

First Nationalism Then Identity

On Bosnian Muslims
and Their Bosniak Identity



Mirsad Kriještorac

First Nationalism Then Identity

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Cover: Bosnia, June 1990. Photographs by Šahin Šišić.

To my sister Dr. Sadeta Kriještorac and our parents

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Abbreviations

ARBiH	Armija Republike Bosne i Hercegovine [Army of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina]
BiH	Bosna i Hercegovina [Bosnia and Herzegovina]
BSP	basic social psychological process
BSSP	basic social structural process
JNA	Jugoslovenska Narodna Armija [The Yugoslav People's Army]
SDA	Stranka Demokratske Akcije [The Party of Democratic Action]
IZ	Islamska zajednica [The Islamic Community]
IZBiH	Islamska Zajednica u Bosne i Hercegovine [The Islamic Community in BiH]
IVZ	(Jugoslovenska) Islamska vjerska zajednica [The (Yugoslav) Islamic Religious Community]
JMO	Jugoslovenska muslimanska organizacija [The Yugoslav Muslim Organization]
ICTY	International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia
NDH	Nezavisna Država Hrvatska (The Independent State of Croatia), Croatian Nazi-run state
HVO	Hrvatsko vijeće obrane (The Croatian Defense Council), BiH Croatian paramilitary troops
ZAVNOBiH	Zemaljsko anti-fašističko vijeće narodnog oslobođenja Bosne i Hercegovine [The State's Anti-Fascist Council for the National Liberation of Bosnia and Herzegovina]

SFRY	Socijalistička Federativna Republika Jugoslavija [The Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia]
TO	Teritorijalna Odbrana [Territorial Defense]
BiH TO	Teritorijalna Odbrana Bosne i Hercegovine [Bosnia and Herzegovina's Territorial Defense]

Terms and Transliterations

al-Kalām	speculative theology based on elucidation of the meaning of the words in the Qur'an
aqida	religious creed
bey	Muslims medieval landowners
bratstvo i jedinstvo	brotherhood and oneness
Četniks [Chetniks]	decentralized Serbian quasi-fascist paramilitary bands from World War II era, ostensibly loyal to exiled Serbian king, while in fact collaborating with Italian and German occupiers against Croatian Ustashas, Muslims, and Tito's Partisans
deen we devlet	unity of belief and state
eyelet	administrative division unit of the Ottoman Empire
haqeeqah	real, apparent
Hijra	emigration
hodža	priest, Imams
Ijma	the consensus or agreement of Islamic scholars on an issue based upon Islamic law
islah	a reform through returning to Islam's original message

istiḥsân	preference based on strength of substantive proof
madhab	school of jurisprudence
maslaha	the establishment of sharia law regulations based on general interests and benefits
Medresa	school, implicitly of Muslim religion
millet system	Ottoman pluralism system under which a religious community rules itself under its own religious laws
Mladi Muslimani	Young Muslims
mufti	judge, implicitly in Muslim religion
narodna religija	people's religion
qiyâs	analogical deduction
ravnopravnost	equality
<i>reis-ul-ulema</i> or <i>reis</i>	head of the Rijaset and the IZBiH
Rijaset (Rijaseti ilmije)	the presidency of the ulama
Risala o Hijri	Treatise on Emigration
sevdalinka	a Bosnian soulful love ballad
Sharia	ideal Islamic religious law
ulama	Islamic scholars
urf	customs
Ustaša [Ustashas]	Croatian Nazi and German collaborators, and local anti-Serb and anti-Jews/Roma Nazi movement
waqfs	a religious endowment as a voluntary and irrevocable dedication of property to serve the Islamic objectives prescribed at inception
zekat	almsgiving, the yearly religious tax

Introduction

Ever since its emergence as a phenomenon, nationalism has been the political process that creates the context for the production of nations. These nations and nationalism then become the backdrop for new elites-desired salient identities galvanized by nationalism.¹ This structuring is done either by significantly altering or upgrading the previous identity (e.g., as in the recent case of modern Russia after the USSR, or that of the USSR after Tsarist Russia) or by creating a completely new identity (e.g., the cases of Israel, Turkey, Italy, Algeria, Eritrea, and post-Soviet Central Asian states). As Ernest Gellner (2006) famously elaborated, “It is nationalism which engenders nations and not the other way around” (54).² The societal changes and identity signifiers brought forward by nationalism are revealed not just through the usual change of name of a group and its members—an act which by itself is important enough to be accounted for by researchers³—but also through changes of context, circumstances, and the roles each member of those groups claiming nationhood has performed or may perform. Although this research will not observe all those aspects of change, it will show that changes of context and circumstances create a new reality which so significantly shapes the societal and individual awareness of self and the signifiers for identification that they alone prove the claim that a new salient identity emerges after the experience of nationalism. The same process occurred during the dissolution of the former Yugoslavia, with various nationalism projects and the subsequent formation of newly independent states with upgraded and fitting salient identities.⁴ The ongoing condition of that process invites social scien-

tists to observe the two processes—nationalism and the emergence of the desired identity—and draw conclusions from them. This work will attempt to point to their interactions and show, empirically and historically, that nationalism is a process that comes before a new salient identity for a population. Nationalism works through a combination of roles that serve to encourage a new identity, as producer, propagator, facilitator, encourager or backdrop, in short, as an episodic context that demands some previous identity to change. It is important to note here that nationalism and the struggle it often causes can produce multiple and different, previously not used, not defined, or even non-existent identities.⁵ This inquiry, however, is primarily concerned with the one identity that elites desire to be salient for the population that undergoes nationalism.

Researchers point out that the sense of salient identity is the basis for collective action (see Tajfel and Turner 1979; van Zomeren et al. 2004), and as such it is the main drawing force of nationalism for the essentialists.⁶ In that way they imply two things: that nationalism is a form of collective action with willing participants (Barreto 2012), and that the group's identity remains *more or less* the same after the whole process of nationalism is over and if a desired goal (often seen as self-rule) is achieved. Guiding propositions for this inquiry consider that suggestion to be a post hoc fallacy⁷ and suggest that even when there is some prior and formed social identity that undergoes nationalism, it is transformed into a new or significantly upgraded one.⁸ The process of nationalism is usually seen as modern and separate from the concept of a nation (Geertz 1963; Smith 2009; Gellner 2006; Connor 1994; Anderson 1991),⁹ while identity is seen as a political and social category, “a sort of public good produced by [nationalism] and available to everyone, as ‘public pronouncement of status’” (Flesher-Fominaya 2010, 397).¹⁰ Therefore, when identity is observed, it is seen as an aggregate of individual and societal responses and interactions.¹¹ Because “scholars take identities both as things to be explained and things that have explanatory force”¹² (Fearon 1999), it is hard not only to account for its effects, but also to determine on what side of actions “identity” is, independent or dependent. For that reason, in an exploratory study like this, where identity is treated as an outcome, it is important for the researcher to provide clearer possible definitions of the terms for the study, with the intention that such definitions serve as codes and signs to produce and support what Umberto Eco (1998) would call a “model reader” (64–66), who will understand the intention and be invited through infinite conjectures to interpret this text that describes the study and its results.¹³ Consequently, this inquiry builds upon the grounded theory method and

definitions of identity and nationalism provided in the first chapter. This exploratory work seeks to clarify the relationship between nationalism and identity and to suggest and test through a particular case study the proposal that in their interactions, a salient new desired identity is the dependent variable, while nationalism is the independent variable, and to report the results of that observation based on the data collected for this study.

The case study for this research involves observation of the contemporary Bosniak identity and its grounding nationalism, in order to determine whether that desired salient identity is likely to be acquired by the proposed population influenced by nationalism.¹⁴ Bosnian Muslim nationalism and Bosniak identity emerged as the result of various nationalism projects that caused the dissolution of the former Yugoslavia.¹⁵ Those nationalisms pushed the group to restructure and emerge, and the effects of those changes are to be observed on the individual level, with the new salient identity among members of the group. Therefore, a new salient identity, under observation here, is being formed largely by the context of local events, as Erving Goffman (1959) proposed to be the case with identities in his seminal work on identity formation and identity acquisition.

Bosniak identity is now (re)claimed by those who used to be of Muslim nationality and spoke some of the local Slavic languages in the two former Yugoslavias (Ćerić 1971; Zulfikarpašić 1990; Balić 1995).¹⁶ Therefore their name, Muslim, did not refer to their religious identity but to the population's proposed subethnic nationality.¹⁷ It was an ambiguous nationality because even under communism, when the group became officially recognized under that name, the boundaries of such a presupposed Muslim nationality were not clear.¹⁸ This was so because Muslims were not allowed to claim Bosnia and Herzegovina's (BiH)¹⁹ history and cultural developments for themselves exclusively, so that the only recognized remaining boundary of their nationality was religion, which in turn was not favored by the communists.²⁰ Therefore, the Muslim nationality was in a constant state of paradox, where religion was accepted as the basis of their groupness, and at the same time that religious basis was disapproved of in its essential form by the state structure. In such an atmosphere Bosnian Muslims as a group could not actualize their political ambitions and goals in the early 1960s when Serbian and Croatian communists began to foster their own nationalistic aspirations, even though Muslims were structurally ready for that step. Interestingly, even that previous Muslim identity was not chosen solely by them;²¹ rather, since it was a religious designation (clearly not a national one) and without a claim to a specific territory that usually accompanies national identities, it was ascribed to them by the powers at the time



Fig. I.1. Map of Sandžak and its crossover populations in 2008. (Copyright Philippe Rekacewicz, reprinted by permission.)

to signify their religion and (possibly problematic) loyalty to the Ottoman Empire.²² The local Slavic Muslim population, however, mostly accepted the name “Muslim” as their own designation, in part as a vestige of the old identity that the last Ottoman sultan, Abdulhamid II, tried to push for during his rule in order to unify millions of people who flocked as refugees to the receding empire for protection. Muslim identity also served them well in Yugoslavian lands, as it made them be seen as “close to Turkish culture” and which made them “eligible” for emigration to Turkey (Pezo 2009, 90),

and this identity supported a basis for their own political aspirations that have existed ever since medieval times. Those newly arrived people faced varied pushback from local, mostly Turkic, peoples, who were pushing for Turanian Muslim nationalism and its desired Turkish identity.²³ Faced with such intrapopulation tensions, Abdulhamid's administration developed an alternative to the situation and urged a political Muslim identity for all those peoples to create the possibility of cohesion, solidarity, and collective action. Those ideas and identities certainly traveled throughout former Ottoman lands as well.²⁴ They began to play an important role in those regions too,²⁵ and they were expedient for the new Turkish state at the outset of World War I, when the state managed to mobilize thousands of volunteers in the Balkans to fight and die for that state without ever becoming Turkish citizens.²⁶ Although during World War I, Slavic-speaking Muslims (from the former Yugoslavia) served in the armies of two different states, Austro-Hungarian and Ottoman, they were allies in the war and sometimes fought together, although in different uniforms, and ideas of common identity could still freely flow among them. After it served Ottoman collectivism, "Muslim" identity also served well two of the following forms of collectivism in the Kingdom of Yugoslavia, which initiated the idea of "one nation of three tribes" as its national platform and which looked favorably on Muslim's Yugoslav collectivism, sometimes epitomized by the Jugoslovenska Muslimanska Organizacija (Yugoslav Muslim Organization; JMO)—which appropriated and propagated Muslim identity as a separate shy identity that will linger between Serbian and Croatian identities (Purivatra 1977). Tito's communist-led Yugoslavia eventually also saw "Muslim" national identity as a useful form of Yugoslav subcollectivism, but preferably without its religious practices. Both the king and the communists tried to find a way to unify various peoples that lived in the territory in Yugoslavia, and Muslim identity, which was built as a common identity for all Slavic-speaking Muslims of the country, was serving them well in that regard.

At the same time the "choice" of Muslim national identity for local Slavic-speaking Muslims was useful in their effort to distance themselves from the "foreign" Turkish identity that was often assigned to them by local Christians, and at the same time to maintain diacritic boundaries from other neighboring Slavic groups that had already developed their own national programs.²⁷ Those Slavic-speaking Muslims lived throughout the central and southern parts of Yugoslavia, while a majority of them still live in BiH, and that is the reason why they are often referred to in the literature and in everyday discourse as Bosnian Muslims. This, how-

ever, is also a new and previously not well-known or often-used category, which resulted from their Yugoslav-wartime effort to differentiate themselves from the larger body of world Muslims. Hence, they went through three steps of signification, from the nationality category of “Muslim” in the former Yugoslavia, to “Bosnian Muslims” at the outset of the Bosnian war, and finally to “Bosniak,” which emerged during the war and has been emphasized since.²⁸ The essential difference between two political identities of Muslim and Bosniak is that the latter emerged as a result of the group’s own nationalism, while the former was an identity that the group had adopted and carried without its own incipient nationalism.

Therefore, this is a case study of an autochthonous Muslim population going through the full process of its own nationalism, which thus far has been largely absent among world Muslim peoples,²⁹ excluding Turkey. The Turkish case, however, represents the situation that Anderson (1991) calls “official nationalism,” which he defines as “stretching the short, tight, skin of the nation over the [remaining] body of the empire” (86), and it is thus very different from the vernacular type of nationalism of Bosnian Muslims. The Turkish experience of nationalism took a particularly aggressive form, imposed directly from the top of the then newly emerging nationalistic state, and the subsequent invention of identity was mainly of an official and political nature, to borrow the convenient distinction of nationalism style of Hobsbawm (1992, 263). As Özkan (2012) states, “the notion of common Turkish *vatan* was deployed to override differences within the society” (4), and such a notion could only be promoted from the top of the state. The experience of nationalism for Bosnian Muslims and the project of Bosniak identity, however, came in response to aggressive Serbian and Croatian essentialist nationalisms in the form of a remedial (re)action, as suggested by Brubaker (1996), and it developed without a national state, yet with clear political consciousness. Since the Serbian and Croatian nationalisms were primarily constructed based on the cultural distinctiveness of the “entropy resistant traits” (Gellner 2006, 63–65) of religious differences, the Bosnian Muslim nationalism came as “a reaction of people who feel culturally disadvantaged” (Plamenatz 1976, 27) by those two groups, and it creates a strange constellation that merges the two ultimately opposing forces of religion and nationalism.³⁰ The case of Bosnian Muslims’ nationalism and the identity it might have produced also represents a different strand of nationalism from the Turkish model, which strongly de-emphasized religion.³¹ This observation could potentially be important for the other cases in the Muslim world without strongly developed national states where the masses increasingly demand political self-rule and assume the new identity

of citizens. The case of Bosnian Muslims presents itself as a good opportunity to examine how the process of nationalism develops in the absence of national state or solid ethnic differences,³² and what kind of identity may emerge from that process.

It is important to note that this observation of the emergence of a new salient identity in the case of Muslims in BiH and Sandžak *does not imply* that they are a newly settled group in the region that uses nationalism to incorporate itself in the territory, or that the people who are members of this group just “popped up” in the Balkans. Far from that! People referred to as Muslims in Yugoslavia are part of the Balkan tapestry of people, and they have been living there for as long as any other Balkan group.³³ They were a *distinct* local autochthonous group of people before they were a modern nation.³⁴ Furthermore, suggestions that they are not autochthonous people of the Balkans have serious implications in the local and European settings,³⁵ and could be—and *were*—used to justify policies of ethnic cleansing and genocide³⁶ perpetrated against Muslims in the Balkans several times in the previous century.³⁷ The cases of Srebrenica,³⁸ Prijedor,³⁹ Lašva Valley,⁴⁰ and many other local places of carnage are just the latest episodes in those attempts to eliminate them from the Balkans.

Rather, this inquiry looks at an existing group of people that is emerging into a nation as a *new form* of grouping resulting from a loosening of previous interdependencies with a larger unit. When that loosening of interdependence happened as the consequence of the breakup of the former Yugoslavia, and previous forms of living unfroze, Muslims in Bosnia were attentive and open to new ideas and changes. Nationalism as a form of episodic groupness particularly facilitates change or restructuring of an identity. So the Muslims of the former Yugoslavia are the same people who were living on their land for centuries and they are now at the stage of forming a new national consciousness and identity, which is often an omitted point in the works on Muslims in the Balkans.⁴¹ This is similar to the observation of the moments when native peoples inhabiting *Ruritania* become and gain consciousness as *Ruritarians*, to use Gellner’s (2006, 57–61) famous fable in which he described how the process of nationalism works to form a separate and specific *form* of a group out of the people who were previously living in *Megalomania* without the consciousness of being *Ruritarians*. Analogously, the Muslims of Bosnia are a group that is in the stage of emergence into a new form of groupness, and they are made up of people whose lives were already intertwined through various forms of social life and interactions, even though not necessarily as an independent nation.⁴²

The data collection for this section of the study of Bosniak identity coincided with the first official national census in independent BiH, held in 2013, where one of the census questions was about the national self-identification of the population.⁴³ For the first time, one of the questions allowed a person to declare himself or herself a Bosniak, which is imagined as an evolved Bosnian Muslim national identification, separate from the eponymic nationality of “Bosnian,” which can be shared by all ethnicities in BiH.

Following Snyder (1968), who proposed approaching the subject by “clarification of its meaning not by definition but by description” (196), the two key concepts of nationalism and identity are described separately. Nationalism is seen as a superimposed, elite-driven, ideological process that seeks to provide political fulfillment for a particular cultural group of people at the stage of emergence.⁴⁴ As an opportune process, nationalism creates a social context that demands a new or “upgraded” salient identity for members of a group, which becomes acquired by a population as the final outcome of the process if nationalism is successful. Furthermore, this work will rely throughout on Snyder’s (1977) observation that “nationalism has two major senses: concrete (geographical, linguistic, political, social, economic, and cultural); and ideal (psychological)” (196). Therefore, nationalism may use a combination of all those elements to fulfill its goal. As a force, it is usually employed by those who may be considered elites at the opportune time in the international arena,⁴⁵ as a possible *situational* nationalism (Jenne and Bieber 2014, 439).

In the life of any group, the stage of emergence is a stressful time when norms are being tested, re-evaluated, and replaced, and when, as a result, the self-understanding and identity of members of that group are often being rearranged, adapted, or completely changed. These changes are sometimes brought about in a gradual way, but at other times they are forced by war or some other form of destruction or deconstruction of the social order. It is not easy to change or rearrange identity, since change is exactly what identity is trying to tame and slow.

One of the processes that suggests, encourages, and sometimes forces such change is nationalism as an “ideology of order,” to use Juergensmeyer’s (1993) description.⁴⁶ For him “secular nationalism, as an ideology of order, locates an individual within the universe. It ties her or him to a larger collectivity associated with a particular place and particular history [and such] nationalism, therefore, involves not only an attachment to a spirit of social order but also an act of submission to an ordering agent” (31–32). Order brings meaning to change and uncertainty, and through that process also brings about a new or upgraded salient identity. Like religion, nationalism

also “contains images of grave disorder as well as tranquil order, holding out the hope that, despite appearances to the contrary, order will eventually triumph and disorder will be contained” (Juergensmeyer 1993, 32). To recreate equilibrium, a new or upgraded salient identity is produced for the people engulfed in the process of nationalism to acquire as the result of the rearrangements.

Perhaps the very reason man is a *homo politicus* is that he is exposed to continuous internal-external tensions, where inside is order and outside is disorder. Analogously, within a nation, there is order, while outside there is disorder, and on the next level, within a state, there is hierarchy, while outside there is anarchy in the world.⁴⁷ Such a constant “inside—order, outside—disorder” tension seeks to be resolved by an individual and by a society. Identity is an instrumental aspect of that resolution. To step away from “methodological nationalism,” as Chernilo (2007) describes it, rather than observing the relation between a nation state and identity, what is looked at here is the relation between the political society of a nation (apart from a state) and identity, where neither is taken for granted.

Identity is seen as “the set of meanings that define who one is when one is an occupant of a particular role in society, a member of a particular group, or claims particular characteristics that identify him or her as a unique person” (Burke and Stets 2009, 3). It is obviously an external signifier that may be ascribed by an individual if he or she finds it salient. As Levy (2014) noted, ascribing identity is not a zero-sum game, and in an everyday life situation, an individual is exposed to many possible identities. The concern here is how and why a new one, out of many possible identities, becomes salient in the political sphere for an individual to ascribe it to himself or herself. The proposal here is that nationalism is the main factor that makes the new desired identity salient and ascribed by the group members.

This research utilizes the grounded theory method and examines various theories and disciplines, taking many major works into account regardless of the publication year.⁴⁸ A comprehensive examination is needed to show that both modern and primordial schools studying nationalism show to varying degrees that nationalism is about change and group emergence from one state to another, consistently over time. Such an approach is warranted because present-day case studies of nationalism and identity building, such as the case of Bosnian Muslims, have elements of different theoretical assumptions built in. Only by taking account of most of them will a more comprehensive picture of the relation between nationalism and the process of new salient identity construction become apparent.

This multidisciplinary approach is necessary, moreover, because the literature that deals with both nationalism and identity comes from various research fields and disciplines, including sociology, psychology, geography, religion, comparative politics, and international relations. It will begin with an overview of the literature on the subject of nationalism and identity. The research then moves into an examination of the history of Bosnian Muslims and the origin of their groupness. This approach will provide an opportunity to observe the early modern period of nationalistic sentiments among Bosniaks, which it will follow all the way up to the present time to reveal the process of creating a new political identity for the Bosnian Muslim population. The relationship between nationalism and identity is examined with a multimethod approach, using qualitative and quantitative components where information provided by a case analysis is empirically transformed and evaluated against the causal framework suggested here, as the best approach to investigation of causality (Crasnow 2012).

The qualitative component involves participant observation of individual interactions among the population at multiple sites across the United States and an examination of the existing literature about Bosnian Muslim nationalism and Bosniak identity now available to the Muslim population from the former Yugoslavia.⁴⁹ The quantitative component is discussed in a separate chapter and contains comparative statistical analyses of the survey data collected at ten sites throughout the United States from people from the former Yugoslavia who were referred to as Muslim.⁵⁰ Although the U.S. section of the research provides us with important conclusions, this research is envisioned as just the first step in the investigation of the salience of Bosniak identity among former Yugoslav Muslim populations, while the next two important steps should be to replicate the research in their home environment, BiH and Sandžak, and in Turkey, the previous place of their mass emigration.⁵¹ Many Muslims from the former Yugoslavia, for various reasons, have lived in diasporic conditions for most of their time as Muslims since the fourteenth century. The latest large exodus from their homeland occurred during the wars of the dissolution of the former Yugoslavia, corresponding with the maturation of their nationalism. Such conditions necessitate research on their modern salient identity, including conditions of the population in the diaspora where their identity also persists. Brubaker (2005, 12–13) argued that this should be done and that the diaspora should be treated as a category of practice for the nonterritorial form of essentialized belonging to the group, and as a nonterritorial condition for the population, which in the case of Yugoslav and Bosnian Muslims has been more or less the constant condition during the twentieth century.

The contemporary transstate nature of Bosniak identity resulted from the 1990s BiH war, when around two million people, mostly Bosniaks, were expelled and settled all over the world.⁵² Since the United States is one of the countries with the most significant number of those BiH refugees,⁵³ any study of the development and acquisition of the modern Bosniak identity should include it in the analysis. Additionally, as Kligman (1992, 4) reminds us, when nation and state are seen as two different phenomena, as they should be seen, then the term or adjective “transnational” is a malaprop. Although identities as social constructions inevitably do contain some built-in elements of territoriality, we should be mindful that the contemporary conditions of impermanence of human dwellings are actually not new. Classic anthropological theory still talks about the stage when most humans were primarily nomads and herders moving around in search of food and safety. It seems that the same search is continuing now. Social units and their identities existed in those conditions of constant movements then as they do now. Only the liberal ideology that promulgates a state structure as the best possible lifestyle sometimes blinds us from considering identities outside of state and territorial boundaries. Furthermore, Appadurai (1995) points out that this (old) new reality of constant movement of people makes the condition of locality problematic if imagined only in terms of particular territory (192). Rather, some other space can become the “place,” while “locality” can be produced and reproduced in whichever “neighborhoods”⁵⁴ people have knowledge of how to do so, and wherever large enough communities of the particular group exist so that exercise of power, conceived as “us” apart from “them” relations, can be implemented (Appadurai 1996, 183–87). In this way we connect “local to other places, levels and scales of social experience,” as Levitt (2007, 22) calls for.

Therefore, the data for this research was not collected in places where Bosniak identity means the most to the group;⁵⁵ it was collected in Appadurai-type (Bosniak) neighborhoods across the United States. At these sites, however, locality-as-a-place is not only reproduced by memory-imagination or posters, but also through the Bosnian-language newspapers regularly published and distributed there, through Bosnian-language radio programs, and through the physical representation of “back-home” identity, such as mosques with tall minarets and other artifacts.⁵⁶ There are also continuous exchanges of “social remittances” (Levitt 2007, 23) in both directions, although not necessarily with the exact back-home locality, since sometimes no one is left there due to the Serbian and Croatian troops’ policies of ethnic cleansing of territories they captured. Moreover,



Fig. I.2. *Sebilj* in St. Louis, MO. The Ottoman-style fountain is a symbol of “back home” in Sarajevo. (Photograph by author, 2021.)

others, like Cheah, Karamehic-Muratovic, and Matsuo (2013), have shown that cultural and ethnic identity remains prominent for Bosnians in such neighborhoods.⁵⁷

Finally, by including the diaspora in the research design, this inquiry is to some extent avoiding the problem of essentialism of prototypical identity that is implicit in many studies of identity, as noted by Calhoun (1994). His criticism raises the important research design question of how and



Fig. I.3. Bevo Mill Bosnian Muslim-run *masjid* with 107-foot tall minaret, St. Louis, MO. (Photograph by author, 2021.)

whether it is possible to observe salient group identities, as is usually done, by comparing them with some type of prototypical identity that is assumed to be shared by the majority of members of a group. The ascription of such shared identity is a precondition for a member if he or she is to be able to effectively participate in the group's social life (Calhoun 1994, 23). This is particularly problematic today, when any social group and category may and does exist in many places at the same time, and interacts with different ecologies, while the sense of shared identity persists among group members.⁵⁸ Furthermore, this study is not taking the group-as-unitary for granted, but is instead accounting for possibilities of more or less groupness among members, as Brubaker (2006) urged.

The issue of prototype is also potentially detrimental in modern democracies that assume individual participation by *all* the people of the nation. "Bosniak" nationalism was conceived in a trans-situational (trans-state) milieu from the beginning and without clearly defined goals, in contrast to contemporary Serbian and Croatian essentialist nationalisms, which are mainly structured around their own states and religions.⁵⁹ The nationalism-desired Bosniak identity should also respond to many of those

different situations the group finds itself in.⁶⁰ Therefore, any research on it should heed Calhoun's (1994) observations and try to avoid the prototypical and territory-bounded identity approach, instead accounting for the diaspora as part of a "wider identity landscape" (Jenne and Bieber, 2014, 438). By observing the diaspora, this inquiry tries to observe the lowest common denominators that are absolutely essential in order for a social identity to remain cohesive and retain a definable structure before it dissolves into some amorphous shape incapable of serving as any particular identity in terms of individuals belonging to a specific group, and in terms of the group claiming that it is composed of identifiable individuals.⁶¹ Such an approach allows the concept of identity to envelop the empirical facts and enables one to explore implications of their interactions, as suggested by Barth (1998a, 10). Therefore, in this inquiry, comparisons are made among several identity categories in the diaspora population sample.⁶² Such an approach provides a better possibility of noting the essentials of Bosniak identity outside of its original context and of noting the group's "criteria for determining membership and ways of signaling membership and exclusion" (Barth 1998a, 15).

Since this book is essentially a theoretical contribution to the field of nationalism in comparative politics, this discussion of nationalism and identity and their definitions should expand in the next chapter to examine the foundations for this theoretical probe. Since most cases of nationalism are the episodic events of groupness that came about as the result of historical contingencies (Brubaker 2006, 12), it is useful to observe the historical process of its development for each case under observation in order to ground its desired identity projects. That is why chapter 2 provides a historical account of the emergence and development of Bosnian Muslims as a group. Chapter 3 provides a historical account of the Bosnian Muslim nationalism program and the major structural and political themes upon which it is based nowadays and which are built into its desired salient identity. Chapter 4 describes in more detail the Bosnian Muslim diaspora population at the data collection sites, while chapter 5 provides a short discussion on the methodology behind the study, operationalization of the concepts, and frequencies of responses to the surveys collected. Chapter 6 reports the results of the statistical analysis of the test that is proposed to show the direction of interaction between Bosnian Muslim nationalism and desired Bosniak identity. The concluding chapter is where major points and findings are summarized and where some implications of the findings are discussed.

Nationalism, Nation, Maybe State . . . and Identity

Theorizing Nationalism and Its Relation to a Group's Salient Identity

1.1. Universal Particularism of Nationalism

The subject of nationalism as a form of particularization has been studied by numerous scholars in various fields, and that makes the phenomenon difficult, if not impossible, to grasp and define. This is not a surprise, considering that nationalism entails two at first glance paradoxical sentiments, the sense of togetherness and the sense of distinctiveness, where the latter employs politics and uses the former to signify itself. All the authors agree that nationalism entails an emphasis on feelings of togetherness, a “we-sentiment,”¹ and a political consciousness that is organized around the idea of independence or some other form of political representation or self-rule. These political aspirations, however, are fed and guided by selected norms, whether they come from religion, myths, symbolism, public culture, codes of communication, or other cultural constructions that signify distinctiveness, real or perceived.²

This is “normal” for at least two reasons. The sense of distinctiveness can be found essentially in a culture and not in biological structures, since all human beings are biologically the same. Secondly, it is usual that political processes use all elements of social interactions to achieve desired ends, nationalism especially, in its quest for political importance. Every

people awakened to nationalism sees political self-determination as its goal, explains Woolf (1996, 4). Therefore, the phenomenon of nationalism seems to be an intricate part of the process in which a society turns from one form into another, whether tribe or ethnicity (or *ethnie*), into nation. Sometimes this is related to the similar process of turning the older type of society of *Gemeinschaft*, into the new form, of *Gesellschaft* (Tönnies 1887, 34).³ Since nationalism has elements of both difference and similarity in cases where it played a role in defining or transforming a group, it is important to use relevant works to frame and conceptualize this observation of a Bosnian Muslim, or Bosniak, case. Furthermore, this is consistent with the grounding theory method that guides this study, which suggests that existing literature can be used as data to support inquiry.

1.2. Nationalism as Groupness

For Rogers Brubaker (1996), nationalism is to be understood as apart from nation, because “nation” is a category of practice, not . . . a category of analysis” (7). He suggests that we should reconceptualize a “nation” as a contingent event, institutionalized form, and practical category. Furthermore, it is necessary to capture the reality of nationhood as an institutionalized and political form, nationness as contingent event, and a nation as a category of practice (15–21). Such an approach invites us to perceive nationalism as the political mechanism for the production of *possible* identity and “treat groupness as an *event*, as something that ‘happens’” when it does (Brubaker 2006, 12), that *possibly* crystallizes into an identity that members of a group accept or not. Therefore, nationalism is a context that sometimes produces a new salient identity, but it *always* demands that the appropriate salient identity be embraced by the people to whom nationalism happens. In such a case the new salient identity is not seen in direct relation to a previously existing group or ethnic reality, but rather is conceptualized as a “changeable product of collective action” (Brubaker 1996, 20). For Brubaker, nationalism is such action that is intended to address deficiencies of a political condition, such as lack of adequate polity, or lack of an adequate national base, or, in his own words, “polity-seeking [and] polity-upgrading” (1996, 79) situations. Therefore, nationalism for Brubaker (1996) is essentially a “political stance [and] not an ethnodemographic fact” (5).⁴ The main goal of such a political attitude, which has a performative character, is to reify the group’s existence as an undisputed fact and subsequently provide for its increased unity (Brubaker 2006, 10) as a context for a new salient identity.

Therefore, a group's cohesion should be treated as a *variable*, and here it is proposed that increased group cohesion increases the likelihood of a new salient identity. It should be noted one more time that both variables, group cohesion and Bosniak identity, are not taken for granted and are treated as new realities for the Muslims of BiH and Sandžak, which they can accept or reject to varying degrees. Therefore, accepting and ascribing to a new salient identity is a significant social phenomenon that must be carefully observed and analyzed.

Brubaker's most important contribution to this inquiry is his suggestion to treat nationalism as a form of *more or less* groupness, which directs inquiry toward the literature on group development and maintenance, as Brubaker (2006, 7) also hinted at in his comment on the juncture between the subdisciplines on groups and ethnicities.

Approaching nationalism as a variation of groupness provides the opportunity to address some other important shortcomings often found in studies that see nationalism and nations as given categories with a taken-for-granted consistency. The curiosity about that is best answered when the inquiry includes everyday people as responders, since they are the main recipients of those policies and political projects. According to Enloe (2004, 26), considering the experiences and responses of ordinary people "is one of the most efficient ways to accurately estimate just how fragile that artifice [of a group] is, just how far off the mark it is to" take the group's consistency for granted. Furthermore, focusing on the bottom level of action enables us to notice the group's different voices and the positions of women, which are often missed or neglected in analyses of nationalism and identity. Since there are only a few women at the elite and policy-making level, concentrating solely on that level means avoiding voices already silenced in politics and literature. In order to change this reality, where "margins stay marginal, the silent stay voiceless" (Enloe 2004, 24), an attempt is made here to examine responses to nationalism and identity at the level of ordinary people, so that women's attitudes and voices will also be accounted for.

1.3. Power Relations as History of Nationalism

Foucault's (2003) structuralism also contributes to our understanding of the phenomena of nationalism and nation. For him, French nationalism was a tactical choice by the defeated elites, and the nation that choice had created was envisioned as the body of a sovereign over the state (the peo-

ple) which became heir to the throne after the king was decapitated. Before his death, the king's inevitable mission was to form the new nation, as a milieu for the new identity, out of groups that used to be *different* peoples.⁵ Foucault explains that the sense of togetherness, among the commoners, clergy, nobility, and everyone else who might be present in any particular case, is the necessary precondition for a nation to exist, but that precondition is not enough. That possibility has to be fulfilled by the destined group's achievement of its own state if the group is to become a nation. For Foucault "what defines a nation is not its archaism, its ancestral nature, or its relationship with the past. [It is] a vertical relationship between a body of individuals who are capable of constituting a State, and the actual existence of the State itself" (Foucault 2003, 223). That individuals-state reality, which has become the norm in the international arena, urges everyone globally to try to seek it, and that is how nationalism became a universal process requiring everyone to engage with it. So Foucault's definition of a nation is tied to the group's connectivity to a state, primarily seen as a structure capable of mobilizing oppressive force to coerce primarily within (and, less so, outside) its borders. Therefore, for a group of people to become a nation, "will" alone is not sufficient; rather, for Foucault, just as for Gellner (1997, 52), it is "will" and a "coercion," an ability to administer itself, that constitute a nation as a social reality. For Foucault (2003) "the nation is the active, constituent core of the State. The nation is the State, or at least an outline State" (223), whether real or potential. And so Bosniaks also are becoming a nation precisely at the moment when they can claim even partial ownership of a state, when they claim to be the constitutive core of the state of BiH, as is often noted by the members of their bearer class. Bosniaks, therefore, are fighting the main battle to reassert themselves as a nation by asserting themselves as the core national group of BiH even though they are sharing the state with two other national groups.⁶ So just as with the emergence of a modern nation and its constituting state, "the State, and the universality of the State, become both what is at stake in the struggle, and the battlefield" (Foucault 2003, 225).

For Foucault, history as the source of a nation is the "concept of nation, which the aristocracy wanted to reserve for a group of individuals whose only assets were common customs and a common status, [but] is not enough to describe the historical reality of the nation" (Foucault 2003, 221), because history as an instrument of power is not a force of nature that shapes nations and their possibilities (158). Foucault suggests that history should be seen as a "calculation of forces," and for those who look at it, the focus should be to establish "who became strong and who became

weak. Why did the strong become weak, and did the weak become strong?" (161). The source of a nation, therefore, should be sought not in nature, but elsewhere in the *conditions* that enabled it to emerge as an outcome of specific power relations.

And so, how can those relations of power that enabled the French Revolution to occur and nationalism to play its *historical* role still be useful for contemporary analysis? Foucault focuses on the maneuvering of elites and prescriptively describes how a defeated aristocracy took refuge in the church to regroup and then reassert itself through a nation and concurrent citizenship. "The fact that they had been driven off their land and into the arms of the church, gave them influence over the people, but also an understanding of right" (Foucault 2003, 161). Hidden there among the ordinary folks, armed with new mystical instruments of influence over the people, the former Gaulish nobility, now priests, eventually aligned themselves with the new monarch against the (new) nobility and created conditions for the Third Estate, people, to emerge and overthrow the nobility and shape a nation around themselves.

That historical situation is similar to the several cases of emergence of a nation in the Balkans. As those territories were overrun by the Ottomans, the nobility that lost the war and then the wealth and privileges it had had before mostly became members of the Orthodox Christian clergy, although many also converted to the other religion.⁷ From there, they became close to the people and, although initially loyal vassals of the Ottoman sultans, they eventually became the foundation for the emergence of the people's nation, which over time materialized into its own state.

For Bosnian Muslims, the arrangement of power relations was slightly different. When, as a result of the Ottoman decline, they lost their favorable position in the Balkans, some of their nobility also withdrew into the Muslim clergy. Once there, they were forced to erase Ottoman-established class structures that had separated them from the commoners, and, using religion, they forged close ties with the population and maintained control over knowledge production and attainment. As one of the older informants told me, *hodžas* (Muslim priests) even discouraged people from attending regular state-run schools in order to maintain their dominance over proper knowledge production.⁸ For many decades after that, any person who sought any kind of influence over Bosnian Muslims had to seek explicit support from the *hodžas* and *their* organization, the Islamic Community of BiH (IZBiH), which was seen by many commoners as the prime legitimator for any influential aspirations within the group. The same organization survived the Austro-Hungarian occupation of Bosnia, the Kingdom

of Yugoslavia, the Croatian *Ustaša* Nazi regime of World War II, and the postwar Communist Party dominance in Yugoslavia; it always tried, and succeeded more or less, to be close to the dominant power at the time and an arbiter of groupness for Bosnian Muslims.

Although after World War II the *hodžas* lost their firm control over the production of knowledge after the communist regime instituted obligatory and universal public education,⁹ they still maintained several IZBiH-run *madrasas* as their own institutions of learning and memory, and they cultivated the concept of the right of a citizen (as in Foucault 2003, 161). When the time became appropriate, many of the alumni of those institutions, like the IZ prime institutions such as the IZ Gazi Husrev-Beg Medresa in Sarajevo,¹⁰ led the Bosnian Muslims through the turbulent years of the dissolution of Yugoslavia, their process of nationalism and of seeking their rights, and their emergence as a nation.

1.4. Types of Nationalism

Scholars like John Plamenatz (1976) see nationalism primarily as a cultural phenomenon, though it can, and often does, take a political form. Of concern for this inquiry is the typology of nationalism noted prominently by this late Montenegrin-born scholar. Although Plamenatz's (1976) and before him Kohn's ([1965] 1982) typology of Western nationalism as liberal and Eastern nationalism as illiberal *is* controversial,¹¹ most if not all of the authors who study nationalism do acknowledge that it manifests itself in different ways at different times and in different regions. Scholars see the typology of nationalism based on its first two successful manifestations, the first being the French model based on the ideological acceptance of nationalism, and the second being the German model, developed in contrast to the French one, built around notions of genuine peoplehood, folklore, and other possible elements usually used to describe an ethnic group. The first is seen as based on a willing acceptance of membership into a nation, and it is often referred to as the civic type of nationalism, while the second is seen as being based on a membership established by birth and is noted as the ethnic type of nationalism.

This typology of claims could be problematized, since both types actually contain elements of coercion, willing acceptance, and possibly some elements of ethnicity among members. Observations of typology and differences between the two models of nationalism, however, cannot be ignored, and the effects of the typology should be measured to see if they

make any difference among the population that is experiencing the process of nationalism, in terms of acceptance or rejection of the desired salient identity. Therefore, in agreement with Billig (2002) and Dungaciu (2000), nationalism here is seen as one phenomenon—a thing common to “us” and “them,” but emphasized more or less by civic or ethnic aspects that may be present in any case of nationalism.¹² For that reason, in this inquiry, nationalism is measured by its two essential characteristics: its intensity (or strength) and, on a bipolar scale, its civic or ethnic nature, to note how those two different aspects of the phenomenon interact with the ascription of identity by the population. Nationalism could also be distinguished in terms of the tools it employs and aims it attempts to achieve as conventional and banal nationalism. Conventional is the one that stimulates acceptance of the first level of identity ascription, self-defining and it is being observed here. Banal nationalism (Billig 1995) could be useful to observe the self-investment stage that occurs as the second phase of identity ascription.

1.5. Nationalism as a Motivation for a Group Change and to Overcome Inertia

Since the past is often a relevant starting point in studies of a group's nationalism, it is considered in this case as well. Scholars observe the historical process of nation building through nationalism as (1) deliberate actions of the state (Geertz 1963; Weber 1976; Hobsbawm and Ranger 1992; Connor 1994); (2) an almost inevitable consequence of a particular approach and type of modernization (such as expressed in writings of Deutsch, Gellner, and Smith); (3) an elite-driven response to changes in the circumstances in which people find themselves (Plamenatz 1976; Shils 1982), or similarly (4) maneuvering by the defeated old elites to a position where they are able to appropriate knowledge and become the main educators of a new prince for a state (Foucault 2003).

Scholars of nationalism suggest that nationalism brings about the same change of context and causes the emergence of a specific form of groupness, although they differ as to the degree of inertia within a group to change.¹³ Some are preoccupied with those elements that increase inertia, which are usually codified through culture and cultural production, while others, modernists, primarily observe structural conditions that facilitate change in the form of groupness. Although the main concern of nationalism is an identity as a political construction, it is often difficult to separate the two; nevertheless, it is useful conceptually to keep the two apart and to

observe relations between them as is often done across the field of nationalism studies.

The factors on which the primordialists' observations about groups are based are those cultural constructions that might have preceded the formation of modern states, which Geertz (1963) notes as assumed blood ties, race, language, region, religion, and custom. Primordialists who draw from the teachings of Edward Shils (1982) try to go back in history "to see how far [group's] themes and forms were prefigured in earlier periods and how far a connection with earlier ethnic ties and sentiments can be established" (13). So even for them, nationalism, or groupness, might be new, but the need for increased integration of a group is not (Shils 1982, 4). Nevertheless, even if and where those primordial norms are at play, the aim of nationalism is still "a search for an identity, and a demand that that identity be publicly acknowledged as having import, a social association of the self as 'being somebody in the world'" (Geertz 1963, 108), an identity that should serve as a springboard for political modernity. Since the basic organizing principles of all human associations predate complex modern political formations and provide a structure upon which they are built, they are considered to be primordial. Once formed, these principles tend to persist, and scholars of the primordial approach are therefore primarily concerned with the higher degree of inertia to change; it does not, however, completely close the door to change. For them, nationalism might be the new manifestation of political aspirations that causes change in intragroup structure, while there is nothing particularly modern about the claims of particularism *per se* made by nationalists. Therefore, Bosnian Muslims were a distinct group before, and Bosniakness is a new form and practice of groupness.

Another thing that is new for primordialists is the construct of the modern state, which should be considered as separate from the nation, while the population of such states might have possessed prior forms of homogeneity (Connor 1994), as might be the case with the people of BiH. Connor (1994) also warns of the danger of equating nationalism with loyalty to the state and notes that political and ethnic borders often do not match (97). Therefore, modern nations emerge as complex social formations rather than simple extensions of proto-societies. Since for Connor (1994) nation is primarily self-defined (103), the main requisite for the sense of togetherness "is subjective and consists of self-identification of people with a group—its past, its present, and, what is most important, its destiny" (4) and nationalism thus "is unquestionably a very recent creation" (98). Some groups went through this process earlier, and some are going through it now depending on the circumstances they face.

Abstractions such as destiny, memory, and commonality reappear in most of the other observations of nation and nationalism. All of them might easily be employed for upgrading or creating new signifiers for an identity. Quoting Max Weber's (1958, 102) ideas about the importance of common descent and homogeneity, Connor (1994), for example, asserts that "a nation can only be made by a State if the population on which it works already possesses some homogeneity" (12), where individual psychological attachments to the "national consciousness" can travel through time and survive into modernity (106). Implicitly, the same could be said about the case of nationalism that a stateless group might be exposed to.

Most scholars agree that the process of nationalism is about turning subjects into citizens (of a nation), but Smith (1987) provides a tie between cultural and structural approaches to observe it, and he offers the link between the culture, politics, and self-identification of a nation. The structure emerged, accidentally, as a result of a sequential triple revolution. He notes the revolution in division of labor, then the revolution in control of administration, and then the revolution in cultural coordination. Therefore, for Smith, structural conditions caused by modernity provided a foundation for the emergence of a nation that is often nested in some prepolitical cultural container that he calls an *ethnie*, constituted as a community of ethnic groups. Although it is not clear, nationalism for him seems to be the precursor of the politicizing of a group, a sort of darkroom where the correct salient identity of a *citizen* emerges as a prerequisite for a nation's evolution and for a possible subsequent own state. Smith (1987) proposes that instead of going back so far in the past to understand nations and their nationalisms, we should rather look into "the state of cultural identity on the eve of its exposure to the new revolutionary forces in order to locate bases of its subsequent evolution into a fully-fledged nation" (3). For Smith those forms are *ethnies*, which exist "between modern national units and sentiments of the collective cultural units" (1987, 14), although nations can also form without *ethnies* (Smith 1991, 40).

Smith (2009, 15), like many others, also sees a nation as a project formed somewhere between the levels of ordinary peoples and key circles of the group. Hence he also points to the importance of a "bearer class" that can "reshape an ideology to which [the population] is attracted" (15), which can surely prefigure a context for a change of identity. Therefore, we can infer that for Smith also, nationalism as a prime ideology able to materialize the elective affinity of the bearer class may be a mechanism for the configuration of a new identity that fits new circumstances in which a group, *ethnie* or not, finds itself once it becomes a nation.¹⁴

In his later work, Smith (2009) shifts the entire emphasis to the transformation of *ethnie* into a nation through the process of nationalism and shows that the main aspect of the process is about the creation of new signifiers through institutionalizing cultivation and propagation, which are built upon some elements of the shared old (albeit selective) memories and myths. The case of a Bosniak nation, which stemmed from an “unnamed *ethnie*” of Muslims of Bosnia (Smith 1987, 23), is especially concerned with all these elements of transition that clearly suggest change. For Bosniaks that change occurred again when the “sense of community and difference had reached a certain point of consciousness and common awareness, under the pressure of [new] social and political obligations” (Smith 1987, 23) toward BiH.

Smith’s definition of nationalism is also concerned with identity. He sees nationalism as “an ideological movement to attain and maintain autonomy, unity and *identity* on behalf of a population” (Smith 2009, 61). In practice, for him, nationalisms are driven by specific programs “peculiar to the historic situation” (63) of the people to whom they are happening and whose imaginations they have to satisfy through a form of “political archeology” (65).

National identity is “fundamentally multi-dimensional [and as such it cannot be] swiftly induced in a population by artificial means” (Smith 1991, 14). Therefore, it seems that nationalism is a mechanism to induce a fitting national identity, albeit only by using appropriate means. In fact, Smith (1991) notes the “resolution of identity crisis” as one of the “benign effects of nationalism” (18). National identity for him, however, seems to be implicitly and explicitly tied to the state in several ways, since it serves to underpin the state and its organs or prepolitical equivalents in stateless nations, to legitimate common legal rights and duties of legal institutions, and to socialize the members of a group as nationals and citizens (2009, 16). This conception of identity, however, provides little chance to observe many situations where a nation and its nationalism lack a state, or where a group is a part of a multinational state, as in the situation of Bosniaks in BiH.

Furthermore, Smith’s suggestion that cultural forms within which *ethnies* “exist” are unique parts of an *ethnie*’s heritage and should be treated carefully. This is so because by now it is established that interactions of peoples produced mixed cultural forms that cannot be any more clearly untangled to examine unique expressions of current nations.¹⁵ For example, after expelling Spain’s Muslim inhabitants, new Spaniards adopted myths, norms, and culture from previous inhabitants but claimed them to

be uniquely their own. And in the Balkans, it would be hard to untangle the Serbian quasi-history transmitted by the blind folk singer Filip Višnjić, who composed his poems to address all the “deficiencies” of their history,¹⁶ or to unscramble the standardization of the Slav-Serbian language by the path-making Serbian nationalists Vuk Karadžić and Dositej Obradović, modeled on the Austro-Hungarian and Russian approach (Plamenatz 1976; Markovich 2011)¹⁷ and based on the dialect of a language spoken by non-Serbs in Herzegovina.

After the European cultural revolutions, the official historians attempted to codify most of those early Serbian nationalist assertions as a Serbian form of political and social invention of tradition,¹⁸ but the clash with accurate historical accounts still lingers unresolved.¹⁹ On the other hand, supporters of Serbian folkloric myths long ago decided to follow exclusively the blind poet’s fables about the battle of Kosovo, when the fictional “Serbian Army” chose a “heavenly kingdom over an earthly kingdom” and created Serbs as a specific group and an imagined “chosen” *ethnie*.²⁰ Although Smith (1991) notes that those who control the choice of the myth are often “literally the only witnesses” (36–37), as with the historic accounts attributed to the blind bard Višnjić, this is inconsistent with his other assertions. Smith implies that such a strategy can work for prehistoric *ethnies*, while Serbs perceived as “ethnic nations” are not that and their core ethnic selection myth is also a well-established historic event. Obviously, nationalists are usually credulous and “indifferent to reality,” as Orwell (1953, 83) noted, and they do not take people as they are; rather, their main goal is to transform them through the process of nationalism to be as they wish them to be (Smith 2009, 74).

Obviously, creation of the myths involves more forgetting (Renan 1996; Woolf 1996; Gellner 1997)²¹ and alleviation of the perceived group’s deficiencies (Kamenka 1976) than remembering through codified “crafts and minor arts,” which Smith (1987, 14) suggests are clues about the feelings and attitudes of communities. Nationalism, rather, is a mechanism for the production and mass dissemination of possibly new signifiers that certain populations may (or should) adopt as a salient identity.²² Therefore, it appears that the Smith’s ethno-symbolist approach to the study of nationalism keeps open the possibility for a change of a group, but in two different ways and with more or less inertia to such change. More when there is an *ethnie* as the core of a nation, and less when there is no *ethnie*.

1.6. Prescription for Imagining Nations

Like others, Benedict Anderson (1991) also considers elements of time and continuity in his descriptions of nationhood. He offers a structural approach in which nationalism and national identity are analyzed as ever-changing cultural constructions that are not exclusive of other identities. Thus structuralists are most open to observing changes that groups might undergo, and in their approach, structure minimizes inertia to change. Structuralists draw from the pivotal 1969 work of Fredrik Barth about the persistence of social boundaries of ethnic groups, which occurs, however, at the same time as continuous interactions and mobility among the members of those groups. In such a situation the boundaries of both, ethnicities and their identities, are floating and changing in order to fulfill the intentions and aims of those social containers to maintain their distinctiveness. For Barth (1998a) “the elements of the present culture of [an] ethnic group have not sprung from the particular set that constituted the group’s culture at a previous time” (38). Barth (1998a, 38) suggested, however, that most of the cultural matter can [and will] vary, be learned, and change, while the feeling of distinctiveness of an ethnic group within its own imagined boundary markers will persist. Finally, Barth (1998a) considers that “the critical focus [in investigation should] become the ethnic *boundary* that defines the group, not the cultural stuff that it encloses” (15). Importantly for our case, Barth therefore allows for a group to change *and* to remain a distinct unit, as is the case with our distinct group, Bosnian Muslims, remaining distinct while (re)turning into Bosniaks.

Besides the work of Barth, most of the other modernist approaches to nationalism also see a nation as a social unit built by more or less willing members,²³ in line with Renan’s nation-as-plebiscite approach, Anderson (1991) most prominently for us. An imagined political community, the nation is always conceived as a horizontal comradeship (Anderson 1991, 2–7), which is limited and is to be distinguished primarily by the style in which it is imagined, not by its genuineness. Therefore, he focuses on the process of reinvention of a previously established territorially delineated social group into a nation through the process of nationalism, which encouraged the original and all subsequent imaginations, including the nation’s identity.

Due to his concerns with death and dying in his consideration of the emergence of modern nations, Anderson (1991), like many others, suggests a strong affinity between nationalism and religious imaging (10), which relies on the same faculties of heightened emotions and devotion.

This affinity perhaps explains how a combination of religion and nationalism can be so deadly, as was observed in the case of the Serbian state, which managed to tie together those two concepts in the recent Balkan conflicts. Another possible parallelism between nationalism and religion may be seen in how they both address the very issue of Bosnian Muslim nationalism, the topic of this inquiry. One of the most important themes that religion is concerned with is the identity that it offers to its followers. Often, the main concern of a religion in its proselytizing mission is the change of identity of a person into a new, religiously desired, and appropriate identity. Similarly, then, the main mission of nationalistic proselytizing is the change or restructuring of the identity of the expected group members into a desired one.

In his search for the cultural roots of nationalism, Anderson observes that the two relevant systems against which nationalism developed were the religious community and the dynastic realm, and that the change of worldview produced by the systems that those realms produced was gradual. Nowadays nationalism insists that a group have its own national language or culture, be a society organized with anonymous and equal conationals, and have its own account of its history with many points of reference to show its separate origin and continuity as a self-evident *raison d'être* for its political independence.

As nationalism asserted itself, sometimes in spite of religion, and from its inceptions in western Europe, where it came in the wake of rationalist secularism, it served as a replacement for Euro-Christian religious modes of thought and the previous, religious apprehension of time. It therefore required the transformation of fatality into continuity, because even if the reality of a nation-state is accepted as a historical novelty, the nation comes from the immemorial past and is to remain a guide into a limitless future. The view of nationalism as the antithesis to religion, however, is ambiguous in the case of many Balkan peoples, such as Bosnian Muslims, since one of the primary boundary markers for their sense of groupness is based on religious notions, unless we note Bosnian Muslims' *cultural* religiosity as primarily an (sub)ethnic category,²⁴ and almost as just a confessional difference from their "Christian" neighbors and not some difference of deep theological worldview.²⁵ In that case, Bosnian Muslims' "religiosity" can coincide with the notion Tomka (1995) described as a basis for early European nationalism when Christian "confessions were celebrated as 'national' religions in order to produce awareness of the coincidence of national and confessional persecution, or even to provoke resistance" (27). This view is especially feasible because real religiosity among Bosnians was totally

subdued after five decades of communism, and, since Anderson and others suggest that nationalism can be well understood by aligning it with the large cultural systems that preceded it, the modern nationalism and religiosity of Bosnian Muslims should be primarily aligned with that period of communism seen principally as a cultural system.

Anderson (1991) notes that once the concept of a nation was “invented,” it became something that could be sought by political actors from early on, and available for pirating by many different forces. As a reaction to the increased use of vernacular languages and popular national movements arising all over Europe after 1820, a new era of “official nationalism” ensued, which for Anderson (1991) was a “willed merger of [desires for] national and dynastic empires” (86). This historical aspect of European nationalism also played its part in the case of the former Yugoslavia, and especially in the aspirations of the Serbian and Croatian state(s), when many minorities were expected to erase or adjust their ethnic boundaries and memories to be conjoined in the new states’ desired salient identities or be expelled or destroyed. Those separate groups eventually reacted with their own vernacular nationalism projects, with their own political consciousness organized around their distinct cultures. As the vernacularizations of nationalism confronted the official nationalism, chauvinistic racism appeared as a reaction among Serbs and Croats, with a clearly defined notion of “upper nation”²⁶ imagined as a race²⁷ living in its own (only) “natural” land.²⁸ Many observers of the recent Balkan wars allege that nationalism is the main ideology of most local actors, and they therefore wrongly perceive them as nationalists. As Gellner (2006) warns us not to confuse tribalism with nationalism, to heed Anderson’s warning, we should also be careful not to confuse chauvinism and fascism with nationalism.

Since “nationalism thinks in terms of historical destinies, while racism dreams of eternal contaminations” (Anderson 1991, 149), racism is essentially ahistorical, as “N[—]s were always N[—]s” and will always remain so; Jews are considered “forever Jews no matter what passports they carry or what language they speak” (Anderson 1991, 149), and, similarly, in the case of the Balkans, all local Muslims are forever seen as Turks in a derogatory sense. For Anderson (1991) the origin of the very idea of racism may also be traced “in ideologies of class, rather than in those of nation” (149),²⁹ and racism essentially manifests itself primarily within national borders rather than outside them (150), as in the case of the chauvinistic racism in most of the new states of the former Yugoslavia. Bosnian and other Muslims were usually referred to as “Turks” by Serb and Croat chauvinists, not only to establish the basis for their chauvinistic racism, but also to undermine Bos-

nian Muslims' claims on the territory in which they live, calling them by a name that indicates an outsider in Europe.

Another important work for this book is Anderson's unpublished 1992 manuscript on long-distance nationalism. In it, he notes that spatial aspects of nationalism and nationhood are undergoing changes due to the nature of capitalism and technological innovations, through which, as people move around, "the mediated imagery of 'home' is always with them" (Anderson 1992, 15). This reality has only intensified lately. That is, since a nation is a matter of imagination, it can be imagined equally well from "here" as from "there." Many of those great romanticized nationalists about whom people read with awe were actually brewing nationalism from a "long distance." For example, consider the nationalist and main propagator of modern Bosniak identity, Adil Zulfikarpašić, a communist dissident who spent most of his life in Switzerland, or Smail Balić, who lived and worked for Austria's National Library, or Alija Izetbegović, who spent a significant number of years in prison, or Ferid Muhić, one of the highly regarded and accomplished Bosnian Muslim intellectuals who lives in Skopje, North Macedonia.³⁰

It should be noted that the diaspora population sample of Bosnian Muslims used here can be seen as a population that will probably not go back to the land where their nationalistic aspirations are primarily directed. Yet long-distance nationalism still pertains to those "*émigrés* who have no serious intention of going back to a home, which, as time passes, more and more serves as a phantom bedrock for an embattled metropolitan ethnic identity" (Anderson 1992, 20).³¹ Therefore, such nationalism is most likely not only a transnational phenomenon, since even those and their nationalisms are still as potent, or often even more so, as those of nationalists "back home." Hence, long-distance nationalism is *not long-distance* in terms of *sources* of nationalism. Each diaspora group has its own nationalists; it is long-distance in terms of the object of nationalism, which is somewhere out there, outside of the geographic locality in which long-distance nationalists currently physically reside. Furthermore, "as a result of globalization, nationalism did not subside, only nationalists began to carry their struggle on the global stage" (Demmers 2002, 93); therefore, diaspora groups gained in significance as "forward forces" for any nationalism project, especially those situated in the United States, as was directly expressed to me in many conversations during the field work. In agreement with Demmers (2002), it can be concluded that the political weight of diaspora communities regarding various aspects of nationalism has increased, and it is indeed as useful to measure and study nationalism among diaspora groups as to do so in their home territory.

1.7. Social Structure Transformation

For Gellner (2006), nationalism emerged only as the result of structural changes in European societies when, due to the possibilities presented by industrialization and urbanization, elites could produce high culture and diffuse it throughout the willing populace (54) and by the force of nationalism make sure that the land of Ruritania is *primarily* for Ruritarians (2006, 58–60), who had awakened to realize themselves as a modern group-form of a nation.

The social conditions that produced a nation (often with a concurrent state) were the products of nationalism, seen as a force of change from a non-egalitarian agrarian society into an industrial society of baseline equality where each member relates directly to the whole community and can, at least theoretically, move up and down the societal strata (Gellner 1997, 18–28). Once that change occurred, high culture was imposed upon the population through public education in order to preserve the new societal structure.³² In the case of Bosnian Muslims, such changes were the legacy of communist rule, which not only pushed for industrialization, but also—often even more forcibly—pushed for social *changes* and baseline equality.³³ Most importantly, the communist era also created a situation of almost universal literacy, which then enabled a dominant high culture to (re)emerge that displaced folk culture in imagined Bosniak society,³⁴ and a such development is for Gellner (1997, 28–9) the essential condition for the success of nationalism. That is why the communist era and the nationalist ideas it produced among Bosnian Muslim elites are important. Therefore, in agreement with Gellner, Plamenatz, Anderson, Smith, and Hobsbawm, nation is seen as an outcome of a top-down-driven project of nationalism. In order to better understand workings of nationalism, it is observed at both levels of society.

1.8. Case Study Selection

Most modernist ideas of nationalism stress the tie between the nation and the state as the ultimate driving force behind nationalism. The case of nationalism here is specific in its effort to declaratively preserve the state as a trinational civic entity, where Bosniaks are neither the dominant nor the overtly eponymic nation. So identity construction is not a state-driven endeavor; rather, it is a result of the process of the substate form of nation-

alism, as defined by Guibernau (1999) and Stepan, Linz, and Yadav (2011), with many identity engineers and gatekeepers. This inquiry had to take account of that “state of nation’s” reality and treats “ownership of a state” only as a distant, possibly unattainable goal.

Some, like Kosterman and Feshbach (1989), Schatz, Staub, and Levine (1999), and Blank and Schmidt (2003), try to test the relations between national identity, nationalism, and patriotism by examining attitudes of Americans toward their national state, and West and East Germans toward the German nation and state. It would be problematic, however, to apply their circumstantial contingency approach to other cases where the distance between the nation and the state is much wider and where national history and patriotism did not develop, as in the case of those already (internationally) established nations.³⁵ Kamenka (1976) already correctly pointed out that there are significant differences between the places where “the community [already] has a political unity clearly defined” (15) and the places where this is not clear. Therefore, context matters a great deal, and cases like contemporary Germany or the United States cannot provide us with the necessary conditions to observe the true relationship between nationalism and identity, when nationalism has been central to the political life of the community for some time. This is so because the assumptions and conditions of one case cannot be used to help explain the emergence of that condition in the case (Gellner 2006, 53). Those efforts are perhaps appropriate to pursue when considering Billig’s (2002) situations of “banal nationalism” and in cases of “nationalism in a weak sense” (Kamenka 1976, 16), where state, national history, and related patriotism and some level of homogeneity are already developed. Be that as it may, it would generally be problematic to treat identity as a starting point for the examination of nationalism in cases of the emergence of new states and constituent peoples, as is the case with Bosniaks, who have been until now, generally, people without a “national” history.³⁶ We should keep in mind that case selection is important in understanding the results of the study in the cases under discussion, those of Germany, with a long-ago-established identity based on the nationalism of the time, and of the Bosniaks, which is still under construction. The same case selection significance is established by the Bayesian analysis approach, which stresses the importance of understanding the context and whether the case is useful in determining if the intervening phenomenon can be present to begin with.³⁷

Authors frequently confuse Bosnian vs. Bosniak identity. Most of them, like Tufekčić and Doubt (2019), imply that Bosnia and Herzegovina is not

a multination but a multiethnic state.³⁸ In contrast to this idea, I maintain that all peoples who are now constitutive political subjects in BiH are of one and the same ethnic group, namely Slavs, and they should be seen as three political nations: Bosniaks, Serbs, and Croats. Accepting that reality, Malcolm (1996) noted “that the shift from folk Christianity to folk Islam [is] not great” (58) especially within the same ethnic group, and the research focus should not be on their putatively subethnic nuanced practices sanctioned by different religions, but on their different political aspirations, because that is where their true difference in identity manifests itself. There is no doubt that Bosniaks are a large Slavic group that lives in the same land of Bosnia and Herzegovina and Sandžak. It is not surprising to find evidence of cultural interborrowing among the peoples who share the same territory, the same language, often identically worded patronymic surnames, and shared customs and practices, and who have the same ethnic Slavic origin. Those practices are certainly understandable in the context of an intermixed setting in which they have resided for centuries. The term *Bosnian*, therefore, should be used to denote a form of “extranational mass” of people as Foucault (2003, 23) might call it, but not a panethnic political entity.³⁹ Conversely, *Bosniaks* in BiH *are* actually a nation, meaning a group of people with their *own* particular political consciousness and aspirations. The acceptance and use of these terms with these meanings in such a way by academic and laypeople alike who try to understand the situation in the Balkans will facilitate, rather than obfuscate, their scholarly and policy-related efforts.

I find it similarly problematic that Cheah, Karamehic-Muratovic, and Matsuo’s (2013) measure of the salience of regional eponymic Bosnian identity relied heavily on the questionable consideration that Bosnian is essentially an ethnic identity. They concluded that “a refugee can simultaneously possess both the U.S. cultural and ethnic [Bosnian] identity salience” (412). Implicitly, the ethnic identity they claim to measure is derived from a presumed but factually nonexistent Bosnian national identity associated with the state of BiH. The scholars of area studies and comparative politics should seek a more precise conceptualization of both terms and variables to support the scholarly and scientific approach. This book simply acknowledges the group’s claim of nationhood and offers a more accurate explanation of recent developments pertaining to Bosniak identity than what political science works have done thus far. That is the main reason why this book’s recognition of Bosniak national identity is important for the scholarly world, which often reifies the political aspirations of strong and powerful groups at the expense of weaker ones.

1.9. An Argument for a Bottom-Up Approach for a Study of a Case of Nationalism

Although the focus of this work is not to uncover the masculinity behind nationalism, which Enloe (2004, 107) calls for, an effort is made to note how men *and women* respond to calls of nationalism. In such a way, the inquiry reports differences between the two genders when it comes to nationalism and ascription of the new salient identity, and it accounts for possible women's less opportunistic and more emotional response to the group's new context, as Hercus (1999) called for. Consideration of the emotional response to the nationalist project is very much needed, because the desired identity it seeks to enact as salient cannot rely only on the rational calculus of the population to evaluate identity choices in the way that personal interests do (Polletta and Jasper 2001, 285). They also note that collective identity commonly carries with it positive feelings toward other members of the group, and not a sense of competition and interest, which are usually associated with rationality. Therefore, women's responses are noted apart from men's, and any significant differences in their responses are indicated.

As observed here, the process of nationalism is about creating a specific political consciousness organized around the legitimacy of ruling a particular territory and people(s). Because a "nation" is not just the extension of some previous sentiments of ethnic solidarity (Weber in Woolf 1996, 23), it, rather, needs that political consciousness to *be* a "nation." To impact that political consciousness of the people affected, nationalism aims to produce a desired salient identity. Therefore, nationalism is to be conceived as a political process that aims to produce and propagate an identity that can or will be adopted by the targeted group of people on an individual and group level.

By seeing nationalism as a process, we can note its beginning, emergence, and maturation, and we can point to its essence. Furthermore, treating nationalism as a process allows us to note when nationalism becomes an integral part of a society's development and to note its manifestations and applications as an ideological or policy tool that can be employed and claimed by the political left or right, capitalist or communists, liberators or occupiers. This generalization about nationalism may be problematic, since nationalism is a form of particularism. The most important aspect of particularism is that it contains particularity or case specificity,⁴⁰ and therefore any generalizations about it run the risk of conceptual stretching. After acknowledging this danger, however, it should be noted that particu-

larity is an essential element of each case study, while seeing nationalism as a process is actually a conceptual tool to see how human groups manage to politically emphasize their own particularity.

This short examination of some of the major works and approaches to nationalism provides us with a theoretical foundation to observe the case of Bosnian Muslim nationalism and the crystallization of Bosniak identity as a signifier that an individual might claim and adopt to establish his or her social location and conceptualize his or her own self-understanding.

1.10. Defining and Disaggregating Salient Identity

In everyday conversations, individual identity is usually perceived as a solely internal feeling or sense that somehow plays itself out in a person's life. As established by various social science approaches, salient identity provides a basis for an individual's external activities and social significance, and a basis for participation in the collective action of different groups. Evident in these perceptions is the idea that identity is seen as both, something a person possesses and something a person acts out. That is why most scholars write on identity as something internal while actually observing a person's external activities. In that way they run into a problem described by Brubaker (2006), namely that it is unclear what exactly is a category of analysis: is it an individual's internal feeling or an individual's external actions?²⁴¹ As Brubaker further suggests, "as a category of practice, [identity] is used by 'lay' actors in some (not all!) everyday settings to make sense of themselves, of their activities, of what they share with, and how they differ from, others" (31–32). A good way to clarify this concept is offered in the study by Leach et al. (2008), suggesting that identity should be observed in two essential dimensions, those of self-definition and of self-investment, where self-investment is a higher form of *conscious* self-defining, ascription of an identity as a form of an investment into the in-group and coordination with other members of the group. It is this investment of the self in order to coordinate activities with those to whom one feels committed that most differentiates the two levels of identity, since the former, self-defining, is more of an innate, internal definition of the self at the group level (Leach et al. 2008, 147). Self-defining occurs after individuals perceive that they are joined in a common group, which Turner (1981, 100) calls the self-identifying stage.

Of particular concern for this inquiry is the first dimension of identity, self-definition, described as inclusion of the self in an in-group, which Reese,

Proch, and Finn (2015, 428) say “subsumes the lower-level components of self-stereotyping (*i.e.*, individuals’ similarity to the in-group prototype) and in-group homogeneity (*i.e.*, cohesiveness and coherence of the in-group).”⁴² Even though “individuals can self-stereotype by perceiving themselves as similar to average (or otherwise prototypical) members of their in-group” (Leach et al. 2008, 146),⁴³ for the case in question of Bosniak identity, the group that is to adopt it is still in its early stages, and without a clearly developed prototypical identity to rely on or an individual to compare itself to. Therefore, it is interesting to observe that process of self-definition, based on the individual’s *imagined ideal*, and on imagined in-group cohesiveness, as it is developing. Yet, as observed through research, “social identification, the *perception* by individuals that they are joined in common category membership is necessary and sufficient” (Turner 1981, 100) for a group and identity to exist.⁴⁴ For that reason, also, measuring identity in a diaspora situation is appropriate, because there it might be the most salient of all local, regional, or all other back-home identities. Yet this work does account for back-home regionalism in the data collection and analysis.⁴⁵

Building on the formative works of Goffman (1959) and Barth (1998), and in agreement with Burke and Stets (2009), identity is seen here as “the set of meanings that define who one is when one is an occupant of a particular role in society, a member of a particular [identifiable] group, or claims particular characteristics that identify him or her as a unique person” (3). Therefore, identity is seen as a signifier, which becomes available to be claimed and acted on as the result of social interactions and circumstances, as well as ecological adaptations. As described by Turner (1981), identity is a cognitive category that is based on and shaped by social interaction, and, although it is played out only at an individual level, it is actually a part of the social domain, since only there does it essentially become meaningful. Being a social, therefore interpersonal, category, a person’s identity is an “individual’s knowledge that he belongs to a certain social group” (Tajfel 1974, 69). Finally, national identity is beyond the *relational self*, which is “based in individuals’ role relationships with significant others’ in dyads (e.g., mother, friend, sibling) or small co-acting groups (e.g., a family or small set of coworkers)” (Leach et al. 2008, 147), and rather, it is an institution that relates to other members of the group with which an individual does not necessarily have consanguineal or accidental relations. It is a social, political category an individual assumes for himself or herself first through self-defining and then through self-investment.

National (social) identity is observed simultaneously on two levels and as an interaction of the group and individuals, where an individual can

ascribe his or her social identity in certain situations, by mechanisms that we do not yet fully understand, as Turner (1981, 99) noted in his work on identities. Therefore, social identity first acquires meaning and becomes available on the group level, possibly to be claimed later by an individual.

Due to the interpersonal nature of identity, any new delineation of a group (or at least an idea of it) has to emerge first, even if it is just among selected elites. Since identity is a social category, it structures power relations and interdependence within and outside a group, and if change is to happen, it might encounter resistance since some of the stakeholders might be reluctant to accept it, exhibiting inertia in motivation. An individual usually cannot overcome that inertia by himself or herself. But a group that is changing can; often, first it has to use the great force of nationalism to change the circumstances of previous interdependence within any larger group or state that it might have been part of. At that point a new or reformed identity is needed when a group separates from any other solidarity or form of community of groups, whether they are a Slavic mass, a Muslim Ummah, a Yugoslav state, or any other type of previous primary interdependence that the group, or its constitutive individuals, might have been part of before. All this further supports the notion being proposed here, that nationalism *first demands* the emergence of the group bound together by some commonness, which only then provides the possibility for a new salient identity for an individual to ascribe for himself or herself, which emphasizes interdependence primarily among the members of the newly formed or reformed group.⁴⁶ Once a group emerges, the group shapes its salient identity over time, however long, and then that identity becomes available for members to adopt.⁴⁷

To be fully understood, a nation and its identity must be observed at both levels, that of a group's elites and that of its ordinary people.⁴⁸ In this book, nationalism and identity are observed at the level of ordinary people in a diaspora situation and conclusions are drawn based on this approach, while most other works are focused on the elite level only. Identity here is a cross-sectional category: it is ascribed by an individual, while observed through individual responses to the questions designed to measure it as a category of practice of a group. Ecological adaptations offer the backdrop for interactions and circumstances that provide signifiers for an identity, although adaptations to the ecology, nowadays, less often include adaptations to a particular space due to people's increased mobility. Yet social interactions, here or there, are still paramount for a person's self-understanding and defining.

Identity should not be confused with "self" (Elliott 2001, 9); identity

exists as a signifier outside of an individual which he or she can adopt and claim for himself or herself through communicative activities. Likewise, Bosniak identity is the external signifier that an individual person can or does adopt and claim for himself or herself, and in such a way it exists as both a personal and a social reality. To shed some light on both the activities and actors, this inquiry is considering it as an interaction of both levels to find out how strongly it is embraced by individuals through the interplay with nationalism, and whatever elements that identity entails.

Identity, as individual and group choice, responds to three types of circumstances and interactions. It attends the needs of an individual who exists and interacts with comembers of a group, of a group that seeks to structure itself, and of a group that interacts with other groups in the regional, international, or global arena.⁴⁹ This work attempts to measure how a group changes on the individual level through a person's choice about the new salient identity.

1.10.1 Three Levels of Identity: Individual, Group and Community of Groups

For a human being there is no escape from social interactions, and identity is essential for them.⁵⁰ Durkheim (1997, 179–80) furthers this notion by explaining that a person fulfills his most intimate instincts to be happy by being part of a society, and consequently he instinctively seeks to be part of one.⁵¹ For Wilfred Bion, it is impossible to be a human being without having some degree of *valency*,⁵² which he also sees as the instantaneous, involuntary, and instinctive aspect of human behavior.

In more complex social and political circumstances, whether incidentally or purposely created, social interactions shape the demand on an individual to feel, adopt, or claim some identity. In what Baum (2001) describes as a Durkheimian argument, “human beings are integrated into humanity not as single individuals but as members of different peoples or cultural communities” (111), and that social level is where identities are formed and offered to individuals. As Kedourie (1993) wrote about Poles, “I myself did not know that I was a Pole till I began to read books and papers” (115) that were not written by me. Both group and individual levels constantly interact with each other's self-perceptions, and that intersubjectivity often serves to distinguish “us” from “them.” Groups can not only provide and assign signifiers to an individual that determine his social position, as Berger and Luckman (1966, 74–76) established, but can also influence the individual's own perception of self-defining. But the game does not stop

there; through “learning,” individuals can also create new circumstances which (re)define poles of identity.

Since all groups have their progenitors and subsequent members who have to live and face a constantly changing world, identity becomes an anchor-like category in that ever-changing world. These changes sometimes require new individual actions, which after the process of routinization and social formalization, or significant shared experiences, may become relevant to the whole group’s self-perception. These changes may also require the group to expand, contract, alter, and adopt a whole new form of groupness and subsequent identity.⁵³

1.10.2 Third Level of Response for Group Identity

Although identity is certainly a matter of more or less conscious individual and group ascription, it may be externally imposed on a group and subsequently on a constitutive individual. Woolf (1996, 29), Hobsbawm (1990), and Anderson (1991) noted well how external impositions by local inhabitants and officials particularly affected European emigrant identities. As a result of mass communications, the same external impositions can now occur on the international level where identities are imposed on states, groups, and individuals, whether they like it or not.⁵⁴ So Muslims today, including Bosniaks, especially those living in or interacting with the West, often have to respond to the externally imposed identity of suspect, extremist, terrorist, of permanent stranger. Whether the person ignores, accepts, or rejects such signifiers, those external impositions still affect and shape identity, which partly develops in response to them. Such identity strongly determines the quality and mode of interactions with others, and as a result, one identity might be dropped and replaced by another. But, as Huntington (2004, 22) noted, it is easier for an individual to change or modify identity than it is for a group, and the same is true for Muslims in general, and Bosnian Muslims in particular, especially those in the diaspora (see Miskovic 2003, 224; and Colic-Peisker 2005, 624). That is why Bosnian Muslims are carefully negotiating ascription and adaptation of any new or significantly reshaped identity. Since Muslims are now stigmatized in the post-9/11 West, these conditions might create a further incentive for Muslims from BiH to drop the “old” identity of “Muslim” and adopt the “new” one of “Bosniak.”

External demands placed on identity are evident not only in a group’s decision about who is the disconfirming other that significantly shapes any form of groupness, but also in those external influences that result from

the dynamics of international relations, norms, and frames originated at that level of politics.⁵⁵ Since the international realm is the prime political domain where the nation is acting as a collective, the dynamics of international relations are very important for the nation, as they significantly frame possibilities for movements and processes that concern a group's and its members' identity. Two things emerged from observations among the diaspora population sample. First, there is apprehension regarding the old identity of "Muslim" due to the anti-Muslim climate in the West, and second, because of that, they might lose their status as victims, which they paid for with thousands of dead and maimed Muslims in the war and genocide in BiH. Confirmation that these apprehensions are not unfounded comes from one of the Bosnian diplomats (who represents Bosniaks in the diplomatic corps),⁵⁶ who has said off the record that Muslims from Bosnia have paid a big diplomatic price in international arena because of their "Muslim" identity, which denotes their religious affiliation, and who explained to me, a sympathetic listener, the urgency to embrace the new term and identity of "Bosniak."⁵⁷

Framing an identity is strategically important in the process of appealing to the target population. The interplay of internal and external demands on a group that aspires to nationhood is actually a matter of the everyday life of the group's members, as well as of greatest concern to the group's leaders, who are choosing between conformity with, or protest against, framing when constructing the desired identity.⁵⁸ Therefore, international relations do influence the internal dynamics of nationalism and their desired salient identity projects, especially in regions such as the Balkans and for the Muslims as a people.

For Bosnian Muslims, the geopolitical production of representations affects their identity project in at least two ways. First, they are Muslims, and international representations of Muslims and Islam are significant factors in their strategic interactions with others as well as among themselves, and, as it is observed, their elites are aware of such negative representations as they push for the new identity of Bosniak to be salient, rather than the old identity of Muslim. Second, as a nation from BiH they are part of the regional tapestry of the Balkan peoples from the south who are often epitomized by northwestern Europeans as the "others within" (Neofotistos 2008), while the region in which they live is seen as Europe's internal Orient.⁵⁹

Both aspects of the geopolitical representations play a role on the level of international relations, as they significantly affect Bosniak identity, and the kind of identity Muslims of BiH and Sandžak can safely claim. Although data for this research was gathered in the conditions of the group's diaspora,

I will argue that the same issues affecting the diaspora affect the homeland population as well, while the two segments of the group are responding to those pressures differently. For example, both segments make an effort to distinguish themselves as “different Muslims,” claiming that they are European or, more often, *Bosnian* Muslims, where “Bosnian” is an adjective that is supposed to describe an especially tolerant kind of Muslim, as opposed to the rest of the world’s Muslims, who are perceived exceedingly negatively at the international level.⁶⁰ Muslim elites in Bosnia, along the same lines, emphasize more their Europeaness to signal both that they are European natives and that they are *therefore* more tolerant Muslims.⁶¹ The Bosnian Muslim diaspora groups in the United States and elsewhere in the West,⁶² however, appear to exert more effort to distinguish themselves as a separate group from other Muslims in the United States, especially if they try to maintain their religiosity. They try hard to establish their own mosques, even when they build a Bosnian Mosque literally right next to the mosque attended by all other Muslims in the area,⁶³ as well as to cultivate their own separate relationship with non-Muslim neighbors in the places where they live in significant numbers. Yet, evidently, both Bosnian Muslim groups, those “back home” and those in the United States, *are* essentially responding to the framing of Muslims that is done at the international level.

A Short History of Bosnian Muslim Groupness

2.1. Bosnian Muslims as a Distinct Group of the Bosnian Pot of People¹

At the outset of a brutal war waged against the Bosnian Muslims with genocidal intentions to destroy and expel them from their homeland of BiH, eight hundred of their notables² gathered in Sarajevo on December 22, 1992, and issued a declaration in which, in passing, they mentioned the name Bosniak (*Bošnjak*) in reference to their own people. At a second, better-organized meeting held a few months later with more than three hundred selected participants from all over the country, they definitively agreed on behalf of their population to give up the group's old name, "Muslim," and adopt "Bosniak" as their new name and identity. This decision can be seen as their major step toward secularization of their identity and toward their choice to give up "Muslimness" and adopt "Bosniakness."³ This act was noted as the fulfillment of the long-sought historical right and dream of Bosnian Muslims to reclaim, or claim, not only the name for themselves, but also the role of a decisive political agent in the newly independent country of BiH and the *right* to decisively tie their origins and fortune to the country.⁴ The decision was then publicized as a major step forward for Slavic Muslims of the former Yugoslavia living within and without BiH,⁵ as well as those recent refugees living in the diaspora. The following year, on September 28, 1993, the (new) Council of the Congress of Bosniak Intellectuals called for the First Bosniak Congress in Sarajevo when some 340 delegates officially adopted the new name of Bosniak for Slavic-speaking Muslims of former Yugoslavia.⁶

The city of Sarajevo, where the first and second meetings were held, was under siege and intense shelling by the former Federal Yugoslav Army (JNA) and Serbian paramilitaries from the nearby hills. It was the first year of war and the normal lines of communication and traffic had all been destroyed. It was extremely hard and dangerous for Bosnian Muslims to travel around BiH, so few of them did. Therefore those hundreds of men and few women who gathered on December 22, 1992, and decided on the name change were mostly residents of Sarajevo. They made the decision on behalf of the rest of the population, about three million Muslim people of the former Yugoslavia and the diaspora. Among the attendees were some notables who had moved to Sarajevo from other regions of BiH and Sandžak, but nearly all of them had lived and worked in the Bosnian capital for some time before the war and the decisive meeting. In his book about the city, Donia (2006) documented how Sarajevo emerged as the Bosnian Muslim elites' main power base and how the city outmaneuvered and outstripped other important Bosnian cities of power and influence. Because of that, Sarajevo-based elites one more time played a decisive role in making the profound decision about the name of the Slavic-speaking Muslims of the former Yugoslavia and BiH. The decision was not, however, made without some vacillation.

From the title of this historic event, the "Kongres Bosansko-Muslimanskih Intelektualaca" (The Congress of Bosnian-Muslim Intellectuals) and through the contributions and documents from the event, it can be observed that the Muslims of BiH were referred to in several different ways. They were mentioned as just "Muslims" (with capital M according to the Serbo-Croatian language grammar rule to denote a national group); as "bosnian-herzegovinian muslims" (both with lowercase letters to denote a regional religious group); "muslims" (with lowercase m to denote a religious group); as "Bosnian Muslims" to denote an initiative for a new national name for the group;⁷ and somewhat shyly as "Bošnjaci"⁸ (Bosniaks). From all these variations we can sense their uncertainty and indecision about the exact name of a desired salient identity.⁹

The people who were to accept the new name responded with mixed reactions as well. Older people were confused about the change, and many of them rejected it completely. For them it meant discontinuity of their previous, primarily religious, subethnic identity, which they had gotten used to carrying, despite all they had to pay for it, especially since the Ottoman withdrawal from the Balkans.¹⁰ Others, mainly from the younger generation, more readily accepted both the name "Bosniak" and the assertion that it was not new but only a reclaimed forgotten old identity that

members of the group carried proudly when they were the most important political subjects of BiH. The middle generation of Bosnian Muslims thus became the decisive section of the group in this salient-name-changing project, since their decision would tip the scale toward acceptance or rejection of the Bosniak name. These were the Bosnian Muslims who grew up during the time of communist-led Yugoslavia and who “made a choice” to be Muslims for the first time by a self-assertion in the census of 1961, then were subsequently acknowledged as “people” by the Constitution of the Socialist Republic of BiH in 1963, and finally also were officially recognized in the federal census of 1971.¹¹ Through careful observation of the reaction of this section of the population, we can see if they will unlearn what they learned from those previous experiences¹² and measure the “success” of Bosnian Muslim nationalism in its mission of engendering a political nation.

The term *Bosniak* was sometimes used, in addition to other names, throughout the time of the Ottoman Empire to distinguish Muslims of Bosnia from all other Muslim groups of the empire,¹³ and sometimes to distinguish them from non-Muslim subjects of neighboring Balkan territories. Bosnian non-Muslims, however, were also sometimes referred to as *Bosniaks*.¹⁴ Some Bosnian Muslim intellectuals, Professor Mustafa Imamović (1994), Smail Balić (1995), and Osman Ibrahimagić (2017) among them, argue that *Bosniak* was the term primarily used to denote Bosnian Muslims, and only during the years when Ottoman control over BiH was being replaced by Habsburg rule did both empires try to push for the term to be used by all three religious groups in order to stamp out growing Serbian and Croatian nationalisms.¹⁵ The empires’ administrators were not successful in their attempts, and the groups never jointly adopted the name, Bosnian Muslim historians argue. Perhaps inadvertently, however, they managed to push Bosnian Muslims out of the integral *Bosniak* name designation.¹⁶ In order to differentiate themselves further from the Orthodox Christian Bosnian Serbs, and the Catholic Christian Bosnian Croats, Bosnian Muslims chose to identify themselves simply as Muslims, sometimes with the adjective “Bosnian,” but more frequently without it. During that whole time, Bosnian Muslims spoke a Slavic language that was referred to by the demonym “the Bosnian language,” after the land where they lived.¹⁷ Since it was also the language of a particular Muslim group from which came many military and civil dignitaries of the Ottoman Empire,¹⁸ the Bosnian language became one of the languages of the Porte. Yet it should be noted here that it was not the systematized and organized Bosnian language, written in Latin script, that it is today.¹⁹

The variations of these same three issues, of territory, language, and a new religion that propelled the group to the level of active subjects of the Ottoman Empire, became factors of groupness for the newly formed assembly of Bosnian Muslims that emerged from among the locals as the result of the Islamization of Bosnia. It took time for a tip and cascade effect of Islamization to occur,²⁰ but when it did, the new form of groupness was more readily accepted by younger people,²¹ the usual vanguard section of a society. Karpat (1990, 135) notes that Slavic-speaking Bosnians had a strong political-ethnic consciousness prior to their conversion to Islam, and they maintained it afterwards as well. In the permissive environment of the Islamic Ottoman Empire, Bosnian Muslims over time developed their own Muslim elites, which gradually began to have their own strictly local interests. Ever since that time, Bosnian Muslims have continued to exist in their homeland as a more or less coherent group, without their own state but with their own, more or less capable, elites whose rule was instrumental in the important turns the group took throughout its history.

Using a historical, although not chronological, approach is useful to provide the background for this study of the project of contemporary Bosnian Muslim nationalism and Bosniak identity and to review the historical development and the composition of the Bosnian Muslim elites.

2.2. Significant Early History of Bosnia and Its People

The eminent Bosniak laureate Abdulah Sidran²² once simplified the history of the central Balkan territory by saying that “the history of Bosnia is the history of the various attempts to grab Bosnia.” This statement is a good representation of how Bosnian Muslims want to perceive the story of BiH and its people, who are inevitably at the center of those efforts to win over the history and subsequently the land, which is now internationally recognized as Bosnia and Herzegovina. This perception comes from the fact that for the past 144 years, Bosnian Muslims have been the main Bosnian group that tied its own survival to the survival of BiH as an entity. Since all people’s stories in Bosnia begin with Kulin Ban,²³ the relevant “history of grabbing for Bosnia” can also be said to have started in 1192, when the jurisdiction over Bosnia²⁴ was transferred by Pope Gregory IX from the archbishop of Dubrovnik to the archbishop of Split. It was an act orchestrated by the Hungarians, who sought ways to assert their authority over Bosnia via Split.

Although Christianity had existed to some extent throughout Bosnia



Fig. 2.1. Bosnia and Herzegovina, summary map (Reproduced from United States Central Intelligence Agency, 1993; <https://www.loc.gov/item/93685376/>)

from the fifth century on, Slavs who came to the Balkan Peninsula in the sixth century were still not Christianized until the tenth century.²⁵ Their Christianization, however, should be seen as partial, since they were only adopting some of the major Christian rituals of the time, albeit in localized form.²⁶ The lack of proper knowledge of Christianity allowed for various deviations and local practices to develop, and in 1270 the Inquisition was dispatched to the land of *Bossona* (Bosnia) to investigate alleged heresies.²⁷ Although Kurtz (1983) proposes that “every heresy implies a political stance” (1087), in the case of Bosnia the “heresy” was more the

result of an absence of a centralized religious hierarchy and a consequent lack of knowledge than of a political stance. Yet designating such conditions as heresy was indeed a matter of political stance. Since the Bosnian ruler Kulin Ban ignored the transfer of the bishop's authority to Split and continued to maintain close relations with Dubrovnik, the Hungarians escalated their plots against Bosnia in their efforts to take over the land by claiming that it was a hotbed of heresy.²⁸ The accusation of religious sacrilege was followed by the Crusades, which ravaged Bosnia from 1234 until 1239 and during a second time in 1241,²⁹ which the Pope dispatched to fulfill his "moral duty" (Malcolm 2019, 9).

The Hungarians withdrew from Bosnia only after the Mongols invaded their land in 1241,³⁰ but they left behind a great hatred for those Hungarians, and by extension for the official Catholicism they represented while occupying Bosnian lands. In his work on the dualist Bosnian Church, Fine (1975, 140–55) writes that only after those Hungarian Crusades in Bosnia did nativist movements give birth to the independent Bosnian Church, with its own hierarchy and its own version of Catholicism mixed with local traditions, as well as elements of Manicheism and dualism found elsewhere in the Balkans. Animosity toward Hungarians enabled the Bosnian Church to continue and to keep the land from being dominated by any single religion, as well as without a coherent religious core belief of a Bosnian state. This situation also provided an opportunity for the eventual emergence of the Orthodox Christian influences that began in the 1440s and the late 1450s, primarily in Herzegovina.³¹

Eventually, the animosity toward Hungarians turned Bosnians closer to the new regional hegemon of the Ottomans, until they came completely under Ottoman rule in 1481, when the last parts of Herzegovina were taken over. In the decades after the Ottoman takeover and political stability it brought,³² Bosnian Muslims emerged as a political factor in the lands of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Sources note that by the sixteenth century travelers mentioned Catholics, Orthodox, and Muslims in Bosnia, signaling that by that time some natives were fully Muslims and that the Bosnian Church no longer played a role in local affairs even if some individuals continued to practice some forms of the Bosnian nativist Christianity.³³ By the early seventeenth century, Muslims were the clear majority in Bosnia while the Bosnian Church had almost disappeared.³⁴ This brief venture into the pre-Ottoman history of the region is useful since some contemporary Bosniak narratives are trying to tie Bosniaks, and their acceptance of Islam, to the "heretic" Bosnian Church and its purported mass conversion to Islam, as well as to the animosity toward Hungarians and the pope as a catalyst of

Islamization.³⁵ Such assertions, however, are either ignored or sometimes accepted—but with strong hesitation—by the Bosnian Islamic *ulama*.

2.3. Bosnia's Ottoman Legacy

Right before the Ottoman conquest, Bosnia was beginning to enter the feudal era, when landowning was the main source of wealth and warfare was the main tool for the increase of wealth. Due in part to its geography, being a rugged terrain where the plains of Slavonia turn into hills and eventually mountains, some more than two thousand meters high, Bosnia became a natural frontier for the powerful kingdoms of the northwest and southeast, with all the implications of a frontier. The designation of a territory as “frontier” usually means it is a place for “natural” expansions of powerful people and civilizations. Additionally, it often also means a place that needs to be tamed and “civilized” by those same powers, which is a much uglier aspect of designation as a frontier.³⁶ Both happened to the Balkans in general and to Bosnia in particular, where over time many intruders came and left traces of their presence. That is why Bosnia was a meeting place for Illyrians, Hellenic Greeks, Romans, Macedonians, Avars, Huns, Thracians, Celts, Goth, Gepids, and others, who were eventually all overcome by the southern Slavs who came to the Balkans between 540 and 800 CE and overwhelmed all other groups, mainly through warfare and the imposition of Slavic languages.³⁷

The Ottomans began to encroach on the Balkans after the acquisition of Gallipoli in 1354, and as a response to European Catholic campaigns against the Ottomans in 1396 and 1444 (Malcolm 2019, 4). As a result, the Ottomans eventually seized Bosnia (with Herzegovina) in 1481.³⁸ For the Ottomans, Bosnia became the empire's westernmost point, especially after the Karlowitz Agreement of 1699, which established the westernmost borders of the empire. Even though several times they tried hard to expand northwest and northeast, they were eventually pushed back to Bosnia.

It may be argued that the Karlowitz Agreement created a new sense of purpose for Bosnian Muslims, as it manifested itself in two ways. Having learned from the plight of fellow Muslims from neighboring territories that were taken away from the Ottomans in the wars prior to the agreement, Bosnian Muslim elites realized not only the symbolic importance of Bosnia as their motherland, but also that they had to rely on their own capacities for their defense and that strategic towns and regions were important for their collective defense needs, which were not necessarily the same as the

larger Ottoman Empire's needs. So they insisted on retaining every inch of Bosnian territory in all subsequent agreements the Ottomans tried to make with the Habsburgs.

This intense concern about Bosnian territory by Bosnian Muslim elites was already obvious during the negotiation of the next treaty, the Passarowitz Agreement, twenty years later. The negotiations over the borders around Bosnia's northwesternmost town of Bihać were particularly hard. The territory around the town protrudes deeply into Habsburg territory (which is now considered the "belly" of Croatia, see figure 2.1), and the Habsburgs wanted to take control over it and were ready to give the Ottomans more territory elsewhere in return. Yet the sultan's negotiators resolutely refused to cede Bihać, realizing that its cession would jeopardize the rest of Bosnia's security for years to come. Virmont (of the Habsburgs) and Ibrahim Agha, the chief Bosnian negotiator, had a particularly heated debate about the *eyalet's* new border with Venetian Dalmatia, a subject of little interest to Ruzzini (of Venice). Agha wanted the province to retain its previous borders. Numan Pasha Koprulu also busily lobbied all the Ottoman dignitaries at Passarowitz not to let the Austrians get "a single inch of Bosnian territory. He was even ready to take military action over this" (Pelidija 2011, 119). This approach, therefore, has had a profound impact ever since on the history of both BiH as a territory and Bosnian Muslims as a people.

2.4. The Rise of Independent Bosnian Muslim Elites

The reality of being the Ottoman Empire's northwestern border land meant that Bosnia was also the last military staging ground for all attempts to expand the territory, as it was also the military bastion for the defense of the empire. Pelidija (2011) notes that after the Treaty of Karlowitz was signed, "the Ottoman government laid particular emphasis on Bosnia's military and strategic organization. The best example of this organizational structure was the *kapetanijas* (smaller military-administrative territories under a captain's rule)" (114). By 1716, the Ottomans had increased the number of *kapetanijas* from twelve to twenty-five, creating a strong defense network throughout Bosnia that kept peace and security at the borders as well as within the Ottoman *eyalet* of Bosnia. *Kapetanijas* were a significant military-administrative structure numbering up to 20,000 recruits. During the first decades of the eighteenth century, that number grew to 60,000 men (20,930 of them being the standing army), and eleven new *kapetanijas* were created deeper in the Bosnian countryside to further

bolster the military and provide more recruits.³⁹ Eventually, most of those *kapetanijas* were commanded by native Bosnian officers (*kapetans*), and with them the power of domestic military elites became significant. As an illustration of their power, one of the *kapetans*, Husein Kapetan Gradašćević, led the unified Bosnian troops against the sultan's forces in the second Battle of Kosovo, initially routing them. Nevertheless, the *kapetan* eventually lost when troops from Herzegovina led by the Bosnian Bey Ali Agha Rizvanbegović joined the sultan's troops and together they attacked and defeated Gradašćević.⁴⁰ Initially, Kapetan Gradašćević rose to protest the Ottoman reforms and abolition of the janissary corps.⁴¹ The support for his revolt was also driven in part by the Ottomans giving some traditionally Bosnian territory to semiautonomous Serbia in the early 1830s.⁴² The *kapetan* wrested control of Bosnia from the local vizier in 1831, occupying the town of Travnik in central Bosnia, and even tried, unsuccessfully, to assert himself as governor of Bosnia. Sultan Mahmud II exiled him from Bosnia to Istanbul, where he died on May 17, 1834.

This incident is important to Bosnia for several reasons. The figure of Kapetan Husein Gradašćević, whose forces at the time included even some Bosnian non-Muslims, is now often invoked by Bosnian Muslim nationalists as the first unifying Bosnian leader. "The Dragon of Bosnia," as they refer to him, was the first Bosnian nationalist who fought for Bosnian autonomy. Recently, the Bosnian Cultural Association "Preporod" from Gradačac (BiH) even started an initiative to relocate Gradašćević's grave to Bosnia from Istanbul.⁴³

The second battle at Kosovo Polje is also important because it occurred when the region of Herzegovina first became administratively separated by the Ottomans from the *eyalet* of Bosnia. As the reward for his support of the sultan's troops against Bosnian (and Albanian) rebels, Ali Agha Rizvanbegović was awarded rule over the reconstructed Herzegovina.⁴⁴

With such a huge number of soldiers,⁴⁵ Bosnia and its Muslim population became an important military territory for the Ottomans, as well as for other powers who wished to control the region after them. Furthermore, such conditions provided not only for the formation of the military elites, but also for the emergence of a class of all types of service providers supporting such a large military contingent. The service providers were the builders who were instrumental in constructing and reinforcing fortifications, the landowners and merchants who furnished everyday provisions for the military and other people, and the local religious elites who tended to the spiritual needs of all the people, especially in big cities. Pelidija (2011) notes that after the Treaty of Karlowitz, the Ottoman Porte repaired many

old fortifications and constructed new ones, with help from provincial and local nobles. Such an undertaking required a lot of resources and skilled craftsmen. He notes that “overall, the bulk of the funds and almost all of the necessary construction material were secured in Bosnia. Along with other leading figures, the Bosnian *wali* also made a major contribution. Between 1699 and 1714, there were around ten governors in Bosnia [and] of those seven were Bosnians. The same was true of the *sanjak-beys*, as well as of other civil and military officials, almost all of whom hailed from BiH” (114–15).

The military leaders in Bosnia were mostly from janissary troops, out of which grew landowning elites who got control over large land parcels given to them by the sultan for their military services,⁴⁶ while some of them became merchants and shop owners who supplied military troops with provisions.⁴⁷ Although those janissary soldiers were initially conscripted from among the general Muslim population and rewarded with land parcels for their bravery and service, eventually they became selected blood-nobility who inherited both the leadership of the troops and ownership of the land, which over time began to grow and consolidate into fewer hands.⁴⁸ After the schooling of local boys and men in the empire’s centers of learning, Bosnia’s own religious and state-supporting bureaucratic elites⁴⁹ emerged as well.⁵⁰ Eventually the military elites transformed themselves mostly into landowners, traders, and shop owners. Together with the Ottomans, the military class slowly disappeared, while the state-supporting elites, particularly the religious functionaries, remained and actually increased their influence over the population while balancing the new rulers. The members of those elites were of course not strictly separated, and some of them were parts of multiple groups, yet it is important to note that Bosnian Muslim elites relied on those three types of economic and social power sources. As they formed, those three types of elites became the key players in Bosnia for the next few centuries, as things did not change much in the economic and societal sense until Austro-Hungary defeated the eliteless but popular Bosnian resistance and took control of Bosnia in 1878.⁵¹ On the heels of the Habsburg takeover, Hungarians returned to Bosnia to rule once again.⁵²

Such a situation, where Bosnian Muslims were abandoned by their elites, repeated itself several times afterwards, resulting from their specific socioeconomic situation prior to the Austro-Hungarian takeover. During the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, when the ideology of nationalism began to reach Balkan shores, Bosnian Muslims were on a different trajectory from their Slavic non-Muslim neighbors because of their different

history up until that point. For that reason, it can be noted that Bosnian Muslims shared the territory of the Balkans with their neighbors, but actually did not share a history with them, especially in the case of their elites. Although the Ottomans occasionally did mobilize Christian Serbs to fight local wars, generally Serbs were not involved much in Ottoman affairs or the military. On the other hand, as Muslim subjects in the Ottoman Empire, Bosnian Muslims, as a part of the Ottoman "*natio militans*" (Balić 1995, 40), were regularly mobilized into Ottoman armies to serve and fight wars on the European, Asian, and African continents. Because of this, they were in more or less constant contact with and interacted with various peoples from that empire. All that had an impact on demographics in Bosnia, Herzegovina, and Sandžak, where many males were absent, and especially at the time when nationalism began to play a greater role locally. Some of those males survived and came back to Bosnian areas, bringing with them stories and experiences from the distant places where they served, which must have impacted the consciousness of their people⁵³ and supported the idea of universalism on which the religious empire was built and for which all those men had fought and died. Their local Slavic non-Muslim neighbors did not have such views, and they saw their experiences differently, even in the cases when they, too, had fought for the Ottomans.⁵⁴

When it comes to the elites, these differences were even more profound. It is hard to find a biography of any prominent Bosnian Muslim from the Ottoman era who had not spent time studying or living in some of the cosmopolitan centers of the empire, in Edirne, Istanbul, Damascus, Cairo, or, even further, in Africa.⁵⁵ They could do that because they could afford it. Although different from European feudalism, the logic of Ottoman feudalism created rigid economic and social stratification as well, especially after Bosnian blood nobility was established.⁵⁶ Such a situation encouraged Bosnian Muslim elites to feel a sense of superiority vis-à-vis both ordinary Bosnian Muslim people and especially toward their non-Muslim Slavic neighbors. The difference was further exacerbated by the dissimilar economic circumstances they faced, which produced a strong and different class consciousness among Bosnian Muslims themselves, as well as a different cultural consciousness between Bosnian Muslims and non-Muslims. Both of those worked against nationalism within the Bosnian Muslim group, as well as among Bosnian people from the same common territory.⁵⁷

Local Serbian elites at that time were mostly illiterate⁵⁸ and scantily wandered outside of their immediate Balkan locality.⁵⁹ Things began to change in the eighteenth century, when a number of Serbs went to Vienna

to be educated.⁶⁰ Even fewer of them actually returned and tried to engage and impact their local coreligious population, either because it was too costly for them or because the Ottomans would not let them return.⁶¹

The situation was slightly different among Catholic Croats for two reasons, but in both cases their education was also regionally centered. They had had the Yugoslav Academy of Arts and Sciences in Zagreb since 1866 and later the University of Zagreb, established in 1874, so they could attain a higher education in Croatia, and although it was not as well-funded as universities in other parts of the Empire, it was an option nevertheless. As for those who wanted better and higher levels of education, since Croats were the direct subjects of the Habsburgs, for them the roads to European centers of learning were more accessible.⁶² But not many could afford that and only a small number of Croats actually pursued that path to education, and an even smaller number of those who did could not resist the strong Germanization or Magyarization to which they were exposed in those schools.⁶³ Furthermore, few of them returned to their towns and villages after schooling, since they had nothing to do there, due to the mostly inadequate development of those regions in the empire.⁶⁴ The Croatian elites' situation was even more desperate than that of the Bosnian Muslim elites when it came to the Croats of Herzegovina and Bosnia, who were mostly left to fend for themselves until the BiH takeover by the Austro-Hungarians.⁶⁵

Although such conditions might seem advantageous for Bosnian Muslims, it actually worked differently. Apart from the extraordinary situations of war and destruction, when Bosnian Muslims were collectively endangered because of their religion and were in solidarity in defending their lives, the lack of a sense of baseline equality within the Bosnian Muslim group caused their in-group differentiation to strengthen. Given the class structure, coupled with the urban-rural difference, often reinforced by differences in literacy, even their Islamic-based culture could not bridge the gaps to create full horizontal solidarity and a sense of togetherness for the group, which is necessary for any nationalism project to operate properly. The neighboring non-Muslim groups were therefore structurally in a better position to use nationalism to their advantage, and that, to a great extent, explains the late arrival of Bosnian Muslims on the scene of the local nationalism projects. Another aspect that helps explain that late arrival was their specific relations with the Ottoman state, which were significantly impacted by the change of rule after the Berlin Congress Resolution of 1878. This event signaled the beginning of a new era for Bosnian Muslims and will be further discussed in the next chapter.

THREE

The Three Pillars of Bosnian Muslim Nationalism

When observed from the group's current elite level, land and territory, language, and a (new understanding of) religion have all emerged as the most visible factors supporting the notion of contemporary Bosnian Muslim political consciousness and identity. The joint expression of these three issues is embedded into today's Bosniak identity, put forth to the Bosnian Muslim population by their present elites. The foremost factor is the religious framework out of which Bosnian Muslims emerged as a distinct group and which has determined many of their circumstances, especially the development of the elites in the group's early, formative times.¹ The second factor, which can be seen as a separate and more strictly political issue, is the integrity of BiH as a territory—now an independent state—and as the only place where they represent a real political force. The integrity of the territory here means the survival of BiH as an entity and, contingent upon that, the existence of Bosnian Muslims as a political factor now and as they have been for the past five centuries. Additionally, after the demise of the Ottoman Empire, landowning elites emerged as the most important group among Muslims in BiH, and for them the issue of land and territory was the most important economic issue that they struggled for. The complications stem from the fact that BiH is not theirs only, for the Bosnian Muslims have to share it with two other peoples who often wanted Bosnia to dissolve. The third issue is the Bosnian language, as their mother tongue and as a concept of self-assertion in the world for Bosnian Muslims today.²

Over the past 144 years, these three main factors have become the building blocks of Bosnian Muslim political consciousness,³ which became the foundation for contemporary Bosniak identity. Although one might advocate for the inclusion of more elements in the mix,⁴ these three loom largest in the contemporary conditions of the Slavic Muslims of the former Yugoslavia. The combination of these issues emerged as the result of the historical development of the group's elites and their internal and external struggles,⁵ as well as their response to the other two regional nationalisms that encroach upon all three elements of the Bosnian Muslim national project. Since nationalism is an episodic event that occurs as a result of historical contingencies, it is useful to observe the process of the development of the pillars of any nationalism in order to understand its desired salient identity projects.

3.1. Integrity of BiH as a Territory and an Entity

The Austro-Hungarian takeover was not just a simple change in the governing entity, but a much more challenging change in the structure and type of state. With the takeover, the concept of unity of belief and state (*deen we devlet*) was broken, and relationships within the state that Bosnian Muslims, and especially their *ulama*, had to adjust to when Muslims were no longer privileged political subjects changed as well. The implications regarding the religious elites were profound and central for the project of Bosnian Muslim emergence as a distinct sociopolitical group, and they will be discussed separately. Politically, the impact of the changes of the type of rulers had repercussions that lasted until the end of World War II.⁶ Under the Ottomans, in circumstances where privileged status was acquired by birth or religious conversion, there had not been much need to build alliances based on political programs or ideologies. Rather, all political strategies and alliances were personalistic and opportunistic. A similar situation, but in new circumstances, permitted a personalistic Muslim political block to form over time. During the initial Habsburg rule, Bosnian Muslim representatives with some political power were mostly chosen and appointed by the new rulers. Their main concern at that time was preservation of the privileges they had had during Ottoman rule and issues regarding religion.⁷

The integrity of BiH was well-protected by the Berlin Agreement, which determined the fate of BiH territory, and the new ruling empire could not change it on its own. There were some issues, however, regarding the territory of Sandžak, which was initially seen as part of BiH, but with Article

25 of the Berlin Agreement⁸ and the subsequent 1879 agreement of Novi Pazar, partial control of Sandžak was ceded, first to the Ottomans⁹ and then, after the First Balkan War of 1912, to Serbia and Montenegro, when the borders of BiH became close to what they are now. Yet since Sandžak had its own independent nobles, by then the Bosnian nobility could no longer see it as part of BiH and did nothing about it. Eventually, some alternative political leaders emerged among the religious and political elites in BiH who had very different goals and ideas about the Bosnian Muslim national project. Some of them pushed the Bosnian idea proposed by Austro-Hungarians. Others argued for closeness to and identification with the Serbian national project. A third group argued for getting closer to the Croats, and the smallest group of individual intellectuals joined the project of South Slavic (Yugoslav) unity.¹⁰ Religious elites were reluctant to fully endorse any of those initiatives, as their membership was also split along the same lines and any specific endorsement would mean serious intragroup cleavages. Eventually Bosnian Muslim elites led by the Mostar Mufti Ali Džabić managed to create their own cultural movement under the name the Muslim National Organization, officially registered in 1906.¹¹

Eventually, after the Habsburg demise and South Slav unification, when BiH became part of the new Serbian-led state, the first real political parties began to form. Initiated by Bosnian Muslim religious dignitaries as a cultural movement in 1906, the leadership was taken over in 1919 by more secular-leaning Bosnian Muslims represented by the Yugoslav Muslim Organization (JMO), and from 1921 its longtime leader was the Vienna-educated lawyer Mehmed Spaho (1839–1939). All the scholars who have discussed the JMO and its leaders¹² have noted that the primary objective of the party was the preservation of BiH integrity¹³ and support of the Bosnian Muslim landowning elites in their attempts to protect their properties and economic base,¹⁴ and that the party also occasionally supported the efforts of the JMO's religious elites.¹⁵ Even in the 1923 text by the party's leader about the reasons for the formation of the JMO, the lack of any political ideology is obvious, with only existential and pragmatic reasons noted as motives for the creation of the party.¹⁶ During that time, specific ethnic and national uniqueness was completely denied to Bosnian Muslims, who were instead urged to declare themselves as Serbs or Croats. Eventually, under the influence of the Serbian Radical Party leader Milan Srškić, even BiH territorial integrity and BiH as an entity within Yugoslavia ended in 1921.¹⁷ Bosnian Muslim elites could not forget that Serbian-led episode, and the memory of the loss of BiH integrity influenced local alliances for a long time.

The 1921 episode of BiH disintegration was further exacerbated by the 1939 agreement between the Serb and Croat political leaders. The so-called “Cvetković-Maček Agreement,” completely dividing BiH as an entity between Serbian and Croatian autonomous units of Yugoslavia, was seen as the most serious endangerment of Bosnian Muslim existence. “The division was accomplished by discounting the Muslims altogether” (Banac 1984, 376). The prominent Bosnian Muslim intellectual Mahmutćehajić (2000) notes that the agreement provided “possibilities for municipalities in BiH to be considered, where convenient, as either Serb or Croat, even when the proportion they contained was minute. This principle is the principal source of their national ideologies whose inherent goal was to erase the Muslims from the Bosnian map” (133). The agreement was a prelude to what ensued during World War II, when the entire territory of BiH was ceded by the Germans to the Nazi-led Croatian state of Nezavisna Država Hrvatska (NDH).¹⁸

During World War II, “a considerable part of JMO leadership” (Redžić 2005, 165), including Dr. Džafer Kulenović, who replaced Mehmed Spaho,¹⁹ and others like Hakija Hadžić and Alija Šuljak, made a ghastly choice to side with the Croatian Ustasha’s anti-Serb Nazi movement.²⁰ Because of that, JMO not only lost ground as a party,²¹ but also tarnished the reputation of Bosnian Muslims, painting them exclusively as Croatian helpers and Nazi supporters. This was not true, though, as some prominent leaders and members of JMO also joined the Tito-led people’s liberation struggle together with other groups in Bosnia.²² During the war, ordinary Bosnian Muslim people faced the possibility of complete annihilation,²³ in part because the Croatian Ustasha regime purposely created a condition where Muslims would be targeted by Serbs for revenge for what the Croats were doing to them.²⁴ As the only major Yugoslav group without a unified and well-organized military force, they tried hard to survive and to make sense of what was going on.²⁵ Even the Germans pointed out that Muslim support for them was predicated exclusively upon BiH’s independence or self-rule, but not BiH under the Croatian NDH.²⁶

Not only were Bosnian Muslims left without their own effective leadership, but they were courted by very different groups. The Germans made a considerable and well-planned effort, and even brought the Jerusalem Mufti to convince them to join the infamous 13th Muslim Division, also known as the SS “Handschar Division,” but they had only limited success.²⁷ The Croatian Ustashes made efforts to win them over for their project, even converting a building in the Croatian capital, Zagreb, into a mosque to stress their closeness to Muslims, ostensibly labeled as best Croats.²⁸

Fascist Serbian bands of Chetniks tried to win over some Muslims after 1941,²⁹ with even less success.³⁰ Some local Bosnian Muslim leaders tried to organize regional Muslim militias to protect the population, which was often left defenseless under the Ustasha's leadership and the deliberate Italian support of Chetniks.³¹ Finally, Tito's Partisans actually succeeded in winning the Muslims over,³² and after November 1943, when the first State's Anti-Fascist Council for the National Liberation of Bosnia and Herzegovina (ZAVNOBiH) signaled BiH's autonomy within Yugoslavia, Bosnian Muslims by and large (especially during 1944) supported Tito's Partisans.³³ In a rare book that specifically deals with the Bosnian Muslims' role in World War II, Hoare (2014) correctly points out that their support for Tito and his Partisan movement was crucial for Tito's victory at the end of the war. To further support Hoare's notion that Bosnian Muslims' support for Tito's Partisans was *their strategic choice*, we can add that even present-day Bosnian Muslims consider and celebrate November 25, 1943, as the official BiH National Independence Day. On that day, the communist-led ZAVNOBiH met in the Bosnian town of Mrkonjić Grad and reinstated BiH integrity as a condition of the future federal Yugoslavia after four years of its nonexistence following the 1939 dismemberment.³⁴ After 1943, Bosnian Muslims decisively threw their support to Tito's Partisans, who eventually won the war and took over Yugoslavia, urging a new era of cooperation among Yugoslav federal units, nationalities, and its local Slavic ethnic subgroups.

While Bosnian Muslim leaders were not the only people during World War II who wanted Bosnia to regain its integrity and become an equal state within Yugoslavia—some of the important Bosnian Serb and Croat communists also insisted on this—the Muslims had a different reason. Bosnian Serbs and Croats have their corresponding nation-states adjacent to BiH as an option to fulfill their cultural and political ideals, while Muslims did not have such a “second option.”³⁵ Therefore, BiH statehood served a different purpose and had a different political goal for each group. The Bosnian Muslims struggled exclusively for real Bosnian state integrity, which was lost right before World War II with the Serbo-Croatian Cvetković-Maček Agreement of 1939, which made Bosnian Muslims a powerless minority in each state. For them, a BiH state meant a homeland territory where they could exist as a political factor large enough to balance the power of other groups. Therefore, Bosnian state geographic integrity for Bosnian Muslims was of existential importance. On the other hand, for the communists of Yugoslavia, especially the Serbs and Croats, BiH statehood was a necessary compromise to prevent its territory from becoming either a

“Croat Bosnia [or a] Serb Bosnia,” and thus an “apple of discord between the Serbs and the Croats [while it also helped] win over Muslims” (Hoare 2014, 169) for the communist cause during that perilous period during and after World War II. Simply stated, in 1943 the question “Whose Bosnia?” was postponed until some time in the future. That time came in the 1990s, when the two former communists, the Croatian Tudman and the Serbian Milošević, made the Karadžević Agreement about yet another division of BiH—and “once leaders engaged in ethnic mobilization for political gains, these attempts were on fertile ground to trigger collective action and inter-ethnic violence” (Weidmann 2011, 1182).³⁶

During that communist-dominated time, slogans such as “all the people of Bosnia” and the joint “happiness of Serbs, Croats and Muslims,” as well as “brotherhood and unity among all Bosnians—Serbs, Croats and Muslims alike,” were meant to sound all-inclusive for propaganda purposes, but those phrases did not really mean true equality for Muslims in Yugoslavia, or even in BiH, then or now. Therefore, although each Bosnian group had different intentions in its struggles for Bosnian statehood during World War II, their efforts in the end converged in the formal recognition of Bosnian statehood when in 1943, BiH got “squeezed” into the constitution, but Muslims were not even mentioned.³⁷

Nevertheless, the policy of urging Muslims to choose a Montenegrin,³⁸ Serbian, or Croatian nationality continued until 1968, when they were finally recognized as a separate titular Muslim nationality.³⁹ Since they were not recognized earlier as a nation, they lost critical time during the formative era of the Federal People’s Yugoslavia, when they could have competed with other groups for collective resources. The resource mobilization theory points to the significance of this setback and the consequent lack of the ability to set up “the effective political and organizational structure to channel wealth to further the political agendas of the group” (Tatari 2009, 278). This was an important factor that delayed the reconstruction and development of the parts of BiH and Sandžak where Muslims were large majorities.⁴⁰ The political and organizational structure of a group is particularly important for federal systems, where it is customary that political elites of groups and units compete for collective resources.⁴¹

Nevertheless, when recognition finally happened, Muslims readily accepted their newly acquired right. That acceptance was evident from the percentage of them selecting that option in the census held that year and abandoning the previous options of “undecided” or “Yugoslav” that many of them had chosen in previous instances. During these times the motto “*bratstvo i jedinstvo*” (brotherhood and oneness)⁴² was the official

communist national pluralism policy.⁴³ Bosnian Muslim elites, mostly from among the communists, tried to contain the assimilation aspect of the policy of “brotherhood and oneness,” and urged instead “brotherhood and equality” (*bratstvo i ravnopravnost*).⁴⁴ Eventually their efforts succeeded, and their group was recognized as a separate titular nation, albeit without its own specific republic, like the other nations.⁴⁵ In Yugoslavia, becoming a titular nation with its own federal unit also meant the right to organize the school program around national history, cultural norms and ideals. When Muslims were declared a titular nation in 1968, more than twenty-three years after the war, things were politically already organized and there was no federal unit just for them. Therefore, they had no chance of creating their own national educational system that could reinforce a common consciousness, and they could attend schools only in the educational systems of other groups, primarily Serbian and Croatian, somewhat less Montenegrin and Kosovo Albanian, and even less Macedonian. Yet even without that recognition and their own exclusive Yugoslav unit, that period under communism was still mostly beneficial for Muslims.

In the period after World War II, when the Muslims of Bosnia and Sandžak experienced a population bottleneck, they were finally able to recover and rebuild as a group.⁴⁶ After more than a century of murder and expulsions to Turkey, topped by a particularly bloody World War II in which, relative to their prewar size, Muslims lost the most people of all the Yugoslav groups, Bosnian Muslims urgently needed to replenish their biological base. The period of stability provided by communist rule in Yugoslavia allowed Muslims to increase their population from 808,921 in 1948 to 998,698 in 1953 and then significantly more to 1,719,932 by 1971 and to 2.3 million in 1991.⁴⁷

At this time Slavic-speaking (Bosnian) Muslims also needed to rebuild their intellectual and elite structures. Many of the groups' leaders had been murdered during the war, and many others had emigrated to Turkey and elsewhere, essentially leaving Muslim peoples leaderless. And when the Communist Party took over, even the previous traditional elites were disunited due to an internal power struggle.⁴⁸ Those who remained, the *bodžas* (imams) and landowners (*bey*s), were essentially shunned and made powerless. The disenfranchisement of the previous elites gave rise to the ideas of baseline equality and solidarity as necessary preconditions for nationalism to appear and take hold among people. A new generation of leaders had to emerge from within the new system, which took about two decades. That period gave Slavic-speaking (Bosnian) Muslims time to catch up with the

other two groups' nationalism projects, and when they began to appear openly in the late 1960s, Muslims began to articulate their own responses to those neighboring nationalisms. Serbian nationalism was initially less pronounced, since they were in many ways the dominant group in Yugoslavia, and their dissatisfaction with the system was at first focused on economic inefficiencies of the state at the time, but Croatian dissatisfaction stemmed from various cultural institutions and was therefore essentially expressed as nationalism.⁴⁹ Yet both Serbs and Croats already had institutions and ideas that they could rely on and rally around.⁵⁰ The Slavic-speaking (Bosnian) Muslims of Yugoslavia, on the other hand, were fighting to assert their right to their separate identity and deliberating about the base on which to construct their solidarity and choose the best name for themselves.

The discussion about their name was led by intellectuals among the communist-leaning Muslims, like Enver Redžić, Selim Ćerić, Muhamed Hadžijahić, Alija Isaković, Muhamed Filipović, and Adil Zulfikarpasić.⁵¹ They debated whether to connect themselves to Bosnia by adopting a Bosnian or Bosniak name,⁵² or to Yugoslavia by embracing a Yugoslav identity,⁵³ or to keep the name "Muslim," with which they had won the right of nationality in 1974 and which is also indirectly tied to Yugoslavia.

Others, like Mladi Muslimani [the Young Muslims], with Alija Izetbegović among them, tried to build a sense of togetherness by asserting the religion-based character of the group as the primary element of their solidarity, even though not necessarily through the (Yugoslav) Islamic Religious Community (IVZ). The regime dealt with that group harshly, sending most of them to prison to serve lengthy sentences.⁵⁴ Obviously they tried too early, when the circumstances were still not ready for the mobilization of Muslims toward national self-emancipation. Nevertheless, it was an important step, which martyred Alija Izetbegović and other members of the group and became their social capital in 1990, when they formed a political party and won the first multiparty election in BiH.⁵⁵

Muslim imams also played a role in building the religion-based nature of the group, in two ways. They were trying to stop Muslims' migration to Turkey by redefining Muslimness as apart from Turkishness, essentially establishing the critical tie of Islam to the land of Bosnia. That way, they found a common ground with other Bosnian Muslim elite groups. Parallel to the connection of Islam to Bosnia, they were also reinterpreting the Islamic concept of *hijra*, which tells Muslims to emigrate from non-Muslim to Muslim-ruled lands.⁵⁶ As early as 1884, just six years after the Austro-Hungarian takeover of BiH, the mufti of Tuzla, Mehmed Teufik Azabegić, wrote the *Risala o Hijri* [Treatise on Hijra] to redefine the concept of *hijra*

in light of the new circumstances that Bosnian Muslims had found themselves living in, under non-Muslim rule for the first time.⁵⁷ In his writing Azabegić emphasized that *hijra* means more than just emigrating from the rule of unbelievers to a Muslim-majority land. After the Ottoman withdrawal, due to the constant pogroms against them and the insecurity they experienced, millions of Muslims left Bosnia and Sandžak and headed toward Turkey. Since that movement was meant to help them preserve their religion, it was seen as *hijra*. That movement was also encouraged by the Turkish policy of needing and welcoming Muslims from the Balkans.⁵⁸ Movement toward Turkey slowed down after the Atatürk takeover, due to his harsh treatment of religion and forceful attempts to modernize Turkey.⁵⁹ That, however, did not completely stop migration to Turkey by Bosnian Muslims all the way into the 1970s.⁶⁰

Faced with the possibility of losing so many people, the Bosnian mufti Azabegić began to appeal to Muslims to stay on their land by emphasizing that *hijra* is not an obligation but a recommendation and that it should be done only if *hijra* brings better conditions for a person. He further explains in his writings that the emigration of Bosnian Muslims to Turkey, however, will mean emigrating from the safety of their Bosnian homes, and security of their Bosnian homeland, to the insecurity and poverty of a refugee life in Turkey that will make the practice of their religion much harder, and therefore the main benefit of *hijra*, which is to preserve their religiosity, will be lost.⁶¹ This idea was supported by the *hadith* of the Prophet Mohammed, who said that there is no required *hijra* after the Muslim takeover of Mecca and therefore it is not an individual obligation anymore.⁶² But to stay in BiH or Sandžak meant that Bosnian Muslims had to find a way to accept the new type of states they were encountering, and through them find support for their lives. Muslims needed to reinvent themselves politically and to build a new type of public servant, and that was especially important after World War II, during the rule of the ostensibly secular communist regime.

Since the communist regime was staunchly bureaucratic, the main battle in establishing new elites among Yugoslav groups was fought primarily in that arena. Accordingly, some argue that the beginning of the Yugoslav “third estate,” built along the lines of the techno-managerial structure, started in 1965 when executive power was taken from the president (Tito), and the Savezno Izvršno Vijeće (Federal Executive Board) began to run the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY).⁶³ As a continuation of the trend of decentralization, the federal reforms in the early 1970s established the Basic Organization of Associated Labor as the most important administrative unit

of the workers' self-management regime, and in them more educated "white collar staff outnumber their blue collar counterparts in the ratio 2:1. The most favorable rate of representation was achieved by [educated] highly skilled manual staff. They accounted for 40.2% of the workforce, but they supplied 56.8% of all council members" (Rojek and Wilson 1987, 302).

Ever since the Austro-Hungarian takeover, Slavic-speaking (Bosnian) Muslims lagged behind in adapting to the new legal-rational state that relied to a large extent on bureaucracy. During the era of communism, that lag was even more pronounced. Serbian communist elites quickly adapted their long-term policies of Serbianization of the Muslims precisely through those structures and used the Communist Party's position to ensure those policies. As a mirage of objectivity, they insisted that only a secular, merit-based bureaucracy was to run the affairs of local, state, and federal governments, while in effect stripping Muslims of their diacritical markers established through their religion.⁶⁴ As mentioned earlier, that paradox where the religious basis of their groupness was at the same time accepted and suppressed in its essential form by state structures contributed to the ambiguity of the Muslim identity and created doubt about the possibility for their collective action. Such an approach created a huge advantage for Serbs, and to an extent for Croats, who had already produced many more civil servants and teachers than Muslims were able to produce during the time of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia.⁶⁵ In my field work, Bosnian Muslim informants frequently recalled to me that in their villages, in eastern and western Bosnia under communist rule, all of the teachers were Serbs or, less often, Croats.⁶⁶ For many Muslim children, that was the first time they encountered Serbian teachers directly and learned the Serbian (Croatian) vision of Yugoslavia and BiH.⁶⁷ That type of education did not help Slavic-speaking Muslims to nourish a sense of their own togetherness, but more importantly, those teachers taught them nationalism. That meant that young Slavic-speaking Muslims, separated from their religion by aggressive communist secularism, learned nationalism in public schools from Serbs and Croats, who knew it well.⁶⁸ That is how Bosnia's Muslim nationalism emerged as "a reaction of people who felt culturally disadvantaged" (Plamenatz 1976) by those other two groups with whom they shared their land. Mandatory public education helped that process of learning and accepting nationalism as a new worldview, since it provided a possibility for mass literacy and education among the Slavic-speaking Muslims of Yugoslavia.⁶⁹

Learning about other people's nationalism was a good starting point, but it was not sufficient for Muslims to proceed with their own national

project, as they still needed leaders with qualified supporting people who could help them fulfill their aspirations.⁷⁰ Muslims needed a new generation of their own public servants, from elementary school teachers to the highest public officials, to serve in various capacities throughout BiH and Yugoslavia.⁷¹ The federal and state structure was not organized to their advantage either. Because of national parity, Bosnian Muslims had to comply with multinational quotas in BiH to an extent unlike that in other republics in Yugoslavia.⁷² Leaders of the republic and its representatives on the federal level had to come from all three groups, and they were rarely Muslims. As Abazović (1999) notes, it was popular to repeat that BiH was a “mini-Yugoslavia,” a home for many nationalities. But that characterization also set standards and expectations that BiH’s leadership and bureaucracy members would match the “nationality key” (quotas), which the other two neighboring republics of Yugoslavia were not expected to do.

As a result of the particularly harsh policies of Aleksandar Ranković,⁷³ and the strong Serbian nationalistic hold on the BiH (and Yugoslav) state apparatus, the rise of the Bosnian Muslim political and technocratic elites was crippled for a long time,⁷⁴ and twenty years after the end of World War II, when Ranković was deposed, new, socialism-groomed, intellectual elites could begin to form.⁷⁵ For that reason, Bosnian Muslims highly revere those few of their own top bureaucrats who rose to prominence despite those difficulties, such as Hamdija Pozderac, Raif Dizdarević, and Džemal Bijedić, all secular communists. Many people credit Bijedić, one of Tito’s favorite Muslim communists, for winning the right to a Muslims appellation and the recognition of their nationality in the Yugoslav constitution of 1974. Bijedić was the Federal Yugoslav prime minister from 1971 until 1977, when he died in an unexplained plane crash, which many Bosnian Muslims see as an assassination. Kamberović (2013, 48) notes that Bijedić was the key player who argued for more BiH equality within the Yugoslav socialist state during the 1960s and 1970s, and with it more equality for the largest Bosnian group, Bosnian Muslims.⁷⁶ Those efforts to assert BiH autonomy and more rights for Muslims there emerged as a platform that all the different Bosnian Muslim elites converged upon.⁷⁷

Notwithstanding all those difficulties, the opportunity provided by the peace and relative security of those communist-ruled years allowed Bosnian Muslims the time to recover from the previous century of murder and expulsion and possibly to create some of their own bureaucratic personnel. Abazović (1999, 380–81) writes that in 1991, Muslim personnel held 35.5 percent of the administrative positions (or 9 percent less than their proportion of the population in BiH), while Serbs held 39 percent (or 8 percent

more than their proportion), and Croats held 13.7 percent (or 3.5 percent less than their proportion) of the total republic's bureaucratic positions. Although they filled less than their national quotas, it was a far better situation for Bosnian Muslims than during the time right after World War II.

Three significant moments nourished the further strengthening of an incipient national consciousness among Yugoslav Muslims during the turbulent 1980s. In 1982, the Serbian author Vuk Drašković publishing a novel *Nož* [The Dagger], describing Muslims as butchers of Serbs during World War II. This publication in a tightly controlled communist Serbia certainly caused a lot of commotion, but things became clearer and more dangerous for Muslims after Slobodan Milošević was elected as a leader during the 8th Plenary Session of the Central Committee of the League of Communists of Serbia in 1986. A year later, he openly declared support for Serbs against Albanians in Kosovo and openly revived the Kosovo Myth.⁷⁸ The final point of urgency came during Milošević's speech at the Gazimestan rally in 1989, when he stated his intention to pursue Serbian expansionistic aspirations to achieve a "Greater Serbia," as stated in the 1980s Memorandum of the Serbian Academy of Arts and Sciences.⁷⁹ His first goal was to strip Kosovo's autonomy and to rein in ethnic Albanians; this was portrayed as a new battle for Kosovo and was a powerful "chosen trauma" (Volkan 1997) for Serbian mobilization used against Muslim invaders.⁸⁰ Bosnian Muslims, who had learned nationalism from Serbs, knew what such Serbian attitudes meant for them.⁸¹ The sense of urgency for a collective response by Muslims to the upcoming Yugoslav crisis was also supported by the 1987 arrest of the west Bosnian Muslim businessman, Fikret Abdić, for alleged financial mishandling of insolvent promissory notes on behalf of the "Agrokomerc," an important employer in the most underdeveloped part of BiH, Cazinska Krajina.⁸² Additionally, in that affair, a prominent Muslim communist leader from that region, Hamdija Pozderac, who was seen as a backer of Abdić, was dishonored and deposed. Stories about the Agrokomerc affair are still circulating, and many things about it are not clear,⁸³ yet it was an important rallying point for Slavic-speaking Muslims. It occurred when many of them began to see the inevitable end of Yugoslavia, when Muslims would have to make their own choices for their future status. In an interview published in December of 1987, the Muslim intellectual Hamdija Čemerlić stated that "every nation has institutions for the development of its own identity. The Muslims have none. Such are the circumstances! That is why a comprehensive national institution should be formed that will deal solely with national issues within the Muslim community" (Izetbegović 2003, 60–61). Although some other Muslims expressed

skepticism about it, this notion prevailed. Led by Alija Izetbegović, who was martyred through his long prison sentence for a Muslim cause, the Bosnian Muslim political party *Stranka Demokratske Akcije* [Party of Democratic Action] (referred to as SDA), which at the time looked more like a Muslim national movement than a political party,⁸⁴ began its mission to lead the Slavic-speaking Muslims of Yugoslavia toward their full national self-fulfillment and emancipation in BiH.⁸⁵ The path ahead was not easy for them and Izetbegović tried to avoid escalations by negotiating with the Serbs and Croats to try to preserve Yugoslavia as the preferred option for Muslims, or at least to buy more time for them because he was aware that the other two groups were better organized.⁸⁶

When all the above-mentioned preconditions were in place for nationalism to play its decisive role, the Slavic-speaking Muslims of Yugoslavia were ready for emergence and a change in the form of their groupness. As the final step before creating a platform for their nationalism and concurrent Bosniak identity, the Muslims of BiH and Sandžak also needed to overcome their fragmented consciousness, formed as a result of the regionalism they had adopted as a mechanism for survival ever since the Berlin Congress, and especially during World War II.⁸⁷ That platform was provided at the December 22, 1992, meeting of three hundred Muslim intellectuals at the Bosnian Muslim Congress in Sarajevo, then under siege, where they (re)introduced the Bosniak identity as a unifying form for the Slavic-speaking Muslims of the former Yugoslavia. The very last step for them to become a group completing its emergence through nationalism and asserting itself as a full-fledged nation on the local and international level was to survive the Bosnian War.

Although during the time of Yugoslavia Muslims managed to match to an extent their Serbian and Croatian counterparts in bureaucratic and leadership personnel, this was not so across the institutions and on all levels of the BiH republic's government. The most important lag in personnel was in the Ministries of Defense and the Interior, where Serbs dominated with 44.7 percent and 39.1 percent respectively.⁸⁸ That Muslims were the only major Slavic-speaking nationality that did not have its own republic to build its administrative infrastructure put Bosnian Muslims at a disadvantage in the lead-up to the wars of dissolution of Yugoslavia in the 1990s. They paid dearly for this during the Bosnian War, when they were, again, the only group without an effective military force to protect them.⁸⁹ Bosnian Muslims could not even rely fully on the federally based and controlled units, BiH Teritorijalna Odbrana [BiH TO—Territorial Defense] that were established during the early times of SFRY based on the World

War II Partisan-led people's resistance to the occupation. Like the people's resistance, the BiH TO was built to be a supportive or alternative force to the regular Yugoslav People's Army, JNA. Since the early 1970s, however, events with the so-called "Croatian Spring," and especially after the Albanian Kosovo protests in the 1980s, the nationally oriented Serb-Croat communist leaders and Serb-dominated JNA took steps to weaken and disarm Yugoslav (and BiH) TO structures.⁹⁰ Finally, in 1990, right before the new democratically elected Croatian and BiH governments were to be seated, the control of the arms was even formally taken over by the new law regulating the function of TO. The organization of the SRBiH TO structure remained, with some of the weapons under their direct control, but again due to the triune BiH national reality, every local municipality controlled whatever was left of those structures. And again, due to the bureaucratically weaker position of Bosnian Muslims overall, they did not control many of the municipal resources either.⁹¹ Even though not a real match for the JNA in BiH, which became a foreign military force after the March 1992 independence of the Republic of BiH, those remnants of the TO BiH made all the difference to Muslim national survival, as they became the foundation of the official Army of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina (ARBiH),⁹² which managed to defend the core of BiH and prevent Serbian and Croatian forces from erasing BiH as an entity. On the other hand, the Serbs relied greatly on the national JNA, headquartered in Belgrade, in addition to their own paramilitary civil defense forces, which each republic and town had. Croats, like others in the former Yugoslavia, built their forces on top of their own civil defense units and their police.⁹³ Since Bosnian Muslims shared BiH with Serbs and Croats, they did not have control over either of those organizations and entered the war for BiH independence unprepared and very much, again, relying on Croatian good will to help them.⁹⁴ Difficulty in relying on Croatian good will was significantly exacerbated by the Western-initiated U.N. embargo; "no arms to anyone' [in Yugoslavia], which tacitly sanctioned the military advantages of the Serbs and Croats, and left the Muslims virtually defenseless" (Wilmer 1998, 101), and Croatian territory was effectively the only route through which the Republic of BiH could smuggle some badly needed arms for the defense of a newly independent state.

In 1994, when Croatian paramilitaries turned against the Army of the Republic of BiH, which was staffed and supported mainly by Bosnian Muslims, their battle for a unified BiH was lost, but the other battle, for BiH integrity, continued.⁹⁵ The only way to preserve the integrity of the territory was to agree to the U.S.-brokered Washington Agreement with the

Croats in 1994, which essentially first divided the country by creating the B-H Federation, and then to agree to the Dayton Peace Agreement in 1995.⁹⁶ The Dayton Peace Agreement confirmed the already effectively split BiH into two administrative units:⁹⁷ the Republika Srpska (controlled almost exclusively by Bosnian Serbs who dreamed of separating from BiH and joining Serbia)⁹⁸ and the Federation of BiH (jointly controlled by Bosnian Muslims and Croats, who also looked over the border into Croatia as their national state and wished to separate from BiH and join Croatia).⁹⁹ Despite that, Bosnian Muslims did not abandon their aspiration for BiH's integrity and sovereignty, as could be observed from frequent pronouncements of their leaders, who all reiterated that BiH's integrity and their resolve to fight for it was not to be questioned. That is why Bosnian Muslim leader Bakir Izetbegović noted in a 2015 interview, an integral "Bosnia brought in its sovereignty into SFRY [whose structure is the basis on which all new former Yugoslav states are internationally recognized], . . . and if [Republika Srpska] questions the first paragraph of the Dayton Peace Agreement called 'the continuity of BiH' it will bring into question its own continuity as well [since it did not exist during SFRY]."¹⁰⁰

Nevertheless, with the severely endangered BiH integrity consuming all their energies, the Bosnian Muslim nationalism project and Bosniak identity became issues that were neglected by the elites. That became especially obvious on the eve of the first postwar BiH census, in 2013, when many of them had to publicly urge Bosnian Muslims to adopt the name "Bosniak" as their identity choice in the census and the Bosnian language as their national language. Based on the results of the data, which will be discussed in the next chapters, they were relatively successful, since a large majority of survey respondents did select the identity "Bosniak" for themselves.

This brief examination of the issue of BiH integrity as one of the main pillars of the Bosnian Muslim nationalism project may be concluded with a note about the referendum for BiH independence from Yugoslavia, held on March 1, 1992, when more than 63 percent of BiH residents voted for independence.¹⁰¹ For many Bosnian Muslim nationalists, the day when BiH regained its independence after centuries of being ruled by various foreigners is considered one of the most important days in the modern history of Bosnian Muslims. By stressing that significance, they signal the importance of BiH for the Bosnian Muslim nationalism program. At that time, however, Bosnian Muslims constituted less than 50 percent of the population of BiH, and it is obvious that they were not the only ones voting for independence. It is assumed that a majority of Bosnian Croats voted for BiH independence as well, while only a small number of Bosnian Serbs

did. For that reason, the date March 1 is sometimes used as a symbol of the platform for unitary Bosnian nationalism,¹⁰² as opposed to separate Bosnian Muslim, Croatian, and Serbian nationalisms.¹⁰³

Unitary Bosnian nationalism also feeds on similar issues of interest to Bosniaks, and it is likewise primarily concerned with BiH territory, where both sovereignty and the integrity of BiH are equally important. Of concern to unitarists too is the Bosnian language, but to be the official language of the people of the country, not only of a single BiH group.

The most significant difference between the two nationalisms is the issue of religion. While Bosnian Muslim nationalism considers Bosnian Islam an essential aspect of its groupness, unitary Bosnian nationalism is trying to build its platform on civic ideas of BiH or Bosnian citizenship (sometimes excluding Herzegovina from its name). Unitary Bosnian nationalists thus have their own preferred salient identity project.¹⁰⁴ They are arguing for a Bosnian identity for the whole Bosnian population, including Bosnian Muslims.¹⁰⁵ For that reason, unitary Bosnian nationalism most significantly impacts the Bosnian Muslim population and, judging from conversations during the field work, many Bosnian Muslims are unsure about the differences between the two.¹⁰⁶ Yet as this study's survey data reveals, a significantly larger number of respondents indicated that Bosniak identity was their primary identity, rather than Bosnian identity, and that they feel more intensely Bosniak than Bosnian. Therefore, as a diacritical factor of Bosnian Muslim nationalism, the religious foundation should be examined more closely.

3.2. Islamic Foundation of Bosnian Muslims as a Separate Group

Even though a few local activists now claim that Bosnians came in contact with Islam a few centuries before the Ottoman conquest,¹⁰⁷ it is commonly thought that Islam took hold in Bosnia with the Ottomans. Contrary to some local Bosnian Muslim claims, it took a long time for the locals to embrace Islam.¹⁰⁸ It should be noted that Bosnia was never a land or country of one religion. Even before Islam, as noted above, at least three broadly defined religious practices existed in Bosnia: Catholic Christianity, the unstructured practices of the "heretic" Bosnian Church, and the least common at that time, the local version of Orthodox Christian practices in Herzegovina. It may be argued that besides the different topography and lifestyles of the people in Bosnia, the practices of those different pre-Islamic beliefs also influenced how Islam was perceived, received, and observed in

BiH. Its slow embrace was most likely not the result of doctrinal issues, since prior to Islam Bosnians practiced only peasant rituals loosely connected to Christianity and often some that were not connected.¹⁰⁹ It was more likely due to the nature of communication at that time when information traveled slowly,¹¹⁰ as well as the nature of the initial measured phase of the establishment of the Ottoman administrative structures¹¹¹ and millet system of ruling, which provided room for other faiths to continue practicing their religions but without much space for growth.

The official Ottoman court of that time followed Sunni Islam, based on Hanafi jurisprudence, and the Sufi-influenced Maturidi creed.¹¹² The same doctrinal approach was also adopted by the Muslims in Bosnia, and it is still followed by the majority of Bosnian Muslims, as the official religious organization *Islamska Zajednica u BiH* (Islamic Community in BiH; IZBiH) frequently emphasizes in its declarations and announcements.¹¹³ Some Bosnian imams claim that such a combination means Hanafi jurisprudence and its understanding and commentary by the imam Abu Mansur al Maturidi.¹¹⁴ Yet most ordinary people and imams do not know much about those high-level theological discussions in Islam¹¹⁵ passed down to them by the official governing body of the IZBiH.¹¹⁶ Nevertheless, in that way the IZBiH claims that adherence to such an approach and understanding of Islam “provides air by which it could freely breathe in its own confined area” (Cerić 1995, 232). It has become the main element of the Bosnian Muslim tradition, which provides a historical anchor and stability for the community. Yet, that disparity between the official pronouncements of the IZBiH and the lack of knowledge among the religious people on the ground leaves room for local, often non-Islamic, practices to remain part of the rituals among different Bosnian Muslim communities.¹¹⁷ Some local authors refer to those practices as “people’s religion” (*narodna religija*).¹¹⁸ But the influx of the local is observed not only in practices of *narodna religija* by ordinary folks, but also in a different way, at the official level of understanding and practice of Islam in BiH. The “people’s religion” in the case of Bosnian Muslims is not what is sometimes referred to as a “folk religion” for at least two reasons. First, Bosnian Muslims have lived largely in urban settings since their acceptance of Islam, apart from empire’s non-Muslim subjects.¹¹⁹ Second, folk religion is usually conceptualized and practiced in opposition to the official religion.¹²⁰ In the case of Bosnia, though, the people’s religion actually represents a synthesis of both folk practices and the resolutions of high Islam. In such a situation, like the institution of the *neo-ijma*,¹²¹ the IZBiH becomes the main negotiator between those two strands and the primary judge of what is to be included in the “people’s

religion” of Bosnian Islam, as it is now also ostensibly sanctioned by state law. Navigating between those different tendencies, the IZBiH occasionally publicly declares and sanctions practices and teachings, not as “un-Islamic” but essentially as “un-Bosniak.” It should be added that among Bosnian Muslims, the two levels of folk and official religious understanding and practice exist as well, and tensions are present within each level, between those two levels, and between both of them and the non-Islamic, social, and official spheres.¹²²

3.2.1. Theological Roots of Official Bosnian Islam

Although a very specific and highly specialized discussion about the Islamic creed is beyond the scope of this book,¹²³ it will be useful to try to explain in a few words what the practical implications of Hanafi jurisprudence and the Maturidi creed are for Bosnian Muslim practices, since they are not much discussed in the literature.¹²⁴ Both great Islamic scholars were non-Arab Sunni Muslims, living and working outside of the core of Arabia. Of Persian lineage with an Afghan father, Abu Hanifa was born in Kufa (Iraq),¹²⁵ while Al Maturidi was from the small town of Maturid, near Samarkand (Uzbekistan).¹²⁶ As they both came from places far from Medina and Makkah, where many of the disciples of the Prophet Mohammed lived and where, in general, rulings were primarily based on the memorized and exactly recorded Prophetic sayings and Arab customs of the time, both Abu Hanifa and Al Maturidi employed discursive analysis, analogical deductions, and rationality in their rulings and understandings of the religion.¹²⁷ Abu Hanifa was a scholar of theology and jurisprudence, and he based his method on the principle of group discussion that he used with his students, and on the principle of the abstract judicial review and preparing for hypothetical situations before they occur.¹²⁸ Furthermore, besides the primary sources of religious law, Abu Hanifa’s method also utilized *qiyâs* (analogical deduction), *istihsân* (preference based on strength of substantive proof),¹²⁹ and *urf* (customs). For a wider audience he was primarily a jurist, paying special attention to the forms and rules of behavior in accordance with Islam.¹³⁰ Since “religious behavior is historically, socially, and culturally informed,”¹³¹ Abu Hanifa had to “translate” some of the Islamic rules derived from understandings of Arab culture at the time of Revelation and the Arabs’ norms of behavior,¹³² to non-Arab people by using *qiyâs*, *istiban*, and *urf* in addition to primary Sharia sources of the Qur’an and the prophetic Tradition.¹³³ Therefore, the role of Abu Hanifa as a translator of those specific social and cultural contexts into other situ-

ations was extremely valuable, since he established an important model and method of *how to* transfer those customs and norms of behavior.¹³⁴ For example, his rules are strictly followed in regard to prayer and in regard to the dress code, such as the rule that a beard is mandatory for Muslim men.¹³⁵ He is therefore considered a founder of the Islamic world's most widely followed *madhab* (school of jurisprudence), especially among non-Arabs, and his work is the basis for the religious practices of Bosnian Muslims as well. Because of European Bosnian Muslims following the Hanafi *madhab*, it was even considered by the Austro-Hungarian Empire as the primary "European-Islamic law" (Potz 2012, 20).¹³⁶

Imam al Maturidi came a century after Abu Hanifa and was primarily concerned with the understanding of *al-Kalām* (rational theology based on elucidation of the meaning of the words in the revelation)¹³⁷ and the higher principles of Islamic law and forms.¹³⁸ Although Cerić (1995) warns us that "al Maturidi was not a man of systematic definitions" (115), it may be said that in some way he was trying to normalize relations between perennial knowledge based on Revelation and worldly, acquired knowledge, and his "primary concern was to prove the soundness of Islamic doctrine as opposed to Indo-Iranian dualism, Judeo-Christian entangled monotheism, and the profanity of Greek philosophy" (Cerić 1995, 109). Al Maturidi was responding especially to the anthropomorphist ideas of the Mushabbihah and the ultrarationalist movement of the Mu'tazilites. He believed it was possible to have a fruitful discussion with all these groups only if mutually accepted arguments based on the senses and reason were employed.¹³⁹ İskenderoğlu (2015) explained that Imam al Maturidi argued that "there are three sources of knowledge: reports, sense experience and reason, and he tried to support the principles of religion through these sources" (310), and while Revelation is always superior and the starting point of any true knowledge, the senses and reason should not be ignored. In the words of a commentator describing Al Maturidi's approach, "he created a much stronger synthesis between Tradition and Reason . . . recognizing the necessity of reason to properly [through Islamic rationality and logic] understand the revealed text" (Yusuf 2007, 22).¹⁴⁰ Driven by reason, human beings make decisions for their own benefit, and they are solely responsible for their own acts and for choosing good over evil, while God still decides the true outcome of anything.¹⁴¹

The discussions and differences *within* a particular school of jurisprudence are sometimes divided between the understanding of God's attributes, which are mentioned in the Qur'an, and those mentioned in recorded Prophetic narrations. Some Islamic scholars take the position that those

attributes should be seen as real (*haqqeqab*)¹⁴² as they are mentioned in the Revelation and the authentic hadith, and they must be understood as their primary meanings indicate, while acknowledging the transcendence of God and incomparability of the unseen with the seen world. Others scholars argue that those attributes should not be understood as real; rather, they should be comprehended rationally and speculatively using Islamically structured logic and deduction.¹⁴³ Such was the position of Imam al Maturidi, who argued that the principles of understanding of Islam should not use tradition blindly; rather, the understanding should also utilize the senses and reason, because through them we actually comprehend God.¹⁴⁴ Out of that discussion about the exact attributes of God and the use of reason came also a different approach to issues regarding the affirmation of faith. The Maturidi approach is that it is enough that faith is in the heart of a person and it does not have to be affirmed by tongue and actions,¹⁴⁵ while others within the same Hanafi school of jurisprudence argue otherwise. Although faith is primarily a matter of heart, the actions of a human being are the result of divine decree and divinely decreed individual free will. Therefore, the conditions that an individual can find himself or herself in are also based upon those two. The God-decreed individual free will opens room for the senses, analogy, and reason to play a role in human life, as is explained by Imam al Maturidi.

This discussion of matters of Islamic creed may appear pretentious on my part, but since it is frequently mentioned by Bosnian Muslim activists it is necessary to attempt to provide at least its basics tenets, as they do play a role in the self-understanding of Bosnian Muslims, especially on the level of their official Islam and Islamic elites.

The introduction of analogy and reason into official Bosnian Islam may be seen in the Bosnian Muslim interpretation of the notion of *islah*, a critical concept for understanding the IZBiH's continuing evolution. In his glossary of terms, Saeed (2006) notes that *islah* indicates "a reform, the idea of returning to Islam's original message that has been obscured owing to misinterpretation and distortions," and as a concept it was often invoked by reformists after the eighteenth century to urge the return to Tradition and the reassessment of Islamic solutions and organizations. A Bosnian scholar from the IZBiH structure defines *maslaba* as "the establishment of sharia law regulations based on general interests and benefits."¹⁴⁶ For the IZBiH, then, *islah* means a constant reform of their own organizational structure, while relying on the particular tradition and specific experiences of Bosnian Muslims, with the Tradition being secondary. Such an approach may be seen in the declaration of the governing body of the IZBiH ordering

all Bosnian imams to interpret Islam according to the official teaching,¹⁴⁷ based not only upon the high-Islamic principles of the Qur'an and the Sunnah of the Prophet Mohammed, but also according to "our Bosnian-Herzegovinian experience."¹⁴⁸ There are also different implications on the level of ordinary people of such an approach, which emerged from the conditions in which Bosnian Muslims found themselves living, similar to the case of other Muslims who lived under the reign of communist parties. As the ruling party, Yugoslav communists were tolerant of, but not accommodating to, religion, as they often legislated against Muslim religious practices and norms, making it hard or impossible to practice Islam properly in accordance with religious tradition.¹⁴⁹

Although the distancing of Bosnian Muslims from their religious law started at the beginning of the Habsburg rule over them, the process was gradual and reached its apex during the reign of communism, when in 1946 all Sharia courts were banned. In the words of Štulanović (2002), "the positive Sharia law system was reduced through the Islamic ethical code to private and social norms and customary law," and only in that way did Islam remain relevant in the lives of the people. In such a situation, the approach to the particular creed whereby faith does not have to be affirmed with the tongue or with practice, was then very helpful for Muslims in BiH. Since many of them held only a very scant idea that they were Muslims without practicing the faith at all, their Islam mostly retreated into the practice of localized culture and traditions. In 1983, Gellner wrote that "to be a Bosnian Muslim you need not believe that there is no God but God and that Mohamed is his Prophet [this is the essence of the Islamic creed], but you need to have lost that faith" (70). Yet, even then, a Bosnian Muslim was considered a Muslim by his conationalists and by other Muslims.¹⁵⁰ In her work, Bringa (1995) also describes such a situation. "The relationship between being a Muslim and a Communist (and atheist) was problematic to many of the Muslims [but] to most of the Muslim villagers I knew, a Muslim was necessarily a believer, although he did not have to be devout or regularly observant. [It] did not mean that individuals from Muslim families and with Muslim names who were declared Communists were not perceived as 'Muslims'" (163–64). Obviously, it was understood by the Bosnian Muslim population that these negotiations between political activism and open religiosity were difficult, and compromises had to be made, particularly after the purges of the 1950s like the one in Cazin.¹⁵¹ Yet since it is enough for the faith to be in a person's heart, which no one can look into, generally a person will be perceived as Muslim despite all his shortcomings. Interestingly, the same approach toward Bosnian Muslims

was the case with the Serbian and Croatian armed forces, which also did not differentiate between “muslims” and “Muslims,” or “observant” and “nonobservant” Muslims during the Bosnian War.¹⁵²

Nevertheless, the IZBiH embraces all those experiences that Bosnian Muslims have gone through and incorporates them into its own understanding of Islam. It responds to those who try to annul such communist experiences by saying that “IZ is a gift from God, and it should not be denied, or belittled. Whosoever does not understand that, cannot pass judgment on Bosnian Muslims; whosoever does not respect that, does not have the right to teach Bosnian Muslims anything—neither religion which they know, nor loyalty to the Umma to which they hold on staunchly.”¹⁵³

In numerous other pronouncements, the official Islamic organization tries to reiterate that line of Bosnian Islam that incorporates both high-Islam discussions and the tendencies of Bosnian Islamic scholars, and the folk-Islam practices of ordinary Bosnian people and the remaining Bosnian Sufi groups. As it tries to balance the approaches and practices of those two strands of Bosnian Islam, it sometimes employs the power of a state in order to achieve that balance. Although “the general trend of the official Islamic thought of Bosnian-Herzegovinian Muslims in the twentieth century was modernist, enlightened and reformist,” Karić (2010, 45), himself very much a part of the official IZBiH,¹⁵⁴ actually refers to the high-level scholarly discussion among the members of the official organization and not to the knowledge and practices of ordinary people. On the ground and in its public declarations, the official IZBiH tries very much to balance the positions of the two and to maintain the Bosnian application of Islam in a non-Islamic environment, as IZBiH considers it is approved by the Hanafi School.¹⁵⁵ A good example of that balance is the way the official IZBiH took over the annual gathering in Ajatovica and other places of local Sufi pilgrimages, which they used to see as unacceptable but which they now sanction as the very place of public expression of Bosnian Islam. Now these rituals and places are not only acceptable, but are actively promoted and advertised as the places to be visited by all Bosnian Muslims.

The knowledge discrepancy between the two levels of practice and understanding in the Bosnian Muslim community provides a *feeling of difference* and the possibility for ordinary people and local imams to use (or not) the IZBiH-ratified Bosnian Muslim practices as evidence to construct the diacritical marker for their own group and to separate themselves from other Muslims when needed.¹⁵⁶ This is especially pronounced in the Bosnian Muslim diaspora, where the IZBiH hierarchy is also present, and where the “disconfirming other” for them is the Arab, Pakistani, Albanian,

Turk—essentially any non-Bosnian Muslim—and such differentiation is often used to seclude themselves from others¹⁵⁷ or to justify the building of their own Bosnian mosque, sometimes right next to an existing “Arab or Pakistani mosque.”¹⁵⁸ The same mark of difference is lately being used in BiH as well to counter influences and teachings now coming to Bosnian Muslims from different foreign sources¹⁵⁹ and from the Bosnian Muslim students who were studying throughout the Muslim world and are now back in BiH teaching what they have learned elsewhere.

In this way the process of Bosnian particularization distantly resembles the turning of Jewish universalism into “Jewish ethnicism,” well-described by Baron (1971), or, put another way, their wrestling with Islamic universalism brings to mind what happened as Christians encountered Germanic tribes in northern Europe when the “Christianization of the Germanic tribes was matched by the Germanization of Christianity,” and such localizing of religious universalism later provided accommodation for nationalism to grow along confessional lines within the religion.¹⁶⁰ How did that feeling of difference come to play a role in the case of Bosnian Muslims?

The propensity toward peasant or folk religion in BiH was there even before the arrival of Islam,¹⁶¹ and many of those folk religious practices have continued throughout the lives of Bosnian Muslims.¹⁶² Those who maintain those local ceremonies often engage in power struggles with each other over various issues, from who controls the venerated sites to the exact order and forms of practice of their rituals.¹⁶³ Then there are the tensions that have existed throughout time between folk Islam practices and the efforts of high-level religious reformers to adjust and correct them.¹⁶⁴ As elsewhere in the Islamic world, those tensions were between the two t’s (t and T), local Islamic traditions and high Islamic Traditions.¹⁶⁵

Ever since their acceptance of Islam, Bosnian Muslims have been educated throughout the Ottoman Empire and some of them reached such a level of prominence that they left a strong impact in BiH and the region concerning the understanding of Islamic orthodoxy. Locally, they were very much part of the level that is usually considered high Islam. It should be noted, however, that among the scholars at that level, there are sages from different branches of Sunni Islam, from various Sufi orders, from the early twentieth-century Islamic reformers,¹⁶⁶ and from the various orthodox Traditionalists.¹⁶⁷

That is where the IZBiH steps in to play a critical role as arbiter among all those strains. Perhaps for that reason, from its beginning as an official organization, it has been referred to as *Zajednica* (a collective community)¹⁶⁸ to emphasize the desire for collectiveness, despite all the dif-

ferences. In BiH today, all those tensions in and around the religion are mediated by the IZBiH, primarily in terms of Bosnian or non-Bosnian traditions, and their resolutions might be called, *as they often are*, Bosnian Islam.¹⁶⁹ The IZBiH does not use the term “Bosnian Islam” in its official documents. Instead, in its constitution, the IZBiH uses the construct the “Islamic tradition of Bosniaks,” together with (and after) the Qur’an and Sunnah (the Tradition of the Prophet Mohammed), as a source of its resolutions, in line with the Hanafi approach and “the demands of time.”¹⁷⁰ But even equating in a single sentence the Bosniak-specific tradition and the primary sources of Qur’an and Sunnah is theologically tense.

Although the Bosnian Muslim experience of Islam is now closely tied to the resolutions and decrees of the IZBiH, it is important to note that the IZBiH was not there from the beginning of Bosnia’s acceptance and practice of Islam.¹⁷¹ Just as it took time for Bosniak consciousness to emerge as a form and a practice, it took time as well for the IZBiH to become central for their comprehension and expressions of Islam. The roots of the IZBiH emerged in 1882, only after the Austro-Hungarian takeover of BiH. After the occupation of BiH, in part due to international obligations, the Habsburgs tried to preserve a semblance of social continuity, in spite of all the reforms they initiated. As already noted, the change in the type of state when the concept of unity of belief and state was broken had a profound influence on Bosnian Muslim *ulama* relations with the state.¹⁷² Over the past 144 years, there have been four broadly defined phases of the changes in their modes of interaction with the new states they encountered. Throughout those times, as Durmišević (2008, 218) notes, the Hanafi school rationale has allowed Bosnian Muslims to live under non-Islamic rulers, on the condition of an autonomous judicial system that provides for the Sharia norms to guide and rule the Muslim private sphere. This condition offers a religious justification for the creation, existence, and continuous improvements through reforms of the religious hierarchy, which they see as part of *islah*, embodied in the IZBiH.¹⁷³

3.2.2. Four Phases of IZBiH Interactions with the Non-Islamic State

With the Austro-Hungarian takeover, after the Ottoman concept of unity of belief and state was broken, the Bosnian official religious hierarchy had to align itself with the rational and bureaucratic European model of a state.¹⁷⁴ In the old model, there had been some semblance of balance between belief and state. Religious supremacy in the Ottoman Empire was in the hands of the sheikh-ul-Islam, who was based in Istanbul, the political



Fig. 3.1. Bosnian Islamic Cultural Center, located on N. Western Ave., Chicago, notable for the lack of signage. (Photograph by author, 2021.)

center and the seat of the sultan, who was the leader of the Muslim religious community and who was in essence the embodiment of the state as the caliph. The state had its own coercive powers, but Islamic scholars and even ordinary people still could call upon the higher law established by the power above the state. The new European institutional model broke that balance, and the state became the top authority, over and above any and all other hierarchies. Such a situation was new for Bosnian and most other Muslims, and they had to respond somehow. The whole process happened gradually and “this institutional Europeanization of the organization of the Islamic community in Bosnia stimulated a large-scale modernization of Bosnian Islam which also had an impact on its history in the 20th century” (Potz 2012, 15).

In the first phase, when the Habsburgs were just administering Bosnia, Islamic law was still officially recognized legislatively and normatively, and it was still able to insert itself into the official and even the international sphere.¹⁷⁵ The official *ulama* were still able to apply pressure on the state in matters of great concern to them, such as the controversial conversions episodes.¹⁷⁶ This made the Austro-Hungarians push harder in their attempts to sever ties between Bosnia and Istanbul. Since at that point those ties were primarily religious, they created a new religious hierarchy, based in BiH and controlled by the Habsburgs.¹⁷⁷ They accomplished that gradually, first by encouraging fifty-eight prominent Sarajevans in 1878

to write a petition to the new authorities asking for more religious independence. In 1880 the Habsburgs prevented the new, Ottoman-appointed Bosnian mufti Hilmi Omerović from returning to Bosnia and assuming his position. They kept him at bay until 1882, when they quelled the 1881–82 Bosnian anticonscription rebellion¹⁷⁸ and formalized the post of *reis-ul-ulema* as the head of an official body independent of the *sheikh-ul-Islam* in Istanbul; it was, essentially, an organization able to interpret Sharia law autonomously. The new post of *reis-ul-ulema* became the head of the Bosnian Muslim religious hierarchy, which the Austro-Hungarians recognized as the Rijaseti ilmije (for short, the Rijaset, or the presidency of the *ulama*). On October 17, 1882, the Austro-Hungarians officially appointed the same Hilmi Omerović,¹⁷⁹ with the salary of eight thousand guildens a year, to the new post.¹⁸⁰ Potz (2012) states that “reorganization of the Islamic community in Bosnia went hand in hand with a certain ‘hierarchization’ of its structure in line with Christian models [and with] a determining influence on Bosnian Islam” (15).¹⁸¹ Although the Ottomans did not establish or recognize the position of the *reis-ul-ulema* and appointed Omerović only as mufti, the new hierarchy nevertheless has used that appointment ever since as the source of religious legitimacy for its existence.

The next significant step occurred in 1884, when the new Regional and District Waqf Commission was inaugurated to regulate the use and ownership of *waqfs*.¹⁸² In this way, all independent financial sources for religious workers were eliminated or placed under state control. Essentially, this process of transforming the Bosnian Muslim religious hierarchy into the new model of a state was fully completed in 1887 with the opening of the new school for Sharia judges in Bosnia “away from any foreign influences,”¹⁸³ primarily away from the Ottomans, of course. In that way, judges and all other Muslim religious dignitaries became fully part of the new state bureaucracy and agents of a state again, albeit this time a non-Islamic state.¹⁸⁴ Their role was to be moderators between a strong society and the state, an essential bureaucratic task for a modern state that tries to position itself as the final arbiter. Ever since then, to justify their role as state agents, monitoring and keeping the Muslim religion in check, or balancing religion between the state’s needs and the population’s religious demands, Bosnian Muslims’ official religious hierarchy began associating Islam with “Bosnian tradition.”

In that first phase of Bosnian Muslim adjustments to a new type of a state, the Austro-Hungarian state worked hard to accommodate Islamic rituals, and most of their efforts at modernizing the state and society were built along the reformist laws previously established, but not upheld, by the

Ottomans. The Sharia courts continue to exist, dealing primarily with family and individual issues, but their number was never increased to the point where they could be sufficient and effective in administering even those provisions of law.¹⁸⁵ Nevertheless, when they passed judgment, the Austro-Hungarians had to accept them or run the risk of upheavals. Eventually, after annexing BiH in 1909, the Austro-Hungarians adopted the Islam Act of 1912, fully recognizing Islam in Austrian public life. This was necessary, among other reasons, to accommodate Muslims in the Austro-Hungarian army and other parts of the empire's administrative structures to "ensure the adherents of Islam enjoyed the same legal status as the members of the legally recognized churches and religious communities" (Potz 2012, 20). The act was designed primarily along the lines of Bosnian Muslim practices of Islam and their Hanafi school approach, with some restrictions. Although this period of Austro-Hungarian rule was relatively short, their efforts at "institutional Europeanization of the organization of the Islamic community in BiH" (Potz 2012, 15) left a permanent mark on the structure of IZBiH and administrative role in BiH society.

The second phase of adjustments for Muslim religious elites,¹⁸⁶ by then completely dependent on the new non-Islamic state's good will to support and tolerate them,¹⁸⁷ occurred during the time of the initial South Slav state attempt.¹⁸⁸ With the new state,¹⁸⁹ the Islamic law became normatively consulted and applied exclusively among Muslims, and only in the case of family matters and certain customs.¹⁹⁰ At that point, however, the new state could freely ignore any of the judgments or suggestions made by the Sharia courts, which it did, even though the state continued to declaratively recognize Sharia courts and pay the salaries of all Muslim religious functionaries.¹⁹¹ During that phase, the Islamic community was living through its worst period. It was the time of the decay and complete disorganization of most of the old social structures,¹⁹² as seen through the total unpreparedness and horrendous massacres Muslims experienced during World War II,¹⁹³ when Bosnian Muslim functionaries mostly failed and left their people without any clear guidance.¹⁹⁴ To make matters structurally even more difficult for Muslims, this was also the time when the Vidovdan Constitution of 1921 designated the Bosnian-based *Islamska Zajednica* (Islamic Community) as only a part of the *Islamska Vjerska Zajednica* (Islamic Religious Community), which was declared in charge of the entire Yugoslavia by the constitution. The subsequent law regarding the Islamic Religious Community of Yugoslavia brought the whole institution under the firm control of Serbian interests and moved the seat of the Rijaset from Sarajevo to Belgrade. Since that meant the incorporation of all other Mus-

lim ethnic groups, with significant differences among them in terms of economic base, language, and lifestyle, into one structure, it became even more complicated to come up with a unified strategy of development and action for Bosnian and other Yugoslav Muslims.¹⁹⁵

As a result, Bosnian Muslim religious elites were even more stagnant and undecided as to which direction to take, whether to be champions for all Muslims in those South Slavic (Yugoslav) projects, or to act only for themselves. Their structural educational situation partly decided the dilemma, since most Bosnian Muslim religious workers would be schooled within BiH, while most of those from southern Serbia, Macedonia, and Kosovo would go to *medresas* in Skopje, Macedonia, or Kosovo. Muslim functionaries from Sandžak would go both ways. They preferred Bosnian schools, but often could only afford one in Skopje since it was less costly.¹⁹⁶ But that was not enough to bridge the different circumstances in which all Muslims from the former Yugoslavia lived and the even more different aspirations they dreamed of. Bosnian Muslims and their religious elites were primarily concerned with issues pertaining to Slavic Muslims living in the territory of BiH, and Albanian Muslims in Serbia and Macedonia were concerned about Albanians in their territories, while the other Muslim minorities were concerned with the mere issue of survival. Yet at that point, in addition to the IZBiH, Bosnian Muslims also had the Jugoslovenska Muslimanska Organizacija (JMO: Yugoslav Muslim Organization) to champion their needs and aspirations.¹⁹⁷ This political organization worked in close cooperation with the religious hierarchy but was nevertheless separate from it. After political maneuvering by the JMO, the seat of the *reis-ul-ulema* was eventually returned to Sarajevo in 1936, but all the other issues stemming from the Slavic unification project of Yugoslavia, which the IZBiH and IVZ had to face, remained unresolved. Although individual imams performed heroic acts of resistance and spoke openly against Ustasha's activities,¹⁹⁸ the official IVZ remained close with the JMO during their reign over Bosnia when the *reis-ul-ulema*, every now and then, backed the JMO decisions with *fatwas* and official proclamations,¹⁹⁹ until Sarajevo was liberated by Tito's Partisans on April 6, 1945.²⁰⁰

The third phase of the religious functionaries' interactions with the state was during the time of communist-ruled Yugoslavia. All political parties and organizations besides the Communist Party were banned, including the JMO, and the IZBiH became the only organization specifically made up of Muslims. In a one-party state there was not much room for any other ideology, and especially not for any alternative laws. The IZBiH functionaries understood that well²⁰¹ and acted appropriately,²⁰² sometimes

even urging believers to give up religious norms and duties and adopt those proposed by the communists.²⁰³ The Islamic law and courts were completely abolished on March 5, 1946,²⁰⁴ and the official sphere took over the private sphere almost completely. With that, family laws and norms also became a matter of the official sphere exclusively, and religious practices became problematic even in the personal sphere. Basically, Sharia law completely ceased to have any positive judicial authority (*ius positum*) for Bosnian Muslims, and it was completely transformed into the realm of mostly *negative* Islamic obligation, along with customs and tradition and ethical principles,²⁰⁵ which played a role in smaller private settings, and only occasionally in small villages or in selected social spheres.²⁰⁶

The role of the *ulama* and the space in which it could play a role, therefore, were severely limited. Furthermore, with the agrarian reforms of 1949 and 1959, when any large landowners were dispossessed of their land tracts, the IZBiH's main financial base of *vaqfs* was taken away and the religious hierarchy was crippled.²⁰⁷ That removed even the semblance of autonomy, and the IZBiH became almost completely dependent upon state subsidies and contributions and direct giving by the people who attended mosques and services.²⁰⁸ It took time for the IZBiH to adjust to these new budgetary circumstances, but eventually it did, by becoming closer to ordinary men and women and their *culture* and by adopting many folk practices for which it could receive financial compensation, and in that way it further developed the syncretic "people's religion" of Bosnian Islam.²⁰⁹ In this situation,²¹⁰ and as also preferred by the communist regime, the IZBiH became the interpreters and arbiters primarily of *Bosnian Muslim* tradition, and less of the (high) Islamic tradition.²¹¹ With this opening of a sociotheological sphere, as time passed, through continued improvements (*islah*) adopted as a method early during the time of the Habsburg takeover,²¹² the IZBiH also learned to balance between the religious norms and the state regime's scientific-based ideology.²¹³ The IZBiH (as part of the IVZ) often tended to the needs of the state, to the point where the *reis-ul-ulema* would meet foreign dignitaries to support the Yugoslav state's non-alignment foreign policy project.²¹⁴

The uneasy nature of relations between the state and the IZBiH may also be observed from the other end. Although the regime played an active role within the IZBiH, especially in appointing the leaders of the organization, it tried hard to interact with the religious hierarchy outside of the public view in order to keep up the appearance of the separation of the state from religion. Furthermore, the communists were aware that direct confrontational contacts would benefit the religious hierarchy and could

even provide them with the legitimacy of a people's tribunal.²¹⁵ Instead, conversations with those deemed problematic would usually initially be held informally, in a restaurant over a cup of coffee. It was only after a few such "conversations" that direct and decisive action might be taken, along with the appropriate propaganda spin that was orchestrated to frame the particular interaction of the state and the religious hierarchy in the desired way.²¹⁶ Furthermore, the separation of state and religion was only apparent in public, while in fact the state actively intervened in matters of religious concern. That may have been done indirectly, when the regime urged imams to advocate some aspects of religion more than others, or directly, when the regime steered things in the direction that worked for them.²¹⁷

As the state and the IZBiH both learned how to interact with and tolerate each other, such relations continued until the early 1990s, when the collapse of the regime became obvious. The religious hierarchy publicly challenged the state and openly declared its direct support for the Muslim political party led by the dissident Alija Izetbegović and its indirect support for the independence of BiH in the referendum held on March 1, 1992.

With such open support of certain options, the IZBiH signaled that it was ready to play an active role in any new state that might develop, yet with the understanding that the state would be only the main framework for those future relations. During the first months of the Bosnian war, the newly independent state of BiH provided the means for the IZBiH to separate from the IVZ of Yugoslavia, to discontinue its relations with the Skopje-born *reis-ul-ulema*, Jakub Selimovski, and to bring to Sarajevo and nominate the new *reis-ul-ulema* of the IZBiH, the University of Chicago graduate Dr. Mustafa Cerić. With the official split from the Yugoslav-based IVZ, an interesting new realization came to light. The IZBiH completely adapted to the model of its relations with a new type of state, and now views the legitimacy of the state as the main source of validity for its existence. In a text published by the newspaper *Ljiljan*, considered the main voice of Bosnian Muslim nationalism at the time and closely aligned with the IZBiH during the war, Turčić (1993)²¹⁸ explained that the end of Yugoslavia also ended the legitimacy of the IVZ as the religious hierarchy of the Muslims in the region. The text further argued that the efforts of the former *reis-ul-ulema*, Selimovski, to establish a new Islamic hierarchy for the entire region of the Balkans in 1993, therefore lacked the legitimacy provided by a state. It was therefore no longer the 1880 decree of the *sheikh-ul-Islam* appointing Mufti Omerović that established the legitimacy of the BiH religious hierarchy, since its legitimacy was now to be based on the international sovereignty and the legitimacy of a nation-state. With this

approach, the full circle of the BiH religious hierarchy adjusting its role to the non-Islamic, Weberian-defined, rational-legal state is completed.

And today, as Karčić (2008) explains, the official Bosnian Islamic hierarchy has now “learned” how to function in those new circumstances of a secular state, and “when today the secular state is discussed in BiH, as an adequate model for multi-religious societies, that should not mean a return to the past, but the acceptance of the highest modern development of such a model” (Karčić 2006, 57). Therefore, since it mastered the concept of rights,²¹⁹ the official Islamic hierarchy in BiH claims rights for itself and expects the state to define secularity as “neutrality with respect” (Karčić 2008, 35), and not as a complete absence of religion. In the words of *Reis-ul-Ulema* Cerić, “we are in favor of a state that is separated from religion in its form, but we are against a state that is separated from religion in its content.”²²⁰ So it should not be as it was with the secular communist-led state, where the state tolerated but discouraged religion; rather, now there should be not only toleration of religion, but also neutrality in terms of preference and respect for a religion, in this case Islam. The first step toward that goal occurred when the IZBiH wrested back its ability to independently select its own leaders, while the second step occurred when it regained ownership of the *vaqf* properties throughout BiH.

It seems that the lines between the official and social spheres in such multireligious states should be blurred. The official IZBiH basically would like to retain its autonomy in financial and normative matters, while the religious hierarchy would like to be much more apart from the state hierarchy.²²¹ Yet in their view, the Islamic laws and norms were to be a significant part of the individual and social spheres, while the official sphere was to support the religious hierarchy as an alternative law giver as well as a law decipherer, but not a law enforcer.²²² The IZBiH prefers what international relations observers note as the Kantian type of state. As Karčić (2006) continues, “although religious institutions are structurally and functionally separated from a state, they do have a right to comment about public issues” (57), and their role and direct responsibility within the state is along the line of “deciphering of the religious norms (*ifta*), upbringing and education (*adab*), and alternative solutions for the conflicts among Muslims, such as finding peaceful resolutions (*sulh*) and arbitrations (*tabkim*), among others” (58).

With such a relationship, the state is becoming what Migdal (1988) saw as a *mélange* of social organizations often competing for influence by creating their own unit-special strategies of survival, rather than a hierarchy of power relations. In such a state, contrary to Piscatori (1991, 13), despite

claims that politics is independent of religion, the separation between the two may not be so neatly delineated since both are actually instruments of the religious hierarchy. The IZBiH in such relations then plays the role of mediator of the religious, social, and even to some extent political order within and outside the group. The political order might be concerned with hard politics (as when the *reis-ul-ulema* emeritus Mustafa Cerić became a direct candidate for the BiH presidency,²²³ or when the IZBiH-appointed mufti of Sandžak and the 2019 contender for the position of *reis-ul-ulema*, Muamer Zukorlić, was also the direct candidate for the presidency of Serbia in 2012,²²⁴ or when the current *reis-ul-ulema*, Husein Kavazović, warned Serbs and Croats in an open letter not to make any deals at the expense of the BiH state (that implicitly the Bosnian Muslims he leads will defend).²²⁵ It might also be concerned with soft party politics, as when the IZBiH supported the SDA or when it softly advocated a referendum vote for BiH independence. But the political order may also involve participation in discussions over the decision of the Bosnian Constitutional Court about women's right to wear a hijab in public institutions, or which mosque is legal and which one is not, or establishing its own office in Washington, DC, as is currently happening.²²⁶ Finally, the IZBiH is the decisive arbiter in selecting which practices are part of the Bosnian Muslim tradition and which are not. In such a way, entangled within the web of state social and political structures, it is instrumental in pushing for a specific manifestation that feeds the *feeling* of religious difference and particularism for Bosnian Muslims, and that is now part of the Bosnian Muslim nationalism project and its salient Bosniak identity.²²⁷

3.3. Bosniaks, Bosnian Language, or Language of Bosnia and Herzegovina

The third type of Bosnian Muslim elites which developed particularly well during the years of communist rule was the intelligentsia, composed of intellectuals, journalists, and educators. For them the most frequently emphasized factor of Bosnian nationalism and Bosniak identity was the Bosnian language. The question of the language, its name, and purpose was most strongly articulated by Bosnian Muslim intellectuals, like Isaković and Dizdar, during the existence of communist-led Yugoslavia. Since it was seen not as a religious but only a cultural expression of their group, it was therefore safe for them to ask publicly: What is the language of Bosnia and Herzegovina and its most numerous groups, Bosnian Muslims?²²⁸ There

are two ways in which the Bosnian language, now using the Latin alphabet only, came to be important for Bosnian Muslim nationalism.

The Bosnian language exists, and it should be viewed as a separate element of Bosniak identity that provides an anchor and historical stability for the community, because it is the most easily noted form of expression of the group that can be pointed to by people within and without the Bosnian Muslim community. Furthermore, the Bosnian language is often presented by intellectuals from the community as a feature that can be traced as proof of their existence in the past and in the present, and in the two worlds in which they simultaneously exist: the larger religious community of world Muslims, where the primary diacritical marker is their Slavic Bosnian language; and the immediate geographical neighborhood where they live, where the assertion of the Bosnian language as their mother tongue is the most important link that ties them to the Bosnian land and its history. The language itself, and sometimes its name, is often contested by their neighbors who have seen (Bosnian) Muslims as “(br)others”²²⁹ so often in the past few centuries.²³⁰ The contestation has been expressed in different ways, ranging from denial of the existence of the language itself, or denial of the attribute “Bosnian” for the language that Bosniaks speak,²³¹ to denial of the right of a group to physically exist, which resulted in frequent genocidal attempts to eliminate them from the region during the last century and a half.²³² Although both Serb and Croat intellectuals do it, the Serbs are more aggressive in attempting to deny the existence and name of the language.²³³ Perhaps that is because the dialect spoken primarily in the region of Herzegovina was singlehandedly chosen in the eighteenth century by Vuk Karadžić (1787–1864)²³⁴ to be the model on which the Serbian literary language and nationalism were built.²³⁵ The different systematization of that same central *Štokavian* Slavic dialect, now together with its Cyrillic alphabet, therefore endangers Serbian nationalist projects, built along the lines of the folkloric German approach (Plamenatz 1976), where the core language and its name play a significant role.²³⁶

For Bosniaks, the Bosnian language is their mother tongue and it now uses a local version of the Latin alphabet. The narrative of Bosniak intellectuals and nationalists is that BiH used to be inhabited by interconfessional people who shared the local version of the Slavic language, which was called Bosnian after the territory where it was spoken.²³⁷ As mentioned earlier, BiH was inhabited by people who were nominally considered Catholics, followers of the dualist-type Bosnian Church, and with not very many Orthodox Christians except for a small number in the southern parts of Herzegovina and among the Vlachs,²³⁸ who were mainly shepherds. In

the Balkans, Vlachs were people on the move looking for the best grazing lands for their flocks of sheep, basically nomads for a good part of the year—as some of them still are—and who often came from Serbia, Montenegro, or Bulgaria.²³⁹ After the Ottoman Conquest, the Bosnian Church disappeared, and the new religious group of converts to Islam, the local Slavic Muslims, emerged. All these groups at that time spoke the language named Bosnian after the territory, while not necessarily writing in that language.²⁴⁰

On the heels of the Ottomans, the land of BiH also became the new destination for many Serbs, who moved onto the land under the guise of their association with the Vlachs, who were permitted by the Ottomans to freely move throughout the territory of the empire. Since they were mostly Orthodox Christians, those Vlach groups were served by Orthodox Christian priests from the Serbian Church based on the doctrines established by Saint Sava, nowadays the patron saint of Serbian schools and universities.²⁴¹ Significant numbers of Serbs began to appear in BiH, initially in Herzegovina and medieval Zeta, after they lost the Battle of Kosovo in 1389 and after the Ottoman conquests of Bosnia. Their resettlement was also made possible because of the Serbian Orthodox Church's privileged position by the Ottoman Porte since its seat was within the Empire,²⁴² as opposed to the seat of the Catholic Church, which was in Rome.²⁴³ The priests promoted the idea that all people of the Orthodox Christian faith in BiH should also be hierarchically tied to the Serbian Church.²⁴⁴ Since their subethnicity was the primary social unit at that time, and a structured hierarchy tied to a church was the most important pillar of many (sub)ethnicities, Orthodoxy began to mean Serbianism in the ethnic sense as well. This is an interesting twist of the norm that works the other way in Serbia. There, Serbianism *means* the Saint Sava version of Christian Orthodoxy, while outside of Serbia, in the lands where similar Štokavian dialects of the Slavic language are spoken and where teachers, priests, and bureaucrats were supplied by Serbia, Christian Orthodoxy *means* Serbianism. This could be observed during the Serbian takeover of Macedonia in 1912,²⁴⁵ or in Montenegro during the 2020 Montenegrin Serbs' protests against a government attempt to regulate church property and return ownership of some of it to the Montenegrin Orthodox Church, which is ostensibly not of Saint Sava–Serbian orientation.²⁴⁶ The same relations locally work between Catholicism and the Croats,²⁴⁷ who also struggled to standardize and “properly” name their language over time.²⁴⁸ This idea worked well, in part due to the Ottoman system of governing that saw the religious group as a primary political unit, often before ethnicity. Later, in the eighteenth

and nineteenth centuries, when early nationalism began to develop among the Serbs, the idea of all coreligionists as one nation was additionally promoted by the parochial schools and teachers imported from Serbia into BiH to serve the Orthodox Christian community there.²⁴⁹

The same thing happened among Bosnian Catholics. Their church leaders, who came initially from Bosnia, were eventually replaced by Franciscan priests, first from the Italian peninsula and then from Dalmatia and other regions of Croatia.²⁵⁰ Those local priests also spoke a similar version of the Štokavian dialect and also, in the nineteenth century, advanced the idea that coreligionists must be of one nation,²⁵¹ for them Croats.²⁵² As that shift happened, Orthodox Christians learned in their religiously segregated schools that the language they spoke was called Serbian and written with their Cyrillic alphabet,²⁵³ while Catholics learned to call their version of the same Slavic language Croatian and written with their Latin alphabet.²⁵⁴ The only group that continued to use and call their language Bosnian was the Bosnian Muslims. Since they were an important Muslim group, they even managed to have the name of their language mentioned as one of the official languages of the Ottoman Empire. So that memory of the name of the language spoken in Bosnia is now important to Bosniaks as a reminder that they were one of the original groups inhabiting the land. At the same time, it is a reminder to the other two groups that by abandoning the name of their language, they also abandoned the idea of BiH as their land.

The Bosnian language is not equally important for all of the people who adopt the identity of Bosniak. For the Bosniaks of BiH, it serves to reassert their claim to the country; for the Bosniaks of Sandžak, Macedonia, and Kosovo, it serves to assert their tie to the region of the Balkans, and it is a factor with which they try to assert themselves politically in the newly independent states that are now their homes. So for them, it is not a claim to the country in which they live, but it is a claim to the history of which they are part, a history of when Bosniaks and the Bosnian language were visibly recognized. While they might not be recognized as Sandžaklije, who now live outside of BiH, or as Našenci, Goranci, or Pomaci—who all have their own eastern versions of the Slavic language, which is different from western and more common version of Bosnian, and which they speak at home and in their social spheres²⁵⁵—in the official sphere and in schools they insist on using the Bosnian language.²⁵⁶ For the same reason, where the Bosnian language implicitly stakes a claim to the land of BiH, now a state, some of the Bosniaks in Montenegro refer to their language as Bosniak, rather than Bosnian.²⁵⁷ When I ask them why, they explain that they do not want to be tied to a country in which they do not live. Most Muslims

in all those countries who refuse the name of the Bosnian language, however, usually also prefer an identity other than Bosniak.

During Ottoman rule, the Bosnian language existed under that name as an official category, and under the Habsburgs it was actually reinforced as an important foundation that the Bosnian administrator Kallay wanted to use to support unitary Bosnian nationalism.²⁵⁸ After Kallay's death in 1903, the Austro-Hungarians abandoned both the project of the Bosnian nation and, after 1909, the name of the Bosnian language as well. Its use was discontinued, however, only in official documents, while Bosnian Muslims continued using it under that name in their interactions,²⁵⁹ until BiH became part of the new South Slavic state. The new state was based on the union (*narodno jedinstvo*) of Croats, Serbs, and Slovenes, with each group named for its version of the local Slavic language, and all united as a result of the Vienna Literary Agreement of 1850.²⁶⁰ During that time, Bosnian Muslims were seen by the two dominant groups, Serbs and Croats, exclusively as a religious group that was part of their respective nations. Reluctantly recognized as Slavic "(br)others," Muslims were urged to choose whether they were Croats or Serbs. Many Bosnian Muslim intellectuals at that time began to declare themselves as Serbs or Croats, or sometimes both.²⁶¹ Thus Bosnian Muslims were once more left leaderless, to fend for themselves.

The policy of denial of nationhood to Bosnian Muslims, along with denial of the Bosnian language, continued under the communist version of South Slavic nationhood.²⁶² Eventually, with the so-called Novi Sad Agreement in the 1950s, a new language combination was standardized under the name Serbo-Croatian or Croato-Serbian as the official language of the central part of the former Yugoslavia (Slovenia and Macedonia had their own languages recognized).²⁶³ Again, Bosnian Muslims were not invited to that meeting, and the decision was made without them. In the 1960s, some Bosnian Muslim intellectuals tried to reassert the specificity of the spoken Bosnian language, but without much success. And then in the National Census of 1991, instead of being given the previously preselected choices for language, each person was offered an option to name her or his own mother tongue. Almost a third of the total BiH population, and possibly 85 percent of Bosnian Muslims, named as their mother tongue the Bosnian language.²⁶⁴

As mentioned, the issue of the Bosnian language is primarily important to the more or less secular Bosnian Muslim intelligentsia, which formed during the communist era and was part of the state bureaucracy.²⁶⁵ During the late stages of the Ottoman era, the three types of elites (military,

landowning, and religious) coexisted among Bosnian Muslims. With the Habsburg takeover, the military elites disappeared, replaced by a small number of new bureaucratic elites, who continued to coexist with the remaining two groups.²⁶⁶ When BiH became part of the South Slav unification projects embodied in the kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes, the religious elites were handicapped by the state, while the other two groups, the landowners and bureaucrats, continued to be influential, although the landowners were significantly crippled by the new state-implemented land reforms. Simmons (2002) notes that the 1919 land reform of the new kingdom was a significant factor in the redistribution of wealth in Bosnia. Christian serfs were freed and received legal title to the land they worked. “Agrarian land reform resulted in the virtual impoverishment of many Bosnian Muslims. A people who had owned eighty percent of the land, who had great wealth, were transformed suddenly, by means of the laws on agrarian reform, into, one could say, beggars” (Simmons 2002, 625). As a consequence, the descendants of formerly wealthy Bosnian Muslim landowners often sought professional training and education in the West. They joined their Croatian and Serbian counterparts in studying abroad, to form a growing class of professionals and intellectuals who were affected by the secularizing influences of the West.²⁶⁷ That time, therefore, may have signaled the beginning of the process when the new Bosnian Muslim elites, professional bureaucrats, began to have the upper hand over the landowning elites. Furthermore “in the long run, the decline of the Muslim ruling [landowning] class in BiH set the stage for economic and political equalization” (Simmons 2002, 629–30), a necessary precondition for nationalism to grow within the group.

In communist-led Yugoslavia, when religious elites were further crippled and only still relevant culturally, Bosnian Muslim bureaucrats became the most significant group within the population,²⁶⁸ while the landowners disappeared completely. This is the moment when “the shift from class to mass”²⁶⁹ began. With the landowners’ disappearance, class and status consciousness disappeared as well, and only then did the communist-based ideas of equality and horizontal solidarity finally flourish among Bosnian Muslims. Those ideas of horizontal solidarity were first directed toward Yugoslavianism, but with the strengthening of Serbian nationalism during the Ranković era, and the subsequent 1968 so-called antibureaucratic student protests in Belgrade, as well as the Croatian nationalistic response seen in the events of the 1971 Croatian Spring, Bosnian Muslims also began to speak aloud about themselves as a separate group, and their aspirations had to be addressed by federal government.²⁷⁰

The first result of this group's awakening was its decision to champion the name of "Muslim" as a national designation, without emphasis on the specific territory, but rather just on Slavic Muslim cultural history and folklore. With focus on a culture and community, the secular intelligentsia "became interpreters and translators for and within their community" (Malešević 2006, 200), and this is where they encountered religion and the religious hierarchy, which entered the community sphere first through continued maneuvering while they improved their organizational structures (*islah*). As was established earlier, the religious hierarchy had been in the realm of culture since it had gradually withdrawn from religious universalism into norms, customs, and resolutions about Bosniak traditions, during the first two phases through which Bosnian Muslims had passed since they became a distinct local group. So the new secular intelligentsia, composed mainly of bureaucrats, educators, and other literary people, picked another people's issue, the Bosnian language, as their torch to carry.

The first significant assertion of the name "Bosnian language" was in the 1991 book on the language of Bosnian Muslims, *Jeziik Bosanskiib Muslimana*, by Dževad Jahić, while the dictionary published in wartime of the characteristic words of the Bosnian language, authored in 1991 by Alija Isaković (published 1992/1993), resonated more strongly with the public. Previously, the same author made waves with his 1972 book that included a selection of (Bosnian) Muslim literature.²⁷¹ This was seen as a provocative step out of the cultural frame established by the normative naming of the official Serbo-Croatian language that was then expected to be adopted with that name eponymous orientation by other national groups as "theirs." Another important contribution on the issue of language was made by Muhsin Rizvić, with his book that also reiterates the historical right to the language used by the people of Bosnia over centuries, and its Bosnian name. In his introduction, Isaković (1993) noted that Bosnian Muslims as "people . . . have named their language spontaneously, as all independent people do—both the greatest and smallest—as they did not disappear at any historical time, did not leave, nor did it get dissolved into other people, [and now] the descendants of [those] ancient Bosnians are still using the Bosnian language" (9). With these words, Isaković reaffirmed the Bosnian Muslim people's right to name their own language, an essential sign of being someone in the world, and, in this case, of uniting themselves with the particular history they chose and wanted to inherit. The name was further promoted by the Bosnian weekly *Ljiljan*, the prime media outlet for Bosnian Muslim intellectuals during the war. From 1993 through 1995, *Ljiljan* published a slew of articles, all of which argued that

the Bosnian language had existed historically primarily as the language of Bosnian Muslims, which further decreased the chances for the other two groups to call their version of the same language “the Bosnian language.”²⁷² Eventually, the term took hold, and even the voice of the Socialist Union of Workers, the daily *Oslobođenje* began to use the name “Bosnian language” in print using the Latin alphabet. That signaled not only that the name of the people’s language was fully accepted by the group, but also that the Bosnian Muslims had finally asserted themselves as a distinct local national group that was to play a decisive role in BiH once again. The Bosnian language was then mentioned also in the international Dayton Peace Agreement signed in 1995.²⁷³ But there are still many uphill battles to be won before it is fully accepted on the ground locally in the Serbian-dominated side of BiH, and even in the many localities outside of BiH, where Bosnian Muslims, as Bosniaks, now live.²⁷⁴

With this, the three factors of Bosnian Muslim nationalism—BiH territorial integrity, Bosnian Islam, and the Bosnian language—were therefore firmly established as the group elites began to actively foster the sense of togetherness during the twentieth century. Although these issues became important on the level of the elites, and were used by them to build and further the Bosnian Muslim nationalism project, the impact of that nationalism is to be observed at the group’s ground level, the ordinary people. This was suggested by the Hobsbawm (1990), when he wrote that nations are “dual phenomena, constructed essentially from above, but which cannot be understood unless also analyzed from below, that is in terms of the assumptions, hopes, needs, longings and interests of ordinary people” (10). Therefore, as mentioned in the previous chapters, an occurrence of increased groupness such as nationalism should be seen as a contingency event and process, and as such it should be tested with real case studies, in this case with the data gathered from the Bosnian Muslim population sample under diaspora conditions in the United States and based on the survey constructed on the issues stemming from the history of the Bosnian Muslims mentioned here.

The Bosnian Muslim Diaspora Sample

4.1. Materials and Procedure

The empirical part of this study, designed to test the relationship between nationalism and the salient identity of a group, is based on the external surveys collected from a sample of the population of Bosnian Muslim diaspora groups at sites throughout the Midwest and eastern United States, where they have large enough populations with their own religious, cultural, and social centers. Bosnian Muslim participants from those sites were selected based on a quasi-random, purposeful snowballing sampling method, usual for hard-to-reach populations such as diaspora groups (Handcock and Gile 2011; Atkinson and Flint 2001; Faugier and Sargeant 1997). To help minimize homophily biases inherent in a snowballing sampling, the data was collected at ten sites. Each time a respondent comes from a different location, it may be viewed as a “new wave” of respondents, which minimizes the bias inherent in quasi-random sampling. Per Heckathorn (2011), the increasing number of waves eventually eliminates such bias from the initial selection of seeds, because bias is reduced at a geometric, rather than arithmetic, rate, and having multiple sites helps in that regard. Finally, since this is only an observational study designed to test the proposal of the relationship between nationalism and identity, conclusions are to be treated cautiously and conditionally in connection with the inquiry discussed in this work.

A Dillman, Smyth, and Christian (2009) tailor-designed questionnaire generated specifically for this study with a focus on case study issues related to Bosniak nationalism and identity was used to collect the data (see appen-

dix C). To reduce the rate of incomplete questionnaires, particular attention was paid to the order of questions in the survey in terms of difficulty and the level of engagement of the respondents necessary to answer the questions. Although the rate of collected surveys, 37 percent, may be considered low to moderate for an external survey, the rate of completion of those collected is high, over 95 percent, with only a dozen partially completed surveys.¹ To further increase the rate of collection and completion, two versions of the same questionnaire were printed, in the Bosnian and English languages, and participants chose whichever they preferred. Of those collected, 604 are in Bosnian, while 60 are in English.²

Most of the surveys were distributed and collected between August 2013 and May 2014. That means that responses were collected immediately before, during, and after the first postwar census in BiH, taken in November 2013, when Bosnian Muslims for the first time in their history had a chance to identify themselves as Bosniaks in an official way.³ For that reason, there was an active campaign to popularize the identity of Bosniaks to the Bosnian Muslim population in the homeland and the diaspora as the best strategic choice for the group at that time. Hence the responses in this sample were also affected by that campaign.⁴

The front page of the survey booklet, with the heading “Bosniak Identity Survey Questionnaire,” explained the purpose of the study, guaranteed confidentiality of the participants, and provided the researcher’s contact information (see appendix C). In addition, more than 80 percent of the surveys were accompanied by a signed consent letter, which was later separated to ensure complete anonymity, while the remainder, collected in 2014 through the mail-in method, was done with verbal consent only. An entire survey took from thirty to forty-five minutes to complete, and any participant’s questions concerning the purpose and the nature of the study were fully answered during or following completion.

Two dozen questionnaires were completed with my assistance, mostly those of older responders who could not do it by themselves. About the same number of respondents were contacted again and asked to complete their surveys, since they had initially skipped some questions; only a few of them wished to leave those questions unanswered. Altogether, 1,800 copies of the thirteen-page, 68-question survey were distributed to willing participants. Of the 670 returned surveys, 101 were from the New York City Metropolitan area, 182 from St. Louis, and 189 from Chicago, while the remaining 192 survey responses came from all other sites combined. All the participants were volunteers, and no incentive was offered for their participation. Six surveys were filtered out of the analysis, since the respon-

dents were determined not to be part of the (Bosnian) Muslim population.⁵ As suggested by the central limit theorem, a large number of valid survey responses allows the use of data with reasonable confidence, as well as the possibility of drawing inferences from the statistical tests.⁶

The targeted segment of the diaspora population was respondents over 40 years of age. The mean age of the participants was 44.8 years ($SD = 12.4$), with the youngest participant being 18 and the oldest 92 years old. This segment was targeted because they are the people who lived and experienced the previous political system and organization, and because they had the previous national identity of “Muslim” during their formative years. Therefore, the assumption was that vacillations over the new identity should be felt most intensely among this segment of the population, since they are the ones who are living the change and are the prime group that is actually facing the choice to assume the new salient identity or to keep the previous one. Although 8.7 percent of the participants left their homeland before 1990, most of them, 90.4 percent, left after that (see fig. 4.1). Therefore, the majority of this sample of the population experienced the group’s “back-home” nationalism, which began to be fostered in the 1970s and matured by the 1990s, before they left the homeland.

All the questionnaires were coded and inputted into SPSS software for further analysis.⁷ Since the 64 questions were organized to collect the maximum of information, responses were coded and organized as a set of 115 items, as some of the responses contain multilayered information.⁸

Although the survey was designed to collect the maximum amount of information about the group, the discussion and data description provided in the following two closely related chapters will be limited only to the questions used for this inquiry. Chapter 4 provides the working definition of diaspora and a brief discussion of the sites where data was collected. The following chapter will provide the tie between the discussions about the collection sites and the representativeness of the population sample and will provide frequencies and distribution of the responses to the questions used to construct the empirical model for this inquiry about the relationship between nationalism and salient identity.

4.2. Definition of Diaspora and Population Sample

Since the population sample comes from a diaspora group, it is useful to provide a working definition of the concept of diaspora for this study. In what Hockenos (2003) calls the “elastic definition,” diaspora is seen as a




Fig. 4.1. Frequency of years when survey participants left homeland of Bosnia and Herzegovina

group of people dispersed from their homeland, but clustered and connected in communities outside of their homeland. In that way they consist of all members who wish to be part of a diaspora and who conform to some common elements of groupness in the particular situation, elements that might not be universally accepted by all existing diaspora groups from the same homeland community. Acceptance depends on the conditions in which each diaspora group finds itself when they *collectively* adjust and adapt to the new context. But what is necessary for a group to be considered a diaspora, in agreement with the above-mentioned elastic definition and with Barth's (1998a) approach to groups used in this work to define identity, is that individual members of such groups need to be connected with other members of the same group at more or less regular intervals. In that way they evaluate each other's performance based on their in-group understanding of the original group's value orientations and, based on those criteria, determine individual membership. So members might be connected and do any of these multiple things: they may "pay dues to one of the many diaspora associations, or may subscribe to émigré periodicals, attend religious services at their national churches, follow events in the Old World, and communicate regularly with relatives in the homeland. In these ways they keep alive emotional ties with the Old Country and, through the *institutions* of the diaspora, sustain a degree of cohesion in the com-

munity” (Hockenos 2003, 8). In the social sciences, institutions are defined as any regular interactions that occur and reproduce themselves between individuals and groups of people. In the words of Turner (1997), social institutions are “a complex of positions, roles, norms and values lodged in particular types of social structures and organizing relatively stable patterns of human activity with respect to fundamental problems in producing life-sustaining resources, in reproducing individuals, and in sustaining viable societal structures within a given environment” (6). Therefore, the survey collection sites were places with such institutions that provide possibility for the members of a group to have regular interactions (see table 4.1). In that way, so-defined members of the diaspora familiarize with (and possibly internalize) the groups’ normative collective process of preference elicitation to assess the reality in which they live and can similarly evaluate the questions of the survey and respond through self-stereotyping.

At each site there are certainly some individual members who stay away from the local Bosnian Muslim community and who do not interact with it. Those individuals are not discounted from the Bosnian Muslim group, but they are not considered a part of a diaspora group (by their own choice), and so they were not targeted for recruitment for the study.⁹

The selection of sites for data collection was consistent with the working definition of diaspora for this research. These are the sites where Bosnian Muslim institutions exist, where Bosnian Muslims regularly interact with each other in Appadurai-type (1995) neighborhoods across the United States, and where Bosnian Muslim localities are re-realized. As mentioned above, each site has at least one Bosnian Muslim mosque, a cemetery, an ethnic food store, a few restaurants, and often much more than that. The three main sites, Chicago, St. Louis, and New York, also have several Bosnian mass media programs and other institutions where Bosnian Muslims interact and their language dominates. Mass media is one of the prime elements for dispersion of a culture, so without its own mass media, a community cannot effectively maintain its culture. As Fennema (2004) noted, ethnic mass media strengthens vertical and horizontal relationships among the members of a group and enables a “we feeling” among members. Therefore the existence of a Bosnian Muslim media outlet was considered an important factor in the selection of each data collection site.

4.3. The Collection Sites

The surveys were collected through a mixed mode of on-site and mail-in methods. The majority of surveys were collected in person on site at

TABLE 4.1. Respondent's Interactions with Other Bosniaks and Homeland Culture

A: How often do you read Bosnian literature, watch Bosnian films/TV:					
	Never	Rarely	Occasionally	Often	Very often
Literature	5.6	17	32.1	23.5	21.8
Film or TV	8.4	21.4	28	17.2	22.3

B: In which media do you mostly read/watch news about BiH?				
	BiH	Regional (non BiH)	U.S.	None
	83.6	2.4	4.7	9.3

C: How often do you talk to someone in Bosnia/Sandžak?					
	Never	Rarely	Sometimes	Weekly	Every day
	1.4	4.4	26.7	40.5	26.1

D: How often do you travel to Bosnia/Sandžak?					
	Never	Occasionally	Every other year	Every year	I live there
	8.3	47.2	27.2	15.1	2.1

Note: All numbers are valid percentages of total number of participants.

the three main locations discussed below. The remaining 189 surveys were collected in person and by mail. Of these, 137 survey questionnaires were collected in person, with 23 from Atlanta, GA; 33 from Detroit, MI; 28 from Grand Rapids, MI; 33 from Erie, PA; and 20 from Elmwood, NJ. The remaining 55 survey questionnaires were mailed back to me. Of these, 36 were from Waterloo, IA, and 19 from Lincoln, NE. All these responses were grouped together and noted as the fourth collection site, "Other." A brief overview of the three main sites where 71 percent of data was collected is useful at this point.

4.3.1. Chicago Metropolitan Area

The main component of the inquiry is a quantitative statistical analysis of the survey data collected at multiple U.S. sites with large diaspora groups. Bosnian Muslims have been coming to the United States for more than a century. Their first formal organization, Džemijetel Hajrije (The Benevolent Society) of Illinois was formed in Chicago on May 1, 1906. Bosnian Muslims in the United States consider this the group's starting point in the New World.¹⁰ They have continued to immigrate to the United States ever since, and four of them were even on the famous *Titanic* when it sank in 1912.¹¹ The Bosnian Muslim diaspora group in the city grew slowly, until

the three larger waves of newcomers in the second half of the twentieth century began to arrive. The oldest still living subgroup of Bosnian Muslim Chicago immigrants is composed of those who came right after World War II; they are part of a group that Hockenos (2003) describes as “pathological anticommunists.”¹² Some of them are from families with members who fought on the wrong side in World War II and fled the country before Tito’s Partisans. The second subgroup is made up of those people who came during the time when communism and the SFRY were flourishing and reoriented their foreign policy toward closer cooperation with the United States and the West when “Yugoslavs were the ‘good Communists’” (Wilmer 1998, 97).¹³ There is permanent mistrust between those two groups due to their different positions toward communist Yugoslavia (Zulfić 2003, 85). The second subgroup is the only one that can be considered a *voluntary* (Bosnian Muslim) migrant Chicago diaspora subgroup that mainly came to Chicago after the 1970s. The other three subgroups are all refugees, or *involuntary* migrants, and that is also an important distinction between in-group subcategories.¹⁴

The third subgroup is those who came during the 1990s Bosnian war, who were disadvantaged compared to the other two regarding their English language use, and who were often still poorly equipped to deal with the New World realities.¹⁵ Ultimately, since many of them viewed neither Yugoslavia nor Croat nationalists with much sympathy due to their experience of ethnic cleansing, they came to differ more from the other two subgroups. Finally, the last subgroup of émigrés is composed of those who came through the resettlement program after the Bosnian war. Many of them came from Germany or another western European country, but there are also some who came directly from BiH through the family reunion program. Based on participant observations, the fourth subgroup appears closer to those of the 1990s wave and is distant from the first two groups. Yet due to their late arrival, they still have to catch up with everyone in terms of language and other skills to help them to establish themselves in the new place. Most of the places in Chicago where data was collected were to some extent exclusive to each of these Bosnian Muslim subgroups, more so by immigrant patterns than by their regional origin, even though regional attachments do play a role as well.

Although each Yugoslav diaspora group had its own nationalistic dreams and aspirations, most of them shared what Hockenos (2003) properly called “pathological anticommunism” (10). Bosnian Muslims had their own staunchly anticommunist groups, and especially in Chicago, they aligned closely with Croat émigrés and the Croat nationalistic circle.¹⁶ In 1951,

Chicago Croat-Muslims [Bosnian] emigres published a booklet a speech written for the World Muslim Congress held in 1950 in Karachi, Pakistan, by Džafer Kulenović, who was a deputy minister of the Croatian Nazi State of NDH.¹⁷ Although the post-World War II Bosnian Muslim diaspora was anticommunist, unlike Croats,¹⁸ they were not anti-Yugoslav.¹⁹ The Bosnian Muslims who arrived during the 1990s, on the other hand, were less anticommunist but more anti-Yugoslav, as the data reveals. Most participants think that life was good for Muslims under communism in the former Yugoslavia, while a very few of them still feel Yugoslav.²⁰ These latecomers were either disappointed, but generally indifferent toward communism;²¹ or many of them were still sentimentally procommunist in their nostalgia for the “good old days” (see Croegaert 2011). These different realities of back-home conditions that each of the different waves of Bosnian Muslim immigrants experienced also created tensions among the current group’s diaspora population.²² The four subgroups of the Bosnian Muslim diaspora in Chicago are different not only in their ideological leanings but also in their socioeconomic and, more importantly, their educational levels.²³

Since Chicago has the oldest Bosnian Muslim diaspora group, it has often been regarded as the political capital of Bosnian Muslims in the United States. Since the mother organization Džematul Hujrije was formed, many more organizations have sprung up in Chicago with ambitions to organize and represent Bosnian Muslims in the United States. The first postwar Bosnian Muslim Chicago émigrés eventually managed to establish their own “Muslimansko vjerski-kulturni dom” (Muslim Religious and Cultural Home—MVKD) and purchase their own building in 1956 (Zulfić 2003, 95).²⁴ In 1968, Bosnian Muslims reformed the MVKD and continued their work under the new name Bosnian-American Cultural Association (BACA), to indicate a stronger Bosnian national orientation (Zulfić 2003, 167). That building and organization served as the major center for the entire U.S. Bosnian Muslim diaspora until 1976, when they moved into a new space in a suburb of Chicago. In 1981 the new Islamic Cultural Center of Greater Chicago, in Northbrook, became a home for the new Bosnian imam, Mustafa Cerić, who in 1992 became the first *reis-ul-ulema* of the newly independent IZBiH. With that, the prominence of the Chicago center increased even more, and therefore its new imam, Senad Agić (who arrived in 1989),²⁵ then became regarded, unofficially, as the head Bosnian imam for the entire United States. Several years later, in 2003, Bosnian imams from all over North America finally organized themselves into a registered official organization, the Islamic Association of Bosniaks of North America (IABNA), with its headquarters in the

same Northbrook Islamic Center (Agić 2006, 170). Both the imam and IABNA were replaced by a new head imam, now officially designated as such by the back-home IZBiH, and a new organization name, with the initial headquarters in Phoenix, AZ, and now about to move to Washington DC.²⁶ Another Bosnian Muslim volunteer-based religious organization and made up exclusively of those who came after 1990, Udruženje Muslimana Sjeverne Amerike (Society of Muslims of North America), with its own social and religious activities in the Bosnian language throughout the United States, also had its seat in Chicago between 2001 and 2006, when it dissolved.

At the time data for this work was collected, Chicago had five Bosnian Muslim-run *masjids*, four of which were served by full-time imams and the fifth by a volunteer. Three *masjids* were in northern parts of the town, one was still in Northbrook, and the fifth, which is run by western Bosnians, was in the suburb of Roselle. Services in each were held in the Bosnian language, and four of them also had weekend schools where pupils were taught the Bosnian language and Islam. The center in Northbrook even hosts a small “Bosnian-American Muslim Cultural Museum” with many photos, documents, and exhibitions that document their struggle to establish themselves in the city (Zulfić 2003, 257; al-Ahari 2006, 197).²⁷ Although mosques also serve as cultural centers, there are other places that provide cultural and other types of programs for the Bosnian Muslim population.²⁸

Chicago is also the home of the two most important Bosnian Muslim social and political organizations. The first is BACA, created to advance Bosnian Muslim cultural and social causes.²⁹ The second is Kongres Bošnjaka Sjeverne Amerike (Congress of Bosniaks of North America), created in 2000 to organize and advance social and political goals of the Bosnian Muslim North American diaspora.³⁰ Since then, the organization has split into two organizations, both of which now have headquarters in other parts of the United States.

Chicago is also now the home of other former Yugoslavia Slavic-speaking Muslims, mostly from around the Montenegrin coastal towns of Bar.³¹ Montenegrin Muslims have their own mosque and cultural center, Rumija, in the same neighborhood where many Bosnian Muslims live, and it is just two miles away from the Bosnian Islamic Cultural Center on Western Avenue. As observed from the field work, the two groups visit each other’s centers but they remain separated nevertheless.³² The data frequencies discussed in the next chapter also show that Chicago Bosniaks have Montenegrin Muslim friends.

Finally, Chicago is also the site of numerous Bosnian Muslim media and

cultural institutions. The oldest Bosniak diaspora radio program, “Radio Glas Bošnjaka” (Radio Voice of Bosniaks), began its regular broadcasts in 1964, and it still airs its program every Sunday.³³ During the Bosnian war, enthusiasts from the local BiH Club initiated another weekly radio program, “Slobodna Bosna i Hercegovina” (Free BiH). The third, perhaps most popular program, currently broadcasts regularly from Chicago, “Radio TV Naša Rijec” (Radio TV Our Voice). Besides radio programs, Chicago has two satellite channel companies that bring homeland programming to viewers in North America, BosnaTV³⁴ and Bostel.³⁵ Chicago is also home to a monthly newspaper, “Ujedinjena Bosna” (United Bosnia), as well as the Bosnian-language journal “ZAMBAK BH Odjek” (ZAMBAK BH Echo), which no longer exists but was an important Bosnian Muslim diaspora voice during the BiH war.³⁶ To end this report on the city’s cultural offerings, it should be mentioned that the local Conrad Sulzer Public Library hosts a Bosnian Library with a relatively large collection of various books printed in the Bosnian language. The Bosnian Library used to organize many different cultural programs, exhibits, and promotions featuring Bosnian Muslim community members in Chicago, but they stopped sometimes in 2019.³⁷ In response to Bosnian Muslim immigrants’ demands, the Eugene Field Elementary School for a few years offered bilingual classes in English and Bosnian language to its students.³⁸

At the time when data was collected, there were at least a dozen restaurants and cafes owned by Bosnian Muslims, especially along North Western Avenue and North Lincoln Avenue. An interesting and unexpected place where Bosnian Muslims spend time is on the corner of those two large Chicago avenues. A lot of Bosnian Muslim pensioners spend every afternoon together at a local McDonald’s, where coffee is inexpensive and the temperature is pleasant.

The list of the activities of the Bosnian diaspora in Chicago is not completed here, but this many available activities clearly show that Chicago is the major center of the U.S. Bosnian Muslim diaspora. Although fragmented along many lines, Bosnians are active and organized, with various institutions to preserve the culture and boundaries of the group. Thus they provide a suitable pool for a sample of the Bosnian Muslim population for this research.

4.3.2. St. Louis, Missouri

Since St. Louis is the U.S. site with the largest number of Bosnian Muslim immigrants, it was an obvious choice for data collection. Some like to exag-

gerate and claim that St. Louis became the site of “the largest population of Bosnians outside of Europe”³⁹ in order to illustrate their numbers. While there are no solid figures, estimates vary around the number of fifty thousand people, a vast majority of them Muslims (Jalalzai 2011, 104).⁴⁰ Most of these people initially moved into St. Louis’ South County, particularly the Bevo Mill neighborhood, where in a section of several blocks on Gravois Avenue (between Sigel and Taft Avenues), there are more than twenty businesses operated by and oriented toward Bosnian Muslims. At the time when data was collected there were eight Bosnian restaurants and cafes, four ethnic food grocery stores, an insurance company, a law firm, two hair salons for women, a carpet store, an auto repair shop, a chiropractic clinic, a medical clinic, a mosque of Masjid Nur,⁴¹ and the Bosnian-American Chamber of Commerce building. In the small park on the corner of Gravois Avenue and Morganford Road, the neighborhood is now decorated with a Sebilj.⁴² Just a few blocks away, there is another Bosnian Muslim Islamic Community Center (Medina Masjid) with a 107-foot-tall minaret. A few miles south of Bevo Mill, along the Lemay Ferry Road, another Bosnian Muslim community and its businesses have sprung up, along with the Bosnian Islamic Center St. Louis.⁴³ At this time, the center is just next door to the Fethullah Gülen–inspired Turkish American Society of Missouri,⁴⁴ which has its own section that serves Bosnian Muslim youth. Both of the other two Bosnian Muslim mosques also acquired properties and began new mosque-building projects in the same area (Townsend 2013). The acquisition of these new properties indicates the Bosnian Muslims’ slow movement toward the suburbs, with more family-oriented neighborhoods and less crime.

These businesses and centers are not the only institutions in St. Louis that cater to the community in the Bosnian language. For example, there are numerous Bosnian Muslim ethnic media outlets in the city. As noted by Fennema (2004), ethnic media represents an essential part of the maintenance of an ethnic group in the diaspora. For that purpose, in St. Louis there are several weekly radio shows, in addition to a daily Bosnian-language M-Radio program broadcasting back-home music and news at various times during the day and night at WEW 770 AM. The same owner, who is a local Bosnian folk music enthusiast, also runs a TV station, MiM TV, which broadcasts programs in the Bosnian language, mostly via their satellite channel or YouTube, while many of the programs are also available via various internet platforms.⁴⁵ Local western Bosnians have their own radio program, “Glas Zapadne Bosne” (Voice of Western Bosnia), which broadcasts once a week on the same WEW 770 AM radio. There is another

Bosnian-language weekly program, “Glas Bašnjaka” (Voice of Bosniaks), which is run by other local Bosnian Muslim volunteers. From this media reality we can see that Bosnian Muslims in St. Louis are fragmented along the lines of back-home regionalism. Most, if not all, St. Louis Bosnians are refugees, not migrants, and that is an important aspect of their sameness.⁴⁶ Perhaps that is the reason why St. Louis, although the place with the largest number of Bosnian Muslims, has no headquarters of any larger U.S. Bosnian Muslim organizations.

Additionally, even some local universities have faculty who speak the Bosnian language. Fontbonne University, a Catholic institution, even has a Bosnian Studies Program, which runs the Bosnian Memory Project, with the ambitious goal of collecting a thousand interviews of Bosnian genocide survivors. The same center maintains the Prijedor Genocide Exhibit.⁴⁷ St. Louis also has the population of the two back-home neighboring groups who settled there much earlier, and both Croats and Serbs have their own local corresponding churches.⁴⁸

Finally, St. Louis is now home of the most well-known, at the time, U.S. Bosnian-language weekly newspaper, *Sabah*, which in its masthead claims that it is the newspaper with the largest circulation in the BiH diaspora (see fig. 4.2). The newspaper began in 1997 in New York, but it eventually moved to St. Louis to be closer to such a large number of readers, and it is run by a Muslim Bosniak family originally from Montenegro. All the places mentioned above were also the local St. Louis collection sites for the data acquired for this study.

4.3.3. *New York Metropolitan Area*

Thus far, almost nothing has been written about Bosnian Muslims from Plav and Gusinje who now reside in New York, they have for some time constituted a large majority of the Bosnian Muslims in the city. Plav and Gusinje are two small towns in the foothills of the Prokletije mountain range, at an elevation of about a thousand meters. According to the Yugoslav census of 1991 (Grpković 1993), both towns together had 19,300 people, of whom about 60 percent were Slavic-speaking Muslims, while another 20 percent were Albanian Muslims. Almost everyone in those two towns knows of each other, and they are often connected through family ties as well. As I was told, three large family clans from back home dominate the New York population from Gusinje. Among those from Plav, a single family clan is dominant, since it has the most members and family ties among that town’s diaspora population in New York. All this is to

**CIA OBJAVILA 300
POVJERLJIVIH DOKU-
MENATA O RATU U BIH**



**Popis u BiH:
NEKIMA JE
STALO DA SE
NAROD
DEZORIJENTIRA**

NAJTIRAŽNIJI LIST BH DIJASPORE - OSNOVAN U NEW YORK-U 1997.

BOSNIAN - AMERICAN NEWSPAPER

Sabah

27. SEPTEMBAR 2013.

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**Anesa Kajtažović
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Interjuju **ef. Belić**

**NAS BOŠNJAKE JE
PRIZNALA AKTUALNA
HRVATSKA VLAST,
JOŠ SAMO DA I MI
SEBE PRIZNAMO PA
MOZEMO IĆI DALJE**



Steve Stenger

**ČISTA VODA I
ČIST ZRAK SU
NAM
NEOPHODNI**

Fig. 4.2. Front page of Bosnian-American weekly newspaper *Sabah* ("Dawn"), September 27, 2013

show how strongly interconnected those people in New York are, as they induced each other to come to New York, as is typical in many other cases of chain migrations in the United States.⁴⁹ They provided support for each other when they came to the New World and in turn created a diaspora cluster in the metropolis of New York City.

According to Alahari and Bogucanin (2006, 146), Slav Muslims from Plav and Gusinje began to arrive in New York in the late 1960s. They came together with Albanians who were leaving the region through emigration refugee centers in Italy and Austria, escaping the draconian anti-Muslim policies of the Yugoslav Secret Police chief Aleksandar Ranković.⁵⁰ In addition to repression, their two towns, hidden away in the pocket of Montenegro that protrudes into Albania (see fig. I.1), were mostly neglected by the governments of SFRY and Montenegro, and residents could barely make a living. So many were forced to leave, and, in search of a better life, some ended up in New York. From the trickle that left initially, by the 1970s the number had reached a few thousand. As they came, they mostly began working at manual jobs in buildings maintenance and the city construction industry. Although these waves of immigrants from Sandžak might be considered migrants since there was no open warfare there as there was in BiH, they were nevertheless exposed to various threats and pressures to emigrate, and it would be inaccurate to treat their migration as completely voluntary. Yet unlike the Muslims from BiH, they were not refugees, either.

As my interlocutors told me, the second wave came to New York during the 1980s, many through smuggling routes via Mexico. The final wave of Muslims from the two Montenegrin towns came during the war of dissolution of Yugoslavia during the 1990s. According to the guesstimates of community members, several thousand people came during each wave of immigration. In an article in the *New York Daily News*, Lewine (2001) quotes an imam from the community who claimed that some twenty thousand Muslims from Plav and Gusinje then lived in the New York metropolitan area.⁵¹ Yet again, there is no firm number to back up these claims about their population size in New York.⁵² Nevertheless, it was obvious to me during the field work that a lot of them now live there and their organizations are well-known in the diaspora for having contributed a lot to the national cause during the 1990s struggle for BiH independence.⁵³ Some of them live in Manhattan, where they work as superintendents of buildings so they do not have to pay rent for the apartments where they live.⁵⁴ Yet participants from that group were also recruited and surveys were collected in Astoria, Queens, and in the borough of Brooklyn, where most of them live and where their centers, restaurants, cafes, and ethnic food stores are.

Although people from Plav and Gusinje are a clear majority, the New York (Bosnian) Muslim diaspora group also has people from other BiH regions. To further emphasize reasons for a regional approach to the study of diasporas, it should be noted that Muslims from Plav and Gusinje have their two Islamic centers. One is a recently acquired former church property in Richmond Hill, in Queens. The other is the older and better-known Islamic Unity & Culture Center of Plav-Gusinje Mosques (aka, Ali Pasha's Mosque), at 3133 Twelfth Street, in Astoria, Queens. The other Muslims from BiH, on the other hand, have formed a separate congregation and have established their own Bosnian-Herzegovinian Islamic Center only two miles away from the Plav-Gusinje center, at 37-46 Crescent Street in Astoria. In another corner of Astoria, again less than a mile away from these two centers, there is a third, smaller, Bosniak Islamic Cultural Center, at 18-02 Astoria Boulevard, attended by another regional group of (Bosnian) Muslims, mostly from Kosovo and the Serbian parts of Sandžak.

The fourth Islamic center that also serves Bosnian Muslims is the Islamic Center of the Bronx, where Bosnian Muslims pray together with Muslims from Macedonia and the Muslim Roma population from the former Yugoslavia. Finally, Plav-Gusinje and other Muslims from Sandžak also formed another congregation in Brooklyn with more emphasis on high Islam, yet where services are held primarily in the Bosnian language.⁵⁵ Obviously, regionalism among Bosnian Muslims plays an important role in their interactions and even in the establishment of their religious institutions. Bosnian Muslims in New York have several weekly radio programs. The oldest, "Bosniak Muslim Voice," began in 1993 and is still running.⁵⁶ New York is also the home of the best-known Bosniak diaspora web media site, *Bosnjaci.net*, which began in 2001 and serves as one of the main Bosniak media platforms for the entire U.S. and Canada Bosniak diaspora population.⁵⁷ Finally, there are several Bosnian Muslim restaurants and ethnic food stores spread throughout Astoria, Queens, as well as other small businesses that are owned by and primarily serve the Bosnian Muslim community of New York, along with other immigrants from the former Yugoslavia (see Sietsema 2008). The data for this study was collected randomly at all these locations, in addition to using the purposeful sampling method where the Bosnian Muslim population was actively sought, and the snowballing method of personal recommendations by the initially recruited participants.

Although the New Jersey location is a separate state and city, it has a strong connection to the New York Sandžak community, and both communities have staunch supporters of Slavic-speaking Muslim political



Fig. 4.3. Front view of the West Bosnian Islamic Center, on Bleecker St., Utica, NY, just a few blocks away from the other Bosnian Islamic Center in the city. (Photograph by author, 2021.)



Fig. 4.4. The Bosnian Islamic Center on Court St., Utica, NY, in the center of the city and a few blocks away from the West Bosnian Islamic Center. (Photograph by author, 2021.)

emancipation in Yugoslavia. New Jersey is the site of publication of the 1993 booklet “Memorandum on the Establishment of a Special Status for Sandžak” in English, which was published to support the Sandžak autonomy referendum organized by the Muslim National Council of Sandžak in October 1991.⁵⁸

4.3.4. *Other Locations*

Like these three main sites, the other places where data was collected also have Bosnian Muslim centers and businesses, and all Bosnian Muslims at these sites are refugees who arrived in the United States after the dissolution of Yugoslavia. Lawrence, a suburb of Atlanta, for example, has two Bosnian Islamic centers and several ethnic food stores and restaurants. The population is large enough that the local Walmart has a section with a few Bosnian ethnic food items. For two years in a row, one of the Islamic centers in Lawrence has been the largest contributor of *zakat* (Islamically obligated alms-giving) money of all the Bosnian Muslim diaspora congregations in the world.⁵⁹ It appears that in addition to other factors, the chain migration driven by back-home regionalism among Bosnian Muslims is also beginning to play an important role in their choice of settlement and relocation within the United States. For example, in Waterloo, Iowa,⁶⁰ the dominant regional population is from West Bosnia, and so they were targeted for recruitment for participation in this study as well. At those other locations, regionalism also plays a role, especially in the case of West Bosnia, as those groups typically create and maintain their own social and religious centers wherever they settle (for example, see figs. 4.3 and 4.4).

This brief history and description of the places where data for this research was collected clearly shows that the sites are indeed Appadurai-like locations where back-home spaces can be and indeed are reproduced and where social instructions exist to support the existence of the group, although in new circumstances dictated by life in the different parts of the United States. For some of these groups, our observations are even more important because those back-home conditions do not exist anymore due to Serbian and Croatian policies of ethnic cleansing.

Analysis of U.S. Bosnian Muslim Diaspora Survey Data

Frequencies and Distributions

The following chapter will provide a short recapitulation of the methodological premise and of how the concepts, variables, and processes are conceptualized for this study. It also discusses the representativeness of the population sample and provides frequencies and distribution of the responses to the questions used to construct the model between the explanatory and responding variables for this inquiry. Therefore, the chapter contains information on the responses used to construct two independent variables (fourteen items used to construct the Nationalism Type Index, and seventeen items used to construct the Nationalism Strength Index), and the distribution and frequencies of the responses used to construct the responding variable of six variations of salient Bosniak identity (for visual representation of the model, see figure 6.2). Finally, this chapter also provides a brief note on the five items treated as controlled variables.

5.1. Discussion on Operationalization and Level of Analysis

Before the empirical examination of the guiding idea for this inquiry, that nationalism is a mechanism for the imposition of new salient identity for a group that has to go through a change, a short recapitulation of the methodological premise, and of how the concepts, variables, and processes are conceptualized for this study, is useful.

Operationalization of this inquiry is rooted in the logic of the grounded theory approach, as described by Dey (1999), that suggests considering the phenomena under observation as a process, where the outcome emerges as the result of the interactions of the structure at the group level, and of agency at the individual level. The whole process is considered a temporal sequence (see fig. 5.1) that occurs in several stages and that works differently among elites and commoners within the group, each entrusted with different nationalism tasks in helping the group evolve through nationalism into the new stage of its existence.¹ This work is particularly concerned with the effects of nationalism on commoners in regard to the new salient identity ascription.

The extant literature notes that to play its usual role, nationalism requires the antecedent conditions of mass literacy and baseline equality, which come before the interactions between structure and agency and which are not seen as part of those interactions (Dey 1999, 184). When a group reaches those conditions of mass literacy and education (as a foundation for development of a common culture frame), and the group's members believe in baseline equality among each other (as a political principle of egalitarianism) in which nationalism can operate, the basic preconditions are therefore established. After that the interactions between elites and commoners can be considered as a situation of nationalism that seeks to push and facilitate the group's desires and goals.

As those preconditions are being fulfilled, previous cultural pattern-maintaining flexibility is no longer an option,² and elites seek to establish the parameters of the particular nationalism project antecedent appropriate for the group. Once those parameters of the basic social psychological process (BSPP) are established at the elite level of the group, they reach out for an internationally "preformed" structure of nationalism³—as a basic social structural process (BSSP)⁴—to drive the desired changes of identity among the commoners of a group. Individuals are therefore agents who are exposed to external socializers and are to acquire an orientation toward change⁵ and to respond (ideally) first through self-defining⁶ and, eventually, as the interaction between the two levels of the group continues (nurtured with banal nationalism), through self-investment to their stronger commitment to a new salient identity.⁷

For that reason, this work first provides a historical account of how elites were formed, how and why they picked the particular issues to especially care for, and how they formulated them to fit the group's project. Once those parameters were recognized, nationalism as a structure was ready to be imposed on the group, which then throughout the duration of




Fig. 5.1. Temporal sequence of the three stages of a group's national evolution

the process responded to it by accepting (or not) the change and by adopting a new salient identity to be chosen by the individual members of the group, and then (if it was accepted) carrying it forward (see fig. 5.1). Therefore, although nationalism is an elite-conceived and elite-driven process (it is a process since it has its beginning and its desirable end), the best time to measure the effects of nationalism is at the consequential point of the process, at the level of the individual member of a group, which is the major concern of this inquiry.⁸

In order to make broader inferences about the effects of interactions between the structure acting upon the group and the agency of the individual actors, individual responses are aggregated, and the effects of the interactions are then measured on the group level. Therefore, the group is the level of analysis in this inquiry, while individual members of the group are the units of analysis and the method is established by the grounded theory approach. In this case the methodology helps to observe the effects of the interactions between the structural dictate upon the group and the individual group members' responses, to understand the direction of action and test it with an experimental statistical analysis, as preferred by the grounded theory approach (Simmons 2010, 17). Obviously, this is a situation of continuing interaction between all those different levels with and without the group, and the process can stop and restart again as necessitated by the group's developments.

Responses are organized on the two lower levels of the group, the ground-level elites and the level of group commoners. Although the elites are driving the nationalism, most scholars of nationalism suggest that the effects of nationalism are to be observed at the ground level.⁹ I propose that there is also a *mezzo* level, which should be distinguished and observed separately, to provide for a more comprehensive understanding of the whole process, and in that way we can perhaps notice what level is affecting the intensity and texture of nationalism and whether and when

nationalism is diluted and discontinued. This is because it is not enough to notice that nationalism is a top-down project, in terms of the initiation, but we should also try to follow how intensity subsides and what level is instrumental in the process of turning it off. Observations on those three levels of a group could potentially give us such clues.¹⁰ For that reason, one of the controlled variables here is a person's social status, whether he is part of those ground-level elites, so that it can be measured whether that has any effects on nationalism and acquisition of identity among the population sample. This is particularly important when a sample is drawn from the diaspora, which is often distant from the key circles of the group, and where those ground-level elites play an instrumental role in pushing for and implementing the group's collective projects and goals, and the new salient identity is one such collective goal.¹¹

The interactions between the two different levels of a group are measured by the responses to the questions posed in the survey. Respondents are asked to rank possible answers based on their preferences among the available options. As Slovic (1995) established, the individual "values or preferences are commonly constructed in the process of elicitation" (364) of norms acquired from interactions with the group, which provides a frame of common culture and mores. Therefore, the recruitment of individuals who fit the definition of diaspora (provided in chapter 4) and the collection sites, as spaces with institutions that provide the possibility for the members of a group to have regular interactions from which they can elicit preferences, is warranted. In that way, so-defined members of the diaspora familiarize with (and possibly internalize) groups' normative collective process of elicitation of preferences to access the reality in which they live and perhaps to similarly evaluate the questions of the survey as members of a same group.

Based on the author's theoretical sensitivity to the case and the literature, questions and responses in the survey were grouped to create two nationalism index constructs. Cronbach and Meehl (1955, 283) and Messick (1995, 746) recommend indirect constructs to measure social interactions and behavioral outcome, such as feeling of nationalism and ascription of salient identity. As the same authors note, the constructs are reflected in test performance, and in our case are observed through the survey responses. The constructs are Nationalism Strength and Nationalism Type. An outcome variable is the particular construct of Bosniak Identity composed of responses to two questions: "What is your national identity?" and "How strongly do you feel Bosniak?" Since the criteria for inclusion of questions in the constructs are vaguely defined in terms of whether a rea-

sonably commonsense, nomological criterion will see them as some expression of nationalism, the EFE test was done to ensure that all the questions do in fact covary and that they *together* measure the intended phenomenon of nationalism. As it is reported in chapter 6, tests confirmed the reasonable homogeneity, with an internal variability score for both constructs of $\alpha > 0.65$ (for more, see chapter 6 and the conclusion).

5.2. Questions and Constructs

Fourteen questions included in the constructs are grouped based on theoretical sensitivity about the characteristics of Bosnian Muslims. For Nationalism Type they involve questions regarding the internal group differences about local regional customs (R3), about perceptions about Bosnian Muslim culture that could be shared or not with the neighboring groups (CULT 10), parenting as source of group membership as a possibility for recruitment of new members (NAT 15, NAT 16), attitudes toward *possible* other identities (NAT 17b, NAT 17d), questions pertaining the individual social distance toward non-Bosniak and non-Muslim groups (SD 19, SD 20, SD 22r, SD 23), attitude toward group's membership based on a race (SD 27) and religion (REL 48c) (for more details, see appendix B). The final score for Nationalism Type is constructed out of combined homogenized z-scores for each question combined together to create a bipolar variable of Nationalism Type where the lower pole indicates an ethnic and the higher pole a civic type of nationalism, with the range of 2.44.

Seventeen questions included in the construct of Nationalism Strength include exposure to influences of the elites through education, media, and family-home environment (EDU6c, CULT 8b), cultural exclusivity (LAN 56c, LAN 57, REL 47) feeling of the sense of frustration regarding perceived group's cultural nonrecognition (LAN 58C, MEM 50, MEM 51, MEM 52), political consciousness and involvement (PC 28a, PC 32c, PC 34, PC 35c, PC37c) exposure and attitudes toward war (PC 29b, MEM 55) (for more details, see appendix A, and the discussion in chapter 6). The final score is made out of combined homogenized z-scores for each question, and Nationalism Strength is conceived as more or less with the range of 2.22 scores. The hypothesis for the test is that Nationalism Strength is positively related with the desired identity ascription among respondents.

The dependent variable, desirable Bosniak Identity, is constructed out of the two questions in the survey, one asking the respondent to choose his national identity out of nine options (NAT 13) and the other asking a

person to note how strongly he or she feels Bosniak (NAT 17a). Responses to those two questions were combined to construct the desired Bosniak identity.¹²

Question NAT 13 asked: What is your nationality? For question NAT 13, the respondents selected their own national identity out of nine possible nonranked categories: Bosniak, Bosnian/Herzegovinian, Muslim, Serbian, Croatian, Montenegrin, Yugoslav, American, and Other. In the final analysis, all responses were grouped into two categories of Bosniak or non-Bosniak, since Bosniak identity is the particular concern for this inquiry. Once reorganized, final responses were coded as dummy variable, with Bosniak as 1 and non-Bosniak as 0.

Question NAT 17a asked: How strongly do you feel Bosniak? Respondents could select from five Likert-scale response options: Very strongly, Strongly, Somewhat, Very little, and I don't feel so at all. Respondents were instructed to answer the question by checking one field that best represents their attitude regarding this identity. In the final analysis, all responses were grouped into three categories: Very Strong, Strong, and Weakest. Very strong included only those who responded "Very strongly," Strong included the two middle, mild, categories, and Weakest included the two weakest categories. Once reorganized, the final responses were coded as three-point nominal variables, Very Strong as 3, Strong as 2, and Weakest as 1.

Once the answers to the two survey questions (NAT 13 and NAT 17a) were reorganized and recoded, they were combined to create six categories of nominal, unordered, discrete outcome variable (see table 5.1). The six categories of possible combinations of the responses to these two questions are: Other/Weakest Bosniak (OWB), Other/Strong Bosniak (OSB), Other/Very Strong Bosniak (OVSB), Weakest Bosniak (WB), Strong Bosniak (SB), and Very Strong Bosniak (VSB), with the last category also selected to be the base value against which all other options were compared (for case processing summary, see table 5.2). That means that each of the identity categories was compared to the nationalism-desired VSB category to determine whether the likelihood for the respondent to select that category was influenced by his or her Nationalism Strength, Nationalism Type, and the controlled variables. Since the dependent variable is a categorical variable with more than two options and with no natural ordering, the appropriate model for the analysis was a multinomial logistic regression (Kinnear and Gray, 2010, 565).

To investigate the likelihood of base category of identity ascription over

TABLE 5.1. Outcome Variable with Identity Categories

		Feeling of Bosniak Identity		
		<i>Very strong</i>	<i>Strong</i>	<i>Weakest</i>
Identity choice:	<i>Bosniak Id</i>	VSB*	SB	WB
	<i>Other Id</i>	OVSb	OSb	OWb

TABLE 5.2. Case Processing Summary for Bosniak Identity Data

6 Category			
Bosniak Identity		<i>N</i>	Valid Percent
	Strongest Bosniak Id (VSB)	388	59%
	Strong Bosniak Id (SB)	78	11.9%
	Weakest Bosniak Id (WB)	19	2.9%
	Other Id/Strongest Bosniak (OVSb)	69	10.5%
	Other Id/Strong Bosniak (OSb)	49	7.4%
	Other Id/ Weakest Bosniak (OWb)	55	8.4%
Education Level	Elementary	77	11.7%
	High School	303	46%
	College	278	42.2%
Gender	Female	261	39.7%
	Male	397	60.3%
BiH Home	No	294	44.7%
Ownership	Yes	364	55.3%
Promoter (Social)	No	594	90.3%
Status	Yes	64	9.7%
Valid		658	100%
Missing		6	
Total		664	
Subpopulation		658 ^a	

^a The dependent variable has only one value observed in 658 (100 percent) subpopulations.

another category among the responders, a multinomial logistic regression was used to model nominal outcome variables of different categories of Bosniak identity, in which the log odds (logits) of the outcomes were modeled as multinomial logits estimate combination of the seven predictor variables. The starting point of the investigation was that the person's identity choice response was influenced by his intensity and type of nationalism, my main predicting variables, along with schooling level, economic attachment to the homeland, social status in the population, and gender as the controlled variables. The multinomial logistic regression is a discrete choice model allowing for multiple outcomes, and as such it is often used to measure the likelihood of preferences among discrete outcome choices.




Fig. 5.2. Model of interactions between Nationalism and Salient Identity

5.3. Representativeness of This Sample of the Bosnian Muslim Population

Although previous chapters establish the usefulness of the diaspora for this type of study, it is nevertheless necessary to examine the composition of the population sample in order to have a clear picture of how representative it is for the particular case of Bosnian Muslim nationalism. It may be argued that even in cases where a diaspora is used in a research design, the sample should reflect as closely as possible the varieties of the “back-home” population. At least, any analysis should contain a report on the representativeness of the sample used for the study. In this way, such information by itself will be an important contribution to the body of knowledge on the case under examination for other researchers. Among the first issues in this regard to which special attention is paid here is the regional representation of the respondents. Regional representation is important even in studies where samples are drawn from the diaspora because diaspora clusters usually first mirror homeland regions, or occasionally some other forms of “back-home” groupness, so that there is a real possibility for the “place” and back-home “locality”—important for observations of social identity—to be produced and reproduced in a new space. That is why regions in this inquiry are listed based on traditional back-home identifications of the Bosnian Muslim population.¹³ There are a few more, even smaller, regional associations that are sometimes also meaningful for the Bosnian Muslim population, but for the sake of space in this research, the questionnaire offered seven regions and two subregions, a total of nine

possible choices, to participants to self-select (for all options see appendix A, question 1).

5.4. Nationalism Constructs

Since the phenomenon of nationalism contains two functionally different aspects, for this exploratory study it is divided into two constructs, one that measures the strength of nationalism and the other that measures the type of nationalism among the respondents. It is implied here that they work differently and that, of the two, the intensity of nationalism should be more of a factor in a new salient identity ascription, rather than the type. The construct of “Nationalism Strength” is created by combining the scores for seventeen items from the questionnaire (see appendix B). Since all the items have different scales of responses, the standardized z-score was computed to homogenize the scores between the different scales for each item. The range of final scores for the Nationalism Strength index is 2.23, with a minimum score of -1.34 and maximum of 0.89. The mean score of Nationalism Strength for the population sample is 0.005 (SD = 0.4). The median score is 0.06, a slightly lower value of mean than the central tendency of median, while both of the positive signs suggest an overall moderate intensity of nationalism strength among this sample of the population.

Similarly, the third construct is a bipolar index of the Nationalism Type, created by combining the z-scores for fourteen items (see appendix C). The Nationalism Type Index was measured between the civic and ethnic poles, and its range is 2.44. For the Nationalism Type construct, the more ethnic the type of nationalism was, the lower the score, while the more civic the type of nationalism was, the higher the score. It should be noted that different results of the tests on relations between variables and the two nationalism constructs support the model’s two-dimensional treatment of nationalism and show that those two essential aspects of nationalism should be treated separately, which is *usually never* done.

A large number of valid survey responses provide us with the confidence to use the homogenized z-score for both constructs, since the central limit theorem states that in population samples with a sufficiently large n , the sampling distribution of the sample mean is approximately normally distributed, which is important for the z-scores to work as intended.¹⁴

To check for evidence of the multidimensionality of the strength and type of nationalism among participants, two separate iterated principal factor analyses were performed on all items included for the two constructs

and on all valid responses in the sample. The results showed a reasonable internal reliability for the items selected for the constructs, as discussed below. Finally, the preliminary tests showed no effects of interactions among the two independent variables.

5.5. The Type of Nationalism Index

For this sample of the Bosniak population ($N = 664$) the mean score for the Nationalism Type construct¹⁵ is positive, $\mu = 0.21$ ($SD = 0.4$). The range of scores is 2.44, with a minimum of -0.6 and a maximum of 1.83. Again, it is useful for the construct to note that the median of the scores on Nationalism Type is 0.16, and therefore results show that the mean, as the central tendency of all scores, is higher than the median. The positive signs for both, the median and the mean, suggest that the population sample is leaning moderately more toward the civic type of nationalism.¹⁶ The construct demonstrated a reasonable internal consistency reliability composite score ($\alpha = 0.61$) for the fourteen indicators selected for the index of the Nationalism Type, and it shows that all those items from the data combined do measure the same concept intended to be measured. Again, the reliability score is slightly lower than the recommended $\alpha = 0.70$ value for exploratory research (Nunnally 1978, 245; Lance, Butts, and Michels 2006, 205) like this one, but all the items included in the construct are theoretically important and have been kept.¹⁷ Additionally, the grounded theory approach for the study suggests including as many items as possible. Finally, more items provide higher score variability among the participants.

5.6. Controlled Variables

For the controlled variables, education level was measured by the respondents' declared level of education; respondents' economic attachment to the homeland was measured by their declared home ownership back in BiH; gender was the self-selected respondent choice; and finally, respondents' social status in the population was measured by a dummy variable of whether or not they have the role of identity promoter assigned to them by the investigator based on the social status of an influential person. Such social status was given to them in two ways, by the job they hold, or by participant observations, and therefore they may be seen as spontaneous or traditional leaders, as Breuilly (2011) would consider them. This type of

spontaneous leader close to the population is consistent with the intended bottom-up approach of the test and for a study in which the focus is on the horizontal connections among members of a group.¹⁸

The age of the respondents was treated in two ways. In the model, age was treated as a continuous variable based on birth year, with increments of one year. For lower-level analysis, age was also treated as an ordinal variable where respondents were classified based on their birth age into three categories: those born before World War II, those born during the communist-rule era, and those born in the postcommunist era. The largest number of respondents comes from the group born during the communist-rule era because they were the primary segment of the group targeted for this study.

Education level is treated as an ordinal variable, where respondents were classified based on their declared level of schooling: elementary, high school, or college. Gender was treated as a categorical variable, where respondents were either male or female. And social status and house/apartment ownership in BiH were treated as categorical values, with yes/no options.

5.7. Nationalism Type—Frequencies of Fourteen Items

5.7.1. Regional Representation

Sample respondents from rural areas totaled 51 percent, while the remaining 49 percent come from urban areas. Of the urban population sample, 20 percent are from the capital.¹⁹ Since one of the issues most nationalists have to deal with is regionalism, efforts should be made in studies to have appropriate representation from all the different geographical, cultural, and political realities in which a population lives, which often are expressed as a form of regionalism. In this regard, the case of (Bosnian) Muslims is particularly telling, since the population now occupies several different geographical regions,²⁰ two strongly confronted in-group political factions,²¹ two political BiH subdivisions,²² ten cantons within B-H Federations, eight *muftijstva* (administrative divisions within the structure of IZBiH), and now, five independent Balkan countries.²³

The importance of each of these circumstances is that almost all of the diaspora situations contain networks of friends, cultural groups, social organizations, or at least sports clubs based on those regional associations. In fact, the very attachment to BiH by its Muslims and others is quite

TABLE 5.3. Feeling of Differences in Customs among BiH Regions

BiH Region	<i>N</i>	<i>Not at all</i>	<i>Not much</i>	<i>Somewhat</i>	<i>Significant</i>	<i>Very</i>	Identify as Bosniaks (%)
East Bosnia	180	5.6	41.7	34.4	12.8	5.6	76.5
Central Bosnia	139	5.8	28.8	44.6	10.8	10.1	66.9
Krajina	87	3.4	27.6	48.3	18.4	2.3	75.9
West Bosnia	57	3.5	42.1	33.3	17.5	3.5	61.4
Posavina	32	3.1	34.4	46.9	12.5	3.1	90.6
Herzegovina	44	2.3	29.5	43.2	15.9	9.1	65.9
Sandžak	101	5	34.7	38.6	12.9	8.9	86.1
USA & other	24	4.2	20.8	25	29.2	20.8	50

Note: All numbers (except *N*) are valid percentages of total within each region.

often expressed primarily as a form of *heimat*, the notion of attachment to a country through loving their own region. Sometimes, more or less informal Bosnian Muslim groups are organized around certain Islamic practices, like Sufi order associations, or Salafi and Bosnian traditional mosques, but even within those groupings, a careful observer can notice social clusters which are usually regionally based. For that reason, effort was made to recruit participants from seven of those regions where Bosnian Muslims live (see table 5.3).²⁴

Table 5.3 shows the number of participants from each region, as well as the perception of a difference in customs between the BiH regions. The cross-table was created based on the responses to two questions from the survey (for complete frequencies of R3 see appendix B). From five options, where 1 means customs are “not different at all” and 5 means that they are “very different,” the mean value for the sample of the population is 2.85 (SD = 0.97). This value, slightly above half for this sample of the population, shows that there is a marginally higher sense of differences in customs among people from different regions. Yet the last column of table 5.3 shows the difference in percentage of participants within each regional group who chose to identify their own nationality as Bosniak from eight possible nonranked options. From the numbers, it may be observed that the percentage of those respondents who are from West Bosnia and who have chosen to identify as Bosniaks, while slightly lower than percentages in the other groups, is still the majority of that regional group. Furthermore, the feeling of regional difference did not appear to be a statistically significant factor in participants selecting Bosniak identity vs. other possible identities. Yet, attitudes toward regional custom differences essen-

tially provide the inquiry with the texture of nationalism and the sense of a group's homogeneity, factors that an investigation of nationalism should account for, and our data shows that all those different Slavic-speaking Muslims now are the one Bosniak group that is spread over a territory with different ecological circumstances, that will *naturally* exhibit regional diversities of overt behavior and customs, but which does not reflect differences in the general cultural and political orientation of a group that is aspiring to modern nationhood.

5.7.2. Regionalism and its Manifestations Among Participants

As indicated in the chapter that discussed the pillars of Bosnian Muslim nationalism, the BiH territory is one of the important issues in their nationalism project. Bosnian Muslim nationalism and their salient Bosniak identity project, however, are sometimes concerned with Slavic Muslims in other parts of the former Yugoslavia, who are occasionally also the target of other nationalizing nationalism projects. The contest of those different nationalizing nationalisms is particularly intense over the Muslims of Sandžak, a region now split between Serbia and Montenegro, whose Muslim populations are also targeted for recruitment into Montenegrin, and to a much smaller extent, Serbian nationalism projects and their respective national identities.²⁵ Those Muslims from Montenegro are particularly aware of the competitions over them and the possible implications of their decision to accept Bosniak identity.²⁶ A few of them expressed to me uneasiness about Bosniak identity since it signals too strong a tie to Bosnia, where they had never lived.²⁷ Furthermore, the state of BiH does practically nothing for them. Even those Muslims from Sandžak who live in BiH are often treated as outsiders by the state²⁸ since they do not have automatic rights to education, work, or other benefits that other Bosnian Muslims enjoy in BiH, despite their efforts to present BiH as a champion of their rights²⁹ and their sacrifices to help support its quest for independence.³⁰ They are sometimes seen as different even by other Bosnian Muslims.³¹ Therefore, it is not a surprise that for Muslims from Sandžak the issue of Bosnianness, or eponymic Bosnian identity, is less salient than for Bosnian Muslims from other regions (for more, see appendix B, question NAT 17B frequencies).

Such evident differences among the population, and their attitudes toward these Muslims from Sandžak, provide a possibility for this inquiry to account for the breadth and composition of Bosnian Muslim nationalism. Just like the question regarding regional differences in perceptions about customs, these attitudes toward Muslims from Sandžak essentially

TABLE 5.4. Association with Bosnia and Yugoslavia among Regional Subgroups

<i>How strongly you feel?</i>	I don't feel at all	Very little	Somewhat	Strongly	Very strongly
<u>East Bosnia</u>					
Bosnian?	5.4	65	16.7	22	49.4
Yugoslav?	75.1	17.8	5.3	0	1.8
<u>Krajina</u>					
Bosnian?	4.7	1.2	15.3	24.7	54.1
Yugoslav?	82.4	10.6	5.9	0	1.2
<u>West Bosnia</u>					
Bosnian?	7.1	3.6	16.1	14.3	58.9
Yugoslav?	70.4	16.7	7.4	1.9	3.7
<u>Central Bosnia</u>					
Bosnian?	6.6	2.9	14	18.4	58.1
Yugoslav?	78.2	12.8	5.3	3	0.8
<u>Posavina</u>					
Bosnian?	3.4	6.9	13.8	24.1	51.7
Yugoslav?	65.5	27.6	6.9	0	0
<u>Herzegovina</u>					
Bosnian?	25.6	18.6	11.6	16.3	27.9
Yugoslav?	74.4	18.6	7	0	0
<u>Sandžak</u>					
Bosnian?	42.7	27.1	17.7	9.4	3.1
Yugoslav?	59.4	20.8	11.5	8.3	0
<u>Other</u>					
Bosnian?	68.2	9.1	4.5	4.5	13.6
Yugoslav?	69.2	18.2	4.5	4.5	4.5

Note: All numbers are valid percentages of total number of participants.

indicate the nature of their nationalism. Therefore, those questions are included in the Nationalism Type Index, which tries to capture participants' attitudes toward those issues of social and political width and composition of the Bosnian Muslim nationalism program.

Question NAT 17B asked, "How strongly do you feel Bosnian?" and participants had five options to respond: I don't feel so at all; Very little; Somewhat; Strongly; and Very strongly (for the total frequencies of the NAT 17B responses, see appendix B). The largest number of those who do not feel Bosnian at all is from the region of Sandžak, 42.7 percent, followed by respondents from the region of Herzegovina, with 25.6 percent.³² All other Bosnian regions have much smaller percentages of respondents who do not feel Bosnian at all (see table 5.4).

At the other end, interestingly, from the same table it may be observed

that among those who identify strongly with Bosnian identity are respondents who come from the region of West Bosnia (associated with autonomy and the Bosnian Muslim fratricidal war). West Bosnians have the largest percentage among all regions that feels very strongly Bosnian. Since Bosniak identity was adopted as an issue to be championed by the Bosnian Muslim nationalistic party, the SDA, which led the BiH government's side in the fratricidal war,³³ Bosnian identity became particularly salient over Bosniak identity on the other side, which advocated West Bosnian autonomy within BiH.³⁴ Yet, as previously noted in table 5.3, even within that regional group of respondents, the majority, 61.4 percent, identified as Bosniaks as well (although, again, that is the lowest percentage of all the regional groups; see table 5.3).

5.7.3. Feeling Yugoslav, Yes or No?

Another question in the Nationalism Type Index, NAT 17D, asks participants how much they feel Yugoslav, with the same five options to respond. From the table with regional breakdown it may be observed that the sense of Yugoslav identity is almost gone. Some 73.2 percent of the total "Do not feel Yugoslav at all," while 16.6 percent feel "Very little," and only 10.2 percent still feel somewhat Yugoslav. The question was asked as a separate item to provide for the possibility of a respondent's having and feeling multiple identities, Yugoslav being one of them. For that reason, this issue of possible layered identities, which essentially do not exclude each other, was used as an item of the Nationalism Type Index.³⁵

5.7.4. Friendship and Social Distance

Another question measures the social distance of Bosnian Muslims from other ethnic and national groups, in this case from Bosniak back-home neighbors.³⁶ Like the question regarding family members, question "SD19 Total-friends" asked participants to indicate if nowadays they have friends among Albanians, Croats, Serbs, Montenegrins, Americans, and other immigrants. For the purpose of the Nationalism Type Index, each friendship selection response was coded according to the history of each group's enmity and amity with Bosnian Muslims (for more, see the frequencies for question SD 19 total-friends in appendix B). Respondents were offered the opportunity to check multiple boxes to indicate all the friends that they might have among all the noted groups. The respondents in this sample of the population indicated that there were not many friendship interac-

tions with other non-Bosniak groups in general, except with Americans and other immigrants. Among respondents, 41.8 percent indicated that they have friends among other immigrants, while the majority, 80 percent of those friends from the other immigrant category are religiously Muslims. Even more respondents, 67.3 percent, indicated that they have friends among Americans, and again, of those American friends, 58 percent are religiously Muslims, while the remaining 42 percent are non-Muslim Americans.³⁷

It is not completely clear if these numbers of current friendships among respondents are influenced by structure and opportunity or by content and individual preference. We can speculate that they are influenced to some extent by both. The same “back-home” neighboring groups often settled close to each other in the diaspora as well, so the same network of ethnic stores, services, and entertaining events³⁸ supports all groups, and therefore there is still an opportunity for contacts between the different former Yugoslav groups in the diaspora as well. Furthermore, these numbers are consistent with O’Loughlin’s (2010) research about friendship and social trust in BiH. In his data, the more rural the population is, the less likely it is to have friends from other groups. Furthermore, the negative impact on friendship preferences for his Bosniak respondents was also dependent on whether or not they were forced to leave their homes during the war. Both of these categories (rural and expelled) have more representation in this sample of the diaspora population, and therefore the numbers about friendship here correspond to those numbers found in the back-home population. The numbers may also, however, reflect the issue of an opportunity to meet regularly and become friends with members of other groups, which is much more limited in the group’s diaspora situation.³⁹ O’Loughlin (2010) also finds that even in the BiH context, opportunity does play a role in having or not having friends from different national groups. Therefore, these questions need to be further refined and researched in order to draw clearer conclusions regarding the reasons for low friendship of Bosniaks in this diaspora sample with back-home non-Bosniak groups.⁴⁰

If these frequencies of friendship with Americans are to be used to sense how well Bosnian Muslims are integrated in the larger American society at those sites where data was collected, it may be observed that friendship with Americans, as well as with any other group, is the least frequent among the population sample in St. Louis (although even there, again, the largest number of out-group friendships are those with Americans; for more see table 5.3). Such a situation perhaps indicates that in conditions where a diaspora group is large enough to satisfy its own social needs, members

tend to interact less with outside groups.⁴¹ Therefore, the issue of opportunity in such situations works in reverse, where an abundance of in-group members limits contact with out-group members in general. Furthermore, the St. Louis population sample overall is the youngest out-of-homeland subgroup among the four locations noted in this data set. Only 4.2 percent of respondents in St. Louis left their homeland before 1990. On the other hand, in Chicago, 14.3 percent of respondents left BiH/Sandžak before 1990, and in the New York metropolitan area 18.3 percent of respondents left their homeland before 1990 (for more on the frequencies of years when participants left their homeland, see figure 4.1). So it may be that St. Louis's Bosnian Muslims need more time to learn the language and develop more ties with their American neighbors.⁴² Since, thus far, the majority of those friendship contacts are with American Muslims, that might be an early indication of segmented assimilation of a group into a *section* of the larger American society.⁴³ In any case, the preference in this study for Muslim friends among Americans is consistent with the work of Jalalzai (2011, 98), who found that in St. Louis more than 60 percent of Bosnian Muslim participants in her sample experienced both personal and group discrimination after 9/11 (even though, as noted in the study, Bosnians tend to downplay those instances of discrimination).

When it comes to friendship ties with Bosnian Muslims' Balkan neighbors in the diaspora, in this sample of the population the highest percentage, 42.5 percent, is reported with Albanians. Most of these Albanians, 91.4 percent, are Muslim and only 8.6 percent are non-Muslim. These numbers are skewed toward a higher percentage of friendships due to a large population of respondents from Sandžak in New York, where 70 percent of respondents indicated that they have Albanian friends. This New York group of Bosnian Muslims lived and interacted regularly with Albanians back home in Sandžak's two towns of Plav and Gusinje. The same may also be happening in the New York City area, since there is a large Albanian diaspora group there, as well, and therefore opportunity seems to be the driving mechanism for the friendship indicators. Although Albanians do live in Chicago and St. Louis as well (see chapter 4), outside of New York far fewer respondents indicated that they have friends among Albanians (for more, see table 5.5).

In this sample of the Bosnian Muslim population, 36 percent of the respondents indicated that they have Montenegrin friends, and 82.6 percent of those are Muslim while 17.2 percent are non-Muslim. These numbers show that some Bosniaks do differentiate between themselves and other Slavic Muslims from Montenegro. Again, this is especially interest-

ing in the case of New York, where, as noted earlier, most of the participants come from the two towns in northern Montenegro. Among them, 44.2 percent responded that they have Muslim Montenegrin friends, while 28.8 percent noted non-Muslim Montenegrin friends. Therefore, they are ready to see Montenegrin Muslims as a distinct group, apart from Bosnian Muslims or Bosniaks. Yet that should not be a surprise, because even in the Sandžak part of Montenegro, the differences among those Muslims who see themselves as Bosniaks and those who are Montenegrins are sometimes expressed vocally.⁴⁴

When it comes to friends who are Serbians, 29.3 percent of respondents indicated that they have Serbian friends. Of that number, 74.5 percent are non-Muslims and 25.6 percent are Muslims. Again, about the same number of respondents see non-Bosnian Muslims as different from Bosnian Muslims.

In this sample of the population, 34.8 percent of respondents indicated having a Croat friend, and of them, 73.1 percent are non-Muslims while 26.9 percent are Muslims. As with their Serbian and Montenegrin friends, we can see the differentiation between Serbian and Croat Muslim friends, since the same question also contained a separate box for Bosniak friends. Even among those with Bosniak friends, some 10 percent of respondents indicated they have non-Muslim Bosniak friends. These responses correspond to answers to question REL 49, asking if Catholics or Orthodox Christians can be Bosniak, to which some 65 percent responded “Yes.”

5.7.5. Participant Attitudes toward Traits of the Group

Most respondents in the sample selected White as their racial category, while only 1 percent of respondents selected the non-white option.⁴⁵ Another question dealing with race, SD 27, used as an indicator of the Nationalism Type Index, is, “Can a non-White person be Bosniak?” (for more, see appendix A, 6, question 27). Respondents were offered four choices, with 16 percent of them responding “No,” another 15.4 percent selecting “I don’t know,”⁴⁶ the next 17.9 percent responding “Yes, but under certain conditions,” and the remaining 50.8 percent responding “Yes.” If the last two options are collapsed into one, it shows that a clear majority of 68.7 percent of respondents do not see Bosniak racial identity as exclusively White.⁴⁷ The percentage grows to 84.1 percent if the last three options are combined. The initial reaction to this kind of population sample response is that such a racially open notion of Bosniak identity is probably influenced by life in the United States and exposure to and interactions with other races.⁴⁸ As noted by observers, however, some other groups, such as

TABLE 5.5. Frequencies of Bosnian Muslim Friends at Research Sites

<i>Do you have friends among:</i>	Chicago	St. Louis	New York	Other Sites
Americans Total	72.3	58.8	78.2	64.6
% of them Muslim	37.91	43.97	44.92	44.87
% of them Non-Muslim	62.09	56.03	55.08	55.13
Albanian Total	52.7	28.6	70.3	30.7
% of them Muslim	85.18	71.42	80.23	76.12
% of them Non-Muslim	14.82	28.58	19.77	23.88
Croat Total	40.4	31.9	41.6	28.6
% of them Muslim	18.18	26.86	23.91	29.31
% of them Non-Muslim	81.82	73.13	76.09	70.69
Montenegrin Total	55.3	20.3	61.4	18.7
% of them Muslim	72.22	69.05	72.6	62.5
% of them Non-Muslim	27.78	30.95	27.4	37.5
Serb Total	37.8	19.2	33.7	28.1
% of them Muslim	21.51	24.39	27.91	30
% of them Non-Muslim	78.49	75.61	72.09	70
Other immigrant	50.5	34.1	53.5	34.4
% of them Muslim	60.16	59.74	63.89	67.42
% of them Non-Muslim	39.84	40.26	36.11	32.58
Bosniaks Total	100	100	100	100

Note: All numbers are valid percentages of total number of participants.

Irish or Italian, with a much longer presence in the United States and a history of interactions with other races, do not have such racially relaxed attitudes toward their national identity. Therefore, an answer should be sought elsewhere.⁴⁹

Besides race, another set of questions was asked regarding acquired vs. given traits. To the question, “Can a person be Bosniak even if he or she does not have any Bosniak parent?” respondents were offered five choices. Some 23.2 percent responded with “No,” followed by 7.2 percent who responded with “Not so easy,” while 25 percent selected “Maybe yes.” The largest group, 42.9 percent, responded “Definitely yes.” If the last three answers, all possible versions of yes, are collapsed into one, then 82.1 percent of the respondents in this sample of the population view Bosniak identity as acquired and not as given (for more, see question NAT 15 frequencies, in appendix B).

5.7.6. Bosnian Muslims as an Endogamous Group

As a part of the Nationalism Type Index indicator of the perception of gender and Bosniak identity, question NAT 16 asked, “Which parent is more

important to be Bosniak?” Such a question might be especially interesting in light of the diaspora conditions that many Bosnian Muslims now live in around the world, with some of them even possibly living with non-Bosniak partners. Some 51.9 percent answered that both parents are equally important for a person to be seen as an a priori Bosniak.⁵⁰ Almost 10 percent selected “mother” as more important, while 21 percent selected “father.” “Neither is important” was the response of 17.1 percent (for more details, see question NAT 16 frequencies, in appendix B). Therefore, if the first three options, that at least one Bosniak parent is important for a person to be Bosniak, are collapsed, 82.9 percent of respondents consider parentage important. On the other hand, responses may also be seen as 49 percent noting that having one or neither parent who is Bosniak is acceptable for a person to be an a priori Bosniak. If we can generalize from this sample of the population, it appears that Bosnian Muslims are partly ready to accept the reality of their current conditions and to welcome as conationals new members and children from all those relationships.⁵¹ Such acceptance is more likely to be geared toward persons coming from relationships where the Bosniak parent is the father.

BiH is often described as a place of many ethnically mixed marriages.⁵² If that is correct, that possibility should be more commonly found among urban populations, where interactions are more frequent and such mixing is more possible.⁵³ Since overall, Bosnian Muslims were more urban, compared to the other two largest BiH groups,⁵⁴ then such phenomena should be more frequent among them as well. Furthermore, questions about marriage are usually asked as one of the factors of social distance, which is an important aspect of the type of nationalism since it may signal a group’s norms of inclusion and exclusion. For this research, questions about marriage were used as an indicator of the Nationalism Type Index as well, but it is also relevant to evaluate the endogamous aspect of Bosnian Muslims as a group.⁵⁵

The numbers in this study confirm Bosnian Muslims as an endogamous group and further problematize the notion of mixed marriages in BiH. Question SD 18 asked, “If married, your husband/wife is?” with eight possible nationalities offered as answers. A majority, 66.4 percent of respondents, are married to Bosniaks. Another 20.9 percent are married to Muslims (who could be viewed as members of the same group). Only 0.8 percent are married to Serbs, and even fewer, 0.5 percent, are married to Croats. Another 0.5 percent are married to Albanians. A slightly larger number, 1.2 percent, are married to Americans, and lastly, 1.5 percent are married to someone from another background. Finally, 8.3 percent

of respondents are not married. If the first two responses are collapsed, the percentage of respondents married within the group is an overwhelming 87.3 percent. Again, in this sample of the population we have a larger number of participants from rural settings, but the number of those with spouses who are group-outsiders is so small that even this rural/urban sample imbalance cannot make up for obvious endogeneity.⁵⁶ Even if all cases of marriage to a group-outsider are combined, they still make up only 3.7 percent of respondents. These numbers about marriages could mean two things in terms of the data used for this study. First, they could mean that the often-repeated notion about many mixed marriages in BiH is incorrect. But they could also mean that people in these mixed marriages are not interacting with Bosnian Muslims in the settings where data was collected, and so they are unrepresented here. Perhaps those people in mixed marriages often interact with other couples like themselves, or with other Bosnian groups besides Bosnian Muslims. When they interact with other Bosnian Muslims, it is mainly in private settings, as was hinted to me by some participants. In any case, the low numbers of those married to a spouse from outside the group in this data set further challenges the notion of BiH as a country with many mixed marriages.

The result from another question, SD 20, about family members, confirms such a group characteristic. Although participants were asked to check as many options as apply, and therefore a person might have checked multiple boxes, a consistently high choice of the response “no family members from outside groups” confirms the results of the previous question, as well as conclusions about Bosnian Muslims as an endogamous group and the problematic notion of the BiH mixed-marriage situation.⁵⁷ The largest non-Bosniak group with whom this population sample mixes is Americans, with whom 20.1 percent of respondents have some family ties. That might be expected since this is a sample drawn from the group’s diaspora situation, where there is no previous history of hostility between them and the national majority group.⁵⁸ The other three groups of friends are from the neighboring homeland groups, and it is interesting that mixing is less common with Albanians (11.9 percent) who are the closest mainly Muslim nation, than with the other mainly non-Muslim Balkan Slavic groups, the Croats (16.8 percent) and the Serbs (15.8 percent).⁵⁹ The smallest number of respondents, 11.8 percent, indicated family ties with people from other immigrant groups, but they are mainly of the Islamic faith as well (almost 70 percent of them). Since these numbers are not exclusive for each group, and respondents could have checked more than one option, the same respondent could have ties with multiple groups, and that is why

only these numbers of contacts for each group are reported separately here (for more detailed percentages, see question SD 20 frequencies in appendix B). Furthermore, even the previously discussed question on friendship indicates a larger social distance from their Slavic neighbors, and in such situations marriages are also less likely.

Another part of the Nationalism Type Index that might confirm the endogamous aspect and speaks about the level of social distance of the group is two hypothetical questions. The first, SD 22r, asks, "If you have a child, would you approve of him/her marrying a non-Muslim person?" A large majority of respondents, 87.4 percent, answered no, while 12.6 percent answered yes. Approval was higher in response to the second question, SD 23: "If you have a child would you approve of him/her marrying a Non-Bosnian Muslim/Bosniak person?" meaning it could be another Muslim, just not a Bosnian Muslim (for more, see appendix C, p. 6, question SD 23). A majority, 55.8 percent, answered no, while 44.2 percent responded with yes. Although again the majority would not approve of marriage with an out-group person, the difference between the "yes" and "no" group is much smaller (for more details, see appendix B frequencies for questions SD 22r and SD 23). All these indicators of social distance suggest a higher sense of homogeneity among Bosnian Muslims as a group, as well as a strong sense of social distinctiveness for this sample of the population. Such a conclusion about the endogeneity and restricted rules of group membership might indicate a higher possibility of cooperation among members.⁶⁰ Such conditions of a restricted entry/exit mechanism for the Bosnian Muslim group are particularly important for a group in diaspora conditions. All groups consist of vertical and horizontal associations. The main concern of this study is the horizontal associations of the Bosnian Muslim group. The main characteristic of these horizontal associations is a restricted entry/exit mechanism for members. Although ethno-national associations usually have built-in primordial-like or "given" elements, the penetration of modernity has significantly altered such elements (Habermas, Cronin, and De Greiff 1998, 115–17). This alteration of the foundational elements of a group is especially significant in the case of a group in the U.S. "melting-pot" diaspora situation, in which membership in a group is significantly more voluntary and association increasingly more horizontal. Therefore, this finding regarding still-restricted entry/exit mechanisms for the Bosnian Muslim diaspora group is an important factor, as it may suggest not only a possibility for group cooperation, but also a possibility for the further existence of the group.

5.7.7. Participants' Perceptions about Bosnian Muslim Culture

Culture is the prime element of any nationalism, and several questions on the survey, which are included in the Nationalism Type Index, tried to gauge perceptions about Bosnian Muslim culture. One question, CULT 10, asked whether the culture is primarily Islamic, primarily Slavic, or both Islamic and Slavic. Of those who responded, 43.4 percent perceive it as primarily Islamic, while only 2.1 percent perceive it as a primarily Slavic. The largest number of respondents, 54.5 percent, think it is both Islamic and Slavic (for more, see appendix B, question CULT 10, frequencies). Answers to this question are potentially important for the measure of the social distance Bosnian Muslims feel from their Balkan Slavic neighbors. This is not surprising, since their Slavic Bosnian language is the primary expression of Bosnian Muslim culture, and even their Islamic heritage is internalized and expressed through that language, which is now one of the pillars of Bosnian Muslim nationalism.

To further explore perceptions of their culture, respondents were asked to rate the subjective importance of five common elements of culture: language, religion, literature and art, customs and tradition, and cuisine. Using a Likert-scale-type option, respondents could select a number from 1 to 5, with 1 being the most important and 5 the least important. The most important element for this sample of the population is religion, followed by language, customs and tradition, cuisine, and the least important, literature and art (for more, see table 5.6). Therefore, when we combine answers about the primacy of Islam vs. that of Slavness, and the importance of different aspects of culture, we get an interesting mix, where most participants feel that Bosnian Muslim culture is Islamic and Slavic, while the religion of Islam is the most important element of the same culture. It is not surprising, then, that to question REL 48, also an item of the Nationalism Type Index, which asked, "How important is it that a Bosniak is religiously a Muslim?" only 15 percent of participants responded that it is not important, while 83.5 percent consider it important.

While religion is obviously an important pillar of Bosnian Muslim nationalism, it appears however that it is not a restrictive factor for this population sample. Question REL 49c, also used as an item on the Nationalism Type Index, asked for the participant's opinion on whether a Bosniak could be a Catholic or an Orthodox Christian.

While such a large percentage of respondents indicated that it is important that a Bosniak be religiously Muslim, their solidarity can go beyond

TABLE 5.6. Individual Ranking of Importance of Five Elements of Culture ($N = 607$)

	Language	Religion	Literature & Art	Customs & Tradition	Cuisine
A: Values					
Mean	4.02	4.27	2.52	3.32	2.75
Standard Error	0.05	0.05	0.06	0.05	0.06
Standard Deviation	1.22	1.3	1.51	1.25	1.4
B: Respondent (%)					
Not so important	5.2	4.2	25.7	16.3	20.9
Least important	7.7	9.3	23.3	9.1	36.6
Important	11.5	5.3	22.1	31.9	16.2
Somewhat important	29	13	10.5	19	7.2
Most important	46.6	68.2	18.4	23.7	19.3
Missing	6.6	6.2	8.1	7.4	8

Note: All numbers in **B** are valid percentages of total number of participants.

religion, since more than half of them, 65.4 percent, also responded that a non-Muslim could be Bosniak as well. These answers provide further evidence that for the majority of respondents, acquired traits are more important than those which are “given” at birth and indicate a leaning toward the civic pole of the Nationalism Type Index in this population sample (for more, see appendix B, frequencies for question REL 48c).

5.8. The Nationalism Strength Index

For this sample of the Bosniak population, the internal consistency reliability composite score for the seventeen indicators included in the Strength of Nationalism construct⁶¹ is acceptable ($\alpha = 0.68$), and it shows that all the items combined from the data do work together to measure the same concept intended to be measured. It is slightly lower than the often-mentioned exploratory study cutoff score of $\alpha = 0.7$ (Nunnally 1978, 245; Lance, Butts, and Michels 2006, 205). But since all the remaining items are theoretically important, they were all kept as part of the construct. Furthermore, as suggested by Khamis (1988, 178), the large enough sample size might perhaps allow a slightly lower α . The mean score on Nationalism Strength for the population sample is 0.005 (SD = 0.4). The range is 2.23, with a minimum score of -1.34 and a maximum of 0.89. The median score is 0.06, and the lower value of mean suggests an overall lower intensity of nationalism among this population sample, although the sign is still positive.

5.9. Frequencies of Nationalism Strength Index Items

5.9.1. Attitudes toward Fellow Slav Muslims Outside of BiH

The issues about Muslims from Sandžak, in a different way and with two other questions, are also part of the Nationalism Strength Index. Question PC 36c asked whether or not Muslims from Sandžak should be allowed to vote in BiH elections. Besides the texture and type of nationalism, the attitude toward Muslims from Sandžak is therefore also useful for measuring the intensity of nationalism among respondents. If the previous question, which asks how much a person feels Bosnian, measures the participant's attitude toward Bosnia, this question provides a clue as to how BiH is seen by them, more precisely, to what extent they see BiH as their national state, and whether, driven by the intensity of that feeling, they include Muslims from Sandžak (and outside of BiH) in that vision of BiH.⁶² A majority of 67.1 percent responded yes, while a still large 32.9 percent answered no. These numbers provide a reason to see participants as having a healthy dose of nationalism since it shows that many view BiH as a Bosnian Muslim national state, even though it is shared by two other national groups. The relatively large percentage of "no" responses, however, feeds the uncertainty among Muslims in Sandžak toward BiH as a crucially important factor for the Bosniak nation.⁶³

Similar attitudes are observed in the responses to another question, PC 35c, which is also an item included in the Nationalism Strength Index. In response to the question "For you, Muslims from Sandžak, in terms of nationality, are?" out of eight options, 65.8 percent of respondents see them as Bosniaks and 28.5 percent see them as something else, while 5.8 percent responded "I don't know." Again, these numbers reveal the desire to embrace fellow Muslims from outside of BiH into the Bosnian Muslims' national project, but it also shows a certain hesitation toward them as well. Considering, however, that 82.2 percent of all respondents who see them as Bosniaks are from BiH territory, such a reality provides further support for the first option that Bosnian Muslims want to embrace their fellow Slav Muslims from Sandžak into their national project. This is even more obvious in responses to question PC 37c, on Bosnian Muslims' nonstate national organization. To the question "Should Bosniaks/Muslims from Sandžak be allowed to vote in the elections for Bosniak/Bosnian Muslim national organizations?" an overwhelming 82 percent of respondents indicated yes, signaling that their community imagination extends beyond the border of BiH, and that they do see Muslims of Sandžak as their conation-

als (for more details on PC 35c, PC 36c and PC 37c, see frequencies in appendix A).

5.9.2. Regional and Schooling Frequencies

Since many studies of nationalism consider schools as temples of nationalism, an effort was made to account for schooling within and outside of BiH, considered to be the homeland of Bosnian Muslims (see table 5.7).⁶⁴ Education is measured by the self-identified years and place of schooling of respondents. In BiH, as in the rest of the former Yugoslavia, elementary school lasts eight years, high school four, and college can be finished in four years, even though for many it takes longer.

Of this sample of the population, 664 participants, only 29 percent studied exclusively in BiH, while the rest were exposed to schools outside of BiH. Of the 11.4 percent of respondents who attended elementary school, only 75 percent attended school in BiH;⁶⁵ of the 87.5 percent who attended high school, 66.3 percent attended school in BiH. A relatively high number of participants, 41.9 percent, have a higher education, and of that number, 37.7 percent studied in BiH,⁶⁶ while 16 percent studied in the United States.⁶⁷ As mentioned earlier, the high number of those who attended college in the sample is the legacy of communist rule, where education was not only free but encouraged.⁶⁸ Only during the rule of communism did Bosnian Muslims, as well as other nationalities in the former Yugoslavia, finally achieve high rates of literacy.⁶⁹ Education and literacy are those often-noted preconditions of nationalism, and they are certainly factors in the growth of national consciousness in Bosnian Muslims as well. It may be argued that a major reason stronger nationalism could not happen earlier for them is precisely the high levels of illiteracy and lack of mass education among Bosnian Muslims. Only after World War II did the communists push hard to increase literacy in the population and enforce a mandatory

TABLE 5.7. Respondent's Place of Schooling

	Elementary	High School	College
BiH (outside of capital)	64.9	44.7	5.9
Sarajevo (capital)	10.1	13.3	9.6
Serbia	7.2	6.5	3.8
Montenegro	8.6	6.2	0.6
Croatia	1.1	2.1	0.9
USA	3.5	10.1	16
Other	3.8	4.7	4.4

Note: All numbers are valid percentages of total number of participants.

school attendance policy for boys *and* girls.⁷⁰ Public schools did exist before the war, but Muslim children, and especially girls, rarely attended those schools, particularly outside of the big urban centers.⁷¹ With the communist takeover, that changed, and school attendance became mandatory. The mean age of the sample population, 44.8 years (SD = 12.4), shows that the main group of respondents encountered and learned from the Serbian or Croatian nationalism embedded in school textbooks and instructions during the communist-ruled era of mass education.

5.9.3. Culture and Ties to the Homeland

Since the sample of the population is drawn from a diaspora group, to measure the impact of the homeland's cultural effects on respondents, two questions, included in the Nationalism Strength Index, asked about how often they read Bosnian literature or watch Bosnian films or TV. The assumption is that the more often they see or read the news from back home, the more intensity of nationalism they might feel, since those news reports mostly use the language of nationalism to convey their messages.⁷² There were five options to respond for both questions: 1 = Never; 2 = Rarely; 3 = Occasionally; 4 = Often; and 5 = Very Often. The results for both questions are fairly similar. Regarding Bosnian literature, the mean is 3.39 (SD = 1.16), and for film or TV the mean is 3.24 (SD = 1.27) (for more, see table 4.1a). The results show that this sample of the Bosnian Muslim diaspora is still connected to cultural productions from the homeland and to the effects of what Anderson (1991) calls "print capital" in creating national imaginings, and the transformed nature of modern media has enabled that connection even further.⁷³ A great number of viewers is needed to measure the impact of such structures on group maintenance. In that sense, information on how often group members watch news from back home, in addition to the number of local ethnic media outlets, is important. Furthermore, it is useful to ask whether they follow the *news*, not just any television programming, since watching info channels provides an increased possibility for political participation, even from a distance, while watching only entertainment decreases that likelihood.⁷⁴

Furthermore, such a connection was also observed in the responses regarding where they get their news about BiH. An overwhelming number of respondents, 83.6 percent, indicated BiH media as a source of news (for more, see appendix A, PC 32c frequencies). Although they were not asked, "How often do you read the news?" it may still be concluded that the significant number of respondents who do read the news are informed about

BiH news from the same media sources as the homeland population. It also means that this sample of the population, besides household interactions, has regular interactions with their mother tongue,⁷⁵ which is one of the most important factors in Bosnian Muslim nationalism, as discussed above, and noted as well in their responses on the importance of elements of culture.

5.9.4. Long-Distance Imagination and Engagement

As argued in the chapter on extant literature, long-distance nationalism is a relevant approach to the study of the nationalism phenomenon, especially in the case of Bosnian Muslims, and particularly the possibility of absentee voting, which is predicated on citizenship in BiH and willingness to participate.⁷⁶ “In fact, the transnational links of the Balkan diasporas [with their back-home national brethren] were strongest when used to further nationalist politics in the homeland” (Kostovicova and Basic 2004, 588). In response to question PC 34, 61.9 percent of respondents indicated that they have voted in BiH elections at least sometimes. That suggests that they did have at least some contacts with back-home politics, an important factor for nationalism. Furthermore, since an overwhelmingly large number of participants, more than 95 percent, left the homeland after 1991, they have also experienced the initial wave of nationalism that swept the former Yugoslavia in the late 1980s and early 1990s, and they might have participated in the first elections in BiH and, more importantly, in the referendum for the independence of BiH, which was held just before the war, on March 1, 1991. As mentioned in the previous chapter, the internationally recognized referendum was one of the most significant events in the recent history of Bosnian Muslims, one through which they regained the full ability to be the decisive factor when it came to the territory of BiH.⁷⁷ Finally, from the responses to question PC 34, we can infer to some extent that the majority of the respondents themselves experienced the same traumatic experience of the Bosnian war as did the back-home population. More than 53 percent of the respondents lived in BiH during the Bosnian war, while an additional 12 percent lived somewhere else in the former Yugoslavia during the same period (for more, see appendix A, question PC 34 frequencies). These numbers indicate that this population sample is not far removed from the experience of the homeland population and that it may be used as a representative sample for the study of Bosnian Muslim nationalism.

5.9.5. Bosnian Language and Intensity of Nationalism

Since language is an important pillar of the Bosnian Muslim nationalism project, participants' attitudes about it are used as a part of the Index of Nationalism Strength.⁷⁸ One more set of questions regarding the language further sheds light on the topic. Question LAN 57 asked, "How important it is for you that a Bosnian Muslim can speak the Bosnian language?" Participants had four options: "Not important at all," coded as 1; "Not important," coded as 2; "Somewhat important," coded as 3; and "Very important," coded as 4. The sample mean of 3.81 (SD = 0.52) suggests that this population considers language a strong factor for identification of Bosnian Muslims. An overwhelming 85.7 percent of respondents answered that knowledge of the Bosnian language is very important. Additionally, for 88.7 percent of respondents, the Bosnian language is the primary language spoken at home. Only 4.8 percent of respondents speak English at home, and even fewer, 2.3 percent of respondents, selected Serbo-Croatian as the language spoken at home. Not surprisingly, most of the respondents, 95.8 percent, answered that they can read and write in the Bosnian language, while only 46.5 percent indicated that they can read in English with no problem, 41.2 percent can do so with difficulty, and 12.4 percent cannot read in English.

Another, bivariate question, LAN 58c, asked, "Did it ever bother you that the name Serbo-Croatian language was the official language of the former Yugoslavia?" The majority, 54.5 percent indicated yes, while the remaining 45.5 percent selected no. Therefore, the issue of the name of the language does contribute to feelings of resentment and suffering for this sample of the population. Since resentment and suffering are important factors that usually fuel any type of nationalism, this question about the name of the official language during the time of the two Yugoslavias⁷⁹ may be one of the indicators for the measure of resentment among the Bosnian Muslim population.⁸⁰ Yet the respondents see the Bosnian language as a "middle language," equally close to the Serbian and Croatian languages. When asked question LAN 59r, "In your opinion, which language is closer to the Bosnian language?" 54.1 percent responded "Both, Serbian and Croatian are close; the same." Serbian is closer was selected by 27.3 percent and Croatian by 8.3 percent.

As there is no physical difference among the three peoples, differences are primarily religious and discursive, considerably less so linguistically, because the vernacular languages spoken by each different nation, for the

most part, are mutually intelligible. Since the difference is partly discursive, the naming of a language becomes a crucially important factor because by asserting the right to name the language of their own group, that group asserts the right to its own essential form of groupness and the right to the land where they reside. It is not a surprise, therefore, that the name of the language becomes an issue that groups fight very intensely over, and they frequently deny the right of another group to name the language that they jointly use after the name of that other group or territory. Bosnian Muslims feel the same way, especially since the standard on which the previously common language was built actually originated in BiH, and for that reason the question was included in the survey.⁸¹

5.10. Controlled Variables Distribution and Frequencies

5.10.1. *Gender and Representativeness*

The self-identified gender distribution of the population sample is 60 percent male and 40 percent female respondents. It should be noted that it was much harder for me, as a male investigator, to reach females. Most of the places where Bosnian Muslims interact socially, where I was trying to recruit participants, are male-dominated.⁸² The data reflect this gendered social reality, as may be observed from the participants' responses to a question regarding involvement with Bosnian organizations, since women are much less likely to be involved with any type of organization than men (for more information, see table 5.8).⁸³ Furthermore, in mixed gatherings it was often difficult to talk and interact with women directly due to cultural norms that might consider such interactions with a stranger (researcher) problematic for the women, so they shied away even when I tried to engage them in conversation. So many female participants were recruited through their male counterparts. Female participation was slightly better when I tried to engage them in the social spaces where women are dominant, such as hair salons for women and women's social gatherings in restaurants and other settings.⁸⁴

The critical literature has already warned us against an assumed stable groupness among a people going through the process of nationalism. The feminist approach, especially, argued persuasively that women and men do not respond in the same way to a crisis, and especially to the experience of nationalism.⁸⁵ As women are often disproportionately more the victims of the conflicts that usually accompany bursts of nationalism,⁸⁶ it is important

TABLE 5.8. Gender Distribution among Different Types of Organizations

	Religious	Political	Social	Cultural	Sport	Professional	Other	>1
Female (<i>N</i> = 265)	46.8	1.5	7.5	10.9	3	2.3	0.8	10.9
Male (<i>N</i> = 398)	53.3	5	10.8	11.3	9.8	2	1.5	17.8

Note: All numbers (except *N*) are valid percentages of total number of participants.

to consider their position vis-à-vis the group's nationalism projects.⁸⁷ Furthermore, if women were considered true members of a group, and their voices and impact on a group's nationalism projects were considered of equal importance, many conclusions regarding nationalism perhaps would be different. This data also shows interesting differences in responses between male and female participants. For example, a much larger percentage of female respondents, 34.8 percent, vs. 20.85 percent of men, selected other than Bosniak identity as a response to the question "What is your nationality?" A *chi*-square test between the two gender variables and choice preference for nationality shows that differences are statistically significant as well (*chi*-square with three degrees of freedom is 17.276, with $p < 0.001$). Yet the difference in intensity among those who selected Bosniak identity is not statistically significant. A question was asked about how strongly Bosniak respondents feel, and answers were collapsed to "Weak," "Strong," and "Very Strong"; gender difference is statistically not important in terms of the responses to that question, and it may be concluded that both segments of the population sample are similar in that regard (see appendix C, 4, Q. 17).

Finally, women and men in this sample differentiate in terms of social engagement. Men are more likely to be engaged in at least one Bosnian Muslim organization (for more, see table 7.8). Among 398 male respondents, 37.2 percent are not engaged in any organizations, while out of 265 female respondents, 46.4 percent are not engaged with any Bosnian organization.

Most of those women and men participants who are members of Bosnian organizations are part of religious organizations due to the nature of the religious structure of the IZBiH, which is a prime factor for the creation and maintenance of the sense of Bosnian Islam, discussed in a separate chapter. Furthermore, most, if not all, Bosnian Muslim-run mosques have a structured membership culture.⁸⁸ Those who are members do not have to be religious at all, but they regularly pay their dues (*vazifa*),

which is usually a set amount of money per family depending on its size. In return, the IZBiH, or in the case of the diaspora, a particular mosque, takes responsibility for the burial of any member of a family regardless of their religiosity.⁸⁹ That is why in many sites where Bosnian Muslims came to live, they often bought property for a Bosnian Muslim cemetery *before* they built their mosques. Once they obtain property for the cemetery, the mosque then has a service to offer that is needed by everyone.⁹⁰ In a way we can say that only after it acquires its own cemetery is the Bosnian Muslim mosque then truly open for business.⁹¹ The two primary services most Bosnian mosques offer are weekend schools for pre-K and elementary-school-age children (*mektebs*)⁹² and burial service.⁹³ Besides these, most of these mosques now offer regular Friday and *Bajram* (*Eid*) prayers, and only rarely more than that.

Finally, in table 5.8 we can see the overall engagement in formal and informal Bosnian Muslim organizations by the participants in this sample. Of the total number of participants, a large part—44 percent—are involved with at least one organization, while 15.1 percent of the respondents are involved with more than one. These numbers combined show that more than half of this population sample are connected to other Bosnian Muslims through some type of organization, and those interactions recreate some back-home conditions of regular interactions among members. When that is considered in conjunction with the information on the sample's frequency of contacts with the back-home population, it becomes clear that both the U.S. and BiH populations are very much interconnected, and that ideas and norms of groupness may be and indeed are shared among them regularly.⁹⁴ This further supports the approach that nationalism should be studied in population diaspora situations, as well as among groups in the homeland (for more on the connections to the homeland population, see table 5.9).

5.10.2. Gender and Traits of Bosniak Identity

The responses from this sample of the Bosnian Muslim population suggest that both genders have the same attitudes toward the acquired and given traits of Bosniak identity discussed earlier. A difference, however, comes in the realm of political consciousness and perceptions of in-group differences, both important parts of any case of nationalism. For instance, both genders in this population sample answered the question on race similarly, where the majority in both gender groups thinks that nonwhite persons can be Bosniak. In both gender groups a majority of respondents also think

TABLE 5.9. Respondent's Connection with Homeland

A: How often do you spend time with Bosniaks? (non-family members)				
Never	Rarely	Sometimes	Weekly	Every day
0.2	1.8	18.1	26.7	52.4
B: How often do you talk to someone in BiH/Sandžak?				
Never	Rarely	Sometimes	Weekly	Every day
1.4	4.4	26.7	40.5	26.1
C: How often do you travel to BiH/Sandžak?				
Never	Occasionally	Every other year	Every year	I live there
8.3	47.2	27.2	15.1	2.1

Note: All numbers are valid percentages of total number of participants.

that non-Muslims can be Bosniak. Again, the majority of respondents in this sample of both genders also think that a person can be Bosniak even if that person does not have Bosniak parents. The same preferences appear in the case of the marriage of a child, where neither gender group would approve of marriages with either non-Muslim, or non-Bosnian Muslim/Bosniak persons. Furthermore, the statistical tests among all these situations and gender preferences showed that differences among them are not statistically significant (for frequencies of the responses to question SD 22r, see appendix B).

5.10.3. Gender and Customs

In this population sample, the difference between the two genders in perception of customs among different BiH regions is not significant. Yet the gender difference in perceptions of Bosnian culture is statistically significant (*chi*-square with two degrees of freedom = 10.076; $p < 0.006$). The majority of women respondents, 50.4 percent, answered that Bosnian culture is primarily Islamic, while, 47 percent of women participants answered that Bosnian Muslim culture is both Islamic and Slavic. Among male respondents, 38.7 percent think it is primarily Islamic, while 59.5 percent consider Bosnian Muslim culture as both Islamic and Slavic. This is perhaps especially interesting since the difference between genders is not significant when it comes to how often they pray. In this population sample, both genders are fairly similarly distributed among the five response options on how often they pray.

5.10.4. Religiosity and Representativeness

In this population sample, 98.5 percent of respondents indicated their religion as Islam, while only 1.2 percent selected agnostic or atheist and 0.3 percent selected unspecified other. It appears that this sample of the population is more religious than expected of Bosnian Muslims, who are usually described as not a very religious Muslim group.⁹⁵ Only a small percentage of the respondents do not pray at all, while more than half indicated that they observe the full daily Muslim prayer ideal of five times a day (see table 5.10, part A).⁹⁶ That may be the result of three factors.

The average age of the participants, middle-aged, suggests that most of them come from the group who came as refugees during or right after the war, when many Bosnian Muslims rediscovered religion, perhaps as a need to realign their world and make sense of the destruction and death they witnessed in their homeland. Once religion started to become important among the population, coming to the United States, where religiosity is publicly welcomed and often encouraged, it increased. Furthermore, Bosnian Muslims looked closely at diaspora groups of their Balkan neighbors who were also primarily organized through their respective churches, which proudly displayed national colors to indicate whom they serve. So to mimic that, Bosnian Muslim mosques served not only as religious centers where Bosnian Muslims come to pray, but also as centers where most of their other social and cultural needs were met. Even their usual name, “Bosnian Islamic Cultural Center,” signals that. Needless to say, their mosques also proudly display their national colors (see figure 5.3).

Many Bosnian Muslims were assisted in their immigration to the United States by various Christian faith-based organizations that were contracted

TABLE 5.10. Bosnian Muslim Population Sample’s Religiosity

A: How often do you pray?				
5 per day	Sometimes	Only Friday	Only Eid	Never
51.2	36	4.1	4.2	4.5
B: How often do you go to the mosque?				
Daily	Sometimes	Fridays	Only Eid	Never
24.6	10.6	56	5.7	3
C: In your opinion, could a Bosniak be a Catholic or Orthodox Christian?				
			No	Yes
			34.7	65.3

Note: All numbers are valid percentages of total number of participants.



Fig. 5.3. Entrance of Tampa Bay Bosnian Muslim *masjid*, with a sign and flags of Bosnian designation. Such displays are uncommon for Muslim centers, but a common sight for most Bosnian Muslim places of worship throughout the United States. (Photograph by author, May 2015.)

by the U.S. State Department to facilitate their arrival and adaptation to the new country,⁹⁷ which could further facilitate religiosity among their U.S. diaspora population.⁹⁸ At all the sites where data was collected, the first and primary Bosnian Muslim organization is their local mosque, and therefore mosques often serve as primary agents of Bosnian Muslim nationalism, not only by emphasizing “Bosnian Islam,” but also because they are the sites of many social and cultural gatherings where people discuss matters related to BiH and the culture and history of Bosnian Muslims. Finally, as the data reveals, a majority of respondents in this population sample are from rural areas, where religiosity is usually higher. More than 86 percent of those who never pray are, in fact, from urban settings. Furthermore, the results of the Pearson *chi*-square test indicate that there is a statistically significant

relationship between Muslim daily prayers and rural/urban populations (*chi*-square with four degrees of freedom is 22.975; and $p > 0.001$).

5.10.5. *Memory and Perception of Inequality*

Bad memories and perception of inequality in multiethnic countries often feeds a sense of nationalism and a desire by the unequal or unrepresented population to improve its situation through autonomy or independence. For that reason, three questions that ask about memory and perception of inequality are included in the Nationalism Strength Index. An interesting mix may be observed in the responses. More people feel that BiH in comparison with the other units of the former Yugoslavia was more unequal than equal, [38.5 percent vs. 31.5 percent] respectively, and even more, 55.6 percent, think that Bosnian Muslims as people were not equal with the other nationalities of the former Yugoslavia. Nevertheless, a majority, 53.6 percent, think that life in the former Yugoslavia was mostly good. What their answers suggest is that the sense of a good life does not necessarily come from equality or adequate representation, but from other factors that a population might be experiencing (for more details on the answer distribution to questions MEM 50, MEM 1, MEM 52, see appendix B).

5.10.6. *Passport Identity*

To comply with European Union–mandated rules, BiH has adopted biometric passport standards for its international travel documents. Because of the cost of a passport, responses to question PC 28a, which asks what passport the person holds, are part of the Nationalism Strength Index.⁹⁹ The requirement to uphold biometric standards significantly increased the cost of a BiH passport. This is so not only because of the higher administrative fee, but also because one must apply in person at one of only two official BiH diplomatic consulates in the United States.¹⁰⁰ Perhaps for that reason, the largest number of respondents, 44.4 percent, do not have a BiH passport. The smallest number, 23.5 percent, hold BiH passports only, while 33.9 percent have a BiH passport together with some other passport. Among those who hold other than BiH passports, most of whom hold a Montenegrin passport, 78.13 percent are from the New York City metropolitan region, since many Bosnian Muslims who reside there are from the two Montenegrin towns of Plav and Gusinje, as indicated before. A number of Muslims from Montenegro now also live in Chicago, and in this population sample, 18.75 percent of the Chicago respondents also

hold a Montenegrin passport. From conversations with them, I can conclude that most of those participants from Chicago are from coastal areas and a few towns in northern Montenegro, but not from Plav and Gusinje. Finally, 2.4 percent of respondents who hold a Serbian passport are mostly from the Serbian side of Sandžak, and they are equally spread throughout the cities where data was collected. Not surprisingly, most respondents, 77 percent, hold U.S. passports. Considering their time spent in this country, most people are eligible by now to have U.S. passports and this reality is reflected in these numbers. Again, respondents may have selected more than one choice, so they could be holding multiple passports (for more on the question of passports, see appendix B, question PC 28a).

5.10.7. Other Relevant Data Frequencies

This sample of the population includes 45 percent of respondents who own property (a house or apartment) in BiH, while as a separate category, 67 percent are property owners in the United States.¹⁰¹ From the six categories describing the kind of work they do for a living, 10 percent are retirees, 14 percent are not working, 8 percent are working manual jobs, 22 percent are professionals or business owners, and the remaining 37 percent work in a service industry.

The frequencies of this data set show that conclusions drawn from this study of Bosnian Muslims' nationalism and their adoption of the new Bosniak identity are representative of their larger group, although the sample is from the diaspora. Further study with a population sample in the homeland would supplement and enhance this study and provide possible interesting comparisons between the groups in both situations, diaspora and homeland.

5.11. Limitations of Data and Study

This exploratory study, limited by budget constraints, has some drawbacks, such as the potential selection bias of the respondent population sample inherent in surveying the diaspora. Furthermore, like any other nonlongitudinal study, this one lacks a point of comparison in time to better measure the effects of the process of nationalism. Yet this data will be valuable with further studies and more data on Bosniak identity and nationalism.

The lower-level analysis shows that correlation scores among variables are only low to moderate, and that suggests that those correlations should

be treated cautiously. The low correlation scores are perhaps the result of the lower-than-commonly-used alpha scores, as suggested by Lance, Butts, and Michels (2006): “using less reliable measures lowers the expected observed correlation and the power to detect it with a constant sample size” (206). At this early stage of an exploratory research approach, however, even these slightly lower scores should be considered, and results may be seen as an indicator that further research, with more cases, is warranted. The same is suggested by the grounded theory approach that guided this study.¹⁰²

Furthermore, the low correlation scores are perhaps the result of the homogenized standardized scores for nationalism instead of the “true” scores. So study suggests that those two indexes should be further refined to try to measure the “true” intensity, instead of standardized scores. Be that as it may, the primary intent of this study was to test the alternative premise that nationalism is the intervening variable for the development of an identity and to decide whether this path about the direction of interaction should be pursued further. Now that there is evidence to support the proposition for the direction of interaction, further studies should better refine the instruments of measurement by developing scores for measuring nationalism that are more applicable to *ongoing* cases, and perhaps by developing a separate scale for measuring other cases, where both, nationalism and identity, have already been present for a while in a population.

The most serious empirical limitation of the study is the two-item measure of the desired identity. This condition produced results that are skewed to the right, with most respondents scoring high on the Likert-scale question. That provides little variance to measure and compare the fine shades of identity ascription correlation with our variables.

Despite a relatively large data set, this inquiry utilized a single case study to test the relationship between nationalism and identity. Some scholars (Lijphart 1975; Flyvbjerg 2006) have already suggested that such a purposive case study done as observational research is useful as a contribution toward building up the necessary in-depth knowledge to offer an alternative explanation for a social phenomenon that has been considered in a different manner for so long.¹⁰³ Seawright and Gerring (2008) defined a case study as “the intensive (qualitative or quantitative) analysis of a single unit or a small number of units (the cases), where the researcher’s goal is to understand a larger class of similar units” (296). In this research, the case study under intense observation is the situation of Bosnian Muslims as an autochthonous and distinct ethno-religious Balkan group that is at the stage of emergence into a full-fledged European nation. Therefore,

a single case and the group level is the appropriate level of analysis for this inquiry. As Flyvbjerg (2006) correctly stated, “good social science is problem-driven and not methodology-driven” (242), and this situation involves a case study of a group, that for the first time, is undergoing the conditions of the phenomena under observation.

Finally, this work does not claim to offer a *theory* on how things work; rather, its goal is much less ambitious. The intention here is to offer a possible avenue to observe the phenomenon and to suggest that such a case study is warranted; therefore it is quite within the guidelines provided by Fearon and Laitin (2011), who claim that “case studies are not designed to discover or confirm empirical regularities [while] they can be quite useful—indeed, essential—for ascertaining and assessing the causal mechanisms that give rise to empirical regularities in politics” (773).

Brubaker and Cooper (2000) note that the term “identity” has been so widely used that it became irrelevant and impossible to operate with. Precisely because of such a wide usage, however, political scientists should wrestle with both the term and its implications in political interactions. In that regard, this may be a step in that direction, an attempt to observe and empirically measure a relationship between the two important social science concepts of nationalism and identity.

Results of the Test of Interactions between Nationalism and Desired Salient Identity

6.1. Lower-Level Analysis

As a building block for the model, a lower-level analysis among the individual explanatory variables and the outcome variable of six categories of Bosniak identity was done, with mixed results in terms of statistical significance. Both Indexes of Nationalism were tested for correlation with the controlled variables of age, gender, social status, education, and ownership of a house/apartment in BiH.

Finally, as an additional level of analysis and to measure possible effects, the three constructs were tested for correlation with the previous identity of “Muslim” as a nationality in the former Yugoslavia, which is coded as an ordinal variable based on the 5-point Likert-scale type responses to question Nat17c, “How strongly do you feel Muslim?”

Since variable values used for the constructs of nationalisms are of a different scale, they were first standardized, where all means are computed as zeros and values are given to each item based on the mean’s standard deviations for each item.¹ Therefore, while a z-score mean indicates negative correlation, the true mean score for the Nationalism Strength construct is not necessarily negative in value. Although a z-score com-

puted in this way does not always represent the true intensity of the variable, it does tell us whether a particular score is equal to the mean, below the mean, or above the mean. A homogenized z-score can also tell us how far away a particular score is from the mean score for the item and the direction in terms of the mean. Although z-scores may be large, most of them are within the range between 3 and -3, where the value of 0 is considered to be the mean score.

6.1.1. Correlations of Nationalism Strength with Desired Identity, Previous Identity, and Controlled Variables Success

As discussed in chapter 5, for this sample of the Bosniak population the internal consistency reliability composite score for the seventeen indicators included in the Strength of Nationalism construct is acceptable ($\alpha = 0.68$), and it shows that all the items combined from the data do work together to measure the same concept intended to be measured. As indicated above, a slightly lower value of the mean than the sample's central tendency of the medium suggests the overall moderate intensity of nationalism of this population sample.

6.1.2. Correlations between Social Status Categories and Nationalism Strength

The construct of Nationalism Strength was tested for the correlation significance between scores of the two groups among the population sample. Additionally, a test was done to assess the significance of the mean difference between the two groups.

A *t*-test was done to compare the means of scores for groups of Promoters ($n = 64$) and non-Promoters ($n = 600$) on the Nationalism Strength Index, and it found that their mean differences were statistically only marginally significant (see table 6.5). Therefore, the social status, or whether or not the person can be considered a member of a work group, has no effect on the nationalism strength. Perhaps this is the result of the selection process, where all members of local elites are included regardless of whether they support the Bosnian Muslim nationalism project or not, and some of them certainly do not. If data selection was designed to differentiate between those who support the process and those who do not, results would probably be different. As it is now, the mean difference between the two groups shows no significance.

6.1.3. Correlations between Previous Identity and Nationalism Strength

The correlation scores for all participants on Nationalism Strength and Feeling of Previous Identity were slightly positively correlated, but this correlation was statistically not significant (see table 6.3). Feeling of Previous Identity was measured by question Nat 17C: “How strongly do you feel Muslim?” with four Likert-type scale response options, from lowest score for “Not at all” to highest score for “Very Strongly.”

6.1.4. Correlations of Social Status and Previous Identity with Nationalism Strength

The correlation between Nationalism Strength and feeling toward Previous Identity for Promoters, and for non-Promoters, was found to be statistically not significant. In that sense we can assume that both groups feel the same toward the previous identity of “Muslim” as a former Yugoslav nationality (see table 6.3).

6.1.5. Correlations of Level of Education and Nationalism Strength

Table 6.1 shows the frequency distribution of schooling levels across the Bosniak identity groups in the population sample. As is obvious from the table in each category of Bosniak identity, most respondents have at least a high school education. This is not surprising since the population sample’s mean age is 44.8, and it is safe to assume that most of the respondents grew up and were educated in communist Yugoslavia, where education was emphasized and made mandatory for all.

It is interesting to note that more than 50 percent of the VSB category of Bosniak identity respondents have a college education. Yet the Pearson correlation test between education and Nationalism Strength shows that for this population sample, education level is not a statistically significant factor for Nationalism Strength scores (see table 6.3). Although education is often referred to as an important factor in the rise of nationalism, the correlation results for education and intensity of Nationalism may be seen as a further indicator that Bosniak nationalism is still developing and is trying to find its own voice among the population that was educated by different national programs—mainly Serbian and Croatian—and under different ideological systems, communism and postcommunism. This suggestion is further supported by the increased statistical significance when it comes to the correlation of education level and Nationalism Type.

TABLE 6.1. Education among Subcategories of Population Sample (N = 660)

	No school	Elementary	High school	College	Total
VSB	0.3	6.1	28.6	56.8	58.9
SB	0	1.1	5.6	5.2	11.8
WB	0.2	0.5	1.1	1.2	2.9
OVS	0.2	0.9	4.8	4.5	10.5
OSB	0.2	1.4	2.4	3.5	7.4
OWB	0.2	1.2	3.3	3.8	8.5
% of total	0.9	11.1	45.9	42.1	100

Note: All numbers (except N) are valid percentages of total within each category.

6.1.6. Correlations of Nationalism Strength and Age of Respondents

Respondents were organized by age into three categories, those born before, during, and after the communist era, to test for the correlation between age groups and Nationalism Strength. The correlation scores show a higher score on the Nationalism Strength Index among the older population, in one-way ANOVA between the age categories. The results show that age has a significant effect on the level of Nationalism Strength for the three age categories [$F(2, 659) = 7.36, p < 0.001$].

Post hoc comparisons using the Tukey HSD test indicate that the mean difference on the score of Nationalism Strength between the precommunist (pre-World War II) and the communist era categories is not significant, while the mean difference between the communist- and postcommunist-era groups is significant. The mean difference between the pre-World War II era group and the postcommunist era groups is also significant (see table 6.2). Therefore, we can see that the significance of age appears among those born in the late stage of communist rule or after, and after the full cycle of communist-induced development was over in BiH. On the other hand, since there is no significance between those born in the pre-World War II-era and communist-era groups, those two categories of respondents may be considered as similar in terms of the Nationalism Strength (see fig. 6.1).

It should also be noted, however, that the three age groups were not equally represented. With the sample population's mean age of 44.8 (SD = 12.4), most of the respondents were from the communist-era group ($n = 628$), while the flank groups, those born in the pre-World War II era ($n = 20$), and the postcommunist era ($n = 14$), are of similar size, but both less than 30, recommended by Khamis (1988, 181). To address that shortcoming, an additional test for correlation between age and Nationalism Strength was done to re-examine the results of the ANOVA.

TABLE 6.2. Nationalism Strength, Age Categories—ANOVA

Within-Group Mean Difference	Mean difference	Significance (<i>p</i>)
Pre-WWII era vs. Communist era	.16	.17
Pre-WWII era vs. Post-Communist era	.52**	.001
Communist era vs. Post-Communist era	.36**	.003

** Correlation is significant at the $p < .05$ level.

Also observed was the correlation between Nationalism Strength and the increase of age of participants, where age was treated as a continuous variable with increments of one year. Positive correlation shows that the increase in Nationalism Strength moderately correlates with increase in age. That correlation significance comes from the non-Promoters category of the population sample, while age is not a significant factor for the Promoters on their Nationalism Strength scores (see table 6.3).

6.1.7. Comparison of Nationalism Strength Across Gender Groups

When Nationalism Strength is *t*-tested against the controlled variable of gender, the mean for men is higher than for women, and the difference is statistically significant (see table 6.3). This statistically significant difference for Nationalism Strength between gender groups comes from the non-Promoter population sample (see table 6.3). Among Promoters, gender is not a statistically significant factor for Nationalism Strength scores.

6.1.8. Strength of Nationalism for BiH Property Owners

When the relationship between Nationalism Strength and home ownership in BiH is analyzed, the results show that owners scored higher in Nationalism Strength than non-owners, and that difference is statistically significant. From this we can deduce that economic interest in BiH, as measured by home ownership among respondents, does play a role in higher score in Nationalism Strength.

Once again, the mean difference between property owners and non-owners comes from the non-Promoters, while it is not significant for the Promoters (see table 6.3). From this we can infer that a short-term economic interest, such as property ownership, affects Nationalism Strength for ordinary people, but not for Promoters, who are lower-level elites in this sample of the population.




Fig. 6.1. Correlation of Nationalism Strength with age groups

The same economic interest plays a different role in two Nationalism constructs. Table 6.3 helps us compare correlations between the z-score-homogenized mean scores for Promoters and non-Promoters among those who own a house/apartment in BiH and those who do not, on the two constructs of Nationalism where it is clear that home ownership in BiH influences Nationalism Strength, but not Nationalism Type.

Table 6.3 also helps in comparing correlations between the mean scores for the two gender groups on both constructs of Nationalism,

TABLE 6.3. Mean Differences for Nationalism Strength and Nationalism Type

	Mean	Sig.	Male	Female	Sig.	Home-owners	Non-owners	Sig.
<i>Nationalism Strength</i>								
Population sample	.04		.04	-.05	.07*	.08	-.09	.001**
Promoter	.09		.14	-.02	.12	.16	.04	.23
Nonpromoter	-.004	.06*	.03	-.05	.03*	.07	-.10	.001**
<i>Nationalism Type</i>								
Population sample	.21		.23	.17	.008**	.22	.18	.21
Promoter	.43		.37	.59	.008**	.5	.38	.17
Nonpromoter	.18	.001**	.21	.14	.003**	.2	.16	.34
<i>Previous Identity</i>								
Population sample	4.71							
Promoter	4.73							
Nonpromoter	4.61				.37			

** Significant at $p < .05$; * significant at $p < .1$.

where we can see that female respondents scored lower on both constructs, and that mean difference among genders is statistically significant. It may be concluded, therefore, that gender plays a role for both Nationalism constructs, and that female respondents have a different, more ethnic, preference for Nationalism Type, and, at the same time, are less nationalistic than men. Furthermore, even among the social status categories, it is interesting to note that on both Nationalism constructs, both Promoter and non-Promoter female respondents' scores differ from those of male respondents. In both social categories women score lower on Nationalism Strength, while, when it comes to preference of Nationalism Type, women Promoters prefer less of the ethnic type of Nationalism than the general female population sample and even less than men.

Furthermore, these differences among Nationalism constructs reveal that the process of nationalism consists of at least these two essential aspects, which work differently in a population. Therefore it is important to *account for and report* those differences in the tenacious process of nationalism in any cases under observation.

6.2. Types of Nationalism Correlations

For this sample of the Bosniak population ($N = 664$), the mean score for the Nationalism Type construct² is positive $\mu = 0.21$ ($SD = 0.40$), while the

median score is 0.16. As indicated in the previous chapter, we interpret that as the population sample's moderate leaning toward the civic type of Nationalism.

As discussed in chapter 5, the construct demonstrated a reasonable internal consistency reliability composite score ($\alpha = 0.61$) for the fourteen indicators selected for the Nationalism Type Index, which shows that all the items from the data combined do measure the same concept intended to be measured, with possibility for higher score variability among participants.

6.2.1. Types of Nationalism Correlations with the Controlled Variable of Age

The Nationalism Type score correlates with age increase among the population sample, showing that higher scores for the civic Nationalism Type coincide positively with an increase in age. This correlation is small, and the acceptable significance probably comes from the long range and large sample size of the age variable. Additional tests also confirm this conclusion.

No significant correlation was found when a one-way ANOVA was conducted to compare the effect of age. Respondents were organized into three age groups: those born in the pre-World War II era, the communist era, and the postcommunist era. The three groups' mean scores were compared with scores on the Nationalism Type Index [$F(2, 659) = 0.20, p = 0.82$]. The test of ANOVA again confirmed that there was no significant effect of age on the scores on the Nationalism Type Index for this population sample. Since the three age groups were not equally represented, which may cause a problem in comparisons, a new test was conducted to further evaluate the effect of age.

Nevertheless, the new test confirmed the result, and no statistically significant effect was found when the variable of age in an increment of one was tested against the Social Status categories of Promoters and non-Promoters (see table 6.4). More specifically, when Promoters were compared with non-Promoters, age was not significantly correlated with the scores on the Nationalism Type Index among Promoters, while among non-Promoters the correlation with age had only marginal significance. Yet again, due to the large size of the non-Promoter population, such marginal correlation should be treated cautiously.

6.2.2. Correlations of Type of Nationalism with the Controlled Variable of Gender

The Nationalism Type score was also checked against the controlled value of gender, and an independent sample *t*-test showed different values of means for males and females, but with only marginal significance (see table 6.3).

The same results were observed when scores for Nationalism Type were checked by gender of Promoters, where the difference between males and females showed the same marginal statistical significance (see table 6.3).

Therefore, both situations show that despite small differences between the means for the two population samples, gender has marginal statistical effects on changes of scores on the Nationalism Type.

Among non-Promoters, the male vs. female difference is significant. An additional test shows that, again, difference in scores on Nationalism Type comes from the non-Promoter part of the Bosniak sample population (see table 6.3).

6.2.3. Nationalism Type and Years of Schooling

The Pearson correlation test comparing schooling categories and Nationalism Type scores shows that education level is a statistically significant positive correlation factor (see table 6.4). As mentioned in the discussion of the relationship between education and Nationalism Strength, where education level is not significant, these results demonstrate that in this case of nationalism, education plays only a small role when it comes to Nationalism Type.

6.2.4. Correlations of House/Apartment Ownership in BiH with Type of Nationalism

Finally, the Nationalism Type index score was checked against the controlled variable of House/Apartment Ownership in BiH and no significant correlation was found. The analysis shows that there is no statistically significant mean difference in the Type of Nationalism between Promoters and non-Promoters, regardless of their home-ownership status (see table 6.3).

6.2.5. Correlation of Nationalism Type with the Feeling toward Previous and Desired Identities

When the correlation between Nationalism Type and feeling toward Previous Identity is tested, the results show a statistically significant negative association between the two variables. It means that the more strongly respondents feel Muslim (nationally), the lower their scores on the Type of Nationalism Index scale, and the further away from the civic type of nationalism (see table 6.4). Such expected results further support the Nationalism Type construct validity, as they show that the civic pole of the variable is opposite from the old, primordial, quasi-religious, association for Bosnian Muslims.

Therefore, we can see that among the non-Promoter sample of the Bosniak population, feelings toward previous identity again negatively correlate with the civic Nationalism Type; the stronger the feelings toward previous identity, the lower the scores on the civic Nationalism Type. Yet these weak negative correlation scores toward previous identity suggest that those correlations should be treated cautiously (see table 6.4).³

Finally, the *t*-test shows that the mean difference between Promoters and non-Promoters in the scores of the Nationalism Type is significant. This suggests that Promoters score stronger on the civic Nationalism Type than non-Promoters, whose scores are closer to the ethnic pole of our index for the Nationalism Type scale (see table 6.3).

The mean difference in feeling toward Previous Identity by Promoters and non-Promoters is not significant. Such scores suggest that Promoters and non-Promoters have different feelings toward Nationalism Type, but they feel the same toward Previous Identity (see table 6.3), and therefore we can expect different approaches to the selection of the identity category between those two groups. These results suggest that both groups have the same starting point but have different approaches to Nationalism Type, which might regulate group's member inclusion and exclusion.

Table 6.4 may help us compare correlations between Nationalism Type with Age and Nationalism Strength with Age, Social Status, and feelings toward Previous Identity for this population sample. Additionally, it may be observed how the statistical significance and correlation matrix varies for both aspects of nationalism. So the level of education plays a role for the scores on civic type of nationalism, while it does not in terms of intensity. Also, feeling toward Previous nationality Identity again plays a role for the type, but not for the intensity of Nationalism, which may have some interesting implications in terms of further studies of nationalism

TABLE 6.4. Correlations among Different Categories of Bosniak Population Sample

	Correlation (<i>r</i>)	Sig.		Correlation (<i>r</i>)	Sig.
Nationalism Strength and Education Level Population Sample	-.03	.512	Nationalism Type and Education Level	.243	.001**
Nationalism Strength and Previous Identity Population Sample	.02	.65	Nationalism Type and Previous Identity	-.14	.001**
Promoter	-.04	.75		.06	.62
Nonpromoter	.03	.46		-.16	.001**
Nationalism Strength and Age Population Sample	.11	.003**	Nationalism Type and Age	.08	.03**
Promoter	.14	.32		.07	.07*
Nonpromoter	-.13	.001**		.19	.14

** Significant at $p < .05$; * significant at $p < .1$.

as a type of collective action. Finally, although with different levels of statistical significance, age plays a role for both aspects of nationalism. For type of nationalism, however, a negative correlation sign suggests that the older population tends to have a higher score on ethnic type of nationalism, while they also score higher on nationalism intensity. Since most of the correlation scores are low, we cannot draw strong conclusions, yet they do suggest that further analysis is warranted. Nevertheless, statistical significance for the correlations provides us with the justification to examine how those variables will interact among each other in a higher model of regression.

6.3. Multinomial Logistic Regression for Nationalism Strength and Nationalism Type on Six Bosniak Identity Categories

To investigate the likelihood of one category of identity ascription over another among the responders, the multinomial logistic regression (MLR) is used to model nominal outcome variables of different categories of ascription of Bosniak identity, in which the log odds (logits) of the outcomes are modeled as a multinomial logit estimate combination of the seven predictor variables. The starting point of the investigation was that the responder's identity choices are influenced by their intensity and type

TABLE 6.5. Model Fitting Information

Model Fitting Criteria		Likelihood Ratio Tests		
Model	-2 log Likelihood	<i>Chi-Square</i>	Df.	Sig.
Intercept Only	1716.01			
Final	1511.23	204.78	40	.000

Note: Correlation is significant at $p < .001$.

of nationalism, which are two main predicting variables. The regression controls for the effects of respondent's education level, economic attachment to the homeland, social status in the population, and gender. The result of the Goodness-of-Fit test performed to evaluate the model shows that the model is significant, meaning that at least a subset of the predictors have nonzero effects, and therefore it means that they do affect the identity category outcome (see table 6.5).

6.3.1. Parameter Estimates for SB Relative to VSB

Intercept. This is the multinomial logit estimate for the SB category relative to the VSB category when the predictor variables in the model are evaluated at zero. For the SB with zero as the score on Nationalism Strength, Nationalism Type, Age, Education, and Gender, the logit for preferring the SB to the VSB category is -2.24 ($SE = 0.73$; $p < 0.002$)

Nationalism Strength: If a subject were to increase his Nationalism Strength score by one point, the multinomial log odds (logit) of preferring the VSB category to the SB would be expected to decrease by -1.56 units ($p < 0.001$) while holding all other variables in the model constant.

If a subject were to increase his Nationalism Strength score by one unit, the relative odds for ascribing to the SB category to the VSB category would be expected to decrease by a factor of 0.21, given that the other variables in the model are held constant [$\text{Exp}(B) = 0.21$; $p < 0.001$]. So, given a one-unit increase in Nationalism Strength, the relative odds of being in the SB identity group would be 0.21 times as likely when the other variables in the model are held constant. More generally, and since the score is less than 1, while the logit sign is negative, it may be said that if a subject were to increase his Nationalism Strength score, he would be *more likely* to ascribe to the VSB identity category than the SB Identity category. At this level of comparison none of the other variables showed significance (see table 6.6).

TABLE 6.6. Multinomial Logit for Five Categories of Bosniak Identity

		B	S.E.	Wald	Df.	Sig.	Exp (B)
SB	Intercept	-2.24	.73	9.33	1	.002	
	Age	0	.01	.02	1	.892	1
	Nationalism Type	.3	.33	.8	1	.373	1.35
	Nationalism Strength	-1.56	.37	17.62	1	.001	.21**
	Higher Education ^a	-.18	.48	.14	1	.712	.84
	High-School Education	-.03	.29	.01	1	.922	.97
	Gender (Female)	-.04	.27	.02	1	.876	.96
	BiH Home Nonowner	.16	.27	.35	1	.554	1.17
WB	Status: Nonpromoter	.59	.51	1.35	1	.246	1.8
	Intercept	3.64	1.45	6.3		.012	
	Age	0	.02	.00	1	.993	1
	Nationalism Type	-.22	.63	.13	1	.724	.8
	Nationalism Strength	-2.9	.63	21	1	.001	.06**
	Higher Education ^a	.28	.75	.147	1	.701	1.33
	High School Education	-.37	.57	.414	1	.52	.69
	Gender (Female)	-.21	.51	.168	1	.682	.81
OVS	BiH Home Nonowner	.27	.5	.293	1	.588	1.31
	Status: Nonpromoter	.63	1.07	3.44	1	.557	1.86
	Intercept	.05	.73	.005	1	.944	
	Age	-.04	.01	11.2	1	.001	.96**
	Nationalism Type	.36	.37	.984	1	.321	1.44
	Nationalism Strength	-.77	.4	3.74	1	.053	.46*
	Higher Education ^a	-.02	.51	.00	1	.965	.98
	High School Education	.24	.31	.61	1	.436	1.27
OS	Gender (Female)	.54	.27	4	1	.046	1.72**
	BiH Home Nonowner	-.17	.28	.35	1	.552	.85
	Status: Nonpromoter	-.22	.44	.24	1	.625	.81
	Intercept	-1.71	.95	3.22	1	.073	
	Age	-.03	.02	3.82	1	.051	.97*
	Nationalism Type	.51	.42	1.45	1	.228	1.66
	Nationalism Strength	-2.47	.45	29.89	1	.001	.09**
	Higher Education ^a	.59	.49	1.48	1	.223	1.81
OW	High-School Education	-.11	.38	.08	1	.773	.9
	Gender (Female)	.84	.33	6.48	1	.011	2.32**
	BiH Home Nonowner	-.16	.33	.22	1	.638	.85
	Status: Nonpromoter	.37	.65	.32	1	.571	1.45
	Intercept	-2.81	.95	8.79	1	.003	
	Age	-.01	.02	0.1	1	.752	1
	Nationalism Type	.65	.41	2.52	1	.112	1.92
	Nationalism Strength	-4.47	.48	86.56	1	.001	.01**
OWB	Higher Education ^a	.5	.56	.79	1	.374	1.65
	High-School Education	.28	.4	.49	1	.485	1.32
	Gender (Female)	.41	.35	1.4	1	.238	1.51
	BiH Home Nonowner	-.14	.35	.16	1	.692	.87
	Status: Nonpromoter	-.15	.59	.06	1	.802	.86

Note: The reference category is the VSB group.

** Significant at $p < 0.05$; * significant at $p < 0.1$.

^a Elementary/No School is the base category for comparison among schooling groups.

6.3.2. Parameter Estimates for WB Relative to VSB

Intercept. This is the multinomial logit estimate for the WB category relative to the VSB, when the predictor variables in the model are evaluated at zero. For the WB category with zero as the score on Nationalism Strength, Nationalism Type, Age, Education, and Gender, the logit for preferring the WB group to the VSB category is -3.64 ($SE = 1.45$; $p < 0.012$).

Nationalism Strength: If a subject were to increase his or her Nationalism Strength score by one point, the multinomial log odds of preferring the WB to the VSB identity category ascription would be expected to decrease by -2.9 units ($p < 0.001$) while holding all other variables in the model constant.

If a subject were to increase his Nationalism Strength score by one unit, the relative odds for ascribing to the WB category to the VSB would be expected to decrease by a factor of 0.06 , given that the other variables in the model are held constant [$\text{Exp}(B) = 0.06$; $p < 0.001$]. So, given a one-unit increase in Nationalism Strength, the relative odds of being in the WB group would be 0.06 times as likely when the other variables in the model are held constant. More generally, and since the score is less than 1, it may be said that if a subject were to increase his Nationalism Strength score, it could be expected that he would be *more likely* to ascribe to the VSB category than to the WB. At this level of comparison none of the other variables showed significance (see table 6.6).

6.3.3. Parameter Estimates for OVSB Relative to VSB

Intercept. This is the multinomial logit estimate for the OVSB relative to the VSB when the predictor variables in the model are evaluated at zero. For the OVSB with zero as the score on Nationalism Strength, Nationalism Type, Age, Education, and Gender, the logit for preferring the OVSB to the VSB is 0.05 ($SE = 0.73$; $p < 0.053$).

Nationalism Strength: If a subject were to increase his Nationalism Strength score by one point, the multinomial log odds of preferring the OVSB to the VSB category would be expected to decrease by -0.77 units ($p < 0.053$) while holding all other variables in the model constant.

If a subject were to increase his Nationalism Strength score by one unit, the relative odds for ascribing to the OVSB identity category to the VSB would be expected to decrease by a factor of 0.46 , given that other variables in the model are held constant. So, given a one-unit increase in Nationalism Strength, the relative odds of being in the OVSB identity group would

be 0.46 times as likely when the other variables in the model are held constant. More generally, and since the score is less than 1 and the multinomial log is negative, it may be said that if a subject were to increase his Nationalism Strength score, it could be expected that he would be more likely to ascribe to the VSB identity category than the OVSB.

Age: If a subject were to increase his age by one year, the multinomial log odds of preferring the OVSB to the VSB identity category would be expected to decrease by -0.04 units ($p < 0.001$) while holding all other variables in the model constant.

If a subject were to increase his age by one unit, the relative odds for ascribing to the OVSB to the VSB would be expected to decrease by a factor of 0.96, given that other variables in the model are held constant. So, given a one-unit increase in age, the relative odds of being in the OVSB identity group would be 0.96 times as likely when the other variables in the model are held constant. More generally, and since the score is less than 1 and the multinomial log is negative, it may be said that as a subject age, it may be expected that he will be more likely to ascribe to the VSB than the OVSB identity category.

Gender (Female): The multinomial logit for females relative to males is 0.54 units higher ($p < 0.046$) for preferring the OVSB to the VSB given that all other predictor variables in the model are held constant. In other words, females are more likely than males to prefer the OVSB category to the VSB.

For males relative to females, the relative odds for ascribing to the OVSB relative to the VSB would be expected to increase by a factor of 1.72, given that other variables in the model are held constant. More generally, and since the score is greater than 1 and the multinomial log is positive, it may be said that a female subject is more likely to ascribe to the OVSB identity category than the VSB category. In other words, females are 1.72 times as likely as males to ascribe to a non-Bosniak national identity while still feeling strongly toward Bosniak identity, as compared to males, who are more likely to ascribe to a Bosniak national identity and also feel strongly about being Bosniak at the same time. At this level of comparison, none of the other variables showed significance (see table 6.6).

6.3.4. Parameter Estimates for OSB Relative to VSB

Intercept. This is the multinomial logit estimate for the OSB category relative to the VSB when the predictor variables in the model are evaluated at zero. For the OSB with zero as the score on Nationalism Strength,

TABLE 6.7. Cross Tabulation for Gender and How Strongly Bosniak

Gender		<i>How Strongly Do You Feel Bosniak?</i>			<i>Total</i>
		Weak	Strong	Very Strong	
Female	Count	35	60	171	266
	% within Gender	13.2%	22.6%	64.3%	100%
Male	Count	43	69	289	401
	% within Gender	10.7%	17.2%	72.1%	100%

Nationalism Type, Age, Education, and Gender, the logit for preferring the OSB to the VSB is -1.71 ($SE = 0.95$; $p < 0.73$).

Nationalism Strength: If a subject were to increase his Nationalism Strength score by one point, the multinomial log odds of preferring the OSB to the VSB would be expected to decrease by -2.47 units ($p < 0.001$) while holding all other variables in the model constant.

If a subject were to increase his Nationalism Strength score by one unit, the relative odds for preferring the OSB identity category to the VSB would be expected to decrease by a factor of 0.09 , given that the other variables in the model are held constant. So, given a one-unit increase in Nationalism Strength, the odds of being in the OSB identity group would be 0.09 times as likely when the other variables in the model are held constant. More generally, and since the score is less than 1 and the multinomial log is negative, it can be expected that if a subject were to increase his Nationalism Strength score, he would be more likely to ascribe to the VSB than the VSB Bosniak identity category.

Age: If a subject were to increase his age by one year, the multinomial log odds of preferring the OSB to the VSB identity category would be expected to decrease by -0.03 units ($p < 0.051$) while holding all other variables in the model constant.

If a subject were to increase his age by one unit, the odds for preferring the OSB identity group to the VSB would be expected to decrease by a factor of 0.97 , given that the other variables in the model are held constant. So, given a one-unit increase in age, the relative odds of being in the OSB identity group would be 0.97 times as likely as being in the VSB, when the other variables in the model are held constant. More generally, and since the score is less than 1 and the multinomial log is negative, it may be expected that if a subject were to increase his age, he would be more likely to be in the VSB identity category than the OSB.

Gender (Female): The multinomial logit for females relative to males is

0.84 units higher ($p < 0.011$) for preferring the OSB category to the VSB, given that all other predictor variables in the model are held constant. In other words, females are more likely than males to prefer the OSB to the VSB identity category.

This may be interpreted to mean that females are following their male counterparts in terms of the nationalism project, but with slight hesitation, as they claim to feel strongly and very strongly Bosniak, while at the same time also clinging to the old Muslim identity more than males. It appears that this group of women is more hesitant than men about the abstract concept of the new identity. This situation is partly explained by the well-known Gilligan-Kohlberg debate,⁴ which suggests that, in general, context influences women's reasoning more than men's. Women's thinking is generally more immanent than abstract, and so here it appears that this sample of women prefers the certainty of the old identity rather than the uncertainty of the new one, which is being pushed for by nationalism. At this level of comparison, none of the other variables showed significance (see table 6.6).

6.3.5. Parameter Estimates for OWB Relative to VSB

Intercept. This is the multinomial logit estimate for the OWB relative to the VSB when the predictor variables in the model are evaluated at zero. For the OWB with zero as the score on Nationalism Strength, Nationalism Type, Age, Education, and Gender, the logit for preferring the OWB to the VSB is -2.81 ($SE = 0.95$; $p < 0.003$).

Nationalism Strength: If a subject were to increase his Nationalism Strength score by one point, the multinomial log odds of preferring the OWB to the VSB identity category would be expected to decrease by -4.47 units ($p < 0.001$), while holding all other variables in the model constant.

If a subject were to increase his Nationalism Strength score by one unit, the relative odds for ascribing to the OWB identity category rather than the VSB would be expected to decrease by a factor of 0.01, given that the other variables in the model are held constant. So, given a one-unit increase in Nationalism Strength, the relative odds of being in the OWB identity group would be 0.01 times as likely when the other variables in the model are held constant. More generally, since the score is less than 1 and the multinomial log is negative, it may be expected that if a subject were to increase his Nationalism Strength score, he would be more likely to ascribe to the VSB identity category over the OWB. At this level of comparison, none of the other variables showed significance (see table 6.6).

TABLE 6.8. Cross Tabulation for Gender and Respondent Nationality Choice

Gender		<i>What is your nationality?</i>				<i>Total</i>
		Bosniak	Muslim	Bosnian/ Herzegovinian	Other	
Female	Count	172	45	37	10	264
	% within Gender	65.2%	17%	14%	3.8%	100%
Male	Count	316	45	32	7	400
	% within Gender	79%	11.3%	8%	1.8%	100%

TABLE 6.9. Nationalism-Strength-Based Hierarchy of Bosniak Identity Groups

	B	S.E.	Wald	Df.	Sig.	Exp (B)	NS Mean ^a	NT Mean ^b
<i>Other-Very Strong Bosniak (OVSB)</i>	-1.56	0.37	3.74	1	.001	.46**	.03	.21
<i>Strong Bosniak (SB)</i>	-2.9	0.63	17.61	1	.001	.21**	-.06	.23
<i>Other-Strong Bosniak (OSB)</i>	-0.77	0.4	29.89	1	.053	.09*	-.22	.25
<i>Weakest Bosniak (WB)</i>	-2.47	0.45	21.00	1	.001	.06**	-.27	.17
<i>Other-Weakest Bosniak (OWB)</i>	-4.47	0.48	86.56	1	.001	.01**	-.52	.34

** Significant at $p < 0.05$ * significant at $p < 0.1$.

^a Nationalism Strength Standardized Mean

^b Nationalism Type Standardized Mean

6.3.6. Discussion on Multinomial Regression for the Case of Bosniak Identity

The results of the analysis show that the factor of Nationalism Strength is significant for the likelihood of identity ascription for each category relative to the VSB. If a hierarchy of groups is created based on the intensity of how strongly respondents feel Bosniak, it may be seen that the likelihood of change to the Desired exclusive Bosniak Identity category based on Nationalism Strength is statistically significant for each group. As the Nationalism score increases, the likelihood of stronger Desired Identity group selection changes correspondingly. This pattern is not followed when the scores for Nationalism Type and Desired Identity are observed, and that variance shows not only that those two concepts work differently, but that intensity of Nationalism for this group is a greater factor that encourages the ascription of a Desired Bosniak Identity (see table 6.9).

Furthermore, it should be noted that the Nationalism Type score indicates that the Bosniak identity group with the lowest level of Nationalism Strength, OWB, has the highest score on the civic type of Nationalism, while the group with the highest score on Nationalism Strength among the five categories, OVSB, has the highest score on the ethnic nationalism type. In fact, the correlation between the two variables indicates a small but statistically significant ($p = 0.017$) negative correlation, ($r_s = -0.09$).⁵ That means that for this sample of Bosniak population, the stronger the nationalism, the less of a civic type it is, keeping in mind that it is a weak correlation, and the preliminary tests showed no effects of interactions among the two independent variables.

As could be observed from table 6.6, Nationalism Strength is, more or less, a factor in all situations. So for the OVSB group—made up of respondents who feel strongly Bosniak but have self-identified in the survey with an other than Bosniak identity—the nationalism logistic coefficient has the strongest effect and it can significantly increase the odds of a person's membership in the Desired Identity category. The same arrangement follows for each other category, where nationalism strength affects the probability to adopt a new Bosniak identity. The closer a logistic coefficient is to zero, the less influence the nationalism strength has in predicting the odds of change of the identity category. Additionally, Wolff (2014) argues that coefficient results should not be treated as a linear correlation, but rather as a function that could be affected by changes in marginal variables as well. It should also be noted that since there is still no uniform scale of nationalism out there, this table does not tell us the “true level” of the intensity of nationalism for each category, and it rather only demonstrates how much nationalism strength drives the likelihood for a member of a group to adopt the elite-desired salient identity.

Nonetheless, the MLR test provides the empirical evidence that shows a stable correlation between Nationalism Strength and Desired Identity across all identity categories. This confirms the guiding hypothesis, as the results empirically support the model established for this exploratory study and shows that the direction of interaction goes from nationalism to salient identity for a group members. This direction is what this research set out to examine, as opposed to the common conventions regarding the interaction between the two, and it provides further causes-of-effects evidence to build a more robust causal explanation of the relation between nationalism and identity.

Conclusion

Lessons for a Better Understanding of Nationalism and Importance of Bosniak Identity

Although for Bosnian Muslims the process of national emergence and the assertion of a new salient identity have been going on for more than two decades, for the first time this work explains the significance of the whole process as well as the adoption of their new Bosniak identity. It provides a historical overview of Yugoslav and BiH Slavic Muslims' transformation from an ethno-religious group into a full-fledged distinct and independent national group. As shown in chapters 2 and 3, it took several centuries for them as an autochthonous local group to develop full self-awareness as a distinct national group, and, as pointed in chapter 4, to reach the stage of in-group baseline equality and the necessary level of literacy for nationalism to emerge and play the role it usually does: the role of precursor and facilitator of a group's newly desired salient identity. Most observers gloss over this new identity of Bosnian Muslims and note only in passing that this group has adopted a new name, and there is not much elaboration. What this study shows is that this group has adopted not only a new name but also a new significance and a new self-awareness expressed through nationalism that serve as a context for that new identity. Thus far, the whole phenomenon of this adaptation of a group has been largely glossed over by social scientists. This work fills the void and provides a much-needed in-depth description of the change.

This exploratory study has been guided by a few basic premises that provide justification for further studies about the particular relationship

between nationalism and identity: (1) that nationalism stimulates change of a group's salient identity; (2) that an increase in the sense of strength of nationalism in an individual, based on a sample of a Bosnian Muslim group, increases the likelihood of a strong ascription of a new, Bosniak identity; (3) that nationalism possesses two essential characteristics, strength (intensity) and type (civic and ethnic); (4) and that these two aspects of nationalism have two different functions when it comes to identity ascription.

Nationalism has been seen as an elite-driven process that serves as a context that demands a new salient identity because it causes cultural discontinuity for a group. Nationalism may be stronger or weaker, depending on the exposure to influences of the group's elites who steer the nationalism project and shape and encourage the targeted population to ascribe new salient identity through the group's internal and external power struggles. In a nuanced approach, this study treats the two main aspects of nationalism, strength and type, differently. Nationalism may be of two types, ethnic or civic, and these types provide their own textures for the phenomenon and an essential context for the breadth and character of the identity.

Identity is an outcome, a strategic role for both the group and the person. Identity is formed on the group level and is then available for an individual to ascribe to and claim for herself or himself. Identity has two levels of acquisition by an individual. The lower level, self-defining, occurs after individuals perceive they are joined in a common group, when a person evaluates and accepts or rejects the group's salient identity and subsequently claims it or not for herself or himself. The higher level, self-investment of identity, is a level that involves consciousness and investment in the social contract of the group. Self-investment occurs after the first stage is completed, and it could be stimulated through experiences of everyday, banal nationalism.

This inquiry observed the first level, self-defining, among a sample of the Bosnian Muslim population living in a diasporic condition. In these conditions, the identity adopted by the main, back-home population still plays a role for evaluation of individuals in the interactions among members of the group.¹ For this reason, Hockenos' (2003) elastic definition of diaspora was used to ensure that participants are indeed people dispersed from their homeland, but clustered and connected in communities composed of people from back home with whom they interact at more or less regular intervals. Although the sample is drawn from sites with diaspora populations, it should be emphasized that these are places where homeland localities are reproduced and where many back-home situations are recreated, and so they can produce the necessary context for Bosniak identity

to play a role in the social life of an individual.² That is why it was noted above that a diaspora situation with long-distance nationalism is a situation where the object of nationalism may be distant, but sources of nationalism are not.³ Additionally, if nation is an imagined community, imaginations may be equally strong or weak “here *and* there.” Finally, even back-home localities are no more stable and undisturbed by new circumstances than diasporic ones, since the Bosnian Muslim homeland has been very much destroyed and the process of (re)construction is still ongoing, while a large number of the BiH population is still internally displaced (see Dahlman and O’Tuathail 2005), and many more are now also looking to emigrate to the West in search of jobs.

Since nationalism is antithetical to religious universalism, Bosnian Muslims had to adapt and wrestle with factors that distinguish their group from other groups. Although it is known that Bosnian Muslims adhere to the Hanafi School of jurisprudence, it is not so much discussed in the literature that the Bosnian Muslim official religious hierarchy tries to adhere to the Maturidi creed. For the first time, this work provides an explanation of what exactly this combination of school of jurisprudence and creed means for the Muslim group in a volatile region of southeastern Europe. It describes the adaptation by the Bosnian Muslim religious hierarchy to four different types of secular state, an adaptation that has provided them with the possibility of fostering a sense of distinctiveness to assert themselves within the region and within the larger body of Islam, as well as in the contemporary world of nations.

Although the adjective “Bosnian” is used for (Bosnian) Muslims, it is not commonly understood that (Bosnian) Muslims also live in regions outside BiH. Perhaps that is one of the most important reasons why their nationalism demands the new salient identity of Bosniak, as a platform to enable all those other local Slavic-speaking Muslim groups to join in a single nationalism project. Since this group lives throughout the former Yugoslavia, the literature has thus far failed to provide an explanation of what exactly the territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina means to the Slavic-speaking Muslims of Bosnia, Sandžak, Montenegro, Macedonia, and Kosovo. This is another issue explained in detail in this work.

Finally, the group adopted the Slavic language of Bosnia as its own, and now considers the Bosnian language its own national language. Yet the ascription of that name also implicitly stakes a claim to a territory, and that is why Bosnian language, as a name and as a separate language, is being contested not only by other neighboring groups but, as shown in several chapters, even by some parts within the group.

Bosnian Muslims are not the only group that has gone through this transformation. It may be argued that all the other former Yugoslav groups went through a similar transformation, from subjects of a communist-led state to citizens of a capitalist one. In the case of Bosnian Muslims, however, transformation also included adoption of a new name and a new political role in a newly emerged country. This is an ideal case of a historical social experience that calls for observation and understanding, particularly of the relations between nationalism and the new salient identity. To provide that understanding, 670 surveys were collected over the course of several months from the Bosnian Muslim diaspora population spread throughout the midwestern and eastern United States. This unique data set of group members' responses about Bosnian Muslim nationalism and Bosniak identity was then used for empirical observation of the relationship. Furthermore, this rich data set provides a wealth of information about Bosnian Muslims' views and perceptions of their own culture and self-understanding that may be further utilized for deeper analysis of the group. Described in chapters 4, 5, and 6, this data collected from the diaspora population opens up the possibility for continuing investigation of the group's emergence, as well as for comparative study of the group in its homeland and in other diaspora situations. Most interestingly, it provides the possibility of empirically measuring relations between different aspects of nationalism and identity in a sample of a population, which is rarely done.

This study has several wider implications. First is the unmasking of nationalism as a facilitator of new identity. A detailed review in the chapter 1 of the well-known literature on nationalism accomplishes this through a novel, specific focus on the role of identity in those works. The argument proposed here is that nationalism, as a facilitator of cultural discontinuity and change, actually demands a new salient identity, and as the literature review shows, such an approach does not contradict conclusions of previous authors.

Although empirical evidence from the inquiry discussed in this book shows that the guiding idea is warranted, it is perhaps still premature to make wide-ranging claims. Nevertheless, this work provides a new approach to the question of what exactly nationalism does for a group, as it shows that in the life of a group, nationalism serves as a mechanism to enable needed changes that groups must go through in their political life.

To heed Gellner's (2006) warning against selecting cases where the condition of a case is used to help explain the emergence of that very condition in another case, and since context matters, especially in the case of

identity selection (self-defining), careful consideration has been given to the appropriateness of the case study. Thus, the case of the ongoing Bosnian Muslim nationalism project, with the desired new salient identity of Bosniak, was chosen over some other cases.⁴ Bosniak identity was observed at the lower level of self-defining, where participants self-ascribed variations of Bosniak identity that were offered by the survey questionnaire and self-stereotyping. The participants in this study were seen as members of a group at such an early stage of the process of emergence and self-ascription that they lacked a clearly developed prototypical identity for comparison to rely on, as Leach et al. (2008) suggested would be part of the consideration on the lower level of ascription. The appropriate comparison, therefore, for this part of the research was done only among regionally structured subgroups of the population sample.

Since the research was done on a closed sample of a group instead of measuring just the two options of claiming identity or not, Bosniak identity was divided into six possible categories of the new salient identity ascription in order to capture shades and intricacies of its ascriptions. The six categories were based on the self-selected intensity of identity ascription, and nationalism strength was considered as a factor that moves an individual to choose a stronger or weaker identity category. The most intense ascription of salient identity was Bosnian Muslim nationalism desired, while the least intensive was nationalism undesired.

At last, a multinomial logistic regression was used to test those propositions and compare ascription intensity among the subcategories of the group. It found that the *strength of nationalism* did affect the possibility of the acquisition of a new group's salient identity, while the *type of nationalism* showed no statistical significance in that process, and therefore the type had no effect on the ascription of a new salient identity for this sample of the population.

This method was used because the whole nationalism process and its salient identity project is rarely a yes-or-no process. Rather, as explained in the introduction, it is an ongoing process where both groupness and identity are constantly being evaluated and adjusted to fit the circumstances that envelop both phenomena. Even if the group does not respond to the nationalist identity preference, it might continue to exist in some form and with some other identity. That is why the test was designed to measure the greater or lesser likelihood of the desired identity ascription among the respondents. Therefore, this study does not suggest that every population exposed to nationalism necessarily responds to it positively by adopting all its goals, desires, and preferences. Since nationalism is primarily an

elite-driven project, the population still has the agency to respond to it, to accept, modify, or reject its goals, as appears to be the case with Bosnian Muslims' preference for one type of nationalism. The likelihood of ascription of the desired salient identity versus other identity options was tested among subgroups of the population sample, whose preferences essentially were compared and then conclusions drawn. So unlike regular regression, where the intensity of the independent variable corresponds to the amount of the dependent variable, or when a comparison is made between two groups that choose exclusionary yes or no options, in this study the likelihood of the *preferred* (rather than the only) option was measured based on two independent and several controlled variables.

What this work essentially aims to show is that nationalism is not about a group's permanence, as primordialists and ethno-symbolists claim, or about a group's transience, which some modernists assert, but rather, *that nationalism is about change that is occurring on the group level*, which is implicitly acknowledged by all those different scholarly approaches since they all provide possibility for changes to happen despite in-group inertia. Furthermore, this study's intention is to open that door even wider to see that nationalism, as a value-oriented movement, is the facilitator of change for the institution of identity, among other things. In his seminal work, Barth (1998a) suggested that most of the cultural matters that are usually building blocks of nationalism vary, are (re)learned, and change, on both the individual *and* the group level. In fact, change is imbedded as an essential part of collective action, and nationalism is a prime example of that.⁵ It is still an elite-driven project, guided by the values strategically selected by elites. Once the resulting change in collective action occurs, identity, as the strategic choice of an individual or a group, must correspond to the action and respond appropriately, and therefore a new identity (re)emerges to fit the changes. As shown in this work, throughout their history Bosnian Muslims have gone through different situations, changes and stages of self-identifying, and all those vicissitudes have been followed by adjustments and appropriate salient identities. When they finally emerged as a full-fledged political entity, a nation on the local and international level, which partly came as the result of their nationalism project and the breakup of the previous order, described in chapters 3 and 4, they needed the new salient identity of Bosniak to satisfy those circumstances and reality. This work measured those group change effects and acceptance of the different salient identity on the individual level.

The relationship between nationalism and identity corresponds with the initial assumptions guiding this inquiry. This may have implications for

how nationalism is seen by both social science and by policy makers. Clearly understood, the possibility that identity may be modified, improved, or changed through the process of nationalism, essentially confirms Barth's (1998a) often neglected position that a group's boundaries change while the group maintains itself despite all those changes, and that boundaries are negotiated and compromised at the time when a whole new group is formed out of previously disaggregated groups of people. My findings encourage further study of changes in the social world rather than of the permanence, which social science, guided by functionalism, often tends to implicitly suggest as its guiding standard.

Motivated by the idea of more or less groupness as an essential aspect of nationalism this study included not only the two main guiding hypotheses that nationalism stimulates change of identity and that nationalism has two different components, but also included assumptions that age, gender, education, social standing, and economic attachment to the homeland, as controlled variables, would also impact nationalism strength and type among participants. A lower-level analysis confirms that interaction among some of the controlled variables with both aspects of nationalism does play a role in the case of this population sample. The results justify the variant-groupness approach, since it empirically shows that diverse segments of a group will experience and be affected by the intensity of nationalism differently. Lower-level analysis found that:

- (A) Age has a moderate to low effect on the intensity of nationalism strength among individuals, yet it makes no difference regarding the participants' preference of nationalism type.
- (B) The social standing of a person considered a local identity promoter and a member of a ground-level elite group, does not affect the *intensity of nationalism*, but it does affect *nationalism type*, since responders from that sample subgroup have higher preferences for the civic type of nationalism than does the general population. It should be added that both subgroups prefer the civic type more than the ethnic type. In that sense it may be that ground-level elite group preference is instrumental in determining the type of preference of the rest of the people.
- (C) Gender appears to play a role in determining the feeling of intensity of nationalism, while only marginally in determining the type of nationalism preference. Women tend to score lower on nationalism strength and score closer to the ethnic type than their male counterparts. The different scores show the differ-

ent levels of groupness within a sample of the population. Such results justify calls from those who urge that nationalism be disaggregated as a process and be observed in various segments and levels of the population that experience it.

- (D) Economic attachment to the homeland, defined by property ownership in BiH, is a statistically significant factor for a participant's nationalism strength, as it correlates with a higher nationalism strength score, but it has no statistical significance in determining preference for nationalism type.

This case of Bosnian Muslim nationalism and acquisition of the elite-desired new salient Bosniak identity shows that case selection does matter and, when measured under the ongoing condition of group identity self-selection, the relationship between nationalism and a group's national identity starts with the nationalism and ends with the identity. Although the group possessed previous forms of togetherness, it was with a different notion of boundary markers, not with the group's agreed-upon and universally accepted identity that sets it apart from other groups, nor with political consciousness of group status as a nation. As this study shows, all these elements emerged over time to be used as building blocks of Bosnian Muslim nationalism and to be formalized through the newly acquired Bosniak identity. This emergence has intensified particularly since the breakup of the former Yugoslavia, while it may be considered that the process began in the last years of the Ottoman Empire, and especially after its withdrawal from BiH in 1878, when Bosnian Muslims for the first time found themselves detached from the abode of Islam to fend for themselves. Their emergence occurred in four phases; (a) early on, through the Muslim institutions established and supported by the new occupying powers; (b) then by their new elites, who surfaced through different periods of the several Yugoslavias with their own primarily South Slavic and Muslim religious orientation; (c) through the initial realization of the need to avow themselves of a distinct Muslim group tied primarily to the territory of BiH and its Slavic language; and (d) finally to fully assert themselves as a distinct Bosniak nation after the collapse of the communist regime and breakup of the last Yugoslavia, which served as the opportunity and strong springboard for Bosnian Muslim nationalism to play the role of new salient identity facilitator. Throughout all these phases, they tried hard to resist those neighboring nationalizing projects that attempted to absorb Sandžak and Bosnian Muslim "(br)others" into their nationalist-desired, yet much

more restrictive, Serbian, Croatian, or Montenegrin, all ethnically Slavic identities as defined by their respective nationalisms.

During the group's 144-year history, the structural conditions on which Slavic-speaking Muslims of BiH and Sandžak had little impact, organized the composition of their elites and directed their emergence strategies in a manner similar to those emergence strategies that occurred elsewhere in Europe, as described by Foucault (2003). Over time each of the three broadly defined elite groups, which came from among religious structures, the landowning-political stratum, and the intellectual realm, picked their own issues to champion and endeavored to make them important to the Bosniak nation. Throughout all this turbulent history, Bosnian (and Sandžak) Muslims managed to preserve the integrity of BiH as an entity and a territory on which they could make some claim. They managed to wrestle and tame Islamic universalism into a form of Bosnian Islam, now widely accepted as a particular Islam by the group's population. Finally, they managed to turn the language of the land into the language of the people, and now they have structured, formalized, and claimed the Bosnian language as their group's own national language.

Moreover, what may be observed from this history is that different forms of Bosniak identity were waiting in obscurity and resurfaced several times when stimulated by regional occupiers, elements of the group's elites, or individual notables, who urged various segments of the BiH population, not necessarily only Muslims, to accept this identity. But it took the full-fledged Bosnian Muslim nationalism of the 1990s to fully enable this group to claim Bosniak identity as their own and demand acknowledgment as a Bosniak nation.⁶ Therefore, the occasional recurrence of historical observations and the occasional appearance in writing of "Bosniak" as a term for an identity in BiH that was rejected by the BiH population of the time, shows that nationalism *is not* triggered by a strong sense of pre-existing identity among a particular group. Rather, it is the other way around: *elite-driven nationalism* is the necessary context and mechanism for acquisition, definition, and even production of a new salient identity for an emerging group. Furthermore, nationalism is neither natural nor inevitable, nor should it be observed as either.

A full understanding of this process reveals how policy makers use nationalism to influence ascription of the *desired* salient identity for a group, which then becomes an essential building block for further development and growth of the group. Until now, assumptions and observations have relied on the reverse order of interaction, as though only identity can influ-

ence the rise and strength of nationalism, and that is seen as an almost inevitable *natural* process. So policies are designed and implemented to effect higher levels of self-ascription of identity, instead of observing nationalism projects as an essential process on both the lower and higher levels of identity ascription.

Based on the historical account presented here, it may be argued that Bosnian Muslims' reactant nationalism has emerged late in comparison with the nationalisms of other peoples in the region. It emerged in the form of what Plamenatz (1976) described as the effort of people (finally) culturally equipped to assert themselves as equals in a civilization not of their own making, when they have had to make themselves anew and to create a new salient national identity. Whenever Bosnian Muslims were treated by neighboring nationalism projects as Serbs-to-be, Croats-to-be, or Montenegrins-to-be, they learned from it, and the new Bosniak identity was in part a response to those attempts. It took the strength of their own nationalism to assert themselves anew, and their preference for the civic type of nationalism now shapes the boundaries of their new salient identity. Interestingly, from conversations with members of the local elites and the measurements of the bipolar Nationalism Type Index in the sample, it appears that elites prefer Bosnian Muslim nationalism to be more the civic type than the ethnic, which is preferred by other contending neighboring nationalisms. Yet the nationalism of the ordinary Bosnian Muslim people appears to be more ethnic than that of the local leaders, and, therefore, it appears that the contending nationalisms have had influence on the group, just like the nationalism being promulgated by the group's elites. Thus future attempts to measure cases of nationalism and desired salient identities should take into account the neighboring and contending nationalisms of other groups and examine whether and what influence they have on the populations under observation through interactions and learning.

It should be no surprise to see that the type of nationalism does not affect identity ascription, while intensity does, since both types of nationalism may be weak or strong, and it is their strength that primarily affects the ascription of a group's new salient identity. Yet this apparent difference between the effects of the two aspects of nationalism also justifies the study's binomial functional approach, as it shows that these two traits work differently and serve different purposes in the process of a group's identity ascription. Further study of the difference between these two aspects of nationalism should yield better understanding of the exact roles they play in relation to identity ascription. What may be inferred from the results of this study is that the type of nationalism plays a role in defining the

boundaries and nature of identity (as a cause of effect), rather than a role in the process of ascription of identity by community members (effect of cause). More empirical evidence is necessary, however, to fully accept such a conclusion. This study opens up the possibility that the measure of nationalism type may be important to further understand the possible parameters of the new salient identity, particularly to understand how different types of nationalism might stimulate transition from self-defining to self-investment. Furthermore, a clearer understanding of the impact of the type of nationalism of a group may be potentially important to better assess the possibility of democracy in situations where multiple groups share a state, as in the case of BiH, with Bosnian Muslims, Serbs, and Croats.⁷

In their later work, the pioneers of the study of democratic transitions, Stepan, Linz, and Yadav (2011), also emphasize the importance of the relationship between democratic transitions and the possibility for democratic stability on the one hand and nationalism on the other. One can argue, again, that the possibility of a fine-tuned measurement of a group's nationalism type is instrumentally important in the situation of Stepan, Linz, and Yadav's (2011) state-nation model, which may correspond to the case of BiH. Such measurement has potentially important implications for their theoretical model of a state-nation that allows for state diversity, where each group cultivates its own different type of groupness.⁸ The possibility that in such a state's circumstances one of the containing groups builds its groupness on shared civic ideas and norms of mobilization, while the other containing group sees itself as a fixed (sub)ethnic category, theoretically provides the possibility for mutual coexistence, more so than if both groups cultivated the same civic types of nationalism. With such an approach to democracy in a culturally and ethnically diverse state,⁹ ethnic and civic types of nationalism could potentially coexist and be institutionally organized to create a common "we feeling" and a constitutional patriotism, more so than if there were two or more cases of civic types of nationalism in a single state, but less so than in the case of two budding cases of the ethnic type of nationalism. In the case of a "pure multinational context" (Stepan, Linz, and Yadav 2011, 9), a BiH with three major groups, two of them with an ethnic and one with a civic type of nationalism, could potentially create such a mutually tolerant context. Such a context would demand appropriate salient identities, which are singular but not mutually conflictual, as long as they reach a consensus about policies providing for mutually accepted minimal patriotism and support of a state territory and institution, which are designed to ensure an asymmetrical federalism, as Stepan, Linz, and Yadav (2011, 9–10) prescribe.

Precisely because of that possibility of ensuring an asymmetric federalism, Bosnian Muslim nationalism's desired *Bosniak* identity provides room for a dual, but complementary, *Bosnian* identity to continue to operate as a common ground for all three BiH groups—Bosniaks, Croats, and Serbs—an identity to be voluntarily added as a layer to each group's own exclusive identity. So, contrary to normative suggestions by various activists and observers of the BiH situation, who urge that *Bosnian* identity be adopted by Bosnian Muslims *and others*,¹⁰ such an outcome could move the whole BiH situation further away from the possibility of a state-nation where stability and democracy are plausible.¹¹ If one BiH group laid claim to an all-inclusive Bosnian identity, that group would, at the same time, remove a possibility for mutually complementary Bosnian identity to serve as a foundation for a “we feeling” among members of all different BiH groups and lessen the possibility for a state's civil society to develop, which is a necessary element for a conflict resolution and reconciliation in BiH.¹² So instead of ordinary liberalism, where only the rights of an individual Bosnian citizen are respected, which many advocate for¹³ but where a citizen has a unitary Bosnian identity and is loyal to a state, Michel Walzer's (1994, 99–104) “Liberalism 2,” where both group and individual rights are mutually respected and ensured, would provide more reason for optimism regarding democratic success and state stability in BiH.¹⁴ It should be added that Bosnian identity is not the same as the previously rejected Yugoslav identity, because it is actually more historically grounded in the memory and tradition of all three groups and therefore it may be assumed by all of them. After all, those men from Bosnia who executed the archduke were volunteer members of a secret society called “Young Bosnia,” not “Young Yugoslavia,” even though they came from all three BiH groups with a majority of Serbs, but also a few Croats and Muslims. Furthermore, the success of the Bosniak identity project puts an end to attempts to recruit Bosnian Muslims into Croatian or Serbian nationalism projects and thereby cause the reality of the careful BiH balance to tip toward either the Croatian or Serbian side, with devastating consequences, as it did in the past. As it was discussed in this book, the devastation was experienced particularly hard by Bosnian Muslims throughout all those upheavals, and many of them said that is why they can no longer postpone their nationalism project and cannot risk to go into any other forms of unitarism—Bosnian, Balkan, or European—without first fully emancipating their own national project with its desired identity.¹⁵ Even in the last episode of collapse of the Yugoslav and BiH unitarism, Bosnian Muslims have paid the highest price with the number of killed, expelled, raped, and

traumatized people more so than any other Yugoslav group, including other local Muslim groups. The main difference between all of them and Bosnian Muslims is that throughout those upheavals all others have had clearly defined national projects (within or outside of Yugoslavia) and concomitant identities. Bosnian Muslims did not, and that is why their Bosniak identity is now so important for them, as well as for regional balance and stability.

Appendix A

Nationalism Strength Index

The Nationalism Strength Index consists of the following 17 items from the questionnaire, confirmed by the internal variability score to be part of the same construct. Since all items have different scales for responses, the standardized z-score was computed to homogenize scores between different scales for each item.

TABLE A1. Nationalism Strength Frequencies

(percent of total valid number of respondents)

Variables	Responses (ordinal values)					
	0	1	2	3	4	5
Cult 8B		8.7	22	28.8	17.6	22.9
PC 29R		4.5	6.8	27.7	15.4	45.6
MEM 50		19	12	30.3	18.9	19.8
MEM 51		10.8	8.1	25.6	19.5	36.1
MEM 55		1.2	3.9	17.3	36.8	40.7
MEM 52		5.2	48.4	35.6	10.8	
LAN 57		0.6	3.9	9.8	85.7	
LAN 56		4.8	6.5	88.7		
PC 34		37.7	35.4	26.8		
PC 32C	9.3	4.7	2.4	83.6		
PC 28A	44.5	31.9	23.5			
PC 35C	28.5	5.8	65.8			
REL 47c	1.5	23.3	75.2			
PC 37C	18	82				
PC 36C	32.9	67.1				
LAN 58C	44.9	54.5				
Edu 6	61.1	38.8				

Note: For detailed description and map of variables and scores, see the NS Table in appendix B.

TABLE A2. Nationalism Strength Index Composition

Question	Label	Coding matrix	Explanation
Edu 6c	Did you ever have a chance to attend any panel/lecture about Bosniak identity?	0 = No/Don't remember 1 = Yes	Attendance indicates higher interest. Furthermore, exposure to a talk/lecture about the issue generates a stronger intensity of nationalism.
Cult 8B	How often do you watch Bosnian films or TV?	1 = Never 2 = Rarely 3 = Occasionally 4 = Often 5 = Very often	The more exposure to the homeland's "print capital," the higher the score of intensity of nationalism.
LAN 56c	What is your primary language (main language spoken at home)?	1 = English 2 = Other 3 = Bosnian	The Bosnian language is an important factor of Bosnian Muslim nationalism. Responses were collapsed into three (out of six) options: Bosnian, English, Serbian, Croatian, Serbo-Croatian, Montenegrin, Other. Since it is a non-Slavic language, English has the lowest score.
LAN 57	How important is it for you that a Bosniak/Bosnian Muslim can speak the Bosnian language?	1 = Not important at all 2 = Not so important 3 = Somewhat important 4 = Very important	The Bosnian language is an important factor of Bosnian Muslim nationalism, and the measure of importance for a person is also a factor that affects the intensity of nationalism.
LAN 58c	Did it ever bother you that the name "Serbo-Croatian language" was the name of the official language of the former Yugoslavia?	0 = No 1 = Yes	The Bosnian language is an important factor of Bosnian Muslim nationalism, and the sense of denial of it increases the feeling of deprivation and increases the intensity of nationalism a person might have.

TABLE A2—Continued

Question	Label	Coding matrix	Explanation
PC 28a	Which passport do you hold?	1 = Other 2 = Bosnian	Respondents had a chance to circle more than one option, but if they did have a Bosnian passport, they were coded as 2, since Bosnian passport ownership enables a possibility for a respondent to vote in BiH elections. Furthermore, for participants in the United States, the willingness to obtain the passport in terms of money and time to get it indicates their attitude toward the state of BiH as the national homeland and shows a higher intensity of nationalism.
PC 32c	Where do you mostly read/watch news about BiH?	0 = None 1 = U.S. 2 = Cro/Mtng/Sr 3 = BiH	0 coded as noninterested; 1 is seen as least interested since U.S. media very rarely report news about BiH; 2 Exposure to opposing nationalisms through news; 3 The highest since it indicates continuous contact with the same media sources, and homeland nationalisms, as the population back home. Journalists are often noted in the literature as the forerunners of nationalism.
PC 34	Have you ever voted in Bosnian elections?	1 = Never 2 = Sometimes 3 = Yes, every time	A stronger intensity of nationalism will drive more political activity, and it will certainly motivate a person to participate in back-home elections.
PC 29r	In your opinion, the Bosnian war was primarily about?	1 = Other 2 = Fight for Bosniak/Muslim state 3 = Fight for independent BiH 4 = Defense against Serbian aggression 5 = Defense against Serbian and Croatian aggression	“Our fight” was inevitable, self-defense, and nonaggression, and that view provided additional strength for “us” to fight harder against “them,” the aggressors.

TABLE A2—Continued

Question	Label	Coding matrix	Explanation
MEM 55	Your knowledge of the Bosnian war is?	<p>1 = No knowledge</p> <p>2 = Very small</p> <p>3 = Some</p> <p>4 = Good</p> <p>5 = Excellent</p>	<p>Exposure to the common group's traumatic experience of the war and the higher self-identification from the knowledge about it suggests a higher sense of involvement. Furthermore, Smith sees war as one of the very important factors in the development of a strong sense of nationalism, since it reinforces the feeling of "us" vs. "them."</p>
MEM 50	Was BiH equal with other republics in the former Yugoslavia?	<p>1 = Very equal</p> <p>2 = Somewhat equal</p> <p>3 = Mostly equal</p> <p>4 = Somewhat unequal</p> <p>5 = Very unequal</p>	<p>Another indicator of seeing BiH as one's own state. Furthermore, the feelings of an unequal position of one's own republic/state should stimulate a stronger urge for self-rule, so it carries a higher value.</p>
PC 35c	For you, Muslims from Sandžak, in terms of nationality, are?	<p>0 = Something else</p> <p>1 = Don't know</p> <p>2 = Bosniaks</p>	<p>Respondents could choose one of five options: 1. Bosniak; 2. Muslim, as in the former Yugoslavia; 3. Sandžaklije (local name for people from the region); 4. Serbian/Montenegrin; 5. Don't know. For the purpose of this study all responses were collapsed into three options: Bosniak, Other, and Don't know. The highest score is for the option "Bosniak," followed by "I don't know" (since it leaves the possibility that they might be Bosniak), and the lowest score is the option "Other." Selecting "Bosniak" indicates that horizontal solidarity extends beyond the BiH border to signal nationalistic aspirations, caused by a stronger sense of nationalism. On the other hand, the sense of response "I am Bosniak," while they are "Muslims," not Bosniaks, indicates weaker nationalism.</p>

TABLE A2—Continued

Question	Label	Coding matrix	Explanation
PC 37c	Should Bosniak/Muslims from Sandžak be allowed to vote in the elections for Bosniak/Bosnian Muslim organizations?	0 = No 1 = Yes	Recognition that the nation is larger than the state. Also, recognition that Muslims of Sandžak are part of “our” nation, as such is an indication of a stronger sense of nationalism.
REL 47	Who runs the mosque you go to?	0 = Other (non-goers) 1 = Non-Bosniaks 2 = Bosniaks	Exposure to the IZ BiH-run mosque and “Bosnian Islam.” Responses were collapsed into three out of seven options: Bosniaks, Albanians, Turks, Arabs, Pakistanis, Various nationalities, Others. The option “Bosniaks” was kept separate in the model, while all others were combined into “Others.” The “non-goers” were coded as lowest since they potentially have lower exposure to “Bosnian Islam.”
MEM 51	Were Bosniaks/Bosnian Muslims equal with other nationalities of the Former Yugoslavia?	1 = Very equal 2 = Somewhat equal 3 = Mostly yes 4 = Somewhat unequal 5 = Very unequal	Feelings of an unequal position of one’s own group should stimulate a stronger urge for self-rule, so this carries the highest value.
MEM 52	How was the life of Muslims in the former Yugoslavia?	1 = Very good 2 = Good 3 = Bad 4 = Very bad	Feelings that one’s own group had a bad life should stimulate a stronger urge for separation and self-rule, so this carries the highest value.

Appendix B

Nationalism Type Index

The Nationalism Type Index is constructed with two poles, ethnic and civic, where a higher score means a more civic than ethnic type of nationalism. The same scale was used to code answers for each question. Since all items have different scales for responses, the standardized z-score was computed to homogenize scores between different scales for each item. The Nationalism Type Index consists of the following 14 items from the questionnaire, which are confirmed by an internal variability score to be part of the same construct.

TABLE B1. Nationalism Type Frequencies

(percent of total valid number of respondents)

Variables	Responses														
	<i>(ordinal values except responses to questions SD 19 and SD 20)</i>														
	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
1. SD 19	8.6	51.7	20	10.1	29.7	12.5	25.1	95	10.3	29.8	33.6	38.2	38.7	9.3	
total-friends															
2. SD 20	3.3	9.9	4	2.2	13.5	3.2	14.6	97.1	6	10.6	9.1	13.9	12	5	
total-family															
3. NAT 17B								14.8	8.8	15.1	18.1	43.1			
4. NAT 17D								73.2	16.6	6.7	2.2	1.3			
5. R 3								4.7	34.2	39.8	14.3	7.1			
6. Nat 15								1.7	23.2	7.2	25	42.9			
7. Nat 16								1.7	50.02	9.8	21.1	17.1			
8. REL 48c								65.4	18.1	9.7	6.8				
9. SD 27								16	15.4	17.9	50.8				
10. Cult 10								43.1	2.1	54.5					
11. LAN 59r								10.3	35.6	54.1					
11. SD 22r	55.8	44.2													
12. SD 23								87.4	12.6						
14. REL 49c								34.6	65.4						

Note: For detailed description and map of variables and scores see the Nationalism Type Index, TableB2.

TABLE B2. Nationalism Type Index Composition

Question	Label	Coding matrix	Explanation
R3	How different are the customs from your region, compared to the customs of other regions in BiH?	1 = Not different at all 2 = Not very different 3 = Somewhat different 4 = Significantly different 5 = Very different	Value 1 is considered as no difference to overcome in order to achieve solidarity, while Value 5, although very different, did not present obstacles for solidarity and is therefore seen as closer to the civic type of nationalism.
Cult 10	In your opinion, Bosniak/Bosnian Muslim culture is primarily?	1 = Islamic 2 = Slavic 3 = Both, Slavic and Islamic	1: As a platform to share cultural roots with just one neighbor 2: to share cultural roots with all Slavic neighbors 3: to share cultural roots with all neighbors and possibly recruit members from all groups.
Nat 15	Can a person be Bosniak even if he/she does not have a Bosniak parent?	1 = I don't know about Bosniaks 2 = No 3 = Not so easy 4 = Maybe yes 5 = Definitely yes	Given vs. acquired trait, where the higher perception of acquired traits scores closer to the civic type of nationalism.
Nat 16	Which parent is more important to be Bosniak?	1 = I don't know about Bosniaks 2 = Both (Either) 3 = Mother 4 = Father 5 = Neither is important	Given vs. acquired traits, where acquired traits score closer to civic type. Father is given a higher score because, Islamically, he is considered to be a stronger conduit of societal values.
NAT 17B	How strongly do you feel Bosnian?	1 = I don't feel so at all 2 = Very little 3 = Somewhat 4 = Strongly 5 = Very strongly	A possibility to have shared Bosnian identity, in addition to exclusive Bosniak identity, is considered to be closer to the civic type of nationalism
NAT 17D	How strongly do you feel Yugoslav?	1 = I don't feel so at all; 2 = Very little 3 = Somewhat 4 = Strongly 5 = Very strongly	The possibility to have and feel more strongly more than one identity is treated as closer to the civic type of nationalism.

TABLE B2—Continued

Question	Label	Coding matrix	Explanation
SD 19 Total- friends (continues)	Nowadays, do you have friends from among . . . ? (Respondents were invited to check more than one box if applicable.)	1 = Bosniak Muslims 2 = Bosniak non-Muslims 3 = Montenegrin Muslims 4 = Other Muslim immigrant 5 = American Muslims 6 = Albanian Muslims 7 = Croat Muslims 8 = Serb Muslims 9 = American non-Muslims 10 = Non-Muslim immigrant 11 = Albanian non-Muslims 12 = Croat non-Muslims 13 = Montenegrin non-Muslims 14 = Serb non-Muslims	Respondents selected one of the seven choices of possible friends, from the nationalities Bosniak, Other Immigrant, American, Albanian, Montenegrin, Croat, Serb, and for each group a friend could be a Muslim or a non-Muslim. Each respondent earned an indexed score for each friend, made up of added scores for all boxes checked and then multiplied by the simple number of checked boxes. A Serbian non-Muslim friend has the highest score since the assumption is that animosity toward Serbs is highest due to memory of the recent war. And so, other nationalities are ranked according to their history of enmity and amity with Bosnian Muslims as a group.
SD 22r	If you have a child, would you approve of him/her marrying a non-Muslim person?	0 = No 1 = Yes	Answer "Yes" is seen as closer to the civic type of nationalism, since it is essentially against religious marriage code.
SD 23	If you have a child, would you approve of him/her marrying a non-Bosniak person?	0 = No 1 = Yes	Answer "Yes" is seen as closer to the civic type of nationalism, since it lessens the distance of a group from the members of another group.

TABLE B2—Continued

Question	Label	Coding matrix	Explanation
SD 20 Total-family	Do you have family members who are . . . ? (Respondents were invited to check more than one if applicable.)	1 = Bosniak Muslim 2 = Bosniak non-Muslim 3 = Montenegrin Muslim 4 = Other Muslim immigrant 5 = American Muslim 6 = Albanian Muslim 7 = Croat Muslim 8 = Serb Muslim 9 = American non-Muslim 10 = Non-Muslim immigrant 11 = Albanian non-Muslim 12 = Croat non-Muslim 13 = Montenegrin non-Muslim 14 = Serb non-Muslim	Respondents selected one of the seven boxes of possible family members from nationalities of: Bosniak, Other Immigrant, American, Albanian, Montenegrin, Croat, and Serb, and each of those family members could be Muslim or non-Muslim. Each respondent earned an indexed score made up of added scores for all boxes checked and then multiplied by the simple number of boxes checked. Members of the groups are ranked as in the previous question on friends, based on the history of enmity and amity with Bosnian Muslims as a group.
SD 27	Can a nonwhite person be Bosniak?	1 = No 2 = I don't know 3 = Yes, but under certain conditions 4 = Yes	Answer "Yes" is seen as closer to the civic type of nationalism. Answer "I don't know" is interesting since it is not open rejection and so it may be considered a possible yes.
REL 48c	How important is it for you that a Bosniak is religiously a Muslim?	1= Very important 2= Somewhat important 3= Not so important 4= Not important at all	Option 4 provides the most possibility for the civic type of nationalism.

Appendix C

Survey Questionnaire

BOSNIAK IDENTITY RESEARCH SURVEY**PURPOSE OF THE STUDY**

The purpose of this study is to understand the relations between the process of nationalism and the formation of collective and individual identity.

Does identity come as a result of that process and, if it does, what influences such identity and why. Bosnian Muslims have been a native population of Bosnia and Herzegovina for centuries, yet only recently they became active participants in the political developments in their homeland. That signals that Bosnian Muslims emerged into another, active, political stage where they are taking charge of their own destiny. Once formed, collective identity could be a motivational source for individual selfless action, and a basis for collective action. Therefore, understanding identity formation is important to know the potential for group or national mobilization towards the collective goals, and potential development of a political system. The most accurate way to scientifically research that process is to survey the people who are holders of that identity. Thus far, that was not yet done and my research is attempting to contribute to social science by doing that. I thank you for you agreeing to participate and help me in my task.

Your participation and help in answering this important research question about identity is very important. In order to help us get the most accurate picture about identity, please answer each question. For each question, please answer with only one option as the best possible answer of the provided choices, unless otherwise instructed. Mark your answer with an X in the appropriate box.

CONFIDENTIALITY

The records of this study will be kept private and will be protected to the fullest extent provided by law. Research records will be stored securely and only the researcher will have access to the records. However, your records may be reviewed for audit purposes by authorized University or other agents who will be bound by the same provisions of confidentiality.

RESEARCHER CONTACT INFORMATION

If you have any questions about the purpose, procedures, or any other issues relating to this research study you may contact Mirsad Krijestorac at (xxx) xxx-xxxx, or by email at: xxxxxx@xxx.edu.

Sincerely,

Mirsad Kriještorac
Department of Politics & International Relations
Florida International University

BOSNIAK IDENTITY RESEARCH SURVEY**REGION**

Please answer all the questions. For each question please answer with only one option as the best possible answer of the provided choices, unless otherwise instructed. In order to help us get the most accurate picture about identity, please answer each question. Mark your answers with an X in the appropriate box.

1. Which region are you from?

- | | |
|--------------------------------------|---|
| <input type="radio"/> East Bosnia | <input type="radio"/> Herzegovina (East / West) |
| <input type="radio"/> Krajina | <input type="radio"/> Sandzak (Serbia / Montenegro) |
| <input type="radio"/> West Bosnia | <input type="radio"/> USA |
| <input type="radio"/> Central Bosnia | <input type="radio"/> Other |
| <input type="radio"/> Posavina | |

2. What best describes where are you from?

- Rural
 Urban
 Capital

3. How different are the customs from your region compared to the customs of other regions in BiH?

- Very different
 Significantly different
 Somewhat different
 Not much different
 Not different at all

BOSNIAK IDENTITY RESEARCH SURVEY

EDUCATION

Please answer all the questions. For each question please answer with only one option as the best possible answer of the provided choices, unless otherwise instructed. In order to help us get the most accurate picture about identity, please answer each question. Mark your answers with an X in the appropriate box.

4. Please answer the following question according to the places that you attended the school

	Elementary school	High school	College/university
BIH (outside of capital)	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Sarajevo	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Serbia	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Montenegro	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Croatia	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
USA	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Other	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Did not attend	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>

5. Have you ever heard/learned anything about Bosniaks in school?

- Yes
 No
 I can't remember

6. Did you ever have a chance to attend any panel/lecture about Bosniak identity?

- Yes
 No
 I did not pay attention to it

7. Nowadays, how do you learn primarily about Bosniak identity?

- I talk about it with my family
 From mass media (books, newspaper, radio/tv)
- I hear about it from my friends
 Internet
- I hear about in my mosque
 Never heard

CULTURE

Please answer all the questions. For each question please answer with only one option as the best possible answer of the provided choices, unless otherwise instructed. In order to help us get the most accurate picture about identity, please answer each question. Mark your answers with an X in the appropriate box.

8. Answer the following questions according to the scale provided below

	How often do you read Bosnian literature?	How often do you now watch Bosnian films or TV?
Very Often	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Often	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Occasionally	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Rarely	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Never	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>

9. Did you read book from any prominent Bosnian Muslim author, and can you name him/her?

- I have not read any prominent Bosnian Muslim author
- Yes, but I cannot name him/her
- Yes, and his/her name is _____

10. In your opinion, Bosniak/Bosnian Muslims culture is primarily:

- Islamic culture Slavic culture Both, Slavic and Islamic

11. For the following question place a number in the check-box from 1 to 5 according to the importance to you, where 1 is the most important and 5 is the least important element of your culture.

How important are these elements of your culture to you? (place a number by each element)

Language	<input type="text"/>
Religion	<input type="text"/>
Customs & Traditions	<input type="text"/>
Cuisine	<input type="text"/>
Literature & Art	<input type="text"/>

12. BiH state provides conditions for continuation of Bosniak/Bosnian Muslim culture

Strongly agree	Somewhat agree	Agree	Somewhat disagree	Strongly disagree
<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>

BOSNIAK IDENTITY RESEARCH SURVEY

NATIONALITY

Please answer all the questions. For each question please answer with only one option as the best possible answer of the provided choices, unless otherwise instructed. In order to help us get the most accurate picture about identity, please answer each question. Mark your answers with an X in the appropriate box.

13. What is your nationality?

- Bosniak
- Bosnian/Herzegovian
- Muslim
- Serbian
- Croatian
- Montenegrin
- Yugoslav
- American
- Other (please specify): _____

14. What is your ethnicity?

- Bosniak
- Muslim
- Serbian
- Croat
- Montenegrin
- Other (please specify): _____

15. Can a person be Bosniak even if he or she does not have any Bosniak parent?

- Definitely Yes
- Maybe Yes
- Not So Easy
- No
- I don't know about Bosniaks

16. Which of the parents is more important to be Bosniak?

- Mother
- Father
- Both
- Neither is Important
- I don't know about Bosniaks

17. Answer the following questions according to the scale provided below.

Please answer all of the questions by marking only one filed which best represents your attitude.

How strongly you feel:

	Very Strongly	Strongly	Somewhat	Very Little	I don't feel at all
Bosniak	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Bosnian	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Muslim	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Yugoslav	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>

BOSNIAK IDENTITY RESEARCH SURVEY

SOCIAL DISTANCE

Please answer all the questions. For each question please answer with only one option as the best possible answer of the provided choices, unless otherwise instructed. In order to help us get the most accurate picture about identity, please answer each question. Mark your answers with an X in the appropriate box.

18. If married, your husband /wife is:

- Bosniak Croat Others (please specify):
 Muslim Albanian
 Serbian American _____
 Not married

19. Nowadays, do you have friends from among (please circle all options applicable):

	Muslim	Non-Muslim
Americans	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Serbians	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Croats	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Montenegrins	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Albanians	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Other Immigrants	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Bosniaks	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>

20. Do you now have family members who are: (circle more than one if applicable)

	Muslim	Non-Muslim
American	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Serbian	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Croat	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Montenegrin	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Albanian	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Other Immigrant	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Bosniak	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>

21. Do you now have a colleague/worker with whom you regularly interact who is an/a: (circle more than one if applicable)

	Muslim	Non-Muslim
American	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Serbian	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Croat	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Montenegrin	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Albanian	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Other Immigrant	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Bosniak	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>

BOSNIAK IDENTITY RESEARCH SURVEY

Please answer all the questions. For each question please answer with only one option as the best possible answer of the provided choices, unless otherwise instructed. In order to help us get the most accurate picture about identity, please answer each question. Mark your answers with an X in the appropriate box.

22. If you had a child, would you approve of him/her marrying a non-Bosniak/ non-Bosnian-Muslim person?

 Yes

 No

23. If you have a child, would you approve of him/her marrying a non-Muslim person?

 Yes

 No

24. How often do you travel to Bosnia?

 I live in BiH

 Occasionally

 Every Year

 Never

 Every Other Year

25. How often do you talk to someone in Bosnia?

 I live in BiH

 Sometimes

 Everyday

 Rarely

 Weekly

 Never

26. How often you spend time with other Bosniaks? (non-family members)

 I live in BiH

 Sometimes

 Everyday

 Rarely

 Weekly

 Never

27. Can a non-white person be Bosniak?

 Yes

 Yes but under certain condition

 No

 I don't know

BOSNIAK IDENTITY RESEARCH SURVEY

POLITICAL CONSCIOUSNESS

Please answer all the questions. For each question please answer with only one option as the best possible answer of the provided choices, unless otherwise instructed. In order to help us get the most accurate picture about identity, please answer each question. Mark your answers with an X in the appropriate box.

28. Which passport do you hold? (circle more than one if applicable)

- | | |
|-----------------------------------|--|
| <input type="checkbox"/> BiH | <input type="checkbox"/> Montenegrin |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Serbian | <input type="checkbox"/> USA |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Croatian | <input type="checkbox"/> Other (please specify): _____ |

29. In your opinion the Bosnian war was primarily about:

- Fight for Bosniak national state
- Fight for Bosnian-Muslim national state
- Fight for the independence of BiH, as a multi-national state
- Defense from Serbian aggression
- Defense from Serbo-Croatian aggression
- Other (please specify): _____

30. In your opinion, what is BiH now?

- Bosniak national state
- Sovereign state of Bosniaks, Serbs and Croats
- Sovereign state of all its citizens
- Other (please specify): _____

31. Bosniak/ Bosnian Muslim nationalism was the response to Serbo-Croatian nationalism:

- Strongly agree
- Agree
- Disagree
- No, that was Bosniak/Bosnian-Muslim own political program independent of Serbian/Croatian nationalism
- There was no Bosnian nationalism, just a fight to survive

BOSNIAK IDENTITY RESEARCH SURVEY

Please answer all the questions. For each question please answer with only one option as the best possible answer of the provided choices, unless otherwise instructed. In order to help us get the most accurate picture about identity, please answer each question. Mark your answers with an X in the appropriate box.

32. Where do you mostly read/watch news about BiH?

- | | |
|--------------------------------------|---|
| <input type="radio"/> Bosnian media | <input type="radio"/> Croatian media |
| <input type="radio"/> American media | <input type="radio"/> Montenegrino media |
| <input type="radio"/> Serbian media | <input type="radio"/> I don't follow news about BiH |

33. Are you a member of any Bosnian organization that is: (circle more than one if applicable)

- | | |
|------------------------------------|--|
| <input type="checkbox"/> Political | <input type="checkbox"/> Social |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Religious | <input type="checkbox"/> Professional |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Sport | <input type="checkbox"/> None |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Cultural | <input type="checkbox"/> Other (if possible specify the type of organization): |
| | _____ |

34. Have you ever voted in Bosnian elections?

- Yes every time Sometimes Never

35. For you, Muslims from Sandžak, in terms of Nationality, are (circle only one that in your opinion is most correct):

- | | |
|--|---|
| <input type="radio"/> Bosniaks | <input type="radio"/> Serbians/Montenegrins |
| <input type="radio"/> Muslims, like in former Yugoslavia | <input type="radio"/> Don't know |
| <input type="radio"/> Sandžaklije | |

36. Should Bosniaks/muslims from Sandžak be allowed to vote in BiH elections?

- Yes No

37. Should Bosniaks/muslims from Sandžak be allowed to vote in the elections for Bosniak/Bosnian-Muslim national organizations?

- Yes No

BOSNIAK IDENTITY RESEARCH SURVEY

Please answer all the questions. For each question please answer with only one option as the best possible answer of the provided choices, unless otherwise instructed. In order to help us get the most accurate picture about identity, please answer each question. Mark your answers with an X in the appropriate box.

38. Should those Bosnian Muslims who fought for the independent Western Bosnia be allowed to vote in the elections for Bosniak/Bosnian-Muslim national organizations?

 Yes No

39. How important is solidarity among all Bosniaks/Bosnian Muslims for you?

 Very important Somewhat unimportant Important Not important Somewhat important

40. Does the independent state of BiH provide a platform for solidarity among all Bosniaks/Bosnian Muslims?

 Yes No

41. Does the independent state of BiH serve as a platform for solidarity among all citizens of BiH regardless of their nationality?

 Yes No

42. Does the independent state of BiH provide for Bosniaks/Bosnian Muslims to be equal with other people in BiH?

 Yes No

43. Does the independent state of BiH make Bosniaks/Bosnian Muslims equal with other nations of the world?

 Yes No

BOSNIAK IDENTITY RESEARCH SURVEY

RELIGION

Please answer all the questions. For each question please answer with only one option as the best possible answer of the provided choices, unless otherwise instructed. In order to help us get the most accurate picture about identity, please answer each question. Mark your answers with an X in the appropriate box.

44. What is your religion?

- | | |
|--|---|
| <input type="radio"/> Islam | <input type="radio"/> Don't believe in God |
| <input type="radio"/> Orthodox Christian | <input type="radio"/> Atheist |
| <input type="radio"/> Catholic | <input type="radio"/> Other (please specify): _____ |

45. How often do you pray?

- | | |
|--|---|
| <input type="radio"/> Five times a day | <input type="radio"/> I pray sometimes |
| <input type="radio"/> Only Friday, Juma prayer | <input type="radio"/> I never pray |
| <input type="radio"/> Only Eid (Bajram) | <input type="radio"/> I am not a Muslim |

46. How often you go to the mosque?

- | | |
|--|---------------------------------|
| <input type="radio"/> Daily | <input type="radio"/> Sometimes |
| <input type="radio"/> Only on Friday | <input type="radio"/> Never |
| <input type="radio"/> Only on Eid (Bajram) | |

47. Who runs mosque you do go to?

- | | |
|--|--|
| <input type="radio"/> Bosniaks/Bosnian-Muslims | <input type="radio"/> Arabs |
| <input type="radio"/> Albanians | <input type="radio"/> Various Nationalities |
| <input type="radio"/> Turks | <input type="radio"/> Others (please specify): _____ |
| <input type="radio"/> Pakistani | |

48. How important is it for you that a Bosniak is religiously a Muslim?

- | | |
|--|--|
| <input type="radio"/> Very important | <input type="radio"/> Not so important |
| <input type="radio"/> Somewhat important | <input type="radio"/> Not important at all |

BOSNIAK IDENTITY RESEARCH SURVEY

MEMORY

Please answer all the questions. For each question please answer with only one option as the best possible answer of the provided choices, unless otherwise instructed. In order to help us get the most accurate picture about identity, please answer each question. Mark your answers with an X in the appropriate box

49. In your opinion, could a Bosniak be a Catholic or Orthodox Christian?

- No
- Sure yes
- Yes, only under the conditions (please specify): _____

50. Was BiH equal with other Republics in former Yugoslavia?

- Very equal Somewhat not equal
- Somewhat equal Very unequal
- Mostly equal

51. Were Bosniaks/Bosnian Muslims equal with other nationalities of Former Yugoslavia?

- Very equal Somewhat not equal
- Somewhat equal Very unequal
- Mostly yes

52. How was the life of Muslims in former Yugoslavia?

- Very Good Bad
- Good Very bad

53. When did you leave BiH? (provide a year:

54. Where were you living for the majority of time during the Bosnian war?

- BiH Montenegro
- Serbia USA
- Croatia Elsewhere (please specify): _____

55. Your knowledge of the Bosnian war is:

- Excellent Very small
- Good No Knowledge
- Some

BOSNIAK IDENTITY RESEARCH SURVEY

LANGUAGE

Please answer all the questions. For each question please answer with only one option as the best possible answer of the provided choices, unless otherwise instructed. In order to help us get the most accurate picture about identity, please answer each question. Mark your answers with an X in the appropriate box.

56. What is your primary language (language spoken at home)?

- Bosnian
 Croatian
 Serbo-Croatian
 Montenegrin
 English
 Other (please specify): _____
 Serbian

57. How important is it for you that a Bosniak/Bosnian Muslim can speak Bosnian language?

- Very important
 Not so important
 Somewhat important
 Not important at all

58. Did it ever bother you that the name of Serbo-Croatian language was the official language of former Yugoslavia?

- Yes
 No

59. In your opinion, which language is closer to Bosnian language?

- Serbian
 Both Serbian and Croatian are close the same
 Croatian
 I don't know

60. Can you read and write in Bosnian language?

- Yes, with no problem
 Yes, but with difficulty
 No

61. Can you read and write in English language?

- Yes, with no problem
 Yes, but with difficulty
 No

BOSNIAK IDENTITY RESEARCH SURVEY

DEMOGRAPHIC

Please answer all the questions. For each question please answer with only one option as the best possible answer of the provided choices, unless otherwise instructed. In order to help us get the most accurate picture about identity, please answer each question. Mark your answers with an X in the appropriate box.

62. Where do you live now?

- BiH

 Sandžak (Montenegro)
- USA

 Elsewhere (please specify): _____
- Sandžak (Serbia)

63. How old are you? (provide a year of birth)

64. What do you do for a living?

- Professional (doctor, professor, own boss, etc.)

 Retiree
- Service Industry (mechanic, technician, home care)

 Not working
- Manual Job (cleaning, carrying, painting, etc.)

 Something else: _____

65. You are:

- Male

 Female

66. What is your race?

- White

 Other (please specify): _____
- Black

67. Do you currently own a house/apartment in BiH?

- Yes

 No

68. Do you currently own a house/apartment in the U.S.?

- Yes

 No

Notes

INTRODUCTION

1. The term “elites” is used conditionally here because as Smith (2009, 15) noted, the key circles are not necessarily elite circles. Perhaps more fitting would be the term “work group” used by Wilfred Bion in his seminal work on groups. “Bion’s central thought is that in every group two subgroups are present: the ‘work group’ and the ‘basic assumption group’” (Rioch 1970, in Burke and Stets 2009, 467). For this work the “basic assumption group” is the so-called “common people,” while the “work group” is those who in political science are usually referred to as “elites.” This term is usually meant to denote those selected individuals who have the ability to mobilize people either by their charisma, institutional position, or prominence of some kind among members of the group. In this paper “elites” will be used interchangeably with the term “work group.” The approach to nationalism as a form of groupness was also suggested by Brubaker (2006) in his evaluation of the phenomenon.

2. Others, like Tomka (1995), suggested a similar direction of action where identity emerges as the result of social conditions experienced through the emergence of a nation, as when he states that a “nation offers itself as the dominant institution for formulating cultural identities” (29).

3. For Shils (1982, 19) a name signifies the crucial aspect of interactions between an individual and his or her society. The perception of an individual member’s belonging to a society is evoked through self-naming, which signals that membership does not entail a demand for any particular action and that a common name provides a sense of a state of being and essential quality of self-perception and self-defining. Similarly, Smith (2002) considers a name as a fundamental sign of a community “by which [members] distinguish themselves and summarize their ‘essence’ to themselves” (23) so that “the name summons up images of the distinctive traits and characteristics of a community in the minds and imaginations of its participants and outsiders” (24).

4. Although in all cases promoters of the newest form of identity make claims that they are only renewing an ancient identity, Anderson (1991, 5) correctly notes that for researchers, nation [and its identity] is definitely a modern historic phenomenon, an idea that is commonly disputed by the nationalist, who perceives it as an antiquity that has always been there. The evidence offered is usually the presence of the same name throughout history. As Connor (1994, 94) reminds us, however, even though some term or name might have been noted in the past, that does not mean it has always actually represented the same thing. The most obvious example of this is the name Greece chose for itself to symbolize continuity with antiquity, although the Greece of today has very little to do with the Greece of the past, and Greekness even less so. Sand (2009, 2012) explains how this occurred in the case of Israel and its salient identity, and Pappé's (2017) work expands upon the same argument in the same case of modern nation building.

5. For example, in her work on IR methodology D'Costa (2006) notes how survivors of a war of national liberation afterwards have "created new identities, with suffering as their hidden narratives, and resistance and survival as their primary narratives" (149) and in such a way reveals the important fact that nationalism and its accompanying struggle produces multiple previously nonexistent identities. In the case of Muslims from Bosnia, previously nonexistent but still often invoked identities, for example, include "Babini" (a completely new identity signifying those from western Bosnia who were loyal to Fikret Abdić in the Bosnian Muslims' fratricidal war), or the identity of "Sandžaklija," elevated into a new meaning to signify those Muslims who are from Sandžak as non-Bosnian Muslims (Bosniaks), whose behavior is often explained by such identity, as opposed to "real" Bosnian Muslims. For example, in an interview the Bosniak representative in the BiH Presidency, Bakir Izetbegović, explains why he never went to officially visit Sandžak: "People from Sandžak are hot-blooded. They run ahead of themselves, and this is not good in politics," implicitly differentiating them from the Muslims of BiH (for more, see Džunuzović 2015). All translations are mine unless otherwise specified.

6. "The essentialism inheres not in the description of identity but in the attempt to derive the practices from the identity—we *do* this because *we* are this" (Michaels 1992, 61).

7. The fallacy stems from suggestions often found in the media and literature that since nationalism is accompanied by a strengthening of national identity, nationalism *must* be caused by a strengthening of national identity.

8. A significantly upgraded identity may be, and often is, sufficient to be considered a new identity. But how much of such an upgrade is enough to consider an identity as new will not be considered here.

9. Historian Huns Kohn notes that the political doctrine of sovereignty is the main factor that makes nationalism modern. For Kohn "in the later Middle Ages the word nation often had no political content whatever, but the revolutions of the XVII century awakened the masses to political and social activism, with the result that the nation came generally to mean the whole political organization" (as mentioned by Snyder 1968, 28–29).

10. As Flesher-Fominaya (2010, 397) explained, identity as a product or as a process essentially points to two different aspects of the same phenomenon. Identity as a product is "a public good" that people recognize and respond to, while [as

a process it] is the result of an intramovement social process of identity reformatting, which occurs among the people as they interact with each other or with those outside the group. Although certain elements of this inquiry will be dealing with the process aspect of Bosniak identity, the primary concern is whether the Bosniak identity as a new “public good” is being recognized as a viable “public good” to be acquired by the group. The primary process that shapes identity as a product here is the process of nationalism, as opposed to an identity, which can emerge out of a social movement. Intragroup deliberations about the exact meaning and traits of Bosniak identity will be addressed partly in the specific chapter that talks about Bosniak nationalism and identity.

11. For example, Schuessler (2000) effectively explains with his definition of expressive choice that individuals often *act* “in order to express who they are” (5). So through interaction with a group, individuals find confirmation for their identity.

12. For example, Miller (1988) sees that “nationhood is the crucially valid source of human identity” (253), yet as Vincent (2003) points out, such a position causes ambiguity not only in terms of which social subnational group solidarities take pre-eminence at different times, but also, if Miller’s position is taken as is, in terms of how we explain cases of within-the-nation separatisms.

13. “Since the intention of the text is basically to *produce* a model reader able to make conjectures about it, the *initiative* of the model reader *consists* [also] *in figuring out* a model author that coincides with the intention of the text [and that means here] to check upon the text as a coherent whole” (Eco 1998, 64–65).

14. Bosniak is sometimes spelled in English as Bosniac, but both spellings refer to Bošnjak (pronounced Boshnyak) identity. Bosniak is used for this work because that spelling is used by all U.S. Bosnian Muslim organizations. See, for example, the Islamic Community of North America Bosniaks 2014, or the Congress of Bosniaks of North America 2020.

15. Bosniaks are now living as a relative majority in BiH, Sandžak (see Figure 1.1; for numbers and conditions in Sandžak see, Biševac 2000), and as a sizeable minority in Kosovo especially around the towns of Mitrovica and Prizren; the latter come mainly from smaller ethnic groups sometimes called Torbeši and Goranci, while they refer to themselves as Našenci (Na-shen-tzi). Some of them declare themselves as Bosniaks, while others chose other identifications (see Ellis 2003, 65–68, or Stieger 2017, chap. 3). A relatively small number of Bosniaks also live in what is now North Macedonia, many of whom came there after World War II (see Bandžović 1993, 107). For more numbers, see Republics of Macedonia State Statistical Office 2002.

16. Salim Ćerić, a local Muslim “organic” intellectual, discussed the issue of the rise of national consciousness among Muslims (1971), noting that the Muslim nation of Yugoslavia was composed of *native* Slavic people who emerged as a distinct group as the result of broader historical contingencies. He further clarifies that “it is not extraordinary that there are confusions and dilemmas among today’s Muslims about the further emancipation of national uniqueness of Muslims of the Serbo-Croatian tongue. Such confusions always arise among people who find themselves in critical moments of their life, when they need to make

some decision that will significantly affect their destiny. Nations are not exempt from that” (85).

17. It was a subethnic group identity, since it is part of Slavic ethnicity, just as Slovenian, Serbian, Croat, or Montenegrin groups are as well. Purivatra (1974, 391–420) argues that Muslim identity was the JMO-appropriated and -propagated idea as a separate, shy identity that will linger between Serbian and Croatian, until the strength is gathered to better resolve their political aspirations and groupness. Such a time came in 1993 when Bosnian Muslim intellectuals decided on the choice of Bosniak identity, which was previously also offered to them by Kallay’s Austro-Hungarian policy of containment against Serbian and Croatian nationalist aspirations over Bosnia, but was also a term used to describe them by Ottomans. See Adanir 2002, 274 and 303.

18. In the instructions for the 1961 Yugoslav Census, there was a note to explain the category of Muslims (as a subgroup): “Muslim as a category for ethnicity means ethnicity, not religion. This answer is entered only by persons of Yugoslav [in this instance it probably meant ethnic southern Slav] origin who are considered Muslims in terms of ethnicity. Therefore, the answer ‘Muslim’ should not include members of non-Yugoslav nationalities, such as Shiptars [Albanians], Turks, or Serbs, Croats, Montenegrins, Macedonians or others who are considered members of the Islamic religious community. . . . Since the answer Muslim means ethnic, not religious [association], the answer can also be written by people without [Islamic] belief, if they think they belong to that ethnic group” (as stated in Mrdjen 2002, 80).

19. The internationally recognized acronym for Bosnia and Herzegovina is “BiH,” which will be used in this work.

20. For the communist vacillations over the so-called “Muslim question” and discussion of “m” versus “M” in their Yugoslav designation, see Hoare 2014, 352–59.

21. It is not uncommon that collective identity is sometimes first imposed on a group by outsiders, especially journalists in search of a shortcut term. A good contemporary example is the use of “Hispanics” in the United States, as noted by Polletta and Jasper (2001, 285).

22. For that reason, Slavic Muslims of the former Yugoslavia were also called “Turks” or “*Poturica*” as a derogatory term by their Christian neighbors. Notwithstanding possible other meanings that Malcolm (1996, 60) points to, with focus on the Slavic meaning of words, “*Poturica*” has a triple meaning: it refers to those who are Turkicized themselves, but it could also mean those who offered themselves to the Turks; yet in either form and as a third meaning, it is a pejorative, therefore lower-than-Turk, designation. Although with a different exact meaning of the name “*Poturica*,” Malcolm (1996, 60) concludes the same. This name calling is similarly done in other parts of the Balkans, as in Bulgaria, where local Slavic-speaking Muslims are called “Pomak” (Bulgarian: Pomaklar) which sometimes is noted to mean “those who suffered” or “those who help [Turks]”; or in Macedonia, where those who call themselves Našenci or Pomaks are referred to by their Christian neighbors as “Torbesh” (those with bags), which purportedly means that they accepted Islam for a bag of money. What all these “meanings” of Pomak have in common is an implicitly impure designation (Myuhtar-May 2014, 108). For the majority of them, however, the term “*Poturica*” is still widely used in the former Yugoslavia.

The most famous use of this term is in a medieval Serbian-Montenegrin epic poem “Mountain Wreath,” in a section referred to as “*Istraga Poturica*” (The Inquisition of the Turkicized), in which the Montenegrin-Serb poet-king Petar Petrović Njegoš calls for every Montenegrin, on a Christmas Day in the early 1700s, to look for those who converted to Islam and to execute them, even if it was their sister. Several Bosniak authors argued that the poem was the ideological precursor of the latest Bosnian genocide. Sells (1996) notes that one of Tito’s Partisan colleagues and a famous local chronicler of the events of World War II in Yugoslavia, Milovan Djilas, argued that the poem with its “Inquisition of the Turkicized indicates a ‘process’ rather than a single ‘event’” (41) to signal the possibility that the process of inquisition could continue, as it did in the 1990s. This will be discussed further in the chapter on Bosnian Muslim nationalism.

23. As a reflection of their Muslim identity, the Ottomans even created a new government commission, Muslim Immigrant Commission, to deal with those refugees (Holt 2019, 212). For more on the situation then, see Köroğlu 2007, chap. 3. We can add that Turanian/Turkish nationalism only further pushed all those non-Turk/Turanian refugees and other Ottoman people from the Balkans to the Muslim identity, as the only (political) one left for them to rally around and cling to, especially after the previously unsuccessful episode of Ottomanism as a form of the unitary nationalism for various peoples of the state. Until then, Muslim and Turk was often seen as synonymous, especially in the West (Holt 2019, 36), and since Turkishness was then claimed exclusively by Turanian nationalism, from which other Muslims might have been excluded.

24. See Pezo 2009; Kasumović 2017. Mazower (2002) also well described the movements of peoples at that time, when “the Turks were fleeing before the Christians, the Bulgarians before Greeks and the Turks, the Greeks and Turks before Bulgarians, the Albanians before Serbians” (117). They all carried old and new ideas about themselves and of each other along those routes.

25. See Karpat 1990. The same idea is true of other markers of identity that non-Turkish peoples adopted as a sign of their Muslimness, such as the fez that Bosnian Muslims appropriated as a part of their national dress, even though it was not, and in fact was previously rejected by them in favor of turbans (see Donia 2006, 30).

26. For more, see Ipek 2013. Köroğlu 2007 describes how ideas and propaganda in the Balkans were spread to mobilize Muslim volunteers for a defense of the Ottoman Empire. Ideas certainly traveled with the movement back and forth of Muslim and Christian peoples between the Balkans and Ottoman Empire during those times, even after the Porte lost control of the Balkans (for example, see Karpat 1990 or Bandžović 2003, 202, and for the ambiguity between Turkish and Muslim identity, 214). Ellis (2003, 43–45) notes that during that period some two-and-a-half million Muslim and non-Muslim people were moving between the Balkans and Turkey with unstable identities and associations, therefore open to accept new that will benefit them at the time.

27. Sekulic, Massey, and Hodson (1994) note “the 1971 [Yugoslav] census was the first to allow ‘Moslem’ as a nationality, and many Moslem Bosnians switched from the ‘Yugoslav’ to the ‘Moslem’ category in 1971” (84) to avoid being identified with the two other dominant groups, Serbs and Croats. More correctly, previous

category was “Jugosloveni neopredeljeni” [Yugoslav undecided], then ethnic Muslims, to Muslim nationality (see Adanir 2002, 282).

28. On December 22, 1992, some three hundred Muslim intellectuals attended a congress in the city of Sarajevo when it was under siege, and they (re)introduced the Bosniak identity. A good example of their ambivalence about the national name is evident in the introduction of their resolution where all three names are used interchangeably, spelled differently than presently: “Since the 1928 Congress of the *Moslems* in Sarajevo, the *Moslem people* have gone through a stormy period of their history. . . . While judging that period and that year, and at the same time, remembering the dignified past of the *Bosnian-Moslem (Bosbnak)* people, their cultural heritage and spirituality—the *Bosnian-Moslem* society in Bosnia and Herzegovina in the present war conditions, and its development in the near future, at their Congress in Sarajevo on December 22, 1992, have passed the following . . .” (my emphasis; Kamberović 1994, 186).

29. As Massad (2001) also explained we should “understand their anticolonial nationalism as a strategic essentialism to fight colonial power, [and not as] nationalism for an absolute essence” (277).

30. This merger, however, is not as opposed to religion as were the initial European nationalism projects. Gellner (2006) correctly observes that Bosnian Muslims had secured “the right to describe themselves as Muslims when filling in the ‘nationality’ slot on the census. That did not mean that they were still believing and practicing Muslims, but rather, to be a Bosnian Muslim you need not believe that ‘there is no God but God and Muhamed is his Prophet’, but you do need to have lost that faith” (70), since faith for them had been mostly transformed into culture, while religion survived mainly through deeply buried local *wrf*-based practices focused only on negative Islamic duties, as is well described by Štulanovic (2002).

31. In fact, if we are to compare, Bosniak nationalism is more similar to Kurdish nationalism, which Serhun Al (2014) notes is being “moderated” by competing Turkish nationalism (15–16) and where Kurds are being principally perceived as “Turks-to-be” (11). In the case of Bosniak nationalism, it is in part being “moderated” by Serbian and Croatian nationalisms, and Bosniaks are being principally perceived as Serbs-to-be or Croats-to-be by these respective nationalism projects. An important difference, however, is that Kurdish nationalism is based on the ethnic difference between Turks and Kurds, while Bosnian Muslims are ethnic Slavs as their neighbors are, and cannot build their groupness upon merely ethnic factors.

32. As in the case of Albanian Muslims’ nationalism built primarily upon ethnic difference from their Slavic neighbors, not only on religious diacritical marks. In that sense, it is similar to nationalism among Ukrainians and Russians, or of different Arab nations. It is important to note that the contemporary, so-named “ethno nationalism” in Germany or other western European countries and the United States is ethnic-based and excludes immigrants and others of different ethnicities. That is not the case with nationalisms in less ethnically diverse situations like Ukraine, Lebanon, Ethiopia, Croatia, Serbia, Montenegro, or BiH.

33. Although they eventually accepted Islam and have lived as Muslims among other peoples of the Balkans since the fourteenth century (see Küçükcan 1999).

34. There were suggestions and discussions of exactly what type of group they were before they reached the current stage of nationhood, and whether they were

their own separate ethnic group, or their own *ethnie*; but their separate and distinct groupness was undisputed. For example, see footnote 13 in Ćerić 1971 or Pašić 2008.

35. In Europe, folk traditions (including religion) are strongly defined by a territory, which still serves as a dominant ethnic boundary marker for European groups, and that makes the tie of a group to a territory very important. Muslims are often presented as non-Europeans primarily in a territorial sense. In this way Muslims are in a position in Europe similar to that of Jews in the 1930s because with no clear tie to a territory, they cannot interact with the local ecology embedded in European folklore. That kind of ethno-environmental nationalism was “once upon a time” included in the concept of Volk of the land, which fed the Nazi ideology of German superiority and the inferiority of others. This applied especially to Jews, who could not establish the necessary European territorial component to legitimize their ethnos in European eyes, just like Muslims in Europe today. For a long-established example on such European speculative thoughts about a “natural” habitat for different groups, see Jackson 1869.

36. For an interesting discussion about the legal differences between these two types of war crimes—where ethnic cleansing is seen as an attempt to primarily eradicate a particular population from a certain territory while genocide is seen as an attempt to destroy it—see Schabas 2009, esp. 221–35. Although the first often leads to the second, I would argue that ethnic cleansing even more signals rejection of the targeted population—in this case, Bosnian Muslims—as native inhabitants of the territory. As is obvious from many instances of what Bergholz (2013) calls signs of “sudden nationhood,” whenever disputes were interpreted in ethnic terms, Muslims were referred to as “Turks,” outsiders, nonnatives, while Serbian or Croat actors in those disputes would be called “*Četniks*” [Chetniks] or “*Ustašas*” [Usta-shas], which essentially were not such derogatory terms and certainly as terms do not signal nonnativeness. In fact both are often revered as ultimate Serbs, or ultimate Croats, and they are seen by some as a source of pride, not shame.

37. For example, see Ipek 2013.

38. The Srebrenica genocide is the most well-known case and symbol of the Bosnian Muslim Golgotha (for more see ICTY 2015b). After the fall of Srebrenica, a YouTube video clip emerged with Serbian General Ratko Mladić congratulating Serbs on their victory in “Serbian Srebrenica” in which he says that “the time finally has come to execute revenge on the Turks” (see TrustSRB 2009), to show that local Muslims were not natives of the town, while Serbs were. Interestingly, the YouTube channel TrustSRB, which hosted that video clip, also contains much white supremacist’ propaganda material, while Mladić’s video remains as the most viewed with some 147,000 views at the time. For a powerful testimony about the Srebrenica Genocide, see Habibović 2020.

39. Genocide in Prijedor started on May 23, 1992, and continued until all Muslim residents, about 44 percent of the prewar population of the town and the surrounding areas, were killed, expelled or disappeared (see ICTY 2013, 205–13). Some of those missing are now being found in mass grave sites like the one in the village of Tomašica, in the municipality of Prijedor, where investigators discovered remains of more than 370 persons (for more on the Tomašica case, see ICTY 2015a). Near Prijedor the concentration camps of Omaraska and Keraterm were

also eventually exposed (see Gutman 1993, 28–49). One of many accounts of the treatment of the Muslims kept in those camps states, “Aside from the beatings, the guards humiliated the detainees. On one occasion, military policemen ordered the inmates to stand in a circle and raise their hands showing three fingers, after which they had to drop to the ground and say: ‘I am kissing this Serbian soil. I’m a Serb bastard. This is Serbian land’” (ICTY 2013, 73).

40. Mojzes (2011) notes that “the Lašva Valley ethnic cleansing practically eliminated the Bosniaks from this area in central Bosnia. Particularly dreadful was the Ahmići massacre during which HVO [Croatian] forces killed as many as 120 Bosniaks—ranging in age from 96 years old to three months old—and destroyed their homes. Some were burnt alive, but most were shot at point blank range” (174). On the same page Mojzes notes that about ten thousand people were either killed or expelled from their homes in that valley in a Croatian attempt to ethnically cleanse the area of Bosnian Muslims.

41. As I noted elsewhere, one of the many repugnant examples that first comes to mind is Pranger’s (2011) paper “Milosevic and Islamization Factors,” in which he tries to suggest that the Serbian leader Milošević had some “bigger-than-life” messianic role not only to save Bosnian and Albanian Muslims from the ills of their religion, but to save Europe and the global world order from “another rising tide of Islam” in the Balkans, the first presumably occurring with the Ottoman conquest. Similar ideas were expressed by the Norwegian terrorist Breivik (2011) in his manifesto, where he extensively, in more than sixty pages, quotes Serbian authors and sources that suggest the same ideas of Muslims as foreigners in the Balkans and Europe.

42. Polletta and Jasper (2001, 289) noted that literature on social mobilization considers that such a situation warrants expectations of solidarity behavior among people.

43. The census complemented and possibly intervened in this research, since data collection was done at the height of the campaign for the promotion of Bosniak identity via social media, newspapers and lectures, and presentations by various actors from BiH and the diaspora at the sites where data was collected.

44. Emergence is the stage of a group’s evolution when the circumstances in which the group exists are changing and the group is moving to another phase. When the uncertainty of such a situation becomes apparent to the individual members of a group, it causes anxiety among them. In that phase, a skillful “work group” may introduce changes to the population that might be more easily accepted, due to the innate human need for stability and structure. As argued by Bennis and Shepard (2009 [1956]), such situations of upheaval are the time in the group’s life when their readiness for change can be channeled by skillful leaders into a “barometric event” such as an outburst of nationalism, when difficult changes like those that deal with identity are possible. The authors further note that the French Revolution, Bolshevik Revolution, and the like are historical examples of significant social changes that occurred at a time of widespread emotional tension, accompanied by some form of anxiety (in Burke and Stets 2009, 451).

45. Like democratic transitions, which are famously described as waves (Huntington 1991), it may be said that nationalism also plays a major role in waves on the global stage of international relations, often as a precursor to democratic tran-

sitions. In fact, their concurrence is not only a recent phenomenon. Nationalism has been very closely related to the process of democratization almost since it first emerged at the time of the American and French Revolutions. Additionally, similar to nationalism being seen here as an elite-driven process, democracy is closely tied to elites as it is also explained in terms of elites' transitional pack negotiations (O'Donnell and Schmitter 1986), with elites' competition during the transitions as a factor that increases the likelihood of transition to full democracy (Munck and Leff 1997), and finally as elites' agreement about the only political game in town (Linz and Stepan 1996). So could nationalism be seen as a prerequisite for the social conditions of democracy to work, and as one answer to the question, "What conditions make democracy possible?" that Rustow (1970, 337) posed some time ago? To tease out another point from the same work on transitions to democracy, perhaps nationalism, with its emphasis on a newly desired identity for the population, may be that circumstantial process that might have "forced, tricked, lured, or cajoled" (Rustow 1970, 345) nondemocrats into democrats, by adjusting their beliefs through the process of rationalization or adaptation which are the essential aspects of any nationalism.

46. The same intent may be noted for the version of Marxism that communists in Yugoslavia tried to practice as their own "ideology of order."

47. Indeed, although nationalism seems to be a process and force that is primarily group-inwardly directed, it actually responds to two categories of demands, internal and external. Nationalism projects are especially sensitive to regional and global hegemonies of various kinds. Billig (2002) notes the same thing when he says that "nationalism is not an inward-looking ideology, like the pre-modern ethnocentric outlook. It is an international ideology with its own discourses [which address regional and global] hegemony" (10).

48. Rereading major seminal works is uncommon among today's political scientists, who tend to gloss over, rather too quickly, those works on which the discipline is built, and rely on sometimes unreliable literature reviews done by others.

49. We should note here that there are a few more groups besides the Muslims of BiH who were part of the Muslim religious (sometimes also nationality) group in the former Yugoslavia, such as Albanians, Našenci (Goranci, Torbeši, Pomaci), Roma, Turks, and a small number of those who identify as Egyptians. The construction of the so-called Bosnian Muslim identity is also a relatively new development, as it first appeared prominently in the press at the onset of the Bosnian war to describe the people involved in that war. Although it did not exist before as an identifier of Muslims of the former Yugoslavia, the term Bosnian Muslim has taken hold since then, and it has now become widely used by journalists, academics, and even the domestic population to identify the group. These peoples of the former Yugoslavia converted to Islam mainly willingly and in stages, starting in 1352, while those in BiH were the last in that process, from 1463 until 1528, when the final parts of BiH were taken over by the Ottomans (Minkov 2004, 29).

50. The site selection will be further discussed in the chapter describing the data. The sites are Atlanta, GA; Chicago, IL; St. Louis, MO; Detroit, MI; Grand Rapids, MI; Erie, PA; the New York Metropolitan area; Waterloo, IA; Lincoln, NE; and Elmwood, NJ.

51. Each "diaspora" situation represents a different specific time in the post-

Ottoman Yugoslav Muslim experience. In the first period, from the time of the First Balkan War of 1908 until the 1970s, Muslims from Yugoslavia emigrated mainly to Turkey (see Bandžović 1993, 106; Ellis 2003, 41–52). Biševac (2000, 388) states that more Muslims of Sandžak now live in Turkey than in Sandžak. In the second period, after the 1970s, they began emigrating west, mostly to Germany, as guest workers (see Perić 1984, 100), and eventually, as the result of the Balkan Wars in the 1990s, many of them ended up in the United States. Many of those who are now living in BiH came to their present locations as the result of the Balkans' internal population movements from the time of the Ottoman demise until today. This consistent "diaspora" situation of Muslims from the former Yugoslavia will be further discussed in a separate chapter.

52. Kondylis (2010) notes 1.3 million people. Franz (2005) notes that more than two million people left BiH as a result of the war. A guesstimate is that most of those refugees were Bosnian Muslims.

53. According to the UNHCR 2000 Report, the United States has offered permanent refuge to 140,000 Bosnians (See UNHCR 2000). The BiH Ministry of Human Rights and Refugees Department for Diaspora, however, notes that the number of Bosnians in the United States is between 250,000 and 300,000 (see Ministarstvo za ljudska prava i izbjeglice 2014). According to U.S. Census data, which do not recognize Bosniaks separately, only BiH as a country of birth of responders, the U.S. Census-run American Community Survey (ACS) estimates that there are 104,612 people from BiH (see United States Census Bureau 2018). Although some of them may be Bosnian Croats or Serbs, the most significant number of them are Muslims. Comparatively, the same ACS lists 39,020 people from Serbia (some might be Muslims from Sandžak), and 37,044 from Croatia, while it also estimates 401,595 Croatians and 184,818 Serbians for 2019.

54. This term is used conditionally by Appadurai (1995) to refer to a group's pre-existing social form in which its locality is more or less re-realized, whether it is a boat refugee camp in Hamburg, Germany, Astoria, Queens, in New York, or the Bevo Mill neighborhood in St Louis, MO. All these sites are places with a significant number of Bosnian Muslims at present, and sometimes earlier, in the case of Germany.

55. Although that might be contested as well, since even the so-called back-home localities are very much destroyed and the social and physical reconstruction of those localities is still an ongoing process and maybe even an unattainable goal (see Dahlman and Ó Tuathail 2005). Rogan (2000, 185) states that 2.5 million, or nearly 60 percent of the population of BiH, were displaced in the war. Therefore, any assumption that sees back-home locality as the place of and for Bosniak identity would be problematic.

56. Anderson (1992) notes how those representations are now easier to imagine because images can travel with a person wherever he is. So "a *Gastarbeiter* sitting in his dingy little room in Stuttgart . . . has on the wall a handsome Lufthansa travel poster of the Parthenon, . . . The Parthenon, which he may well never ever have seen with his own eyes, is not a private family memory, but a mass-produced sign for a 'Greek identity' which only Stuttgart has encouraged him to assume" (14). For Bosniaks in the United States nowadays, the reproducing of a place with space with visual representations of identity includes not only posters and mosques with

107-foot-tall minarets built like those “back home” in the Bevo Mill neighborhood of St. Louis (see fig. I.3), but also numerous cafes and restaurants serving Bosnian “*ćevape s kajmakom u somunu*,” and other artifacts such as *sebilj*, on the corner of Gravois Avenue and Morganford Road in St. Louis (see Hume 2015, 6–12). A *sebilj* is a replica of a Sarajevo Ottoman-style wooden fountain, often seen on posters and postcards from the city (see fig. I.2).

57. Although those authors measured salience of regional eponymic Bosnian identity incorrectly considering it as an ethnic identity, they concluded that “a refugee can simultaneously possess both U.S. cultural and ethnic identity salience” (Cheah, Karamehic-Muratovic, and Matsuo 2013, 412).

58. To ensure that, the targeted group for the sample of the population in the data is people over forty years old or those who lived their constitutive years “back home” and who remember those conditions. More than 65 percent of the sample are over forty years old, while 80 percent are older than thirty-four. Only 8.6 percent of the respondents are younger than twenty-eight.

59. Serbian nationalism has roots in the 1860s Russian minister Uvarov’s ideas of Orthodox Christian religious universality (Perkins 2004, 292), while the Croatian version stretched between a German model ideal and a Catholic response to Uvarov’s ideas, and neither had room for any other religions in the state-driven final “national” identity projects. For more, see Woolf (1996, 20–22). Obradović tried to mitigate that religious exclusivism as an effort to co-opt other local Slavic groups into the Serbian national project (Markovich 2011, 18–19), but to this day Serbianism exclusively assumes some version of Orthodoxy. Russians, however, did not universally and indisputably adopt that model with the centrality of Orthodox Christianity for their national project, and they are still contemplating it, especially after the experience with communism. Merati (2017, chap. 2) notes that even Muslims claim a role in shaping of Russian identity. Therefore, the competing nationalisms in Russia are still fighting over “true” vs. “the best” Russian identity. For more, see the excellent overview of Russian nationalist options by Vera Tolz (1998).

60. As Levitt (1998) showed, due to the contemporary nature of travel and communication, social remittances from the diaspora can now influence a homeland group culturally and politically, and accounting for the diaspora situation of that group thus provides more depth to the study of its nationalism.

61. Perhaps in the case of a diaspora group, that moment when things fall apart could be a tipping point when it is no longer the case of a transnational situation, but a new situation when the cascade of assimilation for an individual or a group becomes completely possible. For a good discussion on a tip-and-cascade situation with identity ascription, see Laitin 1998, 25–32.

62. “In stable, self-contained communities, culture is often quite invisible, but when mobility and context-free communication come to be the essence of social life, the culture in which one has been taught to communicate becomes the core of one’s identity” (Gellner 1997, 60).

CHAPTER 1

1. Sociologists “hold that the one indispensable factor in the nation is the ‘we-sentiment,’ or the feeling of oneness” (Snyder 1968, 54).

2. Constructions of (or emphasis on) the particular marks of distinctiveness are often part of the power play within the group under emergence. Within those groups, social classes are codified through the establishment of rules and hierarchies among members, and subsequent selection of the specific marks. Hence, national groups—more than other type of groups—are internally arranged by the elites through that structure of hierarchy right from their beginnings.

3. The distinction between the two forms noted by Tönnies is indeed relevant for those interested in studies of nationalism, since it emphasizes the essential aspect of rationality that modern sociopolitical forms such as nations usually claim for themselves, as opposed to only “feelings,” which underscore premodern social forms. For Tönnies (1887) “there is contrast between a social order [of *Gemeinschaft*], which—being based upon consensus of wills—rests on harmony and is developed and enabled by folkways, mores, and religion, and an order [of *Gesellschaft*], which—being based upon a union of rational will—rests on convention and agreement, is safeguarded by political legislation, and finds its ideological justification in public opinion” (223).

4. Although stateness is not the necessary goal and element of nationalism, it may be noted that when that process is aiming to establish the rule of a state, it also produces an identity that makes a sense of citizenry possible. In that way nationalism is that necessary and essential midpoint between authoritarian situations and democracy, which is a crucial point in the observations about the emergence of new (types of) states and identities in eastern Europe and possibly beyond. Before we can accept that democratic stability is achieved when “democracy is the only game in town,” as Linz and Stepan (1996) suggested, we have to make sure to have *players* ready to play that game.

5. Foucault (2003) notes that “the role of the monarchy is to forge this extra-national mass—the product, the mixture of German subjects, Roman clients, and Gaulish tributaries—into a nation, into a different people” (230). And here Foucault points to the creation of a new group as a context for an identity to emerge as the result of the process of group (trans)formation. “What happened was that something new was created within an entity that was once mononational and totally concentrated around the nobility: a new nation, a new people or a new class was created” (231).

6. That is why even Bosniak and Muslim leaders from Sandžak adamantly insist that Bosnia is their “*matica*” (this word “*matica*” in their discourse is associated with the “queen bee,” yet it is to be understood by the intended audience more as “motherland”).

7. According to some Bosnian Muslim historians, this was especially the case with those who were considered Bosnian heretics by both of the dominant church orthodoxies at the time. According to them, followers of the Bosnian Church accepted Islam en masse without coercion because they found similarities between the old and the new religions, and more so as an act of protest against the [Hungarian] Catholic Church, which had persecuted them previously (for more, see Pašić 2009, 126; Imamović 1995, 206–12, and chapter 2 of this book).

8. A ninety-year-old person from central Sandžak told me that right before World War II, in the entire region only a few boys from several wealthy families went to the state-run elementary schools. Vuković (2000) writes the same in

his book about the regional school and notes that even among pupils who were enrolled, many of them actually did not attend classes until 1973 (28–37), while a television documentary talks about the same trend even beyond 1973 (see Milić 1973). Petranović and Zečević (1987, 620) provide Kingdom of Yugoslavia census data from 1921 and note that more than 80 percent of people in BiH were illiterate and that number decreased only by 6% for the entire Kingdom by 1931 (620) and we can see that the same trend continued. The rest of the people were persuaded by their local *bodžas* not to send their children to the state-run, disbelievers' schools and that *masjid*-run local *mektebs* were providing enough education for all of them. So in 1938–39 no one in Sarajevo went to any other school except for thirty-five men who went to a *Viša islamska šerijatska škola* [Higher Islamic Sharia School] (Petranović and Zečević 1987, 624). Since this was the reality in the biggest Muslim city at that time, we can only imagine how it was in all other Muslim localities. Feldman (2017, 109) notes that of all the children in Bosnia who were enrolled in elementary school during 1899–1900, only 6 percent were Muslim.

9. Muslim children were exclusively taught in *mektebs* until around 1912, and after that religious education was gradually incorporated into public schools (Vuković 2000, 103), while some *mektebs* remained as supplemental and separate schools, especially for girls. A good example of the religious authorities' grip on the production of knowledge is also evident from the story of Ševala Zildžić, who in 1919 became the first Bosnian Muslim woman to go to a medical school. Before that, she asked Reis-ul-ulema Džemaludin Čaušević to write the approval for her, as a girl, to enroll in the former men's high school that became the medical school. Apparently he was encouraging education for everyone at that time and so he approved her choice, but just that she felt the need to ask for such a note from the *reis-ul-ulema* shows how strongly religious authorities still held a grip on knowledge production at that time. (For more on this story, see Muminović 2018.) Elementary religious schools, *mektebs*, were officially closed in the 1950s (for more, see Hoare 2014, 373).

10. The Gazi Husrev-Beg Medresa was established 26 Rajab 943 Hijri year (January 9, 1537), and for a list of some of its contemporary alumni, see the Laureti (Gazi Husrev-Begova Medresa, 2020). It should be added here that the *medresa* should not be seen as the prime national or nationalistic engine. Many, if not all, of those *medresas* are attended not only by Slavic-speaking Muslims from BiH and Sandžak, but also by many students, and sometimes teachers as well, from Albanian, Pomak-Nashenci, and Turkish groups, as well as a few from the Roma Muslim population. Furthermore, several of the Bosnian Muslim nationalists and significant political leaders openly expressed to me reservations about the *bodžas* (priests) coming from those *medrasas*.

11. Noticing how Balkans, and others who are “east of Western Europe,” are framed by Western observers so that they cannot escape their history, Dungaiciu (2000) points to embedded Orientalist notions in the studies of nationalism and how “the adjectives used by Plamenatz to characterize this latter nationalism resemble those used by Kohn: ‘hostile,’ ‘imitative,’ ‘illiberal,’ ‘disturbed,’ ‘ambivalent,’ ‘oppressive’ and ‘dangerous.’ It would not be hard to recall a number of cases in the history of Western Europe where these epithets would fit perfectly. But Pla-

menatz is not interested in such comparisons. These adjectives belong to the Eastern nationalism, and they must stay there” (8–9).

12. Keeping in mind Baum’s (2001) fair criticism that “the neat opposition between ethnic and civic nationalism is easily used as an ideological weapon by liberals and socialists to make people feel guilty over their attachment to their national tradition” (121), we should also remember his observation that “the civic nationalism that has created liberal society continues to have ethnic memories” (121) with instrumentally enhanced ethnic factors, and add that ethnic nationalism continues to have civic aspirations of incorporating those who are presently not ethnic kin but who could become so in the future under certain circumstances. And, therefore, it is indeed possible and useful to measure the extent of one or the other pole of nationalism among the population, as is done in this work.

13. Eckstein (1988) notes that in the culturalist approach [such as nationalism studies] “continuity is the inherent expectation and so, therefore, is resistance to change of motion (inertia in motivation): exceptionally great forces are needed to induce great changes” (793) in orientations of groups and individuals toward modifications of variables such as identity. Nationalism is such a great force capable of overcoming inertia.

14. Smith will agree that it is a new identity that has emerged, although it might have come as some form of continuity where a previous identity is more or less reshaped to fit new circumstances; yet nationalism may still be seen as a mechanism and a facilitator of that transformation (at least) through the stage of emergence.

15. As Barth (1998a, 11) has established, no group is an island and neighboring groups constantly interact and affect each other’s cultures, especially when they share an ecology, as people in Bosnia do. When groups persist, they persist in constant interaction with their *social* and ecological surroundings. In the spirit of Barth’s approach, we must take his notion further and understand that when (ethnic, subethnic, or any other) groups become nations, these groups then exist (and maybe persist) on a global stage and, therefore, in a totally different social sphere. That is a very new and different context, mired by constant impermanence (according to a well-established IR axiom), so Barth’s notions would suggest that their behavior changes significantly, accordingly, if they are to persist as a group. Strategies and alliances, for example, are made not only with their close neighbors, against whom diacritical norms are for that reason primarily maintained. In international arenas they may be made and unmade constantly with distant partners as well. So the possibility of a change of any aspect of a group, even discontinuity, has to be part of any observation.

16. A theme often found in the literature of other South Slavists like the Croatian August Šenoa, who explained in 1876 that “poetic fantasy should not distort the main, generally known events. (The poet) should not narrate against history, . . . but he can alter any accompanying events” (as noted by Hajdarpašić 2015, 69–70). Art and culture have often been used in Europe to modify reality and bend the truth for political reasons, in order to serve the desired narratives, as was famously done with several iconic paintings of Napoleon depicting him in a propagandistic way to advance his image and power.

17. Obradović, who was reportedly a Free Mason, and because of that was not a model Serb, was one of the most important propagators and conduits for the German and Russian version of nationalism among Serbs. See Markovich 2011, 10–16.

18. See Hobsbawm and Ranger 1992, 263.

19. The discussion about purported Serbian history resurfaced again when the president of the Serbian Helsinki Committee, Sonja Biserko, told the Croatian journal *Wreath* that the “entire Serbian history is one big lie,” in part because Serbia has no real access to part of the history that relates to the Ottoman Empire. The imputed ignorance about the facts opened up the possibility for the Serbian myth about the Kosovo battle to flourish. For more, see Tunjić 2015. Perhaps here we should remember Hobsbawm’s (1990, 12) warning that historians of nationalism should distance themselves from nationalist myths because “nationalism requires too much belief in what is patently not so.”

20. For example, those above-mentioned Serbian myths don’t go far into history, except when a connection with “Mother Russia” needs to be evoked, but even then such a connection is murky since such emphasis opens up the question of who is really the “newcomer” in the Balkans, Serbs or Albanians, who claim to be the descendants of Illyrians and therefore the “owner” of the land.

21. As Renan (1996) says, “forgetting, and, I would say, historical errors are an essential factor in the creation of a nation, and thus the advances of historical study are often threatening to a nationality” (50). Anderson also considers the will of the members to be the main basis for a nation, and this is especially pronounced in the most neglected chapter 8 of his otherwise oft-cited work *Imagined Communities*.

22. In fact, with several historical examples, Smith (1987) notes how nationalism and nationalists emerged as the initiators and promoters of an “appropriate” identity. He notes that in late nineteenth-century France, nationalism “emerged to reassert the cultural and historic unity of France against minorities and ideologies that were thought to be subversive of that unity” (149), or in the case of “Nigerian ‘nationalism’ among a small minority of politicians, civil servants, officers and intellectuals” (146), yet still without a form called a Nigerian nation.

23. More or less, for example, means that “will” alone is not enough for a nation to exist, and “will” has to be supplemented by coercion and compulsion (Gellner 2006, 53–54).

24. After half a century of communist antireligiosity, Bosnian Muslims retained only a *sense* of religion stored as elements of subethnicity, like some other Muslim minorities in the Soviet Union, as observed by Bennigsen and Lemerrier-Quellejay (1967). That is why this work focuses on that *sense* in the description of Bosnian Islam.

25. To show the closeness of its peoples, Bosnia is often referred to as a “multiconfessional state,” and at different events in BiH when Muslims, Catholics, and Orthodox Christians are jointly present, the events are referred to as “multiconfessional gatherings” instead of multireligious ones. Even outside of BiH, the same tendency can be observed. For example, in 2008 the prominent German historian, Hannes Grandits, published the book *Power and Loyalty in Late Ottoman Society: The Example of the Multi-confessional* [multikonfessionellen] *Herzegovina*, using the term to describe interactions among followers of the different religions, rather than confessions. Or a more recent work by Cynthia Simmons (2002) also uses “multiconfessional” and “multireligious” interchangeably, as if they mean the same thing.

26. Anderson correctly observes that racism is different from nationalism since nationalism works on a different plane and has a different origin. “For it shows that from the start the nation was conceived in language [primarily of history], not in

blood, and that one can be invited into imagined community” (145), as today most nations have mechanisms of naturalization for new immigrants. Therefore, Anderson (1991) points out that “seen as both a historical fatality and as a community imagined through language, the nation presents itself as simultaneously open and closed” (146).

27. As is also obvious from the Serb(ian) national anthem, whose refrain continually refers to the Serbian race as follows:

“... God save; God defend,
Serbian lands and the Serbian race!” (for more, see Vlada Republike Srbije 2004)

28. In the Croat(ian) anthem, on the other hand, the land is anthropomorphized through the nation that resides upon it (see Kelen and Pavković 2012), and therefore the stress is on the essential tie between the people and the [local] land as indivisible and therefore as a natural, God-given bond. The Croatian Archbishop from Split, Frane Franić, in 1984 exclaimed in his homily that “God rendered to us Catholic Croats this land in which we have lived for one thousand and three hundred years, and we will not let anyone else rule over us in our own land” (in Perica 2002, 70). I referred to this orientation previously as a part of European ethno-environmental nationalism.

29. That association with class might also come from the class consciousness emphasized by the previous communist-led cultural system.

30. As Lord Acton stated long ago, “exile is the nursery of nationality” (Lord Acton 1967, 146, cited in Anderson 1992, 1). A good example of it is the Serbian nationalism, conceived in exile among diaspora in Astro-Hungary. See Markovich 2011.

31. In fact, as Demmers (2002) noted, “both multicultural policies and xenophobia in the Western countries enable and force newcomers to continue to define themselves in terms of their ethnic or national origin” (94), even more so since integration policies that are primarily to be implemented by host societies are neglected and it appears that integration is no longer the goal for either hosts or immigrants.

32. As a point of intraregional comparison, we can mention that the University of Zagreb was established in 1874, Belgrade University in 1908, the University of Ljubljana in 1919, and the University of Sarajevo in 1949. Perhaps because of that timeline, it was the University of Belgrade, not Sarajevo, where some of the initial members of Mladi Muslimani met and began to think about Bosnian Muslims’ national aspirations (for more, see OZN Sarajevo 2020, 14).

33. This process, seen as a precondition for the creation of a national consciousness in BiH, was delayed as elsewhere in the late Ottoman Empire. See Sommer 2015, 31. Pargan (2016) also notes the centuries-late arrival of the Industrial Revolution in Bosnia as a change from a traditional to a modern-industrial society.

34. An example of how strenuous is the transition from folk to high culture is the discussion among the members of the Congress of Bosniak Intellectuals Forum (Vijeće Kongresa Bošnjačkih Intelektualaca—VKBI) regarding the preservation and future of the Bosniak musical form of *sevdalinka* (soulful) ballad. As reported,

one of the participants noted that for Bosniaks “*nije bitna seoska muzika nego je bitna sevdalinka kao gradska pjesma*” (“village folk music it is not important, while *sevdalinka* as an urban song is”), and that whoever denies the *sevdalinka* denies the Bosniak people. At the conclusion of the discussion, another participant expected the society to do more to uphold *sevdalinka*, saying that at the next national celebration of the conclusion of the month of Ramadan, “besides Bach . . . , people can also hear *sevdalinka* at the festive *eid-ul-fitr* concert” (for more see VKBI 2001). Maglajlić (2011, 152) defines *sevdalinka* as “a Bosnian love ballad that originated as a musical-poetic, authentically folkloric traditional creation of the urban areas of Bosnia and Herzegovina and Sandžak, shaped by the diffusion of Middle Eastern culture, transmitted orally probably since the middle of the sixteenth century” (my translation). Another notable example is the transformation of one of the most popular Bosniak folk ballads, “*Hasanaginica*” (translated by Wolff 2003 as “The Mourning Song of the Noble Wife of the Hasan Aga”), into an opera piece (for more on the opera effort, see Likić 2006). Since language is about the expressions of particular spiritual, familial, material sensitives, and locution, the Bosnian language is a distinct local language, and as such it is apart from the other two neighboring Serbian and Croatian languages. With that in mind, songs and folklore are very distinctive and relevant for observations of their differences in the descriptions of the lives of each people. Bosnian Muslim intellectuals are aware of that when they emphasized the importance of *sevdalinka* and other verbal and written expressions of their group’s peculiarities.

35. In agreement with Pearl (2009, 328), we must look at structural rather than circumstantial contingencies to evaluate causal claims.

36. For more, see Markovic, Kovic, and Milicevic, 315, in Brunnbauer 2004.

37. For more, see Browner and Newman 1987, 2460–61.

38. Treating Bosniaks, Serbs and Croats as ethnicities and not as nations usually obscures regional and subethnic variations within the groups and is an example of misclassification bias. All these Bosnian groups are now ethnically Slavs, and so the practices and consciousness of Slavic people is the panel upon which all of them build their uniqueness and group-specific boundaries, while the starting point is the same. Consequently, there are going to be a lot of the same and similar cultural and affinal practices, because most of that cultural stuff is established on particular ecological adaptations to the place where people live. For example, we can note “*saljevanje strave*” (lead casting as fear pouring), sometimes described as a form of healing done by Slavic-speaking Muslims from Sandžak and less so from Bosnia, as a practice of other Slavic groups in Ukraine and elsewhere (for example, see Phillips 2004). So finding that there are a lot of “pan-ethnic” customs that are shared among presumed different ethnic groups is problematic on a fundamental level because it assumes difference as a starting point, not Slavic sameness. Therefore what Tufekčić and Doubt (2019) and others refer to as a transethnic situation within BiH is more a case of pan-ethnicity in terms of Slavic subethnic groups’ shared traits and customs, which predate their religious and regional (and state) differentiation, instead of a case of borrowing from each other as many authors try to imply. Thus again, “the concept of the ‘ethnic’ group, which dissolves if we define our terms exactly, corresponds in this regard to the nation” (Weber 1978, 395). Only if Bosniaks are seen as a nation can we properly understand and note norms

that constitute Bosniaks today, who consist of several different subethnic groups, not only beyond Bosnia but probably within it as well.

39. Even Croat and Serbian national ideologies acknowledge that same ethnic component as they denote Bosnian Muslims as their conationals. For example, see Redžić 2005.

40. Vincent (2002) notes that the “nominalist perspective, [as] particularity denotes a thing which is not universal, is concrete rather than abstract, is one among many particulars, is something which is unique (or individual), and is potentially more real, immediate and familiar” (9).

41. This often-found level of analysis problem continues despite Turner’s (1981) point that “there is an important discontinuity at the level of psychological processes between an individual acting as a differentiated, unique person and an individual acting as a group member, as a relatively interchangeable representative of a social category” (110), which further strengthens the proposal that social identity should be seen as separate from the internal psychological perception of self.

42. The same author notes that the other aspect of identity, self-investment, is “a purposefully chosen categorization of the self and consequential investment into that category or group” (248). It is important to note the distinction by Leach et al. (2008) that a group’s self-definition “focuses on the abstract psychological connection that an individual has to their in-group as a whole, rather than on the dynamics of interpersonal copresence or coaction” (148), which is perhaps still too early to observe in the Bosniak group-level case, and especially in the case of the diaspora, where coaction based on identity is even harder, and so the focus here is on individual self-defining. The self-investment aspect of identity, however, should be very much of concern to nationalists, since nation is often seen as a conscious social construct (Connor 1994). Nevertheless, when observing a group that is aiming to organize itself as an ethnic nation, through a process which Eder (2002, 10–18) would call “ethnicization,” as seems to be the case with Bosniaks, and to develop an identity category which can be adopted by its members, the first step is to observe the lower level of identity, self-definition, which should logically precede the higher level of self-investment.

43. For more, see also Simon 1992, 27.

44. For more, see the seminal work on groups by Tayfel et al. 1971.

45. See chapter 5.

46. For clarification, as explained in the formative work of Allport (1924, 5), a group is seen as a collection of individual members and not a real entity with its own mind or nervous system. The interaction between the individuals and the group, as well as the influence the group can assert upon an individual, happens because, once formed, the group becomes a social system for patterning the interactions among those individual members within and without the group. Yet an individual still has a mind of his own and can choose to conform or not to those patterned standards or to seek an alternative group and its identity.

47. Therefore, three different levels of observations should be distinguished. First is the self-identifying of a group that forms, exists, and continuously develops as a response to structural or historical circumstances, as is described in the case of Bosnian Muslims by observing historical developments of the group. Members of the group then respond to group developments and demands of time first through

(passive) self-defining (as individual self-stereotyping that affects in-group homogeneity) measured here through surveys. After that, it may be observed separately how individuals, perhaps stimulated with banal nationalism, are *acting* in the stage of self-investment (acting solidarity, ensuring satisfaction that affect group centrality), but that is *not done* here.

48. Brady and Kaplan (2010, 66) suggest the same approach in order to understand fully the dynamics of salient identity ascription. Although they observed a situation where a group is choosing between two different competing identities, one in-group and other out-group, in the case study here two in-group identities are observed in order to understand the salience of a newly proposed Bosniak vs. old Muslim identity.

49. This dynamic corresponds to the three images that Waltz (2001) proposed for understanding of international relations.

50. In the conclusion of his treatise on man and the city, Aristotle proclaims that the one who is out of the realm of social exchanges “is either a beast or a god” (Lord 2013, 5) but not a human being.

51. For Durkheim (1997) the need of an individual for society is the very source of morality and it is beyond consciousness, no matter how large a society is (331–37).

52. Bion, discussed in Rioch 2009. “This is a term used to refer to the individual’s readiness to enter into combination with the group in making and acting on the basic assumption” (Rioch 2009, as mentioned in Burke and Stets 2009, 474).

53. Gellner (1997) also noted that it is well known that groups change pillars of groupness such as religion, language, way of life, and even names as a result of changes in structural conditions around them. The same changes may also require groups to expand in order to include other groups, or to contract to shed members and subgroups. All these situations may be ripe for the emergence of new groups and their identities, and sometimes they are considered a turning point that skillful leaders can turn into a “barometric event,” as explained by Bennis and Shepard’s (1956) theory of group development (in Burke and Stets 2009, 450–52).

54. For more on the regime of external imposition, see Doty 1996.

55. For example, Popović (1990) proposes that even the national recognition of the Yugoslav Muslims in 1971 took place in part as a result of Yugoslavia’s efforts to establish itself within the nonaligned movement, which was dominated by Arab and Muslim countries.

56. As in the BiH government, whose personnel is by and large structured by the Dayton Peace Agreement to include representatives of the three constitutional nations of Bosniaks, Serbs, and Croats at all levels of national government. So in the critical diplomatic missions to the United States, the position of BiH ambassador is assigned to a representative of one group by the principle of negotiation among those who were in the BiH national government at the time. As the ambassador is from one BiH national group, however, his deputies are from the other two. That way, not only is the bureaucracy expanding in the BiH diplomatic corps, but also those representatives can in theory control each other’s work and report what is going on to their respective groups “back home.” That is how the diplomat I spoke to is aware of the “diplomatic price” that Muslims of BiH are paying because of their old identity name.

57. As Wilmer (1998) explains in many conversations and constructions, “the ‘international’ community is implicated as a rhetorically constructed normative order from which the collective actors either draw strength and support, or against which they struggle to define and legitimize their own positions [and identities where] the ‘international community’ is articulated by Western states/people as a normative space” (92), which makes identities problematic or not.

58. For example, Miskovic (2007) notes, “Regardless of their racial invisibility, in the atmosphere of loud and widespread American nationalism that dominates the post 9/11 United States, foreign accents and names that do not sound Anglo-American make [Bosnian Muslim] immigrants visible. Thus, they feel threatened in two ways: as being perceived as a foreign and terrorist threat” (538). Such threat perceptions certainly significantly influence not only the calculations of people who are to acquire a new salient identity, but also the strategies leaders might use to cajole people into joining the nationalism project and accepting the new identity.

59. In that Oriental Balkans, Serbs are major regional players, and ever since the late 1800s they have built their hegemony on their willingness to act mercilessly on European fantasies about the Balkans, where they often have to do dirty and unpleasant things to minorities, like Bosnian Muslims. These acts are acceptable since they are being committed there, as Slavoj Žižek similarly noted in an interview (see Spindler 2008). Yet efforts are eventually made to stop the ethnic cleansings primarily because, for northern Europeans, the Balkans are still seen “as part of ‘us’ and therefore [it is] impossible to let it descend into barbarism and cruelty to the degree which the West can accept in Africa” (Buzan and Wæver 2007, 387).

60. In an interview, the Bosniak member of the BiH presidency publicly noted that Bosnian Muslims practice “inclusive Islam,” as opposed to some other types of Islam, which presumably may be found elsewhere. For more, see Tanjug 2016.

61. Bosnian Muslim elites are trying to position themselves as autochthonous Europeans as opposed to non-autochthonous Muslim European immigrants, and they seek to be the voice of Islam in Europe and to gain leadership of the group. A good example of this is the effort of the former Bosnian *reis-ul-ulema* Dr. Mustafa Cerić to position himself as the leader of European Muslims by devising and circulating a Declaration of European Muslims, while being perceived skeptically by other Muslims in Europe and even by other Muslims from the Balkans. One of the leaders of the Macedonian Islamic Community, Jakub Selimovski, who was also the last *reis-ul-ulema* of the joint Yugoslavia’s Islamic Community—which was largely dismembered by Cerić himself—“raised the point that the Declaration might imply geographical divisions within Islam, while ‘Islam is one’” (quoted by Merdjanova 2013, 128. For more, see at 126–28). The idea of “European Islam,” however interesting, is not new. As we mentioned earlier, the idea of “European Islam” as an “acceptable Islam” on the continent was also discussed by the Austro-Hungarians in the lead-up to their Islam Act of 1912. For more, see Potz 2012, 15–20.

62. See, for example, Colic-Peisker 2005.

63. As, for example, in the case of the Islamic Cultural Center Behar in Grand Rapids, Michigan, at 3425 E. Paris Avenue. A beautiful mosque was built right next to the already existing Al Tawhid Islamic Center at 3357 E. Paris Avenue, and they sometimes share each other’s parking lots and often coordinate activities.

CHAPTER 2

1. Bosnian Pot (*Bosanski lonac*) is a famous Bosnian dish known for its taste and for the flexibility in the ways of making it. It is basically a stew slow cooked over a direct fire in a clay pot, made out of whatever ingredients a person might have at the time. It usually includes chunks of different meats and vegetables. It is used here to symbolize the process of the emergence of the Bosnian Muslim group out of the milieu of local peoples and the contingencies of history.

2. The notables were mostly intellectuals from various disciplines, since during the communist era no other type of elites could clearly develop, while the communist school system did produce a good number of intellectuals.

3. Kukavica 2013, 13.

4. Indeed, as Simmons (2002) noted, the “term of identity ‘Bosniak’ (*Bošnjak*), gives evidence of their connection to the territory—rather than the appellation foisted on them by the Yugoslav Bosnia’s government in 1963–Muslim (*Musliman*)” (634). For that reason they overwhelmingly voted for the independence of BiH in the internationally mandated referendum held on March 1, 1992. Some Bosnian Muslims now celebrate that day as the BiH Independence Day, while Bosnian Serbs do not. The Constitution of the Socialist Republic of BiH, adopted on April 11, 1963, replaced the term “nationality,” which was used in the 1946 Constitution of the People’s Republic of BiH to denote Serbs, Muslims, and Croats, with the term “people.” In 1946, the previous constitutional notion of a “national minority” was replaced by the notion of “nationality.” These subtle changes were politically substantial, given the difference between the constitutional position of the titular people and the constitutional position of nationalities, which then meant national minorities. For more, see Ibrahimagić 2017.

5. Although the decision about the name was intended to put an end to the discussion of whether Muslims are a purely religious group or a politico-historical community of BiH that happens to be Muslim, instead many new important questions emerged within the group, such as who Bosniaks are and what that name and identity now means. Kukavica (2013, 14) also notes such differences in understanding even among Bosnian Muslim elites.

6. Since 2017, September 28 is celebrated as “Bosniak Day” among Slavic-speaking Muslims throughout the states of former Yugoslavia, where Bosniaks now live. For more, see Vijeće Kongresa bošnjačkih intelektualaca 2017.

7. For example, Maglajić (1994) argued that “Bosnian Muslims is the best name-option for the current phase of life of the people who are, in the last few months, faced with criminal intent of their extinction” (51).

8. The name was usually noted only in brackets next to the term “Bosnian Muslim,” to make it clear to whom they were referring.

9. For more, see in Kamberović 1994, 185–88.

10. Durham (1905) notes, “One result, and a good one, of the Berlin Treaty was that so soon as the various frontiers were drawn, a shifting of population began to take place” (74) and she continues, saying that a great exodus of Muslims from Bosnia and Bulgaria took place, with “no right to return” (Holt 2019, 197–213). Bandžović (1993, 103–15) describes how it was done in phases, while semisupported by the Porte, and notes that 6.5 percent of the total BiH Muslim population

left, especially those from the cities, of whom some 20 percent left for Turkey. In Sandžak, Muslims began mass emigration in the same direction after the Balkan Wars of 1909 all the way until 1919, and more than 22 percent eventually left. Palairet (1997, 29–33) points to the significant regional deurbanization that came as a result of the number of homes and their Muslim inhabitants that were lost after the Ottoman withdrawal from the Balkans. Karpat (1990, 133–34) indicates that between 1860 and 1914, the number of people moving from the lost territories in the Balkans, the bulk of them Slavic-speaking, to the lands of the remaining empire was between five and seven million. Until recently, McCarthy (2014) was the rare U.S. historian who raised awareness of the ethnic cleansing and genocide of Muslims from the Balkans following the withdrawal of the Ottomans. More recently, William Holt (2019) has also written about those mass eliminations of native Muslims from the Balkans. Those “cleansings” were carried out differently throughout the region. Palairet (1997, 29) notes that in comparison with Bulgaria and Serbia, the pogroms of Muslim inhabitants were most severe in Montenegro. My parents came from the border region of Sandžak, now squeezed between Serbia and Montenegro, and they still remember well the pogroms they experienced and other older ones that their parents recounted to them (Bandžović 2003, 193–94, describes some of them). Everything they experienced was because of their Muslimness, and for them the particular term “Muslim” as their national identity carries a special significance. Since I am close to some of the subjects of the study and to possible readers in English, I have adopted Eco’s approach of emphasizing the intention of the text in presenting results of the inquiry to the reader.

11. See Sekulic, Massey, and Hodson 1994, 84.

12. For more on early learning and cultural approach to change, see Eckstein 1988, 790–92.

13. For example, Miran (2009, 120) notes the last name of “Bashnak” for several families of “Askeri origin” among the current residents of the Red Sea city of Massawa (off the coast of present-day Eritrea), an important deep-sea port held by the Ottoman Empire steadily till 1813 (and intermittently until 1885). They were descendants of the Ottoman soldiers from Bosnia/Sandžak, who came to serve in this important cosmopolitan city, married locally, and stayed even after their units were gone. Now they carry the last name to denote their origin from Bosniaks.

14. For example, see Jukić 1850a, 131–32; Klaić 1882, 65; Balić 1995, 154–57. Additionally, we can note that Bošnjak is sometimes used as a last name among Catholic Croats of both Croatia and BiH. It is also used as a last name by some people in Serbia, mainly among Muslims in Sandžak, but also by a few from Orthodox Christian backgrounds. Finally, there is also a village in Central Serbia with such a name, now occupied exclusively by Orthodox Christians. In Kosovo, when used by Albanians, Bošnjak can also have a derisive connotation. When the accent is on Boš (Bosh), the first syllable of the name, it purportedly means “nothing” in the Albanian language. In that way, non-Slav Albanians try to insult Bosnian Muslims and assert their own nationalism against them to make them give up their Slavness—since they are not well-treated by other non-Muslim Slavs anyway—and push them to adopt Albanianess, primarily by abandoning their Slavic language and adopting the Albanian language as their own. This is particularly well-known to the Muslims of Sandžak and Macedonia and by the Nashenci and Goranci of Prizren, who frequently interact with the overwhelming Albanian majority.

15. Imamović goes further, arguing that Bosniaks have pre-Slavic and Illyrian roots, apart from Serbs and Croats, who are only Slavs. Ibrahim Pašić (2008) criticizes Imamović's arbitrariness and scientific inconsistencies as a mythological approach to antiquity (23) and refers to him as a “national-romantic and theoretician of nation and land” (30). Pašić (2008, 2009) reiterates that all local groups have their own parts in a pre-Slavic Balkan heritage, even though Bosniaks' heritage is perhaps rooted primarily in that of the Illyrians and Goths. For Pašić, that pre-Slavic heritage never discontinued (even in language), but syncretized with the heritage of the South Slavs who eventually overwhelmed the Balkans—but again in different ways for each pre-existing local group—and in that way established the primordial pre-Slavic roots of the Bosniak group.

16. For more, see Maglajlić 1994, 51, or Imamović 1994, 14.

17. Rizvić (1990a) provides an interesting short list of the historical mentions of the term Bosnian language, as a Slavic language of the local people. Over time the Bosnian language was written in different scripts. Jukić (1850b) states that “from the earliest times until almost 1813, Bosniaks used the alphabet and letters from St. Cyril” (25). During medieval times, some Bosnians also used *bosaničica*, a Bosnian version of a Cyrillic script, now often found on Bosnian medieval tombstones (*stećci*) from that time. The same script was also sometimes used by Catholic churches in Dalmatian coastal areas. For more, see Zelić-Bučan (2000).

18. For example, Bišćević (2006, 470–86) notes at least eighty-four different governors of Bosniak origin who ruled in Bosnia, while Ramić (2012) notes twenty-nine Bosnian Muslim *kadis* (judges), and six governors in Egypt.

19. During Ottoman rule, Bosnian elites adopted the same interests as Ottoman elites and often wrote in the primary languages of literature of that time, Arabic and Persian, and sometimes in *arebica*, a Bosnian version of Arabic script adjusted to denote Slavic sounds and used especially to write *alhamijado* literature. The word *alhamijado* derives from the Arabic term *al adjemia* (foreign, non-Arabic). Muhsin Rizvić (1990b) provides a good bibliography of interesting Bosnian contributions on this topic, while Algar (1994) has written about the Persian-language contributions of Bosnian Muslim authors.

20. The first to accept Islam were *spabis* from among the remaining small land-owning class, followed by peasants. The tipping point for a cascade of conversions corresponded with the demise of Hungary in 1526, after which people in Bosnia accepted Islam collectively and in large numbers (Handžić 1975, 121–22). Also see Mazower 2002, 46.

21. Filipović (2005, 103) notes that Islam was initially accepted by the younger generation, as can be observed in Turkish *tefters* from that period, which often note a Christian father and one or two Muslim sons. The same can be observed in the Ottoman court records, as Buturović (2015, 6) noted in her interesting work.

22. A self-declared Bosniak, Abdulah Sidran is a BiH author who wrote the screenplay for several world-acclaimed films such as the Oscar-nominated *When Father Was Away on Business*, *Kuduz*, and *The Perfect Circle*, among others.

23. “*Od Kulina Bana i dobrijuh dana*” (“from the time of Kulin Ban and the good old days”) is a common phrase regularly used by Bosnians to denote the ultimate beginning of any good long story. Kulin Ban ruled Bosnia from 1180 to 1204 and for the first time brought stability to the medieval Bosnian state as an independent political entity (Gazi 1993, 77). About Kulin's good times, in 1882 Klaić writes that

“Dubrovnik writers also report that during Kulin’s government in Bosnia there was abundance and fertility in grain and everything, so that after many years, when the harvest would bear fruit, Bosniaks would say: ‘We are going back to Kulin’s times.’” Bosnia existed as more or less its own entity until 1250, when it came under Hungarian rule again (Klaić 1882, 81–83).

24. The name Bosnia will be used according to historical records. The name Bosnia and Herzegovina began to be used during the last period of Ottoman rule and after the Austro-Hungarian takeover.

25. Fine 1975, 113; Durham 1905, 23.

26. For example, the Bishop of Bosnia, Radigost, was consecrated in 1189 in the Slavic language since he knew no Latin or any other language (Fine 1975, 115).

27. As reported in the Second Inquisition Treatise, “*Tractatus de Hereticis*,” of Anselm of Alexandria (Fine 1975, 119–20).

28. Fine 1975, 120–23.

29. For more, see Lock 2013, 172–73; Klaić 1882, 71.

30. Mongols were often wrongly referred to as “wild Tatars” in the older literature; see Klaić 1882, 75.

31. Fine (1975, 327) points out that despite the popular notions of Bosnia as a battleground between the two versions of Christianity, this was generally not the case until the mid-fifteenth century, when Orthodox Christian religious teachings started to appear in Bosnian regions while they were still without a significant Serbian presence.

32. Mazower 2002, 17.

33. Fine 1975, 375.

34. Adanir 2002, 286.

35. For example, I was told by a Našinac from Prizren, Kosovo (who now lives in Chicago), that they prefer the Bosniak identity because they share not only a common religion now, but also the history of the same medieval heresy of Bogumils, or Kristijani, with Bosnian Muslims. Fine (1975, 85) notes that the last Bosnian Kristijani family, the Helež, who lived near Konjic, BiH, accepted Islam in 1867.

36. Such an opinion was held about America’s West, and it resulted in the obliteration of Native American populations. This comparison of the Balkans and its people with Native Americans was already made in 1895, in the conversations of the American president Theodore Roosevelt with the novelist H. G. Wells about the “queer little ape like figures” of (Balkan) Morlocs. For more, see Wolff 2003, 48–49.

37. For more, see Wilkes 1992, 269–73. Some local primordialists argue that the way of life, language, and structure of dwellings of those pre-Slavic groups still matter in the structuring of the current groups. For a good example, see Pašić 2012 and Pašić 2008.

38. In part due to the ruggedness of the terrain, it took more than forty years to completely occupy the entire territory of the present BiH (for more, see Hupchick 2002, 104–21), while Šabanović (1982, 5) notes that the last Bosnian stronghold of Bihać fell to the Ottomans even later, in 1592.

39. Pelidija 2011, 114.

40. For more on Gradašćević and Rizvanbegović, see Koller 2009, 93.

41. See Palaret 2003, 132.

42. That also shows the early intense concern of the Bosnian Muslim elites over the integrity of Bosnian territory. For more, see Banac 1994, 133; and Donia 2006, 27.

43. See Kujraković 2015.

44. The first Battle of Kosovo of 1389 is much more famous, where Sultan Bayazit defeated the Serbs and others and opened up the Balkans for further expansion north. The first Battle of Kosovo is epical for Serbs nowadays, and it is a foundational myth for their nation, while this second Kosovo battle with Gradašević and Rizvanbegović is much less known by locals.

45. Just to put the number of 60,000 soldiers in some perspective, it may be noted that sixteen years later, in 1732, that number would constitute more than 17 percent of the total population. The Bosnian population was then about 340,000 people (Koller 2009, 92). Of that number, Bosnian Muslims constituted less than half of the population, and at that time they were the primary fighting force of BiH.

46. Aličić 1996, 42.

47. Donia 2006, 25.

48. Filipović 2005, 95.

49. Since the Ottoman Empire was a religious-based empire, both could be seen as part of the same type of elites.

50. Šabanović (1982, 5, 58) points out that it took more than 150 years for Bosnian *eyalet* (*pašaluk*) to form, with all its auxiliary administration to support the state and permanently stationed Ottoman troops, while Buturović (2015) notes that Bosnia developed its own religious elites “within a century or two” (18).

51. Donia (1981, 6) notes that at the time Austro-Hungarians were taking over BiH, there were three types of elites: “religious functionaries, commercial entrepreneurs, and the landowners.” According to the same author twenty-five years later, in 1910 the same three groups of elites constituted about 17 percent of Bosnian Muslim heads of household, while 66 percent of those were landowning elites.

52. Pinson (1993) notes that both “Gyula Andrassy, the imperial foreign minister in the 1870’s, and his colleague, Benjamin Kallay, prominent head of the Austro-Hungarian administration in Bosnia [after 1882], were both Hungarians” (87) and their mission was to prevent Magyar encirclement with a Panslavic sickle (see Bridge 1972, 90–97).

53. A trace of that consciousness may be seen in the survey respondents’ attitude toward Bosniak identity and nonwhite people. In stark contrast to other neighboring Slavic nationalities, more than 80 percent of respondents indicated that they are open to nonwhites being Bosniaks. For more, see chapter 5.

54. In addition to Uvarov’s exclusive notion in the 1860s about the nation hailed by Serbs, which was discussed in the introduction, and Khomyakov’s nineteenth-century epistle to a Slav nation, an example of Serbian historical attitudes toward race, foreign and different, may be observed in the people’s ballads about the Serbian king (1371–1395) and Ottoman vassal, Marko Kraljević (1335–1395), often portrayed as the ultimate heroic figure by the Serbian people. In one such ballad, he was saved from captivity by an Arab princess, who then runs away with him. In the morning, when he sees the princess’s skin color, he is disgusted by it and cuts the princess in half. But let the ballad tell the story:

“On a morning, as day dawned,
 I sat me down to rest,
 And the Moorish maiden took me,
 Encircling me with her black arms,
 and when I looked on her, mother,
 On her black face and white teeth,
 A loathing got hold on me;
 I drew the rich-wrought sabre,
 And smote her in the silken girdle,
 That the sabre cut clean through her . . .”
 (in Low 1922, 106).

55. An interesting short list of Bosnian Muslim notables and their contributions to the Ottoman Empire and Islamic civilization is provided in Balić (1995, 39–44).

56. Such order persisted into the early twentieth century (Tufekčić and Doubt 2019, 38) and after. Even now, the classification among prominent Bosnian Muslims is often driven along those lines, and it is noted if a prominent person comes from an old *begovske* (bey’s) or *hodžinske* (imam’s) family. See, for example, Ključanin’s (1993) article on the well-known Bosnian Muslim communist-era writer Skender Kulenović, defined as a descendant of a prominent Bosnian bey’s family, “who became a Communist partisan *fukara*.” In this instance, *fukara* means both wretch and beggar. Coming from a bey’s family, but schooled at a Jesuit grammar school and a law school in Zagreb, Kulenović eventually became a communist and joined the Partisans during World War II. Klaić (1882) notes that people say “the wealthy beys of the Kulenović family in today’s Bosnia are descendants of Kulin Ban” (65).

57. As elsewhere, different colonial experiences are reason enough for separate nationalisms, despite shared ethnicity. Since nationalism is the political fulfillment of a culture, both sides of that equation are important for any nationalism project. The usual academic focus on political aspirations *is* important, yet it is also important to understand cultural foundations established through specific circumstances and education. Those differences among the modes of education of the elites, even if through colonialism, are an important factor to take into account in any nationalism case. For example, see Abbay (1998) for the case of Eritrea, or numerous instances of differences produced through state-sanctioned education in various former Soviet states in Central Asia, which essentially have created cultural foundations and consciousness of a separate groupness.

58. Mazower (2002) notes that “as late as 1810, there were only two elementary schools in the *Pashaluk* of Belgrade (the core of future Serbia) and in both the language of instructions was Greek: in Montenegro the first elementary school opened in 1834” (74).

59. The Serbian king, Miloš Obrenović, who ruled in the first part of the nineteenth century, was known to be an illiterate pig merchant, is a good example of such reality.

60. See Markovich 2011, 14.

61. In his book, Hajdarpasic (2015) writes about the Ottomans not allowing educated Serbs to return and agitate the local Christian population.

62. For more, see Hajdarpasic 2015, 135–38.

63. Jukić (1861) explains that “when they return home after so many years [of schooling], they will be like strangers; for such usually forget their mother tongue” (207).

64. The famous Croatian literary laureate Miroslav Krleža wrote that around the city of Zagreb at that time, the Croatian people were living in destitute poverty. And Ugrešić (2010) wrote an essay about the poverty of provincial Austro-Hungarian Croatia and the Croatian literary themes of that time. Also see Gazi 1993, 161–69.

65. Neumayer and Schmidl (2008, 120–22) note that in 1910 the Croats were considered the poorest segment of the population in BiH, and that things began to change for them only after the Austro-Hungarian takeover, when their population doubled as a result of those changes.

CHAPTER 3

1. Elites are also an essential part of the authoritative structure, which is an element that scholars such as Shils note as the first step in the formation of a new community. For Gellner (2006), they are the ones who first came up with the ideas of “Ruritania for Ruritarians,” essentially operating during the group’s self-identifying stage.

2. A form of self-expression that Geertz (1963) would recognize as “a social association of the self as ‘being somebody in the world’” (108).

3. After the disappointment over the lost, short-lived idea of limited BiH autonomy negotiated by the Ottomans in the San Stefan Treaty with Russia in the spring of 1878 (for more, see Finkel 2005, 485), conditions changed. The Berlin Agreement, fully reached in April of 1879 among the Western powers, Russia, and Ottomans, placed BiH under the administrative rule of the Austro-Hungarian Empire (see Shafer 1989, 66; Bridge 1972, 92–97). Although initially reluctant to accept the new ruler, Bosnian Muslims finally understood that they had been left to fend for themselves after four hundred years of serving the Islamic Ottoman Empire.

4. Such as the myth built around the heretical Bosnian Church as the medieval Bosnian core group, or Bosnian Muslims as the descendants of Illyrians, the original inhabitants of the Balkans (see Pašić 2012, 622–25)—although that myth is now pretty much taken over by Albanians, who have been pursuing it actively since World War II (see Wilkes 1992, 10–11 and 27)—or other similar myths and stories. Interestingly, Bosnian Muslims do not want to claim such associations with other ancient local Balkan peoples, such as the Vlach or Morlacchi, who also lived throughout the Balkans at that time, even though one of the original Bosnian Muslim folk poems, “Hasanaginica,” translated and praised by Fortis, Goethe, Herder, and Pushkin, was originally (mis)described as “a masterpiece of the Morlacchi” people. See Wolff 2003, 45.

5. As Foucault (2003) approached the birth of nationalism in France. For more, see chapter 1.

6. Until then, Bosnian Muslims were represented almost exclusively by the Yugoslav Muslim Organization (JMO). During the war, some individual communist and peasant leaders emerged, but not as a separate Muslim political party or group.

7. The Austro-Hungarians understood that and tried not to disturb Bosnian Muslim landowning privileges (Neumayer and Schmidl 2008, 96). Once they annexed BiH, they also adopted the Islam Act of 1912, recognizing fully the religion of Islam in the Empire, to try to normalize relations between the state and Bosnian and other Muslims, as a religious group.

8. Sandžak was called “the ancient *Vilayet* of Bosnia.” See Mowat 1916, 80.

9. One of the most prominent leaders of the Bosnian Muslim resistance to the Austro-Hungarian occupation was Mehmed Vehbi Šemsikadić, the mufti of Pljevlja, an important town in Sandžak at that time. Interestingly, he led a force of a couple thousand men including Muslims and non-Muslim Serbs into battle against the occupiers. After his southward withdrawal from Sarajevo and Bosnia to Sandžak, some of the prominent members of the 1878 Prizren League in Kosovo threw their support behind him. That significantly increased the number of troops under his command and made the takeover of Sandžak difficult for the ill-prepared occupying army (see Ličina 2015, 80). That became clear to the Austro-Hungarians as well, so they modified the agreement to have troops present in only a few major cities, but control of the province was to remain with the Ottomans. For more, see Crnovršanin and Sadiković 2001, 152–68. Essentially at that point Sandžak was to serve Austro-Hungarian anti-Slavic geostrategic goals because “Sanjak was to BiH what the Straits were to the Black Sea: a gateway to the East which must be kept open” (Bridge 1972, 97). In all those treaties, Sandžak is mentioned by the name “Sanjak of Novi Bazar” or “Sanjak” and therefore it did have international recognition as a special region, as often noted by Bosniak institutions there, which Serbia nowadays tries to contest when it sometimes refers to the region as “Raška.”

10. The term *Yugoslav* (South Slav) came from the Habsburg administrative description, which categorized Slovenes, Croats, and Serbs as Southern Slavs apart from those in the northern parts of Europe, like Poles, Czechs, and Slovaks. It was derived from German *die Sudslaven* and simply translated by Croats into *Jugoslaveni* [Yugoslavs] (see Gazi 1993, 161).

11. For more, see Pinson 1996, 103–10.

12. See, for example, Purivatra 1974; Crnovršanin and Sadiković 2007; Kamberović 2009, among others.

13. The famous instance of their focus on the integrity of the territory of BiH was the inclusion of the so-called “Turkish paragraph” as Article 135 of the 1921 Vidovdan Constitution, “which ensured that BiH alone, in its pre-war borders, would form a single region among the twenty-six into which the Serb-Croat-Slovene kingdom came to be divided. The ‘Turkish paragraph’ was the outcome of Mehmed Spaho’s efforts and policy, a result of the JMO’s constructive approach and votes, which secured the adoption in 1921 of the so-called Vidovdan Constitution” (for more, see Bajić 2009).

14. For more, see Duranović 2013, 385–90.

15. Such as the instance in 1936 when they supported the Serbian Radical party government in exchange for returning the seat of the Yugoslav (BiH) religious hierarchy to Sarajevo, among a few other things.

16. See Spaho 1923.

17. BiH was divided into parts to become included into four (out of nine) new administrative units, *banovine*, always joined with Serbian, Croatian, or Montenegrin majority districts. See Banac 1994, 138–39.

18. In fact BiH was referred to as “the heart of the [NDH] state without which the state cannot exist,” signaling that any autonomy was out of question, and that made many Muslims weary of the NDH (see Petranović and Zečević 1987, 697).

19. Mehmed Spaho died suddenly in a Belgrade hotel room soon after he arrived to negotiate better terms for Bosnian Muslims at the time when the new Yugoslav constitution, which was to deny BiH, was being discussed between Serbs and Croats. Many Bosnian Muslims believe he was poisoned by the Serbian side to disrupt the balance that the Muslim side provided in any Serbo-Croatian negotiations. For more, see Crnovršanin and Sadiković 2007, 408–14; and Kamberović 2009, 147–50.

20. No doubt the Ustasha were also brutally anti-Jewish and anti-Roma, but anti-Serbism was their “*raison d’être* and *ceterum censeo*” (Redžić 2005, 73).

21. Because those prominent JMO leaders sided with the NDH, they caused JMO to lose their main political goal and reason for existence, the fight for BiH autonomy, and therefore they lost credibility among people as well and were no longer a rallying focal point. Some members, however, were eventually reintroduced into public life, such as the prominent Bosnian theologian Muhamed Đozo, who was brought back to service a few years after the war, when communist rule was stabilized.

22. Hoare (2014, 171, 177) explains well the importance of the participation of prominent JMO members at the first ZAVNOBiH meeting in November 1943, which constituted BiH as an equal federal unit of Yugoslavia. Nevertheless, some of them, like Bektašević, were declared later to be German occupation collaborators and executed by the communists. For more on JMO’s role, see also Redžić (2005, 81–89, 169); Banac (1994, 142) also elaborates on that.

23. Dedijer and Miletić (1990) wrote the most comprehensive account, not only of Muslim victimhood during the war, but also of the intent of Draža Mihajlović and his Chetnik forces to eliminate as many Muslims as possible from Yugoslavia (see, for example, the document shown in their book on page 26).

24. On October 12, 1941, in a Sarajevo resolution, the Muslim organization “El-Hidaya” issued a statement saying among other things (in translation): “Many Catholics falsely blame the Muslims for all the recent atrocities and present all the events as mutual reckonings between Muslims and Greco-Easterners [Serbs] . . . However, when things are more correctly and accurately known, it is clear that the Muslims are not guilty, and that is why they most vigorously reject these accusations. . . . We now conclude that those atrocities could have been committed only by scum and criminal types, which exist in every community. We also state that they did not do that of their own accord, not until they were given weapons, uniforms, and authority, and often orders to do it. Therefore, in no case are Muslims responsible for these atrocities, nor are they the initiators. We also state that in order to push the responsibility for the crimes on to the Muslims, the killers used the fez and Muslim names. Namely, they wore a fez, which was registered as the uniform of the entire Bosnian army, when committing various atrocities against non-Muslims, during which they called each other by Muslim names. . . . Muslims in their past during Turkish rule, when they were the only masters [in BiH], tolerated all religions without distinction and did not wrong anyone. Therefore, even today, Muslims cannot be presented as the initiators of the crimes, and as those who do not tolerate Greco-Easterners and who cause all

the rebellions, as some are deliberately trying to present them [by blaming Muslims]” (Petranović and Zečević 1987, 699–70).

25. Perhaps the best illustration of Bosnian Muslim wandering is the true story of Husko Miljković described in Bijedić’s (1968) book. Several times during the war, Miljković changed sides, sometimes even within a single day, as he tried to make sense of what was actually going on and how to best protect the people of his Cazinska Krajina in BiH. Eventually, in 1944 he decided to join the Partisans and with that probably provided for their decisive victory in his region and beyond. Nevertheless, he did not live to see the end of the war, as he was killed in an ambush a few months later. The communists claimed that he was killed by the Ustashas (see Karović 2007, 67), but the clear responsibility for his death was never determined, and because of that, after his death many of his soldiers turned against the Partisans. Miljković’s name and role during World War II are still considered controversial, while he is hailed by local Muslims as their hero and protector (see Vojić 2019). Similarly, his cousin and associate, Hasan Miljković, from Velika Kladuša, was prosecuted by all, Germans, Ustashas, and Partisans, as an “enemy of people.” An answer to which “people” was he enemy of is essentially tied to the issue of which groups were actually recognized as “people” in Yugoslavia at that time.

26. See Redžić 2005, 69–71; Banac 1994, 142.

27. The division lasted for only about a year, from spring of 1943 until October of 1944, when it was dissolved after many of its soldiers deserted to the Partisans and other local armed Muslim units (see Redžić 2005, 183). The Nazis did this with other Muslim minority groups in the Soviet Union. For example, a relatively small legion made up of Volga Tatars was used to create the Idel-Ural Legion, and Stalin later used this as a pretext to accuse entire nations (the Ingush, Chechens, Crimean Tatars, Meskhetian Turks, Kalmyks, Crimean Greeks, Bulgarians, Volga Germans) of collaboration with the Nazis and send them into internal exile in Siberia and Central Asia.

28. More explicitly as “the most vital and noblest part of the Croatian people” (Redžić 2005, 68).

29. From the beginning of 1941, the Chetniks were opportunists and tried to cooperate with all local actors when it served their agenda, and they even ostensibly sided with Tito’s Partisans and others who attempted to resist German occupation. By the end of the same year, however, the Chetniks became Italian and German collaborators (see, for example, Gutman 1990, 289–30). After 1943 the Chetniks more or less even collaborated with the Ustashas. Tito’s Partisans, on the other hand, long avoided recognizing the Chetniks as an enemy of the people (see Pijade 1981, 26–7) and did not list them as such.

30. See Redžić 2005, 97, 143–46; Karović 2007, 59.

31. See Redžić 2005, 82–83.

32. A major contributor to their anti-Partisan efforts was the 1942 Ustasha-Chetnik accord of mutual support, which made the already bad Bosnian Muslims’ situation even more dire. For more see Redžić 2005, 87–89.

33. The support was probably in exchange for the promise of BiH integrity and autonomy, for which only Muslims as a national group truly strived for during the war. See, for example, Avdo Humo’s report from the communist-led State Anti-Fascist Council for the National Liberation of BiH (ZAVNOBiH), in Čemerlić and

Redžić (1968, 229), or, throughout the same book, the numerous other declarations and propaganda materials about BiH remaining first an autonomous, and later also an equal, federal unit of the new communist-ruled Yugoslavia in exchange for the Muslim support of the Partisans-led struggle. Granting Bosnia a status equal to that of other political units within Yugoslavia was in part done by the Partisans to serve two pragmatic purposes: The first was to prevent a potential attempt to divide BiH territory and causing a “discord between the Serbs and the Croats” (Hoare 2014, 169). The other reason was to counter the Ustasha policy of denying Bosnians their autonomy, which had angered and kept Bosnian Muslims at bay regarding the NDH project. The same was done by the Partisans to Sandžak during the war, when they created *Zemaljsko antifašističko vijeće narodnog oslobođenja Sandžaka* [the National Anti-Fascist Council of the People’s Liberation of Sandžak] to signal a special status for Sandžak in order to appease the Muslims there, only to revoke this status at the end of war to please the Serbs and Montenegrins, when the Muslims were not in a position to do anything about it (for more see, Kožar 2019, 168–70).

34. It should be mentioned that in this age of historical revisionism by both Serbian and Croatian intellectuals, who are both trying to distance themselves from their communist past, the BiH national Independence Day, celebrated mainly by Bosnian Muslims, is still the day of the communist-led ZAVNOBiH meeting when BiH integrity was reinstated. Hoare (2014, 164–72) provides a detailed description of the importance of that event for Bosnian statehood within Yugoslavia. For an example of Serbian revisionism, see Nećak 2010. For Croatian revisionism, see Pavlakovic 2010. See also more comprehensive work by Subotić 2019.

35. Although BiH is occasionally described politically as a possible “Switzerland of the Balkans” because it is geographically located between Croatia in the north and Serbia in the south and has large populations of Croats and Serbs living in it, nevertheless, BiH is different in at least one important way: in Switzerland, each national group has a corresponding national state to provide for the full balance of power among them, while in Bosnia, (Bosnian) Muslims do not have a national state. That is why most of the accused Bosnian Serb and Croat war criminals easily went from BiH to their respective national states, where many of them still live outside the reach of the BiH judiciary and law enforcement. It is important to add that BiH was not so much more diverse than other Yugoslav units, as many commentators claim. Diversity has been the norm in the whole southern part of Yugoslavia, including Serbia, with large numbers of Hungarians, Albanians, Muslims, and others living there for centuries. That diversity was specifically mentioned and expected to be accommodated by the new state of Serbia by the Berlin Treaty of 1878, which recognized its independence (see Mowat 1916, 80; Salkic 2008, 441). Nevertheless, during and after the existence of Yugoslavia, such diversity was not expected to be represented in the governing bodies of Serbia, Montenegro, or Macedonia, the way it was “normally” expected in BiH.

36. Serbian communist leaders led by Milošević noted that any change in the structural arrangements within Yugoslavia would open the possibility of redrawing the borders of Serbia to ensure that Serbian territories (in Bosnia) would become part of a new Serbia (for more, see ICTY 2003, 20887–88). Another example of how that orientation toward Bosnia was understood by many Bosnian

Serbs and Croats may be seen in their actions toward their Muslim neighbors during and *after* the war. In his testimony Habibović (2020) describes how his Eastern Bosnian colleagues he knew and worked with nevertheless proceeded to torture and murder neighbors. Similarly, Pervanić and Ashdown (1999) in their book describes how Pervanić's Serb neighbors acted in western Bosnia: "we were attacked and rounded up by former neighbors—suddenly claiming never to have been our neighbors." This continued even after the war, when few Serbs or Croats came forward to at least report the locations of mass graves of murdered Muslims (see US Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe 2012). Marquand (2005) writes that "even with photographic evidence, many Serbs at the tribunal have denied involvement. One, Dusko Jevic-Stadja, shown in uniform in a videotape standing next to Mladić in July 1995, denies any harmful action." No matter how predictable these instances of genocide denial are, such accounts must be a part of the assessment of the orientation of different groups toward BiH and Bosniaks. Stanton (1998) indicates that the eight stage of genocide is denial, and it indicates the future intentions of the perpetrators, who were agents of the Serbian state and national project (see Papić 2021), while all political leaders are more or less aligned with and respond to wishes of their power base. For more on the techniques of denial, see Toom 2020.

37. Hoare (2014) notes that during the federal Yugoslav constitutive meeting of AVNOJ in 1943, upon the suggestion of Colonel Sulejman Filipovic (a Bosnian Muslim who declared himself nationally a Croat), BiH was included in the definition of Yugoslavia, which was "to be built on a federative basis, which will guarantee the full equality of Serbs, Croats, Slovenes, Macedonians and Montenegrins and of the peoples of Serbia, Croatia, Slovenia, Macedonia, Montenegro and Bosnia-Herzegovina respectively" (183–84).

38. It is often neglected in the literature that during the communist era, some Bosnian Muslims were "offered a choice" to be nationally "Montenegrin," in addition to the well-known options of "Serb" or "Croat." See, for example, Lakić 1992, 74. Even now, the Montenegrin government is actively trying to court Slavic-speaking Muslims of Montenegro to be Montenegrin and not Bosniaks, and some of them do accept that identity (see Parliament of Montenegro 2016). Halep (2013) notes that those Muslims live mainly around the two southeastern Montenegrin coastal towns of Bar and Ulcinj. In the data set compiled for this study, members of those Montenegrin Muslims in the diaspora are now living mainly in Chicago, with only a few in the New York City Metropolitan area.

39. Many people credit the Bosnian Muslim Džemal Bijedić, one of Tito's favorite Muslim communists, for that. In my conversations with them, both Nedžib and Muhamed Šaćirbegović (Shacirbey) repeatedly expressed great admiration for Bijedić as a tribune of the Bosnian Muslim people. For more on the issue of recognition of Muslim nationality, also see Lucic 2012.

40. Quoting from a document issued by the Office of the High Representative in BiH, Rogan notes that "before the war, some 40% of Bosnia's labor force was employed in agriculture, but only 16% of the 570,000 farms were larger than 12.4 acres" (185). Geographically, BiH does not have a lot of land for agricultural business; therefore, most farming was on the subsistence level.

41. As is also noted by Fetzer and Soper 2005, 10–11. This reality of federal competition becomes even more relevant to understanding the position of Muslims as a nonrecognized group in Bosnia after the Yugoslav constitutional changes of the 1950s, after which economic planning was no longer to be done on the central level only. Instead, in a system of workers' self-management, it would be in the hands of "the republic governments, the industry-wide, worker-elected management organs, and in some cases individual factory units" (Neal 1954, 323), and not based on quotas with representation of "all people" and nationalities. This system of self-management was destined to fail because it could not provide overall sufficient growth due to the differences among the federal units and the subgroups, which consistently put their own interests above all others (see Rojek and Wilson 1987). This situation was also instrumentally important for the distribution of military power among Bosnian groups at the time when BiH became an independent state. For more on this, see Shaykhutdinov 2010, 182. In fact, as the Slovenian communist leader Milan Kučan explained, the attempt to change the institutional structure of Yugoslav federalism was actually the main reason for the country's collapse. For example, see ICTY 2003 (20852–989) for Kučan's comments on this matter.

42. "*Bratstvo i jedinstvo*" does not mean "brotherhood and unity" as it is often wrongly translated in the literature. *Bratstvo* does mean "brotherhood" and it allows plurality, but *jedinstvo* is derived from the noun *jedan* ("one") and it does not necessarily mean unity of many different individuals or units. In local Slavic languages, such unity in diversity would be referred to as "*zajedništvo*," unity and togetherness while remaining different. *Zajedništvo* is derived from the word "*zajedno*" and implies and allows for differences among units joined together. *Jedinstvo* means "oneness" (singleness), implicitly, without retention of individuality, not unity in difference, as it is usually used in English. That oneness without individuality was the intended meaning in the Yugoslav context as well.

43. Which was a slightly upgraded policy instituted previously by the Kingdom of SHS and Yugoslavia, called "*narodno jedinstvo*" (people's oneness). The Serbian king declared his official nationalizing policy to be Yugoslavia as one nation with three tribes (not three nations or ethnicities), and he tried to promote it through nascent public schools as "*jedinstvo države i narodne misli*" (oneness of the state and people's thought) (Petranović and Zečević 1987, 624). As mentioned earlier, such "feeling of oneness" creates "we-sentiment" as the indispensable factor in the nation (Snyder 1968, 54). That goal of oneness was essentially built primarily upon policies of Serbianism (see Duranović 2013, 393–94). This unitaristic approach initially worked well for communist totalitarianism as well, but it also carried the seeds of its own demise (see Banac 1984, 333–38). Although Jelavich also translates *jedinstvo* as "unity," it is a type of unity that also suggests the state of being one in number, so it implies sameness and oneness without retention of difference of those united people. For more, see Jelavich 2003, 95–96. The continuance of the policy of "*narodno jedinstvo*" with "*bratstvo i jedinstvo*" could also be seen from the "gentlemen's agreement" on migration signed in 1953 between Tito and the Turkish Minister of Foreign Affairs Köprüllü, and from subsequent activities done by the Communist rulers to encourage Muslim emigration to Turkey just as previous Yugoslavia under King have done it as well. Ellis (2003) notes that emigration to be "the second largest influx of people to Turkey in the post-World War II period" (41). It was clear that Tito's national pluralism policy was a continuation of the

King's approach toward oneness, from which non-Christians who were belonging to the "Turkish culture and consciousness" were excluded. For more on that policy, see Çavuşoğlu 2007, 148; and Pezo 2009, 82–85. Finally, let us not forget that Communist-led Partisans in 1944 executed the assassin Puniša Racić in Belgrade, for his 1928 murder of Croat-tribunes Stjepan Radić and others, which many argue, was a final act that broke King-created previous Yugoslavia of one people with three tribes.

44. For example, see Ćemerlić and Redžić 1968, 190 or 220.

45. For a good overview of the discussion regarding the recognition of Muslim nationality in 1968 and the unequal position of Bosnian Muslim intellectuals regarding the importance of BiH, see Lucic 2012. Ellis (2003, 68–71) notes that the Communist-ruled Yugoslavia at that time a category of "nation" used to indicate a Slavic subgroup that is native of the country, while designation of a "nationality" was (mostly) awarded for groups that have had national homelands outside of Yugoslavia.

46. Glenn (1992) notes that most of those murdered in Yugoslavia—including Muslims—were killed by other Yugoslavs, and that the average age of those dead was twenty-two years old. Considering that the most intense World War II fighting in Yugoslavia was occurring in BiH and Sandžak, the very significant number of victims were (Bosnian) Muslims. If the numbers of Muslims killed during World War II provided by Cigar (1995, 9) are averaged, eighty-five thousand Muslims perished, or more than 10 percent of their population in 1948 (for 1948 numbers, see Petranović and Zečević 1987, 769). Averaged in the same way, Serbs lost about 5 percent, while Croats lost about 4 percent of their 1948 population. For more see Cigar 1995, 9. This fact about Muslims casualties—along with the inability of Muslims to declare themselves a nation at that time—is the important factor to properly understand the population proportions and numbers of Croats, Serbs, and Muslims in BiH censuses after World War II.

47. In part these numbers also represent inconsistencies with defining Muslims as a separate group (not Serbs-Croats-Montenegrins) and with people self-reporting to official census inquiries. Yet the numbers definitely point to an increase in fertility rates among the population (for more, see Petranović and Zečević 1987, 769). Yet these numbers initially grew slowly, increasing from 340,000 Bosnian Muslims in 1769 (Koller 2009, 92), to only 808,921, after 179 years, in all of Yugoslavia (163,167 in Sandžak alone), and only then did the Muslim population increase more significantly to almost two million in 1981 (see Jovanović 1992, 154) and then to some 2.3 million in 1991, an almost 35 percent increase since 1948 (see Mrdjen 2002, 86). Interestingly, there were also about 1.1 million in 1820–1840 (Karpat 1985, 23).

48. For more, see Hasanbegović 2010.

49. Perić 1984, 26–30. For Croatian nationalists, the problem of Yugoslavia was primarily a problem of separation between them and the Serbs. Other nations and people in Yugoslavia had only to choose one of those two sides. Perić 1984, 63.

50. The continuity of that national thought can be observed in the national project developed by the Serbian Academy of Science that was issued in 1986 and that followed the path of the Serbian nationalism foundational document *Načrtanije* [Writings] from 1844.

51. See Filandra 1998.

52. The Bosnian Muslim intellectual Redžić even then argued instead for the "Bosniak" appellation. For more, see Redžić 1970, and Promitzer 2004, 79.

53. Merdjen (2002, 89) notes that 87 percent of self-declared Yugoslavs in the 1961 Federal Census were from BiH, and were mostly Muslims.

54. Alija Izetbegović, for example, was sentenced to fourteen years in prison for writing his books on Bosnian Muslims and Islam, an act seen as “verbal delict” by the security agencies and authorities. Izetbegović describes his trial and prison experience in his autobiography (2003, 25–59). Izetbegović and his book were certainly not that dangerous, as he was ostensibly not quite practicing Muslim at that time. In my conversations recorded in 2013 with Nedzib Šaćirbegović, one of the earliest members of Mladi Muslimani, he was gently distancing organization from Alija Izetbegović since, according to him, he was not a disciplined practicing Muslim at that time. Abazović (1999) notes that security agencies were filled predominantly with Serbian operatives, and their Serbian vision of Islam was instrumental in such harsh dealings with Muslim intellectuals. Abazović (1999) writes that during the period of Yugoslavia in BiH, of all personal files that police held about nationalist-related activities of individuals, 47.3 percent of them were on Muslims, 37.2 percent on Croats, and only 15.6 percent on Serbs.

55. See Arlsanbenzer 2014.

56. The concept of *hijra* was established during the time of the Prophet Mohamed when he emigrated from Mecca to Medina and then asked other Muslims to do the same for two reasons: (i) to strengthen the Muslim presence in Medina, and (ii) to support the efforts to secure peace and safety for Muslims there at a time when they were being persecuted in Mecca. After Mecca was taken over by the Muslims, the rule of *hijra* was no longer an individual obligation and with that, the ways to interpret the obligation of *hijra* also changed. An important interpretation based on the second original reason for *hijra* says that Muslims should emigrate from insecurity to safety, where they can preserve life and practice their religion. The first reason emphasizes that Muslims should emigrate to support a Muslim government and rule, wherever it is. Obviously, those two visions clashed in 1884 and Azabegić’s interpretation significantly clarified things for Bosnian Muslims at the time. For more on the interpretations of *hijra*, see Masud 1990.

57. Soon after that, following the retirement of Hilmi Omerović, Azabegić becomes the second *reis-ul-ulama*, and the first one to be appointed by the Austro-Hungarian Emperor without any consultation or regard to the Ottoman religious hierarchy that previously had a definitive say for Bosnian religious structures. With that, Azabegić’s appointment could be considered an important break away of Bosnian Muslim’s religious hierarchy from the Ottomans, and *dar-ul-Islam* structures. For more see, Al-Arnaut 1994, 248–49.

58. Both the Ottoman Empire and its successor state, the Republic of Turkey, have negotiated and signed numerous agreements that rationalized resettlements of the Balkan Muslim peoples to Turkey to benefit the new Turkish state, but with devastating long-term consequences for the remaining local Muslim populations in Yugoslavia. For examples of those agreements see Avdić 1991; Andrić 1992, 193–95.

59. Bandžović 2003, 222.

60. See Jovanovic 2008, 65–66; Akan 2003, 52.

61. For this interpretation of *hijra*, see *Risala o Hijri* [Treatise on Hijra], written in Arabic in 1884, by Mehmed Teufik Azabegić, later also the *reis-ul-ulama* of BiH himself. This utilitarian interpretation of *hijra* was provided for Bosnian Mus-

lims' *ulama* by their adherence to the Hanefi/Maturidi approach to Islam, which invites reason and analogy to inform human actions, as is explained in detail later in this work. *Risala* was transcribed and translated by the Bosnian Islamic theologian Muhamed Handžić in 1942, when Muslims were going through horrific pogroms at the hands of Serbian Chetniks in eastern Bosnia and Sandžak and many began emigrating again. To celebrate the *Risala* and to “assert their European intellectual heritage,” the IZBiH in 2018 issued a special publication about the treatise in English as a centennial celebration of the document, and as their contribution to the scholarship on contemporary Muslim migrations (see Azabegić and Ljevaković-Subašić 2018).

62. A similar interpretation of *hijra* not being individual obligation anymore was confirmed after by Muhamed Rashid Rida in 1909 (Al-Arnaut 1994, 253). Such interpretation is mostly consistent with the Hanafi juristic school's ruling (see Masud 1990, 33–39).

63. See Savezna Narodna Skupština 1963, 314–15.

64. Abazović (1999) establishes that many of those teachers were not necessarily qualified for the job but got it due to their connections to their ethnic kin in state bureaucracies.

65. As mention above, there were no schools at that time to produce such public servants in BiH, and the University of Sarajevo was established only in 1949 (for numbers, see Petranović and Zečević 1987, 624; Neumayer and Schmidl 2008, 96).

66. Although ideologically paradoxical, many previous nationalist policies toward local Muslims of the “old era” were often continued by the new, progressive Communist Parties throughout the Balkans. Myuhtar-May (2014), for example, documents policies of continuous Christianization of Muslim Pomaks by the Bulgarian Communist Party. In the case of BiH, and even Yugoslavia, the Communist Party was composed of many illiterate and barely literate people, who were overwhelmingly Serbs (for example, see Petrić 2004). In 1949 in BiH, some 21 percent of them had no schooling, while more than 57 percent had only the basic four years of elementary school, while in 1954 these categories were 12.18 percent and 54.42 percent respectively (Abazović 1999, 363). So they were not conscious vanguards of the society; rather, they were mostly expedient local people who joined the Communist Party to advance themselves. Such people mostly followed policies and practices they knew from the old, precommunist Yugoslavia, and they kept the old attitudes toward Bosnian Muslims as well.

67. Abazović (1999, 386–87) also points to that fact that many of the teachers came to teach Muslim children and young people the Serbian vision of Muslims and Yugoslavia, which they had acquired before World War II, when they got their own education, *if they did*. Some of those teachers got their jobs as a token of appreciation for their contributions in the war and not because they were otherwise qualified to teach. Additionally, many of those local civil servants and teachers in the Muslim-dominated villages and towns were sent there as a punishment for “anti-revolutionary behavior.” The Bosniak novelist Isnam Taljić set his novel *Vjetrometina* in the eastern Bosnian town of Vlasenica to describe that type of situation in such small towns (see Taljić 2004). Many of those who got their teaching positions after the war remained there until retirement, like most other public-sector employees in the former Yugoslavia. That means that many of those teachers

remained as faculty members until the 1980s. For example, an informant from Foča told me that she had the same first grade teacher, Ranka Slavić, when she began her schooling in 1977 as her father had had in 1947. The same conditions were even more pronounced in Sandžak, where teachers were almost exclusively Serbs all the way until the 1970s (for example, see Vuković 2000, 103–7), while for the entire history of the same school in the small, predominantly Muslim Sandžak town of Brodarevo, from 1919 into the 2000s, nineteen of twenty principals were Serbs and only one was a Muslim, who served for about six years (114).

68. All schools throughout BiH taught Serbian history, including the myths about the battle of Kosovo and other stories that glorified various Serbian struggles. All students also had to learn poems like “Mountain Wreath,” written by the Montenegrin poet-king Njegoš, which is recognized as an ideological precursor to the 1990s genocide of Bosniaks (see Sells 1996, 41). All my informants from Čapljina, Prijedor, Sarajevo, Foča, and Trebinje told me that they never spoke to their parents about what they learned in school and they never thought twice about the things that they were taught, even when ideas and instructions were openly anti-Muslim.

69. For example, the education on the elementary school level quadrupled in Yugoslavia from 1945 to 1981. During the same period, the number of high school and college graduates in the country grew even more, to twelve times higher (Petranović and Zečević 1987, 771). The same trends regarding education levels are reflected in the sample we captured for this study. See table 5.7 in this work and the discussion about it.

70. Bosnian Muslims were not the only group to learn nationalism from their Balkan neighbors. A good example of learning from Serbian nationalism and adopting it to fit their own needs and circumstances could be the case of Zionism, which was apparently conceived and significantly learned among the Serbs in the Austro-Hungarian exile. For more, see Shnidman 2018. This is also a place where the Austro-Hungarian administrator of Bosnia, Benjamin Kallay, first learned from and about Serbs (see Feldman 2017, 105).

71. For more on the importance of the proper development of bureaucracy and the middle-level structures in multinational states like Yugoslavia or BiH, see Migdal 1988.

72. Although Yugoslav identity first existed in Kingdom of Yugoslavia, after World War II communist rulers initially tried to offer a new socialist-constructed, classless, inclusive salient identity to all Yugoslav groups. The communists, however, could not effectively resolve their universalist ideals with local subethnic and national realities. The initial, inclusive approach was then replaced by the unit-specific, titular, and subethnic group dominance, preferred by previous regimes. Socialist inclusiveness was then to be manifested through centrally planned proportional national numbers among federal and state personnel based on the unit structure. This was especially pronounced after the legislative changes in the 1950s. With those changes, titular ethnic and national identities gained importance because they had added material benefit attached to them, since titular recognition and presence at the decision-making table increased access to state and federal collective goods.

73. As a principal architect of communist Yugoslavia’s secret service, Ranković

was probably deeply impacted by the torture he had experienced when imprisoned by the Gestapo early during the German occupation. When he later became the head of the state's internal affairs, he dealt mercilessly with all he perceived as anti-Serb, as he considered them the most important Yugoslav group. Ranković was deposed in 1966 when Tito discovered his plots to overthrow him. He is still revered by Serbs as a national martyr. For more on Ranković, see Bećirević 2014, 17; Midžić 2007, 299.

74. See Abazović 1999, 70–113.

75. For more see Malešević, 2006, 191–201, 214–15.

76. In my conversations with them, both prominent Bosniak Americans Nedžib and Muhamed Saćirbegović (Sacirbey) repeatedly expressed great admiration for Bijedić as a tribune of the Bosnian Muslim people. Nedžib was one of the members of the religion-based and politically oriented Mladi Muslimani organization, yet he expressed deep respect for the communist Bijedić. His son Muhamed shared his sentiments, probably learned from his father.

77. For example, see Filandra 1998, 276.

78. For more, see Vladisavljević 2004.

79. See Cigar 1995, 23.

80. Milošević's messages traveled far and received support from many intellectuals worldwide. It was the time when Huntington's dubious thesis of the "clash of civilizations" emerged and caused a lot of excitement in some intellectual circles. As Malcolm (2019) established, these were not new ideas among Europeans, and Milošević perhaps counted on those long-established attitudes when he relied on them to justify his policies and actions of Serb forces toward Muslims in BiH, Sandžak, and Kosovo. As mentioned, many sympathized with Milošević's anti-Muslim attitude, like the American professor Pranger, the Norwegian mass murderer Brevik, and the Austrian writer Peter Handke (see Maass 2019). The last time this attitude attracted notoriety was in 2019 with the New Zealand mosque massacre, where an Australian white supremacist, inspired by Serbs, murdered hundreds of Muslims in cold blood (see Moghul 2019). For more on Milošević's anti-Muslim platform for the mobilization of Serbs, see also Cigar 1995, 24–30.

81. Volkan (1997) also argues that "Bosnian Muslims served as a reservoir for the massive projections of Serbs' unwanted qualities."

82. The issuing of such insolvent promissory notes was common in Yugoslavia at that time, when the economy was experiencing huge rates of inflation. The arrest of only Abdić for such a wide-spread practice, committed by many other companies throughout Yugoslavia, was perceived as a message. The pursuit of Abdić began in Serbia, not BiH, and that further aided perceptions that his removal was a warning to all Muslims.

83. One of the main actors in revealing the affair, the Serbian journalist Zvonko Azdejković, committed unexplained suicide a few years after the affair. For more, see Brkić 2017.

84. At its helm were a few prominent Bosnian Muslims, like Adil Zulfikarpašić, Safet Isović, and other members of Mladi Muslimani, but the party was led by Alija Izetbegović, who firmly assumed the role of "philosopher king" (Arslanbenzer 2014), as many other Muslims around the world saw him (see The King Faisal International Prize 1993), to lead his people on the winding path of self-emancipation through a nationalism that they learned from others.

85. See Izetbegović 2003, 64–75.

86. For more, see Pejić 2008.

87. Bandžović (2003, 184) notes that due to the extreme measures of “deosmanization” including expulsion and murder, the formation of the new local nation-states broke up the unified territory of the Ottoman Balkans, where Muslims had been in charge of the state as a single group. The subsequent new, narrowly constructed national identities demanded by the latest rulers also caused those local Muslims to begin to see themselves as a fragmented and disconnected religio-ethnic group. Such narrow self-perception was often regionally based, as were Muslims’ strategies of survival. This was further aided by the large exodus of educated elites and Muslim leaders from BiH after the Berlin Congress (see Karpat 1985, 76). As a result, each area developed its own milieu, which Rohe (1990) defines, in his work on another case, as “a distinct way of life shared with others and reproduced by daily practice” (7).

88. Abazović (1999) provides these numbers and further notes that from 1945 to 1991, some 66.6 percent of BiH Security Services personnel were Serbs, while Muslims were 23.6 percent and Croats only 9.3 percent (381–82).

89. This is due to the bureaucratic structure of the SR BiH, which was controlled by three nationalities (Serbs, Croats, Muslims). Each of them had hands in the collective resources of BiH, so Bosnian Muslims could not claim many TO resources exclusively for themselves. To the extent that they did, the same was done by Croats and even more by Serbs (for more, see Kolarić 2018). Serbs controlled 70 percent of officers and carrier soldiers in all Yugoslav military structures, especially at the onset of the wars of dissolution (for example, see Williams 1991).

90. One of those steps was to conceive a new Yugoslav national defense strategy built upon a single joint program as opposed to the previously federally structured system. As an example of the new strategy, the Supreme Command of JNA (the Yugoslav army only) became the Supreme Command of [all] the Armed Forces of SRFY, essentially collapsing the previously separate TO structures under one national command. See, Šadinlija 2011, 771–81.

91. At that time, Rogan (2000) states that “municipal governments were typically composed of the members of one [dominant] ethnic group [and] power normally was concentrated in the [local] executive” (189), which, after the war began, proceeded to carry out “ethnic cleansing themselves” (189). It is important to keep in mind that in the former Yugoslavia, the primary holders of rights were constitutive people, not republics as federal units. So in those more homogeneous republics like Slovenia, that meant both, but in BiH, Serbia, Croatia, Macedonia, and even Montenegro, the situation was much more ambiguous in terms of who controlled what, and the local composition of any branch of government or bureaucracy had a particularly strong influence on that. For example, since the federal unit of Serbia was defined by the constitution of 1974 “as a state of the Serbian people and members of other peoples of Yugoslavia and nationalities within Serbia, the Republic of Serbia is based on the sovereignty of the people and on the government and self-government of the working class and all working people” (Petranović and Zečević 1987, 530). In practice that meant that Serbs were always represented while others not explicitly mentioned were combined in a category of “other people” within the state structures, regardless of their numbers. For an example of the relevance see ICTY 2006, 7882–90; or see NIN 2002.

92. A day after the United States recognized the RBiH as independent country, the Presidency of the RBiH established a new staff of the TO of RBiH on April 8, 1992, and also decided that the official emblem of the TO RBiH would be the Bosnian shield-shaped blue coat of arms, intersected by a white diagonal, with three golden-yellow lilies in each field. Then on April 15, 1992, the TO staff ordered the creation of the Main TO Headquarters, which acquired full command over all existing units defending BiH. On May 20, 1992, the Presidency of RBiH passed the Decree on the Armed Forces of Bosnia and Herzegovina and formally recognized the already-established ARBiH. On May 25, 1992, the president appointed as chief of staff of the ARBiH General Sefer Halilović, who then structured the entire army on the principles noted in his “Directives for the Defense of the Sovereignty and Territorial Integrity of RBiH,” written while he was a commander of the Bosnian Muslims-led Patriotic League of BiH before the war began but when he anticipated a conflict with the Serbs and Croats over BiH. Once leader of the ABiH, Halilović embraced the officer cadre of the TO of RBiH and organized the ARBiH in the image of BiH as a multinational army.

93. As shown by Shaykhutdinov (2010), those power arrangements and the balance among opposing groups in BiH were important factors that caused the division of the unitary BiH state.

94. In essence, they relied on Croats because they, like Muslims, were trying to win their right to independence from the new Slobodan Milošević–controlled Yugoslavia. For that reason Bosnian Muslims had to rely on Croats and for the same reason Croats were initially calculating the same, until the March 1991 Karadordevo meeting between Milošević and Tuđman, when they divided BiH in to their zones and both turned against Bosnian Muslims (see ICTY 2000).

95. As indicated above, from the time of the Ottomans, Bosnian Muslim elites understood that they were an important regional political factor *only* with the existence and integrity of BiH, where they remained as a significant population. If BiH were diminished, their significance would also be severely lessened, almost nonexistent. So, judging from the history thus far, Bosnian Muslims have focused on preserving the integrity of BiH, even if that meant losing territorial sovereignty and the *integral* BiH becoming part of some larger empire, kingdom, or entity, like Yugoslavia.

96. For more, see Dahlman and Ó Tuathail 2005. To see the Washington Agreement, see Bosnia and Herzegovina: Constitution of the Federation 1994.

97. Bosnia was first split by the Washington Agreement signed in March 1994 under the auspices of the United States, which created the first previously nonexistent unit of the Bosnian-Herzegovinian Federation. After that, the Dayton Agreement just reified the second unit of the Republic Srpska (for more, see Kriještorac 2021).

98. See Macdowall 2017.

99. Bugajski (2014) notes that “one of the primary goals of the November 1995 Dayton Accords was to give the three nations a stake in a single country through a protective veto over decision-making. However, the agreement was not designed to build an integrated state in which the central government in Sarajevo possessed decisive authority” (41).

100. For more, see NIN (2015) interview with Bakir Izetbegović.

101. The referendum was mostly boycotted by Serbs, which is why 99.7 percent of those who actually came out to cast their ballots voted for independence (for more, see Woodward 1995, 218).

102. Shortly after the referendum, the Parliament of RBiH, without Bosnian Serb participation, declared the date as BiH Independence Day.

103. Unitary Bosnian nationalism, and its salient Bosnian identity, are often seen as an extension of unitary Yugoslav nationalism and identity, which, according to Čengić (2015, 225–27), both had strong roots in the BiH of the 1980s, but were then overrun by the Bosnian Muslim, Serbian, and Croatian nationalisms of the 1990s.

104. Hoare (2014) refers to Bosnian as “the shy nationality” that was “avoided not only by the [communist] regime, but by its own Muslim people, even though, when abroad, all of them were proud of the Bosnian name” (355).

105. There is a whole rainbow of organizations, some smaller and radical like the Bosnian Movement of National Pride (see Bosanski Pokret Nacionalnog Ponosa 2014), some more visible and vocal like Bosanski Kongres (Bosnian Congress). Some other groups joined together through the “March 1st” Coalition, which wants to ensure and support the rights of all BiH citizens, especially BiH returnees and those still in the diaspora to vote and participate in the homeland political process (Boračić-Mršo 2012). Interestingly, there are several such groups operating in the United States as well, like the Bosnian Congress, run primarily by activists from Boston (for more about the organization, see Fazlic et al. 2013); the Advisory Council for BiH (formerly the Bosniak American Advisory Council for BiH), with its principal office in Washington (for more, see Advisory Council for Bosnia and Herzegovina 2016); and the “March 1” Coalition (see Prvi Mart Coalition 2012).

106. See, for example, Karamehić-Oates 2015.

107. In his historical novel, the Bosnian professor Imamović (2012) claims that he found evidence that some Muslims settled near the Bosnian town of Kalesija in the twelfth century, long before the Ottoman takeover. Professor Imamović is not alone; claims like his are noted by local Bosnian Muslim authors. For example, Kukavica (2013, 6) also indicates that Islam was present in Bosnia four centuries before the Ottomans. Most promising of all, Haveric (2004) also notes probable earlier encounters of Bosnians with Islam since the seventh century, when many of them were enslaved, or due to contacts with merchants and their own travels throughout the Mediterranean. These claims, however, have yet to be substantiated with more research. Nevertheless, it is interesting to note those efforts to assert pre-Ottoman Bosniak ties with Islam.

108. See Fine 1975, 33. Malcolm (1996, 54) notes that it took some 150 years.

109. For example, see Mazower 2002, 59–63.

110. Adanir (2002, 290) also suggests that regionalism played a role in the phase of the population’s embrace of Islam.

111. Initially, the Ottoman regional administrator Ishak Beg was seated some three hundred miles south, in Skopje, Macedonia. For more on the Ishak Beg ruling, see Šabanović 1982, 25.

112. Karčić (2006) notes that “the process of spreading Islam in BiH under the Ottomans, was at the same time the process of spreading the Maturidi creed (*aqida*) of the Islamic belief and the Hanafī understanding of Sharia law” (54). Dominant

in the eastern, non-Arabic-speaking parts of the Islamic world, the Maturidi creed focused on the true meaning of revelation discourse and was embraced by the Ottomans, while the al-Ash'ari creed, which relies strictly on the revelation and authentic Prophetic tradition, was adopted in the central part. The al-Tahawi creed was adopted in the far west (Cerić 1995, 252).

113. For example, see the decree about the obligation to comply with Hanafi jurisprudence by Cerić 2007a; or “About Us” at the *Islamska zajednica u Bosni i Hercegovini* 2020. Interestingly, the specific creed (*aqida*) is mentioned only in the Bosnian-language version of “About Us,” but not in English.

114. It is reported that Imam Abu Ansar al Maturidi was from Samarkand (in present-day Uzbekistan). He lived between 852 and 944 CE and was an important Islamic scholar on issues of creed as a leading teacher of one of the major branches of Islamic schools of creed within Sunni Islam (for more, see Cerić 1995).

115. When I asked some Bosnian imams what such a mix means, they could not really explain it to me and they admitted that it is not clear to them either.

116. Interestingly, one of the few books on Imam al Maturidi written originally in English was based on the dissertation of the former leader of IZBiH, *reis-ul-ulama* Dr. Mustafa Cerić (see Cerić 1995).

117. Well-described in Bringa's 1995 book, especially in chap. 5.

118. See Karčić 2006; Karić 2010, 44–45.

119. Donia 1981, 5; Mazower 2002, 25.

120. In his seminal work, Yoder (1974) notes that “folk religion exists in a complex society in relation to and in tension with the organized religion(s) of that society” (11), and he concludes that “folk religion is the totality of all those views and practices of religion that exist among the people apart from and alongside the strictly theological and liturgical forms of the official religion” (14). That has not been the case with the people's “Bosnian Islam.” *Ijma* is an Islamic technical term that means primarily consensus among scholars, and also sometimes among members of a community.

121. Piscatori (1991, 20) suggests this to be the Islamic consensus among current national leaders, as opposed to the traditional views, where consensus is an exclusive privilege of Islamic scholars who lived closer to the time of the Revelation.

122. Eickelman and Piscatori (1996) see that as “Muslim politics” that “involves the competitions and contest over both the interpretation of symbols and control of institutions, formal and informal, that produce and sustain them” (4).

123. For that, see Piscatori 1991, 3–10.

124. This attempt is based on Kant's encouragement to us to dare to be wise. My bravery, however, is trying to understand, and to explain this broad and multifaceted concept in just a few words is a risky proposition. In that way, by essentializing the beliefs of Bosnian Muslims and the schools of thought that are the basis of their belief, I run the risk of orientalism in my attempt to better explain their nation-building project. That, however, is not the intention of this work, and the Bosnian Muslim faith and reality in which they live are much more complex and multivariate than what could possibly be explained here. This work should be seen as only a small step toward a better description of Bosnian Muslims as a group and only limited to understanding their practice of religion as “the condition and effects of a particular type of social action” (Weber 1978, 399).

125. He lived between 699 and 767 CE and his actual name was Nu'man ibn Thabit. For more, see Jackson 2006, 25.

126. For more, see Leaman 2009.

127. At the time of the emergence, Hanafi's approach was primarily contrasted to the approach of the Medina jurist Imam Malik ibn Anas and his students.

128. See Philips 2006, 65.

129. A method of favoring the proof that is superior in substance over that which is superior in form, in other words, favoring one that is teleologically superior over the other that is technically superior.

130. It is important to note that it is not being argued here that Islam is an Arab religion or that its rules are meant for Arabs only. Ramadan (2009) clarifies this well by saying that “the classical tradition of the fundamentals of law and jurisprudence [and Abu Hanifa was an especially important part of it] has always approached the founding texts with the deepest respect and devotion and that, while reference to the historical and social environment was always present, it mainly served to shed light on the meaning of the texts or how they should be implemented. The Universe, the social and human context, has never been considered as a *self-standing* source of law and its production” (82).

131. Hann 2006, 18.

132. Ramadan (2009) notes that “in early societies on the Arabian Peninsula, the social and human context was in itself a source of law that was so fully integrated by interpreters of texts that they had only to refer to it implicitly, without any particular insistence, to be understood” (85).

133. For more, see Philips 2006, 66–67. We distinguish here upper case T for the Prophetic Traditions of high Islam and lowercase t for local Islamic traditions, as it is discussed later in the book.

134. Perhaps, for that reason, notables from other schools of Islamic jurisprudence say that Abu Hanifa's method is useful and needed by all other schools of jurisprudence. The issue of cultural history is so important that all major theological Islamic universities in the world study pre-Islamic Meccan Arab customs and practices as a mandatory part of the curriculum.

135. These two rules are mentioned not only because they are visual manifestations of Muslimness in a public sphere, but also because they have lately become points of controversy among Bosnian Muslims. Calling upon Bosnian Muslims' unspecified tradition, many commentators and local Bosnian Muslims now view the widely practiced norms among younger people of wearing longer beards and shorter pants as “foreign” Islamic practices. This is so despite the Hanafi School rule specifying the necessity of both beard and shorter pants for men. Furthermore, during Ottoman times Bosnian Muslims were traditionally those who most fiercely opposed any attempts to reform. Donia (2006, 30) notes, for example, how they refused to rid themselves of turbans in favor of the new hat, the fez. Obviously, as Hann (2006) pointed out, the era of “socialism was still a basic point of reference in the ‘lived history’ of most residents” (1) of postcommunist states. The primacy of that experience over Islamic rules is therefore obvious when social and official “judgment” on those practices are issued, not in terms of whether they are “Islamic” or “not-Islamic,” but in terms of whether they are “Bosnian” or not. Obviously, the era of communist rule is an important point of reference for Bosnian Muslims as well.

136. For more, see also Abderrazzaq (2009), who also notes that “the Hanafi school is generally viewed as the most liberal of the Sunni juristic schools and is commonly regarded by many contemporary Muslim thinkers as the school of Islamic law most compatible with reform.” To balance such a notion, which runs the risk of normative subjectivity, it may also be noted that some of the most reactionary and traditionalist movements in Islam, such as the Taliban, are also part of the Hanafi *madhab*. Yet they are of a slightly different school of creed than Bosnian Muslims.

137. For a good theological discussion about *kalām*, see Al-Haj 2020, 21–45.

138. The Islamic scholars who come from that line of thought argue that Islamic law should be understood “in light of the higher objectives and human interests on behalf of which they were brought into existence” (al-Raysūnī 2005, 337).

139. See Cerić 1995, 109, 187.

140. Cerić (1995) capitalizes both “tradition” and “reason” throughout his book. For example, see at p. 254.

141. In this sense, a sin is the choice to do bad, and the outcome of that choice, whose true essence only God knows, is out of the hands of humans. For more, see Kozarčanin 2005, 32.

142. Al-Haj (2020) notes that *haqqeeqab*, often translated as “literal,” is closer to the word “real” and subsequently suggests that “our understanding of the *zawâbir* (apparent or primary meanings) of the Revelation depends, in addition to the conventions of the language, on two important hermeneutical principles: intertextuality and contextuality” (75).

143. To better understand the meaning of “Islamically structured rationality and logic,” see Adilović 2011.

144. “Al-Mâturīdī argues that what we see around us provides evidence that the world was created by a Divine Being, and reason leads to the conclusion that He, unlike His creation, must be eternal” while his attributes are beyond our comprehension, beyond what God has revealed about himself (Leaman 2009). Yet God cannot be compared to a human being, for God transcends any human attributes (see Kozarčanin 2005, 32).

145. An example of this situation is mentioned in the famous hadith of the Prophet Mohammed’s ruling, where he noted that although a person, Ammâr ibn Yâsir, denied his Islam with his tongue to save his life, while still holding the belief in his heart, he was still a believing Muslim. The Prophet’s ruling was then reaffirmed through the revelation of Surah An Nahl, verse 106: “Whosoever disbelieved in Allah after his belief, except him who is forced thereto and whose heart is at rest with faith” and in other places in the Qur’an with the same point that God truly knows what is declared and what is concealed. For the hadith see Tafsir Ibn Kathir, in *er-Rafa’i* 2002, 730. For Qur’anic 16:106, Al-Hilali and Khan’s (2003) English language translation is used in this work.

146. Ljevaković 2001, 30.

147. Adherence to such IZBIH-sanctioned approach is also the *only* way for any religious workers to get the *certificate* by the IZBiH to be the “legitimate” imams for Bosnian Muslims (in addition to the unwritten rule of him being able to speak the Bosnian language).

148. See Cerić 2007a.

149. Such was the Yugoslav legislation adopted in 1952, which forbade Muslim women to wear the veil. Communist rule made it hard, or impossible, to proselytize or visibly practice any religion. Any attempt to proselytize or advocate religion, privately or publicly, would have been perceived as “anti-systemic,” and those who tried to do this were imprisoned or their civil rights were restricted. Even those who were trying to practice religion privately had to conceal it. An elderly woman told me she would get up before sunrise and have her morning meal during Ramadan without turning the lights on, so that no one would know that she was fasting. And boys from the towns would be circumcised back in their village, where some relatives lived, by a barber or imam, not in hospitals. In general, the norm at that time in BiH and SFRY was that if a person was trying to practice any religion, it was difficult or impossible to move up in his career, whatever he was doing, because his religiosity was a sign of an undeveloped communist consciousness and therefore seen as “anti-systemic” (for more, see Hadžišehović 2003, 120–25 and 153; also Donia 2006, 220). As was discussed in the introductory chapter, this situation created a paradox for Bosnian Muslims, whose very basic form of groupness was being recognized even as its practice was disapproved at the same time. This was also a particularly complicated time for the Yugoslav regime, internally and externally, which came into being after the split with Stalin. Tito’s regime at this time reorganized Yugoslav federalism with the system of “workers’ self-management,” diminished the role of the Council of Nationalities, and made structural reforms within the Communist Party that almost annulled any strides that prominent Muslims had made within the top-down communist model that was applied in postwar Bosnia and Yugoslavia. Furthermore, since pressure was applied in the countryside and villages to produce more food that country needed after the split with Stalin, traditional Muslim life, which was still practiced there, was under duress. For more on the reforms, see Neal 1954. For a good description of the internal and external situation of Yugoslavia, see the report by Zimianin 1953.

150. See Azyumardi 2002, especially 145–47.

151. For a good description of those pogroms and their impact on Muslims, see Križišnik-Bukvić 1993, particularly part III.

152. For example, a Serbian political scientist, Miroljub Jeftić, has argued that under Yugoslav conditions, each Bosnian Muslim is an Islamic fundamentalist because even if he is not religious, he certainly belongs to the “secular Islamic Fundamentalism” or “Communist Islam.” Obviously, Jeftić “stretched his definition of ‘fundamentalism’” to denote “secular Islamic ‘fundamentalism’ and ‘Communist Islam’ in order to encompass anyone and everyone who is in any way a Muslim,” concludes Cigar (1995, 28). (For more on the role of Serbian academia in the Bosnian genocide, see also Cigar 2001). Framing on the Croatian Catholic side was deep-seated while *maybe* slightly better, as Muslims were usually referred simply as “Turks.” See Klaić 1882. More recently, for example, Abazović et al. (2007) note that “in Herzegovina another clerk, Vinko Mikolić, adds that the Bosnian government is ‘just like the Turkish aggressors’” (28). Malešević (2006) described very well how all those organic communist intellectuals turned overnight in to ideologues of ethnic cleansing and genocide and became the “chief media propagandists disseminating the images and language of hatred and fear for the national cause” (196).

153. See the previously mentioned amended Rijaset resolution in Cerić 2007b.

154. Karić was a candidate for the *reis-ul-ulema*, the head of the IZBiH in 2005, and was also a member of the *waqf* commission run by the IZBiH, as well as of the Faculty of Islamic Studies at the University of Sarajevo and the former minister of education, science, culture and sports for the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina. So he is very much part of the official version of Islam in Bosnia, and it is not an exaggeration to consider him its main voice.

155. As the IZBiH claims is the case now, and in the past, Durmišević (2008, 218) notes that the Hanafi school allows Muslims to live under non-Islamic rulers, under the condition of an autonomous judicial system which provides for Sharia norms to rule in the private sphere.

156. Due to the mix of perceived political costs and stigmas attached to Islam and different Islamic practices of other Muslims elsewhere.

157. During my field work, one of the Bosnian Muslims in Chicago told me that the Bosnian mosque recently established in the city chooses not to put a sign outside the building so that it does not attract non-Bosnian Muslims to come in and use the facility and affect its Bosnian Islamic ritual practices (see fig. 3.1).

158. Since Bosnian mosques and organizations are meant to serve only one ethnic community, in this work they are considered primarily as ethnic interest organizations, as is argued by Fennema's (2004, 441) approach as well.

159. Henig 2012.

160. For more, see Conzemious 1995, 17; Weber 1958, 316.

161. For more on those pre-Islamic practices, see an excellent description in Fine 1975, 9–23.

162. See Duranović 2011; Bringa 1995.

163. See Henig 2012.

164. For more, see Karčić 1990, 204–48 (or English summary 253–35); Adilović 2013, 103–13, 139–41.

165. A good source for the examination of high and folk religion tensions in Islam is Gellner's (1992) book on postmodernism, reason, and religion.

166. For an interesting review of the early twentieth-century Bosnian Muslim reformers, see Karić 2008. The reformer tendencies that have occurred in the wider Muslim world, exemplified especially in the works of Abduh and Arslan, reached Bosnian Muslims as well (for more, see Karić 2008). As noted earlier, they also interacted with prominent reformer Muhammed Rashid Rida on the question of *hijra* (Al-Arnaut 1994, 253). Many Bosnian Muslim religious scholars joined the reformer camp and wrote, trying to teach the population how to correct pre-Islamic and Christian practices that local Muslims continued to observe even after they embraced Islam, or those new ones that they had adopted from their Christian neighbors, or how to “change perceptions and limited understandings and accept the need for a new interpretation of Islamic thought” (Đozo 1976, 7). For more, also see Vlahović 1968, 153–59; Đozo 2006, especially books 4 and 5.

167. Most visible among them nowadays are those who are often referred to by locals, as well as Western academia, as “Wahhabis.” Since the term “Wahhabi” is used in a disparaging way, in this sense even Western academia has become an interpreter of local Islam, and its “contributions” add to the local tensions among Bosnian Muslims. Yet strangely enough, such an active role and such normative-

ness, and the name calling on the part of academia is acceptable, as it may be found throughout the various disciplines that are concerned with Muslims in general and Bosnian Muslims in particular.

168. The word *zajednica* is often translated simply as “community” or “association.” It should be added that *zajednica* is actually a derivative of the adverb *zajedno* (together), and it points to togetherness despite the *differences* which form a community. That was especially pronounced during the time of Yugoslavia, when the name of the organization that represented Muslims within the state was *Islamska Vjerska Zajednica* (Islamic Religious Community; IVZ) as it represented very different Muslim groups, including Bosnian Muslims, Pomaks, Turks, and even a small number of Egyptians who live throughout Kosovo and Macedonia, as well as Albanians who live in great numbers in Kosovo, Macedonia, and Montenegro, and Torbeši, Goranci, Našenci, and Romas (see OSCE Mission in Kosovo 2009).

169. See Bougarel 2018. Furthermore, in his work, Karić (2004) discusses the issue (37–42) and concludes that he supports the notion of Bosnian Islam, explaining that “Islam in Bosnia is universal in its belief, but culturally Islam in Bosnia *is* Bosnian Islam” (42).

170. Both are pointed out by Karčić (2006, 52), who also notes that IZBiH never defined exactly what the “Islamic tradition of Bosniaks” and “the demands of time” mean. Rather, they left it open for interpretation, intentionally or not, and to leave ample room to respond strategically to “the demands of time” in the future. For example Dozo (1976, 8) acknowledges that the repurposing of *sadaqul-fitr* money for building of the Islamic Faculty of Islamic Studies is contrary to centuries-old tradition and it is understandable that ordinary Muslims are disturbed and opposed to it. But obviously for him it is justifiable to change such a tradition to satisfy the demands of time, similar to nowadays financing its own “BIR” radio station with the same money (for more, see Garanović 2019). There are numerous other similar examples that show how that dilemma between tradition and “the demands of time” are usually resolved in favor of the latter.

171. Despite all my efforts, I could not find a clear definition of who actually are the members of this specific “Islamic community.” Supposedly, all Muslims in Bosnia (including non-Bosniaks) are part of it, but they are not actually consulted about that membership. The IZBiH constitutions throughout time (1909–1997) have had different definitions of members, ranging from all Muslims from BiH, to all those who *feel* a part of this group. IZBiH is perhaps a postfeudal neo-*millet* institution, where membership is ostensibly acquired by the sheer chance of birth into a Bosnian Muslim family, since *reis-ul-ulema* Cerić noted that Bosnian Muslims are now “Bosniaks by birth” (Cerić 2013). Therefore, the IZBiH is an abstract organization whose members are not clearly identified and whose structure was created and exists primarily within the non-Islamic official sphere, which has had a strong continuous influence over it. At the same time the IZBiH is also part of the Bosnian Muslim social and the BiH public sphere. During all this time that structure, the “Islamic community,” has been outside the reach of ordinary Bosnian Muslims, who cannot directly choose or elect the members of the religious hierarchy. They are, rather, chosen by the imams themselves and by selected prominent Bosnian Muslims, whatever that “prominent” designation means at a particular time. So

they are not elected representatives of the Bosnian Muslim population, nor are they directly responsible to them, yet they speak and interpret Islam on their behalf, as they claim in the Bosnian media to be exclusively authorized to do by the BiH Law about Churches and Religious Communities. But the law actually does not say that. Nevertheless, the IZBiH is a unique organization in the Islamic world. For the text of the BiH law, see the Ministry of Justice of Bosnia and Herzegovina 2012.

172. The term *ulama* usually means Islamic scholar(s), but in the case of BiH and the former Yugoslavia, it is liberally used to include most religious workers, and sometimes even the village *bodža* (imam of the mosque), who might have only the equivalent of a high school diploma, or less, and is certainly not a scholar. The same tendency of calling any Islamic workers part of the *ulama*, nowadays, is not exclusive only to Bosnian Muslims; it can be observed worldwide.

173. Furthermore, the IZBiH considers the Ottoman document of Hattı şerif od Gülhane, from 1839, issued at the time of the Tanzimat reforms, as an institutional basis for their creation. The 1839 document called for the creation of new solutions and institutions to provide answers for the new circumstances in which Muslims lived. For more, see Durmišević 2008, 224.

174. This is how Kallay described the Austro-Hungarian mission in Bosnia in an interview for the London *Daily Chronicle* in 1895 (Donia 1981, 14). Also noted by Neumayer and Schmidl 2008, 105.

175. The Bosnian *ulama* occasionally tried to raise its issues to the international level through the Ottoman sultan, who was still nominally in charge of Bosnia. The Austro-Hungarians, at least initially, tried hard to avoid any challenge at that level, as they were “sensitive to Great Power opinions concerning upheaval or signs of popular discontent” (Donia 1981, 14) in Bosnia.

176. For more, see Donia 1981, 116–20; Donia 2006, 100.

177. For that, the Habsburgs were supported by Sarajevo Bosniak elites, notes Durmišević 2008, 214.

178. The rebellion for them made it clear “that as long as Turkey was sovereign over the province, they [Bosnians] would never settle down” (Bridge 1972, 127), and a new Austro-Hungarian-established office of *reis-ul-ulema* served as a step toward severing those ties. This was the same year that the administrators of Bosnia, Kalonky, and Kallay wrote a draft of Bosnia’s annexation law putting Bosnia directly under the emperor.

179. Omerović himself was one of the fifty-eight signatories of the letter.

180. After intense diplomatic lobbying by the Austrians, on February 9, 1882, the *sheikh-ul-Islam* appointed an Austrophile, Omerović, to the post of mufti and the head of a small legal Sharia system composed of some fifty judges and their courts. But he was never confirmed as the *reis-ul-ulema*, a previously nonexistent title and institution in the Ottoman Empire or Islamic world. The post of *reis-ul-ulema* is still a unique institution, found only among the Muslims of the former Yugoslavia. For more, see Durmišević 2008, 215–20; Donia 1981, 20–23.

181. Using a Christian organizational structure as a reference, Potz (2012) explains *how* the structure was probably understood and organized by Austro-Hungarians. “Under this reorganized structure the lowest level, the ‘*džemat*’, more or less corresponded to a parish organization. A *džemat* with a mosque (*džamija*) as its center generally consisted of a village or part of a city. The next highest admin-

istrative unit was the ‘*medžlis*’, with the ‘*muftijstvo*’ that was comparable to a bishopric. There were eight such *muftijstva* in Bosnia. The organization was headed by the *Reis-ul-Ulema*—comparable to a Metropolitan—who was elected by the supreme legislative body of the Islamic community, the general assembly which *inter alia* appointed *muftis* and founded new religious schools (‘*madrasa*’). Its executive body, the Rijaset in Sarajevo, is headed by a *Reisul-ul-Ulema* and a spiritual council” (Pötz, 2012, 15). I wrote elsewhere (2015a, 286) that *džemat* (jamaat), ideally, is a religious community organized around prayer and care for each other, often as a basic unit of Muslim community around which a neighborhood of houses is established, especially as understood by Bosnian Muslims. This is not, however, the only way the word *džemat* is used nowadays, since the worldwide groups like Tablikh Jamaat, and the even larger group of Ahlus Sunnah wal Jamaat, also refer to themselves as *džemat* to show the closeness of the same principles among group members.

182. In another work [2015a] I explain that a *waqf* is “a religious endowment as a voluntary and irrevocable dedication of property, where the value of these properties becomes restricted on a perpetual basis, to serve the Islamic objectives prescribed at inception” (285). Traditionally, *waqf* was also a financial support for a lot of independent religious institutions and scholars (see Donia 1981, 22). With the new law of 1909, *waqfs* were permanently cut off from the possibility of serving as an independent financial base for any religious activity not sanctioned by the state, and often also from its initially dedicated purpose.

183. Durmišević 2008, 212.

184. For example, from 1882 they became the officially appointed military imams in the Austro-Hungarian army (see Neumayer and Schmidl 2008, 110–13).

185. See Rašljanin 1993, 94.

186. Salkić (2008) divides this period into three sections: 1918–1929, with small changes; 1929–1935, when the seat of the Rijaset was moved to Belgrade in Serbia; and 1935–1940, when the Rijaset returned to Sarajevo.

187. To make matters even worse, at the end of World War I, BiH and its Muslim residents found themselves on the losing side of the war and without anyone to champion specifically Muslim rights and interests. See Part XIV, Annex II, Article 381 of the Treaty of Saint-Germain at the Australasian Legal Information Institute 1999.

188. It includes the period of the two states, the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes (1918–1923; SHS) and the Kingdom of Yugoslavia (1923–1943[5]) essentially ruled by the same king. For more, see Krijestorac 2015b, 5.

189. The 1919 Treaty of Saint-Germain vaguely obligated the Kingdom of SHS to protect minorities (which *could* include Muslims) and asked the kingdom to adopt regulations allowing for family and individual matters to be arranged in line with Muslim (minority) customs (see Australasian Legal Information Institute 1999; Salkić 2008, 441; and Karčić 2020, 19). Serbia’s recognition by the Treaty of Berlin in 1878 also stipulated explicit state protection of all people regardless of religious creed (see article XXXV in the Treaty of Berlin, in Mowat 1916, 80). But even then, the Western powers knew well what the Serbian state was doing and the same powers only arranged for travel expenses and visas for Muslim refugees to leave (see Karpat 1985, 71; Bandžović 2003, 206–15).

190. See Rešljanin 1993, 95.

191. For example, the Article 109 of Vidovdan's constitution states: "U porodičnim i nasljednim poslovima Muslimana sude *državni* šerijatski sudovi" [In the family and inheritance affairs of Muslims, *state* sharia courts judge] (my emphasis) (Ustav Kraljevine SHS, 1925, 40).

192. Yet since all other independent sources of religious authority at that point had been suffocated, Muslim society was completely dependent on them, and when they failed, the whole society failed, as indeed it did in the period preceding, and especially during, World War II. In his 1952 book, Balić made the same comment, calling the period between the two world wars the worst period of life for Bosnian Muslims.

193. For example, see the description of the horrifying crimes against Muslims in eastern Bosnia and Sandžak in Balić 1952, 36–37.

194. This was also the period when the Jerusalem mufti, Al Huseini, came to Bosnia under the auspices of Nazi Germany to agitate for the creation of the 13th "Muslim" SS Division (but mainly under the German Volksdeutsche command, and with about 40 percent of German soldiers). Some Bosnian imams and press supported the recruitment efforts, while others were weary of German promises that the unit would be kept in BiH to protect Muslims and establish law and order, which NDH could not. Although the important Bosnian Muslim *ulama* issued several decrees that essentially discouraged Bosnian Muslims from cooperating with the Ustasha regime, they did not offer any alternative or guidance as to what to do. That led some Bosnian Muslims to support the idea of Al Huseini, who promised that such a large and well-armed Muslim military unit could save Bosnian Muslims from horrendous massacres by their neighbors, since, according to him, the unit was to remain in Bosnia (see Redžić 2005, 181–84). The whole experiment with the Germans ended in disappointment for Bosnian Muslims (for more, see Hoare 2014, 51–54). Some of the conscripted Muslim and Croat soldiers in 1943 even staged a mutiny against their German SS officers. A few of those soldiers escaped and sparked the French resistance in the city of Villefranche-de-Rouergue, for which the city erected a monument to commemorate their rebellion, although it was labeled "under the slightly one-sided title of '*la révolte des Croates*'" ['revolt of the Croats'] (Malcolm 1994, 191), neglecting the Bosnian Muslim participation in the revolt.

195. The mufti of Belgrade, for example, fought against the establishment of the office of the *reis-ul-ulema* to be in charge of the entire Kingdom (see Salkić 2008, 442).

196. V. Jovanović (2013) notes that in 1940 half of the graduates of the *madrasas* in Skopje were from Sandžak.

197. Other, non-Slavic Muslim groups relied on their own national projects outside of Yugoslavia.

198. Like Mufti Šefket-ef. Kurt, who along with the delegation of prominent Muslims of Tuzla, managed to prevent the burning of the Serbian Church and the slaughter of thousands of Serbs in that city on Christmas Eve of 1942 in spite of danger to his life, which even the Serbian media sometimes notes as heroism (see Bukvić 2019).

199. For example, the World War II *reis ul-ulema*, Fehim Spaho, called upon Muslims in May of 1941 to celebrate and appreciate the creation of NDH (see Petranović and Zečević 1987, 711).

200. Even at that time, the representative of the *reis-ul-ulema*, Muhamed Ridanovic, agreed that the Ustasha's sanctioned condemnation of the "savage behavior of Bolshevik bandits in Croatian state territory" be published by the IVZ in Sarajevo, only to be stopped by the Partisans' takeover of the city (see Redžić 2005, 191).

201. On the occasion of his inauguration as the first postwar *reis-ul-ulema*, on September 12, 1947, Ibrahim Fejzić gave a speech in the central Sarajevo mosque and said, "Comrades, brothers and sisters! As I assume this position . . . knowing your wishes, I direct my first thought to our beloved Marshal Tito and ask Allah for his long and happy life and blessing of all our peoples of FNRY. It is our duty to remember our beloved leader and teacher on every occasion" (Salkić 2008, 451).

202. For example, Trhulj (1995, 21) reports an instance in 1949 when the director of the *madrasa*, Sulejman Kemura, personally seized and reported to the authorities a young *madrasa* student who was handing out Mladi Muslimani-made Islamic pamphlets, who was then interrogated and killed by the communist secret police. A few years later, Kemura became *Reis-ul-Ulema* himself.

203. As one of the examples of the situations where "religious doctrines were adjusted to *religious needs*" (Weber 1958, 270) of Yugoslav Muslims, Hoare (2014, 373) notes that after World War II, *Reis-ul-Ulema* Fejzić endorsed the communist-driven campaign against the woman's veil, followed by other Muslim religious authorities, who finally declared in 1947 "that the veiling of women is not required by religious code" (374). The veil was finally outlawed by state law in 1952, the same year when religious schools, *mektebs*, were also officially closed down. Hadžišehović (2003, 116–24) describes well the upheavals those changes caused for Muslims.

204. Hoare 2014, 373.

205. Karčić 2006, 58.

206. For example, see Hadžišehović 2003, 123.

207. Although the IZBiH remained owner of the mosques and religious school buildings, the land was taken away from it. For more, see Haore 2014, 373.

208. Zachary (1984, 441), noted the IZ source reports that the state provided 7 percent of the operating budget of the IVZ between 1945 and 1947, and that the support increased to 73 percent between 1948 and 1950.

209. A good example of their "learning and adapting" is the way the IVZ of Yugoslavia (and now IZBiH as well; see Garanović 2019) traditionally used funds from *sadaqul-fitr*, also called *zakāt al-fītrah*, the giving of food (or nowadays money) at the end of the month of fasting, Ramadan, to the poor so that they can take part in the holiday festivities. After 1969 and 1976, those funds were diverted to finance the building and operation of the University of Islamic Studies in Sarajevo, despite some reservations by other Muslims in Yugoslavia who wanted that money to be used in their own localities (see VIS 1976, 58). Although this is a religiously sound decision in terms of the purpose of the Hanafi School, it is interesting that the IVZ took it upon itself to decide that the money from *zakāt al-fītrah* would be used to build its own school, instead of giving it to the poor. For more on this decision see Dozo 1976. For more on *zakāt al-fītrah*, see al-Shiekh and Stewart 2009.

210. Although the Hanafi School of jurisprudence practiced abstract judicial review and discussed hypothetical situations Muslims might find themselves in, they could not envision a situation of communist rule, and Bosnian Muslim religious leaders had to innovatively create their own interpretations and rulings, for

which their adherence to the Maturidi creed was useful. Cerić (1995, 233) argues that al Maturidi developed a system of theological reasoning that provides a guideline for new doctrinal possibilities, while staying on the path of the main Islamic doctrine.

211. To gain access and derive understandings from higher religious sources became much harder—if possible at all—but what every *masjid's* *bodža* knew is the local context and *urf* practices, and over time this became their primary concern.

212. Karčić 2006, 55.

213. Zachary (1984, 442) notes how the Islamic hierarchy emphasized the scientific communist approach as Islamically appropriate and compatible. For an example of this evolution, see Hoare 2014, 356.

214. A similar approach was taken by the USSR, which used Muslim religious leaders to cultivate soft power in the Muslim world (for more see Koçak 2018, 109).

215. See Ćimić 1967, 158.

216. For example, in an interview, Dr. Halil Mehtić, who became the mufti of Zenica after BiH independence, describes this process in the case of his 1987 arrest (see IML TV Press 2016).

217. When the *Reis-ul-Ulema* Kemura issued the *fatwa* in 1950s providing religious justification for women to take off the hijab and go to mixed schools.

218. At that time, however, some people wrote for *Ljiljan* under different pen names. The name Šahbaz Turčić might also be the pen name of a person who wished not to be identified as the author of the text, especially since it appears to be written from Macedonia, where the influence of the old *reis*, Selimovski, was still strong at that time.

219. As Foucault (2003, 161) mentioned in his description of priests in France.

220. Bougarel 2018, 115.

221. An example is that in 2016 the IZBiH finally signed an agreement with the BiH state regarding the *waqf* properties, which were either to remain under IZBiH control if they already are using them. Those that are not owned by the IZBiH due to expropriation by the SFRY state were to be returned to them, or if that is not possible, the IZBiH was to be re-compensated for their value. Additionally, in the same agreement the IZBiH wanted to be included in the education curriculum as the exclusive provider of religious instructors for pupils who would choose to study Islam electively, instead of civics, in public schools. Finally, the official imams wanted to receive all the benefits of social welfare such as health care and the right to education, but not to contribute through taxes, since their sources of income as *waqf* are tax-exempt and theoretically could only increase.

222. As examples, see the 2016 decree about “illegal mosques” or, as the IZBiH calls them, “quasi-*jamaats*” (see Al Jazeera Balkans 2016), or the previous 1952 official decree providing for the communist shutdown of Sufi orders (see Buturovic 2015, 26).

223. For more, see Gadzo 2014.

224. For more, see Barlovac 2012.

225. For more, see Kavazović 2020.

226. For more, see Subašić 2019.

227. In 2012 the IZBiH issued a declaration that Bosnian Muslims must identify

themselves as Bosniaks in the then-upcoming 2013 census, and not as Bosnians or Muslims, as they used to do. For more, see Rijaset 2012.

228. For more see Filandra 1998, 270–82.

229. Hajdarpasic (2015) coined the amalgam “(br)others” to describe the position of Bosnian Muslims vis-à-vis their Slavic neighbors in the Balkans. For more, see Hajdarpasic (2015), especially 15–18.

230. Vuk Karadžić basically arbitrarily and singlehandedly decided that Štokavian, the particular local dialect of Slavic languages spoken in East Herzegovina in his time, should be the standard for what he named the Serbian language. By doing that, Vuk not only outran neighboring people’s nationalisms by putting his name-claim first, but he also provided a long-term direction for future Serbian nationalism projects and determined which population should be targeted to be nationalized into the project of the Serbian nation (Gazi 1993, 179). Obviously, since many people who spoke the Štokavian dialect in the region were not Orthodox Christians (which only later became the essential element of Serbian identity), Vuk referred to them as Roman Catholic Serbs, or Muslim Serbs living in Bosnia. The process resembles today’s European games of branding certain foods and recipes so there is now a lively discussion, at least in the Balkans, of whose baklava it is: Turkish or Greek? Or whose coffee is being served with it, Serbian, Bosnian, or Turkish? It is assumed that the winners of those debates will have some advantage over other local people who have made and eaten baklava with coffee for centuries without a second thought about whose recipes are behind them. Vuk did achieve an advantage over other local Balkan peoples whose language was called “Serbian” without their knowledge or their comprehension of the consequences of such naming, even though at that time “the term Serb was a vague ethnic term, and the spatial distribution of Serbs was even vaguer” (White 2000, 182). Today, however, this language name designation has serious political implications for various nationalist projects. For illustrative examples of the ongoing “battles” over baklava and coffee, see Schleifer 2012; and Kakissis 2013.

231. Alexander (2006) notes that “a devoted and diligent group of Bosniak intellectuals undertook the more or less parallel task [to that of their Croatian colleagues] of establishing a language that would also be distinct from Serbo-Croatian—a language which they call Bosnian, but which many outside Bosnia believe should bear the name Bosniak” (425). Even the Washington Agreement on the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina refers to it as a “Bosniac language.”

232. Attempts to insert transhistoricism of groups in the Balkans are perhaps most pronounced in the case of languages, where all dominant groups are actively projecting current language names into the past and challenging the right of a group to exist as a separate group, based on their own transhistorical projections. In that way they force those groups that are trying to assert themselves onto a local political map to respond with their own transhistoricism, as Bosniaks are doing with the projections of the name of Bosnian language into the past.

233. For more see Murtagić-Tuna 2015, 2:81.

234. “Vuk chose ijekavian, the East Herzegovinian speech of the region where he himself originated, an area which was known to be a stronghold of traditional epic singing. He would not allow in the grammar of this new language any word or form that did not exist naturally in this East Herzegovinian speech” (Alexander

2006, 382), a specific dialect of the local Slavic language. The Serbian Church tried to resist Vuk's effort to impose an essentially foreign accent onto Serbian spoken language, arguing that in that way Serbian people were being distanced from their history and the tradition of the church and of the people. As an illustration of how much the Vuk-selected language norm was different from the spoken Serbian, Alexander (2006, 383) notes that at that time for Serbian people around Novi Sad, East Herzegovinian speech was almost a completely foreign language. Yet Vuk's approach culminated in the 1899 publication of Tomo Maretić's "*Gramatika i stilistika hrvatskoga ili srpskog književnog jezika*" (Grammar and Stylistics of the Croatian or Serbian Literary Language), and was eventually supported by the Serbian state when it prevailed and was adopted as the norm for the Serbian and Croatian language. Interestingly, both Croats and Serbs did continue to speak a different version of the language, and in practice never truly adopted Vuk's model. For more, see Alexander 2006, 382–86.

235. Banac (1984) refers to this program as "Karadžić's linguistic Serbianism" (79–81). For more on Vuk as a "man of the people" who wrote extensively about Herzegovina while never actually being there, see Hajdarpasić 2015, 20–38.

236. As is obvious from the attempt by the Serbian national cultural institution Matica Srpska [Serbian Heritage] to deny the name "Bosnian language." In a widely distributed 2014 recommendation they stated that "use of the term Bosnian language is not acceptable for the Serbian culture" (see Stanić 2014).

237. White (2000, 180–82) notes that until then people identified the language they spoke by the regions they were from (e.g., Bosnian, Dalmatian, Slavonian).

238. As mentioned in the first part of this work, nowadays "Vlach" is sometimes used as a pejorative term for non-Muslims in BiH, mainly to denote Serbs. The term should not be confused with the actual Vlach people who lived throughout the region in medieval times. Fine (1975, 388) gives informative and useful information about the Vlachs. They were a specific ethnic and linguistic group, which was eventually Slavicized in language and gradually "swallowed" by the larger Slavic ethnic groups. Over time, the term "Vlachs" came to designate "shepherds," and under the Ottomans it gained a new significance as a particular status, which provided a right to relatively freely resettle throughout the region and pay a set tax in cash rather than in kind. It may be noted that the patronymic last name Vlahović, which is derived from the term "Vlach," is not uncommon among Serbs and Montenegrins, and sometimes Croats, while it is rare among Muslims. The Croatian nationalist Stahuljak in 1907 argued that Orthodox Christians in Croatia are Vlach, who became Serbs by accepting Orthodox Christianity (see Perić 1984, 225–26).

239. For more see Malcolm 1994, 70–81; Fine 1975, 381.

240. For example, Omerbašić (2008) quotes the journal published by the institute of *Takribul-mezahbi*, which noted that "among *hajjis* of Bukhara and Bosnia in the eighteenth century, it was easier for the members of both groups to communicate with Turk in a Turkish dialect, than in the Turkish [Ottoman] literary language" (204).

241. Born as Rastko, Saint Sava (1174–1236) lived and rose into prominence at the onset of the Ottoman conquest of the Balkans and Serbia, which most likely permanently influenced the development of particularization within Orthodox Christianity (see Emmert 1981). At the time, Saint Sava was an embodiment of

the strong ties of the religious and political powers in the Serbian states of Hum and Raška (the territory of present-day Sandžak). Coming from the regional ruling family of Nemanjić, Sava pushed for the establishment of an autonomous Orthodox Christian Church, initially against the wishes of the central Byzantine bishop. Sava, however, was not only a priest; he was also a diplomat and briefly even the ruler of the state of Hum. He also wrote the document *Zakonopravilo* (Rules and Laws), which Serbs now refer to as the oldest Serbian constitution. After he established the independent church, he was canonized and venerated by the same church and its followers. His teaching significantly influenced the local practice and understanding of Serbian Orthodoxy. Papo (2015) notes that for the Serbs, “Jesus is saintly, but not divine [and Jesus is] reduced to a mere saint. Even if holding the position of the chief of all the saints, Jesus does not seem to be the focus of Serbian folk religion and peasant imagination” (30). Rather, Saint Sava is. So when animosity toward the Croats overpowers an ordinary Serb, he may venerate Saint Sava above the figure of Jesus, because Jesus is often evoked by the “enemies,” the Catholic Croats, even in their everyday greeting of “*Hvaljen Isus*” (Praise Jesus). For those types of people and situations, even “God is Serb” (see M. Jovanović 2013; or, more entertaining, see the song “Zivece ovaj narod” by the popular Serbian singer Baja Mali Knindža available on many YouTube channels). Sava’s obvious strong ties to both the political and religious worlds permanently influenced the Serbian version of Orthodox Christianity and provided a fertile ground for Serbian nationalism to blossom along the lines of the Serbs’ own version of religion. In her travel book, Seierstad (2006) notes about Saint Sava that “he established the doctrine that the Serbian Orthodox Church and the Serbian people are the same, a doctrine later to be used by bishops to emphasize Serb supremacy” (84).

242. For example, Çelik (2010) notes that “the Orthodox Church became an Ottoman institution and its Patriarch was a high-level Ottoman official with the rank of vizier.”

243. Fine (1975) lists four main reasons for the spread of Orthodoxy among the inhabitants of medieval Bosnia: “vernacular liturgy; Ottomans preferred them to Catholics; Orthodox did not previously seriously persecute Bosnian [Church] heretics; the Orthodox were linked with the Serbs (fellow Slavs), not with the hated Hungarians” (344).

244. In fact, Donia and Fine (1994) argue that “the translation of one’s religious denomination to Serb or Croat nationality also had no relevance to the area’s population, since Bosnians before the nineteenth century had not described themselves as either Serbs or Croats” (73).

245. Bandžović (2003, 206) notes that the British consul at the time commented that the focus of the Serbian Church activity in Macedonia was not to build a kingdom of God’s but a kingdom of Serbia.

246. In her revealing essay, Balić (2009, 123–28) also noted that the similar question of who exactly was considered a Serb in BiH was not clear even during World War II. Atlagić and Elezović (2014) note the same when they regard as Serb people who are Orthodox Christians from Croatia who declared themselves Croats and who served and died for the Croatian Ustaša (359), while the Croats obviously did not see them as such. In his work on Croatian nationalism, Perić (1984), on the other hand, noted that building upon the teaching of the Croatian *uber*-nationalist

Ante Starčević, his disciple Stahuljak in 1907 argued that the Orthodox Christians in Croatia were Vlach, who were to be transformed into Croats—or Serbs—through acceptance of one or the other local Christian confessions (225–26). Such an approach led to the policy of forced conversion of Serbs to Catholicism by the Croatian Catholic Church under the Ustasha's regime. This shows the ambivalent nature and perceptions of both Serb and Croat identities, which obviously are “open” and “closed” at the same time: open to adopting others within its group (upon acceptance of the “correct” religion) and closed to excluding others (who are others presumably because of the “wrong” religion).

247. During World War II in NDH, conversion from Orthodoxy to Catholicism meant acceptance of full Croatian identity. See Redžić 2005, 71; Petranović and Zečević 1987, 702.

248. See Ostojić 1999.

249. Jelavich (2003) notes that prior to the First World War (and even after that) “Serbian students were taught Serbianism, as their parents and grandparents had been” (96). Those students did not necessarily need to be Serbs to be taught Serbianism. The same education was provided to all students in schools run by Serbs. Jelavich also notes that everywhere in the Habsburg empire the Croatian side taught Croatianism to the pupils under their care with the goal of instilling “in the students love for Croatia, its history and traditions” (97).

250. For more see Malcolm 1996, 40.

251. Malcolm 1996, 149. For that reason, sometimes even nowadays Bosnian Muslims and Bosnian Serbs derogatorily call Bosnian Catholics and Croats “cunning Latins” (*lukavi latini*), tying them to the Church of the Latin language.

252. Purivatra (1974, 551) noted that the Croatian nationalist Stjepan Radić, on the occasion of the centennial celebration of the Croatian Kingdom in Krašić in 1924, attacked Catholic Church bishops for their official letter in which they demanded that the celebration have an exclusive religious character. Radić claimed that with such a letter, the bishops “excluded around eight hundred thousand Muslim Croats” who lived throughout southern Yugoslavia. In this way, claimed Radić, by a stroke of the pen, the priests downgraded and cut by a quarter the number of Croats in BiH to a “negligible minority,” and with that delivered BiH to the Serbs. A few lines later, however, Purivatra also noted that on another occasion, in 1927 Radić referred to Bosnian Muslims as “Turks.” Similar “inconsistencies” were observed in BiH during the reign of the Ustasha, who proclaimed Muslims to be Croats but did not protect and treat them as such. Redžić (2005, 65–67) also notes how the Croatian national program in BiH was built on the idea that Bosnian Muslims were ethnic Croats. Stjepan Radić was assassinated by Puniša Racić in Yugoslav Parliament in Belgrade. The assassin, Racić, was actually from a town of Andrijevica in Montenegrin part of Sandžak (see Djilas 1958, 316).

253. Markovich (2011, 10–17) writes about the early tensions between Russian-Slavic and the Slavic-Serbian written language and eventual Obradović-directed development of the official Serbian language from the enlightenment-inspired local vernacular form. For an example of Russian-Slavic, see Karano-Tvrtković 1840.

254. This tradition of tying the language of a religion to ethnicity can be traced to those first efforts to Christianize local Slavic populations by “the missionary brothers Cyril and Methodius of Salonika who preached and conducted services in the Slav language, into

which Cyril translated the Scriptures, using for this purpose an alphabet said to be of his own construction, which is the origin of the alphabets still used by all the Orthodox Slav people of today” (Durham 1905, 23); hence it is called the Cyrillic alphabet. Interestingly, the similar mechanism of using religion to substitute for a “real” linguistic difference to differentiate Serb and Croat ethnic solidarities respectively was also noted by Max Weber (1958, 173). This Cyrillic orientation was reinforced after 1730, when Russians opened schools for Serbs in Vojvodina and the graduates became teachers elsewhere.

255. Prominent Bosnian linguist Dževad Jahić recognized and named the two spoken variants of the Bosnian language as the western variant spoken in most of BiH and the eastern variant spoken primarily in Sandžak but also in some parts of eastern BiH and Kosovo as well. For a good example and discussion of Sandžak’s eastern version of the Bosnian language, see Begović and Begović-Ličina 2012.

256. See Saliji 2014; or see the OSCE Mission in Kosovo 2009.

257. The same is the case with some Bosnian and Sandžak Muslims who emigrated to Turkey during the early 1900s. See Begović and Begović-Ličina 2012, 18.

258. Pinson (1996, 103) also notes the same about the Bosnian language factor. It may be added that in 1890, for example, even a grammar of the Bosnian language with Latin alphabet was issued for Bosnian high schools. Also see Feldman 2017.

259. At the same time as the abandonment of the unitary Bosnian nation project, in 1903 Bosnian Muslims created their own pro-Western, self-help cultural society Gajret, sometimes credited as being a progenitor of the modern Bosnian Muslim intelligentsia class (see Pinson 1996, 110). Seen also as pro-Serbian, Gajret continued to exist until 1941, when Croat Ustashas shut it down and forced the creation of a new Bosnian Muslim organization.

260. Banac 1984, 211; Hajdarpasic 2015, 41. It should be added that the Vienna Literary Agreement was also made without Bosnian Muslim representatives.

261. The first president of the Bosnian Muslim organization Gajret, the great Bosnian Muslim poet Safvet-beg Bašagić, famously first declared himself a Serb, then changed his mind and publicly became a Croat. The next Gajret leader, Osman Đikić, is still celebrated as a great Serbian national and even has a street named after him in the elite part of Belgrade. Other notable Bosnian Muslim intellectuals publicly declared themselves Serbs, such as Meša Selimović, while his brother chose to be a Croat. Esad Ćimić decided to be Croat, while his brother was Serb. The great poet Mehmedalija Mak Dizdar decided to be a Croat, and the list goes on. This trend of “choosing” a nationality happened not only among Muslim intellectuals. David Dicker notes that in 1956, of notable state and party leaders with Muslim names, 61.5 percent were self-declared Serbs, 12.6 percent Croats, and 8.6 percent of a nondeclared nationality (in Balić 1995, 159).

262. As mentioned previously, the communist version of South Slavic nationhood was most often built upon the Serbian vision of Yugoslavia.

263. With this, the use of the names Serbian and Croatian languages was also discontinued in official practice for a while. The agreement made by prominent Serb and Croat linguists and writers was accepted by Matica hrvatska [Croatian Heritage] and Matica srpska [Serbian Heritage], but no similar Bosnian Muslim institutions were consulted. For more, see Perić 1984, 24.

264. See Alihodžić 1993, who also notes that more than 65 percent of the population chose to identify their language as other than the official Serbo-Croatian.

The overwhelming majority of the Bosnian Serb population chose to identify their language as Serbian, Bosnian Croats chose theirs as Croatian, while Bosnian Muslims identified theirs as Bosnian.

265. See Pirić 1993; Malešević 2006, 197.

266. Initially this was a small number of bureaucrats, since there were only a few Latin-alphabet-literate Bosnian Muslims at the time of the Austro-Hungarian takeover. Neumayer and Schmidl (2008, 96) report that in 1910, some 94.65 percent of Bosnian Muslims were illiterate, which means they could not use the Latin alphabet, which became dominant with the Habsburgs' takeover of BiH.

267. They all had to seek education elsewhere since elementary-school-level public education in Yugoslavia began only in 1929, and a higher level of education even later (see Petranović and Zečević 1987, 623).

268. As a result of what Curry (1995) calls the “industrialization legacies” of the mass rural-urban population movement (60–63).

269. Riall (2009) noted the phrase and urged investigators to pay attention to that shift as a significant moment in the process of any nationalism. Furthermore, she suggested that a “mass” could be conceptualized as an “urban middle- and lower middle-class ‘public’ of enthusiasts” (404) that shares interests and solidarity. Such a mass for Bosnian Muslims could emerge only after the communist takeover of Yugoslavia and the final demise of the Bosnian Muslim landowning elite’s class *and* status.

270. See, for example, the four important discussions on the question of Bosnian Muslim national identity by Redžić (1970), Suljević (1970), Čerić (1971), and the collection of various views by Hadžijahić and Purivatra (1970), which, interestingly, in 2016 I could find only in the IZBiH-run library and nowhere else in Sarajevo. Although these authors could not agree among themselves on a specific name for the group, their open and frank discussions about the issue signaled that the group has emerged into a new stage of national awakening and consciousness. This was a significant public steppingstone for Bosnian Muslim elites as a group that was almost invisible until then. The same argument was also made by Popović (1990).

271. Isaković’s (1972) book about Bosnian Muslim literature came out a year after the 1971 Yugoslav census, when “muslims” were for the first time provided a choice to identify as Muslims nationally. The book then further opened up the question of their specific cultural expressions and emancipation.

272. Among many, see, for example, Čeman 1993; Durić 1993; Pirić 1993; Latić 1994; Isaković 1995; Nanić 1995.

273. Right above the signatures, at the bottom of the General Framework of the Agreement signed in Paris on November 21, 1995, it is indicated that the agreement is written “in the Bosnian, Croatian, English and Serbian languages, each text being equally authentic.” The agreement can be viewed in Szasz 1996.

274. As of 2013, the refugee service organizations in the United States, as well the official USCIS, did not have the category of Bosniak nationality/ethnicity or Bosnian language in their files. Therefore, for those refugees from BiH of ethnic Serbian origin, the files would note the country of origin as BiH, ethnicity as Serb, and language as Serbian. For BiH Croats, again the country of origin would be noted as BiH, ethnicity as Croat, and language as Croatian. Only for Bosnian Muslims would the country of origin be BiH, their ethnicity listed as (the nonex-

istent) Bosnian and Herzegovinian (but none of them would note Bosniak), and their language, chosen from the drop-down computer-generated menu as “Serbo-Croatian,” but not the Bosnian language. When I inquired about these designations, the responding people acted as if they had only first heard of this issue. Yet according to their estimates, more than ten thousand refugees from BiH have been processed by the same institutions, with the overwhelming majority of them being Bosnian Muslims, Bosniaks, who speak and call their language the Bosnian language. The same unfamiliar response was received from the historian at the Department of State when asked about its Bosnian war history web page, where neither Bosniaks nor the Bosnian language are noted, even after its acknowledgment of the potential shortcoming (see the personal communication in Cabrera 2015).

CHAPTER 4

1. This rate was also affected by the first IRB requirements for data acquisition, which stipulated a written consent signed by each participant. Many of the initially willing participants became reluctant after they were told the IRB mandated information about the study and were asked to sign the consent form. At that point many of them returned or refused to take the questionnaires. As observed by others as well, in postcommunist societies, research that requests a person to sign a consent to participate immediately increases suspicion about the “true” intention of the researcher and dampens willingness to participate. Those reservations are present, or even increased, when the researcher is perceived as a member of the same group, as in my case (for a well-described example of such fears among another postcommunist group, see Vamanu 2012). For Muslims from those countries, the communism-inherited fears were exacerbated by the post-9/11 anti-Muslim atmosphere in the United States. Any attempt to recruit such Muslim participants for the research and to ask them to sign the consent was usually met with reservations. So those two qualms, combined, significantly affected the survey collection rate for this study as well. At one of the collection sites, a pub in Astoria, Queens, I explained to the group of potential participants the whole procedure and why it was better for them to talk to someone through an IRB-mandated procedure than to someone seeking information without such a procedure, as they claimed was previously done on several occasions. Yet my effort to clarify the IRB process was still met with hesitation, and only a few of the people did agree to sign the consent and participate. This suspicion was widespread regardless of gender, education, or class. Even a prominent Bosnian Muslim journalist refused to sign the consent for the interview. The same thing happened with a U.S.-based Bosnian Muslim diplomat. They both agreed to participate if it could be done without their signing the consent, but due to the IRB requirements at the time, they could not be included.

2. This ratio between the languages was not always a matter of individual preference, but also an issue of the availability of the questionnaires at the time. In general, many more Bosnian-language copies of the questionnaire were printed, and so they were more readily available for the respondents.

3. For more, see Brunnbauer 2004.

4. As an example, the campaign *Važno je biti Bošnjak* (It is important to be

Bosniak) may be noted. The campaign was especially focused on Bosnian Muslims living in BiH and others who could potentially take part in the BiH 2013 census. During the field work, I attended several panels and events propagating Bosniak identity, usually held at Bosnian-run mosques. The campaign was also carried out through various media channels, from Bosnian newspapers and TV stations to YouTube channels and social media such as Facebook pages. The campaign was particularly intensive during the last month before the census, the same time I was collecting data at the first two sites, Atlanta and Chicago. Because of the campaign, I often had to reiterate to the participants that my research was in no way connected to the official census. For an example of the U.S. campaign see Šunj 2013, 3.

5. Based on their names, language, place of birth, country of origin, and their self-declaration as non-Bosnian.

6. For more on sample size and central limit theorem, see Myers, Well, and Lorch 2010, 99–100.

7. For a good reference guide on SPSS, see Pallant 2007.

8. For example, survey question number 4 requested that the responder indicate a place of school attendance for the three levels of schooling. So that question contains information about the level and amount of education, the place of education, experience of non-BiH school systems and languages, and level of exposure to other regional school systems and languages (for more, see appendix C).

9. This is in line with the suggestion of Abdelal et al. (2009, 18) to consider contestation, seen as agreement within a group, as a factor in measuring social identity; such contestation can occur only in those diaspora situations and interactions with other members of the group.

10. Although the organization was formed on that day, it was officially registered by the secretary of state on July 9, 1906 (Tanovic 2005, 119). A few months later they purchased a building at 1637 N. Clybourn Avenue, Chicago, which they still own (Saric 2005, 91). Many Bosnian Muslim immigrants have lived in the same part of Chicago (See Paral and Norkewitz 2003, 41).

11. See Bogucanin 2005, 87.

12. They were part of the large Chicago pre-Bosnian-war immigrant population from the former Yugoslavia numbering some eighty thousand people, including twenty-five hundred Bosnian Muslims (Somach 1995, 10).

13. For more, see Zimianin's 1953 report to Molotov, where he emphasizes the development of those relations with an agreement on U.S. military assistance to Yugoslavia (signed on November 14, 1951) and an agreement on economic cooperation (signed on January 8, 1952), and the accompanying implications.

14. Among the differences, it is assumed that involuntary migrants have little or no choice as to where they are placed, while voluntary migrants have a choice (Nathansen 2013).

15. The same distinction was reported by the U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Population, Refugees and Migration Report. For more, see Somach 1995, 11–27.

16. This is the result not only of ideological closeness with them, but also because Chicago was a major center of the Serbian Chetnik diaspora (see the Movement of Serbian Chetniks of Ravne Gore 2017 for information on their activities in Chicago and the rest of the United States). One of the prominent members of those Chicago Chetnik circles was the infamous Serbian terrorist Nikola Kavaja,

who purportedly assassinated various people from Yugoslavia and even hijacked an airplane in 1979, allegedly as a CIA hitman (see Stewart 2006). Although Abazović (1999, 340) notes that a small number of Yugoslav Muslims in Toronto became close to those Serbian anticommunist diaspora circles, generally Serbian Chetniks were considered the archenemy of Bosnian Muslims from back home due to their horrendous policy of and attempt at complete annihilation of Muslims from the Balkans (see Dedijer and Miletić 1990; Šarkinović 2012, 300–308). Both Yugoslav fascist groups, the Croat Ustashas and the Serb Chetniks, were essentially anti-Semitic (in 1942, Serbia was the second European country, after Estonia, to be declared “Judenfrei” due to Serbian government systematic anti-Jewish activities; see Karčić 2020, 32); Ustashas, however, were a bit more selective and turned their anti-Semitism primarily against Jews and less against Muslims (although it should be noted that they did eliminate a number of Bosnian Muslims as well). In his book, Halilbegović (2006) provides a detailed account of more than fifteen hundred Bosnian Muslims who were killed by Ustashas. Their attitudes toward Muslims could also be understood from their policies toward Jews who converted to Islam, and this was one of the major complaints by the official Muslim dignitaries during World War II when Ustashas refused to grant safety to Jews who became Muslims (see Redžić 2005, 73). For more on both groups’ anti-Semitic policies, see also Bokovoy 1998, 11–14; Cigar 1995, 127). Serbian Chetniks, on the other hand, treated both Jews and Muslims equally badly. As noted earlier, at the beginning of 1941, the Chetniks tried to side with Tito’s Partisan to resist the Germans, but by the end of the same year the Chetniks had turned away from the Partisans to collaborate primarily with the Italians and sometimes with the Germans (see Shelhan’s note on Chetniks in *Encyclopedia of the Holocaust* in Gutman 1990, 289–30). These relations with the Chetniks, however, also caused Bosnian Muslim hesitation toward the Tito-led Partisans during World War II. Chetnik ideas were strong among Partisans until the end of the war, when the Germans were defeated and communists were freed at last to solidify their leadership position in Yugoslavia (see, for example, Zulfikarpašić 1991). As a result of Chetnik influences among the Partisans, during the war on some occasions the Partisans turned Jews away from joining their forces. Donia (2006) notes an instance remembered and described by a Partisan commander, Danilo Staka, when a group of 30 Jews were forced to return to Sarajevo after they unsuccessfully tried to join the Partisans. Return to Sarajevo meant certain death for them, and most of them were eliminated on their return. Donia (2006) indicates that some sources “blamed the decision on *Chetnik* influence among the Partisans” (179). On the other hand, the relations between Partisans and Muslims were also tenuous for a long time because of the same latent Chetnik influence among the Partisans due to the large number of Chetniks who switched sides. Donia (2006) writes that after the arrival of the Partisans’ First Proletarian Brigade on January 28, 1942, in eastern Bosnia, “Serb volunteers, including many who had previously served as Partisans, abandoned the Chetnik unit and flocked to join the Partisans. The Serb peasant volunteers thus voted with their feet for the force they believed would offer the staunchest resistance to Ustasha and German rule” (180). Despite everything, however, this “voting by feet” certainly caused strong reservations and hesitation in Bosnian Muslims about supporting the Partisans. For Muslims, neither the Germans nor the Ustashas, but rather the

Chetniks were the existential enemy—and having so many former Chetniks among Partisans kept the Muslims weary of them. This antagonism was carried over to Chicago with those Bosnian Muslim emigrants who came after World War II and later. The Chetniks come out of the tradition of the Serbian Hajduk, an archetypal bandit, sometimes freedom fighter (Hobsbawm 2000, 77–90). Although Hajduks were present throughout the Balkan Peninsula during Ottoman rule, they are most celebrated in, and mostly attributed to, Serbian tradition (Bracewell 2003). The same tradition produced a Serbian military approach in the wars of the dissolution of Yugoslavia, where Serbian troops looked and acted like patriotic bandits, very much like their people, and not like an army.

17. For more, see Kulenović 1951.

18. According to a significant Croatian Yugoslav communist politician, Vladimir Bakarić, Croatia had the largest and the most anti-Yugoslav emigre community (see Petranović and Zečević 1987, 477).

19. To my surprise, during an interview one of the pioneers told me they were disappointed by the dissolution of Yugoslavia, which they had never wished for. A similar sorrow for Yugoslavia was expressed in a public statement issued on December 1, 1941, by the Muslim People's Committee to the Bosnian Muslims (Petranović and Zečević 1987, 703). That sentiment was the continuation, discussed in the previous chapter, of the JMO policies under Mehmed Spaho, who was supportive of the concept of Yugoslavia, but with a more equal position in it for Muslims (Spaho 1923).

20. For more, see the next chapter's discussion of the Nationalism Strength Index.

21. In her self-published memoirs, Seferović-Drnovšek (2013, 241) talks about her hesitant leanings toward socialism during the Obama re-election campaign in 2011. Her book is not a scholarly work, but it is valuable as a document of a person's internal struggle with immigration. The book covers a time span of almost three decades, from the late 1980s to 2013, recounting the struggle of a woman from the former Yugoslavia who had to come to terms with the United States as her new country of refuge, and that is how it is being considered here.

22. For more, also see Saric 2006, 98.

23. "The pre-war diaspora communities tended to include simple working-class immigrants, many with rural backgrounds, most intent on blending in, and contributing to, their adopted states. The new émigrés, on the other hand, included Yugoslavia's disinherited bourgeoisie. In contrast to the diaspora old timers, they were often educated and urban: families associated with deposed royal houses, the military elites, and banned political movements" (Hockenos 2003, 10).

24. That era corresponds to the improvement of Yugoslav-U.S. relations. See Zimianin 1953.

25. Abiva 2006, 106.

26. See ICNAB 2021.

27. Unfortunately, the museum is not open for regular visits anymore, but the center's board members can provide access to researchers, as they did to me.

28. Seferović (2006) provides a list of some of those (423–62).

29. Tanovic 2006, 118.

30. For more, see Erović 2010.

31. See Parliament of Montenegro 2016.

32. They even frequent different social sites and restaurants. In one of them, Utjeha, where people from different former Yugoslav states sometimes come, each group occupies different tables. Although they talk to each other across the tables, they all stay seated with their own groups, as they clearly prefer people from their back-home regions. Utjeha means solace, and the café is named after a small town with beautiful beaches near the Montenegrin port city of Bar, as a clear association with “back home.”

33. See Seferović 2006, 458. It should be noted that the radio program used the term “Bošnjak” (Bosniak) in its name, and in that regard it represents an early advocate for the Bosnian Muslims’ new identity, which became salient at last during the 1990s.

34. For more, see BosnaTV 2016 (sometimes in 2021, BosnaTV became part of a larger New York–based media company).

35. For more, see BH BosTel Net 2019 (BosTel moved its headquarters to St. Louis in 2020).

36. See Seferović 2006, 71–77.

37. The same library helped with this research by providing a space for the interviews during the field work.

38. Seferović–Drnovšek 2013, 92.

39. DiPietro (2019, 80) and many others repeat the number of seventy thousand Bosnians and point to St. Louis as the city with “the largest concentration of Bosnians worldwide,” but without any reference. Jalalzai (2011, 104) quotes Muhammad Nur Abdullah, the former leader of the Islamic Foundation of Greater St. Louis, in saying that. Yet many more Bosnian Muslims now live in the Asian part of Turkey, and so it is a slight exaggeration to claim that St. Louis has the largest population of Bosnians outside of Europe or worldwide. Their claims, however, do serve as an illustration that a large number of them live there.

40. As Smith (2002) showed effectively, the numbers for some populations in the United States get easily inflated for various reasons. As for the number of Bosnians in St. Louis, referring to the International Institute of St. Louis (IISL), the local Bosnian Imam claims that there are 75,000 Bosnians in the city. When I asked one of the directors of the IISL where that number came from, he noted a local newspaper as a source. He then called the newspaper and asked about the source for the number, and they referred him back to the Bosnian community. So the circle was closed, while a credible source for the number of Bosnians in the city could not be established. The only credible number that can be used to further estimate population size is 11,087 people served by the IISL (from the limited data made available by the IISL exclusively to me). A similar number of 11,000 refugees who came between 1993 and 2001 is noted by Hume (2015). The USCIS report about the adjustment of status for permanent residence says that between 2002 and 2011, some 6,060 people born in BiH applied for the status adjustment (Office of Performance and Quality 2012). It should be noted that many people were eligible to adjust their status before 2002. Furthermore, the report I saw is from one of the USCIS offices in the states neighboring the St. Louis Field Office (MO, IL, and IN). At the bottom of the report it is noted that “Some of these applications may have been approved at a Service Center or at another Field Office. Some applica-

tions adjudicated at the St. Louis Field Office may not be included if the applicant resided in a state other than MO, IL, or IN.” Therefore, the number of 6,060 Bosnian applicants cannot be considered a final indicator, yet it is clear that it is in the range of tens of thousands.

41. For more information, St. Louis Islamic Center 2020.

42. A Sebilj is a replica of a Sarajevo Ottoman-style wooden fountain, often seen on posters and postcards of the city. For more, see Hume 2015, 6–12.

43. For more, see Moore 2013.

44. For more, see Turkish American Society of Missouri 2016.

45. For more, see the East European Folklife Center 2019.

46. A short, but in many ways representative, account of the journey of a few Bosnian Muslim families to St. Louis is described in McCarthy and Maday (2000).

47. For more, see Bosnian Studies 2020.

48. See Archdiocese of St. Louis (2020) and Holy Trinity Serbian Orthodox Church (2020).

49. Chain migration played a role in the case of those Yugoslav Muslims who came before the 1990s war. For those who came later, chain migration played only a limited role, and the settlement sites were largely the result of options offered by a sponsoring resettlement agency.

50. For more on Ranković, see Krijestorac 2015b.

51. Alahari and Bogucanin (2006, 146) note the same number without any reference to a source.

52. For example, Memić (2003, 254) notes that it is “known that some 15,000 Bosniaks have left the Plav-Gusinje region, and that is more than the number which have been left back home.” On the other hand, Rastoder (2010, 210) quotes from a book from 1980 that notes that from the Plav region (at that time Gusinje was administratively part of the Plav municipality) some 389 people were working in the West. Yet these numbers should be taken with a grain of salt, since many families were reluctant to report to authorities the real destination of their members who left for work. The rulers of the country looked at all of them with suspicion; receiving a letter from a relative from the West could sometimes result in a visit from the police for an informal talk about the purpose of mail exchange and activities of the émigré, wherever he might be. Rastoder himself also notes that the number has grown drastically since then, yet without providing any exact estimate.

53. Any Google search for “Plav, Gusinje, New York” will yield numerous websites and entries on the activities of the New York diaspora group, with all kinds of community news. In his above-mentioned work, Memić (2003, 254) also lists many things that Bosniaks from Plav and Gusinje have done for BiH and for the Bosniak national struggle.

54. One of them, Ekrem Jevric, even became a back-home celebrity via his music video clip with tens of millions of viewers on YouTube. The video for his song “Kuca, poso. Poso, kuca” (Home to work; work to home), describing with Zen poetry simplicity his life in New York, was partly recorded in “Mrki’s Place,” one of the main diaspora social clubs in Astoria. For video, see Kolenovic 2010.

55. For more, see Gellner’s 1992 explanation of the term.

56. For more, see Lewine 2001.

57. For more, see Bosnjaci.net.

58. The Muslim National Council of Sandžak was an assembly of several local Muslim organizations, led by the Sandžak branch of SDA, and its leader, Sulejman Ugljanin. Some 70.2 percent of the voting population took part in the Serbian part of Sandžak where the referendum was held. The Muslim population voted massively (98.9 percent) in favor of “the full political and territorial autonomy of Sandžak and in the event of SFRY disintegration for the right to adjoin the region to any Yugoslav republics” (Biševac 2000, 392). The referendum was declared invalid and unconstitutional by the Serbian authorities and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and its leaders were prosecuted, and Ugljanin took refuge in Turkey for several years. The Muslim National Council of Sandžak is now renamed the Bosniak National Council (BNC) and recognized by the current Serbian government as the National Council of the Bosniak National Minority. For more on the referendum, see Bosniak National Council 2020.

59. See Ured za zekat 2015, 2016.

60. As in many other smaller cities where a Bosnian Muslim population has resettled and where data was collected (Clarkston, GA; Lincoln, NE; Erie, PA; Waterloo, IA; Grand Rapids, MI; Detroit, MI; Elmhurst, NJ), they are mainly hired by local factories and the meat packing business as low-skill laborers, in part to control local labor costs (see Warren 2007, 71). In Waterloo, IA, with a population of about three thousand Bosnian immigrants (Edsall 2000), however, a young Bosnian Muslim woman, Anesa Kajtezovic, even became the mayor in 2010. She also ran as a Democratic Party contender for Iowa congressperson in the 2014 election. She lost that election, but she was very much noticed in the Bosnian Muslim community as someone from Bosnia who successfully entered American politics (for more, see Schrock 2014; also see figure 4.2, where she is featured on the front page of the newspaper).

CHAPTER 5

1. As noted above, nationalism’s unintentional role as an organizing principle is “to place the community in its appropriate temporal and spatial context” (Smith 2009, 65) of the new world.

2. For more see Eckstein 1988, 796.

3. As mentioned earlier, Anderson (1992) remarked that once the concept was “invented,” it became something that could be sought and replicated by political actors by means of many different forces and in different places.

4. The elites are seen as the initiators when BSPP is first realized and initiated. Glaser (1978) describes BSPP as becoming, highlighting, personalizing, health-optimizing, and awe-inspiring. The BSPP is seen as a bureaucratization, routinization, centralization, and organizational growth admitting or recruiting procedures, succession, etc. For Glaser (1978), “it is likely the emergent mix would emphasize the BSPP (psychological process)” (104), and for this inquiry that “mix” consists of changes that have occurred for Bosnian Muslims with the decaying of the former Yugoslavia and the subsequent Bosnian war.

5. As postulated by the political culturalist theory. See Eckstein (1988).

6. As described above in detail in the chapter 1, self-definition (individual self-stereotyping that affects in-group homogeneity) “focuses on the abstract psycho-

logical connection that an individual has to their in-group as a whole” (Leach et al. 2008, 148), therefore it is considered here as an individual’s internal feeling of belonging to a group.

7. The same chapter defines self-investment as “a purposefully chosen categorization of the self and consequential investment into a group” (Reese, Proch, and Finn 2015, 248), therefore as a situation where individual identity is being acted upon.

8. The elite level measure perhaps is more appropriate to understand the texture and goals of each nationalism project, not discussed much in this inquiry.

9. For example, Hobsbawm (1990) notes that nations are “dual phenomena, constructed essentially from above, but which cannot be understood unless also analyzed from below” (10).

10. Smith (2009, 15) also considers a nation as a project formed between the levels of ordinary people and key circles of the group.

11. As is discussed in depth in the introduction of this work, Flesher-Fominaya (2010, 397) explained that identity as a product is a form of “a public good.”

12. This is along the lines of the suggestion by Brady and Kaplan (2010, 54) to measure graded identity ascription in relation to factors that might affect that self-ascription, and for this study they are factors of nationalism.

13. Croegaert (2011) notes in her paper that for the people she talked to, those regional identifications were often the “distinctions that are at least as important, if not more so, than are the ethnic markers of Croat, Bošniak, or Serb” (474).

14. As indicated by Myers, Well, and Lorch 2010, 100–102.

15. The Type of Nationalism bipolar index is constructed with civic and ethnic poles of the Nationalism Type. Answers to the 14 items in the questionnaire are coded to measure for the strength of the civic type of nationalism (see appendix C). That connotes that the higher the mean score is, the more of civic type of nationalism it is, while lower and negative mean score suggests it is more of the ethnic type of nationalism.

16. Myers, Well, and Lorch (2010) note that “unlike the mean, whose value changes if any individual score is changed, the median is considered a *resistant statistic* because it is unaffected by changes in the value of any single score . . . because of that, there are circumstances in which it provides a more representative index of the location of a distribution” (24).

17. The EFA test showed that the score could be increased only slightly if more items were removed from the index; however, the alpha will still remain under the recommended value of 0.70.

18. For more on the different types of group organizations and connections among members, see Fennema 2004.

19. According to the CIA World Facts website, 39 percent of the BiH population is from urban areas. That number is even larger for the Bosnian Muslim population, which historically has been mainly concentrated in urban settlements (for more, see Donia 2006). Yet the larger population of respondents from rural areas in this sample is probably due to the much more thorough implementation of ethnic cleansing in rural areas of BiH, where Bosnian Muslims were much more vulnerable. According to the same source, the Sarajevo population makes up 20 percent of the total BiH urban population, and again, the percentage of Bosnian

Muslims there is probably higher when it comes to Bosnian Muslims exclusively. Interestingly, the 1991 census report for SR Yugoslavia (composed of only Serbia and Montenegro) notes a frequency very similar to our sample frequency of rural-urban proportion of the Muslim nationality. Of the total Muslim nationality population of 336,025 who lived in SR Yugoslavia in 1991, only 49 percent of them were urban population. In Montenegro there was a similar ratio: of 89,614 total people with Muslim nationality, 45 percent were from urban areas. In Serbia, of 246,411 Muslims, some 50 percent were from urban areas. Finally, in Kosovo, of 66,189 people of Muslim nationality, only 34 percent were from urban areas (for a complete list see Grpkovic 1993, 8). Such difference between Muslims of the rump Yugoslavia and Muslims of BiH further shows the importance for the sample in a study to include people from all those locations.

20. Spahić and Jahić (2014, 40–47) provide a detailed account of different BiH regional classifications over time. Most of them tend to agree with Ahmetbegović's (2014) geomorphological regionalization approach with at least four larger geographic regions and their respective subregional units. As he showed, the characteristics of each region impacted population distribution in BiH. The four regions include: Northern Bosnia, or Krajina, surrounded by plains, with low horst mountains, characterized by generally low elevations of 100–200 m above sea level. Five major BiH rivers flow through this region and serve as natural corridors for continental population movements. Central Bosnia is the region of the central Dinaric basin and valleys with mining and flysch mountains. Central Bosnia is characterized by many medium and high mountains. The capital city of Sarajevo is within the same region, but it is noted as a separate option in the survey due to its specifically urban situation. The third region of high karst covers the transitional area from the mountain basin to the Mediterranean area, represented through eastern Bosnia. It separates central Bosnia from the fourth region of lower Herzegovina, an Adriatic and sub-Adriatic zone (Mediterranean zone), where the population is oriented toward the coast. The inhabitants of each region cultivate different crops and have different food ways. As a result, each region also developed different folklore. Regions in this survey follow to some extent these four basic BiH regions and their subregional units, with the addition of Sandžak, as an outside-of-BiH region with a significant Slavic Muslim population, and western Bosnia, as a separate Krajina subregion with a population resulting from specific political developments during the Bosnian war in the 1990s. Furthermore, Midžić (2007, 300) also notes that that region has a long history of autonomous tendencies.

21. The Bosnian Muslim people who were fighting for the idea of a so-called West Bosnia Autonomy (Zapadna Bosna), were led by Fikret Abdić, against the rest of the Bosnian Muslims who were for a unitary BiH. For an example of their division, see figure 4.3. The attempt of the autonomy could be a result of the local collective memory. The repetitiveness of the harsh experiences and policies toward the people of Cazinska Krajina developed the local collective memory and their understanding of the problems they face. These local collective memories developed their propensity to seek their own solutions. For example, several of the informers from West Bosnia that I interviewed during my data collections noted that many of the people supporting Fikret Abdić, who attempted to declare regional autonomy,

were the sons and relatives of the leaders of the 1950s Cazin Rebellion, which was a previous local attempt to resolve the problems they faced.

22. The Federation of BiH and the Republika Srpska. For more on BiH constitutional arrangements and Bosniak position in those two BiH subdivisions, see Bardutzky 2010.

23. Primarily BiH, Serbia, Montenegro, Croatia, Kosovo. Some (Bosnian) Muslims also live in other former Yugoslav states, but in these five they represent a large enough minority to be influential at least on the local or regional level.

24. The data contains a sample of the population from each region, except for a sample of Bosnian Muslims (Bosniaks) from Macedonia, and a relatively small sample of Bosniaks from Kosovo. The population sample from Sandžak is disproportionately larger from the Montenegrin part of Sandžak, since people from Plav and Gusinje are the major Sandžak regional group that created its own diaspora niche in the New York metropolitan area, which for some time has served as a magnet for the constant flow of new people from “back home.” Other subregions of Sandžak are not as strongly represented, since it is much harder for people from those other parts to come and *remain* in the United States without an immediate group support network. Furthermore, compared to Muslims from BiH, those from Sandžak are without a legal path to the benefits of residency and citizenship, while Bosnian Muslims, escaping the immediate war in BiH, received those benefits right from the start. Most Bosnian Muslims from BiH had the legal status of refugees, with employment authorization and permanent resident status right upon their arrival, while those from Sandžak did not (although that did not necessarily transfer to a tangible economic advantage; see Nathanson 2013, 17). Since other Bosniak Muslims faced different circumstances on their arrival, they could rely only on their own group support networks, and that is how diaspora clusters formed.

25. See Jenne and Bieber 2014.

26. See Rastoder 2010, 481–83.

27. Karalić and Hadžić (2012) note that in the latest Montenegrin census, 7.11 percent of people declared themselves Bosniaks, while 3.97 percent were “old” Muslims, and noted that this split could have serious implications for the Muslims of Montenegro.

28. It should be added here that some of the most prominent players in the BiH war of independence were Muslims from Sandžak, from the Mehmed Šemsikadić, the first leaders of Bosnia’s resistance to Austro-Hungarian takeover, to the first commander of the BiH Army, Sefer Halilović, to Ejup Ganić, the first person to replace BiH president Izetbegovic when he was briefly detained by the JNA. Both men were then long-term residents of Sarajevo, but also both were Muslims originally from Sandžak. Although Woodward (1995, 478) incorrectly considers Ganić a high-level political figure in President Izetbegovic’s pro-Muslim SDA party, the truth is that neither of them were part of the same party. Ganić, at the time a declared Yugoslav, was a member of the BiH presidency as a representative from a left and pro-Yugoslav party, while Halilović was not a member of any political party then (for more see Halilović 2005). Yet all three were part of a Muslim bloc that came together to resist Serbo-Croatian joint attempts to destroy BiH integrity (Woodward 1995, 216).

29. For example, in the famous “Memorandum on the Establishment of a Spe-

cial Status for Sandžak” issued in 1993 in Novi Pazar, although printed in Clifton, NJ (close to one of the data collection sites for this study), initiators of the memorandum call for international verification of their demands with one of the signatories to be a representative of BiH (9–10).

30. See, Kahrović 2001, 111–28; Crnovršanin and Sadiković 2001, 680.

31. See, for example, Halilović 2005.

32. Herzegovina is another region that is sometimes seen as apart from Bosnia, as even the binomial term “Bosnia and Herzegovina” for the name of the country indicates.

33. The animosity caused by that war is still strong. For examples, see Nadarević 2013.

34. This is so even though their leader, Fikret Abdić, first advocated Bosniak identity together with Adil Zulfikarpašić and Muhamed Filipović at the outset of the BiH war, and before the SDA adopted it as well.

35. For good sources on the effects of nested identity, see Herb and Kaplan 1999.

36. As also suggested by Brady and Kaplan 2010, 54–55.

37. As is well observed by Waters (2008), all questions that ask about and compare immigrant minorities with “Americans” implicitly or explicitly carry some problematic assumptions about who those “Americans” are. Although it is true that the term “American” can mean different things to different people, the term in this survey *implicitly* assumes Americans to be religiously undefined native-born white and black people. This approach comes from the personal knowledge of Bosnian Muslim in-group assumptions about Americans in general.

38. As an example of what Al-Ali, Black, and Koser (2001) call “transnational cultural activities” (625), folk and rock music entertainers from “back-home” regularly perform across the United States in cities with large numbers of residents from the former Yugoslavia, regardless of their nationalities. One Bosnian Muslim, who is a major U.S. promoter of such events from Queens, NY, told me that he regularly advertises all those events across nationality lines in these cities, and that people who attend these events are indeed from all nationalities in the former Yugoslavia.

39. The percentages about friendship with Americans and Albanians support the notion of the opportunity indicator.

40. For a discussion on structure and content of associations among members of a group, see Fennema 2004, 436.

41. For example, a similar situation is true of Cubans in Miami and Somalis in Minneapolis.

42. If they have no party affiliation in the United States (Jalalzai 2001, 102), for Bosnian Muslims as a group the reality of still being a new immigrant group could be an explanation.

43. For more on segmented assimilation, see Portes and Zhou (1993).

44. Halep (2013) mentions the complaint of the Muslim Council of Montenegro (Muslimanski Savjet Crne Gore) that Bosniaks are trying hard to assimilate Montenegrin Muslims into Bosniaks. Also, see Rastoder 2010, 483.

45. Two respondents selected Black, and five selected Other.

46. The option “I don’t know” is considered different from the option “No”

because it is not the rejection of a notion. It is not an acceptance of it, either, but, more importantly, since Bosnian Muslims are overwhelmingly white, the option “I don’t know” is interesting in that it does not flatly reject the notion of a nonwhite person being Bosniak.

47. This is particularly interesting since it might be expected that Bosnian Muslims are affected by the racially exclusive attitudes of their neighboring Slavic nations of Croats, Serbs, Slovenes, and Montenegrins. In these relations with their Slavic neighbors, however, Bosnian Muslims are often seen as others, possibly as “blacks.” Although some might argue that Bosnian Muslims will adopt the same in-group exclusive racial attitudes as their neighbors, from the results of this sample it is obvious that the opposite is the case. This could therefore indicate that Bosnian Muslim people’s nationalism rejects Germanic and Uvarov’s (and Khomyakov’s) 1860s concept of a nation built upon the tie between race and religion, largely adopted by other neighboring Slavic groups. An example of such an approach is Khomyakov’s conception that “the Slav cannot be fully a Slav without Orthodoxy” (Leatherbarrow and Offord 1987, 1860). For more on Germanic and Uvarov’s concepts of a nation, see the literature review chapter of this book, especially notes on Perkins 2004, 292, and Woolf 1996, 20–21.

48. This also could be the result of the discrimination Bosnian Muslims face because of their religion. In the post-9/11 United States, they are of the “right skin color [but of the] wrong religion,” as Martin (2008) noted, and it could be that Bosnian Muslims in the United States internalized that ambiguity of what race they are, in the highly racialized reality of the United States. DiPietro (2019) notes difficulties young Bosniak immigrants had negotiating race and how they were perceived in St. Louis when they went to school.

49. As discussed in the chapter on the history of Bosnian Muslims as a group, during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, when the ideology of nationalism began to reach Balkan shores, Bosnian Muslims had until that point been facing a different trajectory than their Slavic non-Muslim neighbors because of their different history. On the other hand, the Serbian view of a nation is based on Obradović’s application of Uvarov’s ideas and Khomyakov’s nineteenth-century epistle for a Slav nation, urging the exclusive unity of Slavs and Orthodox Christianity (to read the entire epistle, see Leatherbarrow and Offord 1987, 93–94).

50. The situation when a self-naming individual considers that his or her membership in a group does not entail any particular action and is thus an a priori state of being, as Shils (1982) would argue (19).

51. Without reference to a source of information, in her interesting work Simmons (2002, 628) notes that the BiH capital, Sarajevo, had some 30 percent of mixed marriages, the highest percentage in the former Yugoslavia. If this information is correct, it might suggest that Sarajevo was very different from the rest of BiH. But Simmons herself wonders “whether all Sarajevans or, perhaps more significant, whether all Bosnians (and Herzegovinians) shared these attitudes” (632). This is also potentially important, since other previous observers of Bosnian Muslims, as the now dominant group in BiH, noted explicitly that they are an endogamous group. We can see that such a notion is changing, if it was ever completely accurate.

52. Although a study done by Botev (1994) already effectively challenges that

notion, showing that reports of mixed marriages in the former Yugoslavia were exaggerated. The same is suggested by O’Loughlin (2010, 54) who notes only 6.5 percent of mixed marriages among Bosniaks in his study on interethnic friendship in BiH.

53. In this sample, a large majority of respondents who are married to non-Bosniak/Muslim partners are from urban areas.

54. Ipek (2013) details how such rural-urban dynamics developed during the late 1800s and early 1900s and concludes that “the real reason for the migration of Muslims [to cities] was the general policy of destruction of Muslim civilians, as evidenced in the activities of the Serbian, Bulgarian, Greek, and Montenegrin guerrillas as well as of the Balkan armies” (643).

55. Although many people could have been divorced and remarried after the war, the number of in-group spouses is overwhelmingly high, and this is more likely than not a condition that existed even before the war.

56. Indeed, all those married to Serbian spouses are from urban settings, while all those married to Croats come from rural areas. Finally, in this sample of the population, those from urban areas are also those more commonly married to an American spouse.

57. As described by Tufekčić and Doubt (2019, 35–38), the affinal relations in the region have a special significance and serve as an important source for intra- and intersocial capital among different Bosnian groups.

58. The same effect among different American communities is noted by Herb and Kaplan 1999, 11.

59. In fact, for both Serbs and Croats, a small percentage of Serb Muslims and Croat Muslims are indicated as family or friends. Those Bosnian Muslims who checked such options obviously see the difference between their group and other Slavic Muslims. It should be noted here that a marriage connection in a local context, for some, does not constitute a family tie with the spouse’s family, as I was told by several participants.

60. As Ahn, Isaac, and Salmon (2008) suggested in their experimental study on endogenous groups’ entry/exit mechanisms. Although they limit their conclusions to midsize groups, and nations are certainly not that, some aspect of their conclusion may apply in this case as well.

61. Since variable values used for this construct of nationalism are on different scales, they were first standardized, where all means are computed as zeros, and then values of each item are given, based on the mean’s standard deviations for each item. Therefore, while a z-score mean indicates negative correlation, the true mean score for the construct is not necessarily negative. Although a z-score computed in this way does not necessarily represent the true intensity of the variable, it does tell us whether a particular score is equal to the mean, below the mean, or above the mean of multiple scores for an item, and whether the intensity of a phenomenon is higher or lower. Furthermore, since it is not the true score, it is useful also to report the median score because it allows a clearer picture of the tendencies toward the construct among the respondents. A homogenized z-score can also tell us how far a particular score is away from the mean score for the item, and the direction in terms of the mean. Although z-scores may be large, most of them are within the range between -3 and 3 , where the value of 0 is considered to be the mean score.

62. This question is based on the reality that the other two groups, by and large, can participate in the elections in their national states across the border. So 300,000 Bosnian Croats can participate in the elections in Croatia (Hockenos 2003, 8), and many Serbs from Bosnia with very little bureaucratic maneuvering can participate in the elections in Serbia. Only Bosniaks from Sandžak cannot join their conationals in voting and participating in the elections in their imagined national state of BiH, and so the question measures attitudes toward that issue.

63. The prime example of those vacillations is the strongest Muslim party from Sandžak at this time, the Sandžak Democratic Party led by Rasim Ljajić, which is one of the best-maneuvering parties in Serbian politics. Its leader loses no opportunity to emphasize that Muslims from Sandžak are part of the Serbian state on the path toward the European Union, and that they see Serbia as their state as well (see Biševac 2000, 393). Furthermore, some imams even created a separate organization in Serbia, apart from the IZBiH, to represent their interests as Muslims from Serbia. Although they are challenged by another branch, led by a mufti appointed by the IZBiH, their effort certainly signals uneasiness in Muslims from Sandžak regarding the BiH state as their only option for a national state as homeland for Slavic Muslims or Bosniaks. Muslim imams from the Montenegrin part of Sandžak separated from IZBiH even before their colleagues on the Serbian side. Their IZ of Montenegro has its own unchallenged *reis ul-ulema* and subsequent organizational structure, recognized by the state as the exclusive representative of Muslims in Montenegro.

64. For example, in her dissertation, Levy (2010) effectively argues that the place and context of schooling, as well as the language used in schools, do affect issues of group belonging, such as nationalism and identity ascription, among younger people in BiH today (152–56).

65. Only 0.9 percent of them indicated that they are without any school. This could be the result of the U.S. immigration process, which may be hard to navigate for illiterate people and therefore filters out those who could not read, write, or understand what it is required to facilitate the process of immigration. As a result those who managed to come have at least some years of education.

66. From the answers, we can assume that respondents finished school in the place they indicated, but it is possible that a person might have started school in one place and finished it in another.

67. This is indicative information for those in the United States who treat a college degree as an indicator of class status. Following preliminary observation by Hill (2016) and considering probable problems with such classification, this study refrains from such characterization and, rather, reports only their level of schooling, treating it as a controlled variable by itself without referring to it as an indicator of class.

68. A study conducted among the Bosnian diaspora in the United States by the Center for Applied Linguistics in 1996 found a similarly high number of participants, some 36 percent, with a college degree and 45 percent with a high school degree. For more, see Dimeo and Sumach 1996.

69. Malešević (2006), for example, notes that the literacy rate in BiH “jumped from 55% in 1948 to over 90% at the end of the 1980s” (214).

70. The distribution among those who have attended college is larger among women (60.5%) than among men, while a larger percent of men attended elementary or high school only.

71. See, for example, Vuković 2000, 35–37.

72. See Obradović, Mitrović, and Milovanović 2014.

73. Džihana, Ćendić, and Tahmaz (2012, 29) note that while newspaper reading was never widespread in BiH, TV dominance there slowly gave way to the increasing use of the internet and other digital media so, in that sense, the back-home population is becoming more like the diaspora population in terms of access to media sources.

74. See Fennema 2004, 442–43.

75. More than 90 percent of respondents indicated that they speak the Bosnian language at home.

76. In the literature on the logic of democracy, the cost of participation and the possibility of “free riding” are factors in individual deliberations on whether or not to participate in elections. Since such participation is irrational in terms of costs and benefits, participation is considered to be driven by the sense of nationalism, which Orwell (1953) correctly notes to be an irrational force. Therefore, the assumption here is that if participants have a strong sense of nationalism, they will assume the cost and participate in BiH elections. That is why this issue is part of the Nationalism Strength Index. For more on the logic of voting, see Downs 1957, 38; and on free riding, see Olson 1971, 21, 60–65.

77. They lost their position of the most important population factor in BiH with the formation of the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes and subsequent Yugoslavias in which the dominant roles were held by the Serbs and Croats and where Bosnian Muslims were left only to declare themselves either Serbs or Croats, and in that way indirectly decide if BiH is Serbian or Croatian.

78. This is especially so since the diaspora population is aware—from the BiH media sources—that the issue of the language and its name is a contentious factor in BiH realities and many clashes occur over the right to call and use the Bosnian language in schools controlled by Serbs and Croats.

79. Historically, the first was the initial Kingdom of Yugoslavia formed by King Alexander in 1921; the second was the communist-ruled Yugoslavia after 1945; and the third was the briefly lasting union of Serbia and Montenegro in the late 1990s, sometimes referred to as the “rump Yugoslavia,” but it is not considered much in this work since it did not include BiH (for more on the rump Yugoslavia, see Crnobrnja 2002, 228).

80. This is especially the case for the peoples of the former Yugoslavia, who all rushed to recreate and reorganize their languages to emphasize differences from previous language standards, and so old languages reappeared dressed with new structures and names. Each of the new states and constituting nations now has its own language and name for it, including Bosnian, Croatian, Montenegrin, *and* Serbian, while Macedonian and Slovenian were separate and official languages even during the time of SFRY. Furthermore, as pointed out by many different scholars, the issue of language was the primary pillar of all local Slavic nationalisms, even during the time of Austro-Hungarian rule of the region.

81. The unity of the several main dialects of the local spoken Slavic languages was declared a few times. The first time was in Vienna in 1850, when Vuk Karadžić and Đuro Daničić met with several prominent representatives of the Illyrian movement of Croatia and decided jointly to standardize all dialects of the language spoken by local Slavic peoples and push for their harmonization based on the standards of a middle dialect spoken in East Herzegovina. The second time was at the convention in Novi Sad in 1954, when they adopted the name Serbo-Croatian or Croato-Serbian for the name of the language in addition to some common standards for it. Both times, however, the decisions were made by representatives of the Serbs and Croats, without any Muslim member present. This is probably the result of their ambivalent perception of Slavic Muslims, who were often seen as “Turks,” and at other times as “our Mohamadan brothers” (the adjective “our” is used to avoid saying whether they were specifically Serbs or Croats, or later Montenegrin, and to leave it open for Muslims “to decide”). For Bosniaks today the fact that they were left out of those deliberations about the common language represents an example of their neglect by both groups, and it is often noted by the national tribunes as an example of the Serbs’ and Croats’ intent to deny their group altogether (for more on the process of standardization, see Alexander 2006, 382–86). Finally, even Croats essentially rejected that common Croato-Serbian standard in 1967 by issuing a declaration about the name and status of the Croatian language that was signed by most prominent Croat writers and linguists of that time, including Miroslav Krleža (Pavičić 2017, 29).

82. The same situation was actually carried over from the back-home context, as noted by Croegaert (2011): “although increased urbanization and intensification of industry in Yugoslavia during the 1960s and 1970s drew more women onto the factory floor and into urban commercial life more broadly, public social spaces—streets, coffeehouses, and taverns—were still most often gendered male spaces. Women might work as servers and entertainers in such spaces but rarely occupied them as patrons” (468). This was especially true in the small cities and towns in BiH, where the majority of the general population of BiH Muslims have lived and from where the majority of this sample population comes (only about 10 percent are from Sarajevo, which was the only *truly* big city in prewar BiH).

83. Except for involvement with religious organizations where the percentage for both gender groups is relatively high, although still lower for female than male respondents. See table 5.6.

84. For example, during the field work, four gender-divided focus group interviews were conducted, and women in those groups also completed questionnaires at that time. Also, some Bosnian mosques have women’s study groups, and a few of them agreed to respond directly to the survey without male interlocutors. The analysis of the focus group discussions will not be reported in this book.

85. Although the focus of this inquiry is not to uncover the masculinity behind nationalism, which Enloe (2004, 107) calls for, an effort is made to note how men and women respond to calls for collective action by a group by those who have a position of power, as well as differences in terms of the burden carried by women and men in the struggle to survive and assert oneself as a nation.

86. This is especially true for Bosnian Muslim women, who were one of the primary targets of the Serbian and Croatian aggressions against the group. Sofos

(1996) provides an example of the different gender experiences when she notes how the Serbian notion of nationalism saw male Muslims of Bosnia as those to be eliminated as “irremediable” souls, while Muslim females were potentially “remediable” by rape and impregnation.

87. A difference in nationalism–desired identity choice calculations among genders is also present for Bosnian Muslim women who cover their heads with the highly politicized piece of clothing, the *hijab*. They do so because they have much less choice to hide their religious identity in the often hostile U.S. public sphere than do their male conationals who, due to their whiteness, could easily pass for just another white person as long as they do not speak. Robert Young described the U.S. situation well when he noted that “few items of clothing throughout history can have been given more meanings and political significance” than the Muslim women’s *hijab* (as cited by Miskovic 2007, 540).

88. An example of that structure is seen in regular reports about *zekat* (the yearly religious tax) collections, where ICNAB, the U.S. Bosnian *jamaats* (congregations) organization, for the last several years has topped the list as the greatest contributors among all Bosnian Muslim world diaspora groups. For more information on ICNAB, visit their website at <http://www.icnab.com>. For *zekat* collections, see Ured za zekat (2015, 2016).

89. Bringa (1995) reported the same in her seminal work on Bosnian Muslims in BiH.

90. Some Bosnian Muslims centers even have own cemeteries right next to the mosque, just like back home. See for example the Bosnian Muslims Center in greater Des Moines, Iowa, at 17630 Bosniak Lane in Granger.

91. In places in Europe closer to the homeland, instead of their own cemeteries, mosques would have strong relations with funeral service companies, “Bakije” or “Jedileri” (both operated by or in very close cooperation with the official IZBiH), which provided transportation of the deceased person to BiH or Sandžak for burial back home. *Vazifa* that the member had been paying while he or she was alive covered most of the expenses for the funeral services at that time.

92. Sometimes *mekteb* is also referred to as *mejtef*. The word *mekteb* is derived from the Arabic language term for elementary school. *Mejtef*, on the other hand, is derived from the word *mejt*, meaning the body of a deceased person, and during the communist era, often the same school space was used to keep and wash the body of a deceased person, when needed, and to pray over it. Since the same spaces were used on weekends for schools, people began to refer to schools as *mejtefs*. It is an irony that religious weekend schools started to be referred to by such a term, yet the term has now persisted, and those weekend schools are often referred to as *mejtefs* in addition to *mektebs*. *Mektebs* were officially outlawed by the communist regime in BiH in 1950 (Hoare 2014, 374), and they began operating again as weekend schools only on the eve of the Bosnian war.

93. With the demand for these two primary mosque services, Bosnian Muslims and *their* Islam resemble “Jewish ethnicism,” where the majority of them also “continue entering after birth the covenant of Abraham [with circumcision of boys and attendance at the basic school, *mekteb*], and finding after death a permanent resting place in a [Muslim] religious cemetery” (Baron 1971, 241).

94. Individual membership in an ethnic organization constitutes a bonding type

of connection (Putnam 2000), while membership in multiple organizations constitutes bridging connections (Fennema 2004). Therefore, we can see that a larger number of members in only one organization, even if it is religion-based, provides a foundation to consider people of this sample strongly bonded, while less bridged across the community since the percentage of those who are members of multiple organizations is much smaller. Since bridging associations contribute to more cohesion, while bonding associations contribute to more group fragmentations, it may be concluded that this Bosnian Muslim population sample is more fragmented than cohesive.

95. Yet, as observed by Bringa (1995), since the association with Islam for Bosnian Muslims is more cultural than religious, it does not necessarily translate into stronger religiosity.

96. Although, as Croegaert (2011) notes, a common pattern for other immigrant groups like Italians and Hispanics is to religiously diffuse and assimilate and intermarry. Sherkat (2001) points out that some more recent immigrants, especially Muslims, show a higher degree of religious loyalty than the previous immigrant groups.

97. Just in the city of St. Louis, according to the data I was able to see, the Catholic Charities of St. Louis assisted with the immigrant needs of around a thousand Bosnian immigrants, and a vast majority of them are Bosnian Muslims (see conversation with Hennicke and Kriještorac 2014). This situation, where Christian organizations were contracted to bring them over to the United States while Christian forces back home expelled them from their houses, created some uneasiness among many Bosnian Muslims and increased their desire to uphold their religious identity. This apparent coincidence was also created by policies of admission to the United States, which stated that “certain categories are not eligible unless referred by the UNHCR, such as Bosnian Croats (the program focuses on Bosnian Muslims); only two ways to get to the U.S. are by AOR [immigration officer’s assessment of applicant] or by UNHCR referral (AORs must be Bosnian Muslim)” (Somach 1995, 11). Purak (2017, 124) states the same for the city of Rochester in New York. Croegaert (2011) reports about the same situation in Chicago, where other Christian faith-based agencies were contracted to help the resettlement process for Bosnian Muslims there. The 1996 Center for Applied Linguistics report notes nineteen different Christian-based organizations throughout the United States that were assisting Bosnian immigrants (see Dimeo and Somach 1996, 4–5). Yet we should add that many Bosnian immigrants were also resettled throughout the United States by other types of organizations that are part of the nonreligious structure of USCRI.

98. Furthermore, even in a larger, host society, religious affiliation is by far the most common associational membership among Americans (Putnam 2000, 68).

99. Furthermore, the possession of a BiH passport is also an indicator of BiH citizenship and the consequent ability to participate in homeland elections, which, as previously argued, is an element of Nationalism Strength.

100. For more on passport requirements and BiH diplomatic offices in the United States, see Embassy of Bosnia and Herzegovina 2021.

101. Paral and Norkewicz (2003) note that 45.4 percent of immigrants from BiH (not only Bosnian Muslims) owned property in Chicago when they did their study. Chicago is a site with a lot of Croats and Serbs as well, but there are disproportion-

ally more Bosnian Muslims, who had no place to return to, which provided further impetus for them to buy property and try to settle in these locations of their refuge. Although Chicago and the United States experienced a real estate bust in 2008 and many people lost property, the bust also caused the prices of homes to drop significantly, so many more Bosnians could afford to buy property (the same authors note that in 2003 some 73.4 percent of immigrants from BiH were at 200 percent or more of the poverty level and so they could not afford earlier skyrocketing home prices). In fact, I was told that after the bust in St. Louis, many Bosnian Muslims started moving out of South County to more affluent suburbs.

102. See Dey 1999, especially 10–11.

103. Perhaps the different and prevalent view of nationalism as a generic and natural force is an example of what Glaser (2010) properly called “socially structured fictions [in which] many people have large stakes in maintaining them” (10). Many things about nationalism, from how it starts to how it operates and what it does, constitute a very much “socially structured fiction” in the popular (and often, in social science as well) discourse. In the same work Glaser also advises, when trying to suggest an alternative explanation to those socially structured fictions, to do it bit by bit, in a systematic and carefully considered way.

CHAPTER 6

1. See the note on the central limit theorem and the z-scores above.

2. The Type of Nationalism Bipolar Index is constructed with civic and ethnic poles of the Nationalism Type. Answers to the 14 items in the questionnaire were coded to measure for the strength of the civic type of nationalism (see appendix B). That means that a higher score indicates a more civic type of nationalism, while a lower score means a more ethnic type.

3. Khamis (2008, 157) suggests that associations smaller than 0.02 should be seen as weak correlations.

4. For more, see Gilligan 2003, 160.

5. The Shapiro-Wilk Test suggested that indexes are not normally distributed, so the Spearman *Rho* test was used to test the correlation between the two, as suggested by Shapiro and Wilk (1965).

CONCLUSION

1. Sometimes even to assess who are the “soldiers, martyrs, traitors and exiles” among members of a diaspora, as Hepner (2009) well-described the situation of another similar large diaspora group, with its own case of an ongoing nationalism identity project. For Bosnian Muslims in the diaspora, ascription (or not) of Bosniak identity does not yet have such severe connotations, but it does play a role in evaluations among different subgroups of the population, as was discussed in the section about regional representations and populations from Sandžak and western Bosnia.

2. It should be noted that this study was designed primarily to measure whether or not, influenced by nationalism, Bosniak identity is being ascribed by the members of the Bosnian Muslim diaspora.

3. Indeed, due to changes in the modes of communications and travel, now even the object of long-distance nationalism is not that distant anymore. This reality is confirmed by the recent report that a record number of 65,398 Bosnians in the diaspora (a jump from 42,139 people in 2014) have registered to participate in BiH local elections (see Centralna Izborna Komisija BiH 2016). Furthermore, statistical reports for the year 2016 note the ever-increasing number of foreign visitors in BiH (see Küçükkiremitçi 2010, 9–13; and the tourism report by Agencija za Statistiku BiH 2016). If we combine these reports, it is safe to assume that most of those foreign visitors are actually people from the BiH diaspora who are coming back to visit the homeland. In our data set, more than 70 percent of participants indicated that they have another passport besides a BiH one (44 percent do not have a BiH passport at all), and so as they travel they are technically foreigners when in fact they are part of the Bosnian Muslim diaspora. Finally, according to many news reports, the main point of contention regarding the publication of the last BiH 2013 census, which took almost three years to be revealed, was the number of those who are in the diaspora but who registered as residents in their prewar localities. This trend is expected to continue, together with high economic emigration of the Bosnian population. All this demonstrates that Bosniak identity may be seen as an important factor by Bosnian Muslims in the diaspora, as it is by those in BiH and Sandžak.

4. As established by the Bayesian analysis approach, which stresses the importance of understanding the context and whether the case may be useful for the determination of whether the intervening phenomenon may be present to begin with.

5. This is very important and often ignored aspect of collective action is based on Smelser's (1963) theory, which states that "collective behavior 'lies outside this area of cultural prescription.' It is behavior which develops new forms of interaction to meet 'undefined or unstructured situations'" (6). Therefore, he also emphasizes "change" as an important and, it may be argued, essential element of collective action.

6. As confirmed by the results of this study and the results of the recently published first postwar BiH census, where a large majority of Bosnian Muslims self-identified as Bosniaks and now make up, according to the same census, 50.11 percent of the BiH population (see Agencija za Statistiku Bosne i Hercegovine 2016a, 54).

7. In part, in another case, Kuru (2009) addresses in more depth this issue of different types of nationalism and their impact on democracy.

8. "State-nation is a term introduced to distinguish democratic states that do not and cannot fit well into the classic French-style nation-state model based on a 'we feeling' resulting from an existing forged homogeneity" (Stepan, Linz, and Yadav 2011, 7).

9. As measured by Shaykhutdinov (2013) in many cases of eastern and south-eastern Europe, including BiH and Sandžak, where Muslim groups constitute significant part of the local polity, they are also more likely to benefit from increases of democracy and, therefore, are less likely to oppose a state that ensures democracy and recognition and accommodation of their political aspirations (also see Nikolaidis 2000, 449–51). Such situation increases chances for "social and political stabil-

ity within a country contributing to greater democracy and leading to a virtuous circle” (Shaykhutdinov 2013, 664).

10. Implicit in all these suggestions, since the time of Benjamin Kallay, is that Bosnian Serbs and Croats would only add a layer to their existing national identity, while Bosnian Muslims would abandon their own national project for the sake of an ambiguous joint Bosnian identity that had not until now been able to take root among the entire population since the time of the Austro-Hungarian takeover.

11. Knutsson (1998) suggested a similar thing in another case where a different all-inclusive identity as a strategic choice for an individual “does not weaken the person’s original [other] identity in the eyes of [other members of his group] nor does it meet with any envy from his group of origin or opposition from any aimed-at ‘goal’ group” (99).

12. As also suggested by Wilmer 1998. A similar approach was argued by a Bosnian Muslim intellectual, Redžić (See Promitzer 2004, 79).

13. As the Soros-funded Open Society, for example, seems to be advocating and arguing for through the Seidić and Finci case in the EU Court of Human Rights decision about insurance of (their) individual rights in BiH (see Varenik 2008). In that locally well-known case, “Mr. Sejdīć and Mr. Finci describe themselves to be of Roma and Jewish origin respectively. They have not declared affiliation with any of the ‘constituent peoples’ [Bosniaks, Serbs, or Croats] and are therefore ineligible to stand for election to the House of Peoples and the Presidency” (Bardutzky 2010, 317). The EU court decided in their favor and demanded changes to the BiH constitution to ensure their individual rights. For more, see Bardutzky 2010.

14. It appears that the official Islamic hierarchy in BiH now expects exactly that when it wishes for the state to define its secularity as “neutrality with respect” (Karčić 2006, 57). For more, see chapter 3.

15. For example, see Filandra 1998, 355–98.

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