

AURÉLIE DIANARA ANDRY

SOCIAL EUROPE, THE ROAD NOT TAKEN

**The Left and
European Integration
in the Long 1970s**

OXFORD

OXFORD STUDIES IN MODERN
EUROPEAN HISTORY

General Editors

SIMON DIXON MARK MAZOWER
AND JAMES RETALLACK

Social Europe, the Road not Taken

*The Left and European Integration
in the Long 1970s*

AURÉLIE DIANARA ANDRY

OXFORD
UNIVERSITY PRESS

OXFORD
UNIVERSITY PRESS

Great Clarendon Street, Oxford, OX2 6DP,
United Kingdom

Oxford University Press is a department of the University of Oxford.
It furthers the University's objective of excellence in research, scholarship,
and education by publishing worldwide. Oxford is a registered trade mark of
Oxford University Press in the UK and in certain other countries

© Aurélie Dianara Andry 2022

The moral rights of the author have been asserted

First Edition published in 2022

Impression: 1

Some rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in
a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means, for commercial purposes,
without the prior permission in writing of Oxford University Press, or as expressly
permitted by law, by licence or under terms agreed with the appropriate
reprographics rights organization.



This is an open access publication, available online and distributed under the terms of a
Creative Commons Attribution – Non Commercial – No Derivatives 4.0
International licence (CC BY-NC-ND 4.0), a copy of which is available at
<http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/>.

Enquiries concerning reproduction outside the scope of this licence
should be sent to the Rights Department, Oxford University Press, at the address above

Published in the United States of America by Oxford University Press
198 Madison Avenue, New York, NY 10016, United States of America

British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data

Data available

Library of Congress Control Number: 2022936802

ISBN 978-0-19-286709-4

DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780192867094.001.0001

Printed and bound by
CPI Group (UK) Ltd, Croydon, CR0 4YY

Links to third party websites are provided by Oxford in good faith and
for information only. Oxford disclaims any responsibility for the materials
contained in any third party website referenced in this work.

Preface

This book is the result of several years of research carried out first at the European University Institute in Florence, then at the University of Paris Sorbonne and at the University of Glasgow; it has received funding by the European Research Council under the European Union's Horizon 2020 research and innovation programme (Grant Agreement no. 716849).

Above all, it has benefited from the discussions I have had the chance to have with many researchers, and from their invaluable work on which I have built. I am also grateful to the staff of the archives, libraries, and documentation centres, as well as to technical and administrative university staff, without whom this book would not have come about. Special thanks to Federico Romero, Antonella Romano, Laura Lee Downs, Hannah Eklund, Rían Derrig-Eklund, Giuliano Garavini, Haakon A. Ikonomou, Nancy Fraser, Wolfgang Streeck, Joel White, Roberto Ventresca, Rosa Gilbert, Piers Ludlow, Emmanuel Mourlon-Druol, Alexis Drach, and Lorenzo Alba for guidance, advice, proofreading, stimulating conversations, and encouragement.

Contents

<i>List of Abbreviations</i>	ix
Introduction	1
Social Europe, the Road Not Taken	1
Why This Forgotten Struggle Matters	8
Methodology and Book Structure	21
1. The ‘Social Dimension’ of Postwar Europe	27
The European Rescue of ‘Welfare Capitalism’	29
Liberalism, Social Welfare, and the Treaty of Rome	42
Socialism and European Integration	51
2. 1968, 1969: Social Protest, European ‘Revival’	60
The Spirit of 1968 and Europe’s Social Deficit	61
The Left’s (Crippled) European Turn	74
The Hague, 1969: European Revival and Social Policy	88
3. A New Social Wind	97
False New Start	98
Europe Goes Left	104
Enlargement and ‘Socialist Europe’	116
The 1972 Paris Summit: Economic, Monetary, and ‘Social Union’?	122
4. ‘For a Social Europe’	133
Socialism through Europe	134
The Socialists’ ‘Theses for a Social Europe’	145
The Social Action Programme	156
5. There Were Alternatives	167
European Socialism Turns Left	170
Beyond Capitalist Planning	179
A Socialist Alternative to Neoliberal Europe?	186
European Trade Unions beyond Keynes	195
6. The Defeat	203
Dropping the ‘European Social Union’	204
Trying Eurocorporatism	215
Takin’ It to the Streets	224
Renouncing Economic Democracy	239
Coup de Grâce	253

viii CONTENTS

Epilogue: The Road Taken	265
The Other 'Social Europe'	265
Reasons for the Defeat	279
<i>Bibliography</i>	295
<i>Index</i>	317

List of Abbreviations

ACLI	Christian Association of Italian Workers
ACUE	American Committee on United Europe
AES	Alternative Economic Strategy
AFL	American Federation of Labor
APO	Extra-Parliamentary Opposition (Germany)
CAEUE	Comité d'action pour les États-Unis d'Europe
CAP	Common Agricultural Policy
CCOO	Spanish Workers' Commissions
CDU	Christian Democratic Union
CEDEFOP	European Centre for the Development of Vocational Training
CEEP	European Centre of Employers and Enterprises
CERES	Centre d'études, de recherches et d'éducation socialiste
CeSPE	Centro studi di politica economica
CFDT	French Democratic Confederation of Labour
CGB	Christian Trade Union Federation of Germany
CGIL	Italian General Confederation of Labour
CGT	General Confederation of Labour (France)
CGTP	General Confederation of the Portuguese Workers
CIA	Central Intelligence Agency
CIO	Congress of Industrial Organizations
CISL	Italian Confederation of Workers' Trade Unions
CJEC	Court of Justice of the European Communities
CNPF	Conseil national du patronat français
CNV	Christian National Trade Union Federation
Comecon	Council for Mutual Economic Assistance
COPA	Committee of Professional Agricultural Organizations
CSPEC	Confederation of Socialist Parties of the EC
CSV	Christian Social People's Party
DG	Directorate-General
DGB	German Trade Union Confederation
DGV	Directorate-General for Social Affairs
DKP	German Communist Party
EAGGF	European Agricultural Guidance and Guarantee Fund
EC	European Community/Communities
ECA	Economic Cooperation Administration
ECAE	European Community of Atomic Energy
ECB	European Central Bank
ECFTU	European Confederation of Free Trade Unions
ECJ	European Court of Justice

X LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

ECSC	European Coal and Steel Community
ECU	European Currency Unit
ED	European Democrats
EDC	European Defence Community
EEC	European Economic Community
EESC	European Economic and Social Committee
EFTA	European Free Trade Association
EIB	European Investment Bank
ELEC	European League for Economic Cooperation
EMS	European Monetary System
EMU	Economic and monetary union
EO-IFCTU	European Organization-IFCTU
EO-WCL	European Organization-WCL
EP	European Parliament
EPC	European Political Community
EPP	European People's Party
EPU	European Payments Union
ERDF	European Regional Development Fund
ERP	European Recovery Programme
ERT	European Round Table of Industrials
ESF	European Social Fund
ETUC	European Trade Union Confederation
ETUI	European Trade Union Institute
ETUS	European Trade Union Secretariat
EUA	European Unit of Account
EU	European Union
Euratom	European Atomic Energy Community
Eurofound	European Foundation for the Improvement of Living and Working Conditions
EWC	European Works Council
FDP	Free Democratic Party
FEN	National Education Federation
FGDS	Fédération de la gauche démocratique et socialiste
FGTB	General Labour Federation of Belgium
FRG	Federal Republic of Germany
FNV	Federation of Dutch Trade Unions
FO	Workers' Force (France)
GATT	General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
GDP	Gross domestic product
GDR	German Democratic Republic
GNP	Gross national product
ICFTU	International Confederation of Free Trade Unions
IFCTU	International Federation of Christian Trade Unions
ILO	International Labour Organization
ILP	Independent Labour Party
IMF	International Monetary Fund
IPSE	Initiative for Political and Social Economy

LD	Liberal and Democratic Group
LO	Danish and Swedish Trade Union Confederations
LSAP	Luxembourg Socialist Workers' Party
MEP	Member of the European Parliament
MEUSE	Movement for the United Socialist States of Europe (from 1947 Socialist Movement for the United States of Europe, MSEUE)
MISSOC	Mutual Information System on Social Protection
MRG	Mouvement des radicaux de gauche
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NEB	National Enterprise Board
NEC	National Executive Committee (of the British Labour Party)
NIEO	New International Economic Order
NKV	Industrial Workers' Union
NVV	Dutch Confederation of Trade Unions
OAPEC	Organization of Arab Petroleum Exporting Countries
OECD	Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
OEEC	Organization for European Economic Co-operation
OMC	Open Method of Coordination
OSS	Office of Strategic Services
PASOK	Panhellenic Socialist Movement
PCE	Spanish Communist Party
PCF	French Communist Party
PCI	Italian Communist Party
PIIGS	Portugal, Italy, Ireland, Greece, and Spain
PS	Parti socialiste (France)
PSB	Belgian Socialist Party
PSDI	Italian Social Democratic Party
PSI	Italian Socialist Party
PSIUP	Italian Socialist Party of Proletarian Unity
PSOE	Spanish Socialist Workers' Party
PSU	Parti socialiste unifié
PTT	Postal services and communications federations
PvdA	Dutch Labour Party
S/SAP	Swedish Social Democratic Party
SAP	Social Action Programme
SCE	Standing Committee on Employment
SDP	Social Democratic Party (UK)
SFIO	French Section of the Workers' International
SGEP	Socialist Group of the European Parliament of the European Communities
SPD	Social Democratic Party of Germany
SPÖ	Socialist Party of Austria
TCE	Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe
TUC	Trades Union Congress (Britain)
UGT	Spanish General Union of Workers
UIL	Italian Labour Union
UK	United Kingdom

xii LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

UNCTAD	United Nations Conference on Trade and Development
UNCTC	United Nations Centre on Transnational Corporations
UNICE	Union of Industrial and Employers' Confederations of Europe
US	United States
VAT	Value added tax
WEO	Western European Union
WFTU	World Federation of Trade Unions

Introduction

For a solution to this structural crisis of capitalism to come about, new socialist forces would have to be recomposed in the West, operating on a continental scale in Europe, replacing the failing national state with a supranational state capable of managing on that scale the new social compromise. This perspective seemed to be taking shape in the 1970s, after the great ideological upheaval of 1968. [...] The fact remains that all the hopes that might have been entertained at the time simply went up in smoke, as the Western Left missed the opportunity to renew itself.¹

Social Europe, the Road Not Taken

In recent years, ‘Europe’—nowadays a widespread metonym for ‘the European Union’ (EU)—has faced rising unpopularity. Back in 2005, the French and Dutch citizens’ votes rejecting the Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe (TCE), followed by an Irish vote against the Lisbon Treaty in 2008, already indicated a deep crisis of democratic legitimacy. The ever-lower rates of participation in the elections to the European Parliament (EP), together with the growing electoral scores of the so-called ‘Eurosceptics’, both on the Left but mostly on the Right and far-Right of the political spectrum, have been further indicators of this trend. At least on the Left, the European response to the economic and debt crisis that followed the 2007–8 financial shock, the disputes among European governments over the European budget and European solidarity, the austerity measures imposed against their will on the Greek people (and on other ‘PIIGS’), the billions of euros spent to save European banks while public services and social expenses shrivelled under the watch of the ‘Troika’ (European Commission, European Central Bank and International Monetary Fund), all contributed to darken the picture. Mounting fears about immigration fed by right-wing propaganda did too. In 2016, the ‘Brexit’ vote of the British people, which announced the first withdrawal in the EU’s over-sixty-year history, added to the perception that ‘Europe’ was disintegrating.

¹ Samir Amin, *Mémoires: L'éveil du Sud* (Paris: Indes savantes, 2015), 175 (author’s translation).

More recently, the extraordinary health, economic, and social crisis generated by the Coronavirus pandemic was, at least initially, a further blow to the image of the European Union. As China and Cuba were sending material and human resources to help Italian health staff, other European countries shied away, governments acted separately, and the EU was almost absent from the scene in the first weeks of the disaster. While European citizens were facing a dramatic health emergency which had already claimed thousands of victims and some countries' health systems threatened to collapse in the spring of 2020, the European Council only painfully overcame its traditional divisions over financial and budgetary solidarity. The Commission's vaccine strategy has also been criticized for its opacity and messiness; and the virus raised the question of the short-sightedness of the economic and social formulas designed in Brussels, as it exposed the European Commission's role in pressuring member states to reduce expenses and introduce privatization in the public health sector. It remains to be seen whether recent evolutions, like the €750 billion 'Next Generation EU' package eventually adopted by the European Council and supported by the unprecedented creation of mutual bonds will, in the long run, alter this ingraining unpopularity.

All these recent predicaments have brought to the fore questions that had previously remained relatively side-lined. Among these, the question of the fundamental social purpose of European integration, and its consequences for people's lives, is essential. 'Europe' is increasingly seen (and often denounced) as one of the main actors of a 'neoliberal' shift in public policies that took place in recent decades. The neoliberal doctrines—characterized in short by the consecration of 'free and undistorted' global competition and market-oriented policies such as liberalization of trade, finance, and services, increased labour flexibility, monetary rigour, decreasing taxes on wealth and businesses, privatization, and a reduction in public sector and social expenditure—rouse growing resentment as they are more and more identified with rising inequalities in Europe and worldwide, and with the dismantling of social welfare. As both Brexit and to some extent the unexpected French Yellow Vests' movement recently illustrated, today lower and decaying middle classes tend to blame European political elites and the EU for exclusively favouring the rich and being responsible for their declining living standards.

Against this rising social conflict and decreasing popularity of 'neoliberal Europe', responses diverge—including on the Left. While some believe that there is no room within the European Union and its treaties to build a socially progressive Europe, and thus favour leaving, others continue to plead for a profound reform of European treaties and institutions in order to build a 'social Europe'. Mostly championed by present-day inheritors of the social-democratic tradition—today's 'Centre-Left'—this idea of a 'social Europe' often entails ingredients such as greater competences and upward harmonization at the European level in the fields of social and fiscal policies, an increased EU budget and improved European

solidarity mechanisms and funds, the creation of a solidarity-based monetary and banking union, enhanced powers to the EP and greater transparency of Eurozone governance, greater political accountability of the European Central Bank (ECB), and, sometimes, a European ‘New Deal’ strategy coupled with re-regulation of financial transactions and trade according to socially and ecologically sustainable goals.²

Of course, ‘social Europe’ is an elusive concept: a concept that has regularly been brandished—but rarely precisely defined—by European elites in search of assent in recent decades. It has been a promise of the European centre-Left in the run-up to each and every European election or referendum since the first direct election of the EP in 1979.³ So much so that for some years now the idea of a ‘social Europe’ has started to lose its appeal, often being mocked as a dream that will never materialize, or more harshly attacked as an ‘alibi’ used to disguise the actual construction of a liberal Europe.⁴ Some even consider ‘social Europe’ as a plain countersense, as European integration plans were marked from the outset with the seal of United States (US) domination and designed as a liberal and capitalist economic project.⁵

Though it is clear that the idea of ‘social Europe’ has been around for some time, little is known about the origins of the concept. For some historians, the idea could be traced back to the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, when projects to harmonize social policies at the European scale emerged among international ‘social reformist’ circles and organizations such as the International Labour Organization (ILO).⁶ During the Second World War and in its immediate aftermath, some, like the famous French intellectual Jean-Paul Sartre and his colleagues on the journal *Les Temps modernes*, cultivated the hope of building a peaceful, democratic, and social—or perhaps more precisely *socialist*—Europe, atop the ruins of Germany’s nationalist Europe.⁷ This hope even nourished some of the earliest projects of European postwar unification among the Resistance. Although it is rarely remembered, the famous 1941 *Ventotene Manifesto*, the holy book of European federalism written by Altiero Spinelli and Ernesto Rossi while

² Some of the main advocates of such a ‘social Europe’ publish regularly on the online media outlet *Social Europe*, available at <https://www.socialeurope.eu>.

³ See, for instance, this collection of audiovisual archives showing French socialist leaders promising ‘social Europe’ since 1979: <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=pMRgQQ7TNr8>.

⁴ For instance, in Hubert Bouchet, ‘L’Arlésienne du social’, *Le Monde diplomatique*, July 1996, <https://www.monde-diplomatique.fr/1996/07/BOUCHET/5636>.

⁵ François Denord and Antoine Schwartz, *L’Europe sociale n’aura pas lieu* (Paris: Raisons d’agir, 2009).

⁶ See, for instance, Rainer Gregarek, ‘Le Mirage de l’Europe sociale: Associations internationales de politique sociale au tournant du 20e siècle’, *Vingtième Siècle: Revue d’histoire* 48, no. 1 (1995): 103–18; Sylvain Schirmann, ‘Albert Thomas, il BIT e i progetti di Europa sociale fra le due guerre’, in *Lionello Levi Sandri e la politica sociale europea*, ed. Lorenzo Mechi and Antonio Varsori (Milan: Angeli, 2008), 119–32.

⁷ Stève Bessac-Vaure, ‘L’idée européenne dans *Esprit* et *Les Temps modernes*: Penser ou construire l’Europe? Idéalisme intellectuel et refus du réalisme (1945–1954)’, *Siècles: Cahiers du Centre d’histoire «Espaces et Cultures»*, no. 41 (2015).

they were prisoners of the fascist Italian regime, called not just for a free and united Europe but also for a socialist Europe:

A free and united Europe is the prerequisite for the development of modern civilization, of which the totalitarian era represents an interruption. As soon as this era comes to an end, the historical process of struggle against social inequalities and privileges will be restored in full. [...]

To meet our needs, the European revolution must be socialist in nature; in other words, its goal must be the emancipation of the working classes and the guarantee of more humane living conditions for them.⁸

These few examples highlight the ambiguous and polysemic nature of this concept. Indeed, in political, journalistic, and academic discourse, ‘social Europe’ is alternately understood as a project to harmonize social policies at the level of the continent, as a left-wing—most often social-democratic—project of European governance, or as the various competences of the European Union in the field of employment and social policy. The line between these different meanings is often blurry.

Notwithstanding this elusiveness, it is usually alleged that actual progress in the realization of ‘social Europe’ mainly took place since the mid-1980s, thanks to the activism of the French socialist Jacques Delors, then President of the European Commission (1985–95). In the discourse of European political elites, the story usually goes along the following lines. In the beginnings of today’s European ‘construction’, during the postwar years, European policymakers did not pay much attention to social issues because they believed that social progress would naturally flow out of the prosperity generated by economic integration. This ‘social deficit’ remained practically unchallenged until Delors, the uncontested ‘father of social Europe’, opened the way to the adoption of a series of social directives and action programmes, the institutionalization of ‘European social dialogue’, the reinforcement of European social and cohesion funds, and gradually increasing European competences and regulation in the social field. Overall, this story is often told in a somewhat teleological fashion, as a progressive but difficult endeavour to balance economic integration with social integration.⁹

Although in less hagiographic terms, a similar depiction can also be found in the academic literature. The few historical accounts of the social dimension of European integration since the Second World War, as well as the extensive social

⁸ Altiero Spinelli and Ernesto Rossi, *Il manifesto di Ventotene* (Rome: Centro italiano di formazione europea, 1988), 53 (author’s translation).

⁹ An example is the account of a former director-general for social affairs of the European Commission: Jean Degimbe, *La Politique sociale européenne: Du traité de Rome au traité d’Amsterdam* (Brussels: ISE, 1999).

and political science literature on the topic, tend to present the period that started with the Delors Commission as a ‘golden age’ whereas the previous decades are depicted at best as a prehistory of social Europe.¹⁰ This is somewhat true to the extent that ‘social Europe’ is understood as the consolidation of competences in the social field at the level of the EU, but not if it is understood as a European project for ‘the emancipation of the working classes and the guarantee of more humane living conditions for them’, in Spinelli and Rossi’s words—in other words, a socialist project.

In contrast, this book argues that the critical highpoint of ‘social Europe’ as a political project and battle was in fact what we could call the ‘long 1970s’, roughly stretching between the late 1960s and the mid-1980s. During those years, part of the European Left—not least European socialists¹¹—tried to imagine and promote an alternative European unity project that ambitioned to transform the nature of European cooperation and integration along democratic and socialist lines. Successful European unification plans since the end of the war had undoubtedly been mainly centred on economic cooperation and inclined towards economic liberalism, with scarce consideration for social issues. Instead, the alternative European project explored in this book favoured wealth redistribution, market regulation, social and economic planning, increased public control over investments and economic forces, economic democratization, upward harmonization of European social and fiscal regimes, improved working and living conditions, guarantee of the right to work, and access to social protection for all. It also included environmental concerns, proposals for a democratization of European institutions, and claims to rebalance the international system to favour the development of the rising ‘Third World’.

More than just an aspiration to balance market liberalization with harmonization of social regimes and implementation of social policies at the European level, ‘social Europe’ as understood by its promoters back then took the shape of a broad European socio-economic governance reform project. Its fundamental

¹⁰ The expression is used for instance in Jean-Claude Barbier, *The Road to Social Europe: A Contemporary Approach to Political Cultures and Diversity in Europe* (Abingdon; New York: Routledge, 2013). See also René Leboutte, *Histoire économique et sociale de la construction européenne* (Brussels: PIE Peter Lang, 2008); Antonio Varsori, ‘Development of European Social Policy’, in *Experiencing Europe: 50 Years of European Construction 1957–2007*, ed. Wilfried Loth (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2009), 169–92; Robert Geyer, *Exploring European Social Policy: An Explanation* (Malden, Mass: Blackwell, 2000). Note that some authors, such as Barbier, argue that this ‘golden age’ ended in the 2000s.

¹¹ Throughout the book, the terms ‘European socialists’ and ‘European social democrats’ are used generally as quasi-synonyms when referring to the parties in western Europe that adhered to the Socialist International, the CSPEC, and the Socialist Group of the European Parliament. For a brief overview of this political family, see for instance Stefan Berger, ‘Social Democratic Trajectories in Modern Europe: One or Many Families?’, in *The Future of European Social Democracy: Building the Good Society*, ed. Henning Meyer and Jonathan Rutherford (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012), 13–26.

stated goal was to turn ‘Europe’—starting with the European Community (EC)¹², the forerunner of the EU—into an instrument serving social progress and working-class interests. ‘Social Europe’, also often referred to as ‘workers’ Europe’, was, in short, a proposal for a rather different future than the one we inhabit today. Socialist and social-democratic parties in western European countries were not the only promoters of this alternative European project. European trade unions and some communist parties pushed in a similar direction in these years, and a broad alliance of the European Left in support of this project was—at least in theory—conceivable.

And the European Left happened to have the wind in its sails in those years. The long 1970s were a time of great social contestation virtually everywhere in Europe, which burst out with the famous protests of 1968. They were also the culmination of the post-1945 golden years of western European social democracy (some would say its Indian summer), when prominent figures like Olof Palme, Willy Brandt, Bruno Kreisky, Harold Wilson, and Joop Den Uyl found themselves able to sit at the table of world leaders. Social democrats in fact led governments for much or part of the period in Sweden, Norway, Denmark, West Germany, Austria, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom, then Portugal, France, Greece, and Spain, and took part in several coalition governments in Italy, Belgium, Ireland, and Luxembourg. At the same time, new prospects seemed to be opening for western European communists, who also had remarkable electoral successes, especially in France and Italy—where the Italian Communist Party (PCI) reached over 34 per cent of the vote and made its way closer to government by sealing a ‘historic compromise’ with the ever-ruling Christian Democrats— and who were following their own path to ‘Eurocommunism’. For their part, the European trade unions also reached a peak, especially in terms of membership and combativity. This leftward trend constituted a fertile ground for a new ‘social Europe’ project, which progressively emerged in the 1970s, and grew stronger throughout the decade.

The long 1970s that opened with the great contestation of the ‘1968s’ marked an epochal shift in the history of western Europe, as for the broader world. It was a decade in which the international economic and political order underwent profound and accelerating dislocations: the fall of the Bretton Woods monetary system, the exhaustion of the economic boom that had followed the Second World War, a momentary weakening of US leadership, a détente of Cold War tensions and the gradual opening of East–West dialogue, the affirmation of a union of

¹² The European Community (also often referred to as the European Communities), initially formed by six European member countries (France, Italy, West Germany, the Netherlands, Belgium, and Luxembourg), consisted of three international organizations—the European Coal and Steel Community, the European Economic Community (often referred to as the ‘Common Market’), and the European Community of Atomic Energy. They were eventually incorporated into the European Union in 1993.

'Third World' countries for a redistribution of power and wealth, the 1973 and 1979 oil shocks, economic downturn, currency crises, and the emergence of 'stagflation' and unemployment, the world economic crisis of 1981–2 sparked by the US central bank's interest rate hikes, and so on. The postwar 'social compromise' characterized by social-democratic recipes was seriously challenged, as was Keynesian capitalism, and a new window of opportunity was opening for new alternatives. In those years, the world—and western Europe in particular—seemed to be at a crossroads.

During the long 1970s, indeed, radically divergent solutions were envisaged. In an ironic illustration of this tension, in 1974, the Nobel Economics Prize was jointly awarded to two rather contrasting thinkers: the influential social-democratic Swedish economist Gunnar Myrdal and the Austrian-British neoliberal champion Friedrich von Hayek. Several roads were open, and for a time it seemed like a shift to the left of western Europe and a reshuffling of European cooperation and of world relations away from the postwar international order was possible. Several 'social Europe' proposals made their way onto the agenda of European policymakers. In 1973, the EC's first enlargement to include three new members—the United Kingdom (UK), Ireland, and Denmark—also opened new prospects for 'Europe.' Now the largest commercial area in the world, with its postcolonial ties extending throughout the globe and agreements with a wide array of countries in northern Europe, in the Mediterranean rim, and throughout Africa, the Caribbean, and the Pacific, it was becoming an economic giant and a more significant international actor with its own regional economic sphere of influence, which had the potential to weigh in an unprecedented way on world trade and monetary, economic, social, and political relations. In those years, it looked as if the EC could become a 'most favoured' partner for the developing countries which were struggling for a 'New International Economic Order' (NIEO) and be turned into a 'workers' Europe'.¹³

Instead, in the following years, the European Left's alternative vision for Europe would be increasingly battled by the new conservative formulas emerging under the banner of neoliberalism. Between 1979 and 1982, the Right came back to power in the UK, the US, and West Germany when Margaret Thatcher, Ronald Reagan, and Helmut Kohl were elected. The electoral victories of the former two are generally regarded as key political events marking neoliberalism's ascendancy. By the mid-1980s, after a series of tussles over some of the key proposals for a 'social Europe' in Brussels, it appeared more and more evident that 'Europe' was taking a different road than the one imagined by most of the European Left. The global window of opportunity that had opened in the late 1960s had been slowly closing with a European and global restructuring of capitalism. After 1986, with

¹³ Giuliano Garavini, *After Empires: European Integration, Decolonization, and the Challenge from the Global South, 1957–1985* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012).

the implementation of the single market programme and later economic and monetary union (EMU), increasing liberalization and budget rigour, national welfare states came under growing pressure whereas supranational forms of welfare making—the ‘European welfare state’—remained largely embryonic. ‘Social Europe’—or, rather, that particular idea of ‘social Europe’ that had been supported by the Left during the long 1970s—had been defeated.

Why This Forgotten Struggle Matters

Retracing this ‘road not taken’ is the main aim of this book. It is important for several reasons, some of which seem particularly salient. First, it helps in revisiting the historical relationship of socialists and other forces of the Left with European integration. As the main forces claiming to represent the lower, disempowered classes in modern societies and to engage in a democratic and social struggle, left-wing political parties have of course received wide historical attention. Their relation to European economic, social, and political integration, however, only figures sporadically, if at all, in the essential historical accounts of the Left in modern Europe.¹⁴ The dominant role of European conservative and liberal spheres in shaping the first decades of postwar integration is evident and partly explains this omission.¹⁵ Against the backdrop of exacerbating Cold War tensions and the polarization of world politics into two main ‘blocs’ in the late 1940s, European reconstruction and integration plans became one of the most contentious questions for the European Left. Comparing left parties’ different positions and documenting transnational debates regarding ‘Europe’ in postwar decades, historians have usually highlighted differences and divisions.¹⁶ There is in fact a widespread emphasis in the literature on the Left’s initial lack of support for European integration and its limitation—despite its internationalist rhetoric—to a national political framework, and an assumption that it did not engage in serious or efficient efforts to weigh on European decisions.¹⁷

However, focusing on transnational networks and exchanges, recent studies have highlighted socialists’ continued practice of internationalism and growing

¹⁴ For instance, Donald Sassoon, *One Hundred Years of Socialism: The West European Left in the Twentieth Century* (London: I.B. Tauris, 1996); Geoff Eley, *Forging Democracy: The History of the Left in Europe, 1850–2000* (Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press, 2002).

¹⁵ Wolfram Kaiser, *Christian Democracy and the Origins of European Union* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007).

¹⁶ Kevin Featherstone, *Socialist Parties and European Integration: A Comparative History* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1988); Michel Dreyfus, *L’Europe des socialistes* (Paris: Éditions complexe, 1991).

¹⁷ For instance, Sassoon, *One Hundred Years of Socialism*, 1996; Laurent Warlouzet, *Governing Europe in a Globalizing World: Neoliberalism and Its Alternatives Following the 1973 Oil Crisis* (London: Routledge, 2018); Thomas Piketty, *Capital and Ideology* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2020).

European cooperation.¹⁸ During the 1970s especially, as socialist parties represented the strongest political force in western Europe and in the EC, they significantly increased their formal and informal transnational cooperation in order to weigh on European politics.¹⁹ A similar Europeanization process was taking place during those years among trade unions and (although perhaps to a lesser extent) communist parties, which made important efforts to increase transnational cooperation, organize at western European level and influence EC policies.²⁰ Since the late 1960s and early 1970s, with the prospect of enlargement and enhancement of the EC's role, and with rising concern about the internationalization of capital, the growing power of multinationals, and growing global interdependence, transnational cooperation at European level and beyond appeared more and more as a necessity for the Left. It became even more pressing with the prospect of direct elections to the European Parliament decided at The Hague in 1969, which would materialize for the first time in 1979.

Besides, between the 1950s and early 1970s most left-wing forces in western Europe—not just socialists and not just parties, but communists and trade unions as well—progressively moved away from their initial rejection of, or suspicion towards, European economic integration. Although discussions and tensions on the question of 'Europe' persisted throughout these years, by the 1970s with few exceptions the European Left had undergone a 'European turn': it had accepted the common market as an objective reality, increasingly supported western European unity, and convinced itself that the EC could be turned into a useful tool to achieve its objectives.²¹ This turn was not limited to political leaders: European populations, including left-wing constituencies, increasingly supported European projects of unity as well.

Today, as the nature of the EU appears increasingly at odds with the Left's traditional values and objectives, and the question of the compatibility between economic liberalism and social welfare is thriving, it seems crucial to revisit the

¹⁸ Talbot Imlay, *The Practice of Socialist Internationalism: European Socialists and International Politics, 1914–1960* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018); Kristian Steinnes, *The British Labour Party, Transnational Influences and European Community Membership, 1960–1973* (Stuttgart: Franz Steiner Verlag, 2014).

¹⁹ Christian Salm, *Transnational Socialist Networks in the 1970s: European Community Development Aid and Southern Enlargement* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2016).

²⁰ For instance, Christophe Degryse and Pierre Tilly, *1973–2013: 40 Years of History of the European Trade Union Confederation* (Brussels: ETUI, 2013); Barbara Barnouin, *The European Labour Movement and European Integration* (London: F. Pinter, 1986); Maud Bracke, 'From the Atlantic to the Urals? Italian and French Communism and the Question of Europe, 1956–1973', *Journal of European Integration History* 13, no. 2 (2007): 33–53.

²¹ See, for instance, Kristian Steinnes, 'The European Turn and "Social Europe": Northern European Social Democracy 1950–85', *Archiv für Sozialgeschichte*, no. 53 (2013): 363–84; Richard Dunphy, *Contesting Capitalism? Left Parties and European Integration* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2004).

history of this European turn.²² In a recent study, Brian Shaev showed that French and German socialists' choice to support the common market in the postwar years was rooted in a long ideological consensus among transnational socialists that free trade was preferable to protectionism.²³ In this view, however, trade liberalization could only be envisaged if it was complemented with trade organization through planning, regulation, and a degree of unification of—for instance—taxes, salaries, and social security. Socialists' adherence to the European project after the Second World War therefore relied on an imprecise conviction that some degree of inter- or supra-national centralized control was necessary, and conceivable in the framework of the EC. Similarly, non-communist trade unions supported European economic integration but emphasized the need to balance it with a 'social integration' understood as an upward adjustment of social conditions with a view to achieving a maximum degree of harmonization to avoid social dumping.²⁴ By the end of the 1960s, as I will show, left-wing forces realized that economic liberalization had been prioritized to the detriment of economic and social coordination—a priority that, they felt, was no longer bearable. The long 1970s thus saw an alignment of most left-wing forces on a broad reformist project to reverse this tendency and implement a new European governance.

Few historical works have, however, addressed the question of how left-wing forces attempted to design a common political programme at the European level, to formulate common policy objectives regarding European integration, and to 'change Europe' from within. This book contributes to filling this gap by highlighting the Left's efforts to build a common project for a 'social Europe', exploring the concrete proposals contained in this project, tracing its evolution, and assessing its scope. Of course, 'social Europe' was never—and should not be understood as—a clear-cut platform but rather a loose, evolving, and somewhat heterogeneous political project complexified by the diversity of ideological legacies of socialism and their national histories. Reconstructing this political project in all its complexity enables a better understanding of the rationale (and internal contradictions) behind the left's 'European turn', the strategies imagined with the aim of gearing European integration along socialist and democratic lines, and the connections and alliances between the different forces of the Left in this endeavour.

Writing his memoirs a few years ago, the famous Egyptian-French radical political economist Samir Amin lamented the European Left's missed opportunity,

²² A question that has attracted surprisingly little attention from historians. A noteworthy recent exception is Lucia Coppolaro and Lorenzo Mechi, eds., *Free Trade and Social Welfare in Europe: Explorations in the Long 20th Century* (Abingdon; New York: Routledge, 2020).

²³ Brian Shaev, 'Liberalising Regional Trade: Socialists and European Economic Integration', *Contemporary European History* 27, no. 2 (2018): 258–79.

²⁴ Lorenzo Mechi, 'A Precondition for Economic Integration? European Debates on Social Harmonisation in the 1950s and 1960s', in *Free Trade and Social Welfare in Europe: Explorations in the Long 20th Century*, ed. Lucia Coppolaro and Lorenzo Mechi (Abingdon; New York: Routledge, 2020), 76.

during the 1970s, to renew itself and ‘substitute to the failing national state a supranational state capable of managing’, at the scale of the European continent, a ‘new social compromise.’²⁵ This book attempts to shed light on this missed opportunity, arguing that there did indeed exist on the Left such a project to build a new social compromise at the European level—although the construction of a European ‘super-state’ was never truly envisaged, as the European Left favoured multi-level cooperation for a more social and democratic Europe, including but not limited to supranational solutions.

This project for a new social compromise was, in many regards, an attempt to respond to the erosion of the postwar compromise and delegitimizing of the Keynesian welfare state that came both from the great social contestation and from the post-1973 economic crisis. The aim was to renew socialism on a European ground to address some of the demands raised by the new social movements that emerged after 1968 and fed European political imaginaries throughout the 1970s—workers’, feminist, environmental, and peace movements, but also the return of Marxist theories in universities, the emergence of the ‘New Left’, the radicalization of young people, and the ‘Third World’ movement and its claims for a NIEO—and to use the EC to strengthen control over capital beyond the national level. Indeed, a central argument of this book is that the long 1970s witnessed a remarkable leftward tendency among European societies, which had a direct impact on discussions and negotiations between the forces of the European Left about the definition of their ‘social Europe’ project. Within European social democracy, a power struggle was taking place between ‘radical’, ‘mainstream’ and social-liberal currents. Whereas only the strengthened radical currents were striving for a transition to socialism, many even on the mainstream now contemplated alternative economic policies going beyond the Keynesian consensus and further constraining capital and private property through greater economic democracy, capital control, redistribution, extended welfare, and social and economic planning at the continent level. ‘Social Europe’ was an important stake in this attempt by the European Left to renew itself and propose an alternative both to the Keynesian welfare state and to neoliberal-neoconservative formulas.²⁶ Yet, for many reasons that will be explored here, this more radical ‘social Europe’ never saw the light of day.

The defeat—or surrender—of ‘social Europe’ had long-lasting repercussions on the European Left itself. Indeed, this story is not just about the Left’s role in shaping European integration—it is also about European integration’s influence upon the Left. There is an ample debate in the historical literature regarding the transformation of European social democracy in the last quarter of the twentieth

²⁵ Amin, *Mémoires*, 175 (author’s translation).

²⁶ See also Ingo Schmidt, ‘There Were Alternatives: Lessons from Efforts to Advance beyond Keynesian and Neoliberal Economic Policies in the 1970s’, *WorkingUSA* 14, no. 4 (December 2011): 473–98.

century and whether this was a process of ‘neoliberalization’ or something slightly different.²⁷ It is hardly deniable, however, that during that time European socialists renounced the pursuit of Keynesian and demand-sided policies, market regulation and control of capital, planning and public ownership; and ended up accepting increasing liberalization of capital markets, embracing competition as the best way to create value, envisaging the market and globalization as things that should be supported (and to which there was no alternative), adapting their policies to attract capital investment, mistrusting public sector activities, advocating ‘austerity’, and so on.²⁸ In short, during those years, ‘the primacy of politics’ gave way to the primacy of the markets as the core of socialists’ ideology; the old Left rearticulated politics around the imperatives of markets, competition, and globalization.²⁹ By the 1990s, as noted by Geoff Eley, ‘No one talked any longer of abolishing capitalism, of regulating its dysfunctions and excesses, or even of modifying its most egregiously destructive social effects.’³⁰ This progressive programmatic change, along with a sociological shift away from the lower classes and towards educated middle classes, is actually shared almost unanimously by European (non-radical) left-wing parties and seems to have become today their largest liability.

The part played by European integration and European institutions in this shift is subject to debate, although rarely researched by historians. Some, usually close to the social-democratic family, argue that part of the Left—starting with Delors at the head of the European Commission—attempted to bring to the European level socio-economic objectives that could no longer, at a time of increasing globalization, be pursued solely at the national level.³¹ In this view, European

²⁷ On the alignment of social democracy on the ‘neoliberal’ or ‘market’ paradigm, see, for instance, Sassoon, *One Hundred Years of Socialism*; Gerassimos Moschonas, *In the Name of Social Democracy: The Great Transformation, 1945 to the Present* (London: Verso, 2002); John T. Callaghan, *The Retreat of Social Democracy* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2000); Fabien Escalona, *La Reconversion partisane de la social-démocratie européenne: Du régime social-démocrate keynésien au régime social-démocrate de marché* (Paris: Dalloz, 2018); Johan Magnus Ryner, ‘Neoliberalisation of Social Democracy: Transmissions and Dispositions’, *The SAGE Handbook of Neoliberalism* (London: SAGE, 2018), 248–59. Jenny Andersson, on the other hand, describes social democracy’s ‘Third Way’ shift in the 1990s as a distinct political economy based on the concept of ‘knowledge economy’: Jenny Andersson, *The Library and the Workshop: Social Democracy and Capitalism in the Knowledge Age* (Redwood City, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 2010).

²⁸ A process that was underpinned by the gradual transformation of the Left’s economic experts’ sociological and educational profile. See Stephanie L. Mudge, *Leftism Reinvented: Western Parties from Socialism to Neoliberalism* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2018); Johanna Bockman, *Markets in the Name of Socialism: The Left-Wing Origins of Neoliberalism* (Redwood City, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 2011).

²⁹ Sheri Berman, *The Primacy of Politics: Social Democracy and the Making of Europe’s Twentieth Century* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006).

³⁰ Eley, *Forging Democracy*, vii.

³¹ For a survey of the different interpretations of European socialists’ support for European integration, see Michele di Donato, ‘The European Social Democrats: Neoliberalism or Internationalism?’, in Michele Di Donato, Silvio Pons (eds.), *European Integration and the Global Financial Crisis: Looking Back on the Maastricht Years, 1980s-1990s*, Palgrave Macmillan (forthcoming).

socialists' and other left-wing forces' commitment to European integration (and, in the mid-1980s, to the deepening of the single market) actually corresponded to an attempt to propose an alternative to the neoliberal offensive led by Reagan and Thatcher by promoting a 'European social model' and building a protective 'social Europe' able to operate as a shield against the negative consequences of a globalizing world.³² Others argue that the Left's infatuation with the market since the 1980s underpinned its endorsement of an increasingly liberal Europe that in turn contributed to reinforce its shift. Indeed, the evolution of 'Europe' in the 1980s and 1990s—particularly with the Single European Act, the creation of the ECB and the fiscal and budgetary convergence criteria defined by the 1992 Maastricht Treaty to accompany the EMU and, more recently, by the 'Stability and Growth Pact' (and assorted 'six-pack', 'two-pack', and 'fiscal compact'), and so on—seriously hindered the possibility of carrying out traditional left-wing policies within the EU. The current institutional structure of the EU, by making 'virtually inevitable the almost "unconditional surrender" to liberal solutions', actually makes any kind of 'Keynesian'—let alone 'socialist'—policy of state intervention quite unrealistic, even at the national level.³³

This book shows that the Left's failure to impose a reform of European socio-economic governance on its own terms during the long 1970s contributed to encouraging this shift to the right of the European Left. Indeed, the European socialist parties' gamble on 'social Europe' contributed to consolidating their active participation in European institutions, and led them to enhancing their transnational cooperation, to increasing the coordination of their policies in all domains, and to almost unconditionally endorsing 'Europe'—and its basic economic orientations. When the defeat of 'social Europe' became evident and increasingly appeared irreversible, European socialists in a way found themselves trapped in their own game: they continued to support an integration process more and more ostensibly liberal because 'Europe' had become a fundamental aspect of their ideological profile. In 1983, the decision of the French socialist government to

³² A good example is Stuart Holland, 'Europe from the Left: From Delors to Gutteres', in *Europe for the Many*, ed. Tony Simpson (Nottingham: Spokesman, 2018), 7–37. On this narrative, see also Alessandra Bitumi, "An Uplifting Tale of Europe": Jacques Delors and the Contradictory Quest for a European Social Model in the Age of Reagan', *Journal of Transatlantic Studies* 16, no. 3 (July 2018): 203–21. For a positive appraisal of the social democrats' efforts to bring their agenda to the European level, see Robert Ladrech, *Social Democracy and the Challenge of European Union* (Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner, 2000).

³³ Gerassimos Moschonas, 'Reformism in a "Conservative" System: The European Union and Social Democratic Identity', in *In Search of Social Democracy*, ed. John Callaghan et al. (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2017), 182. See also George Ross, 'European Center-Lefts and the Mazes of European Integration', in *What's Left of the Left: Democrats and Social Democrats in Challenging Times*, ed. James E. Cronin, George Ross, and James Shoch (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2011), 319–41. And, regarding the influence of European integration on the evolution of communist parties Dunphy, *Contesting Capitalism?*

renounce its socio-economic programme in order to remain in the European Monetary System (EMS) epitomized this trap. To put it bluntly, the most ambitious design ever developed by the European Left to reform the existing European institutions and use them to shift western Europe politically to the left turned out, in the long run, to be a powerful motor—although certainly not the only one—for the European Left’s own political shift towards the right. Unable to substitute the postwar social compromise with a new social compromise at the European scale, the Left was forced to accept the emerging neoliberal consensus.

Another reason why exploring the story of ‘social Europe’ during the long 1970s is important is that it allows us to get a better understanding of the epochal shift that took place during those years and that was so decisive in defining the present era. Countless scholarly works have depicted the 1970s and 1980s as a ‘turning point’ in European political, social, cultural, and economic history—and in the nature of global capitalism.³⁴ Some, like Eric Hobsbawm, described it as a turn from the ‘golden age’ of postwar capitalism to the age of ‘the landslide’; others like Philippe Chassaing, more optimistically, as the beginning of our modernity.³⁵ At any rate, it is now widely accepted that those years marked a decisive shift from a ‘Keynesian’ capitalism towards a more globalized, financialized, and ‘neoliberal’ form of capitalism.³⁶ Piketty’s notorious works show how this shift underpinned rising social inequalities in Europe, and describe it as a shift from the ‘social-democratic societies’ characterized by a rising fiscal and social role for the state and a de-concentration of private property, to the present ‘neoliberal societies’ marked by increased wealth and income inequalities and a reaffirmation of private property.³⁷

³⁴ See, on these pivotal years, among the many recent works, the two issues of the *Journal of Modern European History* coordinated by Andreas Wirsching, ed., ‘The 1970s and 1980s as a Turning Point in European History?’, *Journal of Modern European History* 9, no. 1 (April 2011): 8–26; and, co-directed by Marc Lazar, Andreas Wirsching, ed., ‘European Responses to the Crisis of the 1970s and 1980s’, *Journal of Modern European History* 9, no. 2 (August 2011); see also Elke Seefried, ‘Reconfiguring the Future? Politics and Time from the 1960s to the 1980s: Introduction’, *Journal of Modern European History* 13, no. 3 (August 2015): 306–16; Niall Ferguson, ed., *The Shock of the Global: The 1970s in Perspective* (Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press, 2010). For an overview of the literature of the last two decades on this shift, see Michele Di Donato, ‘Landslides, Shocks, and New Global Rules: The US and Western Europe in the New International History of the 1970s’, *Journal of Contemporary History* 55, no. 1 (January 2020): 182–205; Frank Georgi and Lucia Bonfreschi, ‘Nouvelles gauches et extrêmes gauches européennes à l’épreuve des années 1970: Périodisation, cultures politiques et circulations transnationales’, *Histoire@Politique*, no. 42 (2020).

³⁵ Eric Hobsbawm, *Age of Extremes: The Short Twentieth Century 1914–1991* (London: Michael Joseph, 1994); Philippe Chassaing, *Les Années 1970: Fin d’un monde et origine de notre modernité* (Paris: Armand Colin, 2008).

³⁶ See among the many accounts Barry Eichengreen, *The European Economy since 1945: Coordinated Capitalism and Beyond* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2006); Giovanni Arrighi, *The Long Twentieth Century: Money, Power, and the Origins of Our Times* (London: Verso, 2010); Wolfgang Streeck, *Buying Time* (London: Verso, 2014).

³⁷ Thomas Piketty, *Capital in the Twenty-First Century: The Dynamics of Inequality, Wealth, and Growth* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2014); Piketty, *Capital and Ideology*.

Concomitantly, the long 1970s have been reassessed as a defining period in the history of European integration. The traditional cliché about the 1970s in Europe—that of a merely transitional decade characterized by stagnation—is now considerably nuanced by historians.³⁸ The past decade has seen a burgeoning of scholarly works which depict those years as a moment of assertion for the EC in particular, with significant institutional and policy change, and important efforts to develop its international role.³⁹ These important changes took place during a pivotal period of transformation of the international outlook, when the Cold War order was replaced by an increasingly pluralistic, interdependent, and ‘globalized’ world in which new international actors—including the EC itself—began to play major roles.⁴⁰

But while it is now widely accepted that the ‘long 1970s’ marked a major change both in the history of European integration and in the history of modern capitalism and its shift to the ‘neoliberal’ era, the interactions between these two historical fields remain largely unexplored. In recent years, the growing literature on the history and ‘archaeology’ of neoliberalism has offered a far better understanding of this omnipresent but often unclear ideology and policy model. Among many others, Quinn Slobodian pointed out how—contrary to an all-too-diffused general wisdom that tends to confuse it with a retreat of governments and state intervention—neoliberalism actually relies fundamentally on national and supra-national governance to insulate property rights and capital markets from the threats of mass democracy, labour militancy, and national sovereignty.⁴¹ This booming field of neoliberalism studies, however, pays little attention to the question of European integration.

At the same time, historians of European integration have scarcely addressed the question of neoliberalism. Indeed, though the relationship between neoliberalism and European integration (and in particular the current EU) has been captivating the public and political debates and attracted mounting academic attention in

³⁸ Keith Middlemas described the 1970s as ‘the Stagnant Decade’ in Keith Middlemas, *Orchestrating Europe: The Informal Politics of the European Union 1973–95* (London: Fontana, 1995).

³⁹ For instance, Emmanuel Mourlon-Druol, *A Europe Made of Money: The Emergence of the European Monetary System* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2012); Garavini, *After Empires*; Angela Romano, *From Détente in Europe to European Détente: How the West Shaped the Helsinki CSCE* (Brussels: PIE Peter Lang, 2009); Claudia Hiepel, ed., *Europe in a Globalising World: Global Challenges and European Responses in the ‘Long’ 1970s* (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2014).

⁴⁰ Antonio Varsori and Guia Migani, eds., *Europe in the International Arena during the 1970s: Entering a Different World* (New York: PIE Peter Lang, 2011).

⁴¹ Quinn Slobodian, *Globalists: The End of Empire and the Birth of Neoliberalism* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2018). See also Serge Audier, *Néolibéralisme(s)* (Paris: Grasset, 2012); David Harvey, *A Brief History of Neoliberalism* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005); Philip Mirowski and Dieter Plehwe, eds., *The Road from Mont Pèlerin: The Making of the Neoliberal Thought Collective* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2009); Dieter Plehwe, Quinn Slobodian, and Philip Mirowski, eds., *Nine Lives of Neoliberalism* (London: Verso, 2020); Barbara Stiegler, *‘Il faut s’adapter’: Sur un nouvel impératif politique* (Paris: Éditions Gallimard, 2019).

recent years, it remains startlingly unexplored by historians to date.⁴² Several scholars have, however, shown how rival economic ‘models’ or ‘projects’—free-market, mercantilist, and social-democratic—have historically influenced the European integration process and competed in the search for solutions to the crisis of the 1970s.⁴³ Laurent Warlouzet argued that these three models continued to coexist and to inspire European policies after the relaunching of European integration in the mid-1980s.⁴⁴ Although there is undeniable evidence to sustain this claim, it tends to downplay the shift that took place during this period, because it overlooks one of the key points of this story: the qualitative difference that existed between the ‘social Europe’ imagined by European socialists during the 1970s—based on redistribution, market regulation, extension of the public sector, social and economic planning, redistribution, and ‘democracy in all spheres of life’—and the free-market-compatible ‘social Europe’ promoted from the 1980s onwards by Delors and his allies.

As this book argues, the progression of ‘Europe’ on the neoliberal road did not come about randomly; it was the outcome of a decade-long power struggle. European integration historiography, including the wide literature on the role of economic circles, has been traditionally dominated by a ‘realist’ diplomatic approach and focused on nation-states’ interests. It has almost entirely eclipsed the centrality of social conflict and social forces’ diverging European strategies in shaping the socio-economic content and social purpose of the European integration process.⁴⁵ Yet, as suggested by Bastiaan van Apeldoorn, the ‘European order’ that emerged from the 1980s was ‘the outcome of a political struggle, not so much between states but between social forces (who may be “represented” by a variety of actors) developing strategies and engaging in a struggle over European order at all levels of Europe’s polity.’⁴⁶

This story of ‘social Europe’ in the long 1970s therefore ambitions to remedy this major flaw by ‘bringing social conflict back’ in European integration

⁴² For a summary of the debate in other disciplines, see Amandine Crespy and Pauline Ravinet, ‘Les Avatars du néo-libéralisme dans la fabrique des politiques européennes’, *Gouvernement et action publique* 2, no. 2 (July 2014): 9–29.

⁴³ Warlouzet, *Governing Europe in a Globalizing World*; see also Eric Bussière, Michel Dumoulin, and Sylvain Schirmann, eds., *Europe organisée, Europe du libre-échange? Fin XIXe siècle–années 1960* (Brussels: PIE Peter Lang, 2006); Bastiaan van Apeldoorn, *Transnational Capitalism and the Struggle over European Integration* (London; New York: Routledge, 2002); Aurélie Andry et al., ‘Rethinking European Integration History in Light of Capitalism: The Case of the Long 1970s’, *European Review of History/Revue européenne d’histoire* 26, no. 4 (July 2019): 553–72.

⁴⁴ Warlouzet, *Governing Europe in a Globalizing World*.

⁴⁵ To borrow Bastiaan van Apeldoorn’s expressions in Apeldoorn, *Transnational Capitalism and the Struggle over European Integration*. See also Francesco Petrini, ‘Bringing Social Conflict Back In: The Historiography of Industrial Milieux and European Integration’, *Contemporanea*, no. 3 (2014): 525–42. For a review of the literature on European integration, see, for instance, Kiran Klaus Patel, ‘Widening and Deepening? Recent Advances in European Integration History’, *Neue Politische Literatur* 64, no. 2 (July 2019): 327–57.

⁴⁶ Bastiaan Van Apeldoorn, ‘Transnational Class Agency and European Governance: The Case of the European Round Table of Industrialists’, *New Political Economy* 5, no. 2 (2000): 11.

history.⁴⁷ The ‘long 1970s’ were a decade of unparalleled social unrest, social struggle, and increasingly explosive conflict in most western European countries.⁴⁸ The famous 1968 uprisings were in fact only the beginning of a wave of contestation and radicalization of European societies and politics. The intensity of social conflict and the strength of workers’ movements—and of other kinds of social contestation—directly impacted the emergence of the Left’s ‘social Europe’ project. This cannot be ignored when writing its history. The book therefore tracks the connection between rising social conflict, the emergence in the late 1960s of a new consensus among European elites about the need to enhance Europe’s ‘social dimension’, and the Left’s project for a ‘social(ist) Europe’. The postwar European ‘rescue’ of the nation-state that Alan Milward so rightly pointed out did not only sustain the economic recovery and social welfare that the state needed in order to regain ‘allegiance’ from European populations; it also sustained the so-called ‘social compromise’ that was the keystone of the stabilization of capitalism and containment of the revolutionary thrust that marked the immediate postwar period in Europe.⁴⁹ By the late 1960s, however, the postwar compromise was winding up in rising social conflict.

Therefore, and crucially, the book pays due attention to the unfolding of the social, political, and ideological power struggle that took place over the ‘European order’ during those years. It does so by showing how European socialists contemplated a broad ‘progressive’ alliance with other political and social groups and how a loose coalition of left-wing forces—mainly socialists and trade unions, but also to some extent communist and other left-leaning formations—pushing for a market-regulating, planned, and redistributive ‘social Europe’, lost the power struggle over the long run. The crisis of the 1970s, like every true crisis, was a turning point—a vitally important moment when change had to come, for better or for worse. Like every true crisis, it was an opportunity for the dominant forces in society to push through their agenda. At the same time, it was a unique moment of awareness among populations of the need to change things. During the long 1970s, social forces therefore turned to ‘Europe’, and the EC became one of the battlefields on which labour and capital (in all their forms) opposed each other. As detailed in this work, the late 1970s and early 1980s indeed saw one of the first and most important union-led transnational social contestations over the socio-economic content of European integration, which however failed to tip the balance in favour of workers’ and lower classes’ interests. It is the failure of

⁴⁷ To borrow once more Petrini’s expression in Francesco Petrini, ‘Bringing Social Conflict Back In’.

⁴⁸ See Gerd-Rainer Horn, *The Spirit of ’68: Rebellion in Western Europe and North America, 1956–1976* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007); Colin Crouch and Alessandro Pizzorno, *The Resurgence of Class Conflict in Western Europe since 1968* (London: Macmillan, 1978); Beverly J. Silver, *Forces of Labor: Workers’ Movements and Globalization since 1870* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003).

⁴⁹ Charles S. Maier, ‘The Two Postwar Eras and the Conditions for Stability in Twentieth-Century Western Europe’, *American Historical Review* 86, no. 2 (1981): 327–52.

the European Left to build, at the transnational level, a new hegemonic bloc able to sustain an alternative socio-economic strategy against the emerging neoliberal bloc that determined the fate of the current European order.

The outcome of this story—that is, the *defeat* of a labour-oriented social Europe and the decision to gear European integration towards increasing market-oriented liberalization, fiscal austerity, competition, and labour ‘flexibility’ mainly through the creation of the single market and the EMU—was far from a foregone conclusion. There were, actually, many alternatives and until the early 1980s many roads were still open. This power struggle and its outcome were decisive for the progressive replacement of the ‘social-democratic consensus’ with a ‘neoliberal consensus’, for the rising influence of neoliberal ideas on European states and EU socio-economic policies, for the rescuing of European capitalism, and for the affirmation of an emergent globalizing transnational capitalist elite over Europe.⁵⁰ In this sense, ‘Europe’ was one of the decisive battlegrounds on which the epochal shift of the 1970s and 1980s was determined.

Consequently, retracing this forgotten struggle helps in putting into historical perspective the question of the ‘social dimension’ and social purpose of European integration.⁵¹ Scholarly debates around ‘social Europe’—and its correlatives of ‘European social policy’, ‘European social model’, and the like—have raised countless controversies.⁵² One of the main overarching questions addressed by the literature regards the relation between European integration and social welfare. The most optimistic argue that, although it has been a slow and ongoing process, the EC (and, after 1993, the EU) has developed a more and more active role in promoting social harmonization, social rights, and social cohesion in Europe.⁵³ Indeed, it certainly did increase its activities in the social field, through growing legislation and policy instruments regarding for instance health and security at

⁵⁰ Petrini makes a similar claim in Francesco Petrini, ‘Demanding Democracy in the Workplace: The European Trade Union Confederation and the Struggle to Regulate Multinationals’, in *Societal Actors in European Integration*, ed. Wolfram Kaiser and Jan-Henrik Meyer (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013), 151–72.

⁵¹ This has so far received little attention from historians, in particular for the 1970s and subsequent years. There are several studies focused on the 1950s and 1960s: for instance, Antonio Varsori and Lorenzo Mechi, eds., *Lionello Levi Sandri e la politica sociale europea* (Milan: FrancoAngeli, 2008); Lorenzo Mechi, ‘L’action de la Haute Autorité de la CECA dans la construction de maisons ouvrières’, *Journal of European Integration History* 6, no. 1 (2000): 63–88; Lise Rye, ‘The Rise and Fall of the French Demand for Social Harmonization in the EEC, 1955–1966’ (PhD thesis, Norwegian University of Science and Technology, Trondheim, 2004); Nicolas Verschuere, *Fermer les mines en construisant l’Europe: Une histoire sociale de l’intégration européenne* (Brussels: Peter Lang, 2013).

⁵² The most comprehensive and useful discussion of the literature on the topic can be found in Amandine Crespy, *L’Europe sociale: Acteurs, politiques, débats* (Brussels: Éditions de l’Université de Bruxelles, 2019).

⁵³ A view reflected to different extents in Wolfgang Kowalsky, *Focus on European Social Policy: Countering Europessimism* (Brussels: European Trade Union Institute, 2000); Linda Hantrais, *Social Policy in the European Union* (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1995); James A. Caporaso and Sidney Tarrow, ‘Polanyi in Brussels: Supranational Institutions and the Transnational Embedding of Markets’, *International Organization* 63, no. 4 (October 2009): 593–620.

work, gender equality, access to social protection for migrant workers, social and regional cohesion, and public health; through the increasing association of ‘social partners’ to European policy making and the development of ‘European social dialogue’; through the implementation of the ‘Open Method of Coordination’ and later the ‘European Semester’ to coordinate member states’ social policies; through the drafting of the 1989 Social Charter of the EC first, the adoption of the ‘Social Protocol’ annexed to the 1992 Maastricht Treaty and the incorporation of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU into the 2007 Lisbon Treaty later; through the most recent ‘European Pillar on Social Rights’; and so on.

On the other hand, the most critical depict European integration as a Trojan horse for social welfare which, far from allowing social progress, contributed to the dismantling of welfare states in Europe.⁵⁴ They insist, for instance, on the EU’s role in encouraging regional and worldwide competition, therefore unleashing a race to the bottom in terms of wages and labour rights; on the role of the single market and the European Court of Justice (ECJ) in favouring the dominance of economic freedoms over social rights; on the increase of social dumping within the EU due to its successive enlargements to include countries with widely contrasting social and wage policies; on the challenges that EU-wide fiscal competition raises for the sustainability of welfare states; on the negative consequences of liberalization, marketization, and austerity policies for employment and wages, welfare services and benefits, workers’ rights; and so on. The European governance and ‘structural’ reforms that followed the post-2008 recession only worsened this trend and contributed to a further dismantling of social protection and labour law, especially in Mediterranean, Eastern and Baltic countries.⁵⁵

Despite their diverging interpretations of the question, scholars generally agree that the social dimension of European integration has remained very limited compared to its economic dimension. In particular, its redistributive function remains particularly weak compared to national welfare states, whose role in providing social benefits and public services remains preponderant. This book contributes to putting these debates into historical perspective by revealing another idea of ‘social Europe’ that had emerged during the long 1970s. It underlines that another road could have been taken, which has been largely forgotten today, a road towards a qualitatively different form of European integration and

⁵⁴ For instance, Andreas Bieler, *The Struggle for a Social Europe: Trade Unions and EMU in Times of Global Restructuring* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2006); Daniel Preece, *Dismantling Social Europe: The Political Economy of Social Policy in the European Union* (Boulder, Colo.: First Forum Press, 2009); Robert Salais, *Le Viol d’Europe: Enquête sur la disparition d’une idée* (Paris: Presses universitaires de France, 2013).

⁵⁵ Amandine Crespy and Georg Menz, eds., *Social Policy and the Eurocrisis: Quo Vadis Social Europe?* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2015); Caroline De La Porte and Elke Heins, eds., *The Sovereign Debt Crisis, the EU and Welfare State Reform* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2016); Arnaud Lechevalier and Jan Wielgohs, eds., *Social Europe: A Dead End—What the Eurozone Crisis Is Doing to Europe’s Social Dimension* (Copenhagen: DJØF, 2015).

socio-economic governance. If anything, comparing current European social policies, governance tools, and redistributive resources, as well as European labour law and social rights to the proposals and ambitions that were formulated during the 1970s (especially, if not only, on the Left), shows a sharp shift from a redistributive, interventionist, and market-regulating approach to a much more residual and market-enabling approach to ‘social Europe’. In other words, to borrow Wolfgang Streeck’s expression, European social policy has experienced ‘progressive regression’ since the 1970s.⁵⁶ In this new light, the ‘golden age’ of social Europe inaugurated by Delors—although it implemented some of the proposals inherited from the discussions of the 1970s—appears to be in part a renouncement of some of the most ambitious proposals that had been formulated then.

Exploring this road not taken provides a better understanding of the reasons why ‘social Europe’ never saw the light of day: that is, why ‘Europe’ has not been able to develop a genuine ‘European welfare state’ through larger supranational social policy competences and redistributive capacities; and why its socio-economic content seems to work against social welfare. The influence of economic liberalist thought over the European treaties and integration process may account partly for this state of things.⁵⁷ Cultural and institutional differences between national conceptions of social policy, the welfare state, social security, and even wage relations certainly also mattered; and so did clashing national interests.⁵⁸ The institutional setting of the EU (fragmented powers, small budget, cumbersome policy making, the legal *acquis*, the primacy of technocracy over partisan politics, etc.) definitely also played a role, since it structurally favours ‘negative’ integration through liberalization and de-regulation over ‘positive’ integration through market-regulating, interventionist, redistributive, and ultimately progressive policies—thus favouring market forces and disembedding them from political pressure.⁵⁹ Digging into one of the most prolific historical periods in the conceptualization, discussion, negotiation, and mobilization of ‘social Europe’ helps underline just how crucial power struggles and the strategic failure of the Left to push through its agenda in the 1970s—when the balance of power was much more favourable

⁵⁶ Wolfgang Streeck, ‘Progressive Regression: Metamorphoses of European Social Policy’, *New Left Review*, no. 118 (August 2019): 118–39.

⁵⁷ François Denord, ‘Néo-libéralisme et «économie sociale de marché» : Les Origines intellectuelles de la politique européenne de la concurrence (1930–1950)’, *Histoire, économie et société* 27, no. 1 (2008); François Denord and Antoine Schwartz, ‘L’économie (très) politique du traité de Rome’, *Politix*, no. 89 (April 2010): 35–56. However, the pluralist socio-economic character of the European treaties is underlined in Clemens Kaupa, *The Pluralist Character of the European Economic Constitution* (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2016).

⁵⁸ Barbier, *The Road to Social Europe*; Giandomenico Majone, *La Communauté européenne: Un État régulateur* (Paris: Montchrestien, 1996).

⁵⁹ Fritz Scharpf, *Governing in Europe: Effective and Democratic?* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999); Fritz Scharpf, ‘The Asymmetry of European Integration, or Why the EU Cannot Be a “Social Market Economy”’, *Socio-Economic Review* 8, no. 2 (2010): 211–50; Martin Höpner and Armin Schäfer, ‘Polanyi in Brussels? Embeddedness and the Three Dimensions of European Economic Integration’, MPIfG Discussion Paper (2010).

to labour than it is today and when the framework of European socio-economic governance was more malleable—were in shaping the present European order.

Although social contestation over European macro-economic governance, social policy, and the marketization of welfare have continued to take place at local, national, and transnational level since then, the European Left has never been able to build an offensive strong enough to reverse the road taken after the long 1970s.⁶⁰ With the exhaustion, during the long 1970s, of the postwar social-democratic parenthesis in the history of capitalism, the consolidation of the EU's 'institutional trap' since the 1980s and the Left's shift to the right, and the enlargements to include Scandinavian as well as central and eastern European countries and the twenty-seven member states sitting at the Council table today, social Europe appears less and less at hand.

In a nutshell, by investigating the forgotten struggle for a 'social Europe' and by reconnecting the history of capitalism, the history of European integration, and the history of European socialism, this book attempts to shed new light on a critical episode of our recent history. The defeat of the European Left in realizing its project for a 'social Europe' was not the end point of the story. It had long-lasting and arguably dramatic repercussions for the nature of European integration and European societies, the relations of western Europe with the rest of the world, the history of capitalism and its shift to the 'neoliberal' paradigm, and the European Left itself. Understanding this historical path is crucial to shedding new light on our current predicaments.

Methodology and Book Structure

As much as possible in this broad portrait of 'social Europe', the story told here tries to attribute the appropriate weight to the influence of individuals and ideas, the role of national governments and European institutions, the pressure of party and trade union organizations, social movements and economic interest groups, and the significance of changes in the global and western European social, political, economic, cultural, and intellectual landscape. It relies on a variety of sources, encompassing historical archives of left-wing forces (especially the European-level organizations of socialist parties and trade unions) and European institutions (such as the European Parliament and Commission), official and published documents, press articles, and, occasionally, European treaties and legislation, personal papers, and diplomatic cables. These are largely supplemented by secondary literature, which has been particularly useful in grasping the positions

⁶⁰ On recent contestations, see, for instance, Amandine Crespy, *Welfare Markets in Europe* (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2017).

and debates within the various parties, trade unions, governments, and European institutions, and their roles in shaping the fate of ‘social Europe’.

Just as European integration was and still is predominantly an elite-driven and top-down process, ‘social Europe’ remained, throughout the period, a project very much formulated and promoted at the level of top party and union leaders and European technocrats, and only rarely reached the rank-and-file and the citizens. Inevitably, this story therefore has to pay a great deal of attention to that level of analysis, while it duly highlights that ‘social Europe’ was formulated and pushed by (mostly left-wing) political and trade union elites partly in an attempt to respond to—and to channel—the demands that emerged from the very vivid and diverse foyers of social contestation of the ‘long 1970s’. At the same time, it evidences and appraises these elites’ incapacity to build an organic relation to the grassroots movements, labour, and the New Left, and to build wider and deeper popular support for this project. Therefore, this account of ‘social Europe’ is both deeply embedded in the social context of the period and puts significant emphasis on the political agency (or absence thereof) of left-wing constituencies, social movements, and actors such as the European workers’ movement. Particular attention is paid to the attempt—mostly pushed by European trade unions—to build a transnational workers’ movement to support the project during the late 1970s and early 1980s. Since they were the main actors of the institutional attempt to move towards a social Europe within the structure of the EC, the focus is predominantly on socialist (and to a much lesser extent communist) parties and trade unions and on the ‘loose coalition’ that they tried to form with this aim. This does not reflect, of course, a conviction that the European Left could be reduced to these forces or that they were the only ones to imagine a different Europe.

With this in mind, the originality of this work is to investigate both the shaping of the transnational European Left’s ideas and contentious politics regarding European integration, and EC policy making in relation to social and employment policies and ‘social Europe’. Recognizing the importance of transnational networks and non-governmental actors and organizations for the European integration process and the emergence of a multi-governance European polity, the study looks particularly at transnational socialism and trade unionism.⁶¹ ‘Social Europe’, in fact, took shape principally within formal and informal nexuses of cooperation between the forces of the left—mainly socialist parties and trade unions—at European level. International structures such as the Socialist

⁶¹ This is emphasized by research that went beyond a hitherto state-centric strand of European integration history that had often relied exclusively on governmental archives. Wolfram Kaiser and Peter Starie, eds., *Transnational European Union: Towards a Common Political Space* (Abingdon: Routledge, 2005); Wolfram Kaiser, Brigitte Leucht, and Morten Rasmussen, eds., *The History of the European Union: Origins of a Trans- and Supranational Polity 1950–72* (New York; London: Routledge, 2009); Wolfram Kaiser, Brigitte Leucht, and Michael Gehler, eds., *Transnational Networks in Regional Integration: Governing Europe, 1945–83* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010).

International; the CSPEC; the European Trade Union Confederation; parliamentary groups such as the Socialist Group of the European Parliament; and institutionalized summit meetings and congresses between the party leaders and experts of European socialist or communist parties were important platforms for cooperation and coordination of the European Left and for the formulation of common European proposals. These international structures and ‘networks’ in fact appear to be as important for their roles as discussion and socialization forums as for their roles as promoters of political action.⁶² Their archives constitute a valuable source through which we can grasp the emergence and consolidation of ‘social Europe’—and the tensions it aroused.

At the same time, this work highlights the influence of social conflict and of the European Left’s plans for a ‘social Europe’ over European institutions and policy making. The historical role of the institutions of the EC/EU in pushing and orienting European decision and policy making and in developing shared views among European elites is evident.⁶³ The European Commission’s advocacy of more competences in the field of social policy will be scrutinized here, as well as the decisions of the European Council of Ministers and of the European Council, and the position of the European Parliament. Of course, despite some timid progress in the 1970s—with relatively increased budgetary prerogatives and improved representative legitimacy after the first direct European elections—the EP’s lack of power until the implementation of the co-decision procedure between the Parliament and the Council of Ministers in the 1980s and early 1990s (and, some would argue, until today) is undeniable.⁶⁴ Nonetheless, it has emerged since its creation as an actor in a transnational political culture and in the ‘transnationalization’ and cooperation of European political parties.⁶⁵ Against the backdrop

⁶² A point made regarding business networks in Michel Dumoulin, *Réseaux économiques et construction européenne* (Brussels: Peter Lang, 2004); Neil Rollings and Matthias Kipping, ‘Private Transnational Governance in the Heyday of the Nation-State: The Council of European Industrial Federations (CEIF)’, *Economic History Review* 61, no. 2 (May 2008): 409–31.

⁶³ Katja Seidel, *The Process of Politics in Europe: The Rise of European Elites and Supranational Institutions* (London: I.B. Tauris, 2010); Michel Dumoulin and Marie-Thérèse Bitsch, eds., *The European Commission, 1958–72: History and Memories* (Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications of the European Communities, 2007); Eric Bussière et al., eds., *The European Commission, 1973–86: History and Memories of an Institution* (Luxembourg: Publications Office of the European Union, 2014); Antonio Varsori, ed., *Il Comitato economico e sociale nella costruzione europea* (Venice: Marsilio, 2000).

⁶⁴ The existing historical reconstructions generally focus on the ‘battles’ fought to gradually increase the powers and representativeness of an institution whose role when it was first founded in 1952 was merely consultative. Julian Priestley, *Six Battles that Shaped Europe’s Parliament* (London: John Harper, 2008); Berthold Rittberger, *Building Europe’s Parliament: Democratic Representation beyond the Nation State* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005).

⁶⁵ Aurélie Élisabeth Gfeller, ‘Champion of Human Rights: The European Parliament and the Helsinki Process’, *Journal of Contemporary History* 49, no. 2 (2014): 390–409; Aurélie Elisa Gfeller, Wilfried Loth, and Matthias Schulz, ‘Democratizing Europe, Reaching out to the Citizen?’, *Journal of European Integration History* 17, no. 1 (2011): 5–12 see also Christian Salm and Jan-Henrik Meyer’s contributions in this special issue.

of growing and persistent discussions regarding the ‘democratic deficit’ and technocratic outlook of the European polity, moreover, the EP has consistently tried to assert itself by stressing its role in voicing European citizens’ and civil society’s concerns and trying to draw the attention of other institutional and non-institutional actors to particular themes and problems.⁶⁶ It has therefore been targeted as a potential ally by the advocates of ‘social Europe’. During the 1970s, left-wing European parties, including communist parties, placed high stakes on the Community and the EP in order to implement their new proposals—even more so as the socialist group became the dominant parliamentary group and with the prospect of the first direct elections. The plenary debates, working documents of parliamentary committees, resolutions, and other sources are therefore a valuable lens through which to look at shifting ideas and discussions on ‘social Europe’.

The first chapter sketches the political and historical background to the project for a ‘social Europe’ prior to the 1969 Hague Summit. It outlines the social dimension—or rather the social deficit—of postwar European cooperation and integration, which underpinned the exceptional growth of the postwar decades and helped the stabilization of capitalism—a Keynesian type of ‘welfare capitalism’—in western Europe. Although the European integration process from the Marshall Plan to the EC was not a ‘pure’ liberal or free-market undertaking, it bore the mark of Christian democracy and ordoliberalism, of the affirmation of a new international liberal order dominated by the US, and of a productivist economic model. It was intrinsically anti-communist, and the non-communist European Left hardly managed to play a role in its genesis.

The second chapter examines how, at the end of the 1960s, things started changing and rising concerns emerged for the ‘social dimension’ of European integration. The spirit of 1968 and rising economic and monetary turmoil started to alert European political elites about the need to make up the EC’s social deficit; the late 1960s saw an alignment of the forces of the Left—in particular, socialist and communist parties, and their ‘sister’ trade unions—around a position of ‘pro-European’ reformism; and this ‘European turn’ occasioned intensifying calls for a more ambitious European social policy and more inclusion of trade unions in European policymaking, and started opening new perspectives. The European revival decided in 1969 in the Dutch coastal city of The Hague by the leaders of ‘The Six’—France, West Germany, Italy, Belgium, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands—despite its meagre commitment on social issues, would pave the way for a broader rethinking of Europe’s social purpose.

⁶⁶ Christian Salm, ‘Die sozialistische Fraktion, das Europäische Parlament und die Entwicklungshilfepolitik der Europäischen Gemeinschaft 1968–1975’, *Journal of European Integration History* 17, no. 1 (2011): 87–102.

The third chapter examines the new ‘social wind’ that came to the EC at the dawn of the 1970s (1969–72). The first works of the Community on social policy after the Hague Summit showed some will to develop the social activity and image of the EC but did not modify the productivist inspiration of European social policy; nor did it improve the association of labour organizations to European policymaking. As western Europe experienced a turn to the left and the enlargement of the Common Market to include new members would increase the weight of social democracy within the EC, however, a redefinition of the social goals of ‘Europe’ seemed increasingly plausible to turn it into the ‘most advanced model’ for social progress in the world. The West German Chancellor and leader of the Social Democratic Party of Germany (SPD) Willy Brandt played a decisive role in advocating a ‘social union’ in the run-up to the October 1972 Paris Summit of the EC, which would mark the apex (perhaps the twilight) of European elites’ new social intentions, as they announced their commitment to take vigorous actions in the social field—which they now deemed, they declared, to be as important as future progress towards economic and monetary integration.

The fourth chapter examines the efforts undertaken by the then rising European Left—especially European socialist parties—to finally outline a concrete programme for a ‘social Europe’ in the run-up to the adoption of the EC’s first Social Action Programme (1972–4). First, it explains how European socialists, communists, and trade unions converged (despite a few exceptions) on the conviction that socialism needed to be achieved through ‘Europe’, and to organize to this end. Second, it examines the socialist parties of the EC’s Bonn Congress in April 1973, when they adopted despite some disagreements their first programmatic platform ‘For a Social Europe’—a redistributive, market-correcting, workers-oriented, democratized one. Third, it assesses how the European Left attempted with moderate success to influence the drafting of the 1974 Social Action Programme at the dawn of the 1970s economic recession.

Chapter 5 analyses the European Left’s attempt to formulate a coordinated response to the crisis between the two oil shocks (1973–9). It argues that the crisis, which accelerated the breakdown of the postwar compromise, pushed the European Left to formulate new proposals for an alternative macroeconomic European strategy that went beyond Keynesianism welfare capitalism and constituted a possible alternative to the rising neoliberal doctrine. At a time when the European Left dominated the EC, this was no point of detail. The chapter first looks at the leftward turn that characterized European social democracy from the late 1960s, which climaxed a few years later with the adoption of alternative economic strategies by several parties; it then investigates how socialist economists tried to promote a coordinated alternative European strategy at the transnational level; and goes on to assess socialist parties’ and trade unions’ efforts to adopt common European programmes that went beyond ‘Euro-Keynesianism’.

The sixth chapter then analyses what could be described as the defeat of the European Left's struggle for a 'social Europe' in the late 1970s and early 1980s. It first exposes how, despite some achievements, the EC's social concern of the early 1970s faded away with the 1974–5 economic recession, the restrictive turn of several governments, and Helmut Schmidt replacing Brandt in West Germany. Second, it turns to the failed 'Eurocorporatist' attempt to define a new EC-level social compromise. Third, it retraces the unions' forgotten efforts to take to the streets their demands for an alternative macroeconomic European strategy and for a European reduction of working time. Fourth, it exposes the defeat of the struggle for a democratization of the economy through greater workers' control of multinational companies. Finally, it shows how the French government's 1983 decision to abandon its socialist programme in order to remain in the EMS marked the final blow to the European Left's struggle for a redistributive, planning-oriented, and regulatory 'workers' Europe'.

The Epilogue then draws some conclusions regarding the reasons for this defeat. Some of its main causes were internal divergences within the European Left regarding European integration and regarding the very idea of socialism and its relationship with capitalism: hidden behind the convenient use of ambiguous and unclear statements of intent were often essential divisions among the Left on key concepts of their 'social Europe' project—such as workers' control, economic planning, and control of multinationals. Other reasons were its inability to truly unite and to consolidate an 'alliance of the Left' at European level; its failure to organize an efficient multilevel lobbying force to constitute a democratic counter-power to international business and financial forces; problems of timing for Social Europe proposals, which often arrived late on the EC agenda when free-market ideology was already on the rise and when the window of opportunity of the 1970s was closing; and the counter-offensive experienced by its supporters and the dislodging of its proposals. Above all, there was a lack of grassroots thrust, as European socialists and trade unions never managed to mobilize a mass social movement about the need to radically impose change at the European (EC/EU) level.

Overall, this book uncovers a forgotten struggle for an alternative to neoliberal Europe. Investigating the reasons for its defeat allows to understand that the present state of affairs is not inevitable but is instead the result of a series of political choices; that these choices were not necessary but determined by social conflicts and power struggles; and that history remains open. It can be useful not just to scholars and students eager to understand the historical evolution of European integration, the European Left, and European capitalism, but also to anyone hoping to engage in building an alternative European and global future. To borrow Eley's words, 'both the achievements and the foreshortenings of the old remain vital to the shaping of the new'—'history can both impede the present and set it free.'⁶⁷

⁶⁷ Eley, *Forging Democracy*, viii.

1

The ‘Social Dimension’ of Postwar Europe

In January 1957, an important debate took place at the French National Assembly regarding the future Rome treaties that the government was negotiating with its European ‘partners’. Indeed, it was just a couple of months before the treaties establishing the European Economic Community (EEC) and the European Community of Atomic Energy (ECAE, or ‘Euratom’) were signed in Rome by the governments of West Germany, Italy, France, Belgium, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands. During the debate, Member of Parliament Pierre Mendès France—a renowned exponent of the centre-left Party of Radicals—gave an address in which he warned about the risks inherent to the creation of the common European market negotiated by the ‘Six’:

Let us not hide the fact that our partners want to maintain the commercial advantage they have over us because of their social backwardness. Our policy must continue to aim, at all costs, not to build Europe in regression to the detriment of the working class [...]

The Common Market is expected to include the free movement of capital. However, if the harmonization of competition conditions is not achieved and if, as at present, it is more advantageous to set up a factory or assemble a given product in other countries, this freedom of capital movement will lead to an exodus of French capital [...] Capital tends to leave the socializing countries and its departure exerts pressure in the direction of abandoning an advanced social policy. [...]

The abdication of a democracy can take two forms, either the recourse to an internal dictatorship by handing over all powers to a providential man, or the delegation of these powers to an external authority, which, in the name of technique, will in reality exercise political power, because in the name of a healthy economy it is easy to dictate monetary, budgetary and social policy, ultimately ‘a policy’, in the broadest sense of the word, both national and international.¹

¹ *Journal officiel de la République française*, ‘Débats parlementaires, Assemblée nationale, séance du 18 janvier 1957, n°4 AN, 19 January 1957’, 159.

‘PMF’—as he was usually nicknamed by his fellow countrymen and women—had gained widespread popularity and respect throughout his political career as a supporter of the Front populaire in the 1930s, member of the Resistance during the Second World War, several times minister and briefly president of the French Council of Ministers in 1954–5. A moderate socialist, he was certainly not a ‘Eurosceptic’. Quite the opposite. ‘I have always been a proponent of an organic construction of Europe’, he claimed from the start of his address. Indeed, PMF believed, ‘our old European countries have become too small, too narrow for the great activities of the twentieth century to develop therein’. PMF was firmly convinced of the necessity to ‘make Europe’, but not *that* Europe. Not that Common Market Europe based merely on the free circulation of workers, goods, and capital, and on the sole principle of pure competition. ‘Harmonization must be carried out in the direction of social progress, in the direction of a parallel increase in social benefits’, he said, and not ‘to the benefit of the most conservative countries and to the detriment of the most socially advanced countries’. Although his party was part of the coalition government that negotiated and supported the treaties, Mendès France was profoundly worried about what he saw as the classic liberalist inspiration and the potential technocratic drifts of the European project in discussion.

Though his fears were shared by part of the Left (and of the Right) at the time, the Rome treaties were signed by the French socialist-led government on 25 March and finally ratified by the French Parliament in July. This was not a foregone conclusion, considering that only a few years earlier, in 1954, the treaty establishing a European Defence Community (EDC) was ripped down after it got rejected by the French National Assembly—which also blocked its pendant project, the European Political Community (EPC). Against the background of the Algerian War and shortly after the Suez crisis, the question of France’s adhesion to a new common European market largely remained below the radar of the public debate, and the birth of the new European communities—which would have penetrating consequences for the peoples of Europe in the long run—went relatively unnoticed.

Reading Mendès France’s address now, it is striking to see how the exact same concerns that torment the European Left and the EU today were already so clearly enunciated over sixty years ago: the impact of liberalization over social progress and employment, the consequences of ‘Europe’ for the working class, the (neo) liberal outlook of the European treaties and institutions, the technocratic and anti-democratic drifts of the European project. Was the ‘social deficit’ inherent to the European integration process from the outset? Or could it be compatible or even useful to a ‘socializing’ policy and the interests of the working class? There is endless discussion among scholars on these questions. Digging into the early steps of European integration—and putting into historical perspective the forces and principles that drove this unique political-institutional process—is crucial to

improving our understanding of the nature of European integration and its 'social dimension'.

The European Rescue of 'Welfare Capitalism'

European integration is widely depicted—in the official history of European institutions as well as in schoolbooks and often in the public debate—as the outcome of a unique peace project. After European countries had been the scene of two devastating world wars, the story goes, they learned their lesson and understood that nationalisms had to be overcome through the construction of the 'United States of Europe'. This difficult undertaking to move beyond national interests was pushed heartily by some exceptional personalities such as Jean Monnet, Robert Schumann, Alcide De Gasperi, Paul-Henri Spaak, and Konrad Adenauer, the 'Fathers of Europe'; without the 'energy and motivation' of these 'visionary leaders' who shared the same ideal of a 'peaceful, united and prosperous Europe' we would not be living today in 'the sphere of peace and stability that we take for granted'.² According to these accounts, the project of a united Europe had deep historical roots that could be dated back several centuries but owed much to the federalist movements that emerged after the First World War, such as Richard von Coudenhove-Kalergi's Pan-Europa movement launched in 1923, and to the Second World War's anti-fascist Resistance, as in the case of Altiero Spinelli's European Federalist Movement founded in Milan in 1943. The economic and political integration of Europe was the key to transcending spatial fragmentation and political rivalries—thus impeding other wars from breaking out.

These narratives tend to downplay or simplify some important and complex impulses as well as unsuccessful alternative proposals that marked European integration history. Hence, for instance, while the continuities between the Resistance and Allies' ideas of European unity and the origins of European integration are often inflated, the same cannot be said when it comes to the influence of Nazi Germany's vision of a 'New European Order' or French Vichy nationalists' conversion to European federalism.³ Besides, although the idea of European unity did acquire some popularity from the 1930s—when Britain's conservative wartime leader Winston Churchill was already promoting the idea of a 'United States

² The European Union's website, https://europa.eu/european-union/about-eu/history/eu-pioneers_en; cited in Cédric Durand, ed., *En finir avec l'Europe* (Paris: La Fabrique, 2013), 6. For a critique of the hagiography of the 'Eurosaints' and on the official history of European integration, see Alan S. Milward, *The European Rescue of the Nation-State* (London: Routledge, 1992), ch. 6; Cornelia Constantin, "'Great Friends': Creating Legacies, Networks and Policies that Perpetuate the Memory of the Fathers of Europe", *International Politics* 48, no. 1 (January 2011): 112–28.

³ Antonin Cohen, 'De la révolution nationale à l'Europe fédérale: Les Métamorphoses de la troisième voie aux origines du mouvement fédéraliste français: La Fédération (1943–1948)', *Le Mouvement social*, no. 217 (2006): 53–72.

of Europe’—and European movements flourished after the Second World War, their success in bringing about concrete results in the political-institutional European construction of the late 1940s and 1950s remained limited.⁴ Certainly, in the peculiar political atmosphere that characterized the immediate afterwar period, when the Resistance movements subsumed for a time older political rivalries, European unity became a redemptive good that created consensus among Catholic conservatives, liberal intellectuals and social reformists, trade unionists and big business, members of the Resistance and former collaborationists, as well as state officials. But ideas on how European unity should take shape—intergovernmental cooperation or supranational federation, ‘unionism’, and ‘federalism’—greatly diverged and the pro-European movement was fragmented.

Significantly, despite their displayed political inclusiveness, European unity movements only saw scarce participation of the labour movement, and so did the nascent European institutions. Christian democrats, liberals, and even neoliberals—who had been engaged in favour of a federal Europe since their founding Walter Lippmann Colloquium in 1938 and the creation in 1947 of the Mont Pelerin Society to counter the ideological hegemony of socialism and state interventionism—were particularly well represented among the pro-European galaxy. To name but a few examples, in the UK, the ‘United Europe Movement’ created by Churchill was then led by his son-in-law, the conservative deputy Duncan Sandys; its French affiliate, the conservative Conseil français pour l’Europe unie was founded by the French economist and member of the Mont Pelerin Society René Courtin, while Charles Rist, Wilhelm Röpke, and Jacques Rueff, also leading personalities of Mont-Pèlerin, animated the economic commission of Koudenhove-Kalergi’s ‘Paneuropean Union’; and the influential European League for Economic Cooperation (ELEC) formed in 1946 was presided over by the former Belgian Prime Minister and liberal champion Paul Van Zeeland and owed much to the activism of diplomat Joseph Retinger, a less known ‘father of Europe’ who was close to European and US business circles.⁵

Of course, European unity was not an exclusively right-wing project. Several eminent socialists and trade unionists took part in some pro-European movements like the Union of European Federalists created in 1946, and some left-leaning pro-European groups appeared in the immediate afterwar period, such as a group of socialist activists organized around the journal *Cahiers socialistes* in Belgium, and the Movement for the United Socialist States of Europe (MEUSE, later MSEUE) formed in June 1946 in the Parisian suburb of Montrouge. But socialist parties and trade unions remained at the time generally distrustful

⁴ For an account of the rise of European federalist movements and their role in the postwar origins of European integration, see in particular Walter Lipgens, *A History of European Integration*, Engl. ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1982).

⁵ François Denord and Antoine Schwartz, ‘L’économie (très) politique du traité de Rome’, *Politix*, no. 89 (April 2010): 35–56.

towards a pro-European movement widely perceived as conservative and capitalist. The divorce was total with communist forces, who were plainly absent from the scene, especially as emerging Cold War tensions started to polarize the European Left—and the European political landscape more broadly—around a communist versus anti-communist divide.⁶ This scepticism was palpable across the left-wing press of the time. In November 1948, for instance, the prestigious French journal *Esprit*, a precursor of what would become the French new left, warned: 'the federation of the peoples of Europe, the abandonment of national sovereignty, was until now the boldest dream of left-wing men. Today, the United States of Europe have the whole reactionary world for them.'⁷

The 'Congress of Europe' organized by pro-European movements in May 1948 at the Castle of The Hague in the Netherlands with over 800 delegates from around Europe—widely celebrated today as a founding event for European unity—evidenced this lopsided Europeanism. Chaired by Churchill and praised by Pope Pius XII, the Congress was boycotted by Clement Attlee's British Labour government, one of the most important left-wing governments of western Europe at the time. Likewise, several socialist parties encouraged their members not to attend the Congress and even the MSEUE refused to take part. Some socialist leaders, like the French Paul Ramadier and François Mitterrand, however attended. Very few trade unionists were present. This was in part a reaction to the ostensibly anti-communist stance of the Congress, as representatives of eastern European governments, now increasingly tied to the Soviet Union, had been purposely left out and no communist party representatives, despite their relevance in the French and Italian political landscape in particular, were present. It was also due to the labour movement's refusal to serve 'a replastering of global capitalism.'⁸ Therefore, at a time when socialists and communists, as well as trade unions, were playing a major role in the postwar reconstruction of European societies and in defining postwar national arrangements and welfare policies, they were remarkably marginalized in the incipient European unification process.

At the Hague, the economic and social committee of the Congress, presided over by Van Zeeland, proposed a liberal programme supported by champions of economic (neo)liberalism like Daniel Serruys, Walter Layton, Jacques Rueff, and Jacques Lacour-Gayet. During the discussions, vivid tensions arose between trade unionists and socialists on one side, and liberals on the other, regarding social and economic questions—should a united Europe be built on the principles of

⁶ Pierre Tilly, 'Milieux intellectuels et ouvriers belges et le Congrès de La Haye', in *Le 'Congrès de l'Europe' à La Haye (1948-2008)*, ed. Jean-Michel Guieu and Christophe Le Dréau (Brussels; New York: PIE Peter Lang, 2009), 109-22.

⁷ Jean-Marie Domenach, 'Quelle Europe', *Esprit*, November 1948, 652. Cited in François Denord and Antoine Schwartz, *L'Europe sociale n'aura pas lieu* (Paris: Raisons d'agir, 2009), 17.

⁸ G. Dejardin, 'Le Socialisme et l'Europe', in *Éducation et socialisme: Carnet mensuel de la centrale d'éducation populaire*, no. 15-16 (November-December 1948), 76. Quoted in Tilly, 'Milieux intellectuels et ouvriers belges et le Congrès de La Haye', 114 (author's translation).

economic planning or free enterprise; should workers take part in the management of enterprises and in the economic decisions of a united Europe? Unable to have their proposals approved, French socialists and trade unionists left the Congress at the beginning of the plenary session; the final declaration only timidly alluded to workers' concerns and avoided any clear reference to planning.⁹ Meanwhile, the main outcome of the Congress, the Council of Europe created a year later in May 1949 by the Treaty of London signed by Belgium, Denmark, France, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, and the UK—joined three months later by Turkey and Greece—only timidly advanced European unity and lacked supranational competences. It soon disappointed the federalist 'fathers of Europe' such as Spaak, who abandoned his position as first president of the organization's parliamentary Assembly in 1951.

Historians have by now widely documented the tremendous role played by the US in orienting the unification of western Europe after the Second World War. As tensions between the US and the Soviet Union were escalating into a full-scale Cold War by 1947–8, partnership with a stabilized and united Europe sustaining a Western 'bloc' became crucial to US interests. Hence, the US turned out to be one of the main supporters of pro-European groups, in particular thanks to Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) funding, which transited through the American Committee on United Europe (ACUE), set up in 1948 by the high-ranking diplomat and future CIA director Allen Dulles, and directed by former director of the Office of Strategic Services (OSS) William Donovan, then through private foundations such as the Ford Foundation. The international 'European Movement' born after the Hague Congress to coordinate pro-European groups, which was presided over by Duncan Sandys and had such prestigious honorary presidents as Spaak, Léon Blum, Churchill, De Gasperi, Schuman, and Adenauer, owed much to this ACUE financing. The same would go for the Comité d'action pour les États-Unis d'Europe founded in 1956 by Jean Monnet, the influential French entrepreneur, diplomat, financier, and administrator appointed in 1945 by the head of the French government Charles de Gaulle to head France's new planning commission.¹⁰ Monnet had close ties to the highest spheres of power in the US.¹¹

The American role in assisting European integration was not limited to financing pro-European movements—far from it. In June 1947, US Secretary of State George Marshall proposed an ambitious plan to provide economic aid for Europe's postwar reconstruction. At the time, wartime destruction was still

⁹ Gérard Bossuat, 'Le Projet d'union économique européenne', in *Le 'Congrès de l'Europe' à La Haye (1948–2008)*, ed. Jean-Michel Guieu and Christophe Le Dréau (Brussels: PIE Peter Lang, 2009), 321–36; Robert Salais, *Le Viol d'Europe: Enquête sur la disparition d'une idée* (Paris: Presses universitaires de France, 2013), 47–67.

¹⁰ Richard J. Aldrich, *The Hidden Hand: Britain, America, and Cold War Secret Intelligence* (Woodstock, NY: The Overlook Press, 2002), 342–70.

¹¹ François Duchêne, *Jean Monnet: The First Statesman of Interdependence* (New York: Norton, 1994).

acutely felt—basic essentials of life such as food, housing, transport infrastructure, and healthcare were lacking—and European economies were engulfed in an economic crisis. As a result, by September that year, sixteen countries were enrolled in the Organization for European Economic Co-operation (OEEC) which set its headquarters in Paris. Between 1948 and 1952, \$13 billion in cash and essential supplies were injected into European economies through the newly created European Recovery Programme (ERP)—which was preferred over the United Nations' already existing European Commission for Europe headed by the famous Swedish social-democrat economist Gunnar Myrdal, whose engagement in social reform and conciliant attitude towards the Soviet Union were frowned upon by the US government.¹²

The Marshall Plan aimed to encourage trade and economic cooperation between European countries and to foster commerce between those countries and the US. Access to ERP money was conditioned upon coordinated rather than individual national use of economic aid. American administrators exerted recurrent pressures upon European officials to accelerate progress towards economic integration during those years. The General Secretary of the OEEC, Robert Marjolin, an adjunct of Monnet at the French Commissariat général au plan, as well as the Belgian centre-left Prime Minister Paul-Henri Spaak, who sat at the organization's Council, supported this endeavour. So did the Economic Cooperation Administration (ECA), the US government agency in charge of supervising the funds. In 1949, its first administrator, the US businessman Paul Hoffmann, intervened at the OEEC to warn European governments that unless rapid and serious progress was made towards integration, the US would have to reconsider its commitment.¹³ Importantly, the US administration pressured its European allies to accept the integration of West Germany into the new European economic structure—a prospect that initially did not enthuse French leaders. On 9 May 1950—a date now celebrated as 'Europe Day'—the French Foreign Minister Robert Schuman made a historic declaration proposing to pool French and German coal and steel production together with those of their European neighbours in one

¹² Gérard Bossuat, *L'Europe occidentale à l'heure américaine: Le Plan Marshall et l'unité européenne (1945–1952)* (Brussels: Éditions complexe, 1992), 73. On the Marshall Plan's role in postwar European reconstruction and integration, see Michael J. Hogan, *The Marshall Plan: America, Britain, and the Reconstruction of Western Europe, 1947–1952* (Cambridge University Press, 1987); David W. Ellwood, *Rebuilding Europe: Western Europe, America, and Postwar Reconstruction* (London: Longman, 1992); Alan S. Milward, *The Reconstruction of Western Europe 1945–51* (London: Methuen, 1984); Barry J. Eichengreen, *The European Economy since 1945: Coordinated Capitalism and Beyond* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2006), 54–73. The sixteen countries were Austria, Belgium, Denmark, France, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Norway, the Netherlands, Portugal, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, and the UK. West Germany joined in October 1949 straight after the creation of its first government presided over by Konrad Adenauer.

¹³ Bossuat, *L'Europe occidentale à l'heure américaine*; Annie Lacroix-Riz, *L'intégration européenne de la France: La Tutelle de l'Allemagne et des États-Unis* (Pantin: Le Temps des cerises, 2007); Denord and Schwartz, *L'Europe sociale n'aura pas lieu*, 28–30.

common market under one common supranational High Authority. Resulting the following year in the establishment of the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) allying France, West Germany, Italy, Belgium, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands, the ‘Schuman Plan’ inspired by Monnet’s federalist ideas owed much to diplomatic pressures by the US, and specifically by Marshall’s successor, Dean Acheson.

Though historians diverge in their assessment of how crucial Marshall Aid was to European recovery, it no doubt helped stabilize western European finances by easing the balance-of-payment constraints, helping to overcome shortages of basic necessities and encouraging investment in infrastructure and raw materials critical to economic growth.¹⁴ It also provided the impetus to rebuild European regional trade around West Germany’s economy, ‘the pivot on which the increases in foreign trade, investment and prosperity turned.’¹⁵ Marshall Aid was conditional upon the acceptance by recipient states of a determined set of policies, from balanced budgets to stable exchange rates; it tolerated their commitment to a mixed economy but ‘insisted that market forces be represented more liberally in the mix.’¹⁶ US administrators of the Marshall Plan also managed, notwithstanding friction with their European counterparts, to impose an anti-cartel competitive framework onto European reconstruction and integration plans—therefore easing access for US capital.¹⁷ In fact, the Marshall Plan had a much broader strategic significance than stabilizing European economies: ‘the economic, political, ideological, and military dimensions of the American rescue of European capitalism were intertwined and inseparable.’¹⁸

Most importantly, unifying western Europe became key to US President Harry Truman’s efforts to contain communism. Indeed, the Marshall Plan went hand in hand with the so-called ‘Truman Doctrine’: a containment policy announced earlier in 1947 by the US government, which aimed to prevent the spread of communism around the world through economic and military assistance. One aspect of this containment policy was to turn western Europe into an effective bulwark against the Eastern bloc. This implied reconstructing European economies and rearming western European states, overcoming French–German rivalries, and anchoring West Germany to the Western bloc. The Marshall Plan brilliantly

¹⁴ Milward, *The Reconstruction of Western Europe 1945–51*, ch. 3; Charles S. Maier, ‘The Two Postwar Eras and the Conditions for Stability in Twentieth-Century Western Europe’, *American Historical Review* 86, no. 2 (1981): 327–52.

¹⁵ Alan S. Milward, *The European Rescue of the Nation-State*, 2nd ed. (London; New York: Routledge, 2000), 223.

¹⁶ Bradford De Long and Barry Eichengreen, ‘The Marshall Plan: History’s Most Successful Structural Adjustment Program’, NBER working paper series, 1991; cited in Leo Panitch and Sam Gindin, *The Making of Global Capitalism: The Political Economy of American Empire* (London: Verso, 2012), 96.

¹⁷ Volker Rolf Berghahn, *The Americanisation of West German Industry 1945–1973* (Leamington Spa: Berg, 1986), 143.

¹⁸ Panitch and Gindin, *The Making of Global Capitalism*, 96.

succeeded in pushing into that direction. In its last operative year, as Cold War tensions were flaring up around the Korean War (1950–3), funds were requalified and allocated specifically to European rearmament. In Truman's words, the Marshall Plan 'helped save Europe from economic disaster and lifted it from the shadow of enslavement by Russian Communism.'¹⁹ Truman's policy also resulted, through the 1948 Brussels Treaty creating the Western European Union (WEO) and the 1949 Atlantic Pact creating the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), in the birth of the 'Atlantic Community'—a military alliance including western European countries and led by Washington to face the challenge of the Soviet Union and its allies.²⁰ At the same time, a growing network linked other states' intelligence and security apparatuses to those of the US. Under this light, the origins of European integration appear driven more by war than by peace.

Moreover, Washington's support for European integration was part of its efforts for the assertion of a reshaped international economic order. With the creation of new institutions following the 1944 Bretton Woods agreements—the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT)—and the Marshall Plan's OEEC as well as the European Payments Union (EPU) created in 1950, a complex structure of multilateral cooperation based on liberalized trade, freedom of enterprise, and currency convertibility took shape under 'consensual American hegemony'.²¹ ERP funding was in fact conditional upon ratification of the Bretton Woods agreements. Through the implementation of the Marshall Plan, the US therefore made sure not only to reinforce its main strategical allies and its main market for goods and capital exportations, but also to anchor western Europe to a reshaped capitalist bloc. By pioneering European integration from the EPU to the Schuman Plan and the Rome treaties, Marshall Aid ensured western Europe's commitment to the private-ownership, market-oriented camp—and against the communist camp. With the creation of the Common Market in 1957—including French and Belgian postcolonial territories—the EEC allowed for an expansion of European markets in order to compete in the reshaped capitalist order; this reinforced rather than threatened the US camp.²² Leo Panitch and Sam Gindin rightly underline that the foundations of postwar European integration and cooperation were thus grounded in the emergence of a new type of US imperialism.²³

¹⁹ Geoff Eley, *Forging Democracy: The History of the Left in Europe, 1850–2000* (Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press, 2002), 300.

²⁰ NATO originally included the UK, France, the Netherlands, Luxembourg, Belgium, Canada, the US, Denmark, Iceland, Italy, Norway and Portugal; West Germany joined in 1955.

²¹ Charles S. Maier, *In Search of Stability: Explorations in Historical Political Economy* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987), 148.

²² See Peo Hansen and Stefan Jonsson, *Eurafrica: The Untold History of European Integration and Colonialism* (London: Bloomsbury, 2014).

²³ Sam Gindin and Leo Panitch, *The Making of Global Capitalism: The Political Economy of American Empire* (London: Verso, 2012), 67–109.

All this is not to say that the US completely over-determined postwar reconstruction and integration in Europe. The UK, despite its 'special partnership' with the US giant, resisted US pressure to join in the nascent European Communities and stuck to its imperial preference system and to free trade agreements with its other commercial partners. Besides, as mentioned previously, the project for a European army under NATO auspices—the EDC and its political complement, the EPC—ostensibly pushed by the US against initial French government hostility and supported by Monnet, Spaak, and the Belgian senator and European federalist Fernand Dehousse, was eventually overruled in 1954 by the French Assembly. Above all, though subjected to US pressures, European elites played the main part in the actual running of the EPU, the formation of the ECSC and the negotiations that led in 1957 to the Rome treaties.

The federalist vision of a supranational Europe promoted by Monnet and his collaborators, a small group of technocrats including the civil engineer Étienne Hirsch, the economist Pierre Uri, and the lawyer Paul Reuter, greatly influenced the Schuman Plan as well as the institutional setting of the EEC eight years later. As Perry Anderson rightly emphasizes, Monnet's 'direct line to Washington' was the main source of his strength as an architect of integration, but his political inspiration was somewhat different from the Americans's.²⁴ The federalist idea of Europe was also pushed by the Benelux countries, which had already formed a customs union 'in exile' as early as 1943 and hoped that a supranational framework would allow them to gain influence over European politics. The Dutch Foreign Minister Johan Beyen and Spaak, who was Foreign Minister in Belgium and Secretary General of NATO, played a great role in the coming about of the Rome treaties. In fact, European business and political elites actively shared their views of European and world politics with their US partners, for instance in the secretive (but nonetheless famous) Bilderberg Group founded in 1954 by Retinger, which presumably had a sizeable intellectual influence over the formation of the EEC.²⁵ In this sense, the Marshall Plan and European integration allowed western European elites to re-establish their control over postwar societies, but also to shift the postwar settlement towards the right.

Indeed, the US containment doctrine was not limited to containing the threat of a Soviet takeover: an essential aspect of this policy was to contain communist and left-socialist forces around the world. The Second World War and the anti-fascist Resistance had 'brought a powerful shift to the Left, bringing socialists and communists center stage in entirely new ways' in western Europe, leading them to share governing coalitions with Catholic, liberal, and radical forces, or, in the case

²⁴ Perry Anderson, *The New Old World* (London: Verso, 2009), 17.

²⁵ Valérie Aubourg, 'Le Groupe de Bilderberg et l'intégration européenne jusqu'au milieu des années 1960', in *Réseaux économiques et construction européenne*, ed. Michel Dumoulin (Brussels: PIE Peter Lang, 2004).

of the UK, to form a majority government, and creating openings for radical transformations of European societies.²⁶ The Left's growing popularity since the war worried the US administration, especially since general elections were impending across much of western Europe in 1947–8. As Europe's postwar recovery was lagging behind with crippled infrastructure and large budget deficits, the heavy food shortages caused by the harsh winter of 1946–7 threatened to widen popular discontent: in 1947, for instance, important strikes took place at Renault factories in France. Even before the Marshall Plan came into operation, 'dollars were pumped into France and Italy for political "stabilization" against the Left'; by May 1947, shortly before the announcement of the Marshall Plan, the French, Italian, and Belgian communists had already been expelled from government.²⁷ Marshall Aid aimed to stabilize European finances and release pressure on domestic consumption to prevent left-wing radicalization; it helped legitimize the moral and political demonization of communism and anchor socialists to the Western camp. Marshall Aid was, for example, applied to split freshly unified trade union movements, as in the case of the Italian General Confederation of Labour (CGIL) whose unification in 1944 symbolized wartime solidarities.²⁸ In fact, although they managed to place the blame for rejecting aid onto the Soviets—thereby securing a great propaganda victory—US officials made their reluctance to grant financial aid to socialist-leaning governments rather clear.²⁹ Essential to the US project for western Europe was 'marginalizing the most radical impulses in the labor movement and channelling the expectations and demands of workers and farmers towards making gains within the boundaries of a growing capitalism.'³⁰

There is wide historical evidence of US meddling in the European labour movement after the war, which consisted in methodically isolating communist parties and trade unions. US trade unions, in particular the American Federation of Labour (AFL) and the Congress of Industrial Organizations (CIO), backed by the US government and the CIA, played a noteworthy role in the formation and consolidation of non-communist and anti-communist unions.³¹ Equally

²⁶ Eley, *Forging Democracy*, 288.

²⁷ Eley, *Forging Democracy*, 300.

²⁸ Eley, *Forging Democracy*, 302.

²⁹ See Eichengreen, *The European Economy since 1945*, 64–70; Peter Weiler, *British Labour and the Cold War* (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1988), 124; on the demise of Western communist parties at the time, see Donald Sassoon, 'The Rise and Fall of West European Communism 1939–48', *Contemporary European History* 1, no. 2 (1992): 139–69.

³⁰ Panitch and Gindin, *The Making of Global Capitalism*, 98.

³¹ Federico Romero, *The United States and the European Trade Union Movement, 1944–1951* (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 1992); Anthony Carew, *American Labour's Cold War Abroad: From Deep Freeze to Détente, 1945–1970* (Edmonton: Athabasca University Press, 2018); Anthony Carew, 'The Politics of Productivity and the Politics of Anti-Communism: American and European Labour in the Cold War', in *The Cultural Cold War in Western Europe, 1945–60*, ed. Hans Krabbendam and Giles Scott-Smith (London: Routledge, 2004), 73–91; Annie Lacroix-Riz, 'Autour d'Irving Brown: L'A.F.L., le Free Trade Union Committee, le Département d'État et la scission syndicale française (1944–1947)', *Le Mouvement social*, no. 151 (1990): 79–118.

important and effective to this aim was the Marshall Plan's crucial role in importing a specific economic and social model into European societies. Indeed, the postwar recovery of European capitalism and its progressive regional integration favoured the adoption of forms of production and accumulation that had been developed earlier in the US, heralding the so-called Fordist and Taylorist models in Europe. These forms of production, aiming at mass production for mass consumption of standardized goods, required the realization of an extended market justifying the adoption of modern methods of 'rationalization': larger firms, mechanization, scientific management, deskilling of work, control of the labour process and the production line, and so on. The success of this economic model entailed a non-conflictual approach to labour relations that Charles Maier famously termed as the 'politics of productivity'.³² Its basic rationale was to supersede class conflict and avoid redistribution of power and wealth thanks to economic growth—baking a bigger cake instead of dividing the cake more fairly, as it is often put.

While the 'American challenge' had already constituted an important stimulus to the integration of European industrial capitalism well before the second postwar period, the Marshall Plan gave it a new, deliberate impetus.³³ 'Productivism'—including new forms of production, management, and technologies—was propagated in Europe first through the Anglo-American Productivity Council and later through the European Productivity Agency, as well as national productivity councils which promoted 'managerial retraining seminars, "pilot plant" projects, consultancy programs, and thousands of visits to American industries by European managers, technicians, and trade unionists' and, more generally, through informal contacts and the dissemination of the US culture in western Europe.³⁴ Important transfers of technology took place from the US to western Europe, especially in sectors like steel, chemicals, distribution, retail, and automobiles.

This productivist model contributed to shaping the implicit postwar 'social compromise' which underpinned Marshall Aid and the later European cooperation schemes. A new compromise that relied on an enhanced role for the state in social and economic affairs following Keynesian macroeconomic formulas—taming capitalism's cycles and stabilizing demand through large-scale public spending, monetary policies, and progressive taxation—with a view to full employment

³² Charles S. Maier, 'The Politics of Productivity: Foundations of American International Economic Policy after World War II', *International Organization* 31, no. 4 (October 1977): 607–33.

³³ See Francesco Petrini, 'Save Capitalism, Make Europe! Conflitti politici e integrazione economica nel "lungo ventesimo secolo"', *Zapruder: Rivista di storia della conflittualità sociale*, no. 51 (2020): 11–33. Also Sven Beckert, 'American Danger: United States Empire, Eurafica, and the Territorialization of Industrial Capitalism, 1870–1950', *American Historical Review* 122, no. 4 (October 2017): 1137–70.

³⁴ Panitch and Gindin, *The Making of Global Capitalism*, 101; see also Anthony Carew, *Labour under the Marshall Plan: The Politics of Productivity and the Marketing of Management Science* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1987), 80–91; Michael J. Hogan, 'American Marshall Planners and the Search for a European Neocapitalism', *American Historical Review* 90, no. 1 (1985): 44–72.

and stable prices. Economic planning (with great variations in its application) became the 'political religion of post-war Europe'.³⁵ The postwar compromise was backed by a package of social reforms and higher social spending, and relied on the 'corporatist' system reinforced in the second postwar era—a system of institutionalized cooperation between employers and trade unions mediated by the state.

Therefore, labour got more political influence, stable employment, and a share of the productivity gains, with regularly rising real wages, increasing standards of living, and more consumer goods; employers reasserted control over the means and methods of production, and won predictable economic conditions, increased productivity, a booming consumer market, and steady rates of profit; the state got 'allegiance', political stability, and social peace. Corporatism served to contain labour's demands and militancy within limits, and stalled far-reaching plans for socialization and redistribution; as such, it was essential to postwar stabilization. Supported by a resounding majority of western European elites extending across the Right and Left of the western European political spectrum—eased once the communists had been manoeuvred out of power—the postwar compromise was arguably dominated by social-democratic recipes, even when conservatives were in power. Indeed, they were pioneered by Scandinavian social democrats, who remained in government throughout the postwar decades.

The productivist strategy sustaining this 'state-managed' or 'welfare' capitalism largely paid off. Its success can be measured in the emergence of the so-called golden age in western Europe, a period of unparalleled growth and capital formation coupled with virtual full employment until the crisis of the 1970s.³⁶ Though absolute poverty still existed even in the richest countries, European populations entered an age of improved standards of living and welfare. The leap in income was accompanied by a considerable rise in the consumption of goods and services that had once been confined to wealthy minorities. As is well known, the postwar years in Europe saw the 'democratization' of what had once been considered luxury goods such as automobiles, telephones, and refrigerators, and the spread of new household commodities such as televisions and washing machines. It was also the time when European tourism increased massively.³⁷ Beyond the increase

³⁵ Tony Judt, *Postwar: A History of Europe since 1945* (London: William Heinemann, 2005), 67–8, here p. 67.

³⁶ Besides, the politics of productivity and the US containment policy brilliantly succeeded in securing a balance of political forces in line with US interests: by early 1948, non-socialist parties had a majority in thirteen out of the sixteen OEEC countries, and the 1947–8 elections generally strengthened the non-socialist majorities. The US meddling in Italian elections in those years also greatly assisted De Gasperi's victory over the communist–socialist camp.

³⁷ See Eric Hobsbawm, *Age of Extremes: The Short Twentieth Century 1914–1991* (London: Michael Joseph, 1994), 263–8.

in income and material affluence, hours worked declined, and leisure time and life expectancy increased.³⁸

Alan Milward argues that European economic integration—since it formed one of the main pillars of the ‘economic miracle’ that characterized this period, thanks to the reintegration of West Germany into European trade, the creation of a large ‘domestic market,’ and the broader postwar international economic and monetary system it was embedded in—sustained the development of European welfare states.³⁹ With the EPU and the ECSC first, then the EEC and the creation in 1960 of a European Free Trade Association (EFTA) including Austria, Denmark, Norway, Portugal, Sweden, Switzerland, and the UK, European countries moved progressively down the road of trade liberalization, supporting export-led growth.⁴⁰ Stabilized currencies and liberalized trade and capital movements, although they remained subject to control, generated the resources to support very high private and public investment in industrial sectors as well as public investment in education, health, and social security provision. European integration therefore constituted, in this view, ‘the external buttress’ to the welfare state.⁴¹ This unique combination of trade liberalization and ambitious social welfare policies was summarized in Robert Gilpin’s famous formulation ‘Smith abroad, Keynes at home,’ which pointed out ‘the positive synergy between economic policy guidelines at a national and European level that from a strictly doctrinal point of view could appear in striking contradiction to each other.’⁴²

This is partly true. On the one hand, there is little doubt that European integration and economic liberalization were paralleled with the construction of the most advanced welfare states in European history. Despite marked differences between each western European country’s welfare and industrial relations system, everywhere a rapid and unprecedented increase in social welfare expenditure—social security against life risks such as unemployment, illness, accidents, and old-age difficulties, social services such as medical care, education, housing, subsidized public transport and infrastructure, and leisure facilities and publicly funded art and culture—took place between the second half of the 1940s and the 1970s.⁴³ These new social rights, ‘all longstanding demands of the European

³⁸ Eichengreen, *The European Economy since 1945*, 1–14.

³⁹ Milward, *The European Rescue of the Nation-State*, 21–45.

⁴⁰ Eichengreen argues that the common market allowed EEC countries to increase their income by 4 to 8 per cent between 1959 and 1969. Eichengreen, *The European Economy since 1945*, 178–82.

⁴¹ Milward, *The European Rescue of the Nation-State*, 216.

⁴² Lorenzo Mechi, ‘A Precondition for Economic Integration? European Debates on Social Harmonisation in the 1950s and 1960s’, in *Free Trade and Social Welfare in Europe: Explorations in the Long 20th Century*, ed. Lucia Coppolaro and Lorenzo Mechi (Abingdon; New York: Routledge, 2020), 72–3. See Robert Gilpin, *The Political Economy of International Relations* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1987).

⁴³ P. Flora and J. Alber, ‘Modernization, Democratization, and the Development of Welfare States in Western Europe’, in Peter Flora and Arnold J. Heidenheimer, eds., *The Development of Welfare States in Europe and America* (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Books, 1981), 55 and following. For an

labour movement, now became general entitlements via post-war reconstruction and remained so until the 1970s.⁴⁴ By the early 1970s, Eric Hobsbawm noted, western Europe saw 'the appearance of welfare states in the literal meaning of the word, that is to say states in which welfare expenditures [...] became the greater part of total public expenditure, and people engaged in welfare activities formed the largest body of all public employment.'⁴⁵ Although they did not challenge the underpinnings of the capitalist economy and did not erase wealth inequalities, these sets of welfare policies, and the rise of the fiscal and social state, implied unprecedented levels of redistribution.⁴⁶

But on the other hand, this historic development was mostly the result of pressures from below and of the radical openings that had immediately followed the Second World War—not of European 'visionaries.' The civil liberties and social and economic rights engraved in the new constitutions, women's enfranchisement, nationalization and public ownership, central planning, strong welfare states and active labour policies, as well as the recognition of trade unions and their association to the state's decisions through collective bargaining, were for the good part a legacy of the anti-fascist Resistance and a result of the success of communist and socialist forces in the ballot box after the war.⁴⁷ In France, for instance, the National Resistance Council's 1944 programme, *Les Jours heureux*, committed its signatories once the war ended to pursue full employment, wealth redistribution, nationalization of banks, insurance companies, and industrial sectors dominated by monopolies, and economic planning, as well as a broad system of social security, a minimum guaranteed wage, and the ultimate goal of instituting 'a true economic and social democracy.'⁴⁸ In the following years, it was particularly the communist Labour Minister Ambrose Croizat who oversaw, with remarkable support from the five-million-member, communist General Confederation of Labour (CGT), the creation of the most far-reaching social security scheme in French history. During the 1950s and 1960s, the electoral successes of the social democrats in Scandinavia, the Benelux countries, Austria, Switzerland, the UK, and West Germany (and the competition they faced with the communists in France and Italy) greatly contributed to imposing a so-called 'social-democratic consensus.' In the Scandinavian countries it was the permanence of social-democratic parties

overview of the rise of welfare states in postwar Europe, see also Judt, *Postwar*, 185–96. On the different models of 'welfare capitalism', see Gösta Esping-Andersen, *The Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1990).

⁴⁴ Eley, *Forging Democracy*, 311. ⁴⁵ Hobsbawm, *Age of Extremes*, 84.

⁴⁶ See Thomas Piketty, *Capital and Ideology* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2020), ch. 10.

⁴⁷ Eley, *Forging Democracy*, 311.

⁴⁸ Conseil national de la Résistance, *Les Jours heureux*, 1944. As cited in Petrini, 'Save Capitalism, Make Europe!', 22.

in government that gave rise to the most inclusive, universal, ‘de-commodifying’, and expensive welfare states.⁴⁹

To some extent, it could even be argued that European integration, embedded in the broad postwar productivist settlement described above, actually helped to end the radical hopes of the postwar years. Just like the Marshall Plan, the Schuman Plan and the Treaty of Rome, while they contributed to ‘buttressing’ the welfare state, also helped to shut down social conflict, weaken labour movements, and stabilize the inequalities of income and power within European societies. Indeed, during the ‘golden age’, despite the general increase in wages, the share of wages in national incomes remained stable or even dropped slightly.⁵⁰ Measured against the hopes that had emerged during the war, this was a greatly restricted settlement. Far from expressing an irresistible drive towards the ‘United States of Europe’, Milward famously argues, European integration enabled the postwar reinforcement and re-legitimation of national states—a manoeuvre brilliantly summarized as the ‘European rescue of the nation-state’. Behind the black box of the nation-state and undefined ‘national interests’ of Milward’s account, however, one may wonder if what Europe was really rescuing was not—more specifically—its ruling classes and capitalist economic elites.⁵¹ Indeed, ‘in the post-war period it was not so much the survival of the continental nation states that was at stake, but rather the fate of an entire social order: capitalism itself. A system considered responsible for the misery and unemployment of the years of the “Great Depression” first, then the outbreak of the world conflict.’⁵²

Liberalism, Social Welfare, and the Treaty of Rome

There is a longstanding debate—especially among historians and social scientists—about the socio-economic paradigm dominating the European polity since its inception in the 1950s. Were the European institutions and policies imagined back then by European political elites intrinsically liberal? Or did they result from a combination of diverse economic and political philosophies—classic liberalism, German ordoliberalism, state interventionism, French indicative planning,

⁴⁹ For a detailed analysis of how socialist and social-democratic parties shaped the development of social policies and social provisions throughout the period in Scandinavia, Germany, the UK, France and Italy, see Gianni Silei, *Welfare state e socialdemocrazia: Cultura, programmi e realizzazioni in Europa occidentale dal 1945 ad oggi* (Manduria: Lacaita, 2000). See also Judt, *Postwar*, 241–77 and 360–89.

⁵⁰ Maier, ‘The Two Postwar Eras and the Conditions for Stability in Twentieth-Century Western Europe’, 345; Eley, *Forging Democracy*, 302.

⁵¹ A point well argued in Francesco Petrini, ‘Bringing Social Conflict Back In: The Historiography of Industrial Milieux and European Integration’, *Contemporanea*, no. 3 (2014): 525–42; Petrini, ‘Save Capitalism, Make Europe!’, 20–1.

⁵² Petrini, ‘Save Capitalism, Make Europe!’, 22.

democratic socialism, and so on? In other words, to use a French saying, was the 'worm in the fruit' from the very beginning, barring the way to a 'social' Europe?

Despite the unprecedented consideration for social welfare and the significant role played by the labour movement in western European societies in the three post-1945 decades, European cooperation and integration plans turned out to be characterized by their rather scarce attention to social issues. Historians who have delved into the question generally agree that until the turn of the 1970s, despite substantial achievements in economic integration, there was very little effort to think about the social consequences of the Common Market and implement, at European level, any substantial social intervention.⁵³ There is an apparent paradox between the unprecedented commitment by postwar western European states to social welfare and economic interventionism, on the one hand, and the social deficit of the mostly liberal projects of European integration, on the other. It is often argued that social policy was guarded as a domain of competence by nation-states themselves, as it was one of the keystones of their postwar reassertion, and that European decision-makers believed that trade liberalization and cooperation would naturally lead to economic prosperity and social progress. This idea of economic integration as a mean to increase wealth, and hence the prosperity and living conditions of workers, was already present within pre-war projects of economic and social integration—in particular, the ILO created in 1919 to draw up international conventions promoting harmonization of social rights, with only limited results.⁵⁴

As Mechi's works highlight, however, the synergy between economic liberalization and social welfare was not at all obvious.⁵⁵ On the contrary, the contradictions between trade liberalization and the construction of welfare states emerged explicitly during the postwar years. Even before the Treaty of Rome was negotiated, the liberalization of cross-border trade in a context of high social disparities between countries had been the topic of recurrent discussions within international forums such as the ILO, the OEEC, the Council of Europe, and the ECSC. Industrial milieus and their political representatives feared that the great differences in social contributions and wage levels would create unfair competition for firms. The labour world in turn feared that international competition would lead to a race to the bottom regarding wages and social rights. To counter the risks of social

⁵³ Maria Eleonora Guasconi, 'The Origins of the European Social Policy: The Standing Committee on Employment and Trade Unions', in Antonio Varsori, ed., *Inside the European Community: Actors and Policies in the European Integration 1957–1972* (Baden-Baden; Brussels: Nomos; Bruylant, 2006), 301–11; Andrea Ciampani, 'La politica sociale nel processo d'integrazione europea', *Europa/Europe X*, no. 1 (2001): 120–34.

⁵⁴ Lorenzo Mechi, 'Du BIT à la politique sociale européenne: Les Origines d'un modèle', *Le Mouvement social* 244, no. 3 (2013): 21–22, 27. See in general Jasmien van Daele, ed., *ILO Histories: Essays on the International Labour Organization and Its Impact on the World during the Twentieth Century* (Bern: Peter Lang, 2010).

⁵⁵ Mechi, 'A Precondition for Economic Integration?'

dumping, in the 1950s European trade unions launched within the ILO a campaign for ‘upward social harmonization’—a general adjustment to the social rights and wages of the most socially advanced countries. In 1953, the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions (ICFTU)—the main non-communist international labour organization—adopted a resolution at its third world congress emphasizing the need to accompany European economic integration with ‘social integration’, understood as ‘an upward adjustment of social conditions with a view to achieving a maximum degree of harmonization.’⁵⁶

Countries with the most advanced social protection systems—like France, which inherited a progressive equal pay and social security regime from the 1930s *Front populaire* and from the postwar implementation of the Resistance programme, and the UK, where the British Labour governments of 1945–51 promised protection ‘from the cradle to the grave’—were concerned about being competitively disadvantaged. Social disparities between countries therefore represented a major problem—and a potential obstacle—for European unification. Social harmonization was seen by several governments as well as unions and industrial circles as a precondition to economic integration. This explains, for instance, why the treaty establishing the ECSC, which was signed in April 1951 in Paris, included a provision for intervention if wage levels and social provisions led to a distortion of competition within the market and explicitly prohibited the use of wage reduction as a means of competition between undertakings.⁵⁷

Designed in great part by Monnet and other French civil servants to manage the key industries of coal and steel while keeping German industry under control, the ECSC was basically a technocratic instrument combining freedom of enterprise with *planification à la française*. The Treaty of Paris displayed a certain will to include workers’ representatives in its policy and decision making: the High Authority (the supranational executive body of the ECSC) was to include at least one trade union representative out of nine members and be flanked with a Consultative Committee that included representatives of trade unions, employers, and a third interest group of ‘users and stockholders’. It also set progressive social goals for the nascent ECSC, as its institutions were to ‘promote improved working conditions and an improved standard of living for the workers in each of the industries for which it is responsible, so as to make possible their harmonisation while the improvement is being maintained.’⁵⁸ It remained unclear, however, how this objective would be reached.⁵⁹

⁵⁶ Resolution cited in Mechi, ‘A Precondition for Economic Integration?’, 76.

⁵⁷ Article 68 of the treaty establishing the ECSC. See Mechi, ‘A Precondition for Economic Integration?’, 74–5.

⁵⁸ Article 3, paragraph ‘e’ of the treaty establishing the ECSC, available at <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:11951K:EN:PDF>.

⁵⁹ Nicolas Verschuere, ‘Le Mirage de l’Europe sociale: Du statut européen du mineur au rapport Bertil Ohlin’, Fondation Jean-Jaurès, April 2019, <https://jean-jaures.org/nos-productions/le-mirage-de-l-europe-sociale-du-statut-europeen-du-mineur-au-rapport-bertil-ohlin>.

After its creation, the ECSC displayed a few 'social' features. The first college of the High Authority, presided over by Monnet, included two trade union representatives. Monnet himself, although he 'was a stranger to the democratic process, as conventionally understood'—he never ran for office and worked among elites only—was 'not economically conservative'; he always sought trade union support for his schemes.⁶⁰ During the 1950s and 1960s, the High Authority promoted various social initiatives, such as financing the construction of housing for workers and their families, carrying out studies on the improvement of working conditions, and providing funding to support vocational training courses for workers affected by the restructuring of the mining and steel industries.⁶¹ Joint committees including employers' and workers' representatives were created following pressure from trade unions—one for coal and one for steel. This relative attention to social issues was mainly motivated by the context of rising Cold War tensions (and therefore the desire to tone down the appeal of communism to workers), and by the fact that the workers of the coal and steel sectors were highly organized. Non-communist trade unions had therefore been associated with the preparatory works of the Treaty of Paris.⁶²

Notwithstanding the progressive intentions, however, the most ambitious trade union proposal for a European minor statute projected after the Marcinelle mining disaster in 1956—the deadliest mining accident in Belgium's history, which killed 262 miners, 136 of whom were Italian—led to a dead-end. Despite the support of the ECSC's High Authority and Common Assembly—and despite the organization in July 1964 of the first European demonstration in Dortmund, West Germany, by the socialist trade unions of the six member countries, with over 25,000 miners asking for a 'social Europe'—the proposal met with resistance from employers and governments and was eventually abandoned.⁶³ Besides, in 1961 the Court of Justice of the European Communities (CJEC) ruled against the West German government's 1956 creation of a miners' bonus, which it considered as a public subsidy to coal industries provoking competition distortion within the EC. The

⁶⁰ Anderson, *The New Old World*, 12–17.

⁶¹ Regarding the action taken by the ECSC in the social field, see in particular Lorenzo Mechi, *La politica sociale della CECA, 1950–1957* (Florence: Università degli studi di Firenze, 1995); Lorenzo Mechi, 'Una vocazione sociale? Le azioni dell'Alta Autorità della CECA a favore dei lavoratori sotto le presidenze di Jean Monnet e di René Mayer', *Storia delle Relazioni Internazionali* X–XI, no. 2 (1994–5): 147–83; Lorenzo Mechi, 'L'action de la Haute Autorité de la CECA dans la construction de maisons ouvrières', *Journal of European Integration History* 6, no. 1 (2000): 63–88; see also Nicolas Verschuere, *Fermer les mines en construisant l'Europe: Une histoire sociale de l'intégration européenne* (Brussels: Peter Lang, 2013).

⁶² Antonio Varsori, 'The Emergence of a Social Europe', in *The European Commission, 1958–72: History and Memories*, ed. Michel Dumoulin and Marie-Thérèse Bitsch (Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications of the European Communities, 2007), 427–41; Andrea Ciampani, ed., *L'altra via per l'Europa: Forze sociali e organizzazione degli interessi nell'integrazione europea (1947–1957)* (Milan: FrancoAngeli, 1995).

⁶³ Verschuere, *Fermer les mines en construisant l'Europe*, 149–70. The demonstration was even supported by the French CGT despite its strong scepticism towards the EC.

High Authority helped pressure the West German government to abolish this bonus and ask for reimbursement from the German miners, an objective finally reached in 1963. In other words, the harmonization towards improvement of the working and living conditions of the workers promised in the Treaty of Paris had already been sacrificed in the name of free competition. The European polity displayed early on its latent tendency to become an area of competition between workers, leading to a downward harmonization of wages and social rights.

Discussions about social harmonization were particularly stiff during the negotiations of the Treaty of Rome. The French government, driven by the pressure of national debate regarding the disparities between French and foreign prices after it had to temporarily restore commercial protection on imports in 1952, was particularly keen to raise the issue of social harmonization to counter the problem of its competitive disadvantage. Within the Council of Europe, the French government led by Mendès France had already initiated the works that led to the adoption of the European Social Charter in 1961—a list of social principles that, however, remained rather symbolic, due to the resistance of employers and of some governments to apply it.⁶⁴ As a result of those discussions on social asymmetries and the insistence of the French government, the question appeared prominently in the negotiations that started in 1955 in Messina between the member countries of the ECSC to revive European integration. Within the Spaak Committee—an intergovernmental working group set up in Messina and presided over by Spaak—the French delegation pushed to subordinate economic integration to social harmonization.

The intergovernmental negotiations within the Spaak Committee were greatly influenced by a report published at the same time, on the issue of trade liberalization and social harmonization, within the ILO. The author of the report, Bertil Ohlin, a liberal economist and leader of the Swedish Liberal Party known for his theories on the advantages of international free trade inspired by the influential classical theorist David Ricardo, was tellingly commissioned by the International Labour Office (the permanent secretariat of the ILO) to preside over a group of experts in charge of studying the social consequences of economic integration in Europe.⁶⁵ The report concluded that neither social rights and wage harmonization nor fiscal harmonization was necessary to the creation of a common market, but would come naturally as the result of economic integration. Even more, artificial harmonization would be deleterious for European economies. The Ohlin Report was published in the spring of 1956, just a few weeks before the Spaak Committee released its own conclusions, and the two reports present evident

⁶⁴ Mechi, 'A Precondition for Economic Integration?', 77–8.

⁶⁵ Mechi, 'Du BIT à la politique sociale européenne'; Lorenzo Mechi, 'Economic Regionalism and Social Stabilisation: The International Labour Organization and Western Europe in the Early Post-War Years', *International History Review* 35, no. 4 (August 2013): 844–62.

similarities.⁶⁶ The Spaak Report, which would effectively be the first draft of the treaty establishing the EEC, assumed that the common market would favour 'the spontaneous tendency to harmonise social systems and salary levels'; it only vaguely recommended harmonization efforts in the fields of overtime work, paid holidays, and women's remuneration.⁶⁷ After that, the French government, led from February 1956 by the socialist Guy Mollet, reduced its pressure regarding social harmonization to these three fields, in which it felt the strongest competitive disadvantage.⁶⁸

Tensions, however, re-emerged in October 1956 over the question of social harmonization, which set the West German and French governments in opposition to each other. The French delegation, particularly sensitive to the position of the Conseil national du patronat français (CNPF), insisted on social harmonization regarding equal pay between men and women (on which France had recently passed a law), a forty-hour week with harmonized overtime pay, paid holidays, and wage harmonization.⁶⁹ In contrast, the German delegation opposed the inclusion of any principle of intervention or social harmonization in the treaty. Since its formal creation in 1949, West Germany had been run by Christian democrats, and a mix of social Catholicism and 'ordoliberalism'—the German variant of neoliberalism—fashioned market-enabling and socially protective public policies.⁷⁰ German ordoliberals were strongly engaged at the European level. Ludwig Erhard, the German Minister for Economics and one of the champions of the ordoliberal doctrine, and his main counsellor Alfred Müller-Armack who was among the most influent neoliberal theoreticians worldwide, exerted a prominent role in the negotiations of the Treaty of Rome. German officials worked to ward off any market-distorting social policy clause. The French Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, Maurice Faure, reported: 'The German Minister makes no secret of the fact that he considers the French legislation to be harmful and that the common market cannot result in its application being extended to Germany.'⁷¹ Eventually, Mollet and the German Chancellor, Adenauer, reached an agreement when meeting in Bonn on 6 November 1956. The agreement can be summarized in the following way: the treaty was to include a section on social policy, although most of its provisions would not be binding, a fund to sustain workers' retraining

⁶⁶ Mechi, 'A Precondition for Economic Integration?', 78–80.

⁶⁷ Mechi, 'A Precondition for Economic Integration?', 79.

⁶⁸ Lise Rye, 'In Quest of Time, Protection and Approval: France and the Claims for Social Harmonization in the European Economic Community, 1955–56', *Journal of European Integration History* 1, no. 8 (2002): 85–102.

⁶⁹ See Milward, *The European Rescue*, 208–16. On the role of French employers, see Laurent Warlouzet, *Le Choix de la CEE par la France: L'Europe économique en débat de Mendès France à de Gaulle, 1955–1969* (Paris: Comité pour l'histoire économique et financière de la France, 2011), 50–9.

⁷⁰ See, for instance, Ben Gook, 'Backdating German Neoliberalism: Ordoliberalism, the German Model and Economic Experiments in Eastern Germany after 1989', *Journal of Sociology* 54, no. 1 (March 2018): 33–48.

⁷¹ Cited in Denord and Schwartz, *L'Europe sociale n'aura pas lieu*, 63 (author's translation).

and reconversion of enterprises, a European Investment Bank (EIB), equal pay for women and men, and some flexibility for member states in the transitional phase of the Common Market in case of economic difficulties.⁷² The final formulation of the treaty did not differ much from the Ohlin and Spaak reports in that it assumed that upward social harmonization would result naturally from the creation of the Common Market.

The treaty establishing the EEC, signed on 25 March 1957 by the six countries that were already members of the ECSC, therefore marked the victory of a liberal vision of economic integration to the detriment of social harmonization. In total, only twelve out of 248 articles (117–28) were devoted to social policy, many of which were non-binding. Article 117, for instance, stipulated that the six member states ‘hereby agree upon the necessity to promote improvement of the living and working conditions of labour so as to permit the equalisation of such conditions in an upward direction’. Article 118 conferred on the Commission the task of promoting ‘close cooperation between Member States in the social field’—namely, in employment, labour legislation and working conditions, occupational training, social security, health and security at work, and the law regarding trade unions and collective bargaining between employers and workers. This would be achieved not through any transfer of power, but through soft coordination—studies, consultation, opinions, and the exchange of information. Some clauses, however, did provide the EC with legislating powers in the social field. This concerned equal remuneration for women and men (art. 119) as well as non-discrimination in working conditions and access to social protection for workers moving between the member states (art. 48–51). The treaty also stipulated the creation of a European Social Fund (ESF, art. 123–8), whose task was to support the creation of an integrated labour market by providing the financial means to improve labour mobility within the EC through vocational retraining and relocation, while also supporting industrial modernization.⁷³

In sum, despite the declarations of intention concerning improved working and living conditions, and social progress, the overarching principle of the social clauses of the Treaty of Rome was to permit the creation and good functioning of the Common Market.⁷⁴ In other words, the EEC treaty ‘provided the means for market-making but not for market-correcting’ social policies: the principle of

⁷² This compromise provided Mollet with the mostly symbolic victory he needed to gain domestic support for the Treaty of Rome. Frances M. B. Lynch, *France and the International Economy: From Vichy to the Treaty of Rome*, Routledge Explorations in Economic History (London: Routledge, 1996), 181.

⁷³ Treaty establishing the EEC, available online at https://www.cvce.eu/en/obj/treaty_establishing_the_european_economic_community_rome_25_march_1957-en-cca6ba28-0bf3-4ce6-8a76-6b0b3252696e.html.

⁷⁴ This was the underlying objective admitted even by Jean Degimbe, one important stakeholder of EC social policy who was Director-General for Social Affairs from the mid-1970s until the 1990s. Jean Degimbe, *La Politique sociale européenne: Du traité de Rome au traité d'Amsterdam* (Brussels: ISE, 1999), 59–92.

harmonization of the social regimes of the member states responded to the aim of guaranteeing free competition.⁷⁵ This has led several historians to the conclusion that the very embryonic 'European social policy' included in the treaty was designed to serve a productivist goal: improving the productivity of the Common Market and promoting economic growth.⁷⁶ At the heart of the treaty were some fundamental principles of postwar European neoliberalism: the consecration of market freedom, monetary convertibility, undistorted competition and monitoring of cartels and mergers, and limitation of state interventionism and aid to enterprises.⁷⁷ The creation of the EEC enshrined the principle of free movement of goods, capital, services and people among its member states. However, some elements of a more interventionist or 'neo-mercantilist' approach were also to be found in the treaty—in particular, common policies in fields like agriculture, trade, and transport.⁷⁸ Some scholars have in fact argued that ambitious solidarity mechanisms were present in the treaty, especially regarding the agricultural policy.⁷⁹

The newly formed European institutions—the Commission, the Council, the European Parliamentary Assembly (later called the European Parliament), and the CJEC—were granted powers to defend these principles. Contrary to arrangements under the ECSC, the EEC treaty did not stipulate the inclusion of any representative of trade unions in the college of the new Commission.⁸⁰ On the insistence of the pro-European trade unions, however, a consultative tripartite body, the European Economic and Social Committee (EESC) was set up with representatives of trade unions, employers, and other interest groups. However, the EESC could only deliver non-binding opinions to the Commission, and on

⁷⁵ Philip Manow, Armin Schäfer, and Hendrik Zorn, 'European Social Policy and Europe's Party-Political Center of Gravity, 1957–2003', MPIfG Discussion Paper 2004/06 (Cologne: Max Planck Institut für Gesellschaftsforschung, 2004), 22, http://www.mpi-fg-koeln.mpg.de/pu/mpifg_dp/dp04-6.pdf. Also Mark Kleinman, *A European Welfare State? European Union Social Policy in Context* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2001), 84.

⁷⁶ For instance, Lorenzo Mechi and Francesco Petrini, 'La Comunità europea nella divisione internazionale del lavoro: Le politiche industriali', in Antonio Varsori, ed., *Alle origini del presente: L'Europa occidentale nella crisi degli anni settanta* (Milan: FrancoAngeli, 2007), 251–83; Antonio Varsori, 'The Emergence of a Social Europe', in *The European Commission, 1958–72: History and Memories*, ed. Michel Dumoulin (Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications of the European Communities, 2007), 411–26.

⁷⁷ Denord and Schwartz, 'L'économie (très) politique du traité de Rome'.

⁷⁸ The 'neo-mercantilist Europe' model combines trade liberalism with some punctual or indirect measures of protectionism aimed at strengthening European industrial productivity. For an overview of these ideal types, see the introduction in Laurent Warloutzet, *Governing Europe in a Globalizing World: Neoliberalism and Its Alternatives following the 1973 Oil Crisis* (London: Routledge, 2018).

⁷⁹ Ann-Christina L. Knudsen, *Farmers on Welfare: The Making of Europe's Common Agricultural Policy* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2009).

⁸⁰ In Corinne Gobin's view, the political power created with the EEC was qualitatively different from the one that had been created with the ECSC: less interventionist economically and less democratic politically. Corinne Gobin, 'Consultation et concertation sociales à l'échelle de la Communauté économique européenne: Étude des positions et stratégies de la Confédération européenne des syndicats (1958–1991)' (PhD thesis, Université libre de Bruxelles, 1996), 55–61.

occasion to the Council, on certain economic and social issues regarding the implementation of the treaty.⁸¹

Though it was dominated by a liberal economic approach, the Treaty of Rome was embedded in the context of the state-managed ‘welfare capitalism’ of the postwar era. Of course, in a sense the EEC could be seen as less liberal than the free-trade agreement established by the ‘Seven’ of the EFTA, which entailed no common external tariff and no common policies. For this very reason, some of the proponents of German ordoliberalism were initially critical towards the project of the Common Market. Erhard and Müller-Armack would have preferred a free-trade area, even extending beyond Europe, to a customs union, and Röpke feared the negative consequences that interventionist countries like France could have for countries of monetary and budgetary discipline like Germany within a common market.⁸² However, prominent French neoliberals, like Rueff and Jacques Villiers, president of the CNPF and a member of the Mont Pèlerin Society, applauded the signature of the treaty.

Mendès France offered another very perceptive analysis of the stakes during the French parliamentary debate on the ratification of the treaty when he highlighted, ‘I believe that the understanding of these arid, obscure, difficult texts can be greatly aided if one remembers that they indeed reflect a permanent conflict—and naturally a series of compromises—between two opposing principles, the one of liberal and capitalist essence, the other of a dirigiste, planist, communitarian or, if you like, socialist tendency.’ That being said, he warned, ‘the predominant influence of the theses of economic liberalism in the adopted texts can jeopardise not only the structures of our economy, but also its most legitimate aspirations and the very conception of its progress and development.’⁸³

From a legal point of view, it could be argued that the European economic ‘constitution’ was ‘pluralist’ in the sense that it borrowed from different socio-economic paradigms and could allow the pursuit of variable policies by European and national legislators.⁸⁴ Like any treaty, the EEC treaty represented only a legal framework and could have been interpreted and applied in varying ways—more or less liberal, more or less interventionist, more or less favourable to workers’ or business interests. It was therefore possible for the European Left—or at least part of it—to believe in the opportunity to use the nascent European Communities to create further social progress.

⁸¹ See Eleonora Calandri, ‘La genesi del CES: Forze professionali e strategie nazionali’, in Antonio Varsori, ed., *Il Comitato economico e sociale nella costruzione europea*, 1st ed. (Venice: Marsilio, 2000), 47–65. The EESC would always remain a marginal body within the EC decision-making process. Its lack of representativeness and of influence would be regularly contested by European trade unions.

⁸² Milward, *The European Rescue*, 213–14.

⁸³ *Journal officiel de la République française*, ‘Débats parlementaires, Assemblée nationale, 3e séance du 6 juillet 1957’, 3383.

⁸⁴ This is the argument defended in Clemens Kaupa, *The Pluralist Character of the European Economic Constitution* (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2016).

Socialism and European Integration

European unity has arguably been one of the most contentious questions for the European Left in the twentieth century. Although the idea of a union of the peoples of Europe was, in abstract, in line with the internationalist principles of socialism, left-wing parties, activists, and intellectuals were widely divided on what it could mean in practice. Long before postwar achievements in European integration, leading socialist thinkers engaged with the idea of a 'United States of Europe'. In 1911 the German Marxist Karl Kautsky, one of the most influential socialist theorists during the years of the Second International (1889–1916), wrote that there was only one way to 'ban the spectre of war' in Europe: 'the union of the states of European civilisation in a confederation with a universal trade policy, a federal Parliament, a federal Government and a federal army—the establishment of the United States of Europe.'⁸⁵ Writing in 1915, another prominent member of the Second International, Vladimir Lenin—who would lead the Bolshevik Revolution in Russia in 1917 and become one of the most important socialist thinkers shaping labour and anti-colonial movements throughout the century—most severely disagreed. 'Under a capitalist regime,' Lenin affirmed, 'the United States of Europe are either impossible or reactionary'; in a world divided between a handful of great powers and where international capitalism ruled, a European union was only possible 'as a cartel of European capitalists' for the sole purpose 'of jointly smothering socialism in Europe, jointly protecting the captured colonies.'⁸⁶ In contrast, socialists should work towards the realization of the 'United States of the World'—not of Europe—which could only be the result of the 'free union of nations in socialism' once capitalism had been overthrown in each country singularly.

After the First World War, Kautsky became an outspoken critic of the Bolshevik Revolution, engaging in polemics with Lenin as well as Leon Trotsky and Joseph Stalin about the nature of the Soviet state; the disunion between revolutionary socialists and social democrats worsened and led to the communist/socialist scission of the Second International and the creation of two separate international organizations of the Left: the Communist International (1919–43), and the Labour and Socialist International (1923–40). Within the international socialist arena, discussions continued about the realization of a united, 'socialist' Europe throughout the 1920s and 1930s; European socialists often imagined a socialist-inspired united Europe as a 'third force' between Soviet communism and US capitalism. In 1925,

⁸⁵ Karl Kautsky, 'Krieg und Frieden, Betrachtungen zur Maifeier', *Die Neue Zeit*, 29, no. 2 (1911), 97–107. Quoted in Brian Shaev, 'Liberalising Regional Trade: Socialists and European Economic Integration', *Contemporary European History* 27, no. 2 (2018): 261.

⁸⁶ 'Du mot d'ordre des États-Unis d'Europe', *Sotsial-Demokrat*, no. 44, 23 August 1915, *Œuvres*, vol. XXI (August 1914–December 1915) (author's translation).

the SPD inscribed the 'United States of Europe' into its political programme.⁸⁷ Many, like the socialists of the French Section of the Workers' International (SFIO), viewed a federation of European states as a way of taming nationalism and preventing war.

Later, as the Cold War dawned on Europe, the Marshall Plan and the question of European unity created polarization among working-class parties and unions and helped resurrect tensions between the communist and the non-communist Left that the war and the Resistance had momentarily concealed. US support for European unity, coupled as it was with the US government's anti-communist doctrine, obviously led Moscow and western European communist forces to condemn the Marshall Plan and later projects for European integration. The main communist parties of western Europe, the French Communist Party (PCF) and the Italian PCI, like the rest of the international communist movement organized in the Cominform (1947–56) harshly criticized the Marshall Plan and, subsequently, the Schuman Plan, the ECSC, the EDC, and the EEC. In their view, these projects of European unity were instrumental to isolating the Soviet Union, dividing the European continent and the world, rallying western Europe to a Western bloc and placing it under US (and German) hegemony. Moreover, they promoted a capitalist, bourgeois, Catholic, militaristic, imperialist, and colonial Europe that served European and US monopolistic interests, promoted economic inequalities and threatened workers' rights, social welfare, and national sovereignty. In short, they were fundamentally incompatible with socialism. In contrast, the communists envisioned a different kind of European unity, which would promote a continent-wide democratic Europe of the workers and cooperate with the Soviet Union, while encouraging demilitarization, East–West and North–South dialogue, and recognition of the German Democratic Republic (GDR).⁸⁸ Following Lenin, they believed that European countries first had to overcome capitalism individually, before economic or political integration could be envisaged.

Rising Cold War tensions at the end of the 1940s also resulted in a partition of European trade unions, ending the relative postwar unity of the European trade union movement. On 7 December 1949 in London, following a split within the World Federation of Trade Unions (WFTU), a large number of non-communist unions including the American AFL–CIO, the British Trades Union Congress (TUC), the French Workers' Force (FO), the Italian Confederation of Workers' Trade Unions (CISL), the German Trade Union Confederation (DGB) and the

⁸⁷ Shaev, 'Liberalising Regional Trade', 267; Talbot Imlay, *The Practice of Socialist Internationalism: European Socialists and International Politics, 1914–1960* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018), 311–13.

⁸⁸ Emilia Robin Hivert, 'Anti-européens et euroconstructifs: Les Communistes français et l'Europe (1945–1979)', *Cahiers de l'IRICE* 4 (2009): 49–67; Mauro Maggiorani and Paolo Ferrari, *L'Europa da Togliatti a Berlinguer: Testimonianze e documenti, 1945–1984* (Bologna: Il Mulino, 2005); Severino Galante, *Il Partito comunista italiano e l'integrazione europea: Il decennio del rifiuto, 1947–1957* (Padua: Liviana, 1988).

Spanish General Union of Workers (UGT) seceded and created the rival ICFTU. This schism arose in great part because of conflicting positions regarding the Marshall Plan and European reconstruction and integration. While the communists condemned it, the non-communist unions, pushed by the AFL-CIO, supported the Plan. The socialist and social-democratic unions of the ICFTU would tirelessly support the different projects of European integration and encourage the coordination of European trade unions' positions regarding the EC. Similarly, the Christian unions of the International Federation of Christian Trade Unions (IFCTU) also supported all western European integration projects after the Marshall Plan.⁸⁹ Each time new international European institutions such as the OEEC, the Benelux, the High Authority of the Ruhr, the European Productivity Agency, the ECSC, and the EEC were created, socialist and Christian trade union leaders followed suit by creating related structures of trade union cooperation in order to take part in their policy making. In contrast, communist trade unions would remain excluded from any kind of representation within European institutions until the mid-1960s—just like communist party representatives.

Among European socialist parties, the Marshall Plan and early plans for European integration created considerable controversy. While the Labour government was enthusiastic about the US proposal, within the British Labour Party the 'Keep Left' group feared what it saw as Washington's attempt to interfere with socialist economic planning in the UK and Europe and to increase hostility between the superpowers. The SFIO initially appeared uncertain and worried about a possible US manoeuvre to weaken European socialism. French socialists therefore started to argue that international socialism needed to launch an offensive on European unity, supporting political and economic integration and the introduction of economic planning at a European scale; the Marshall Plan could become an opportunity to further that aim. Mollet, who became the SFIO's secretary general in 1946, and the prominent French socialist Léon Blum, argued in favour of a federal 'Socialist United States of Europe'; an idea supported by the SPD on the condition that West Germany would be treated as an equal partner, but rejected by Scandinavian social democrats and by the British Labour Party. Indeed, despite the activism of a couple of groups lobbying within the party in favour of European unity—such as the federalist 'Europe Group' founded in 1947 by Labour Member of Parliament Ronald Mackay within Labour's parliamentary party—the Labour Party and government remained generally hostile to European federalism, which it viewed as idealist and dangerous for national sovereignty and for socialism, and preferred European intergovernmental cooperation.⁹⁰

⁸⁹ See, for instance, Gobin, 'Consultation et concertation sociales à l'échelle de la Communauté économique européenne', 51–186; Barbara Barnouin, *The European Labour Movement and European Integration* (London: Frances Pinter, 1986).

⁹⁰ Imlay, *The Practice of Socialist Internationalism*, 311–13, 318–23.

It was nonetheless in Britain that the main socialist transnational pro-European movement had taken its first steps during the Second World War when members of the Independent Labour Party (ILP), a marginal political organization formerly affiliated to the Labour Party, proposed to create a group of European militants engaged for a socialist Europe. Finding support in several countries after the war—in particular, in the person of one of the leading figures of the SFIO left, Marceau Pivert—the initiative led to the creation of the aforementioned MEUSE in June 1946 in Montrouge, which advocated a socialist and federal Europe to surpass nationalisms and constitute a ‘third force’. One year later, in June 1947, the MEUSE organized its Second International Conference for the United Socialist States of Europe with leaders of socialist parties, trade unionists, members of the Resistance, journalists, and intellectuals from fourteen countries who discussed a programme for a socialist Europe that would ‘reconcile a planned economic unification with a social and democratic policy’. The preparatory document of the conference proposed, among other things, to ‘socialise the production of industrial raw materials, all key industries, and the basic structure of capitalism’, abolish tariff walls, cancel debts between European nations, and create a European banking system with a standard currency. It insisted that ‘it is the mass of the workers in the widest sense of the term, who must be called upon to construct the United Socialist States of Europe’—a historic task that only socialist parties and trade unions could assume.⁹¹

The inherent tension between the struggle for socialism and the struggle for federalism was, however, palpable; it was best exemplified by the movement’s decision, after an internal dispute between ‘moderates’ (who believed that European unity could not be achieved by socialists alone) and ‘radical socialists’, to prioritize the fight for a federal Europe before their fight for a socialist Europe—a shift symbolized by the decision to change their name to the Socialist Movement for the United States of Europe (MSEUE) in 1947. The movement then decided to join the politically plural European Movement led by Sandys, which was seen by some of its members as a relinquishing of the socialist strand of their struggle. One of the main objectives of the MEUSE was to increase its influence within socialist parties, particularly the British Labour Party; Pivert and Mollet hoped that it could become a useful instrument to mobilize Labour members in favour of a united Europe—a task in which it had very moderate success.⁹²

⁹¹ ‘Report of the Second International Conference for the United Socialist States of Europe, Paris, 21 and 22 June’ (London; Paris: International Committee of Study and Action for the United Socialist States of Europe, 1947). Available at https://www.cvce.eu/en/collections/unit-content/-/unit/02bb76df-d066-4c08-a58a-d4686a3e68ff/ef8c1091-c47b-4713-98b2-70d197d34b62/Resourc#d1f291b5-bf84-4ee1-9fd5-f7661de97632_en&overlay

⁹² The MSEUE grew increasingly isolated from mainstream European socialism (several parties cut ties during the 1950s) and later became the Mouvement démocrate et socialiste pour les États-Unis d’Europe (MDSEUE). It endures today as the ‘European Left’ movement. See Gérard Bossuat, ‘Les Euro-Socialistes de la SFIO, réseaux et influence’, in *Inventer l’Europe: Histoire nouvelle des groupes*

Indeed, as mentioned previously, although they affirmed their attachment to the ideal of European unity, the British Labour Party and government refused to attend the Hague 'Congress of Europe' mostly because the predominantly conservative United Europe Movement was seen as a Tory attempt to disturb the unity of the Labour Party and to form a European bloc against the Soviet Union.⁹³ The SPD also decided to counsel against attendance. Although this decision disappointed French socialists like Mollet, who believed that socialists 'cannot wait for Europe to be socialist before seeking to federate it', the SFIO was conflicted about acting without the Labour Party and decided to strictly limit participation to the Congress on the part of French socialists.⁹⁴ In the following years, the SFIO placed great hopes in the new Assembly of the Council of Europe, which it expected to use to convince Labour to cooperate on building an interventionist, socially ambitious, and redistributive Europe. Although the Strasbourg assembly facilitated the structuring of a transnational socialist inter-group deliberating about European unity, which entangled socialist parties 'in a web of mutual expectations and obligations', a line divided European socialists into two broad camps: one comprising the SFIO and other western European parties in favour of economic and political integration, and one including the British Labour Party and the Scandinavian countries opposed to supranational European unity.⁹⁵

In sum, the socialist parties and the governments of those countries pursuing socialism at home were lending reserved support to European unity, thus weakening the chances for anything else than a liberal or capitalist Europe to succeed. In May 1950, shortly after Shuman's famous declaration, the National Executive Committee of the British Labour Party released a Manifesto on European Unity warning that:

The Labour Party could never accept any commitments which limited its own or others' freedom to pursue democratic socialism, and to apply the economic controls necessary to achieve it. [...] No Socialist Party with the prospect of forming a government could accept a system by which important fields of national policy were surrendered to a supranational European representative authority, since such an authority would have a permanent anti-Socialist majority and would arouse the hostility of European workers.⁹⁶

d'influence et des acteurs de l'unité européenne, ed. Georges Saunier and Gérard Bossuat (Brussels: Peter Lang, 2003), 409–29.

⁹³ John T. Grantham, 'British Labour and The Hague "Congress of Europe": National Sovereignty Defended', *Historical Journal* 24, no. 2 (June 1981): 443–52.

⁹⁴ Imlay, *The Practice of Socialist Internationalism*, 326.

⁹⁵ Imlay, *The Practice of Socialist Internationalism*, 328–30, here p. 330.

⁹⁶ Labour Party, *European Unity: A Statement by the National Executive Committee of the British Labour Party* (London, May 1950). Available at https://www.cvce.eu/en/obj/manifesto_by_the_national_executive_committee_of_the_british_labour_party_on_european_unity_may_1950-en-626bf849-0be2-499c-a924-d768c9f05feb.html. Quoted in Denord and Schwartz, *L'Europe sociale n'aura pas lieu*, 21.

British Labour would thereafter remain hostile to the European Communities throughout the 1950s and until the mid-1960s, when a faction of the party turned to Europe.⁹⁷

However, while British Labour and Scandinavian socialists in government were unwilling to take the lead on European unity, the socialist parties of the 'Small Europe' of the ECSC and the EEC gradually started to hope that, despite their lack of influence at the national level, they could use a federal Europe to their advantage. The Belgian Socialist Party (PSB), the Dutch Labour Party (PvdA) and the Luxembourg Socialist Workers' Party (LSAP), for their part, had supported a federal type of European unity since the war.⁹⁸ Despite some internal disagreement, hesitation about the Schuman Plan and division over the CED, the French socialists of the SFIO were among the most enthusiastic supporters of European unity and supranationalism during the postwar years. Among other French socialists André Philip, a member of the Assembly of the Council of Europe, had been pushing for the creation of a European authority for the steel sector, and arguably exerted some influence over French officials, particularly Monnet, in the genesis of the Schuman Plan.⁹⁹ Several French socialists, like Blum, Philip, and Mollet, would assume leading positions in the European Movement. Mollet, the leader of the SFIO until 1969, was a convinced pro-European; he chaired the socialist groups of the Council of Europe and the ECSC's assemblies and presided over the Socialist International's study group on European unity; he was close to Monnet and became in 1955 a member of the Comité d'action pour les États-Unis d'Europe (CAEUE) for which he even obtained the SFIO's official support.

German socialists were initially much more critical towards European integration. Kurt Schumacher, the leader of the SPD until 1952, vigorously opposed any plan of European unity that would discriminate against Germany and denounced France's use of European unity to impose hegemony over western Europe. He rejected the ECSC, warning against the threats of the four European 'Cs': capitalism, conservatism, clericalism, and cartels. Schumacher also feared that the Schuman Plan would separate Germany from Europe's socialist-led countries and prevent the socialization of West German industry. Not opposed to supranationalism per se, SPD leaders opposed the terms of the Schuman Plan. While in 1949 the SFIO, worried about losing political and economic control over a revived Germany, opposed the latter's inclusion in a six-nation customs union supported by the SPD, in 1950 the SFIO supported the ECSC (and so did the main German union, DGB), but the SPD campaigned against it. Later, the SPD opposed the EDC which

⁹⁷ See Erin Delaney, 'The Labour Party's Changing Relationship to Europe: The Expansion of European Social Policy', *Journal of European Integration History* 8 (January 2002): 121–38.

⁹⁸ See Kevin Featherstone, *Socialist Parties and European Integration: A Comparative History* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1988); and the contributions in Richard Griffiths, ed., *Socialist Parties and the Question of Europe in the 1950s* (Leiden: Brill, 1993).

⁹⁹ Matthias Kipping, 'André Philip et les origines de l'Union européenne', in *André Philip, socialiste, patriote, chrétien*, ed. Christian Chevandier and Gilles Morin (Paris: Comité pour l'histoire économique et financière de la France, 2005), 387–403.

it considered harmful to the prospects of German reunification. Vivid tensions between European socialists in those years—in particular between the SFIO and the SPD—did not impede their commitment to the practice of international socialism and continued discussions on European unity.¹⁰⁰

Although they worried about the submergence of socialism within institutions dominated by conservative forces in a 'small Europe' without the UK, by the time the Treaty of Rome was negotiated in the mid-1950s the socialist parties of 'the Six' had converged on sustaining a common market. Discussions within the new Socialist International, created in 1951, and the Common Assembly of the ECSC's transnational socialist group were essential in bringing about this convergence.¹⁰¹ As highlighted by Brian Shaev, the SPD and SFIO's support for the EEC built upon 'a long tradition of socialist thought on trade liberalisation in transnational and national spheres' based on the classic liberal assumption—adopted by many socialists in the interwar period—that free trade promotes peace among nations, economic modernization, and lower consumer prices.¹⁰² During the 1950s, German and French socialists overcame their postwar opposition or reservations towards economic liberalism and increasingly assimilated economic liberalization to rising living standards for workers. This support for economic liberalization, however, usually presumed, for European socialists, the construction of an international economic organization invested with powers to regulate trade; supervise international production as well as distribution of food and primary resources, consumption, currency, and transport relations; and even unify taxes, salaries, and social security legislations.

When Mollet became Prime Minister of a left-leaning coalition in France in January 1956, he and his Foreign Minister, Christian Pineau, took over and played an important role in the intergovernmental negotiations that led to the Treaty of Rome, insisting that social harmonization and economic integration needed to mitigate the negative consequences of trade liberalization.¹⁰³ Despite the rhetoric, however, 'the social aspects of European unity were not a priority for Mollet', who was 'less opposed in principle to a liberal Europe' than some of his collaborators, like Philip or Pivert.¹⁰⁴ Mollet's concessions on measures aimed at protecting workers worried many French socialists who remained concerned about their party's support for the EEC. Yet the SFIO was not the only socialist party in government when the Rome treaties were signed. In Belgium and the Netherlands, the PSB and PvdA were leading coalition governments with liberal and conservative

¹⁰⁰ William E. Paterson, *The SPD and European Integration* (Farnborough; Lexington, Mass.: Saxon House; Lexington Books, 1974); Imlay, *The Practice of Socialist Internationalism*, 335–7; Brian Shaev, 'Estrangement and Reconciliation: French Socialists, German Social Democrats and the Origins of European Integration, 1948–1957' (PhD thesis, University of Pittsburgh, 2014), 201–28.

¹⁰¹ Shaev, 'Liberalising Regional Trade', 274–7.

¹⁰² Shaev, 'Liberalising Regional Trade', 259–63, here p. 259.

¹⁰³ See François Lafon, *Guy Mollet: Itinéraire d'un socialiste controversé, 1905–1975* (Paris: Fayard, 2006), 491–9; Warlouzet, *Le Choix de la CEE par la France*, 35–59.

¹⁰⁴ Imlay, *The Practice of Socialist Internationalism*, 340.

forces respectively; in Luxembourg, the LSAP was part of a Christian-democrat-led coalition government; in Italy, although the Italian Socialist Party (PSI) abstained from the vote on the EEC, the right-leaning Italian Democratic Socialist Party (PSDI) was in a coalition cabinet with Christian democrats and liberals. Despite their very mitigated success in orienting the treaties, socialist parties in the 'Small Europe' all voted for the EEC treaty (notwithstanding internal disquiet and hesitation). Although Christian democrats and Christian social forces dominated EC governments in the postwar decades, socialists participated actively in the politics of European integration.¹⁰⁵ But continental socialists never intended to lend their support to a liberal Europe merely centred on the reduction of obstacles to exchanges between countries. Organized trade, a directed economy, and social harmonization were indissociable from liberalized trade in the united Europe they imagined.

Of course, the socialists' embrace of trade liberalization and of the EEC should also be connected to their de-radicalization during the postwar decades. Although it did not happen without controversies and enduring internal dissension, during the 1950s and 1960s western European socialist parties progressively abandoned Marxist and internationalist principles, definitely embraced liberal democracy, and dropped references to revolution and the abolition of capitalism. As the main economic problems seemed to have been neutralized by 'welfare capitalism', social democrats abandoned their radical claims and concentrated increasingly on improving the conditions of their electorate within the framework of a strong wealth-creating capitalism. They 'put their faith in economic growth, industrial prosperity, and rising standards of living, imagining societies where "ideological questions" and the "class struggle" had died away'.¹⁰⁶ Claims about the ownership of the means of production and economic democracy were progressively subordinated to objectives of full employment, social rights, and reduced inequalities. The 'golden age' of capitalism also encouraged a move by socialist parties beyond their working-class constituencies to attract middle classes which were growing as a result of the economic boom, in an attempt to define themselves gradually as catch-all parties of 'the people'.¹⁰⁷ The confirmation of this revisionist trend famously came at the SPD's 1959 Congress in Bad Godesberg, when the party explicitly confirmed its shift away from its Marxist heritage and affirmed its commitment to the liberal market economy.¹⁰⁸

¹⁰⁵ A point made by Shaev and by Talbot in Brian Shaev, 'Socialism, (Neo)Liberalism and the Treaties of Rome', *Renewal: A Journal of Labour Politics* 27, no. 1 (2019): 31–40; Imlay, *The Practice of Socialist Internationalism*, 310–11.

¹⁰⁶ Eley, *Forging Democracy*, 319.

¹⁰⁷ Donald Sassoon, *One Hundred Years of Socialism: The West European Left in the Twentieth Century* (London: I.B. Tauris, 1996), 187–274; Eley, *Forging Democracy*, 314–20.

¹⁰⁸ On the German SPD's shift away from classist rhetoric and Marxist analysis and its turn towards the new middle classes, see Karim Fertikh, 'Le Congrès de Bad Godesberg: Contribution à une socio-histoire des programmes politiques' (Paris: Centre Maurice Halbwachs, 2012); Karim Fertikh, 'Trois petits tours et puis s'en va...', *Sociétés contemporaines*, no. 81 (March 2011): 61–79.

Most importantly, however, behind the pro-European socialists' support for European integration despite its predominantly liberal and capitalist traits were two fundamental assumptions. One was that the Common Market did not preclude the construction of a socialist Europe—on the contrary, it provided opportunities, for instance regarding economic planning and agricultural policy. The second was that, to realize their ambitions for a socialist Europe, they would need to work together to transform it—a rather difficult task given the lack of interest of the British and Scandinavian Left. As underlined by Imlay, European socialists' 'faith in socialist internationalism' was rather bold given their scarce ability to shape European institutions hitherto and—above all—since 'European socialists never worked out a clear project for a socialist Europe, satisfying themselves instead with general references to planning or *dirigisme*'.¹⁰⁹ Elaborating such a shared project offering an alternative approach to European unity would be one of the main tasks of European socialists and, more broadly, of the European Left during the following years.

¹⁰⁹ Imlay, *The Practice of Socialist Internationalism*, 358.

2

1968, 1969: Social Protest, European ‘Revival’

It is very clear, moreover, that the progressive construction of a Europe can only be achieved through a deeper adhesion of the working masses—an adhesion which implies a real European social policy that means something clear and substantial for these masses. In other words, in order to gain the popular support that it has lacked up to now, Europe must give a more important place to social policy.¹

During the 1960s, the European Commission adopted tools to measure European public opinion. From 1962, it commissioned occasional surveys in all member countries of the EC, which were carried out by national polling institutes asking the same questions in each country. Although these polls revealed a firm consensus in favour of European unification, they also highlighted that European populations’ ‘pro-European’ feeling was directly proportional to their social status. People with higher professional positions, higher levels of education, and higher incomes were more likely to support European unification and the EC, while the ‘working masses’ were much more reluctant.² In a way, these surveys substantiated criticisms that had depicted European unification as an elite-driven project—had a ‘Europe of business’ taken the lead at the expense of a ‘workers’ Europe’?

The conception of the European Economic Community, as laid out in the Treaty of Rome in 1957, had relied mostly on the idea that economic liberalization would naturally lead to prosperity, increased social welfare and perhaps harmonization of social regimes within the Community. By the late 1960s, however, this liberal theory was less and less convincing. The ‘May 1968’ insurrection in France, with the greatest general strike in the country’s history, would be only the most famous episode of a remarkable outburst of social conflict across the continent in the late 1960s and 1970s and, coupled with a slowdown in the unique economic

¹ Gérard Lyon-Caen, *Droit social européen* (Paris: Dalloz, 1969), 5. Cited in Karim Fertikh, ‘La Construction d’un «droit social européen»’, *Politix* 115, no. 3 (December 2016): 222 (author’s translation).

² Anne Dulphy and Christine Manigand, ‘L’opinion publique française face à l’unification européenne: Approche quantifiée’, in *Europe des élites? Europe des peuples? La Construction de l’espace européen, 1945–1960*, ed. Elisabeth Du Réau (Paris: Presses de la Sorbonne nouvelle, 1998), 303–15; Anne Dulphy and Christine Manigand, eds., *Les Opinions publiques face à l’Europe communautaire: Entre cultures nationales et horizon européen* (Bern: Peter Lang, 2004).

growth that had characterized the so-called 'golden age', signalled a profound crisis of the 'postwar compromise'. As such, 'Europe' could hardly remain unaffected by this powerful wave of contestation which, together with the low support of working classes for the ongoing European unification process, pushed European elites to grant more attention to the 'social dimension' of their European construction.

This included the party elites of the European Left. As explained in the previous chapter, the European non-communist forces of the Left, at least in the 'Six', had almost unanimously supported the creation of the EEC because they believed that they could turn it into a socialist project. The social contestation wave of the late 1960s therefore also constituted a wake-up call for them, when they realized, among other things, that they had yet been unable to work out a clear project and an effective strategy for a socialist Europe that went beyond general invocations of a 'planned' or 'organized' Europe—one that could offer an alternative approach to European integration.

The Spirit of 1968 and Europe's Social Deficit

By the late 1960s, a combination of changes led European socialists, the European Left, and European political elites more broadly to engage in a rethinking of the scope and socio-economic purpose of European integration, and to reopen the questions of the interaction between social policies and economic liberalization and of the 'social dimension' of European integration.

One of the main reasons for this was the wave of protests that hit western Europe and the rest of the world during the 1960s. This protest movement was marked by a revival of labour militancy, as two important European-wide strike cycles affected most western European countries during 1960–4 and 1968–73.³ The second cycle, which was remarkably strong in terms of days struck, participation, and combativity, touched France in May–June 1968, Italy during the 1969 '*autunno caldo*', West Germany in 1971, Finland in 1972, and Holland in 1973. Its magnitude had never been paralleled in the postwar decades. Although the intensity of work stoppages varied considerably between countries, the intense industrial conflict of the late 1960s was a Europe-wide phenomenon. Concomitantly, at the end of the 1960s, came rising inflation rates. Whether these were a consequence of increased wage pressure from the workers, or of other factors of capitalist disorder like the excessive power of big firms or the external pressure of the inflationary spiral of the US investment in the Vietnam War, has been subject to

³ Donald Sassoon, *One Hundred Years of Socialism: The West European Left in the Twentieth Century* (London: I.B. Tauris, 1996), 357–82. See also Colin Crouch and Alessandro Pizzorno, *The Resurgence of Class Conflict in Western Europe since 1968* (London: Macmillan, 1978).

political and scholarly debate.⁴ In any case, governments and central banks often responded to inflationary pressure by adopting wage restraints and deflationary policies; whereas employers sought to contain wages and cut costs by rationalizing work practices—for instance, trying to increase productivity by speeding up assembly lines. These responses in turn exacerbated workers' discontent and fed the revival of working-class militancy.⁵

Workers' protests, from both private and public sectors, took the form of major official strikes, demonstrations, wildcat actions, spontaneous workers' meetings, occupations of factories, and the sabotage of production plants. The claims behind this revival of working-class militancy were plentiful and varied geographically and between different groups of workers (skilled blue-collar workers, unskilled and low-paid labour, often immigrant or female workers). Mainly, workers demanded higher wages, improved working conditions, and shorter working time. Surrounding these core demands was a wider set of issues, like less hierarchical and discriminating forms of management, levelling of pay scales, and claims for greater workers' control, for instance over the work process and the speed of assembly lines—what was produced and how. This renewed aspiration to increase the political weight of the workers in the economy and reclaim control over the means of production contrasted with the relative de-politicization that characterized the postwar compromise. Importantly, wildcat actions and the demand for 'industrial democracy' represented a contestation not only to employers and governments: it was also a challenge to the established trade unions and to their historical political allies, the parties of the Left.⁶

At the same time, in the late 1960s student protests emerged across most of the Western world, with particular strength in West Germany, France, Italy, Holland, and Sweden, involving the occupation of university buildings and (sometimes intense) street demonstrations with improvised barricades. The youth revolts expressed values of strong anti-authoritarianism and declared anti-capitalism, a rejection of codes of behaviour, bureaucracy, and outdated and selective education systems, and claims for world peace and for a sexual revolution—values that were partly inspired by the 'anti-establishment' counterculture that had emerged in the US and the UK in the 1960s, symbolized by the hippie movement and influential pop music bands like the Beatles. They intersected with the emergence of other social movements: civil rights movements, LGBT rights movements, peace movements, environmental movements, and the emergence of a mass and transnational feminist movement—the so-called 'second wave' of feminism—which

⁴ See Sassoon, *One Hundred Years of Socialism*, 362.

⁵ See David Soskice, 'Strike Waves and Wage Explosions, 1968–1970: An Economic Interpretation', in *The Resurgence of Class Conflict in Western Europe since 1968* (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 1978), 221–46, doi:10.1007/978-1-349-03025-5_9.

⁶ Sassoon, *One Hundred Years of Socialism*, 369–70. See Gerd-Rainer Horn, *The Spirit of '68: Rebellion in Western Europe and North America, 1956–1976* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007).

exposed structural, institutionalized, and sometimes disguised forms of sexism, racism, imperialism, and other forms of oppression.⁷ This period also saw the affirmation of a new generation of renowned Marxist intellectuals such as E. P. Thompson and Eric Hobsbawm in Britain, and 'a flowering of studies on the works of the young Marx, Rosa Luxemburg, Antonio Gramsci, Georg Lukacs, Karl Korsch, and many others.'⁸ It was the era of the so-called New Left.

Crucially, all these overlapping social mobilizations—despite their internal conflicts—revealed that the economic successes of postwar state-managed capitalism, although buttressed by the welfare state and legitimized by liberal democracy, were not sufficient to satisfy European societies. The protests were in different ways a contestation of the conservative, patriarchal, and discriminatory nature of the state, including the Keynesian welfare state, and its lack of inclusiveness. Women's movements, for instance, contested the bread-winning model supported by the welfare state and their assignment to the roles of caregivers in the private sphere, and demanded better access to education and employment, as well as an expansion of public care services and higher wages. Environmental movements denounced the devastating effects of productivism on the environment. As suggested by Eley, 'public ownership without public participation, planning without democracy, and a welfare state without popular accountability' had made reform, after the war, 'an unfinished thing, bureaucratic and paternalistic superstructures lacking democratic roots.'⁹ In short, those various forms of left-wing activism contributed to delegitimizing the postwar 'social compromise'.

This could not be completely ignored by European political elites. In order to reassert their authority, the different constituents of the postwar compromise—governments, parties, trade unions, etc.—needed to meet some of the new demands. The social outburst of the late 1960s posed particular ideological and strategic problems to the forces of the 'old Left', which in most cases remained unable to build organic links with the protests and were often criticized for their centralized and hierarchical structures, and for their connivance with the established order. This was particularly true for European social democracy, as the explosion of social conflict reawakened the questions of revolution, capitalism, and its possible alternatives—and demonstrated to all that class conflict was not over. The return of working-class militancy and the various social movements revived the dispute between 'revisionists'—who believed that the era of working-class conflict had come to an end, wanted to abandon a strict class identity in favour

⁷ For a recent transnational enquiry into 'second wave' feminism, see Barbara Molony and Jennifer Nelson, eds., *Women's Activism and 'Second Wave' Feminism: Transnational Histories* (London: Bloomsbury, 2017); see also Nancy Fraser, *Fortunes of Feminism: From State-Managed Capitalism to Neoliberal Crisis* (London: Verso, 2013).

⁸ Donald Sassoon, *One Hundred Years of Socialism*, 385.

⁹ Geoff Eley, *Forging Democracy: The History of the Left in Europe, 1850–2000* (Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press, 2002), 297.

of parties of ‘the people’, and embraced welfare capitalism—and ‘traditionalists’, who held on to a labour class party, in line with the overarching principles of Marxist thought, and wanted to overcome capitalism. The revisionist view, which had dominated since the late 1950s, appeared challenged by the anti-capitalist stance of the new contestations, as did the socialist parties’ ‘race to the centre’.¹⁰

Together with social contestation, by the late 1960s mounting inflation and declining profitability signalled that the postwar ‘golden age’ might be coming to an end. The 1950s and 1960s had been the heyday of extensive growth in western European countries. Growth depended greatly on investment, which in turn depended on ‘the postwar bargain of wage restraint in return for the retention of profits.’¹¹ Intensification of wage and price inflation would thus inevitably threaten postwar stability. Between 1966 and 1969, nominal wages rose by 11 per cent in Italy and Denmark, 13 per cent in the Netherlands, and 15 per cent in Ireland. Of course, given the increase in consumer prices, real wages only rose by about half that amount. As wages increased, productivity growth slowed and profits were squeezed, therefore undermining investment. There was, concomitantly, a saturation of western European consumption markets, which led to an exhaustion of the Fordist model of production.¹² These factors, combined with an increase in raw material import prices, all contributed to the incipient economic slowdown.

Meanwhile, as a response to rising production costs, European companies gradually began to relocate production plants to countries where the labour supply was cheaper, social conditions worse, trade unions weaker, and fiscal pressure lower. New technologies also appeared which decreased the need for labour on production lines. By the late 1960s, unemployment rates were starting to rise again. At the same time, monetary turmoil appeared in some western European countries like France and the UK, where the pound was devalued in 1967 and the franc in 1968 and 1969. In West Germany, the deutschmark was revalued against all other European currencies in October. This nurtured fears about the sustainability of the international monetary system, which was based on the Bretton Woods agreements of pegged but adjustable exchange rates. These signs of economic slowdown and instability in the international financial system added to the perception that the postwar era of welfare capitalism was under strain. In the

¹⁰ For an overview of the revisionist/traditionalist dispute in European labour parties, see Sassoon, *One Hundred Years of Socialism*, ch. 10; Eley, *Forging Democracy*, 314–20; Gerassimos Moschonas, *In the Name of Social Democracy. The Great Transformation, 1945 to the Present* (London: Verso, 2002), ch. 3; see also Jacopo Perazzoli, «Qualcosa di nuovo da noi s’attende»: *La socialdemocrazia europea e il revisionismo degli anni cinquanta* (Milan: Bibliopolis, 2016).

¹¹ Barry J. Eichengreen, *The European Economy since 1945: Coordinated Capitalism and Beyond* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2006), 216–17, here p. 216. See also Andrew Glyn, *Capitalism Unleashed: Finance Globalization and Welfare* (Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press, 2006), ch. 1.

¹² For an early analysis of the exhaustion of Fordism, see Robert Boyer, ed., *La Flexibilité du travail en Europe: Une étude comparative des transformations du rapport salarial dans sept pays de 1973 à 1985* (Paris: La Découverte, 1986), especially ch. 9.

following years, the search for stabilization, new macroeconomic recipes, and an alternative 'social contract' thus became recurrent themes in political discourse both at national and, as will be shown in the following chapters, at European level.

Indeed, these first signs of economic slowdown and monetary turmoil also raised fears about the negative impact they might have on trade liberalization and on the EC, as they affected the functioning of the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) and of the Common Market. For sure, by the late 1960s the circulation of goods had increased significantly, prompted by trade liberalization within GATT (especially after the completion of the Kennedy Round of negotiations in 1967) and the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD, formerly OEEC), and within regional agreements such as the EEC and EFTA. In addition, internal tariff barriers had been eliminated within the Common Market by 1 July 1968, a year and a half ahead of schedule, and some of the EFTA countries were knocking at the door of the EC. But the expansion of trade was grounded in the stability of the international monetary framework. By the end of the 1960s, increasingly, 'questions were raised about whether the golden age of export-led growth and even the European Community itself could survive its demise', as slower growth announced more adjustment difficulties in the labour market and therefore 'greater resistance to trade liberalization and increasing resort to non-tariff protection.'¹³ In short, social unrest could indirectly put the EC at risk.

In fact, to some extent social contestation was also a reaction to the reinforcing of economic competition within the Common Market. In France, for instance, since the late 1950s de Gaulle (back in power since 1958) and his successive governments had made important efforts with a view to completing of the Common Market, in order to increase the competitiveness of the country's economy vis-à-vis other EC member states and cope with public deficit and balance of payment issues. Hence, whereas employers in sectors most exposed to international trade imposed wage restraint and increased productivity, the French government was adopting stability plans and anti-inflationary policies. Limiting wage increases and public spending and hindering public intervention that could have countered rising unemployment, this economic pressure affected the French social climate. Although there were plenty of other motives, the policies of economic convergence applied by EC member states—while wages and social benefits continued to differ across borders—indirectly helped to pave the way for the social protests of 1968.¹⁴ A couple of months after the heyday of the French protests, in a conference speech he gave in Heidelberg in July, former West German Chancellor Erhard emphasized the important differences in wages between French and German workers, the latter earning much higher net salaries. Even a convinced ordoliberal like Erhard could not help but see that the old question of harmonization of wages, working time,

¹³ Eichengreen, *The European Economy since 1945*, 223–4, 225–6.

¹⁴ Mathieu Dubois, *Les Conséquences économiques de mai 68* (Brussels: Peter Lang, 2018), 82–102.

and social policies in relation to economic liberalization and integration was re-emerging.¹⁵

The question of the social dimension of European integration had been more or less buried since the signature of the Treaty of Rome. Between the establishment of the EEC in 1958 and the end of a transitional period on 31 December 1969, the application of the different measures included in the treaty was quite uneven. The liberalization of trade between member states was achieved quickly (although still imperfectly), and the principle of free competition—clearly enshrined in the treaties, which for instance prescribed controlling cartels, monitoring potential abuse of monopolies, and strictly limiting state aid—was progressively applied. During the early 1960s, the European Commission managed to prepare the way for a common competition policy that drew largely on ordoliberal ideas, with the support of the German and Dutch governments. The German Commissioner for Competition, Hans von der Groeben, worked closely with ordoliberal experts like Müller-Armack himself. Although in practice it applied unevenly and member countries found ways of favouring some industrial sectors and cartels (to encourage ‘national champions’), this emerging competition policy became one of the bedrocks of the EEC.¹⁶ Alongside liberalization measures, from 1959 onwards the French Commissioner for Economics and Financial Affairs, Robert Marjolin, was striving to put forward broad macroeconomic coordination through an ‘organized Europe’ (*Europe organisée*) that would complement market opening.¹⁷ In the 1960s this vision gave birth to projects to coordinate member states’ economic, monetary, and industrial policies. Despite the creation of a number of programmes and committees, such as the ‘medium-term economic policy committee’ tasked to draft ‘medium-term economic policy programmes’, those projects remained rather exploratory and—importantly—the trade unions’ demands to be included in these committees were not satisfied.¹⁸

¹⁵ Dubois, *Les Conséquences économiques de mai* 68, 101.

¹⁶ See Laurent Warlouzet, *Le Choix de la CEE par la France: L’Europe économique en débat de Mendès France à de Gaulle, 1955–1969* (Paris: Comité pour l’histoire économique et financière de la France, 2011), 269–338; Laurent Warlouzet, ‘The EEC/EU as an Evolving Compromise between French Dirigism and German Ordoliberalism (1957–1995)’, *Journal of Common Market Studies* 57, no. 1 (2019): 77–93; Brigitte Leucht and Katja Seidel, ‘Du traité de Paris au règlement 17/1962: Ruptures et continuités dans la politique européenne de concurrence, 1950–1962’, *Histoire, économie & société* 27, no. 1 (2008): 35–46; Sigfrido M. Ramírez Pérez, ‘La Politique de la concurrence de la Communauté économique européenne et l’industrie: L’exemple des accords sur la distribution automobile (1972–1985)’, *Histoire, économie & société* 27, no. 1 (2008): 63–77.

¹⁷ Warlouzet, *Le Choix de la CEE par la France*, 339–417. It is worth noting that although he was close to socialist circles, inspired by the then ongoing French ‘indicative planning’ experience and by Keynesian theories, Marjolin had also been close to French liberal and neoliberal circles since the 1930s, and had attended the 1938 ‘Colloque Lippmann’.

¹⁸ A ‘short-term economic policy committee’ was also created in 1959–60, a monetary committee was established in the early 1960s, followed in 1964 by the creation of a committee of the governors of central banks and a committee for budgetary policy. Eric Bussière, ‘Moves towards an economic and monetary policy’, in *The European Commission, 1958–72: History and Memories*, ed. Michel Dumoulin (Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications of the European Communities, 2007), 391–410. See also

Besides competition policy, another important achievement of the EEC in its early phase was of course the creation of the CAP in 1962, following four years of hard negotiations between member countries and strong pressure by the French government. The CAP relied on a strong 'mercantilist' or 'protectionist' stance—heavily taxing extra-EC imports while generously subsidizing exports of agricultural products. Price policy and European subsidies allowed the protection of European agriculture and the maintenance of farmers' incomes, but also encouraged modernization and increased productivity. The CAP would take more than two-thirds of the EEC budget—through the European Agricultural Guidance and Guarantee Fund (EAGGF)—until the 1980s. Although it was designed to back productivist reform of European agriculture to the detriment of small farms and the environment, it certainly introduced the first and largest financial solidarity mechanism between member states and also supported farmers' incomes and activities, which led Ann-Christina Knudsen to argue that 'it may be possible to see the CAP as the European Rescue of the agricultural welfare state'.¹⁹

Regarding social policy, in contrast, few tangible results were reached during those years. Although each European institution had its own group, committee, or department dedicated to 'European social affairs', social policy remained a weak field of Community policy.²⁰ At the CJEC, there were no judges specialized in social law from 1958—when judge Petrus Serrarens, former Secretary General of the ICFTU (1920–52), got excluded from the court before the end of his mandate (1952–8)—up until the 1980s. Perhaps consequently, there was no clear existing European jurisprudence in the field of social law until the mid-1970s, and social and labour law remained extremely marginal within the emerging discipline of European law.²¹ Some timid efforts to start applying—let alone extending—Community competences in the social field came mainly from the Commission, the EP, the EESC, and the Italian government, which saw the Common Market as an opportunity to launch a strategy of emigrating-labour-based growth.²² Within the European Commission and the EP, social affairs were entrusted in large part to personalities linked to national social policy

Eric Bussière, 'An Improbable Industrial Policy', in *The European Commission, 1958–72*, ed. Dumoulin and Bitsch, 457–70.

¹⁹ Knudsen, *Farmers on Welfare*, 315; on the making of the CAP, see also N. Piers Ludlow, 'The Making of the CAP: Towards a Historical Analysis of the EU's First Major Policy', *Contemporary European History* 14, no. 3 (August 2005): 347–71; Katja Seidel, 'Contested Fields: The Common Agricultural Policy and the Common Fisheries Policy', in *The European Commission, 1973–86*, ed. Bussière et al., 313–28.

²⁰ Karim Fertikh, 'A Weak Field of Social Policy? A Transnational Perspective on the EEC's Social Policymaking (from the 1940s to the 1970s)', in *Charting Transnational Fields: Methodology for a Political Sociology of Knowledge*, ed. Stefan Bernhard and Christian Schmidt-Wellenburg (London; New York: Routledge, 2020), 178–95.

²¹ Karim Fertikh, 'La Construction d'un «droit social européen»', *Politix* 115, no. 3 (December 2016): 207–9.

²² On the role of the EESC and of the European Commission in promoting the development of a common social policy, see respectively Maria Elena Guasconi, 'Il CES e le origini della politica sociale

making—such as administrators of social welfare systems, trade unionists, or lawyers—who were often part of the pre-existing transnational *nébuleuse* of social policy promoters and had worked in other international institutions. Their resources were, however, limited. At the European Commission, for instance, the Directorate-General (DG) for Social Affairs was much smaller than the Competition and Agricultural DGs.²³

Much of the initial work of the new European institutions regarding social affairs was employed in defining and framing the frontiers of ‘European social policy’. Until the late 1960s, the European Commission’s DG for Social Affairs—‘DGV’—was very cautious in its interpretation of the Treaty of Rome’s social dimension, which it deemed unclear. It invested considerable resources and time in mobilizing experts, collecting data, and organizing international seminars and conferences (regarding social security regimes and legislation, working time, wages, youth employment, social ‘harmonization’, collective agreements, etc.), and in establishing a working routine with the social partners and with the other Community bodies. In its first memorandum on social policy in 1959, the Commission identified few fields of action as its domains of competence: free movement of labour, the activities of the ESF, vocational training in the agricultural sector, and a vaguely defined ‘coordination’ of economic and social policies of the member states.²⁴

During the transitional period, the only social policies envisaged in the Treaty of Rome that were actually activated concerned free movement of workers, including access to social benefits for migrant workers, and the creation and operation of the ESF—‘both strictly functional to the opening of the Common Market and both with obvious operating limits.’²⁵ Between 1958 and 1970, the European Commission’s DGV was assigned to Italian Commissioners: Giuseppe Petrilli (1958–60), a Christian democrat trained in mathematics and statistics, and later Lionello Levi Sandri (1960–70), an expert in labour law with close ties to the Italian Democratic Socialist Party (PSDI). In line with the preoccupation of their government, their main concern was to set in motion a policy that would enable unemployed Italian labour to relocate to other parts of the Community, where labour was needed.

According to articles 48 and 49 of the Treaty of Rome, free movement of labour was to be established before the end of the transitional period. This implied

europa 1958–1965’, in Varsori, *Il Comitato economico e sociale nella costruzione europea*, 155–67; Varsori and Mechi, *Lionello Levi Sandri e la politica sociale europea*.

²³ Fertikh, ‘La Construction d’un «droit social européen»’, 210–12.

²⁴ Antonio Varsori, ‘The Emergence of a Social Europe’, in *The European Commission, 1958–72*, ed. Dumoulin and Bitsch, 427–41.

²⁵ Lorenzo Mechi, ‘A Precondition for Economic Integration? European Debates on Social Harmonisation in the 1950s and 1960s’, in *Free Trade and Social Welfare in Europe: Explorations in the Long 20th Century*, ed. Lucia Coppolaro and Lorenzo Mechi (Abingdon; New York: Routledge, 2020), 83.

suppressing any form of nationality-based discrimination between member states' workers regarding access to employment, remuneration, working conditions, and eligibility. This issue, however, raised significant resistance by member-state governments, and it was not until 1968 that the Council adopted the first substantial decision in the field.²⁶ Until then, several years of preparatory studies and discussions took place in European institutions which focused, for instance, on the problem of removing priority for national workers in access to employment, or on reducing waiting time and facilitating procedures for the issuance of work permits. To encourage and ease movement of workers between member states—through the progressive definition of a Community 'employment policy'—a number of organs were created. In 1961, a European Coordination Bureau was created under the control of the Commission; it was intended to collect offers of vacancies and of unemployed workers from the various member states, and to match supply with demand. In addition, a Consultative Committee (composed of representatives of governments, trade unions, and employers' organizations) and a Technical Committee (composed of government representatives) were set up with the task of advising the Commission in this field.²⁷

Directly related to the question of free movement of labour was the question of the rights that a worker could enjoy when moving from one country to another. Discussions were particularly difficult on this question: the difficulty consisted in deciding which country—host or origin—was responsible for paying social benefits to EC migrant workers and their families when they moved around the Community (country of employment or residence), and which regime should apply. Immigration countries with high social benefits, like France, Belgium, and Germany, whose temporary workers would later go back to emigration countries with low levels of unemployment and family allowances, preferred to outsource the payment or to calculate social benefits according to the country of origin's laws. Emigration countries with low social allowances like Italy advocated the reverse system. A timid achievement only came in 1971, when the member states adopted a resolution that imposed the application of the laws of the country of employment, with a temporary exception regarding family allowance for France, which continued to calculate the allowances on the rate of the country of residence (a solution that was supposed then to be renegotiated in 1973, but lasted until the late 1980s).²⁸

²⁶ Council Regulation 1612/68 on 15 October 1968, *Journal officiel* (henceforth *JO*) L257 19/10/1968, which would henceforth govern free movement of workers within the EC. For a list of the decisions, directives, and regulations that were progressively adopted to complement Regulation 1612/68, specifying the beneficiaries, extending to families, overseas territories, etc., thus regulating the scope and nature of workers' right to free movement within the EC, see Degimbe, *La Politique sociale européenne*, 64–5.

²⁷ Peter Coffey, ed., *Economic Policies of the Common Market* (London: Macmillan, 1979), 53–6.

²⁸ Emmanuel Comte, *The History of the European Migration Regime: Germany's Strategic Hegemony* (Abingdon: Routledge, 2018), 84–5, 131–4, 163. On the evolution of internal migration flux and

In the same vein, since its establishment in 1961 the activity of the ESF concentrated on promoting geographical and inter-professional mobility of labour. The ESF was managed by the Commission with the consultancy of a tripartite committee. Before its first reform in 1972, the ESF mainly focused on co-financing vocational training courses to support regional mobility and reconversion. Between 1960 and 1970, 154.2 million European Units of Account—admittedly a very meagre amount—were allocated to this end.²⁹ During the 1960s, the ESF proved to be quite inefficient and numerous applications could not be satisfied. Several attempts were made to propose its reform, in part under the insistence of the EP. However, not least because of the reluctance of countries like France and Germany, and because of tensions between the member states, the ESF's activities remained very limited.³⁰

Aside from that, by the end of the transition period most social policies envisaged in the Treaty of Rome remained inactivated. Attempts to implement article 119 on equal pay between men and women by the end of 1961, as the treaty originally envisaged, failed. In 1959 the Commission launched its first initiative and started consultations on the matter, but divergences of views between member countries and between experts prevailed. Consultations with social partners also revealed important discrepancies between official national legislation and the actual state of things regarding equal pay and working conditions, which contributed, together with a favourable economic conjuncture and its priority interest in the implementation of the CAP, to convincing the French government to relax its pressure on the issue. By the end of 1961, the issue was postponed to an eventual more auspicious moment; by the end of the decade, it remained unheeded.³¹

Besides, trade unions' association with policy and decision making in the EEC was weaker than had been the case within the previously created ECSC. Contrary to the demands of the trade unions, the Treaty of Rome only established three forms of participation by the unions in the institutional architecture of the EEC (in the EESC, the Social Fund Committee, and through consultation by the Commission on some social questions as stipulated by article 118). Despite their best efforts, trade unions did not manage to secure a seat in the college of

migration policies in Europe at the time, see also Federico Romero, *Emigrazione e integrazione europea, 1945–1973* (Rome: Edizioni Lavoro, 1991).

²⁹ The European Unit of Account (EUA) was a basket of the currencies of the EC member states, used as the unit of account of the EC before it was replaced in 1979 by the European Currency Unit (ECU), itself replaced in 1999 by the euro.

³⁰ On the emergence and activities of the ESF in the 1960s, see Lorenzo Mechi, 'Les États membres, les institutions et les débuts du Fonds social européen', in *Inside the European Community*, ed. Varsori, 95–116. Council Regulation of 9 May 1961 established the functioning of the ESF in its initial form. See also René Leboutte, 'Cinquante années d'action sociale en Europe: Le Fonds social européen', 2008.

³¹ Lise Rye, 'The Rise and Fall of the French Demand for Social Harmonization in the EEC, 1955–1966' (Norwegian University of Science and Technology, 2004), 113–29; on gender policies in the history of European integration, see also Federica Di Sarcina, *L'Europa delle donne: La politica di pari opportunità nella storia dell'integrazione europea, 1957–2007* (Bologna: Il Mulino, 2010).

Commissioners or to obtain parity of representation within the EESC; they were kept out of the discussions of the Council of Ministers, including regarding labour and social affairs;³² and even lost their right to co-opt a judge at the ECJ in 1958 when Serrarens was excluded from the reshuffled court.³³ Although during the 1950s and 1960s a number of trade unionists or former trade unionists worked in European institutions (in the Commission's DGV and in the EP's Social Affairs Committee, for instance), trade unions were marginalized in European institutional arrangements.³⁴

There were several reasons why, from its creation in 1958 until the late 1960s, the EEC's delimitation of social policy was very narrow, and its action in the social field very limited. One reason is a lack of resources available to the Commission and its lack of legal competences in the social field. It was not until 1970 that the EEC received its own resources directly from import taxes and value added tax (VAT). This meant more dependence on governments, which had to agree on each of its expenses. The High Authority of the ECSC, thanks to its own resources, was able to adopt a rather proactive stance and to finance ambitious social programmes. In particular, in 1954 it managed to establish a housing programme financing the construction, acquisition, and renovation of housing for workers in the coal and steel industries by granting long-term loans at very low interest rates. To finance the loans, the High Authority created a 'Special Reserve' fund financed by its own resources and by fines and interest rates. In order to launch this programme despite the absence of juridical provision in the Treaty of Paris for social housing, the High Authority relied on article 54, which authorized it to finance programmes, works, and infrastructures that would directly contribute to improving the productivity of the coal and steel industries. Hundreds of thousands of units of social housing were co-financed this way, allowing workers to become owners on relatively good financial terms.³⁵ Despite support from the European Parliamentary Assembly and the EESC, the EEC Commission did not have the financial means to autonomously implement this kind of interpretation of the Treaty of Rome.

³² The Council generally showed reluctance to let trade unions play a role at the EC level. According to Gobin, until the late 1960s, the dispute opposing the Commission to the Council—in particular, between the French government and the Hallstein Commission—led the Council to impose a freeze on the Commission's relations with trade unions. Gobin, 'Consultation et concertation sociales à l'échelle de la Communauté économique européenne', 367.

³³ Fertikh, 'La Construction d'un «droit social européen», 207–9. Having the right to coopt a judge was considered by trade unions as a guarantee that social and economic law competences would be represented at the CJCE.

³⁴ See Fertikh, 'La Construction d'un «droit social européen», 211.

³⁵ The ECSC housing programme, like all other competences of the ECSC, was taken over by the unique Commission after the fusion of the executives (of the ECSC, EEC, and Euratom) in 1967. On these housing schemes, see Lorenzo Mechi, 'L'action de la Haute Autorité de la CEEA dans la construction de maisons ouvrières', *Journal of European Integration History* 6, no. 1 (2000): 63–88.

Besides financing social housing, the ECSC was able to adopt some measures in the fields of vocational training and relocation (including temporary income maintenance), and health and security at work (it heralded legislation in these two sectors after the deadly 1956 mining accident in Marcinelle in Belgium). Furthermore, when the coal and steel sectors started to decline at the end of the 1950s due to growing oil competition, the ECSC was able to develop large-scale reconversion support schemes; firms were encouraged to permanently change their activity and could receive provisions to temporarily maintain their staff salary during reconversion.³⁶ Scholars generally emphasize that the social provisions of the Treaty of Rome—mostly non-binding and providing the EEC with no legislating prerogatives—were more restrictive than those of the ECSC treaty.³⁷ This point should be nuanced, however, as the Treaty of Rome did introduce some important new clauses such as equal pay for men and women (article 119), which were simply not implemented for lack of commitment by the member states within the Council.

In fact, the main reason for the social deficit of the EEC was a lack of political will, primarily from member states. Social rights and benefits differed greatly between each country and made discussions on coordination particularly arduous. Aside from Italy, most governments were uninterested in or hostile to the creation of a ‘European social policy’ during the 1960s, since they either wanted to avoid new financial solidarity engagements or considered that Community interference with national welfare policies could have threatened domestic political and social balances. In the years following the signature of the treaty, the French government quickly lost its initial interest in the application of social harmonization clauses after Mollet handed power over to de Gaulle.³⁸ French concern about the negative impact of its higher social protection on the competitiveness of its industries quickly vanished with the economic upswing that followed the 1958 devaluations. Meanwhile, German wages and social expenditure were also rising, restraining the gap between the two countries. The incentives for social harmonization therefore decreased, in part due to the success of the Common Market. The economic ‘miracle’ of these years therefore temporarily neutralized the contradiction between economic liberalization and social welfare. As a result, article 100, which conferred powers on the Community to harmonize such national laws that affected the Common Market, was never mobilized in the social field. As Scharpf argues, this ‘road not taken’ led increasingly to the

³⁶ Nicolas Verschueren, *Fermer les mines en construisant l’Europe: Une histoire sociale de l’intégration européenne* (Brussels: Peter Lang, 2013).

³⁷ See Varsori, ‘Development of European Social Policy’, 170–8; Degimbe, *La Politique sociale européenne*, 17–20, 49–57.

³⁸ Lise Rye, ‘The Rise and Fall of the French Demand for Social Harmonization in the EEC, 1955–1966’, in *Which Europe(s): New Approaches in European Integration History*, ed. Katrin Rücker and Laurent Warloutzet (Brussels: Peter Lang, 2006), 155–68.

'de-coupling of economic integration and social-protection issues' and to the assertion of 'negative integration'—the removal of tariffs, quantitative restrictions, and other barriers to trade or obstacles to free and undistorted competition—over 'positive integration'—the creation of measures aimed at intervening directly in the economy—leading to a dominance of the liberal aspects of the EC over its interventionist dimensions.³⁹

Therefore, any effort to increase the social competences and budget of the EEC met obstruction. During the 1960s, for instance, under the impetus of Lionello Levi Sandri, the Commission, backed by the EESC and the EP, drew up plans to promote exchanges between young trainees, as well as policies and an action programme on vocational training.⁴⁰ The projects provoked lukewarm reactions from a number of governments, especially those of France and Germany, which already had good retraining programmes and were not keen to pay for the retraining of Italian labour. As in the case of the ESF, the French government was also highly critical towards the political implications of such initiatives: the proposals implied enhancement of the Commission's powers and competences, to which the French government was fiercely opposed. From the end of 1962, the tensions between the Commission and the Council started to increase around the division of their respective prerogatives, not least in the social field. By the mid-1960s, due to increasing tensions between the French government (and by extension the Council) and the European Commission, Community social policy was in a deadlock. Between December 1964 and November 1966, there were no meetings of the ministers for social affairs in the Council.⁴¹

Aside from political will, what was really missing until the late 1960s was social pressure for the development of the 'social dimension' of the EC. In the 1950s and 1960s, the 'Six' were dominated by Christian-democratic, Gaullist, and liberal forces; this 'party-political centre of gravity' certainly had an influence on the political economy of the EEC and worked to the advantage of a liberal Europe.⁴² But the governments' reluctance was not the only motive. European trade unions and the European Left initially lacked organization and concrete policy proposals at the EC level. The trade unions' scarce association with the decision-making process of the Community gave them even less leverage to put forward demands for social measures. This started to change at the end of the 1960s, when the

³⁹ Fritz Scharpf, *Governing in Europe: Effective and Democratic?* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), 45–6, 50–2.

⁴⁰ Francesco Petrini, 'The Common Vocational Training Policy in the EEC from 1961 to 1972', *Vocational Training European Journal* 32, no. 2 (August 2004): 45–54.

⁴¹ Gobin, 'Consultation et concertation sociales à l'échelle de la Communauté économique européenne', 367.

⁴² Philip Manow, Armin Schäfer, and Hendrik Zorn, 'European Social Policy and Europe's Party-Political Center of Gravity, 1957–2003', MPIfG Discussion Paper 2004/06 (Cologne: Max Planck Institut für Gesellschaftsforschung, 2004), 18–23, http://www.mpi-fg-koeln.mpg.de/pu/mpifg_dp/dp04-6.pdf.

social, economic, and political stability that characterized the postwar years started to give way.

The Left's (Crippled) European Turn

By the late 1960s, the diverse components of the European Left started rethink their position and strategy towards European integration and institutions.

European socialists became increasingly worried about the path that European integration was taking and about their own ability to adjust it. As explained in the previous chapter, despite internal dissensions, by the late 1950s European socialists within 'the Six' had already converged on their support to the Common Market. The Italian PSI—the only socialist party in western Europe that was not part of the pro-Atlantic Socialist International until 1969 because of its ties to Italian communists and the Soviet Union—had been the only socialist party to abstain in the vote on the Treaty of Rome. During the 1960s the PSI increasingly supported the European integration process, especially after it broke with the communist camp in 1957 (partly as a result of the Soviet repression of the Budapest insurrection one year earlier), moved closer to the Christian Democratic Party and became part of a coalition government for the first time in 1963.⁴³ Besides, a number of social-democratic and labour party leaders of Sweden, Norway, and even the UK had gradually abandoned their conviction that the EC was antagonistic to their agendas. By the end of the 1960s, 'the well-connected centre-right leadership of these parties, which had built up extensive networks, thought membership was consistent with their programmatic objectives, as did Danish and Finnish Social Democrats'.⁴⁴ European socialists' support for the EEC was founded on a belief in the Treaty of Rome's open-ended nature—'though perhaps not socialist itself, the Common Market supposedly did not preclude the development of a socialist Europe'—and on the conviction that 'it was European socialists, working together, who would transform the EEC into a socialist project'.⁴⁵ In order to do so, however, socialist parties needed to harmonize their European policies and to work out a clear project for a socialist Europe. By the late 1960s, they realized that they had hitherto largely failed to meet this collective challenge.

During the second half of the 1960s, the socialist parties of the two main countries of the EC—West Germany and France—underwent important changes that led them to better define their European policy. In West Germany, after three years of

⁴³ Maria Serena Adesso, 'Il consenso delle sinistre italiane all'integrazione europea (1950–1969)', *Diacronie* 9, no. 1 (2012) (online, accessed on 7 October 2020).

⁴⁴ Kristian Steinnes, 'The European Turn and "Social Europe"', *Archiv für Sozialgeschichte* 53, (2013), 378, <http://repository.uibn.ru.nl/handle/2066/120154>.

⁴⁵ Talbot Imlay, *The Practice of Socialist Internationalism: European Socialists and International Politics, 1914–1960* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018), 358.

'Great Coalition' with the Christian Democratic Union (CDU), the SPD won the elections in September 1969. The new Chancellor, Willy Brandt, had earned growing fame first as a journalist in his Scandinavian exile during the Nazi regime, then as Governing Mayor of West Berlin (1957–66), and finally as Vice-Chancellor and Foreign Affairs Minister (1966–9). Although he was originally considered as one of the leaders of the right wing of the party and had built important contacts with US progressive elites—including with President John Fitzgerald Kennedy himself—during his chancellorship (1969–74) Brandt's first foreign policy priority was to implement the so-called *Ostpolitik*, an effort to break with the boldly anti-Soviet and anti-communist policies pursued by the Christian Democrats in government from 1949 to 1969 and to normalize relations with eastern Europe, particularly the GDR. *Ostpolitik* profoundly modified the then established Cold War division of the world into two blocs and pioneered western Europe's opening towards the East.⁴⁶ Brandt was also a staunch European federalist and a member of Monnet's Action Committee for the United States of Europe. Hence, (western) European integration was not absent from the SPD's agenda.⁴⁷ The SPD's experience in government pushed the party to reflect upon its European policy, to try and define it more precisely, and to start advocating, as explained in the last section of this chapter, the development of a more 'social' Europe.

In France, between 1965 and 1971 a redefinition of French socialism took place that culminated with the creation, at its famous Épinay Congress in 1971, of the new Parti socialiste (PS); this reconfiguration occasioned a repositioning on European questions. In a first phase, between 1965 and 1968, it led the main currents of the non-communist Left, gathering together in the Fédération de la gauche démocratique et socialiste (FGDS), to broadly agree on their support for European integration and the Common Market. However, during those years French socialists were increasingly concerned about the consolidation of a free-market Europe of the 'merchants', while their hopes for a common market based on the principles of economic planning and full employment were disappointed.⁴⁸ Later, the different components of the socialist family—except for the Parti socialiste unifié (PSU) but including some 'social Christians' close to the erstwhile Christian trade union, the French Democratic Confederation of Labour (CFDT), de-confessionalized after 1964—united in the new PS under François Mitterrand's leadership. Mitterrand promoted a union of the Left including the communists. This would lead to a more articulate (and much more critical) attitude to the EEC

⁴⁶ See Arne Hofmann, *The Emergence of Détente in Europe: Brandt, Kennedy and the Formation of Ostpolitik* (London; New York: Routledge, 2007).

⁴⁷ See Daniel Möckli, *European Foreign Policy during the Cold War: Heath, Brandt, Pompidou and the Dream of Political Unity* (London: I. B. Tauris, 2009).

⁴⁸ In September 1965, the creation of the FGDS saw an alliance of the SFIO, the Radicals, the Union démocratique et socialiste de la Résistance, the Convention des institutions républicaines, and clubs like the Cercles Jean Jaurès. Bossuat, 'Les Socialistes français et l'unité européenne', 339.

with the adoption of a common programme of the Left between the PS, the PCF, and the centre-left Mouvement des radicaux de gauche (MRG) in 1972. It was in part the result of the labour mobilization and bottom-up pressure for unity of the late 1960s and of the serious blow that the communists and socialists received in the 1968 elections held in the aftermath of the May events, which saw a reassertion of the Centre-Right; both things facilitated a unity of the trade union movement (between the communist-controlled CGT and the CFTD), and of the parties of the Left.⁴⁹

Meanwhile, the question of the coordination of western European socialist parties became more pressing. Throughout the 1940s, 1950s, and 1960s, western European socialists had met, cooperated, and discussed European integration within several platforms and through the constitution of transnational networks. Despite the very limited competences of the Socialist International, the 'practice of socialist internationalism' never ceased to exist; it took place within the Socialist International and its 'European study group', within economic experts' conferences, political foundations such as the SPD's Friedrich Ebert Foundation in Bonn, and transnational movements like the MSEUE, as well as within nascent European organizations such as the Socialist Intergroup at the Consultative Assembly of the Council of Europe and the Socialist Group of the Common Assembly of the ECSC, which later became the Socialist Group of the European Parliament (SGEP).⁵⁰ In 1957, the six socialist parties of the ECSC-EEC-Euratom had also decided to create a Liaison Bureau for the Socialist Parties of the EC, based in Luxembourg, to encourage closer and more permanent cooperation. The aim of the Liaison Bureau was to promote the exchange of information between its socialist and social-democratic members, so as to seek common positions on EC policy. It would also organize biannual congresses. The SGEP and the Liaison Bureau worked in cooperation with the Socialist International.⁵¹

Until the end of the 1960s, however, efforts to increase party coordination had proved largely unsuccessful. At the beginning of the 1960s, the socialist parties of the EC had expressed an increasing will for cooperation and tried to draft a 'common European programme', without much success. Their efforts met with several obstacles. First, decisions in the Liaison Bureau had to be taken unanimously, which led to the adoption of resolutions that generally expressed little more than a lowest common denominator position. Besides, the decisions and resolutions of

⁴⁹ Mitterrand's FGDS had lost sixty-one seats, with 16.5 per cent of the votes; the PCF lost thirty-nine seats, obtaining 20.02 per cent in the first round. The entire Left now held only ninety of the 487 seats in the National Assembly. The Gaullists made inroads among industrial workers, obtaining more working-class votes than the PCF. See, for instance, Sassoon, *One Hundred Years of Socialism*, 401.

⁵⁰ Imlay, *The Practice of Socialist Internationalism*, ch. 7; Christian Salm, *Transnational Socialist Networks in the 1970s: European Community Development Aid and Southern Enlargement* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2016), ch. 1.

⁵¹ Simon Hix and Urs Lesse, *Shaping a Vision: A History of the Party of European Socialists, 1957-2002* (Brussels: Parti socialiste européen, 2002), 11-17.

the Bureau were non-binding for its member parties. Its financial and human resources were also scant. Importantly, moreover, there was no consensus within the Liaison Bureau about what a truly socialist European policy should be: its members disagreed, for instance, on whether and to what extent the EEC should intervene directly in the economy of its member states—French socialists favoured high interventionism whereas other members ruled it out.⁵²

As a matter of fact, behind the façade, a decade after the creation of the EEC the socialist parties of 'the Six' had been unable to articulate their socialist ideology and their support for European unity into a coherent project to transform the EEC into a socialist Europe. On 23 March 1967, the socialist parties of the EC organized a public event in Paris to celebrate the tenth anniversary of the signature of the Treaty of Rome, which was attended by important figures like Mollet and Levi Sandri.⁵³ But the 1966 congress of the socialist parties of the EC in Berlin highlighted disagreements between the member parties, after which no congress would be held until 1971. Sassoon's severe assertion that Europeanism occupied 'the foreign policy void of the Left' and that 'there was no significant debate at all on the European Community among the socialist parties of the EEC' is severe but not quite inaccurate.⁵⁴

Facing this state of affairs, at the end of the 1960s renewed efforts emerged to enhance cooperation structures among socialist parties of the EC, to give the Liaison Bureau more powers, and to work towards a common socialist European policy.⁵⁵ In May 1969, a group of leading social democrats of different countries—mostly from the 'inner Six' but also including UK Labour Party representatives—met under the chairmanship of PvdA member and Member of the European Parliament (MEP) Henk Vredeling. Vredeling was a convinced European federalist who believed that there was a political void at EC level that could only be filled by the empowerment of the EP and the creation of unified Europe-wide political parties that would be able to politicize and influence EC policy making.⁵⁶ To him, the inability of 'progressive' parties to merge at EC level and to constitute a sister party for the European trade unions explained why a Community of *laissez-faire*,

⁵² According to Gérard Bossuat, 'Les Euro-Socialistes de la SFIO, réseaux et influence', 420. On the evolution and internal limitations of the Liaison Bureau, see in particular Salm, *Transnational Socialist Networks in the 1970s*, ch. 1.

⁵³ Jules Moch, 'La Première Décennie du Marché commun', *La Revue socialiste*, no. 204 (June 1967).

⁵⁴ Sassoon, *One Hundred Years of Socialism*, 338.

⁵⁵ See Wendy A. Brusse, 'The Dutch Socialist Party', in *Socialist Parties and the Question of Europe in the 1950s*, ed. Richard T. Griffiths, Contributions to the History of Labour and Society 4 (Leiden; New York: E. J. Brill, 1993), 106–34; Hix and Lesse, *Shaping a Vision*, 17–19.

⁵⁶ Hendrikus 'Henk' Vredeling (20 November 1924–27 October 2007) was a Dutch politician who played an active role in promoting EC intervention in the social field throughout the 1960s and 1970s, and in promoting the creation of a federation of European social-democratic parties. He had close ties to Dutch trade union circles, was first elected to the Dutch House of Representatives for the PvdA in 1956, then became an MEP (1958–73); he would serve as Minister of Defence in the Dutch government (1973–77), then as a European Commissioner for Social Affairs under the Roy Jenkins Commission (1977–81; see Chapter 6).

laissez-passer had emerged. In Vredeling's analysis, after the Second World War, socialism had re-entered the realm of national politics, whereas capital had internationalized. Growing multinational companies and big European firms had their lobbies in Brussels and were able to influence European policy. Only a commitment to counter this problem would allow for a European policy based on progress and geared towards workers' interests.⁵⁷ The participants of the meeting later formed a European Political Action Group to work on the creation of a European 'socialist' or 'progressive' party, aligning all progressive forces under a common agenda.⁵⁸ The push for a European socialist party was broadly shared by influential socialist figures within the European Commission, such as Levi Sandri and the Commissioner for Agriculture, Sicco Mansholt, and by the Dutch PvdA.⁵⁹

Concomitantly, another significant political event increased the need for socialist parties of the EC to increase their cooperation and better define their European policy: after losing a referendum in which he proposed a reform of the Senate and the creation of regional governments, de Gaulle resigned the French presidency on 28 April 1969. During the 1960s, de Gaulle's peculiar vision of European unity had occasioned important tensions between France and its 'partners' in the EC. Though he supported the Common Market—which he had clearly preferred to the 'Free Trade Area' project proposed the UK government in 1956—de Gaulle promoted a different idea of European unity, based on a 'core Europe' dominated by France, excluding the UK, freed from US influence, based on intergovernmental rather than federal cooperation, and wary of the technocratic leadership of what he used to term Brussels' 'aeropagus'. In October 1961, the French government had presented to the member states of the EC the 'Fouchet Plan', a treaty proposal to create, in addition to the EC, a new confederal body for political cooperation in terms of foreign affairs, defence, science, culture, and human rights. The proposal was rejected by the other member states, mainly by the Netherlands and Belgium whose governments feared it might compromise a possible entry of the UK into the EEC, and jeopardize relations with the US.

In the following years, tensions continued between the French government and its European partners, particularly following de Gaulle's repeated vetoes—in 1963 and 1967—of the UK's accession to the EC. They culminated in the 1965–6

⁵⁷ HAEU, GSPE-051-FR-A, Henk Vredeling, 'Vers un parti progressiste européen', 1970; article first published in the PvdA's monthly journal *Socialisme en democratie* no. 3 (1970).

⁵⁸ HAEU, GSPE-049-FR, 'Procès-verbal de la réunion du 26 février 1969', February 1969; IISH, CSPEC-16, 'Déclaration du Groupe d'action politique européenne', Bemelen, 18–19 October 1969. The Group was created during a conference held in Bemelen by members of socialist parties of western Europe with the task of submitting proposals to a congress to be held publicly in spring 1970, aimed at drafting a European political programme to democratize political, economic, and cultural life in Europe. Elections of the EP and the creation of a 'European Progressive Party' were its priorities. The group considered as its potential allies the trade unions, socialist parties, progressive parties, and cultural and political groupings that sought to strengthen and revive democracy throughout Europe.

⁵⁹ Steinnes, 'The European Turn and "Social Europe"', 377.

'empty chair crisis' when the French government decided to boycott European institutions to block Walter Hallstein's federalist ambitions at the head of the European Commission. In January 1966, the so-called 'Luxembourg compromise' put an end to this institutional crisis, tethering the Commission to the Council, introducing qualified majority voting in the Council, but preserving member state sovereignty with the introduction of a *de facto* veto power for matters considered to be of 'very important national interest'.⁶⁰ Although de Gaulle's wide depiction in the literature as an anti-European is a misrepresentation, it is doubtless that his presidency was the main obstacle to the Communities' enlargement to the UK and to further supranational integration.⁶¹ When he resigned, socialist parties saw a potential opening for a European revival, enlargement, and perhaps reinforcing of the socialist Left within a wider Europe.

The eleventh congress of the Socialist International happened to take place in Eastbourne, England, a month after de Gaulle's resignation, and one day after Georges Pompidou's election as the new President of the French Republic, on 16–20 June 1969. The question of European integration was a prominent topic during the congress. On 17 June, a specific debate on 'The Unity of Europe' took place, with interventions from several leading figures of European socialist parties: the then Foreign Minister of West Germany and Chairman of the SPD, Willy Brandt; the Italian Foreign Minister, President of the PSI, and the Vice-Chairman of the Socialist International, Pietro Nenni; the Prime Minister of the UK, Harold Wilson; the deputy leader of the British Labour Party, George Brown; the Chairman of the Social Democratic Party of Austria (SPÖ), Bruno Kreisky; and the Vice-President of the European Commission, Sicco Mansholt, among others.⁶²

The discussions attested European social democracy's shift, since the late 1960s, away from its postwar focus on Western cooperation, the US, and the Atlantic alliance, towards greater international autonomy and 'Europeanism'—a shift favoured by the disastrous image of the Vietnam War on the Left, the *détente* of Cold War bipolarism, greater global interdependence, and rising tensions between Europe and the US.⁶³ All interventions pointed to the new prospects that a revival of Europe's unification could open for a politically and economically stronger Europe, which could emancipate itself from US influence; restore its role on the world stage as an actor of peace, *détente*, prosperity, and disarmament; and

⁶⁰ See N. Piers Ludlow, *The European Community and the Crises of the 1960s: Negotiating the Gaullist Challenge* (London; New York: Routledge, 2006).

⁶¹ See for a different account Laurent Warlouzet, 'De Gaulle as a Father of Europe: The Unpredictability of the FTA's Failure and the EEC's Success (1956–58)', *Contemporary European History* 20, no. 4 (November 2011): 419–34.

⁶² Archives of the International Institute of Social History (IISH), SI-260, 'Eastbourne Report 1: 11th Congress of the SI, 16–20 June 1969'; IISH, SI-260, 'Eastbourne Report 2: 11th Congress of the SI, 16–20 June 1969'.

⁶³ Michele Di Donato, 'Internazionalismo socialdemocratico e storia internazionale degli anni settanta', *Ventesimo secolo*, no. 44 (2019): 11–37.

promote development of the Third World and reform of the international trade system. Brandt asserted that 'the organization of Europe will be in the interest not only of the peoples of this continent themselves; it will be beneficial to world peace and, not least, to cooperation with the people of the Third World'. He insisted that for this political union to take shape, economic unification was a precondition. Brandt advocated harmonization of trade, monetary, economic, and social policies within the Community. Nenni insisted on the need to democratize the Community, in particular by implementing the Treaty of Rome's commitment to direct elections. He also emphasized the need to develop new common policies and new instruments in order to 'go from a customs union to a planned economic union'. Brown shared the will to see a democratization of the EC through an empowered and directly elected EP. He also underlined that 'we need an effective European authority to control the new international companies which in their growth straddle many frontiers'.⁶⁴

All these interventions testify to the fact that the prospective revival of European integration in 1969 created concrete impetus for western European socialists to envisage the achievement of a socialist Europe. This socialist Europe was to be built thanks to economic integration, starting with the EEC and EFTA but understood as a larger pan-European unification project. In Kreisky's words,

Social Democracy can, however, only be fulfilled in Europe if the material requirements are there. Again, these can only be created by the economic integration of Europe. Therefore, the struggle to create a united Europe is also a struggle for the realization of our aims. [...] Social Democracy in an integrated Europe will exercise a fascination which will reach out beyond its own boundaries and will lend meaning and reality to the grand vision of a Europe which extends to the Urals.⁶⁵

This ambition, however, could hardly be realized if the member parties of the Socialist International did not manage to assert their influence over European policy making. In his intervention in the debate, Mansholt raised the question again:

What about Socialism? Where is the influence of our parties in Europe? We see being created at this very moment a more and more capitalistic, uncontrolled economy. We see big industrial concentrations traversing the borders. We see that major decisions are more and more taken by these great companies. Perhaps this concentration is necessary in our modern world. But where is the counterpart?

⁶⁴ See Brandt, Nenni, and Brown's speech transcripts in IISH, SI-260, 'Eastbourne Report 1: 11th Congress of the SI, 16–20 June 1969'.

⁶⁵ Kreisky's speech transcript in IISH, SI-260, 'Eastbourne Report 1: 11th Congress of the SI, 16–20 June 1969'.

Where are the socialists? We are still working on a national base. We are split up in national socialist parties. If we as Socialists want to control and have an influence on the development of Western Europe, can we go on like this? Of course, we have here our conference. But this conference is a meeting where we hear speeches and there is a resolution which is not binding for the parties. That means it is only a recommendation as to the position to be taken nationally. I am convinced that the time has come to think over our situation. And in my opinion the only answer is that we establish in Western Europe, in this Community, a European socialist—progressive socialist—democratic party.⁶⁶

Indeed, in the absence of stronger party coordination, social-democratic parties had limited influence over European policy, including the definition of the social and economic guidelines of the EC. In the years before 1969, the archives of the SGEP and of the Confederation of Socialist Parties of the EC show the lack of initiative taken to define and put forward concrete proposals to rethink the social policy of the EC, or to formulate a comprehensive project for a 'social' Europe.⁶⁷ The issues that figured prominently on the SGEP's agenda were the achievement of the CAP, the completion of the Common Market, the crisis of the EC under de Gaulle's presidency, the fusion of the executives, and the international and monetary situation. The minutes of the SGEP's working party on social and economic affairs show a broad shared idea that monetary union would presuppose the reinforcement of economic coordination, direct elections, budgetary policy, and regional and social policy.⁶⁸ There were, however, no concrete proposals on these different questions at the time.

For the time being, however, Mansholt's speech at the congress met with lukewarm reactions and the project of a centralized European socialist party met with resistance within the Socialist International. Some important socialist parties from non-EC countries, such as the SPÖ, feared being left aside, while strong parties from EC member countries were reluctant, chiefly the SPD.⁶⁹ Meeting at the Excelsior hotel in Amalfi on 16–17 October 1969, the members of the SGEP discussed a working paper drafted by two eminent socialist federalists—Francis Vals, President of the SGEP, and Lucien Radoux, President of the Liaison Bureau—which gave indications on what the group's 'strategy' should be regarding key aspects of European policy, such as the CAP and monetary integration. The report pointed out that socialist parties had lagged behind (compared to

⁶⁶ Mansholt's speech transcript in IISH, SI-260, 'Eastbourne Report 2: 11th Congress of the SI, 16–20 June 1969'.

⁶⁷ For instance, HAEU, GSPE-046-FR; HAEU, GSPE-047-FR; HAEU, GSPE-048-FR; HAEU, GSPE-049-FR. The freezing of EC activity clearly halted the activity of the group, and there was no real effort to counter this inertia.

⁶⁸ HAEU, GSPE-050-FR, 'PV de la réunion du Groupe de travail sur les problèmes économiques et sociaux', 7 July 1969.

⁶⁹ IISH, SI-260, 'Eastbourne Report 1: 11th Congress of the SI, 16–20 June 1969'.

employers and trade unions) in realizing the social consequences of the Common Market, called for national parties to grant more consideration to European questions, and proposed to increase the efficiency of the group's work and to reform the Bureau's role in order to form 'European consciousness'. The paper made proposals for immediate reform, including organizing a yearly 'European Socialist Assembly', a 'Socialist Women's Conference', a 'Conference of Leaders of Socialist Parliamentary Groups', a 'Conference of Socialist Youth', and so on.⁷⁰ These proposals received a lukewarm welcome from the national party representatives within the Liaison Bureau. The SPD in particular was not keen, now that it was in government, to transfer authority to a European party organization and thus constrain its manoeuvring space in the Council of Ministers. As a result of these contrasting positions, no substantial decision was taken at the time.⁷¹

Writing a few months later in *Socialisme en Democratie*, Vredeling lamented:

In many areas, economic integration is constantly reducing the scope for decisions taken at the national level. At the same time, the absence of a European policy is increasingly felt. [...] A huge political vacuum is thus being created in Europe. [...] How do the political parties react to this Europe that is integrating economically and therefore, according to Marx, politically as well? It's quite simple, they don't react, they hardly react at all. Economic circles have reacted. There is no fishermen's association, no doctors' or architects' association, no chemical industry, no rural federation, no housewives' club that does not have its European federation, that does not regularly organize European congresses, that does not have its pressure group in Brussels. And what about political parties?⁷²

Vredeling denounced the absence of a true binding common European socialist programme, of a real common strategy and of organic ties with 'an organized and coherent rank-and-file'. He linked this absence to the lack of parliamentary control over Community decisions; the fact that no congress had been organized by the socialist parties of the EC since 1966, and of course the Bureau's lack of powers and resources and the national parties' reluctance to advance towards the creation of a European progressive party.

While by the late 1960s socialists in the countries of the EC were increasingly aware that they had become supporters of a 'Europe' they were unable to shape, the main communist forces of western Europe—in particular, the Italian PCI—were also adopting a new attitude towards European integration and towards the

⁷⁰ HAEU, GSPE-631, 'Document de travail préparé par Lucien Radoux et Francis Vals en vue de la réunion du Groupe socialiste les 16 et 17 octobre à Amalfi' (October 1969).

⁷¹ Hix and Lesse, *Shaping a Vision*, 17–19; Salm, *Transnational Socialist Networks in the 1970s*, 23–4.

⁷² Henk Vredeling, 'Naar een Progressieve Europese Partij?', *Socialisme en democratie* 3 (1970): 144–51.

EC. This change of attitude led them to consider influencing, although rather marginally, European policy making.

The change was particularly remarkable for the Italian PCI, the most powerful communist party in western Europe, which moved gradually between the 1940s and the late 1960s from firm rejection to acceptance of the EC. Since the late 1950s, some members of the PCI had developed the idea of 'another Europe' (*'l'altra Europa'*) that could emerge from an alliance with all socialist, social-democratic, and other 'progressive' forces in Europe, including parties, trade unions, and social movements at large. In 1959 the head of the party, Palmiro Togliatti, advocated in *Rinascità* the construction of a 'European Left' including all forces that strove for profound socio-economic reform in Europe.⁷³ Meanwhile, some party members like Giorgio Amendola, leading moderate and Europeanist of the PCI, as well as economists of the Centro studi di politica economica (CeSPE) and their periodical *Bollettino*, started to advocate a new opening towards the EC. The idea gradually made its way to the party's Central Committee. As a matter of fact, the party slowly abandoned its intransigent stance towards the Common Market and adopted a more open attitude, advocating a revision of the treaties and the participation of all democratic forces in European institutions in order to change the Communities from within. This was a remarkable change, as for the first time it opened up the possibility of communist participation in the EC polity, from where they had been excluded since the start. By the early 1970s, the PCI even came to see the EC as a potential vehicle for social, economic, and political change in Europe, for a new *détente*, and for new relations with the Third World.⁷⁴

Different factors converged to encourage Italian and other Western European communists to reconsider their stance on European integration. The unpicking of the bipolar world through the process of *détente* after 1963 contributed to toning down the marginalization of pro-Moscow parties within the western European political landscape. In the early 1960s Togliatti started to seek some degree of disengagement from Moscow by setting Italian communism on the path of 'reform communism'. This disengagement was further encouraged by the 1968 repression of the 'Prague Spring' by Soviet troops, which put western European communists in great difficulty. The SPD's *Ostpolitik* and its role in easing the East–West dichotomy also had a major impact on convincing communists—especially the PCI—to

⁷³ Togliatti explained that singling out only those who more closely represented the working class would mean sacrificing the possibility of realizing true political change in Europe. Palmiro Togliatti, 'Per una sinistra europea', *Rinascità*, March 1959.

⁷⁴ On the evolution of the PCI towards acceptance of the EC, see Mauro Maggiorani, *L'Europa degli altri: Comunisti italiani e integrazione europea (1957–1969)* (Rome: Carocci, 1998); Mauro Maggiorani and Paolo Ferrari, *L'Europa da Togliatti a Berlinguer: Testimonianze e documenti, 1945–1984* (Bologna: Il Mulino, 2005). See also Adesso, 'Il consenso delle sinistre italiane all'integrazione europea (1950–1969)'; Valentine Lomellini, 'Dall'europposizione all'euroeuforia: La traiettoria del comunismo italiano nel processo d'integrazione europea', in *Contro l'Europa? I diversi scetticismi verso l'integrazione europea*, ed. Daniele Pasquinucci and Luca Verzichelli (Bologna: Il Mulino, 2016), 71–92.

open dialogue with other political forces of the European Left. Likewise, mounting tensions between European countries and the US towards the late 1960s (in part because of decreasing European support for the US war in Vietnam) toned down their conviction that any form of western European integration was bound to serve US interests and nurture the confinement of the communist world.⁷⁵

Following a long institutional struggle, in 1969 for the first time communist deputies were able to join the assembly of the EC. Since their creation, representatives of the Italian Left (including socialists) had been excluded from the assembly, where only deputies of the parties that belonged to the governing majority had been able to sit.⁷⁶ On 11 March 1969, seven Italian communist MEPs, led by Amendola, therefore arrived in the parliamentary hemicycle of Strasbourg, followed by six MEPs from the PSI.⁷⁷ This was not a detail, as it marked the first participation of communist representatives in a western European organization and the first time that communists were formally allowed to participate in EC institutions. In an interview that he gave to the communist daily newspaper *l'Unità*, Amendola emphasized this landmark event:

We are now getting ready to be present at the Strasbourg Parliament, being well aware of the fundamental limits of this institution—also due to the fact that so many democratic and socialist forces in Western Europe are excluded from it—and of the deep crisis in which all Europeanist politics finds itself. However, we aim here to achieve a more direct knowledge of the terms of the issues that arise in 'Little Europe' and to use the possibilities of new contacts with all the left-wing forces to carry on in Europe the battle against monopolies, militarism and revanchism, for peace, for overcoming blocs, international economic cooperation and deep social and political reforms.⁷⁸

In his inaugural speech to the EP, Amendola insisted that the communist MEPs would strive for a revision of the Treaty of Rome and for a democratization of

⁷⁵ Note that the PCI secretly played a role in the establishment of *Ostpolitik*. In 1967, Sergio Segre, foreign policy adviser to the then PCI leader, Luigi Longo, acted as intermediary between the SPD and East Germany. The PCI thus established useful contacts with the most powerful social-democratic party of the time and succeeded in persuading the SPD to lift the ban on the West German Communist Party. Sassoon, *One Hundred Years of Socialism*, 336.

⁷⁶ Until the first direct elections in 1979, the members of the Italian delegation to the EP were chosen by the Italian government. Pier Luigi Ballini, Sandro Guerrieri, and Antonio Varsori, eds., *Le istituzioni repubblicane dal centrismo al centro-sinistra, 1953–1968*, Studi storici (Rome: Carocci, 2006), 124–41.

⁷⁷ The delegation led by Giorgio Amendola included Giovanni Bertoli, Francesco d'Angelosante, Nilde Iotti, Silvio Leonardi, Agide Samaritani, and Mauro Scoccimarro. Samaritani died that same month and was replaced by Nicola Cipolla. This group played an important part in shaping the PCI's European policy in collaboration with the CeSPE throughout the early 1970s. Maggiorani and Ferrari, *L'Europa da Togliatti a Berlinguer*, 43.

⁷⁸ 'Eletti ieri alla Camera i delegati a Strasburgo', in *l'Unità*, 22 January 1969. Quoted in Adesso, 'Il consenso delle sinistre italiane all'integrazione europea (1950–1969)'.

European institutions (especially its representative organs, the EP and EESC). This was to be achieved through cohesive action of the European Left, stretching from communist to social-democratic parties. The new MEPs would also seek to reform the common policies of the EC, starting with the CAP.⁷⁹ This new battle of Italian communists 'from within' contributed to legitimize the EC—including in the eyes of the party militants—which, 'from an obstacle on the path of détente, was becoming an indispensable tool to achieve the very result of détente'.⁸⁰

At that time, the French Communist Party did not experience the same European conversion as its Italian sister party. As in the case of the Italian Left, out of the will of the French government the PCF remained excluded from the EP for several years, until 1973. Besides, it continued to oppose any extension of the Community's competences—including direct elections and enhanced powers for the EP. Its views coincided more with those of the Labour Party in the UK than with those of the PCI. However, from the end of the 1960s, in part under the influence of the PCI and the French socialists, with whom it sought to seal an alliance, the PCF gradually abandoned its firm rejection of the EC, stopped calling for France's withdrawal, and started accepting the Community as an established fact that needed to be addressed seriously.

This shift of communist parties from Euroscepticism to a more open stance towards the EC also reflected a change of heart in the communist electorates in France and Italy. In France, when an October 1950 survey asked a representative sample of the French public 'Are you for or against the efforts being made to unify Europe?', 65 per cent of respondents were favourable but only 19 per cent among the members of the PCF. In May 1957, these figures were down to 53 per cent and 13 per cent. In 1962, after the creation of the Common Market, they had gone up to 72 and 60 per cent respectively; they would then remain stable and even increase slightly in the following years. Therefore, although the PCF remained one of the most Moscow-aligned parties in the West and was sensitive to the Soviet Union's hostility to the EC, it became more careful on the question. Indeed, continuing to advocate withdrawal from the Communities would have been unpopular with the communist electorate. In Italy, the convergence was even starker between the general public's support for European unity and the support of communist voters.⁸¹

⁷⁹ Giorgio Amendola, 'Speech to the European Parliament, 12 March 1969', in *I Comunisti al Parlamento europeo: Interventi dei parlamentari italiani del Gruppo comunista e apparentati nelle sedute del Parlamento europeo* (Luxembourg: Segretariato del Gruppo comunista e apparentati, 1977). See also on the topic Donald Sassoon, 'The Italian Communist Party's European Strategy', *Political Quarterly* 47, no. 3 (July 1976): 253–75.

⁸⁰ Maggiorani and Ferrari, *L'Europa da Togliatti a Berlinguer*, 45 (author's translation).

⁸¹ Ronald Inglehart, *The Silent Revolution: Changing Values and Political Styles among Western Publics* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1977), 348–9. See also Giannēs Balampanidēs, *Eurocommunism: From the Communist to the Radical European Left* (Abingdon: Routledge, 2015), 212–13.

The 'pro-European' turn seems to have occurred in the communist electorate before it happened at the level of the party elites.

Meanwhile, European trade unions were strengthening their presence at the level of the EC. As mentioned in the previous chapter, since the war non-communist and communist unions had been divided on the issue of European integration. The socialist unions of the 'Six' affiliated to the ICFTU had supported the different projects of western European integration and encouraged the coordination of European trade unions' positions regarding the EC. In 1952, a coordination committee of the coal and steel unions that were members of the ICFTU was created at the ECSC level. In 1958, the ICFTU created a European Trade Union Secretariat (ETUS), including all its member unions from the six EC countries. On their part, the Christian unions of the IFCTU, which had also supported European integration projects since the Marshall Plan, created the European Organization-IFCTU (EO-IFCTU) with the same design.⁸²

Although non-communist trade unions had placed hopes in European unification in the early 1950s, they were soon disillusioned.⁸³ As mentioned previously, European trade unions had been very disappointed by the Treaty of Rome, which granted less weight to trade union representatives in the institutions of the EC compared to those of the ECSC. Despite this bad start, from 1959 European trade unions (mainly the ETUS) managed to establish an informal consultation procedure with the European Commission, which proved more open than the Council to letting trade unions play a part in the EC's policy making. Several tripartite cross-industry and bipartite sectoral committees were created in the early 1960s for consultation on common policies (coal, steel, agriculture, ESF, etc.), in particular under the auspices of Commissioner for Social Affairs, Levi Sandri. However, the EC's institutional crises in the 1960s undermined this rapprochement. After 1963, the Council's efforts to limit the involvement of trade unions within the Commission's work, including on social policy, resulted in a weakening of trade union representation within the EC, and the dissociation of the unions from its policy-making process.⁸⁴ Trade unions' demands to obtain a chair within the

⁸² For useful overviews of the transnational organizations of European trade unions, see, for instance, Pierre Tilly and Christophe Degryse, *1973–2013: 40 Ans d'histoire de la Confédération européenne des syndicats* (Brussels: Institut syndical européen, 2013), ch. 1; Marcel van der Linden, ed., *The International Confederation of Free Trade Unions* (Bern: Peter Lang, 2000).

⁸³ Gobin showed that the ETUC (the main confederation of trade unions at European level) remained consistently attached, since its creation, to the idea of European integration. Its 'pro-European' stance had two main sources. On one hand, it derived from a generally shared European idealism—union leaders were receptive to the idea that supranational integration would help prevent wars and preserve democracies in Europe. On the other hand, it was an expression of political pragmatism—if economic and political power was transferred to supranational entities, trade unions needed to exert influence at this new level. See Corinne Gobin, 'Consultation et concertation sociales à l'échelle de la Communauté économique européenne: Étude des positions et stratégies de la Confédération européenne des syndicats (1958–1991)' (PhD thesis, Université libre de Bruxelles, 1996), 367–76.

⁸⁴ Gobin, 'Consultation et concertation sociales à l'échelle de la Communauté économique européenne', 367; Barbara Barnouin, *The European Labour Movement and European Integration* (London: Frances Pinter, 1986), 8 and following.

Commission, a more balanced representation within the EESC, and a representative within the EIB and the CJEC were systematically rejected. This situation led non-communist trade unions to display a more critical stance towards the EC and to try more strongly to assert their influence over European policies.

Moreover, the end of the 1960s saw a reorganization of international and European trade unionism, and the idea of creating a single European trade union organization was making inroads. In 1968, the IFCTU abandoned its strictly Christian orientation and changed its name to the World Confederation of Labour (WCL; EO-IFCTU hence became EO-WCL), allowing a rapprochement with socialist unions. The ICFTU lost in 1969 its largest member, the American AFL-CIO. In April 1969, in an effort to establish a more structured and efficient organ of coordination at EC level, the European Confederation of Free Trade Unions (ECFTU) replaced the ETUS, drawing sectorial and inter-professional unions closer together and introducing the possibility of taking binding political decisions with a two-thirds majority vote. Cooperation increased also between trade unions of EC and EFTA countries. At the same time, the ECFTU and the EO-WCL started to collaborate more closely and to jointly demand greater association with EC decision and policy making.⁸⁵

Even the main communist trade unions of the member countries of the EC revised their attitude to the EC during the second half of the 1960s. Communist trade unions, in line with western and eastern European communist parties, had opposed early projects of European integration inaugurated by the Marshall Plan, which they generally saw as a means for European and US monopolies to exploit the resources of European (and African) countries, and to decrease social protection. During the 1960s, however, they adopted a more open stance towards western European integration. Encouraged by the relative achievements of the ECSC regarding the living and working conditions of the workers of the coal and steel sectors, those unions started to believe that European economic integration could be beneficial to labour, and not only to capital. They therefore decided to work to influence the EC from within. In 1965, the French and Italian communist unions created a 'CGT-CGIL standing committee' and in 1967 they established a common 'Liaison Bureau' in Brussels in order to coordinate their action and to establish dialogue with EC institutions. In April 1969, a month after Italian communists first entered the EP, CGT and CGIL were finally allowed to sit at the EESC.⁸⁶ Although the division between the communist unions and the ECFTU-IFCTU unions

⁸⁵ Corinne Gobin, 'Construction européenne et syndicalisme européen: Un aperçu de trente-quatre ans d'histoire (1958–1991)', *La Revue de l'IREs*, no. 21 (1996): 119–51.

⁸⁶ On the European policy of the CGT and CGIL, see in particular Jean-Marie Pernot, 'Dedans, dehors, la dimension internationale dans le syndicalisme français' (PhD thesis, Université de Nanterre, 2001); Ilaria Del Biondo, *L'Europa possibile: La CGT e la CGIL di fronte al processo di integrazione europea, 1957–1973* (Rome: Ediesse, 2007); Alexandre Bibert, 'L'européanisation inattendue: La CGT et la CGIL devant l'intégration européenne (1950–1974)', *Journal of European Integration History* 26, no. 1 (2020): 43–60.

remained until the early 1970s, in the following years, the improved organization and coordination efforts among European trade unions would allow for the formulation of more precise and decisive positions on European policies.⁸⁷

In sum, at the end of the 1960s, most forces of the Left—parties and unions alike—had adopted a vague pro-European reformism. They were increasingly willing to play an active role in European policymaking, but lacked transnational coordination and programmatic content and cohesiveness to do so.

The Hague, 1969: European Revival and Social Policy

The increasing social conflict of the late 1960s, combined with the economic turmoil and the changing political context in western Europe, prompted European political elites to work towards a 'revival' of European integration and to place more emphasis on its social dimension. This new social concern was also the result of pressures exerted mainly by trade unions, the European Commission's DGV, and the EP.

To start with, the trade unions were asking for more inclusion in Community decision and policy making. Since May 1967, they had demanded the organization of an EC-level tripartite conference on employment, but met with resistance within the Council.⁸⁸ During that year, several organizations, including the IFCTU, the ICFTU, the Committee of Professional Agricultural Organizations (COPA) and the Union of Industrial and Employers' Confederations of Europe (UNICE, the main European employers' organization), voiced concerns regarding their insufficient inclusion in Community decisions, and criticized the lack of action taken by the Community in the social field. Chief demands of the non-communist unions at the time were a reform of the EC so as to change the ESF into a powerful tool for the establishment of a comprehensive common social policy, including a far-reaching employment policy; and to democratize European institutions through empowerment and readjustment of the EESC, and of the EP. They also demanded the establishment of EC-level collective bargaining, with the aim of reaching European collective conventions. Rather than a precise programme for how to achieve a more 'social' Europe, the trade unions counted primarily on institutional reform. In their view, a more 'democratic' functioning of the EC—in the sense of greater representation of organized interests within the

⁸⁷ Gobin, 'Consultation et concertation sociales à l'échelle de la Communauté économique européenne', 374.

⁸⁸ The Council was divided on the claims of the trade unions. Throughout the year 1967, the Luxembourg and Italian ministers of social affairs tended to support the unions' demands, while the French and Belgian ministers were very reluctant to involve unions at EC level beyond already existing structures such as the EESC, and preferred to keep consultation at a national level. Gobin, 'Consultation et concertation sociales à l'échelle de la Communauté économique européenne', 370.

EC's institutions—would give unions more influence on European policy making and would in turn open the way to implementing policies that would favour the workers. The unions hoped that the Commission would support them in this regard.

At the same time, and partly due to these pressures, the attitude of the Commission's DGV, in charge of social affairs, also showed some signs of opening. In a report drafted in view of the merger of the executives of the ECSC, the EEC, and Euratom in December 1967, Levi Sandri called for more 'positive' action in the social field—reconciling the economic and social tasks of the EC as envisioned in the treaties. The document, entitled 'Report on the Social Policy of the Community', pointed out, albeit cautiously, the vast number of social areas in which the EC could still take effective action.⁸⁹ From the late 1960s, the Commission started to ask more consistently for firm action to be taken by the EC in the social field.

Some pressure also started to come from socialists within the EP, who demanded the end of the EC's inaction in the social field. The EP had little say on the matter at the time, especially since meetings of ministers for social affairs were at a standstill at the Council. It was seldom consulted on social matters, except on points of detail. One of the few tools at the disposal of the European deputies then was to put oral or written questions to the Commission or the Council to draw their attention to identified problems, or to criticize their behaviour in a given field. Towards the end of the 1960s, MEPs asked several questions that sought to denounce the Council's attitude regarding social affairs. The previously mentioned Vredeling, who was an MEP from 1958 to 1973 and a member of the parliamentary Committee for Social Affairs, was particularly fond of this technique and adopted a very cutting tone in his questions—the 'Vredeling questions', as they came to be called among EC institutions' staff, earning him a certain fame.⁹⁰

Hence, on 22 March 1968, prompted by Vredeling, the Social Affairs Committee of the EP put an oral question to the Council, demanding justification for its recent decision to restrict the Commission's autonomy in its contact with the 'social partners'. For the committee, that decision was in contradiction with 'the spirit and the letter of the European Treaties and the need, recognized by all, for a dynamic and progressive Community social policy'.⁹¹ The oral question also asked the Council to put article 122 of the EEC treaty into effect, which would

⁸⁹ Antonio Varsori, 'The Emergence of a Social Europe', in *The European Commission, 1958–72: History and Memories*, ed. Michel Dumoulin (Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications of the European Communities, 2007), 434–5.

⁹⁰ HAEU, INT691, 'Entretien avec Jean DEGIMBE' par Pierre Tilly, Woluwe-Saint-Lambert, 13 July 2010.

⁹¹ Historical Archives of the European Parliament (HAEP), PE0-AP-QP/QO-O-0002/680010FR, Parlement européen, 'Question orale n°2/68 avec débat de la Commission des affaires sociales et de la santé publique au Conseil des CE', 22 March 1968 (author's translation).

enable the EP to ask the Commission to draft reports on specific social problems. A few days later, in a written question to the Council, Vredeling expressed his impatience with the Council's failure to meet and act in the field of social affairs, and asked 'How does the Council think it can prevent the most socially disadvantaged sections of the population of the Member States and their social and political representatives from condemning its attitude?'⁹² In September, Vredeling again denounced the fact that the Council was taking no concrete steps towards the adoption of the definitive version of the ESF (which was to be revised after the end of the transition period), and insisted that the EP should be consulted on this matter.⁹³

Following these different impulses, the governments of the member states started to take some timid steps to give a more 'social' or 'human' face to the EC. First, on 29 February 1968, the Council adopted a resolution asking the Commission to encourage further cooperation between the member states in the social field. The initiative came from the West German government, which back then was led by a coalition including the SPD. In November 1967, the German Representation to the Communities had put forward a proposal for a Council resolution calling on the Commission to study and present a report on the links between social policy and the other EC policies. The aim was to encourage coordination of the measures taken by the various member states in the field of social policy. The Commission—in particular, Levi Sandri—supported the proposal and launched a series of studies. Started under the direction of the Commissioner for Social Affairs, Levi Sandri, and taken up after July 1970 by his successor, the Belgian Christian Democrat Albert Coppé (1970–3), these studies assessed the social aspects of each existing EC policy—agricultural, transport, regional, industrial, energy policy, medium-term economic policy, etc.⁹⁴

The Commission's reports examined in detail what had been implemented and what remained to be done to comply with the social provisions of the treaties—migrant workers' rights, health and security at work, vocational training, the harmonization of working time, and so on. They also considered some employment and social problems that had arisen in relation to the implementation of the Common Market, which had led to restructuring in several economic sectors. The Commission pointed out that the social dimension of the treaties had been too systematically neglected and subordinated to the economic one. It advocated

⁹² HAEP, PE0-AP-QP/QE-E-0017/680010FR, Parlement européen, 'Question écrite n°17/68 de M. Vredeling au Conseil des CE; 26 March 1968 (author's translation).

⁹³ HAEP, PE0-AP-QP/QE-E-0181/680010FR, Parlement européen, 'Question écrite n°181/68 de M. Vredeling au Conseil des CE; 9 September 1968.

⁹⁴ The Commission submitted two reports to the Council (on which the EP was consulted): HAEU, BAC-094/1985_0413, 'Rapport intérimaire de la Commission des Communautés européennes au Conseil sur les corrélations entre la politique sociale et les autres politiques de la Communauté (SEC (68) 1932 final)', 12 July 1968; HAEU, CM2/1970-1163, 'Deuxième rapport de la Commission des Communautés européennes au Conseil (SEC (70) 510 final)', 17 March 1970.

increased efforts to catch up with the implementation of social measures in order to 'reconcile' the EC's broad social and economic goals. In Coppé's words, it was high time to reconsider the EC's overemphasis on economic goals:

If we have indeed experienced an average economic growth of 4.3% over the last decade, one is entitled to wonder whether the price of this success is not too high and whether it would not be more reasonable to be satisfied with a gross national product growth of 3.3%, but which would not be at the expense of safety, hygiene and health at work.⁹⁵

The institutional debate about the 'correlations' between social policy and other EC policies, which lasted over two years, contributed to the initiation of a broader reflection on the development of a more coherent, fully fledged and ambitious 'European social policy'. The EP broadly supported the Commission's reports.⁹⁶ During the plenary debates, all political parties embraced the plea for increased social action in all sectors of EC policy. But a handful of left-wing Non-Attached MEPs—such as the Italian deputy Lucio Mario Luzzato, member of the Italian Socialist Party of Proletarian Unity (PSIUP)—harshly criticized the insufficiency of the sectoral approach adopted by the Commission and voted against the chamber's resolution. He advocated instead the definition *in primis* of common social goals that should then guide all dimensions of EC policy making.⁹⁷

This criticism was in fact shared by the Left more broadly. The rapporteur of the chamber's Committee on Social Affairs on the issue, Walter Behrendt (SPD), called in his report for a surpassing of the fragmented approach and the adoption of a comprehensive approach to social policy: 'it is especially important to ensure an internal cohesion between economic policy and social policy.'⁹⁸ As expressed in the name of the Socialist Group by Luxembourgish MEP Astrid Lulling, then a member of the LSAP, it was necessary to sharpen 'an overall vision of social policy

⁹⁵ Coppé's intervention in HAEP, PE0-AP-DE/1970-DE19701006-029900FR, Parlement européen, 'Séance du 6 octobre 1970' (author's translation).

⁹⁶ HAEP, PE0-AP-RP/ASOC.1967-A0-0058/690001FR, 'Résolution sur le rapport intérimaire de la Commission des CE au Conseil sur les corrélations entre la politique sociale et les autres politiques de la Communauté', 28 July 1969; HAEP, PE0-AP-RP/ASOC.1967-A0-0077/700001FR, 'Résolution sur le deuxième rapport de la Commission des CE au Conseil concernant les corrélations entre la politique sociale et les autres politiques de la Communauté', 26 October 1970.

⁹⁷ Luzzato's intervention in HAEP, PE0-AP-DE/1970-DE19701006-029900, Parlement européen, 'Séance du 6 octobre 1970'.

⁹⁸ HAEP, PE0 AP RP/ASOC.1967-A0-0058/690010, 'Rapport complémentaire sur le rapport intérimaire de la Commission des Communautés européennes au Conseil sur les corrélations entre la politique sociale et les autres politiques de la Communauté', 17 June 1969, rapporteur Behrendt. Also HAEP, PE0-AP-RP/ASOC.1967-A0-0077/700010, 'Rapport sur le deuxième rapport de la Commission des Communautés européennes au Conseil sur les corrélations entre la politique sociale et les autres politiques de la Communauté', 1 September 1970, rapporteur Behrendt. Walter Behrendt was a member of the Bundestag (1957–76) where he was assistant chairman of the Labour Committee. He was an MEP between 1967 and 1977, serving as Vice-President (1969–71; 1973–7) and President (1971–3).

to determine coherent action in the various sectors of Community policy' and to have a clear concept of a dynamic social policy that is not just an annex to other policies.⁹⁹ Socialist MEPs demanded that the Commission draft a precise action programme on social policy, indicating the priorities as well as the ways and means to achieve concrete objectives.

Concomitantly, the revival of European integration by the governments of the 'Six' opened new space for discussion on the EC's 'social dimension'. De Gaulle's successor, Georges Pompidou, had quickly shown signs of a possible modification of the French position on European policy.¹⁰⁰ By spring 1969, both Pompidou and Brand were advocating the organization of a summit conference to discuss how to go beyond the degree of integration already achieved with the EC.¹⁰¹ On 1–2 December 1969, the heads of government of the EC met in The Hague, a symbolic place for European unity since the 1948 summit. Over the summer, the 'Six' had agreed on the famous triptych that would guide their efforts for a European revival: completion, deepening, and widening.¹⁰² In brief, completion involved concluding the unresolved argument over the financing of the CAP, providing the EC with its 'own resources' (budget), and implementing the pending clauses of the Treaty of Rome. Deepening included opening new areas of cooperation between the member states, mainly with the creation of an economic and monetary union (EMU) supposed to restore stability in western Europe and through political coordination in the field of foreign affairs. Widening referred to the long-deferred examination of the accession of potential new members to the EC: the UK, Ireland, Denmark, and in theory Norway.

The Hague Summit and the prospective revival of European integration was widely seen, by socialist parties and unions of the European Left essentially, as an opportunity to repair the EC's democratic and social deficit.¹⁰³ But since most EC

⁹⁹ Lulling's intervention in HAEP, PE0-AP-DE/1969-DE19690701-039900FR, Parlement européen, 'Séance du mardi 1^{er} juillet 1969—Corrélations entre la politique sociale et les autres politiques de la Communauté'. Astrid Lulling (born 1929) became a member of the House of Representatives in 1965 for the LSAP (which she left in 1971 following a party split, joining the Social Democratic Party). In 1965, she was one of the first two women MEPS (out of 142 deputies) and served in 1965–74 and 1989–2014. During the 1960s and 1970s, she was particularly active in promoting the implementation of equal treatment between men and women, and policies supporting women employment.

¹⁰⁰ On Pompidou's European policy, see Eric Bussière and Emilie Willaert, eds., *Un projet pour l'Europe: Georges Pompidou et la construction européenne* (Brussels: Peter Lang, 2010); Marie-Pierre Rey, 'Georges Pompidou et l'Europe', *Vingtième Siècle: Revue d'histoire*, no. 43 (1994): 124–6.

¹⁰¹ See Andreas Wilkens, 'Dans la logique de l'histoire', in *Willy Brandt et l'unité de l'Europe: De l'objectif de la paix aux solidarités nécessaires*, ed. Andreas Wilkens (Brussels: PIE Lang, 2011).

¹⁰² On the three dimensions of the European relance and their aftermath, see Jan van der Harst, ed., *Beyond the Customs Union: The European Community's Quest for Deepening, Widening and Completion, 1969–1975* (Brussels: Bruylant, 2007).

¹⁰³ For an in-depth analysis of the Hague Summit and its implications for the social dimension of the EC, see Maria Eleonora Guasconi, *L'Europa tra continuità e cambiamento: Il vertice dell'Aja del 1969 e il rilancio della costruzione europea* (Florence: Polistampa, 2004); Maria Eleonora Guasconi, 'Paving the Way for a European Social Dialogue', *Journal of European Integration History* 9, no. 1 (2003): 87–110.

governments were led by conservative parties, and in the absence of party coordination and of a clear common European programme, social democrats could only have limited influence on the Hague negotiations. On 28 November 1969, a few days before the summit, a declaration of the Liaison Bureau of the Socialist Parties of the European Community called for new political impetus and for a democratization of the EC—granting budgetary and legislative powers to the EP, instating direct elections, enhancing the Commission's executive powers, applying the majority vote in the Council—in order to reinforce the 'people's' influence on the decisions of the EC. It insisted on the need to open enlargement negotiations, adopt new procedures for closer coordination of foreign and security policy, and strengthen economic and monetary solidarity. It made no mention of social policy but called broadly for 'budgetary solidarity' at EC level.¹⁰⁴

The EP, following its Committee for Social Affairs, also insisted that European revival should come along with a greater attention to social questions. Therefore, for instance, a few weeks before the heads of state and government were to meet, on 3 November 1969, European deputies discussed what they regarded as the fundamental problems the EC had to face, and took a position in favour of the inclusion of social issues amongst the points listed on the summit's agenda. The EP adopted a resolution advocating 'the promotion of a common social policy and in particular the reform of the European Social Fund, which must become a true Community instrument for a policy of full employment and improving living conditions in the Community'.¹⁰⁵ In October 1969, in view of the summit, European trade unions of the ECFTU also released a memorandum calling for more representation at EC level and criticizing the lack of action on social and employment policy. In particular, the memorandum criticized the inefficiency of the ESF and the malfunctioning of its intervention. Soon after, the ECFTU and the EO-WCL adopted a common declaration addressed to the participants of the Hague Summit, asking for a political revival of Europe with a concrete programme including enlargement, reform of the ESF, enhanced powers for the EP, and closer association of social partners with EC decision making.¹⁰⁶ How effective these kinds of declarations were in actually influencing decisions is, of course, unclear.

It is often alleged that the Hague Summit was the first occasion on which the new social-democrat West German Chancellor laid the basis for the creation of a

¹⁰⁴ HAEU, GSPE-6, 'Déclaration du Bureau de liaison des partis socialistes de la Communauté européenne sur la conférence des chefs d'Etat ou de gouvernement qui se tiendra les 1^{er} et 2 décembre 1969 à La Haye', 28 November 1969 (also published in *Courrier socialiste européen*, no. 5, 1969).

¹⁰⁵ The 3 November 1969 resolution can be found in HAEU, PE0-AP-RP/ASOC.1967-A0-0170/690010 'Résolution sur l'avis de la Commission des Communautés européennes au Conseil sur la réforme du Fonds social européen', 9 December 1969 (author's translation).

¹⁰⁶ Maria Elena Guasconi, 'The Origins of the European Social Policy', in *Inside the European Community: Actors and Policies in the European Integration 1957–1972*, ed. Antonio Varsori (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2006), 302; Gobin, 'Consultation et concertation sociales à l'échelle de la Communauté économique européenne', 378–82.

European social policy.¹⁰⁷ This should be nuanced, however. Brandt's address outlined an ambitious programme to revive 'Europe' focused primarily on enlargement, political cooperation regarding foreign affairs, and the creation of an EMU flanked by a common European Reserve Fund expressing European 'solidarity' and involving the 'social partners', as well as completion of the CAP.¹⁰⁸ It made no mention of European social policy or 'social Europe', which evidently were not priorities for the EC's main social-democratic government at the time; nor for the other governments, except for the Italian government, which demanded a reform of the ESF.¹⁰⁹ As Andreas Wilkens pointed out, the Hague Summit was a moment of subtle negotiation between France's ambitions (mainly the completion of the CAP), and the demands of Germany and its partners (enlargement of the Community, EMU, political cooperation, etc.)—other issues were intentionally put aside. At the time, for the German government European social policy and regional policy remained long-term objectives that would be tackled once the revival of European integration was secured.¹¹⁰ As a matter of fact, the final resolution adopted at the Hague Summit only devoted one sentence to social policy: 'The heads of State and Government recognize the opportunity of a reform of the Social Fund, within the framework of a close coordination of social policy.'¹¹¹

Despite the meagre social commitment by the heads of state in The Hague, the outcome of the summit was generally presented as a milestone for European unity. For some, it raised hopes for the future development of a common social policy, the aim of which would not be limited to ensuring the principle of free competition and labour market efficiency, as had widely been the case until that point. In their debates in the following days, MEPs involved in the Committee for Social Affairs repeatedly pointed out that the new opening of the heads of state towards social policy at The Hague was an opportunity that needed to be seized to push for achievements in the social field. Lulling, who was a keen advocate of a more solid European social policy, put it in these terms:

Puisse le léger souffle européen que nous avons senti destandinndre de la réunion au sommet de La Haye porter rapidement le Conseil de ministres sur la voie des réalisations tant attendues par nous dans le domaine social. Puisque nos chefs de

¹⁰⁷ For instance, Sylvain Schirmann, 'Willy Brandt et les débuts de l'Europe sociale, 1969–1974', in *Willy Brandt et l'unité de l'Europe: De l'objectif de la paix aux solidarités nécessaires*, ed. Andreas Wilkens (Brussels: Peter Lang, 2011), 311–23, here p. 312; Bino Olivi, *L'Europe difficile: Histoire politique de la construction européenne*, 156 (Paris: Éditions Gallimard, 2007), 104–5.

¹⁰⁸ Brandt's speech is published in the appendix of Wilkens, *Willy Brandt et l'unité de l'Europe*.

¹⁰⁹ Guasconi, *L'Europa tra continuità e cambiamento*, 36, 69.

¹¹⁰ Andreas Wilkens, 'Dans la "logique de l'histoire": Willy Brandt et la césure européenne de 1969/1970', in *Willy Brandt et l'unité de l'Europe: De l'objectif de la paix aux solidarités nécessaires*, ed. Andreas Wilkens (Brussels: PIE Lang, 2011), 272 and 276.

¹¹¹ See the full-length version of the resolution, 'Communiqué final du Sommet de La Haye' (2 December 1969), at <http://www.cvce.eu/viewer/-/content/33078789-8030-49c8-b4e0-15d053834507/fr>.

gouvernement ont appelé de leurs vœux la réforme du Fonds social européen, que leurs ministres s'emploient à la mettre en œuvre au plus vite, réalisant ainsi un apport fondamental à notre Communauté pour sa stabilité et sa croissance et pour le bien-être de tous nos citoyens.¹¹²

A few days after the summit, during a debate in Strasbourg involving the EP, the Commission and the Council, the President of the SGEP, Francis Vals, expressed the group's relative satisfaction with the commitments taken by the member states in The Hague, especially regarding prospective enlargement, the completion and rationalization of the CAP, the creation of the EC's 'own resources', and the prospective creation of the EMU. He regretted, however, the member states' lack of commitment to reform and democratize the EC's institutions, and especially deplored the very mild declarations regarding the prospective direct elections of the EP. Regarding social policy, he explained, the SGEP welcomed the member states' commitment in favour of a reformed, more efficient ESF.¹¹³ Vredeling's assessment of the Hague Summit, in contrast, was much more critical. He charged that the resolution adopted by the heads of state 'offer[ed] no basis for a progress-oriented European policy'.¹¹⁴

However small the commitment taken at The Hague in the social field, the decisions taken by the member states of the EC in December 1969 did revive discussions on the 'social dimension' of European integration. First, it provided an impetus for the reform of the ESF which, as I will show in the next chapter, would also contribute to a greater awareness of the need for an 'overall', more ambitious, European social policy. More importantly, the summit marked a significant new political dynamic for European integration for the coming years. Indirectly, the triple objective fixed by the 'Six' during the summit—completion, widening, and deepening—would contribute to triggering more concern about the 'social dimension' of European integration.

Indeed, all three objectives were expected to have important social consequences for the EC. First, the completion of the common market (especially the suppression of non-tariff barriers) revived the question of social harmonization and migrant workers' rights. Second, accession of the candidate countries would bring new depressed areas and sectors within the EC, especially in the case of the highly industrialized UK, which was experiencing increasing industrial 'restructuring'. The prospective enlargement to include the UK, Ireland, Denmark, and at the time possibly Norway also raised the problem of how to harmonize an increasingly diverse number of social welfare systems. But it also meant opening

¹¹² Lulling's intervention in HAEP, PE0-AP-DE/1969-DE19691209-039900FR, Parlement européen, 'Séance du 9 décembre 1969'.

¹¹³ HAEU, GSPE-6, Francis Vals, 'Traduire La Haye dans les faits', in *Courrier socialiste européen*, no. 6 (1969).

¹¹⁴ HAEU, GSPE-051-FR-A (1970), Vredeling, 'Vers un parti progressiste européen', 101.

negotiations with countries that had, like Norway and Denmark, some of the most comprehensive welfare regimes and highest social standards in Europe. Furthermore, the decision to deepen the integration process through the progressive achievement of an EMU raised complex questions about the social consequences and orientations (and generally about the political economy) of such a union.

In the following years, the forces of the European Left would have to address their European shortcoming by organizing at European level and working on the definition of a fully fledged policy programme and strategy for the realization of a 'socialist' Europe.

3

A New Social Wind

The revival of European integration at the 1969 Hague Summit had been a response of European leaders to growing social and economic instability in the late 1960s. The summit had established a new agenda for European unification, especially with the decision to enlarge the EC to include the UK and other candidate countries, agreement over the financing of the CAP and over the EC's own resources, and the establishment of an economic and monetary union with the aim of achieving a complete unification of the European market.

Those perspectives both opened new opportunities and presented new challenges for the Left in addressing a European unification process that it had so far been largely unable to shape. Writing about plans for economic and monetary union in the Dutch labour journal *Socialisme en democratie* in 1970, Adriaan Oele, a member of the PvdA and of the EP, aptly summarized the challenges ahead:

This naturally brings us back to the social aspect of European politics in the 1970s. Once the need for closer cooperation between people is recognized as a prerequisite for the convergence of systems, the monetary union appears no more promising than the enhanced customs union of the 1960s. Something more can only be expected if economic and monetary union is successfully linked to the fulfilment of the justified aspirations of many Europeans for social advancement and greater equality. This is a crucial problem, but also a task for the socialist and progressive parties of Europe, which unfortunately are still so divided, and their efforts so widely dispersed.¹

For if the German social-democratic Chancellor had played a large part in making this revival of European integration possible, it was still unclear how the Left would manage to make 'Europe' more 'social' or 'democratic'. During the early 1970s, the way the 'social dimension' of European integration was imagined by European elites, especially left-wing party and union leaders, was to undergo a significant although gradual shift. The first works of the EC on social policy after The Hague showed a new consensus on the need to develop the social activity and image of the EC, but did not fundamentally challenge the liberal inspiration of European social policy or improve the association of labour organizations with

¹ Adriaan Oele, 'Kanttekeningen bij de plannen voor een economische monetaire unie', *Socialisme en democratie*, 8 (1970). September 1970 (author's translation).

European decisions. As western Europe experienced a turn to the left and enlargement to include new members would increase the influence of social democracy within the EC, however, a redefinition of the social goals of 'Europe' seemed increasingly possible. Brandt's government played a decisive role in opening this perspective in the run-up to the October 1972 Paris Summit, when it placed the realization of a 'social union' on the agenda of the EC—a 'social union' meant to place western Europe at the avant-garde of social progress in the world.

False New Start

Following the Hague Summit, against the backdrop of strong popular mobilization, the EC launched some initiatives to improve its 'social dimension'. The most notable efforts were the creation of the Standing Committee on Employment (SCE) and the reform of the ESF—which would both leave the European Left unsatisfied. So would the adoption of a plan for economic and monetary union.

With the prospective revival of European cooperation, the question of the association of 'social partners' with the EC's policy making was of the utmost importance for European trade unions and the Left in general. As explained in the previous chapters, the trade unions organized at EC level (especially the socialist-leaning ETUS/ECFTU, which was by far the largest organization) had been persistently insisting on being formally involved in the EC's decision-making process since its creation, with very little satisfaction.² In substance, they demanded the substitution of mere consultation of social partners (in the different bi- and tripartite consultative committees, such as the committee of the ESF and the committee on migrant workers, and in informal meetings) by real institutionalized and binding participation in decisions. In May 1968 the trade unions, together with UNICE, reiterated their call for the organization of a tripartite summit meeting on employment, including workers' and employers' representatives, the Commission, and the social affairs ministers, with a view to the creation of a permanent body. Despite French reluctance, in July 1968 the proposal was adopted unanimously at the Council; the first tripartite conference was held in April 1970.

The conference inaugurated a new form of European-level social dialogue 'at the top' and led to the creation of a tripartite SCE. In principle, the SCE was to meet twice a year; it was the first time in the history of the EC that trade unions, including communist trade unions, obtained the right to sit next to the labour ministers and the Commission in a permanent

² For a detailed overview of the ETUS/ECFTU's struggle to increase unions' participation in the EC's institutions from 1958 to 1969, see Corinne Gobin, 'Consultation et concertation sociales à l'échelle de la Communauté économique européenne: Étude des positions et stratégies de la Confédération européenne des syndicats (1958-1991)' (PhD thesis, Université libre de Bruxelles, 1996), 193-298.

body and to take part in decisions.³ However, due to an institutional conflict between the Commission and the Council over the control and supervision of the committee, the SCE was not granted more than a consultative role; its task remained rather vague and limited to ‘ensur[ing] on a permanent basis [...] dialogue, concertation and consultation [...] with a view to facilitating the coordination of Member States’ employment policies by harmonizing them with Community objectives.’⁴ This decision deeply disappointed the ECFTU, which had advocated the creation of an SCE that would coordinate the already existing tripartite committees (including the committee of the European Social Fund) and would have its own initiative, management powers, and a binding say in EC decisions. Furthermore, disputes on composition and representation jeopardized the functioning of the new body throughout the early 1970s. As a result, what could have been an important step towards increased involvement of social partners turned out to be a missed opportunity and led to further deterioration of the relations between the ‘social partners’ (especially the unions) and European institutions.

The same appraisal can be made of the concomitant works on the reform of the ESF—the only redistributive instrument set up by the Treaty of Rome in the social field which, with the new perspective of the creation of an economic and monetary union, achieved potential new importance. According to the treaty, the ESF’s task was to facilitate access to employment and to increase geographical and occupational mobility of labour within the EC. It could contribute to covering vocational training and relocation indemnities co-financed by the member states, as well as temporary aid granted to workers whose jobs were reduced or suspended following economic restructuring. In practice, the policies implemented in the years following its creation mainly focused on improving occupational mobility and retraining. Between its activation in 1960 and 1969, the ESF had spent the equivalent of \$80.26 million and helped almost 1 million workers in all six countries, especially in Italy, Germany, and France.⁵ In its initial form, the ESF was essentially a productivist instrument in a Maierian sense: it incited economic productivity by promoting the adaptability of the labour force, and facilitated technological and structural changes by softening their negative social consequences. In other words, it was a means of favouring economic competitiveness and optimizing the functioning of the Common Market.⁶

³ Out of 18 seats for trade unions, 9 were given to the ECFTU, EO-WLO 4, the CGT-CGIL permanent committee 2, CIC 1, CFTC 1, and DAG 1. See Maria Eleonora Guasconi, ‘The Origins of the European Social Policy: The Standing Committee on Employment and Trade Unions’, in *Inside the European Community: Actors and Policies in the European Integration 1957–1972*, ed. Antonio Varsori (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2006), 301–11; Daniel Paulus, *La Création du Comité permanent de l’emploi des Communautés européennes* (Brussels: Bruylant, 1972).

⁴ Council Decision 70/532, JO L273, 17 December 1970.

⁵ ‘Reforming the European Social Fund’, *Trade Union News*, European Communities press and information, 1/1969, 15–16.

⁶ Lorenzo Mechi, ‘Stabilisation sociale et efficacité économique: Les Origines “productivistes” du Fonds social européen’, in *The Road Europe Travelled Along: The Evolution of the EEC/EU Institutions and Policies*, ed. Daniela Preda and Daniele Pasquinucci (Brussels: Peter Lang, 2010), 353–65.

As initially set up, the ESF soon proved inadequate to fulfil its tasks and by the end of the 1960s reform became more pressing for several reasons. First, the ESF had initially been set for the transitional period of the Common Market due to end on 31 December 1969, after which it could be either terminated or corrected. The member states were then losing the advantage of the safeguard clauses provided for by article 226 of the Treaty of Rome, which enabled them, in case of serious difficulties, to rescue a given sector or region. Therefore, as they were losing this safeguard, member states might want to entrust the EC with greater competences in the field of social and employment policies. Second, it had become clear that its functioning was flawed by highly restrictive conditions of allowance, excessively complex and dissuading administrative requirements, discouraging reimbursement procedures, fragmented intervention, and so on.⁷ Finally, the budget of the ESF—which still depended directly on the contributions of member states—was very limited, especially if compared to the budgets of other EC funds such as the one regarding agriculture or to national retraining schemes.

The Commission and the EP had already called for a reform of the ESF several times, as had the trade unions and the employers (ECFTU and UNICE), which wanted the ESF to become the backbone of a fully fledged common employment policy that still had to be defined. During the decade of the ‘empty chair’ crisis, given the French government’s already mentioned decreased interest in the social aspects of the treaty by the late 1950s, a decision that would improve or extend this EC financial instrument was rather unlikely. This changed at the end of the 1960s; at the December 1969 Hague Summit the heads of state and government of the EC asked the Commission to make proposals for a reform of the ESF.

Beyond the technical and administrative aspects, the reform of the ESF raised questions regarding the definition and assertion of a social policy at the EC level, regarding financial solidarity between member states, but also regarding the EC’s institutional set-up and the involvement of social partners in its policy making. The Commission’s opinion, released in June 1969, aimed at reinforcing the ESF through more effective management, larger scope for intervention in terms of activities, sectors, and beneficiaries, and an increase in its resources—from approximately \$9 million a year to \$50 million immediately, and ultimately to \$250 million.⁸ The priority of the Commission was to rethink the rationale of the ESF’s function, which should no longer be limited to action a posteriori (‘repairing’) but should become an efficient tool that intervenes a priori (‘boosting’ or ‘preventing’) to facilitate structural economic change, the implementation of

⁷ Lorenzo Mechi, ‘Les États membres, les institutions et les débuts du Fonds social européen’, in *Inside the European Community: Actors and Policies in the European Integration 1957–1972*, ed. Antonio Varsori (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2006), 95–116; René Leboutte, *Histoire économique et sociale de la construction européenne* (Brussels: PIE Peter Lang, 2008), 653–64.

⁸ ‘Avis de la Commission au Conseil sur la réforme du Fonds social européen’, June 1969, in *Journal officiel des Communautés européennes (JOCE)*, no. C 131, 4–21.

the EC's common policies, and the functioning of the Common Market. The Commission wanted to open the ESF to new beneficiaries, such as independent workers and workers leaving the agricultural sector, as well as disadvantaged categories of workers such as women, young people, seniors, and the disabled. Furthermore, it recommended extending the range of interventions—for instance, by supporting measures favouring not only re-employment but also first professional insertion. On the institutional level, the Commission proposed that the ESF's revenue should be independent of the member governments and come from the EC's own resources, subject to control of the EP. In short, although it aimed to increase financial solidarity between member countries and inclusiveness, the broad rationale was still to increase the efficiency of the Common Market and optimize the organization of the labour market.

The reform adopted by the Council on 1 February 1971 and in its subsequent regulations (coming into force on 1 May 1972) clearly disappointed the trade unions and the left-wing members of the EP. First, trade unions had advocated an increased role for the committee of the ESF, with managing role and binding status as well as the right for 'social partners' to choose their own representatives. These demands, like the demand to place the committee of the ESF under the coordination of the new SCE, had been supported by the EP, where Lulling was very active as a rapporteur in promoting the reform of the ESF.⁹ They were eventually left out by the Council. Also, the reformed ESF allowed for only a moderate increase in the managing powers of the Commission, the Council keeping its grip on many aspects of the management of the ESF, such as which categories of workers, regions, and sectors should receive aids. Moreover, some ambitious proposals put forward by the trade unions, and which had been supported by the EP and the Commission, were also left out by the Council: in particular, the proposal to extend the ESF's intervention to maintaining workers' revenues during periods of unemployment.¹⁰ The EP, however, obtained the right to be consulted on the ESF's implementing regulations, on budget proposals, and on the annual reports that the Commission was charged to draft.¹¹

Essentially, the reform of the ESF helped improve its efficiency and scope for intervention. In subsequent years, the ESF's operation was effectively extended to

⁹ IISH, European Trade Union Confederation Archives (ETUCA)-513, 'Résolution sur le Fonds social européen', 11 February 1971. HAEP, PE0-AP-RP/ASOC.1967-A0-0170/690010FR, 'Rapport sur l'avis de la Commission des Communautés européennes au Conseil (doc. 91/69) sur la réforme du Fonds social européen', 4 December 1969, rapporteur Lulling; HAEP, PE0-AP-RP/ASOC.1967-A0-0043/700001FR, 'Résolution sur la réforme du FSE', 15 May 1970; HAEP, PE0-AP-RP/ASOC.1967-A0-0147/710001, 'Résolution sur les propositions de la Commission des CE au Conseil relatives à...', 9 June 1971 and 18 October 1971; HAEP, PE0-AP-DE/1969-DE19691209-039900.EP, 'Séance du mardi 9 décembre 1969—Réforme du Fonds social européen'.

¹⁰ HAEP, PE0-AP-DE/1971-DE19711018-019900FR, 'Séance du lundi 18 Octobre 1971'. Gobin, 'Consultation et concertation sociales à l'échelle de la Communauté économique européenne', 386.

¹¹ Article 6 of the European Council Regulation of 24 April 1972, in *Official Journal of the European Community*, 28 April 1972, 353–5.

new categories of workers according to the economic situation of the Common Market, such as workers leaving agriculture, workers in the textile and clothing sectors, disabled workers, and so on.¹² Applications for aid from the ESF grew, and its budget was augmented. At the end of the first year of activity of the renewed ESF, 150 million units of account had been granted, which surpassed the amount of aid granted during the previous ten years of activity of the old Fund.¹³ Overall, however, the reform did not improve in any significant way the association of trade unions and other ‘social partners’ with the EC’s policy making—to the contrary, it caused disillusion and further deterioration of relations between trade unions and European institutions. Nor did it entail a fundamental reorienting of the scope of ‘European social policy’: though the reform was conceived as a way to promote full and better employment, to enable a more even development throughout the EC, and to encourage social solidarity between the member states, the means designed to achieve these goals still disclosed a market-oriented vision of social policy that assumed that social progress would derive from economic development. The mainstay of ‘boosting instead of repairing’ reflected, above all, a strong emphasis on economic efficiency as the fundament of social progress.¹⁴

Finally, decisions regarding economic and monetary union occasioned a similar disappointment of the Left. According to the commitments made at The Hague, in March 1970 the Werner Committee, presided over by the Luxembourgish Christian-social (CSV) Prime Minister Pierre Werner, was set up to start working on a plan for the implementation of EMU in stages, over ten years.¹⁵ Initially, the trade unions (just like the socialist parties of EC countries) were enthusiastic about this new prospect, which they saw as an opportunity to move beyond the mere customs union to institutionalize a closer participation of ‘social partners’ in EC decisions, a democratization of its institutions, and a redefinition of its economic, monetary, and even fiscal orientation in accordance with the interests of European workers. Early in 1970, however, the ECFTU voiced criticisms about the absence of social measures and the lack of consideration for institutional democratization in the projects that were being drafted. On 13 May 1970, the ECFTU published a press release entitled ‘Economic and monetary union, YES, but with worker participation,’ which contested the absence of social measures in

¹² Leboutte, *Histoire économique et sociale de la construction européenne*, 653–8.

¹³ Mechi, ‘Les États membres, les institutions et les débuts du Fonds social européen’, 114–16.

¹⁴ See the different interventions in HAEP, PE0-AP-DE/1969-DE19691209-039900FR, ‘Séance du 9 décembre 1969—Réforme du Fonds social européen.’

¹⁵ The committee drew on previous work on the creation of EMU, particularly the Commission’s first and second ‘Plans Barre’, released in February 1969 and March 1970 respectively, under the supervision of the French liberal Vice-President of the Commission in charge of Economic and Financial Affairs, Raymond Barre. See Elena Danescu, ‘Le «Comité Werner»: Nouvelles archives’, *Histoire, économie & société*, 4 (February 2012): 29–38; Elena Danescu, *Pierre Werner and Europe* (Cham: Palgrave Macmillan, 2018).

the preparatory works.¹⁶ In this document, ECFTU insisted that EMU should go hand in hand with EC actions to support employment, better working conditions, and upward harmonization of social security; invoked the inclusion of redistributive and regulatory measures such as fiscal harmonization at EC level in order to generalize direct progressive taxation throughout the Community, and the creation of an EC regulation of capital markets combating fraud and fiscal evasion. It also advocated association of workers' representatives to the elaboration of EMU, making a series of demands including the creation of a tripartite committee with a binding status. Subsequently, it released other documents insisting that EMU should come with a deep democratization of EC institutions, including for instance direct elections and more powers to the EP and association of 'social partners' with the work of EC committees from which they had been excluded, such as the mid-term economic policy committee.¹⁷

The Werner Report, released in October 1970, included a section calling for a strengthening of 'consultation' of 'social partners' prior to the definition of common policies.¹⁸ Although it merely envisaged consultation and remained vague on how it should take place, the will to associate trade unions to EC economic and monetary policy making (instead of just social policy) was unprecedented. The Council decision, however, which adopted the Werner Plan on 9 February 1971, fell short of the unions' demands and only mentioned the consultation in the framework of the already existing EESC. The ECFTU thus decided to dedicate its yearly assembly entirely to the question of EMU in October 1971; most discussions centred on the democratization of European institutions and on the political economy of EMU. Released a month later, its 'ECFTU proposals for the resolution of the currency crisis' advocated measures to reinstate fixed exchange rates within the EC, a profound reform of the IMF, participation of trade unions in EC economic and monetary policy-making bodies (including with the creation of a new committee of central banks), and so on.¹⁹ Eventually, the first steps towards the creation of an EMU—which would quickly run into increasing difficulties due to rising instability in the international monetary system—highlighted the trade unions' incapacity to truly influence European decisions.²⁰

¹⁶ IISH, ETUCA-509, 'Union économique et monétaire, OUI, mais avec la participation des travailleurs', 13 May 1970.

¹⁷ See Gobin, 'Consultation et concertation sociales à l'échelle de la Communauté économique européenne', 409–17.

¹⁸ 'Rapport au Conseil et à la Commission concernant la réalisation par étapes de l'union économique et monétaire dans la Communauté' (rapport Werner), Luxembourg, 8 October 1970, supplément au *Bulletin des CE* 11 (1970), 12.

¹⁹ IISH, ETUCA-542, 'Propositions de la CESL pour la solution de la crise monétaire', 26 November 1971. Gobin, 'Consultation et concertation sociales à l'échelle de la Communauté économique européenne', 416–22.

²⁰ See, for instance, Emmanuel Murlon-Druol, *A Europe Made of Money: The Emergence of the European Monetary System* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2012), 22–4.

These disappointments would encourage the socialist trade unions to rethink their strategy towards European institutions and to invest further during the following years in reinforcing their own coherence and integration—with a view to increasing coordination between European trade unions beyond ideological, geographical, and sectoral divides, elaborating a more articulated common action programme, and, as we shall see in the following chapters, working towards the creation of a united and combative European trade union movement. These disappointments also underlined the already obvious incapacity of European socialist parties to influence significantly the reform of the ESF, the creation of EMU, or the question of trade unions' association with the decisions of the EC. Indeed, the relaunching of European integration after the Hague Summit caught European socialists unprepared and shed light on their abysmal lack of organization, common objectives, and capacity to influence the fate of the EC and turn it into a socialist project. However, at the time, a 'new social wind' was blowing in western Europe, which would also shake the EC.²¹

Europe Goes Left

By the beginning of the new decade, a cultural, intellectual, economic, and political turn to the Left seemed to mark the European continent, a shift encouraged by the era of European protests.²² The postwar golden age of social democracy reached its apex in 1969 when the German social democrats formed a coalition government with the liberals and for the first time won the Chancellorship of the FRG, ending a twenty-year rule of the Christian democrats. The new Chancellor, Brandt, and his Swedish peer, Olof Palme, were joined in the club of prestigious social-democratic leaders by the Austrian SPÖ Chancellor, Bruno Kreisky, in 1970; they would be followed by the Dutch PvdA Prime Minister, Joop den Uyl, in 1973 and the British Labour Prime Minister, Harold Wilson, in 1974. In Norway and Denmark, social democrats won landslide victories in 1971. In Belgium, Italy, and Ireland, the socialists took part in several coalition governments during those years.

These successes were not a given, as the youth protests and the new, radical social demands of a rising 'New Left' had challenged European social democrats at the end of the 1960s, thereby forcing them (and their communist rivals) to revise their ideological and strategic stances. In the early 1970s, as Di Donato pointed out, European social democrats convinced themselves that 'The demands

²¹ The expression was used by former Director-General for Social Affairs of the Commission, Jean Dégimbe, during an interview with the author in November 2015, in which he described the months surrounding the 1972 Paris Summit as a time when a 'new social wind' was blowing in the EC.

²² Giuliano Garavini, *After Empires: European Integration, Decolonization, and the Challenge from the Global South, 1957–1985* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), 109, 124–6.

of the social movements, appropriately reinterpreted, could accompany a phase of consolidation of social democracy on the European political scene.²³ A noteworthy affirmation of this new conviction was formulated by Kreisky in an interview for the Socialist International's journal shortly after coming to power, when he explained that social democracy was to enter its third historical phase: after helping European workers to acquire class consciousness, after constructing the welfare state, it was time to extend the welfare state and go beyond it, towards a 'democratization of all fields of social life'.²⁴

Therefore, the social democrats' answer to social mobilizations in the early 1970s started with an extension, and greater inclusiveness, of the welfare state. While the Swedish government continued to anchor the myth of the Scandinavian welfare state—increasing old-age pensions, extending unemployment benefits and invalidity pensions, raising housing allowances for families with children, strengthening health services, and extending maternity benefits with a parental allowance—the new German government increased social expenditure in housing, education, public transportation, and healthcare. The Austrian government implemented a reduction in working time, passed legislation providing equality for women, and launched a partial nationalization of the economy.²⁵

This trend was not limited to socialist-led governments. Demands for greater institutional and economic democratization, for a more even distribution of wealth, for greater individual and collective rights, and for more 'humane' working and living conditions permeated all European societies. In Italy, although the Christian democrats remained in power throughout the decade, the 1970s saw the creation of factory, neighbourhood and school councils, the approval of the 1970 Workers' Statute, pension reform, divorce and abortion laws, as well as important reforms of the health and education systems.²⁶ In France, Pompidou's new Gaullist Prime Minister Jean-Jacques Chaban-Delmas launched a 'new society' programme with the help of Jacques Delors, an economic expert and member of the Commissariat au Plan with a Christian trade union background, which still pointed to increasing growth and competitiveness of the French economy, passed a controversial repressive '*loi anticasseurs*', but showed some new concerns for social dialogue, vocational training, women's rights, a minimum wage increase, and education. In general, throughout the 1970s, a steady increase in state and

²³ Michele Di Donato, *I comunisti italiani e la sinistra europea: Il PCI e i rapporti con le social-democrazie (1964–1984)* (Rome: Carocci, 2015), 87 (author's translation).

²⁴ Di Donato, *I comunisti italiani e la sinistra europea*, 87; Sassoon, *One Hundred Years of Socialism*, 339; Garavini, *After Empires*, 126; see Bruno Kreisky, 'Social Democracy's Third Historical Phase', *Socialist International Information*, no. 5 (May 1970): 65–7.

²⁵ Garavini, *After Empires*, 124–5.

²⁶ For a useful summary of the Italian workers' struggle between 1968 and 1973 and its consequences for social rights, see Guido Crainz, *Il paese mancato: Dal miracolo economico agli anni ottanta* (Rome: Donzelli, 2003), 321–62; Lorenzo Alba, 'Il "punto di flesso": Lotte operaie e contrattazione dal 1968 al 1973' (Bachelor thesis, Università degli studi di Firenze, 2010).

welfare expenditure continued to take place in Western countries: the percentage of gross domestic product (GDP) allocated to public spending throughout the countries of the OECD rose from 31 to 40 per cent across the decade, passing 45 per cent in western Europe and reaching nearly 60 per cent in Holland and Sweden.²⁷

Concomitantly, by the end of the 1960s and in the early 1970s, important changes marked the evolution of economic thought in western Europe, the US, and beyond. The students, women's and workers' movements, the liberation movement of the Third World, and the neo-Marxist revival in intellectual spheres, 'had opened Europe's doors to a partial rethinking of economic science, and to reconsider the damage caused to the nations of the Third World, to the Earth, and to all mankind by Western models of development'.²⁸ Uruguayan journalist Edoardo Galeano's 1971 *Open Veins of Latin America*, French Marxist economist Pierre Jalée's 1965 *Le pillage du tiers monde*, Guyanese activist and economist Walter Rodney's 1973 *How Europe Underdeveloped Africa*, and the Franco-Greek economist Arghiri Emmanuel's 1965 *Unequal Exchange* all pointed to the fact that Western development had been anchored in economic imperialism, exploitation, slavery, extractivism, and pillage. The Rostowian paradigm—the theory centred on 'modernization' and 'stages of growth' that had dominated the West's approach to economic development since the late 1950s—was criticized in some of the most prestigious universities and international economic institutions. GDP as a measure of development was increasingly criticized: obsession with productivity and economic growth was found to be of no use to fight poverty, unemployment, or inequality; instead, programmes for social services, public spending on healthcare and education, and redistribution of wealth were needed. Moreover, industrialization, modernization, and the predatory logic of capitalism were increasingly criticized for their impact on the natural environment and the quality of human life. Intellectuals like the Austrian Ivan Illich and the German-born Ernst Friedrich Schumacher and his influential *Small is Beautiful: Economics as if People Mattered* criticized the excess of productivity, the overabundance of unnecessary goods, and the overconsumption of energy that degraded social relations, physical milieu, and quality of life. Other critics evidenced the increasingly unsustainable levels of pollution in the world's great urban centres and the need to make profound technological changes to restore sustainable equilibrium. After the environmental disaster caused by the shipwreck of the oil tanker *Torrey Caynon* off the English coast, public attention grew towards the environmental damage caused by the industrialized world.²⁹

²⁷ Garavini, *After Empires*, 123–5; Andrew Glyn, *Capitalism Unleashed: Finance Globalization and Welfare* (Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press, 2006), 17–18.

²⁸ Garavini, *After Empires*, 121. This and the following paragraphs draw on Garavini's pioneering work on European integration and the challenges from the 'Global South'.

²⁹ Garavini, *After Empires*, 115–21.

Although they were initially outsiders to the established intellectual and political orthodoxy, these voices were gaining reputation in public and academic debates, and increasingly influenced parts of the traditional Left. As Garavini put it, questions such as ‘How to obtain better working conditions for Western workers and simultaneously support a structural redistribution of resources toward developing countries?’ and ‘How to pay attention to the environment without halting the development of technological innovation where it was most needed?’ would provoke much concern—and often tensions—among social-democratic elites (but also among European trade unions and communists) during those years.³⁰ In 1969, the influential Dutch economist Jan Tinbergen—a convinced social democrat, European federalist, and ‘Thirdworldist’—was awarded the Nobel Prize for Economics. A few years earlier, he had advocated the substitution of gross national product (GNP) with ‘gross national happiness’ as a measure of progress. In other words, the ‘Old Left’ was incorporating these new concerns and demands emerging from the ‘New Left’ in order to reassert itself; and for European social democrats this effort seemed to bear fruit.

This new assertiveness marked the appearance of what Di Donato called an ‘ideological offensive’ of European social democracy that strove to become a ‘hegemonic force’ in European politics at the expense of Western conservatives and Eastern communists; an offensive embodied with particular strength by the three prominent ‘progressist’ social-democratic leaders—Brandt, Kreisky, and Palme—who met regularly during those years and were particularly active in promoting a ‘new global social-democratic vision’ on highly important themes such as *détente*, disarmament, peace, North–South relations, and aid to developing countries.³¹ This new world vision relied on the space opened by *détente* and by a relative autonomization of European social democracy vis-à-vis the US: in 1969, whereas the US debacle in Vietnam had contributed for years in tarnishing the image of the world’s leading economic and military power, Brandt’s *Ostpolitik* was reassessing western Europe’s role in the Cold War equilibrium, and Olof Palme allowed himself to be captured on television arm in arm with the Ambassador of North Vietnam, breaking the news and transgressing the usual pro-Atlantic stance of European social democrats. Besides, in those years rising tensions were affecting diplomatic relations between the US and western European countries, triggered in part by the US administration’s upset with the EC’s commercial policy and its stance over the creation of a Generalized System of Preferences in favour of the developing countries. US President Nixon’s decision to abandon the Bretton Woods monetary system in August 1971—one of the most meaningful

³⁰ Garavini, *After Empires*, 121.

³¹ Di Donato, *I comunisti italiani e la sinistra europea*, 85–94, here p. 88. On the positions of European social democrats regarding the question of North–South relations during those years, see Garavini, *After Empires*, 122–61.

economic decisions of the century—was taken without any consultation with the US's European allies and 'with the deliberate intent of making them pay for its consequences in full'.³²

Crucially, for European social democrats, this new ideological offensive relied strategically on Europe—social democracy could achieve its 'third historical phase' only in an integrated Europe.³³ A key actor in striving for more European integration was the SPD, then the most influential social-democratic party in the EC, and particularly its leader Willy Brandt. But for European integration to help the achievement of social democracy, it needed to be reformed and given a 'human face'. Although, as explained in Chapter 2, when they first came to power in 1969, and during the Hague Summit in December that year, their European policy priorities were centred on enlargement to new countries, East–West rapprochement, and the creation of EMU, after the Hague Summit, German social democrats gradually put forward a more 'social' project for the EC.

From 1970, Brandt started defining and promoting a new vision of European integration with a particular emphasis on its social dimension. At the SPD's May 1970 congress in Saarbrücken, for instance, he affirmed that economic progress encouraged by the EC could only be deemed valuable if geared towards achieving greater social progress for European citizens. He insisted on the need to create a common regional policy to correct regional inequalities, and supported the idea of greater inclusion of social partners at EC level—a prospect that would benefit from the upcoming accession of the Scandinavian countries and the UK, which were experts in institutionalized 'social dialogue'. In October 1970, in a speech to the annual assembly of the ECFTU, Brandt called for a more 'social' EC, with increased participation of trade unions, the definition of a new ESF and a common employment policy. In November of the same year, at the Bundestag, he explained his view that before the end of the decade the EC should become the promoter of a progressive social policy and of an efficient policy of vocational training.³⁴

Although these ideas were hardly revolutionary at the time (they were shared by most European political elites), Brandt's vision of the EC's social dimension went a step further. He invoked the need to surpass 'business Europe' (*Europa der Geschäfte*) and to create, before the end of the decade, 'the largest progressive social area in the world'. In fact, Brandt and other European socialists nurtured hopes of consolidating the EC as a model of progressive economic and social

³² Garavini, *After Empires*, 123, 130. See also Michele Di Donato, 'The Cold War and Socialist Identity: The Socialist International and the Italian "Communist Question" in the 1970s', *Contemporary European History* 24, no. 2 (May 2015): 193–211.

³³ Kreisky, 'Social Democracy's Third Historical Phase'.

³⁴ Sylvain Schirmann, 'Willy Brandt et les débuts de l'Europe sociale, 1969–1974', in *Willy Brandt et l'unité de l'Europe: De l'objectif de la paix aux solidarités nécessaires*, ed. Andreas Wilkens (Brussels: PIE Lang, 2011), 313–14.

organization for the rest of the world.³⁵ With the prospective enlargement, the EC was to become an economic giant—the largest trade bloc in the world, with 256 million people compared to 207 million in the US, and 245 million in the Soviet Union—and could potentially acquire a determining role in setting the global organization of trade, economic, monetary, social, and environmental rules. With this colossal change in mind, Brandt and the SPD considered that the EC could become a lever to extend its model of social democracy to western Europe more broadly, which it intended then to resonate with the rest of the world. Although it was still largely unclear how it would be achieved, this idea made its way to the European institutions, where German officials and MEPs repeated that the EC had to become the ‘most socially advanced area in the world’ if it were to ever play a leading and determining role on the international scene.³⁶ Brandt’s 1971 Nobel Peace Prize, by establishing the reputation and confidence of social democrats’ international outlook, only comforted this European and global ambition.

The German SPD-led government’s determination to promote a new model of European integration emphasizing social aspects was driven by several factors. It was perhaps motivated in part by Brandt’s personal European convictions, but mostly followed from the internal and external political context of the early 1970s. An important drive was the SPD’s will to follow its Bad Godesberg programme—committing to reform capitalism and a people’s party orientation—while not losing its working-class electorate. German social democrats’ penetration of the working-class population was markedly inferior to that of their Swedish or even British counterparts. The SPD’s coalition government with the liberal Free Democratic Party (FDP), its adoption of concepts such as the ‘meritocratic society’ (*Leistungsgesellschaft*) and market economy, and the success of its foreign policy earned the party a spectacular breakthrough among the salaried middle classes by 1969.³⁷ It also triggered criticisms from the SPD Left, from some sectors of the workers’ movement (such as the metal and chemical sectors), and from the students’ movement, forcing Brandt and the SPD to better define and reaffirm their idea of reform politics in favour of the lower working class. Therefore, in the early 1970s new emphasis was placed on implementing co-management (*Mitbestimmung*) and social dialogue, improving living conditions, and enhancing vocational training. Reinforcing its model of social democracy at EC level was seen by the SPD as an opportunity to regain the support and votes of organized labour. In September 1971 in a conference organized by the DGB on works councils in enterprises, for instance, Brandt gave assurances that the

³⁵ Wolfgang Kowalsky, *Europäische Sozialpolitik: Ausgangsbedingungen, Antriebskräfte und Entwicklungspotentiale*, Grundlagen für Europa, Bd. 4 (Opladen: Leske + Budrich, 1999), 387–8.

³⁶ For instance, in Behrendt’s intervention, HAEP, PE0-AP-DE/1970-DE19701006-029900EP, Parlement européen, ‘Séance du 6 octobre 1970’.

³⁷ Gerassimos Moschonas, *In the Name of Social Democracy: The Great Transformation, 1945 to the Present* (London: Verso, 2002), 152–5, eBooks version.

creation of the EMU would be conditioned on a consolidation of European democracy, meaning first and foremost participation of trade unions in EC policy making.³⁸

The German government's new design for European policy was also motivated by the wider international context of *détente* and the will to strengthen its *Ostpolitik*. In short, the establishment of social democracy in Europe was seen as a means of stabilizing and consolidating the Western bloc, therefore contributing to guaranteeing *détente* in Europe and in the world. In May 1970, in his speech at the SPD congress in Saarbrücken, Brandt explained that the achievement of *détente* required the creation of a 'fair social and economic order' in the West. To this end, he vowed to work in favour of an irreversibly integrated Europe, understood as a large 'social and democratic' area, thanks to the participation of trade unions in the definition and management of new social policy measures. The SPD was therefore starting to present its western European integration policy as indissociable from its *Ostpolitik*. Furthermore, other political parties—mainly the CDU—accused the government of neglecting European integration for its *Ostpolitik*. Therefore, as early as 17 June 1970, the SPD member, MEP, and at the time Vice-President of the EP, Walter Behrendt, presented the government's European policy to the Bundestag in strikingly federalist terms. In parallel with the creation of EMU, he insisted on the objective of implementing fiscal, transport, social, commercial, energy, and industrial policies. Behrendt affirmed that the definition of a European social policy was of the utmost importance for the federal government. He went on to call for an increase of the ESF's resources and scope, the development of a European company law, and a democratization of the European institutions—implementation of simple majority voting in the Council, increased budgetary and legislative powers for the EP (eventually including the right to elect Commissioners and Judges of the Court), and more responsibility for the Commission.³⁹

Gradually, Brandt and his close collaborators therefore defined a broadened vision of the social purpose of European unification, which went much beyond the narrow definition of European social policy that had prevailed so far. Beyond the claim for an increase in the ESF's scope and resources and improved industrial and economic democracy, a series of new aspects were progressively included in their vision of the realm of Europe's social policy, from urban planning, housing conditions, transport, and the living conditions of migrant workers, to environmental problems, public health, development of Third World countries, inter-generational dialogue, and 'conscious'—socially and environmentally

³⁸ Sylvain Schirmann, 'Willy Brandt et les débuts de l'Europe sociale, 1969–1974', 316–17.

³⁹ GSPE-51-FR-B, 'Document d'information: Controverse sur la politique du gouvernement allemand à l'égard de l'Est et sur sa politique européenne', 23 June 1970.

responsible and sustainable—growth.⁴⁰ In Brandt's view and in the view of his government, the EC needed henceforth to put all these questions on its agenda.

The social-democratic German government started by making proposals for the harmonization of national regimes of social security thanks to the creation of a 'European social budget'. The proposal was submitted to the Commission and Council in the spring of 1970, by the Labour and Social Affairs Minister, Walter Arendt, and inspired by the German social budget: a detailed monitoring of the social situation and evolution of social services in the country. At the EC level, this budget assessment should be established by the Commission in collaboration with national experts and would enable coordination between the economic policies of the EC and of its member states. This would allow for a better inclusion of social requirements when defining economic, financial, and monetary policies in view of the creation of EMU. To be clear, the proposal therefore pointed to the progressive adoption of common objectives and progressive harmonization of member states in the field of social security, not to the creation of a new EC budget for social provision.⁴¹ It was adopted by the Council in November 1970 and the Commission was instructed to collect the statistical data and draw up previsions and non-binding indications.

At the same time, the Commission, where Raymond Rifflet, a former activist of the PSB, of the General Labour Federation of Belgium (FGTB), and of the European Movement was now Director-General for Social Affairs (1970–3), set out to surpass the narrow and market-oriented rationale of European social policy.⁴² On 17 March 1971, as a result of the three-year investigation of the social aspects of common policies (detailed in Chapter 2), the Commission published a memorandum entitled 'Preliminary guidelines for a Community social policy programme', presented as a response to the commitments made by the heads of state at The Hague in December 1969 for the creation of EMU: 'Now that the Community has embarked resolutely on the road to economic and monetary union, social policy appears in a new light.' Indeed, the document went on, the previous vision which regarded social policy as an adjunct to spontaneous economic integration no longer fitted the bill:

The terms of the problem have been changed by the prospects opened up by the achievement of economic and monetary union. The economic and social aspects of the process of integration will, of necessity, become increasingly inseparable.

⁴⁰ Sylvain Schirmann, 'Willy Brandt et les débuts de l'Europe sociale, 1969–1974', 314.

⁴¹ HAEU, GSPE-51-FR-B, 'Document d'information: Walter Arendt, ministre fédéral du travail et des affaires sociales, prend une initiative européenne—La Création d'un budget social européen', 22 June 1970.

⁴² Bertrand Vayssièrre, 'Pour une politique sociale européenne: Les Espoirs et les déceptions de Raymond Rifflet à la direction générale des Affaires sociales (1970–5)', *European Review of History/Revue européenne d'histoire* 26, no. 2 (March 2019): 284–304.

The success of the whole process will be jeopardised if economic and monetary integration and social integration do not take place simultaneously.

Again, the achievement of economic and monetary union itself takes on its true dimension by the contribution which it can make to fulfilling the *major aims of society*, on which there is a wide measure of agreement in Member States: full and better employment, [...] greater social justice, [...] better quality of living.

Economic and monetary union, with all its consequences, must contribute effectively to improving living conditions and the general well-being if European integration is to obtain the wholehearted support of the population and particularly of the young people who expect the building of Europe to produce a new society to match their fondest aspirations. This will call for the establishment and strengthening of economic and social democracy, involving both the democratisation of economic and social structures and enhancement of the role and independent responsibilities of employers' and workers' organisations at Community level.⁴³

Rather than putting forward concrete proposals, the document presented a list of what the Commission identified as priority fields of intervention. The seven priorities set out by the Commission were: speedier achievement of the common labour market; absorption of under-employment and structural unemployment; improvement of safety and health conditions at work and in 'life'; equal treatment for women at work; integration of disabled persons into active life; the establishment of a 'social budget', as proposed by the German government; and strengthened cooperation with 'social partners.' Regarding the latter point, the Commission advocated promoting contractual relations between the 'social partners' at EC level, with the objective of adopting collective conventions. To achieve these objectives, the Commission recommended setting out an EC strategy relying partly, but not exclusively, on the newly created SCE and the reformed ESF.

The Commission's memorandum, however, received unenthusiastic reactions from the trade unions and from employers, although for different reasons. The unions considered it too generic to constitute the basis of a true European social policy, whereas the employers considered it too ambitious, rejecting, for instance, the idea of supranational collective conventions.⁴⁴ Moreover, social policy once again proved a matter of tension between the Council and Commission, on the

⁴³ Commission of the EC, 'Preliminary guidelines for a Community social policy programme', 17 March 1971. *Bulletin of the European Communities*, Supplement 2 (1971).

⁴⁴ A consultation meeting to discuss the document was organized by the Commission with the representatives of employers and trade unions on 15 and 16 July 1971. During the meeting, the ECFTU presented a 'counter-project' that included claims such as the introduction of the forty-hour working week and four weeks' holidays, and the adoption of strict rules against real estate speculation; it was received coldly by the employers. See Gobin, 'Consultation et concertation sociales à l'échelle de la Communauté économique européenne', 424.

issue of the repartition of competences. As a response to the proposal, the Council merely defined a work programme for the Commission that consisted of drafting studies in the fields of employment, free movement of workers, vocational training, social security, working conditions, salary and incomes, health and security at work, and harmonization of social statistics. In fact, the Council was sticking to a rigid interpretation of the Treaty of Rome, firmly retaining social policy competences at the national level. Notwithstanding this meagre result, the Commission's document testified to new concerns at the level of the European executive, such as the question of greater justice in the distribution of income and wealth; greater equality of opportunities; increased efforts to combat the harmful effects of productive activities on the environment; and greater satisfaction of collective needs, for example regarding education, public health, and housing.

This change of attitudes foreshadowed a more significant leftward shift within the Commission when Sicco Mansholt succeeded Franco Maria Malfatti as its new President in April 1972 and remained in office for little over seven months. Born into a socialist farmers' family in the northern Dutch province of Gröningen, Mansholt had worked as the manager of a tea-producing business in Java in the East Indies in the early 1930s, then returned to the Netherlands to start his own farm. He had joined the Resistance during the war, then served as Agriculture Minister in Dutch cabinets and became the first European Commissioner in charge of agriculture in 1958 (until 1972). Mansholt was an influent Dutch socialist, a salient figure of European social democracy, and had played an important role in setting up the CAP.⁴⁵ Between 1968 and 1973, at the end of his career, Mansholt turned increasingly towards far-left ideas, his tone became more radical, and he became used to quoting radical left-wing intellectuals like the famous German-American 'father of the New Left', Herbert Marcuse.

In 1971, Mansholt was deeply shaken by the highly explosive report *Limits to Growth*, ordered by the Club of Rome, which attracted global public attention for its alarming assessment of some of the consequences of growth, such as pollution, famine, and the unrestrained conduct of multinationals, and suggested that at the then current pace of growth, most world natural resources would run out within ten to thirty years.⁴⁶ After reading the report, Mansholt started fervently preaching what might today be called a planned 'degrowth' of the European economy; to tackle the new issues of population growth, food shortage, scarcity of energy and raw materials, the power of multinationals, environmental pollution, and

⁴⁵ In 1968 he had made controversial proposals for a reform of the CAP with the so-called 'Mansholt Plan', which aimed to modernize production methods and increase the size of farms by encouraging 5 million farmers to leave agriculture. This provoked a protest movement that culminated on the streets of Brussels on 23 March 1971 in a clash with the police, in which one of the demonstrating farmers was killed. For a complete biography, see Johan van Merriënboer, *Mansholt: A Biography* (Brussels: Peter Lang, 2011).

⁴⁶ van Merriënboer, *Mansholt*, 329; and Donella H. Meadows et al., *The Limits to Growth: A Report for the Club of Rome's Project on the Predicament of Mankind* (Washington, DC: Potomac Associates, 1972).

automation, he advocated a reversal of growth in rich countries—replacing GNP with ‘Gross National Utility’ as the parameter for development—together with a substitution of the consumer society with a new society based on clean production, a redistribution of resources to the global South, and a better world division of labour.⁴⁷ In January 1972, he declared on a Dutch TV broadcast, ‘I am coming to the conclusion that a solution to the great problems of our times can no longer be reached within the capitalist system.’⁴⁸ To solve these great problems, he argued on several occasions, a ‘second Marx’ was needed, a ‘new’, ‘modern socialism’ that could no longer restrict itself to correcting capitalism; he advocated growing socialization and democratization.⁴⁹

Mansholt’s vision came hand in hand with a conviction that western Europe had to play a leading role in the definition of a new world order. This led him to advocate a strengthening of the EC’s competences—he even mentioned European-level ‘nationalizations’—and to reiterate his vows for the greater influence of socialists in European policies—‘practically null’ up to that point—through the creation of a supranational ‘European Congress’ of socialist parties.⁵⁰ On 9 February 1972, he shared his thoughts in a private letter addressed to President Malfatti, in which he called for radical reforms—with the adoption of a ‘Central European Plan’ aimed at reducing consumption and pollution even at the cost of swift adjustment in the Western way of life, and heavy investment in education and public services—and urged his colleagues to work out a new policy agenda for the EC. The letter was then disclosed publicly by the French PCF in an attempt to discredit the European elites’ ‘Malthusian’ conspiracy to ‘stop economic growth’ and ‘lower the quality of life’ of workers.⁵¹ It attracted much media and political attention across Europe, and Mansholt became earned significant popularity among the radical young, especially but not only in the Netherlands.⁵² He engaged in public debates with important figures of the intellectual Left such as Marcuse himself.

His positions were also intensively discussed—and met with more or less enthusiasm—in transnational socialist and federalist networks. The European

⁴⁷ Johan Van Marriënboer, ‘Sicco Mansholt and “Limits to Growth”’, in *Europe in a Globalising World: Global Challenges and European Responses in the ‘Long’ 1970s*, ed. Claudia Hiepel (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2014), 319–42. See also Mansholt’s autobiography: Sicco Mansholt and Janine Delaunay, *La Crise* (Paris: Stock, 1974).

⁴⁸ HAEU, GSPE-053, ‘Les Socialistes en Europe doivent gagner en influence’ (déclaration de Sicco Mansholt), *Het Parool*, 3 January 1972.

⁴⁹ Sicco Mansholt, ‘Modern socialisme’, *Socialisme & democratie*, no. 28 (1971): 523–39.

⁵⁰ HAEU, GSPE-053, ‘Les Socialistes en Europe doivent gagner en influence’.

⁵¹ See Laurence Reboul, Albert Te Pass, and J. C. Thill, *La Lettre Mansholt: Réactions et commentaires* (Paris: J. J. Pauvert, 1972).

⁵² According to Merriënboer, Mansholt’s personal archives are filled with fan letters. When he was invited to debate ‘Ecology and revolution’ in Paris with Herbert Marcuse and several French intellectuals on 13 June 1972, 1,200 people showed up, and another 2,000 could not get in. Johan van Marriënboer, ‘Sicco Mansholt and “Limits to Growth”’, 334.

Movement in Norway printed 1,500,000 copies of his letter for distribution.⁵³ Among the socialist parties of the EC, which organized several meetings to discuss Mansholt's letter, it gave rise to fundamental discussions about the viability of the capitalist system and of the private property of the means of production, wealth inequalities in Europe and in the world, and the need to adopt a 'socialist action programme' to face the new global challenges. The participants of these meetings showed almost euphoric enthusiasm for Mansholt's new ideas and the historical perspectives that were opening for social democracy. Wrapping up an exchange of views in May 1972 between Mansholt, the Bureau of the Socialist Parties of the European Community, and the SGEP, for instance, the President of the SGEP, Francis Vals, exclaimed: 'Socialists can play in this respect the historical role of our generation.'⁵⁴ In the Socialist International, however, Mansholt's ideas, especially the de-growth concept, received mixed reactions.⁵⁵

In the European Commission, Mansholt's letter met with disapproving or even teasing reactions. The Vice-President of the Commission, in charge of economic and financial affairs, the French liberal Raymond Barre, expressed firm criticism; the principle of economic growth was not negotiable.⁵⁶ Altiero Spinelli, the Italian Commissioner for Industry and well-known European federalist, mocked him by asking if he was becoming 'a hippy'. Although he did not share the 'zero growth' theories of his colleague, Spinelli was nonetheless engaged, at the same time, in formulating the (still non-existent) industrial objectives of the enlarged EC in the light of the new social needs. In April 1972, under his lead, the Commission organized in Venice a conference on 'Industry and Society in the Community' with around 350 participants (employers, trade unions, European institutions, and governments) meant to explore the 'qualitative ends' of industrial development. Spinelli's welcome address insisted that 'our Community can only be based on the hypothesis of a growing, developing society' but that, under the current circumstances, a common industrial policy needed to take shape, as a means not of raising productivity but of increasing social progress. This would mean

⁵³ HAEU, GSPE-054-FR, 'Réunion exceptionnelle du groupe socialiste et du Bureau des partis socialistes de la Communauté européenne: Exposé de Sicco Mansholt', Brussels, 29 May 1972.

⁵⁴ HAEU, GSPE-053, 'Projet de procès-verbal, réunion exceptionnelle du groupe socialiste et du bureau des partis socialistes de la Communauté européenne', Brussels, 29 May 1972—'Échange de vues avec Sicco Mansholt, Président de la Commission de Communautés européennes, sur les observations qu'il a présentées en vue de définir une politique économique nouvelle (lettre du 9 février 1972 de Mansholt à Malfatti)'

⁵⁵ IISH, Archives of the Socialist International (SI)-263, 'Report of the 12th Congress of the Socialist International held in Vienna 26–29 June 1972' (proceedings; section on 'Socialist policy for Europe'). During the Congress, Ivar Norgaard, the Danish Minister for Foreign Trade and EEC Affairs, declared that 'zero growth' was unrealistic and undesirable, while Joan Lester, member of the National Executive Committee of the British Labour Party, expressed strong scepticism towards Mansholt's ideas.

⁵⁶ AHEU, GSPE-054-FR, pp. 97–105: 'La Croissance économique et les mutations de la société: Réflexions de M. Raymond Barre (vice-président) sur le lettre de M. Mansholt au président de la Commission', 22 June 1972.

granting priority to environmental protection, 'quality of life', shopfloor democracy, a more even geographical wealth distribution, and a new just policy towards the developing world. For this new industrial policy to take shape, he suggested that a regional fund be created, the investment bank and the social fund strengthened, more powers be given to the EC, and direct elections be organized for the EP.⁵⁷ Although questioning capitalism was going a bit too far for European bureaucrats and for many on the European Left, a broad consensus had emerged among political and social forces on the idea that economic integration needed to be balanced with more social measures and geared more coherently towards the achievement of social goals in order to gain the assent of European 'peoples' and 'workers', and to preserve social peace and stability in western Europe.

Enlargement and 'Socialist Europe'

Brandt and Mansholt were not the only European socialists who envisaged a new role for the EC in defining a new international and continental social, economic, and political order. Prospective developments of the EC in the early 1970s encouraged all European socialists to think afresh about their commitment to European integration. The reopening of negotiations with the UK, Denmark, Ireland, and Norway in June 1970 and the signature of the accession treaty in January 1972 with these countries—Norway would only withdraw later following a referendum on accession—raised hopes for the socialist parties of the 'Six', who saw an opportunity to finally increase the weight of socialist parties in the integration process and to shift European policies in a direction that would be more in line with their objectives.⁵⁸ Indeed, except for Ireland, the candidate countries counted among some of the main strongholds of European social democracy: the Norwegian Labour Party had dominated Parliament since the war, ruled uninterruptedly from 1945 to 1965, and retook power in 1971; in Denmark the social democrats had been in power almost uninterruptedly since the war; in the UK Wilson's Labour Party returned to opposition in 1970 but the party and the British TUC were among the largest social-democratic forces in western Europe. Besides, the UK and the Scandinavian countries were historical pioneers of the western European welfare states. The prospect of these four new countries joining the EC opened the way for a rebalancing of political forces within the EP, the Council and the Commission. For this reason, socialist parties in the old member countries were greatly in favour of enlargement.

⁵⁷ Archives of European Integration (AEI), 'Conference Industry and Society in the Community: Introductory Speech by Mr A. Spinelli', 20 April 1972, available at <http://aei.pitt.edu/12963/1/12963.pdf>.

⁵⁸ Norway's government signed the treaty of accession to the EC on 22 January, then withdrew its application following a referendum on 24 and 25 September 1972, where nearly 54 per cent of voters rejected accession. The official date of entry of the three new member states was set for 1 January 1973.

However, the Left in the candidate countries had diverging and often hostile positions regarding the EC, especially in the case of UK and Ireland. In the UK, the Labour Party was deeply divided between a 'pro-European' revisionist Right and an 'anti-European' Left. Although party leaders like Harold Wilson had become increasingly convinced that the Common Market was compatible with their domestic ambitions during the mid-1960s, and the Labour government had (unsuccessfully) applied for accession to the EC in 1967, Labour voted to campaign against the terms of accession that were eventually negotiated by Edward Heath's Conservative government (1970–4).⁵⁹ In the vote in October 1971, although 69 Labour MPs, led by the pro-European revisionist Roy Jenkins, voted for membership, 'flouting the demands of the Labour leadership who imposed a three-line whip against membership', the majority voted no.⁶⁰ The TUC, a giant representing 10 million workers—as against the ECFTU's 11 million—adhered to the line adopted by Wilson's party after 1970. Both the TUC and the Labour Party pleaded for the setting of very precise conditions for accession that would counter the foreseen negative economic consequences of entering the EC. In particular, they feared that the UK's financial contribution to the EC would generate a budget deficit and would lead the government to apply deflationist and austerity policies, therefore threatening employment. Moreover, they were opposed to the CAP, which would represent an unbearable burden for a country that relied predominantly on agricultural imports from the Commonwealth. They were rather hostile to the idea of granting supranational competences to the EC, and opposed to the prospective EMU and to the EC's competition policy, which in their view posed problems for the states' sovereign capacity to intervene in the economy and society. Besides, for Labour, by undermining the UK's trade relations with Commonwealth countries, joining the EC would also pose a problem for development in Third World countries.⁶¹ In Ireland, the Labour Party also campaigned against accession to the EC because it considered it too risky for an 'underdeveloped' country like Ireland to join a common market with much more advanced capitalist countries in the absence of economic planning and regional policy.

Even in applying countries where the social democrats decided to embrace the EC—Norway and Denmark—the accession debates highlighted the opposition of segments of the Left, who feared that the model of free-trade capitalism championed by the Common Market would have negative economic consequences for some workers (like fishing communities in Norway), threaten their social model, and impose a straitjacket on national socio-economic policies. In Denmark,

⁵⁹ Erin Delaney, 'The Labour Party's Changing Relationship to Europe: The Expansion of European Social Policy', *Journal of European Integration History* 8 (January 2002): 121–38.

⁶⁰ Delaney, 'The Labour Party's Changing Relationship to Europe', 131–2.

⁶¹ See Harold Wilson's speech titled 'Labour and the Common Market' in IISH, SI-263, 'Report of the 12th Congress of the Socialist International held in Vienna 26–29 June 1972' (proceedings; section on 'Socialist policy for Europe').

Socialdemokratiet was only unenthusiastically supporting entry and the leftist Socialist People's Party, twelve dissident social democrats, as well as a handful of left radicals and greens voted against accession; the Danish Federation of Trade Unions' support came despite a strong internal split (after a 524 to 406 vote).⁶² In Norway, the Labour Party campaigned in favour of accession in view of the referendum, supported by a large majority of the Norwegian Confederation of Trade Unions, but a left-wing coalition of communists and left-wing socialists successfully campaigned for a 'no' vote.

In the views of the socialist parties of the old 'Six', these hostile positions obviously represented an obstacle to greater transnational cooperation and coordination, and to the achievement of a socialist Europe. In the early 1970s, the socialist parties and unions of the 'Six' tried to exert repeated pressure on their peers and to convince them to change their attitude towards the EC—for instance, by issuing statements that insisted on the importance of UK entry for the future of European socialism and the European trade union movement. On 9 July 1971 the ECFTU sent a message to the British TUC, (unsuccessfully) asking it to shift its position on the EC. On 16 July 1971 in London, on the eve of a special Labour Party conference discussing the UK's accession to the EC, Mansholt spoke in a personal capacity to the British labour movement:

I, together with Continental socialists of all tendencies, urge you to be realistic and have the courage to take part in this great supranational development for the benefit of your own people, for the benefit of the peoples of Europe. [...] The debate is not simply about British entry. It is about the future of Europe, it is about the future of socialism. The existing problems are not created by the Community. [...] The problems consist of the economies of scale, of the ever-growing interdependence of international capitalism, of the ever-increasing web of multinational companies, of the increasing impact of international decisions on the daily lives of all our citizens. [...] We socialists must be at the European vanguard to ensure the vital interest of all our people. We will make an historic error if we do not take the necessary steps to create a Community with an economic and political framework responsive to the needs of future generations.⁶³

The European question gave rise to tensions between socialists of the old EC countries and the 'Euroseptics' of candidate countries. During a conference of party leaders of the Socialist International in September 1971, tensions arose between the British and Irish leaders and some of the leaders of the socialist

⁶² Since the pro-EC vote was short of a required five-sixths majority, a referendum was organized with 63.3 per cent voting for entry. Donald Sassoon, *One Hundred Years of Socialism: The West European Left in the Twentieth Century* (London: I.B. Tauris, 1996), 337.

⁶³ 'Socialism and European Integration', *Trade Union News from the EC*, 6 (1971).

parties of EC countries, like the Dutch Joop den Uyl. Bredan Corish, leader of the Irish Labour Party, affirmed: 'We have no illusion that the EEC could be used for Socialist objectives.'⁶⁴

In fact, this problem contributed to pushing the socialist forces of the 'Six' to advancing the idea that the EC could become a key actor in promoting social change in Europe. On 28–30 June 1971 in Brussels, when the 8th Congress of the Socialist Parties of the European Community finally took place after five years of standstill, the participants adopted a resolution on the enlargement of the EC. The resolution expressed marked enthusiasm for the prospective enlargement to the UK and the other candidates, presented as a guarantee of a strengthening of the cause of democratic socialism in Europe:

The 8th Congress of Socialist Parties of the European Community [...] expresses its conviction that once the European Economic Community has been enlarged, the socialist parties in the current candidate countries will be able to work more effectively in cooperation with the other socialist parties in the Community: – to implement policies which will lead to a fairer distribution of income and wealth in the EEC; – to organize a system of democratic control of concentrations of economic power; – to help the various members better to cope with the difficulties posed by regional decline; – to ensure the continued expansion of trade between the developed countries; – to assist the developing countries in their economic development, by increasing their export opportunities in the Community and at the same time ensuring that the Community sets an example by granting a high volume of development aid; – to advance commercial, scientific and technical cooperation between Western and Eastern Europe, thereby promoting lasting détente.⁶⁵

Although the resolutions of the congress of the Socialist Parties of the European Community were not binding for its member parties and were only to a limited extent representative of their position, this congress did witness a markedly more affirmative stance from the Socialist Parties of the European Community regarding European policy, and the formulation of proposals meant to gear the EC's political economy to the interest of workers. Indeed, the general resolution adopted at the congress proclaimed the SPEC's deep conviction that only European unification could allow for the achievement of socialist objectives on the continent.

Therefore, aside from the institutional reforms advocated to democratize the EC (such as more power to the Commission and direct elections, budgetary and

⁶⁴ IISH, SI-346, 'Summary of interventions', SI Party Leaders' Conference in Salzburg, 3 September 1971.

⁶⁵ HAEU, GSPE-6, 'Résolutions: 8e Congrès des PSCE', 28–30 June 1971, Brussels. There were three resolutions: one on the enlargement of the EC; one on the reform of the Liaison Bureau of the Socialist Parties of the European Community (which instructed the Dutch socialist Alfred Mozer to draft proposals); and one general resolution.

legislative powers for the EP), the resolution supported a reassessment of the social goals of the EC and of the future EMU through a set of policy proposals. Regarding social policy, these included more equal opportunities thanks to education and vocational training, improvement and harmonization of living and working conditions, of salaries, income and social security, democratization of social life at different levels, including within undertakings, more justice in the distribution of income and wealth, harmonization of legal dispositions regarding marriage, family, and divorce, in order to secure women equal rights to men in the family and in society, and total free movement of people thanks to harmonization of legislation regarding nationality and the political rights of EC migrants. Regarding EMU, its tasks should be to guarantee economic stability and growth; to enable an efficient control of economic power in the EC through an active competition policy, control of mergers and monopolies, and the adoption of common policies to control multinationals; to ensure an industrial and development policy targeting valorization of least favoured regions; to ensure democratization of 'economic power', especially enterprises, through the legally defined participation of workers and their organizations; a policy on salary and incomes (without limiting the autonomy of social partners) that would enable growing layers of the population to benefit from the fruits of economic growth; a common energy policy to ensure supply at the cheapest possible price; coordination of research policies; and harmonization of fiscal and budgetary policies that would first and foremost be geared towards the interests of the working classes. The resolution ended with a call to the socialist parties and trade unions of the candidate countries to understand their responsibility and to weigh on the enlargement negotiations.⁶⁶

This increasing trust in the EC was shared in larger forums of socialist internationalism and by its most prominent elites. During the 12th Congress of the Socialist International that took place on 26–9 June 1972 in Vienna, several leading socialist figures expressed their hopes and conviction that the enlargement of the EC—and of Europe more broadly—along socialist lines. The leader of the new French Socialist Party, François Mitterrand, the Chairman of the Dutch PvdA, André Van Der Louw, the Danish social-democratic Minister for Foreign Trade and EEC Affairs, Ivar Nørgaard, and the Italian PSI MP and former Foreign Trade Minister, Mario Zagari, among others, all voiced their intention to turn the EC into a useful tool to control multinational companies, to control investment and capital movements, to implement regional, social, industrial, and incomes policies, as well as to encourage the participation of trade unions and other social groups.⁶⁷

⁶⁶ HAEU, GSPE-6, 'Résolutions: 8e Congrès des PSCE', 28–30 June 1971, Brussels.

⁶⁷ IISH, SI-263, 'Report of the 12th Congress of the Socialist International held in Vienna 26–29 June 1972' (proceedings; section on 'Socialist policy for Europe').

One of the resolutions adopted by the SI congress concerned European economic integration and stated that:

The SI realizes the importance of the progress of the economic integration of Europe which is now coming about through the enlargement of the EEC and welcomes the position of the Socialists in the Communities who plan the strategy for the creation of a Socialist Europe. Congress is convinced that the EEC will have to meet the essential needs of the British and other Labour movements in order to create conditions for full participation of all countries concerned in the European Community.⁶⁸

The forthcoming enlargement also encouraged western European communists—who were facing a ‘crisis of internationalism’ after the 1968 Soviet intervention in Czechoslovakia—to seek new alliances at the continental level and to confirm their will to shift European integration towards a socialist perspective.⁶⁹ This, of course, was true of Italian communists much more than of the still Euro-critical PCF. During a June 1970 meeting of PCI and PCF leaders in Rome, Amendola argued that enlargement would make it possible to change the EC’s ideological and political orientation from within; the French communist Jacques Denis was sceptical, but the French delegation ‘did nonetheless declare itself in favour of an “active presence” in and continued pressure on the EEC institutions, to make them “more democratic and anti-monopolistic”’.⁷⁰ Amendola, who was travelling around Europe and discussing the need for an alliance of the European Left with prominent socialist figures like Tony Benn and Mitterrand, was the chief promoter along with the communist MEPs and the CeSPE of a conference on ‘Italian Communists and Europe’ organized in Rome on 23–5 November 1971—a founding moment for the party’s ‘communist Europeanism’.⁷¹ In his closing speech to the conference, Amendola reasserted the PCI’s vision regarding the European construction: its importance in consolidating *détente*, the need to establish contacts with the left-wing forces at European level, and the importance of a ‘commitment of the popular and democratic forces [...] of the people’s organizations, of the trade unions, to affirm the need for a democratic transformation of the Community’.⁷² The same year, Amendola published a book entitled *I comunisti e l’Europa*, with

⁶⁸ IISH, SI-263, ‘Resolutions Adopted by the Congress’.

⁶⁹ Di Donato, *I comunisti italiani e la sinistra europea: Il PCI e i rapporti con le socialdemocrazie (1964–1984)*, 105–15.

⁷⁰ Bracke, ‘From the Atlantic to the Urals? Italian and French Communism and the Question of Europe, 1956–1973’, 52.

⁷¹ Di Donato, *I comunisti italiani e la sinistra europea*, 111; Mauro Maggiorani and Paolo Ferrari, *L’Europa da Togliatti a Berlinguer: Testimonianze e documenti, 1945–1984* (Bologna: Il Mulino, 2005), 11 and 212–33. See *I comunisti italiani e l’Europa: Atti del convegno promosso dal CESPE e dai gruppi parlamentari del PCI, Roma 23–25 Novembre 1971*, Quaderni Di Politica Ed Economia 3, n.d. (1971).

⁷² *I comunisti italiani e l’Europa*, 12 (author’s translation).

the intention of providing party activists and leaders with a pedagogical explanation of the communist strategy regarding the EC, but also explaining how the EP and other institutions worked and exposing the EC's different policies.⁷³

Besides, at the end of September 1972, the powerful French and Italian communist-led trade unions, the CGT and the CGIL, issued a joint appeal for trade union unity in the countries of the Common Market. The two federations considered that the enlargement of the Community, and the involvement in its affairs of the important Scandinavian and British trade union organizations, brought an opportunity for 'reinforcing the presence and efficiency of the trade union organizations within the Community institutions' and raised hopes that new forms of cooperation and coordination would be found, and they called for the convocation of a large European trade union conference.⁷⁴

The emerging project for a socialist Europe was obviously still embryonic and vague; it insisted on a democratization of the EC and a revision of the treaties that would give scope for redistribution, harmonization of macro-economic, social, fiscal, and budgetary policies, regulation and control of economic activities, economic democratization, and regional economic planning. It went much beyond the conception of European social policy that had been included in the Treaty of Rome and put forward until then by the EC. In the absence of an efficient coordination of the parties and unions, and of any real strategy to weigh on European decisions through the organization of grassroots mobilization, this embryonic project was insufficient to make a difference, however. The activism of the German SPD and of Willy Brandt was much more decisive, as they decided to use the upcoming EC summit meeting in Paris at the end of 1972 to call for the creation of a 'social union'.

The 1972 Paris Summit: Economic, Monetary, and 'Social Union'?

From 19 to 21 October 1972, a new summit conference took place in Paris, and marked the apex of European political elites' new declared determination to provide the EC with a social dimension. Brandt had launched the idea for a new summit early in 1972, and Pompidou seized this opportunity to reassert his European commitment shortly after securing popular assent in a French referendum on the enlargement of the EC. The Paris Summit was the first summit of the heads of state and government of the EC since the 1969 Hague Summit, and was presented as a solemn occasion to celebrate the forthcoming accession of the new member states, who were also invited to take part in the summit. The foreign

⁷³ Giorgio Amendola, *I comunisti e l'Europa*, Il Punto (Rome: Editori Riuniti, 1971).

⁷⁴ AEI, *Trade Union News from the EC*, 10/1972, 27.

affairs ministers had chosen three themes to structure the discussions of the summit; the first theme was 'The EMU and social progress in the Community'; the other two were 'Foreign relations and global responsibilities of the EEC' and 'Institutional reinforcing and progress in the political field'.

In the run-up to the summit, all governments affirmed their desire to see closer relations between economic and monetary integration and social progress, and made proposals that implied an extension of the scope of the EC's social policy. Candidate countries formulated rather ambitious proposals. The Danish government emphasized the need to implement an action programme to improve the quality of human environment and pollution within the enlarged EC, insisted on a common employment policy that would include setting minimum norms for all important social policy fields such as health, housing, and education, and called for increased use of the ESF and for examination of the question of economic democracy through workers' participation in enterprises and through the adoption of a common 'Community code' regarding multinational companies, in order 'to ensure that they did not take advantage of their situation to act against the common interest'.⁷⁵ The Irish government insisted in particular on the need to create a common regional and 'structural' policy to aid regions and sectors in difficulty, and affirmed its will to see stronger emphasis on the EC's commitment to social progress.⁷⁶ The Norwegian government—which participated in the preparations for the summit before its accession to the EC was rejected by referendum—insisted on the need to create a 'social union' following the will expressed by the trade unions. This implied collaborating with the social partners in defining the EC's economic policy; aiming for greater equality between social groups and greater income equality; achieving better control of multinationals; establishing a regional policy relying on the creation of a regional fund and the reinforcement of the other EC funds; and establishing an action programme for an environmental policy.⁷⁷ The UK government insisted mainly on the need to create a regional policy, to deal especially with regions marked by deindustrialization, underdevelopment, rural exodus, and unemployment.⁷⁸

The governments of the 'old' member states mostly reiterated their positions of the previous years, but new concern was evident regarding regional disparities and wealth distribution in regard to the EMU. The Italian government emphasized the

⁷⁵ HAEU, Fonds Émile Noël (EN)-477, 'Schéma de l'intervention de Monsieur Ivar Noergaard, Ministre de l'économie extérieure du Danemark', 24 April 1972 in Luxembourg (author's translation); HAEU, EN-122, 'Mémorandum du Gouvernement danois au sujet de la préparation de la Conférence au sommet', 7 July 1972.

⁷⁶ HAEU, EN-122, 'Mémorandum indiquant les questions que le Gouvernement irlandais souhaiterait voir examinées à la Conférence au sommet', 7 July 1972.

⁷⁷ HAEU, EN-122, 'Mémorandum du gouvernement norvégien concernant la préparation de la conférence au sommet', 7 July 1972; HAEU, EN-477, 'Schéma de l'intervention de Monsieur Per Kleppe, Ministre du Commerce extérieur de Norvège', 24 April 1972.

⁷⁸ HAEU, EN-122, 'Points submitted by the UK government' (no date).

need for a 'regional and structural' policy with appropriate resources; but also the need for the EC to show a real political commitment to implementing a European social and employment policy, and for the realization of 'European citizenship' based on free movement within the EC; as well as a common cultural policy.⁷⁹ The Belgian government suggested that guidelines should be adopted, to 'give a political impetus' for new achievements in the fields of social, regional, scientific, and technology policies.⁸⁰ The Dutch government considered it essential that the conference should show clearly that the EC was not just following economic goals, but was 'working even harder to promote social progress and improved living conditions', and insisted on the need for greater social 'harmonization'—rather than 'unification', which it deemed unrealistic given the great differences between the countries' social regimes.⁸¹ As for the French government, its priority was on the monetary and economic aspects of EMU, and it merely mentioned that the heads of state and government should examine which guidelines could be adopted regarding 'actions in the industrial, social and regional field.'⁸² Finally, the government of Luxembourg asked to 'base future Community policies—in particular, social harmonization and regional policy—on the principle of a fairer distribution of the benefits of economic expansion between the different social categories and between the different regions of the Community.'⁸³

Brandt and his government dedicated more attention than any other government to the theme of 'social progress within the Community', seizing the opportunity offered by the summit to affirm the new European policy envisioned by the SPD since the early 1970s. The German government affirmed that 'The Summit Conference should establish the principle that the Community should develop into an area at the forefront of social progress, on a basis of stability, growth and regional balance.'⁸⁴ In its view, the EMU and social progress, institutional reform/democratization, and the place of the EC in the world—the three broad themes of the summit—were indissociable. In brief, by democratizing the EC's institutions and by gearing all European policies—economic and monetary policies, social policy, foreign trade and foreign relations, and so on—towards social progress, EC countries would guarantee internal and external stability, and therefore contribute to consolidating *détente* and peace in Europe. In his intervention during an

⁷⁹ HAEU, EN-122, 'Déclaration introductive de la délégation italienne', 7 July 1972; HAEU, EN-477, 'Rencontre informelle des ministres des États membres de la Communauté et des États adhérents et des représentants de la Commission à Luxembourg, le 24 avril 1972: Schéma de l'intervention de M. Aldo Moro, ministre des affaires étrangères de la République italienne', 24 April 1972.

⁸⁰ HAEU, EN-122, 'Délégation belge: Conférence au sommet', 7 July 1972 (author's translation).

⁸¹ HAEU, EN-122, 'Mémorandum néerlandais sur la conférence des chefs d'État et de gouvernement envisagée pour octobre 1972', 7 July 1972 (author's translation); HAEU, EN-477, 'Schéma de l'intervention de M. W.K.N. Schmelzter, ministre des affaires étrangères des Pays-Bas', 24 April 1972.

⁸² HAEU, EN-122, 'Aide-mémoire relatif à l'ordre du jour du sommet européen', 10 July 1972.

⁸³ HAEU, EN-122, 'Liste des points sur lesquels le gouvernement luxembourgeois considère nécessaire une décision à l'occasion de la conférence des chefs d'État ou de gouvernement', 7 July 1972.

⁸⁴ HAEU, EN-122, 'Aide-Mémoire', 6 July 1972.

informal preliminary meeting, the German Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, the liberal Sigismund von Braun, explained that the EC now had a chance to become 'the most socially advanced region of the world':

It is important to make it clear once again that the union of the peoples of Western Europe is a phenomenon which is not only aimed at a quantitative increase in well-being, but above all at improving the quality of the individual's living conditions. Indeed, only if the Community is accepted, supported and further developed as an area of social progress by its inhabitants can it become an area of internal and external stability.

[...] The vast progress made within the Community requires the strengthening and development of its institutions and the granting of greater democratic legitimacy to them. On the other hand, the social principles which determine internal development also have an impact on the Community's external relations and on its prestige in the world through their influence beyond its borders. Focusing on social policy, the development of the Community's economic and monetary union is thus closely linked to the other two major themes of the summit conference. If all participants succeed in systematically linking these three areas so that they form a whole, then it will have made a substantial contribution to the organization of peace in Europe.⁸⁵

Most notably, the German government expressed its commitment in favour of the realization of EMU but insisted on several important points in the preparation of the summit. Three aspects were particularly ambitious. First, social partners should be given a much more important role in its realization. Second, social security systems should be harmonized. And third, it was also in favour of tax harmonization.⁸⁶

Besides the governments, many other actors seized the opportunity of the upcoming summit to voice their demands regarding the necessity to gear European cooperation towards the achievement of greater social progress. In the EP, several deputies (especially on the Left) insisted that the Paris Summit should be the occasion for a firm commitment on the part of the heads of state, and demanded greater attention to 'social progress' when determining the guidelines of the EMU, as well the adoption of a true action programme in the social field.⁸⁷ In a resolution adopted at the beginning of October, the (now renamed) Office of

⁸⁵ HAEU, EN-477, 'Rencontre informelle des ministres des États membres de la Communauté et des États adhérents ainsi que des représentants de la Commission, à Luxembourg, le 24 avril 1972: Schéma de l'intervention de Monsieur von Braun, Secrétaire d'État aux affaires étrangères.'

⁸⁶ HAEU, EN-160, 'Note sur la position provisoire du gouvernement allemand en ce qui concerne l'Union économique et monétaire et le progrès social', 8 May 1972.

⁸⁷ For instance, the Dutch PvdA MEP Vredeling, in HAEP, PE0 AP DE/1972 DE19720613-019900FR, Parlement européen, 'Séance du 13 juin 1972: Orientations préliminaires pour un programme de politique sociale.'

the Socialist Parties of the European Community expressed its hope that the heads of state would commit to creating real EC policies on economic, monetary, regional, social, and environmental affairs. On the social front, it demanded new tools for 'a policy oriented towards a new distribution of all wages and income, including incomes from the liberal professions and from wealth, and towards guaranteed employment and harmonized social security' (achieved in collaboration with workers' and employers' organizations and embodied in the 'European social budget').⁸⁸

As for the ECFTU, it addressed a document to the heads of state that outlined in great detail its position on the three themes of the summit meeting, and insisted that it would support the creation of an EMU only if it was conceived 'to serve social progress, a fair distribution of national income and full employment'. This meant organizing a coordination of monetary, fiscal, budgetary, economic, and social policies through the creation of a 'Community Plan Commission' in close cooperation with the 'social partners'. Accordingly, the programme for achieving EMU should be conditional on a democratization of the EC and include the following aspects: guaranteeing full and better employment through a larger use of the ESF and SCE and the adoption of common regulations to protect workers against dismissal and maintain their income in case of unemployment; regional development planning and funding to level regional inequalities; active upward coordination of member states' social security systems; implementation of price control; environmental protection; as well as democratization of the economy—for instance, with the adoption of an EC regulation forcing multinational companies to guarantee a right to information and consultation for workers and their representatives in case of economic restructuring.⁸⁹ Beyond this, it exhorted the EC to become a true political actor guaranteeing *détente*, peace, and security in the world, promoting the development of Third World countries and a complete revision of the rules of the international monetary and trade systems.

Mansholt's European Commission presented social progress as the chief precondition for the realization of EMU. It released a statement in preparation for the summit, which placed full and better employment at the top of its objectives for social progress. To achieve it, it proposed the creation of 'a mechanism to guarantee workers' incomes against the consequences of economic changes resulting from common policies'—mainly through increased ESF aid and increased financial solidarity within the EC. European civil rights, environmental protection, regional development, industrial integration, and a new policy of

⁸⁸ HAEU, GSPE-6, 'Résolution du Bureau des partis socialistes de la Communauté européenne à l'intention des chefs d'État ou de gouvernement', 3 October 1972.

⁸⁹ IISH, ETUCA-543, 'Position adressée à la Conférence des chefs d'État ou de gouvernement', September 1972. The ECFTU had adopted in March a detailed common programme. Gobin, 'Consultation et concertation sociales à l'échelle de la Communauté économique européenne', 431–3, 558.

cooperation with developing countries were other aspects of the Commission proposal.⁹⁰ Mansholt saw the Paris Summit as a chance to give a new impetus to European unification, not merely turning the EC into a privileged partner for the Third World but also reinforcing the democratic features of the EC by giving more powers to the Commission and Parliament, extending common policy domains, and deeply reforming existing policies.⁹¹ During the informal meeting of ministers in preparation for the summit on 24 April 1972, Mansholt insisted that in order to convince European populations of their will to commit to social progress and to greater financial solidarity, European social policy needed to target workers as well as 'all strands of the active population' by putting production at the service of the protection and improvement of the quality of life, and by improving the environment. To him, this was a precondition of EMU:

The gradual achievement of economic and monetary union requires, in addition to the completion of the internal market, a coherent set of actions relating not only to the coordination of global economic and monetary policies, but also to the various policies which are its tangible expression and which condition its effectiveness: regional, social and sectoral policies. Without Community progress in these particular areas, it would be impossible to give substance to economic and monetary union. [...]

Coherence between economic development and social progress is essential for all of us. In the long run, it is inconceivable that economic policy should be increasingly defined and conducted, in its broad guidelines, at Community level without the same being true of social policy. This implies, as in other common policies, financial solidarity, of which the Social Fund is a first—and still timid—manifestation.⁹²

All these contributions led to a particular consideration of social aspects in preparation for the summit.

By the time the Paris Summit came, the German government had taken a new initiative in this regard. The day before the summit started, in an interview given to a French television programme, Brandt explained that the two priorities of the German government were the realization of the EMU and the social dimension of the EC, which should include three dimensions: social policy, regional policy, and environmental policy. Following the 'no' of the Norwegian people to their

⁹⁰ HAEU, EN-121, 'Communication de la Commission des Communautés européennes en vue de la préparation de la Conférence au sommet', 7 July 1972.

⁹¹ Jan Van der Harst, 'Sicco Mansholt: Courage et Conviction', in *The European Commission, 1958–72: History and Memories*, ed. Michel Dumoulin and Marie-Thérèse Bitsch (Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications of the European Communities, 2007), 182. See also Merriënboer, *Mansholt*, 547–9.

⁹² HAEU, EN-160, 'Union économique et monétaire et progrès social: Discours prononcé par M. le Président Mansholt lors de la réunion des ministres des Affaires étrangères des pays membres et des pays adhérents à Luxembourg, le 24 avril 1972.'

accession to the EC, Brandt affirmed that an action programme was necessary in the social field to bring the EC closer to the 'simple people'.⁹³ At the start of the summit, the German government then presented a memorandum titled 'German initiative for measures to implement a European social and societal policy'. The general idea underlying the fifteen-page document was that the progressive creation of EMU over the following years supposed not only liberalization but the creation of 'an area forming an economic unit', which required increasing Community measures 'in the areas of conjuncture, budget, finance and credit, currency, taxes, capital market, structural and regional development'. Importantly, 'social integration must be placed on an equal footing with economic integration if a sustainable economic and monetary union is to be achieved and its dynamic development is to be ensured'.⁹⁴

The German government's initiative was certainly the most ambitious and comprehensive proposal that had ever been put on the table by a government of the EC regarding social policy. The proposals were divided into four categories. The first category concerned 'labour', for which the German government advocated: intense cooperation between national labour administrations through the creation of an information centre on the labour market in the EC, connected to the ESF; upwards harmonization of working conditions and protection at work (e.g. regarding the prevention of work accidents and work-related sicknesses, preventive protection regarding hygiene at work, etc.); implementing EC regulation for workers' participation in policy and decision making in enterprises and factories, including multinational companies, European companies, and in the case of mergers; and studying the possibility of reaching European collective conventions in collaboration with labour and management organizations, including for multinationals.

The second category related to the 'formulation and realization of Community guidelines for social security'. The German initiative advocated developing a 'catalogue of fundamental principles in the social field that would serve as a basis for Community development and for the progressive approximation of member states' social policies'. It advocated developing methods and instruments for 'European social planning' including for health, invalidity, old-age, pension benefits, and so on. This would be done by the creation of the 'European social budget' to help harmonize member states' social policies and monitor social progress. This did not necessarily mean, in the German government's view, that the EC should move towards institutional coordination of social security systems, but

⁹³ See Schirmann, 'Willy Brandt et les débuts de l'Europe sociale, 1969–1974', 317.

⁹⁴ *Deutsche Initiative für Massnahmen zur Verwirklichung einer europäischen Sozial- und Gesellschaftspolitik* (communicated to the permanent representations of member states and the Commission on 16 October). HAEU, EN-126, 'Initiative allemande pour des mesures en vue de la réalisation d'une politique européenne dans le domaine social et dans celui de la société', 19 October 1972. Author's translations.

that all citizens of EC countries should gain access to social security systems that would undergo 'upward' harmonization. It also advocated the adoption of common guidelines for a 'social structure policy', understood basically as a vocational training policy so as to achieve equal opportunities for European workers and to encourage their free movement.

The third category concerned 'economic policy and *society* policy'. The German government proposed: a regional and structural policy that aimed to suppress regional unbalances through the creation of common tools (e.g. creation of a European regional fund financed by the EC's own resources); and developing a coordinated European policy of environmental protection and an improved quality of life to guarantee a healthy and dignified environment (e.g. making enterprises bear the costs of the damage they caused to the environment, such as air, seas, and rivers; and enhancing EC measures to improve the quality of food and pharmaceutical goods).

Finally, the last category concerned 'improvement of the institutions'. Here the German memorandum advocated increased participation of social partners in the EC's economic and social decisions: the EESC should be given its own initiative to present opinions regarding all economic and social questions and the SCE should become the core body of dialogue and consultation between the Council, the Commission, and the social partners, not just on employment but for 'all questions regarding society at the Community level'.

Regarding the procedure, the German government suggested that the heads of state and governments, during the summit, should charge the EC institutions with formulating objectives and measures in the social 'and societal' field which, importantly, should be carried out 'in parallel' to the development of the different phases of economic and monetary integration. In other words, this social dimension should be regarded as an indispensable condition for the policies pursued within the framework of EMU; 'European union' needed to be social as well as economic, so as to allow identification of citizens with the integration project.

The German proposal thus in fact went far beyond the narrow conception of social policy that had hitherto dominated EC action in the social field, as it included environmental and regional policy, participation of social partners in EC decisions on all questions, upward harmonization of all aspects of social security, vocational training, health and security at work, workers' participation in enterprises, and European collective conventions. It even contained the novel idea of adopting a catalogue of fundamental principles in the social field, which prefigured the later debates on an EC 'social charter'. In many regards, it was in line with the demands of the ECFTU and even went beyond what socialist parties organized at a transnational level had ever formulated. However, it omitted some aspects that had appeared in the discussions of European trade unions and socialists about the reform of the EC: mainly the question of economic planning (the German government, on the contrary, supported the liberalization of capital),

redistribution of income and wealth, regulation of large firms and multinationals, and EC protection of workers' incomes in case of dismissal.

In Paris, the proposals of the German government were welcomed with polite enthusiasm by all delegations of the 'Nine'—the 'Six' and the three candidate members. All heads of state and ministers expressed their support for Brandt's widened conception of social policy, especially regarding regional policy and the creation of a regional solidarity mechanism, and environmental protection. The new Danish Prime Minister, Anker Jørgensen, former leader of the Danish General Workers' Union and member of the Danish Social Democratic Party, insisted that the question of a fairer distribution of income should also be included, as well regulation of multinational companies. The French, Dutch, and Italian governments agreed on closer association of social partners to EC decisions. All political leaders seemed to converge on three main points: that the EC needed to be placed 'at the service of human beings' to 'win popular support' through an orientation of its policies towards 'social progress'; that social integration should go hand in hand with economic and monetary integration, as 'a condition,' 'in parallel,' or as 'a constitutive element' of EMU; and that some form of social integration should be realized, through a combination of solidarity mechanisms (ESF, regional fund), EC actions, and harmonization of social welfare regimes. None of the governments imagined a supranational 'welfare Europe', but rather cooperation and integration in the social field in various forms.⁹⁵

At the close of the summit, the 'Nine' confirmed in a public statement their will to strengthen political cooperation and achieve EMU—including through the creation of a 'European Monetary Cooperation Fund'—and the 'European Union' by the end of the decade, and emphasized 'that they attached as much importance to vigorous action in the social field as to the achievement of the Economic and Monetary Union.' They invoked increased involvement of labour and management in the economic and social decisions of the EC and invited the institutions, after consulting with 'social partners,' to draw up, before 1 January 1974, a 'programme of action providing for concrete measures and the corresponding resources,' particularly in the framework of the ESF, based on the suggestions made in the course of the summit by the governments and the Commission. This social action programme should aim in particular 'at carrying out a co-ordinated policy for employment and vocational training, at improving working conditions and conditions of life, at closely involving workers in the progress of firms, at facilitating on the basis of the situation in the different countries the conclusion of collective agreements at European level in appropriate fields and at strengthening and co-ordinating measures of consumer protection.' The statement also committed to the implementation of a programme in the environmental field, the creation of a

⁹⁵ See the minutes in HAEU, EN-383, 'Conférence des chefs d'État ou de gouvernement, Paris, 19–21 octobre 1972: Deuxième séance tenue le jeudi 19 octobre.'

common regional policy with a regional development fund, as well as new common policies in the industrial, scientific, technological, and energy fields, and a common policy for the GATT negotiations. It moreover invited the EC institutions to recognize the right of the EESC in future to advise on its own initiative on all questions affecting the EC.⁹⁶

Although many aspects of the proposals that had emerged during the preparation of the summit were not included in the public statement, these were remarkably ambitious commitments compared to what had so far been the 'social dimension' of European cooperation schemes. The term 'social union', the idea of a mechanism to guarantee workers' incomes when facing the consequences of economic changes resulting from common policies, the control of multinationals, the increase in the resources of the ESF, tax harmonization, and the idea of a fairer division of the benefits of economic growth between social classes had disappeared.⁹⁷ However, the statement mentioned that economic expansion should first aim to enable disparities in living conditions to be reduced, emphasized the participation of the 'social partners' in EC decisions and even in firms, announced new redistributive tools such as the monetary and regional funds, and even mentioned collective agreements at European level, including commitment to protecting the environment, 'so that progress may really be put at the service of mankind'. Therefore, although it remained unclear precisely how social integration would be intertwined with economic integration, the heads of state and government of the 'Nine' were making a novel commitment and giving a mandate to European institutions to figure it out in more detail in the following year.

The decision of the (mostly conservative) heads of state to show a commitment to a more 'humane' Europe during the 1972 Paris Summit responded to the explosion of social conflict during previous years, echoed the cultural shift to the left in western Europe, and testified to the need to win greater popular support for the EC after the Norwegian people's 'no' to joining. It was also partly motivated by the internal political context of several member states. The German initiative was, of course, in line with the European policy matured by the government during the previous couple of years, but it also responded to the political agenda of the country: during the autumn, Brandt was in the midst of his campaign for federal elections, due to take place on 19 November 1972. Over the previous years, he had been criticized by some components of his camp for having abandoned social reform in favour of the more prestigious international policy, and of neglecting the interests of the working classes to the benefit of the middle

⁹⁶ The original final release of the 1972 Paris Summit is available at <http://www.cvce.eu/viewer/-/content/b1dd3d57-5f31-4796-85c3-cfd2210d6901/en>.

⁹⁷ Compare with the proposals of the 'ad hoc' group created by the ministers of foreign affairs in preparation for the Summit: HAEU, EN-124, 'Préparation de la Conférence des chefs d'État et de gouvernement', rapport du groupe «ad hoc» aux ministres, 9 September 1972.

classes.⁹⁸ In France, Pompidou was also getting ready for the March 1973 legislative elections, and the Gaullists probably found this commitment convenient at a time when the French Left had just adopted a common programme and reached apparent unity for the first time in a very long time. In the UK and in Italy, where the Centre-Right was also in power, political tensions were triggering fears of anticipated elections, which were deemed to favour the left-wing opposition.⁹⁹ All these circumstances contribute to explaining why Brandt's initiative was at first welcomed by the other governments.

This new political commitment to an EC geared towards social progress owed more to the activism of Brandt himself and his SPD-led government than to the rest of the European Left, despite important changes in the attitudes of left-wing forces towards the EC in those years. In the following years, the drafting of the first Community Social Action Programme (SAP) by European institutions would pave the way for the implementation of a wide range of European-level measures, policies, and regulations in the social field during the 1970s. Besides, the prospective enlargement announced the transformation of the EC into an economic giant whose potential to influence the global organization of trade, economic, monetary, and social rules, among others, was increasing exponentially; and created a perspective for left-wing forces, especially social-democratic forces, to raise their influence over European institutions and policies. Thus, as we will see in the next chapter, enlargement, combined with the creation of EMU and the move towards a broader conception of the EC's social role, would encourage greater efforts from European socialists (as from the rest of the western European Left) to start seriously enhancing transnational cooperation and coordination of their European policies, adopting a common programme for a 'socialist' Europe, and envisaging an alliance of the 'European Left'.

⁹⁸ See, for instance, Gianni Silei, *Welfare state e socialdemocrazia: Cultura, programmi e realizzazioni in Europa occidentale dal 1945 ad oggi* (Manduria: Lacaita, 2000), 360–3.

⁹⁹ Fernand Dehousse, 'Le Sommet de Paris', *Chronique de politique étrangère* 25, no. 6 (November 1977): 741–54.

4

‘For a Social Europe’

In September 1972, in the context of a heated debate about the accession of the UK to the EC, Tom Nairn, one of the leading intellectuals of the British Left, published a book-length essay in the *New Left Review*, titled ‘The Left against Europe?’. His essay brilliantly unravelled the European Left’s enduring European dilemma, which all boiled down to one fundamental question:

We know, indeed, that the Common Market is intended to strengthen the sinews and the world-position of European capitalism and its various ruling classes. What we do not know [...] is whether, or in what ways, it may also strengthen the position and enlarge the real possibilities of the European working classes and European social revolutionaries.¹

Could the EC favour the interests of the working classes and the realization of socialism? The European Left remained divided on this question.

During the early 1970s, to shift the balance towards a positive answer, those who had placed their bets on European unification engaged in considerable activism to define and promote a project for a ‘social’ or ‘workers’ Europe’—a prospect which was helped by the social combativeness of the time. Indeed, social revolts did not end in 1968–9; the decade that followed was a time of continued, intense social turmoil throughout western Europe, so strong that splinters of the movement eventually went as far, in some countries like France and Germany but above all in Italy, as to engage in armed struggle against what they denounced as the bourgeois capitalist state. More generally, the social movements born around 1968 continued to flourish in every country during the ‘long 1968s’ and to challenge the fundamentals of the postwar economic and social order and to push the ‘Old Left’ to renew its ideological stance and social project, including at the European level.

Against this background, the period that stretched between the commitment of the heads of state of the EC to ‘vigorous action in the social field’ at the 1972 Paris Summit and the adoption of the EC’s first Social Action Programme (SAP) in January 1974 were ambitious and prolific years for the European Left to finally start defining more concrete proposals to give shape to their still embryonic ideas of a ‘social Europe’.

¹ Tom Nairn, ‘The Left against Europe?’, *New Left Review*, no. 75 (September 1972): 111.

Socialism through Europe

During the first half of the 1970s, at a time when Western social-democratic and communist forces were enjoying significant electoral successes, and when European trade unionism was at its apogee, the 'Old Lefts' finally made some progress in consolidating their European policy and organizing at the European level in order to build, they believed, socialism through Europe.

In West Germany, the social democrats, who had asserted themselves since 1969 at the head of a social-liberal government in the strongest economy in western Europe and had gained much international prestige with their foreign policy activism, were increasingly emphasizing their commitment to a united and 'social' Europe. After contributing significantly to reviving European cooperation at the 1969 Hague Summit and managing to place social concerns high on the EC's agenda at the 1972 Paris Summit, Brandt and the German social democrats started campaigning more explicitly for a Europe modelled after their own idea of socialism. Shortly after the October 1972 Paris Summit, for instance, in an interview with a leading German newspaper, Brandt explained his will to bring the German model of industrial democracy to the European level: 'We ask for the participation of workers, of employees in the decision-making processes of large European companies, because these decisions have an impact on the economic and social daily lives of citizens.'² In April 1973, the discussions of the SPD party congress in Hanover centred on the adoption of a new orientation-framework and occasioned discussions on European integration, what many denounced as 'business Europe', and its effects on the German economy. Brandt insisted again on the need to foster a 'European Social Union' (*europäischen Sozialunion*) parallel to the creation of EMU.³ He emphasized his government's leading role in guiding the continent: 'Europe views our social-liberal policy as a decisive element of our continent's politics, as a solid construction on which Europe can be consolidated and with which Europe can be built. The German experience of social dialogue can provide the necessary impetus and raise hopes among our partners for an era of freedom for Europe.' Despite the use of the 'social-liberal' adjective, the Chancellor was moving away from a free-market conception of Europe, as explained in his conclusions: 'Planning, co-management and democratic control must finally determine the quality of our Community.'⁴

² Sylvain Schirmann, 'Willy Brandt et les débuts de l'Europe sociale, 1969–1974', in *Willy Brandt et l'unité de l'Europe: De l'objectif de la paix aux solidarités nécessaires*, ed. Andreas Wilkens (Brussels: PIE Peter Lang, 2011), 317 (author's translation).

³ Wolfgang Kowalsky, *Europäische Sozialpolitik: Ausgangsbedingungen, Antriebskräfte und Entwicklungspotentiale* (Opladen: Leske & Budrich, 1999), 387–8. See also on the Hanover Congress, Gianni Silei, *Welfare state e socialdemocrazia: Cultura, programmi e realizzazioni in Europa occidentale dal 1945 ad oggi* (Manduria: Lacaita, 2000), 360–3.

⁴ Schirmann, 'Willy Brandt et les débuts de l'Europe sociale', 317 (author's translations).

In France, although the conservatives remained in power, the Left was undergoing an important reshuffling and reassertion process, which also impacted its European line. After its inaugural June 1971 Épinay Congress, the new Socialist Party adopted a fairly different approach to the EC than that of its predecessor, the SFIO. At Épinay, the newly appointed party secretary, François Mitterrand, who had never been a member of the party until then, sought to bolster his socialist legitimacy by warning: 'He who does not accept the break—the method comes afterward—who is not willing to break with the established order [...] with capitalist society, that person, I say, cannot be a member of the Socialist Party.'⁵ Mitterrand advocated increased public intervention in the economy and invoked Latin American radical socialist experiments, such as Salvador Allende's Chile, as political references. But he also defined himself as a 'pragmatic European', one who had been pleading during the 1960s for a democratization of the EC's institutions and for the implementation of new common policies in fields such as health, regional development, harmonization of national economic planning, and so on.⁶ Under his thrust, the newly founded Socialist Party chose a strategy of union with the communists, which marked an important step towards the rise to power of the French Left some years later. This evolution, coupled with the increased influence of the left within the PS, especially with the growing influence of Jean-Pierre Chevènement's Centre d'études, de recherches et d'éducation socialiste (CERES), resulted in the party's adoption of a more critical stance towards the EC and European integration.⁷

When, in June 1972, the PS and the PCF, together with the centrist Radical Movement of the Left, adopted a 'Common Programme' with a view to establishing a left-wing government in France, European policy figured in their discussions.⁸ In the four-page section dedicated to the EEC in the common programme (out of 188 pages), the position of the socialists prevailed. They asserted that a left-wing government would not exit or try to paralyse the Community, but

⁵ The passage of his speech is available online at: <https://www.ina.fr/ina-eclair-actu/video/i09082533/francois-mitterrand-celui-qui-n-accepte-pas-la-ruptureil-ne-peut-pas-etre> (author's translation).

⁶ Among the many accounts of Mitterrand's early personal and professional path and the evolution of his ideas until the 1970s, see Éric Duhamel, *François Mitterrand: L'unité d'un homme* (Paris: Flammarion, 1998); see also Sylvain Kahn, 'La Place de la construction européenne dans la conquête puis la conservation du pouvoir par les socialistes français, 1966–1984', *Les Cahiers européens de Sciences Po*, no. 1 (2012); for a critical assessment see Jonah Birch, 'The Many Lives of François Mitterrand', *Jacobin*, August 2015, <https://www.jacobinmag.com/2015/08/francois-mitterrand-socialist-party-common-program-communist-pcf-1981-elections-austerity/>.

⁷ Kevin Featherstone, *Socialist Parties and European Integration: A Comparative History* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1988), 107–39.

⁸ On the *programme commun* and the union of the Left, see in particular Danielle Tartakowsky, Alain Bergounioux, and Claude Bartolone, *L'union sans unité: Le Programme commun de la gauche, 1963–1978* (Rennes: Presses universitaires de Rennes, 2012); Mathieu Fulla, *Les Socialistes français et l'économie (1944–1981): Une histoire économique du politique* (Paris: Les Presses de Sciences Po, 2016).

would rather try to reform it from within, with the explicit aim of freeing it from the influence of big business:

The government will have a twofold objective for the EEC: – on the one hand, to participate in the construction of the EEC, its institutions, its common policies, with the will to act in order to free it from the domination of big capital, to democratize its institutions, to support workers' demands and to guide Community achievements in their interests. – on the other hand, to preserve within the Common Market its freedom of action for the implementation of its political, economic and social programme. In any event, the government will retain the right to invoke the safeguard clauses provided for in the Treaty of Rome. It will freely exercise the right, not limited by the Treaty, to define and extend the public sector of the economy in its territory.⁹

To gear the Community's actions towards the interests of the working class, the programme proposed, for instance, to democratize the EESC with a more equitable representation of workers and an extension of its competences. It also included proposals to democratize the EAGGF and to increase the EP's control of the budget and weight in EC decision making. Regarding social policy, the programme advocated a modification of the Treaty of Rome so as to achieve upward harmonization of national social legislation, and to guarantee equal pay, social rights, and benefits for women and men and for migrant workers within the EC. The programme pleaded for a reform of the CAP to benefit the least favoured farmers, the creation of adequate regional and structural development policies, a common environmental policy, and the realization of large-scale industrial and scientific projects.

Although historians have generally pointed out that the common programme of the Left had a minimal European dimension, it actually represented an important shift in several regards.¹⁰ First, it signalled the PCF's change of attitude towards the EC from rejection to resigned reformism. Soon thereafter, the PCF would send deputies to the EP, and it would later accept, in 1976, the principle of the election of the EP by direct universal suffrage. Moreover, the common programme would have an important impact on the European policy of the PS in the coming years, as Mitterrand's party had accepted an economic and social strategy much more radical than that of the social-democratic model that dominated the former SFIO, and European social democracy. In the following years, the French socialists' European policy would be a balancing act between the 'pro-European' views of

⁹ Parti communiste français and Parti socialiste, *Programme commun de gouvernement du Parti communiste français et du Parti socialiste (27 juin 1972)*, 117 (author's translation).

¹⁰ For instance, Gérard Bossuat, 'Les Socialistes français et l'unité européenne', in *Le Couple France-Allemagne et les institutions européennes: Une postérité pour le Plan Schuman?*, ed. Marie-Thérèse Bitsch (Brussels: Établissements Emile Bruylant, 2001), 325–51.

part of the leadership and the right wing of the party, and the views of the PCF and PS Left, which were more resolute about the need to impose radical change on the EC's policies and institutions.

The new union of the Left thus prompted French socialists to clarify internally and assert their European policy. On 15–16 December 1973, the PS organized an extraordinary congress on the EC in which the European question arose as a real focal issue for French socialists for the first time since the 1954 disagreements regarding the EDC. During the conference, tensions surfaced, and Mitterrand threatened to resign as First Secretary if participation in the EC was questioned. As a result, the Bagnolet Congress eventually pronounced itself in favour of European integration by unanimously adopting a motion called '*Pour une Europe en marche vers le socialisme*' (For a Europe on the way to socialism), which claimed that socialism in France was not incompatible with European integration, and that the Treaty of Rome and 'liberal Europe' were not irredeemable and could be changed—for instance, to include economic planning, democratization of the EC's institutions, central European control of multinationals, and the implementation of a proper European labour law.¹¹ The vivid debates that emerged around the European question forced the party to clarify its line and explicitly postulate that henceforth European integration should serve and be subordinate to the construction of socialism in France and Europe. At the Bagnolet Congress, the French PS officially asserted that idea, but also—significantly—that socialist goals needed to be pursued simultaneously at national and European level. The last part of the motion announced the party's intention to propose to the socialist parties of the 'Nine' the organization of a series of conferences 'in order to establish a programme for the relaunch of the European construction and to involve the popular masses in this process.'

In the most important new member joining the EC in January 1973, however, the Left remained one of the principal holdouts from the 'social Europe' project. After unexpectedly losing the 1970 election to the Conservatives, the British Labour Party remained divided on the subject of Europe during Edward Heath's premiership (1970–4). As mentioned in previous chapters, after a period of virtual unity on rejection of the Common Market during the 1950s and 1960s, pro-Europeanism had become solidly entrenched in a minority that included part of the leadership and around one-third of the Parliamentary Labour Party, mostly belonging to the 'social-democratic' right wing of the party. On the Left of the party, in contrast, anti-EC feelings held firm. As noted by Delaney, one of the

¹¹ HAEU, GSPE-USPEC-140, 'Pour une Europe en marche vers le socialisme, Motion adoptée à l'unanimité au Congrès national extraordinaire du PS sur l'Europe, 15–16 décembre 1973, Bagnolet'; HAEU, GSPE-USPEC-14, 'Rapport général: Congrès extraordinaire du Parti socialiste sur les problèmes européens, Bagnolet 15–16 décembre 1973', by Robert Pontillon, General Secretary of International Affairs of the PS; HAEU, GSPE-057-FR-A, 'Les Socialistes français et l'Europe: Note d'information sur le congrès extraordinaire du Parti socialiste français consacré à l'Europe', by Jean Laleure, 30 January 1974.

strengths of Nairn's 1972 essay, 'The Left against Europe?', was that it framed the European question 'in relation to the deeper debate within the Labour Party—that of the nature of Socialism.'¹² On one side were the revisionists, who identified themselves with the social-democratic movements of the continent and adhered to the strategy of promoting socialism through the EC; on the other side, the Left of the party who refuted the revisionist stance and the positive social aspects of the EC. The British Communist Party, the trade unions, the Labour Left and virtually all leftist groups, Trotskyist or otherwise, rallied against the Common Market, as did some representatives of the Labour Right such as Peter Shore, Denis Healey, and Douglas Jay.¹³ Nairn's essay broke with this mass consensus of a revolutionary Left that—in his view—mistakenly remained attached to the nation-state mould and to social chauvinism. Concrete internationalism in fact advised entry into the Common Market, which 'increases the chance of effective political opposition to capitalism,' as Marx himself would have prescribed:

In general, the protective system of our day is conservative, while the free trade system is destructive. It breaks up old nationalities and pushes the antagonism of the proletariat and the bourgeoisie to the extreme point. In a word, the free trade system hastens the social revolution. It is in this revolutionary sense, alone, gentlemen, that I vote in favour of free trade [...].¹⁴

Could participation in the Common Market, thanks to the dialectic potential of a transnationalized bourgeoisie, strengthen the position and enlarge the real possibilities of the European working classes and European social revolutionaries? Yes, Nairn argued. In fact, he added, 'If the culture and the politics of Brussels are so nerveless, this is largely because the left, and above all the Marxist left, have been absent from their history.'¹⁵

Despite this compelling case for entry into the EC by one of the leading thinkers of the British New Left, and despite the increased attention paid to social policy within the EC, the British Left remained overwhelmingly opposed to the Common Market even after the UK joined in January 1973. Labour announced that it would boycott the EC institutions, and refused to nominate deputies to the EP and even to join the Bureau of the Socialist Parties of the European Community. Although the leadership of the party, while not always enthusiastic, was nonetheless committed to European

¹² Erin Delaney, 'The Labour Party's Changing Relationship to Europe: The Expansion of European Social Policy', *Journal of European Integration History* 8 (January 2002): 131.

¹³ Donald Sassoon, *One Hundred Years of Socialism: The West European Left in the Twentieth Century* (London: I.B. Tauris, 1996), 339–40. See also Robert Broad, *Labour's European Dilemmas: From Bevin to Blair* (New York: Springer, 2001); Kristian Steinnes, *The British Labour Party, Transnational Influences and European Community Membership, 1960–1973* (Stuttgart: Franz Steiner Verlag, 2014); Michael Newman, *Socialism and European Unity* (London: Junction Books, 1983).

¹⁴ Karl Marx, *On the Question of Free Trade* (1948). Quoted in Nairn, 'The Left against Europe?', 115.

¹⁵ Nairn, 'The Left against Europe?', 116–18.

cooperation, this state of affairs gave rise to tensions between Labour and European socialists on the continent, who had hoped that enlargement would open new perspectives for them to influence EC policies and institutions.

In part because of the British and Irish labour parties' hostility towards the EC and Danish social democracy's half-hearted support, during the early 1970s the socialist parties of the Community made little progress towards the creation of a supranational 'European Progressive Party' or 'European Congress of Socialist Parties' repeatedly called for in previous years by the likes of Vredeling, Mansholt, and Levi Sandri. For the time being, the 1971 congress decision to instruct the Dutch socialist Alfred Mozer to draft a report outlining a plan for a reform of the structure of transnational cooperation remained a dead letter, as it could have compromised efforts to integrate the British and Danish parties into the organization.

Nonetheless, the Dutch Labour Party's lingering plea for the adoption of 'an urgent draft programme of European social-democrats' was echoed by the 'pro-Europeans' of the Socialist Group and of the Office of the Socialist Parties of the European Community, and by several other parties including, as we have just seen, the new French Socialist Party.¹⁶ Besides, the lack of efficient formal supranational party cooperation was compensated by increasing informal transnational cooperation at the EC level and beyond. This included the party leaders' meetings of the Socialist International, and independent political foundations such as the SPD's Friedrich Ebert Foundation, which organized meetings of high-ranking European politicians, conferences, and seminars, drafted policy papers, and stimulated the creation of informal networks between politicians, decision-makers, researchers, experts, journalists, and so on.¹⁷ During those years, as we shall see, cooperation with a view to defining a common position on 'social Europe' therefore made some significant progress.

Except for the case of the UK, therefore, by the time of the enlargement of the EC in January 1973, the bulk of European socialists in the 'Nine' had embraced the idea that the EC could be changed in order to serve the purpose of socialism in Europe. Irish and Danish socialists joined European institutions and the Bureau.¹⁸ The continuing rise of European socialists contributed to reinforcing their confidence in a future social(ist) Europe. After Willy Brandt, Olof Palme, and Bruno Kreisky, in May 1973 Joop den Uyl, 'one of the most controversial and best loved politicians in Dutch history', became the leader of an unusual radical coalition when the Dutch Labour Party came to power after seven years in opposition.¹⁹ In Ireland as well, the Irish Labour Party formed a coalition government

¹⁶ HAEU, GSPE-052-FR-A, 'Document d'information: Résolution sur l'Europe adoptée par le Partij van de Arbeid', 6 February 1971. See Simon Hix and Urs Lesse, *Shaping a Vision: A History of the Party of European Socialists, 1957–2002* (Brussels: Parti socialiste européen, 2002), 20–2.

¹⁷ Christian Salm, *Transnational Socialist Networks in the 1970s: European Community Development Aid and Southern Enlargement* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2016), 11–42.

¹⁸ The northern Irish Social Democratic and Labour Party only joined in 1976.

¹⁹ Giuliano Garavini, *After Empires: European Integration, Decolonization, and the Challenge from the Global South, 1957–1985* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), 125.

with the centre-right party Fine Gael after the February 1973 elections, thus assuming power after sixteen years in opposition, and announced a shift in the government's policy with greater emphasis on social issues. In Belgium until January 1974, in Italy with few interruptions, socialists were part of coalition governments too. In other words, European socialists were sitting in the governments of most member states of the EC and made up one of the largest groups of the EP after the enlargement.

As socialist parties of the 'Nine' were acquiring more weight at the EC level, the rest of the European Left was also on the rise, and increasingly turned to the EC to achieve its political goals. Trade unions were still experiencing a period of historical strength, in part invigorated by the rise of workers' militancy and social movements since the 1960s. Despite national differences and with few exceptions, European trade unions were at their peak, particularly in terms of membership and combativity.²⁰ Under the pressure of grassroots activists, a unitary movement was also taking shape within the trade union landscape, particularly in countries where the labour movement had experienced the greatest splits at the dawn of the Cold War. In France, the CGT and the CFDT sealed an agreement in 1966 for unity of action which lasted (despite some turmoil) until the end of the 1970s. In Italy, the three main trade union centres—the Italian Labour Union (UIL), the CGIL, and the CISL—embarked in 1972 on an attempt to unite into a single unitary federation. In the Netherlands, the socialist Dutch Confederation of Trade Unions (NVV) was attempting to form a federation with the two Christian federations at national level, the Industrial Workers' Union (NKV) and Christian National Trade Union Federation (CNV).²¹ The period also saw further geographical and ideological unification of trade unions at the European level. In February 1973, the transformation of the ECFTU into the European Trade Union Confederation (ETUC) marked an important step in this direction, as the ETUC now brought together the socialist-leaning trade unions of the nine EC countries and the six countries of EFTA. The following year it was joined by the Christian trade unions of these countries, by several small independent unions, and even—significantly enough—by one of the main communist-leaning western European trade unions: the Italian CGIL.²² For the first time since the beginning of the Cold

²⁰ Bernhard Ebbinghaus and Jelle Visser, *Trade Unions in Western Europe since 1945*, Societies of Europe (London; New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2000), 33–74; Michel Pigenet, Patrick Pasture, and Jean-Louis Robert, *Lapogée des syndicalismes en Europe occidentale: 1960–1985* (Paris: Publications de la Sorbonne, 2005).

²¹ See generally Pierre Cours-Salies and René Mouriaux, *L'unité syndicale en France: Impasses et chemins 1895–1995* (Paris: Éditions Syllepse, 1996); Sergio Turone, *Storia del sindacato in Italia: Dal 1943 al crollo del comunismo* (Rome: Laterza, 1992).

²² The CGT remained excluded, however, and so did two Christian trade unions: the Christian Association of Italian Workers (ACLI) and the Christian Trade Union Federation of Germany (CGB). Barbara Barnouin, *The European Labour Movement and European Integration* (London: Frances Pinter, 1986), 18–36.

War, trade unions that had been divided, at the international level, between the three major global trade union organizations—the International Confederation of Free Social Democratic Trade Unions, the World Confederation of Christian Labour, and the World Federation of Communist Trade Unions—found themselves in the same structure. Between 1972 and 1976, the organization leaped from seven to thirty member unions in seventeen different countries; it now represented 37 million affiliated members.

This novel process of trade union unification at western European level had important consequences in the following years for the ideological stance of the structure concerning European integration. Although the social-democratic current continued to dominate the new structure (the German DGB chiefly), the enlargement to trade unions of countries that were not part of the EC, to members that did not share the federalist Europeanism that had characterized the ECFTU until then—such as the plainly hostile TUC and the Danish Trade Union Confederation (LO)—and to Christian trade unions and the communist CGIL, modified the ideological stance of the new ETUC and its attitude towards European institutions.²³ The TUC's opposition to UK entry into the Common Market and its decision not to take part in EC institutions such as the EESC and the SCE destabilized the ETUC and encouraged the adoption of a more combative stance towards European institutions.²⁴ The accession of the new members, particularly the Scandinavian and UK unions, brought new imperatives to the ETUC's agenda, such as a far greater emphasis on the control of multinationals, environmental issues, the Third World, and peace and disarmament. In the following years it would contribute to the designing of a much broader and more comprehensive programme including demands for full employment, the transformation of the international economic order, the reduction of working time, expanded public sector and public investment, economic democratization in firms, and so on.²⁵

Although it would take until 1976 before the enlarged ETUC adopted its first common programme, it was already using its new numeric strength to influence European decisions and guide the EC's works on the forthcoming first SAP and to shift European integration towards a 'social' or 'worker's Europe'. Before its

²³ See also Guy Groux, René Mouriaux, and Jean-Marie Pernot, 'L'europanisation du mouvement syndical: La Confédération européenne des syndicats', *Le Mouvement social*, no. 162 (1993): 41–67.

²⁴ The TUC's attitude was all the more problematic as with 10 million members, in 1973, it represented more than a third of the new ETUC's total members, and the ETUC's new President was the TUC's General Secretary, Vic Feather (until May 1974). See Barnouin, *The European Labour Movement and European Integration*, 16–17; Paul Teague, 'The British TUC and the European Community', *Millennium* 18, no. 1 (1989): 29–45.

²⁵ This will be developed in the following chapters. Corinne Gobin, 'Consultation et concertation sociales à l'échelle de la Communauté économique européenne: Étude des positions et stratégies de la Confédération européenne des syndicats (1958–1991)' (PhD thesis, Université libre de Bruxelles, 1996), 587–90.

restructuring, the ECFTU had drafted in March 1972 its most wide-ranging common programme, which listed its fundamental goals—such as full and better employment, the right to permanent education and training, equal treatment for men and women, the right to income maintenance, a fairer distribution of income and wealth, extended trade union rights and collective agreements, the right to consultation, information, and participation of workers in enterprises, and environmental protection—and priority measures to be taken by the EC: regional planning and an EC labour policy, realization of EMU with policies aimed at fiscal harmonization, capital control, regional development, industrial democratization and the creation of a European Social Plan, protection of workers' employment in cases of restructuring, and notably the adoption of a minimum wage in all member countries.²⁶

Concomitantly, at their May 1972 congress, the (ex-)Christian-leaning unions of EO-WCL had adopted a resolution called 'Elements for Building a Social Europe' in which it demanded an EC labour policy, industrial democracy in European enterprises, regulation of monopolies and multinationals, and a policy of income sharing. The congress rejected 'the neo-capitalist, technocratic and anonymous system existing and developing in Europe. It refuses integration in this system and strives, on the contrary, to replace this system by an economy satisfying actual needs, offering services and equal chances.' It also insisted on a democratization of the EC's institutions, which should give more weight to workers' representatives.²⁷

Even the French CGT, which had been dumped by the CGIL but was pleading for trade union unity at the European level, was increasingly calling for a 'workers' Europe', the development of a European social policy, upward harmonization of social regimes, an extension of trade union rights in member countries, better representativity, and increased powers for the EESC, the SCE, and the EC's parity committees, participation in all EC policy decisions, fairer trade rules with developing countries, and so on.²⁸ In short, European trade unions were now all pressing for the realization of a Europe that would favour workers, through democratization of the EC's institutions, increased workers' participation, planning, redistribution, and social harmonization. This way, Europe could become a political actor guaranteeing *détente*, peace, and security in the world, and impose a complete modification of the rules of international monetary and trade systems in favour of developing countries.

²⁶ Gobin, 'Consultation et concertation sociales à l'échelle de la Communauté économique européenne', 431, 557–62.

²⁷ AEI, Resolution of the OE-WCL Congress, 'Elements for building a social Europe', 19 May 1972, available at <http://aei.pitt.edu/94515/>.

²⁸ 'L'avenir de l'Europe est lié à celui des travailleurs', 'La CGT, le Marché commun et la démocratisation des institutions économiques et sociales' and 'Pour des rapports nouveaux entre la CEE et les pays en voie de développement', *Le Peuple*, no. 947, July–August 1974.

At the same time, the main western European communist forces were also consolidating their stance regarding the EC. The French PCF's attitude in this regard continued to evolve during the 1970s, owing much to its union with its ally and rival, the PS, to the influence of the PCI, but also to the changing international context—*détente*, *Ostpolitik*, and the EC's turn to the Soviet East with the opening of negotiations between the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (Comecon) and the EEC, and the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe—and to its worsening relations with Moscow.²⁹ It also reflected, as mentioned in Chapter 2, an increasingly positive attitude of the French communist electorate towards European unification, which continued to rise after the creation of the Common Market, and skyrocketed from 13 per cent in 1957 to 64 per cent in 1975.³⁰ Consequently, as mentioned previously, the PCF confirmed its shift from categorical rejection to a resigned reformism regarding the EC. Although it still viewed the Common Market as harmful, the PCF accepted that the EC was a political reality that needed to be dealt with. It started to envisage efforts at the national and European levels to modify the social and economic contents of the EEC, to implement democratic and anti-monopolistic measures.³¹ On 13 June 1973, the first delegation of French communists—Gustave Ansart, Gérard Bordu, and Marcel Lemoine—arrived at the EP. In November of that year, they formed the Communist and Allies Group with the Italian communist MEPs and a handful of other far-left deputies.

Meanwhile, the PCI was both raising and taking up at its core the 'communist Europeanism' spearheaded in previous years by Amendola and his clique. Under the leadership of Enrico Berlinguer, first as Vice-President and from 1972 as General Secretary of the PCI, and one of the most popular politicians in Italian history, the party's national and international repositioning was brought a step further. This repositioning, denounced by some as a 'social democratization' of the party, led the PCI to reassert itself during the 1970s as a central actor on the Italian political landscape and a more important player on the Western international scene. It also contributed to reinforcing the party's attractiveness to electors: by the early 1970s, the PCI—the largest communist party of the capitalist West and the second political force in the country behind Democrazia

²⁹ Angela Romano, *From Détente in Europe to European Détente: How the West Shaped the Helsinki CSCE* (Brussels: PIE Peter Lang, 2009); Maud Bracke, 'From the Atlantic to the Urals? Italian and French Communism and the Question of Europe, 1956–1973', *Journal of European Integration History* 13, no. 2 (2007): 33. According to Bracke, the PCF's gradual acceptance of the EEC was always more tactical than it was in the case of the PCI and signified a far less fundamental change in its international outlook and strategy.

³⁰ Giannēs Balampanidēs, *Eurocommunism: From the Communist to the Radical European Left* (Abingdon: Routledge, 2015), 212–13.

³¹ See Marco Di Maggio, *Alla ricerca della terza via al socialismo: I PC italiano e francese nella crisi del comunismo (1964–1984)* (Naples: Edizioni scientifiche italiane, 2014); Emilia Robin Hivert, 'Anti-européens et euroconstructifs: Les Communistes français et l'Europe (1945–1979)', *Cahiers de l'IRICE* 4 (2009): 49–67.

Cristiana—was rising in popularity. At the May 1972 political elections, the party obtained 27.15 per cent of the votes. Berlinguer became the champion of a ‘third way’ to socialism: a new European communism independent of both the US and the Soviet Union. This project relied on the assertion of western Europe—and the EC itself—as a potential independent actor: within the party, the conviction grew that Europe, increasingly autonomous from the US, could be turned into an instrument of *détente*, of a new international economic order, as well as of social and political change. European unity and integration became important issues for the PCI during these years, and the party engaged in more concrete efforts in this regard: by working inside the European institutional framework, the PCI also believed it would contribute to making western Europe socialist.³² Again, the leadership was following the trend of the party’s electorate, 65 per cent of whom favoured European unification by 1973.³³ This communist Europeanism was consistent with the PCI’s focus on a parliamentary strategy, and with the party’s increasing efforts to build international alliances with social-democratic parties with a view to achieving ‘another Europe.’³⁴

Western European communists were also strengthening transnational contacts and networks and increasing their cooperation. The Italian PCI’s repositioning and its search for a ‘third way’ to socialism was paralleled by a shift of its political frame of reference: moving away from the international communist movement towards western European socialism. To promote its idea of a new democratic, independent, and peaceful Europe ‘neither anti-Soviet nor anti-American’, Berlinguer and his party were engaging efforts into organizing summit meetings between Western communist parties. A series of western European communist conferences and meetings took place in the early 1970s that prefigured the later development of ‘Eurocommunism’. In 1971, all western European communist parties had gathered at a congress in London, including the usually reluctant Dutch and Swedish parties, to discuss the growing problem of how to control multinationals, and agreed that more sustained contacts between parties were necessary, especially between parties of the EC. The Italian, French, and Belgian communist parties later met to discuss this endeavour and planned a conference in October 1972, to be held in parallel with the Paris Summit of the heads of state of the EC, but due to internal disagreements the conference did not take place.³⁵ From 1972 to 1973, however, the PCI’s efforts to favour cooperation between western European communist parties started to be much more fruitful.

³² Maggiorani and Ferrari, *L’Europa da Togliatti a Berlinguer*, 11, 42–3, and 212–33.

³³ Balampanidès, *Eurocommunism*, 212–13.

³⁴ See Michele Di Donato, *I comunisti italiani e la sinistra europea: Il PCI e i rapporti con le social-democrazie (1964–1984)* (Rome: Carocci, 2015).

³⁵ See Maggiorani and Ferrari, *L’Europa da Togliatti a Berlinguer*, 40, 52. A preparatory meeting took place in Düsseldorf at the beginning of the month, where the Italian, French, German, Norwegian, Danish, Belgian, and Dutch communist parties gathered, but an organizational misunderstanding led the British party not to attend, and the meeting ended with no concrete decisions.

In particular, the party engaged in a rapprochement with Georges Marchais' PCF. On 8–11 May 1973, a meeting took place between delegations of the two parties led by Enrico Berlinguer and Georges Marchais. During the meeting, both leaders agreed on the importance of political engagement within the EC.³⁶

In sum, by January 1973, when the UK, Ireland, and Denmark joined the EC, the European Left, except for British Labour, was finally investing some efforts to give a programmatic content to its hitherto vague European reformism. If adequately reformed, they believed, the EC could become a useful tool to serve the interests of the workers, to fight against monopolies, to control multinationals, to increase social standards and economic democratization, to apply European-wide economic planning, to implement *détente* and to revise the rules of international trade in favour of Third World countries, among other things. At a time when growing globalization was starting to be understood as an obstacle to the realization of socialism in one country, the European Left convinced itself that this European organization could become a means through which it might build a socialist and democratic Europe. The affirmation of a communist Europeanism, the unification and assertion of European trade unions within the new ETUC, and the rising weight of social-democratic parties within the EC, contributed to opening new perspectives for the socialist parties of the EC to build a loose convergence of left-wing forces to support an alternative type of European integration. One of the main challenges facing the European Left in those years would be their organization and the strategies they would use to impose themselves at western European level. In April 1973 at their congress in Bonn, the socialist parties of the EC would make their first concrete attempt to put forward a comprehensive programme 'for a social Europe'.

The Socialists' 'Theses for a Social Europe'

On 26 and 27 April 1973, two years after their 1971 Brussels Congress, the socialist parties of the EC organized their 9th Congress in the city of Bonn, the 'provisional' capital of the FRG situated on the banks of the Rhine. The theme of the meeting—'For a Social Europe'—could trigger high expectations. It was the first congress of the socialist parties of the EC since its enlargement; but while the Irish Labour Party and the Danish social democrats were represented, the British Labour Party boycotted the congress. Participants included such high-ranking socialist personalities as Mitterrand; the German Minister for Labour and Social Affairs and the Secretary of State for Labour and Social Order, Walter Arendt and Helmut Rohde; the Irish Labour Minister, Michael O'Leary; the adjunct

³⁶ Maggiorani and Ferrari, *L'Europa da Togliatti a Berlinguer*, 52; see also Silvio Pons, *Berlinguer e la fine del comunismo* (Turin: Einaudi, 2006).

responsible for the international relations of the Italian Socialist Party, Mario Zagari; the Vice-President of the Italian Senate and member of the Italian Socialist Party, Egidio Ariosto; the Belgian Minister for Labour and Employment, Louis Major; the adjunct Vice-President of the Luxembourg Labour Socialist Party, Antoine Vehenkel; the Austrian Vice-President of the Socialist International, Bruno Pittermann; the French Vice-President of the SGEP, Francis Vals; and the adjunct Vice-President of the SGEP, Henk Vredeling.³⁷

Under the presidency of Lucien Radoux, Vice-President of the SGEP, the participants discussed their political objectives and proposals for the realization of a 'social Europe'. The parties took as a starting point the observation that social questions could no longer be confined to the national sphere while economic and political integration was taking place at the international and EC level. According to Helmut Rohde, this congress had 'a historical importance', as for the first time the socialist parties of the EC were trying to adopt a common position on themes that were at the core of their doctrines and of the preoccupations of the time: social policy, social Europe.³⁸ The objective of the congress was to define what exactly could be the socialists' programme and strategy for that longed-for social Europe. To this end, the participants discussed how to establish an efficient European employment policy, how to improve working conditions in the EC, how to define fundamental principles for EC social security, how to democratize the economy and the EC's institutions, and so on.

At the close of the congress, the parties adopted a seminal document that listed a series of 'Theses for a Social Europe'; it was a collection of broad principles and more concrete proposals for the creation of a 'European social union'.³⁹ The preamble to the twenty-page document announced the general inspiration of their proposals:

The socialist parties in the countries of the European Community are in favour of a united Europe. They believe that this Europe can only be a social Europe. In all areas of European policy, social objectives must be taken as a starting point. A purely economic and monetary policy can only be fragmentary if it is not inspired by the objectives of a European social union. Improving the living and working conditions of Europeans must be the criterion for all political action.⁴⁰

The fundamental principles of Europe's social policy as outlined by the socialist parties started with the assertion that 'the European Community must become a region of the world at the forefront of social progress' and 'must not be a

³⁷ HAEU, GSPE-USPEC-131.

³⁸ 'Le Congrès des Partis socialistes de la Communauté,' *Agence Europe*, 30 April–1 May 1973.

³⁹ HAEU, GSPE-131, 'Pour une Europe sociale', 26–7 April 1972.

⁴⁰ HAEU, GSPE-131, 'Pour une Europe sociale', 1 (author's translation).

Europe of banks and industrial groups. It must be at the service of workers.' They reiterated in part the broad vision of social Europe put forward by Brandt during the October 1972 Paris Summit: European integration should become a motor for a social and democratic Europe guaranteeing security, freedom, equality, social justice, and improved working and living conditions, taking into account that 'growth must be oriented towards social objectives.' Fulfilling these objectives, the document stated, implied efforts at the EC level and coordination of member states' policies, and presupposed increased solidarity of workers in the EC. Indeed, as a result of economic integration:

The social problems and conflicts arising in any region of the Community no longer concern only the Member States involved. European solidarity is a necessity because the fate of each and every worker is increasingly dependent on the development, in social terms, of the Community as a whole.⁴¹

Therefore, in view of the elaboration of the EC's future social action programme, the socialist parties affirmed their will to take on the 'historical task' of reinforcing this solidarity and affirming the political weight of workers in the EC: 'Workers and their representatives in political parties and trade unions must actively contribute to the definition of Community policy.' Moreover, they asserted their vision of social Europe based on cohesion, justice, and freedom as 'the basis of external European solidarity with the Third World'.

The first heading of the socialist parties' proposals concerned the right to work—understood as guaranteed full and stable employment, equal professional opportunities for all and suppression of discriminations, and employment opportunities that meet the skills and aspirations of the workers. To implement this right, the parties affirmed that 'planning and democratic control are indispensable in the Community at all levels of the economy' and should be formulated in collaboration with trade unions. Therefore, to ensure the right to work, the Bonn Theses first advocated a democratization of the EC's institutions: the EESC and the SCE should be made more representative and more influential. In addition, they proposed the creation of a central European Labour Office whose task would be to survey and inform on the trends of the labour markets in Europe. Moreover, they held that freedom of movement for workers within the EC—which should be a right, not a social constraint—should be backed by a coordinated employment policy, the right to information on employment opportunities, access to vocational training, labour protection, and social security. To ensure freedom of movement and protect workers from economic and structural changes, measures that needed to be considered by the EC included: workers' protection against mass dismissal;

⁴¹ HAEU, GSPE-131, 'Pour une Europe sociale', 2 (author's translation).

the definition of legal conditions at the European level for collective conventions and protection agreements in cases of restructuring, applying to European and multinational companies; an efficient European vocational training policy; eased intervention of the ESF regarding employment problems and to help structural change; and better coordination of the (forthcoming) Regional Fund, the ESF, agricultural funds, and the Investment Bank. Importantly, the parties advocated orienting capital investment towards under-industrialized and high-unemployment regions. Finally, the parties advocated a common policy regarding workers from third countries, who should benefit from the same social and economic rights as other workers, and favoured the transfer of industrial equipment in tier countries from where foreign workers migrated.⁴²

The second broad ambition was to work for a ‘humanization of the environment’. The inhumane work pace and working conditions on the assembly line had been one of the main sparks of the revival of working-class militancy since the 1960s.⁴³ European socialists therefore deemed it urgent to adapt machines and techniques to the needs and abilities of workers, not the other way around. Concretely, the parties advocated: a drastic increase of investment in research on the social organization of work; strengthening protection of women and young people at work; improving security at work and improving the quality of the workplace environment; defining binding minimal norms for health and security at work at EC level to avoid social dumping (in collaboration with the ILO); planning environmental protection at the EC and international level to improve living conditions, including through orienting public and private investments; applying the ‘polluter pays’ principle; investing in non-polluting products and clean technologies (through Euratom), and setting European minimal environmental norms for production.

Regarding social security in Europe, the parties outlined a third set of proposals. It proposed to adopt a ‘Charter of fundamental social principles’ that should become the basis for ulterior development of social security in the EC, in the framework of the future social action programme. For instance, the charter would state: that there can be no more blind spots in social security in Europe (social security regimes should be extended to all those who could not then access them); that in the event of sickness, invalidity, old age, and unemployment, or in other similar circumstances, social benefits must make it possible to maintain the standard of living acquired through employment; that social benefits must be constantly adapted to the increase in the economic potential of the member

⁴² The question was raising increasing tensions within the EC. See Emmanuel Comte, *The History of the European Migration Regime: Germany’s Strategic Hegemony*, Routledge Studies in Modern European History 47 (Abingdon: Routledge, 2018), 110–42.

⁴³ For two fascinating literary illustrations of how the worsening conditions on the assembly line stirred increasing conflict in the car industry in Italy and France, see Nanni Balestrini, *Vogliamo tutto: Romanzo* (Rome: DeriveApprodi, 2004); Linhart Robert, *L’Établi* (Paris: Éditions de Minuit, 1978).

states; that health protection should be guaranteed to all; that people with mental and physical disabilities had a right to a complete system of medical, professional, and social retraining to enable their social participation; that those who were experiencing particularly difficult living conditions should all have access to public aid. This Charter would not imply uniformity of member states' social regimes but a 'qualitative approximation, in progress, of social security regimes of the Community'. Moreover, 'European social planning' should be established through the new 'European social budget' (as proposed by the German government; see Chapter 3), which should serve as a tool to guide social expenditure in Europe, as well as economic and financial policies in accordance with social goals.

Another crucial aim of the parties was to set 'social guidelines for an income policy' that would enforce one of the backbones of social Europe: 'equitable repartition and security of incomes', aiming to increase workers' incomes as much as social benefits and public services. Since economic forces alone cannot ensure social justice in the distribution of incomes and wealth, the parties affirmed that intervention was needed to avoid the concentration of wealth in few hands. The document remained very vague on which kind of intervention was required: it mentioned a more progressive taxation system and social contributions system, a rethinking of the subvention systems within the economic policies of member states and at the EC level, and the acquisition of statistical data on all incomes as a first step towards an efficient income policy. Such an incomes policy should apply not only to waged workers but also to self-employed workers (including farmers) and to all types of incomes (profits, dividends, etc.). Understood in this way, the incomes policy advocated by socialist parties in their seminal document had little to do with the anti-inflationary incomes policies attempted by several European governments during the 1960s and 1970s, which were primarily aimed at containing wages and prices.⁴⁴ Although it remained unclear how this incomes policy should rely on EC intervention, the socialist parties were indicating an ambitious proposal to coordinate member states' fiscal and investment policies towards wealth redistribution.

Finally, two questions were particularly critical keystones for the socialist parties' 'Theses for a Social Europe': democratization of the economy and economic planning. The theme of economic democratization was, of course, another response to the revival of workers' unrest since the late 1960s: shopfloor initiatives, wildcat strikes, factory occupations, and experiments in worker-management—such as the emblematic occupations of the Fiat Mirafiori plant in northern Italy in March 1973 and of the worker-managed Lip company in eastern France a few months

⁴⁴ Against the social and economic inconveniences caused by mounting inflationary pressures since the 1960s, consultation of trade unions and employers under government auspices were sought in several countries in order to favour 'voluntary incomes policy' instead of compulsory incomes policies or deflationary policies, which were highly unpopular with left-wing parties and trade unions. See Sassoon, *One Hundred Years of Socialism*, 365–6.

later—expressed the workers' will not just to improve job security, wages, and working conditions, but to have a greater influence in the structure of organization and decision making at work.

The theme of workers' participation in decision making had become one of the mainstays of trade unions and of socialist parties after 1968. In Sweden, demands for industrial democracy were first driven by the unions affiliated to the Swedish Trade Union Confederation (LO) and stirred by the wildcat strikes of 1969–70 (including in the state-owned iron mines of Kiruna). Swedish social democrats and unionists gradually took over this new goal and started arguing that, as the party had achieved political democratization after the First World War and social democratization with the welfare measures of the post-Second World War period, the time was now ripe for a move towards 'economic democratization'.⁴⁵ As in other Scandinavian countries, unions and social-democratic parties embraced demands for 'co-determination' (workers' right to information and to participating in workplace decisions and firms' management bodies), and employee participation in collective ownership. In Germany, after the widespread wildcat strikes of 1969 and under pressure from union leaders with the backing of the SPD, the government promised to extend *Mitbestimmung* (co-determination) in industry to match the system that had operated in the coal and steel industries since the early 1950s. In France, workers' control was one of the strongest themes to survive the students' and workers' protests; important segments of the non-communist Left, beginning with the CFDT and the PSU, a left-wing secession of the former SFIO, and extending to the left of the Socialist Party, believed in *autogestion* (self-management) as an alternative to the authoritarian socialism of the East and the welfare capitalism of the West, both seen as paternalistic.⁴⁶ In all cases, the basic aim was empowering the workforce and combating concentration of economic power by encouraging greater shopfloor democracy: establishing and strengthening workers' and trade union representation at plant and company level.

A result of this labour militancy, at the turn of the 1970s new legislation and collective agreements had strengthened (although with significant national differences and limitations) trade union representation and works councils in several western European countries: in West Germany through the 1972 Works Constitution Act, in the Netherlands with the 1971 Works Councils Act, in Belgium through a new national agreement in 1970, in Italy with the 1970 Workers' Statute, in Denmark with the 1970 National Cooperative Agreement.⁴⁷

⁴⁵ See Rudolf Meidner, 'Our Concept of the Third Way: Some Remarks on the Socio-Political Tenets of the Swedish Labour Movement', *Economic and Industrial Democracy* 1 (1980).

⁴⁶ John T. Callaghan, *The Retreat of Social Democracy* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2000), 54–82; Pierre Rosanvallon, *L'âge de l'autogestion* (Paris: Seuil, 1976).

⁴⁷ See in general Herman Knudsen, *Employee Participation in Europe* (London: SAGE, 1995).

The question of economic democratization was the subject of much discussion and study within international trade unionism and socialism during those years.⁴⁸ At the time of Mansholt's proposals for a 'Modern Socialism' and for an alternative type of European integration, for instance, debates had taken place within European socialist networks. Questioning the private ownership of the means of production, Mansholt was advocating controlled production, central European economic planning, and, as a counterpart to this centralization, the implementation of a 'new kind of democracy'. When he met with the SGEP and the Office of the Socialist Parties of the European Community in May 1972, Mansholt had explained:

We must therefore provide for another society, in which planning, programming and also execution at European level will be instituted [...] I believe that, if we are forced, on the one hand, to accept, whether we like it or not, directed economy and distribution and controlled production, we must find the counterpart in a new type of democracy with greater human responsibility, at general level but also at local and regional level as well as at corporate level.⁴⁹

These ideas triggered quite some enthusiasm within European socialist circles. However, there were among the European Left—and among European socialists themselves—various different ways of understanding economic democratization, from the implementation of neo-corporatist structures of collective bargaining, plans for workers' access to information, and participation in decisions at plant and company board level, to plans for workers' co-ownership of companies and capital sharing, or in other cases economic planning and widespread nationalization of key economic sectors, and so on. Plans for economic democratization were also sometimes imagined coupled with an incomes policy and other mechanisms of wage constraint.⁵⁰

In particular, two different 'models' dominated and opposed each other in western Europe: the *cogestion* (co-management or co-determination) model that prevailed in Germany and the *autogestion* (self-management) model that was particularly trendy among French workers and socialists at the time. These contrasting models echoed contrasting ideas of the road to socialism and the

⁴⁸ From the mid-1960s, in the framework of the discussions on a European company law, the ECFTU/ETUC set up a working group called 'Democratization of the economy', and issued on 15 April 1970 a press release on its vision of workers' participation, following a German-inspired dual model of co-management. HAEU, GSPE-051-FR-A, 'Communication: La Cogestion dans la société anonyme européenne'; HAEU, GSPE-057-FR-A, 'Colloque européen de 1974: La Participation au centre des discussions', 4 July 1974.

⁴⁹ HAEU, GSPE-054-FR, 'Réunion exceptionnelle du groupe socialiste et du Bureau des partis socialistes de la Communauté européenne: Exposé de Sicco L. Mansholt', Brussels, 29 May 1972, here pp. 77–8 (author's translation).

⁵⁰ See also on this Andrew Glyn, *Capitalism Unleashed: Finance Globalization and Welfare* (Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press, 2006), 18 and following.

crucial question of the ownership and control of the means of production: broadly, self-management assumed a decentralised form of economic planning, with key sectors of the economy nationalized, and the control and management of private enterprises transferred to the workers organized in workers' councils, whereas 'co-management' was premised on giving equal weight to employers' as to workers' representatives within works councils, therefore proportionally advantaging the employers and underrepresenting the workers.

In their Bonn document, the socialist parties of the EC defined economic democratization very broadly, as a profound reorganization of the decision-making structures in the public and private sectors and in institutions, so as to ensure that workers intervene in all decisions of all sectors of the economy, from the company to the local, regional, national, and EC levels. Regarding democracy in firms, the document followed the codetermination model:

Employee participation requires a modern status of the company. In all companies, a works council must be set up with a right, guaranteed by law, to participate and co-manage in the interest of workers. This right must cover all social, personnel or economic issues that arise in the company. On the social level, the works council's right of co-management must humanize working conditions and the worker's relations with the company. Regarding personnel, the right of workers to participate must ensure that their legitimate interests, both individually and collectively, are fully respected as regards personnel management, vocational training and certain individual measures (recruitment, dismissal, reunification). On the economic level, the right of co-management and the right to information of employees must enable their representatives to be informed in a timely and thorough manner of any changes made to the company and to be involved in actions to deal with the social consequences of these changes. Employees must be represented in the company's management bodies. Where a supervisory board exists, workers and employers must be represented on it on the basis of equal rights and votes. Any third party, member of the Supervisory Board, must enjoy the confidence of both workers and employers or be appointed by both on a parity basis. Only in this way can employee participation in company decisions be commensurate with their importance in terms of capital, the responsibilities they assume in the company and the risks inherent, for them, in terms of material and living conditions, to the company's fate.⁵¹

This question, however, occasioned profound divergences between the supporters of co-management, such as the German and Dutch social democrats, and those who rejected it, including the French and Italian delegations. Although all parties

⁵¹ HAEU, GSPE-131, 'Pour une Europe sociale', 26-7 April 1972, here pp. 15-16 (author's translation).

agreed that workers' *control* over enterprises—especially large enterprises and multinationals—should be enhanced, they disagreed on how to actually implement it. In his intervention during the congress, Mitterrand underlined that each country should proceed according to its own socio-economic reality: 'Co-management can mean great progress if it results in increased control by workers, but for the French Socialist Party the term "control" cannot be confused with "co-management" or "participation", concepts which, in France, have been used to the advantage of employers.'⁵²

In order to overcome those divergences (and the tensions that had characterized the relations between the PS and the SPD in previous years), French and German socialists decided that the problem would be discussed directly by the party leaders during a bilateral meeting: Brandt would receive the visit of a delegation of the PS led by Mitterrand in Bonn a few weeks later, in May 1973.⁵³ In the meantime, a footnote—which was, however, no point of detail—was introduced in the adopted text that clarified the position of the French socialists on the issue:

the French Socialist Party believes that the march towards economic democracy does not require co-management in private companies. On this point, it is in full agreement with all the French trade union organizations. It advocates the extension of nationalizations with the decentralization of their management and, in the private sector, the increase of workers' powers of information and control. The originality of its position is to place itself in the perspective of self-management within the framework of democratic planning.⁵⁴

The Italian socialists, who were also on the left of the European social-democratic family at the time, also had some reserves on this issue. The PSI therefore also demanded the insertion of a footnote outlining its understanding of workers' control as an objective to be attained through democratic planning. The Italian addendum stated:

The PSI is in Italy against those forms of worker participation which tend to place workers in a subordinate position in the hierarchy of managerial responsibility. For the PSI democratization of the economy must be achieved via democratic planning for the development of employment and incomes, capable of devising ways and means of intervening to control and channel investments and to adjust the production programmes of the major companies (including subsidiaries of

⁵² 'Divergences franco-allemandes au IXe Congrès des partis sociaux-démocrates de la Communauté, *Le Monde*, 29–30 April 1973 (author's translation).

⁵³ See Judith Bonnin, *Les Voyages de François Mitterrand: Le PS et le monde (1971–1981)*, Histoire (Rennes: Presses universitaires de Rennes, 2019), ch. 4.

⁵⁴ HAEU, GSPE-131, 'Pour une Europe sociale', 26–7 April 1972, p. 15 (author's translation).

multinational undertakings) to the objectives of economic and social development set by society as a whole: the contribution and weight of the workers' movement must be decisive in shaping these instruments.⁵⁵

In fact, these footnotes hardly concealed that very different conceptions conflicted at the Bonn Congress regarding economic democratization, workers' control, and reorganization of power and ownership structures within the economy. To try and unpick this disagreement, the final version of the 'Theses for a Social Europe' specified that there was no incompatibility between *cogestion* in a firm or an workplace and the workers' position as a 'force counterbalancing that of the employers'.⁵⁶ On the contrary, it said, institutionalized participation and co-management would strengthen the influence of trade union representatives in the interest of workers. It is clear that the German social democrats not only took the initiative of organizing the Bonn Congress and proposed the draft common declaration, but also managed to broadly impose its views and its programme for a social Europe on its European partners.⁵⁷ Eventually, the French and Italian parties abstained during the vote on the Bonn Theses, thereby undermining the impact of the common text.⁵⁸

In sum, as emphasized the following day by the British newspaper *The Times*, the two-day congress of European socialist parties 'served to make it clear that socialism had a long way to go before it acquires a European identity'. Aside from the British Labour Party's refusal to participate, indeed, disagreements were evident not only regarding workers' participation: the Irish Labour Minister Michael O'Learly, for instance, lamented that the document did not even mention the problem of inflation, which should have been central to the socialists' European policy.⁵⁹ Despite these 'wide rifts', however, with the adoption of the 'Theses for a Social Europe', the socialist parties became the sole political movement to possess a social programme in readiness for the following year's work on social policy in the Commission. Indeed, they were finally formulating some common lines for the realization of socialism throughout Europe. Although they remained vague and sometimes timid, their proposals outlined an alternative Europe based on

⁵⁵ HAEU, GSPE-058-EN, 'Extract of the Resolution Adopted at the 9th Congress of the Socialist Parties of the European Community in Bonn on 26th and 27th April 1973'.

⁵⁶ HAEU, GSPE-131, 'Pour une Europe sociale', 26-7 April 1972, p. 15 (author's translation).

⁵⁷ Compare, for instance, the Bonn Theses with the German proposals contained in: HAEU, GSPE-USPEC-131, 'Auf dem Weg zu einem sozialen Europa', article by Rudi Adams, who was also the author of Rudi Adams, *Sozial- und Gesellschaftspolitik in der Europäischen Gemeinschaft* (Bonn-Bad Godesberg: Verlag Neue Gesellschaft, 1973). Also HAEU, GSPE-USPEC-131, 'Speech by Helmut Rohde (State Secretary of West Germany for Labour and Social Affairs) at the 9th Congress in Bonn: "Für ein Soziales Europa"'.
⁵⁸ IISH, CSPEC-18, 'Document d'information: "La Coopération entre les PSCE" par Helga Köhnen (d'après un article paru dans *Neue Gesellschaft*, 6/76)'. The Danish delegation was also reserved regarding the document: IISH, CSPEC-8, 'Social Democracy in Denmark'.

⁵⁹ Dan van der Vat, 'Wide Rifts in European Socialism', *The Times*, 28 April 1973.

wealth redistribution not only between regions but also between social classes (through progressive taxation, investment control, economic planning, income security, increased welfare, and enhancement of redistributive EC funds); economic democratization at all levels of the economy; increased social, fiscal, economic, and environmental coordination at European level (with the help of the 'European social budget'); increased social rights (equal opportunities, access to vocational training, health and security at work, income maintenance, equal access to social security for all (guaranteed with the 'social charter') and the right to work); and a 'humanizing' environmental policy to improve living and working conditions in Europe. Importantly, this programme did not rely on the merging of the national welfare states into a supranational European welfare state; it relied both on some new competences at the EC level and on increased transnational social and economic coordination of European governments.

Besides, although it inevitably came down to the lowest common denominator and although it was not binding for the parties, the drafting of the common platform had indeed served to highlight the differences among parties, thus providing potentially a starting point for the elaboration of a European socialist programme and strategy. It was the first time that the socialists of the EC had met to discuss a specific policy issue. By focusing on policies rather than tackling an ambitious plan to create a supranational European socialist party, the organizers hoped to bring all socialist parties, including the absent British Labour Party, around to the idea that a socialist Europe was possible on the condition that they joined forces. Beyond this, they ambitioned to build and lead a left-wing alliance, perhaps even a new hegemonic social bloc including the 'Old' and 'New' Left, for its realization. Indeed, the road towards European social union was described as 'a challenge to all progressive forces of the Community', for which better cooperation between socialist parties was needed.⁶⁰ 'It is with a view to this struggle for a social Europe', the manifesto ended, 'that the socialist parties call on all Europeans.' This social Europe would aspire to suppress all discrimination and build a more 'humane' society, and would therefore, the socialists believed, appeal not only to European workers but also to European youth, to women, those with disabilities, and the elderly, among others. Would European socialists be able to influence the elaboration of the EC's new social action programme and the parallel emergence of social union and EMU? Would they be able to organize beyond the borders of the nation, create alliances, and trigger a struggle of 'all Europeans' for an alternative, social Europe? Those would prove to be decisive questions for the years to come.

⁶⁰ HAEU, GSPE-131, 'Pour une Europe sociale', 26-7 April 1972, p. 18 (author's translation).

The Social Action Programme

The social Europe project that emanated essentially from socialist parties and trade unions (the communists were lagging behind in this regard), benefiting from particular engagement from German social democrats and Brandt's government, made its way through the institutions of the EC and impacted their new social proposals. In particular, following the initiative of the German government and the commitment taken by the heads of state and government at the October 1972 Paris Summit, the EC started working on formulating a Social Action Programme (SAP) that was supposed to be implemented in parallel to the implementation of the plan for EMU. Unsurprisingly, the institutional debate on the adoption of this SAP was therefore seen by the European Left as a crucial opportunity to flesh out its proposals for a 'social union' and to change the nature of European integration, placing economic integration finally at the service of social goals, and not vice versa. With the concomitant strengthening of the Left at the EC level, the social-democratic governments in the Council, the left-wing officials in the Commission and deputies in the EP, and the newly enlarged ETUC in different consultative instances of the EC, were particularly active in pushing forward this new design—albeit with only limited results.

The trade unions' initial hopes to be formally included in the elaboration of the new proposals were quickly disappointed. Seizing the opportunity offered by the commitment taken at the Paris Summit regarding the 'increasing involvement of labour and management in the economic and social decisions of the Community', the trade unions had immediately demanded the organization of a tripartite social conference prior to the drafting of the SAP. This proposal had been accepted by the Council, which had charged the Commission with producing a first draft proposal to be discussed in a tripartite conference to take place before the summer of 1973, after which the Commission would submit its final proposals in the Autumn. However, the tripartite conference that was supposed to take place in Luxembourg—first in April, then in May, then on 28 and 29 June—and should have played a key role in the shaping of the SAP, never took place. Its organization encountered various difficulties linked to a conflict between the ETUC and the Council on the distribution of seats, similar to what had occurred with the first tripartite conference and the creation of the SCE in 1970–1. Unable to win its case, the ETUC refused to take part in the conference, which was hence cancelled.⁶¹

⁶¹ The Council insisted on the inclusion of some sectorial and national trade unions and rejected the ECFTU/ETUC's demand to revise the distribution of seats and to only include the EC-level organizations—ECFTU/ETUC, EO-WCL, and until 1974 CGT-CGIL. This problem, together with the TUC boycott of EC organs, led to a standstill of the SCE's functioning between 27 October 1972 and 16 February 1975 (for more than twenty-seven months) until in 1975 the Council decided to revise its rules on seat distribution. See Gobin, 'Consultation et concertation sociales à l'échelle de la Communauté économique européenne', 436–49.

This missed opportunity was a hard blow to the unions, especially for the newly enlarged ETUC which was struggling to establish its influence over EC decision making and to convince its new largest member, the British TUC, to stop boycotting European institutions and support the project of a social Europe. Moreover, it constituted an important breach in the drafting of the SAP. As a result, even the EP and its socialist deputies, who had demanded to take part in the conference, remained excluded from this preparatory phase.⁶² Despite the cancellation of the social conference, however, the ETUC continued tirelessly to work its contacts with the Commission in order to keep communicating its views on the proposal, through several consultation meetings starting in November 1972, letters to Commission and Council members, and the publication of different position papers.

Notwithstanding these difficulties, on 18 April 1973 (a few days before the socialist parties adopted their 'Bonn Theses') the Commission presented its 'Guidelines for the social action programme' to the Council, which structured the SAP around three objectives—full and better employment; improvement of living and working conditions; and participation of the 'social partners' in the economic and social decisions of the EC. It presented thirty-two action proposals for a European social policy within those three axes, which were to be applied between 1974 and 1976 as 'the implementation of the first phase of European social union', to be completed in parallel and no later than the conclusion of the second stage of EMU. Although it remained vague and cautious on most points, the document was undoubtedly the most innovative and ambitious proposal ever put forward by the Commission until then, and certainly proposed important steps forward beyond the mere application of the treaties. The actions included, for instance, EC contributions to employment premiums for the creation of new jobs in underdeveloped or declining regions; the creation of a European centre for vocational training; measures to give migrant workers assurances on social protection, and reception facilities including training, education, and housing; income maintenance for workers in re-adaptation and seeking a new job or elderly workers forced into premature retirement; the creation of a permanent body in charge of coordinating national employment services; the creation of an EC system of information on wealth and income distribution in order to ensure a fairer repartition of wealth; the examination of the question of minimum wages; the implementation of the principle of equal pay between men and women; the improvement of asset formation by workers; the strengthening of the 'European social budget' to improve harmonization of the member states' social policies; the examination of the possibility of introducing EC support for unemployment benefits; the setting up of pilot schemes of social housing, especially for migrant workers; the realization of studies aimed at the abolition of chain-work; the creation of a European

⁶² HAEP, PE0-AP-PV/ASOC.1973-ASOC-197305150010, 'Commission des affaires sociales et du travail: Procès-verbal de la réunion des 15 et 16 mai 1973'.

foundation for the improvement of the environment; adoption of measures for security at work; measures to apply workers' participation in European company law; regular organization of tripartite consultations at EC level; and the extension of sectoral joint committees with the object of preparing binding collective agreements on an EC level.⁶³

The Commission's guidelines, although they took up some of the proposals formulated by the German government at the Paris Summit, by the ETUC and by the socialist parties, received generally mixed reactions from the European Left. The ETUC expressed its support for the Commission's proposals in a memorandum released on 15 May, but put forward ten priority objectives, such as adopting full and better employment as a politically binding objective, ensuring income in case of job loss, improving security at work, implementing equality between women and men, creating a European centre for vocational training, applying equal economic and social rights for migrant workers, instituting binding collective conventions at EC level, increasing workers' participation at all levels, and improving information, consultation, and participation of workers in the management of multinational companies. Importantly, it also insisted that this social programme could only be effective if combined with planned and politically managed economic development, which was not explicitly mentioned by the Commission's document.⁶⁴ In a new document presented in October before the Commission released its final proposal, the ETUC further detailed the priorities already put forward in May, and insisted further on the need to include in the SAP an EC policy on price and speculation control to fight against inflation. It mentioned new claims including control over multinationals' activities through socio-economic information transparency, the need to extend industrial democracy to private financial institutions (banks and credit agencies), suppression of national restrictions to striking rights, protection of workers against all kinds of dismissals (particularly in the case of international mergers), upward harmonization of social security systems, and so on. This text adopted a tone of trade union militancy that was distinctly stronger than that which had previously characterized the organization's rhetoric.⁶⁵ It emphasized particularly the demand that the Council acknowledge full and better employment as a priority political goal, and the realization by the EC of an equitable redistribution of all incomes and wealth to tone down disparities.

⁶³ Historical Archive of the European Commission (HAEC), 22/1995-1, 'Orientations du programme d'action sociale présentées par la Commission au Conseil, le 18 avril 1973 (COM (73) 520 final)'.
⁶⁴ IISH, ETUCA-1882, CES, 'Memorandum: Programme d'action sociale de la Communauté européenne', Brussels, 15 May 1973; see Gobin, 'Consultation et concertation sociales à l'échelle de la Communauté économique européenne', 452-3.

⁶⁵ As already pointed out in Gobin, 'Consultation et concertation sociales à l'échelle de la Communauté économique européenne', 454-5. See IISH, ETUCA-1883, CES, 'Déclaration sur la question d'un Programme d'action sociale de la CE et affaires connexes', 10 October 1973.

On 24 October, the Commission adopted its final proposal; it contained a slightly increased number of actions which were more detailed and ordered in terms of priority.⁶⁶ Among the most urgent actions were listed: a directive concerning the implementation of equal pay for men and women; the creation of a European foundation for the improvement of the environment and working and living conditions; a directive on the harmonization of the laws of the member states concerning mass dismissals; the creation of a European centre for vocational training; an action programme for migrant workers guaranteeing access to social security and services; a long-term programme for the social reintegration of people with disabilities; an action programme on industrial safety; an action programme to combat poverty; a directive proposal to increase workers' protection in case of mergers; and a new proposal, in line with the ETUC's demands, on the implementation of the principle of the forty-hour week and of four weeks' annual paid holiday. Compared to the first guidelines, many of the most ambitious proposals were either watered down—such as the proposal for EC support to unemployment benefits and the abolition of chain-work—or relegated to 'complementary' actions, for which there was no definite time commitment, such as the questions of a redistribution of wealth and income, social housing, minimum wage, asset formation for workers, and workers' participation. Notwithstanding these reservations, it was the first time that the Commission had ventured into presenting *directive* proposals—not just recommendations—regarding a series of social matters that up to then had been the exclusive domain of the member states and expressed its intention to extend the EC's social competences on the basis of article 235 of the Treaty of Rome, which signalled a real intention to extend its social action and to tackle social and employment issues through binding normative action. Besides, this was presented as only a first step in the achievement of European social union.

Unable to participate in the preparation of the SAP before the Commission released its final proposals, the members of SGEP had, however, carefully studied the Commission's guidelines in comparison with the socialist parties' Bonn Theses and with the ETUC position. In a note circulated for discussion to the members of the SGEP's working party on Social Affairs, Environment and Youth, the Dutch PvdA deputy Harry van den Bergh lamented primarily that social policy was merely 'juxtaposed' to the EC's general policy in the framework of EMU, whereas economic and monetary policy should rather be 'subordinated' to the realization of social objectives. Moreover, he considered that more coordination between social and regional policy and a greater coordination between the different common funds and the EIB was necessary, as well as directing public and private investments and capital flows according to social and regional necessities. He

⁶⁶ HAEC, 129/1983–41, 'Programme d'action sociale (présenté par la Commission au Conseil), 24 octobre 1973 (COM (73) 1600 final)'.

welcomed the Commission's mention of redistribution of income and wealth, and advocated more emphasis on this point, in accordance with the Bonn 'Theses for a Social Europe'. Finally, he advocated much more ambitious proposals to guarantee workers' participation at all levels of the economy, including control over banks and private financial institutions.⁶⁷

The EP discussions on the SAP at the end of 1973 vented patent disappointment with the Commission's proposal, not just among the members of the Left. The trade unions had expressed their disappointment during a hearing organized by the Social Affairs Committee on 30 October 1973; the ETUC, EO-WCL, and CGT-CGIL were lukewarm, if not plainly hostile towards the Commission's proposal, considered as 'a haphazard listing of unrelated ideas'.⁶⁸ The Social Affairs Committee regretted the 'obvious inadequacies and shortcomings' of the Commission's proposal, in particular concerning financial resources and overall consistence.⁶⁹ During the plenary debate in December, the general feeling was that the Commission's proposal fell short of the expectations raised since the Paris Summit. Italian communist MEP Luigi Marras was particularly eloquent in this respect: 'The path of European social policy—make no mistake about it—has been like the path of a crab, moving sideways and backwards. We started off with grand proposals and we finished by setting out a limited series of actions without any general framework.'⁷⁰ As expressed even by the Irish centrist-conservative Fine Gael MEP Charles McDonald:

We do not find in this document the same energy and commitment which was devoted to the question of economic and monetary policy. We do not find in this document mechanisms by which economic expansion can be translated into improved living standards. We do not find in this document an explanation of how social policy should be the yardstick and should influence the vital policy areas. Indeed, even within this document itself, we find something of a contradiction between the main objectives of the policy—the attainment of full employment, the improving of living and working conditions, and the extension of participation—and the concrete proposals which are put forward under each of these heads.⁷¹

⁶⁷ HAEU, GSPE-056-FR, 'Note à l'attention des membres du Groupe socialiste', 10 October 1973.

⁶⁸ AHPE, PE0 AP PV/ASOC.1973 ASOC-197310300010, 'Committee on Social Affairs and Employment: Minutes of the meeting of Tuesday, 30 October and Wednesday, 31 October 1973'. The quotation is from Théo Rasschaert, Secretary-General of the ETUC.

⁶⁹ AHPE, PE0 AP RP/ASOC.1973 A0-0256/730010, 'Report on the Social Action Programme submitted by the Commission of the EC to the Council (Doc. 216/73)', rapporteur Luigi Girardin (Christian Democrat), 6 December 1973.

⁷⁰ AHPE, PE0 AP DE/1973 DE19731210-019900, 'Séance du 10 décembre 1973: Programme d'action sociale' (author's translation).

⁷¹ AHPE, PE0 AP DE/1973 DE19731210-019900, 'Séance du 10 décembre 1973: Programme d'action sociale'.

When the discussions on the SAP took place in the EP, although the Right dominated the chamber, the SGEP was one of the largest groups with fifty-one deputies, almost placed equal with the Christian democrats. Although it suffered from the boycott of the British Labour Party that lasted until July 1975, it could count on the occasional support of the thirteen members of the new Communist Group, and from some centre-left deputies (social Christian, social liberal or social Gaullist) to support its proposals. On 13 November 1973, Brandt had visited the EP in Strasbourg; it was a particularly noteworthy visit, as it was the first time that a head of state had attended a session of the EP and a meeting of the SGEP.⁷² During his speech in front of the plenary, Brandt presented his idea of Europe's role and place in the world at the forefront of social progress and insisted on the need for a social policy at European level, for a common energy policy, and for an institutional reform of the EC that would enhance the powers of the EP and launch 'European Council' summitry. Once again, Brandt was putting forward his idea of the future 'European Union' that comprised three interwoven and indispensable components: EMU, social union, and political union.⁷³

Notwithstanding the meagre (merely consultative) powers of the EP back then, the members of the SGEP tried to relay the 'social Europe' project during the discussions on the SAP and managed to impose their view to a fairly large extent, both at the level of the parliamentary committee and in plenary debates. Convinced that the Commission's proposal lacked audacity and could only be considered as a first, minimal step towards 'social Europe', in the Social Affairs Committee, they put forward many amendments to shape the resolution of the EP with a view to shaping the Council's decision, most of which were passed. The socialists mainly demanded that the resolution insist on equitable redistribution of incomes and wealth and on workers' participation in enterprises, and on better articulation of social goals with all fields of Community policy. Concretely, they introduced new paragraphs asking the Commission not merely to undertake statistical work regarding wealth redistribution but to put forward proposals for a European incomes policy before 1 January 1975, to undertake a study on the effects of fiscal and welfare systems on wealth repartition in each member state, and to add to its priority actions measures regarding minimum wages, minimum pensions, and asset-building policies. Moreover, they added to the resolution that EC tools should be adopted to combat the causes of migrations at their roots, because movement of labour could only be considered as 'free' if it was not forced for socio-economic reasons. Furthermore, an important amendment passed by the SGEP—despite opposition by the German Christian Democrats—was that the

⁷² HAEU, GSPE-056-FR, 'P.V. réunions du GS du PE des 12, 13, 14 et 15 novembre 1973 à Strasbourg'.

⁷³ Speech by Willy Brandt at the EP, in 'Débats du Parlement européen', *Journal officiel des Communautés européennes*, no. 108, 13 November 1973; see Wilkens, *Willy Brandt et l'unité de l'Europe*, 475–6.

common employment policy should rely on member states ‘directing’ investments in coordination with each other and with the ESF and the future regional fund. Finally, they emphasized that an increasing percentage of the EC’s own resources should be devoted to social actions.⁷⁴

The resolution adopted by the EP on 10 December therefore took over those socialist amendments. Besides, following proposals from Italian communists, it recommended EC measures for retirement at the age of sixty and the participation of both sides of industry on the committees which drew up the various EC policies—a reference to the committees on economic policy, budgetary policy, medium-term economic policy, monetary policy, agricultural policy, and regional policy. More generally, it expressed cautious support for the proposed SAP provided that its requests would be taken into account, insisted that a more equitable distribution of income and wealth and the recognition of workers’ right to participate in decisions of the firm should be added to the three broad social objectives outlined by the Commission, insisted that those objectives could only be realized ‘if other Community policies, for example in the economic and monetary, regional, industrial, commercial, competition, and environmental protection fields are simultaneously implemented’, and demanded that an increasing percentage of the EC’s own resources be dedicated to action in the social sector.⁷⁵

Eventually, the decision taken by the Council in January 1974 regarding the SAP was even more watered down than the Commission’s proposal and fell drastically short of the Left’s expectations.⁷⁶ In previous months, whereas the German Labour Minister, the social democrat and former trade unionist Walter Arendt, had lamented the lack of ambition of the Commission’s proposals, Heath and Pompidou both proved sceptical, especially regarding workers’ participation and the possibility of EC support for unemployment benefit.⁷⁷ A result of the reluctance of most member states, the actions taken up by the Council were less ambitious than those presented by the Commission. The adopted SAP included about thirty measures to be implemented before 1976, with nine actions listed as having priority: coordination of employment policies between the member states and coordination between national employment services; an action programme in favour of migrant

⁷⁴ HAEU, GSPE-056-FR, ‘Note aux membres du Groupe socialiste: Quelques remarques de M. Egbert R. Wieldraaijer concernant la résolution de la commission des affaires sociales et du travail sur le programme d’action sociale’, 29 November 1973.

⁷⁵ AHPE, PE0 AP RP/ASOC.1973 A0-0256/730001, ‘Resolution embodying the opinion of the EP on the Social Action Programme submitted by the Commission of the European Communities to the Council’, 9 January 1974 (adopted 10 December 1973).

⁷⁶ ‘Résolution du Conseil du 21 janvier 1974 concernant un programme d’action sociale’, followed by the ‘Déclarations à inscrire au Procès-verbal de la session du Conseil’, *Journal officiel des Communautés européennes*, no. C 13, 12 February 1974.

⁷⁷ Laurent Warlouzet, *Governing Europe in a Globalizing World: Neoliberalism and Its Alternatives Following the 1973 Oil Crisis* (London: Routledge, 2018), 38–9.

workers of member states and third countries; implementation of a common vocational policy and creation of a European centre for vocational training; ensuring equality between men and women at work (equal pay, access to employment, training, and promotion); appropriate consultations between the member states on social protection policies with the aim of their approximation on the way of progress; an action programme for health and safety at work; pilot schemes to combat poverty; progressive involvement of workers or their representatives in the life of undertakings in the EC; and involvement of management and labour in the economic and social decisions of the EC.

The most ambitious measures envisioned by the ETUC, European socialists and communists, and even the Commission did not make their way into the Council resolution, such as the proposal to maintain incomes for workers in vocational retraining and the idea of EC support to unemployment benefits, proposals on minimum wages and pensions, asset building for workers, direction of investment to least favoured areas, a European incomes policy, and wealth redistribution. The commitments to improve the participation of 'social partners' in EC decisions and in enterprises, although they remained vague, were however notable, and so was, for instance, the will to achieve equality of treatment for EC and non-EC migrant workers and members of their families in respect of living and working conditions, wages, and economic rights. But most of the pro-labour redistributive, interventionist, welfare-oriented and democratizing core of the 'social Europe' project supported by the European Left did not appear in the final SAP. Although the SAP constituted the most far-reaching commitment taken by the member states so far to widen the 'social dimension' of the Community since the creation of the EEC in 1957, the end result was visibly falling short of the expectations raised by the heads of state in their declaration at the October 1972 Summit.

There were many reasons for the lack of audacity of the programme adopted in 1974. First, of course, were the difficulties of social dialogue, the cancellation of the tripartite conference, and the hostility of the employers on several points, such as the idea of harmonization of social provisions towards the highest existing level, the question of collective agreements at EC level, participation of workers in the decisions of enterprises, the use of social security as a means of redistributing income, the adoption of interventionist measures favouring employment, a supranational wages policy, the reduction of working time, and equal pay for men and women.⁷⁸ Another reason was changes in the composition of the European Commission and some confusion in the preparation of the final proposal.

⁷⁸ UNICE, 'Second UNICE Memorandum on Social Policy in the EEC', 15 May 1973 (available at <http://aei.pitt.edu/93164/>); HAEP, PE0-AP-PV/ASOC.1973-ASOC-197305150010, 'Commission des affaires sociales et du travail: Procès-verbal de la réunion des 15 et 16 mai 1973'.

Although following the EC's enlargement the new Irish Commissioner for Social Affairs, Patrick Hillery, was criticized for being too accommodating to trade unions' demands, in May 1973 the Belgian socialist Director-General of Social Affairs, Raymond Rifflet, who was strongly committed in favour of a 'Europe of the peoples', was replaced by the British Michael Shanks, who in contrast had close ties to British business spheres (like the industrial gas multinational British Oxygen Company).⁷⁹ In fact, the Commission's final text was likely redrafted at the last minute by Jean Degimbe, a Belgian member of the Ortoli cabinet, who was a former Christian trade unionist but also had close ties with the employers' representatives.⁸⁰ Most importantly, although the German government was pushing for an ambitious SAP, other governments were putting brakes on the project. The Paris Summit had taken place at a time when social mobilization was high in western Europe and when national elections were pending in France, Germany, and the Netherlands—favouring popular commitments. Over a year later, the situation was quite altered.

Indeed, the decision over the SAP took place in a changing socio-economic international context, which differed drastically from the one that prevailed when the October Paris Summit took place. As we saw in Chapter 2, since the late 1960s growth had been slowing down, the international monetary system was increasingly unstable, inflation was rising, and unemployment was re-emerging in western Europe. Moreover, in October 1973 the Yom Kippur war between Israel and the neighbouring Arab states and the ensuing oil embargo proclaimed by the members of the Organization of Arab Petroleum Exporting Countries (OAPEC) pushed the oil-dependent capitalist West into energy crisis, economic recession, and higher inflation. This changing context was double-edged for the 'European social union'. On one hand, the crisis made social intervention and coordination more vital than before, but on the other, it pushed the different governments to be more reluctant towards redistribution measures and towards increasing the social budget of the EC. When the Council resolution on the SAP was adopted in early 1974, the German, Danish, French, Luxembourg, and Dutch delegations explicitly stated in the minutes of the session that the realization of the proposed actions should fall within the available budgetary means, thus ruling out an increase of the social budget of the EC.⁸¹

⁷⁹ Bertrand Vayssière, 'Pour une politique sociale européenne: Les Espoirs et les déceptions de Raymond Rifflet à la direction générale des affaires sociales (1970–5)', *Revue européenne d'histoire* 26, no. 2 (March 2019): 284–304.

⁸⁰ Degimbe explained in a conversation with the author that he almost entirely rewrote the SAP presented by the DGV before presenting it to the collegium of commissioners. See also HAEU, Oral History Fund, INT109, Entretien avec Annette Bosscher par Pierre Tilly, 13 August 2010, about the lack of Commission staff during the elaboration of the SAP.

⁸¹ Gobin, 'Consultation et concertation sociales à l'échelle de la Communauté économique européenne', 458–9.

Furthermore, the implementation of the Werner Plan for the EMU encountered growing difficulties as member states adopted uncoordinated and contrasting economic policies to respond to inflationary pressures and growing monetary instability. The so-called 'monetary snake'—the exchange rate system created on 24 April 1972 to narrow fluctuation margins between EC currencies—was disrupted by the increasing monetary turbulence. By the end of 1973, Britain, Ireland, and Italy had already left the snake; France was to follow in January 1974. Although some efforts were made to overcome this situation and proceed to the second phase of the Werner Plan at the beginning of 1974, its implementation was, albeit unofficially, abandoned over the next year.⁸² This development would clearly impact the social union project, which was conceived from the start as complementary with EMU.

Finally, European socialists lacked a clear strategy to impose their proposals for a social Europe. For a start, although the early 1970s saw a distinct *crescendo* in the European Left's demands for social action, and despite Brandt's activism and the declared ambitions of the Bonn 'Theses for a Social Europe', European socialists remained unable to build a solid alliance of left-wing or 'progressive' forces to support their project. Socialist parties and trade unions remained widely divided on some key questions at the time, such as workers' participation. During the discussions on the SAP in the EP, the SGEP became divided over several proposals—for instance, an amendment presented by the Italian communist Luigi Marras on an EC-wide adoption of sliding-scale wages.⁸³ Since most of their amendments were rejected, the Communist Group eventually abstained in the final vote on the SAP, signalling division on the Left and lukewarm support for the programme. But most importantly, neither European socialists—despite their Bonn declarations on the need to build a struggle of 'all Europeans' for a social Europe—nor any other force of the European Left tried to organize a grassroots movement to support in the streets and in workplaces the proposals that were being moved in the institutions of the EC.

The game was not over obviously, as the SAP adopted by the Council in January 1974 was only a declaration of intent and the concrete actions remained to be defined and adopted later. Besides, it was still intended as a 'first step' to be followed by new, more far-reaching measures. In the following years, in a severely changing context characterized by economic crisis, shifting world balance, but also

⁸² Emmanuel Mourlon-Druol, *A Europe Made of Money: The Emergence of the European Monetary System* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2012), 24–6.

⁸³ HAEU, GSPE-057-FR-A, 'Procès-verbal de la réunion du GSPE, mardi 11 décembre 1973'. German trade unions and social democrats were against the principle of sliding-scale adaptation of salaries to inflation, which was applied in Italy, Belgium, and Luxembourg and was part of the French socialists' common programme of the Left.

persisting social unrest, trade union combativity, and (uneven) left-wing electoral success, the European Left's ability to design a common strategy to uphold its ambitions for a social Europe would be decisive. As the class struggle worsened, the European Left more than ever would need a clear programme, an alliance of progressive forces, and a struggle of all Europeans in order to counter the rise of a neoliberal Europe.

5

There Were Alternatives

Socialists therefore face a choice. On the one hand they can rely on the profit motive which can only operate effectively by abandoning the traditional social democratic goals [...] or they can supplant the private accumulation of capital by far greater state control (and workers' control) [...] than they have so far contemplated.¹

After the 1973 oil shock, the political momentum for a 'social Europe' soon met with an increasingly difficult economic context, pairing decreasing growth and falling investment with increasing rates of inflation—'stagflation'—as well as rising unemployment. The western European economy underwent important transformations in the 1970s: the collapse of Bretton Woods and the return of an unstable system of flexible exchange rates, growing and increasingly unregulated international financial markets such as the Eurodollar market, the saturation of key markets and the turn to 'post-Fordist', diversified, and specialized models of production and consumption, increasing relocation of production to lower-wage and less unionised countries, rising competition from new exporting countries, particularly in Latin America and Asia, and, of course, the rise in the prices of oil and other raw materials. The 1973 and 1979 'oil shocks' and ensuing energy crises were particularly harsh on economies such as the western European ones, which had become increasingly dependent on imported oil; they triggered the world economic recessions of 1974–5 and of the early 1980s and aggravated the picture of a deep, structural economic slowdown in western Europe. The progress of the tertiary sector, both public and private, failed to stop the bleeding. By the end of the decade, western Europe counted 7 million unemployed, two-fifths of them being less than twenty years old. Rising unemployment also contributed to decreasing the states' tax revenues and increasing their expenditures. To use Hobsbawm's expressions, these years saw the end of the 'golden age' and the beginning of an 'age of crisis'.²

¹ IISH, CSPEC-21, 'Draft report of the working group "Employment"', 7 October 1978, here p. 58.

² Eric Hobsbawm, *Age of Extremes: The Short Twentieth Century 1914–1991* (London: Michael Joseph, 1994). See also Derek Howard Aldcroft, *The European Economy 1914–2000* (London: Routledge, 2001), 196–203. On the oil shock and its impact on western Europe, see for instance Elisabetta Bini, Giuliano Garavini, and Federico Romero, *Oil Shock: The 1973 Crisis and Its Economic Legacy* (London; New York: I.B. Tauris & Co. Ltd, 2016); Barry J. Eichengreen, *The European Economy since 1945: Coordinated Capitalism and Beyond* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2006), 246–56.

The crisis highlighted in the eyes of Europeans the interdependence of the world economy. The first 'oil shock', provoked by the Arab countries' decision to use the 'oil weapon' to their advantage, was part of the broader framework of an intensifying conflict between the so-called developed and developing countries; it contributed to creating a sharp sense that a 'crisis of the West' was under way. Meanwhile, while international oil companies greatly benefited from the oil crisis, the ever-rising economic power of big firms and multinational companies was increasingly evident. The role of US multinationals in backing Pinochet's military coup on 11 September 1973 in Chile, which overthrew the Popular Unity government of President Salvador Allende, further underlined this perception. Business attempts to maintain profit margins by capping salaries and resorting to mass layoffs and relocations, and governments' efforts to impose 'neocorporatist' agreements and incomes policies to limit wages met with great resistance in western Europe, which remained the world epicentre of workers' militancy throughout the 1970s, even though their bargaining power was weakened by the economic restructuring.³ As noted by the Secretary General of the French union CFDT in 1975, the vivacity of the labour movement came with a growing awareness of the European and global dimension of its problems:

There are strikes, demonstrations and factory occupations in companies, regions and various professional sectors over demands concerning employment, purchasing power, working conditions, trade union freedoms and living conditions. All this shows a massive refusal of workers to pay the price of the crisis, a refusal to accept austerity. [...] At the same time, all over Western Europe, workers affected to the very depths of themselves, in their living conditions, are currently in the process of giving the indispensable European dimension to class consciousness. Admittedly, in each of our countries, the forms of trade union action are different and marked by the diversity of our history. But all of us touch the limits of trade union action when it does not spill over national borders. There are no longer any national problems that do not have a European and global dimension. There is no longer a completely satisfactory solution at the level of one country alone.⁴

Yet, the short-term solutions adopted by western European governments were anything but coordinated. Each country responded unilaterally, resorting to

³ Beverly J. Silver, *Forces of Labor: Workers' Movements and Globalization since 1870* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 43–54; Colin Crouch and Alessandro Pizzorno, *The Resurgence of Class Conflict in Western Europe since 1968* (London: Macmillan, 1978); Aurélie Andry, 'Was There an Alternative? European Socialists Facing Capitalism in the Long 1970s', *European Review of History/Revue européenne d'histoire* 26, no. 4 (July 2019): 495–8.

⁴ Archives of the French Democratic Confederation of Labour (ACFDT), CH/8/1838, 'Intervention E. Maire—meeting CES Bruxelles le 14 novembre 1975'.

different monetary policies to regulate their trade balance and combat inflation, which in turn induced high fluctuations in exchange rates, creating much chaos in European trade and cooperation. The passage to the second phase of EMU—initially planned for the end of 1973 in the Werner Report—was in fact unofficially abandoned. In the following years, due to increasing monetary turbulence and speculation, the ‘Monetary Snake’ was reduced to a mere skeleton: only West Germany and the Benelux countries resisted throughout the decade. Currency instability threatened not just the Common Market but also the functioning of the CAP, a centrepiece of the EC. As plans for greater European unity encountered considerable difficulties, it was not clear if the project of ‘European social union’—supposed to be implemented ‘in parallel’ to EMU—would endure.

How did the European Left respond to this crisis? The ultimate swing to neo-liberalism over the course of the 1980s has tended to obscure the fact that there were progressive alternatives. The economic crisis added a critical layer to the de-legitimization of the postwar compromise and ‘welfare capitalism’ that had already started with the labour unrest and new social movements of the ‘long 1968s’. Like every crisis, it opened a window of opportunity. As in every crisis, there was no objectively best solution but a range of policy options to choose from.⁵ The options eventually chosen would be the outcome of a political struggle. The second half of the 1970s were marked by a frantic search for new solutions on all sides—including on the Left, where ‘the far-reaching but also very dispersed ideas that inspired left debate in the early 1970s were superseded by more comprehensive strategies that, on the most general level, blended Marxist and Keynesian ideas and aimed at a gradual transition from capitalism to socialism.’⁶ The Left’s new alternative strategies, which presented alternatives both to Keynesian welfare capitalism and to neoliberal capitalism, did not ignore the European dimension. Far from nipping the idea of ‘social Europe’ in the bud, the crisis stimulated ambitious new proposals from European socialists and the broader western European Left, who succeeded in elaborating a fairly shared broad common policy platform for a coordinated European recovery plan to get out of the crisis. The ‘social Europe’ project turned into an even more assertive project that could have challenged, to some extent, the liberal-capitalist nature of European integration and presented an alternative to a ‘neo-liberal’ Europe.

⁵ Peter Gourevitch, *Politics in Hard Times: Comparative Responses to International Economic Crises* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1986).

⁶ Ingo Schmidt, ‘There Were Alternatives: Lessons from Efforts to Advance beyond Keynesian and Neoliberal Economic Policies in the 1970s.’ *WorkingUSA* 14, no. 4 (December 2011): 477.

European Socialism Turns Left

The crisis actually pushed European socialists further to the left. Within the broad political family of western European social democracy, different currents had of course always coexisted, ranging—to schematize—between a more ‘radical’ left wing that remained inspired by Marxist principles to a ‘revisionist’ right wing that had embraced welfare capitalism and won hegemony during the 1950s and 1960s. During the 1970s, this hegemonic tendency experienced a reversal. The ‘Old Left’ was permeated by the ideological thrust that came from the European labour and social movements of 1968—and took over some of their demands, for instance regarding more democracy and environmental concerns—in particular through an influx of newly recruited members in the parties’ youth sections. Across the continent, a strengthening and radicalization of their left-leaning currents was particularly noteworthy. New, radical tendencies were at work in all labour, socialist, and social-democratic parties from the late 1960s onwards—a trend initially intensified by the crisis of the 1970s.⁷ Indeed, as Keynesian economics went into crisis as a discipline—in no small part as a result of an offensive launched by academics, financial economists, international economists, and sometimes conservative economists or economists affiliated to centre-right parties through a ‘stagflation-killed-Keynesianism’ narrative⁸—and with it the foundations of the postwar ‘social-democratic consensus’, European socialists needed new formulas. The changing economic context called for new solutions, and for a time the European Left looked for more radical solutions, reaching beyond Keynesian management and welfare state capitalism. The very question of the relation to capitalism, which had become redundant in the vision of most western European reformist socialists in the postwar era, was reopened.⁹

Nowhere was this more obvious than in the UK, where the Labour Left—increasingly disappointed with Wilson’s Labour government (1964–70) for its wage-restraining incomes policy, costly military presence ‘East of Suez’, and ‘special relationship’ with the US—had been steadily growing since the mid-1960s. During the early 1970s, rising unemployment, increasing inflation, and slowing economic growth, coupled with the new Conservative government’s commitment to deflationary policies, reinforcement of market forces, and a controversial Industrial Relations Act in 1971, prompted massive strike waves and social discontent. Reflecting the mood of the rank-and-file, left-wing trade unionists were elected to leadership positions of some of the biggest trade unions, and the

⁷ On this leftward tendency see, in particular, John T. Callaghan, *The Retreat of Social Democracy* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2000), 54–82.

⁸ Stephanie L. Mudge, *Leftism Reinvented: Western Parties from Socialism to Neoliberalism* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2018).

⁹ Donald Sassoon, *One Hundred Years of Socialism: The West European Left in the Twentieth Century* (London: I.B. Tauris, 1996), 445–8.

Labour Left managed to gain particular influence within the party's National Executive Committee (NEC) and policy-making committees. Within Labour, in the first half of the 1970s, an 'Alternative Economic Strategy' (AES) emerged that centred on reflation policy, wealth redistribution, public ownership of key firms and financial institutions, workplace democracy, economic planning, and industrial reconversion, as well as control over multinational companies, capital flows, and trade exchanges. Leading theoreticians and promoters of this new strategy were Tony Benn, Labour MP and former Cabinet minister, and the economist Stuart Holland, whose 1975 *The Socialist Challenge* was considered the bible of the AES.¹⁰ Alternative strategists considered that the postwar increase and growth of monopolistic, multinational companies had created a new 'meso-economic' sector immune to national Keynesian management and in great part responsible for inflation. Indeed, less than 1 per cent of firms accounted for 50 per cent of the UK's output and foreign trade in 1976—a figure bound to increase in Holland's view—causing a major imbalance between public and private power. Failing to address this problem would only lead the state to endorse increasing inequality, forced as it would be to revert to wage restraint, anti-trade union policies and a dismantling of workers' rights. Instead, he called for workplace democracy, transparency of private firms' finances, and public control of the most profitable companies.

From 1972 until the early 1980s, Labour's programmes reflected this new economic strategy and advocated the creation of a 'National Enterprise Board', nationalization of the UK's top twenty-five firms, and a system of planning agreements extending to major private and public firms. This new thrust was supported in particular by the rank-and-file of the party, the TUC, and other trade unions affiliated to the party, the left-leaning 'Tribune group' of Labour MPs and various groups inside and beyond the party, such as the communists and left-wing academic circles, who were increasingly critical regarding the party's commitment to the revisionist model of Keynesian social democracy, and were putting the fight for the control of the means of production and for economic planning back on the agenda. As we shall see, the new Labour government elected in 1974 with a slim parliamentary majority on an election manifesto that vowed to 'bring about a fundamental and irresistible shift in the balance of power and wealth in favour of working people and their families', would end up ignoring the AES, preferring a policy of wage restraint and spending cuts—but the rank-and-file continued to push left well into the 1980s.¹¹

¹⁰ Stuart Holland, *The Socialist Challenge* (London: Quartet Books, 1975).

¹¹ See Simon Hannah and John McDonnell, *A Party with Socialists in It: A History of the Labour Left* (London: Pluto Press, 2018), 122–63, here p. 145; Callaghan, *The Retreat of Social Democracy*, 55–62; Patrick Seyd, *The Rise and Fall of the Labour Left* (London: Macmillan Education, 1987).

In France, the profound social discontent that began to explode in May 1968 had signalled the emergence of a left-radicalism that strongly influenced left-wing parties and unions in the following decade. As explained in Chapter 4, the reorganization of French socialism since the late 1960s had come with an opening to new components of the Left, with a new strategy of alliance with communists into the Union of the Left, and with a clear ideological and programmatic leftward shift. Symptomatic of this shift, Mitterrand's audacious declarations about the need to break with capitalism (however sincere or opportunistic they may have been) did not scare activists and voters away. Quite to the contrary, between 1972 and 1976, party membership grew from 80,300 to 149,623. After Pompidou died in 1974, the Union of the Left led by François Mitterrand missed the presidency by only a very small margin (49.19 per cent) against Valéry Giscard d'Estaing—an Economy and Finance Minister under de Gaulle and Pompidou, who was already calling himself a 'neoliberal' in the 1960s. The Left, however, continued its electoral rise: in the 1977 municipal elections, the parties of the Left would win their best historical results and beat the Right; they continued their ascension in the 1978 legislative elections, where for the first time the socialists obtained more votes than the communists—a result that put strains on their union.

At the time, much like in the UK, the party advocated increased public intervention in the economy, extension of public ownership to the banking and financial sector as well as strategic industries (including armament, aeronautical, nuclear, and pharmaceutical companies, mineral resources, and parts and the electronics, chemical, steel, petrol, and transport sectors), and greater control of multinational companies. Democratic—and decentralized—planning, beginning with the public sector, regional bodies, and consumer associations, should supplement parliamentary democracy. Control over prices, industrial development, and foreign trade should be increased. Under the growing influence of Chevènement's left-leaning CERES, but also after it was joined in October 1974 by several cadres and activists of the PSU and CFDT, like Michel Rocard and Jacques Chérèque, the party leadership took over several demands of the 'New Left', in particular self-management (*autogestion*) which, conceived as a counterpart to an expansion of the public sector, became the new identity marker of a reunited French socialism. Even the PCF, which remained hostile to the idea of *autogestion* because it considered that nationalization was the only true form of workers' control, eventually adopted the slogan in 1979. As in other western European countries, it was not just the question of the *ownership* of the means of production that was back on the French Left's agenda. The very question of the workers' right to collectively *control* what will be produced, how, when, and where, and how resources should be spent, was trendier than ever. State-controlled economic growth, technological progress, and social welfare were no longer considered sufficient to ensure collective emancipation, and the state's

bureaucratizing tendencies were to be avoided through decentralization and economic democracy.¹²

In West Germany too, the leftward tendency was perceptible, especially among the Young Socialists of the SPD, the *Jusos*, which formed up to 30 per cent of the party membership. Following the adhesion of numerous new activists and young political leaders of the 1968 students' movement influenced by the radical student-led Extra-Parliamentary Opposition (APO), the *Jusos* underwent a remarkable radicalization by the late 1960s. They adopted a starkly critical position on the 1959 Bad Godesberg programme with which the SPD had abandoned the class-party perspective, and insisted on turning the SPD into a 'workers' party'; they used a Marxist vocabulary, defined themselves as supporters of 'socialism, feminism, and internationalism', pressed for mass social mobilization, advocated anti-capitalist structural reforms based on economic and social planning within an extended framework of workers' control, and worked to hegemonize their views within the party. The new SPD Left argued that the economic crisis that started emerging in the late 1960s necessitated major changes in both production and consumption, restraint of big business, expansion of the public sector, and a shift from private to public control of investment.

During the first half of the 1970s, the rise of this New Left current opposed to the 'old guard' of the party occasioned an internal debate and power struggle best exemplified by the hitches in the formulation of a new long-term programme after the 1969 party congress, which dragged on until 1975. The first draft of the document was released in 1972 by a party commission chaired by one of the leaders of the SPD Right and then Minister of Finance, Helmut Schmidt, and conditioned future reforms on the attainment of a 4–6 per cent level of annual growth. It was condemned by the party's Left, primarily the *Jusos*, as a mere programmatic form of 'enlightened capitalism' and was rejected by the 1973 conference of the SPD in Hanover. A new version of the programme, 'Framework of Economic and Political Orientation of the SPD for the years 1975–85', adopted by the party congress in 1975 in Mannheim, therefore uncoupled promises of reform from yearly growth and committed to state regulation of investment and measures to curb the power of big business. Although it still endorsed competition policy and an ongoing role for the market, the Mannheim Programme seemed to signal a more critical stance towards social market capitalism compared to Bad Godesberg and

¹² See Callaghan, *The Retreat of Social Democracy*, 62–8; Stephen Padgett and William E. Paterson, *A History of Social Democracy in Postwar Europe* (London; New York: Longman, 1991), 83–4. On French socialists during these years, see also Hélène Hatzfeld, 'Une révolution culturelle du Parti socialiste dans les années 1970 ?', *Vingtième Siècle: Revue d'histoire* 96, no. 4 (October 2007): 77–90; D. S. Bell and Byron Criddle, *The French Socialist Party: The Emergence of a Party of Government* (New York: Clarendon Press and Oxford University Press, 1988). On the French Left and *autogestion*, see Frank Georgi, *L'autogestion en chantier: Les Gauches françaises et le 'modèle' yougoslave (1948–1981)* (Nancy: Arbre bleu éditions, 2018).

a case for socialist planning.¹³ Of course, there was a significant difference between the party's compromise position and the SPD's exercise of power in government, especially after Schmidt replaced Brandt in May 1974 and started applying deflationary policies—this could only be seriously curbed through mass social mobilization. Yet at the same time, there were evident signs of radicalization among some trade unions, at both the rank-and-file and leadership levels.¹⁴ By the mid-1970s, alternative economic policies were being advocated by members of the German Communist Party (DKP) and left-leaning SPD and DGB members, and in 1975 three professors of the University of Bremen Jörg Huffschmid, Rudolf Hickel and Herbert Schui, founded the 'Working Group for Alternative Economic Policy', a think tank that issued analysis and policy proposals and aimed to lobby the German Council of Economic Experts.¹⁵

Even in the Scandinavian stronghold of social democracy, a leftward trend was perceptible. In Sweden, between 1968 and 1976 the trade unions and social democrats were increasingly worried about the concentration of economic power in the banking and industrial sectors. While at governmental level social democrats did not attempt to introduce planning or significant nationalization, several initiatives emerged regarding economic democracy, especially under the thrust of wildcat strikes and trade unions, which sought to challenge the power of private capital beyond the welfarist orientation that had prevailed until then. In 1969, a Swedish Social Democratic Party (S/SAP) and Swedish Trade Union Confederation (LO) study group chaired by Alva Myrdal produced *Towards Equality*, which advocated a significant shift of power and resources towards workers and greater workers' participation in the decision making of firms.¹⁶ The S/SAP's 1975 programme also emphasized the importance of industrial democracy and the need to restrict capitalism—a system now deemed unable to overcome unemployment and inflation—by changing who owns capital and giving each individual control over the direction, distribution, shaping, and conditions of production within a planned economy.

The Swedish leftward trend arguably occasioned one of the most ambitious policy proposals for a democratization of the economy through (partial) gradual socialization of all major industrial sectors ever seriously considered in a Western country. In 1973, the LO charged one of its leading economists, Rudolf Meidner, a former student of Gunnar Myrdal, to set up an expert commission instructed to

¹³ At least according to the most optimistic left-wing critiques, for instance Norbert Wieczorek, 'Perspectives for Planning', Stuart Holland, ed., *Beyond Capitalist Planning* (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1978), 106-117.

¹⁴ Callaghan, *The Retreat of Social Democracy*, 72-7; Padgett and Paterson, *A History of Social Democracy in Postwar Europe*, 74-81, 86-8; Gerard Braunthal, *The German Social Democrats since 1969: A Party in Power and Opposition* (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1994), pages.

¹⁵ Also known as the Memorandum Group, it then evolved in the 1990s as the European Working Group for Alternative Economic Policies (EuroMemo). See Schmidt, 'There Were Alternatives', 487-9.

¹⁶ Alva Myrdal, *Towards Equality* (Stockholm: Prisma, 1971).

study ways to better redistribute firms' profits, to counteract the concentration of private capital, and to give employees more control over the workplace. The Meidner Plan, published two years later, envisaged the creation of 'wage-earner funds,' owned collectively by the employees and administered by union-appointed directors, financed through the firm's profits in the form of newly issued (voting) shares; it would progressively allow the workers to collectively earn increasing shares of the company until they became the majority owners, and the dividends earned would be invested to support workers' interests—for instance, in research, labour education, and training.¹⁷ While the plan received overwhelming support from the union rank-and-file, it met with lukewarm enthusiasm from the leadership of the S/SAP, including Palme, and encountered intense resistance from employers.¹⁸ Three months after it was adopted by the LO congress in 1976, the social democrats were defeated in the election by a right-wing coalition and were removed from power for the first time in forty-four years, but the debate on economic democracy persisted and would be back on the Left's agenda, albeit under much different terms, when the S/SAP came back to power in 1982.¹⁹

This leftward tendency of European social democracy took place in a context of the continued hope of a global socialist revolution for many on the Left—a feeling brilliantly captured in 1977 by the French documentary film director Chris Marker with *Le Fond de l'air est rouge*.²⁰ The Prague Spring of 1968 and its repression, the guerrilla war in Bolivia and the killing of Che Guevara, the mass peace mobilizations against the Vietnam War, the global student protests, the rise of Salvador Allende and the US-backed military coup in 1973 in Chile... Despite the failures and the shattered hopes, there still remained 'red in the air' throughout the 1970s. A worldwide political struggle was going on and the international context seemed to open a new window of opportunity for the Left. Since the 1960s, the Non-Aligned Movement had engaged in a struggle for a redistribution of global resources and challenged the liberal organization of the international economy in favour of the global South. The Third World countries officially advanced proposals for a New International Economic Order (NIEO) at the United Nations Assembly in 1974. This struggle climaxed between 1973 and 1977, with oil as an economic weapon brandished by the Arab states and the non-Arab oil-producing countries, and the United Nations Conference on Trade and

¹⁷ See Rudolf Meidner, Gunnar Fond, and Anna Hedberg, *Employee Investment Funds: An Approach to Collective Capital Formation* (London: Unwin Hyman, 1978).

¹⁸ See Joe Guinan, 'Socialising Capital: Looking Back on the Meidner Plan', *International Journal of Public Policy* 15 (January 2019): 38–58; Peter Gowan and Mio Tastas Viktorsson, 'Revisiting the Meidner Plan', *Jacobin*, 22 August 2017, available at <https://jacobinmag.com/2017/08/sweden-social-democracy-meidner-plan-capital>.

¹⁹ Callaghan, *The Retreat of Social Democracy*, 68–74.

²⁰ Chris Marker, *A Grin Without a Cat* (France: Dovidis, 1977).

Development (UNCTAD) as a diplomatic tool.²¹ Concomitantly, with the 1974 Watergate Scandal, the US hegemony over the world and over western Europe was more shaky than ever. In southern European countries, the fall of the authoritarian regimes between 1974 and 1976 created new opportunities for a revival of the Left in Spain, Portugal, and Greece. In Portugal, the 1974 ‘Carnation Revolution’ showed that socialist ideas were on the rise even in southern Europe. In Greece, after the fall of the military regime in 1975, the Greek Panhellenic Socialist Movement (PASOK) was growing and distinguished itself by its plain Marxist vocabulary, endorsing socialization of the main industrial and financial activities and control over trade, attacking inequality, and promising universal healthcare, social insurance, and self-management in the larger firms. In Spain, the socialists of the Spanish Socialist Workers’ Party (PSOE) continued to define their ideology as Marxist and revolutionary until the late 1970s.²²

Against this background, the new world vision and ‘ideological offensive’ defined in the early 1970s by the European social democrats’ ‘progressive core’—spearheaded by Palme, Brandt, and Kreisky—continued to flourish, and was initially reinforced by the outbursts in response to the economic crisis.²³ Meeting a couple of months after the oil shock in Schlagenbad, Brandt, Kreisky, and Palme discussed how the oil crisis could pave the way for an expansion of the public energy sector and public transportation, open new possibilities for economic planning and wealth redistribution, and ultimately reinforce European social democracy.²⁴ They saw the crisis as an opportunity to assert their socialist offensive and a new economic model consonant to the interests of the Third World. In 1976, as the new President of the Socialist International, Brandt would become the chief promoter of a global socialist alternative based on North–South dialogue and a fairer international system.²⁵ The socialists’ new assertiveness towards the US continued: although the alliance with the dominant partner was not questioned by most, a more autonomous and critical stance, in particular regarding the centrality of the US and the dollar in the international economic and monetary system, prevailed.²⁶ The idea of a redefinition of the world order to favour the

²¹ Nils Gilman, ‘The New International Economic Order: A Reintroduction’, *Humanity Journal* 6, no. 1 (March 2015): 1–16; Adom Getachew, *Worldmaking after Empire: The Rise and Fall of Self-Determination* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2020); Giuliano Garavini, *After Empires: European Integration, Decolonization, and the Challenge from the Global South, 1957–1985* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), 162–83.

²² Callaghan, *The Retreat of Social Democracy*, 78–9.

²³ Michele Di Donato, *I comunisti italiani e la sinistra europea: Il PCI e i rapporti con le socialdemocrazie (1964–1984)* (Rome: Carrocci, 2015), 85–94, here p. 88.

²⁴ See Garavini, *After Empires*, 171–2.

²⁵ Bernd Rother, ‘Between East and West—Social Democracy as an Alternative to Communism and Capitalism: Willy Brandt’s Strategy as President of the Socialist International’, in *The Crisis of Détente in Europe*, ed. Leopoldo Nuti (London: Routledge, 2008), 235–47.

²⁶ See also Michele Di Donato, ‘The Cold War and Socialist Identity: The Socialist International and the Italian “Communist Question” in the 1970s’, *Contemporary European History* 24, no. 2 (May 2015): 193–211.

global South was also advocated by the Dutch Prime Minister after 1973, Joop Den Uyl. Under the influence of the *Nieuw Links* ('New Left') that had won over the majority of the party since 1969, the PvdA was also turning more radical and becoming much more incisive on gender and environment issues, industrial democracy, and the need to challenge capitalism, to establish a new world order through North–South cooperation, and to condemn the role of NATO, US foreign policy, and the arms race.

Of course, as pointed out by Ingo Schmidt, 'not everyone who advocated this kind of Marxian and Keynesian blend [...] was serious about the socialist goals' of these new economic strategies; 'some saw them as a chance to integrate New Left intellectuals and rank-and-file militants into the old Keynesian welfare state project.'²⁷ The growing 'radical' components of the socialist Left coexisted with other currents to their right, to whom the majority of socialist party leaders, state officials, and members of government belonged. An extreme case, Schmidt was certainly even more scornful towards these strategies than he was towards Keynesianism itself. Palme, Brandt, Kreisky, and Wilson—who returned as Prime Minister of the UK in 1974—belonged to a mainstream, 'moderate' tendency that probably saw these alternative strategies less as a transitional programme to socialism than as a way of rebranding the revisionist social-democratic tradition: the mixed economy, a welfare state supported by sustained economic growth, an expanding industrial base in part publicly owned, full employment made possible by Keynesian management and trade union moderation, as well as more or less hostility vis-à-vis the communists. But the questions raised by the more 'radical' socialists and their alternative strategies were extensively discussed in every party in those years and managed to shift the programmatic stances: economic democracy and workers' control, planning and socialization of the economy, expansion of the public sector, the need to control big firms, multinationals, and the financial sector, and the claims for a new international economic order and even for a radical democratization of the European integration process. Undoubtedly, 'alternative economic policies did gain some traction among left-wing intellectuals, within unions, communist, and social democratic parties.'²⁸

Even the opening to potential alliances with communist forces was not purely confined to the 'radical' left wing of the Socialist International. Under Berlinguer's leadership, the PCI's geopolitical outlook—promoting an autonomous western Europe, East–West *détente*, and North–South dialogue, insisting on peace, security, and disarmament, and supporting the Non-Aligned Movement—was increasingly in line with the mainstream social democrats' world vision. Italian communists in fact had relevant ties with the SPD and Scandinavian social democrats, and increasingly since the mid-1970s with British Labour, Austrian, and

²⁷ Schmidt, 'There Were Alternatives', 477.

²⁸ Schmidt, 'There Were Alternatives', 477.

Dutch parties.²⁹ Although they emphasized the need for a democratic planning of the economy, the ‘austerity’ proposals refined by the Italian communists to address the economic crisis in regard to their possible entry into government with the ruling Christian democrats—the idea that the struggle against inflation must be made a priority, that European workers must adapt to new models of development, lifestyle habits, and consumption—were actually less ambitious than the new alternative strategies proposed by parts of European socialism. Along those lines, Berlinguer became the main promoter of ‘Eurocommunism’, a project to gather western European communist parties around a revised approach to socialism more adequate for western Europe and autonomous from the Soviet Union, which climaxed in the mid-1970s. Eurocommunism, along with the electoral success and strength of communist parties in some important western European countries—particularly in Italy, where the PCI received over 34 per cent of the votes in 1976, but also in France, Spain, and Portugal—thus widened, at least in theory, the possibility of an alliance of the European Left for an alternative socialist strategy to get out of the crisis.³⁰

At a time when rank-and-file militancy was made fragile by the crisis, left-wing party and union organizations appeared strengthened and could try to rally the new social movements, the new urban Left and labour activists to form a new hegemonic bloc around alternative macro-economic strategies that went beyond Keynesian welfare capitalism and countered the neoliberal offensive.³¹ Although the trend differed from one country to the other, socialist parties, for instance, continued to increase their membership in France, Sweden, and West Germany, where the SPD grew from 710,448 members in 1965 to 998,847 in 1975.³² Besides, after a gradual decline in blue-collar workers’ (and increase in white-collar workers’) support for the Left since the mid-1950s, the 1970s saw a strengthening of class voting for left-wing parties in countries like France and Germany, while support from manual workers only started slightly decreasing in the UK and

²⁹ See Di Donato, ‘The Cold War and Socialist Identity’; Raffaele D’Agata, ‘L’“altra” distensione: Brandt, Berlinguer, e la ricerca di un nuovo ordine di pace negli anni ’70’, *Contemporanea*, no. 2 (2002): 233–52; Fiamma Lussana, ‘Il confronto con le socialdemocrazie e la ricerca di un nuovo socialismo nell’ultimo Berlinguer’, *Studi storici* 45, no. 2 (2004): 461–88.

³⁰ Although the Italian, French, and Spanish communist parties were at the spearhead of the movement, other communist parties adopted the slogan—in Finland, Belgium, Great Britain, the Netherlands, and Austria among others. For an overview of Eurocommunism during the 1970s, see Silvio Pons, ‘The Rise and Fall of Eurocommunism’, in *The Cambridge History of the Cold War*, ed. Melvyn P. Leffler and Odd Arne Westad, vol. 3 (Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 45–66; Giannēs Balampanidēs, *Eurocommunism: From the Communist to the Radical European Left* (Abingdon: Routledge, 2015). On the evolution of the PCF and PCI from the 1960s to the 1980s, see also Marco Di Maggio, *Alla ricerca della terza via al socialismo: I PC italiano e francese nella crisi del comunismo (1964–1984)* (Naples: Edizioni scientifiche italiane, 2014).

³¹ See Schmidt, ‘There Were Alternatives’, 473–98.

³² Callaghan, *The Retreat of Social Democracy*, 77. See also Padgett and Paterson, *A History of Social Democracy in Postwar Europe*; Sassoon, *One Hundred Years of Socialism*, 461–8.

Denmark.³³ The time was more than ever ripe for the European Left to push through an alternative European order.

Beyond Capitalist Planning

The turn to the left that characterized European socialism throughout the 1970s was also palpable within transnational socialist networks. Even before the oil shock, Mansholt had already triggered great debate among the European Left when he started, notwithstanding his prominent role at the European Commission, invoking a 'second Marx', a 'new socialism', a break with capitalism, and a better global distribution of wealth. The crisis of the 1970s, by emphasizing the interdependence of European and global economies and by bringing about a partial convergence of the European Left in its determination to challenge international capital, contributed to bringing some socialist spheres to try and formulate a *coordinated* alternative economic strategy.

By the mid-1970s, some leading European socialist economists began a transnational effort to jointly theorize a strategy to move beyond capitalist planning and the model of 'welfare capitalism' that had characterized the postwar era, through an extension of public ownership based on 'socialist planning'. Stuart Holland himself was one of the main promoters of such an initiative and organized in 1976 a conference on the crisis in capitalist planning at the University of Sussex, where he taught and researched in the Department of Economics, inviting socialist economists from several countries including Italy, France, the UK, and Germany. Two years later, this conference resulted in the publication of a now unknown but fascinating book, *Beyond Capitalist Planning*, which included contributions from both 'radical' and 'moderate' (if not right-wing) socialists including Stuart, Jacques Delors, Franco Archibugi, Karl Georg Zinn, Thomas Balog, Jacques Attali, Giorgio Ruffolo, and Norbert Wieczorek. Most contributors were economic thinkers with a particular interest in planning, and had carried out high-level governmental tasks: Delors had been head of the social department of the French planning agency in the 1960s, then social affairs adviser to Prime Minister Chaban-Delmas; Archibugi had been an official in the High Authority of the ECSC; Holland had been an adviser on European affairs in Wilson's government during the 1960s.

The book took stock of the flight from planning in western European countries during the 1970s. With the economic crisis, capitalist planning, understood as 'the coordination of public and private interest, through a combination of indicative targets and aids and incentives', proved incapable of reversing the crisis in

³³ Gerassimos Moschonas, *In the Name of Social Democracy: The Great Transformation, 1945 to the Present* (London: Verso, 2002), ch. 7.

confidence in key firms and industries in the economy. The result was a dual challenge to capitalist planning. On the Right, Milton Freidman and his neo-liberal allies promoted Manichean explanations of the crisis, blaming the futility of planning, the wrong-mindedness of Keynesian intervention, mismanagement of the money supply, high taxation, and excessive public spending. On the other side of the political spectrum, 'the European Left' had started challenging capitalist planning long before the oil shock and the appearance of 'stagflation', and started shaping new policies for democratic socialist planning, as evidenced in the Common Programme of the French Left, in the British Labour Party's programmes since 1972, and in the demands of the younger generation within the West German SPD to move from capitalist market policies towards socialist planned intervention in the market.³⁴

The aim of the authors—expounded in Holland's introduction to the volume—was to show that a degree of convergence was under way on a large spectrum of the Left which transcended the radical versus moderate divide. They agreed that the period of postwar expansion had resulted in a rise of big private enterprise groups and a monopoly trend in western European capital which 'posed new problems in the relationship between big business and the modern capitalist state', provoking inflation and undermining effective taxation. Economic slowdown then worsened the picture and, together with tax handouts and subsidies to the private sector, further decreased the efficacy of taxation, causing a fiscal crisis of the state. This in turn reduced the state's capacity to sustain public services, absorb in public services the major structural unemployment resulting from technical innovation, and ensure sustained demand and expansion. By resorting to simplistic monetarist explanations suggested by right-wing economists, the western European welfare state 'thus compounded the nature of its own crisis.'³⁵

To respond effectively to this 'crisis of ideology and state power', the European Left needed to open perspectives for a new mode of socialized development. 'Only a combination of new public ownership and new forms of social control' could place governments of the Left 'in a position to transform the criteria and use of such big business power in a socialized economy'. The question of social control was crucial in this new economic strategy:

If capitalism is a mode of production based on class, then class power itself is two-sided: it is a matter not only of who owns but also who controls the means of production, distribution, and exchange. The change of ownership from private capital to the state will not in itself transform the criteria or general use of resources in society. Control itself has to be transformed. [...] Without a socialization of control, with new forms of industrial and economic democracy, and

³⁴ Stuart Holland, ed., *Beyond Capitalist Planning* (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1978).

³⁵ Holland, ed., *Beyond Capitalist Planning*, 4.

new negotiation of changed ends for the use of resources, the institutions of state ownership and planning would tend to mean corporatism or state capitalism, rather than a transition to socialist planning and socialized development.³⁶

The declared objective of the authors was therefore to help challenge the ideology of ‘managed capitalism’ and raise the confidence of activists on the European Left ‘in the feasibility of transforming the present political and economic crisis through a strategy for socialist planning.’ Their ambition was to show that the case for such ‘socialist planning’ was ‘not limited to one country, one party, or one fraction of the Left.’ According to Holland, if the Left in government in the UK or West Germany was hesitant to challenge capitalism by resorting to socialist planning—Wilson himself was clearly not a fan of the AES, nor was the Parliamentary Labour Party—this was in part due to ‘their own discredited assumptions that modern capitalism can be planned without a change in the balance of power away from capital in favour of working people through economic democracy.’³⁷

Exactly how socialist planning would be combined with increased workers’ control—how to solve the tension between the two desiderata of planning and decentralization—remained unclear, but the contributors offered detailed reflections pointing to building a new socialist planning science based on indicators of development that would take into account not just quantitative growth but above all qualitative indicators expressing social needs and objectives—education, health, social security, research, justice, housing, recreation, greater attention to leisure time and leisure use, improvement in working conditions, protection of the environment, etc. This would be possible thanks to modern techniques of data collection and processing, which opened new perspectives for democratic participation in the planning process.

The last two chapters of the book, co-authored by Holland, Delors, and Archibugi, outlined a common analysis of the economic context and proposals for the future, to get out of structural unemployment and inflation. They advocated a social rather than private allocation of resources and a reorganization and social control of the structure of production; a widening of the scope of collective bargaining and an extension of the role of trade unions beyond conventional bargaining on wages and working conditions; a radical redistribution of wealth and income through a new selective tax policy, increased welfare, and a basic minimum income both for wage earners and for unemployed persons; redistribution of jobs through a new employment policy and a reduction of working time; a change in the model of consumption (for instance, a fight against artificial obsolescence) with a shift from private to ‘social consumption’; and a comprehensive

³⁶ Holland, ed., *Beyond Capitalist Planning*, 3.

³⁷ Holland, ed., *Beyond Capitalist Planning*, 4.

reflation of demand based on a new approach to development, new consumption patterns, and new dimensions to social policy, combined with public policies for effective price control in the ‘meso-economic’ sector.

It is noteworthy that, to deal with big business, which was crucial to the crisis of the postwar mode of development, urgent action was to be taken at national and EC levels: ‘it is often not within the power of a single member state to ensure effective surveillance of meso-economic multinational firms. The information needed [...] should therefore be collected at Community level with a view to detecting and combating compensatory dumping, transfer-pricing (and thus profit transfer) within a mesoeconomic firm.’³⁸ Besides a predominant role in controlling capital flows and the pricing policies of multinationals, the EC should play an important role in cases of transnational mergers of firms, and a committee of representatives of employers and trade unions should be set up, for example, to advise the Commission’s Directorate-General for Competition on restrictive practices or further ways of containing multinational firms.

In fact, Holland, Delors, and Archibugi promoted the same analysis in their contribution to the *Report of the Study Group on Problems of Inflation* commissioned in 1975 by the Directorate General for Economic and Financial Affairs of the European Commission—a study group that also included other left-wing economists like Dirk Dolman, a PvdA member of the Dutch Parliament, and Heinz Markmann, head of the Economic Department of the West German DGB.³⁹ Its chairman, Robert Maldague, a Christian democrat, head of the Belgian Plan, was then critical of the EC’s response to the crisis. The members of the study group disputed the view that rising inflation and decreasing growth should be answered with deflationary, monetarist policies. As Holland remembered many years later, at the first meeting of the study group, ‘Delors waited until the rest of us had spoken and then opened his remarks by saying “Inflation has nothing to do with the bargaining power of labour. It is a symptom of capitalist disorder.”’⁴⁰ Published in March 1976, the Maldague Report advocated a fundamental reconsideration of the structural factors which gave rise to inflation and crisis in capitalist accumulation even before the commodity and oil price rises of the early 1970s. In Holland’s view, it

differ[ed] dramatically from the analysis and policy currently pursued by the European Commission and Council of Ministers in the crisis of the seventies. It advocat[ed] reflation, rather than deflation and public expenditure restraint as a

³⁸ Holland, ed., *Beyond Capitalist Planning*, 165–202, here p. 197.

³⁹ AEI, Commission of the EC, ‘Interim Report of the Study Group Problems of Inflation’, Brussels, 18 July 1975; Commission of the EC, ‘Report of the Study Group Problems of Inflation: Annexes’, Brussels, March 1976, available at http://aei.pitt.edu/32792/1/Problems_of_Inflation_1976.pdf.

⁴⁰ Stuart Holland, ‘Europe from the Left: From Delors to Gutteres’, in *Europe for the Many*, ed. Tony Simpson (Nottingham: Spokesman, 2018), 7–37.

counter-inflationary strategy. It also advocates an enlargement of the sphere of public expenditure and social consumption as a medium to long-term condition of the recovery of new forms of employment and income, within a democratized planning framework.⁴¹

However, the Commission's DG of Economy and Finance—although led by the German (right-wing) social democrat and former DGB leader Wilhelm Haferkamp—not only refused to press release the Maldague Report, but, according to Holland, 'recalled all the copies that it could find, and pulped them in the basement of the Berlaymont. Maldague and Delors responded by press releasing it independently. Unlike most reports to the Commission, it was reproduced in full in several European newspapers. It also was published by *Agenor*—a pro-Europe but anti-neoliberal journal—as *The Maldague Report—Banned*.⁴² Although in fact the report's mediatic success was probably rather limited, it did attract some press attention as well as interest from European trade unionists and the SGEP.⁴³ For Holland, the banning by the Commission of the Maldague Report at the time testified to the growing hegemony of a neoliberal ideology within the Commission.

The Maldague Report, *Beyond Capitalist Planning*, and the Sussex Conference bore witness to the emergence of a transnational network of socialist economists aiming to theorize and promote at the European level alternative economic strategies relying on democratic socialist economic planning to counter the rise of neoliberal theories. At the time, they were far from isolated; the early 1970s, even after the demise of Bretton Woods and the oil crisis, saw the blossoming of 'worldwide' planning proposals in the spheres of trade, finance, industrialization and development within international organizations like the ILO, UNCTAD, and the OECD.⁴⁴ Several members of this new socialist planners' network, like Holland and Delors, had met on the committee on inflation set up by the Commission in the mid-1970s. After the Commission refused to publish or discuss the Maldague Report, they decided, after Delors' initiative, to regroup socialist experts on planning and set up an 'Alternative Europe network' on the basis of the 'clandestine' Maldague Report. The group met every month and progressively deepened its research agenda and widened its membership, including for instance: Dominique Strauss-Kahn, then assistant Professor of Economics at the University of Nanterre and member of the CERES; Yannis Papanicolaou,

⁴¹ Holland, ed., *Beyond Capitalist Planning*, 5–6.

⁴² Holland, 'Europe from the Left', 9.

⁴³ See 'Un rapport d'«experts» dénonce les causes structurelles de l'inflation', *Le Monde*, 14 September 1976.

⁴⁴ Michel Christian, Sandrine Kott, and Ondřej Matějka, 'Planning in Cold War Europe: Introduction', in *Planning in Cold War Europe: Competition, Cooperation, Circulations (1950s–1970s)*, ed. Michel Christian, Sandrine Kott, and Ondřej Matějka (Berlin: De Gruyter, 2018), 1–18; Jenny Andersson, 'Planning the Future of World Markets: The OECD's Interfuturs Project', in *Planning in Cold War Europe*, ed. Christian, Kott, and Matějka, 315–44.

economic adviser to the leader of PASOK, Andreas Papandreou; Egon Matzner, an Austrian economist close to Bruno Kreisky; Enrique Baron Crespo, a labour lawyer member of the PSOE; and João Cravinho, economist and member of the Portuguese Socialist Party. By the late 1970s, the group included two dozen participants from all of the then member and candidate countries of the EC and named itself the ‘Initiative for Political and Social Economy’ (IPSE).

In fact, the late 1970s and early 1980s saw a flourishing of proposals from socialist economic thinkers and leaders for an alternative European and global economic strategy.⁴⁵ In the early 1980s, the IPSE network would launch a research project called ‘Out of Crisis’ which resulted in the publication of a 1983 report subtitled ‘An Alternative European Strategy’, proposing a broad-ranging alternative to neoliberalism: it pleaded for a coordinated sustained recovery based on the substitution of the ‘3D neoliberal agenda’—deregulation, devaluation, and deflation—with the ‘3R counter agenda’—to *restructure* the growing imbalance between private and public economic power, *redistribute* wealth and income, and *recover* full employment by a social-investment-led strategy.⁴⁶ Meanwhile, Brandt’s presidency of the Socialist International from 1976 onwards saw the organization’s efforts to move beyond its previous Eurocentric prism by expanding its reach to Latin America, Africa, and Asia, and a strong engagement regarding peace, world development, and the new international order favouring the global South. In 1977, the President of the World Bank, Robert McNamara, asked Brandt to set up a high-level commission to study measures to reduce the gap between rich and poor countries. For a time, it seemed like an alliance between Third World countries and European socialists could lead, through cooperation within UNCTAD and other international organizations, to an egalitarian reshaping of the world’s order and a socialist governance of globalization. Brandt submitted his report to the Secretary General of the United Nations in 1980 and it was to be discussed by the world’s leading governments at the 1981 Cancun Summit on Cooperation and Development.⁴⁷

How would European socialists coordinate, at the programmatic and strategic levels, to bring about this alternative socialist strategy to get out of the crisis of Keynesian capitalism? It remained unclear so far how such a coordinated response could be implemented, and what role the EC should play. While the Left in all EC

⁴⁵ For instance, IISH, SI 409, Jan Tinbergen, Joop Den Uyl, Jan Pronk, and Wim Kok, ‘A New World Employment Plan’, October 1980; Neil Kinnock, ‘A New Deal for Europe’, *New Socialist*, March–April 1984; Willy Brandt and Michael Manley, *Global Challenge: From Crisis to Cooperation, Breaking the North–South Stalemate* (London: Pan, 1985).

⁴⁶ Stuart Holland, ed., *Out of Crisis: An Alternative European Strategy* (Nottingham: Spokesman, 1983). See also Holland, ‘Europe from the Left’, 12.

⁴⁷ Guia Migani, ‘The Road to Cancun: The Life and Death of a North–South Summit’, in *International Summitry and Global Governance: The Rise of the G7 and the European Council, 1974–1991*, ed. Emmanuel Mourlon-Druol and Federico Romero (Abingdon: Routledge, 2014); Garavini, *After Empires*, 239.

countries, including the main communist parties, had turned to European reformism by the early 1970s, Wilson's new Labour government in 1974 had embarked on a campaign to renegotiate the terms of the UK's membership of the EEC and held a referendum on continued membership in June 1975—where a 67 per cent majority voted to remain. But the Labour Left was not as single-minded on nationalist strategy to exit the crisis as the literature usually depicts.⁴⁸ Holland, for instance, who was opposed to supranationalism, however believed that any left-wing government 'would be ill-advised to try to "go it alone" in attempting a programme of socialist transformation.'⁴⁹ But he criticized the Socialist International for accepting since the 1950s the framework of liberal capitalism and rejecting an offensive strategy able to tame multinational companies. Instead, to advance an alternative socialist strategy, he advocated 'the creation of a permanent international committee of the executives of all the parties concerned—socialist and communist—but also international trade union coordination' in which the left-wing parties of Britain, France, and Italy should play a leading role.⁵⁰

The fall of dictatorial regimes in southern Europe and the decision of Spain, Portugal, and Greece to apply to join the EC in the mid-1970s strengthened the European Left's hopes to weigh more decisively in Europe and on EC policies.⁵¹ In the early 1960s, the French socialist Commissioner for Economics and Financial Affairs, Robert Marjolin, had tried to launch some European planning effort with the creation of the 'Middle-Term Economic Policy Committee', but with very limited results.⁵² *Beyond Capitalist Planning*, like the Maldague Report, pleaded for an important role for the EC. But for Holland their analysis

counters and challenges the simplistic advocacy of monetary integration in the EEC as a solution to the problems of the current crisis of the Community. It also maintains that any fundamental change in the conception and implementation of economic and social policy in the EEC is only probable through *international* action, based on joint decision-making by national governments and parliaments, rather than through *supranational* pretensions, based on an outmoded liberal capitalist ideology.⁵³

⁴⁸ For instance, Seyd, *The Rise and Fall of the Labour Left*, 30–1.

⁴⁹ Holland, *The Socialist Challenge*, 344, quoted in Callaghan, *The Retreat of Social Democracy*, 67.

⁵⁰ Callaghan, *The Retreat of Social Democracy*, 67.

⁵¹ For an account of the fall of dictatorial regimes in Spain, Portugal, and Greece, and their relevance for the European Left, see Sassoon, *One Hundred Years of Socialism*, ch. 21.

⁵² Laurent Warloutzet, *Le Choix de la CEE par la France: L'Europe économique en débat de Mendès France à de Gaulle, 1955–1969* (Paris: Comité pour l'histoire économique et financière de la France, 2011), 339–56.

⁵³ Holland, ed., *Beyond Capitalist Planning*, 6. In 1980, Holland published *UnCommon Market: Capital Class and Power in the European Community*, a Marxist analysis which warned that the prevailing 'negative' integration and 'neoliberal' ideology that dominated the DG of Economics and Finance threatened to marginalize national democracy and negate the power of electorates and

Other European socialists, however, particularly in the German, Italian, and Dutch parties, had a different approach to European cooperation and a more federalist stance. The decision of the December 1974 Paris Summit to organize the first direct elections to the EP ‘in or after 1978’ provided an opportunity for western European socialists to engage in a serious debate on the economic nature of the socialist alternative for Europe and to try to tackle the problem of their internationalist coordination.

A Socialist Alternative to Neoliberal Europe?

Despite these informal transnational developments, in the official structures of socialist internationalism, things were shakier. For one, the difficulty of the transnational coordination of European socialists and the definition of a common line regarding European policy only experienced limited improvements. The 1973 Bonn Congress and the adoption by the socialist parties of the EC of their ‘theses for a social Europe’ marked a first step towards greater programmatic convergence, but it had also highlighted wide rifts between the parties. The perspective of the first European election made this problem more pressing than ever. In the autumn of 1973, the Liaison Bureau had returned to the proposals of the Mozer Report and agreed to set up a new working group in charge of drawing up plans for a restructuring and enhancement of their cooperation. In April 1974, the socialist parties inaugurated the Confederation of Socialist Parties of the EC (CSPEC), whose new officers—President Wilhelm Dröscher, Vice-Presidents Siccò Mansholt, Robert Pontillon, and Ivar Nørgaard—enjoyed a much more prestigious stature than their predecessors. New rules of procedure introduced majority voting for some decisions in the new Bureau and opened possibilities for the adoption of binding decisions from the congress.⁵⁴ This was meant to mark a new start in the parties’ transnational cooperation and to reinforce the socialist parties’ political influence in the EC. Of course, the new structure fell short of creating the supranational party of which Vredeling, Mansholt, and others had been dreaming in previous years. Institutional improvements enabled by the reform were very limited and formal cooperation continued to falter: the first congress of the CSPEC would only take place in 1979, six years after the Bonn Congress. Informal cooperation between socialist parties, however, increased

governments to choose their own social and welfare model. Stuart Holland, *UnCommon Market: Capital, Class and Power in the European Community* (London: Macmillan, 1980).

⁵⁴ The voting members in the new Bureau included two members from each of the ten affiliated parties as well as the President of the SGEP. Non-voting members were the socialist Commissioners, the Secretariat of the SGEP, one representative from the Socialist International, and one from the Socialist Group of the Assembly of the Council of Europe. Simon Hix and Urs Lesse, *Shaping a Vision: A History of the Party of European Socialists, 1957–2002* (Brussels: Parti socialiste européen, 2002), 22–5.

significantly during the second half of the decade, at EC level and beyond. In November 1974, the first party leaders' summit of socialist parties of the EC was held in The Hague, inaugurating a routine of summit meetings in the following years.⁵⁵

Meanwhile, European socialists worked on defining common political lines. In November 1974, the bureau of the new CSPEC proposed the drafting of a broad 'Common Programme' to replace the much outdated one adopted at their 1962 congress; it was later decided that this programme would be the basis of a common election manifesto for the upcoming European elections. This first direct election of the EP was deemed a historic turn: it would confer a new democratic legitimacy on an assembly that had already gained slightly enhanced budgetary powers in recent years.⁵⁶

At a time when socialist parties—and the European Left more broadly—virtually dominated the EC, this was no point of detail. After 1975, when the British Labour Party put an end to its boycott of EC institutions and sent a delegation of eighteen deputies to Strasbourg, the SGEP became the largest European group with sixty-six members (out of 198, a third of the total number of MEPs).⁵⁷ Concomitantly, the communists had also been increasing their cooperation and presence in the EC institutions; from fourteen members in 1973, the Communist and Allies Group rose to seventeen in 1977.⁵⁸ By 1974 the socialists were leaders or coalition partners in six out of nine governments of the EC (West Germany, Denmark, the Netherlands, the UK, Ireland, and Luxembourg (in Italy the socialists were lending external support to Aldo Moro's government); and Belgium from 1977)—which could mean a majority at the table of the European Council. European socialists also included some important members in the European executive during those years, such as Commissioners Henk Vredeling, Antonio Giolitti, Claude Cheysson, Wilhem Haferkamp, Raymond Vouel, and of course Roy Jenkins, who in 1977 would take the head of the European Commission.⁵⁹

⁵⁵ On the strengthening of informal transnational socialist party cooperation during the 1970s and the emergence and growing influence of party leaders' summits since the 1970s, see in particular Christian Salm, *Transnational Socialist Networks in the 1970s: European Community Development Aid and Southern Enlargement* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2016), 11–42.

⁵⁶ On the evolution of the EP powers, see, for instance, Julian Priestley, *Six Battles that Shaped Europe's Parliament* (London: John Harper, 2008); Yves Mény, ed., *Building Parliament: 50 Years of European Parliament History, 1958–2008* (Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications of the European Communities, 2009).

⁵⁷ In July 1976, there were 18 British deputies, 17 German, 8 French, 7 Italian, 5 Dutch, 4 Belgian, 3 Danish, 2 Irish, and 2 Luxembourg deputies. HAEU, GSPE-060-EN, 'Background Information on the SGEP, 9 July 1976: Detailed Composition and Organisation of SG as of July 1976'.

⁵⁸ 9 PCI; 4 PCF; 1 Danish Socialistisk Folkeparti and 3 'indipendenti di sinistra' elected on the PCI lists. *I comunisti al Parlamento europeo: Interventi dei parlamentari italiani del gruppo comunista e apparentati nelle sedute del PE* (Luxembourg: Segretariato del Gruppo comunista e apparentati, 1977).

⁵⁹ Roy Jenkins was a leading figure of the Labour Right who was in sharp opposition to the leftward shift of the Labour Party and its rejection of the EC during the 1970s and early 1980s, and would found, when returning to UK politics in 1981, the Social Democratic Party (SDP) on a decisively more pro-EC and social-liberal line. On his role at the head of the European Commission, see Piers Ludlow,

With the notable exception of the British Labour Party, European socialists generally trusted that the new predominant position of the Left in European institutions was a crucial strategic tool to achieve socialism throughout Europe; voices were raised to support an alliance of the Left in European institutions against the threat of a coalition of centre-right parties.⁶⁰

The evolution of 'Eurocommunism' for a time comforted these views. The EC was an important point of debate between the communist parties and an important—although contentious—aspect of Eurocommunism. Berlinguer's PCI, with the help of Amendola's activism, worked to convince the other parties, especially the Spanish Communist Party (PCE) and the reluctant PCF, to converge on its European policy and presented the EC as the test case on which all western European communist parties needed to constructively converge.⁶¹ The joint declarations issued between 1975 and 1977 by the PCI, the PCF, and the PCE explicitly indicated the intent of western European communist parties to seal a large progressive and democratic alliance to allow new orientations to be taken at both the national and the European levels.⁶² In the communist parties' view, 'The development of solid, lasting co-operation among communists and socialists constitute[d] the basis for this broad alliance', which should aim at isolating the forces of social conservatism and reaction and should include communists, socialists, social democrats, and even left-leaning Christian democrats.⁶³ The PCI's communist Europeanism gained symbolic prominence when Spinelli—the prestigious European federalist—got closer to the party and agreed to run for the PCI in 1976 and 1979.⁶⁴ Of course, anti-communist positions endured in part of European social democracy—starting with the new German Chancellor Helmut Schmidt—and to provoke clashes between socialist leaders, as at the Helsingør Summit of socialist party leaders in 1976.⁶⁵ This made any formal coalition like the one advocated by Holland hardly thinkable, but a convergence of views on the content and necessity of a socialist Europe was undeniable.

Roy Jenkins and the European Commission Presidency, 1976–1980: At the Heart of Europe (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2016).

⁶⁰ HAEU, GSPE-059-EN, 'Information Document: Predominant position of the Socialist Group. Articles of the London *Times* of 10 October 1975'.

⁶¹ See Amendola's speeches in Communist and Allies Group of the European Parliament, ed., *I comunisti italiani e l'Europa: Dichiarazioni, documenti, interventi* (Luxembourg: Segretariato del Gruppo comunista e apparentati al PE, 1978), 49–52; also Giorgio Amendola, *I comunisti e le elezioni europee* (Rome: Editori Riuniti, 1979).

⁶² The declarations are reproduced in the appendix of Peter Lange and Maurizio Vannicelli, eds., *The Communist Parties of Italy, France, and Spain: Postwar Change and Continuity—A Casebook*, Casebook Series on European Politics and Society, 1 (London: Allen & Unwin, 1981), 357–61.

⁶³ Lang and Vannicelli, eds., *The Communist Parties of Italy, France, and Spain*, 359–60.

⁶⁴ Calogero Laneri, 'Il PCI di Enrico Berlinguer e le elezioni europee attraverso la lettura della stampa comunista (1979–1984)', *Diacronie: Studi di storia contemporanea* 32, no. 4 (2017), online version.

⁶⁵ Michele di Donato, 'The Cold War and Socialist Identity: The Socialist International and the Italian "Communist Question" in the 1970s', *Contemporary European History* 24, no. 2 (May 2015): 193–211.

The work on the 'Common European Socialist Programme' began on a confident and optimistic note under the impulse of Mansholt, who had been charged with comparing all the parties' programmes with a view to preparing a united programme that would go beyond the lowest common denominator principle. However, it soon became clear that the undertaking would not be as easy as socialists had initially hoped, as each party came with its own different list of proposals. The CSPEC created a working group headed by Dröscher in February 1975 to carry on Mansholt's initial effort; then suspended its work in December; then created a Steering Committee still chaired by Dröscher in January 1976 to coordinate the activities of four sub-parties, each with one delegate from every member party: on economic policy (chaired by Michel Rocard, French PS), social policy (chaired by Lionello Levi Sandri, Italian PSI), democracy and institutions (chaired by Schelto Patijn, PvdA), and external relations (Bruno Friedrich, SPD). All member parties appointed delegates for each working group, which met for the first time in April 1976.⁶⁶ The working parties submitted their reports in mid-1977, after which a single draft election manifesto was adopted and circulated to the national parties for them to submit amendments by the end of November 1977. The idea was to incorporate amendments and then agree on a final version to be adopted at a congress to be held in March 1978, which should then be put to European voters at the time of the European elections. This was a highly ambitious plan considering the socialists' rather weak past record in outlining a common European policy programme.

A closer look at the topics discussed in the working parties and the issues that arose from these discussions is useful to understand the outcome of this arduous undertaking. The themes initially debated were vast and reflected the ambition to imagine a socialist programme for Europe that would entail a complete redefinition of European cooperation and integration along socialist lines. The discussions included issues such as: capitalism and the market economy, the influence of the state, investment control, economic crisis and unemployment, control of multinationals, technological development and industrial policy, bureaucratization and alienation, worker participation and self-determination, equality and fairness of the distribution of wealth, minimum incomes and pension systems, regional problems, energy problems, environmental questions, health policy, relations with the Third World and global wealth redistribution, and foreign and defence policies (the role of NATO), etc.⁶⁷ Unsurprisingly, Mansholt, who would be one of the most active participants in the drafting of the Common European

⁶⁶ IISH, CSPEC-18, 'Elaboration of a Socialist European Platform' (not dated). Other participants to the Social Policy sub-group included Jacques Delors and Ernest Glinne. See also Hix and Lesse, *Shaping a Vision*, 25–7.

⁶⁷ IISH, CSPEC-18, 'Socialist Programme working party: Draft report on the meeting on 24 September 1975 of the working party on a European Socialist Programme'.

Socialist Programme, raised the crucial question as early as the second meeting of the initial working party, on 24 September 1975:

Sicco MANSCHOLT felt that the question of principle then arose as to whether European Socialists wanted to continue seeking partial solutions within a capitalist system or to establish a new political basis. DRÖSCHER emphasized that the SPD could not go beyond the Godesberg Programme.⁶⁸

Although several members of the CSPEC—including the German SPD leaders—were not prepared to challenge their commitment to a mixed, ‘social market economy’, the question of the very essence of socialism in its relation to capitalism remained a topic of heated debate among European socialists throughout the discussions on the common programme and for the entire second half of the 1970s.

In many ways, the twenty-seven-page draft election manifesto, adopted unanimously by the bureau of the CSPEC on 6 June 1977, was an updated and expanded version of the social Europe project that had been debated and matured by the socialists since the early 1970s.⁶⁹ One thing was made explicit from the outset: each European country was now too small to realize a socialist transformation of economic and social structures, and although the national framework remained crucial, ‘it is only at European level that the conditions for the survival, development and fulfilment of our peoples and the conditions for a fairer distribution of the world’s wealth can be established’. The manifesto vowed to replace the prevailing commercial Europe with ‘a peaceful Europe with higher standards of freedom, justice and solidarity, a Europe more socially just and with a more human face, a Europe of citizens and workers’, based on economic, social, and democratic rights. This implied profound reforms in three respects: democracy and institutions, economic and social policy, and external policy. Economic and social questions constituted the bulk of the programme. European socialists advocated greater coordination between European countries, the long-overdue realization of common policies (in the fiscal, social, energy, transport, and monetary fields, etc.), and the adoption of common positions regarding the energy crisis and the international monetary system.

To overcome the construction of a merely business-oriented Europe, in the economic and social sphere European socialists advocated committing the EC and its member states to consciously shaping economic and social structures to guarantee full employment, economic stability, a fairer distribution of income and wealth, an effective and democratic economic structure, economic democracy, improved social security and social harmonization, better working and

⁶⁸ IISH, CSPEC-18, ‘Socialist Programme : Draft report, here p. 4.

⁶⁹ IISH, CSPEC-19, ‘Draft election manifesto of the CSPEC’ adopted by the Bureau of the CSPEC on 6 June 1977.

living conditions, and improved educational opportunities. In the other fields, they promoted a democratization of EC institutions, insisting that any transfer of responsibilities to the EC should be subject to greater democratic participation and control, making sure that powers lost by the national parliaments were transferred to the EP; they advocated a commitment to *détente*, peace, and a new international economic order favouring the development of the Third World. They also re-emphasized their commitment to EMU but warned that 'progress towards monetary union presupposed success in harmonizing economic development in the Community'. Moreover, they pleaded for joint efforts by member states in the field of industrial policy, an extension of the EC's regional fund, and a reform of the CAP to avoid production surpluses and to aid developing countries. Ambitious proposals were made regarding cooperation with developing countries, such as the proposal to devote 1 per cent of the GNP of EC countries to development aid.

Were European socialists merely advocating a coordination of European economies along Keynesian lines or were they leaning towards more 'radical' alternative strategies in order to get out of the crisis—a solution that would entail a gradual push back of private property and encroach on the 'welfare capitalist' structure of western European societies? The manifesto remained so vague in its formulation that it was actually hard to tell. To get out of the crisis, a comprehensive structural recovery plan was advocated, with particular attention to favouring 'humane growth' by investing in collective needs such as health, welfare services, culture and education, by promoting research and development in the energy field, and investing in developing industry, trade, and the service sector, taking into account the conditions for the creation of a new international division of labour. The manifesto also suggested strengthening the powers of the European Cartels Office and a coordination of the economic, budgetary, and monetary policies of EC member states. Increased funds, improved instruments, and streamlined decision-making procedures were advocated for the EC to have greater powers to coordinate and sustain member states' full-employment policies. This, combined with an imprecise 'considerable' shortening of working hours and extension of annual holidays, as well as regional policies and targeted professional training, would help redeem growth and restore full employment.

Besides this somewhat 'Euro-Keynesian' advocacy, European socialists at least left the door open for a transition to a 'socialist Europe'. Although in less unequivocal terms, the manifesto contained some of the ideas formulated by Holland's network of socialist economists. Just like *Beyond Capitalist Planning*, it criticized 'monetarist' responses to the crisis and the stimulation of investment by means of tax cuts or credit alone. Excessive inequality of incomes, unfair distribution of wealth and land, financial speculation, and economic monopolies were seen as the main causes of inflation, which should be combated jointly by

member states at EC level. Several of the proposals envisaged the adoption of policies that could have improved the balance of private and public economic power and favoured the workers. First, some proposals concerned the redistribution of income and wealth in Europe: implementing strongly progressive fiscal policies, increasing taxes on large fortunes, fighting tax evasion, encouraging workers' savings and workers' shares in the profits of big firms, realizing greater transparency regarding incomes and profits in all sectors of society, and so on.

Second, the manifesto left the door open to more state intervention, extension of the public sector, supervision and control over large firms, controlled investments, as well as a rebalancing of economic power to favour small and medium-sized firms. Third, it also insisted on the need for economic planning and workers' control. Contrary to proposals made some years earlier by Mansholt and the ETUC, the text did not envisage a central European plan; it mentioned the need for economic planning but recognized that different measures might be required in individual member states. However—and this was one of the aspects in which the manifesto showed a will to push back private capital—economic democracy was still emphasized as one of the backbones of a socialist Europe:

A market economy does not automatically lead to social justice. Unless the workers and their representatives are involved in economic and social planning, and unless a truly democratic economic system is achieved, living and working conditions cannot be humanized in the foreseeable future. Planning and democratization should not be limited to the public sector. Democratic control over the whole economy should be improved. In a society of workers, the latter can no longer be excluded from the decision-making process in the economic sector.⁷⁰

To avoid the kind of frictions that had arisen at the 1973 Bonn Congress, this time the manifesto proposed an *à la carte* menu for the participation of workers in the economic direction of enterprises, whether it was in the form of 'worker representation on the management bodies of public and private firms, joint management on an equal basis, the extension of the negotiating powers of unions in all sectors of the firms' activity, or worker control'. Here, too, it was deemed that 'stronger state planning requires democratic control and decentralization'.

Moreover, the manifesto demanded 'the implementation by the authorities at national and Community level of an active competition policy aimed in particular at controlling the expansion of multinational firms'. To stabilize European market structures against the domination of monopolistic and oligopolistic firms, socialists demanded 'the creation within the Community of a body legally and

⁷⁰ IISH, CSPEC-19, 'Draft election manifesto of the CSPEC', here p. 15.

technically equipped to keep the activities of large enterprises under surveillance, so that the realization of the economic and social objectives of the EC was not compromised. A harmonization of European legislation dealing with companies should monitor mergers, guarantee workers' representation, and oblige firms to draw up and publish the consolidated balance sheets of company groupings. Although a greater role was prescribed for the EC in monitoring big business, however, the text remained very careful not challenge the 'mixed economy' defended by the likes of Dröscher:

The magnitude of the problems with which some of [the member states] have to contend may lead them to use economic planning techniques and possibly to extend the area of state influence. To create an efficient and effective industrial structure planning systems must, where appropriate, be devised to mobilise capital for the development of cooperative and private undertakings, to facilitate cooperation on development projects between the private and the public sector, and, where necessary, to promote direct investment in production undertakings by public institutions. When applying such measures, Socialists will adhere to Community law and ensure that the market continues to function properly. It is extremely important to achieve structural balance among undertakings and this involves promoting small and medium-sized firms. Supervision over firms in dominant market positions and of concentrations of undertakings must be extended at Community level to prevent the development of monopolies and to ensure compliance with the rules of competition and price formation.⁷¹

The overall feeling was that the manifesto tried to balance both the partisans of alternative economic strategies who wanted to increase public economic power and workers' control, and the old mainstream partisans of Keynesian managed capitalism. In any case, the manifesto proposed a response to the crisis of the 1970s diametrically opposed to the 'neoliberal' recipes that were then surfacing—an alternative based on a reflationary recovery plan, coordinated action to increase control over multinationals, policies to carry out a redistribution of wealth within western European countries and towards the global South, and the extension of economic democracy. Despite its limitations, the manifesto constituted the most ambitious common programme ever adopted by European socialists.

By the beginning of 1978, however, the manifesto was in disarray, as several national parties objected to parts of it. The SPD and the PvdA had together proposed over sixty amendments; and national parties were setting their EP electoral campaigns along domestic lines.⁷² As time was running out, the bureau of the

⁷¹ IISH, CSPEC-19, 'Draft election manifesto of the CSPEC', here pp. 12–13.

⁷² Hix and Lesse, *Shaping a Vision*, 27–32.

CSPEC engaged in efforts to prepare a condensed version of the programme, but a political commitment by party leaders appeared necessary to solve the problem. In June 1978 in a summit meeting in Brussels, the socialist party leaders of the 'Nine' signed a thirty-one-point 'Political Declaration' on the basis of the new text prepared by the bureau and presented it to a crowd of European journalists.⁷³ The declaration was a watered-down version of the election manifesto; it was intended to be a general framework of basic principles to guide the parties' European policy instead of a binding common programme. As most commentators were quick to point out, the 'Political Declaration' was not much more than a vague summary of socialist principles with hardly any concrete proposals for a common policy. To solve this problem, the bureau was charged to draft another document in view of the upcoming elections, an 'Appeal to the Electorate' that was presented and adopted at the 10th Congress of the CSPEC in Brussels in January 1979: a series of joint proposals that the parties committed 'to defend in each country and in the European Parliament'.⁷⁴

Despite these limitations, both the 'Declaration' and the 'Appeal' still broadly reflected the same approach to the predicaments of the time as the electoral manifesto, and was compatible with the ideas of Holland's socialist planners: an alternative socialist Europe based on 'Euro-Keynesian' formulas combined with a touch of increased public power, planning, and workers' control. Of course, there were important differences between every party, but also a very clear perception of the options within sight, which was helped by the transnational efforts to draft a common programme. During the preparatory works of the 'Appeal to the Electorate', in a 1978 report of the CSPEC's working group on employment chaired by Joop den Uyl, the conclusion stated:

There is a final, fundamental problem that must be faced by Socialists. In recent years social democrats have come to take for granted that steady growth and full employment were attainable in a capitalist economy. They have sought merely to tame capitalism by bringing it under greater public control and making it accept the growing burdens of the welfare state. There is now increasing evidence that this policy is reaching a dead end. With labour costs increasing and profits declining in many industries, we can no longer rely on the private accumulation of capital to fuel the expansion and create the jobs we need. Private investment is seeking increasingly to escape the burdens of the welfare state by concentrating

⁷³ IISH, CSPEC 18, 'Party-Leaders Conference 23–24 June 1978 Brussels' and IISH, CSPEC 18, 'Political Declaration'. All EC socialist party leaders attended the summit and signed the political declaration except for the leader of the British Labour Party, Wilson's successor James Callaghan. That is even though the British Labour Party had joined—first as an observer—the CSPEC after the 1975 referendum and had supported for the first time the idea of a common electoral manifesto prior to the leaders' summit. The Spanish and Portuguese leaders also attended the summit.

⁷⁴ IISH, CSPEC-8, 'Appeal to the electorate', 10th Congress of the CSPEC, Brussels 10–12 January 1979, here p. 2.

on the industrial rationalization which dispenses with labour or by diverting its resources overseas where greater profits can be made with lower labour costs. Socialists therefore face a choice. On the one hand they can rely on the profit motive which can only operate effectively by abandoning the traditional social democratic goals of full employment and higher public expenditure, or they can supplant the private accumulation of capital by far greater state control (and workers' control) over the investment process than they have so far contemplated. It is this problem which should now engage the attention of Socialists.⁷⁵

This almost prophetic analysis of the historical choice they were facing shows just how aware European socialists were of the situation.

European Trade Unions beyond Keynes

In parallel, European trade unions, which were experiencing a period of high combativity, were also formulating an ambitious European plan in response to the crisis. As explained in the previous chapter, since the early years of European integration, European trade unions had increasingly and repeatedly insisted on taking part in EC decisions and tried to lobby European institutions and governments—generally with limited results. The creation of the ETUC in 1973 and its geographical and ideological enlargement in the mid-1970s gave rise to a potential mastodent to support the struggle for a Europe of workers. By the late 1970s, the organization counted thirty-one member unions in eighteen different countries; it now represented almost 40 million affiliated members—thus positioning itself as the main organization of trade unions at the European level—and could therefore potentially hope to weigh much more significantly on the EC. By then, eighteen more trade unions had applied to join the organization, including the French CGT, the Spanish Workers' Commissions (CCOO) and the General Confederation of the Portuguese Workers (CGTP), as well, for instance, as Turkish, Maltese, and Cyprian trade unions.⁷⁶

Since its inauguration in 1973 in the context of 'stagflation' and rising unemployment, the ETUC had engaged in increasing efforts to delineate a common policy programme based on a series of concrete proposals for a coordinated European recovery plan to counter the crisis, with the objective of restoring full employment. During its April 1976 congress in London, it adopted its first substantial common action programme. This programme built on the 'social Europe' proposals formulated by European trade unions and European socialists in the

⁷⁵ IISH, CSPEC-21, 'Draft report of the working group "Employment"', here p. 58.

⁷⁶ Christophe Degryse and Pierre Tilly, *1973–2013: 40 Years of History of the European Trade Union Confederation* (Brussels: ETUI, 2013), 70–5.

early 1970s, but also formulated a shared analysis of the socio-economic context and an alternative to the policies then adopted by European leaders at national and EC level. Indeed, the ETUC and its President Heinz Oskar Vetter, leader of the German DGB, condemned the type of economic policies adopted by European governments since the start of the crisis—in particular, inappropriate deflationary policies and uncoordinated measures at the EC level. Warning against what it denounced as the use of mass unemployment as a stabilization tool against inflation, the ETUC insisted that full employment should be the priority objective of European governments. In its view, the increasing interdependence of European and global economies, as well as the growing economic power of multinational companies, called for greater economic cooperation.⁷⁷

The unions' proposals therefore included the implementation of a planned and coordinated economic policy at European level which would set itself the objectives of restoring and maintaining full employment, protecting the environment, producing useful goods and expanding the public sector and public services; increased intervention of public authorities into price control—at the European level—and job creation through subsidies and vocational training; upward harmonization of social benefits and income maintenance in case of unemployment; public control over the private sector at the EC and EFTA level, and EC control over multinational companies, capital flows, and currency markets; economic democratization through workers' control in multinational and national firms, sustained by EC regulation, and workers' shares in firms' profits; a Europe-wide reduction of working time, improvement of working conditions, guarantee of equal rights for workers, and support to migrant workers; and development of new sustainable energies. They also advocated the definition of a new international economic order, the association of trade unions to EC trade agreements and migration policies, and the development of *détente*, security, and cooperation in Europe. All these aspects were inextricably connected in the trade unions' view.⁷⁸

Meanwhile, trade union economic experts were developing similar analyses and proposals to their fellow socialist economists. In 1977, the Executive Committee of the ETUC asked Clas-Erik Odner, head of the Research Department of the Swedish LO, to draw up a study on short- and medium-term economic problems. It was one of the first studies funded by the new European Trade Union Institute (ETUI), the independent research and training centre of the ETUC, created in 1978. A small working group chaired by Odner was set up, which included several leading trade union economists: John van der Hoeven,

⁷⁷ IISH, ETUCA-739, 'Proceedings of the Second Statutory Congress of the ETUC in London 22–24 April 1976'.

⁷⁸ IISH, ETUCA-738, 'Action Programme adopted at the Second Statutory Congress of the ETUC in London 22–24 April 1976'.

Secretary in the Economic Department of the Dutch FNV; David Lea, Deputy Secretary of the British TUC; Bernd Mulhaupt, economic adviser of the German DGB; Hubert Prévot, Confederal Secretary of the French CFDT; and Peter Coldrick, ETUC Secretary and TUC member. The report was published in 1979 after nine meetings in Belgium, Germany, the Netherlands, Spain, Italy, France, and the UK, where the members of the working group visited trade unions to collect and summarize the main currents of economic theory and the main economic policy proposals of western European trade unions. It recused the neoclassical and monetarist theories increasingly followed by western European governments and international organizations, which were responsible in their view for the whirlwind of unemployment, inflation and stagnation. Just like the socialist economists of the 'Alternative Europe' network, the union economists held that the rise of monopolistic trends at the national and international levels and the growing economic power of multinational companies and banks were the main causes of inflation. At the same time, they too considered that the people's growing desire for participation in political and economic decisions was bound to profoundly change economic and social structures in the years ahead.⁷⁹

Titled *Keynes Plus: A Participatory Economy* (the French title was *Au-delà de Keynes*, "beyond Keynes"), the report argued that a 'post-Keynesian' vision was emerging from the trade union movement, which called for an extension of expansive and progressive politics to guarantee stability and full employment, for a different—'qualitative'—growth, industrial democracy, and a redistribution of wealth and incomes. The authors contended that economic policy could no longer be based on the principle of free trade and that the market economy could only be sustained on the condition of much greater public control of prices, investments, and mergers at international level, regulation and taxation of multinational companies, control of international capital movements and currency fluctuations, and greater participation of workers in decisions regarding investment and in the share of profits. An 'extended system of investment planning' was deemed necessary, which should be democratic and take into consideration the preservation of natural resources and the promotion of well-being. Only a participatory economy going 'beyond Keynes' could guarantee stability:

In order to achieve a more equitable distribution of income and wealth and, at the same time, to avoid both inflation and unemployment, it is necessary to dissociate decisions on savings-investment from the struggle for income distribution by giving all workers a right of participation and responsibility for both savings and investments.⁸⁰

⁷⁹ European Trade Union Institute, *Keynes Plus: A Participatory Economy* (Brussels: ISE, 1979).

⁸⁰ ETUI, *Keynes Plus*, p. xi.

European trade unions—in particular, ETUC leaders—initially put great hopes in the possibility of finding an agreement to solve the crisis, restoring growth and employment at European level through collective bargaining involving trade unions, employers, and governments. During the early 1970s, as explained in the previous chapters, several attempts had been made to increase the official participation of ‘social partners’ in EC decisions ‘at the top’, with very limited results: the 1970 Tripartite Conference on Employment remained a one-off experiment and the SCE went into lethargy pretty much immediately after its creation in 1971. Since its extraordinary congress in Copenhagen in May 1974, a few months after the first ‘oil shock’, the ETUC had been asking for the organization of special tripartite conferences at the European level to collectively define a response to the crisis. Between 1974 and 1978, five annual ‘Tripartite Conferences’ were organized at the EC level—including employers, trade unions, labour and (from 1975) economic affairs ministers, and Commission members—with a view to establishing a ‘new socio-economic pact’.⁸¹

Over the years, however, the conferences occasioned increasing confrontation between the employers’ and unions’ views, whereas European governments proved rather unwilling to implement the decisions taken. The ETUC increasingly insisted on its proposals: it demanded a coordinated reflation policy, measures for the protection of employment and incomes, more intervention of public authorities in economic management through economic planning and investment in major public works and collective services (housing, health, environment, education), public control of private investment, extension of the public sector and social protection, fiscal redistribution, and, above all, a general reduction of working time in order to ‘redistribute’ work. At the European/EC level, the ETUC demanded the implementation of fiscal and social coordination, increased social and regional funds, regulation of multinational companies, control of financial speculation, EC-wide economic planning, creation of a European zone of stable exchange rates, and a common monetary policy that would reduce interest rates, favour employment, and rest on a system of regional solidarity able to combat the existing imbalances.⁸²

⁸¹ On the episode of the Tripartite Conferences between 1974 and 1978, see Corinne Gobin, ‘Consultation et concertation sociales à l’échelle de la Communauté économique européenne: Etude des positions et stratégies de la Confédération européenne des syndicats (1958–1991)’ (PhD thesis, Université libre de Bruxelles, 1996), 461–519; Andrea Becherucci, ‘Prove di dialogo sociale: La CEE e le conferenze tripartite degli anni settanta’, in *Fra mercato comune e globalizzazione: Le forze sociali europee e la fine dell’età dell’oro*, ed. Ilaria Del Biondo, Lorenzo Mechi, and Francesco Petrini (Milan: FrancoAngeli, 2010), 179–202.

⁸² See, for instance, IISH, ETUCA-1781, ‘Les Travailleurs exigent des actions concrètes’, 30 November 1977; IISH, ETUCA-1781, ‘Déclaration de la CES pour la Conférence Tripartite de 1978’, 2 November 1978; IISH, ETUCA-762, ‘Rapport d’activités 1976–1978’, adopted by the 3rd Statutory Congress, 14–18 May 1979, and ‘Supplément au Rapport d’activités 1976–1978’, adopted by the 3rd Statutory Congress, 14–18 May 1979.

As for the employers' organizations—mainly the UNICE and the European Centre of Employers and Enterprises (CEEP)—their demands were diametrically opposed to those of the trade unions: they considered that high wages were the main reason for inflation and demanded wage containment and greater labour flexibility as conditions for restoring growth and therefore employment; they demanded a liberalization of the market and less intervention of public authorities in economic management; they rejected governments' involvement in price controls, but invoked policies of public aid to corporate investment and reduced social and fiscal charges; and they showed particular scepticism towards the proposal to reduce working time, which, according to them, would imperil growth and therefore destroy employment.

The November 1978 Tripartite Conference, which was supposed to consider the question of job redistribution, ended in deadlock as employers firmly opposed the unions' demands for a European framework-agreement on working time reduction and governments seemed unwilling to take firm decisions on the question. The ETUC soon after announced that it would no longer take part in the conferences under these conditions, as 'it is totally unacceptable for governments to limit the use of these conferences to mere listening posts without being prepared, either before or during the conferences, to engage in real discussions and make real commitments.'⁸³ Also, the trade unions had grown increasingly disappointed by the Commission's proposals, which seemed more and more inclined to support the employers' approach of reducing wage costs. They increasingly felt that they had kept their commitment to limit their wage demands in order to stabilize the economy, while employers and governments had both failed to fulfil their part of the deal. In other words, workers alone were paying for the crisis.

Although this unique experiment in 'Eurocorporatism' ended in stalemate, it played an important role in leading the unions of the ETUC to formulate proposals for a coordinated European recovery programme and to radicalize their ideological stance and action strategy beyond a mere Keynesian vision of managed capitalism. The newly created unitary organization was initially pervaded by contradictions and often tensions—between 'internationalists' and 'supranationalists', between different ideological currents, and by the boycott of the British TUC until 1976. Focusing on the Tripartite Conferences and using them as an occasion for discussion allowed the ETUC to build greater ideological cohesion around socio-economic questions.⁸⁴ The action programmes adopted by the

⁸³ IISH, ETUCA-1781, 'Déclaration à la presse de la CES sur les résultats de la Conférence Tripartite de 1978', Brussels, 9 November 1978.

⁸⁴ Gobin, 'Consultation et concertation sociales à l'échelle de la Communauté économique européenne', 585.

ETUC at its 1979 Munich Congress and its 1982 Hague Congress would reflect this significantly greater ideological unity.⁸⁵

The formulation of a shared analysis of the crisis and of a common policy platform would in turn help the ETUC develop a more combative European trade unionism in the coming years. This new combative approach was inaugurated for the first time on 14 November 1975—a few days before the Tripartite Conference on ‘The Economic and Social Situation in the Community: Prospects’—when the young ETUC organized for the first time a mass meeting in Brussels to support its demands for full employment and a guaranteed-income policy.⁸⁶ The demonstration was reportedly attended by around 2,000 trade unionists from France, Germany, Belgium, Netherlands, Luxembourg, and Italy. In their speeches during the rally, European trade union leaders all underlined the importance of Europe-wide mobilizations to get out of the crisis the right way. The French Secretary of the CFDT, Edmond Maire, declared:

The solution to the most immediate problems [...] depends on the strength of the social struggles in our different countries and on the convergence of these struggles at European level, through the unity of action of our confederations. Beyond the most immediate demands, we must also bring together our pressure to obtain the indispensable transformation of the economic and social policy of our different countries and in particular the revival of popular consumption and collective equipment, the fight against inflation and for the control of currencies, the public control of investment and the increase of economic planning in cooperation with the countries of the Third World, and the reinforcement of the powers of workers and of trade union organizations. The ETUC can thus be an irreplaceable means of building a workers’ Europe. [...] Today, the ETUC is taking an important step. It is showing its will to be much more than a body representing workers in the European institutions; it intends to be a real trade union force capable of helping to analyse, confront, stimulate and coordinate struggles against European and multinational capitalism in all its forms.⁸⁷

This was only a first glimpse of a new combative stance that, as we shall see in the next chapter, would culminate at the end of the decade. Throughout the second half of the 1970s, the unions of the ETUC were impressively active in issuing statements, analyses, and proposals to counter the crisis and the rising rates of

⁸⁵ For a summary of the ETUC’s positions adopted at each of its congresses, see Corinne Gobin, ‘La Confédération européenne des syndicats’, *Courrier hebdomadaire du CRISP* 1367–8, no. 22 (1992): 1–86.

⁸⁶ Demands summarized in the statement ‘Emploi assuré, revenu garanti’, 5 July 1975, in IISH, ETUCA-1779.

⁸⁷ ACFDT, CH/8/1838, ‘Intervention E. Maire—meeting CES Bruxelles le 14 novembre 1975’ (author’s translation).

unemployment, and to pressurize governments to act upon them. In parallel to their efforts within the Tripartite Conferences, they expended considerable energy in trying to influence the decisions of the major Western leaders at a time when the latter had started to gather regularly in informal summit meetings ‘at the top’ to tackle the ‘crisis of the West’. Owing much to the initiative of the French President, Valéry Giscard d’Estaing, and the West German Chancellor, Helmut Schmidt, the rise of international summitry—the G7 and European Council summits—after 1974–5 announced a new form of European and global governance on which trade unions obviously were anxious to weigh.⁸⁸

Time and time again, the ETUC condemned the uncoordinated, deflationary responses of western European leaders to the social and economic crisis, and warned that only a coordinated recovery plan could fight unemployment and restore stability. This was deemed a fundamental and urgent task now that EC leaders had revived negotiations on monetary unification, leading to the launching, at the beginning of 1979, of the EMS. Since the late 1960s, the European Left had insisted that social and economic integration should be a precondition to monetary integration. Without this prior harmonization, without economic and industrial planning, without control on capital flows and multinational companies, and in the absence of strong redistributive mechanisms and close association of trade unions to its decisions, the ETUC was adamant: monetary union was doomed to fail or to cause great damage, and the crisis would only get worse.⁸⁹

It is almost common wisdom that the success of ‘neoliberal’ recipes by the 1970s and 1980s was due to the objective failure of Keynesian economic theories and to the absence of alternatives. Historians of the Left and political scientists have often claimed that, from the 1970s onwards, European socialists ‘lacked well thought out plans for getting economies moving again or for using the democratic state to protect citizens from the changes brought by ever-evolving capitalism’ and that the weakness of the Left was ‘the absence of a clear program to refashion capitalism and globalization for the twenty-first century.’⁹⁰ As this chapter has shown, the western European Left was much more engaged in formulating and coordinating new answers to the crisis of the 1970s than is usually assumed by historians. In the 1970s and early 1980s, there were alternatives

⁸⁸ On the rise of international summitry, see Emmanuel Mourlon-Druol and Federico Romero, eds., *International Summitry and Global Governance: The Rise of the G7 and the European Council, 1974–1991* (London: Routledge, 2014).

⁸⁹ In particular, IISH, ETUCA-1781, ‘Déclaration de la CES pour les préparatifs du Conseil européen de Brème le 5 et 6 juillet 1978’, 20 May 1978.

⁹⁰ Respectively Sheri Berman, ‘Europe’s Centre-Left Risks Irrelevance’, *Social Europe* (blog), February 2017, <https://www.socialeurope.eu/europes-centre-left-risks-irrelevance>; Dani Rodrik, ‘The Abdication of the Left’, *Project Syndicate*, July 2016, <https://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/anti-globalization-backlash-from-right-by-dani-rodrik-2016-07>. Quoted in Stuart Holland, ‘Europe from the Left: From Delors to Gutteres’. See also Gerassimos Moschonas, *In the Name of Social Democracy: The Great Transformation, 1945 to the Present* (London: Verso, 2002).

within reach. What the Left urgently needed was not intellectual analyses or theoretical and political recipes, but a common strategy, and firm will, to build a power struggle, and to compose a new hegemonic bloc able to succeed in imposing a socialist Europe based on market regulation, redistribution, equality, social and economic planning, and 'democracy in all spheres of life'. To this we must now turn.

6

The Defeat

A European class consciousness is developing. This class consciousness can change the direction of European integration to turn it into the Europe of social progress.¹

The Europe presented to us by Carter, Schmidt, Giscard and Andreotti has nothing to do with proletarian internationalism, nothing to do with the workers' Europe that the Western workers' movement has dreamed of for a century. In the spirit of its promoters, it is, on the contrary, in the current dynamic of class forces, a question of building a Europe of capital [...]²

From the 1980s until the present day, the slogan vulgarized by Margaret Thatcher to justify her anti-popular reforms—'There is No Alternative'—would become symptomatic of the forcefulness of the new common wisdom. According to this emerging 'neoliberal' wisdom, 'globalization' would be an unstoppable force leading towards increasing global competition that inevitably imposed wage restriction, flexibilization of the labour market, public sector cuts, privatization, welfare state 'reform', and limitation of redistributive policies. In a way, the radical-leftist French economist and philosopher Frédéric Lordon encapsulates the problem faced today by European socialists when he provocatively declares that he agrees with Thatcher: 'It is true, there is no alternative *within the structural frame that we currently live in*'. Indeed—he explains—within a framework characterized by free movement of capital, free trade, liberalization of investment, and the policy 'orthodoxy' of balanced budgets and deflationary policies, it is not possible to carry out a series of socialist policies without taking extremely severe macro-economic risks. The only alternative would be to reset the entire framework.³

In the 1970s and 1980s, however, there were alternatives within reach. One of them could have built upon the 'social Europe' plan that European socialist parties and trade unions had tried to formulate during these years. As this book has shown, the western European Left was much more engaged in formulating and

¹ Edmond Maire, General Secretary of the French Democratic Confederation of Labour, during a round table of European trade unions on the reduction of working time in Paris, 28 March 1979. ACFDT, CH/8/1838 (author's translation).

² Jean-Paul Sartre in *Le Monde*, 10 February 1977 (author's translation).

³ Frédéric Lordon à HEC Débats—Conférence—Présidentielles 2017, Nuit Debout, Capitalisme, available at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=9JwBII0xf_k (author's translation).

coordinating new answers to the crisis of the 1970s than is usually assumed by historians. To be sure, their failure to impose their socialist alternative back then was due less to their incapacity to think of solutions to the demise of the postwar compromise and the so-called 'Keynesian' or 'social-democratic' consensus than to their difficulty to actually form an efficient social and political bloc to impose it at the supranational level.

Although it is largely forgotten today, in the late 1970s and early 1980s the European Left—trade unions and political parties alike—actually attempted, and failed, to impose a socialist alternative to neoliberal Europe.

Dropping the 'European Social Union'

The 1973 oil shock and the economic recession that followed did not, in the short run, put an end to the social impetus that had marked EC politics since the late 1960s. The commitment taken by the member states at the October 1972 pre-enlargement summit in Paris to undertake vigorous action in the social field and the Social Action Programme adopted by the Council in January 1974—although it did not include all the proposals that the European Left, or even the European Commission, had hoped for—led to the adoption of a series of new measures in the following years. The measures envisaged in the Social Action Programme had been intended to achieve, either through EC action or through coordination of member states' social policies, three broad objectives: to guarantee full and better employment in the EC; to improve living and working conditions; and to increase participation by both sides of industry in the economic and social decisions of the EC and of workers in the conduct of firms. Despite the worsening social and economic context, a significant number of studies, memorandums, pilot schemes, opinions, recommendations, decisions, directives, and regulations were adopted—and some important rulings of the ECJ regarding labour law were handed down. Until the late 1970s, 'social Europe' remained an option.

The increasingly tense socio-economic context did not make EC action in the social field less urgent, of course; quite the contrary. This was acknowledged, at least declaratively, by the governments of the member states at their December 1974 summit meeting in Paris, when they insisted on 'the imperatives of a progressive and equitable social policy', affirmed that 'vigorous and co-ordinated action must be taken at Community level to deal with the problem of employment', envisaged increasing the resources of the ESE, reasserted their objective 'to harmonize the degree of social security afforded by the various member states while maintaining progress', and confirmed the importance that they attached to the realization of the measures of the SAP.⁴

⁴ 'Meeting of the Heads of Government', *Bulletin of the European Communities*, 12 (1974).

Regarding the objective of guaranteeing full and better employment, throughout the 1970s efforts were made to extend and redefine the role of the ESF, and action programmes to favour access to vocational training for migrant workers and persons with disabilities were adopted but proved largely insufficient to mitigate the growing rates of unemployment across the EC. Against the backdrop of growing relocations, declining industries, and structural unemployment among the young people, women, migrants, and other marginalized social groups, its scope was extended after the 1971, 1977, and 1983 reforms, and its intervention was progressively opened to new categories of beneficiaries: migrant workers and disabled workers, workers leaving agriculture, workers in the shipbuilding sector, workers in the textile and clothing sectors, and workers most hit by unemployment (such as women, those with disabilities, migrants, youths, and the elderly). However, despite a consistent increase in its budget during the 1970s, and notwithstanding repeated pressure by the Commission and the EP—especially following the efforts of the SGEP⁵—to increase its resources much more substantially, the ESF's budget remained limited: it did not exceed 7 per cent of the EC's (meagre) budget in the 1970s, and about 10 per cent today. Unable to truly cope with rising unemployment, the ESF continued to be mainly a tool to support structural economic transformation and labour adaptation within the EC.⁶ It failed to become the backbone of a truly redistributive EC geared to support full employment, as the most enthusiastic champions of European social policy had hoped in the early 1970s. Besides the action programmes and the ESF, an EC consultation mechanism including government officials and 'independent experts' was set up to coordinate national employment policies and the Council adopted recommendations regarding access to vocational training for women and young people.

Regarding the improvement of working and living conditions, despite resistance from employers and several member states, the Council adopted six directives in the field of health and security at work between 1974 and 1983—regarding safety signs in the workplace (1977), the protection of workers exposed to vinyl chloride monomer (1978), the protection of workers exposed to chemical, physical, and biological agents (1980), the protection of workers exposed to lead (1980), major accidents in some industrial activities (1982), and the protection of workers from the risks of exposure to asbestos (1983)—as well as the EC's first

⁵ IISH, CSPEC-8, 'The work of the SGEP: Report to the Xth Congress of the CSPEC' by Ludwig Fellermaier, January 1979.

⁶ Jeffrey J. Anderson, 'Structural Funds and the Social Dimension of EU Policy: Springboard or Stumbling Block?', in *European Social Policy: Between Fragmentation and Integration*, ed. Stephan Leibfried and Paul Pierson (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 1995), 123–58; René Leboutte, 'Cinquante années d'action sociale en Europe: Le Fonds social européen', in *50 ans du Fonds social européen* (Luxembourg: Gouvernement du Luxembourg, Ministère du travail et de l'emploi, 2007), 8–27; Amandine Crespy, *L'Europe sociale: Acteurs, politiques, débats* (Brussels: Éditions de l'Université de Bruxelles, 2019), 137–61.

'action programme to improve health and security at work' in 1978.⁷ Besides, a first programme of pilot schemes and studies to combat poverty was adopted by the Council in 1975 and the action programme for workers with disabilities and migrant workers and their families included some advancements regarding working and living conditions, such as equality regarding trade union rights for migrant workers and access to education for their children. Moreover, although it had been removed from the 1974 programme, in 1976 the Council adopted a (non-binding) recommendation of the Commission for member states to implement the forty-hour working week and four weeks' paid holiday at the latest by the end of 1978.

As for increased participation by both sides of industry in the economic and social decisions of the EC, in early 1975 the SCE—which had remained frozen for three years—was finally reactivated. As explained in the previous chapter, the EC also launched from 1974 the annual Tripartite Conferences, which represented in theory an important attempt to associate 'social partners' to the EC's highest decision-making level. Two EC agencies were also created, which included on their management boards trade unions, employers' organizations, national governments, and Commission representatives: the European Centre for the Development of Vocational Training (CEDEFOP), set up in West Berlin in 1975, and the European Foundation for the Improvement of Living and Working Conditions (Eurofound), established in Dublin in 1976. However, their activity, at least during their first decade of existence, had little impact.⁸ Both sides of industry were also represented in the new Advisory Committee for Safety, Hygiene and Health Protection at Work set up in 1975 to assist the Commission, and the responsibilities of the existing Mines Safety and Health Committee were extended. Finally, the Commission granted aid to trade unions to set up the ETUI bound to finance studies and trainings for trade unionists in a European context. In short, although the powers and composition of the ESC did not change and although trade unions were not associated with the creation of the European Regional Development Fund (ERDF) and remained excluded from important policy-making arenas—such as the Economic Policy Committee when it was created in 1974 (merging the different economic policy committees created in the 1960s) and the Board of Directors of the EIB—there was some improvement regarding participation of 'social partners' in EC policy making.

⁷ Pierre Tilly and Sylvain Schirmann, 'Free Movement of Workers, Social Rights and Social Affairs,' in *The European Commission, 1973–86: History and Memories of an Institution*, ed. Michel Dumoulin and Marie-Thérèse Bitsch (Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications of the European Communities, 2007), 352–67; Jean Degimbe, *La Politique sociale européenne: Du traité de Rome au traité d'Amsterdam* (Brussels: ISE, 1999), 109–10.

⁸ According to Elisabeth Palmero's brief summary in Eric Bussière et al., eds., *The European Commission, 1973–86: History and Memories of an Institution* (Luxembourg: Publications Office of the European Union, 2014), 151–67. On CEDEFOP, see Antonio Varsori, 'Vocational Education and Training in European Social Policy from Its Origins to Cedefop,' *European Journal: Vocational Training*, 2004.

Regarding increased participation of workers in the conduct of firms—one of the crucial battles of the 1970s for an extension of democracy to the economic sphere—it made little progress during those years, but an impressive number of studies and proposals were in the EC pipeline. The 1970 and 1975 Commission proposals for a Statute for the European Company, the 1972 proposal for a fifth directive to coordinate the laws of member states as regards the structure of *sociétés anonymes* (limited liability companies), and a proposal for a third directive on coordination of safeguards in connection with mergers between those companies, all contained proposals for workers' participation on managing boards.⁹ Following pressure from the trade unions, the question of the problems posed by the activities of multinational enterprises for employees had also been the subject of studies and proposals from the Commission.¹⁰ In 1975, the Commission published a Green Paper on 'Employee Participation and Company Structure in the European Community', where it examined the problem of the structure of companies and the different models of employee participation in company decisions across the EC, and advocated a gradual convergence—with due flexibility to allow national specificities—towards a dualist board system inspired by the German model of *Mitbestimmung* and employee participation on the supervisory boards.¹¹

New achievements regarding European labour law were among the most progressive advancements of the EC during these years. Growing public attention was drawn to the need to protect workers' rights against restructurings and mergers encouraged by the Common Market and the rise of multinational companies through regulation that reached beyond the national framework. In 1971, among many other examples, mass dismissals following the merger of the Dutch Fokker and the German VFW—at least 3,000 workers in the two countries—had created a great deal of consternation. In 1972, joint action by chemical workers' trade unions in the Netherlands, Belgium, and Germany obliged Akzo, a Dutch multinational chemical firm, to reconsider its decision to close down three of its plants and its intention to dismiss around 6,000 workers.

Notwithstanding delays and countless difficulties, several directives were adopted by the Council that extended workers' protection against dismissals. A directive on collective redundancies was first adopted in 1975 which required the member states to oblige employers contemplating large-scale dismissals of their employees to enter into consultations with the employees' representatives with a view to reaching an agreement. These consultations were to cover ways and means of avoiding collective redundancies, or of reducing the number of

⁹ The proposals were published in *Bulletin of the European Communities*, Supplement 8 (1970); *Bulletin of the European Communities*, Supplement 4 (1975); *Bulletin of the European Communities*, Supplement 10 (1972); *Bulletin of the European Communities*, Supplement 1 (1973).

¹⁰ 'Multinational Undertakings and Community Regulations', Communication from the Commission to the Council, 8 November 1973, *Bulletin of the European Communities*, Supplement 15 (1973).

¹¹ *Bulletin of the European Communities*, Supplement 8 (1975).

employees affected, and mitigating the consequences. The employees' representatives were to be supplied with all relevant information concerning the redundancies, and projected redundancies were to be notified in advance to a public authority, which then would have a period of at least thirty days to seek solutions.¹² In 1977 the Council adopted another important directive on the protection of the rights of workers in the case of mergers, takeovers, and amalgamations generally, which required each enterprise concerned to inform its trade union representatives in advance of the reasons which led it to consider the operation, and also of the legal, economic, and social consequences for the employees, then give workers' representatives the chance to launch negotiations. The directive also entailed some measures to protect workers in particular regarding their dismissal compensations and retirement pensions.¹³ Another Council directive was adopted in 1980 on the protection of workers' rights in the case of employer insolvency, which included some guarantees regarding compensations owed to workers.¹⁴ Besides, the Commission was trying to encourage the development of collective bargaining at the European level, which it saw as an essential part of the solution to the problems posed by multinational firms. Although these were only limited steps in the direction of workers' protection against the power of multinational companies, they did seem to indicate that the EC was on the road to a more 'social' Europe.

A major aspect of social advancement at the EC level during these years was gender equality. Three important directives were adopted by the Council between 1975 and 1978 to implement the principle of equality of treatment between female and male workers enshrined in article 119 of the Treaty of Rome, which had so far remained unheeded: dealing with pay, access to employment, training, and vocational training, and social security.¹⁵ Against serious resistance from employers and member states that feared the national cost of such legislation, the

¹² Council Directive on the approximation of the laws of the member states relating to collective redundancies (75/129/EEC) in *Official Journal of the European Community*, L48, 22 February 1975. The directive was modified by Directive 92/56 on 24 June 1992 (*Official Journal of the European Community*, L245, 26 August 1992).

¹³ Council Directive on approximation of the laws of the member states relating to the safeguarding of employees' rights in the event of transfers of undertakings, businesses or parts of businesses (77/187/EEC) in *Official Journal of the European Community*, L61, 5 March 1977. The directive was modified by directive 98/50/EC on 29 June 1998 (*Official Journal of the European Communities*, L201, 17 July 1998).

¹⁴ Council directive on the approximation of the laws of the member states relating to the protection of employees in the event of the insolvency of their employer (80/987/EEC) in *Official Journal of the European Community*, L283, 28 October 1980.

¹⁵ Directive 75/111/EEC adopted by the Council on 10 February 1975 on the application of equal pay between men and women (*Official Journal of the European Community*, L75, 19 February 1975); Directive 67/207/EEC adopted on 9 February 1976 on equal treatment between men and women regarding access to employment, vocational training, promotion, and working conditions (*Official Journal of the European Community*, L39, 14 February 1976); Directive 79/7/EEC adopted on 19 December 1978 on equal treatment in access to social security, which did not come into effect until 1984 (*Official Journal of the European Community*, L6, 10 January 1979).

ECJ's jurisprudence in the following years contributed to entrenching the EC's progressive role on this specific issue. The ECJ's 1975 ruling in the famous case of *Defrenne v. Sabena*—where a Belgian flight attendant, Gabrielle Defrenne, accused the Belgian national airline Sabena of imposing discriminatory retirement conditions—marked a milestone in the implementation of European law on equal opportunities between men and women. The judgment held that the EC was 'not merely an economic union, but [was] at the same time intended, by common action, to ensure social progress and seek the constant improvement of the living and working conditions of their people'.¹⁶ In 1982, the Commission launched its first action programme for equal opportunities (1982–8). Progressively, the strategy of integrating the equal treatment dimension in all common policies—so-called 'gender mainstreaming'—made its way into EC policy making.¹⁷

In contrast, several aspects of the SAP proved particularly difficult to implement—especially the coordination of member states' social security regimes and migration policy. In accordance with the proposals of Brandt's government in the early 1970s, in 1974 the Commission started establishing a very detailed 'European Social Budget' that presented a comprehensive analysis of the evolution of social expenses in each member state of the EC over five-year periods, including social insurance benefits, family allowances, and medical care. Supposed to be a prerequisite of coordinated action in the social field and to pave the way for closer alignment of member states' social regimes, it actually led to few tangible results.¹⁸ The same could be said of the groups of government officials and 'independent experts' set up to coordinate national social security schemes. Despite a recommendation drawn up by the Commission concerning the progressive extension of social protection to categories inadequately protected by existing schemes (such as those with disabilities, students, the self-employed, etc.), and a communication to the Council on the 'dynamization' of social security benefits—that is, the systematic adjustment of social benefits to take account of inflation and growth—there lacked real political will from member states to make any serious progress towards social harmonization. Regarding migrant workers' rights, despite some timid improvements—for instance, on access to social security for migrant workers and their families—cooperation between the

¹⁶ Case 43/75, *Gabrielle Defrenne v. Société anonyme belge de navigation aérienne Sabena* (Defrenne II), ECR [1976] I-455, Judgment of the Court of 8 April 1976. See Gillian More, 'The Principle of Equal Treatment: From Market Unifier to Fundamental Right?', in Paul Craig and Gráinne De Búrca, eds., *The Evolution of EU Law* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), 517–53.

¹⁷ On the emergence of the 'gender mainstreaming' approach in EC/EU institutions, see Federica Di Sarcina, *L'Europa delle donne: La politica di pari opportunità nella storia dell'integrazione Europea, 1957–2007* (Bologna: Il Mulino, 2010).

¹⁸ The 'European social budget' was abandoned in the late 1970s; it was later replaced by the Mutual Information System on Social Protection (MISSOC), still in use today and published twice a year.

member states proved very difficult to achieve. Against rising unemployment that strongly hit industrial sectors where foreign workers were particularly numerous, and against growing economic and social tensions, European countries started to raise growing barriers to both intra- and extra-EC migration. France remained reluctant, for instance, to pay family benefits to intra-EC migrant workers whose family members remained in their country of origin.¹⁹

The same difficulties arose concerning environmental policy, which had been a significant part of the 'social Europe' project promoted by Brandt's Germany at the beginning of the decade. Although it led to the adoption in 1973 of an Environmental Action Programme, no real progress was made in the adoption of binding legal instruments at EC level until the second half of the 1980s. The member states' governments were usually very reticent in adopting environmental regulations which might harm their industrial performance (unless their own national norms were higher than the other countries'). It was not until 1985, for instance, that legislation was adopted to limit lead in petrol.²⁰

Moreover, despite the enhancing of the ESF and the creation of the ERDF in 1975, redistributive mechanisms remained insufficient to cope with regional and social imbalances within the EC. Regional development policy grew from 5 to 7 per cent of the total EC budget between 1975 and 1984, which remained proportionally small compared to the total EC budget (not to mention national budgets), and much less than the UK and Italy had hoped for.²¹ The CAP—the EC's main redistributive policy—was absorbing more than two-thirds of the budget and was increasingly criticized at the time for generating expensive and wasteful surplus production, for becoming excessively costly, and for its negative social consequences for poorer workers, as it favoured large farms to the detriment of small and medium ones. With an EC budget that oscillated between 0.5 and 0.8 per cent of the wealth produced in the EC in the second half of the 1970s (and averages 1 per cent today), the EC's redistributive dimension remained very limited.

Several far-reaching ideas that had emerged during the early 1970s at the time of the formulation of the SAP—such as proposals regarding minimum wage, income and wealth monitoring, social housing, a common unemployment scheme, or control of temporary work agencies—lingered. Besides, in many cases the Commission remained particularly cautious, choosing to submit memorandums,

¹⁹ See Emmanuel Comte, *The History of the European Migration Regime: Germany's Strategic Hegemony* (Abingdon: Routledge, 2018).

²⁰ Jan-Henrik Meyer, 'L'européanisation de la politique environnementale dans les années 1970', *Vingtième Siècle*, no. 113 (2012): 117–26; Schulz-Walden Thorsten, 'Between National, Multilateral and Global Politics: European Environmental Policy in the 1970s', in *Europe in a Globalising World* (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2014), 299–318.

²¹ Jean-François Drevet, *Histoire de la politique régionale de l'Union européenne* (Paris: Belin, 2008), 57; Pierre Tilly, 'Regional Policy: A Tangible Expression of European Solidarity', in *The European Commission, 1973–86: History and Memories of an Institution*, ed. Eric Bussière et al. (Luxembourg: Publications Office of the European Union, 2014), 337–50.

opinions, and recommendations instead of proposing binding instruments. Plus, the instruments adopted by the Council were generally watered-down versions of the proposals made by the Commission and voiced by the EP, which repeatedly denounced the Council's significant delays in adopting some of the most important measures of the SAP.²² Of course, the fact that social policy decisions were subject to the rule of unanimity vote at the Council made decisions particularly difficult. Nonetheless, the 1970s were outstanding years in terms of social policy since the creation of the EEC in 1957.

The fate of the 'European social union' imagined in the early 1970s was in fact also linked to the fate of the Werner Plan for the realization of EMU. When the first Social Action Programme was conceived and adopted in 1973–4, it had been clearly understood as a first step towards the realization of a 'social union' that was to be implemented 'in parallel' to EMU. Specifically, the first SAP was to be implemented in concomitance to the second stage of the realization of EMU (1974–6), and to be succeeded by a second, more ambitious SAP after 1976, during the third stage of completion of EMU. The Commission, the EP, the ESC, and even the heads of governments of the member states had greatly insisted on that point—and so had European trade unions and European socialists. By the mid-1970s, however, it was clear that the implementation of the Werner Plan had been abandoned. In a famous 1975 report of the Study Group on 'Economic and Monetary Union 1980' drafted for the European Commission—the Marjolin Report—a group of economic experts estimated that 'the efforts undertaken since 1969 added up to failure.'²³ Although they indicated a short-term programme to resume the efforts, EC member states made no commitment on that issue until the late 1970s when, as we shall see, they engaged in the creation of a new EMS.

The realization of the 'social union' underwent the same misadventure. At the end of 1976, when the first SAP was supposed to have been fully implemented, the Commission considered 'that it ha[d] fully accomplished the tasks assigned to it' by the SAP and that 'the Council, for its part, ha[d] fulfilled its commitments.'²⁴ This rather self-congratulating stance did not come with any mention of a second SAP. In fact, the commitment to adopt a second SAP was briefly considered by the member states at the beginning of 1977, when the UK started its presidency of the Council, but was quickly ruled out.²⁵

²² For instance, HAEP, PE0-AP-RP/ASOC.1973-A0-0161/750001, European Parliament, 'Resolution on the report by the Commission of the European Communities on the development of the social situation in the Community in 1974', 20 October 1975 (adopted on 24 September 1975).

²³ Commission of the European Communities, DG Economic and Financial Affairs, 'Report of the Study Group "Economic and Monetary Union 1980"', Brussels, 8 March 1975.

²⁴ HAEU, EN-2413, 'Aide-mémoire concernant le programme d'action sociale (établi sous la responsabilité de M. le vice-président Hillery)', November 1976.

²⁵ National Archives of the UK (NA), Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO), 30/3253, 'EEC social policy'; Cabinet Papers (CAB), 193/176, 'EEC social policy: Action programme (1976)'.

Back in office since February 1974, the Labour leadership did not follow the AES on which it had been elected and which swept through the party's NEC and annual conference in those years. Wilson himself was resistant to the new stress on public ownership and state intervention and vetoed the demand to nationalize twenty-five companies supported by 'Labour's Programme 1973'. During his premiership (1974–6), the old leadership deviated from the mass party's ambition to create a National Enterprise Board (NEB) to intervene in 'the promotion of publicly owned enterprises, as well as job creation, investment, [and] the adoption of new technologies', coupled with compulsory planning agreements to organize the private sector. Instead, 'the NEB was confined to bailing out moribund firms and planning agreements were restricted to feeble voluntary arrangements which the private sector was able to ignore completely', and the new Labour government quickly embarked on deflationary policies, cutting expenditure, increasing taxes, and closing a succession of wage policy agreements with trade union leaders to tackle double-digit inflation.²⁶ Proposals to introduce industrial democracy—the 1977 Bullock Report, commissioned two years before by Wilson's government in response to the EC's 'Draft Fifth Company Law Directive', had advocated equal representation by workers and shareholders and a participation of the state on boards of directors of companies with over 2,000 employees—were watered down in cabinet sub-committee then buried a few years later under Thatcher.²⁷

To be sure, the global economic recession did not help; by the time Wilson unexpectedly resigned in March 1976, the oil crisis combined with monetary speculation had plunged the country into a deterioration of the balance of payment and a sterling crisis. After a bitter leadership struggle, the new Prime Minister, James Callaghan, and the Chancellor of the Exchequer, Denis Healey, both Atlanticists, decided to negotiate with the IMF and applied for a \$3.9 billion loan. The loan imposed tax increases, rises in interest rates, and drastic cuts in public expenditure. This was not only 'a defeat for the British left, the unions and the working class'; it was, in Mark Mazower's words, 'the first step in the capitalist reconstruction of the West'.²⁸ It would help fuel widespread workers' strikes during the 1978–9 'Winter of Discontent', which in turn precipitated the discredit of the Labour government and the Tory victory in the 1979 general elections.

In West Germany, the social-liberal government also underwent a shift towards budget discipline after Helmut Schmidt replaced Brandt as Chancellor in May 1974. Schmidt was one of the main exponents of the SPD's right wing and an expert in international economics who had earned prestige with his French and

²⁶ John T. Callaghan, *The Retreat of Social Democracy* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2000), 46.

²⁷ Adrian Williamson, 'The Bullock Report on Industrial Democracy and the Post-War Consensus', *Contemporary British History* 30 (August 2015): 1–31.

²⁸ Mark Mazower, *Governing the World: The History of an Idea* (London: Penguin, 2013), 346.

American peers when in charge of the Ministry of Finance since 1972. The anti-pode of Brandt in many respects, he was opposed to the left-leaning aspects of his party's 'Orientation Framework 85' and hostile to European socialists' proposals for a coordinated reflation combined with socialist planning, redistribution, and greater workers' control described in the previous chapter, as well as to the global South's quest for a 'New International Economic Order.' For Schmidt, the crisis demanded 'the abandonment of Keynesian policies on work and wages, a strong reduction in the role of the state in the economy, and a commitment to freeing up the flow of goods and capital'.²⁹ He believed that the world—including the labour movement—needed to adapt to the realities of globalization and was inclined to restoring the West's role in the international economic order in strong alliance with the US and Giscard d'Estaing's France. He favoured stronger intervention of international authorities into domestic economic choices, and backed, together with the US, the IMF's imposition of anti-inflationary and austerity conditions onto the UK—and Italy—in 1976.³⁰

At home, after the first oil shock, the West German government tackled the economic recession by slashing wages and stifling inflation, ignoring trade unions' demands to respond to rising unemployment with reflationary measures. Instead, it decided to dismiss half a million foreign industrial workers, thus artificially keeping unemployment figures down. This 'stabilization' policy managed to restore price stability and faster economic growth between 1976 and 1979, and was actually combined in that period with a targeted Keynesian stimulus and social measures—such as a four-year public investment programme was adopted in 1976, along with schemes for early retirement and an increase in the school-leaving age, as well as improved maternity leave. In 1976 the Codetermination Act extended the 1951 and 1952 laws by introducing the participation of employee representatives on supervisory boards (but not on executive boards) in all companies with more than 2,000 employees. It was, however, a much watered-down reform compared to the proposals of the trade unions and the left of the SPD, which had encountered fierce resistance from the employers and the liberals; the Act was understood by the right wing of the SPD as a means to encourage self-limitation of workers' wage claims.³¹

The UK and West Germany were not the only countries that underwent an austerity turn after the crisis; in France, for instance, Giscard d'Estaing's new

²⁹ Giovanni Bernardini, 'Helmut Schmidt, the "Renewal" of European Social Democracy, and the Roots of Neoliberal Globalization', in *Contesting Deregulation: Debates, Practices and Developments in the West since the 1970s*, ed. Knud Andresen and Stefan Müller (Oxford: Berghahn, 2017), 114.

³⁰ Julian Germann, 'German "Grand Strategy" and the Rise of Neoliberalism', *International Studies Quarterly* 58, no. 4 (2014): 709; Bernardini, 'Helmut Schmidt, the "Renewal" of European Social Democracy, and the Roots of Neoliberal Globalization', 117.

³¹ Callaghan, *The Retreat of Social Democracy*, 48–9. On codetermination more generally, see Stephen J. Silvia, *Holding the Shop Together: German Industrial Relations in the Postwar Era* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2013).

Prime Minister after 1976, Raymond Barre, was following a similar course, and in Denmark the social democrats were undertaking a restrictive policy by the summer of 1976. But the new attitude of these two governments had particular consequences for the fate of ‘social Europe’. This was, first, because they were the two main socialist-led governments of the EC at the time. Despite its Euro-critical stance, the UK’s Labour government had pushed for more redistribution in the EC budget as it started renegotiating the terms of accession in 1974; new economic discipline undoubtedly impacted its reluctance to put a second SAP on the table in 1977.

More crucially, after Schmidt replaced Brand as Chancellor in 1974, the ‘social Europe’ agenda of the German government was significantly toned down. Perceived as a half-hearted European, Schmidt actually understood European cooperation as an integral part of a broader cooperation of Western industrial states in which the transatlantic bond was vital and where promotion of West German interests was primordial.³² Far from dreaming of an EC at the vanguard of social progress, as Brandt had before him, Schmidt considered that the EC needed to adjust to the new challenges facing humankind in an increasingly interconnected world—a philosophy that in fact was not completely dissimilar to the Darwinian inspiration of neoliberal thought.³³ Together with the liberal Giscard d’Estaing, with whom he had started building a strong political friendship, he favoured renewed intergovernmental European and Western coordination through the establishment by the mid-1970s of the European Council summits of the heads of state and government and the G5, then G7, groups. Within this framework, he promoted a more liberal and austere economic policy in opposition to the ‘post-Keynesian’ alternative economic strategies imagined by many on the European Left—which placed him in clear conflict with the vast majority of his own party and with international socialism. The time when the West German government had been the main promoter of a ‘social Europe’ within EC institutions was gone.

In short, despite important new achievements in the social field, with the economic recession of 1974–5, the restrictive turn of several European countries, and Schmidt replacing Brandt at the German Chancellorship, the impetus of the early 1970s faded away. Among member states and EC institutions more broadly, the enthusiasm that had characterized the proposals for a ‘social union’ gave way to a frantic search for new solutions to the socio-economic crisis.

³² Hartmut Soell, *Helmut Schmidt: Pioneer of International Economic and Financial Cooperation* (Cham: Springer International Publishing, 2013); Mathias Haeussler, ‘A “Cold War European”? Helmut Schmidt and European Integration, 1945–1982’, *Cold War History* 15, no. 4 (October 2015): 427–47.

³³ Barbara Stiegler, *‘Il faut s’adapter’: Sur un nouvel impératif politique* (Paris: Éditions Gallimard, 2019).

Trying Eurocorporatism

The economic crisis of the mid-1970s accelerated the unmaking of the ‘social compromise’ that had allowed the stabilization of capitalism through the construction of the Keynesian welfare state: it led to intensified distributional conflict ‘between wage earners and capitalists in general; between organized groups, notably unionized workers, and unorganized groups, such as marginally employed workers, students and old-age pensioners; and, finally, between private and public sector workers.’³⁴ The focus of European political elites was now on the definition of a ‘new social contract’ to restore economic stability and full employment.

When taking stock of the implementation of the first SAP and outlining future perspectives for the EC’s social policy at the end of 1976, the Commission’s new Director-General for Social Affairs, the Belgian Christian-social Jean Degimbe (1976–92), internally displayed great caution—in sharp contrast with the spirit of its direction under his predecessor, Rifflet, in the early 1970s—insisting first of all on

the prudence required of all countries on the path that has so far formed the basis of social policy, namely increased public spending, particularly on social matters. Prudence is also called for in the development of social legislation, which must take care not to further increase rigidities and not to burden producers.³⁵

Prudence in social expenses, as well as price and wage containment, became the new leitmotifs of the European Commission by the mid-1970s—a view that was expressed explicitly in the Commission’s proposals in preparation for the annual Tripartite Conferences resumed in 1974 and which, by 1975, included not just both sides of industry, the Commission, and member states’ labour ministers, but also finance ministers.³⁶ This new configuration had been accepted by the Council at the insistence of the ETUC with a view to recognizing that social and employment problems needed a social *and* economic response—it constituted a first in the history of the EC, the inauguration of a short-lived ‘Eurocorporatist’ policy.

³⁴ Ingo Schmidt, ‘There Were Alternatives: Lessons from Efforts to Advance beyond Keynesian and Neoliberal Economic Policies in the 1970s’, *WorkingUSA* 14, no. 4 (December 2011): 473–98, here p. 483.

³⁵ HAEU, EN-2413, ‘Aide-mémoire concernant le programme d’action sociale (établi sous la responsabilité de M. le vice-président Hillery)’, November 1976.

³⁶ AEI, Commission des CE, ‘Situation économique et sociale de la Communauté et perspectives (Doc. COM(75)540)’, 22 October 1975; Commission des CE, ‘A Community strategy for full employment and stability’ (Doc. SEC(76) 1400). Available at <http://aei.pitt.edu/>.

By 1975, the Tripartite Conferences also included the British TUC, which had put an end to its EC boycott following the June referendum.

This prudence, however, did not mean for the Commission that western Europe was heading towards a 'social break', as social pressure for change and progress was unlikely to decrease. In order to reconcile the caution imposed by the economic context and the need to keep developing social policies, Degimbe insisted, it would be necessary to emphasize the 'qualitative dimension' of social policy, beyond a mere increase in social expenditure. Indeed, European countries had learned at their own expense that economic growth 'destroys at the same time as it creates', that 'an increasing share of social spending tends to address the social costs of growth and inflation, and that their redistributive effects are ultimately limited'. Consequently, although economic growth needed to be restored, it should be 'optimized' instead of 'maximized'—it must take better account of social goals and well-being. This reasoning led Degimbe to call for the definition of a new 'social consensus' in which the EC should play the important role of promoting—in close collaboration with both sides of industry as well as member states—the search for coordinated solutions so that each country's efforts should be directed firmly towards a common formulation of the social objectives of growth.³⁷

The view that the crisis could only be overcome through the establishment of a new social pact at the EC level was widespread in the Commission at the time, which hoped that the Tripartite Conferences would form the answer to the problem. One of its main representatives in the conferences—the German social democrat, former leader of the DGB, and Vice-President of the Commission, Wilhelm Haferkamp, then in charge of Economic and Financial Affairs, Credit, and Investment—was a firm believer in such a pact, which he saw as a matter of life and death for western Europe's democracies, 'For if we fail in the task of finding reasonable and socially balanced solutions, social conflicts may easily arise to the advantage of undemocratic radical forces.'³⁸ He analysed the crisis not just as a cyclical one but as the result of long-term structural problems: inflation and economic slowdown were the result of conflicts concerning the distribution of income then worsened by the collapse of the monetary system and the soaring of oil prices. Consequently, he believed, the challenge of inflation and recession could only be met if the need was recognized for closer solidarity between social groups within countries, between the member states within the EC, and also between the EC and the rest of the world.³⁹

³⁷ HAEU, EN-2413, 'Aide-mémoire concernant le programme d'action sociale (établi sous la responsabilité de M. le vice-président Hillery)', November 1976.

³⁸ HAEU, GSPE-060-EN, 'Statement by Wilhelm Haferkamp on economic and monetary questions to the SGEP', 11 December 1975.

³⁹ AEI, 'Vice-President Haferkamp Expresses Commission Viewpoint', *Trade Union Information*, 1 (1976).

For the Commissioner for Social Affairs who had overseen the drafting of the SAP in 1973–4, the Irish conservative Patrick Hillery (1973–6), the solution to the crisis should be found in improved social policy. Hillery explained: ‘I am convinced that social policies dealing with matters such as job security, worker participation, the distribution of income and wealth, and living conditions, have a fundamental role to play in overcoming what we chose to call our current “economic” problem.’⁴⁰ But the new context required ‘a coordinated effort extending over the whole range of social, economic and financial policy’ at EC level.⁴¹

How could full employment and social progress be assured, while at the same time restoring price stability and economic recovery? This was the great question of the time. Haferkamp’s answer was simple:

If firms are to improve their profit margins and step up investment, the unions should show moderation in the forthcoming rounds of wage negotiations and be prepared to forgo, for the time being, the major real wage increases obtained in the last few years which have outstripped productivity gains and have led to a significant increase in the wage ratio. Any such wage policy is, admittedly, only feasible if workers are involved in the decisions shaping economic growth and kept properly informed of economic development.⁴²

In short, in the eyes of high-ranking Commission officials, to overcome the crisis all elements were to make sacrifices and concessions. To enable economic recovery meant restoring investment, which implied restoring greater profit margins. The Commission’s idea was to find the best ways of containing wages and prices while at the same time ensuring an increased participation of workers in economic decisions and a better distribution of wealth, not through wage increases and increasing social expenditure, but through ‘qualitative growth’ and improved working conditions.

To ensure a better distribution of incomes, aside from increased workers’ participation in the decisions of firms, one of the main solutions envisaged by the Commission at the time was workers’ participation in asset formation, which was also the object of much interest within the EC at the time. The Council and the governments of the member states had already expressed, ever since the first medium-term economic policy programme adopted in 1967, that an effort in this direction could make it possible to reconcile workers’ aspirations to receive a

⁴⁰ University College Dublin Archives, Papers of Patrick Hillery, P205/75, ‘Speech to the European Atlantic Group concerning social policy, in the Grand Committee Room’, House of Commons, London, 20 February 1975.

⁴¹ Statement by Patrick Hillery in HAEP, PE0-AP-DE/1976_DE19760406-049900, ‘Sitting of 6 April 1976: Statement on behalf of the Commission on the social situation in 1975; Open Question on the Community action against unemployment’.

⁴² AEI, ‘Vice-President Haferkamp Expresses Commission Viewpoint’.

greater share of profits with the 'requirement of investment'.⁴³ The objective of pursuing active asset policies was reaffirmed in the second medium-term economic policy programme in 1969, in the third programme in 1971, which underlined the need for 'greater justice in the distribution of income and wealth', and in the fourth programme adopted in 1977, which expressed the wish that specific reforms be implemented by member states by 1980.⁴⁴ The rationale was simple: in a society where the need for participation, workers' 'control' or 'codetermination' was making itself increasingly felt, worker demands for a share in undertakings' profits and assets were considered fair. If workers were to be asked in the medium term to moderate their wage claims in order to facilitate the reconstitution of firms' investment capabilities, this should be offset by worker participation in the productive assets created by their restraint. Whether these policies could contribute to a serious push-back of private capital, or to preserving the structures of a capitalist economy while giving the workers a bigger share of the cake, would depend on the details of their application. It was clear, however, that the possibility of a kind of stronger social-democratic consensus to be defined at the European level was envisaged, which could have meant tipping the balance in favour of workers at the expense of capital.

But would containing wages and prices, keeping inflation down, and adopting budgetary prudence suffice to restore full employment in the EC? Hillery believed it would not, as with an under- and unemployment rate of about 7–8 per cent in 1976 (including over 5 million unemployed and over 2 million underemployed), and a labour force growing by 0.6 or 0.7 per cent per year, restoring full employment would demand an average economic growth of around 5–6 per cent—a figure deemed quite impossible. Consequently, it would be an illusion to expect growth alone to resolve unemployment and new solutions needed to be sought by EC countries, which included, in Hillery's mind: giving employment incentives to firms; a better match of supply and demand of labour through the coordination of employment agencies, improved labour mobility through training and retraining, housing, and mobility policies; direct creation of employment through public investment in the service sector and in social activities; and 'work sharing', particularly through a reduction of working time.⁴⁵

The ambiguity of the Commission's idea of a new social pact—mixing ideas of a fairer distribution of resources and workers' participation with calls for prudence in public spending, wage containment to restore economic growth through higher private profits, increased labour mobility, and employment premiums for firms—clashed with the proposals of most of the European Left, particularly the

⁴³ *Official Journal of the European Community*, 79, 25 April 1967.

⁴⁴ *Official Journal of the European Community*, L129, 30 May 1969; *Official Journal of the European Community*, L49, 1 March 1971; *Official Journal of the European Community*, L101, 25 April 1977.

⁴⁵ AEI, 'Unemployment in the Community: Speech Given by Vice-President Patrick Hillery in Dublin, 23 March 1976', *Trade Union Information*, 4 (1976).

trade unions. While the Commission had moved closer to the positions of the trade unions in the early 1970s, by the mid-1970s it seemed to be more in line with those expressed by European employers and industrialists. The latter analysed the crisis as the result of rising wages and advocated, to restore economic growth, 'a more balanced distribution of national income, capital income being disadvantaged in relation to the wage share'.⁴⁶ As explained in the previous chapter, they also demanded suppression of price controls by governments, less state intervention in the economy, greater 'flexibility' of the labour market, a reduction of social contributions, and increased tax incentives for firms—which they presented as the way to job creation.

In total contrast, trade unions, through the ETUC, analysed inflation as the result of the excessive economic power of multinational companies and of uncontrolled international capital flux. To restore employment, they demanded the end of deflationary policies, a coordinated reflationary policy at the European level led by those countries which had a balance of payments surplus, public control over private investment and prices, greater intervention of the state in the economy with the establishment of a medium- and long-term planning effort at EC level and employment as the main goal, investment in public services and infrastructure, ending tax allowances to firms, selective credit and subsidy policies conditioned on the creation of jobs, improved protection of workers in case of dismissals, fiscal and other measures to encourage consumption, a reduction of working time, wealth redistribution through progressive taxation, upward harmonization of unemployment benefits and pensions in the EC, Community regulation of multinational companies and control of capital movements and financial markets, a monetary policy guaranteeing stable exchange rates and low interest rates, greater association of trade unions to economic and financial policy making, and cooperation with the global South for a global redistribution of wealth.⁴⁷

These dramatically opposed positions appeared as early as the first economic and social Tripartite Conference in November 1975—and seemed hardly reconcilable. The following year, in preparation for the second economic and social Tripartite Conference to be held in June 1976, the Commission released a document that confirmed its new stance and was deemed unacceptable by the trade unions. It identified the pressures imposed on national income by high wages, high prices, and public spending as the main causes of the economic recession.

⁴⁶ UNICE, 'Conférence tripartite économique et sociale', 13 November 1975. Cited in Corinne Gobin, 'Consultation et concertation sociales à l'échelle de la Communauté économique européenne: Étude des positions et stratégies de la Confédération européenne des syndicats (1958–1991)' (PhD thesis, Université libre de Bruxelles, 1996), 476 (author's translation). See also HAEU, EN-381, 'Résolution de l'UNICE en vue de la conférence au sommet', 27 November 1974.

⁴⁷ IISH, ETUCA-1893, 'Premières propositions en ce qui concerne la situation économique, l'emploi et les revenus en Europe', 9 July 1975; 'Emploi assuré, revenu garanti', 14 November 1975. See also Gobin, 'Consultation et concertation sociales à l'échelle de la Communauté économique européenne', 461–519.

The Commission advocated 'an alliance for full employment and stability', implying more restraint by both sides of industry regarding wages and prices and by public authorities with regard to public expenditure and taxes, limiting national budget deficits, keeping wage increases below productivity growth to restore profits, limiting the indexation of wages on inflation, awarding employment premiums and tax reduction to enterprises, favouring private investment in depressed areas and sectors concerned with saving energy, alleviating pollution, and improving health and security at the workplace, restraining consumption, and strengthening competition policies.⁴⁸ This should be compensated by the promotion of asset ownership, better information on income and asset distribution, and greater worker participation in company decisions in order to restore social peace.

This document was attacked by the trade unions, which were particularly opposed to the Commission's attempted interference in wage policies, and by the European Left more broadly. In the EP, left-wing members of the SGEP and the Communists and Allies were critical of the Commission's position, which was judged too biased towards the interests of business. In brief, they held that the Commission was placing too much emphasis on restoring profits as the solution to the problem of employment; they disavowed the 'theorem' famously coined by Helmut Schmidt according to which 'today's profits will be tomorrow's investments, which will create the jobs for the day after tomorrow'; they rejected the solution of reducing budget deficits by reducing public investment; and they denounced redistribution of incomes to the benefit of enterprises by reducing private consumption and public spending.⁴⁹ In contrast, the SGEP fully supported and reaffirmed the solutions put forward by the European trade unions, calling for special programmes for the unemployed, elderly, women, and young people; planning and public works instead of granting subventions and tax reductions to the private sector; aid to enterprises conditional on job creations; preserving the autonomy of social partners and organizing regular meetings between workers and employers from each sector at European level; and implementation of a balanced regional and structural EC policy, and of economic democracy.⁵⁰ The report adopted by the Social Affairs Committee of the European Parliament, which was drafted by the Belgian socialist Ernest Glinne, as well as the resolution adopted by the chamber, encouraged closer attention to the position adopted by the ETUC.⁵¹

⁴⁸ AEL, 'A Community strategy for full employment and stability' (Doc. SEC(76) 1400), 31 March 1976. Available at <http://aei.pitt.edu/>.

⁴⁹ HAEP, PE0 AP DE/1976 DE19760617-01 9900, 'Sitting of Thursday, 17 June 1976: Preparation of the Tripartite Conference—Guidelines for a Community strategy for full employment'.

⁵⁰ HAEU, GSPE-642-FR-A, PE/GS/126/76, 'Déclaration relative à la Conférence tripartite', 10 June 1976.

⁵¹ HAEP, PE0-AP-RP/ASOC.1976-A0-0160/760010; HAEP, PE0-AP-RP/ASOC.1976-A0-0160/760001.

The Commission then tried to reconcile the positions of trade unions and employers and to bring all stakeholders—including the national governments—to adopt a common programme to get out of the crisis. Its second document took slightly greater account of trade unions' demands and mentioned, for instance, the desirability of a reduction of working time and of favouring job creation instead of overtime work.⁵² During the June 1976 Tripartite Conference 'on full employment and stability in the Community', the ETUC managed to defend its positions and obtain some (limited) concessions.⁵³ The participants adopted a Joint Statement with common objectives: restoring full employment by 1980; an annual growth target of around 5 per cent for 1976–80 through both supply- and demand-side policies; a gradual reduction of inflation to 4–5 per cent a year by 1980; and a medium-term reduction in national public deficits. Reference to wage moderation was watered down, and the trade unions obtained a commitment for the organization of another conference to monitor the progress on each objective, as well as a commitment that 'governments, employers and labour will take appropriate measures to promote workers' interests and their participation in the life of undertakings'. Importantly, they also satisfied a long-time request: recognition of the right of 'social partners' to a seat on the Economic Policy Committee, which until then had only included representatives of the Commission, of the member states and of central banks. Together with the Tripartite Conferences and the SCE, the trade unions would therefore obtain a third tripartite body 'at the top' to take part in the definition of economic and social policy making at EC level.⁵⁴

Changes in the composition of the Commission in January 1977, with the (right-leaning) British Labour leader Roy Jenkins as the new President and Henk Vredeling—a long-time supporter of 'social Europe'—as new Social Affairs and Employment Commissioner (1977–81), seemed to announce better times for the Left's project for an alternative Europe. Shortly after taking up his functions, in his 'Programme Speech' to the EP, Jenkins announced 'a new kind of Community economic solidarity', economic coordination and 'selective intervention of the Community in the economy as a whole', and greater emphasis on regional, social, and employment policy, on industrial, technology, and energy policy, on the coordination of EC funds, and on the EC's 'human face'.⁵⁵ As to Vredeling, he gave interviews to the press announcing that he would oppose any restructuring

⁵² AEI, 'Restoring full employment and stability in the Community' (Doc. SEC(76) 2003), 26 May 1976. Available at <http://aei.pitt.edu/>.

⁵³ Gobin, 'Consultation et concertation sociales à l'échelle de la Communauté économique européenne', 483–5.

⁵⁴ AHUE, Fonds Emile Noel, EN-1916, 'Final Declaration of the Conference on the restoration of full employment and stability in the Community', 24 June 1974. Also in *Official Journal of the European Community*, C73, 28 July 1976.

⁵⁵ AEI, Roy Jenkins, 'Presentation of the General Report for 1976 and programme of the Commission for 1977: Address by Mr Roy Jenkins, President of the Commission of the European

or reorganization of branches of industry in the EC if at the same time a plan was not drawn up to create alternative employment, and that he would be studying the question of a fair redistribution of work.⁵⁶

Under Vredeling's impulsion, indeed, in the following years the Commission engaged in new efforts regarding controversial proposals such as the reduction of working time, workers' participation in multinational companies, and asset-building policy. The objective of an asset-formation policy to improve the distribution of income and wealth had also been repeatedly pushed for by the EP during the 1970s.⁵⁷ After the 1976 Tripartite Conference, the Commission was charged to take on an analysis of this controversial issue at EC level. The 1975 Green Paper on employee participation mentioned previously had already analysed some of the problems concerned with shareholding and participation in company profits; in 1979 the Commission published another memorandum entitled 'Employee Participation in Asset Formation'.⁵⁸ The Commission considered that coordination of member states was essential for the EC:

When considering certain of the more advanced recent proposals based on the principle of worker participation in profits, capital growth or the capital of undertakings [...], one can imagine the repercussions on investors' decisions that would follow if their realization were limited to certain countries, notably the transfer of profits and flight of capital to other countries which would ensue. Again, on the social front, although it is possible (it has actually been introduced already) that certain countries may move in that direction, transition to subsequent more effective stages is inconceivable unless all Member States of the Community move in the same direction. [...] Finally, within the general framework of the gradual realization of economic and monetary union, the development of employee participation in asset formation is justified, not only by an economic approach in view of the wished-for investment growth but also by a social approach where the main objective is a fairer distribution of the wealth generated by undertakings.⁵⁹

Despite these efforts, attempts to reach a new social compromise at the European level stumbled. Trade unions were increasingly disappointed as they felt that

Communities, to the European Parliament', Luxembourg, 8 February 1977. Available at <http://aei.pitt.edu/>.

⁵⁶ AEL, 'Interview Given by Commissioner H. Vredeling to the Weekly Journal "Dutch Trade Union News"', *Trade Union Information*, 2 (1977).

⁵⁷ In its Resolution of 28 November 1968 (*Official Journal of the European Community*, C135, 14 December 1968); Resolution of 13 June 1972 (*Official Journal of the European Community*, C70, 1 July 1972); Resolution of 24 April 1979 (*Official Journal of the European Community*, C127, 21 May 1979).

⁵⁸ 'Employee Participation in Asset Formation', *Bulletin of the European Communities*, Supplement 6 (1979).

⁵⁹ 'Employee Participation in Asset Formation', 12.

European governments and employers were not respecting their commitment to prioritize full employment and keep prices down, and were relying on market mechanisms alone to solve their current predicaments. Increasingly, it seemed like workers alone were paying the price of inflation—keeping wages down, although this was not reducing unemployment. Moreover, the Tripartite Conferences actually highlighted that several trade unions were firmly opposed to the kind of ‘pact’ enthusiastically supported by the Commission (and by some social-democrats, especially in the SPD). In fact, in 1976, the trade unions were very divided on the question of wage containment. Although the ETUC voted in favour of the final declaration of the Tripartite Conference that year, as a matter of fact not all trade unions accepted the document. In particular, the French CGT left the chamber, rejected the declaration, and called on other unions to reject the compromise; it criticized the German unionists for making too many concessions in favour of the employers with a view to restoring profits. Belgian unions were hostile too, and none of the important British TUC leaders were present at the conference. The CFDT, CGIL, and FGTB also expressed their opposition to the overall terms of the compromise proposed by the Commission.⁶⁰ In fact, at the time, growing labour resentment was perceptible towards this kind of ‘neocorporatist’ agreement. In 1978 in the UK, for instance, the TUC decided to reject the Labour government’s intention to impose a fourth round of incomes policy. To the trade unions, western European governments were turning unemployment into an economic tool to keep wages low and restore profits.

During the following years, European employers’ organizations increasingly opposed the solutions put forward by the trade unions, whereas European governments were unwilling to make any real binding political commitments, either within the Tripartite Conferences or within other tripartite bodies at the top, like the SCE and the Economic Policy Committee. At the end of each conference, the conclusions presented by the ministers merely listed points of conflict that resulted from the discussions, and invited the Commission to continue working on those issues and the ‘social partners’ to continue their negotiations; the Tripartite Conferences failed to become the place of orientation of European national and EC policy making.

The 1978 conference therefore ended in clear conflict. Trade unions had hoped that the meeting, held during the German presidency of the Council, would lead to firm commitments to restore employment, in part through a reduction of working time. On the contrary, in his concluding speech the liberal German Economy and Finance Minister, Otto Graf Lambsdorff, a member of the FDP and firm ordoliberal advocate, merely took note of the divergence of views of the

⁶⁰ The Commission toned down these conflicts and presented the declaration as an important achievement towards a social compromise. IISH, ETUC-1906, ‘Conférence économique et sociale du 21 juin 1976’.

participants, invited the Commission to pursue its work, underlined the employers' reticence on the question of working time, and favoured the extension of part-time work. Compelled to note that European governments were unwilling to give priority to restoring employment and to give credit to trade unions' demands, the General Secretary of the ETUC, the Luxembourger Mathias Hinterscheid, declared that the unions would no longer take part in the Tripartite Conferences unless their role and nature were seriously rethought. Despite some attempts to reform their functioning, as the Council persisted in refusing to turn the conferences' conclusions into binding decisions, the economic and social Tripartite Conferences therefore came to an end. This dead end marked the failure of the attempt to institutionalize 'Eurocorporatism', and a deterioration of the relations between European trade unions and EC institutions.

This failed experiment encouraged a shift in the ETUC's attitude towards the EC. During the following years, for the first time they attempted to build a true combative European trade unionism—a step that could have been decisive on the path to the realization of the European Left's plans for a workers' Europe.

Takin' It to the Streets

Despite these difficulties, the trade unions' struggle continued. Although it is largely forgotten today, the late 1970s and early 1980s were a moment of exceptional mobilization by the European trade union movement—with some support of the broader European Left—for a 'workers' Europe'. As explained in the previous chapters, since 1973 the new ETUC had considerably strengthened its position through a series of geographical and ideological unifications which led it to represent almost 40 million workers by the late 1970s, extending well beyond the countries of the EC. From the mid-1970s, it consolidated its positions and proposals for a coordinated European recovery plan combating unemployment and relentlessly campaigned to defend them at the European level. Although it had concentrated much of its energy on the Tripartite Conferences, it also intensified its efforts 'at the top' of European institutions and beyond—meeting with presidents and vice-presidents of the Commission, European Commissioners and their heads of cabinet, directors of the different Commission services, members of the Council of Ministers, the European Council, the OECD, EFTA, the Council of Europe, and so on. It also managed to obtain prior meetings with the presidents in charge of the new European Council summits and the new G5/G7 summits soon after their creation.⁶¹ During the late 1970s and early 1980s, the ETUC issued a multitude of statements and calls to European governments to compel

⁶¹ Gobin, 'Consultation et concertation sociales à l'échelle de la Communauté économique européenne', 474.

them—in an increasingly combative tone—to follow an alternative economic strategy allowing a planned economic recovery, full and better employment, and more economic democracy.

While it intensified its multi-level ‘lobbying’ effort, for the first time the European labour movement also took ‘social Europe’ to the streets. As the European social dialogue experiment of the Tripartite Conferences was stumbling, and in the face of what it increasingly denounced as culpable inaction on the part of European governments, the ETUC decided to adopt a more combative stance in its struggle for another Europe. Several trade unions had been advocating the construction of a more ‘combative’ European trade unionism—one that no longer merely ‘represented’ workers before the European institutions but constituted a real trade union force capable of stimulating and coordinating the struggles against European and global capitalism. This was particularly the case for the CFDT and FO in France, the FGTB, and the trade unions of southern Europe (Greece, Spain, Italy, and Portugal). Thus, on 14 November 1975, as explained in Chapter 5, the ETUC had organized its first European demonstration to promote its demands, just a few days before the first economic and social Tripartite Conference.

Towards the late 1970s, the necessity to build in the streets a popular force capable of leveraging its proposals seemed ever more pressing to the trade union movement. Years after the beginning of the social and economic crisis, European governments were still unable to adopt coordinated economic and monetary measures and had failed in most cases to stabilize their economies and absorb unemployment. In 1975, the French government’s unsuccessful attempt to stimulate economic growth and employment through a unilateral reflation plan proved, in the eyes of many observers on the European Left, their point that only a coordinated economic plan could solve western Europe’s predicaments. Having the strongest currency and export-led economy, West Germany’s choices were decisive for the whole region: it could either lead a coordinated reflationary plan or force its economic partners into monetary and fiscal discipline. In 1977 and 1978, the rotating presidency of the Council of the European Communities was to be held by three socialist-led governments in a row: the UK, Denmark, and West Germany. The European Left could hope that this would favour the adoption of a coordinated financial stimulus, as well as economic and social planning for full employment along the lines it had been advocating for years. A concerted European stimulus had been defended by Wilson’s government since late 1975 and was still being advocated by Callaghan’s government in 1977. The idea was that countries which still had a balance of payment surplus, such as West Germany, should reflate and act as a ‘locomotive’ for other countries such as the UK and Italy, which were facing dire financial difficulties. Although Schmidt was more than reluctant, the proposal was welcomed by a large part of the European political class, the European Commission, the OECD, and even Jimmy Carter’s

administration in the US.⁶² At the same time, in late 1977 Jenkins proposed to revive European monetary union, referred to the need to increase financial transfer in the EC, and called for a major new stimulus of historic dimensions.⁶³ There seemed to be, in short, a window of opportunity for the Left's European alternative macroeconomic European strategy to get through the EC.

During the late 1970s and early 1980s, the European trade union movement therefore launched a campaign for an alternative economic strategy supporting employment, in which it decided to highlight one claim in particular: the reduction of working time *without loss of wage*. Reducing working time had been a major struggle in the history of the international workers' movement—the strike for the eight-hour working day had sparked the well-known 1886 Haymarket Square uprising in Chicago and had subsequently been adopted as one of the core demands of the 1 May International Workers' Day since the beginning of the twentieth century. Its primary goal was, of course, to improve working and living conditions for the working class. It was also increasingly deemed to be a natural consequence of technical and scientific progress that increased productivity at work and thus reduced work needs. Facing the crisis of the 1970s and rising unemployment, which put an increasing burden on social expenditure, moreover, most of the European Left considered working time reduction to be one of the keys to restoring full employment and socio-economic stability in western Europe. Indeed, they believed, it would encourage the creation of new jobs and thus a fairer distribution of available work; it would help to contain unemployment insurance expenditure and increase social security contributions in order to guarantee the welfare state; it would contribute to maintaining workers' purchasing power and thus allow economic recovery; and by increasing work incomes it would contribute to a fairer distribution of wealth. Although the priorities varied according to each union and sector, during the 1970s the objective of reducing weekly working hours and extending paid holidays was progressively adopted by most unions.⁶⁴ It also gained prominence in the programme of socialist parties and was in sum probably one of the claims on which the European social and political Left, which diverged on many questions, most unanimously agreed at the time.

At its second congress in London in April 1976, the ETUC had adopted a long resolution on inflation and employment and a common action programme in which it consolidated its views regarding an alternative economic strategy and announced for the first time the launching of a coordinated political campaign

⁶² Laurent Warloutzet, *Governing Europe in a Globalizing World* (London: Routledge, 2018), 142–3.

⁶³ Piers Ludlow, *Roy Jenkins and the European Commission Presidency, 1976–1980: At the Heart of Europe* (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2016), 126–34.

⁶⁴ Institut syndical européen, *La Réduction du temps de travail en Europe occidentale*, Brussels, August 1979.

for a reduction of working time at European level.⁶⁵ The reduction was to be realized by different measures according to national situations—through the adoption of different policy mixes including the reduction of weekly working hours (preferably to thirty-five), an increased number of weeks of paid holiday (preferably six), a longer schooling period (at least until sixteen), and earlier retirement (preferably at the age of sixty). The ETUC also advocated limiting overtime work and introducing an extra shift for continuous shift work. The same objectives were officially adopted by socialist parties during their 10th Congress in Brussels in January 1979.⁶⁶

Given the increasing interdependence of European economies, socialists and trade unionists agreed that in order to be efficient and to avoid undesirable social dumping effects, the measure ideally needed to be implemented concomitantly in all western European countries. The recommendation on the reduction of working time adopted by the Council in 1975 was deemed insufficient by the unions—besides, it remained unheeded in most cases. Between the mid-1970s and the mid-1980s, they engaged considerable efforts to reach an agreement at European level on this matter. Within European institutions, the project was mainly supported by Vredeling and by the SGEP. Moreover, by the late 1970s several governments seemed to be showing some opening up on the question, at least at their domestic level, in Belgium, Denmark, Luxembourg, and West Germany; the Italian government was carefully affirming that only a European-level agreement could be efficient on the matter.⁶⁷

When it became clear that no consensus could be reached on the question through the Tripartite Conferences, European trade unions—in particular, ETUC leaders—had to rethink their strategy. During the late 1970s and early 1980s, with the support of their allies on the left, they pushed for a political commitment of both the European Commission and Council to counter the neoliberal counter-offensive promoted by European employers. They continued to lobby strongly for a coordinated strategy of economic and social planning to overcome the crisis, and in particular for a reduction of working time to protect employment, either through a collective framework agreement or a legally binding instrument at the EC level. On 9 February 1978, for instance, ETUC leaders met with Jenkins and expressed their scepticism about his monetary union project as long as it did not include a true job creation perspective. Georges Debunne, Secretary General of the Belgian FGTB, explained that priority should be given to reducing working time, not to monetary union, which would not in itself solve workers' problems.⁶⁸

⁶⁵ IISH, ETUCA-738, 'Action Programme adopted at the Second Statutory Congress of the ETUC in London 22–24 April 1976'.

⁶⁶ IISH, CSPEC-8, 'Appeal to the electorate', 10th Congress of the CSPEC, Brussels 10–12 January 1979.

⁶⁷ Institut syndical européen, *La Réduction du temps de travail en Europe occidentale*.

⁶⁸ US Embassy, Brussels, 'European Labor and European monetary union', 15 February 1978, Wikileaks cable, available at https://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/1978BRUSSE02960_d.html.

To back its proposals, the ETUC intensified its combative stance through popular mobilization. On 5 April 1978, it organized, for the first time, a 'European Action Day for Full Employment' that took place simultaneously in all western European countries. The initiative aimed to raise workers' awareness about the European dimension of unemployment and to emphasize the need for coordinated action at European level, just a few days before the European Council meeting in Copenhagen. Public gatherings, demonstrations in many European cities, press conferences, and meetings with national governments, the EC, EFTA, the Council of Europe, the European Council, and employers' organizations were widely reported in the European (especially left-leaning) press.⁶⁹ Trade union leaders in each country voiced their demands for a Europe-wide planned, selective, and coordinated expansion plan coupled with a mass reduction of working time.⁷⁰ In Italy, Spain, Greece, and Belgium, for the first time, 'European strikes' were organized by trade unions; spontaneous strikes also took place in Finland.⁷¹ According to the CCOO and the UGT, in Spain, 3,720,600 people took part (almost 50 per cent of Spanish workers), including 800,000 in Madrid, 980,000 in Catalonia, and 514,000 in Andalusia.⁷²

Although participation did not have the same intensity in all countries, the ETUC was very satisfied with this first show of strength. A few days later in Copenhagen, some relatively encouraging signs came from the heads of government when—in view of progressing towards EMU and to reverse the current economic and social situation—they committed to developing a common strategy covering economic and monetary affairs, employment, energy, trade, industrial affairs, and relations with the developing world, and showed some opening up on the question of working time.⁷³ Although this was only a timid and vague opening, it was welcomed by ETUC leaders, who—also given the conservative reaction of the employers expressed in a UNICE 'memorandum' to political leaders on the very same day as the unions' mobilization—continued and intensified their pressure towards European institutions and governments to make sure they took efficient measures against unemployment and for an economy 'at the service of the people'.⁷⁴ A few months later, in preparation for the July 1978 European and World summits, the ETUC released a long and articulated statement where it reiterated its positions. A new EMS would not, in the view of the unions, be enough to overcome the crisis. It had to be accompanied by a mechanism for financial redistribution between countries and be part of a 'selective and

⁶⁹ IISH, ETUCA-1771, 'Première brève évaluation de la journée d'action du 5 avril 1978', 20 April 1978.

⁷⁰ For instance, CFDTA, CH/8/1838, Edmond Maire to Raymond Barre, 4 April 1978.

⁷¹ IISH, ETUCA-1773. ⁷² IISH, ETUCA-1777.

⁷³ AEI, 'Conclusions of the Copenhagen Council, 7–8 April 1978' available at <http://aei.pitt.edu/1440/>.

⁷⁴ CFDTA, CH/8/1838, 'Réunion du CE de la CES: La Journée d'action européenne et ses suites', 13 April 1978.

planned' economic development policy—that is, one that focused on full employment, the satisfaction of collective needs, and environmental concerns—otherwise it might even have harmful consequences for workers.⁷⁵ Though the Bremen European Council adopted the principle of creating of the EMS and the G7 Bonn Summit led to an agreement on a concerted stimulus led by West Germany and Japan—as Schmidt yielded to international pressure in order to counter protectionist tendencies—trade unions considered these commitments inadequate if they were not flanked by sufficient economic and social measures, EC solidarity mechanisms for countries with a budget deficit, control of capital movements and multinational companies, and, of course, a coordinated reduction of working time.⁷⁶

In regard to work sharing, the trade unions could count for some time on the support of Vredeling in the European Commission, who organized informal meetings with the leaders of European trade unions affiliated to the ETUC in June 1978 and February 1979 to discuss the best possible strategy to reach a binding European agreement on working time; however, they continued to push for a firmer commitment from the Commission as a whole.⁷⁷ In a visit to Brussels in January 1979, for instance, the General Secretary of the UIL, Giorgio Benvenuto, met with several members of the European Commission—including Vice-President of the Commission, François-Xavier Ortoli; Commissioner for Industrial Affairs and Energy, Etienne Davignon; Commissioner for Regional Affairs, Antonio Giolitti; and President of the Economic and Social Committee, Fabrizia Baduel Glorioso—to voice his organization's support for a coordinated recovery plan including a reduction of working time, for which he proposed the organization of a round table of negotiations at EC level. He warned, among other things, that UIL's support for the EMS was tied to the implementation of policies aimed at suppressing inequalities.⁷⁸

To obtain a commitment of the European Council on the reduction of working time, trade unions renewed their efforts to lobby national governments in their respective countries. In Italy, following pressures from the Unitarian Federation CGIL-CISL-UIL, in December 1978 the Italian Minister for Labour and Social Affairs, Vincenzo Scotti, sent a letter to the French Minister of Labour and soon-to-be President of the EC Council, Robert Boulin, asking for a discussion on working time to be added to the agenda of the next Social Affairs Council meeting, and stating that

⁷⁵ IISH, ETUCA, 1781, 'Déclaration de la CES au Conseil européen de Brème', 28 June 1978.

⁷⁶ IISH, ETUCA, 1781, 'Déclaration de la CES pour la Conférence Tripartite de 1978', 2 November 1978; 'La CES discute le système monétaire européen', 15 November 1978.

⁷⁷ Archives of the CGIL (CGILA), 017-147, Vredeling to Lama, 31 May 1978; Archives of the UIL (UILA), box 1, Vredeling to Benvenuto, 13 February 1979.

⁷⁸ UILA, box 1, 'Visita Benvenuto a Bruxelles 28-30 gennaio 1979', January 1979.

the Italian Government considers it a priority, in view of all the economic and social implications that this issue entails, to seek a solution at European level, in the conviction that non-harmonized choices would present a serious risk of further deepening the imbalances between the various areas of the Community, at a time when the launch of the European Monetary System requires the greatest possible effort to harmonize the economic and social conditions of the Member States.⁷⁹

During the first half of 1979, under the French presidency, negotiations therefore started in the Council on this subject. The French trade unions put pressure on their government, as did the leaders of the ETUC.⁸⁰ In March 1979 in Paris, the CFDT organized a 'Euro-trade-unionist round table' (*table ronde eurosyndicale*) on the reduction of working time in the presence of activists and journalists, in which Edmond Maire and Albert Mercier (CFDT), Wim Kok (FNV), Aldo Bonaccini (CGIL), Eugen Loderer (DGB), Georges Grinberg (FGTB) and François Staedelin (ETUC) took part; it was followed by a period of action on 2–14 April 1979, launched jointly by the CFDT and the CGT for a reduction in working time.⁸¹

The efforts made within the Commission and the Council, however, met with very disappointing results. On 15 May 1979, the much-awaited meeting of the EC Council of Ministers for Social Affairs, which was to finally discuss the reduction of working time, generated stark disappointment when it merely tasked the European Commission once again with carrying out new studies on the question. Meanwhile, the Commission had drafted a working document that pointed to the beneficial effects of work sharing in terms of employment creation, well-being and productivity, but it failed to take a firm stance in favour of the reduction of working time without loss of salary. Its first document, discussed in the framework of the SCE on 22 May 1979, did not lead to any agreement between participants—as the employers' representatives refused once more to negotiate on the question of working time reduction.⁸² During the meeting, the ETUC threatened to suspend its participation in the discussions of the SCE temporarily until a firm

⁷⁹ CGILA, 017–147, Scotti to Boulin, 22 December 1978; CGIL1, 017–147, Scotti to CGIL-CISL-UIL Secretariat, 22 December 1978 (author's translation).

⁸⁰ Archives of FO (FOA), box CES-1/4, 'La CES à l'Élysée: En attendant la semaine européenne de 35 heures', *FO Hebdo*, 13 March 1979; 'Durée du travail: Grèves et manifestations aujourd'hui', *Le Matin*, 29 Novembre 1979; CFDTA, CH/8/1834, Hinterscheid to Giscard d'Estaing, 9 May 1979; Hinterscheid to Boulin, 30 May 1979; 'Circulaire: Entrevue de la CES avec le Président en exercice des CE Valéry Giscard d'Estaing', 13 June 1979.

⁸¹ CFDTA, CH/8/1838. 'Table ronde européenne organisée par le CFDT le 28 mars 1979 sur la réduction du temps de travail.'

⁸² HAEC, 375/1999–1342, Commission des CE, 'La répartition du travail—objectifs et effets', SEC (78) 740/2 (annexe au 740); HAEC, 375/1999–1342, Commission des CE, 'Secrétariat Général, note à l'attention de MM. les membres de la Commission, 13^e réunion du Comité Permanent de l'emploi tenue à Bruxelles le 21 mars 1978 sur la division du travail.'

commitment had been made to reach an agreement. As a result, Boulin affirmed that the Council was determined to reach concrete results on working time by 1 December that year. The employers' delegation, however, declared that they refused to start negotiations at the European level.⁸³ The next EC Council meeting for social affairs and the next European Council summit were both planned for November.

Against this backdrop, European trade unions continued to campaign more strongly than ever for their proposals at local, national, EC and international levels. In the face of the constant wait-and-see attitude of European leaders, the ETUC intensified its transnational mobilization and action strategy. A consecration of its more combative attitude took place at the 3rd ETUC Congress in May 1979 in Munich, where some 200 trade union delegates unanimously adopted a detailed and ambitious action programme repeating the organization's proposals for planned full employment, a reduction of working time, economic democratization, improved working and living conditions, regional development, and a new international economic order, which some participants and observers described as a 'European New Deal'.⁸⁴ The congress decided to launch a coordinated mobilization campaign in support of these common European demands, in all countries and at the level of the EC. To back this campaign, for the first time the word 'strike' had appeared in the ETUC's programme, thus opening the possibility of using, any time it was deemed necessary, Europe-wide agitation.

The congress also elected a new President of the ETUC, the Dutchman Wim Kok of the Federation of Dutch Trade Unions (FNV), who embodied a more 'militant' trade unionism than his German predecessor, DGB leader Heinz Oskar Vetter. Among other press articles, the Italian newspaper *Corriere della Sera* observed:

Kok, the forty-year-old secretary of the FNV, is considered to be the man who can determine for the European trade union the transition from the phase of mere statements to that of concrete results. This means turning the ETUC into a real counterpart to the new European government, business associations and multinational companies.⁸⁵

With this choice, the ETUC thus announced loud and clear that it was now ready to harden its confrontation with the political and economic elites at EC level by organizing demonstrations and mobilizing public opinion in support of its demands, just as any national trade union could.

⁸³ CFDTA, CH/8/1834, 'Circulaire: Réunion du Comité Permanent de l'emploi du 22 mai 1979', 29 May 1979.

⁸⁴ For instance, 'Un "new deal" economico dei sindacati europei: Democrazia in fabbrica e pieno impiego', *Avanti!*, 16 May 1979. IISH, ETUCA-762, 'Programme d'action, résolution générale et résolutions spécifiques, 1979-1982, adopté par le 3^e Congrès statutaire', 14-18 May 1979.

⁸⁵ 'Il sindacato europeo codifica gli obiettivi comuni di lotta', *Corriere della Sera*, 19 May 1979 (author's translation).

Kok also embodied the new unitary stream of European trade unionism, and thus raised hopes for the emergence of a more unitarian and therefore more incisive European trade unionism. With the prospect of possible CGT membership still open—supported for a time by the CFDT, TUC, and FGTB, and welcomed by a majority of the ETUC Executive Committee, but fiercely opposed by the most anti-communist unions, particularly the FO, the DGB, and the Italian CISL—the trade union movement seemed to be at a historical turning point.⁸⁶ Despite the vicissitudes of its ‘unity of action’ pact with the CDFT, until 1980 the CGT remained in favour of the construction of a European trade unionism of unity and action respectful of pluralism.⁸⁷ On 4 April 1979, its Executive Committee thus declared:

The CGT reiterates its firm desire to join the ETUC and stresses the value of a strong, independent and sovereign ETUC, rich in the diversity of its components. In the meantime, however, it considers it necessary to develop the united action of the workers of Europe and their trade union organizations and will do its utmost to achieve this objective as soon as possible.⁸⁸

The announcement of a stronger, more combative, and more united trade unionism at European level was seen at the time as a decisive moment for the European trade union movement and for the construction of a ‘workers’ Europe’. On the eve of the first European election, this new European trade unionism came at a timely moment: it was hoped that the emergence of a transnational workers’ movement could support in the streets the alliance of progressive forces that could potentially emerge from the first European election. In his closing speech to the congress, Kok declared that ‘the trade union movement must fight tooth and nail to ensure that the consequences of the crisis do not fall on millions of workers who did not want it.’⁸⁹ This new combative strategy was to focus in particular on one essential struggle: the struggle for a general reduction in working time at European level. This historic congress was widely reported in the press, especially on the left.⁹⁰

⁸⁶ The very concrete possibility of the CGT’s entry into the ETUC until its rejection in 1980 is in fact attested by the US diplomatic cables. For example, US Mission EC Brussels, ‘ETUC Executive committee approves CGT talks and reviews East–West conference’, 10 February 1975, Wikileaks cable, available at https://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/1975ECBRU01153_b.html.

⁸⁷ On these incidents and on the breakdown of the unity of action, see Claude Roccati, ‘Si proche, si loin: L’Europe et la CFDT dans la politique revendicative de la CGT’, in *La CGT, 1975–1995: Un syndicalisme à l’épreuve des crises*, ed. Sophie Bérout et al. (Nancy: Arbre bleu éditions, 2019), 299–307.

⁸⁸ CGT Archives, Archives départementales de Seine-Saint-Denis (ACGT), 242J8, ‘The problems of Europe: Executive Committee document of April 4 1979’.

⁸⁹ IISH, ETUCA-765, ‘Closing remarks by Willem Kok’ (May 1979).

⁹⁰ For instance, in Italy, ‘Concluso a Monaco il congresso della Ces: Il neo-presidente annuncia lotte sindacali “con le unghie e coi denti”’, *Il Messaggero*, 19 May 1979; ‘Storica decisione dei sindacati

Consequently, in late November 1979, in view of the European Council of Dublin, the ETUC organized for the first time an entire week of protest actions. The moment was particularly critical as European trade unions expected to force European leaders to finally take, as promised, serious measures to restore full employment, including a decision on working time. In 1979, the increasingly tense economic context of the 'second oil shock' in 1979 accelerated the ideological shift among European political elites: after the Tory victory in the May elections, the new British Prime Minister, Margaret Thatcher, was a fierce promoter of monetarist and neoliberal formulas; the West German government had responded to its balance-of-payments deficit with stricter domestic austerity; European governments had abandoned their coordinated reflationary strategy; the ETUC felt increasingly that European governments and institutions were adopting the employers' views and favouring the fight against inflation at the expense of employment and thus of millions of workers; and relations between trade unions and Jenkins Commission worsened.⁹¹

To reverse this tendency, the 'European Action Week' took place from 24 to 30 November 1979 across western Europe and involved all affiliated unions of the ETUC, including European industry federations. It entailed demonstrations, activist meetings, press conferences, events in major European cities with an exchange of speakers between different countries, dissemination of leaflets and posters with common slogans, meetings with governments and employers' organizations, and, where deemed appropriate, strike action. It was largely followed in Greece, Italy, France, Belgium, and Spain; and to a lesser extent in the Netherlands, Ireland, West Germany, the UK, the Scandinavian countries, Switzerland, Austria, and Luxembourg; meetings with public authorities were accompanied with public actions and demonstrations, and sometimes strikes.⁹²

In Italy, for instance, where trade unions were in the middle of negotiations about the renewal of the collective agreements at sectorial level, the Unitary Federation CGIL-CISL-UIL sent to all its affiliated structures a bulletin that explained the state of negotiations at EC level and called for mobilization along the lines set by the ETUC.⁹³ It identified, for specific actions such as strikes and activist assemblies, some particular regions (Trentino Alto Adige, Lombardia, Veneto, Lazio, and Puglia) as well as several particular sectors. Discussions and actions on European questions were thus organized during the assemblies of food

a Monaco: D'ora in poi lo sciopero può abbracciare l'Europa', *Il Giorno*, 19 May 1979; 'La Ces si prepara ad uno sciopero europeo', *La Sinistra*, 19 May 1979; 'Può nascere in Europa una nuova forza: È l'unità dei sindacati', *L'Unità*, 17 May 1979; 'Sindacati europei: Via alla lotta per l'orario', *Il Popolo*, 16 May 1979.

⁹¹ At the end of 1979, a CFDT leader described Vredeling as a 'dull' character, 'often closer to the employers' positions out of tactical caution than those of the ETUC'. ACFDT, CH/8/1838, 'Comptendu rencontre CES-CEE-UNICE 7 & 8 novembre 1979' by Michel Rolant, 12 November 1979.

⁹² CFDTA, CH/8/1834, 'Premières informations sur la semaine d'action', 26 November 1979.

⁹³ CGILA, 142/094, 'Circolare 23/757: Settimana europea di mobilitazione', 6 November 1979.

processors for the renewing of the industry's collective agreement; chemists organized a national strike on 28 November as well as two big assemblies in Marghera and Pallanza; labourers integrated discussions on the reform of the CAP and the ETUC's proposals within their ongoing strike movement between 19 and 24 November; metalworkers planned moments of awareness-raising on European questions during assemblies that took place in large companies (Olivetti, Fiat, and Alfa), and in regions like Taranto and Varese that were particularly touched by industrial restructuring in their sector; and textile workers included the European dimension in their meetings and assemblies to discuss problems of restructuring in their sector, especially in the Mezzogiorno. Demonstrations took place in Rome, Milan, Palermo, and Monzano, and a general strike took place on the 21st with high participation, for instance at Fiat plants. The Federation CGIL-CISL-UIL also decided to include pressure on the objectives set by the ETUC's Munich Congress in its meetings with the government regarding the ongoing negotiations on fiscal questions, pensions, prices policy, energy, and restructurings.⁹⁴

In France, to give another example, all unions were mobilized during the European Action Week, including the CGT which called its affiliates, together with the CFDT and the National Education Federation (FEN), 'to take the widest possible initiatives for the week of 26 to 30 November in the form of work stoppages and demonstrations with a view to extending the action to as many workers as possible.'⁹⁵ The unitary call was widely followed: the postal services and communications federations (PTT) of the CGT and CFDT called for mass participation in the initiatives, such as a strike of financial services on 22 November and a strike of station offices, sorting centres and telecom installations on 29 November; the same instructions were given for massive participation of railway workers and bank staff, among others; in Aquitaine, the regional federations called for a minimum two-hour stoppage and demonstrations; and so on. On 29 November demonstrations took place in Paris and several other cities such as Marseille, Bordeaux, Lille, and Clermont-Ferrand.⁹⁶ As for the FO, it refused to take part in the unitary initiatives organized by the other unions, but called its federations and departmental unions to follow the ETUC's instructions to organize actions against employers and public authorities at all levels and to support these actions with whatever demonstrations were deemed appropriate as well as a work stoppage of at least one hour on 30 November.⁹⁷ The call was rather successful: among

⁹⁴ CGILA, 142/094, 'Nota per la segreteria della Federazione: Settimana di mobilitazione europea 24-30 Novembre', 14 November 1979; 'Uffici Internazionali CGIL CISL UIL to Hinterscheid', 15 November 1979.

⁹⁵ 'La FEN dans l'action du 26 au 30 novembre', *Le Matin*, 21 November 1979.

⁹⁶ 'Nouvelle action commune la semaine prochaine', *L'Humanité*, 21 November 1979.

⁹⁷ FOA, box CES 1/4, 'Circulaire: Semaine d'action européenne 24-30 Novembre 1979', 6 November 1979; 'Communiqué: FO demande à ses militants et adhérents de cesser le travail au moins une heure

other initiatives, FO Railroaders called for a one-hour work stoppage on 28 November; FO Finance decided to hold a twenty-four-hour general strike; FO Electricity and Gas called for one-hour work stoppages on 27, 28, 29, and 30 November; and FO Public Services and Health organized a national demonstration with a rally in front of the Ministry of Health.⁹⁸ A national delegation of FO led by its Secretary, André Bergeron, was received by the Prime Minister, Raymond Barre, and the new Labour Minister, Jean Mattéoli, on 26 November to talk, above all, about working time reduction.⁹⁹

All this was not quite enough to convince European governments, however. At the Council, indeed, member states failed ever to really support the unions' project for a reduction of working time, just as they generally failed to support their proposals for a coordinated European 'new deal'. Schmidt's government initially showed interested but remained ambiguous on the matter. The French government under Giscard d'Estaing seemed open to discussions on social Europe and on working time, but its conception of the problem differed on almost every point from the project put forward by the European Left: it refused any reduction of working time without loss of wage and preferred solutions like limiting overtime work or encouraging part-time work. Rather tellingly, it preferred the term 'reorganization' to 'reduction' of working time, which was less constraining and more compatible with the objective of 'flexibilization' of labour and the increase in part-time work. The Italian government, pressured by the Italian unions, was willing to place the issue on the agenda but showed no extravagant public support for the project. The Commission proposal discussed at the Council in 1979—which itself was considered very insufficient by the trade unions—raised stark opposition from Barre, from the French Commissioner, François-Xavier Ortoli, and even from the German government. Whereas the British Labour government had been cautious on the matter, Thatcher's new government was plainly and fiercely opposed to the project.¹⁰⁰

The immediate result of the unions' mobilization was therefore a very modest (and non-binding) resolution on working time adopted by the EC Council for Social Affairs on 22 November 1979.¹⁰¹ In a letter to Giscard d'Estaing a few days later, Jacques Chèreque, adjunct Secretary General of the CFDT, denounced this resolution as 'a total alignment on the positions defended by the employers'.¹⁰² On the following week, and despite the promises made by the Irish Taoiseach and President in exercise of the European Council, Jack Lynch, to an ETUC delegation,

le 30 Novembre 1979', 21 November 1979; 'Circulaire: Semaine d'action européenne du 24 au 30 Novembre 1979', 21 November 1979.

⁹⁸ 'La Semaine d'action des travailleurs européens', *FO Hebdo*, 28 November 1979.

⁹⁹ 'Durée du travail: Grèves et manifestations aujourd'hui', *Le Matin*, 29 November 1979.

¹⁰⁰ For a detailed description of the member states' positions on the matter, see Warloutzet, *Governing Europe in a Globalizing World*, 44.

¹⁰¹ *Official Journal of the European Communities*, C2, 4 January 1980.

¹⁰² CFDTA, CH/8/1838, Chèreque to Giscard d'Estaing, 26 November 1979.

the heads of state and government meeting in Dublin declared, in stark contrast to trade unions' hopes, that priority should be given to combating inflation (not to unemployment). Despite all the lobbying efforts and the week of protest actions organized for the occasion—and in spite of the previous commitments made by the governments—European trade unions and all other promoters of the project were losing the battle. The ETUC unions remained utterly disappointed by the decisions of European governments in the Council of Ministers and the European Council and accused the governments of preferring to support the demands and interests of the employers at the expense of European workers, of 9 million unemployed, and of any hope of lasting social peace and democracy in Europe. They nevertheless renewed in the following years their call to continue and intensify the actions and mobilization in support of their proposals.¹⁰³

The battle went on for several years. The European Action Day in April 1978, and even more so the European week of mobilization in November 1979, were remarkable novelties in the history of Europe's transnational labour mobilization. They epitomized a phase of particularly incisive European activism for trade unions. In the following years, trade unions continued their attempt to build a mass offensive at the European level, although in less ambitious ways and without ever resorting to real coordinated European strikes. In 1980, during the June European Council in Venice, the ETUC gathered a demonstration of 5,000 militants; it then decided to launch a new 'popular campaign against mass unemployment'. Demonstrations then took place in March 1981 during the Maastricht Council; and in June 1981 for the Luxembourg Council, when 12,000 people gathered and the ETUC presented its manifesto entitled 'For Employment and Economic Recovery'. In 1983, the ETUC organized in February a festival for the tenth anniversary of its creation in Brussels where 5,000 to 6,000 militants gathered for a demonstration and launched a Europe-wide campaign for employment, reinforced in June 1983 by an important European demonstration organized with strong support of the DGB in Stuttgart, where 80,000 trade union members took part. It was undoubtedly the most combative period in the history of European-level trade unionism, at least until the 2000s. The gap between the trade unions' views and the employers' and governments' solutions was, however, widening.¹⁰⁴

Meanwhile, in the EP, the socialist and communist groups continued to push the battle forward by trying to pass resolutions and raising oral questions calling

¹⁰³ IISH, ETUCA-1781, 'Déclaration de la CES sur le Conseil européen de Dublin', 5 December 1979; 'Échec à Stockholm et à Venise', 2 July 1980.

¹⁰⁴ IISH, ETUCA-1781 to 1785. See also Pierre Tilly and Christophe Degryse, *1973–2013: 40 Ans d'histoire de la Confédération européenne des syndicats* (Brussels: Institut syndical européen, 2013), 239–41; Gobin, 'Consultation et concertation sociales à l'échelle de la Communauté économique européenne', 516–19 and part three; Georges Debunne, *Les Syndicats et l'Europe: Passé et devenir* (Brussels: Éditions Labor, 1987), 141–58. The nomination of the Belgian FGTB trade unionist Georges Debunne as the new President of the ETUC during the 4th Congress of the ETUC in April 1982 confirmed this more 'combative' orientation of European trade unionism.

on European institutions to adopt an alternative economic strategy aiming at full employment. In the meantime, however, the first direct European election in June 1979 had marked a setback for the Left. The Socialist Group remained the largest group with 113 seats out of 410 and the Communist and Allies Group won 44 seats (24 of which belonged to the PCI), but the high scores of the Christian democrats of the European People's Party (EPP, 107 seats), the European Democrats (ED, involving British and Danish conservative parties, 64 seats) and the Liberal and Democratic Group (LD, 40 seats) significantly undermined their position. Shortly after the EP elections, nevertheless, following a proposal put forward by the then socialist MEP Jacques Delors, the socialists decided to set up an ad hoc working group on employment to 'launch an offensive' at European level, prepared a resolution on employment drafted by the Italian PSI deputy—and former member of the Italian CGIL—Mario Didò, and demanded a major debate on the employment situation in the EC to be held during a plenary sitting on 15 January 1980.¹⁰⁵

During the plenary debate, the members of the SGEP put forward their arguments for a coordinated response to the employment situation at EC level, which should embrace, among other things, a reduction of working time. The socialists' demands were in line with the broad alternative socialist response to the crisis that had been formulated within transnational socialist circles since the mid-1970s: redistribution of work and wealth, industrial and regional planning, economic democratization, improvement of working conditions, reflationary policy, increased public spending to stimulate the economy and control of private investment, control of major firms and multinational companies, increased and better coordination of European Funds, and so on.¹⁰⁶ Vredeling, who presented the Commission's work on the matter, supported the proposals. The Communists and Allies also supported proposals regarding working time reduction.¹⁰⁷ The proposals were nonetheless torpedoed by the new right-wing alliance, which instead passed a resolution that attacked both 'work sharing' and expansion of the public sector as costly and damaging for Europe's international competitiveness,

¹⁰⁵ HAEU, GSPE-066-EN, 'Note regarding the setting up of an ad hoc working party on questions relating to employment', by Jacques Delors, August 1979; HAEU, GSPE-066-EN, 'Draft resolution on employment prepared by Mario Dido', 18 September 1979; HAEP, PE1-AP-QP-QO-O-0148-79-0010-FR, 'Question orale avec débat de M. Glinne et autres au nom du groupe socialiste à la Commission des CE sur la situation de l'emploi dans la Communauté', 18 December 1979.

¹⁰⁶ HAEP, PE1-AP-DE/1979-DE19800115-039900EN, 'Sitting of Tuesday 15 January 1980: Employment situation in the Community'; HAEP, PE1-AP-PR-B1-0659/79-0010-FR, 'Proposition de résolution présentée par M. Glinne au nom du GS relative à la situation de l'emploi dans la Communauté', 14 January 1980.

¹⁰⁷ HAEP, PE1-AP-PR-B1-0671/790010FR, 'Proposition de résolution présentée par MM. Bonaccini et autres sur la situation de l'emploi dans la Communauté', 15 January 1980; HAEP, PE1-AP-PR-B1-0672/79-0010-FR, 'Proposition de résolution présentée par M. Frischmann et autres sur la situation de l'emploi dans la Communauté', 15 January 1980.

emphasized the need for greater labour flexibility, and encouraged public authorities to support retraining schemes and economic restructuring.¹⁰⁸

This episode was a patent defeat for the European Left. It highlighted the socialists' inability to build a political alliance of European 'progressive forces' to sustain its proposals. The liberal-conservative shift of the EP was a particularly hard blow for European trade unions, socialist parties, and the Italian communists, who had nourished high hopes concerning the new elected Parliament's potential role as a motor for a 'social' and 'democratic' Europe. In the following years, repeated attempts by the left-wing groups to put the question of employment and economic recovery back on the EP's agenda ended up more often than not in the adoption of resolutions that watered down socialist proposals and increasingly emphasized principles such as competitiveness, flexibility, training and mobility of labour, as well as anti-inflation measures and financial and fiscal aid to the private sector.¹⁰⁹

After 1981, when the Left took office for the first time in the French Fifth Republic, the French government attempted to put the question of working time reduction back on the EC agenda. The Commission—where Vredeling's British Labour successor Ivor Richard was much less willing to act on the issue of working time—then carried out new studies, which were examined by the Economic Policy Committee, with limited results.¹¹⁰ Employers' organizations had continued to dodge the trade unions' attempts to negotiate on the question: UNICE had rejected the organization of a tripartite conference with EFTA and the EEC on the reduction of working time in June 1978; of a west European tripartite conference on employment organized by the Council of Europe in May 1980; then refused Vredeling's proposals to engage in negotiations on framework agreements between UNICE and the ETUC.¹¹¹ In the Council, the hostility of Thatcher's government was reinforced by the reluctance of the German government, which was grappling with internal conflict regarding the thirty-five-hour week and wanted to keep the EC away from this burning issue. The UK government applied its veto to the Commission's recommendation proposal at the Social Affairs Council meeting of 7 June 1984. The other nine member states did decide to adopt a recommendation on the reduction and reorganization of working time, but it was once again very cautious and non-binding, and envisaged working time

¹⁰⁸ HAEP, PE1-AP-PR-B1-0669/79-0001-EN, 'Resolution on the employment situation in the Community', 15 January 1980.

¹⁰⁹ For instance, HAEP, PE1AP-RP/ASOC.1979-A1-0425/810001EN, 'Resolution on employment and the adaptation of working time', 12 October 1981; HAEP, PE1-AP-RP/ASOC.1979-A1-0071/830001EN, 'Resolution on the memorandum from the Commission of the EC on the reduction and reorganization of working time', 28 April 1983.

¹¹⁰ AHCE, 375/1999_1929, 'Document interne de la Commission sur les travaux du Comité de Politique Economique' (no date).

¹¹¹ Gobin, 'Consultation et concertation sociales à l'échelle de la Communauté économique européenne', 510; Warloutzet, *Governing Europe in a Globalizing World*, 51.

reduction as a means to increase flexibility and competitiveness—in opposition to the general reduction of working time by 10 per cent with no loss of wage supported by the European Left. In short, the European Left failed to weigh in any significant way on the decisions of European governments and the EC regarding employment and economic recovery.

Renouncing Economic Democracy

Another decisive aspect of the European Left's struggle for a 'social' Europe—and its defeat—was the question of economic democracy.

As we have seen, in one form or another democratization of the economy had been one of the mainstays of the western European Left since the social protests of the late 1960s. Broadly understood, it could entail greater power and entitlements for workers not only in the workplace or at the company level, but at all levels of economic decision making from the local and national levels to the EC and other international organizations. But industrial democracy was key to this new aspiration. Of course, there were endless debates and divergences regarding the exact form that this democratization should take: the legal and institutional forms of industrial democracy (jurisdiction, collective bargaining); the type of participation envisaged and the role of trade unions ('direct' participation of workers or trade union representatives); the decision-making process (consultation, involvement in decision making, co-management, self-management); the type of decisions concerned (working conditions, operational or strategic economic decisions); the ownership of the enterprise (profit sharing, sharing of the enterprise's shares to workers, wage-earner funds, social enterprises and producer cooperatives); and the type of enterprise concerned (small and medium firms, big firms, multinational companies), etc.¹¹²

European socialists and trade unions intensively discussed economic and industrial democracy in their transnational circles throughout the 1970s. Although, as explained in Chapter 4, they diverged on many points, particularly regarding the role of workers in the governance of firms, they broadly agreed on the fact that European countries and European and international authorities should encourage greater democracy in the workplace, especially within multinational companies. The debate on multinational companies had intensified since the late 1960s as both supporters of a fairer world economic order in the global South and the labour movement in the North pointed to their disruptive social consequences. Increasing globalization and the spread of multinational companies meant a multiplication of production sites and higher competition of workers of different countries against each other. This, in turn, weakened the trade unions

¹¹² See in general Herman Knudsen, *Employee Participation in Europe* (London: SAGE, 1995).

in their bargaining power against management, which could always threaten to switch production to another site. With the profit squeeze of the long 1970s, with an increasingly mobile capital 'voting with its feet' through relocation of production to lower-wage areas with weaker unions and more tax evasion, and with unemployment figures rising, it became even more vital for the European Left to control and democratize multinational companies.¹¹³

From this perspective, since the early 1970s, European trade unions and socialist parties had taken several initiatives beyond the national level. In October 1972 the ECFTU held a colloquium on 'The possibilities of workers exerting their influence within multinational companies.' In 1975, the ETUC passed a resolution addressed to the EC, EFTA, and all the governments of their member states demanding the establishment of an information and consultation body for workers of multinational companies. At its London Congress in 1976, the organization adopted in its action programme a resolution on economic democracy and multinational groups, urging legislation for the setting up of such body.¹¹⁴ As for European socialist parties, their 1973 Theses for a Social Europe, their 1978 Political Declaration and their 1979 Appeal to the Electorate, for instance, all called for greater control by workers in European firms and for greater control over and democracy within multinational companies. So did the European economic strategy promoted by Stuart Hall, Franco Archibugi, Jacques Delors, and their 'Alternative Europe' network.¹¹⁵ In April 1979, in the run-up to the EP's first election, the confederation of the Socialist Parties of the European Community organized a 'Conference on economic democracy: guarantee of peace, liberty and equality' in Copenhagen, which emphasized the need for European legislation on multinational groups.¹¹⁶ In the Socialist International, the question of transnational corporations and their effects on the global economy gained prominence under Brandt's presidency after 1976; a study group on multinational corporations was set up in 1977 and its final report advocated greater public control through government representation on managerial boards, full access to information for unions and governments, greater participation of workers in firms' decisions, the setting up of an international authority to monitor the conduct of multinationals, and so on.¹¹⁷

¹¹³ Francesco Petrini, 'Demanding Democracy in the Workplace: The European Trade Union Confederation and the Struggle to Regulate Multinationals', in *Societal Actors in European Integration*, ed. Wolfram Kaiser and Jan-Henrik Meyer (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013), 155–6; Beverly J. Silver, *Forces of Labor: Workers' Movements and Globalization since 1870* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 163–4; Thomas Fetzter, 'The Late Birth of Transnational Labour Cooperation: Cross-Border Trade Union Networks at Ford and General Motors (1953–2001)', *Labour History Review* 75, no. 1 (2010): 76–97.

¹¹⁴ Petrini, 'Demanding Democracy in the Workplace', 156–7.

¹¹⁵ Franco Archibugi, Jacques Delors, and Stuart Holland, 'Planning for Development', in *Beyond Capitalist Planning*, ed. Stuart Holland (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1978), 184–202.

¹¹⁶ IISH, CSPEC-24, 'CSPEC Conference on "Economic Democracy: Guarantee of Peace, Liberty and Equality" organized in Copenhagen 5–6 April 1979'.

¹¹⁷ IISH, SI-945, 'Resolution of the Congress of the SI, 14th Congress, Vancouver, 3–5 November 1978. See also Giuliano Garavini, *After Empires: European Integration, Decolonization, and the Challenge from the Global South, 1957–1985* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), 234.

The European Left therefore actively pushed for major international organizations—such as the United Nations Centre on Transnational Corporations (UNCTC), the ILO, GATT, and the OECD—to elaborate international guidelines or agreements for the control of multinational companies.¹¹⁸ They could count on the engagement of supporters of a fairer international economic order in the ‘Group of 77’ (G77) non-aligned nations. In 1974, the United Nations’ ‘Declaration on the New International Economic Order’ had advocated the adoption of a code of conduct of multinational companies. Several codes of conduct, resolutions, declarations, and international agreements were indeed adopted by these international authorities in the 1970s and early 1980s. In June 1976, for instance, the OECD adopted ‘Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises’—a set of general principles which condemned corruption, encouraged firms to respect the economic and social policies of the host country, recommended releasing information on the company’s organization, management, shareholders, pricing policy, etc., advised non-interference in local politics, and encouraged the participation and informing of workers (that is, participation in negotiations on working conditions, and prior information in case of dismissal). In November 1977, the ILO also adopted a ‘Tripartite declaration of principles concerning multinational enterprises and social policy’. All these texts, however, remained legally non-binding and were intended to work on a voluntary basis. They did not imply sanctions in case of non-compliance by a multinational. As a consequence, they had very little impact on national regulation and on the enterprises’ actual conduct.

The reasons for the overall failure to adopt significant binding international rules to control multinational companies were manifold. The rise of neoliberal ideology and the stiff opposition of employers’ organizations—and the effectiveness of their lobbying—was a most efficient deterrent. So was the opposition of the US government, which threatened to freeze its contribution to the ILO budget in November 1975 in order to obtain a phasedown of the issue, and actually did so in 1977. Historians have documented the attacks waged by neoliberal advocates against some of the attempts of developing countries to obtain a regulation of transnational companies and international trade through the UNCTC, UNCTAD and other organs supporting the agenda of the NIEO within international organizations—for instance, the counter-campaign of the Heritage Foundation, close to the Reagan administration.¹¹⁹ Another important element

¹¹⁸ See Warloutzet, *Governing Europe in a Globalizing World*, 57–63; Geoffrey Hamilton, ‘Initiatives Undertaken by International Organisations in the Field of Employee Information and Consultation in Multinational Undertakings (ILO, OECD, UN)’, in *Employee Consultation and Information in Multinational Corporations*, ed. Jacques Vandamme (London: Croom Helm, 1986), 95–116.

¹¹⁹ Jennifer Bair, ‘Taking Aim at the New International Economic Order’, in *The Road from Mont Pèlerin: The Making of the Neoliberal Thought Collective*, by Philip Mirowski and Dieter Plehwe (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2009), 347–85; Jennifer Bair, ‘Corporations at the United Nations: Echoes of the New International Economic Order?’, *Humanity: An International Journal of Human Rights, Humanitarianism, and Development* 6, no. 1 (March 2015): 159–71; Michel Christian, ‘“It Is Not a Question of Rigidly Planning Trade”: UNCTAD and the Regulation of the

was obviously the fact that these international organizations did not have the institutional means to adopt or implement legally binding instruments on the question.

Instead, the EC could potentially adopt binding legal instruments to enforce regulation of transnational companies.¹²⁰ In 1973, the European Commissioner for Industry and Technology, Altiero Spinelli, who was obviously close to the European Left's positions, had issued a programme of action regarding multinationals, which insisted that protection and participation of workers should be a priority—and met with strong hostility from business associations.¹²¹ As we have seen, since the beginning of the decade, the 1974 SAP, the Commission's proposals regarding the creation of a European Company Statute, and several directives regarding company law had asserted the necessity to increase the consultation of workers and their participation in the decisions of firms; however, they had led to dead ends.¹²² Although important, the 1975 and 1977 directives that introduced protection of workers in case of mass dismissals and relocation of business activities were deemed insufficient by the forces of the Left to address the problem posed by the complex decision-making structures in multinational companies: that of identifying a responsible interlocutor for workers' representatives. In the late 1970s, European trade unions therefore continued to pressure the European Commission for EC action in this regard.¹²³

In 1980, Commissioner for Social Affairs Vredeling presented a directive proposal on information and consultation of workers in transnational firms, which was an attempt to tackle this key issue. Although it abandoned its earlier ambitions for workers' participation in decision making, the Commission's proposal would have been ground breaking in some regards. Officially named the 'Proposal for a Council Directive on Procedures for Informing and Consulting the Employees of Undertakings with Complex Structures, in particular Transnational Undertakings', the text provided that decisions by multinational companies on all questions 'likely to substantially affect workers' interests' (including closures or transfers, important organizational changes, mergers, and so on) should be subject to information and consultation with employee representatives in

International Trade in the 1970s', in *Planning in Cold War Europe: Competition, Cooperation, Circulations (1950s–1970s)*, ed. Michel Christian, Sandrine Kott, and Ondřej Matějka (Munich: De Gruyter, 2018), 285–314.

¹²⁰ See Udo Rehfeldt, 'Les Stratégies syndicales européennes', in *Le Syndicalisme dans la mondialisation*, ed. Annie Fouquet, Udo Rehfeldt, and Serge Le Roux (Paris: Éditions de l'Atelier, 2000), 77–86.

¹²¹ 'Multinational undertakings and Community Regulations', Communication from the Commission to the Council, 8 November 1973, *Bulletin of the European Communities*, Supplement 15 (1973).

¹²² See Frédéric Mertens de Wilmars, 'La Société européenne: Les Raisons d'un blocage', in *Firm Strategies and Public Policy in Integrated Europe, 1950–1980: Confrontation and Learning of Economic Actors*, ed. Marine Moguen-Toursel (Brussels: Peter Lang, 2007), 105–26.

¹²³ Petrini, 'Demanding Democracy in the Workplace', 156–7.

European subsidiaries.¹²⁴ In addition, the companies in question would be subject to obligations of disclosure (regarding the firms' economic situation, production, investment, restructuring projects, the introduction of new work methods and technologies, etc.)—and could no longer invoke arbitrary business secrets. Moreover, and most ambitiously, the directive proposal sought to make the multinational headquarters accountable to workers in its subsidiaries. Indeed, the so-called 'by-pass clause' allowed employee representatives to engage in direct consultations with the company's headquarters in case the subsidiary did not provide satisfactory information, even if the headquarters was located outside the EC. In this latter case, the parent company would have to designate an 'agent' inside the EC charged with informing and consulting workers; should it fail to do so, this responsibility would fall onto the firms' largest subsidiary inside the EC—the so-called 'hostage clause'. The directive would apply to all multinational companies with more than ninety-nine employees within the EC and all companies whose headquarters was located outside the EC but which employed more than ninety-nine workers in one of their subsidiaries within the EC.¹²⁵ In short, by countering business secrecy, by-passing local management, and applying extraterritoriality, the directive struck at the heart of the immunity enjoyed by companies operating in more than one country. Above all, it would be legally binding.

Unsurprisingly, the proposal occasioned intense discussions within the Commission. Unlike Vredeling, who had long been a supporter of trade unions, socialist demands, and a 'social Europe', most Commissioners were rather hostile to the proposal, starting with the then Commissioner for Industry, Etienne Davignon, who was very close to European business circles. Like Davignon, several other Commissioners—including the French Commissioner for Economy and Finance, François-Xavier Ortoli; the German liberal Commissioner for Energy, Guido Brunner; and the British Conservative Commissioner for Budget, Christopher Tugendhat—argued forcefully in favour of a non-binding decision, challenged the principle of the extraterritoriality of the directive, claimed it would discriminate against multinational companies compared to other firms and disadvantage European companies compared to their global competitors, warned that the economic context was inadequate and that employers would oppose such a proposal, recommended targeting subsidiaries instead of headquarters, brandished the need to protect the firms' strategic information, and argued that relying on international organizations such as the ILO and the OECD was more

¹²⁴ HAEU, BAC 42/1988/1611, 'Proposition de directive sur l'information et la consultation des travailleurs des entreprises à structure complexe, en particulier transnationale', 23 October 1980, doc. COM (80) 423 final.

¹²⁵ See François Vandamme, 'The Proposal of a Directive on Procedures for Informing and Consulting the Employees of Undertakings with Complex Structures, in Particular Transnational Undertakings', in *Employee Consultation and Information in Multinational Corporations*, ed. Vandamme, 149–83.

suitable and that the decision would entail the risk of encouraging Third World countries to adopt similar legislation, therefore harming European firms, and so on.¹²⁶

Despite these overwhelming criticisms and points of reticence, astonishingly, the Commission adopted Vredeling's proposal on 1 October 1980. According to the then Director-General for Social Affairs, Jean Degime, the Commission's vote was in fact a retirement gift, a way 'to allow Vredeling to leave with an important feather on his hat'. It was indeed the last session of the Jenkins Commission and the end of Vredeling's long-standing European engagement. In January 1981, the 'Vredeling Directive' would be passed to the new Commissioner for Social Affairs, Ivor Richard. Many years later, Degimbe recalled:

The discussion was going round in circles, and I had the feeling that the Commissioners were very reluctant—at least some of them. But at the same time, it was Vredeling's last session, and we knew that the opportunity wouldn't come back. [...] Then Davignon came to see me and said: 'What should we do? We could at least give this to Vredeling. I am conscious of the limits of the affair, but we can still start.' Eventually, I told him: 'At any rate, the file as it stands now is only at its first stage anyways; there is the whole Council procedure coming, you can imagine!'—and thus everything was passed.¹²⁷

Of course, it was also for the Commission an attempt to improve employer-worker relations and to lessen the risks of social conflict in the EC as the recession worsened.

The proposal directive attracted a torrent of outrage and unleashed a ferocious reaction from employers' organizations, international business circles, and conservative-liberal forces before and after the Commission adopted the text. It unshackled what was described at the time as 'the most expensive lobbying campaign in the European Parliament's history'.¹²⁸ European, US, and international business circles hurled a lobbying campaign of unprecedented virulence at the Commission, the Council, and the EP and Economic and Social Committee, which were consulted on the proposal. According to Degimbe, detractors denounced the directive as a 'true revolution', and not one that they deemed desirable.¹²⁹ He described the months and years that followed the Commission proposal as 'a very long battle'.¹³⁰ In February 1981, UNICE released a document that resolutely dismissed the text as 'unacceptable'. In the view of the business

¹²⁶ Warloutzet, *Governing Europe in a Globalizing World*, 68–9.

¹²⁷ HAEU, INT-139, 'Entretien avec Jean Degimbe par Pierre Tilly', 13 July 2010.

¹²⁸ Richard P. Walker, 'The Vredeling Proposal: Cooperation versus Confrontation in European Labor Relations', *International Tax and Business Lawyer* 1 (1983): 191.

¹²⁹ Jean Degimbe during an interview with the author in November 2014 in Brussels.

¹³⁰ HAEU, INT-139, 'Entretien avec Jean Degimbe'.

organization, there was no need for such EC legislation because the OECD and ILO non-binding codes of conduct were sufficient; the directive would undermine the 'authority of employers, threaten the competitiveness of undertakings within the Community, introduce discrimination between transnational and national companies and between multinationals that operated in the Community depending on whether their headquarters were located inside or outside the Community, and so on.¹³¹ UNICE therefore engaged in constant efforts to delay the procedure, and criticize and amend each part of it, ideally to see it peter out.

European Commissioners and officials, particularly Davignon, received countless letters and position statements from European, US, and Japanese multinationals, business organizations, and government officials.¹³² They generally expressed their serious concerns that the text would complicate industrial relations—how could they organize consultations with trade unionists from so many different countries, including communist unions? Would they not end up being confronted with some sort of 'soviet assemblies'?¹³³ Above all, the by-pass clause and the fact that worker representatives could engage legal procedures in case of non-compliance by the firms raised fierce indignation. The International Chamber of Commerce expressed strong opposition to the Commission's proposal. The proposal also received very negative coverage in the European business press.¹³⁴

The US lobby was particularly intense and efficient. Several years later, both Degimbe and Richard recalled being subjected to constant questioning on the issue, and having to go several times to Washington and New York during the early 1980s to defend the proposal before US officials and business representatives.¹³⁵ US companies and the US government fiercely rejected the by-pass clause, and argued for instance that the directive would force them to release sensitive information regarding their economic strategies and practices, and that the internationalization of collective bargaining would complicate their operations. The National Foreign Trade Council in New York and the American Chamber of

¹³¹ AHCE, 42/1988–1613, 'Prise de position sur la proposition de directive' and 'Press release' by the UNICE, 12 February 1981. On the employers' position, see Etienne Arcq, 'L'UNICE et la politique sociale communautaire', in *Quelle Union sociale européenne? Acquis institutionnel, acteurs et défis*, ed. Mario Telò and Corinne Gobin, Etudes européennes (Brussels: Éditions de l'Université de Bruxelles, 1994), 325–41.

¹³² For instance, AHCE, 42/1988–1613, 'Letter to Etienne Davignon from Maurice Hodgson, Chairman of the Imperial Chemical Industries Limited', 18 July 1980; AHCE, 42/1988–1750, 'Note for the attention of Mr Narjes on the Visit of Japanese Ambassador regarding the Vredeling Directive' (not dated) and 'Note for the attention of Mr Narjes on the views of Confederation of the British Industries (CBI) and the Institute of Directors (ID) concerning the fifth directive and "Vredeling" proposal' (not dated).

¹³³ HAEU, INT-139, 'Entretien avec Jean Degimbe'.

¹³⁴ For instance, 'Why EEC Company Law Proposals Alarm directors in Britain', *Financial Times*, 5 August 1982.

¹³⁵ HAEU, INT-139, 'Entretien avec Jean Degimbe'; Tilly and Schirmann, 'Free Movement of Workers, Social Rights and Social Affairs', 363.

Commerce in Brussels declared that the directive would have a negative effect on US investment in Europe.¹³⁶

As for European governments, the major actors within the Council were either hostile or quite reluctant. Thatcher's government sternly opposed the project, and worked hand in hand with British business circles to undermine the Commission's proposal. The French government under Giscard was lukewarm; and even after Mitterrand came to power, the socialist government remained rather uncommitted on the issue, and insisted much more on the reduction of working time. The German government was strongly divided on the issue. While the liberal Minister for the Economy, Lambsdorff, was stiffly opposed, the SPD Labour Minister, Herbert Ehrenberg, was more open to the idea. But the question of the compatibility of the directive with German *Mitbestimmung* laws further complicated the problem.¹³⁷

Faced with such an arduous beginning, the European Left would have to intensify its efforts to constitute an efficient social and political bloc to maintain the fight. European trade unions and transnational socialist circles broadly welcomed the Commission proposal with enthusiasm. The ETUC saw the directive as the accomplishment of years of efforts, as an important complement to the codes of conduct adopted by the OECD and the ILO, and as a first step towards the implementation of its claims for economic democracy, control of multinationals, and a 'social Europe'. Although it deemed some aspects disappointing, like the fact that the text did not provide for mandatory creation of transnational consulting bodies, the binding nature of the directive and the by-pass clause were especially important to European trade unions. In December 1980, the ETUC therefore decided to launch an information campaign on the 'Multinational Directive', based on a brochure and with the involvement of all its member confederations and industry committees; to set up an *ad hoc* working party to coordinate proposals and put pressure on European institutions and national authorities; and to start working on ways to launch 'an offensive to counter the policy of massive obstructionism pursued by the representatives of capital' and in support of the directive.¹³⁸ Its worsening relations with the European Commission in 1979 and 1980 and the political composition of the Council made its lobbying enterprise rather difficult. For the directive to have a chance of being adopted, it would have to obtain a majority vote in the EP and in the Economic and Social Committee.

The SGEP's capacity to play its role as a 'sister party' to back trade union efforts would prove fundamental. For years, the ETUC had asked to be more closely associated to, and supported by, the SGEP. In June 1976 the latter had decided to

¹³⁶ Petrini, 'Demanding Democracy in the Workplace', 159. On US reactions, see also Bennett Harrison, 'The International Movement for Prenotification of Plant Closures', *Industrial Relations: A Journal of Economy and Society* 23, no. 3 (1984): 395–6.

¹³⁷ Warlouzet, *Governing Europe in a Globalizing World*, 70–1.

¹³⁸ IISH, ETUCA-2200, 'Decision of the Executive Committee', Brussels, 4 December 1980.

create a liaison committee to intensify its cooperation with the ETUC and with socialist Commissioners.¹³⁹ The SGEP had shown great interest in the question of economic and industrial democracy over the years. In 1975, for instance, it had organized one of its meetings in Portoroz, a small seaside town in Yugoslavia, to discuss models of industrial democracy and visit Yugoslav firms. The report described the Yugoslav model of workers' self-management and the workers' councils in Yugoslav firms as a model of democratization and redistribution 'towards a classless society'.¹⁴⁰ The SGEP supported Vredeling's initiative on multinational companies from the outset. In September 1980, to encourage the Commission to adopt the directive proposal in the face of intense criticism, it put an oral question to the Commission pressing it to submit its proposal.¹⁴¹ In June 1981, the CSPEC expressed its full support for the Commission's proposal.¹⁴²

Once the proposal was published, however, the SGEP would have to forcefully defend the text's key advances in both the parliamentary committee and the plenary debate. Before the autumn of 1982, the context seemed surprisingly favourable to the European Left to pass its directive. In 1981, the SGEP had organized meetings with socialist members of the Commission and with the ETUC to discuss the proposal and strategies to support it.¹⁴³ Facing concerns that Richard would be less favourable to the project than his predecessor, it promptly organized a meeting with him to explain the socialists' and trade unions' position and obtained his support.¹⁴⁴ The socialists were aware that the battle in the parliamentary committees and in plenary would be difficult. Given the right-wing majority of conservatives, Christian democrats, liberals and Gaullists dominating the EP, they decided that they would have to work very hard to persuade members of other groups—primarily left-leaning Christian democrats close to trade unions.¹⁴⁵ Thanks to their efforts, although the Right designated the British Conservative Tom Spencer as draftsman, the Social Affairs and Employment Committee of the EP, in charge

¹³⁹ HAEU, GSPE-061-FR-A, 'OJ réunion de la commission des affaires sociales et de la commission des affaires économiques et monétaires du 15 juin à Strasbourg'; HAEU, GSPE-061-FR-A, 'PV des réunions du GS des 7, 8 et 9 septembre à Munich'.

¹⁴⁰ HAEU, GSPE-058-EN, 'Draft summary report of the meeting of the SGEP held on 5 and 6 May 1975 in Trieste and on 7 May in Portoroz'; HAEU, GSPE-058-EN, 'Memorandum on the System of worker management in Yugoslavia', by Jan D. Kurlmann, 4 April 1975.

¹⁴¹ HAEU, GSPE-069-EN, 'Oral question by H.O. Vetter on the Commission proposal for a Directive on information and consultation of workers', September 1980.

¹⁴² IISH, ETUCA-2204.

¹⁴³ HAEU, GSPE-071-EN-05, 'Communication from Ien van den Heuvel to the Bureau of the SG', 13 May 1981.

¹⁴⁴ HAEU, GSPE-071-EN-07, 'Summary Report of the meeting between the Socialist members of the Committee on Social Affairs, the Committee on Economic Affairs and the Legal Affairs Committee and Mr Ivor Richard, Member of the Commission', 17 July 1981.

¹⁴⁵ HAEU, GSPE-071-EN-07, 'Summary Report'.

of the first examination of the text, issued a rather conciliatory report.¹⁴⁶ So did the Economic and Social Committee, where the trade unions managed, after a year of tough discussions, to rally a majority of the 'general interest' members—farmers' organizations, consumer organizations, the liberal professions, and so on—to vote a positive opinion on the Commission's proposal.¹⁴⁷ There even seemed to be broad consensus in the Council on the need for EC legislation on the topic (except, of course, for the UK government).

The multi-level lobbying battle staged against the directive by business circles was fierce—it not only targeted the Commission, Council and European member states, but also the EP and national political parties. Although it still had only a consultative role, the EP had gained political legitimacy over the years, especially since it had been directly elected. Its opinion could therefore influence the Commission and Council decisions, and business organizations were well aware of this. Thus, for instance, the Confederation of British Industry developed a strategy targeting European commissioners and British Conservative MEPs, while at the same time encouraging UK multinational companies to exert similar pressure. In February 1981, UK and German employers' representatives met with right-wing MEPs to make clear their grievances with the proposal. In July 1982, UNICE officially asked all its member federations to lobby British MEPs before the debates, set to start in September. This was clearly a strategy implemented by numerous European and US business organizations and multinational companies.¹⁴⁸

Though the SGEP was probably less targeted by this kind of direct lobbying by business circles, its members were subject to pressures coming from US Congress deputies. Inter-parliamentary relations had been established between the EP and the US Congress since 1972.¹⁴⁹ In November 1981, a delegation from the US Congress visited Brussels for an exchange of views with MEPs on several topics, among which was the control of multinationals. Another EP-US Congress meeting took place in The Hague in January 1982, in which US deputies expressed their opposition to the Vredeling Directive.¹⁵⁰ In June 1982, another meeting

¹⁴⁶ See Petrini, 'Demanding Democracy in the Workplace', 160. HAEU, PE1 AP ASOC.1979 RP A1-0324/82, 'Rapport sur la proposition de la Commission concernant une directive sur l'information et la consultation de travailleurs des entreprises à structure complexe, en particulier transnationales', July 1982.

¹⁴⁷ HAEU, Economic and Social Committee Archive (CESA)-963, 'Avis du CES concernant la Proposition de directive sur l'information et la consultation des travailleurs des entreprises à structure complexe, en particulier transnationale', 27 January 1982.

¹⁴⁸ Warloutzet, *Governing Europe in a Globalizing World*, 71–4. See also AHCE, 42/1988–1750, 'Letter from J. Solvay, CEO Solvay and Cie, to Gérard Deprez, President of the Belgian PSC (Parti Social Chrétien)', 1 September 1982.

¹⁴⁹ HAEU, GSPE-071-EN-06, 'Information document on EP-US Congress joint delegation in Washington' (1971).

¹⁵⁰ HAEU, GSPE-071-EN-10, 'Draft record of the meeting of the Bureau of the SG held in Strasbourg on 18–19 November 1981'; HAEU, GSPE-072-EN-01, 'Draft summary report of the meetings of the SG in Brussels, 13–14 January 1982'; HAEU, GSPE-072-EN-02, 'Report by Norbert Gresch

between the EP and the US Congress took place in Washington and San Francisco, in which 'Europeans have been warned that the entry into force of this directive could have serious repercussions on investment by American firms in the Community. Great significance is attached to the opinion of the EP' The American Chamber of Commerce also had the opportunity during that meeting to express its great concerns about the Vredeling Directive.¹⁵¹ It is not inconceivable that these pressures affected the behaviour of socialist MEPs.

Once the debates started in the chamber in September 1982, the attitude of socialist MEPs nearly resembled self-sabotage. The right-wing majority had tabled nearly 300 amendments, which basically aimed at dismantling the most progressive aspects of the directive. During the votes, the Left could only ensure the discreet support of some Christian democrats if the roll-call vote was avoided. The Bureau of the SGEP, however, had to renounce this strategy given the alarming rates of absenteeism in its own ranks. It had to insist several times that the presence of all socialist members was required during the votes, and even announced that absenteeism would be subject to sanctions.¹⁵² Despite these precautions, by the end of the EP's examination of the amendments in October, most right-wing amendments had been passed, whereas the amendments tabled by socialist and communist MEPs had been almost systematically rejected. At least fifteen Christian democrats who had voted with the Left in the parliamentary committee votes switched their stance in plenary. When the vote on the amended text as a whole came in October, the socialists held an emergency meeting to decide how to vote. Most members were first inclined to reject the amended directive, then after a long exchange of views a majority decided to abstain.¹⁵³ They did not have time to vote anyway, as the vote took place whilst the SGEP was still in its meeting, which obviously reduced even further the Left's minority of votes and made for a very bad impression of the SGEP's commitment. Many communist MEPs were absent too.¹⁵⁴ When they came back, socialists and communists protested that their meeting room was too far away and that the translators had taken some time to arrive, but the chamber did not agree to retake the vote.¹⁵⁵

and Jean-Pierre Simon on the 19th meeting between the EP Delegation and the United States Congress held from 6 to 10 January 1982 in the Hague; 9 March 1982.

¹⁵¹ HAEU, GSPE-072-EN-05, 'Report on the 20th meeting between the delegation from the EP and the USC of 21-27 June 1982 in Washington and San Francisco.'

¹⁵² HAEU, GSPE-072-EN-03, 'Draft summary report of the meeting of Coordinators held on 4 May 1982 in Brussels'; HAEU, GSPE-072-EN-01, 'Confidentiel: Présence des membres socialistes aux réunions durant 1981', 7 January 1982; HAEU, GSPE-072-EN-05, 'Draft minutes of the Bureau meeting 6 September 1982 in Vouliagmeni, Greece'; HAEU, GSPE-072-EN-05, 'PV SG meeting 13 September 1982.'

¹⁵³ HAEU, GSPE-072-EN-06, 'Draft summary report of the meeting of the SG on October 12, 1982 in Strasbourg.'

¹⁵⁴ HAEC, 42/1988-1750, Commission of the EC, DGIII, 'Mission report on the vote on "Vredeling" directive in EP', 12 October 1982.

¹⁵⁵ HAEP, PE1 AP DE/1982 DE19821012-05-9900, 'Séance du 12 Octobre 1982.'

This incident constituted another humiliating defeat for the Left. After the vote, the President of the SGEP, the Belgian Ernest Glinne, was so helpless that he announced his resignation—only to resume his functions after a few hours.¹⁵⁶ The incident also aroused indignation from trade unions. The European Union of Metal Workers and other unions requested the SGEP to set up an internal committee of inquiry to look into the influence and pressure possibly exerted in connection with the adoption of the Vredeling Directive.¹⁵⁷ The final vote took place on 14 December 1982 and confirmed the amendments by a crushing majority (307 voting: 162 for; 61 against; 84 abstentions).¹⁵⁸ The adopted resolution drastically undermined the ambitious features of the original Vredeling proposal—for example, by reducing how many times the firms were to release information (once a year instead of twice), significantly decreasing its scope of application (firms of 1,000 employees instead of 100), reinstating business secrecy, and above all neutralizing the famous by-pass and hostage clauses and the other most ambitious clauses, leaving little more than the empty shell of Vredeling's original proposal.

During the final vote, even though all socialist MEPs expressed strong disappointment and disagreement with the amended text, the SGEP decided to abstain, arguing that it hoped that the Commission would resubmit a new binding directive. The French socialist MEP Jacques Moreau regretted that:

The European Parliament could have made this debate a great moment in the history of our legislature. Overcoming the more or less justified fears and the various pressures to which it was subjected, it could have adopted a text that would have marked a stage in the progress of industrial and economic democracy within the Community. This is not the case. The majority of this House, yielding to conservationist instincts, preferred to adopt a low profile and to delete or water down the most innovative aspects of the Commission's directive.¹⁵⁹

Some socialist MEPs, like the British Labour MEP Derek Enright, voted against the amended text resolution. So too did the Communist Group—French and Italian members alike. The French communist MEP Frischmann lamented: 'So the damage is done, this Assembly has lost the only great opportunity to vote on a social initiative which was favourable to the workers and which was

¹⁵⁶ HAEU, GSPE-072-EN-06, 'PV meeting of the SG October 14, 1982 in Strasbourg: Incident in plenary during the vote on the Vredeling directive.'

¹⁵⁷ HAEU, GSPE-072-EN-07, 'PV SG meeting 18 November 1982.'

¹⁵⁸ HAEP, PE1 AP DE/1982 DE19821214-04-HAEP, 9900, 'Séance du 14 décembre 1982 (débat et explication de vote)'; HAEP, PE1 AP PV/SEANCE SEAN-19821213-0020, 'Séance du 14 décembre 1982 (vote).'

¹⁵⁹ HAEP, PE1 AP DE/1982 DE19821214-04-HAEP, 9900, 'Séance du 14 décembre 1982 (débat et explication de vote).'

not at all revolutionary!¹⁶⁰ European trade unions also expressed their deep disappointment.¹⁶¹

The battle was not completely over, however. Richard had announced that the Commission would take the EP vote into consideration and would present an amended text to the Council.¹⁶² Business circles wanted to bury the text altogether and continued their lobbying pressure on national and European authorities. European Commissioners continued to receive numerous letters from chief executives of multinational companies that expressed their distress, for even a watered-down version of the text would undermine competitiveness and employment.¹⁶³ In the US Congress, several bills had been introduced to shield US firms from the directive—aiming, for instance, to allow the US government to retaliate against foreign investment in the event of restrictions imposed on US companies abroad.¹⁶⁴ A bill introduced by the Democratic Party Congressmen Thomas A. Luken and John Dingell intended to protect US firms from having to disclose confidential business information under foreign legislation; its authors even exerted direct pressure on the Commission.¹⁶⁵ Commissioners like the conservatives Narjes and Ortoli, and even the right-wing social-democrat Haferkamp, took the opportunity of the redrafting to demand revisions in favour of European firms' 'competitiveness'.¹⁶⁶ The second version presented by the Commission on 15 July 1983 followed the EP's majority opinion on the essential points and was a much watered-down version of the initial proposal.¹⁶⁷ The ETUC saw it as a capitulation, but it still continued to support the idea of a directive, hoping it could at least obtain a victory on business secrecy and the by-pass clause. Despite some marginal efforts by left-wing MEPs to put the debate back on the agenda, the EP was not consulted on the amended text.¹⁶⁸

¹⁶⁰ HAEP, PE1 AP DE/1982 DE19821214-04-HAEP, 9900, 'Séance du 14 décembre 1982'.

¹⁶¹ Petrini, 'Demanding Democracy in the Workplace', 160.

¹⁶² HAEP, PE1 AP DE/1982 DE19821117-03-9900, 'Séance du 17 novembre 1982'.

¹⁶³ AHCE, 42/1988-1750, 'Letter from Akio Morita, Chairman CEO of Sony Corporation, to Etienne Davignon', 14 May 1982 and 'Letter from B. Sassen (Secretary General of UNICE) to Ivor Richard', 3 September 1982.

¹⁶⁴ Richard P. Walker, 'The Vredeling Proposal: Cooperation versus Confrontation in European Labor Relations', *International Tax and Business Lawyer* 1 (1983): 177.

¹⁶⁵ AHCE, 42/1988-1751, 'Congressional Record Statement of the Hon. Thomas A. Luken, Member of Congress: Speech for his HR 1532 Bill on Vredeling legislation'; 'US 98th Congress, H.R. 1532 Bill introduced by Luken (for himself and Mr Dingell)', 17 February 1983; 'Letter from John D. Dingell (Chairman Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations, Committee on Energy and Commerce) and Thomas A. Luken (Member Committee on Energy and Commerce) of the US House of Representatives (Congress) to Ivor Richard, Commissioner for Employment, Social Policy and Education', 3 March 1983; 'Telegram from EC Washington Delegation to Braun, DGIII, 25 March 1983, on US legislation on the Vredeling Directive'.

¹⁶⁶ Warloutzet, *Governing Europe in a Globalizing World*, 73.

¹⁶⁷ AHCE, 42/1988-1611, 'Proposition modifiée de directive sur l'information et la consultation des travailleurs présentée par la Commission au Conseil, 8 juillet 1983, COM (83) 292 final'.

¹⁶⁸ HAEP, Pe1 AP PR B1-0707/83-0010, 'Proposition de résolution présentée par M. Adam'; HAEP, PE1 AP DE/1983 DE19830915-11-9900, 'Séance du 15 Septembre 1983'; HAEP, Pe1 AP QP/QO

Like the defeat on a reduction of working time and for a coordinated European strategy to restore full employment, the defeat of the European Left on the Vredeling Directive indicated a stark change in the *rapport de force*. The conservative turn of the EC and of its member states was evident. The ETUC's attempt to redirect its lobbying efforts towards national governments after the EP's vote did not bear fruit. In the Council, UK opposition remained unchanged throughout the 1980s, the Right had come to power in Germany in 1982, and the only governments that (flaccidly) supported the project after 1983 were France, Greece, the Netherlands, and to a lesser extent Italy and Belgium. In May 1986, the European Council decided to put discussions on the Vredeling project on hold for several years, calling on management and labour to continue their own negotiations on the question. Vredeling's proposal—one of the most promising EC initiatives in line with a 'workers' Europe'—was informally abandoned.

Never as much as in this case, the European Left's incapacity to mobilize—both in the institutional game and in the streets—proved fatal to the realization of a 'social Europe'. The Vredeling Directive was perhaps the most important attempt to pass supranational legislation to establish some control over multinational companies. To counter the unprecedented lobbying campaign of business circles, the European Left would have needed to be both united and strongly mobilized in favour of the directive. Instead, during the years of discussions on the proposal, the ETUC concentrated virtually all its mobilization efforts and its combativity on the questions of working time and of a European recovery plan. The information campaign decided by its Executive Committee failed to reach the rank-and-file and had very little mediatic resonance. The 'offensive' to support the initiative never saw the light of day. National trade union confederations, like socialist and communist parties, were scarcely informed, only marginally lobbied their governments, and failed to mobilize their members. Mass mobilization of trade unions and parties of the Left, with workers of multinational companies taking to the streets and campaigning in their plants to support the Vredeling proposal, might have made it possible to tip the balance. The attitude of the EP, and perhaps even of member states in the Council, could have been slightly different. The lack of mobilization of parties and trade unions, like the lack of commitment and efficiency of left-wing members in the EP, indicated not just an under-assessment of European-level issues on the Left but also a lack of experience as to how and where to mobilize on such issues. The European Left certainly also paid the price of its lack of active collaboration and unity—between communists and socialists, between parties and unions.¹⁶⁹

O-0057/83-0010, 'Question orale avec débat au nom du groupe Communiste et apparentés à la Commission des CE'.

¹⁶⁹ See the dossier 'Hush! Don't Tell the Workers', *Agenor*, 90 (May–June 1983) in IISH, ETUC-2202. See also Udo Rehfeldt, 'Les Syndicats européens face à la transnationalisation des entreprises', *Le Mouvement social* 162 (1993): 69–93.

This most significant and resounding defeat for the European Left, adding to the failure of the combative mobilization on employment and working time, signalled the twilight of the battle for an alternative, 'social Europe'. The failure of the French left-wing government's attempt to obtain the support of its European partners to carry out its Keynesian programme in 1981–4 was to be the final blow.

Coup de Grâce

The victory of the Left in May 1981 in France, when Mitterrand was elected president and a government of socialist ministers took over—joined in June by three communist ones—after twenty-three years of right-wing regime, was definitely no small event for the European Left. France was one of the leading western European countries and a key government in the EC.

Of course, the French socialists acceded to power when the social-democratic era was already showing clear signs of demise. Social democrats had suffered important electoral setbacks, including in their historic strongholds, in the second half of the 1970s—in Sweden in 1976 they were left out of government for the first time since 1932; in the Netherlands they won the elections but were sent back to opposition by a centre-right coalition in 1977; in the UK in 1979 Labour lost and was sent back to opposition for almost two decades; in Norway the social democrats were sent back to opposition in 1981. In October 1982, the defeat of the SPD and the rise to power of a CDU–CSU coalition led by Helmut Kohl in West Germany, added to the return of the Danish social democrats to opposition the same year, seemed to mark the end of the postwar era of social-democratic hegemony that had climaxed by 1969 when Brandt became Chancellor.¹⁷⁰

Besides, the western European communist movement in western Europe was beginning its slow decline at the end of the 1970s. In Italy, the violent social and political turmoil of the so-called 'Years of Lead' climaxed between 1977 and 1982, and the kidnapping and execution in May 1978 of the Christian-democratic leader Aldo Moro by the revolutionary communist armed group Brigade Rosse obstructed the communists' endeavoured rise to power. Despite the PCI's attempt to respond with a government of 'national unity', the turn of the decade marked the failure of the *compromesso storico*—the PCI returned to opposition. By then, 'Eurocommunism' was in demise.¹⁷¹

However, the victory of the French Left seemed to signal the ascension of the socialists of 'southern' Europe. In Greece, which joined the EC in 1981, Andreas

¹⁷⁰ Donald Sassoon, *One Hundred Years of Socialism: The West European Left in the Twentieth Century* (London: I.B. Tauris, 1996), 469–534.

¹⁷¹ Giannēs Balampanidēs, *Eurocommunism: From the Communist to the Radical European Left* (Abingdon: Routledge, 2015), 4–10.

Papandreou's PASOK won a landslide victory in October 1981 with 48 per cent of the vote, forming the first socialist government in Greece's history. In Spain and in Portugal, which both applied to join the EC in 1977, the new democratic regimes saw an assertion of left-wing parties. The PSOE rose to power in 1982 in Spain, and Portugal was led by socialist- and social-democratic governments from 1983 onwards. In Italy, in March 1979 the PSDI and PSI became minority partners in coalition governments. In 1983 Bettino Craxi would become the first socialist Prime Minister in Italian history.

At the time, this double trend could be seen as a victory of the southern European, more 'radical' tendency of socialism against a 'moderate' northern social democracy. The setbacks experienced by the historic stronghold of European social democracy were in part a response to the austerity policies that it had started to adopt since the mid-1970s but that failed to reduce unemployment. The decade had seen a rise of the 'radical' socialist currents and a leftward turn in western European socialism paralleled with an intensifying power struggle between the left and right currents in each party and tensions between European parties. The tensions had been particularly strong between French and West German socialists during the first half of the decade, when Mitterrand presented the SPD as the emblem of the 'old' social democracy that had chosen compromise over rupture towards the capitalist system—a confrontation epitomized in the expression 'Epinay against Bad Godesberg'; it was no secret that he and Schmidt could not bear each other's company.¹⁷² The French socialists attempted to hegemonize their conception of socialism, particularly through the organization of the 1st Conference of the Socialist Parties of Southern Europe held in Paris on 24 and 25 January 1976. The initiative, followed in the coming years by other similar gatherings, intended to unite socialists from Spain, Portugal, Italy, Greece, Belgium, and Luxembourg around the ideas of self-management, democratic economic planning, extension of the public sector, and alliances with communists.¹⁷³ With this move, Mitterrand quite explicitly attempted to reassert his party's position within the Socialist International and to shift the balance in his favour, to the detriment of the SPD which had long dominated European and international socialism.¹⁷⁴

Immediately after its election, the new French executive led by Pierre Mauroy swiftly passed a number of important social and economic reforms, such as extensive nationalization of industry and banks, mass assumptions in the public sector, an increase of the minimum wage as well as pensions, increased family

¹⁷² See Christelle Flandre, *Socialisme ou social-démocratie? Regards croisés français allemands, 1971–1981* (Paris: L'Harmattan, 2007).

¹⁷³ HAEU, GSPE-138, 'Conférence des partis socialistes d'Europe du Sud, Paris, 24–5 janvier 1976'.

¹⁷⁴ Michele Di Donato, 'Un socialismo per l'Europa del sud? Il PS di François Mitterrand e il coordinamento dei partiti socialisti dell'Europa meridionale', in *Nazioni e narrazioni tra l'Italia e l'Europa*, ed. Michelangelo Di Giacomo et al. (Rome: Aracne, 2013), 235–51.

allowances and access to health insurance benefits, increased benefits for unemployed and part-time workers, increases in housing subsidies and allowances to people with disabilities, reduction of working time (from forty to thirty-nine weekly hours, with the objective of soon reaching thirty-five hours), introduction of a fifth week of paid holiday, strengthening of health and safety protection in the workplace, and the abolition of the death penalty.¹⁷⁵ At the same time, the government launched a large Keynesian reflation plan to relaunch growth and employment. To a large extent, the costs of these measures were met through the introduction of more progressive taxation, a wealth tax, and a clamp-down on tax evasion. The 1982 Auroux laws also introduced greater industrial democracy (although *autogestion* was still a very remote dream), while power was increasingly decentralized to the regions, departments, and communes. Although the new government's reforms 'fell a long way short of the 1970s rhetoric promising a rupture with capitalism', they certainly went against the new neoliberal tide that had carried most capitalist countries.¹⁷⁶ France was becoming in fact the first (and only) country to implement the 'alternative economic strategy' for a transition to socialism, imagined by some socialists in the UK, Sweden, Germany, and other western European countries during the 1970s.¹⁷⁷

The new French government was well aware of the constraints that the interdependence of European (and world) economies and the EC itself placed on its domestic plans, especially critical when the country's main commercial partners were adopting deflationary austerity policies in sharp contrast with its ambitions. In its 1972 Common Programme, the Left had vowed to simultaneously reform the EC to serve workers' interests and preserve its freedom of action to realize its political, economic, and social programme. When it finally rose to power in 1981, it endeavoured to do so. As early as 11 June 1981, during a joint Council meeting of finance and social affairs ministers, Jacques Delors, the new French Economy and Finance Minister, called for an EC-wide concerted reflation plan, while Jean Auroux, Minister of Labour, asked for radical measures against unemployment, in particular for a reduction of working time. On 29 June, at the European Council summit in Luxembourg, Mitterrand himself then made an official declaration in favour of a 'social' Europe, calling for the creation of a 'European social space' based on coordinated working time reduction, improved social dialogue, and the adoption of a European economic recovery plan.¹⁷⁸ On 13 October 1981,

¹⁷⁵ See Éric Duhamel, *François Mitterrand: L'unité d'un homme* (Paris: Flammarion, 1998); Mathias Bernard, *Les Années Mitterrand: Du changement socialiste au tournant libéral* (Paris: Éditions Belin, 2015); Serge Berstein, Pierre Milza, and J. L. Bianco, eds., *Les Années Mitterrand: Les Années du changement (1981–1984)* (Paris: Perrin, 2001).

¹⁷⁶ Callaghan, *The Retreat of Social Democracy*, 105.

¹⁷⁷ Schmidt, 'There Were Alternatives'.

¹⁷⁸ *Bulletin des Communautés Européennes*, 6 (1981). See Georges Saunier, 'François Mitterrand, un projet socialiste pour l'Europe? L'équipe européenne de François Mitterrand, 1981–1984', in *Inventer l'Europe: Histoire nouvelle des groupes d'influence et des acteurs de l'unité européenne*, ed. Gérard

the French government issued a memorandum on revitalization of the EC, proposing the consolidation and development of common policies in order to support the European economic revival. Europe, it asserted, 'must achieve social growth and be bold in defining a new economic order'.¹⁷⁹

Though it was drafted by the most 'moderate' and Europeanist wing of the party, resulted from a compromise between diverging views in the French government, and therefore lacked ambition, the memorandum nevertheless encapsulated an attempt to make EC policies compatible with a socialist reform programme. To support the European economic revival and 'restore the confidence of our people in Europe', the French government insisted on undertaking priority action on employment geared towards the creation of long-term, 'competitive' jobs. Though it specified that its revival plan did not demand an increase of the EC budget, it proposed to make greater use of the various borrowing facilities available to the EC to encourage selected sectors, such as energy, industrial conversion in certain regions, research, and technology. It pleaded to improve and strengthen EC policies and made precise proposals regarding commercial policy, agricultural policy, energy, research and innovation, industrial and regional policy, and regarding North–South dialogue and relations with the developing countries. The French government wanted to protect European industry through a constraining of free trade and control of foreign investments, and with the support of an interventionist industrial policy.¹⁸⁰

Regarding social and employment policy, the document took over many of the long-standing ingredients of the 'social Europe' imagined by the Left since the late 1960s. It advocated a more efficient and employment-friendly use of the already existing schemes, like the ESF. It pleaded for adaptation and reduction of working time, starting with but not limited to the implementation of the 1979 Council Resolution on the matter. It insisted on increasing social dialogue at company, national, and European levels—evoking the organization of Tripartite Conferences on employment and working time, increased 'participation' of both sides of industry in every possible EC issue, better functioning of the SCE and of other tripartite bodies, and the creation of new joint sectorial bodies. It also suggested giving greater consideration to the ETUC, supported the Vredeling Directive on information and consultation of workers in multinational companies, and pleaded for the establishment of a 'social balance sheet' for all undertakings, and for consultation of workers regarding the introduction of new

Bossuat (Brussels; New York: P. Lang, 2003), 431–48; Elisabeth Du Réau, 'L'engagement européen', in *Les Années Mitterrand: Les Années du changement (1981–1984)*, ed. Berstein, Milza, and Bianco, 282–94.

¹⁷⁹ 'Mémorandum du gouvernement français sur la relance européenne', 13 Octobre 1981. Available at https://www.cvce.eu/en/recherche/unit-content/-/unit/02bb76df-d066-4c08-a58a-d4686a3e68ff/9c605146-47d5-4df5-9340-2e56edd466cb/Resourcess#a8377c45-380f-4679-8d17-62d42f4734d5_en&overlay.

¹⁸⁰ Warloutzet, *Governing Europe in a Globalizing World*, 126–7.

technologies. It also insisted on improving cooperation on social protection with the reinforcement of the 'European social budget', increased protection for migrant workers, and eliminating discrimination towards women.

Although the proposals of the French government were cautious, definitely free of Marxist rhetoric, and much less ambitious than the demands raised since the early 1970s by the European Left (for instance the CSPEC and ETUC), they failed to convince its European partners. Schmidt was not much more enthusiastic than Thatcher, who was plainly hostile. The Greek government's support was not enough to tip the balance. The proposal for a coordinated European stimulus, which was key to the French revival plan, met with particular contempt. Schmidt had turned increasingly to domestic austerity since the 1979 second oil shock—which inflicted a balance of payments deficit on West Germany. The agreement on a concerted international stimulus reached in Bonn in 1978 was effectively dropped in 1979 as German leaders imputed their country's economic difficulties to their previous commitment to reflate.¹⁸¹ In the UK, Thatcher—dubbed the 'Iron Lady' for her uncompromising politics and leadership style—constituted an irremovable obstacle to a 'social Europe'. Thatcher had become the symbolic leader of the conservative (counter-) 'revolution' in western Europe, championing budget austerity, deregulation, flexible labour markets, privatization of state-owned companies, and a reduction of the power and influence of the trade unions. At the same time, between 1979 and 1984, the question of the UK's contribution to the EC budget poisoned relations between the member states. The prospects for a redistributive, market-interventionist or solidarity-based Europe were waning; Mitterrand's European proposals were politely dismissed.

Yet for the French government to be able to carry on with its socialist programme, it would have had to rely on solidarity from its European partners. Forced to embark on an isolated reflation, France obviously got bogged down in rising macro-economic difficulties: an increasing trade deficit, rising inflation, and a growing budget deficit. Above all, France was facing capital flight, currency speculation, and sharp hostility from business and finance. In the US, deflationary policies promoted by 1979 by the Federal Bank—the 'Volcker shock'—and confirmed after 1981 by the new conservative President Ronald Reagan helped bring about a global recession which only worsened the situation for the French socialists. All this, especially the high interest rates on the international markets, made it increasingly difficult for the state to fund its deficits. With each devaluation, its foreign debt increased. The franc was thus devalued in October 1981 and June 1982. Faced with stubborn refusal of the main European governments regarding a coordinated European stimulus and with continued downward

¹⁸¹ Warlouzet, *Governing Europe in a Globalizing World*, 144–5.

pressure on its currency, the French government would not be able to remain in the EMS for long if it did not change the course of its policy.

In fact, the monetary system designed in 1978–9—following the impetus given by Jenkins and rallied by Schmidt and Giscard—proved to be an additional obstacle on the road to a socialist Europe. Contrary to what had been advocated by European trade unions and left-wing parties, enhanced monetary integration did not come with solid economic and social coordination or financial solidarity.¹⁸² Though expert studies, such as the 1975 Marjolin Report, had highlighted the need to complement fixed exchange rates with a common monetary fund, common debt, fiscal and social harmonization, a much higher EC budget, and an EC unemployment scheme, the road taken by monetary integration in those years was radically different.¹⁸³ The system established in March 1979 after thirteen months of negotiations anchored European currencies to the strongest currency, the Deutschmark, and introduced a monetary constraint that geared European countries to economic ‘stability’ and anti-inflationary policies—public spending restriction, wage containment, and high interest rates—not to full employment or redistribution. *De facto*, its application reduced the monetary and budgetary autonomy of its member countries and worked to the advantage of West Germany’s interests and to the disadvantage of those countries with the weakest currencies, where it imposed fiscal and budgetary austerity, increased public debt, and indirectly favoured welfare cuts and industrial ‘restructuring’, often through modernization of production lines and mass dismissals.¹⁸⁴ This had been lucidly foreseen by the PCI, which despite its communist Europeanism voted against the EMS.¹⁸⁵ These policies were diametrically opposed to the expansionist policies that European trade unions and socialists had been demanding for years to fight unemployment, which included increased public spending and increased control over public and private investment. In short, the EMS made the pursuit of socialist policies, such as the one France attempted in 1981–2, extremely difficult.

In March 1983, after a third devaluation, the French government had to choose between sticking to the programme on which it had been elected, which implied leaving the EMS, or the other way around. It chose to renounce its efforts to build ‘socialism in one country’ and carried out a radical change of economic policy:

¹⁸² HAEU, GSPE-065-EN-B, ‘The Work of the Socialist Group in the EP: Report of the Xth Congress of the CSPEC, Brussels 10–12 January 1979’.

¹⁸³ Commission of the EC, ‘Report of the Study Group “Economic and Monetary Union 1980”’, 8 March 1975, available at http://aei.pitt.edu/1009/1/monetary_study_group_1980.pdf.

¹⁸⁴ Julian Germann, ‘German “Grand Strategy” and the Rise of Neoliberalism’, *International Studies Quarterly* 58, no. 4 (2014): 706–16. On the history of the EMS, see in general Emmanuel Mourlon-Druol, *A Europe Made of Money: The Emergence of the European Monetary System* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2012).

¹⁸⁵ See Antonio Varsori, *La Cenerentola d’Europa? L’Italia e l’integrazione europea dal 1947 a oggi*, Saggi 242 (Soveria Mannelli: Rubbettino, 2010), 314–30; Mauro Maggiorani and Paolo Ferrari, *L’Europa da Togliatti a Berlinguer: Testimonianze e documenti, 1945–1984* (Bologna: Il Mulino, 2005), 65–75.

turning to deflation, budget restrictions, a reversal of nationalization, and progressive financial deregulation. As the Finance Minister, Jacques Delors took the lead in this austerity turn. In 1984, the communists left the government and the union of the French Left came to an end. This so-called *tournant de la rigueur* (austerity turn), which was to become a trauma in the collective memory of the French Left, was undertaken in the name of Europe. It was a hard blow to those on the European Left who had believed in socialism through Europe and had hoped that a leftward renewal of socialism could lead to a new European social and economic order and to the establishment of a socialist Europe.

This episode was another patent defeat for the European Left and its ‘social Europe’. Of course, the international recession, the deflationary policy carried out by the main world powers, the deregulation of financial markets, and the gradual turn to neoliberal policies were important causes for the failure of the French socialist experiment in the early 1980s. So, certainly, were some faults in the French socialist project and its implementation.¹⁸⁶ But popular support was also lacking. The French socialists’ European strategy had relied on the hope that the advent of a left-wing government in France would generate a wide popular impulse in all countries of the EC, which would tip the balance of power in favour of a socialist Europe.¹⁸⁷ Yet, once they rose to power and undertook radical domestic reforms and proposed a coordinated European revival, French socialists were left virtually alone, including by the European Left. Of course, with Labour out of office and Thatcher leading the UK government, France had lost a major potential ally. Despite the French socialists’ support for the German government regarding the Euro-missile question in previous years, Schmidt’s social-liberal coalition government refused to consider Mitterrand’s proposal. European trade unions, like left-wing parties, did not mobilize—either through institutional pressure or in the streets—to back the French endeavour. In the absence of a radical transnational popular movement behind its reforms, the French government’s retreat was virtually unavoidable. All the efforts made to increase transnational cooperation of European trade unions and parties and build programmatic unity and combativity to erect an alternative Europe seemed to have been in vain.

More than ever before, the European Left was stuck in the European dilemma. On one side, the French renouncement seemed to confirm that ‘socialism in one country’ was no longer an option in an increasingly interdependent world economy. It reinforced the European Left’s now consolidated view that socialism would necessitate organizing beyond the nation-state. Unfortunately, on the other

¹⁸⁶ See Callaghan, *The Retreat of Social Democracy*, 106–9.

¹⁸⁷ Georges Saunier, ‘Le Gouvernement français et les enjeux économiques européens à l’heure de la rigueur 1981–1984’, in *Milieus économiques et intégration européenne au xxe siècle: La relance des années quatre-vingt (1979–1992)*, ed. Éric Bussière, Michel Dumoulin, and Sylvain Schirmann, *Histoire économique et financière XIXe–XXe* (Vincennes: Institut de la gestion publique et du développement économique, 2018), 109–46.

side, the woes of French socialism, like the defeat of the battle for a coordinated European ‘new deal’, a reduction of working time, a democratization of the European economy, and EC regulation of multinational companies, all signalled the failure of the European Left to turn the EC into a ‘social Europe’. Moreover, it was becoming evident that the EC was an increasingly tight straitjacket in which economic, social, industrial, budgetary, and fiscal policies could not be decided independently by member states. In the light of the ‘French lesson’, the European Left was forced to rethink its socialist strategy within the European framework. Although some viewed it as a confirmation that the EC was antithetic to socialism, many convinced themselves that socialism could only be achieved through a reform of the EC towards more redistribution and control of the economy. What has often been described as the ‘European turn’ of the French government after 1983—which led Mitterrand to relaunch the process of economic, monetary, and political union together with Helmut Kohl at Fontainebleau in 1984—resulted from this conclusion.¹⁸⁸ In the UK, it was among the more radical proponents of the AES—like Stuart Holland and Francis Cripps—that proposals would emerge in this latter direction.¹⁸⁹

But by then, the window of opportunity that had opened in the late 1960s, when the balance tilted in favour of workers, was closed. The short-lived dominance of socialist forces in the EC had ended; it was dominated by the Right throughout the 1980s, leaving virtually no hope for a redistributive and market-directing Europe. The evolution of the global economic and political context was also less and less favourable to a socialist Europe. The waning of *détente* was one factor. In the last years of the decade, a series of episodes led to deteriorating relations between the US and the Soviet Union. The ‘Euro-missile’ crisis signalled the end of the disarmament strategy; the 1979 Sandinista revolution in Nicaragua gave rise to preoccupation in the US, especially in the growing neoconservative spheres; as did Soviet involvement in conflicts taking place in the Horn of Africa in those years. In December 1979, the Soviet military intervention in Afghanistan put the final touch to the collapse of *détente*.¹⁹⁰

At the same time, the ‘global South’ had ceased to be the united and challenging front in favour of a fairer international economic order that it had managed to become since the 1960s. In 1979 the Iran–Iraq war and the ensuing ‘second oil shock’, in contrast to the first shock, contributed to breaking the unity of producing countries. The gap between developing countries was widened by the

¹⁸⁸ For instance, Sylvain Kahn, ‘La Place de la construction européenne dans la conquête puis la conservation du pouvoir par les socialistes français, 1966–1984’, *Les Cahiers européens de Sciences Po*, no. 1 (2012).

¹⁸⁹ Stuart Holland, ed., *Out of Crisis: An Alternative European Strategy*, European Socialist Thought, no. 11 (Nottingham: Spokesman, 1983); Callaghan, *The Retreat of Social Democracy*, 110–11.

¹⁹⁰ Federico Romero, *Storia della guerra fredda: L'ultimo conflitto per l'Europa*, Einaudi Storia 30 (Turin: Giulio Einaudi, 2009), 266–81.

resurgence of a more competitive and globalized form of capitalism and some, like the ‘Asian Tigers’ and South Korea, were embracing economic competition, exporting massively, and showing record growth rates, whereas others in Africa and South America were crumbling under increased debt and economic strain.¹⁹¹ This was also linked to the new role of international economic organizations—like the IMF and the World Bank—and financial markets, which by the beginning of the 1980s had reasserted their authority and were increasingly conditioning governments’ economic policies.

The ‘real new international economic order’ that thus emerged reasserted US hegemony and the Atlantic alliance.¹⁹² When Reagan succeeded Carter, his aim was to restore US leadership in the world. If anything, the ‘Euro-missile’ crisis, just like the second ‘oil shock’ had restored Western unity. Against this background, the European socialists and communists’ international strategy based on East–West *détente* and North–South cooperation appeared more and more quixotic. In 1982, the international Cancun Summit, which brought together world leaders as diverse as Reagan and Trudeau, Thatcher and Mitterrand, marked the end of discussion of the NIEO that had been so ardently promoted by Brandt at the head of the Socialist International.¹⁹³

A shift towards a new model of capitalism was emerging—more competitive, globalized, financialized, liberalized, deregulated, monetarist, constantly innovative—and, with it, increasing inequalities.¹⁹⁴ The new world order was permeated by a neoliberal culture that preferred individualism, competition, free enterprise, and market discipline to solidarity, workers’ control, and development aid. As historians and philosophers have increasingly pointed out in recent years, the ‘new’ bit in the ‘neoliberalism’ that has spread around the world since the late 1970s and 1980s is that it is no longer content with *laissez-faire* in the manner of classical liberalism. Rather, it seeks to impose a direction that society must follow: namely, the achievement of a world global market governed by ‘free and undistorted competition’. The realization of this end-state, which is at the heart of the neoliberal utopia, demands the return of an invasive state which imposes a compulsory agenda on the whole of society. The neoliberal state must drive humanity—by will

¹⁹¹ Vijay Prashad, *The Darker Nations: A People’s History of the Third World*, A New Press People’s History (New York; London: New Press, 2008), 349–59.

¹⁹² Mark Mazower, *Governing the World: The History of an Idea* (London: Penguin, 2013), 343–77.

¹⁹³ Giuliano Garavini, ‘Dal Nuovo ordine economico internazionale al Mercato unico: Evoluzione e involuzione della strategia economica internazionale dei socialisti Europei’, in *Fra mercato comune e globalizzazione: Le forze sociali europee e la fine dell’età dell’oro*, ed. Ilaria Del Biondo, Lorenzo Mechi, and Francesco Petrini (Milan: FrancoAngeli, 2010), 203–27; Guia Migani, ‘Lomé and the North–South Relations (1975–1984): From the “New International Economic Order” to a New Conditionality’, in *Europe in a Globalising World: Global Challenges and European Responses in the ‘Long’ 1970s*, ed. Claudia Hiepel (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2014), 123–46.

¹⁹⁴ Thomas Piketty, *Capital in the Twenty-First Century: The Dynamics of Inequality, Wealth, and Growth* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2014); Thomas Piketty, *Capital and Ideology* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2020).

or by force—to adapt to this new and ‘modern’ environment.¹⁹⁵ Neoliberal thinkers promoted a vision of global economic governance where market forces and private property could be shelved from democratic forces and national sovereignty. Neoliberal policies, aimed to ‘disembed’ the economic sphere from society—to use Karl Polanyi’s famous metaphor—were antithetic to the planification and democratization of the economy.¹⁹⁶

Moreover, by the 1980s, the propulsive strength of the communist model and hopes for a global socialist revolution had started to vanish. At the end of 1978 the US was establishing diplomatic relations with China, which was opening to the West and to the market economy, abandoning its revolutionary aims and rhetoric. Communist countries were dramatically increasing their imports from Western markets just as socialist economies entered stagnation; the codes and languages of consumer capitalism were increasingly spreading around the world and pervading every aspect of life, from clothing to music, sport to food trends. Besides, from 1975 onwards news of ‘re-education’ camps and waves of migrants fleeing Vietnam were marring the image of the communist Hanoi regime, which had been a rallying symbol for the Left in the long 1970s; while news of extermination and deportations carried out by the Khmer Rouge in Cambodia were putting the final touches to the delegitimizing of communist regimes in the eyes of international public opinion. By the end of the 1980s, the collapse of the Soviet bloc would mark the end of an era.¹⁹⁷

Finally, profound structural economic and social change was under way that in the long run contributed to weakening the influence of the workers’ movement in western Europe. Increasing relocations, restructuring of production and distribution, rising unemployment, and deindustrialization—industrial, manufacturing, and agrarian jobs started declining while white-collar jobs and services were rising, especially food, health, information, and business services—contributed considerably to the decline in trade union strength. The new forms of work, which were often low-paid, part-time, unprotected, and highly ‘feminized’, were also non-unionized and fell ‘beyond the established reach of the labour movement and its cultures and institutions.’¹⁹⁸ As a result, unions were increasingly inclined to accept compromises in the name of productivity that should create employment; workers were exhorted to accept more sacrifices in the name of international competition. Workers’ organizations started to suffer important defeats,

¹⁹⁵ Stiegler, *Il faut s'adapter*; Serge Audier, *Néolibéralisme(s)* (Paris: Grasset, 2012).

¹⁹⁶ Karl Polanyi, *The Great Transformation: The Political and Economic Origins of Our Time* (Boston, Mass.: Beacon Press, 2001); Quinn Slobodian, *Globalists: The End of Empire and the Birth of Neoliberalism* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2018). See also Philip Mirowski and Dieter Plehwe, eds., *The Road from Mont Pèlerin: The Making of the Neoliberal Thought Collective* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2009); David Harvey, *A Brief History of Neoliberalism* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005).

¹⁹⁷ Romero, *Storia della guerra fredda*, 260–6.

¹⁹⁸ Sassoon, *One Hundred Years of Socialism*, 433 and following.

as in the case of Italian workers for Fiat in 1980.¹⁹⁹ In other words, the power balance between workers and ‘capital’ was shifting to the detriment of the former—and the postwar era of ‘social-democratic consensus’ was consequently coming to a close.

The defeat of the European Left’s battle for a ‘social Europe’ was part and parcel of this broader evolution, of the closing of the window of opportunity that had characterized the long 1970s and the consolidation of a neoliberal Europe. The political renunciations of the French socialists signalled and accompanied the end of the leftward trend that had characterized European socialism during the 1970s, and fit into the broader ideological retreat of social democracy in the 1980s.²⁰⁰ By then, social democracy had started its transition into what Jean-Pierre Garnier and Louis Javoner would presciently term in a 1986 pamphlet *La Deuxième Droite* (The Second Right).²⁰¹ They abandoned the gradual push back of private property that characterized alternative economic policies.²⁰² Swedish social democrats engaged in such ‘third way’ policies as financial deregulation and wage squeezing to the benefit of profits, or tax concessions for the rich. In Greece and in Spain, socialists in government preferred budgetary rigour, monetary stability, and sound public finances over the objective of full employment. By 1983, the left-wing Bennite current of the Labour Party was receding, and so were the left-wing factions in all other European parties until they had become practically inexistent by the 1990s.²⁰³ The heirs of European socialism, including trade unions and part of the communist Left, ended up accepting and even pursuing the principle of private-capitalist economy and the shareholder model of corporate governance, as well as privatizations, deregulation of capital flows, and even fiscal and social dumping, among other things. In part, the failure of ‘social Europe’ in the early 1980s contributed to the establishment of a new ideological consensus of European social democracy on the terms set by neoliberalism.²⁰⁴

¹⁹⁹ Geoff Eley, *Forging Democracy: The History of the Left in Europe, 1850–2000* (Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press, 2002), 386. On the weakening of trade unions and labour parties and the fragmentation of the working classes, see, for instance, Eric Hobsbawm, *Age of Extremes: The Short Twentieth Century 1914–1991* (London: Michael Joseph, 1994), ch. 14; Beverly J. Silver, *Forces of Labor: Workers’ Movements and Globalization since 1870* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 163–4; Bernhard Ebbinghaus and Jelle Visser, *Trade Unions in Western Europe since 1945, Societies of Europe* (London; New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2000), 61–8.

²⁰⁰ Callaghan, *The Retreat of Social Democracy*, 101–31.

²⁰¹ Jean-Pierre Garnier and Louis Janover, *La Deuxième Droite* (Marseille: Agone, 1986).

²⁰² Schmidt, ‘There Were Alternatives’, 480.

²⁰³ John Callaghan, ‘Social Democracy in Transition’, *Parliamentary Affairs* 56, no. 1 (2003): 125–40.

²⁰⁴ Sassoon, *One Hundred Years of Socialism*, 691 and following.

Epilogue: The Road Taken

Experience has taught us that the free market forces guarantee neither full employment nor equality. To give the highest priority to these goals means challenging the principles of the capitalist system which is based on the profitability of privately owned capital.¹

The Other ‘Social Europe’

‘L’Europe sera socialiste ou ne sera pas’... Judging by the state of Europe today, Mitterrand’s catchy prophecy simply could not be further from the truth.² Since the 1980s, ‘Europe’—embodied more and more assertively by an expanding EC, re-baptized the European Union in 1993—engaged on a road that was swerving further and further away from that ‘social Europe’ that European socialists and trade unions had imagined and striven for in the long 1970s. Indeed, far from a market-controlling, redistributive, economic-planning-oriented and democratized Europe at the service of workers, what came into being was an increasingly neoliberal Europe, whose social dimension was not only compatible with, but an incentive to, free markets and the extension of private property. Whether we choose to see it as an illusion, an alibi or a reality, the kind of ‘social Europe’ that emerged from the mid-1980s onwards was in many regards the opposite of the one imagined by the European Left during the long 1970s.³

Yet, the period that began in the mid-1980s is generally described as the golden age of social Europe, made possible through a revival of the European integration process.⁴ At the June 1984 European Council in Fontainebleau, EC leaders reached an agreement that allowed a *relance* of European cooperation, which had been strained in ‘Eurosclerosis’ in the early 1980s with the economic crisis and the budget dispute between member states. They settled their budget wrangle with a rebate of the UK contribution, and committed to contain the budget of the

¹ Rudolf Meidner, ‘Why Did the Swedish Model Fail?’, *Socialist Register* 29 (March 1993): 218.

² François Mitterrand, ‘L’Europe sera socialiste ou ne sera pas’, *La Nouvelle Revue socialiste* 36, December 1978.

³ Eliane Vogel-Polsky and Jean Vogel, *L’Europe sociale 1993: Illusion, alibi ou réalité?* (Brussels: Éditions de l’Université de Bruxelles, 1991).

⁴ See, for instance, Michael Gehler and Wilfried Loth, eds., *Reshaping Europe: Towards a Political, Economic and Monetary Union, 1984–1989* (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2020).

CAP, to extend the EC's own resources, to start working towards the accession of Spain and Portugal (Greece had already joined in 1981), and to reinforce the EC's institutional mechanism—paving the way to the signature of the Single European Act in 1986, the first major revision of the 1957 Treaty of Rome.

Fontainebleau, just like the appointment, a few months later, of Jacques Delors as the new President of the European Commission (1985–94), confirmed the French government's choice, after renouncing 'socialism in one country', to reassert its European commitment and leadership, in alliance with Mitterrand's new German 'friend', Kohl. Belonging to the liberal wing of the French Socialist Party, Delors was an experienced politician who, as we have seen, had been one of the main architects of the French turn to austerity and perseverance in the EMS. In Thatcher's own words, he was 'extremely intelligent and energetic and had, as French Finance minister, been credited with reining back the initial left-wing socialist policies of President Mitterrand's Government and with putting French finances on a sounder footing'.⁵ In addition to having won the confidence of neoliberal conservatives, Delors was also a social-Catholic acceptable to Christian democrats, had gained the trust of the German government, was well versed in European bureaucratic jargon, and, as we have seen, had profound knowledge of European socialists' and trade unions' transnational dynamics and contradictions.

Actually, although the 'Delors moment' is often remembered as a moment of promotion of a 'social Europe', after he took office in January 1985 the new President of the Commission first placed economic integration and the single market project at the top of his agenda.⁶ This was a consensual choice, as Delors himself explained some years later: 'I had to fall back on a pragmatic objective that also corresponded to the spirit of the times, since back then it was all about deregulation, the removal of all obstacles to competition and market forces.'⁷ Although customs duties and quotas had been suppressed with the creation of the Common Market in the years following the Treaty of Rome, many 'non-tariff barriers' persisted, such as food sanitation rules, technical norms, and state subsidies to firms and services. The completion of the EC's internal market—thanks to the removal of obstacles to the 'four freedoms': the free movement of goods, capitals, services, and people within the EC—was of course strongly supported by Kohl's government and by Thatcher herself. The new UK Commissioner for Internal Market and Services, Arthur Cockfield, a former head of the UK's Boots

⁵ Margaret Thatcher, *The Downing Street Years* (London: HarperCollins, 1993), 547.

⁶ For example, in Claude Didry and Arnaud Mias, *Le Moment Delors: Les syndicats au cœur de l'Europe sociale* (Brussels: Peter Lang, 2005).

⁷ Jacques Delors, *L'unité d'un homme: Entretiens avec Dominique Wolton* (Paris: Éditions Odile Jacob, 1994), 220. Cited in François Denord and Antoine Schwartz, *L'Europe sociale n'aura pas lieu* (Paris: Raisons d'agir, 2009), 94 (author's translation).

pharmacy chain who had held economic portfolios in Thatcher's governments, played a central role in laying the foundations of the project.⁸

The single market project also brought together the ambitions of two rival 'fractions' of Europe's increasingly transnational capitalist class: 'on the one hand, a "globalist" fraction consisting of Europe's most globalized firms (including global financial institutions) and, on the other hand, a Europeanist fraction made up of large industrial enterprises primarily serving the European markets and competing against the often cheaper imports from outside Europe.'⁹ The former defended a neoliberal project for Europe, with an opening up of European markets to the globalizing world economy, deregulation and privatization, and less state intervention in the economy; the latter promoted a neomercantilist project, with the construction of a bigger European 'home market' and public industrial and technology policies to boost 'European champions' that would be able to compete, thanks to larger economies of scale, with the technologically advanced US and Japanese firms as well as the new emerging economies. Those two fractions nonetheless converged in exercising increasing pressure on European political elites for the removal of all obstacles to free trade within the internal market.

Pressures from the various business lobbies were indeed crucial in determining the reshaping of European integration from the mid-1980s onwards. In 1979, the Jean Monnet Action Committee had been refounded and for the first time included business representatives. In 1983, at the initiative of Volvo chief executive, Pehr Gyllenhammar, and with the help of European Commissioner Étienne Davignon, who had played a critical role in building ties between big business and the European Commission in those years, the leaders of seventeen top European transnational corporations—including Volvo, Philips, Fiat, Nestlé, Shell, Siemens, Thyssens, Lafarge, Saint Gobin, and Renault—met in Paris to found the European Round Table of Industrials (ERT). Its goal was to promote further opening of markets together with European support for industry. The Commission's 1985 'White Paper on Completing the Internal Market', which proposed around 300 measures to complete the single market by 1992 through the abolition of non-tariff barriers, closely resembled the recommendations of the ERT.¹⁰

The rationale underlying the internal market programme, which was institutionalized by the Single European Act, was therefore intricately free market oriented. Far from the kind of 'socialist planning' promoted by Delors himself

⁸ George Ross, *Jacques Delors and European Integration* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1995).

⁹ Bastiaan van Apeldoorn, 'Transnational Class Agency and European Governance: The Case of the European Round Table of Industrialists', *New Political Economy* 5, no. 2 (2000): 167.

¹⁰ See Bastiaan van Apeldoorn, *Transnational Capitalism and the Struggle over European Integration* (London; New York: Routledge, 2002); Keith Middlemas, *Orchestrating Europe: The Informal Politics of the European Union 1973–95* (London: Fontana, 1995), 102–10; Belén Balanyá, *Europe Inc.* (London: Pluto Press, 2000); Maria Green Cowles, 'Setting the Agenda for a New Europe: The ERT and EC 1992', *JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies* 33, no. 4 (1995): 501–26.

and his socialist colleagues only a few years earlier, its aim was to build a bigger market, ‘supposed to lead to tougher competition resulting in higher efficiency, greater profits and eventually through a trickle-down effect in more general wealth and more jobs.’¹¹ Delors, like Jacques Attali and other liberal socialists in close contact with European business circles, had come to believe that the ongoing trends of trade liberalization and banking and financial deregulation were inevitable and indispensable to enable economic growth and job creation, and to re-establish western Europe as a leading economic actor in an increasingly competitive and globalized world. Of course, the Single European Act was not limited to the completion of the single European market. It also extended qualified majority voting in the Council (including on a few social issues such as workplace health and safety standards); increased the EP’s legislative powers with the cooperation and assent procedures (later consolidated with the ‘co-decision’ procedure, although the chamber has never been granted the right of initiative); defined among its objectives the strengthening of cooperation regarding regional development, research, and environmental policy; and so on. However, the bulk of the new treaty was concerned with liberalization, harmonization, and ‘mutual recognition’ in the economic sector. In the following years, critical directives would be adopted regarding the liberalization of capital movement and deregulation of the banking and insurance sectors.¹²

Did Delors and his colleagues not foresee that unleashing trade, liberalizing services and letting capital move freely within the Community without prior fiscal and social harmonization would inevitably pit workers and national welfare regimes against each other and cause a race to the bottom in terms of social rights, salaries, and redistribution? This remains perhaps the most unsettling question, as European socialists had been talking about upward social and fiscal harmonization, about greater control over capital movement and multinational companies throughout the long 1970s—not about deregulation. For it was as obvious then as it is now that ‘allowing capital to circulate freely without prior tax harmonization is tantamount to leaving it to the financial markets to carry out such harmonization in practice’, and that ‘the introduction of tax competition between states not only considerably reduces their budgetary room for manoeuvre, but also threatens redistribution and social protection systems.’¹³

Actually, Delors’ administration adopted what some of its prominent figures called a ‘Russian doll’ strategy: a kind of spill-over approach in which each step of

¹¹ Andreas Bieler, ‘Social Europe and the Eurozone Crisis: The Importance of the Balance of Class Power in Society’, in *Social Policy and the Euro Crisis: Quo Vadis Social Europe*, ed. Amandine Crespy and Georg Menz, Palgrave Studies in European Union Politics (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2015), 27.

¹² See Alexis Drach, ‘Removing Obstacles to Integration: The European Way to Deregulation’, in *Financial Deregulation: A Historical Perspective*, ed. Alexis Drach and Youssef Cassis (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2021), 75–99.

¹³ Denord and Schwartz, *L’Europe sociale n’aura pas lieu*, 98 (author’s translation).

the way forward was ‘designed to contain the seeds of another to follow’.¹⁴ The Commission hoped to ‘cash in’ the success of the single market programme—‘1992’—with new initiatives: the ‘*Paquet Delors*’, meant to double the EC budget and the Structural Funds for more ‘economic and social cohesion’; EMU and the creation of a single currency; and the ‘social dimension’ with the adoption of a Social Charter of fundamental rights, a new Social Action Programme, and the relaunching of ‘European social dialogue’. In Delors’ own words:

The competition which will be developed by the large market will also promote cooperation. And like competition and cooperation, liberalization and harmonization will go together, creating the conditions for a new regulation of the totality which will be created.¹⁵

To put it simply, Delors saw the single market as a step towards a closer union; market-led integration would call for social and fiscal corrections.

Unfortunately, in practice, not all aspects of the process ended up having the same success; the consolidation of a ‘European social model’ that was supposed to follow somehow necessarily from the strengthening of the market kept lagging behind. The ‘Delors Package’ was adopted after fierce negotiations, doubling the Structural Funds while restraining the budget of the CAP, but the overall budget of the EC—and therefore its potential for social and regional redistribution—remained extremely limited, barely ever exceeding 1 per cent of the European GDP to the present day.¹⁶ The social dialogue relaunched initially in 1985 with the Val Duchesse discussions among UNICE, the ETUC, and the public sector associations, and supported by the new article 118b of the Single European Act which was meant to institutionalize European collective agreements, gave very few results. The Charter of the Fundamental Social Rights of Workers adopted in 1989 did proclaim a number of social and economic rights for workers—such as improvement of working and living conditions, equal treatment for men and women, freedom of association and collective bargaining, information, consultation and participation of workers, the rights to decent pay, to social protection, and so on—but remained non-binding. The SAP adopted in 1989 to implement the Charter consisted of forty-seven instruments (compared to the nearly 300 for

¹⁴ George Ross and Jane Jenson, ‘Reconsidering Jacques Delors’ Leadership of the European Union’, *Journal of European Integration* 39, no. 2 (February 2017): 129; see also Ross, *Jacques Delors and European Integration*, 39.

¹⁵ Jacques Delors, *Le Nouveau Concert européen* (Paris: Éditions Odile Jacob, 1992), 73; cited in Ross, *Jacques Delors and European Integration*, 46.

¹⁶ On social and regional redistribution through the EU budget and its Structural Funds, see especially Amandine Crespy, *L’Europe sociale: Acteurs, politiques, débats* (Brussels: Éditions de l’Université de Bruxelles, 2019), 137–61.

the single market programme), most of which were non-binding ‘recommendations’ and ‘opinions’, for instance concerning minimum income.¹⁷

In contrast, monetary union turned out to be Delors’ greatest political success. In 1988, he had managed to convince the European Council to set up a committee largely composed of European central bankers and chaired by himself, to make new proposals for the realization of EMU. Here again, pressures from business circles proved crucial in influencing the Commission’s work and convincing European leaders, and so was the activism of prestigious European ‘fathers’ like Giscard d’Estaing, Schmidt, and Davignon.¹⁸ Initial unwillingness of the German government to abandon the all-powerful Deutschmark had been softened by the commitment of the French government to favour freedom of capital movement, and by the assurance that the future supranational ECB would be modelled after the Bundesbank—that is, independent from political powers and devoted primarily to ‘price stability’.¹⁹ By the time the Delors Report had been released and adopted by European governments in the spring of 1989, Europe was about to enter a new historical phase, marked by three major interconnected changes: the collapse of the communist regimes in the former countries of the Warsaw Pact, the reunification of Germany, and the Maastricht Treaty signed in 1992.

The core of this new treaty was the commitment of the member states, except the UK and Denmark, to adopt a single currency under the authority of a single and independent central bank by the end of the millennium. This was no small decision. Even more so than the EMS, the new EMU meant that European governments would abandon key aspects of national economic and monetary sovereignty, starting with their right to issue money and alter exchange rates. The treaty also formally introduced for the first time the ‘convergence criteria’ that set mandatory rules regarding the member states’ economic policies: limiting the government budget deficit to 3 per cent of GDP and public debt to 60 per cent of GDP, keeping inflation rates not higher than 1.5 points above that of the ‘best performing’ countries, maintaining exchange rate stability and respecting interest-rate convergence. Behind the rhetorical smokescreen of ‘fiscal responsibility’ and ‘price stability’—and thanks to the growing depoliticization of monetary questions—the new EMU consecrated the move away from Keynesian policies and towards a combination of ordoliberalism and monetarism inspired by Milton

¹⁷ Vogel-Polsky and Vogel, *L’Europe sociale 1993*, 165–75.

¹⁸ Luc Moulin, ‘L’Association pour l’Union monétaire de l’Europe: Un groupe d’entrepreneurs contribue à la création de l’euro’, in *Milieus économiques et intégration européenne au XXe siècle: La Relance des années quatre-vingts (1979–1992)*, ed. Eric Bussière, Michel Dumoulin, and Sylvain Schirmann (Paris: Comité pour l’histoire économique et financière de la France, 2007), 241–56; Stefan Collignon and Daniela Schwarzer, *Private Sector Involvement in the Euro: The Power of Ideas* (Abingdon: Routledge, 2002).

¹⁹ Rawi Abdelal, *Capital Rules: The Construction of Global Finance* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2007), 54–85.

Friedman and his peers.²⁰ Much to Delors' regret, the negotiators of the Maastricht Treaty refused to include convergence criteria regarding employment.²¹

Meanwhile, the 'social dimension' that had been promised to trade unions continued to trail behind. The 'Agreement on Social Policy' annexed to the Maastricht Treaty (from which the UK opted out until the New Labour government joined in 1997) reaffirmed attachment to the social provisions of the Treaty of Rome; provided new legislative competences to the new EU by extending (in a limited way) qualified majority voting to equal opportunities, working conditions, information and consultation of workers, and integration of those excluded from the labour market; while unanimity was retained for most issues like social security and dismissals; and several social policy fields, like pay and trade union rights, remained explicitly excluded from EU competence. A 'Social Protocol' included in the treaty also institutionalized a new tripartite legislative procedure in the social field: European-level labour and business organizations could now agree on work-related proposals that would be adopted as EU legislation; failing to reach agreement would leave it to the Commission to propose legislation. In the absence of social and political pressure to reach agreement, however, this new Eurocorporatism was unlikely to bring significant results.²² Indeed, between 1995 and 2013, only three directives were passed under the Protocol procedure—on parental leave, part-time work, and fixed-term work—as well as five bilateral agreements regarding telework, work-related stress, harassment and violence at work, inclusive labour markets, and youth unemployment, with very few concrete legislative changes for member states.²³

Overall, despite these modest extensions of the 'social dimension' of the EU, European social policy can be said to have undergone since the 1980s what Wolfgang Streeck has called 'progressive regression': it was increasingly oriented towards the goals of competitiveness, flexibility and 'restructuring'.²⁴ By the mid-1990s, as Streeck puts it:

²⁰ Frédéric Lebaron, *Ordre monétaire ou chaos social? La BCE et la révolution néolibérale* (Bellecombe-en-Bauges: Éditions du Croquant, 2006).

²¹ Bernard Cassen, 'La Cohésion sociale sacrifiée à la monnaie', *Le Monde diplomatique*, June 1995, <https://www.monde-diplomatique.fr/1995/06/CASSEN/6452>; cited in Denord and Schwartz, *L'Europe sociale n'aura pas lieu*, 105.

²² Gobin's argument that the European Commission used the new European tripartism as a tool to build ideological consensus around the single market project certainly holds some truth. Corinne Gobin, 'Consultation et concertation sociales à l'échelle de la Communauté économique européenne: Étude des positions et stratégies de la Confédération européenne des syndicats (1958–1991)' (PhD thesis, Université libre de Bruxelles, 1996), 125, 139. See also Wolfgang Streeck and Philippe C. Schmitter, 'From National Corporatism to Transnational Pluralism: Organized Interests in the Single European Market', *Politics and Society* 19, no. 2 (June 1991): 133–64.

²³ Wolfgang Streeck, 'Progressive Regression: Metamorphoses of European Social Policy', *New Left Review*, no. 118 (August 2019): 127–8.

²⁴ Streeck, 'Progressive Regression'.

Gone were the days when ‘Europe’ was to become a supranational welfare state integrating, and improving on, member countries’ existing welfare regimes. Less ambitious efforts at regulating national policies from above, in order to harmonize them ‘upwards’, also ran out of steam, as did more or less successful attempts—in company law, workplace representation—to complement national institutions with supranational ones.²⁵

The ‘social Europe’ brandished by Delors from the mid-1980s onwards with the support of other European socialists like Stuart Holland, gave rise to a qualitatively different project from the one revealed in this book. It was no longer based on redistribution, equality, social, fiscal, and economic planning, and ‘democracy in all spheres of life’—but merely constituted a ‘competitive adjustment to the global markets.’ In the light of the proposals of the European Left during the long 1970s, the main policies and instruments adopted in the social field since the 1980s appear strikingly unambitious. The evolution of two of the most emblematic proposals of the ‘social Europe’ project explored in this book—the directive on information and consultation of workers in multinational companies and the directive on the reduction of working time—are particularly enlightening in this regard.

Indeed, after the defeat of the European Left on the Vredeling Directive, the project of a directive on information and consultation of workers at European level remained dormant for several years. In 1994, thanks to the extension of qualified majority voting in the Council, the EU finally adopted a directive on the establishment of European Works Councils (EWCs), which required firms employing over 1,000 workers, of whom at least 150 were in two different European countries, to negotiate and install a transnational body of workers’ representatives, with legal rights to information and consultation. However, the directive adopted in 1994 (recast in 2009) was less ambitious than the Vredeling Directive that European socialists and trade unions had unsuccessfully promoted during the 1970s. EWCs are not mandatory but negotiated after an initiative of at least 100 employees; the threshold is much higher; the directive only provides general requirements instead of a common framework on the competences, procedures, role, and composition of the EWC; it promotes flexibility and encourages the creation of a corporate culture to ease the management of change; it does not extend to head offices outside the EU or European Economic Area; most importantly, all EWCs created before September 1996 (39 per cent of the over 1,000 EWCs that exist today) are excluded from the binding legal framework of the directive. In fact, studies show that the rights provided by the EWCs are very often ignored and violated: only a minority of councils are actually informed

²⁵ Streeck, ‘Progressive Regression’, 130.

before decisions are finalized or even made public; almost a third of them are not consulted at all.²⁶ This lack of incisiveness was best illustrated shortly after the implementation of the directive, in February 1997, when the closure of the Renault plant in the Belgian city of Vilvoorde was announced at a press conference without prior consultation with the EWCs.²⁷ More recently, to give but two other examples, when Whirlpool decided to close its plants in Amiens and Naples to relocate its tumble-dryers production in Poland, and when GKN decided to close its automotive plant in Florence to relocate, neither the EWCs nor the directives supposed to protect workers against collective redundancies proved of any help to the hundreds of workers whose jobs were to be sacrificed in the name of market competition.

The same general observations apply to the other measures on workers' participation adopted by the EU in later years: the European Company Statute (2001) and the Directive on Information and Consultation of Employees (2002) were both watered-down versions of the proposals that entered the EC pipeline during the long 1970s—employee participation as a 'productive factor' having replaced workers' control over multinationals, prevention of social dumping, and protection of workers' rights as the main rationale underlying these policies.²⁸ More broadly, as the ETUI recently pointed out, workplace democracy is in decline in Europe.²⁹ The aspirations for economic democratization that were inherent to the social Europe project in the long 1970s, which entailed not only information and consultation, but also calls for workers' participation in firms' decisions (self-management, codetermination) and ownership; inclusion of workers' representatives in economic and social planning decisions at national and international level; and extension of the public sector (decentralized nationalization), have lost ground.

In the case of the directive on the reduction of working time, the efforts of European trade unions and left-wing parties—backed for a time by the Commission—for a legal framework on the reduction of working time in order to redistribute jobs and fight unemployment, had ended in disappointment in the early 1980s. The adoption of the toothless 1984 Council recommendation already reflected a semantic and political displacement from reduction to a

²⁶ Romuald, Jagodziński, 'European Works Councils: An Experiment in Workplace Democracy which Remains More Relevant than Ever', LSEEuropblog, October 2016, <https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/europblog/2016/10/27/european-works-councils/>. See also Jeremy Waddington, *European Works Councils: A Transnational Industrial Relations Institution in the Making* (London: Routledge, 2010).

²⁷ Francesco Petrini, 'Demanding Democracy in the Workplace: The European Trade Union Confederation and the Struggle to Regulate Multinationals', in *Societal Actors in European Integration*, ed. Wolfram Kaiser and Jan-Henrik Meyer (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013): 163.

²⁸ Michael Gold, 'Employee Participation in the EU: The Long and Winding Road to Legislation', *Economic and Industrial Democracy* 31, no. 4S (2010): 9–23.

²⁹ Stan De Spiegelaere and Sigurt Vitols, 'A Better World with More Democracy at Work', *Etui* (blog), available at <https://www.etui.org/news/better-world-more-democracy-work>.

competitiveness- and flexibility-friendly ‘reorganization’ of working time. The struggle was never completely abandoned by its promoters, however. In 1993 the Council finally adopted a directive ‘concerning certain aspects of the organization of working time’ (revised in 2003). The directive included a limit to weekly working hours, capped at forty-eight hours on average including overtime, and paid annual leave of at least four weeks per year.³⁰ This, like the adoption of the directive on the EWCs, was certainly the result of over two decades of efforts by the European Left, but it was strikingly unambitious if compared to the thirty-five-hour working week, six weeks’ paid holiday, longer compulsory schooling and lower retirement age advocated two decades earlier as part of the ‘Social Europe’ project. In short, instead of regulating and correcting the market, as the Left’s ‘social Europe’ project had advocated during the 1970s, European social policies were increasingly conceived—including by left-wing actors—as minimum social standards and as complements to the market-building process.

Even more importantly, the implementation of the single market programme and the strengthening of EU competition law increasingly became levers and alibis for neoliberal restructuring of national economies, dismantling of national public and social services, privatization of state-owned companies, and marketization of welfare services. Indeed, the consecration of competition has favoured the dismantling of public ownership (including transport, telecommunications, energy, and welfare services), disincentivized state intervention in the economy, and provoked ‘social dumping’. The 2006 directive on services in the internal market, promoting service liberalization and deregulation—a watered-down version of the infamous ‘Bolkenstein Directive’ that had provoked mass protests in various EU countries—was a case in point, as it favoured privatization of public service provision.³¹ In short, although social policies and welfare services have remained a competence of the EU member states, ‘the gradual extension of the scope of the market to areas which were formerly managed by public authorities has implied increasing encroachment of EU internal market and competition rules over national traditions pertaining to the provision of welfare services’—regarding both regulatory and redistributive aspects.³²

Meanwhile, the jurisdiction of the European Court of Justice has also tended to favour economic freedoms over social rights. In the *Viking* and *Laval* cases, for instance, the Court found the workers’ collective bargaining rights and right to strike inferior to economic freedoms; in the *Rüffert* case a German *länder* was prohibited from imposing social conditions on public procurement contracts; in

³⁰ Council Directive 93/104/EC of 23 November 1993, concerning certain aspects of the organization of working time, *OJ L307/1993*. The current version is available at <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/en/ALL/?uri=CELEX:32003L0088> (accessed 12 June 2017).

³¹ Amandine Crespy, *Welfare Markets in Europe* (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2017), 33–70, 71–112.

³² Crespy, *Welfare Markets in Europe*, 34.

the *Commission v Luxembourg* case a member-state was prohibited from requiring higher labour standards for foreign workers than prescribed by the EU Posted Workers Directive.³³ This state of affairs does not seem to have been challenged by the reaffirmation of the social principles contained in the 1989 Charter with the adoption in 2000 of a Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU, which then became legally binding with the ratification of the Treaty of Lisbon in 2009.³⁴ Integration through market and integration through law have therefore tended to overlap and combine in favouring a market-oriented Europe.

The evolution of European socio-economic governance after Maastricht and especially since the 2008 financial crisis confirmed this bias against a redistributive, market-correcting, and socially progressive Europe. The alleged ‘trickle-down’ effect of competition on growth and employment is still not in sight—instead, the EMU’s prioritizing of price stability and low inflation rates has had a depressing effect on growth and employment levels. Budget discipline rules and sanctions pertaining to EMU have been introduced and consolidated with the adoption of the 1997 Stability and Growth Pact, the 2011 Six Pack and the 2013 Fiscal Compact and Two Pack, which have tended to encourage limitation of public services and welfare expenditure as well as mass public investment into—for instance—the ecological transition sectors. It is presently doubtful that the current suspension of the EU’s budgetary rules will last, and the ‘Next Generation EU’ package adopted by the European Council and supported by the unprecedented creation of mutual bonds in response to the Covid crisis could well remain a historic exception.

Until this day, progressive social and employment criteria have not been included in any of these Pacts—social and employment policies remain subordinated to economic guidelines. In 1997 after Sweden, Finland, and Austria joined the EU and as centre-left governments of a new ‘Third Way’ type—led by the social-democrat heads of government Tony Blair, Lionel Jospin, and Gerard Schroeder—dominated the Council, a new ‘Employment chapter’ was added to the European treaties, introducing a ‘European Employment Strategy’ based on a non-binding approach named ‘Open Method of Coordination’ (OMC), later integrated in the EU economic coordination and budgetary monitoring framework ‘European Semester’. Member states now had to present annual action plans regarding employment, in accordance with Council guidelines, but these have to

³³ Niklas Bruun, Klaus Lörcher, and Isabelle Schömann, eds., *The Lisbon Treaty and Social Europe* (London: Bloomsbury, 2012), 3, 19–43. See also Stefano Giubboni, ‘Freedom to Conduct a Business and EU Labour Law’, *European Constitutional Law Review* 14, no. 1 (March 2018): 172–90.

³⁴ See Hanna Eklund, ‘National Margins of Discretion in the Court of Justice of the European Union’s Adjudication of Fundamental Rights: Studies of Interconnectedness’ (PhD thesis, European University Institute, Florence, 2016); Sandra Fredman, ‘Transformation or Dilution: Fundamental Rights in the EU Social Space’, *European Law Journal* 12, no. 1 (2006): 41–60; Judy Fudge, ‘Constitutionalizing Labour Rights in Canada and Europe: Freedom of Association, Collective Bargaining, and Strikes’, *Current Legal Problems* 68, no. 1 (2015): 267–305.

comply with the broad economic guidelines of EMU. This European soft-law approach favoured a reorientation of social policies towards objectives of competitiveness and ‘flexicurity’, with a focus on supply-side measures such as vocational training to increase the ‘employability’ and flexibility of ‘human capital’ to favour transition from one job to the next. The reintroduction, in 1999, of a ‘macro-economic tripartite dialogue’ resembling the 1970s Tripartite Conferences—including trade unions and employers’ organizations, economic and social affairs ministers, as well as the Commission and the ECB—has not brought any significant change to this state of affairs either: the priority objectives are now competition and price ‘stability’.

In short, broadly speaking, the ‘social dimension’ of the kind of Europe that emerged in the 1980s has been insufficient to cope with the consequences of liberal economic integration, to the point that the socio-economic governance of the EU today ‘can be regarded as an attack on the welfare state.’³⁵ In recent years, many scholars have pointed to the adverse effects of this kind of market-led economic integration and of the austerity policies promoted by the EU as a response to the eurozone debt crisis on national welfare systems, wages, employment levels, and public services, as well as trade union involvement in economic and social decisions.³⁶ Beyond the academic and political debates, over recent decades the perception that European populations had to sacrifice wages, social rights, and welfare benefits in the name of ‘Europe’ has been spreading. This in turn has fuelled resentment against the EU and favoured so-called ‘populist’, often right-wing, movements which present themselves as defenders of the interests of the losers of EU-driven liberalization. Shaky popular support for the road taken by European integration has been increasingly obvious since the 1990s with the referendums on the Maastricht Treaty in Denmark and France, on Norwegian membership in 1994, on the European Constitution in 2005 in Ireland, France, and the Netherlands, on the Greek memorandum in 2015, and ultimately the 2016 Brexit vote.

It is now widely recognized—by scholars and policymakers alike—that the architecture of EMU is incomplete, incoherent, and inadequate. A vast literature points to the flaws in the governance of the eurozone, the independence of the ECB and its lack of democratic legitimacy, the lack of macro-economic coordination between the member states, insufficient financial solidarity, inadequate fiscal and banking policies, as well as the insignificance of the EU budget and the

³⁵ Bieler, ‘Social Europe and the Eurozone Crisis’, 32.

³⁶ Costas Lapavistas, *Crisis in the Eurozone* (London: Verso, 2012); Henk Overbeek, ‘Sovereign Debt Crisis in Euroland: Root Causes and Implications for European Integration’, *International Spectator* 47, no. 1 (March 2012): 30–48; Roland Erne, ‘European Industrial Relations after the Crisis: A Postscript’, in *The European Union and Industrial Relations: New Procedures, New Context*, ed. Stijn Smismans (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2012), 225–35; Amandine Crespy and Georg Menz, eds., *Social Policy and the Eurocrisis: Quo Vadis Social Europe* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2015).

strong and explosive imbalance between social policies and EMU.³⁷ Until the 1970s, the ‘Smith outside, Keynes inside’ principle underlying European integration could work, because member states retained most of their macroeconomic and social prerogatives in the same political arena. By the 1980s, macroeconomic policies and social policies became increasingly split between the national and the supranational arena—social tensions were inherent to this architecture.³⁸ The steps undertaken towards more unified fiscal and banking policies and the creation of European sovereign bonds in the aftermath of the eurozone and Coronavirus crises have only very partially fixed the problem.

For better or worse, there is today no such thing as a European welfare state or strong European social and fiscal policies capable of hindering the social and fiscal dumping caused by the present form of European integration and globalization. The 2004 Eastern enlargement to low-wage countries, the association agreements with Turkey and Balkan countries, the progressive opening of the EU to global trade since GATT’s 1986 Uruguay Round (now the World Trade Organization), and the numerous free trade agreements signed with all parts of the globe, mostly regardless of social and environmental conditions, have reinforced competition between workers and environmental destruction. Meanwhile, global and intra-EU fiscal competition favours fiscal evasion by multinational companies, which today shift 40 per cent of their profits to tax havens each year—EU (non-tax haven) countries being the main losers of this fiscal competition, with Italy, France, and Germany losing respectively 15, 22, and 26 per cent of their corporate tax revenue each year, mostly to tax havens in the EU like Luxembourg, Ireland, the Netherlands, and Belgium.³⁹ These ‘missing profits’ obviously represent another strain on public and social expenditure, and are a further demonstration of the defeat of the capital-controlling ‘social Europe’ project as formulated by the European Left during the long 1970s.

Against this backdrop, the EU’s constantly reaffirmed commitment, in principle, to full employment and enhanced social rights and environmental protection—for instance, with the adoption of the ‘Lisbon strategy’ in 2000 or the

³⁷ For instance, Fritz W. Scharpf, ‘Monetary Union, Fiscal Crisis and the Pre-emption of Democracy’, *Journal for Comparative Government and European Policy* 9, no. 2 (2011): 163–98; Kevin Featherstone, ‘The Greek Sovereign Debt Crisis and EMU: A Failing State in a Skewed Regime’, *JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies* 49, no. 2 (2011): 193–217; Georg Menz and Mitchell P. Smith, ‘Kicking the Can Down the Road to More Europe? Salvaging the Euro and the Future of European Economic Governance’, *Journal of European Integration* 35, no. 3 (April 2013): 195–206; John Grahl and Paul Teague, ‘Reconstructing the Eurozone: The Role of EU Social Policy’, *Cambridge Journal of Economics* 37, no. 3 (May 2013): 677–92.

³⁸ Andrew Martin and George Ross, eds., *Euros and Europeans: Monetary Integration and the European Model of Society* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004); Kathleen R. McNamara, *The Currency of Ideas* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1998).

³⁹ As recently revealed by researchers from the University of California, Berkeley and the University of Copenhagen in a study called ‘The Missing Profits of Nations’; see <https://missingprofits.world>.

more recent ‘European Pillar of Social Rights’ in 2017 and ‘European Green Deal’ in 2019—rings hollow. There is a fundamental tension between the stated social and environmental objectives of the EU and the economic guidelines enshrined in its politico-legal framework. The institutional set-up of EMU and of the EU more broadly has entrenched what Stephen Gill calls ‘new constitutionalism’: an international governance framework that seeks ‘to separate economic policies from broad political accountability in order to make governments more responsive to the discipline of market forces and correspondingly less responsive to popular-democratic forces and processes.’⁴⁰ The EU’s constitutionalization of crucial economic policies is therefore closely intertwined with its lack of democratic legitimacy, as constitutionalization means de-politicization, withdrawal from democratically legitimized institutions, and immunity from political correction.⁴¹

Although the question of the neoliberal nature of today’s EU is still vigorously debated among the academic community, there is little doubt that the kind of Europe that has emerged since the 1980s resembles much more the neoliberal ideal than the ‘social Europe’ imagined by the European Left during the long 1970s. For liberalizing trade and capital movement, marketizing public and welfare services, protecting and extending private property, and taking the control of monetary, economic, and social policies ‘out of the hands of national governments subject to democratic pressure’ were the priorities of neoliberal thinkers like Friedrich von Hayek.⁴²

In contrast, as this book shows, the ‘social Europe’ project formulated and promoted during the long 1970s by the western European Left—in particular, by social-democratic parties and trade unions—had intended to change the nature of European integration and cooperation and to use the EC as a tool to serve the interests of (lower- and middle-class) workers in Europe. This project favoured the redistribution of wealth, the regulation of markets, the democratization of the economy and of European institutions, upward harmonization of social and fiscal systems, the guarantee of full employment, economic and social planning with greater consideration for the environment, increased public spending to meet collective needs (in the sectors of health, education, housing, transport, etc.), greater control of investment, large companies, and multinational corporations, a

⁴⁰ Stephen Gill, ‘European Governance and New Constitutionalism: Economic and Monetary Union and Alternatives to Disciplinary Neoliberalism in Europe’, *New Political Economy* 3, no. 1 (March 1998): 5. See also Jean-Claude Barbier, ‘The Time Has Finally Come to Start Deconstitutionalizing the EU’, May 2020, <https://jesp.eu/2020/05/18/the-time-has-finally-come-to-start-deconstitutionalizing-the-eu/>.

⁴¹ Dieter Grimm, ‘The Democratic Costs of Constitutionalisation: The European Case’, *European Law Journal* 21, no. 4 (2015): 460–73.

⁴² Perry Anderson, *The New Old World* (London: Verso Books, 2009), 32; see also Quinn Slobodian, *Globalists: The End of Empire and the Birth of Neoliberalism* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2018). On the academic debate regarding the EU’s neoliberal nature, see Amandine Crespy and Pauline Ravinet, ‘Les Avatars du néo-libéralisme dans la fabrique des politiques européennes’, *Gouvernement et action publique* 2, no. 2 (July 2014): 9–29.

reduction in working time, and a fairer international economic order favouring the global South. It was a project for a completely different Europe than the one we actually inhabit today. Some ingredients of this project did leave their mark on today's Europe, as in the case of directives regarding collective redundancies, information and consultation of workers, working time, gender equality, health and safety at work, and the Charter of Fundamental Rights. Overall, however, the 'social Europe' project, just like the 'neomercantilist' project, has been superseded by the neoliberal one or, at the very least, by a form of 'embedded neoliberalism'.⁴³ Was this bound to happen?

Reasons for the Defeat

It is a core argument of this book that the defeat of 'social Europe' and the present state of the EU was not a foregone conclusion. Although the kind of western European unity that emerged after the Second World War was essentially an instrument for the stabilization of capitalism and was part and parcel of the affirmation of a new world order governed by the US, and although the Treaty of Rome establishing the EEC in 1957 was largely inspired by liberal precepts, until the 1970s many roads were still open. There was, in the first postwar decades of European integration, a real margin of manoeuvre to shift the European treaties and institutions in one way or another, including in a way compatible with a left-wing agenda. The road taken by European integration after the long 1970s was the result of a decade-long political and social conflict that opposed different social forces, and which took place in part at the European (Community) level.

Indeed, the long 1970s—which stretched roughly from 1968 to 1985—were a defining historical moment for European integration. During the pivotal years following 1968, deeply marked by the rise of labour militance, new social movements and the 'New Left', the intensification of the level of social conflict, the disintegration of the 'postwar compromise', and economic crisis, a window of opportunity opened in which the European integration project and the broader world order could have taken many different directions. One possible direction was in line with the 'social Europe' vision, which would have required a new, extended, Europe-wide social-democratic consensus 'challenging the principles of the capitalist system which is based on the profitability of privately owned

⁴³ My assessment in this respect is more stringent than the recent work by Laurent Warloutet, *Governing Europe in a Globalizing World: Neoliberalism and Its Alternatives Following the 1973 Oil Crisis* (London: Routledge, 2018). On 'embedded neoliberalism', see Bastiaan van Apeldoorn, 'Transnationalization and the Restructuring of Europe's Socioeconomic Order: Social Forces in the Construction of "Embedded Neoliberalism"', *International Journal of Political Economy* 28, no. 1 (April 1998): 12–53.

capital.⁴⁴ During those years, an intense political struggle took place at the local, national, European, and global levels. At a time when the Third World movement was promoting a fairer NIEO project, when left-wing forces—socialist parties, trade unions, and strands of western European communism—dominated the EC and started to organize increasingly at the transnational level to defend a model of Europe in line with the interests of the lower classes, it seemed like a loose coalition of ‘progressive’ forces could win on the European battleground. On the other side, an increasingly transnationalized production and finance capitalist elite, although heterogeneous, defended its own interests against the declining rates of profits and the economic recessions of the 1970s and early 1980s through either a ‘Europeanist’ mercantilist or a ‘globalist’ neoliberal vision of Europe.⁴⁵ This was fundamentally a battle over the distribution of wealth and power across countries and classes. The defeat of ‘social Europe’ was a result of the shifting balance of power towards capital at the expense of labour and was critical in shaping the present European and world order.

Analysing the reasons for this defeat is therefore not only crucial to understanding how we got here, but also to contribute, from a historical perspective, to the current debate on possible European and global prospects. There were many, complex reasons why the ‘social Europe’ road was not taken. Some have already been well researched and evidenced by the literature. There were in part, undeniably, structural and institutional incentives that favoured a market-oriented Europe. The fact that most social and fiscal policy issues remained excluded from EC competences—or in any case, were subject to a unanimity vote in the Council—and the peculiar institutional decision-making process of the EC/EU meant that ‘negative integration’—that is, EU-wide economic deregulation and liberalization—was structurally, institutionally, and politically easier than ‘positive integration’ involving market regulation, fiscal and social directives, redistributive policies, etc.⁴⁶ The wide divergences in the substance, institutions, and politics of social policy across the EU also mattered; a variety of ‘welfare capitalism’ that complexified with the different rounds of European enlargement made harmonization more and more difficult, and pitted workers and welfare regimes against each other.⁴⁷

This book unveils another part of the story. Its contention is that the strategic failure of the European Left to win its ‘social Europe’ project during the 1970s—when the balance of power was much more favourable to labour than it is

⁴⁴ Meidner, ‘Why Did the Swedish Model Fail?’, 218.

⁴⁵ Apeldoorn, ‘Transnationalization and the Restructuring of Europe’s Socioeconomic Order’.

⁴⁶ Fritz Scharpf, ‘The Asymmetry of European Integration, or Why the EU Cannot Be a “Social Market Economy”’, *Socio-Economic Review* 8, no. 2 (2010): 211–50.

⁴⁷ See the seminal work by Gosta Esping-Andersen, *The Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1990).

today and when the framework of European socio-economic governance was more malleable—was even more decisive.

Internal divisions between the forces of the European Left regarding European policy and regarding an alternative socialist strategy to oppose rising neoliberal ideas were wide ranging and tenacious. Ideological, political, strategic, and structural differences divided European socialist parties, just like European trade unions.⁴⁸ Despite some efforts to increase cooperation between unions and parties at European level throughout the 1970s, divisions remained constant. The structures charged with ensuring their international and European coordination—the Socialist International, the CSPEC, the ETUC especially—remained relatively weak in their capabilities, under-resourced and essentially non-binding in their decisions throughout the period. Notwithstanding the efforts of some federalist socialist leaders like Mansholt and Vredeling, there was little political will to turn these structures into anything like a supranational party or union structure, and the necessity to reach compromises between their national components often paralysed formal cooperation.

At the peak of their prestige and power in the 1970s, the difficulties of the different European socialist parties in agreeing on concrete proposals to put forward a common European socialist programme certainly worked against them. Within the CSPEC and the Socialist International—as even the press often noted—European party leaders were persistently divided.⁴⁹ Although there was broad convergence on generic themes (such as wealth redistribution, upward social harmonization, primacy of full employment, working time reduction, better control of multinationals, and more economic democracy), they diverged widely on important themes like the democratization and competences of EC institutions (for example, the powers of the EP and of the Commission), workers' control (self-management versus co-management, workers' funds, etc.), and the ways EC economies should be run—more or less economic planning, more or less capital control and control of multinational companies, extension of the public sector and nationalization, and so on.

The divergences that arose during the formulation of the 1973 'Theses for a Social Europe' in Bonn in 1973 or the difficulties in drafting a common electoral platform before the first election of the EP—for instance, regarding workers' control in enterprises—were cases in point. There were, to schematize, important

⁴⁸ Regarding differences between European trade unions in postwar decades, see, for instance, Michel Launay, *Le Syndicalisme en Europe* (Paris: Imprimerie nationale, 1990); on socialist and social-democratic parties, see Stephen Padgett and William E. Paterson, *A History of Social Democracy in Postwar Europe* (London; New York: Longman, 1991).

⁴⁹ For instance, 'Socialists: A House Divided', *Newsweek*, 9 February 1976; 'Nei PS europei riappare l'attrito tra Nord e Sud', *La Repubblica*, January 1979; 'Something in Common', *The Economist*, 20 January 1979; 'Europe: Pour un pluralisme accepté et vivant', *L'Unité*, 19 January 1979; 'Le Congrès des partis socialistes européens a été celui des "divergences escamotées"', *La Libre Belgique*, 14 January 1979.

divergences between some 'Southern' socialists like the French PS (which at the time was promoting self-management, economic planning from the regional to the European level, alliance with communists, etc.) and some 'Northern' social democrats like the German SPD (which advocated co-management, were more reluctant to talk about economic planning and nationalization, tended to reject alliances with communists, etc.). These divisions were exemplified in the tensions that surfaced in the mid-1970s between Mitterrand and Schmidt, and in the organization of conferences of the 'Socialists of Southern Europe' during the second half of the 1970s. But there were, above all, wide internal divisions between the rising 'radical' (anti-capitalist) left-wing currents of European socialism inspired by Marxist principles, to which much of the youth and the rank-and-file rallied and which promoted alternative economic strategies that wanted to push back private property, extend the public sector, and increase control over capital, and the 'mainstream' of European social democracy that then favoured a strengthened form of Keynesian welfare capitalism, not to mention its right-wing, social-liberal currents to which Schmidt and Callaghan belonged.

This is not to say, however, that European socialists did not make important efforts to coordinate and formulate a common European policy; on the contrary, as this book shows, the 1970s were a pioneering decade of 'Europeanization' for European socialist parties, which generally ended up finding compromise solutions to their divergences. The common guidelines prepared in view of the first election of the EP in the second half of the 1970s, for instance, tried to strike a balance between the 'radical' and 'mainstream' partisans by leaving open the possibility for more or less economic planning, nationalization, and so on in each country, while adopting shared proposals for a 'social Europe'. The trade unions also managed to overcome wide differences and adopt a common programme to go 'beyond Keynes' in the second half of the 1970s. But this was a slow and laborious process.

Under the façade, divisions perdured. To what extent should private investment be controlled by the states and the EC? Should the state or the EC nationalize resources, industries, and financial institutions? How should wealth distribution be carried out at the national and EC levels? Can a 'new socialism' be affirmed without breaking with capitalism? When discussing European economic, social, and employment policies, these were questions that arose over and over again in transnational socialist networks—for instance, in the SGEP. Although there were many points of convergence, the exact meaning and significance of central propositions such as 'economic planning', 'work sharing', 'investment control', 'democratization of the economy', 'redistribution of wealth', and 'new international economic order' remained under discussion throughout these years. Crucial questions were left unanswered, first among which was the question of capital freedom. Should the Treaty of Rome be revised in order to allow control of capital? It is rather telling, for instance, that during a discussion

of the SGEP on the definition of its proposals on employment in 1981 (the Salisch Report), vivid tensions still arose on these fundamental questions. Allan Rogers, a British Labour MEP and Vice-President of the EP, asserted: 'Control of capital on the scale necessary to revive economies, both on the points outlined in Salisch and in the way I would like, would seem to me to be against the concept of freedom of capital movement enshrined in the Treaty of Rome. So, a prerequisite of tackling unemployment would have to be reform of the institutions and the framework within which we operate.'⁵⁰ Most socialists, according to Rogers, agreed with this 'heretical request', but European socialists ended up supporting the acceleration of trade and capital liberalization a few years later with the Single Act and the subsequent treaties.

Actually, despite the official turn to reformist Europeanism of most parties, European socialists continued to diverge in their positions regarding the reinforcement of supranational competences for the EC. In January 1979, during their 10th Congress in Brussels when the Socialist Parties of the European Community meant to launch their campaign for the European elections, divergences were still obvious on the questions of increased powers for the EP and the Commission.⁵¹ In 1980, after a decade of coordinating efforts to put forward a project for a 'social Europe', the President of the SGEP still had to acknowledge that 'the most fundamental problem, and where the Group is deeply split, is that of building Europe itself'. Some wanted to see a stronger Community and the construction of a political Europe, and others aimed at the dilution of the EC.⁵² Fundamentally, European socialists continued to have different conceptions of what a 'social Europe' would be. Few of them—perhaps none of them—envisaged a European welfare state, a new 'supranational state' of the kind evoked by Samir Amin in the epigraph that introduced this book. Many agreed that European redistribution instruments (such as the ESF and the ERDF) should receive more resources, but there was no consensus on increasing the EC budget, and certainly not in proportions comparable to those of European member states. The 'European Social Budget' proposed by Brandt's administration and developed for a time by the European Commission in the early 1970s was not a proposal for a mutualization but for a monitored harmonization of the member states' social spending and policies. Meanwhile, calls for fiscal harmonization remained vague and did not result in strong proposals for a common fiscal policy, most probably because there was no consensus on the matter. But this book argues that these divergences did not impede the emergence of a broad 'social Europe' project: the European socialists' proposals, like those formulated by European trade unions, actually relied both on an intergovernmental

⁵⁰ HAEU, GSPE-071-EN-05, 'Letter to Heinke Salisch by Allan Rogers elaborating the points made by Rogers to the Socialist Group on 3 June 1981', 8 June 1981.

⁵¹ HAEU, GSPE-0713.

⁵² HAEU, GSPE-069-EN, pp. 177–8, PE/GS/208/80 'Updating the Group's strategy', by Ernest Glinne, 25 August 1980, here p. 179.

coordination of member states' socio-economic policies and on increased competences of the EC (and other international structures) in a few strategic fields (such as control of multinational companies) where it was deemed appropriate. 'Social Europe' relied on multi-level cooperation, including but not limited to supranational solutions.

A key cause of the failure of the 'social Europe' project was the Left's incapacity to build a broad alliance at European level. The EP, growing in its power, was regarded by many on the Left as one possible platform where such an alliance could come into play. Although they agreed that an alliance was necessary, however, socialist parties continued to disagree throughout the period on how to achieve it. Some, like the French socialists, favoured a union of the Left at EC level with the rising communists, especially the PCI, which at that time had also turned to the EC and engaged on the road to Eurocommunism, adopting a reformist strategy within the institutions of parliamentary democracy, including the European ones. Some instead rejected this solution and preferred to look right to 'democratic and progressive' forces among the Christian-democratic and liberal families. The leadership of the German SPD, especially its most right-wing figures like Schmidt, continued their opposition to any form of collaboration with communist forces; it actively worked to repress, internally, the *Jusos'* interest in western European communist forces, and in left-wing socialists of the British Labour Party, and French and Italian socialists, and even supported in West Germany the adoption of the *Radikalenernass*, a decree that discriminated against left-wing 'radicals' in their access to public services and that provoked indignation inside the European Left.⁵³ Despite the 1972 decision of the Socialist International to allow its members to decide freely on how to arrange their bilateral relations with communist forces, within European socialist networks (the Socialist International, the CSPEC, and the SGEP), the question remained intensely debated throughout the decade; it created stark tensions at the Helsingør Summit of socialist party leaders in 1976, which took place just a few days before the PS's 'Southern European' conference.⁵⁴ Towards the late 1970s, Mitterrand's idea of a European alliance including socialists and communists seemed to lose ground. The laborious efforts of European socialists to draft a common electoral manifesto in 1977–9 contributed to pulling to pieces the *union de la gauche* in France, which in turn favored a revived hostility of French communists towards the EC and, together with the progressive demise of Eurocommunism, made the possibility of

⁵³ John T. Callaghan, *The Retreat of Social Democracy* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2000), 74–9; in general, see Gerard Braunthal, *The German Social Democrats since 1969: A Party in Power and Opposition* (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1994).

⁵⁴ IISH, SI-348, 'Party Leaders' Conferences, Elsinore (Denmark), 19 January 1976, press cuttings'. See Michele Di Donato, 'The Cold War and Socialist Identity: The Socialist International and the Italian "Communist Question" in the 1970s', *Contemporary European History* 24, no. 2 (May 2015): 193–211.

a victorious left-wing alliance at EC level even less probable. By the early 1980s, socialists in the EP were clearly tacking their alliance strategy further to the right.⁵⁵

The same difficulties faced European trade unionism. Within the ETUC, some unions—first among which was the German DGB—were ferociously opposed to an alliance with communist unions. Aside from the Italian CGIL (which benefited in the 1970s from its alliance with the two other important Italian unions, CISL and UIL, themselves members of ETUC), the other communist unions' persistent demands to join the ETUC were tirelessly obstructed until the 1990s, after the fall of the Soviet Union. The Spanish CCOO was only granted membership in 1991, the Portuguese CGTP in 1995, and the French CGT not until 1999. The archives reveal, for instance, the commitment of Heinz Oskar Vetter, President of the DGB and of the ETUC during the 1970s, to sabotage the entry of the French CGT into the organization and its alliance with the European mobilizations for a 'workers' Europe'.⁵⁶

The British Labour Party's position regarding the EC also put obstacles in the way of a 'social Europe'. The prospect of the UK's accession had represented one of the main hopes of European socialists to push the EC to the left in the early 1970s. The party's decision to 'boycott' European institutions until the 1975 referendum, then to stay away from the preparation of the European socialist programme in the following years, obviously weakened the socialist front. In the early 1980s, after losing the election to Margaret Thatcher, Labour returned to its hostile position regarding the EC, thus disavowing the feasibility of the 'social Europe' project.⁵⁷ The same was true of the TUC's boycott of European institutions, although it is remarkable that the British labour movement's hard line regarding the Common Market helped to encourage the ETUC to adopt a more radical and combative stance towards European institutions and policies in the second half of the 1970s.

Aside from internal divisions and an inefficient alliance strategy, European socialists mostly lacked the strategic skills to impose their agenda at the European level. At the time, business lobbying of European institutions was burgeoning.⁵⁸ Employers showed themselves to be increasingly hostile to the kinds of policies that constituted the 'social Europe' put forward by European socialists and trade

⁵⁵ HAEU, GSPE-069-EN, 'Updating the Group's strategy', by Ernest Glinne, 25 August 1980.

⁵⁶ ACFDT, CH/8/1833, 'Réunion du Comité exécutif de la CES 9 et 10 février 1978: Informations et suites à donner', 15 February 1978; ACFDT, CH/8/1833, 'Réunion du Comité exécutif de la CES 13–14 avril 1978', 20 April 1978.

⁵⁷ See Erin Delaney, 'The Labour Party's Changing Relationship to Europe: The Expansion of European Social Policy', *Journal of European Integration History* 8 (January 2002): 121–38.

⁵⁸ Sylvain Laurens, *Lobbyists and Bureaucrats in Brussels: Capitalism's Brokers* (Abingdon; New York: Routledge, 2017); Svein S. Andersen and Kjell A. Eliassen, 'European Community Lobbying', *European Journal of Political Research* 20, no. 2 (1991): 173–87; Sonia Mazey and Jeremy Richardson, eds., *Lobbying in the European Community* (Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press, 1993).

unions alike. They developed very efficient arguments that aimed to twist the unemployment problem to their advantage—in short, informing and consulting workers, like working-time reduction, like social contributions, would destroy employment whereas fiscal relief to firms and more flexible dismissal would create it. Business circles were able to lobby not only the Commission, Council, and EP, but also at national party level, in order to get parties to boycott the directive in the EP. The discussions on the Vredeling Directive at the dawn of the 1980s saw the unleashing of the most expensive and intensive lobbying campaign in the EP's history until that time. Since the 1960s, in the wake of increasing 'globalization', European trade unions had intended to constitute a 'counterpower' to multi-nationals (and capital) at EC level.⁵⁹ However, they proved unable to compete with the intense and multi-level lobbying efforts of business circles—and so did the socialists.

Within the (then barely consultative) EP, socialists were constantly trying to set priorities and to make their work more efficient, but with limited results. The SGEP, by its own reckoning, suffered from absenteeism; a lack of discipline in voting behaviour; an inability to exert pressure on socialist groups in national assemblies; a lack of initiative and a tendency to follow the political lead given by the other groups; a tendency to split up into national subgroups, each with its own distinctive policies; and a tendency to overload agendas with relatively minor items and procedural matters, leaving little time for the most important political debate.⁶⁰ The dire consequences of this poor level of organization were demonstrated when the Vredeling Directive was torpedoed in the EP. Throughout the decade, the SGEP failed to take advantage of its political prominence and to pass resolutions on any of the main objectives of the socialists' project for a 'social Europe'.

At the same time, socialists and social democrats who participated in governments during these years failed to really push 'social Europe' proposals and to back European trade unions' demands in the Council. During the first half of the 1970s, Brandt's personal activism in convincing his European counterparts of the need to invest in a 'European social union' had been determining for the EC leaders' commitment to enhance the social dimension of their cooperation. It had opened the way to the adoption of the SAP and thus to a series of measures and directives in social policy in the following years. During the second half of the 1970s, in contrast, political will was lacking in the Council. EC governments (including socialist-led governments) abandoned, for instance, their commitment

⁵⁹ Udo Rehfeldt, 'Les Stratégies syndicales européennes', in *Le Syndicalisme dans la mondialisation*, ed. Annie Fouquet, Udo Rehfeldt, and Serge Le Roux (Paris: Éditions de l'Atelier, 2000), 77–86.

⁶⁰ HAEU, GSPE-069-EN, 'Programme and activities of the SG in the EP (proposals from the Italian members of the Group)', 5 June 1980 and 'Contribution to the discussion on the operation of the SGEP by the Dutch members', 5 June 1980; HAEU, GSPE-069-EN, 'Note: Paper on the position of the Socialist Group in the EP', by Rudi Arndt, 25 August 1980.

to draft a second SAP and refused to abide by the trade unions' demands to give binding force to the decisions of the Tripartite Conferences. By the time the socialists came to power in France and put new proposals for a 'social Europe' on the table, the Left had lost its majority at the Council table. Mitterrand's proposals were politely ignored—including by Schmidt, who had never embraced his predecessor's 'social union' project. The need to ensure unanimity in the Council certainly stood in the way of progress towards a market-disciplining, redistributive Europe. But had the German, UK, and French governments pushed with determination for a 'social' agenda during the second half of the 1970s, things might have taken another direction.

The role of the German social-democratic government, not just in determining the fate of 'social Europe', but in placing Europe and the international economic order on the austerity and free-market road after 1974, should not be underrated. Schmidt was a key supporter of the birth of the G7, which institutionalized international summitry of the Western world's (initially five then) seven most industrialized countries to rewrite the rules of the international economy—a framework that excluded less developed countries and minor partners in Europe, and in which socialists were a minority. In the G7 as in the European Council, he insisted that overcoming inflation should be the top priority in order to deal with the crisis, he pleaded for the removal of obstacles to capital mobility and for flexible currencies subject to market and investors' pressures, and he maintained that governments should renounce their prerogatives in the monetary field, which should be handed over to 'independent' authorities like the central banks. Schmidt in fact contributed to committing not just the EMS but the US itself to monetary discipline (that is, the 'Volcker shock') in 1979. He also pushed to make intervention by the IMF to grant credits to countries facing particularly serious financial crises—like Italy and the UK in 1976—conditional upon the adoption of anti-inflationary policies and austerity measures. Unlike Brandt, Schmidt was hostile to the global South's claims for a fairer international economic order and for economic self-determination, and considered instead that 'G77' countries should only receive Western development aid if they abided by the IMF's recommendations and opened themselves up to the flow of international private capital. In short, against the interventionist and expansionary responses envisaged at the time by most of the European Left, Germany's response to the crisis of the 1970s contributed to the 'disembedding' of the liberal international economic order.⁶¹ The German government also played a leading role in counter-acting a shift to the left of southern European countries—not least by insisting

⁶¹ Giovanni Bernardini, 'Helmut Schmidt, the "Renewal" of European Social Democracy, and the Roots of Neoliberal Globalization', in *Contesting Deregulation: Debates, Practices and Developments in the West since the 1970s*, ed. Knud Andresen and Stefan Müller (Oxford: Berghahn, 2017), 115–17; Julian Germann, 'German "Grand Strategy" and the Rise of Neoliberalism', *International Studies Quarterly* 58, no. 4 (2014): 706–16.

that international economic aid to Italy was conditional on the exclusion of the PCI from the Italian government.⁶²

The German Chancellor, like other right-wing social-democratic leaders, greatly contributed to the demise of an alternative macro-economic response of the European Left to the crisis of the 1970s that could have countered neoliberal solutions. Within European socialism, the 1970s witnessed a clear leftward tendency that was the result of the new thrust that came from the new social movements, renewed workers' militancy, and the radicalization of young people. This is not to deny that socialist (and communist) parties in part proved themselves uncomprehending of and disconnected from these new forms of contestation, but undeniably throughout the 1970s these parties tried to renew their ideological stances and channel some of this discontent and to attract new membership, particularly among the young, which in turn led to a shift in the internal balance and structure of the parties, to reconsideration of their commitment to the capitalist market economy, and to a clear (although uneven) radicalization to the left of their programmatic lines. The programme of the 'Union of the Left' in France and the AES in Britain are only the most blatant examples of this leftward trend; workplace democracy, workers' control over decisions and ownership, economic planning, nationalization of major industries and banks, working time reduction, and control of multinational corporations were some of its mainstays. But these strategies were not followed by the leaders of the main social-democratic and labour parties in government. By the second half of the 1970s, Schmidt and Callaghan were going the opposite way, adopting austerity policies, increasing pressure on workers, and praising wage moderation and workforce discipline. To the dilemma facing European socialists in the long 1970s—having to choose between abandoning the traditional social-democratic goals of full employment and higher public expenditure or supplanting the private accumulation of capital by far greater state control and workers' control—Schmidt answered that workers had to make sacrifices and public control had to be decreased. Although he was isolated in the socialist galaxy of the time, he would turn out to be a precursor of European socialism's acceptance of neoliberal solutions in the following decades.⁶³

The sincerity of European social democracy's commitment to challenge capitalism was one of the major issues, at both the national and European levels. As the social movements of the 'long 1968s' and the economic crisis had combined in delegitimizing the old 'postwar compromise' and in unmaking the historic

⁶² Antonio Varsori, 'Puerto Rico (1976): Le potenze occidentali e il problema comunista in Italia', *Ventesimo Secolo* 7, no. 16 (2008): 89–121; Antonio Varsori, 'Crisis and Stabilization in Southern Europe during the 1970s: Western Strategy, European Instruments', *Journal of European Integration History* 15, no. 1 (2009): 5–14; Duccio Basosi and Giovanni Bernardini, 'The Puerto Rico Summit of 1976 and the End of Eurocommunism', in *The Crisis of Détente in Europe*, ed. Leopoldo Nuti (New York; London: Routledge, 2008), 274–85.

⁶³ Bernardini, 'Helmut Schmidt, the "Renewal" of European Social Democracy, and the Roots of Neoliberal Globalization', 118–20.

social bloc that underpinned the Keynesian welfare state, mainstream social democrats were joining in the call for more public intervention and democratization of the economy. In line with this trend, by the mid-1970s the kind of ‘social Europe’ demanded by most of the European Left was attempting to reinforce, beyond the national level, labour’s weight in its historic struggle against capital. But as Ingo Schmidt has convincingly put it, ‘the alliance between people pursuing alternative economic policies as a transitional program to socialism and those using them as a marketing device for the Keynesian welfare state turned out as a major stumbling block when the time came to advance these policies against the emerging neoliberal bloc.’⁶⁴

Timing strategy also played a part in the failure of ‘social Europe’. By the time the emblematic proposals for the reduction of working time and for the information and consultation of workers in multinational companies arrived on the EC table, for instance, the social-democratic momentum was already in demise. Thatcher’s conservative government was now at the table, and several social-democratic governments had adopted austerity and liberal policy choices. By 1982 social democrats were out of power in West Germany too and by 1983 France had operated its economic ‘U-turn’. Reaganomics were spreading from the US. Until the mid-1970s, Keynesian ideas of economic management and regulation were still widespread and social mobilizations were peaking; the climate was auspicious for a ‘social Europe’. By the second half of the 1970s, the political and ideological climate was shifting; employers were well aware of this and used delaying techniques purposely to muddy the waters. Vredeling, one of the leading promoters of ‘social Europe’ within European institutions, only arrived at the European Commission in 1977. He first set his sights on working time reduction, before he presented his well-known directive on workers’ information and consultation in 1979. European trade unions had first focused on other international bodies like the United Nations before they identified the EC as the best framework to enforce binding legislation. The workers’ mobilizations organized by the ETUC in the late 1970s and early 1980s were certainly unprecedented attempts to take ‘social Europe’ to the streets, but they would perhaps have been more effective a few years earlier. Then, however, European trade unions and European socialists, not to mention the rest of the Left, had not structured a European organization able to make a difference.

Social Europe therefore arrived too late, or rather too slowly, on the EC’s agenda. After the Bonn ‘Theses for a Social Europe’ and the adoption of the SAP in 1973–4, socialist parties set highly ambitious projects for a socialist Europe but failed to act on them. This is in part because they spent so much time trying to agree on the concrete terms of their broad socialist Europe design and in part

⁶⁴ Ingo Schmidt, ‘There Were Alternatives: Lessons from Efforts to Advance beyond Keynesian and Neoliberal Economic Policies in the 1970s’, *WorkingUSA* 14, no. 4 (December 2011): 480–1.

because they were divided on the best strategy to adopt. It is also because they waited to see the outcomes of the ‘Eurocorporatist’ attempt launched between 1974 and 1978. The idea of sealing a ‘new social contract’ between social partners, member states, and European institutions had at first seduced some moderate social democrats. They had thought that in this way a sort of ‘Euro-Keynesian’ compromise could arise in line with their principles. Instead, their proposals gradually lost ground and the window of opportunity opened for a social Europe and for a NIEO a decade earlier was definitively closed during the 1980s.⁶⁵

As much as internal divisions and strategic flaws of European socialists and trade unions, the defeat of ‘social Europe’ was the consequence of the waning of the postwar ‘golden age’ of social democracy, at the level both of western European governments and of EC institutions, to the benefit of the liberal and conservative Right. Whereas social democrats had dominated EC member states in the mid-1970s, by the end of the decade this was no longer true; they also came out of the first direct elections to the EP in 1979 at a disadvantage. Although they were still numerically the largest group, they were proportionally weaker than before and were dominated by a right-wing liberal-conservative axis. The defeat of ‘social Europe’ was also prompted by the increasing popularity of ‘neoliberal’ solutions amongst right-wing actors and business circles. In the late 1970s, European leaders were starting to adopt policies that ran contrary to the alternative socialist Europe imagined by European socialists during the previous years. Fiscal prudence, budgetary cuts, and deflationary policies took the lead, and the policies of increased public spending, reflationary policies geared to the satisfaction of collective needs, increased state intervention in economic and social policies, investment control, and so on, were dismissed. So were the projects of fiscal redistribution within the EC. The new EMS, created in 1979, was a case in point.

The rising neoliberal doctrines advocated dismantling the welfare state, decreasing public spending and insulating market forces, attacking the powers of the trade unions, and ‘flexibilizing’ labour.⁶⁶ Neoliberal restructuring—through deindustrialization, relocations, reduction of the public sector, reduced job security, growing unemployment, an explosion of the shareholding company model, and so on—encouraged a fragmentation of the workforce and weakened trade unions. The transnationalization of production and finance greatly increased capitalist power, making it easier to play workers off against each other. Under

⁶⁵ Nils Gilman, ‘The New International Economic Order: A Reintroduction’, *Humanity Journal* 6, no. 1 (March 2015): 1–16; Jeffrey Cason, ‘Whatever Happened to the New International Economic Order?’, in *Ethics in International Affairs: Theories and Cases*, ed. Andrew Valls (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 2000), 201–13.

⁶⁶ See, in particular, Slobodian, *Globalists*; David Harvey, *A Brief History of Neoliberalism* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005); Daniel Stedman Jones, *Masters of the Universe: Hayek, Friedman, and the Birth of Neoliberal Politics* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2012); Philip Mirowski and Dieter Plehwe, eds., *The Road from Mont Pèlerin: The Making of the Neoliberal Thought Collective* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2009).

these increasing pressures, the power balance was shifting; the waves of contestation that had challenged the postwar 'order' in the 'long 1968' (and had fuelled 'social Europe') were tamed. European trade unions accepted collaboration with governments at national and European levels to safeguard the competitiveness of European economies in the global market, in a desperate attempt to preserve employment.⁶⁷ European socialists and trade unions adopted defensive struggles against losses of jobs, wages, and benefits. The demands for wealth and power redistribution on a European and global scale that had underpinned 'social Europe' in the 1970s gradually waned.

Finally, and most importantly, a key reason for the defeat of 'social Europe' was the incapacity of the European Left to build a true transnational mobilization involving the grassroots to support their ambitions for radical change at European level. Yet, such mobilization would have been—and still would be—absolutely necessary to invert the balance of power in favour of labour and to gear up European integration and governance for a left-wing agenda. It is significant that aside from a gathering under the Eiffel Tower a few days before the first elections to the EP, socialist parties never even considered mobilizing on their European project in those years. Throughout the long 1970s, European policy remained a top party-leader matter, and a remote concern for militants and medium and lower executives of socialist (as well as of communist) parties. This is not to say that the 'social Europe' project was completely disconnected from popular thrust; as we have seen, it was formulated by the elites of the European Left partly in an attempt to respond to (and to channel) the demands that emerged from the very vivid and diverse foyers of social contestation of the 'long 1970s'. At the same time, this evolution of the 'Old Left' and their social Europe project can be at least partly interpreted as an attempt to reassert their authority over their constituencies, in a rather 'paternalistic', top-down way and without ever trying to trigger widely mobilized popular support for their European project. Whereas the 'Old Left' had never managed to truly intercept the new social movements, its gradual loss of support from the working classes to the advantage of white-collar employees, which had worsened by the 1980s, would only make the prospects for such popular support for an alternative socialist Europe more remote.

Things were a little different on the trade union front, where, as discussed in the last chapter of this book, there was a real intent to build a transnational workers' movement to support a 'social Europe' project during the late 1970s and early 1980s. In particular, the European Action Day and Action Week organized in 1978 and 1979 by the ETUC were certainly great innovations in the history of workers' mobilization in Europe and witnessed a particularly incisive phase of activism for the European trade unions. But did western European trade union

⁶⁷ Anne Dufresne, 'Le Salaire, au cœur de l'eurosyndicalisme?', *Politique européenne*, no. 27 (July 2009): 47–74.

leaders really fight ‘tooth and nail’ for a workers’ Europe when they were calling on their members to mobilize *en masse* in 1978 and 1979? This is doubtful. According to US diplomatic cables, at the Munich Congress, while Georges Debunne (FGTB) insisted on the adoption of ‘35 hours’ as a common slogan for all trade unions in Europe, several trade unions, particularly in the Nordic countries, were reluctant, arguing that it was necessary to remain flexible in their demands. Moreover, several northern trade union leaders reportedly told the US Labour Attaché to the EC, in private conversations on the side-lines of the Congress, that they had doubts about the appropriateness and realism of a reduction in working time.⁶⁸ Besides, despite the announcements of the Munich Congress, the trade unions within the ETUC have never been able to call for truly coordinated European general strikes. The week of mobilization in November 1979, which saw the participation of millions of workers throughout Europe, was certainly an important effort to build a European trade union movement, but again the proposal to organize a coordinated strike across Europe was rejected by a majority of unions in the ETUC Executive Committee.⁶⁹

Besides, despite its attempt to launch a more active trade unionism with a number of demonstrations in the late 1970s, the ETUC remained unable not only to inform and mobilize workers, but also to truly connect with national trade unions in support of some of their main European struggles. In a pamphlet on the fate of the Vredeling Directive tellingly titled ‘Hush! Don’t Tell the Workers’, a group of left-wing members of the EP sarcastically deplored that:

The secretariat of the European Trade Union Confederation followed the events closely, maintained a critical stance throughout, and lobbied and informed members of the European Parliament. But it seems not to have seen it as its task to mobilise unions and workers throughout the Community in support of the Vredeling directive. National unions were not well informed, and most of them paid little attention to what was happening at the European level. They also made little or no effort to inform or mobilise the rank and file: not untypical is the case of a Danish trade unionist, working in a major multinational, who first heard of the struggle around the Vredeling text by chance, during a visit to Brussels [...] in May 1983.⁷⁰

⁶⁸ US Embassy, Brussels, ‘ETUC Congress May 14–18: a more militant posture on reducing working time’, 22 May 1979, Wikileaks cable 1979BRUSSE09335_e, available at https://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/1979BRUSSE09335_e.html.

⁶⁹ AFO, box CES-1/4, ‘Circulaire : Semaine d’action européenne 24–30 novembre 1979’, 6 November 1979. FO had advocated a one-hour work stoppage throughout Europe, but the proposal did not win majority support.

⁷⁰ IISH, ETUC-2202, ‘Hush! Don’t Tell the Workers’, *Agenor*, 90 (May–June 1983). See also Petrini, ‘Demanding Democracy in the Workplace’.

Although it has played a crucial role in developing common positions and creating a common trade union culture—thus contributing to the ‘Europeanization’ of European trade unionism—the ETUC has remained to this day a body of representation within the institutions rather than of struggle. Historically, in contrast to socialist parties and trade unions at the local and national levels, European-level socialist and trade union structures did not emerge from a popular push. They resulted from decisions of elite party and union leaders, remained distant from mass movements, and were therefore limited in their power and influence. Contrary to expectations at the end of the 1970s, due to a lack of political will on the part of most of the national confederations that make up the ETUC, and lacking resources, it has always remained a colossus with feet of clay. The European Left never succeeded in building the unitary and combative bloc that would have been necessary in order to build a *rapport de force* sufficient to impose an alternative Europe—antithetical to the neoliberal point of view—compatible with social and climate justice and the redistribution of power and wealth at the global, European, national, regional, and local levels, but also between genders, races, and classes. Had it been able to do so, we would perhaps be living in a very different Europe today.

In short, just as postwar European integration was predominantly an elite-driven process, ‘social Europe’ itself remained to a large extent a project formulated and promoted largely by political and technocratic elites, top party leaders, and European technocrats. The incapacity of the advocates of ‘social Europe’ to build organic connection with the rank-and-file, with their supporters, and with grassroots movements, and to build widespread transnational popular support for an alternative project is not only the main reason why ‘social Europe’ failed; it is also a piece of the puzzle that allows a better grasp of the transformation of social democracy in Europe and the paradigm shift to neoliberal capitalism from the late 1970s onwards.

Bibliography

- Abdelal, Rawi. *Capital Rules: The Construction of Global Finance* (Cambridge, Mass.; London: Harvard University Press, 2007).
- Adesso, Maria Serena. 'Il consenso delle sinistre italiane all'integrazione europea (1950–1969)'. *Diacronie: Studi di storia contemporanea*, no. 9, 1 (January 2012). <https://doi.org/10.4000/diacronie.3068>.
- Alba, Lorenzo. 'Il "punto di flesso": Lotte operaie e contrattazione dal 1968 al 1973' (Bachelor thesis, Università degli studi di Firenze, 2010).
- Aldcroft, Derek Howard. *The European Economy 1914–2000*. 4th ed. (London; New York: Routledge, 2001).
- Aldrich, Richard J. *The Hidden Hand: Britain, America, and Cold War Secret Intelligence*. 1st ed. (Woodstock, NY: The Overlook Press, 2002).
- Amendola, Giorgio. *I comunisti e l'Europa*, Il Punto (Rome: Editori Riuniti, 1971).
- Amendola, Giorgio. *I comunisti e le elezioni europee* (Rome: Editori Riuniti, 1979).
- Amin, Samir. *Mémoires: L'éveil du Sud* (Paris: Indes savantes, 2015).
- Andersen, Svein S., and Kjell A. Eliassen. 'European Community Lobbying'. *European Journal of Political Research* 20, no. 2 (1991): 173–87.
- Anderson, Jeffrey J. 'Structural Funds and the Social Dimension of EU Policy: Springboard or Stumbling Block?' In *European Social Policy: Between Fragmentation and Integration*, edited by Stephan Leibfried and Paul Pierson (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 1995), 123–58.
- Anderson, Perry. *The New Old World* (London; New York: Verso, 2009).
- Andersson, Jenny. *The Library and the Workshop: Social Democracy and Capitalism in the Knowledge Age* (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 2010). <https://doi.org/10.2307/j.ctvqsdxkg>.
- Andersson, Jenny. 'Planning the Future of World Markets: The OECD's Interfuturs Project'. In *Planning in Cold War Europe: Competition, Cooperation, Circulations (1950s–1970s)*, edited by Michel Christian, Sandrine Kott, and Ondřej Matějka (Berlin: De Gruyter, 2018), 315–44. <https://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/hal-02931022>.
- Andry, Aurélie. 'Was There an Alternative? European Socialists Facing Capitalism in the Long 1970s'. *European Review of History/Revue européenne d'histoire* 26, no. 4 (July 2019): 723–46. <https://doi.org/10.1080/13507486.2019.1613345>.
- Andry, Aurélie, Emmanuel Mourlon-Druol, Haakon A. Ikonomou, and Quentin Jouan. 'Rethinking European Integration History in Light of Capitalism: The Case of the Long 1970s'. *European Review of History/Revue européenne d'histoire* 26, no. 4 (July 2019): 553–72. <https://doi.org/10.1080/13507486.2019.1610361>.
- Apeldoorn, Bastiaan van. 'Transnationalization and the Restructuring of Europe's Socioeconomic Order: Social Forces in the Construction of "Embedded Neoliberalism"'. *International Journal of Political Economy* 28, no. 1 (April 1998): 12–53.
- Apeldoorn, Bastiaan van. 'Transnational Class Agency and European Governance: The Case of the European Round Table of Industrialists'. *New Political Economy* 5, no. 2 (2000): 157–81.

- Apeldoorn, Bastiaan van. *Transnational Capitalism and the Struggle over European Integration* (London; New York: Routledge, 2002).
- Archibugi, Franco, Jacques Delors, and Stuart Holland. 'Planning for Development'. In *Beyond Capitalist Planning*, edited by Stuart Holland (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1978), 184–202.
- Arrighi, Giovanni. *The Long Twentieth Century: Money, Power, and the Origins of Our Times* (Verso, 2010).
- Aubourg, Valérie. 'Le Groupe de Bilderberg et l'intégration européenne jusqu'au milieu des années 1960'. In *Réseaux économiques et construction européenne*, edited by Michel Dumoulin (Brussels: PIE Peter Lang, 2004).
- Audier, Serge. *Néolibéralisme(s)* (Paris: Grasset, 2012).
- Bair, Jennifer. 'Taking Aim at the New International Economic Order'. In *The Road from Mont Pèlerin: The Making of the Neoliberal Thought Collective*, edited by Philip Mirowski and Dieter Plehwe (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2009), 347–85.
- Bair, Jennifer. 'Corporations at the United Nations: Echoes of the New International Economic Order?' *Humanity: An International Journal of Human Rights, Humanitarianism, and Development* 6, no. 1 (March 2015): 159–71. <https://doi.org/10.1353/hum.2015.0001>.
- Balampanidès, Giannès. *Eurocommunism: From the Communist to the Radical European Left* (Abingdon: Routledge, 2015).
- Balanyá, Belén. *Europe Inc.* (London: Pluto Press, 2000).
- Balestrini, Nanni. *Vogliamo tutto: Romanzo* (Rome: DeriveApprodi, 2004).
- Ballini, Pier Luigi, Sandro Guerrieri, and Antonio Varsori, eds. *Le istituzioni repubblicane dal centrismo al centro-sinistra, 1953–1968*, Studi storici (Rome: Carocci, 2006).
- Barbier, Jean-Claude. *The Road to Social Europe: A Contemporary Approach to Political Cultures and Diversity in Europe* (Abingdon; New York: Routledge, 2013).
- Barbier, Jean-Claude. 'The Time Has Finally Come to Start Deconstitutionalizing the EU'. JESP European Social Policy Blog, May 2020. <https://jesp.eu/2020/05/18/the-time-has-finally-come-to-start-deconstitutionalizing-the-eu/>.
- Barnouin, Barbara. *The European Labour Movement and European Integration* (London: Frances Pinter, 1986).
- Basosi, Duccio, and Giovanni Bernardini. 'The Puerto Rico Summit of 1976 and the End of Eurocommunism'. In *The Crisis of Détente in Europe*, edited by Leopoldo Nuti (New York; London: Routledge, 2008), 274–85.
- Becherucci, Andrea. 'Prove di dialogo sociale: La CEE e le conferenze tripartite degli anni settanta'. In *Fra mercato comune e globalizzazione: Le forze sociali europee e la fine dell'età dell'oro*, edited by Ilaria Del Biondo, Lorenzo Mechi, and Francesco Petrini (Milan: FrancoAngeli, 2010), 179–202.
- Beckert, Sven. 'American Danger: United States Empire, Eurafrica, and the Territorialization of Industrial Capitalism, 1870–1950'. *American Historical Review* 122, no. 4 (October 2017): 1137–70. <https://doi.org/10.1093/ahr/122.4.1137>.
- Bell, D. S., and Byron Criddle. *The French Socialist Party: The Emergence of a Party of Government* (New York: Clarendon Press and Oxford University Press, 1988).
- Berger, Stefan. 'Social Democratic Trajectories in Modern Europe: One or Many Families?' In *The Future of European Social Democracy: Building the Good Society*, edited by Henning Meyer and Jonathan Rutherford (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012), 13–26. https://doi.org/10.1057/9780230355040_2.
- Berghahn, Volker Rolf. *The Americanisation of West German Industry 1945–1973* (Leamington Spa: Berg, 1986).
- Bergounioux, Alain. 'Socialisme français et social-démocratie européenne'. *Vingtième Siècle: Revue d'histoire*, no. 65 (January 2000): 97–108. <https://doi.org/10.2307/3770764>.

- Berman, Sheri. *The Primacy of Politics: Social Democracy and the Making of Europe's Twentieth Century* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006).
- Bernard, Mathias. *Les Années Mitterrand: Du changement socialiste au tournant libéral* (Paris: Éditions Belin, 2015).
- Bernardini, Giovanni. 'Helmut Schmidt, the "Renewal" of European Social Democracy, and the Roots of Neoliberal Globalization'. In *Contesting Deregulation: Debates, Practices and Developments in the West since the 1970s*, edited by Knud Andresen and Stefan Müller (Oxford: Berghahn, 2017), 111–24.
- Berstein, Serge, Pierre Milza, and J. L. Bianco, eds. *Les Années Mitterrand: Les années du changement (1981–1984)* (Paris: Perrin, 2001).
- Bessac-Vaure, Stève. 'L'idée européenne dans Esprit et Les Temps modernes: Penser ou construire l'Europe? Idéalisme intellectuel et refus du réalisme (1945–1954)'. *Siècles: Cahiers du Centre d'histoire «Espaces et Cultures»*, no. 41 (2015).
- Bibert, Alexandre. 'L'europanisation inattendue: La CGT et la CGIL devant l'intégration européenne (1950–1974)'. *Journal of European Integration History* 26, no. 1 (2020): 43–60. <https://doi.org/10.5771/0947-9511-2020-1-43>.
- Bieler, Andreas. *The Struggle for a Social Europe: Trade Unions and EMU in Times of Global Restructuring* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2006).
- Bieler, Andreas. 'Social Europe and the Eurozone Crisis: The Importance of the Balance of Class Power in Society'. In *Social Policy and the Euro Crisis: Quo Vadis Social Europe*, edited by Amandine Crespy and Georg Menz, Palgrave Studies in European Union Politics (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2015), 24–44. https://doi.org/10.1057/9781137473400_2.
- Bini, Elisabetta, Giuliano Garavini, and Federico Romero. *Oil Shock: The 1973 Crisis and Its Economic Legacy* (London; New York: I.B. Tauris & Co. Ltd, 2016).
- Birch, Jonah. 'The Many Lives of François Mitterrand'. *Jacobin*, August 2015. <https://www.jacobinmag.com/2015/08/francois-mitterrand-socialist-party-common-program-communist-pcf-1981-elections-austerity/>.
- Bitsch, Marie-Thérèse, ed. *Le Couple france-allemande et les institutions européennes: Une postérité pour le Plan Schuman?* (Brussels: Établissements Emile Bruylant, 2001).
- Bitumi, Alessandra. "'An Uplifting Tale of Europe": Jacques Delors and the Contradictory Quest for a European Social Model in the Age of Reagan'. *Journal of Transatlantic Studies* 16, no. 3 (July 2018): 203–21. <https://doi.org/10.1080/14794012.2018.1482709>.
- Bockman, Johanna. *Markets in the Name of Socialism: The Left-Wing Origins of Neoliberalism* (Redwood City, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 2011).
- Bonnin, Judith. *Les voyages de François Mitterrand: Le PS et le monde (1971–1981)*, Histoire (Rennes: Presses universitaires de Rennes, 2019). <http://books.openedition.org/pur/50889>.
- Bossuat, Gérard. *L'Europe occidentale à l'heure américaine: Le Plan Marshall et l'unité européenne (1945–1952)* (Brussels: Éditions Complexe, 1992).
- Bossuat, Gérard. 'Les Euro-Socialistes de la SFIO, réseaux et influence'. In *Inventer l'Europe: Histoire nouvelle des groupes d'influence et des acteurs de l'unité européenne*, edited by Georges Saunier and Gérard Bossuat (Brussels: Peter Lang, 2003), 409–29.
- Bossuat, Gérard. 'Le Projet d'union économique européenne'. In *Le 'Congrès de l'Europe' à La Haye (1948–2008)*, edited by Jean-Michel Guieu and Christophe Le Dréau (Brussels; New York: PIE Peter Lang, 2009), 321–36.
- Bouchet, Hubert. 'L'Arlésienne du social'. *Le Monde diplomatique*, July 1996. <https://www.monde-diplomatique.fr/1996/07/BOUCHET/5636>.
- Boyer, Robert, ed. *La Flexibilité du travail en Europe: Une étude comparative des transformations du rapport salarial dans sept pays de 1973 à 1985*, Economie Critique (Paris: La Découverte, 1986).

- Bracke, Maud. 'From the Atlantic to the Urals? Italian and French Communism and the Question of Europe, 1956–1973.' *Journal of European Integration History* 13, no. 2 (2007): 33–53.
- Brandt, Willy, and Michael Manley. *Global Challenge: From Crisis to Cooperation, Breaking the North–South Stalemate* (London: Pan, 1985). <https://trove.nla.gov.au/work/19166868>.
- Braunthal, Gerard. *The German Social Democrats since 1969: A Party in Power and Opposition* (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1994).
- Broad, Robert. *Labour's European Dilemmas: From Bevin to Blair* (New York: Springer, 2001).
- Bruun, Niklas, Klaus Lörcher, and Isabelle Schömann, eds. *The Lisbon Treaty and Social Europe* (London: Bloomsbury, 2012). <http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/gla/detail.action?docID=1772985>.
- Bussière, Eric, Vincent Dujardin, Michel Dumoulin, N. Piers Ludlow, W. J. C. Brouwer, Pierre Tilly, and Élisabeth Palmero, eds. *The European Commission, 1973–86: History and Memories of an Institution* (Luxembourg: Publications Office of the European Union, 2014).
- Bussière, Eric, Michel Dumoulin, and Sylvain Schirmann, eds. *Europe organisée, Europe du libre-échange? Fin XIXe siècle–années 1960* (Brussels: PIE Peter Lang, 2006).
- Bussière, Eric, and Emilie Willaert, eds. *Un projet pour l'Europe: Georges Pompidou et la construction européenne* (Brussels; New York: PIE Peter Lang, 2010).
- Callaghan, John. 'Social Democracy in Transition.' *Parliamentary Affairs* 56, no. 1 (2003): 125–40.
- Callaghan, John T. *The Retreat of Social Democracy* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2000).
- Caporaso, James A., and Sidney Tarrow. 'Polanyi in Brussels: Supranational Institutions and the Transnational Embedding of Markets.' *International Organization* 63, no. 4 (October 2009): 593–620. <https://doi.org/10.1017/S0020818309990099>.
- Carew, Anthony. *Labour under the Marshall Plan: The Politics of Productivity and the Marketing of Management Science* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1987).
- Carew, Anthony. 'The Politics of Productivity and the Politics of Anti-Communism: American and European Labour in the Cold War.' In *The Cultural Cold War in Western Europe, 1945–60*, edited by Hans Krabbendam and Giles Scott-Smith (London: Routledge, 2004), 73–91.
- Carew, Anthony. *American Labour's Cold War Abroad: From Deep Freeze to Détente, 1945–1970* (Edmonton: Athabasca University Press, 2018).
- Cason, Jeffrey. 'Whatever Happened to the New International Economic Order?' In *Ethics in International Affairs: Theories and Cases*, edited by Andrew Valls (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 2000), 201–13.
- Cassen, Bernard. 'La Cohésion sociale sacrifiée à la monnaie.' *Le Monde diplomatique*, June 1995. <https://www.monde-diplomatique.fr/1995/06/CASSEN/6452>.
- Chassaigne, Philippe. *Les Années 1970: Fin d'un monde et origine de notre modernité* (Paris: Armand Colin, 2008).
- Christian, Michel. "'It Is Not a Question of Rigidly Planning Trade": UNCTAD and the Regulation of the International Trade in the 1970s.' In *Planning in Cold War Europe*, edited by Michel Christian, Sandrine Kott, and Ondřej Matějka (Munich: De Gruyter, 2018), 285–314. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/j.ctvbkjvbs.15>.
- Christian, Michel, Sandrine Kott, and Ondřej Matějka. 'Planning in Cold War Europe: Introduction.' In *Planning in Cold War Europe: Competition, Cooperation, Circulations (1950s–1970s)*, edited by Michel Christian, Sandrine Kott, and Ondřej Matějka (Berlin: De Gruyter, 2018), 1–18. <https://www.jstor.org/stable/j.ctvbkjvbs.3>.

- Ciampani, Andrea, ed. *L'altra via per l'Europa: Forze sociali e organizzazione degli interessi nell'integrazione europea (1947–1957)* (Milan: FrancoAngeli, 1995).
- Ciampani, Andrea. 'La politica sociale nel processo d'integrazione europea.' *Europa/Europe X*, no. 1 (2001): 120–34.
- Coffey, Peter, ed. *Economic Policies of the Common Market* (London: Macmillan, 1979).
- Cohen, Antonin. 'De la révolution nationale à l'Europe fédérale: Les Métamorphoses de la troisième voie aux origines du mouvement fédéraliste français: La Fédération (1943–1948)'. *Le Mouvement social*, no. 217 (2006): 53–72.
- Collignon, Stefan, and Daniela Schwarzer. *Private Sector Involvement in the Euro: The Power of Ideas* (Abingdon: Routledge, 2002).
- Communist and Allies Group of the European Parliament, ed. *I comunisti italiani e l'Europa: Dichiarazioni, documenti, interventi* (Luxembourg: Segretariato del Gruppo comunista e apparentati al PE, 1978).
- Comte, Emmanuel. *The History of the European Migration Regime: Germany's Strategic Hegemony*, Routledge Studies in Modern European History 47 (Abingdon; New York: Routledge, 2018).
- Constantin, Cornelia. "Great Friends": Creating Legacies, Networks and Policies that Perpetuate the Memory of the Fathers of Europe'. *International Politics* 48, no. 1 (January 2011): 112–28. <https://doi.org/10.1057/ip.2010.33>.
- Coppolaro, Lucia, and Lorenzo Mechi, eds. *Free Trade and Social Welfare in Europe: Explorations in the Long 20th Century* (Abingdon; New York: Routledge, 2020).
- Cours-Salies, Pierre, and René Mouriaux. *L'Unité syndicale en France: Impasses et chemins 1895–1995* (Paris: Éditions Syllepse, 1996).
- Cowles, Maria Green. 'Setting the Agenda for a New Europe: The ERT and EC 1992'. *JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies* 33, no. 4 (1995): 501–26.
- Craig, Paul, and Gráinne De Búrca, eds. *The Evolution of EU Law* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011).
- Crainz, Guido. *Il paese mancato: Dal miracolo economico agli anni ottanta* (Rome: Donzelli, 2003).
- Crespy, Amandine. *Welfare Markets in Europe* (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2017).
- Crespy, Amandine. *L'Europe sociale: Acteurs, politiques, débats* (Brussels: Éditions de l'Université de Bruxelles, 2019).
- Crespy, Amandine, and Georg Menz, eds. *Social Policy and the Eurocrisis: Quo Vadis Social Europe* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2015).
- Crespy, Amandine, and Pauline Ravinet. 'Les Avatars du néo-libéralisme dans la fabrique des politiques européennes'. *Gouvernement et action publique* 2, no. 2 (July 2014): 9–29.
- Crouch, Colin, and Alessandro Pizzorno. *The Resurgence of Class Conflict in Western Europe since 1968* (London: Macmillan, 1978).
- Daele, Jasmien van, ed. *ILO Histories: Essays on the International Labour Organization and Its Impact on the World during the Twentieth Century*, International and Comparative Social History, 1420–5297, vol. 12 (Bern; New York: Peter Lang, 2010).
- D'Agata, Raffaele. 'L"altra" distensione: Brandt, Berlinguer, e la ricerca di un nuovo ordine di pace negli anni '70'. *Contemporanea*, no. 2 (2002): 233–52.
- Danescu, Elena. *Pierre Werner and Europe* (Cham: Palgrave Macmillan, 2018).
- Danescu, Elena Rodica. 'Le «Comité Werner»: Nouvelles archives'. *Histoire, économie & société* 30e année, no. 4 (February 2012): 29–38.
- De La Porte, Caroline, and Elke Heins, eds. *The Sovereign Debt Crisis, the EU and Welfare State Reform* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2016).
- De Long, Bradford, and Barry Eichengreen. 'The Marshall Plan: History's Most Successful Structural Adjustment Program', NBER working paper series, 1991.

- De Spiegelaere, Stan, and Sigurt Vitols. 'A Better World with More Democracy at Work.' *Etui* (blog). Accessed 7 February 2022. <https://www.etui.org/news/better-world-more-democracy-work>.
- Debunne, Georges. *Les Syndicats et l'Europe: Passé et devenir* (Brussels: Éditions Labor, 1987).
- Degimbe, Jean. *La Politique sociale européenne: Du traité de Rome au traité d'Amsterdam* (Brussels: ISE, 1999).
- Degryse, Christophe, and Pierre Tilly. *1973–2013: 40 Years of History of the European Trade Union Confederation* (Brussels: ETUI, 2013).
- Dehousse, Fernand. 'Le Sommet de Paris.' *Chronique de politique étrangère* 25, no. 6 (November 1977): 741–54.
- Del Biondo, Iliaria. *L'Europa possibile: La CGT e la CGIL di fronte al processo di integrazione europeo, 1957–1973* (Rome: Ediesse, 2007).
- Delaney, Erin. 'The Labour Party's Changing Relationship to Europe: The Expansion of European Social Policy.' *Journal of European Integration History* 8 (January 2002): 121–38.
- Delors, Jacques. *Le Nouveau Concert européen* (Paris: Éditions Odile Jacob, 1992).
- Delors, Jacques, and Dominique Wolton. *L'unité d'un homme: Entretiens avec Dominique Wolton* (Paris: Éditions Odile Jacob, 1994).
- Denord, François. 'Néo-libéralisme et «économie sociale de marché»: Les Origines intellectuelles de la politique européenne de la concurrence (1930–1950)'. *Histoire, économie & société* 27, no. 1 (2008): 23. <https://doi.org/10.3917/hes.081.0023>.
- Denord, François, and Antoine Schwartz. *L'Europe sociale n'aura pas lieu* (Paris: Raisons d'agir, 2009).
- Denord, François, and Antoine Schwartz. 'L'économie (très) politique du traité de Rome.' *Politix*, no. 89 (April 2010): 35–56.
- Di Donato, Michele. 'Un socialismo per l'Europa del sud? Il PS di François Mitterrand e il coordinamento dei partiti socialisti dell'Europa meridionale.' In *Nazioni e narrazioni tra l'Italia e l'Europa*, edited by Michelangelo Di Giacomo, Annarita Gori, Tommaso Nencioni, and Gregorio Sorgonà (Rome: Aracne, 2013), 235–51.
- Di Donato, Michele. 'The Cold War and Socialist Identity: The Socialist International and the Italian "Communist Question" in the 1970s.' *Contemporary European History* 24, no. 2 (May 2015): 193–211.
- Di Donato, Michele. *I comunisti italiani e la sinistra europea: Il PCI e i rapporti con le socialdemocrazie (1964–1984)* (Rome: Carocci, 2015).
- Di Donato, Michele. 'Internazionalismo socialdemocratico e storia internazionale degli anni settanta.' *Ventesimo secolo*, no. 44 (2019): 11–37.
- Di Donato, Michele. 'Landslides, Shocks, and New Global Rules: The US and Western Europe in the New International History of the 1970s.' *Journal of Contemporary History* 55, no. 1 (January 2020): 182–205. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0022009419899230>.
- Di Maggio, Marco. *Alla ricerca della terza via al socialismo: I PC italiano e francese nella crisi del comunismo (1964–1984)* (Naples: Edizioni scientifiche italiane, 2014).
- Di Sarcina, Federica. *L'Europa delle donne: La politica di pari opportunità nella storia dell'integrazione europea, 1957–2007* (Bologna: Il Mulino, 2010).
- Didry, Claude, and Arnaud Mias. *Le Moment Delors: Les Syndicats au cœur de l'Europe sociale* (Brussels: Peter Lang, 2005).
- Drach, Alexis. 'Removing Obstacles to Integration: The European Way to Deregulation.' In *Financial Deregulation: A Historical Perspective*, edited by Alexis Drach and Youssef Cassis (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2021), 75–99.
- Drevet, Jean-François. *Histoire de la politique régionale de l'Union européenne* (Paris: Belin, 2008).

- Dreyfus, Michel. *L'Europe Des Socialistes* (Paris: Éditions complexe, 1991).
- Du Réau, Elisabeth. 'L'engagement européen.' In *Les Années Mitterrand: Les Années du changement, 1981–1984*, edited by Serge Bernstein, Pierre Milza, and J. L. Bianco (Paris: Perrin, 2001), 282–94.
- Dubois, Mathieu. *Les Conséquences économiques de mai 68* (Brussels: Peter Lang, 2018). <https://doi.org/10.3726/b14407>.
- Duchène, François. *Jean Monnet: The First Statesman of Interdependence*. 1st ed. (New York: Norton, 1994).
- Dufresne, Anne. 'Le Salaire, au cœur de l'eurosyndicalisme? Euro-Unionism and the Wage.' *Politique européenne*, no. 27 (July 2009): 47–74.
- Duhamel, Éric. *François Mitterrand: L'unité d'un homme* (Paris: Flammarion, 1998).
- Dulphy, Anne, and Christine Manigand. 'L'opinion publique française face à l'unification européenne: Approche quantifiée.' In *Europe des Élites? Europe des Peuples? La Construction de l'espace européen, 1945–1960*, edited by Elisabeth Du Réau (Paris: Presses de la Sorbonne nouvelle, 1998), 303–15.
- Dulphy, Anne, and Christine Manigand, eds. *Les Opinions publiques face à l'Europe communautaire: Entre cultures nationales et horizon européen* (Bern: Peter Lang, 2004).
- Dumoulin, Michel. *Réseaux économiques et construction européenne* (Brussels: Peter Lang, 2004).
- Dumoulin, Michel, and Marie-Thérèse Bitsch, eds. *The European Commission, 1958–72: History and Memories* (Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications of the European Communities, 2007).
- Dunphy, Richard. *Contesting Capitalism? Left Parties and European Integration* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2004).
- Durand, Cédric, ed. *En finir avec l'Europe* (Paris: La Fabrique, 2013).
- Ebbinghaus, Bernhard, and Jelle Visser. *Trade Unions in Western Europe since 1945*, Societies of Europe (London: New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2000).
- Eichengreen, Barry J. *The European Economy since 1945: Coordinated Capitalism and Beyond* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2006).
- Eklund, Hanna. 'National Margins of Discretion in the Court of Justice of the European Union's Adjudication of Fundamental Rights: Studies of Interconnectedness' (European University Institute, 2016).
- Eley, Geoff. *Forging Democracy: The History of the Left in Europe, 1850–2000* (Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press, 2002).
- Ellwood, David W. *Rebuilding Europe: Western Europe, America, and Postwar Reconstruction*, Postwar World (London: Longman, 1992).
- Erne, Roland. 'European Industrial Relations after the Crisis: A Postscript.' In *The European Union and Industrial Relations: New Procedures, New Context*, edited by Stijn Smismans (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2012), 225–35.
- Escalona, Fabien. *La Reconversion partisane de la social-démocratie européenne: Du régime social-démocrate keynésien au régime social-démocrate de marché* (Paris: Dalloz, 2018).
- Esping-Andersen, Gøsta. *The Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1990).
- European Parliament, ed. *I Comunisti al Parlamento europeo: Interventi dei parlamentari italiani del Gruppo comunista e apparentati nelle sedute del Parlamento europeo*, EDC Collection (Luxemburg: Segretariato del Gruppo comunista e apparentati, 1977).
- 'European Works Councils: An Experiment in Workplace Democracy which Remains More Relevant than Ever.' *EUROPP* (blog), October 2016. <https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/europpblog/2016/10/27/european-works-councils/>.

- 'Europe's Centre-Left Risks Irrelevance – Sheri Berman.' *Social Europe* (blog), February 2017. <https://www.socialeurope.eu/europes-centre-left-risks-irrelevance>.
- Favier, Pierre, and Michel Martin-Roland. *La Décennie Mitterrand* (Paris: Seuil, 1999).
- Featherstone, Kevin. *Socialist Parties and European Integration: A Comparative History* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1988).
- Feverstone, Kevin. 'The Greek Sovereign Debt Crisis and EMU: A Failing State in a Skewed Regime'. *JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies* 49, no. 2 (2011): 193–217. <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-5965.2010.02139.x>.
- Ferguson, Niall, ed. *The Shock of the Global: The 1970s in Perspective* (Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2010).
- Fertikh, Karim. 'Trois petits tours et puis s'en va...' *Sociétés contemporaines*, no. 81 (March 2011): 61–79.
- Fertikh, Karim. 'Le Congrès de Bad Godesberg: Contribution à une socio-histoire des programmes politiques' (Paris: Centre Maurice Halbwachs, 2012).
- Fertikh, Karim. 'La Construction d'un «droit social européen»'. *Politix* 115, no. 3 (December 2016): 201–24.
- Fertikh, Karim. 'A Weak Field of Social Policy? A Transnational Perspective on the EEC's Social Policymaking (from the 1940s to the 1970s)'. In *Charting Transnational Fields: Methodology for a Political Sociology of Knowledge*, edited by Stefan Bernhard and Christian Schmidt-Wellenburg (London; New York: Routledge, 2020), 178–95.
- Fetzer, Thomas. 'The Late Birth of Transnational Labour Cooperation: Cross-Border Trade Union Networks at Ford and General Motors (1953–2001)'. *Labour History Review* 75, no. 1 (2010): 76–97.
- Flandre, Christelle. *Socialisme ou social-démocratie? Regards croisés français allemands, 1971–1981* (Paris: L'Harmattan, 2007).
- Flora, Peter, and Arnold J. Heidenheimer, eds. *The Development of Welfare States in Europe and America* (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Books, 1981).
- Fouquet, Annie, Udo Rehfeldt, and Serge Le Roux, eds. *Le Syndicalisme dans la mondialisation* (Paris: Éditions de l'Atelier, 2000).
- Fraser, Nancy. *Fortunes of Feminism: From State-Managed Capitalism to Neoliberal Crisis* (London: Verso, 2013).
- Fredman, Sandra. 'Transformation or Dilution: Fundamental Rights in the EU Social Space'. *European Law Journal* 12, no. 1 (2006): 41–60.
- Fudge, Judy. 'Constitutionalizing Labour Rights in Canada and Europe: Freedom of Association, Collective Bargaining, and Strikes'. *Current Legal Problems* 68, no. 1 (2015): 267–305.
- Fulla, Mathieu. *Les Socialistes français et l'économie (1944–1981): Une histoire économique du politique* (Paris: Sciences Po Les Presses, 2016).
- Galante, Severino. *Il Partito comunista italiano e l'integrazione europea: Il decennio del rifiuto, 1947–1957* (Padua: Liviana, 1988).
- Garavini, Giuliano. 'Dal Nuovo ordine economico internazionale al Mercato unito: Evoluzione e involuzione della strategia economica internazionale dei socialisti Europei'. In *Fra mercato comune e globalizzazione: Le forze sociali europee e la fine dell'età dell'oro*, edited by Ilaria Del Biondo, Lorenzo Mechi, and Francesco Petrini (Milan: FrancoAngeli, 2010), 203–27.
- Garavini, Giuliano. *After Empires: European Integration, Decolonization, and the Challenge from the Global South, 1957–1985* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012).
- Garnier, Jean-Pierre, and Louis Janover. *La Deuxième Droite* (Marseille: Agone, 1986). <http://journals.openedition.org/lectures/11293>.

- Gehler, Michael, and Wilfried Loth, eds. *Reshaping Europe: Towards a Political, Economic and Monetary Union, 1984–1989* (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2020). <https://doi.org/10.5771/9783748907855>.
- Georgi, Frank. *L'autogestion en chantier: Les Gauches françaises et le "modèle" yougoslave (1948–1981)* (Nancy: Arbre bleu éditions, 2018).
- Georgi, Frank, and Lucia Bonfreschi. 'Nouvelles gauches et extrêmes gauches européennes à l'épreuve des années 1970: Périodisation, cultures politiques et circulations transnationales.' *Histoire@Politique*, no. 42 (2020).
- Germann, Julian. 'German "Grand Strategy" and the Rise of Neoliberalism.' *International Studies Quarterly* 58, no. 4 (2014): 706–16.
- Getachew, Adom. *Worldmaking after Empire: The Rise and Fall of Self-Determination* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2020).
- Geyer, Robert. *Exploring European Social Policy: An Explanation* (Malden, Mass.: Blackwell, 2000).
- Gfeller, Aurélie Élisabeth. 'Champion of Human Rights: The European Parliament and the Helsinki Process.' *Journal of Contemporary History* 49, no. 2 (2014): 390–409.
- Gfeller, Aurélie Élisabeth, Wilfried Loth, and Matthias Schulz. 'Democratizing Europe, Reaching out to the Citizen?' *Journal of European Integration History* 17, no. 1 (2011): 5–12.
- Gill, Stephen. 'European Governance and New Constitutionalism: Economic and Monetary Union and Alternatives to Disciplinary Neoliberalism in Europe.' *New Political Economy* 3, no. 1 (March 1998): 5–26. <https://doi.org/10.1080/13563469808406330>.
- Gilman, Nils. 'The New International Economic Order: A Reintroduction.' *Humanity Journal* 6, no. 1 (March 2015): 1–16.
- Gilpin, Robert. *The Political Economy of International Relations* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1987).
- Giubboni, Stefano. 'Freedom to Conduct a Business and EU Labour Law.' *European Constitutional Law Review* 14, no. 1 (March 2018): 172–90. <https://doi.org/10.1017/S157401961800007X>.
- Glyn, Andrew. *Capitalism Unleashed: Finance Globalization and Welfare* (Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press, 2006).
- Gobin, Corinne. 'La Confédération européenne des syndicats.' *Courrier hebdomadaire du CRISP* 1367–8, no. 22 (1992): 1–86.
- Gobin, Corinne. 'Construction européenne et syndicalisme européen: Un aperçu de trente-quatre ans d'histoire (1958–1991).' *La Revue de l'IREES*, no. 21 (1996): 119–51.
- Gobin, Corinne. 'Consultation et concertation sociales à l'échelle de la Communauté économique européenne: Étude des positions et stratégies de la Confédération européenne des syndicats (1958–1991)' (PhD thesis, Université libre de Bruxelles, 1996). http://www.academia.edu/download/35495937/THESECorinne_GOBINULB.pdf.
- Gobin, Corinne, and Dirk Buda. "'L'émergence des comités d'entreprise européens?": In *Quelle Union sociale européenne? Acquis institutionnel, acteurs et défis*, edited by Mario Telo (Brussels: Éditions de l'Université de Bruxelles, 1994), 273–95.
- Gold, Michael. 'Employee Participation in the EU: The Long and Winding Road to Legislation.' *Economic and Industrial Democracy* 31, no. 4S (2010): 9–23.
- Gook, Ben. 'Backdating German Neoliberalism: Ordoliberalism, the German Model and Economic Experiments in Eastern Germany after 1989.' *Journal of Sociology* 54, no. 1 (March 2018): 33–48. <https://doi.org/10.1177/1440783318759085>.
- Gourevitch, Peter. *Politics in Hard Times: Comparative Responses to International Economic Crises* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1986).

- Grahl, John, and Paul Teague. 'Reconstructing the Eurozone: The Role of EU Social Policy.' *Cambridge Journal of Economics* 37, no. 3 (May 2013): 677–92. <https://doi.org/10.1093/cje/bet011>.
- Grantham, John T. 'British Labour and the Hague "Congress of Europe": National Sovereignty Defended.' *Historical Journal* 24, no. 2 (June 1981): 443–52. <https://doi.org/10.1017/S0018246X00005562>.
- Gregarek, Rainer. 'Le Mirage de l'Europe sociale: Associations internationales de politique sociale au tournant du 20e siècle.' *Vingtième Siècle: Revue d'histoire* 48, no. 1 (1995): 103–18. <https://doi.org/10.3406/xxs.1995.4427>.
- Griffiths, Richard T., ed. *Socialist Parties and the Question of Europe in the 1950s*, Contributions to the History of Labour and Society 4 (Leiden; New York: E.J. Brill, 1993).
- Grimm, Dieter. 'The Democratic Costs of Constitutionalisation: The European Case.' *European Law Journal* 21, no. 4 (2015): 460–73. <https://doi.org/10.1111/eulj.12139>.
- Groux, Guy, René Mouriaux, and Jean-Marie Pernot. 'L'européanisation du mouvement syndical: La Confédération européenne des syndicats.' *Le Mouvement social*, no. 162 (1993): 41–67. <https://doi.org/10.2307/3779515>.
- Guasconi, Maria Eleonora. 'Paving the Way for a European Social Dialogue.' *Journal of European Integration History* 9, no. 1 (2003): 87–110.
- Guasconi, Maria Eleonora. *L'Europa tra continuità e cambiamento: Il vertice dell'Aja del 1969 e il rilancio della costruzione europea*, Storia Delle Relazioni Internazionali 8 (Florence: Polistampa, 2004).
- Guinan, Joe. 'Socialising Capital: Looking Back on the Meidner Plan.' *International Journal of Public Policy* 15 (January 2019): 38–58. <https://doi.org/10.1504/IJPP.2019.099049>.
- Haessler, Mathias. 'A "Cold War European"? Helmut Schmidt and European Integration, 1945–1982.' *Cold War History* 15, no. 4 (October 2015): 427–47. <https://doi.org/10.1080/14682745.2014.989841>.
- Hamilton, Geoffrey. 'Initiatives Undertaken by International Organisations in the Field of Employee Information and Consultation in Multinational Undertakings (ILO, OECD, UN)'. In *Employee Consultation and Information in Multinational Corporations*, edited by Jacques Vandamme (London: Croom Helm, 1986), 95–116.
- Hannah, Simon, and John McDonnell. *A Party with Socialists in It: A History of the Labour Left* (London: Pluto Press, 2018).
- Hansen, Peo, and Stefan Jonsson. *Eurafrica: The Untold History of European Integration and Colonialism* (London: Bloomsbury, 2014).
- Hantrais, Linda. *Social Policy in the European Union* (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1995).
- Harrison, Bennett. 'The International Movement for Prenotification of Plant Closures.' *Industrial Relations: A Journal of Economy and Society* 23, no. 3 (1984): 387–409.
- Harst, J. van der, ed. *Beyond the Customs Union: The European Community's Quest for Deepening, Widening and Completion, 1969–1975*, Publications du Groupe de liaison des historiens auprès de la Commission européenne, vol. 11 (Brussels: Bruylant, 2007).
- Harst, J. van der. 'Sicco Mansholt: Courage et conviction'. In *The European Commission, 1958–72: History and Memories*, edited by Michel Dumoulin and Marie-Thérèse Bitsch (Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications of the European Communities, 2007).
- Harvey, David. *A Brief History of Neoliberalism* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005).
- Hatzfeld, Hélène. 'Une révolution culturelle du Parti socialiste dans les années 1970?' *Vingtième Siècle: Revue d'histoire* 96, no. 4 (October 2007): 77–90.
- Hiepel, Claudia, ed. *Europe in a Globalising World: Global Challenges and European Responses in the 'Long' 1970s* (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2014).
- Hix, Simon, and Urs Lesse. *Shaping a Vision: A History of the Party of European Socialists, 1957–2002* (Brussels: Parti socialiste européen, 2002).

- Hobsbawm, Eric. *Age of Extremes: The Short Twentieth Century 1914–1991* (London: Michael Joseph, 1994).
- Hofmann, Arne. *The Emergence of Détente in Europe: Brandt, Kennedy and the Formation of Ostpolitik* (London; New York: Routledge, 2007).
- Hogan, Michael J. 'American Marshall Planners and the Search for a European Neocapitalism'. *American Historical Review* 90, no. 1 (1985): 44–72. <https://doi.org/10.1086/ahr/90.1.44>.
- Hogan, Michael J. *The Marshall Plan: America, Britain, and the Reconstruction of Western Europe, 1947–1952*. Fulcrum.Org (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, n.d.).
- Holland, Stuart. *The Socialist Challenge* (London: Quartet Books, 1975).
- Holland, Stuart, ed. *Beyond Capitalist Planning* (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1978).
- Holland, Stuart. *UnCommon Market: Capital, Class and Power in the European Community* (London: Macmillan, 1980).
- Holland, Stuart, ed. *Out of Crisis: An Alternative European Strategy*, European Socialist Thought, no. 11 (Nottingham: Spokesman, 1983).
- Holland, Stuart. 'Europe from the Left: From Delors to Guttes'. In *Europe for the Many*, edited by Tony Simpson (Nottingham: Spokesman, 2018), 7–37. <https://blackwells.co.uk/bookshop/product/Europe-for-the-Many-by-Tony-Simpson-editor-Bertrand-Russell-Peace-Foundation/9780851248776>.
- Höpner, Martin, and Armin Schäfer. 'Polanyi in Brussels? Embeddedness and the Three Dimensions of European Economic Integration'. MPIfG Discussion Paper, 2010. <https://www.econstor.eu/handle/10419/43291>.
- Horn, Gerd-Rainer. *The Spirit of '68: Rebellion in Western Europe and North America, 1956–1976* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007).
- I comunisti italiani e l'Europa: Atti del convegno promosso dal CESPE e dai gruppi parlamentari del PCI, Roma 23–25 Novembre 1971*, Quaderni Di Politica Ed Economia 3, n.d.
- Imlay, Talbot. *The Practice of Socialist Internationalism: European Socialists and International Politics, 1914–1960* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018).
- Imlay, Talbot C. "'The Policy of Social Democracy Is Self-Consciously Internationalist": The German Social Democratic Party's Internationalism after 1945'. *Journal of Modern History* 86, no. 1 (March 2014): 81–123. <https://doi.org/10.1086/674292>.
- Inglehart, Ronald. *The Silent Revolution: Changing Values and Political Styles among Western Publics* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1977).
- Jones, Daniel Stedman. *Masters of the Universe: Hayek, Friedman, and the Birth of Neoliberal Politics* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2012).
- Judt, Tony. *Postwar: A History of Europe since 1945* (London: William Heinemann, 2005).
- Kaal, H. G. J. 'Constructing a Socialist Constituency: The Social Democratic Language of Politics in the Netherlands, c.1890–1950'. 202, 2013. <http://repository.ubn.ru.nl/handle/2066/120154>.
- Kahn, Sylvain. 'La Place de la construction européenne dans la conquête puis la conservation du pouvoir par les socialistes français, 1966–1984'. *Les Cahiers européens de Sciences Po*, no. 1 (2012).
- Kaiser, Wolfram. *Christian Democracy and the Origins of European Union* (Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007).
- Kaiser, Wolfram, Brigitte Leucht, and Michael Gehler, eds. *Transnational Networks in Regional Integration: Governing Europe, 1945–83* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010).
- Kaiser, Wolfram, Brigitte Leucht, and Morten Rasmussen, eds. *The History of the European Union: Origins of a Trans- and Supranational Polity 1950–72* (New York; London: Routledge, 2009).

- Kaiser, Wolfram, and Peter Starie, eds. *Transnational European Union: Towards a Common Political Space*. Transnationalism (Abingdon: Routledge, 2005).
- Kaupa, Clemens. *The Pluralist Character of the European Economic Constitution* (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2016).
- Kipping, Matthias. 'André Philip et les origines de l'Union européenne'. In *André Philip, socialiste, patriote, chrétien*, edited by Christian Chevandier and Gilles Morin (Paris: Comité pour l'histoire économique et financière de la France, 2005), 387–403.
- Klaus Patel, Kiran. 'Widening and Deepening? Recent Advances in European Integration History'. *Neue Politische Literatur* 64, no. 2 (July 2019): 327–57. <https://doi.org/10.1007/s42520-019-00105-4>.
- Kleinman, Mark. *A European Welfare State? European Union Social Policy in Context* (Basingstoke; New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2001).
- Knudsen, Ann-Christina L. *Farmers on Welfare: The Making of Europe's Common Agricultural Policy* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2009).
- Knudsen, Herman. *Employee Participation in Europe* (London: SAGE, 1995).
- Kowalsky, Wolfgang. *Europäische Sozialpolitik: Ausgangsbedingungen, Antriebskräfte und Entwicklungspotentiale*, Grundlagen für Europa, Bd. 4 (Opladen: Leske + Budrich, 1999).
- Kowalsky, Wolfgang. *Focus on European Social Policy: Countering Europessimism* (Brussels: European Trade Union Institute, 2000).
- Kreisky, Bruno. 'Social Democracy's Third Historical Phase'. *Socialist International Information*, no. 5 (May 1970): 65–7.
- Lacroix-Riz, Annie. 'Autour d'Irving Brown: L.A.F.L., le Free Trade Union Committee, le Département d'État et la scission syndicale française (1944–1947)'. *Le Mouvement social*, no. 151 (1990): 79–118. <https://doi.org/10.2307/3778185>.
- Lacroix-Riz, Annie. *L'intégration européenne de la France: La Tutelle de l'Allemagne et des États-Unis* (Pantin: Le Temps des cerises, 2007).
- Ladrech, Robert. *Social Democracy and the Challenge of European Union* (Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner, 2000).
- Lafon, François. *Guy Mollet: Itinéraire d'un socialiste controversé, 1905–1975* (Paris: Fayard, 2006).
- Laneri, Calogero. 'Il PCI di Enrico Berlinguer e le elezioni europee attraverso la lettura della stampa comunista (1979–1984)'. *Diacronie: Studi di storia contemporanea*, 32, no. 4 (2017). <https://doi.org/10.4000/diacronie.6983>.
- Lange, Peter, and Maurizio Vannicelli, eds. *The Communist Parties of Italy, France, and Spain: Postwar Change and Continuity: A Casebook*, Casebook Series on European Politics and Society, vol. 1 (London: Allen & Unwin, 1981).
- Lapavistas, Costas, and Eustache Kouvelakis. *Crisis in the Eurozone* (London: Verso, 2012).
- Launay, Michel. *Le Syndicalisme en Europe* (Paris: Imprimerie nationale, 1990).
- Laurens, Sylvain. *Lobbyists and Bureaucrats in Brussels: Capitalism's Brokers* (Abingdon; New York: Routledge, 2017). <https://doi.org/10.4324/9781315267258>.
- 'Le Mirage de l'Europe sociale: Du statut européen du mineur au rapport Bertil Ohlin.' Fondation Jean-Jaurès, April 2019. <https://jean-jaures.org/nos-productions/le-mirage-de-l-europe-sociale-du-statut-europeen-du-mineur-au-rapport-bertil-ohlin>.
- Lebaron, Frédéric. *Ordre monétaire ou chaos social? La BCE et la révolution néolibérale* (Bellecombe-en-Bauges: Éditions du Croquant, 2006).
- Leboutte, René. 'Cinquante années d'action sociale en Europe: Le Fonds social européen.' In *50 ans du Fonds social européen* (Luxembourg: Gouvernement du Luxembourg, Ministère du Travail et de l'Emploi, 2007), 8–27.
- Leboutte, René. *Histoire économique et sociale de la construction européenne* (Brussels: PIE Peter Lang, 2008).

- Lechevalier, Arnaud, and Jan Wielgohs, eds. *Social Europe: A Dead End—What the Eurozone Crisis Is Doing to Europe's Social Dimension* (Copenhagen: DJØF, 2015).
- Leucht, Brigitte, and Katja Seidel. 'Du traité de Paris au règlement 17/1962: Ruptures et continuités dans la politique européenne de concurrence, 1950–1962'. *Histoire, économie & société* 27, no. 1 (2008): 35–46.
- Linden, Marcel van der, ed. *The International Confederation of Free Trade Unions* (Bern: Peter Lang, 2000).
- Lippens, Walter. *A History of European Integration*. English ed. (Oxford; New York: Clarendon Press; Oxford University Press, 1982).
- Lomellini, Valentine. 'Dall'europposizione all'euroeuforia: La traiettoria del comunismo italiano nel processo d'integrazione europea'. In *Contro l'Europa? I diversi scetticismi verso l'integrazione europea*, edited by Daniele Pasquinucci and Luca Verzichelli (Bologna: Il Mulino, 2016), 71–92.
- Ludlow, N. Piers. 'The Making of the CAP: Towards a Historical Analysis of the EU's First Major Policy'. *Contemporary European History* 14, no. 3 (August 2005): 347–71.
- Ludlow, N. Piers. *The European Community and the Crises of the 1960s: Negotiating the Gaullist Challenge*, Cold War History 9 (London; New York: Routledge, 2006).
- Ludlow, Piers. *Roy Jenkins and the European Commission Presidency, 1976–1980: At the Heart of Europe* (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2016).
- Lussana, Fiamma. 'Il confronto con le socialdemocrazie e la ricerca di un nuovo socialismo nell'ultimo Berlinguer'. *Studi storici* 45, no. 2 (2004): 461–88.
- Lynch, Frances M. B. *France and the International Economy: From Vichy to the Treaty of Rome*, Routledge Explorations in Economic History (London; New York: Routledge, 1996).
- Lyon-Caen, Gérard. *Droit social européen* (Paris: Dalloz, 1969).
- Maggiorani, Mauro. *L'Europa degli altri: Comunisti italiani e integrazione europea (1957–1969)* (Rome: Carocci, 1998).
- Maggiorani, Mauro, and Paolo Ferrari. *L'Europa da Togliatti a Berlinguer: Testimonianze e documenti, 1945–1984* (Bologna: Il Mulino, 2005).
- Maier, Charles S. 'The Politics of Productivity: Foundations of American International Economic Policy after World War II'. *International Organization* 31, no. 4 (October 1977): 607–33.
- Maier, Charles S. 'The Two Postwar Eras and the Conditions for Stability in Twentieth-Century Western Europe'. *American Historical Review* 86, no. 2 (1981): 327–52. <https://doi.org/10.2307/1857441>.
- Maier, Charles S. *In Search of Stability: Explorations in Historical Political Economy* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987).
- Majone, Giandomenico. *La Communauté européenne: Un État régulateur* (Paris: Montchrestien, 1996). <https://www.decitre.fr/livres/la-communaute-europeenne-9782707606990.html>.
- Manow, Philip, Armin Schäfer, and Hendrik Zorn. 'European Social Policy and Europe's Party-Political Center of Gravity, 1957–2003'. MPIfG Discussion Papers 2004/06 (Cologne: Max Planck Institut für Gesellschaftsforschung, 2004). http://www.mpi-fg-koeln.mpg.de/pu/mpifg_dp/dp04-6.pdf.
- Mansholt, Sicco L. 'Modern socialisme'. *Socialisme & democratie*, no. 28 (1971): 523–39.
- Mansholt, Sicco, and Janine Delaunay. *La Crise* (Paris: Stock, 1974).
- Martin, Andrew, and George Ross, eds. *Euros and Europeans: Monetary Integration and the European Model of Society* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004).
- Mazey, Sonia, and Jeremy Richardson, eds. *Lobbying in the European Community* (Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press, 1993).

- Mazower, Mark. *Governing the World: The History of an Idea* (London: Penguin, 2013).
- McNamara, Kathleen R. *The Currency of Ideas* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1998).
- Meadows, Donella H., Dennis L. Meadows, Jørgen Randers, and William W. Behrens. *The Limits to Growth: A Report for the Club of Rome's Project on the Predicament of Mankind* (Washington, DC: Potomac Associates, 1972).
- Mechi, Lorenzo. *La politica sociale delle CECA, 1950–1957* (Florence: Università degli studi di Firenze, 1995).
- Mechi, Lorenzo. 'Una vocazione sociale? Le azioni dell'Alta Autorità della CECA a favore dei lavoratori sotto le presidenze di Jean Monnet e di René Mayer.' *Storia delle Relazioni Internazionali* X–XI, no. 2 (1994–5): 147–83.
- Mechi, Lorenzo. 'L'action de la Haute Autorité de la CECA dans la construction de maisons ouvrières.' *Journal of European Integration History* 6, no. 1 (2000): 63–88.
- Mechi, Lorenzo. 'Les États membres, les institutions et les débuts du Fonds social européen.' In *Inside the European Community: Actors and Policies in the European Integration 1957–1972*, edited by Antonio Varsori (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2006), 95–116.
- Mechi, Lorenzo. 'Stabilisation sociale et efficience économique: Les Origines "productivistes" du Fonds social européen.' In *The Road Europe Travelled Along: The Evolution of the EEC/EU Institutions and Policies*, edited by Daniela Preda and Daniele Pasquinucci (Brussels: Peter Lang, 2010), 353–65.
- Mechi, Lorenzo. 'Du BIT à la politique sociale européenne: Les Origines d'un modèle.' *Le Mouvement social* 244, no. 3 (2013): 17–30.
- Mechi, Lorenzo. 'Economic Regionalism and Social Stabilisation: The International Labour Organization and Western Europe in the Early Post-War Years.' *International History Review* 35, no. 4 (August 2013): 844–62. <https://doi.org/10.1080/07075332.2013.813569>.
- Mechi, Lorenzo. 'A Precondition for Economic Integration? European Debates on Social Harmonisation in the 1950s and 1960s.' In *Free Trade and Social Welfare in Europe: Explorations in the Long 20th Century*, edited by Lucia Coppolaro and Lorenzo Mechi (Abingdon; New York: Routledge, 2020), 71–89.
- Meidner, Rudolf. 'Our Concept of the Third Way: Some Remarks on the Socio-Political Tenets of the Swedish Labour Movement.' *Economic and Industrial Democracy* 1 (1980).
- Meidner, Rudolf. 'Why Did the Swedish Model Fail?' *Socialist Register* 29 (March 1993): 211–28.
- Meidner, Rudolf, Gunnar Fond, and Anna Hedberg. *Employee Investment Funds: An Approach to Collective Capital Formation* (London: Unwin Hyman, 1978).
- Mény, Yves, ed. *Building Parliament: 50 Years of European Parliament History, 1958–2008* (Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications of the European Communities, 2009).
- Menz, Georg, and Mitchell P. Smith. 'Kicking the Can Down the Road to More Europe? Salvaging the Euro and the Future of European Economic Governance.' *Journal of European Integration* 35, no. 3 (April 2013): 195–206. <https://doi.org/10.1080/07036337.2013.774783>.
- Merriënboer, Johan van. *Mansholt: A Biography* (Brussels; New York: PIE Peter Lang, 2011).
- Merriënboer, Johan van. 'Sicco Mansholt and "Limits to Growth".' In *Europe in a Globalising World: Global Challenges and European Responses in the 'Long' 1970s*, edited by Claudia Hiepel (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2014), 319–42.
- Mertens de Wilmars, Frédéric. 'La Société européenne: Les Raisons d'un blocage.' In *Firm Strategies and Public Policy in Integrated Europe, 1950–1980: Confrontation and Learning of Economic Actors*, edited by Marine Moguen-Toursel (Brussels: Peter Lang, 2007), 105–26.
- Meyer, Jan-Henrik. 'L'europanisation de la politique environnementale dans les années 1970.' *Vingtième Siècle*, no. 113 (2012): 117–26.

- Middlemas, Keith. *Orchestrating Europe: The Informal Politics of the European Union 1973–95* (London: Fontana, 1995).
- Migani, Guia. ‘Lomé and the North–South Relations (1975–1984): From the “New International Economic Order” to a New Conditionality’. In *Europe in a Globalising World: Global Challenges and European Responses in the ‘Long’ 1970s*, edited by Claudia Hiepel (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2014), 123–46.
- Migani, Guia. ‘The Road to Cancun: The Life and Death of a North–South Summit’. In *International Summitry and Global Governance: The Rise of the G7 and the European Council, 1974–1991*, edited by Emmanuel Mourlon-Druol and Federico Romero (Abingdon; New York: Routledge, 2014).
- Milward, Alan S. *The Reconstruction of Western Europe 1945–51* (London: Methuen, 1984).
- Milward, Alan S. *The European Rescue of the Nation-State* (London: Routledge, 1992).
- Milward, Alan S. *The European Rescue of the Nation-State*. 2nd ed. (London; New York: Routledge, 2000).
- Mirowski, Philip, and Dieter Plehwe, eds. *The Road from Mont Pèlerin: The Making of the Neoliberal Thought Collective* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2009).
- Moch, Jules. ‘La Première Décennie du Marché commun’. *La Revue socialiste*, no. 204 (June 1967).
- Möckli, Daniel. *European Foreign Policy during the Cold War: Heath, Brandt, Pompidou and the Dream of Political Unity* (London: I.B. Tauris, 2009).
- Molony, Barbara, and Jennifer Nelson, eds. *Women’s Activism and ‘Second Wave’ Feminism: Transnational Histories* (London: Bloomsbury, 2017).
- Moschonas, Gerassimos. *In the Name of Social Democracy: The Great Transformation, 1945 to the Present* (London: Verso, 2002).
- Moschonas, Gerassimos. ‘Reformism in a “Conservative” System: The European Union and Social Democratic Identity’. In *In Search of Social Democracy*, edited by John Callaghan, Nina Fishman, Ben Jackson, and Martin McIvor (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2017), 168–93.
- Moulin, Luc. ‘L’Association pour l’Union monétaire de l’Europe: Un groupe d’entrepreneurs contribue à la création de l’euro’. In *Milieus économiques et intégration européenne au XXe siècle: La Relance des années quatre-vingts (1979–1992)*, edited by Eric Bussière, Michel Dumoulin, and Sylvain Schirmann (Paris: Comité pour l’histoire économique et financière de la France, 2007), 241–56.
- Mourlon-Druol, Emmanuel. *A Europe Made of Money: The Emergence of the European Monetary System* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2012).
- Mourlon-Druol, Emmanuel, and Federico Romero, eds. *International Summitry and Global Governance: The Rise of the G7 and the European Council, 1974–1991* (Abingdon; New York: Routledge, 2014).
- Mudge, Stephanie L. *Leftism Reinvented: Western Parties from Socialism to Neoliberalism* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2018). <https://doi.org/10.2307/j.ctv2867r6>.
- Myrdal, Alva. *Towards Equality* (Stockholm: Prisma, 1971).
- Nairn, Tom. ‘The Left against Europe?’ *New Left Review*, no. 75 (September 1972): 5–114.
- Newman, Michael. *Socialism and European Unity* (London: Junction Books, 1983).
- Olivi, Bino. *L’Europe difficile: Histoire politique de la construction européenne* (Paris: Gallimard, 2007).
- Overbeek, Henk. ‘Sovereign Debt Crisis in Euroland: Root Causes and Implications for European Integration’. *International Spectator* 47, no. 1 (March 2012): 30–48. <https://doi.org/10.1080/03932729.2012.655006>.
- Padgett, Stephen, and William E. Paterson. *A History of Social Democracy in Postwar Europe* (London; New York: Longman, 1991).

- Panitch, Leo, and Sam Gindin. *The Making of Global Capitalism: The Political Economy of American Empire* (London: Verso, 2012).
- Parti communiste français, and Parti socialiste (France). *Programme commun de gouvernement du Parti communiste français et Du parti socialiste (27 juin 1972)*. (Éditions sociales, 1972).
- Paterson, William E. *The SPD and European Integration* (Farnborough; Lexington, Mass.: Saxon House; Lexington Books, 1974).
- Paulus, Daniel. *La Création du Comité permanent de l'emploi des Communautés européennes* (Brussels: Bruylant, 1972).
- Perazzoli, Jacopo. «Qualcosa di nuovo da noi s'attende»: *La socialdemocrazia europea e il revisionismo degli anni cinquanta* (Milan: Bibliopolis, 2016). https://www.ibs.it/qualcosa-di-nuovo-da-noi-libro-jacopo-perazzoli/e/9788898490394#a__abstract.
- Pérez, Sigfrido M. Ramírez. 'La Politique de la concurrence de la Communauté économique européenne et l'industrie: L'exemple des accords sur la distribution automobile (1972–1985)'. *Histoire, économie & société* 27, no. 1 (2008): 63–77.
- Pernot, Jean-Marie. 'Dedans, dehors, la dimension internationale dans le syndicalisme français' (PhD thesis, Université de Nanterre, 2001). <https://tel.archives-ouvertes.fr/tel-00927161/document>.
- Petrini, Francesco. 'The Common Vocational Training Policy in the EEC from 1961 to 1972'. *Vocational Training European Journal* 32, no. 2 (August 2004): 45–54.
- Petrini, Francesco. 'Demanding Democracy in the Workplace: The European Trade Union Confederation and the Struggle to Regulate Multinationals'. In *Societal Actors in European Integration*, edited by Wolfram Kaiser and Jan-Henrik Meyer (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013), 151–72.
- Petrini, Francesco. 'Bringing Social Conflict Back In: The Historiography of Industrial Milieux and European Integration'. *Contemporanea*, no. 3 (2014): 525–42.
- Petrini, Francesco. 'Save Capitalism, Make Europe! Conflitti politici e integrazione economica nel "lungo ventesimo secolo"'. *Zapruder: Rivista di storia della conflittualità sociale*, no. 51 (2020): 11–33.
- Petrović, Nikola. 'The Promethean Role of Europe: Changing Narratives of the Political and Scholarly Left'. *National Identities* 19, no. 2 (April 2017): 179–97. <https://doi.org/10.1080/14608944.2016.1270923>.
- Pigenet, Michel, Patrick Pasture, and Jean-Louis Robert. *Lapogée des syndicalismes en Europe occidentale: 1960–1985* (Paris: Publications de la Sorbonne, 2005).
- Piketty, Thomas. *Capital in the Twenty-First Century: The Dynamics of Inequality, Wealth, and Growth* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2014).
- Piketty, Thomas. *Capital and Ideology* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2020).
- Plehwe, Dieter, Quinn Slobodian, and Philip Mirowski, eds. *Nine Lives of Neoliberalism* (London: Verso, 2020).
- Polanyi, Karl. *The Great Transformation: The Political and Economic Origins of Our Time*. 2nd Beacon paperback ed. (Boston, MA: Beacon Press, 2001).
- Pons, Silvio. *Berlinguer e la fine del comunismo* (Turin: Einaudi, 2006).
- Pons, Silvio. 'The Rise and Fall of Eurocommunism'. In *The Cambridge History of the Cold War*, edited by Melvyn P. Leffler and Odd Arne Westad (Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 3: 45–66.
- Prashad, Vijay. *The Darker Nations: A People's History of the Third World*, A New Press People's History (New York; London: New Press, 2008).
- Preece, Daniel. *Dismantling Social Europe: The Political Economy of Social Policy in the European Union* (Boulder, Colo.: First Forum Press, 2009).
- Priestley, Julian. *Six Battles that Shaped Europe's Parliament* (London: John Harper, 2008).

- Reboul, Laurence, Albert Te Pass, and J. C. Thill. *La Lettre Mansholt: Réactions et commentaires* (Paris: J. J. Pauvert, 1972).
- Rehfeldt, Udo. 'Les Syndicats européens face à la transnationalisation des entreprises.' *Le Mouvement social* 162 (1993): 69–93.
- 'Revisiting the Meidner Plan.' Accessed 31 December 2019. <https://jacobinmag.com/2017/08/sweden-social-democracy-meidner-plan-capital>.
- Rey, Marie-Pierre. 'Georges Pompidou et l'Europe.' *Vingtième Siècle: Revue d'histoire*, no. 43 (1994): 124–6.
- Rittberger, Berthold. *Building Europe's Parliament: Democratic Representation beyond the Nation State* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005).
- Robert, Linhart. *L'établi* (Paris: Éditions de Minuit, 1978).
- Robin Hivert, Emilia. 'Anti-européens et euroconstructifs: Les Communistes français et l'Europe (1945–1979).' *Cahiers de l'IRICE* 4 (2009): 49–67.
- Roccati, Claude. 'Si proche, si loin: L'Europe et la CFDT dans la politique revendicative de la CGT.' In *La CGT, 1975–1995: Un syndicalisme à l'épreuve des crises*, edited by Sophie Bérout, Élyane Bressol, Jérôme Péliasse, and Michel Pigenet (Nancy: Arbre bleu éditions, 2019), 299–307.
- Rodrik, Dani. 'The Abdication of the Left.' *Project Syndicate*, July 2016. <https://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/anti-globalization-backlash-from-right-by-dani-rodrik-2016-07>.
- Rollings, Neil, and Matthias Kipping. 'Private Transnational Governance in the Heyday of the Nation-State: The Council of European Industrial Federations (CEIF).' *Economic History Review* 61, no. 2 (May 2008): 409–31.
- Romano, Angela. *From Détente in Europe to European Détente: How the West Shaped the Helsinki CSCE* (Brussels: PIE Peter Lang, 2009).
- Romero, Federico. *Emigrazione e integrazione europea, 1945–1973* (Rome: Edizioni Lavoro, 1991).
- Romero, Federico. *The United States and the European Trade Union Movement, 1944–1951* (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 1992).
- Romero, Federico. *Storia della guerra fredda: L'ultimo conflitto per l'Europa*, Einaudi Storia 30 (Turin: Giulio Einaudi, 2009).
- Rosanvallon, Pierre. *L'âge de l'autogestion* (Paris: Seuil, 1976).
- Ross, George. *Jacques Delors and European Integration* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1995).
- Ross, George. 'European Center-Lefts and the Mazes of European Integration.' In *What's Left of the Left: Democrats and Social Democrats in Challenging Times*, edited by James E. Cronin, George Ross, and James Shoch (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2011), 319–41.
- Ross, George, and Jane Jenson. 'Reconsidering Jacques Delors' Leadership of the European Union.' *Journal of European Integration* 39, no. 2 (February 2017): 113–27. <https://doi.org/10.1080/07036337.2016.1277718>.
- Rother, Bernd. 'Between East and West—Social Democracy as an Alternative to Communism and Capitalism: Willy Brandt's Strategy as President of the Socialist International.' In *The Crisis of Détente in Europe*, edited by Leopoldo Nuti (London: Routledge, 2008), 235–47.
- Rücker, Katrin, and Laurent Warloutzet, eds. *Which Europe(s): New Approaches in European Integration History* (Brussels: Peter Lang, 2006).
- Rye, Lise. 'In Quest of Time, Protection and Approval: France and the Claims for Social Harmonization in the European Economic Community, 1955–56.' *Journal of European Integration History* 1, no. 8 (2002): 85–102.
- Rye, Lise. 'The Rise and Fall of the French Demand for Social Harmonization in the EEC, 1955–1966' (Norwegian University of Science and Technology, 2004).

- Ryner, Johan Magnus. 'Neoliberalisation of Social Democracy: Transmissions and Dispositions'. In *The SAGE Handbook of Neoliberalism*, edited by Damien Cahill, Melinda Cooper, Martijn Konings, and David Primrose (London: SAGE, 2018), 248–59. [https://kclpure.kcl.ac.uk/portal/en/publications/neoliberalisation-of-social-democracy\(bb8d113f-1b03-4a94-853f-d41f036f5b85\).html](https://kclpure.kcl.ac.uk/portal/en/publications/neoliberalisation-of-social-democracy(bb8d113f-1b03-4a94-853f-d41f036f5b85).html).
- Salais, Robert. *Le Viol d'Europe: Enquête sur la disparition d'une idée* (Paris: Presses universitaires de France, 2013).
- Salm, Christian. 'Die Sozialistische Fraktion, das Europäische Parlament und die Entwicklungshilfepolitik der Europäischen Gemeinschaft 1968–1975'. *Journal of European Integration History* 17, no. 1 (2011): 87–102.
- Salm, Christian. *Transnational Socialist Networks in the 1970s: European Community Development Aid and Southern Enlargement* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2016).
- Sassoon, Donald. 'The Italian Communist Party's European Strategy'. *Political Quarterly* 47, no. 3 (July 1976): 253–75. <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-923X.1976.tb02185.x>.
- Sassoon, Donald. 'The Rise and Fall of West European Communism 1939–48'. *Contemporary European History* 1, no. 2 (1992): 139–69.
- Sassoon, Donald. *One Hundred Years of Socialism: The West European Left in the Twentieth Century* (London: I.B. Tauris, 1996).
- Saunier, Georges. 'François Mitterrand, un projet socialiste pour l'Europe? L'équipe européenne de François Mitterrand, 1981–1984'. In *Inventer l'Europe: Histoire nouvelle des groupes d'influence et des acteurs de l'unité européenne*, edited by Gérard Bossuat (Brussels; New York: Peter Lang, 2003), 431–48.
- Saunier, Georges. 'Le Gouvernement français et les enjeux économiques européens à l'heure de la rigueur 1981–1984'. In *Milieus économiques et intégration européenne au xxe siècle: La relance des années quatre-vingt (1979–1992)*, edited by Éric Bussière, Michel Dumoulin, and Sylvain Schirmann, *Histoire économique et financière XIXe–XXe* (Vincennes: Institut de la gestion publique et du développement économique, 2018), 109–46. <http://books.openedition.org/igpde/4725>.
- Scharpf, Fritz. *Governing in Europe: Effective and Democratic?* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999).
- Scharpf, Fritz. 'The Asymmetry of European Integration, or Why the EU Cannot Be a "Social Market Economy"'. *Socio-Economic Review* 8, no. 2 (2010): 211–50. <https://doi.org/10.1093/ser/mwp031>.
- Scharpf, Fritz W. 'Monetary Union, Fiscal Crisis and the Pre-Emption of Democracy'. *Zeitschrift für Staats- und Europawissenschaften (ZSE)/Journal for Comparative Government and European Policy* 9, no. 2 (2011): 163–98.
- Schirmann, Sylvain. 'Albert Thomas, il BIT e i progetti di Europa sociale fra le due guerre'. In *Lionello Levi Sandri e la politica sociale europea*, edited by Antonio Varsori and Lorenzo Mechi (Milan: Angeli, 2008), 119–32.
- Schmidt, Ingo. 'There Were Alternatives: Lessons from Efforts to Advance beyond Keynesian and Neoliberal Economic Policies in the 1970s'. *WorkingUSA* 14, no. 4 (December 2011): 473–98. <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1743-4580.2011.00358.x>.
- Seefried, Elke. 'Reconfiguring the Future? Politics and Time from the 1960s to the 1980s: Introduction'. *Journal of Modern European History* 13, no. 3 (August 2015): 306–16. <https://doi.org/10.17104/1611-8944-2015-3-306>.
- Seidel, Katja. *The Process of Politics in Europe: The Rise of European Elites and Supranational Institutions* (London: I.B. Tauris, 2010).
- Seyd, Patrick. *The Rise and Fall of the Labour Left* (London: Macmillan Education, 1987).

- Shaev, Brian. 'Estrangement and Reconciliation: French Socialists, German Social Democrats and the Origins of European Integration, 1948–1957' (PhD thesis, University of Pittsburgh, 2014).
- Shaev, Brian. 'Liberalising Regional Trade: Socialists and European Economic Integration.' *Contemporary European History* 27, no. 2 (2018): 258–79. <https://doi.org/10.1017/S0960777318000073>.
- Shaev, Brian. 'Socialism, (Neo)Liberalism and the Treaties of Rome.' *Renewal: A Journal of Labour Politics* 27, no. 1 (2019): 31–40.
- Silei, Gianni. *Welfare state e socialdemocrazia: Cultura, programmi e realizzazioni in Europa occidentale dal 1945 ad oggi* (Manduria: Lacaita, 2000).
- Silver, Beverly J. *Forces of Labor: Workers' Movements and Globalization since 1870* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003).
- Silvia, Stephen J. *Holding the Shop Together: German Industrial Relations in the Postwar Era* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2013). <http://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/perspectives-on-politics/article/holding-the-shop-together-german-industrial-relations-in-the-postwar-era-by-stephen-j-silvia-ithaca-ny-cornell-university-press-2013-296p-8250-cloth-2995-paper/65CB082884F729C3E7C0E7178CD0CD09>.
- Slobodian, Quinn. *Globalists: The End of Empire and the Birth of Neoliberalism* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2018).
- Soell, Hartmut. *Helmut Schmidt: Pioneer of International Economic and Financial Cooperation* (Cham: Springer International Publishing, 2013).
- Soskice, David. 'Strike Waves and Wage Explosions, 1968–1970: An Economic Interpretation.' In *The Resurgence of Class Conflict in Western Europe since 1968* (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 1978), 221–46. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-03025-5_9.
- Spinelli, Altiero, and Ernesto Rossi. *Il manifesto di Ventotene* (Rome: Centro italiano di formazione europea, 1988).
- Steinnes, Kristian. 'The European Turn and "Social Europe": Northern European Social Democracy 1950–85.' *Archiv für Sozialgeschichte*, no. 53 (2013): 363–84.
- Steinnes, Kristian. *The British Labour Party, Transnational Influences and European Community Membership, 1960–1973* (Stuttgart: Franz Steiner Verlag, 2014).
- Stiegler, Barbara. *Il faut s'adapter: Sur un nouvel impératif politique* (Paris: Éditions Gallimard, 2019).
- Streeck, Wolfgang. *Buying Time* (London: Verso, 2014).
- Streeck, Wolfgang. 'Progressive Regression: Metamorphoses of European Social Policy.' *New Left Review*, no. 118 (August 2019): 118–39.
- Streeck, Wolfgang, and Philippe C. Schmitter. 'From National Corporatism to Transnational Pluralism: Organized Interests in the Single European Market.' *Politics and Society* 19, no. 2 (June 1991): 133–64. <https://doi.org/10.1177/003232929101900202>.
- Tartakowsky, Danielle, Alain Bergounioux, and Claude Bartolone. *L'union sans unité: Le Programme commun de la gauche, 1963–1978*, Histoire (Rennes: Presses universitaires de Rennes, 2012).
- Teague, Paul. 'The British TUC and the European Community.' *Millennium* 18, no. 1 (1989): 29–45.
- Telò, Mario, and Corinne Gobin, eds. *Quelle Union sociale européenne? Acquis institutionnel, acteurs et défis*. Études européennes (Brussels: Éditions de l'Université de Bruxelles, 1994).
- Thatcher, Margaret. *The Downing Street Years* (London: HarperCollins, 1993).
- Thorsten, Schulz-Walden. 'Between National, Multilateral and Global Politics: European Environmental Policy in the 1970s.' In *Europe in a Globalising World* (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2014), 299–318. https://doi.org/10.5771/9783845254272_299.

- Tilly, Pierre. 'Milieux intellectuels et ouvriers belges et le Congrès de La Haye.' In *Le Congrès de l'Europe à La Haye (1948–2008)*, edited by Jean-Michel Guieu and Christophe Le Dréau (Brussels; New York: PIE Peter Lang, 2009), 109–22.
- Tilly, Pierre, and Christophe Degryse. *1973–2013: 40 Ans d'histoire de la Confédération européenne des syndicats* (Brussels: Institut syndical européen, 2013).
- Tilly, Pierre, and Sylvain Schirmann. 'Free Movement of Workers, Social Rights and Social Affairs.' In *The European Commission, 1973–86: History and Memories of an Institution*, edited by Michel Dumoulin and Marie-Thérèse Bitsch (Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications of the European Communities, 2007), 352–67.
- Togliatti, Palmiro. 'Per una sinistra europea.' *Rinascità* (March 1959).
- Turone, Sergio. *Storia del sindacato in Italia: Dal 1943 al crollo del comunismo* (Rome: Laterza, 1992).
- Vandamme, Jacques. *Employee Consultation and Information in Multinational Corporations* (London: Croom Helm, 1986).
- Varsori, Antonio, ed. *Il Comitato economico e sociale nella costruzione europea*. 1st ed. (Venice: Marsilio, 2000).
- Varsori, Antonio. 'Vocational Education and Training in European Social Policy from Its Origins to Cedefop.' *European Journal: Vocational Training*, no. 32 (2004): 63–76. <https://eric.ed.gov/?id=EJ734147>.
- Varsori, Antonio, ed. *Inside the European Community: Actors and Policies in the European Integration 1957–1972* (Baden-Baden; Brussels: Nomos; Bruylant, 2006).
- Varsori, Antonio, ed. *Alle origini del presente: L'Europa occidentale nella crisi degli anni settanta* (Milan: FrancoAngeli, 2007).
- Varsori, Antonio. 'The Emergence of a Social Europe.' In *The European Commission, 1958–72: History and Memories*, edited by Michel Dumoulin (Luxembourg: European Commission, 2007), 411–26.
- Varsori, Antonio. 'Puerto Rico (1976): Le potenze occidentali e il problema comunista in Italia.' *Ventunesimo secolo* 7, no. 16 (2008): 89–121.
- Varsori, Antonio. 'Crisis and Stabilization in Southern Europe during the 1970s: Western Strategy, European Instruments.' *Journal of European Integration History* 15, no. 1 (2009): 5–14.
- Varsori, Antonio. 'Development of European Social Policy.' In *Experiencing Europe: 50 Years of European Construction 1957–2007*, edited by Wilfried Loth (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2009), 169–92.
- Varsori, Antonio. *La Cenerentola d'Europa? L'Italia e l'integrazione europea dal 1947 a oggi*, Saggi 242 (Soveria Mannelli: Rubbettino, 2010).
- Varsori, Antonio, and Lorenzo Mechi, eds. *Lionello Levi Sandri e la politica sociale europea* (Milan: FrancoAngeli, 2008).
- Varsori, Antonio, and Guia Migani, eds. *Europe in the International Arena during the 1970s: Entering a Different World* (New York: PIE Peter Lang, 2011).
- Vayssièrè, Bertrand. 'Pour une politique sociale européenne: Les Espoirs et les déceptions de Raymond Rifflet à la direction générale des Affaires sociales (1970–5).' *European Review of History/Revue européenne d'histoire* 26, no. 2 (March 2019): 284–304. <https://doi.org/10.1080/13507486.2018.1479376>.
- Verschueren, Nicolas. *Fermer les mines en construisant l'Europe: Une histoire sociale de l'intégration européenne* (Brussels: Peter Lang, 2013).
- Vogel-Polsky, Eliane, and Jean Vogel. *L'Europe sociale 1993: Illusion, alibi ou réalité?* (Brussels: Éditions de l'Université de Bruxelles, 1991).
- Waddington, Jeremy. *European Works Councils: A Transnational Industrial Relations Institution in the Making* (London: Routledge, 2010).

- Walker, Richard P. 'The Vredeling Proposal: Cooperation versus Confrontation in European Labor Relations'. *International Tax and Business Lawyer* 1 (1983): 177.
- Warlouzet, Laurent. 'De Gaulle as a Father of Europe: The Unpredictability of the FTA's Failure and the EEC's Success (1956–58)'. *Contemporary European History* 20, no. 4 (November 2011): 419–34. <https://doi.org/10.1017/S0960777311000464>.
- Warlouzet, Laurent. *Le Choix de la CEE par la France: L'Europe économique en débat de Mendès France à de Gaulle, 1955–1969* (Paris: Comité pour l'histoire économique et financière de la France, 2011).
- Warlouzet, Laurent. *Governing Europe in a Globalizing World: Neoliberalism and Its Alternatives Following the 1973 Oil Crisis* (London: Routledge, 2018).
- Warlouzet, Laurent. 'The EEC/EU as an Evolving Compromise between French Dirigism and German Ordoliberalism (1957–1995)'. *JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies* 57, no. 1 (2019): 77–93.
- Weiler, Peter. *British Labour and the Cold War* (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1988).
- Wilkens, Andreas, ed. *Willy Brandt et l'unité de l'Europe: De l'objectif de la paix aux solidarités nécessaires* (Brussels: PIE Lang, 2011).
- Williamson, Adrian. 'The Bullock Report on Industrial Democracy and the Post-War Consensus'. *Contemporary British History* 30 (August 2015): 1–31. <https://doi.org/10.1080/13619462.2015.1061941>.
- Wirsching, Andreas, ed. 'European Responses to the Crisis of the 1970s and 1980s'. *Journal of Modern European History* 9, no. 2 (August 2011): 167–9. https://doi.org/10.17104/1611-8944_2011_2_167.
- Wirsching, Andreas, ed. 'The 1970s and 1980s as a Turning Point in European History?' *Journal of Modern European History* 9, no. 1 (2011): 8–26.

Index

For the benefit of digital users, indexed terms that span two pages (e.g., 52–53) may, on occasion, appear on only one of those pages.

- Adenauer, Konrad 29, 32, 33n.12, 47–8
Alternative Economic Strategy (AES) 170–1,
181, 212, 259–60, 288
Amendola, Giorgio 83–5, 121–2, 143–4, 188
American Federation of Labour (AFL) 37–8
And AFL-Congress of Industrial
Organizations (AFL-CIO) 52–3, 87
Archibugi, Franco 179, 181–2, 240
- Bad Godesberg 58, 58n.108, 109–10, 173, 254
Behrendt, Walter 91–2, 91n.98, 109n.36, 110
Belgian Socialist Party (PSB) 56–8, 111
Benn, Tony 121–2, 170–1
Berlinguer, Enrico 143–5, 177–8, 188
Brandt, Willy 6, 25–6, 74–5, 79–80, 80n.64,
93–4, 97–8, 104, 107–11, 116, 122–5,
127–8, 130–2, 134, 139–40, 146–7, 153,
156, 161, 165, 173–4, 176–7, 184, 209–10,
212–14, 240, 253, 261, 283–4, 286–8
Bretton Woods 6–7, 35, 64–5, 107–8, 167, 183–4
- Callaghan, James 193n.72, 212, 225–6,
281–2, 288
Centre d'études, de recherches et d'éducation
socialiste (CERES) 152, 172–3, 183–4
Centro studi di politica economica (CeSPE) 83,
84n.77, 121–2
Chevenement, Jean-Pierre 135, 172–3
Cheysson, Claude 187–8
Christian democrats, and Christian democracy,
and Christian Democratic 6, 24, 30, 47–8,
57–8, 68, 73–5, 90, 104–6, 161–2, 177–8,
182, 188, 236–7, 247–9, 253, 266, 284–5
Christian Democratic Union (CDU,
Germany) 74–5, 110, 253
Christian National Trade Union Federation
(Holland) (CNV) 140–1
Churchill, Winston 29–32
Cold War 6–8, 15, 30–2, 34–5, 45, 52–3, 74–5,
79–80, 107–8, 140–1
Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) 65, 67, 70,
81–2, 92–5, 97, 113, 117, 136, 168–9, 190–1,
210, 233–4, 265–6, 269–70
Commonwealth 117
Confederation of Socialist Parties of the
European Community (CSPEC) 5n.11,
22–3, 78n.58, 154n.58, 167n.1, 186–95,
205n.5, 227n.66, 240n.116, 258n.182,
281, 284–5
and Socialist parties of the EC 25, 56, 76–8,
82, 114–16, 118–19, 137, 139–41, 145–6,
152, 186–7
and Socialist Parties of the European
Community 76–8, 81, 92–3, 114–15, 119,
119n.65, 125–6, 138–9, 151, 154n.55,
240, 246–7, 283–4
and Liaison Bureau 76–7, 81–2, 92–3, 186–7
Council of Europe 31–2, 43–4, 46, 55–6, 76,
186n.54, 224–5, 228, 238–9
Craxi, Bettino 253–4
- Danish Trade Union Confederation (LO) 141
Debunne, George 227, 236n.104, 291–2
de Gaulle, Charles 32, 65–6, 72–3, 78–9,
81, 92, 172
And Gaullist 73–4, 76n.49, 105–6, 131–2,
161, 247–8
Degimbe, Jean 48n.74, 89n.90, 104n.21, 163–4,
215–16, 244–6, 245n.133
Delors, Jacques 4–5, 12–13, 16, 19–20, 105–6,
179, 181–4, 188n.65, 236–7, 240, 255–6,
258–9, 266–72
den Uyl, Joop 6, 104, 118–19, 139–40, 176–7,
184n.45, 194–5
Directorate-General for Social Affairs
(DG V) 67–8, 70–1, 88–9, 164n.80
Dröscher, Wilhelm 186–7, 189–90, 192–3
Dutch Confederation of Trade Unions
(NVV) 140–1
Dutch Labour Party (PvdA) 56–8, 77–8, 97,
104, 120–1, 159–60, 176–7, 182, 189, 193–4
- Economic and monetary union (EMU) 7–8,
12–13, 18, 92–6, 102–4, 108–11, 117,
119–20, 122–32, 141–4, 156–61, 165,
168–9, 190–1, 211, 228–9, 268–71, 275–8

- Economic democracy 11,58, 110–11, 123, 153,
174, 180–1, 190–3, 224–5, 239–53, 281
- industrial democracy 62, 134, 142, 150,
176–7, 197, 212, 239–40, 246–7, 254–5
- Erhard, Ludwig 47–8, 50, 65–6
- Eurocommunism 6, 144–5, 177–8, 188,
253, 284–5
- European Coal and Steel Community
(ECSC) 33–4, 36, 40, 43–6, 48–50,
52–3, 56–7, 70–2, 76, 86–9, 179
- European Commission 1–2, 4–5, 12–13, 23–4,
32–3, 48–50, 60, 66–73, 77–9, 86–93, 95,
98–101, 102n.15, 110–13, 115–16, 119–20,
124n.79, 126–7, 129–31, 154–64, 179,
182–4, 187–8, 199, 204–12, 215–20, 223–7,
229–31, 233, 235, 237–9, 242–8, 250–1,
266–71, 273–6, 281, 283–6, 289
- European Confederation of Free Trade Unions
(ECFTU) 87–8, 93, 98–100, 102–3, 108,
112n.44, 117–18, 126, 129–30, 140–2,
151n.48, 156–7, 240
- European Democrats (ED) 236–7
- European Economic and Social Council
(EESC) 49–50, 67–8, 70–1, 73, 84–9,
88n.88, 103, 129–31, 136, 141–2, 147–8
- European Free Trade Association (EFTA) 40,
50, 65, 80, 87, 140–1, 196, 224–5,
228, 238–40
- European Investment Bank 47–8
- Europeanisation 8–9, 282, 293
- European Monetary System (EMS) 13–14, 26,
201, 211, 228–9, 257–9, 266, 270–1,
287–8, 290
- European Organization-WCL 87, 93, 142,
156n.61, 160
- European Organization-IFCTU 86–7
- European Parliament (EP) 1–3, 5n.11, 22–4,
49–50, 67–8, 70, 73, 77–80, 84–5, 84n.76,
87–93, 95, 97, 100–1, 110, 116, 119–22,
125–6, 136–40, 143, 156–7, 160–2, 165,
190–1, 193–4, 205, 210–11, 220–2, 236–8,
244–52, 281–2, 286, 291–2
- and direct elections 8–9, 23–4, 79–81, 84n.76,
85, 92–3, 95, 102–3, 115–16, 119–20,
186–7, 290
- and Member of the 77–8, 84–5, 89, 91–2, 94,
108–10, 121–2, 125n.87, 143, 160, 187–8,
236–51, 282–3
- and Social Affairs Committee of the 70–1,
89–90, 160–2, 220
- European People's Party (EPP) 236–7
- European Regional Development Fund
(ERDF) 206
- and regional development 126–8, 130–1, 135,
141–2, 210, 231, 267–8
- European Social Fund 48, 68–70, 73, 86–90,
93–5, 98–104, 108, 112, 123, 126–8,
130–1, 147–8, 161–2, 204–5, 210,
256–7, 283–4
- European Trade Union Confederation
(ETUC) 86n.83, 140–2, 145, 151n.48, 153,
156–60, 163, 195–201, 215–16, 219–36,
240, 246–8, 251–2, 256–7, 269–70, 281,
285, 289, 291–3
- European Trade Union Institute (ETUI) 196–7,
206, 273
- European Trade Union Secretariat
(ETUS) 86–7, 98
- European Works Councils (EWCs) 272–4
- Federation for National Education (FEN,
France) 234–5
- Fédération de la gauche démocratique et
socialiste (FGDS) 75–6
- Federation of Dutch Trade Unions (FNV)
196–7, 230–1
- Fellermaier, Ludwig 205n.5
- Free Democratic Party (Germany) (FDP)
108–9, 223–4
- French Communist Party (PCF) 52, 75–6, 85–6,
114, 121–2, 135–7, 143–5, 172–3, 178n.30,
187n.58, 188
- French Democratic Confederation of Labour
(CFDT) 75–6, 140–1, 150, 168, 172–3,
196–7, 200, 203, 222–3, 225, 230, 232,
233n.91, 234–6
- French Section of the Workers' International
(SFOI) 51–8, 75n.48, 135–7, 150
- Friedrich, Bruno 189
- Friedrich Ebert Foundation (FES) 76, 139
- General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
(GATT) 35, 65, 130–1, 241, 277
- General Confederation of Labour (CGT,
France) 41–2, 45n.63, 75–6, 87–8, 99n.3,
122, 140–2, 156n.61, 160, 195, 222–3, 230,
232, 234–5, 285
- General Confederation of the Communist
Workers (CGTP) 195, 285
- General Labour Federation of Belgium
(FGTB) 111, 222–3, 225, 227, 230, 232,
236n.104, 291–2
- German Communist Party (DKP) 173–4
- German Trade Union Confederation
(DGB) 52–3, 56–7, 109–10, 141, 173–4,
182–3, 195–7, 216, 230–2, 236, 285
- Giolitti, Antonio 187–8, 229
- Giscard d'Estaing, Valéry 172, 200–1, 203,
212–14, 230n.80, 235–6, 246, 258, 270
- Group of 77 (G77) 241, 287–8

- Haferkamp, Wilhelm 183, 187–8, 216–17, 251
 Heath, Edward 117, 137–8, 162–3
 Holland, Stuart 170–1, 179–85, 188, 191–2,
 194, 259–60, 272
- Industrial Workers' Union (Holland)
 (NKV) 140–1
- International Confederation of Free Trade
 Unions (ICFTU) 43–4, 52–3, 67–8, 86–9
- International Federation of Christian Trade
 Unions (IFCTU) 52–3, 86–9
- International Labour Organization (ILO) 3–4,
 43–4, 46–7, 148, 183–4, 241–6
- International Monetary Fund (IMF) 35, 103,
 212, 260–1, 287–8
- Italian Communist Party (PCI) 6, 52, 83–5,
 121–2, 143–5, 177–8, 187n.58, 188, 236–7,
 253, 258, 284–5, 287–8
- Italian Confederation of Workers' Trade Union
 (CISL) 52–3, 140–1, 229, 232–4, 285
- Italian General Confederation of Labour
 (CGIL) 36–7, 87–8, 99n.3, 122, 140–2,
 156n.61, 160, 222–3, 229–30, 233–4,
 236–7, 285
- Italian Labour Union (UIL) 140–1, 229,
 233–4, 285
- Italian Social Democratic Party (PSDI) 57–8,
 68, 253–4
- Italian Socialist Party (PSI) 57–8, 74, 79, 84,
 120–1, 153–4, 189, 236–7, 253–4
- Italian Socialist Party of Proletarian Unity
 (PSIUP) 91
- Jenkins, Roy 117, 187–8, 221–2, 225–7, 233,
 244, 258
- Jørgensen, Anker 130
- Jospin, Lionel 275–6
- Kok, Wim 184n.45, 230–2
- Kreisky, Bruno 6, 79–80, 104–5, 107–8, 108n.33,
 139–40, 176–7, 183–4
- Labour Party (UK) 53–6, 77–9, 85, 115n.55,
 116–18, 137–8, 145–6, 154–5, 161, 179–81,
 187–8, 193n.72, 263, 284–5
- Labour Party (Ireland) 117–19, 139–40, 145–6
- Levi Sandri, Lionello 68, 73, 77–8, 86–7, 89–90,
 139, 189
- Liberal and Democratic Group (LD) 236–7
- Lulling, Astrid 91–2, 94, 101
- Luxembourg Socialist Workers' Party
 (LSAP) 56–8, 91–2
- Maastricht Treaty 12–13, 18–19, 270–1, 275–6
- Maldague, Robert, and Maldague Report 42–5
- Malfatti, Franco Maria 113–14
- Mansholt, Sicco 77–82, 113–16, 118, 126–7, 139,
 151, 179, 186–7, 189–90, 192, 281
- Marjolin, Robert, and Marjolin Report 33–4,
 66, 185, 211, 258
- Marras, Luigi 160, 165
- Marxism, and Marxist, and Marx, Karl 11, 51,
 58, 62–4, 82, 106, 113–14, 137–8, 169–70,
 173, 175–7, 179, 185n.53, 257, 281–2
- McNamara, Robert 184
- Mendès-France, Pierre 27–9, 46, 50
- Mitterrand, François 31, 75–6, 120–2, 135–7,
 145–6, 152–3, 172, 246, 253–7, 259–61,
 265–6, 281–2, 284–7
- Mollet, Guy 46–8, 53–8, 72–3, 77
- Monnet, Jean 29, 32–4, 36, 44, 56, 74–5, 267
- Mont Pelerin Society 30, 50
- Mouvement des radicaux de gauche
 (MRG) 75–6
- Movement for the United Socialist States of
 Europe (MEUSE), and from 1947 Socialist
 Movement for the United States of Europe
 (MSEUE) 30–1, 54, 76
- Mozer, Alfred, and Mozer report 119n.65,
 139, 186–7
- Müller-Armack, Alfred 47–8, 50, 66
- Myrdal, Alva 174
- Myrdal, Gunnar 7, 32–3, 174–5
- Nairn, Tom 133, 137–8
- Nenni, Pietro 79–80
- neoliberalism 7–8, 13–16, 47–9, 184,
 261–3, 278–9
- New International Economic Order (NIEO) 7,
 11, 143–4, 175–7, 196, 212–13, 231, 241–2,
 261, 279–80, 282–3, 289–90
- Nørgaard, Ivar 120–1, 186–7
- North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
 (NATO) 34–6, 176–7, 189–90
- oil crisis, and oil shock 25, 164, 167–8, 176–7,
 179–80, 182–4, 198, 204, 212–13,
 216, 260–1
- Ordoliberalism 24, 42–3, 47–8, 50,
 65–6, 270–1
- Organisation for Economic Cooperation and
 Development (OECD), and OEEC 32–5,
 43–4, 52–3, 65, 105–6, 183–4, 224–6,
 241, 243–6
- Ostpolitik* 74–5, 83–4, 107–8, 110, 143
- Palme, Olaf 6, 104, 107–8, 139–40, 174–7
- Panhellenic Socialist Movement (PASOK)
 175–6, 183–4, 253–4
- Papandreou, Andreas 183–4, 253–4

- Parti socialiste (PS, France) 75–6, 120–1, 135–7, 143, 150, 152–3, 189, 266, 281–2
- Parti socialiste unifié (PSU) 75–6, 150, 172–3
- Pineau, Christian 57–8
- Pittermann, Bruno 145–6
- Pivert, Marceau 26, 57–8
- Pompidou, Georges 79, 92, 105–6, 122–3, 131–2, 162–3, 172
- Pontillon, Robert 137n.11, 186–7
- Radoux, Lucien 81–2, 146
- Rifflet, Raymond 111, 163–4, 215
- Rocard, Michel 172–3, 189
- Rome Treaties, and Rome Treaty 27–8, 35–6, 42–51, 57–8, 60–1, 66, 68–74, 77, 79–80, 84–5, 88–9, 92, 99–100, 112–13, 122, 136–7, 159, 208–9, 265–7, 271, 279, 282–3
- Röpke, Wilhelm 30, 50
- Rueff, Jacques 30–2, 50
- Sandys, Duncan 30, 32, 54
- Schmidt, Helmut 26, 173–4, 177, 188, 200–1, 203, 212–14, 220, 225–6, 228–9, 235, 254, 257–9, 270, 281–2, 284–9
- Socialist Group of the European Parliament (SGEP) 76, 81–2, 95, 114–15, 145–6, 151, 159–62, 165, 183, 186n.54, 187–8, 205, 220, 227, 237–8, 246–50, 282–6
- Social Democratic Party (Germany) (SPD) 25, 51–3, 55–8, 74–6, 79, 81–4, 90–2, 108–10, 122, 124–5, 132, 134, 139, 150, 153, 173–4, 177–80, 189–90, 193–4, 212–13, 222–3, 246, 253–4, 281–2, 284–5
- Socialist Party of Austria (SPO) 79, 81–2, 104
- Spaak, Paul-Henri 29, 31–4, 36, 46–8
- Spanish Communist Party (PCE) 188
- Spanish General Union of Workers (UGT) 52–3, 228
- Spanish Socialist Workers' Party (PSOE) 175–6, 183–4, 253–4
- Spanish Workers' Commissions (CCOO) 195, 231, 285
- Standing Committee on Employment (SCE) 98–9, 101, 112, 126, 129, 141–2, 147–8, 156–7, 198, 206, 221, 223, 230–1, 256–7
- Strauss-Kahn, Dominique 183–4
- Swedish Social Democratic Party (S/SAP) 174–5
- Swedish Trade Union Confederation (LO) 150, 174–5, 196–7
- Tinbergen, Jan 107, 184n.45
- Trade Union Congress (UK) (TUC) 52–3, 116–18, 141, 156–7, 171, 196–7, 199–200, 215–16, 222–3, 232
- Tripartite Conference 88–9, 98, 156–7, 163–4, 198–201, 206, 215–16, 219–27, 238–9, 256–7, 275–6, 286–7
- United Nations Conferences on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) 175–6, 183–4, 241–2
- United Nations Centre on Transnational Corporations (UNCTC) 241–2
- Union of Industrial and Employers' Confederations of Europe (UNICE) 88–9, 98, 100, 163n.78, 199, 228–9, 238–9, 244–5, 248, 251n.163, 269–70
- Uri, Pierre 36
- Van Zeeland, Paul 30–2
- Vals, Francis 81–2, 95, 114–15, 145–6
- Vetter, Oskar 195–6, 231, 247n.141, 285
- von Hayek, Friedrich 7, 278
- Vredeling, Henk, and Vredeling Directive 77–8, 82, 89–90, 95, 125n.87, 139, 145–6, 186–90, 227, 229, 237–9, 242–4, 245n.132, 246–50, 251n.165, 252, 256–7, 272–3, 281, 285–6, 289, 292
- Wilson, Harold 6, 79, 104, 116–17, 170–1, 177, 179, 181, 184–5, 212, 225–6
- Workers' Force (France) (FO) 52–3, 225, 230n.80, 232, 234–5, 292n.69
- World Federation of Trade Unions (WFTU) 52–3