is not a reinvention of the wheel; neither is it a mere expansion, nor disregard, of existing international migration theories. Rather, the chapter takes cognisance of the challenges of universalistic approaches to migration realities that often undermine the fact that both experience and knowledge are contextual. In this chapter, the emphasis is on retheorising migration to account for contextual specifcities that characterise and shape the realities of those who move within and across the continent. The chapter makes a deliberate effort to illuminate how emerging

K. Batisai (\*)

Department of Sociology, University of Johannesburg, Johannesburg, South Africa e-mail: keziab@uj.ac.za

<sup>©</sup> The Author(s) 2022 11

P. Rugunanan, N. Xulu-Gama (eds.), *Migration in Southern Africa*, IMISCOE Research Series, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-92114-9\_2

South-South theorisations resonate with migration realities in the broader Global South context; and, where necessary, expose gaps or enhance existing theorisations located in the Global North.

The chapter focuses particularly on Africa, where migration – subsequent to involuntary push factors such as civil wars, political violence, economic challenges, extreme poverty and other social realities specifc to the continent – is often a forced experience compared to the Global North where it is a choice and lifestyle. For instance, South Africa is increasingly a major transnational destination for migrants from different African countries due to the ever-evolving socio-political and economic crisis on the continent (Batisai & Manjowo, 2020; Batisai, 2016a; Kufakurinani et al., 2014). Migration to South Africa is therefore a poverty reduction strategy for most southern African migrants (mainly Zimbabweans), and those from distant African countries (Nigeria, Cameroon, Somalia, Ethiopia and the Democratic Republic of Congo), who regard the country as the regional powerhouse (Manjowo, 2019; Singh & Khan, 2017; Nshimbi & Fioramonti, 2014). One cannot begin to understand and theorise migration on the continent without paying attention to the socio-political and economic challenges that push or force many citizens involuntarily out of their homeland into a foreign country, which in many instances is South Africa. An analysis of the South-South migration experience from a Global North perspective misses these contextual specifcities that shape the migratory process in the Global South.

Guided by the observation that there is very little theoretical understanding of South-South and African-southern African migration, this chapter develops contextbased theorisations rooted in the socio-historical, as well as theorisations informed by situated contemporary meanings and complexities of the migratory experience on the continent. Contextual theories of migration in this chapter avoid rendering the specifc universal by exploring the state and how it polices the migratory process; society and the social meanings it attaches to 'that which is foreign'; and the ultimate meaning of being a black African migrant in Africa. The chapter theorises that when the diverse experiences of people who have crossed internal and external borders in Africa are juxtaposed, they tell a profound conceptual narrative about the meaning of living in a 'foreign' space. The main conceptual contribution of this chapter is that it is built around experiences that hardly fnd their way into mainstream discourses and theorisations because of the Global North and Asian biases articulated above, which have dominated what is considered as the literature and theories of migration. Analysing the politics of inclusiveness and exclusiveness allows this chapter to raise ontological and epistemological questions that serve as powerful phenomenological lenses through which scholars located in the Global South can imagine and explore notions of identity and diverseness (Batisai, 2019). Answers to these questions are key to that which is produced as a sociology of migration theory and knowledge.

### **2.2 Retheorising Migration Without Recreating the Borders**

This chapter rethinks migration without recreating the same intellectual and physical borders that sociology of migration scholars strive to dismantle. As the chapter refers to the unavoidable Global North-Global South binary, as well as (trans) national and ethnic borders, it illuminates the importance of the deconstruction theory in sociology of migration. Inserting a deconstructive perspective into migration theory allows scholars in the Global South to debunk both imagined and real borders that create complex insider-outsider identities that often exclude internal and cross-border (transnational) migrants. Instead of merely rehashing realities known or obvious to the sociology of migration, retheorising migration in this chapter entails identifying key contextual conceptualisations. These contextual realities further our understanding of migration in light of the much-needed theoretical explanations that are shaped by the diverse socio-political and economic realities specifc to the continent. The contextual specifcities include the history of labour migration, the economic meltdown and political violence that have shaped the migratory process over the years, gendered vulnerabilities and sexual and health-related realities, xenophobia, feminisation and the precariousness of labour, Africanness, and emerging questions of exclusion and inclusion. These thematic areas expose how existing defnitions and experiences of an internal or cross-border migrant are shaped and reshaped by historical intersections of race, class and gender among other categories central to the formation of a migrant identity in Southern Africa.

### **2.3 Historicising (Labour) Migration in Southern Africa**

A theory of migration will be inadequate without mapping the history of labour migration in Africa, particularly southern Africa – the historical and contemporary epicentre of migration in sub-Saharan Africa (IOM, 2020; Agadjanian, 2008; Oucho, 2006). The historical position echoes the observation that, in addition to post-independence realities, internal and transnational migration confgurations are better understood within the historical and political context that has been central to the evolution of African societies (Adepoju, 2006). Throughout the colonial period and the apartheid era, unskilled labour criss-crossed from non-mining to mineralrich countries such as Zambia, Zimbabwe and South Africa (Oucho, 2006). Over the decades, the criss-crossing birthed a wide range of concepts in migration literature aimed at understanding the complexity of migration confgurations based on the migration regimes specifc to the African context (Adepoju, 1979, 2006). Of particular interest is the concept of circulation, which "seems to best encapsulate the essence and specifcity of migration dynamics in Africa – the non-permanent movements in circuits within and across national borders, which begin and (must) end at 'home'" (Adepoju, 2006:26). To date, circulation – also referred to as seasonal or temporary migration – is central to conceptualisations of migration and the realities of a migrant identity in Southern Africa.

Circulation – which explained how migrant mineworkers in apartheid South Africa, who were recruited from the peripheral countries for specifed periods, had to go back home and repeat the migration process as and when their labour was needed (Adepoju, 2006) – is still relevant almost three decades after apartheid. Over the years, South Africa has received and continues to receive a huge infux of nonpermanent migrants from Lesotho, Mozambique, Swaziland, now known as eSwatini, and Zimbabwe to work in farms and mines across the country (IOM, 2010; Sachikonye, 1998; Crush, 1995). The infux is best understood in light of contextspecifc, complex social factors as well as persistent economic diffculties that push internal and transnational migrants in Africa (Adepoju, 2006). By the turn of the twenty-frst century, Zimbabweans were migrating in numbers to different global destinations, including South Africa, in an attempt to escape the shifting sociopolitical terrains and economic strain weighing heavily on citizens with limited (if any) sources of income in their homeland (Batisai, 2017; Kufakurinani et al., 2014). Hence the conclusion that "the southern African transnational migration system, pivoted on South Africa, is the largest on the sub-continent" (Manjowo, 2019:1). Post-apartheid South Africa is yet to fulfl the promises of democracy, such that a South-South theory of migration interrogates the realities of being a migrant in a country where historical forces intersect and produce hierarchized inequalities for citizens (Batisai, 2018). Juxtaposed, the realities of South Africans and black Africans from across the continent suggest a way for re-engaging and retheorising the multilayered notion of xenophobia that affects the region and the continent at large.

Even though labour migration has been observed across the globe, the historical character, in southern Africa, of migration that is largely seasonal or temporary (IOM, 2010; Brummer, 2002) makes it particularly interesting for scholars to theorise about the vulnerabilities and precariousness of being a migrant worker in the region. The theory of migration would be incomplete if not conceptualised and located in the context of HIV/AIDS, gendered vulnerabilities and risks that the migratory process causes for migrants in southern Africa. For instance, the region accounts for 46% of the world's HIV infections; and women are 61% of the infected population, accounting for 59% of new infections, whilst adolescent girls and young women account for 29% of new infections (UN Women, 2020). A theoretical analysis of gendered vulnerabilities and risks is pertinent for African migrants whose number one destination country, South Africa, recorded a total of seven million people infected with HIV in 2015, and accounted for 40% of new infections worldwide (Statistics South Africa, 2016; UNAIDS, 2016). Currently, South Africa has 221 new infections and an alarming record of nine girls and young women infected per hour on average (UN Women, 2020). A South-South migration theory stands to beneft from an analysis of the unique contextual vulnerabilities and risks, as well as the intersections of HIV/AIDS and migration in southern Africa.

While scholars acknowledge the non-causal relationship between migration and the transmission of HIV, there has been an increasing recognition of the

vulnerabilities to HIV infection among mobile populations relative to non-mobile ones (Muindi et al., 2014; IOM, 2010; Oucho, 2006; Brummer, 2002). The vulnerabilities are attributed to the way migration infuences behaviours and creates environments conducive for the transmission of HIV from person to person (Muindi et al., 2014). The transmission often happens as migrants working in the context of circulation (seasonal or temporary migration) return home to their families regularly (IOM, 2010; Adepoju, 2006; Oucho, 2006; Brummer, 2002). In addition to circulation, southern Africa experiences high levels of forced mobility as political violence survivors seek refuge or asylum and ordinary citizens try to escape extreme poverty in their home countries. A gendered analysis of the migration trends in southern Africa reveals that young women – younger than 19 years – constitute 20% of the 44% of migrants who either voluntarily migrate or are traffcked from Malawi, Mozambique, Zambia and Zimbabwe, among other countries across the region (IOM, 2014). Women migrants, whether traffcked or not, "face the triple burden of being female, foreign and, often, working in dangerous occupations" (UNDESA, 2006:2). From a healthcare perspective, this burden, world over, manifests as medical xenophobia, experienced when migrant and refugee women try to access maternal and general healthcare services (Zihindula et al., 2017; Pollock et al., 2012).

What differentiates the South from the North is that, often, healthcare systems in the former are battling with the increased burden of disease (Chiwire, 2016), overwhelming demands of a rapidly increasing population (Yeld, 2013), and high levels of migration (Walls et al., 2016). In southern Africa, for example, South Africa is failing to meet the medical demands of its citizens to the extent that medical xenophobia can be partly attributed to increased pressure from migration that aggravates existing healthcare challenges (Batisai, 2020) as migrant women resort to free public maternal healthcare (Benjamin, 2019). Migrant women of child-bearing age in sub-Saharan Africa (median age: 30.6 years) constitute 47.8% of 22,976 migrants (IOM, 2017:25), while in South Africa the same population constitutes 44.4% of the 4,037,000 migrants, with a median age of 33.7 years (UNDESA, 2017:26). Most migrant women have very limited fnancial resources, which puts them at risk of sexual violence with little to no access to sexual and reproductive healthcare services (Mafuwa, 2016). An analysis of the impact of intersecting socio-economic, gendered labour realities and sexual and health-related factors on the well-being of migrants and refugees in southern African enhances South-South migration theory.

### **2.4 Migration and Feminisation of Labour in the South**

The South-South migration theory in this chapter builds on the observation that, similar to the migration of women from the Global South to global cities often located in the Global North (Sassen, 2003), new forms of labour have resulted in the migration of women between Global South countries in search of green pastures (Batisai, 2016a, 2017). However, African women's migratory experiences of feminisation of labour on the continent are hardly incorporated into mainstream discourses and theorisations because the focus has been on the socio-economic impact of women's transnational migration from Asia to countries in the Global North and in the Middle East. The scholarly gap presents an opportunity for this chapter to focus on African migrant women's experiences of feminisation of labour in response to ongoing calls for new theorisations of gender and sexuality in the diaspora (Batisai, 2015, 2016a; Pasura, 2014; Tinarwo & Pasura, 2014; Fonkem, 2013).

A theory of feminisation of labour migration on the continent brings to the fore the interplay between gendered migrant labour and women's empowerment. Contrary to the domestication of women that traditionally reduced their work to "reproductive or intimate labour" (Boris & Parreñas, 2010), the theory of feminisation of labour takes into account African migrants' progressive roles as key economic actors who, through their work in destination countries, exercise their agency and navigate or subvert long standing gendered and xenophobic hierarchies (Batisai & Dzimiri, 2020; Batisai, 2016a). For instance, Zimbabwean women in South Africa break the shackles of gendered stereotypes that previously tagged them as non-productive citizens, and they emerge as superheroes whose fnancial contributions sustain families and the economy of their motherland (Madambi, 2020). The women renegotiate gendered identities that are linked to their sexual and reproductive bodies and embrace an emerging breadwinner role, which was previously perceived as a male preserve (Batisai & Manjowo, 2020). Thus, the process of theorising feminisation of labour on a highly patriarchal continent deploys migrant women's emerging identities and roles to debunk the long standing gendered categorisation of women.

By contrast, the process of retheorising migration is also informed by the shortcomings of the rising feminisation of labour on the continent that has led to the marketisation of childcare within households (Smit, 2014). Children in the Global South increasingly spend more time with domestic workers than their migrant parents; and migrant domestic workers also emerge as absent mothers who spend more time at work than with their children (Sibanda & Batisai, 2021; Sibanda, 2019; Batisai, 2017). For instance, the multifaceted economic and political crisis in Zimbabwe saw many parents migrating alone and leaving their children behind, resulting in prolonged periods of separation or even permanent separation (Madziva, 2010). Batisai (2017) interrogates the meaning Zimbabwean migrant women in South Africa assign to transnational mothering experiences, particularly those that expose theories of motherhood, intimacy, separation, moral degeneration, and bewilderment. The theories complement those stemming from South-North migration, especially the experiences of Zimbabwean mothers in the UK that reveal how separation undermines family life (Madziva & Zontini, 2012), as well as a sense of loss rooted in the absence of physical interaction between mothers and their children recorded among Ecuadorian mothers in Italy (Boccagni, 2012).

Evidence from South-South migration contradicts positive narratives of material mothering observed among Sri Lankan women located in the Global North, who use the money they remit home to compensate for their absence (Gamburd, 2000). In essence, it challenges conceptualisations that mothering can operate without physical proximity (Madziva & Zontini, 2012). Zimbabwean migrant women's experiences in South Africa challenge the materiality of love because they feel guilty about neglecting the children they left across the border (Batisai, 2017). The absence of parents affects the child-parent bond, leaving the children to negotiate their identities in a context of low self-esteem and with no sense of attachment, such that they resort to anti-social forms of recognition, including drug misuse (Sibanda & Batisai, 2021; Sibanda, 2019). These South-South realities expose gaps and enhance existing theorisations that unpack migrant women's experience of mothering from a transnational context.

South-South migration literature reveals that while family separation, among other social consequences of migration, cannot be addressed remotely, digital media plays a central role in how migrants experience and manage transnational relationships (Meyers, 2019). Zimbabwean migrant women, for instance, acknowledge that social networking platforms such as WhatsApp have, in recent years, increased their levels of interaction with their children back home (Batisai, 2017). Thus, South-South theoretical discussions that make reference to the interplay between digital media and transnational mothering in South Africa and the continent at large contribute to the body of literature on this emerging feld of social enquiry (Mandewo, 2022; Meyers & Rugunanan, 2020; Meyers, 2019).

### **2.5 Rethinking Africanness in the Context of South-South Migration**

Several incidents of xenophobia have been recorded in Global South contexts, particularly in Asian countries such as China (Hangwei, 2020; Wang & Qin, 2020) and India (Rugunanan, 2016). However, the unique nature of xenophobia in southern Africa calls for ongoing serious contextual theorising. Episodes of xenophobic attacks in South Africa justify conceptual renegotiation of the meaning of Africanness or African identities, especially for black African migrants located in spaces of violent and brutal prejudice against those perceived as foreign. Emerging out of the 2008, 2015 and 2019 spates of xenophobic attacks is a contextual theorisation about 'black against black violence' that captures the violent and brutal attacks on black foreign nationals by black South Africans (Batisai, 2016b; Brookes, 2015; Gqola, 2008). Even though the reasons for these xenophobic attacks vary, it can be argued that a wide range of theories about xenophobia attributes the attacks to a shortage of jobs and poor service delivery (Rukema & Khan, 2013). The black African migrant in this instance is theorised and perceived "as a new danger to society, a threat, an invader intent on usurping the hard won materialities which the locals earned with sweat and blood" (Tafra, 2011:116). Retheorising migration from a South-South perspective allows a migrant identity to be understood and read through contextual socio-economic and even politicised realities. The theorisation further exposes "the xenophobic grammar and vocabularies that frame black African migrants as bodies that destabilise the very foundation and survival of the nation" (Batisai, 2016b:129).

Theoretical analysis of the foreign identity in the context of xenophobia reveals that "foreign nationals are 'throw-away people' who disturb the status quo" (Batisai, 2016b:128). This analysis echoes what Mary Douglas terms "matter out of place" or "dirt in the bedroom", particularly the argument that dirt belongs in the garden, such that when it is in the bedroom, it is pollution and the only way of dealing with "matter out of place" is to "sweep it up" or "throw it out" (see Hall, 1997:330). Ultimately, "the 'foreigner' [should] be kept at a distance, expelled and if all else fails, destroyed" (Tafra, 2011:116). The metaphors speak to the ways in which the violent insults, prejudices and physical attacks on foreign nationals become a legitimate way of marking difference which, according to Douglas, serves "to stigmatise and expel anything which is defned as impure, abnormal" to ensure that order and sanity return to society (Douglas quoted in Hall, 1997:330). These metaphoric representations illuminate some of the situated social meanings that society attaches to 'that which is foreign'; and the ultimate meaning of being a black African migrant in Africa – core to the production of rooted theories of migration in this chapter.

### **2.6 A Theory of Migration That Crosses Nationalistic and Ethnic Boundaries**

The chapter rethinks migration and the meaning or scope of xenophobia in the context of identity politics that emerge from social relational interactions and intermarriages between South Africans and black Africans from across the continent. As children of the latter acquire permanent immigrant status, or South African citizenship upon reaching the age of majority irrespective of their place of birth or nationality, they produce complex 'diluted' identities. These acquired identities blur the xenophobic migration boundaries that often serve as the very foundation of excluding the other. Consequently, answers to who belongs and who does not or what constitutes the 'in group' and the 'out group' are not static, due to "ethnic and cultural intermixing, intermarriage, cross-cultural love relationships and 'interbreeding'" in South African societies (Tafra, 2011:116). Hence the inference that "the xenophobic binaries that exist between citizens ('in group') and foreign nationals ('out group') shift depending on one's contextual socio-economic positionalities" (Batisai, 2016b:128). As migration boundaries become blurry, the liberty to retheorise migration in Africa allows this chapter to move beyond binary nationalities in a manner that generates contextual knowledge – core to our understanding of the South-South and African-South African migration realities – which either makes new contributions or enhances existing international migration theories.

### **2.7 Concluding Theoretical Standpoints**

This chapter provides contextually relevant insights into how migration is experienced, understood and theorised from a South-South perspective. Emerging out of this chapter is a South-South migration theory that crosses and debunks nationalistic and ethnic boundaries that are too deterministic in nature. 'Beyond nationalisms and binaries' is a theory that is inspired by the observation that, similar to women's land struggles that are shared across Africa (Chipuriro & Batisai, 2018; Bauer et al., 2017; Bouilly et al., 2016), being black in South Africa is a constant struggle for both citizens and migrants (Batisai, 2019). This observation validates the recommendation that scholars who write about women's struggles in South Africa should go beyond South African women to encompass "women who follow the fow of the Limpopo southwards" because "they too seek their emancipation" (Gasa, 2007:xv). Similar to the seminal work of Biko (2004) on collective forms of blackness, juxtaposing African migrant women's struggles with those of their South African sisters moves these struggles from the peripheries of literature on migrancy (Gasa, 2007), presenting these struggles as polarised slips into "unnecessary and uncomfortable hierarchies of blackness" (Batisai, 2019:97), which, in the context of post-apartheid South Africa, are more complex than before (Khunou et al., 2019).

As the chapter moves beyond exclusive nationalistic binaries, it illuminates the shared experiences, connectedness and commonalities amongst blacks irrespective of nationality and contextualised cultural specifcities (Chipuriro & Batisai, 2018; Gasa, 2007). The collective theorisation brings Africa together and reinforces the spirit of solidarity without perpetuating the same colonial gaze and the global matrices of power that have historically homogenised African people at the expense of their heterogeneity, individuality and diverseness (Tamale, 2011). The theoretical standpoint acknowledges that the most signifcant differences amongst blacks intersect and collectively infuence their positionalities, which in turn determine how they access opportunities and resources and what they produce as knowledge (Batisai, 2019). Refecting on being a black South African, Phaswana (2019) hints at these commonalities implied in how she survived exclusion in higher education by pledging solidarity with other blacks, and how she ultimately realised that her struggle was not isolated because it speaks to black people's broader struggle for existence and survival.

The all-encompassing black African identity disrupts language and nationalistic borders; it deconstructs pigmentation differences and divisive grammars or vocabularies such as 'the better black' discourse, which breeds competition over space and recognition (Batisai, 2019:98). The disruption or deconstruction is of great signifcance to a South-South theory of migration because the binaries constitute the very basis for xenophobic othering, which raises questions of belonging as one tries to ascertain where home is (Ndlovu, 2010). Black African migrants in the South African context have become part of the broader society such that their struggles warrant scholarly attention (Kihato, 2007). These experiences are rich conceptual sources that enhance theoretical and analytic frameworks in this chapter. That way, black African migrants "emerge as brothers and sisters whose black African identity, not nationality, matters [and] Africanness as a result of this 'embrace' ceases to be territorialised [or] reduced to one's national identity" (Batisai, 2016b:127). Acknowledging collective struggles allows this chapter to retheorise migration by assigning new meaning to Africanness and embracing a 'black African identity' that crosses nationalistic and ethnic boundaries.

The thought-provoking solidarity theory hints at the intellectual wealth in Africa that could potentially rebuild the continent from within through socio-economic and political regional integration facilitated by migration. The need to acknowledge the intellectual wealth in Africa is partly informed by African migrants' progressive self-representations in print and social media as 'not just foreigners', given how they deconstruct long standing xenophobic hierarchies and actively contribute to the economy in transnational spaces (Batisai & Dzimiri, 2020). Although the focus is on Africa, southern Africa and more specifcally South Africa, far reaching empirical and theoretical conclusions can still be drawn because some of the migratory experiences discussed in this chapter are shared across countries in the broader Global South context. These commonalities are often characterised by unequal distribution of resources that shape the socio-economic and political dynamics of migration in the Global South. Thus, inserting African experiences into existing South-South literature exposes gaps in scholarly debates that have been largely informed by the gendered realities of migration amongst and within Asian countries; and simultaneously enhances existing South-North migration theorisations.

### **References**


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### **Chapter 3 Migrating Beyond Borders and States: Instrumental and Contingent Solidarities Among South Asian Migrant Informal Workers in South Africa**

**Pragna Rugunanan**

### **3.1 Introduction**

South-to-South migration will dominate global migration trends instead of Global South to Global North in the future. With the imposition of stricter immigration controls across many European Union and North American countries, the Global South and South Africa, in particular, became preferred destinations. There is increasingly a recognition that half of all international migration is South to South (Nawyn, 2016; Czaika & de Haas, 2015) and that South-South migration differs from South-North migration (Bylander, 2017; Nawyn, 2016; Rugunanan, 2016; Anich et al., 2014). This calls for redefning how we view and theorise about migration to the Global South – who is migrating, to which countries, the reasons for migration, whether this is a renewed form of circular migration, our understanding of transnationalism, the role of remittances, and how migrants are received in the countries of the South.

When South-to-South migration was recognised as a feld, research largely focused on migration and development, determining how South-South migration diverged in comparison to South-North movements (Bylander, 2017; Anich et al., 2014; Hujo & Piper, 2010; Bakewell, 2009). The fndings revealed that migration in the Global South may be transient; border porosity remained worrying; narrowing wage differentials and declining remittances, with migrants moving to insecure places, produced concerns about the declining levels of well-being (Bylander, 2017). In addition, fears that the "trends towards the feminisation of migration" are less visible are raised made by Melde (2014, cited in Bylander, 2017). While an argument can be made that considerable empirical research is still required on understanding the dynamics of South-to-South migration (Bylander, 2017; Melde, 2014), there is also an acknowledgement that the similarities and differences in

P. Rugunanan (\*)

Department of Sociology, University of Johannesburg, Johannesburg, South Africa e-mail: prugunanan@uj.ac.za

<sup>©</sup> The Author(s) 2022 25

P. Rugunanan, N. Xulu-Gama (eds.), *Migration in Southern Africa*, IMISCOE Research Series, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-92114-9\_3

migration to the Global South are under-theorised (Nawyn, 2016; Rugunanan, 2016). The view that an understanding of South-to-South migratory dynamics is absent depends on the positionality and placement of the author(s).

With the fastest growing economies located in the Global South (World Bank, 2016), many countries in the Global South have received the largest increases in net migration (Czaika & de Haas, 2015). In 2017, approximately 97 million migrants born in developing countries relocated to other developing countries (South-to-South migration); around 89 million migrants born in developing countries migrated to developed countries (South-to-North migration) (United Nations, 2017). Many migrants from developing countries such as Mozambique, Nigeria, Zimbabwe, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Pakistan, India, and Lesotho settle in South Africa, also a developing country, in the hope of social and economic success (Peberdy, 2016). Despite these statistics and realities, research about migration to and from Africa is not given the prominence it deserves in the global migration literature. Even when it is written about, attention is given to authors from the Global North writing about Africa (Whitaker, 2017; Nawyn, 2016). This chapter, therefore, questions how we begin to decolonise our research when we still privilege the Global North; where are the voices on the African continent theorising the broader scholarship on migration?

This chapter contributes to an understanding of South-to-South migration by examining South Asian and African migration to South Africa. Since the founding of Johannesburg in 1886, migrant communities have successively recrafted and reconceptualised their identities and have given multiple meanings to the same communal physical and historical spaces (Rugunanan, 2016). A deeper question that I grapple with is conceptualising "community" in the broad sense but also consisting of several ethnic communities, leading to tensions amongst identity, belonging and community. My research examines new migratory fows after 2000, from South Asia and North Africa to South Africa, and shows how people retreat into enclaves, causing multiple identities to emerge. I explored the interrelationships amongst Indian, Pakistani, Bangladeshi, Egyptian and Malawian migrants and with South African nationals living in a bounded space, or neighbourhood, called Fordsburg, in Johannesburg. The research considered the role that family relationships, livelihoods, religion, and remittances play in the integration of migrant communities, and demonstrated how social networks and social capital, become the solidarities that connect and reinforce communities.

Migrants, I argue, developed "an instrumental and contingent solidarity", which transcends the dichotomy of inclusion and exclusion (that is, how power is experienced through xenophobic violence), practices of religion and economics, and how they move towards a politics of inclusion where they overcome forms of exclusion. My main fnding is that solidarity is the glue that binds migrant communities and when we have different migrant communities sharing bounded spaces, a contingent and instrumental solidarity emerges. Strands of solidarity emerge from sharing precarious journeys to South Africa and sharing economic and cultural spaces, but not communities: instead, strands of solidarities become a strategy for survival, contingent on the need or circumstance. I argue that communities are created through

necessity, stemming from the need to "belong to something and to identify with something" (Rugunanan, 2016:318). Solidarity becomes the pivot upon which communities are forged. Thus, I argue that migrant communities develop instrumental solidarity and draw upon resources from each other in the form of employment, loans, sharing of accommodation and labour, but deliberately exclude the South African community as a source of labour. There is a contingent and instrumental solidarity that is dependent on the benefts that can be accrued through social capital. Solidarity is sensitive to extraneous factors as it is always subject to change, always shifting. The forging of a contingent and instrumental solidarity was visible in the early migrant communities of Johannesburg and is repeated in the new migrant communities in the post-2000 era (Rugunanan, 2016).

### **3.2 Why the Global South?**

Together with Nawyn (2016) and Czaika and de Haas (2015), I argue that more people are moving within the Global South rather than from the Global South to the Global North (Rugunanan, 2016). Amidst fears of rising international terrorism, the perception created by political and economic elites is that migrants are a major drain on state fnances and compete with native-born workers for employment. In response, countries in the Global North have selectively shut borders and corridors, resulting in the imposition of stricter immigration controls across many European Union and North American countries, and fuelling anti-immigrant sentiment across the North. The recent increase in waves of migration due to political uncertainty in many developing countries has resulted in a role reversal for some receiving countries in Europe. Traditionally migrant-sending countries such as Portugal, Italy, and Spain have suddenly become migrant-receiving countries, with migrants from Brazil, Morocco, and Tunisia, to name a few (Gheasi & Nijkamp, 2017). Adding to their complexity, forms of migration have changed, ranging, for example, from "asylum seekers, temporary and permanent resettlers, economic migrants, labour migrants, knowledge migrants, tourists who became permanent residents, social migrants, [and] international students" to different types of immigration as well (Gheasi & Nijkamp, 2017:1).

Defning the Global South remains contentious. Africa, together with Central and Latin America, the Pacifc and Caribbean islands, and Asia are viewed as the Global South (Hollington et al., 2015:8). Previous conceptions were much more problematic: categorical descriptions of "developing countries", "low-income countries", "third world", "poor world", and "non-Western world" perpetuated the view that these countries were synonymous with corruption, failing economies and poverty, being torn apart by in-fghting and high mortality rates, and riddled with human and civil rights abuse together with ethnic and regional confict engendering large scale displacements of people (Hollington et al., 2015:8). Currently, Asia has some of the fastest growing economies in the world, for example, China, India, Bangladesh, Myanmar and Cambodia (Jennings, 2019). Given geopolitical shifts in the global

economy, how we defne the Global South remains fuid. It is precisely because of this fuidity that we need to justify the drivers that shape South-to South movements. For example, one of the dominant narratives of South-to-North migration is economic imperatives and the migration of highly skilled migrants. We need to develop theories in the Global South to explain why people migrate from less developed countries to a developing country, why young men and male breadwinners migrate, why women migrate on their own leaving their children behind; and of problems in the destination country, integration and the hope for return migration to the country of origin.

In research conducted between 2011 and 2017, I examined migration from South Asia, Egypt and Malawi to South Africa. I argued that the theories used to explain migration in the Global North failed to capture the experiences of migration to the South. My earlier research on Zimbabwean, Rwandan and Burundian refugees showed that they had no wish to settle in South Africa, and instead would willingly return to their home country once peace had been established (Smit & Rugunanan, 2014; Rugunanan & Smit, 2011). Research on South Asian migrants indicates a willingness to retire back in the home country once they had accumulated some wealth (Rugunanan, 2016). These fndings raise important questions for how we conceptualise migration, settlement, integration and return migration. In contrast, second generation immigrants prefer the host country compared to their parent's country of origin (Onukogu, 2018).

Established literature in southern Africa (Madhavan & Landau, 2011; Nzinga, 2006) focused on the movement from less developed to developing countries, instead of fows to stronger established economies. What, then, are the opportunities for migrants in the global economies of the South that are we missing? Some of the pull factors of the Global South are that, while offering less modest economic opportunities (Nawyn, 2016), they offer more opportunities and new untapped markets. Rugunanan (2016) confrms that migrants choose South Africa because of its economic potential, untapped markets, temperate weather conditions, clean environment, lower population density, space and absence of the frenzied lifestyle that characterises their home countries. The migrants affrm the availability of employment and religious freedom as strong pull factors. Cultural similarity and geographic proximity, also confrmed by Ponce (2016), are some of the reasons migrants choose to migrate to South Africa (Rugunanan, 2016). Lastly, the cost of migrating to the North far outstrips that of the Global South. More importantly, a network of resources is already in place due to chain and labour migration practices of the past; this provides a sense of home for the migrant. Transnational migration practices, spurred by rapidly changing technologies, eliminate distance, creating a 'here' and 'there' simultaneously reconfguring our understanding of transnational migration in the Global South.

### **3.3 The Allure of South Africa**

While South Asian migration is a worldwide phenomenon (Sarwal, 2012), South Africa has become an attractive destination country where a range of non-nationals, documented and undocumented, have made their home. They come from Europe, North Africa (Algeria, Morocco, Egypt, Libya, and Sudan), some countries from the Southern African Development Community (SADC) region (Democratic Republic of Congo, Malawi, Mozambique, Zimbabwe); South Asia (Bangladesh, India, Pakistan, Nepal, Sri Lanka) and China. The numbers have grown steadily: besides traditional forms of labour migration, political and economic refugees and asylum seekers increasingly make their way to the South, alongside migration for retirement and mobility in search of better or different lifestyles. The allure of South Africa's progressive constitution, human rights policies and laws (Gordon, 2016) includes a business friendly environment in which migrants can hone their entrepreneurial skills to set up small businesses and create livelihoods (Peberdy, 2016). Johannesburg, as the economic pulse of South Africa, becomes a conduit for new migrant communities to contest social and economic spaces to recreate new histories and communities.

In recreating new communities in South Africa, the intense and violent forms of xenophobia scupper the international image of a socially cohesive and integrated society. One of the main reasons for the rise in xenophobia is the claim that foreigners are here to "steal" jobs and contribute to the spiralling crime rate (Moatshe, 2017). These anti-immigrant sentiments are not isolated in South Africa but extend throughout the world. Xenophobia is a phenomenon that is not unique to Africa, and migrants across the world are affected by xenophobic practices. Unique to South Africa is the intensity and violence associated with the xenophobic attacks on foreign nationals (See Batisai and Kaziboni in this volume). Often, foreign small entrepreneurs (such as *spaza* shop1 owners), are consistently targeted in xenophobic attacks (Chaskalson, 2017). Ironically, research shows that migrants play an important role in small business activity (Peberdy, 2016; CDE, 2008): their enterprises contribute signifcantly to the informal sector and the creation of independent medium and micro-enterprises, and often create employment opportunities for South Africans (Peberdy, 2016; Peberdy & Rogerson, 2000).

The literature shows that the growth of semi-skilled and unskilled migration to the Global South in search of employment is invariably in unskilled work and at the low end of the scale of globalisation (Rugunanan, 2016; Zack, 2015). This work entails low wages, insecure employment and obscure employment relations. The current shift in world politics and the rise in far-right extremism confrm that policymakers do not welcome the migration of lower skilled workers from South to North, giving rise to a "migration industry" (Sandoval, 2013) that facilitates the movement of unskilled workers, particularly to countries in the Global South, creating a

<sup>1</sup>A colloquial term which originated during apartheid to describe a small shop run from someone's home, now used to describe all sorts of small informal shops.

"second" economy. There is a concerted effort by governments in the Global South to support the migration of less skilled workers and unskilled workers to other parts of the Global South in the hope they secure some form of employment and education rather than face underemployment back in the country of origin (Page & Mercer, 2010:103). These migrants often take on employment that unskilled nationals will not, ensuring a niche in the marketplace. Migrant-sending countries such as the Philippines, South Korea, Indonesia, Sri Lanka, Bangladesh, India, Pakistan, China, Vietnam and Egypt have brokered policies to promote labour migration as part of a broader strategy to gain "foreign exchange, reduce unemployment and develop skills" (Massey, 1999:311; see also Castles, 2004). Similarly to Bloch (2010:234), I argue that migration to South Africa is a "survival strategy" for those migrants whose families are dependent on remittances.

Migrant workers enter into a range of low-level service occupations such as cleaning, caring, tending, selling and fxing for the wealthier sections of society. Similarly to studies in the North (Anderson, 2007), Holgate et al. (2012) show that the creation of ethnic enclave economies opens doors for a "grey economy" characterised by long hours of work and low pay, with little recourse to the law. As in the study on Kurdish migrants in the United Kingdom by Holgate et al. (2012:602), many migrants in South Africa tend to be employed in "ethnic enclaves" of family and kin networks. Here they experience high levels of exploitation characterised by poor working conditions, long hours of work, below-minimum wages and insecure employment practices, often in a bid to avoid formal documentation. The concept of immigrant ethnic enclaves describes a space complete with social capital and social networks that support entry-level access to employment and accommodation, especially for newly arriving migrants who face barriers such as language fuency, employment credentials, job skills and visa legitimacy, providing access to a labour market from which they might ordinarily be excluded. These research fndings support work on migrant communities in South Africa which documents the tendency to access ethnic communities as a form of social support (Rugunanan, 2016; Gebre et al., 2011; Madhavan & Landau, 2011; Amisi, 2006).

The participants revealed that they search for and make informed choices about their destinations. Conditions in the sending countries were similar: political uncertainty, spiralling population growth, poverty, ethnic violence and dwindling infrastructure were strong push factors, while economic stability, employment and better living standards were strong pull factors to South Africa as the host (Rugunanan, 2016). The decision to migrate is based not only on the personal pursuit of individual freedom and opportunities but rather on how the opportunity to migrate would fund other family and economic interests in their home countries and the potential to diversify and develop new skills (Rugunanan, 2016).

Once in Johannesburg, migrants enter into a community inclusive of friends, family and fellow countrymen. Amid the uncertainty, there is a sense of stability, continuity and networks that originate from a common culture, religion and sense of belonging. Familiarity is created from knowing that other migrants from the home country reside in Johannesburg in areas previously designated for the so-called "Indian community2 " in apartheid South Africa. The prevailing Indian diaspora provides the emotional link to the home country and kinsmen. Similarly, for the Egyptians, the existence of an "Arab community" allows the migrants to tap into a network of existing resources even if the migrant does not know anybody. National loyalty provides a backbone to help nurture the migrant.

### **3.4 Feminisation of Migration in the Global South**

The fows of migration do not only include the dominant male; instead, single women and, in many cases, women who leave their children behind are choosing to migrate independently (Meyers, 2019; Rugunanan, 2017; Batisai, 2016; Huynh et al. 2015). Women are active agents in migration; they constitute 51% of the refugee population in southern Africa (UNHCR, 2018), and constitute 48.4% of international migrants across the globe as of 2017. In 2019, international female migrants living in North America and Europe accounted for 51,8% and 51,4% respectively. While the percentage of international female migrants residing in Oceania, Latin America and the Caribbean, Central and Southern Asia, and Eastern and South Eastern Asia was 50.4%, 49,9%, 49,4%, and 49,3% respectively. In sub-Saharan Africa, and Northern Africa and Western Asia, international female migrants accounted for 47,5% and 35,5% respectively (United Nations, 2019). A body of research conducted on the continent into the agency and empowerment of migrant women challenges the views of women as invisible, victims and appendages. This scholarship gives importance to agency by pinpointing how women make decisions and plan for their families' future well-being (Khan, 2018; Rugunanan, 2017; Batisai, 2016; Jinnah, 2013; Kihato, 2007).

Similarly to migrants in the North, female migrants in the South also occupy positions characterised as women's work in the service sector, involving cleaning, domestic work, health care and service work, thus entering into societies steeped in patriarchy and becoming the new precariat (Hlatshwayo, 2018; Smit & Rugunanan, 2014). With the increase in the feminisation of migration, much of the literature purports to explore the renegotiation of gender identities and role expectations of female migrants (Batisai, 2016; Huynh et al., 2012). In adverse circumstances, migrant women employ a form of precarious resistance to their insecure livelihoods, demonstrating their social agency and what I conceptualise as contingent solidarity (Rugunanan, 2016).

My research among South Asian migrants indicates that migration to South Africa is predominantly male; religion and culture dictate migration practices and the movement of people, and the independent migration of women remains curtailed by these conventions. Married women who follow their husbands as dependants are regarded as "appendages" or "trailing spouses". For many of the South

<sup>2</sup>South Africans of Indian origin.

Asian migrant women, their daily routines as wives and mothers are recreated in their identities as migrant women, ascribed by culture-specifc roles and practices of the migrant communities. Home-country politics, patriarchal relations of authority and gender norms reinforce gender practices and gender identities. While the Bangladeshi and Pakistani women shouldered domestic responsibilities, their cultural and religious norms dictate that men take the responsibility for the fnancial support of the family and to uphold the family's honour.

There are some exceptions. My research shows that skilled Indian migrant women in South Africa are the antithesis of the "dependent, trailing spouses"; instead they use the traditional practices of arranged marriages as a lever for upward mobility through outward migration practices (Rugunanan, 2017). Some Pakistani women and young single and married Indian women, whilst undertaking the burden of home chores, also displayed agency by operating enterprises or taking employment outside the home. By asserting their right to work, the women also asserted their rights and agency, away from the prying eyes of elders. While their businesses add to the family's pool of resources, their labour forms part of a bigger network of family-owned businesses. In as much as some women displayed agency in choosing to set up their employment practices, cultural dictates make it diffcult for some to assert themselves. Despite the presence of Bangladeshi women in Johannesburg, they remain invisible; employment outside the household is a "violation of the Islamic gender order" (Dannecker, 2007:9). This view perhaps best explains the lack of visibility of Muslim Egyptian, Bangladeshi and Malawian women in Fordsburg. It also explains the lack of visibility of Muslim Egyptian and Bangladeshi women in the world of work and visible public spaces.

A study on Egyptian female migrants in Johannesburg by Khan (2018) demonstrates that while gender roles are indeed reproduced, migration empowers women to exert some degree of agency to counter traditional norms of patriarchy. More recent research on skilled Indian female migrants, who migrated as dependents on their skilled spouses, illustrate that they exerted considerable agency in choice of spouse, the decision to migrate, and the decision to work in the host country, subverting the notion of "trailing spouses" as lacking in agency (Rugunanan, 2017). They develop a form of contingent instrumentality to renegotiate their gender identity and assert their hegemony.

### **3.5 Social Networks as a Source of Social Capital**

In the South African scholarship on migrant networks, various researchers (Rugunanan, 2016; Nyström, 2012; Gebre et al., 2011; Madhavan & Landau, 2011) examine migrants' social networks as a source of social capital. A study on Bangladeshi communities in Rome, by Knight (Knights, 1996:105), showed that, despite the absence of bilateral sovereign structures and very little linguistic, historical, cultural, religious, or geographic connections, Bangladeshi numbers grew from 300 to 10,000 mainly undocumented migrants, driven by "chain migration

mechanisms" and infuenced by social networks. Similar to Congolese migrants in South Africa, the refugee community strengthened its formal and informal social networks to protect itself from possible xenophobic attacks and social exclusion (Amisi, 2006; Nzinga, 2006). Amongst the Congolese, Amisi (2006) showed, social networks serve as a "social net" against illness, police arrest and even death, and provide valuable information about migration routes, costs, accommodation and employment opportunities.

A critique of the broader literature on social networks and social capital confrms that extensive attention is given to shared ethnicity and the migration experience. Implicit in this understanding of networks (migrant and ethnic) is the perception that the migrant is categorised as the "other", argue Raghuram et al. (2010:624), with very little commonality or shared experience with nationals. Raghuram et al. (2010:626–7) identify a gap in the existing literature in the Global North on social networks and social capital in three respects. Firstly, migrants and their experiences are seen as a distinct category from non-migrants; secondly, the "shared habitus" (Bourdieu, 1970), where migrants and non-migrants co-exist, is ignored; and thirdly, studies consider the two groups as separate entities, instead of seeing them "relationally". My work on South Asian migrants fts into the gap identifed by Raghuram et al. (2010) by demonstrating that African cities do indeed have a signifcant number of domestic migrants, a growing urban population and a fuid host community. To date, research has neglected to use social capital concepts in urban settings among migrants in South Africa; my research explores social connectivity within and between groups to demonstrate similarities and differences. The question of how best social capital, as an analytical construct, can be understood is addressed by conceptualising social capital as a form of contingent and instrumental solidarity (Rugunanan, 2016).

The established literature on migration suggests that migrants will feel a sense of disconnection from the host community, including a loss of social ties resulting in identity isolation from the host community. In contrast, I argue that the character, structure and make-up of my research sites, such as Fordsburg and Lenasia3 , already host diverse migrant groups and nationals, and the shared habitus provides an enabling community that is experienced as familiar. Historically, the Indian and Pakistan diaspora provides a relational connection to the established nationals and new migrants. The shared habitus, Fordsburg and Johannesburg, provides a space where migrants draw on both symbolic and cultural capital to establish a sense of belonging. Deeply rooted networks of family, extended family and friends, religious networks, and even those provided by agents who operate a migrant business provide reliable information about living arrangements, employment opportunities and documentation. The choice to migrate is thus not undertaken in isolation, but instead is based on careful information provided by a network of migration agents. The migrants come to places where established communities of

<sup>3</sup>Lenasia is an area south-west of Johannesburg, set aside for people categorised as Indian by the apartheid government.

migrants from Bangladesh, India, Pakistan, Malawi and Egypt have paved the way for new migrants. Migrants who come from migrant-sending regions, share similar low socio-economic backgrounds, class, education and skill levels. Ethnicity serves as social capital to support members from the same ethnic and national background, irrespective of kin or familial relations. Irrespective of ethnicity, an instrumental solidarity emerges to assist foreign migrants to integrate into the host society.

In these research sites, "niche markets" exist which facilitate the entry and settlement of low-skilled migrants. Instead of entering into the unskilled market, they enter into low-wage labour; migrants are found in the microeconomic sector and establishing micro-enterprises. In Fordsburg, the Pakistani, Bangladeshi and Indian migrants are concentrated in small-scale retail trades and ethnic-owned restaurants. The Egyptian traders have captured the market for traditional Muslim clothing and specifcally choose Fordsburg because of its Islamic associations. The South African traders are involved in tailoring, fast food, merchandise and speciality stores. The patterns of trading occur at three levels: frst as sole traders operating small retail outlets and relying on their own labour. A second group draws their labour from family, spouses and kin. These traders then set up common labour practices such as tailors, hairdressers and beauty outlets. The third group comprises a mixture of traders: restaurant owners, owners of multiple outlets and traders in the fea markets.

Social capital and social networks prevail to allow migrants to enter into some form of income-generating activity. The close-bounded space of Fordsburg affords the migrant access to a network of resources, such as fows of capital, established spaces or employment in established enterprises, giving rise to instrumental solidarity. It is discernible that Bangladeshi, Egyptian and Pakistani migrants collectively aggregate money within their ethnic group for investment in business ventures in South Africa or to fund business ventures back in the country of origin. Working in ethnic enclaves opens up the migrants to exploitative labour practices of low wages and long working hours. While the migrants appear to tolerate these exploitative conditions, their overriding concerns are to remit money as a form of necessity and to remain in employment. A common practice is the migrants' employment of workers from vulnerable groups from their countries of origin, South Africa, or other African countries. Malawian migrants enter the role of precarious labour. Solidarity emerges in the collective economic spaces to provide employment for unemployed migrants. Networks are deeply embedded and organised (a syndicate type of operation), facilitating a situation where they look out for each other, taking new migrants into the fold as soon as they enter South Africa. Contingent and instrumental solidarities become the glue that binds together the communities of migrants.

### **3.6 Conclusion: All Is Not What It Seems**

Despite the overwhelming optimism from the migrants that South Africa is a "good place" – it is "clean", it is "easy to make money here", "I am free to practice my religion here" – all is not what it seems. From the migrants' narratives, patterns of interrelationships emerge where forms of discriminatory behaviour between the various non-national groups and between the South Africans and migrants become apparent. Two distinct forms of insular relationships arose: those concerning South Asian nationals, and the other, African nationals. Apparent within each of these national groups is a need to preserve cultural and religious identity. While there was a level of tolerance within shared confnes of space, the groups seem to prefer to remain independent of each other in their ethnic communities, and so I argue that while migrants share the same spaces, sharing a sense of community is lacking. Common among all the traders, nationals and non-nationals, is their dependence on South Africans to support their businesses. The South Asian nationals are at pains to understand why, given common ancestral origins, South African Indians are aloof and do not easily respond to opportunities for association.

For the African nationals, an African identity overrides a national identity, with friendships and associations more likely with fellow nationals, giving rise to an instrumental solidarity. This contrasts sharply with the views which regard South Africans as intolerant and inhospitable. From various media accounts, migrants from Africa are here to take jobs, and contribute to the increase in crime. The presence of non-nationals in Fordsburg gave rise to a feeling of an "invasion" from the perspective of the South African Indian traders. This underlying tension and resentment may also exist because non-nationals are dislodging local South Africans in physical and economic spaces. In contrast, though, I argue that some form of contingent solidarity does exist. For example, during the May 2008 xenophobic attacks, the residents and traders in Johannesburg assisted migrants under threat to ward off possible attacks. Participants revealed that South Africans assisted in matters with the police, but it all depended on the nature of matter. The view that migrant groups assist each other because of solidarity supports other research in South Africa (Dwyer et al., 2006).

My research examines the movement of South Asian migrants to South Africa, contributing to the body of scholarship on South-to-South migration. My fndings illustrate that, while there are similarities with migratory movements of the North, there are divergences as well. The research shows that migrants develop various strategies as forms of solidarity to survive. While migrants enter into low-skilled forms of micro enterprises and precarious forms of labour, they contribute to the regeneration of the economy, create jobs for kin and South African nationals, and sustain families in the home country. The fndings elucidate that a transnational system of social, cultural, political and economic relationships exists in Fordsburg, allowing migrants to draw on this transnational capital within the host community, yet at the same time maintain insular communities as a protective strategy against xenophobia and forms of exclusion. Within the shared confnes of economic and

religiously bounded spaces, there is a level of tolerance and acceptance, but not integration, a form of tacit contingent solidarity. Moving towards a politics of inclusion would require South Africans and migrant communities to overcome their fear of the "other" to ensure that power and justice are equalised and that inclusive instrumental solidarity prevails that is all-encompassing.

**Acknowledgements** This work is based on the research supported wholly or in part by the National Research Foundation of South Africa (Grant Number 107087). Opinions expressed and conclusions made are those of the author and are not to be attributed to the Foundation.

### **References**


*and Women*. Paper presented at the Ethnicity, Mobility and Society Leverhulme Programme conference, University of Bristol: 16–17 March.


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### **Chapter 4 Neoliberal Capitalism and Migration in the Global South: A Case of Post-ESAP Zimbabwe to South Africa Migration**

**Samukele Hadebe**

### **4.1 Introduction**

Zimbabwe has been haemorrhaging via international migration, especially since the 1990s and 2000s. While there could be as many different reasons for this exodus of Zimbabweans as there are people emigrating, it is indisputable that the introduction of the Economic Structural Adjustment Programme (ESAP) in 1991 at the behest of the Bretton Woods Institutions forms the major causes. Zimbabwe used to be a migrant-sending as well as a migrant-receiving country, but after ESAP, the trends were outwards with barely any inward movements. Zimbabwe became not only a net exporter of labour, especially human capital, but it depleted its human resources capacity, perhaps beyond levels of easy recovery in the foreseeable future. The political economic factors resulting from ESAP-induced poverty drove a signifcant section of the population to the indignity and insecurity of migrant labour. Drawing from that experience, it could be claimed confdently that "migration and labour questions are two sides of the same coin" (Delgado, 2015: 26) driven by neoliberal capitalism.

In this chapter, I argue that the phenomenal upsurge of cross-border labour migration from Zimbabwe to the rest of the region and overseas followed Zimbabwe's introduction of ESAP. While some writers have attributed the economic problems to the failure of ESAP, I demonstrate that the economic decline is not the only characteristic of ESAP but a desirable outcome for capitalism. Zimbabwe has become the source of an uprooted, desperate and cheap labour supply for the care industry in the UK (Crush & Tevera, 2010: 28), domestic work, farm labour, risky security work in South Africa, and teaching and nursing in South

© The Author(s) 2022 39

S. Hadebe (\*)

Chris Hani Institute, Johannesburg, South Africa

Sociology Department, Rhodes University, Makhanda, South Africa e-mail: samukele@chi.org.za

P. Rugunanan, N. Xulu-Gama (eds.), *Migration in Southern Africa*, IMISCOE Research Series, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-92114-9\_4

Africa, Namibia and Botswana. Zimbabweans are worse off today than they were at independence in 1980, and available evidence suggests that the economic reform programme brought little but economic hardship, not only for the poorest groups, but also to middle-income households, in both rural and urban areas (Zinyama, 2002: 27). Of course, the trends, nature and intensity of migration and the response to it have undoubtedly been infuenced by the dominance of neoliberal capitalism. Contrary to the stated advantages of ESAP, it instead resulted in deindustrialisation and consequently massive job losses. Drawing from the Zimbabwean experience as a migrant-sending country and South Africa as a migrant-receiving country, this chapter interrogates the often-ignored class dynamics of international migration in the Global South in a neoliberal capitalist era (see also Davison & Shire, 2015).

Studies have established that, since structural adjustment programmes, the number of migrants from the countries of the South to those of the Global North increased (Trifonov, 2013; UNDP, 2008; Bloch, 2005; Chetsanga & Muchenje, 2003). Since "one of the main engines of neoliberal capitalism is cheap labour" (Delgado, 2015: 28), it creates conditions that pressurise people to emigrate. Similarly, the Zimbabwean scenario is used as a reference point to argue that the very contradictions of neoliberal ideology not only induce labour migration through deregulation, but are also responsible for the criminalisation of migrants, hence reducing them to workers "having no right to rights" (Trifonov, 2013: 6) and subject to super-exploitation, casualisation and precarity. Furthermore, I explore the dichotomous view of immigrants as both necessary and undesired, in that their labour power is needed yet loathed for social security protection, which is often denied. The hegemonic neoliberal ideology has rendered "immigration labour desired for its productive capacity and disdained for its reproductive capacity" (Trifonov, 2013: 5). While aspects of dependency theory are utilised in characterising relations between labour exporting and receiving countries, this chapter takes a sociohistorical view as a way of highlighting the role of ESAP in particular in accounting for massive labour migration. The outline of this chapter is as follows: an overview of the migration landscape; the historical context; a characterisation of neoliberal capitalism in the Zimbabwean context; labour and migration questions; and recommendations and conclusion.

### **4.2 Overview of the Zimbabwean Migration Landscape**

In their book that aptly describes Zimbabwe's contemporary migration as the "exodus", Crush and Tevera (2010: 1) concede that: "After 1990, however, the accelerating social, political and economic unravelling of the country led to a rush for the exits. An economy in free-fall, soaring infation and unemployment, the collapse of public services, political oppression and deepening poverty proved to be powerful, virtually irresistible, push factors for many Zimbabweans." Of note, this coincides with the era of Zimbabwe's economic structural adjustment programme. As discussed below, often the political repression of the increasingly paranoid Mugabe

regime has been cited as the primary reason for socio-economic chaos in the country. Where economic reasons are given, it is usually to magnify the negative effects of the Fast Track Land Reform that stripped white farmers of land, and the government mismanagement of the economy – but defnitely not mentioning that the worst mismanagement was the implementation of austerity measures under ESAP as had been prescribed by the International Monetary Fund.

While generally there has always been the movement of people within the SADC, the Zimbabwean political and economic crisis created a new pattern that obviously put strain on its neighbours. A survey in 2005 by the Southern African Migration Programme (SAMP) established that 58% of Zimbabwean migrants were in the SADC region (Crush & Tevera, 2010; Landau, 2008). An earlier study in 2001 had revealed that "55% of the Zimbabwean migrant stock was in South Africa, followed by Mozambique (17%), Zambia (16%) and Malawi (16%) (IOM, 2016; Crush & Tevera, 2010). However, the UN Migrant Stock database suggests that the Zimbabwean-born diaspora was already becoming global in its distribution in 2001. Nearly 20% of the global migrant stock was located in Western Europe, 5% in North America, 4% in Australasia and 3% in the rest of Africa (Crush & Tevera, 2010: 18), while the International Organisation for Migration estimated that, of the 2.4 million migrants in South Africa, about 1.5 million were from Zimbabwe (IOM, 2016).

Another signifcant feature of Zimbabwe's contemporary migration since the 1990s is in its composition. According to Crush and Tevera (2010: 18):

There are almost as many women migrants as men; there are migrants of all ages, from young children to the old and infrm; those feeing hunger and poverty join those feeing persecution and harassment; they are from all rungs of the occupational and socioeconomic ladder; they are highly-read and illiterate, professionals and paupers, doctors and ditch-diggers.

The gender composition has been confrmed by a South African Migration Programme survey in 2005 which put the gender ratios at 56% men and 44% women (Crush & Tevera, 2010: 18).

Skilled personnel emigrated even beyond the SADC, especially health sector professionals. It was recorded that, by 2003, Zimbabwe had become the fourth largest "supplier" of nurses to the UK after the Philippines, India and South Africa (Crush & Tevera, 2010: 18). At that time, nurses constituted almost 80% of immigrants from Zimbabwe to the UK. On the other hand, unskilled labour was pouring out in great numbers too, to South African farms in particular. In 1998, the proportion of migrant farmworkers who had entered South Africa without documentation was more than 90% (Crush & Tevera, 2010: 33). Stories abound of abuse in the farms, including raids and deportations just before payday, as it is alleged farmers collaborated with the police, not to mention the sexual abuse of women migrants during transportation, at border crossings, and in farms. In addition to being criminalised, migrant workers live with constant fear of xenophobic backlashes that spontaneously arise in South Africa in particular.

The Zimbabwe–South Africa situation is of particular interest for a number of reasons; some historical reasons will be elaborated below. But most signifcant is the perception held by many Zimbabweans, wrongly of course, that South Africa has the political and economic clout to push Zimbabwe towards better governance. With the pivotal role of President Thabo Mbeki in crafting the government of national unity in Zimbabwe, perhaps these assumptions about South Africa are not far-fetched. But also, South Africa is perceived as a benefciary of the collapse of Zimbabwe in the thousands of jobless Zimbabweans at the disposal of South African employers. It is believed that South Africa has exaggerated the number of Zimbabweans in the country. For a long time, the media has used a fgure above three million, which Zimbabwean researchers dispute. But what is undeniable is that there is a signifcant number of undocumented migrants in South Africa, among whom are Zimbabweans. That on its own creates yet another problem administratively. That South Africa is the destination of choice for many Zimbabweans either for long term work and settlement or for days or even hours of shopping is indisputable. For example, SAMP research has shown that almost a quarter of adult Zimbabweans have parents and grandparents who have worked in South Africa at some point in their lives (Tevera & Zinyama, 2002: 2). That could be a demonstration of the fact that South Africa has, for a long time, been the preferred destination of Zimbabwean migrants.

### **4.3 The Historical Context of Zimbabwe to South Africa Labour Migration**

There are few households in Zimbabwe that could claim they never had a member in South Africa, either working or seeking employment or even in the informal sector, particularly after the 1990s. Even before then, there is a long history of migrant labour to the gold mines in South Africa. In particular, there are districts of the Matabeleland region of Zimbabwe that have been associated with exporting labour specifcally to South Africa. Although initially, it was the pull of the gold rush, these migrants, mainly young men, eventually entered other sectors beyond mining such as factories, the service sector and farms. This is one category of migrant labour associated with colonial political economy and it is signifcant to note that none of those labour exporting districts had ever experienced migration due to overqualifcation, which has depleted the country of its professionals. Also, that category was confned to men, without the massive migration of families that is the case now.

While historical facts do not directly account for the seeming penchant for outward movement by Zimbabweans, they nonetheless give a full picture of the migration landscape. According to Mlambo:

For most of its history, Zimbabwe was primarily a destination for migrants. Prior to the nineteenth century, the Zimbabwe Plateau was peopled by migrants from the north. In the early eighteenth century, there was a wave of migrants from the south feeing the political and economic upheavals of Zulu expansionism. In the twentieth century, following colonial conquest and extensive land expropriation, white settlers entered the country in considerable numbers (Mlambo, 2010: 53).

As succinctly presented by Mlambo (2010), Zimbabwe's history is partly that of migration. Its negative side has been that the politics of the country have largely refected that too, in terms of access and distribution of resources and opportunities. Even the controversial land issue partly derives from this background of migration. Some of these early migrants, the Shona speaking groups who became numerically dominant, have used that dominance to claim rights to ownership of the country and even to marginalise the rights of the Khoisan, Tonga, Venda, Kalanga and others, some of whom could claim earlier arrival in what is today Zimbabwe. The Ndebelespeaking people, although the majority are not of Zulu origin, have found their status as indigenous Zimbabweans often questioned. The majority of Europeans came through colonial conquest, but some had migrated and settled earlier while some migrated after World War Two, some from other parts of Europe and not necessarily the UK. However, when land expropriation took place, those waves of migrations and how land was acquired by different categories was ignored. Similarly, the country has fourth if not ffth generation Asians who have integrated into Zimbabwean society, but it is doubtful whether they are perceived as belonging.

This background is crucial in explaining contemporary Zimbabwe's sociocultural dynamics, as sometimes it is invoked to justify forced migration. When the colonial government dispossessed Africans of arable land and legally denied them the right to even purchase land in certain areas, it was perceived by Africans as purely racism, although behind the racial cloak were capitalist interests to maximise profts from commercial farms. The resulting internal migrations due to land dispossession literally changed the settlement patterns in the country. Further, the migration of Zimbabweans to settle in Zambia was partly due to the land issue and also facilitated by the then federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland.

In essence, Zimbabwe labour migration, be it rural to urban or cross-border to South Africa and the region, or/and even to overseas destinations, has largely been induced and infuenced by capital. In any event, "the direction and fow of migration are determined by global fows of capital" (Petras, 2007: 40) since migration is "a refection of the class dynamic of domestic, regional and international capitalism" (Canterbury, 2010: 6). The focus here is to demonstrate how neoliberal capitalism in particular impacted on Zimbabwe-to-South Africa labour migration.

Throughout the 90 years of colonial rule, colonial government policy was always to attract European migrants, particularly those who were English-speaking. However, in the late 1970s, whites were emigrating mainly to South Africa as it was proving futile to thwart majority rule. A signifcant number of whites also left in the years immediately after independence in 1980. Many Zimbabweans from exile were returning home and expatriate professionals also moved in to fll the gap left by the emigrating whites. Interestingly, when the Zimbabwean government unleashed its army, the Fifth Brigade, against civilians in Matabeleland immediately after independence, some people fed to South Africa even while it was still under apartheid. It is believed that 5000 people migrated to South Africa, Botswana and Britain as a result (Madebwe & Madebwe, 2017). The uprooted white farmers also trekked to South Africa following the Fast Track Land Reform that dispossessed them of the land. When there was economic collapse triggered by ESAP and

exacerbated by government policy failures, rampant corruption and repression, the exodus of skilled labour was destined for South Africa mainly, and to an extent Europe, in particular, the UK and North America.

It may be necessary to explain why both colonial-era and post-independence migration has tended to be towards South Africa. Well, colonial history tied the two countries, considering that Zimbabwe was colonised by a British and South African company as led by the then Cape prime minister, Cecil John Rhodes. There were thus political, economic and cultural ties between the two countries; and at the end of company rule, Rhodesian whites went to the polls to decide whether or not to join the Union of South Africa as a ffth province. South Africa has always been more industrialised than Zimbabwe, making the latter dependent on its economically superior sister country. South Africa has remained Zimbabwe's largest trading partner, although the trade is skewed in favour of the bigger economy. Landlocked Zimbabwe has depended largely on South African ports. For a long time, tertiary education, especially university education, could only be obtained in South Africa. In the region, South Africa had played the centre of capital while the rest of the countries were the periphery (Hlatshwayo, 2017).

In essence, it can be claimed that, as part of global capital machinations, Zimbabwe has been tethered to South Africa since colonisation in 1890 and has failed to free itself four decades after liberation. The relations between the two countries have barely changed as Zimbabwe continues in that colonial role of exporting labour both legally and illegally.

### **4.4 Why Neoliberal Capitalism in Zimbabwe?**

Since its colonisation, Zimbabwe followed a capitalist path of development or underdevelopment and has continued to do so even four decades after attaining independence. Amazingly, those opposed to the Zimbabwean African National Union-Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF) government have often claimed, with some element of mischief, that the country once pursued socialism. The Africanisation of the civil service and expansion of social services to the majority population cannot be a measure of socialism. According to Hadebe (2019: 115):

Indeed, the ruling party offcials expertly deployed Marxist-Leninist rhetoric to masquerade as leftist revolutionaries whose interests were the same as those of the poor working people. These opportunistic tendencies by the ruling nationalist elite were later deployed with devastating effects to the country's economy … When properly put in context, it is clear that ZANU-PF has had very little regard for the workers in particular and the populace in general beyond serving its own interests.

Notwithstanding the glaring capitalist-orientation of the ZANU-PF government, those fond of bashing socialism still feel obliged to claim that Zimbabwe was once socialist. In any event, from its very frst economic policy, Growth with Equity, the government avoided "disrupting the accumulation model of [the] settler bourgeoisie" (Raftopolous, 2001: 5), which was a clear indication of its pro-capital bias, notwithstanding socialist rhetoric and grandstanding (Hadebe, 2019: 115).

From a comparative perspective, the colonial settler government had much more control of the economy than any post-independence administration in Zimbabwe. Taking advice from the World Bank and International Monetary Fund (IMF), the Zimbabwean authorities implemented an ESAP faithfully, claiming that it was a home-grown initiative. The ZANU-PF government did so in spite of a lack of evidence of the success of such programmes in sub-Saharan Africa and against the ferce protest by organised labour, as ZCTU aptly observed that:

The government strategy of staking the people's hopes on World Bank structural adjustment policies, on foreign investment, on privatisation and on trade liberalisation ignores the evidence of the devastating effects of these policies on working people across the globe and dooms a vast section of the society to permanent joblessness, hopelessness and economic insecurity (Raftopoulos, 2001).

As correctly predicted, the trade unions saw the implementation of ESAP as a betrayal of the nation; and argued that the consequences to citizens would be dire. Already there was evidence of the triple impact of ESAP elsewhere, namely:


The Zimbabwean state, typical of a neo-colonial state, succumbed to neoliberal capitalism and used its monopoly over instruments of violence to suppress civil society, particularly the Zimbabwe Congress of Trade Unions (ZCTU), through frequent arrests of its leaders and violently suppressing strikes. The government preached the supposed benefts of ESAP such as increased foreign direct investments, increased employment opportunities and general upliftment of the citizens' standard of living. According to the ESAP policy document, the objectives of the programme were to ensure higher medium- and long-term economic growth, reduce poverty, improve living conditions (especially for the poorest groups), and address the problems of burgeoning unemployment (Zinyama, 2002). As would be demonstrated later, the exact opposite happened. The Zimbabwean state became "the real guarantor of these new practices of labour domination and alienation" (Delgado, 2015: 29). Massive unemployment continues to worsen and more job losses, both in the public and private sector, have further burgeoned the informal sector. The local industries were not ready to compete with cheap imports. Infation ballooned and as the government continued printing money, it eventually surpassed six digits, one of the worst infation rates in living memory for a country not at war. Undoubtedly, the unbudgeted pay-outs to former guerrillas and the intervention in the DRC war were equally damaging to the Zimbabwean economy.

As should be expected, some neoliberal apologists dispute the role of ESAP as having triggered the downward free fall of the Zimbabwean economy. Normally such writers, in resonance with the Government of Zimbabwe's narrative and that of the Bretton Woods institutions, either blame the drought or inadequate implementation of the programme, or both (Brett & Winter, 2003). According to Brett and Winter (2003: 1):

Yet ESAP is widely seen as an almost unmitigated failure…. Circumstances were unfavourable when ESAP was introduced. There were disastrous droughts in 1992 and 1995, and a global recession in 1991/92 reduced raw material prices and export demand.

The facts cited are undeniable, but they are insuffcient on their own to exonerate ESAP as having been the essential problem. Whenever a government crafts and rolls out a policy, it is prudent to factor in potential risks and ways of mitigation. Droughts in Zimbabwe are a common phenomenon, and they tend to recur every 4 or 5 years. The government could not have been unaware of that. The global recession did not affect Zimbabwe alone, and it is not a convincing reason for the sudden breakdown of the country. Actually, prior to ESAP, the wage bill was 16.5% of GDP. The programme aimed at 12.9% which was never attained as it rose to 39% by 1997 (ADB, 1997) and thereafter skyrocketed to the current 80% of total expenditure.

On the other side, several scholars (UNDP, 2008; Bloch, 2005; Chetsanga & Muchenje, 2003; Gaidzanwa, 1999) do attribute the causality to ESAP of not only the economic collapse but also the trigger of massive labour migration not previously witnessed. Madebwe and Madebwe (2017: 33) write that "as a direct consequence of the austerity measures associated with the ESAP, migration was adopted as a survival strategy." Figures for labour migration rose phenomenally after 2000, as the state response to civil unrest and political opposition was characterised by excessive violence. Indeed, poor economic conditions and political instability combined to be push factors almost a decade after the introduction of ESAP, but my argument is that ESAP remains the trigger for the social, economic and political crisis.

Of note is the changing pattern of labour migration from mainly semi-skilled young men to wholesale population movements. Munangagwa (2009: 110) puts the number as high as 37.8% migrating out of a population of around 13 million by 2008. Similarly, Madebwe and Madebwe (2017: 33) write:

Apart from unskilled and semi-skilled workers, approximately 200 000 skilled professionals emigrated, frustrated by the introduction of wage restraints, deteriorating working and living conditions, as well as instability in food prices due to the removal of subsidies.

Unemployment rose to 94% in 2008 (Van Klaveren et al., 2010; AFP, 2009). Formal employment shrank from 3.6 million in 2003 to an estimated 480,000 by 2008. High unemployment caused the informalisation of the economy where incomes are unstable (McGregor et al., 2011; Simpson, 2008). Of course, this was what has been referred to as third wave of migration that peaked in 2008. While undeniably far more massive than in the ESAP era, it is my contention that the economic liberalisation of ESAP had been the root cause.

### **4.5 The Impact of ESAP on Zimbabwe**

The resultant deregulation and liberalisation led to deindustrialisation and massive job losses. The standards of living of the majority deteriorated drastically, and infation fgures were astronomic, further eroding the incomes, savings and pensions of the citizens while collapsing social services. Thus the conditions were set for a massive exodus of labour from Zimbabwe to the diaspora, with South Africa receiving perhaps the largest share. Indeed, as Delgado (2015: 31) states, "Neoliberal capitalism has accelerated mechanisms of social exclusion and dispossession through creation of an overpopulation that has no means of earning a living and whose livelihood is at stake."

Actually, in the past two decades that have witnessed the hegemony of neoliberal capitalism, labour supply increased worldwide from 1.5 billion to 3.3 billion, and yet between 57% and 63% are absorbed, leaving an oversupply of unemployed workers (Forster et al., 2011: 3). In addition, the ILO reported that by 2009, labour insecurity had risen to 1,230 million workers, which was then more than half of the entire labour force. Undoubtedly, migrant labour has a bigger share of that insecurity, as does labour from the Global South.

### **4.6 Labour and Migration Interface**

Neo-liberalism has resulted in a contradictory relationship between capital and labour in as far as liberalisation and free movement are concerned. The contradiction is that while capital freely moves about the world, labour cannot enjoy that fexibility (King, 1995). While governments in the Global South are cajoled to open up their countries for the free fow of imports and unlimited repatriation of profts, in the same breath the powerful economies tighten their border controls, impose anti-immigration laws and unleash xenophobic attitudes towards migrant workers. According to Adler (1977), developed countries can control migration fows in such a way as to maximise their own benefts at the expense of those accruing to a less developed country which is the source of migrant workers. Zimbabwean nurses, as an example, were given access to the UK to supplement its demand for care work. South Africa too opened work opportunities for science and mathematics teachers among the professionals allowed in.

As already noted, the direction and fow of migration are determined by global fows of capital (Petras, 2007), and even within the Global South there are centreversus-periphery relations refective of the global inequalities and social differentiation. With its relative economic development and undoubtedly the attraction of constitutional democracy as compared to its neighbours, South Africa tends to be both a transit and a destination for immigrants from the region and from Zimbabwe in particular.

Drawing from Adler's (1977) theory of dependency, it could be claimed that Zimbabwe's relation with South Africa, in particular, is one of dependency. According to dependency theory, migration is viewed either as benefting the receiving country more than the labour-exporting country, or as positively retarding the development of the peripheral country (Adler, 1977).

Unfortunately, the dependency relations not only affect the present but contribute to future dependence too. The depletion of skilled human-power, especially science and mathematics teachers, would result in future inadequacy in those areas, as is already the case with high failure rates in the sciences in the Matabeleland region of Zimbabwe, which is closest to South Africa.

### **4.7 The Role of the Zimbabwean State Under Neoliberalism**

Perhaps some could be wondering what role the state plays in all of this conundrum. In the Marxist sense, the bourgeoise state serves the interests of capital, and unfortunately, the Zimbabwean state is no different. In a way, the role of capital remained hidden as the Zimbabwean state took responsibility for the anti-people policies that impoverished a nation, turning it into hapless beggars. In its propaganda effort, the government claimed that its ESAP was homegrown and unlikely to have negative consequences.

It is the unfavourable economic conditions primarily, and political insecurity, that set Zimbabwe up as a net exporter of labour – I daresay resulting in the loss of the country's greatest asset that it may never replenish, its workforce! Again, drawing from dependency theory, if the ruling elite of the labour-exporting country supports the emigration of labour, then that elite would not be acting in the best interest of their country (Adler, 1977). Although the Zimbabwean authorities have not openly declared their role in exporting labour, the various mechanisms put in place to siphon remittances, including through police roadblocks specifcally targeting foreign-registered vehicles, could be a pointer to the state's interest. It is a wellknown fact that Zimbabwe would have long been a failed state had it not been for the support from migrant remittances and development aid from international donors.

At the service of neoliberal capital, the Zimbabwean state exposed its citizens to becoming almost stateless labour nomads and that despised subclass of workers caricatured for the hollowness of their once-respected education and skills that have neither saved their country nor themselves from sliding into an economic abyss – indeed, confrming the secondary importance of the superstructure over the base, which remains the economy.

Of course, in the dependency relationship between Zimbabwe as a migrantsending country and South Africa as a receiving country, the South African state is not neutral. As an agent of South African capital, the South African state is responsible for policies that undermine African economies; it is responsible for policies that extract wealth from Africa into South Africa, and it is responsible for policies that are concentrating the capital of the continent. Be that as it may, Zimbabwe has a responsibility and must be held primarily accountable to its super-exploited citizens.

### **4.8 Migration in the Age of Neoliberal Capitalism**

Trifonov (2013: 5) states correctly that "immigration labour is desired for its productive capacity and disdained for its reproductive capacity…" thus expressing the dichotomous view of immigrants as both necessary for their labour and undesired for social protection. Most often, the media and policy makers underplay the benefts from super-exploitation of cheap labour and instead amplify the supposed drain on social services such as health, education, housing and water due to the "infux of aliens." Indeed, the ever-widening asymmetries among and within countries and regions mean that in those countries where production has been dismantled by structural adjustment programmes, social services were similarly destroyed. The search for health and educational services means that more and more Zimbabweans cross to South Africa to seek those services. If the cost to households could be quantifed, it could perhaps shed more light on how the little income earned in the migrant-sending countries is similarly exported for social services.

The love-hate relationship is most often also experienced in the migrant-sending country, Zimbabwe in this instance. The government instituted mechanisms to siphon as much as possible from remittances. While the fnancial benefts are appreciated by the government, those who have emigrated are looked down upon and often ridiculed for the menial jobs they have to do for a living.

International migration is increasingly subject to criminalisation policies and practices, racialisation, and race- and gender-based discrimination (Davison & Shire, 2015; Delgado, 2015). In the SADC in particular, criminalisation goes against offcially proclaimed regional integration efforts. Migrant workers are dehumanised as stateless people without claim to human and labour rights. It is this labour precarity and vulnerability that exposes migrant labour to super-exploitation by capital. Chilling stories of how labour migrants have suffered horrendous abuse when traffcked across international borders have not deterred future migrants. Apart from very low wages on farms, and in domestic work and other menial jobs that migrant workers opt for, women and girls are often subjected to sexual abuse too. But this precarity and vulnerability is not confned to migrant labour, especially undocumented labourers, but affects local workers too due to the growth of unemployment and competition with a pool of cheaper migrant labour. The resultant friction stratifes and divides the working class, which turns against itself leaving capital entrenching itself deeper with minimum resistance from fractured labour.

### **4.9 Ways of Mitigating the Neoliberal Onslaught Against Labour**

Considering that, under neoliberalism, government policies tend to entrench rather than roll back neoliberal forces, what option does labour have to address this scourge manifesting itself as a migrant labour problem? Some lessons could be drawn specifcally from the Zimbabwe-to-South Africa labour migration experiences. Firstly, there is a need for organised labour to organise beyond its traditional base of formal employment. That applies to both sending countries such as Zimbabwe and migrantreceiving countries such as South Africa. Organising the precarious in the informal sector and migrant workers could give a voice to the exploited and marginalised groups in the labour market.

Zimbabwe's ESAP-induced massive unemployment and state repression of organised labour has resulted in many workers being pushed into the informal sector. It is mainly these precarious workers who are forced to emigrate from an ununionised background to a criminalised, precarious, vulnerable and often diffcult-to-organise immigrant labour force in South Africa. Strengthening efforts towards organising the unorganised workers that include migrant labour would go a long way towards lessening the capitalist onslaught against working people. Webster (2016) sees organising informal workers in the Global South as part of the antineoliberal approach that reverses the logic of the decent work defcit.

Secondly, it is important for progressive forces, especially civil society including organised labour, to advocate for a transformative agenda that could reverse some policies and laws that have so far promoted an anti-people agenda, including the casualisation of labour. It is important to address the socio-economic conditions that compel labour migration and the system that sustains it. The complicit role of the state in creating conditions for emigration should be interrogated regarding whether the same state power could be used to reverse its negative policies for the good of citizens and retention of its workforce. Similarly, the migrant-receiving countries, South Africa in this case, should proffer progressive legislation and policies that properly respond also to the root causes, and not just the "infux of immigrants" and impact on social services. For example, documenting all migrants provides the government with information on who is in the country and from where and since when. Civil society, and organised labour in particular, should play a proactive role in the integration and socialisation of the newcomers, who would have been legally permitted to stay.

Lastly, it is important to strengthen research and documentation on labour migration in the Global South, especially from pro-worker perspectives. Such research fndings could help infuence migration policies in the Global South which, to an extent, replicate trends in the Global North whose conditions differ markedly from those of the south. An understanding of labour migration in the Global South could illuminate our appreciation of Global South to Global North migration and dispel the myths of migration and development. It is important to see the negative side of

neoliberal capitalism behind the uprooting of communities, compelling them to emigrate.

### **4.10 Conclusion**

In this chapter, I used the example of ESAP in Zimbabwe and its liberalisation agenda, which triggered deindustrialisation and massive job losses and consequently increased exportation of labour, to argue that neoliberal capitalism has been the root cause of increased labour migration. Of course, the ZANU PF government of Zimbabwe had continued with the capitalist model inherited from colonial rule, together with its protectionist safeguards. The move towards liberalisation and deregulation, which characterise neoliberalism, was the Zimbabwean government's initiative on the advice of IMF and the World Bank. It hurriedly implemented the structural adjustment programme against evidence of its previous failures in Africa and against strong protestations from the labour federation, ZCTU.

While it is a fact that the manner in which the Mugabe administration handled the economic meltdown and other imprudent decisions such as the unbudgeted payment of former guerrillas, the intervention in the DRC war, and its violent suppression of the labour-backed opposition, was inept and grossly irresponsible, it can still be argued that ESAP was the tipping point for the economic collapse. Indeed, the massive exodus of labour migration was experienced more than a decade after the ESAP's introduction in 1991; nevertheless, the push factors are still traceable to ESAP. It is unfortunate that the hegemony of neoliberalism continues in Zimbabwe and elsewhere, notwithstanding its devastating impact on populations. This chapter further shows that the inherent contradictions of the neoliberal ideology of deregulation and control of labour across international boundaries account for the criminalisation of migrants and their super-exploitation, casualisation and precarity. However, the precarity of labour is not limited to immigrant labour but extended to workers in the migrant-receiving country such as South Africa, resulting in further disintegration of working-class solidarity in the form of xenophobic outbursts. Unfortunately, Zimbabwe continues, after the Mugabe era, to embrace neoliberalism with the hope of rebuilding its shattered economy.

### **References**


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### **Part II Legislation and Policy Frameworks Governing Migration**

### **Chapter 5 Immigration Policy in South Africa: Public Opinion, Xenophobia and the Search for Progress**

**Steven Lawrence Gordon**

### **5.1 Introduction**

The African Union Commission (AUC) (2015) prepared and published Agenda 2063, a strategic framework that lays out a roadmap for regional integration on the African continent. In the First Ten-Year Implementation Plan (2014–2023), the AUC (2015) made it clear that regional cooperation and harmonisation of labour migration policies was central to that roadmap. As part of the plan, the AUC (2018) produced the Migration Policy Framework for Africa (MPFA) and its plan of action for the period 2018–2030. In the MPFA, the commission expressed its concern about growing levels of xenophobia on the African continent, arguing that this type of prejudice undermines regional integration efforts. Hostility towards international migrants is a serious issue in South Africa. In recent years, collective anti-immigrant violence has soured relationships between South Africa and its neighbours, damaging the country's participation in regional integration projects. The government has struggled to develop meaningful strategies to deal with anti-immigrant hostility.

To solve the problem of anti-immigrant prejudice, we need to adequately understand it. The goal of this chapter is to provide a comprehensive examination of antiimmigrant attitudes and behaviours in South Africa. Xenophobia is explored using public opinion data from the nationally representative dataset of the South African Social Attitudes Survey (SASAS). First, the study will be placed into its proper context. This will include a brief outline of the country's immigration policy before the problem of anti-immigrant violence is reviewed. Second, the fndings are presented, examining public attitudes towards anti-immigrant stereotypes, selection criteria preferences, welfare chauvinism and views on combatting xenophobic hate crime. Self-reported public participation in anti-immigrant violence is also assessed.

S. L. Gordon (\*)

Developmental, Capable and Ethical State, Human Sciences Research Council of South Africa, Pretoria, South Africa e-mail: sgordon@hsrc.ac.za

It will show that many believe dangerous lies about immigrants, stereotyping foreigners as criminals and 'job stealers'. The chapter concludes by outlining what needs to be done to reduce xenophobia in the country.

### **5.2 Immigration Policy Reform in South Africa**

It is not possible for us to comprehend xenophobia in South Africa without understanding the evolution of the country's immigration policy during the modern period. For most of the twentieth century, two distinct policy frameworks governed migration fows. The frst accorded migrants basic rights and protections and, eventually, the benefts of full citizenship. This framework was preserved primarily for white migrants. The second migration framework focused on contract labourers of colour and was this track was design to provide workers for certain industries (such as the minerals industry). These contract workers were subject to draconian movement controls. Legislation in the country was only amended to ostensibly deracialise immigration law in 1986 (for a review of immigration policy during this period, see Klotz, 2013).

Following the democratic transition, the new post-apartheid government joined the Southern African Development Community (SADC) in 1994. A regional organisation founded in 1992, the SADC was dedicated to a paradigm of linear market integration, pursuing the stepwise harmonisation of goods, labour and capital markets. During this period, the free movement of persons was becoming a more essential goal of those supporting Pan-African integration. Opening national borders for the creation of economic and social growth was outlined as a key priority of the new African Economic Community launched in 1991. Some regional organisations in Africa (such as the East African Community) were making great strides to eliminate visa requirements and liberalise rights of residence and establishment in this period (Abebe, 2017). However, the South African government was initially resistant to calls for visa liberalization within SADC and in the 1990s fought against the creation of visa-free zones which would have allowed the free cross-border movement of people (Maunganidze & Formica, 2018).

The resistance to visa liberalisation in SADC by the South African state was part of a generally restrictive approach to immigration policy. Severe limitations were placed on the number of international migrants that could be legally admitted into the country (Segatti, 2011). In particular, the government worked to limit opportunities for unskilled and semi-skilled immigrants. Employers were encouraged to reduce their formal foreign workforce, and state offcials placed restrictions on the number of work permits that could be issued. The new democratic government granted wide-ranging powers to immigration offcials and police to detain individuals suspected of being undocumented migrants, and signifcant capital was laid out for border control. The state conducted about 2.9 million deportations between 1994 and 2009 (Fig. 5.1). This approach was very expensive and was criticised as an extremely unproductive method of controlling migration infows.

**Fig. 5.1** Deportations of undocumented migrants by the South African Department of Home Affairs, 1994–2018. (*Source:* Data was compiled by the author from annual reports of South Africa's Department of Home Affairs. Data from 2011 and 2012 is from the 2013 Parliamentary Portfolio Commission on Home Affairs)

Following the passage of comprehensive immigration reform in 2002, the policy environment became more welcoming for skilled foreigners. Further progressive changes followed these initial reforms in the following years, and the country's immigration policy has been repeatedly amended (in 2004, 2007, 2011 and 2016) with the stated aim of encouraging more skilled labour migration. During this period, the South African government also appeared to soften on the question of border harmonisation in the SADC (Maunganidze & Formica, 2018). New agreements on travel were reached that facilitated intra-regional migration. As a result, the number of deportations between 2009 and 2018 dropped dramatically. The international migrant stock living in the country grew from around two million in 2000 to more than four million in 2019.1 In addition, the number of SADC citizens moving in and out of South Africa has increased considerably over the last decade.

Despite progressive policy change, the government has remained highly concerned with border security and the risks associated with international migration. This concern is best expressed by the agency most responsible for managing immigration in the country, the Department of Home Affairs (DHA). The department often places security concerns above the economic goals outlined in the current immigration policy. Consider an important example, the requirements of the special visa for entrepreneurial migration. The entrepreneurial visa was designed by policymakers to help foreign entrepreneurs start new businesses in South Africa. The visa requirements designed by the DHA (especially the investment condition), however, have been described by the Helen Suzman Foundation as excessive and internationally uncompetitive (van Lennep, 2019). This limits entry for foreign businesspeople and undermines enterprise development in the country.

<sup>1</sup>The fgure is based on estimates from the United Nations Development Programme.

### **5.3 Results: The Extent of Anti-immigrant Sentiment and How It Infuences Policy**

I will now outline the extent of anti-immigrant sentiment in the country as well as attitudes towards immigration policy using data from SASAS. This dataset was selected because, following xenophobic violence in May 2008, a comprehensive set of questions on migration was introduced into the survey series. This data allowed me to look more closely at how ordinary people feel about immigration in South Africa and what kind of migration regime they would like to see. Each SASAS round was planned to produce a representative sample consisting of 3000 individuals aged 16 years and older in households which are geographically spread across the country's nine provinces.2 In order to create a nationally representative dataset, benchmark weights are then applied to the data. All data portrayed in this chapter is weighted unless otherwise specifed.

### *5.3.1 Crime Narratives of Immigration*

Following the democratic transition in South Africa, the country experienced a considerable surge in reported crime. Reports of drug-related crime have, in particular, grown exponentially in the past two decades according to data from the South African Police Services.3 Many have attributed this upsurge in criminality to international migrant fows. Indeed, the alleged link between international migration and incidence of crime is one of the most widespread anti-immigrant narratives in South Africa. SASAS respondents were asked if they agreed or disagreed that foreign nationals increase crime rates. Figure 5.2 displays the distribution of answers to this question during the period 2008 to 2018 for the general populace. Approximately two thirds of the adult public saw foreign nationals as detrimental to public safety. Responses to this question did not fuctuate noticeably over the period, implying the stability of this stereotype.

The question of whether international migrants contribute to existing crime levels in South Africa is a diffcult one to answer. Data published by state authorities contain insuffcient information about perpetrators' identities to establish a clear relationship between international migration and crime rates in the country. Using advanced statistical techniques, Kollamparambil (2019) looked to circumvent this

<sup>2</sup>The primary sampling units of each round of SASAS are 500 population areas, stratifed by province, geographical sub-type and majority population group. These areas were selected using data from the national census. Seven households were selected by feldworkers at random in each area. Using a Krish grid, an individual aged 16 years or older within each household is chosen to be interviewed.

<sup>3</sup>There were 45,928 drug-related crime incidents recorded by South African Police Services in 1994. In 2018 this fgure had risen to 323,547.

*Do you agree or disagree that immigrants increase crime rates?*

**Fig. 5.2** Public attitudes about whether foreign nationals increase crime rates in South Africa, 2008–2018. (*Source:* South African Social Survey (SASAS) series 2008–2018)

problem by mapping data from 1141 police stations onto datasets from the 2011 National Census and 2016 Community Survey, both conducted by Statistics South Africa. The study tested the association between international migration and crime across 231 municipalities and found *no* evidence of a signifcant impact. The research suggests that other factors (such as income inequality) better explain crime patterns in South Africa.

The results outlined above are consistent with empirical research in other countries. Let us consider, for example, the existing scholarship on how international migration affects crime levels in the United States. Many ordinary Americans believe that there is a robust relationship between crime and immigration, and several scholars have looked into this question. MacDonald et al. (2013), for instance, found that levels of immigrant concentration were *not* correlated with high crime rates. Immigrant concentration, in fact, seemed to reduce neighbourhood-level crime in their study. Similar fndings were observed by Ousey and Kubrin (2014), who discovered that immigration seems to reduce serious levels of crime in American cities. The research from the United States, much like the work of Kollamparambil (2019), tends to show that factors other than migration play a much more important role in determining crime patterns.

### *5.3.2 Economic Narratives of Immigration*

One of the most consistent anti-immigrant narratives in South Africa concerns the economic effect of international migration. Many seem to believe external migrant fows have a distinctly negative effect on national economy. To gauge the extent of this belief, SASAS respondents were asked if they agreed or disagreed that foreign nationals were generally good for South Africa's economy. Responses for the adult population are presented for the period 2008–2018 in Fig. 5.3. The general public is divided on this issue. Almost a third of the adult population saw international migrants as having a benefcial fscal effect. A similarly sized segment disagreed, and approximately a quarter said that they were unsure about this issue. Public responses to this question did not vary considerably over the period, suggesting the durability of the observed division in national public opinion.

Several recent studies have looked into whether international immigration is benefcial for the South African economy. There is signifcant empirical evidence to suggest that people are correct to assume that foreign nationals have a positive impact on the economy. Data from a World Bank study shows that levels of immigration into the country were economically benefcial for the nation (Hovhannisyan et al., 2018). During the study period 1996–2011, immigrant infows were discovered to have a positive effect on the employment and wages of the native-born. Findings from an OECD-ILO (2018) study confrmed these results and found that international migration raises the country's income per capita by as much as 5%. This may be driven by the higher than average educational attainment rate observed amongst foreign-born workers.

The results outlined above are consistent with what empirical scholars have found in other countries. Economists have built models to estimate the gains for the world economy from eliminating various barriers to migration. Without delving into the specifcs, the general conclusion of these models is unmistakably positive. The projected gains are frequently in the range of 50–150% of gross domestic product globally (for a detailed discussion, see Clemens, 2011). Indeed, the available evidence suggests that the fscal returns from lowering international barriers to migration are much greater than returns from reducing trade barriers between countries. The economic benefts of international migration are amongst the reasons that visa reduction and free movement are prioritised as part of the AU's own migration policy framework, as well as Agenda 2063 (AUC, 2018).

### *5.3.3 Welfare Chauvinism*

South Africa's welfare system is one of the largest in Africa4 and the government allocates billions of rand each fnancial year to a range of different social welfare programmes. A powerful anti-immigrant narrative is that international migration depletes state resources and is a burden on this welfare system. But existing evidence suggests that, in fact, migrant infows have a net positive impact on public fnances. The OECD-ILO (2018) study outlined in the previous section concluded that international migration had a net positive impact on public fnances between 1996 and 2011. This may be due to the fact that foreign nationals were found to pay more in taxes (especially income and value added taxes) than locals. In other words, the foreign national community seemed to help strengthen the welfare state in South Africa. Despite their aggregate positive contribution to state fnances, many ordinary people would like to exclude all foreign-born persons from accessing welfare.

In SASAS 2016, respondents were asked when they thought foreign nationals should obtain the same rights to social grants and services as citizens already living in the country. The fve response categories were: (i) immediately on arrival; (ii) after living in South Africa for a year, whether or not they have worked; (iii) only after they have worked and paid taxes for at least a year; (iv) once they have become a South African citizen; and (v) they should never get the same rights. What was surprising about the public's responses to this question was that heritage and not reciprocity emerged as the main driving mechanism for granting welfare. The most popular response was also the most exclusionary, with 47% of the adult public supporting the strongest form of welfare chauvinism while 29% backed welfare based upon citizenship. A tenth of the adult population said that welfare should be conditional upon payment of taxes and 7% took an unconditional stance on this issue.

'Welfare chauvinism' refers to the unwillingness of the native-born to grant welfare rights to outsiders. This term has been employed in Europe to explain the emergence of right-wing nationalist parties who advocate that the welfare state should be an exclusive system of social protection which is bounded by heritage. At their most extreme, welfare chauvinists argue for excluding the foreign-born from welfare based on their place of birth. In weaker forms, chauvinists of this kind contend that benefts for immigrants should be conditional on, for instance, time spent in the country or citizenship status (for further discussion, see Reeskens & van Oorschot, 2012). It is apparent from data presented here that there is widespread support for an extreme form of welfare chauvinism in modern South Africa. This is troubling as it suggests that a signifcant segment of the general populace display a deep-seated exclusionary animosity towards outsiders.

<sup>4</sup>For a comparative discussion of social protection programmes in Africa, see Bhorat et al. (2017).

### *5.3.4 Immigrant Selection Criteria*

In immigration policy, admission criteria can be seen as an expression of how ordinary citizens conceive of the nation's boundaries. This can be especially true if the criteria involve cultural factors (such as ethnicity or religion). Throughout South Africa's history, the character of selective immigration regulation has been publicly (and ferociously) debated (Klotz, 2013). In the modern period, factors broadly related to human capital (such as education or work-related skills) have come to dominate debates on access criteria. But, of course, credential-based selection criteria are not neutral concepts and constitute instances of symbolic boundary making (albeit of an acquired variety). In addition, we must consider supranational policymaking on admission criteria. As previously discussed, the AU's Agenda 2063 outlines plans to both harmonise members' immigration control regimes and establish a visa-free zone (AUC, 2015). Under this proposal, selection criteria would be geographical in nature. An individual has to be a citizen of an AU member state (that is, an 'African') to qualify for free movement.

The 2018 round of SASAS included an array of questions about the standards for admitting migrants. On a scale running from extremely unimportant (0) to extremely important (10), respondents were asked to rate four different criteria for immigration. The four were: (i) educational qualifcations; (ii) Christian background; (iii) work skills that the country needs; and (iv) African. Using this data, it is possible to acquire a deeper understanding of what selection conditions people think should be placed on immigrants. It would appear that many people want human capital conditions placed on foreigners wishing to settle in the country. Being skilled and welleducated were the most highly-rated criteria while less importance was placed on being African (Fig. 5.4).

During the pre-democratic period, religion (specifcally Christianity) was a crucial aspect of public debates on immigrant selection (Klotz, 2013). Given how much the immigration debate has changed since that period, it is surprising that Christianity remains such an important criterion of selection for many. It was interesting to examine how public views on preconditions were distributed against general hostility towards international migrants: people who had a negative view of foreign nationals rated the four criteria, on average, as less important than those with a more positive view. This seems to indicate that there is no precondition that can be placed on immigration that would satisfy this group. There is a segment, in other words, of the general population that would reject all foreign nationals regardless of their cultural or economic character.

### *5.3.5 Discrimination Is a Doorway to Participation in Anti-immigrant Hate Crime*

At the time of writing, South Africa does not have hate crime legislation and the authorities did not gather data on this type of crime5 However, we can use selfreported public opinion data to obtain an understanding of participation rates in xenophobic violence. In 2015, SASAS introduced a single item which attempted to measure public participation in violence against foreigners living in the country. The question was worded as follows: "Have you taken part in violent action to prevent immigrants from living or working in your neighbourhood?" The results for the period 2015–2018 are presented in Table 5.1. The vast majority of the adult population reported that they had not participated in this form of anti-immigrant aggression and would never do so. The share of the general public who gave this answer varied very little over the period 2015–2018.

Possible participation in anti-immigrant aggression amongst non-participants was found to be much higher than anticipated: more than a tenth of the general public claimed that they had not taken part in an assault on foreign nationals but *would* be prepared to do so. Although most of the South African populace rejected anti-immigrant hate crime, this fnding is disturbing. Psychological studies (for example, Webb & Sheeran, 2006) have tended to show that behavioural intention is a reasonably good (albeit not perfect) predictor of future action. In a recent study, Gordon (2020b) found that negative stereotypes about foreign nationals were a robust driver of behavioural intention amongst non-participants. These fndings


**Table 5.1** Count of adult population who reported participation in anti-immigrant violence, 2015–2018

*Source*: South African Social Attitudes Survey 2015–2018

<sup>5</sup>The Prevention and Combating of Hate Crimes and Hate Speech Bill (B9–2018) has been put forward for debate. But there was signifcant opposition to the bill and at the time of writing, it was under consideration by the National Assembly.

seem to suggest that anti-immigrant attitudes can have a rallying effect, goading individuals into adopting a violent stance towards foreigners.

It is diffcult to corroborate the rates of participation observed in Table 5.1. Using publicly available data, the non-proprietary platform Xenowatch has tracked the number of xenophobic incidents in the country from 1994 to 2019. Hosted and supported by the University of the Witwatersrand, Xenowatch has recorded 529 such incidents over the past 25 years (42 of which occurred in 2018 alone and resulted in 12 deaths). The managers of Xenowatch acknowledge, however, that these fgures may be underestimations of the true extent of hate crime victimisation in the country.6 Because of poor data quality, there are many important questions about xenophobic violence we cannot answer. We do not readily understand, for instance, which foreign groups are the most discriminated against.

Violence is not the only form in which xenophobia may manifest itself. Different types of non-violent discrimination against foreign nationals have also been reported in South Africa. Consider, for instance, anti-immigrant demonstrations or boycotts. Research has shown that participation in such actions is often the frst step in a process of escalation that can result in xenophobic violence (Gordon, 2019). Indeed, violent anti-immigrant hate crime cannot be explained without understanding nonviolent anti-immigrant discrimination. Policymakers must consider non-violent anti-immigrant activity as an important early warning sign. If suffcient resources were marshalled to nip such activities in the bud, future outbreaks of xenophobic violence could be mitigated.

### *5.3.6 Explanations for Anti-immigrant Hate Crime*

There is widespread disagreement about the drivers of anti-immigrant hate crime, with ordinary South Africans polarised on who (or what) is to blame for the seeming rise of xenophobic violence. This is an important area of discord. It has been claimed that the causal attribution process is essential to almost all decision-making. Weiner (2006) considers causal explanations to be a powerful force in structuring an individual's attitudes towards injustice in society (also see Sahar, 2014). Indeed, it could be argued that such interpretative schemas are at the heart of how many people think about societal problems such as hate crime. Research shows that certain types of lay attributions can be used to justify violence or exonerate perpetrators (for a discussion of this research, see Bilali & Vollhardt, 2019). Let us look at what the general public think the primary causes of anti-immigrant hate crime in South Africa are.

Respondents in both SASAS 2017 and 2018 were asked the following question: "There are many opinions about why people take violent action against foreigners living in South Africa. Please tell me the MAIN REASON why you think this

<sup>6</sup>For an outline of the complexity of documenting hate crime statistics in South Africa, see Mlilo and Misago (2019).

happens." The question was open-ended, which allowed survey participants to answer in their own words. The open-ended format reduced bias in answering and allowed respondents to give salient information about the issue. After an extensive review, each response was then evaluated and sorted into one of the 16 predetermined categories (Fig. 5.5). Some respondents put forward multiple reasons for the violence and, therefore, the data was captured with multiple responses. Reviewing these results, it is clear that the crime and economic narratives outlined earlier in the chapter play a decisive role in how people thought about the causes of anti-immigrant hate crime.

The most popular answers identifed in the given textual responses were outgroup-based attributions. About half of the adult population blamed the violence on the activities of foreign nationals. The most common of these outgroup-based reasons was lawbreaking. Roughly a ffth of the total population ascribed the

**Fig. 5.5** Main reasons given to explain why people take violent action against foreigners living in South Africa in 2017 and 2018 (multiple responses). (*Source*: South African Social Attitudes Survey 2017–2018)

violence to the criminal behaviour of foreigners.7 This was followed by economic outgroup-based schemas, of which foreign labour market activity was the most prevalent. A ffth of the populace listed the labour practices of foreigners and this was the most popular of all economic outgroup-based attributes given. Other outgroup-based attributions (including sexual immorality and disease transmission) were far less popular. A minority made a highly general statement about foreigners being a threat (for example that immigrants were trying to 'destroy' and/or 'take over' the country).

When compared to outgroup-based attributions outlined above, perpetratorbased answers were far less popular. The most common type of perpetrator-based attributions concerned lay beliefs about foreigners and their behaviours. A seventh of the populace said that it was people's own views about immigrants that drove them to violence. The second most frequently cited perpetrator-based attribute was emotion, with respondents saying that locals were motivated by their emotive state (such as fear or hatred) to attack the foreign-born. Of all the emotions listed by respondents as main causes, jealousy or envy were the most common. Only about a tenth of the adult population identifed system-based attributes, such as macroeconomic forces (for example, poverty or unemployment) or a culture of lawbreaking, as primary causes.

### *5.3.7 Preferences for Strategies to Combat Anti-immigrant Hate Crime*

In the current period, the National Action Plan to Combat Racism, Racial Discrimination, Xenophobia and Related Intolerance (hereafter, the NAP) is the main policy instrument to address xenophobia in South Africa. Developed through a comprehensive consultation process that began in 2015, the plan serves as the nation's guide to eradicating societal intolerance.8 The document acknowledges the existence of anti-immigrant hate crime and the serious challenge it presents to South African society. Here xenophobia is defned as an "attitudinal orientation of hostility against non-nationals in a given population" (Department of Justice and Constitutional Development, 2019: 9). The NAP includes a targeted set of actions to reduce xenophobia centred on immigrant integration, improved migration management, and better law enforcement.

Using SASAS data, it is possible to ascertain which anti-xenophobia interventions enjoy the most public support. In the 2018 SASAS round, feldworkers asked respondents what could "be done to *STOP* attacks against foreigners living in the

<sup>7</sup>A surprisingly large share of the general public blamed the attacks on the alleged involvement of foreign nationals in the sale of illegal narcotics. About a ffth of the adults who opted for outgroup blaming (or 13% of the total) specifcally mentioned drug traffcking.

<sup>8</sup>The NAP was written to provide the foundation to develop a comprehensive public policy.

country." The question was open-ended and this format allowed respondents to provide an unbiased answer to feldworkers. A substantial proportion of the general adult population (88%) gave a valid answer to this question, suggesting a powerful desire amongst the public to end xenophobic violence. A surprising diversity of responses were given and no single proposal commanded a majority of popular support. After the data was reviewed, a set of 12 codes for the open-ended question were developed based on typologies adopted for classifying similar types of studies. Public preferences for the 12 categories are displayed in Fig. 5.6.

The most popular anti-xenophobia solutions proposed by the adult population concerned migration management. A ffth of the public felt that deporting all (or most) foreign nationals from the country would resolve the problem of xenophobic violence. A tenth identifed better border controls, while 8% told feldworkers that migrants should change their behaviour. Many identifed public awareness and community-based approaches to xenophobia. A tenth preferred education campaigns and a twentieth championed community dialogue while a similar proportion advocated for attitudinal change. Resource management strategies (for example, job creation and poverty reduction) were preferred by 10% of the general population. Overall, it is clear from Fig. 5.6 that the general public is divided on how xenophobic violence should be addressed, with many favouring solutions that could be described as reactionary.

**Fig. 5.6** Main solutions proposed to solve anti-immigrant violence in South Africa (multiple response). (*Source:* South African Social Survey (SASAS) series 2018)

Citizen preferences for combatting xenophobic hate crime can be linked to lay attributes of anti-immigrant violence. In a comprehensive study of public opinion, Gordon (2020a) found that public beliefs about the etiology of an intergroup confict infuenced their desire for confict resolution as well as the type of solutions preferred. Outgroup-based attributions were found to infuence the espousal of prejudicial solutions to anti-immigrant violence (for example, mass expulsion of foreign nationals). If a person attributed hate crime to perpetrator-based causes (such as beliefs about foreigners or emotions) then they were more likely to favour liberal solutions (for example, education campaigns). The results of this study show how anti-immigrant crime and economic narratives undermine popular support for antixenophobia strategies in South Africa.

### **5.4 Discussions and Conclusions**

The modern South African migration regime is not perfect, and signifcant reform is required. The current task is to make the regime more benefcial for people living in the country by encouraging more skilled and entrepreneurial immigration. Progressive reform will not be easy given the current state of public opinion. The data presented in this chapter demonstrates both the extent and depth of antiimmigrant sentiment in South Africa. As discussed in this chapter, there is no empirical justifcation for anti-immigrant stereotypes (such as foreign nationals are a major cause of unemployment or crime). Public attitudes towards immigration in South Africa are probably infuenced by the lack of knowledge people have about this issue.9 The general populace needs to be better informed about immigration and its economic and social impacts on the country. In addition, given the climate of public opinion outlined in this chapter, reformers must show courage and fnd ways to generate support for their policies and programmes.

The persistent preoccupation of some policymakers with restrictionism seems to have compromised the use of international immigration to boost economic growth. A preventive regime driven by a preoccupation with security forces foreigners into spaces of exploitation. The effect is an unproductive immigration regime focused primarily on control and deterrence to the detriment of human rights. Moreover, it is important to consider the relationship between public opinion and policy in South Africa. In immigration policy, we can observe an overemphasis on the securitisation of borders and this overemphasis only exaggerates anti-immigrant perceptions amongst the public. There is a need to move the general focus of the immigration debate away from deterrence and control towards management and integration.

<sup>9</sup>Consider, for example, how the general public answered the following question: "What is the size of the international migrant population in South Africa?" Gordon et al. (2020) examined lay beliefs about the number of foreign nationals living in the country and the results showed that the most of the adult populace are out step with offcial estimates. A distinct majority was found to overestimate the nation's international immigrant stock by a substantial margin.

Policymakers can persuade the general public to embrace a more progressive view of migration. Many people already view migrants as good for the national economy and would be more positive about immigration if it were framed in terms of its economic benefts.

There are several progressive reforms that would greatly beneft foreign nationals already living in South Africa. Consider, for instance, the case for the regularisation of undocumented migrants. Without documentation, foreigners can be deprived of their access to basic services such as healthcare, education and work. In addition, the welfare of this group cannot be monitored and managed. Past regularisation programmes have been effective in improving immigrant livelihoods (Klotz, 2013) and similar programmes could be just as successful if introduced timeously. Another intervention that deserves greater state investment is immigrant integration programmes that would help foreign nationals establish positive contacts in the communities where they live. According to existing public opinion research, positive (that is, friendly and cooperative) contact with foreign nationals reduces antiimmigrant attitudes in South Africa (for a review of this research, see Gordon, 2018).

The chapter has advanced our understanding of mass attitudes towards immigration policy in South Africa. Using a unique longitudinal public opinion dataset, it has mapped attitudes for the period 2008–2018. Crime and economic narratives about immigration have been highlighted, issues also noted by other scholars (e.g., Klotz, 2013). Disaggregated data showed how durable these narratives were over the period. In addition, the chapter explored welfare chauvinism and public preferences for immigration admission criteria. These issues have received little attention in the existing scholarship on xenophobia in South Africa. The data presented in this chapter has shed new light on public attitudes towards anti-immigrant hate crime. It has shown how crime and economic narratives undermine existing efforts to fght this particular form of hate crime. Based on a review of the available evidence, a number of anti-xenophobia interventions can be put forward.

This chapter established that a clear minority in the country support participation in anti-immigrant hate crime. South Africa has strong anti-discrimination laws but the mechanisms to enforce them are often weak when it comes to immigrants. In addition, many migrants suspect enforcement agencies are not on their side and many victims do not report violations of their rights. Interventions that could improve the situation include shorter procedures, alternative dispute resolution mechanisms and greater assistance for victims. This can include legal aid so that immigrants can better access justice via the legal system. The country also needs adequate hate crime legislation. This would allow authorities to target hate crime and to gather data on this type of crime. As this chapter has outlined there is still a lot we don't know about hate crime in South Africa and this undermines antixenophobia policy.

**Acknowledgements** This publication was supported by the Centre of Excellence in Human Development at the University of the Witwatersrand, Johannesburg, under Grant P2018003. Opinions expressed and conclusions made, are those of the author and are not to be attributed to the centre. Steven Gordon is a Research Associate at the Faculty of Humanities, University of Johannesburg.

**Disclosure Statement** No potential confict of interest was reported by the author.

### **References**


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### **Chapter 6 Refugee Policy as Infrastructure: The Gulf Between Policy Intent and Implementation for Refugees and Asylum Seekers in South Africa**

**Khangelani Moyo and Christine Botha**

### **6.1 Introduction**

This chapter engages the policy practices of the South African state in handling refugees and asylum seekers. The research considers the decision-making timeline involved in developing the policy landscape and the resulting migration infrastructure (or lack thereof) for refugees and asylum seekers. We explore policy as hard and soft infrastructure and note that refugee and asylum seeker policies in South Africa have at times been shaped to align with migration patterns retrospectively (Crush et al., 2017), but, in recent years, have taken a more restrictive position towards mobility generally (Zanker & Moyo, 2020). We note that the legislative conditions for migration are determined by the state, which defnes which movements constitute regular and irregular migration (Khan & Lee, 2018). The actions and non-actions of the state to facilitate mobility have also come to redefne the notion of community, home and belonging for migrants and refugees (Landau & Bakewell, 2018). Our focus is on the ft between the legislative instruments of government and the reality on the ground, and we ask whether the legislative infrastructure is ft for its purpose in terms of protecting refugees and asylum seekers. A Southern approach to theorising migration must, of necessity, engage the infrastructure that (dis)enables the processes of immigration and integration in the destination countries. We note that the refugee governance regime in South Africa has been at best incoherent, and at worst not ft for its purpose, which has resulted in its failure to achieve its aims. We argue that the evolution of refugee policy in South Africa still has antecedents in the apartheid apparatus, and continually slips into the same spirit of restrictionism that guided apartheid thinking where the preoccupation is that of restricting access to channels of immigration into the country. Similar observations were made as early as the 1990s by Crush (1999) who likened South Africa

K. Moyo (\*) · C. Botha

Global Change Institute, University of the Witwatersrand, Johannesburg, South Africa

<sup>©</sup> The Author(s) 2022 77

P. Rugunanan, N. Xulu-Gama (eds.), *Migration in Southern Africa*, IMISCOE Research Series, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-92114-9\_6

to a fortress owing to the clearly xenophobic stance taken by its then Minister of Home Affairs in restricting immigration into the country. Other writers have, over the years, also decried the non-adherence to a human rights-based framework in the management of refugees and asylum seekers in South Africa as well as institutionalised xenophobia (Smit & Rugunanan, 2014; Rugunanan & Smit, 2011).

In our discussion, we conceive policy as infrastructure in the hands of both government and the governed – in this case, the refugees and asylum seekers. Our interest is in understanding the nature and dimensions of policies which affect refugees and asylum seekers and how they make do with the restrictionism that is inherent in the policies. Currently, the refugee policy landscape in South Africa lacks coordination amongst national, provincial and local government levels. During the process of writing this chapter, the president of South Africa signed into force the amendments to the Refugees Act and gazetted new regulations which came into effect in January 2020. The new regulations have effectively curtailed the rights of refugees and asylum seekers within the Republic (Zanker & Moyo, 2020) and further reinforce the securitised and restrictionist path that South Africa has adopted (already foreseen by Crush et al., 2017; Dostal, 2017).

In this work, we draw on the existing literature as well as insights from keyinformant interviews with representatives of refugee protection non-governmental organisations (NGOs), the City of Johannesburg migration unit, and academic researchers.

### **6.2 The Evolution of Refugee Policy and Governance in South Africa**

South Africa has been receiving migrant populations from different parts of the world since precolonial times. During the apartheid era, the government maintained tight control on immigration with an emphasis on desirable white immigrants for becoming citizens (Klotz, 2013; Peberdy, 2009). Since 1994, the nature and magnitude of migratory fows have changed signifcantly as the new dispensation enabled many potential migrants from the rest of the African continent, Asia and the Indian sub-continent to migrate to South Africa (Rugunanan, 2016; Crush et al., 2005; Crush, 1999). The legislation around refugees and asylum seekers fts within the larger framework of immigration policy. The most signifcant initial pieces of South African legislation that governed immigration policy after apartheid were the Refugees Act of 1998 and the Immigration Act of 2002. Although South Africa supports the in-migration of skilled and professional people, the country does not welcome low-skilled or semi-skilled foreign workers, who constitute the bulk of undocumented migrants to the country (Peberdy, 2009). The Immigration Act of 2002 can accordingly be regarded as having created a very restrictive immigration regime, which fails to address the reality of the many low-skilled migrants entering the country, and effectively opens avenues for irregular migration (see, for instance, De Gruchy, 2018).

The earliest mention of forced migrants in the country's legislation was in the Cape's Immigration Act of 1906. It made provision to grant entry to immigrants who had been forced to fee their country due to imminent danger, persecution, imprisonment or punishment based on religion or political beliefs, and stated that they would not be turned away based on the absence of "visible means of support". These provisions were not included in the more restrictive Immigrants Regulation Act of 1913 to suit the desired nationality quotas (Klotz, 2013). Between the Act of 1913 and the Aliens Control Act of 1991 there was no strategic legal framework in place to receive and process refugees and asylum seekers in South Africa. Some 300,000 civil war victims displaced from Mozambique had arrived in the country since 1980 and were managed under the illegal immigrant and migrant worker legislation clauses in the Act of 1991 (Amit, 2012; Handmaker, 2001). The Aliens' Control Act of 1991, using the divisive term 'alien' to describe non-citizens, was developed during the apartheid era (Aliens' Control Act, 1991; Polzer, 2007). It was rooted frmly in the principles contained in acts dating back to the Immigrants' Regulation Act of 1913, and therefore proved to be misaligned with the legislative requirement to provide refugee protection (Klaaren et al., 2008). The 1991 Act subsequently allowed the state to clamp down on irregular migration as a guise for arresting and deporting forced migrants from war-torn Mozambique (Polzer, 2007; Crush & McDonald, 2001).

The Act of 1991 underpinned the discussions around immigration legislation and fundamentally shaped immigration debates and practices after apartheid (de Gruchy, 2018; Peberdy, 2009; Crush & McDonald, 2001). The policies contained in the 1991 Aliens' Control Act gave new perceived power to the fading rule of the apartheid state to enforce border policing as pressure mounted for political reforms (Klotz, 2013). The United Nations (UN) urged the need for protective legislation for displaced people in South Africa to address the management of the displaced Mozambican civil war victims (Klotz, 2013; Crush & McDonald, 2001). The National Party government initially resisted the UN and OAU (Organisation of African Unity) refugee conventions, but due to international pressure, the UN refugee agency (now UNHCR – United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees) was authorised to act as a conduit between the South African and Mozambican governments to reach the "1993 Tripartite Agreement" (Polzer, 2007). A basic status determination process was adapted from the Passport Control Instruction No. 20 of 1993 contained in the Aliens' Control Act of 1991 to retrospectively recognise the status of the Mozambican refugees for a repatriation program. Amnesty was offered later, in 1997, to those who fed to South Africa before 1992 (Klaaren et al., 2008; Handmaker, 2001). Due to the limited time in which the initial repatriation program for Mozambican refugees was developed, it failed to recognise the complexity of the displaced's fight and return and did not prove to be a resilient solution, leaving many refugees in "legal limbo" between being offered amnesty and its eventual implementation in 2000 (Handmaker, 2001). In 1995, South Africa fnally became a signatory to the UN's and the OAU's refugee conventions, which provided additional international funding support to implement repatriation programs and refugee reception camps (Klotz, 2013). Post-apartheid South Africa saw the return of those

who had fed the country into exile, with many reapplying for citizenship. Immigration amnesty was offered to contract mineworkers who had been working for a period of at least 10 years, as well as citizens from the Southern African Development Community (SADC) region who could offer proof that they had been residing in South Africa for a minimum of 5 years (Crush & McDonald, 2001).

It was a turbulent start to the policy process, premised on very little experience in refugee law following the initial "1993 Basic Agreement", which was later compiled into the Draft Refugee Bill of 1996 by the Department of Home Affairs in partnership with the UNHCR (United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees) and NGO representatives forming the National Consortium on Refugee Affairs (NCRA) (Klotz, 2013; Crush & McDonald, 2001). Despite these reforms to immigration policy, border policing had otherwise remained hostile with a 75% increase in deportations of irregular migrants from 1994 to 1995. Reports state that 84% of these deportations were Mozambican citizens (Crush & McDonald, 2001). The Draft Refugee Bill of 1996 incorporated more transparency for asylum seekers to gain access to the details of their individual application, such as information concerning the application outcome (Klaaren et al., 2008). State law advisors began revising the legal defnition of a refugee, narrowing its description and the legal approach to status determination by omitting some of the international convention's defnitions. Aware of this, the task team submitted a document illustrating its concerns when the White Paper and Refugee Bill were presented to the Parliamentary Portfolio Committee on Home Affairs in October 1998 (Klaaren et al., 2008; Handmaker, 2001). Various consultants, stakeholders and task teams worked to refne the national protocol to align to international refugee protection mandates until the Refugee Act was signed into law in December 1998 (Klotz, 2013; Crush & McDonald, 2001). The Refugee Act of 1998 contained the acclaimed progressive legislation for refugees and asylum seekers, extending the right to freedom of movement, basic human rights and security and self-suffciency including education, employment and other basic services such as healthcare, and rejected the practice of encampment (Khan & Lee, 2018; Crush et al., 2017). The Act of 1998 contained the guiding principles protecting refugees and asylum seekers against refoulment, prosecution for irregular entry into the country, or deportation unless there was a threat to national security or "public order".

However progressive its intentions have been, the implementation has given grounds for concern (Farley, 2019; Khan & Lee, 2018).

Although the Bill had been signed into law in 1998, the policies were only implemented subject to the Regulations to the Refugees Act issued in April 2000. The time lag between the formal signing into law and the implementation regulations caused an upheaval as the much-criticised Aliens Control Act No 96 of 1991 remained largely in practice during this time (Polzer, 2007; Handmaker, 2001). Despite the acclaimed amendments for recognising and receiving refugees in the Refugees Act No. 130 of 1998, there was a disjuncture between the act and South Africa's relationship with the SADC region's migration management. South Africa refused to incorporate regional SADC protocols around easing movement for trade and education, creating further disparity with its neighbours even as many SADC-region migrants settled in South Africa (Klotz, 2013; Polzer, 2007; Crush & McDonald, 2001).

Concern grew over refugee policy implementation, rights of applicants during the status determination process, and the temporary rights associated with refugee status. The Refugee Appeals Board submitted amendments to the regulations to "Draft Rules" in June 2000, and the Ministry of Home Affairs distributed a Refugees Amendment Bill. Suffcient protection for refugees and asylum seekers remained a concern throughout this early policy evolution, and subject to consideration by the NCRA (Klotz, 2013; Handmaker, 2001).

Five refugee reception offces (RROs) were opened in 2002 in Cape Town, Durban, Port Elizabeth, Pretoria and Johannesburg, in line with an urban-based reception strategy (Khan & Lee, 2018). This was a signifcant gesture and commitment to accommodate the processing of refugees and asylum seekers within the country. We view the urban-based reception centres as physical symbols of the South African government's policy intent against encampment. During 2008, a mass infux of Zimbabwean asylum seekers arrived in South Africa, contributing to an overall total of 207,206 applications that year (Matji, 2017). This was a considerable increase in applications, with the previous year only adding a quarter of that total (Matji, 2017). Another RRO was strategically opened in Musina, near the border, to assist with the sudden infux, whilst waves of xenophobic attacks were sweeping through the country which directly impeded the refugee and asylum seekers' access to rights (Gil-Bazo, 2015). The *Government Gazette* containing the Refugees Amendment Act No. 33 of 2008 described the use of biometrics for the purpose of identifcation and included gender as a reasonable basis for well-founded fear of persecution. Section 27 of the Act of 2008 made additional provisions for the protection and general rights of refugees, including the replacement of an "immigration permit" with "permanent resident status" after 5 years from the date when asylum was granted if there is reasonable certainty that the individual will remain a refugee indefnitely (Refugees Amendment Act No. 33 of 2008).

The immigration policy in the immediate post-apartheid years has a clear link to the principles of control and exclusion contained in the Aliens' Control Act of 1991 (Peberdy, 2009; Crush & McDonald, 2001). The policy discussion about refugees and asylum seekers has primarily advocated and centred around non-encampment and local integration, though the extent of integration had its limits given the temporary nature of the permits (Crush et al., 2017). With the legislation in place, the migration of refugees and asylum seekers followed a similar pattern to that of local (displaced) migrants to urban environments, leaving them to compete for the same limited resources, according to an interview with a policy expert. There are no exceptional policy provisions made by the government to facilitate local integration on an urban scale (apart from urban reception centres). Neither the government nor the UNCHR provide material support to refugees and asylum seekers, and rely on the agency of these individuals to seek means of making a livelihood or to depend on NGOs assistance (Crush et al., 2017). Little attention was given to the role of local government in the formulation of refugee legislation because the national government offered protection, yet the policy pushes for urban based reception (Palmary, 2002).

There is a continuum of lived experience amongst the social, physical and legal aspects of migration. Scholars such as Xiang and Lindquist (2014) have contributed to the theory that describes "migration infrastructure". There is a need, as indicated by Landau and Bakewell (2018) to acknowledge not only the legislative conditions to determine integration and belonging but also the more nuanced socio-political aspects of assimilating and forming part of a local community.

### **6.3 A Policy Shift**

The year 2009 saw the highest number of asylum applications – 223,324 – and a slight decline in 2010 with 180,637 new applications (White Paper on International Migration (WPIM), 2017: 26). The Johannesburg RRO in Crown Mines was closed in 2010, and the Port Elizabeth RRO in 2011, despite the large numbers of applicants. Applications during 2011 declined overall, dipping to 106,904 (WPIM, 2017: 26). During 2012, another RRO was closed in Cape Town and a litigation process was started to re-open the offce (Scalabrini, 2018). The remaining state capacity available for processing was now resting on three offces. This put strain on the Department of Home Affairs' administrative capacity as well as applicants who, in order to renew their permits, are required to travel to the relevant offce to which their fles have been moved (Amit, 2012).

Within a global climate of securitisation of borders, the 2017 White Paper on International Migration reiterates a similar sentiment over concern about irregular migration (Kahn & Lee, 2018; Crush et al., 2017). The WPIM (2017) calls for the need to update the current strategies captured in the Immigration Act No. 13 of 2002 (amended in 2014) and the Refugees' Act of 1998. The 2017 WPIM argues that the current refugee regime has overextended its generosity with rights and provisions, leaving the country vulnerable to security risks, and is reinforcing historical colonial migration fows for trade and labour (Farley, 2019). The 2017 WPIM further states that the UN historically promoted specifc administration principles which were applied in middle and higher income countries but have misaligned South Africa's position within the African Union as a regional community. A recurring sentiment has been expressed at national level that "migrants" would be competing with local populations for already scarce resources and burden access to employment, housing and healthcare (Klotz, 2013).

The national stage has further been used to weave certain narratives into public discourse, and thus iterate the need to respond to these issues through policy. These narratives include that of economic migrants abusing the asylum system and drawing a connection with undocumented migrants (WPIM, 2017; Klotz, 2013). Precautions to limit irregular migration are in the amendments made to the policy via heightening the security infrastructure as well as repositioning the state function of the Department of Home Affairs (DHA) from the administrative cluster to the

Justice, Crime Prevention and Security cluster (DHA, 2019). Legislative measures have been taken to make South Africa a less desirable destination for asylum in order to further lessen the demand on asylum processing (Crush et al., 2017). The 2017 WPIM shows a particular concern for the irregular migration of low-skilled or unskilled labour from the SADC region and goes on to state that this migration threatens the country's economic stability and national sovereignty (Khan & Lee, 2018). There is a disjuncture in the interface between the matter of human rights policy and the state's responsibility to share the burden of forced migrants and the migration patterns contained in the WPIM for tourism, study and business as well as other push and pull factors (Interview, Humanitarian Organisation, Pretoria, November 2019). The 2030 National Development Plan (NDP) indicates strategies for specialised visa provisions embracing skilled migrants to contribute to its economic growth objectives, whilst the White Paper (WPIM, 2017) aims to bring attention to the security risks involved with refugees and asylum seekers that need to be addressed (Farley, 2019: 12; WPIM, 2017).

The Refugees Amendment Act No. 11, signed into law on 14 December 2017, unveiled a departure from the 1998 Refugees Act. In the years leading to the development of Act No. 11, the margins for exclusion of refugee status have been broadened to include irregular entry into the country without valid reasons, presenting fraudulent or misleading documentation, being found to have committed a schedule 2 crime in the country or having failed to report to an RRO within 5 days of entering the country "without substantive reasons" (Refugees Amendment Act No 11 of 2017: 16). The available timeframe to report to an RRO has been shortened from 14 days to 5 days. As the RRO accepts specifc categories of asylum seekers on different days of the week, this iteration of the 2011 amendment would then require asylum seekers to coordinate their arrival into the Republic to align to specifc reception days. The director general of Home Affairs may practice full discretion to open or close RROs in the country as they deem necessary, and have further instated a minimum of one required Status Determination Offcer at each RRO (Refugees Amendment Act 2017). They may also refer any category of asylum seeker, whether by "country of origin or geographic region, gender, religion, nationality, political opinion or social group", to a specifed RRO or place designated to administer the act. Any asylum claim will be marked as abandoned should an asylum seeker not renew their permit or report to an RRO 30 days after expiry without convincing reasons directed to the Standing Committee on Refugee Affairs (Refugees Amendment Act 2017). The Minister of Home Affairs may practice the right to withdraw refugee status from an individual or a group, and an action such as a refugee seeking consular service may directly result in such a withdrawal. Restrictions are imposed on rights to employment and education which will be revoked for asylum seekers unless they undergo a separate application process to evaluate whether they will be able to support themselves (WPIM, 2017). The prospect of applications for permanent residency has been extended from the previous 5 years to 10 years of continuous stay as a requirement. The White Paper (2017) further replaced the permanent resident status with a "long term resident visa", exaggerating the condition of a temporary welcome extended to refugees by putting a timeframe limit on their prospects of fully integrating (Crush et al., 2017). The dangers of this focus on temporary protection and delayed processes that leave applicants with uncertainty is a concern not only for ensuring their physical and legal safety but also their psychosocial wellbeing. These challenges force refugees and asylum seekers into an underlying situation of perpetual "survival mode" (Interview, Humanitarian Organisation, Johannesburg, May 2019).

The policy intervention concerning refugees and asylum seekers reiterates its commitment to upholding and protecting human rights in a humane and secure manner which aligns with the constitution as well as international legal instruments (WPIM, 2017). Admission of refugees and asylum seekers is currently based on an "inclusive approach" to any foreign national claiming asylum; however it fails to recognise cases where special protection such as medical assistance and psychosocial support are necessary (WPIM, 2017). The acclaimed progressive policy which accommodated generous access and opportunities was criticised by the WPIM as a cause of abuse of the system by irregular and economic migrants (Khan & Lee, 2018). According to the WPIM, more than 90% of claims are rejected on the grounds of economic migrants using the asylum regime as an entry point; however this claim has been based on anecdotal evidence, based on the fact that only 10% of applicants have successfully gained refugee status (Khan & Lee, 2018; Crush et al., 2017). The White Paper on International Migration (2017) has adapted its strategy to facilitate the status determination process for asylum seekers with a 'multistakeholder approach' to operate on a national level, and it proposes that a regional solution should be developed in the African region. This would include the collaboration of various state departments (WPIM, 2017).

### **6.4 The Gaps in the (Legislative) Fence**

Earlier in the chapter, we highlighted that political ideologies and state power are embedded in the shaping of the immigration policy framework, which effectively becomes a symbol for belonging and exclusion as part of the national identity (Klotz, 2013; Peberdy, 2009). There appears to be a disjuncture between the perceptions of a Pan-African solidarity of African immigrants whose countries aided the South African struggle against apartheid on the one hand, and ordinary South African citizens in South Africa on the other hand, who have held onto the beliefs engrained in the apartheid legacies that foreigners will compete with their access to resources and freedom (Klotz, 2013). These beliefs have an impact on the lived experience of forced migrants entering the country, not only in interactions with ordinary citizens but also interactions with offcials at the Department of Home Affairs (Amit, 2012).

The resilience of the policy framework for refugees and asylum seekers is relevant across two timescales of implementation. It ought to make provision for the policy infrastructure to manage refugee and asylum applications during times of mass infux as well as maintaining effcient day-to-day processing operations. Building on the theory of migration infrastructure put forward by Xiang and Lindquist (2014), which acknowledges the range of factors and complexities that condition mobility, we frame the notion of policy infrastructure as both hard and soft infrastructure. The border control, policy and refugee reception offce articulate the legislation in defnite terms which make up the hard infrastructure. The hard infrastructure is representative of the sentiment of the state with regards to a national identity regarding who belongs within the country. The soft infrastructure speaks to the implementation of the policy by the DHA offcials and frames the nuanced experience of the policy and hard infrastructure by refugees and asylum applicants. Soft infrastructure also describes the NGO and community networks which operate as a result of the policy experience. Scholars such as Polzer (2007) have articulated this nuanced experience of refugees and asylum seekers as a means to understand the implications of policy from the bottom up. The RRO and DHA offcials form a key interface between asylum seekers and the state and policy. The DHA offcials are in essence the implementing agents of the policy at state level and play a vital role in relaying rights to applicants; however, they also hold the power to cripple the legal process with corruption (Amit, 2015; Polzer, 2007). The physical thresholds at reception centres have become barriers to accessing the facility and generate a toxic environment of corruption by various gatekeepers and offcials (Interview, Humanitarian Organisation, Johannesburg, May 2019; see also Amit, 2012; Vigneswaran, 2008). As South Africa mandates for urban settlement of refugees and asylum seekers, the lived experiences in cities may differ depending on the urban environment and city-level sentiment towards (forced) migrants (Klotz, 2013; Peberdy, 2009).

The number of RROs in the country is at the discretion of the Department of Home Affairs (WPIM, 2017). We mentioned above that fve offces were opened across the country with the promulgation of the Refugees Act of 2002 and, after the mass infux in 2009, an additional offce was opened in Musina and a temporary offce in Tshwane in 2010 (Khan & Lee, 2018). In 2010, the Johannesburg offce closed, followed by the Port Elizabeth offce in 2011, while the Cape Town offce closed for new applicants in 2012 (Scalabrini, 2018). The closure of these offces puts many applicants at a geographic and fnancial disadvantage in renewing their permits as well as submitting applications in person, as required (Interview, Humanitarian Organisation, Johannesburg, May 2019; see also Khan & Lee, 2018; Amit, 2012). The signifcance of these decisions further reduced the available state capacity to the three remaining offces, adding strain on the DHA staff through pressure to process greater numbers each day (Scalabrini, 2018). The shrinking capacity to accommodate refugees and asylum seekers along legislative lines has been refected in the administrative capacity of the reception offces, and even preceded some of the legislative decisions (Khan & Lee, 2018). The travelling distance to the nearest RRO for asylum seekers arriving in Port Elizabeth or Cape Town has now more than doubled, and individuals whose fles went missing in the move from the offces in Johannesburg and the interim offce in Tshwane further contributed to the diffculties in applying for asylum (Khan & Lee, 2018; Amit, 2012). The UNCHR Global Survey in 2012 shows that some of the greatest challenges to documentation

for asylum seekers are due to the geographic location of an application centre (Morand et al., 2012). This fnding compounds the problem for refugees and asylum seekers, but also the DHA staff at the remaining RROs who have to accept additional cases. This raises concern over the capacity of the state to ensure the protection of asylum seekers' rights during processing (Amit, 2012).

The 2017 White Paper indicated an intent to reduce the asylum population in South Africa and move the application functions of the state to processing centres near the border, effectively turning away from the global trend of urban-based processing centres (Morand et al., 2012). The construction of the frst of these processing centres is reportedly underway in Lebombo, with another location planned near the Zimbabwe border (Khan & Lee, 2018; Crush et al., 2017). The 2017 policy document confrmed and supported this intention, with the policy pointing to a series of overburdened urban-based RROs, which was reported to be due to bogus applications by economic migrants (WPIM, 2017). This sentiment has been echoed in the historical narrative of criminalising undocumented migrants, which contributes to tension and animosity towards foreigners within the country (Klotz, 2013).

By introducing asylum processing centres near the border, another threshold will restrict physical access and freedom of movement into the country. The DHA maintains that this will not mean encampment, as they have proposed conditions for relative fuidity in and out of the centres (WPIM, 2017). The amendment reinforces refugee reliance on the state or on written undertakings by organisations or community members to cater for their basic needs, through the removal of asylum seekers' automatic right to work and study during status determination (WPIM, 2017). Asylum seekers with the fnancial capacity to make their own provisions without participating in economic activity are permitted to do so. Only in "exceptional circumstances" such as judicial review may asylum seekers have access to employment and education (WPIM, 2017).

The proposal of processing centres near the border poses a concern due to the vague description of its implementation, let alone the construction and operational costs which the state will have to carry without material assistance from the UNHCR (Crush et al., 2017). The decision to discard the urban processing centres in favour of locations near the border has been criticised for the resemblance to refugee camps and for fundamentally lacking any genuine addressing of the systematic administration failures on the part of the state within the centre itself (Amit, 2012). These shortcomings are rather due to ineffcient systems, poorly trained staff and corruption (Khan & Lee, 2018). In the case that the centres are well resourced, the delivery of services at the processing centres may begin to fuel xenophobic tendencies amongst local communities where the state has failed to deliver basic services (Farley, 2019).

A clear pathway to the processing centres has not been realised for asylum seekers whose status determination is pending who have already settled elsewhere in the country. The processing centres claim to have a shorter evaluation time, but questions remain over the capacity for these centres to deal with infux and ensuring refugees' and asylum seekers' rights are protected during evaluation (Amit, 2012).

More restrictive legislation has been implemented, rendering South Africa less desirable for settlement (Crush et al., 2017). In recent protests, refugees and asylum seekers in Pretoria and Cape Town demanded to be settled in a third country because they do not feel safe in South Africa (Interview, Humanitarian Organisation, Pretoria, November 2019). Considering the proportion of asylum seekers within the landscape of migration to South Africa, the specifc amendment to asylum seeker processing centres will not justify the monetary cost and resources of establishing this scale of infrastructure (Farley, 2019).

### **6.5 Conclusion**

The policy agenda with regards to refugees and asylum seekers has shifted towards more restrictive measures for legal settlement and more temporary conditions for integration and belonging in the country (Crush et al., 2017). There is a palpable discord between the policy intentions of the South African government and implementation on the ground, as noted in discussions with some NGO representatives. For example, one key informant highlighted that the displacement of refugees and asylum seekers is a humanitarian question yet the South African policy makers refer to it in terms similar to international migration policy; there may be a misdiagnosis of the intention across the entire policy landscape (Interview, Humanitarian Organisation, Pretoria, November 2019).

The resilience of the proposal of processing centres near ports of entry is questionable on the grounds of providing protection for asylum seekers' rights. The urban-based processing centres lack effcient implementation strategies and the DHA has not indicated a clear way forward regarding this particular aspect in proposing the new centres (Crush et al., 2017; Amit, 2012). This brings into question whether the intention of reducing processing time will become a reality at these centres. The DHA has shifted the blame for its apparent backlog by making most applicants into economic migrants abusing the system (WPIM, 2017). When the security question around asylum seekers is moved to the point of entry, the legal limbo that many refugees and asylum seekers inhabit remains at that threshold, between the border and the local community. Temporary legal protection through renewable permits does not put refugees and asylum seekers on a permanent path for settlement in the country (Handmaker, 2001). The conditions for integration and belonging are also iterated through local perceptions (Interview, Policy Expert, Johannesburg, June 2019).

In urban areas where RROs have closed, refugees and asylum seekers are forced to re-evaluate their livelihoods and mobility in the country to support their journeys to the RROs which remain open. Policy shifts have tightened restrictions on the scope of what constitutes a regularised stay which, in turn, criminalises undocumented migrants within very fne margins. The complex notion of migration and integration extends beyond the policy framework and physical border, but also the host community.

### **References**


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### **Chapter 7 Policy Implementation Challenges for Worker Education and Foreign National Migrants**

**Nomkhosi Xulu-Gama , Sibongile Ruth Nhari, Musawenkosi Malabela, and Tebogo Mogoru**

### **7.1 Introduction and Background**

The importance of worker education around the presence of foreign national migrants "beyond the apartheid workplace" (Webster & von Holdt, 2005: 4) is undisputed. Our intention is to establish the extent to which worker education programmes beneft foreign-national migrants and also to establish the possible challenges in the implementation of the related legislation and policies. The current context of neoliberal capitalism and growing informalisation of work (Webster & von Holdt, 2005; Muller & Esselaar, 2004) is particularly important, as it tends to challenge the existence and effectiveness of worker education while promoting divisions among the workers. During the apartheid era, worker education was a resource used by the trade union movement to address struggles in the workplace and those percolating to the communities (see Xulu-Gama, 2018; Von Holdt, 2002; Webster, 1985; Friedman, 1987). Worker education always took into consideration the history of the South African workplace, which made it relevant, comprehensive, critical and progressive (Hamilton, 2014).

N. Xulu-Gama (\*)

M. Malabela Chris Hani Institute, Braamfontein, South Africa

Sociology Department, Wits University, Johannesburg, South Africa e-mail: musawenkosi@chi.org.za

T. Mogoru Chris Hani Institute, Braamfontein, South Africa

Department of Sociology, University of Cape Town, Cape Town, South Africa e-mail: nomkhosi.gama@uct.ac.za

S. R. Nhari Writing Centre (Alan Pittendrigh Library), Durban University of Technology, Durban, South Africa

Worker education is as much a historical concept as foreign national migration in southern Africa. This allows us to comfortably locate our chapter within the South-South migration research framework, which has been understood as an extension of migration studies (Campillo-Carrete, 2013). The importance of South-South migration studies is supported by statistical evidence from the United Nations Department for Economic and Social Affairs (UN DESA). Migration within the South is just as important as, if not more important than, movement from the South to the North (ACP Observatory, 2013). The migrant labour system and its persistence in postapartheid South Africa is a cornerstone of the labour landscape of colonial and apartheid South Africa and southern Africa (Xulu-Gama, 2017; Bezuidenhout & Buhlungu, 2011; Leliveld, 1997; Wilson, 1972).

In addition, the South African economy, in particular mining, was and continues to be built on the migrant labour system: "South Africa – Johannesburg in particular – drew its labour from the reserves as well as other southern African countries" (Hlatshwayo, 2012: 231). Employers sourced their labour from all countries in Southern Africa. Foreign-national migrants and worker education played prominent roles in the workplace during the colonial and apartheid eras in South Africa, and continue to forge a presence in the post-apartheid workplace (Webster & von Holdt, 2005) and thereby in labour scholarship (Bezuidenhout & Buhlungu, 2011), despite a myriad of evolving challenges for both. The attempt to look at these concepts together – foreign-national migrants and worker education – is complex as they are, and further complicated by the fact that both can be quite controversial and contested regarding how they are defned, accessed and worked with conceptually and practically (see Koen, 2019; Hamilton, 2014; Motala & Valley, 2014).

Thus the report of the NALEDI-HRDC-WEC (National Labour and Economic Development Institute-Human Resource Development Council) Worker Education Committee (WEC) defnes worker education as:

…education of workers by workers (through their organisations), for the purposes that they themselves determine. Worker Education is worker-controlled and working-class oriented with a core objective of building working class unity, collective organisation and solidarity. It is aimed at building working class consciousness for the purpose of advancing working class struggles against exploitation and oppression and for progressive alternatives (NALEDI-HRDC-WEC, 2018: 22).

Orr (2019: 4) argues that worker education in South Africa developed in the context of the liberation movement, the workers' movement, and the popular education movement, during a period of heightened mass mobilisation. Worker education was understood to be about empowering workers to build trade unions and the workers' movement in order to liberate the working class from oppression and exploitation. Thus worker education has been an emancipatory tool, political in nature, while affording workers an opportunity to own it and focus on building their consciousness rather than increasing their productivity to maximise profts for employers. Worker education was designed to assist in forging solidarity between local and migrant workers, uniting the workers of the world (Hlatshwayo, 2012). Worker education, in this view, would operate as a thread sewing workers together to unite in the struggle against capitalism. Worker education, argues Cooper (2019: 13), has a long history of being politically inspired; further, she notes, "Worker education was unashamedly partisan; it emphasised the political character of workers' education and the fact that it should be rooted in workers' experiences and aimed at building workers' class identity and confdence."

This chapter begins with a brief explanation of the methodology employed for data collection. Thereafter, it discusses some of the prevailing worker-education tensions as they relate to the South African context. This is pivotal as we proceed to frame the positioning of the Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU) in South-South migration relations, as it is the largest federation of trade unions in South Africa. This is followed by a discussion of the labour migration policy framework and some insights from primary data collected through key-informant interviews as we establish the extent to which worker education programmes beneft foreign-national migrants and the possible challenges in implementation of related legislation and policies. This chapter does not differentiate between the different migrants' statuses (documented or undocumented; refugee; asylum seeker or economic migrant), although we are aware that undocumented migrants are more vulnerable than documented ones. We take particular interest in the vulnerabilities of working class migrants.

### **7.2 Methodological Insights**

This chapter is based on literature reviewed as well as four semi-structured interviews with key informants from COSATU. This process involved interviewing individuals who were likely to provide "needed information, ideas, and insights" on the subject (Kumar, 1989: 1). According to Kumar (1989) only a small number of informants are interviewed. The data that is collected from such a small number is normally used for a follow up larger research project comprised of a bigger sample. Key informant interviews are essentially qualitative interviews. They are conducted using interview guides that list the topics and issues to be covered during a session. The interviewer frames the actual questions in the course of interviews. The atmosphere in these interviews is informal, resembling a conversation among acquaintances (Kumar, 1989: 1).

Central to the underlying objective of this chapter is the presentation of the views of key informants. The interview approach is a fexible approach, allowing for new questions or check-questions to be posed when the need arises. The fexibility it provided made the interview a superior technique for the exploration of the area of interest considering the sensitivity of the subject matter.

The few and specifc key informants were chosen because the chapter has a focus on COSATU's role, as the biggest trade union federation is South Africa with a rich history in both the liberation struggle and worker struggles in the country. The interviews are with key players in the trade union federation especially on issues of international relations and labour migration as they deal directly with migrant workers. These key informants are both responsible for policy formulation and implementation in the labour federation. These are also key fgures who also contribute on issues of labour migration and international relations in the ANC, through the tripartite alliance which the ANC has with COSATU and the SACP (South African Communist Party). The positions in departments in which the key informants occupy justify the solicitation of their insights for our examination, it not only makes them knowledgeable but their insights are also nuanced.

The data informing the frame of reference in this chapter was gathered qualitatively by use of face-to-face interviews held in groups of three, comprising two researchers (interviewer and a scribe for observation and note-taking) and one interviewee. Open-ended questions were asked and the interviewer probed for more information as the hour-long interviews were conducted. The atmosphere was informal, resembling a conversation among acquaintances. The convenience sampling method was used as respondents were purposely approached for their experience in heading and coordinating the various divisions of the COSATU federation (namely international, organising, campaigns and the secretariat). Two key questions asked in data collection related to the possible challenges in implementing the South African labour legislation. The second investigated the extent to which the respondents felt foreign national migrant workers are able to access worker education and how worker education is negotiated in modern day South Africa.

### **7.3 What Has Happened to Worker Education in South Africa?**

Worker education is a contested concept and labour scholars have grappled with it for years. Its defnition has also proved to be elusive. Central to this contestation are the parameters within which worker education should fall: that is, what it should and should not include. The three-pillar model argues that worker education should constitute the knowledge, skills and attitudes of workers at the following levels: vocational (skills development), political and trade union education (NALEDI-HRDC-WEC, 2018). Motala and Valley (2014) argued that, at its core, the outcome should be raising the consciousness of workers and promoting an understanding of their organisations (trade unions); that is to say, political and organisational education should constitute worker education. Worker Education is worker controlled and focuses on building consciousness to help workers advance their class struggle, and excludes vocational or skills development, which is geared at improving productivity. As such, worker education includes both political and organisational and/or trade union education. It is vital to understand workers as a class and just as important for workers not to see themselves in narrow racial and national terms but as a collective class.

The NALEDI-HRDC-WEC Report (2018) characterised worker education as based on workers' knowledge and experience, which includes their creative and innovative abilities. This reinforces the idea that worker education is and should be

worker controlled. Worker education aims to develop working class consciousness and democratic movement and organisation building, guided by collective solidarity in the struggle. Worker education in this sense is about the worker serving the interests of the worker and not those of capital, and as such it should focus on building worker organisations with workers charting the way forward.

In summary, worker education is education that is infuenced and controlled by workers. It is shaped or informed by the conditions, experiences and struggles of the workers at the point of production and in the broader society (Vally et al., 2013). Guided by working class principles in terms of methodology and values, it must allow workers to contest power, exert pressure, and control their organisations and their places of work. Worker education must develop a variety of competencies that enable workers to actively and critically engage with social, political, economic and cultural engagements inside and outside the workplace. This defnition consciously shifts from the exclusive focus on productive activities (wage labour) to social reproduction and recognises the unpaid work done mostly by women at home and in the communities.

The low levels or complete lack of political consciousness among workers leads to xenophobic attitudes and extreme violence towards foreign-nationality migrants. This is also an indicator that workers do not consider themselves as collectively belonging to the working class, giving precedence to a narrow national focus (see Alfaro-Velcamp & Shaw, 2016; Hlatshwayo, 2012, 2013). This narrowed form of nationalism impacts negatively on the principle of worker solidarity and internationalism advanced by COSATU. Thus, sentiments such as "foreigners are taking our jobs" are not only prevalent in our communities but also fnd expression in the trade unions and organised workplaces. The lack of political education produces fewer progressive workers who can make the link between community struggles and workplace struggles (Ginsburg et al., 1995) – what scholars have termed social movement unionism (Von Holdt, 2002). A gulf between productive and reproductive spheres emerges because of the decline in social movement unionism, where community struggles are fought in isolation from those at the workplace. Orr (2019: 7) argues that: "Worker education is affected by the diminished organisational vibrancy and weakened worker control and solidarity within trade unions. This is a critical challenge given the organic relationship between education and organisation."

The NALEDI-HRDC-WEC Report (2018) notes that the lack of both trade union and political education is due to the lack of funds from the union. This is due to budget cuts for worker education and the education departments that house worker education programmes. This in turn leads to low levels of consciousness and understanding of worker solidarity. The lack of political education means that workers are deprived of the chance to get education about international worker solidarity which is derived from *The Communist Manifesto's* clarion call for "[w]orkers of the world [to] unite, you have nothing to lose but your chains" (Marx et al., 2002: 265). Hence, the call for COSATU has always been about international worker solidarity (Buhlungu, 1999), notably, moving away from the use of the word 'foreign' as it carries negative connotations and xenophobic sentiments.

### **7.4 Positioning COSATU in South-South Relations**

In the context of neoliberal globalisation and capitalist crisis, migration has become a typical and characteristic feature of the integrated global economy. The comparative development of South Africa, coupled with the collapse or decline of many Southern African economies under the pressure of neoliberalism and structural adjustment programmes, means that, as long as the country continues to nourish a steady economy, it will continue to be at the centre of in-migration in the region (COSATU, 2015).

This intensifes competition between workers, creates divisions and induces xenophobic sentiments, which undermine the unity of workers' struggle and the potential for their emancipation. Political elites exacerbate these tensions to defect attention away from the failures of service delivery. The media also play a role in promoting negative images of Africans. But more fundamentally, this situation benefts capital – which actively promotes xenophobia while enjoying ever-expanding profts as workers fght amongst themselves for the crumbs. (COSATU, 2015: 28)

In an effort to strengthen and promote South-South relations within the region, COSATU has identifed South-South co-operation as a key priority. It has acknowledged that building alliances with progressive workers' unions in the global South is vital for the development and transformation of the international trade union movement into a robust and united force. Lambert (1998: 73) argues that it is characterised by a narrow "workplace focus" and a "failure" to engage community organisations. COSATU further contends that the global South is a key location of struggle against capitalism, harbouring signifcant practical examples and experiments in building alternatives in the sphere of trade unionism.

The COSATU International Policy (COSATU, 2015) outlines four focal points for strengthening and promoting South-South relations:


Below are strategies through which COSATU (2015: 29) intends to address the challenges encountered on the question of worker education and foreign-national migrants:

(i) Classifying migrant workers under the vulnerable sections of the working class who face super-exploitation. This will enable COSATU to have a more organised approach to oppose such practice.


At this juncture, it is useful to discuss some of the key challenges that unions face. It is important to note the role of global capitalism in the creation of more solid connections between countries. This has led to throwing "workers in one country into competition with each other, which opens up the danger of a 'leveling down' in wages and working conditions" (Bezuidenhout, 2000: 1). One of the key recurring challenges is xenophobic sentiments and violence toward foreign-national migrants. The motivation given is that undocumented foreign national workers need to be weeded out of the system and South African nationals are to be employed. The negative sentiments towards foreign-national migrants are also fueled by the harsh economic environment prevailing in South Africa. Capitalists tend to exploit to maximise profts without regard for colour or nationality, while, due to intrinsic and extrinsic factors, foreign-national migrants supply cheap labour on the market which leads to the notion amongst South Africans that "these foreigners take anything" (see Machinya's work (Chap. 16) in this volume).

<sup>1</sup>A South African *isi* Zulu word to express the humanity in people, the compassionate and considerate nature: "I am because you are".

Regardless of the other glaring challenges, there is a general feeling among foreign-national migrants that unions do not address their issues; hence their disinterest in joining unions. There is no motivation to join the union since the primary aim is to get access to assistance regarding working conditions but the union does not offer this. This decision, once again, deprives them of access to worker education, which is intricately intertwined with union membership. COSATU's approach suggests that they defend undocumented migrants, and upon winning some of the cases, they can then organise them into unions. This will, in effect, ensure access to all workers. "Organising external migrants and integrating them into the union structures is potentially one of the most powerful weapons in the struggle against xenophobia, as it strengthens workers' identity and solidarity" (Hlatshwayo 2009 cited in Hlatshwayo, 2012: 238). This organising strategy is not suffcient, however, to address all the challenges faced by foreign-national migrants. The COSATU strategy should broaden its traditional approach from just arranging permanent work and secure jobs for nationals, but should also include vulnerable groups, including foreign-national migrants and those in the informal sector.

Foreign-national migrants do not join unions as they perceive that it would make them more susceptible to being unfairly dismissed, primarily because they are vulnerable and sometimes do not have proper documentation. In addition, they know that employers have a negative perception of unionised workers. Therefore, when employers contract undocumented workers deliberately, it is to avoid paying the stipulated minimum wage for their sector. Because the worker is undocumented and hence fearful, and unaware of their rights, they do not report the employer, leaving them more vulnerable and susceptible to more exploitation than that experienced by local workers (see COSATU, 2015; Lorgat (Chap. 17) in this volume).

### **7.5 The Labour Migration Policy Framework**

Among other things that the Employment Services Act No. 4 of 2014 seeks to achieve is the promotion of employment of young work seekers and other vulnerable persons. The act also aims to facilitate the employment of foreign-national migrants in a manner that is consistent with this act and the Immigration Act No. 13 of 2002. According to South African policy and its legislative framework, a 'foreign national' is an individual who is not a South African citizen nor has a permanent residence permit issued in terms of the Immigration Act. The Employment Services Act is designed to be a short-term measure to bridge the skills shortage within the employer's business. It makes clear that foreign-national migrants should be employed on the basis that their employment promotes the training of South African citizens and permanent residents. This consequently excludes many semi-skilled and unskilled migrants from participating in the South African post-apartheid workplace. Additionally, the act states that employment of the foreign national migrant must not impact negatively on existing labour standards or the rights and expectations of South African workers, and it gives effect to the right to fair labour practices as explained by section 23(1) of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, Act 108 of 1996 (Republic of South Africa, 1996). Leliveld (1997) documents the negative effects of the restrictive South African labour policy as a shift from the 1994 democratic era:

Section 1 of the Immigration Amendment Act No. 13 of 2011 defnes work as:

conducting any activity normally associated with the running of a specifc business or being employed or conducting activities consistent with being employed or consistent with the profession of the person, with or without remuneration or reward. (Immigration Amendment Act No. 13 of 2011: section 1).

Section 1 also says that a foreigner is an individual who is not a citizen. An illegal foreigner refers to an individual who is in the Republic in contravention of the act. Section 38 of this act further stipulates that no person shall employ (a) an illegal foreigner; (b) a foreigner whose status does not authorise him or her to be employed by such a person, or (c) a foreigner on terms and conditions or in a capacity different from those stipulated in such foreigner's status (see Kaziboni's work (Chap. 14) in this volume).

The policy, legislative and strategic framework assists and promotes management of inter-regional labour migration to the value of both the sending and the receiving countries, but especially the migrant workers. In the area of labour migration, there is a serious policy gap that the White Paper (DHA, 2017) has been able to identify regarding asylum seekers and refugees. South Africa has never been able to provide basic necessities to asylum seekers; hence they have been allowed to seek employment while their claims are being adjudicated.

Since the end of apartheid, South African policy and its legislative framework have been accused of following the previous colonial patterns. It has also been seen "to perpetuate irregular migration, which in turn leads to unacceptable levels of corruption, human rights abuse and national security risks" (DHA, 2017: v). While South Africa has opened its borders to the world, it prioritises the emigration of people with scarce skills, forsaking semi-skilled and unskilled migrants (Employment Services Act 2014).

### **7.6 Insights from Key Informants**

Below are the responses of the four key informants interviewed.

Key Informant #2 reported to have been part of a COSATU coordinated campaign with workers from other countries through a Vulnerable Workers Task Team (VWTT), which caters for informal workers such as local and foreign national street traders. These campaigns are attempts to unite the groups. This is also reportedly done in the farms where workers are organised. The few locals at the farms feel that their jobs are at risk due to the high volumes of foreign national workers on the farms. Key Informant #2 pointed out that the use of the word 'foreign' in South Africa is divisive and suggestive of trouble, making the use of appropriate terminology inappropriate and dangerous. This was shared just to highlight the context in which COSATU is supposed to be organising and uniting workers.

### *7.6.1 Challenges to Policy Implementation*

The key informants highlighted two challenges that relate to why issues of migrant workers do not seem to dominate the agendas of worker education, with recruitment being the frst (Key Informant #1). If there are no foreign nationals in the union and the bulk of the membership is not foreign nationals, worker education on the issues that deal with the socio-economic problems of foreign national workers do not seem to dominate the agenda. The second issue highlighted was that, if the union does not conceive itself as a union that represents workers on a class basis regardless of where they are from, as opposed to a national basis, problems arise.

It was additionally pointed out that policy and legislation have many loopholes, and it has followed many colonial trajectories (Key Informant #1, #2, #3 and #4). As a possible challenge to policy implementation, our key informants pointed out a problem with the conception of people who are from outside the South African borders (Key Informant #2 and #4). One key informant preferred to refer to foreignnational migrants as economic migrants because the word "foreign" has negative and xenophobic connotations. She further highlighted that "this comes from trying to educate our own members, to get them to understand that these are also workers. It does not matter if they are not South Africans…they are workers and should enjoy the same rights" (Key Informant #2). The informant further suggested that it is not only South African workers affected by "this" thinking. Once you say "foreign" in South Africa, the background that was instilled in the general population suggests that "we are South Africans and not Africans" (Key Informant #2). Another key informant pointed out that if a medical doctor were to indicate that there was a foreign object in "your body, you would develop a natural aversion to the unknown object" (Key informant #4). A historian would, for example, refer to a foreign invasion and an environmental scientist to an invasion by a foreign species. Hence, anything foreign is alien and has problematic connotations. When an individual is referred to as a foreigner, it immediately classifes that person as a species that does not belong, hence implying that there is an intruder.

"['Foreign' is] clumsy and rejectionist in any frame of reference. It also defeats the purpose of trying to educate local workers to understand that these are also workers and should enjoy the same rights" (Key Informant #4).

Another key informant added that "another possible challenge in policy implementation in South Africa is trying to stop or limit migration", highlighting that migration is a permanent worldwide phenomenon, "so fghting migration is an impossible war to win; you will never win it" (Key Informant #1).

More challenges were cited such as the lack of knowledge on the part of the trade union leaders who are unfamiliar with the processes, legislation and policies; for example, how Home Affairs operates with regards to the documentation of workers. This knowledge would make people sympathetic to the plight of undocumented workers. An informant pointed out that it is not the fault of the employee and that employers hire workers knowing very well that they are undocumented. Therefore, the obligation lies with the employer and the trade unions. "The reason why they join a trade union is that they need assistance. If a trade union is unable to do that, there is no need for workers to join a trade union" (Key Informant #3).

### *7.6.2 Foreign National Migrants and Worker Education*

One of the fundamental views expressed was that migrants' lack of documentation makes it diffcult to organise and communicate their rights to them. The informant sighted the example of farm workers as one of the vulnerable sectors and acknowledged the deplorable living conditions provided by the employers (Key Informant #3). Migrant workers were consistently referred to as vulnerable and highlighted as the most exploited group of workers, requiring different strategies to organise them (Key Informant #3).

One informant proposed that when the extent to which worker education benefts foreign national migrant workers is discussed,

we must capture the ability to change power relations in society and transform the quality of life of workers; particularly, the case of migrant workers and to be able to improve their working conditions. It must be able to contest the share in the distribution of wealth in society but also transform consciousness, it must make me different, and it must be a baptism of fre. It must be able to listen to you in a meeting and be able to tell that you are class conscious and not some [corporate] offcial, without you even mentioning an organisation or where you are from. It must be able to challenge the normalcy, the falsehoods of the dominant system. It must not make us fantasise about reality; reality is concrete (Key Informant #4).

Another informant suggested that "The role of Worker Education is to try to convert the perceptions. The level at which it is happening is not meaningful because if it was meaningful we could've seen the changes; worker education has to go beyond the stipulated terrain which is labour federations" (Key informant #1).

While detailing examples of successful and unsuccessful unions, one key informant mentioned the National Union of Mineworkers (NUM) as an example of a union that, for decades, has managed to organise both South African and foreignnational miners because the mining industry was built on the migrant labour system (Key Informant #3). The migrant labour system encouraged workers from neighbouring countries to migrate to the mines. This helped the union to build solidarity amongst workers and develop bargaining power for the union. He further argued that if this model of organising were replicated across all unions in South Africa, it would have the potential to address the xenophobic sentiments amongst workers and forge international solidarity or internationalism. The Southern Africa Clothing and Textile Workers Union (SACTWU) is another union which refects in its name its goal of forging international worker solidarity. This union has a high

concentration of Basotho workers. The Food and Allied Workers' Union (FAWU) is also organised amongst farmworkers around Mpumalanga, and some of its members are from Mozambique or eSwatini.

Key informants attested to the fact that most foreign-national migrants do not feel that their concerns are addressed by the unions, which is why they seem uninterested in taking up membership with the unions. Another related problem is that the federations argue that they have been organising foreign-national migrants as far back as colonial times, and yet their members are still not educated enough. The conclusions they draw are based on their experiences with the members and by apparent divisions amongst foreign and South African workers (Key Informant #2).

The key informants argued that worker education must adjust its content to speak more to the current challenges faced by foreign-national migrants. Unfortunately, unions only operate within the realm of their levels of organisation, but in practice, worker education is supposed to go beyond that. They also highlighted that worker education has never distinguished between local and migrant workers and that worker education should advocate for South African workers not to be xenophobic or rejectionist towards foreign-national migrants (Key Informant #2).

Global capitalism, with its neoliberal orientation and the growing informalisation of work, has equally contributed to a growing informal economy. This implies the proliferation of precarious forms of work that cut across racial, class, gender and national lines. As a countermeasure to this increase, COSATU, in collaboration with the Migrant Workers' Union of South Africa (MIWUSA) established the Vulnerable Workers Task Team in 2012 (Key Informant #2). The task team spans multiple sectors of the economy. This collaboration bridges the language barrier in the articulation of issues affecting foreign-national migrants in South Africa. Such issues include adequate representation at the Commission for Conciliation, Mediation and Arbitration (CCMA) for unfair dismissals, particularly dismissals on the grounds of being undocumented when the employer knowingly employed them (Key Informant #2).

### **7.7 Conclusion**

The purpose of this chapter was to establish the extent to which worker education programmes beneft foreign-national migrants. The insights from examining the key informants' interviews, COSATU international policy, the South African labour legislation and literature on worker education have allowed us to conclude that worker education programmes and their role in linking workplace struggles with household and community struggles remain critically important for the workplace. It is this kind of education that has been in decline, due to the focus on accredited forms of education, diminished organisational vibrancy and a lack of commitment to funding. Therefore, the quality and quantity, effciency and effectiveness of such programmes are debatable in relation to the experiences of the workers. These experiences relate particularly to the rhetoric about foreign-national migrants and

the rate of xenophobic violence in South African communities. There is a need to revisit the content of worker education programmes and align them with the defning characteristic of worker education to incorporate the experiences of all workers.

Our conclusion is that worker education does not generally beneft foreignnational migrants, except in a few affliates such as NUM, SACTWU and FAWU. The unions are not fully committed to actively tapping into the foreign-national migrant membership. There is a paradox caused by the high unemployment rate in South Africa, as well as the different working conditions that foreign-national migrants are normally willing to accept, compared to locals. Unions also fnd it diffcult to implement either COSATU policy or South African policy and legislation because they are not always well-versed on the processes, systems, policies and legislation.

This chapter has outlined the South African legislative framework as well as COSATU's international policy framework, noting their shortcomings in the lack of a shared understanding of the treatment of foreign-national migrants. While COSATU's framework is friendly, welcoming and comprehensive, South African policy is very specifc, selective and conditional about how and why it would accept foreign-national migrants. This, we argue, can be seen as contributing to the unfriendly environment in which foreign-national migrants fnd themselves in South African workplaces and beyond. On the other hand, it is clear that, while COSATU has an attractive international policy, the key informants' insights suggest that it has not been very successful in the implementation of its policy framework in all its affliates. Therefore, it is our view that there is much that can still be done to ensure that worker education programmes beneft foreign-national migrants. The chapter clearly shows that good intentions and policies on paper alone are not enough, and cannot bring positive change if they are not followed by practical actions and implementations.

**Acknowledgements** The authors would like to acknowledge the funding of this project by the National Skills Fund.

### **References**


Xulu-Gama, N. (2018). Hostels as 'forgotten spaces' for trade union mobilisation in the postapartheid era. *South African Labour Bulletin, 42*, 1.

Xulu-Gama, N. (2017). *Hostels in South Africa: Spaces of perplexity*. UKZN Press.

**Open Access** This chapter is licensed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits use, sharing, adaptation, distribution and reproduction in any medium or format, as long as you give appropriate credit to the original author(s) and the source, provide a link to the Creative Commons license and indicate if changes were made.

The images or other third party material in this chapter are included in the chapter's Creative Commons license, unless indicated otherwise in a credit line to the material. If material is not included in the chapter's Creative Commons license and your intended use is not permitted by statutory regulation or exceeds the permitted use, you will need to obtain permission directly from the copyright holder.

### **Part III Internal Labour Migration and Regional Mobility**

### **Chapter 8 Informal Settlements: A Manifestation of Internal and Cross-Border Migration**

**Anna Oksiutycz and Caroline Muyaluka Azionya**

### **8.1 Introduction**

Informal settlements are perceptible material expressions of internal and crossborder migration in South Africa. New arrivals, drawn to urban centres in search of economic opportunities, fnd a residence in one of the high-density informal settlements dotted around the economic hub of South Africa, the Gauteng province. It is projected that an estimated 1.6 million migrants,1 including 48% of all immigrants in South Africa, will make Gauteng province their home by 2021 (Stats SA, 2018a). However, instead of better conditions, rural-urban and urban-urban migrants as well as undocumented and documented immigrants experience a lack of service delivery in health, education, road infrastructure, security, electricity, water and sanitation (Marutlulle, 2017). The lack of provision of basic services and resources from the government at such sites often results in community protests and translates into attacks against immigrants residing in those communities.

We approach this chapter using two important lenses. Firstly, we largely depart from the stereotypical binary discourse that frames residents of informal settlements around illegality as land invaders, undocumented immigrants and criminals. Secondly, we challenge the assumption that such communities are unsophisticated, disorganised and unresourceful. Instead, we recognise them as resilient and selforganised communities, with bottom-up participatory structures that engage and advocate for appropriate solutions to the private and public sectors' inability to

<sup>1</sup> In this chapter, we distinguish between *internal* and *cross-border migrants* (also referred to as *immigrants*); when we refer to both categories, we use the term *migrants*.

A. Oksiutycz (\*) · C. M. Azionya

Department of Strategic Communication, University of Johannesburg, Johannesburg, South Africa e-mail: aoksiutycz@uj.ac.za; carolinea@uj.ac.za

P. Rugunanan, N. Xulu-Gama (eds.), *Migration in Southern Africa*, IMISCOE Research Series, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-92114-9\_8

provide formal, quality housing for all. This chapter aims to explore the realities and lived experiences of the residents of Zandspruit informal settlement.

### **8.2 Migration, Housing Policy and the Social Role of Informal Settlements**

South African shantytowns, popularly known as "squatter camps" and offcially referred to as "informal settlements" (Stats SA, 2018b), are a distinct feature of South African urban areas. They are indicative of economic inequality, housing policy failures, the long-standing practice of spatial segregation of poor migrants in urban environments, and corruption and maladministration at municipal, provincial and national government levels (Marutlulle, 2017).

### **8.3 Informal Settlements, Migration and Urbanisation in South Africa**

The growth of informal settlements in South Africa is mainly driven by urbanisation and internal migration, although other factors such as cross-border migration and population growth also affect urbanisation (Segatti, 2011). Currently, more than 60% of South Africans live in urban areas (Stats SA, 2019) compared to 47% in 2001 (Stats SA, 2006). Population relocation and burgeoning household growth compound state interventions to address fresh housing demands and existing backlogs (Stats SA, 2018b). Similarly, the private sector lacks a model to house the urban poor proftably. Therefore, the inability to provide housing at scale for ruralurban/urban-urban migrants and immigrants leads the affected to identify vacant land (usually municipal) and use their meagre resources to build informal dwellings and fnd ways to address service delivery gaps.

While not all migrants are poor, they account for a large percentage of urbanites living in poverty (Tacoli et al., 2015). A study on the needs and vulnerabilities of people living in poverty in the Gauteng province names long-term, urban, informalsettlement migrants as most vulnerable to insecure and unstable livelihoods (IOM, 2013). Nevertheless, migrants settled in urban areas "tend to have better economic prospects than people who remain in rural areas" (Turok, 2018: 7). Although all residents of urban informal settlements are vulnerable to poor health and living conditions, violence, assault and harassment, immigrants are the most vulnerable to these factors (IOM, 2013). Generally, in South Africa, poor migrants and immigrants, including asylum seekers and refugees, are pushed to live together in informal settlements and experience similar socio-economic conditions.

Informal settlements are mainly considered to be cases of socio-economic spatial segregation within South African cities (Turok, 2018). In developed countries,

considerable evidence of spatial segregation of immigrants based on their origins (Sydes, 2019; Nielsen & Hennerdal, 2017; Søholt & Lynnebakke, 2015) raises concerns about integration and the existence of parallel societies. However, in South Africa, poor internal migrants and poor immigrants live side by side, usually on the periphery of large cities, with poor transport links and limited access to education, training and job opportunities, which consequently perpetuates poverty (Marutlulle, 2017). That does not mean that the co-existence of internal and cross-border migrants is always peaceful within the settlements.

Despite research indicating the positive impact of immigration on local employment, labour earnings, wages and public fnance (OECD/ILO, 2018) in South Africa, widespread negative attitudes towards immigrants – particularly those living in the informal settlements – persist. Saleh (2015: 298) and Mensah and Benedict (2016: 73) argue that the biggest trigger for the xenophobic violence in 2001, 2002, 2008 and 2015 was the sentiment that immigrants were taking away employment opportunities from South Africans and that immigrant entrepreneurs were pushing local micro and small enterprises out of business using nefarious business practices (Skinner, 2015). Distorted perceptions around the number of immigrants in South Africa (Pretorius, 2019) further fuel negativity towards immigrants. South Africans often portray immigrants as impediments to accessing services in formal and informal settlements (Mensah & Benedict, 2016) and attribute high crime levels to illegal immigration, despite lack of evidence supporting such claims (Crush & Williams, 2002). Furthermore, South Africa lacks an effective system for managing migration and integrating immigrants into communities for social cohesion (Landman & Napier, 2010).

### *8.3.1 The Role of Fragmented Policy in Housing Delivery Failures*

The rate of migration in South Africa remains relatively constant, at around 12% of the population for the fve-year intervals studied by Stats SA between 1975 and 2001 (Stats SA, 2018c). Since South Africa has not experienced rapid migration, housing shortages, growth of informal settlements and service delivery problems are not solely attributable to migration. This indicates policy failures in terms of housing delivery and migration management. The right to housing is entrenched in the South African constitution, which states that all South Africans have the right to have "access to adequate housing" (Republic of South Africa, 1996: 26). The constitution also makes it incumbent on the state to realise this right.

To assist the poor to get access to housing, the government introduced a range of subsidies such as providing Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP) housing after 1994, serviced building stands, and rental housing (National Department of Housing, 1994). The RDP was replaced by the Breaking New Ground (BNG) housing policy in 2004, which aimed to deliver housing to the poor as a form of poverty-alleviating, wealth-creating asset, holistic and sustainable (National Department of Housing, 2004). Although a 25-year longitudinal study found "little evidence that informal settlement dwellers build assets by means of the secondary housing market", the study highlighted an improved quality of life for some benefciaries (Marais et al., 2018: 105). BNG/RDP housing2 is allocated to benefciaries with a household income of less than R3,500 per month. Benefciaries of this subsidy receive a once-off grant for land, basic services (water and sanitation) and the house (top structure) (Landman & Napier, 2010).

Despite these policies, after 25 years of democratic Black majority rule, informal dwellings comprise 13.6% of all houses (Stats SA, 2019). This is signifcantly less than in other African countries such as Kenya or Nigeria, where it is estimated that well over half of urban dwellers live in slum-like conditions (Abubakar & Dano, 2018; Amendah et al., 2014). Offcial informal settlement defnitions are premised on illegality and informality, inappropriate locations, restricted public and private sector investment, poverty and vulnerability, and social stress, and are rarely considered in the context of managing the outcomes of migration. "When shack settlements are seen as a problem, we are assigning blame for the exclusion of the poor from their rights as citizens [to] the poor themselves", argue Bradlow et al. (2011: 269). Furthermore, housing, migration and economic policy fragmentation in South Africa hinder the effcacy of interventions related to informal settlements. For instance, migration issues are often regarded by local government as the responsibility of the national government. Since 1994, the South African government's policy documents proclaim a people-centred approach to housing delivery based on community participation and partnership between low-income groups and the government (Miraftab, 2003). However, research suggests that both internal migrants and immigrants are largely excluded from local government participatory processes such as Community Policing Forums, stakeholder forums or even meetings held by ward councillors (Landman & Napier, 2010).

Facing the reality of the social housing backlog, in 2004, the South African government introduced the *Upgrading of Informal Settlements Programme* as part of its new housing policy (National Department of Housing, 2004). Municipalities apply to the provincial government for basic infrastructure funding limited to providing electricity, sanitation, water and roads; a housing subsidy for construction is accessed via other programmes (National Department of Housing, 2004). Despite the importance of infrastructure for poverty alleviation, which has been highlighted by several studies conducted in other African countries (Ogun, 2010), very few applications for funding for informal settlement upgrading have been submitted.

<sup>2</sup>Despite the policy change, the public still refers to this housing as RDP houses.

### *8.3.2 Social Aspects of Informal Settlements*

Informal settlements are an integral part of the South African economy and society. Cross (2008: 7) argues that shack housing is "the active lowest level of a functioning housing market", where there is evidence of an informal land management system embedded in the community networks which has a signifcant capacity to distribute resources. The informal settlement also provides a moderate level of security (Cross, 2008). Other factors infuencing the quality of life in informal settlements include residents' employment statuses, access to basic services (such as sanitation), quality of roads, access to leisure services, levels of crime and violence, the prevalence of drug abuse, and access to local government offcials (Richards et al., 2007). A study by Hunter and Posel (2012: 294) shows that the 43% unemployment rate for those living in informal dwellings is lower than for those living in traditional rural dwellings (62%). This explains the migrational drive from rural to urban areas in search of jobs. Many of the jobs are in the informal sector – 27% of people living in informal dwellings have informal sector jobs – and 35% perform casual jobs (Hunter & Posel, 2012: 294).

Perceptions of social injustice and being victims of undelivered government promises about housing and infrastructure frequently culminate in anger and violent protests (Huchzermeyer, 2008). Having a house fulfls an important social and symbolic function of belonging and giving legitimacy to living in the city (Oldfeld & Greyling, 2015), conferring a certain social status and sense of stability which thus infuences migrants' perceptions of their quality of life. The ineffciency of government housing delivery programmes is not the only obstacle to accessing housing. Informal settlement dwellers face economic and bureaucratic barriers when applying for a state-built house or a subsidy (Oldfeld & Greyling, 2015; Gunter, 2013). Engagement with the state bureaucratic machine requires fnancial, temporal and other resources that many of the inhabitants of informal settlements do not have.

### **8.4 The Study Site and the Survey Design**

This descriptive crossectional study was conducted in one of the oldest informal settlements in the north-west of Johannesburg, namely Zandspruit, which means "sand river". It has been in existence since the early 1990s and is surrounded by luxury estates. It is near Cosmos City, a multiracial, multiclass, mixed-use suburb established in 2005, considered a beacon of modern urbanisation by the government of South Africa (Sisulu, 2016). During the 1990s, Zandspruit was on the outskirts of the city. Now it is well within the boundaries of the Johannesburg metropolitan area, close to commercial and formal residential areas. As such, Zandspruit is a typical case of an informal settlement in South Africa, where issues of migration, economy and policy intersect.

The primary data collection method for this study was a survey. In designing the questionnaire, we consulted the Zandspruit leadership committee to identify issues of concern to the community. The data collection instrument had fve sections, namely demographics, living conditions, community needs, housing preferences, and communication preferences. A group of 70 feld workers collected data in one day over four hours from all 13 sections ("wards") of the settlement. The feld workers were volunteers instructed in data collection procedures prior to the feld visit. For safety reasons, each group of fve to six feld workers had a local guide provided by the youth activists from the settlement.

Without a sampling frame, sampling was limited to an accessible sample. Within the wards, feld workers applied heterogeneous sampling in terms of the age and gender of respondents. Van Hoeven et al. (2015: 2) argue that, in circumstances where random sampling is not feasible, as was the case in this research, purposive sampling may lead to representative samples "where a sample is considered representative when either sample characteristics or inferences from the sample approximate population values." Collis and Hussey (2009) state that, for a population of 20,000 to 50,000, a sample of 380 cases is suffcient. The 2011 census recorded 31,716 residents in Zandspruit. Our realised sample size was 445. The respondents were Zandspruit residents. However, questions about nationality or country of origin were not included in the questionnaire due to the sensitive nature of such information. The question about native languages provided some indirect evidence about respondents' origins. The survey data was supplemented by qualitative data obtained through a focus group with the Zandspruit leadership committee, an informant interview with a youth leader, and ethnographic observations made during our two visits to the settlement. The discussion in the focus group and the interview with the youth leader focused on living conditions, housing and infrastructure needs and coping strategies used by the residents of Zandspruit.

### **8.5 Results**

### *8.5.1 Sample Description*

Of the 445 respondents, 221 (49.7%) were female and 224 (50.3%) male. Most of the respondents (76.2%) were between the ages of 18 and 45 years, with the highest concentration in the 31 to 45 year age range (see Fig. 8.1). Only 26 people were above the age of 60. Therefore, most respondents were working-age adults.

**Fig. 8.1** Age of respondents (%)

### *8.5.2 Mother Tongue*

Most of the respondents (39.4%) spoke one of the Nguni languages spoken in South Africa, eSwatini, Zimbabwe and Lesotho. These include *isi*Zulu (95 respondents), which is the most widely spoken in South Africa, *isi*Xhosa (42 respondents), *isi*Ndebele (29 respondents) and *si*Swati (10 respondents). The Sotho-Tswana languages spoken in Botswana, Lesotho and South Africa were spoken by 37% of the respondents. Xitsonga, which is spoken by the Shangaan-Tsonga people found in Zimbabwe, Mozambique, eSwatini and South Africa, was spoken by 7.4%; also, 7.4% of respondents declared Tshivenda their mother tongue. Overtly foreign languages represent a minority in the sample, 4.9%. They include *chi*Tumbuka, which is spoken in Malawi, Tanzania and Zambia; Swahili, spoken in Tanzania, Kenya, Uganda, Rwanda, Burundi, Mozambique, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo; Amharic, which is native to Ethiopia; West African dialects; and Portuguese, which is spoken in Mozambique and Angola.

### *8.5.3 Education*

A signifcant proportion of respondents – 58.2% – had dropped out of school while 29.2% had attained their matric (high school) certifcate. Only 12.6% of participants were pursuing a post-high school qualifcation (see Fig. 8.2).

**Fig. 8.2** The education levels of respondents (%)

### *8.5.4 Unemployment and Underemployment*

The data point to a widespread state of unemployment (joblessness) and underemployment (part-time employment or employment in jobs not commensurate with qualifcations). Self-reported unemployment levels for this cohort are quite high at 46.1%, with only 18.2% reporting full-time employment. The rest support themselves through occasional jobs (21%) and about 10% have their own businesses, usually in the informal settlement. Although there is no data to point to what type of business they are engaged in, it is most probably in the informal sector (selling alcohol, hawking food, fruits and vegetables, running beauty salons or spaza shops). The vast majority of the residents who can supplement their primary income tend to do so through casual work (42.5%), a government grant (10%), or pensions (5%). Many (14%) rely on support from their family and 10% get income from miscellaneous sources, such as rental income from renting their "properties" in the settlement.

Examples of participant views on employment opportunities were as follows: A 26–30-year-old Tswana woman with some primary education school state, "Job creation is needed so that we can be able to feed our families." A 26–30-year- old Xhosa woman said, "[We need a] subsidy to do projects in the community." An 18–25-year-old Xhosa woman with a matric [high school diploma] said, "I would like the government to create projects that will uplift this settlement while creating jobs for us."

### *8.5.5 Housing Conditions, Preferences and Infrastructure Needs*

Three-quarters of the respondents live in temporary structures commonly referred to as shacks. About 15% live in permanent houses constructed within the boundaries of the settlement and around 10% indicated that they live in backrooms in someone's yard. The vast majority of residents (72.4%) live with their families or partners, 14.8% live alone, and 12% share accommodation with friends, acquaintances or other families. Just about 55% of the respondents live in households of two to four people, 23% in households of one or two persons, 15% in households having fve to six people and 7% in houses having seven or more residents. Nearly 40% declare that they "own" the house in which they stay, and around 60% are renters. Considering that all houses in Zandspruit are built without necessary permissions, the concept of property ownership has a very specifc meaning. Around 25% of respondents moved to Zandspruit in the three years before the survey; nearly a third have lived in the settlement for four to nine years; 40% have resided in the settlement for 10 to 25 years, and 6% have lived there for longer than 25 years.

Just more than half (55%) of the respondents indicated that they would move to another area, while 45% would stay in the area they are currently living in. The residents indicated a high preference for an RDP house (67%) and believe that the qualifying criteria should include families who earn R0 to R3,500 per month (76.9%%). Around 12.6% would prefer a serviced stand and 8% would prefer help with building on their land. Only 38.2% declared that they had applied for social housing, while 61.8% had never applied; 61.3% stated that they did not know how to apply for government housing, while three quarters did not know how to apply for a housing loan from a bank. Around 17% of respondents indicated that, apart from an RDP house, they would welcome any type of housing subsidy. For example, a 31–45-year-old male Tsonga speaker with some primary school education said, "We would like RDP houses; we are tired of paying rent."

Answers to the section of the questionnaire that asked what improvements were needed in the informal settlement indicated that the settlement is lacking almost all facilities. The survey identifed electricity as the top priority area for most households (69.1%). The second priority area revolves around access to water and sanitation (53.8%). During the data collection process, there were areas where raw sewage was fooding the streets. Children were running in it, exposing them to untold health hazards. The poor sanitation issues can also be linked to the third priority area, which is the provision of quality healthcare in the community. The community clinic is then an important interface where community members can access health services. The survey found 46% of the respondents pointing to the need for another clinic. Considering the health hazards identifed in informal settlements, longer opening hours are needed whilst still taking into consideration the safety of health care providers.

Concerns about crime were frequently expressed during the focus group. Inadequate policing compounds the issue of crime. Even though the Honeydew police station is not far, residents point to the unavailability of police services or slow response times, partly due to infrastructural inadequacies (bad, inaccessible, narrow roads) and poor lighting. Street lighting is a deterrent for crime to some degree. Consequently, street lighting and high mast lights were high on the wish list of the residents of Zandspruit.

Examples of participant views on infrastructure needs were as follows: An 18–25-year-old Tswana male resident with some high school education said, "We also need drug rehabilitation facilities as drugs are a big problem among the youth of this community. I have been smoking *nyaope* [a highly addictive drug] since 2010 and would like to quit but I need the government's help." A 60–75-year-old Zulu woman with some high school stated, "The government can't provide services when people do not have houses."

A 31–45-year-old Xhosa woman with some high school education highlights the need for "buildings for elders."

A Zulu-speaking 31–45-year-old man with some high school education stated, "I would like the government to come here and address the issues that we face every day." A 31–45 year old Tswana man with a further education and training qualifcation said: "The government has forgotten about the people residing in Zandspruit. We would also appreciate [the] housing subsidy and community growth like they are doing for Diepsloot even though Zandspruit has been around longer." A 26–30-year-old Sesotho speaking male said, "Relocate residents to (a) different place while fxing different sections at a time."

### *8.5.6 The Quality of Life of the Youth*

An interview with a youth leader points to low levels of education among youth due to apathy and a lack of fnances. A lack of recreational facilities geared to youth results in young people engaging in illegal activities such as crime, gangsterism, and alcohol and substance abuse. The participants of the focus group indicated that teenage pregnancy is also rife. At the same time, the settlement has an active grassroots youth leadership group that proactively engages in self–help such as sharing employment opportunities and skills development, and even engages with authorities such as the City of Johannesburg's top offcials to highlight the plight of Zandspruit.

Participants had this to say about the effects of living in the settlement on youth: A 46–59-year-old Zulu man with some high school education stated, "The surroundings that we live in have clouded our children's visions and dreams to a better future, as a lot of the youth has lost all hope and resort to drugs and crime to forget all that they are facing." An 18–25-year-old Tsonga woman with some high school education said, "Sometimes I just imagine how my life would have turned out if it was not of the situation in this area, I probably would have not been a victim of teenage pregnancy and would have fnished my matric." A 26–30-year-old Sotho woman with some high school education states, "There are a lot of alcohol operating businesses that contribute to the high level of alcohol abuse that leads to killings among the youth."

### *8.5.7 Views on Immigration*

Immigrants are directly and indirectly linked to all manner of social ills and negativity, including rape and vandalising and stealing state resources. Although the prevalence of these sentiments cannot be quantifed from this data set, it does provide an important indication of the depth of resentment and fear immigrants attract. The study also demonstrates that a lot of misinformation exists around the allocation of housing resources by the government and eligibility criteria. Only a few residents correctly identifed community members as the perpetrators of selling the RDP houses allocated to them to immigrants. Participants made the following statements about immigrants: A 31–45-year-old Sotho man with a further education and training qualifcation said: "There are too many migrants [immigrants] in [the] informal settlement." A 31–45-year-old Sesotho *saLeboa*-speaking man with some high school education believed, "There is just too much crime. Too many foreign nationals are occupying the informal settlements and this affects our employment opportunities. There are many rape incidents. Cables get stolen at night. [The] government should ask for IDs [identity documents] from foreign nationals." A 60–75-year-old Zulu woman stated, "Foreigners buy these houses and end up having RDPs. [I] applied for an RDP in the '90s, but due to corruption it was given to someone else."

### **8.6 Discussion: Disillusionment and Resilience**

In this study, we present Zandspruit informal settlement in South Africa as an example of physical manifestation of migration to urban centres that highlights migration drivers and the impact of the ineffcient implementation of policies on the lives of poor migrants. This study highlights the fact that Zandspruit is a melting pot of different ethnic and cultural groups, as demonstrated by the plurality of languages and nationalities found in Zandspruit. Since many of the languages spoken by respondents are not specifc to a single nationality, it is impossible to make defnite assumptions about the country of origin of the respondents. Nevertheless, our results paint a picture of a multi-ethnic community comprising internal and cross-border migrants, united by the similar challenges of living in a resource-deprived and underdeveloped urban area. While locals and immigrants co-exist in Zandspruit, the study showed that there is some underlying animosity towards immigrants. This fnding is consistent with previous studies (Mensah & Benedict, 2016; Skinner, 2015), which indicated that immigrants, without real evidence, are often accused of perpetrating crimes, "taking" away opportunities from locals, and even manipulating the system to obtain social housing.

Our study revealed the high levels of unemployment and underemployment among residents, with fewer than 20% of the respondents having stable jobs and many relying on part-time and casual jobs. This is despite nearly 40% of the respondents having completed at least high school education or having formal vocational

training. At the same time, there is evidence of a thriving informal economy with a functioning rental market, although generally the entrepreneurship level in Zandspruit, at 10%, is relatively low by comparison with similar settlements in other African countries. For instance, in a study of informal settlements in Lagos, more than 40% of participants identifed themselves as traders (Akinwale et al., 2013).

The biggest challenge highlighted by the residents is the provision of housing or rather lack of it. While the residents are subject to government's inability to effciently execute its BNG housing policy, they face other obstacles to accessing affordable housing, primarily revolving around a lack of knowledge of qualifying criteria, relevant policies or application procedures for a house from the government or a loan from the bank. Consequently, nearly 40% of the respondents have not applied for any form of social housing. This points to the need to educate the communities living in informal settlements about the application process and make the information available in plain English or conversational vernacular. In line with the suggestions made by Gunter (2013) and Oldfeld and Greyling (2015), in general, the bureaucratic barriers to accessing housing must be lowered.

As informal settlements are a reality in South Africa it is necessary to move away from perceiving informal settlements in terms of illegality to rather see them as natural outcomes of migration and urbanisation. As such, policies should be developed and implemented that effectively address the issues associated with migration and mushrooming informal settlements, primarily by engaging with the community to utilise their social capital. We concur with Saharan et al. (2019: 7) that "even though city interventions are top-down, households living there cannot be viewed as 'passive' recipients of policy interventions." Our study revealed that Zandspruit residents have developed grassroots self-governance structures, independent of the formal structures such as those around councillors.

The dominant approach to dealing with informal settlements in South Africa is evictions (often unlawful), displacement of population to temporary accommodation, or resettlement to formal BNG/RDP housing in a different location, which destroys the fabric of the community (Huchzermeyer, 2008). The government is still far from even modest implementation of the programme to upgrade informal settlements such as Zandspruit by providing basic services as intended by the 2004 policy (National Department of Housing, 2004). As shown by the example of Zandspruit, residents are very unhappy with service delivery and lack of basic infrastructure such as electricity, water and sanitation. Associated with these are issues around basic healthcare and crime prevention. As indicated by prior research in Africa, infrastructure plays a key role in reducing poverty (Ogun, 2010). Other areas for improvement are community upliftment, mentoring and skills transfer programmes, and schools to stimulate the economy of settlements were identifed by the respondents as a priority. In particular, issues related to creating opportunities for young people are of high importance to the community.

Overall, the respondents are largely disillusioned with the state's perceived indifference to their plight and inability to improve their living conditions. The survey responses indicated that the residents call for urgent government interventions; at the same time, there is a lot of mistrust of and even hostility towards the government. During and before data collection, we had to assure residents and the leadership committee that we did not represent any government agencies. As previously noted by Huchzermeyer (2004), people living in informal settlements tend to resist external control.

### **8.7 Conclusion**

This chapter explored the realities and lived experiences of the residents of Zandspruit informal settlement, against the background of drivers of migration to urban centres in South Africa resulting in ever-expanding informal settlements around major cities. Informal settlements are not unique to South Africa. They are a common feature in many African countries when the rate of urbanisation and migration accelerates. At the same time, the distinct features of South African migration, which are determined by the country's history, economy and geopolitical situation, need to be acknowledged. Among these are the historical legacy of apartheid, extreme social inequality, high unemployment, and low economic growth that result in a growing army of urban poor. Another unique factor, which to some extent affects the growth of informal settlements, is the country's attractiveness as a legal and illegal immigration destination. Notwithstanding the differences, South Africa and other African countries face the challenge of developing and implementing effective, coherent and sustainable policies leading to investment in social and physical infrastructure such as housing, health facilities and education to alleviate poverty and build a prosperous society. These actions need to focus on delivering on the policy promise, through the provision of social housing and through upgrading infrastructure in informal settlements. At the same time, more effort should be put into building community participation and partnership between low-income groups and the government.

### **References**


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### **Chapter 9 Migrant Women's Experiences in the City: A Relational Comparison**

**Nomkhosi Xulu-Gama**

### **9.1 Introduction and Background**

Something remains to be said about how African migrant women's experiences, […] have affected the system of migrant labour (Phillips & James, 2014: 411).

Scholars who write about migrant women, whether rural-urban or international migrants, have tended to always link women's migration processes to men's, thereby reducing women's agency and will power. It is in this regard that women's positionalities have continued to remain on the peripheries in literature (see Phillips & James, 2014), even if in reality they have become the main players in their own right. Kihato's (2013) work reiterates the importance of the role of migrant women in shaping the way the city's life is played out. Jayaram et al. (2019) posited that women are very mobile, frequently moving locally and internationally between their areas of origin and different urban work destinations. Xulu-Gama (2017), Kihato (2013) and Zulu (1993) prove that women do migrate on their own.

This chapter is a contribution to the emerging feld of women's migration in the Global South literature. It uses feminist-standpoint epistemology as a way of embracing and acknowledging as valid the experiences and voices of women, especially in the feld of migration, which was historically designed to be solely for men. The focus is on going beyond the differences and the complexities and embracing the undervalued similarities which exist between rural-urban and foreign-national migrant women. This chapter intends to make a relational comparison between African rural-urban and African foreign-national1 migrant women in the South

N. Xulu-Gama (\*)

<sup>1</sup> 'Foreign national' means an individual who is not a South African citizen or does not have a permanent residence permit issued in terms of the Immigration Act, according to the South African Immigration Amendment Act 13 of 2011.

Department of Sociology, University of Cape Town, Cape Town, South Africa e-mail: nomkhosi.gama@uct.ac.za

P. Rugunanan, N. Xulu-Gama (eds.), *Migration in Southern Africa*, IMISCOE Research Series, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-92114-9\_9

African city of Durban. Foreign-national migrants are those women who come from outside the borders of South Africa.

There is insuffcient research exploring the relations between internal and international migration (Lerch, 2016). Lerch argues that theories of migration have not explained whether international migration is a complement to or substitute for the rural-urban fows which characterise many developing countries (Lerch, 2016). Many scholars choose to focus on either rural-urban (see Xulu-Gama, 2017; Bhengu, 2014; Ajaero & Onokala, 2013; Bozzoli & Nkotsoe, 1991) or international migration (see Galvin, 2015; Kihato, 2013). This chapter does not argue for a comparison for the sake of pointing out similarities and outlining endless differences; rather, it seeks to look more into how they [should] relate to and through each other. A "relational comparison method is that which refuses to measure 'cases' against a universal yardstick. Instead of taking as given pre-existing objects, events, places and identities, I start with the question of how they are formed in relation to one another and a larger whole" (Hart, 2002: 13). A relational comparison is methodologically useful and a politically enabling concept and tool of analysis (Hart, 2016).

In this chapter, I have not made a distinction between the documented and the undocumented foreign-national migrant women. The reason is that the focus of the research was not on their "status" in South Africa but on their experiences of the city as migrant women. It is, however, undeniable that the "status" of foreign-national migrant women has the potential to play a big role in the experiences that women acquire in that particular space. For example, Galvin (2015) notes that being an undocumented Zimbabwean in Botswana is an experience of vulnerability that migrants live with daily.

Migration is mostly seen as something positive: it is a refection of having faith in the "system". The idea of migration is on its own a promise for something better than what people have at that time, and sometimes who they are (Simone, 2003). Migration is seen as a key survival strategy, especially for rural-urban migrants (Xulu-Gama, 2020; Ajaero & Onokala, 2013) as well as for international migrants who are affected by disasters such as civil wars, economic meltdown and so on.

The hopes are always high, although migration mostly involves a sacrifce of some sort. One always has to leave that which is dear to her to advance her desires or hopes and dreams. Leaving family (which may involve parents, children, spouse or other relatives), leaving the hometown and all that is associated with it, such as culture, is what the migration process has to involve for most people. However, some women had to migrate because they felt there was nothing dear left for them in their areas of origin. Some women migrated to the city to escape patriarchal authority (Phillips & James, 2014). While for some, it would just be the land which they leave behind, for a few, even that land would have been dispossessed from them, or it is land that was never in their names. Dispossession of land does not, however, imply dispossession from their spiritual connections and ancestors, who are in most cases buried or embedded in that land which they leave behind. By this, I mean that this chapter recognises the different positions and contexts in which women fnd themselves when having to decide to migrate.

Women's experiences are the focus of this chapter because I believe that they have been, and continue to be, fundamental drivers of this migration, which is a defning aspect of contemporary South African society (Phillips & James, 2014). While looking at rural-urban migrant women together with foreign-national migrant women as a whole can be seen as a potential weakness – because it might be assumed that I see them as a homogenous group – I am quite conscious of the differences, divisions, tensions and sometimes contradictions that exist within these groups of women. Hence this chapter does not assume that the difference is only in the nationalities of these women. There is indeed a considerable degree of heterogeneity among the various levels of difference between and among these women who are loosely referred to as migrant women in this chapter.

So rural-urban migrant women would be women who have moved from rural areas into urban areas and continue to regard home as a place somewhere in the rural areas. Foreign-national migrant women are women who originate from outside the geographical boundaries of South Africa, coming from anywhere on the African continent. In addition to the few sources of difference and self-identifcation that this chapter focuses on, there are many other important sources of difference which these groups of women ascribe to themselves or sometimes have imposed on them, for example, sexual orientation, religion, marital status, political affliation and so on.

Although all these migrant women do not originate from the same place, both groups of women have been brought to the city of Durban by a variety of circumstances. This is where they are all hustling, with their children and sometimes without their children. The other factor that is shared by these women is their social class, which is working class.

The highly mobile middle to upper class migrants are usually exempt from exclusion [and vulnerability], as their class status and global social capital enable them to integrate into similar class positions in many different countries. Indeed, many immigration policies worldwide are geared towards attracting, rather than expelling, those migrants who already hold high net wealth and/or global skills in high demand. (Erwin & Grest, 2018:5)

The Employment Services Act No. 4 of 2014 says that foreign-national migrants should be employed on the basis that their employment promotes the training of South African citizens and permanent residents. This legislation immediately clarifes its unfriendly position towards working class migrant women who come as an unskilled pool of labour; this supports Erwin and Grest's argument above.

The contribution of this chapter, as part of the scholarship of the sociology of migration in the Global South, is to use existing data to provide a practical analysis of the relations between rural-urban and foreign-national migrant women. In doing that, it emphasises the importance of class in the analysis of gender, place, work and social relations.

### **9.2 Methodological and Theoretical Context**

#### Hart (2002: 14) argues that the

…concept and method of relational comparison are grounded in an understanding of place not as a bounded unit, but as always formed through relations and connections with dynamics at play in other places, and in wider regional, national, and transnational arenas.

In her later work, she adds, "Relational comparison focuses instead on spatiohistorical specifcities as well as interconnections and mutually constitutive processes" (Hart, 2016: 373). This chapter has been written using data from two sets of research done in the city of Durban. One set was gathered from women who came from the rural areas of KwaZulu-Natal province to stay at KwaMashu2 hostel and look for work. The second data set3 is from a research project which collected data from both rural-urban women migrants living at the Thokoza hostel4 and international women migrants coming from different parts of the African continent. That study wanted to fnd out about their experiences of the city of Durban. Foreignnational migrant women were found using a snowball sampling method, and they were scattered across the different parts of the city of Durban. Rural-urban migrant women were accessed at the hostel because this is where most local migrants reside.

Twenty foreign-national migrant women were interviewed and ten rural-urban migrant women were interviewed. All women were interviewed through life histories, which meant allowing them tell stories about their lives, at a time and in a place where they felt comfortable. The interviews asked when and how the migrant women arrived in Durban and what had been their experiences as foreign national migrants. They were all interviewed in their home languages. For the rural-urban migrants, *isi*Zulu was the predominant language used by the migrant women, with a limited number of *isi*Xhosa-speaking women. For the foreign-national migrant women participants, foreign-national migrant women feldworkers who spoke the same home language as the research participants were employed and some of the languages the participants spoke were Thiluba, Swahili, Lingala and French. This meant that there had to be numerous feldworkers, because each was employed based on the particular foreign language that was needed for interview purposes. The same feldworkers were responsible for translating into English and transcribing, for easy access by the researcher. I was responsible for interviewing, translating and transcribing the transcripts into English for all the local languages. Some of the key themes that came out of the interviews were social network support, search for a better life, journey to destination, anxieties around children's well being, decision to migrate, and sexual economy.

<sup>2</sup>KwaMashu is a township and it has a formerly single-sex workers' hostel, known as KwaMashu hostel and offcially called KwaMashu Community Residential Units. Townships are areas which were formerly offcially designated for black occupation under apartheid legislation.

<sup>3</sup>This research project was funded by the Cities Alliance.

<sup>4</sup>Thokoza hostel continues to be a single sex women's hostel based in the central business district in Durban.

My positionality as a researcher, a black South African woman, was advantageous, although it also has its limits when it comes to familiarity, which holds the risk of taking for granted many aspects that another researcher, differently positioned, would not.

Feminist-standpoint epistemology argues that this position provides the clearest vision of women's social relations because unbiased knowledge of the world is women's direct experience. Choosing this epistemology can be understood as part of women's resistance by embracing their "subjective" experience; in this way, they can resist men's objectifcation (Walby, 1990). Instead of starting with gender and then adding other variables such as age, sexual orientation, race, social class and religion, black feminist thought sees these distinctive systems of oppression as being part of one overarching structure of domination (Collins, 2000: 221). Walby (1990: 3) argues that the concept and theory of patriarchy are essential to capture the depth, pervasiveness and interconnectedness of different aspects of women's subordination, and can be developed in such a way as to take account of the different forms of gender inequality over time, class and ethnic group.

### **9.3 Women's Everyday Lived Experiences**

This section is divided into two main subsections. The frst discusses the underlying similarities, and the second the complexities in the differences, of rural-urban migrants and foreign national migrants. The frst part documents social relations, reasons for migration, vulnerabilities and what I call a "double standard lifestyle". The second section opens with a quote from an interview transcript which confronts us with questions of difference and nationality. It depicts what possibly happens when a local meets with a foreigner and they have to negotiate issues of love, intimacy and family relations.

### *9.3.1 Undervalued Similarities*

#### **Social Network Support:**

For the South African women, these networks are made up of both kin and friends who live in the hostel, as well as kin and friendship networks linked to their rural homesteads outside of the city. For women coming from outside the country social networks consist mostly of other migrant families, who either work or worship in the same spaces, with some tenuous links accessing fnancial resources from networks in their home countries. In addition, the [Faith Based Organisations] FBOs and [non- Governmental Organisations] NGOs who assist in providing services and goods to migrant and refugee women serve as critical spaces for creating new social networks in the city, and as a safety net for children […] While there is some evidence from the oral histories that new friends have been made through attending church, there are also social divisions based on nationality between and within churches. (Erwin & Grest, 2018)

The quote above shows that women rely on social networks to help them with different things including fnding accommodation, jobs, joint savings (*stokvels*<sup>5</sup> and rotating-credit societies) and burial societies (see Phillips & James, 2014). On the other hand, my earlier work (Xulu-Gama, 2017) on migrant women from the rural areas clearly demonstrated that women did not fnd it easy to form solidarities amongst themselves. Ramphele (1993) also found that, although there were numerous potential points of solidarity among migrant women in the hostel, they were able to fnd and hold on to the divisions that kept them apart.

**In Search of a Better Life:** One other profound similarity between these two types of migrant women is being in search of a better life. All these migrant women who have moved from one area to another have, in many more ways than one, expressed that they want to have a better life and this is the reason for their migration. For the majority of them who come to the city of Durban, they come to fnd job opportunities or even to start various livelihood procurement activities. The few who come following their partners, upon reaching the city of Durban, also take the opportunity and look for employment opportunities, participate in informal economic activities or further their education. Foreign-national migrant women, more than rural-urban migrant women, take up the option of furthering their education. They have even expressed a lack of understanding as to why South Africans do not use the opportunity of furthering their tertiary education because it is free in South Africa.6

**Many Stops and Long Journey to Destination:** There are many ways in which vulnerability is described and experienced by migrant women. For example, the interviews with some women, especially foreign-national women migrants, showed that these women have had many other stops in different cities before they reached South Africa. For example, Sarah7 from the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) went through Burundi, Tanzania and Mozambique before reaching South Africa. An interview with Rosa, also originally from DRC, showed that she frst went to Zambia, then Zimbabwe, and then came to South Africa. Florence from Uganda went to Kenya, then to Tanzania and through Zimbabwe before coming to South Africa. This is an experience that most foreign national migrant women have to go through and hence bring with them to the destination city. By the time they reach their destination and experience different and mostly harsh receptions in Durban, they would have already been through a lot. Meanwhile, from the ruralurban migrant women's sample, both from Thokoza and KwaMashu hostel, the experiences of vulnerability are there but not in the same way as those described above. The migrant women in the hostel normally have one direction and a one-stop journey, where they leave the rural areas and reach the hostel on the same day and reside there for a very long period of their lives. Two main reasons for this are

<sup>5</sup>Stokvels are money-saving schemes, mainly based on women's informal networks.

<sup>6</sup>By this, they refer to full-time research Masters' and PhDs in most South African universities, as well as the availability of a National Financial Aid System.

<sup>7</sup>All names used are pseudonyms.

because KwaZulu-Natal province's rural areas are always closer to the city of Durban, compared to departing from a country out of South African boundaries. Secondly, rural-urban migrants use relations and connections which are normally socially closer to them.

**Anxieties Around Children's Well Being/Safety:** Erwin and Grest (2018: 39) argue that migrant and refugee mothers from outside of South Africa have many anxieties around discrimination against their children in the state schooling and healthcare system. Concerns around safety in schools loom large for many migrant mothers; these generally are around forms of xenophobia and language barriers. Xenophobia, Erwin and Grest (2018) argue, may indicate a misplaced fear and distrust of the state's ability to create a harmonious society. Onukogu's work in this book discusses the different ways children are affected by migration. She uses excerpts to demonstrate the various ways which the children use to protect themselves from the harsh experiences of foreign migration, including bullying at school. My earlier research (Xulu-Gama, 2017) shows that rural-urban migrant women also worry about their children growing up in these migrant city spaces. They worry about their safety since their places of origin are safer and more protected than the urban areas. They are concerned about their children growing up without proper cultural traits which are practised in the rural areas; they argue that the beliefs and values in the city are different to those held in the rural areas. Loss of respect is one of the main concerns, which mothers claim children growing up in the urban areas are susceptible to.

**Diffcult Decision Making Process/Indecisiveness:** Phillips and James (2014) argue that being a migrant woman means that you also sometimes grapple with the question of whether to stay or to return home (see Hooks, 2009); this, they argue, is a state of vulnerability. Your feelings are compounded by experiences that challenge your resilience levels. Your identity is challenged in many ways and on many levels. Jayaram et al. (2019: 86) posit that "[w]omen migrants experience different forms of exclusion […], compounded by their gender-based experiences and patriarchal power relations in the city […]."

**Unknown Journey:** This research has established that migrant women, upon leaving their areas of origin, embark on an unknown journey, which they hear of from the experiences of their family members or friends. The people who they hear from sometimes become part of their social networks in the foreign city, as has been highlighted above. However, this departure allows migrant women to start a new life in the new city because it is not all the old life traits that are needed in the city. They learn new languages, cultures, lifestyles and even gain new friends; some start new families in the city. Among all that, what sometimes opens are possibilities for what I will call a "double standard lifestyle". Migrant women, in the process of navigating the city, forging life, negotiating access and identity, procuring livelihoods and seeking happiness, may fnd themselves in really diffcult situations where compromising decisions have to be taken.

**Embarrassing Status:** The work of Machinya in this book gives the example of Zimbabwean migrant workers who fnd themselves forced to lie to their families and relatives in the areas of origin about the kinds of work that they do in the migrant cities. He relates that, sometimes, when their social networks have arrived in the same migrant city, they have to make excuses not to meet them, or for them not to see what kind of work they do or even the kinds of places they live in. Migrants get embarrassed to tell true stories about their migrant status. My research at KwaMashu also shows that migrant women have to lie to their relatives about where they live because of the negative connotations which are associated with the former singlesex hostels, which are generally known as men's spaces (see Xulu-Gama, 2017). Migrants resort to lying, as they fear harsh judgment from their social networks. Research has shown that migrants, when in the city, tend to take up jobs that they would not normally take up in their areas of origin. These are jobs seen as menial jobs with low pay, such as being a cleaner, domestic worker or car guard. They sometimes leave respected qualifed or professional positions attained through tertiary education in their society. They have qualifcations that are downgraded or not recognised by the South African Qualifcations Authority or they cannot use them because of their migrant status.

**Sexual Economy:** With limited formal and permanent employment opportunities and the survivalist economy not providing enough money, migrant women fnd themselves having to work in the sexual economy (see Xulu-Gama, 2017; Hunter, 2010). Connell (2009) makes an example of how women who are engaged in "sex work" always have to keep it from public knowledge because of fear of discrimination and stigmatisation. The experience of working in the informal sector presents migrant women both with dangers and opportunities to put down more permanent roots in the urban areas. Both the threats and the promises of such work are inseparable from those that come with living in informal settlements (Phillips & James, 2014: 415). The informal economy also allows women the freedom to develop relationships of a kind denied to those who ended up in formal employment.

### *9.3.2 Complexities of Difference*

Michelle: We fell in love and he told me that I could not live with him because his family did not understand this thing of foreigners. He told me that he loved me, and he would do everything for me. I wanted him to come to my home and I also wanted him to invite me to his home, but he didn't want to do that. That really hurt me, and I told my sisters about it. I have a sister who came here in 2010, before I had the child. When she came, I was pregnant, and she said it would be better if we looked for a place to stay together because my boyfriend was useless.

Above is an excerpt from an interview with Michelle, a 19-year-old Zimbabwean woman. She fell pregnant while in a relationship with a South African man but she eventually had to take her child back to her grandmother in Zimbabwe, who helped her look after the child while Michelle was fnding her feet with job opportunities. Michelle had to be painfully reminded by her partner that she was indeed a foreigner, more an "unaccepted outsider", and her partner was not ready to explain her difference to his family.

The most notable difference between these two kinds of migrant women is that rural-urban migrants have the advantage of citizenship, which on its own comes with a whole lot of benefts: access to social grants and access to Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP) housing. There are further advantages such as the proximity of extended family members, common language and culture. The issue of language can either make one's life easy or impossible in a foreign space. Although it would be impossible to generalise on the issue of language and assume that all foreign national migrants are unable or fnd it diffcult to converse with locals in their local languages, this is mostly the case. Most foreign-national migrant women would even point out that not being able to communicate with locals is one of the biggest challenges in settling in the new city.

Rural-urban women migrants also suffer alienation in the city especially in looking for employment. Not having secondary school or tertiary education causes them to focus their attention on acquiring survival strategies, either in the informal economy or in the domestic arena, where they can survive with no or limited spoken English language.

Nomkhosi: Do you have a bank account? Gogo S: Why would I put it [the money] in the bank? Nomkhosi: How do you get your pension money? Gogo S: I get paid8 from *isikhungo*<sup>9</sup> [South African Security Agency (SASA)] by hand Nomkhosi: at Ndwedwe? Gogo S: Yes, I get paid at the farm.

The excerpt above is taken from an interview with an elderly woman who is a pensioner from Ndwedwe, which is in the northern KwaZulu-Natal province's rural areas. She has been living in Thokoza hostel for decades and she has never been formally employed in her life; she has always been in the survivalist economy and it has worked for her, in terms of being able to sustain and maintain herself and her family. She has been able to build a house in the rural area as well as educate her children from the money she makes from selling on the streets of Durban. Something she shares with all undocumented migrant women is not having a bank account. Looking at her life achievements, one can see that she does a good job of taking care of her money without having it go via the bank. As a result of never having been formally employed, she has never been forced to open a bank account. She complained about the charges one has to pay when depositing or withdrawing the money. Even her old age grant she collects from the SASA payment centres in Ndwedwe. That does not give her any practical problems because she anyway always has to go home at the end of the month to see her family, since she lives alone at the hostel.

Mama C: I came here [Thokoza Hostel in Durban] in 1953. Nomkhosi: 1953, okay.

<sup>8</sup> In order to qualify for the old age social grant, you must be living in South Africa, you must not be receiving any other social grant for yourself, you must be 60 years of age or older; you must be a South African citizen, permanent resident or refugee, and you and your spouse must meet the requirements of the means test, according to the SASA website.

<sup>9</sup>Pay centre.


The passage above is yet another example of an elderly rural-urban migrant woman. She is telling her brief family background and how she had to leave the rural areas to eke out a living after her husband, who was a breadwinner for the household, passed away. She also speaks proudly of her achievement in the rural areas, which she was able to attain through her migrant status. She got a casual job which she used to support herself and her family. When she became too old and ill, she successfully applied for the old age grant. She is quite content, as she states above, with the grant, and she claims it allows her to cover all her basic needs. This passage starkly shows the difference which exists between foreign-national migrant women and rural-urban migrant women. When rural-urban South African migrant women get too old to work, they have the opportunity of applying for state support, the old age social grant which was R 1780 per month (approximately US\$105) at the time of writing. She also mentioned that when she is not well, she does not worry too much because she can access the public health system for free.

These factors, as has been highlighted above, are really what makes a big difference between a local and a foreign woman migrant. Although foreign national women migrants are also entitled to use the health system, their experiences with the nursing staff are mostly unpleasant. Foreign-national migrant women only go to the public health system when they are forced to because, naturally, nobody wants to expose themselves to negativity or a harsh and discriminatory system or people.

From research undertaken with the rural-urban migrants, it was clear that social grants continue to play a prominent role in facilitating the migration processes of women. With a high unemployment rate in South Africa (29%), women's lives can be seen as hopeless but saved by the availability of the different kinds of social grants. The role played by the old age grant has been established and traced as impacting on many different members of the family, including the children and the grandchildren of the senior citizens, (see Mosoetsa, 2011). Rural-urban migrant women tend to use grants for survival in the city as well as to supplement the survivalist activities that they engage themselves in upon reaching the city (see Mokoena and Khunou's work (Chap. 10) in this volume). "There was little evidence in this study of women who come from other African countries successfully accessing government grants. Women who only have asylum seeker permits and are still waiting for refugee status are not able to access the child support grant from the state" (Erwin & Grest, 2018: 37).

Another factor we learn from the experiences of these two elderly ladies living at the Thokoza hostel is that, although they have reached their retirement age, there is nobody who is pushing them to leave the city and go back where they "belong".

### **9.4 Concluding Remarks**

In this chapter, I have shown that there are vast similarities between rural-urban and foreign-national women migrants' experiences. Some of those are challenges, such as the issues with language, vulnerability, and reasons for migration, although these are never experienced in the same manner. I have also shown that migrant women who are also mothers all have a certain degree of concern around the effects of migration on their children. The idea of crossing the border is one of the main differences among these women. It does not only become an issue of geography and distance. While that matters a lot, there are many other interrelated diffcult experiences which compound the decision to migrate across the border.

I recommend that there should be associations created for women, by women, which are going to go beyond national, class and religious lines. Focusing on the associational life of women migrants. Phillips and James (2014) highlight how women make connections which either reaffrm their rural links or help them settle in the cities. Faith-based organisations have been noted as one such association, but perhaps because these organisations are faith based, their focus is never on trying to connect the pieces which seem disconnected in the social and economic aspects of migrant women's lives. The other weakness of faith-based organisations is that they tend to continue to divide women along national lines. For example, you would fnd a church dominated by Zimbabweans and another dominated by Nigerians, and so on. These divisions continue to leave gaps, which tend to highlight the differences and undervalue the similarities and the shared experiences of migrant women in the city of Durban. These are the gaps which should be cemented by the associations that need to be established, with a vision and a focus on making migrant women see that they all belong in this African city and they all have value to add.

**Acknowledgements** The author would like to acknowledge the funding of this project by Cities Alliance Cities without Slums.

### **References**


**Open Access** This chapter is licensed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits use, sharing, adaptation, distribution and reproduction in any medium or format, as long as you give appropriate credit to the original author(s) and the source, provide a link to the Creative Commons license and indicate if changes were made.

The images or other third party material in this chapter are included in the chapter's Creative Commons license, unless indicated otherwise in a credit line to the material. If material is not included in the chapter's Creative Commons license and your intended use is not permitted by statutory regulation or exceeds the permitted use, you will need to obtain permission directly from the copyright holder.

### **Part IV Children and Mothers on the Move**

### **Chapter 10 Young Mothers, Labour Migration and Social Security in South Africa**

**Kearabetswe Mokoene and Grace Khunou**

### **10.1 Introduction**

Due to the conditions of apartheid and social engineering, internal labour migration played an important role in shaping the dynamic roles and relationships of South African families. In a recent study on internal labour migration in South Africa, Mokoene (2017) found that even though men remain the main migrants in households, young women are increasingly becoming prominent migrants as well. This fnding echoes other existing fndings on national and international migration which illustrate that women continue to migrate in large numbers within and across borders to fnd employment (Xulu-Gama, 2017; Kihato, 2013; Walker, 1990). Studies also show that labour migration presents both benefts and costs for migrant sending families (Mokoene & Khunou, 2019; see also Yao & Treiman, 2011). Thus in this chapter we take a closer look at experiences of the families of young women who migrate from the rural parts of Madibeng in the North West Province of South Africa, to neighboring cities in search of employment. This is from a study by Mokoene (2017) which found that the migration of these young women come with a cost including, non-remittance, parental absence and poverty (struggle for survival) to the families they leave behind.

South African women have long been part of internal migrantion even before the advent of democracy. The early migrant labour system was complex, and thus impacted communal lives and survival of these women as they remained at home with children, the old and frail (Walker, 1990). There's agreement that benefts of migration include its positive contribution to the well-being of families who

K. Mokoene (\*)

G. Khunou

Department of Sociology, Wayne State University, Detroit, MI, USA e-mail: kearabetswem@wayne.edu

Department of Leadership and Transformation, University of South Africa, Muckleneuk Campus, Pretoria, South Africa

P. Rugunanan, N. Xulu-Gama (eds.), *Migration in Southern Africa*, IMISCOE Research Series, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-92114-9\_10

receive(d) remittances from labour-migrant family members (Mokoene & Khunou, 2019; Yao & Treiman, 2011). But not all families have the positive experience when it comes to receiving remittances from their migrant labourers, as it is the case in this study's migrant families. Also, in Mokoene's (2017) study, (2019) these young migrant women were mothers to young children. Thus, one of the costs of migration to these households is the creation of parental absence (Mokoene & Khunou, 2019), and in particular maternal absence. These absences have a negative impact when those left behind are unable to provide appropriate care because of continuing experiences of poverty. The migration of these young women to cities for work evokes the signifcance of familial relationships, in particular the signifcance of the grandmother in migrants' households (Mokoene, 2017).

Research on social security has rightfully noted that grandmothers play an important role in families as they continue to provide fnancial support and care for young children who, in most cases, are left in their custody by migrant mothers and fathers (Makiwane, 2014). With regard to grandmothers, research notes that the old age grant (OAG) and chronic illness grant (CIG) facilitate their ability to provide for children left behind by migrant parents. Studies further highlight fact that the child support grant (CSG) also facilitates the ability of young mothers to migrate to fnd suitable employment (Wright et al., 2014). The role of the CSG in the lives of mothers and families is captured in detail by Wright et al. (2014), who indicate that, although the CSG is seen as providing various protections for the child, it also invariably protects recipients' dignity. One of the ways it enhances recipients' dignity is through the possibilities it provides regarding their endeavours to fnd employment.

This chapter, therefore, intends to illustrate that the social security system, as in the CSG and the OAG, are signifcant for maintaining familial relationships and facilitating the development and work-seeking possibilities of young migrant mothers. The chapter also makes the argument for a reconsidering of comprehensive social security with a call for a rethinking of the basic income grant (BIG) and the provision of a comprehensive social security system for the support of the vulnerable, in this case young South African mothers who migrate for purposes of fnding work. To illustrate the signifcance of social security and the need to enhance the current notion of a comprehensive social security system, the fndings are presented in four sections: (1) unemployment and internal labour migration; (2) how the roles and responsibilities in households of labour migrants are reconstituted and grandmothers signifed; (3) the role of social grants in labour migrant households; (4) whether South Africa's comprehensive social security is really comprehensive. These sections are preceded by a brief review of the literature and a brief methodological section that foregrounds broader discussions of gender, social grants and migration in the chapter. The data for this chapter was drawn from a bigger study which focused on internal labour migration and its impact on households left behind.

### **10.2 Gender, Skills and Migration**

One of the biggest challenges experienced in rural areas and semi-urban areas is the availability of appropriate employment for residents. Another important challenge in these areas and in South Africa generally has been the provision of skills for its young people (Kane-Berman, 2013). Research on skills and young people in South Africa illustrates that the education and skills levels of job seekers under the age of 35 are not high enough to meet the current skills requirements of employers (Yu et al., 2016). According to the South African National Youth Policy 2015–2020, young people are defned as people who fall within the age group of 14 to 35 years. In this study, the young women, as described by the families they left behind were above 18 years old and below 35.

The majority of the South African population which should be economically active – that is, aged between 15 and 64 years – are either unemployed or not in permanent employment, and are mostly located in the rural areas and in poor provinces; North West province has been identifed as one of them (Mosoetsa, 2011: 4; see also Statistics SA 2014). The youth desk also argues that the skills pipeline is riddled with obstacles that undermine equitable access to opportunities in the labour market; thus unemployment rates among South African youth are extremely high not only by global standards but also by those of sub-Saharan Africa (Kane-Berman, 2015: 1). Furthermore, Statistics South Africa's Quarterly Labour Force Survey for the second quarter of 2014 found that unemployment rates were higher among younger people, and notably higher among Africans and women (Kane-Berman, 2015: 9). Using a stricter defnition, unemployment among individuals of working age who were born after 1994 (aged 15 to 24 years at the time of the survey) was running at 53% at that time and, among women in that age group, at 61% (Statistics South Africa, 2014).

As a result of skills challenges and high unemployment, especially for young women, internal labour migration for African women is steadily increasing (Posel, 2004). The increase in migration for work purposes happens in a context where women are said to experience poverty disproportionately and are increasingly seen as heads of households (Chant, 2006). The deepening of poverty experienced by women stems from the historically gendered nature of access to resources and opportunities. Chant (2003) further indicates that the feminisation of poverty is also seen in the disproportionate tendency for women to occupy informal, low paying positions. The feminisation of poverty resulting from the gendering of means also implicates the reach of the South African social security system.

The new generation of internal migrants continue to emerge from geographical areas that historically depended on the mining migrant labour system due to lack of skills, challenges with access to higher education, lack of training opportunities for youth, unemployment and poverty (Ngonini, 2007; Ramphele, 1993; Webster et al., 1997; Wolpe, 1972). Even with the improvement in the welfare system, poverty in rural areas remains high. Poverty affects access to education, skills and other life chances. According to Kane-Berman (2015: 13), levels of education and skills have a material impact on job prospects. With the rise of unemployment, more and more young skilled and unskilled women are migrating to the big cities, leaving their young children behind with their aged parents. The question raised in this chapter, then, is how those left behind make ends meet when income from the migrant does not reach them.

### **10.3 Methodology**

The study informing this chapter was based on a review of literature and interviews with 13 individuals from 11 households with migrants. Of these households, fve indicated that the migrants in their households were young women who had left children behind with grandmothers and other family members. This chapter focuses on the experiences of the fve households with young women migrants who left children behind.

The study used a qualitative approach and in-depth interviews. The data was collected between March and April 2016 in Madibeng in the North West province. Madibeng is a local municipality that comprises 43 villages, 9000 farm portions and the small towns of Brits, Hartebeespoor and Skeerpoort. Its location is roughly 40 km from Pretoria, 55 km from Johannesburg and 50 km from Rustenburg. Because of its proximity to bigger towns and the city, and its history of internal labour migration, Madibeng was an appropriate site for accessing internal-labourmigrant households. Three of Madibeng's villages were selected for the study – Oskraal, Rabokala and Madinyane – as well as one semi-urban area named Letlhabile. The interviews lasted between an hour and an hour and a half. They were conducted in Setswana and then translated into English by the frst author during transcribing (Mokoene, 2017). Once translation and transcription were completed, the interviews were transcribed in detail before analysis started.

The data was then analysed through thematic content analysis, as described by Smith et al. (2014): the transcripts were read and reread to identify emergent themes. However, as indicated by Bazeley (2009: 6), thematic content analysis is not only about themes. The analysis process also involves "a more comprehensive model of what [we] have found, that is an attempt to illustrate how themes relate to each other".

The study received ethical clearance from the University of Johannesburg's Humanities Research Ethics Committee. The study methodology is discussed in more detail in Mokoene (2017).

### **10.4 Unemployment and Internal Labour Migration**

Households that participated in this study had labour migrants because they were unable to fnd employment in their home town or closer to their households. The majority of these labour migrants were reported to be unskilled with low levels of education, some with only grade 121 as their highest qualifcation. Thus, the unavailability of either skilled or unskilled employment opportunities in Madibeng was the main reason for increasing internal labour migration in the area. For example, Tshenolo, one of the mothers left behind by a labour migrant, shared that her daughter obtained a grade 12 certifcate as her highest level of education. When asked about her daughter's employment, Tshenolo had this to say:

The time she had a baby she was not working. Only after my sister's child came to fetch her and took her with to Johannesburg to help her look for a job at Wimpy… she works there now. (Interview, Tshenolo, 2016)

On the national scale, according to the 2016 frst quarter Labour Force Survey (Statistics South Africa, 2016: iv), the unemployment of South Africans who are of a working age was reported to have increased for the period January to March 2016 and stood at 26.7%. In the same breath, there are reports that employment in both the formal and informal sectors decreased from 44.2% in the last quarter of 2015 to 43.0% during the frst quarter of 2016. This speaks directly to the lack of employment for these labour migrants in the cities. During the interviews with participating households, it was established that the majority of the labour migrants who had left home to seek employment in Gauteng had not confrmed whether they were employed or not. The majority of these households are characterised by young labour migrant women who are between the ages of 18 and 35.

Further, Statistics SA (2016: x) illustrates that the Gauteng province was among the seven provinces which was hit by unemployment increases and a decrease in employment opportunities for both informal and formal sectors. This is a clear indicator of the challenges young migrants face when they arrive in Johannesburg. Dinah is a mother to a young woman aged 32, who left two young children with her when she migrated to Johannesburg to look for employment. Dinah shared the following about her daughter's employment:

I don't know where she is working or whether she found employment or not. I don't even know where she is currently staying because when she left here, she was going to join her friend who was already in Johannesburg and try and look for work while there. (Interview, Dinah, 2016)

Dinah's daughter, like the other young women interviewed for this study, is a descendant of labour migrants. She, like Dinah, grew up in the then rural reserves, and thus did not have access to education and skills to allow her to fnd work easily in the city. This predicament impacts directly on whether labour migrants get employment when they get to the cities and on the kind of employment they get; added to their lack of skill is the growing national unemployment rate. Meanwhile these labour migrants have no choice but to stick it out in the city because back at home there are no prospects of employment. According to Dinah, even though her daughter left intending to look for work, nothing shows her that she has found work. She said the following about her daughter's whereabouts:

<sup>1</sup>Ten years of schooling rather than the 12 years considered as completing school.

A friend of hers from here at home who lives in Johannesburg invited her to come and join her to look for work instead of just sitting here at home. She has not informed me that she has a job, but I heard from her friend's mother that they get piece jobs from time to time. The problem is that she has not said anything to me; therefore, I don't know what is happening. I am in the dark and we need her assistance, especially with food. (Interview, Dinah, 2016)

The fact that Dinah daughter is reported to be doing piece jobs in the city suggests to her mother that she should be helping with food. However, from existing research, it is known that piece jobs do not allow one to make enough money to support two households. One of the central tenets of apartheid engineering was the deliberate under-skilling and under-education of black youth in general and specifcally of rural-based youth (Marias, 2011: 331). The democratic South African government's attempts to provide better education have not impacted on the rural areas positively, as there are still a lot of access challenges as a result of the multi-faceted nature of the socio-economic challenges. This lack of impact is echoed by business and trade unions, as they voice their desire for a more utilitarian education system that produces marketable skills that will feed into the economy and reduce unemployment (Marias, 2011). Education is more widely available in the democratic South Africa, but the quality of schooling is poor, and also the level and variety of skills being taught is low, thus perpetuating youth unemployment and reduced access to the mainstream economy. Meanwhile, glaring racial and gender polarisation persist in the schooling system. For example, in poorly resourced, mainly African schools, female learners consistently perform worse than their male counterparts (Marias, 2011: 326).

### **10.5 Grandmothers in the Context of Young Migrant Mothers**

Living arrangements in African households have often been fuid and characterised by spatial mobility of domestic units over annual cycles, especially during the apartheid period (Townsend et al., 2002: 215). This has been because of historical longterm economic insecurity, employment instability and land dispossession that added migration for wage labour to the picture (Townsend et al., 2002: 215). The extended family structure of these households facilitated and made migration possible. African families have never distinguished between nuclear and extended families; thus, in rural African communities, two to three generations can be found living in the same household (Amoateng & Kalule-Sabiti, 2008: 76). This was true in households that participated in the study informing this chapter.

Another possible contributing factor to multigenerational households could be that the female labour migrants from this study were between the ages of 18 and 35 and unmarried, and the majority of them had children. These households were characterised by frst, second and third generations. Therefore, migration is made possible by the fact that there are caregivers who can take care of their children. Ipeleng said the following on household membership:

I have four children and six grandchildren. The frst daughter is the one that is working, so here at home I live with my other two daughters, my last-born son and my grandchildren. (Interview, Ipeleng, 2016)

Ipeleng had three generations in her household. Although this situation makes migration for young mothers possible as it allows a familial safety net for the children left behind, research has found that, with regard to the sharing of scarce resources, it leads to complications (Mosoetsa, 2011). Again, the challenge experienced in these households is the shift of care-giving responsibility for the children left behind, and how these children experience the absence of their biological parent.

Lulama, another grandmother left with young children, also mentioned that she stays with her granddaughter while her daughter is working in Kuruman, and her grandson joins them on weekends and school holidays. Tshenolo, on the other hand, said:

I stay with my granddaughter while her mother is in Johannesburg for work. My mother also stays with us, so I take care of both of them. (Interview, Tshenolo, 2016)

For Dinah, the biggest challenge is that she is forced to take care of her grandchildren without their mother's assistance. She said:

I have not received any money from her since she left here to go look for work. I am not sure if she is working or not. But what confuses me is, as a mother, does she ever think about the survival of her children? (Interview, Dinah 2016)

Grandmothers play an important role in the internal labour migration process which involves young mothers having to migrate to go look for employment. These young labour migrants are able to migrate with the knowledge that there is support from their mothers and siblings to care for their children. This puts pressure on the unemployed, under-resourced and, in some instances, chronically ill grandmothers to provide for their grandchildren. Although these grandmothers facilitate mobility for their daughters, it does not bring the expected rewards as the young migrants struggle to fnd suitable work. Again, the grandmothers are negatively affected in cases where they have to care for these children without fnancial and familial support from their migrant daughters.

### **10.6 The Social Role of Social Grants in Labour Migrant Households**

The CSG is highly contested in rural labour migrant households which participated in this study. The study found that the CSG is regarded by rural households as a family income, as money for the upkeep of children but also as a fund to sustain labour migrants as they seek employment in cities. The majority of the heads of labour migrant households reported that the labour migrants, who are mothers, regard the CSG as their own, meaning that it is a fund that can facilitate their ability to fnd work and also to distribute to their households. On the other hand, the heads of the households, who are caregivers of young migrants' children, were strong in their views that the CSG should be their responsibility to collect and distribute in accordance with the needs of the household and the children. Moreover, the children also demanded the grant, claiming that it is theirs.

According to the Department of Social Development (DSD), the CSG is paid to the primary caregiver, who must be sixteen years or older, to provide for the child's basic needs. The Social Assistance Act of 2004 also states that the primary caregiver of the child should be responsible for collecting the grant and ensuring that it benefts the child as required by the law, meaning that the grant must follow the child where he or she is based. There is, however, a misalignment, because the CSG does not necessarily follow the child, as it is mostly used as a family grant (Wright et al., 2014). In the case of this study, the CSG was used as a survival strategy for young mothers in the cities. The DSD has also argued that social welfare plays an important role in the alleviation of poverty for children, women, the elderly, people with disabilities and their families (Manicom & Pillay, 2003: 94). The key fnding of this study is that the CSG is highly contested by three parties: the heads of the households, the young labour migrant mothers, and their older children who strongly believe that the grant is theirs to manage.

For example, Ipeleng, who is looking after her labour migrant daughter's children, gave details as to who gets the CSG and how it is used in their household:

All my grandchildren receive the child grant. So, the two mothers who are unemployed use the grant as their income. But from time to time they contribute towards the household's monthly groceries. But previously the eldest sister who is working used to keep the grant to herself, then she would meet with her eldest son in town every month end to buy and send him with some goods. Even that was not consistent. I used to ask her how she thinks we are surviving and what her children are eating. I even threatened to report her to the social workers. (Interview, Ipeleng, 2016)

In Ipeleng's household, the labour migrant is the only one working. The entire household survives mainly through Ipeleng's chronic illness grant and a minimal contribution from the CSG. Her other daughters are unemployed and have no skills or higher education. According to Ipeleng, her labour migrant daughter collects and keeps the CSG meant for her three children, then only sends monthly groceries home. To Ipeleng this was not enough, all the more so because her daughter does not live with them; therefore she does not comprehend the suffering that the household goes through to survive. Now, after her mother threatened to involve the social workers, the labour migrant has given the responsibility of collecting the grant to her children. Ipeleng shared the following:


Ipeleng also said that she has since decided to take a step back and not be part of the CSG fght anymore because of fear of her grandson, who has since become aggressive when it comes to matters concerning his grant. She also presents herself as being sympathetic and understanding towards her grandson, as, she added, her grandson is older now and he requires enough food, and that because of his fastgrowing pace there's often a need to replace clothes and shoes. Ipeleng also added that the money is meant for him in any case; that is why she has taken the resolution to abstain from that struggle.

Lulama, Tshenolo and Dinah also alluded to the same experience of being left behind with their grandchildren but without the CSG that is supposed to ease the fnancial burden of taking care of the children. But, interestingly, they were also conficted as they acknowledged that their daughters also needed the money to survive in the city as they are looking for employment, and for those who are employed, the money assists them in addition to the little money they make. This sentiment is an acknowledgement of the reality that migrant labour, lack of skill and the types of labour available do not pay enough for the young labour migrant to remit; instead, she needs the CSG for her upkeep in the city.

Evidence derived from this study shows that the CSG represents a crucial fnancial resource. The social grants are a signifcant fnancial resource that most young unemployed women in rural South Africa use (Compion & Cook, 2006: 99). But the assumption made by the DSD is that the grant should be an addition to existing income. This assumption does not make sense in cases where options for another income are unavailable. The households that participated in this study are evidence that the CSG is, at times, the only household income.

The "existing income" in the cases of households which participated in the study included CIG, OAG, the CSG and piece jobs. For instance, Lulama looks after two toddlers from the neighbourhood during the day while the young mothers are at work. This gives Lulama extra income as she is not a pensioner yet. Tshenolo is in the same boat as Lulama: she is unemployed and too young to receive the OAG; thus she relies on her mother's OAG to provide for her and her grandchild. Ipeleng relies on her CIG to take care of her unemployed children and grandchildren. She augments it with the little bits she occasionally gets from her unemployed daughters who get the CSG. The question that becomes signifcant here is whether the comprehensive social security system is really comprehensive.

### **10.7 Is SA's Comprehensive Social Security Really Comprehensive?**

The fndings presented above suggest that young women without skills and proper jobs are not adequately covered by the social security system. As a result, we ask: What would it mean to have a wide-ranging social security system? Research on children indicates that a lot of children live in poor-income households (Hall and Sambu cited in Delany et al., 2016), and when this is coupled with the vulnerable position of women and young women, in particular, it is important to consider alternative ways of support apart from the CSG. This is because, even though the CSG is useful for improving the position of children and families, it is usually contested as its uses range across providing the needs of the child and those of the family and those of mothers who are looking for employment.

On the same note, it has been suggested that, given the signifcant role of the CSG in improving children's well-being, there might be a need to increase the amount of the grant (Delany et al., 2016). Although this call is commendable and supported, the increase of the CSG will not cater for the particular needs of young people, especially those of young mothers who migrate to cities for work. We would therefore like to put on the table the issue of the provision of a comprehensive social security system. This idea was put forward after 1994 in the form of the Basic Income Grant (BIG). In the early 2000s, through the initiative of labour movements, the notion of the BIG was introduced, discussed and thrown out. What is at stake here is the fact that young people are left out of the economy due to poverty and lack of skills.

The notion of the youth grant is a noble one; like the BIG it acknowledges those who are not covered by the current social security system. The challenge, though, is how it will improve access to skills and jobs. Research on social grants indicates that those accessing the grants want jobs, as there is dignity in work. The recent calls for decolonisation also indicate the need for interlinked interventions for the well-being of the youth. This would include free access to higher education, protection of families through the provision of a family grant, improvement in how the skills fund operates, and most importantly the protection of young women from the vulnerabilities that are a result of the "feminisation of poverty" and its predecessor, the "feminisation of migration".

### **10.8 Conclusion**

Youth unemployment has to be one of the biggest challenges that affect mostly the poor. To add to the problem, those who exit secondary education and cannot afford tertiary education are not in a position to easily get employment and thus they are unable to sustain themselves and their families; they end up underemployed while some resort to informal employment. In South Africa, the sight of a graduate looking for a job on the street corner is becoming a familiar sight due to rising unemployment. This problem impacts directly on the South African social security system. According to this study, the CSG has become the most targeted as it is easily accessible to the young mothers who migrate to cities to look for employment.

The CSG helps these mothers in the city, as some struggle to fnd employment. Since these young labour migrant mothers are unskilled, there is a heavy reliance on the CSG because employment is not easy to fnd, and those who do fnd employment may earn only enough to sustain themselves in the city and not enough to remit money back home. Thus the CSG becomes a reliable income to help them and at other times to assist the family back home.

Thus, the question of whether the South African "comprehensive" social security is really comprehensive becomes a signifcant one. This study challenges the current social security policies. A lot of research done on the CSG concedes that this grant is income for households, while for some it is the only income. According to this study's fndings, the CSG facilitates migration for the young mothers of the recipients. This leaves the children who the money was meant for economically and socially vulnerable. It also opens up the conversation around the BIG and youth grants concerning other processes of empowering the youth. This chapter concludes by arguing that, even though the employment of the youth is signifcant, it is important to think about the kinds of jobs they enter into and how these help them to contribute to their own development and the development of their families and communities.

### **References**


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### **Chapter 11 Conceptualising Second Generation Immigrants in South Africa: The Experiences of Nigerian Second Generation Immigrants**

**Chioma Joyce Onukogu**

### **11.1 Introduction**

Immigration to South Africa accelerated after the collapse of apartheid in 1994. Since then, many migrants from African countries arrived for the purposes of seeking a better life in the country (Ogujiuba et al., 2019). Some of them arrived with young children and some have had children in the country after arrival. While most studies (Mahati, 2015; Palmary, 2009) have focused on the experiences and rights of children who cross borders from neighbouring countries to South Africa as refugee and unaccompanied migrant children, very few studies have been done on children who are born in the country to immigrants (second generation). As such, there is limited understanding about this group of children in the South African context.

Some scholars writing about the second generation in the Global South have drawn their understanding of the term from a body of literature emanating from the Global North (Montero-Sieburth, 2018; Onukogu, 2018; Bartlett, 2012). Very little by way of conceptualising the second generation from a Global South perspective has been done. Rather, what exists is a wealth of research on refugee and migrant children (Anderson et al., 2017; Mahati, 2015; CERT, 2012). The few studies on the second generation have often adopted the defnitions generated by American demographers and researchers based on western immigration laws and integration policies. Among United States of America (US) demographers for instance, second generation refers to US-born children whose parents immigrated to the United States (Suarez-Orosco et al., 2016). Crul et al. (2012) used the term to refer to children born in European countries to immigrants. Understanding second generation in the above sense indicates that they are second generation by virtue of *their being born in the host country*, and are therefore not regarded as immigrants. However, researchers such as Rumbaut (2004) and Zhou (1997) extended the term to include

C. J. Onukogu (\*)

Department of Sociology, University of Johannesburg, Johannesburg, South Africa

<sup>©</sup> The Author(s) 2022 153

P. Rugunanan, N. Xulu-Gama (eds.), *Migration in Southern Africa*, IMISCOE Research Series, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-92114-9\_11

children of immigrants who were born in the host country and *foreign-born children who migrated with their parents at an early age*. The latter defnition highlights the importance of age or life stage at migration in understanding second generation immigrants.

This chapter will contribute to the literature on second generation immigrants in the Global South by taking into consideration the migration laws and the peculiar circumstances of immigrants and their offspring in the South African context. In South Africa, children of immigrants are called different things such as migrant children, refugee children (Anderson et al., 2017; UNICEF, 2016; CERT, 2012), or, generally, immigrant children (IOM, 2011). No attempt has been made at a conceptualisation of second generation from the place of birth or age at migration in the South African context. Generally, there is a lumping together of all children of migration into one category called migrant children (CERT, 2012; Vandeyar & Vandeyar, 2011; Osman, 2009). This chapter aims to conceptualise second generation from a South African context. It will refer to the South African Citizenship Act and use experiences of children born to Nigerian immigrants to develop a typology of South African second generation immigrants.

The subsequent sections will discuss the extant literature on the defnitions and experiences of immigrant children in South Africa. This is followed by an overview of the South African Citizenship Act as the context for the development of a South African perspective of second generation immigrants. The methodology is followed by the fndings and discussion. The chapter closes with the observation that the South African second generation is much more than the US demographer's defnition (US-born children of immigrants). A conceptualisation of South African second generation includes a wide range of children of immigrants delineated by their place of birth, age at migration, immigration status and access to citizenship rights.

### **11.2 Immigrant Children**

In South Africa, a child is any person between the ages of 0 and 18 years (RSA, 1996a). The same defnition is affrmed in the United Nations Convention on the Right of the Child (UN, 1989). Worldwide, about 31 million children have been estimated to embark on migration. The record shows that the number of children younger than 20 years of age who engaged in migration fell from 15% in 2013 to 14% in 2017 (UN, 2017; UNICEF, 2017). An estimated 10 million of these children across the globe are irregular, displaced and refugee children (UNICEF, 2017). The UNHCR's recent report, *Desperate Journeys* (UNHCR, 2019a)*,* notes that about 80,800 people feeing wars, terrorism, natural disasters, hunger and poverty from countries such as Afghanistan and Syria arrived in Europe by the Mediterranean route between January and September 2018. More than one quarter of this number were children travelling alone and unaccompanied by parents or adult family members (UNHCR, 2019b). In South Africa, the Save the Children/UNICEF programme assists and provides shelter for hundreds of unaccompanied migrant children at the border town of Musina, most of whom are from Zimbabwe (UNICEF, 2016).

To conceptualise second generation in the Global South context, a clear distinction has to be made between different categories of immigrant children. Refugee children are children who were forced to leave their normal places of residence to move to another area (within or across borders) with or without their parents or an adult family member as a result of conficts, natural disasters, or terrorism (IOM, 2011). The refugee children, like all refugees, are protected by the 1951 Convention relating to the status of refugees. Most recently, the New York Declaration for Refugees and Migrants (UN, 2016) recognises the need to protect those individuals who would not ordinarily fall under the strict defnitions of the 1951 Refugee Convention.

Migrant children, on the other hand, are not necessarily affected by wars and conficts. They constitute the group of children who migrate with parents or adult family members (Anderson et al., 2017; CERT, 2012). Some of them take the decision to cross the border to run away from hunger and poverty (UNICEF, 2016). This latter group are also called "independent migrant children" (Mahati, 2015: 1). Another group of migrant children are those who have been traffcked or lured into moving by criminal elements for the purposes of exploitation (UN, 2016; De Sas Kropiwnicki, 2010). Because migrant children often cross the border alone or with traffckers, they are mostly irregular and vulnerable to abuse and child labour, and are exposed to disease, poverty and all manner of discrimination and hardships intransit and in the host country (Mahati, 2015; Health and Development Africa, 2011). The rights of all children, irrespective of place of residence, are protected by the United Nations' Convention on the Rights of the Child (UNCRC) (UN, 1989).

The UNCRC requires state parties to follow the principles of non-discrimination (Article 2) in matters concerning children, migrant or non-migrant. For instance, the rights of all children to a primary and free education is specifed in Article 28 of the UNCRC. In line with this requirement, Section 28 of Chapter 2 (the Bill of Rights) of the South African constitution (Act No. 108 of 1996) provides for the protection of children's rights. Chapter 2, Section 29 (1) of the constitution states that "everyone has the right to a basic education, including adult education" (RSA, 1996a). This provision is affrmed in Chapter 2 (5) of the South African Schools Act No. 84 of 1996, which states that "a public school must admit learners and serve their educational requirements without unfairly discriminating in any way" (RSA, 1996b).

Earlier studies in South Africa (CERT, 2012; Palmary, 2009) found evidence of institutional abuse of the rights and privileges of refugee children to schooling, social and health services. These fndings were supported by later studies (Anderson et al., 2017; Mahati, 2015) which found that many of the children faced structural discrimination from the host country in the form of arrest, detention, abuse, denial of school enrolment and proper documentation. It has also been established that they experience bullying, teasing and name calling from their local peers at school and in the host communities (Vandeyar & Vandeyar, 2011; Osman, 2009). These studies failed to take cognisance of the fact that some of the children were born in the country, and some came with their migrant parents as infants or in their early

childhood. This latter group of children is widely referred to in the literature as second generation (Rumbaut, 2004; Zhou, 1997).

The few researchers (Montero-Sieburth, 2018; Onukogu, 2018; Bartlett, 2012) who have focused on second generation children in South Africa and in the Global South have often borrowed the defnitions of second generation used in the Global North (Rumbaut, 2004; Zhou, 1997). Prominent among them is Rumbaut's (2004) typology, defned according to place of birth, age and life stage at migration. The frst generation immigrants, classifed by Rumbaut (2004) as the 1.0 generation, are the foreign-born who migrated to a new country as adults. Examples are parents who take the frst decision to move for specifc reasons or adult children who migrate with or without their parents. Rumbaut classifed children born in the host country as the 2.0 generation. The 2.0 generations are also referred to as the "true secondgenerations" (Zhou, 1997: 65). In the US, the 2.0 generations are US citizens by virtue of their being born in the country, irrespective of the parents' immigration status. This is because America practises the *jus soli* system of citizenship. The *jus soli* system grants automatic citizenship by place of birth to children born to immigrants in the US (Bloemraad & Graauw, 2011: 32). *Jus soli* (right of soil in Latin) is different from *jus sanguinis* (right of blood), which follows a parent-child derivative citizenship status (Collins, 2014: 2182), as practised in some European countries such as Germany.

Rumbaut (2004) classifed another group of second generation as the 1.75 generations. These are children of immigrants who arrived in the host country with their parents as infants (ages 0–4). The 1.75 are similar to the 2.0 in characteristics such as experience, schooling, language, accent and culture. The main difference is that they are foreign-born and the 2.0 are not. Other classifcations of foreign-born immigrants who arrived at later ages are 1.5 (later than age 4 but before adolescence) and 1.25 who arrived before adulthood (ages 13–17). The 1.5 and 1.25 generations are distinct from the 2.0 generations (true second generations) and the 1.75 because they acquired distinct language and cultural characteristics of their native country before arrival. Through the process of socialisation in the new environment, they become bicultural – retaining aspects of the old culture and acquiring aspects of the new culture (Zhou, 1997). The 1.5 and 1.25 in the classifcation do not qualify to be called frst generations because they arrived with their parents as children (see RSA, 1996a; UN, 1989). However, like the 1.75, they are foreign-born second generations and do not have the same rights in America as the 2.0 generations, who are American citizens. They have to undergo an immigration process to acquire citizenship or regularise their stay in US. Like migrant and refugee children, they fall into the "vulnerable" group, and in some societies are faced with a number of risk factors such as exclusive policies, abuse, violation of their rights, language diffculties, and racial and ethnic discrimination (Capps et al., 2016).

While the defnitions of second generation used in the Global North provide a starting point for understanding the concept of second generations, the South African context-specifc conceptualisation of second generations in this chapter takes into consideration the country's immigration laws and Citizenship Act and the peculiar circumstances of immigrant children in South Africa.

### **11.3 The South African Context**

The understanding of second generation in the South African context in this chapter is derived from the South African Citizenship Act No. 17 of 2010 (RSA, 2013). The act highlights who, when and how of citizenship acquisition by immigrant children. The different ways of acquiring citizenship specifed in the act include citizenship by birth (Chapter 2, Section 3) and citizenship by naturalisation (Chapter 2, Section 4). In Chapter 2, Section 3(1a), citizenship by birth applies to "any person who immediately prior to the date of commencement of the South African Citizenship Amendment Act, 2010, was a South African citizen by birth". Also, "any person who is born in or outside the Republic, one of his or her parents, at the time of his or her birth, being a South African citizen, shall be a South African citizen by birth [(Chapter 2, Section, (1b)]".

Chapter 2, Section 3 (2), states that, "Any person born in the Republic of parents who have been admitted into the Republic for permanent residence and who is not a South African citizen, qualifes to be a South African citizen by birth, if – (a) he or she has lived in the Republic from the date of his or her birth to the date of becoming a major; and (b) his or her birth is registered in the Republic in accordance with the Births and Deaths Registration Act, 1992 (Act 51 of 1992). [S 2 subs by s 2 of Act 17 of 2010.]".

On citizenship by naturalisation, Chapter 2, Section 4 (2) states: "Any child born in the Republic of parents who are not South African citizens or who have not been admitted into the Republic for permanent residence qualifes to apply for South African citizenship upon becoming a major if – (a) he or she has lived in the Republic from the date of his or her birth to the date of becoming a major; and (b) his or her birth has been registered in accordance with the provisions of the Births and Deaths Registration Act, 1992 (Act 51 of 1992). [S 4 am by s 3 of Act 69 of 1997; subs by s 4 of Act 17 of 2010]".

### **11.4 A South African Perspective of Second Generation Immigrants**

Considering the South African Citizenship Act No. 17 of 2010 (RSA, 2013), two groups of Rumbaut's 2.0 second-generations can be identifed. The frst group are those born to naturalised residents or to one foreign-born parent. This group of children are South African citizens by birth and have an advantageous position at birth with regard to rights vis-à-vis their counterparts born to temporary, permanentresident or undocumented immigrants (see Chapter 2, Section 3(1a) of the Citizenship Act). They are similar to the 2.0 second-generation in the US who enjoy full American citizenship because of the *jus soli* system of citizenship. The second group are those born in the country to permanent, temporary or undocumented residents. These are non-citizens, or immigrants in the South African context. As

non-citizens, they have limited socio-economic, political, and educational rights, like their counterparts born outside the country (Rumbaut's 1.75, 1.5. and 1.25). Their access to rights changes when they turn 18 and are granted citizenship by birth if born to permanent residents (RSA, 2013: Chapter 2, Section 3 (2a; b)) or by naturalisation if born to temporary residents (RSA, 2013: Chapter 2, Section 4 (2a; b)). Applicable to the foreign-born children who migrated with their parents as temporary or permanent residents is Chapter 2, Section 5 of the act. Upon application for naturalisation by either their parents or when they become adults, this group of children will be issued a certifcate of naturalisation (refer to the Citizenship Act No. 17 of 2010 for details).

It is understood from the provisions of the South African Citizenship Act above that an immigrant parent's citizenship or migration status at the time of a child's birth determines whether the child is a South African citizen or not. Citizenship at birth is differentiated by the type of birth certifcate that is issued to the child. Children born to undocumented or temporary-resident immigrants receive a notice of birth flled in in black ink on form DHA B1-24, as opposed to the computer generated unabridged birth certifcate with national identifcation number.

Using place of birth, the Citizenship Act reveals that both those born as citizens or non-citizens are 2.0 second-generations in Rumbaut's sense. But the second group (children born to temporary residents) differs in immigration status and access to rights and privileges from the frst group (children born to permanent residents or naturalised residents). Generally, the South African second generations are different from refugee and migrant children by virtue of being born in the host country or having accompanied parents as young children. Unlike refugee children, they are not protected by the United Nations' Refugee Act of 1951. They are a distinct group of immigrant children whose rights are defned by the societal context they fnd themselves.

To understand the experiences of second generation in South Africa, the chapter draws from research on the identity and integration of second generation children of Nigerian immigrants living in Johannesburg. This is one of the few studies in South Africa that excluded independent migrant and refugee children.

### **11.5 Methodology**

The study site was Johannesburg, the economic hub of South Africa. Johannesburg, known as the City of Gold, was established after the discovery of gold in the Witwatersrand in 1886. Since then, the city has grown into a metropolis and the largest city in South Africa. Johannesburg is the provincial capital of the Gauteng province and destination for migrants from Africa and across the globe because of its rich economic, political and cultural activities (Nuttall & Mbembe, 2008). The study adopted a qualitative semi-structured interview method. Participants were recruited from three different ethnicities of Nigeria (Igbos, Yoruba and Orogbo) through snowball sampling (Edwards & Holland, 2013) from initial contacts made with friends and leaders of migrant ethnic associations. The main participants were grouped into four categories: second generation immigrants, parents, teachers and peers. A ffth group, comprising one representative from the Johannesburg Migrant Desk, was added to represent the state.

The second generation immigrants are called primary participants and the rest secondary participants. The main criteria for recruiting the second generation immigrants were as follows; they had to be children born to voluntary or economic migrants from Nigeria and not refugees or independent migrant children (Mahati, 2015); they were either born in South Africa, or foreign-born who arrived with one or both parents before they started primary school – that is, 2.0 and 1.75 generations respectively, according to Rumbaut (2004). They included boys and girls between the ages of 11 and 14 who were either in primary or high school. The total number of all participants was 38. The secondary participants allowed the researcher to triangulate the responses of the ten primary participants. The in-depth interviews of all the participants were carried out over a period of 1 year.

Ethical values for doing research with children were observed by frst obtaining ethical clearance from the Faculty of Humanities Ethics Committee of the University of Johannesburg. Participant information sheets explaining the objectives of the study and the participants' rights were given to all the participants. Since the primary participants were less than 18 years of age, the consent of the parents was sought frst before the children were approached for their assent. Interviews were conducted in safe environments after the researcher had taken time to explain their right to voluntary participation, confdentiality and anonymity. A distress protocol was in place for psychological interventions in case any child showed sign of emotional distress during the interview.

The data was analysed using thematic interpretive analysis. For this chapter, the primary participants (second generation immigrants) were grouped according to gender, place of birth, age at migration, immigration status, grade at school and type of school as well as experience at school. The responses were then analysed and interpreted. Only pseudonyms are used to represent the participants.

### **11.6 Findings**

In this section, only the research questions and responses from the primary participants with regard to place of birth, age at migration, immigration/citizenship status and experiences at school are used. Overall, fve boys and fve girls aged 11–14 were interviewed.

### *11.6.1 South African Second Generations by Place of Birth*

The participants were asked: "Where were you born?"

The responses revealed that Chinyere (female, 12, grade 7), Ike (male, 11, grade 6), Ibe (male, 13, grade 8), Ijere (male, 12, grade 8) and Oka (male, 14, grade 9) were born in South Africa. Those born outside South Africa are Biola (female, 12, grade 6), born in Atlanta, Georgia, US, while the rest – Stella (female, 13, grade 7), Cynthia (female 11, grade 6), Nnamdi (male, 12, grade 5) and Ego (female 13, grade 8) – were born in Nigeria.

Place of birth determines whether one is classifed as 2.0 (Rumbaut, 2004) – according to Zhou (1997), true second generation. It also determines access to socio-economic, educational, and political rights in the host country (Suarez-Orosco et al., 2016). The fnding shows that, going by the defnitions of the American demographers and Crul et al. (2012), only Chinyere, Ike, Ibe, Ijere and Oka, who were born in South Africa, are second generations, and the rest are immigrants. However, being born in South Africa is not likely to grant them automatic citizenship rights like their American born counterparts. All the foreign-born immigrants who came before starting formal schooling are 1.75 second-generations in Rumbaut's (2004) classifcation.

### *11.6.2 Classifying Second Generation Immigrants by Age at Migration*

The foreign-born participants were asked: "At what age did you migrate to South Africa?"

Biola, who was born in the US, arrived at the age of three with her mother and two siblings. Stella came at the age of 4. Cynthia, who is Stella's younger sister, was 2 years old when they came with their mother. Nnamdi arrived at the age of 6 with his mother and a younger brother. Ego came at the age of 6 with her mother and three older siblings. All the children except Biola came to join their fathers, who were already in South Africa. Biola, Stella and Cynthia started preschool in South Africa and Nnamdi and Ego, who arrived at age 6, started grade R, the grade before primary school. Although the age at migration for all the children born outside South Africa classifes them as 1.75 generation (Rumbaut, 2004), they also fall under Zhou's (1997) true second generation. They all started formal schooling in South Africa, and are likely to acquire the linguistic, educational, behavioural and cultural characteristics of the host country like their counterparts who are South African born. Age at migration also determines whether a foreign-born immigrant is classifed as second generation or frst generation (Rumbaut, 2004; Zhou, 1997). The foreign-born immigrants in the study are second generations going by their ages at migration.

### *11.6.3 Positioning South African Second Generations by Immigration Status*

In order to fnd out the current immigration statuses of the participants, they were asked: "What type of documentation do you have?"

Chinyere currently has permanent residence status through her parents, but at the time of her birth, her parents had a temporary residence permit. As such, she had to take up the parents' citizenship at birth. The fact that the child born to temporary residents takes up the parents' citizenship indicates that an aspect of the *jus sanguinis* system (Collins, 2014: 2182) is found in the South African system. However, the South African Citizenship Act specifes that Chinyere can apply for South African citizenship by naturalisation if she continues to live in the country until age 18 (see Chapter 2, Section 4 (2a; b) of the Citizenship Act No. 17 of 2010 (RSA, 2013). The same applies to Ijere and Oka, who were born to temporary resident parents who have become permanent residents. Ike and Ibe were also born as temporary residents but have acquired citizenship by naturalisation after their parents acquired the certifcate of naturalisation.

Although being born in South Africa makes these children 2.0 or true second generation in the American or European sense (Rumbaut, 2004; Zhou, 1997), they are regarded as foreigners or immigrants at birth. They will remain foreigners with limited rights and privileges until they turn 18, when they can apply for South African citizenship by naturalisation and not by birth. Their situation is not different from that of Biola who has South African permanent residence status. Biola was born to a US temporary resident, but she is a US citizen in the *jus soli* system, unlike her counterparts, born in South Africa. The fnding shows that, at the time of the interview, the children born in South Africa to Nigerian immigrants do not have the same immigration status. Ike and Ibe are already South African citizens, while the rest have become permanent residents. The common ground is that they all depended upon their parent's immigration status. All those born in Nigeria before migrating to South Africa will also follow their parents' immigration status or take an individual route to citizenship when they become adults (Citizenship Act No. 17 of 2010, Chapter 2 Section 5).

### **11.7 Experiencing South African Schools as Second-Generation Immigrants**

The fndings reveal both positive and negative experiences at school among the Nigerian second generation immigrants interviewed. The experiences were similar for all the children in different schools.

### *11.7.1 Bullying*

The bullying experienced by the children was revealed when they responded to the question, "Have you been bullied at school?" Chinyere said, "Bullying is not good. I have not experienced physical bullying but mental abuse…They say 'You are a Nigerian, what gives you the right to do that at school?'…" Biola responded, "Every single day from grade two to grade fve… They say I have germs, when I touch anybody, they will start wiping their body, because am a Nigerian... don't play with her, she is a Nigerian."

Chinyere's and Biola's experiences of bullying show that, irrespective of where one is born or grew up, a second generation is always identifed by the parent's nationality. As such, acquiring the country's citizenship may not stop their peers from treating them differently. The experience of bullying among immigrant children has been noted in earlier studies (Mendez et al., 2016; Vandeyar & Vandeyar, 2011; Osman, 2009).

### *11.7.2 Perception of the School Environment*

In spite of the negative experiences of bullying from their peers, the children have a positive attitude towards their school and their teachers. Evidence of experience of equal treatment from teachers and an inclusive school environment is found in the response to the question, "How do you see your school?" Chinyere said, "I love my school" and Nnamdi said, "I feel that I am appreciated in that school." To the question, "How do your teachers treat you?" both Stella and Cynthia replied, "Our teacher is kind; we are all treated equally by our teacher." By treating the children equally, the school and the teachers adhere to the United Nations' provision on the rights of the child as well as the South African Schools Act, which both specify the right of the child not to be discriminated against, exploited or abused.

On the down side, fndings reported in previous studies (Bartlett, 2012; Crush & Tawodzera, 2011) confrm institutional abuse of the rights of children to education. Two of the participants (Stella and Nnamdi) also experienced denial of access to school at different times. Nnamdi was forced to register in a private school after he was denied enrolment in a public school. According to his mother, "I had to enrol my children in a private school because they refused to accept them in public school because they have no legal permit." A follow-up revealed that Stella lost the frst term of high school until she had produced a study permit. The evidence of a positive attitude towards their schools and teachers shows that once admitted, the children are treated equally at school.

A further indication of positive experiences at school was found in the network of friendship the children have established. Stella said, *"*I have many friends. Some of my friends are Taiwanese and South Africans. I have this one South African friend who says I am her only family, because I am always good to her. I make her

wipe her tears; I take her to the bathroom to wash her face." Chinyere said, "Most of my friends at school are South Africans, Congolese, Ethiopians and Angolans… The entire school is my friend." The ability to create and maintain a network of friends from different nationalities points to the individual characteristics of the children in navigating their school environment. The network of friends maintained by the second generations in this chapter contrasts with research by Ozdemir et al. (2018) and Plenty and Jonsson (2017), who found that children of international migrants experienced social isolation and rejection by their Swedish peers.

Participation in school sports also provided an opportunity for intercultural exchange with their peers. When asked "What sport do you play at school?" Biola replied, "I play tennis and netball at school." Ike said, "I play soccer at school … I was the captain for two times", and Chinyere responded, "I play different sports. I run, play basketball and tennis." The school provided the multicultural space and enabling environment for the children to harness their talents through sports and to use their personal characteristics to build friendships with children from different nationalities. The bullying and teasing experiences were counteracted not only by the individual's positive self-identity but also by the inclusive school environment and positive teacher attitude.

### **11.8 Discussion**

A South African perspective on second generation immigrants, based on the country's immigration law and Citizenship Act, is the main contribution of this chapter. It draws from the experiences of Nigerian second generation to highlight the unique nature of South African second generation immigrants. The chapter reveals that, while the term second generation may be used in both the West and the Global South, it should be defned according to each country's citizenship and immigration processes. This is echoed in the fnding that the 2.0 generation (Rumbaut, 2004) and the concept of the "true second-generation" (Zhou, 1997), widely used in the literature, do not entirely accommodate the different groups of second generations found in South Africa. The 2.0 generation in the US context is a US-born citizen with equal rights and privileges under the *jus soli* system of citizenship. By contrast, a South African-born 2.0 generation may be born a citizen or a non-citizen (foreigner) depending on the parent's immigration or citizenship status at the time of his or her birth. A child born under the parent's temporary or permanent residence status will have to wait until 18 years of age before applying for citizenship by naturalisation or by birth. This means that, from the time of his or her birth, until the time the naturalisation process is through, he or she is a foreigner with limited access to education, social welfare, economic opportunities and political rights (Palmary, 2009). The question is, can South Africa be said to practise a *jus sanguinis* system instead?

The answer is yes and no. Yes, because South Africa recognises citizenship by descent for children born to one parent who is a South African citizen (RSA, 2013: Chapter 2, Section, (1b)). No, because, in the strict *jus sanguinis* system, there is no

option of citizenship by birthplace for children of immigrants (Collins, 2014: 2182). Since the Citizenship Act No. 17 of 2010 gives children born in South Africa to temporary and permanent residents the opportunity to become South African citizens later in life, what exists in this instance is what I call a *"*delayed *jus soli* system*"* and a *"*temporary *jus sanguinis* system." The Citizenship Act is not clear on what happens to children born to undocumented parents. A South African concept of second generation in this chapter is one that takes into consideration the place of birth, age at migration, parent's immigration status at the time of the child's birth and the process of acquiring citizenship. Their unique characteristics set them apart from second generations in the US with regard to access to citizenship and socioeconomic, educational and political rights.

South African second generations face educational, socioeconomic, and political integration challenges as a result of the country's process of acquiring citizenship by naturalisation. There is evidence (Broughton, 2020; Meyer, 2020) that those who qualify for citizenship by naturalisation at the age of 18 if born to temporary residents, as stipulated in the Citizenship Act Chapter 2, Section 4 (2a; b) (RSA, 2013) are blatantly refused by the Department of Home Affairs (DHA). This is indicated in several court cases involving the DHA and those who have been disqualifed from applying (Broughton, 2020; Meyer, 2020). In most of the hearings, the cases have been decided in favour of the children and in all the cases, the DHA had failed to heed the court decisions but instead continued to institute objections to the rulings (Broughton, 2020). An example is the ruling by the Constitutional Court (the highest court of the land) which overturned the objections of DHA to the ruling by two separate high courts in favour of fve claimants represented by the Legal Resources Centre. In the ruling, the Minister of Home Affairs was instructed to accept the applications for citizenship of the fve claimants and make decisions within 10 days (Meyer, 2020). To date, there has been no information about the department's compliance with the Constitutional Court's ruling. Instead, more and more second generations who qualify to apply for citizenship are denied the opportunity to apply on the grounds that their parents do not have current legal permits, and with the DHA claiming that there are no such forms available to cater for this category of second generation (Broughton, 2020). On the other hand, those who already have permanent residence and are considered for application often face delays in approval of their citizenship, with a lot depending on how a particular offcer handling the application understands and interprets the act in terms of an individual case. A follow up shows that Chinyere, who already had a permanent residence permit, applied for citizenship in 2020 after turning 18 years old, but has not received any response from the department of Home Affairs more than one year later.

The denial of citizenship application or delay in the approval of citizenship for the second generation immigrants has educational, employment and political implications. Educationally, it means that the children will have to obtain study permits to pursue higher education as international students, and those of them from low income families may have to stay at home because they are not able to access the free education available to South African citizens from poor households (NSFAS, the National Student Financial Aid Scheme). At the same time, they will not be able

to secure employment as the employment act specifes that South African citizens should be prioritised before non-citizens (RSA, 2014). South African citizens are identifed by the possession of a 13-digit barcoded identity document, and unless a second generation gets this document upon naturalisation, he or she remains a foreigner with no right to jobs, free education, or bursaries or political participation.

Denial of access to schooling, as reported in this chapter, amplifes the challenges that second generations face in accessing education even at primary or secondary school levels. Stella had to obtain a study permit to be enrolled in a high school. Nnamdi needed some kind of legal documentation to be enrolled in a public school. Stella and Nnamdi's experiences are similar to that of the child of a Rwandan asylum seeker who was refused enrolment without a study permit by the Western Cape Metro North Education District (Washinyira & Groundup, 2020). Like those who were denied applications for naturalisation, cases of denial of school enrolment to undocumented children that were brought to court have been decided in favour of the children. Yet, reports of instances where some schools have failed to comply for lack of proper communication from the Department of Education exist (Washinyira, 2020). In the Gauteng province, for instance, school principals complained that the department of education is insisting that all learners must be properly documented before registration. Proper documentation in this case is presentation of a study permit which many families are unable to get (Washinyira & Groundup, 2020). While the schools could be said to adhere to the institutional requirements for enrolment in schools by demanding legal documents, at the same time, the rights of the children to education as specifed in the United Nations' Convention on the Rights of the Child (UN, 1989) and the South African constitution (RSA, 1996a) were violated. However, the children's reports of kindness and equal treatment from their teachers shows that the schools observed the children's right to equality, respect and dignity (RSA, 1996a) once they were admitted. The schools also provided spaces for intercultural exchanges through friendship networks and participation in school sports. Overall, the bullying experiences from the peers were neutralised by the positive atmosphere of the schools.

### **11.9 Conclusion**

The chapter has conceptualised second generation in the South African context using the country's Citizenship Act No. 17 of 2010. Reference to the act highlights the unique characteristics and conditions of different groups of children born to immigrants. Whether or not one is a true second generation in the US sense depends on the parent's immigration status at the time of the child's birth. This chapter observes that South African second generation is not a uniform group, and as such, no single defnition can accommodate all of them. A conceptualisation of South African second generation should take into consideration the place of birth, age at migration and parents' immigration status at the time of birth as well as the child's access to rights and privileges. While the Citizenship Act grants every second

generation born in the country the opportunity to become a South African citizen at some point in time, obtaining South African citizenship is a mammoth task for most second generations, the implication of which is continued inequality in education, employment and political participation, especially for children from poor immigrant homes, vis-à-vis their South African citizen counterparts.

The chapter recommends that, to avoid a chain of generational inequality and poverty in immigrant families, migration destinations in the global south should consider the *jus soli* system which grants children of immigrants citizenship by birthplace irrespective of the parents' immigration status, and easy access to the host's education, employment and political opportunities. Also, future research on the life courses and experiences of the different categories of second generations should be conducted to understand how they are able to navigate the challenges of acquiring the host's citizenship as well as their socioeconomic, educational and political participation.

### **References**


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### **Chapter 12 Experiences of Mozambican Migrant Children in Bushbuckridge, Mpumalanga, South Africa**

**Betty Chiyangwa and Pragna Rugunanan**

### **12.1 Introduction**

Bushbuckridge District is situated within Mpumalanga province, located on the northeastern side of South Africa, 100 km from the Mozambican border. It is home to frst-generation Shangaan-speaking Mozambicans who settled in the then Gazankulu (a former apartheid homeland, now part of Mpumalanga) between 1970 and 1980. Statistics South Africa (2015: 40) estimates that 200,000 out of 320,000 of the frst generation of Mozambican migrants, who fed persecution and the RENAMO (Mozambican National Resistance) civil war in Mozambique, settled in South Africa. Bushbuckridge District is particularly signifcant in migration studies because the majority of the population is foreign-born (Polzer Ngwato, 2012). Statistics SA (2015: 14) shows that, of the current population of Bushbuckridge, numbering 546,215 people, approximately 60% originated in Mozambique. These Mozambican families "self-settled" permanently in Bushbuckridge (Polzer, 2004: 4) and gave birth to second-generation migrants. These are individuals born in a host country to at least one migrant parent. Mpumalanga province is one of the poorest and most marginal areas of South Africa, with the second-highest offcial unemployment rate at 56% (Statistics SA, 2015).

The site of this research is Hluvukani village, a former refugee area during the apartheid era (Polzer Ngwato, 2012), located in the rural areas of Bushbuckridge. It is home to a majority of Mozambican children of school-going age, the subject of this study (Chiyangwa, 2018). The village is one the poorest in Bushbuckridge, where people compete for limited resources such as food, health care, water and educational support structures (Buffelshoek Trust Website, 2014). Nevertheless, for Mozambican migrant families, the situation is particularly dire because of additional societal and structural barriers attributed to the discrimination and

B. Chiyangwa (\*) · P. Rugunanan

Department of Sociology, University of Johannesburg, Johannesburg, South Africa e-mail: prugunanan@uj.ac.za

<sup>©</sup> The Author(s) 2022 169

P. Rugunanan, N. Xulu-Gama (eds.), *Migration in Southern Africa*, IMISCOE Research Series, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-92114-9\_12

xenophobic attitudes experienced (Chiyangwa, 2018; Machava, 2005), resulting in non-nationals being unable to access social services such as education, despite it being acknowledged as a fundamental human right. Migrant children, together with their caregivers,1 have to overcome multiple barriers encountered whilst living in socio-economically poor rural areas.

This chapter departs from the norm in South African migration studies by drawing attention to a neglected research area, that of second-generation migrant children. It answers the question: How do migrant children employ agency in fulflling their educational needs, overcoming barriers concerning access to education? The research contributes to the literature on migrant children in South Africa by examining their agency when accessing education. For migrant children, agency is demonstrated regardless of the challenges brought by the underprivileged context they experience and the power structures that present them with multiple vulnerabilities (Bandura, 2006). This chapter summarises the literature on second generation Mozambicans residing in Bushbuckridge. A discussion on relational theory in understanding the experiences of children is followed by the methodology. The fndings expand on participants' challenges and their agentic responses in navigating such diffculties. The chapter concludes by demonstrating the participants' capabilities as social agents.

### **12.2 Literature Review**

Access to education is valuable for the development of societies and as a tool for curbing inequalities (Carabott, 2018). The United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child (UNCRC, 1989) categorically states that education is a human right for all (United Nations, 1949). The South African Human Rights Commission (SAHRC) specifes the nation's commitments towards upholding human rights and access to education. The SAHRC stipulates the state's obligations to ensure access to education in the "4A" legal framework: availability, accessibility, acceptability and adaptability. Availability speaks of what should be legally, institutionally, and structurally in place for children to access education. Accessibility pertains to non-discriminatory forms of education that allow school-going children, particularly marginalised children, to enrol, attend and complete their education. Acceptability is the quality of learning (for example, content being taught), while adaptability concerns the fexibility of learning institutions for meeting the specifc and unique needs of children (Proudlock, 2014: 102).

Chapter 2 of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa (Act 108 of 1996) is the Bill of Rights, which emphasises the rights to equality. The Bill of Rights is the central legal framework governing the right to education in South Africa and emphasises the rights of children to access education. It encourages the South

<sup>1</sup>Adults who have custody of a child or children, who can be biological parents or not.

African government to cooperate with non-governmental organisations (NGOs) in providing basic education for all (Chapter 2 Section 29: 1–4 of the Bill of Rights). Although the SAHRC (1996) and the Bill of Rights focus on the right to education for children, migrant children are not explicitly provided for, exposing them to different kinds of structural vulnerabilities. Killander (2019) argues that, by denying migrant children access to education, South Africa violates its international obligations such as agreed in the United Nations Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights.

Globally, migrant children face enormous challenges in host societies when trying to access education. For instance, refugee children are fve times less likely to access education than the global average (Sobane et al., 2018: 6). A 2016 UNCRC report shows that approximately 3.7 million of the 6 million school-age children under the UNCRC mandate have no access to school. Mainly, they struggle to access education due to challenges with proper documentation (UNICEF, 2003; Bartlett, 2015). Migrant children in South Africa (particularly second generation), are regarded as foreign nationals who should retain the citizenship of their parents and must apply for appropriate visas to access basic social services such as education, health care, foster grants and child support grants (Immigration Act 13 of 2002). One possible visa option for a child born to migrant caregivers in South Africa is to acquire the accompanying dependent visa or permanent resident visa. The latter is on the basis that either of the migrant caregivers gets South African citizenship since they are non-South Africans. These children can apply for a relative visa. Upon reaching 18 years of age, the children are granted the right to apply for South African citizenship on the basis that they have ordinarily been residents of South Africa for those 18 years (Immigration Act 13 of 2002).

Migrant families face considerable diffculty obtaining identity documents, permanent residence permits or dependant visas. This leaves many migrant children without proper documentation ("irregular") and unable to access education (Bartlett, 2015). The South African education system is fairly reluctant to incorporate undocumented migrant children, especially in rural areas where access to resources is limited (Makgate, 2013). The International Organisation for Migration (2019) acknowledges the challenges of implementing policies for migrant children. In some parts of South Africa, documented or undocumented, migrant children are turned away from public schools and experience xenophobia (UNESCO, 2018), making them vulnerable to human rights abuses.

Irrespective of the developed-and-developing-countries binary, migrant children are exposed to racial discrimination, poverty and poor nutrition, since they tend to be concentrated in poor residential areas (Bartlett, 2015). In developing countries such as South Africa, research on migrant children's access to education refects their problems underpinned by lack of fnances (Palmary, 2009). Nonetheless, they often outperform their local counterparts in school (Tienda & Haskins, 2011).

In navigating some of the challenges to accessing education, Bandura (2006) shows that migrant children employ agency as individuals, in groups, or through peers, demonstrating that they are social actors in their own right. Even in hostile situations such as wars and abusive circumstances, children can be active survivors rather than victims of their situations (Honwana, 2005; Punch, 2002), or make decisions to join support groups in schools (Manzoni & Rolfe, 2019). This chapter closes a gap in the narrative on migrant children, which normally presents them as passive recipients of circumstances (Hendrick, 2015), to present a perspective that views them as capable social beings who can use agency in navigating daily challenges.

### **12.3 Theoretical Framework**

Relational theory is a philosophical approach that gives importance to the relational nature of experiences (Huijsmans et al., 2014). People in society are motivated by the need for relations and are active participants in shaping their own experiences. Through the lens of relational theory, the reality is understood by interpreting the existing nature of things through their relatedness while acknowledging that experiences are not isolated. The theory is valuable in migration studies in analysing children's development since it exposes the connection of interrelated forms of development in migration processes. Relational theory is adopted in migration studies that focus on children because of its ability to view children as "social actors" who are infuenced by and are infuential on the structures and organisation of their societies (Huijsmans et al., 2014: 45).

This study applies to Huijsmans et al.'s (2014) approach, taking into account the confuence of context, power, agency or structure and barriers in shaping one's experience. Migrant children in rural areas face challenges in accessing education because of caregiver migration and their foreign status.

Agency is the ability of an actor (or actors) to make purposeful choices and is determined by an individual's assets (social, psychological and collective assets). Samman and Santos (2009) show that agency is multidimensional and can be exercised in different societal structures, domains and levels. The "duality of structure" states that the formulation of structures can be both enabling and constraining to human development (Giddens, 1984). This chapter seeks to understand the constraining factors that inhibit migrants' children's access to social services. The ability of these children to infuence their situations is therefore discussed with their varying levels of agency.

### **12.4 Methodology**

This study utilised a qualitative approach to understanding the experiences of Mozambican migrant children in accessing education. This methodology allowed the researcher to engage with, talk with, listen to and interact with the participants, thus helping in understanding and interrogating the topic from the participants' perspectives (Babbie, 2012). The chapter forms part of a broader Master's dissertation

conducted with a sample inclusive of 24 migrant children, their caregivers, organisational staff and other key informants on the subject. Upon reviewing the documents of the Buffelshoek Trust2 and for this chapter, a sample of one primary and one secondary school – those with the highest numbers of Mozambican children enrolled at the time of the study – was purposively selected from Hluvukani village. Permission was granted by the headmaster of each school to choose fve Mozambican migrant children, based on specifc criteria, from the school's database. These children were fve boys and fve girls in grades 6–12, 13–18 years old and born to former refugee Mozambican parents in South Africa. Face-to-face, semi-structured interviews were conducted with each participant. The focal participants were children, a vulnerable group, which meant that obtaining permission from the university ethics committee was necessary, and, in 2015, ethical clearance was granted. Their participation was vital, and hence child-centred research techniques such as story writing, drawings, mingle gaming, guessing gaming and mapping exercises were employed to enhance participation. In the broader study, additional focus-group interviews were conducted with caregivers of the migrant children interviewed. Written consent was obtained from participants through signing consent forms after a detailed verbal discussion of the research purpose.

Among the key questions asked were the following: (i) Explain why you think it's important for you to go to school; (ii) What challenges at home, school or community are blocking you from attending school regularly? (iii) How do you overcome the challenges you experience? All interviews were recorded for analysis, with the participants' permission.

A thematic analysis was used to analyse the qualitative data (Babbie, 2012). Data was analysed through the themes of agency, structure, context and barriers, generated from the relational theory. In the thematic analysis, the researchers followed Taylor-Powell and Renner's (2003: 5) fve-step guidelines for getting to know your research material, focusing on the analysis, information categorising, identifying connections among categories and information consolidation. The researchers were aware of the biases and problems associated with a single data collection method, and thus data triangulation was used to enhance the validity and reliability of this research. Primary data was gathered from interviews and focus group discussions with participants, while secondary information for triangulation was gathered through reports, articles and programme documents. Informed by the constructs of relational theory (context, power and structure) in determining participants' agency to respond to their daily challenges, this research ensured that the information presented refects participants' viewpoints.

<sup>2</sup>This was an NGO that worked in Bushbuckridge with the mandate "Education for all".

### **12.5 Results and Discussion**

Although non-generalisable, the experiences of migrant children in accessing education are indicative of a complex relationship amongst the concepts of value, barriers and agency. Access to education for participants in this study was laden with obstacles presented by institutional and social structures. In refusing to accept practices that stigmatise and undermine them, such as mistreatment at school, participants showed that they exercised agency in navigating challenges they faced while accessing education.

### *12.5.1 Understanding the Value of Education*

The participants' responses refected their understanding of the value and benefts of receiving an education. From their perspective, education is a meaningful tool capable of positively transforming one's future and able to nurture children into becoming responsible adults who are independent (fnancially and socially) and can contribute to their families and society. Lida,3 a 15-year-old girl, wrote in her worksheet: "… I want to study for a degree in medicine and help my parents. I will take my family to stay at the home that I would have built-in town". Thabiso, a 14-yearold boy, also narrates:

I have to go to school and get my matric certifcate to get a place to study further at a university. I know that if I am not educated, I will struggle to get a job that can pay good money. My wish is to become a teacher. End of every month when I get my salary, I want to help my two little sisters so that they can learn in good schools.

These fndings are similar to those of Wenxin (2013: 55), who states that education is a "crucial vehicle by which economically and socially marginalised children and adults can lift themselves from poverty and be able to obtain the means to participate fully in their communities". The participants from this study see themselves as having the capacity to act or to infuence their society, thus indicating agency and the desire to make a difference to household income and the well-being of their families. In narrating the value of education, participants also emphasised the need for food, school clothing, and parental care in infuencing the overall development of children. Accessing education without support for these basic needs is diffcult for migrant families, especially when high poverty and poor socio-economic conditions threaten their wellbeing (Buffelshoek Trust Website, 2014). Language barriers and weak psychosocial support at home were found to add to their problems.

Rabia, a 14-year-old girl, stated:

I wish my father could help me with my schoolwork. Sometimes I do not understand the words that my teacher use[s] in class. Especially when its examination time, I feel that I am

<sup>3</sup>Names used are pseudonyms.

alone and maybe it will be better if I stop going to school. … I know that I will have a brighter future if I pass.

The participant's response refects self-motivation and understanding of the importance of education. These fndings are similar to those of Samman and Santos (2009: 4), who show that children demonstrate resilience because they are aware of the possibilities of improved employment prospects when they are educated.

Crush and Tawodzera (2014) draw attention to the lack of psychosocial support and its impact on the wellbeing of migrant children. Thabiso, a 14-year-old boy, shared: "I grew up without my parents, there was no one to take care of me until, recently, my aunt took me into her house. Thinking of my past makes me feel neglected. It disturbs me from focusing well at school."

His response shows the need for psychosocial support. Unathi, a 14-year-old girl, also emphasised the need for psychosocial support when she says, "I come from a very large family and it is a problem for granny to always give us full attention. We are many and she is the only parent, we fght for her attention" Unathi found comfort and support from friends and members of the community whom she could confde in. She wrote, "I thank God for my two friends. We play and work together, we are like family. She always support[s] me and encourage[s] me to complete my secondary school and go to college." Friends and social network support systems played a role in providing some form of psychosocial support for participants in this study.

The Regional Psychosocial Support Initiative (REPSSI, 2015) states that the provision of psychosocial support – psychological, social, environmental or spiritual – is benefcial to one's well-being. Despite South Africa's obligation to make education available and accessible for all, migrant children who participated in this study in Bushbuckridge painted a different picture as they had experiences of structural and societal barriers.

### *12.5.2 Participants' Challenges in Accessing Education*

The participants refected on their problems with accessing social services meant for migrant children. They reported negative experiences around their status as second-generation migrants in South Africa. The structural barriers include the Department of Social Development (DSD), the Department of Home Affairs (DHA), and their policies. The institutional structures (such as the DSD, Child Support Grant, and public health care) were reported as inaccessible by participants. Yet organisations such as UNICEF (2003) emphasise that children in rural areas rely on social services for survival.

Asasia, a 13-year-old girl from a child-headed family,4 relayed some of the diffculties she encountered with the DSD: "I recently visited the DSD in Hluvukani because I wanted them to help me with taking care of my younger siblings while I

<sup>4</sup>A family where someone younger than 18 years became the head of the household.

was at school, but there was no help. I was told to go from one offce to the other without any meaningful help. I left and never went back." The majority of the participants confessed that they had no identity documents and this deterred them from approaching the DSD during times of need. Shelton, an 18-year-old boy, narrates his challenges with the DHA:

When I started school at this primary, the principal wanted a birth certifcate but my parents failed to get one at the Home Affairs because they feared [they would] be turned away since they did not have proper documents. I was born in South Africa but I struggle to get an identity document. Our neighbours, who are South Africans and have South African identities, ended up adopting me and they helped me to get a birth certifcate that I am using now. The birth certifcate has the neighbours' surname, not my own.

Similarly, Lwandile, a 14-year-old boy, together with his parents who possessed refugee permits during the time of the study, were entitled to access the child support grants and health care assistance, but offcials failed to recognise their refugee permits.

The cases of Asasia, Shelton and Lwandile refect some of the diffculties that participants faced in rural Bushbuckridge. The DSD (2015) states that the role and responsibility of the DSD are to uphold the well-being and protection of children's and families' rights. Such rights encompass protection from maltreatment, neglect, abuse or degradation, and access to social services, family care or parental care. Even though the responsibility of the DSD is clear in policy, participants' experiences show a deviation in the implementation of these responsibilities.

Lida, a 15-year-old girl, described her challenges with securing identity documentation because her caregiver also failed to renew her own documentation. She explained that her caregiver was using an asylum permit5 since she came to South Africa; she was told that DHA no longer recognises such permits as they had expired. The participant further narrated that her mother failed to process her identity documents. A similar story about the DHA was also shared by two other participants. Even though the majority of the children interviewed were born in South Africa, they were not recognised as South African citizens and were expected to acquire appropriate legal documentation to access services from schools, clinics and social welfare institutions. Proudlock (2014) notes that children born in South Africa to undocumented parents are stateless, and hence constrained from accessing services, despite the policy specifcations of the Convention on the Rights of the Child 1989. Without proper identity documentation, migrant children face diffculty in accessing services.

In this study, the process of acquiring identity documents was a complex one for migrant children because most of them were dependent on their caregivers who were also are undocumented because they failed to secure proper documentation when they came to South Africa as refugees. The fndings show that the lack of proper documentation perpetuates generations of undocumented stateless people.

<sup>5</sup>A temporary permit valid for two years, given to an individual pending a decision after applying for refugee status.

Manjengenja (2014) concurs that migrant families and their children encounter administrative barriers when trying to acquire identity documents at the DHA, pointing to the lack of implementation of national policies.

The UNCRC (1989) specifes the care and protection of all children irrespective of their origin or documentation status. While protection and care are important for children, according to the South African Human Rights Commission, it is also important to have laws that specifcally cater for children of migrants as they grow into adulthood. There are no such provisions for migrant children born in South Africa and they "often fall under the radar as stateless children who later are bound to become discarded adults" (Magnus 2019).

Responses from some children suggest that they would like to strengthen their social relationships with other children at school and in the community to ease the social exclusions they face regularly. Elements of stigmatisation echoed in the low self-esteem prevalent among the children and negatively infuenced their educational performance. One of the children wrote, "… Sometimes others laugh at me in class and call me names like *mupoti*<sup>6</sup> especially when the teacher asks me a question and I do not know it. This is stressful and it makes me feel less of a human" (Mavie, a 16-year-old girl).

In addition to the structural barriers, the migrant children also shared their experiences of integrating into society, and the majority of them identifed barriers such as discrimination and bullying at school and diffcult living conditions in the home. Each of the children showed a level of agency in overcoming some of the barriers experienced.

### *12.5.3 Participants' Agency*

Agentic response is an important concept that entails one's capability to exercise control over one's context. Migrant children in this study were not mere recipients of circumstances; they presented themselves as capable of infuencing their surroundings. Similar to the rural migrant children in Punch's study (2002), participants employed mechanisms to mitigate the daily challenges of accessing education because they were active social members of the community they were living in. Traditional constructions of children largely perceive them as objects of situations; however, in some cases in this study, they were active subjects in infuencing their daily experiences.

**Direct Agency** Responses from the majority of the participants indicated that they often use direct agency at school. Asasia, a 13-year-old girl, explained that she reported the perpetrators whenever she was mistreated or called derogatory names at school. Another female participant explained that she negotiated chores with her family members at home as a way of mitigating time to focus on schoolwork at

<sup>6</sup>A degrading term used to refer to those of Mozambican origin.

home. She stated, "When my mother wants me to do the house chores and I have homework to do, I tell her nicely that my elder sister should assist her, and I cover up for her when I have submitted my homework." These responses show how children reset their boundaries in search of autonomy and dealing with circumstances at school or home. She did acknowledge that this was a stressful process because she was often labelled as a rude and rebellious child. It is important to understand that migrant children's attempts to realise their autonomy are not perceived as means of being resistant to adults but are emphasised as part of complex processes in exercising their direct agency when their behaviour is directed by their own goals and outcomes (Bandura, 2006: 164). In a similar vein, Alanen (2011) argues that the aim of children's negotiations is for them to gain control of their time and space and to shift unequal child-adult power relations.

Some participants indicated that it was challenging to navigate institutional barriers such as problems experienced with the DSD. One of the participants confessed that it was impermeable because he believed that he had less power to challenge institutional structures. Foucault (1982: 793) understood this as the "ambiguity of free choices" because children may have positively infuenced their immediate situations but some of their experiences related to the broader structures that frame their lives have left them with minimal choices. Without just complaining about their situations, most participants found comfort in acknowledging that they could take advantage of some areas such as fghting and negotiating discrimination and bullying at school.

**Proxy Agency** Participants responses show that the children also exercised proxy agency. This is when one chooses to exercise their agency through others (Bandura, 2006). Rabia (a 13-year-old girl) reported that: "If I am not able to talk to those who bully me, I nicely ask my friend to accompany me to report to the educators. It disturbs my mind when I am bullied but I know she is able to help me". Such proxy agency motivated the participants' efforts to complete their education. Rabia's response concurred with the majority of the participants' responses and demonstrated their resilience. Similar fndings by the Centre for Education Rights and Transformation (CERT, 2012) show that there is evidence of widespread xenophobic violence and abuse against migrant families and their children, which hinders their safety in schools, threatens unity and security among migrant families, and produces detrimental effects on migrant children's psychosocial development and integration into host societies.

The children reported that they were involved with non-governmental organisations which were able to assist them with some material support such as school uniforms, stationery and food parcels. Shelton, an 18-year-old boy, explained: "I knew there were a lot of organisations that were helping children in this community but I had to choose and associate myself with the one that was important to me – I needed food and school uniform the most." The majority of the children echoed that they were grateful for the support they received from Buffelshoek Trust and stated that it was making a signifcant difference in their educational lives.

In addressing the fnancial hardships at home, the teenage participants said they sought part-time work to assist their caregivers. They were engaged in work opportunities such as cleaning cars, assisting in shops, selling fruits or even cleaning their educators' houses at school or anywhere in the community to get money to contribute towards their schooling requirement. This demonstrates migrant children's agency as a means to minimise fnancial constraints. Lwandile, (a 14-year-old boy) wrote in his worksheet:

I was separated from my parents when I was starting grade 3 and until now I'm in grade 7 and I still do not stay with my parents. I have to decide what to eat and what I do to be able to go to school. My parents are hardly home – they work in the city – so they sent money for me and my younger brother to use at home.

His response refects his agency for minimising his reliance on his caregivers. The children, who stayed in a child-headed family of six, showed that migrant children were independent beings who, through their ability to make meaningful decisions and choices, allowed societies to reconstruct the notion of "traditionally seeing children as passive and dependent beings" (Wenxin, 2013: 46).

**Collective Agency** Despite direct and proxy agency, responses from migrant children in this study showed they also exercised collective agency. This is organised agency guided by collective intentions, resulting in enhanced collective effcacy (Bandura, 2006: 164). Collective agency was employed as a strategy to overcome structural and societal barriers in their access to education. Participants demonstrated collective agency by the way their households were situated in Hluvukani village. The village has specifcally demarcated areas where migrants are located, known as former refugee areas. One of the children acknowledged: "Though people from Mozambique are looked down upon in my community, I appreciate that all my neighbours are also from Mozambique, so we get along well and there is no one calling me names." Participants felt comfortable being in places with other migrants where living arrangements seemed not as discriminatory to the children.

Collective agency was also demonstrated through peer relations. Three children mentioned that they played with and shared ideas with other children at home and school. These informal interactions directly supported the children in building their social capital in the community. Foucault (1982) defnes social capital as the networks and associations in a society created by individuals to derive support in improving their well-being. The children emphasised that, through play and engagement with friends at school, they built trusting relationships that the children could draw upon during times of need. Given the responses from children, strengthening social capital was essential in minimising the emotional stress experienced by the children while accessing education.

Collective agency was also pronounced during examination time. The secondary school children would team up with other children in the neighborhood and help each other prepare for exams. In this way, they developed new friendships as a way of coping with emotional distress at school. As evidence, one of the children in the study stated:

I cannot imagine myself spending the whole day without talking to my friend. I like her so much; she is more than a sister to me. I talk to her when I am happy or even when I have problems. She always listens to me and encourages me to take my school serious. (Nasma, a 13-year-old girl)

Nasma's explanation suggests that migrant children in this study believe in collective agency and they consider each other as family, especially in times of need.

### **12.6 Conclusions and Recommendations**

This chapter is important because it demonstrates that interwoven structural and social factors in a rural context shaped the experiences of migrant children. Numerous challenges have created barriers in limiting equal access to education for the participants. The study brings attention to the nexus of migration and rural contexts; the relationality of second-generation migrants in rural spaces remains an under-researched area. South Africa is one of the top countries where migrants experience many negative attitudes when accessing social services (Manzoni & Rolfe, 2019). Access to education is arguably vital for eliminating poverty, fghting social exclusions and contributing to mending social disharmonies as stated in the 1960 UNESCO Convention Against Discrimination in Education. For migrant children, access to education is characterised by bullying and discrimination, and the most critical challenge is the access to legal identity documentation (Proudlock, 2014).

Through a relational theory, this chapter introduced a new perspective for viewing migrant children as agentic when facing adversity in rural Bushbuckridge. Being a rural migrant child has multiple constraints on accessing education, but evidence in this study shows that migrant children employ resilience and signifcant agency in overcoming daily hurdles in the form of direct, proxy or collective agency. Hence, they are seen as active contributors in shaping their own experiences (Wenxin, 2013: 46). Specifc contributions of this chapter are that migrant children face diffculties in all spheres of their educational lives, but their lives are also defned by resistance and, in this case, agentic response. As essential as it is for migrant children to be protected, it is also important to better enlighten them on how they can protect themselves through strengthening their resilience and self-effcacy. The migrant children need to be educated about the human rights they are entitled to. This study calls upon rural institutions such as tribal authorities to assist former refugees with supporting documents that they can submit to DHA. Relationally, the inability to meet these needs posed a threat and introduced intertwined social and structural barriers to migrant children's access to education, and in turn compromised participants' access to social services.

**Acknowledgements** Family's, colleagues' and supervisor's contributions are valued. Financial assistance from the National Research Foundation is equally acknowledged.

### **References**


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### **Part V Identity Politics in Migration Studies**

### **Chapter 13 The Role of Interpersonal Communication in Re-identity of Voluntary Economic Migrants Living in South Africa**

**Karabo Sitto**

### **13.1 Introduction**

Developed and developing nations compete for domination, offering individuals with skills opportunities for economic prosperity. South Africa has legislated critical skills required to grow the economy of which the country is in short supply. There is signifcant statistical evidence to support the positive correlation between the process of globalisation and international migration, most especially the voluntary movement of highly skilled individuals in the labour force away from countries of origin to destination countries.

The number of degreed, highly skilled migrants has risen exponentially in the last few decades when compared to low-skilled migrants, driven by increased global competitiveness for skills in the pursuit of world domination at a national and organisational level. These individuals are highly sought after, and thus presented with multiple choices for destination countries, making them highly mobile and frequent movers. In making their decision to migrate, voluntary economic migrants engage in interpersonal communication with their personal networks to test out their reasons for migration and choice of the destination country. Remaining in contact with their personal networks has been made easier as the growth of communication technologies has transformed the communicative process for individuals, enabling them to construct and maintain membership of personal networks in a transnational context.

Social representations held in their interpersonal communication signal the processes and outcomes of their settlement process of re-identity. This chapter focuses on the transnational interpersonal online/offine communication of voluntary economic migrants as an enabler and facilitator of migration intentions, moving and

K. Sitto (\*)

Department of Strategic Communication, Auckland Park Kingsway Campus, University of Johannesburg, Johannesburg, South Africa e-mail: ksitto@uj.ac.za

settlement. The system coupling outcomes of individual voluntary economic migrants, a highly mobile group, can signal how quickly they can achieve their migration objectives. System coupling1 outcomes provide an insight into understanding social representations that can infuence the decision-making process of voluntary migrants with respect to their length of stay in their destination country. The unsuccessful migration of voluntary economic migrant individuals is costly fnancially and socially on the destination country, and this research provides a lens through which individuals' challenges may be better understood by recruiting decision-makers.

The chapter begins by discussing the growth of voluntary economic migration, and the role of globalisation and interpersonal communication patterns in spurring the growth on. The South African context concerning the recruitment of skilled migrants is discussed, before examining the individual motivations of voluntary economic migrants for moving. The chapter highlights the confict created by the pressure faced by voluntary economic migrants to conserve and to change, through the acculturation process, with a resultant internal confict arising – that is, a schism. The implications of schism on individual identity are discussed, including the importance of stabilising it in order for individuals and destination countries to realise their respective migration objectives, which may not always be aligned. The process of re-identity and resultant system coupling outcomes are discussed in the context of the results of data collected from voluntary economic migrants living in Johannesburg and Cape Town. The chapter concludes by contextualising the importance of individual re-identity process outcomes for recruiting countries as a signal of the potential duration of stay of individual voluntary economic migrants and suggests a possible intervention by recruiting organisations/countries.

### **13.2 Literature Review**

The unsuccessful migration of highly skilled voluntary economic migrant individuals is costly fnancially and socially on the destination country, making it important for destination countries to understand individual motivations for the length of stay. Signifcant statistical evidence supports a positive relationship between the growth in the process of globalisation and exponential growth in international voluntary migration (Docquier & Rapoport, 2012). The migration of highly skilled individuals is on the rise, a key element of economic growth in countries (Bailey & Mulder, 2017). The biggest rise in migration has been that of voluntary economic migrants,2 who are also termed highly skilled individuals and self-initiating expatriates, although there has been no standardised term to refer to these individuals (Suutari

<sup>1</sup>One of three possible outcomes in relation to how voluntary economic migrants settle into their destination country, namely *reject* (fssion), or *blend* (integration) or *cling* (fusion).

<sup>2</sup>Voluntary economic migrants are defned for this study as individuals with some university education, who are highly skilled and have chosen to move for professional gain.

et al., 2018; Garcia-Rodriguez et al., 2015; Doherty, 2013). The migration of tertiary-educated individuals has been rising irrespective of global economic cycles (Garcia-Rodriguez et al., 2015). Kerr et al.'s (2016) study reports that the number of university-degreed migrants increased by nearly 130% from 1990 to 2010.

Governments and organisations engage in the global recruitment of individuals who are highly skilled experts, facilitating their easier mobility across borders (Shachar & Hirschl, 2013:75) compared to other types of migrants. This recruitment is bolstered by the help and word-of-mouth support of the personal networks of these individuals in those destination countries – that is, the network pull effects (Lemos & Portes, 2013:322). Voluntary economic migrants hold different personal networks globally as a result of their exposure through their education and professional lives (Garcia-Rodriguez et al., 2015).

Exceptionally talented individuals have the privilege of their citizenship being fast-tracked as countries compete to buy the talents of skilled migrants in a bid for countries to remain globally competitive (Shachar & Hirschl, 2013). In 2014, the South African Minister of Home Affairs introduced the critical skills visa (DHA, 2014) in an effort to address the widely reported critical skills shortage in South Africa. In 2003, South Africa launched its frst statistical report on migrants, which revealed the peak age of migrants being early thirties and the leading sources (sending areas) reported were Africa, the UK and the rest of Europe (Statistics South Africa, 2005). This report emphasised that, in documenting migrants in South Africa, the most important characteristics were age and occupation (Statistics SA, 2005:v). Migrants have become younger and more educated, have access to better information-gathering tools and resources, and are more open to taking risks than those that do not move (Bauernschuster et al., 2014). Migration is also a gendered process (Hoang, 2011), and overall, men are the ones most likely to migrate: men outweigh women in terms of global migration fgures (Bajt, 2016). Nevertheless there has been a surge in the role of women as a component of highly skilled migrants, with Africa and Asia having experienced the largest growth of highskilled female emigration (Kerr et al., 2016).

Most migrants in South Africa live in Gauteng, followed by the Western Cape (Meny-Gilbert & Chiumia, 2016), as these cities present most of the economic opportunities in the country. The source of migrants by country has remained largely the same, and in the most recent census in 2011 it was reported that three quarters of migrants in South Africa are African and largely from the Southern African Development Community (SADC) (Meny-Gilbert & Chiumia, 2016). The critical skills visa qualifcations were drawn up to include a broad list of categories (DHA, 2014) which aimed to attract voluntary economic migrants to bring their skills for the beneft of South Africa.

Migration is a wholly social process that involves multiple consultations and interpersonal interactions before individuals move (Hoang, 2011), even when it is voluntary economic migration. Migration is thus a diffcult decision to make (Harper & Zubida, 2016) because of the multiple people involved in making it. Individuals will test out their reasons for migration on those around them through interpersonal communication narratives and evaluate them based on the feedback they receive,

and this narrative development encourages their identity evolution (Conroy & O'Leary-Kelly, 2014). The communication goals of interpersonal relationships may be shaped by geographic distance, changing cognition and behaviour towards stabilising the relationship (Crystal Jiang & Hancock, 2013) through online platforms. Those individuals who decide to move away do so having analysed all the push and pull factors of both their current and desired locations before making their decision (Zhou, 2016).

In the majority of instances, the economic mobility of voluntary migrants is considered a precondition for being allowed into the destination country, with them receiving special advantages, such as permits and residency, as well as the prospect of gaining certain class and social positions in the destination country (Hayes, 2015). However, these advantages can be a source of disgruntlement for locals in their destination country, especially in developing countries. Without precise statistical information about migration, the lack of information may contribute to negative stereotypes held about migrants in South Africa (Meny-Gibert & Chiumia, 2016).

Voluntary economic migrants are held to certain standards by personal networks in their country of origin while simultaneously being questioned about their willingness to embrace and conform to their destination country, especially in the workplace (Power, 2008). During the moving process, voluntary migrants experience a sense of loss of themselves and need to work on fnding themselves anew within a short space of time to be successful. The loss experienced may be in the relationships with both their country of origin and their destination country, that is, they disassociate from who they were to build a new identity within their new country (Conroy & O'Leary-Kelly, 2014). Feelings of isolation are commonplace and individuals may draw closer to traditional communities when they feel a sense of loss of an integral way of life or position or image, such as masculinity, poverty in the new setting, and so on (Abdi, 2014).

Remaining connected to their network in their country of origin through online interpersonal communication has become easier for voluntary economic migrants due to the ubiquity and wide adoption of communication technologies (Crystal Jiang & Hancock, 2013; Watson et al., 2002). The participation of individuals in online interpersonal communication is infuenced by factors such as the individual's motivations for participation, their personality traits (Bazarova, 2015; Malinen, 2015) and their personal values linked to their cultures (Malinen, 2015). The convergence of mass and interpersonal communication has happened in different ways (Walther & Valkenburg, 2017). Social media is a merger of interpersonal and mass communication (Bazarova, 2015), allowing one to broadcast to an audience or communicate privately, as well as being able to choose to disclose differing levels of information. Advances in communication technologies have changed socialisation and given rise to social relations online where geographic closeness is no longer important and relationships have become more fexible (Basuki et al., 2015:246). Maintaining close relationships over long distances has become fairly common practice because of increased social mobility due to career pursuits and even migration, conducted through the adoption of communication technologies (Crystal Jiang & Hancock, 2013:556).

Globally, emphasis is placed on improving governance mechanisms to build a supportive environment where destination countries' systems are responsive to migration rather than seeking to control the movement of individuals (Hanefeld et al., 2017:2359). This responsiveness can only take place if individual voluntary economic migrants are understood, especially their motivations and process of settling in and renegotiating and reconstructing their sense of self in the destination country. This requires research and analysis of who they are, how they process the conditions in their destination country and social interactions arising from their process of settlement through their interpersonal communication and arising social representations.

### **13.3 Theoretical Framework**

Social representation theory, developed by Sergè Moscovici, focuses on processes of interpersonal communication (Breakwell, 1993) and is concerned with social reality, knowledge and symbols (Joffe, 2003:60). Interpersonal communication interactions can transform knowledge and facilitate building a shared understanding of the world (Ginges & Cairns, 2000:1347). Social representation theory helps provide tools for identifcation of social problems, as people move through different systems of relation (Bratu, 2014), observed through interpersonal, face-to-face, online, symbolic and other forms of communication. "Representations [are] rooted in language and culture because they are the work of collectivity, [and thus] cannot be entirely conscious" (Moscovici, 1993:40). People, as individuals and in social groupings, produce social representations through their interactions with others and interpersonal communication (Hoïjer, 2011).

Through their interpersonal communication with destination-country personal networks online prior to moving, individuals begin to imagine, by processing social representations, what their migrant life will be like, through the eyes of their personal network. This narrative development encourages "identity evolution" (Conroy & O'Leary-Kelly, 2014) in voluntary economic migrant individuals. The process of imagining social representations helps to transform unfamiliar representations into concrete common-sense realities (Jaspal et al., 2014) for individual voluntary economic migrants.

Voluntary economic migrants begin to experience the abstract more literally as their social representations meet those of their destination country in a process of acculturation. "Acculturation is the dual process of cultural and psychological change that takes place as a result of contact between two or more cultural groups and their individual members" (Berry, 2005:698). The meeting of these different representations causes voluntary economic migrants a schism, to conserve their identity and past experience or to transform. Both a cognitive and an interpersonal confict (schism) may arise because people do not concede when faced by someone with a different viewpoint or judgements, because they are afraid to lose face (Moscovici & Nève, 1971).

Voluntary economic migrants, upon migration, exist simultaneously in two places, experiencing transnational social felds (Yaylaci, 2015:247). The simultaneous transnational existence results in individuals experiencing a pull between the social representations of their destination country and those of the country of origin, that is, schism. Voluntary economic migrants' schism arises from socio-cultural pressures on their identity, from the transnational personal network members involved in their migration decision-making (Hoang, 2011). The arising disintegrative tendencies of schism threaten individual identity, where one struggles to perceive appropriate levels of socio-psychologically salient principles (Jaspal et al. 2014:120).

Unfortunately for many migrants, even more so for voluntary economic migrants, they are often lumped together into one undifferentiated group (Harper & Zubida, 2016) by those who interact with them in the destination country. They are frequently not considered as individuals each with their own unique identities, but grouped by their social category. Social categorisation theory described how individuals become representations of their group and this process generates stereotypes (Hogg & Reid, 2006). This phenomenon only increases the tension between voluntary economic migrants and the different destination societies they engage with and need to become part of to be successful in their migration intentions. The demand is for minorities to behave according to the social norms, but also to maintain being different (Moscovici, 2011:452) in destination countries.

These social struggles experienced by voluntary economic migrants are captured by the concept of schismogenesis, which is a process that is naturally borne out of human relationships and interactions (Morgan, 1981). Schismogenesis is defned by Bateson (1936:175, cited by Morgan, 1981:30) as "a process of differentiation in the norms of individual behaviour resulting from cumulative interaction between individuals." Schismogenesis, a consequence of a specifc pattern of interaction, generates tension and potential breakdown between system elements and takes shape in emotionally charged situations of an intensely personal nature (Morgan, 1981:30). In relationships between individuals or groups, schismogenesis observes that the behaviour of one determines the reaction and behaviour of the other towards them, and can be symmetrical (escalation of the same behaviour), or complementary (which results in behaviours that are different but complement each other) (Morgan, 1981).

Central to identity are the relationships people hold and their commitment to those relationships (Stryker et al., 2005). The relationship of commitment to identity is critical for understanding why individuals behave the way they do (Burke & Reitzes, 1991). The defnition and representation of identity is complex, everchanging, dynamic and dependent on context, and shifts across theories in defnition and meaning (Pozzi et al., 2014:19; Breakwell, 2010:61). Theories on identity focus primarily on three categories of identity, at a simplifed level. These are national identity, social group (ethnic/cultural) identity, and individual identity, organised in a hierarchy where national identity reportedly enjoys the highest position. Identity, according to Hogg et al. (1995), is a key concept that links social structure with people's individual actions.

In the short term, while they work to settle in, the challenge to voluntary economic migrants' identity experienced through transnational social representations needs to be resolved. The "inevitable end" is an often unspoken and sometimes explicitly voiced expectation of destination countries for voluntary economic migrants to simply assimilate (Khattab & Mahmud, 2019; Berry, 2005; Ginges & Cairns, 2000), in effect being expected to discard their existing identity on migrating. Destination countries though, while placing such expectations on migrants, also build invisible boundaries to voluntary economic migrants becoming part of society (Yaylaci, 2015) through various laws, policies and social behaviours. Individuals' social identity has multiple layers, made exponentially complex online, as they are infuenced by communication norms in their real-world and online communities, using networks that fulfl an individual need (Voloacă et al., 2011).

Whilst unresolved, individual voluntary economic migrants remain dislocated and their identity in a state of fux until they resolve their schismogenic acculturation. This struggle and the resolution thereof takes place through their interpersonal communication with their personal network members in their transnational context, both online and offine. The resolution of the schism is benefcial for their employer organisations and their professional reputation, as it can result in the retention of voluntary economic migrants' skills in the destination country for longer periods of time.

The degree of change demanded by the process of reconstruction of voluntary economic migrants' identity has a much more immediate infuence on individual identity within a limited timeframe than organic identity processes. Their struggle to internalise a new identity (Conroy & O'Leary-Kelly, 2014) may be prolonged by being held to certain standards by social networks in their country of origin and the hostility experienced against their process of renegotiation of their identity. Voluntary economic migrants also experience being discriminated against in the destination country because of their foreignness, although well-educated migrants battle fewer entry restrictions and have access to the labour market (Bajt, 2016).

Re-identity, as conceptualised by Sitto (2019), describes the short term process of settling in and resolving the schism experienced from migration acculturation. The process is simultaneously conscious and subconscious as the individual voluntary economic migrant undergoes it. As voluntary economic migrants settle into their transnational context, they simultaneously change their personal networks and change with respect to their own identities. The outcome of this process is refected in their social representations of system coupling outcomes produced through their interpersonal communication with their personal network members online/offine. The process of re-identity is defned by Sitto (2019:61) as:

…a short-term social process of autonomous reconstruction of identity in order to attain schismogenic stabilisation during the initial phase of settlement in a new context(s) through the personalisation of social representations arising from acculturation.

There are three possible social system coupling outcomes from the process of reidentity in the re-presentation of social representations, namely rejection (fssion), blending (integration) or clinging (fusion), illustrated in Fig. 13.1. Re-identity as a

**Fig. 13.1** Amended schismatic framework for social analysis and re-identity. (Sitto, 2019)

concept emphasises the assertion by Breakwell (2010) that agency is critical to the formation of identity. This includes reconstruction and re-presentation of identity in the short term to ensure settlement of individual voluntary economic migrants in their destination countries. The outcomes of the process of re-identity through system coupling outcomes socially represent the relationships that individual voluntary economic migrants form and how they grow their transnational personal networks (see the second panel in Fig. 13.1). System coupling outcomes may also provide insights into individuals' possible length of stay as well as their professional performance using their skills. Whilst voluntary economic migrants, as highly skilled individuals, migrate in a cyclical pattern, understanding their system coupling outcomes may indicate their tie-strength – that is, their commitment to their destination country.

The process of re-identity is illustrated in Fig. 13.1 and explained below.

Individuals or an organisation can have the process of re-identity triggered by a change in their social context as system participants. The expanded schismatic framework begins by acknowledging that agentic voluntary economic migrant individuals are the sum of their identities, whose complexities play a pivotal role in them making their decision to migrate. Migration as a social process requires interpersonal interaction of individuals with members of their personal networks both in countries of origin and their destination countries. These interpersonal interactions carry their social representations of identity, communicating their expectations arising from their social interactions. Their interpersonal communication carries language, non-verbal cues, and metaphors, thus building networks of meaning, that is social representations as processes and products. These networks of meaning are produced through transnational social contexts, involving country of origin and destination country social representations simultaneously online and offine with their personal network members. The processing of social representations involves the meeting of different social representations, and arising acculturation schismogenesis. Participants undergoing this process only have a short space of time to resolve the schismogenesis in order to settle, realising their migration intentions and coping in a new system contex, that is, their transnationalism. During this short time, participants will go through a process of personalisation of social representations, ultimately leading to three broad likely social outcomes between participants and the system in the new context. The system coupling outcomes – reject, blend or cling, can be fexible in retaining and forming new identities, depending on individual objectives of social outcomes as participants in new social contexts and systems.

### **13.4 Methodology**

Eleven voluntary economic migrants working and living in South Africa and twelve of their personal network members participated in the study about their migration experience from their country of origin to their current cities of residence. The two most economically popular cities (South African Tourism United States, n.d.) were chosen for contextual sampling and the sampling of participants was purposive snowball sampling with criteria for selection of individuals formed upfront (a priori) (Bryman, 2012). These individuals were spread between Johannesburg and Cape Town. These 11 migrants were from different parts of the world (see Table 13.1 for participant profles), some having migrated from other parts of the world to South Africa. In total, 23 interviews were conducted for this study. The research participant cases data collection was a balancing act for the researcher between participant availability and willingness as well as theoretical saturation, but also allowing for deeper case-oriented analysis (Bryman, 2012:425).


**Table 13.1** Participant profles

The frst of the three sets of data collected were video-recorded in-depth interviews with the voluntary economic migrants (11), self-reporting their migration journeys and their experiences of moving to South Africa. The second set was their Facebook data, which included voluntary economic migrants' full online activity publicly available on their Facebook wall. The video-recorded interviews with nominated members of the voluntary economic migrants' personal networks (12) living in South Africa, with whom they were in frequent communication, was the third set of data collected. The aim of the interviews with the voluntary economic migrants was to determine how their self-reported interpersonal communication shaped their process of re-identity online and offine. To collect their communicative representations, the researcher used questions that elicited narratives during in-depth interviews with voluntary economic migrants and members of their personal network.

Voluntary economic migrant individuals were asked about their journey to South Africa, their experiences prior to moving, personally and professionally, as well as how they experienced their arrival in their city of choice. They were then asked about their interpersonal communication with their personal networks, professional and personal challenges experienced since migrating, and any changes in themselves and their interpersonal communication patterns with their transnational personal networks. All questions were followed up in terms of any details following the order of the interviewee's narrative.

The personal network members were asked about their relationship with the voluntary economic migrant, their frst impressions of them personally and professionally, and how they perceive them to have changed from their initial meeting of them. Additionally, personal network members were asked about their interpersonal communication patterns with their voluntary economic migrant, their online and offine relationship with them and any changes that have happened in their interpersonal communication. Again, all questions were followed up in terms of any details following the order of the interviewee's narrative.

The data gathered and analysed from the in-depth interviews with the 11 voluntary economic migrants resulted in themes (Saldaña, 2015) related to how they socially represented their re-identity. This included an analysis of their social representation theory processes of anchoring and objectifcation before, during and after their voluntary economic migration to South Africa. The Facebook data analysed through Kozinet's (2015) netnography yielded themes of social representations of their re-identity process online. The interviews with members of their personal networks yielded themes with respect to the online and offine social representations of the voluntary economic migrants in their interpersonal communication with members of their networks. The results of their system coupling outcomes and their migration intentions are discussed in the following section.

### **13.5 Results and Discussions**

The voluntary economic migrant individuals reported that they had consulted with their immediate and broader families and personal networks of friends about their migration decision before making it. Their transnationally located personal networks were important consultative groups engaged through interpersonal communication online and offine. Voluntary economic migrants ultimately made their decision driven by their individual professional motivations and evaluated the benefts of the opportunity as outweighing concerns their personal networks had about their migration.

The consistent and recurring theme running through their in-depth interviews and their Facebook netnography data, as well as their network members' interviews, was the centrality and importance of their professional identities. Not only had they evaluated the attractiveness of South Africa as a destination country on their professional growth, but also on socio-cultural benefts with respect to their global exposure. There were different social representations from voluntary economic migrants' in-depth interviews that alluded to or directly referred to their processes of reidentity, such as their experience of a culture shock. These included terms such as "readjustment", "shift", "change", "adapting", and "development". Some refected on this adjustment during the interview (see Table 13.2), acknowledging that these were not deliberate changes from their end.

Their process of settling in could not be a wholly individual process because people "need others to develop the ability of self-recognition, to build relationships with others and to become self-conscious and agentic" (Howarth & Andreouli, 2016:330). Voluntary economic migrants also recognised experiences of their ingroup/outgroup membership boundaries in their transnational setting within their personal networks and their social privilege in their destination country. Three factors identifed from the data themes proved critical for determining the length of their process of re-identity, which were:


The system coupling outcomes analysing their interpersonal online and offine communication during their process of re-identity proved a potentially good measure in this study of the individual attainment of their migration objectives. Most of the voluntary economic migrant participants developed social networks outside of the workplace, contrary to Kerr et al.'s (2016) assertion that such individuals build their networks in their employer organisations. The participants arrived into existing personal networks, confrmed in narratives from personal network members; some built among other voluntary economic migrants from similar regions of origin, or did not build personal networks in the destination country, having moved with their immediate families. These outcomes signalled system coupling outcomes, which have implications for their projected length of stay.


**Table 13.2** Readjustment of self-identity

Three of the voluntary economic migrants participating in the study have since re-migrated – that is, moved again to other destination countries, specifcally to developed countries, though not their countries of origin. Their move may be linked to the overarching theme from participant interviews of their perceptions of the term "home" – of the construct more as an emotional tie rather than a physical place for voluntary economic migrants, in relation to their self-identity. Their moves within 12 months of their participation in the study demonstrated the high mobility of voluntary economic migrants, as well as the strength of their transnational personal networks in facilitating their moves across the globe. It also demonstrated the theme of their propensity for personal mobility and new experiences through their recruitment by countries, providing voluntary economic migrants special status, making them more highly sought after and thus spoiled for choice. For developing economies such as South Africa, losing these individuals leaves them worse off from an economic and skills-availability perspective, given the global competition for highly

skilled migrants explained in literature (Bailey & Mulder, 2017; Kerr et al., 2016; Garcia-Rodriguez et al., 2015).

### **13.6 Conclusions and Recommendations**

The intentions of recruiting destination-country governments such as South Africa and recruiting employer organisations may be noble with respect to the desired outcomes and achievements of attracting highly skilled professionals. However, the aims and objectives of policy makers, individual voluntary economic migrants and destination country societies do not always align. Voluntary economic migrants seek professional growth, recruiting countries seek the acquisition and retention of their skills, and receiving societies expect them to assimilate in spite of being treated as outsiders by them.

Interpersonal online/offine transnational communication with personal network members plays the critical role of helping individuals imagine and concretise their decision to move their destination countries. Upon migration, voluntary economic migrants need to work through their acculturation processes, arising from the meeting of different social representations and causing identity confict/schism. To reach schismogenic stability and system coupling outcomes in line with their migration goals, individual voluntary economic migrants undergo a process of re-identity. Through the agentic process of re-identity, individuals rebuild, reconstruct and represent their identity in the short term to attain stabilisation of their schism. The system coupling outcomes of re-identity as represented in the extended schismatic framework, can infuence their intended length of stay and openness to remigration.

There seem to be minimal skills sharing or transfer by such voluntary economic migrant individuals, given their intention for migration once they fulfl their professional objectives in a specifc destination country, which are individualistic and not altruistic. This study highlights that while voluntary economic migrants are individuals, their decisions with respect to settling in their destination country are infuenced by their online/offine interpersonal social interactions with members of their transnational networks. Recruiting countries and organisations need to facilitate such individuals building local personal networks beyond their professional settings, as that may encourage them to remain longer in the destination country. This action may assure recruiting destination countries of retaining and benefting from these individuals' skills long enough for skills sharing to take place, as they integrate or cling to the destination country social representations.

**Acknowledgements** This works forms part of my NRF-funded doctoral research, undertaken at the University of Johannesburg under the supervision of the late Professor Sonja Verwey in the Department of Strategic Communication, Faculty of Humanities.

### **References**


**Open Access** This chapter is licensed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits use, sharing, adaptation, distribution and reproduction in any medium or format, as long as you give appropriate credit to the original author(s) and the source, provide a link to the Creative Commons license and indicate if changes were made.

The images or other third party material in this chapter are included in the chapter's Creative Commons license, unless indicated otherwise in a credit line to the material. If material is not included in the chapter's Creative Commons license and your intended use is not permitted by statutory regulation or exceeds the permitted use, you will need to obtain permission directly from the copyright holder.

### **Chapter 14 Apartheid Racism and Post-apartheid Xenophobia: Bridging the Gap**

**Anthony Kaziboni**

### **14.1 Introduction**

Africa has generally been portrayed in international media as a continent of mass exodus to the Global North (McAuliffe & Kitimbo, 2018; Flahaux & De Haas, 2016). Statistics in existing literature, however, present a different picture about African migration. The majority of African migration actually occurs within the continent, and specifcally intra-regionally: intra-African migration grew from 12.5 million in 2000 to 19.4 million in 2017 (United Nations (UN), 2018). On the continent, South Africa is the recipient of the highest number of African migrants (UN, 2018). Confict in the East and Horn of Africa has led to 8.1 million internally displaced people, as well as 3.5 million refugees and asylum-seekers (International Organisation for Migration (IOM), 2020). Africa faces numerous security and governance challenges, and this exacerbates the poverty already faced by many other countries, and all these factors contribute to human mobility both within the continent as well as overseas (Kaziboni, 2019).

South Africa's strong judicial system anchored in the rule of law and respect for human rights, as well as its comparatively better economy, makes it a preferred destination for many migrants on the continent (Chikalogwa, 2018; Moagi et al., 2018; Rugunanan, 2016; Adjai & Lazaridis, 2013a; Choane et al., 2011). Looking at South-to-South migration, in this chapter I investigate the consequences of intra-African migration, and particularly how xenophobia in the post-apartheid state is grounded in South Africa's racist past. Legislation, statutes and policies instituted under apartheid saw black Africans reside in quasi-homogenous impoverished communities, both in rural and urban areas, in which violence was normalised, and against this backdrop, xenophobia was born.

© The Author(s) 2022 201

A. Kaziboni (\*)

Institute for the Future of Knowledge, University of Johannesburg, Johannesburg, South Africa e-mail: anthonyk@uj.ac.za

P. Rugunanan, N. Xulu-Gama (eds.), *Migration in Southern Africa*, IMISCOE Research Series, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-92114-9\_14

There is a very fne line between racism and xenophobia. In this chapter, I argue that racism and xenophobia are two different phenomena and should be understood as such. The concept of "race" denotes a group of people with the same physical characteristics, such as skin, hair, and eye colour, and with, in some cases, notable cultural and social similarities. Given this description, racism can be defned as an attitude of prejudice, bias and intolerance between various racial groups – people who look physically different (Vorster, 2002). Racism has been used to legitimatise the unequal distribution of society's resources, specifcally, various forms of wealth, prestige and power (Vorster, 2002). Xenophobia, on the other hand, comes from two Greek words: *xenos* meaning stranger, and *phobos* meaning fear (Charman & Piper, 2012). Combined, the word means an intense dislike for, fear of or hatred of strangers. Xenophobia describes attitudes, prejudices and behaviours that reject, exclude and often vilify people based on the perception that they are outsiders or foreigners to a community, society or national identity (Pillay, 2017; Misago et al., 2015; International Labour Organisation (ILO) et al., 2001).

Racism denotes a racial hierarchy where one racial group is considered superior to another, whereas xenophobia is an acute sense of fear or hatred of others from another group (Pillay, 2017). Xenophobia targets people who are considered foreigners in a particular community, often irrespective of overt characteristics shared with locals (Yakushko, 2009). Whilst racists generally accept the presence of others and attempt to keep them subordinate, xenophobes tend to refuse to accept the presence of "other" outsiders in their communities, and this is predominantly because they are viewed as a threat (Pillay, 2017). In contemporary South Africa, racism is inexcusable to such an extent that people are held responsible for its perpetuation. Paradoxically, xenophobia does not rank high on the list of moral faults, and in some instances, open expressions of it can be supported (Bernasconi, 2014). This is, unfortunately, in contradiction to the South African constitution, which affords all people socio-economic rights that are deeply engrained in the fundamental right to dignity (Republic of South Africa (RSA), 1996).

There is extensive literature on xenophobia in South Africa which delves into its causes (Crush & Ramachandran, 2014; Charman & Piper, 2012; Choane et al., 2011; Everatt, 2011b; Dodson, 2010; Desai, 2008; Danso & McDonald, 2001; Dodson & Oelofse, 2000; Maharaj & Rajkumar, 1997). Whilst some proponents argue that xenophobia is a type of racism (Tafra, 2011; Vorster, 2002), others are of the opinion that xenophobia is a mutation of racism and argue that xenophobia is a shift from racism because it moves from notions of biological superiority to exclusion based on cultural and national difference (Adjai & Lazaridis, 2013a, b). Some scholars argue that xenophobia is a negative consequence of democracy and nationalism (Kwanga, 2016; Neocosmos, 2006, 2011; Desai, 2008; Nyamnjoh, 2006; Harris, 2001; Crush, 2000). Xenophobic experiences of migrants in different social spaces in South Africa have been documented (Vanyoro, 2019; Kaziboni, 2018; Moagi et al., 2018; Pineteh, 2017; Vandeyar & Vandeyar, 2017; Kang'ethe & Wotshela, 2016; Dodson, 2010; Nyamnjoh, 2010). Some scholars have argued for using religion as an avenue to counter xenophobia (Pillay, 2017; Kaunda, 2016). A

lacuna in South-to-South migration literature and theory is the absence of literature on the apartheid roots of xenophobia in South Africa.

In view of the above, this chapter seeks to provide a comprehensive analysis that demonstrates how xenophobia is rooted in the legacy of South Africa's apartheid and racist past. It is based on a conceptual and empirical review of books, journals, published articles and reports, as well as other credible sources on xenophobia and apartheid in South Africa. I addressed three main objectives in order to demonstrate the apartheid roots of xenophobia, and these were: (1) to unpack the separatist legacy of apartheid; (2) to analyse xenophobic violence in post-apartheid South Africa; and (3) to detail the manifestations of immigrant stereotypes in the "new" South Africa. From an analysis of the data, this chapter contributes to migration studies that immigrants in South Africa live in an era of "post-apartheid-apartheid". I argue that whilst the "new" South Africa is founded on "[h]uman dignity, the achievement of equality and the advancement of human rights and freedoms" (RSA, 1996), immigrants still experience multiple forms of discrimination and oppression which manifest in covert and overt experiences of xenophobia, which can mirror the experience of racism by black people during apartheid.

### **14.2 The Separatist Legacy of Apartheid**

Before 1994, black South Africans were not considered "citizens" in the country. Their movement during the early 1900s was governed by the Immigrants Regulation Act No. 22 of 1913, which defned them as "non-citizens" (Adjai & Lazaridis, 2013a). Even though the practice of racism in South Africa started in the seventeenth century, it was institutionalised in May 1948 when the National Party came to power with the vision of a South Africa "built around a new hierarchy with Afrikaner identity at the core" (Verwey & Quayle, 2012: 553). Racism was created and supported through government structures, the courts and the police (Verwey & Quayle, 2012), and maintained through violence.

Apartheid, as an ideology and a system, was introduced by Dutch-born Hendrik Frensch Verwoerd, referred to as the "architect of apartheid" (Ally, 2005; Webster, 1998). The term "*apartheid*" is translated from Afrikaans, meaning apartness, by which it was meant that blacks and whites were to live separately. The Reservation of Separate Amenities Act No. 49 of 1953 enforced the racial segregation of all public spaces, except for public roads. This eliminated the possibility of any mixing in social environments amongst different racial groups. During this time, the "k-word" was used as a general nomenclature for blacks, in addition to being a racial slur (Mtose, 2011).

Beyond racism, South Africa also has a history of ethnocentrism in which ethnic groups privileged their linguistic, cultural, and geographical identities, often with hostility against others (Moagi et al., 2018). Through the Bantu Homelands Citizenship Act No. 26 of 1970, native black South Africans were considered citizens in "homelands", or Bantustans, as per their ascribed ethnicity. Bantustans existed for Zulus, Xhosas, Sothos, Tswanas, Vendas, Pedis and Shangaans (see Bantu Authority Act No. 68 of 1951; Promotion of Bantu Self-Government Act No. 46 of 1959). In urban areas, blacks were housed in urban townships also along ethnic lines (South African History Online (SAHO), 2015). This therefore meant that black communities were generally quasi-homogenous, as they generally only had a particular ethnic group.

The movement of black people was further managed by the Native Laws Amendment Act No. 54 of 1952, as they had to abide by infux control and the pass laws. Through this legislation, pass laws dictated that all blacks 16 years and over had to carry a pass book (a *dompas*) and failure to produce one upon request by the authorities would result in incarceration (Du Plessis, 2015). This document was similar to a conventional passport and contained biographical information such as a person's names, their photograph, fngerprints, employment details and also an endorsement from the apartheid regime for the holder to carry out work in a specifed area (Du Plessis, 2015).

In terms of accessing education, the apartheid Bantu Education Act No. 47 of 1953 enforced racially separated educational facilities. Further, blacks received schooling in ethnically defned schools in their residence area (SAHO, 2015). In the view of apartheid white supremacists, black education was supposed to create docile servants, and Bantu education was the means to attain that (Tomlin, 2016). Bantu schools were also plagued by human and physical resource deprivation, which contributed to the poor schooling environments and outcomes for black people. By 1993, the end of the apartheid era, vast inequalities in educational quality remained, effectively curtailing labour market success for many black people (Moses et al., 2017).

Pervasive in apartheid South African was a systemic use of violence by the state to maintain socio-political control (Marks & Andersson, 1990). Violence was by whites on blacks, and the apartheid state against any individual or entity opposing the system. The restriction of movement, as well as the institutionalised segregation, led to the disruption of the black African family during apartheid. Children of migrant workers, especially boys and young men, were often left unsupervised, and the lack of parental control led to them taking part in mischief, petty crime and gang violence (Delius & Glaser, 2002). In the homes, upon returning from work, men used violence to claim power and authority. This overly entrenched the use of violence and the normalisation thereof. Scholars such as William Gumede support this view and suggest that, historically, South Africans have used violence for different causes during colonialism and apartheid (Mahlokwane, 2018). Violence was used to resolve most minor conficts; violence is associated with alcohol abuse and toxic masculinity (Charman & Piper, 2012; Harris, 2001).

Early manifestations of xenophobic violence were noted in the 1990s in areas where locals and immigrants resided. Historically, immigrants, whether unskilled or semi-skilled, generally established communities in the informal settlements in metros such as Johannesburg, Pretoria, Cape Town, and Durban. In 1990, locals burnt about 300 huts belonging to undocumented Mozambican immigrants in Hlaphekani near Giyani, in the Northern Transvaal, now Limpopo province (Choane et al.,

2011; Solomon, 2003). Violence also occurred in the Western Cape province. Since the establishment of *Imizamo Yethu* (formerly *Mizamoyethu*), an informal settlement in Hout Bay, in 1991, tensions between locals and migrants were noted (Dodson & Oelofse, 2000). In 1993, locals in the area forcibly entered houses of Namibian migrants and removed their possessions to assert their non-belonging (Dodson & Oelofse, 2000). Combined, these accounts affrm how the use of violence in apartheid South Africa could have contributed to the expulsion of immigrants in communities shared with South Africans.

### **14.3 Xenophobic Violence in Post-apartheid South Africa**

Xenophobic violence has continued to erupt in the "new" South Africa, which can be attributed to the use of violence in South Africa originating from apartheid. From December 1994 to January 1995, "Operation *Buyelekhaya"* (go back home) began in Alexandra, a township in the north of Johannesburg (Idehen & Osaghae, 2015; Choane et al., 2011; Steenkamp, 2009), where immigrants, mostly from Malawi, Zimbabwe and Mozambique, were forcibly ejected from the community (Idehen & Osaghae, 2015). In 2000, three immigrant vendors on board a train – a Mozambican and two Senegalese – were killed (Steenkamp, 2009; Solomon, 2003; Vale, 2002; Crush, 2000). They were chased on the train and escaped a carriage by going onto the roof of the moving vehicle. One fell off and was hit by another train, whilst the other two were electrocuted by the overhead electricity cables (Solomon, 2003).

The most brutal and violent xenophobic incidents documented in South Africa to date occurred between May and June in 2008. During these attacks, at least 62 people were killed (including about 21 believed to be South Africans), nearly 700 were injured, and thousands fed the country. Victims were mainly migrants from Mozambique, Somalia, and Zimbabwe (Hickel, 2014). At least 100,000 immigrants were displaced during this unrest (Kaunda, 2016; Pugh, 2014; Adjai & Lazaridis, 2013b; Charman & Piper, 2012; Steinberg, 2012; Everatt, 2011b; Tafra, 2011; Steenkamp, 2009; Consortium for Refugees and Migrants in South Africa (CoRMSA), 2008; Kapp, 2008). Amongst the deceased was a 35-year-old Mozambican national, Ernesto Alfabeto Nhamuave, who was beaten, stabbed and necklaced in Ramaphosa, an informal settlement east of Johannesburg. Necklacing is placing a gasoline or diesel-flled tyre around an individual's neck and then setting it alight, burning them to death (Hickel, 2014). This heinous act has its roots in apartheid (Hickel, 2014), and was a prescribed way of dealing with societal deviants such as rapists, murderers and traitors (Ball, 1994).

The harrowing image of Nhamuave engulfed in fames has come to be known as "The Burning Man", which is a symbol of the 2008 xenophobic violence (Vanyoro, 2019; Hickel, 2014). The South African government was short-sighted and lethargic in its response to the 2008 violence (Adjai & Lazaridis, 2013b; Everatt, 2011b; Kapp, 2008). For Nhamuave, justice was never served: his case was closed in 2015 (Tromp, 2015). Local inhabitants of Ramaphosa patrolled the locale making sure that it remained a "*kwerekwere*-free society" (Desai, 2008). *Kwerekwere* is a derogatory term that denotes how native South Africans consider other black Africans as strange, implying that their native languages have peculiar phonetic sounds (Moagi et al., 2018; Tafra, 2011, 2018; Pineteh, 2017; Vandeyar & Vandeyar, 2017; Idehen & Osaghae, 2015; Hickel, 2014; Everatt, 2011b; Steenkamp, 2009; Harris, 2002). The term also suggests that one is subhuman (Nyamnjoh, 2006), an "inferior scum of humanity" (Nyamnjoh, 2010). By framing their narratives around *makwerekwere*, locals lay the basis for claims of spatial ownership of South African territory (Pineteh, 2017). *Makwerekwere* are the "undeserving outsiders", whilst South Africans are the "deserving citizens" (Nyamnjoh, 2010).

In a 2013 incident, Emidio Josias Macia, another Mozambican national, died at the hands of South African Police Service (SAPS) offcials in the township of Daveyton, east of Johannesburg. He was tied to the back of a police vehicle and dragged, and he succumbed to the injuries he had sustained (Liang, 2015). In April 2015, another Mozambican national, Emmanuel Sithole, was attacked and killed in Alexandra, a day after the government assured that they would quell the xenophobic violence that had erupted in the area (Kaunda, 2016). In the same month, a nationwide attack on immigrants prompted several foreign governments to repatriate their citizens. These attacks were sparked by the infammatory comments of the late Zulu monarch, King Goodwill Zwelithini (Mabera, 2017; Idehen & Osaghae, 2015). Seven people lost their lives, and more than 5,000 immigrants were displaced during the turmoil. The South African Human Rights Commission (SAHRC) cleared the Zulu King of hate speech, even though his words were "hurtful towards foreigners and could perpetuate discrimination" (Human Rights Watch (HRW), 2017).

In September 2019, riots and looting targeted shops owned by foreign nationals in Jeppestown and the Johannesburg central business district. Ten out of the 12 people killed in the violence were believed to be South Africans, and about 1000 foreign-owned business were attacked (HRW, 2019). The specifc nature of such attacks, mostly directed at foreigners, impinges on the security of society and highlights the magnitude of violence in South Africa as a whole.

As posed by some commentators, it is quite intriguing to ask how South Africa could end institutionalised racism by the apartheid regime in the pursuit of democracy and democratic rights; and why xenophobia is a persistent problem (Choane et al., 2011). A view common in, and about, South Africa is that South Africans are xenophobic (Charman & Piper, 2012; Choane et al., 2011; Crush, 2000), and they generally harbour an acute anti-migrant sentiment (Gordon, 2016; Black et al., 2006; Crush & Pendleton, 2004). This attitude is often directed against African immigrants. This is supported by the fact that the South African government has generally accepted Afrophobia instead of xenophobia (Mabera, 2017). South Africa is viewed and classifed as one of the most xenophobic countries in the world (Crush & Ramachandran, 2014). Underscoring the effects of violence across South African society, the IOM (2009: 10) infers that xenophobic attacks "should not be isolated from a more general history of violence in informal settlements and townships in South Africa".

### **14.4 The Manifestation of Immigrant Stereotypes**

Black African migrants have been negatively stereotyped. There is a plethora of literature that demonstrates that South Africans view immigrants as "illegal" "job stealers" who are "criminal" as well as "diseased". Put succinctly, immigrants are "taking the jobs of locals, lowering wages, increasing crime and spreading diseases" (Maharaj & Rajkumar, 1997). Portraying black African immigrants them as such has condoned the perpetuation of violence against them in the post-apartheid landscape.

Irrespective of their documentation status, immigrants are generally viewed as "illegal", implying that they are undocumented (Danso & McDonald, 2001; Dodson & Oelofse, 2000). Senior government ministers and offcials have blamed "illegal immigrants" for placing strain on state resources or engaging in criminal activity (Choane et al., 2011; Dodson, 2010). Such a construction fails to appreciate the diversity of causal factors around why people move – some are refugees, others asylum seekers, migrants, or immigrants. In post-apartheid South Africa, the *dompas* has been reimagined, and foreigners must produce a valid visa. The visa is supported by the *Immigration Act No. 13 of 2002*, and failure to produce one upon request by the police or immigration offcials can result in a person being taken to the Lindela Repatriation Centre (Kaziboni, 2018).

Immigrants are viewed as criminals. The former minister of Home Affairs, Mangosuthu Buthelezi, used the term "illegal" indiscriminately (Adjai & Lazaridis, 2013b). Buthelezi urged citizens to assist the South African Department of Home Affairs as well as the SAPS in the removal of "illegal aliens" from the Republic. Senior police offcers were also noted to contribute to the "othering" of immigrants and politicisation of immigration as they labelled the majority of African immigrants as criminals. Then Senior Superintendent Johan Steyn stated that "90 percent of criminals who break into homes, commit armed robbery and rape the women are Zimbabweans" (Desai, 2008: 52). With such incriminating statements and perceptions, immigrants in South Africa have been negatively depicted, and this has led to them being viewed as responsible for the increase in crime in South Africa (Pineteh, 2017; Vandeyar & Vandeyar, 2017; Kwanga, 2016; Choane et al., 2011; Everatt, 2011b; Harris, 2002; Danso & McDonald, 2001). In the Africanisation of crime in South Africa, Nigerian nationals are stereotyped as drug dealers (especially as cocaine dealers) (Hickel, 2014; Harris, 2002; Danso & McDonald, 2001); Lesotho nationals as smuggling gold dust and copper wires (Danso & McDonald, 2001); and Mozambicans as being in a car-stealing ring (Danso & McDonald, 2001).

African immigrants have also been perceived as diseased or "bringing diseases" into South Africa (Mabera, 2017; Crush & Tawodzera, 2014; Charman & Piper, 2012; Choane et al., 2011; Roberts, 2009; Harris, 2002; Danso & McDonald, 2001; Dodson & Oelofse, 2000). They are viewed as hosts of diseases such as the human immunodefciency viruses (HIV), and thus a physical threat to the country (Pineteh,

2017; Vandeyar & Vandeyar, 2017; Steenkamp, 2009; Harris, 2002). The Covid-19 pandemic has reignited the sentiment that African immigrants bring in Covid-19. In haste, the state spent R37 million erecting a border fence between Zimbabwe and South Africa (Hosken, 2020). Describing immigrants as diseased justifes their extermination in a latent way.

There is a widespread notion of immigrants being perceived as "job stealers" (Mabera, 2017; Pineteh, 2017; Vandeyar & Vandeyar, 2017; Hickel, 2014; Charman & Piper, 2012; Choane et al., 2011; Everatt, 2011a; Everatt, 2011b; Dodson, 2010; Steenkamp, 2009; Danso & McDonald, 2001). Immigrants offer their labour and services at cheaper rates, which is against the stipulations outlined by law, and this puts them at an unfair advantage over locals (Pineteh, 2017; Choane et al., 2011; Dodson & Oelofse, 2000). To a limited extent, this argument holds water, and this is not because employment is a zero-sum game, but because undocumented immigrants "unfairly compete" for lower-end jobs and are generally more willing to accept lower wages compared to citizens (Choane et al., 2011; Dodson, 2010). These are spurious claims that have plagued the media, and the problem is that no one knows certainly the overall impact of migration on the labour market in South Africa. This assumption that immigration contributes to the increasing unemployment rate in South African is uncritical, and it dismisses a growing body of research that argues that immigrants create jobs as well as compete for jobs in South Africa (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) and the International Labour Organisation (ILO), 2018a, b; Danso & McDonald, 2001). In De Doorns, a small town located in the Cape Winelands, thousands of foreigners, mostly Zimbabwean migrants, were forced to abandon their homes because they were considered to have "stolen" seasonal jobs from locals (Choane et al., 2011). Through this, foreigners were also viewed as "parasites" taking jobs from South Africans (Vorster, 2002).

From taking jobs, there is a notion that they are "taking our women" (Everatt, 2011a), and another local accused "foreigners of stealing their women by wooing them with cash" (Hickel, 2014: 106). Some locals believed that immigrants were morally bankrupt, malicious and irresponsible as they "make babies with our sisters and then run away after that" (Everatt, 2011b: 27). In some cases, there are concerns that immigrants may marry South African women (Choane et al., 2011).

As a consequence of the above, immigrants have become targets of resentment, hostility, and verbal and physical abuse (Dodson & Oelofse, 2000). In formal work opportunities, migrants are discriminated against (Everatt, 2011b). Migrants experience medical xenophobia, which is a poor treatment that is a direct consequence of the patient being a non-South African (Crush & Tawodzera, 2014). In physical violence, African migrants experience robbery, rape and murder (Everatt, 2011b). In some cases mentioned above, people have been displaced, and others lost their lives (Choane et al., 2011; Everatt, 2011b), for example through necklacing like "The Burning Man".

### **14.5 Conclusion: Criminalisation of Xenophobia?**

After reviewing the literature on migration, racism and xenophobia, it is evident that South Africa's apartheid and racist history laid a fertile ground in which the use of violence was born. Apartheid in praxis, as well as spatial planning, culminated in black people residing in indigent quasi-homogenous communities where violence was normalised. The earliest xenophobic incidents documented were before 1994, which contradicts arguments supporting a nationalist underpinning of the phenomenon. Xenophobic incidents have, however, increased since. The occurrence of xenophobic violence has been attributed to scape-goating on various levels; however, the sheer nature of violence is unfathomable.

Ideologically, xenophobia is different from racism. What ties the two forms of prejudice is that they manifest in a gross violation of human rights in their worst forms. As such, both have no place in the "new" South Africa and do not refect the values of the South African constitution (1996), which emphasises the recognition of the fundamental human rights of all who live in South Africa (Choane et al., 2011). Like black people during apartheid, the victims of xenophobia are excluded, discriminated against and marginalised. In the worst cases, some have been beaten and others killed. African immigrants have been negatively stereotyped as "diseased", "criminal", "illegal" "job stealers", and to this extent, this has provided an environment in which the violation of their rights has been condoned.

Furthermore, if it is racist to use the "k-word" in post-apartheid South Africa, why is the use of *kwerekwere* not xenophobic, since both terms are derogatory and are used to dehumanise and disempower? If perpetrators of racism, such as Vicki Momberg (see Southern African Legal Information Institute [SAFLII], 2019), in the "new" South Africa have been prosecuted, for using the racist "k-word", then why can't this happen for the use of kwerekwere, the xenophobic "k-word"?

It is, therefore, important for the state and policymakers to implement strategies of the re-humanisation of African immigrants, particularly in social studies, confict resolution, peace education, and in the literature of non-proft and humanitarian organisations, as a way of redressing the xenophobia (Kaziboni, 2018: 50). Until policies and legislation that support the rights of immigrants, documented or not, are implemented, African immigrants in South Africa continue surviving in the era of "post-apartheid-apartheid".

### **References**


**Open Access** This chapter is licensed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits use, sharing, adaptation, distribution and reproduction in any medium or format, as long as you give appropriate credit to the original author(s) and the source, provide a link to the Creative Commons license and indicate if changes were made.

The images or other third party material in this chapter are included in the chapter's Creative Commons license, unless indicated otherwise in a credit line to the material. If material is not included in the chapter's Creative Commons license and your intended use is not permitted by statutory regulation or exceeds the permitted use, you will need to obtain permission directly from the copyright holder.

### **Chapter 15 Strategies and Tactics of Integration of Transnational African Migrants: Case Study of Ethiopian Migrants in South Africa**

**Biniam Misgun**

### **15.1 Introduction**

Ethiopians come from a fractured country, with a heightened sense of ethnic identifcation. Ethnicity is central to their self-identifcation, accompanied by deeply entrenched ethnic cleavages at home and here in South Africa. Past and recent ethnic-based dynamics and cleavages are actively playing a part here. Such dynamics gained salience with the modern Ethiopian state's practices and through their political history (Vaughan, 2003). These are part of the pervasively African concern: tension between the ethnic and the national, and the impulse to reconfgure and reconcile them. It is crucial to ask how these tensions evolve and transform in movements and moments in transnational spaces, and the interactions and encounters of these tensions and impulses in these spaces. Similarly, South African society too is very much divided, with its own tensions and contradictions. These coalesce with the tensions and dynamics that Ethiopians bring with them.

My preoccupation has been on how transnational migrants interact with, and transform, prominent modes of 'othering' already shaping South African society and their countries of origin. Coming from a differentiated (and often divided) country to live in South Africa, that is also divided, foregrounds their transnationalism. In the background of such circumstances, how do they negotiate and encounter integration within or with South African society or segments of the society? My inquiry accordingly has centred on making sense of the problematic of "integration" in the face of multiplicities and movements, and how transnational bodies navigate these in diasporic spaces. Thus, the moments and movements of their co-sociation, sociality and affect, the ins, outs, and about of relationships and interactions, are of particular interest in this inquiry.

B. Misgun (\*)

Department of Economic History and Development Studies, School of Social Sciences, Howard College Campus, University of KwaZulu-Natal, Berea, Durban, South Africa e-mail: misgunb@ukzn.ac.za

I explore these themes by drawing on ethnographic research I conducted between 2008 and 2016 among Ethiopian and Rwandan migrants living in two major South African cities, Durban and Johannesburg. Much of the materials used here comes from feld notes and diaries, and formal and informal interviews conducted with Ethiopians of various backgrounds. In this chapter, I pay attention to Ethiopian migrants' tactics and strategies of integration and senses of communities, and the manner in which they play with sameness and difference. European and North American migration studies have conceptualised integration of transnational migrants as an outcome which can be guided by practices of the state and receiving society; most importantly, this is cast as a process through which new arrivals are incorporated into receiving society. My research challenges such conception of integration, and treats it rather as a problematic, feeting and undetermined condition. Transnational space in the African context, where diversity of receiving society/ies and new arrivals are the dominant features, necessitates the need to appraise dynamics and directions of incorporation within and with-the-other. One of the main suggestions of this chapter is that integration and its processes feature as competing and conficting strategies (as organised by state and local elites of receiving and migrant communities), and tactics (as feeting and inventive acts pursued by individuals). These are captured as dynamics fowing in and through the everyday interactions and discourses within transnational migrant groups as well as with the receiving society.

### **15.2 African Migrants and the Problematic of "Integration" in South Africa**

An African, a native of this continent, a foreigner, a black person, a refugee and an Ethiopian are all markers of identity defning transnational Ethiopians. Being the South African 'other' is also accompanied by exhausting and the unremitting questions: "Where are you from?" and "What are you?". These questions are constant reminders of one's otherness. There are also stories of African solidarity and bonds; cross-marriages and community relations among African migrants and locals abound. Indeed, these are resilient relations often tested by the pervasive and disturbing incidents of xenophobic violence perpetrated against African migrants.

Though these conficting stories are everyday encounters, the most publicised ones are often those of xenophobic violence. Attracting much attention, these incidents tend to produce disgust and shame. Once again, we declare "never again". Despite such a declaration, these incidents continue. In each instance, scores of African migrants, as well as South Africans considered to be, or "look like" foreigners, are brutally attacked and killed, prompting displacement of African migrants in their thousands. In the aftermath, the public discourse buzzes with "reintegration". Though these eruptions happen frequently, we barely notice a difference in the manner of talking about and debating "reintegration".

"Reintegration" here manifestly assumes the existence of "integration" prior to the xenophobic violence and displacements. Senior Home Affairs and other state offcials insistently point to the fact that many foreigners (particularly Africans) live side by side with South Africans as a sign of "integration". Though these views from state offcials appear to be for political consumption, they capture the partial story. Social movements, activists, and political commentators have often drawn attention to the weakness of the state's narrative as well as to its "slow" response to these developments and regular warnings; in other instances, they suggest that the state is implicated in xenophobic outbursts and violence.

Such debates feature as reactions to repetitive incidents of xenophobia, conficts, and tensions. These compel us to contend with the meaning of "home" and "abroad", living in this world as a transnational body, and sharing experiences and spaces as differentiated bodies. The South African encounters direct us to three pertinent issues. First, the problematic of "integration"/"social cohesion" that is yet to be interrogated suffciently to frame broader policy and political debates on transnational migration in South Africa. Second, it is not clear what it means to be talking about "integration" in a society that is as spatially and socially divided as that of South Africa. Third, these ghastly violent episodes have obliged us to wrestle (though clearly reactively) with the fundamental question of our ability to coexist on terms agreeable to everyone and with equality and dignity accorded to "all".

Thus, considering these points, we should ask: What should "integration" of transnational bodies look like in a society that is heterogeneous and differentiated (even somewhat segregated) along racial and class lines? Such a question inevitably goes beyond non-nationals' and nationals' relations, and demands self-introspection by the South African state and society. It raises questions on what it means to live in and belong to a post-apartheid South Africa, and how we make sense of and appropriate the most-quoted assertion of the constitution: "South Africa belongs to all who live in it." These introspections invariably oscillate between the possibilities of "integration" within and with the "other", of citizens and non-citizens alike.

Strikingly, the dominant conception of "integration", which views it as a fnal stage - an outcome - through "boundary crossing", is not well placed to capture such complexities. Migration studies, particularly within North American and European scholarship, used "assimilation"/"integration" to describe a process of incorporation of newcomers into the "national culture", institutions and dominant language of the "host society". This includes incorporation of newcomers into the social, political and civic structures of the "host society". Incorporation in the above sense is constructed as mainstreaming of newcomers into the dominant, arguably "white middle-class" (and, one may add, Judeo-Christian) establishment. "Integration", as a normative construct, is signifed by a supposed dominant world or national "culture", towards which all recent arrivals will (and have to) gravitate (Gans, 2007; Favell, 2001).

Hence, Western migration studies' theoretical and policy conception of "integration" assumes and demands a degree of homogeneity; subtle and, at times, not-sosubtle pressures are thus exerted on newcomers, demanding them to adopt and adjust to the existing institutions in the name of "integration". However, in a society that racially codes and discriminates, incorporation into a European or white mainstream is not available to non-white transnational migrants (Gans, 2007; Nagel, 2002). In an attempt to capture this, some scholars have proposed "segmented

assimilation" as a way of considering the possibility of divergent modes of incorporation and outcomes by considering the racial, ethnic and class contingencies of newcomers and receiving-society engagements and relationships (Alba, 1999; Portes & Rumbaut, 1996).

Either way, I fnd these are less productive for examining and understanding the dynamics of "integration" in the South African context. Transnationalism of divided newcomers in a differentiated receiving society requires rethinking "integration" as a concept and practice. Mapping transnational spaces, where race, class, ethnicity, and nationality are stitched and unstitched, requires a different framework. The conceptual tool I am searching for here is one that accommodates differentiations and fuidity, and captures the dynamic process that characterises the fuidity of association, belonging, sociability, and power relations. Inasmuch as these are functional to social cohesiveness, they are also embodiments of socio-political actions through which material and power relations are contested and resisted. Working and reworking discursive formations and (re)appropriation of multiple identities and attachments play a signifcant role in these spheres (Brah, 1992).

Michel de Certeau's theoretical appropriation of strategy and tactics to unpack the everyday has been instrumental in this inquiry. These conceptions capture everyday forms of sociations and solidarity, as well as identifcations working through what appears to be trivial but is actually a signifcant part of everyday encounters and interactions (Simmel, 1997). In this milieu, we fnd the (re)construction of "us" and "them", repertoires of sameness and difference. Mobilising these discursive repertoires, contingent on a context, moment and movement, are essentially formed as strategies and tactics.

Following de Certeau's theoretical formulation, I recast integration from above as a realm of strategy, with all its attributes of mapping, marking, cataloguing and designing bodies and places, as part of the state's thrust to incorporate and demarcate them into its domain of infuence. Such enterprise operates through simplifcation (Scott, 1998) – as a view from above, homogenising and trimming the edges. Tactics, on the other hand, represent views, practices, and (re)appropriations from below. These entail multiple discursive repertoires (imaginative and inventive discourses) and actions deployed in everyday interactions and sociations.

For de Certeau, while strategies are in the realm of organised power, of architecture and planning, tactics are located in the realm of the everyday, the indeterminate stories and practices. For him, strategies are techniques of place – organising power and domination – whereas tactics are techniques of space (de Certeau, 1984:31) – "imaginative and inventive" practices (and forms of acts) of the everyday life. For de Certeau, tactics entail "the inventive employment of possibilities within strategic circumstances: disguise, surprise, discretion, secrecy, wit, play, bluff and so on" (Highmore, 2002:159). My reading of tactics and strategies is thus as techniques of space and place, entailing both discursive and material forms.

Landau and Freemantle (2010) and Harrison et al. (2012) are amongst the few signifcant researchers in South Africa who offer insight into transnational bodies' socialities, belonging and attachments through appropriations of discursive repertoires as tactics. Landau and Freemantle (2010) generate insight into transnational social spaces, economies, and categories of belonging through what they termed "cosmopolitan tactics", which entail practices and discourses "that transcend national borders and are, in some cases, so fuid as to almost transcend territory altogether" (Landau & Freemantle, 2010:382). While their work illustrates ways of inserting and integrating oneself into specifc groupings and of fnding belonging in feeting spaces, it remains partial. It captures only aspects of the broader picture of multiple modes of actions and socialities, considering the wide range of positionalities and discursive repertoires available to transnational bodies.

In this sense, Harrison et al. (2012) move further by considering the ways in which discursive repertoires are produced and controlled (which is strategy) and how they are appropriated and subverted from below (which is tactic). Harrison et al. (2012) apply this approach to reveal the dynamics of coalitions and tensions among Chinese migrants in Johannesburg. Harrison et al. (2012) and I do certainly exploit de Certeau's formulation of strategy and tactic to explore transnational migrants' experiences, as well as their multiple positions, narratives and identities. Harrison et al. (2012) pursue generating insight into diasporic spaces and "migrant and host-society" interactions. My work focuses on the everyday and the problematic of "integration", and how these are constituted in and through multiplicities of identities and concomitant discursive repertoires.

Of course, not all discursive repertoires are available to everyone; they are neither commanded nor produced by everyone. They are produced in particular historical and political moments, and they are differentially accessed and, thus, differentially appropriated. This fundamentally mirrors the power dynamics and historical conditions within which they are produced, promoted, and circulated. I would like to stress that strategies are not only practices of the state and capital, but also localised elites managing and policing in-groups. Harrison et al. (2012) caution us not to simply relegate strategy exclusively to the receiving society and tactics to new arrivals. It is also important to recognise the multiplicities and intersections of power plays within the interactions of migrants and the receiving society.

Stretching de Certeau's conception of power, I consider here not only those who have colonised the state, but also those of sub-national groupings and their structures of domination. This entails the possibility of individuals' engagements with ethnically based and localised institutions and structures, as conduits of power and another layer to strategy and tactics. Thus, I pay attention to power and domination at the local level, and to strategies of integrating bodies and places by localised elites, and attendant tactics.

### **15.3 Playing with Sameness and Difference as Tactics and Strategies of Integration**

Durban and Johannesburg host a large number of Ethiopians. While the central business districts (CBDs) of these cities function as hubs for their wholesale and retail shops, an activity which many Ethiopian migrants are involved in, there are so many of them working in various parts of these metropolitan cities and surrounding towns.

Thus, suburbs situated closer to the CBDs of both cities – mainly working class and racially mixed neighbourhoods – were popular among Ethiopian and other transnational migrants. Following the growing trend of setting up *spaza* shops1 in townships and working class residential areas, we fnd Ethiopians reside in different parts of these cities and their townships. Upwardly mobile Ethiopians have been leaving these areas for the upmarket white-dominated suburbs, which is a sign of deepening class differentiation, coupled with safety and security concerns. It is against the backdrop of such mixed urban residential areas that the dynamics of identity plays of Ethiopian migrants, their ethnic politics, and their sensibilities feature. These urban spaces host transnational bodies who carry the burden of home with memories, nostalgia and recast narratives as well as newly acquired experiences and narratives.

Ethiopian migrants in South Africa are very diverse in terms of ethnic, socioeconomic class, religious, and educational backgrounds. In the early 1990s, there were fewer Ethiopian migrants in South Africa, and during this period, being an Ethiopian was an important source of identifcation. In these narratives of "we", either Muslim or Christian, ethnic Amhara or Tigre, all were bounded together in this strange land of "others". While fewer in number, forging connections, bonds and social support in a country which showed little interest in their wellbeing, was central. Crossing borders to assert a narrative of an "African migrant" was also another important source of identifcation through which they stitched a community and solidarity. I was often told how Kenyans, Nigerians, Ethiopians, Somalis and Senegalese in Durban were bonded by their foreignness and Africanness. It was a period when there were fewer migrants from other parts of Africa in the country. Sharing accommodation and trading spots, supporting each other and socialising were common. Such a bond was formed in opposition to the unkind reception they had received from the South African state and society. Back then, when their numbers were relatively small, it was tactically useful to assume a transnational identity, to be a foreign African. This allowed them to form a group with African migrants and a source of solidarity in the face of perceived or real discrimination from the state and society.

In the late 1990s, Ethiopian migrants started *mahaber* – a religious grouping with a get-together to be hosted by one person each month. They would light a candle and offer food and drinks to the attendees. *Mahaber*, as gatherings, were organised around specifc religious days in the Coptic orthodox tradition – in Durban, Saint Mary's Day and Saint Gabriel's Day (which happen on the 21st and 19th respectively of each month on the Geez calendar). They were and remain very popular. (As a matter of fact, the two Coptic orthodox churches in the city are named after these two saints). As part of these gatherings, the host would offer food and drinks. This used to be attended by everyone, including Muslim Ethiopians.

<sup>1</sup> *Spazas* are informal shops, historically a grocery store run from someone's home. The term now denotes any informal shop.

Though *mahaber* do exist these days, they are now very fragmented and fêted primarily with close friends who belong to Coptic Orthodox Christianity, and, usually, of the same ethnicity, class, and social status – or a combination of these. The ways in which *mahaber* are currently organised thus clearly refects the pervasive ethnic, religious and class cleavages as well as political leanings (those who support the government in power and those who oppose it). For the most part, these feature as sub-groupings for exclusive and intimate social relations.

The widely shared feeling is that the sense of community, solidarity, and support were stronger when their number was fewer, referring to the period between the mid-1990s and the mid 2000s. Since the mid-2000s, forming exclusive groups along ethnic and religious lines and fragmentation became a common feature. Noticeably, ethnic affliations and networks are dominant features amongst Ethiopians in South Africa. Ethnicity has relentlessly been a defning identity when they gather, while they immediately become, all over again, one Ethiopian in the company of others. Like most African states, the Ethiopian state certainly struggles with heightened ethnic political identity as an important mode of identifcation, and its three decades old experiment in ethnic federalism has not helped (Abbink, 2006; Vaughan, 2003).

Alemayew, a successful Ethiopian man who has lived in South Africa for more than two decades, captured this in the following: "I used to invite people [Ethiopians] over. Each occasion looked very cliquey with each one of them gathered to [their] own ethnic bodies. When conversations heated up, the ethnic tensions crept out. Noticing that, I decided not to ever do these events again." In a number of instances, while they tend to mark the spaces they occupy as distinctly Ethiopian on the surface, the ethnic element lurks in the background, and at times lurches to the front. The Majesty building on Jeppe Street, Johannesburg, with the Ethiopian fag conspicuously painted over it, is an example of marking space using national symbols, and yet, inside the building, each occupant, most of them Ethiopians, tells a different tale, an ethnic tale.

Yared asserts as much in the following: "The ethnic grouping has dominated us. You have to belong to one or the other group in order to survive South African life." Ethiopians from Addis Abeba inject a narrative of non-ethnic self, portraying themselves as individuals with no ethnic background, "just Ethiopian" – a refection of, on one hand, their aversion to the ethnic politics that have become Ethiopia's main preoccupation, and on the other, the Amharanised2 version of them through erasure of ethnic bodies. Among most Ethiopian urbanites, bringing up and talking about ethnic identity is frowned upon. They tend to dismiss anyone who appears to emphasise ethnic identifcation and grouping. However, even among them, those individuals from Oromo, Kembata, and Hadiya ethnic groups are likely to assert and claim their ethnic identity far more enthusiastically and openly.

Roughly fve distinct groupings, with much stronger bonds, connections, and support structures, have been formed. One, the Ethiopians' grouping, is largely

<sup>2</sup>This represents assimilation into ethnic Amhara's language and culture.

composed of urbanites from different Ethiopian cities, declaring Ethiopian identity as their main source of identifcation. They form their own exclusive grouping, even though they are splintered into other groups based on class and social status. The second grouping is individuals from the Oromo ethnic group, with a strong sense of ethnic identity. On the fringe of this, a group of Ethiopian Somalis exist, who appear to be far more linked to ethnic Somalis from Somalia. The fourth one is individuals from the Gurage ethnic group. Most of them are of a Muslim religious background. Though they are fewer in number, they still constitute a visible group with a strong support system and ethnic bond (and Islam as a religion). The fourth one is composed of Kembata and Hadiya, and to lesser extent Welayta, and like their Gurage counter parts, this grouping is also solidifed around religion cojoined with ethnicity.

Kembata and Hadiya constitute the majority of Ethiopian migrants in South Africa. Most of them belong to the charismatic churches. This group is often identifed as "*Hossana*", a somewhat derogatory term, coined and commonly used by the urbanites from Ethiopia, distinguishing themselves from this group. "*Hossana*" became the libel assigned for all people who come from Southern Nations, Nationalities and People's Region (SNNPR).3 In some ways, it appears to be a product of sheer laziness and ineptitude in clearly differentiating from which ethnic or linguistic group each of them come. However, for a large part, it is an active construction of people from this region as rural, unrefned and unsophisticated; such is a construction of the 'other' from the citadel of power, that allows distinguishing the modern and sophisticated urbanite, and, in a similar fashion, the Amharanised Ethiopian.

Kembata and Hadiya for their part have an intense mistrust of other Ethiopians, particularly those whom they presume are from *mahal ager* (central region), and whom they stereotypically characterise as urbanites. The frequent use of *ye ketema ligoch* (city boys) represents the "othering" process through stereotyping. In most cases, this term is used to mean all other Ethiopians from the northern parts of the country, irrespective of whether they come from urban or rural areas. Individuals who come from other major cities in the southern parts of Ethiopia are also painted with the same brush. For a Kembata or Hadiya, thus, a "city boy" represents a mischievous crook – *chulule* is the Amharic word often used – meaning one is untrustworthy and unreliable. It is not clear how they deduced that the term covers all other Ethiopians. It is evident, however, that such stereotypes have an ethnic undertone.

Kembata and Hadiya differentiate themselves from other Ethiopians – the *mahal ager sew* [a person from the centre] – disidentifying with anything of their "other". To be considered one of them, one must "act like one of them", "do things they do", whatever they mean, which is, for the most part, set discursively in opposition to their "other". In as much as these identifcations are the basis for inclusion, they are the basis for exclusion too. These categories organise the economy of emotion – who they sympathise with and who they should not, who they consider potential

<sup>3</sup>Hossana is the administrative centre of the Hadiya zone in the SNNPR (regional state in Ethiopia). Many of those called "*Hossana*" in fact neither come from, nor have ever visited, the town of Hossana.

mates, who they can love, and so on. As Ahmed (2004) would argue, as much as their love for the in-group, their desire to stand distinctly within their own group blurs this boundary where hate for the other begins.

These, however, are not stable groupings with rigid markers and boundaries. Individuals move in and out of them. There are also individuals who sit on the fence, the periphery, or straddling multiple groupings. I have noticed a few urbanites who speak prim and proper Amharic locate themselves within the ethnic and the urbanite groups. These divisions, or rather integration into specifc groupings, can only be sensed when one carefully navigates the different community organisations and associations (such as *mahaber*, *idir,* and *iqub*). While *idir* is an association for support in the event of death, *iqub* is an informal credit association. These associations, in these transnational spaces, are organised and regulated by local elites, who have control over narratives of sameness and difference. In these Ethiopian communities, belonging goes beyond just the sentimental; it is also a source of material support. Loans, advances, crucial information, and grants to support weddings and deaths are all made available through these networks of ethnic groupings. There are certainly sub-ethnic groupings within them, based on kinship (both marital and blood), and depending on affliations established according to which village they come from.

Local elites decide, police, and regulate boundaries of in-groups, who is in and who is out, who an in-group member ought to be (and could be) associated with, which is considered a sign of allegiance, loyalty, and respect for in-groups. They determine who should be supported and who should have access to the community's resources. Terms such as *tifoso* (support) and *ade'ma* (boycott) capture these far more signifcantly. *Asademu* and *ademubign* (to boycott a business or to get people to boycott) are common phrases. These practices are often associated with Ethiopians who come from the SNNP region. However, others, too, refer to the importance of *tifoso* (supporters – usually for business and forms of social support), especially when the service on offer specifcally targets Ethiopians. What this reveals is that these local elites have a bounded infuence to mobilise their in-group for such purposes. On many occasions, thus, support is offered on account of ethnicity and religious affnity. The theme is, "One has to be supported because he is one of us", and it is a strong driver, irrespective of the quality of product or service.

Kembata and Hadiya employ another discursive repertoire – the *Habesha*. The question, "*Habesha aydelehem ende*?" ("Aren't you *Habesha*?"), is a loaded question, but with a clear interest of connecting, establishing a "we", asserting sameness. This is intriguing because of the contrast with their distrust and desire to distance themselves from "*ye mehal ager sew*", barely paling in the face of this claim, which is usually meant to negotiate prices, obtain discounts and favour, or merely to establish a connection. Some encounters are framed within the narrative of "We are all *Habesha*". *Habesha* identity used to represent an ethnic grouping from northern Ethiopia and southern and central Eritrea. In this transnational context, however, it is now appropriated simply to straddle boundaries, to establish common narratives of sameness, or, rather, strategies of integration.

Many efforts to establish formal Ethiopian associations have not materialised due to multiple factors, such as competition for control and dominance of these organisation, as well as due to divisions over political affliation – supporters and opponents of the regime. In 2013, there was an effort to establish an Ethiopian Community Association in Durban, which could not get off the ground because of such divisions. Many Ethiopians who were opposing the regime back home considered simply the establishment of this association as the work of the Ethiopian government, and dismissed the coordinators as "tools of the regime". Curiously, however, those who opposed the establishment of the association happened to be mostly urbanites and ethnic groups other than Kembata and Hadiya. Most of them referred to this association as "*Hossana's* association" and "a tool for the embassy". This division was also visible in who represented this community with regards to refugee affairs and relations with the state and NGOs.

Later in 2015, an Ethiopian Refugee Association was established, where the participants agreed that any negotiation with the local government and NGOs could only be possible through collective representation and organisation. As things stand currently, there are multiple associations claiming to represent the Ethiopian community. Perhaps we should talk about Ethiopian communities. We have seen this even with churches, which usually bring people together, and yet they become divisive at the same time. As some point, there were two concurrent initiatives with fundraising to set up a Coptic Orthodox Church in Durban: one for those in the opposition to the regime in Ethiopia, and one for the ones associated with the regime.

In the face of such divisions noted above, remarkable narratives are mobilised to calm the tides and tensions: "We are of the same region", "We are in a foreign country", "We have a common struggle", "We are brothers", "Share the same history". "We are Ethiopian", is another important narrative suturing "us" from below when it is necessary, to make connections, to fnd company in a bar, to strip away loneliness, or to get a discount while purchasing merchandise. These narratives are telling – to be together, to co-exist peacefully, they had to emphasise commonalities; sameness has to be projected and difference has to be suppressed at least for the moment, in that instance.

Undoubtedly, these notions are very elastic; they overlap, they stretch, they sit in apparent contradictions and tensions. Yet, they are mobilised in the everyday, as part of claim-making. Consider "We are all African" as speaking to the solidarity in the continent, a narrative often used to assert, and claim, the right to live in South Africa. They assert that they are African and have a natural right to live anywhere in Africa. I had multiple conversations of a similar type, lamenting why black South Africans cannot consider their "African brothers" as entitled to live in this country, while they have given "white colonial settlers" this right. Many African migrants use this narrative to this effect. Themes on "We supported the anti-apartheid movement" and "We hosted and supported ANC's struggle", "From Hailesellasie to Mengistu, Ethiopia has done a lot for this country", and so on, are all part of this assertion. These discursive repertoires are appropriated to claim inclusion.

On one occasion, an Ethiopian shop owner dealing with a Zulu hawker pointed out to his customer: "We are all Africans! We are children of this continent." Such is an attempt in searching for a narrative to claim that he too has a stake in this country, which is located on this continent. Their claim of pan-Africanism is, however,

rather a tactical one; it is a desire to temporarily transcend borders and boundaries, in order to be accepted and fnd belonging in their new abode or garner support for their cause – whatever that may be. These are temporary, tentative claims but certainly serve the purpose of the moment. Despite invoking such narrative, many still cling to the ethnic, and their support/solidarity is organised and mobilised in and through ethnic allegiances.

It should be noted that such discourses are not always available to everyone nor are mobilised by everyone in a similar fashion. Reclaiming and deploying such narratives is contingent upon one's exposure and access to them. One has to be equipped with such a narrative as an African identity, and consider it to be a tool. For someone from rural Ethiopia, who recently arrived in South Africa, these narratives are rather foreign and distant. After all, these are also racial solidarities, mostly based on notions of collective historical and current victimhood. Some Ethiopians, however, have an aversion to racially identifying themselves as black – which is in direct confict with the repertoire of an African identity. It is interesting to notice the use of "we", which certainly obscures and occludes other experiences.

These are played out against the backdrop of the South African state's impulse to incorporate these migrants as a temporary "other" into its political economy, while extracting material gains from their presence as economic actors. Here, I am referring to the asylum and refugee regime many have been stuck with for well over a decade. Nevertheless, the state's project is constantly tempered by blurring of boundaries of citizenship, which is traditionally formed around and assumed to be confned within delineated political geography. This blurred vision has taken shape with unbounded rights and citizenships that have now deepened their roots and expanded globally. We notice the discourse that the South African state placed within the notion of a sovereign nation that has a responsibility to its "own citizens". Many have heard, on more than a few occasions, government offcials making the statement "We have a responsibility to our citizens", which refects their unease with expanding rights to those they would like to view and keep as the "noncitizens", particularly those in the asylum and refugee system. It is in recognition of these conditions on rights that Ethiopians enter the asylum regime. This can be viewed as a tactic of integration from below, as the transnational bodies search for ways of adapting to, or in some cases subverting, strategy.

### **15.4 Conclusion**

Ethiopians are equipped with multiple narratives, of self and their own "other". They tell stories they invent or appropriate. In telling stories about themselves, who is in and who is out, simplifed categories are useful, consistently reducing and consigning individuals into identifable categories. Such stories are almost all the time recast in a particular fashion to serve the particular moments of sociation and interaction, confict and struggle. Such moments are feeting, temporary, and "undecided" (Highmore, 2002). These stories are nonetheless useful in facilitating individuals' interactions, ftting in and claiming specifc supports and resources.

It is also clear that the discourse on 'integration' fnds legibility through its emphasis on the presumed difference between "us" and "them" as separate beings, with different characters, qualities, national identities, culture, political allegiances, and even sensibilities. Departing from the notion of "us" and "them", "integration", as a mode of incorporating the "other," seeks to re-mark, instead of unmark, "other" bodies and the spaces they occupy. Despite formal and institutional strategies and policies of integration, people, from below, have their own kinds of strategies.

Ethiopian elites in these diasporic spaces pursue strategies of organising what they consider to be in-groups, be they national, ethnic, or religious bodies, and yet inject claim-making discourses and strategies to integrate themselves into the South African state. These elites, infuencing their community in many instances, make claims over transnational citizenship, cosmopolitan reception, and African identity as Pan-Africanist claims. They do not seem to see therein, however, the tensions and contradiction. The tensions among these claims and tactics appears to carry the possibility both for division and fracture, and for cohesion and solidarity. These are refections of the conditions of their relative position in relation to the state, their desire to organise their 'own' community in a particular way to serve their own interests, and hence the tactical mobilisation of these narratives as part of their claim-making practices.

"Integration" is, in this sense, a sociospatial construct that works with the assumptions of the "other" needing to immerse into "us" and "ours," an imaginative production in "being rather than becoming". Ethiopian migrants in South Africa have a duality in their encounters – a dynamic process of stitching and unstitching "home" and "abroad". In sum, assessing "integration" inevitably leads us to the furry of identity plays that represent part of the impulse to, at once, "ft in" and belong, but also to exclude; to demarcate resources and privileges, but also to redemarcate; a constant and instant marking and re-marking of social boundaries. Sameness and difference are at the heart of these plays, producing and reproducing social boundaries, appropriating and transforming them.

### **References**

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Ahmed, S. (2004). *The cultural politics of emotion*. Routledge.


**Open Access** This chapter is licensed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits use, sharing, adaptation, distribution and reproduction in any medium or format, as long as you give appropriate credit to the original author(s) and the source, provide a link to the Creative Commons license and indicate if changes were made.

The images or other third party material in this chapter are included in the chapter's Creative Commons license, unless indicated otherwise in a credit line to the material. If material is not included in the chapter's Creative Commons license and your intended use is not permitted by statutory regulation or exceeds the permitted use, you will need to obtain permission directly from the copyright holder.

### **Part VI Workers' Rights and New Forms of Work**

### **Chapter 16 "We maZimba… There Is Nothing That We Cannot Do": The Work Ethic of Undocumented Zimbabwean Day Labourers in eMalahleni, South Africa**

**Johannes Machinya**

### **16.1 Introduction**

Between June 2015 and December 2016, I interacted with undocumented Zimbabwean day labourers in eMalahleni. These were predominantly men who congregated at strategic locations such as the local shopping mall, Isibindi Centre, and road intersections around the mall, waiting to be hired for a day's work. Some of the men, such as Donald,1 would strategically isolate themselves to avoid competition from the other men and make themselves easily noticeable to prospective employers. One afternoon, in the sweltering heat of October 2015, on my way to Isibindi Centre, I noticed Donald sitting alone with his lawn mower on the roadside. I joined him, and after exchanging salutations, inquired:


The above vignette illustrates the work-related predicament confronting undocumented Zimbabwean day labourers and their tactical approach in dealing with the challenges. Examining this approach, which is driven by a logic of "getting by"

J. Machinya (\*)

<sup>1</sup> I use pseudonyms for all the names of the participants and other locations (such as Isibindi Centre), except for eMalahleni, which is the study area.

<sup>2</sup> "Joni" is a term for Johannesburg but is popularly used by Zimbabweans to refer to the whole of South Africa.

Wits Institute for Social and Economic Research, University of the Witwatersrand, Johannesburg, South Africa

P. Rugunanan, N. Xulu-Gama (eds.), *Migration in Southern Africa*, IMISCOE Research Series, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-92114-9\_16

(*kukiya-kiya*), and guided by ethics of hard work and reliability, this chapter focuses on the (re)production of exploitation among undocumented migrants. While this approach makes undocumented migrants more attractive to many employers, I argue, they inadvertently discipline themselves, thus actively contributing to their own exploitation.

Job opportunities have signifcantly waned in South Africa. The Quarterly Labour Force Survey (QLFS) in the third quarter of 2019 showed that the country has an unemployment rate of 29.1%, its highest in more than 16 years (Statistics South Africa, 2019). This, coupled with structural barriers that prohibit the employment of undocumented migrants, makes it onerous for undocumented migrants to fnd work. However, research shows that undocumented migrants fnd work mostly in the informal sector, where employers prefer hiring them because they have less bargaining power and are thus more exploitable (Crush, 2011). Migrant "illegality", this literature notes, makes undocumented migrant workers reluctant to join trade unions or complain about unpaid or low wages and substandard working conditions for fear that their employers would retaliate and take action that could lead to their arrest and deportation. For example, the Human Rights Watch (1998) found that farmers would report their undocumented migrant farm workers to the police when time to pay their wages approached or when they appeared to be subversive, which, consequently, restrained the workers for fear of being reported to the police.

Reitzes (1995) cited in Solomon (2001) portrays undocumented migrants as passive victims who are heavily constrained by their "illegal" status to unwillingly acquiesce to their own exploitation. While acknowledging the structural constraints that predispose undocumented migrants to exploitation, such as South Africa's restrictive immigration and labour market policies, I seek to broaden this analysis by underscoring the place of agency in the (re)production of the exploitation of undocumented migrant workers. I utilise what the Zimbabwean day labourers call, in *Chi*Shona, *kukiya-kiya* or *kubatanidza-batanidza* (joining things together to make do), which is a tactical approach for and a logic of "getting by" and "making do", as a lens through which I examine how these undocumented migrants adopt and cultivate a series of work traits that are guided by the moral ethics of hard work, trustworthiness and reliability to make themselves more attractive to employers, but, inadvertently, exploitable. So, instead of overstating the seeming vulnerability and powerlessness of undocumented migrants, I demonstrate how the Zimbabwean day labourers' agency can both shape and be limited by structures of power (see Giddens, 1993), thereby constituting an oxymoronic mix of a responsive strategy to their work-related challenges that also exacerbates their exploitation.

The chapter demonstrates how the moral ethics guiding the notion of *kukiya-kiya* or *kubatanidza-batanidza* enable the undocumented Zimbabwean men to do a performance of willingness to be an obedient, fexible, and hardworking workforce that is, performing some impression management (Goffman, 1959), which shapes their employers' perceptions of them and therefore, makes them preferred workers. This, however, raises some questions pertaining to such exercise of agency by these men through *kukiya-kiya*: Given that migrant "illegality" circumscribes the entry and involvement of undocumented migrant workers in the labour market, is *kukiya-kiya* an exercise of agency by the undocumented migrant workers, or through *kukiya-kiya* they merely do what they should for them to survive? This analysis nuances the dynamics at play in the (re)production of undocumented migrant workers' exploitation, and more importantly, underlines how, as Batisai's chapter in this book highlights, the contextual specifcities shape the work-related experiences of undocumented migrants, thus giving a southern perspective to the analysis of migrant worker exploitation within the South-South migration context.

In the sections that follow, I examine the concept of *kukiya-kiya* or *kubatanidzabatanidza*, highlighting its meaning and origins. I then look at daily wage work in South Africa and analyse how the undocumented Zimbabwean men deploy the idea of *kukiya-kiya* in their everyday work experiences in order for them to fnd work and negotiate and maintain employment relationships. This analysis will reveal how *kukiya-kiya* as an agential project enables the undocumented Zimbabwean men to both overcome their work-related challenges and actively contribute to the (re)production of their exploitation.

### **16.2** *Kukiya-kiya* **or** *Kubatanidza-batanidza***: Some Conceptual Explanations**

For the past several years, many Zimbabweans searching for economic opportunities considered South Africa synonymous with the biblical land fowing with milk and honey. But South Africa's restrictive immigration policy forces many "lowskilled" Zimbabweans to cross the border "illegally". And those who do so often fnd life to be a parody of what they anticipated before they migrated, with limited opportunities for "better" paying jobs. Such migrants fnd themselves in conditions similar to, or even worse than, the ones they ran away from.

Oftentimes, my interlocutors bemoaned that "z*vinhu zvakakiya*/*zvakaoma"* (things are tight) when describing their daily life struggles in South Africa, and that *"tiri kukiya-kiya/kubatanidza-batanidza"* (we are getting by/we are joining things together) to highlight their responsive strategies to overcome the challenges. In this section, I examine the notion of *kukiya-kiya* or *kubatanidza-batanidza*, its meaning and conceptual origins.

*Kukiya-kiya* or *kubatanidza-batanidza* became popular in Zimbabwe at the height of the socio-economic crisis that started in the early 2000s and peaked in 2008 as everyday jargon, not only to defne the crisis, but also to underline people's industrious efforts to keep going in the face of debilitating socio-economic circumstances (Madambi et al., 2015; Jones, 2010). I use the terms *kukiya-kiya* or *kubatanidza-batanidza* interchangeably.

*Kukiya* is a verb whose literal meaning is "to lock". It is used to describe situations that are stifing. As we have seen in my conversation with Donald, undocumented Zimbabweans in South Africa also use the term *-kiya* to describe the "tight" conditions they live in. *Kukiya* is also used metaphorically with a sense of victory to

denote an act of forcefully or cleverly knocking down an adversary. This metaphorical usage of *kukiya* informs the meaning of *kukiya-kiya* which suggests "cleverness, dodging, and the exploitation of whatever resources are at hand" for self-sustenance (Jones, 2010:286). Therefore, *kukiya-kiya* is a tactical response to crisis that enables people to make ends meet in the here and now. *Kubatanidza-batanidza*, as the equivalent of *kukiya-kiya*, refers to the process of joining things together under diffcult conditions as a way of desperately achieving a desired end – to get by (Chimhundu & Mangoya, 2001).

In Zimbabwe, these concepts referred to unorthodox survival strategies adopted by many people as the country's formal economy crumbled (Madambi et al., 2015; Jones, 2010). But, far from being a new phenomenon, the logic of *kukiya-kiya* or *kubatanidza-batanidza* has always been a part of Zimbabwe's urban landscape (Jones, 2010). *Kukiya-kiya* was largely driven by a pre-existing and deeply held ethic of working with one's hands (*kushanda mabasa emaoko*) that was propagated by some churches and state programmes to promote self-suffciency (Jones, 2010). For example, some African apostolic Christians, popularly known as *mapostori* in Zimbabwe, presented working with one's hands as a moral alternative to working for *varungu* (whites) (Dillon-Malone, 1978). Other formulations of working with one's hands were linked to the creation of a racialised labour force (Jones, 2010). Studies in the West show that - and this has been the case in most parts of contemporary Africa - the rhetoric of working with one's hands was a form of "protest masculinity" (McDowell, 2003) linked to the construction of certain occupational identities associated with "a particular type of working-class masculinity" among young, poorly educated men (Nixon, 2006:208). This "macho" masculinity considered one's competences as embodied in the body's physical ability, which contrasts middle-class "cerebral masculinities" that celebrate academic success, intellect, and non-manual labour (Nixon, 2006; McDowell, 2003).

The practices that constitute *kukiya-kiya* relate well to de Certeau's (1984) discussion on tactical action, which he argues is dependent on lack of access to "proper place". He defnes "proper place" as "a place that can be delimited as its own" and can "serve as the base" for managing "relations with an exteriority composed of targets or threats" (de Certeau, 1984:37). Because it is bereft of a "proper place", a tactic harnesses time, always looking to seize opportunities, and "constantly manipulat[ing] events in order to turn them into 'opportunities'" (de Certeau, 1984:xix). A tactic, therefore, is a "calculated action", an "art of the weak" (de Certeau, 1984:37) that depends on the clever utilisation of time and opportunities. What this means is that a tactic can enable one to opportunistically overturn unfavourable circumstances and derive some positive outcomes.

De Certeau's analysis helps elucidate the notion of *kukiya-kiya*. Migrant "illegality" positions the migrants "out of place" with no "proper place" and the space they exist in is the space of another. Thus, they "play on and with a terrain imposed on [them] and organised by the law" of the country, seizing "the chance offerings of the moment" (de Certeau, 1984:37). Being "out of place" subjects them to prohibitions and exclusions, making them structurally vulnerable. However, through *kukiyakiya*, the migrants can exploit and manipulate the regulations designed to exclude them; they can ingeniously cope with the myriad challenges they face in their everyday struggles to fnd work in an environment where they are perceived as criminals (see Crush & Williams, 2003), where jobs are scarce, and their "illegality" prohibits them from working.

As a tactical approach, *kukiya-kiya* depends on the "clever utilisation of time" (de Certeau, 1984:39), which gives it a limited spatio-temporal horizon. It is a transient response "just for now" (Jones, 2010:295) because the prevailing circumstances demand such a proactive response. In Zimbabwe, its functionality as a temporal means to an end that was defned in the here and now often resulted in the suspension of rules and straightness and adoption of "whatever works" (Jones, 2010:294) methods for achieving desired goals. This had far-reaching repercussions on the ethics and morality of the Zimbabwean people in general, as the culture of surviving through crooked means took root. While the undocumented Zimbabwean day labourers in South Africa build their understanding of *kukiya-kiya* around the ways the concept was understood and deployed in Zimbabwe, theirs is guided by some degree of moral propriety and ethics.

### **16.3 Daily Wage Workers: Men Who Stand by the Side of the Road**

The daily wage labour market is burgeoning worldwide and is predominantly constituted by men. This informal labour market is linked to the expansion of global economic restructuring, the emergence of informal markets, and the decline of formal economic activity regulated by the state, particularly the rise of part-time and contingent work (Belous, 1989). It serves as a safety net for those people who fall out of or fail to enter the formal job market. In developed countries in the Global North, it serves as an entry point into the labour market for migrant workers who may be able to transition into the formal economy (Van Nieuwenhuyze, 2009; Valenzuela Jr., 2000).

In South Africa, daily wage work is linked to the liberalisation of the economy and the resultant erosion of employment opportunities for those with labour market disadvantage (Blaauw et al., 2006). Daily wage work thus became a source of livelihood for the "less-skilled", among them migrants from other countries. Just as in the United States of America, daily wage work in South Africa serves as an avenue into the labour market for many Zimbabwean migrants, most of whom are undocumented, but this is how far the similarity goes because the chances for these migrants to transition into the formal labour market are extremely limited (Blaauw et al., 2012).

Daily wage work is a precarious form of work; employment relationships are forged outside the regulatory systems designed to protect workers (Camou, 2009). It is a "laissez-faire market place" (Blaauw et al., 2012:1335) where work processes are easily alterable with little or no institutional protection for the workers. For example, labour is largely clandestine, undeclared, paid below the minimum wage,

or employed under circumstances that society's norms would not otherwise allow (Valenzuela Jr., 2000). The work is temporary, short-term (sometimes lasting only a few hours), and is often composed of daily work assignments. Recruitment for the jobs and the pricing of labour are mostly through negotiation with no written contract. This mostly takes place before the worker gets into the vehicle of the employer to be transported to the actual place where he is going to work for the day. The employer and the worker may agree on the terms of employment, but the lack of a written contract means there is no guarantee that the worker will be paid after completing the job. Incidents of under-payment or no payment at all are common (Blaauw et al., 2006). In the end, wages in this labour market depend largely on the goodwill of the employer (Blaauw et al., 2012). While I concur with this, we should also not understate the persuasive power of the daily-wage workers. Since the negotiation for the job happens mostly before the employer hires the worker, the Zimbabwean migrants invoke the notion of *kukiya-kiya* as being able to cunningly wheedle prospective employers into hiring them and agreeing to pay "better" once the job is completed.

As I indicated in the introduction to the chapter, the Zimbabwean day labourers in eMalahleni congregate at Isibindi Centre and surrounding areas, signalling to passing motorists either by shouting the jobs they are looking for or waving a placard on which is written the jobs they do, or holding the tools for the jobs they are looking for. It is common to see these men circling cars that stop looking for workers. The men try to outmuscle and outbid one another to get hired. Sometimes the men just scramble into the passenger seat or jump into the back of the car and urge the driver to drive off even before hearing they type of job to be done or terms of engagement. While the hiring sites are marked by bouts of pandemonium as the daily wage workers compete to be hired, for the most part, the workers maintain a modicum of orderliness (Valenzuela Jr., 2000).

### **16.4 Methods**

This chapter is based on qualitative ethnographic data gathered with undocumented Zimbabwean migrant daily wage workers between the ages of 20 and 50 years in Emalahleni, a mining town in Mpumalanga Province, South Africa. As I highlight elsewhere (Machinya, 2019, 2021), the undocumented Zimbabwean migrants in Emalahleni live with incessant anxiety over disclosing their "illegal" status for fear of arrest and deportation. This fear pushes them into spaces where they prefer their status to remain undetectable to state offcials and anyone who shows interest in their undocumented status.

I was aware that for me to forge relationships of trust with such people and gain suffcient insights into the capriciousness of their everyday life, it was important that I follow these undocumented Zimbabwean men over a longer period, and ethnography provided me with appropriate methodological tools to achieve this. Between June 2015 and December 2016, I lived with the undocumented Zimbabwean migrants in an informal settlement. My prolonged presence enabled more relaxed interactions with my interlocutors. I would write feldwork notes to capture these informal conversations as well as the observations I made. The people were able to share more intimate stories as well as sorrowful narratives about their experiences in these relaxed informal conversations.

In addition to the informal observations and conversations through ethnography, I conducted and audio-recorded twenty-two in-depth interviews with the undocumented Zimbabwean daily wage workers. The interviews were all in *ChiShona* and I transcribed and translated them into English. The process of transcribing was time-consuming and tedious, but as Riessman (1993) notes, it proved to be an excellent way of familiarising myself with the data and gaining a more thorough understanding of the different aspects of the lives of my interlocutors. Through listening and re-listening to the audios, repeatedly reading the transcribed interviews and feldwork notes, I was able to make sense of the verbal utterances in relation to the research participants' experiences of "illegality" and deportability. In fact, through this process, I immersed myself in the data (Braun & Clarke, 2006), which was crucial for analysis.

### **16.5 "We** *Kiya-kiya* **to Survive"**

The Zimbabwean day labourers deployed the notion of *kukiya-kiya* to both defne and survive the existential challenges associated with migrant "illegality". Being "illegal" and subsequently prohibited from working and accessing other social services linked to citizenship evokes feelings of being left on their own with no one to help them; as Pardon revealed, "There is no one to help us here except ourselves." These feelings of socio-political abandonment propel the Zimbabwean men into *kukiya-kiya* as a pragmatic and well-calculated response for survival. When asked about their responses to the challenges they face in South Africa, the men frequently responded like Ronny, *"Munhu[rume] ndewekuzvishandira"* (A man must work for himself), or Amos, *"Murume chaiye ndewe kukiya-kiya"* (A real man must *kiyakiya*), or Donald *"..tiri kungo kiya-kiya… kuti life ifambe"* (…we *kiya-kiya…* to survive).

These men see *kukiya-kiya* as underlining a certain degree of "real" masculinity and engendering self-reliance whereby they look not to the state for the provision of the means for survival, but instead look to themselves. Through *kukiya-kiya,* the men engage in self-employment and work with their own hands - as Pardon puts it, "… if you do not have a [formal] job, you must work for yourself with your own hands". These men take pride in their bodily ability to survive diffcult situations, as Amos proudly articulated: "… We *maZimba* (Zimbabweans), we are strong. There is nothing that we cannot do; we use our own hands; we do not sit on our hands."

They celebrate working with their own hands as a display of "real" manhood, which is a form of protest masculinity (McDowell, 2003). This masculinity energises them to overcome labour market disadvantages that restrict their entry into the formal labour market, particularly those associated with educational qualifcations and "legal" status. While I met a few men with post-secondary school qualifcations, most of the Zimbabwean day labourers did not have educational qualifcations. These men exalt bodily ability and strength as central to executing their jobs. As such, most of the jobs they do through *kukiya-kiya* are manual jobs that require no or little mental dexterity. So to say that "… we are strong… [and] we use our own hands" downplays middle-class "cerebral masculinities" that celebrate academic success, intellect, and non-manual labour (Nixon, 2006; McDowell, 2003).

Migrant "illegality" and the general scarcity of jobs in South Africa leave these men with limited labour market choices, to the extent that through *kukiya-kiya,* they do anything and everything to survive. Amos said, "When we are here in Joni, we do anything to survive." These men are less selective in what they do. Through *kukiya-kiya,* they do the most dangerous jobs under minimum safety standards for low pay. For example, I once witnessed three men felling a tree in a suburb. One of them was precariously perched on tree branches cutting the tree with a chainsaw but with no protective clothing.

Doing anything to survive gives the men a wide array of activities that constitute the portfolio of *kukiya-kiya*. They do menial odd jobs, mostly groundskeeping (lawn mowing, landscaping, tree felling, gardening) or building maintenance (painting, tiling, and roofng). Others work in construction as casual workers or *madhakaboy* (mud-mixers), and others work as *vana mahobho* (security guards). Not only are these different work skills found amongst the different men within the group, but almost every man claims to be a jack of all trades able to fx any problem. For example, Mr. Dzika, a leader in one of the Zimbabwean churches, was doing tiling, painting, building, and selling mops, mats, and brooms. He told me, "I *kiya-kiya*. I do anything as long as it makes me survive."

Given that the majority of the Zimbabwean daily wage workers do not have educational qualifcations, being jacks of all trades broadens their skills profle and makes them a convenient and dependable workforce for many employers. Amos Tumbare proudly referred to the group of Zimbabwean men that congregate at Isibindi Centre as a "one-stop-shop":

Here we are a one-stop shop. You fnd [every worker] here; if you want a plumber, you fnd him here. If you want a welder or a builder, they are here. Men who fx electric faults are also here. All these men you see here know how to do many things; we don't just mow lawn.

The men acquire these different skills by persistently trying different avenues to earn a living: they try this today; if it does not work, then tomorrow they try another one. Also, the availability of some jobs in the daily wage market is subject to cyclical variations related to weather and seasonal periods (for example, lawn mowing), or the ups and downs of the construction or home improvement industry.

While "doing anything" to survive may insinuate that one may go to the extremes of getting involved in criminal activities, my interlocutors revealed that the jobs they do through *kukiya-kiya* and how they do them are guided by some form of moral propriety and ethics that cultivate and value hard-work, trustworthiness, and honesty. This effectively creates a culture of work that shapes how each migrant approaches his work as well as how their employers perceive them. Their adoption of *kukiya-kiya* is intertwined with the drive to deconstruct the perceptions that associate migrant "illegality" with criminality (see Crush & Williams, 2003). These men mostly work around people's homes; so, for them, doing unstraightforward activities would jeopardise their chances of getting hired. Therefore, they try to establish a virtuous and moral community that is intolerant of improper behaviour in order to deconstruct public perceptions that associate migrant "illegality" with criminality and discourage anything that can invite unwanted attention from the police.

### **16.6 The Spatio-Temporal Horizon of** *Kukiya-kiya*

The undocumented Zimbabwean day labourers frame *kukiya-kiya* in a spatiotemporal boundary limited to "these days" and "in this country". For example, Pardon told me that, "These days life in South Africa requires us to *kiya-kiya.*" The phrases "These days…" and "… in South Africa…" delimit the spatio-temporal zoning of *kukiya-kiya* as something the migrants adopt at a particular temporal juncture in a particular space. The framing of the temporal horizon of *kukiya-kiya* in the present suggests that the migrants have a certain moment located in the past that they compare their current experiences to. Often refecting nostalgic memories of remembered or imagined pasts, the day labourers highlighted that things have changed in South Africa. How far they went back into the past was unclear, but they generally alluded to a past where life was better. Mr. Muzivi, who represented Zimbabweans as a committee member of the community policing forum said, "[South Africans] no longer want us here… Things were better when I frst came here, even xenophobia, we did not hear about it."

Mr. Muzivi frst came to South Africa in 2002 and moved to eMalahleni in 2004. According to him, jobs were easy to fnd and xenophobia threats were rare until May 2008. His account refers to a past that he nostalgically remembers, when "things were better". During that time, he easily found work as backroom staff at a butchery in eMalahleni. He fondly remembered those days because "we were paid better". Life for him took a slide in 2010 when his employer's business crumbled, and he lost his job. That is when he began *kukiya-kiya*. Some of the men had no experience of these better times; they only heard about such times from those who had been in South Africa before them. It is from these accounts that they imagined these past times. For example, Taonga Makombe, who came to South Africa in 2015, said, "We just hear that *kare* (some time ago) it was easy to fnd jobs here." Nonetheless, these men's remembered and imagined pasts in relation to the present, which is characterised by *kukiya-kiya*, were too romanticised, as the exploitation of undocumented migrants in South Africa is a well-documented reality (Solomon, 2001; Human Rights Watch, 1998).

What is conspicuous in these men's refections on *kukiya-kiya* are feelings of shame about what they do – a shame produced when their migrant experience intersects with home. The jobs that these men do through *kukiya-kiya* are despised back in Zimbabwe, and some of the men fail to withstand the indignity of doing such work, so they choose to return to Zimbabwe if they fail to fnd "real" jobs. As these men engage in *kukiya-kiya*, they discard their pre-migration aspirations and imaginations of life in South Africa. Most of them told me that the jobs they were doing were not the ones they envisaged before coming to South Africa. They had envisioned South Africa as a place of opportunity, but after failing to fnd the "real" jobs they hoped for, they turned to *kukiya-kiya*.

If the jobs that the Zimbabwean day labourers do through *kukiya-kiya* are seen as humiliating and degrading, why do these men continue doing such low-status jobs? Jones' argument about the limited spatio-temporal horizon of *kukiya-kiya* as a transient response "just for now", "these days" and in "this country" (Jones, 2010:295) is useful to explain this. The threat of deportation works as a disciplinary instrument that reminds undocumented migrants that their time in South Africa is ephemeral. This is tremendously productive of these undocumented migrants' consciousness of their "illegality", unwantedness, unbelonging, and unrootedness to the social setting they are in (Machinya, 2021). Deportability and the temporariness of their migration decouple the performance of these socially degraded jobs, as something they only do in South Africa, from their social identities back home. This is because an individual's social identity is located in their place of origin. "Home" is the place where their social identities as migrant workers are acknowledged and valued (Galvin, 2015), mainly through the tangible things they bring as the fruits of their toiling. That deportability unsettles the Zimbabwean day labourers from the social setting they are in makes them a true economic man, probably the closest thing in real life to the *Homo Economicus* of economic theory. The men frequently told me that, "We just do this when we are here [in South Africa]," which implies they cannot perform these are jobs in Zimbabwe.

Doing work that is generally held in low esteem back in Zimbabwe is emotionally draining for some of these men. And since such jobs do not ft the defnition of what they understand as "real" jobs, they do not take *kukiya-kiya* as work. Such men were supremely disinterested in the jobs they do as such jobs did not correspond with the men's pre-migration imaginations. Taonga aspired to get a job as an electrical technician but ended up being, frst, a *dhakaboy* and then a security guard. Lovemore also came to South Africa hoping to fnd a job as a truck driver, but he was working as a *dhakaboy*.

Those who were disinterested in their work were reluctant to have people back home know their actual jobs in South Africa. Lovemore queried, "How can I tell people [back home] that I am a mud mixer?" He said those who do low status jobs such as *"kukanya dhaka"* (mud-mixing), or *"kuchera matrench"* (digging trenches), or *"kucheka* lawn*"* (lawn mowing) do not disclose such jobs to people in Zimbabwe because they were despised. If he were to tell the people in Zimbabwe that he was working as a mud-mixer, Lovemore said, they would scornfully ask, "Surely, how do you go to Joni to be a mud-mixer?" For people in Zimbabwe, it is incomprehensible that one migrates to South Africa to do such despised jobs.

Most of these men remain evasive about their actual jobs to people back home using the statement, *"Ndiri kukiya-kiya"* (I am making do). This way, the undocumented migrants conceal their sources of livelihood, the same way Jones (2010) notes how *kukiya-kiya* was shrouded in secrecy in Zimbabwe. However, in this instance, the migrants conceal the actual nature of their jobs because the jobs they do are despised and they are afraid that people in Zimbabwe will mock them, while in Jones' study, *kukiya-kiya* is shrouded in secrecy due to the underhand and often illegal dealings involved.

### **16.7 Getting and Doing the Work Through** *Kukiya-kiya*

The Zimbabwean day labourers deploy *kukiya-kiya* as tactical innovativeness that is little concerned with perfection but, instead, enables them to overcome the structural challenges that impede them from getting hired or getting the jobs done. One aspect that is central to *kukiya-*kiya is language profciency, particularly given that recruitment and the pricing of labour is usually done through negotiation. Previous studies indicate that profciency in the employer's preferred language places the migrants in a better position to communicate information about their skills and negotiate for better wages, thus enhancing their chances of getting hired (Blaauw et al., 2012; Chiswick & Miller, 2003). While English is a universal language in eMalahleni, my interlocutors said they get hired by people who speak other languages, mostly isiZulu and Afrikaans.

Amos narrated how, most of the time, Afrikaans speakers come and shout the jobs that they are looking for someone to do from their cars, *"Grassnyer!"* (Lawn mower!), or *"Verwer!"* (Painter!). Amos said if one does not understand Afrikaans, one would remain seated whilst others run towards the car shouting in Afrikaans, *"Ek kan dit doen; ek kan dit doen!"* (I can do it; I can do it!). This, I was told, is also a deliberate strategy by some employers to screen the workers, with those who cannot converse in the employer's language being automatically excluded. Here, *kukiya-kiya* is deployed as the ability to speak simple, usually broken, phrases in the employer's preferred language. Profciency in the employer's preferred language acts as a form of social capital that helps in establishing relations between employers and individual workers and increasing one's chances of getting rehired. The possibility of rehiring stands in contrast to the image of daily wage work as a spot market of anonymous, substitutable individuals.

While *kiya-kiyar*ing the language of a prospective employer helps them get hired, sometimes the workers impulsively accept a job without getting full details about it. This opens opportunities for unfair labour practices as happened to Peter and his two colleagues. Peter told me that a white man pulled his car in at Isibindi Centre and called out in Afrikaans, *"Ek soek drie mense wat 'n stukkende heining by my huis kan reg maak"* (I'm looking for three people who can fx a broken fence at my house). Peter outpaced the other men. In broken Afrikaans, he told the white man that he could do the job with his two friends, and that was how far he could negotiate. Without further conversation, the man ordered Peter and his friends into the back of the car, and off they went. Peter and his friends were surprised as they drove more than an hour out of eMalahleni. They arrived at the man's house and were shown where they were to repair the fence; actually, it was not a yard but a whole farm. They worked for three consecutive days at that farm without returning to eMalahleni, and Peter said that if he had known about that arrangement, he would not have accepted the job.

The art of *kukiya-kiya* is also mobilised when one successfully completes a job that they are not knowledgeable about. In a context where jobs are scarce, the Zimbabwean men use the catchphrase "*basa harirambwi*" (you do not turn down a job) even if they do not know how to do it. Instead, they summon the idiosyncrasy of *kukiya-kiya* or *kubatanidza-batanidza* wherein they would "join things together" and get the job done. *Kukiya-kiya* or *kubatanidza-batanidza* becomes an innovative way of learning how to fx things whilst actually doing the job. For example, Donald told me that a white man once pulled over his vehicle at the spot he was sitting looking for a carpenter to fx and repaint a broken ceiling at his house. Despite not having any carpentry skills, let alone the tools, Donald accepted the job. He was taken to the man's house and was shown a warehouse with many tools. He selected the ones he wanted for the job. Before he started fxing the ceiling, Donald took some time carefully examining how the other ceiling boards were joined so that he could lay the new ceiling boards the same way. He fxed the ceiling and magnifcently repainted it and the employer was impressed. Boastfully, he said to me, *"Ndakakiyakiya basa zvikaita murungu akanakirwa"* (I successfully did *kiya-kiya* the job and the white man was impressed).

Through *kukiya-kiya,* one does not need to have prior knowledge about how to do the job; one just fgures out how to do it in the process. Through this kind of *kukiya-kiya*, the Zimbabwean men actually learn multiple skills which they did not have when they frst came to South Africa. Therefore, *kukiya-kiya* is more about creativity and individual ingenuity, and less about doing things by the book. What Donald did qualifes as *kubatanidza-batanidza* (putting things together), whereby he took this and that and put them together to fx the broken ceiling. What is also important is being able to recognise moments of opportunity and quickly grab the opportunity before someone else takes it. Donald knew that, had he told his hirer that he was not a carpenter, he would have lost a big opportunity to make money that day.

Impressing an employer is a crucial part of *kukiya-kiya* as this creates a good relationship between the employer and the worker, increasing chances of rehiring. They may exchange phone numbers afterwards. Also, since the payment of wages depends on the goodwill of the employer, many employers pay if they are impressed. My interlocutors did not rule out that through *kukiya-kiya*, some people perform disappointingly and in such cases, employers may refuse to pay.

### **16.8 Conclusion: On the Question of Agency and Exploitation**

Undocumented migrant worker exploitation in South Africa has largely been examined from a structural perspective, looking at how the structural constraints of "illegality" and deportability disempower undocumented migrants by circumscribing their participation in the labour market, weakening their bargaining power, and making them vulnerable to exploitation. Part of the explanation for this lies in the fact that anti-immigrant policies hardly reduce the fow of labour migrants. Instead, such policies "illegalise" certain labour migrations, which leaves some of the migrant workers in a vulnerable position which perpetuates their exploitation.

As this chapter has highlighted, while the structural constraints of "illegality" weigh heavily on the undocumented Zimbabwean day labourers, these men do not completely capitulate to its disempowering force. They adopt *kukiya-kiya* as a tactical approach to overcome some of the challenges caused by their "illegal" status. *Kukiya-kiya*, which takes pride in bodily ability and strength, and the ability to work with one's own hands allows the Zimbabwean day labourers to tactically manoeuvre the terrain of "illegality", enabling them to fnd work in an environment marked by acute job scarcity. Moreover, the framing of *kukiya-kiya* around ethics of selfreliance, hard work, reliability, and obedience make Zimbabwean day labourers attractive to some employers. However, the downside is that it adversely makes them active in the (re)production of their exploitation.

This then raises questions about *kukiya-kiya* as an agential project. As an expression of agency by people who are circumscribed by their "illegality", it enables them to be self-reliant and more attractive to employers, but at the same time it makes them more exploitable. As a lens through which we can analyse the work experiences of undocumented migrant workers within the South-South migration context, *kukiya-kiya* presents these workers not as mere unwilling victims of exploitation, nor as inherent hard workers, nor liberated actors free of the constraints of "illegality". Rather, they are complex people who creatively engage in work-related struggles to make do and survive the diffcult circumstances they live in.

### **References**


Blaauw, P. D., Pretorius, A., Schoeman, C., & Schenck, C. R. (2012). Explaining migrant wages: The case of Zimbabwean day labourers in South Africa. *International Business and Economics Research Journal, 11*(12), 1333–1346.

Braun, V., & Clarke, V. (2006). Using thematic analysis in psychology. *Qualitative Research in Psychology, 3*(2), 77–101.


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### **Chapter 17 "No, We Are Not Fighting Against Foreign Workers and We'll Never Fight Against Foreign Workers": Trade Unions and Migrant Rights**

**Aisha Lorgat**

In South Africa, the post-apartheid period can be seen as one in which foreigners have been demonised and blamed for various social ills, ranging from crime to persistent high unemployment rates. Too often, these negative perceptions, expressed in various discriminatory ways, erupt into extreme xenophobic violence (Misago et al., 2015). These perceptions permeate all levels of society and are arguably fed and emboldened by pronouncements of political leaders and others in positions of power (Landau & Freemantle, 2010; Scott, 2013). These practices and discourses persist despite the rhetoric of adherence to and valorisation of human rights as expressed and articulated both in international human rights instruments and in our own lauded constitution.

One institutional formation that enjoys widespread infuence is trade unions. They purport to represent workers of all types, and claim legitimacy on the basis of their collective bargaining power, which relies on the discourse of global worker solidarity. Migrants, however, occupy a nebulous space, defned in many ways by precariousness, a precarity moreover that is at the same time common to many among the working class, who are faced with various forms of late-capitalism induced insecurity, but that is also exacerbated by the additional degree of insecurity afforded by the migrant status.

As a result, my overall research question is whether the way trade union leaderships and shop-stewards engage with and defne the existence of denizens shapes consciousness and dispositions towards "others", and either facilitates or obstructs them from carrying out their rights based obligations. Further, the very survival of unions itself depends, as will be shown, on their ability to negotiate these obligations.

A. Lorgat (\*)

© The Author(s) 2022 247

Chris Hani Institute, Johannesburg, South Africa

P. Rugunanan, N. Xulu-Gama (eds.), *Migration in Southern Africa*, IMISCOE Research Series, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-92114-9\_17

### **17.1 Human Rights Discourse**

Human rights are rights that are "held by individuals simply because they are part of the human species", and they are universal in content and "shared equally by everyone regardless of sex, race, nationality, and economic background" (Ishay, 2008:3). For Sen (2010:357) human rights are "strong ethical pronouncements as to what should be done" that serve as grounds for legislation that will give human rights claims legal force. Human rights are often seen as divided between frst and second generation rights, with the former covering political and civil rights and the latter covering social and economic rights.1 This apparent division is refected in the two human rights instruments, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) (UN, 1966b) and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) (UN, 1966a), that were adopted in 1966 to make the rights declared in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) legal and binding (Mattila, 2000:59). These three documents taken together form the International Bill of Rights.

Historically, there has been a division between these two groups of rights that was tied to cold war ideological conficts, with the capitalist West prioritising civil and political rights and the communist East favouring social and economic rights, with each criticising the other for their shortcomings in realising the largely ignored set of rights. More recently, this divide continues although the geography has shifted, with the geopolitical North valorising frst generation rights and the South favouring second generation economic and social rights. (Chong, 2010; Ishay, 2008; George, 2003).

Among human rights practitioners, activists and academics working in the feld, there is also a supposed functionalist divide in that second generation rights are seen either as not being justiciable2 (related to the institutionalisation critique3 ), or that the naming and shaming methodology used by human rights organisations such as Human Rights Watch to draw attention to clear violations of frst generation rights does not lend itself to achieving positive second generation rights irrespective of the validity and legitimacy of these rights claims (Chong, 2010; Sen, 2010; Roth, 2004; Taran, 2000). Focusing on social and economic rights is also discouraged on philosophical grounds, on the basis that "human rights ought to be exclusively negative protections of individual liberty, and that economic and social rights threaten to dilute the effectiveness of civil and political rights because they are inherently collective, positive, or programmatic rather than appropriately legal" (Chong, 2010:12).

<sup>1</sup>Third generation rights are those related to group rights or rights to self-determination (Ishay, 2008).

<sup>2</sup>This is demonstrably not the case in South Africa (see for example Klaaren, 2005).

<sup>3</sup>This "relates to the belief that real rights must involve an exact correspondence with precisely formulated correlate duties" (Sen, 2010: 382). This correspondence is only seen to exist when a right is institutionalised.

I see this divide as a socially constructed one, and for me, human rights in the tradition of the UDHR are intrinsically linked, and the effective attainment of one necessitates the realisation of the others. After all, "People cannot participate in a political process or truly exercise free speech if they are dying of hunger or a preventable disease" (Chong, 2010:7). This is also in keeping with the insistence by international bodies such as the UN and the ILO that human rights must be seen as universal, indivisible and inalienable (Taran, 2000).

Human rights instruments nevertheless do not explicitly include protection of undocumented migrants, but arguments for their inclusion are made on both a normative and a pragmatic basis (Berg, 2007). The great increase and growth in visibility of migrants as a group, globally and in South Africa (ILO, 2018; Moyo et al., 2018; Joynt & Webster, 2011; Landau et al., 2010; Castles & Miller, 2009; Muzondidya, 2008), has led to attempts to redefne what it means to be a citizen and what is covered under citizen rights (with the corollary being what is denied to those identifed as non-citizens) (Ishay, 2008). As Taran (2000:10) notes, "In many countries, legal application of human rights norms to non-citizens is inadequate or seriously defcient, particularly as regards undocumented migrants, those without authorization to enter or remain in the country". The new denizens, as Standing (2011) refers to migrants, are often prevented from accessing rights de facto due to social practices, even when they are accorded de jure rights4 through legislation. As a result, the overwhelming majority of migrants are faced with limited options and have little voice, and have to make a living among and as part of the precariat.

### **17.2 Migrants and Precarity**

The concept of precarity here is especially useful. The precariat, for Standing (2011:10), is made up of people who lack what he identifes as the seven forms of labour related security: labour market security, employment security, job security, work security, skill reproduction security, income security and representation security. Migrants are often, irrespective of their qualifcations or status in their countries of origin, included among the ranks of the precariat in the receiving country, subject to this array of insecurities that is often exacerbated by their migrant status. They do not have citizenship and become what Standing (2011) terms denizens, people who are perceived or constructed as lacking entitlement to some or all rights. They are workers who frequently do not have the right to work, never mind the rights and protections of those recognised as workers. All global migrants, in this sense, are denizens, perhaps enjoying some rights but not others. It must be noted that many of the sources of insecurity experienced by migrants in precarious employment arrangements are also experienced by domestic migrants and locals.

<sup>4</sup>As refugees and asylum seekers are accorded under the 1998 Refugees Act in South Africa.

However, my research contends that there is an additional layer of precariousness that the migrant status adds.

Many employers express a preference for employing migrant workers, who are professed to be better, more conscientious (in effect, more pliable) workers than locals (Tame, 2018; Mosala, 2008; Rogerson, 1999). This apparent preference for more easily exploited migrants is thought to displace local labour from accessing available job opportunities. This in turn provides employers with leverage in seeking concessions from local labour. As a result, employment of migrants is not only thought to displace local labour but also to contribute to the reduction of wages and labour standards for all workers. These arrangements are recognised as having very serious consequences: "To the extent that an increasingly large and important sector of the working class is managed outside normative protections, outside social dialogue and outside labour market institutions, it contributes to accelerated deregulation of labour markets as well as to deterioration of labour-employer-state relations overall" (Taran, 2000:19).

However, some research studies have disputed both the apparent displacement effect of employing migrant workers, especially at the lower skills levels, and the negative effect this employment purportedly has on wages and working conditions. Facchini et al. (2011), using regression analysis on census and community survey data from 1996, 2001, and 2007,5 found that while migration had no signifcant effect on wages, it did serve to displace local labour, but only at higher skills levels. At the lower skills end of the labour market, only self-employed locals were signifcantly affected. Araia et al. (2010), in their pilot study on the construction sector, also found that wages and working conditions were more signifcantly correlated to informal and other non-standard employment arrangements, fnding no signifcant difference in wages and working conditions of migrants as opposed to locals. While Rogerson (1999) reported similar fndings, he pointed to the hidden savings of employing migrants as opposed to locals that contributed to employer preferences in hiring practices.

National surveys have shown that xenophobic attitudes are not confned to any one socio-economic, racial, demographic or political grouping, although the main targets are Africans from other countries, and that these attitudes are largely infuenced by stereotypes (Gordon, 2018; Crush, 2008). Further, studies have demonstrated that xenophobic attitudes are not confned to the general public but are also held by employees of the state, and that this affects the way they treat and interact with migrants (Crush & Tawodzera, 2013:678). The South African Human Rights Commission (SAHRC) found in 1999 that the South African Police Service (SAPS) had abused their powers with regard to foreigners (Valji, 2003). Under the Immigration Act it is "assumed that, like all other departments that are affected by the Immigration Act, the police will carry out their duties with the 'highest applicable standards of human rights protection'" (Republic of South Africa, 2002:

<sup>5</sup> It must be noted that these are problematic sources of data as undocumented migrants in particular are likely to try and avoid being identifed and therefore counted by census takers.

Preamble). But as a 2004 study by the Centre for the Study of Violence and Reconciliation found, police say: "[I]t is diffcult to police foreigners because we do not understand their language or culture. As a result we sometimes do not believe what they say because most police offcials believe that foreigners are lying [in order] to remain in the country […] Most police offcials do not understand that foreigners are human too with human rights (white male captain)" (Newham et al., 2005 cited in Adjai & Lazaridis, 2014:249).

### **17.3 Trade Unions and Migrants**

Trade unions, as the recognised representatives of workers, have a major role to play in recognising and mitigating the dangers inherent in dividing workers into citizens and denizens, or foreigners and locals. Trade unions themselves, though, are in decline, with union density falling as a result largely of increasing use of nonstandard employment arrangements by employers in an attempt to increase fexibility and bypass labour regulations. Trade unions fnd it extremely diffcult to access and organise these atypical workers, many of whom are migrants (both domestic and cross-border) (Hyland, 2012; Araia et al., 2010; Chinguno, 2009; Webster, 2008; Webster & von Holdt, 2005).

Trade unions have found it diffcult to change their established practices in order to meet the challenges raised by this increasing fexibility in the workplace. Trade unions are discussed as being in crisis, being seen as relics of a moribund age of industrialisation, and having little or no effective role to play in the new network society (Castells, 2000). Others point to the role trade unions play in further segregating the labour market, creating a labour aristocracy – an elite workforce of workers whose rights and entitlements are protected, excluding others who do not exemplify the traditional unionised worker (Hyland, 2012; Chinguno, 2009). A further diffculty faced by trade unions when it comes to organising migrants under these circumstances is pointed out by Denis McShane (2004:viii, cited in Hyland, 2012:6): "While the rhetoric of internationalism has always been part of the trade union narrative, the actual trade union form has remained profoundly national. They are embedded in specifc national contexts and thus primarily represent the interests of their existing national membership."

This is further complicated by union assertions that they only organise workers with proper documentation (Chinguno, 2009:92). As Trimikliniotis et al. (2008:1332) point out, immigration in the post-apartheid period has been understood by trade unions primarily as a way for employers to undermine labour standards. This is refective of what Paziuk (2017:20), citing Fine, says is the "extraordinary ambivalence" of South African trade unions with regard to migrants. As a result, trade unions are able to construct themselves as pro-immigrant6 (in keeping with the

<sup>6</sup>See COSATU's (2008) press statement, for example.

principle of global worker solidarity) while being anti-immigration, and pressing for sanctions to be imposed, not on undocumented migrants, but on the employers who hire them.

The result of the aforementioned changes in employment relationships is that the labour market becomes increasingly segmented into a core of workers employed on a permanent basis with relatively good labour standards, working conditions and benefts, and a non-core of workers employed in casualised and externalised arrangements with little protection, poor working conditions, and little or no access to benefts. At the very margins are the peripheral workers – those who are unemployed and those engaged in informal sector economic activities. It is increasingly diffcult under these circumstances for workers and unions to fnd common cause and for unions to identify and work towards the common interests of workers, on which the principle of collective organisation is based (Joynt & Webster, 2011; Bamu & Godfrey, 2009; Chinguno, 2009; Webster & von Holdt, 2005; Goldman, 2003). My contention is that, within this framework, migrants, particularly undocumented migrants, add an additional dimension that is always located in the periphery even while crossing over into the non-core to access jobs, due to their more vulnerable migrant status, and this position in the labour market renders their claims to rights and the role of trade unions in supporting these claims more diffcult but equally necessary. This is in keeping with Trimikliniotis et al.'s (2008:1336–1337) assertion that "Trade unions, social movements and human rights organisations can be at the forefront of regularising and organising undocumented and irregular migrant workers," and Taran's (2003:16) conclusion that "Solidarity with migrant workers is fundamental; exclusion and disassociation from foreign workers simply facilitates situations in which migrants are exploited to the detriment of upholding decent work conditions." However, while noting that these changes brought about by globalisation have demanded that trade unions adopt new strategies, tactics and organisational modalities, this still has to be mediated through "Flanders' two faces of trade unionism" serving either as "a sword of justice" or vested interests (Hyland, 2012:7). While these two roles are likely to be in confict,7 they may sometimes be complementary.

The construction sector is notable as one in which a large number of migrants are employed8 as a result of generally low barriers to entry and increasing demand for and adoption of fexible employment relationships. According to trade union offcials organising in the sector, migrants constitute more than 70% of the workforce (Chinguno, 2009:45). The sector is divided into three sub-sectors: civil

<sup>7</sup>For Hyland (2012:8), this emerges in three areas: the complexities of the relationship between internal and external forces; the tension between roles as "social partner" vs. as an organisation campaigning for broader societal changes; and negotiating the relationship with other social movements.

<sup>8</sup>Other notable sectors are agriculture, security, domestic work, and informal street trading. However, English's, 2002 study on the construction labour force in the Western Cape posited that since Cape Town is relatively far from the country's land borders, it has far fewer migrants than Gauteng, Mpumalanga or Limpopo, and this is a position shared by others (see Mosala, 2008, for example). Nevertheless, my contention is that the migrant population in Cape Town has grown and is no longer insignifcant (if it ever was), and allows for valuable research and insight.

engineering,9 materials manufacturing and supply,10 and building.11 This study focused on the building sub-sector which is where most non-standard employment activity occurs, and which is reportedly the most labour-intensive (Goldman, 2003). Union membership is low in the sector generally for people who are employed through the casualised and externalised practices that predominate, but unionisation is thought to be especially low for migrants. The low union density, in fact, reportedly led to the collapse of four bargaining councils, including those operating in Gauteng and KwaZulu-Natal, with only six statutory councils operating in the sector12 (Araia et al., 2010; Bamu & Godfrey, 2009; Chinguno, 2009; Goldman, 2003; English, 2002; Rogerson, 1999). The Cape of Good Hope Building Industry Bargaining Council (CBIBC) appears to be in good standing, with two employers'

<sup>9</sup>The civil engineering sub-sector includes work in connection with: "aerodrome runaways or aprons; aqueducts; bins or bunkers; bridges; cable ducts; cassions; raft or other maritime structures; canals, cooling water or other towers; dams, docks, harbours, quays or wharves; earthworks, encasements; housings or support for plant, machinery or equipment; factory or works chimneys; flter beds; land or sea defence works; mine head gear, pipelines piers, railways, reservoirs, river works, roads or streets; sewerage works, sewers, shafts or tunnels, silos; sports felds or grounds, swimming baths; viaducts or water treatment plants ..." (Department of Labour: Sectorial Determination 2 Civil Engineering Sector, Government Gazette No 26049 February 2004, in Chinguno, 2009:50).

<sup>10</sup>For the sector as a whole.

<sup>11</sup>The building sub-sector is defned in the BIBC (Building Industry Bargaining Council) Collective Agreement [Department of Labour, *Bargaining Council for the Building Industry (Cape of Good Hope): Extension of Collective Agreement to Non Parties,* Government Gazette No 33874, 17 December 2010: 4–5] as: "the industry in which employers and their employees are associated for the purpose of erecting, completing, renovating, repairing, maintaining or altering buildings or structures and/or making articles for use in the erection, completion or alteration of buildings or structures, whether the work is performed, the material is prepared or the necessary articles are made on the sites of the buildings or structures or elsewhere: Provided that such manufacturing activities shall be limited to the specifc manufacturing activities that are mentioned in the following trades or subdivisions thereof, and shall further be limited to the carrying out of such activities by an employer who is associated with his employees for the purpose of erecting, completing, renovating, repairing, maintaining or altering buildings or structures for use by him in the conducting of building work, and includes all work executed or carried out by persons therein who are engaged in the following trades or subdivisions thereof, including excavations and the preparation of sites for buildings as well as the demolition of buildings, unless such demolitions were not carried out for the purpose of preparing the sites for building operations but does not include clerical employees and administrative staff, nor the wiring of or installation in buildings of lighting, heating or other permanent electrical fxtures and the installation, maintenance or repair of lifts in the buildings".

<sup>12</sup>The four remaining bargaining councils that have collective agreements in place include the Kimberley Building Industry Bargaining Council, the Bloemfontein Building Industry Bargaining Council, the Boland Building Bargaining Council, and the Cape of Good Hope Building Industry Bargaining Council (Bamu & Godfrey, 2009; Chinguno, 2009).

associations13 and four unions14 party to the collective agreement currently in place, which extends to parties operating in the sector who were not party to the agreement.15 The presence of four unions, each with different traditions and underlying principles, provides an interesting contrast for this study.

The dominant trend in the industry, which has led to increased labour insecurity, is the casualisation and informalisation of recruitment practices and employment relations. Stratifed sub-contracting practices have delinked responsibility for providing legallyminimum and adequate labour conditions from the major construction companies and transferred it to bodies such as brokers or subcontractors who may not accept that legal responsibility, or indeed may not have a legally registered identity through which they can be held accountable. These systems also make it more diffcult for labour unions to organise workers (Araia et al., 2010:35).

The challenges presented by the predominance of practices of externalisation and casualisation in the structure of the industry16 described in the quote above have also been pointed out recently by Bamu and Godfrey (2009) and Chinguno (2009). All indicate that these arrangements appear to affect all workers indiscriminately and that vulnerability and insecurity are more clearly positively linked to employment in non-standard or informal arrangements than to migrant status (whether documented or undocumented).

This research uses offcial union publications as well as interviews with trade union offcials in the construction sector in Cape Town to assess trade unions' responsiveness to migrant rights claims. Migrants are generally located on the periphery due to their more vulnerable status, and this position in the labour market renders their claims to rights and the role of trade unions in supporting these claims more diffcult but equally necessary.

<sup>13</sup>Boland Meesterbouers en Verwante Bedrywe Vereniging; Master Builders and Allied Trades' Association, Cape Peninsula.

<sup>14</sup>Building, Construction and Allied Workers' Union (BCAWU); Building, Wood and Allied Workers' Union of South Africa (BWAWUSA); Building Workers' Union (BWU); National Union of Mineworkers (NUM).

<sup>15</sup>Although, even in Cape Town, unions struggle to meet the representation thresholds, and in fact, some workers reportedly view the unions and the bargaining council as competing entities since they offer similar benefts. Furthermore, unions argue that the CBIBC is dominated by white conservatives who support the council and sponsor 'yellow trade unions' (Chinguno, 2009:55–62).

<sup>16</sup>People in the construction sector are employed under the following arrangements: permanently; on limited duration contracts; through labour brokers; and through multiple layers of subcontracting arrangements (including labour-only subcontractors), with the subcontractors themselves engaging in some combination of the three previous arrangements (Bamu & Godfrey, 2009; Chinguno, 2009).

### **17.4 Findings**

Trade unions in the construction sector in Cape Town deal with a number of challenges, primarily the predominance of temporary employment services, limited duration contracts and subcontracting relationships that have become the norm. As one union offcial pointed out, the big frms such as Murray and Roberts and WBHO are really just project managers with thousands of subcontractors doing all the work. Another worrying trend is the constantly shifting membership, with trade unions in the sector poaching each other's members, so the base membership does not grow, it just moves around.

All claim no discrimination against foreign workers and that a large part of their work is educating them on their rights and encouraging them to join trade unions. However, on probing further, it emerges that the actions taken tend to be most progressive and inclusive at federation level and quite limited or non-existent lower down. On the one hand, there is the COSATU offcial who stated:

Now the way that we've, the Western Cape for instance, where we've tried to address the concerns of foreign nationals specifcally, whether they're Zimbabweans, whether they are Nigerians, wherever will fnd them, is to try to and get involved in areas where there are concerns. So this building for instance, we have Nigerians, so we have, together with others, hosted education sessions in order to inform people about their rights, the fact that they can join the union, the fact that they can get UIF. It's a different process, but you have access to it and whatever rights are where workers are concerned. And also infuencing them about joining the union, I mean in fact many people just join the union. So if you enter the workplace and there is a union, they join, so it hasn't been an issue, but yes, I mean there are concerns about, about having people feel more comfortable and be active in the union, which is a different thing that needs to be addressed with regards to language and other…other barriers that, or perceived barriers that may be there, that needs to be addressed; so that people are more free and feel free that they can…that they can participate in the union and so forth.

The offcial acknowledged that translating this down the structures can sometimes be more diffcult:

So it is our duty, it is our obligation to make sure that that is the message and that is how, even our members, let alone leaders, are going to be treating people, treating people as people, because we not going to ask where, what, whether you have a document or not, and that's how we are going to have to take the message down. Now it has been slow and it's …in fact it is frustrating because from a federation side, we try and do our best, we try and get unions to be focused on certain areas, but of course all unions, and there is some autonomy so of course all unions have their own focus and they have their own pace at which they do things, and they have their own priorities that they would want to focus on. So it's a…it's a process that we've embarked on, that we will continue to do and…and hopefully we'd see a lot more…earlier success than what we have recently.

This inclusive approach was echoed by an independent union offcial who claimed (noting that the same claim was made by another union offcial from a different union),

We are the frst who brought in the situation of bringing in, arranging migrant workers in the bargaining council, where other trade unions said no no no, they taking our work from our people away, and we said no we have to include them; they already here you can't wish them away.

However this same respondent later stated:

There are companies who are very few in minority who, where you get…when we identify a company and see that we are losing the battle at this company, the foreign workers are the majority. This is where as I've indicated we used the arm of the bargaining council, but we frst try…try within our own house to try to win them over; when we fail we use all the other avenues because we want workers to be united. They've got one common enemy and that's […] the capitalist and they are the socialists.

At frst, the language is of inclusivity, but later it becomes framed in more martial and divisive terms, where majority-migrant workplaces are a battle to be fought which requires the deployment of institutional weapons in order to claim victory.

Or, an offcial from another trade union said:

*Ya*, they started *infltrating* our sector and…okay myself being as one of the… in fact the biggest trade union in the sector, we have actually made provision for these persons to also be recognised and also to receive the same conditions of employment as our… as our pardon, our own people, you know our citizens and… if it comes to social benefts… they must also receive it. So whatever apply to our people applies to them also (My emphasis).

This came along with racist overtones:

*Ya*, in fact initially they were a bit, there was…*ya*, they were very…sceptical, but …then they realised you know the value of a trade union and also you mustn't forget that where they come from that there's also trade unions, but unfortunately the trade unions over in the black countries and the black states haven't got the same powers that we have, you know, and they… a lot of them are not recognised by the government itself.

Resentment or tensions between South African workers and migrants were also noted and it seemed little effective action was taken in order to address this:

Look, I think it's only natural that people will feel threatened as long as they, the numbers you know, the foreign numbers don't outnumber local guys and…something interesting you know…you fnd even our local guys sort of tend to victimise those people […] you fnd that they would… our people take the back seat and make them work, chase them on, you know, and threaten them if they don't, we will *klap* [slap in Afrikaans] you and we'll make sure you don't work here no more. But that…it happens…it happens…and then you fnd companies that, where the majority of persons are foreigners.

In addition, the perceived labour market effect that employment of migrants depresses working conditions and pay was also reinforced in some of the responses:

Their rights should be protected, their social needs should be protected equally, but we are unable to protect their interests for one reason. One – when they not joining the trade union, two – when they take…when they allow to be taken advantage of, in a sense that knowing…let me use, for example, in the building sector, we know what the rates are to be paid in the building sector, then say for example a bricklayer, you get very good quality bricklayers from Zimbabwe, they don't necessarily have that kind of documents, that they've got to be raised through the SETA17 systems. Now employers take advantage of them and say that they should not go through the legal system to be registered, in that way they going to get

<sup>17</sup>Sector Education and Training Authorities are mandated by the government through the Department of Higher Education and Training to identify and meet the skills development needs of the South African economy.

some kind of an income and then their income [is] going to be lesser than what is… they are being used where their social benefts should not be paid, and they take it, whatever comes to them, say where they, instead of getting R55 per hour, they'll settle for R30 per hour; obviously we are going to fght against that.

Now there is a tendency that trade unions fght against foreign workers. No, we are not fghting against foreign workers and we'll never fght against foreign workers, but what we like is all workers to be treated equal and them to be going through the legal system, to be protected, to be registered and to be paid equally to the brothers in South Africa; in that way there will be no situation of Pete versus Jan and Hadebe or whatever or Nkomo from Zimbabwe

The purported treatment of undocumented migrants is contradictory as well. A bargaining council representative pointed to the predominance of unregistered18 and undocumented migrants in certain sub-sectors such as marble and granite (especially monumental art), and that there was a blurring of occupational categories, with undocumented farm workers also often being found working on construction sites. Many migrants in the sector operate either as labour-only subcontractors, or as unskilled general workers who are often "recruited" at the side of the road.

One BIBC informant claims no discrimination on the basis of documentation, claiming that they register all workers they fnd and would provide a temporary registration number if a worker lacks an ID or passport, but this was then contradicted by the operations manager, who said, "If he's legally in the country, he's legally entitled to be in the labour market. If he's not legally in the country, in other words, he hasn't got a passport, he hasn't got a permit or work application or something like that, then we can't register him," and stated further, in response to questioning about what happens if an undocumented migrant is found on a site inspection, that the employer:

[…] must either send him to get the correct documentation or he must get rid of him in terms of employment. We can't have [him] employed if he's not registered, if he is illegal. But if he hasn't got documents, whether he is a foreigner or South African, one of the things to register an employee is, we need his ID book because we manage only benefts […] So if a guy haven't got documents, whether South African or non-South African, he needs to go get that documentation.

This perspective was reinforced by union offcials with, for example, one offcial stating that migrants must be here legally, but that they are prepared to provide assistance in order to ensure that this is the case: "Of course there is the…there's this one qualifcation, you know you must…you must be here legally, they must have a working permit or if you are an asylum seeker, yes, you know. In fact we even give assistance there also. So *ya*… we try to do our bit by assisting."

The role that capitalist employers play in creating or encouraging these divisions was also noted:

[…] it's very easy for employers to divide people and create a division and make sure that division is in fact exacerbated because we've heard employers or our workers, our members

<sup>18</sup>At that time, 38,000 registered with the BIBC and receiving benefts.

would come and tell us that employers are saying nah, those people are not… you can't represent those people, you can't speak on their behalf, they are not part of you and… and there are workers down there who would want to represent them, would want to make sure that they can enjoy the same benefts that they do. Now that's happening and so that division is being created deliberately, and part of how we need be going about things is to empower our people to say, well, how do we tackle the employer to make sure that… that those workers who work next to us, who are just being paid by somebody else, are in fact brought back into the fold.

### **17.5 Conclusion**

Trade unions in South Africa are dedicated to serving the interests of workers collectively, and part of the rhetoric they deploy as a result is the notion of international worker solidarity.

This rhetoric arguably serves, in itself, to disadvantage workers with specifc vulnerabilities or determinants of precarity such as migrants, whose particular challenges are subsumed within universalist paradigms that view workers as a homogenous entity defned wholly and exclusively in terms of their relation to capital. This framing lends itself to positioning migrant workers, who are often seen as more easily exploitable by employers because of their precarious status as migrants, as enemies who are betraying their fellow workers by "accepting" poorer pay and conditions. Therefore, despite the clarion calls for workers of the world to unite, the reality is that on the shopfoor, nationalist sentiment often overwhelms the more egalitarian, inclusive principles that are expressed at the top. Migrants therefore often feel excluded and turn to other organisational formations and interventions in order to claim their rights and make progress in their workplaces.

The inability of trade unions to effectively service the needs of these workers, furthermore, is refective of the unease with which they deal with so called atypical workers more generally. As these types of fexible employment arrangements increasingly become the norm, together with workforces that refect changing societal demographics, including large numbers of people who happen to be born outside the country's borders, trade unions must adapt. This is a challenge that trade unions must address if they are to remain the vanguard organisations representing workers and their interests.

### **References**


**Open Access** This chapter is licensed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits use, sharing, adaptation, distribution and reproduction in any medium or format, as long as you give appropriate credit to the original author(s) and the source, provide a link to the Creative Commons license and indicate if changes were made.

The images or other third party material in this chapter are included in the chapter's Creative Commons license, unless indicated otherwise in a credit line to the material. If material is not included in the chapter's Creative Commons license and your intended use is not permitted by statutory regulation or exceeds the permitted use, you will need to obtain permission directly from the copyright holder.

### **Chapter 18 Conclusion**

#### **Nomkhosi Xulu-Gama and Pragna Rugunanan**

### **18.1 Introduction**

This book has provided a perspective on the sociology of migration in southern Africa. It is widely acknowledged that Africa is historically differently positioned from other continents and that the relations within the continent are more complex in their specifc, geographic and historical ways. The specifc focus on southern Africa is indicative of and acknowledges the different dynamics in the various parts of Africa. This book moves away from the traditional approach in the literature, which views the African continent as homogenous with only shared characteristics. The continent has vast religious, linguistic, racial, national, ethnic, historical, economic, and geopolitical differences. While the focus of the book is on southern Africa, far-reaching empirical and theoretical conclusions can still be drawn because some of the migratory experiences discussed in this book are shared across countries in the context of a broader Global South. These commonalities are often characterised by unequal distribution of resources that shape the socio-economic and political dynamics of migration in the Global South.

Nevertheless, the contextual specifcities rooted in the socio-historical, as well as theorisations informed by situated contemporary meanings and complexities of the migratory experiences on the continent, make southern African migration unique. Some of the contextual specifcities include the history of labour migration, the economic depression, political uncertainties that have shaped migratory processes over decades, gendered vulnerabilities and unfavourable sexual and health-related experiences, the eruption of xenophobia, feminisation and the precariousness of

N. Xulu-Gama (\*)

P. Rugunanan

Department of Sociology, University of Cape Town, Cape Town, South Africa e-mail: nomkhosi.gama@uct.ac.za

Department of Sociology, University of Johannesburg, Johannesburg, South Africa e-mail: prugunanan@uj.ac.za

P. Rugunanan, N. Xulu-Gama (eds.), *Migration in Southern Africa*, IMISCOE Research Series, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-92114-9\_18

labour, historical and reimagined African identities, and emerging questions of exclusion and inclusion. These thematic areas expose how existing defnitions and experiences of internal or cross-border migrants are shaped by historical intersections of race, class, nationality and gender, among other categories central to the formation of a migrant identity in southern Africa.

The rationale for the focus on a sociology of migration from the South is that there has been an overwhelming growth in the migration of African people beyond their countries but within African borders. All of these have caused us to want to provide a sociology of migration which provides Southern perspectives on global migration experiences, debates and frameworks. This book is cognizant that most Africans migrate within the continent after failing, or realising that it would be more diffcult for them, to cross borders into other continents. Hence, some travel within the continent is a second option or even a step towards eventually migrating beyond the African borders.

There are three main gaps in literature that this book has tried to address. Firstly, research on migration to and from Africa is not given the prominence it deserves in the global migration literature; even when it is written about, attention is given to authors from outside the African continent to write Africa and theorise about migration to Africa. On the same note, this book decisively shifts away from defning or charaterising Africa in terms such as "developing countries", "low-income countries", "third world", "poor world", and "non-Western world" (Hollington et al., 2015:8) because of the negativity that is associated with all these phrases. Secondly, race, class, nationality and gender are issues which are typically examined separately, and this book has relied on intersectional theoretical underpinnings to move away from that separatist framing. Thirdly, this book departs from seeing ruralurban migration as safe, intimate, feminine and local, while cross border migration is risky, masculine, exploratory and global. Furthermore, in the feld of migration, scholars normally write either about rural-urban/urban-rural migration or international migration, assuming that there are no similarities or relationships between the two. This book, however, incorporates the two types of migration, rural-urban and international migration, and looks at the complexities and challenges which are shared by both types. In doing so, it has provided a peculiar lens through which rural-urban and international migration will be considered.

### **18.2 What Is an African Migrant Identity?**

Misgun, in this volume, argues that construction and reconstruction of identities in migrant spaces, renegotiation of new identities, carefully balancing that which should be conserved and that which should be changed or could be let go, infuenced by one's migration objectives are important in defning an African migrant identity. Batisai, Rugunanan and Kaziboni in this volume have called for a redefnition of what it means to be a migrant in Africa when you are African. They have advocated for more inclusive 'Africanness' and African identities, while not ignoring the differences and complexities, which abound. The book investigated the various levels of migration, moving from cross-border migration to more internal and regional migration, which is inclusive of local (rural to urban and urban to rural) migration. It looked at how migrants make meaning of their circumstances in a 'foreign' space, among other avenues of inquiry. This book has evoked and given serious attention to the importance of the history of migration and generational change, aspects that we have noted as absent in many studies on migration.

The book begins by proposing new ways of theorising migration in the southern African region, arguing that traditional Western conceptions do not fully address South-South migration processes and dynamics. This book acknowledges the intertwined issues of gender and class as important in analysing migration processes. Critical and intertwined issues of race, nationality, class and gender were woven in by authors in dynamic and interesting ways. One of the interesting ways to demonstrate the complexity of African migrants in Africa is that they cannot only be categorised as either low skilled or highly skilled. The everyday lived experiences of migrants refect a varied reality.

One example is that of highly educated and qualifed migrants who, upon reaching South Africa, cannot take up employment in their feld of expertise. Instead, they undertake menial jobs for various reasons. Firstly, it could be because they are undocumented. Secondly, it could be because there is already high unemployment in South Africa and they cannot fnd jobs they are qualifed for. Thirdly, their qualifcations might not be recognised by the South African Qualifcations Authority. Finally, and most importantly, it is often because the South African immigration policy prioritises South Africans and clearly states that migrants should only be employed if they have critical skills and on condition that they will train South Africans. Migrants in such cases are always found to be willing to take anything, for the sake of survival. They persevere, they are resilient, they are hard working, and they are determined.

In this volume, Misgun tackled the diffculties encountered by governments and transnational bodies as they try to "integrate" locals with migrants. The complexity is in attempting to integrate migrants with locals who in their individual groupings are intrinsically and intricately divided. Integration and its processes feature as dynamics fowing in and through the everyday interactions and discourses within migrant groups as well as with the receiving society. He posits, departing from the notion of "us" and "them", that integration, as a mode of incorporating the "other", seeks to re-mark, instead of unmark, "other" bodies and the spaces they occupy. Despite formal and institutional strategies and policies of integration, individuals have their own kinds of strategies. The tensions among these claims and tactics appear to carry the possibility both for division and fracture, and for cohesion and solidarity. This is exactly what needs to be borne in mind as the redefnition and renegotiation of African identities are tackled.

This book uses South Africa's constitutional framework and basic human rights as lenses through which migrants and their identities may be understood. It relies on South African policy and legislation around migration, refugees, asylum seekers, workers and workers' rights to frame and critique the offcial position of authority. It does this because South Africa has been constructed as an attractive destination which many Africans run to for refuge, asylum, and easier access to socio-economic prosperity, political freedom, a friendly constitution and free education. Migration is not just a choice and lifestyle but largely involuntary and forced. It is a "poverty reduction strategy" or a "survival strategy" for many Africans.

### **18.3 Why Migrate from South to South?**

South Africa has deeply entrenched historical migratory roots, dating as far back as 1886 to the discovery of gold. Some of the attractive points in favour of South Africa are its cultural similarities and geographic location, which allow for easier and faster access; similar and shared histories, sometimes with shared forefathers' migration trajectories; and a business-friendly environment in which migrants are able to use their entrepreneurial skills to set up small businesses and create livelihoods. Although South Africa has also been in the spotlight for xenophobic attacks, and immigration controls have become stricter over the past few years, South Africa remains the country of choice, even if it is not totally voluntary nor option number one.

This is partly why this book has a strong focus on South Africa. The other reason is that all the authors are in one way or the other institutionally affliated with South Africa, although they individually come from many different parts of the continent and beyond. This can be viewed as a strength or a limitation of this book, since the role of South Africa has already been critiqued by a lot of people for various reasons, including playing the "big brother" role to other African countries. Hadebe has argued in this volume that "… as an agent of South African capital, the South African state is responsible for policies that undermine African economies; it is responsible for policies that extract wealth from Africa into South Africa, and it is responsible for policies that are extracting the capital of the continent". He further argues that, most often, the media and policy makers underplay the benefts from super-exploitation of cheap labour and instead amplify the supposed drain on social services such as health, education, housing and water due to the "infux of aliens".

An additional critique is that South Africa supports the in-migration of skilled and professional people and does not welcome low-skilled or semi-skilled foreign workers, who constitute the bulk of undocumented migrants to the country (Peberdy, 2009). A recurring sentiment has been expressed at national level that "migrants" would be competing with local populations for already scarce resources and that they burden access to employment, housing and healthcare (Klotz, 2013).

Restrictive legislation, xenophobic violence, high unemployment and crime rates, criminalising undocumented migrants (stripping them of rights by denying them legal identity), and unfriendly sentiments between local and international migrants render South Africa less desirable for settlement. Gordon demonstrates in this volume that there is a need to investigate public participation in anti-immigrant hate-crime in the African context. He further shows that there is no empirical justifcation for stereotypes that suggest that foreign nationals are a major cause of unemployment or crime. Rather, the evidence he presents suggests that immigration is a positive force in the country. Moreover, he argues the importance of considering the relationship between public opinion and policy in South Africa. An overemphasis on borders and security in policy and discourse only increases threat perceptions amongst the public.

### **18.4 Child Migrants**

After criticisms against always looking at women migrants as wives who migrate when they follow their partners, there is now literature arguing that women do migrate independently. By asserting their right to work, women also asserted their rights and agency away from their normal and sometimes oppressive environments. The migration of women has led to the rising feminisation of labour on the continent, that has led to the marketization of childcare within households. What this book does in addition to that scholarly contribution is to look at children and mothers on the move. This book also takes into serious consideration and analysis the presence of children in the migration processes. The subject of children is largely ignored by many scholars, as are the complicated positions that women with children (mothers and guardians) fnd themselves in.

Upon mentioning the benefts of remittances, Mokoena and Khunou and Batisai have highlighted the often-ignored issue of parental absence and specifcally maternal absence when women – when mothers – decide to migrate for livelihood procurement purposes. These authors demonstrate that a familial support system is important, and mostly serves as a foundation upon which women take decisions to migrate and leave their families behind. However, it does not compensate for biological mothering. Onukogu has outlined that the mothers who take their children with them on migration journeys or who have children born at the destination suffer some negative consequences, such as their children being bullied, discriminated against and called names such as migrant children and refugee children. They also deal with issues of identity, in the offcial, administrative sense (the legal identity documentation), as well as in the socio-political sense of belonging. Migrant children employ resilience and signifcant agency in overcoming daily hurdles associated with being a migrant.

Chiyangwa and Rugunanan, as well as Onukogu, take a special interest in the second generation children who are based in South Africa. It is through their work that we were able to see the intersection between education and migration. Most acknowledged and researched is higher education and migration; however, this book has presented the often-ignored intricacies of basic education and migration through the lived experiences of children. Among other things, these scholars engaged with issues of the second generation migrant children's access to and success in basic education in South Africa.

Mokoena and Khunou's and Rugunanan's chapters show that women sometimes have to leave their children behind in order to capitalise on the available social capital offered by their families. Mokoena and Khunou, as well as Xulu-Gama, directly engage with the so-called comprehensive social grant system, which is a big differentiator between who is South African and who is a migrant. While it is called comprehensive, it is means-tested, and only those with a South African identity document can apply for it. This leaves out many migrants who are in need of this grant, especially migrant women with children.

### **18.5 Migrant Workers Eke Out a Livelihood**

The chapters that directly engage with work and workers in this volume include contributions by Xulu-Gama et al., Machinya and Lorgat. Some of these works demonstrate the diffculties, challenges, marginalisation and alienation that African foreign migrants experience in their efforts to make a livelihood in South Africa, either through formal employment as shown by Xulu-Gama et al. and Lorgat, or through informal employment, as shown by Machinya. Work and livelihood procurement are the main reasons that people migrate. Work is generally an allencompassing term; trade unions in South Africa are dedicated to serving the interests of workers collectively. Although the South African legislation is restrictive, by only showing interest in and welcome to highly skilled workers, it still does not fnd fault with or put blame on workers who work without documentation. Instead it fnds fault with the employers who take undocumented workers in, with the intention of exploiting them as they lack security.

Several scholars in this volume have criticised the universalist paradigms that view workers as a homogenous entity, making mention that these are too broad to be able to consider and take care of individual or minority cases of the poorest of the poor migrants. Scholars have argued that seeing migrants as general workers is not practical when some segments of workers are protected by certain policies and legislations while others are not. Migration-related issues are largely left unspoken in the trade union meetings because they do not affect the majority of workers. Migrants themselves do not feel confdent to raise specifc issues related only to migrants, as their marginal and minority status is strongly felt. While the approach of treating everyone as equal seems positive, it does not refect the lived experiences of the workers, and hence it is dangerous in the sense that it easily neglects serious differences, thereby further exacerbating inequalities among the workers on the basis of, for example, race, gender or nationality.

On the other hand, a particularistic approach targets migrant workers as members of specifc ethnic communities, or as migrants with specifc social and workplace needs (Alberti et al., 2013). Using a particularistic approach would allow for interpreters in different languages in order to cater for the language diffculties that most migrants experience when they are in foreign countries. This would also facilitate trade unions creating space for employment, welfare and community advice for migrants, because many of them are in desperate need of such services. The most important item that could beneft the migrant workers if trade unions used a particularistic approach would be the unions' active role in the development of advocacy activities to infuence the government's immigration policy (Alberti et al., 2013), particularly since it has been noted to be too restrictive and unfriendly towards migrants, specifcally with regard to the low skilled and undocumented.

Since seeking work opportunities is one of the key reasons for migration, the general conclusion is that there is a need for organised labour to organise beyond its traditional base of formal employment. Civil society, and organised labour in particular, should play a proactive role in the integration and socialisation of the newcomers, who would have been legally permitted to stay. It is important to strengthen research and documentation on labour migration in southern Africa, especially from pro-worker perspectives. The juxtaposition suffered by local migrants is also acknowledged by Hadebe, who argues that precarity and vulnerability are not confned to migrant labour, especially undocumented labourers, but affect local workers too, due to the growth of unemployment and competition, with a pool of cheaper migrant labour.

Contributions on internal labour migration by Xulu-Gama, Mokoene and Khunou, Oksiutycz and Azionya show the different points of departure of locals and migrants and how that makes it diffcult for migrants to compete for jobs and livelihoods on an equal plane with locals. Both these groups withdraw from different sources of social capital and government social grant support. Foreign national migrants usually have a different educational background and they mostly carry with them many skills and much training experience. The diffculties which they would have experienced in their home countries, which sometimes would have caused their migration, puts them on a different footing in terms of their motivation and zeal to succeed.

Oksiutycz and Azionya look at how local and migrant workers are affected by the manifestation of informal settlements as the most visible material display of internal and cross-border migration. They show how both local and international migrants are negatively affected by the lack of delivery of basic service needs. They further explain how the consequences include locals blaming and attacking cross-border migrants. It also leads to a distrust of governmental and developmental institutions instead of perhaps coming together, forming alliances and confronting the government for its failure and capital for its exploitative tendencies. Migrants, local and international, fail to see the state as the troublemaker and further fail to see the role of capitalism as fundamental in creating the divisions amongst the migrant workers (those from within and those from across the border), causing divisions among the classes and nationalities. All kinds of migrants want to be closer to towns and cities for employment and livelihood-making opportunities. They all would rather not pay a lot of money in making a living, which is inclusive of paying municipal and transport bills. This is because they know that they have homes, which they have to be remitting money to; they intend for their migration spot not to be their permanent location.

### **18.6 Policy Implications for Migrants**

This book has demonstrated that the policy and legislative framework is as important as the socio-economic-political environment for creating a welcoming and conducive space for migrants. The policy chapters cover three different parts of how government policy affects the migrants. First is how the South African government handles refugees and asylum seekers (see Moyo and Botha). Second is how the legislation treats migrants at the workplace and how industrial relations policies respond to the presence of international migrants at the workplace. How inclusive and aligned are they? (See Xulu-Gama et al.). Third, policies in South Africa have at times been shaped to align with migration patterns retrospectively, and some scholars have argued that South African legislation has followed on from the preapartheid and apartheid precepts by taking a more restrictive position towards mobility generally (see Gordon).

Policy chapters and other works in this volume have shown that anti-immigrant policies do not necessarily reduce the fow of labour migrants; instead, they "illegalise" certain labour migration processes by making access to political, economic, and social resources a right of citizenship. Therefore, such an exclusionary stance leaves most migrant workers in vulnerable positions, which perpetuates their exploitation. Gordon concluded that there is a need to shift the general focus of the immigration policy regime from deterrence and control to rights, implementation and management.

### **18.7 Concluding Remarks**

Almost all migrants want to eventually return to their countries of origin, on condition that socio-economic and political situations improve there. Onukogu's work shows that second generation immigrants prefer the host country compared to their parents' country of origin. Skilled migrants always get better reception and livelihoods in comparison to those who are unskilled and semi-skilled. South African immigration policy and legislation have been a sore point of critique in most of the chapters (Gordon, Kaziboni, Moyo and Botha) which have directly engaged with it. It is seen as too restrictive, illegalising the presence of vulnerable migrant workers from neighbouring countries while unfortunately prioritising and promoting only the presence of skilled migrants.

This book has called for new ways of theorising migration in the southern African region as well as a new defnition for 'African migrant'. Xulu-Gama, examining women's experiences of migration, concludes that there should be more associations targeting women in general, without categorising them according to their national identities. Lorgat, viewing migrants as workers, felt that migrants often feel excluded from trade unions and turn to other organisational formations and interventions in order to claim their rights and make progress in their workplaces. Lorgat therefore concludes that while most scholars, including herself, acknowledge that it is becoming even more diffcult to organise precarious workers, it is indeed becoming equally important to do so. Hadebe concludes that immigrants are both necessary and undesired, in that their labour power is needed yet loathed in social security protection, which is often denied.

This book has demonstrated that while there is a groundswell of scholarship emerging in the sociology of migration space in response to social challenges and discontent related to the movement of people across borders, both internal and external, there is however a dearth of theorizing migration from the global South. On the African continent especially, the impetus to migrate is inextricably tied to the ravages of capitalist exploitation and the imposition of inhumane policies and practices that are given sanitized labels such as globalization, internationalization of markets, structural adjustment programs.

This book makes a key contribution to the feld of the Southern Theory by focusing on the sociology of migration in the global south. It proposes new ways of theorizing migration, arguing that traditional western forms of theorizing are not fully ftting the South-South migration. This book argued for the intertwined issues of gender and class as important in analysing and theorising migration processes. In recognition of the differences between rural-urban/ urban-rural migration vs international migration, the book challenges the assumptions that there are no similarities or relationships between these forms of migration.

The overall contribution of the book is that migration research to and from Africa is not given the prominence it deserves in the global migration literature. Even when it is written about, attention is given to authors from the Global North writing about Africa and theorising about migration to Africa. This book is an effort of undoing that by giving prominence to the voices on the African continent theorising on the broader scholarship on migration to and within African countries. Theoretically this book has shown contrasts to the neo-classical theory of migration. These views support the new economics of labour migration theory, which purports that the decision to migrate is based on investment decisions and the potential to diversify and to develop new skills. For many migrants, their choice to migrate is not only driven by the search for individual freedom and opportunities, but the expectation that such freedom and opportunity would also fund family and other economic interests in the home country.

Finally, compiling this manuscript has been a bold step of taking action. Rather than continuously arguing that research about migration to and from Africa is not given the prominence it deserves in the global migration literature, we stepped into that gap in research by being that voice. We have been decisive about prioritising scholars who are from the South and who are also based in the South. We have also been intentional about not investing our focus in the already well-acclaimed academics and experts in the feld, but have welcomed and encouraged the wide participation of young scholars, particularly giving voice to young black women to use this intellectual space.

### **References**


**Open Access** This chapter is licensed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits use, sharing, adaptation, distribution and reproduction in any medium or format, as long as you give appropriate credit to the original author(s) and the source, provide a link to the Creative Commons license and indicate if changes were made.

The images or other third party material in this chapter are included in the chapter's Creative Commons license, unless indicated otherwise in a credit line to the material. If material is not included in the chapter's Creative Commons license and your intended use is not permitted by statutory regulation or exceeds the permitted use, you will need to obtain permission directly from the copyright holder.