**IMISCOE Research Series**

Maria Kousis Aspasia Chatzidaki Konstantinos Kafetsios *Editors*

# Challenging Mobilities in and to the EU during Times of Crises

The Case of Greece

**IMISCOE Research Series**

Now accepted for Scopus! Content available on the Scopus site in spring 2021.

This series is the offcial book series of IMISCOE, the largest network of excellence on migration and diversity in the world. It comprises publications which present empirical and theoretical research on different aspects of international migration. The authors are all specialists, and the publications a rich source of information for researchers and others involved in international migration studies. The series is published under the editorial supervision of the IMISCOE Editorial Committee which includes leading scholars from all over Europe. The series, which contains more than eighty titles already, is internationally peer reviewed which ensures that the book published in this series continue to present excellent academic standards and scholarly quality. Most of the books are available open access.

Maria Kousis • Aspasia Chatzidaki Konstantinos Kafetsios Editors

## Challenging Mobilities in and to the EU during Times of Crises

The Case of Greece

*Editors* Maria Kousis Former Member of the UCRC Board The University of Crete Research Center for the Humanities, the Social and Education Sciences Rethymno, Greece

Konstantinos Kafetsios Former Member of the UCRC Board The University of Crete Research Center for the Humanities, the Social and Education Sciences Rethymno, Greece

Aspasia Chatzidaki Former Member of the UCRC Board The University of Crete Research Center for the Humanities, the Social and Education Sciences Rethymno, Greece

This work was supported by Special Account for Research Funds of University of Crete (SARF UoC) (KA3650)

ISSN 2364-4087 ISSN 2364-4095 (electronic) IMISCOE Research Series ISBN 978-3-031-11573-8 ISBN 978-3-031-11574-5 (eBook) https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-11574-5

© The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s) 2022 . This book is an open access publication.

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## **Endorsements**

"Based on the premise that migration cannot be detached from the wider economic and political context in which it takes place, this carefully scripted edited collection on Greece addresses Europe's most dramatic case of migration linked to times of crisis. In addition to its longer history of labour migration and brain drain, Greece was on the front line of two major crisis epochs: the post-2008 fnancial meltdown and the mass infux of Syrian and other refugees during 2015–16. This book contains a rich menu of interdisciplinary analyses of various aspects of these migration episodes, the foretaste of more to come with the Covid-19 pandemic and the Ukraine exodus. The volume will be a unique resource for scholars, students and policymakers alike."

**Russell King**, Professor of Geography, School of Global Studies, University of Sussex, co-author of Young EU Migrants in London in the Transition to Brexit (Routledge 2022), co-editor of *Handbook on Return Migration* (Edward Elgar 2022) and *Onward Migration and Multi-Sited Transnationalism* (Springer 2022).

"The salience of 'crisis' for contemporary democracies has become a key issue in current debates. *Challenging Mobilities in and to the EU During Times of Crises: The Case of Greece* addresses in full the long-lasting and 'ubiquitous' crisis through which Greece has been going since 2008, facing worldwide shocking events such as global recession, war in Syria and Covid. An impressive multidisciplinary team of contributors provide a pathbreaking collection that, albeit focused especially on Greece, tells us so much on the world around us."

**Manlio Cinalli**, Professor of Sociology (University of Milan and Sciences Po Paris)

"This superb collection stands out from the many books about the Greek migration and refugee experience due to its multi-disciplinary approach and its frm anchoring in the socio-economic framework of the crises faced by Greece over the last decade. The diverse perspectives and levels of analysis adopted serve to highlight the complexity of mobility processes and the contested, constantly shifting landscape on which strategies and decisions are shaped by people on the move and by related actors such as humanitarian organisations and government authorities. The volume at hand very effectively illuminates the immensity of the challenges posed by migration and asylum-seeking, along with the high stakes in play for social cohesion. A must-read for academics, policymakers, and actors on the ground."

**Jennifer Cavounidis** has researched various phases of the migration experience of Greece, beginning with the massive infows of the 1990s. She has published dozens of articles in international journals (most recently in the *Journal of Refugee Studies*) and numerous books (most recently *The Emigration of Greeks and Diaspora Engagement Policies for Economic Development*).

"Coordinated by Maria Kousis, Aspasia Chatzidaki and Konstantinos Kafetsios, this volume offers a very timely, impressive and competent compilation of exemplary research addressing the current state of migration and asylum studies in Greece in times of crises and beyond. This publication not only captures the moment of migrant and refugee research in a country that has been and continues to be at the epicentre of European interest but is also destined to become one of the reference works for future migration researchers."

**Apostolos Papadopoulos,** Director of the Institute for Social Research, National Centre of Social Research and Professor at Harokopio University, Athens

"Crisis-related mobilities are, without doubt, one of the most burning issues of our time. The complex and multi-faceted migrations that Europe has experienced over the last decade are not just episodic events linked to particular regions, countries or populations but one of the major challenges contemporary Europe and the world are facing. Opening a perspective from the South European periphery, this thoughtprovoking collection of studies offers a much deeper investigation of the so-called refugee crisis in the context of the economic and fnancial crisis and more recently also the health crisis. The book collects fresh insights and theoretically driven explanations from Greece, a country that was already the epicentre of the Eurozone crisis after 2008 and has since then become one of the main-gates of migration to Europe. It is a must-read for everyone who wishes to deepen their understanding of the history and path dependencies of the European crises and migrations."

**Hans-Joerg Trenz**, Professor at Scuola Normale Superiore, Pisa, Florence

## **Foreword**

The feld of migration studies has mushroomed all over the world and has now gained a certain academic autonomy. However, as the editors to this volume, Maria Kousis, Aspasia Chatzidaki and Konstantinos Kafetsios insist that the study of migration cannot be separated from the wider social, economic and political contexts in which mobility takes place. For Greece, as for Europe at large, that context can be summarised by the now ubiquitous word 'crisis' or, to be more exact, three crises – the frst arising from the ramifying effects of the 2008 fnancial crisis, the second from the movement of migrants and refugees to Europe during 2015/2016, and the third from the Covid-19 crisis, commencing in 2020. Greece was at the vortex of the frst two crises, though, thankfully, she has so far been relatively less affected by the Covid crisis. So dispiriting was the period from 2008 onwards that, on the surface, it was diffcult to discern periods of normalcy between the crises. *Sotiris Laganopoulos,* the Secretary of the Bodossaki Foundation, a Greek philanthropic organisation active in supporting refugees and migrants, even suggested that the foundation had to administer its programmes during a period of 'perma-crisis'.1

The great virtue of this pathbreaking and carefully curated collection of 15 studies on mobilities in Greece during the three crises is that the authors probe the complex reactions and interactions happening below the surface. In their introduction, the editors commend the multi-disciplinary nature of the contributions. Of course they are right, but even more impressive is that it is often diffcult, without looking at the authors' affliations, to tell what the contributors' home disciplines are. As a perceptive scholar, George Homans remarked long ago that this happens when 'the problem is in control'.2 In short, when facing a complex issue and a fast-moving reality, a scholar has to grab whatever insights and information are available, unfltered by prior loyalties and affliations. The simultaneity of being hit by high rates

<sup>1</sup> https://www.bsg.ox.ac.uk/events/what-future-philanthropy-era-perma-crisis

<sup>2</sup>George Homans (1970) 'A Life of Synthesis'. In Irving Horowitz *Sociological Self-images.* Pergamon Press.

of poverty, crushing austerity packages, and large fows of migrants from Asia, the Middle East, and Africa generated a complex set of responses at the policy level, from political parties and social movements, and from the women and men 'in the street'. The 2020 confation of a partial economic recovery, weakened social security systems, and the outbreak of the Covid pandemic produced a similarly complex range of reactions.

How does one characterise these reactions? When I was a schoolchild, I was captivated by the ancient Greek heroes – *Achilles*, *Heracles*, *Hector*, *Jason*, *Odysseus*, *Perseus*, *Prometheus* and *Aeneas*. Now that I'm an old man who has been suitably educated by my female and non-binary colleagues, I can see that what I so admired in ancient Greece was an excessively masculine form of heroism – bravery in warfare, superhuman physical strength and an inordinate amount of low cunning. However, I could not help wondering whether modern Greeks' reactions to migration show an opposing form of heroism, more human and more caring – encompassing quotidian acts of solidarity, kindness and hospitality. I have to admit that this interpretation of Greek responses to the three crises is not entirely sustained by the research fndings of the contributors to this book.

Authors describe contradictory 'claims-making' by social actors, confused policies by public offcials, and a considerable level of public hostility mixed in amongst the acts of hospitality and humanitarianism. For example, in one survey (described in Chap. 5 by Stefania Kalogeraki), just over half of the Greek respondents were moderately opposed to Syrian refugees, while 18 per cent did not want to let a single Syrian refugee enter Greece. Another contributor (Angelo Tramountanis in Chap. 13) argues that while Greek politicians occasionally talked positively about immigrant integration, a proactive and coherent policy towards this end was never a priority.

One can take this negative perspective even further. The right-wing party, the Golden Dawn, gained a signifcant number of adherents after the 2008 crisis, winning seven per cent of the vote and 18 out of 300 seats in the Hellenic Parliament. The party even set up a food bank in Athens which was open only to Greek citizens and, for that reason, was shut by the police. In a sense, this act of closing a nationalsonly kitchen makes my point. It is not that Greece did not experience some xenophobia (a Greek word, after all) or that there were no acts of violence and hostility directed against migrants. Of course that is true. But, given the scale of the crises Greece endured, the bigger truth is that so many Greek citizens acted in a generous manner and in defence of a common humanity, thus giving us glimpses of a cosmopolitan (another Greek word) future. Assuming similar circumstances, can those in other European countries honestly declare that their governments and fellowcitizens would have behaved as well?

#### Robin Cohen March 2021

**Robin Cohen** is Professor Emeritus of Development Studies, University of Oxford, and Senior Research Fellow, Kellogg College. He is author, with Nicholas Van Hear, of *Refugia: Radical Solutions to Mass Displacement* (2020).

## **Preface**

The present volume is a product of the newly founded University of Crete Research Centre for the Humanities, the Social and Education Sciences (UCRC) and its frst international conference, *Migrations: Interdisciplinary Challenges*, which took place in Rethymno, on October 17 and 18, 2019. It offers a cross-disciplinary view of challenging mobility issues for migrants and refugees in Europe, focusing on Greece during a decade marked by the economic and refugee crises as well as the Covid-19 pandemic.

Contributors from the felds of philosophy, anthropology, sociology, economics, political science, geography, linguistics, law, health sciences and mathematics offer new analyses and data on a diverse range of mobility-related topics concerning the new Greek emigrants as well as refugees in Greece. First, chapters on mobility issues regarding the new emigration wave from Greece centre on decision-making, related benefts from emigrants, and education-related issues. Secondly, examinations of host receptivity towards refugees in Greece focus on attitudes as well as social distance and national stereotypes. Third, solidarity and claims-making analyses unravel aspects of a contested solidarity in the country, as well as migrants' protests and cosmopolitanism issues. Fourth, investigations of transformations in the governance of refugee and migrant mobilities lead to theoretical and political refections on how the country experienced crises. Finally, analyses on durable integration challenges centre on the evolution of integration and migration policy for Greece as well as on those posed for the municipality of Athens and the Covid-19 pandemic. In an era of continuing crises deeply affecting migration, as witnessed also in the unprecedented wave of refugees due to the war in Ukraine, the volume aims to become a unique resource for students and scholars from the above disciplines, but also for policymakers, working on crises and migration within and beyond Europe.

Rethymno, Greece Maria Kousis Aspasia Chatzidaki Stavroupoli, Greece Konstantinos Kafetsios

## **Acknowledgements**

The origin of this volume goes back to the decision of the 2016–2021 Board of the University of Crete Research Centre for the Humanities, the Social and Education Sciences to organise its frst conference titled 'Migrations: Interdisciplinary Perspectives' in Rethymno in October 2019, in which the contributors of this volume presented their work. We therefore gratefully acknowledge the Board's valuable input and, at the same time, the support of the co-organiser of the conference and its main funder, the Regional Unit of Rethymnon of the Region of Crete, especially *Stavros Arnaoutakis*, Governor of the Region of Crete, and *Maria Lioni*, Regional Vice Governor of Rethymno. We are also deeply thankful for the support of the Municipality of Rethymnon and the sponsors of the conference, Rethymno Mare Hotels; *Emmanuel Kugiumutzis*, President of the World Council of Cretans; Cultural Crete USA; and the General Secretariat for Research and Development. Funding covering the open access cost of the volume by the University of Crete Special Account for Research Funds is highly appreciated.

This volume however would not have been possible without the invaluable input by different people. We are most grateful for the dedication, tireless work, diligence and the collaborative spirit of all the authors throughout the long process of writing and revising their chapters. Special thanks go to *Chara Kokkinou* for her care and thoroughness on style-related editing of the volume and its chapters.

Furthermore, we are very thankful for the detailed and constructive comments provided by two anonymous reviewers. We are in particular deeply appreciative of the generous support of the people at IMISCOE-Springer, especially *Anna Triandafyllidou* (Editorial Committee Chairperson), *Irina Isaakyan* (Managing Editor), *Evelien Bakker* (Senior Publishing Editor), *Bernadette Deelen-Mans* (Senior Publishing Assistant), *Alexander James* (Production Editor, Books), *Corina van der Giessen,* as well as *Selvaraj Ramabrabha*, project manager at Straive handling the production process.

> Maria Kousis Aspasia Chatzidaki Konstantinos Kafetsios

## **Contents**



## **About the Editors**

**Maria Kousis** (PhD, The University of Michigan, 1984) is professor of Sociology and former director of the University of Crete Research Centre for the Humanities, the Social and Education Sciences (UCRC) (9/2014–11/2021). She was coordinator or partner in European Commission projects including Grassroots Environmental Action, TEA, PAGANINI and MEDVOICES. Her publications consist of 16 edited volumes, books, or special issues, 43 journal articles, and 39 book chapters. Recent publications include *Transnational Solidarity in Times of Crises: Citizen Organisations and Collective Learning in Europe*, focused on the felds of migration, disability and unemployment (Eds. C. Lahusen, U. Zschache and M. Kousis, Palgrave, 2021) and *Transnational Solidarity Organisations in Times of Crises – Comparative European Perspectives* (Eds. M. Kousis and C. Lahusen, special section of *Sociological Research Online*, 2021). Her research centres on social change, contentious politics, crisis and society, environmental politics, bioethics and Southern Europe. Recent work focuses on the socio-economic and political dimensions of hard times, especially in the context of the research projects 'The Greeks, the Germans and the Crisis' (GGCRISI, Greek-German Ministries Cooperation), 'Living with Hard Times: How European Citizens Deal with Economic Crises and Their Social and Political Consequences' (LIVEWHAT, EC, FP7), 'European Paths to Transnational Solidarity in Times of Crisis' (TransSOL, EC, Horizon 2020), EURYKA (EC, Horizon 2020) and 'Social and Solidarity Economy, Urban Communities and the Protection of Vulnerable Groups' (Swiss Network for International Studies).

**Aspasia Chatzidaki** holds a BA in Greek Philology (University of Thessaloniki, Greece), an MA in Theoretical Linguistics (University of Reading, UK), and a PhD in Sociolinguistics (Vrije Universiteit Brussels, Belgium). She is a professor in the Department of Primary Education at the University of Crete and Director of the Centre for Intercultural and Migration Studies of the same Department. In addition, she served as member of the UCRC Board on two separate occasions (7/2012-8/2014, 9/2016–11/2021). Her research interests include the study of sociolinguistic and educational aspects of bilingualism as well as Greek as a second language both in Greece and in diasporic communities. In the past 20 years she has taken part in numerous educational intervention programmes and teacher capacity-building seminars regarding the education of immigrant and refugee students. She is the author of a book (*Teaching Bilingual Students; Theoretical Issues and Educational Approaches* Athens, Pedio, 2020) and co-editor of a book on educational aspects of 'new migration' from Greece (Eds. Panagiotopoulou, A., Rosen, L., Kirsch, C. & Chatzidaki, *A. New' Migration of Families from Greece to Europe and Canada –A 'New' Challenge for Education?* Springer Verlag, 2019) and another one on refugee education (Chatzidaki, A. & Tsokalidou, P. *Challenges and Initiatives in Refugee Education: The Case of Greece.* Cambridge Scholars Publishing, 2020). Her recent research focuses on the reconceptualisation of Greek-language education abroad in the light of recent migration from Greece.

**Konstantinos Kafetsios** (PhD, Lancaster University) is Professor of Social Psychology at Aristotle University in Thessaloniki and visiting Professor of Social and Organisational Psychology at Palacký University in the Czech Republic. He has held research and teaching positions at the University of Cambridge School of Social and Political Sciences, the Department of Psychology at Anglia Ruskin University, and the Department of Psychology at the University of Crete, where he was also a member of the board of the University of Crete Research Centre for the Humanities, the Social and Education Sciences (UCRC) (9/2016–9/2019). Research in his lab addresses emotional and social interaction phenomena across cultural and social-organisational contexts. This research has received research funding from the European Commission, EEA, the Hellenic Foundation for Research and Innovation, GACR, and the General Secretariat for Research and Innovation. He currently serves as an associate editor for the *Journal of Experimental Social Psychology* and the *European Journal of Social Psychology* while on the editorial board of several international journals and as a reviewer for international funding agencies in the social and behavioural sciences.

## **Abbreviations**




## **List of Figures**


## **List of Tables**


## **Chapter 1 Introduction: Challenging Mobilities, Greece and the EU in Times of Crises**

**Maria Kousis, Aspasia Chatzidaki, and Konstantinos Kafetsios**

#### **1.1 Crises and Challenging Mobilities: A Multidisciplinary Approach from the EU's South-Eastern Periphery**

Notable migration related transitions took place during the past decade in Greece, a country that became the epicentre of the Eurozone crisis following the 2008 global fnancial crisis as well as the European Union's (EU) main-gate during the so-called refugee crisis of 2015–2016. The present volume offers a novel, multidisciplinary perspective on the challenges and complexities of crisis-related mobilities, as well as an open-ended view of crises that takes into account the opportunities (Carastathis et al., 2018, p. 33), but also the constraints they pose for migration processes and the involved groups (Kousis et al., 2020).

Responding to the need for delving into less researched country-cases that aim to enhance our understanding of the broader dynamics related to international migration politics (Thiollet, 2019), the volume centres on the single case of Greece, both a sending and a receiving country at the South European periphery (King, 2018). Through a multidisciplinary perspective, the contributions in this volume, offer fresh insights on how crises interact with migration processes at the individual,

M. Kousis (\*) · A. Chatzidaki · K. Kafetsios

Former Member of the UCRC Board, The University of Crete Research Center for the Humanities, the Social and Education Sciences, Rethymno, Greece e-mail: kousis.m@uoc.gr; aspahatz@uoc.gr; kkafetsios@flm.auth.gr

M. Kousis et al. (eds.), *Challenging Mobilities in and to the EU during Times of Crises*, IMISCOE Research Series, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-11574-5\_1

organisational and macro levels concerning critical economic, humanitarian and governance emergencies, and thereby contributes to the migration literature.1

The volume addresses issues related to the third ('new') emigration wave, representing a reactivation of periphery-to-core nation patterns about 50 years after it was last initiated (King, 2018; Pratsinakis Chap. 2 in this volume). The more recent exodus was a signifcant product of the severe political, economic and social impacts of the 2008 global economic crisis on Greece, a vulnerable, debt-ridden South European member state (Lapavitsas, 2019). The severity of this crisis on the country was refected in the largest received International Monetary Fund (IMF) loan in history (in relation to quota) which was generally considered as a 'rescue package for the banks, not Greece' (Galbraith, 2016, p. 5). Under such conditions, Greece experienced the highest upsurge in the at-risk-of-poverty rate, a reversal of key development trends (Della Porta & Portos, 2020), high rates of relative deprivation (84.6%) and the highest unemployment rate in 2014 (26.5%) (Grasso & Giugni, 2016). Greece is referred to as an 'extreme case' because it has the highest number of bailout agreements and the largest number of protest events, compared to all other bailout recipient countries in Europe (Altiparmakis & Lorenzini, 2020). Compared to other Southern European countries, Greece also stood out for its drastic drop in political satisfaction, its intense national protest campaign against the Troika's2 memoranda, severe austerity policies (Diani & Kousis, 2014), and the institutionalisation of new, left and right challenger parties. Such conditions had a signifcant impact on people living within its borders, whether natives or migrants (see, e.g. Arapoglou & Gounis, 2017; Dalakoglou & Agelopoulos, 2018; Triandafyllidou & Kouki, 2013; Diani & Kousis, 2014; Doxiadis & Placas, 2018; Kafetsios, 2022; Kalogeraki, 2018a; Lekakis, 2017; Panagiotopoulou et al., 2019; Papataxiarchis, 2018). Affected by these conditions, the third wave of better-educated emigrants from Greece (compared to those of previous waves) moved primarily to the global North, especially to Europe (Triandafyllidou & Gropas, 2014), given EU's freedom of movement for its member states.

In addition, this collection of original empirical and theoretical works, addresses issues concerning the so-called refugee, humanitarian, or migration governance crisis of 2015–2016, or the 'crisis of the Common European Asylum System,' when 'in each of these two years more than 1.2 million asylum seekers submitted asylum claims in the EU' (Niemann & Zaun, 2018, p. 3) the largest number, at the time, since World War II.3 The sharp peak in the number of irregular migrants from Asia and Africa in Greece, an EU country under the impact of harsh Troika Memoranda

<sup>1</sup>The contributions stem from and refect the aims and objectives of the frst international conference of the University of Crete Research Centre for the Humanities, the Social and Education Sciences (UCRC), on 'Migrations: Interdisciplinary Challenges,' which took place in Rethymno, in 2019. https://keme.uoc.gr/images/conference/2019/imi\_conf151019.pdf

<sup>2</sup> In the Eurozone crisis, Troika refers to the decision making body comprised by the European Commission, the European Central Bank and the IMF.

<sup>3</sup>Following expert scholars (Della Porta, 2018; Krzyżanowski et al., 2018; Triandafyllidou, 2018), we adopt the widely used term 'refugee crisis' or refer to it as the so called refugee crisis through-

and austerity policies, triggered a wide repertoire of reactions that reverberated through the EU, the Greek state, stakeholders, transnational actors, as well as local native and migrant communities (Brändle et al., 2019; Cinally & Trenz, 2018) – reactions that were not experienced during the previous smaller migration waves in Greece, such as those in the 1990s. During the summer and autumn of 2015 alone, approximately *one million* displaced people entered Europe from Turkey – half of them through the island of *Lesvos* (Papataxiarchis Chap.8 in this volume). Along with the displaced people, *thousands* of volunteers, activists and professionals from Non-governmental Organisations (NGOs) and International Organisations (IOs) arrived in Greece, responding to the humanitarian and governance crisis, placed especially at the borders and in the island of *Lesvos* (Paparaxiarchis Chap. 8, Parsanoglou Chap. 12, Mantanika & Arapoglou Chap. 10 in this volume). The 2015–2016 migration wave had become one of the top priorities of the European Commission, as European politicians became more alarmed, compared to the 1990s, due to the development of a 'perfect storm' that brought together societal, economic and political factors which had been largely unrelated in the past (Lucassen, 2018). Being EU's main entry point, Greece was of paramount importance, as is visible in the EU-Turkey Statement and the implementation of the hotspots policy in its islands.

The present volume centres on the impacts of the two aforementioned crises. Albeit to a lesser extent, the volume also deals with the impact of the Covid-19 pandemic on displaced people arriving in Greece since 2015 and living in bleak conditions. The pandemic impacted heavily on these groups of migrants due to their confnement in crowded reception centres, with very limited health care, as well as encompassing surveillance mechanisms to contain, track and manage them in the camps (Triandafyllidou, 2022). This crisis concurred with related gaps in the protection of migrants, the retreat of the humanitarian regime, as well as the reproduction of existing repertoires of control and remaining risks linked to harmful infrastructures of neglect in *Lesvos* and Athens (e.g. Pallister-Wilkins et al., 2021).

The effects of the three different layers of emergency contexts in Greece have been multi-dimensional and cumulative, especially in reference to the 2015–2016 wave of migrants. The 'refugee crisis' alone is considered to be a multiple crisis, e.g. in terms of the high infow of migrants and the EU political dimension (Triandafyllidou, 2018). This collection has therefore turned to more comprehensive defnitions of 'crisis' aiming to grasp the wider complexities involved and move beyond defnitions of specifc crises. According to Graf & Jarausch (2017, p. 12):

Framing a problem as a crisis regardless of its contents and origins, politicians and intellectuals try to conjure up an imminent threat, one that demands an immediate and drastic response. The designation of any given situation as a crisis creates an exceptional state of emergency that requires unusual measures.

out the text, so as to denote our recognition of the humanitarian and EU governance dimensions of the 2015–2016 crisis and not only the number of refugees involved.

These types of measures are refected in supra-state actions such as the Troika's Memoranda and austerity policies (Kousis et al., 2020), EU measures controlling the arrival of displaced people through hotspots at EU external borders, sharing responsibility (via relocation and resettlement), and controlling irregular migration through border measures, the EU-Turkey Statement and Covid-19 related EU regulations (Niemann & Zaun, 2018).

Taking into account the multiple, complex and interlinked dimensions of crises related to the case of Greece, within a global context, we adopt the more open-ended approach by Carastathis et al. (2018, p. 33), whereby:

… crisis (from the Greek word *κρίση* [krisi]) suggests that in addition to the frst sense of temporal interruption of a condition of normality, 'crisis' also refers to the critical act of judgment and thinking, which indicates a space of meaningful self-refection. Following this logic, crisis can be seen as an opportunity to redefne what had seemed unquestionable and fxed.

In addition, we also view 'crisis' as a constraint, or a threat limiting positive action under conditions of urgency (Hassel & Wagner, 2016; Kousis et al., 2020). Adopting this open ended view of 'crises' the volume offers new knowledge on crises and mobilities involving Greece, EU regions and migrants from Asia and Africa, by highlighting migration-related opportunities and constraints created in the past decade at the individual, the organisational and macro-levels. Through rigorous and refned state-of-the-art examinations the volume contributes new knowledge on how international crises have affected local and national contexts as well as the lived experiences of migrants and host communities.

Although an increasing number of crisis-related works was produced, collective works on the economic crisis in Greece (e.g. Doxiadis & Placas, 2018; Kalogeraki, 2018a; Triandafyllidou & Kouki, 2013) have rarely addressed migration issues (as e.g. Labrianidis, 2011). Furthermore, collective works on the 'refugee crisis' or new emigrants in Greece are very limited. They adopt either a single-disciplinary, or a policy perspective (e.g. Dalakoglou & Agelopoulos, 2018; Damanakis et al., 2014; Frangiskou et al., 2020); others cover a broader period and range of issues concerning migration and refugees (Papageorgiou & Sourlas, 2019). Other than collective volumes, most crisis-related works on Greece have appeared in the form of individual articles or chapters examining specifc issues (e.g. Carastathis et al., 2018; Cavounidis, 2018; Giannakopoulos & Anagnostopoulos, 2016; Kafe et al., 2018; Kalogeraki, 2018b; Kontogianni et al., 2019; Michail & Christou, 2016; Missiou, 2019; Papadopoulos, 2019; Papataxiarchis, 2018; Triandafyllidou, 2014).

Subsequently, this volume aims to provide a comprehensive multidisciplinary perspective on challenging mobilities arising during the 2009–2021 period and to continue the scholarship carried out on Greece and migration in the previous decade (i.e. Kolovos, 2011; Robolis, 2007; Triandafyllidou & Maroukis, 2010; Varouxi et al., 2010). Recognising the diverse theoretical perspectives in the feld as well as the related inter-disciplinary challenges (Anthias, 2012; Castles, 2010), the volume engages contributors from Sociology, Anthropology, Political Science, Education, Philosophy, Sociolinguistics, Health Sciences, Law, Geography and Mathematics. Authors with mobility-oriented perspectives examine issues related to the new emigration from Greece, as well as those related to refugee and migrant governance, while authors adopting a migration approach analyse host perceptions, claimsmaking, solidarity and integration issues.

Centring on fve key areas highlighted for their importance by its contributions, the collection at hand provides fresh and critical analyses and new knowledge on the interplay of crises with migration processes involving supra-state, state and nonstate actors as well as citizens and migrants/displaced people, for the case of Greece. The fve areas cover challenging mobility issues on, (i) crisis-driven emigration, (ii) crises-affected host attitudes, (iii) solidarity and claims-making under crises, (iv) mobility reception transitions in times of crises, and (v) perennial integration challenges.

Following the above introduction, the next Sect. 1.2 situates the contributions of the volume in reference to the existing migration literature across the fve key areas and identifes related gaps. The applied multidisciplinary approach on the single country case of Greece is presented in Sect. 1.3 and the related contributions are highlighted by key area. New knowledge and fresh insights into challenging mobility issues are offered in Sect. 1.4, centring on crisis-related opportunities and threats affecting transnationalism, collective action, migrants' political agency, governance and reception practices, secondary migration, and other aspects, based on an 'exceptional' South European periphery case. A very useful short overview to the volume follows in Sect. 1.5.

#### **1.2 Crises and Migration Related Works on Greece: Situating the Contributions of the Volume**

The ways that the crises of the past decade have impacted migration-related issues has been examined in reference to emigration from South European countries, to EU policies on the 'refugee crisis' as well as to the broader migration context in Greece. Below we present related works which are, in varying degrees, related to Greece as a case at hand, and identify *lacunae* associated with fve key areas that have received less attention and are therefore highlighted as areas in need of fresh and critical analyses by the contributors of the volume; the frst two areas relate more to the economic crisis, the remaining three are linked more directly to the 'refugee crisis.' These focus on crisis-related *emigration, host attitudes, solidarity and claims-making, reception transitions and integration challenges.*

Even though recent works offer comprehensive insights on the *new emigration during the economic crisis period* from southern to northern EU countries, or more developed regions around the world, analogous work on Greece is limited. The former focus on emigration of younger and better educated citizens leaving the countries of the old periphery of the European Union (including Greece) to seek a brighter future in more developed regions (e.g. Giousmpasoglou et al., 2016; King, 2018; Lafeur & Stanek, 2017). The latter, more limited works, usually centre on the exodus of more educated Greek youth moving to northern destinations (e.g. Giousmpasoglou et al., 2016; Giousmpasoglou & Marinakou, 2017; Labrianidis, 2011; Pratsinakis et al., 2017); they mainly focus on related policies and conditions in Greece, as well as on the profle of the emigrants themselves. Similarly limited are works on family and education issues under the third wave (e.g. Damanakis et al., 2014; Panagiotopoulou et al., 2019).

Part I of the volume offers Chaps. 2, 3 and 4 with fresh empirical fndings to the above literature on major features of the third emigration wave from Greece, especially in terms of the emigrants' motivations and aspirations (Pratsinakis Chap. 2), the attitudes of professional Greek PhD recipients towards potential engagement with their home country and related policies (Labrianidis & Karampekios Chap. 3), as well as the views and experiences of teaching staff in 'non-mixed' Greek schools in Germany with students from new-emigrant working-class families (Chatzidaki Chap 4).

Albeit limited, works based on national survey data concerning *host attitudes towards migrants* in Greece reveal that the economic crisis has led to an upsurge of intolerance towards migrants, primarily based on economic perceptions of threat (Kalogeraki, 2015). Subsequent national surveys show that the majority of Greeks believe that the impacts of immigration are negative, given the country's limited resources (e.g. Dixon et al., 2019).

Chapters 5 and 6 of Part II further contribute in this area with fresh evidence on host attitudes refecting the impact of the two crises. Kalogeraki (Chap. 5) focuses on Greeks' attitudes specifcally towards Syrian refugees, analysing national survey data on real and symbolic/cultural factors infuencing indigenous attitudes. In addition, analysing comparative survey data on Greeks and Hungarians, Fokas et al. (Chap. 6) offer novel fndings on national stereotypes, cognitive maps and social distance in reference to 'Others.'

The remaining three areas covered by the volume centre on the ways the 'refugee crisis' has affected collective action and governance in Greece. As regards *solidarity, protests and claims making* in the public sphere since 2015, although these have been addressed by scholars to varying degrees, specifc scholarship on Greece is limited (e.g. Afouxenidis et al., 2017; Andretta & Pavan, 2018; Kanellopoulos et al., 2021; Oikonomakis, 2018; Tsavdaroglou et al., 2019). Most works have typically dealt with the solidarity movement, protests and the 'refugee crisis' in European countries and cities, including, but not focusing on Greece (e.g. Agustín & Jørgensen, 2018; Della Porta, 2018; Lahusen et al., 2021), depicting new ways in which solidarity has been affected by the European 'refugee crisis.' Work has also examined the politicisation and the mediatisation of the 'refugee crisis' in Europe, but not on Greece (see e.g. Krzyżanowski et al., 2018; Triandafyllidou, 2018).

New insights on the above issues are offered in Chaps. 7, 8 and 9 of Part III on the complexities of contested solidarities in the public sphere, by thoroughly examining public claims making, the cycle of solidarity and the way protests by migrants themselves constitute claims towards cosmopolitan citizenship. Paschou et al. (Chap. 7) provide a systematic examination of the public political discourse in mainstream media on the 'refugee crisis' in Greece between August 2015 and April 2016. Papataxiarchis' (Chap. 8) ethnographic account on the island of *Lesvos* documents the rise and fall of the 'solidarity to refugees' movement between 2015 and 2018. Koukouzelis (Chap. 9) highlights the importance of cosmopolitan citizenship and centres his analysis on migrants' agency in the *Idomeni* protests.

*Transitions in mobility governance* since 2015, have previously been investigated in terms of EU refugee policies and politics (e.g. Niemann & Zaun, 2018; Sansus et al., 2020), intra EU mobility and international migration (Trenz & Triandafyllidou, 2017), or its spatial (multi-level) dimension since the Lisbon treaty (Panizzon & van Riemsdijk, 2019), with comparatively few references to Greece. Related works centring exclusively on Greece are limited and examine the ways in which EU policies and measures have impacted on the reception of migrants at EU's south-eastern external borders (e.g. Bartolini et al., 2020; Hatziprokopiou et al., 2021; Rozakou, 2017).

Chapters 10, 11 and 12 in Part IV contribute with new fndings on the transitions in the governance of reception in Greece, especially since 2015–2016, following the EU-Turkey Statement. Mantanika and Arapoglou (Chap. 10) analyse the 'secondary' system of reception, established in-between the frst reception and the longerterm plans for integration. Dimitriadi (Chap. 11) examines the bleak circumstances migrants experienced when reaching Greece, marked by strandedness and absence of information and divergent practices between those who were maritime and land border documented. Parsanoglou (Chap. 12) examines governance and sovereignty issues of the 'refugee crisis' and their theoretical and political implications, based on an empirical investigation for the case of Greece.

The *new integration and migration governance* challenges introduced since the 'refugee crisis' of 2015–2016 has been addressed in recent works with relatively few references to Greece (e.g. Duszczyk et al., 2020; Gregurović & Župarić-Iljić, 2018). Recent works on Greece remain limited in covering the complexities of the issues in relation to the crises; they address policy related issues, including those concerning basic needs and work (Afouxenidis et al., 2017; Bagavos & Kourachanis, 2021; Frangiskou et al., 2020; Manou et al., 2021; Papatzani et al., 2022). Chapters 13, 14 and 15 of Part V add to the above literature with fresh perspectives on the perennial integration challenges Greece was faced with during a period of consecutive crises, including the pandemic of Covid-19. Tramountanis (Chap. 13) critically evaluates the evolution of integration policies in Greece, whereas Stratigaki (Chap. 14) offers an in-depth account of migration governance challenges posed for the metropolitan case of Athens, during challenging times with multiple constraints. The Covid-19 pandemic crisis has had a signifcant impact on Greece, topping up two previous signifcant crises within a decade. Of special importance, the chapter by Petelos et al. (Chap. 15) critically investigates the challenges posed by the Covid-19 crisis on refugees and displaced people since the 'refugee crisis' in Greece. Offering new analyses from current research and an interdisciplinary perspective, the authors highlight that Greece lags behind when it comes to the integration of public health and primary care policies, a context that impacts signifcantly on migrant populations within the country.

#### **1.3 A Multidisciplinary Approach on a Single Country Case: Levels of Analysis and Migration During Crises**

During the last decade, the study of issues involving migration and crises fostered diverse methodological approaches and tools to delve into the complexities brought by transitionary processes impacting on mobile lives. For instance, works covering this period highlight the importance of a 'necessarily multi-disciplinary' approach on irregular status migrants in Europe (Triandafyllidou & Spenser, 2020, p. 2), or on the fourth wave of Portuguese migration (Pereira & Azevedo, 2019). There remains however the need for more multi-disciplinary works particularly by examining the connections between the micro, meso and macro levels of analysis, with the different methodological approaches and tools each discipline offers; this approach also involves case studies that require the command of local language and locally lived experiences (Mbaye, 2019; Skeldon, 2019; Thiollet, 2019).4

The volume embraces contributions offering analyses based on different disciplinary and methodological approaches from social sciences, humanities, law, health sciences, and mathematics, thereby facilitating the incorporation of both macro and micro level analyses (Mbaye, 2019) and the identifcation of connections between those levels of analysis (Skeldon, 2019). Using predominantly Greek sources and material (e.g. newspapers, legal and policy documents), the authors bring together fresh and rich evidence produced via a wide variety of methodological approaches ranging from philosophical analysis and ethnographic feldwork, to participant observation, qualitative in-depth and semi-structured interviews, mixed methods, policy analysis, political claims analysis, desk research, as well as quantitative online surveys. Through these approaches, the contributors examine the depth and breadth of the complexities and entanglements of mobility related issues during an intensive period of crises in Greece, for each of the fve key areas covered.5 In so doing, the volume also highlights the multi-spatial aspects of the issues under study (Skeldon, 2019, Thiollet, 2019).

Following this approach, the analyses on third wave emigration issues in Chaps. 2, 3, and 4, enhance our understanding on the connections between individual and context related issues from Greece to Western countries. In his micro level social geography analysis Pratsinakis (Chap. 2) identifes three types of emigrants on the basis of 34 qualitative interviews and a web based respondents' survey. Macro-level analysis on return policies and brain drain in Greece are combined by Labrianidis and Karampekios (Chap. 3), with new micro level economic analysis of a large survey on motives of emigration and intentions to return by approximately 11,000 PhD holders. The authors address the need to develop policy initiatives creating

<sup>4</sup>Micro-level studies examine individuals and individual-level interactions, while meso-level ones centre on the study of groups and organisations and macro-level research examines the wider context (e.g. political, national, economic) (Jilke et al., 2019).

<sup>5</sup>The presentation involves not only chapters which are directly related to the fve areas, but also those that are indirectly/partly related.

'bridges' for the return-reconnect of emigrant professionals. Focused on new emigrant families and Greek schools in Germany, Chatzidaki (Chap. 4) aptly combines micro-level data from qualitative interviews with teachers and a critical exploratory account on these schools, at the meso level, to discuss macro level policies on 'Greek state schools' in Germany.

Different disciplinary approaches and levels of analysis on the attitudes of natives towards migrants (Chaps. 5, 6 and 8) offer a more nuanced view on the links between the individual and the community level which takes into account the national samples of (micro) attitudes during a specifc time point, but also the rich diachronic account of attitude shifts in a specifc community. Kalogeraki's (Chap. 5) sociological analysis at the micro level illustrates opposition attitudes of Greeks towards Syrian refugees in 2016, based on data from a large national survey. Fokas et al. (Chap. 6) sociological analysis on self-positioning, stereotypes, cognitive maps and in-group/out-group social distance uses comparative national survey data (2016 and 2017) on Greeks and Hungarians. Papataxiarchis' (Chap. 8) anthropological examination based on ethnographic research in his own anthropological village in *Lesvos*, but also the centre of the humanitarian crisis, lucidly documents the rise and fall of 'solidarity to refugees.' The complementarity of the two disciplinary perspectives contribute towards a more comprehensive and refned portrait of host views towards migrants and refugees.

Examined through philosophical, sociological and anthropological conceptual and methodological tools, collective action and political claims in the public sphere document a contested solidarity cycle since 2015, involving local, national and transnational arenas (Chaps. 6, 7, 8, and 9). Papataxiarchis' (Chap. 8) ethnographic study documents how the community's micro-macro interactions between locals, displaced people, solidarity activists and local authorities, including the 'pogrom' against 150 Afghan asylum seekers, depict a cycle of 'ephemeral solidarity.' Philosophical analysis, at the macro-level, by Koukouzelis (Chap. 9) moves beyond migrant agency claims which challenge the state's supposed 'right to exclude' and highlights the importance of cosmopolitan citizenship, based on the largest migrants' protests in the country, in *Idomeni*, targeting all involved states, on March 2016. Focused at the meso level, sociologists Paschou et al. (Chap. 7) illustrate the dynamic interplay between (meso-level) discourse-claim making and (macro) socio-political context, using a random sample of political claims on the 'refugee crisis' in Greece between August 2015 and April 2016, drawn from three national newspapers. In a different meso-level approach using press reports, Fokas et al. (Chap. 6) apply socio-semantic network analysis based on the compilation of word co-occurrences in two established Greek dailies and two Hungarian ones and investigate how media frames infuence the attitudes of Greeks and Hungarians.

Underscoring organisational and context related limitations, Chaps. 10, 11, 12 and 14, focus on the governance of refugee/migrant mobility through reception practices in the south-eastern (Greek) borders of the EU. By examining the interplay between macro-level conditions, such as the political, policy and regulatory context and the 'secondary' system of reception (meso-level), Mantanika & Arapoglou (Chap. 10) offer an in-depth account of changes in the dynamics of inclusion and the ways these interact with the development of the reception as system. Centring on bordering practices at the meso level through qualitative interviews with the migrants themselves, Dimitriadi (Chap. 11) also spotlights the bleak circumstances they face when reaching Greece. These include experiences of strandedness and divergent reception practices, depending on their entry points, period and ethnic origin. Parsanoglou (Chap. 12) combines interview fndings with macro level analysis to document the 'new geographies of control' under the EU-Turkey Statement and the hotspot system. Additionally, he examines reception practices (meso level) and the ways in which mobility was controlled internally, under the new hotspots regime, using qualitative interviews with key stakeholders and volunteers. Finally, an insider's view on urgent policy challenges is provided by social policy expert and former vice mayor of Athens, Stratigaki (Chap. 14), who focuses on meso level organisational factors and the related political, social and economic context.

In the last section, integration challenges are mostly analysed at the macro level (Chaps. 13, 14 and 15). Through the critical examination of integration related legislative and policy frameworks in Greece, Tramountanis (Chap. 13) offers a macrolevel analysis over a 30-year period traced in four phases. The analysis illustrates that integration has not been a priority for the Greek state and that de-integration characterises the crisis period. Stratigaki (Chap. 14) refers to the signifcance of these limiting contextual factors in her study of how city authorities in Athens struggled to overcome constraints and political obstacles rooted in the public sector. Challenges of integration in the Greek capital face constraints related to the lack of a coherent strategic plan and a xenophobic environment. Contextual factors on Covid-19 related migrant health policy and the institutional regulatory system at the national and supra-national levels are critically evaluated by health and legal experts mostly through macro level analysis (Petelos et al. Chap. 15). They document the impact of the macro context at the (meso) level of the refugee settlements and highlight the (macro level) obstacles to health care provision for refugees and displaced people.

#### **1.4 New Knowledge on Crises and Mobilities from the EU Periphery**

Grounded on an open-ended view of 'crisis' not only as temporal interruption, but also as opportunity (Carastathis et al., 2018) and constraint (Hassel & Wagner, 2016; Kousis et al., 2020), the volume singles out migration-related opportunities and constraints that surfaced in the 2009–2021 period in the form of transnationalism, contested solidarity, migrants' political agency, and governance, in an 'exceptional' South European periphery case, Greece. The new knowledge illuminates the dynamic interactions between crises and migration processes involving supra-state, state and non-state actors as well as citizens and migrants, or displaced people.

#### *1.4.1 Third Wave Emigration and Transnationalism from Below and Above*

The economic crisis can be seen as an opportunity of increasing *transnationalism* from above (e.g. home country policies affecting migrants), or from below such as migrant practices in relation to individuals and civil society (Tedeschi et al., 2020, p. 3 & 7). The impacts of Troika Memoranda and austerity policies in the crisis period were signifcant in intensifying and exacerbating the third (new) wave of emigration from Greece which had begun before that period, especially for highly skilled youth (Pratsinakis Chap. 2 and Labrianidis & Karampekios Chap. 3). The crisis acted as an opportunity of transnationalism from below for emigrants of different skills, education levels and ages, who largely construed it as the extra push needed to leave for better prospects and the fulflment of their aspirations in Western urban centres. The crisis allowed the lifting of social constraints on long distance mobility, creating further opportunity for these emigrants. In addition, such opportunities expanded migrants' transnational networks, while they were also facilitated by the freedom of movement within the EU (Pratsinakis Chap. 2), refecting transnationalism from above.

New emigrant families mostly from lower-SES backgrounds, moved to Germany for better economic prospects as well. This created an important opportunity for the Greek state schools in Germany, depicting transnationalism from above through home country policies. Initially established in the 1970s these 'K-12 schools' faced a drop in their numbers before the crisis, but experienced a signifcant increase in their student body in the past decade. Furthermore, the faculty/teachers of the schools perceive them as important institutions assisting new immigrant youth (of different ethnic origins) from Greece to adjust to their new environment (Chatzidaki Chap. 4).

In addition, opportunities for transnationalism-from-above after the third emigration wave have also surfaced in the form of (virtual) return policy options, such as the 'Knowledge and Partnership Bridges' initiative aiming to support the development of the country by connecting highly skilled emigrant professionals in Europe or North America with their communities of origin. The new survey fndings show that more than half of the professional emigrants themselves are also willing to offer their services, or are already offering such services from abroad, thus also refecting transnationalism from below (Labrianidis & Karampekios Chap. 3).

#### *1.4.2 A Cycle of Pro-Migrant Solidarity*

The humanitarian and governance dimensions of the 'refugee crisis' created opportunities for solidarity actions and public claims making by an unprecedented variety of grassroots, national and international groups as well as (non-state) organisations at the borders and reception centres, the local communities of the frontline, as well as the hotspots and large cities in Greece and in Germany (e.g. Kanellopoulos et al., 2021). Chapters 7, 8, 10, 12 and 14 add new knowledge based on contextualised in depth examinations at the community and national levels as well as at reception sites. A cycle of 'solidarity' that emerged to support urgent needs of Greeks confronting the negative impacts of the economic crisis since 2009 (Loukakis, 2020), was extended to support the irregular migrants in meeting daily needs. It was produced from below, in frontline Aegean communities of EU's external border in Greece during 2015, but lasted until the spring of 2016. Under the auspices of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, international and Greek NGOs as well as grassroots and informal initiatives (e.g. 'Solidarians') offered services to address the needs that the state alone was not able to, due to the massive fows of irregular migrants. A caring border was produced, which reached more than 3000 non-local volunteers and activists in *Lesvos*, during the peak of the crisis (Papataxiarchis Chap. 8).

The activists and volunteers of informal and formal Civil Society Organisations (CSOs) participating in solidarity actions formed a 'bottom-up governmentality' representing both formal charities, NGOs, or humanitarian organisations as well as 'counter-folding' grassroots and local solidarity initiatives, but also transnational action organisations (Mantanika & Arapoglou Chap. 10). They coexisted and interacted in specifc periods and spaces, from *Lesvos* to the *Piraeus* port and camps such as *Idomeni* (Parsanoglou Chap. 12). They also collaborated with Athens municipality authorities under Kaminis' centre-left (PASOK)6 governance framework involving the public sector, the private sector and civil society to provide social solidarity services and to combat xenophobic reactions (Stratigaki Chap. 14).

In the Greek public sphere CSOs were addressees of political claims making from 2015 to early 2016, a period of intense humanitarianism, with the dominant narrative being a plea for transnational and humanitarian support and just burden sharing. However, since March 2016 following the closure of the Balkan route and the EU-Turkey Statement, the public discourse expanded and diversifed. During this time, refugee groups themselves, as well as informal and formal action organisations became claimants (Paschou et al. Chap. 7). Overall their claims were more diversifed compared to the other claimants, centring on migration management, refugees' background, social consequences or problems and civic activities, with more than half being linked to noncontentious (nonprotest) actions.

Civil society groups and individual citizens were visible through their speech acts (39.2%), involvement in protest (44.8%) and direct solidarity/humanitarian aid (13.3%). When it comes to the claims of the refugees and their supporting groups, there is a prevalence of claims in confrontational actions – illegal demonstrations and self-imposed constraints – such as hunger strikes, suicides and blockades. All related claims referred to the inhumane conditions and emergency situations experienced in the refugee camps (Paschou et al. Chap. 7).

<sup>6</sup>*Panelinio Sosialistiko Kinima* (Panhellenic Socialist Movement).

#### *1.4.3 The Political Agency of Migrants Themselves and Cosmopolitan Citizenship*

There is limited scholarship on migrants and refugees *themselves* as political agents (e.g. Thiollet, 2019, p. 118; Andretta & Pavan, 20187 ). During the past decade the humanitarian and migration governance crisis of 2015–2016 formed opportunities for the creation of actions and claims by the migrants themselves in different key migration sites in Greece. Through a multidisciplinary lens, Chaps. 7, 8, 9, 10, 12 and 13 provide refned analysis on this understudied issue, with relevance beyond Greece.

At the national level, public sphere political claims by the refugees themselves and their supporting groups constituted about one tenth of all claims; they referred to the inhumane circumstances and emergency situations the migrants experienced in the refugee camps. They increased especially since January 2016, but climaxed in the spring of 2016 (as most claims in Greece did), given salient developments of the period, including the closing of the Balkan route, the refugees' protests in *Idomeni* and the EU-Turkey Statement. These claims were more often expressed through confrontational protest actions, including illegal demonstrations, selfimposed constraints, such as hunger strikes, suicides as well as blockades (Paschou et al. Chap. 7).

The hotspots policy and the EU-Turkey Statement which posed severe limitations on asylum-seeker transit, during the SYRIZA8 -ANEL9 coalition government (2015–2019), shaped opportunities for two notable cases of contentious actions by the migrants themselves, those of *Idomeni* in 2016, when the Balkan route closed and those of *Sappho* Square in *Lesvos* by asylum seekers from the *Moria* hotspot, in 2018 (Chaps. 7, 8, 9, 10, and 12).

When the EU-Turkey Statement left 46,000 migrants trapped in Greece, in urgent need for food, medical help and shelter, migrants of different nationalities united in intense protests from March to May 2016, including the 'March of Hope,' blockades of highway and railroads, as well as acts of self-harm. Refusing to be represented by nonmigrant NGOs or supporting-Greek citizens, they demanded the ban of border crossing for migrants and targeted all responsible EU and state actors. Illustrating 'cosmopolitanism from below' the case of migrant protests in *Idomeni* calls for cosmopolitan citizenship, a matter of justice and urgent importance, following Arendt (Koukouzelis Chap. 9).

A peaceful occupation that lasted almost one week in April 2018, by about 150 Afghan men, women and children asylum seekers from the *Moria* hotspot ended in a 'pogrom' when a group of approximately 200 right-wing extremists and hooligans

<sup>7</sup>Based on media mentions from Google News, about half of the protest events in Italy, Greece and Spain were carried out by the refugees themselves, spontaneously, against border controls blocking their way to other countries (Andretta & Pavan, 2018).

<sup>8</sup> *Sinaspismos Rizospastikis Aristeras* (Coalition of the Radical Left).

<sup>9</sup>*Anexartiti Elines* (Independent Greeks).

violently attacked the Afghan squatters (Papataxiarchis Chap. 8). The occupation of the migrants themselves was part of a series of protests since March 2016, with claims related to inadequate health services, bad living conditions and movement restrictions.

The volume therefore highlights the salience of public discourse and protests by migrants themselves at the external EU border in Greece. Through a multidisciplinary view, it points to the importance of transnational claims on citizenship and migrants' empowerment as well as to the signifcance of migrants' autonomous political participation in the public sphere. It thereby contributes to related debates (e.g. Cohen & Van Hear, 2019; Della Porta, 2018) as migrant emergency fows continue even more drastically in 2022, with war refugees from Ukraine.

#### *1.4.4 Crises' Driven Host Attitudes and Xenophobic Acts*

Even though the economic crisis led to opportunities for Greek emigrants, it simultaneously fuelled already existing anti-immigrant rhetoric and led to a nationalist intolerance (Triandafyllidou & Kouki, 2014). When combined with the 'refugee crisis' it led to restraining attitudes, actions and policies (Chaps. 5, 6, and 8). The dual crisis heightened negative attitudes by parts of the native population towards the new migrants and increased xenophobic actions by ultra-right and more conservative groups. Such negative actions are illustrated in the anti-immigrant protests that occurred in crises-stricken Greece (2007–2016), especially under Golden Dawn (GD)10; they were nevertheless strongly correlated with antifascist mobilisations,11 which affected their development (Ellinas, 2020). These refect 'contentious solidarity' actions, especially visible since the global fnancial crisis (Della Porta & Steinhilper, 2021).

New, national level evidence shows that the two crises triggered socioeconomic concerns and symbolic threats in Greece which, in turn, activated considerable opposition towards Syrian refugees: seven out of ten Greek respondents had a negative stance, as Kalogeraki (Chap. 5) illustrates. She also fnds that being more likely to compete with them in the labour market, respondents with lower income, educational level and occupational class were more likely to strongly oppose Syrian refugees; different cultural characteristics of these refugees (such as religion) form an additional perceived threat. A similar, signifcant crisis-driven impact in the form of threats is documented in the bi-national survey on representations of 'Others' in Greece and Hungary. The fndings by Fokas et al. (Chap. 6) on national stereotypes,

<sup>10</sup>Golden Dawn, one of the most extreme right-wing political parties in Europe, that used violent tactics and extremist ideology (Ellinas, 2020) succeeded in entering Parliament during the crisis period (5/2012 to 6/2019).

<sup>11</sup>Between 2007 and 2016, 2,966 antifascist events (reported in the Indymedia news portal) were organised in Greece, versus 1,249 GD activities (reported in the GD party newspaper) (Ellinas, 2020, pp. 178 & 179).

cognitive maps and in-group/out-group social distance illustrate the representation of 'Others' as a source of threat, in both countries. Complementing and supporting these fndings, their comparative media analyses of Greek and Hungarian mainstream press showed substantial shifts between pre- and post-crisis patterns. Both of their analyses reveal a polarised rearrangement of the imageries of 'Others' in the Greek as well as in the Hungarian national contexts.

At the frontline of the 'refugee crisis', in *Mytilene*, the impact of the two crises is especially visible after March 2016, in the form of perceived threats, hostile attitudes and acts against refugees by groups of xenophobic locals. As Papataxiarchis (Chap. 8) documents, these marked the fall of 'refugee solidarity' patriotism, leading to increased xenophobic actions, especially visible in the 'pogrom' of mass violence against Afghan asylum seekers who occupied the town's central square with claims related to being restricted on the island and to the bad living and health care conditions at the hotspot. Police-pressed charges against instigators of the attack are still under judicial investigation in the most serious incidence of xenophobic violence on the island, and one of the most serious in Greece. These mark a shift towards xenophobic intolerance and violence while pointing to the rise in intolerance and violent acts against migrants' political autonomous agency 2 years after the 'refugee crisis.'

#### *1.4.5 Crisis-Steered EU Migration Governance: Multiple and Increasing Constraints for Migrants, Reception Infrastructures and National Policy*

EU's reaction to the migration governance crisis through the 'hotspot' approach, the EU-Turkey Statement, the Law on Asylum (4375/2016) and related measures was drastic, and highly penetrating in the case of Greece, leaving it with a higher share of responsibility and creating numerous constraints related to migration issues (Chaps. 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, and 15). A viable restructuring of responsibility across member states did not occur, while securitisation and externalisation of responsibilities by the EU now dominate human rights and refugee protection considerations (Niemann & Blöser, 2021). The chapters above contribute with new knowledge on how these impacts of the EU's response were experienced more as constraints at the individual migrant level, at the infrastructural organisational level, as well as at the national policy level.

The governance of migration in Greece included containment practices, geographical dispersal, deterrence policies and redirection of migrant journeys. Dimitriadi's (Chap. 11) analysis sheds new light on the complexity of migrants' decisions on further mobilities, as well as on their insecurity and marginalisation by documenting how encounters between migrants and border actors from 2016 to 2018 were often more crucial than the border crossing itself in shaping migrants' lives – leading to containment, dispersal, or onward movement. She shows how

inclusion or exclusion from critical services (e.g. asylum and accommodation) was produced through the construction of administrative and legal barriers under reception conditions and how migrants' experiences both at the border crossing itself and with the border agent were infuenced by entry point, nationality, gender, family status and time of arrival in Greece.

EU policies from 2015 to 2019 were signifcant obstacles for inclusive practices performed by international humanitarian organisations and grassroots solidarity initiatives in Greece. They led to the shaping of reception into a more complex infrastructure, with funding being outsourced to supranational and non-state institutions, according to Mantanika & Arapoglou (Chap. 10). Through a Foucaultian analysis, they illustrate the production of precarity – concerning the duration of provisions and the form of settlement – through governmentalities of inclusion in spaces of reception. In addition, they document governance transitions in the 'refugee crisis' by tracing how informal practices of screening and sorting migrants and refugees became established policies and how precarious settlement now has more permanent characteristics.

The new governance regime of the EU-Turkey Statement and the hotspot system, not only shifted outwards, but also created internal buffer zones within EU spaces, especially within Greece and more specifcally within spaces of detention and processing, in particular islands, as Parsanoglou (Chap. 12) shows. He emphasises how state sovereignty was repositioned in the management of migration through the active involvement of non-governmental organisations, international organisations and EU agencies.

The 2016–2020 period was marked by infrastructural changes, especially on containment and deterrence issues –differing from the 2009 to 2015 period of 'disintegration of immigrants' in Greek state policies– based on Tramountanis' analysis (Chap. 13). These changes included the establishment of the Ministry of Migration Policy in 2016, under the SYRIZA-ANEL government. In 2019, under the *New Democracy* government, the Ministry of Migration Policy was merged with the Ministry of Citizen Protection. He highlights the impacts of the economic crisis as well as the 'refugee crisis' and related EU policies on Greek state policies, as most state measures hinder the integration prospects of migrant populations, by concentrating in the management of migrant fows, the control of borders, police checks, or illegal immigrants and in streamlining the process of issuing permits for residence and work. The state sponsored HELIOS programme (Hellenic Integration Support for Benefciaries of International Protection) forms an exception to these.

The lack of a coherent national strategy pressured the Municipality of Athens to adopt innovative strategies, especially since late 2014 when it witnessed the arrival of large numbers of refugees and migrants from the Aegean islands, most of whom were 'transit' asylum seekers, according to Stratigaki's analysis (Chap. 14). She emphasises the need for durable state reforms and policies and a National Strategic Plan for the successful social integration of refugees. Simultaneously she shows how under harsh political and economic conditions, changing legal frameworks, bureaucratic barriers and xenophobic reactions, the administration of the city of Athens was able to develop goods-and-services provision policies to respond to migrants' needs.

In reference to the Covid-19 crisis, the critical examination by Petelos et al. (Chap. 15) highlights the pervasive effects of the continuation of pre-existing problems, the lack of a cohesive approach to risk communication and the absence of an effective triage system in the immigrant camps. More importantly, their interdisciplinary analysis points to the need for human rights solidarity, for a comprehensive Common European Asylum system, and for a comprehensive Global Health Policy towards the protection of refugees as well as non-displaced people. Such policies, which they recommend, encompass global health security considerations and ensure that the implementation of programmes is both feasible and context relevant.

#### **1.5 Closing Note**

With its undivided attention to critical junctures of crises and migration, the collection at hand can serve as a unique comprehensive resource for students and scholars in social sciences and humanities, in health and legal sciences, as well as for policymakers, working on migration-related issues within and beyond Europe. On the one hand, the volume contributes to migration scholarship by pointing to the advantages of the multi-disciplinary single-country approach offering complementary analyses at the individual, organisational and macro levels. On the other hand, the contributions feature the ways in which the economic crisis, the 'refugee crisis' and to a lesser extent the Covid-19 pandemic, led to opportunities as well as constraints that have greatly affected migration related processes in an EU country. As curators of this volume, we strongly hope that this collection of diverse analyses on a decade of consecutive crises in a single European country can instigate further deliberating on migration and crisis, in terms of host receptivity, solidarity and governance issues, as these are refected in mass migration emergencies, such as in the case of refugees entering the EU due the war in Ukraine.

**Acknowledgments** This chapter refects contributions of the volume that derive from selected presentations on Greece at UCRC's frst international conference on 'Migrations: Interdisciplinary Perspectives' carried out in Rethymno, in October 2019. The conference was co-organised by UCRC and its main funder, the Regional Unit of Rethymnon of the Region of Crete, with the support of the Municipality of Rethymnon. Conference sponsors also included Rethymno Mare Hotels, Emmanuel Kugiumutzis, President of the World Council of Cretans, Cultural Crete USA, and the General Secretariat for Research and Development. We gratefully acknowledge their support, as well as that of the University of Crete Special Account for Research Funds. We deeply thank each of the authors for their dedication and hard work in the long process of preparing their chapters, as well as the two anonymous reviewers for their very constructive comments.

#### **References**


**Maria Kousis** (PhD, The University of Michigan, 1984) is Professor of Sociology and former Director of the University of Crete Research Centre for the Humanities, the Social and Education Sciences (UCRC) (9/2014-11/2021). She was coordinator or partner in European Commission projects including Grassroots Environmental Action, TEA, PAGANINI and MEDVOICES. Her publications consist of 16 edited volumes, books, or special issues, 43 journal articles and 39 book chapters. Recent publications include, *Transnational Solidarity in Times of Crises: Citizen Organisations and Collective Learning in Europe*, focused on the felds of migration, disability and unemployment (Eds. C. Lahusen, U. Zschache and M. Kousis, Palgrave, 2021) and *Transnational Solidarity Organisations in Times of Crises – Comparative European Perspectives* (Eds. M. Kousis and C. Lahusen, special section of *Sociological Research Online*, 2021). Her research centres on Social Change, Contentious Politics, Crisis and Society, Environmental Politics, Bioethics and Southern Europe. Recent work focuses on the socio-economic and political dimensions of hard times, especially in the context of the research projects 'The Greeks, the Germans and the Crisis' (GGCRISI, Greek-German Ministries Cooperation), 'Living with Hard Times: How European Citizens Deal with Economic Crises and Their Social and Political Consequences' (LIVEWHAT, EC, FP7), 'European Paths to Transnational Solidarity in Times of Crisis' (TransSOL, EC, Horizon 2020), EURYKA (EC, Horizon 2020) as well as 'Social and Solidarity Economy, Urban Communities and the Protection of Vulnerable Groups' (Swiss Network for International Studies).

**Aspasia Chatzidaki** holds a BA in Greek Philology (University of Thessaloniki, Greece), an MA in Theoretical Linguistics (University of Reading, UK), and a PhD in Sociolinguistics (Vrije Universiteit Brussels, Belgium). She is Professor at the Department of Primary Education of the University of Crete and Director of the Centre for Intercultural and Migration Studies of the same Department. In addition, she served as member of the UCRC Board on two separate occasions (7/2012-8/2014, 9/2016-11/2021). Her research interests include the study of sociolinguistic and educational aspects of bilingualism as well as Greek as a second language both in Greece and in diasporic communities. In the past twenty years she has taken part in numerous educational intervention programmes and teacher capacity-building seminars regarding the education of immigrant and refugee students. She is the author of a book (*Teaching Bilingual Students; Theoretical Issues and Educational Approaches* Athens, Pedio, 2020) and co-editor of a book on educational aspects of 'new migration' from Greece (Eds. Panagiotopoulou, A., Rosen, L., Kirsch, C. & Chatzidaki, *A. New' Migration of Families from Greece to Europe and Canada –A 'New' Challenge for Education?* Springer Verlag, 2019) and another one on refugee education (Chatzidaki, A. & Tsokalidou, P. *Challenges and Initiatives in Refugee Education: The Case of Greece.* Cambridge Scholars Publishing, 2020). Her recent research focuses on the reconceptualisation of Greeklanguage education abroad in the light of recent migration from Greece.

**Konstantinos Kafetsios** (PhD, Lancaster University) is a Professor in Social Psychology at Aristotle University in Thessaloniki and visiting Professor in Social and Organisational Psychology at Palacký University in the Czech Republic. He has held research and teaching positions at the University of Cambridge School of Social and Political Sciences, the Department of Psychology at Anglia Ruskin University, and the Department of Psychology at the University of Crete, where he was also a member of the board of the University of Crete Research Center for the Humanities, the Social and Education Sciences (UCRC) (9/2016-9/2019). Research in his lab addresses emotional and social interaction phenomena across cultural and social-organisational contexts. This research has received research funding from the European Commission, EEA, the Hellenic Foundation for Research and Innovation, GACR, and the General Secretariat for Research and Innovation. He currently serves as an Associate Editor for the Journal of Experimental Social Psychology and the European Journal of Social Psychology while on the editorial board of several international journals and as a reviewer for international funding agencies in the social and behavioral sciences.

**Open Access** This chapter is licensed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits use, sharing, adaptation, distribution and reproduction in any medium or format, as long as you give appropriate credit to the original author(s) and the source, provide a link to the Creative Commons license and indicate if changes were made.

The images or other third party material in this chapter are included in the chapter's Creative Commons license, unless indicated otherwise in a credit line to the material. If material is not included in the chapter's Creative Commons license and your intended use is not permitted by statutory regulation or exceeds the permitted use, you will need to obtain permission directly from the copyright holder.

## **Part Ι A Crisis Driven Third Wave of Greek Emigration**

## **Chapter 2 Greece's Emigration During the Crisis Beyond the Brain Drain**

**Manolis Pratsinakis**

#### **2.1 Introduction**

People's capacities in relation to the surrounding physical, social and political possibilities for movement are unevenly distributed across class, gender, ethnicity and age lines (Kaufmann et al., 2004). And when it comes to international migration, they are largely determined by the legal structures regulating who can and cannot move. In his aspiration/ability model, Carling (2002) analytically distinguishes between migration as a potential course of action and the realisation of actual mobility. Concretely, when people develop an aspiration to leave, the outcome depends on their capacity to convert this desire into reality depending on context-specifc barriers and constraints, which each potential migrant is differently equipped to overcome. According to Carling, the most consequential barriers to migration are often restrictive national immigration policies.

Seen through this light, legally unconstrained migration in the European Union (EU) makes for an exceptional mobility system. The process of European integration has constructed a supranational area within the borders of which the power of nation-states to control individuals' choices of travel and settlement has been curbed (Recchi, 2015). As a result, European citizens aspiring to migrate have increased capabilities to do so. Free movement within the EU thus makes migration an easier mobility strategy to pursue, reducing its economic and psychological costs, and accounts for a radically different context within which to assess how migration decisions are taken and practiced.

Harokopio University, Athens, Greece

University of Oxford, Oxford, UK e-mail: m.pratsinakis@hua.gr

© The Author(s) 2022 M. Kousis et al. (eds.), *Challenging Mobilities in and to the EU during Times of Crises*, IMISCOE Research Series, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-11574-5\_2

27

M. Pratsinakis (\*)

The right to free movement, employment and settlement across the European Union was established for Greek citizens in 1988. However, it did not lead to a signifcant increase of outmigration from the country. In its own right, freedom of movement did not seem to provide incentives for mobility and until recently, Greeks were among the least mobile Europeans (see Pratsinakis et al., 2020). This changed drastically after the eruption of Greece's economic crisis in 2009, the impact of which remains substantial on the Greek society and economy, more than a decade later. This crisis, which was one of the worst to hit a western nation during peacetime since the 1929 economic crash, led to the decline of the country's Gross Domestic Product (GDP) by more than a quarter and the escalation of public debt that reached 186% of GDP at the end of the adjustment and austerity programmes. The austerity measures implemented resulted in soaring unemployment rates, decreased income and in the absence of an effective safety net, led to impoverishment for a signifcant part of the Greek population. The combined effects of recession, austerity and a generalised mistrust towards institutions and disillusionment from the political system altered mobility intentions and practices in Greece and compelled a large number of Greeks to exercise their right to free mobility. According to Eurostat data more than 500,000 Greek citizens left the country since 2010, the vast majority of whom for countries within the EU, making Greece one of the countries with the highest emigration rates in EU.

This resurgence of large-scale emigration from Greece, effectively marking Greece's third major wave of outmigration, has received extensive media coverage and has fgured prominently in political debates in Greece. In a rather politicised public discourse, emigration has been presented as an one-way option for certain population segments, notably the young and the highly skilled, and hence a drain of the most dynamic part of the country's labour force (Pratsinakis et al., 2017a). This focus on the highly educated led to a misleading equation of outmigration during the period of the crisis with the phenomenon of brain drain. The term itself has often been applied indiscriminately to all people leaving, regardless of their qualifcation and occupation, while the emigration of older people and people with less educational attainments has generally been neglected. Εmigration from Greece in the years of the crisis became almost synonymous to brain drain in the public debate in Greece.

Accounting for the experiences of wider educational groups and focusing on Germany as a destination country, Damanakis (2013) termed the re-emergence of large-scale emigration as Greece's new emigration or 'neo-migration,' shifting attention away from the brain drain phenomenon. He employed this term not solely in a descriptive manner, but rather to demarcate a new phase in Greece's migration history and to highlight its difference from the country's previous waves of outmigration, primarily that which took place in the context of the so-called guestworker's migration to Western Europe. The term 'new migration' has been adopted in several subsequent publications which similarly look beyond the brain drain phenomenon (Chap. 4 in Chatzidaki, this volume; Georgalou, 2021; Groutsis et al., 2020; Panagiotopoulou et al., 2019) and has been also occasionally picked up by the

media. Others, stressing on the crisis context (Pratsinakis, 2019a, 2017a) opted for the term 'crisis-driven migration' instead.

How can we appraise and best describe the re-emergence of large-scale emigration from Greece in hindsight, more than ten years since the eruption of the Greek economic crisis? How can we understand its socio-demographic composition and what type of changes did the crisis bring in migrants' aspirations and trajectories. Finally what can be said to be 'new' about the post-2009 economic crisis outfow when compared to migrations preceding the crisis? Drawing on secondary sources as well as qualitative and quantitative data collected in the context of the EU funded Marie Curie EUMIGRE,1 this chapter aims to challenge a number of conventional assumptions underlying the way the new Greek outmigration is commonly presented and to critically assess the main labels used to describe it namely, brain drain, new migration and crisis-driven migration. It further highlights the signifcance of the prolonged economic crisis in Greece and the freedom of movement within the EU in shaping the characteristics of the outfow and the experiences and motivations of the migrants. It also discusses their role in altering everyday discourse on emigration and loosening up social constraints towards long distance mobility.

#### **2.2 Methodology**

The chapter is based on a combination of qualitative and quantitative data conducted in the context of the EUMIGRE project, which aimed to assess the new Greek emigration through a mixed methods approach research design. It primarily draws on 34 in-depth interviews with Greek migrants in London and Amsterdam, two major destinations of the new Greek emigration. The interviews were conducted between 2016 and 2017 with migrants of different age groups, with the majority falling in the 25–35 age group, and were approximately equally split between men and women and between higher and lower educated people. Twentytwo of the interviews were conducted with migrants in Greater London and 12 in Amsterdam. The main themes of the interview were reasons for migration, experiences of work and life in the United Kingdom and the Netherland and plans for the future. The average interview time was one hour and a half and all interviews were recorded. After the initial interview, I had the chance to meet again with several interviewees and chat further with them on their experiences, views and plans. Interviewees were accessed via personal networks and snowballing, as well as through community organisations. In Amsterdam, further data were collected through participant observation in the Greek community organisation *Neoafhthendes*, which provides information and support to newcomers in the Netherlands and in

<sup>1</sup>More information for the project 'New European Mobilities at times of Crisis: Emigration Aspirations and Practices of Young Greek Adults' (EUMIGRE) can be found at https://cordis. europa.eu/project/id/658694/reporting

which I offered voluntary work from November 2015 until May 2017. Pseudonyms are used to maintain participants' anonymity.

Secondarily, the paper draws from a survey (EUMIGRE survey) which was conducted in Greater London and the Netherlands from January to June 2017, generating a dataset comprising 996 respondents in total. The survey was conducted through a combination of sampling methodologies, namely a web-based Respondent-Driven Sampling (RDS) and opt-in online survey sampling. Seven of the interviewees, as well as 197 survey respondents, had emigrated before 2010 allowing for comparisons of migration before and after the crisis. Both the survey and the interviews were carried out in the context of the EUMIGRE project.

#### **2.3 What is New About the 'New Greek Emigration'?**

Greece had experienced two major waves of outmigration before the recent one that followed the 2009 economic crisis. The frst one started in late nineteenth century until the mid-1920 and was driven by war and concurrent economic crises in Greece and shaped by economic opportunity in the United States. The second one took place in the postwar era up until the mid-1970s. In this period, more than one million Greeks left their country to fll the gaps in the booming industrial sectors in Western Europe in the context of the so-called guest-workers programmes, or moved to more far away destinations such as Australia, USA and Canada.

By the mid-1970s, net migration rates had turned positive largely due to return migration especially from European destinations. It is around the same period when the recruitment of foreign labour was frst registered, and by the early 1990s, Greece became a de facto destination for international migrants. Greece's emergence as an immigration destination was originally linked to the breakdown of the Soviet Union and the demise of 'actually existing socialism' in Eastern Europe. The bulk of immigration fows in the 1990s concerned two major waves: on the one hand, migration from neighbouring Balkan countries, chiefy from Albania and on the other, migration of ethnic Greek origin, primarily from former Soviet republics.

In the same period, even though limited, emigration had not ceased completely. It was more frequent among specifc groups: emigrants of the post-war waves and their offspring moving between Greece and European destinations, and Muslims from the minority of Thrace or the (then recently settled) diaspora Greeks from the former Soviet Union spending spells of employment in Germany or Turkey (Pratsinakis et al., 2017b). In parallel, there has been a continuous outfow of professionals that started becoming prominent in the 1990s (see Chap. 3 in Labrianidis & Karampekios, this volume). Structural weaknesses of the Greek economy and long-standing pathologies such as nepotism and clientelism entailed that the substantial opening of higher education was not matched by a proportional rise in corresponding employment opportunities, resulting in relatively high unemployment rates among graduates from the 1990s onward (Labrianidis, 2014). At the same time, greater opportunities for employment in highly skilled positions as well as higher average salaries of graduates in specifc destination countries, combined with ease of migration in the EU, attracted Greek professionals abroad. As a result, even before the outbreak of the crisis, a considerable number of highly skilled young Greeks had been emigrating for better career prospects, better chances of fnding a job related to their specialisation, a satisfactory income and increased opportunities for further training (see Chap. 3 in Labrianidis & Karampekios, this volume).

The crisis critically intensifed this trend; the outmigration of graduates skyrocketed as job opportunities in the private sector shrank in the shadow of the crisis and public-sector employment was no longer an option due to cuts and restrictions in new recruitments (Labrianidis & Pratsinakis, 2016).2 A study by Labrianidis and Pratsinakis (2016) conducted a nationwide representative survey to 1237 households in Greece, gathering information for 248 emigrants. According to this survey, two out of three of the emigrants who left Greece during the years of the crisis were university graduates. Expectantly, the data highlight that the educational composition of the migrants in the period of the crisis sharply contrasted with that of the emigration up to the mid-1970s, which almost uniformly comprised people of lower education.

However, the educational composition of the migrants leaving Greece in the years of the crisis was found to be identical to that of the preceding decade. Even if a much less signifcant phenomenon in absolute numbers, highly skilled migration comprised the vast majority of the outfow already during the 2000s and it was on the increase already since the 1990s. Thus, the brain drain phenomenon in Greece should not be understood as a new phenomenon resulting from the crisis but rather (1) as a continuation of an earlier ongoing trend whose volume critically increased during the crisis but whose underlying structural causes predated the crisis (2) a part, albeit a very signifcant one, of the increased emigration that followed the crisis (Labrianidis & Pratsinakis, 2017).

At the same time, even if a minority in the total outfow, the crisis did push a signifcant number of people of lower educational and income backgrounds out of the country and also made several people to take the route of emigration at a late phase in their life-course. Data from the survey in Labrianidis and Pratsinakis study, show that the share of emigrants from low to very low-income households as well as the mean age of emigration increased after the crisis. Similarly, data on unemployment from that study and the EUMIGRE study show a clear distinction between the pre-crisis emigrants and those who left after 2010, who were far more pushed by the unfavourable conditions in the Greek labour market compared to the pre-crisis migrants (see also Pratsinakis & Kafe, forthcoming). The deterioration in the quality of life, loss of employment and impoverishment brought about by recession and austerity not only intensifed emigration fows among the highly skilled but altered mobility aspirations and decisions more widely including those with 'lower skills.'

<sup>2</sup>While in most European countries the unemployment rates of highly educated people in the period of the crisis increased only marginally, if at all, in Greece they skyrocketed, to almost four times higher than the EU-28 mean, making the push-pull migration factors for Greeks with higher education particularly strong.

The degree to which emigration has been an unwanted and enforced decision differs temporally and by country of destination. As far as the latter is concerned, it should be noted that the vast majority of post 2019 migrants headed to European destinations facilitated by the freedom of movement within the EU, which decisively contributed to the large scale of emigration. Germany and the UK attracted the largest share of emigrants, concentrating together more than half of the total emigration outfow. More than 250,000 Greek citizens migrated to Germany between 2010 and 2019, with net migration being approximately 120,000 people, while by June 2021, almost 120,000 Greek citizens' applications for UK's EU settlement scheme, the vast majority of which by post-2009 migrants, were approved (Pratsinakis & Kafe, forthcoming). The Netherlands appears to be the third most popular European destination of the crisis-driven Greek emigration with approximately 31,500 arrivals from 2010 to 2019 and a net migration in the same period of approximately 13,500 people.3 At the same time, emigration to traditional non-European destinations such as Australia and the USA appears to be considerably lower. Approximately 13,000 people have obtained permanent resident status in the USA in the period 2010–2019 and 11,000 Greeks settled in Australia until 2016, according to estimations by Field-Theotokatos (2019).

People with lower formal education migrated primarily to the traditional destinations of postwar emigration because they could make use of social networks available to them to secure employment in ethnic niches in those countries. Consequently, Germany and Australia attracted a majority of people with low to medium levels of education. On the other hand, those who migrated to Britain or new emigration destinations such as Switzerland were more often people with high educational qualifcations. The share of tertiary educated among the Greek UK based population, which comprises a majority of post-2009 migrants, was estimated at approximately 70% (Pratsinakis & Kafe, forthcoming). Similarly, the share of tertiary educated Greeks who settled in Switzerland was 73% in the period 2011–2014 and 80% in the period 2015–2018 (Nccr on the move, n.d.). To the contrary the share of tertiary educated migrants who settled in Germany in 2007–2012 was 29% (von Koppenfels & Hohne, 2017) and 24% for those who settled in Australia in 2006–2016 (Field-Theotokatos, 2019).

In terms of the *temporal* dimension of the emigration, data indicate that through time emigration became less so an involuntary decision enforced by economic hardship. As seen in Fig. 2.1, emigration increased steeply in 2010 and peaked in 2012. It modestly decreased the year after and since then it has rather stabilised with approximately 50,000 Greek citizens and 50,000 non-Greek citizens leaving the country annually. In the early years of the crisis many people emigrated in a pressing need to make ends meet making use of support networks they had abroad. Several such migrations were indented to be temporary, as a means of a short-term adjustment to the fnancial diffculties faced. They also included people who

<sup>3</sup>Data respectively derived from three online databases: that of the German Federal Statistical Service (De Statis, n.d.), the Statistics Netherlands (CBS, n.d.) and that of the British Home Offce EU Settlement Scheme quarterly statistics (Gov.uk, 2020).

**Fig. 2.1** Estimated annual emigration from Greece, 2008–19. (Source: Eurostat (n.d.))

emigrated with longer term aspirations but ending up returning prematurely due to diffculties faced in destination countries. According to data from the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) on Germany, the country that received the majority of those early migrations, only one in two Greeks remained in Germany for longer than one year in this early phase of migration (Sommer, 2013).

It should be noted that experiences of discrimination were reported by many migrants working in low-skilled jobs (Damanakis, 2013; Pratsinakis et al., 2017a; see also Chap. 4 in Chatzidaki, this volume), with people working in more skilled occupations not being totally unaffected (Pratsinakis & Kafe, forthcoming). According to the EUMIGRE survey 62% of the participants in the Netherlands experienced discrimination and 37% felt they were treated unfairly at work due to being foreigners. Not all such experiences concerned interactions with the native populations. Particularly notorious have been cases of exploitation by Greek employers affecting mostly those migrants who were provided accommodation as part of the remuneration agreement and were thus more vulnerable due to dependency relations to their employers.

Those negative experiences of a segment of post-2010 migrants attracted some attention by the media in Greece (Pratsinakis et al., 2017a) but research has been limited and generally the experiences of people of lower socioeconomic backgrounds has been less well documented. Similarly limited has been research on the onwards migration of the immigrants in Greece and the experiences thereof. That is despite the fact that they comprise almost half of the total migration outfow from Greece as can be seen in Fig. 2.1. Recent studies (Dimitriadis, 2021; King & Karamoschou, 2019) explore the migration decision making of Albanian onwards migrants in the UK, their sustained transnational practices as well as their ambivalent identifcation.4

<sup>4</sup>Chapter 4 in Chatzidaki (this volume) further provides very interesting information about integration of onward migrants from Greece in Greek schools in Germany.

Overall, research has focused primarily on the highly skilled but without much attention on their migration motivations, which are thought of as a direct function of the deterioration of socioeconomic conditions in Greece. As it will be described, even though the crisis has had a major role in shaping the migration decisions, both among the highly educated and the less educated ones, its impact was far from being straightforward. I explore this issue in the next section (Sect. 2.4), while looking at the multiplicity of migration aspirations and trajectories.

#### **2.4 Necessity Driven Migrants, Career Migrants and Middling Transnationals**

Analysing the migration motivations and trajectories of the EUMIGRE research interview participants in the Netherlands and Greater London, three migrant profles can be singled out. The career migrants, the necessity driven migrants and the middling transnationals.

#### **The Career-Oriented Migrants**

The career-oriented migrants were found to be a small minority among the respondents. Their experiences and motivations highlight a continuation of pre-crisis migration patterns when emigration from Greece was largely a career move concerning primarily the upper classes. They are akin to the 'global nomads,' a category coined by Jordan and Duvell (2003) to describe the highly mobile professionals who move from one country to another depending on work opportunities that arise as a result of the integration and globalisation of the world economy, and who often exhibit a cosmopolitan orientation. The career-oriented interviewees were highly educated, mostly in Information Technologies (IT), business and economics, and treated their move as a means to embark on or further advance their professional career. They contrasted with the necessity-driven migrants in that their migration was very marginally, if at all, infuenced by the economic crisis.

Migration was described by them as a strategically identifed step in a planned career path. They commonly had found employment through applications for advertised vacancies before emigrating, or were headhunted or transferred by an employer. They were open-minded about their future, mostly younger in age, which helped them sustain a lifestyle of mobility. However, they planned to settle at a later phase in their life-course, primarily for reasons of family formation. They were disillusioned about the potential of having a stable and satisfying professional life in Greece and were hence less oriented towards a return.

#### **The Necessity-Driven Migrants**

At the other end of the spectrum several research participants noted that lack of a job and/or marginal socioeconomic conditions shaped the migration to London or the Netherlands. Many of those migrants highlighted the centrality of the crisis in shaping their rather abrupt migration decisions. Giorgia (31, London) revealed that

a year before she left Greece, emigration had not crossed her mind. She had invested the savings of several years' work in the hospitality sector to open, together with a friend, a tapas bar in the centre of Athens. Their business had gone through diffcult times, but they had managed to keep it going and gradually things started looking up. But the imposition of capital controls, which were put into effect in 2015 in Greece, was a huge blow:

People stopped going out. I mean, things became very bad after the capital controls were imposed. . . everything ended. Four months of slack can be coped with; but not more [. . .]. And so, I was thinking what I should do, it's only once in my life I'm 30 years old. I thought I shouldn't fght for my business anymore. . . It was worthless. I couldn't describe a more depressing situation. . . [. . .] I wanted to fght for my future; you can't do that in Greece though. . . You fght a battle you can't win there. . . I mean, it's depressing. . . (2/2016)

Giorgia sold her car to support her migration project and left Greece. She was initially hosted by friends in London until she found a job and moved out. She started working as a waitress. Professionally her migration entailed a downward move. Her housing conditions were also worse than in Greece. Like the majority of the interviewees, she was living in a room in a shared apartment. Yet she was happy with her decision to move to London and was planning her future there, not considering returning to Greece any time soon. Giorgia explained that in Greece she felt trapped in a situation in which she was unable to plan her life. She was devastated by the fear she described as being gradually instilled among people in Greece – a fear that paralyses and makes them downscale their expectations. She told us she was not willing to cope with this situation. Her life in London came with many hardships and a lot of stress, but also excitement about new experiences, expectations about the future and a frm belief that she can gradually progress and build her life there. Her goal was to open her own business in the tourism sector. I was also told such stories of moving abruptly as a result of the crisis by several people I met as part of my volunteer work in the organisation *Neoafhthendes* in Amsterdam.

Giorgia, along with other migrants whose move was forced by circumstances induced by the crisis, can be described as necessity-driven migrants. Those migrants had a lesser ability to plan their move strategically. Motivations relating to personal development and adventure were less strong in shaping their migration decisionmaking, but a favourable attitude towards mobility was prevalent and migration was seen as a great learning experience. Most of the necessity-driven migrant interviewees had not secured employment prior to migration and moved to London or Amsterdam to look for work opportunities on spec. Overall, fnding employment proved to be relatively easy especially in London. Finding a job matching their qualifcations and working experience prior to migration, however, was more diffcult. Yet, most of them expressed a belief they can make it in the long run and embraced a strong work ethos with that target in mind.

Most of the necessity-driven migrants left their country at a later phase in their life-course, often 30 or older. They described migration as means to progress and a way to restore the socioeconomic stability which they had lost over the past years in their countries of origin. Like the Polish and Spanish migrants interviewed by Bygnes and Erdal (2017) in Norway, they were seeking to create the grounded and predictable lives and futures that were no longer attainable in Greece. Even if most of the necessity-driven migrant interviewees were people without university degrees, I did encounter highly educated migrants in this category, too. However, and contrary to what one may have expected, the necessity-driven migrants were not a majority among the overall sample of interviewees.

#### **Migrating as a Way to Getting Ahead in Life: Middling Transnationals in Times of Crisis**

If we conceptualise the infuence that the crisis has had on emigration decisions as lying along a continuum, with the necessity-driven migrants and the career-oriented migrants forming the two polar opposites, the majority of the research participants would fall somewhere in between. The interviewees of this majority category expressed a pro-migration attitude, and many of them noted that they had always wanted to leave Greece and live abroad. The economic crisis has not had a direct impact in shaping their decision to emigrate, unlike the necessity-driven migrants. Yet, unlike the career-oriented migrants, the crisis was often important in reshaping the wider socioeconomic dynamics that triggered their decision to leave.

A common denominator among the research participants of this diverse category is that they treated their migration project as a way to get ahead in life. Younger participants were over-represented in this category: they approached migration as a route towards leading an independent life without being dependent on family support and the life-stage stagnation that this entails. Most of them had jobs in Greece, so that migration was not shaped by an urgency to get employed as in the case of the necessity-driven migrants. The majority thus had the ability to plan their emigration more smoothly than the necessity-driven migrants and many, especially the highly educated, had secured employment in their country of settlement before emigration.

They migrated aiming to achieve a sense of personal fulflment and progress coupled with socioeconomic stability. Several of them embarked on an attempt to pursue their dream career by seeking employment in a feld they had given up trying in Greece often in art or in academia. Many interviewees, especially those who emigrated later in their life-course, compared themselves to local residents and expressed feelings of lagging behind in terms of their school-to-work transitions.

For the graduates in social sciences and humanities, fnding employment that matched their qualifcations and subject specialisms was not easy and many had to take up lower status jobs in the service economy, sharing similar employment trajectories with lower-educated migrants. This is also corroborated with the survey fndings of the EUMIGRE survey which showcases that the income level of migrant in those felds was comparable to people without University degree (see also Pratsinakis & Kafe, forthcoming). To the contrary, the trajectories of those with education in hard science, engineering, business, medicine and IT were much more favourable, resulting in faster upward career mobility. Their pathways resembled those of Favell's (2008) Eurostars, whilst the rest of the interviewees in this category would be more appropriately described as Conradson and Latham's (2005) 'middling transnationals' with middle-range offce and administrative work or employment in the education or health sector.

#### **2.5 The Changing Emigration Environment in Greece: Migration as a Materialisation of an Existing Aspiration**

When I explained the topic of my research to my research participants who belonged in this last category, many of them felt the need to dissociate themselves from what they described as the typical new Greek migrant: someone urgently feeing the economic crisis in Greece. Assuming it was such experiences that I was looking to record and fearing that they may be not suitable respondents, they were telling me that for them it was not the need that pushed them out of Greece, and further explained that they always wanted to leave Greece, or that they had a job in Greece as well as a relatively job security before leaving. In the same light, others would tell me that they came to the UK or the Netherlands to follow their partners or close friends and that it was not a direct impact of the crisis in their personal life that shaped their decision making. Kostas (36, London) was a characteristic such a case. In his own words:

Some of my friends in Greece had already been living in Oxford and so I travelled to England three times in 2010, 2012 and 2014 to visit them. [….]The last time I visited the country, in March 2014, my friends from Oxford had moved and they were living in North London. At that time, I was in a strange situation, like I was looking for change. I thought the time was ripe for a thought I'd had in mind for years. It's not that I was unemployed in Greece. I was working as a Customer Service Representative at IKEA in Athens. I had been working there for seven years and although it wasn't terrifc, it was quite a good job if you consider the situation in Greece. A person wouldn't leave easily this job to emigrate, especially during the crisis. However, for several years I wanted to go and live abroad, see how life is outside Greece (7/2016).

Kostas told me that his friends had been already half-jokingly telling him that he should go live with them. When they moved to London they had a spare room he could rent for an affordable price. He was single at this period. When he returned in Greece, he told me, he had already taken the decision to leave:

The truth is, I always wanted to work with children, I mean work in the education feld. However, I didn't have the necessary qualifcations to do something like that in Greece and I also couldn't attend courses to acquire such qualifcations because of my working hours. And so I thought I would go to England to do something about it there, thinking I could combine work and studies more easily. This was the plan: to go to England and do something in the feld of education (7/2016).

Kostas resigned from IKEA and moved to his friends' house in London. He started working in a cafeteria and offered voluntary work in a community organisation working with children, where he was also later offered accommodation. His aim was to save money and improve his English and then follow a course which would allow him to become a teaching assistant.

Similar was the case of Nikos (35, Amsterdam) who had a position as civil servant in Athens from which he decided to resign to join his Serbian girlfriend and his best Greek friend in Amsterdam in 2016. Nikos, who had a degree in tourism, found very swiftly a job in a hotel and within a years' time he was promoted to work on a project in the fnancial department of the company owning the hotel. In a follow-up

meeting several months later, Nikos told me he had applied and was accepted to study economics at a BA level at Nijmegen.

Even though respondents like Kostas and Nikos described their trajectories as rather exceptional, this seemed not to be the case given that I was often hearing stories akin to theirs. Later on I was able to test this observation by including two questions in the survey questionnaire. The frst one was 'to what degree was your decision to emigrate something you have been wishing for?' and the second one 'to what degree was your decision to emigrate enforced by the circumstances in Greece?' Forty-three percent of the sub sample of the post-2010 migrants (*N* = 799) indicated that their decision was basically something they have been wishing for, while 27% indicated that it was more so enforced upon them due to the circumstances in Greece. Even if differences were found to be less pronounced in London (38% wish and 34% need), the survey fndings clearly show that the people who rejected the economic crisis as the main motivation for their migration were certainly not a small minority, if not the majority among the post 2010-emigrants.

What does the fact that a signifcant segment of the so-called crisis-driven migrants present their migration not as a direct outcome of the economic crisis signify? As I have explained in more detail elsewhere (Pratsinakis, 2019b), the large number of people who present their emigration from crisis-driven Greece as a materialisation of an earlier aspiration does not only affrm the self-selectivity of migration, but also highlights a signifcant change that the emigration environment in Greece has undergone in the past few years. It was this change that allowed, triggered or gave an extra push to several people to leave Greece –people who wished to experience life abroad but would most probably have not done so otherwise.

Drawing on Carling's work (2002, 2014), with the term 'emigration environment' here I refer to the historical, sociocultural, economic, and political settings in a given locale, which encourages migration or not. This can be understood to have two dimensions: one that concerns the structural backdrop upon which emigration decisions take place, and a second one that concerns the ways that this structural reality is evaluated at the collective level and by individuals. As Carling (2014, p. 3) argues, 'a vital part of the emigration environment is the nature of migration as a socially constructed project. People who consider migration as an option relate to it through the meanings with which it is embedded.'

Someone does not feel the urge to emigrate because she is poor in absolute terms or because she receives a salary that can be objectively defned as being low. Instead, it is because someone *feels* she is poor and importantly because she feels her poverty or her socioeconomic stagnation and/or downward mobility is place-bound. Migration decisions are thus taken with reference to both feelings of frustration and disappointment with conditions at home and related positive expectations about life abroad. It is in this context that in crisis-driven Greece emigration emerged as a sensible strategy to pursue in order to better one's life.

Media started painting a rather positive image of emigration, highlighting successful cases of Greek emigrants broad. This emphasis on positive examples may be read as an attempt to boost the wounded national sentiment, forming hence the other pole in an ambivalent presentation of emigration, which on the one hand laments the 'bleeding' of the nation, while, on the other, depicts it as an (easy) way out from a wrecked economy and a corrupt and ineffcient state (Pratsinakis et al., 2017a). This same discourse seems to have permeated to a certain degree the everyday too. Natasha (33, London) emigrated before the crisis erupted in Greece initially to do a postdoctoral degree in the Netherlands and then to London for work. She told me that one of the most signifcant changes that she experienced while being abroad was the reversal of views of people back in Greece in relation to her decision to emigrate:

During the frst three years, people used to say to me 'oh, it is such a pity, you live so far away,' but the next three years the same people would say 'you are far better abroad.' There was a high contrast in their reactions. It was outrageous. At frst they couldn't understand my decision to leave the country and I had to convince them I did what I thought was right for me and after that, I had to convince them that things are not the best when you live abroad. During the frst period when I had a plain job in England and earned little money, people in Greece used to disapprove my life and judge me. I had to prove to them why I did what I did. On the contrary now, they tend to accept my life and think that it is the best thing to do. Now they say to me 'Are you crazy you want to come back?' (4/2016).

As emigration was widely being discussed and indeed practiced equally widely, people were increasingly confronted with the dilemma if they should leave or stay. Emigration was thought as something they needed to urgently put in practice to avoid socioeconomic stagnation. For others, the fact the emigration gradually became a reality that concerned a signifcant number of people had in itself an impact on how they took migration decisions. Mihalis (32, London), for instance, described to me how he decided to emigrate at a period when many of his friends and fellow students in the University (he had studied civil engineering) were leaving. The emigration of a friend of his who had a good salary given the circumstances in Greece but decided to emigrate together with his girlfriend regardless, had a considerable impact on him:

Manolis: So the fact that many people were leaving made you also consider emigrating?

Mihalis: Yes. I think this applies to everyone. When you see that most of the people you know are leaving the country then you take the decision to leave more easily… Maybe ten years before, the situation was different. For example, possibly when you would try to leave things behind, people might have tried to stop you. However now people even encourage you to leave, 'leave the country, there is nothing you can do here anyhow' they say… (11/2016).

#### **2.6 The Loosening of Social Constraints**

People are embedded in webs of social relations. Taking the step to emigrate is a decision that does not only infuence the migrant herself but also other people with whom she is invested in reciprocal relations. The departure of one or more individuals utterly reshapes this web of social relations and its internal arrangements and dynamics. In that sense, migration decisions are decisions that have a strong moral dimension. Often this moral dimension is perceived to concern one's obligation towards the national community and, in this framing, decisions to leave may be seen as escapist or even treasonous (see Genova, 2020). Much more concrete are the dilemmas that migrants face towards 'their close people'; the more one is embedded and invested in relations of solidarity and strong psychological and social dependency, the weightier it is for her to emigrate.

That concerns particularly family relations, and especially in Greece, which is characterised by a collectivistic culture (Kafetsios, 2019). In Greece, family relations have remained closely knit often characterised by mutual socioeconomic dependency and a culture of intergenerational solidarity that has historically substituted for the lack of provisions from a traditionally weak Greek welfare state. Along with its functions as provider of childcare, the family in Greece, and in Southern Europe more broadly, is the main locus of support, with both a social role and a productive role (Ferrera, 1996; Karamessini, 2007). The former role is pursued through the provision of care, emotional support and fnancial transfers for the needy and vulnerable members, such as the unemployed, the elderly and the chronically ill. The latter through the creation of family businesses, which have fourished in Greece.

The Greek family is also characterised by a child-centred mentality (Maratou-Alibranti, 1999, p.61) which augmented from the 1990s onward when the family emerged as a prime 'social shock absorber' against relatively high youth unemployment and protracted school-to-work transition (Karamessini, 2007). Parents provide support through extended co-residence with their adult children, fnancial support of their education and training, and a strong commitment to secure them stable employment. In this attempt they often mobilised clientelistic networks and family loyalties related to patron-client hierarchies to provide them access to public sector jobs. Others, in a similarly paternalistic mentality, expected their children to follow their profession, if self-employed, or to take over the family business if they had one.

Once public sector employment became no longer an option as a result of cuts and restrictions in new recruitments, and while several professional and employment sectors collapsed and small-scale family business found it extremely diffcult to remain economically viable during the crisis, many Greek parents found it increasingly diffcult to offer to their children access to any employment or to employment that their children would wish to take up. As a result, children became much more open to take risks to avoid socioeconomic stagnation by emigrating. On their side, the parents, partly as a result of their inability to provide access to good jobs to their children and partly due to a general deep-felt disappointment for what is widely perceived to be a grim future for younger generations in Greece, they became more favourable towards the emigration of their children even if that would, regrettably for them, entail physically separating from them.

#### **2.7 Conclusion**

In the past decade, in a period when Greece has suffered deeply from the economic crisis, austerity measures and their social and political consequences, emigration rates rose steeply. This resurgence of outmigration has attracted considerable attention in public debates in the country, particularly in relation to the brain drain phenomenon. Emphasis has been placed on the combined effect of the fight of a highly educated labor force on the one hand and recession or economic stagnation on the other. In this context, the emigration of a young generation of Greece professionals came to symbolise Greece's economic and political downfall and indicate its grim prospects for the future. A discourse gradually emerged in which the return of the 'brain drain' generation was deemed *sine qua non* for Greece's regeneration and subsequent governments made promises for repatriating the Greek professionals who left during the crisis. Such promises were not met leading to accusations and the further politicisation of the issue with the return of the young professionals who left during the crisis coming centre stage to the discussion about the emigration during the crisis.

The brain drain phenomenon, which as described was not caused by the recent outfow per se but was critically exacerbated by it, does merit the attention that it has attracted. That is not only due to its detrimental consequences on Greece's socioeconomic and political progress, but also to uncover and problematise the evermore complex stratifcation of 'core-periphery' relations re-emerging within the EU (King, 2015). However, reducing Greece's emigration in the period of the crisis to the brain drain phenomenon is misleading. It reproduces a statist and economistic conceptualisation of migration far removed from the migrants' subjectivities. As such it does not only silence the emigration of people of lower educational attainments, but also simplifes the subjective motivations, aspirations and desires of the majority of recent migrants, whose emigration cannot be explained as an outcome of strict economic, material and career considerations (see also Bartolini et al., 2017; Groutsis et al., 2020).

As outlined, the crisis not only fed Greece's recent outfow in terms of volume, effectively shaping Greece's third major outwave of migration, but also brought qualitative changes in migration motivations and aspirations. Unlike pre-crisis emigrants most of whom saw their emigration as a career move followed by an eventual return to Greece, most post-2010 emigrants, left Greece due to a perception of a depressing lack of prospects in their home country and a deep felt disappointment in the socioeconomic environment in Greece. Irrespective of skills, educations and age, the majority planned a longer stay abroad driven by a search for more predictable and stable lives and with the aim to 'get ahead in their lives' and materialise their aspirations. Many also described their decision to leave Greece as something they have always wanted to pursue, and that the crisis just gave them the extra push to do so. Their emigration thus hints of the drastically changed emigration environment in Greece. By altering everyday discourse on emigration and loosening up social constraints towards long distance mobility, the crisis has made emigration an option to be widely considered and practiced. At same time, the presence of new migrants abroad induced further migration through the workings of transnational networks in a self-feeding process which was critically facilitated by the freedom of movement within the European space.

Their ongoing emigration takes place in a period when Greece continues to be home for signifcant numbers of immigrants and one of the main entry points to Europe in the extremely perilous journey taken by various categories of disadvantaged moving populations. Similarly to the recent Greek emigrants, the arriving immigrants move striving to avoid major crises and ameliorate their live conditions. Yet their reduced options for legally permitted mobility entails a much more dangerous migration project which for large segment of them results in their forced immobilisation in Greece's hot spots. Their exit strategy is not only a political act in relation to their home countries but also as a means to contest the condition that deprives them from the right to seek and upgrade their life conditions through geographical mobility (Mezzadra, 2010). The parallels between emigration of Greek citizens and immigration to Greece from the Global South become apparent and the contrast evident. In Greece's dominant public discourse on brain drain, however, they conveniently remain hidden, serving the reproduction of 'us' and 'them' distinctions even in this transnational setting.

**Acknowledgments** Research for this paper was funded by the European Commission Horizon 2020 Framework e Marie Skłodowska-Curie project EUMIGRE, Grant No. 658694.

#### **References**


**Manolis Pratsinakis** is Assistant Professor in Social Geography at Harokopio University and research affliate at the Centre on Migration, Policy, and Society (COMPAS) at the University of Oxford. He was previously Departmental Lecturer in Migration Studies at the School of Anthropology & Museum Ethnography, University of Oxford (2020–2022); SEESOX/Onassis fellow at the Department of Politics and International Relations (2017–2022), University of Oxford; Marie Curie postdoctoral fellow at the University of Macedonia (2015–2017), visiting fellow at the University of Sussex (2016) and lecturer at the University of Amsterdam (2013–2015). His academic interests broadly concern the study of migration and nationalism. He has done research and published on immigrant-native relations, ethnic boundaries and categorisation, everyday nationhood, brain drain, and intra-EU mobility in the post 2008 period. Manolis has studied Geography and Sociology (with honors) and completed his PhD in 2013 in Anthropology. His MA studies were supported by a Nuffc Huygens Scholarship and his PhD research by an IKY scholarship from the Dutch and Greek state respectively.

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## **Chapter 3 The 'Virtual Return' Option of the Highly Educated Immigrants: The Case of Greek PhD Holders**

**Lois Labrianidis and Nikolaos Karampekios**

#### **3.1 Introduction**

The historical evolution of the debate on mobility and the different policy approaches towards high value individuals to return to their home country are explored. We focus on the Greek case and provide an account of fnancial and non-fnancial policy measures developed in recent years. Also, evidence of a new nation-wide survey on a specifc sub-population of the global science diaspora is presented. Focusing on Greek PhD holders, we explore their attitudes towards assisting their mother country and the steps that Greece should undertake to lure them back. Specifcally, we seek to understand the actual mobility of the Greek highly educated based on new data. Moreover, we seek to contextualise these fndings within a pragmatist frame. Making use of 'diaspora option'/'virtual return' strategy, we point to policy directions for harnessing this potential.

Firstly (Sect. 3.2), the importance of the highly skilled personnel is reiterated while exploring the increase in tertiary education globally. The competition between countries to attract the highly educated is revisited. Emphasis is paid to the typology of policies that states develop in order to achieve this. Towards this, the alteration from a physical-based return to a virtual/partial one capitalising upon the globalised trait of these highly educated people is presented. Capitalising on this, herein we make use of transnationalism as an appropriate theoretical concept that can account for the connection between migrants with their communities of origin (Portes, 2001; Vertovec, 2004). While transnationalism considers individuals as carriers of their

L. Labrianidis (\*)

University of Macedonia, Thessaloniki, Greece e-mail: loisl@uom.edu.gr

N. Karampekios National Documentation Centre, Athens, Greece e-mail: nkarampekios@ekt.gr

<sup>©</sup> The Author(s) 2022

M. Kousis et al. (eds.), *Challenging Mobilities in and to the EU during Times of Crises*, IMISCOE Research Series, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-11574-5\_3

own identity, they belong to several places simultaneously, building up and maintaining networks over borders, which lead to entrepreneurial and academic collaborations (Levitt & Schiller, 2004; Tejada et al., 2013; Vertovec, 2004).

Then, Sect. 3.3 focuses on the Greek case and identifes the root causes of the brain drain. The policy tools developed in recent years to curb the one-dimensional fight as a result of the decade-long economic crisis are described. Greece faced a sovereign debt crisis in the aftermath of the global fnancial crisis of 2007–08, which reached the populace as a series of painstaking reforms and austerity measures that led to impoverishment, loss of income and property, including the explosion of outward mobility. Concerning methodology, new results of a major nation-wide study are presented (Sect. 3.4). We make our case building on new fndings that have been collected through feld-based questionnaire answered by Greek PhD scholars that have obtained their doctorate degree from a domestic tertiary education institution or a foreign. Focusing on these new data, we proceed to a descriptive statistical analysis to explore their demographic, geographical and employment mobility as well as their intention to return home.

Based on the literature review and the empirical fndings, the chapter concludes (Sect. 3.5) that while a good part of the most educated –more integrated, presumably, than other types of immigrants– would be unwilling to physically return home in the near future, they are open to maintain/initiate economic or research relations with their homeland.

#### **3.2 The Brain Drain Phenomenon**

In this section, we focus on the economic, social and knowledge importance of the highly educated individuals. Building on this, we further the argument on the grounds of the increase of the tertiary education and the variety of incentives provided by countries to attract this kind of skilled people. We, then, explore the typology of return options. We focus on the theoretical notion of transnational communities and we conclude this section by establishing a dichotomy on the available return options –be that of the 'diaspora option' and the 'virtual return.'

#### *3.2.1 The Economic, Social and Knowledge Importance of Highly Skilled People*

In the last three decades, the importance of knowledge, innovation and human capital on economic development has been recognised (Lundvall & Borras, 1997; Nielsen & Lundvall, 2003). Indeed, their signifcance on economic development surpasses that of the physical capital (Mathur, 1999; Romp & Haan, 2007). Human capital stands as one resource propelling frms and economies into higher tier of competitiveness (Papademetriou & Sumption, 2013).

The geographic mobility of the Highly Skilled Migrants (hereafter HSM) shapes a key knowledge process that results in the transfer of 'non-codifed' knowledge to another country (Williams & Baláz, 2008). While this type of knowledge transfer is multi-formed, a common aspect is one-dimensional mobility from a less developed country to a more developed one. It indicates a zero-sum game that results in draining the originating country of its 'brains.' Hence, 'brain drain,' referring to this onedimensional mobility (Beine et al., 2001) can severely affect the ability of the originating country to incentivise innovation, resulting in sub-optimal developmental patterns (Hunt & Gauthier-Loiselle, 2010; Nijkamp, 2009). The irony is that those migrating are those most needed to stay since they possess the skills to regenerate an economy (Todaro, 1996, p. 119; Van Gla, 2008). In this process, host countries (developed) are the winners while the home countries (usually less developed) are generally the losers (Williams & Baláz, 2008, pp. 17–46).

#### *3.2.2 Increase in Tertiary Education and Competition Between Countries to Attract HSM*

The growth of 'knowledge-based' industries has put a premium on high-quality education, training, the acquisition and constant honing of skills. Domestic education and workforce training systems try to keep up with employer demands (Papademetriou & Sumption, 2013).

Given this, governments put enormous effort into increasing educational attainment levels. Increase in participation in tertiary education has been signifcant recently. In OECD (Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development) countries, the average proportion of 25 to 64-year-olds with tertiary education has been steadily increasing. While in 1998 it was around 21%, in 2008 it rose to 28% and in 2018 it reached 38% (OECD, 2016, 2019).1 In developed countries, the demand for skilled human capital is greater than the supply while the opposite is usually the case in the less developed ones.

HSM policies are en vogue, leading policymakers worldwide increasingly vie to attract 'the best and brightest.' Developed countries are engaged in a global 'race /war for talents' to attract the HSM (Boeri et al., 2012; Czaika & Parsons, 2017; Kapur & McHale, 2005). Historically, countries of the developed North attract the largest share of HSM (Artuç et al., 2014). Since the 2000s, they have been actively seeking to encourage the admission of highly skilled and business migrants while preventing the entry of low-skilled ones (Castles, 2002; Ozcurumez & Aker, 2016).

As competition for the highly skilled intensifes, European states and companies fnd themselves in a battle for the 'best and brightest' (Cerna & Czaika, 2016).

<sup>1</sup>Between 2000 and 2010, OECD countries observed a 70% increase in higher education migrants (Arslan et al., 2014). Also, 64% between 1990 and 2000 (Beine et al., 2001).

Europe 2020 Strategy sets a clear objective to attract highly skilled third-country nationals. The European Union's (EU) Blue Card Directive, adopted in 2009, in addition to recommending ways to improve EU's ability to attract HSM, discusses means to limit the outgoing mobility of Europeans (European Migration Network, 2013). Recently, most EU Member States introduced measures to facilitate the entry of highly skilled third-country nationals resulting in the following inter-European situation: European authorities seek to curb the outward mobility of Europe, while European countries engage in a zero-sum game with each other aiming at attracting highly-prized individuals. Thus, the asymmetrical 'global race for talent' between the Global North and South is mirrored between Northern and Southern European member states.

Despite the concurrent rise in the number of HSM worldwide and the proliferation of policies targeting them, the effectiveness of such policies remains contested (Bhagwati & Hanson, 2009; Czaika & Parsons, 2017) because, as Doomernik et al. (2009) argue, attracting HSMs depends upon a range of economic and social factors,2 what Papademetriou et al. (2008) coined as 'immigration package' (p. 25). These broader-than-purely-fnancial-parameters have also been identifed in Wei et al. (2019).

#### *3.2.3 Return Policies for Highly Skilled – Transnational Communities*

The return of HSMs to their originating countries, after a period of employment abroad, creates multiple benefts. For example, Indian return migrants in the feld of Research and Development (R&D) helped promote technology diffusion in India (Choudhury (2015). Ximena et al. (2016) argue returning HSM may lead to considerable economic benefts. According to Dustmann and Kirchkamp (2002) and Dos Santos and Postel-Vinay (2003) return migrants transfer skills and knowledge to their country of origin.

Encouraging return migration as a policy tool for origin countries to ameliorate the negative effects of brain drain and even beneft from global labor mobility, is not without its limitations. Indeed, in only a few cases this repatriation policy succeeded. Cases include newly industrialised countries such as Singapore and the Republic of Korea. Large countries such as China and India, where large-scale return programmes were accompanied by a set of parallel policy initiatives enabling the creation of R&D infrastructures and high economic growth rates.

Governments play a central role in facilitating the fow of human talent through providing higher salaries, better housing, dual passports or long-term residence

<sup>2</sup>E.g. research labs, professional growth opportunities, working environments, generous social model, lifestyle and environment factors, tolerant and safe society, transparent residency/citizenship rules, recognition of foreign credentials and licensing facilities, opportunities for family members.

cards. Also, overseas scientists are offered leading roles in domestic laboratories and access to cutting-edge equipment. Importantly, the state can play a role in curbing vested interests and biases against the returnees. Such biases are found at the national, institutional or individual level –including less talented individuals/professionals who feel threatened and may present obstacles to the returnees.

South Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong and India have witnessed a signifcant return of HSM due to the growth of domestic economies and the creation of new jobs and opportunities (Zweig & Wang, 2013). This virtuous cycle creates demand for skilled people and by becoming wealthier, these states can offer further rewards and incentives making returning home a serious option.

However, this approach has limits. Even in China, return policies did not fully work despite the Chinese government aggressively introducing such policies (Zweig & Wang, 2013). This is attributed to wider socio-political parameters (such as vested interests, extant power structures, non-transparent decision making and a relatively stifing bureaucracy), keeping expatriates at bay. As a result, few of the talented Chinese leave their secure posts abroad and return. Policies to encourage their return failed because they were focused on offering higher wages and lower taxes. Other considerations, such as provision of better research conditions, political and institutional reforms, greater transparency, more democracy, overall improvement of the country's economy, possibility for dual citizenship, etc., were neglected (Gibson & McKenzie, 2010). This is in line with Papademetriou et al. (2008), Doomernik et al. (2009); Gibson & McKenzie, 2010; Wei et al. (2019).

#### *3.2.4 Return Policies for Highly Skilled – The 'Diaspora Option' and 'Virtual Return'*

There are two ways (Meyer & Brown, 1999) for a country to beneft from its expatriate graduates: aim for their physical return (return option) or engage this human capital while physically present in the hosting country (diaspora option).

Since then, an increasing interest in initiatives designed to attract a country's professional diaspora (Ximena et al., 2016) 3 recognised merit in both options. Examples, include, the Indian and Chinese governments offering special fnancial and non-fnancial incentives to recruit from the expatriated and enable partial return4 (Wei et al., 2019). In the case of China, multiple initiatives aimed to lure for short

<sup>3</sup>E.g. the Millennium Science Initiative (Chile), One Thousand Talent Programme (China), Presidential Fund for Retention in Mexico and the Raices programme (Argentina) provided supplementary income and research funds. The UN Tokten programme, attracting high-skilled diaspora members for short durations to provide training, was implemented in 15+ countries over the last 30 years.

<sup>4</sup> In 1992, China encouraged students abroad to short returns. In 2001, it adopted a new policy, encouraging professionals working abroad to contribute to China's economy while staying abroad (Zweig et al., 2008).

periods of stay those unwilling to return for longer periods of stay or even permanently. Examples of such initiatives include the 'National Specially Invited Expert' and the 'Innovative Talents (Short Term) Project.' Similarly, in 2008 India launched the 'Outstanding Scientist-Technologists of Indian origin' and 'Innovation in Science Pursuit for Inspired Research' programmes (Inspire, n.d.).

For those countries not having the resources to match the salary and work environments offered by Global North countries, effectively engaging highly skilled members of diaspora in collaborative research and exchange schemes with their country of origin is a good step forward (Wei et al., 2019). Partial return has been adopted by a number of countries seeking to beneft from temporary returns and circular migration schemes (Mendoza & Newland, 2007; Wickramasekara, 2011).

The highly educated workforce abroad can help upgrade the domestic science and knowledge base by establishing bilateral links without the precondition of having to permanently return to the country of origin. This led to Scientifc Diasporas being identifed as a new development actor (Barré et al., 2003; Karampekios, 2020; Labrianidis et al., 2019; Tejada & Bolay, 2010).

The above approaches share a trait to what Saxenian (2002) argues. Highly educated individuals are willing to work in both the originating and hosting country. The highly skilled engineers in Silicon Valley established companies in their home countries (India and China, respectively) and traveled back and forth (Saxenian, 2006). These were the *new Argonauts*.

These engineers and professionals signifcantly contribute to their home countries through knowledge, investment and technology transfers (Saxenian, 2005, 2006). They form a transnational technical community providing an alternative and often more fexible mechanism for skill and know-how transfer. By becoming transnational entrepreneurs, they combined important contacts, information and cultural know-how. Closely associated, Yang and Welch (2010) have coined the term 'knowledge diasporas.' This notion seeks to explain contemporary global highlyskilled mobility which is 'sustained by both increases in global migration fows and the rise and increasing ubiquity and density of information and communication technologies' (p. 594).

The policy problem of whether to establish a permanent versus partial return state-led initiative is based on recognising that the probability of returning home is associated with one's profle. The elite hesitate to return (Sbalchiero & Tuzzi, 2017). Specifcally, the probability of Italian HSM returning was highest (77%) for professionals on fxed-term employment contracts whereas it dropped to 18% for scientists with permanent posts. Full professors were the least likely to return. Potential reasons are older age, being abroad for extended period, good working conditions and probably family obligations, indicating a 'settled down' *mentalité*.

This fexibility between the physical and the 'virtual return' has created the conditions where returning to the originating country has become a reversible choice (Saxenian, 2005). This is particularly so for those with scarce technical skills, while the increase in IT (Information Technologies) infrastructure adds to this, making it possible to collaborate over great distances. This 'dual presence' acts as a 'bridge' between home and host countries, promoting ideas, skills and knowledge transfer. For example, Indian and Chinese professionals living in the USA in the 1990s strengthened their countries' scientifc and technological capacities through knowledge and technology transfers as well as investment linkages (Saxenian, 2005, 2006; Tejada et al., 2013).

Recently, a new phenomenon has been observed according to which the highly educated while physically present (i.e. staying) in their home country work for frms/employers located in another country. They make use of online outsourcing platforms (e.g. Freelancer, Upwork, Appen, Fiverr and Peopleperhour) that act as intermediaries between employers and employees on an international scale connecting supply and demand of employment. The nature of the relevant labor entailed is usually of high quality and concerns complex projects that are pursued by multinational groups. These online platforms allow the division of the project in a number of smaller sub-projects and are assigned to members of the group (e.g. Graham & Anwar, 2019). Τhis new form of work assignment leads to a new type of 'brain drain,' which we could call 'de facto brain drain.'5

Studying the evolution of the academic debate on skilled migration in particular, indicates that the pessimistic and skeptical brain drain option of the 1970s and 1980s underwent a signifcant change from the 1990s. Since then, a more balanced approach focuses on migrant transnationalism and the creation of networks with home countries. This led to proposals promoting the use of skilled migrants through knowledge transfer and circulation strategies for the beneft of their home and host countries (Meyer, 2001; Tejada et al., 2013). In sum, brain drain is a more complex phenomenon, both in terms of its socio-economic and political preconditions and implications and in terms of the policies needed to deal with it, than once was thought.

From 2000, transnationalism became a popular theoretical framework in migration and development studies praising the transnational ties of migrants with their originating communities (Portes, 2001; Vertovec, 2004). Transnationalism considers individuals as carriers of their own identity. While belonging to several places simultaneously, they build and maintain links over borders (Levitt & Schiller, 2004; Tejada et al., 2013; Vertovec, 2004). This has been enabled by the capability to be digitally employed. The dominance of the digital economy, in our context, has further evolved the concept of 'brain drain.' Thus, countries recognising that capable individuals 'embody' knowledge, skills and networks, and as such are highly attractive, have been formulating policies based on the 'virtual return' approach. This 'virtual return' policy is becoming the dominant theoretical paradigm for engaging the highly educated. Under the title of the 'highly educated,' a range of associated genres can be found. The commuters, while a small percentile, indicate highly adept professionals and career people continuously on the move. The majority of the

<sup>5</sup> It is a brain drain in the sense that highly skilled workers offer their jobs in foreign countries while they live in their homeland. Thus, they spend and save resources at their location due to their physical presence. Also, they may be more available to use their high knowledge capital for the domestic labor market through synergies, work assignments and research partnerships.

emigrated individuals fall under a different genre –in want of stability and predictability, they choose their location on a range of criteria rather than solely their career trajectory. As such, it seems more realistic for a comprehensive 'virtual return' approach to target the second population group. Herein, we analyse the brain drain phenomenon for Greece. Arguing in favor of a diaspora/'virtual return' policy.

#### **3.3 Brain Drain from Greece**

In this section, we explore the actual brain drain patterns in Greece. Specifcally, we provide secondary evidence of this one-dimensional mobility. We, then, explore the availability of implemented policy options to reverse this type of pattern.

#### *3.3.1 Setting the Tone*

During the decade-long sovereign debt crisis, as a result of the global fnancial crisis of 2007–08, Greece suffered the longest recession of any advanced mixed economy to date. This led to a series of painstaking reforms and austerity measures that led to impoverishment, loss of income and property, including hundreds of thousands of well-educated Greeks having left the country. Indeed, the combined effects of recession, extreme austerity and a concomitant generalised mistrust of institutions and the political system led to a resurgence of large-scale emigration from Greece of skilled as well as less skilled people. The type of skilled emigration received extensive media coverage (often to the expense of the less skilled type who also moved abroad in large numbers) – an emigration which was presented as a one-way option for them (Chap. 2 in Pratsinakis, this volume).

The brain-drain phenomenon is a recurring theme in Greece, yet since the 90s it has grown in momentum. The latest instance of this took place within the context of the decade-long 2009 economic crisis. More than 250,000 professionals were abroad in 2017, with some 200,000 leaving the country after 2010 (Labrianidis, 2011, 2014; Labrianidis et al., 2019; Labrianidis & Pratsinakis, 2016; Labrianidis & Vogiatzis, 2013). Outward fight of these individuals who are of high caliber6 signifcantly hinders the developmental potential of the Greek economy, in addition to placing signifcant stress on the societal, cultural and national fabric.

It would be benefcial for the individuals and the country to develop policies breaking the vicious cycle where the highly educated depart because a sustainable demand for their services is lacking because the country is less developed - an economic situation continuously prolonged due to their emigration. Thus, it goes

<sup>6</sup>E.g. Yuret (2018) showed Greek scholars populate a disproportionately high share in leading US academic institutions.

without saying that excluding those individuals from the return option undermines the very transition to a knowledge-based economy. Combined with the severe demographic problem, formulating a policy initiative for these individuals should be based on the realisation that the expatriated communities are essential for vital socio-cultural changes. Of course, not all those who have left constitute a homogeneous community or group, nor are they all exceptional scientists or enjoy enviable professional, fnancial and social status in the countries where they work; and, undoubtedly, it is not the case that all the 'best minds' have gone and the worst have remained!

While the brain-drain problem was certainly there before the economic crisis, it worsened as a result of its intensity. The discrepancy between supply and demand of skilled human resources is not due to the excess supply of graduates,7 as claimed in the national press, but to the limited demand of such employability characteristics by Greek companies. Until recently, Greek companies remained hesitant in committing resources towards the production of complex products or knowledge intensive services that required the employment of highly skilled human resources (Labrianidis, 2011, 2014). While this trend has started to change,8 this discrepancy has been the main cause for the high levels of unemployment, underemployment and employment in jobs not making the full use of an employee's qualifcations ('brain waste'). In addition to economic reasons, the lack of political and institutional reforms, transparency, etc. contribute to brain-drain (Gibson & McKenzie, 2010). Thus, policies for addressing or putting a stop to this one-dimensional mobility require a systemic approach touching on a number of societal, institutional and political parameters. Policy makers should eliminate the very reasons that led to it in the frst place.

#### *3.3.2 Policies to Reverse the Brain Drain*

Facing the (various) diffculties to incentivise an economic rebound, prompted the government, during the 2015–2019 period, to examine ways to slow down brain drain. Policy tools in this direction were developed on at least three levels:

Firstly, the strategy titled 'Greece: A Growth Strategy for the Future' offcially launched in 2018, as well as other preceding legislation (such as the Development Law and the reorientation of the National Strategic Reference Framework), set the overarching context in which the shift towards the 'knowledge economy' was named as the central developmental policy in the twenty-frst century. To achieve that, skilled human resources were named as the

<sup>7</sup>During 2006–2016, 25.4% of people aged 25–64 in Greece had a higher education degree, while the EU28 average was 26.8%. In 2017, the respective shares were 41% and 38.2%.

<sup>8</sup> Indicatively, from 0.24% in 2011, frm R&D spending as % of GDP, has risen to 0.69 in 2020. Also, the share of Greek innovative enterprises has been steadily increasing - from 51.0% in 2012–2014 to 60.3% in 2016–2018). On R&D, see TSC00001 data code of Eurostat (n.d.) and data from EKT (2021, p. 9). On innovation, see Community Innovation Survey 2016–2018 (EKT, 2020).

prime enabler. Further developing the domestic skilled human resources as well as attracting the expatriated skilled human resources were central to this end.

Secondly, a set of fnancial incentives targeting the young researchers were developed providing direct fnancial assistance through scholarships aimed (also) at curbing brain drain. These scholarships stand as prime incentives supporting the domestic academic and research excellence for the 2017–2020 period by way of enhancing academic performance and employment as well as nurturing R&D-led entrepreneurship and innovation (Sachini et al., 2020a, b).

Finally, the 'Knowledge and Partnership Bridges'9 initiative. It was conceived with the aim of 'connecting' Greek experts and professionals, regardless of the country of current location, and create an e-community. Capitalising on the 'diaspora option,' the initiative is indifferent to whether the individuals wish to continue work abroad or are interested in re-settling in Greece. Instead, it aims to incentivise academic and entrepreneurial linkages and connections that may lead to the knowledge transfer and professional experience within the country (Labrianidis et al., 2019). With an expatriated community amounting to approximately eight million, establishing 'bridges' will allow Greeks abroad to reconnect with Greece. Given that science and technology is a collaborative arrangement, networks are central avenues for knowledge acquisition, especially since many Greek scientists abroad hold important academic and business positions.

This triple set of strategies and policies was devised in view of an outward fight of the skilled human capital that had become a kind of 'trend,' an obvious course of action, so to speak. Thus, while many undeniably left because of the discrepancy in labor supply and demand, others followed convinced by a dual-pillared conventional wisdom: Overall opportunities were elsewhere whereas unemployment, nepotism etc. ruled in Greece. While instances of truth can be found herein, these stereotypical views exaggerated existing dysfunctions in Greece whilst promising work-paradises abroad.

#### **3.4 A Study of Geographic Mobility of Greek PhD Holders**

In such matters, the issue of offcial and robust data indicating the mobility of the highly educated is of primary importance. Such data allows making evidence-based claims. Given that there are no offcial records of Greek professionals abroad, it is impossible to design a sample refecting the characteristics of the total population. This lack of offcial data constitutes a signifcant caveat to the study of brain drain. In the remainder of this chapter, we will present the provisional data of a recent Greek-wide survey. This dataset is being presented for the frst time.

In this study we focus solely on PhD scholars. Following the International Standard Classifcation of Education (ISCED) standardisation (ISCED-8), it concerns those individuals who have been awarded the highest educational degree (i.e.

<sup>9</sup>See *yefres gnosis ke sinergasias* (n.d.)

a doctorate degree). To be exact, the focus has been on the PhD scholars that have obtained their doctorate from a Greek tertiary institution or one such institution abroad. This was made possible by making use of a completely new database, that of the National Archive of PhD Theses (NAPhD). NAPhD is the national registry collecting PhD theses from all Higher Education Institutions in Greece as well as those PhD degrees awarded to Greeks by foreign universities and certifed by the Hellenic National Academic Recognition and Information Centre (Hellenic NARIC). It spans a period of more than 30 years (1985–2020). In addition, an openended announcement made through social media called for the registration of Greek PhD holders that had acquired their PhD from non-Greek institutions and have not certifed it through Hellenic NARIC.

Between May and July 2020, an electronic survey was conducted by the Greek EKT [*Ethniko Kentro Tekmiriosis* (National Documentation Centre)] which is the organisation responsible, by law, for the collection, development and maintenance of ΝΑPhD and the Regional Development and Planning Research Unit of the University of Macedonia. The survey was conducted on individuals that obtained their PhD during the 1985–2018 period and were included in ΝΑPhD The number of the doctorates contained in ΝΑPhD amounted to 39,207. After application of multiple data cleansing techniques, an electronic questionnaire was sent to 22,349 individuals. The survey contained a range of multi-variate questions ranging from demographics, geographical and employment mobility to social and career satisfaction. In addition, it was appropriately customised to cater for different employment statuses of the PhD holders (employed, unemployed, retired etc.).

A combination of established taxonomic schemas, such as the ISCED felds of education, the occupation classes of ISCED, the employment categories of the Hellenic Statistical Authority, as well as open questions examining age range, sex, professional degrees and certifcates, quality of life and the quality of work conditions were adopted. This was the case in order to cater for the complex geographical, educational and employment realities of such a large population group. The survey was initiated on the 25/05/2020 and concluded by 24/9/2020. It was successfully submitted by 10,295 individuals (46%). The remainder of this analysis will offer a frst account of the submitted answers.10

According to the following table (Table 3.1), the respondents' gender is broken down between males (54.5%) and females (45.3%), while the age distribution is as follows: the majority are between 40 and 49 years old (43.6%) while one third of the respondents lie within the 30–39 years range (31.5%). In terms of tertiary education degrees and the respective countries of origin, concerning bachelor degrees, 92.0% obtained their undergraduate degrees in Greece, followed by studies in the UK, Italy and Romania. Concerning the master's degree, for 77.6% it was obtained from Greek institutions, followed by UK institutions (13.7%), French institutions and US institutions (2.2%, respectively). In terms of PhD's, these were almost comprehensively attained from a Greek tertiary institution (97.2%), followed by the UK (1.3%).

<sup>10</sup>The results of the survey are presented in Labrianidis et al. (2022a, b).


**Table 3.1** Overall demographic characteristics of PhD Holders (%)

a absolute number of total population Labrianidis et al. (2022a)

Seeking to identify the mobility pattern of the doctorate holders, four major patterns emerged (see Fig. 3.1):


These four [1–4] mobility categories account for the 97.7% of the total number of responses (10,054 out of 10,295). The remainder 2.3% concerns individuals that submitted foreign citizenship in the relevant question and as a result were not taken into consideration in the analysis. Importantly, categories [2] to [4] concern individuals who all have worked abroad. Analysis of the data indicates that 31.3% of the individuals have been employed either in the past and/or currently in another country and 14.8% are still employed outside of Greece.

**Fig. 3.1** Number and % of PhD Holders according to their mobility pattern. (Labrianidis et al., 2022a)

Henceforth, the focus will be on the specifc population group that identifed themselves as 'individuals who currently live' [3], i.e. *N* = 1343 individuals and 'individuals who were active abroad, returned to Greece and have left again,' i.e. *N* = 138 [4]. Thus, herein total *N* = 1343 + 138 = 1481. Given that the overwhelming majority of these individuals indicated that at the time of the survey they were employed, they largely ft the description of the HSM bibliography as those individuals whose originating countries develop policies to lure back and/or establish a partial presence there. As such, it would be informative to present their opinions in terms of the public incentives that should be put in place to consider this option. Tables 3.2 and 3.3 present the combined results of the two sub-populations [pattern 3 and pattern 4].

In terms of demographic and professional characteristics (see Table 3.2), most were males (62.5%). Their age profle mostly belonged to the 30–39 age group (52.3%) and the 40–49 group (40.4%). Only a relatively small percentage received their bachelor's (8%) and doctoral degrees (2.8%) from Greece, this percentage is very high for those who received their master's degree (22.4%). Being a globalised workforce, these individuals have worked in multiple foreign countries. Among these countries, most have worked in the UK (25.7%), the US (15.8%), Germany (11.0%) and France (6.6%). Assessing their employment position, the great majority of them (95.5%) were employed, 65.1% were employed in the public sector, of whom 65,8% claimed that their position was of high status. This was followed by 21.6% of the individuals thinking of the positions as of medium


**Table 3.2** Demographic and professional characteristics of individuals of patterns 3 & 4 (%)

a absolute number of total population Labrianidis et al. (2022a)

status. Only 12.6% thought of themselves as working in a low status position. This indicates that those individuals perceived themselves as having achieved a high professional status. Taken together with the fnding that 47.5% of those individuals had an average monthly salary of, over 4500 euros and 28.4% between 3000 and 4500 euros, the above argument is further enhanced. For comparison, the average monthly salary of a fully employed individual in Greece amounts to 1202 euros (EFKA, 2020, p. 3).

In terms of professional employment, most individuals indicate a high-profle employment position either as university personnel or as professionals and managers. Approximately half of those individuals (42.8%) work as academic personnel in tertiary education institutions. This is followed by HSM being employed as professionals (26.7%), such as foreign language teachers, administration analysts, and data and network engineers. Lastly, 9.5% of those individuals indicate that they are employed as chief executives and senior offcials. Τhe large majority enjoy a high professional status. In hindsight, one can only try to appreciate the very signifcant potential these individuals could provide their home country, if not for their fight.

In order to understand their perception of the incentives that should be developed for those individuals to consider the physical/partial return option, one should examine links and connections already developed (Table 3.3). Being highly educated and employed in high-profle positions, they were asked whether


**Table 3.3**Individuals of patterns 3 & 4 (\*) and Conditions for their return (%)

3 The 'Virtual Return' Option of the Highly Educated Immigrants: The Case…

Labrianidis et al. (2022a)

they would be willing to provide mentoring and/or fundraising services to the domestic science and entrepreneurial base. More than half (56.0%) would either be willing to do so or are already providing such services from abroad, thus enabling an invaluable knowledge-transfer mechanism. On a more personal basis, the doctorate holders were asked for the conditions that should be fulflled before they would consider their return. First among them is the issue of fnding employment compatible with their qualifcations (69.9%). Taken together with the conceptually affliated question of fnding a fnancially satisfactory employment (34.7%), it indicates that almost all of the respondents put a premium on landing a well-rounded employment position as a key factor for returning. Indeed, 25.3% selected both answers. A second cluster of responses revolved around family and the raising of children. Indeed, 42.6% of the respondents indicated family reasons as a condition for their return, followed by 14.6% responding that they would be returning so that they could raise their children. 5% of them selected both answers. A third option for returning was nostalgia. Missing home was a parameter pointed out by 43.4% of the respondents.

How can the state enable their return? On this, it should be mentioned beforehand, that this group maintained very strong links to their homeland in as much as they communicated with their families back home on a daily basis (48.9%) or quite often (23.2%). Additionally, they visited Greece once or twice per year (61.9%) or even more than three times per year (33.1%). Also, some (8.0%) have invested in Greece in the form of acquiring houses and estates. It is only 8.9% that seemed unwilling even to consider returning. As such, according to the respondents, the range of the relevant actions that could be taken by the authorities is as follows: frst, the state should open up new positions in tertiary education institutions (60.5%) – most of those currently employed in tertiary education institutions abroad sought similar career opportunities in their originating country. This was followed by an answer on the need for the broader socio-economic conditions (59.5%), pointing to the much-needed improvements in public administration, rule of law, corruption cases, etc. A third factor was the need for a better collaboration/communication on behalf of the state with those professionals working abroad. That is, to increase opportunities for collaboration with Greek tertiary institutions and/or the private sector (38.6%). In close connection with the frst option (see above), it indicated the untapped highly educated personnel that the lifting of the respective burden would help capitalise. Also, 30.1% selected the need for a transparent and direct communication on the opportunities available to this kind of diaspora, while 23.2% the legislative arrangements allowing them to work part-time while retaining their employment abroad. Finally, only 10.1% thought that fnancial incentives for repatriation were return enablers.

These fndings are consistent with Doomernik et al. (2009) and Wei et al. (2019). Financial incentives, beyond higher wages, appeared to have no major impact on persuading HSMs to repatriate. Factors such as a better communication by the state could facilitate strong links with the Greek economy while they still continue to work abroad.

#### **3.5 Concluding Remarks**

Making use of transnationalism as the theoretical concept upon which to account for the connection between migrants with their communities of origin (Portes, 2001; Vertovec, 2004), in this chapter we built upon the premise that highly educated human capital is crucial for the development of an economy. Developed countries offer incentives so as to attract highly skilled individuals from other countries. The ensuing one-dimensional mobility represents a loss of growth potential for the originating country. Recently, originating countries have been initiating policies to contain or curb this phenomenon. The nature and orientation of these policies is relative to domestic priorities. Overall, return policies provide various incentives and can be categorised between those placing emphasis on the 'physical' and the partial/ 'virtual return'/ 'diaspora option.' Recognising that such individuals are highly prized as well as understanding that being part of a network is extremely important, countries have been formulating policies based on/and the 'virtual return' approach.

Greece is a country suffering from this one-dimensional mobility. At large numbers, this mobility has been undermining the country's potential. To curb this, there is a need for policies to face the very reasons that led the country's highly educated human capital to leave in the frst place, i.e. primarily the discrepancy between supply and demand of professionals. This relates to the need to change the pattern of economic development of the country, something that has begun to be put into effect in recent years. Policies aimed at directly keeping young professionals in the country have been implemented. As already shown, most of this diaspora was fond of their home country and, as such, was willing to offer their services – even in a digital and virtual manner. A range of policies on enhancing academic and research excellence and on supporting employment, entrepreneurship and innovation have been initialised. However, one has to be realistic and understand that most of those abroad are not going to return in the immediate future. The advantages of the hosting countries may potentially be too great to miss and Greece, being a small economy with structural problems, may not be able to provide what is asked by all of them. This pragmatism is important in formulating policies aspiring to make the most of expatriates while they remain abroad ('virtual return' option). 'Knowledge and Partnership Bridges' seeks to create 'bridges' to allow Greeks living and working abroad to reconnect with the country through co-operation with Greek professionals whether they are in business or in academia.

Herein, data from a recent, novel, nation-wide survey on Greek PhD holders was presented. Methodologically, this chapter was built on a new data set that was collected through a questionnaire-based survey sent to Greek PhD scholars. Having obtained their doctorate degree from a domestic tertiary education institution or a foreign, we proceeded to a frst descriptive statistical analysis to explore their demographics, geographical and employment mobility as well as their intention to return home. The evidence points to a situation where those highly educated individuals that were situated abroad wished to sustain their own identity, belonged to several places simultaneously while they had managed to build and maintain academic,

entrepreneurial, or other such networks over borders. This is in accordance to the theoretical premises of transnationalism (Levitt & Schiller, 2004; Tejada et al., 2013; Vertovec, 2004) and could lead to academic and entrepreneurial collaborations.

According to the fndings, most Greek doctorate holders were based in Greece and were employed in the public sector. Importantly, 31.3% of all Greek doctorate holders had worked and/or were, at the time of the survey, employed abroad. Of those currently based (14.8%) abroad, most would consider themselves as being employed in high status positions (e.g. working in academia, as professionals and senior offcials). These fndings could steer policy proposals. Understanding their mobility patterns and their points of view in relation to the most appropriate list of incentives are two such tokens that could be fed into the policy making loop. Regarding policy considerations it is important to note that while the respondents left in search of better career options, they maintained strong bonds with Greece, their family in particular, and were willing to support Greece through mentoring domestic individuals. To return they would have to fnd an employment compatible with their qualifcations. This was often translated into new positions in tertiary education institutions. Closely affliated is the fnding that fnancial incentives alone were not suffcient return enablers. Of importance to HSM were wider socioeconomic considerations. They pointed out the need for arrangements that would facilitate their engagement with the Greek economy while they still resided abroad. Signifcantly, the above fndings appear compatible with the fndings that have been identifed in the existing bibliography, which fall in the lines of the 'diaspora option'/'virtual return' strategy. In our case, also, the 'diaspora option'/ 'virtual return' stood as the most combinatorial of strategies. Thus, one might conclude that countries losing highly skilled personnel, depending on the socio-economic and political juncture they are at, must develop different policy mixes, i.e. policies to persuade highly skilled nationals not to leave, to return or to follow a 'virtual return' option.

#### **References**


**Lois Labrianidis** is Professor in the Department of Economics, University of Macedonia Greece and Head of the Regional Development and Planning Research Unit. During 2015-2019 he was Secretary General for Investments Ministry of Economy & Development. He is an economic geographer (BA, Aristotelian University of Thessaloniki -MA, Sussex -PhD, LSE). His scholarly publications include 12 books: *Provincial Universities in Greece; Albanian Immigrants in Thessaloniki* (co-authored), *Economic Geography* (editor), *The Future of Europe's Rural Periphery* (in English) (editor); *The Moving Frontier: The Changing Geography of Production in Labour Intensive Industries* (in English) (co-editor), *Cities on the Verge: Thessaloniki in a Process of Change. Investing in Leaving: The Greek Case of International Migration of Professionals* (co-editor) and *Spatial Development and Human Capabilities*. His main research interests are: migration - highly skilled migration, delocalisation of economic activities/ FDI, spatial aspects of subcontracting, development of rural areas/ rural entrepreneurship. He has published more than 70 papers in peer reviewed journals such as: Urban Studies, Regional Studies, Journal of International Migration and Integration, Environment and Planning A' and C', International Journal of Urban and Regional Research, Sociologia Ruralis, European Urban and Regional Studies, Population Space and Place, Antipode, European Planning Studies, Competition and Change, International Planning Studies, Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies, Journal οf Entrepreneurship Development. He was a member of the Editorial Board in European Urban and Regional Studies, and a member of the Advisory Board of Journal of Immigrant and Refugee Studies. He was guest editor of *Regional Studies*, 2011 vol. 45(2) and of the *Journal of European Planning Studies*, 2006 vol. 14(1). He was the scientifc coordinator of 16 major research projects (e.g. The Changing Geography of Production in Labour Intensive Industries, European Commission FP6 and The future of Europe's Rural Periphery, EC FP5)

**Nikolaos Karampekios** PhD in technology policy at NTUA –School of Applied Mathematics / University of Athens –Department of History of Science, and post-doc at the University of St. Gallen at the Centre for Security, Economics and Technology under a state scholarship, is the Head of the Research, Development, Innovation Analysis Unit of the Research, Development, Innovation Services and Metrics Department at the National Documentation Centre (EKT). He is engaged in a multitude of RDI metrics on a national/regional/sectoral level (e.g. tax incentives on R&D, high tech business demography, scientometrics, performance of Greek institutions in EU competitive projects; customised analysis on the domestic innovation system; highly educated human capital). He regularly contributes in EKT's relevant evidence-based policy-making analysis and reporting. His work has appeared, among others, in: Journal of Knowledge Economy, Science and Diplomacy, Géopolitiques et Géostratégies Régionales, Military Power Review, Southeast European and Black Sea Studies, Allgemeine Schweizerische Militärzeitschrift, Foreign Affairs, Hélice. Nikos has coedited two books: *The Emergence of EU Defense Research Policy. From Innovation to Militarisation* (2018) Springer Press, and *The European Defence Agency. Arming Europe* (2015) Routledge Press. Nikolaos participates in a number of OECD and EU working groups.

**Open Access** This chapter is licensed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits use, sharing, adaptation, distribution and reproduction in any medium or format, as long as you give appropriate credit to the original author(s) and the source, provide a link to the Creative Commons license and indicate if changes were made.

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## **Chapter 4 Greek State Schools in Germany and the Impact of 'New' Migration**

**Aspasia Chatzidaki**

#### **4.1 Introduction**

Since 2010, more than 500,000 Greek citizens –and a large number of foreign subjects residing in Greece– have left the country as a result of the impact of the global fnancial crisis (Pratsinakis, 2019; Chap. 2 in Pratsinakis, this volume).1 This crisisdriven migration or 'new' migration2 bears certain features which distinguish it from previous forms of migration. First, contemporary migration is a rather individual enterprise contrary to migration from Greece between the 1950s and 1970s which was based on intra-state agreements (Damanakis, 2014; Siouti, 2019). Second, pre-2010 migrants were mainly low-skilled, uneducated men and women in search of employment.3 By contrast, the recent, crisis-driven migration also involves well-educated and highly-qualifed individuals who migrate not out of necessity –e.g. many were employed at the time of their departure– but in order to secure professional advancement and fulfl their potential (Aravossitas & Sugiman, 2019; Labrianidis & Pratsinakis, 2016; Pratsinakis, 2019). In fact, they constitute

A. Chatzidaki (\*)

<sup>1</sup>These fgures do not include the number of foreign nationals who either returned to their country of origin or immigrated to another country, what Labrianidis & Pratsinakis (2016, p.7) refer to as 'the emigration of immigrants.'

<sup>2</sup>The term translates the Greek term *neometanastefsi* (cf. Damanakis, 2014). For studies regarding this new phenomenon and its impact on Greek-language education abroad see the collective work edited by Damanakis et al. (2014).

<sup>3</sup>Cf. Pratsinakis (Chap. 2 in this volume) for a more nuanced appraisal.

Former Member of the UCRC Board, The University of Crete Research Center for the Humanities, the Social and Education Sciences, Rethymno, Greece e-mail: aspahatz@uoc.g

the majority of those who left Greece post-2010.4 However, as Labrianidis and Pratsinakis (2016) claim, although people with low or middle-education backgrounds are a minority, they tend to appear in large percentage in certain European countries such as Germany (43% of the total infow of Greek migrants in this country) and the Netherlands. The authors attribute this to the tendency of these migrants to seek employment through social networks (family and acquaintances) who are already settled in these countries. Finally, a feature which bears particular importance for our research is that 'new' migration takes the form of family movement to a much larger extent than previous migration waves did when family migration happened almost exclusively as part of a two-stage process with family members joining the primary (mostly male) migrant at a later phase (Pratsinakis, 2019).

In a thorough overview of related research, Panagiotopoulou and Rosen (2019a) compellingly argue for a new perspective in the feld of migration studies, whereby migration is approached as a *family project.*<sup>5</sup> This reconceptualisation of the role of the family in contemporary migration brings to the fore the centrality of children's education for pre- and post-migration decision-making at the family level. Related topics of interest are whether the children's educational future played a part in the family's decision to migrate, and the degree to which educational provisions in the host country are perceived as meeting the parents' expectations and contribute to the family's integration.

The exploratory study reported here follows this line of inquiry, as it focuses on the importance of Greek-language educational institutions already in place in the various countries of destination for families who have moved abroad in the past few years as a result of the economic crisis. In particular, it seeks to explore how changes in the school population have infuenced teachers' perceptions of the role of such schools. My research focuses on a particular type of Greek-language education abroad (non-mixed schools in Germany) and the impact 'new' migration has had on their functioning. The frst phase of the study was informed by current sociolinguistic thinking on identity construction in multilingual and multicultural settings such as community schools6 and took place in November 2016 in two such schools in the State of North Rhine-Westphalia. It investigated teachers' views and beliefs on the importance of these schools and their own role as educators (Chatzidaki, 2019). A follow-up study took place in January 2019 in one of the two schools. This chapter discusses, in a comparative manner, fndings from the two studies in regard to how

<sup>4</sup>See discussion on the brain drain phenomenon in Labrianidis & Karampekios (Chap. 3 in this volume) and related works by Labrianidis.

<sup>5</sup>Pratsinakis (2019) also makes a similar argument for the need to study family considerations as an important factor in migration-related decision-making- albeit from a different research perspective. See also the importance of children's education as a factor infuencing plans to repatriate in Labrianidis and Karampekios (Chap. 3 in this volume).

<sup>6</sup>The term usually refers to voluntary, grassroots organisations in the form of after-school and weekend programmes which aim to transmit the ethnic language and culture to the second and third-generation of speakers of a particular community (Mattheoudakis et al., 2017). However, state-sponsored schools providing full-fedged education for their nationals are also included in this category (cf. some of the case studies in García et al., 2013).

teachers conceptualise the role of these schools in the 'new' migration era and aspires to offer some new insights on the importance of Greek-language education abroad for recently migrated families.

In the following Sect. 4.2, I discuss the particular type of educational institution which I studied and the way it has evolved in the past ffty years. Then, (Sect. 4.3) I discuss the rather scarce literature on educational choices made by Greek immigrant families especially in the context of 'new' migration. Findings from the two studies are presented and discussed in chronological order in Sects. 4.4 and 4.5 respectively, while the chapter ends with a brief Sect. 4.6 on conclusions and perspectives for future research.

#### **4.2 Non-mixed Greek Schools in Germany**

The issue of Greek-language education for diaspora Greeks is quite complex; there are various forms of institutions providing courses of language and culture to students who wish to learn Greek (irrespective of their origin) in more than 60 countries all over the world (Damanakis, 2007). While the most common type of Greek-language education is the 'Saturday' or 'afternoon' classes which operate for a few hours per week, there are also other forms of Greek-language education institutions (cf. Chatzidaki, 2015; Damanakis, 2007).

The study presented here focuses on a particular type of Greek-language school similar to Greek mainstream schools in all respects but the student population. Such schools are called 'non-mixed' Greek Schools.7 They can be found both in Europe (e.g. in United Kingdom, Belgium, Italy and Romania) and in other parts of the world (such as Israel, Egypt, Ethiopia, People's Republic of Congo, Sudan, etc.).

However, Germany is the only country where this type of Greek-language education has been quite widespread (Damanakis, 2007; Stylou, 2019). Such schools (K-12) were founded in many German *Laender* (States) in the 1960s to cater for the needs of Greek 'guestworkers' who planned to repatriate after a few years of stay. The purpose of these schools was to facilitate transition for children whose families eventually returned to Greece. Greek schools followed the Greek curricula for preschool, primary and secondary education, while German was taught as a foreign language for a few hours a week. The teaching staff comprised primary and secondary education teachers seconded from Greece for up to three years. Finally, their operation was coordinated and supervised by the Greek Ministry of Education and the local Educational Coordinators.

For decades, these schools were very popular with Greek parents in Germany as they offered their graduates relatively easy access to Greek Higher Education Institutes: three to four percent of places offered each year by each Department are

<sup>7</sup>The Greek term is *Amiyi.*

reserved for graduates of Greek schools abroad.8 However, in the course of time, many second-generation Greek parents opted for mainstream German education while they tried to maintain the community language by sending their children to afternoon Greek courses. In the early 2000s, the number of students attending nonmixed Greek schools was very low, compared to the total number of students of Greek origin in Germany (Damanakis, 2007).

Moreover, the operation of these schools presented a disproportionately high cost for the Greek state, which became unjustifable for a country facing a state-debt economic crisis following the 2007 global fnancial crisis. As a result, but also on pedagogical grounds,9 the authorities decided to abolish these schools and replace them with bilingual schools jointly run by the Greek and German authorities and open to non-Greek students as well. In 2011, the Greek Parliament voted Law 4027/2011 on Greek-language education abroad which stipulated the gradual abolition of non-mixed schools in Germany. In the following years, and despite parental protests (Chatzidaki, 2019; Damanakis, 2007), a considerable number of primary and secondary Greek schools in various German states closed down or were transformed into bilingual schools (cf. Stylou, 2019). In 2014, the Greek State reaffrmed its decision to abolish all such schools starting from school year 2016–17.10 However, as we shall see, new developments may have halted this process and contributed to a reappraisal of the role of such schools at least in the eyes of the teachers.

#### **4.3 'New' Migration and Education: Expectations and Choices**

As was to be expected, the relationship between 'new' migration and forms of Greek-language education has only recently attracted the researchers' interest. Despite the emergence of some small-scale, qualitative studies (Chatzidaki, 2019; Kirsch, 2019; Panagiotopoulou & Rosen, 2015; Panagiotopoulou & Rosen, 2019b; Panagiotopoulou et al., 2017 etc.), it remains a rather under-researched subject considering the diversity of host countries and educational institutions involved.

The relationship between 'new' migration and parents'educational choices has been approached both from a quantitative and a qualitative perspective and has been investigated by sociolinguists and migration specialists alike. An example of the latter is provided by Pratsinakis (2019); drawing on data from the EUMIGRE survey,11 he discusses family-related migration among Greeks who settled in

<sup>8</sup>This means that such students do not have to compete with mainland Greek students in the extremely demanding university entrance exams but take special exams which allow them to gain access to their department of choice with much lower grades.

<sup>9</sup>For a discussion cf. Damanakis (2007), Damanakis and Andreadakis (2011).

<sup>10</sup>Law 264/2014, article 57.

<sup>11</sup>The EUMIGRE project was funded by the EU's Horizon 2020 research and innovation programme under the Marie Skłodowska Curie grant agreement No 658694.

London and the Netherlands as a result of the crisis. Among the participants who migrated with their partners or with their families, 60% chose the answer 'the future of my children' as one of the reasons for taking the decision to migrate (the single most oft-cited reason). The centrality of their children's education was observed both among less-skilled migrants –who were almost one third of the sample– and more highly-educated professionals (80% and 69% respectively opted for this answer). Ιn a similar vein, research in Greek PhD holders who have settled abroad in the past few years (Chap. 3 in Labrianidis & Karampekios, this volume) suggests that for a large part among them, ensuring academic and professional opportunities for their children was an important factor in their decision to stay abroad or return to Greece.

From a sociolinguistic perspective, Gogonas (2019) discusses recent Greek migration to Luxembourg focusing on the investigation of parents' motives for migration and degree of intercultural adaptation. The paper discusses two families who migrated in this country in 2013 and who exhibited opposing views and behaviour with regard to their migration experience. The frst couple was unsatisfed with their current conditions and perceived a large social distance between them and the natives, while the other enjoyed the cosmopolitan and multicultural character of life in Luxembourg. The former were attached to the Greek language and culture and wanted to raise their children as 'Greeks' while the latter were thrilled with the opportunities that multilingualism in three international languages offered their children. The study fndings testify to the diverse patterns of integration manifested among 'new' migrant families even in the same country of destination and to the ways these differences were illustrated in educational choices.12

Another qualitative study (Panagiotopoulou & Rosen, 2015), among recently migrated families in Canada this time, shows that for many parents, especially highly qualifed professionals, ensuring good academic prospects for their children was one of their main motivations for migrating. As a result, they made a conscious choice to enrol their children into the mainstream Canadian system which they believed could meet their expectations much better than any form of Greek-language education in the country.

The relationship between the educational choices of the families and their socioeconomic status and general ethno-cultural orientation was more pronounced in the case of Germany, where families may opt for full-fedged Greek schools for their children as seen in the previous section. Based on evidence from the mid-2000s, Damanakis (2007) argues that there were important differences among the settled Greek immigrants in Germany regarding their educational choices. On the one hand, most parents were well-integrated and sent their children to mainstream German schools where they often excelled and managed to enter tertiary education institutions at rates comparable to German students or even higher (Heath et al., 2008). These children could attend community schools for a few hours per week and manifested a strong attachment to their country of origin while being

<sup>12</sup>See also Gogonas and Kirsch (2016) and Kirsch and Gogonas (2018).

successfully integrated in German society. On the other hand, other frst- and second-generation parents –usually of a lower socio-economic background– seemed to adopt an ethnocentric approach to their children's education and upbringing. They tended to socialise predominantly with Greek people and opt for Greek schools for their offspring (Damanakis, 2007). The importance of the Socioeconomic Status (SES) factor is illustrated in offcial data as well; according to fgures from 2006/07, most children attending Greek schools in North Rhine-Westphalia came from low SES families (Damanakis et al., 2011).

The same trend surfaces when one discusses 'new' migration to Germany. First of all, it seems that full-fedged Greek-language education still presents an important alternative to many migrant families (Damanakis, 2014). According to data provided by the local Greek educational authorities in 2014 and presented by Damanakis (2014, pp. 160–165), the number of newly arrived students who were enrolled in Greek primary and secondary schools in Germany between 2011 and 2014 increased considerably (almost 2500 new enrolments between 2011–12 and 2013–14 alone).13 Moreover, there is some evidence which suggests that these students usually came from families with a low SES, while qualifed professionals enrolled their children in mainstream schools; according to fndings from Damanakis' (2014) study in the Greek primary school in Duesseldorf, only one third of the 'new' immigrant parents whose children attended this school at the time were well-educated professionals (holders of a University degree at least). In contrast, more than two thirds of the new arrivals in the city were well-educated professionals, something which points to a link between SES and preference for the 'Greek' school as an educational choice.

Based on such fndings, Damanakis (2014, p. 165) claimed that for an important number of 'new' immigrant families –especially of a lower socioeconomic status– such schools serve the role of 'receiving institutions' for their children. As a result, he argued that 'new' migration seemed to have brought about a renewed salience and legitimacy for the Greek schools in Germany. This claim was behind my motivation to study 'new' migration in Germany and its impact on this particular educational setting from a qualitative perspective. In the frst study I carried out, the research questions were mostly linked to issues of bilingualism and the differences in student identity as perceived by the teachers. In the follow-up study, I focused on issues which arose as 'themes' from the frst study regarding the new role of such schools. As will become evident in the discussion, a shift in the percentage of 'new' immigrant students in the school population seems to have infuenced the prominence of some of these themes.

<sup>13</sup>See Stylou (2019) for a more detailed account of recent developments in Greek-language education in Germany.

#### **4.4 The First Study**

#### *4.4.1 Research Sites, Participants and Data Collection*

The frst study of teachers' perceptions of the role of Greek schools in Germany, especially high schools, and of their students' profle and needs took place in 2016, centring on issues of bilingualism and the differences in student identity as perceived by the teachers. It was designed as a small-scale, exploratory study which would yield some initial information on the situation under investigation.

My frst visit to the sites in question was carried out in mid-November 2016.14 Before the visit, I contacted the principals of the two schools, explained the aim of the research and asked for their collaboration in identifying teachers who would be willing to participate. In both cases, the school principals were interviewed informally but were not included in the sample.

The sites chosen for the research were the Greek high schools (grades 7–12) in Cologne and Duesseldorf, two neighbouring cities in North Rhine-Westphalia. After Law 4027 passed from the Parliament in late 2011 and it was announced that the schools were going to close, both schools saw their enrolments drop considerably. For instance, in the school year 2012/2013, there were only 15 students in the Greek high school in Cologne. However, the number of students rose dramatically in the following years as a result of the 'new' migration: in the school year 2015/16 there were 53 students, while in November 2016 the school hosted about 70 students, more than half of whom were 'new' immigrants, according to the school principal and the teachers.

Contrary to Cologne, Düsseldorf hosted a Greek kindergarten and a primary school, which provided the high school with a steady fow of students. Nonetheless, 'new' migration has contributed to an increase in student numbers here as well. The number of students was 108 in 2012/13, 260 in 2015/16, and increased to over 300 at the beginning of the school year 2016/2017. According to estimates given by the principal and the teachers, 'new' immigrants accounted for more than one third of the student population, perhaps even half of it.15 The fgures of both schools matched the information provided by the Greek educational authorities up to 2013/14 (Damanakis, 2014).

Seven teachers participated in the frst study, three in Cologne and four in Duesseldorf. All but one were seconded from Greece (the other one had been

<sup>14</sup> It was facilitated and partially fnanced by the Department of Education and Social Science of the University of Cologne and Prof. Argyro Panagiotopoulou who invited me to give a lecture at one of her postgraduate classes.

<sup>15</sup> It has to be taken into consideration that it is diffcult to determine the number of 'new' immigrants with great accuracy due to the complex family trajectories involved in this type of migration (see Sects. 4.4.2 and 4.5.2). Moreover, obtaining detailed data on the students' backgrounds would require the study of their school records something which I did not have the authorisation to do.

employed at the school for more than thirty years) and at the time of the study had spent at least three years in Germany working in Greek high schools, in these or other cities.

The interviews were conducted on the school premises during the teachers' breaks. In each case, I explained to the informants which was the purpose of the research and how the research fndings would be used, asked for their permission to record the interview and informed them that I would take all measures to ensure their anonymity. The research instrument was a semi-structured interview which aimed to collect information on their background and migration experiences, as well as the informants' views about (a) their students' socio-educational background and linguistic profle, (b) teachers' and students' use of language at school, and (c) their views on the school's mission.16 Finally, the interview data were analysed using Richard Boyatzis' (1998) version of *thematic analysis*.

#### *4.4.2 Findings*

First of all, the teachers' accounts offered a glimpse of the complex backgrounds and migration trajectories of their students as they were shaped in the past fve years prior to the researcher's visit.

When asked to describe their students in general terms, all teachers made a distinction between students who grew up in Germany as members of the second or third immigrant generation and students who arrived between 2013 and 2016 with their families. The main difference between them was that the frst group of students was supposed to be fuent in both languages contrary to 'new' immigrants who seldom have some German language skills upon arrival.

Several participants mentioned the complexity of the students' trajectories in terms of their schooling experience; besides the recently-arrived students from Greece who enrolled in these schools as a frst choice, one fnds children who were sent by their parents to a German school upon arrival and were, later, transferred to the Greek school for various reasons (either because the child could not adapt or as an 'academic career' move –to ensure the right to take the University entrance exams as a graduate of a non-mixed school). In addition to this group of students, one fnds second-generation immigrants born in Germany whose families had settled in Greece a few years back and then returned to Germany as a result of the economic crisis. In many cases, these children have attended both the Greek and the German educational systems.

With regard to the students' socio-economic background, one teacher in Duesseldorf and the three teachers in Cologne described it as 'generally low.' The

<sup>16</sup>Cf. Chatzidaki (2019) for more details.

others claimed that the parents' fnancial and intellectual standing varied and that many parents were highly qualifed and educated professionals.17

Finally, it is noteworthy that several of the students were not of Greek origin although they had previous experience of the Greek educational system; teachers mentioned students of Albanian, Bulgarian, Polish, etc. background, whose families lived as immigrants in Greece and had recently migrated to Germany.18 Having grown up in Greece, these students were fuent Greek speakers and possessed Greek school certifcates.

As previously mentioned, I aimed to explore teachers' beliefs on the role played by the Greek schools as 'receiving institutions' for families migrating to Germany as a result of the economic crisis. In this regard, three major themes emerged from our data, the frst two refecting the schools' institutional objectives:19 Greek schools in Germany were important and should be maintained because they:


Five of the seven teachers mentioned that Greek schools presented their students with two important career options. On the one hand, they offered them the possibility to gain access to a tertiary education institute either in Greece or in Germany. On the other hand, if they did not wish to study, they could secure a place in a wide variety of vocational training institutes to achieve professional qualifcations. For young people whose families migrated to secure a livelihood, both these options should be particularly appealing.

Regarding the second theme, all teachers mentioned the formation and maintenance of a Greek identity among students as one of the most important aims of the school (if not *the* most important one). The fact that the school taught all subjects through the Greek language and that it operated according to a monolingual, monocultural *ethos*, was seen by some teachers as the only way to ensure the maintenance of a 'Greek' identity and culture in a foreign country.20

The third theme is the one that, in my view, refected more strongly the new circumstances surrounding the schools' operation. Nearly all teachers portrayed newcomers as young people who faced important adaptation problems because of their families' decision to migrate. This move disrupted the teenagers' social lives and

<sup>17</sup> It has to be acknowledged that it is not clear from the teachers' accounts whether the difference in SES cut across the two categories ('old' and 'new' immigrants).

<sup>18</sup>Cf. Labrianidis and Pratsinakis (2016, pp. 8–9). Also cf. Gemi (2014) for a discussion of Albanian immigrants' transnational practices before and after the economic crisis.

<sup>19</sup>For a thorough discussion of these fndings see Chatzidaki (2019).

<sup>20</sup>The construction of a purely 'Greek' identity is considered paramount even for second- or thirdgeneration Greek students, cf. Chatzidaki (2019). Unfortunately, a more thorough discussion of why these schools are perceived as safeguarding this identity as opposed to bilingual schools falls outside the scope of this paper.

academic trajectories, leading to all sorts of negative feelings. The following extract is quite telling:21

Another aim of the school, at least how I experienced it, is that it helps children integrate… they feel much better when they come to the Greek school because they have been violently cut off from their home country and their friends and by coming here they fnd themselves in an environment that is friendlier, warmer and quite familiar, contrary to the German schools… there is this possibility to communicate, to communicate directly and, in fact, while at frst they go through this period of mourning so to speak, little by little they integrate quite well (Interview with Danae,22 Cologne).

The argument put forward in such accounts seemed to be that Greek schools constituted a 'safe haven' for newly arrived teenagers who were traumatised by the forced move to a new country and the adjustment diffculties faced by all family members. The SES factor seemed to play an important role in this respect:

I used to reject the Greek schools, I thought they were a waste of money. But now I think they have an important mission and children understand that on so many levels, the children who come to the Greek schools are the disenfranchised children... the others go to mainstream schools (Interview with Yerasimos, Cologne).

In such bleak circumstances, these schools provide a familiar socio-educational environment where students can continue their studies without the extra psychological pressure they would face in mainstream schools:

What I mean is that they come to school not just to attend lessons, to do their homework and all that, but mainly to meet with their friends, to speak Greek and to alleviate this feeling of 'unfamiliar,' so to speak, of 'being a foreigner,' because at school they are … in their homeland… the school is a small Greece (Interview with Anna, Duesseldorf).

Well, it's certain that those who arrive now, the 'new' immigrants, who are plenty, they couldn't go anywhere [to study]… they would be ruined for sure if they [*the Greek schools*] didn't exist… they can't go to German or bilingual schools, they simply can't! (Interview with Thalia, Duesseldorf).

Although certain success stories are mentioned in passing, most teachers tend to foreground their students' diffculties instead of their agency. My fnal conclusion read as follows:

The overall picture emerging from the teachers' accounts is that 'Greek' schools are irreplaceable institutions not only because they safeguard a certain sense of Greek identity abroad but also –even more so– because they are the only educational institution which truly takes into account the needs of 'new' immigrant students. This discourse, repeated in many forms and with different degrees of emphasis, provides an argumentation for the maintenance of such schools at a time when the Greek authorities have taken the decision to abolish them (Chatzidaki, 2019, p. 171).

<sup>21</sup>Notice the emotionally-laden terms (e.g. 'a small Greece,' 'violently cut off,' 'a period of mourning') to refer to the school and the students' experiences respectively.

<sup>22</sup>Participants are referred to by pseudonyms.

As 'new' Greek migration to Germany has continued, I decided to carry out a follow-up study, as presented below.

#### **4.5 The Second Study**

Two years following the frst study, the second study took place with the aim to explore possible changes in the views held by teachers in the same schools. The section presents fndings from this study in a comparative light.

#### *4.5.1 Research Sites, Participants and Data Collection*

The second study was also an individual enterprise.23 Due to time limitations, I decided to conduct a follow-up study only at the Greek high school in Cologne. The school was the smallest of all Greek high schools in that State;24 in the 2018–19 school year, it hosted nearly 70 students, 50 of whom were in the last three grades.25 An additional feature which was very important to my research was the drastic change in the composition of the student population since 2016; according to the principal, 95 per cent of the students in January 2019 came from 'new' immigrant families. He explicitly mentioned that only a handful of students belonged to the second-generation group and, in fact, two of them were born in Germany, followed their families in Greece a few years back and returned to Germany as a result of the crisis. So, in comparison with the situation in the school year 2016–2017, in early 2019 the school hosted nearly exclusively 'new' immigrant students.

This fnding led me to alter the interview schedule to a certain extent, as the questions referring to the teachers' views on bilingualism appeared to be no longer pertinent. If most of their students were native Greek speakers with limited profciency in German, there seemed to be no point in investigating whether they were perceived as bilingual and whether the school promoted their plural repertoires in any meaningful way. On the other hand, I decided to place more emphasis on how teachers viewed their students and their own role as educators in this particular setting.

The follow-up study took place for a whole week in late January 2019 and included interviews with staff and students as well as class observations, following informed consent. Prior to my visit I contacted the new principal and made the relevant arrangements. These included sending informed consent forms to be signed

<sup>23</sup> It was however partly funded by the Special Account for Research Funds of the University of Crete (Grant no.10113).

<sup>24</sup>The other four high schools in the State (in Bielefeld, Dortmund, Duesseldorf, and Wupertal) had twice or thrice that number of students according to the school principal.

<sup>25</sup>The frst two grades (catering for 13–14 year olds) had only two students each, something which testifes to the diffculties faced by the school in terms of attracting new enrolments.

by the students' parents as I planned to attend lessons and even interview some students.26 Due to space limitations, this chapter does not include any results from the students' interviews, but focuses on interviews with the teachers. Besides the principal, four staff members were interviewed; they taught a variety of subjects and had started teaching in the school in the past two years. They shall be referred to here by the pseydonyms 'Thanos,' 'Alexandra,' 'Katia' and 'Zoe.'

It has to be said that although the interviews were organised according to the semi-directed format, on many occasions the interviewees volunteered information on their motivations to work abroad and their expectations or disillusionment, offered unsolicited comments on aspects of life in Greece or Germany and used narratives to make a point.27 As a result, all of our informants manifested agency in the production of their accounts as they foregrounded the themes that were salient in their view.

#### *4.5.2 Findings*

The four teachers' accounts exhibited many similarities with the ones collected in the frst study regarding the students' profle, with one important difference: this time there was no reference to the second-generation group, which occupied quite a large proportion of the student population in November 2016. When asked to give a general description of their students and their families, both the principal and the teachers referred to their generally low socioeconomic and educational background. Moreover, all teachers mentioned the large numbers of students whose parents were not Greek but foreign nationals who used to live in Greece as immigrants and left the country after the crisis in search of employment. Through their accounts, one can also catch a glimpse of the students'complex migration trajectories (a fnding also present in the frst study):

Almost half the children are … not of Greek origin, they went to the Greek school, they grew up in Greece but they are from Syria, Romania, Albania, from all over the world. Some had been in Italian schools, we have such a student… another student speaks French, she is Greek but, I don't know how, she was in Belgium before, I think... in a French school… (Interview with Katia).

The erratic pattern of enrolments and school attendance was also mentioned in the frst study (cf. Chatzidaki, 2019). Some parents reportedly left Greece before the school year was over, which means that the child could not obtain a certifcate and had to repeat the class; or, they decided to withdraw their child from the Greek school and enrol him/her at a German school also before the end of the academic year:

<sup>26</sup>Τhe study protocol was approved by the Research Ethics Committee of the University of Crete (decision date 22/11/2018).

<sup>27</sup>This was also the case with most of the teachers interviewed in the frst study.

And we've got cases of parents who bring their children to the school and three or fve or seven months later they return to Greece with them because they couldn't fnd a job or did not like it here (Interview with the principal).

This results in the child having to repeat two or more grades, as the German educational system usually places recently arrived children in a grade lower than that corresponding to their age. These incidents are usually mentioned by teachers in an attempt to illustrate the parents' despair and confusion as to their stay in Germany.

However, the defning characteristic of these students according to their teachers was that they found themselves in an extremely diffcult situation at a very sensitive age. This seems to be the factor that shaped the way teachers saw their students and their own role in these schools.

The three themes regarding the importance of Greek schools in Germany were present this time as well; however, not all of them appeared with the same degree of intensity as in 2016. First of all, the role of the Greek schools as *bastions of ethnic identity maintenance* was mentioned only by two of the four teachers (as opposed to all of the seven informants in 2016) and not with the same prominence.28 Second, all teachers referred to the *professional and educational benefts of attending such a school* which suggests that this aspect of the school's mission remained uncontested. Finally, the third theme, namely the importance of Greek schools as a 'safe haven,' was not only present but quite prominent. Not only did the principal and all teachers refer to these issues, but two of them engaged in lengthy and quite emotional accounts of the challenges their students faced and their impact on the latter's behaviour. I would like to argue that this is linked to the change in the student population which occurred in-between the two studies, namely the overwhelming presence of new migrants at the school, and their families' socioeconomic status. According to the teachers, the majority of their students had to face the sudden loss of their familiar surroundings, lifestyle and friends:

And that's when I realised how much this change has hurt these children. Cause they followed their parents with a suitcase, they were the live suitcases… Of course parents may have the best intentions and may think it's for the best but the child experiences it as a loss, as a small death of his world (Interview with Thanos).

In addition to that, migration to Germany was sometimes the result of a rushed decision with stressful outcomes; their parents may have been unemployed for months and may have lived off social benefts or may have faced exploitation at work; the family may have moved in with relatives to save money or simply because they were not certain as to whether they would stay or return to Greece, etc. Several interview excerpts illustrated such integration challenges:

<sup>28</sup> In fact, one of the informants mentioned this aspect of the Greek schools when she referred to a hypothetical case; if there was a Primary school in the vicinity, especially a bilingual one, she would have liked to send her children to this school to allow them to become acquainted with the Greek culture and history as 'Greeks.'

I wish there was psychological support in high schools for those children who arrive suddenly, cut off from their roots. I mean, there are so many children who tell me 'I've just arrived and I'm waiting for the Easter holidays to go back. If I leave, I am not coming back here.' They even say that they will do it in secret, things like that, or''I don't like it here at all,' they are so negative about it…''I don't want to do anything, I'm not interested in the language, I'm not interested in this country, I'm not interested in anything!' … Negative feelings, bitterness… or phrases like 'I ll go back to my village and won't go as far as the next village ever again,''I don't want to do anything' … this shows negative feelings, bad feelings, depression… (Interview with Alexandra).

The way these students experienced this important change in their lives seems to be linked to their parents' own attitudes. According to the teachers' reports, certain parents blamed the German authorities for the severe austerity measures imposed on Greeks which forced them to migrate (see also Chatzidaki, 2019). In this climate, it is to be expected that some families would manifest a strong opposition to integration, particularly if they perceived their stay in Germany as temporary. In this regard, a comment made by Zoe, is quite revealing:

People who come to Germany as immigrants don't try to integrate, they have this fear, based on the experiences of the past, that 'we will get stuck here as immigrants' and 'Germans are our enemies' and […] 'They give us jobs, sure, but we are not interested in getting an education according to their system'. […] 'If we could just stay out of it, create a 'mini-Greece' and keep away from them…' I've met parents who think like that… (Interview with Zoe).

All teachers referred to the challenges faced by their students and stressed how this impacted on their own practices as educators. For many adolescents experiencing such circumstances, the achievement of high educational standards seemed an unattainable goal; as a result, teachers tended to focus more on providing psychological support to newcomers to help them overcome their diffculties:

'Cause now, you have to support one kid psychologically, tell another 'You should learn German', and help a third one to make friends… it's a bit [/] we are doing a different job here than back in Greece. We are a bit of a psychologist, a bit of a Greek, a kind of oasis in the foreign country… kids feel very strongly about it. They want to hang out only with other Greeks (Interview with Katia).

I think it's very important that teachers provide some psychological support. They may not learn [*her subject*], but if I've managed to help someone express himself, or not be shy or move on, I think I've accomplished more than if I just taught them [*subject*] (Interview with Alexandra).

However, it would be a mistake to consider the teachers' practices merely as acts of leniency and charity. In addition, and based on interview material, the study documents that although teachers took into consideration their students' diffculties, they also tried to help them acquire skills, that would empower them and help them integrate or study in Greece. Obviously, teachers acknowledged that there were certain students who were well adapted and consciously took advantage of the opportunities presented to them in Germany; however, these students seemed to be the minority.

All in all, the fndings of the second study confrmed the initial ones. According to the participating teachers,29 non-mixed schools fulfled more than one mission in the new circumstances. First, they constituted institutions which ensured a sense of cultural maintenance especially for young people whose families wanted them to identify as 'Greeks' despite having been born and raised in Germany. Second, they continued to offer their graduates the opportunity to study in both countries or follow a vocational track and ultimately fnd a job in Germany. Finally, they represented supportive environments which helped newly arrived pupils endure the psychological pressures brought about by migration.

The parents' socio-economic and educational background emerged as an important variable in this setting offering support to claims made by Damanakis on the same subject (Damanakis, 2007; Damanakis et al., 2011). The teachers' interest in their students' well-being was linked to the hardships experienced by low-SES families who took the decision to migrate out of necessity and had no intention to stay in Germany permanently. There is no evidence to suggest that such families did not hold high educational aspirations for their children (although some parents made rushed decisions which hindered their children's academic progress). For many among them, however, attendance of a non-mixed school was a completely satisfactory option as it leaves open the possibility of gaining entrance in a Greek higher education institute.30 As research in other 'new' migration settings suggests, when parents consider migration as an opportunity to raise their children in a more meritocratic society which will allow them to fulfl their potential and compete on a par with indigenous students, they tend to enrol them in the mainstream education system31 (cf. Gogonas, 2019; Panagiotopoulou & Rosen, 2015). Such families do not need the 'security' provided by the familiar environment of a Greek school abroad as they experience their migration in more positive terms and are able to support their children both psychologically and academically.

#### **4.6 Suggestions for Further Study**

The two studies presented here represent an exploratory step towards a deeper understanding of the impact 'new' migration had on the operation of the Greek schools in Germany. Moreover, they contribute to the literature on the links between

<sup>29</sup>The students' interviews –which are not discussed in this chapter- confrmed, broadly speaking, the teachers' conceptualisation of the role of the school. However, the interviewees' accounts also revealed a sense of agency and determination which were in stark contrast with the bleak pictures painted by some teachers with regard to how these students experienced their new lives.

<sup>30</sup>The matter is taken up in other publications (Chatzidaki, forthcoming) which unveil the students' perspective.

<sup>31</sup>One of the teachers also mentioned that doctors and other professionals in the area have sent their children to mainstream German schools.

migration and education, while they also ultimately aim to contribute to concrete educational policies.

Obviously, the issues should be investigated more thoroughly through both quantitative and qualitative studies, in other parts of Germany and in different schools; primary school children, for instance, may face fewer problems (as has been mentioned by some teachers in both studies). In high schools with a large presence of second - or third - generation students, group dynamics and individual adjustment may follow a different path than the one described here. Moreover, it would be interesting to extend our scope of investigation to countries where full-fedged Greek-language education is not an option and compare the educational choices made by parents of the same category.

A second point of interest relates to the question of 'integration' and what Greek teachers understand by that. In the 2016 study, this term was used in very different ways as some informants placed emphasis on the maintenance of a distinctly Greek ethnocultural identity, while others put forward more nuanced versions of integration. In fact, certain teachers in both studies argued that the 'new' migrants' future is in Germany and that such schools should help them acquire the language skills, but also the sociocultural knowledge required to adjust to their new life conditions. In their eyes, non-mixed schools should change in this direction, to empower 'new' migrant children and help them fnd a place in the host country. In the current conditions, Greek schools do not appear to play this role to a satisfactory level. These issues are currently largely underresearched. Further investigation is therefore required in order to reach a level where informed decisions about the future of these schools can be made in response to the students' overall needs.

**Αcknowledgments** The author would like to acknowledge the fnancial aid provided in 2019 by the Special Account for Research Funds of the University of Crete (Grant no. 10113) for the completion of the second study.

#### **References**


**Aspasia Chatzidaki** holds a BA in Greek Philology (University of Thessaloniki, Greece), an MA in Theoretical Linguistics (University of Reading, UK), and a PhD in Sociolinguistics (Vrije Universiteit Brussels, Belgium). She is Professor at the Department of Primary Education of the University of Crete and Director of the Centre for Intercultural and Migration Studies of the same Department. In addition, she served as member of the UCRC Board on two separate occasions (7/2012-8/2014, 9/2016-11/2021). Her research interests include the study of sociolinguistic and educational aspects of bilingualism as well as Greek as a second language both in Greece and in diasporic communities. In the past twenty years she has taken part in numerous educational intervention programmes and teacher capacity-building seminars regarding the education of immigrant and refugee students. She is the author of a book (*Teaching Bilingual Students; Theoretical Issues and Educational Approaches* Athens, Pedio, 2020) and co-editor of a book on educational aspects of 'new migration' from Greece (Eds. Panagiotopoulou, A., Rosen, L., Kirsch, C. & Chatzidaki, *A. New' Migration of Families from Greece to Europe and Canada –A 'New' Challenge for Education?* Springer Verlag, 2019) and another one on refugee education (Chatzidaki, A. & Tsokalidou, P. *Challenges and Initiatives in Refugee Education: The Case of Greece.* Cambridge Scholars Publishing, 2020). Her recent research focuses on the reconceptualisation of Greeklanguage education abroad in the light of recent migration from Greece.

**Open Access** This chapter is licensed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits use, sharing, adaptation, distribution and reproduction in any medium or format, as long as you give appropriate credit to the original author(s) and the source, provide a link to the Creative Commons license and indicate if changes were made.

The images or other third party material in this chapter are included in the chapter's Creative Commons license, unless indicated otherwise in a credit line to the material. If material is not included in the chapter's Creative Commons license and your intended use is not permitted by statutory regulation or exceeds the permitted use, you will need to obtain permission directly from the copyright holder.

## **Part II Crises and Host Attitudes**

## **Chapter 5 Attitudes Towards Syrian Refugees During the 'Refugee Crisis' in Greece**

**Stefania Kalogeraki**

#### **5.1 Introduction**

Since 2015 the massive movement of forcibly displaced people, as a consequence of international confict proliferation, including the war in Syria, has challenged Europe. European countries had to tackle one of the largest movements of displaced people through their borders since the World War II (UNHCR, 2018). The Syrian civil war has played a key role in the recent refugee infux into Europe (Lucassen, 2018). Since the start of the Syrian civil war in 2011 more than 5.6 million people were forced to fee to neighboring countries as well as several European ones (UNHCR, 2019). In 2016, frst time asylum seekers applying for international protection in the European Union (EU) member-states reached the record number of 1.2 million, around 30% of them originating from Syria1 (Eurostat, 2017). This unprecedented movement of refugees and asylum seekers2 seeking safety in European countries has led to what has been called the 'refugee crisis.'3 The term 'refugee crisis' is used to describe the movement, primarily under hazardous or extremely diffcult conditions, of large groups of displaced people feeing their home countries due to conficts, persecution, wars or natural disasters and seeking

3Also referred to as 'migrant crisis.'

<sup>1</sup>Top citizenships also included Afghans and Iraqis.

<sup>2</sup>Under international law, the term 'refugees' refers to individuals who have been forced to fee their home country due to conficts, persecution and man-made or natural disasters. The term 'asylum seekers' refers to individuals seeking protection in the country they are in, but their application for refugee status is still being processed. Since some rejected asylum seekers may be refugees, the term 'refugees' is used in the chapter to refer to both to asylum seekers and refugees.

S. Kalogeraki (\*)

University of Crete, Rethymno, Greece e-mail: kaloge@uoc.gr

<sup>©</sup> The Author(s) 2022 M. Kousis et al. (eds.), *Challenging Mobilities in and to the EU during Times of Crises*, IMISCOE Research Series, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-11574-5\_5

safety in countries other than their own. The specifc term can refer to the displacement taking place in refugees' origin countries, in host countries or the potential hazards refugees face during their movement. Therefore, it involves the perspective of the refugees, of the counties to which they fee or both of them. For the rationale of the present chapter the term 'refugee crisis' refers to the perspective of the host countries facing signifcant challenges to effectively manage the massive movement of forcibly displaced people entering their borders.

The unprecedented arrival of refugees has caused different reactions among European populations. On the one hand, *Refugees Welcome* movements have emerged in different European countries to provide support and claim refugees' rights (Nikunen, 2019; Chap. 8 in Papataxiarchis, this volume) but on the other, negative stances towards refugees have been reported primarily grounded on socioeconomic, cultural and security concerns (Dempster & Hargrave, 2017; Ipsos MORI, 2017). For instance, Wike et al. (2016) found that a relatively high percentage of European citizens perceived refugees as a threat to their cultural norms and economic resources; also that they were concerned refugees would increase the likelihood of terrorism and commit more crimes than other social groups. Moreover, the same study showed that more than half of participants supported the notion that Muslims were not willing to adopt the way of life and customs of the host countries, indicating that European citizens' perceptions of Islam might impact on their attitudes towards refugees from the specifc religion.

During the recent 'refugee crisis,' certain European countries had critical roles as transit (such as Greece, Italy or Spain) and as destination (such as Germany, Sweden or Austria) countries. In 2015 Greece became one of the major entry points by sea since a high number of refugees entered its territory en route to wealthier European countries. By the end of 2015, the total number of registered refugee arrivals in Greece reached the record fgure of 821,000 with the bulk of the fow being directed towards the islands bordering Turkey (IOM, 2015). In 2016 the top nationality of refugee arrivals in Greece was Syrian refugees (European Stability Initiative, 2017).

Greece became one of the epicentres of the 'refugee crisis' activating mixed reactions towards newcomers and raising similar concerns as in other European populations about the potential negative impact refugees could have on the country. For instance, Dixon et al. (2019) argue that while more than half (56%) of the Greek population felt warm towards refugees and expressed substantial empathy for the newcomers, the majority of Greeks perceived refugees as potential threats to the country's scarce economic resources. Furthermore, more than half of participants (51%) supported the notion that refugees would negatively affect the economy due to costs on the welfare system provisions. Similarly, in a cross-national survey conducted during 2016–2017 (Tent, 2017), the economic and cultural perceived impacts of refugees on the country were of greater concern among the Greeks compared to the populations in other host countries in the globe. Moreover, across ten European countries, Greece had the second highest prevalence of responses (69%)4 supporting

<sup>4</sup>The highest prevalence is reported for Hungary.

the view that a large number of refugees leaving countries such as Syria and Iraq constitute major threats to the country (Wike et al., 2016). Other studies support that the sizable refugee infux has fuelled the rise of neo-fascist parties in Greece (Dinas et al., 2019).

Given that during the recent 'refugee crisis' Greece has played an important role, primarily as a transit country, and has hosted a signifcant number of Syrian refugees, the main rationale of the present chapter is to explore Greeks' attitudes towards the specifc ethnic group entering the country. Using survey data from the EU-funded TransSOL project5 and incorporating realistic group confict and social identity theories I investigate potential determinants shaping natives' differing attitudes towards Syrian refugees.

The present chapter contributes to related migrant research in two important ways. First, the analysis focuses on Greece, a country that has been challenged by the recent 'refugee crisis' while suffering one of the deepest recessions in its modern history. In times of simultaneous crises it is fascinating to examine how attitudes towards Syrian refugees have been shaped when the population has been strained by both the economic depression and the massive infows of thousands of refugees. Second, the chapter attempts to unveil individual factors that trigger different attitudes including different levels of opposition towards Syrian refugees by providing empirical evidence on some key determinants in elaborating such stances. Understanding the individual determinants of anti-refugee sentiments is particularly important in designing effective policies that aim at modifying such negative stances.

The chapter is structured as follows: The following Sect. (5.2) discusses realistic group confict and social identity theoretical frameworks and develops specifc research hypotheses. Sections 5.3 and 5.4 present the methods applied and the statistical results, respectively providing some evidence on the main determinants shaping different attitudes towards Syrian refugees. Finally, the concluding Sect. (5.5) outlines the main fndings and discusses how these might inform policy initiatives as well as recommends some future research directions.

#### **5.2 The Realistic Group Confict and Social Identity Perspectives in Understanding Attitudes Towards Migrants**

Realistic group confict theory (Blalock, 1967; Blumer, 1958; Campbell, 1965; Sherif & Sherif, 1979) and social identity theory (Tajfel, 1981, 1982; Tajfel & Turner, 1979, 1986) constitute two of the most prominent and complementary

<sup>5</sup>More information for the project 'European Paths to Transnational Solidarity at Times of Crisis: Conditions, Forms, Role Models and Policy Responses' (TransSOL) can be found at: http:// transsol.eu/

frameworks for understanding attitudes towards migrants.6 Although these theories have been predominately applied to understanding attitudes towards individuals who voluntarily move to different host countries (Schweitzer et al., 2005) most of the recent research focusing on refugees use realistic group confict and social identity theoretical frameworks (see for instance Cowling et al., 2019; Steele & Abdelaaty, 2019).

Realistic group confict theory focuses on material interests and primarily entertains economic justifcations for anti-migrant sentiments (Blalock, 1967; Blumer, 1958; Bobo, 1999; Campbell, 1965; Coser, 1956; Olzak, 1992; Quillian, 1995; Sherif & Sherif, 1979). Proponents of the theory advocate that the inter-group competition between natives and migrants over the same material resources (such as jobs, welfare benefts, etc.) drives realistic threat perceptions to natives' interests, which, in turn, motivate unfavourable attitudes towards migrants. Natives' perceptions of such competitive threats from migrants might be infuenced by individual determinants as well as macro level factors. With respect to the former, natives with low socioeconomic status and low skill levels perceive higher inter-group competition and therefore higher realistic threats which in turn motivate their opposition towards migrants (Dustmann & Preston, 2007; Mayda, 2006). It should be noted that migrants usually occupy the lowest echelons of the social ladder as on average they work at less prestigious positions, therefore natives in a similar precarious socioeconomic status perceive higher threats and are prone to negative stances towards migrants (Coenders et al., 2008; Gijsberts et al., 2004; Gorodzeisky & Semyonov, 2009; Kalogeraki, 2012; O'Rourke & Sinnott, 2006; Scheepers et al., 2002).

The macro level factors primarily involve the state of the economy and the size of the migrant population in the host country. Adverse socioeconomic conditions (such as high unemployment rates) intensify the inter-group competition over scarce material resources whereas a sizeable migrant group implies a large number of competitors in the labour market which increase natives' realistic threats and triggers opposition towards migrants (Lahav, 2004; Schneider, 2008; Semyonov et al., 2008; Sides & Citrin, 2007).

Although realistic group confict theory emphasises the key role of material interests in shaping attitudes towards migrants, social identity theory underscores the importance of symbolic and cultural threat perceptions. These threat perceptions refer to natives' fears that newcomers with distinct values, norms and beliefs threaten the cultural identity of the host country (Zárate et al., 2004). Proponents of social identity theory contend that individuals defne themselves in terms of group membership and strive to achieve a positive social identity by assigning positive characteristics to the members of their own social group (in-group favouritism) at the expense of other social groups that they do not belong to (out-group discrimination) (Tajfel, 1981, 1982; Tajfel & Turner, 1979, 1986). Symbolic threats to the host

<sup>6</sup> In the chapter the term 'migrant' is used as an umbrella term to refer to any person who moves away from his or her place of usual residence, whether within a country or across an international border, and regardless of whether the movement is 'forced' or voluntary.

country's ethnic and cultural cohesiveness posed by migrants of different race, values, norms and religion are interpreted as threats to the native group's identity; therefore, such threat perceptions may activate negative stances (Davidov et al., 2008; McLaren & Johnson, 2007; Sides & Citrin, 2007; Sniderman et al., 2004). At the individual level symbolic threats intensify among individuals, emphasising the unity and coherence of the native population as a group or as a 'nation' clearly differentiating itself from other ethnic groups (Pichler, 2010). Research has shown that natives' preference for cultural unity across different European countries is one of the strongest predictors of hostility towards migrants (Ivarsfaten, 2005; Sides & Citrin, 2007). At the macro level symbolic threats can be triggered when a sizable migrant group is perceived as a threat to the ethnic and cultural cohesiveness of the host country activating negative stances towards migrants (Lahav, 2004).

Despite the importance of realistic group confict theory and social identity theory in understanding natives' attitudes towards migrants, some scholars advocate that such attitudes are formed in relation with the perceived identities and attributes (for instance, religion, culture, economic status, country of origin, etc.) of migrants per se which might activate different types of threat perceptions and in turn stimulate negative stances (Hellwig & Sinno, 2017). For instance, Ford (2011) found that among the British population opposition towards non-white and culturally more distinct migrant groups was higher than towards white and culturally more proximate groups, i.e. migrants from countries with stronger cultural and political links to Britain.

Based on the aforementioned research one could assume that refugees who originate from culturally distinctive countries will pose greater threats to the cultural unity, therefore, in accordance with social identity theory, they might attract more opposing attitudes. Because of Syrian refugees' different cultural and religious background (most of them are Arab and Muslims)7 than the dominant Greek one, the sizable arrivals of the specifc ethnic group might activate symbolic and cultural threat perceptions and therefore prompt opposing attitudes among the native population. It should be noted that recent studies show Greeks' increased concerns about Islam and Muslims (Dixon et al., 2019; Lipka, 2018; Tent, 2017). Moreover, the recent sizable refugee infux partly coincides with a deteriorating economic environment due to the Greek recession, i.e. macro level conditions that according to realistic group confict theory foster negative stances towards migrants (Kalogeraki, 2015). As Syrian refugees constitute an important segment of the recent refugee infux, I expect the specifc ethnic group to attract unfavourable attitudes. Therefore, I hypothesise that opposition towards Syrian refugees is widespread in Greece (Hypothesis 1).

Attitudes towards migrants might range from strong opposition to strong support, i.e. including different levels of opposing and accepting attitudes (Abdel-Fattah, 2018). In the present study I expect that due to the perceived cultural and

<sup>7</sup> It should be noted that although Syria has no offcial religion, approximately 85% of the population is Muslim, and of these, 85% are Sunni Muslims (Kurian, 1987).

religious distinctiveness between Syria and Greece, individual determinants associated with social identity theory will be particularly important in shaping natives' moderate acceptance and different levels of opposition towards Syrian refugees. However, strong opposition towards the specifc ethnic group might be triggered by an amalgam of individual factors related with both realistic group confict and social identity theoretical frameworks. Due to the recessionary conditions prevailing in the country a signifcant segment of the Greek population has suffered from record unemployment and poverty rates, therefore the massive refugee infows might have triggered socioeconomic concerns motivating unfavourable stances. Drawing on the theoretical discussed arguments and the empirical evidence, the following hypotheses are examined:


Moreover, several studies have established links between specifc demographic characteristics and opposition towards refugees. Recent meta-analytic reviews support that older age, being male and being resident in an urban setting are associated with unfavourable attitudes towards refugees (Anderson & Ferguson, 2018; Cowling et al., 2019). Therefore, I expect the specifc demographic attributes to predict natives' opposition towards Syrian refugees entering Greece (Hypothesis 4).

#### **5.3 Data and Measurements**

The chapter used a Greek dataset that derived from an online survey conducted during November and December 2016 within the context of the TransSOL project.8 The Greek sample (n = 2061) was matched to national statistics with quotas for education, age, gender and region. Since I explored Greeks' attitudes towards a specifc ethnic group, i.e. Syrian refugees, the analysis excluded from the initial sample migrants. In the chapter migrants were operationalised as individuals whose parents and who themselves were born abroad (Dumont & Lemaître, 2005), therefore the number of observations used in the analysis was reduced from the initial

<sup>8</sup>The survey data used in the chapter derived from Work Package 3 ('Online Survey: Individual forms of solidarity') of the project. More information for the specifc Work Package and the methods applied see the Integrated Report (TransSOL, 2017).

sample size to n = 1975. In the sample 49.7% were men and 50.3% were women whereas the mean age was approximately 47 years old. Individuals with lower education (i.e. less than lower secondary education) accounted for 45.2% of the sample, whereas 35.7% and 19.1% had intermediate (i.e. upper secondary and postsecondary non-tertiary education) and higher education (i.e. university and above), respectively.

The survey included a question that asked respondents how they think Greece should handle refugees feeing the war in Syria providing four responses: Greece a) should admit higher numbers than recently (labelled as 'strong acceptance' b) should keep the numbers coming here about the same (labelled as 'moderate acceptance'), c) should admit lower numbers than recently (labelled as 'moderate opposition') and d) should not let anyone from this group come here at all (labelled as 'strong opposition'). The question measured the level of acceptance/opposition towards Syrian refugees entering Greece.

Predictor variables involved a set of items capturing specifc demographic characteristics and measurements of individual characteristics that in accordance to realistic group confict and social identity theory are associated with attitudes towards migrants. With respect to the demographic characteristics, respondents' gender, age, and area of living were included in the analysis. The latter was assessed with a recoded variable including individuals living in an urban area, a semi-urban area or a rural area.

Three indicators of socioeconomic status were used in the analysis to investigate the hypotheses associated with realistic group confict theory including respondents' educational attainment, income and occupational class. Educational attainment was measured with three responses including individuals with lower education (i.e. less than lower secondary education), intermediate (i.e. upper secondary and post-secondary non-tertiary education) and higher education (i.e. university and above). Income was measured with a question asking respondents on a ten-point scale for their household monthly net income after tax and compulsory deductions from all sources providing ten responses: a) less than 575€, b) 576€-775€, c) 776€-980€, d) 981€-1.190€, e) 1.191€-1.425€, f)1.426€-1.700€, f)1.701€-2.040€, g) 2.041€-2.500€, h) 2.501€-3.230€, i) 3.231€ or more. Respondents' occupational class was assessed with a recoded variable including 'low occupational class' (such as skilled/semi-skilled or unskilled manual workers), 'middle occupational class' (such as clerical/sales or services/foreman or supervisor of other workers), 'high occupational class' (such as professional/managerial workers) and 'other occupational class' (such as farming, military workers).

The questionnaire included three questions related to social identity theory measuring on a fve-point scale ('Not at all attached,' 'Not very attached,' 'Neither,' 'Quite attached,' 'Very attached') respondents' level of attachment to different groups of people, including 'people from your country of birth,' 'people with the same religion as you' and 'all people and the humanity.' The recoded variables ('Not attached,' 'Neither,' 'Attached') assessed respondents' level of identifcation with those born in their country and those of the same religion with them, as well as their level of identifcation with 'all people and the humanity.'

The analysis involved descriptive and multinomial logistic regression analysis to explore Greeks' attitudes towards Syrian refugees entering the country. The latter is used to predict the probability of category membership on the dependent variable measuring 'moderate acceptance,' 'moderate opposition' and 'strong opposition' compared to 'strong acceptance' of Syrian refugees based on the set of independent variables previously described. For the analysis data were weighted to match national population statistics in terms of gender, age and educational level.

#### **5.4 Findings**

Figure 5.1 shows that more than half of the Greek respondents (52.6%) expressed moderate opposition towards Syrian refugees and 18% adopted the most opposing attitude by supporting that Greece should not let any Syrian refugee entering the country. Approximately one out of fve respondents (20.5%) showed moderate acceptance of Syrian refugees, whereas almost 9% strong acceptance of the specifc ethnic group. The descriptive fndings demonstrated that opposition attitudes towards Syrian refugees were prevalent among the Greek population.

Tables 5.1 and 5.2 present the descriptive analysis of respondents' characteristics among groups reporting different attitudes towards Syrian refugees. As expected the most widespread response among respondents with different characteristics is reported for 'moderate opposition' (Table 5.1). Specifcally, almost half of the male respondents (48.9%) and more than half of the female ones (56.4%) reported moderate opposition towards Syrian refugees entering Greece. Strong opposition towards Syrian refugees was higher among male respondents (22.4%) than female

**Fig. 5.1** Attitudes (%) towards Syrian refugees entering Greece


**Table 5.1** Descriptive analysis of respondents' age and income among groups reporting different attitudes towards Syrian refugees entering Greece

**Table 5.2** Descriptive analysis of respondents' age and income among groups reporting different attitudes towards Syrian refugees entering Greece


*M* mean, *SD* standard deviation

ones (13.5%). More men (10.5%) than women (7.2%) reported strong acceptance of the specifc ethnic group entering the country, whereas the inverse fndings were found for respondents reporting moderate acceptance. The vast majority of respondents living in rural areas (67.5%) reported moderate opposition towards Syrian refugees entering Greece whereas slightly more than half of individuals residing in urban and semi-urban areas reported similar stances. The highest prevalence of strong opposition towards the specifc ethnic group (18.5%) as well as of strong acceptance (9.6%) was found for individuals living in urban areas compared to their counterparts in rural and semi-urban settings.

More than half of participants with different levels of educational attainment reported moderate opposition towards Syrian refugees, whereas the highest prevalence for the specifc response was reported for respondents with higher educational attainment (58.4%). The highest prevalence of the most opposing stance towards Syrian refugees was found among individuals with lower educational attainment (25.3%), whereas strong acceptance of the specifc ethnic group was higher among respondents with higher educational attainment (10.7%) than other educational background. With respect to respondents' occupational class, more individuals belonging to the higher occupational class (57.4%) compared to respondents in other occupational classes reported moderate opposition towards Syrian refugees entering Greece. The highest prevalence of strong opposition was reported among individuals belonging to the 'other' occupational class (27.7%) whereas strong acceptance of Syrian refugees was higher among individuals of the lower occupational class (13.0%) than the other occupational classes (Table 5.1).

The analysis indicated that the most widespread response among respondents with different degrees of attachment to different groups of people, as indicators of social identity theory, was reported for the moderate opposition towards Syrian refugees. The highest prevalence of strong opposition was found among respondents that do not feel attached to 'all people and the humanity' (26.4%). Favourable attitudes towards Syrian refugees related to strong (16.3%) and moderate acceptance of the specifc ethnic group (23.9%) were found among individuals that feel attached to 'all people and the humanity.'

Moreover, the descriptive analysis showed that more than half of the Greeks who feel attached to the people born in their own country (55.5%) reported moderate opposition towards Syrian refugees. The highest prevalence of strong opposition towards the specifc ethnic group was found for Greeks who do not feel attached to the people born in their own country (23.7%). Strong acceptance of the Syrian refugees was higher among individuals that do not feel attached (11.0%) or feel neither detached nor attached to the people born in their own country (11.6%). The prevalence of responses associated with strong (19.4%) and moderate opposition (60%) towards Syrian refugees entering Greece was higher among individuals attached to the people of their own religion. The prevalence of responses related with strong acceptance of the specifc ethnic group was higher among Greeks who do not feel attached to the people of their own religion (13.5%) (Table 5.1).

Table 5.2 shows that the mean age of respondents reporting strong opposition towards Syrian refugees was higher (M = 49.09, SD = 14.39) than those with less opposing stances. The lowest mean age was reported for individuals reporting moderate acceptance of the specifc ethnic group (M = 45.30, SD = 15.51). The most opposing attitude towards Syrian refugees was found among respondents with the lowest mean income (M = 3.30, SD = 2.28) whereas individuals reporting moderate acceptance of the specifc ethnic group have the highest mean income (M = 4.27, SD = 2.40).

Table 5.3 presents the multinomial logistic regression analysis for the variables predicting membership in the groups of 'moderate acceptance,' 'moderate opposition' and 'strong opposition' towards Syrian refugees compared to the 'strong acceptance' group (reference group). Respondents' gender, occupational class and level of attachment to 'all people and the humanity' were signifcant predictors in differentiating the 'moderate acceptance' group from the reference group. Specifcally, male respondents were less likely to be in the group of respondents showing moderate acceptance towards Syrian refugees rather than the group fully accepting them. Furthermore, respondents of middle occupational class as well as those reporting that they are not attached or feel neither detached nor attached to 'all people and the humanity' were more likely to express moderate acceptance towards Syrian refugees compared to the reference group.

In the comparison of survey respondents with moderate opposition towards Syrian refugees to those that fully accepting them, all the indicators related with social identity theory as well as respondents' gender and area of living were signifcant predictors. Specifcally, male respondents and those residing either in urban or rural areas were less likely to be in the group of respondents showing moderate opposition rather than the group fully accepting Syrian refugees. Moreover, respondents reporting lack of attachment or feeling neither detached nor attached to 'all people and the humanity' were signifcantly more likely to express moderate opposition. Furthermore, attachment to the people from respondents' country of birth and from the same religion predicted membership in the group of moderate opposition rather than the group of respondents fully accepting Syrian refugees (Table 5.3).

All variables under study, except from the attachment to people from respondents' country of birth, became signifcant predictors in differentiating the respondents who strongly oppose Syrian refugees from those who fully accept them. Specifcally, older individuals were more likely to strongly oppose Syrian refugees rather than to strongly accept them. High earners, male respondents as well as respondents living in urban or semi-urban areas were less likely to strongly oppose Syrian refugees compared to the reference group. Indicators of socioeconomic status, such as the lower educational attainment, the lower occupational class and the 'other' occupational class predicted membership in the group of 'strong opposition.' Additionally, lack of attachment to 'all people and the humanity' but strong attachment to the people of the same religion predicted membership in the group of 'strong opposition' rather than the reference group. It should be noted that the Odds Ratios (ORs) of the specifc indicators were increased, indicating that these attributes related to social identity theory were particularly important in differentiating strong opposition towards Syrian refugees rather than fully accepting them.

**Table 5.3** Multinomial logistic regression analysis for the variables predicting membership in groups of 'Moderate acceptance,' 'Moderate opposition' and 'Strong opposition' compared to 'Strong acceptance' of Syrian refugees entering Greece (*n* = 1698)


(continued)


**Table 5.3** (continued)

(continued)


**Table 5.3** (continued)

Nagelkerke pseudo-R2 = 0.25, *SE* Standard Error, *OR* Odds Ratio, *CI* Confdence Interval, a the reference group is 'Strong acceptance' b Reference category. This parameter was set to zero because it is redundant, Data weighted

#### **5.5 Discussion**

In 2016, the closure of the Balkan route and the EU-Turkey Statement led to the decline of refugee infow; however, a high number of refugees were left stranded in Greece waiting for relocation or for getting integrated into the country (European Commission, 2017). The present chapter inspired by the realistic group confict and social identity theoretical frameworks (Blalock, 1967; Blumer, 1958; Bobo, 1999; Sherif & Sherif, 1979; Tajfel, 1981, 1982) examined specifc determinants forming Greeks' attitudes towards Syrian refugees during the recent 'refugee crisis,' which as discussed earlier, in the present chapter it refers to the perspectives of the host countries and the challenges they face due to the large groups of refugees entering their borders. The fndings provide some preliminary evidence that the 'refugee crisis,' i.e. the sizable refugee infux in Greece as well as the recessionary conditions prevailing in the country might have triggered socioeconomic concerns and symbolic threats (Kalogeraki, 2015; Lahav, 2004; Semyonov et al., 2008; Sides & Citrin, 2007; Chap. 6 in Fokas et al., this volume). Such threats, in line with the hypotheses, have activated extensive opposition towards Syrian refugees (including both moderate and strong opposition) as approximately seven out of ten Greek respondents reported such a negative stance. Similar anti-refugee sentiments have been also reported in the city of Athens receiving large numbers of refugees and asylum seekers from the Aegean islands (Chap. 14 in Stratigaki, this volume). For instance, local citizens reacted negatively for the access of refugee children to specifc schools, for renting out apartments to host refugees and in some cases locals expressed their discomfort when meeting Syrian women wearing their headscarves.

Due to the cultural and religious distinctiveness between Syria and Greece, natives' concerns about refugees' potential impact on the Greek customs and traditions may have played a decisive role in triggering widespread opposition (Adida et al., 2019; Bansak et al., 2016; Ivarsfaten, 2005). Accordingly, several studies have shown that host populations prefer migrants from originating countries whose cultures are perceived as similar to their own (Dustmann & Preston, 2007; Hainmueller & Hangartner, 2013). Moreover, research suggests that host populations prefer migrants whose faith and traditions match the host countries' dominant religion (Adida et al., 2019; Laitin et al., 2016). For instance, Bansak et al. (2016) argue that in traditionally Christian societies, religious concerns are crucial in shaping unfavourable attitudes towards Muslim asylum seekers.

In accordance with the aforementioned arguments, specifc factors related to cultural or identity concerns as developed in social identity theory (Davidov et al., 2008; Sides & Citrin, 2007; Sniderman et al., 2004; Tajfel, 1981, 1982) were particularly important in understanding Greeks' different levels of opposition towards Syrian refugees. The analysis demonstrated that individuals who strongly identifed with people born in Greece and with those of their own religion, as well as individuals feeling detached from all other people and from the humanity were more likely to oppose Syrian refugees entering the country. Although strong attachment to people born in Greece became a non-signifcant predictor for individuals strongly opposing the specifc ethnic group, the increase in ORs in the rest social identity indicators indicated the decisive role of the specifc determinants in shaping extreme opposition towards Syrian refugees.

As many Syrian refugees are Arabs and Muslims, they are likely to activate symbolic threats escalating concerns on the potential incompatibility of refugees' value and belief system with the dominant culture and with Greek Orthodoxy as the dominant religion in the country. Despite the visibility of Islam in the Greek public sphere9 and the gradual transformation from a relatively culturally and ethnically homogenous society into a more diverse one (Cavounidis, 2013) hosting a signifcant number of Muslim migrants (Sakellariou, 2017), the native population seems to be reluctant in accommodating the cultural, ethnic and religious diversity of Muslims (Lipka, 2018; Tent, 2017). For instance, Dixon et al. (2019) found that the majority of the Greek population expressed increased anxiety about the potential incompatibility of the Greek culture and the Islam religion. Nevertheless, similar anxieties about Islam and Muslim migrants' cultural incompatibility with the western customs and way of life are widespread among most European populations (Wike et al., 2016) indicating that such perceptions might negatively affect attitudes towards migrants of the specifc cultural and religious background.

The hypothesis on specifc demographic characteristics was confrmed only with regard to age: older natives strongly opposed Syrian refugees entering the country. However, contrary to our expectations, men and individuals residing in urban areas were less likely to express such negative stances. As women have been particularly affected during the recent economic downturn (Anastasiou et al., 2015), it is likely that their socioeconomic concerns are more strongly heightened than those of men, and consequently that their opposition towards Syrian refugees is higher. Moreover, as migrants usually reside in urban areas, natives have more opportunities for intergroup contacts and interactions, which usually ameliorate negative attitudes towards migrants (Escandell & Ceobanu, 2009). In agreement with our expectations, extreme opposition towards Syrian refugees is not only shaped by individual factors related to social identity theory, but also to realistic group confict theory. The analysis indicated that individuals of lower socioeconomic status, i.e. of lower income, educational attainment and occupational class, were more likely to strongly oppose Syrian refugees rather than fully accept them. The recent recession has intensifed socioeconomic perceived threats among natives of lower socioeconomic status (Kalogeraki, 2015) who are likely to compete for similar positions with Syrian refugees in the labour market. Providing empirical support to realistic group confict theory, concerns over scarce economic resources might have activated extreme opposition towards the specifc ethnic group among natives in the lower positions of the social ladder. The aforementioned fndings underscore that the profle of the native population strongly opposing the specifc ethnic group includes an amalgamation of individual attributes related with both cultural as well as socioeconomic determinants.

Both cross-sectional (e.g. Dixon et al., 2019) and cross-national studies (e.g. Wike et al., 2016) underscore the relatively high prevalence of unfavourable attitudes towards refugees among the Greek population. Nevertheless, such empirical evidence lacks a thorough investigation of the main determinants shaping such negative stances specifcally towards Syrian refugees, who constitute an important

<sup>9</sup> 10It should be noted that in Greece, there is an indigenous Muslim minority located in Western Thrace, including 110,000–120,000 Muslims of Greek citizenship that enjoy a number of minority rights.

segment of the refugee population in Greece. The chapter sheds some empirical light on key individual level factors that trigger anti-refugee sentiments/attitudes towards Syrian refugees; therefore, it empirically enriches a relatively underresearched issue for the Greek case. At the theoretical level the chapter contributes to migrant related research on the signifcance of realistic group confict and social identity theories to examine key factors shaping natives' attitudes towards migrants.

To mitigate the anti-refugee sentiments/attitudes, policy initiatives need to be designed (see e.g. Chap. 13 in Tramountanis, this volume) that aim at curtailing the main sources of negative stances. These interventions may involve cultural diversity programmes targeting the promotion of intercultural dialogue which may counter Greeks' socio-economic and mostly cultural concerns about the potential impacts of Syrian refugees on the country.

It should be noted that even though Syrian refugees continue, even nowadays, to be an important segment of the refugee population in Greece, recent data demonstrate that top refugee nationalities also include Afghans (UNHCR, 2020). Due to the lack of questions on attitudes towards refugees of different ethnic backgrounds in the questionnaire, the present chapter is limited specifcally to Syrian refugees. Studies investigating natives' attitudes towards different ethnic groups and types of migrants are exceptionally scarce (Hellwig & Sinno, 2017). However, migrants of different ethnic origins might trigger different concerns and consequently attract different attitudes among host populations (Ford, 2011). Future studies may examine whether refugees of different ethnic backgrounds and qualities activate different types of socioeconomic and cultural threat perceptions, as well as explore the mechanisms that each of these threats, activate negative stances.

**Acknowledgments** Data presented in this chapter have been collected as part of the project 'European paths to transnational solidarity at times of crisis: Conditions, forms, role models and policy responses' (TransSOL). The project received funding from the European Union's Horizon 2020 programme under grant agreement No 649435. The TransSOL consortium is coordinated by the University of Siegen (Christian Lahusen), and is formed, additionally, by Glasgow Caledonian University (Simone Baglioni), European Alternatives e.V. Berlin (Daphne Büllesbach), Sciences Po Paris (Manlio Cinalli), University of Florence (Carlo Fusaro), University of Geneva (Marco Giugni), University of Sheffeld (Maria Grasso), University of Crete (Maria Kousis), University of Siegen (Christian Lahusen), European Alternatives Ltd. LBG UK (Lorenzo Marsili), University of Warsaw (Maria Theiss), and the University of Copenhagen (Hans-Jörg Trenz).

#### **References**


**Stefania Kalogeraki** is Associate Professor of Quantitative Methods in Sociology and Social Demography at the Department of Sociology, University of Crete (Greece). She holds a BSc in Statistics (1998, Athens University of Economic and Business, Greece), an MA in Sociology with Research Training (2002, University of Reading, UK) and a PhD in Sociology (2007, University of Reading, UK). She has participated as a member of research teams in European cross-national projects and worked as principal investigator in Greek surveys. She is the author of two books (in Greek) and editor/co-editor of three volumes (in English and in Greek). Her main research interests focus on questionnaire design, quantitative social research, secondary data analysis, mixed method designs and social demographic analysis with a special research interest on migration.

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## **Chapter 6 Cognitive Maps, Cultural Distances and National Stereotypes in Times of Crises: Comparing Greece and Hungary**

**Nikos Fokas, Gábor Jelenf, and Róbert Tardos**

#### **6.1 Introduction**

This chapter deals with the parallel impacts of the 2008 fnancial crisis and the 2015 massive fow of refugees on public beliefs in Greece and Hungary. Our analysis utilises data from a multistage research project,1 focusing not so much on the crises situations themselves, but on the public beliefs concerning these crises. In the spring of 2014, the Peripato Research Group of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences at the Eötvös Loránd University conducted the 'Crisis and Social Innovation' Survey. The questionnaire contained a module on immigration and stereotypes towards some nations and further questions on various public issues (including the issue of trust) (Fokasz et al., 2017). The next stage of our research emerged from the insight that the refugee infux from Turkey along the so-called Balkan route during 2015–2016 was an unprecedented mutual experience for both Greeks and Hungarians.

Given that this 'refugee crisis' generally impacted public life both in Greece and Hungary, the Peripato Research Group conducted online comparative surveys in Hungary and Greece, in collaboration with EKKE (*Ethniko Kentro Kinonikon Erevnon* [National Centre for Social Research]) in Athens, at the turn of 2016 and 2017. To place the initial refugee problem in a broader framework, our research also dealt with the more general questions of the economic and social shocks of the last decade that had a strong impact on citizen beliefs and public images. These crises

<sup>1</sup>The Peripato Research Group was awarded a research grant from the Hungarian Academy of Sciences in 2013.

N. Fokas (\*) · G. Jelenf · R. Tardos Eötvös Loránd University, Budapest, Hungary e-mail: fokasz.nikosz@tatk.elte.hu

substantially affected how the position of other nations and that of their own was seen in the Greek and Hungarian public.

Based on the 2016–17 Peripato survey fndings this chapter attempts to study national and ethnic images by extending a classical technique developed by Buchanan and Cantril (1953), adopting contemporary network methodology. Our central research question concerns the impact international crises have on global world images, stereotypes and cultural distances and the rearrangements of the mental confgurations in the two countries. The chapter targets the general patterns that can be revealed on the basis of various stereotypes with regard to sympathies and perceived skills. Our approach pays special attention to the 'catnet' character of network-like entities, that is those with salient categorical properties (White, 2008), and to the interplay of these features based on the structural and cultural duality (Breiger, 2010).

In order to approach the public discourse from other perspectives beyond the survey methodology, we also conducted a socio-semantic network analysis of media contents. A two-mode network analysis (Yang & González-Bailón, 2018) was performed on textual data based on the co-occurrence of words. On the one hand, our analysis included countries and ethnic groups,2 and on the other, various activity domains as properties typically attached to these nationalities.

The media research was based on our previous comparative analysis of the Greek and the Hungarian public discourse in the course of 2015 (Bodor et al., 2016). Our research revealed that the topics which prevailed in the 2015 Greek political public discourse were the debt crisis and the 'refugee crisis.' The detailed reconstruction of the related processes indicated that the initial prevalence of topics was connected to the debt crisis, and that a change took place with a surge of the 'refugee crisis' in August 2015 (Fokas et al., 2021). Some lessons from these previous studies may provide an introductory view of the settings that surrounded the present research.

As far as Hungary is concerned, during 2015, we detected a signifcant turn of the political agendas in the press (Bodor et al., 2016). Since the terrorist attacks against *Charlie Hebdo,* the Hungarian government used various ways to place the immigration issue in the focus of the Hungarian public discourse. The character and themes, and even the vocabulary of this discourse were determined by the government's xenophobic communication during 2015–2016 (Gerő & Sik, 2020; Simonovits, 2020):

• April 2015 witnessed the start of the so-called 'national consultation on immigration and terrorism,' initiated by the government. The very title of the consultation clearly showed that throughout this campaign, the Hungarian government immediately associated the topic of immigration with terrorism.

<sup>2</sup>We also included Arabs as one of the national and ethnic groups in both the survey and the media analyses, given the direct implications of the 'refugee crisis' and the migration wave in Europe.


The investigation of the Greek and Hungarian dailies clearly showed (Bodor et al., 2016; Fokas et al., 2017) that the Greek and Hungarian media were different in the ways in which they assimilated and presented the 'Others' during the 2015 high refugee infux. Comparing the two countries' dailies, it was especially conspicuous that during 2015 the various versions used for 'illegal migrants' appeared in the Hungarian dailies twenty times more often than in the Greek ones, which was an apparent indication of the different ideological and political contexts embedded in the Hungarian and the Greek media. These observations were of special relevance for initiating further studies to explore the impact of international crises on global images, stereotypes and cultural distances in these two countries. Media framing were obviously infuential in the development of these cultural schemes, as to both the image of nations and of ethnic groups, and to the perception of the crises. The analyses of media contents based on text corpora of political dailies on various activity domains and countries/nationalities provided additional details for the study of changes in the public opinion related to the crisis context.4

By presenting an overview of the related literature, Section 6.2 reveals how public attention in Greece shifted from focusing on the fnancial crisis towards focusing on the migration issue, while public discourse in Hungary was dominated by xenophobic and anti-immigrant content. In this section we also present a conceptual discussion, with special regard to a social network approach (Breiger, 2010; White, 2008) applied to both the surveys on national stereotypes and the media analyses of public discourse. The data sources and the specifc methods used are analysed in Sect. 6.3 and range from the classical comparative technique based on a joint

<sup>3</sup>There were giant roadside billboards (in Hungarian) throughout the country stating that 'If you come to Hungary, don't take Hungarians' jobs!' or 'If you come to Hungary, you have to keep our laws' and 'If you come to Hungary, you have to respect our culture!'

<sup>4</sup>Thematically, the topic of the crisis was involved as a part of the domain roster of our media analyses. Also, the temporal extension of the period covered by our media analyses permitted us to include both signifcant crisis events of the recent decades.

approach of attributes and nationalities in the adaptation of our key survey instrument, to the related thematic domains implied by our media analyses.

Section 6.4 on the fndings of both pillars of our investigations highlights the visual confgurations as they emerge from the surveys on national stereotypes and the thematic patterns related to the same countries, as they manifest themselves from a corresponding analysis of the Greek and Hungarian online press. The fndings are summarised and discussed in the concluding (Sect. 6.5), also involving historical and cultural-anthropological material into their interpretation within a broader perspective.

#### **6.2 Related Research and Conceptual Literature**

Though the recent fnancial and refugee crises have given rise to several studies on the development of the related public attitudes and the rearrangements of the mental confgurations, the focal subject matter of our study has remained more or less unexplored. A substantial body of comparative research on the consequences of the 2008 fnancial collapse was produced regarding public attitudes towards international institutions and inter-state relations. Sierp and Karner (2017) have raised the emergence of a new type of essentialism connecting notions of reifed collectives with their economic achievements, with special regard to those in a lending position along the North/South divide. Processes of victimisation and the generation of expressive narratives have been submitted to quantitative and qualitative analyses by Lialiouti and Bithymitris (2017), Capelos and Exadaktylos (2017) and Michailidou (2017), with special regard to the currently stereotypical features of the Greek-German relationship in the Greek public discourse. Hutter and Kriesi (2019) have pointed out a sharp politicisation of the crisis phenomena on the public agendas. Regional characteristics such as an emphasis on European economic issues with respect to the polarisation of the political landscapes in the Southern part of the continent are also relevant for our study.5

The latter observations already relate to the effects of the 2015–16 refugee crisis, a subject which has also witnessed a growth of publications based on surveys and media analyses. As observed by Paschou et al. (Chap. 7 in this volume), public claims-making in Greece turned towards the migration issue somewhat later than in other parts of Europe. Our related analysis of online contents (Fokas et al., 2021) indicated the parallel domination of two topics in the Greek public discourse: the debt crisis and the refugee crisis, with a shift from the former to the latter beginning in August of 2015. The analyses related to the Hungarian media revealed the

<sup>5</sup>With more attention to the Greek developments Koniordos (2014) has focused on the erosion of confdence in the reciprocity between the governing elite. Pleios (2014) has highlighted the emerging prevalence of a tone of fnancial expertise in media contents alongside with a loss of expressive features of media-specifc representations.

domination of the political discourse by the 'refugee crisis' in 2015, heavily impacted by xenophobic anti-immigrant propaganda messages.

Utilising comparative material from the European Social Survey, Messing and Ságvári (2019) and Gerő and Sik (2020) pointed to an exceptional increase in noninclusive Hungarian attitudes towards migration issues. Simonovits (2014) presented the selectivity of exclusion-oriented attitudes towards migrants for this earlier period, suggesting that Hungarians tended to distance themselves to a lesser extent from European migrants than from migrants of more remote (non-European) origins. Boda and Simonovits (2016) indicated a further decrease in the receptive attitudes in Hungary in the attitudes in the highlighted 2015–16 period, while Sik and Simonovits (2019) pointed out a sharp surge of refugee and immigrant topics in the media over a similar period.

However, despite more extensive research, there are no comparative studies that attempt to approach global images from a stereotypical beliefs' perspective, as originally conducted by Buchanan and Cantril's (1953) classical study in the aftermath of World War II.6 Though not directly crisis-related, the work by Fiske and her colleagues (e.g. Fiske, 2017; Fiske et al., 2007) is an important exception on the conceptual foundation of social judgment and stereotype content theory. The researchers found the emotion-driven aspect of warmth and cognition-led competence as universal dimensions of group stereotypes.7 In addition to various minority segments of the American population, Fiske et al. (2007) indicated generally low scores on both warmth and competence (e.g. 'hostile,' 'untrustworthy,' respectively 'stupid' or 'unmotivated'), the two principal dimensions.

The study of global images also requires attention to dominance-symbolic aspects. While the warmth/competence dimensional design has proven to be a plausible starting point for the present study, it also required some additions to the dominance-symbolic aspects of global images of particular relevance to our topic. The inclusion of a typology close to the sorts of skills and assets outlined by Bourdieu (1986) resulted in a broader framework in this respect.8 At the same time, the dynamic elements potentially present in the Fiske model, especially the contextual component, were more directly accessible through a network-like approach that simultaneously included aspects of cultural and structural embedment.

Global images and cognitive maps are inseparable from national stereotypes, but they do not contain the richness of pictures and memories that may be present regarding some familiar macro-collectives; however, they comprise more general cues of orientation in the world. For example, Buchanan and Cantril's abovementioned study appeared when the Western and Eastern 'camps' diverged sharply and was followed by the birth of the 'Third World' as a notion. Though with no

<sup>6</sup>The 1948/49 comparative project involved nine countries and the stereotypes of their population, along with other peoples,' including, among others, the Americans and the Russians.

<sup>7</sup>With regard to the ways immigrants were stereotyped, Fiske et al. (2007) indicated generally low scores on both warmth and competence, the two principal dimensions.

<sup>8</sup>See Angelusz and Tardos (1995) with a distinction of cognitive-instrumental, expressive and dominance skills.

exact knowledge of their meanings, most people had some ideas about the 'good' and 'bad' sides and who belonged where. The 'great transformation' of the nineties also brought a re-arrangement of beliefs about world images. The fnancial and migration crises of the last decades re-organised the perceptions and the formation of cognitive maps of the world. Besides contemporary effects, however, the global images at issue are linked to the remote past in many cases.

The mental cues of navigation at issue contain beliefs of national-ethnic entities and their wider groupings (such as what a 'Westerner' or an 'Easterner' means). Alternative emphases on being 'good,' 'smart,' or 'strong' are of importance just as the structural aspect of 'being alone' or 'together with others.' Therefore, the sharpness of the boundaries between 'Us' and 'Them' is of primary relevance (this is an aspect also highlighted by Kalogeraki in Chap. 5, this volume).

Emerging issues of migration have also triggered a reinterpretation of several aspects of national identity. Triandafyllidou (2006) points to the role of the 'Signifcant Others' that can be perceived as a source of threat for ethnic and cultural identity and independence. The motive of differentiating from others may surge amidst the confrontation of ideologically coloured platforms in public discourse. Krzyżanowski et al. (2018) analyse robust tendencies of politicisation of the 'refugee crisis' in Europe, with the related features of mediatisation entailing a sharp polarisation of public opinion on migration issues and in many cases evoking traditional exclusionary patterns rather than new ways of perception of 'Others' outside national boundaries.

New currents of network analysis mutually linking structural and cultural aspects are key sources for our theoretical and methodological orientation. The cultural turn of the network analysis was in many respects anticipated by Harrison White's (2008[1965]) explications on the catnet concept.9 Basov et al. (2020) review of the recently increased body of socio-semantic networks research was the next step. It combined the two-mode perspective of cultural and social duality (as explained by Breiger, 2010; Everett & Borgatti, 2020) with a simultaneous approach of microand macro elements of society. It also emphasised not only the presence, but the absence of ties in the formation of meanings. Division and discontinuity are highlighted by the conception of 'cultural holes' (see Pachucki & Breiger, 2010 also with a reference to transnational aspects).

Results on belief networks based on total populations may be erroneous given that different subgroups can have different thought patterns with particular logics on their own (see DiMaggio & Goldberg, 2018). Thus, we analyse the general Greek and Hungarian survey populations and various segments, with their specifc stereotypical confgurations. In addition to the perception of economic hardships, we introduce the degree of trust radius as another criterion of segmentation. The level of general trust is signifcantly related to positive attitudes towards migration (see

<sup>9</sup>Catnet formations (see Diani, 2013; Fuhse, 2015) bear both structural and cultural features, while they are constituted by both 'catness' and 'netness' (from soccer fans' communities to examples of political-ideological camps or national-ethnic groupings).

e.g. Drazanova & Dennison, 2018), and as part of an inclusive orientation, migration attitudes are also associated with the radius of trust (see Delhey et al., 2011).

The element of national uniqueness rooted in history, both in Greece and Hungary, is a key aspect of our empirical analyses and the discussion of fndings. Our triangulation efforts are not only methodological, using both survey and media analyses to study public images, but also involve contextualising our fndings in light of historical-cultural evidence (see Tsoukalas, 1995 or Luhmann, 1995 for such a broader perspective).

#### **6.3 Research Design**

Our research design is based on a network approach using data from a comparative attitudinal survey and on the media analysis of two daily newspapers, as described in detail below.

**Comparative Survey of Stereotypes:** The adapted Buchanan-Cantril questionnaire block of national stereotypes was administered at the turn of 2016 and 2017 on subsamples of 907 Greek and 1000 Hungarian Internet-using respondents aged 18–70. Our version of the Buchanan and Cantril (1953) method required some substantive and technical modifcations. We sought to balance the positive (Brave, Debonair, Generous, Hard-working, Intelligent, Open, Passionate, Practical, Selfcontrolled) and negative adjectives (Backward, Conceited, Crafty, Cruel, Domineering, Factious, Lazy), with some increase of the latter aspect in the questionnaire. The scope of attributes was also expanded with special regard to some in-group and out-group features of national-ethnic stereotypes. Besides the feeling aspect, our version also emphasised competencies (see Fiske et al., 2007) and the knowledge styles based on cognitive-instrumental, expressive, and dominantsymbolic skills (See Angelusz & Tardos, 1995). The respondent had to select three attributes considered most characteristic of the given nationality from the provided list. In addition to Greeks and Hungarians, we selected some nationalities – Americans, Germans, Russians– based on their historical or current political roles. Due to the 2015–16 wave of migration, 'Arabs' were also included.

**Network Analysis in a Two-Mode Approach:** Our survey tackled two types of entities: nations and attributes which constituted each other through their linkages. Their stereotyped cognitive maps in the two populations were depicted by twomode tools of network visualisation (see Everett & Borgatti, 2020). These global images were revealed from the joint clustering of nations and attributes, outlining cultural proximities/distances and knowledge-style dimensions in a parallel way.

Network inputs as scores for a kind of cultural matrix (see Edelmann & Mohr, 2018) were generated by the attributes' relative occurrences with the given nationalities in the two samples. Scores of similarities and differences implied the stereotypical features attributed to nations.

We aggregated multiple response contingency tables including all nation/attribute mentions. These were transformed into a network analysis format through adjusted standardised residuals by post-hoc analysis with Bonferroni adjustment (Agresti, 2019). The positively signifcant and the negatively signifcant values highlighted the salient and the non-characteristic features for each nationality, respectively.

We identifed community structures (see Girvan & Newman, 2002) based on two-mode network techniques. The two-mode Factions module was used to fnd sub-groups with both relational and positional features of direct or indirect relations. The community groupings comprising both aspects, nationalities and attributes, provided the outlines of network patterns with categorical characteristics.

**Segmentation of the Survey Population:** One selected dimension segmented the population by their perceived exposure to the economic crisis. The degree of being stricken by the economic crisis was approached by a composite index of seven variables. These related to the evaluation of the personal situation, the country's economic situation, life satisfaction and a question on the most important problems.

Another dimension of segmentation was related to the refugee crisis, in terms of external groups (foreigners, people of different nationalities, people of different religions) with which we segmented the population based on the levels of the radius of trust. The survey questions included various target groups from the family to the 'strangers.' We separated the population into three segments again, from 'trusting only the family' to 'trusting more distant groups too,' referring to minimal, narrow and broad trust radius.

**Media Analysis Regarding Topic Domains and Nations:** Relying on a previous media dynamics study for some political dailies by Bodor et al. (2016), our analysis of media contents extended the period covered by the study from 2004 to 2016. The database embraced the online edition of two dailies per country, *Kathimerini* and *To Vima*, from Greece and *NOL* and *MNO* from Hungary. These dailies were chosen based on their common traits. All of them had a considerable history and solid reputations. The former ones from both countries were considered right-leaning while the latter left-leaning.

The analysed themes included nations, on the one hand, and various activity domains as properties typically attached to them, on the other. We examined the same six countries used in our survey.10 We aggregated 48 thematic units (e.g. aggression, victory, crisis, technology, and celebration), emerging from searches based on selected keywords into 14 synthetic activity domains (see Table 6.1). The 14 felds of activity take more similar positions on the cognitive-instrumental, expressive-emotional and symbolic-dominance axes than the applied stereotype attributes in the survey.

<sup>10</sup>To search for countries and ethnic groups, we used the widest possible set of keywords (country, people's name, abbreviations, etc.).


**Table 6.1** The list of aggregate activity domains in the media content analysis and the thematic keywords underlying the aggregation in the textual corpus

Our semantic network analysis, following Yang and González-Bailón (2018), which was based on the compilation of word co-occurrences (see Lenci, 2008) in distinct articles from text corpora, resulted in a two-mode (nation/domain) cultural matrix for our examination.

**Media Segmentation:** Corresponding to one key aspect of our survey analyses, we distinguished a pre-crisis and a post-crisis corpus of the newspaper texts. Constrained by our media study's period limits, the former was based on data from 2004 to 2008 and the latter from 2009 to 2016. Our study focused on the complexity of global images and in-group/out-group distinctions, which were highlighted under the impacts of the fnancial and migration crises of the last decades. Employing a contextualised adaptation, it revived the approach of the classical comparative study by Buchanan and Cantril (1953) following the aftermath of WWII concerning stereotypes of friends and foes in the public discourse of several nations. Based on the underlying conceptual framework with a duality of national-ethnic communities and attributes mutually defning each other, it made use of the contemporary apparatus of social network analysis. Beyond Greek and Hungarian populations, two cases heavily impacted under the recent crises, our analyses also differentiated between various segments of these publics differently exposed to the recent emergencies (as distinguished by the perception of the economic crisis and the radius of trust towards 'Others,' including other religions and nationalities).

#### **6.4 Findings**

Scholarly and everyday experiences all suggest that the fnancial and refugee crises of the last decades were robust enough to bear upon the perceptions of the world outside and the relations of 'Us' and 'Them.' The analyses below outline how this potential was realised in the formation of public opinion in Greece and Hungary.

#### *6.4.1 Global Images in the General Public in Greece and Hungary*

Based on the two-mode data emerging as the frequent occurrences of the nations/ attributes' matrix, we found that Greek auto-stereotypes were very strong and mostly positive. In contrast, Hungarian auto-stereotypes refected an instrumentaloriented self-image as an ideal. The Greek auto-stereotypes were much stronger than their hetero-stereotypes. Based on these stereotypes, it seems that Greeks had a defnitive idea of the kind of people they are. It is also noteworthy mentioning that of the four stronger stereotypes, two were positive (intelligent and generous), while two were rather negative (lazy and crafty) (Fig. 6.1, left side). Based on a typology of attributes according to their differentiation into instrumental, expressive and dominance-oriented traits, the prevalence of the characteristics to the right side of the origin indicated an auto-stereotypical profle of the pronouncedly expressive character.

The auto-stereotypes of the Hungarians (Fig. 6.1, right side) were much less salient than of the Greeks, and one negative attribute (factious) dominated all others. Hungarians' stereotypes concerning Greeks were also quite strong. Hungarians also had a defnitive idea as to the kind of people Greeks are. Furthermore, two attributes

**Fig. 6.1** Spider charts of national stereotypes. (based on odds ratios; Greek and Hungarian baseline samples)

(generous and lazy) assigned to Greeks by Hungarians were also strong among the auto-stereotypes of Greeks.

Greeks' and Hungarians' stereotypes concerning Germans also shared some characteristic similarities as well as differences. Attributes such as 'self-controlled' and 'hardworking' were frequently mentioned both in Greek and Hungarian samples. The differences between the samples were also of interest. Hungarians found Germans 'intelligent,' while Greeks did not share this positive image. Also regarding non-frequented characterisations, according to Greeks, Germans were defnitely 'non-open,' 'non-generous,' and 'non-brave.' It seems that Greeks also had a defnitive idea of the kind of people the Germans were not. It remains a question as to how much of this negative attitude was due to uneasy memories from the past or to more recent impressions like those regarding the German role in the treatment of the Greek debt crisis.

The visual patterns outlined by the Greek survey manifested three subgroups of nations, the 'Western-type' German–American group, the 'peripheral' Hungarian and the 'Eastern-type' Greek-Russian-Arab subgroups, framed by some characteristic attributes (Fig. 6.2).11 The abbreviation 'N' at the beginning of expressions (e.g. 'Nopen') denotes the typically non-chosen/non-characteristic traits in the fgures of two-mode networks.

The profle of the latter grouping was mainly affected by the Greek autostereotypes with mostly expressive features such as 'brave,' 'passionate,' 'open' and

**Fig. 6.2** Two-mode network pattern by the Greek baseline sample

<sup>11</sup>The division into subgroups was performed using the quality method of the two-mode Factions procedure of the Ucinet/Netdraw subgroups analysis module in Fig.6.3, 6.4, and 6.5. The procedure separated three groups of nodes (best ftting and best interpretable division). Based on this classifcation, we rearranged the visualisation layout created by the Netdraw Spring Embedding (graph theoretical) method. The given networks contain only the edges based on signifcant relationships.

'generous.' In addition, 'intelligent' was also a distinctively positive attribute, while 'crafty' was ambivalent in the Greek self-image with some positive nuances. Two positive attributes, i.e. 'generous' and 'passionate' and one negative, i.e. 'lazy' connected Greeks and Arabs, while 'brave' connected Greeks and Russians.

Regarding the out-group relations, Greeks and Hungarians were connected by the 'non-domineering' and 'hardworking' attribute ties, while the latter represented a link between Greeks and Germans. Germans and Americans were both characterised as 'conceited' as well as 'cruel' and 'domineering,' which may sound like a kind of shorthand evaluation of Western-type societies by Greeks.

Based on various criteria, we also applied the results based on total populations to various subgroups. The frst of these dimensions segmented the population by their perceived exposure to the economic crisis. The labels for the suffering and thriving segments of the poles of crisis perceptions borrowed from the classic Cantril ladder approach and we found that the 'suffering' segment was more prevalent in the Greek sample, while the 'thriving' one was relatively larger in the Hungarian case.

The 'Eastern-like' category of nations and attributes also appeared in the 'suffering' segment of the crisis perception; the positive attributes of this grouping were joined by 'intelligent' used for the Russians too (Fig. 6.3). In the grouping including Hungarians and Germans, as a difference from the baseline setup, the neutral or sometimes positive image of the Hungarians was replaced by affliation with a German profle, seen hereby especially negative. 'Cruel' became a joint attribute of Germans and Hungarians, turning the peripheral yet positive Hungarian baseline image into negative. Having suffered most from the post-2010 debt crisis, this Greek segment seems to have attributed their troubles to the severe expectations of austerity attached to Germans. Americans constituted a one-nation category with a more balanced image and a kind of mediating role.

**Fig. 6.3** Two-mode network pattern by the Greek 'suffering' segment of the crisis perception

**Fig. 6.4** Two-mode network pattern by the Hungarian baseline sample

According to the Hungarian sample as compared with the Greek global images, the most signifcant difference was related to the close position of Greeks with Hungarians, mostly due to linkages by attributes like 'generous' and 'nondomineering' (Fig. 6.4). Among the Hungarian auto-stereotypes, we found two negatives: 'factious' and 'backward.' The frst one was a distinctively negative attribute of Hungarians while the second one connected Hungarians with Arabs and Russians with regard to out-group relations. According to the Hungarian sample, 'hard-working' as well as 'non-lazy' connected Hungarians and Germans while among Hungarian auto-stereotypes 'open' was assigned to both Greeks and Americans. Somewhat differing from the pattern by the Greek sample, the 'Westerner' sub-grouping was embodied with mostly positive, respectively nonnegative, attributes (except for 'conceited' in this case, too). At the same time, the contrary stood for the 'Easterner' counterpart, especially as far as negative instrumental features were concerned.

As a further aspect of segmentation of the general populations besides crisis perception, the survey also showed that in both Greek and Hungarian cases, the radius of trust was drastically reduced for all groups other than 'the family.' There was somewhat more differentiation in the Hungarian attitudes regarding such external groups (as with religious ones, contrary to nationality and political). The somewhat symbolic 'unknown' category reached the lowest level of trust in both cases.12

<sup>12</sup>Based on the European Social Survey (ESS) data, the Greek and Hungarian public attitudes towards outgroups show similarity in a decade-long European comparison. Both the Greeks and Hungarians rejected outgroups. Hungarians had recently become even more dismissive in some areas, especially in the case of symbolic threats as observed by the 2017 Peripato survey. Social distancing (e.g. against Arabs) was high in both cases but signifcantly higher for Hungarians. In contrast, the fear of losing jobs by immigrants was more characteristic of the Greeks.

**Fig. 6.5** Two-mode network pattern by the Hungarian 'broad trust' segment of trust radius

Trust radius as a segmenting criterion resulted in more differentiation in the Hungarian than in the Greek sample and was closely related to attitudes regarding immigration (Fig. 6.5). Respondents who were more open to other groups and external relations positioned themselves in the same grouping with Arabs besides Greeks. This kind of self-image suggested a sense of community with small countries and peoples. In the global pattern of this segment, the further sub-groups of 'Westerners' (Americans and Germans) as well as of the Russians were all represented with mixed attributes (the former had more positive ones corresponding to the general pattern of the Hungarian case). This 'broad trust' pattern can be compared to the self-image of the Greek 'suffering' segment, however, with a more moderate negative counter-image of the European centre.

#### *6.4.2 Global Images in the Greek and Hungarian Media*

With a focus on how the Greek and Hungarian media assimilated the 2008 fnancial crisis, we also examined the changes in the public images of the respective six countries as compared to the pre-crisis years. In correspondence with our survey approach, we conducted media analyses of the online press highlighting these countries/nationalities and various activity domains typically attached to them with respect to characteristic skills and knowledge styles.

Figure 6.6 shows, based on the Hungarian media, how the nations' position changed in the post-crisis period (marked II on the visual schemes) as compared to

the pre-crisis years (marked I in the network diagram) –in a network confguration derived from the two-mode data-matrix of nations and thematic domains.13

From the countries/nationalities included in the study, the position of the Greeks and Germans changed signifcantly between the two periods. There was a slighter but readily noticeable shift of the Arabic image, while the position of Hungarians, Americans and Russians essentially remained unchanged.

The signifcant shift in the position of Greeks was due to no longer being linked to basically positive attributes like 'invention,' 'culture & arts,' 'tradition,' 'contests,' and 'tourism' while controversial or negative issues apparently related to the debt crisis such as 'fnance' and 'crisis' became dominant. The German shift was brought about by a strong focus on the crisis aspects in the Hungarian media between 2009 and 2016, while 'invention,' 'culture & arts,' 'tradition' and 'tourism*'* felds of activity more or less related to science and learning became less cultivated*.* The relative stability of the pattern was particularly true for the self-reference of the Hungarian media which probably had to do with a sort of path-dependence in domestic reporting.

Figure 6.7 shows, based on the Greek media, how the positions of countries/ nationalities changed in the post-crisis period compared to the pre-crisis one.

The relatively stable Greek position was due to its stable relation to basically positive aspects like 'development,' 'tourism,' 'culture & arts,' 'tradition' as well as 'protest' and 'fnance.' It does not mean any lack of thematic changes in the Greek media (Fig. 6.7). Generally, an array of activities from 'invention,' 'technology' to 'contests' or 'corruption' were relegated to the back by the domination of the elements of the crisis situation.

<sup>13</sup>We represented the network like with Fig. 6.7 too, using the graph rendering method of the Netminer Social Network Analysis Software with a Spring Embedding algorithm.

**Fig. 6.7** A two-mode network confguration of nations and thematic domains based on the analysis of Greek media

#### **6.5 Discussion and Conclusions**

The concluding section of this chapter sums up the evidence found for the periods under study, implying signifcant impacts exerted by the fnancial and refugee crises on cognitive maps and world imageries in the Greek and Hungarian public. These fndings highlight the representation of 'Others' as a source of threat, particularly in the sharply politicised Hungarian public discourse; furthermore, the heavy infuence of the perceptions of the economic crisis on attributing the troubles to the 'domineering Westerners,' with special regard to the most hard-hit segment of the Greek public. Our discussion contextualises these observations in the frames of long-range cultural-historical processes embedding the related attitudes up to 2017.

#### *6.5.1 Uniqueness and Belonging*

Cognitive maps emerging from national stereotypes called for a renewed application of the catnet concept introduced by Harrison White. The catnet-like nation/ attribute two-mode network confgurations revealed a dominant 'Western-like' component with both cases studied. The content of such a centre-block differed, however, by the specifc attributes attached to them. While the Greek cognitive maps merged Americans and Germans into one subgroup mainly for negative traits of dominance, the same nation-set was embodied by the Hungarian pattern with a positive image of modernism.

Being a key outgroup aspect of the Greek pattern, no positive attributes were found connecting the 'Western-like' and the 'Eastern-like' clusters. The Greek pattern embodied only the national self-portrait with a longer list of positive attributes. This corresponds to the idea of 'uniqueness' widely shared in Greece. Also, the 'Eastern-like' nation/attribute set appeared in its core with the Greek profle.

The crises of the last decades brought the age-old issues of 'Who we are' and 'Where we belong' to the forefront both in Greece and Hungary. 'We belong to the West' stated the prime minister of Greece, *Konstantinos Karamanlis,* in 1979. Presenting the opposite position, *Andreas Papandreou*, a later prime minister, declared: 'Greece should rather belong to the Greeks.' A similar in-between situation was depicted in Hungary with the metaphor 'Ferry-land.' All this corresponds to the Hungarian historian Szűcs (1983) about Europe's historical regions presenting East-Central Europe, including Hungary, as an intermediate one stranded between Western and Eastern Europe.

Infuencing the public discourse and public opinion, self-positioning along West/ East and North/South axes has been a major element of political discourse in both countries. The content analysis carried out on Greek newspaper texts data agreed with the survey-based fndings of stereotypical images. The domestic reports cultivated a positively shaded theme structure (like culture, tourism, traditions and science) for the whole period covered. The noticeable shift in the images of Arabs and Russians in the media compared to the pre-crisis period also coincided with tendencies in survey related results.

The Hungarian stereotypes presented a wider dispersion than the Greek ones. The Hungarian respondents were most defnitive with respect to negative features, particularly towards the Arabs and then Russians. The Greek global images' network pattern was more polarised with regard to their cultural and political affliations.

The contents of the Hungarian online press also exhibited some matches with the survey fndings, especially with regard to the auto-stereotypes. The thematic profle of the domestic focus was close to the Greek media self-portrait. An additional similarity was that this pattern remained throughout the period. However, contrary to the initial period when the domains outlined for the Greeks and Germans were close to the domestic aspects, a signifcant departure occurred after 2008, resulting in a somewhat isolated domestic position.

The Hungarian confgurations suggested some distancing from the East and even more from the South, while the Greek ones rather manifested opposition to some centre-image of big powers. They both referred to a semi-periphery situation, though the Greek 'suffering' segment even shifted to a periphery standpoint. Though a hostile image of the Centre was present in both crisis-hit cases, the self-image of the Hungarian segment was more isolated even if accompanied by some sympathy towards those from the East and South. This feeling implied some expressive attributes perceived as kin manifesting a catnet-like global pattern, sort of 'we and those left behind.' Also, the Hungarian segment of 'sufferers' exhibits a different pattern

of attribution than the Greek one. The latter tends to rely on a mechanism blaming others, while the former seems to acknowledge its own part (as shown by the presence of backward in the self-portrait).

#### *6.5.2 A 'Southern' Model*

The Greek public opinion displayed particular institutional distrust and resentment following the fnancial crisis since 2008. However, this negative turn of attitudes had less impact on subjective well-being (beliefs of self, personal confdence, level of happiness). The term 'tightness' of belief organisation (Martin, 2002) helps interpret these results.

The Greek self-portraits and some 'Eastern-like' affnities were mostly based on the expressive traits of 'connectivity' and 'self-representation' (like 'passionate,' 'debonair' or 'brave' connecting to Arabs, respectively to Russians). These fndings agree with Tsoukalas' (1995) insight that the Greek national self-portraits mirrored not so much norms and values as attitudes, habitual traits and feelings.

The appearance of 'lazy' among the 'self-related' attributes may seem curious in light of the Greek public's deep resentment regarding such a portrayal of Greeks in the European media after the 2010 debt crisis. The parallel presence of 'hardworking' in the 'suffering' population segment suggested that the traditional Greeks' self-image element of a leisurely lifestyle has been joined by the emphasis on solid work attitudes.

The combination of the attributes 'intelligent,' 'crafty' and 'lazy' referred to a rule-evading habitus regarding the role of law and norms in social life. It also suggested a public awareness of the problem of rent-seeking behaviour, putting a burden on mutual confdence. As data on trust radius also suggested, trust in Greece typically relied on direct interaction and embedded relations.

In some modifcation of his functional differentiation theory, Luhmann (1995) outlined a 'Southern' model whereby universal principles of an impersonal character, such as normative contractual obligations, played a secondary role relative to the network symbolism of reciprocity.

Both the large gap between personal and impersonal trust and the particularly low level of institutional trust14 correspond to Tsoukalas' (1995) further observation that reciprocity and expressive self-representation in Greece were stronger than normative rules, which were interpreted as a defcit in freedom.

<sup>14</sup>According to the ESS comparative data, while trust in institutions, in the Greek case (alongside with overall satisfaction), declined by 2010 even compared to pre-crisis, personal trust somewhat increased. Ervasti et al. (2019) interpret these fndings as suggesting that needs in crisis tended to bring people closer to each other. According to our fndings (calculations) the 2017 European/ World Values Study data also indicated extremely wide scissors of trust between situations, when an individual was personally known, or unknown to someone, which refects the results on trust radius. This gap was much larger in Greece than in the majority of comparative cases including Hungary.

#### *6.5.3 Public Beliefs of Themselves and 'Others'*

Trust radius, another criterion of our segmentation, was closely related to attitudes regarding migrant and outer groups. Both the Greek and the Hungarian data scored relatively high on the non-receptive traits in the European comparison. This resemblance relied, however, on a different base of experiences. Based on more extensive immediate contacts, Greeks manifested more irritation by everyday inconveniences like competition in the labour market. In turn, Hungarians' resentment against migrants and refugees was more related to abstract attitudes, a tendency likely related to a massive fow of propaganda. The Hungarian study population was signifcantly differentiated by trust radius. Those most receptive to other groups tended to have a 'small-country-like' attitude relative to hostile forces and had positive feelings for people of remote origins. Agreeing with the observations of Fiske et al. (2007), Triandafyllidou (2006) and Krzyżanowski et al. (2018), those with a narrow trust radius, who sharply differentiated between in-group and out-group relationships, tended to be more aversive to nationalities of more distant and less familiar origins.

The baseline pattern of Hungarian self-positioning clearly exemplifed an intermediary image between West and East. A 'Western-like' cluster was seen more positively, mainly in instrumental regards and an 'Eastern-like' one was regarded with more criticism. The joint position with Greeks in the self-portrait was both an expression of friendly feelings towards 'small countries' and some appreciation of 'Southern-like' expressive contact-creating skills somewhat perceived as kin.

The portraits of 'this is the way we are' and 'those are the ways they are' evolve amidst an interplay of structural and cultural aspects (White, 2008). Larger groupings of national-ethnic entities get combined for perceived geographic-historicalpolitical proximities, just like the ones for stereotypical features of skills and knowledge styles. Conforming to this conceptual duality, our two-mode network approach permitted us to reveal national-ethnic groupings and the clustering of related attributes in a complex joint analysis. Contrary to most studies of national stereotypes, our research focused not so much on distinct ethnic/national specifcities, but on more general confgurations exhibiting specifc cultural distances. So, categories, like the 'Westerners' and the 'Southern-likes' can be interpreted in terms of certain country nodes and in terms of more or less distinctive characteristics attached to them in public beliefs.

Our segmentation's aspects also pointed to some limitations of the stability of cognitive maps. Differing images in a given society facing each other may loosen the sharpness of stereotypical contours. However, in cases of sharply differing ideological platforms, and especially in times of crises, even an opposite tendency can occur when views of the world become even more rigid. Our analyses shed light from various angles on a polarised rearrangement of the imageries of 'Others' both in the Greek and the Hungarian public in the context of the developments of the fnancial and the refugee crises of the last two decades. Public opinion was examined amidst crisis developments in Greece and Hungary, with a focus on national

stereotypes, cognitive maps and in-group/out-group social distance. The comparative analysis unravelled contrasting global images in the two countries offering new insights on native perceptions of refugees and migrants.

We expect that the combination of the catnet concept, of our theoretical basis, and of the two-mode approach, as a methodological innovation, may open the path to further research areas. On the one hand, these may be concrete empirical areas such as those of networks of public discourse or the reconstruction or interpretation of the formation of political camps. On the other hand, employing this dual approach may signifcantly contribute to the understanding of how micro- and macro-level phenomena may lead to divergent social-organisational patterns.

The catnet concept may furthermore serve as a comparative approach of social mechanisms, and thereby also contribute to a deeper understanding of the specifcities of the societies of Southeast Europe*.*

**Acknowledgements** We thank a research grant received from the Hungarian Academy of Sciences during 2013-2019. We highly appreciate the contribution by Manina Kakepaki at EKKE in Athens and the technical support by András Hering at ELTE in Budapest. We also thank Alexander S. Onassis Public Beneft Foundation fellowship for Nikos Fokas in 2015 at the Host Institution University of Athens. We thank the Higher Education Institutional Excellence Programme in Hungary fellowship (grant number 1783-3/2018/FEKUTSTRAT) for the support.

#### **References**

Agresti, A. (2019). *An introduction to categorical data analysis* (3rd ed.). Wiley-Blackwell.


**Nikos Fokas** is professor at Eötvös Loránd University (ELTE) of Budapest. He headed the Department of Sociology (2011-2016), the Research Institute of Greeks in Hungary (2003-2015) and the MTA-ELTE-Peripato Research Group (2013-2019). In 2014 he received the Albert Szent-Györgyi Prize. In 2018 he was awarded honorary doctorate by the National and Kapodistrian University of Athens. He headed numerous research projects such as the 'Community life and integration strategies of Greeks in Hungary' (2012-2018) and the 'Crises and Social Innovations' (2013-2019). He has written articles, has written and edited books on integration strategies of Greeks in Hungary and on complex social dynamics, with particular reference to the dissemination processes in the mass media. Recent publications include: Unforeseen Routes, Pictures about the Life of the Greeks in Hungary (2017) [in Greek], … and Next Year in Greece, (2018) [In Hungarian], Trauma and Appeasement (2020) [In Hungarian], Mapping Cultural Distances in a Catnet Approach (2022).

**Gábor Jelenf** is PhD candidate at the Doctoral School of Sociology, Eötvös Loránd University (ELTE) of Budapest. He is a lecturer and researcher at ELTE. He studied sociology and informatics, he works for a public opinion and market research company and worked for the Hungarian Charity Service of the Order of Malta. His scientifc career is linked to the Peripato Comparative Social Dynamics Research Group supported by the Hungarian Academy of Sciences and Problemsolving Societal Systems Research Group at the ELTE Faculty of Social Sciences. His research areas are broader patterns of political behaviour, election campaigns, national-ethnic images, cultural distances, organisation of cultural orientations and attitudes in public thinking, quantitative media dynamics and comparative analysis. In addition to his experience in social research and methodology, his interests include the theory of systems, networks, and information. He has published articles in peer-reviewed journals and collective volumes.

**Róbert Tardos** is Researcher at the Eötvös Loránd University (ELTE) of Budapest. He is an economist and earned a degree of CSc in sociology; held his career positions at the Mass Communication Research Centre, Budapest, the Hungarian Public Opinion Research Institute, the Research Group for Communication Studies, and for Peripato Comparative Social Dynamics of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences at ELTE. His current activities are affliated with the Faculty of Social Sciences at ELTE, and at the Corvinus University of Budapest. Longer fellowships took place at the University of Pennsylvania, the University of Wisconsin-Madison and the University of Michigan. His principal research foci relate to cultural-interactional stratifcation, social network analysis and political behaviour. He published in *Social Networks* 2022, *International Journal of Sociology* 2017 and *Comparative Sociology* 2022. His attention spans to alternative attempts on comparative analysis of public beliefs and mutually related conceptual frames of structural and cultural patterns.

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## **Part III Solidarity and Claims-Making Under Crises**

## **Chapter 7 Political Claims and the So Called 'Refugee Crisis' in the Greek Public Sphere, 2015–16**

**Maria Paschou, Angelos Loukakis, and Maria Kousis**

#### **7.1 Introduction**

Beyond an array of tragic events of human transport and suffering, the mass arrival of migrants and refugees1 to European shores in 2015, subsequently framed as the 'refugee crisis' (Chouliaraki et al., 2017), involved a process of political contestation in the public sphere (Cinalli et al., 2020). The mediated political discourse on refugees refects the interests and demands of various actors who gained visibility in the public sphere through the expression of political claims. These public claims connected the lived experiences of the refugee population to the social reality of the place of their permanent or temporary destination. Filtered and widely circulated by the mass media, which constitute 'a forum of critique and of normative debate about the interpretation of […signifcant] events and their relevance for our moral self-understanding' (Silverstone 2006, as cited in Cinalli et al., 2020, p. 122), these have infuenced public opinion and shaped policy making agendas across Europe. This chapter focuses on the media discourse on refugees and its evolution in Greece, aiming at a better understanding of the public sphere dynamics in the August 2015–April 2016 period, when the increased refugee infow was at the epicentre of public attention.

M. Paschou (\*) · A. Loukakis

The University of Crete, Rethymno, Greece e-mail: paschoumaria@social.soc.uoc.gr; loukakisangelos@social.soc.uoc.gr

M. Kousis

<sup>1</sup> It is noted that the population under investigation is better defned by the broad term immigrants/ migrants, although the majority of them were refugees. The above terms are therefore used interchangeably, as this was also the case in the public discourse of that period.

Former Member of the UCRC Board, The University of Crete Research Center for the Humanities, the Social and Education Sciences, Rethymno, Greece e-mail: kousis.m@uoc.gr

Our understanding of the so called 'refugee crisis' refers to the mass displacement of refugees/migrants and their transport to Europe, but mostly to the political and social responses on this humanitarian and governance emergency. Thus, we defned this as a crisis mainly in terms of the political governance ineffciency in dealing with the circumstance of a massive and unprecedented in recent times, human infow and its urgencies. This condition was acknowledged to provide a solid and rich ground of public debate which allowed the identifcation of the components related to political management, prioritising policy action and political accountability. Above all, this condition feeds back to the process of ascribing meaning and signifcance in the public sphere as to why this constitutes a crisis. Indeed, the imperatives of this crisis prompted the intensifcation of claims-making and the escalation of the debate in the studied period all over Europe (Cinalli et al., 2020). In the remainder of the chapter we have used the phrases the 'so-called "refugee crisis"' or, 'what was labeled/referred to as a "refugee crisis"' interchangeably.

Scholarly interest in the politicisation and mediatisation of the so called 'refugee crisis' is not scarce, as evidenced in the works included in two recent special issues, in the *Journal of Immigrant & Refugee* Studies (Krzyzanowski et al., 2018) and *Social Inclusion* (Vandevoordt & Verschraegen, 2019). Empirical studies on news coverage in specifc national contexts have also been produced, each focusing on particular traits of mediated discourses, such as the framing patterns of tabloid and quality media in Austrian newspapers (Greussing & Boomgaarden, 2017), partisan journalism in German and Irish newspapers (Wallaschek, 2019) and refugee voices in news articles across eight European countries (Chouliaraki & Zaborowski, 2017).

While the 2015–16 migratory and refugee fow had an impact all over Europe, its effect was more immediate and unexpected in frontline countries and more specifcally in Italy and Greece, the main gateways in the passage from Middle East and North Africa to Europe. The Greek case is particularly interesting given the unprecedented magnitude of the migrant infow. In 2015, a year marked by a sharp increase in the number of refugees due to the Syrian war, Greece recorded about 880,000 arrivals.2 Being most affected in comparison to other European countries, Greece also experienced a high level of solidarity contestation (Cinalli et al., 2018), which was mainly related to the political management of the mass human infow. There are several reasons which can explain why the political management of the refugee infow was deadlocked in the Greek context. As an entry point, and considering its size, Greece had to welcome disproportionately large populations compared to other countries (Dullien, 2016). Given that Greece does not traditionally qualify as the fnal destination of migrants, a solid plan for their gradual and long-term societal integration was missing (Chap. 13 in Tramountanis, this volume). Governing these large fows was challenging (Chap. 10 in Mantanika & Arapoglou, this volume; Chap. 12 in Parsanoglou, this volume; Chap. 14 in Stratigaki, this volume) especially in a period of indebtedness and austerity. Moreover, since 2010, a generalised crisis –economic, social, institutional and of public trust– infuenced public attitudes towards migrants

<sup>2</sup>For a detailed account of both the arrivals at the Aegean islands and the land borders in the years 2015–2016, see General Secretariat for Media and Communication (2017).

and ethnic minorities, which varied between solidarity and hostility (Galariotis et al., 2017; Kaitatzi-Whitlock & Kenterelidou, 2017; Chap. 5 in Kalogeraki, this volume). Together with long existing political controversies on migration issues, this polarisation made it harder for the SYRIZA (*Sinaspismos Rizospastikis Aristeras* [Coalition of the Radical Left]) and ANEL (*Anexartiti Elines* [Independent Greeks]) coalition government at that time to deal with migration-related challenges (Kaitatzi-Whitlock & Kenterelidou, 2017, p. 133), given also the different ideological orientations of the two political parties. Added to this, the low standards in asylum procedures and legal protection of refugees in Greece further complicated the management of the sharply increasing migrant fow (ibid, p. 5).

The interplay of the aforementioned conditions fueled the political scene with tensions. The complexities of the sociopolitical landscape led to public controversies and to emotionally charged media coverage. Media scholars were attracted by the escalation of public debates which occurred in the aftermath of the recent migratory fow (Fotopoulos & Kaimaklioti, 2016), the portrayal of refugees in the Greek press (Serafs et al., 2019) and the 'absurdity' of public discourse (Boukala & Dimitrakopoulou, 2018). However, a systematic examination of the main features of the public discourse during the period of heated political debate in Greece is lacking in the literature and it is our intention to fll this gap.

This chapter offers an analysis of the political claims, i.e. the interventions related to the interests, needs or rights of refugees that appeared in the Greek press.3 Claims are raised by actors including individuals, civil society representatives, political representatives and institutions who compete for visibility in the public arena (Cinalli et al., 2020). Given that the public sphere of the mass media connects to the realm of shared understanding (Habermas, 1996), those who occupy a space in it justify their positions drawing on a shared toolkit of common sense, social relevance and moral commitment, thus their claims gain validity through 'mediated' discourses (Cinalli et al., 2020, p. 123). A political claim can be raised in different forms and can concern various themes and subthemes; its realisation can lead to an improvement or worsening of the position of its object, i.e. the refugees in our case. By validating the broad spectrum of public claims, ranging from those raised within the parliament to those voiced in the streets in the form of protest, we aimed to gain an insight into the multifaceted nature of the so-called 'refugee crisis' related public discourse. From a perspective of political opportunity, the harsh impact of the recent economic crisis in Greece was expected to have encouraged collective action and political expression in contentious forms (Kriesi et al., 2020; Meyer, 2004). Given that claims-making develops in a strong relationship with political opportunities, our analysis aimed at providing deeper insights into the underlying connections between competing or allied social actors and their surrounding milieu (Lahusen et al., 2016; McAdam & Tarrow, 2018).

<sup>3</sup>Results presented in this chapter have been obtained within WP5 of the project 'European paths to transnational solidarity at times of crisis: Conditions, forms, role models and policy responses' (TransSOL, 2018). This project has received funding from the European Union's Horizon 2020 research and innovation programme under grant agreement No 649435.

The chapter analyses the public contestation of what was labelled as the 'refugee crisis,' based on a study of 711 randomly selected political claims, found in three widely read Greek national newspapers (TransSOL, 2018). The period studied begins in August 2015, when the human transfer and arrival in Greece was frst framed as a crisis and ends in April 2016, immediately after the EU-Turkey Statement which aimed to tackle irregular migration. Our research design of claimsmaking links actors' positions to public justifcation, given that media claims are related both to agenda-setting of social actors (and thus to power relations) and to media logic of publicity (Cinalli et al., 2020). Our analysis revealed the protagonists of the debate, the main issues discussed, the positioning of the claims towards refugees, how claims were expressed and how these characteristics evolved over time. The undertaken analysis was primarily exploratory, aiming to offer a better understanding of the forces which shaped the public discourse. The identifed trends are discussed in relation to scholarly works in this feld as well as in relation to the sociopolitical context.

#### **7.2 The Discursive Construction of the 'Refugee Crisis'**

This section discusses how the so called 'refugee crisis' was discursively constructed in the public sphere, through the intensifcation of political debates and the increased media attention on the migrant and refugee infow, from the Summer of 2015 to the Spring of 2016 in Greece, in relation to its broadest European context. Following the related literature review, it aims to familiarise a broader readership with the dynamics of mediated political debates. It ultimately aims to foster an understanding of how political signifcance and meaning is ascribed to certain events and how competing interests interact in the public sphere to defne what is at stake under specifc circumstances.

Media narratives of this period were linked to particular events which were directly or indirectly related with the arrival of refugees and its political management or with migration and migrants more generally. Among the landmark images of this period were: one of a young Syrian boy who washed up drowned on a Turkish shore in early September 2015; the fence built at the Hungarian-Serbian border mid-September; the welcoming German stance; the terrorist attacks in Paris in November and the Cologne incident of women's assault by foreign-looking men on New Year's Eve (Georgiou & Zaborowski, 2017; Triandafyllidou, 2017). While the watershed of the so called 'refugee crisis' in most European countries was therefore the second semester of 2015, in Greece, the frst months of 2016 were those that marked the peak of public discourse. Critical points for the Greek context were the debate concerning the exclusion of Greece from Schengen in January 2016, the closure of the Balkan route (Slovenia, Croatia, Serbia and FYROM), the resulting refugees' crowding at the Greek-FYROM crossing point of *Idomeni* in February 2016 and the EU-Turkey Statement for the regulation of migration from Turkey to the EU in March 2016 (Boukala & Dimitrakopoulou, 2018; Fotopoulos & Kaimaklioti, 2016; Kaitatzi-Whitlock & Kenterelidou, 2017). While there were national and temporal variations identifed in media coverage and the framing of the crisis across Europe (Consterdine, 2018), political contestation over granting solidarity and media attention cycles followed a rather unifed pattern across European countries, with their peak being recorded in Autumn 2015 (Cinalli et al., 2018, 2020). Greece, however, was found to depart from this ubiquitous trend, with the public debate having escalated in early 2016 (ibid).

In addition, a pan-European discourse on what was labelled as the 'refugee crisis' emerged as a result of the widespread impact of the aforementioned signifcant events beyond the local or national scope, the need of cooperation across EU countries to fnd solutions to a common 'problem' as well as the wider cross-national discursive exchanges. The so-called 'Europeanisation' of the public sphere (Trenz, 2008) presumes its broadening beyond national borders, 'driven by a new enlightened movement seeking to generate a normative debate about the transnationalisation of democracy' (p. 274). In the refugee discourse, 'Europeanisation' was prompted by the political necessity to abide to a common EU strategy and the interaction of actors across borders, or by the transnational infuence of powerful actors who defned a shared space in the mediated discourse across Europe. This suggests that national actors were not expected to have monopolised the media discourse, while political conficts were not restricted at the national level. The discursive transnationalisation of the debate is manifest in the appeal of Greek actors to European political leaders, in response to foreign accusations on the ineffective control of Greek borders. In this case, the Greek government's plea for transnational support was at the same time a complaint about the unjust distribution of refugees (Boukala & Dimitrakopoulou, 2018, p. 9) and allowed national actors to abdicate or share the responsibility of their political decisions.

Another characteristic of the public discourse on the mass displacement of refugees and the respective political responses is its shift in focus, from seeking to manage the fows at the beginning of this period to its construction as an effective emergency at the end (Triandafyllidou, 2017, pp. 9–10). Hence, the discursive shift involved the reorientation of policy makers from the distribution of responsibility through quotas in the spring and fall of 2015 to a call for more drastic measures, such as the closure of national borders. A dynamic interaction between policy developments related to the aforementioned critical events and media and civil society mobilisations (ibid) took place, activating the emergence of positive and negative representations in the media discourse. Thus, a sympathetic outlook which was linked to a humanitarian media framing at the beginning of the summer of 2015 was gradually replaced by hostile attitudes and a suspicious media framing (Chouliaraki et al., 2017; Consterdine, 2018; Ferreira, 2019; Georgiou & Zaborowski, 2017; Vollmer & Karakayali, 2018).

These shifting media narratives emerged in line with the values and the imperatives of the dominant actors in the public sphere, who were local, national and transnational and were propagating competing views on the managerial priorities of what was referred to as a 'refugee crisis.' Thus, whereas governments and policy makers were trying to control the human fow, civil society actors focused on the conditions of their transfer and the processes of their integration, while local communities were interested in the price they would have to pay for the reception of large numbers of migrants. Each of them, respectively, was defending their own position in the traditional and social media, thus participating in the 'mediatisation' of the refugee fows (Krzyzanowski et al., 2018). Humanitarianism which was refected in the rhetoric of the political leaders and constituted the underlying value in the pan-European public discourse on the migratory fow abided with the humanitarian tradition of Europe upon which a shared European identity and vision was built (Triandafyllidou, 2017, p. 14). Solidarity values which were prominent in the discourse of civil society aimed to promote a political project revolving around ideas of autonomy, emancipation, equality and justice (Siapera, 2019) as well as humanitarian value frames such as altruism (Kousis et al., 2021). In contrast, the portrayal of refugees as threats abided to a nationalistic representation of others as 'aliens,' which relates to the mechanism of collective identity formation through the demonisation of the outsiders (Eberl et al., 2018; Triandafyllidou, 2000).

The political stress was particularly intense in Greece due to the strong asymmetry between the needs of the incoming migratory population and the availability of resources and political preparedness of the country, which continued facing the drastic impacts of the 2008 economic crisis (Paschou & Kousis, 2019). At times, refugees were viewed with pity due to their indisposition and at other times as dangerous intruders (Georgiou & Zaborowski, 2017; Matar, 2017). The ambivalence of the public sentiment (Chap. 5 in Kalogeraki, this volume) was refected on the concurrence of xenophobic manifestations which were fueled by the hatred rhetoric of the extreme right (Galariotis et al., 2017; Sekeris & Vasilakis, 2016) on the one side and anti-racist, pro-refugee attitudes against the discriminating actions of the farright political party Golden Dawn on the other. Empirical fndings demonstrate that the Greek media were drawing on an institutional and generalist approach and using representational frames which reproduced stereotypes (Pelliccia, 2019).

Compared, however, to the West European countries, the press in Greece focused more on humanitarian actions than on military securitisation (Georgiou & Zaborowski, 2017, p. 10). Refugees in the Greek press were given more voice, they were described with more attention to their gender and age and their emotions were also reported more often compared to the European average (Georgiou & Zaborowski, 2017). Moreover, the Greek press paid particular attention to the humanitarian dimension, by reporting the poor living conditions in the refugee camps and refugees' protests or the violent incidences in the hot spots (Fotopoulos & Kaimaklioti, 2016). Despite the aforementioned diverse public attitudes towards the incoming population, the pervasiveness of a humanitarian narrative prevailed in the Greek public sphere. This relates to an overwhelming public sensitivity which also raised volunteering and which can be justifed in terms of the Greek 'proximity to suffering' due to the country's attribute as a frontline country (Clarke, 2015, p. 79). The humanitarian narrative also relates to the so called 'Greek paradigm of philoxenia-xenophilia' (Kaitatzi-Whitlock & Kenterelidou, 2017), the emergent solidarity movement (Oikonomakis, 2018) and the awakening of a type of bottomup hospitality in emic terms (Chap. 8 in Papataxiarchis, this volume).

This humanitarian narrative was overshadowed at times by certain occasions which prompted a reframing of the crisis in the public discourse, bringing to the fore managerial aspects, or relating it with its impact on the hosting communities and the Greek society at large, or with the political cost resulting from certain political decisions. In this context, very little is known on the political claims made by the different actors involved in the public sphere and the variable visibility of these actors over time, which documents the dynamic nature of the debate upon which the defnition of the crisis is built.

Our study aims to fll this gap by shedding light at the traits of the public discourse on what has been labelled as the 'refugee crisis' in Greece. The selected methodological approach, as presented in the following section, allowed us to examine the degree to which different types of actors appeared in the public sphere to challenge other actors, to defne what is at stake from their own perspective and to intervene through certain action repertoires. Our analysis provides a quantitative account of the attributes of public contention, aiming to contribute towards a better understanding of the forces which played the most decisive role in defning the signifcance of what has been termed as a crisis.

#### **7.3 Method and Data**

This section presents the method applied, i.e. Political Claims Analysis (PCA) (Koopmans & Statham, 1999), which was used to identify the main traits of the public discourse on refugees for the period from August 2015 to April 2016 in Greece. This method was acknowledged as most appropriate for the examination of the roles and positions of all actors formulating claims in the public sphere, as it allows retrieving interventions in the public domain on a given issue (in our case the so called 'refugee crisis'), using national newspapers (Cinalli et al., 2020). The data were gathered in the context of the EU funded TransSOL project, and the Media Analysis of Work Package 5.

The adoption of this methodological approach involved the quantifcation of the attributes of public claims and in particular the examination of:



**Table 7.1** Articles/Claims retrieved, selected and coded by newspaper

The unit of analysis was the political claim, defned as a public (verbal or nonverbal) intervention made by any actor that bears on the interests, needs or rights of refugees (Cinalli et al., 2020). Print media were selected for empirical investigation, with the selection of newspapers being based on the criteria of representativeness and diversity (ibid). We therefore selected newspapers which are widely read nationwide –based on their circulation rates– and which cover a diverse readership, based on their profle and ideological orientation. The newspapers selected are *Kathimerini*, a quality centre-right newspaper, *Ta Nea*, a quality centre/centre-left newspaper and *Proto Thema,* a popular tabloid outlet. Relevant articles were selected via keyword searches in the electronic archives of the newspapers. Following consortium decisions on the procedures used across all eight countries, our random selection within each newspaper assured that the data refected the different claims presented in the public sphere. As Table 7.1 shows, we retrieved more than 16,000 articles in order to code a systematic random sample of 402 articles. In detail, we frst extracted 100 articles from our sample in order to identify the average number of claims per article. Second, we divided the total number of articles from our database by 100, giving us a rank X. Third, we sorted all articles in a chronological order and coded every Xth article. Fourth, we repeated the procedure on the basis of the average of claims coded in the frst round until we reached the required number of claims. At the end of the coding procedure, we obtained a dataset of 711 public claims. A codebook was used in the analysis, with a structure similar to that of a closed questionnaire, thus allowing us to typify and quantify the information obtained from the claims (TransSOL, 2021).

The frst pa**r**t of the analysis offered descriptive statistics on the types of actors (claimants), addressees, issues and form of claims. The second part involved the search of temporal trends through the study of media attention cycles. For this reason, we used time series analysis on the overall claims-making activity. Finally, we examined how the above-mentioned variables as well as the positioning of claims towards refugees vary over time.

#### **7.4 The General Traits of Public Discourse on the So Called 'Refugee Crisis' in Greece: Actors, Addressees, Issues and Forms of Political Claims**

This section presents the main elements of political claims on refugees in the Greek press for the August 2015–April 2016 period. By answering the question of *who said what, to whom and in what form* the aim is to shed light on the quantitative attributes of the mediated political discourse on what has been termed as the 'refugee crisis.' In what follows we present the fndings of our study as to the most prevalent actors –claimants and addressees– issues and forms of political claims which brought the 'refugee crisis' at the top of the political agenda.

The distribution of different actor types is an indication of political representation and demonstrates if the so called 'refugee crisis' opened up spaces for the intervention of actors who challenge established policies in the public domain. Our fndings (Fig. 7.1) demonstrate that state actors were leading the public discourse, representing more than half (56%) of the total claims-making in our sample. The other half involves claims raised by other actors, with supranational actors and migrants/refugees and their supporting groups exhibiting about 11% each.

The comparison between actor types highlights some interesting fndings. First, despite the preponderance of government actors, the political party representatives were not very visible in the public sphere. Second, supranational actors occupied the second position in terms of public visibility. Third, summing up the claims

**Fig. 7.1** Actor types (%), N = 711 claims

raised by the different representatives of organised civil society actors (third sector, unions and grassroots groups) showed that they altogether occupied about 20% of the total claims. While the dominance of state actors is an omnipresent feature of the public sphere as demonstrated by other studies on public claims-making (Koopmans, 2007; Van Dalen, 2012), the visibility of other actors provides evidence for the plurality of the debate on the 'refugee crisis.' In particular, the appearance of supranational actors in national media relates to the transnationalisation of the public sphere, whereas the high levels of visibility of civil society can be seen in relation to the strengthening of solidarity activism following the 2008 global fnancial economic crisis in Greece.

Next, we examined the actors who were addressed in the claims. Our fndings (Fig. 7.2) demonstrate an absence of addressees for about 60% of claims, while for the remaining share of claims the distribution of addressees was similar to that of claimants, with the most frequent addressees being state actors, followed by supranational actors and refugees or migrants and their supporting groups. Given that the addressees of the claims are those who are held accountable to act in response to the claim, their infrequent appearance in the public discourse suggests low levels of responsibility attribution. This provides further confrmation for the political urgency experienced during this period, with the facts themselves imposing the overwhelming force in the public sphere.

The examination of the issues which gained media attention (Fig. 7.3) showed that the policies related to the political management of migration was the most frequently discussed issue, occupying about 65% of claims. This broad category was represented by several subcategories in our codebook which were merged for the

**Fig. 7.2** Type of addressee (%), N = 711 claims

**Fig. 7.3** The issues of claims (%), N = 711 claims

analysis. The subcategories appearing most frequently in our studied claims were border management and asylum policies (23% and 11% respectively). The background of migration as a broad theme came second in frequency (11.4%), with its most frequent subcategories being the journey of refugees and the inhumane conditions in the refugee camps as well as the refugee routes. The subcategories which refer to the reasons of the human transfer and the living conditions of refugees in their home countries exhibited very low appearance in our sample (less than 1% each). Third in frequency were the social consequences and problems associated with the arrival of refugees (10.8%). Most frequent in this category was the problem of internal security (mainly in the refugee camps and the localities where the refugees were accommodated), followed by civic activities (8% of claims), that mainly referred to volunteering and meeting basic needs. Very few claims were raised, fnally, on the integration of refugees (3.1%), refecting the actors' prevailing concern that Greece, as a transit –not a destination– country should not prioritise long term policies. Thus, the low number of claims on the policies that ensure equal access to health care, education and the labour market relates to the unresponsiveness of a nevertheless weak welfare state, but also to the expectation that migrant populations would not stay in the country.

As evidenced by these fndings, the public agenda of the studied period was shaped by concerns of the 'here and now' which succinctly captures the generalised sociopolitical anxiety given the low levels of political effcacy and preparedness magnifed by pervasive fnancial crisis and austerity.

The cross-tabulation of actor types with the issue of their claims (Table 7.2) brought to surface differences between actors in respect to their concerns and it therefore contributed to a better understanding of the forces which shaped the public agenda. Based on the fndings, the preponderance of the political management of migration was


**Table 7.2** Issues of claims by actor type

much greater in the discourses of the political elites who acted at the national and transnational level (state actors, political parties and supranational actors) than in the discourses of civil society. The later exhibited a more balanced distribution across the different issues of public concern. However, whereas organised civil society recorded considerably high levels of interest in the background of refugees, individual citizens – mostly at the local level– were particularly interested in the social consequences of the refugee infows but also in civic activities –though in lower frequency. This fnding feeds back to the tension identifed in the literature between intolerant/xenophobic attitudes and humanitarian/solidarity manifestations**.**

As political claims in the public sphere are expressed in various forms, we also examined the central tendency of the form of claims and their relation with actor types. Figure 7.4 shows that more than half of the claims were expressed as verbal statements – usually as media declarations. Less frequent were claims expressed through protest (13.2%) and political decisions (12.5%). Even lower were claims of solidarity actions and humanitarian aid (8.6%) and repressive measures (2.3%). Interestingly, the relatively high share of protest actions demonstrated the contentiousness of the feld, while its combination with direct solidarity actions was an indication of the strong societal impact of the refugee infow in that period.

The cross-tabulation of the form of action with actor types (Table 7.3) demonstrated that most state and supranational actors raised their claims predominantly in the form of verbal statements with political decisions following. Civil society groups and individual citizens, on the contrary, were found not to have been visible through their speech acts, but through their involvement in protest.

A closer investigation of the claims raised by the refugees themselves and their supporting groups showed a high concentration of claims in confrontational actions– illegal demonstrations and self-imposed constraints– such as hunger strikes, suicides and blockades. The examination of the issue variable of these claims showed that they all referred to the inhumane conditions and emergency situations experienced in the refugee camps.

**Fig. 7.4** The form of claims, N = 711 claims

**Table 7.3** The form of claims by actor type


#### **7.5 The Chronicle of the Public Debate on the So Called 'Refugee Crisis' in Greece**

Beyond the examination of the main traits of the public debate, we also aim to shed light on the distribution of claims over time, in order to achieve a better understanding of media attention cycles and the evolution of the public debate on the so called 'refugee crisis.'

Based on the centralisation of claims over time, two periods were identifed, the frst one in the autumn of 2015 and the second one in January–April 2016. As seen

**Fig. 7.5** Total number of claims by month

in Fig. 7.5, claims making on refugees dramatically intensifed during the second period, reaching a peak in March 2016. This fnding mirrors the salience of the events which occurred from December 2015 to early 2016 in Greece, as discussed in the literature review.

The visibility of different actor types in the Greek public sphere over time is seen in Fig. 7.6 It illustrates that political elites, who were the dominant actors in the public discourse, increased their claims-making activity on refugees since December 2015. A similar pattern, but with lower frequencies throughout the whole period was observed also for supranational actors. Regarding the visibility of civil society actors, it was limited in the frst period, but gradually increased since January 2016 while it climaxed in the spring of 2016. This fnding suggests that the peak of crisis proliferated the opportunities for the less powerful actors to be voiced in the public sphere.

The examination of the appearance of different actor types as addressees of the claims over time (Fig. 7.7) showed that supranational actors and civil society were more frequently addressed during the frst period compared to state actors, unlike the second period, when the latter prevailed. This tendency to delay addressing the state can be seen as an indication of the perceived unresponsiveness or inability of the Greek state to deal with the human infow in the outburst of what was labelled as the 'refugee crisis.'

Concerning the temporal particularities of the public discourse with respect to the issues discussed (Fig. 7.8), our analysis suggests that the second period exhibited a much richer agenda. It was a period in which actors brought to the fore issues other than the political management of migration, which monopolised the public discourse in the frst period. Whereas the social consequences of migration gained media attention mainly in January 2016, media reporting on civic activities and the background of the refugee population intensifed in March 2016.

**Fig. 7.6** Claims by type of Actor and month

**Fig. 7.7** Claims by type of Addressee and month

**Fig. 7.8** Issues of claims by month

**Fig. 7.9** Forms of claims by month

The examination of the temporal trends with respect to the forms of political intervention (Fig. 7.9) demonstrated that the claims during the second period were more diverse in terms of their form. Specifcally, while during the frst period the Greek media reported only verbal statements and very few claims of other forms, the second period involved more claims which were raised in the form of political decisions (particularly in February 2016) as well as claims of direct action and in

**Fig. 7.10** Evolution of the positioning of claims by month

particular protest and solidarity action (in March 2016). This, once more, attests to the opening up of political opportunities during the peak of public contestation when the less powerful actors who expressed themselves through direct action gained increased visibility.

We fnally examined the evolution of the positioning of the claims over time, which indicated the positive, negative or neutral disposition of each claim towards refugees, with scores ranging from −1 to +1. Figure 7.10, which illustrates the mean scores of claims per month, shows that the trend of claims was constantly changing throughout the studied period, something that refects the ambivalence of the public discourse. Whereas in the beginning of our studied period, August 2015, the trend was overall negative, given the political stress caused by an increasing, continuous and uncontrollable wave of refugees and upcoming national elections, in September 2015 the positive positioning of claims outweighed the negative ones. This was a refection of a widespread sentimental media narrative which encouraged humanitarian activism. After two months of instability, the following couple of months, December 2015 and January 2016, scored highest in terms of negative positionality, indicating the infuence of a discourse of intolerance and xenophobia also related to the threat of expulsion from the Schengen zone. Since February 2016, the claims in support of refugees' rights and interest gained ground, responding to the strengthening of a solidarity discourse.

#### **7.6 Discussion and Conclusions**

This chapter is based on an exploratory, quantitative analysis of the political claims that were raised in Greek newspapers concerning the 2015–16 infow of migrants and refugees. Our adopted methodological approach defned who have been the main actors in the public sphere –together with their considerations, their adopted forms of action and their varied visibility over time. It aims to contribute to a deeper understanding of the political developments of that period in response to the infow of refugees as well as to the refning of the constituents in its discursive construction as a crisis.

Our analysis revealed that beyond the humanitarian urgency and the political predicament, the 'refugee crisis' was the product of the discursive interaction of various actors with diverse agendas in the public sphere. In the Greek context particularly, the recent mass arrival of refugees was at the epicentre of public discourse. The country's geographical location at the crossroads of East and West, its suffering of multiple crises, and contradictory public attitudes towards refugees posed diffculties to the political management of the crisis and fueled political debate.

Our fndings therefore shed new light on the discursive construction of the crisis by illustrating the main traits of the public debate and its chronicle. Specifcally, this study evidenced the variable visibility of different actors, the signifcance of particular issues and the prevalence of certain forms of public intervention in the public sphere. It also identifed the successive occurrence of two media attention cycles, based on the intensifcation of claims-making on refugees. Each cycle exhibited distinctive features in terms of the actors (both claimants and addressees), issues and forms of claims. However, these characteristics and their evolution over time are meaningful under the interpretative light of the sociohistorical context and the political circumstances which brought them to the fore.

As evidenced in our analysis the debate was characterised by a plurality of voices and was not monopolised by a single actor. Nevertheless, overall, state actors were the most visible claimants and addressees of claims, something which confrms the 'structural bias' of the mainstream press towards the representation of domestic government actors (Koopmans, 2007; Van Dalen, 2012; Wallaschek, 2019). Noticeably, the prevalence of state actors was not constant throughout the analysed period. The preponderance of supranational addressees in the frst period, spanning from September 2015 to December of the same year, refects the state's appeal for transnational support. This period was very crucial in terms of transnational political deliberations, with several occasions, such as the UN's September Plenary, the Bratislava Summit and the summit of the Southern European state leaders (Kaitatzi-Whitlock & Kenterelidou, 2017, pp. 314–5). Moreover, this period was characterised as a time of 'ecstatic humanitarianism' (Georgiou & Zaborowski, 2017, p.8), something which can be seen in relation to the high levels of civil society's appearance as an addressee of the public claims. However, while during the frst period civil society appeared relatively frequently as an addressee in the claims raised by other actors, it was not until March 2016 that it gained its visibility as a claimant in the public sphere. State actors also recorded a sharp increase in claims-making activity during this time, when political tensions and controversies escalated, leading to a 'blame game' between political leaders (Boukala & Dimitrakopoulou, 2018).

As participation broadened, the agenda and the forms of public intervention in the public discourse also expanded since 2016. The themes relating to the social consequences of migration and to civic activities were thus more frequently mentioned during this second phase. Notwithstanding, the analysis evidenced a dominant and persistent interest in the political management of the so-called crisis throughout the period studied, in agreement with previous research fndings (Fotopoulos & Kaimaklioti, 2016). The broadening of public discourse since 2016 was also refected in the selected forms of action in raising claims, with contentiousness and direct actions increasing since 2016, together with an increase in the number of claims raised in the form of political decisions.

Our interest in the examination of the chronicle of the debate drew on scholarly research which identifed the temporal instability in media coverage and framing patterns on the incoming refugees (Chouliaraki et al., 2017; Consterdine, 2018; Ferreira, 2019; Georgiou & Zaborowski, 2017; Vollmer & Karakayali, 2018). Through the exploration of the temporal trends of the public discourse, we envisage to contribute to a broader understanding of the dynamics of the public sphere. Α critical refection on our fndings is prompted when acknowledging the particularities of the historical and sociopolitical context. Two crucial moments are discussed below, September 2015 and March 2016, aiming to illustrate the interrelation of the attributes of public claims and the political developments.

September 2015 witnessed high levels in the frequency of claims compared to the other months of the frst period. However, contrary to other European countries, where this was the milestone of the whole period, claims-making in Greece did not peak during this month (Cinalli et al., 2018, 2020). These relatively low levels of media coverage should be seen in relation to the comparatively greater attention paid to the national elections by the Greek media in September 2015. Based on the fndings of our study, during this month the discourse was rather unifed in Greece, with national political actors being almost exclusively voiced by the media and supranational actors and civil society appearing most frequently as addressees of public claims. With the vast majority of claims being expressed as verbal statements and concerning the political management of migration, it was a time of low political activity, with the dominant narrative being fair burden-sharing and a plea for transnational and humanitarian support.

March 2016 is the time when claims-making on refugees reached its peak. In the aftermath of the threat of expulsion from the Schengen zone and under the pressures to respond to the closure of the Balkan route and the resulting overcrowding in the camp of *Idomeni*, the fow of refugees reduced due to the EU- Turkey Statement. Public discourse in this period became richer and diversifed in terms of actors, issues and forms of action compared to that of the frst period. The media narrative of this time was fragmented, evoking both solidarity and fear. A thorough examination of the claims of this period showed that the claims of the refugees themselves (Chap. 9 in Koukouzelis, this volume) together with civil society actors as well as local society actors, peaked in the public discourse. This was most likely due to the contentiousness of their reaction, manifested in their high rates of protest, a fnding which provides further confrmation for the connection of grievances with contentious politics (Giugni & Grasso, 2016; Klandermans et al., 2008; Kriesi et al., 2020; Meyer, 2004; Rüdig & Karyotis, 2014). Moreover, the proliferation in the political representation of different actors suggests the opening up of a window of opportunity in the public sphere.

Finally, our fndings on the positionality of public claims highlight the ambivalence and instability of the public discourse throughout the studied period, supporting what previous studies underlined (Georgiou & Zaborowski, 2017; Matar, 2017) and contrary to the generalised trend of negative representations of otherness (Eberl et al., 2018; Triandafyllidou, 2000).

Future work may centre more on the role of the different political actors, especially political parties, in terms of their relation to the protests of the refugees and to the formation of the public discourse on migrant issues, as refected in their claimsmaking. Other future work could offer comparative analysis on the effects of the new online sources other than mainstream newspapers on political aspects of claims making. Such enriching of the sources may lead to more informed views on twentyfrst century public discourse.

**Acknowledgments** Data presented in this chapter has been collected as part of the project 'European paths to transnational solidarity at times of crisis: Conditions, forms, role models and policy responses' (TransSOL). The project received funding from the European Union's Horizon 2020 programme under grant agreement No 649435. The TransSOL consortium is coordinated by the University of Siegen (Christian Lahusen), and is formed, additionally, by Glasgow Caledonian University (Simone Baglioni), European Alternatives e.V. Berlin (Daphne Büllesbach), Sciences Po Paris (Manlio Cinalli), University of Florence (Carlo Fusaro), University of Geneva (Marco Giugni), University of Sheffeld (Maria Grasso), University of Crete (Maria Kousis), University of Siegen (Christian Lahusen), European Alternatives Ltd. LBG UK (Lorenzo Marsili), University of Warsaw (Maria Theiss), and the University of Copenhagen (Hans-Jörg Trenz). We gratefully acknowledge the coding work in WP5 by Chara Syndikiotou and Efthymia Katsouli, research assistants of the Greek team.

#### **References**


**Maria Paschou** received her PhD in Sociology from the Department of Political Science and Public Administration, at the University of Athens in 2014 (MSc LSE, in Social Research Methods 2004, MSc LSE, in Social and Public Communication 2005). She has worked as junior researcher for the National Hellenic Research Foundation, the Institute for the Study of Migration and Diaspora of the University of Athens, the University of Vienna and the National Centre for Social Research in Athens. Since 2014 she has been working as a postdoctoral researcher at the University of Crete, in the European Commission FP7 LIVEWHAT project, the German-Greek GGCRISI project, the EC H2020 TransSol project, the EC H2020 EURYKA and the H2020 SMARTCHAIN project. Her recent research focuses on civil society action in times of crises, solidarity practice and most recently, on issues of youth participation in the social and political life.

**Angelos Loukakis** (PhD) is postdoctoral researcher in the EUROPOLITY (HFRI) project at the University of Crete Research Centre for the Humanities, the Social and Education Sciences (UCRC). His PhD research focused on the political dimensions of the solidarity initiatives in Greece during hard economic times. His other research interests focus on Mobilisation, Collective Action, Protest, Social and Environmental Movements. He has participated as researcher in the Horizon 2020 projects EURYKA and TransSOL, as well as in the LIVEWHAT (EC FP7) and GGCRISI projects.

**Maria Kousis** (PhD, The University of Michigan, 1984) is Professor of Sociology and former director of the University of Crete Research Centre for the Humanities, the Social and Education Sciences (UCRC) (9/2014-11/2021). She was coordinator or partner in European Commission projects including Grassroots Environmental Action, TEA, PAGANINI and MEDVOICES. Her publications consist of 16 edited volumes, books, or special issues, 43 journal articles and 39 book chapters. Recent publications include, *Transnational Solidarity in Times of Crises: Citizen Organisations and Collective Learning in Europe*, focused on the felds of migration, disability and unemployment (Eds. C. Lahusen, U. Zschache and M. Kousis, Palgrave, 2021) and *Transnational Solidarity Organisations in Times of Crises – Comparative European Perspectives* (Eds. M. Kousis and C. Lahusen, special section of *Sociological Research Online*, 2021). Her research interests centre on Social Change, Contentious Politics, Crisis and Society, Environmental Politics, Bioethics and Southern Europe. Recent work focuses on the socio-economic and political dimensions of hard times, especially in the context of the research projects 'The Greeks, the Germans and the Crisis' (GGCRISI, Greek-German Ministries Cooperation), 'Living with Hard Times: How European Citizens Deal with Economic Crises and Their Social and Political Consequences' (LIVEWHAT, EC, FP7), 'European Paths to Transnational Solidarity in Times of Crisis' (TransSOL, EC, Horizon 2020), EURYKA (EC, Horizon 2020) and 'Social and Solidarity Economy, Urban Communities and the Protection of Vulnerable Groups' (Swiss Network for International Studies).

**Open Access** This chapter is licensed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits use, sharing, adaptation, distribution and reproduction in any medium or format, as long as you give appropriate credit to the original author(s) and the source, provide a link to the Creative Commons license and indicate if changes were made.

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## **Chapter 8 An Ephemeral Patriotism: The Rise and Fall of 'Solidarity to Refugees'**

**Evthymios Papataxiarchis**

#### **8.1 'Solidarity to Refugees': The Developmental Cycle of a Cultural Innovation**

This essay discusses 'solidarity to refugees,' its rise in the form of a new patriotism, and its decline and fall from 2016 to 2021. It approaches 'solidarity to refugees' ethnographically, from the *bottom up* and in *emic* terms, as a socially and politically productive *symbolic structure of affect* towards displaced people.1 'Solidarity' (*alilengii*) as well as 'hospitality' (*floxenia*) are analysed as emic or native terms, rather than employed as general, descriptive categories, and, thus, they are put in quotation marks. The emic strategy that is adopted here puts analytical emphasis on the everyday usage of unoffcial categories on the ground. From the locals' point of view both 'solidarity' and 'hospitality' have provided the key metaphors that *alternatively* organise their engagement with the irregular travelers. Therefore, the analysis of both metaphors in the specifc historical context of their use and from an emic perspective allows the more thorough, in depth understanding of the set of meanings that inform the engagement of locals with the displaced people and the transformations in local attitudes.

'Solidarity to refugees' (*alilengii stus prosfyes*) has been one of the most important legacies of the so called 'European refugee crisis.' In Greece the two categories, solidarity and refugeehood, have been around for some time now, yet until recently they have been kept separate from one another. 'Solidarity,' literally meaning 'standing by someone,' suggests a horizontal, egalitarian attitude of support towards a

<sup>1</sup>On the emic approach to 'solidarity,' see Papataxiarchis (2016b).

E. Papataxiarchis (\*)

University of the Aegean, Mytilene, Greece e-mail: epapat@aegean.gr

<sup>©</sup> The Author(s) 2022 M. Kousis et al. (eds.), *Challenging Mobilities in and to the EU during Times of Crises*, IMISCOE Research Series, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-11574-5\_8

fellow human being who needs help. It historically referred to comrades suffering police prosecution or, more recently, to victims of the economic crisis.2 The term 'refugee' referred to the Ottoman Christians who came to Greece after the big Exodus mostly from *Anatolia* in 1922.3 These two symbolic categories, 'solidarity' and 'refugee,' came together for *the frst time* in the course of the 'refugee crisis,' a development that was made possible by the *resignifcation of 'refugee'*<sup>4</sup> *–now meaning a person on the move*– and its application to the displaced people from the Middle East, Asia and Africa, who arrived in big numbers to the Aegean islands. In 2015, in a short period of time, yesterday's 'migrants' turned into 'refugees.' The new identity, which was attributed to the, mostly Syrian and Afghan and often 'middle class,' irregular travelers by the locals, *allowed the extension of 'solidarity'* to them*.* They were treated as vulnerable human beings (*anthropi*) in need, irrespective of color/race, ethnicity, social class or age.5

The new symbolic formation replaced the historically dominant 'hospitality to migrants' (*floxenia stus metanastes*). The latter suggested a contradictory attitude of openness to the newcomers from the East. As is evident in the rich ethnographic literature,6 'hospitality' combines two opposite sides, xenophilia and xenophobia. It identifes the migrant's settlement in the host territory as a 'problem' to be dealt in a hierarchical way and an assimilationist direction. In the period before the 'refugee crisis,' 'hospitality to migrants' was in retreat, exhausted by the violent confict between its two political sides, the xenophilic Left and the xenophobic Right battling for political hegemony.

The replacement of 'hospitality to migrants' by 'solidarity to refugees,' in the autumn of 2015 and during the climax of the civil war in Syria, was a turning point. The upcoming attitude was a cultural innovation carrying the promise of deep changes in the Greek collective sub conscious. During the frst years of the economic crisis a wave of the worst xenophobic violence ever experienced had swept Greece, a wave that reached its probably highest point with the murder of *Shehzad* 

<sup>2</sup>On 'solidarity,' during the Greek economic crisis, see Rakopoulos (2015) and Douzina-Bakalaki (2016). On the confusion of the boundaries between the politico-ideological and the religious versions of 'solidarity,' see Theodossopoulos (2016).

<sup>3</sup>See Voutira (2003).

<sup>4</sup>Throughout this essay I use the terms displaced people, irregular travelers or border crossers as my own *descriptive* categories in order to refer to all those who irregularly cross the Greek (EU)- Turkish border and enter Greek territory irrespective of their offcial status (asylum seeker, refugee or migrant without papers) or the causes of their mobility. The great majority of the displaced people in *Lesvos* are asylum seekers. Whenever I use the terms 'asylum seeker' and 'refugee' as identity categorisations I put them in quotation marks.

<sup>5</sup>See Papataxiarchis (2016c). The ethnographic analyses of the value system of modern Greek society by John Campbell, Juliet Du Boulay and Michael Herzfeld have signifcantly contributed to the anthropological understanding of *anthropia* and *anthropos*.

<sup>6</sup>On 'hospitality' in Greece, see Papataxiarchis (2006, pp. 1–10). For a recent application of the concept of 'hospitality' in the analysis of migration management in Greece, see Rozakou (2012). On the politicisation of 'hospitality' during the frst years of the Greek crisis, see Papataxiarchis (2014).

*Luqman* in January 2013 by Golden Dawn members.7 Two years after, a major reversal of cultural mood seemed to be on the way.

I have been ethnographically following closely the whereabouts, the ups and downs, of 'solidarity to refugees' from a privileged position, *Skala Sykamnias*, 'my anthropological village,' a small fshing community that received more than a quarter of a million irregular border crossers in a period of a few months, and *Mytilene,* my professional base and capital of the humanitarian regime in Greece.8

Since the EU-Turkey Statement of 2016 the 'refugee crisis' has entered a new phase. Because of the deal and the subsequent re-bordering of the Aegean, the displaced people became trapped on the islands and their place in the humanitarian regime as asylum seekers became contested from different sides. The development of protests by both locals and asylum seekers and the intensifcation of confict reached a climax with the 'pogrom' against the 150 Afghan asylum seekers who occupied the central square of *Mytilene* in April 2018. This was a turning point. As a good part of the local population withdrew its tolerance towards the asylum seekers and generously offered it to the violent xenophobes, the patriotism of 'solidarity to refugees' came to its conclusion.

In this essay I would like to address a set of questions on the developmental cycle of 'solidarity to refugees' –its rise, demise and eventual fall. How has 'solidarity to refugees' been gradually reconfgured in the new circumstances, after the EU-Turkey Statement of 2016? What was the impact of the conficts around the prolonged stay of displaced people on the island, of the asylum seekers' struggles but also of the xenophobic reactions to their presence, on 'solidarity'? How do the grassroots mobilisations for and against the displaced people and contests around 'solidarity' impact high level politics? I particularly want to address these issues from the angle of the events of April 2018, a moment of climax of grassroots struggles and a turning point in local attitudes towards the irregular travelers.

#### **8.2 The Rise of a New Patriotism: 'Solidarity to Refugees' from a Grassroots Movement into a State Project**

#### *8.2.1 Birth: Grassroots Empathy in the Caring Border*

'Solidarity to refugees' was *born* on the frontline, on the shores of the Eastern Aegean islands, the squares of Athens and along the route that was followed by the irregular travelers on their way to the Northern European destinations. It frst emerged in the *grassroots*, in everyday practices of rescue at sea and frst reception, among ordinary citizens, activists, local and foreign volunteers and humanitarian

<sup>7</sup>The reports of the Racist Violence Recording Network (RVRN) amply demonstrate the rise of xenophobic violence on the above period.

<sup>8</sup>See Papataxiarchis (2016a, 2017, 2020).

workers. It took the form of empathy with and support for the displaced people, particularly in the early phase of the 'crisis.'9

In the summer and autumn of 2015, almost one million displaced men, women and children entered European territory through the Aegean. Half of them came through *Lesvos*. The record number of people who crossed the European Union (EU) border in its Eastern Mediterranean route employed a new type of passage to the Aegean islands: due to the short distance to cover it was *a private, small scale*, and easy to manage operation involving infatable dinghies usually carrying 40–60 people. This type of passage invited an equally *decentralised and privatised, but also democratic, grassroots model of response.*10 Since the offcial state authorities were unable to cope with the situation, a signifcant part of the work of rescue and frst reception of the border crossers was realised *unoffcially*, by many private individuals –locals, volunteers and activists. In the context of an unprecedented mobilisation of human and material resources throughout Europe, relying on social media, thousands of foreign and Greek citizens came to *Lesvos* to help. At the peak of the crisis, more than 3000 non-local volunteers and activists were operating on the island. The rise of *digital grassroots humanitarianism*11 totally transformed the frontier zone of Northern *Lesvos* into a humanitarian borderscape, an unstable, diverse yet highly energetic margin. As the policies of deterrence and the pushbacks were replaced by the spontaneous offering of help by thousands of volunteers, a *caring border* was produced.12

In these conditions, an attitude of welcome to the displaced people emerged in the frontline and gained wider visibility particularly through social media. 'Solidarity to refugees,' as this attitude was coined by ordinary citizens, activists, politicians and the media, was generated *from below*. 13 In the context of unoffcial rescue and reception at the grassroots, the relationship of many locals and foreign volunteers with the border crossers, mostly middle class Syrian families with lots of children, became *personalised*; spaces for interpersonal interaction and empathetic

<sup>9</sup>See Papataxiarchis (2016c).

<sup>10</sup>This comparison with the Western and Central Mediterranean routes mostly relies on the works of Andersson (2014) and Albahari (2015).

<sup>11</sup>On the blurred boundaries and the tensions between (unoffcial) 'solidarity' and (offcial) humanitarianism (i.e. Non-Governmental Organisations, NGO's), see Rozakou (2017). On the 'informal path' of volunteering for the displaced people, see Kalogeraki (2018).

<sup>12</sup> In the social sciences there is an extensive literature on the various facets of the 'refugee crisis' in the Aegean. For *Lesvos,* in particular, see the works of Heath Cabot, Anna Carastathis, Effrosyni Charitopoulou, Sotiris Chtouris, Anja Franck, Sarah Green, Chloe Howe Haralambous, Pafsanias Karathanasis, Maria Kastrinou, Alexandra Knott, DeMond Miller, Nikos Nagopoulos, Dimitris Papadopoulos, Ilektra Petrakou, Michalis Psimitis, Kostas Rontos, Katerina Rozakou, Kostas Rontos, Dina Siegel, Aila Spathopoulou, Katerina Stefatos, Sevasti Trubeta and Nikolaos Xypolytas.

<sup>13</sup> 'Refugee solidarity' contrasted the exclusionary solidarity to the Greek victims of the economic crisis by the xenophobic Right. For a comparative assessment of how national contexts impact transnational solidarity organising in the sphere of migration, see Kanellopoulos et al. (2020).

understanding of their predicament were created, and this, in effect, radically altered the local attitudes towards them.14

During the 2015 crisis the irregular border crossers stopped being conceived as 'illegal migrants' (*lathro-metanastes*). Instead they were reclassifed as 'refugees.' The emic category of 'migrant' suggests a claim to settle in the host environment and thus raises the sovereign worries that dominate the practice of 'hospitality.' 'Refugee,' on the other hand, is a politically innocent and sympathetic category, which in the local mind, besides recalling the traumatic memories of the 1922 'Asia Minor Disaster' and the massive exit of ethnic Greek Christians from *Anatolia,* suggests *a person on the move*, in transit, with no intention to settle in the locality.15 For the frst time in local perception the displaced people were divested of all troubling particularities –the color of their skin, their ethno-national identity, their language or, most important, their religion- and were identifed on the basis of a common denominator, as vulnerable, suffering 'human beings' in need.

'Solidarity,' suggesting a rather lighter form of sociality than 'hospitality,' with fewer 'obligations' attached to it, a short-term arrangement that lasts as long as the other is in a state of need, was often employed in the extra-parliamentary Left towards 'comrades' suffering police prosecution. After 2010, it gained wider currency and characterised the 'solidarity movement' towards the victims of the economic crisis.16 In 2015 the reconfguration of the irregular travelers in need made possible the dramatic change of attitude. Thus, 'solidarity' was extended to include them, thereby replacing the politically controversial 'hospitality to migrants.'

#### *8.2.2 Consolidation: The Humanitarian Regime*

This shift of attitude was initially partial. Xenophobic reactions were strong on the ground, leading to internal strife and intercommunal conficts that started *breaking down* the local communities in the front line.17 Yet 'solidarity to refugees' was soon *consolidated* in the context of the *regime of humanitarian governance*, which was established under UNHCR (United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees**)** auspices when Greece was offcially declared to be in a state of 'humanitarian emergency.'18

In the summer and autumn of 2015, the collapse of the border and the subsequent retreat of the state to the very basics created a vacuum in the management of the

<sup>14</sup>On the role of interpersonal contact in the formation of 'prosocial behavior,' see Charitopoulou (2020).

<sup>15</sup>On emic constructs of refugee that are embedded in cultural perceptions of Greece's refugee past, see Voutira (2003).

<sup>16</sup>See Oikonomakis (2018).

<sup>17</sup>During these months I had the impression of a 'broken place.' See Papataxiarchis (2016a).

<sup>18</sup>For a critical assessment of humanitarian governance, from the angle of power and 'technologies of control' of these vulnerable populations, see Barnett (2013) and Fassin and Pandolf (2010).

'refugee crisis.' Greek authorities, despite their commitment to apply the 'hotspot system' in the frontline, could not manage the massive fows alone.19 For the frst time the EU deployed its own humanitarian response unit inside Europe and UNHCR increased its staff in Greece from a dozen to around 600 in a few weeks.20 The interstate agents that took control of the situation, in cooperation with international and few local NGOs under the auspices of the UNHCR, gradually flled the vacuum side by side with the grassroots initiatives and the experimental 'structures' that were born in the informal humanitarian sector.

The local regime of humanitarian governance involved three categories of actors-the displaced people, the locals (including state offcials) and the foreign humanitarians. It was premised on a very simple idea of how to inter-connect the three sides: state and municipal authorities offered 'hospitality' to the foreign humanitarian actors and, through them, provided help and 'solidarity' to the displaced people. You often had the impression that local authorities were nominally present in the running of humanitarian affairs. The actual work, the division and coordination of humanitarian labor or the administration of funding were done by the experienced foreign humanitarians.

From the perspective of local authorities, this worked as a *disemic* model of governance: 'hospitality' towards the 'inside' of the humanitarian regime, the foreign humanitarian agents of governance, 'solidarity' towards the 'outside,' the irregular travelers, recipients of help. Through their inclusion in the hierarchical structures of 'hospitality' and their subjection to the 'law of hospitality'21 the humanitarian 'guests' symbolically confrmed the sovereign status of the local authorities –they offered *the illusion of sovereignty*– and got literally a free hand to pursue their operations. Local authorities, on the other hand, performed 'solidarity' *indirectly*, through the foreign humanitarian actors and their actual contribution in the provision of aid.

Although the unconditional welcome of 'refugees' was adopted in offcial discourse, 'refugee solidarity' primarily informed unoffcial humanitarian action, and in this capacity started working as a sort of *legitimising superstructure* of the humanitarian regime. It also became more established as the humanitarian regime expanded its own social and economic base forming a whole *assemblage of mechanisms and practices* and producing important spatial transformations which I have described using the term *'humanitarian town.'*22 I refer to a new dimension of urban space, which is produced by the humanitarian regime. As the town adopted the properties of humanitarian space it turned into a complex, dynamic feld, where various political, institutional, and economic agents, forces, mechanisms, and processes met to produce antagonistic relations.

<sup>19</sup>See Parsanoglou (Chap. 12 in this volume).

<sup>20</sup>Howden and Fotiadis (2017, p. 3).

<sup>21</sup>See the classical work of Pitt-Rivers (2012).

<sup>22</sup>See Papataxiarchis (2017). This concept allows for a more balanced view of the multiple aspects of the refugee condition on the islands and the unraveling of refugee agency and interaction.

The humanitarian town is composed of *a network of interactions emplaced in humanitarian spaces*, yet extending far beyond them in all directions.23 It is geographically located in all sorts of humanitarian spaces –camps, 'structures,' residences, offces, warehouses, 'schools,' recreational facilities– and made of all sorts of interactions (between displaced people, humanitarian workers, state offcials and locals), yet it is shaped around two defning types of accommodation, the camps and the urban refugee residences and places of refugee sociality. After March 2016 the hotspot and the municipal camp of *Karatepe* suggested the bureaucratic, disciplinary and ultimately biopolitical aspect of the humanitarian regime, while the places of residence and sociality in the town offered alternative outlets for interaction and, often creative, experimentation.24

For the displaced people the humanitarian regime worked as a special entrance to local society. In this respect, it *mediated* between the locals and the displaced people, thus changing the terms of their interaction. It eventually functioned as a *buffer zone*, offering much needed assistance, visibility and protection from xenophobia. It also offered spaces of experimentation in new ways of *inter-cultural* action and interaction that promised the transcendence of the narrow limits and the self-centredness of 'hospitality.'

The humanitarian regime relied on the social alliance between the professional humanitarians, the segment of the local population that embraced 'solidarity to refugees' on pragmatic grounds and the idealist 'solidarians.' The regime eventually became more solid as it acquired roots in the growing humanitarian economy. Humanitarian tourism was in full swing. New professions emerged and a good part of the local population either diversifed in the direction of the booming humanitarian economy or became employed in humanitarian structures.

#### *8.2.3 Offcial Upgrading: 'Refugee Solidarity' as a State Project*

'Solidarity to refugees' was also fashioned *from above* and eventually *upgraded into a new patriotism by the SYRIZA (Sιnaspismos Rizospastikis Aristeras [Coalition of the Radical Left] -ANEL (Anexartiti Elines [Independent Greeks]) government and the sympathetic media*. 25 As a big, principally mediatic, state project, the new patriotism capitalised on the *border spectacle*26 and the stories and representations of rescue and reception. 'Refugee solidarity' was celebrated as a distinctive mark of the local and national character and a property ingrained in places such as *Lesvos* or

<sup>23</sup>For a critical assessment of the term 'humanitarian space,' see Hilhorst and Jansen (2010).

<sup>24</sup>On the urban qualities of the camp and the interface between camp and city, see Agier (2011) and Sanyal (2014).

<sup>25</sup>See Chouliaraki (2012).

<sup>26</sup>On the border spectacle, see De Genova (2013).

*Skala*. In this capacity, it was embraced by large sections of the population at the national level, turning into a sort of national pride and an asset with which the government attempted to restore the country's wounded international image.27

The crisis attracted the attention of world media and eventually offered immense visibility to the village, the island, and the protagonists of the humanitarian drama. The journalists were primarily interested in the rescue at the frontline. The *new spectacle of the caring border* portrayed the rescue in dramatic aesthetic terms as a relation between a vulnerable refugee, often a child or a woman, and a virile male lifeguard or just a caring person. In this respect, the visual economy of the crisis adopted a strong *soteriological* tone.

*Skala* was a major provider of the raw materials –the emotional narratives of the drama of rescue, personal accounts and, most important, photos– with which *the romance of 'solidarity'* was produced. A cataclysm of photos from the village fooded the globe. The best example of course is the photo of 'the three grannies feeding the refugee child' by the photographer *Lefteris Partsalis*, one of the most signifcant photos of the 2015 crisis. This photo had a remarkable career. Soon after it became viral on the internet it was upgraded into a big background poster at the joint press conference of the Greek Prime Minister and the President of the European Parliament, it latter fgured as the emblem of *Lesvos* during the Pope's visit to the island and covered a wall in the *Mytilene* airport. This emblematic photo offered immense visibility to *Militsa Kamvisi,* the elderly woman who was photographed feeding the baby, turning her into a star of 'solidarity.' As an effect of the immense visibility she gained from the photo, she gave tenths of interviews to the national and international press, she was awarded prizes (including being one of the three offcial candidates for the Nobel Peace prize who were selected by the Greek government), and, together with the other two elderly women of the photo, inspired a wave of humanitarian pilgrimage to *Skala*.

In all these performative activities, 'solidarity' was celebrated as an essence that lies in places, such as *Skala* and *Lesvos*, or in ordinary individuals: all these were assumed to constitute the 'human face' of Greece or Europe. The actual behavior of people, emptied of its idiosyncratic complexity, in visual and other forms, turned into the symbolic base of a political project. Thus 'solidarity to refugees' emerged as a new symbolic *topos* with which citizens could identify and thus turn to 'solidarians.'28 Α new cosmopolitan form of political attachment and, as in the case of constitutional patriotism, a post national identity, not to say faith, was under construction.29

<sup>27</sup>The 'patriotism of solidarity to refugees' has been a much larger project with a much wider ideological scope than the 'Refugee Solidarity Movement' (Oikonomakis, 2018) that consists of informal, collective 'initiatives.'

<sup>28</sup>On the production of the 'solidarian,' see Rozakou (2016).

<sup>29</sup>On the differences between patriotism and nationalism, the limitations of a 'placeless cosmopolitanism' and the prerequisites of post-national patriotism, see Turner (2002).

In one word, all this together –the representations, the honors, the exhibitions, the visits– were fused into a larger political project; they made up what I have coined as the new 'patriotism of solidarity to refugees.'30 This has been the political legacy of the 'refugee crisis.' In 2015–2016 the 'patriotism of solidarity to refugees' adopted multiple functions: it legitimised the humanitarian regime and provided an important political horizon to the Greek government of the Radical Left which was shaken by the negative outcome of its negotiation with its creditors. It also *overshadowed the dark side*, which was present from the frst moment of the crisis: the xenophobic reactions, the exploitation of the asylum seekers and, particularly, the internal strife that was generated by the passage of the displaced people through localities.

#### **8.3 The Decline: Excessive Bordering and the Political Contestation of the Ambiguous 'Asylum Seeker'**

The new patriotism fell victim to the closure of the Balkan corridor and the effects of the EU-Turkey Statement of March 2016, which, by instituting an internal border, set the new terms of (im)mobility in the Aegean. It was *undermined* by the social and political protest and confict which arose around the immobilisation of the displaced people and the *ambiguous* status of the asylum seeker that was offcially attributed to them. After March 2016 almost all irregular travelers opted for seeking asylum in Greece. The legal status of the asylum seeker provided the source of a new identity, which politically enabled the displaced people yet also exposed them to the suspicion and eventual hostility of the locals since it hung suspended in-between the (innocent) deserving 'refugee' and the (threatening) 'migrant.' Under these conditions 'solidarity to refugees' eventually *demised* where it was actually born, at the grassroots, in the very consciousness of all those who had earlier expressed sympathy yet later, in the course of the struggles that were generated around the continuous presence of the displaced people on the island, turned their back to them.

The decline of the new patriotism is a *multi-factor* phenomenon. Here I want to discuss three principal factors: the formation of the internal border and the immobilisation of the border crossers on the islands, the fragmentation and eventual decline of the humanitarian regime and the contests around the challenging fgure of the 'asylum seeker.'

<sup>30</sup>See Papataxiarchis (2016b).

#### *8.3.1 The Internal Border as a Source of Stagnation and Subsequent Protest*

The policy of geographical restriction of the newcomers to the islands, which became effective in the context of the EU-Turkey Statement, had an immense impact on the mobility and the local demographics of the displaced people. Once stuck on *Lesvos* the new, more ethnically diversifed, arrivals radically transformed the local humanitarian scene.

The internal border was not waterproof. Quite the contrary, there was a certain degree of mobility of displaced people across it, in the direction of the Greek mainland, mostly on grounds of vulnerability.31 The Greek government strategically managed the otherwise restricted mobility of displaced people, by closing and opening the tap depending on the number of arrivals, through the manipulation of the criteria that decided mobility, and particularly the criterion of 'vulnerability.' Thus, emphasis shifted from the external caring border of 2015–2016 to the *internal strategic* border.

Yet, the *very slow pace of the asylum process*, which was engulfed in legal battles over the rights of the irregular travelers and suffered structural weaknesses (e.g. small number of asylum offcials) resulted in big delays. For this reason, an increasing number of asylum seekers were stuck in *Lesvos* and the other frontline Aegean islands, suspended in a prolonged state of *waiting*. Their 'congestion' on the islands, to use a popular term, was a continuous source of strain for them as well as for the locals. It fueled the corrosive forces that eventually undermined 'refugee solidarity' in the Aegean.

No doubt, this was a complex situation. The life of displaced people in *Lesvos* from 2016 onwards had its bright as much as its dark sides. On the bright side, one could count the new spaces of symbiotic sociality, primarily organised around projects of informal education, 'schools' and 'nurseries,' which had spread all around, in the humanitarian town and the camps, and the limited, yet important, immersion of the asylum seekers, who lived in apartments, in urban life.32 On the dark side, the hotspot of *Moria* dominated as a clear case of *failed protection*. Oversised, with serious problems in sanitation, accommodation and medical aid, the hotspot was a constant source of often suicidal violence.

It is not easy to describe the exact balance between the two extremes since the living conditions of the asylum seekers were quite volatile and *changed all the time*. Yet, the management of the internal border through the strategic handling of

<sup>31</sup>For example, from 20 March 2016 till the frst of October 2017, 46,600 displaced people reached the islands of the Aegean. 65% (33,140) of them left the islands, most (around 30,240) moved to the mainland, primarily on grounds of vulnerability or because they obtained asylum. A relatively small percentage, less than 3% (mostly Pakistanis) returned to Turkey and an equal number participated in the IOM (International Organisation for Migration) scheme of 'voluntary return.' See European Stability Initiative (2018).

<sup>32</sup> In a sympathetically critical account (Papataxiarchis, 2017), I have discussed some of these projects of informal education.

'vulnerability' by the SYRIZA-ANEL government, systematically failed to decongest the island and diminish the pressure. It was principally undermined by the spectacular on-going inability of the authorities to improve the conditions in the hotspot of *Moria.* Therefore, the hotspot *was increasingly exporting trouble to Mytilene and the rest of the island*. The bad conditions in the hotspot were regularly leading to unrest –riots, suicides, inter-ethnic violence– and fed a *chain of protests and mobilisations from all sides*. This was increasingly becoming an ideal environment for the application of the strategies of Ultra-Right xenophobes and their allies who struggled for visibility and political gains. The occupation of the central square of *Mytilene* by tenths of asylum seekers and the violent reactions of locals in April 2018, as well as the arson of a number of humanitarian facilities in the frst half of 2020, and the eventual destruction by fre of the hotspot of *Moria* in September 2020 are key moments in this middle term cycle of contention and unrest.

#### *8.3.2 The Humanitarian Regime Under Transformation and Eventually in Retreat*

From a certain moment onwards, particularly after the UNHCR ended its 'emergency response' in Greece and reduced its staff in 2017, the humanitarian regime shrunk in numbers and its informal sector, the grassroots humanitarians, went into retreat. As the regime turned into a more bureaucratic and technocratic direction, it started fragmenting into its multiple components (e.g. the professional humanitarians and the activists).

The policy of geographical restriction changed the operational priorities which after 2016 shifted from rescue and frst reception to *accommodation, protection and education*. As rescue was *bureaucratised* and went back to the full control of the Hellenic Coastguard and Frontex, the bipartite character of the regime also changed, and, with the *retreat of grassroots humanitarianism*, the unoffcial side declined and to a large extent became integrated into the offcial one.

Most importantly, the humanitarian regime became increasingly *Hellenised,* thus losing its disemic character: 'hospitality' overpowered 'solidarity.' On the one hand, the Greek state authorities gradually took control of important functions in the administration of humanitarian fnances, in education and in the overall management of the crisis. The UNHCR retreated from the role of fnancial manager and coordinator to that of consultant, while the foreign NGOs occupied an increasingly marginal position. On the other hand, the growth of Greek NGOs and the recruitment of Greek personnel by the big international organisations facilitated the better integration of humanitarians with local society. In this regard, the social base of the humanitarian regime stabilised, and its compositional dualism increased as well.

The hotspots changed their function, which now included not only reception, identifcation and the detention of those facing deportation, but also the processing of asylum applications, accommodation and even informal education. The offcial camps and structures of 'hospitality,' such as the hotspot of *Moria* and the municipal camp of *Karatepe,* replaced the informal camps of frst reception in the centre of public attention. The *Moria* hotspot, particularly, grew into a huge administrative structure. At the same time, as the state regained control, the humanitarian regime fell prey to the antagonism between political parties. It was subjected to the dynamics of the extremely polarised political scene (1 year before the national and municipal elections of 2019) and embedded in the heated debates around burning 'national issues' such as the diffcult Greek-Turkish relations.

Under these conditions, 'solidarity to refugees' started losing its glamour, fell in popularity and became deconstructed into its technocratic, philanthropic, transactional, and politico-ideological components. At best, in this new context the predicament of the displaced people was increasingly thought of as a matter of asylum rights and/or in terms of services, and, more generally, 'hospitality,' offered to them, and not as an issue of 'solidarity to refugees.'

#### *8.3.3 The 'Asylum Seeker,' a New Political Subject and a Challenging Puzzle*

Asylum, as an institutional structure, and the asylum seeker, as a legal category, were available yet underdeveloped and certainly peripheral in the Greek socio-legal context before 2015.33 In this sense, the establishment of the humanitarian regime and the widespread adoption of asylum strategies by the irregular travelers who came to Greece after March 2016 signaled both a *quantitative and qualitative change*. A new identity was born out of the offcial category. The 'asylum seeker' emerged for the frst time as a *recognisable identity*, suspended between the 'refugee' and the 'migrant.' This emergent identity is still perceived by many as strange and challenging.

From March 2016 onwards, the great majority of the border crossers opted for applying for asylum in *Lesvos*. In contrast to those who arrived before March and continued their journey across the Balkan route in order to apply for asylum somewhere in Northern Europe, the newcomers after March risked their forced return to Turkey if they did not ask for international protection. Also, in contrast to the many thousands of African and Asian travelers, who irregularly crossed the Aegean since 2000 to be lost in the grey zone of invisibility, they were more generously offered the (diachronically available) option to claim the status of asylum seeker and the rights that go with it and, therefore, place themselves under the aegis of the humanitarian regime which had become available after 2015.

Their immobilisation on *Lesvos* radically changed the terms of their perception by the locals. The newcomers ceased being thought of as 'refugees,' they reminded the 'migrants' of the old days, yet not exactly, at least not as long as they claimed

<sup>33</sup>See Cabot (2014).

refugee status and the aura of the 'refugee crisis' had not disappeared. They belonged to *an in-between category*, *a transitional offcial status* that allowed accessing the support of the humanitarian structures that mediated in their involvement in Greek society. Their institutional and symbolic emplacement in the humanitarian town, the raison d'être of which were the asylum seekers themselves, made a difference, particularly in offering visibility and a basis of empowerment.

On the other hand, the settlement of asylum seekers in camps and apartments was a continuous source of worry. Also, the 'special rights' (to humanitarian protection, medical care, accommodation), which were awarded to them by the humanitarian regime, their membership in one of the *parallel worlds* that emerged in Greece during the years of the crisis, and *their visibility were challenging.* Instead of hiding (as their predecessors did before 2015), they were all around: men, women and children, proudly taking their evening promenade in the town's main waterfront, performing their cricket in the playground of the central Lyceum or attending the many informal structures of education and sociality that were spreading in the humanitarian town!34

On top of all these, the new, post-2016 group of displaced people *exercised their political agency* systematically and persistently. They did so often in some sort of coordination with 'solidarians' and activists, who shared local knowledge with them, introduced them to the Greek ways of assembling, marching, protesting, and making claims, as well as exercising their rights, and 'showed them around,' exploring together the symbolic geographies of mobilisation in an alien environment.35 This is how a genealogy of asylum seeker protests and mobilisations was created.

Under these conditions, the humanitarian town became a *contested space*, particularly as organised groups exploited the growing discomfort around the asylum seekers to pursue xenophobic political agendas. Subsequent conficts between locals and humanitarians, between locals and the government, between asylum seekers and the government or between locals and asylum seekers were generated.

During these conficts, the UNHCR was caught in the middle, in an awkward position of neutrality, increasingly marginalised as the Greek state was taking control of the management of the refugee population, unable to put a brake to the internal fragmentation of the humanitarian regime. Humanitarian assistance was losing its nerve as it became increasingly bureaucratised and the informal base of the humanitarian regime, activists, and volunteers, became alienated from its formal administration by the UNHCR and the big NGOs. Particularly foreign activists, who strongly criticised humanitarian offcials, started facing the open hostility of the locals.

<sup>34</sup>See Papataxiarchis (2017).

<sup>35</sup>On the common struggles of asylum seekers and local activists, see Tsavdaroglou (2019).

#### **8.4 The Events of** *Sappho* **Square**

#### *8.4.1 The 'Pogrom'*

On Sunday 22 of April 2018 an *unprecedented* burst of xenophobia took place in *Lesvos.* The xenophobic incident, which focused on the occupation of the town's main square by a big group of Afghan asylum seekers from the hotspot of *Moria*, 36 provides a very interesting angle through which we can analyse the developmental cycle of 'refugee solidarity' and the causes of its collapse.

The incident happened as two separate moves of protest came together in the central square of *Mytilene* turning it into a battlefeld. The frst involved around 150 Afghan asylum seekers –men, women, and children– who occupied *Sappho* square protesting against their restriction on the island, the bad conditions in the hotspot of *Moria* and, particularly, the insuffcient medical care. Their collective action was part of the long chain of similar moves, demonstrations, occupations, and hunger strikes, which were taking place on the island since March 2016. Asylum seeker mobilisations were testimony of the bad living conditions but also an index of the empowerment of the displaced people. Their repertoire of collective action was becoming increasingly sophisticated as they acquired ground knowledge and became familiarised with local ways and modes of political becoming.37

The other move came from organised groups of local xenophobes, who were systematically trying to politically exploit the growing discomfort with the prolonged stay of asylum seekers on the island. It involved activists belonging to the Right (*Nea Dimokratia*) and the Ultra-Right (Golden Dawn), organised in Facebook groups, exploiting 'national sensitivities' during a period of tension in the Greek-Turkish relations and investing in the alleged threat of Islamisation of the island by the primarily Muslim newcomers.38

Previous asylum seeker mobilisations had a peaceful conclusion despite the tensions that arose with locals. This time, the centre of the humanitarian town turned into a battlefeld. After the end of an informal gathering of local citizens to honor the traditional lowering of the Greek fag in the main square of the town every Sunday, a sort of secular ritual that had gained greater attention because of the crisis in the Greek-Turkish relations, a large group of around 200 right-wing extremists, joined by hooligans and young sympathisers from nearby villages, attacked the Afghan squatters with stones, heavy metallic objects, bottles, Molotov cocktails and fares. The asylum seekers defended their ground peacefully with the help of some

<sup>36</sup>For descriptions of the events of 22 April, see Observatory of the Refugee and Migration Crisis in the Aegean (2019). Also see the frsthand account by Pafsanias Karathanasis and Angelos Varvarousis (Karathanasis & Varvarousis, 2018).

<sup>37</sup>For another example of refugee protest in the northern Greek borders, see Koukouzelis (Chap. 9 in this volume).

<sup>38</sup>For a systematic analysis of the trajectory of asylum seeker mobilisations and local protests in another Aegean Island with a hotspot, *Chios*, see Souzas et al. (2021).

'solidarians' and other asylum seekers from *Moria*. The police did not manage to restrict the local xenophobes and their attacks went on for more than 5 h. According to offcial calculations, more than 30 people, mostly asylum seekers, and a few policemen were injured and taken to hospital.

Early in the morning the police evacuated the square by force and arrested 103 asylum seekers, thus bringing to violent conclusion a peaceful occupation that had lasted for almost a week. Some newspapers spoke of a 'pogrom' and a 'Crystal night'. Yet, many locals were quite understanding of the xenophobic violence and put the blame to the asylum seekers. Months later, the police pressed charges against some of the alleged local protagonists of the violent attack. The whole issue thus came and, till the winter of 2021, remained under judicial investigation. The asylum seekers were recently acquitted by the local court.

The events in *Sappho* square were a landmark. This was the most serious incident of explicitly xenophobic mass violence that ever happened on the island and one of the most serious in the country for a long time. After April 2018, asylum seeker protests and mobilisations on the island were frozen for more than a year.

The signifcance of these events exceeds local boundaries. What I fnd particularly remarkable is not so much the undoubtedly shocking scale of violence. The asymmetrical violence against the asylum seekers suggested something of greater signifcance–*a clear shift in the direction in which local public opinion was movin*g. It marked the very end of the patriotism of 'solidarity to refugees' in its very birthplace.

#### *8.4.2 The Threshold: Cultural Incompatibilities*

During the asylum seekers' occupation of *Sappho* square a threshold was crossed. This was primarily due to the religious mode of organising their political agency. For the frst time in the long chain of protests, the asylum seekers avoided to confate their mobilisation with local 'solidarian' actions or offer a recognizably secular, political identity to their protest. Instead *they exercised their political agency in their own cultural terms*. They pursued a stance of radical autonomy by explicitly articulating their protest in a religious, Islamic idiom. They almost turned the main square into an informal place of worshipping Islam.

The religious mode of mobilisation, which was employed by the protesting Afghans, worked as a powerful reminder of their ethno-cultural specifcity. Besides increasing further their visibility, in the local mind this strategy transformed them into a *threatening alterity* and turned their protest into an act of hubris. For some locals it was also a matter of cultural and aesthetic *incompatibility*. Because, as one prominent local opinion maker and 'sympathiser' to the asylum seekers' cause argued (from an allegedly secular perspective) in Facebook, Sappho and Islam do not go together!39

Under these conditions, the occupation of *Sappho* square worked as a catalyst among the 'tired' locals. Once the Afghan protesters phrased their public collective action in religious terms, they *energised the framework of 'hospitality' in the local mind*, they activated, in other words, a structure of control that demands from the guest to respect the host's culture, show cultural self-restraint and adopt a public stance of cultural conformity. The public projection of their ethno-religious difference in the context of a political mobilisation with big visibility clashed with the guest's assumed obligation to comply with local cultural norms. For many sympathisers of the refugee predicament, particularly for those who identifed with the refugees on the basis of a common humanity and not on ideological grounds of cosmopolitanism or radical equality, this behavior was too much: it suggested a selfish concern with (asylum) rights and the total neglect of the obligations (of respect) towards the host population.

It was under such conditions that the locals stopped tolerating the presence of the asylum seekers on the island. In April 2018, *they instead tolerated the exercise of brutal violence against them by the xenophobic attackers*. Those locals who, in 2015, were 'shamed'40 in some sort of pro-refugee action, now, *without shame, shifted to reaction*. The violent events signifed that the protest of the asylum seekers surpassed the limits of tolerance and energised a clear and important shift in public opinion.

#### **8.5 Conclusion: On the Cultural Limits of an Alternative Politics of Difference**

The new patriotism of 'refugee solidarity' proved to be ephemeral. Its fate was decided where it was born, at the *grassroots*, in the interaction of local citizens with the displaced people. As at the beginning the outcome of this interaction largely depended on cultural perceptions of difference, so it was at the end. Once the *logic* that organised the interaction remained the same, then the new patriotism was destined to fall under the weight of excessive bordering. The migration politics of the conservative government which came into power in the summer of 2019 just confrmed and translated into policy the shift in attitudes towards the asylum seekers that had already taken place in front line societies.

<sup>39</sup>On the intolerance towards Muslim immigrants in Athens during the early phase of the economic crisis, see Triandafyllidou and Kouki (2013).

<sup>40</sup> I borrow the term from Miriam Ticktin's (2017) argument on 'innocence' as a criterion of 'deserving.'

A key lesson we get from the study of the developmental cycle of the patriotism of 'solidarity to refugees' concerns the formative power of moves on the ground, particularly in times of crisis. *'Refugee solidarity' was both born and concluded at the low level of politics.*

'Refugee solidarity' grew into a grassroots movement under *unique* historical circumstances: the open, caring border, the mass mobilisation of young volunteers and activists from Northern Europe, the establishment of a humanitarian regime on European soil. Most important, its upgrading into the new patriotism was made possible by the conjunctural placement of the displaced people somehow outside the realm of the Greek regime of difference and the terrain of 'hospitality' because of their reconfguration as 'refugees' in transit. The offcial adoption of these grassroots developments was also linked to an equally unique historical phenomenon, the transformation of a marginal political party of the Left, SYRIZA, into the dominant force in Greek politics during the frst years of the economic crisis.

The decline of the new patriotism (from 2016 to 2018) followed the same *bottom up* path. 'Refugee solidarity' frst demised at the grassroots while SYRIZA was still in power. The multifarious contestations around the presence of the displaced people on the island, which were organised around the slogan of 'decongestion', gradually undermined the potential of 'refugee solidarity.' As it has become clear, many factors contributed to this development, yet here I want to distinguish and discuss in greater detail one of them that became very salient in the *Sappho* square incident. I refer to the public mood towards the asylum seekers.

#### *8.5.1 Volatile Tolerance*

*Why has the new patriotism failed as a deterrent to the xenophobic backlash?* This is a key question. The answer lies in the exact character of mass 'solidarity.' 'Refugee solidarity' in the form of patriotism was *a matter of tolerance rather than of actual engagement* with the predicament of the displaced people. Through time, this tolerance, which had a shifting inclination either towards sympathy or towards indifference, proved to be quite volatile.

The majority of those who were once supportive of the cause of the 'refugees' were passive observers from a distance. They were agents not of empathy (that presupposes face to face interaction) but of an '*armchair sympathy,*' a sympathy from afar that is nourished by the mediatic humanitarian sentimentality41 and is often expressed in donations. *This* attitude of sympathetic tolerance was made easier (not to say possible) by the ongoing movement of the displaced people. However, as it became clear in the April 2018 events, sympathy to the 'refugees' lacked frm foundations on *alternative ways* of thinking the predicament of the displaced people. Therefore, as it was constantly undermined by a strong

<sup>41</sup>See Chouliaraki (2012).

undercurrent of 'primary' concerns about the self and 'tiredness' from the prolonged coexistence of local citizens with the 'problem,' it became easily exposed to political manipulation.

Most importantly, the tolerance towards the displaced people was defned from the start and remained under the terms of the historically hegemonic way of understanding difference, the assimilationist logic that evaluates the foreign migrant and the refugee on the basis of his (assumed) cultural compatibility with the (national) self. Tolerance is an endemic property of the Greek regime of difference. The puzzling or even challenging alterity of the other (irrespective of whether it is an alterity of sexual orientation, ethno-cultural identity or religion) is tolerated as long as it is kept at bay, in the sphere of cultural intimacy, remaining largely invisible in the informal margins of the everyday.42

The tolerance of many local citizens was initially perplexed by the immobilisation, i.e. the continuous presence, of the displaced people on the island. It was further challenged by their 'offensive' visibility (often associated with incidences of petty crime) and their insistence on rights and their identity. Therefore, when their presence assumed the 'aggressive' form of protest it touched a sensitive nerve. The 'protesting migrants' who claim their rights looked the opposite of the innocent 'refugees' who need help. On top of this, the use of a religious idiom seemed almost as a provocative act. Based on their own cultural understandings the protesting asylum seekers did not adequately assessed the severe cultural limitations of their mobilisation. Instead of, at least, *conforming* to the *local* ways of being a political subject they employed *their* ways that puzzled and alienated even the few sympathisers to their cause.43 The symbolic acts of reciprocity (e.g. gifts) towards the locals, which they employed during the protest, and some gestures of respect (e.g. cleaning the square) and obedience to the authorities were not enough in altering the local mood.

#### *8.5.2 Innovative Failures*

The upgrading of 'refugee solidarity' into a patriotic concern, not to say duty, and its conceptualisation as a national attribute further reinforced the articulation of local sentiment towards the asylum seekers in the terms of the assimilationist logic. The Left government did *not* work on the cultural foundations of patriotism. Probably, it did not have the time nor/or the political will. Therefore, *it failed to reconfgure the Greek regime of difference, to shift it in a new, more open direction informed by a post-culturalist, dialogical understanding of the alterity of the displaced people from Asia and Africa.*

<sup>42</sup>See Papataxiarchis (2006, pp. 25–39).

<sup>43</sup>The strategic invocation of mainstream, culturally legible, identity discourses by African women struggling for citizenship rights of children born in Greece to migrant parents (Zavos, 2014) is a good example of the use of cultural conformity in recent migrant mobilisations.

'Solidarity to refugees' became popular in the wider population in the same essentialist terms with the old patriotism, particularly its Leftwing version, and, therefore, *lost its innovative potential,* its power to transform patriotism in a new direction on the basis of a critical awareness of the complex relation between national self and other.

As an effect, 'solidarity to refugees' was trapped in the same terrain with 'hospitality to migrants' that was reproduced as its counter-part. Both were anchored on a territorial sense of the self, conceived as essences endemic to place and nation. 'Refugee solidarity' eventually developed into a sort of humanitarian fashion which served well the functioning of the humanitarian regime yet lacked its distinct cultural logic. It became, therefore, vulnerable to the political struggles at the grassroots and eventually fell prey to the strategies of the xenophobic Right.

The asylum seekers are still around, living in hotspots, camps, apartments, and alternative structures. Their presence is still surrounded by ambiguity and suspicion and raises anxieties. In the recent past, SYRIZA dealt with this ambiguity through the realistic application of the Left, soft, tolerant side of traditional patriotism. The limitations of this strategy are clear. Since 2020 the New Democracy (*Nea Dimokratia*) party has eradicated the source of the 'anxiety' by eliminating the 'asylum seeker' as a distinct identity through the narrowing down of the legal category (and the undermining of legal protection), and by speeding up the asylum process and the reduction of the population of asylum seekers through pushbacks and legally controversial returns.

In these circumstances, the creative processing of this ambiguous identity remains a major challenge for the innovative political forces in Greek society. As long as the struggles of the asylum seekers continue, such challenges will be there, alive, a reminder that *their* predicament is a potential source of the host's critical *self*-awareness.

**Acknowledgements** I would like to thank Maria Kousis for the invitation to participate in the UCRC conference on 'Migrations: interdisciplinary challenges' and for her comments to an earlier draft of this essay. Many thanks also to Ef Avdela, Aspasia Chatzidaki, Effe Plexousaki, Katerina Rozakou and Alexandra Zavos for their comments.

#### **References**

Agier, M. (2011). *Managing the undesirables*. Polity Press.


Charitopoulou, E. (2020). *The European refugee crisis in Greece: Understanding host communities*. [Unpublished DPhil thesis]. University of Oxford.


**Evthymios Papataxiarchis** (PhD, London School of Economics, 1988) is Emeritus Professor of Social Anthropology in the Department of Social Anthropology and History, at the University of the Aegean, where he has been teaching and holding positions of research and administrative responsibility since 1987. He taught and did research in a number of institutions including the London School of Economics, the Research Foundation of the Commercial Bank of Greece, the Centre of Asia Minor Studies, the University of Crete, the University of Athens, the École des Hautes Études en Sciences Sociales and Boğaziçi University. As a PI or co-PI he has held several competitive research grants (e.g. Wenner Gren, Horizon 2020, Elidek), fellowships, scholarships and honors from several national and European institutions. Professor Papataxiarchis has published extensively in Greek, English and French on a wide range of topics. His recent books include: *Worlds of Domestic Labour: Immigration, Gender and Cultural Transformations in Early 21th Century Athens* (2008, co-author, in Greek); *Adventures of Alterity: The Production of Cultural Difference in Modern Greece* (second edition 2015, editor, in Greek); *The Politics of Everyday Life: Border, Body and Citizenship in Greece* (2014, editor, in Greek). He is also the editor of the series 'Anthropology' and 'Ethnographies' in Alexandria Publications, a founding member of the European Association of Social Anthropologists, and member of the Scientifc Committees of several Greek academic journals. He is directing since 2012 the International Postgraduate Summer School 'Cultures, Migrations, Borders,' and since 2017 the Observatory and Archive of the Refugee and Migration Crisis in the Aegean.

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## **Chapter 9 Claiming Cosmopolitan Citizenship: Migrants' Protests and Border Controls**

**Kostas Koukouzelis**

#### **9.1 Introduction**

Cosmopolitanism is, frst and foremost, a normative idea about global justice, which represents one of the various proposals in dealing with the problem of migration (Brock, 2009; Caraus & Paris, 2019; Nail, 2015). This is contrasted with the traditional approach founded on a treaty-based conception of international law and state negotiations, which come together with the supposed right of a sovereign, that is, a state, to exclude by unilaterally controlling its borders (Walzer, 1983, p. 62). According to a certain view, the current failure of dealing successfully with the problem of migration can be attributed to a large extent to the failure of realising the consequences of and dealing with global *interdependence* under traditional international law.1 For example, the failure of the European Union's (EU) migration policies, so far, is characteristic of a solution-oriented logic that is premised on negotiations among sovereign states seeking to promote their relatively narrow national interests. The cosmopolitan alternative can take, in my view, different normative forms: (a) the frst form recognises that we owe other people duties of humanitarian assistance beyond the state, but nothing more –this is a version of 'moral cosmopolitanism,' which I leave aside, because it just fails to go beyond morality; (b) the second form claims we have duties of justice to other people and the best institutional form would be a cosmopolitan order, either under the

<sup>1</sup>Talking about migration here I will limit myself to the case of migrants conceived as refugees or stateless people, that is, I will focus on *forced* migration, defned as the result of natural or social determinants of various kinds that leave in practice no space for choice (Castles, 2003). Therefore, I will leave aside the further complications immigration creates, which ask for a different treatment.

K. Koukouzelis (\*)

University of Crete, Crete, Greece e-mail: koukouze@uoc.gr

constitution of a world state (a solution that could notoriously create more problems for freedom), or under other supranational institutional forms; (c) the third form, which also claims we have cosmopolitan duties of justice, leaves open the foor for the possible institutional form they can take. This is also because it sees cosmopolitanism not only as a normative idea, which must be applied top-down, but having also a cognitive and epistemological dimension, which defnes the self-understanding of (cosmopolitan) political community, that is based on the notion of cosmopolitan citizenship.2

I will try to argue for the third normative form by describing and evaluating a particular instance of migrants' protests, which occurred in *Idomeni* Greece during the so called 'refugee crisis' of 2015–16. Looking closely at migrants' protests in this particular case, there seems to be a certain paradox, which I call 'the paradox of citizenship.' The paradox runs as follows: on the one hand, migrants protest against exclusionary policies of citizenship. If citizenship is allegedly always controlled by the state, migrants' protests seem to contest exactly this authoritative power of citizenship to exclude and control who can enter, who can be a citizen and what citizenship means. This might plausibly create the impression that migrants dismiss the notion of 'citizenship' *tout court.* On the other hand, what they are asking for is a certain status, which, after careful thought, seems akin to citizenship. How can this be possible?3 To be sure, there have been efforts to dissolve the paradox by completely scraping the notion of citizenship from what migrants are asking for, mainly by subsuming it under 'freedom of movement' and arguing for open borders. I will take another path here, arguing that migrants' protests, as expressed in the example of *Idomeni*, Greece, can be interpreted as a revival and redefnition, under modern circumstances of justice, of the old notion of 'cosmopolitan citizenship.'4

#### **9.2 Closed European Borders and Migrants' Protests in** *Idomen***i, Greece**

It is especially in the case of state borders, that is, of controlling, crossing, and challenging them –a case that is placed at the centre of recent discussions across disciplines in Europe (El Qadim et al., 2020)– that what we have just called 'the paradox of citizenship' is particularly revealed. To this task the example of the closure of the European borders between Greece and the Republic of North Macedonia (former

<sup>2</sup>Cosmopolitanism and cosmopolitan citizenship occupy an important place in the history of ideas and there is no space here for elaborating on their origins that go back to *Socrates* and *Diogenes the Cynic*, *Stoicism* and, of course, *Immanuel Kant*; see Heater (1996, pp. 6–8) and Ypi (2012, pp. 11–34).

<sup>3</sup>For an acknowledgement of such a paradox see Tyler and Marciniak (2013) and McNevin (2007, p. 670).

<sup>4</sup>An earlier version of the argument presented here can be found in Koukouzelis (2019b). Here, the focus is more on cosmopolitan citizenship, its meaning and possible objections.

FYROM) in 2016 provides a useful and instructive case of migrants' protests. On March 7, 2016, the EU heads of states and governments declared in Brussels that the illegalised fows of migrants across the East Balkan path had been blocked. This was the result of the closure of borders and the obstruction of their crossing from Greece to North Macedonia, which left more than 46,000 refugees and migrants trapped in continental Greece (Amnesty International, 2016, p. 2). At the same time EU's promise that a legal way out from Greece for those applying for asylum would be found had remained unfulflled to a large extent. According to information provided by the European Commission on April 12, 2016, only 615 out of 66,400 asylum seekers for whom there was a commitment that they would be relocated from Greece on September 2015, had moved to another EU member state. Lack of political will on behalf of the receiving countries and the alleged right for state borders control were the basic reasons. Amnesty International accused EU member states of being responsible for failing to implement the agreed system of relocation adopted by Dublin II and therefore for having trapped refugees and migrants in Greece (Amnesty International, 2016).

Until March 8, 2016, when North Macedonia's borders closed permanently, the vast majority of refugees and migrants reaching Greece continued their journey towards other countries passing through Balkans.5 This was the result of a number of reasons. A major reason was and still is the desire of several migrants to reunite with members of their family who live in safe and rich countries such as Germany and the United Kingdom. Another reason was the hope that they could receive help and support from communities of co-nationals that had already settled elsewhere. One last, yet equally important reason, was the complete lack of humane conditions or the ineffective and time-consuming procedures of getting asylum and papers or work permits in many of the receiving countries –a situation that characterised Greece as well. Actually, in the case of Greece the last issue was of particular importance as Greece was convicted in 2013 by the Court of the EU because of the inhumane conditions asylum seekers were experiencing.6

The closure of borders between Greece and North Macedonia had the unfortunate result that more than 14,000 of migrants, refugees and asylum seekers mainly from Syria, Iraq and Afghanistan (the so-called 'SIA countries') were trapped on the Greek side of the borders in *Idomeni* (The Guardian, 2016). There were extreme needs for food, medical help and shelter, something that had already started to be happening sporadically since 2015 when borders were also sealed at the same place (Amnesty International, 2015). The whole situation ended up in a severe humanitarian and migration governance crisis with people starving and having no shelter against weather conditions. Migrants became desperate since they could neither move forward nor go back. The *Médicines sans Frontiers* reported cases of refugees having met with severe violence from North Macedonia's border police (Amnesty

<sup>5</sup>For a good overview of migrant mobility in Greece since the early 2000s, see Mantanika and Arapoglou (Chap. 10 in this volume).

<sup>6</sup>Thus, the Court judged that asylum seekers should not be returned to Greece; see Court's decision in case C-4/11 Bundesrepublik Deutschland v. Kaveh Puid (2013).

International, 2016, p. 10). No refugee was given the opportunity to explain her status or situation. This complex situation created progressively a massive feeling of anxiety, despair and anger. Migrants started, for the frst time, to protest. Protests existed before both in Greece and elsewhere in Europe (Atac et al., 2016, pp. 528–9; Monforte & Dufour, 2013; Papataxiarchis Chap. 8 in this volume) but the claims now were different.

The protestors included immigrants, but also and mainly refugees from the SIA countries, who although formerly were allowed to use the Balkan route, they were now blocked because for the frst time they were considered to be coming from Turkey that was now characterised as a 'safe country.' Their protests between March and May 2016 involved efforts to cross the borders, their refusal to abandon their camps for other places in continental Greece and the occupation of the railway connecting Greece to Europe through North Macedonia blocking all cargos from *Piraeus* port and creating chaos in Greece's export fows to Europe. On March 14, 2016, several thousands of people who had been stuck in *Idomeni* for days or even weeks set off on what was later called a *March of Hope* and tried to cross into the territory of the Republic of North Macedonia at a place several kilometers away from *Idomeni,* where no fence had been built, but failed dramatically (Anastasiadou et al., 2017, pp. 61–63). Furthermore, on 23 March 2016, almost 500 migrants blocked the highway from *Thessaloniki* to North Macedonia, only 1 day after two migrants tried to set themselves on fre in the *Idomeni* camp. More than 2 months still followed before the *Idomeni* camp was evicted for good in late May 2016, and during this time migrants kept staging protests and blockades at borders, on the railroad tracks and on the highway, and acts of self-harm, like hunger strikes and lip-sewing, continued to take place (ibid., pp. 63–64).

What is important for us here is basically the claims put forward by migrants. Traditionally, migrants' claims either refer to advocacy for human rights, humanitarian aid, a fair asylum process and access to labor markets or involve resistance to deportation. The case of *Idomeni* can be interpreted as an overall different paradigm on two fronts: (a) it presented a paradigm of migrants' *protests*, which meant, as shown above, that contrary to most situations, where migrants were passive receivers of aid, they this time took a more active role. One should note here that *humanitarian aid*, as practiced mainly by Non-governmental Organisations (NGOs) or grassroots movements, portrayed an image of victimhood regarding migrants, not only in the sense of innocence, but equally in the sense of powerlessness. Of course, this does not perhaps apply to every single NGO that is activated in the feld, nevertheless, a paramount part of the logic of humanitarian assistance in the form of satisfying many of the aforementioned claims reduces migrants' subjectivity to less than full agency, metaphorically speaking. Sometimes migrants internalise this image and are led to self-victimisation. This was not the case for migrants in *Idomeni* examined here. (b) It presented a case where protesting took a specifc content. Now protesting was about border controls or to be more accurate, the complete ban of border crossing for migrants.7 Protests that challenged border controls showed an 'amazing stubbornness' (Mezzadra, 2020, pp. 433–434) on behalf of people that did not want to be treated as mere victims but wanted to have their views heard and respected by others *despite* their not being citizens of the receiving countries.

More specifcally, such protests against borders closure, although grounded in a specifc context, contested frameworks and assumptions that were also wider in scope. Their targets were not only the particular state they were in, but also the EU's policies, so their goal was not just articulated in terms of state citizenship, but in terms of something autonomous and independent from it, claiming a distinct political subjectivity detached from any membership in a particular political community. Through protesting migrants constituted themselves as autonomous political agents, and therefore their status was no longer defned by the state they happened to be, but by the very act of *contestation*. This was moreover interestingly articulated in their refusal to be represented by Greek citizens or NGOs who acted in solidarity to them.8 What exactly did they claim and in virtue of what? Did they simply claim their human right to freedom of movement, or something else? We need to fnd the right conceptual language for comprehending this political subjectivity. This is, in my view, not just a thoroughly descriptive endeavor, but a distinct normative enterprise.

#### **9.3 Open Borders: Freedom of Movement or Finding a Place in the World?**

Contrary to much of the contemporary literature on migration and borders, I would like to stress the importance and the persistence of the notion of *citizenship* itself, casting some further light on the 'paradox of citizenship' mentioned above. It is true that much of contemporary thought on migration, both of liberal and post-marxist origins, argues for the case for open borders and freedom of movement, instead of citizenship.9 On the one hand, certain liberals argue that citizenship is as arbitrary a factor, as race, sex and ethnicity for justifying inequalities. Closed borders create injustices, because they differentiate rights based upon one's origins or political allegiances (Carens, 1987; Carens, 2013). Post-marxists, on the other hand, argue that at the normative level citizenship is always a restriction of mobility, thus at the same time a restriction of freedom (of movement) to cross borders. At the descriptive

<sup>7</sup>This is not of course the only case regarding border controls and migrants' protests. An important case study regarding borders can be found in *Calais,* France; see Rigby and Schlembach (2013).

<sup>8</sup> Indeed, in the case study of *Idomeni,* citizens acting in solidarity created sometimes more problems, when they provided false information about open borders (Anastasiadou et al., 2017, p. 62).

<sup>9</sup>Freedom of movement within one's state, the freedom to leave it and the freedom to return to one's own state are now considered fundamental human rights; see *Universal Declaration of Human Rights* (United Nations, 1948), art. 13. Nevertheless, the *Declaration* does not specify any obligation on the part of States to accept migrants in their territory.

level, it is also argued that migrants who cross borders do not want to be integrated into the institutional regime of the frst hosting country but want to move on. To be sure, movement is part of their identity as migrants. Migration then is autonomous in the sense that it has the capacity to develop its own logics and its own motivation. This has been called 'autonomy of migration thesis' (Papadopoulos & Tsianos, 2013, p. 184).

In my view, both defenses of the case for freedom of movement and open borders fail for various reasons I cannot pursue here in detail but suffce it to mention here the core issues (Hossein, 2013; Owen, 2014; Wilcox, 2009). First, it is revealing that, at the descriptive level, migrants do not ultimately aim at mobility, but the opposite. It is because they are forced to move for reasons of persecution, personal liberty and poor income, that they long for a place where they can feel at home, that is, they can be treated as free and equals.10 Second, and at the normative level, our duties towards migrants are sometimes reductively described as duties to protect and enforce their fundamental *human right* to free movement. I think this is neither what they are asking for, nor what we owe them as a matter of priority. Freedom of movement however important it may be for enhancing autonomy retains, nevertheless, an instrumental value. By defnition, movement presumes direction towards a destination (literally and metaphorically speaking) and it is connected with certain goals to be achieved (feeing from danger, association with others, professional career etc.). The instrumental approach explains why the importance of mobility is a changing parameter.11 In the end, freedom of movement takes value and gets importance when it is equally accompanied by a certain status that protects people from being *forced* to move and secures that they get to decide for themselves where to move to, should other considerations apply. Otherwise, we just talk about the movement of a*utomata,* that is, creatures that perform functions according to predetermined instructions, as long as there are no external obstacles to this. However, this is neither a descriptively accurate nor a normatively satisfactory picture.

Hannah Arendt, a migrant, and refugee herself, described in 1951 what is at stake in migration fows nowadays. Her writings on the status of refugees are in my view still relevant and pregnant with important and revealing insights. Migrants, whom Arendt calls 'rightless,' suffer from the loss of their homes in the sense of a loss of the entire social texture into which they were born. This means they have lost, in her terminology, a place in the world, 'which makes opinions signifcant and actions effective.' In another formulation 'they are deprived, not of the right to freedom, but of the right to action, not of the right to think whatever they please, but of the right to opinion.'12 Together with a loss of government protection migrants have therefore lost what she has famously called as the 'right to have rights.' She fnally argues that '[m]an, it turns out can lose all so-called Rights of Man without losing his essential

<sup>10</sup>This is a normative conception of 'home,' and does not necessarily coincide with a psychological or, indeed, a geographical conception of 'home.'

<sup>11</sup>The valuing of mobility is different for a US businessman and an Afghan migrant.

<sup>12</sup>All quotations are from Arendt, 2004 [1951], p. 376.

quality as man, his human dignity. Only the loss of a polity itself expels him from humanity' (Arendt, 2004 [1951], pp. 376–377).

According to Arendt's argument, it seems that there is an important connection between humanity, rights and membership in a polity, or, in other words, the status of citizenship. In Arendt's conception, humanity is not just being conceived *in abstracto* but *in concreto,* which means that it can be sustained and developed not by mere reference to nature or history, but to a specifc institutional order. For example, in the social contract tradition outside a political community one fnds herself in the so called 'state of nature,' a condition variously described as fear of sudden death, insecurity, vulnerability to the arbitrary will of another, and so on. In that sense, every human being has the right and the duty to enter with others and constitute a political community, that is a state. This is the meaning of Arendt's 'right to have rights,' conceived as a universalistic foundation of citizenship. Now, to be sure, the 'right to have rights' is not just another right, at least not of the same plane as the rest of rights, but a political status that everyone must enjoy in order to participate in humanity and in order to enjoy other rights (Michelman, 1996). This particular status means one has a voice, a capability to speak and fnd an addressee for her claims –this is what having a 'place' in the world really means. Nevertheless, ιt is most of the times argued that migrants' status –in our case refugees' status– should be normatively defned either as a severe basic human rights violation, or more extensively, as a threat of suffering serious harm that undermines human dignity.13 Both approaches lead to the claim that we have duties to provide aid, because migrants are above all human beings and in order for them not to lose their humanity, conceived as life, food, movement etc. we should protect them. Open borders are therefore conceived as a human rights or humanitarian correction to the state's right to self-determination. Yet, I think, this is not the whole story.

Hannah Arendt goes much deeper than the aforementioned two approaches, both at the level of normative foundation and of the nature and scope of accompanying duties. Loss of a place in the world, that is, loss of a home is not unprecedented in history. 'What is unprecedented is not the loss of a home, but the impossibility of fnding a new one' (Arendt, 2004 [1951], p. 372). The problem is not one of overpopulation, but of political organisation. Furthermore, she argues:

The trouble is that this calamity arose not from any lack of civilisation, backwardness, or mere tyranny, but on the contrary, that it could not be repaired, because there was no longer any 'uncivilised' spot on earth, *because whether we like it or not, we have really started to live in One World*. *Only with a completely organised humanity could the loss of home and political status become identical with expulsion from humanity altogether* (emphasis mine) (Arendt, 2004 [1951], pp. 376–377).

Arendt's insight is therefore that what is lost cannot be regained at will, because under current circumstances of justice what she calls 'One World' also constitutes the fgure of the migrant in our times. Taken at its face value, this argument shows

<sup>13</sup>An example of the frst can be found in Hathaway and Foster (2014) and of the second in, among others, Zolberg et al. (1989).

that borders and especially unilaterally border controlling does not just separate places through states, but unify what is separated, otherwise migrants would fnd themselves in a desert when crossing borders, not in the territory of a foreign state. Thus, we are not merely talking about separate states, but about a unifed space that, conceived systematically as the total aggregate of interconnected 'places,' excludes whoever has lost what everybody else enjoys. This form of interaction and interdependence creates duties of justice, not just moral duties, because, in that sense, borders can be coercive or dominating when excluding people merely because they are not members of the polity. Exclusion in our sense here means without adequate justifcation (Abizadeh, 2008, also Koukouzelis, 2019b). From the point of view of the excluded, the latter is already the victim of *such a* political organisation.

The force of Arendt's argument is, I think, still, unappreciated or, to say the least, partially appreciated. On the one hand, everyone should have the right to be a member of a particular polity. However, on the other hand, who might have the duty to fulfll this right? There are, of course, states that can do more than others in fulflling their duties towards migrants, because of their economic power. However, the crux of our argument is that, if it is this political organisation that victimises migrants *all* states should change their attitude towards them, not because the latter are *human beings* with certain human rights, but because migrants are thus prevented to act *as citizens* within a political organisation that already includes them only to ultimately exclude them (Cohen & Van Hear, 2019).

I think this is one of the lessons migrants' protests teach us. There is a sense that the moment of exclusion makes people migrants, whereas the moment of inclusion reminds us that the same people, conceived before as migrants, are already citizens of a common world. The case of *Idomeni,* Greece, was one that unveiled efforts to reclaim such a status. When migrants protested, they protested as cosmopolitan citizens.

#### **9.4 Migrants as Cosmopolitan Citizens**

Let us frst try to recapitulate and come to a preliminary conclusion. Opening borders and allowing for mere freedom of movement is doubly misguided. First, migrants do not ask to be treated merely as *humans*, because they do not protest or contest borders as humans, but as (former) citizens who have lost this essential feature that makes their humanity something more than membership in a biological species. Migrants' protests in *Idomeni* were an example of this. Second, what we owe them is not just humanitarian assistance, not even just granting them the right not to be deported (*non- refoulement*), but a specifc kind of protection, which goes beyond survival or protecting physical existence. Freedom needs space, albeit not in the sense of geographical space (which is not unlimited), but in the sense of a 'place' in a political community (Arendt, 2005, p. 170; Lindahl, 2004, p. 478). Such an approach has further consequences on two fronts. First, focusing exclusively on freedom of movement only works along with a misconception of migrants' statuses

conceived as mere nomadic populations who are rootless. This does not entail that freedom of movement across borders is not important, yet it is not the major characteristic of refugeehood. Second, it puts pressure on the recent ad hoc solutions promoted by the EU, which involve the politics of funding detention camps in the so called 'secure' receiving or third countries that supposedly guarantee, at least, survival.

Let us unpack these claims. First, we have in front of us a completely organised world that also has a spherical shape, which means it is fnite, as Kant reminds us in *The Metaphysics of Morals* (Kant, 1996 [1797], p. 489). Second, it is after all a matter of *place* in the normative meaning of the word, our place in the world, and the impossibility for migrants to fnd their place in it. It is therefore not a matter of state sovereignty or international relations, but a matter of cosmopolitics, not just morality. In virtue of these two features every human being in this world is at the same time a *cosmopolitan citizen*. Such a strong statement could attract accusations that we are arguing either for too much, or for too little. Too much, for without a (world) state any talk about citizenship is futile; too little, for mere change of terminology achieves nothing. Nevertheless, arguing for such a status –and citizenship is such a status concept– silences any misleading discussion of whether migrants can be 'allowed' to be present somewhere in the world. Migrants are already citizens of a common world of interaction, which means that they should enjoy the status of nondomination by exercising at a minimum the normative anti-power to contest. Without such a normative capacity even a system of human rights can become a system of infantilisation, fostering what we termed in the case of *Idomeni* as victimhood.14 This does not of course give migrants any right to secure permanent settlement, no further criteria applied, but gives them the recognition that whatever is decided for them by citizens of the hosting state or of any state can and should be *contested* on a fair basis. Note here that this might imply that if such a 'place' could be secured or re-established back in the polity migrants have lost, then the duties of justice would have been fulflled. Admittedly this also puts pressure on dealing with the *structural* causes of transnational migration, which include, but are not limited to, environmental risks, such as climate change, as long as there is a fundamental lack of the ability to claim remedies regarding the situation other than fight.15

Migrants' protests, as described in the case of *Idomeni*, can be conceived as a kind of 'cosmopolitanism from below' (Ingram, 2016; Kurasawa, 2004; Nail, 2015). These protests provide empirical manifestations of cosmopolitan citizenship through their engagement with a transnational mode of contestation of border controls. In that sense, they challenge methodological nationalism regarding borders.

<sup>14</sup> 'Non-domination,' briefy speaking, means not to be dependent on the arbitrary will of another, and have the *ability* to contest, as neo-republican political philosophy argues. Arendt's argument is exactly that stateless people suffer from this particular *vulnerability*. For an elaboration of this point see Koukouzelis (2019b) and Gundogdu (2015).

<sup>15</sup>Arendt's argument unveils, in my view, a *structural,* among others, injustice, which is the fruit of intended and unintended consequences of collective action and institutional interactions. The current regime of state borders creates such an injustice as it has been recently argued by Uhde (2019).

One of the errors of methodological nationalism is that it naturalises borders, which are taken as natural walls, something that is surprisingly enough given the borderless fows of goods and services worldwide. To be sure, borders demarcate politically organised communities, which are self-determined and are necessary because politics must occur somewhere. Nevertheless, they are still social constructions and need to be justifed externally, because, as we have seen, they can dominate nonmembers. The local should be aware how it is connected to other localities and/or non-members, who have lost state citizenship.16

Our notion of 'cosmopolitan citizenship' bears differences, but also some affnities with other similar notions proposed, past and present. Two examples should be enough for our purposes here. First, our notion should be distinguished from the view that migrants' struggles put in motion a new notion of citizenship, which is formed in and through relations of solidarity that transcends boundaries. The inspiration for that comes from the notion of 'international citizenship,' which, according to Michel Foucault (1981) who put it forward, 'is obliged to stand up against all forms of abuses of power, no matter who commits them, no matter who are the victims. After all, we are all governed, and, by that fact, joined in solidarity.' Although useful, if taken as a kind of 'supplementary citizenship' (Gordon, 2015) the use of solidarity is too quick and neither corresponds directly to migrants' claims, as presented here, nor is suffciently political. Second, there is a certain affnity with the notion of 'citizens without frontiers,' which wants to describe migrants' actions that do not only involve physical crossing of borders, but actions that question the very idea of borders (Isin, 2012, pp. 11–12). Furthermore, it exactly sees acts of contestation as acts of citizenship, which transform migrants into 'acting subjects' or, in other words, citizens not attached to any specifc body politic, but to something that challenges constituted forms of authority, legitimacy and belonging (Caraus, 2018, p. 801). Nevertheless, although it escapes the shortcomings of the one-sided insistence on freedom of movement, this approach gives too much weight on the performative value 'acts of citizenship' have, and completely misses the normative content the notion of 'place' brings in the discourse. Migrants' protests instantiate what citizenship means: the capacity to be heard and address people who cannot just unjustifably dismiss one's claims.17

However, there are also some potential objections. One of them that could be raised to our argument here would be that not all, indeed very few, migrants

<sup>16</sup>We should therefore distinguish methodological nationalism from the state's right to selfdetermination. Self-determination implies that those who are subject to the state's authority must be given an equal say in what that authority does. According to our argument here those who are subject to the state's authority are not only those who are within the state's territorial borders. The 'self' in 'self-determination' is expanded with border controls, as migrants are included (and dominated) when subject to the state's 'right to exclude.' See, especially Abizadeh (2008)*.*

<sup>17</sup>Therefore, not every migrant protest is an instantiation of cosmopolitan citizenship. See for further criticism of this approach Koukouzelis (2019b, pp. 66–67). Interestingly, Mezzadra (2020), who defends a version of the 'autonomy of migration' thesis has nowadays clarifed his position arguing that a politics of freedom of movement 'emphasises the moment of struggle and claim, it does not envisage as its goal the opening of borders by decree' (p. 436).

conceive themselves as cosmopolitan citizens. Migrants can be diverse with many of them having different agendas or wishing to be assimilated to nationalist narratives, therefore they fear rather than endorse cosmopolitanism. This is true as far as protests contain a rich mixture of motives. Yet, frst, I do not think this is relevant because migrants' protests only show that their civic activity (contestation) is not exclusively defned or demarcated by the state they are currently in but should be a part of a more fundamental political status, ascribed to their humanity. Second, cosmopolitan citizenship does not lead to a denial of one's particular identity. Politics of assimilation has proved to be wrong-headed, and cosmopolitanism is not about the imposition of a single substantive identity, but a political status. Migrants' protests claim a voice, that is, repeating Arendt's words, they claim a place in the world, 'which makes opinions signifcant and actions effective.' Third, migrants' protests have a cognitive and epistemological dimension. As mentioned above, migrants constitute themselves as political agents. There is also a process of translation going on through the activity of contestation. They bring new interpretations of rights, and they also acquire a critical refexive capacity that might have not existed before. Claiming cosmopolitan citizenship migrants reconnect cosmopolitanism with its Kantian meaning, that is, learning and the expansion of our own horizons. In that sense they broaden the scope of the demos, which extends as far as justifcation goes.18

Despite the current shortcomings of the EU's migration policies there has been a recent effort on behalf of the EU to present itself as the laboratory of turning the idea of cosmopolitan citizenship into reality. The Lisbon and Rome Treaties defned a new kind of citizenship –European citizenship– as additional to that of the member states. This was built around a 'free movement' discourse yet recognised that this should be accompanied by a certain political status. EU citizens who reside in a member state of which they are not nationals have the right to vote and stand as candidates at local elections and in the elections of the European Parliament. In that case the Lisbon Treaty proposed 'enacting European citizenship' as it connected citizenship with action that gives individuals the right to make claims to legal and political forms of access to rights –in Arendt's formulation the 'right to have rights.'19

Our aim in this chapter was mainly to contribute some fresh thoughts to the ongoing debate on migrant mobilities. I take it that the conceptualisation of migrants' protests in *Idomeni,* Greece, as part of migrants' reclaiming a particular status, opens the feld for rethinking whether it is truly mobility that matters or something else that comes prior to it. By realising that their urge for protesting is a manifestation of their *lost* status of citizenship on which they have a claim our contribution seems utterly to be that it is high time that migrants should be treated not just as

<sup>18</sup>The cognitive and epistemological aspects of cosmopolitanism are well described by Delanty (2014). For the claim that cosmopolitanism is fundamentally about the public use of reason see Koukouzelis (2019a).

<sup>19</sup>For the argument that migrants' protests exercise some form of cosmopolitan citizenship, putting in practice what the EU has been preaching see Urbinati (2015).

human beings, but as cosmopolitan citizens. I will conclude by noting that migrants claim cosmopolitanism in yet another respect, which shows why cosmopolitanism is primarily a political concept, not just a moral one, because it reveals itself not as an idealisation of humanity, but as a political concretisation of humanity. This is both a matter of justice and of urgent importance to *us.* Arendt argues with much insight: 'The danger is that a global, universally interrelated civilisation may produce barbarians from its own midst by forcing millions of people into conditions which, despite all appearances, are the conditions of savages' (Arendt, 2004 [1951], p. 384). The twenty-frst century will be the century of the migrant. I hope it will also be the century of cosmopolitan citizenship.

**Acknowledgments** Many thanks to Maria Kousis for the invitation to participate in the conference organised by the University of Crete Research Centre for the Humanities (UCRC) under the title 'Migrations: Interdisciplinary Challenges,' the editors of this volume and Konstantinos Papageorgiou for reading and commenting on an earlier draft.

#### **References**


Cohen, R., & Van Hear, N. (2019). *Refugia: radical solutions to mass displacement*. Routledge.


**Kostas Koukouzelis** holds a PhD in philosophy from the University of London and is currently an Assistant Professor at the Department of Philosophy and Social Studies, University of Crete. He is a member of the Centre for Bioethics and sits on the National Ethics Committee for Clinical Trials since 2010 as an alternate member. His research interests lie in political philosophy and philosophy of law, global justice, Kant, and bioethics, with a special focus on sustainability, climate change, and intergenerational justice. Some of his publications have appeared in *Globalisations, Journal of Global Ethics, Philosophy & Social Criticism, Synthesis Philosophica, Public Reason: A Journal of Political & Moral Philosophy, Politics in Central Europe,* and *Theory, Culture & Society.*

**Open Access** This chapter is licensed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits use, sharing, adaptation, distribution and reproduction in any medium or format, as long as you give appropriate credit to the original author(s) and the source, provide a link to the Creative Commons license and indicate if changes were made.

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## **Part IV Mobility Reception Transitions in Times of Crises**

## **Chapter 10 The Making of Reception as a System. The Governance of Migrant Mobility and Transformations of Statecraft in Greece Since the Early 2000s**

**Regina Mantanika and Vassilis Arapoglou**

#### **10.1 Introduction**

This chapter focuses on the governance of migrant mobility by examining the reception system in Greece during two key periods. We view the reception system as an intermediary space which engages diverse policy actors who question the established understanding of the relationship between mobility and inclusion in distinct ways. More specifcally, we examine how, different policies and measures have shaped this intermediary space since the beginning of 2000s. We also comment on the participation of grassroots organisations, other than formally recognised policy actors, 'whose objective is a different form of conduct' (Foucault, 2007, p.194), in the confguration of this process.

In this analysis, reception, as a term, refers to varied practices around migrant mobility that apply once migrants have crossed the border. In offcial discourse, the term 'reception' has often been used in a euphemistic way, as in the examples we provide in subsequent sections, to cover up the inadequate provisions and protracted violation of basic rights for persons arriving in Greece and seeking international protection, and to deter or impede migrant mobility. Our intention in this chapter is to shed light on the different, complex and sometimes apparently conficting rationales that establish reception practices, and their ambivalent use in multiple levels of migration management.

Migration management is a form of governance that treats migration as a kind of irregularity (Ceiger & Pecoud, 2013); it is part of what Fassin (2011) calls the 'humanitarian state' or 'humanitarian government.' Humanitarianism has become an approach that links values and affects inextricably, and serves both to defne and justify discourses and practices that govern human beings (Fassin, 2011).

201

R. Mantanika (\*) · V. Arapoglou

University of Crete, Crete, Greece e-mail: arapov@uoc.gr

<sup>©</sup> The Author(s) 2022 M. Kousis et al. (eds.), *Challenging Mobilities in and to the EU during Times of Crises*, IMISCOE Research Series, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-11574-5\_10

Humanitarian and security actions are both actions which frame 'border-care' governance and conceptualisations of protection (Bigo, 2006; Walters, 2010).

We consider the making of reception as a system during two key periods in Greece – at the early 2000s and in the post 2015 era. These are pivotal moments in which to investigate the different forces that have shaped the governance of mobility, and indeed, these have been important periods for migration in the EU in general. In the frst period, during which transit migration was being established as a result of specifc EU regimes, Greece became one of the major frontline areas of the EU. In the second period, Greece's external and internal borders became the main corridor for migration to Europe leading the European border regime into a period of crisis (Kasparek, 2016b). Both periods were important in the shaping of the reception system, and in our analysis, we draw attention to the different governmentalities that are activated within them.

Before moving on to the exposition of the two periods we briefy locate our approach within the literature on the governmentality of migration and refect on the discourses and practices of the main actors involved in the construction of this intermediary space. In contemporary policy making, 'governance' refers to the diverse interactions and modes of co-ordination between political authorities, social and economic actors. The term governmentality was adopted by Foucault to address the rationalities and technologies of governing by different agencies in many areas of everyday life, i.e. in directing the conduct of others and oneself (for a concise defnition see Dean, 2017). Governmentality studies draw upon Foucault's writings to analyse the exercise of political power through multiple interactions, stressing the role of conficts and confrontations that the offcial discourses seek to minimise. Foucault (2007, 2008), in his earlier lectures during 1978–1979, traced the origins of modern governmentality in the eighteenth century, whereby liberal government was associated with the knowledge of controlling the population, and regulate the behavior of various groups and individuals. In his later lectures, during 1982 and 1983, Foucault (2005, 2010) expanded his conception of governmentality to examine how political government was linked to ethical self-government. Since then, the analysis of governmentality has been increasingly concerned with how specifc 'problems' (health care, crime control, welfare assistance, migration etc.) are constructed as objects of government (i.e. 'problematised') through competing forms of knowledge and ethics.

#### **10.2 Problematising Mobility, Reception and Inclusion**

Over the last 20 years, studies on the governmentality of migration have fourished and have contributed in two main ways to the critical analysis of migration policies. On the one hand, earlier studies of governmentality elaborated the role that expertise, bureaucracy, humanitarian agencies and technologies of government play in the production of borders, the management of mobility and differential inclusion (Bigo, 2002; Fassin, 2011; Mezzadra & Neilson, 2013; Nyers, 2010). On the other hand, more recent studies have shifted attention to the contingency of bordering. Thus, research has looked at the specifc political alliances and historical circumstances within which technologies that channel migrant mobility come to be stabilised or destabilised. Current research further focuses on the inclusive possibilities that civil society and migrant agency open up, by examining how routes, trajectories, informal knowledge and settlement practices emerge through migrant networks and struggles (Mitchell & Sparke, 2018; Tazzioli, 2014; Walters, 2015). Cities have become prominent sites for research into how certain practices challenge and potentially transform the hierarchies into which migrants are inserted, as well as the stratifcation of their capacities for belonging. These include commons, sanctuary spaces, welcome and solidarity initiatives, everyday cosmopolitanism and practices of coexistence and emplacement (Bagelman, 2016; Darling & Bauder, 2019; Glick-Schiller & Çağlar, 2016; Oomen, 2019; Trimikliniotis et al. 2016; Wessendorf & Phillimore, 2018). In the present chapter, we seek to further understand the changing dynamics of inclusion by exploring the distinct governmentalities that unfold in the spaces of reception.

In one of his most cited statements, in which he introduced the concept of governmentality, Foucault (2007, p. 109) suggested that 'What is important for our modernity, that is to say, for our present, is not then the state's takeover (etatisation) of society, so much as what I would call the "governmentalisation" of the state.' He went on to explain that the transformation of the state and the continual defnition of its competences and the relationships between public and private have 'allowed the state to survive' (Foucault, 2007, p. 109). As key theorists of governmentality have maintained (e.g. Dean, 2009; Larner & Walters, 2004), this statement implies that the state extends its power by connecting to and remaking existing networks of power, thereby reconstituting its relation with society. Dean (2002) further elaborates the relationship between the state and civil society, arguing that it can be conceived of as a series of 'foldings.' These combine freedom with coercive instruments, thus allowing for the possibility of certain amalgamations of liberal and authoritarian practices, as in the examples of poor relief, colonial rule, and the so called 'War on Terror'. Critical within this system is the 'liberal police,' which is primarily concerned with security, and works through three inter-related processes, he calls 'foldings': 'an unfolding of the (formally) political sphere into civil society; an enfolding of the regulations of civil society into the political and a refolding of the real or ideal values and conduct of civil society onto the political' (Dean, 2002, p. 45).

Our conceptual innovation stands in our effort to extend and modify Dean's thesis (2002) by considering an issue that escaped his attention, as he was only concerned with explaining the articulation of liberal with authoritarian practices. We introduce Foucault's notion of 'counter-conduct' [*contre-conduite*] (cf. Foucault, 2007, pp. 191–226) to capture the effects of two additional processes: the process of 'counter-folding' initiated by those struggles, which resist and modify the operations for conducting others and, what we term 'transfolding.' 'Transfolding' refers to the political response which, in partial and contradictory ways, attempts to mirror and model the practices of those who question the dominant operations and want to be led differently.

The unfolding of the political into civil society may take extreme forms when linked to sovereign power and the exercise of territorial control. The use of offcial spaces and infrastructures for detention, reception and accommodation thereby serve as a means of fragmenting migrant populations, by deciding who will be excluded and who will not. Refolding involves the remodeling of administration and society to the regulations of the market, and, as we suggest, may combine with the exercise of 'pastoral power,' i.e. a productive power of life and care (Foucault, 2007). Through refolding, migration and humanitarian agencies may be subjected to compliance with the inscription of managerial logics onto their operations. Enfolding, following Dean (2002, p.45), can be seen as merely a 'replication' of 'what is presumed to occur within civil society' in order to buttress the obligations of authoritarian government. Enfolding becomes evident in the engagement of parochial communities with xenophobic attitudes in local government. We argue, however, that the contingency of migration policies is shaped most especially by the operation of counter-folding, grassroots initiatives and migration struggles. Moreover, 'transfolding' may involve attempts to incorporate the informal techniques of civil agencies and grassroots initiatives, and may, as a consequence, be shaped by pro-migrant sentiments within civil society. Thus, this modifcation of Dean's thesis enables us to capture the effects of those political struggles and informal techniques which modify authoritarian tendencies; and the rescaling of the care and control competences of the state.

Indeed, the 2010–2018 bailout agreements and reforms on debt crisis management that occurred on Southern Europe, combined the dismantling of rudimentary welfare state structures with the piecemeal rebuilding of decentralised and privatised forms of social support but were challenged by solidarity initiatives (Arapoglou & Gounis, 2017). A concomitant attempt to decentralise and privatise asylum schemes has been observed in the context of the so-called refugee crisis and the closing of the Balkan route.

In keeping with the scholarship on counter-conduct and bottom-up governmentality, we identify those elements of inclusive experiments that can foster diverse cosmopolitan and egalitarian spaces. Moreover, it is important that civil society in the European South should not be understood as confned to formal charity, Nongovernmental Organisations (NGOs), or humanitarian assistance, but should rather be extended to include grassroots organisations, a variety of local solidarity initiatives and even transnational movements (Kanellopoulos et al., 2020; Kanellopoulos et al., 2021).

In order to proceed with an analysis of the reception system, we frst need to make a number of conceptual clarifcations of the term 'reception.' As a system of governance, reception must be seen in relation to mechanisms of migration management and the invalidation of migrant mobility and settlement that happen through the different (re)labelling processes that characterise these mechanisms. The distinction between deserving refugees and undeserving migrants is presented as crucial and necessary for protecting people in need. The invalidation of immigrant or migrant mobility –as opposed to the migration of refugees– is occurring because the crossing of borders is considered to be a free and autonomous *choice*. Such a conception of free choice positions migrants 'as unworthy of social, economic, and

political rights' (Holmes & Castaneda, 2016, p. 17). This kind of invalidation of movement of different categories of migrants is directly related to the design of policies and infrastructure that function in specifc border areas as well as on the mainland.

In the Greek case, reception emerges and unfolds both as a narrative and a practice that is marked by the complexity described above. Local and humanitarian agencies working in the feld of reception implement European Union (EU) and governmental regulations that aim to flter mobility and sort newcomers. At the same time, they continue to uphold a humanitarian rhetoric. The end result is often the creation of fragmented spaces and practices, whose management combines humanitarian spirit with parochial or nationalistic values.

Yet, through our examination of the recent history of migration policy in Greece, we also observed that reception has had to accommodate a parallel world of intramigrant relations that are developed in contexts of overlapping displacement (see Fiddian-Qasmiyeh, 2016). Fiddian-Qasmiyeh points out how multiple periods of protracted displacement in (peri)urban settings can be considered as periods of overlapping displacements in at least two senses. Firstly, because refugees and displaced persons have already experienced secondary and tertiary displacement before reaching the EU borders. Secondly, refugees are experiencing overlapping displacement as they share physical space with other displaced people in the asylum system's many spaces (Fiddian-Qasmiyeh, 2016). In addition to this world of intramigrant relations reception has had to accommodate also diverse welcoming and solidarity initiatives. Thus, it has become an intermediary space where practices, performances and narratives on short and long term solutions for the settlement of migrants in the context of protracted staying (in limbo), generate narratives and practices around inclusiveness. We argue that the intermediary space of reception must be considered together with the concept of the sociabilities of emplacement (Wessendorf & Phillimore, 2018). The concept refers to some of the ways in which migrants forge social relations which enhance their connectedness with the place in which they settle and the wider society around them. Therefore, the relationalities and proximities that are tied throughout the short and long term procedures of settlement could render some aspects of this intermediary space of reception more inclusive. We move now to a discussion of the two key periods that we consider important in the emergence, evolution and consolidation of this intermediary space of reception.

#### **10.3 The 'Transit' Era: The Unfolding of Exclusions and the Counter Folding of Solidarity**

The concept of 'transit migration' frst appeared in the late 1990s and early 2000s. Despite not having any basis in legal or institutional defnition, it became a key concept (Duvell, 2011) and international organisations; EU agencies and national governments started referring to 'migration movement' that had to be stopped or

controlled. From this point on, the external borders of countries such as Greece, Italy and Spain were treated as the EU's external borders, and they became frontline EU countries. These areas were therefore expected to prevent migrant mobility from moving further onto other EU countries; which is why, together with the mobility they 'hosted', these areas were named transit areas. For these latter, this designation meant EU intervention and critique of the way in which border controls and the reception of newcomers were carried out. For migrant mobility, it meant protracted periods in situations of limbo, in between border areas and border countries.

The concepts of transit migration and countries of transit have been viewed critically as they simplify and depoliticise migration movement. At the same time, they usually attribute an irregular status to that specifc form of mobility. In order to avoid reproducing the same line, we view migrant mobility from that era through the lens proposed by Angels Pascuals de Sans (2004). Thus instead of transit, we refer to 'a sequence of movements that are linked to each other by periods of settlement in spaces of relationships, in socially constructed places' (p. 350).

The context in which this sequence of movements unfurls is the one defned by the establishment of the so-called European External Border or Border Regime.1 This border regime was produced from the nexus between the Schengen Agreement and the Dublin System. It was during this period that the EU started 'doing border' (Kasparek, 2016a) by forcing migrant mobility in Europe into a constant cycle of departure and deportation (Kasparek, 2016a, p. 60) through the use of the Dublin convention. Kasparek suggests that we view the above mechanisms as the evolving art of government that is represented by this process of constantly interrogating the patterns of migration and adapting to their concrete manifestations (p. 66). This constitutes not so much a prevention or reversal of mobility, as the disenfranchisement of migratory populations and the implementation of social practices of differential inclusion (p. 68).

From the late 1990s onwards, Greece began to play the role of the EU's external border. It did so by reinforcing the surveillance of entries at the Greek-Turkish borders and blocking departures by air (Athens) or sea (*Patras* and *Igumenitsa*, which are amongst the country's main points of departure). Even though this era was marked by a lack of coordinated policies vis-à-vis migration, both parties alternating in government, PASOK (*Panelinio Sosialistiko Kinima* [Panhellenic Socialist Movement], the centrist 'third-way' party) and *Nea Dimokratia* (the right-wing section of the political scene) adopted conservative and exclusionary policies in order to address migrant mobility and to divert public discontent by mobilising antimigrant sentiments. As Tramountanis (Chap. 13 in this volume) presents, the frst national plans for the integration of immigrants in 2002 and 2005 remained on paper and their subsequent development until 2014 adopted a clear assimilation rationale with evident nationalistic tones.

<sup>1</sup>Dimitriadi (Chap. 11 in this volume) describes how Greece continues to be seen as a transit country after the EU-Turkey Statement.

However, the asylum system of the time was one of the most stringent in Europe, with a recognition rate of less than 1%. Further, newly arrived migrants picked up at the border were detained (Law 3386/2005). According to EU law, detention should be considered a last resort and decided on an individual basis. However, as noted at the time in the *Special Rapporteur on the Human Rights of Migrants* by the United Nations' (UN) General Assembly (2013) in the case of Greece being a migrant in an irregular situation constituted a crime for which non-custodial measures existed. For that reason migrants in Greece were systematically detained. The reception infrastructure was limited to very few special detention facilities for newly arrived migrants. These were called 'Special Accommodation Centres for Aliens' (created by Law 3386/2005) and were located mainly at the Greek-Turkish borders. Reception facilities for unaccompanied minors and the most vulnerable migrants were almost non-existent. Therefore, at the start of 2000, Greece's reception system was made up of a plethora of different detention-like sites which could be set up practically anywhere: in regular police cells or at police or border guard stations, as well as in yards and other improvised facilities adapted for this purpose.

This frst period, which we consider key in the creation of the reception system, was characterised by complex mobilities. During that period, frontline states as well as EU institutions were concerned primarily with what they termed 'irregular crossings.' These were the object of statistics and analyses aimed at controlling and channelling them by means of established policies. However, these policies and mechanisms of control provoked other types of crossing such as push-backs, deportations and returns. These last mobilities remained unnamed in the narratives of the different stakeholders (policy makers and practitioners) who designed the constant cycle of departure and deportation that Kasparek (2016a) refers to.

The spatial patterns traced by this constant cycle highlight the interplay between departure and return, between irregular and unnamed mobility. That mobility which was observed in border areas, provoked by returns and push-backs, remained unnamed. The same is true of the perpetual to-and-from Italian ports which was induced by the mechanisms of control implemented at Italian and Greek ports. Two further forms of mobility that went unnamed are the transfers of migrants to holding facilities –dispersed across Greece– and the roaming itineraries of those released from these holding facilities.

During the frst key period, a vast number of places such as encampments, transit areas, 'jungles' and so on, became visible within the (social, political and media) daily life of different countries. And in a broader sense, camps or encampments have become the places of everyday life for tens of millions of people around the world (Agier, 2014).

In Greece, such infrastructures started to develop during this period in the context of overlapping displacements. The grassroots manifestation of this sequence of movements was the proliferation of different types of enclaves of precarity in various urban and peri-urban areas. The spontaneous makeshift camps of *Patras* and *Igumenitsa* –port cities that border the Adriatic– constitute such an example. In these, migrants organised their daily lives as a response to the blocking of their onwards mobility to Italian shores. The camp of *Patras* in particular, had a very long

life as it was established at the beginning of 2000 and was fnally demolished only in June of 2009. Starting as a small settlement, it evolved into a large camp inside the city.2 In Athens, migrants who found themselves in limbo took shelter in overcrowded apartments and squatted buildings. In addition, public squares and other public spaces were precariously inhabited by homeless migrants for short periods of time.

As noted above, in the early 2000s, there was no centrally organised reception plan, neither in policy nor in practice, for dealing with 'new-arrivals.' Nevertheless, the grassroots spaces produced by the sequence of movements as in the cases of *Patras* and *Igumenitsa*, manifested different subversive practices. These rendered reception more inclusive and in a sense challenged migrants' state of waiting and the transit character of the places that hosted them. In *Patras,* migrants transformed city spaces into an important stage in their itinerary, thereby forming atypical urban constellations, that is to say, ephemeral confgurations with a permanent character. Such urban confgurations provoked the emergence of solidarity initiatives at the local, national and European levels. According to Hole (2012), activist groups were involved in migrants' struggles in *Patras* and, rather than giving rise to a coherent solidarity movement, they forged a complex space made up of competing political voices.

One could view the intermediary space of reception as being built, during this long period, by diverse negotiations for the location of migrants' informal settlements between, on the one hand, those living in the camps and the different solidarity initiatives that supported them, and, on the other hand, the various manifestations of anti-migrant sentiment by municipal/national authorities and some locals. These negotiations occurred during a period in which reception did not even exist as a package of measures and practices, and instead a handful of detention facilities were operating as explained above. Migrants and grassroots initiatives, were increasingly treated with hostility by the Greek governments and public authorities, implementing harsh austerity measures.

In December 2008, the murder of a secondary school student by a special unit police offcer in central Athens sparked weeks of civil unrest across the country (see Vradis & Dalakoglou, 2011). This event triggered the emergence of an underlying discontent that existed on multiple levels. State narratives and practice approached youth protests as a problem of lawlessness in Athens' central districts. Along the same lines, the government and media stigmatised migrants, qualifying them as a 'health bomb' in the city centre (Filippidis, 2013). Emblematic of this attitude was the 'witch hunt' against HIV positive sex workers (many of whom where migrants) in downtown Athens initiated by the then Health Minister *Andreas Loverdos*. 3 Equally representative of the period is *Antonis Samaras'* (*Nea Dimokratia*) key statement, made during a pre-election rally, on the issue of migration in Greece:

<sup>2</sup>For more on this see Hole, 2012; Lafazani, 2013; Teloni, 2011.

<sup>3</sup>Sex workers picked up on the streets of Athens where arrested and detained, while mainstream media stigmatised them by broadcasting their photos.

'We shall reoccupy our cities and our neighborhoods…And the feeling of security shall be reinstated among their residents' (Filippidis, 2013).

It was in this climate that, between 2008 and 2012, the practice of 'zero tolerance' was extended to also include intensifed police raids on makeshift camps, together with what are known as 'sweep operations' in central Athens, *Patras* and *Igumenitsa*, amongst others. In June 2009, the makeshift camp in *Patras* was demolished by the police and municipality. In May 2011, police raids resulted in the dismantling of the *Igumenitsa* 'jungle.' From August 2012 onwards, police raids were more centrally coordinated under operation '*Xenios Dias'*. The name of the operation draws from the Greek mythology, and refers to the hospitable *Zeus*; therefore, coordinated police raid operations in the government's narrative were conceived as operations of hospitality. This describes in the most cynical way certain aspects of the management of migrant mobility (and thus, certain aspects of the reception practices) of that era.

However, the hesitant introduction of a formal reception system occurred after pressure of international and humanitarian agencies. Between 2010 and 2014, varied measures were taken in an effort to transform informal reception practices into an institutional system of governance for channelling migrant mobility. Greece became the object of severe criticism for its non-existent asylum system, arbitrary detentions and inhuman reception conditions for migrants.4 In early 2010, the Greek government took steps to take asylum procedures out of police hands. Law 3907/2011 aimed to respond to criticisms of arbitrary detention by creating new structures called 'frst reception centres,' along with new detention facilities and asylum services. It was during this period that both the concept and institution of 'frst reception' initially appeared. The contradictory reshaping and expansion of this system took place after 2015 amidst the turmoil of political events regarding the fate of the bailout agreements and international concerns for the escalation of migrant mobility during this period.

#### **10.4 The Post-2015 Period: The Contradictions of Reception, Refolding Humanitarianism and 'Transfolding' Solidarity**

In 2015, Greece's political scene underwent a signifcant change as for the frst time, the coalition of parties of the left and radical left known as SYRIZA (*Sinaspismos Rizospastikis Aristeras* [Coalition of the Radical Left]) formed a government with the national-conservative ANEL (*Anexartiti Elines* [Independent Greeks]), a National Patriotic Alliance which served as its junior partner. This paradoxical

<sup>4</sup>The ECtHR, M.S.S. v. Belgium and Greece in 21.01.2011 is a case that encapsulates the basic violations of fundamental human rights that were taking place in Greece in the sphere of migration and asylum during the period. For more see EDAL (2011).

coalition brought about some changes in the narratives on migration, introducing pro-migrant rhetoric in a period during which migrant mobility towards Greece was reaching its peak. It is beyond doubt that the strict mobility control policies implemented after 2016 in particular, were designed to counterbalance the pro-migrant rhetoric of the coalition's frst phase in power.

The 2015 summer is commonly conceived as a 'refugee crisis.' We place our analysis on that part of literature that displaces the concept of crisis from the refugee arrivals to the policy responses that address them until that moment (Christodoulou et al., 2016; Crawley, 2016). More in particular, we consider that 2015 constitutes the culmination of a crisis that had already begun since 2011. As Kasparek (2016b, p. 25) states the main elements of the European border and migration regime gradually entered a crisis in 2011, culminating in the 2015 summer of migration and the temporary breakdown of the European migration and border regime. The vast scale of migrant mobility during 2015–2016 and the border policies which forced that mobility into limited and remote pathways –in Greece's case, via the islands of the North East Aegean– created a hybrid situation in relation to the reception system on those islands. The different stakeholders providing frst reception in the feld were largely still in formation when they suddenly had to start dealing with very large numbers of border crossers. First reception services were unable to do anything as they lacked both the time and the infrastructure for registering and channeling that mobility. Rozakou (2017) describes this situation of the non-recording of migrant mobility as a modality of statecraft and not as an indication of state failure. This was a period during which the islands of the North East Aegean became a hub for International Organisations (IOs), NGOs, volunteers, students and journalists who put into practice various arts of government that were complementary as well as confictual, both in relation to themselves and to national and EU level practices (see Papataxiarchis, 2016). Thus, diverse agents and jurisdictions set up a complex infrastructure of reception where formal practices went hand in hand with what Rozakou (2017) calls 'irregular bureaucracies.' During this period, the phenomenon of migrant mobility to Europe evolved from an issue that concerned only frontline member states, to one that confronted the EU as a whole.

In the post 2015 era, the framework within which the reception system had developed consisted of various types of policy and practice. The most signifcant of these were the hotspot approach, the 'closing down' of the Balkan route, the EU-Turkey Statement –which went hand in hand with geographical restrictions– and the new reception infrastructure that emerged during the period, which was characterised by a proliferation of camps, mechanisms of relocation and housing programmes that used apartments and hotels.

The hotspot approach, also known as the hotspot scheme, constituted an effort to institutionalise and regularise practices designed back in 2011 when frst reception initially emerged as a concept and as a service. In a sense, the hotspot scheme was aimed at instituting what until then had only existed on paper or which had been taking place unoffcially. For these reasons, the hotspot scheme activated different streams of funding and a reception economy emerged locally, nationally and at the European level (for more on this see Bartolini et al., 2020).

It was Law 4375 in 2016 that sought to establish the hotspot scheme. The Law mandated that newly arrived persons should be directly transferred to a Reception and Identifcation Centre, where they were subject to a short restriction of their freedom in order to undergo reception and identifcation procedures. It is through the hotspot approach that the frst reception of all third-country nationals was established both as an obligation of the third-country nationals themselves and of national institutions. Furthermore, the hotspot scheme institutionalised the outsourcing of services related to border control, frst reception and the channelling of migrant mobility from state institutions to EU institutions, IOs and NGOs. Parsanoglou (Chap. 12 in this volume) describes in a very explicit way how the new geographies of control that emerged with the establishment of the hotspot approach go hand in hand with the involvement of non-state actors in the migration management. The hotspot approach constituted an EU initiative to put forward a specifc form of governance of the places at which migrants arrived, i.e. frontline member states (Greece and Italy). It was neither a policy, nor a practice, nor a place. And yet, it created policies and practices just as it created places and infuences local geographies, as highlighted in the work of Vradis et al. (2018) on hotspots and the European migration regime.

During the summer of 2015, the Balkan route became the main corridor of migrant mobility towards Europe. From Greece's borders, migrants continued their journey to Northern Macedonia and further north, through Slovenia or Hungary, towards countries like Germany. As a de facto or de jure interruption of the Dublin Convention and of the 'frst safe country' principle (Triandafyllidou & Mantanika, 2016), this itinerary became known as 'the opening of the Balkan route.' After some months, countries along this route started to randomly apply the category of refugee (Christodoulou et al., 2016) at their borders, initially only allowing migrants originally from Syria, Iraq and Afghanistan to pass and later– not allowing any migrants to pass at all. Hence, migrant mobility was blocked along this route. This produced a domino effect that ended at the Greek-Macedonian border in the town of *Idomeni*. In this period, within a matter of days, the region surrounding the small village of *Idomeni* was transformed into a vast makeshift camp which, little by little, assumed the characteristics of a humanitarian intervention.5 As time passed and the border crossing became more and more diffcult, this obstruction of migrant mobility started affecting neighbouring mainland areas as well as the cities of Athens and *Thesaloniki.*

Along the same lines, a few months later, the EU-Turkey Statement established procedures on the islands of the North-East Aegean, that were also applying an arbitrary interpretation of the category of refugee. The difference in this case was that these arbitrary practices were henceforth transformed into offcial agreements and legislation. More specifcally, the EU-Turkey Statement was designed to stop arrivals from the Aegean Sea. It aimed to do so via the roll out of mechanisms to sort

<sup>5</sup>The ethnographic documentary *Feeling of a Home* is an excellent flm that presents the different levels of meaning attached to that border during this specifc period (Kastanidis & Chaviara, 2017).

and categorise newly arrived migrants on Greek territory in order to return them to Turkey.

The EU-Turkey Statement disrupted the logic of the hotspot approach and the reception system on the islands. It created two types of reception: one that applied to the islands (a de facto prolonged stay) and the other to the mainland (see Petracou et al., 2018). From that point on, reception on the islands equated to the restriction of movement and detention. Dimitriadi (Chap. 11 in this volume) describes in a very illustrative way how the EU-Turkey Statement attempted to constraint the migrant mobility through a complex nexus of bordering practices. The most signifcant development with regards to de facto prolonged reception on the islands was the March 2016 geographical restriction that was imposed, frst by the police and then by the Asylum Service, on every newly-arrived person on specifc islands. As a result, migrants were enclosed within the wider territory of these islands, unable to move on to the mainland.

After the imposition of geographical restrictions, the channelling of vulnerable migrants and other persons with special needs from the islands to the mainland occurred through referral mechanisms. For other refugees, transfer to the mainland took place once they had applied for asylum. However, those who went through the fast track procedure along with those who had not applied for asylum were excluded from this process. Therefore, the way that reception has offcially since then evolved, functioned as mechanism for excluding those migrants that were categorised as ineligible for international protection.

In accepting the EU-Turkey Statement, the SYRIZA government attempted to counter for mandatory EU obligations on border surveillance and normalisation with a strategy of integration.6 By doing so, it made a tactical attempt to refold informal arrangements and to enroll an array of national and international humanitarian agencies into a plan for social integration that included only those who were eligible to apply for asylum. This move complied with United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees **(**UNHCR) pressure and priorities for the settlement of vulnerable people within the fabric of large cities, and it was also supported by NGOs and some local authorities. At the same time, this top-down attempt to create a decentralised strategy for the making of inclusive spaces was also an opportunity to repair the party's image, which had been damaged by the bailout agreement. However, this plan for social integration remained limited to short-term housing solutions and did not foresee other parallel aspects for/of integration. Furthermore, solidarity initiatives and grassroots movements in Athens and *Thesaloniki* criticised government plans and the operation of the UNHCR schemes as selective and contradictory. At the same time, these initiatives created a parallel infrastructure of commons through the temporary appropriation of urban spaces (Foerster, 2019; Mezzadra, 2018; Squire, 2018; Tsavdaroglou & Lalenis, 2020).

<sup>6</sup>Tramountanis (Chap. 13 in this volume) offers some more details about the subsequent devise of the national strategy for Integration by the SYRIZA-ANEL government which shifted the emphasis to refugees and was guided by an intercultural orientation, in contrast to the assimilationist orientation of its predecessors in the 2000s.

During 2015 and at the start of 2016, the reception system aimed at providing assistance and services to people upon arrival as well as during their transit to the northern border of *Idomeni*. However, at the end of February 2016, its focus was on 'border procedures and large-scale registration and examination of asylum claims' (Petracou et al., 2018, p. 68). From that period onwards, the humanitarian response has striven both to compensate for gaps in basic needs provision and to orientate its services so as to address longer-term needs trying to address the protracted staying of thousands of migrants.

Of particular interest in this new era is the Greek state's outsourcing of a very signifcant part of the governance of migrant mobility to international organisations. This fact has inaugurated a daily interaction between local and national authorities and EU institutions, non-state stakeholders and grassroots initiatives. The interaction between these actors is visible even in the way in which reception is funded. Two very large European Funds were assigned to migration and security for the period 2014–2020, the Asylum, Migration and Integration Fund (AMIF) and the Internal Security Fund (ISF) (see Bartolini et al., 2020). These provided member states with a policy and budgetary framework for national and local implementation of programmes and actions. Therefore, the main components of reception funding in Greece (as elsewhere) were outsourced to supranational and non-state institutions. Thus, the reception system's governing authorities were numerous; their interventions took place across many scales and were deployed through complex coalitions.

In the period that followed the 'summer of migration' in 2015, the Greek government put together an emergency action plan to address the accommodation needs of 100,000 refugees and migrants. At this time, longer-term reception was becoming established and expanding rapidly on the mainland. As Belavilas and Prentou (2016) note:

Around the country, hundreds of different hot spots, rescue points, open camps, and fnally organised hostels and residencies were created…Some of them are self-made, others are made by volunteers or NGOs, others by the army or the municipalities. They are located in the cities, near the cities or in the middle of nowhere.

The camps that proliferated across Greece over a very short period of time are a key aspect of the establishment and evolution of reception. According to Belavilas and Prentou (2016, p. 3), the creation and development of the network of refugee camps has been consistent with the evolution of refugee fows and the broader conditions affecting them. Their analysis suggests that the informal and frst line structures that were set up in 2015 as immediate responses to arrivals on the islands, in turn opened the way for the establishment of second-line reception, which to a limited extent fulflled the political aspirations for transforming the country's integration policies. This attempt may be considered a contradictory and indecisive process over the mentalities of government, namely the balance between enfolding the values and demands of NGOs within an EU funded humanitarian economy and the *ethos* and practices of grassroots solidarity initiatives.

The UNHCR has been a key actor in the accommodation of refugees and asylum seekers since the beginning of the refugee emergency in 2015. UNHCR played a signifcant role in the management of the camps and has additionally been in charge of implementing the Emergency Support to Integration and Accommodation (ESTIA)7 programme. ESTIA aimed to address the needs of those asylum seekers and vulnerable refugees who arrived on Greek soil from 2015 on. The programme's objective was to fund accommodation mainly in apartments, hotels and other buildings. Furthermore, ESTIA provides its benefciaries with food, personal hygiene products, social support, interpretation services and travel assistance. Medical, legal and psycho-social assistance is also provided, depending on need. Funded by the European Commission, the programme designated municipalities and NGOs as its implementing actors (UNHCR, 2017) and the time or drafting of this chapter is still operational.

Tackling the same needs as ESTIA, refugees, NGOs, volunteers and activists have devised alternative solutions for shelter, and have thereby built an unoffcial network of reception, mainly in Athens, but also in other areas of the country. Its members come from various civil society initiatives such as grassroots organisations, local solidarity groups and transnational networks of activists that emerged from anti-austerity movements and welcome initiatives during the refugee crisis (Arampatzi, 2018). These have the potential to uncover migrants' invisible needs and claims and these projects have experimented with protection and accommodation set ups that enhance the appropriation of urban spaces.

#### **10.5 Conclusions**

Our analysis of the frst key period (the early part of the decade of 2000) reveals that the border regime and the migrant patterns of that period created the broader context in which the intermediary space of reception took shape as a concept and practice. The complex mobilities and the enclaves of precarity that encircled urban and periurban areas (and that were enduring) were symbolic of the characteristics that this intermediary space took on. Reception was set up during the late 1990s through varied informal, semi-formal and formal practices. Being mainly invisible, it was comprised of informal networks of friends, family, acquaintances and facilitators. This system constituted a 'premature' form of reception, which was precarious, but at the same time more inclusive. During the second key period (the post 2015 era), the reception system gradually evolved into a complex mechanism for the governance of migrant mobility, and expanded its scope in order to address the protracted staying of migrants on the islands and mainland. Reception therefore developed into a complex infrastructure set up by diverse agencies and jurisdictions. Nevertheless,

<sup>7</sup>For more see UNCHR (n.d.), while for a critical analysis of the ESTIA programme and similar accommodation projects, see Kourachanis, 2019.

its foundations derived from prior non-formal and more grassroots experiences. Interestingly, this complex infrastructure is established as a response to the European border regime crisis that began unfolding already from 2011 and culminated in 2015: a crisis of the nexus between Schengen and Dublin which describes the common response of EU to the migrant mobility that is heading towards its borders.

As evidenced in the section in which we problematise the governmentality of mobility and reception, our argument is that political responses are crucial in determining whether inclusive policies will be modeled in accordance to humanitarian concerns, funding and market oriented regulations, or whether, they will develop in accordance with grassroots and solidarity initiatives. Our study of the reception system during the frst key period demonstrates how diverse informal and solidarity practices constitute counter-foldings that create inclusive spaces. Solidarity practices respond to governmental attempts to channel migrant mobilities and draw their sources from migrants' strategies to negotiate their settlement in the territory and/or their departure from that territory. The spaces in which these practices are enacted can be physical spaces (urban and peri-urban areas of precarious settlement) or symbolic places of government intervention (complex mobilities). The intermediary space of reception is made up of these physical and symbolic places: in-between borders; in-between staying and leaving; in-between urban and peri-urban; inbetween non-citizen and local inhabitant. Along the same lines, our examination of reception during the second key period brings to light those factors which were involved and replicated in the transformation of reception into a more institutionalised mechanism of mobility governance. Thus, the informal practices of screening and sorting migrants and refugees have become established policies. In addition, with the proliferation of open and closed camps on the mainland and in border areas, precarious settlement has assumed more permanent features. During this second key period, one must look to the multiplicity of physical and symbolic spaces constructed by the complex interventions of NGOs, IOs and EU institutions focusing on where these meet national and local practices around migrant mobility and settlement. It is also necessary to assess the extent to which formal policy venues were able to learn and make use of the informal supports to migrants and their struggles.

Through this research we intend to intervene in the broader discussion about the governmentality, governance and governmentalisation of migration. We contribute to this discussion by focusing on and highlighting the changes in the dynamics of inclusion, that interact with the development of reception as a system. By examining the two key periods we trace the distinct governmentalities of inclusion that unfold in spaces of reception. In the frst period, the reception system remained mainly informal and the possibilities for inclusion that were created were limited to migrants' strategies and, to a lesser extent, to grassroots initiatives. With time, reception was shaped into a more complex infrastructure. Once established as a system of governance, it concerned only those eligible to apply for asylum and those already part of the scheme (inside the different camps or other settlement solutions such as the ESTIA programmes etc.). Therefore, from an institutional point of view, potential inclusion excludes all those who are not enrolled in any scheme. In this way, it reproduces precarity in terms of the duration of the provisions and the form of settlement (camps and temporary housing solutions in apartments).

We believe that further research into the intermediary space of reception is needed, particularly in depth analysis of the interactions of its diverse actors and the knowledges they produce. Such investigations would enable us to better understand the different forms of inclusive governmentality, and continuities and disruptions in the governance of migrant mobility.

**Acknowledgments** Regina Mantanika's work in this chapter is part of her postdoctoral research project supported by the IKY Foundation and co-fnanced by Greece and the EU (European Social Fund, ESF) through the operational programme 'Human Resources Development, Education and Lifelong Learning 2014- 2020'/ 'Support of Postdoctoral Researchers' Cycle B.

#### **References**

Agier, M. (Ed.). (2014). *Un monde de camps*. La découverte.


Filippidis, C. (2013). *État de siege. Public space user manual parts 1 to 3. A city at a time of crisis*.


**Regina Mantanika** trained in Political Science in Athens, is holding a Masters and a PhD from the University Paris 7-Diderot, department of social science. Her thesis adopts an interdisciplinary perspective, which draws from urban anthropology, human geography, political science and political philosophy. Currently post-doctoral researcher in the department of sociology of the University of Crete, her research focuses on a genealogical analysis of the power relations that are involved in the attempts to govern the mobility of migrant newcomers in Greece. Her previous research has focused on the spatialities of the EU and national policies of migration in borderline areas and the re-appropriation of space in urban transit zones by undocumented migrants in Greece. She has also a long experience as research associate on projects related in general to migration, borders and EU policies, collaborating among others with the European University Institute (EUI) in Florence, the International Centre for Migration Policy Development (ICMPD) in Vienna and the Migreurop network of academic and activists based in Paris. She has also been working as an adjunct lecturer at the University of Vienna department of historical and cultural studies. Her current research and teaching interests concentrate on urban exclusion, the history of migrant mobility and settlement and the industrial culture.

**Vassilis Arapoglou** (BSc, MSc, PhD LSE) is Professor in urban sociology, social inequalities and exclusions at the department of sociology of the University of Crete and tutor in European studies at the Greek Open University. His research and teaching concentrates on the critical analysis of urban social problems, residential segregation, migration and social integration policies in European cities. He is member of the LSE Hellenic Observatory Research Programme group and the editorial board of the Social Atlas of Athens. He has served as editor and editorial board member of European Urban and Regional Studies and member of the administrative board of the University of Crete Research Centre for the Humanities, the Social and Education Sciences (UCRC). He has also been visiting research fellow at the Hellenic Observatory- European Institute LSE (UK), the OpenSpace Research Centre (Open University UK), and research associate of the Greek National Centre for Social Research, the Labour Institute of the Greek National Confederation of Labour (Athens), the Foundation for Economic and Industrial Research (Athens), the Immigration Policy Institute (Athens). Recent publications include a book on poverty and homelessness in Southern Europe published by Macmillan Palgrave and a theme issue on diversity in European cities in European Urban and Regional Studies.

**Open Access** This chapter is licensed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits use, sharing, adaptation, distribution and reproduction in any medium or format, as long as you give appropriate credit to the original author(s) and the source, provide a link to the Creative Commons license and indicate if changes were made.

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## **Chapter 11 Governing Migrant (Im)mobility in Greece After the EU-Turkey Statement**

**Angeliki Dimitriadi**

#### **11.1 Introduction**

Zahia1 arrived in Greece in 2017. She fed from Afrin, a city in Northern Syria that is part of the Aleppo Governorate and has seen heavy fghting throughout the Syrian civil war. Her daughter lives in Turkey with her husband. Zahia came to Greece with her youngest and eldest son, aiming to reach Germany as their destination. They entered Greece over the land border. On their frst attempt, they were apprehended and detained for 2 days by Turkish border guards, who released them when they declared they were from Afrin. The second attempt to cross, in 2017, was successful. They crossed the border undetected and made their way to Athens. Her eldest son had already spent a few months in the city, staying with friends before making his way to Germany. When we met, in 2018, she described how she could not get accommodation in one of the camps because she had not registered on entry to Greece. She recounted the countless hours of waiting at the Asylum Service that had postponed her interview from May 2018 to the summer of 2019, and the exploitation they suffered at the hands of a lawyer who disappeared after receiving payment of six hundred euros. Throughout the waiting period in Greece, Zahia encountered both physical and institutional barriers, in her efforts to remain. Despite having received asylum, she attempted to leave Greece and reunite with her sons in Germany. Zahia's story is not unique. Since 2016, a multitude of barriers have emerged, aiming to deter, delay, contain, disperse and redirect migrant trajectories in Greece and Europe.

A. Dimitriadi (\*)

<sup>1</sup> Informant names have been pseudonymised.

Hellenic Foundation for European & Foreign Policy, Athens, Greece e-mail: angeliki@eliamep.gr

The frst barrier those attempting to cross to Greece encountered was the new physical border around the hotspots on the islands in the Northern Aegean. As a border within a border, it seeks to deter entry and, when that fails, to contain migrants2 ' presence within a specifc geographical space. The divergent border screening practices at the land border constituted a second barrier; since 2016, while some migrants are detained, others are registered and simply allowed to move on to the mainland. Migrants' experiences were different and depended primarily on the administrative capacity and will of the border guards and institutions on a given day. This resulted in confusion and mixed information, which functioned as a deterrent to staying in Greece. The third barrier was encountered by those who managed to reach the mainland. It related to the access to the asylum procedure, which in turn determined the access to formal accommodation and cash assistance, though both in practice also depended on availability. This also served as a deterrent: by wearing down asylum seekers, Greece was seen as a transit country once more, unft for settling in; in turn, this promoted onward movement into the Schengen area. All barriers shared a further commonality; they were part of the governance of mobility that, beyond deterrence, produced also geographical dispersal and containment of those in-country.

The unequal and asymmetric function of the borders and the barriers has been explored in the migration literature (Bojadzijev & Mezzadra, 2015; Squire, 2011; Tsianos & Karakayali, 2010). Borders and barriers, both internal and external, emerge, impacting –deliberately or inadvertently – migrants' mobility at different stages, from entry to onward travel. They are central to the distinction between desirable and undesirable movement, but also to the distinction between 'deserving' and 'undeserving refugees' in what Caluya (2019) calls 'a politics of differential compassion' (p. 1). Different actors perform and/or construct the borders and barriers: Institutional actors, from border guards to the Asylum Service, erect obstacles that regulate the movement of migrants, while migrants themselves help shape the emergence of barriers, since their mere presence mobilises state institutions to respond and attempt to manage migration, particularly unauthorised migration. Mobility is experienced differently by those who are excluded from entering, as well as by those who are socially excluded during their stay in the country. In many cases, as Tazzioli (2020) has shown, mobility is also a product of state strategy that seeks to divert migrant routes, forcing them to undertake the same journey multiple times and making their stay in the country, diffcult. This is also evident in Greece.

The chapter discusses the encounters between migrants and border actors in the period 2016–2018 and how they infuenced migrants' trajectories within and from

<sup>2</sup>The term 'migrants' refers to all people on the move, including asylum seekers. Refugees is used only in relation to those who have received international protection. For a discussion on the signifcance of categories, see Carling, 2015.

Greece. It thus covers a specifc period of the 'refugee crisis'3 where a series of measures were applied at the external borders (in this case of Greece) to reduce refugee-arrivals. The analysis is informed by the empirical research conducted within the framework of the CeasEVAL project, with migrants who arrived in Greece in 2016–2018. The chapter contributes with fresh fndings on the analysis of the governance of migration in Greece, through the construction of (im)mobility and the role of borders and other (administrative and regulatory) barriers. The focus is on migrants' differentiated experience regarding entry at the external borders and registration, but also on their access to asylum and –by extension– reception services such as accommodation and cash-assistance. Findings indicate that this differentiation was very much a product of the EU-Turkey Statement and the way it was implemented, but also of the Greek migration management that sought to govern migrant mobility through practices of inclusion and exclusion. The different encounters resulted in journeys being blocked, delayed, deterred, but also encouraged and lengthened.

The frst section (Sect. 11.2) offers some theoretical clarifcations on borders, border actors and mobility and migration. The chapter moves on (Sect. 11.3) to offer a brief overview of the EU-Turkey Statement of March 2016 and the legislative changes initiated (Sect. 11.4) that resulted in the emergence of new administrative and legal barriers at the borders and on the mainland of Greece. The next section (Sect. 11.5) focuses on the border experiences of migrants, indicating the practices of different actors in governing irregular entry and stay, in the country. Two main border practices were identifed by migrants themselves as crucial in the construction of internal barriers: the asylum process (Sect. 11.6) and the access to accommodation (Sect. 11.7) as a part of the reception system (for a detailed discussion on the governance of migrants' mobility through reception see Mantanika & Arapoglou Chap. 10 in this volume). The chapter illustrates how different encounters with border actors resulted in containment, dispersal, and (desire for) onward movement and were therefore often more critical than the border crossing itself in shaping migrants' lives.

#### **11.2 Borders and Bordering Practices**

Borders are rendered tangible in migrants' daily lives through the policies of different border managers (border/frst reception agencies, policymakers, etc.). In that sense, borders are 'lines that distinguish political, social and economic spaces' (Newman, 2006, p. 144). Over the past decade, a signifcant body of research has

<sup>3</sup>The term 'refugee crisis' refers to a very specifc period (2015–2018) and refects the crisis framework on which policy responses were eventually built. Policy, discourse, and events since 2015 have shown that the arrival of migrants in Europe was treated frst and foremost as a crisis of numbers, particularly at the political level. In reality it was a humanitarian crisis and a crisis of management, particularly for frontline states like Greece (see Dimitriadi & Malamidis, 2019).

emerged which investigates the issue of borders (Amilhat-Szary & Giraut, 2015; Mezzadra, 2015; Newman & Paasi, 1998; Walters, 2006), but also tries to 'rework the by-now well-worn focus on the image of the border as "wall" and its corresponding concept of the "exclusion" of the migrant' (Casas-Cortes et al., 2015, p. 57).

Borders, therefore, can refer to physical frontiers and territorial boundaries, but they can also be social categorisations which expand internally and are situated in the middle of the political space (Balibar, 2009). Borders have a dual but complementary identity: they are both institutions and processes, tools of state policy and markers of identity (Anderson, 1996); they function both as a flter for migrant entry (De Genova, 2013) and as a barrier. As an institution, borders delineate state sovereignty and the rights of citizens. As a process, they are an instrument of state policy but also of national identity, continuously changing, since policies and border controls shift (Anderson, 1996, pp. 1–3). This approach is particularly useful for understanding the border processes undertaken by the institutions of the state and their agents at the external border. Border institutions and actors are critical in governing migrants' mobility and, more importantly, their success at 'crossing borders and entering the territory of a state' (Newman, 2003, p. 14). I refer to migrant's mobility as the key objective of border institutions and actors, however the term 'mobility' is not used to denote a common linear movement between and across borders. Instead, drawing from Tazzioli (2020) and Cresswell (2006), and as highlighted by the research feldwork discussed in this chapter, there are different hierarchies of mobility, regulated by legal, technological and administrative measures, with this chapter focusing predominantly on the latter.

Border institutions and actors are not only situated at the external frontier; they also exist within the state territory, where they (re)make social categorisations and govern the migrants' inclusion and/or exclusion. Migrants are usually faced with a series of rules and procedures embedded in bureaucracies (Campesi, 2014) encountered as early as the external border crossing. Barriers can thus be rendered tangible in migrants' daily lives through the actions of different border managers including border agents and frst reception actors, legislators, and housing and employment actors that are usually public but may also be non-governmental or private (Paraschivescu et al., 2019). At the Greek external border, migrant entry is deterred and/or rendered illegal through a process of excluding those deemed undesirable. The *Evros* river and the islands of the North Aegean transform into border zones where 'politics becomes fully entangled in matters of life and death' (Walters, 2013, p. 206).

In the period of 2016–2018, this was particularly evident at the maritime border and on the islands of the Northern Aegean, which functioned as a 'tool of governance of irregular mobility: as gates but also as guardians at the gates' (Dimitriadi, 2017, p. 82). The geography of the islands facilitated the implementation of a geographical containment policy that would have been unenforceable on the mainland. It has also resulted in different border practices being applied there, than at the land border; these include geographical containment, fast-track border processing and differentiated treatment of nationalities.

Thus, even those who arrive are categorised between eligible and undesirable at every step from disembarkation to the submission of an asylum application. Following the implementation of the Statement, the maritime border moved beyond deterrence, revealing a wider spectrum of containment which extends beyond deterring entry or imposing spatial containment on the island. Rather, it is about disrupting the overall migrant journey. The containment that is part of the bordering process constructed from the Statement decelerates, but also diverts migrant movement and disrupts their presence in different spatial contexts (Tazzioli & Garelli, 2020, p. 3). While it can result in spatial confnement, as it does in the hotspots or detention facilities, it can also produce a protracted strandedness and drive onward movement in search of other destinations.

Though bordering practices are most visible at the actual frontier, they are not limited to the external border. Barriers emerge within countries, and although less visible, they are often more powerful in the infuence they exert over asylum applicants and migrants. It is through policies of inclusion and exclusion (Mezzadra & Neilson, 2013) that migrant presence is negotiated. In most cases, the mechanism for the inclusion/exclusion draws on the legislative framework that reduces or provides access to rights and social benefts for asylum seekers and migrants. The legislative framework results in 'obstructions' that are 'produced by implicit and informal administrative praxes that implement the national laws' (Artero & Fontanari, 2019, p. 3).

The emerging barriers, particularly since the implementation of the EU-Turkey Statement of March 2016, regulate migrant (im)mobility through geographical containment and/or dispersal in the country, while often resulting in the desire for onward movement into the Schengen area. The Asylum Service has evolved into a key border actor. Registration for asylum allows access to key social provisions, like housing and cash assistance. Those who entered the land border in 2016–2018 encountered divergent bordering practices that resulted in the registration of some and in the exclusion of others. Institutional bordering practices that seek to determine who can enter and who can remain in the country include waiting for the registration and nationality identifcation, vulnerability screening and asylum application (with or without an interview), waiting for a decision, an offer of international protection or a rejection on the grounds of inadmissibility or an unfounded application, waiting for deportation and, in some cases, physical removal from the country (returns). The re-bordering that emerges can result in transitory movement and/or in a waiting state, which leaves the individual in limbo, or, in some cases, results in the physical return/deportation of the individual to their country of transit and/or origin. Thus, the governance of mobility includes secondary movement to other EU member states, containment in specifc locations (e.g. hotspots) and mobility in specifc locations (e.g. camps in the mainland). Physical (im)mobility produces also socio-economic (im)mobility, since reception services are offered to some and withheld from others.

#### **11.3 The Impact of the EU-Turkey Statement on Migrants in Greece**

Greece has functioned as a country of transit for asylum seekers for the past 20 years (Dimitriadi, 2018; Papadopoulou-Kourkoula, 2008). However, it had limited capacity for asylum processing and reception of asylum seekers until 2013. Although, in 2015, a total of 856,723 persons entered through the Greek maritime border (UNHCR, n.d.), the majority continued their journey onwards to other EU member states. A new migratory corridor emerged, facilitated by Germany's suspension of the Dublin Regulation for all Syrians and the de facto opening of the Western Balkan route until February 2016. The closure of the Western Balkan route in March 2016 struck a critical blow to the Greek policy of allowing transitory movement as a way of alleviating the impact of hundreds of thousands of arrivals (Dimitriadi, 2018). The closure of the land border was accompanied by an attempted 'closure' of the maritime border by means of the EU-Turkey Statement of 18 March 2016. A key component of the Statement is that all new irregular migrants crossing to the Greek islands as of 20 March 2016, could be returned to Turkey following an individual examination of their asylum application. Until a decision is reached, applicants are restricted from leaving the island, and are 'accommodated' in and around the Reception and Identifcation Centres (RIC), also known as hotspots.

The Statement has had a dual impact: It resulted in parallel, albeit different, asylum processing on the mainland and on the Greek islands of the eastern Aegean. For those arriving after 20 March 2016 on the islands with hotspots after the 20th of March 2016, a different asylum procedure is in place with the inadmissibility of claims frst examined based on the safe third country and frst country of asylum rules. Those whose claims are found inadmissible, or whose asylum is rejected on merit, are (in principle) returnable to Turkey. In contrast, for those entering through the land border, the regular asylum procedure is applied.

The Statement resulted in the emergence of a new border zone. The islands situated on the Greek-Turkish sea border continue to function as a buffer zone for onward mobility to the mainland and, by extension, to the rest of the Schengen area (Dimitriadi, 2017).

#### **11.4 Legislative Barriers**

In April 2016, Law 4375/2016 was adopted to enable the implementation of the 'hotspot' approach and of the EU-Turkey Statement, the latter applying only to the maritime border. The law introduced a partial reform of the asylum application processing system based on fast-track border procedures (Petracou et al., 2018). Furthermore, it regulated the organisation and operation of the Asylum Service and the Appeals Authority, renaming the First Reception Service as the Reception and Identifcation Service. According to Law 4375/2016, newly-arrived persons were transferred to a Reception and Identifcation Centre and 'placed under a status of restriction of liberty.' This practice was replaced in 2017 by the implementation of the geographical restriction, whereby newcomers could not leave the island until the end of the asylum procedure, i.e. throughout the examination of their asylum application (Greek Council for Refugees, 2018).

Since 2016, the only ways for migrants to leave the islands have been to receive international protection, to be exempt from the border procedure due to vulnerability, to be eligible for family reunifcation under the Dublin Regulation, or to be included in the transfers the government implements occasionally for reasons of decongestion. However, even those transferred from the island to the mainland – for vulnerability reasons – must return to the island where they submitted their application for their interview and the fnal processing of their claim.

Divergent practices exist across different borders (Petracou et al., 2018). An example of this is the fast-track procedure applied at the maritime, but not the land border. Applicable to asylum seekers arriving after 20 March 2016 on the Greek islands, the registration of asylum applications as well as the notifcation of decisions can be undertaken by members of the Hellenic Police or Armed Forces. Moreover, the asylum interview can be conducted by either the Asylum Service or the European Asylum Support Offce (EASO) staff. Fast-track asylum procedures should be concluded within 2 weeks (Greek Council for Refugees, 2017), though this has yet to happen in practice.

The standard procedure for migrants arriving at border points includes their identifcation (nationality screening) and referral to a Reception and Identifcation Centre for frst reception procedures. After the completion of the identifcation procedures, third-country nationals who request international protection are referred to the Asylum Service. This means that only those who have been apprehended, rescued or sought a law enforcement agent on arrival themselves have immediate access to the Asylum Service. In 2016–2018, the waiting time for frst-instance examination, particularly for those outside the hotspots and for non-Syrians, was usually 2 years.

Differences in bordering practices exist also on the Greek-Turkish land border in *Evros*. New arrivals in *Evros* are subject to reception and identifcation procedures in *Fylakio*, *Orestiada,* where their movement is restricted to within the premises of the RIC, or the police detention facilities. As the statement does not apply at the land border, asylum applications lodged in the RIC in *Fylakio* are not examined under the fast-track border procedure (Greek Council for Refugees, 2018; this has changed since 2020). On arrival and/or on being apprehended, migrants are detained for a few days or weeks (depending on the space available at the detention facilities) and released with a police-notice that allows them to travel to Athens, where they can make an appointment to submit an asylum request. Those who entered undetected and did not register at the border, would thus fnd themselves in urban centres unable to access the Asylum Service and having to wait for a Skype appointment. The process often takes weeks and is always dependent on the availability of interpreters.

The following section zooms in on the impact of the bordering practices discussed above and on their impact on migrants' daily existence in Greece. The bureaucratic, legal and spatial barriers produce different migrant trajectories. The analysis that follows draws on the empirical research that took place from February to July 2018 in Athens within the framework of research project evaluating the Common European Asylum System (CeasEVAL project).

Fifteen interviews with migrants, asylum seekers and refugees shed light on how bordering practices unfold at the border and on the mainland and shape migrant trajectories. Semi-structured interviews took place in Athens, Greece with Afghans (six), Syrians (seven), and Iraqis (two). Participants were identifed through contacts with different communities and the only criteria set was to have all three legal categories represented in the sample- irregular migrants, asylum applicants and recipients of international protection. The overwhelming majority were men, with three female participants. Of the ffteen participants, twelve had entered Greece through the land border. Some had reached Greece in 2016, though most had crossed the border between 2017 and 2018. They described very different border encounters, some of which were physically and emotionally violent. Only one interviewee from Syria intended to stay in Greece from the beginning. Of the remaining participants, eight (8) indicated that their initial intention was to reach Germany, two (2) wanted to go to Sweden, one (1) to the Netherlands, two (2) to Italy, and one (1) to the UK. As it turned out, their initial intention often changed, mainly due to administrative and legal barriers presented in Greece.

#### **11.5 Border Encounters**

Different border practices were encountered on entry by our informants, largely due to the timing of their arrival to Greece. One of the participants arrived in *Lesvos* prior to the EU-Turkey Statement, when the migrant population was being transferred from the islands to the mainland in preparation for the implementation of the deal. As a result, he was registered and sent to Athens within a few days. It was an entirely different experience for those who arrived in March 2016, just as the Statement was being implemented; both informants were stranded on the islands for months. The third informant arrived on the island of *Lesvos* after the 18th of March 2016. She described her journey, as one with hours spent adrift at sea. When the group fnally reached *Lesvos*, they were disembarked by a group of volunteers. The impact of the hotspots on the psychological and physical well-being of migrants has been extensively documented (e.g. International Rescue Committee, 2020), as has the impact of the time spent waiting for an asylum interview.

The empirical research in CeasEVAL sheds light on the different border practices implemented at the land border that has been documented less in comparison to the maritime frontier. Starting in 2017, a steady increase of arrivals had already been recorded at the land border in *Evros*. All but three of our informants utilised the land border to enter, in an effort to avoid the geographical restriction of movement imposed on the islands. The level of diffculty also differed, with the land border being a shorter passage and an easier one, especially in spring and summer. Some participants described various kinds of harassment and abuse, pushbacks and physical harm at the border, in both Turkey and Greece:

The second time the police fred at us. We were 40–45 persons in the car and the police used the gun to fre at the car (encounter with Turkish police near the sea border. Kurdish, male, June 2018).

[…] they had dogs and they let them come up to us –very dangerous– and this is how they caught us. They apprehended us, they took our clothes, everything we had with us –many times they would just leave us with our shorts and [eventually] they returned us to Turkey (encounter with police on the Bulgarian-Turkish border. Afghan, male. July 2018).

Pushbacks have also been documented since 2016 at the land border. Nationality did not appear to be the principal criteria, as testimonies gathered by the Greek Council of Refugees (GCR) revealed alleged pushback practices taking place irrespective of nationality and gender (Greek Council of Refugees 2018). In two cases during my feldwork, participants described how they were misled –by what appears from the description to have been Greek border guards – as to where the border zone was. Under the guise of assistance, in one case they were turned back to Turkey and in another to Bulgaria.

Some of the informants (four in total) were apprehended at the border and detained. Some received the registration papers with which they could travel to Athens, though two cases of Syrians noted that they were not registered by the police; the longest period spent in a detention facility was almost 3 months. Some crossed with diffculty, while others reached Greece without encountering major obstacles

Not everyone encountered border agents on entry, which also functioned as a 'barrier.' To access the Asylum Service, as well as accommodation, new arrivals had to register. At the land border in particular, registration was carried out by the police, which required that the migrant was either apprehended or sought out a police station (if their location made this possible). This marked a signifcant reversal in how the border crossing and its aftermath unfolded. In the past, detention was a standard policy, regularly applied also for asylum seekers, particularly in the period 2010–2012 in Greece. Due to the consistent use of detention, most arrivals sought to evade border agents for fear of being detained indefnitely. In contrast, by 2018, participants did not seek to avoid detection on arrival, as registration enabled access (or the prospect for access) to formal reception services (accommodation, food and social provisions). Thus, reception was utilised both as an incentive to register and screen arrivals, but also to exclude those that opted-out of the asylum system or that had bypassed border controls undetected. For those who successfully arrived and proceeded on to Athens without being apprehended, their lack of registration impeded their access to accommodation, cash-assistance and even the asylum process:

Until reaching Athens I was not registered anywhere. Here, I went to the police twice to get registered. [..] I told them I need help. I even hoped they would arrest me and put me in detention for two months so I would get registered. [...] but they asked me to leave (Afghan, male, June 2018).

Syrians entering through the land border were either not detained at all or only for a few days, in contrast to Afghans who were usually detained for weeks and/or months. However, the different experiences highlighted by the interviewees, indicated that no singular practice was applied consistently. This created confusion and misinformation among migrants; it also showed that bordering practices were not set-in stone. In 2018, at the land border, avoiding border agents and police served as an impediment to accessing asylum and therefore accommodation and cashassistance. The different border encounters produced 'erratic geographies' (Tazzioli, 2020, p. 6) resulting in the dispersal of migrants across the country. For many, access to asylum was the second critical barrier they had to overcome.

#### **11.6 Asylum as a Barrier**

The Asylum Service is a key border actor that constructs and deconstructs the legal and social borders at the hotspots and on the mainland, for every individual. Migrant encounters took place at the border, or in Athens, and in some cases would-be applicants were unsuccessful in their asylum applications, despite repeated attempts. The asylum application determined whether they would be able to access housing and cash-assistance, register for a social insurance number, and even fnd employment. Lack of registration rendered one invisible to the bureaucracy and 'illegal' by default. This marked a return to the practices of 2010–2012, when the asylum application –the 'pink card'– was the only means of temporarily legalising one's stay in the country and thus enjoying protection from detention and forced deportation (Cabot, 2014). In other words, the document re-emerged as the most critical element, but also as an obstacle to overcome. Those apprehended on the islands went through the screening and registration process in the hotspots, with an asylum interview very often scheduled for the same day:

When we sat down, they made interviews with us. In the beginning!! They did not let us drink some water, take a break. We didn't know what we were saying. I did not know what I should say. I just said 'my name is this.' It's like an accident when you arrive, and they have an interview with you immediately (Iraqi, female, June 2018).

Migrant interviews take place with the asylum case offcer and often with an EASO representative. The absence of information was stressed by all informants, although the biggest barrier to the bureaucratic process of asylum was (and remains) language. Asylum interviews could only take place when there was an interpreter available who spoke the applicant's language. For languages with few interpreters, the process could take months or years:

There was just one Arabic interpreter, not Kurdish. If you do not speak Arabic, they will postpone your interview. For people that could not speak Arabic it was a big problem because there was no Kurdish interpreter. [...] (Iraqi, female, June 2018).

The standard approach in 2016–2018 was to prioritise interviews for Syrians, because in principle they could be rejected as inadmissible (per implementation of the EU-Turkey Statement). Most cases ended up overturned or pending on appeal, with processing taking as long as 2 years. Until 2020, thousands of applications were pending on appeal.

For those who arrived on the islands without encountering border agents, the process was more complex. To enter the hotspot, they needed to register frst with the regional asylum offce. Only those who were registered were entitled to enter the RIC and receive shelter, food and medical assistance. However, access was not always possible. For example, on the island of *Chios*, the regional asylum offce was not situated in the camp:

To enter the camp, you need to register yourself [with the Asylum Service] but no one can do that, so you have to take the bus and go by yourself. Only people that have friends and have the power can enter and register themselves (Syrian Kurd, male, July 2018).

The reference to power and/or knowing the right people is something that was touched upon indirectly by participants, particularly with regard to navigating legal and bureaucratic processes. The above informant was a Kurdish national from Syria, who had arrived in Greece with his family on the island of *Chios.* Technically stateless, he posed a challenge for the asylum process. The only person who was allowed to submit an asylum application initially was his mother, who held a Syrian passport, but his father was called for an interview instead. He described a rather disorganised process with the asylum staff and a bureaucratic procedure that felt dehumanising:

For them we were not names nor humans, we were numbers. When they announced someone, they would say their number not their name (Syrian Kurd, male, July 2018).

After months of waiting, he eventually decided to call the smuggler and arrange to return to Turkey. He stayed in Istanbul for 3 months to collect money and returned to Greece via the land border, where he was registered on arrival. When we met, he had submitted an asylum application at the Regional Asylum offce in Athens. His parents were still waiting on the island for their transfer to the mainland, having received asylum.

Different bordering practices at the land border were also found regarding registration. Not everyone was registered, while migrants –particularly Syrians– were being told to simply go to Athens. This information was not only fawed, but would come to function as a key barrier to the migrants' acquiring accommodation and cash assistance.

Those registered by the police could in principle make an appointment in Athens to receive the threefold (asylum receipt of application). Here, nationality was crucial once again. The language spoken determined when and if an interview would take place. Interviews still depended on the number of interpreters present on any given day, the number of applicants in the queue and the capacity of the service to accommodate them:

The queues are so long I went there four times and nothing. I gave up. I went to the Greek Council for Refugees and said I am Syrian, I am refugee you need to get me an appointment. They said they will try, but it will take some time (Syrian, male, June 2018).

Three months after our interview, he was still waiting for an appointment. Those that did not register on arrival could not access the Asylum Service directly and had to request an appointment via Skype; a different nationality and language(s) was offered each day:

It took me two months to make an appointment through Skype. They gave me an appointment and I had to go to take this offcial document from the Asylum Service. In this paper they gave me an appointment for an interview in six months! (Syrian, male, June 2018).

Even when an appointment was made with the Asylum Service, the date differed depending on nationality: until 2018, Syrians were prioritised for registration and interviews, whereas Afghans were delayed, with one of the participants receiving an appointment for asylum 20 months after the date of his application, which was in April 2018. The administrative barriers migrants encountered had a direct and immediate impact on their daily life in Greece. Five of our interviewees had still to apply for asylum, unable to access the Asylum Service or book an appointment via Skype. In practice this meant they could physically move, but within specifc spaces evading police presence and could not access any of the reception services.

Overall, entry point, nationality, gender and family status (single, with children) as well as the time of arrival in Greece determined migrants' experiences both at the border crossing itself and with the border agent. In fact, acquiring the legal status to access, where possible, housing, cash assistance, health care and other necessary services –was the most critical aspect of the journey to Greece. In this sense, the Asylum Service, was (and remains) a far more signifcant contact point than the border guards, and access to it had a far-reaching impact on individuals. Multiple border zones emerged, depending primarily on the documents migrants obtained, which subsequently determined the extent of their (im)mobility and irregularity. The latter is a condition that 'any given individual can fit in and out of depending on the relation between his or her movements and activities and the movements and activities of national, international, and transnational agencies' (Squire, 2011, p. 7). Thus, in-country bordering practices acquire far more signifcance, and have the potential to have a greater impact on migrant lives, than the actual border crossing.

#### **11.7 Re-Bordering Through Access to, or Exclusion from Accommodation**

Bordering practices result in the inclusion and/or exclusion of migrants. In most cases, the mechanism for this draws on the legislative framework that denies or provides access to rights and social benefts for asylum seekers and migrants.

Asylum seekers in Greece in 2016–2018 had the right to free public health care and could be issued social security and employment documents. They also had the right to reside either in an offcial accommodation facility or to rent on their own, though the State was obliged to provide housing support. Renting accommodation requires fnancial resources that are not available to everyone.

Accommodation has consistently been a problem in Greece for asylum seekers, even prior to 2015 (Dimitriadi & Sarantaki, 2018). Until 2018, there were 26 reception facilities under the supervision of the Ministry for Migration Policy across mainland Greece, with the government developing 30,000 reception places in collective accommodation schemes (i.e. camps) to respond to the urgent needs presented by the 'refugee crisis.' To this, the Emergency Support to Integration and Accommodation (ESTIA) scheme set up by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees **(**UNHCR) and the European Commission's Directorate General (DG) Migration and Home Affairs should be included. Designed to temporarily house vulnerable asylum applicants and those eligible for relocation, the scheme in November 2018 included 26,526 places in 4427 apartments and 23 buildings in 14 cities and on seven islands (UNHCR, 2018). This was combined with cash assistance offered to formally registered asylum seekers residing either in the camps, hotspots or ESTIA apartments. Since April 2017, a total of 68,110 individuals have received cash assistance ranging from €90 to €550 (UNHCR, 2018). Despite the ESTIA and the multiple camps, there were still signifcant shortages in reception when the research was being conducted and this is largely due to how reception unfolded through fragmented spaces and practices (Mantanika & Arapoglou Chap. 10 in this volume). Though the accommodation spaces were set up for asylum seekers, recognised refugees continued to reside there, since they had nowhere else to go.

To access the camps or ESTIA housing, an individual had to be registered with the Asylum Service, with their application either pending examination or with a date set for an interview. As facilities were at full capacity, there was a signifcant waiting time of months to fnd accommodation space:

I did register our names in the camps, but nobody called us until now. I went to *Eleonas* and told [them] I would like to stay here. They registered our names and they said they will call but nobody called (Syrian, male, July 2018).

Two of the informants (both male, one Syrian and one Iraqi) succeeded in bypassing the system, demonstrating that knowing the right people can have a far greater impact. One of the informants explained that, although he was residing in one of the camps, he was not offcially registered there. A co-ethnic who was employed with one of the Non-governmental Organisations (NGOs) as an interpreter gave him access to the camp and a place to stay in one of the tents. Though he had not applied for asylum, he was registered and was eligible for camp accommodation. However, he was unconvinced that the formal route would have yielded similar results:

You know how many are waiting for somewhere to sleep? Why wait when I can get myself in the door? I wanted to stay there only a few nights, but it has been diffcult fnding a fat so some days I sleep with friends and others I go back to the camp […]. It's diffcult in Athens, I know there is this option with the NGO fats? [ESTIA programme] but you need to have asylum and I don't (Syrian, male, June 2018).

Due to the location of the camps on the outskirts of Athens, the residents were in fact removed physically from the urban centre that they nonetheless had to access for the various services. The cost of public transport (roughly three Euros each way) was not within everyone's means, particularly for families. This was also problematic for those who were unable to stay in fats and were searching for available spaces in the camps. In many cases, they had to visit in person to ask for available spaces. But doing so came at a fnancial cost. In contrast, those who resided in rented apartments in Athens lived around the city and could both move around easily and access services.

Vulnerable persons were, in principle, prioritised for accommodation. However, this was not always the case in practice. A female participant, a mother of two, registered for the ESTIA programme (including cash aid assistance) when we met had been waiting for a response for months:

I have registered myself for the apartment programme [ESTIA]… it's been ten months. Until now they did not call me. I have registered my name in three organisations to get a salary [cash aid]. There is the Caritas organisation… it's been six months now (Syrian, female, May 2018).

Each step in Greece was regulated by registration: registering with the police, registering with the Asylum Service, registering for accommodation and cash assistance. Each administrative step was part of the containment created by bordering practices, and as such it continuously produced barriers:

I went to the GCR, they put me on the list and told me that they would call me for an appointment. I am here for two months now, and I sleep here, in the square. […] I am very tired, I stay in the street in very diffcult conditions, I do not have money for anything […] GCR told me it will take two to three months (Afghan, male, July 2020).

This type of containment, produced through registration and/or its absence, isolated and limited the movement of migrants to specifc geographical spaces such as *Victoria* Square in Athens –a common location for migrants to spend the night since 2015. One of the Afghan participants referred to the area as the camp, because 'It is a bit like a camp, so many people sleep here at night' (male, June 2020). He had tried to fnd formal accommodation through NGOs and the UNHCR but had been unsuccessful.

Overall, seven of our informants either lived in squats or were entirely homeless. The squats do not constitute formal accommodation, and in fact most of them in the centre of Athens were dismantled by the Hellenic Police late in 2019, raising the prospect of homelessness for more asylum seekers:

When I frst arrived, for a week I slept on the streets, then for a month I was sleeping outside the camp to register there. Then after three months I was transferred to an apartment with many diffculties (Afghan, male, June 2020).

Although injured (and thus vulnerable), he was accepted into the ESTIA programme following UNHCR intervention. He acknowledged he was one of the exceptions, and that for those arriving from the land border there were few options but to sleep outside or wait for space to open up in the camps.

Accommodation was and remains critical also regarding employment. To register for social security, one still needs a permanent address. Camps have been used in the past as declared permanent addresses, though they are meant to be temporary accommodation. For those outside any formal accommodation structure, however, the absence of an address impacts severely both their stay and their access to a livelihood. Additionally, they are ineligible for the cash assistance that is provided to asylum seekers living in camps and apartments. Reception conditions can defne secondary movement, provoking it or deterring it (Dimitriadi, 2018; Kuschminder, 2018; Kuschminder & Koser, 2017). Entry, asylum application, accommodation, cash assistance and employment are all links in a chain in which every step functions in its own way as a barrier; sometimes, the process allows new arrivals to enter the reception system, and other times it excludes them from parts of –or the entire– reception process. This, in turn, generates spatial dispersal, containment, but also the desire for onward mobility.

#### **11.8 Conclusions**

New barriers have arisen since the EU-Turkey Statement of March 2016 and preexisting borders have been strengthened. New border actors have also emerged alongside the traditional ones (police, border guards), namely the Asylum Service and the Reception and Identifcation Service, responsible for the registration of new arrivals. Different administrative and legal bordering practices have resulted in the emergence of internal barriers that regulate movement within the country and access to asylum –and by extension– to accommodation.

The chapter sought to highlight how different encounters with border actors within Greece between 2016–2018, and with those situated at the external border, are part of the governance of migrants' mobility. The research fndings indicate that multiple administrative (for a discussion on the public policy responses to the 'refugee crisis' see Stratigaki Chap. 14 in this volume), legal, and physical barriers emerged at different stages of the migrant journey in Greece.

Different border encounters generated differentiated experiences of entry and stay, of containment and (im)mobility, not only physical but also socio-economic and legal. The study demonstrates that migrants' mobility was governed through registration, but also through withholding registration; through access to the asylum and reception system, as well as by preventing such access. Not everyone was registered, either due to the absence of border encounters or due to the action of border actors. The reception and asylum systems did not afford all applicants the same opportunities, while administrative constraints prevented access to asylum, in many cases prioritising specifc nationalities over others (for example Syrians over Afghans). It would not be accurate to attribute the different experiences of migrants only to poor management as this implies a lack of intent. Rather, what was described above should be seen as part of the governance of migration in Greece, whereby inclusion and exclusion were interwoven in the management of mobility made up of containment practices, geographical dispersal, deterrence policies and redirection of migrant journeys. Migrants were rendered governable through the bureaucratic process of registration, asylum and reception, 'forcing' some to onward movement, and others to immobility, while dispersing many in waiting spaces (e.g. islands) for extended periods of time.

Few perceive Greece as the destination. Rather, in-country barriers have reinforced pre-existing plans for onward movement. Empirical data reveals insecurity, resulting from the administrative barriers encountered, but also marginalisation. This further provides evidence of how bordering practices can be utilised to construct containment, but also generate onward movement shedding further light on the complexity of migrants' decisions to engage in further mobilities.

How administrative barriers target and/or affect some nationalities more than others requires further research. The relocation scheme of 2015 was only accessible to those nationalities above the 75% threshold of EU-wide positive recognition. This meant that Syrians were eligible, whereas Afghans were excluded. The experiences of arrivals indicate that differentiated bordering practices were applied in Greece also on the basis of one's nationality, with Syrians being allowed to move in-country when they enter – often unregistered – from the land border, while Afghans tended to be detained for longer, if they were apprehended. A similar divergence was noted between 2016 and 2018 as regards asylum interviews. Thus, a greater understanding is crucial, not only of how bordering practices occur, but also how they diverge depending on nationality and how bordering actors construct barriers that can generate mobility for some and immobility for others.

**Acknowledgments** Thank you to the editors of this book, Maria Kousis, Aspasia Chatzidaki and Konstantinos Kafetsios for their constructive comments during the review and editing process. The chapter partly draws from the empirical research conducted in the framework of the CeasEVAL H2020 project, under grant agreement No 770037. Detailed discussion of the empirical fndings can also be found at Dimitriadi & Sarantaki, 2019, (CeasEVAL Research on the Common European Asylum System, Work Package 4, report No 28).

#### **References**


**Angeliki Dimitriadi** is Research Fellow at the Global Public Policy Institute (GPPi) in Berlin, where she contributes to the institute's work on migration. She is a political scientist interested on migration management at the external borders, migration governance in the EU and the European foreign policy on migration. She teaches at the University of Athens on the governance of asylum and migration policy in Southeast Europe (Master's Programme in Southeast European Studies). Previously, Angeliki was Head of the Migration program at the Hellenic Foundation for European and Foreign Policy, where she remains affliated as a Senior Research Fellow. She has published articles in refereed journals and her most recent monograph, *Afghan Migration Europe: At the Margins, Looking In* (Palgrave, 2018), focuses on Afghan asylum seekers transiting through Greece and Turkey. She holds a PhD from Democritus University of Thrace (2012), an MA from King's College London (2003) and a BSc from the London School of Economics (2002).

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## **Chapter 12 Crisis Upon Crisis: Theoretical and Political Refections on Greece's Response to the 'Refugee Crisis'**

**Dimitris Parsanoglou**

#### **12.1 Introduction**

In this chapter I attempt to contextualise the so-called 'refugee crisis' within the European Union (EU) border regime. It must be noted from the beginning that I put 'refugee crisis' in quotation marks because neither the number of refugees nor the challenges faced by the EU can justify the reactions of its member states (Spyropoulou & Christopoulos, 2016); not to mention that from a historical perspective the illustration of the 2014–2016 rise of asylum seekers as a 'perfect storm' cannot be justifed by the facts, if compared with previous refugee and migrant 'crises' (Lucassen, 2018).

The main objective of this chapter is to refect upon the developments that occurred in Europe in 2015–2016 and have been included under the heading 'refugee crisis.' This refection follows a two-fold logic: on the one hand, I attempt a critical examination of the political responses to the 'crisis'; on the other hand, I attempt to disentangle and theorise the shifts that occurred within the management of the 'crisis,' both at the level of operationality and at the level of sovereignty. In order to do so, I focus on the specifc case of Greece, since the country has been at the epicentre of the 'refugee crisis,' particularly during the period 2015–2016. In fact, crisis has for a long time been the defning term when describing any development in Greece. The dramatic increase of refugee infows in the spring 2015 was approached from the very beginning in terms of crisis. It was also coupled with the sovereign debt crisis following the global fnancial crisis of 2007–2008 in two ways:

D. Parsanoglou (\*)

National and Kapodistrian University of Athens, Athens, Greece e-mail: dimparsa@soc.uoa.gr

either as an additional burden on a country hampered already by an ongoing sovereign-debt crisis and economic recession; or as another (missed) opportunity for the EU member states to show essential solidarity among each other in order to deal with a 'European problem.'

Therefore, I focus on pre-existing and emerging internal contradictions between different actors who have been dealing with refugees since the beginning of the 'crisis' and throughout the 'emergency period,' i.e. from spring-summer 2015 to spring 2016. In other words, I try to capture the contingent character of new geographies of control that occurred with the establishment of the 'hotspot approach,' in correlation with the shifts in state sovereignty as it has been repositioned through the active involvement of non-state actors –from Non-governmental Organisations (NGOs) to international organisations and EU agencies– in the refugee/migration management.

The analysis that follows is based on empirical material, namely in-depth semistructured interviews with different relevant stakeholders, as well as volunteers and activists from Greece and other countries. More precisely, it draws on empirical material from two research projects: the frst from April to September 2016, entitled 'De- and Re-stabilisation of the European Border Regime'; the second from July 2016 to July 2017, entitled 'Volunteering for Refugees in Europe: Civil Society, Solidarity, and Forced Migration along the Balkan Route amid the failure of the Common European Asylum System.' In the framework of the frst research project semi-structured interviews with the following key stakeholders were conducted: two consultants at the Ministry of Migration Policy; two Greek Members of the Parliament; two informants from the Municipality of Athens; one informant from the Hellenic Asylum Service; one liaison offcer from the European Commission's Directorate General for European Civil Protection and Humanitarian Aid Operations (DG ECHO)1 in Athens; and, one Frontex offcer. Within the second project, feldwork was conducted in *Lesvos* and in Athens, including semi-structured interviews with: three American volunteers and one Greek activist in *Skala Sikamnias*; one social worker (former activist) in a minors' shelter run by a Greek NGO in *Mitilini*; one psychologist, employed through the European Asylum Support Offce (EASO) in *Moria* hotspot; one Turkish volunteer in *Eleonas* camp in Athens; one Greek volunteer in *Eliniko* camp in Athens; one activist at the City Plaza hotel in Athens; two Spanish activists in a refugee squat at the district of *Exarchia* in Athens and one activist at a warehouse for refugees at the district of *Exarchia*.

<sup>1</sup>Formerly known as European Community Humanitarian Offce; it changed its name in 2009 but kept the ECHO abbreviation.

#### **12.2 Situating the 'Crisis' Within the Evolution of the EU Border Regime: Establishing a Control-Humanitarianism Nexus2**

A lot has been said and written about the response of the EU as a whole and that of the individual member states to the 'refugee crisis.' Before and after the 'summer of migration' –as it has been defned by activists and critical researchers to distinguish it from the crisis-ridden discourse (Hess & Kasparek, 2017)– the main outcomes of the European Council's resolutions and decisions followed two logics, or an intertwined one: on the one hand, intercepting fows through the enhancement of the 'combat against networks of smuggling and traffcking'; on the other hand, dealing with the 'humanitarian crisis' that emerged in particular places, notably in Greece, where large numbers of refugees were concentrated in order to follow their route towards North-Western Europe. These two principles were guiding EU resolutions and decisions as they were formulated from April 2015 onwards.

As for the response to the emergent 'humanitarian crisis,' which has been a crucial component of shifting dynamics that shaped both state and civil sector scopes of action, the main tool has been the activation of DG ECHO, the Emergency Support Instrument, set up by the European Commission on March 16, 2016. Most of the funding for humanitarian assistance to refugees in Greece was provided by DG ECHO. From March to December 2016, Greece was the only state that allocated 198 million euros to 'address the humanitarian needs', out of the 700 million euros planned over 2016–2018 for any member state that could require funding for humanitarian assistance (European Commission, 2020). The DG ECHO funding was distributed among eight EU humanitarian aid partners, who had already signed a Framework Partnership Agreement with the European Commission (EC). After the heavy 2016–2017 winter that resulted in the death of several people inside camps and even hotspots,3 humanitarian aid partners, both international and nongovernmental, have been the subject of severe criticism (Howden & Fotiadis, 2017).

In fact, humanitarianism has very often been criticised in this respect. According to some critics, International Organisations (IOs) as well as Non-governmental Organisations (NGOs) are only offering an 'illusion of protection,' which normalises the existence of stateless people and impairs the implementation of political solutions while it classifes people according to their alleged worthiness of protection, aid and relocation (Narkunas, 2015). In this context, the focus is reduced to specifc material needs demanding a humanitarian intervention, while the political reasons for which they have become refugees in the frst place are concealed (Malkki, 1996). For Walters (2002), humanitarian actions run by IOs, such as the

<sup>2</sup>Paraphrasing the 'migration-development nexus' promoted in the recent past by the International Organisation for Migration (IOM, 2002; Nyberg Sørensen, 2012; Van Hear & Nyberg Sørensen, 2003).

<sup>3</sup>The total number is not clear, and numbers vary in international press articles from January 2017, e.g. from Independent, The Guardian, CNN, Aljazeera etc.

United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), and NGOs in conficting border zones are actually part of a global 'policing of populations.' From a different perspective, border and migration controls are legitimised as 'humanitarian actions' on the basis that these activities serve the identifcation and hence the protection of refugees (Hess & Karakayali, 2007; Pallister-Wilkins, 2017). In other words, refugee protection through humanitarian interventions is considered as a part of the 'global migration management' (Scheel & Ratfsch, 2014).

The main concern, however, of the EU seems to be the former objective described above, i.e. the management of the fows, in the guise of the vow to combat smuggling networks. This explains why hotspots are very often perceived, and portrayed, as the necessary toolkit for the implementation of the EU emergency response to the 'refugee crisis,' linked in one way or another to the EU-Turkey exchange and collaboration on this matter. However, the very idea of such 'hotspots' can be traced back to the year 2003, when Tony Blair (2003) published the approach of the creation of 'regional protection zones' and 'transit processing centres.' This concept, which was only discussed, but never put into practice by the European Commission, was taken up in 2004 by the German Minister of the Interior, *Otto Schily*, and his Italian counterpart, *Giuseppe Pisanu*. They sketched out a plan to create reception camps for refugees in North Africa. The idea was simple and inspired by the so called 'pacifc solution' enacted by the Australian government (Devetak, 2004): those who were eligible for a refugee status would be resettled into the EU on the basis of a quota system, while all those whose asylum applications were rejected were to be deported to their countries of origin. Schily's (2005) paper proposed to move the examination of asylum claims of people intercepted on the high sea to reception centres on the African continent (Carrera & Guild, 2017).

With the publication of the 'hotspot approach' in the framework of the *European Agenda on Migration*, launched in May 2015 (European Commission, 2015a), the above-mentioned ideas were materialised in specifc modalities of control, where the hotspots should serve as a platform for the rapid, integrated and mutually complementary cooperation of the different European agencies -the European Asylum Support Offce (EASO), the Frontex European Border Guard Agency, the European Police (Europol) Offce, the European Judicial Cooperation Unit (Eurojust). The aim was the smooth co-operation between these agencies and the corresponding national authorities of the Member States in order to be able to react adequately to a potential disproportionately high migration pressure on the European external border. The hotspots should help to channel the mixed migratory fows faster and more closely, either to the European asylum system or to a process for the return of persons classifed as irregular migrants. In the wake of the long-standing crisis of the Dublin regulation that determines the responsibility of the Member State where an asylum application is initially fled, and its practical collapse in the summer of 2015 (Fullerton, 2016; Kasparek, 2016; Moses, 2016), the hotspot approach represented a new, a more even and therefore more sustainable distribution for the resettlement of asylum seekers within Europe and for the actual implementation of a Common European Asylum System (European Commission, 2016a). Therefore, hotspots were seen as an elementary tool for an effective and, more importantly, fast-track procedure to deal with fows and classify newcomers (Parsanoglou, 2020b).

By February–March 2016, fve hotspot centres were put into operation in Greece. In March 2016, the Balkan route was permanently abolished with the closure of the Greek-North Macedonian border for all refugees in transit and the destruction of the informal transit camp of *Idomeni*. The latter occurred in two phases between 24 to 27 May and 13 to 14 June 2016. With the end of the Balkan route, but even more pressingly with the probable entry into force of an agreement between Turkey and the EU, the functioning of the Greek hotspots changed signifcantly taking its current form and content. More precisely, until 20 March 2016, the Greek hotspots functioned primarily as registration centres, where identifcation, fngerprinting and identifcation of refugees' nationalities was carried out. Until then, the primary objective of the hotspots was indeed to collect and match data of refugees with the existing European databases, i.e. Eurodac and Schengen Information System (SIS) II. In practical terms, arrivals were classifed as potentially vulnerable or 'illegal,' depending on their nationality. Apart from persons from Pakistan and the Maghreb, whose right to asylum was collectively denied, most persons received a 30-day residence paper, while Syrians received a six-month paper, which enabled them to transit through Greece.

However, on March 18, 2016, the EU-Turkey Statement (European Council, 2016), most often described as the 'EU-Turkey deal'4 changed everything. Turkey promised, among other arrangements, to stop the departure of migrants towards Greece and to readmit refugees from Greece. In order to facilitate the readmission of Syrian nationals to Turkey, the hotspot centres were declared closed facilities and migrants5 were subjected to a 'restriction of freedom,' i.e. to detention, for a period of 25 days as prescribed by the Asylum Law 4375/2016. The immediate result in at least three of the hotspots was an outbreak of violent protests, followed by a peculiar re-opening of the centres. While migrants were legally still subjected to the 'restriction of freedom,' they were free to leave the centres. A second order of 'restriction of movement' though barred them from leaving the islands, while the centres themselves remained largely inaccessible for outside observers, such as journalists, NGOs or researchers. Four years after the EU-Turkey Statement, the hotspot centres in Greece were still operational on all fve islands. Already in March

<sup>4</sup>The so-called 'EU-Turkey deal' is in fact nothing more than a common statement of EU and Turkey, which means that it does not constitute a legal document, in the typical sense of an agreement, binding for the states that ratify or adhere to. It is based legally on the 'Agreement between the European Union and the Republic of Turkey on the readmission of persons residing without authorisation,' signed in December 2013 (see full text in EUR-Lex, 2014a) and approved by the European Council in April 2014 (EUR-Lex, 2014b). All that has been decided in November 2015 in the EU-Turkey Joint Action Plan (European Commission, 2015b) and in March 2016 (European Council, 2016) is mostly the activation of this Agreement and more importantly the specifcation of a Joint Action Plan (European Commission, 2016b) which is to be under on-going monitoring (European Commission, 2016c).

<sup>5</sup>Here 'migrants' refers to all people arriving at the hotspot regardless their claims or status, e.g. asylum seekers, migrants and others.

2016, the Commission (European Commission, 2016a) had reported that the aim of a fngerprinting rate of 100% of all arrivals had been reached, while numbers of arrivals had dropped sharply after the deal.

#### **12.3 Greece's Response to the 'Crisis': In the Deal We Trust!**

The 'refugee crisis' coincided with the rise to power of the coalition between SYRIZA (*Sinaspismos Rizospastikis Aristeras* [Coalition of Radical Left] and ANEL (*Anexartiti Elines* [Independent Greeks]). The formal Greek position at the beginning of the 'crisis' followed four principles: relocation, resettlement, support to Turkey and other neighbouring countries, and fght against smuggling. Nevertheless, the practical response of the government was tormented by a blatant ambivalence, if not contradiction, between a discourse of solidarity towards refugees and the need for a 'pragmatic' management of a critical situation. In other words, the same time the Greek government was implying that Turkey did not put any barriers to the activity of smugglers in the Aegean Sea and did not offer any substantial help to the refugees, Greek authorities were operating as a travel agency (*KTEL* [public bus service] in the words of a high-rank employee of the Asylum Service), moving people from the islands to *Piraeus* and from there to *Idomeni*. 6

The EU-Turkey Statement of 18 March 2016 set a new basis regarding both the management of refugee fows and the basic priorities/principles of the Greek government. Particularly during the frst months of its implementation, the EU-Turkey deal was considered as the only solution for an effective regulation of the refugee issue. Apart from the recurrent statements at the highest level, most of the offcials that we met shared the conviction that there was no plan B; only one plan, that the deal should work.7 The spokesperson of the Coordinating Body for the Refugee Issue was adamant about the impossibility of any other alternative plan. In the question whether the government had a Plan B in case the deal collapsed, he repeatedly said that Greece could not deal with hundreds of thousands of refugees. In the question whether he was aware of such plans at the level of the European Commission, e.g. moving the buffer zone from Turkey to Greece in exchange of increased funding, he replied that 'this cannot be done; no matter how much money you get, even if you get 10 billion euros, you cannot enlarge *Chios'.*<sup>8</sup>

<sup>6</sup> Interview with offcer at the Hellenic Asylum Service, taken by D. Parsanoglou, September 2016.

<sup>7</sup> Interview with the offcer at the Ministry of Interior and Administrative Reconstruction, department for Migration Policy, taken by D. Parsanoglou and V. Tsianos, May 2016; interview with offcer at the General Secretariat for Migration Policy, taken by D. Parsanoglou and V. Tsianos, May 2016; interview with an advisor of the Alternate Minister of Interior and Administrative Reconstruction responsible for Migration Policy, taken by B. Kasparek and D. Parsanoglou, June 2016.

<sup>8</sup> Interview taken by D. Parsanoglou, June 2016.

It seems that for the Greek government, the EU-Turkey Statement constituted the embodiment of what had been supporting as a 'Europeanisation of the refugee issue.' Nevertheless, serious objections were raised around the issue of the deal. A senior advisor of the Minister of Migration Policy resigned from her post after the statement, arguing that it raised questions of possible violations of national constitutions, EU regulations –i.e. the Procedures Directive of 2013 on common procedures for granting and withdrawing international protection– and, above all, the international public law:

The fact that according to the EU-Turkey Statement a person could be returned and the fact that sanctions are imposed to returned people constitutes a direct breach of the Geneva Convention by establishing an à la carte frame. The concept running the statement is the instrumentalisation of refugees. In addition, Turkey is considered quasi automatically as a 'safe third country,' which in many cases is misleading if not dangerous for some people who will be sent back.9

Even though the statement of 18 March 2016 was not a legally binding document in the sense of international law, it was, and still is presented in the public discourse almost as such. The Law on Asylum (4375/2016), which passed through an 'express procedure' in the beginning of April 2016, was considered by the public and the parliament to be a sort of adjustment of asylum procedures and structures to the new spirit of refugee emergency that underpins the deal between EU andTurkey. It is important to note that the previous law on asylum was passed in 2011 and some of its aspects, such as the asylum committees and the necessary human resources, did not effectively come into force. However, nowhere in the text of the new law nor in the accompanying report that introduced the bill in the parliament, is there any reference to Turkey and to the EU-Turkey Statement.

It was clear that since March 2016 the maintenance of the EU-Turkey Statement had been the one and only sustainable plan for the Greek government. This means, however, that the main goal of the Greek government had been the containment of refugee fows. When I asked a Senior Advisor of the Minister of Migration Policy whether the deal was an unavoidable development or the Greek government pursued it as such, the deal was defended for the following reasons:


Another development that occurred in the summer of 2016 was the modifcation of the composition of the backlog committees, removing the representatives of the

<sup>9</sup> Interview with a former advisor of the Alternate Minister of Interior and Administrative Reconstruction responsible for Migration Policy, taken by B. Kasparek and D. Parsanoglou, June 2016.

<sup>10</sup> Interview taken by B. Kasparek and D. Parsanoglou, June 2016.

UNHCR and the EEDA *Ethniki Epitropi yia ta Dikeomata tou Anthropou* [National Commission for Human Rights]. This happened on 22 June 2016, when this amendment passed through Law 4399/2016 on the 'Institutional framework for the establishment of regimes for the reinforcement of private investments aiming at the regional and economic development of the country –Establishment of a Development Council and other measures'. The National Commission for Human Rights, which is a public body and its members are appointed by the Parliament, published a statement expressing its concerns for the hastiness of the Minister to pass such an amendment through an absolutely irrelevant bill, particularly just some months after the new Law on asylum (4375/2016) which was the result of long consultation with relevant stakeholders. The Commission also expressed concerns as for the constitutionality of the amendment and its compliance with international legal standards (EEDA, 2016).

The deal which is still largely shaping the regulatory framework of entries and exits in the EU, from Greece through Turkey, has to a certain degree achieved its prescribed goals. Sea arrivals to Greece have sharply decreased, although they had already started to fall after their peak in October 2015 (Spijkerboer, 2016). It must be noted though that besides the deal, a signifcant impediment to new arrivals was the closure of borders by several countries and the effective collapse of the Balkan route. In interviews conducted in September 2016 representatives of different organisations were insisting on refugees' 'agency' as an explanatory factor for the limited arrivals on the Greek islands:

If there is no feld research and [we don't] ask the asylum seekers themselves, we cannot draw any conclusion. My personal take is that the crucial factor for the sharp decrease of migrant fows, if you compare this with the previous summer, is the closure of the Northern borders of the country. In my opinion, I don't think that Turkish authorities do something more or something less than what they did before. This is my perception; and it is based on a very simple assumption, that someone might be a refugee, but he is not stupid. Neither he has/has he such a big problem of access to information. Everyone has a mobile phone, with internet access; they read the same things I more or less read (…) I think that they do have basic information. And the basic information is that if you go to Greece, you are stuck!11

In fact, as early as April 2016, arrivals to Italy outreached arrivals to Greece. If in the summer of 2015, Greece was at the centre of the 'refugee crisis,' in the summer of 2016 Italy was receiving around ten times more refugees than Greece. In almost less than three months the feeling of crisis, as far as the refugee question was concerned, had been mitigated. Time matters; from month to month, sometimes even from week to week, the challenges that the actors involved in the 'management of "refugee crisis"' face changes in terms of intensity and the content of the 'crisis.' Moreover, also timing matters; and it matters not only for the classifcation of refugees, i.e. their eligibility for different kinds of statuses and subsequent possibilities; it also matters for the classifcation of space. The new mapping of governance that has been introduced because of and within the 'refugee crisis' is in fact introducing

<sup>11</sup> Interview with offcer at the Hellenic Asylum Service, taken by D. Parsanoglou, September 2016.

a new geography of governance, where specifc places are linked to specifc regulatory frameworks.

#### **12.4 How to Deal with All This? New Kids on the Block**

Coming to the question of how society has responded to the crisis, the summer and the autumn of 2015 generated a series of images that will not easily abandon collective memory. However, despite the dramatic and sometimes tragic content of these images, the 'summer of migration' will also remain in people's memories as an event that triggered an unprecedented outbreak of solidarity and humanitarianism that challenged the ways that we perceive both individual/collective agency and structural/institutional interventions in the feld. Particularly, the intensity of border crossings in the East Mediterranean has de facto produced strong intersections between border/asylum politics and humanitarian action, which raised a series of humanitarian dilemmas that concern all types of actors involved (Scott-Smith, 2016).

In Greece, from the beginning of the 'refugee crisis' and particularly from the early summer of 2015, multiple actors, individual and institutional, local and international, governmental, intergovernmental and non-governmental, technical and humanitarian, have been present wherever emergency situations occurred. This humanitarian outbreak, in particular the reaction of local societies on the main points of arrival, i.e. the islands of the East Aegean Sea, led some, such as the social anthropologist E. Papataxiarchis (2016a), to speak about a 'new patriotism of solidarity,' referring to the dominant attitude towards the refugees.

If we tried to provide a rough typology of the actors who were and, in some cases, still are present in the broad feld of '"refugee crisis" management,' we could distinguish several types of actors, from representatives of IOs and EU agencies to activists and volunteers in local assemblies and community kitchens (Parsanoglou, 2020a). A lot has been written (Oikonomakis, 2018; Papataxiarchis, 2016b; Parsanoglou & Philipp, 2018; Rakopoulos, 2014; Rozakou, 2016; Zavos et al., 2017), particularly on the grassroots movements and solidarity structures that were formed within the fnancial/economic crisis in Greece and constituted the knowledge base for the establishment of robust *infrastructures of solidarity* (Schilliger, 2020) towards the asylum seekers and refugees. Solidarity that can also be seen as a 'bottom-up governmentality' that involves both 'formal charity, NGOs, or humanitarian assistance,' but also 'grassroots organisations, a variety of local solidarity initiatives, and even transnational movements' (Mantanika & Arapoglou Chap. 10 in this volume).

If we examine the motivations and the content of the work/services that all these people have been offering, we could better understand the criteria on which the above categorisation is based (Parsanoglou, 2020a). One might also suggest different categorisations. What is most interesting is the fact that in the specifc spatiotemporal conjuncture of the double-or-multiple-crisis Greece, all these actors have been coexisting and interacting for specifc moments in specifc spaces where the refugee drama occurred. From the northern coasts of *Lesvos* to the port of *Piraeus* and the camps at *Idomeni*, a bunch of people who might never have imagined coexisting and working together under any circumstances constituted a heterogeneous and heterodox continuum.

Quite revealing and illustrative is the example of *Lesvos.* In its 1632.8 km2 *Lesvos* received during 2015 more than 0.5 million refugees and some thousands of volunteers, activists and NGOs-IOs' professionals. During the emergency period, i.e. from spring 2015 to winter 2015–2016, one could fnd all types of actors mentioned above. They were deployed all along the island, but particularly in some specifc localities where specifc acts of the refugee drama were performed. The frst act, that of arriving and being rescued, was mostly taking place on the north shore of the island. The bulk of arrivals were taking place on the coasts of a small fshing village, *Skala Sikamineas aka Skala Sikamnias.* There, local fshermen along with activists and international volunteers participated in everyday rescuing and hosting actions. A Greek volunteer with activist background who went to *Lesvos* in November 2015 and stayed there until March 2016, describes a typical day at the coast as follows:

Let's say that on a regular day seven-eight boats were arriving, which is not much/many, neither few. *Platanos* [the ad hoc collective that people from different places created there]12 had a space of around 200m2 , a squat behind the municipal pumping station and in front of a small park. (…) When we were done, UNHCR vans would come and take them to Camp one*,* on the outskirts of the village, about one kilometre away. (…) It was there that the registration would take place. (…) I don't know for how many hours they had to wait before they got on the big buses to go to *Moria. (…)* There, there was another registration; more formal this time. They were given papers, Police was also there. (…) Those who had money found a ship and left; those who didn't have waited for their folks to come from the other side [Turkey], or stayed inside *Moria* or in *Kara Tepe*, in a space owned by the Municipality. (…) There were times that *Moria* was full, so they were going to another camp, we were calling the Afghan camp, at the 'Better days for *Moria*.' A guy who had created an NGO and was running it is now in *Eleonas* [camp in Athens], a Greek-Cypriot. (…) At *Tsamakia,* there was a 'no border kitchen.' This is near the port. German antifa had created this.13

The extended passage from the above excerpt shows the diversity of actors who were interplaying within the 50 km trajectory of refugees from the coast to the capital city of *Lesvos*. What is interesting is that in this trajectory, which looked like an assembly line of refugee processing, different kinds of mandates, activities and even sovereignties emerged, creating a fascinating *assemblage* of heterogeneous components. It is quite interesting that this coexistence of different actors could and did in fact lead to misunderstandings regarding mandates and responsibilities. An American volunteer was fascinated by the effciency of the 'Spanish coastguard' that provided more than assistance in rescuing refugees:

This was fascinating…The Spanish coastguard was the one managing the whole thing. I remember asking why the Spanish coastguard was the one in charge. And apparently, this has been happening since back in 2015 when [the situation] was getting out of control, the

<sup>12</sup>See Solidarity Team Platanos (2015).

<sup>13</sup> Interview with Greek activist in *Lesvos*, taken by D. Parsanoglou, March 2017.

Spanish coastguard people came and started doing such a good job that none ever replaced them.14

The Spanish Coastguard (as named by the American volunteer) actually was just a Barcelona-based NGO called Open Arms (n.d.) The organisation, in September 2015, had sent two boats to *Lesvos* and was very active in rescuing refugees during the busy months of autumn-winter 2015–2016.

It must be noted, however, that by 2016, even before the EU-Turkey Statement, the situation improved. On the one hand, arrivals had already decreased, and, on the other hand, controls had started to be stricter. In this sense, assistance became more *professionalised* and people who were getting involved were to a lesser or greater extent linked to international organisations or local organisations which acted as partners or subcontractors of the international ones. During this process, interesting shifts emerged, where people who were previously activists were recruited by NGOs15 or even by the Hellenic Asylum Service through the UNHCR.16 People from abroad, i.e. international volunteers and activists, continued to arrive in the country, but since March 2016 the focus was not necessarily *Lesvos* and the other islands; instead, they would move towards *Idomeni* or, after its evacuation, towards other camps and spots of interest in Athens and elsewhere. In addition, cracks on refugee solidarity appeared in *Lesvos*, leading to its actual collapse since spring 2018 (Papataxiarchis Chap. 8 in this volume).

#### **12.5 Sovereignty and Its Discontents**

Two metaphors, among many others, have extensively been used even within critical discourses in order to describe the two-fold crisis that erupted in Greece during the last years: the one referring to the economic crisis is the metaphor of 'debt colony,' accompanied very often by the notion of (German) protectorate; the other referring to the 'refugee crisis' is the metaphor of a 'warehouse of souls', generally used by diverse actors, from Amnesty International to right-wing actors. So, Greece is very often represented as a garbage can: 'Greece is not Europe. This is not Europe. *C'est la poubelle de l' Europe. C'est la poubelle de la poubelle de l' Europe*. 17 This is what young North-African migrants in *Igumenitsa*, who were trying to get on a ferry to Italy, were exclaiming some years ago (Tsianos & Kuster, 2012).

<sup>14</sup> Interview with American volunteer in *Lesvos*, taken by D. Parsanoglou, February 2017.

<sup>15</sup>This is the case of one interviewee, active in the local antiracist and solidarity movement for several years, who started working as social worker at a shelter run by a Greek NGO: Interview taken by D. Parsanoglou, February 2017.

<sup>16</sup>This is the case of one interviewee, a psychologist who started working at the asylum service at the *Moria* hotspot, interview taken by D. Parsanoglou, October 2016.

<sup>17</sup> 'It is the garbage can of the garbage can of Europe.'

Paradoxically enough, all these metaphors were adopted also by the government and to a certain extent by Greek authorities and public services. Although during the years of opposition and during the negotiations with creditors in the long frst semester of 2015, Prime Minister *Alexis Tsipras* was repeatedly defending national sovereignty exclaiming that 'Greece is not a colony and Greeks are not the pariahs of Europe,' the government's position during the 'refugee crisis' seemingly shifted towards a less-sovereign stance, arguing that 'the logic of national sovereignty cannot prevail over the common European rules, when it comes to the refugee problem.'18

One of the main questions that was posed was to examine whether the 'refugee crisis' has had an impact on state sovereignty, and more particularly on the *acts of sovereignty*, if we could think in terms of Isin and Nielsen (2008) with regard to 'state agency.' Or, using the logic of Yasemin Soysal (1994), but adopting the perspective of the state, I wanted to see how sovereignty was challenged or even undermined by developments closely linked to core state operations. Here, apart from the international interventions, mainly within EU instances including Turkey, one can fnd processes of reformulating and reconfguring mechanisms of adjustment and readiness towards the new facets of the European border regime as it has been challenged by refugees and migrants. In other words, sovereignty has been brilliantly challenged when we see how policies and procedures have been practically implemented in Greece.

To start with the fnancial situation of the country, budgetary limitations have been present within the whole range of initiatives that Greek authorities had to undertake from the beginning of the 'refugee crisis.' Recruitment of personnel in order to meet the increasing needs in several services, e.g. the Asylum Service and its local branches, the hotspots etc., creation and maintenance of infrastructure around the country in order to host refugees, as well as material support and assistance, all required a fnancial cost unbearable for the government budget. The inescapable reality of fnancial restrictions has been a constant matter of concern.

The cost of the 'refugee crisis,' which among others triggered the confict between the frst General Secretary for First Reception and Identifcation and the Deputy Minister of Migration Policy that led to the resignation of the former in September 2016 fve months after his appointment,19 was not at all a cost that burdened entirely and directly the Greek government. Aside from voluntary work offered by individuals both on the islands and on the mainland, much of the services to refugees have been provided by international organisations and international and local NGOs. Particularly in the case of humanitarian assistance actions, funding was going directly to organisations, without any involvement of the Greek state.

<sup>18</sup>*Alexis Tsipras* speaking in a meeting of the European Radical Left and Ecology, in Paris, on 11 March 2016 (Lifo, 2016).

<sup>19</sup> In his words: 'Norway has more refugees in proportion to its population than Greece. How much does the Norwegian government spend annually per refugee? It spends less than the money we spend. The average annual cost for a refugee in Norway is about 12,000 (euros). In Greece it is 15.000.' See The Vima Team (2016)

As I mentioned above, the European Commission described the Emergency support instrument as:

a faster, more targeted way to respond to major crises, including helping Member States cope with large numbers of refugees, with humanitarian funding channelled to United Nations (UN) agencies, non-governmental organisations and international organisations in close coordination and consultation with Member States (European Commission, 2020).20

However, the question whether the 'refugee crisis' resulted among others in the establishment of a parallel structure of governance in Greece was widely open. Government offcials have been insisting on two things: the assessment of the needs and the monitoring of the use of resources was a responsibility of the Greek government and more specifcally of the Ministry of Migration Policy. Secondly, the system of hotspots and this kind of collaboration between state and non-state actors did not constitute a precedent, a sort of model for the future, but just an experience. On the other side of the coin, representatives of IOs and NGOs, particularly of EU agencies, such as the EASO and Frontex, were insisting that all they did was providing assistance to Greek authorities. Formally, the role of EASO, both on the islands and in the mainland was 'to assist the EU relocation process, in particular through the provision of information on relocation, assistance provided to the Dublin unit, and detection of possible document fraud' (EASO, 2016).

In the feld, however, it is well known that both EASO and Frontex offcers were very often providing more than auxiliary services in the sense that both identifcation of nationality and initial investigation of someone's demand were undertaken by their offcers. Since it was diffcult, if not impossible for Greek offcers, particularly during the 'hot periods of the crisis' to re-examine in depth the initial report/ opinion on every case, it was a common secret that the international experts' role was very signifcant in the process. It is revealing that, on 7 June 2016, the *Mitilini* Bar Association lodged a complaint against EASO offcers in *Moria* when the latter denied access in the hotspot to local lawyers, requesting a clarifcation of EASO's competences in the hotspots (Aggelidis & Fotiadis, 2016). Further clarifcation was provided by the Law 4399/2016, passed in June 2016, where beside the modifcation of backlog committees' composition, a major development referred to EASO offcers' competences:

The element b of paragraph four of article 60 of Law 4375/2016 [the Asylum Law passed on 1 April 2016] is amended as follows: b. The interview with the applicants for international protection can be conducted also by personnel provided by the European Asylum Support Offce.21

It is also well known that there have been points of confict –more or less latent– when it came to boundaries of competence and to existing discrepancies. The former lies upon the novelty of the situation in which IOs and NGOs found themselves:

<sup>20</sup>Underlined by the author.

<sup>21</sup>Law 4399/2016.

All the NGOs I think, are facing this problem. They're trying to do something for the frst time, but they have the experience from other countries, with different legal frames, with different procedures and they think… I think that it's very diffcult for them to adapt to the new reality. And this is something that you can understand. That's why if you are not there, you face the problem that something like, I don't know, something very strange is going to happen. That's why you have to be there to… set some guidelines: 'No, you cannot do that, you have to do that.'22

Moreover, discrepancies and inequalities have arisen between personnel of Greek authorities and European agencies. It is important to note here that EU agencies, such as Frontex and EASO, have not recruited local people in order to facilitate their operations. The staff remained mainly international, without involving Greek personnel, which is working under more pressure and worse conditions:

But I think that a lot of them are coming from different countries, especially from Germany, Holland. A lot of people from Holland, Italy, Spain, different countries. But they don't have a lot of staff from the local communities. No. And this is an issue also, because they're coming here like experts from different countries, they have a huge amount for salary, different level from the Greek Police, they're working different hours, less hours. They work in better conditions.

#### **12.6 Conclusion: What Has the 'Refugee Crisis' Left Behind?**

The recent 'refugee crisis' triggered a series of repercussions and shifts as far as the EU border regime and asylum policies are concerned. Greece has been at the centre of these transformations bearing the essential burden of the 'crisis' and experimenting signifcant shifts as far as governance of mobility is concerned. Having seemingly left behind the 'emergency period', our fndings contribute with the following insights regarding the impact of the 'refugee crisis' on the EU border regime as it is exemplifed in the case of a specifc member state.

More precisely, the EU-Turkey Statement of the 18th March 2016 resulted practically in the construction of a particular regime of inadmissibility and readmission. The former was constituted by yet another administrative obstacle to the institutions of asylum, while the latter manifested as a constant threat –even though only rarely enforced– of deportation to Turkey. It is noteworthy that the exceptionalism of this regime was not confned to the very hotspot centres but applied to the whole islands. As I have ascertained during our feldwork, the hotspot centres could not function as closed centres of detention, which in turn lead to the islands being bounded spaces as a whole. Migrants who arrived on the island and were registered in the hotspot centres were under a police order of 'restriction of movement.' meaning that

<sup>22</sup> Interview with an advisor of the Alternate Minister of Interior and Administrative Reconstruction responsible for Migration Policy, taken by B. Kasparek and D. Parsanoglou, June 2016.

they were not allowed to leave the island. Greek police and Frontex enforced this order at both ports and airports.

From the above and from our research fndings, the chapter concludes with some general speculations concerning the territorialised aspects of the reconfguration of the European border regime. A lot has been said about the ex-territorialisation of the European border regime. It has been pointed out from the early 2000s that the European borders, more accurately the control of European borders, has been shifting outwards depicting extra-European 'wardens of the European border regime' (see among others: Andersson, 2014; Bialasiewicz, 2012; Casas-Cortes et al., 2011; Tsianos & Karakayali, 2010; Walters, 2009) In this framework, several attempts have been made in the past for outsourcing detention and control in both Africa and Middle East. Through this lens, the EU-Turkey Statement seemed to be the frst comprehensive plan for a systematic, holistic extra-territorialised control and processing of refugee and migrant fows. In other words, through the EU-Turkey Statement a buffer zone was, for the frst time, offcially established at the very external border of the EU. In this sense, hotspots as confgurations of condensed control in terms of space and time could provide new insights into the transformation(s) of the European border regime. Along with the tendency towards an *exterritorialisation* or *externalisation* –pointed out since the mid-1990s in critical migration studies– the hotspot system inaugurated a systematic endeavour for a comprehensive processing of bodies and data *inside* the EU borders. Apart from the reconfgurations of geographies of control, exemplifed in specifc territories of enacted sovereignty, i.e. hotspot-non hotspot, islands-mainland, country of entrycountry of relocation and so on, the concentration of different actors in specifc spatialities and temporalities, lead to constant renegotiations of the margins of both mobility and control within the European border regime and pointed to a deeper restructuring not only of the European border regime, but the European space itself (Dimitriadi Chap. 11 in this volume).

What is even more interesting, however, is the fact that the new regime introduced by the EU-Turkey Statement and the hotspot system was not only shifting outwards; it was also creating *internal buffer zones* within the EU territory, and particularly within a specifc EU country; and even more particularly within specifc spaces of detention and processing. This internalisation of control was exemplifed in different moments and different spaces: the frst moment/space where someone was confned if she/he would manage to cross the external buffer zone erected by Turkish authorities, was the hotspot system deployed in the fve famous Greek islands. The frst spatial distinction that one faced arriving in the EU was the one between 'hotspot' and 'non-hotspot' territory; in terms of time, the distinction between pre-identifcation and post-identifcation, including initial investigation of one's condition. Then one came across the distinction between island and mainland, Greek or Turkish depending on the outcome of her/his demand; in terms of time, a month or less or more that their application was examined. And then came the distinction between Greece and other EU and European Economic Area (EEA) member states, i.e. the distinction between application for relocation (until June 2018) or family reunifcation, acceptance or rejection of the demand, transmission of the fles

to other countries, acceptance or rejection, trip to the destination, while living in formal or improvised camps in the Greek mainland, in accommodation places provided by the UNHCR, local authorities, international or national/local NGOs or informal projects of housing provided by activists and people in solidarity with refugee and so on. Unless, both in terms of time and space, the 'infnity in confnement' exhausted someone and lead her/him to 'chose' the way back home, sponsored by the IOM.23

According to our research fndings, the hotspot centres could not be analysed as merely isolated spaces. While they should by no means be misconstrued as mere 'welcome centres' at the EU border enabling access to EU territory for everybody, the hotspot approach put emphasis on: (a) the processing and registration of all arriving persons in a fast and timely manner and (b) the accelerated onward transportation of selected persons in accordance with the relocation scheme and the family reunifcation mechanism of the Dublin system. Furthermore, the placement of the hotspot centres inside the EU territory lead to a different spatial category, especially if considered relative to the various overlapping and relevant legal orders that came with this inward move of the processing centres. This means that both in the temporal and spatial dimensions, there are stark conceptual differences which need to be considered in any assessment of the overall hotspot system. For these differences are not merely discursive, but indeed point to a changing confguration of central governing rationalities within the EU border regime, which are translated into concrete practises and materialised into an actual infrastructure of control.

**Acknowledgements** This work was supported by the Fritz Thyssen Stiftung under the project 'Transit migration 2: a research project on the de-and re-stabilisations of the European border regime' (2016) and the Gerda Henkel Stiftung under the project 'Volunteering for Refugees in Europe: Civil Society, Solidarity, and Forced Migration along the Balkan Route amid the failure of the Common European Asylum System' (July 2016–June 2017). I must thank all the interviewees for their trust, along with all my colleagues with whom I had the most valuable exchange. Among my colleagues, specifc thanks go to Vassilis S. Tsianos, Bernd Kasparek, Sabine Hess, Serhat Karakayali and Olaf Kleist. I also want to thank the editors of this book, Maria Kousis, Aspasia Chatzidaki and Konstantinos Kafetsios for their constructive comments and the whole review and editing of the volume.

#### **References**


<sup>23</sup> I am referring to the IOM (n.d.) Assisted Voluntary Return and Reintegration (AVRR) programmes.


Open Arms. (n.d.). *Who we are*. https://www.openarms.es/en/who-are-we


**Dimitris Parsanoglou** (PhD, Ecole des Hautes Etudes en Sciences Sociales, Paris) is Associate Professor at the department of Sociology of the National and Kapodistrian University of Athens. He has taught at the department of Philosophy and Social Studies of the University of Crete, at the department of Social Policy of the Panteion University of Social and Political Sciences in Athens and at the department of Sociology of the University of the Aegean. Among others, he has coordinated, as Senior researcher of the Centre for Gender Studies of the Panteion University, the FP7 project 'MIG@NET: Transnational Digital Networks, Migration and Gender' (2010–2013). He was a Post-doctoral research fellow at the University of the Peloponnese, in the framework of the ARISTEIA project 'Migration Management and International Organisations: A history of the establishment of the International Organisation for Migration' (2012–2015). He has worked on the HORIZON 2020 project 'NEGOTIATE – Negotiating early job-insecurity and labour market exclusion in Europe' (2015–2018). He was Scientifc Coordinator of the project 'Beyond the "Refugee Crisis": Investigating Patterns of Integration of Refugees and Asylum Seekers in Greece – BRECht,' which was funded by the Hellenic Foundation for Research & Innovation (2019–2022). His main research interests and publications include history and sociology of immigration to Greece with a special emphasis on employment, urban space, gender and migration policies. He is co-author of *Mobile Commons, Migrant Digitalities and the Right to the City* (Palgrave, 2015).

**Open Access** This chapter is licensed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits use, sharing, adaptation, distribution and reproduction in any medium or format, as long as you give appropriate credit to the original author(s) and the source, provide a link to the Creative Commons license and indicate if changes were made.

The images or other third party material in this chapter are included in the chapter's Creative Commons license, unless indicated otherwise in a credit line to the material. If material is not included in the chapter's Creative Commons license and your intended use is not permitted by statutory regulation or exceeds the permitted use, you will need to obtain permission directly from the copyright holder.

## **Part V Perennial Integration Challenges During Consecutive Crises**

**Chapter 13 Pathways to Integration and Dis-integration: An Assessment of the Greek Immigration Policy for the Inclusion of Immigrants, Applicants and Benefciaries of International Protection**

**Angelo Tramountanis**

#### **13.1 Introduction**

Traditionally characterised as a country of emigration, Greece started receiving small-scale infows of immigrants in the early 1970s and 1980s. It was the collapse of the former Soviet Union in 1989/1990 though that triggered the mass entry of immigrants, initially from the Balkans (and particularly from Albania), Central and East Europe. In the 2000s, immigrants also originated from Asia and sub-saharan Africa, while during the 2015–2016 period approximately 1.2 million individuals transited through the country towards other European countries.

It took the Greek state more than a decade in order to commence drafting and implementing a coherent immigration policy, which remained short-sighted for a considerable amount of time. In addition, it regarded the phenomenon as rather unfortunate and unavoidable. As a consequence, the developed immigration policy treated immigration more through a bureaucratic lens, aiming to regulate it, than as an opportunity. The notion of immigrant integration made its appearance as a concept and a goal in the relevant legislation and proposed Action Plans in the early 2000s. However, this chapter argues that a coherent and proactive policy for immigrants' integration in the Greek society was almost never a Greek state's priority. Even though lip service was paid to the concept of immigrant integration, by drafting Action Plans and Strategies, or by inserting 'integration' in the title of immigrant related legislature, these were not followed through by concrete and suitable measures.

263

A. Tramountanis (\*)

National Centre for Social Research (ΕΚΚΕ, Ethniko Kentro Kinonikon Erevnon), Athens, Greece e-mail: atramou@ekke.gr

<sup>©</sup> The Author(s) 2022

M. Kousis et al. (eds.), *Challenging Mobilities in and to the EU during Times of Crises*, IMISCOE Research Series, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-11574-5\_13

This contribution therefore attempts to make a historical assessment of the past 30 years, by examining the legislative and policy framework of each period and evaluating the suggested and implemented measures. In order to do so, a timeline of the immigration policy for integration is proposed, where the key points that defned each policy are identifed and analysed. This timeline builds upon previous work in defning a chronology of Greek immigration policy (Triandafyllidou, 2010), but focuses more on the specifc aspect of integration.

As such, the decade 1991–2000 could be characterised as an 'early' phase for the development of the Greek immigration policy, during which strict control measures and a repressive approach towards the new phenomenon were adopted. During the following period (2001–2008) the frst comprehensive laws attempting to regulate immigration in the country were presented, hinting at the importance placed on the integration of this population, while a more positive attitude towards the phenomenon was also recorded. The period 2008–2015 was characterised by the economic crisis that severely affected the country. During this period immigration policy came of age, even though missed opportunities for the social and political integration of immigrants were recorded. More importantly, this period was defned by the *disintegration* of immigrants, as a direct consequence of the economic crisis. Finally, the present period which starts in mid-2016 is characterised by the primacy of the refugee issue. Even though during the 2015–2016 refugee crisis more than 1.2 million individuals transited through the country, the population that actually remained was considerably lower than that. Applicants for and benefciaries of international protection are estimated to be close to 120,000 (UNHCR, 2020), yet the issue remains highly politicised, as it disproportionally affects certain geographical areas (Bousiou, 2020). Therefore, moving again out of necessity, the Greek state is in the process of identifying ways by which to integrate this population as well into the Greek society.

#### **13.2 Immigration Policy for Integration of Third Country Nationals During the 1990s**

It is well documented that Greece was completely unprepared for the migration fows of the early 1990s (Cavounidis, 2002). The relevant legal framework in place at the time dated back to the 1930s1 and was primarily focused on issues of emigration; as such, it was inadequate to cope with the new developments. The frst law of

<sup>1</sup>Law 4310/1929 'On the settlement and movement of foreigners in Greece, police control, passports, expulsions and displaced persons,' as updated in 1948.

this period was presented in 19912 and fully adopted a repressive approach towards the new phenomenon. The (then) Ministry of Public Order was designated as the competent Ministry, while the law primarily focused on deterring new immigrants from entering, and facilitating the deportation of those who were already in the country. To this end, the very issue of entering the country without documents and residence permits was defned as a criminal act, a number of provisions and sanctions such as imprisonment or fnancial penalties were introduced, and special bodies to combat irregular immigration were created.

Since mid-1990s, another policy instrument used by the Greek government was that of massive deportations of immigrants (Triandafyllidou, 2009). By 2001, it is estimated that over two million immigrants (predominantly from Albania) were deported back to their country without any legal procedure (Baldwin-Edwards, 2004). Yet neither the provisions of the 1991 law, nor the en masse deportations brought the desired outcomes the Greek state had envisaged. On the contrary, what they achieved was to defne migration in Greece as an illegal phenomenon. As such, by 1997 the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD, 1999) estimated that close to 75,000 legal migrants lived and worked in the country, while irregular migrants were close to or more than 500,000.

In an attempt to manage the situation at hand, the Greek government followed the example of other Southern European countries (Levinson, 2005) and launched a series of regularisation programmes. Two Presidential Degrees that were signed in 19973 initiated a process of mass regularisation of irregular foreigners, yet a series of practical and bureaucratic diffculties hindered their proper implementation (Triandafyllidou, 2005). It is estimated that only 213,000 immigrants received a temporary residence permit, out of 370,000 who applied for one (Cavounidis, 2000).

While regularisation programmes are not integration policies as such, they should be understood as an indirect recognition by the Greek State that the adopted policies of 'arrest and deport' were not suffcient to manage the phenomenon, and therefore, new approaches and policies were needed. Nevertheless, during this frst decade there were no provisions in place regarding the integration of immigrants in Greece. On the contrary, the emphasis on preventing the entry of undocumented immigrants and facilitating the deportation of those already present in the country, defned immigration in terms of illegality. Therefore, laws and initiatives put in place after 2000 attempted to some extent to lessen the effects caused during this period.

<sup>2</sup>Law 1975/1991 'Entry, exit, stay, employment, expulsion of aliens, determination of refugee status and other provisions.'

<sup>3</sup>Presidential Degrees 358/1997 and 359/1997.

#### **13.3 Immigration Policy for Integration of Third Country Nationals During 2000–2008**

An attempt to address the issues and shortcoming raised by the 1991 Law was made almost after a decade, with Law 2910/2001.4 This new legislation had two main aims. It provided a policy framework to manage immigration, by establishing avenues of legal entry for employment or studies, and defning naturalisation conditions for immigrants already residing in the country. In addition, it attempted to implement a second regularisation programme, for new arrivals and those who did not beneft from the frst one. This programme also suffered from serious organisational issues that signifcantly reduced its overall effectiveness (Triandafyllidou, 2009).

During this period a frst Action Plan on the social integration of immigrants (2002–2005) was drafted, supported by the European Social Fund and the European Commission. Measures were foreseen for the integration of immigrants in the labour market, access to healthcare, and initiatives to combat racism and xenophobia in the Greek society, even though most of these actions were not implemented (Triandafyllidou, 2005). It can therefore be argued, that with this Action Plan a vicious cycle commenced, that of integration action plans, which were more or less ambitious, and that generally remained only on paper.

A next law that was presented in 2005 (Law 3386/2005)5 can be considered important in terms of semiotics, since for the very frst time 'integration' was explicitly mentioned in the title of a law that regulated the phenomenon. Interestingly though, issues that deal with integration were only covered in two articles (65 and 66). According to that law, integration aimed to:

grant rights to third country nationals that ensure their 'proportionally equal participation' in the economic, social and cultural life in the country, aspiring at the obligation to respect the fundamental rules and values of Greek society (…) while maintaining their own national identity (Law 3386/2005, article 65).

In accordance with article 66 of law 3386/2005, the Ministry of Interior presented in 2007 an Integrated Action Plan for the smooth adaptation and social integration of third country nationals legally residing in the Greek Territory –programme Emergency Support to Integration and Accommodation (ESTIA).6 ESTIA was structured into sub-programmes based on areas of integration, such as housing, employment, education, healthcare, and was designed to be implemented in the time period 2007–2012. Due to domestic fnancial constrains however, this

<sup>4</sup>Law 2910/2001 'Entry and Stay of Aliens in Greek Territory. Acquisition of Greek Citizenship by Naturalisation and Other Provisions.'

<sup>5</sup>Law 3386/2005 'Entry, Residence and Social Integration of Third Country Nationals on Greek Territory.'

<sup>6</sup>Common Ministerial Decision (*Kini Ypuryiki Apofasi,* KYA) 25,057/2008. Not to be confused with the ESTIA Programme put in place for the integration of benefciaries and applicants for international protection in 2016.

programme also remained largely on paper (Anagnostou & Kandyla, 2014). Complementary to ESTIA were actions implemented through the European Integration Fund (EIF), a multi-annual programme (2007–2013) aiming towards assisting the integration of this population. Highly ambitious in its scope, it aspired to actively engage local, regional and national authorities and streamline social integration goals into all relevant policy sectors. Even though its success was considered limited due to insuffcient funding (Anagnostou & Kandyla, 2014), a crucial design faw was the limited time frame to implement each action (usually only a number of months).

As a concluding note, it should be pointed out that even though Law 3386/2005 established the preconditions for facilitating the social integration of immigrants, it still overlooked reality. As noted, at that time almost 70% or irregular immigrants in the country lacked the opportunity to obtain a residence permit (Gropas & Triandafyllidou, 2005).

#### **13.4 Immigration Policy for Integration of Third Country Nationals During 2008–2015: Coming of Age, Missed Opportunities and 'Dis-integration' of Immigrants**

#### *13.4.1 Citizenship Acquisition, Granting of Voting Rights and Migrant Integration Councils*

With the completion of 20 years since the transformation of Greece into a de facto immigrant destination country, 2010 can be characterised as a year of 'missed opportunities,' regarding the prospects of immigrants' integration in the Greek society. That year an attempt was made to adopt two legislative interventions which could have fundamentally altered the issue of social and political integration of immigrants in Greek society, both of which though failed to bring the desired outcomes.

Law 3838/20107 attempted to renegotiate issues related to the granting of Greek citizenship and the rights to vote and be elected to the immigrant population. Up to that point, Greece had one of the most restrictive policies for granting citizenship in the EU through the right of blood (*jus sanguinis*), and extremely strict naturalisation preconditions (Howard, 2009). Under the new provisions, special procedures were established for the acquisition of citizenship for the children of immigrants, either by birth or by their participation in the educational system. More specifcally, the new law allowed for children born in Greece who had at least one non-Greek parent living in the country legally for at least 5 years to acquire citizenship at birth, or through a simple declaration of their parents, as long as they attended a Greek

<sup>7</sup>Law 3838/2010 'Current Provisions related to Greek Nationality and the Political Participation of Expatriates and Legally Residing Immigrants.'

school for at least 6 years. The second innovation of the law concerned the provision, for the frst time, to certain categories of legally residing third-country nationals of the right to vote and to be elected in local elections, thus initiating the political integration of immigrants (Boswell, 2003). This provision was implemented in the November 2010 Local Government elections.

However, both provisions proved to be short-lived, since the Council of State found them in 2013 to be unconstitutional (Christopoulos, 2017). According to its ruling, naturalisation as described in the law was only based on typical and legal requirements, such as length of stay, birth in the country, or participating in the Greek educational system for 6 years. What the process of naturalisation lacked was proof of a 'real bond' between a foreigner and Greek state, in terms of self-affliation and self-identifcation as constituents of Greek consciousness. In addition, voting rights were reserved to Greek citizens alone, and were not to be extended to non-Greeks without a prior Constitutional amendment. It is estimated that approximately 13,500 migrant children were naturalised within the time period of March 2010 and August 2012, when the relevant provisions of the law were in effect (Anagnostou & Gemi, 2015).

The second legislative intervention, which could have signifcantly enhanced the integration of immigrants in the local society, concerned the establishment in 2010 of Migrant Integration Councils8 (*Simvulia Entaxis Metanaston,* SEM). SEM were established in each municipality as advisory bodies, aiming to record and investigate problems faced by immigrants living permanently in the municipality. In addition, they were tasked with submitting proposals to the municipal council for local actions to promote immigrants' smooth social inclusion and to organise awareness events that would strengthen the social cohesion of the local population.

Success of the Councils was nevertheless limited, for two main reasons. First and foremost, there was a lack of political will for their implementation. As pointed out, while at a central government level there were extensive and well-coordinated efforts for the consolidation of the new institution, at a local level there was considerable variation regarding their proper implementation (Skamnakis & Polyzoidis, 2013). Secondly, the new institution was not properly supported by adequate human and fnancial resources. MICs were to be assisted by existing local authorities personnel, organisations who are usually signifcantly understaffed. At the same time, there were no provisions for fnancial resources, in order for MICs to achieve their stated goals. Hindered by these shortcomings, their participation in designing and implementing integration measures at a local level remained rather marginal (Skamnakis & Polyzoidis, 2013).

<sup>8</sup>Established with Law 3852/2010 'New Architecture of Local Government and Decentralised Administration-Kallikratis Programme.'

#### *13.4.2 The Immigration and Social Integration Code & the National Strategy for the Integration of Immigrants*

The next evolutionary step was the codifcation in 2014 of immigration legislation in the Immigration and Social Integration Code. This codifcation aimed to consolidate all immigration legislation provisions, harmonise with EU legislation, and rationalise the existing institutional framework. Even though social integration was again only analysed in two articles (128 & 129), its reference to the title showed the legislator's special interest in the subject (Anagnostou & Gemi, 2015).

According to the Code, integration policy aims on the one hand to assist third country nationals to adapt to the Greek society, and on the other hand for the Greek society to recognise the possibility of their equal participation in the economic, social and cultural life of the country. In addition, in an effort to regulate the status of the second generation of immigrants, which was left in limbo since 2010, the Code introduced a special favorable residence status and a broader spectrum of protection, aiming thus at enhancing their integration perspective.

Finally, an important element of the Code is the promotion of a long-term residence permit, as a 'migration policy in disguise' (Mavrommatis, 2017). As characteristically mentioned, this permit can essentially be seen as 'a kind of "reward" (…) for those immigrants who prove that they have developed strong ties with Greece, by residing and working in the country legally for a number of years' (Ypuryio Metanasteftikis Politikis [Ministry of Migration Policy], 2019). It should be noted though, that by April 2020, out of a total of 538,000 active residence permits, only 30,000 were long-term residence permits (Ministry of Migration & Asylum, 2020).

In parallel with the publication of the Immigration and Social Integration Code, and in response to a relevant EU request for the design of national integration strategies by all Member States (European Commission, 2010), the Ministry of Interior presented in 2013 the National Strategy for the Integration of Third Country Citizens (Ypuryio Esoterikon [Ministry of Interior], 2013). Aiming to include policies and integration measures in all relevant policy areas, government levels and public services, the Strategy presented an ambitious set of Actions and Measures to achieve this goal.

For the purposes of this article, however, it is worth emphasising the rejection of both 'multiculturalism' as an 'anachronistic and non-functional choice' and 'simple (*sic*) integration' as the preferred model for the integration of immigrants into Greek society. Instead, the Strategy opts for what it defnes as 'structural integration' which is 'characterised by the positive attitude of the immigrant towards the society of the host country, as evidenced by the active demonstration of his willingness to adapt to the dominant political and cultural context.' Structural integration is comprised of four components, political, economic, social and cultural integration. Cultural integration is also of interest, since:

It is identifed with the acceptance by immigrants of the dominant cultural context, as has been shaped after a prolonged period of time by the majority of the native population. Cultural integration presupposes acceptance of the dominant national ideology of the host country (…).

As has been rightly noted, neither the Strategy nor the Code, which entered into force in March 2014, refer to the right of immigrants to maintain their distinct national, cultural and religious identity (Anagnostou & Kandyla, 2014). In addition, it should be pointed out that in essence, under the name 'structural integration,' what is proposed through the Strategy is a process of assimilation of immigrants in Greek society, who should ensure the 'acceptance of all principles of the political and cultural reference of the host country,' by abolishing their previous characteristics.

#### *13.4.3 Economic Crisis and the Disintegration of Immigrants*

Along with the institutional developments of this period, the factor that may have had the greatest impact on the issue of immigrant integration during the 2009–2015 period was the economic crisis and its effects, on the one hand on the society and economy of the country, and on the other hand on the migrant population. During what the Economist described as 'the deepest depression suffered by any rich country since the second world war' (Economist, 2018), Greece's per capita Gross Domestic Product (GDP) fell by 25%, while Household Disposable Income (HDI) fell by 30% (Hellenic Statistical Authority, 2020).

Economic crises tend to affect the most vulnerable economic and social strata in a country, with immigrants usually being among the groups mostly affected. Until the onset of the economic crisis, the unemployment rate of foreigners was consistently lower than that of Greeks, a situation reversed from 2009 onwards. Therefore, while in 2008 the Greeks' unemployment rate was 7.9% and foreigners' unemployment rate residing in the country was 6.8%, the corresponding percentages during the peak of crisis in 2013 were 26.5% and 38.2% (Eurostat, 2020a). Although this difference has been decreasing since 2013, the unemployment of foreigners is still consistently higher than that of Greeks and this fgure has stabilised between six to ten percentage points.

In order for the migrant population to respond to the new conditions arising from the economic crisis, the present chapter argues that it adopted the following three main strategies.

The frst strategy was for immigrants returning to their countries of origin. The Hellenic Statistical Authority estimates that more than 250,000 immigrants left the country during the 2010–2015 period (Hellenic Statistical Authority, 2019). This move concerns mainly immigrants from neighboring countries and predominantly from Albania. Although relevant anecdotal reports exist in the press (for example: Economist, 2012), there is not enough documented research to accurately depict this trend. An exception is a survey by the Albanian Statistical Offce and the International Organisation for Migration which estimated that during 2009–2013

133,000 people voluntarily repatriated to Albania, 71% of whom originated from Greece (about 95,000 people) (INSTAT & IOM, 2014).

The second strategy was for immigrants to change from a regular to an irregular status. As previously mentioned, since the early 1990s a large proportion of immigrants has been employed in the country's shadow economy. According to the relevant estimates, the number of illegal immigrants at the end of the 2000s was close to 300,000–400,000 (Maroukis, 2010), while the legal and illegal immigrants were estimated close to 1.2 million in total (Triandafyllidou 2010).

As any estimate of the irregular labour market involves the inherent uncertainty of that sector, estimates of the shift from the legal to the irregular labour market can only be made indirectly. In Greece, legal residence status is associated with the completion of a prerequisite number of social security stamps resulting from employment. Based on the relevant data, a signifcant part of immigrants who had legal documents before 2009 could not complete the required number of stamps during the crisis period, and as a consequence lost their legal status. More specifcally, residence permits were reduced from 610,800 in 2009 to 440,100 just 3 years later. Therefore, it is estimated that more than 150,000 citizens of non-EU countries were unable to renew their permits during this period, as they could not fnd employment (OECD, 2013). In the following years this number increased and stabilised at around 550,000 (538,000 in April 2020) (Ministry of Migration & Asylum, 2020).

According to the frst strategy developed above, a percentage of those who did not renew their residence permit left the country. However, by extending the relevant reasoning, it could be argued that a signifcant number of immigrants chose to remain in the country, even without documentation, anticipating an improvement of the economic situation and the subsequent recovery of their legal status.

Finally, a third strategy was moving from one sector of economic activity to another. Since 2009, a sharp decline was noted in all economic indicators, and especially in construction, where the majority of immigrants found employment. Consequently, a change in the distribution of migrants between the primary, secondary and tertiary sectors of economic activity was recorded, with immigrants moving from the secondary sector to the primary and tertiary. Therefore, while in 2008 about half of the migrants (49.6%) were employed in the secondary sector, this percentage dropped to 29.1% in 2013. Respectively, the percentage of migrants employed in the primary sector more than doubled between 2008 and 2013, from 5.4% to 13.5%, while an increase in the employment rate was also observed in the tertiary sector, from 45% in 2008 to 57.3% in 2013 (Zografakis & Kasimis, 2014).

In summary, it is estimated that during the economic crisis, a part of the migrant population of Greece returned to their countries of origin, especially Albania. For the purposes of this article, this is particularly important as it may concern a population that has already been successfully integrated into the country. In addition, this is particularly important for second-generation immigrants, many of whom were born and / or raised in Greece, were adequately integrated, and who had no particular ties to their parents' country of origin. Finally, it is estimated that a signifcant

portion of the immigrant population during this period fell out of legitimacy, i.e. lost their legal status, a fact which clearly hindered their integration prospects and possibilities. In conclusion, based on the above, the 2009–2015 period could be characterised as a period of *dis-integration* of immigrants.

#### **13.5 Immigration Policy for Integration of Third Country Nationals 2016 – Today: The Primacy of the Refugee Issue**

#### *13.5.1 Establishment, Abolition and Re-establishment of the Ministry of Migration and Asylum*

As a result of the signifcant infux of mixed migration fows in the 2015–2016 period, and the increasing complexity of managing the phenomenon, an autonomous Ministry of Migration Policy was established in November 2016.9 Although its establishment was rather hasty, the concentration under one institution of services and responsibilities concerning all stages of the immigration process, as well as issues concerning applicants and benefciaries of international protection was a clearly positive development.

While all relevant Secretariats, Authorities and Services were transferred to the new Ministry, the Citizenship Directorate remained at the Ministry of Interior. In a relevant interview, the then Minister of Immigration Policy stated that:

(…) there are two opinions internationally. One, that citizenship is the deep core of the state and must remain in the Ministry of Interior. The other is that citizenship is the culmination of the integration of immigrants and must go to the Ministry of Migration (Aggelidis, 2016).

As the Citizenship Directorate eventually remained in the Ministry of Interior it could be argued that the then SYRIZA (*Sinaspismos Rizospastikis Aristeras* [Coalition of the Radical Left])-ANEL (*Anexartiti Elines* [Independent Greeks]) government adopted the frst interpretation.

With the election of a new government with different political orientation, it was decided in July 2019 to merge the Ministry of Migration Policy with the Ministry of Citizen Protection.10 During the handover ceremony, the competent Deputy Minister of Protection clarifed the rationale behind this merge by arguing that when managing the refugee-immigration issue, one needs to take under consideration on the one hand the respect of people, human life and human rights, and on the other hand the country's security. Therefore, management of the issue should not, in any case, create a feeling of insecurity among the citizens of the country (Ministry of Citizen Protection, 2019).

<sup>9</sup>Presidential Decree 123/2016.

<sup>10</sup>Presidential Decree 81/2019.

It is noteworthy though that only 6 months since its abolition, it was decided to re-autonomy the Ministry, and rename it 'Ministry of Migration and Asylum.'11 In the relevant announcement of (re)establishing the Ministry, the Government Spokesman referred to the governments' comprehensive action plan which was based on four pillars: border controls, acceleration of asylum procedures, increased returns and closed pre-departure centres (Petsas, 2020). Interestingly, while migration was explicitly mentioned in the title of the Ministry, those four pillars ignored its dimension and focused almost exclusively on issues of containment and deterrence.

#### *13.5.2 National Strategy for Integration 2019: Reception and Integration*

One of the main outputs of the Ministry of Migration Policy before its abolition was a new 'National Strategy for Integration' which was presented in January 2019. The new strategy was the result of both new needs arising from international and domestic developments, and the different approach of the SYRIZA-ANEL government on the issue of immigration. Consequently, this document proposes a 'fundamental revision of the (previous) National Strategy for Integration' (Ypuryio Metanasteftikis Politikis [Ministry of Migration Policy], 2019).

Within this context, a signifcantly different approach and scope is adopted regarding the integration of the immigrant and henceforth refugee population in the country. While the 2013 Integration Strategy favoured in essence the assimilation of immigrants into the Greek society, the 2019 Strategy proposes a new model of integration, which among others 'aims to create and sustain an open society that respects diversity' and has as its ultimate goal the 'conquest' of interculturalism (Ypuryio Metanasteftikis Politikis [Ministry of Migration Policy], 2019). The 2019 Strategy identifes three target groups: applicants for international protection, benefciaries of international protection and migrants already residing in the country. In addition, it approaches integration policy as a multidimensional process, formed at two main levels.

The frst level, called 'reception' is aimed at applicants for international protection and can be understood as a form of early integration. Therefore, immediately after recording them at their entry point, the State is called upon to provide this group with protection and basic material reception conditions (such as housing, fnancial assistance and access to health), thus setting the foundations for their subsequent successful integration into the host society (Mantanika & Arapoglou Chap. 10 in this volume).

The second level is called 'integration,' and is addressed to both benefciaries of international protection and immigrants already residing in the country. The actions

<sup>11</sup>Presidential Decree 4/2020.

and measures are specialised according to the needs of each group. Thus, for benefciaries of international protection, the goal is a smooth transition from the protection status of the asylum seeker to insertion into the host society. To this end, the State is expected to provide temporary housing, fnancial aids, Greek language courses, actions to enter the labour market, etc. With regard to the immigrant population, the aim is, among others, to return to the status of legality (for those who have lost their legal status), to obtain permits faster and more effciently, to have non-discriminatory access to state benefts, and to ensure their public participation.

As with previous Strategies, further actions and policy measures are proposed, elaborating on issues such as labour market, education and xenophobia. The Strategy reserves a signifcant role for the Local Government, which is called to become the main executive mechanism of the integration initiatives. To this end, other institutional initiatives were also put in place in the same period, such as the Immigrant Integration Centres (*Kentra Entaxis Metanaston,* KEM) and the Migrant and Refugee Integration Councils (*Simvulia Entaxis Metanaston ke Prosfgon,* SEMP), in order to facilitate and enhance the integration process.

KEM aim to act as a local reference point for the provision of specialised services to third-country nationals in order to improve their living standards and their social inclusion, and are to be developed within each Municipality. SEMP are the evolution of the SEM presented earlier. Yet, apart from the inclusion of the word 'Refugee' in their title, there is no signifcant difference with SEM and are therefore estimated to suffer from the same weaknesses as the institution they are replacing.

#### *13.5.3 Integration of Benefciaries and Applicants for International Protection: The Disparity Between Theory and Practice*

While the issue of immigrants' integration in Greece has preoccupied, to a greater or lesser extent, the Greek state for the past 20 years, integration of benefciaries and applicants for international protection has been raised as a major issue of concern only since mid-2016 (Afouxenidis et al., 2017). When Greece gradually transformed from a transit country to a country of refugee protection in the 2000s, the state was mainly concerned with the criticism it was receiving on prolonged detentions of asylum seekers at the borders, inhuman conditions in reception centres, the backlog of asylum applications, or the proper transposition and implementation of EU Directives on temporary protection, reception of asylum seekers, minimum standards and the identifcation procedures (Karamanidou & Schuster, 2012; Sitaropoulos, 2000).

The focus point changed with the mix migration fows of 2015–2016, and more importantly with the EU-Turkey Statement and the closing of the Balkan route, which resulted in a signifcant number of individuals remaining stranded within the country. As a consequence, asylum applications rose sharply since March 2016, due to individuals aiming to secure their legal stay. While asylum applications before 2015 were close to 10,000 annually, they shot up to 51,110 in 2016 and continued rising each year, reaching 77,275 applications in 2019 (Eurostat, 2020b). In total, 17,355 people were granted international protection in 2019, up from 15,192 in 2018 and 10,351 in 2017 (Ministry of Migration and Asylum, 2018). These developments placed signifcant pressure on the state, since it needed to provide for integration measures for this population.

The main state vehicle for the integration of benefciaries of international protection in the Greek society is through the HELIOS Programme (Hellenic Integration Support for Benefciaries of International Protection), implemented by the International Organisation for Migration (IOM) since July 2019 and supported by the European Commission. The project offers services promoting independent living, including rental subsidies, integration courses, employability support and integration monitoring. Up to November 2020, close to 22,000 benefciaries have enrolled to the programme (IOM, 2020).

Yet, when discussing the integration of this population to the host society, a main feature that needs to be highlighted is the signifcant disparity between the possibilities and provisions provided by the respective legal framework and the reality as refected on the feld (Dimitriadi Chap 11 in this volume). For the scope of this contribution, analysis will focus on four areas of integration: labour market, health, social welfare and education.

Regarding access to the labour market, Law 4636/201912 provides that 'benefciaries of international protection are allowed to engage in employment or independent professional activity' with the same conditions as the nationals, with only the prerequisite of having the relevant residence permits. The situation differs with regard to applicants for international protection, since they have the right to employment or independent professional activity only once 6 months have elapsed from the submission of the application, while this right is revoked in case the application is rejected.

Reality though appears to be harsher. A series of bureaucratic obstacles and diffculties, such as the granting of Social Security Numbers (AMKA, *Arithmos Mitrόu Kinonikis Asfalisis*) (up to July 2019) and Value Added Tax (VAT) Registration Numbers, or the diffculty in opening bank accounts in order for salaries to be deposited in, create barriers to access to employment (Joint Agency Briefng Paper 2017; Solidarity Now et al., 2017). In addition, given the economic crisis and high unemployment rates, foreigners who fnd employment are often employed in the irregular economy, which makes them more vulnerable, increases the risk of exploitation and clearly reduces their integration prospects (ActionAid et al., 2016).

Regarding access to health services, according to Law 4636/2019 benefciaries of international protection have access to medical care on the same conditions that apply to Greek citizens. The main issue though appears to be accessibility, since some services are not always provided free of charge (such as medicines and

<sup>12</sup>Law 4636/2019 'On International Protection and other provisions.'

medical examinations), the health system itself is overloaded (even before the Covid-19 pandemic), and there is often a lack of interpreters, intercultural mediators or the ability to be examined by female doctors (ActionAid et al., 2016; Skleparis, 2018).

A major issue arose in July 2019 when AMKA were stopped been issued to applicants for international protection and were replaced with Provisional Insurance and Health Care Numbers (*Prosorino Arithmo Asfalisis ke Yyionomikis Perithalpsis Alodapu,* PAAYPA). Because the transition period lasted signifcantly more than originally planned, applicants lost access to the public health system for close to a year. This situation had also considerable side effects, by impeding access to employment, insurance or education (for example, the inability to vaccinate children living in refugee camps, which is a prerequisite for their access to education) (Greek Ombudsman, 2019).

The same situation is also observed in issues related to social welfare. Applicants and benefciaries of international protection have the right to access services provided by the Manpower Employment Organisation (*Organismos Apascholisis Ergatiku Dinamiku*, OAED), such as unemployment benefts, subsidised vocational training programmes and advisory services for access to the labour market, on the same terms as Greek citizens. In practice, however, the number of applicants and benefciaries of international protection who receive any type of such assistance is signifcantly low, as access to these services requires proof of employment for at least one year (Solidarity Now et al., 2017).

As far as education is concerned, Law 4415/201613 provided for the establishment of Reception Facilities for Refugee Education (*Domes Ypodochis ke Ekpedefsis Prosfgon,* DYEP), a programme of afternoon preparatory classes for all schoolaged children aged 4 to 15, implemented in public schools, neighbouring camps or places of residence. In the frst year (2016–2017) 2643 school-age students attended DYEP (Ministry of Education Research and Religious Affairs, 2017), a number which almost doubled to 4577 in 2018–2019. In total, 12,867 refugee children were enrolled in formal education during the school year 2018–2019 (Ypuryio Pedias & Thriskevmaton [Ministry of Education and Religious Affairs], 2019).

However, obstacles remain, making it diffcult for refugee children to access the Greek education system, since only one out of three refugee children of school age were enrolled in formal education during the 2018–2019 school year (12,900 out of an estimated total of 37,000) (UNICEF, 2019). That is especially the case for the 4656 school-age refugee children residing in the Greek islands' reception centres, where three out of four do not attend school (UNHCR, 2019). In addition, issues have been recorded on the student enrolment process, students' varied language backgrounds, constant changes and inexperience of teachers, school dropout, as well as the reactions from both refugees and the native population (Action Aid et al., 2017; Ministry of Education, Research and Religious Affairs, 2017).

<sup>13</sup>Law 4415/2016 'On Regulations for Greek language education, intercultural education and other provisions.'

Summarising, while in theory the conditions are in place for a smooth integration of benefciaries and applicants of international protection in the Greek society, in practice there are signifcant administrative and bureaucratic barriers that hinder their access to these resources. Moreover, since March 2020 there exists a crucial integration and protection gap, once a person in granted international protection status. According to an amendment to the asylum legislation:

after the issuance of the decision granting the status of international protection, material reception conditions in form of cash or in kind are interrupted. Said benefciaries residing in accommodation facilities, including hotels and apartments have the obligation to leave them, in a 30-days period since the communication of the decision granting international protection.14

As stated by the competent Minister, the rationale behind this amendment was that 'benefts and hospitality act as a pull factors (for them) to come to our country and take advantage of these benefts' (Proto Thema, 2020). The above decision rendered thousands of benefciaries of international protection homeless and extremely vulnerable, since they ended up been recognised but unprotected (Refugee Support Aegean, 2020).

#### **13.6 Conclusion**

Since the late 1990s, Greece was registered as a 'new host country for immigrants' and was identifed as part of the Southern European model of immigration (King, 2000). However, given that Greece has been an immigrant host country for more than 30 years, the continuous use of 'new host country' as a justifcation for masking structural and other weaknesses in managing the phenomenon is debatable.

Based on the previous analysis, the issue of immigrants' integration in the Greek society has never been a Greek state priority. On the contrary, the country's immigration policy over the last 30 years has been exhausted in the effort to manage and curb fows, enhance border controls, conduct police checks inside the country for irregular immigrants, implementing legalisation programmes (until 2007) and a perpetual effort to streamline the process of issuing residence and work permits.

Only the legislative initiative of Law 3838/2010, which discussed in a new light the granting of citizenship to the second generation of immigrants and that of voting rights to immigrants (even at the local level) can be perceived as an active initiative of the state towards this direction. Both interventions, however, were deemed unconstitutional, and therefore did not bring the desired results.

On the contrary, a series of Strategies, Actions, Plans, etc., which were in their design more or less grandiose, remained only on paper, without bearing any signifcant outcomes. The main reasons for these actions' ineffectiveness should be attributed to insuffcient connection to fnancial resources, design shortcomings, lack of

<sup>14</sup>Law. 4636/2019, Article 114, as amended by L. 4674/2020, Article 111.

political will for their implementation and changes of political correlation. In the context of this recurring pattern, the same fate is expected to befall the National Strategy of 2019. The recent change of government and its focus on other aspects of immigration governance, are clear indications that this Strategy will also remain irrelevant. Therefore, it would not be an exaggeration to conclude that historically, the integration of migrant populations in the country ended up being based on their own agency, initiatives and actions, rather than on state policies.

A rather recent development is the integration of applicants and benefciaries of international protection, a topic raised in the political agenda since mid-2016. The state sponsored HELIOS programme is a positive and welcome initiative; yet, its signifcance is counterbalanced or even outweighed by other state measures that clearly hinder the integration prospects of this population.

Summarising, the Greek state's unfading signifcance attributed to the protection of its external borders from new immigrant fows is more than evident. Particularly when these fows transit through a neighbouring country that demonstrates an interest in instrumentalising the phenomenon as a pressure mechanism for both Greece and the European Union, aiming at its own beneft. However, a coherent immigration policy cannot be solely based on certain aspects of the phenomenon while ignoring others. Just as it cannot focus only on the integration aspect, by ignoring the importance of external borders, so it cannot solely rely on containment and deterrence, disregarding the importance of safeguarding and strengthening social cohesion. Therefore, in place of a short-sighted and day to day management of the situation in hand, it is high time to prioritise the drafting of an encompassing longterm evidence-based policy.

#### **References**


**Angelo Tramountanis** is Researcher at the National Centre for Social Research (EKKE) in Athens, Greece, and a Research Fellow at the Institute for the Study of Migration and Diaspora (EMMEDIA). His feld of expertise is on the applied analysis of immigration policy. He is a PhD Candidate at the University of Piraeus, on a topic related to the securitisation of migration in Greece. Furthermore, he holds an MA in Migration Studies from Sussex University and a BA in Political Science from the University of Athens. His main academic interests are on immigration and refugee policy, the social integration of immigrants and refugees, and the politicisation and securitisation of migration. He has published articles in peer-reviewed collective volumes, journals and conference proceedings.

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## **Chapter 14 A 'Wicked Problem' for the Municipality of Athens. The 'Refugee Crisis' from an Insider's Perspective**

**Maria Stratigaki**

#### **14.1 Introduction**

In January 2015, the radical left-wing party SYRIZA (*Sinaspismos Rizospastikis Aristeras* [Coalition of the Radical Left]) came to power in collaboration with the small far-right nationalist party ANEL (*Anexartiti Elines* [Independent Greeks]). The new government's policy approach to the large number of refugees and migrants arriving on the Greek Aegean islands (and later on the mainland) since the fall of 2014 was open and welcoming. This was partly for ideological reasons (they wanted to express their solidarity with refugees and migrants) and partly because the newly formed government did not yet have public administration experience in dealing with emerging crises of large scale. In 2015, the situation of Greek border controls and regulations could best be described as ambiguous. According to Rozakou (2017), the failure to apprehend migrants and the irregular bureaucratic processes were the result of conficting practices among state offcials, Non-governmental Organisations (NGOs) and the government. This situation allowed for informal reception practices that encouraged the entry of refugees from Syria, Afghanistan and Iraq, as well as economic migrants from Africa and other regions.

In 2015, 856,723 refugees crossed the sea borders with Turkey and settled in Lesvos, Samos, Chios and other Aegean islands (Papataxarchis, 2016). From 2014 till July 2020 a total number of 1,254,000 refugees and migrants entered Greece by both sea and land (UNHCR, 2020a). Their plan was to cross the country as soon as possible for the Northern Europe. In-country mobility and participation in relocation schemes were differentiated according to nationality (see Dimitriadi Chap. 11 in Dimitriadi, this volume). Large scale camps were set-up in the islands and the whole range of humanitarian aid was provided by grassroots solidarity groups, as

https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-11574-5\_14

M. Stratigaki (\*)

Panteion University, Athens, Greece e-mail: mstrati@panteion.gr

<sup>©</sup> The Author(s) 2022

M. Kousis et al. (eds.), *Challenging Mobilities in and to the EU during Times of Crises*, IMISCOE Research Series,

well as by philanthropic organisations: open soup kitchens, shelters, health centres and social services (Cabot, 2018; Kanellopoulos et al., 2020; Oikonomakis, 2018; Parsanoglou, 2020).

This massive arrival of refugees occurred in the midst of the Greek economic crisis, which had begun in 2010 and offcially lasted until August 2018, when the third economic adjustment programme ended. The impact of the economic crisis on the Greek economy and society was enormous. Overall, a quarter of the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) was lost. The rate of those at risk of poverty or social exclusion increased to 36% in 2014 (Ziomas et al., 2019) and the unemployment rate reached 28.7% in 2013 (Hellenic Statistical Authority, 2021, November). This situation has created a 'wicked social problem' in Greece, as public responses were partial and provisional, and ideological political solutions were unstable. The refugee problem had all the main characteristics of a 'wicked social problem,' namely complexity, uncertainty and divergence of stakeholders, as defned in the pivotal work of Rittel and Webber (1973) and recapitulated by Head (2019)1 : Complexity was based on the large number of refugees and the urgent basic needs that had to be met, as well as the cumbersome and lengthy administrative procedures for refugees coming from third countries with different political backgrounds. The uncertainty is related to the unknown number of new arrivals, their willingness to leave Greece and the ambiguity of the political stance of the European Union (EU) destination countries. The divergence of stakeholders lies in the large number of levels of governance (United Nations, European Union, national, local) and the mobilisation of a wide range of non-governmental organisations (foundations, humanitarian aid corps, charities, voluntary associations, etc.).

Public policy responses to 'wicked problems' cannot be readily analysed using the grand 'rational' theories of public policy making that explore and postulate different and distinct stages of policy making, e.g. policy agenda, formulation, adoption, implementation, evaluation (Anderson, 2014), or agenda setting, programming, implementation, and policy impact (Knoepfel et al., 2011), or structuring problems, predicting outcomes, prescribing action, monitoring outcomes, and evaluating performance (Dunn, 2015). On the contrary: addressing wicked problems calls for public offcials to forge new ways in thinking, leading, managing and organizing that recognise the complexity of the issues and process, and that make new demands not only on their own organisations but also on other relevant actors (Head & Alford, 2015, p. 722).

This chapter analyses the main aspects of the policies adopted by the city government of Athens in 2015–2019 to respond to the 'wicked problem' created by the urgent and unprecedented situation of hosting thousands of refugees who had come from the islands with the hope of reaching Greece's northern borders but ended up stuck in the city without clear prospects. The analysis refects the author's experience in the offce of Vice Mayor for Social Solidarity, Welfare and Equality of

<sup>1</sup> 'Wicked social problems' cannot be solved by rationalist design because subjectivities are involved in problem identifcation and political context is crucial (Crowley & Head, 2017).

the Municipality of Athens from 2014 to 2019. The sections that follow present the economic and political context at the time of the refugees' arrival (Sect. 14.2), summarise the urgent policy responses in a xenophobic environment (Sect. 14.3) and analyse aspects of the organisational and fnancial innovation (Sect. 14.4). The last section (Sect. 14.5) presents new forms of collaboration at the level of governance and stakeholder participation.

#### **14.2 The Construction of a 'Wicked Problem'**

With the major reform of local government in 2010 (Kallikratis reform), a large part of social competences was shifted from prefectures to municipalities. The new responsibilities of the municipalities included social benefts and social inclusion policies for the poor, the migrants and the uninsured. However, the shift of social policy to the local administrative level was not backed by the appropriate human and fnancial resources.2 This coincided with the onset of the economic crisis, which severely affected social cohesion as the country faced austerity measures and the impoverishment of large segments of the population. In addition to direct cuts to state budgets, the austerity measures for the public sector included a complete hiring freeze, as one of the main goals of the budget consolidation plan was to reduce the number of state employees. Municipalities had to provide more social services with fewer staff and less funding, while the need for social solidarity increased dramatically.

The emergence of a large solidarity movement for disadvantaged, poor and vulnerable populations was an immediate response to the economic crisis and an important aid to local authorities in their efforts to meet the immediate basic needs of their residents. However, the solidarity actions for the disadvantaged served as an opportunity for the neo-Nazi Golden Dawn party to promote xenophobic attitudes towards migrants who had been living in the country since the 1990s.3 The party's high share in the Greek parliament (7% in the 2012 and 2015 elections) was closely related to the increasing racist reaction of locals against migrants who had 'taken jobs away from Greeks.'

Ιn 2011, after 23 years of conservative governments, the city of Athens elected a centre-left government led by George Kaminis.4 One of his frst public actions was

<sup>2</sup>Public spending at the local level in Greece is only 7.1% compared to the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) countries' average of 40.4% (OECD, 2018). Local authorities constantly demand that a signifcant portion of the state budget be managed at the local level.

<sup>3</sup>The city population was 664,046 people in 2011, including 23% with foreign nationality (Hellenic Statistical Authority, 2011). In 2016, there were 77,806 migrants (mainly Albanians) with a residence permit.

<sup>4</sup>George Kaminis was an academic at the Law Faculty of the University of Athens and served until his election as Greek Ombudsman.

to ban a public soup event organised by Golden Dawn in Athens' most central square. The event was aimed exclusively at Greeks and all 'foreigners' were banned from entering the public soup kitchen. The mayor's reaction had a high symbolic value. He called it a 'soup kitchen of hate,' marking the strong political stance of the new authorities of Athens to protect free spaces and ensure free provision of goods and services to all residents.

Mayor Kaminis was re-elected in May 2014 for a second fve-year term (until August 2019). In the frst months of his second term, the frst massive arrivals of refugees reached the City. With them came smugglers and all kinds of 'intermediaries' offering transport services to the country's northern borders. The city of Athens was faced with situations like the following: In the most central square, *Sintagma*, hundreds of Syrians went on hunger strike, demanding 'papers' that would allow them to leave the country. In the largest city park, *Pedion tu Areos*, thousands of refugees camped out for weeks in 2015. In the large *Victoria* Square, tents with refugees could be seen until early 2016. In March 2016, the EU-Turkey Statement forced the formal closure of the Balkan route and thousands of refugees and migrants were stranded in Greece.

The 'wicked problem' for the city government was the temporary housing of thousands of refugees under the relocation scheme and later the social integration of asylum status holders. Social integration in a country that one would prefer to leave as soon as possible was a diffcult task to begin with. Finding a job in a labour market where unemployment was 51% (Attica region)5 and the income gap between the native and immigrant population reached 69%, the second highest in all OECD regions in 2017, was even more diffcult, with over 18,000 refugees living in the city of Athens that year (OECD, 2018).

In the absence of a coherent national strategy for the management and/or integration of continuously arriving refugees (as documented by Tramountanis Chap. 13 in Tramountanis, this volume), the government of Athens had to improvise by designing and providing immediate social solidarity services, combating politically xenophobic reactions, overcoming obstacles to its operational capacity and expanding networks of collaboration with civil society.

#### **14.3 Urgent Policy Responses in a Hostile Environment**

The emergency nature of the problem facing the city of Athens pushed the authorities to make a quick and clear political decision: to provide basic goods and survival services to the newcomers (housing, food, schools, protection from violence,

<sup>5</sup> In the Attica region, Athens is the largest of 54 municipalities.

language learning), regardless of scarce human and fnancial resources or xenophobic reactions.6

#### *14.3.1 Surviving in Athens*

In the summer of 2015, the frst camp on the mainland was established in the area of *Eleonas*, part of the city of Athens. Initially, it housed 700 migrants and refugees. After its expansion to 37,000 square metres, it housed 2500 people, including a large number of children. Staff was provided by the Municipality of Athens and there were other arrangements for referrals to municipal services (schools, health centres, etc.). In addition, about 2000 refugees participating in the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) relocation scheme (Emergency Support to Integration and Accommodation [ESTIA] programme) were temporarily housed by renting 320 apartments for two families each.

The Municipality provided all refugees with food and housing, medical care, both physical and mental and recreational facilities. In particular, refugees had access to the municipal health centres and the municipal shelter for battered women, as well as to free cultural events organised by OPANDA (*Organismos Politismu Athlitismu ke Neoleas Dimu Athineon*, [Organisation for Culture, Sports and Youth of the Municipality of Athens]). Additional social workers and psychologists were hired to provide counselling and support to the guests.7 The municipality ensured free access to elementary schools for refugee children and resisted negative reactions from local residents. In addition, the municipal social services organised Greek and English courses, as well as training in Information and Communication Technologies (ICT) for adults. In 2017, a Blue Dot Child and Family Support Centre was established in a municipal building in the city centre, with a playground for children and an open space for meetings of migrant communities. The European project 'Curing the Limbo' developed and implemented a dynamic and innovative model aimed at bringing together locals and refugees in Athens neighbourhoods.

<sup>6</sup>For a full assessment of policies in this area, see the Report on the Implementation of the Programme for Social Policy (2014–2019), approved by the Municipal Council Approval on 14.2.2019 (City of Athens, 2019, pp. 41–48). See also Sismanidou (2017, pp. 51–65) and *Drasis tu Dimu Athineon yia ti diachirisi tu prosfyiku* [The actions of the Athens' Municipality for the management of the refugee issue] (2019).

<sup>7</sup>A major obstacle in the provision of social services was the lack of interpreters for Arabic, Farsi and Urdu. The basic information brochure of the Municipality of Athens was printed in fve foreign languages (English, French, Arabic, Farsi, Urdu) to compensate for this shortage.

#### *14.3.2 Xenophobic Environment*

Xenophobic reactions were noted in surveys such as the one conducted by Dianeosis (Georgakopoulos, 2017), which found that 88.3% of respondents believed that the number of migrants in the country was excessive; 64.4% believed that the presence of migrants in the country increased crime, while 58% believed that the presence of migrants increased unemployment. In this context, exacerbated by the insecurity and unemployment resulting from the economic crisis, the city government faced reactions from some residents to most of the decisions regarding the survival and integration of refugees. Spontaneous reactions and complaints from several citizens who visited the social services of the Municipality of Athens expressed their discomfort with the headscarves worn by Syrian women. There was also discontent about the fact that refugees had a right to temporary housing, while locals at risk of homelessness did not. In addition, there were complaints that people with refugee status had access to social benefts on the same basis as Greek citizens.8 In practice, we experienced xenophobic reactions from locals on several occasions, such as the following:


<sup>8</sup>This xenophobic environment led to a rise in power of the far-right parties, which in turn triggered further reactions. Dinas et al. (2019) showed that Greek society's confrontation with the refugee crisis alone was enough to increase support for far-right parties. See also Triandafyllidou and Kouki (2014).

Despite the hostile environment in which the authorities of Athens had to operate, the formulation of the 'problem' and the communication of the 'solutions' were based on the frm political decision that refugees must be supported and integrated into the city, regardless of the political costs. Non-discrimination rules for all residents (permanent or temporary) were applied to all public activities and services provided by the Municipality of Athens. This political will was strongly expressed on all occasions and gradually helped to mitigate xenophobic reactions before they became strong. The decision to apply the principle of 'mixed' benefciaries in the provision of services facilitated the building of relationships between locals, refugees and migrants and led to mutual acceptance.

#### **14.4 'Forced' Innovations in Organisational and Financial Capacities**

#### *14.4.1 Organisational Reforms*

Even in 'non-wicked' situations, the motto, 'it cannot be done because...' was the frst reaction of most municipal administrative staff to any new policy measure proposed by the city political leaders. Partly because of the real obstacles imposed by formal regulations and partly because of the legacy of a slow and non-proactive public sector, most offcials would rather fnd a problem with any solution than a solution to any problem!

Three major organisational changes were introduced by the authorities to adapt the administration to the emerging arrival of refugees and related policy decisions:


Since 2010, due to the restrictions imposed by the austerity measures, it has been almost impossible to hire staff, regardless of their specialisation or qualifcations. This situation condemned the Municipality of Athens to a permanent shortage of staff. This has been particularly critical in the units, which have a high demand for specialised and trained front desk offcials, such as those of the new Unit.

#### *14.4.2 Overcoming Financial Barriers*

Greek Municipalities depend on government funding, which was drastically cut during the economic crisis. Local authorities are subject to preventive control of all their expenditures by the Court of Auditors. In 2011, the negative effects of the austerity measures (more and more rigid restrictions) began to manifest themselves on the fnancial situation of the City.9 In 2015, urgent social expenditures for refugees became necessary at a time when the Municipality not only had no funds of its own, but could no longer even accept fnancial donations in cash from foundations, companies or individual donors. Once donations entered the municipal accounting system, the money had to be spent according to the same strict and often irrational fnancial rules as the transfer of funds from the central government. Government funds to cover the additional cost to municipalities of housing refugees were not provided. On the contrary, the Ministry of Migration Policy failed to organise the necessary administrative procedures for the allocation of the important funds from the European Asylum, Μigration and Integration Fund (AMIF). The call for proposals was never published.

In this context, the government of Athens had to 'invent' innovative concepts to attract funds and then spend them on the basic needs of refugees. The city government had to 'work around' formalities and restrictions in order to implement urgent policies and meet ever-increasing social demands. One way to do this was to directly engage with donors and international institutions that were willing to contribute to addressing the so called refugee crisis in Greece. This was the case with the *Stavros Niarchos* Foundation, which transferred funds to the Athens Partnership, a private non-proft association (*Somatio*), for projects designed by the City. The Athens Partnership carried out specifc projects and then donated the result of the project to the municipality in kind. This was the case with the establishment of the ACCMR (see Sect. 14.5), funding staff costs and activities as well as the renovation of the municipal *Mezonos* building that houses the Centre. Other donors also funded projects (e.g. ICT courses for adult refugees, etc.) through the same intermediary agency.

The funding scheme 'invented' for the City's large-scale housing project for refugees was somewhat different. In this case, it was the Athens Development and Destination Management Agency (ADDMA) (mainly dedicated to tourism), operating on a private law basis, which received a fve million euro grant from UNHCR for this purpose. It turned out that this was the only way for the Municipality of Athens to proceed with the rental of private apartments. According to the national fnancial regulations, public institutions were not allowed to rent apartments for purposes other than their premises. ADDMA had also 'mediated' the implementation of other projects, such as the fve-million-euro pilot project 'Curing the Limbo,' funded under the EU's Urban Initiative Actions (UIA) programme.

<sup>9</sup>For a more comprehensive account of the Municipality of Athens' fnance, loans and revenues, see Nasaina and Hlepas (2018).

#### **14.5 Innovative Collaborative Schemes for Policy Implementation**

Greek Municipalities are situated at the lowest level of the hierarchy of the public administration, below the European (EU), national (Greek government), and regional (Attica regional government). Traditionally, the dependence of cities on national and regional governments was infuenced by party political affliations, 'favouring' those municipalities governed by parties belonging to the same political family. This was not the case for the City of Athens from 2015 to 2019, which exacerbated the City's institutional and fnancial dependence. Indicative of the Municipality of Athens' complete dependence on state funding was the fact that it had never applied for a competitive EU programme. Nor had it ever applied for funding in national European Social Fund tenders.10 Drawing on external funding to address the refugee crisis appeared to be an 'impossible mission' because administrative staff lacked the appropriate skills to design and implement projects under open and competitive programmes.

Expanding collaboration with other public sector institutions and private nongovernmental organisations was a 'mandatory' way to mobilise synergies and attract external support to address the key challenges of the refugee crisis. In the refugee crisis, there was another level of government (the international level) to engage with, as well as a wider range of private non-proft organisations (international foundations such as the International Rescue Committee, Catholic Relief Services, etc.).

With the aim of mapping and coordinating all these actors working in the feld of refugee survival and integration, the government of Athens established the ACCMR, supported by a three-member team. The Centre created a network of 92 public and NGO organisations, all working in the feld of refugees (non-profts, foundations, volunteer networks, etc.). Two hundred representatives of these organisations participated in the Centre's thematic working groups and other activities. The Centre was an innovative policy tool by Greek standards. It collected and disseminated information on residence status, social rights, language and computer courses, and personal counselling and referral services. In addition, the Centre operated an observatory for arriving refugees that regularly conducted opinion polls on the refugee issue.11

To facilitate cooperation and exchange of experiences among municipalities throughout the country and to distribute the number of new arrivals more evenly between large and smaller cities, the authorities of Athens also established a network of 12 Greek municipalities hosting refugees. The authorities had also initiated

<sup>10</sup>The only social project was that a shelter for abused women designed entirely by the General Secretariat for Gender Equality and then transferred to the Municipality for implementation in 2011.

<sup>11</sup>For a full report on the Athens Coordination Centre for Migrants and Refugees activities, see ACCMR (n.d.).

the creation of the EUROCITIES 'Solidarity Cities Initiative'12 to connect and collaborate with other European cities that have taken in large numbers of refugees.13

This large network of international foundations and private organisations opened new opportunities to attract human and fnancial resources to implement the City's policies. In addition to the City's social policies funded by the *Stavros Niarchos* Foundation (see Sect. 14.4), a wide range of services were revised by other actors such as the International Rescue Committee, which provided Arabic, Farsi, and Urdu interpretation services. International humanitarian organisations such as *Médecins du Monde*, *Médecins sans Frontiéres*, Action Aid, etc. offered medical care and social services. The Greek grassroots solidarity movement (which had already emerged during the economic crisis) now focused its priorities on refugees and migrants.

The following fgure shows the linkages, fows and connections between policy actors, administrative levels, funding sources and connections between intermunicipal Units and the City's agencies (Fig. 14.1).

**Fig. 14.1** Institutional mapping of Athens. (OECD, 2018, p. 37)

<sup>12</sup>EUROCITIES is a network of 190 European Cities. It launched the Solidarity Cities Initiative in 2016. See Solidarity Cities (2020).

<sup>13</sup>One example of this collaboration is the EU-funded project GROW, in which the Municipality of Athens and the Municipality of Munich have worked together to develop patterns for integrating migrants into the labour market.

#### **14.6 Concluding Remarks**

#### *14.6.1 Untapping Policy Capacities*

In 2016, the Mayor of Athens George Kaminis, was awarded the '2016 World Mayor Commendation for services to refugees' (City Mayors, n.d.). The Municipality of Athens performance in the refugee issue prompted the OECD to select Athens as the best place to conduct a case study as part of its project 'Territorial Approach to Migrant Integration: The Role of Local Authorities.' The study analyses the policies of the Municipality of Athens in detail and discusses the multilevel governance environment and the specifc measures taken to integrate refugees and migrants (OECD, 2018).

From an insider's perspective, I argue that policy solutions to the 'wicked problem' of the massive arrivals of refugees between 2015 and 2018 were possible because the government of Athens managed to overcome important constraints and political obstacles that are deeply rooted in the Greek public sector. It is evident that the urgency of the refugee problem enabled breakthroughs and innovations14 that would be impossible if there were 'tame' policy problems to solve and if rational policy making phases and rules were followed.

The urgency of the problem, the complicated structure of governance and the divergence of policymakers and stakeholders required innovative skills and innovative management patterns from the politicians in charge. Struggling between political and administrative priorities, between conficting responsibilities at all levels of policymaking (from the supranational level to grassroots citizen solidarity groups), we had to become 'jugglers' of procedures, resources and political management. Overcoming local reactions, inventing fexible administrative procedures, and embedding multi-governance patterns were part of our daily work during our fouryear term of offce. Inventing non-traditional methods to overcome various barriers and obstacles in policy design and implementation was the only way to achieve our political goals. Transforming the administration's work organisation to maximise the impact of collaboration with non-governmental organisations, solidarity groups, volunteers, and international humanitarian organisations became a major challenge and experiment in innovation.

#### *14.6.2 Sustainability in Question*

However, the sustainability of innovative changes in policy capacity and policy implementation, such as those analysed in this chapter, can be challenged by counterproductive administrative and institutional inertia that tend to constantly create new 'wicked problems'.

<sup>14</sup> In the same way the Covid-19 pandemic facilitated major shifts in social policy.

Due to the lack of fnancial and institutional autonomy of Greek local authorities, long-term reforms and sustainable policies need a more secure framework from the higher authority, the national government. For example, effective social integration of refugees requires a coherent and realistic national integration strategy with common guidelines for municipalities.15 This should include the mandatory allocation of a certain number of refugees to each Greek municipality, proportional to its size and fnancial capacity, as is the case in Germany (Katz et al., 2016).16 Such a centralised crucial decision, revolutionary by Greek standards, would require strong political determination from the national government which would necessarily disregard the political cost of various local reactions. At present, it seems unlikely that a Greek government, regardless of political trend would make the decision to distribute the task of integrating the 121,100 refugees living in the country (UNHCR, 2020b) equally among Greek municipalities. Therefore, large Greek municipalities such as the Municipality of Athens will have to continue to improvise policy solutions to 'wicked problems' by bending the multiple constraints and obstacles to refugee integration.

#### *14.6.3 Informing Public Policy Analysis*

The case of the authorities of Athens' policy responses to the unexpected massive arrivals of refugees in 2015 has highlighted the long-standing dysfunctionality of both national and local Greek governments and policy makers and their lack of capacity to think strategically and respond to emergency situations. The anecdotal incidents and experiences described here suggest that rational policy choices do not prevail. In other words, the government of Athens' immediate policy responses to the arrival of refugees could not meet the standards of a (normal) policy cycle as described in the main theoretical works in the framework of Public Policy Studies. Emergencies, unclearly defned responsibilities and a rigid institutional framework limited the smooth implementation of successive phases of policy making. The situation might be better viewed and analysed through the lens of theories of 'wicked problems.'

Nonetheless, the experience of the Municipality of Athens in dealing with the refugee problem can be useful in highlighting the 'black box' of the political 'system' and how the power of different groups can infuence agenda setting, policy design and policy tools, as Birkland (2019) points out. The lack of national strategies for social integration of refugees opened up policy opportunities for many actors, including local authorities. It fostered collaborative innovation in the public sector (Torfng, 2016) and strengthened political leadership and policy innovation

<sup>15</sup>The Ministry of Migration Policy published a National Strategy for Integration shortly before the July 2019 elections in which the SYRIZA government lost power (Ministry of Migration Policy, 2019).

<sup>16</sup>See also European Union (n.d.).

through collaborative governance (Ansell & Torfng, 2017). It also tested the effectiveness of the strategic triangular framework (public sector, private sector, civil society) (Bryson et al., 2017). Last but not least, it has highlighted the benefts of networking in innovative public policy design (Hale, 2011).

#### **References**


**Maria Stratigaki** is Associate Professor at the Department of Social Policy of Panteion University in Athens. Her research interests are gender equality policies, gender-based violence and gender in migration. She was appointed Deputy Mayor for Social Solidarity, Welfare and Equality in the City of Athens (2014–2019) after she was elected City Councillor. She served as General Secretary for Gender Equality (2009–2012) and worked at the European Commission (1991–1999). She was scientifc coordinator of EU funded FP7 research projects (a) GeMIC (Gender, Migration and Intercultural Interaction in the South-East Europe) (2008–2011) and (b) MIG@NET (Migration, Gender and Digital Networks) (2009–2013). She has published in *Social Politics*, the *European Journal of Women's Studies* and *Femina Politica*. She is the author of the books: *The Gender of Social Policy* (2007) and *Gender Equality Policies: UN, EU, Greece* (2021). She is a founding member of the frst *European Feminist Think Tank Gender 5+.*

**Open Access** This chapter is licensed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits use, sharing, adaptation, distribution and reproduction in any medium or format, as long as you give appropriate credit to the original author(s) and the source, provide a link to the Creative Commons license and indicate if changes were made.

The images or other third party material in this chapter are included in the chapter's Creative Commons license, unless indicated otherwise in a credit line to the material. If material is not included in the chapter's Creative Commons license and your intended use is not permitted by statutory regulation or exceeds the permitted use, you will need to obtain permission directly from the copyright holder.

## **Chapter 15 The COVID-19 Pandemic and Refugees in Greece: A New Challenge for Healthcare Service Provision, Public Health Programmes and Policymaking**

#### **Elena Petelos, Dimitra Lingri, Dimitris Patestos, and Christos Lionis**

#### **15.1 Introduction**

Over the past few years, a global change has been witnessed, with forced displacement becoming vastly more widespread, and also a protracted and sustained phenomenon. Refugees and forcibly displaced people have become a key topic in the global agenda for sustainable development. Starting with the New York Declaration for Refugees and Migrants in 2016 (UNHCR, 2016), in which all 193 member states of the United Nations (UN) agreed that the protection of refugees should be a shared responsibility. In the Global Compact on Refugees (United Nations, 2018), agreed by 181 governments in 2018, the values of inclusion and solidarity have been recognised as being of key importance. These values also represent a signifcant aspect of the European Union's (EU) policy. An important challenge was how to protect these people, including in terms of safeguarding their health and wellbeing. The Sustainable Development Goals (SDG) clearly capture the need to consider

E. Petelos (\*)

University of Crete, Rethymno, Greece

Maastricht University, Maastricht, The Netherlands e-mail: elena.petelos@med.uoc.gr

D. Lingri Aristotle University of Thessaloniki, Thessaloniki, Greece

D. Patestos National Kapodistrian University of Athens, Athens, Greece

C. Lionis University of Crete, Rethymno, Greece

Department of Health, Medicine and Caring Sciences, Faculty of Medicine, University of Linköping, Linköping, Sweden e-mail: lionis@uoc.gr

© The Author(s) 2022 M. Kousis et al. (eds.), *Challenging Mobilities in and to the EU during Times of Crises*, IMISCOE Research Series, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-11574-5\_15

299

them in the context of reaching SDG3, i.e. 'To ensure healthy lives and promote well-being for all at all ages' and specifcally sub-goal 3.8, Universal Health Coverage for all with the key message to 'leave no one behind' not only as a key ethical consideration or moral obligation, but as the path to sustainable development for all people across the world (Ghebreyesus, 2017; The Lancet, 2019). Politicians, jurists, health care providers and humanitarian workers, amidst others, have intensely debated which measures are appropriate both in terms of border control and in terms of disease control. The pandemic of the coronavirus SARS-nCoV-2 resulting in millions of cases of COVID-19 across the world intensifed debates and uncertainty on the relevance, effectiveness and on the outcomes of the implemented measures.

Greece is a country with critical relevance in terms of examining Europe's response to COVID-19, but also because it has many commonalities in the challenges many other Balkan and Southern European countries, or countries at the borders of the EU have to tackle. It has experienced a very high volume of refugees and migrants over the previous years and continues to battle key security considerations given its relations to neighbouring Turkey, to which health security issues came to be added over the past year. Greece was successful in implementing key measures in the frst months of the pandemic. Nevertheless, search and rescue operations in Mediterranean were suspended early in the pandemic due to logistical diffculties caused by COVID-19 (Kluge et al., 2020). Prior to the COVID-19 related nationwide lockdowns, there were few such operations, with immediate quarantine of new arrivals. It should be noted that at the time the measures were implemented by the government during the frst pandemic wave there were no confrmed cases of COVID-19 in Africa. Furthermore, many people coming from countries which did not yet appear to be affected by COVID-19 were entering countries where the number of COVID-19 cases was clearly on the rise.

Additionally, Greece lags behind in terms of the integration of public health and primary care, with well documented disconnectedness between key public health actors as well as central and local authorities (Lionis et al., 2019; Tsiachristas et al., 2015). The high level of uncertainty regarding disease transmission and overall severe disease implications was combined with pre-existing conditions in the settlements for refugees (Subbaraman, 2020). These resulted in a very precarious condition n terms of clear guidelines and referral protocols, sound risk communication and mechanisms for tackling misinformation. The situation led to fear and apprehension amongst people across the world, while for refugees or displaced persons the existing disparities became even more exacerbated, on multiple levels. For all of the abovementioned issues, this chapter aims to elucidate key aspects of the care of refugees and forcibly displaced people from the beginning of the pandemic in February 2020 with the main focus in the period until September 2020 without excluding key developments of 2021, examining the state of affairs in relation to the living conditions and the healthcare provision to these populations, as well as briefy assessing its impact in terms of the ethical and legal implications. It addresses these issues by combining rich knowledge and insights on challenging issues based on the expertise of its interdisciplinary team of authors, through the perspectives of health and legal sciences.

Overall, the chapter aims to inform scholars studying migration issues be they health and social care practitioners, researchers working at the intersection of health, migration and human rights, or social science and humanities migration researchers, about the existing framework of the European legislation. Furthermore, with a broad focus on solidarity and human rights, vital issues are identifed in the context of implementation research and capacity-building efforts in the primary health care and community services. These are contextualised within the broader legislative and institutional framework, selectively presented and critically discussed.

#### **15.2 A Focus on European Legislation, Regulations and Solidarity**

EU legislation stipulates how asylum applications are to be handled. With the exception of unaccompanied minors, the frst port of entry, usually Greece or Italy, becomes the member state that is responsible to process the asylum application. Given the limitation on resettlement at the EU level, most asylum seekers arrive to the EU as irregular migrants. This means that Greece is inordinately burdened in comparison to the other member states. Currently, there are no comprehensive, well-developed people-sharing measures, and except for reuniting families or providing for a limited number of minors, once a person is designated as a refugee, it is up to the Member State to provide for this person, whereas this person does not enjoy the right of free movement to other member states. EU funding has allowed for the implementation of programmes to provide urban accommodation and cash assistance to asylum seekers in Greece. Nevertheless, reception conditions and processing defciencies persist across the country.

Up to now, the living conditions and the care provision of refugees and migrants did not markedly improve, despite the rhetoric on imminent implementation of fragmented measures to improve their living conditions and the overall handling of migratory populations. At the same time, xenophobia and racism were exacerbated, primarily because of the populist narratives utilised by politicians, taking advantage of other fears and utilising such topics to justify political stagnation and inability to combat the protracted effects of the crisis across Europe. Based on data of an EU funded national survey1 conducted in 2016, Kalogeraki (2015; Chap. 5 in Kalogeraki, this volume) documents strong and moderate opposition (xenophobia) to Syrian refugees for the majority of the Greek population (seven out of ten responders). The socioeconomic conditions and the protracted fnancial crisis preceding the refugee crisis appear to have played a very important role; the macro-level conditions, namely the sizable refugee infux and the adverse economic conditions triggering

<sup>1</sup>The survey was conducted in eight countries, including Greece, in the context of the TransSOL European Commission Horizon 2020 project; https://transsol.eu/fles/2017/07/D3.1-integrated-WP3-report.pdf?fle=2017/07/D3.1-integrated-WP3-report.pdf

socioeconomic concerns, polarisation in political rhetoric and symbolic threats have also shaped these attitudes. Humanitarian values at the core of the European civilisation were replaced by xenophobic movement and the resurgence of extremist organisations because of the deep social crisis and for political parties to seek advantage by advancing skewed narratives. Thus, the inadequate management of the refugee and migrant crisis in Europe, resulted in indifference, profteering, debasing human life, and fanaticism across involved parties (Triandafyllidou, 2017). There has also been a diversity of patterns of mediatisation and politicisation of the refugee crisis, with stereotypical readings of the recent asylum-seeker and migrant phenomenon becoming the focus media and political agendas, and with strongly mediation-dependent politics generating a broad spectrum of, primarily negative interpretation of this phenomenon, utilised in populistic and opportunistic political campaigns (Krzyżanowski et al., 2018).

The Expert Panel on effective ways of investing in health, the foremost independent panel in all matters pertaining to health convened by the European Commission, has recently issued an opinion entitled *European Solidarity in Public Health Emergencies* (European Commission, 2021). This opinion examines solidarity, clearly identifed as a founding principle of the Treaty of the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), forming the constitutional basis of the Union. Close examination and framework development to operationalise this value, indicates that it contributes towards improved response and preparedness, to strengthen crossborder collaboration and to help absorb learning lessons from the COVID-19 pandemic, by identifying limitations to EU level actions and determining avenues to overcome them.

On a practical level, from the beginning of their operation, the Reception and Identifcation Centres (RICs2 ) were run beyond capacity, with crowding conditions in them and in the areas surrounding them given their limited capacity and the disproportionally increased migratory fows. The surge of a large number of people in the RICs, the delay in processing asylum applications, as well as the movement of these people inland, coupled with the procedure of returning them to Turkey and its own particular conditions, had a tremendously adverse impact in the hygiene and living conditions of those seeking asylum.

Since the summer of 2019, and with the decision of the new Greek government, the movement of those seeking asylum inland was forbidden. The aim of this decision was to create such conditions in the asylum procedures that would deter new arrivals. As a result of this, the overcrowding in the RICs reached extreme proportions, with people living in abysmal hygiene and living conditions. By November 2019, over 20,000 people were living within or around the *Lesvos* RIC, which roughly corresponds to seven times its capacity. In *Samos*, more than 8000 people were living under similar conditions, whereas the number was also disproportionate to capacity across the rest of the RICs. The services for health and psychosocial care in the RICs were based on the limited resources of the EODY (*Ethnikos Organismos* 

<sup>2</sup> In Greek *Kentra Ypodochis ke Taftopoiisis (KYT).*

*Dimosias Ygias* [National Public Health Organisation]) and various Nongovernmental Organisations (NGOs); it should be noted that some of these NGOs are illegally operating in Greece under the Greek legislation provisions. The services of the national healthcare system had repeatedly expressed the inability to serve these groups of people given their multi-vulnerability, coupled with a system of depleted resources given the protracted fnancial crisis. Although, training modules and materials have been developed quite early on the basis of European funding, the Primary Health Care (PHC) was not formally involved in the planning of care until the present time and its contribution remained limited. It is clear then that even during the period of the pandemic the immigration fow does not stop exacerbating the existing health and social problems that Greece encountered in the effort to care for the migrant groups. It is widely recognised that the COVID-19 pandemic has had an impact on human rights (Libal et al., 2021), in Greece, across Europe, and, indeed, across the world. In response, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR, 2020) issued a recommendation to the countries to raise awareness about the long-term damage to human rights and refugee rights from the coronavirus pandemic. Global health security and health threats are issues that have long been discussed in the realm of global public health. For almost two centuries, concerted efforts have been made to safeguard public health and tackle health security issues across Europe, with countries coming together to prevent the spread of diseases. The frst International Sanitary Conference in 1851 focused on harmonising quarantine procedures amongst European states. The fruit of such efforts materialised well after the 2nd World War, as a result of discussions in the UN and in the context of activities of the World Health Organisation (WHO). It took the form of the International Health Regulations (IHR) in 1969, currently in place of their 2005 version (WHO, 2005). The IHR are a set of rules establishing common ground for reporting outbreaks and exchanging information, for managing diseases within borders and aligning for cross-border movement, and for establishing a cooperative path to prevent the spread of the disease. These rules are binding, with all 194 WHO member states implementing them. It should be noted that along with the effort to 'prevent, protect against, control, and provide a public health response to the international spread of disease' (WHO, 2005, Article 2) whilst minimising interference with 'international traffc and trade,' (WHO, 2005, Article 17d) of the IHR it is also clearly stated that 'the dignity, human rights and fundamental freedoms,' should be safeguarded for all people (WHO, 2005, Article 32). It is on the basis of the IHR that WHO has been able to establish a global surveillance network to monitor for potential threats ensuring that these are caught at an early enough stage to prevent them from becoming international health emergencies. Of course, any such network is as good as its reporting from the WHO member states.

The IHR requires that all countries have the ability to: *detect* (assuring surveillance systems can detect acute public health events in timely manner; *assess and report* (using the decision instrument in Annex 2 of the IHR to assess public health event and report to WHO through their National IHR Focal Point those that may constitute a public health emergency of international concern); and *respond* to public health risks and emergencies. The goal of country implementation is to limit the

spread of health risks to neighbouring countries and to prevent unwarranted travel and trade restrictions (WHO, 2005).

Notably, disease does not differentiate between the citizens of a country, displaced persons fnding themselves in said country and/or migrants and refugees. As previously mentioned, according to the UN 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, the needs of these particularly vulnerable persons were recognised and highlighted in the Declaration for Refugees and Migrants adopted by the United Nations General Assembly in resolution 71/1 of 2016, setting out a process for the production of a global compact by 2018.

However, it is important to comprehend the wider institutional regulatory context in relation to legislative acts pertaining to COVID-19, including an examination of all dispositions that constitute emergency law, with due consideration to global health security aspects, as they determine various aspects of entitlements, service provision and access. They also impact upon codes of conduct for health and social care professionals and should provide a guiding framework to safeguard human rights and human dignity, including by addressing stigma and discrimination. The next section of the chapter examines said context.

#### **15.3 Institutional Framework, Rights and Limitations Regarding Refugee Access to Healthcare Provisions During the COVID-19 Pandemic**

In the case of Greece, the EU, and more specifcally the European Commission, has supported the Greek authorities in implementing an emergency response plan to deal with cases of COVID-19 in the camps. The priority was to ensure the immediate evacuation of vulnerable persons to designated places outside the camps, including to hotels on the islands or mainland, to apartments or to open reception facilities. Separate areas were created for new arrivals and containers, consumables, medical equipment and other necessary facilities were made available for quarantine and treatment purposes. To this end, the Commission and the Greek authorities work closely with UNHCR, as well as with NGOs.

The Commission also coordinates the relocation of unaccompanied minors and severely ill children with their families, from Greece. As of 7 July 2020, 11 member states and Norway are participating in this initiative and there are pledges for the relocation of around 2000 persons. This should provide further relief notably to the Greek islands. Moreover, under the Union Civil Protection Mechanism, Member and Participating States have offered over 90,000 items of in-kind assistance to Greece mainly in the areas of mobility, health, sanitation and shelter. Explicit provisions were made by the European Commission, the UNHCR and the International Organisation for Migration (IOM) working closely with the Greek Authorities, and supporting the work of NGOs, deemed essential to ensure adequate support for the care of the people in the camps.3

Furthermore, the EU's Global Health Strategy lacks a coherent frame beyond the IHR to align responsibility and accountability among WHO, the EU and member states. Efforts for an up-to-date strategy (Steurs et al., 2017) and urgent calls for a robust and cohesive strategy remained largely unaddressed (Speakman et al., 2017). The importance of such measures and a cohesive strategy is magnifed when it comes to countries with limited preparedness expertise, capacity and resourcing. This becomes even more critical when these countries are at the borders of Europe and have high geopolitical importance, with potentially conficting state, EU, and global priorities, and the strong emergence of strong biogeopolitical dynamics at the Southeastern EU borderland of Greece and Turkey (Jauhiainen, 2020). In Greece, measures were mainly introduced through legislative acts handled as emergency procedures. The Emergency Act is an instrument used in cases of threats to national sovereignty and security from external or internal enemies of the state. According to the Constitution of the Hellenic Republic emergency acts can be introduced as Act of Legislative Content (ALCs) (*Sintagma tis Eladas* (Constitution of Greece), 2008, Art. 44 par. 1, or by declaration of a state of siege (*Sintagma tis Eladas* (Constitution of Greece), 2008, Art. 48 par. 1 and 5). ALCs are issued in case of unpredictable need by the President of the Republic, upon proposal by the Cabinet, but without prior suspension of human rights, contrary to the acts issued following the declaration of a state of siege. Critically, ALCs are administrative acts issued only for a limited period of time, unless submitted to and ratifed by the Parliament within a specifc period of time. According to the jurisprudence of the Council of the State, the exceptional nature of the particular circumstances that led to the publication of an ALC is not subject to judicial review (*Simvulio tis Epikratias,* 1987, 1989, 2002, 2003, 2015b), contrary to its content, which is, theoretically, subject to judicial control (Gerapetritis, 2012); such was recently the case of the Austrian COVID-19 legislation, which was considered to be partially illegal according to the jurisprudence (Verfassungsgerichtshof, 2020). COVID-19 ALCs introduced structural dispositions, but also substantial human rights' limitations to safeguard public health, which is considered an element of public interest. According to the Hellenic Constitution but also to European Human Rights Convention, human rights' limitations should be prescribed by law, be of legitimate aim and proportionate, a necessary condition in a democratic society (Giannopoulou & Tsobanoglou, 2020; Renucci, 2005). Seven ALCs were introduced into national legal order, ratifed in due course by the Parliament, thus, acquiring timeless retrospective force. By acquiring a rather permanent character, the totality of the measures introduced through delegated acts (ministerial decisions) rendered them susceptible to judicial review.

<sup>3</sup>Answer given by Ms. Johansson on behalf of the European Commission to the question submitted in the European Parliament by Ska Keller (Greens, DE) in relation to the impact of COVID-19 for people in overcrowded refugee camps on the Greek islands. https://www.europarl.europa.eu/ doceo/document/E-9-2020-001906-ASW\_EN.pdf

On February 26, 2020, 2 weeks before the WHO declared the severe acute respiratory coronavirus-2 (SARS-CoV-2) pandemic, the Ministry of Health announced the frst confrmed case of COVID-19 in Greece. Within hours of the announcement, all leaves of absence were revoked for administrative personnel at the Ministry of Health and for medical and scientifc personnel across the country (*Ypuryio Yyias* [Ministry of Health], 2020). Less than a week later, asylum-seeking procedures were suspended with immediate effect (ACL published in offcial gazette Vol. A no. 45/2020 and later ratifed by the article 2 of the Law, published in the gazette Vol. A no 74/2020).

All new arrivals illegally entering the country were to be returned to the country they arrived, or originated, from, with any documentation whatsoever. The time limit for this provision was 1 month. The explicit legal basis of the ACL was the extremely urgent and unpredictable need to confront an asymmetric threat to the security of the country that prevails over international and EU law for the asylum procedure. It is worth noting that the very next day, intense debate erupted across Europe, including in the European Parliament, with key questions being submitted by Socialist & Democrats' members4 with a focus on whether the Greek government was acting lawfully:

In the light of the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees and EU law, does the Commission consider that the Greek Government has acted lawfully in suspending the receipt of all new asylum applications? Does the Commission consider that the provisional measures under Article 78(3) of the TFEU can be extended to the suspension of the internationally recognised right to seek asylum and the principle of non-refoulement enshrined in EU law?5

Ylva Johansson, the EU Commissioner for Home Affairs responded that 'individuals in the European Union have the right to apply for asylum. This is in the Treaty, this is in International Law; this we can't suspend'.6 During a meeting with Johansson, members of the European Parliament from the Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs expressed 'deep concern about the deteriorating humanitarian situation both at the border with Turkey and on the Greek islands, where thousands of asylum-seekers, many of them unaccompanied minors, are stranded.' In response, various governments across the EU responded with what they considered to be 'the appropriate share,' the focus being solely children and in total offering to assist 1000–1600 of them. This 'token' of support left Greece stranded, with the European Commission stepping in to launch a new scheme offering 2000 Euros per person as an incentive for people to return to their country of origin from the Greek islands, under the management of the IOM and the European Border and Coast Guard Agency Frontex. In parallel, the relations of Greece and Turkey continued to deteriorate, with Turkey not preventing people

<sup>4</sup> i.e. Domènec Ruiz Devesa, Javier Moreno Sánchez, Juan Fernando López Aguilar, Dietmar Köster and Isabel Santos.

<sup>5</sup>See https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/P-9-2020-001342\_EN.pdf <sup>6</sup> https://euobserver.com/tickers/147723

from leaving its territory and indirectly, if clearly, demanding support from the EU on the Syrian confict in the *Idlib* province.

Apart of the limitations regarding refugee access to healthcare services during the COVID-19 period, it is important to review what we have learned from implementation studies carried out in Greece and to transform them into health policy recommendations in a context-relevant manner. The next section of this chapter focuses on such studies and lessons learnt.

#### **15.4 Care Provision Model, Considerations for Greece and Implications for Access**

Care provision research contributes signifcantly towards system improvement. Taking this into account, we applied the Chronic Care Model (Wagner et al., 1996) to study what we have learned from the Greek healthcare system prior the pandemic period in relation to the migrants and refugees' health care and what changes were needed towards system improvement. This model identifes six fundamental areas that form a system to encourage a high-quality chronic disease management and particularly: Self-Management Support; Delivery System Design; Decision Support; Clinical Information Systems; Organisation of Health Care Community.

Addressing the above six areas of the Chronic Care Model we present below key summary fndings of a research implemented in Greece, as paradigms. An important task of the PHC services is to provide care according to people's needs and expectations. To respond to the migrants and refugees' health care needs, proper training and communication skills are needed. Lionis et al. (2018) focused their analysis on the methods used for enhancing PHC for refugees through rapid capacity-building actions in the context of an European project. The methods included the assessment of the health needs of all the people reaching Europe during the study period, and the identifcation, development, and testing of educational tools. The developed tools were evaluated following implementation in selected European primary care settings. The work was carried out under the auspices of the European Commission funded collaborative project EUR-HUMAN (3rd Health Programme by the Consumers, Health, Agriculture and Food Executive Agency designed and implemented in eight European countries, including Greece.

Key fndings based on the above project in the spring of 2016 are also offered, deriving from a qualitative comparative case study, in seven EU countries, in a centre of frst arrival, two transit centres, two intermediate-stay centres and two longerstay centres using a Participatory Learning and Action (PLA) research methodology was implemented (Van Loenen et al., 2018). The data reveal that *the main health problems of the participants related to war and to their harsh journey like common infections and psychological distress. They encountered important barriers in accessing healthcare: time pressure, linguistic and cultural differences and lack of continuity of care. They wish for compassionate, culturally sensitive healthcare* 

*workers and for more information on procedures and health promotion*. A total of 98 refugees and 25 healthcare workers participated in 43 sessions. Transcripts and sessions reports were coded and thematically analysed by local researchers using the same format at all sites; data were synthesised and further analysed by two other researchers independently.

In the context of this project, a two-day Expert European Consensus Meeting on key thematic areas including cultural issues in health care, continuity of care, information and health promotion, health assessment, mental health, mother and childcare, infectious diseases, and vaccination coverage and prepare a set of recommendation the primary health care practitioners (Mechili et al., 2018). The expert participants, invited to reach consensus on the above areas, stressed the need to address mental health problems. The needs reported by refugees and other migrants helped identify a serious gap in terms of compassionate attitudes exhibited by healthcare workers. One of the key messages of this meeting was that *linguistic and cultural barriers exacerbate the effect of the lack of compassion, especially where healthcare information and psychological support are urgently needed but an appropriate supportive framework is missing*.

A focus on re-training the Greek General Practitioners (GPs) and Primary Care Providers has received a strong attention in the literature for several reasons. Mental health problems are highly prevalent amongst undocumented migrants, and often part of their consultations with GPs. To get an insight in the barriers and levers in the provision of mental healthcare for undocumented migrants by GPs in Greece, a qualitative study was conducted using semi-structured interviews with 12 GPs in Crete, Greece (Teunissen et al., 2016). This study revealed that Greek GPs recognised many mental health problems in undocumented migrants and identifed the barriers that prevented them from discussing these problems and delivering appropriate care, i.e. growing societal resistance towards undocumented migrants, budget cuts in healthcare, administrative obstacles and lack of support from the healthcare system. Teunissen et al. (2016, p. 123) suggest that 'to overcome these barriers, Greek GPs provided undocumented migrants with free access to care and psychotropic drugs free of charge and referred to other primary care professionals rather than to mental healthcare institutions.'

In the framework of the EUR-HUMAN project, an online capacity building course of eight stand-alone modules were developed, piloted and evaluated. It contained information about acute health issues of refugees, legal issues, providerpatient communication and cultural aspects of health and illness, mental health, sexual and reproductive health, child health, chronic diseases, health promotion, and prevention (Jirovsky et al., 2018). One hundred and seventy fve (175) participants completed all modules of the online course in six countries, 47.7% being medical doctors. The mean time for completion was 10.77 h. In total, 123 participants completed the online evaluation survey; the modules on acute health needs, legal issues (both 44.1%), and provider-patient communication/cultural issues (52.9%) were found particularly important for the daily practice. A majority expressed the will to promote the online course among their peers (Jirovsky et al., 2018, p. 1).

The English course template was translated into seven languages and adapted to the local contexts of six countries. Pre- and post-completion knowledge tests were administered to effectively assess the progress and knowledge increase of participants so as to issue Continuing Medical Education certifcates. An online evaluation survey post completion was used to assess the acceptability and practicability of the course from the participant perspective. This training material was used after the end of this European project, and it served many implementations across Europe.

In 2013, a group of researchers and clinicians across Europe (O'Donnell et al., 2013) identifed two key issues in relation to healthcare access for migrants and the effect of austerity measures on health care. The RESTORE project started from the observation that an area particularly affected is the provision of interpretation services for patients who speak a foreign language. It explored the implementation of initiatives designed to support multicultural consultations in primary care, in six European countries (Austria, England, Greece, Ireland, Scotland, and the Netherlands). The vision of this project was to draw attention to the disproportionate effect that austerity measures are having on migrant health care, even in countries that seem less affected by the economic downturn. Migrants are included among the vulnerable groups at a high risk for severe COVID-19. A focus on the transformation of the PHC to turn the focus to vulnerable groups including migrants has been clearly highlighted as a key priority for the Greek healthcare system, and to allow transition towards an improved health and social care delivery system. This is relevant for public health programmes, such as vaccination programmes, determining the extent protection can be afforded to safeguard the interests of public health for each and every member of a community, indeed, of our society.

Engagement of community stakeholders in regards the healthcare provision for migrants and refugees has been considered as an essential part of an effective and equitable health care system. However, there is limited knowledge in regards the relevant methodology and the effectiveness of implementation interventions in Greece. As part of the RESTORE project and as a part of a comparative analysis of fve linked qualitative case studies, we used purposeful and snowball sampling to recruit migrants and other key stakeholders in primary care settings in Austria, England, Greece, Ireland and The Netherlands and a total of 78 stakeholders participated in the study (Austria 15, England 9, Greece 16, Ireland 11, The Netherlands 27), covering a range of groups (migrants, general practitioners, nurses, administrative staff, interpreters, health service planners). Normalisation Process Theory (NPT) and PLA research to conduct a series of PLA style focus groups has been used. Stakeholders' discussions were recorded on PLA commentary charts and their selection process was recorded through a PLA direct-ranking technique. Among the key results of this study was that 'the need for new ways of working was strongly endorsed by most stakeholders. Stakeholders considered that they were the right people to drive the work forward and were keen to enrol others to support the implementation work.'

In addition to the lessons learnt from implementation studies in regards refugees' health care, it is also important to report the existing organisational issues and barriers for an effective health and social care system for refugees and migrants. It is the issue of the next session.

#### **15.5 Health and Social Care Delivery and the Organisation Thereof**

Several organisational issues and barriers are described here given their impact on the delivery of effective, patient-centred, integrated and compassionate health and social care. Implemented measures exert intense psychological pressure to everyone, whereas, for people on the move, the level of psychological pressure and uncertainty further amplifes as information regarding these measures and their implementation is not communicated to them via appropriate channels, in a formal way, and in a context-sensitive manner, rather, they become aware of them via their implementation primarily by the civil protection and public order (e.g. police force) mechanisms. Misinformation continues to be the prevalent situation in the RICs, as well as in the hospitality centres. In the RICs, hygiene measures, which are imperative for the prevention of the SARS-Cov-2 infection, continue to be practically unenforceable.

The COVID-19 pandemic seems to aggravate pre-existing health conditions, in both adults and children, and to even highlight other forms of vulnerability, resulting in worsening outcomes. Such outcomes are more likely to be identifed in the context of mental health conditions where new psychological stressors have been added adversely impacting the life of all displaced people. The understanding of this situation led the UNHCR to raise awareness on mental health support activities for refugees, asylum seekers and migrants (UNHCR, 2020). Additionally, some of the measures formally or implemented from time to time, such as the postponement of scheduled surgeries and medical appointments in the hospital resulted in uncertainty giving way to intense insecurity, fear and psychological pressure with collateral damage effects identifed from the very frst few months of the COVID-19 pandemic.

Such measures also have a severe impact to the chronically ill, as well as to those newly diagnosed, something which is likely to result in increased hospitalisation, and potentially both morbidity and mortality in the future. In this special population, people's overall health condition, identifying and establishing vulnerability, is key to the asylum procedure and the continuation of their journey towards their destination. Moreover, there are immediate concerns regarding their health, as neglecting the care of the chronically ill and the timely identifcation and treatment for emerging issues may further increase vulnerability and worsen outcomes. It should be stressed here that for people on the move, there are health problems which need immediate diagnosis and treatment such as tuberculosis, HIV, Hepatitis C, and other communicable diseases, as well as psychological issues related to migration, and including post-traumatic stress disorder, abuse-related mental health issues, and others.

The role of the triaging at reception and ensuring the timely detection of early signs of physical and mental health issues should always be kept in mind, rather than be eliminated, during the pandemic, as the aforementioned issue will continue to exist, and indications point to them being on the rise. It is important if we consider that refugees often live in extremely close proximity to others, sharing sleeping and washing material with large number of people, thus facilitating the spread of virus inside in their community. Interviews for those seeking asylum are taking place via videoconferencing due to the social distancing precaution measures. Besides the fact that the PHC system should have had a central role in the management of these patients, it was not adequately prepared to provide this kind of service. As a result, PHC provision in RICs is random and unorganised, despite the good will of those involved, thus, compromising outcomes. A key element of PHC is prevention and health promotion. PHC has a central role to play in mass vaccination and other key public health programmes. Here the role of medical advice and the education programmes to facilitate risk communication and tackle the spread of misinformation is prevalent among the displaced people. Implementation has so far lagged behind given limited human resources, inadequate infrastructure, and other shortages. For these reasons the mass vaccination programme was assigned to secondary and tertiary care. These pause key concerns in terms of prioritising groups according to other vulnerability factors beyond age, lack of information in comprehensive Electronic Health Records, lack of communication with Health Care Professionals providing the regular care and, thus having an established trust relationship; it also compromises hospital capacity and overall disease control. The COVID-19 pandemic occurred at a time of diffcult conditions in the frst quarter of 2020. The protective measures and the guidance on triaging and managing suspected COVID-19 infections in settlements for refugees and migrants were determined by the instructions of the EODY, which were posted to its website on 29 February 2020. Detailed measures were also issued at the same time for the overall protection of the population along with specifc guidance for the medical personnel.

Examining the conditions at the RIC of *Lesvos* may clearly indicate the current challenges encountered and facilitate the understanding of the overall challenges for multiple reasons. It has been established for many years, serving as an EU 'hotspot,' and is enclosed with a chain-link fence. A former military camp, it has been described as the 'worst refugee camp on earth' by the Doctors Without Borders feld coordinator in 2018, and given political decisions of the 2018–2020 period, by the summer of 2020 the camp built to accommodate 3000 people accommodated 20,000 people, one third of whom where children and adolescents under the age of 18 (Jauhiainen & Vorobeva, 2020). The personal hygiene within and outside the RIC at the time was very poor given the horrible living conditions and the overcrowding. Additionally, although guidance was provided for hygiene measures, social distancing and mask use, those measures ware almost impossible to enforce. New arrivals have to wait at Foto before moved to a space belonging to the passenger terminal of the *Mytilene* port. This space is not organised in a manner which allowed them to be appropriately accommodated. According to the EODY's guidance, the EODY's feld coordinator had to assign a healthcare professional responsibility to manage the COVID-19 infection; s/he is to be notifed and to be present at the points of entry for newly arrived people to proceed with triaging people on the basis of the current defnition of 'case' (ECDC reference). This particular guidance had not been implemented until the end of June. The single exception to this was the presence of an EODY physician, who triaged people by taking their temperature, at the time of arrival of 34 persons to the port of *Mytilene.* The medical association of *Lesvos* called for such action, but this was the single arrival event were this happened.

The frst measure that the Ministry of Migration and Asylum7 took was to revoke the operation of the asylum services within the settlements, so as to limit the movement of civil servants to and from the settlements, in order to keep the coronavirus out of 'these closed, in a manner of speaking, communities,' as the Minister mentioned. Additionally, the measure of patrolling the perimeter of the settlement of *Lesvos* was initiated on 19 March 2020, to limit the movement of refugees and migrants towards the urban centres.

By continuing the problems that the current situation meets in the COVID-19 pandemic, the lack of personal protective equipment and of other equipment and resources to combat the coronavirus has been observed across the national healthcare system, the EKAV (*Ethniko Kentro Amesis Voithias* [National Centres for Emergency Care]), but also by NGOs. The living and hygiene conditions, in particular at the Lesvos' RIC, as well as the understaffng, with key medical personnel missing, created conditions that rendered the effective combat against a pandemic not simply improbable, but impossible. In this critical juncture, these conditions may adversely impact not only the national healthcare system and the people of these groups at risk, but the public health of the whole population, whilst seriously jeopardising the overall social cohesion.

The lack of personnel training to manage infectious disease in the state healthcare units, as well as in the NGOs and EKAV was another factor which adversely impacted the management of the current pandemic. The provision of medical and pharmaceutical care to the newly arrived displaced people is non-existent in the desired degree. Limiting them in this particular space designated for migrantsrefugees for this pandemic does not limit the number or the extent of contacts, given that this informal settlement is located very closely to the passenger disembarkation space, while various people move through this area, such as volunteers, employees of the port authority, police, and reporters. Issues of lacking security when refugees are referred to a hospital for chronic care need further analysis.

With all new arrivals moved to closed settlements inland, the manner of gathering these people and transporting them does not, under any circumstances, safeguard their health nor does it serve the interests of public health. Because of the intense criticism by international organisations and NGOs, the Ministry of Migration

<sup>7</sup> It is worth mentioning that the Ministry of Migration and Asylum was founded in January 2020. The Ministry for Migration Policy had been previously established in 2016 but was abolished in July 2019 following the election of the new government.

and Asylum, in collaboration with the Municipality of Western Lesvos created a space in the area of *Sikaminea*, to isolate new arrivals for 14 days. In this space, no medical examination was performed, other than a COVID-19 test upon arrival. The concept of separating people who arrived a few days later in a separate group was not considered at all. This resulted in all people fnding themselves in the same space and at high risk for a potential outbreak or getting infected on the last day of quarantine just before leaving this space, thus, carrying out the virus on the way to an inland settlement. In the municipality of *Mytilene* a quarantine space was created in the municipal settlement of *Kara Tepe*, with medical care being provided by NGOs. The continuous limitation of movement of refugees and migrants living in *Lesvos' Moria* camp8 or the poor living and hygiene conditions, coupled with misinformation, led to the disastrous fre in RIC on 19 September 2020. The population of the centre, including the COVID-19 cases, remained spread around the surrounding areas for many days, within and beyond the city limits. A new space to accommodate up to 10,000 people was created, which consists of tents, with conditions remaining similar to those in the pre-existing RIC.

#### **15.6 Conclusive Remarks and Key Considerations for Preparedness, Resilience, and Evidence-Informed Policymaking**

The theme of this chapter was approached in an interdisciplinary manner and with the prisms of public health, community care, law and human rights, and of clinical care, brought on board by the contributors. The chapter reveals the need for a more focused approach on addressing structural aspects, including in terms of those factors that worsen pre-existing health conditions. Poor hygiene and diffculties in maintaining hygienic conditions, include those due to crowding and settings where

<sup>8</sup>At the time of concluding the initial draft of this chapter, a fre largely destroyed *Moria*'s RIC. Although the fre was contained and no casualties were reported, 12,000 asylum seekers, including more than 4,000 children as well as other vulnerable groups, including 407 unaccompanied children, pregnant women and elderly people were directly affected. The UNHCR reported the escalating tensions between people in neighboring villages and asylum seekers who were trying to reach the town of *Mytilene*. The help and support of the Hellenic Army was required for the provision of food and water for asylum seekers, including in the new temporary site which was rapidly established. 'At the request of national authorities and with the support of the European Commission, UNHCR provided a one-off emergency top-up of cash assistance valued at 50 per cent of the regular monthly amount, to cover urgent needs of those affected. In cooperation with partners, UNHCR also distributed core relief items, including blankets, sleeping bags, mats, jerrycans, plastic sheet and hygiene items to cover the essential needs for up to 12,000 people. UNHCR teams and national humanitarian partners are also continuing efforts to identify and assist vulnerable asylum seekers including families with young children and single women, informing them that they can now seek shelter at the new temporary site.' https://www.unhcr.org/news/ briefng/2020/9/5f6073db4/unhcr-scales-immediate-shelter-support-moria-asylum-seekers-urgeslong.html

displaced people live in extreme proximity to others, the diffculty of communication, and the mass attendance in the clinics for various reasons. The lack of a cohesive approach on risk communication coupled with the unhygienic living conditions make the management of large numbers of people even more diffcult and necessitates some urgent interventions. The absence of an effective triage system in the immigrant camp, consistently applied between hospital and the camp, may lead to unnecessary deaths, increased distress for frontline physicians, and a lack of public confdence in the fairness of scarce resource allocation. Recently, several recommendations have been formulated to improve the current situation (You et al., 2020).

Based on the chapter's analysis and published evidence, the key aspects to incorporate across policies and actions pertain to the inclusion of migrants, refugees and all displaced people in preparedness response, and mitigation efforts for COVID-19 and, in general, in the national strategy to combat this pandemic. More specifcally, due emphasis ought to be given on the following aspects:


to improve communication and the quality-of-care services by using the available EU training materials by using available training material seems to be effective.

(g) Equitable access, incl. in terms of vaccination, as highlighted by the Council of Europe (2021), ensuring intersectionality issues are adequately addressed.

Additionally, to all the abovementioned key considerations, the current socioeconomic conditions and geopolitical parameters have to be taken into consideration for effcient and adequate policymaking, particularly amidst a pandemic.

The recent war emergency situation in Ukraine has created an additional migrant fow affecting multiple European countries. The escalation of the confict has pushed nearly four million people to forcibly move from the place of their permanent residence seeking security, protection, and support. The response from bordering countries, the European Commission, and the member states demonstrates solidarity. Nevertheless, the response plan should be focused on bringing together international organisations and national governments in a human-centred approach to ensure safe access to territory for refugees, but also potentially for third-country nationals feeing from Ukraine, according to international law. Furthermore, the situation creates additional challenges in countries like Greece that are the main gates of entrance of greater migrant fows. Institutions should rapidly and effectively be adapted for cross-border collaboration. 'We welcome with open arms those Ukrainians who have to fee from Putin's bombs and I am proud of the warm welcome that Europeans have given them' *[…]* stated the President of the European Commission, Dr. Ursula von der Leyen, setting the tone for the positive political will that should also be accompanied with concrete steps of action.9 The portal of the Ministry of Migration and Asylum in Greece was rapidly adapted to ensure direct access to information sources and resources for those displaced from Ukraine.10 It is also important to determine whether stereotyping, racial and ethnic background, refugee origin, i.e. from within the European Region versus Africa or Asia, religious background, etc. play a role in terms of how those arriving are perceived and the extent to which they are considered as population that can be well integrated in Europe and, indeed, Greece.

Equally, it is also important for the local population not to perceive the refugees as a burden, and that the protracted fnancial crisis, limited access to care resources and COVID-19 measures, to not further contribute towards the promotion of xenophobic and racist views, with asylum seekers being targeted or even scapegoated (Rizakos, 2020). Establishing supporting mechanisms and policies for the people living in areas where the infux of refugees limits other main source of economic activity is critically needed, and may well determine the behaviour, as well as future outcomes for the wellbeing of the local populations and of those arriving from foreign lands. Most importantly, the protection of refugees and of the wellbeing of all

<sup>9</sup> https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/statement\_22\_1441

<sup>10</sup> https://migration.gov.gr/en/ukraine/

people in Europe as well necessitates a sound and comprehensive Common European Asylum system, as well as a comprehensive Global Health Policy, encompassing global health security considerations and ensuring implementation of programmes remains both feasible and context relevant. Such mechanisms can only be effective if they are based on fair and effcient asylum procedures and comprehensive cross-border multi-stakeholder dialogue. The most critical element for the EU-wide cohesion and for effective policies is to ensure responsibility-sharing among EU member states. COVID-19 brought to the fore and further exacerbated existing inequalities, for vulnerable groups, including for refugees. It also highlighted the need for Europe to move forward with due consideration upon its founding principle of solidarity for the local populations and for refugees, if Europe is to remain a frm promoter and defender of human rights across the world, as well as within its own borders.

**Acknowledgments** We would like to thank all the members of the research and clinical team of the Clinic of Social and Family Medicine at the Faculty of Medicine of the University of Crete for their efforts to successfully implement all the European projects that this chapter mentioned. Many thanks also for the stakeholders in Crete and Lesvos for their strong support in implementing these projects.

#### **References**


professionals in the provision of high-quality care for refugees and migrants. *Global Health Action*. https://doi.org/10.1080/16549716.2018.1547080


**Elena Petelos** is a Senior Research Fellow for Public Health and Lecturer for Evidence-Based Medicine and Evidence-Informed Policy (Clinic of Social and Family Medicine, Faculty of Medicine, University of Crete, Greece), and a Research and Teaching Fellow (Health Services Research, CAPHRI Care and Public Health Research Institute, Faculty of Health, Medicine and Life Sciences, Maastricht University, the Netherlands). She is a Member of the Healthcare Professionals Working Party at the European Medicines Agency and also serves in multiple committees, the Core Committee of the Infectious Disease Control Section and the Vice President of the HTA Section of the European Public Health Association. She serves as a Member of the Steering Group of the European Health Information Initiative of the World Health Organisation (WHO) and as elected Chair of its EU-OECD-WHO Subgroup on Mapping Indicators, and Vice-Chair of its Sub-group on Evidence-Informed Policy. She is a member of the Dutch Association for Migration Research and has participated in multiple European Union (EU) projects focusing on refugees and migrants.

**Dimitra Lingri** is a lawyer, specialised in Public Law. She has been a practicing member of the Athens Bar Association since 2000. Currently, she is a senior legal expert for the Hellenic National Organisation of Healthcare Provision (EOPYY, Greece). Her main work and research interests are healthcare provision, equitable access and patient rights, e-health, and cross-border healthcare, with particular focus on regulatory frameworks for HTA, and coverage and reimbursement. She is a member of multiple European Union (EU) Committees focusing on timely and safe access. She also serves in multiple national collective bodies and international networks, both as a national representative on behalf of EOPYY, and in an individual capacity. She has also participated in EU-wide projects focusing on the harmonisation and standardisation. She is also a Visiting Fellow at the Faculty of Medicine of the National and Kapodistrian University of Athens and a Researcher at the School of Law of the Aristotle University of Thessaloniki in Greece.

**Dimitris Patestos** MD, is a doctor specialised in Cardiology. He has been dealing with the health issues of people on the move since 2006 and he has been the Medical Coordinator of MDM (Doctors of the World) in *Lesvos* from 2015 to 2017 and then Medical Coordinator of KEELPNO (EODY), responsible for the islands of East Aegean. Now he is a medical coordinator and feld coordinator of the MDM Greek Delegation in *Lesvos* as well as a research associate of the Master International Medicine – Health Crisis Management of the National Kapodistrian University of Athens, on immigration issues. He is involved in the development of a health system for people in movement as well as the health problems of vulnerable people such as unaccompanied minors and victims of violence.

**Christos Lionis** MD, PhD, FRCGP(Hon), FWONCA, FESC is a Professor of General Practice and Primary Health Care and Head of the Clinic of Social and Family Medicine at the School of Medicine, University of Crete, Greece. Christos is also appointed as a Visiting Professor at the School of Medicine and Health, University of Linköping, Sweden. He has a strong involvement in European and international funded research projects. Christos is involved in an editorial and advisory capacity with a number of international journals, while he is also a member of the Executive Boards of various professional organisations. He has published 422 papers in international journals (cited in PubMed). Christos was appointed in 2019 as a Member of the European Commission Expert Panel on Effective Ways of Investing in Health and as a Member of the Scientifc Advisory Grοup of the European Medicines Agency in 2022.

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