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1 Sailing on Cold War Tides

The Founding of the Tanzania
Naval Command

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Introduction

The territories and peoples now encompassed by the United Republic of Tanzania have a long and storied history of maritime engagement. The mainland of the Republic has a lengthy coastline that from antiquity was engaged with the long-distance Indian Ocean trade, eventually becoming part of an elaborate and extended trade network from the inland peoples to the coastal cities, which in turn competed with one another in maritime trade. The coastal cities in turn were seen as crucial connections between Africa and the larger cosmopolitan world of the Indian Ocean. These cities in turn would be overtaken in prestige and wealth by the island Archipelago of Zanzibar, which under the Busaid dynasty became the central entrepot of Swahili and Omani traders in their interactions with the sprawling Indian Ocean trade. Simply put, in the era before European colonialism, the region that later would be Tanzania was the location of massive maritime interactions, with vast social, cultural, and economic interactions being carried out across the seas.

While German and British colonialism would connect the same territories into a global network, the region itself became economically subordinated and the local connections suffered. However, with the emergence of African decolonization in the late 1950s, new questions about Tanganyika and Zanzibar as independent maritime nations emerged – particularly given the complex security challenges of the developing Cold War. With independence upon them in 1961 and 1963, respectively, these questions of maritime security and the construction of a navy took on new salience, particularly as they were explicitly bound up in larger debates about colonial influence, East African federation, and the increasing hostility between the Communist and the Capitalist blocs of the globe. For the eventually unified Republic of Tanganyika and Zanzibar, the founding, equipping, and missions of the modern Tanzanian navy were shaped by the United Republic's complex navigations of the tides of decolonization and the Cold War as they attempted to achieve identified capabilities while maintaining their desired non-alignment in the larger global struggle

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The Onset of Decolonization (1945–61)

Following the end of the Second World War, the British government found itself concentrating on a series of crises at home and in its colonies in South and Southeast Asia. Between the costs of the war, Britain's diminished overall stature, and the loss of India as an economic anchor, the challenges of holding the Empire together continued to mount. These challenges, at least from the defense side of the equation, were swiftly laid bare with the publication of the 1957 Templer report, which recommended that Britain pull back the lion's share of its resources from defending its far-flung colonies while consolidating the local defense forces to be a more efficient bulwark against the mounting challenges of Nationalism and Communism. In East Africa, this took the form of attempting to consolidate all the local security forces that had taken shape in the past decades of colonial rule. On the land, that meant taking the far-flung battalions of the King's African Rifles (KAR) and their remaining auxiliary units and placing them under the East African Land Forces Organization. For the various maritime detachments that had finally been formally created in the interwar years, these were formed into the Royal East African Navy (REAN).¹ In both cases, there was some legislative jockeying as there was a discovered clause in the Trusteeship agreement that prevented Tanganyikan forces from being placed into the same formal command as the colonial troops. However, there was a quick law passed that allowed this hurdle to be jumped, creating the new consolidated East African forces that it was hoped would achieve the desired British outcomes while avoiding too heavy of an investment from the already strained British exchequer.

Admittedly, the desired outcomes were quite different between the land forces and the Royal East African Navy. The KAR remained responsible for local security, but the recent deployment of some elements to Malaya combined with the loss of Indian troops raised some hopes for a more formal African army to fill the gap.² The goals for the Royal East Africa Navy were much more modest, as befitted the small force that had taken shape in the interwar years. The REAN was intended to simply fulfill a local supporting role in maintaining maritime security – effectively supplementing local-deployed Royal Navy forces when needed while on occasion also projecting a small amount of reliable authority up and down the East African coast. Aside from its consolidation, the REAN had largely remained unchanged from its creation – its rank and file were still ethnically recruited and its officers were seconded Royal Navy officers.³ While it brought together detachments from across East Africa, it was based in Mombasa, which was seen as an ideal port given its facilities and the large leavening of Kenyan and Zanzibari members of the reserve.⁴ By the end of the 1950s, Britain felt generally confident that its local preparations for maritime security were well in hand and could deal with whatever local issues might arise, albeit sometimes with limited help from the Royal Navy in the region. Their proposed plans for the future were that the

REAN would continue in its role but eventually devolve to local control as a federated East African Navy following the decolonization of all its member states.

However, these plans quickly ran into the reality of decolonization in the region. Beginning in 1958, the political power within the Tanganyikan trustee territory was already being shared with the ascendant leader of the Tanganyikan African National Union (TANU) party, a former schoolteacher named Julius Nyerere. Nyerere would guide Tanganyika to formal independence in 1961 with an eye towards maintaining friendly relations with Britain as Tanganyika underwent a series of proposed development programs to help create a base of educated Tanganyikan civil servants and a firmer economic foundation for the new government. Nyerere saw both of these as vital, given the slow pace of Africanization of the government before independence and the generally poor state of the economy.⁵ Conversely, while Britain could appreciate Nyerere's point of view, its finances were drawn thin as it was and they did not wish to offer any grants on the scale the Nyerere's government requested nor did they wish to continue paying the salaries and pensions of colonial civil servants to remain in Tanganyika while Nyerere put his house in order.⁶ This ended up causing a rapid deterioration in the two governments' relations, as Nyerere could not pay for both development and maintaining legacy British structures and the British refused to offer substantial support for Tanganyika to achieve its own independent goals.

This degradation of relations helped push Nyerere further away from his initial plans to maintain firm connection with the British. He had always been somewhat skeptical of a British-dominated Commonwealth and had shied away from most attempts by Britain to maintain strong influence in Tanganyika. The legacy British Civil Servants he could accept as a stopgap while Tanganyika developed its own African candidates but if Britain was not going to pay for them nor even offer enough support for Tanganyika to develop its own, then they were simply another vector of British neocolonial influence. With British connections increasingly offering too little of an upside for Nyerere's government while providing significant costs and political liabilities, the Tanganyikans began to look for alternate paths to achieve their goals while disentangling themselves from the British.

This rapidly changing political and financial outlook for Tanganyika would have immediate effects on the Royal East African Navy. In terms of costs, Tanganyika was providing approximately £94,000 of support a year to the REAN, funds that Nyerere's treasury saw as being needed for other far more critical priorities for the newly independent country.⁷ Nyerere's government openly questioned the costs they bore for the Navy, leading to a loud protest from the landlocked Uganda, who noted they paid a comparable cost and received no direct benefits from a Navy headquartered in Mombasa and operationally facing the Indian Ocean.⁸ However, with Nyerere's relations with Britain declining and Tanganyika's concerns about British influence rising, the consolidated security structures of East Africa became increasingly a sore

point for his government. Not only were the costs increasingly high, Nyerere and his government saw little point in paying for the communal defense of the region. There appeared to be few formal military threats towards East Africa as a whole, much less Tanganyika in particular. Nyerere felt that if there was an actual threat of invasion or the like, then the United Nations would help ensure his security. In terms of the sea lanes around Tanganyika, Nyerere and his government felt that the Royal Navy would continue to maintain their security as it was well within their interests to do so.⁹

The professed viewpoints led to significant heated debates within the region. Kenya's Tom Mboya made several spirited public addresses directed towards Nyerere about the role and benefits of an East African Navy once independence was achieved for the whole region. However, much like Britain's requests that Tanganyika keep its land forces under an overall East African umbrella, these arguments from Kenya and the other East African nations fell on deaf ears.¹⁰ Nyerere was adamant in his views of Tanganyika going its own way, and in due course in January 1962, his government withdrew from the Royal East African Navy and suspended its payments to the combined coffers that kept the small maritime security force afloat.¹¹ Tanganyika's withdrawal was effectively a death knell for the proposed post-independence federated East African Navy, and the legacy East African Naval Reserve was disbanded on June 30, 1962.

With funds desperately needed elsewhere and with Nyerere's confidence that security was not a prime concern in Tanganyika, the years from 1961 to 1963 represented a moribund period for all the defense forces in the new country. The Tanganyika Rifles, the successors to the colonial sixth KAR in Tanganyika, were badly neglected throughout the period. The preparation of African officers proceeded at a snail's pace, with Nyerere happy to let the British work at their own pace in selecting and training African officers.¹² At the same time, the barracks and equipment of the Rifles fell into disrepair, with even the junior African officers noting the Spartan nature of their accommodations.¹³ Between the institutional neglect, stagnant opportunities, and frozen wages, the numbers of the Tanganyika Rifles dwindled to less than a thousand soldiers under arms. In terms of the naval component, the Tanganyikan members of the Royal East African Navy were simply dismissed. There was no formal military maritime component remaining, only a developing component of maritime police. It was openly debated in the parliament whether Tanganyika should retain any military components at all.¹⁴

Tanganyika's de facto dissolution of its military arms began to come to an end with a series of crises in 1963 and 1964, which caused a volte face among Nyerere and his government. The first was that Nyerere, as an ardent pan-Africanist who was devoted to the liberation struggles in Southern Africa, managed to get the Organization of African Unity (OAU) to place its Liberation Committee headquarters in Dar es Salaam, which in turn attracted a large number of both leaders and rank and file of these organizations to Tanganyika.¹⁵ With these groups being both committed to the armed struggle

for liberation in Africa and involved in neighboring states such as the Congo and Mozambique, this rapidly increased the potential security threats to Tanganyika itself. The struggle in Mozambique in particular brought with it Portuguese incursions chasing Front for the Liberation of Mozambique (FRELIMO) fighters who were trained and housed at a base in Nachingwea in southern Tanganyika.¹⁶ While Nyerere and his administration founded self-defense militias, or *mgambo*, in the southern villages these organizations needed professional military instructors and support.¹⁷

While the intensification of the liberation struggles around Tanganyika brought forward a series of smaller potential threats, the early months of 1964 would completely alter the security trajectory of the country. Just offshore from Tanganyika, Zanzibar had finally shed its protectorate status and become an independent state in 1963. However, in early 1964, following a series of elections that were seen as rigged to support the more traditional Arab elite, the island archipelago erupted into violence.¹⁸ Organized mobs of the disenfranchised and more radical political elements attacked the local police stations and the homes of the elites, overthrowing the local government. In the violence that followed, anywhere from several hundred to several thousand of the local elite were killed and the leader of the Afro-Shirazi Party, Abeid Karume, was placed at the head of a new government. While the widespread violence had ended by early February, the new government had strong ties to the Communist Bloc, with the Russians, East Germans, and Chinese all forming ties swiftly with the Karume's government. This alarmed the British and other western powers, who saw the formation of a feared "African Cuba" despite the Karume government's efforts to disempower its more radical or violent members.¹⁹ To try and halt potential intervention efforts, Karume and Nyerere entered negotiations for a regional solution, with both sides eventually announcing the Act of Union in April 1964, formally establishing the United Republic of Tanzania.²⁰ This new Union created significant new demands for more formal security structures to bind it together.

However, Tanganyika would not arrive at the Act of Union unscathed. Following reports of violence on Zanzibar in January, Nyerere had dispatched his Police Field Force to the islands to help restore order.²¹ These paramilitary forces had been trained to potentially take over the larger part of local security and had in effect become a counterweight to the Tanganyika Rifles. In their absence, on January 20, the Tanganyika Rifles battalion at Colito Barracks outside of Dar es Salaam mutinied, locking their officers up, deporting the remaining British personnel, and then traveled to Dar es Salaam in an attempt to catch President Nyerere and force him to address their grievances.²² While they missed catching Nyerere, the Minister of Defence Oscar Kambona attempted to negotiate with them even as the garrisons at Tabora and Nachingwea joined the mutiny. Following initial successes in negotiations, the Rifles' position hardened, and Nyerere, who had resurfaced in his oceanside home with other ministers of his government, asked for British assistance to put down the rebellious troops.²³ While this was accomplished quickly with

several units of the 45 Marine Commando from the nearby HMS Centaur, it badly hurt the prestige of the Nyerere government, which was seen as asleep at the wheel while the military nearly overthrew the whole state. In response, Nyerere ordered the dismantling of the old military except for a small cadre of loyal officers and non-commissioned officers (NCOs) and then ordered the building of a new military to replace the old rebellious one. While the Act of Union would complicate their efforts to transform 1000 young volunteers into the first battalion of the new military, in September of 1964 the Tanzania People's Defence Force (TPDF) was formed. From here on Nyerere and his government would make funding and supporting the security forces of the United Republic a priority, with an eye to creating a unified apparatus to project military force on the land, in the air, and eventually, at sea.

A New Maritime Force?

While by the end of 1964 the new land force command for the TPDF had already had its first graduates march proudly past President Nyerere and his cabinet, Nyerere and his new Chief of Defence Forces Brigadier General Mwirisho Sarakikya understood there was still much work to do to build a comprehensive and integrated defense force.²⁴ While the British and Tanzanians wanted to keep their relationship at arms' length, the British also were rapidly becoming alarmed at the potential partners involved in building Tanzania's new military. While Nyerere had initially looked for aid from other African countries and smaller non-aligned nations like Sweden, none of these had been able to offer aid.²⁵ Subsequently, when Tanzania announced a half-dozen Chinese trainers would be arriving to help train the new TPDF on Chinese-bought weapons, this confirmed all the western fears of a potentially communist-dominated Tanzania.²⁶ In response, the United States and Great Britain quickly pressured both Canada and Australia to respond to earlier Tanzanian requests for military aid in an attempt to balance Chinese involvement in Nyerere's military. While Australia would not be able to follow up on the requested training team, Canada responded in the affirmative and the resultant Canadian Armed Forces Advisory and Training Team Tanzania (CAFATTT) would be a key influence on the development of both the TPDF land forces and air wing.²⁷

With a solid and trusted Commonwealth partner now in place for the land and air forces, Tanzania now reached out to Britain as a potential partner on a proposed navy. While Britain was still not certain of Tanzania's place within the larger Cold War dynamics, the British government was still concerned about potential Chinese influence, and so in late 1964, the Royal Navy dispatched an officer to Dar es Salaam to put together a plan for a Tanzanian Navy.²⁸ This officer, Commander EMG Johnstone, would spend the next several months discussing possible maritime security needs with the Tanzanian government and command of the TPDF, eventually producing an official report that he provided to the Tanzanians and the British in early 1965.²⁹

This plan, entitled simply “Plan for the Formation of a Navy,” was comprehensive in nature. Commander Johnstone would recommend that the Tanzania Navy, when initially established, should have at the very least three patrol vessels of around 100 tons of displacement as its seagoing element, although he noted that a smaller and likely used craft should be acquired first for training purposes.³⁰ These vessels would be crewed and maintained by a naval element of approximately 240 officers and men, who in turn would be supported by around 50 civilian staff.³¹ A key element in making certain that this newly established navy would flourish would be the construction of a dedicated naval base, for which he recommended the Kigamboni Peninsula in Dar es Salaam.³² This base would provide anchorage and supply storage for the vessels as well as a place for the personnel to live. Admittedly, Johnstone noted that the establishment of such a force and its support structures could not be accomplished without the help of a foreign partner.³³ In terms of training, he recommended that a dedicated outside partner send a training team to Tanzania, where they would train the locally raised personnel for three to five years and then take part in a planned handover of the complete navy to the Tanzanians. To this was added the need for foreign financing for constructing the naval base, either through grants or loans, as Tanzania was in no shape to undertake the construction costs on its own. In fact, the total estimated costs for the navy project as Johnstone saw it were £3,150,000. This total would include the three patrol vessels (£250,000 apiece), the training vessel (£200,000), the base construction (£1.75m), and associated equipment needs (£450,000).³⁴

The Tanzanians were quite pleased at the report, seeing it as the perfect blueprint for moving forward. The envisioned navy would fulfill their needs as they had expressed them and they were eager to get started – as much to strengthen the links between the mainland and the still-fractious Zanzibar as to provide larger coastal security. However, it was at this point that Britain had to disappoint the enthusiastic Tanzanians. While Britain was more than happy with the resulting report and shared it widely with other potential partners for the project, the costs were well more than they were willing to bear at that time.³⁵ As such, when the Tanzanians approached them to begin moving forward with the proposed project, instead the British turned them down, with their own internal debates largely pointing towards interest but unwillingness to prioritize the building of a Tanzanian navy before any of their other current security cooperation projects. In particular, much of the debate focused on how the Tanzanians did not perhaps need such a Navy and that this was ultimately more of a prestige project for Nyerere’s government.³⁶

By June of 1965, the matter was considered closed by many of the western powers. While Nyerere and his administration continued to make discrete requests to Britain and Canada for naval assistance, they were largely ignored. Britain did not want any new capital-intensive projects, and Canada was

already heavily involved elsewhere in Tanzania's military development and was hesitant to become more so. This complacency was also fed by the confusion around another effort that had been ongoing since 1963. The Federal German Republic that had initially offered the gift of two older small patrol craft were in talks to sell two more to Tanzania, and to also offer training on them for Tanzanian crews.³⁷ However, this was not intended to be a military force; these programs were to develop a maritime police force for the coastal region and particularly the ports. For most western observers, this was a prime effort to build Tanzanian maritime security and the focal point of internal efforts, with 36 Tanzanian sailors already selected to travel to West Germany for more training.³⁸ However, the Act of Union had complicated these plans. In the months following its revolution, the government of Zanzibar had welcomed embassies from a variety of communist countries, the German Democratic Republic among them. Following the creation of the United Republic of Tanzania, West Germany had lodged a protest with Nyerere's government, noting that the Hallstein Doctrine forbid them from working with any government that recognized East Germany. While Nyerere tried to negotiate with the West Germans in good faith and offered to downgrade the status of the East German mission, he also refused to allow his foreign policy to be dictated by external powers. Ultimately, these attempts to negotiate fell flat and the Federal Republic of Germany cancelled its various programs with Tanzania, including these maritime efforts.³⁹

Although the Germans had abandoned the project, Tanzania continued its efforts to find a smaller, non-aligned partner to help with its building of a maritime police. These entreaties proved to be successful, with the Netherlands agreeing to send a training team over to help out.⁴⁰ The training team arrived in August 1965 and began their efforts at working with the local proposed maritime police force. These efforts proved to be a complicating factor in the development of a formal navy in two interrelated ways. For some western countries, such as Britain, these efforts were understood to be intended to build a maritime police force, but this sort of program was what the Tanzanians required anyways despite their insistence on a formal navy. For others, particularly the absent-minded United States, these efforts quickly became confused with an actual naval program being implemented. As such, even when the Tanzanians began asking around to other potential partners, the previously anxious Americans felt that the matter was in hand with the Dutch involvement. Sadly, these hopes were to be dashed with the departure of the Dutch maritime police training detachment in December. Their final reports noted frustration with the material and personnel. The German boats that had been donated were in terrible shape and not considered seaworthy. In turn, the personnel offered by the Tanzanian police were not willing to put in the work required to effectively partner with the Dutch team. Citing their inability to work, the Dutch packed up and left.⁴¹



Figure 1.1 Tanzanian sailors pilot a boat during a 2012 exercise with the US Navy at Dar es Salaam, Tanzania.

Source: Public Domain via US Dept. of Defense.

The Scramble for the Tanzanian Navy

It was following this departure at the end of 1965 that alarm bells finally began to ring across the Western countries. The Tanzanians had never stopped seeking a potential partner to build a Navy and the American and British anxiety of increased communist influence in Tanzania was rekindled by the loss of the Dutch program. In particular, beginning in June of 1966, reports were passed around the British office of Commonwealth Relations and the United States Department of State based on the testimony of the Honorary Tanzanian Consul-General in Holland, Ernst Van Eeghen. Van Eeghen reported that the Tanzanians had again approached the Dutch for help in forming the Navy and been turned down.⁴² In doing so though, Nyerere had confided in Van Eeghen that he would now have to approach the Soviet Union or China to finally fulfill his country's need to build a maritime force. While the British and Americans were not certain how seriously to take Van Eeghen's statements, they were largely corroborated by the Dutch government who added the detail that within 24 hours of the Dutch declining to help, the Chinese had approached Nyerere's government again, offering craft and funding for a Navy. Van Eeghen's reports admittedly were also given greater credence from his connections with the American diplomatic establishment, particularly his stated relationship with William Leonhart, the former US

Ambassador to Tanzania who was now serving as the Special Assistant to the President to the National Security Council Planning Board.

Admittedly, it was likely that these connections would add extra gravitas to the next proposal from Van Eeghen, which was his assurance that Nyerere would likely accept limited American involvement through the funding of a North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) mission to build the Tanzanian Navy.⁴³ Assuming this was true, it was a path for the Americans to address the terror-inspiring prospect of a communist-built navy patrolling the shores of East Africa. The temptation to pursue this avenue was reinforced by the reports coming from the Canadians, who were still involved in efforts to shape the Tanzanian land and air forces. The Canadian government and CAFATTT personnel reported that the proposal put forward that the Dutch had declined was based on the Johnstone report and the Dutch government had simply pled poverty when presented with the £3,150,000 estimate.⁴⁴ In turn, while CAFATTT had worked with the Tanzanian military command to integrate those efforts into the five-year development plan that would guide CAFATTT's efforts, the cost of pursuing the Johnstone plan would financially cripple all of the other Canadian projects with the TPDF. However, CAFATTT felt compelled to pass along that Captain Kashmiri, the effective Chief of Staff of the TPDF, had casually mentioned that the Russians had offered six patrol boats and that some 40 Zanzibari personnel had undertaken naval training in Russia.⁴⁵ In addition, the Canadians had also been informed of more of Van Eeghen's efforts, where he was reporting that Nyerere felt under great domestic pressure to finally build a maritime element to the TPDF and so would likely have to seek whatever aid he could in short order. While the Canadians echoed the British dismissal of Tanzania's need for any naval unit, they did note that "Tanzania does not have any apparent need for a naval unit but might find it difficult to refuse a Russian offer if it were made to look like a free gift."⁴⁶

The Canadians were not overly concerned about the potential for Chinese involvement in the Navy. While they did not have exceptionally good relations with China at the time, they had been working alongside Chinese efforts in Tanzania for over a year at this point and so had a relatively pragmatic and level understanding of both Chinese efforts and Tanzanian desires. However, by this point, the US Department of State's East African Bureau was thoroughly alarmed by the potential for a Russian- or Chinese-trained navy in East African waters. The Americans immediately began to ask both the British and the Canadians to try and bring pressure to bear on the Dutch to reverse their decision on the Tanzanian navy project.⁴⁷ In their correspondence to London, the Canadians effectively noted that they had no pressing concerns but wanted to stay on the good side of the Americans. Meanwhile, the British were more than willing to pull on any lever they could to forestall Chinese naval influence in Africa but noted that the problem for the Dutch was financial, where Britain could not offer any effective help. The Commonwealth Relations Office noted drily that their development budget was already a very limited zero-sum affair

and any pound spent on a Tanzanian navy was a pound not spent on a project that was likely of a higher priority to Britain.⁴⁸ The same office also took the opportunity to try and revive the more modest Dutch training program, noting that the earlier maritime police training fell apart because the older German ships were not seaworthy but the Dutch could likely resurrect the program if the newer German patrol boats that had been purchased by the Tanzanians were actually delivered.⁴⁹ However, given that now the Tanzanians were receiving offers of aid from the Communist countries that seemed to parallel the Johnstone plan, the Americans and Canadians were concerned that reducing any potential aid would be seen as surrendering the navy to the Chinese or Russians.⁵⁰ The Americans, particularly the Department of State's Bureau of African Affairs, remained committed to pursuing a mechanism to persuade or even pressure the Dutch to take up the project of building the Tanzanian navy.

By the end of June, the newer plan for naval assistance to Tanzania was taking shape. With reports now confirmed from General Sarakikya himself that the Russians had offered to provide multiple vessels as far back as 1964, the American government now redoubled pressure to find a friendly country to construct the Tanzanian navy.⁵¹ With new entreaties being received, the Dutch tentatively agreed that if the funding could be located, they would provide the personnel for such a scheme.⁵² While they were not necessarily as enthusiastic as Van Eeghen was, they were willing to help. For their own part, the Government of Canada was writing their High Commission asking them to make more direct contact with Nyerere on the matter of naval assistance.⁵³ Considering that Canada was now heavily involved in shaping the TPDF and their Air Wing, it was assumed that they would have credibility in discussions with Nyerere asking him to hold off on accepting any Communist assistance for establishing a navy until a more neutral partner could be found. In particular, the Canadian government noted that the acceptance of any communist partner would have significant impact on Canada's ongoing efforts. Finally, Ottawa noted that if part of the proposed navy's purpose was to solidify relations between the mainland and Zanzibar, then Nyerere was likely treading on dangerous ground with communist aid, which would doubtless empower the more politically radical Zanzibar government.

The response to this last effort came a week later on July 14th, with Nyerere responding at length to the questions and concerns raised by the Canadians and making his mind more broadly known on the question of a navy.⁵⁴ Nyerere apparently was quite relieved he was being given a chance to express himself on the matter to his major defense partner and seemed cognizant that his words would be passed along to other interested parties. He admitted he had been saddened when Holland had turned down the opportunity to carry on the Johnstone plan for two major reasons. The first was that while the construction costs, vessel acquisition, and continuing costs might be calculated at approximately £5m over five years, Holland was not a poor country and he didn't think it was a large ask. The second was that a potential partnership

with Holland, much like his partnership with Canada, fit perfectly within what he saw as the narrow path he had in navigating defense assistance within the Cold War. His government largely was averse to strong ties to the larger western powers within the Cold War; his ministers and his larger public saw such connections as neocolonial. Conversely, he had no interest in binding his state to the Communist Bloc, which he saw as just as compromising of a partnership. Nyerere noted that if he had wanted to make use of their assistance, he could have already launched a navy some time ago. His preference was to partner with smaller, less ideological countries and in the instance of the navy he had dearly hoped for help from the Dutch or another country of similar stature. However, with the loss of the potential partnership with Holland, he now felt somewhat adrift. He noted to the High Commissioner that he was under tremendous pressure to inaugurate a naval program. Members of his cabinet were already expressing frustration that a country with populations including the Swahili and the lacustrine populations did not have a navy for them to participate in their own country's defense.⁵⁵ These complaints had become even more strident since the announcement of Kenya's launching of its own navy, increasing the domestic pressure Nyerere felt to take any offered help to create a navy as quickly as possible.⁵⁶ The High Commissioner left while assuring Nyerere that he would contact the Dutch to see if they would be willing to reconsider.

The following several weeks saw little advancement on the hoped-for naval program though. The Canadians, now more clear-eyed on the motivations and constraints behind the project, saw roughly three ways forward within their purview.⁵⁷ The first would be to undertake the project themselves, which was likely not possible due to the amount of funding they were already pouring into the other projects in Tanzania – including a planned new Tanzanian military academy. The second was to work to convince a smaller European or Commonwealth country to undertake the project. While they also hoped that Holland would reengage, if that failed, they imagined a partner like Australia, India, Italy, or France might be potential partners. However, ultimately, they felt that the likelihood of such a partnership outside of Holland was slim. Finally, there was the possibility that Tanzania might be talked out of a navy altogether, which following renewed discussions with Nyerere at the end of September they now felt was an impossibility.⁵⁸ Regardless, they felt there were not many good options remaining to forestall the eventual Tanzanian acceptance of Communist aid. However, in parallel, the East African Bureau of the US Department of State had been working furiously on a final attempt to procure funding to support a potential Dutch reengagement. While in mid-August they had felt it would be an uphill struggle, they cast such funds as a needed countermeasure to the encroachment of deeper communist influence in the United Republic.⁵⁹ This proved to be an astute move, and by late August, the request had made its way through the African Bureau and through to Politico-Military Affairs who were in consultations with the Department of Defense on potential sources of funding.⁶⁰ However, there

were some questions on the accuracy of Johnstone's estimates and attempts to cut corners, particularly along the lines of incorporating the soon to be delivered German patrol boats as some of the craft. The American hopes were that they could find a creditable amount of funding within what they saw as a narrowing window to entice the Dutch back to Tanzania. There seemed to be a breakthrough on September 12, when the Department of State made what they thought was the compelling argument that the President could authorize such funding himself through the Foreign Assistance Act, although this was somewhat dimmed by their recognition that the German patrol boats would not serve the needs of a navy and thus the overall figures would remain high.⁶¹ However, for all these exertions, it appears that the western efforts were finally for naught. While there are no indications where all of this energy from the Americans had gone, the foundation of the TPDF Navy was to be eventually done in partnership with the Chinese

Chinese Effort, Tanzanian Benefit

While it remains uncertain what eventually caused the collapse of the western attempts to provide – or at the very least finance – the Tanzanian navy, it does appear that it took some time for the Nyerere government to finally accept communist aid. It was not until nearly two years later that reports began to emerge that Tanzania had finally embarked on a partnership with the People's Republic of China in an effort to create a Tanzanian Navy Command. These reports leaked out both through direct private discussions with the remaining members of the CAFATTT team as well as diplomatic discussions with Russian diplomat in Dar es Salaam Georgy Samsonov.⁶² The western powers had been watching Nyerere and General Sarakikya's movements with some trepidation for the past several months, particularly since Nyerere had undertaken a diplomatic trip to China, one that was assumed to have involved military discussions. As such, when initial reports were emerging of Nyerere's acceptance of Chinese aid, it confirmed what had long been assumed. The reactions of Canadian officers also offered a grim assessment of increasing Chinese influence in Tanzania along with a patronizing attitude toward the continued lack of need for a Tanzanian Navy.⁶³

For all the doomsaying of Chinese influence over the Tanzanian state, military, and now particularly the navy, the Tanzanians were consistent with their outlook. Since the establishment of the TPDF in 1964, the military command under General Sarakikya and Colonel Kashmiri had been remarkably clear-eyed with their strategic needs. While the small arms and administrative aid from Canada was critical and appreciated, they had also noted that given that Tanzania was roughly the size of Germany and facing several local threats including from colonial Portuguese forces in Mozambique, they would likely need air transport, jet interceptors, tanks, and artillery much as any other modern military defending a vulnerable state would. At every turn, these officers, both Sandhurst trained, were told they did not actually

need those things. While the Canadians would sell them prop airplanes for air transport, they would not supply the larger weapons systems requested. Instead, the Russians offered artillery and later jet aircraft while the Chinese offered their own jet aircraft and provided several waves of tanks and armor training.⁶⁴ As the Tanzanian political and military leadership would consistently note, while they wanted to remain closer to the moderate, middle-sized western powers, those same states simply refused to take them or their needs seriously.⁶⁵ Conversely, the communist states were more than willing to sell or in many cases donate significant heavy weaponry.⁶⁶ While the Tanzanians understood this was intended to influence them, they remained fiercely independent in political outlook. It was also this priority on independence of political action that led them to more often partner with the Chinese, who, even though they were communist, did not want to openly wed Tanzania to any worldwide political bloc.

These same dynamics once again played out with the establishment of the navy – and the results were again more than satisfactory to the Tanzanians. Beginning in 1968, the Tanzanians were scrambling to locate 70 officer cadets to undergo naval education under the guidance of the Chinese PLA Navy.⁶⁷ While the number was high given the projected size of the navy, it did include both standard commissioned officers as well as the Political Education Officers who had also been established as their own cadre within the TPDF.⁶⁸ In turn, these officers would form the leadership of a full naval complement of 350 officers and sailors once the navy completed its recruiting and training under the auspices of Chinese naval personnel. In addition, the Chinese provided an estimated £4m for the establishment of a naval base off of Dar es Salaam harbor, which would provide both headquarters for the naval element as well as docking facilities for the navy's vessels.⁶⁹ Regarding these, the Chinese had also promised a gift of four Shanghai II class patrol craft. These craft, each displacing around 135 tons, were considered well suited to the coastal patrols and protection of the Zanzibar archipelago that were considered the central mission of the navy. In addition, the new base would also offer berths to the rumored addition of a number of Huchuan-class torpedo boats, which, although smaller and more specialized than the Shanghai-class patrol boats, would add a significant additional punch to the small navy when they were finally operational.

By 1970, there were a full 75 Chinese technicians working busily in Dar es Salaam to complete the naval base on the Kigomboni Peninsula, and the training of the first two groups of naval personnel was coming close to completion.⁷⁰ By 1971, the new leadership of the brand new Tanzanian Naval Command were returning home and the service was formally inaugurated.⁷¹ Perhaps unsurprisingly, the new Naval Command matched almost exactly the Johnstone proposal from six years earlier. Admittedly, the Naval Command now had four ships as opposed to the three and 350 personnel as opposed to the proposed 240, but their roles, missions, organization, and even the location of the naval base matched Commander Johnstone's recommendations almost to the letter. However, because of the turbulent issues of the Cold

War and residual paternalism from the western nations, Tanzania's navy would be built with the help of communist China. It must be noted though that despite the dire warnings of the Americans and Canadians, the Navy was not a hotbed of revolutionary thought nor did it bring more risk to the fractious Zanzibar archipelago. Instead, much like the rest of the TPDF, the Tanzanians managed the political efforts of the Chinese with aplomb and gained the military capacities they recognized they needed.⁷² The end result was ultimately the military – and navy – that they knew they needed through the effort of the one power willing to help them build it.

Coda

The Tanzanian Naval Command continues to serve as the naval component to the TPDF in the present day. Its roles remain constant, with coastal security, harbor defense, search and rescue, and keeping an eye on Zanzibar remaining its core missions.⁷³ In the following years, the Naval Command has also seen an expansion of its reach and duties, with the Naval Command being a critical component of Tanzania's efforts supporting the Seychelles military in the late 1970s and the addition of anti-piracy operations and protecting local fisheries in the late 2000s.⁷⁴ However, these are not necessarily far out of the original envisaged role of the command.

This likely is a good thing. While the Naval Command remains dedicated to the defense of littoral Tanzania, like much of the Tanzanian military establishment it has suffered from some straightened circumstances following the end of the Cold War. The majority of the Shanghai II and Huchuan craft are still operational and are the central pillars of the naval strength of Tanzania. Over the intervening years, additional craft from Russia and North Korea have been added, although most of these have largely degraded and fallen out of service. It has only been in the last five years or so that Tanzania has been rejuvenating its naval strength with the supply of two new Chinese patrol vessels and two new 27-foot Defender Patrol Boats.⁷⁵ However, with the new emphasis on strategic competition in the Indian Ocean, this is likely only the first of many new attempts to court Tanzania and its Naval Command.

Acknowledgments

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Notes

- 1 This force was initially called the East African Naval Force on its forming in 1950 but was renamed to the Royal East African Navy on the Queen's birthday in 1952.

- See Daniel Owen Spence, *Colonial Naval Culture and British Imperialism, 1922–67*, Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2015, 115.
- 2 David Killingray, “The Idea of a British Imperial African Army,” *The Journal of African History*, Vol. 20, No. 3 (July 1979), 434–35.
 - 3 Spence, *Colonial Naval Culture*, 116–17.
 - 4 While Mombasa was on the Kenyan coast, it was technically Zanzibari territory due to the recognized and supported claims of the Sultan of Zanzibar to the port. Mombasa would not become Kenyan territory until formal decolonization in 1963.
 - 5 Cranford Pratt, *The Critical Phase in Tanzania, 1945-1968: Nyerere and the Emergence of a Socialist Strategy*, New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 1976, 91.
 - 6 This was particularly challenging as the Tanganyikans had felt coerced into accepting responsibility for the pensions of the legacy civil servants they required, as this had been the structure accepted in the former West African colonies of Ghana and Nigeria. However, Africanization had been much further along in those colonies, and so there were less legacy civil servants retained. In turn, Britain then conditioned some £3m of its £10m offered development funds to only be used to support these pensions. This bitterly disappointed Nyerere and his nationalist colleagues. See Pratt, 101–103.
 - 7 Spence, *Colonial Naval Culture*, 136.
 - 8 *Ibid.*, 137.
 - 9 *Ibid.*, 139.
 - 10 *Ibid.*, 139.
 - 11 No pun intended.
 - 12 Timothy Parsons, *The 1964 Army Mutinies and the Making of Modern East Africa*, Westport, CT: Praeger, 2003, 69.
 - 13 Lieutenant Ameen Kashmiri, one of the three locally born officers of the Tanganyika Rifles noted:

The beddings I will tell you, you will be surprised, was two blocks of bricks with two on this side and that side, and two planks laid on top of those. And the soldiers had two blankets, one to put on the plank and one to cover themselves. Of course, we had issues with mosquitoes but that was their beddings. No proper beds at all, the mess also wasn't very well catered for.

Interview with Ameen Kashmiri, February 25, 2016.

- 14 Nestor N. Luanda and E. Mwanjabala, *Tanganyika Rifles Mutiny January 1964*, Dar es Salaam: Dar es Salaam University Press, 1998, 46–48.
- 15 *Ibid.*, 50.
- 16 Priya Lal, *African Socialism in Postcolonial Tanzania: Between the Village and the World*, New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 2017, 66. The Tanzanians later would gain a relatively significant amount of operational experience at the Southern border against the Portuguese, as discussed in the author interview with General Benjamin Msuya, February 18, 2016.
- 17 Admittedly, this *mgambo* militia formation would not be formally established until 1965. The TPDF and a contingent of Chinese trainers would help train these initial units. See United Kingdom National Archives (UKNA) DO/213.14, FS Miles to Commonwealth Relations Office, “U.R. Reserve Force,” Tanzania Armed Forces- General, October 1, 1964 and Extract from Fortnightly Summary, “National Volunteer Reserve Force,” UKNA DO/213.14 Tanzania Armed Forces-General, February 12, 1965.

- 18 Paul Bjerck, *Building a Peaceful Nation: Julius Nyerere and the Establishment of Sovereignty in Tanzania, 1960-1964*, Rochester, NY: University of Rochester Press, 2015, 208.
- 19 The classic discussion of western concerns of the Zanzibar Revolution is Ian Speller, "An African Cuba? Britain and the Zanzibar Revolution, 1964," *The Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History*, Vol. 35, No. 2 (June 1, 2007), 283–302.
- 20 Bjerck, *Building a Peaceful Nation*, 224. However, as Bjerck notes, within a week of the Revolution, Nyerere's TANU government was working with Zanzibar to try and create some sort of union to forestall outside intervention. See Bjerck, 206.
- 21 Parsons, *The 1964 Army Mutinies*, 107.
- 22 *Ibid.*, 109–10.
- 23 *Ibid.*, 126.
- 24 Brigadier Sarakikya was a Sandhurst-educated officer who had been a captain in Tabora at the time of the mutinies. He was the third-most senior Tanzanian officer following the removal of the British after the mutiny and was appointed the new Chief of Defence Forces upon the creation of the new TPDF. Author interview with General Mwirisho Sarakikya, February 21, 2016.
- 25 Nyerere noted he had specifically asked Sweden for aid after being impressed with their service in the Congo Peacekeeping operations, but they had turned him down due to a policy of only deploying as part of United Nations efforts. See Julius Nyerere, Press Conference on August 30, 1964. Personal Transcript gifted by Nestor Luanda.
- 26 All of this was announced in Julius Nyerere, Press Conference on August 30, 1964. Personal Transcript gifted by Nestor Luanda.
- 27 A good if brief summary of the overall training and advisory efforts can be found in Andrew Godefroy, "The Canadian Armed Forces Advisory Training Team Tanzania 1965–1970," *Canadian Military History*, Vol. 11, No. 3 (April 26, 2012).
- 28 UKNA File DO/213.14, Commonwealth Relations Office, "Summary of British Defence Aid to East Africa," Tanzania Armed Forces-General, December 2, 1964.
- 29 Library and Archives Canada (hereafter LAC), RG25-A-3-c. Volume/box number: 10422. File number: 27-20-5-TANZ Volume 5, "Plan for the Formation of a Navy." April, 1965.
- 30 LAC, RG25-A-3-c. Volume/box number: 10422. File number: 27-20-5-TANZ Volume 5, "Plan for the Formation of a Navy." April, 1965, Section 4.
- 31 LAC, RG25-A-3-c. Volume/box number: 10422. File number: 27-20-5-TANZ Volume 5, "Plan for the Formation of a Navy." April, 1965, Section 5.
- 32 LAC, RG25-A-3-c. Volume/box number: 10422. File number: 27-20-5-TANZ Volume 5, "Plan for the Formation of a Navy." April, 1965, Section 6.
- 33 LAC, RG25-A-3-c. Volume/box number: 10422. File number: 27-20-5-TANZ Volume 5, "Plan for the Formation of a Navy." April, 1965, Section 11.
- 34 LAC, RG25-A-3-c. Volume/box number: 10422. File number: 27-20-5-TANZ Volume 5, "Plan for the Formation of a Navy." April, 1965, Section 2, Page 13. It should also be noted that those figures do not include continuing costs.
- 35 LAC, RG25-A-3-c. Volume/box number: 10422. File number: 27-20-5-TANZ Volume 6, "Tanzania: British Naval Assistance," May 25, 1965.
- 36 LAC, RG25-A-3-c. Volume/box number: 10422. File number: 27-20-5-TANZ Volume 6, "Tanzania: British Naval Assistance," May 25, 1965.

- 37 LAC, RG25-A-3-c. Volume/box number: 10422. File number: 27-20-5-TANZ Volume 2, "Military Assistance to URTZ," September 25, 1964.
- 38 LAC, RG25-A-3-c. Volume/box number: 10422. File number: 27-20-5-TANZ Volume 3, "Memorandum for File," January 21, 1965.
- 39 This cutting of ties would also lead to the West Germans abandoning their program to help build the TPDF Air Wing, a project that would be taken up by the CAFATTT team. In fact, it was this Canadian aid that later would cause Nyerere to hesitate in asking for more Canadian assistance when it came to maritime security. The Germans did continue their delivery of four small patrol boats and were building two larger ones for the Tanzanians at the time. UKNA File DO/213.13, "Bonn to Foreign Office, Addressed to Foreign Office Telegram 818," Tanganyika Armed Force General, August 12, 1964.
- 40 LAC, RG25-A-3-c. Volume/box number: 10422. File number: 27-20-5-TANZ Volume 3, "Telegram from High Commissioner to Undersecretary of State for External Affairs," March 30, 1965.
- 41 LAC, RG25-A-3-c. Volume/box number: 10285. File number: 27-1-2-TANZ Volume 2, "Telegram, Service Attache at the Hague to National Defense Headquarters," January 13, 1966.
- 42 LAC, RG25-A-3-c. Volume/box number: 10422. File number: 27-20-5-TANZ Volume 12, "Telegram from Commonwealth Relations Office to British High Commissioner in Ottawa," June 10, 1966.
- 43 LAC, RG25-A-3-c. Volume/box number: 10422. File number: 27-20-5-TANZ Volume 12, "Telegram from Commonwealth Relations Office to British High Commissioner in Ottawa," June 10, 1966.
- 44 LAC, RG25-A-3-c. Volume/box number: 10422. File number: 27-20-5-TANZ Volume 12, "Telegram from Ministry of Foreign Affairs to Canadian High Commissioner, Dar es Salaam," June 13, 1966. It is worth noting that by this time the Johnstone Plan had been confused between all the states discussing naval assistance to Tanzania that it was now referred to as "the Johnson Plan."
- 45 LAC, RG25-A-3-c. Volume/box number: 10422. File number: 27-20-5-TANZ Volume 12, "Telegram from Ministry of Foreign Affairs to Canadian High Commissioner, Dar es Salaam," June 13, 1966. It must be noted that the Tanzanians were actually generally at a loss at what to do with the various Zanzibari elements of their new military. These were seen as too radical to effectively be integrated and so tended to be shuffled off to relatively safe postings until they could be discharged.
- 46 LAC, RG25-A-3-c. Volume/box number: 10422. File number: 27-20-5-TANZ Volume 12, "Telegram from Ministry of Foreign Affairs to Canadian High Commissioner, Dar es Salaam," June 13, 1966.
- 47 LAC, RG25-A-3-c. Volume/box number: 10422. File number: 27-20-5-TANZ Volume 12, "Telegram from British Commonwealth Relations Office to Canadian Ministry of Foreign Affairs," June 14, 1966.
- 48 These concerns would echo throughout the British responses, with their fiscal constraints being laid out relatively bare with the statement:

There is aid ceiling of about pounds 225 million for COMWEL during this fiscal year. Present pressures are to reduce this not RPT not increase it. Given the fact that they must operate within this ceiling Brit would not rpt not consider it sensible to for example take money from Nigeria in order to give it to Tanzania.

- Library and Archives Canada, RG25-A-3-c. Volume/box number: 10422. File number: 27-20-5-TANZ Volume 13, "Telegram from British Commonwealth Relations Office to Canadian Ministry of Foreign Affairs RE: Foreign Assistance to Tanzanian Navy," July 11, 1966.
- 49 LAC, RG25-A-3-c. Volume/box number: 10422. File number: 27-20-5-TANZ Volume 12, "Telegram from British Commonwealth Relations Office to Canadian Undersecretary of State for External Affairs, RE: Assistance to Tanzanian Navy," June 20, 1964.
- 50 LAC, RG25-A-3-c. Volume/box number: 28236. File number: 27-1-2-TANZ Volume 3, "Telegram from Canadian Undersecretary of State for External Affairs to US Department of State, RE: Assistance to Tanzanian Navy," June 20, 1966.
- 51 LAC, RG25-A-3-c. Volume/box number: 10422. File number: 27-20-5-TANZ Volume 13, "Telegram from Canadian High Commissioner to Canadian Undersecretary of State for External Affairs RE: Military Assistance to Tanzania," July 1, 1966.
- 52 LAC, RG25-A-3-c. Volume/box number: 10422. File number: 27-20-5-TANZ Volume 13, "Telegram from Canadian High Commission in Washington, DC to Canadian Undersecretary of State for External Affairs RE: Foreign Assistance to Tanzanian Navy," July 13, 1966.
- 53 LAC, RG25-A-3-c. Volume/box number: 10422. File number: 27-20-5-TANZ Volume 13, "Telegram from Canadian Undersecretary of State for External Affairs to Canadian High Commission in Dar es Salaam," July 7, 1966.
- 54 LAC, RG25-A-3-c. Volume/box number: 10422. File number: 27-20-5-TANZ Volume 13, "Telegram from Canadian High Commissioner in Dar es Salaam to Canadian Undersecretary of State for External Affairs," July 14, 1966.
- 55 An interesting inversion of the concept of maritime races as discussed in the work of Spence and others, much as Myles Osborne's work discusses the internalization and reification of martial identities. See Daniel Spence, *Colonial Naval Culture and British Imperialism, 1922–67* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2015) and Myles Osborne, *Ethnicity and Empire in Kenya: Loyalty and Martial Race among the Kamba, c.1800 to the Present*, New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 2014.
- 56 This of course ties in with the concept of African navies as important constructs for national prestige, as discussed in Tim Stapleton's work in this same volume.
- 57 LAC, RG25-A-3-c. Volume/box number: 10422. File number: 27-20-5-TANZ Volume 13, "Telegram from Telegram from Canadian High Commissioner in Dar es Salaam to Canadian Undersecretary of State for External Affairs, RE: Assistance to Tanzanian Navy," August 11, 1966.
- 58 In particular, the Telegram noted that "If domestic pressures are such that Nyerere feels he has to go ahead with this project despite cost any arguments we might put forward would have little effect." LAC, RG25-A-3-c. Volume/box number: 10422. File number: 27-20-5-TANZ Volume 13, "Telegram from Telegram from Canadian High Commissioner in Dar es Salaam to Canadian Undersecretary of State for External Affairs, RE: Assistance to Tanzanian Navy," August 11, 1966.
- 59 LAC, RG25-A-3-c. Volume/box number: 10422. File number: 27-20-5-TANZ Volume 13, "Telegram from Canadian High Commissioner in Washington, DC to Canadian Undersecretary of State for External Affairs, RE: Assistance to Tanzanian Navy," August 11, 1966. In particular, the Americans were stressing events on Zanzibar, which had been a point of sensitivity to the United States

since the expulsion of the American consul on Zanzibar, Frank Carlucci, for subversive activities in 1965. Carlucci was somewhat of a notorious Cold Warrior, but the expulsion effectively ruptured US–Tanzanian relations at a very sensitive time. It also obviously complicated American ability to directly offer aid on projects in Tanzania.

- 60 LAC, RG25-A-3-c. Volume/box number: 28236. File number: 27-1-2-TANZ Volume 3, “Telegram from Canadian High Commissioner in Washington, DC to Canadian Undersecretary of State for External Affairs, RE: Assistance to Tanzanian Navy,” August 31, 1966.
- 61 LAC, RG25-A-3-c. Volume/box number: 28236. File number: 27-1-2-TANZ Volume 3, “Telegram from Canadian High Commissioner in Washington, DC to Canadian Undersecretary of State for External Affairs, RE: Assistance to Tanzanian Navy,” September 13, 1966.
- 62 LAC, RG25-A-3-c. Volume/box number: 28236. File number: 27-1-2-TANZ Volume 3, “Telegram from Canadian High Commissioner in Dar es Salaam to Canadian Undersecretary of State for External Affairs, RE: A Russian View of Tanzanian Defense Policies,” July 27, 1968 and Library and Archives Canada, RG25-A-3-c. Volume/box number: 10422. File number: 27-20-5-TANZ Volume 18, “Letter from Colonel Sheffield, Commander of Canadian Armed Forces Advising and Training Team Tanzania to General EM Reyno, Chief of Personnel, Canadian Armed Forces,” October 4, 1968.
- 63 LAC, RG25-A-3-c. Volume/box number: 10422. File number: 27-20-5-TANZ Volume 18, “Letter from Colonel Sheffield, Commander of Canadian Armed Forces Advising and Training Team Tanzania to General EM Reyno, Chief of Personnel, Canadian Armed Forces,” October 4, 1968. Colonel Sheffield specifically notes that “I am afraid the Tanzanians have been a bit naïve when they signed some of the agreements they have with the Chinese...” and “As with the Russian jet proposal their ability to apply sound judgement to the proposal is virtually nil.”
- 64 Some discussion of these dynamics are found in Library and Archives Canada, RG25-A-3-c. Volume/box number: 28236. File number: 27-1-2-TANZ Volume 3, “Telegram from Canadian High Commissioner in Dar es Salaam to Canadian Undersecretary of State for External Affairs, RE: A Russian View of Tanzanian Defense Policies,” July 27, 1968.
- 65 For the Navy in particular, this is a key discussion point in previous attempts at finding aid. LAC, RG25-A-3-c. Volume/box number: 10422. File number: 27-20-5-TANZ Volume 13, “Telegram from Canadian High Commissioner in Dar es Salaam to Canadian Undersecretary of State for External Affairs,” July 14, 1966.
- 66 Nyerere noted that military aid was the easiest thing in the world to get – you simply had to ask and a Cold War power would offer it. However, the Tanzanians, as noted, were very leery of becoming tied to any particular ideological bloc. This was discussed as far back as Nyerere’s infamous 1964 press conference – see Julius Nyerere, Press Conference on August 30, 1964. Personal Transcript gifted by Nestor Luanda.
- 67 LAC, RG25-A-3-c. Volume/box number: 10422. File number: 27-20-5-TANZ Volume 18, “Letter from Colonel Sheffield, Commander of Canadian Armed Forces Advising and Training Team Tanzania to General EM Reyno, Chief of Personnel, Canadian Armed Forces,” October 4, 1968.
- 68 Political Education Officers were often derogatorily referred to as Commissars by western observers, but internally their role was seen as one that helped continue to

reinforce civic virtues and education within the ranks. While initially these officers were not seen as effective additions, following basic military training many proved worthwhile leaders. Author interview with General Robert Mboma, February 19, 2016.

- 69 LAC, RG25-A-3-c. Volume/box number: 28236. File number: 27-1-2-TANZ Volume 3, "Telegram from Canadian High Commissioner in Dar es Salaam to Canadian Undersecretary of State for External Affairs, RE: A Russian View of Tanzanian Defense Policies," July 27, 1968.
- 70 LAC, RG25-A-3-c. Volume/box number: 10422. File number: 27-20-5-TANZ Volume XX, "Chinese Influence in Africa," July 31, 1970.
- 71 Anderson Ghulila et al., *TPDF: An Operational History*, Dubai: Creo Ltd, 2012, 22.
- 72 It must be noted that while the TPDF Personnel appreciated the aid and instruction that the Chinese were offering, they did not necessarily desire to import the Chinese society that encountered. LAC, RG25-A-3-c. Volume/box number: 10422. File number: 27-20-5-TANZ Volume 18, "Letter from Colonel Sheffield, Commander of Canadian Armed Forces Advising and Training Team Tanzania to General EM Reyno, Chief of Personnel, Canadian Armed Forces," October 4, 1968 and author interview with General Robert Mboma, February 19, 2016.
- 73 Ghulila et al., *TPDF: An Operational History*, 24.
- 74 *Ibid.*, 103–13.
- 75 "Tanzanian Navy Commissions New Vessels," *DefenceWeb* (blog), May 6, 2015, www.defenceweb.co.za/sea/sea-sea/tanzanian-navy-commissions-new-vessels/. (accessed April 1, 2022).