# Trajectories of Memory

Excavating the Past in Indonesia

Edited by Melani Budianta Sylvia Tiwon

Trajectories of Memory

Melani Budianta • Sylvia Tiwon Editors

# Trajectories of Memory

Excavating the Past in Indonesia

*Editors* Melani Budianta Literature Department Faculty of Humanities Universitas Indonesia Depok, Indonesia

Sylvia Tiwon Department of South and Southeast Asian Studies University of California, Berkeley Berkeley, CA, USA

#### ISBN 978-981-99-1994-9 ISBN 978-981-99-1995-6 (eBook) https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-99-1995-6

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# Contents




# Notes on Contributors

**Abdurakhman** Majoring in History, he is now a lecturer as well as the head of the History Department, at Universitas Indonesia. His research focuses on the history of Islamic politics in Indonesia.

**Melani Budianta** is Professor of Literature and Cultural Studies at the Faculty of Humanities, Universitas Indonesia. She has published works on women's movement, gender and representation of violence, Chinese Indonesian cultural identity, and kampung activism in post-Reformasi Indonesia.

**Tommy Christomy** is a senior lecturer at Universitas Indonesia who acquired his Doctorate at the Australian National University, Canberra. He focuses on philology and anthropology in the context of cultural studies.

**Ahmad Fahrurodji** completed his MA degree in Department of History of Russian Literature XX Century, Lomonosov Moscow State University, and his doctoral program at the Faculty of Humanities Universitas Indonesia. He teaches at the undergraduate program of Russian Studies in addition to the MA Program of Southeast Asian Studies and Japanese Studies, with an expertise of Russian diplomatic relations with Southeast Asia and Japan. His research areas include diplomatic history and geopolitics in the Cold War era.

**Putri Haryanti** is a graduate student at the Department of Archaeology, Faculty of Humanities, Universitas Indonesia, with a special interest in Museum Studies. Currently, she is working as a staff member at the Directorate of Cultural Heritage, Preservation and Museums, Directorate General of Culture, Ministry of Education and Culture.

**Sitti Utami Haryanti** obtained her bachelor's degree from the State University in 2006 before starting her teaching career at a tutoring center in Jakarta and SMAN 66 Jakarta. Currently, she works as an educational staff analyst at the Ministry of Education and Culture. In 2019, she obtained her MA from the History Program, Faculty of Humanities, Universitas Indonesia.

**Mohammad Iskandar** is a senior lecturer in the History Science Programme, Department of History, Faculty of Humanities, Universitas Indonesia. He is especially interested in studying sociocultural aspects of history. Some of his articles can be read at http://staff.ui.ac.id/user/952/ publications.

**Madia Patra Ismar** is a PhD candidate at the Faculty of Humanities, Universitas Indonesia. Her background as a dance practitioner and choreographer underlies her interest in *silek* and dance, which emerged during her undergraduate research on the connections between the *Galombang* dance and *Silek Lintau nagari Lubuk Jantan* in West Sumatra in 1998. In 2012, she completed her MA thesis on the interactions between Minangkabau's *silek harimau* and contemporary dance. Currently, she is conducting doctoral research on the oral traditions and performance of *silek harimau*.

**Irmawati Marwoto** is currently a lecturer in the Department of Archaeology, Faculty of Humanities, Universitas Indonesia. Irmawati Marwoto completed her doctoral program at Universitas Indonesia with a dissertation titled *Decorative Art on Buildings in the North Coast of Java During 15th–17th Century: A Problem of Islamic Identity*, with Prof. Dr. Azyumardi Azra as her promoter. Her research expertise includes Islamic archaeology, material culture, and museology.

**Katharine McGregor** is an associate professor at the University of Melbourne. She is a historian of Indonesia, with research interests in Indonesian historiography, memories of violence, the Indonesian military, Islam and identity, and historical links between Indonesia and the world. She has published her works in international journals and monographs. Additionally, she recently held an Australian Research Council Future Fellowship for the project *Confronting Historical Injustice in Indonesia: Memory and Transnational Human Rights Activism*.

**Paul O'Shea** obtained his Bachelor of Arts (Hons) after completing his Honours Thesis at the University of Melbourne in Australia. Paul's research interests include Indonesian History, Indonesian language, and secondary education.

**Muhamad Trishadi Pratama** received his bachelor's degree in history from the History Department, Faculty of Humanities, Universitas Indonesia, in 2012. He is now living in Depok.

**L. G. Saraswati Putri** is a lecturer in the Department of Philosophy, Universitas Indonesia, who specializes in environmental philosophy. She received her doctoral degree in Philosophy from Universitas Indonesia. Currently she is focusing her research on revisiting East Indonesia's historical events and cultural roots.

**Abd. Rahman** is a lecturer at Universitas Khairun, Ternate, Indonesia. Currently pursuing his doctoral degree at Universitas Indonesia, his current research focuses on the history of Loloda, a forgotten sultanate of Northern Halmahera, Maluku, Indonesia. His extensive studies about the sultanate have brought him to new insights of Indonesia's eastern regions.

**Mawaddatul Khusna Rizqika** is a postgraduate student of the Archaeology department, Faculty of Humanities, Universitas Indonesia, with a special interest in Museum Studies. Graduated as a Cultural Anthropology bachelor from the Faculty of Cultural Sciences, Gadjah Mada University in 2007, she has been working as a curator in the National Museum of Indonesia since 2009. Some of her published works are *Jewelry* (2012) and *100 Everyday Objects from Southeast Asia and Korea* (2015).

**Agus Setiawan** is a lecturer at the Department of History, Universitas Indonesia. His PhD dissertation, *The Political and Economic Relationship of American-Dutch Colonial Administration in Southeast Asia: A Case Study of the Rivalry Between Royal Dutch/Shell and Standard Oil in the Netherlands Indies (1907–1928)*, was instrumental for his achievement of a doctoral degree from the Jacobs University in 2014. Known as a historian of Depok, he has made various research and publications.

**Siswantari Sijono** is a lecturer at Universitas Indonesia who is currently pursuing her doctoral degree at the same university. She develops a comprehensive and continuous research about the history and culture of Betawi Community in Indonesia. It is the dynamics of the community that draws her interest in conducting deep research on the aforementioned topic.

**Mokhamad Sodikin** He was a student president when he was pursuing an undergraduate degree at the Surabaya State University. Afterward, he continued his master's studies at Universitas Indonesia and majored in history. He graduated in 2017, and his research focuses on the study of political history.

**Kresno Yulianto Soekardi** is a lecturer at the Department of Archaeology in the Faculty of Humanities, Universitas Indonesia. His dissertation was completed at the State University of Jakarta, with the title *Pengaruh Strategi Pemecahan Masalah dan Pemahaman Sistem Nilai Budaya Terhadap Partisipasi Masyarakat dalam Pelestarian Kawasan Lindung Trowulan*. His research interests are museology and the promotion of museum for the larger public.

**Pudentia Maria Purenti S. S.** is an expert on Modern Literature who obtained her PhD on Oral Traditions through a program between the Universitas Indonesia, Leiden University and University of California, Berkeley, USA. She is a lecturer for the Faculty of Humanities in Universitas Indonesia, the head of Oral Traditions Consortium of the Ministry of Higher Education of the Republic of Indonesia, and the chairperson of the Oral Traditions Association. In addition, she is holding the respected position of the head of Experts on the Intangible Cultural Heritage of Indonesia.

**Suprayitno** is a records manager (archivist) at the Ministry of Manpower of the Republic of Indonesia. He holds a master's degree in archaeology (with a specialization in museology) from the Faculty of Humanities, Universitas Indonesia. His research interests are the felds of records management, archives, museology, and cultural studies. He is a member of Kappa Sigma Kappa Indonesia (KSKI), a study group of neo-documentation movement with concerns in the convergency of documentary institutions, such as gallery, library, archives, museum, monument, and sites (GLAMMS).

**Syahrial** is a lecturer at the Indonesian Studies Program, Faculty of Humanities, Universitas Indonesia. He completed his doctoral degree in 2016. Besides teaching at Universitas Indonesia, he also teaches at the Postgraduate Program for Police Sciences. He is currently doing research on oral traditions.

**Jonathan Peter Tehusijarana** is a PhD student in History at the School of Historical and Philosophical Studies at the University of Melbourne, Australia. His research interests include Indonesian student activism and twentieth-century Indonesian history.

**Sylvia Tiwon** is an associate professor at the University of Berkeley. She teaches literature, gender, oral and cultural studies of Southeast Asia with a focus on Indonesia. Her areas of interest include national and prenational literatures, oral discourse and mythologies, as well as sociocultural formations at the national and sub-national levels.

**Wanny Rahardjo Wahyudi** is Senior Lecturer of Archaeology, Faculty of Humanities, Universitas Indonesia. His research interests are in social archaeology and museum studies.

**Tria Sri Wahyuni** In 2017, she received her Bachelor of Humanities degree with a *cum laude* from the History Program, the Faculty of Humanities, Universitas Indonesia.

**Jacob Wray** is a PhD candidate in Indonesian history at the Australian National University. His current research interests include the control of population movement in colonial Indonesia, Javanese language and history, and the history of minorities in Indonesia.

**Susanto Zuhdi** is now Professor of History in the Faculty of Humanities at Universitas Indonesia. He is an enthusiast of maritime history and has been working on numerous writings regarding the history of Buton Island, which is in Southeast Sulawesi. His publications contain insights about the "forgotten" pages of Indonesian history, particularly the eastern and southern parts of the archipelago. Some of his works include *The War of Buton vs the Colonial Dutch 1752–1776*; *Nationalism, Sea, and History*; and *Cilacap 1830–1942: The Rise and Fall of the Port City in Central Java*.

# List of Figures

#### **Japanese War Memory and Transnational Activism for Indonesian Survivors of Enforced Military Prostitution During World War Two**


**Youth Visitor's Meaning-Making During Visit to the National History of Indonesia in The Museum Sejarah Nasional: Study of Constructivist Learning**


Fig. 2 Change of Vocabulary Quantity in Extent Dimension 258

**Engaging with the Public: Comparing the National Museum of Indonesia and the Kolong Tangga Museum from the New Museology Perspective**


# List of Tables

#### **Memory of the Seroja Struggle: Memories and the Challenges of Life After Military Operations 1978–1998**


#### **Youth Visitor's Meaning-Making During Visit to the National History of Indonesia in The Museum Sejarah Nasional: Study of Constructivist Learning**


**Engaging with the Public: Comparing the National Museum of Indonesia and the Kolong Tangga Museum from the New Museology Perspective**


# Introduction

# Trajectories of Memory: An Introduction

*Melani Budianta and Sylvia Tiwon*

The Indonesian writer Pramoedya Ananta Toer ends his short story, "All that is Gone," with a critical refection on the act of remembering:

How long does it take to speak a sentence? The sound of his voice was but for a few moments. A momentary tremble of sound waves, and then it was gone, not to be repeated. Yet, like the Lusi that constantly skirts the city of Blora, like the waters of that river, the remembered sound of that voice, coursing through memory, will continue to fow—forever, toward its estuary and the boundless sea. And not one person knows when the sea will be dry and lose its tide.

M. Budianta (\*)

Literature Department, Faculty of Humanities, Universitas Indonesia, Depok, Indonesia e-mail: melani.budianta@ui.ac.id

S. Tiwon Department of South and Southeast Asian Studies, University of California, Berkeley, Berkeley, CA, USA e-mail: tiwon@berkeley.edu

© The Author(s) 2023 M. Budianta, S. Tiwon (eds.), *Trajectories of Memory*, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-99-1995-6\_1

But all that is gone, gone from the grasp of the senses.1

In this dense passage, the narrator begins by recalling his deceased father's words about justice and personal freedom. Yet for him, the very effort required to voice his father's advice marks the transience of sensory perception and the beginning of memory: it ends in apprehension about the precarity of memory in the passage of time.

The story traces the interplay of sense, memory, and inscription as the narrator grows from a young child to an adult in a time of turbulent transition—the *jaman edan*, a time of madness or chaos in the traditional Javanese concept of time2—for him personally as for the nation. The child is overwhelmed by the experiences his senses offer up, and dependent upon his parents and an aging nurse to make socially and culturally acceptable sense of them. The young adult he becomes begins to write down these memories, but paradoxically, the act of writing opens up disjunctions between the explanations his elders offered to keep him quiet and what his own, mature, acts of recall reveal. The parallels Pramoedya suggests between the child and the emergent nation are clear. Remembering the child awed by the "greatness of the people in olden days" in the stories he is told, the narrator attempts to break the seductive power (*pesona*) of the old stories and declares: "Looking back now, I see that I was like many people, both now and then, who would rather think about the past than deal with the present" (p. 6).

The gap between sensory perception and the vulnerability of memory, not only in the course of time but also in the hands of power, has been a tenacious topic in Indonesian studies. In the aftermath of the downfall of the authoritarian New Order, the predominant discourse on memory has focused on bringing to voice those silenced in the 1965–1968 purges, thereby addressing what were recognized as distortions in the narratives of

1English translation by Willem Samuels, 2005, of the closing passage of Pramoedya Ananta Toer's short story, "Yang Sudah Hilang" in *Cerita Dari Blora*, 1952: "Suara itu hanya terdengar beberapa detik saja dalam hidup. Getaran suara yang sebentar saja berdengung, takkan terulang lagi. Tapi seperti juga halnya dengan Kali Lusi, yang abadi menggarisi kota Blora, dan seperti kali itu juga, suara yang tersimpan menggarisi kenangan dan ingatan itu mengalir juga—mengalir ke muaranya, ke lautan yang tak bertepi. Dan tak seorang pun tahu kapan laut itu akan kering dan berhenti bertepi. Hilang."

2A term used by the nineteenth-century Javanese poet Ronggowarsito about the cycles of time. See Benedict Anderson's application of this to the disruptions of national revolution (1998, p. 78).

that recent past (Zurbuchen, 2005; Heryanto, 2005; Setiawan, 2006; Roosa, 2006; Adam, 2015). The turbulent *Reformasi* of 1998 (Budiman et al., 1999; Sukanta, 1999; Lee, 2016; Pramesti, 2018) also gave rise to more critical scholarship on other historical moments involving confict and violence, such as the Dutch colonial period (Bijl, 2015; Baay, 2015; Limpach, 2016) and the Japanese Occupation (Janssen, 2010; Mariana, 2015). There has been scholarship on groups affected by these traumatic historical junctures including the Chinese Indonesians (Dawis, 2009) and the Acehnese (Grayman et al., 2009; Good et al., 2010) to name but two. There have also been works on mnemonic instruments and memorialization (Kusno, 2010) and the impact of violence on the contours of urban space (Colombijn, 2016).

Not all memory work is concerned with violence, but the historic scar can serve as a powerful mnemonic, as Auerbach discusses in "Odysseus' Scar" in *Mimesis*, his infuential work on narrative and the representations of reality: in Homer's epic, when the scar is touched, no matter how inadvertently, it must be brought "out of the darkness of an unilluminated past, it must be set in full light" (2013, p. 6). In the Indonesian myth of Sangkuriang, the scar the mother unexpectedly touches on her visitor's head jogs her memory and reveals his true identity: he is her son and the killer of his father. The scar serves as a point of remembrance and recognition in the process of coming to consciousness. For Indonesia, slowly and often painfully emerging from a painful past, as is the case with other postcolonial countries, the importance of decolonizing also involves the act of demilitarizing, of challenging the imaginary construction of Indonesia as a zone of military authority, as a country under a state of exception. Remembering can function as a process of critical disengagement from repressive regimes of thought, but for this to be possible, new strategies are needed to avoid the construction of a unilinear trajectory with a set telos.

It is precisely with this aim of clearing a space for a plurality of memory works that this book is conceptualized. Potential readers who select books based on the word "memory" in the title may not fnd the common themes itemized above. The book may be defned as much by what it leaves out as by what it includes and fulflls. The project began as an effort at gathering scattered work done by scholars on diverse subjects and localities. Some of this research offers rich ethnographic data, which might not directly resonate with the dominant discourse on memory. Juxtaposing these diverse works—on the role of marginalized historical actors, contestations of local memories, transformation of traditional arts and ritual in its transmission—we discover a new vista of multiple trajectories of memory being traced out in and about Indonesia, a quiet yet potentially transformative energy of memory work.

The labor of memory presented in this volume involves marking out and following different, multiple trajectories that we cluster along four broad themes. The frst part, the "Politics of Collective Memory," covers competing or evolving representations of particular events, customs or traditions, and historical personae in offcial and popular expression as they are shaped by economic, political, and cultural forces. The second part deals with memories of war and peace, examining the transnational confict and collaboration, the role of political elites and state projects in dealing with the aftermath of military aggression, and most of all the impact and responses of civilians. The third part focuses on the framing of various historical actors and fgures by the state and civil societies, which transcend the dichotomy of heroes and victims. The fourth part, "Curating Memory," looks at the way Indonesian museums and museology after 1998 serve as the sites where new kinds of memory work occur.

# Part I: The Politics of Memory

This part highlights four overlooked fgures and moments in local histories: the forgotten role of Muhammad Masserie, an intellectual leader from Ethnic Betawi, a "rebel" from Loloda Kingdom in Maluku, a treaty made during Dutch colonial period in Kalimantan, and the quiet transformation of an oral and performative tradition from Sumatra. From Batavia to Maluku, Kalimantan, and Sumatra, from the colonial past to the present, these four chapters argue for the signifcance of lesser-known historical facts in understanding Indonesia's contemporary political and cultural politics.

**Chap. 2** by **Siswantari Sijono** and **Susanto Zuhdi** focuses on the role of Mohammad Masserie in laying the intellectual foundation of the ethnic Betawi community through his activism in the organization of *Perhimpunan Kaum Betawi* (1923) and in the organization's newsletter, *Tjahaja Betawi.* In national history as well as in public discourse, Masserie is barely known, in contrast to the popularity of Muhammad Husni Thamrin, whose name is used for Jakarta's main street and whose pictures are used in stamps and Indonesian paper money. As Masserie's contemporary, Husni Thamrin led a more prominent political actor by joining the *Volksraad* (Colonial Council) as a representative of a political party called Parindra (Partai Indonesia Raya). Suspected of subversion against Dutch authorities in 1941, Thamrin was put in house arrest. When he died of sickness during the arrest, Thamrin's fgure rose as a nationalist martyr/hero. Replacing Thamrin as the chair of the *Perhimpunan Kaum Betawi*, Masserie, with his low-profle fgure and emphasis on education and literacy, was left unnoticed. Working within an ethnic-based organization, Masserie was relegated merely as a "local" fgure. Discussion of Masserie's role in the mass organization and newspaper in this frst chapter can be seen as an act of remembering and balancing this gap in collective memory. This chapter not only flls the vacuum of scholarly discussion on Masserie, but also corrects the general representation of ethnic Betawi as intellectually inactive during the pre-independence period, oriented more toward an aggressive physical anti-colonial front.

The writers of **Chap. 3**, **Abd. Rahman**, **Tommy Christomy**, **Susanto Zuhdi,** and **L.G. Saraswati Putri**, focus on another local hero, Sikuru from the Loloda Kingdom, one of the oldest kingdoms in the Maluku region which emerged from an Islamic family dynasty, presumably in the ffteenth century. Covering large coastal area in North Halmahera, Loloda is considered the "lost kingdom," with textual evidence found only in a colonial document after it was being put under Ternate sovereignty in 1912. In local collective memory, the story of Loloda is not only a narrative of colonial repression but a continued marginalization, even after Independence, and up to the present. The collective effort of the Loloda community in remembering their local hero, Sikuru, especially his heroic fght against the economic and political domination of the Dutch, therefore, is a political and cultural act of resistance against their present marginalization. This chapter foregrounds the context of the Loloda revolt and the intricate power relations to secure economic-political supremacy since the colonial time.

In **Chap. 4, Siti Utami Haryanti** revisits a groundbreaking event in 1894 that shaped the life of the Dayak communities in Kalimantan. From May to July 1894, over 800 Dayak tribal leaders assembled in Tumbang Anoi, upstream of Kayahan River, in Central Kalimantan, to agree upon a confict resolution based on economic sanction, rather than the practice of head-hunting, which was then an established practice during tribal wars. The initiator of the Tumbang Anoi treaty was Dutch East Indies colonial government, with the help of Damang Batu, chief of one Dayak tribe in Tumbang Anoi. The event led to the agreement called the *Treaty of*  *Tumbang Anoi*, which not only banned head-hunting practice, but helped the Dutch domesticate the indigenous population, spread Christianity among the Dayak tribes, and gave opportunities for the Dutch miners to exploit the land. Going back and forth from the present to the past and back to today's context, the chapter discusses the postcolonial legacy of the Tumbang Anoi treaty. Complex and contradictory, this colonial milestone has in one aspect unifed the Dayak tribes, while at the same time concocted the very forces of colonial and national modernity which eventually marginalized them. In contrast to the revival mode of the Sikuru memorialization, the Tumbang Anoi treaty, which has greatly shaped Kalimantan today, is hardly remembered by the local population. The chapter addresses this erasure of memory as an overdetermined gap to refect amidst the controversial plan of the Jokowi government to move the capital to the heart of Kalimantan.

The last chapter in this part (**Chap. 5**), written by **Madia Patra Ismar**, **Pudentia Maria Purenti,** and **Syahrial**, follows the transformation of an oral tradition from the sacred realm of adat, to the dynamic art of modern choreography, and eventually to a screen icon. *Silek Harimau* is a sacred dance in rural Minangkabau, practiced only by a few chosen pupils of a guru, whose great master is believed to be the Tiger spirit. While being exclusively restricted, the oral tradition is transmitted trans-locally, as Minangkabau young men practiced *merantau,* or migrated outside their birthplace to fnd their living far from home to other islands. Shifting to other localities, the collective memory of this sacred dance was transformed into a more profane performing arts, that is, choreographed modern dance and martial arts school in urban centers, including the capital city, Jakarta, and eventually crossing national boundaries. By examining how students, gurus, and performers remember and practice this evolving art, this chapter examines the collapsing boundaries installed to separate adat from the contemporary world, the traditional from the modern. The chapter also problematizes the division of orality and the written word by showing how dancers and practitioners use their memory to move their body according to the shape of a holy inscription. Like previous chapters, this chapter addresses the complex and contradictory forces of memory work. While capital and market forces brought the *Silek Harimau* into international scale through the popular screen, fundamentalist religious force back home in the original site of the oral tradition represses it by considering it as not in line with Islamic religion.

# Part II: Remembering War and Peace

This part focuses on memory at the national scale, involving transnational relations, in times of confict or of peace. It discusses the complex ways some historical events are remembered or forgotten in scholarship, history books, or by individuals and groups affected by them. Several chapters examine different memories and the effect of military aggression on individuals and collective groups, which, in turn, engender the kind of transnational relations and activism. This part of the volume also considers state projects in the aftermath of its own military aggression, and the memories and responses of the military subjects affected both by the aggression and the state project.

The frst two chapters in this part discuss the way Japanese occupation is remembered, both at the national level and in personal memories. Comparing it with the Dutch colonial experience, **Jacob Wray,** in **Chap. 6,** argued that the Japanese occupation was more ambivalent and was marked by "indifference." Interviewing individuals from Jakarta, Central Java, Maluku, Nusa Tenggara Timur, and Papua, he found that despite the acknowledgment of Japanese military cruelty, the memory did not generate hatred. In fact, according to Wray, postwar impression of the Japanese in the eye of Indonesians was more positive, with admiration toward Japan's advanced economy and modernity. After the 1974 student protest of Japanese monopoly during Prime Minister Tanaka's visit to Indonesia, both governments were keen to strengthen economic ties. This and the short period of occupation, plus postwar compensation, were a few factors seen by Wray as contributing to the softening of the past trauma.

Studying the transnational activism on the subject of Japanese "comfort women," however, **Katherine McGregor,** in **Chap. 7**, offers quite a different take on the issue. While Indonesians in Wray's chapter were ready to forgive the aggressor, Japanese leftist individuals with their own personal trauma of military aggression reached out to Indonesian survivors of Iu Gun Ian Fu during the Japanese occupation and advocated to compensate for their past abuses. This chapter follows the life history of three individuals born between 1934 and 1947, before and after the war— Takagi Ken'ichi (a lawyer), Kimura Koichi (a priest), and Matsui Yayori (a journalist/activist)—to fnd explanation for their transformation into transnational activism for Iu Gun Ian Fu survivors. Besides family suffering during the war, like in Wray's chapter, complex factors came to play as the supporting multidimensional contexts for their activism. Strongest of all is their direct interaction with survivors that nurtured their capacity to understand "historical experience of other countries" and empathize with people outside Japan who suffered from injustice done by Japan during the war.

In the two chapters above, individuals who are affected directly or indirectly by military aggression construct their memories differently due to various factors. The question now remains: how governments, as the one responsible for the aggression, deal with the consequences of its own military operation—in lieu of the soldiers involved in the war and their families? Scholarship on the aftermath of the Vietnam War has shown the U.S. government's underplayed effort in coming to terms with the legacy of the two decades of war and the veterans' initiatives for healing (Hagopian, 2009). The subject of **Chap. 8** is the Indonesian government project in dealing with the veterans of a special operation (code-named Seroja or Lotus) in the aftermath of the Indonesian occupation of Timor Leste (1978–1999). This is an under-researched topic, as scholarly attention is directed at the controversy of the aggression and the humanitarian impact. It is a rather dark area in Indonesian history for the military and paramilitary violence during the occupation and in the time before Timor Leste fnally got its independence. **Tria Sri Wahyuni** and **Agus Setiawan** interviewed former soldiers, widows, and families of the unsung veterans, many of whom were disabled, about their memories and responses toward the government's rehabilitation program. The chapter describes the compensation that President Soeharto, who initiated the operation, gave to the veterans by mobilizing funding through the various foundations that he established during his tenure. Depending on their experience, veterans had mixed memories about the war, but were largely satisfed with the compensation. A differing, more critical voice was voiced within the children of the veterans, although only from one individual. The government project and the memory of the Seroja operation still need to be explored further. This chapter shows that awareness about this diffcult moment in post-military aggression history is emerging among Indonesian scholars, as it is a challenging research to unpack something that was hidden while it was happening. The fact that only the militarized image comes out from the interviews shows the diffculty and challenge of demilitarization.

The last chapter in this part, **Chap. 9**, written by **Ahmad Fahrurodji** and **Susanto Zuhdi**, highlights another under-researched area in national history as well as public memory, that is, the relations between the USSR and Indonesia after Indonesian independence in 1945 and prior to the outbreak of the Cold War anti-communist outbreak in 1965. The chapter focuses on the personal relations between Stalin, Kruschev, and President Soekarno and argues that the intimacy of the leaders served as an important factor in the political diplomacy, especially in the critical time of Indonesia's struggle for independence and sovereignty. Russia-Indonesia relations have been underrepresented in the local scholarship due to the state anti-communist ideology, even after the fall of the Berlin wall that signals the neoliberal supremacy. A renewed interest in the subject, therefore, marks a new trajectory. The chapter also delivers a "human touch" by collating personal letters of Russian leaders and by analyzing the diplomatic strategies in accommodating the individual taste and characters of Soekarno.

# Part III: Tracing Agency

The third part compiles four chapters about historical fgures and actors, their interaction with the state and other historical forces, and most of all the way they are framed in historical narratives. In line with the argument made in the frst chapter, the four chapters suggest that in discussing historical fgures in post-Reformasi Indonesia, there is no longer one "same script."

Part III begins by **Paul O'Shea** (**Chap. 10**), who sets up the frame by delineating the shifting discourse of heroes and victims since the leadership of Soekarno, to Soeharto and the post-Reformasi Indonesia. What remains consistent is the link between the choice for foregrounding certain individuals as national heroes (or victims) and the regime political agenda, such as Soekarno's anti-colonial stance and Soeharto's anticommunist ideology. This chapter discusses controversies regarding state nomination of certain individuals as heroes, such as General Sarwo Edhi, which can be in line or contradictory to the perspectives of civil society actors. Similarly, the chapter problematizes the framing of heroic victims (Moenir, Adi Rukun) by using the concept of competitive victimhood.

The fgure and social role of *botoh* (Javanese term, referring to a cockfght gambler), in democratic processes in Indonesia, in **Mokhamad Sodikin** and **Abdurakhman**'s chapter (**Chap. 11**), is defnitely beyond the script of hero or victim. Focusing on the democratic processes in Tuban, East Java, from the New Order to the present, the writers examine the way *botoh* transmogrify, from common gamblers into leaders in current politics. Emerging from the common folk, through his involvement in the betting culture, the *botoh* accumulated social capital and the skill to mobilize people, which enabled him to take on the role of mediator between the elites and the masses. Seizing the opportunities of the new democratic regulation of village head regulation, the *botoh* turned elections as a form of gambling, and emerged as village leaders. Although the role of older *botoh* in Tuban decreased in the vast political changes after the Reformasi of 1998, this chapter points to the susceptibility for the larger Indonesian democratic arena to be turned into *botoh* politics.

The last two chapters of this section deal with the role of students as historical agents, vis-à-vis a repressive state on the one hand and student population in relation with nonstudent population on the other hand, categorized as *rakyat* (or the people) or the masses during a time of political crisis. **Muhamad Trishadi Pratama** and **Muhammad Iskandar**'s chapter (**Chap. 12**) examines state project in disciplining, containing, shaping, and taming student populations during President Soekarno's Guided Democracy Era (1961–1965). The chapter examines the way the state, through the minister of education, enforced state ideology called *Manipol Usdek* to university students. The writers argue that *Manipol Usdek*, an abbreviation of Soekarno's decreed political manifesto of fve state ideological pillars (the 1945 constitution, Indonesian Socialism, Guided Democracy, Guided Economy, and Indonesian Character), is a means for legitimizing Soekarno's power. The indoctrination was administered through a monitored curriculum, compulsory subjects, training of lecturers, and issuing regulations to ban so-called Western infuences in students' lifestyle (such as dancing and partying). Ineffective and resisted by students, the whole project ended up in failure, as the subject of this indoctrination, namely student population, helped to topple down Soekarno in 1965. This chapter critically refects on the recurring pattern of ideological indoctrination in subsequent governments: the Pancasila (called the P4) indoctrination during the Sohearto's government, and similar program initiated in the current leadership of President Jokowi.

**Jonathan Peter Tehusirajana**'s chapter (**Chap. 13**) continues the discussion about students as historical actors, focusing on a critical contestation that occurred toward the end of Soeharto's New Order regime, three decades after the period discussed in the previous chapter. In relation to the previous chapter, Jonathan Peter Tehusirajana also remembers a project administered by the Soeharto government, similar to what Soekarno had done earlier in controlling student population. The policy to "normalize campus life/body for student coordination" (NKK/BKK policy) is deemed to "kill campus politics" or to depoliticize student population. As it was before, the project was deemed to failure, as students became critical of the New Order authoritarianism. The chapter put two moments with differing students-nonstudents relations in contrast, the Kedungombo activism of 1985 and the student protest of May 1998. For the frst, the writer proposes the concept of "*bunuh diri kelas*," in which students aligned themselves with *rakyat*, the common people marginalized by the New Order's economic developmentalism. For the second, the relations became precarious as students are pitted against nonstudent mob (*massa*). Here, the traumatic memory of Malari (abbreviation of January 15, 1974, student protest movement protesting economic mismanagement during the visit of Japanese Prime Minister Tanaka) served as a cautionary reference. This chapter argues that there is a fuid positioning and relations between student and nonstudent protestors with different framing (*rakyat, massa*) based on historical memory and circumstances.

# Part IV: Curating Memory

The chapters in this part take us behind the scenes of what are commonly seen to be designed as seamless, uncritical spectating, often with a singular, linear line of history—connected to ideology. Behind these initiatives is the need to decolonize the museums, using the perhaps very technical language of new curation theory and practice. The Indonesian museum has served as a storage of post-independence bricolage from out of colonial collecting, to the unilinear historical trajectory of nation (already Old Order, New Order rivalry—the militarization, the loss of other voices). This pile of memory is what is now being unwound, with a new poetics in which the authorial ethos is decentered, allowing interaction, inviting individual memories perhaps toward the demilitarization of the image.

The frst chapter in this part, **Chap.** 14 written by **Suprayitno** and **Kresno Yulianto Soekardi**, relates to previous chapters on students (Chaps. 12 and 13) by focusing on youth's perception on the Indonesian National History Museum. This is a set of diorama display underneath the National Monument. Planned by President Soekarno in 1959 to instill "spirit of patriotism among Indonesian youth in the future," the museum was only completed under the New Order government, which altered and fnalized the exhibition. As Katherine McGregor (2003) has shown, plan and fnal exhibit of the diorama of the Indonesian National History Museum was the result of ideological battles between Soekarno's socialism and Soeharto's strategy to erase Soekarno's legacy and instead highlight the role of himself and the New Order. The New Order fnal version kept two period-themes proposed by Soekarno, which were the greatness of the past and which was contrasted to the bleak colonial period. The third period, which was initially designed for the future of Indonesian socialism, was changed to "The Age of Resurrection to Greatness." What Suprayitno and Kresno Yulianto Soekardi's chapter contribute to the existing knowledge is to examine how young people born after the Reformasi (the end of the New Order) make meaning out of the display. Using the PMM (personal meaning mapping) as their method, the writers produce quantitative tabulation of the changes (vocabulary, breadth, depth, and mastery) before and after seeing the diorama. The chapter shows that depending on their education background and interest in history, most young people were indeed affected positively by the diorama (correcting or confrming their knowledge, adding new insights). What is interesting in the fndings is that male visitors responded more to the theme about the "Greatness of the Maritime Era" and "the Age of Resurrection to Greatness," which show strength and virility, while women are affected by the "Darkness of Dutch Imperialism," presumably appealing to empathic feeling of suffering. Another fnding is the disappointment of some young visitors for not fnding Reformasi heroes such as President Gus Dur, and the critical questioning of the diorama depicting Soeharto receiving the command letter of March 11 that justifed Soeharto's rise to power.

**Chapter 15** is a comparative study of curatorial practice at two different museums, the State National Museum and the Kolong Tangga Toy Museum owned by a nonproft organization in Yogyakarta. The writers, **Mawaddatul Khusna Rizqika** and **Wanny Rahardjo Wahyudi**, apply new museology theory to evaluate the curatorial management of the two museums. The chapter contextualizes the two museums and their contrasting curatorial characters. The State National Museum is a postcolonial legacy, which was used to display colonial power over Nusantara regions. The writers show that while adjusting to the new vision and mission, it is still a challenging task for the curators to give new framing for its collection. With intricate structure of departments, the curatorial management of this state museum is highly structured and bureaucratic and often shows overlapping task and job division. Lack of human resource and expertise compromises the quality of collection. The language of curation is scientifc and formal, and the exhibition creates a distance toward the collection. The Kolong Tangga Museum, with a focused collection and clear target audience (children), in stark contrast, has a much simpler structure, and therefore could afford fexibility and creativity. With only one curator, who happens to be the founder and the owner of most of the donated collection, the museum curatorial practice is handled almost single-handedly. Limited funding, which is not a problem in State National Museum, is a challenge for the small museum. The curatorial language is informal and colloquial, with a more interactive approach and themes relevant to current social and environmental issues.

While the previous two chapters evaluate the curatorial practice of the museum and the audience engagement, the last chapter, **Chap. 16**, written by **Putri Haryanti** and **Irmawati Marwoto**, takes another practical step in combining the two. After evaluating the exhibit at the Gallery of Honor in the Presidential Museum of the Republic of Indonesia, Balai Kirti, the writers argue that there is a hollow space, empty of historical narratives in the display of each of the 6 Indonesian presidents, thus making the exhibit devoid of both "wonder" and "resonance." This contrasts with the wealth of references that can be found in the popular memorialization of the six presidents in various media and monuments in the country. Based on literature reviews and interviews, the writers then propose six narrative themes and design various activities for engaging with the audience. This chapter is public history in the making, implementing new museology theory to construct collective memory for the larger audience.

The whole part shows museums as sites of contestation, an arena to decolonize the past and to reach toward new audiences, especially the youth. The chapters also unpack ideological mechanics behind the image, the diorama, and also the bureaucracy of curating. This last part might seem technical, but it is a new kind of memory work done by generations of Indonesian, whose public history had been rigidly controlled by previous regimes.

# Memory Work

While it is crucial to observe the plurality and connections of memory work presented above, as well as the traps that lie in wait, we need to be cautious perhaps of touching yet another scar. In her novel on memories of the spice trade, *The Ten Thousand Things*, Maria Dermout (2002) confronts the quest to fnd the past in order to disinter it. The narrator begins with the conceptualization of memory as an accessible, located object: "The remembrance of a human being, of something that happened, can remain in a place, tangible almost—perhaps there is someone left who knows of it and thinks about it sometimes." In no time, this easy access becomes complicated, as memory is reduced to mystery: "Here it was different again: with no foothold anywhere—nothing more than a question! A perhaps?" This is followed by a series of questions: "Did lovers embrace? Did they say goodbye? Did a child play there? Who was standing there? But the only answer is silence" (p. 6).

In the process of fnding ways to unlock the mysteries from the past that continue to haunt the present, the protagonist recounts what her son learned from the son of their native servants: "'Listen!' he says, 'the beginning of it all is to listen!'" (p. 98). These words speak of layers of transmission, not only from one generation to another, but from one social position to another. Concealed in this advice or warning is a condescending tone that signals the master's inability to listen to lesser stories; the inability of those who bear the privilege of authority—even past authority—leads to a repetition of the patterns of an un-innocent past: "repetition, repetition, nothing but repetitions linked to one another. Again and again the same, and again and once more" (p. 45). In Maria Dermout's novel, the deafness against lesser memories is fatal, leading to the death of the protagonist's son, precisely the person she wished to protect by disinterring these memories and bringing them to light. Who are the people they fail to listen to? These are the people who bear different memories, people who are made servants or mere vessels for the exercise of a "civilizing" power.

For Indonesia, dismantling authoritarian narratives of the past has long been a critically important, often dangerous, task. In the early years of the twentieth century, Mas Marco Kartodikromo's early effort to rewrite the Javanese chronicle of kingship, the *Babad Tanah Jawi*, from a people's perspective (Munasichin, 2005, p. 186; Chambert-Loir, 2018, p. 12) and the poetry he wrote from the prison, *Syair Rempah-Rempah* (1918), were direct challenges aimed at both European colonialism and indigenous forms of feudal adaptation to the pressures of global capital. Even earlier, R.A. Kartini had articulated this necessarily double plot line of critical narrative, though in the early twentieth century writing was seen as an act that took place in the public arena, where no "good" or "moral" woman had any place. In *Madilog*, Tan Malaka presents an imagined park to memorialize alternative world and national heroes. In their 2008 edited volume on writing history, *Perspektif Baru Penulisan Sejarah Indonesia,* Nordholt, Purwanto, and Saptari remind us of another double danger in the inscription of the past, in the two dimensions of writing about what happened ("*apa yang terjadi*") and what is said to have happened ("*apa yang 'dikatakan telah terjadi*,*'*" p. 1). They remind us also that interpretation cannot be separated from the writing of history, and that the methodologies we use must engage the subtle, the less tangible dimensions of the narratives we produce about our past (p. 3). In the conclusion, we fnd ourselves returning to Pramoedya's refections on narrating memory, the transcience of the real, and the role of writing not so much to preserve the past in its pristine purity, but rather to engage with the gaps that writing opens up.

# References


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# Politics of Memory

# The Leadership of Muhammad Masserie in *Perhimpoenan Kaoem Betawi* (The Association of Ethnic Betawi) 1923–1940

*Siswantari Sijono and Susanto Zuhdi*

# Introduction

Those who have lived for quite some time in Jakarta would not fnd *Si Doel Anak Betawi* unfamiliar. Originally a children's story, the frst to use Betawian dialect, it was later adapted into a TV series that portrayed the marginalization of the Betawi people, the perceived "natives" of Jakarta, amid the progressive development of the city. Although some of the lyrics of the series' theme song sound a bit rhetorical ("*Anak Betawi … ketinggalan jaman… katenye*?" that roughly translates to "Betawi people are barely catching up with progress… aren't they?"), what the theme song says might have some truth in it: Betawians are often left behind compared with people from other ethnic groups in Indonesia.

There are two underlying factors that cause this condition: education and economic capability. The TV series *Si Doel* depicts the life of a young Betawinese who managed to graduate from a university. The fact that this

S. Sijono (\*) • S. Zuhdi

History Department, Faculty of Humanities, Universitas Indonesia, Depok, Indonesia

achievement is celebrated suggests that it is not common. Secondly, Betawians are known to have acres of lands, which they sell inch by inch in order to sustain their living.

Marginalized by the urban and economic development of the capital, the Betawi people are forced to move to the outskirts of Jakarta. A rising cultural awareness seems to emerge among Betawians as they promote their cultural identity and tradition through ethnic communities, such as *Forum Keluarga Betawi* (Forkabi) and *Betawi Rempuk*.

What is forgotten, including by Betawians themselves, are the past achievements of Betawian intellectuals and activists such as Muhammad Masserie, who, in the early decades of the twentieth century, dedicated his life to advancing the education and cultural life of Betawians through the organization called *Perhimpoenan Kaoem Betawi*.

The organization emerged in the second decade of the twentieth century, which was often considered the era of development in the Dutch East Indies. This was a period that saw the rise of Hindia natives (*Bumiputera*), who voiced their aspirations for a nationalist movement to fght for Indonesian nationhood.

The birth of the Indonesian national movement was marked by the establishment of ethnic-based organizations by students in Batavia, namely Jong Jawa, Sumatranen Bond, and Pasundan. In addition, youths of Betawi origin founded *Perhimpoenan Kaoem Betawi* (Association of Ethnic Betawi) and registered it as a legal entity in 1923. Betawi is the term used to defne an indigenous ethnic group of Batavia that was originally a mixture of various ethnic groups settled in the area. Remco Raben argues that the formation of Betawi as an ethnic group can be traced back to the seventeenth century.

In the early seventeenth century, Jan Pieterszoon Coen (governorgeneral of the Dutch East India Company (VOC) from 1619 to 1623 and 1628 to 1629) took over Jayakarta and razed the residential district in West Ciliwung. As a result, most of its residents left the area and sought refuge in Banten or in the highlands of Mount Salak and Mount Gede. In 1619, Coen rebuilt Batavia and invited people from the Netherlands and the countryside to settle in the city. It was then called the City of Migrants as a result. According to Remco Raben, Batavia became a multi-ethnic city consisting of residents from various backgrounds, including Europeans, Mestizos, Mardijkers, Chinese, Moors, Malays, Balinese, Javanese, and people from different the eastern islands, like Maluku, Sulawesi, Sumbawa, and Timor. Batavia also hosted slaves who came from various tribes across the country.

The VOC provided the invited ethnic groups with residential areas in the *Ommelanden* (surrounding territory), in which they eventually formed villages. Those from Bali, Bugis, Makassar, and Java were placed alongside the West Canal up to the Angke area. Meanwhile, the Ambonese population was assigned to reside in the eastern part of the city, specifcally, around the Marunda River. However, residential separation based on ethnicity did not go as planned by the colonial government. Many members of these ethnic groups left their assigned villages to move to other places that offered better economic opportunities. Cross-ethnic marriages also became a signifcant factor that blurred the boundaries between ethnic groups. This phenomenon was even more common in the eighteenth century. As a result, it created a new ethnic group called Betawi (Remco Raben, 2007, p. 122).

The development of Batavia as a center of education had turned the city into a top destination for youths from other regions wishing to continue their studies. These youths used the city as a meeting place with their countrymen, which fostered the nationalist youth movements. Budi Utomo was the frst organization founded in this context, initiated by the students of STOVIA in 1908. Students from other regions who were studying in Batavia then created their own organizations, such as Pasundan, Sumatranen Bond, and Jong Java. As an indigenous ethnic group in Batavia, Betawi youths also established their own organization, *Perhimpoenan Kaoem Betawi*.

According to Besluit, as the chair and secretary of *Perhimpoenan Kaoem Betawi*, Muhammad Masserie and M. Damiri requested permission to formally establish the association on April 4, 1923. Bob Hering stated that the founder of *Kaoem Betawi* (Betawi community) in 1916 was Thamrin Muhammad Thabri, the father of Muhammad Hoesni Thamrin.

As it developed, *Perhimpoenan Kaoem Betawi* made a shift from an ethnic-based organization into a nationalist movement. The role of the association's leaders was undoubtedly vital in this context. Nevertheless, discourse on the association is mainly centered on the fgure of M. Hoesni Thamrin, and other central fgures are left unrecognized even though their roles were indisputably signifcant. One may ask who took over the leadership of *Perhimpoenan Kaoem Betawi* after Thamrin became more active in a more revolutionary nationalist movement. This chapter argues that the motor of the association was none other than Muhammad Masserie.

Muhammad Masserie was the frst chair of the association after it was registered as a legal entity in 1923. He held the position for two years until 1924, and then was transferred to his offce in Kupang, East Nusa Tenggara Province. During his two-year term as chair, he laid the foundation for the association's nationalist vision. He built solidarity among the Betawi through the association and formulated strategies to increase the ethnic Betawi population. He encouraged all Betawi people to be members of the association to achieve prosperity for ethnic Betawi specifcally and the Hindia Belanda population in general. Masserie had shown himself to be an infuential actor within *Perhimpoenan Kaoem Betawi*. His leadership became a barometer for the association's future movements. For instance, during the association's general meeting in 1938, Masserie was still asked to give his opinion about issues related to the Betawi community. Furthermore, *Berita Kaoem Betawi*, the association's newspaper, published a special article about Masserie's leadership, titled "Toeroetlah Kaoem Betawi jang Dahoeloe" (Follow the (Example) of the Past Betawi Community).

The questions this chapter attempts to answer are as follows: "What was the leadership of Muhammad Masserie in *Perhimpoenan Kaoem Betawi* like?" "What were his strategies to develop the Betawi community?"

There has not been much research on *Perhimpoenan Kaoem Betawi*. The existing studies, such as research by Pringgodigdo (1950), Leirissa (1985), and Hering (2003), have not discussed the association in a comprehensive manner. Their articles do not highlight the leadership of Masserie in his vital role as the association's frst chair. Bob Hering, in his book, only discusses the involvement of M. Husni Thamrin without even mentioning Masserie.

Similar to Benedict Anderson, who saw that visions of a national unity were facilitated by print capitalism (2008, p. 66), Masserie knew the importance of newspapers (in this case, *Tjahaja Betawi*) as an instrument which shaped Betawinese solidarity as a part of Indonesian-ness. Masserie's movement in developing *Kaoem Betawi* cannot be separated from newspapers. As an editor of *Tjahaja Betawi,* Masserie opted to use Malay, and not Betawinese, as the language of the newspaper. This strategy allowed *Tjahaja Betawi* to reach every region of the Dutch East Indies, sowing seeds of Indonesian-ness.

This chapter affrms Masserie as the agent of change for the Betawi community. Masserie had the passion, capacity, and power to change the community. *Perhimpoenan Kaoem Betawi* was created as an engine for the development of the ethnic Betawi community. Through his leadership, Masserie applied strategies to achieve this objective despite the fact that the Betawis were still underdeveloped in the early twentieth century.

# The Leadership of Masserie in *Perhimpoenan Kaoem Betawi*

Masserie's leadership of *Perhimpoenan Kaoem Betawi* during the 1920s may set an example for Betawi communities in the present. Today's Betawi communities are working on an issue similar to that of Masserie's time: developing the welfare of the marginalized Betawi people. In advocating the welfare of Betawi people, Masserie's movement was not running on a small scale. In spite of this, there has not been any research which elaborates Masserie's strategies.

In the frst year after its establishment, through Masserie's leadership, *Perhimpoenan Kaoem Betawi* successfully built and awakened solidarity among the Betawis, which was a milestone in the history of the association. Building solidarity was deemed essential to achieve the primary objective of the association, namely, to develop the Betawi community and Hindia Nederland natives in general. As chair of the association from 1923 to 1924, Masserie employed the following strategies to achieve this objective: (1) building the solidarity of the Betawi community through the association, (2) setting up *Tjahaja Betawi* as the voice of the association, and (3) improving education for the ethnic Betawi community so that they could progress.

#### *Building a Sense of Solidarity Through* **Perhimpoenan Kaoem Betawi**

The emergence of *Perhimpoenan Kaoem Betawi* was a milestone in building a sense of solidarity among the ethnic Betawi community in Batavia. Prior to the founding of the association, newspapers in Batavia in the nineteenth century, such as *Pemberita Betawi* and *Hindia Olanda*, called the natives of Batavia Selam people. The term "Selam" comes from the word Islam, a religion followed by most Batavian natives.

Batavian natives used to identify themselves by the neighborhood where they lived, for example, Sawah Besar people, Kemayoran people, Kebayoran people, or Condet people. Nonetheless, there were many who identifed themselves as Betawi people and claimed Betawi as their origin. One such person was Syeh Junaid al Batawi, a cleric from Betawi who lived in Mecca. The establishment of *Perhimpoenan Kaoem Betawi* promoted the term Betawi to categorize Batavian natives. This demonstrates that the association had awakened the sense of solidarity within the Betawi community, and Masserie had played a signifcant role in this process. He emphasized the importance of being a member of the association to solidify the solidarity of the Betawi community further.

In his leadership philosophy, Masserie stressed the need for all Betawi people to contribute to *Perhimpoenan Kaoem Betawi*. An article published by *Tjahaja Betawi* on July 15, 1923, discussed the importance of active participation in an association. Associations and social gatherings are fundamental parts of Betawi life. Betawis gather during many parts of their daily routines, such as when praying at the mosque, managing the household with the wife or husband and children, during the holy pilgrimage, or during special events. This has led to the saying, "*banyak tangan ngentengin pekerjaan*" (more hands make work easier).

The article mentioned above further stated that participating in an association is a common theme in the Betawi community and is essential for daily life. In this context, the establishment of associations was deemed normal. Participating in an association provided Betawis with emotional satisfaction. An association consists of individuals from various backgrounds and objectives, so it is diffcult to fnd one that has a strong bond and sense of unity among its members. It was assumed that to create unity, the members would need to be virtuous. Although living in separate bodies, a group of virtuous individuals would devote their souls to Allah (God) and be affectionate toward other living beings. A metaphor for this is the rose, a fower with an attractive shape and nice fragrance. However, the beauty and fragrance are not for its own satisfaction but to please others. If that kind of beauty is given to the Betawi community, it will bring its members prosperity and greatness.

*Orang jang berboedi itoe walaupoen masing-masing toeboeh, tetapi toejoean satoe djoea, karena ingat ia bahwa tiada sesoeatoe dijadikan Allah melainkan mempersembahkan diri kepada Allah, maka itoe orang jang boediman itoe sajang akan sesamanja mahloek. Orang boediman itoe boeleh dioempamakan* 

*seperti boenga mawar, elok roepanjadan haroem baoenja. Baoenja jang haroem mengharoemkan taman memberi sedap kepada orang jang menjioem, boekan pada dirinja. Roepanja jang indah menjedapkan orang jang memandang boekan bagi dirinja. Apakah tiada baik kalau kiranja sedikit darpada kemegahan toean-toean berikan kepada Kaoem Betawi soepaja kaoem KB mengetjap kesedapan toean ?* (*Tjahaja Betawi*, July 15, 1923)

Trans:

A virtuous person has his/her own body, but one purpose (in life), because s/he should remember that Allah creates human beings is none other than to devote themselves to Allah. Hence, virtuous people would love others. They can be associated with rose, a fower with an attractive shape and sweet fragrance. A fower that spread its nice scent to the garden and the people who are around it, not to satisfy itself. Its shape creates happiness to those who see it, not to its own eyes. Would it be great if each Betawi person shares just a small portion of their merit to the Betawi community so that it would experience greatness as well?

Masserie attempted to convince all Betawis to participate in *Perhimpoenan Kaoem Betawi* for the greater good. The mission of the association was to develop Betawi and Hindia Nederland communities in terms of their education, trading, and carpentry skills without breaking the law. Improving education was the hardest task to achieve. The Betawi community itself acknowledged that many of its members were not well educated. Even the teachers were not able to provide education suffcient for the community. However, a well-educated person also needs to have good traits and feel shame when they commit any despicable acts. The association encouraged its members to gather and cooperate to create a greater good for the community; rescue each other from weakness, poverty, and underdevelopment; and enhance their virtues and nationalism.

*Akan memadjoekan onderwijs di dalam pendidikan jang benar-benar sesoenggoehnja itoe, itoelah pekerdjaan jang seberat-beratnja boleh dikata beloemlah kita bertemoe seorang dari pada bangsa kita jang terdidik dengan sampoena didikan, istimewa jang menjadi pendidiknya. Njatanja orang jang berpendidik itoe setidak-tidaknja misti mendjadi boediman, taoe dimaloe, kena disajang, jaitoe maloe berboeatsegala jang tertjela oleh sjara dan sajang akan namanja mendjadi boesoek. Kita dapat barang jang kita kehendaki jaitoe keperloean kita, ialah karena pertjampoeran djoega. Djika perhimpoenan Betawi ini toean katakan tiada ada goenanja bagi toean, jaitoe tiada akan [mengkawankan] diri toean; saja memperbenarkanlah perkataan toean, karena ia akan menjelamatkan isi roemah jang miskin dan lemah dan*  *membangkitkan boedi lagi bagi memberi soemarak kebangsaan lantaran sinar boedi jang kita akan atoer dalam bangsa kita. Ma'loem ada beberapa orang jang djahatdjahat hatinja itoe karena sempit doenianja, maka itoe marilah kita perbaikkan lahirnja soepaja benar bathinnja. (Tjahaja Betawi*, July 15, 1923)

*Hai bangsakoe Betawi marilah kita bersatoe dalam koempoelan kita "kaoem Betawi, bersatoe beroepaja membaikkan nasib kebangsaan kita seperti orang-orang jang lain djoega. (Tjahaja Betawi*, July 15, 1923)

Trans:

Betawi community needs to move forward, start to improve their education that is still behind other communities in the nation. In result, it is hard for Betawi community to discuss (important) matters. The community should be well-established to make everybody in the community contribute to the association and achieve common goals. It would then improve the livelihood of Betawi nation, and they would be able to better deliberate important matters.

Dear our Betawi fellows, let us unify under the notion of 'Kaoem Betawi (Betawi community),' unite to improve the destiny of our nation just like any other nations. (*Tjahaja Betawi*, July 15, 1923)

The association needed support from the Betawi community in terms of human resources and funding. If this support is provided, then one can say that the Betawis feel affection toward the motherland.

*Bahwa moelai 1923 ini dapatlah berdiri seboeah perhimpoenan "Kaoem Betawi" oentoek kaoem Betawi, jang haroes masing-masing menjokong dengan tenaga, maoepoen wang enz. Bilamana hal ini bisa dikerdjakan oleh Toean-toean saudara baroelah kami berani kataka Pendoedoek Betawi masing-masing tjinta dan perhatikan tanah airnja.* (*Tjahaja Betawi*, July 15, 1923)

Trans:

In 1923, *Perhimpoenan Kaoem Betawi* was established to which each member of ethnic Betawi community must provide supports whether it is energy or funding.

If this support can be provided, then we dare to say that the Betawis love and care about their motherland. (*Tjahaja Betawi*, July 15, 1923)

Masserie believed that any activity carried out by the association depended on its members. If the members were willing to give assistance in any capacity, regardless of whether there was a request or not, it would be benefcial to their tribe: Betawi (*Tjahaja Betawi*, July 15, 1923).

#### *Setting up* **Tjahaja Betawi** *as the Voice of Association*

Mass media is an important medium through which to give voice to an association's activity. In his research, Ahmad Adam argues that mass media provides enlightenment and is the voice of the nationalist movement. Masserie initiated the foundation of *Tjahaja Betawi* after realizing the importance of mass media to promote the activities of *Perhimpoenan Kaoem Betawi*. For a few months after it was founded, Masserie personally sponsored the paper:

*Apabila kita menolih kebelakang nampaklah roepa kesoekaran mendirikan Tjahaja Betawi. Soelitnja boekan kepalang. Keroegian sangat ditakoetinja, istimewa djerih dan lelah jang akan dihadapinja—hampir-hampir Tjahaja Betawi tidaklah menjelma. Toean Moehammad Masserie seorang-orang jang tetap didalam berhaloean. Roegi dan penat didalam sesoeatoe pekerdjaan, jang dirasanja pekerdjaan itoe bergoena, tidaklah dipandangnja. Didjalankan djoealah pekerdjan itoe sedapat-dapatnj.*

*Tiga boelan Tjahaja Betawi ditanggoengnja, disiarkan kanan kiri diboeangnja pertjoema. Oeang jang keloear lebih banjak dari pada jang masoek djadi roegilah Toean Moehammad Masserie didalam perdjalanannja menjiarkan Tjahaja Betawi boeat tiga boelan itoe. Siapa jang akan menganti keroegiannja itoe? Tidaklah seorang jang akan mengantinja, melainkan dia djoealah seorang jang menanggoengnja tetapi barang jang ditoedjoenja dapat.*

*Oleh karena dasar itoe ada maka teroeslah adanja Tjahaja Betawi didalam tahoen pertama, ja… boekan saja hidoep, tetapi angka 12 mesti ditambah oplaagnja, seratoes exemplaar tambahnja*. (*Tjahaja Betawi*, July 15, 1923)

Trans:

When we recall how we frst came up with the idea of setting up Tjahaja Betawi, it was extremely challenging. We were worried about the possible fnancial cost and an enormous effort and energy we must put into it that the newspaper almost did not get to publish. Mr. Moehammad Masserie was the only one to assure us and kept us in the direction. He disregarded the exhaustion and fnancial cost he may suffer from doing the work for the association since he believed it would be valuable. He fully dedicated himself to the association.

He sponsored the paper for its frst three months and personally distributed the newspapers. He spent more than the proft he made, so he suffered a signifcant fnancial loss while trying to get Tjahaja Betawi out there in those three months. Who was responsible for that loss? Nobody would pay it back. However, he achieved his goal.

Because of his vigorous effort, Tjahaja Betawi progressed steadily in its frst year … Not only it was well-received by the public, but it achieved good sales fgures by adding 12 to its print run, which is now 100 copies. (*Tjahaja Betawi*, July 15, 1923)

The quote above illustrates Muhammad Masserie's vital role in the foundation of *Tjahaja Betawi* as the voice of *Perhimpoenan Kaoem Betawi*. It indicates that in the frst three months after its release, Masserie personally funded the publication and distribution costs of the paper. His effort reaped its rewards when, in the second year, *Tjahaja Betawi* increased its print run to 100 copies.

Published regularly, *Tjahaja Betawi* was not only the voice of *Perhimpoenan Kaoem Betawi* but also an important tool for building the solidarity of the Betawi community. Many articles were published to promote the goals of the association. The motto of the paper was "Kebenaran Membawa Kemenangan" (Truth Brings Victory). In its frst issue on July 15, 1923, *Tjahaja Betawi* stated its mission and vision was to become a loyal friend who would not leave their friends behind, would tirelessly defend their people, provide constructive feedback to their community, and defend the truth.

*Tjahaja Betawi*'s main function in the history of *Perhimpoenan Kaoem Betawi* was to promote its activities and decisions and to act as a bridge between the association's staff and members. The case of Sarmada's letter illustrates the feedback and suggestions provided to staff by a member. Sarmada wrote his inquiry in a rubric called "Soerat Kiriman" (incoming letter), asking the staff about the transparency of the association's budget.

*Saja sebagai lid Kaoem Betawi biasa dan djoega telah pernah djadi lid jang lain-lain, apabila tiap-tiap tahoen, sering sekali nampak pada saja soeara perhimpoenan-perhimpoenan itoe, ja'ni soeatoe verslag prihal, perhitoenganperhitoengan banjaknya leden, wang jang masoek dan jang keloear dan saldonja pada penoetoep tahoen. Oleh karena itoe seseorang sekoetoe pada perhimpoenan itoe dapat mengetahoei berapa besarnja kekoeatan vereeningingnja….Akan menghilangkan sjakwasanka dari pada leden-leden djab'bel (seperti saja joega) diharap dengan sepenoeh-penoehnja pengharapan, soepaja dibikin tindakan menoejoe jang termaksoed itoe, kelak mendatangkan kegoembiraan didalam golongan leden Kaoem Betawi …Wassalam. Sarmada.* (*Tjahaja Betawi*, May 15, 1924)

Trans:

As a mere member of Betawi community and as a member of other associations, I have observed that commonly in an association each year there is a report that shows how many members they have, to count how much money they acquired, how much that they spent, and the balance at the end of the year. Therefore, the members can determine the value of the association. …

To eliminate suspicion from the critical members (just like I am), the association needs to ensure this aspiration is heard and to take immediate action to solve it so that it will bring satisfaction to all members of the Betawi community … Sincerely, Sarmada. (Tjahaja Betawi, July 15, 1924)

The quotation from Sarmada's letter above developed into a heated debate within the association. *Tjahaja Betawi* ultimately suggested that the association respond to the inquiry:

*Menoeroet pikiran kami adalah perboeatan toean Sarmada itoe baik... Vereeninging Kaoem Betawi hendaknja tanbih didalam Tjahaja Betawi, soepaja orang jang ditanbih itoe dengar dan sedar ia akan alpanja, karena Tjahaja Betawi medan soeara perdamaian antara Bestuur dengan Gewoneleden. Bstuur hendaknja belajar, mempeladjari bagaimana kehendak dan maksoed leden... Permintaan Toean Sarmada soepaja bestuur menapati djandjinja setoejoelah kami...oleh karena kepertjajaan leden lebih perloe dari pada menjemboenjikan rahasia maka pada pendapat saja berilah barang jang dipintanja itoe.* (Tjahaja Betawi, May 15, 1924)

Trans:

We think that Mr. Sarmada's feedback is very positive … Members of Betawi community should provide their criticisms and reminders through Tjahaja Betawi so the targeted stakeholders realize their mistakes, because the paper is a peaceful forum for discussion between the staff and members. The management of the association should learn the needs and interests of the members … We agree with Mr. Sarmada's inquiry that it must keep its promise to the members … The trust from members is more important than keeping secrets from them, so the best solution to the inquiry is to grant the request. (Tjahaja Betawi, July 15, 1924)

The quote above demonstrates the importance of *Tjahaja Betawi* to the association. The publication was to act as a bridge between the members and the association's management and also resolve conficts between the two.

#### *Improved Education as the Gateway to Development*

*Perhimpoenan Kaoem Betawi* under Masserie's leadership attempted to expand access to education to the ethnic Betawi community as Masserie believed that education was a gateway to development. It went along with the goal of the association as set out in Article 3 of its statutes, namely, to develop the quality of education for indigenous Betawi and Hindia Nederland communities. Education in this context was not limited to religious knowledge but included common and Western knowledge. However, the Betawis preferred to send their children to religious schools rather than to public schools. This was arguably a product of ethnic Betawis' strong devotion to Islam. Under Masserie's leadership, the association attempted to provide Western and general education to be accepted by the community. It was vital for the members of the Betawi community to have proper education and skills in order to adequately compete for strategic positions in various occupations.

The association assumed that improving education was a diffcult task. It acknowledged the fact that the Betawi community was not well educated, including teachers. Well-educated people also need to possess virtue so that they can be remorseful after committing a wrong.

*Perhimpoenan Kaoem Betawi* stressed the importance of sending children to general schools so that they could keep up with current developments. It was said that there were two duties of the Betawi community: learn Sharia law and seek one's fortune. Fortune is not merely related to money—seeking greater education is considered part of the duty. However, this does not mean that the Betawis should abandon their religious duty. Educating oneself with knowledge other than religious knowledge is considered equally important (*Tjahaja Betawi*, August 15, 1923).

As one of its main programs, *Perhimpoenan Kaoem Betawi* established schools, both general and religious, such as the HIS, Schakelschool, English Course, and Arabic School. During Masserie's term, there was a concern that only a small number of Betawis would receive a formal education, which became the primary reason for establishing those schools. The high cost of education in that period was also a driving factor behind the establishment. The association organized a meeting to discuss an appropriate and affordable tuition fee that would encourage members of the Betawi community to send their children to schools. The association suggested that there should be a balance between the fee and the school's operation costs. The fee must not be higher or less than the average cost of meals and transport for the schools' administrators and teachers. For that purpose, the association requested the members to send their opinion in the post to the Secretariat (*Tjahaja Betawi*, July 18, 1924). Improving education was becoming the highest priority of the association. It even created a special division for teaching and conducted a meeting at Dr. Moeh Joesoef's house on July 14–16, 1924. The issues discussed at the meeting were the following.


Masserie's devotion to the Betawi community did not stop at the foundation of *Tjahaja Betawi* and the establishment of schools. He expressed concern about the Betawi community, which was still underdeveloped. In *Tjahaja Betawi*, he wrote an article titled "*Apakah Bangsa Betawi Bisa Madjoe*?" (Can ethnic Betawis progress?). He elaborated three phases required to motivate the Betawi community to develop: *Bermoela Kemaoean, baharoelah tenaga, achirnja beroentoeng djoega* (Start from passion, then power, and leave it to luck). Because the Betawi community was on a journey to achieve prosperity, its members had to be wary of any threatening obstacles.

Masserie held the leadership position only for a short period and stepped down in 1924. He transferred his offce to Kupang in East Nusa Tenggara Province. In his last year of serving as chair of the association, he inaugurated the association's frst branch in Bandung.

Masserie's era in *Perhimpoenan Kaoem Betawi* highlights the pattern of the relationship between the ethnic Betawi community and other ethnic groups in Batavia. Masserie underscored the need to establish a good relationship with other ethnic groups in the city. If a metaphor of fruit is used for Hindia, it would be an orange. Each slice of orange is Java, Ambon, and others. If one is more underdeveloped than the other, then it loses its overall value. If one slice of the orange is rotten, the price of the whole orange will decrease (*Tjahaja Betawi*, July 15, 1923).

Although the association's movement was based on nationalism, under Masserie's leadership, Islam remained the primary benchmark for each of its activities. Masserie considered that most members were Moslems, and ethnic Betawis were socioculturally associated with Islam.

*Boeanglah kelakoean kita jang boeroek jang merendahkan nama Islam! Sesoengoehnja deradjat Islam itoe tiadalah rendah, melainkan rendah karena terbawa oleh perboeatan setengah dari pada djoemlah orang hanja me-ngakui dirinja Islam padahal tiada mereka itoe mendjalankan sebagai atoeran Islam. Djadi perboeatan orang jang boeroek lakoe itoe merendong jang lain maka boeroeklah dalam pemandangan orang diatas tiap-tiap orang Islam akan mengangkat derdjat Islam itoe wadjib bagi tiap-tiap orang jang beragama Islam maka itoe wadjib atas tiap-tiap Islam berdaja dengan oepaja jang soedah difahamnja bagi membimbing bangsa kita dari pada kegelapan kepada jang terang dari pada sengsara toentoen kepada djalan jang senang.* (*Tjahaja Betawi*, July 15, 1923)

Trans:

Eliminate our bad attitudes that disgrace Islam! Truthfully, Islamic values are not supposed to be degrading, the behaviors of people who identify themselves as Islamic but have corrupted Islamic values are the reason why the religion is being dragged to degradation. As those people's behavior is then followed by others, Islam is more humiliated.

To recover the dignity of Islam, each of its followers must put efforts to bring our nation out of the dark, lighten it and direct it to happiness. (*Tjahaja Betawi*, July 15, 1923)

The infuence of Islam was found in many different aspects of the association. One of them is the slogan of *Tjahaja Betawi*: "*Kebenaran Membawa Kemenangan*" (Truth Brings Victory), which was inspired by Surah At-Taubah, Article 119, which says, "O you who have believed, fear Allah and be with those who are true." The association refects the idea that true wisdom comes from religion, so a good person should live with faithful devotion to his or her religion.

Masserie consistently underscored the importance of religion in the interaction between people. A human relationship should be based on Prophet Mohammad's philosophy. The Prophet said that in the relationship between humans, one must not abuse, lie, or break promises to others. The establishment of the association was also based on his philosophy. The association positively assumed that the ethnic Betawi community consists of people who will not abuse, lie, or break promises when working with each other. They would also be grateful to gather within the framework of *Perhimpoenan Kaoem Betawi*.

*Kaoem Betawi mengoenjoengi toean, moedah-moedahan persangkaan Kaoem Betawi benar, bahwa toean seorang-orang jang seperti disangkanja Toean soeka bertjampoer diri, bersekoetoe didalam persekoetoean "Kaoem Betawi" soepaja "Kaoem Betawi" poen bergerak dalam gerakan jang bermoeroeah jang sempoerna menoedjoe kepada toejoeannja*. (*Tjahaja Betawi*, July 15, 1923)

Trans:

and the thought that Betawi community naturally likes to associate with each other, *Perhimpoenan Kaoem Betawi* visit and encourage all Betawi people to gather within the framework of association. The Betawis need to initiate a movement to achieve their goals. (*Tjahaja Betawi*, July 15, 1923)

Masserie's effort to develop the Betawi community was not limited to *Perhimpoenan Kaoem Betawi*. He was also an active member of *Gemeenteraad Batavia* in 1923–1924. He acted as the representative of ethnic Betawis in the organization. Alongside M. Husni Thamrin, he initiated programs for the ethnic Betawi population, who was still living in poverty. In the *Gemeenteraad Batavia*, Husni Thamrin was well known for emphatically voicing the aspiration to improve the well-being of the community, particularly as it related to village reconstruction. Masserie fully supported Thamrin's program, and together they tirelessly worked for the development of the Betawi community.

Despite his brief leadership period, the involvement of Masserie in *Perhimpoenan Kaoem Betawi* continued until a few years after he resigned from his post as chair. Following his return from Kupang, he remained active in the association to develop the ethnic Betawi community. He became the leading fgure of the association. The association still asked for his opinion and thoughts on issues related to the Betawi community. For instance, during the association's annual meeting in 1938, Masserie was invited to talk about the economic development of the Betawi community. The association saw the importance of developing the community's economy. If there were successful economic development programs, they would eventually have positive impacts on improving living conditions and fulflling the Betawi community's needs (*Berita Kaoem Betawi*, March 1938).

There is a slight difference between Masserie's and Thamrin's methods of developing the welfare of Kaoem Betawi. In his campaign, Masserie focused on the role of *Tjahaja Betawi*, which inspired and shaped solidarity among Betawi people. Masserie was the primary donor for *Tjahaja*  *Betawi* publications. In addition, believing that education would be the most important factor for the progress of *Kaoem Betawi*, Masserie also supported the establishment of both religious and public schools. Meanwhile, in developing *Kaoem Betawi*, Thamrin put more focus on *Gemeenteraad Batavia.* Through the organization, Thamrin supported the repairs of Betawinese settlements (*kampongs*) while advocating fewer taxes for indigenous people (*pribumi*). Despite their differences, Masserie and Thamrin shared the same goal of improving the lives of Betawi people, whose existence is an inseparable part of Indonesian-ness.

# Conclusion

Muhammad Masserie accomplished much in the two years of his leadership of *Perhimpoenan Kaoem Betawi*. He laid the foundation for the association's movement based on nationalism. Although it was based on the principle of nationalism, Islam was still the central pillar of the movement. The infuence of Islam was refected in the slogan of *Tjahaja Betawi*, "*Kebenaran Membawa Kemenangan*" (Truth Brings Victory), which was inspired by Surah At-Taubah, 119, from the Quran. Masserie transformed the association into a forum to build solidarity among the Betawi people. He also initiated the foundation of *Tjahaja Betawi* as the association's newspaper. It not only acted as the voice of the association, but also became the bridge between the members and the management of the association.

Masserie stressed the signifcance of education to develop ethnic Betawi people and break the stereotype of their backwardness. During Masserie's era, the Betawi community expanded its network in Batavia, and branches of *Perhimpoenan Kaoem Betawi* were also established in other regions. This can be seen from the establishment of a branch of the association in Bandung in 1924. Although Masserie was not the chair of the association anymore, he still became its central fgure. The association still asked for his thoughts and opinion on issues related to the Betawi community. In conclusion, this chapter assesses Masserie as an important fgure who consistently struggled for the development of ethnic Betawi people. He had become the agent of change for the Betawi community through *Perhimpoenan Kaoem Betawi* and inspired all members to promote the development of the community.

Masserie was an open-minded fgure who, through the publication of *Tjahaja Betawi*, advocated the liberation not only of Betawi people, but also the people of the Dutch East Indies (Indonesia). Therefore, he is worthy of recognition as a person who took part in developing the spirit of Indonesian nationalism. To develop the spirit of Indonesian-ness, ethnic groups in Nusantara must share the same spirit of inclusivity.

Masserie emphasized that the Betawi community has the capability of making progress through a process he envisioned: "Begin with a strong will, proceed with efforts, and beneft in the end" ("*Bermoela kemaoean, baharoelah tenaga, achhirnya beroentoeng djoega.*"). It is therefore highly advantageous for the Betawian community and the public at large to reassess Masserie's intellectual fgure and his contribution as he might serve as a model to inspire Betawi people amid the marginalization that persists to this day.

**Acknowledgment** This work was copy edited by ENAGO. This chapter was supported by Research Grant for International Publication managed by Universitas Indonesia Year 2017 (Grant Number: 495/UN2.R3.1/HKP.05.00/2017).

# References


*Tjahaja Betawi*. (1924).

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# Locating Sikuru, "Hero of Loloda"

*Abd. Rahman, Tommy Christomy, Susanto Zuhdi, and L. G. Saraswati Putri*

# Introduction

Having wrapped up our 2017–2018 feldwork in the Moluccas, we landed in Jakarta only to receive a short message from someone we did not know. In the message, the person asked, "Why are you researching Loloda? There is nothing in Loloda. You probably want to work on other regions.

Abd. Rahman (\*)

History Department, Faculty of Humanities, Universitas Indonesia, Depok, Indonesia

History Study Program, Faculty of Cultural Sciences, Universitas Khairun, Ternate, Indonesia

T. Christomy Literature Department, Faculty of Humanities, Universitas Indonesia, Depok, Indonesia

S. Zuhdi History Department, Faculty of Humanities, Universitas Indonesia, Depok, Indonesia

L. G. S. Putri Philosophy Department, Faculty of Humanities, Universitas Indonesia, Depok, Indonesia

© The Author(s) 2023 M. Budianta, S. Tiwon (eds.), *Trajectories of Memory*, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-99-1995-6\_3

Loloda is long gone." The text message made us rethink the position of Loloda, a region in the west coast of Halmahera Island, North Maluku, in society today (Andaya, 1993). Loloda used to be one of the oldest kingdoms in the area during colonial times. Such a message contrasted with the enthusiasm of the people of Loloda that we witnessed during the feld research, particularly after the appointment of Suaib bin Syamsudin Syah as *kolano* (king) of Loloda in 2016. Belittling Loloda is a postcolonial legacy in the local politics of the region today.

Therefore, if the history of the region begins with colonial records, then the fgure of Sikuru, one of the most renowned heroes of Loloda, is not an essential part of the colonial history in North Maluku. From a colonial perspective, Sikuru is no more than a character of folklore. This is particularly evident in how colonial archives mention the name of Sikuru. Naidah, a local historian who was assigned by van der Crab to write the stories around Ternate, only feetingly mentions Sikuru without further explanation (van der Crab, 1878). This is in contrast with the local perspective: for the locals, the heroic fgure of Sikuru cannot be separated from the Kingdom of Loloda and from the Loloda people's struggle against the colonial power.

During the 2014 Jailolo Bay Festival, the government ordered every district to create art exhibitions that represent the uniqueness of their respective districts. In this occasion, a middle school teacher from Loloda came up with an unexpected idea: a Loloda war dance with the fgure of Sikuru as its main protagonist. Despite such a boldly creative move, the exhibition did not garner much attention from the national media. Nonetheless, there is no question that the Sikuru exhibition represents the historical and cultural consciousness of the contemporary Loloda society that still has the capability to preserve their collective "memory" about their ancestors. Meanwhile, the colonial historical legacy in Ternate has almost no record of Sikuru, and if there is, the portrayal is of him being a mere bandit.

Not long after the Sultan of Ternate passed away in 2015, just one year after the Jailolo festival, there arose an emerging movement among the people of Loloda. The movement consciously and systematically resurrected the fgure of Sikuru that had long been buried underneath the memory of local history. Thereafter, the position of the Sultan of Loloda, which had been vacant since 1909 (Rahman, 2018), was flled up and ushered a fresh start for the people of Loloda for rearticulating the remnants of the past glories of *Moloku Kie Romtoha* (The fve Mountain Kingdoms of the Moluccas).

This chapter discusses the fgure of Sikuru from a historical perspective by reconstructing his presence. The reconstruction itself is based on a number of data gathered from primary and secondary sources, along with their relation to Loloda society's new consciousness and surrounding contemporary political contexts. We believe that the fgure of Sikuru—which originally appeared in collective memory and constituted a mythical sense of the local people's oral tradition—was transformed into a part of "the history" after his story was recorded by a local Ternate writer (Naidah), with such portrayal being continued by contemporary local writers. It is important to note that the Dutch offcial documents at the time never mentioned the name Sikuru, but merely described events pertaining to the fgure.

To support our claim, we perused texts of Sikuru as written by Naidah (1878), relevant texts found in Dutch colonial newspapers (1909–1910), memories of appointments of offcials (1909), and colonial reports (1909). In addition to the use of written records, we also built our arguments based on oral narratives that we gathered during the feldwork (2017).

Literary works relating to Sikuru are scarce. The few works we refer to were written by a few authors, namely Naidah in van der Crab (1878), Mustafa Mansur (2007, 2013), Mapanawang (2012), Rahman (2015, 2016a, 2016b, 2017, 2018). Naidah mentioned that in the nineteenth century, a boat merchant named "Sikuru" was often used by the Sultan of Ternate for the kingdom's military interests (Naidah, 1878). Being the frst to mention Sikuru, Naidah's work can be found in the translated writing of van der Crab about the historical context of Ternate. Hundreds of years after van der Crab, a local author named Mustafa Mansur (who claims to have a bloodline of the King of Loloda), in his master's thesis in Universitas Khairun Ternate (2007), more explicitly revealed the fgure of Sikuru based on his examination of numerous secondary sources and existing oral tradition. Five years later, Mapanawang (2012) wrote a popular book, titled *Loloda as the First Moluccan Kingdom*, which was a book that utilizes and restates a lot of Mustafa Mansur's narratives (2007). Despite their signifcance, these writings have never discussed the issues pertaining to the rearticulation of Sikuru and how it impacts local history.

Sikuru is rearticulated in the moment when the hegemony of Ternate weakened, particularly after Sultan Mudaffar Sjah passed away on February 20, 2015. Loloda has wider territory, more diverse culture, and more promising natural resources compared to Ternate and Tidore. However, in a modern Indonesia, the roles and positions of Loloda people do not gain as much attention and concern as those of the people of the surrounding islands. The recent death of the Ternate Sultan provided the people of Loloda an opportunity to assert or articulate its history, including that of Sikuru.

Prompted by the situation, numerous political interests that had been triggered in the past by the creation of North Maluku Province (which had been planned since 1999) reemerged. The new province of North Maluku not only provided a pathway for interests emanating from Jakarta but also created a space for local political contestation that made use of various discourses, including "new ethnocentrism." From what we observed in 2017, Loloda was invaded not only by local and national, but also global, interests, represented by mining and fshing companies whose licenses were issued out of political decisions that did not take the voice of the Loloda people into account.

Along with the emergence of overlapping interests, there have been attempts to remember Sikuru's presence in contemporary Loloda society, especially when sociopolitical contexts of North and West Halmahera are taken into account. Recent studies (Rahman, 2015, 2018) found that much additional evidence provided by primary and secondary sources from the colonial period are worthy of consideration when excavating information about Sikuru's historical presence. Not only that, but our ethnographic approach has also led to a fnding in which the presence of Sikuru has been recorded in Loloda society's collective memory.

Before focusing on Sikuru, we observed that Sartono Kartodirdjo's study on resistance movements by Javanese farmers at the end of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries has been a model in Indonesian historiography, especially writings that discuss social history (Kartodirdjo, 1984). Before it was published in 1974 in the form of a book, the study was a development of his doctoral research in the University of Amsterdam in 1966. In the work, Sartono wrote about the rebellion of Ciomas farmers in Banten in 1888, using several approaches from social sciences, particularly those of sociology, which was at the time a relatively new cornerstone in history writing. Sartono has contributed to Indonesian historiography particularly with regard to linking farmers' protest movements with *Ratu Adil*, nativism, revivalism, and millenarianism, a movement marked by member farmers' belief that their leader was capable of bringing justice into the land (Kartodirdjo, 1978).

As colonialism signifcantly altered traditional social order in Javanese rural communities, the farmers' resistance aimed to restore the social order into its "pure" condition. Other patterns found in the movements were accompanied by a desire to "resurrect" the old social order. In general, the dawning twentieth century was perceived as a millennium that brought forth hope for a prosperous life free from colonial exploitation.

Some farmers' resistance in Java included movements led by Bapak Kaiyah in Tangerang (1922), Entong Gendut in Cililitan (1916), and Gedangan in Surabaya (1916). Bapak Kaiyah was a shadow puppeteer who frequently conveyed messages of resistance against colonialism through his shows. However, these movements in general were weak and could have been easily eradicated by the colonial authorities (Poesponegoro & Notosusanto, 2010, pp. 286–305).

With a focus on a different setting outside Java in a region dominated by islands, the study on Sikuru's resistance has the potential to be developed in a similar direction to Sartono's research. A folk song tells of how Sikuru came from the direction of the sea. After enduring oppression, Sikuru became a leader of a protest movement among dammara plantation workers in North Halmahera who fought against the fxed colonial order. The movement was quickly and easily disbanded, and Sikuru was exiled to another region.

Ideologically, Sikuru's position as a marine captain (*kapita laut*) can be interpreted as a "King of the Sea" who wished to liberate his region from the Dutch colonial regime. A.B. Lapian (2009), writing in a broader context, made a comprehensive study on the dynamics of the power struggle for control over the seas in his work *Orang Laut, Bajak Laut, Raja Laut: Kawasan Laut Sulawesi Abad XIX* (People, Pirates, and King of the Sea: A Study on Celebes Seas in the Nineteenth Century). This study on Sikuru complements existing discussions on sea-based movements of resistance.

# Sikuru as <sup>a</sup> Rebel

History serves as a crucial factor, of course, in determining the future not only of the individual and the community, but also of the nation. The past never truly separates from the present, because, among others, history supports, motivates, and inspires people in their future lives. Instead of belonging to a single person, the past belongs to the community's collective memory. However, most people want to leave a traumatic story behind while preserving a glorious event (Le Goff, 1992). One of the community's common memories is the story of the great man or the hero (Hook, 1955). This trend applies to the Loloda people, who, through their oral tradition, transmitted the story of a great fgure through the generations. The story of Sikuru, the navy commander who fought to the death against the Dutch colonial government, still lingers and is being passed down by people living in Loloda today.

As one of the oldest empires in the Maluku Islands, Loloda once covered almost the entire islands of Halmahera and Morotai. However, Loloda was never recognized as part of the "Moloku Kie Raha" kingdom alliance, which was established in the thirteenth century and comprised of Ternate, Tidore, Bacan, and Jailolo. Initiated by the seventh King of Ternate, Sida Arif Malamo (1322–1332), even though in Loloda's narratives, they belong to the constellation of "the fve mountain kingdoms of Molucca," *Moloku Kie Romtoha.*

The Loloda kingdom was centered on the western coast of Halmahera Sea, Soasio, near the three main villages of Laba, Bakun, and Kedi (Interview, M. W Hamad, 07/01/2016). The three villages strongly connect to Loloda history because they determined the kingdom's future sovereignty after the 1908–1909 period. As a consequence of the foreign invasion, the Loloda kingdom suffered forced labor and an unjust tax scheme (*belasting*) that were imposed by the Dutch colonial government and its counterpart, the Ternate kingdom (National Archives of Indonesia, 1980). In reaction, locals, mainly villagers of Laba and Bakun, opposed these policies and joined the uprising led by the Loloda Navy Commander Sikuru. This act, according to the Loloda people, was a response to Dutch repression.

The story of Sikuru was frst recorded by two local Loloda writers, Mustafa Mansur and Arend L. Mapanawang, the latter being an internist who took his medical magister degree in Gadjah Mada University, Yogyakarta. For his book, Mapanawang conducted interviews on Sikuru with locals in Loloda. Mapanawang, who originated from Asimiro village, is an expert on Loloda history and culture. Although he does not bear a direct genealogical relation to Loloda kings, Mapanawang is a registered member of an indigenous council in Tobelo, the former region of Loloda Kingdom in North Halmahera. Due to failure in a local election, Mapanawang was motivated to write the story of Loloda. On the other hand, Mansur, who now lectures in the History Department of Unkhair Ternate University, is a direct descendant of the last Loloda king, which allowed him to also serve as the secretary (*tilu lamo*) of the Loloda Kingdom Indigenous Council. Originating from the kingdom's capital city of Soasio, South Loloda, Mansur grew up amid the royal family. These two writers served as this research's primary sources, and they reveal details on the role of Sikuru in Loloda's history during the twentieth century.

This research also obtained some information about the tale of Sikuru of Laba village by interviewing Sulaiman or Jan (date/month/year). However, the story of Sikuru has actually been passed down orally over generations. Jan (65), a fsherman and the captain of his traditional boat (*semang-semang*), shared a long story about Sikuru. Apart from him, we also interviewed other informants, including Muhammad Jae bin Syamsuddin and Jonas Toseho (January 2–8, 2016). Majority of our informants, living in Soasio, Laba, and Bakun, were civil servants, clerics, youth leaders, and indigenous groups.

Our visit to Loloda was part of an effort to clarify claims or facts found in several books on the Loloda people's oral tradition.

# Forced Labor and Tax Policy

After the Dutch managed to control some empires in the Maluku Islands, local leaders were forced to comply with colonial laws, including two types of forced labor, *Hereendienst* and *Gemeentedienst*, on October 22, 1894, and effective from March 24, 1896 (Amal, 2007, p. 378). Laborers under the *Hereendienst* were not paid while being forced to work on public construction supervised by the colonial government's local administration. The *Hereendienst* system forced locals to work 32 days a year, 12 hours a day, but with working hours as covering the time the laborers took walking from their homes to the work felds. Apart from not being paid, workers received neither meals nor transportation costs from the colonial government. Slightly different from the *Hereendienst*, laborers under the *Gemeentedienst* worked 30 days a year (Amal, 2007, pp. 379–380). Their tasks were mostly to build infrastructure, such as roads, bridges, and religious halls for villagers. Although the Dutch government had allocated a budget to fund several projects in colony states, the colonial government violated that commitment by imposing forced labor systems on locals in most regions, including the Maluku Islands (Amal, 2007, pp. 378–379). Because of forced labor regulations, locals in the Maluku Islands were exploited for years and, as a result, the colonized people, including the Loloda folks, lived in poor and despicable conditions for so long (Kolonial Verslaag van Oost Indie, 1909, p. 77). According to colonial government records, the forced labor imposed on the Loloda people involved building roads and bridges in the capital city of Soasio.

# Dutch-UZV Mission

Amid their forced labor, the Loloda people were also obliged to convert to Christianity by the *Utrechtsche Zending Vereniging* (UZV), a missionary group established in Utrecht, the Netherlands, in 1865. The group's initial aim was to baptize people on Papua Island. However, before achieving their objective, a high-ranking offcial of Ternate and van Baarda, a member of the UZV visiting Loloda in 1899, was reportedly disappointed because the pastor Dores Nuha had succumbed to an infdel's life. He drank alcohol instead of completing his task of baptizing the Loloda people. After an investigation, Baarda fred Nuha, and the missionary group later burned down locals' "pagan" statues.

Although the missionary group had great power within the colony, Baarda was still concerned over the power of the Loloda king. Wanting to curb the Loloda king's power, Baarda reported the king to the Dutch's Ternate regent. In response, the colonial government assigned a controlling assistant to Loloda (Magany in Mapanawang, 2012, p. 70). This led to the tighter supervision of the colonial government over the kingdom and the king, mainly concerning his role in obstructing missionary work in the region.

According to the *Kolonial Verslag Nederland Oost Indie* (1909, p. 77), when Loloda Navy Commander Sikuru of Laba led an uprising on February 14, 1909, the controlling assistant, along with two colonial policemen posted in Loloda, was later found dead. Based on an offcial note, the three were murdered by a group of Laba villagers because of the colonial government's forced labor law imposed on the Loloda people.

# Political Conflict of the King's Family

Sometime in the mid-nineteenth century, prior to the Sikuru-led uprising, the death of King Sunia led to a political confict among the princes (*kaicil)* of the Jou elite on the issue of ascendancy to the kingdom's throne. King Sunia's sons, Prince Arafane, Prince Syamsuddin, and Prince Nasu, fought against Prince Kayoa, the frst son of the Army Commander (*Kapita Lao*) Dumba, who was the king's brother (Sjah et al., 2005, p. 26). To seize power, some princes sought support from the Dutch colonial government and its counterpart, the Ternate kingdom. Following political negotiation, the Ternate and Dutch leaders recognized Prince Syamsuddin as the new king of Loloda. Meanwhile, Prince Arafane was assigned as Loloda's *Kapita Lao*, and his brother Prince Nasu was appointed Junior Army Commander. No position was granted to Prince (Jongofa) Kayoa.

Following that decision, Kayoa then opposed King Syamsuddin, alleging his lack of leadership on the colonial government's tax law (*belasting*), claiming that Syamsuddin allowed the Dutch to intervene in the kingdom's authority by letting the colonial government, along with its Ternate counterpart, to collect taxes from the Loloda people.

# The Revolt

In his protest against the tax law, Prince Kayoa provoked locals to impeach King Syamsuddin. This action was later supported by some insurgents, who infltrated the palace and murdered the Dutch tax collector. Led by the Loloda Navy Commander Sikuru of Laba village, the insurgent group, comprised of Bagina and Tasa of Bakun *soa* (village), also fatally attacked three colonial offcials and two policemen in front of King Syamsuddin and Queen (Jou Ma-Boki) Joboki Habiba at the palace. However, the colonial government launched a counterattack and squashed the insurgent group. After the revolt, the Dutch placed the king and his family into lifetime exile from Loloda. Following the queen's death in 1912, the king passed away in 1915. The colonial government then took over the Loloda throne and degraded its status to a district chaired by a *sangaji* (KV, 1909, p. 77; Interview Mustafa, Ternate, 15/02/2015).

The Loloda people memorialized the story of Sikuru and his revolt in local poetry as told below:

*Kapal dai Lalaweri, Sordano Walanda Na Kapal; Isa yo parang Laba; ma sarsan o uci; ma komdan o ginado; Hongi ma kapita nage; ma kapita, Kapita Sikuru; masongo-songo Bagina; Madiki-diki Kayoa; Mamegi una Tasa; Suba Jou Kolano Malamo-lamo; Au le.*

Trans:

The ship of the Dutch was sailing. Along with our brothers, the people of Laba, we went into the war. When the sergeants were in (combat) positions, the chief called, "Who is the army commander?" We answered, "Our Captain Sikuru, along with his aide Bagina, and Kayoa as the mastermind. And Tasa as navigator. All hail the noble King. Kill (the enemy)." (Mansur, Interview, 15/02/2015)

According to the locals, Sikuru had been opposing the kingdom since 1908 and followed the people's uprising in early 1909. During the 1909–1915 period, Loloda lost its privilege of autonomy and was transformed into a district due to colonial intervention and political confict among elites.

Dutch newspaper, *Nieuwe Amsterdamsche Courant, Algemeen Handelsblad*, (March 13, March 15, 1909), published the story of Loloda's failed coup. The uprising had cost the lives of three Dutch nationals, a tax collector and two policemen, and another eight were badly injured. About 30 armed personnel later departed from Ternate to Loloda to halt the revolt under Lieutenant Meihuizen's leadership, as reported in the newspapers:

*De resident van Ternate seinde den 9en Februari via Gorontalo: vier dezer bericht van posthouder Djilolo: Politie-adsistent Loloda 2 dezer in huiz Radja te Soa Sioe door bende Alfoeren kampong Laba overvallen en met twee politieopassers vermoord; militaire patroille, 30 man, onder Luitenant Meihuizen van Ternate gezonden, over viel nacht 5 op 6 dezer versterkte kampong Laba; kwaadwilligen vluchtten met achterlating van twee dooden, een geweer en veel blanke wapens; onzerzijds geen gewonden*.

Trans:

The Ternate regent announced in Gorontalo on February 9th, and the controller in Jailolo has submitted four reports to the authority that two policemen were killed at the Loloda palace in Soasio by the Alifuru insurgent group from Laba village. [Hence,] to halt the attack, about 30 military soldiers, led by Lieutenant Meihuizen departed from Ternate to take over the Laba village for fve to six nights. After killing two people, the perpetrators escaped, carrying many guns and other weapons. However, on our [colonial] side, nobody was injured. (See *Nieuwe Amsterdamsche Qourant, Algemeen Handelsblad,* March 15, 1909, p. 13)

*Kolonial Verslag van Nederlandsch (Oost) Indie* 1909 also reported the failed coup.

*Lolode werden in Februari 1909, zonder bekende aanleiding, de ten laste van de lanschapskas in dienst genomen assistent an twee gewapende politiedienaren door de bevolking van Laba vermoord. Nadat de kampong door an militair detachement uit Ternate bezet was, waarbij op eenig verset werd gestuit, dat den aanvallers op 3 dooden en 8 gewonden te staan kwam, verbeterde de toestand spoedig. De gevluchte bevolking keerde terug en werkte, onder leiding van de nieuwent assistent, aan wegen en bruggen. Een onderzoek bracht aan het*  *licht dat de radja, de djogoegoe en de kapitein laoet van Loloda de hand in het gebeurde de moeten hebben gehad. Zij werden ontslagen en met de hofdschuldigen aan den moord naar Ternate gezonden*.

Trans:

In February 1909, two armed policemen posted in Loloda were murdered by locals from Laba village. Following the attack, some military troops sent from Ternate took over the village. The revolt has cost the lives of three, and another eight were badly injured. [However,] the situation in Loloda is under control. Locals who fed have returned to fnish constructing roads and bridges, under supervision of a new assistant. The initial investigation revealed that the king, the prince, and the Navy Commander were behind the attack. The king, along with his elites, as a result, were discharged from their positions, found guilty, and went into exile. (See: KV (Oost) Indie, 1909, p. 77)

These written sources detailed the Loloda people's sudden uprising that caused three fatalities to the Dutch.

Meanwhile, as locals mentioned, the uprising actually started in 1908 (H.M. Jae bin Usman, Interview, Ternate, 04/01/2016) under the leadership of Navy Commander Sikuru, who also served as the kingdom's war commander, along with his two aides, Bagina and Tasa (Sulaeman, Interview, Ternate, 03/01/2016). Contrary to other sources claiming that the coup was immediately halted, locals say that the colonial government was only actually able to quash the uprising on March 15, 1909, a year after it frst began in Loloda. Locals believed that the Loloda kingdom lost power in 1908, following the *belasting* tax law imposed by the colonial government. The story of Sikuru and his revolt was later shared orally with future generations, as the story of "Kolano Madogaga" or "The Last King of Loloda."

Following the failed rebellion led by Navy Commander Sikuru, King Syamsuddin was exiled to Ternate in 1909. During that time, Ternate was led by the 27th Sultanate Haji Muhammad Usman (1896–1929), under supervision of the 28th Dutch Regent, K.H.F. Roos (1903–1908) and the 29th Regent, E.J. Gerrits (1909–1912).

# After the Revolt

Because of the uprising, the colonial government on June 28, 1909, renewed the forced labor *Hereendienst* and *Gemeentedienst* agreements, which had been signed back on October 22, 1894. The colonial authority, moreover, also imposed the tax law (*belasting*) on the Loloda people in 1903 (Amal, 2007, p. 381). The king and his loyal followers' exile was the colonial government's strategy to gain legitimacy with the Loloda people. To strengthen their power in Loloda, the Dutch further assigned a district chairman (*sangaji*) to oversee locals, while he maintained communication with his counterpart in Ternate. This measure, which adopted the legalrational approach, also aligned with Ternate's request to degrade all empires in the Halmahera region into districts (Leirissa, 1996). Following the measure, an election system for appointing new leaders also transformed Loloda from "hereditary ascribed" status to "assigned" status, as established by the colonial government and the Ternate kingdom.

Three years after the death of his wife Siti Habiba in 1912, King Syamsuddin passed away in Ternate, leaving hereditary power void in Loloda. During that year, the Dutch decided to integrate Loloda into the Ternate kingdom. As a result, the colonial government revoked the semiindependence once granted to Loloda, and the king was no longer the highest offcial serving in the region.

# New Articulation

In 1999, Maluku became a province that administratively supervised the regencies of North Maluku, Central Halmahera, Ternate City, and Tidore City. The legal basis of this provincial division is Law No. 32/2001. At the time, Loloda District belonged to Maluku Province where Ambon is the province's capital city. The administrative division that gave birth to Maluku Province was soon followed by the emergence of the new regency Central Halmahera and, subsequently, by other regencies, such as North Halmahera, West Halmahera, East Halmahera, South Halmahera, and the Islands of Sula, after the creation of Law No. 32/2004. In 2010, administrative dividing continued in North Halmahera, leading to the creation of Morotai Islands Regency. To this day, Loloda has not been listed as a region slated to be transformed into a regency under the province of North Maluku. In fact, while as the idea has not yet come into reality, the broad territory of Loloda has even been divided into two new different districts, namely North Loloda District under North Halmahera Regency (with Tobelo as the regency's capital) and South Loloda in West Halmahera Regency (with Jailolo as the regency's capital).

Although the age of North Maluku at the time (1999–2019) was already 19 years, Loloda and its people have never really benefted from the province despite having become a new autonomous region. The Loloda people have thus been complaining to the Regent of North (and West Halmahera) about the lack of change for the better of the government behavior toward them. In fact, socially and economically, Loloda is even gradually being left out of opportunities and positive governmental actions compared to the surrounding regions. This is evident in the lack of development in the area, such as the absence of proper land and marine infrastructure to connect Loloda to the surrounding regions and islands.

Compared to other regions that have had the privilege of regional autonomy, the lack of development in Loloda is clear such that the people of Loloda consider themselves as being treated unfairly by the government of Indonesia and the local governments of North Maluku Province and North and West Halmahera. They feel that they are left abandoned in poverty and isolation while enduring discrimination in terms of development and socioeconomic welfare. Worse, Loloda's abundant natural resources cannot be enjoyed by its own people, not even in the forms of infrastructure facilities. Moreover, their natural resources are exploited for the development agendas of the other North Maluku regions such as Tobelo, Galela, Jailolo, Sahu, and Morotai.

To this day, the road connecting North and South Loloda remains undeveloped. The same condition can be found in the infrastructure and suprastructure of the trans-Halmahera land transportation, which connects North and West Halmahera as well as villages in Loloda. In addition, long and short distance inter-island transportation operates under rather worrying conditions. The government has not developed proper facilities to sustain electricity (PLN, the state-owned electrical company), communication (TELKOM), or water system (PDAM, regional drinking water company). Despite having been independent from the Dutch colonizers for 74 years already, Indonesia has failed to share a fair proportion of its welfare with Loloda as a region under the wing of North Maluku Province.

According to the local history of North Maluku Province, Loloda was a kingdom with magnifcent territory spread across the Northwest Halmahera coast, covering the areas which now belong to North and West Halmahera regencies. Although West Halmahera was administratively divided from North Halmahera in 2003, Loloda has remained a district, which is inferior to regencies.

Taking these factors into account, the fact that Loloda and its history remains hardly noticed when compared to other events in the national history of Indonesia is unsurprising. Both Ternate and the Dutch merely viewed Loloda as a small kingdom in the Moluccan spice islands without any signifcant sovereignty or power. However, Loloda had its own contribution to both Ternate's authority and anti-colonial resistance. Without the contribution of Loloda after being assigned under its control, Ternate would not have the necessary human and natural resources to sustain its power and hegemony over Maluku. Furthermore, Loloda contributed to Sikuru's rebellion that successfully weakened colonial power as it led to the death of van Rooij (an assistant of the Dutch's administrative government in Ternate in the sectors of economy and tax) and his two military police guards.

Discriminatory treatment of Loloda persisted even until after the independence of Indonesia. Local, national, and foreign (Australian, American, Chinese, French, and Singaporean) liberal capitalists have exploited various resources of Loloda. Two of the most evident cases would be the exploitation of manganese mine in Doi Island from 1957 to 2011 and of the forests in almost all villages in Loloda from 1977 to 2012. The acquired resources and the subsequent proft are not being distributed to the people, but merely go to corporations, investors, and certain parties in the regency, provincial, and central governments.

The people of Loloda do not see a hopeful future in being a part of the North Maluku Province and Indonesia. Loloda has been suffering from lack of attention, discrimination, and unfair treatment, while other regions are being rapidly developed by the government. In short, Loloda has been and continues to be marginalized and largely ignored by the provincial government of North Maluku and the Central Government of Indonesia in Jakarta while being exploited for its natural resources.

It is unsurprising to see that the Loloda people are in search of their own historical and cultural identity. In particular, there is a rising historical awareness among their youth. They are trying to understand their history as one of the biggest Maluku kingdoms in the past, which now has become forgotten as the people are marginalized in terms of regional development and autonomy. Alongside Loloda's search for historical identity have been attempts at re-presenting Captain Sikuru as a hero of Loloda. His heroic action in defending Loloda and its people from Dutch colonialism is once again remembered, with Sikuru being transformed into a source of inspiration for the young people in their mission to develop Loloda and introduce the region to the outer world using their own efforts without considering whether other North Maluku regions support or oppose them.

Resurrecting the historical discourses about Sikuru as a part of Loloda and North Maluku's history is certainly not without controversies. Certain groups of people raise their objections as they are unsure about the existence of Sikuru himself. Some are even doubtful about Loloda's signifcance in the history of North Maluku. Despite this, the revitalization of the fgure Sikuru brings potential advantages to the Loloda people, who have long waited for a hero of their own. For them, Sikuru is also an inspiration that motivates them to persist in the contemporary political struggle of voicing out their concerns as descendant people of a former kingdom long marginalized in North Maluku's local historiography. They hope that the revitalized historical representation of Sikuru can be recognized as a part of Indonesia's national anti-colonial resistance in North Maluku, for Sikuru to serve as a symbol that should be acknowledged by the regional government of North Maluku Province.

From an academic point of view, local historians and cultural activists in North Maluku do not consider the rebirth of Sikuru as problematic. In fact, they believe that the narrative will enrich Loloda's local history, although there are multiple subjective understandings related to the history of Sikuru, particularly from the people of *Moloku Kie Raha* (Ternate, Tidore, Bacan, and Jailolo). On the other hand, there are certain parties who feel threatened by the reactualization of Sikuru as a local hero of Loloda. Customary leaders and people in the Kingdom of Ternate (*Kesultanan Ternate*) cannot accept the integration of Loloda's historical accounts and Sikuru into North Maluku's local historiography, considering that such narratives will challenge Ternate's dominant hegemony in Moluku Kie Raha as well as the sources of North Maluku's history as commonly understood by young people of Ternate. If the history of Sikuru is revealed, the established order of Ternate's domination as the leader of *Moloku Kie Raha* without Loloda in old North Maluku historiography will certainly fade away.

# Conclusion

The chapter has shown the way Loloda people struggled against the Dutch, an abusive colonizing power that, frst, enforced forced labor and taxation and, second, moved to eradicate the local religion by promoting conversion to Christianity. However, their struggle was complicated by internal conficts and the collaboration of neighboring Ternate Kingdom with the Dutch colonizers as the elites and the descendants of Loloda king fought each other to claim the throne. After Navy Commander Sikuru and his men failed in the revolt, the kingdom lost its recognition as an empire in the Maluku Islands. The Dutch colonial government, supported by its counterpart in the Ternate kingdom, revoked the king's privilege (*kolano*), downgrading his position to a district chairman (*sangaji*). However, Loloda was not actually the only empire that lost its privilege, because when Indonesia declared its independence in 1945, hundreds of kingdoms across the country also eventually lost sovereignty over their people. As a united republic, Indonesia has governed the distribution of power in accordance with the new state laws.

Despite changes that occurred in Loloda, the collective memory, traditional values, and history among the Loloda people still remain strong. The uprising led by Sikuru from Laba still exists as one of the most important historical events ever to occur in Loloda. The Loloda people have embraced their past and view it as a spirited inspiration for their future. The Loloda people, however, are now facing an entirely different challenge because the current Indonesian government, in accordance with the law, now recognizes indigenous groups as functioning only within cultural activities and not in the political realm.

It is important to note, however, that the reemergence of Sikuru as a historical fgure occurred during a critical moment of the weakening power of Ternate. The government policy for the administrative proliferation and division of districts, regencies, and provinces (*pemekaran)* also played a part in this process. The situation opens the opportunity for the local people to establish the Kolano Loloda Institute, which works to reawaken local collective memories. This suggests that customary institutions can serve as alternative mediator to negotiate with formal institutions in the empowerment of local communities.

**Acknowledgments** This work was copy edited by ENAGO. This research was supported by Direktorat Jenderal Pendidikan Tinggi, Riset, dan Teknologi, Kementerian Pendidikan, Kebudayaan, Riset, dan Teknologi Republik Indonesia (The Directorate General of Higher Education, Research, and Technology, Ministry of Education, Culture, Research, and Technology of the Republic of Indonesia) under Grant Penelitian Unggulan Perguruan Tinggi 2017 (Grant Number NKB-2644/UN2.R3.1/HKP.05.00/2017).

# References


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# The Treaty of Tumbang Anoi, 1894: Impact on Borneo's Social Structure

*Sitti Utami Haryanti*

Visitors to the village of Tumbang Anoi, which lies upstream of the Kahayan River in the Gunung Mas Regency of Central Kalimantan, may not realize that it was the site of a groundbreaking historical event that signifcantly changed the life of the people of the Dayak tribe. Yet the event that took place over three long months in 1894 in this very village had done precisely that. What is now often referred to as the *Tumbang Anoi Peaceful Meeting* was attended by representatives of all the Dayak tribes in Kalimantan to discuss issues of Dayak customary law and possible solutions to disputes, producing a historically signifcant document called the Treaty of Tumbang Anoi. The meeting involved the colonial government of the Dutch East Indies and all Dayak tribes in Kalimantan. The fgures involved at that time were the Dutch c*ontrolleur* of Dayak Lands and other representatives from the Dutch East Indies colonial government. The Dayak tribes were represented by the central fgure, the Damang Batu, or Damang Ribu, who facilitated the Peace Meeting. This event marks the beginning of the establishment of a new legal order that

S. U. Haryanti (\*)

History Department, Faculty of Humanities, Universitas Indonesia, Depok, Indonesia

generally affected the Dayak tribal community. It also brought about a number of social changes among the Dayak people.

Some works in which this topic is mentioned include *Kalimantan Tempo Doeloe* (The Best of Borneo Travel), an anthology of European travel records in Borneo describing the European occupation period in Kalimantan, written by Victor T. King. *Anomie and Violence: Non-truth and Reconciliation in Indonesian Peacebuilding,* a work discussing peace efforts for regions of potential confict, mentions Tumbang Anoi but maintains that its "main effect" was the "loss of headhunting in the period 1910–1925" (Braithwaite et al., 2010, p. 293).

The present study of the history of the Tumbang Anoi Treaty uses both written and oral primary sources, as well as secondary sources. With its focus on the roles played by individuals and groups involved in the event, it further analyzes the social change in the Dayak community that transpired following the treaty. The chapter examines various cultural aspects of the Treaty of Tumbang Anoi in order to better understand its processes and impacts on Indonesian society.1

# Tumbang Anoi Today

Tumbang Anoi is now located in the Damang Batu District of Gunung Mas Regency in Central Kalimantan. It lies some 300 kilometers north of Palangkaraya, the capital city of Central Kalimantan, and can be reached by a seven-hour overland trip from Palangkaraya. Law No. 5 of 2002 made Gunung Mas a district of the territorial division Pro Kapuas in the province of Central Kalimantan. The Gunung Mas Regency lies 0°18′0.00 to ± 01°40′0.30 South and ± 113°01′0.00 to ± 114°01′0.00″ East, covering an area of 10,804 km2 that comprises 7.04% of the province of Central Kalimantan. It is divided into 12 districts: Manuhing, Manuhing Raya, Rungan, Rungan Hulu, West Rungan, Sepang, Mihing Raya, Kurun, Tewah, Kahayan North Hulu, Damang Batu, and Miri Manasa. In 2010, Gunung Mas had a total population of 96,838 consisting of 51,385 males and 45,453 females from a total of 22,933 households, with a population

<sup>1</sup> Some primary sources were obtained from the National Archives of the Republic of Indonesia (ANRI), the Government of Gunung Mas, especially from Vice-Regent Roni Karlos and his staff, who made available relevant data; the staff of the Gunung Mas Department of Culture and Tourism, Gauri Vidya Daneswara who provided data on the *Treaty of Tumbang Anoi*; and from Palangkaraya University, Kumpiady Widen, who provided data related to the Dayak in Kalimantan.

density of 8.98 persons per km2 (Central Bureau of Statistics of Gunung Mas, 2010).

The Gunung Mas Regency is an upland area with relatively cool temperatures. It is traversed by four rivers: the Manuhing, stretching ± 2875 km long; the Rungan, ± 8625 km; the Kahayan ± 60,000 km; and the Miri, ± 2000 km. Bukit Raya, its highest peak, is 2278 meters above sea level. Blessed with a tropical climate, the Gunung Mae Regency boasts of a great diversity of fora and fauna (Karlos, 2015).

The indigenous peoples of the Gunung Mas district are the Dayak, but residents of the area include migrants from Java, Sumatra, Sulawesi, as well as the Banjar from other parts of Kalimantan. The term "Dayak" refers to a designated ethnic category for native inhabitants of the island of Borneo. They make up generally heterogeneous societies that comprise small communities where different dialects are spoken. Their customary traditions are similar but nonetheless not exactly the same. Communities generally identify themselves by the name of the river fowing through the residential area or by the name of the area itself (Florus et al., 1994, p. 211). In the Gunung Mas District, Dayak Ngaju and Ot Danum are the largest, most dominant communities.

The Dayak Ngaju people are the majority and are settled around the Kapuas and near the Kahayan Rivers (*Ngaju Kahayan*) that fow through the Regency. They speak Indonesian in formal situations but use Ngaju Dayak as their everyday language. To ensure that the Ngaju Dayak language is passed on to future generations, the Gunung Mas District Education Bureau made the language a subject in local schools (Tangara, 2015).

The people of Gunung Mas still live their daily lives in proximity to the forest and are engaged in agriculture, farming, and raising livestock like poultry and pigs. Other activities are also linked to the natural resources of the regency such as, for instance, gold. The current interest in gold has affected the livelihoods of communities previously dominated by agriculture, and many have shifted to mining because of the high market price of gold.

Private companies manage some gold mines under the supervision of local governments, but many people with knowledge of gold-mining technology engage in informal mining to raise the family income. Traditional mining generally refers to mining without government permission and is considered an illegal act; it has an impact on the environment as well as on the miners themselves. All forms of informal gold-mining activities are termed "Unlicensed Gold Mining" (PETI/*Penambangan Emas Tanpa Izin*). In a bid to regulate unlicensed mining, the government enacted Law No. 23 of 2014, stating that all licenses are to be granted through the sole authority of the governor. This includes panning for gold in the rivers.

The communities of Gunung Mas, mainly Dayak Ngaju and Ot Danum, have traditions of specialized technology to produce the equipment they use. One such technology is the craft of the traditional *mandau*, a kind of saber made of a special mountain ore that renders it very strong and sharp. The *mandau* may be inlaid with gold, silver, or copper (Widen, 2015). In an interview (personal communication, September 6–10, 2016), the *Mantir* (tribal chief) at Kuala Kurun said that in the past, the *mandau* was sheathed in the *kayau,* the hair of the enemy. The more hair that covered the *mandau*, the greater its owner's strength and power. In addition to hair, other body parts like teeth and bones of the victims of headhunting might be pinned to the *mandau*. Thus, the *mandau* symbolized power and was believed to bestow power upon its owner.

The majority of people in the Gunung Mas Regency have adopted Protestant Christianity, which was brought to Kalimantan in 1835 by the *Rheinische Missionsgesellschaft* (RMG) that followed the major rivers in Central Kalimantan, including the Kapuas (Suroyo et al., 2012). A few communities still practice Kaharingan, the traditional religious rituals of their Ngaju Dayak ancestors2 (Central Bureau of Statistics of Central Kalimantan, 2017).

In Gunung Mas, the house is a symbol whose architecture encapsulates the values and basic philosophy regulating social relations, genealogies, technology, and art. The Dayak Ngaju tribal houses in Gunung Mas are called *betang*, and some are estimated to have been standing since the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. *Betang* were initially created as a form of collective protection against wild animals and the enemy headhunters but further evolved to encompass the extended family as a whole (Widen, 2015). All *betang* residents form a social unity bound by a consciousness of a common territory and a common genealogy. Communities that occupy a particular territorial *betang* are autonomous. Traditional

<sup>2</sup>The numbers have likely gone down between 2017, as refected in BPS statistics, and the time when the research published in Scharer, 1963, was conducted. For BPS statistics on Central Kalimantan, see https://kalteng.bps.go.id/statictable/2017/11/01/592/jumlahpemeluk-agama-menurut-kabupaten-kota-di-provinsi-kalimantan-tengah-2016.html

customs regulate social behavior among *betang* residents (Florus et al., 1994, p. 212).

*Betang* are about four to six meters high and reach hundreds of meters in length. Constructed of ironwood, with roof, walls, and foors made of thick bark, *betang* generally face the river or the east. Its interior consists of family residences, a cultural space, and *pante* (an open verandah). One enters the house by climbing an ironwood staircase called *hejan*, marked in its front by a statue and a structure to hang skulls, which is also used to enter the family ceremonial site for family funerals called *sandung*. Nowadays many *betang* are abandoned structures because most people have moved into modern housing. One *betang* which is still inhabited is the *betang* Toyoi in Tumbang Melahoi village. The location of the treaty between the Dayak tribes in Borneo in 1894, the Betang Tumbang Anoi, is no longer inhabited (Florus et al., 1994).

# *The Treaty of Tumbang Anoi*, 1894

In 1817, the territory of Banjarmasin that had been under British control was transferred to the Dutch. In the process, the Dutch demanded that the territories controlled by the Banjar Sultanate be handed over to the Dutch East Indies and that this transfer be set out in writing. On January 01, 1817, Sultan Sulaiman signed the Agreement of Karang Intan in the presence of J.D.J. Aernout van Boekholz, thereby ceding the lands under his control, which consisted of the Greater and Lesser Dayak Lands. Five years later, on September 13, 1823, the second Agreement of Karang Intan was signed in the presence of the resident, Mr. Tobies. This agreement clinched Dutch East Indies control of the Dayak provinces (*Dajaksche Provintien*) covering the Kapuas, Kahayan, Dusun, Pembuang (Seruyan), Katingan, Sampit, Kotawaringin and Jelai, and Mendawai areas. However, the region—and especially the hinterlands occupied by the Dayak tribes proved too large for effective oversight by the Dutch East Indies government apparatus. In 1938, the entire territory of Borneo was divided into two residencies: the *Westerafdeling* (Western division) of Borneo and *Zuid-oosterafdeling* (Southeastern) division of Borneo. Central, East, and South Kalimantan merged into the *Zuid-oosterafdeling*, while West Kalimantan merged into the *Westerafdeling* with South Kalimantan. The *Zuid-oosterafdeling* was divided into fve sections: the Banjarmasin section consisting of four subdivisions; the Hulu Sungai section, with fve subdivisions; the Barito Kapuas section, with six; the Samarinda section, with fve; and the Bulongan Berou section, with fve (Rusan et al., 2006, p. 68). Each section was divided into district, onder district, and district onder, while Dutch offcials occupied positions as resident, resident assistant for each section, and controller and assistant controller for each onder section. At each local government level, there were chief *kiai*, *kiai*, and assistants at the levels of onderafdeling, district, and onder district. The rank of *kiai* is equal to that of the *wedana* in Java (Umberan, 1994).

One reason the colonial Dutch East Indies government encountered diffculties in managing its Bornean territories was that the Dayaks fought hard against them. Resistance erupted in the Barito War when a Dayak tribe protected refugees from the Banjar Sultanate, and a series of wars in Pangkoh, Bukit Rawi, Tewah, Mandoun, Kasintu, and Bukit Panya followed. Dayak tribes in Borneo often fought to maintain their power, launching mutual attacks, called *Hakayau*, *Habunu*, and *Hatetek*, in which they decapitate the enemy combatants after killing them (Rusan et al., 2006, p. 71). In the past, men were deemed to have reached adulthood only after successfully participating in war and headhunting. Additionally, headhunting was often performed in the Tiwah ceremony, a death ritual enacted some years after a temporary burial in completion of the family's obligation to safely deliver the deceased to *Lewu Liaw*, the life after death. This ceremony involved sacrifcing a large number of animals like buffalo, cows, pigs, goats, and chickens; the sacrifces sometimes included slaves. In 1834, a man sacrifced up to 20 slaves when his wife died. In the Kaharingan belief, a deceased person must be accompanied by their belongings to ensure that they will continue to be served in the next life. Unlike the ritual of sati in Hinduism, in which the wife joined her husband in death by being cremated on his funeral pyre, the Tiwah tradition sacrifced only animals and slaves. For the burial of deceased persons who had no slaves of their own, families would seek out slaves to sacrifce (Mihing et al., 1979a). In other words, rituals of *pengayauan* or headhunting were demanded or required by religious belief. Charles Brooke, who worked as a British naval cadet in Sarawak, mentioned such events in his journal written from 1852 to 1863. He described the battle against the Iban Dayak on the Skrang and Saribas Rivers, during which many headhunting incidents took place (King, 2013, pp. 137–138).

On June 14, 1893, the Dutch East Indies government held a meeting at Kuala Kapuas to discuss ways to resolve these recurring wars. They planned a great assembly to negotiate a treaty to end these conficts. This plan aimed to include representatives of all Dayak subtribes in the treaty. In the meeting at Kuala Kapuas, it was decided to convene an assembly of all Dayak at Tumbang Anoi. The *betang* owned by Damang Ribu (aka Damang Batu), head of the Dayak Ot Danum, was designated as the site for the treaty. Damang Ribu had extensive knowledge of Dayak customs in Borneo and agreed not only to host the meetings slated to be held in three months but even to bear the costs. Tumbang Anoi was also chosen because it was located upstream from the Kahayan, and the residence of Damang Batu was large enough to accommodate many people. The place was also the most strategically located for the Dayak in Borneo at that time.3 Damang Ribu/Batu was believed to have the competency required to facilitate these meetings because he himself was concerned about the threats made against him by a tribe who was dissatisfed with the existing means of confict resolution. Damang Batu's opponent had threatened to launch a headhunting attack on all local citizens. Damang Batu had gathered his people in a fortifed place called Kuta, built to protect the area, but the people's fear never entirely subsided. He was thus eager for the meeting to bring an end to the confict among Dayak tribes ("Sosok Damang Batu ternyata Orang Biasa", 2014).

From that time until the end of 1893, Damang Batu traveled throughout the area to invite people having the ranks of *tamanggung*, *Damang*, *damboeng*, *dohong*, who were regarded to be deeply knowledgeable of Borneo Dayak customs, to ensure their presence at the assembly planned for the month of May. The date was selected because by then the harvesting of rice would have been over and the risk of withdrawal by farmers tasked with harvesting would be greatly minimized (Nainggolan, 1986, p. 3).

To support what was going to be a lengthy meeting, Damang Batu, along with local citizens, built cottages upstream and downstream from Tumbang Anoi, and across Tumbang Anoi for the guest accommodations. He issued invitations and prepared 100 buffalos to provide meat for the participants. The government also bought provisions like salt, rice, and tobacco to Banjarmasin and transported them from Kuala Kapuas to Kuala Kurun for storage at Tumbang Anoi. With the same purpose in mind, the government of West Kalimantan in Muntumoi near the border of the Melawi River basin kept rice stores for the event (Nainggolan, 1986).

<sup>3</sup>*Reports of Controleur Afdeling Tanah Dayak and Melawi*, translated by J.M. Nainggolan, 1986

The report of the controller of the Dayak Land Division described the two-week trip he made to Tumbang Anoi over rough terrain in heavy rain, arriving on May 08, 1894. The controller of Melawi arrived on May 20, 1894. The next day, on May 21, 1894, the two controllers held a meeting attended by two delegates from the Seri Panembahan Sintang and the two district heads from the Dayak Land Afdeling. In the meeting, it was determined that only past cases that had occurred at most 30 years ago would be accepted for resolution. Complaints related to the cases could be submitted within a period of 40 days, beginning on the frst day of the assembly. Complaints could be conveyed orally, or by a letter of application to the controller. If after 40 days the party being prosecuted or witnesses would fail to show up, then the verdict would be determined and be deemed binding. Payments made for the storage of goods would be charged to the defendants, and in case they were already deceased, their heirs were to inherit the responsibility. However, if the heirs were unable to bear the costs, the bill would be completely revoked. In order to avoid revenge acts, the families of the deceased perpetrator were obligated to pay a fne, called *tipoek danoem*, to facilitate the forging of peace between the two parties. Other regulations involving successful petitions forbade the petitioners from taking compensation claims directly. Instead, compensation would be paid through the government acting as intermediary.

The guidelines for the meeting also determined that if on both sides an equal number of heads had been taken, reconciliation could take place through the mutual exchange of *danoem*. But if there was a discrepancy in the number of heads taken, then a payment called *sahiring* had to be made. Most cases taken up that were considered criminal murder cases actually constituted a form of human sacrifce for funeral ceremonies such as the Tiwah. To ensure that no party made a proft from the restitution, the *sahiring* was instituted. If no proft was involved, the payment would be less than half of the *sahiring* and was called *tentoemahan*.

The second regulation had to do with captives. A person who took captives usually did so after suffering disappointment at the hands of another party who had failed to meet the demand for restitution. Thus, he resorted to capturing a person from that party as a way of fulflling the restitution demand. This captive had to be treated well and were to be released upon payment of a fne called *peteng lenge*.

The third regulation dealt with the crime of robbery, which called for the payment of fne paid, termed *saki*. The last regulation dealt with marriage and inheritance, for which traditional regulation and laws were deemed applicable.

Meetings took place in Tumbang Anoi every day except Sunday, beginning at 8:00 a.m. until 1:00 p.m. Tribal leaders took turns submitting documentations of criminal cases and civil suits slated to be brought to trial and group resolution. A month after the assembly began, about 830 people had already shown up, but this fgure did not include those from the surrounding communities who came to Tumbang Anoi. Not all visitors came to have their cases resolved; rather, many came to do business and conduct trade. The meeting facilitated traffc between the upstream and downstream areas and created social events among residents from different regions. As of the fnal day of the treaty, 233 cases had been processed, of which 152 were resolved completely, while 81 remained unresolved (Nainggolan, 1986, p. 18).

On July 24, 1894, the *Treaty of Tumbang Anoi* was closed in a ceremony that took place in front of Damang Batu's home. A day later, all chiefs and traditional leaders recited the Pledge of Peace in which they declared their readiness to help the Dutch East Indies government to achieve the goals of peace and prosperity for the entire community. The event is often called the Peace Meeting of Tumbang Anoi.

What the Dutch East Indies colonial government had done may also be viewed through the lens of Anna Tsing's work, which examines the process of marginalization of isolated communities. Tsing's research was conducted among the Dayak Meratus people, while the *Treaty of Tumbang Anoi* referred to the Dayak tribe of mainland Borneo as a whole. Tsing studied the intersection of state rules, regional and ethnic identity formation, and gender differentiation that are involved in the marginalization of the Meratus Dayak. In her work, she shows that marginality occurs in the asymmetrical contact between cultural identities of two groups (Tsing, 1998). In the event of Tumbang Anoi, the two asymmetrical groups were the Dutch East Indies colonial government and the Dayak tribes. The Dutch Indies government created the stereotyped representation of the Dayaks as primitive headhunters living in a disorderly, uncivilized society that created diffculties for its exercise of colonial power. The *Treaty of Tumbang Anoi* can thus be seen as an attempt by the Dutch colonial government to bring order to the Dayaks by imposing uniformity on a territory with disparate customary laws. The event also served as a form of propaganda, promising that the Dayak people were to be led to economic, political, cultural, and even religious development in a process believed to be in harmony with the idea of progress at the time. Fact is that colonial repressive power justifes its entry into the realm of indigenous people by declaring that it is developing civilization; culturally, however, they ignore local perspectives and end up overthrowing the entire cultural order of the local communities.

In the end, *The Treaty of Tumbang Anoi* impacted both the Dutch East Indies government and the Dayak community. The treaty enabled the Dutch to minimize the potential of the Banjar War spreading to Central Kalimantan and, at the same time, dampened Dayak resistance to the Dutch colonial government (Interview with Gauri Vidya Daneswara, 2017). At the economic level, the Dutch colonial government gained access to natural resource management in the region of Borneo, for instance, by opening a mechanical gold-mining company in Tewah (Mihing, et al., 1978, p. 18). At the sociocultural level, the Treaty of Tumbang Anoi facilitated Christianity's spread among the Dayak people. The report of the controller of Dayak Lands mentions missionaries, including Michtel from Kuala Kurun, participating in the Tumbang Anoi Treaty meeting. Missionaries spread the Christian religion among the Dayak tribes by liberating slaves, baptizing them, and restoring their status in society (Depdikbud, 1982, p. 46). Missionaries were gradually changing original Dayak beliefs, commonly called Kaharingan, while also eliminating rituals like *Tiwah* among the Dayak Ngaju and *Ijambe* among the Dayak Maanyan. This was possible partly because, by that time, fewer people were choosing to participate in the rituals, with some having grown fearful of the headhunting practices (Mihing et al., 1979b, p. 24).

*The Treaty of Tumbang Anoi* had a signifcant impact on Dayak communities. As a result of the treaty, animal heads replaced human heads in the headhunting tradition. In addition, fnes could be paid in the form of Dutch East Indies currency. It also shaped customary law by its recognition of the uniformity of the agreement, thus making the treaty applicable to the entire Dayak tribe. The resolution of cases also became uniform in the sense that the cases all had to undergo the same process: they frst need to be submitted to the Damang Customary Chief, who, in the event he fails to resolve it, would then elevate the case to the District Court. The Damang usually dealt with civil cases, while criminal cases were more commonly submitted directly to the District Court. After headhunting was abolished, criminal cases involving killings were often fled as murder cases under the criminal code. Slavery was also abolished under the treaty. In addition, the treaty impacted the economy as it led to the abolition of the barter system called *banurup*. Further, the European system of weights and measures used by the colonial government replaced traditional measurement systems. Moreover, with the arrival of the Dutch East Indies and its exercise of more effective oversight, the Dayaks were forced to abandon adherence to their indigenous farming practices as they were required to plant rubber and coffee (Department of Education and Culture Republic of Indonesia, 1982, p. 146).

Traditional forms of governance and other life traditions began to fade when the Dutch colonial government intervened in customary village governance following their establishment of a new government structure adapted to Dutch interests. One of the manifestations of village-wide change was the emergence of the district head, a new functionary within the village administration. After the *Treaty of Tumbang Anoi*, the situation in the Dayak community became relatively safe as all intertribal disputes involving headhunting became taboo. The security guarantees were followed by trade efforts that encouraged rural communities to connect with the world outside their villages. The penetration of money into village life opened isolated rural communities. Over time, the Dayak people gradually began to use money to acquire goods that they could not produce by themselves, such as salt and tobacco. At the same time, the newfound direct control over local government by the Dutch marked a change in the structure of traditional Dayak forms of governance. The Dutch instituted regulations that had the effect of undermining traditional local governance, such as the one issued in 1904, requiring each family to build permanent housing and to engage in agriculture around the township (Florus et al., 1994, pp. 215–216). After the slave system was abolished, native society was divided into two layers, the general public and the nobility (Utus Gantong/Putu Ambau/Tutur Ambau). The royal title also changed, with the traditional *Dambong,* the term for a regional head of government, being replaced during the colonial period with the title *Damang* or traditional leader. The opportunity to pursue education was opened to the nobility or to people who had been baptized because the schools they attended were founded by the Protestant mission (Department of Education and Culture Republic of Indonesia, 1982, p. 149).

That the *Treaty of Tumbang Anoi* continues to be relevant to the Dayak tribe today is seen in their efforts to preserve the event in their collective memory. This is true especially for the Dayak Ot Danum and Ngaju in the Central Kalimantan region. Educators today are making efforts to include historical material on the Tumbang Anoi Peace Meeting in the school curriculum. Interviews conducted with the Chairperson of the Teachers' Conference on Historical Subjects of Central Kalimantan Province, Mr. Adriansyah, reveal that there is actually no discussion about the *Treaty of Tumbang Anoi* in the curriculum (personal communication, April, 2019). Nevertheless, teachers in Central Kalimantan present material on the *Treaty of Tumbang Anoi* as part of their discussions of the colonial period of Indonesian history. In this way, students are introduced to the history of their area. Mr. Adriansyah also said that not all people share information about the *Treaty of Tumbang Anoi* with their families. As a result, many students are yet unaware of the treaty. Few members of the church in Central Kalimantan remember the event despite its signifcance to the spread of Christianity in the Dayak community.

In 2004, the Regional Government of Central Kalimantan, in collaboration with the University of Palangkaraya, the Government of Gunung Mas Regency, and the Dayak Indigenous Community (East Kalimantan Dayak Customary Council and the Central Kalimantan Dayak Adat Assembly), organized a program of activities at Tumbang Anoi that included an activity commemorating the treaty. This involved a visit to Tumbang Anoi to commemorate the events surrounding the treaty: retreat was held to discuss a variety of historical materials, among them the meeting of Tumbang Anoi and the launch of a book on the history of Central Kalimantan (Interview with Gauri Vidya Daneswara, June 30, 2017). In 2017, in an effort to preserve the events of the Treaty of Tumbang Anoi, the *betang* or house where the treaty came into being was registered as the Damang Batu Cultural Reserve Site in Tumbang Anoi Village. By this time, all that is left of Betang Tumbang Anoi is but a stake. Next to it, a replica of the Betang Tumbang Anoi was constructed by the Government of Central Kalimantan Province. Presently, it is occupied by heirs of Damang Batu (cagarbudaya.kemdikbud.go.id: 2018). The local government also has plans to create a "Tourism Village" at the location of the *Treaty of Tumbang Anoi*. Despite some setbacks, there are signifcant efforts to maintain and preserve the events of Tumbang Anoi as a way of ensuring that it remains within the collective memory of the Dayak people.

# Conclusion

The Treaty of Tumbang Anoi had a profound infuence on the lives of the Dayak people. Some outcomes of the treaty included: reduction of hostilities with the colonial Dutch government; vitiation of the custom of intertribal and intervillage war; putting an end to the custom of taking revenge; abolition of the indigenous headhunting custom (*mangayau)*; removal of traditional slavery practices; recognition by the Netherlands of Dayak Customary Law; the restoration of all the Dayak tribal rights and positions within their traditional, local government's scope; enforcement of the uniformity of tribal customary law; and establishment of permanent settlement patterns (Rusan et al., 2006, pp. 71–72; Sejarah Kabupaten Kapuas, 1981, pp. 33–34).

When viewed from the perspective of the active involvement of the colonial Dutch East Indies government by helping to facilitate the Treaty of Tumbang Anoi, it is clear that the treaty was a political strategy carried out by the Dutch among the indigenous tribes of Kalimantan. In particular, they couched these changes in the language of eradicating head hunting as a specifc Dayak tradition to justify their efforts to quell the resistance of the indigenous tribes in Kalimantan. As material for propaganda, the Dutch colonial government called it the Tumbang Anoi Peaceful Meeting, which created the impression that the meeting would bring peace to the Dayak tribes. In fact, the *Treaty of Tumbang Anoi* strengthened the power of the Dutch in Borneo/Kalimantan. After the Treaty of Tumbang Anoi, the colonial government experienced few signifcant obstacles as they expanded their political, economic, and cultural reach. On the other hand, the event taught many lessons to the succeeding generations in Kalimantan, especially the Dayak tribes. They are today aware of the value of local wisdom in learning the history of a period when their parents had deliberative authority to resolve disputes within the community. In addition, the younger generation fnd it noteworthy that their ancestors were able to coordinate and collaborate with each other and sustain the social and cultural solidarity necessary to organize a meeting attended by around 1000 people—including leaders of neighboring but disparate communities over a three-month period, with results that are felt by the community even today. Preservation efforts on all matters relating to the *Treaty of Tumbang Anoi* 1894 at this time are necessary to maintain the Dayak people's knowledge of confict resolution.

**Acknowledgments** This work was copyedited by ENAGO.

# References


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# Minangkabau *Silek Harimau*: Evolving Oral Traditions, Performance, and Choreography

*Madia Patra Ismar, Pudentia Maria Purenti S. S., and Syahrial*

# Introduction

In 2010, an Indonesian movie titled *Merantau* won Best Film Award at ACTIONFEST, a festival dedicated to action flms from around the world.1 Directed by the American Gareth Evans, this flm presented a storyline based on the travels and conficts encountered by a Minangkabau youth in his journey away from his home village in West Sumatra. The action scenes in the flm used movements from *silat*, the traditional martial arts of West Sumatra, Indonesia. The leading actor, Iko Uwais, then an Indonesian unknown, became a star and went on to earn lead roles in *Raid I* and *Raid II*, both flms by the same director, that also used *silat*

Literature Department, Faculty of Humanities, Universitas Indonesia, Depok, Indonesia e-mail: syahrial.s@ui.ac.id

<sup>1</sup> See htttp://www.merantauflms.com. Since the flm *Merantau*, the actors involved, Iko Uwais and Yayan Ruhyan, continued to stardom and were involved in *Raid 1* and *2*. They now also act in Hollywood movies.

M. P. Ismar (\*) • P. M. Purenti S. S. • Syahrial

movements. The action scenes in *Merantau* that drew so much attention were the fghting sequences choreographed following the motifs of traditional Minangkabau *silat harimau* ("tiger-style" fghting) movements. This genre was as yet unknown outside the martial arts scene because most of the choreography of fghting scenes in the flm is based on Chinese or Japanese martial arts styles. Breaking away from that convention, the choreographer for the scenes in *Merantau* was Edwel Yusri Datuk Rajo Gampo Alam, a master and teacher of traditional tiger-style silat (or *silek harimau*) originating in West Sumatra. In the Minangkabau language, *harimau* means "tiger." The word is also used in Bahasa Indonesia.

In the years following *Merantau*, Edwel Yusri has become a prominent fgure in the *pencak silat* world and has been invited to national and international cultural events as an expert and performer. He has also been invited to speak at national and international seminars on *silat*. 2 His school, called *sasaran* in Minangkabau, is based in Jakarta and has attracted numerous youths. This *sasaran* has also attracted students from other ethnic groups in Indonesia and has become a magnet for foreign martial arts enthusiasts. The school is not merely a place, but it also stands as an effort to revitalize a cultural memory that has been passed down over generations.

Cultural memory acts as an interplay of the present and the past in the cultural context (Erll, 2008, p. 2). Thus, through *silek harimau*, cultural memory continues as a process of becoming as the past resonates in today's performances and into new spaces of the imagination enabled by modern technology and environmental concerns. In addition, interest from local Minangkabau and national and international groups is expanding the geocultural range of these arts beyond its original homeland. Martial arts practitioners from outside Indonesia who studied *silek harimau* under the tutelage of Edwel Yusri at the school in Jakarta have established branches in the United Kingdom and Singapore. Students in Europe and Australia are also forming groups on the basis of the *silek harimau* style learned from Edwel Yusri. This international network has gradually expanded since the *guru's* earliest days as a young silat athlete performing in sports events organized by Indonesian Pencak Silat Association (IPSI), the

2Edwel Yusri has been invited to speak in Singapore for the *Merantau* event in 2015 at the Malay Heritage Centre, seminar for the Golok Arts Festival 2019, held in Cilegon Banten Indonesia, Jampang Silat Seminar in 2019 held in Pamulang West Java, and other seminars in West Sumatra. For practice workshops, he has been invited to teach in countries in Europe.

national *pencak silat* organization in Indonesia, and as an actor in Indonesian flms.

In 2012, Edwel Yusri and Madia Patra Ismar launched a collaborative effort to combine *silek harimau* and contemporary dance. Madia Patra Ismar, one of the writers of this chapter, is a Minangkabau residing in Jakarta, with a background in contemporary dance. The product of this collaboration was performed at the Taman Ismail Marzuki Arts Center under the title *Indahnya Hutan Kami* (The Beauty of Our Forests) as part of Greenpeace Indonesia's social awareness campaign for environmental sustainability. The performance expressed concern for the declining numbers of endangered tigers in the wild, a species on the brink of possible extinction. At the 2013 Indonesian Dance Festival, a contemporary dance titled *In Between* was performed. The choreography for this piece was inspired by the *silek harimau* co-created by Benny Krisnawardi and Davit Fitrik, both of whom are Minangkabau dancers, in collaboration with Katia Engel from Germany as artistic director and Helly Minarti as dramaturg. The source of *In Between* was the memory shared by Benny Krisnawardi and Davit Fitrik, both Minangkabau youths who migrated in the tradition known as *merantau* from West Sumatra to Jakarta. The performance used multimedia technology projecting visuals of the two dancers in low crouching movements and visuals of two tigers moving through a sand desert devoid of trees. Benny and Davit are lead dancers in the well-known Minangkabau contemporary dance group Gumarang Sakti, formed by the late Gusmiati Suid, a Minangkabau choreographer recognized as an Indonesian National Treasure. Benny Krisnawardi had stated that he had not studied the tradition of *silek harimau*. Rather, the movements in the dance were what he and Davit remembered, imagined, and interpreted from the movements of *silek harimau* intertwined with their impressions of tigers.

This chapter does not discuss the work of these Minangkabau choreographers as an artistic novelty, but rather traces the roots of these works embedded in *silek harimau* performance that has been passed down from generation to generation as part of an oral tradition. This chapter explores why the *silek harimau* remains important to the Minangkabau, and its performance as a form of cultural memory today.

Conversations with present-day Minangkabau youth leaders revealed that karate and taekwondo are now the more popular forms of martial arts. Belonging to *adat* or traditional custom, *silek* is generally viewed as backward or rural. However, the increasing adoption of *silek harimau*

style in popular culture is contributing to greater interest in the tradition of *silek* Minangkabau in general. In her 1994 dissertation, Hildred Cordes maintains that *silek* Minangkabau has over 70 styles. Other literature on *silek* Minangkabau include those of Alexander, et al. (1972), Mason (2009), Maryono (2008), Kartomi (2012), Garcia et al. (2013), Abdullah (2013), and Wilson (2015). Research on the connections between *silek* Minangkabau and dance has been carried out by Nor (1986), Sedyawati (1981), Murgiyanto (1992), Ismar (1998), Minarti (2014), Mahjoedin in Paetzold and Mason (2016), and Utama (2012). Scholars who are known for their work on *silek* Minangkabau and performing arts are Barendregt (1995) and Pauka (1998). In addition, a compilation of works is carried out by Paetzold and Mason (2016). However, limited research has focused on the *silek harimau* as part of a living oral tradition.

Oral tradition can be understood as a system of verbally transmitted communication that encompasses cognitive knowledge, values, and norms passed down from one generation to the next. Among the most pertinent to this study is the work of Albert B. Lord with his infuential literature on the theory of epics and oral formula in 1960, and further elaboration in 2000 (Lord et al., 2000). In terms of how bodily movements feature in oral tradition, Walter J. Ong, in *Orality and Literacy* (1982, p. 62), noted that oral expression may involve gestures. Roger Tol and Pudentia (1995, p. 2) argued that oral traditions not only contain folk tales, myths, and legend, but also store entire indigenous cognitive systems including histories, legal practices, adat law, and medication. David Rubin, in *Memory and Psychology* (1995), explained that oral tradition depends on human memory as a storage system and using oral ways for transmission that remain nearly unchanged over long periods of time, even though the stories change in the retelling. Thus, in the transmission of oral tradition, the songs, stories, and poetry can be stable in form over centuries even without the use of a writing system (Rubin, 1995, p. 3).

The works mentioned above offer a framework by which connections between oral transmission and bodily expression in the *silek harimau* can be understood, because they have been passed down over generations of masters. The verbal and kinesthetic interplay carries into and transforms the performative dimension of *silek* as a martial art. Field research shows that sacred ritual performances continue in preparation for the public performance of the *silek.* These rituals bind the *silek harimau* students to traditional beliefs that are still alive in Minangkabau society. Thus, it is hoped that this study offers an understanding of different aspects of *silek*  *harimau*, not only as a staged performance but also of its operations as an inherently oral tradition. In our view, identifying the dynamics of this oral tradition, and how the communities that claim ownership of *silek harimau* understand the meanings embedded in the memories and rituals related to the traditional transmission, is necessary before discussing the shift to new choreographic practice.

# Methodology and Data Collection

Literature has previously discussed the question of why *silek* movements are ingrained in Minangkabau creative dance. Well-known Indonesian scholars of choreography such as Sal Murgiyanto (1992), Edi Sedyawati (1981), Helly Minarti (2014), and Yulianti Parani (2011) show how Minangkabau choreographers incorporate patterns of silat movements into new movements of modern Indonesian dance. This patterning can be seen in almost all works produced by choreographers such as Hoerijah Adam, Gusmiati Suid, Arison (Tom) Ibnur, Dedi Luthan, Boi G. Sakti, Hartati, Benny Krisnawardi, Jefriandi Usman, Indra Zubir, Ali Sukri, and Ery Mefri. The bodily expressions of *silek* Minangkabau continue to emerge in their choreographies, although several have been toned down, blurred, and hybridized in an attempt to be more modern and thereby gain recognition as contemporary dance expression. Sal Murgiyanto (1992) and Helly Minarti (2014) wrote about the life experiences of Horeijah Adam and Gusmiati Suid as Minangkabau choreographers who created new dance works using movements developed from traditional *silek*. In her dissertation on the development of choreography in Indonesia, S.N. Kusumastuti (2017) wrote that "in accordance with an artists' ambitions or visions of the ideal, existing work is crafted to deliver novelty in every particularity; this search can be so far reaching that the traces of older work are no longer perceptible" (Kusumastuti, 2017).

The research on which this chapter is based involves a qualitative approach through feld observations and interviews, and secondary published resources and unpublished documentation of *silek harimau*. Ethnographic feld research includes observations at the training site in the Tanah Abang area in Jakarta, Taman Ismail Marzuki Art Center in the Cikini area, and the Painan area located on the southern coast of West Sumatra. Interviews began with choreographers from Minangkabau and subsequently engaged gurus of *silek harimau* and their students (*murid*). Chance conversations with Minangkabau people are likewise included.

A few of the informants were Minangkabauans who believe themselves to be descendants of tiger spirits and those who told stories of seeing tiger spirits. Several interviewees declared that they were descendants of people possessed by tiger spirits. Mentions of these tiger spirits or descent often emerged in discussions regarding the *silek* harimau.

Participative observation was also carried out at the training practice in Jakarta, in Bukittinggi, West Sumatra, and in Painan, West Sumatra. A further participative experience involved one of the researchers of this study, in collaboration with the guru *silek harimau* in Jakarta on a dance created from observations of distinct styles taught at the *sasaran*. The joint production was performed in Bogor in 2015 at one of the major *masjids* connected with a Minangkabau community. This collaboration contributed to the understanding of the actual bodily movements performed by the *silek harimau* and went beyond simple imagination. The possibility for collaboration was offered by Edwel Yusri in a continuation of earlier research that began when the guru realized that the researcher who frequently visited the school and conversed with him was trained in dance and choreography. The *silek harimau guru* in Painan also came to understand this when the authors carried out ethnographic work in the area, noting how quickly the same researcher picked up the movements. This guru likewise expressed interest in collaboration to produce a dance choreography based on *silek harimau* movements. For various reasons beyond our control, such collaboration has yet to take place.

To interpret the data collected on the *silek harimau*, we use Finnegan's (2005, 2012) concepts on carrying out research on oral tradition and performance. This interpretation enabled the identifcation of connections between performances and different forms of oral transmissions. Finnegan (1992) asserted that in oral traditions, expanding the gaze beyond the Western performance model and literary canon is necessary (pp. 5–9). We also drew on the work of Adrienne Kaeppler (2000), who studied dance performances as structured movement systems that included those associated with religious and secular rituals, with which they share a creative process. Lord, et al. (2000) also noted the importance of deciphering differences between the creative artist and practitioners who are actually, as he says, "in the tradition" (p. 155). These concepts frame the present study and efforts to scrutinize the layers of different elements in *silek harimau*.

In gathering data for this chapter, the writers interviewed and followed the practice of *silek harimau gurus* who had migrated (*merantau*) to the urban space of Jakarta. These gurus continued their *silek* practice by teaching or performing their choreographic works or by becoming a source of inspiration for other artists. The study includes observations from the following *gurus*. Edwel Yusri Datuk Rajo Gampo Alam traveled from his *kampung* in Agam, Bukittinggi, in his search for *silek harimau* teachers in the different regions of West Sumatra. Sonsri Madjoindo, from Painan in the Pesisir Selatan coastal region of West Sumatra, migrated to Jakarta but has now returned to his home village to teach what he terms *silek kampung* or village *silek.* Arison Ibnur, a well-known choreographer who teaches Minangkabau traditional dance at the Jakarta Institute for the Arts, was also interviewed. He had learned the *silek harimau buluah*, or bamboo tiger *silek*, as a young man still living in Solok and Padang. Learning from the *silek harimau guru* there, Arison Ibnur mastered dancelike movements in this style and chose to concentrate on the dance aspects rather than on combat movements. His *guru* was the maestro in the dance tradition called *randai ilau* in Solok, a form closely associated with tiger rituals. Arison Ibnur had been an accomplished natural choreographer even before academically studying dance choreography. Field notes by Madia Patra in 1998 from a study in Lintau, Lubuk Jantan region of West Sumatra, also served as reference.

Edwel Yusri has become a celebrity because of the choreography he created for fght scenes in flms, and because of his connections with the television and flm industry. As a result, he has helped to increase awareness of *silek harimau* for popular culture not only among the Minangkabau but also among a wider public, even internationally. Meanwhile, the *silek harimau guru* in Painan is unknown and seems content to educate his students in the ancient heritage. These masters of the *silek harimau* oral tradition are literate, able to read and write either in the Western or Islamic form. However, the stories, myths, and legends stored in their memories and experiences of *silek harimau* performances that are part of rituals remain unwritten. These stories are commonly only verbalized through the esoteric practice of hidden ritual and through the transmission of movements from guru to *murid*, who are called *anak sasian*.

# *Silek Harimau* and the Act of *Merantau*

The name Minangkabau refers to a matrilineal cultural group in West Sumatra, a volcanic region known for its rain forests and its animals. Perhaps the best-known animal is the *panthera tigris*, the Sumatran tiger or *harimau* of the *silek harimau* tradition. The Minangkabau people are known for a tradition of circular migration, called *pai marantau* or *merantau*, that carries them from their homeland to regions beyond. Thus, the Minangkabau people can be found in nearly all parts of the Indonesian archipelago and in many countries. In the past, the Minangkabau prepare their youth, specifcally males, to endure the demands of travel, face possible dangers, and teach them how to conduct themselves in foreign lands through training in the art of *silek* self-defense.

The underlying philosophy of *silek* is refected in the saying *alam takambang manjadi guru manuruik alua jo patuik manggunoan raso jo pareso, alam basandi syarak, syarak basandi kitabullah* ("The world of nature that unfolds is the Teacher, according to the path of the covenance, using the senses and thought. This world of nature is based on the principles of the sharia, and the sharia is based on Allah's book"). These words refect the close relationship between Islamic practice and the Minangkabau traditions. In past times, youths trained in *silek* were usually taught the ways of Islam at the *surau*, a small prayer house, as part of compulsory religious education. As such, most *silek* teaching is related to Islam and based on the Al Quran.

*Silek* has many forms and styles of self-defense movements inspired by elements found in nature. These *silek* styles and movements infuence the artistic expression of the Minangkabau and are refected in their theater and dance performances even today, whether in traditional or new creative dance. The *silek harimau* style of movement is found not only in a few communities but in the metropolitan capital of Jakarta, and its tradition has evolved into new choreographic forms for new audiences. In this way, the *silek harimau* has shown its capacity to survive, transcending the constraints of cultural and geographical spaces and opening new ones for its training grounds.

In addition to the basic martial arts movements and survival skills, *silek harimau* also comprises a specifc pedagogy and compendium of knowledge contained in legends, myths, spiritual beliefs, proverbs, and herbal medicine. As a practice of self-defense, the teachings of a *guru* are transmitted orally in training systems without writing. Notably, this process is inscribed into movements that can be construed as bodily writing: the moving body serves as encryption of the oral tradition. In *silek*'s more esoteric aspect, meanings may thus be at once preserved and hidden in bodily movements.

In the worldview of the Minangkabau, the tiger has held a special place since pre-Islamic times. Admired for its physical strength and beauty of appearance and movement, the tiger is considered the king of beasts and guardian of the forests. For the Minangkabau people who hold traditional beliefs, the tiger also has a distinct place in their memories. Respectfully called *inyiak* or grandfather, the tiger is believed to be a source of wisdom, protector of human beings, and a guardian of human morals. This majestic animal is also seen as having mystical qualities that surpass the physical. Such spirituality connected to beliefs about the tiger can be traced back to certain artistic practices in particular oral traditions, including legends, myths, songs, and the narratives expressed in *randai ilau*, a song and dance drama performed to appease the spirits of dead tigers. This emphasis on the tiger spirit appeared in interviews with *silek harimau* practitioners, but also with artists and ordinary people.

# Origin and Sacred Rites of the *Silek Harimau*

Through interviews carried out in Lintau and Padang, legends and stories told in *silek harimau* circles were collected. The stories state that this art of self-defense was initially taught to humans by tigers. The tiger spirit is believed to come to the *surau* in the middle of the night in animal form and show its stripes. An *anak sasian* is selected, and he then follows the tiger into a secluded space to be trained. At times, the tiger can also manifest itself as a spirit that bystanders may see as a mist or only its eyes. However, the chosen *anak sasian* believed he was actually parrying with the tiger *inyiak.* Several versions of *silek harimau* stories say that the art came from the Champa Kingdom and was brought by one of the royal guards to the ancient Minangkabau Kingdom. However, historical manuscripts provide no evidence of this provenance.

The *silek harimau* is traditionally considered an ancient esoteric practice in which the learning is hidden from outsiders. This view is still held fast in the *sasaran* in Painan, where strict rules govern contact with and entry. In the old days, *silek harimau* was used only in combat and only when under attack. By contrast, as the guru of *silek harimau* in Jakarta, Edwel Yusri has a more open view and continues to build his profle as an expert in the choreography of fght for flms and trains actors starring in movies and popular television series. At his school, he teaches not only the technique and style of *silek harimau* but also passes on traditional values underlying *silek* that he learned from his own ritual *gurus*. His frst guru was his grandfather, who passed down the heritage of *silek harimau* through family bloodlines. Edwel Yusri then traveled and learned *silek harimau* from seven *gurus* in different areas of West Sumatra. On traveling to Jakarta, he entered the world of modern *silat* through IPSI, where he gained international experience. In one interview, he stated that during this experience, he noticed performances that combined dance and martial arts. He was then inspired to open himself up to other forms of performing *silek harimau*. However, the sacred acts involved in preparing a student, the *anak sasian*, at his *sasaran* are obligatory and still practiced, serving to bind the student to the *sasaran* and the *guru*.

On August 24, 2017, during an interview at the Taman Ismail Marzuki Cultural Center in Jakarta, Arison Ibnur said that he had learned the style of *harimau buluah*, a small bamboo tiger, as a youth in his hometown of Padang. He said he remembers his guru *silek*, the late Mantijo Sutan, a master artist who performed the mourning ceremony *randai ilau* using *silek* movements, sung verse, and music whenever a tiger was killed for intruding into the villages (*kampuang* in the Minangkabau language) in the area of Solok. On September 13, 2017, during an interview in Jakarta, Edwel Yusri said that the *randai ilau* ceremony is called *marojoh* in Sawahlunto and is a performance of song and *silek* dance-like movements to appease the spirit of a dead tiger and to prevent other tigers from searching for it and intruding into the village. A secret mantra is sung, and the spirit of the tiger, highly central to the *randai ilau* performance, is invoked by a percussive instrument covered with a tiger skin standing in for the actual tiger's body, if no dead tigers are available at the time of the performance. In her book, *Musical Journeys in Sumatra* (2012), Kartomi mentions the tiger song, were-tiger beliefs, and the functions of the *guru silek* as shaman.

Several Minangkabau people continue to believe in tiger spirits and were-tigers to this day. In Painan, we encountered a *silek harimau* community that believes that the tiger spirit that unites with that of the *guru* during rituals and *silek harimau* training is in fact an ancestor and is referred to as *angku inyiak*. However, today, this tiger belief is not talked about openly, but rather in hushed tones as part of an esoteric practice when it comes up for discussion in closed circles.

Most people show a disapproval of the practice, an attitude that is quite likely due to the recent rise and strengthening of Islamic puritanism. In Minangkabau history, this tension between the old practices and puritanical Islam can be traced back to the *paderi* war of the nineteenth century. Several Minangkabau talk of war leaders known as the *harimau salapan*, or the eight tigers. According to one source, tiger beliefs connected to the ceremony *randai ilau* as expressed in song, music, and movement are no longer found because the maestro had passed away, leaving only one or two *murid*s who no longer practiced this art. The late master's son is a well-known choreographer and is not interested in continuing the practice. He prefers to shine in the world of contemporary dance and travels to various countries with his performing group. Hence, this genre of *silek harimau* in the *randai ilau* performance has possibly disappeared, although Arison Ibnur mentioned one *murid* of Mantijo Sutan who may still remember how to perform.

Although general audiences can now enjoy the visual presentations of bodily movements of the *silek harimau* style in public spaces, these performances show no further than the expression in the form of dance or choreography. Meanings beyond the visual aspect can be discerned by an oral tradition perspective to investigate the primary signifcance behind the aesthetic expression. This understanding can offer a deeper comprehension of how the *silek harimau* oral tradition is understood by the communities that "own" it, and how they view the choreographic practice. The *guru* is "at once the tradition and creator," and thus individual styles may differ. Nevertheless, in the composition of movement linked to the *silek harimau* tradition, a consciousness of the origin remains, which in itself is an act of preserving the memory of the magic of the tiger spirit.

The *guru silek harimau* is believed to have magic powers, and in the eyes of the Minangkabau community, the *guru* is also recognized as having the knowledge of meditative medicines and prayers to expel evil spirits and jinn. This belief was observed at various times during contact and interviews with the *gurus* themselves or with the *anak sasian*. The roots of oral traditional narrative are not artistic but religious in the broadest sense. As Lord says of oral tradition, "Its symbols, its sounds, its patterns were born for magic productivity not for aesthetic satisfaction. If later they provided such satisfaction, it was only to generations which have forgotten their real meaning" (2000, p. 67).

# Transmitting *Silek Harimau* Memories and Movements Through Initiation Rituals

Different versions of the initiation ceremony mark the entry of a young person into the brotherhood of the *silek harimau* school. Drewes (1949) included a short narrative of the importance of this ritual in a young Minangkabau man's life. The initiation ceremony in traditional *silek* communities may have different names, such as *darahan*, *rajok*, *kaputusan*, and *bai'at.* In Painan, the guru calls the ritual *diduduakkan*. The main differences are in the sequences of performance and content. The initiations observed in this study, and a few described in interviews, consist of ritualistic sequences, mantras, and religious prayers that involve symbolism, structure, performer roles, interrelations, specifc moments, metaphysical atmosphere, improvisational energy, suggestive utterances, and audience response as witnesses.

In an interview about achieving *silek harimau* skills, a practitioner from Payakumbuh, who now lives in Jakarta, recited in a singsong voice, "go home to the *kampuang*, say the *dzikirs* and drink the *limau* water and the tiger spirit will come."

The saying *Adaik diisi, limbago dituang* (When adat is fulflled then so is culture) is the philosophical foundation of the *bai'at* ceremony for the *silek harimau*. The initiation rite observed in Jakarta used the following symbolic materials. First, a white cloth represents death but also a pure heart, refecting that all actions must be done and purifed by *niat* (pure intentions). A white cloth also means sincerity. Second, a knife carries the meaning that the higher the frequency of its sharpening, the better it would be to use for positive reasons as humankind has been appointed by Allah to be the *Khalifah* (steward or leader). Once the knife is sharp, it must be *nan bungkuak makanan saruang* (resheathed) and only used in times of dire need. Third, the *Siriah langkok* (a complete set of betel offerings) combines the tastes of bitterness, spiciness, and sweetness as a symbol of life. Fourth, coins signify that the student is not to become a burden on the teacher. A *silek* student must not become a burden on others and thus must be useful. The word *Pandeka* (warrior), often used for *silek* adepts, is interpreted as an abbreviation of *pandai manggunokan aka*, meaning "good at using one's wits." Fifth, the *giriang* rooster, a creature that is the frst to wake before the break of dawn at *subuh* prayer times for *sholat* or Islamic prayers, is sacrifced in the Islamic way and shows the contents of the heart of the one who brings it to the *bai'at* ceremony. When its blood drops onto the earth, any arrogance is taken away and any ugliness in the heart is discarded. The meaning of this blood ritual is to willingly throw away one's negative traits and to let go of evil knowledge through inner spirituality. The frst sequence of the *ba'iat* involves reciting verses from the Qur'an while making the motions of ablutions to purify oneself. Evil lusts or passions are thus expelled. The blood symbolizes diseases of the heart, as for example the passion of anger, that drive actions of wrath and jealousy. Such passions are animalistic in nature, and the consequence of giving in to these emotions is a life ruled by one's animalistic side, called *maraji*.

The *ruh harimau* (tiger spirit) is believed to be present during the ritual. In the Painan area, and according to several interviews with the *anak sasian*, the ancestral tiger spirit is believed to speak and act through the *guru*, who functions as a medium. The proper term for addressing the *guru* in this form is *angku inyiak*, a term of respect for an ancient one. The ancestral spirit of the tiger is believed to be the one who actually trains the selected *murid*, usually in the middle of the night. *Dzikir* prayers from the Qur'an are used but recited in the heart. The guru also distributes water that has been recited over if the *murid* is in danger of being overcome by the tiger spirit.

However, the *bai'at* in Jakarta has no event in which the *silek harimau* guru acts as a medium for the tiger spirit. The *dzikir* is recited, accompanied with repeated movements referencing the movements of *wudhu* (ablutions). Recitations of the verses from the holy Qur'an in a repetitive form provide improvisational energy as part of the *bai'at.* In the last sequence, performed at midnight, the *murid* (or *anak sasian*), guided through recitations and suggestive motivations by the guru, is suddenly and spontaneously able to execute diffcult movements such as jumping while spinning and fipping to different positions, despite being previously unsure and unable to perform such stunts. This sequence of the entire *bai'at* ritual is a technique of exploring movement but is also a semihypnotic birthing of a *harimau pandeka*. Stories also tell of persons not taking part in the rituals nor even learning *silek* from the guru but spontaneously transforming into were-tigers when overcome by feelings of rage.

Attitudes toward beliefs in the tiger spirit are found to differ during research at the cultural space of the *silek harimau* guru of Sasaran *Silek Harimau* Tongga in Painan Pesisir Selatan, which has a different ritual structure. In Painan, before meeting the ancestor *angku inyiak*, one must be purifed by *wudhu* (ablutions). The ancestral tiger spirit can then be spoken to after its entrance into the body of the *silek harimau* guru. Requesting permission of the *ruh inyiak harimau* is required before participating in the training. Taking part in this ritual is necessary before permission is granted to interact with the tiger spirit. For this reason, to interview this ancestral spirit through the *guru*, the researcher had to request permission by participating in the ritual. Observations of the learning and training by the *anak sasian silek harimau* Tongga in Painan during the day with the *guru*, and during midnight training with the tiger spirit, showed a change in his mannerisms and voice.

In being born through ritual, a *silek harimau pandeka* has to learn the *silek harimau* core movements. The participants are also believed to be flled with the *angku inyiak* spirit, and thus are taught to control and suppress or activate this presence based on the need. In contact with the *angku inyiak* spirit through the guru as medium, the *anak sasian* learn the core movements of *silek harimau* motifs that they can use in combative situations and in performances of the *tari piriang randai* theater performances. The movements are named in accordance with their functions, including *tagak alif* (Arabic letter *alif*, upright position), *kudo-kudo harimau* (tiger stance), *pilin* (twist), *pitunggue* (protective stance for the body), *sambah* (movements of respects to the earth, sky, and audience), *langkah* (core footsteps), *gelek* (dodge), *lantiang* (tiger jump), *caka harimau* (tiger claw), *gampa* (tiger slap), *elo* (pull), *cakiak* (throttle or choke), and *maramuak lihia* (neck crush).

# Islamic Renditions in the *Silek Harimau*

The *surau* to which *silek* is commonly connected is a small prayer building that is traditionally situated on the grounds of the Minangkabau traditional long house, the *rumah gadang*. In the past, the *surau* served as a network for *silek gurus* and pupils, who learned to recite the Al Quran. In certain regions, *silek* movements became bodily inscriptions of the *hijaiyah* Arabic letters used in the Quran. The movements of *silek* were thus a form of bodily writing representing Arabic calligraphy. This concept is also practiced by the *sasaran* in Jakarta, Pesisir Selatan, and Lintau.

Although the connection between *silek* and *surau* is of cultural signifcance to the Minangkabau, few *silek* schools retain this connection to the *surau*. 3 However, a *silek harimau* performance at the Masjid Harakatul Jannah in Gadog, Bogor, shows that a *masjid* can be considered a continuation of the *surau* as a performance and is still considered important.

The Islamic religious concepts in the current study are derived from interviews with three *silek harimau gurus* and observation of initiation rituals between 2015 and 2017. The transmission of the *silek harimau* incorporated the use of Al Quran verses recited as *dzikir*, *the* Islamic act of recitation in which the name of God is repeatedly vocalized. The Arabic letters used in the Quran, that when combined spell the name of God, are embodied in the *langkah* or basic steps of the *silek harimau*. The *Dzikir* recitation is also accompanied by bodily movements in rituals for initiation of the *murid* into the *sasaran*. These sacred acts were performed when giving offerings to the *guru;* these symbolize the *murid*'s intention to be accepted and initiated into the group. Upon passing this ritual, the student would then be referred to by the *silek harimau* community as *anak sasian*.

# Conclusion

In the stories told during initiations, the guru conveys the wisdom of learning *silek*. Edwel Yusri Datuk Rajo Gampo explains:

[F]or a Minangkabau, to learn *silek* is not just learning the *langkah* steps or movements, or *gelek* (avoiding attacks) but also to learn that *silek* means to learn the history (through the legends in *tambo* and *kaba*) and the heritage. Because to learn the background means you know your place, understand adat, understand religion, that both [i.e. adat and religion] are mutually supporting, mutually interweaving, upward and downward, to the left and to the right, to the front and to the back; these aspects cannot be separated. They encompass everything as a whole. That is what is called a living history, a history that never dies as long as this world exists. (Interview with Edwel Yusri Datuk Rajo Gampo Alam, 2016)

By contrast, the modern creative artist interprets *silek harimau* on the basis of his or her aesthetic imagination. Kaeppler (1972) carried out research on dance in Tongan society and observed, "If we are to

<sup>3</sup> Interviews with Datuk Tunaro nan Bagak, a 24-year-old *adat* leader from Payakumbuh, who is also a practitioner of *silek,* and Roni, the 30-year-old president of West Sumatra Muhammadiyah Organization.

understand (rather than to just appreciate) an aesthetic, or a society's cultural form, it is essential to grasp the principles on which such an aesthetic is based, as perceived by the people of the society that holds them" (p. 154). Thus, as the *silek* tradition becomes increasingly intertwined with contemporary notions of dance, to resist a simplistic merging of indigenous concepts into modern ones enhances its importance.

The indigenous Minangkabau term *mamancak* (from *ma-ancak*), used to refer to the movements of the *silek harimau*, means "to move in beauty," and is linked to *pencak silat*. *Silek harimau* practitioners move fuidly, using paw-like swings of the arms and legs, and propel themselves from a crouching position on the ground to spinning toward an opponent while gripping the throat or head for a deadly twist in one fuid motion. They also grapple with and throw the opponent to the ground, locking him into a position of immobility. Although the movements seem brutal, visually they are considered beautiful, though deadly. To see this performance is to witness a deadly dance.

The different styles of *silek* (Cordes, 1994; Ismar, 1998, p. 82; Kartomi, 2012; Mason, 2016; Minarti, 2014, pp. 104–108; Murgiyanto, 1992; Navis, 1986, pp. 263–274; Pauka, 1998, pp. 1–3; Sedyawati, 1981, p. 73; Utama, 2012) are further shaped by the natural environment. In the hinterlands, called the *dare*, where the landscape is dominated by volcanoes, the basic form is usually a stance called the *kudo-kudo* in which one leg is slightly raised, with only the toe touching the ground. This stance is perhaps infuenced by the hard ground. By contrast, this stance is not practiced in coastal areas, perhaps because of the need to have both feet planted frmly on the ground in the shifting sand, hence the need for extra balance.

The values and norms of conduct of the *silek harimau pandeka* are learned through the rituals and instructions of the guru. In any combative situation, a *silek harimau pandeka* requires calmness. By being calm and collected, a *pandeka* can vanquish an opponent. Emotions that are out of control can bring diffculties and become a hindrance. This is different from modern choreography, where emotions are explored for their expression through movement. In dance, a conscious control accentuates the beauty revealed in bodily movement. By contrast, for a *pandeka* of *silek harimau*, the main function of movement is the effciency of the skill, and beauty is an incidental aesthetic resulting from such functionality and prowess in technique. The rhythmic pauses of movement in *silek harimau* are functional, whereas in dance, the pauses, starts, and stops strengthen the expression of emotions and intentionally emphasize the aesthetic line of the body presented to the audience. The essence of the *silek harimau* spirit lies in performing the stages of rituals toward becoming a *pandeka* as opposed to the display of physical prowess in stage performance. In rituals, the transmission is a choreography of sequential moments, including the act of improvising with the tiger spirit of the ancestral *angku inyiak* within oneself to imprint the *silek harimau* into the *pandekas* and bind them to the group. However, the movements themselves also form core motifs of traditional Minangkabau dances such as the *tari piring* (dance with plates) and the *randai* dance drama.

The *silek harimau* is yet to fully realize its potential in the struggle to withstand the onslaught of time. The beauty of the *silek harimau mancak* movements and the high level of diffculty of bodily technique and skills necessary to execute these movements leave open further opportunities for development by the *silek harimau* community itself. The traditional performance space of the *silek harimau* comprises the elements of earth, water, night, and brotherhood, with the most important audience being the *angku inyiak* tiger spirit. However, with the passage of time, the potential for further artistic dialogue and shared ideas and dreams between modern dance choreographers and the *silek harimau* gurus is yet to be fully realized, though the seeds of renewal have been sown.

**Acknowledgment** This work was copyedited by ENAGO. This chapter was supported by Research Grant for International Publication managed by Universitas Indonesia Year 2017 (Grant Number: NKB-485/UN2.R3.1/HKP.05.00/2017).

# References


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# Remembering War and Peace

# National Histories, Private Memories: Indonesia and the Japanese Occupation

*Jacob Wray*

# Introduction

In 1982, the Japanese Ministry of Education authorised the publication of a history textbook in which some of Imperial Japan's most controversial acts of wartime aggression were signifcantly downplayed, if not altogether omitted. The publication of the textbook angered the governments and peoples of many former occupied territories. The governments of China and South Korea, for instance, accused Japan of attempting to rewrite history and thus denying responsibility for the brutalities it inficted upon colonial subjects during the Second World War. Okinawans denounced the omission of the forced mass suicides which took place during the Battle of Okinawa, the Taiwanese government made representations over the depiction of the colonial administration in Formosa, and activists in Hong Kong organised large-scale protests at which a petition condemning the textbook collected some 400,000 signatures.

e-mail: jacob.wray@anu.edu.au

J. Wray (\*)

Department of Political and Social Change, Coral Bell School of Asia Pacifc Affairs, College of Asia and the Pacifc, Australian National University, Canberra, ACT, Australia

In Southeast Asia, voices of discontent were quieter, but nevertheless present in protests which erupted in Hanoi and Bangkok, in the Vietnamese government's offcial request to amend the textbook, and in the negative sentiment expressed by newspapers and other publications, the most aggressive of which was in Singapore. Indonesia, however, was an outlier: no diplomatic representations were made by the government, no protests were organised by local activists, and little mention of the textbook's publication was made by Indonesian media outlets. This response (or lack thereof) is just one example of the kind of indifference Indonesians have long displayed towards a period of history that remains highly controversial elsewhere in Asia.

This chapter considers why Imperial Japan's three-and-a-half-year occupation of the Netherlands Indies has seldom been a matter of controversy, sensitivity, or consequence in post-war Indonesia. It begins by showing that the Japanese period—which began with the capture of Balikpapan and Kendari in January 1942 and which ended offcially with local acceptance of Japanese surrender to Allied forces in September 1945—is largely absent from Indonesian historical consciousness and collective memory. It then draws on oral histories to describe aspects of the Indonesian experience of the war and to deepen existing understandings of Southeast Asian attitudes towards this often-contentious period of history. Lastly, it suggests two ways in which Indonesian memories of the war have been shaped by political agendas, social circumstances, and cultural values.

# Historical Consciousness and Collective Memory

What does it mean for the past to be inconsequential or uncontroversial in the present? Here, I suggest two conceptual frameworks which help reveal how the Japanese period is understood in Indonesia today. The frst of these frameworks is historical consciousness, which, according to the historian John Lukacs (1968), is a recollection of history which extends beyond the recorded past to include the remembered past. In Lukacs's view, the remembered past is "something uniquely human, because it is conscious as well as unconscious, because it involves cognition together with re-cognition, because it involves thinking, and because thinking always involves some kind of consciousness" (pp. 9–10). Historical consciousness is therefore not a refection of historical reality but rather an ever-changing and inherently fallible understanding of the past.

The importance of historical consciousness comes in large part from its role in the creation of identities. Collective identities are underpinned by the acceptance of a shared history, and, as Peter Seixas (2004) writes:

Identity and memory and inseparable because a common past, preserved through institutions, traditions and symbols, is a crucial instrument—perhaps *the* crucial instrument—in the construction of collective identities in the present… Belief in a shared past opens the possibility for commitments to collective missions in the future. In order to serve these purposes powerfully, memories organised as narratives include a temporal dimension, conveying an idea of origins and development, of challenges overcome, with collective protagonists and individual heroes confronting diffcult conditions and threatening enemies. (p. 5)

Based on these conceptions, the Japanese Occupation of the Netherlands Indies is absent from Indonesian historical consciousness. In Indonesia as elsewhere, national identity features heroes and enemies, institutions, and various successes and struggles, but very few of them are associated with the Japanese period by Indonesians today. Instead, the foundation of Indonesian national identity lies in the shared experience of disparate peoples living under Dutch colonial rule. The past struggles of which Indonesians are most conscious are those against Dutch colonists, and it is this history which is kept at the forefront of public consciousness. One such reminder of this struggle are the names of Indonesian airports, many of which come from national heroes who fought against the Dutch. The cities of Bandung, Jakarta, Madiun, Malang, and Yogyakarta, for instance, all have airports named after Indonesian air force personnel who fought during the Indonesian National Revolution. Beyond Java, Manado's airport in North Sulawesi is named after Sam Ratulangi, a member of the Preparatory Committee for Indonesian Independence; Ambon's airport in Maluku is named after Pattimura, who fought against the Dutch in the Ambon Revolt of 1817; and Biak's airport in Papua is named for Frans Kaisiepo, the only Papuan delegate to participate in the 1946 Malino Conference, where he sided with anti-Dutch nationalists. While the fgures after whom Indonesian airports are named represent myriad ethnic, religious, and linguistic groups, their point of similarity was their resistance against Dutch colonialism.

The Dutch—much like the Ottomans in Greek historical consciousness or Imperial Britain in the Americas—are the enemy Indonesia had to overcome in order to create the nation that exists today. For several centuries, Dutch colonists exploited the archipelago's resources, enforced a rigid social structure, and created a trail of bloodshed and destruction. The other enemy of Indonesia's past is the Indonesian Community Party, which is considered responsible for, among other things, the political turmoil of 1965 and the Madiun Revolt of 1948. Hostility towards both Dutch colonialism and Indonesian communism remains apparent in Indonesia today. It has become relatively common, for instance, to hear Indonesians declare that they were wrongly colonised (*salah dijajah*). This declaration attributes many of the challenges Indonesia currently faces to the incompetence of Dutch rule and suggests that Indonesia would be far more prosperous if it had been colonised by the British. Anti-Communist sentiment in Indonesia is perhaps more overt again: banners depicting a hammer and sickle overlaid with an interdictory circle and the words *Tolak Komunisme* ("Reject Communism") are regularly displayed on prominent buildings and street corners.

Unlike the Dutch and the Communists, however, the Japanese have never been the subject of such disapproval. Instead, Indonesia is one of the foremost cases of successful Japanese cultural promotion in the world today. Japanese culture—cinema, cuisine, fashion, literature, music, and so forth—is popular throughout Indonesia. Gramedia, Indonesia's largest book retailer, stocks a wide selection of manga and anime. Sushi restaurants and ramen noodle bars are located anywhere from the glitzy shopping malls of Jakarta and Surabaya to the main street of Banda Aceh and the side streets of Kupang and Jayapura. Karaoke bars like Happy Puppy and Japanese refexology chains like Nakamura are located throughout the cities and towns of Java. The Japanese language is also a popular subject of study among young Indonesians. The Language Training Center at Satya Wacana Christian University in Salatiga, for example, offers tuition in just one foreign language besides English: Japanese. Likewise, Gadjah Mada University in Yogyakarta offers more than thirty Japanese-language courses. (The only languages with a greater selection of subjects are English and Javanese.) Studying Japanese has become so popular, in fact, that Indonesia recently overtook South Korea to become the country with the most Japanese-language learners, second only to China (The Japan Foundation, 2013).

The second conceptual framework which helps reveal how the Japanese period is understood in contemporary Indonesia is collective memory. The sociologist Maurice Halbwachs (1992), who was largely responsible for generating broader interest in collective memory, described it as a social construction of the past shaped by the concerns of the present. Much debate about the usefulness of a concept which applies an inherently individual act to a wider population followed, but the value of collective memory for this study lies in its recognition that individual memories are not immune from infuence and manipulation. As Remco Raben (1999) explains, individual memories engage with, and respond to, other kinds of memory:

What is called personal memory, as opposed to collective memory, is actually the individual voice in a much larger polyphonic choir. The individual, like the nation or everything in between, seeks reassurance in stereotypes, and contrasts his or her memory with the dominant interpretations in a society. (p. 10)

Personal memory is thus shaped by historical narratives of broader social and cultural signifcance, and it is narratives of this kind which form the collective memory of a society (Straub, 2005). In post-war Asia, many of the war narratives most signifcant to their respective contemporary societies are about historical injustice. In China, for instance, stories of the rape and murder of Nanking residents by Imperial Japanese soldiers—an event widely known to English-speaking audiences as "the Rape of Nanking" remain controversial in contemporary Chinese society and have been the subject of repeated calls for fnancial and symbolic recompense. Japanese brutalities inficted upon Indonesians, by contrast, have not entered collective memory in the same way. They have generally not been the subject of calls for recompense, and campaigns for compensation for Indonesian victims of the Pacifc War were mostly confned to a brief period in the 1990s, during which local activists sought fnancial recompense for former so-called comfort women and ex-*Heiho* soldiers. These calls for compensation, however, were mostly initiated by Japanese activists, rather than by Indonesians themselves (McGregor, 2016).

Although Japanese atrocities inficted upon Indonesians during the war have generated little activism and comparatively few calls for appropriate recognition and recompense, other historical injustices have caused major controversy in Indonesia. Dutch atrocities of comparable brutality have long motivated activists to campaign for compensation. The 1947 massacre of an estimated 431 Indonesians by Dutch troops in Rawagede, for instance, ignited decades-long battle for compensation from the Dutch government. In 2011, a court in the Netherlands agreed to provide compensation to the widows of nine victims, and the Dutch ambassador to Indonesia issued a formal apology during the annual ceremony which commemorates the massacre (Scagliola, 2014). The Indonesian government, moreover, was consistently supportive of local activism over the massacre in Rawagede. By contrast, when compensation for Indonesian victims of Japanese atrocities was being negotiated in the 1990s, Indonesian government representatives—motivated by a desire to maintain good relations with its largest donor of foreign aid—argued against paying compensation to individual victims.

Furthermore, commemoration and memorialisation in Indonesia appears to have followed a pattern similar to activism over historical injustice: struggles against the Dutch tend to be commemorated extensively, whereas struggles against the Japanese tend to receive very little attention. The site of the Rawagede massacre, for instance, is now a well-kept cemetery of national heroes where an annual commemorative ceremony takes place. Other famous monuments, such as Jakarta's National Monument, Surabaya's Heroes Monument, and Balikpapan's Struggle of the People Monument, further help preserve the narrative of struggle against Dutch colonialism. The memorialisation of the war in Indonesia, however, has primarily been an endeavour of foreign governments. The war monument in Biak, for instance, was built by the Japanese government in 1994, at a time when war memory in Japan had been revived by ongoing debates about compensation for victims; the Ambon War Cemetery, where some 2000 Allied soldiers are buried, is managed by the Commonwealth War Graves Commission, which is majority funded by the United Kingdom; and the Sparrow Force Monument outside Kupang was built with Australian funds in order to honour "the memory of the men of the 2/40th Australian Infantry Battalion (Sparrow Force) and the Timorese people who died on their mission here in 1942."

# Remembering and Forgetting the Past

Since the mid-1970s, a matter of recurrent discussion within the discipline of history has been the conceptual difference between history and memory. Pierre Nora, the French historian whose work on the subject has been among the most infuential, argued that history is an entirely intellectual production which requires analysis and source criticism, whereas memory is the unselfconscious revival of past experiences through present-day customs and traditions. According to Nora (1989), memory makes possible something that history does not: the very notion that the past can be remembered, forgotten, and revived. Since the work of Nora, the idea that we can better understand human societies by observing what is "remembered" about the past and what is "forgotten" has infuenced historywriting globally.

A consequence of this conceptual distinction, however, is that it encourages a binary view—the past is either remembered or forgotten—and thus distracts attention from important questions about how and why national histories and offcial memories conform and confuse personal memories. In the case of the Pacifc War in Southeast Asia, historians have argued that the period has indeed been forgotten. Some have suggested the existence of a war "amnesia" in several Southeast Asian countries (Blackburn, 2010), while others have described how important local histories have been forgotten even where the war itself is still remembered (Hovinga, 2005; Isnaeni & Apid, 2008).

The oral history interviews I conducted with Indonesians who lived through the Japanese Occupation suggest that "forgotten" is too general a category. In vivid detail, old Indonesians shared stories of being forced to bow before Japanese soldiers, of being expelled from their homes, of having relatives conscripted into forced labour, and of knowing neighbourhood women committed into sexual slavery. They recounted the trauma and chaos of the Japanese years without distress and without any sense of anger or resentment. Unlike the history of Dutch colonialism in the archipelago, which remains a matter of controversy in Indonesia today, or the political turmoil and mass killings of the mid-1960s, which continue to be a deeply sensitive subject for many Indonesians, the war years have acquired a unique ambivalence in Indonesian historical consciousness and collective memory.

Over the course of several months, I spoke with Indonesians in the provinces of Central Java, Jakarta, Maluku, Nusa Tenggara Timur, and Papua about their experiences of the Pacifc War in the Netherlands Indies. In every one of these conversations, the issue of Japanese brutality was raised. During one of my frst interviews in Jakarta, a woman in her late eighties recalled being forced "to pay her respects to the rising sun" ("*menghargai matahari*"), of knowing young women who had been raped by Japanese soldiers, and of observing the grief of widows whose husbands had been killed as a result of Japanese activities. "They were so cruel," she said, "there was no one crueller than the Japanese."

Several thousand kilometres away in Papua, Biak Islanders chewed betel nut as they recounted the experiences of labour mobilisation during the Japanese period. One man, also in his eighties, said that he had been spared from enduring the gruelling life of a labourer because he was too young, but that his parents had not been as fortunate. "Everyone had to work," he said, "because if you didn't work, you were beaten by the Japanese." He remembered seeing the hands of his parents bloodied and callused: "They had to do all the work with their hands. There were no tools, there wasn't anything at all."

Another Biak Islander, who was ten years old when the Japanese arrived in 1942, remarked: "the Japanese ordered people to work the streets. If anyone didn't work fast enough, they were killed. The Japanese at that stage were so vicious!" For many local people, however, the most confronting element of Japanese brutality was that people were seldom killed quickly or mercifully. As one man described, victims were often bludgeoned to death:

The Japanese killed us because we used to have older people who wanted *sampari*, meaning freedom. They didn't kill people with sharp objects but instead they did it with sticks, with frewood, with things like this [points to a rock on the ground]. We had to resist all of this for three years.

Anyone who escaped the worst of the wartime brutality was nonetheless exposed to the hardships of the war itself. In Central Java, families were kicked out of their homes if the military administration required them to house Japanese soldiers. As one informant explained, "every family that had a clean house had it taken! Taken by the army!" According to another informant from Java, the greatest challenge of the Occupation was the accompanying poverty. Food shortages became the norm: "It wasn't just that ingredients became expensive, it's that they didn't exist. Nothing was sold, so people suffered because they couldn't buy what they needed." In West Timor, people told much the same story. They explained that the currency of the Netherlands Indies became worthless, which forced people to exchange what they had—chickens, eggs, sugar, pumpkins, corn, and so forth—for the items they needed. In Kupang, many items had been rationed, so a coupon system was established.

In Java as elsewhere, cloth also became a rare commodity because of the dramatic decline in cotton production. According to one man in his nineties, "people very rarely used cloth; instead, they made clothes from old sacks." Another recalled that Javanese people made clothes from hemp (*baju rami*), which often became infested with feas. So signifcant was the wartime decline in cotton production that, in 1947, sacks continued to be worn by as much as 80 per cent of the population of parts of East Java (Frederick, 1997).

Although the hardships of war were experienced by most of the population, some participants nonetheless acknowledged that they were exempted from certain challenges because of cooperation and connections. A Chinese Indonesian from Kupang explained that because his father was a cook and his mother a tailor, his family was spared from the more gruelling jobs which other Indonesians were forced to take up. Instead of working in felds or on infrastructure projects, his father cooked food for Japanese soldiers and his mother sewed their uniforms. Likewise, a woman in Biak described how her husband was one of the local men hired to supervise labourers. "He administered the coolies in the feld," she recalled. "He also had a garden, so we were able to pay for the things we needed with food."

One of the most consistent features of these oral histories, however, is that stories of brutality and hardship are recounted without distress. For some, the Japanese period in Indonesia is an unfortunate history but not an unjust one. As one Biak Islander described, the war was one between Japan and America in which Indonesia was simply "stuck in the middle." For others, the experience of Japanese occupation never became controversial in Indonesia in the way that it did elsewhere in Asia because of a variety of cultural and religious factors. Many shared the view that their religious beliefs prevented them from feeling antipathy towards others. According to a Timorese man from Nunbees, "we [the Timorese] have been religious for a very long time, and hatred for anyone is not in accordance with our ethical code as human beings." In both Jakarta and Biak, the absence of any lingering resentment towards Japan was similarly attributed to religiosity. According to one woman who spent the war years in West Jakarta, "our religion compels forgiveness. How can we be religious if we still hate? We cannot believe in an eye for an eye." Likewise, Biak Islanders, most of whom are Christian, generally believe that those who were spared from bombs, beatings, and diseases during the war were so spared because it was the will of God, and that their Christian beliefs compel them to forgive the wrongdoing of both Imperial Japan and the Allied forces.

In Kupang, one man suggested that the propensity to forgive others for wrongdoing was not necessarily connected to religious beliefs but rather inherent in local culture: "Kupang people are more able to forgive and to forget. We felt scared, but perhaps the culture of Kupang is an unassuming (*lugu*) one. Kupang people are generally very unassuming, right?" Much the same trope existed in Biak, with one informant noting:

We are not mad at Japan. When we were foolish, there was hatred [for the Japanese], but after we became clever, there was no hatred… at that time, not many people understood, but the character of the Biak people is to think frst and only then act.

Existing scholarship has sought to explain why this ambivalence exists among Southeast Asians by emphasising three factors: frst, the war was relatively short; second, the necessity for Southeast Asian nations to deal with immediate security and economic concerns reduced their ability to dwell on the past; and third, Japan's efforts to repair its bilateral relations with nations in Southeast Asia, which included the 1977 enunciation of the Fukuda Doctrine, changed how Japan is viewed in the region (Er, 2015).

These factors, however, do not entirely explain the Indonesian case. The frst issue is the idea that the longevity of a period of history determines how important this history will be decades (or centuries) later. In the historiography of the Pacifc War, Southeast Asia's relatively brief experience of Japanese occupation is frequently contrasted with the decades of Japanese colonialism in Northeast Asia. Whereas Japan controlled Taiwan from 1895, Korea from 1910, and Manchuria from 1931 until its surrender in the war in 1945, the former colonies of Southeast Asia (along with Thailand) were either partially or totally occupied by Japan for not more than fve years, and in some cases for barely more than two. Although the Japanese Occupation of what is now Indonesia lasted just three-and-a-half years, the experience was not a mild one. It was a period of turbulence during which mass-scale brutalities were inficted. As one example, nearly 300,000 Javanese labourers were sent to outposts in Southeast Asia and the Pacifc, but fewer than half ever returned home (Sato, 1994).

In post-war Asia, overcoming historical injustices has also been less a matter of time than one might expect. In many cases, the intensity of hostility towards Japan over its wartime aggression has increased because sudden social and political changes within former occupied territories have caused memories of the war to reappear. For example, Singapore's independence from Malaysia in 1965 caused previously suppressed war memories to re-emerge; the construction of the Nanjing Memorial Hall in the mid-1980s reignited anti-Japanese sentiment in China; and the rise of feminist activism in South Korea in the early 1990s caused the "comfort women" issue to resurface. In Indonesia, similarly, controversial periods of history have not necessarily become less controversial over time. More than fve decades after the Indonesian killings of 1965–1966, for instance, little has been achieved in terms of reconciliation or public dialogue.

The second issue is the identifcation of the Fukuda Doctrine as a key turning point for Japan's relations with the former occupied territories of Southeast Asia. Although the efforts of the Japanese government to improve relations with Southeast Asian nations in the 1970s were broadly successful, they made little difference in Indonesia, where ambivalence to the war had long existed. This ambivalence was in fact widespread in Indonesia long before the birth of the Fukuda Doctrine in 1977. Three years earlier, for instance, anti-Japanese riots broke out in Jakarta, in an event which came to be known as the Malari Incident. In the lead up to Japanese Prime Minister Tanaka Kakukei's state visit, protestors decried the dominance of Japanese foreign investment in Indonesia but, despite obvious parallels, seldom invoked memories of Japan's dominance over Indonesia during the war. Although the Japanese government might have suspected that the riots were connected to war memory, it is diffcult to fnd evidence that Indonesians themselves made this connection. In the Indonesian media, coverage of the riots barely mentioned the war. In fact, most references to the war were entirely uncritical of Imperial Japanese brutality, instead applauding Japan for its successful post-war transformation. *Kompas* (1974), for instance, described "Japan's rebirth from the ashes of the Second World War" as "one of the most astounding stories of the twentieth century" (p. 5). Likewise, *Sinar Harapan* (1974) appeared to praise Indonesia–Japan relations, even during this period of intense anti-Japanese sentiment:

Indonesia, the cornerstone of Southeast Asia, is among Japan's most important friendships. Both countries are dependent on each other: Japan, to a large extent, is dependent on Indonesia's natural resources and, along with it, has the ability to provide fnancial and technical cooperation to Indonesia. Relations between the two nations are closer than in the past, especially in the areas of economics and trade. (p. 8)

By late February 1974, following the arrest of more than 800 protestors, the riots had taken on a very different meaning: they no longer had anything to do with Japan, much less the Japanese Occupation, but had instead become associated with political imprisonment, poverty, inequality, and corruption in Indonesia. Despite the Malari incident offering a clear catalyst for the reinvigoration of war memory, there was never any reckoning with Japan's colonial history in Indonesia, nor was it there three years later when the Fukuda Doctrine was enunciated. As post-war Asia has shown, there is no statute of limitations on how far into the future historical resentment can resurface. Indeed, the Japanese period very briefy gained attention in Indonesia during Emperor Akihito's frst offcial visit to Southeast Asia in 1991 (Goto, 2003). But it nonetheless appears that the origins of Indonesian ambivalence are much earlier than the 1970s.

# Collaboration and Coloniality

In the decades following the Pacifc War, two factors specifc to Indonesia shaped offcial accounts of the Japanese period in a way that gave rise to an enduring indifference among postcolonial Indonesians. First, wartime collaboration between Indonesian nationalist leaders and Japanese forces discouraged these leaders from fostering anti-Japanese sentiment and from constructing the period as one of historical injustice when they assumed power in 1945. Second, the sense of coloniality which Indonesia inherited following Japan's rapid post-war modernisation changed broader views of Japan; it was no longer just a failed empire whose costly war effort had come to nothing but also an aspirational model of Asian modernity.

# Sukarno's Role in Hirohito's War

Between 1942 and 1945, the Japanese collaborated with many levels of Indonesian society (Hidayat, 2007), but few collaborated as extensively as Sukarno, the foremost nationalist leader of the late colonial period and the frst president of the Indonesian republic. As early as 1929, Sukarno had anticipated a war in Asia, hoping that any such confict would be an opportunity to bring about the end of colonial rule in the Netherlands Indies. Wary of his anti-colonial ideas and rhetoric, the Dutch governor-general in Batavia, Cornelius de Jonge, exiled Sukarno to the faraway town of Ende, Flores, in 1934. Four years later, he was shipped to Bengkulu in Sumatra, where he remained until the Japanese invaded in 1942. Already aware of his nationalist credentials, the Japanese freed Sukarno from exile and moved him to Padang, where he met with the local military commander Colonel Fujiyama. During this meeting, Sukarno remarked, "Yes, Independent Indonesia can only be achieved with *Dai Nippon*," further adding that, for the frst time, he saw himself "in the mirror of Asia" (Adams, 1965, p. 164). Soon after, Sukarno, motivated by the prospect of independence, and the Japanese, motivated by a need for natural resources and manpower, began to collaborate.

One of Sukarno's frst tasks was to recruit prostitutes. After consulting an Islamic scholar about the issue of facilitating sex outside marriage, he gathered 120 prostitutes and developed a coupon system whereby Japanese soldiers were entitled to one visit per week. Women were often promised lucrative careers as entertainers, only to fnd themselves working as "comfort women" in bars and hotels. In addition, Sukarno worked to recruit labourers (*romusha* ̄ ). He gave speeches about the crucial roles these predominantly Javanese peasants played in dismantling Dutch colonial rule, he posed for photographs with tools in his hands, and he even "served" as a labourer for one week in September 1944 in an attempt to boost waning numbers. As a reward for his efforts, the Japanese made important concessions for the Indonesian nationalist cause. They allowed, for instance, the nationalist anthem, *Indonesia Raya*, to be played at public events. It was the labourers themselves, however, who bore the burden of this collaboration. The Japanese showed little interest in preserving the lives of labourers, many of whom died from malnourishment or from diseases like malaria and dysentery.

On 17 August 1945, two days after Japan's surrender in the Second World War, Sukarno proclaimed Indonesian independence. The Netherlands swiftly dismissed the new republic as having been "made in Japan" (Gerbrandy, 1950, p. 66). Even Dutch colonial offcials who had been sympathetic to Indonesian nationalism spoke out against the legitimacy of Sukarno's proclamation. The wartime lieutenant governorgeneral, H. J. van Mook, for instance, denounced the republican government as "a dictatorship after the Japanese model" (as cited in Reid, 2005, p. 179). The basis for these claims was the collaboration issue.

As in other countries where collaborators assumed power at the end of the war in 1945 (or soon thereafter), the years during which Indonesia was occupied by Imperial Japan are generally represented as an endeavour that brought about the end of Western colonialism, rather than as a period of hardship and humiliation. Throughout his presidency, Sukarno only ever presented the view that, during the war, it was his job to "sacrifce thousands to save millions" (Adams, 1965, p. 193). Even during the fnal months of his presidency, he adhered to the narrative that toppling the Dutch colonial administration was an achievement greater than any of the hardships endured by the local population during the war.

# The End of an Empire and the Resurrection of Modernity

The nature of the relationship between postcolonial Indonesia and postwar Japan was largely determined by the very different trajectories on which the two nations were set in 1945. On the one hand, Japan spent the years between 1945 and 1952 under Allied occupation, recovering from a humiliating defeat in the war, the destruction of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, and the deaths of more than two million of its citizens. Although Emperor Hirohito had foreshadowed the nature of the Allied occupation by famously declaring that the Japanese people would have to "endure the unendurable," the period was a major factor in bringing about the economic prosperity that followed. On the other hand, Indonesia exited the Second World War and entered into a bloody national revolution during which republican forces fought against the returning Dutch. In late 1949, with tens of thousands of Indonesians already dead, the Dutch government caved to international pressure and ceded sovereignty, with the exception of West New Guinea, which remained a Dutch territory until 1962.

Japan's post-war economic recovery was rapid, and by the middle of the 1950s, it was no longer just a failed empire whose expansionist ambitions had come to nothing. Instead, it had become a model of modernity, especially for developing nations like Indonesia. Many Indonesians inherited a kind of coloniality whereby they believed that Japan possessed what Indonesia lacked: impressive infrastructure, freedom from corruption, a booming economy, and so forth. During the 1950s, Japan's infuence in Indonesia was pervasive, partly due to the ongoing reparations negotiations and partly because of the numerous economic ventures its government was pursuing in the archipelago, and by the 1960s Japan was not only a major economic force but also an important player in regional diplomacy.

Indonesia inherited this sense of coloniality from a short-lived Asian colonial power, rather than a centuries-long European one. In its most basic sense, coloniality is a conception of power whereby postcolonial nations lack the modernity of their former administrator. According to the sociologist Anibal Quijano (2000), coloniality takes root in the differentiation of the global population "into inferior and superior, irrational and rational, primitive and civilised, traditional and modern" (p. 342). It typically manifests in a discourse of "lack"—the idea that the "savage, lazy, corrupt and despotic" autochthonous populations of postcolonial nations cannot achieve the same level of modernity as their former colonial power (Ashar, 2015). In the case of Indonesia, discourses of lack are more often conceived in relation to Japan than the Netherlands. This was especially evident in the 1950s and 1960s when Indonesian rhetoric about Japan focused above all on its modernity. In the media, prominent Indonesian writers and intellectuals would routinely applaud Japan's economic progress. Mochtar Lubis (1969), for instance, called Japan:

A good example for developing countries. Based on the conditions required to foster economic progress, Japan is actually one of the countries that least meets these requirements. Its people are abundant, its natural resources are poor. But Japan is nonetheless moving towards a modern economic realm without the need for foreign assistance or foreign cultivation. (p. 10)

In the political realm, much the same discourse existed. For President Sukarno, Japan was a model of modernity from which Indonesia could learn a great deal. In his own words, Japan "became a great nation [even] after experiencing a war with Russia, a war with China, and two world wars" (Amanat Proklamasi IV, 1986, pp. 209–210). Less than two decades after the end of the war, the story of Japan's economic success and social transformation had become so entrenched in Indonesian public discourse that Japan's increased participation in regional affairs, especially in the 1960s, was widely seen as an entirely positive development. In particular, Japan's role as a mediator in *Konfrontasi—*a dispute between Indonesia and Malaysia over the confederation of Britain's territories and protectorates in Southeast Asia—was possible in the frst instance because Indonesian attitudes towards Japan had changed so substantially since the war. An important factor in creating the image of mediator rather than aggressor was, of course, the provision of aid and development assistance. During the 1950, Japan had become a major source of Indonesian aid. As part of the *Konfrontasi* mediation alone, Japan offered economic assistance to Indonesia to the value of USD 234 million (Nishihara, 1976).

# Conclusion

Indonesian indifference towards the Japanese Occupation of the Netherlands Indies, as we have seen, is not happenstance but instead a product of the complex interplay between national histories and private memories. Oral histories of Indonesians who lived through the Pacifc War indicate not that this period of history is less remembered by Indonesians than it is by Chinese or Filipinos or Solomon Islanders, but rather that memories of the Indonesian experience have been subject to a very different set of infuences. In Indonesia, the most important developments in the process of cultivating ambivalence about the war years took place during the subsequent two decades. First, Sukarno and other post-war leaders kept the Japanese period as far away from the forefront of public consciousness as they could, because they had no reason to make an issue of the atrocities which Indonesians were forced to endure. Any such effort would not only have detracted from their narrative of anti-colonial triumph but also have risked revealing the true extent of their collaboration with the Japanese. Second, Japan's rapid economic transformation in the 1950s allowed it to become not just a provider of Indonesian aid, a consumer of industry, and an active participant in regional affairs, but also a model of the kind of prosperity which could be achieved even after the havoc and destruction of war. Indonesian public and political dialogue, especially in the 1950s and 1960s, refected the sense of coloniality which Indonesia inherited as a result of Japan's postwar transformation.

This chapter has attempted to show that the Japanese Occupation of the Netherlands Indies is not just a story of wartime chaos and human suffering. Its legacy in contemporary Indonesia is also a prism through which wider processes of history-making in both Indonesia and the world can be viewed. In Indonesia as elsewhere, memories of the past do not stay the same for long. They are moulded by different sets of political agendas, social circumstances, and cultural values. The historical consciousness and collective memory of a society is thus something very different from historical reality. In Indonesia, the Japanese period is part of a much broader national history in which offcial histories and personal memories are routinely aligned to form a dominant historical narrative. These narratives are often deeply fawed, but they are almost always consequential.

# References


*Studies International Forum, 54*, 67–78. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.wsif. 2015.11.002


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# Japanese War Memory and Transnational Activism for Indonesian Survivors of Enforced Military Prostitution During World War Two

*Katharine McGregor*

In this chapter, I analyse activism relating to survivors of the so-called comfort women system, enforced military prostitution, during World War Two. The term 'comfort women' is highly problematic and considered offensive by many survivors, yet it continues to be the most commonly used term to describe survivors. The most well-known example of nationalbased activism from affected countries is the activism of the Korean

K. McGregor (\*)

This paper was written as plenary presentation at the First International Undergraduate Symposium on Humanities and Arts, Faculty of Cultural Studies, University of Indonesia, August 29, 2016.

School of Historical and Philosophical Studies, Faculty of Arts, University of Melbourne, Melbourne, VIC, Australia e-mail: k.mcgregor@unimelb.edu.au

Council.1 The second most active national group is probably ASCENT from the Philippines (Medoza, 2003). In recognition, however, of the transnational nature of activism on this issue, scholars have studied cooperation between Japanese and Korean activists and between Japanese and Chinese activists, and the role of the Korean diaspora in activism in the United States and Australia.2 In these studies, the authors have variously refected on the bases of these transnational partnerships and the different positions of activists within them in relation to their national affliations and new potential alliances that transcend the nation.

Indonesian activism has, however, not been studied in detail yet. It is an interesting case because it has been constrained by limited domestic support due to issue of lasting stigmas attaching to the women's experiences and more ambiguous attitudes about the occupation in Indonesia (McGregor, 2016). For this reason, I argue Japanese transnational support has been critical. Here, I would like to examine why, at the micro level of personal history, Japanese activists have provided such support.

Some key questions I am interested in are as follows: Why do people engage in transnational activism? To what extent are they motivated by their own experiences and connections to cases of violence? The reason I ask these questions is that Japanese activists on this issue frequently face ire at home (Morris-Suzuki, 2007). Their activism carries with it risks. One long-time Japanese activist on this issue, for example, received a razor blade in the mail and was told he could 'use it to cut his neck'. Another chooses to use a very discrete offce location to disguise her workplace due to the fact others in Japanese society object to the negative light that the

1One of the most detailed and critical studies of the Korean Council is provided by Sarah Soh, *The Comfort Women*: *Sexual Violence and Postcolonial Memory in Korea and Japan*. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2008.

2One of the most prolifc writers on transnational activism on this issue is Vera Mackie. See for, example, Vera Mackie, 'Dialogue, Distance and Difference: Feminism in Contemporary Japan', *Women's Studies International Forum*, Vol 21, No 6, pp. 599–615; Vera Mackie, 'The Language of Globalization, Transnationality and Feminism', International Feminist Journal of Politics, 2001, 3 (2): pp. 180–206 and Vera Mackie, 'In Search of Innocence: Feminist Historians Debate the Legacy of Wartime Japan', *Australian Feminist Studies*, 2005, 20 (47), 207–217. On Sino-Japanese activism, see Karl Gustafsson, 'Transnational Civil Society and the Politics of Memory in Sino-Japanese relations: Exhibiting the 'Comfort Women' in China', Centre for East and Southeast Asian Studies, Lund University, Sweden, Working Paper No 41, 2014. On the activism of Korean diaspora see Hyun Yi Kang, 'Conjuring Comfort Women: Mediated Affliations and Disciplined Subjects in Korean/ American Transnationality', *Journal of Asian American Studies* 6 (1) (February) 2003: 25–55.

Japanese army is presented in her work. So I wanted to think about why particular activists are willing to advocate for survivors of violence inficted by the Japanese army on members of other nations. To begin to answer these questions, I examine how the positions of three Japanese activists who have supported Indonesian activism are connected to their personal histories.

# The History of the System in the Netherlands East Indies

The system of Japanese enforced military prostitution is rooted in the history of Japanese imperialism and state-endorsed prostitution. Long before the creation of Japan's formal and informal empire, Japanese entrepreneurs established brothels throughout Asia in which Japanese women worked (Mihalopoulus, 2011). The Japanese government established a licensed prostitution system in Japan in the late nineteenth century, and this system was replicated in its colonies following, for example, the annexation of Korea in 1910 (Soh, 2008, pp. 9–10).

The Japanese army institutionalised the system of enforced military prostitution during the ffteen-year war in China (Tanaka, 2002, pp. 9–10). The system, which was extended throughout the empire, was based in part on the belief that the provision of women was necessary to satisfy the 'sexual needs' of soldiers (Enloe, 1983, pp. 19–20).

There have been several studies of how the so-called comfort women system worked in the Netherlands Indies.3 Replicating patterns elsewhere and carrying over from traditions in the local prostitution industry, 'comfort facilities' were diverse, including 'movie theatres, bars, restaurants, hotels and comfort stations' across army- and navy-controlled areas (Horton, 2010, pp. 186–196). The Japanese initially 'recruited' from among Indonesian sex workers with encouragement from the nationalist leader Sukarno (Adams, 1965, pp. 220–221). Indonesian women were

3The key works are Tanaka, *Japan's Comfort Women*; William Bradley Horton, 'Comfort Women' in Peter Post et al. (Eds), *The Encyclopedia of Indonesia in the Pacifc War*, Brill: Leiden and Boston, 2010; Budi Hartono and Dadang Juliantoro *Derita Paksa Perempuan: Kisah Jugun Ianfu pada Masa Pendudukan Jepang, 1942–1945* [The Sufferings of Forced Women: The Story of the *Jugun Ianfu* ̄ during the Japanese Occupation, 1942–1945], Jakarta: Pustaka Sinar Harapan, 1997 and Hilde Janssen, *Schaamte en Onschuld: Het Verdrongen Oorlogsverleden van Troostmeisjes in Indonesië* [Shame and Innocence: The Repressed History of Comfort Women in Indonesia], Nieuw Amsterdam: Amsterdam, 2010.

also tricked into forced prostitution with promises of becoming performers, getting education or training as nurses in distant locations. Some were sent to far-off islands or even to other countries based on these promises, only to fnd themselves working in brothels. In the 1990s, an Indonesian organisation estimated there were 20,000 cases of abused local women.4 Not all were forcibly detained.

# The Development of Indonesian Activism

The public testimony of the Korean survivor Kim Hak Sun that was televised across the world in December 1991 in the context of a trial against the Japanese government, triggered new media attention to the so-called comfort women who in Indonesia are mostly commonly referred to locally by the original Japanese designation, *jugun ianfu*. In 1992, Indonesia's leading investigative magazine *Tempo* published several articles dedicated to the topic, including interviews with surviving women.5

It was not until the April 1993 visit of a group of Japanese lawyers, however, that Indonesian activism on this topic began. The lawyers from the Japanese Bar Association (*Nichibenden*) came to Indonesia to seek evidence of Indonesian victimisation during the war. The Indonesian Legal Aid Foundation, YLBHI (*Yayasan Lembaga Bantuan Hukum Indonesia*, hereafter LBH), assumed responsibility for gathering evidence of women who had experienced abuse by the Japanese army and of mostly men who had been forced manual labourers (known as *romusha*). The evidence gathered by LBH was to be used at a symposium of the Japanese Bar Association to be held in October that year on war damages, with the potential for a legal case against the Japanese government.

Alongside these developments, former soldiers who had served in the auxiliary forces for the Japanese army (*heiho*) also began activism for compensation of unpaid wages. In doing so, they worked closely with Japanese activists (Prambadi & Okawa, 1992, p.15).

4Forum Komunikasi Ex-Heiho [Ex-Heiho Communication Forum], *Kompensasi Jugun Ianfu* [Compensation for Comfort Women], Forum Komunikasi Ex-Heiho, n. p., 1996, p. 10. For critiques of their activism see McGregor, 'Emotions and Activism', pp. 72–74.

<sup>5</sup> Selichi Okawa & ADM, 'Maaf, Kata Miyazawa' [Sorry, Said Miyazawa]. *Tempo*, 25 January 1992, p.82; Sri Indrayati & Seiichi Okawa, 'Kisah Kardawati yang Sebenarnya' [The True Story of Kardawati], *Tempo*, 25 July 1992, pp. 17–18; *Tempo*, 'Jeritan dari Rumah Bambu' [Screams from a Bamboo House], *Tempo*, 8 August 1992, pp. 51–60; 'Mereka Pun Tak Punya Pilihan' [They Had No Choice], *Tempo*, 8 August 1992, pp. 61–64.

As Indonesian activism progressed, Japanese activists continued to provide legal and sometimes material support for Indonesian survivors and activists. This included support for travel to regional conferences, including meetings in Korea and Japan, and legal support for preparations for the Indonesian team's participation in the iconic Women's International Tribunal of 2000 held in Tokyo. I would now like to look in more detail at who these Japanese activists were and why they were motivated to extend such support. Due to the limitations of space, I will only consider the personal stories of three Japanese activists here. I begin by positioning these activists in broader discourses about war responsibility within and outside Japan.

# War Memory and War Responsibility: Probing the Life Stories of Japanese Activists for Indonesian Survivors

One reason for examining the complexity of Japanese views on the war is that there are persistent characterisations in the international media of the idea that there is one dominant view on the war and war responsibility in Japan. Philip Seaton is highly critical of what he calls the orthodoxy, especially across English-speaking allied countries, that the Japanese people do not know about or do not hold critical views about the war and that they have failed to adequately deal with war responsibility. He suggests that there is too strong an emphasis on the views of Japanese nationalists 'who justify Japanese war aims and deny or downplay Japanese atrocities', whereas the views of progressives who criticise the war are dismissed as atypical (Seaton, 2007, pp. 2–3). Greater attention to the views of progressive is critical I believe in order to break down simplifcations about Japanese views on the war.

Kamila Szczepanska has usefully charted the development of 'progressive' civil society groups, providing rich profles of particular organisations and their activities (Szczepanska, 2014). But Seaton encourages us to think more about Japanese people's personal connections to the war as one way to explain their positions on war responsibility. Taking up his suggestion below, I provide a preliminary examination of these connections through an analysis of the life histories of three Japanese activists who have assisted Indonesian survivors. In highlighting these three activists, I also highlight the diverse, although not completely unrelated, paths that have led Japanese people to become activists on this issue.

# Takagi Ken'ichi: A Lawyer

Takagi Ken'ichi was one of the frst Japanese activists to work on behalf of those claiming damages from the Japanese government for their wartime suffering. His frst case as a lawyer was a job pro bono case commencing in 1975 for compensation for Korean labourers abandoned in the Russian territory of Sakhalin for many years after the war (Takagi K., personal interview, February 20, 2015). His reputation from this case led to other claimants approaching him to help them seek wartime damages (Takagi K., personal interview, February 20, 2015). It was through this process that he became the lead defence lawyer in Kim Hak Sun's 1991 legal case. In the same year, he founded an organisation called the International Forum on War Compensation for Asia-Pacifc, which was funded by donations from the Japanese public (Takagi K., personal interview, February 20, 2015).

Based on introductions mostly from a Japanese Indonesianist, Mizuno Kōsuke, who had been studying World War Two, he met former *heiho* in Indonesia in an effort to document wartime damages (Takagi K., personal interview, February 20, 2015). He tried to assist them with compensation for unpaid wages during the occupation. These former soldiers were more easily identifable than say former so-called comfort women because the men were organised in the Ex-Heiho Communication Forum. Because of rising attention to the issue of former 'comfort women', Takagi Ken'ichi encouraged the Forum to gather data on surviving women, leading to a report published in 1996 (Fig. 1).6 The International Forum on War Compensation for Asia-Pacifc tried to advocate for compensation for surviving women by using this report.

In contrast with many other activists, Takagi Ken'ichi felt that if some improvements were made, the Asian Women's Fund, a private organisation with partial support from the Japanese government created in 1995, could have been a viable way of attaining compensation for women given the Japanese government's refusal to directly compensate the women (Takagi K., personal interview, February 20, 2015). Unfortunately, however, the Indonesian government signed a deal with the Asian Women's Fund, according to which the Ministry of Social Affairs would instead build or renovate nursing homes where survivors could live (Asian

<sup>6</sup>Forum Komunikasi Ex-Heiho [Ex-Heiho Communication Forum], *Kompensasi Jugun Ianfu* [Compensation for Comfort Women].

**Fig. 1** Cover of the 1996 report of the Ex-Heiho Communication Forum for the International Committee of Asia-Pacifc War Victims Organisations Claiming Compensation

Women's Fund, n.d.). Many Indonesian and Japanese activists including Takagi Ken'ichi were very disappointed with this outcome.

Throughout the 1990s, especially Takagi Ken'ichi became a prominent speaker on the case for redress for surviving women. He recalls giving around ffty public talks a year in Japan on this topic, thus further socialising the idea of why he felt compensation should be paid (Takagi K., personal interview, February 20, 2015). His position, however, was to try to advocate for all wartime victims including, for example, Korean survivors of the atomic bombings in Hiroshima and Nagasaki who had been neglected alongside Japanese survivors.

So why was Takagi Ken'ichi moved to support multiple cases of wartime compensation and to extend support to claimants from many afficted countries? Was it something about his background as a lawyer, or was it connected more intimately to his personal story? Takagi Ken'ichi was born in 1944 in Manchuria during the war when his father was working there as an architect in a private company and then in an iron factory. At the end of the war, however, his father was detained by the Russian army and his mother and two siblings experienced great diffculties during that time living in Manchuria, while the families of those in the Japanese army were quickly repatriated. He suggests that his antipathy to the Japanese army as an institution stemmed from this experience and a perception that the army was extremely reckless even with regard to its own citizens (Takagi K., personal interview, February 20, 2015).

Takagi Ken'ichi was also, however, shaped by political movements in post-war Japan. He became a student activist in the late 1960s at the University of Tokyo when he was undertaking his studies in the law school. He recalls that, along with fellow student activists at this campus, he was highly critical of the contradictions in Japanese society (Takagi K., personal interview, February 20, 2015). In the late 1960s and early 1970s, the New Left student movement in Japan was focused on negotiations over the renewal of the 1958 US–Japan Joint Security Treaty which allowed US bases in Japan including full control of Okinawa Island and which also meant that Japan was becoming an important part of the US-led war in Vietnam (Steinoff, 2012, pp. 63–66). He remembers being infuenced by a popular phrase in student activism at the time adapted from Chinese Communist Party Chairman Mao: 'to rebel is justifed' (Takagi K., personal interview, February 20, 2015). This phrase was articulated in a June 1966 June directive from Mao at the beginning of the Cultural Revolution (Lu, 2004, pp. 57–59). Steinhoff suggests that Japanese students adopted ideas from the Cultural Revolution mostly as a way of 'overcoming traditional status barriers' to confront persons in power in Japan (Steinhoff, 2012, p. 66). She further observes that the student generations that experienced this period continue to participate in high number in political activism and civil society (Steinhoff, 2012, p. 72). This certainly fts with the life trajectory of Takagi Ken'ichi.

Apart from these personal experiences, there are other reasons why lawyers are strongly represented amongst Japanese advocates for wartime compensation for those victimised by Japan during World War Two. All Japanese lawyers are required to join the Japanese Bar Association (JBA), the organisation that frst sent a delegation to Indonesia to investigate war damages. Upon its founding in 1949, the Bar Association established an Attorney's Act. Article 1 of that Act prescribes that a primary mission of the JBA is 'protecting human rights and achieving social justice' (Japan Federation of Bar Associations, n.d.). Further to this, the JBA has a Human Rights Protection Committee and engages in international human rights cases including studies of international treaties and standards (Japan Federation of Bar Associations, n.d.). Takagi Ken'ichi has conducted extensive comparative research on how Japan and Germany have dealt with war responsibility.7 Takagi Ken'ichi's work is thus consistent with a broader ethos amongst Japanese lawyers of a commitment to human rights. His primary entry point on this issue was a belief in war compensation, combined with a personal history that led him to be critical of the wartime Japanese army.

# Kimura Kōichi: A Priest

Kimura Kōichi came to the issue of the 'comfort women' through a quite different process. At the time the story of Kim Hak Sun broke, he was living in Salatiga, Central Java, and working as a priest and theologian. The testimony of Kim Hak Sun moved one of his parishioners, Tuminah, to share her story frst with her nephew who was a journalist at a local newspaper and then with her priest Kimura Kōichi (Kompas, 1992, p. 16). Tuminah was the frst Indonesian woman to go public with her story.

Tuminah (born in 1927) reported that she was a sex worker prior to being forcibly 'recruited'. In her account to *Kompas* newspaper, she revealed that her father had sold her virginity to a Dutch man for fve rupiah (gulden) (Kimura, 1996a, p.19). Tuminah was providing for her family when she was hunted down by the Japanese military along with other sex workers after their advance into Solo. She was then held at the Fuji Inn and not allowed to leave. Although Tuminah did not engage in extensive activism on the issue, her story was popularised by Kimura Kōichi (Kimura, 1996a, pp. 15–20) (Fig. 2).

7He has published the following books considering compensation: Takagi Ken'ichi, *Saharin to nihon no sengosekinin* [Sakhalin and Japan's post-war responsibility], Tokyo: Gaifū Sha, 1990: Takagi Ken'ichi, *Jugun ianfu to sengohosho* ̄ *―*̄ *nihon no sengosekinin* [The military 'comfort women' and post-war compensation―Japan's post-war responsibility]. Tokyo: San'ichi Shobō, 1992: Takagi, Ken'ichi, *Ima naze sengohosho ka*̄ [Why post-war compensation now], Tokyo: Kōdan Sha, 2001, and Takagi, Ken'ichi, *Sengohosho no ronri: higaisha no* ̄ *koe o do kiku ka* ̄ [The logic of post-war compensation: how to listen to the victims' voice], Tokyo: Renga Shobō Shinsha, 1994.

**Fig. 2** Photo from the Collection of Kimura Kōichi of Tuminah (centre), her nephew left and Kimura Kōichi's daughter Okcho, taken in 1992 in Solo

It was Kimura Kōichi's meeting with Tuminah that prompted him to become an activist on this issue. There were other factors in his life, however, that predisposed him to being sympathetic to Indonesian survivors of the so-called comfort women system. First was his personal experience of the war. He was born in Tokyo in 1947, two years after the devastating aerial bombings and during the post-war US occupation of Japan. Largely following his mother's views, he was very critical of the war and the suffering it entailed. His father, by contrast, tended to glorify war (Kimura K., personal interview, February 17, 2015). Kimura Kōichi was also a strong opponent of sexual violence against women from a young age. This resulted from reading a confronting novel as a youth entitled *House of Dolls* by an Auschwitz survivor which centred on the sexual abuse by Nazi soldiers of Jewish women in concentration camps.8 He recalls feeling very

<sup>8</sup>This novel by the famous Polish Auschwitz survivor Yehiel Feiner was written under the pen name Ka-tzetnik 135633. The original title of the 1953 work in Hebrew was *Beyt Habubot*. Ka-tzetnik 135633, *House of Dolls*, Fredrick Muller, London, 1956, translated from Hebrew by Moshe M. Kohn. Kimura Kōichi read a Japanese translation of the work.

disturbed, almost physically ill, after reading this book and suggests it was central to his opposition to militarism from a young age (Kimura K., personal interview, February 17, 2015). The fact that he read this translated book at a young age refects a relatively cosmopolitan upbringing and a developing orientation to thinking about the broader world.

Kimura Kōichi attended a Salvation Army kindergarten and became attracted to Christianity. He became a Christian after high school and began work for the Japan Baptist Convention (JBC), which was founded in 1947 (Melton & Baumann, 2002, p. 720). JBC leaders became highly critical of Japan's wartime actions. In 1988, for example, the JBC leadership produced a 'statement of faith concerning war responsibility', and it has also worked to address what it terms 'the Yasukuni Shrine Problem'.9 The JBC's rejection of offcial shrine visits is presumably based on the fact that the shrine houses all the spirits of Japanese soldiers, including the spirits of those deemed war criminals. On this basis, it views shrine visits as disrespectful to those victimised by the Japanese army.

Kimura Kōichi's compassion for Indonesian survivors was also a product of his growing awareness of oppressed communities. Before moving to Indonesia in 1986, at age thirty-nine, Kimura Kōichi worked in India with the dalit community which is one of the most marginalised groups in the Indian society. When he returned to Japan, he became increasingly conscious of Japanese minority people who also faced discrimination, such as the Burakumin community. When he moved to Indonesia, he carried with him this new social consciousness of the most oppressed members of society, who are indeed the target of the JBC's missionary work (Kimura K., personal interview, February 17, 2015). He came to realise that persons who suffered during the Japanese occupation of Indonesia, in particular survivors of enforced military prostitution, were sometimes also marginalised members of society. This is especially true if their histories were known in local communities due to lasting stigmas surrounding their experiences of sexual enslavement (Hindra & Kimura, 2007, p. 199). Hearing directly from parishioners, such as former forced labourers and Tuminah, about their experiences of the occupation, he felt moved to address these injustices (Kimura K., personal interview, February 17, 2015).

Kimura Kōichi worked together with advocates from Indonesian Legal Aid, other NGOs and the Ex-Heiho Communication Forum to help

<sup>9</sup>Pamphlet, The Japan Baptist Convention, March 2010.

collect information on wartime experiences and to provide translations from Japanese to Indonesian (Kimura K., personal interview, February 17, 2015). He notes that, similar to the case of Takagi Ken'ichi, after he wrote about Tuminah's case, more groups contacted him for help (Kimura K., personal interview, February 17, 2015). He continued to write about this case in Japanese in church journals and secular publications (Kimura K., personal interview, February 17, 2015).

Kimura Kōichi acted as an important trilingual intermediary between Indonesian survivors and Japanese activists assisting to translate for Japanese lawyers, investigators and journalists visiting Indonesia. He recorded many interviews with survivors and raised funds for and accompanied the most active Indonesian survivors including Mardiyem, Suharti and Suhannah to Japan on speaking tours (Kimura K., personal interview, February 17, 2015). He supported the Indonesian delegation at the 2000 tribunal in Tokyo. Later he helped to co-write in Indonesian language, with the Indonesian activist Eka Hindra, the frst book-length account of the life story of Mardiyem (Hindra & Kimura, 2007). He also wrote many pieces in Japanese about Indonesian survivors (Kimura, 1992, 1996b, 1999, 2000a, b). Further to this, he teaches about the issue at Christian universities in Japan and has been involved in fundraising in Japan to support Indonesian survivors and related activism. In 2015/2014, he collected money from his local community to provide a substantial memorial headstone and plaque on the previously spartan grave site of Tuminah in Solo (Fig. 3).

# Matsui Yayori: A Journalist/Activist

The third activist I examine here is Matsui Yayori (1934–2002), who contributed extensively to building transnational bases of support for surviving women. She is most famous perhaps for her role in initiating the 2000 Women's International War Crimes Tribunal on Japan's Military Sexual Slavery held in Tokyo, which brought together sixty-four survivors from eight countries, each represented by a national legal team (Sakamoto, 2001). The tribunal was a response to the lack of success in legal cases against the Japanese government at that time. This people's tribunal focused on the legal responsibility of the Japanese government and former emperor to appropriately compensate and acknowledge surviving women through direct individual compensation in contrast to the proposed payments through the Asian Women's Fund. Using her links across the **Fig. 3** Photo from the Collection of Koichi Kimura Part of the Renovated Gravestone of Tuminah. The text reads: We members of Japanese society respect the greatness and determination of Tuminah as a historical actor, an Indonesian 'ianfu'. This gravesite was built based on the solidarity of the Christian Society for Resolving the Issue of the 'Ianfu' in Kyusyu, Japan

international feminist movement, Matsui Yayori specifcally recruited the Indonesian human rights lawyer, Nursyahbani Katjasungkana, to lead the Indonesian prosecution team (N. Katjasungkana, personal communication, September 11, 2014). Nursyahbani recalls how signifcant Japanese support for her team was, especially the survivors. Meanwhile, Matsui Yayori faced signifcant pressure including threats to her life within Japan, due to her leading role in the tribunal (Yamane, 2010, p. 27) (Fig. 4).

Shortly after the tribunal when Matsui Yayori fell terminally ill, she advocated for a museum dedicated to the memory of the tribunal and of the survivors of the system. Using money donated from her estate and raised through fundraising, the Violence Against Women in War Network opened the Women's Active Museum on War and Peace Museum in 2005 (Women's Active Museum on War and Peace, n.d.). The Museum's mission is primarily to educate the Japanese public about survivors by keeping

**Fig. 4a and b** Photos from the Collection of Kimura Kōichi of the Indonesian team attending the 2000 Women's International War Crimes Tribunal on Japan's Military Sexual Slavery (featuring above: the Indonesian lawyers and Kimura Koichi meeting with Matsui Yayori in the centre, and below: four Indonesian survivors in kebaya and Kimura Kōichi and Eka Hindra)

them in memory.10 The museum features the stories of some of the most high-profle Indonesian survivors such as Mardiyem, Tuminah and Suhannah.

Looking across Matsui Yayori's life, there are several factors that might explain her compassion for surviving women. She was born in 1934 and thus possibly has some memories of life during the war. Her father, despite been drafted into the army in 1945 and sent to China, refused to kill Chinese people and spoke out strongly about the Japanese army's conduct during the war on his return to Japan. Working as a minister, he founded the Japanese Christian Peace Association that opposed nuclear weapons and ongoing wars. Matsui Yayori's mother also supported the anti-war/ anti-nuclear movement (Yamane, 2010, p. 25).

Matsui Yayori came to learn specifcally about the issue of enforced military prostitution through her work as a journalist in the Asia-Pacifc region and her interest in women's rights. She took up many issues relating to women's rights in her press articles and other publications. She followed, for example, issues such as the feminisation of migration, the impact of development projects on women and issues related to the traffcking of women, sexual violence against women and women's efforts to resist the sources of their oppression (Matsui, 1989). Upon learning about the impact on women in the region of the Japanese occupation, she became committed to pursuing historical justice for surviving women (Yamane, 2010, p. 27). As early as 1984, she published an interview in the *Asahi Shimbun*, the newspaper for which she was a foreign correspondent, with a Korean survivor who had stayed in Thailand following her relocation to Thailand during the war. Matsui supported early Korean feminist scholars researching this issue, such as Yun Chong Ok, whose work drew attention to patterns in military sexual violence by the Japanese army (Nozaki, 2005).

As Vera Mackie has detailed, Japanese feminist activism developed in the context of a history within the Japanese women's movement of rigorous critiques of Japanese imperialism and of women's implication in supporting the empire.11 Their activism was thus based on an intense post-colonial critique of their privileged position in relation to other women across Asia, due not only to their connections to the wartime state,

<sup>10</sup>For more on the museum, see Watanabe Mina, 'Passing on the History of 'comfort women': the experiences of a women's museum in Japan, *Journal of Peace Education*, Vo 12, No 3, 2015, pp. 236–246.

<sup>11</sup>On this point, see Vera Mackie, 'In Search of Innocence: Feminist Historians Debate the Legacy of Wartime Japan' pp. 211–212.

but also to Japan's post-war, Cold War alliances with the United States and the economic dominance of Japan in the Asian region (Mackie, 1998, pp. 601–602). Feminist activism on this topic thus refected a deep understanding of how they, as members of contemporary Japanese society, were also connected to the legacies of the war.

It was in this context of ongoing demands for legal recognition, compensation and rehabilitation of survivors that Matsui Yayori worked together with other activists to fnd the Asia Japan Women's Resource Centre in 1994 and the Violence Against Women in War Network (VAWW) in 1998.12 The Resource Centre and the Network formed crucial bases of support for transnational 'comfort women' activism. Its members helped organise the Women's International War Crimes Tribunal on Japan's Military Sexual Slavery. In formulating the idea for a people's tribunal, activists were inspired by developments in international law that indicated growing attention to sexualised violence. This included the United Nations' International War Crimes Tribunals for the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda and the International Criminal Court, all of which prosecuted crimes of sexual violence (Sakamoto, 2001, pp. 49–50). In holding the tribunal, they attempted to transcend national differences and to advocate for further recognition from the Japanese state for surviving women.

# Conclusions on Transnational Activism for the Survivors of Enforced Military Prostitution

This brief survey of the life experiences and pathways to activism of three Japanese activists helps explain why different people became crucial supporters of transnational activism on behalf of survivors of enforced military prostitution. For each activist, their motivations seem to be connected to particular family experiences of the war, including experiences of neglect by the Japanese army, direct suffering through the US bombing campaigns of 1945 or of resistance to fghting with arms. It seems that their parents' experiences particularly shaped these three activists, all of whom were born just before, during or after the war, between 1934 and 1947.

<sup>12</sup>An earlier precedent of Japanese solidarity with Asian women came in the form of the Asian Women's Association, which Matsui co-founded in 1977. Vera Mackie, *Feminism in Modern Japan*, *Citizenship, Embodiment and Sexuality*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2003, pp. 202–204, 217–218.

Further to this, however, are other factors such as the particular views on war of the groups to which they belonged such as the Japanese Bar Association, the Japan Baptist Convention or the feminist activist organisations, Asia Japan Women's Resource Centre and the Violence Against Women in War Network. Each group adopted a slightly different position on the war and Japanese responsibility.

Across the life stories, something striking is a shared cosmopolitan outlook by which I mean each person had the 'ability to stand outside having one's life scripted by any one community' (Hall, 2002, p. 26). They each read and thought about the historical experiences of other countries and developed connections with people outside Japan.

For Kimura Kōichi and Matsui Yayori in particular, it was also their experiences of living in countries in Asia occupied by Japan during the war and hearing direct testimonies from survivors that moved them to act. Both expressed a sense of deep refection on their implication as Japanese people in the suffering of others.

**Acknowledgements** I would like to thank my research assistant Dr. Mayuko Itoh who has provided all translations from Japanese to English of both my interview with Takagi Kenichi and the content and titles of publications in Japanese. This research was supported by funding from the Australian Research Council for my Future Fellowship, 'Confronting Historical Injustice in Indonesia: Memory and Transnational Human Rights Activism' (FT130100957).

# References


Enloe, C. (1983). *Does Khaki Become You? The Militarisation Of Women's Lives*.


**Open Access** This chapter is licensed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/ by/4.0/), which permits use, sharing, adaptation, distribution and reproduction in any medium or format, as long as you give appropriate credit to the original author(s) and the source, provide a link to the Creative Commons licence and indicate if changes were made.

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# Memory of the Seroja Struggle: Memories and the Challenges of Life After Military Operations 1978–1998

*Tria Sri Wahyuni and Agus Setiawan*

# Introduction

In Indonesia, discussions on memories of the Seroja Operation, a military act, and the government efforts to overcome its subsequent problems have not attracted much attention. This topic is sensitive due to the discussion of government responsibility for soldiers and their families after military operations, many of which are launched for the beneft of the state. However, the discussion is important because such operations have a direct effect on the fate of deployed soldiers and their families. Numerous soldiers are killed, or they return home with physical disabilities, and the government is required to issue policies related to their fate and families.

Operation Seroja was the code name of the largest joint military action of the New Order period, with the aim to exert control over Dili, East Timor (Singh, 1998, pp. xv–xvi). With the launch of this operation in December 1975, Indonesia's physical involvement in the East Timor

T. S. Wahyuni (\*) • A. Setiawan

History Department, Faculty of Humanities, Universitas Indonesia, Depok, Indonesia

<sup>©</sup> The Author(s) 2023

M. Budianta, S. Tiwon (eds.), *Trajectories of Memory*, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-99-1995-6\_8

confict began. The announced goal was to halt the Fretilin-led spread of communism and to maintain the political stability of Indonesia and, more broadly, of Southeast Asia. The New Order government, with its centralistic and militaristic tendencies, played an important role in the emergence of confict (Hadi, 2007, p. 273). Operation Seroja had a tremendous effect on soldiers, civilians, and their families. On December 7, 1975, the operation began when the Indonesian military forces moved from the border area near Atambua into East Timor, although they were not able to enter Dili itself until 1976. As the Indonesian troops advanced, several battles and smaller skirmishes occurred and continued until the completion of Operation Seroja in 1978. Numerous deaths were incurred on both the Fretilin and Indonesian military sides. In addition, the death toll among civilians is also estimated to be high, with many casualties yet uncounted. The Indonesian Red Cross found at least four mass graves at Atleu and Same, each of which contained 40–60 bodies (Subroto, 1997, p. 208). Most of these victims were not armed soldiers but members and sympathizers of Fretilin, political opponents who were captured and killed.

With a better knowledge of the battlefeld in several regions, Fretilin guerrillas were able to kill and injure Indonesian soldiers. Still, many soldiers returned home, though not all were in perfect physical health. With lost limbs to gunfre and explosions, the large number of wounded, disabled, and dead soldiers has given rise to social and economic problems because they lost their livelihoods, families lost their breadwinners, and military children lost the fnancial support needed for their education.

Given that Operation Seroja was an offcial mission ordered by President Soeharto, the subsequent problems experienced by the soldiers and their families could be considered the government's responsibility. While the Republic of Indonesia declared the operation successful in bringing East Timor into the fold of the Unitary State as its 27th province, the treatment of veterans and their families did not refect the government's appreciation for the role of the soldiers in the mission.

This study of the effect of the Seroja Operation used a historical approach. The frst stage involved a search for relevant sources. Interviews were carried out among residents of the Seroja Complex—the residential compound specifcally built to house Operation Seroja families—which yielded 20 randomly selected informants, including 10 Operation Seroja veterans, 5 children of former Seroja soldiers, and 5 widows (*warakawuri*). The number of informants was considered to be representative of all residents of Seroja Complex for two reasons. First, many Seroja Complex residents have died or moved, and thus the number of residents has considerably diminished. Seroja Complex archives show that in 1982, the residents included 140 soldiers and 86 *warakawuri*, while in 2017, only 65 soldiers and 101 *warakawuri* remained (Seroja Complex archives, 2017). As soldiers died over the years, the number of *warakawuri* increased and remained in the Seroja Complex. The second reason is that the majority of Operation Seroja troops were loyal supporters of President Soeharto, evidenced by the fact that every interviewed Seroja soldier expressed support for the regime. The possible reason for this continued support of President Soeharto was that they received more welfare benefts from the New Order than from the post–New Order government. The reason is also related to East Timor's separation from Indonesia after the fall of the New Order. In fact, most informants reacted positively to all New Order government aid programs. In addition, interviews were carried out using a general interview approach to understand their experiences and feelings. With the aim to enrich interview data, this study also collected primary archives such as photos, tables, and recordings from the National Library of Indonesia, Dharma Bhakti Social Foundation, Seroja Complex, and the DFM Radio recording (2007) archive. Subsequently, data were subject to qualitative analysis, and interpretation required connections and efforts to understand the spirit of the period under discussion.

# The Impact of Operation Seroja on Families and Soldiers

Operation Seroja resulted in the loss of thousands of Indonesian Armed Forces (ABRI) soldiers in East Timor. Thousands more who survived came home with physical disabilities and psychological trauma. Table 1


**Table 1** Recapitulation of Seroja soldiers killed, 1975–1978

Source: Headquarters of the Indonesian National Military Center for TNI History Archive, 2006

shows the number of Operation Seroja soldiers who died from 1975 to 1978.

Table 1 shows that the Soeharto government felded all branches of the Armed Forces: Army, Navy, Air Force, Police, and other supporting volunteer elements. From 1975 to 1978, the records show that as high as 2209 combatants were killed in the battle in East Timor.

Subsequently, from 1978 to 1982, 140 people with disabilities from all units of the Army, Navy, Air Force, and Police were recorded as residents in the Seroja Complex in Bekasi (Seroja Complex Archive, 2002). Between 1973 and 1977, 2538 children of Seroja soldiers became orphans and 830 women were widowed (Retnowati, 2007, p. 245).

To address these problems regarding Operation Seroja veterans and their families, the Soeharto government created various aid programs, including (1) construction of new housing and facilities (Kompas, 1980); (2) provision of benefts, compensation, and employment (Peraturan Pemerintah Republik Indonesia No. 36, 1968); (3) scholarships for children of former Seroja veterans (Koran Angkatan Bersenjata, 1979; Pratikno, personal communication, April 21, 2016); and (4) the Satyalancana Seroja award for Seroja veterans (Tohroni, personal communication, February 22, 2017).

The Soeharto government launched the programs for Operation Seroja veterans and families in line with Decree No. IV/MPR/1978 on the Guidelines of State Policy issued by the Indonesian People's Assembly. Below is a 1978 quotation from GBHN, Part D, on the Direction and Policy of Development of Welfare obtained from Decree No. IV/ MPR/1978, pp. 622:


In other words, the social welfare of Republic of Indonesia soldiers, especially veterans, had captured government attention. In addition, the quotation also indicates the creation of social programs to help the lower classes through the assistance of social organizations. Thus, the Soeharto government did not implement veterans' programs without clear written regulation. Several policies were not directly executed by the government, but by social organizations as ordered by President Soeharto. These organizations were the foundations established by President Soeharto himself to address social problems, namely, Dharma Bhakti Social Foundation (Dharmais), Trikora Foundation, and the Supersemar Foundation.

Although administered by foundations, part of the funds were provided by the government. From the net proft of state-owned banks, 2.5% were allocated to the three foundations. These amounts were directly controlled by Government Regulation No. 15, year 1976, and subsequently by the Decree of the Minister of Finance no. 333/KMK.011/1978, which further increased the allocation to 5%. The state-owned banks are instructed to deposit 50% of the 5% net income to the Supersemar, Dharmais, and the Trikora Foundations. Clearly, the existence of and actions by these foundations cannot be separated from the government. In addition, funds were also derived from other sources, such as President Soeharto himself, who donated part of his personal wealth as initial capital for these foundations. Different sources of funding include other social organizations and individual donors (Hadiyanto, 1995, pp. 9–10).

# Memories of War from Those Who Returned Home

During the Operation Seroja, the deployed soldiers had no option to reject their assignment and were obliged to fght for their country regardless of the battle conditions. They were expected to be prepared to sacrifce their lives in defense of Pancasila and the 1945 Constitution (Notosusanto, 1985, p. 175). On taking up this onerous duty, the soldiers were carrying out orders issued by their superiors, knowing little about international politics and interventions. To them, this was entirely a duty and a manifestation of loyalty to the country. To quote Colonel (Ret) Ronny Muaya (personal communication, April 22, 2017),

For soldiers, orders from supervisors cannot be refused. They must be carried out; this includes carrying out war orders and I am proud that the army had the experience of war, because this is the duty of the state.

Although East Timor (now Timor Leste) eventually gained its independence, the military views Operation Seroja in a positive light. In addition to pride in what was perceived as an admittedly temporary success, that of integrating East Timor into the Republic of Indonesia, the military operation was also a measure of the capabilities of the Indonesian military. To the soldiers, despite all the casualties, the military operations in East Timor offered priceless combat experience.

One Operation Seroja warrior, Colonel Ronny Muaya, shared memories of his service in East Timor, as reported by CNN Indonesia on November 6, 2014:

The war was bad. Ronny was a member of the 502nd Kostrad Battalion assigned as company commander in Operation Seroja in Timor Leste, which was still called East Timor at that time.

It affected the psychology of a person seriously, especially when 30 people died in one incident. This battle, according to him, was hard-fought because Fretilin forces gave extraordinary resistance and they were armed with standard equipment used by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, NATO, while Indonesian forces only used the M1 Garand semi-automatic frearm, which was an inherited infantry standard rife from World War II.

"I was shot in the fghting and immediately lost consciousness. What was worse was that it was very diffcult to evacuate". After being shot, he did not remember what happened next on the battlefeld. When he opened his eyes he was already in the hospital a week later. Even though he was seriously injured and lost his hand, he was grateful that he was still alive. Although he did not remember the incident after he was shot, Colonel Ronny often imagined an evacuation process that made him shudder because the terrain of the location of the battle was very diffcult.

# Post-war Social and Economic Problems for Soldiers and Their Families

For surviving widows and families, life became immeasurably harder, especially because the daily needs and education of minor children had to be met.

In a 2016 interview, Darifnidar, chair of Warakawuri Seroja (Seroja Widows), recalled that after her husband left to serve in East Timor, her fnancial situation changed dramatically. She had to support their six-yearold son by herself, where before her husband fulflled all economic needs. The situation was even worse for widows who had no marketable skills. This problem was not limited to only families left to vie for themselves upon the death of their heads of household, but also those of disabled veterans. People with disabilities faced serious limitations in their capacity to carry out social roles and to function within the community.

Families left behind by their heads of households experienced a major loss. Agung Pratikno, the son of a Seroja soldier who served as the chairperson of the Indonesian Communication Forum of Sons and Daughters of Retired Offcials (FKPPI) in 2016, said that when his father died in Operation Seroja, his mother made a living by making matches and selling them for additional income. The children suffered psychological trauma (Pratikno, personal communication, April 21, 2016). In addition, many *warakawuri* experienced severe stress because they felt that they had no future (Wijanarko, personal communication, April 8, 2017). Many of them gave up their children, whom they felt they cannot support, to the Seroja Orphanage (Wijanarko, personal communication, April 8, 2017).

Psychological problems are not only experienced by the families but also by former soldiers who returned with physical disabilities. The loss of one or several body parts does not only impair bodily function but also affects the psyche, and these veterans had abundant psychological problems.

# Post-war Government Programs for the Rehabilitation of Soldiers and Their Families

The problems suffered by families of veterans and soldiers who had lost their lives were eventually noted by the New Order government (Meinarno, 2006, p. 2). As solution, the Soeharto government created various rehabilitation programs to fulfll its responsibilities to the former soldiers and their families in the aftermath of the Seroja Operation. These programs include the construction of new housing and facilities, provision of pension and employment benefts, provision of scholarships to the sons and daughters of former Seroja warriors (Pratikno, personal communication, April 21, 2016), and awarding of the *Satyalancana Seroja* military decoration.

The construction of new residential areas for veterans of Operation Seroja and their families was handled by the Dharma Bhakti Social Foundation, or Dharmais, which directly implemented the policies of President Soeharto.

The Dharmais Foundation was established by President Soeharto on August 8, 1975, with himself as the chairperson. The foundation engages in social activities and aims to improve public welfare by helping Indonesian citizen groups who face particular challenges, such as the orphans, physically and psychologically disabled people, elderly, and the homeless (Dharmais, 2017).

The Dharmais Foundation played a large role in the residential development, building four housing complexes for former Operation Seroja soldiers. Three of these are located in Bandung, Malang, and Solo, while the largest is in Bekasi (Meinarno, 2006, p. 2). The Offce of the Center for Disability Rehabilitation (PUSREHABCAT) of the Department of Defense and Security was in charge of the housing built by the Dharmais Foundation in 1976 and 1977 (Seroja Complex Archive, 2002). A total of 467 small and medium-sized houses were built on a land area of 40,000 square meters (Seroja Complex Archive, 2002). Table 2 lists families and unions that received homes provided by the Soeharto government through the Dharmais Foundation from 1978 to 1982. The recipients are classifed by unit and rank, and all former soldiers who received housing aid were disabled.

The government also provided retirement benefts and new jobs for former Seroja soldiers and *warakawuri*. During Operation Seroja, a soldier who could no longer perform his duties due to disability was discharged. Widows had to support families without their husbands. This scenario meant that the Soeharto government was responsible for the provision of retirement benefts, compensation, support for training in new skills, and employment for the family. The government itself directly implemented these programs, unlike the housing complexes that were built by the foundation.

Seroja veterans and widows received compensation in the form of death gratuities as an expression of condolence and appreciation from the Soeharto government. Compensation was given once during their transfer to the Seroja Complex in Bekasi. The amount varied depending on the soldier's rank, class, and physical condition. For example, a widow, Salamah, received a compensation of 24 times the last pay received by her husband before his death in East Timor (Muaya, personal communication, April 22, 2017). In total, the average compensations received by widows in the Bintara group was Rp 54,000,000 in the period from 1977 to the 1980s. The range of compensation was as follows (Muaya, personal communication, April 22, 2017):

**Table 2** List of disabled persons of ABRI Group II and *Warakawuri* former Operation Seroja that received assistance for housing complex of former Seroja, Bulakmacan Village of Bekasi Regency from the Dharmais Foundation, 1978–1982 (Phases I–IV)


Source: Dharmais Foundation Archive, 1982, 1996


In addition, the government also provided scholarships for children of Seroja veterans. Based on our sources, two of President Soeharto's foundations, Supersemar and Trikora, provided scholarship funding for all the Seroja soldiers' children from kindergarten to college.

In 1979, the Secretary of the Trikora Foundation, Col. (Ret.) H. Parwis Nasution, conveyed that they began providing scholarship assistance to Trikora, Dwikora, and Seroja daughters. The monthly scholarship fund amounts are:


The Satyalancana Seroja represents the government's highest appreciation for soldiers in East Timor. For those who came home with disabilities, they received honor for their last missions (Muaya, personal communication, April 22, 2017). For warakawuri, the Satyalancana Seroja is an acknowledgment of their husbands' contribution in the struggle to defend Indonesia (Pratikno, personal communication, April 21, 2016).

# Reactions of Seroja Veterans and Their Families to Soeharto Government Aid Programs

Government assistance programs generate a wide range of responses from the residents of the Seroja Complex. Several people are satisfed, while others are not. However, almost all informants reacted positively to the Soeharto government aid at the time of this study. The possible reason for such positive feedback is linked to their negative response to the government following the Soeharto era. The majority of Seroja Bekasi Complex residents believe that they received better regard from the Soeharto government than the subsequent administration after the collapse of the New Order.

An example of the positive reactions given by the *warakawuri* is from Salimah, who is highly grateful for her current situation. She became a widow when her husband, a soldier, was killed on the battlefeld in East Timor in 1975–1976. When she learned of the death of her husband, she quickly received the help she needed from the government, including assistance for her move from Purwokerto to Bekasi. She said that she did not spend one rupiah on the relocation, which was all borne and provided for by the government.

Similarly, Yulia Partini (personal communication, April 7, 2017), a *warakawuri* of a marine, was immediately approached by her husband's


**Table 3** Recapitulation of satisfaction interview results toward President Soeharto's aid programs from sample of 20 residents of Seroja Complex

unit and was offered a house in the Bekasi Seroja Complex. Yulia immediately accepted the assistance because she and her daughter were the only survivors (Table 3).

Although many residents expressed satisfaction with the Soeharto government assistance, a few were not satisfed and believed that such aid was a fundamental obligation, a manifestation of responsibility to its troops. One such opinion came from a youth activist.

Henu is a political activist who serves in the current Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle (PDIP) as a member of the House of Representatives (DPR). When his father died in East Timor, he lived apart from his family and developed his independence. As a student, he was an activist at the Institute of Teacher Training and Education (IKIP), Jakarta, and participated in the referendum supporting East Timor in 1999. He believed that the New Order government had been mistaken to incorporate East Timor into the Unitary Republic of Indonesia. This position led to confrontation with the police during the New Order period, sparking his resentment of the government. Thus, when asked about his satisfaction with the assistance program, he replied that he considered the aid as a government obligation. He also argued that the New Order government should have provided more assistance than what was given (Sunarko, personal communication, April 8, 2017).

Each resource person has beliefs based on past experience, such as those with the policies of different periods of governments, leading to different views and responses among residents of the Seroja Complex in Bekasi.

# Conclusion

The policy of the New Order government in dealing with soldiers and their families who were victims of the Seroja Operation can be used as a policy model that can be replicated for the military casualties of other previous operations, including the Aceh-GAM confict. Similarly, soldiers killed or wounded in the United Nations' peacekeeping missions abroad also deserve the government's attention, and the welfare of the veterans' families is of particular concern. Supporting small businesses for family members who become the sole source of support for disabled soldiers is a worthy program. In addition to channeling the skills of the family members of the veterans, such programs can help create new jobs in the informal sector.

The fndings of this chapter show that in spite of all the provided facilities, not all of the benefciaries are satisfed with the program. Responses toward the program depend on the individual's background and ideological position. The younger generation, with a more critical distance to the event, is prone to have a less favorable response. In other words, the compensation provided by the Soeharto government is not entirely suffcient to overcome the excesses of the Seroja Operation.

However, the change of government also brought changes to policy priorities. During the New Order, the security approach was considered as a priority to safeguard economic development. On the other hand, the dual function of the Armed Forces was subjected to vehement criticism toward the end of the New Order government when the extent of human rights violations came to light. This condition then created unfavorable public perceptions regarding the existence and role of the military and undermined the continuation of rehabilitation programs such as those provided to the veterans of the Seroja Operations and their families.

# References


**Open Access** This chapter is licensed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/ by/4.0/), which permits use, sharing, adaptation, distribution and reproduction in any medium or format, as long as you give appropriate credit to the original author(s) and the source, provide a link to the Creative Commons licence and indicate if changes were made.

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# From Stalin to Khrushchev: The Dynamics of Soviet Union–Indonesia Relations, 1945–1964

# *Ahmad Fahrurodji and Susanto Zuhdi*

# Introduction

Interest in Indonesia on the part of the Soviet Union can be traced back to Joseph Stalin's government (1924–1953), in particular, to his last decade of leadership (1945–1953). After Indonesia's proclamation of independence in August 1945, the struggle received a positive response from the Soviet Union. Stalin's government supported Indonesia's fght for freedom from the Netherlands, which wanted to regain its control after the Japanese occupation. When the Netherlands fnally recognized the Republic of United States of Indonesia (RUSI) in December 1949, the Soviet Union formally recognized Indonesian sovereignty and established diplomatic relations. The frst two decades played an important role in Indonesia's formation as an independent state and in uniting its territories, particularly as what was known as West Irian at the time.

Research on diplomatic relations between Indonesia and the Soviet Union, especially in the post-independence period, has made signifcant

A. Fahrurodji (\*) • S. Zuhdi

History Department, Faculty of Humanities, Universitas Indonesia, Depok, Indonesia

<sup>©</sup> The Author(s) 2023

M. Budianta, S. Tiwon (eds.), *Trajectories of Memory*, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-99-1995-6\_9

progress since the declassifcation of Soviet archives. Several studies using the new data have been written by Efmova (2003, 2015), Efmova and McVey (2011), Bezik (2004), and Vartanyan (2015). The present chapter employs these new archival resources along with UN Security Council archives and attempts to reconstruct, frst, the signifcant support given by the Soviet Union in the Stalin era despite the lack of offcial diplomatic relations and, second, the personal relationship between Khrushchev and Sukarno that broke through the rigid boundaries of diplomatic protocol and helped to reinforce mutually benefcial relations between Indonesia and the USSR.

This study is anchored in the context of Soviet foreign policy, which can be understood as Russia's geopolitical strategy in the Far Eastern regions, particularly in Southeast Asia. The Soviet Union's diplomatic support for Indonesia in the early years of the formation of the United Nations contributed to political differences between the members of the Allied forces, and, it may be argued, became the starting point of the Cold War. The differences between Soviet and British perspectives on Indonesia marked the beginning of the rift in the relations between the two countries, leading to increased and more open hostilities during the Cold War. While Soviet support provided a stepping stone for Indonesia to become an independent country, as relations between the Soviet Union and the West deteriorated, the decision on Indonesia served as a triggering factor that divided the erstwhile Allied forces into two major power blocs.

It is hoped that the approach of this study, which focuses on individuals as agents that infuenced their countries' policies, offers a contribution to the feld of international relations. We argue that international relations as an academic discipline should pay closer attention to the human factor in the analysis of bilateral and multilateral relations. Culturally, Soviet– Indonesian relations did not only prompt political and economic cooperation but also formed collective memories manifested in various artifacts and monuments, symbols that are retained within the collective memories of both nations.

# Stalin and Diplomatic Support for Indonesia

Although in the Soviet Union the public was late to receive news of Indonesian independence, the rise of the new state of Indonesia in the Nusantara archipelago attracted attention, especially when a ferce battle broke out in Java between the newly formed Indonesian government troops and British troops. On October 13, 1945, the Soviet newspaper *Izvestiya* published an account of the Indonesian situation, relayed from the Soviet information agency TASS based in New Delhi (Solmov, 2009, pp. 92–93).

The Soviet Union was concerned that the new nation was experiencing diplomatic diffculties in the international arena, as Indonesia struggled to prove its independent existence. The United Nations, especially the UN Security Council, an international organization founded by the Allied countries of the Second World War, discussed Indonesia in at least fve sessions during its frst meetings in 1946. The head of the Soviet Ukrainian delegation, D.Z. Manuilsky (1883–1959), proposed what it defned as the Indonesian question, thereby changing the previous perception that viewed the confict as a Dutch domestic matter. Based on Manuilsky's letter, the UN Security Council in its 12th, 13th, 14th, 16th, and 17th sessions (February 7–12, 1946) settled the discussion agenda by relating the Indonesian people's fate. The presence of the Indonesian delegation was made possible by the diplomatic support of both the Soviet Ukraine and the Soviet Union. Consequently, Indonesia was recognized as an independent subject worthy of debate. D.Z. Manuilsky's proposal to the UN Security Council thus played a crucial role in the Indonesian struggle to gain recognition of and support for its sovereignty.

In the Security Council's 17th session on February 12, 1946, Manuilsky stated that a military confict involving British troops had occurred; the Indonesian people deemed that the British had used non-proportional military force and Japanese troops in confronting Indonesian partisans. The British declared that they were doing part of their task to secure the region after the Japanese occupation. Manuilsky accused the British not only of abusing their authority in Indonesia but also of violating the Allied forces' mandate. The Soviet Union, also a member of the Allied forces, declared that the British troops were not carrying out duties in Indonesia, and that, in fact, Britain had violated the Allied forces' agreement on the Far East region (UNSC S-13/1946).

The Soviet Ukrainian delegation's statement not only demonstrated Soviet solidarity with the Indonesian people's struggle, but also explicitly supported Indonesia's diplomatic position. The position of the Soviet Ukraine delegation cannot be separated from the Soviet Union's foreign policy strategy of, frst, supporting the anti-colonial struggle and, second, weakening the hegemony of capitalism. This position implemented the Soviet decision, approved by Stalin with regard to the Indonesian question, which was mentioned in a service note (sluzhebnaya zapiska) of Soviet Foreign Affairs Minister Vyacheslav Molotov to Stalin on December 5, 1945:

#### *Тов. Сталину*

*У меня возник вопрос, не следует ли настаивать, чтобы в повестку дня совещания трех был включен вопрос о событиях в Индонезии. В этом случае можно бы предложить, чтобы была дана информация и объяснения о событиях в Индонезии и чтобы три министра обменялись в формальном порядке мнениями по этому вопросу, у меня в виду необходимость прекращения кровополития и вмешательства иностранных (британских) войск и разрешение спорных вопросов в Индонезии мирными и демократическими средствами.*

[Trans.]

Dear Comrade Stalin,

I have a question. Don't you think we had better demand that the situation in Indonesia become a discussion agenda in a meeting of the Three [Allied Forces]? On that opportunity, it can be suggested to provide information and an explanation about the situation so that the three ministers [of foreign affairs] exchange thoughts about the issue. In my opinion, the bloodshed and intervention of foreign (British) troops needs to be stopped, and we need to solve the problem in Indonesia in a peaceful and democratic way. (AVP RF. No. F 0430 op. 2. p. 4. d.1.l.34)

From this note, it seems that Stalin had paid attention to Indonesia at least since December 1945. Soviet Foreign Minister Molotov advised him that the Soviets needed to request that the Indonesian question be discussed in the meeting among the three Allied nations (Britain, the United States, and the Soviet Union) and demand an explanation of the current situation. The Indonesia question, involving British troops in armed confict in Indonesia, had become a tipping point in differences between Britain and the United States on one side and the Soviet Union on the other. This note makes explicit the rejection by the Soviet Union of foreign and bloody intervention in Indonesia and the request to end that intervention.

The Soviet proposal based on Molotov's suggestions was raised only in the 13th Security Council session in February 1946. Through Manuilsky, one of his comrades in the Soviet Ukrainian delegation, Molotov's suggestions were aired. In his January 21, 1946, letter to the chairman of the UN Security Council, N. J. O. Makin, Manuilsky requested the discussion of the current and developing situation in Indonesia.

Western capitalist countries were against support from the Soviet Union and its allies to strengthen Indonesia's political position. Consequently, several resolutions proposed by the Soviet Union were eventually either rejected or replaced by "softer" alternatives which benefted the Netherlands. Such alternatives served not only to protect the West and Dutch economic interests in Indonesia (for instance, Dutch plantations and American mines) but also to secure the United Kingdom's reputation after its failure in securing peace in Indonesia during the transition period. This became especially evident in 1946, when the United Nations Security Council issued only two decisions related to Indonesia after the United Kingdom vetoed a proposed resolution which would have disobliged the West.

To control and supervise the implementation of UN resolutions and decisions on Indonesian-related questions, the UN Security Council formed ad hoc institutions, for instance, the Consular Commission and Committee for Good Offces. However, since the Soviet Union did not have diplomatic representation in Indonesia, it could not provide maximum political support. The Soviet Union could not join that committee to make concrete decisions. For example, upon forming the Committee for Good Offces (also known as *Komisi Tiga Negara*, the commission of three countries), it was agreed that three countries would address the Indonesian question; these three countries were Australia, Belgium, and the United States. The Soviets believed those three countries were more likely to represent colonial interests rather than the interests of the Indonesian people. For this reason, the Soviet Union was pessimistic about the committee's possible achievements. Based on these circumstances, Stalin's government promoted efforts to open diplomatic relations between Indonesia and the Soviet Union.

# Efforts to Establish Diplomatic Relations During the Stalin Era

The absence of a Soviet diplomatic mission in Indonesia made it diffcult for the Soviet Union to offer diplomatic support to Indonesia in Security Council debates; lack of Soviet representation on the Consular Committee, which consisted of representatives in Jakarta, was especially problematic. Without any representative, the Soviet Union could not become directly involved in the peaceful settlement of the Indonesian question. This situation encouraged the Soviet Union to support Indonesian efforts to establish diplomatic relations between the two countries. On January 28, 1948, the Charge d'Affaires of the Soviet Embassy in Czechoslovakia received a letter from the Special Envoy of the Government of the Republic of Indonesia, Soeripno, suggesting the establishment of diplomatic relations between Indonesia and the Soviet Union. The letter mentioned that the Republic of Indonesia wanted to open diplomatic representation on a consular level and requested an exchange of consuls from each country. Soeripno's request on behalf of the Indonesian government received a positive Soviet response. On May 22, 1948, in a meeting in Prague, the Soviet ambassador for Czechoslovakia, Shilin, handed a letter to Soeripno, agreeing to establish diplomatic relations.

By a Letter of Assignment signed on December 25, 1947, by President Sukarno and Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs Tamzil, Soeripno became Special Envoy to Prague for the Indonesian Government. At the time, Soeripno was head of the Information Bureau of the Republic of Indonesia based in Prague, Czechoslovakia, assigned to Eastern European regions and the Soviet Union. As such, President Sukarno had assigned him to ensure diplomatic cooperation with Eastern European countries and the Soviet Union (Solmov, 2009, p. 265).

Soeripno's suggestion to the Soviet representative in Prague was approved by the highest Soviet leader, Joseph Stalin. In his letter addressed to Stalin, Soviet Foreign Affairs Minister Vyacheslav Molotov had explained the Indonesian government's desire to open diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union through Special Envoy Soeripno. Soviet Ambassador M.A. Shilin's letter of May 22, 1948, shows Stalin's approval. However, this idea received a harsh reaction from inside Indonesia, where various parties questioned Soeripno's authority to create diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union. This rejection meant a discontinuation of diplomatic negotiations and was linked to the protest issued by the Dutch in conjunction with the Renville Agreement, signed January 17, 1948, which, according to the Netherlands, did not allow the Republic of Indonesia to form new contacts or relations with other countries. Another factor that delayed diplomatic relations was the Madiun Rebellion in 1948, in which the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI) was involved and Soeripno, along with other PKI leaders, was executed. Soeripno had returned to Indonesia with Musso, a PKI leader who had lived for a long time in the Soviet Union. The Madiun Rebellion in September 1948 and the execution of PKI leaders including Musso and Soeripno defeated efforts from both sides to open formal diplomatic relations.

In fact, it was only after the Netherlands recognized the sovereignty of the United States of Indonesia (RUSI) in the Agreement of the Round Table Conference of December 1949 that diplomatic relations could be opened. The Soviet Union recognized Indonesian sovereignty by sending a letter from Minister of Foreign Affairs Andrey Vyshinsky to Indonesian Minister of Foreign Affairs Mohammad Hatta on February 3, 1950 (AVP RF F.071 Op. 6. D. 3. p. 3. L. 6). Three months after Soviet recognition on May 3, 1950, the Indonesian government sent a Missi (delegation) to Moscow. Through Minister of Foreign Affairs Vyshinsky, the Soviet government supported Indonesia's desire to become a member of the United Nations. The 1950 delegation's purpose was to receive acknowledgment and support from the Soviet Union as a permanent member of the UN Security Council and to make plans to place diplomatic representatives in both countries (See ANRI KPM No. 2338).

The opening of diplomatic representation between Moscow and Jakarta was delayed until 1954, about four years after the Soviet Union recognized Indonesian sovereignty. The obstacles had to do with Indonesian internal problems; caution and disparity of views about the necessity of opening a diplomatic mission with the Soviet Union were factors that delayed opening representative offces in both countries. However, while political dynamics continued in the domestic sector and in international politics, under the leadership of Indonesian Minister of Foreign Affairs Moekarto Notowidigdo (in the Wilopo Cabinet), the Indonesian government continued efforts to open a diplomatic mission in the Soviet Union. Geopolitical considerations, development of international politics, and economic considerations were reasons to open an embassy in Moscow immediately.

# Soviet Foreign Policy and the Role of the Khrushchev–Sukarno Relationship

After Stalin's death, the Soviet Union's new leadership brought about drastic changes in foreign policy. The new leader, Nikita Khrushchev, paid attention to Third World countries as potential partners in a new world order, a consequence of the peaceful coexistence principle launched by the Soviet Union. Peaceful coexistence was not Nikita Khrushchev's idea. Lenin frst introduced it, but Khrushchev emphasized a new and different perspective. With Khrushchev's rise, efforts to open a diplomatic mission between Indonesia and the Soviet Union gained momentum and became a milestone in bilateral relations.

In foreign affairs, Khrushchev inherited from Stalin complicated effects of Cold War escalation and unfriendly relations with Western countries. Rooted in "Socialism in One Country," Stalin's foreign policies treated capitalist countries as opponents. The Soviet Union's relations with politically neutral countries in Eastern Europe (such as Yugoslavia) worsened. Stalin's disapproval of the 1951 San Francisco Treaty of Peace led to unclarity in the relationship with Japan in the aftermath of the Second World War. In his critique of Stalin, Khrushchev argued that Stalin's policies eliminated the Soviet Union's opportunity to decide the fate of Japan after the Second World War, similar to the problem with Germany. Geopolitically, such policies disadvantaged the Soviet Union's position in the international arena. Stalin's attention was focused mostly on the rivalry with the West, so other substantial problems were ignored.

Khrushchev believed that socialism could live in every type of society and that, therefore, peaceful coexistence was the ideal type of relation between countries that espoused different social systems. Based on this view, he introduced radical changes to Soviet foreign policy. In the frst years of his governance, he paid visits to a number of Western European countries, such as the United Kingdom and France, and even visited the United States. He went to Yugoslavia and normalized diplomatic relations between the two countries.

The important changes made in Soviet foreign policy had to do with Khrushchev's conclusions about world threats and how to deal with them. In the XX Congress of CPSU, among other things, he said that in the absence of a new fatal and inevitable war, it is possible to build socialism in various ways, including the peaceful way; it is possible to have a *peaceful coexistence* between countries with different social systems and politics (Kovalev, 1984, p. 48).

Points 2 and 3 state important matters, which were then implemented in Soviet foreign policy. The second point countered Stalin's misinterpretation that socialism could only be built through violence. According to Khrushchev, through peaceful means, people could rise to build a socialized society. As for the third point, the Khrushchev government believed it possible to have mutual respect and to live side by side in peace (*mirnoye sosushyestvovaniye*) with countries that have different social systems and politics. His idea meant not fghting against social systems and politics considered correct by other countries. At the same time, Khrushchev added that peaceful coexistence is a special form of class struggle that avoids military and violent means.

This policy came from Khrushchev's efforts to avoid a dangerous frontal war in light of the development of nuclear weapons. Although the struggle against capitalist and imperialist countries continued, Khrushchev attempted to avoid direct confict with Western Bloc countries that were convinced the world was divided into two powers frmly separated by their ideological principles.

Although at the beginning of his leadership, Khrushchev optimistically attempted to build better relations with Western countries, including America and Britain, his hopes failed because the West was already deeply trapped in its "old" perception of Stalinist Russia. According to Kovalev (1984), the Soviet Union's foreign policy under him had specifc objectives: (1) to guarantee, with other socialist countries, conditions of international relations for the development of socialism and communism; (2) to strengthen the unity and solidarity of socialist countries, their friendship and brotherhood; (3) to support freedom of movement and independence and to materialize multidimensional cooperation with young, developing countries; (4) to maintain principles of peaceful coexistence with different social systems; to oppose the power of aggressive imperialism; to keep humanity from the threat of a new war (Kovalev, 1984, pp. 48–50). This fourth point stressed the importance of peaceful coexistence with different social systems and was meant not only for capitalist countries but also for countries without similar social systems or those based on socialist understanding. Within this framework, Khrushchev paid much attention to Third World countries. He saw the potential of new countries (Asian, African, and Latin American) as partners in his fght against capitalism. At this point, he met Sukarno, who was then known as an initiator of solidarity among Asian and African countries. The success of the Afro-Asian Conference in Bandung raised Sukarno's reputation in Khrushchev's eyes.

Khrushchev's role as leader is central to understanding the Soviet attitude and position on the Soviet–Indonesian relationship. Specifcally, this role was based on the personal relationship, beginning in 1956, between him and President Sukarno. A formal relation developed rapidly, along with bilateral relations between their countries. Sukarno's four visits to Moscow and his intense meetings with Khrushchev created a certain chemistry between the two leaders. Because the Soviet political system holds the axiom that the leader is able to do anything and make any decision, bilateral relations and powerful support for Indonesia were very much determined by the positive relations between the leaders. In general, Khrushchev saw Sukarno as a leader with a keen intellect and as a hard worker who had dedicated his life to the independence and greatness of his nation. Khrushchev appreciated and honored Sukarno. The latter's skill in speaking and his breadth of knowledge were very impressive to many Russians, including Khrushchev. In his memoirs, Khrushchev wrote:

President Sukarno frst came to visit us [that is, in August–September 1956]. We welcomed him with the honors that were his due. He impressed us as an educated man and above all an intelligent man. After all, education and intelligence do not always go together. I have met many educated people who were not very intelligent, and the other way around, people who had not received systematic education but on the other hand had brilliant minds. In Sukarno's case he had both education and intelligence. We established good relations with him right away. We liked him. (Khrushchev, 1999, p. 785)

In his conversation with Sukarno on a train trip from Moscow to St. Petersburg, Khrushchev frankly stated that Sukarno was luckier than he, who had graduated only from a worker faculty; therefore, he confessed he had to catch up by reading a lot in his spare time. He read so he could be equal in conversations with other leaders. Igor Kashmadze quoted Khrushchev in his memoirs:

You, Mr. President, […] got a bright university education. I never even had any education during my exile, and instead of having education at an elite university, I only fnished Rabfak (faculty of worker). In the meantime, I had to interact with highly educated people like you. This is why I try to catch up by reading a lot, especially every night. (Kashmadze, 2009, p. 8)

Personal closeness, in turn, encouraged rapid diplomatic relations between the Soviet Union and Indonesia during Khrushchev's leadership. The fgure, personality, and diplomatic style of the frst Indonesian president was memorable, so much so that Khrushchev sought friendship (*druzhba*), both personally and as head of state. Sukarno's positive image was the opposite of Khrushchev's perceptions of other leaders, such as Mao Zedong:

[…] in our private meetings, Mao gave character sketches of the other members of the CCP Central Committee Politburo. His way of characterizing his comrades put me on guard. He spoke of most of them in gloomy terms; I would even say he besmirched them. He painted everything in black colors. I cannot recall now, word for word, what he said about Liu Shaoqi, but he had very bad things to say about Liu, citing certain facts as proof. He also gave a negative characterization of Zhou Enlai […] Mao had just as bad characterizations of all the others except for Deng Xiaoping, who at that time was already general secretary of the CCP Central Committee. Mao pointed at him and said: "See that little fellow over there?" Mao and I were having a conversation during a reception, sitting apart from the others. "He's a very wise man, sees far into the future." (Khrushchev, 1999, p. 791)

Khrushchev described Mao Zedong as a leader who did not respect or listen to other people and was always suspicious of people around him, especially those he did not like. Khrushchev equated Mao's personality with Stalin's. In Khrushchev's point of view, Stalin was always suspicious, attributed negative characteristics to people around him, and saw people close to him as his enemies. Khrushchev's perception of Mao later became a factor that encouraged the breakup of the harmonious relations between the Soviet Union and China.

As his friend, Khrushchev knew that Sukarno had a weakness that should have been avoidable by a great person like Sukarno:

[…] he was completely unrestrained in his attitude toward women. That was a notable weakness of his. I am not revealing any secrets here. The newspapers of those times were studded with accounts of his amorous adventures. We condemned that aspect of his behavior, but it is not easy to fght successfully against human weaknesses. We could not understand how an intelligent man, holding such an important post, could allow himself to engage in such escapades in his personal life. This discredited him in international circles as well as in his own country. (Kashmadze, 2009, p. 8)

Nevertheless, as a friend, Khrushchev understood and thought it diffcult to change one's behavior, although he did regret that such weakness could discredit Sukarno and his country.

Khrushchev was an open leader; he spoke frankly, humorously, and at the same time frmly. Sometimes he mixed serious sayings and jokes. On one occasion, Khrushchev received Nasution, who was visiting Moscow to buy weaponry during the liberation of what was known as West Irian at the time. As Nasution presented the request for military assistance, Khrushchev said that President Sukarno was a "plunderer" (for the number of weapons requested). The relationship between Sukarno and Khrushchev must have been close if he could comfortably make such a statement.

Another incident that showed Khrushchev's attitude and character was the appointment of the Soviet Ambassador, Nikolai Aleksandrovich Mikhailov, to Indonesia (1960–1965), as reported by Igor Kashmadze:

It can be said that Mikhailov became an ambassador by coincidence. In February 1960, he accompanied Khrushchev on a state visit to Indonesia. When he landed in Jakarta, our ambassador Boris Volkov did not meet him [Khrushchev] at the airport […] soon he [Volkov] was sent home to the Union [Soviet] with one of the planes that accompanied Khrushchev. Knowing from Khrushchev about Volkov's "problem," Sukarno asked whom would be sent to Jakarta as the new ambassador […] "Please choose [Khrushchev replied] one of the ministers that accompany me: you may choose the Minister of Culture, Mikhailov, or the Head of State Television and Radio, Kaftanov." (Kashmadze, 2009, pp. 4–5)

Khrushchev actually gave Sukarno the choice of ambassador to Indonesia. In the end, Sukarno chose Soviet Minister of Culture Mikhailov, who had accompanied Khrushchev on the visit to Jakarta. This showed two facets of Khrushchev's character. First, he was a hard leader and did not compromise; he could easily fre someone who was not performing his duties well. On the other hand, he gave Sukarno, a person he trusted, the discretion to choose the Soviet ambassador to Indonesia. This was a unique case in the diplomatic world. It would not have happened without trust (*doverie*) and friendship (*druzhba*) between the two leaders.

The Soviets, under Khrushchev's leadership, gave both political and military support to the Indonesian struggle in reclaiming what was known as West Irian at the time. The political support was given to assist Indonesia to gain international opinion vis-à-vis the Netherlands' provocative actions, which could trigger regional tension. For example, on February 9, 1962, the government of the Soviet Union launched its offcial statement (*oftsialnoye zayavleniye*) about the Soviet's position on the what was known as West Irian at the time dispute. In the statement published in the daily newspaper *Pravda* on the same day, the Soviet government stated:

The Soviet government frmly stands on the policy to rescue peace and to strengthen national independence for all states and nations. It cannot help but pay attention to the dangerous situation as a result of the impact of aggressive actions by the Netherlands toward the Republic of Indonesia. By long continuing to refuse the peaceful solution of the what was known as West Irian at the time issue, the government of the Netherlands now stands directly on the path of military provocation. (*Pravda*, February 9, 1962, as quoted by Solmov, 2009)

In this statement, the Soviet government emphasized the Netherlands' aggressive actions toward Indonesia. The Soviets believed that the Netherlands had been guilty of military provocation, which endangered world peace and security, and that their efforts delayed the peaceful solution of the what was known as West Irian at the time dispute. The Soviet attitude confrmed alignment with Indonesia and secured in public opinion the fact that the Netherlands had exercised aggressive action.

On an earlier state visit to Indonesia in February 1960, Nikita Khrushchev in a speech in Bali quoted by the daily newspaper *Warta Sovjet* (June 23, 1962) stated: "The Soviet people consider that [Indonesian] claim to reunite what was known as West Irian at the time to the motherland of Indonesia is a fair and legal claim. You have our sympathy completely." The degree of support declared in the statement above shows the signifcant increase in support amid the escalation of confict between the Republic of Indonesia and the Netherlands. In a subsequent offcial statement on February 9, 1962, the Soviet Union even brought up the issue of the attack by the Netherlands on an Indonesian patrol ship in the Sea of Arafuru (January 15, 1962) as an aggressive step by the Netherlands that was supported by Western powers to protect their colonial system and resist the national independence movement.

A Pravda report of February 9, 1962, quoted by Solmov, 2009, states:

Lately in the what was known as West Irian at the time region, the military of the Netherlands had been mobilized on a large scale. One of the hardest actions was pirate-like on an Indonesian patrol ship by Dutch ships on the open sea. By taking such steps toward an independent Republic of Indonesia, the Dutch tried to prolong their colonial power over what was known as West Irian at the time to make that Indonesian region a front post of the military block of aggressive Western countries in their efforts to resist the national independence movement of nations in Southeast Asia. (*Pravda*, February 9, 1962, as quoted by Solmov, 2009)

This action by the Netherlands was construed as an effort to expand its colonial power and to ignore Indonesian sovereignty. The Soviets believed that this Dutch maneuver did not stand alone and was part of the Western Bloc strategy to reintroduce imperialism against the spirit of the freedom of nations that was on the rise in Southeast Asia. The Netherlands was suspected of wanting to make Indonesia the front post (*forpost*) for the military bloc of the Western countries.

The Soviet government indicated that the attitude of the Dutch and other colonialists was supported by the military powers of the Western Bloc, that is, NATO and SEATO. For the Soviet Union, the what was known as West Irian at the time issue was closely related to the support from the Western countries in their efforts to destroy the independence movement. The Soviets linked this matter to the statement of the United States' 7th Fleet command, which was ready to support the Netherlands in case of combat. This was mentioned in the following quote:

What is the reason for the Dutch, which until this moment have ignored the UN resolution about the eradication of colonialism which had direct connection with what was known as West Irian at the time? This matter can be explained by the fact that behind them, including behind the Portuguese and other colonialists, there are aggressive powers such as NATO and SEATO, which run politics of the demolition of the national independence movement of nations. In this connection, the US 7th feet command had stated that in case of combat between Indonesia and the Netherlands, the US Navy will take action. (*Pravda*, February 9, 1962, as quoted by Solmov, 2009)

Besides that, the Soviet government also believed that with this action the Dutch had violated the UN Declaration on the right of independence of nations. The Dutch action, furthermore, had violated the national sovereignty and the unity of a country, which were regulated in the UN charter. The Soviet government used the term "rude violation" (*gruboye protivorechie*) to indicate a serious diplomatic statement, ignoring the polite terminology commonly used in diplomatic language.

The harsh criticism of the Dutch action is a manifestation of the Soviet political support that was given at the right time. Only two weeks after the Arafuru Sea incident, the Soviet government declared in an offcial statement (on February 9, 1962) their support of the Indonesian position. The open statement by the Soviet government had a huge impact at a time when the various diplomatic steps taken by Indonesia on its own in the international arena had not produced signifcant results. This Soviet move strengthened the international opinion that the Dutch were in the wrong position in their attempts to defend this position by any means necessary.

# Conclusion

In establishing Soviet–Indonesian diplomatic relations, the years 1945–1964 are a critical period that naturally divides into two parts: 1945–1953 under Joseph Stalin's leadership, and 1953–1964 under Nikita Khrushchev. The 1945–1949 period was marked by Soviet efforts to support Indonesia's struggle to gain international recognition of sovereignty through the Soviet Union's role as one of the decision makers in the UN Security Council.

Stalin's approval of Foreign Minister Molotov's proposition that the Indonesia question should become the main agenda of discussions between foreign ministers of the Allied countries actually signaled the quarrel between the Soviet Union and the United Kingdom, in which the former accused the latter of abusing its power in Indonesia. At the same time, the problem of Indonesia was widely discussed among Russian intellectuals.

During Khrushchev's leadership, diplomatic relations progressed. When Indonesia initiated the Asia-Africa Conference in 1955, the Khrushchev government perceived Indonesia as an important partner for the Soviet Union's policy of peaceful coexistence. The mutual interests of both countries were strengthened by the leadership and personal friendship between Nikita Khrushchev and Sukarno.

Personal contact between Sukarno and Khrushchev became a pillar for bilateral relations. Private diplomatic messages between them apparently developed harmony between the two countries. In the Stalin era, no direct contact occurred between Stalin and Sukarno, and certainly not the friendship enjoyed by Khrushchev. Contact during Stalin's era took place only at the level of minister of foreign affairs and diplomats who met in UN Security Council debates.

Based on the spirit of *druzhba* (friendship) and *doverie* (trust), Khrushchev and Sukarno's personal connection was a very important foundation which sustained the bilateral diplomatic relations between the two countries. Thanks to the power of trust between the two leaders, the two countries quickly reached agreements on many important decisions without the obstruction of complicated bureaucracy. Because of this relationship, Indonesia gained the Soviet Union's full political and military support in reclaiming West Papua. After the fall of the Khrushchev government in 1964, Indonesia certainly did not receive the same amount of support in its confrontation with Malaysia in later political developments. In Soviet political culture, the leadership factor played an important role in policy-making, including in diplomacy and foreign policy.

The personal relationship between the two leaders signifcantly impacted all levels in the Soviet hierarchy. This enabled Khrushchev to make quick decisions and cut through existing bureaucratic procedures. Nevertheless, just as leadership is vulnerable to change, so are personal relationships among leaders. Khrushchev's government had been the main pillar which sustained diplomatic relations between Indonesia and the Soviet Union, but its sudden fall in October 1964 was the counterpoint in the relation between the two countries. Subsequently, the period between October 1964 and September 1965 was a transition period in which diplomatic relations between the two countries deteriorated.

# References

Archive AVP RF F.071 Op. 6. D. 3. p.3. L.6


Khruschev, S. (1999). *Memoar of Nikita Khruschev Vol.3 Statesman 1953–1964*. Pensylvania.

Kovalev, A. (1984). *Azbuka diplomatii*. Moskwa.


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# Tracing Agency

# Politics of Recognition: Heroes, Victims and the Contest over History in Post-Suharto Indonesia

# *Paul O'Shea*

# Introduction

The concepts of *pahlawan* (hero) and *korban* (victim) are central to the contest over history in post-Suharto Indonesia. The frst of these concepts, *pahlawan*, is derived from the Persian term *pahlavan* meaning 'champion'. While neither the Indonesian nor the Persian term is exclusively limited to use in the context of military action, the associated connotations of strength and bravery tend to foreground a militaristic conception of heroism at the expense of contributions in other felds. In Indonesia, the state has historically been one of the key promoters of this militaristic conception of heroism. Indeed, by establishing days of commemoration such as *Hari Pahlawan* (Heroes Day) and offcial titles such as *Pahlawan Nasional* (National Hero), the state has ensured that the concept of the hero who defends Indonesia from internal or external

P. O'Shea (\*)

School of Historical and Philosophical Studies, Faculty of Arts, University of Melbourne, Melbourne, VIC, Australia e-mail: poshea@student.unimelb.edu.au

<sup>©</sup> The Author(s) 2023

M. Budianta, S. Tiwon (eds.), *Trajectories of Memory*, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-99-1995-6\_10

threats to its security has remained a conspicuous feature of offcial discourse about the nation's past.

In contrast to the state-centric discourse surrounding *pahlawan*, the word *korban* is more frequently associated with the rhetoric of civil society organisations. Notably, the word *korban* is frequently invoked by NGOs such as the Commission for the Disappeared and Victims of Violence (KontraS) in instances where the state itself is regarded as a perpetrator. It is also signifcant that the Indonesian words *korban* (victim) and *kurban* (sacrifce) are both derived from the same Arabic word *qurban*̄, which refers to the sacrifces offered to Allah as part of the observance of Eid al-Adha. The confating of victimhood and sacrifce evident here is refected in Indonesia through the commemoration of individuals like the murdered human rights activist Munir as heroic victims. By advancing an understanding of heroism as self-sacrifce and resistance to the state, the promotion of heroic victims within Indonesian civil society offers a rival interpretation of heroism to that conveyed by the state through the offcially recognised national heroes.

As a site for contestation between the state and civil society, the recognition of individuals from the past as either heroes and/or victims is a profoundly political act. By focusing on the politics behind the recognition of heroes and victims, the objective of this chapter is to problematise the idea that contestation over history in post-Suharto Indonesia can be understood simply as an effort to *meluruskan sejarah* (straighten out history), motivated by a Rankean desire to discover the truth of what actually happened (Nordholt et al., 2008). Instead, this chapter will contend that both state and non-state actors in Indonesia have sought to promote particular Indonesian fgures as heroes and/or victims in order to advance an interpretation of the past more in line with their political priorities and interests. This contention is the result of a consideration of three key research questions. Firstly, how has the Indonesian state instrumentalised the recognition of national heroes for its own purposes? Secondly, how has the centrality of the state in directing the selection and commemoration of heroes been challenged by civil society in post-authoritarian Indonesia? Finally, how has the hero-enemy binary been challenged by advocates of a new distinction in Indonesian history foregrounding the identities of victim and perpetrator? In order to address these questions, this chapter will draw upon the case studies of the prominent Indonesians, namely, key fgure in the anti-Communist massacres of 1965 General Sarwo Edhie Wibowo, murdered human rights activist Munir Said Thalib and protagonist of Joshua Oppenheimer's recent documentary flm *The Look of Silence* Adi Rukun. These case studies have been chosen since the claims of these individuals to the status of hero and/or victim have generated a high degree of debate and controversy in post-Suharto Indonesia.

This chapter is not the frst study of the political signifcance of the selection and recognition of heroes in Indonesia. The most notable previous contribution to this topic has come from the German historian Klaus Schreiner. In his work, Schreiner (1997) outlines the way in which both President Sukarno and President Suharto instrumentalised the concept of the national hero as part of their authoritarian rule. Specifcally, Schreiner (1997) argues that the recognition and celebration of national heroes was conceived by the Indonesian state to foster national unity and identity, to promote a politically partisan interpretation of the nation's past and to act as a propaganda tool for the indoctrination of the young with the views and values of the ruling regime. Writing about Indonesia during the Guided Democracy and New Order years, what Schreiner's work does not provide is an analysis of the treatment of national heroes in postauthoritarian Indonesia. Thus, this chapter proposes to extend on the work of Schreiner by exploring how the concept of the national hero has been instrumentalised in the increasingly fragmented political environment of post-Suharto Indonesia.

Moving from the state-centric framework for recognising national heroes to the idea of the heroic victim as promoted by elements of Indonesian civil society, this chapter will also engage with the work of the philosopher Diana Meyers. In her article 'Two Victim Paradigms and the Problem of "Impure" Victims', Meyers (2011) identifes the heroic victim and the pathetic victim as the two dominant victim paradigms emerging from the latter part of the twentieth century. Applying Meyers' idea of the heroic victim to the case study of the human rights campaigner Munir, this chapter will seek to explore the extent to which elements of Indonesian civil society, as well as the state, have instrumentalised the commemoration of heroic fgures from the past.

This chapter will then analyse the politics of recognition around the anti-Communist massacres of 1965–1966 through the lens of competitive victimhood. Foregrounding the contrasting representations of this episode in Indonesia's past in the flms *The Look of Silence* and *Pengkhianatan G30S/PKI*, this chapter will highlight the ways in which both sides have sought to advance an account of the past which casts themselves as victims. This focus on competitive victimhood is, of course, not intended to suggest an equivalence of suffering on both sides of the events of 1965–1966. Neither is it intended to advance the idea that a statesponsored historical orthodoxy intended to justify the massacres and the efforts to challenge this orthodoxy and rehabilitate the image of those targeted during the massacres have equal claims to truth. Rather, this chapter highlights the way in which the recognition of the victims of the massacres of 1965–1966 is still contested and how this contestation continues to hamper efforts to achieve reconciliation between the parties involved.

# National Heroes Under Sukarno and Suharto

From the selection of the frst *Pahlawan Kemerdekaan Nasional* (National Independence Heroes) in 1959, the practice of offcially bestowing the title of hero on prominent fgures from Indonesia's past was perceived as benefcial for the project of promoting national unity. Throughout his political career, Sukarno placed particular emphasis on unifying the secular nationalist, religious and Communist elements of Indonesian society (Legge, 1972). This desire to unify the three NASAKOM (i.e., nationalist, religious and Communist) forces Sukarno believed to represent the three truly revolutionary forces in Indonesia is evident in the fgures he chose as heroes to be admired and emulated. Indeed, the recognition as heroes of individuals such as Albertus Sugiyapranata, who combined the identities of pastor and patriot, and Alimin Prawirodirdjo, both a Communist and a nationalist, suggests that Schreiner (1997) is justifed in his description of Sukarno's pantheon of national heroes as a 'personifcation of NASAKOM ideology' (p. 268).

Unifying a diverse Indonesian republic was also a key consideration of Suharto when it came to the selection of national heroes. Sukarno and Suharto, however, conceived of the diversity of Indonesia in very different ways. In contrast to Sukarno's focus on unifying the diverse streams of thought and ideologies that existed within Indonesia, Suharto's selection of national heroes was calculated to refect Indonesia's ethnic and regional diversity (Schreiner, 1997). As a matter of policy, Suharto's desire to have the ethnic and regional diversity of Indonesia represented in his pantheon of national heroes can be understood as part of a broader New Order objective emphasising the production of 'sanitised and authorised versions of cultural difference subservient to national goals' (Robison, 1997, p. 71). By channelling expressions of regional pride and regional identity through national heroes selected and approved by the state, Suharto was able to achieve his purpose of demobilising potential rival political identities such as those built around regional and ethnic loyalties.

The instrumentalisation of the selection of national heroes during the Guided Democracy and New Order eras is most evident when examining the establishment by both regimes of a binary opposition between national heroes and enemies of the state. As perceived by Sukarno, the forces of neo-imperialism, colonialism and imperialism, or NEKOLIM, constituted 'a skilful and determined enemy' (Sukarno, 1970, p. 458), of which Indonesia must be wary. In selecting the heroes of Indonesia, Sukarno therefore emphasised the importance of those who 'oppose colonialism in Indonesia [and] fght foreign enemies' ('Keputusan President Republik Indonesia Nomor 228'). To borrow from the rhetoric of Sukarno, the recognition of national heroes during Guided Democracy was designed to mobilise the forces of NASAKOM in order to combat the forces of NEKOLIM. Likewise for Suharto, the identifcation of the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI) as the greatest threat to Indonesia prompted him to expunge Communist national heroes from offcial hero biographies and instead commemorate the *Pahlawan Revolusi* (Heroes of the Revolution) who—according to the offcial New Order narrative—had their lives cut short as a result of PKI treachery and cruelty.

# Indonesian Heroes Post-Suharto

With the fall of Suharto in 1998, the dominance of the offcial New Order interpretation of the nation's past diminished. However, the link between advocacy of particular individuals as national heroes and politically partisan views of Indonesia's history remained strong. One of the best examples of this link can be found in the debate over the hero candidacy of Sarwo Edhie, a key fgure behind the anti-Communist massacres of 1965/1966 whose son-in-law Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono was the sixth president of Indonesia. For the organisations complicit in the massacres such as the Islamic movement *Nahdlatul Ulama* (NU) and its youth wing Ansor, the possibility of Sarwo Edhie being recognised as a national hero bolsters the claims of those who conceive of their own organisation's past deeds as 'heroic'. It is signifcant then that both NU and the Ansor Youth Movement were among the groups who frst submitted Sarwo Edhie's name for consideration as a national hero (Adityo et al., 2013). The connection between the way the history of Sarwo Edhie is recorded and the way the role of NU and Ansor in the events of 1965/1966 is understood is clear: if the General who exhorted the people to assist in the eliminating the Communists is made a national hero, then those who answered Sarwo Edhie's call are themselves recognised as being part of a heroic act.

For those who were imprisoned, tortured or who lost family members during the 1965/1966 massacres, the proposed recognition of Sarwo Edhie as a national hero carries with it the implication that their suffering was deserved. Responding to media reporting that Sarwo Edhie's had been approved for the title of national hero at each of the regency, provincial and national levels, Soe Tjen Marching—whose father was imprisoned under suspicion of being a Communist sympathiser—initiated a campaign to lobby President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono not to bestow the honour of national hero on his father-in-law Sarwo Edhie. In her petition to Yudhoyono, Soe Tjen Marching argues that national hero status for Sarwo Edhie would not only compound the injustice done to victims of the events of 1965/1966 but would also work to perpetuate the stigmatisation of the victims and their families as tainted by their alleged Communist links (Marching, 2016). By publicly opposing the hero candidacy of Sarwo Edhie in this way, Soe Tjen Marching has challenged the dominant narrative of the violence of 1965/1966 which creates a division between the active 'heroes' of the events such as President Suharto and General Sarwo Edhie and the Communist victims of the massacres, who are commonly attributed only a passive role (Cribb, 1991). More than this, Soe Tjen Marching through her own actions demonstrates the agency that victims and their families possess in disputing the leading interpretation of the events of 1965/1966.

The increased contestation of the nation's past, as evident in the debates over the hero candidacy of New Order fgures Suharto and Sarwo Edhie, has been a notable development in the treatment of history in the post-Suharto era. No longer can an analysis of the selection of national heroes focus solely on the political ideas and interests of towering fgures such as Sukarno and Suharto. Instead, the motivations of a variety of actors, their desire to secure a favourable account of their own place in Indonesia's past and the direction they wish the nation to take into the future must all be considered. This contestation over the question of who the proper heroes for the state to honour are does not, however, represent defnitive departure from the approach to national heroes witnessed in the years of Guided Democracy and under the New Order regime. In fact, in their assumption of the signifcant role played by the state's power to recognise specifc individuals in shaping understandings of the past, debates over the claims of Suharto and Sarwo Edhie to the title of national hero remain frmly within the state-centred framework initiated by Sukarno and consolidated by Suharto.

# Munir: The Heroic Victim

A greater challenge to the state-centred framework for the selection of heroes can be found in the promotion of heroic victims by elements of Indonesian civil society. Whereas the offcial rhetoric of Heroes Day in Indonesia holds that 'acts of service, struggle and sacrifce of heroes are solely for the nation and the state' (Kementerian Sosial Republik Indonesia, 2016a) human rights NGOs and activists in Indonesia have increasingly forwarded an alternate understanding of heroism. According to this interpretation, heroism is located in self-sacrifcial acts of resistance to the state rather than service of the state. A prime example of a heroic victim in post-Suharto Indonesia is the assassinated human rights defender Munir, whose human rights advocacy was silenced when he was poisoned in 2004 and whose death is widely perceived as a testament to the pervasiveness of impunity in Indonesia's political culture. Recognition of Munir as a 'Human Rights Hero' or a 'Hero of the Disappeared' on account of his work with the NGO KontraS is in stark contrast to the state's recognition of national heroes. Intended as a critique of successive Indonesian government's inability to combat impunity, the celebration of Munir as heroic positions the state not as the author of the message but rather as its intended audience.

While the forms of recognition associated with Indonesian civil society differ signifcantly from those instituted by the state, the instrumentalisation of the recognition of heroic individuals for strategic purposes is common to both sides. As political scientists McEntire et al. (2015) observe, civil society groups such as human rights organisations are 'strategic actors' (p. 407) whose aim is to frame issues in such a way as to maximise its impact in terms of mobilisation. From a strategic perspective, heroic victims are an integral element in many campaigns to mobilise resources and support for a given cause. The prominence of heroic victims such as Nelson Mandela and Aung San Suu Kyi in the campaigns to end Apartheid in South Africa and to democratise Myanmar is a case in point. In the Indonesian context, the usefulness of having a fgure like Munir at the forefront of the mobilisation campaigns is evident in the way his case can be neatly accommodated within two of the dominant frames employed by human rights groups: the motivational and the personal (McEntire et al., 2015).

A prime example of the way the case of Munir has been framed for the purposes of motivation can be found in human rights activists' promotion of the slogan 'oppose forgetting' (Hearman, 2014). Sharing with motivational framing an emphasis on 'agency' and 'effcacy', the campaign built by human rights groups around the idea of refusing to forget suggests that every Indonesian has the power to challenge the culture of impunity by continuing to remember human rights abuses and their victims (McEntire et al., 2015, p. 407). By highlighting the importance of individual acts of remembering and forgetting, Indonesian human rights campaigners hope to give Indonesians who sympathise with their cause a sense of agency that will motivate them to join the struggle to bring perpetrators of human rights violations to justice.

While the call to remember Munir's heroic fght for human rights in Indonesia is an example of motivational framing, the victimhood element of Munir's story lends itself to the use of personal framing. The power of the personal frame is that it 'personifes abuse as the story of a single suffering individual who is warranted as representative' (Brysk, 2013, p. 12). For Indonesian human rights organisations such as KontraS, Munir is a leading example of such a representative fgure. A double victim in the sense of, frstly, being poisoned in a politically motivated assassination and, secondly, not having one's murderers brought to justice, Munir and his case are considered emblematic of impunity and political violence in Indonesia. Indeed, belief in the representative nature of Munir's case is so strong that a popular rallying-cry in commemorations of the activist reads 'Justice for Munir, Justice for All' (Muhaimin, 2014). As a mobilisation strategy, highlighting the personal narrative of the life and death of a wellknown fgure such as Munir is an attractive option for human rights groups. As Kogut and Ritov (2005) have demonstrated, focusing on the plight of a single, 'identifed' victim not only elicits a greater emotional response from the wider community but also tends to garner greater fnancial contributions than campaigns that mobilise support for nameless, 'statistical' victims (p. 157). If this holds true in the Indonesian context, one expects spotlighting the plight of Munir to be an effective strategy for KontraS in terms of mobilising both awareness and resources.

The promotion of heroic victims such as Munir as a counter to the national heroes of the state is, of course, only one part of a broader parallel framework for recognising heroism led by elements of Indonesian civil society. Another such example can be found in the bestowing of the Yap Thiam Hien Award to the Indonesian individual or organisation considered to have made the greatest contribution to the advancement of human rights in Indonesia (Yayasan Yap Thiam Hien, 2016). Challenging the statist ideology that underpins the selection of national heroes based on whether the candidate served the interests of the nation and the state to an extraordinary degree, the bestowing of the Yap Thiam Hien award connects heroism with the more universal concept of human rights.

If the Yap Thiam Hien Award is Indonesian civil society's substitute for recognition as a national hero, then the celebration of *Hari Pembela HAM* (Human Rights Defenders Day) can be viewed as their answer to Heroes Day. Alongside the internationally recognised Human Rights Day on December 10, the marking of Human Rights Defenders Day on the anniversary of Munir's assassination gives Indonesian NGOs and activists a platform to promote an alternate account of the relationship between the individual and the state than that forwarded by the government on Heroes Day. According to Indonesian President Joko Widodo, for instance, Heroes Day reminds Indonesians of the importance of the struggle, sacrifce and service of individuals directed at creating an Indonesian state that is 'sovereign' and 'independent' ('Pidato Hari Pahlawan', 2015). Rather than emphasising on what the individual can give to the state, however, Human Rights Defenders Day focuses on what the state has failed to do for its citizens. In particular, the celebration of Human Rights Defenders Day in Indonesia is frequently associated with criticism of the state for its inability or unwillingness to protect human rights activists and to bring those responsible for acts of violence or intimidation to justice ('Hari HAM sedunia', 2014).

This contest over defning heroes and heroism should not, however, be seen as a contest between an instrumentalised, state-sponsored version of history and a truthful account of the past offered by human rights organisations. Even if it is for admirable reasons, Indonesia's human rights organisations instrumentalise the concept of the hero as part of an attempt to advance an account of the past informed by their own interests and values. The rallying-cry 'oppose forgetting' (*melawan lupa*) is therefore not a neutral one directed simply at recovering of the facts of the past but, as Todorov (2001) explains, is rather intended as a 'defense of a particular selection from among these facts, one that assures its protagonists of maintaining the roles of hero or victim' (p. 21).

# Beyond Heroes: Adi Rukun and the Massacres of 1965–1966

Seeking recognition as a hero for oneself or for a member of one's group is not the only strategy available to those wanting to frame their role in the nation's history in a positive light. For instance, one viable alternative to being celebrated as heroic is being recognised as a victim. In the case of the anti-Communist massacres of 1965–1966 in Indonesia, this point is best articulated by Adi Rukun, whose brother Ramli was killed during the massacres. Contesting the self-identifcation of the perpetrators of the massacres as heroes who saved the Republic from the grip of Communism, Adi challenges the hero-enemy binary in Indonesian history by affrming: 'unlike the perpetrators, I do not ask that my older brother, my parents, or the millions of victims be treated as heroes, even though some deserve to be. I just want my family to no longer be described as traitors in the school books' (O'Falt, 2016). Despite this attempt of Adi Rukun to secure recognition of the victimhood of those who suffered during the 1965–1966 massacres, the competing claims to victimhood surrounding the events of 1965–1966 in Indonesia suggest that the possibility of achieving reconciliation in Indonesia between the victims and perpetrators of violence in the New Order years remains limited.

Given the existence of rival claims to the status of victim, the inability to achieve reconciliation regarding the events of 1965/1966 in post-Suharto Indonesia can be productively understood through the lens of competitive victimhood. The concept of competitive victimhood is most commonly applied to cases such as the Israel-Palestine confict in which the number of victims on each side is more equal. However, the psychology and politics behind the practice of competitive victimhood, which states that rival groups are inclined to promote a history of the confict which claims for their ingroup the role of victim, are equally applicable to the Indonesian context (Shnabel et al., 2013). According to the New Order regime's historical orthodoxy, the identities of the victims and perpetrators of violence were clear: the victims were those who suffered allegedly at the hands of the PKI and the perpetrators were members of the PKI or their affliated organisations. With the fall of Suharto, however, attempts to identify the victims and the perpetrators of Indonesia's past have become much more contested.

In recounting the events of G30S and the subsequent massacres, the Indonesian military and those groups targeted by the army in the aftermath of G30S both claim to be the party who suffered and was victimised. According to the historical orthodoxy promoted by the Indonesian military, the victims of 1965 are not the Communists and suspected Communists killed or imprisoned in the aftermath of G30S. Rather, it was the military fgures murdered by the September 30 Movement who were remembered in the offcial military histories as 'the victims of Communist treachery' (Pramono & Marinir, 1979, p. 41). This highlighting of the suffering of the generals whose deaths were allegedly masterminded by the PKI over that of the hundreds of thousands of people killed in the anti-Communist massacres which followed is entirely consistent with the practice of competitive victimhood as based on the belief 'that one's own group (rather than the adversarial group) is the primary or sole victim of the confict' (Adelman et al., 2016, p. 1417). During the militarist New Order regime, the army was able to maintain a hegemonic discourse around the idea of Communist threat and Communist treachery with almost complete success (Heryanto, 1999). With the fall of Suharto allowing the expression of previously suppressed memories and experiences, however, the idea that the generals murdered during Lieutenant Colonel Untung's attempted coup constitute the primary victims of 1965 has not survived unchallenged.

The competing claims to victimhood held by the army and those linked to the PKI are encapsulated in two contrasting flms: Arifn C. Noer's *Pengkhianatan G30S/PKI* and Oppenheimer's *The Look of Silence*. The frst of these flms conveys the Indonesian military's perspective on the events of 1965, depicting in over three and a half hours of lurid detail how the abduction, torture and killing of the seven generals were planned and executed by the PKI (Paramaditha, 2013). In keeping with the concept of competitive victimhood, while this flm thoroughly illustrates the suffering of the seven military fgures killed who serve as representatives of the ingroup (the army), it completely overlooks the suffering of the outgroup (the PKI and its sympathisers) during the subsequent anti-Communist massacres. In contrast, the second of these flms, *The Look of Silence*, is told from the perspective of Adi Rukun as a representative of those suffering from the stigma of real or perceived Communist links. In the opening minutes of this flm, attention is drawn to the central justifcation behind the claim of those who suffered during the anti-Communist massacres to be recognised as the primary victims of 1965/1966: the number of people killed. While seven military fgures were killed during the attempted coup of G30S, *The Look of Silence* informs its viewers that the countercoup led by the military claimed the lives of 'over one million 'Communists'. However reasonable this emphasis on the differential of lives lost, *The Look of Silence* also largely ignores the suffering of the outgroup. The events of G30S are raised briefy, but only in the context of condemning the propaganda taught to Indonesian students. In contrast, the injustice done to the murdered generals is overlooked.

While the flms of Noer and Oppenheimer present to contrasting claims to victimhood status on the silver screen, the phenomenon of competitive victimhood in relation to the events of 1965–1966 in Indonesia has also played out in more explicitly political and legal forums. The year 2016, for instance, witnessed the holding of the International People's Tribunal 1965 (IPT 1965) in the Dutch city of The Hague. While the IPT 1965 concerned itself with legal questions such as whether the massacres of 1965/1966 in Indonesia constituted genocide, its status as an unoffcial tribunal established by a transnational network of civil society organisations means that the tribunal is best understood as a 'moral intervention' (McGregor & Purdey, 2016). Inspired by other civilian tribunals such as the 'Women's International War Crimes Tribunal on Japan's Military Sexual Slavery' held in Tokyo in December 2000, the IPT 1965 offered the opportunity for victims to testify to their suffering and to challenge the offcial history of the massacres of 1965/1966 (Sutrisno, 2016). The relationship between staking a claim to victimhood status and advancing an alternate account of the past is highly signifcant in the Indonesian context. Given that many of the individuals and organisations who beneftted from the violent birth of the New Order remain in positions of power in present-day Indonesia, promoting a rival account of the events of 1965/1966 not only requires the recognition of new victims but also casts many infuential actors in Indonesian politics in the role of perpetrator.

Based on an attempt to revisit and reconsider the established narrative of the events of 1965/1966, efforts at the IPT 1965 to achieve recognition for the victims of the massacres have been highly contested. The IPT 1965 and the reconciliation-focused symposium 'Dissecting the Tragedy of 1965: A Historical Approach' held in Jakarta in April 2016 were countered by the holding in June 2016 of a national symposium on 'Securing the Pancasila from the Threat of the Resurgence of Communism and Other Ideologies'. Attracting representatives from forty-nine organisations, including representatives from groups complicit in the massacres of 1965/1966 such as NU, Ansor and Pemuda Pancasila, this symposium recommended that Indonesia take no further steps towards reconciliation beyond allowing for the perceived natural process of reconciliation already occurring among the descendants of those who experienced the violence (Paskalis, 2016). In addition to arguing against the need for further reconciliation, this anti-Communist symposium also reasserted the New Order historical orthodoxy on the victim-perpetrator binary in Indonesian history by suggesting that Indonesian Communists were guilty of 'a betrayal of Pancasila and the people' by rebelling against the Republic in times of crisis (Paskalis, 2016).

The competition over claims to victimhood represents a signifcant obstacle to the achievement of reconciliation in Indonesia. As Noor (2012) et al. observe, it is far too easy and too common in situations where competing claims to victimhood exist for both sides to place the responsibility for commencing steps towards forgiveness and confictresolution entirely on the other group. Reducing the prevalence of competitive victimhood and advancing the cause of reconciliation, therefore, require an effort to embrace common victim identity in which both sides to the confict acknowledge the harm suffered by the other (Shnabel et al., 2013). In the Indonesian context, this means no longer framing the debate over who was victimised the most or who was victimised frst but rather framing commemoration and discussion of acts of political violence around the idea that injustices suffered by all sides should be acknowledged and condemned. One advocate of such an approach is Goenawan Mohamad, the founding editor of *Tempo* magazine. Disputing the claim of those who suffered during the anti-Communist massacres of 1965/1966 to be recognised as the sole victims of New Order political violence, Goenawan Mohamad (2001) argues that no individual or group in Indonesia can justifably state, 'the victim, that's me' (p. 134).

Achieving reconciliation through a broad-based recognition of a common victim identity is, however, complicated by the desire to appeal to and retain third-party support from those belonging neither to the ingroup nor to the outgroup in the confict. As Adelman (2016) et al. contend, narratives of competitive victimhood become 'vehicles of identity and power politics to gain the moral high-ground and attract the attention and support of third-party groups' (p. 1417). The connection between competitive victimhood and power politics emphasises the extent to which the politics of victimhood in Indonesia have been seen as a zero-sum game. Throughout the New Order regime, in a Cold War world polarised into Communist and anti-Communist camps, key Western powers accepted the historical narrative forwarded by the Indonesian army which privileged their exclusive claim to the status of victim and cast the PKI in the role of perpetrator. More recently, with human rights concerns playing an increasingly prominent part in global politics, the international community has been more receptive of the claims of those targeted during the anti-Communist violence of 1965/1966 to be recognised as the true victims. In this way, the fall of the New Order and the rising prominence of human rights discourses may well have enabled new victim identities around the events of 1965/1966 to emerge and be freely expressed. However, post-Suharto Indonesia has yet to witness the move beyond competitive victimhood required to achieve the goal of reconciliation.

# Conclusion

This chapter has argued that the recognition of individuals from Indonesia's past as either heroes or heroic victims has been instrumentalised to advance the interests of both state and non-state actors alike. For the Indonesian state, the selection and celebration of national heroes has been directed at promoting national unity and for establishing an offcial historical narrative which clearly distinguishes the heroic elements of the population from the enemies of the state. In the context of post-authoritarian Indonesia, the state's power to bestow the title national hero has also become a site for contestation over the nation's history from a variety of non-state actors seeking to promote an account of the past which casts themselves and their organisations in a positive light. The existence of such contestation should not, however, give rise to an uncritical acceptance that recent Indonesian historiography is characterised by a 'straightening out of history' in which a past distorted in the service of an authoritarian regime is being displaced by a more objective account. Indeed, it is important to remember that the democratisation of history is not the same as its depoliticisation. In fact, with the democratisation process facilitating the expression of counter-narratives from elements of society previously silenced under the New Order regime, the number of actors seeking to forward an interpretation of the nation's past in accord with their political and strategic priorities is greater than before. As is evident from the case studies of General Sarwo Edhie, Munir and Adi Rukun, the narrative of Indonesia's past remains a melodrama peopled by heroes, enemies, victims and perpetrators. When recognising heroes and victims in the post-Suharto era, however, Indonesians are no longer required to read from the same script.

# References


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# Contestation and Coalition: The Role of *Botohs* in Local Political Dynamics, Tuban District, 1974–2006

*Mokhamad Sodikin and Abdurakhman*

# Introduction

A surprising, yet important, fgure exists in the development of democracy in Indonesia, as it emerges from its authoritarian past. This fgure is the *botoh*, who plays a signifcant role in democratic transition. Its popularity is inseparable from its expertise in mobilizing the masses in local and national political contestations through a system of cultural support networks. The term *botoh* comes from the Javanese language and carries the meaning of a "gambler" (Pusat Bahasa Departemen Pendidikan Nasional, 2002). In earlier times, the term referred to gamblers in cockfghting rings. Over time, *botoh* has migrated from these traditional gambling arenas into the overtly political arena of village head elections. It began soon after the issuance of new regulations concerning the direct election of village chiefs (Law No. 5 of 1974).

History Department, Faculty of Humanities, Universitas Indonesia, Depok, Indonesia

M. Sodikin (\*) • Abdurakhman

e-mail: mokhamad.sodikin@ui.ac.id; abdurakhman.hum@ui.ac.id

<sup>©</sup> The Author(s) 2023

M. Budianta, S. Tiwon (eds.), *Trajectories of Memory*, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-99-1995-6\_11

The fgure of a gambler or a *bettor* has long been recognized in human civilization, and the existence of the *botoh* is rooted in the gambling culture of Javanese tradition. A successful *botoh* acquires economic affuence and becomes an infuential fgure that may shape public opinion in a particular region. Thus, the *botoh* has unsurprisingly become a new political fgure who plays an important role in local political dynamics. To adopt Keller's terminology (1984, p. 19), the *botoh* is part of the strategic elite whose voice must be reckoned with because of his strong social infuence. This role, as a public relations representative of a candidate for political offce or his/her team, has been useful in traditional political communication (Jackson & Lucian, 1978, p. 257). Sartono Kartodirdjo, in his book *Pesta Demokrasi di Pedesaan (Studi Kasus Pemilihan Kepala Desa di Jawa Tengah dan DIY)*, also mentioned the role a *botoh* plays in mobilizing voters during village elections (Kartodirdjo, 1992, p. 281).

The *botoh* was previously reckoned as a part of the masses, but when potential political opportunities opened up, a trajectory of upward mobility began that eventually placed it in the sub-elite position. Meanwhile, in Tuban Regency, located on the north coast of East Java, the *botoh* who previously occupied the sub-elite position under existing political circumstances moved into the elite position. In a broad sense, the *botoh* in Tuban began its vertical mobility, as it entered pragmatic and mass-oriented organizations. Occupying a strategic social position between local authorities and society, the *botoh* often acts as a mass-transferring instrument for ruling elites. However, with the institution of direct Regional Head Elections (known by the acronym *Pilkada*), a signifcant development of *botoh* roles and functions has occurred. As the immediate subordinate of the ruling elites, it has accrued strong bargaining positions.

*Botoh* roles in local politics have continued to the present. Gaetano Mosca (Varma, 1992, p. 205) asserted that social change is possible when the elite are unable to fulfll their functions and can thus be replaced by ordinary people who, through a learning process, increase their ability to acquire higher status. Mosca divided society into three classes, namely, elite, sub-elite, and mass. As Sastroatmodjo (1995, p. 16) argued, in the end, one's social status affects one's level of political participation.

The potential to garner benefts from its social status encourages the *botoh* to participate actively in politics. Aware of its position as an informal fgure with sizable followings and thus as part of the strategic elite, the *botoh* has strengthened its bargaining position. It no longer serves merely as an instrument of mass mobilization and has now developed into a political player in his own right who must be considered. The *botoh* has thus undergone a metamorphosis from a cultural fgure to a political actor. This chapter examines the shifts in the role of the *botoh* in Tuban Regency and the political processes that have pushed it toward taking on the role in contemporary Indonesian politics.

# Sociocultural Features of Tuban Society

This section analyzes the sociocultural aspects of Tuban Regency in relation to the role of political parties in the direct election of Tuban District from 2001 and 2006. It encompasses the formal and informal contexts of party politics.

As an entry point, we identify the background of the political mobilization of Haeny Relawati, a candidate for village head during the Tuban District elections in 2001 and 2006. The *botoh* responsible for the mobilization was Mito, Chairman of the Coffee Shop (*Warung Kopi*) Society in Montong District. Mito said that he had urged regular customers at coffee shops to place bets on potential candidates during the Tuban Regency elections in 2006. Mito himself sponsored Haeny and her running mate Lilik for the reasons he gave below:

Before the election, Mrs. Haeny had organized coffee shop owners to form a cooperative called the Mega Mendung cooperative. It consisted of 20 people. The number of coffee shops in the district of Montong was approximately 200. I chose Mrs. Haeny because of her personality, a woman who, from the beginning, had good social interactions. She is also sincere, intelligent, and supportive of Golkar ideology, although other parties support other candidates in the 2006 election. Before D-day, the climate of the elections was so intense that board members [of the cooperative] were called for a meeting at the Mustika hotel. I was invited and asked by her whether I could gather votes. And I answered, I could round up votes of about 800 people in a village. And indeed, I managed to get her 967 votes from my village.

This statement shows that before the 2006 Pilkada of Tuban Regency was held, Haeny–Lilik indirectly mobilized the masses and community leaders to support their nomination. This was one of Haeny–Lilik's maneuvers to build a personal political network. At the time, some survey institutions sided with Haeny–Lilik in their assessment of the possible outcomes of the 2006 Tuban elections. Mito was well-acquainted with Haeny–Lilik and with Haeny's husband, Ali Hassan, a prominent businessman and senior politician in the Golkar Party. Additionally, the network of cooperatives and the *botoh* that was established and pioneered by Ali Hasan made Mito dependent on them for the needs of his coffee shop. It indicates the formation of a deep patron–client bond between Mito and Ali Hasan or Haeny–Lilik. The role of Mito in the nomination of Haeny–Lilik was signifcant, as can be seen from the following acknowledgment made by Mito:

My role is to plunge into small communities, approaching the old and young, whatever the community demands for its environment. I will be ready to propose it in the *kecamatan* through the coordinator of the District. One time, there was an incident. My men were performing a play in a tourist spot and there was a turmoil because of the entrance fee, but this problem was solved, thanks to Mrs. Haeny. Haeny-Lilik also visited stalls to campaign. They provided supplies needed by the coffee shops. They are ahead in the election because of the coffee shop community. Apart from the coffee shops, cafes and karaoke places also have their own *paguyuban* (association).

Mito's statement above suggests a reciprocal, patron–client relationship. Mito was willing to move the masses he controlled for the nomination of Haeny–Lilik apparently because he earned a commensurate reward. The campaign also succeeded in attracting the masses of another competing political organization, the Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa (PKB, The National Awakening Party) that had already committed to support the candidacy of Noor Nahar and Tjong Ping. Swing voters supported Haeny–Lilik on the grounds that the fgure of Lilik Soeharjono was popular among the lower middle class. It also happened that Lilik was a PKB cadre. Mito had a strategic calculation in winning the game:

I am a pure volunteer, *Mas* [brother, a greeting form to the male interviewer], sincere in spending my own money to sponsor Haeny-Lilik. What the political *botoh*s often expressed in the mass media [about Mito's fnancial interest] is actually not true. The fact is like this: there is a traditional way of putting one's stakes in an election, called *ngapit*. The pattern is 1:2 for one's candidate versus the opponent. The Haeny-Lilik pair made the top bet, which meant that if Haeny-Lilik won, my friends who championed Haeny-Lilik would win 1, but if the opponent won, then those who championed Haeny-Lilik must pay twice over. Automatically, those who fought for the victory of Haeny-Lilik would desperately try their best.

From the above statement, Mito was clearly driven by Haeny–Lilik and Ali Hasan as one of the political *botohs* who have personal relationships with the candidates they support. He is no longer a *proto-botoh* (i.e., a *botoh* in the original sense) who gambles only for winnings regardless of who will become regent and vice regent. Mito, however, did not want to be called a *botoh*. Instead, he saw himself as a traditional political consultant, with a social motivation for the welfare of his village.

I can help as much as is within my capacity to mobilize the masses for those running for village head, or even for the position of *Bupati*. But in return, I request that they provide streetlights or road improvements for my village.

Mito has also been a political *botoh* in other elections, with terms and rewards that he sets for the beneft of the community. Thus, showing how leadership roles are transformed to ft the demands of practical politics is necessary. In this way, the formation of party politics in Tuban Regency can be traced from the ways by which sociocultural factors shape informal political forces.

In a concrete form, informal politics are present in the fgures of social leadership and in the kinship networks that operate similar to formal political power relations. This chapter contributes to the existing scholarship by offering insights into the way informal sociocultural aspects affect not only Tuban District elections but also the workings of political parties.

The important sociocultural aspects highlighted in this chapter are the control over and mobilization of sociocultural resources during the processes of power formation and political actions (Mochtar, 2011; Snyder, 2003). In the case of Tuban Regency elections, the fgure of Mr. Ali Hasan, husband of Haeny, had a pivotal role. Ali Hasan, a senior Golkar Party politician, was born and raised in Palang, a Tuban subdistrict. At the village level, some other fgures among the economic elite were also involved in local politics, through formal or informal processes.

# The Transformation of *Botoh*

Hergianasari (2013) noted that the word *botoh* has a few different meanings. It may be a traditional political consultant who has the power to mobilize the masses to win elections for candidates it supports. However, the term also refers to a gambler, either an individual or a group of gamblers. In the Tuban Regency, gambling is inseparable from the *botoh*

tradition. Over time, the *botoh* has formed associations (locally called *paguyuban*) called *konco judi* [literally, "gambling friends" or "companions"], made up of three interrelated elements: the *botoh*, *botohan*, and *jathil*. These associations began to display traits and lifestyles that set them apart from everyday society. They became increasingly visible, following the momentum of local and national politics, in the village head elections or even in regional and presidential elections. All these political events turn into betting occasions.

Etymologically, the original meaning of the word *botoh* as a gambler who bets on cockfghts persists to this day. The *botoh* can thus be understood as a character who has particular advantages because of his skills in mapping out winnable situations for gambling, including the political momentum of the *pilkades* (village head elections), *Pilkada* (regional head elections), and *pilpres* (presidential elections). For these reasons, only a few people receive the title *botoh* and gain social recognition (Purwowijoyo, 1985, p. 3). Thus, a *botoh* frequently leads more than two *botoh* networks that serve as his accomplices. A *botoh*'s strength of character and his charisma often enable him to infuence the voice of the masses at the grassroots and to exert strong infuence to support political leadership at the village level and up to the district level and beyond, even to elite politics at the national level.

In the second part of the association, the *botohan* refers to the accomplice of the *botoh* at the broad regional level. *Botohan* is an association within the *botoh* network that is almost the same as the *botoh*, with the distinguishing feature that it is ranked second after the *botoh* in physical and psychic prowess. In terms of age, the *botohan* is younger (averaging between 20 and 35 years); in terms of infuence, the *botohan* has far less than the *botoh*, and the *botohan* personality has yet to achieve full development. For example, the *botohan* is weak in feld analysis and requires direct supervision from the senior *botoh*. Mohammad Fajar Pramono (2013) noted that because the existence of the *botoh* is rooted in the world of gambling or betting, these aspects are still visible in the lifestyles of the *botoh* past and present.

In an interview that took place on January 8, 2017, 79-year-old Carok Samani, a *botoh* who served as a village head and member of the legislative body, admitted that gambling and betting can never be completely separated from the *botoh*. A *botoh* earns wealth in several ways, one of them by winning at gambling. Nevertheless, Samani said that not all *botohs* earned their wealth by gambling. Some inherit wealth from their rich families. However, Samani noted that a person becomes an important *botoh* if he is willing to "learn" (understand) the winning strategies in gambling stakes. It is the *botoh*'s expertise in mapping out masses and the potential for mobilization that has established these traditional fgures as infuential and respected agents in their communities.

Through the enormous infuence of this fgure, the *botoh* has been inducted into the world of the traditional elite in Tuban society. The *botoh* is a leader of many gambling club members who can be mobilized for particular political purposes. In such cases, the *botoh* undergoes a metamorphosis from an entity belonging to the ordinary masses into a fgure who occupies strategic political positions. Even as a gambler, the *botoh* plays a sociocultural role, and political offce can begin when he becomes a *lurah* or a village head, a position opened to the electoral process upon the issuance of regulations, allowing for the direct elections of village heads in the New Order era. According to Tobron Turejo, many *botohs* have succeeded in being elected as village heads or *lurah* because they saw these potential openings. Given this experience in elections and with their proven ability to mobilize their mass base, in the wake of post–New Order reforms, political parties began to show a decided interest in *botohs* as political tools or political machines, as vote getters or legislative candidates.

# The Struggle of *Botoh* in Local Politics

Pramono (2013) traced *botoh* involvement in state politics to the transfer of power from the Old Order to the New Order under President Soeharto. As previously mentioned, *botoh* activities used to mainly involve betting in cockfghts. After power shifted to the New Order, more precisely in 1976 with the policy allowing for direct village head elections, the *botohs* awoke to the possibility of them taking part in local political contests. In the Tuban District itself, going back to the era of direct *pilkades*, many *botohs* plunged into active gambling by taking advantage of the momentum of these local elections, a process that revealed how *botohs* became affliated with whoever was the ruling power and is under their control. Pramono (2013) assumed that *botohs* in their political roles functioned similar to an army. Soldiers depend on political authorities and are subservient and loyal to them. In this case, *botohs* served as stabilizers, following whoever was strong and in control. The role of stabilizers has now become visible. In his article "Politicization and Culture of Gambling as a Tool of Political Communication," based on interviews with the late Mbah Wo Kucing, a respected *botoh* in Tuban, Pramono (2013) said that in gambling, *botohs* are used for political legitimacy and as political instruments of political leaders. Meanwhile, Yusuf Harsono, the founder of *Yayasan Judi Tuban* (Tuban Foundation of Gambling), revealed that the *botoh* role in local politics began around 1974 when *botohs* consciously or otherwise joined the mobilization organized by Indonesian political parties. Most *botohs* are community leaders with a fairly low level of education; however, considering that political parties like to recruit and utilize them as mass mobilizers to gain votes, they have strong social infuence.

In 1976, when Golkar (Golongan Karya) came to power during the New Order era, *botohs* and *konco judi* groups supported it. Local governments then accommodated many *botohs*, granting them public and political positions. Many were appointed village heads or *lurah*. It was a new round in the modern political scene of Tuban. The *botoh* appointment to this structural position was intended to help maintain order in the area and to secure it from threats to the status quo. The appointment of *botohs* as village heads indeed kept the area safe and orderly. Yusuf Harsono expressed the following view:

In the New Order, the role of the *botoh* was increasingly in demand by authorities and *botoh* were targeted by political parties. The *botoh* as a cultural fgure as well as a community leader obviously had real support from the masses, so it was this potential that attracted leaders and political parties to take advantage of the existence of the *botoh*. (Interview, 2017, February 7)

The role of *botohs* in politics continues to this day. In line with the political dynamics of their village or region, many *botohs* receive offers from political parties.

# The Political Role of *Botoh* in the Era of *Pilkada* (Regional Elections)

In the present era, the role of *botohs* in politics can be differentiated into two periods: the era immediately following *reformasi* and the 2000s. During the immediate post-reform era, the *botoh* role at the political–legislative level was marked by the achievement of a position in the local parliament. During the post-legislative era in the 2000s, *botohs* no longer existed in the representative body. *Botohs* have evolved to retain a symbolic role. However, this evolution does not mean that the political role of *botohs* is over, as evident from the meeting between the Botoh Forum and the village head in Tuban. The purpose of this meeting, as written in M. Fajar Pramono's *Local Politics and Local Government* (2013), was to invite *botohs* and other community components to be involved in discussing the future of Tuban Regency, especially to present critiques of the ongoing development of the area. This meeting also aimed at examining the vision, mission, and fgure of the ideal regent for Tuban. The fact that *botohs* were invited demonstrates that they are still needed. Today, no senior *botoh*, born in the previous political era, occupies any political offce. Therefore, how are they still providing their services? Tobron Turejo, an older *botoh*, admits that he continues to contribute to society. For example, he spends time in the organization to anticipate the latent threats of communism. In fact, he is still being offered the position of chair of various nonproft organizations but has declined due to his age.

Tobron Turejo recently experienced some conficts with young people in his party, an indication that the authority of *botohs* in practical politics has declined. However, in the nonpartisan political sphere, the role of *botohs* continues, for example, in social religious and cultural activities. In *Local Politics and Local Government*, Pramono (2013) observed that the decreasing role of *botohs* in Tuban politics is caused by several factors; among them is the increasingly pragmatic and rational orientation in society. Pramono (2013) argued that the community is more independent, that is, as people are better educated and have greater access to information, they no longer depend on particular personages (read: *botoh*). Political and culture dynamics previously dominated by *botohs* are now widely infuenced by other fgures, such as educators, academics, nongovernment organizations, entrepreneurs, and bureaucrats.

# The Role of *Botoh* in the Political Dynamics of Tuban

As previously explained, gambling is entrenched in the Tuban Regency. Its characteristic culture involves drinking palm wine to accompany gambling. The heritage of gambling and drinking a traditionally specifc palm wine reinforces symbolism that reveals the identity and character of the Tuban people. As previously discussed, the origin of *botohs* in gambling is undeniable, and to this day, some *botohs* are still identifed as gamblers, albeit with a more socially oriented interest.

Hildred Geertz (in Magnis Suseno, 1985) stated that in the Javanese society, two rules of respectability exist. The frst is the rule saying that in every situation, people should behave in such a manner to avoid creating conficts. The second rule demands that personal speech, behavior, and personal presentation be commensurate with a person's degree and position. Personal charisma is thus important. These rules clearly apply to the way in which the community views *botohs* who are respected for their physical and personal charismas. When *botohs* become leaders of *konco judi* groups, members obey all orders, thereby avoiding conficts. Similarly, when *botohs* are appointed village heads, no one will dare to oppose them. That is, when a *botoh* is a village head, the area becomes safe and shows a marked difference from earlier conditions. *Botohs* as political actors are products of their culture. As we know, *botohs* thrive in a trading or betting culture. They are born in the gambling culture and grow and mature in it. Consequently, from generation to generation, the gambling tradition has produced *botoh* politicians, enabling them to play the role of regional security stabilizers, in the executive and legislative branches of government.

As this generation of *botohs* has reached their end through age and with the birth of a new generation displaying different characteristics, senior *botohs* have begun to be politically marginalized. Tobron Turejo, on the Board of Trustees of Golkar, has been challenged by young politicians in a rivalry that at one point almost ended in physical confict. This event is heartbreaking, in which a respected *botoh* had to submit to the challenge from a younger generation. C.A. Van Peursen posited a three-stage cultural model for social change, going from the mythological state to the ontological state, and eventually to the functional stage: the mystical/ mythological state is the attitude of humans who feel surrounded by magical forces. The ontological stage is the attitude of the person who no longer lives surrounded by mystical power but wishes to examine all matters freely. The functional state is the attitude and mindset increasingly visible in modern society. In this stage, human beings are no longer fascinated by their mystical surroundings; no longer have a cold, objective distance from their subjects of investigation (the ontological attitude), but instead want to establish new relationships and form new interconnections. In the mystical stage, the community follows *botoh* leadership in the sociopolitical sphere because *botohs* are considered to have the ability to analyze social problems and overcome them. Apart from respecting *botohs* for their skills, people are also afraid to oppose them. When society enters the ontological and functional stages, the *botohs*, originally revered for their ability to control the magical world, no longer occupy the same role. Today's society demands leaders to have the capacity to solve concrete problems: alleviating poverty, facilitating inexpensive education, reducing community burdens, and not merely to be a mystical and charismatic symbol.

# Conclusion

*Botohs* morphed from the gambling arena of cockfghting into the contestation of village chief elections. A symbiotic mutualism exists in *botohs*' rise to a higher social class, as they are rational actors whose work is supported by informal (cultural) institutions. The existence of *botohs* in the contestation of elections cannot be separated from the element of money politics. Nevertheless, *botohs* have contributed to the democratic process. Through their particular style of approach and working mechanisms, *botohs* have increased voter turnout, encouraged the political participation of people, and brought them to the voting places. This phenomenon also suggests the weakness of formal democratic institutions that have failed to give appropriate political education to the public at large (Nurhasim, 2007). This hollow spot during the process of public political education has been flled by the culture of *botohs* and their informal cultural networks.

For democratic system development efforts to run optimally in elections, whether presidential, regional, or village elections, introducing the holistic improvements of formal political institutions and a good regulation of democratic processes are necessary. Despite all the controversies, *botohs* have served to support popular democracy, as they place their stakes on personal reputation, trust, and loyalty—values that ought to be upheld by all political institutions. Whether the betting culture out of which the *botoh* tradition emerged is still operating in the arena of contemporary democracy in Indonesia today is another issue that demands refection.

**Acknowledgments** This work was copy edited by ENAGO. This chapter was supported by Research Grant for International Publication managed by Universitas Indonesia Year 2017 (Grant Number: NKB-423/UN2.R3.1/HKP.05.00/2017).

# References

Sastroatmodjo, S. (1995). *Perilaku Politik [Political Behavior]*. Penerbit IKIP Semarang.


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# Indoctrination in Higher Education: Guided Democracy Politics in Campus Environments, 1961–1965

*Muhamad Trishadi Pratama and Mohammad Iskandar*

# Introduction

After the *Reformasi* movement in 1998, Indonesia has undergone rapid democratization to replace the New Order centralistic and authoritarian government. Horizontal contestation over national issues, including heated discussion regarding national ideology: pro-Khilafah or Islamic state, and in opposition to that, "NKRI harga mati" (United Indonesia without compromise), emerged due to the widening freedom of expression. Concern regarding national ideology is heated. Thus, the government started to form policies to re-entrench state ideology, which is *Pancasila* (or the Five Principles), especially for the younger generation, through formal education. However, people often forget that the use of educational institutions as ideological state apparatus is relatively old. The effort of the state to control the student population has previously

M. T. Pratama (\*) • M. Iskandar

History Department, Faculty of Humanities, Universitas Indonesia, Depok, Indonesia

e-mail: muhamad.trishadi@ui.ac.id; mohammad.iskandar@ui.ac.id

occurred, and students acted as agents of change considering their Indonesian history. In contrast to current Indonesia, this chapter will examine a period when democracy was no longer in the hands of the people but "under the guidance" of the state, particularly by then-President Soekarno. This phenomenon occurred when the parliamentary system was changed to a presidential system. The discussion will focus on the effect of the aforementioned shift on state policy concerning students.

On July 5, 1959, President Soekarno received strong support from the Indonesian National Army (TNI–AD) during his announcement of a presidential decree, which (1) disbanded the Constitutional Assembly and (2) proclaimed the nation's return to the 1945 State Constitution (Undang Undang Dasar 1945). The power of the government of the Republic of Indonesia once again returned to the president as the 1945 State Constitution was reactivated. Consequently, the ministerial cabinet *Kabinet Karya* under Prime Minister Djuanda was subjected to demission before being disbanded. As a replacement for the cabinet, President Soekarno formed the presidential cabinet *Kabinet Kerja* on July 9, 1959. On July 22, 1959, the president later formed a Supreme Advisory Council (Dewan Pertimbangan Agung/DPA), which was led by the president under Presidential Regulation No. 3 Year 1959. On Independence Day in 1959 (17 August), President Soekarno then made a speech titled "The Rediscovery of Our Revolution," in which he explained the accountability of the July 5, 1959, Presidential Decree and introduced his political concept of Guided Democracy (Feith, 1970, p. 98).

In an assembly in September 1959, DPA proposed to the government that the aforementioned speech, namely "The Rediscovery of Our Revolution," be adopted into The Outlines of State Policy (*Garis-garis Besar Haluan Negara/GBHN*) under the name of *Manipol* (Political Manifesto of the Republic of Indonesia). The institution fnalized Manipol as GBHN after the temporary People's Consultative Assembly (MPRS) was founded on December 31, 1959.

The Provisional People's Consultative Assembly (MPRS) accepted the *DPA* proposal and processed it with attention to other inputs, especially that from President Soekarno as a "reinventor" of the revolution. In addition to *GBHN*, the following fve guidelines were included: (1) UUD 45, (2) Indonesian Socialism, (3) Guided Democracy, (4) Guided Economy, and (5) (specifcally Indonesian) Personality (*USDEK*). The title of the speech was then changed to *Manipol-USDEK* with the aforementioned addition. In November 1960, MPRS offcially declared *Manipol-USDEK*

as the *GBHN* as stipulated in Decree No. I/MPRS/1960 on November 19, 1960 (Saleh, 1981, pp. 31–33; Madinier, 2017, p. 146).

As *GBHN*, *Manipol-USDEK* had naturally to be understood by all levels of Indonesian society. The government considered the need for *Manipol-USDEK* dissemination and indoctrination and established an indoctrination executive committee, namely the *Panitia Pembina Jiwa Revolusi* (*PPJR*, the Revolutionary Soul Committee), to prevent misinterpretations. Roeslan Abdulgani was appointed chairman of the established committee. *PPJR* aimed to coordinate the implementation of indoctrination at all levels of education.

At the time, all institutions of the state were ordered by the government to become instruments of revolution, and educational institution (particularly higher education) was the most effective channel, which popularized *Manipol-USDEK*. Under Presidential Regulation No. 130 dated April 14, 1961, the Ministry of Education was divided into the Ministry of Primary Education (*Kementerian PD dan K*) and the Ministry of Higher Education and Science (*Kementerian PTIP*). The former was then led by Priyono, a socialist and an activist of Murba Party. Meanwhile, the latter was led by Iwa Kusuma Sumantri, another activist of the same party (*PTIP*, 1965, p. 16; PaEni & dan Karsono, 2018, pp. 198–200, pp. 217–218).

In addition, the government issued a law on *Undang-undang Perguruan Tinggi* (*UUPT*, Higher Education Regulation) No. 22 of 1961, which explicitly emphasized the importance of understanding *Manipol-USDEK* (*PTIP*, 1965, p. 16). One of the department's special tasks was to design *Manipol-USDEK* indoctrination for universities, hoping it would become the foundation of higher education. This design then led to the inclusion of *Manipol-USDEK* indoctrination in the education system and university curriculums as compulsory for university students. In addition, the book *Tujuh Bahan Pokok Indoktrinasi* (*Seven Basic Materials for Indoctrination*, that is, *Tubapi*) was designed as reference material (Ministry of Information Republic of Indonesia, 1961, p. 1).

Meanwhile, Prijono, the Minister of Primary Education, issued a Ministerial Instruction No. 1 (which was then immediately followed by No. 2 in 1960), and this instruction emphasized the importance of Pancasila and Manipol as the foundation of primary and secondary education. This instruction was also regulated under the concept of *Panca Wardhana*. Afterward, *Panca Wardhana* was fnalized in October 1960 as the foundation of the National Education System.

Many studies on the political history of Guided Democracy have been written. However, studies on *Manipol-USDEK* indoctrination in universities are relatively rare. Thus, the current research aims to fll the aforementioned gap. Despite such scarce research on the aforementioned topic, the attempt at popularizing GBHN as an instrument to support the interest (of the ruler) is an important historical topic to understand. GBHN became a tool of power legitimation. The signifcance of such an indoctrination could be found in the government of the New Order under the leadership of President Soekarno, which toppled the Guided Democracy yet conducted the same act of indoctrination. Under the New Order, Pancasila was transformed into the foundation of Indonesia's democracy, and institutions similar to the PPJR of Guided Democracy were established to implant this idea. An example of such an institution would be *Badan Pembinaan Pendidikan Pelaksanaan Pedoman Penghayatan dan Pengamalan Pancasila* (BP-7) whose responsibilities included the preparation of Pancasila socialization (*Pedoman Penghayatan dan Pengamalan Pancasila/P4*) for students in schools and universities under the People's Consultative Assembly's Regulation No. II/ MPR/1978.

Meanwhile, some studies, which consider books and academic articles related to Guided Democracy's political history, allude to *Manipol-USDEK* indoctrination and higher education; for example, studies by Herbert Feith (1995), Said Hutagaol (1985), and John Maxwell (2001). The study of Herbert Feith is crucial to the explanation of political conditions of Guided Democracy. Additionally, the relevant study of Said Hutagaol on universities describes governmental efforts to guide universities in a certain political direction. Finally, John Maxwell helped explain student response to *Manipol-USDEK* indoctrination. The review of the three books of these authors revealed that *Manipol-USDEK* indoctrination was ineffective in the higher education environment. However, these studies do not adequately explain how or in what form *Manipol-USDEK* indoctrination was conducted. Therefore, the current study exposes such information.

# *Manipol-USDEK* as the Foundation of Higher Education

In the early Guided Democracy era, one opinion of President Soekarno was that Indonesian higher education produces only textbook-oriented ways of thinking of narrow-minded scholars (Maxwell, 2001, p. 77). Such conditions were inconsistent with the needs of the revolution, which required scholars to think broadly and possess creative power, intellectual maturity, and character. Therefore, changing paradigms, specifcally by understanding *Manipol-USDEK* as the basis of the Indonesian Revolution, is necessary.

As mentioned, Soekarno established *PTIP* and issued *UUPT* No. 22 of 1961 to implement his ideas. Additionally, his state address on August 17, 1960, *Djalan Revolusi Kita—Djarek (The Way of Revolution—Djarek)*, powerfully commanded, *Dan saja (saya) komandokan kepada semua sekolah-sekolah dan universitas-universitas (perguruan tinggi), supaja (supaya) semua murid mahasiswa di USDEK-kan dan di Manipol-kan*! ("And I am urging that all the schools and universities (colleges), all the students must be conditioned in *USDEK* and *Manipol*!") (Soekarno, 1960, pp. 68–69). The *DPA* then used this speech as *Pedoman-Pedoman Pelaksanaan Manipol RI* (*Manpower Implementation Manuals* of the Republic of Indonesia).

As proclaimed by Soekarno, *Manipol-USDEK* served as the ideological foundation of the Indonesian Revolution and had a purpose similar to the implementation objectives of universities in article 2, Point 1, *UUPT* No. 22 of 1961, that is, to create a fair and prosperous Indonesian socialist society materially and spiritually. On the contrary, Points 2 and 3 of the same articles aligned with Soekarno's criticism of scholars who needed to think more broadly compared with textbook-oriented thinking to fulfll the needs of the expert advocates of revolution. In other words, *UUPT* was not merely the operational base of higher education but also the basis of authority for the *PTIP* to control universities, especially the implementation of *Manipol-USDEK* indoctrination (Moechtar, 1998, pp. 23–24).

Thus, *UUPT* set the defnition, form, institutionalization, admissions, lectures, degrees, and implementation of private universities not only as an operational guideline but also to remove all irrelevant aspects to *Manipol-USDEK*. The actions of Iwa as Minister of *PTIP* refected this policy by dismissing or decreasing the employment level of rectors, deans, professors, and higher education lecturers with low loyalty to *Manipol-USDEK*. Iwa asked some students to report to the government if professors attempted to preserve liberalism (Feith, 1995, p. 84). Law No. 22 Year 1961 states that "The purpose of higher education is to shape social human beings with the spirit of Pancasila and the responsibility of creating a just and civilized Socialistic Indonesia."

*UUPT* No. 22 of 1961 was welcomed by an inter-association organization of extra-university students (student organizations outside auspices of universities), such as *Perserikatan Perhimpunan-perhimpunan Mahasiswa Indonesia* (*PPMI*, Association of Indonesian Student Associations), and intra-university student organizations (student organizations under auspices of universities), such as *Majelis Mahasiswa Indonesia* (*MMI*, the Indonesian Student Assembly). These organizations believed that *UUPT* would encourage the success of students in their studies (Warta Bhakti, 1961, p. 3). Indeed, the support of *PPMI* and *MMI* cannot be separated from the role of two university student organizations, namely *Gerakan Mahasiswa Nasional Indonesia* (*GMNI*, the Indonesian National Student Movement), which is close to *Partai Nasional Indonesia* (*PNI*, the Indonesian National Party), and *Consentrasi Gerakan Mahasiswa Indonesia* (*CGMI*, the Indonesian Student Movement Concentration), which is ideologically close to *Partai Komunis Indonesia* (*PKI*, the Indonesian Communist Party). *PNI* and *PKI* were two political parties supporting the Guided Democracy government (Maxwell, 2001, p. 140).

The leadership of Iwa as Minister of *PTIP* did not last long because his policy was unpopular and thought to have allowed conficts to fourish in higher education (Feith, 1995, p. 84). Iwa was later replaced by Prof. Dr. Ir Tojib Hadiwidjaja on March 12, 1962 (*PTIP*, 1965, p. 16). Tojib had a good academic reputation and background as a nonparty fgure; he was considered more moderate than Iwa (Feith, 1995, p. 84). Tojib began to improve several policies and actions previously implemented by Iwa. However, efforts to underpin universities with *Manipol-USDEK* continued.

As the second Minister of *PTIP*, Tojib sought to instill *Manipol-USDEK* values by establishing principles, systems, and traditions from *UUPT* as their source. The working principle of higher education was produced and named *Tridharma Perguruan Tinggi*: education/teaching, research, and community service (*PTIP*, 1965, p. 16). Although *Tridharma Perguruan Tinggi* derived from *UUPT*, which was full of manipulation and the *USDEK* efforts of the academic community, the principle was suffciently effective to maintain the nature of the university as an independent science development institution. All Indonesian universities are still based on the same principle.

The preparation of the system and tradition cannot be separated from the infuence of *Manipol-USDEK* ideology as follows.


This new system and tradition showed the seriousness of *PTIP* when Tojib attempted to indoctrinate students and avoid liberalism to create conditions compatible with *Manipol-USDEK* ideology. Matters deemed incompatible with *Manipol-USDEK* were eradicated and labeled as subversive or counterrevolutionary. Tojib also issued Ministerial Instruction No. *PTIP* 8 of 1962 on *Pengabdian Perguruan Tinggi Kepada Masyarakat* (the Service of Higher Education to the Community) as a guideline for its implementation (*PTIP Magazine*, 1962, p. 5) to bring higher education close to the community.

A series of efforts of PTIP to use *Manipol-USDEK* ideology as a basis for higher education indicated higher education as an important target for Soekarno. Experts were needed at that time to support the development of Indonesia. Then, *Manipol-USDEK* not only functioned as the foundation for higher education but also as the knowledge that every student must understand. Therefore, *PTIP* designed mandatory indoctrination courses to realize this plan successfully.

# Internalizing *Manipol-USDEK*-Based Thought in Higher Education Students

The ambition of Soekarno in conducting national development was clear during the Guided Democracy period. However, only a small number of Indonesians received higher education. Moreover, no study system had been developed to regulate the academic programs of students. Thus, the number of scholars needed to fulfll university development lines was unavailable. Moreover, the effcacy of undergraduate outcomes could not be determined without a regular study system.

Before the Guided Democracy era, the educational systems of universities still embraced a free education system that did not have structured guidelines for study plans. In free education, students could generally choose a branch of science as the study object and another for thesis research; they could also postpone the examination period, occasionally attend lectures, and move from one faculty to another without any sanction. Simultaneously, lecturers were obliged only to present lecture materials well and assess student learning only through examinations (*Tim Penyusun Buku Sejarah Pendidikan Tinggi Dikti*, *Compilation Book of Higher Education*, Higher Education Team, 2003, p. 57). This system was ineffective for meeting the needs of experts because many graduates managed to study for more than ten years under educational quality, which was diffcult to measure.

Such ineffectiveness prompted universities and *PTIP* departments to design effective study or learning systems according to *UUPT* 22 of 1961. This design led to the guided course system, an adaptation of a system applied in the United States (Hutagaol, 1985, p. 145). In contrast to the previous free study program, in the student-led study system, students began to establish study obligations, such as presenting systems and lecture-taking requirements at a certain level, by adjusting each type of higher education circumstances. Each student was also required to follow his/her education according to an already determined structure and curriculum with this new system. Therefore, students can no longer study according to their will.

Students then took and followed lectures according to the specifcations of each educational level. For assessing students, lecturers no longer relied only on fnal examinations but also on the timeliness of the study of students. This approach increased the number of graduates who were seriously needed, especially technological and agricultural experts (Hutagaol, 1985, p. 142). Moreover, the government was incessantly attempting to overcome the problem of food and clothing for the population (Soekarno, 1959, p. 34). Thus, the government began to direct students in the guided study system to ft the needs of country orientation. The required country orientation is similar to the needs of experts in the feld of technology, food, and ideological cadres of Manipol-USDEK. Students are expected to study with regular processes and measurable standards to achieve the wishes of the state.

In the academic year 1962–1963, *PTIP* implemented a guided study system that had begun when Iwa led the department. However, the full development of this system occurred under the leadership of Tojib (*PTIP*, 1965, p. 20). This new system was important in Indonesian higher education and continued until the beginning of the New Order when it was replaced by another system introduced in the 1970s, namely *Sistem Kredit Semester* (Semester Credit System), which is still currently used.

The guided study had an important role in the efforts of *PTIP* to indoctrinate higher education students according to *Manipol-USDEK* because the manifesto had its dedicated course. The legal basis for this guided study was *MPRS* Decree no. II of 1960, article 2, verse 2, *UUPT* article 9, paragraph 2 on *Pancasila* (Indonesian fve-pillar ideology), and *Manipol*, which had to be taught in higher education. As previously mentioned, the goal was to indoctrinate students with the ideology of *Manipol-USDEK* and stimulate them to understand and believe *Pancasila* and *Manipol*.

*PTIP* of Iwa took quick action in implementing the indoctrination by issuing a new regulatory requirement for students who wanted to study abroad. Students had to obtain the consent of the minister, promise not to marry, and believe in the truth of *Manipol-USDEK* to go abroad; these requirements aimed to fortify students against ideas that contradicted *Manipol-USDEK* (Feith, 1995, p. 84). *PTIP* also made students who wanted to study abroad Ambassadors of the Suffering of the People (Ampera) and required them not only to follow their indoctrination, which was frst held in the event of Duta Ampera Ambulance (*PTIP*, 1965, p. 38), but also to disseminate *Manipol-USDEK* in foreign countries. Iwa made many changes, especially in the social sciences, to adjust the curriculum and textbooks to align with *Manipol-USDEK* (Feith, 1995, p. 84).

Iwa also began designing compulsory subjects, classifed as "mental education," which are useful as *Manipol-USDEK* indoctrination and called *Pancasila* and *Manipol* of the RI (*PTIP*, 1965, p. 36). In cooperation with *PPJR* and *Panitia Retooling Aparatur Negara* (the State Apparatus Retooling Committee), the initial planning of these compulsory subjects was concentrated to meet the needs of faculty members or lecturers. *PTIP* and *PPJR* conducted indoctrination training in Cibogo from November 10 through 16, 1961, and it was attended by 102 lecturers (*PTIP*, 1965, p. 37). Tojib continued this effort to fulfll the need for lecturers but also issued operational standards used by organizers. Tojib then issued *Instruksi Menteri* (Ministerial Instruction) No. *PTIP* 2/1962, dated April 5, thus requesting higher education to send its representatives for a second wave of indoctrination training from August 13 to 18, 1962, in Kebayoran Baru; this training was attended by 50 lecturers (*PTIP Magazine* No. 2, 1962, p. 3). Furthermore, universities were required to report every two months regarding the implementation of *Pancasila*/*Manipol RI* courses. Furthermore, Tojib issued *Keputusan Menteri* (Ministerial Decree) No. *PTIP* 126/1962, dated September 20, for conducting the course (*PTIP*, 1965, p. 36).

Tojib also formed a special division of *PTIP* in charge of monitoring *Manipol-USDEK* indoctrination in higher education. Based on Ministerial Decree No. *PTIP* 7 years, 1963, *Lembaga Pembina Jiwa Pancasila dan Manipol RI* (the Coordinating Body of *Pancasila and Manipol RI*), as a special division responsible for indoctrination, was formally established (*PTIP Magazine* No. 6/7, 1963, p. 5). In each type of higher education, the indoctrination team, which was double-headed by the rector, was also established. *Manipol-USDEK* indoctrination was conducted on students in every type of higher education through this team and was further continued by a new *PTIP* Minister, Brigadier General Dr. Sjarif Thajeb, who was the former rector of the Universitas Indonesia and was appointed on September 2, 1964 (*PTIP*, 1965, p. 21).

Two months after the appointment of Sjarif, *PTIP* held *Konferensi Kerja Antar Rektor Perguruan Tinggi se-Indonesia* (an Interdepartmental Work Conference of Universities throughout Indonesia) in Jakarta on November 26, 1964 (*PTIP*, 1965, p. 36). This conference generated several matters of *Manipol-USDEK* indoctrination; for instance, this indoctrination aims to produce *Pancasilais/Manipolis*-spirited scholars who are committed to intensifying *Manipol-USDEK* indoctrination in universities and practicing *Pancasila*/*Manipol*. Sjarif then succeeded in forming a curriculum designed under *PTIP* leadership of Iwa. Based on the results of *Rapat Dinas Pentavipan* (the *Pentavipan* Service Meeting, a term the government used to describe preparations against *Vivere Pericoloso* Year or the dangerous year), the Higher Education Curriculum established a new curriculum on June 25 and 26, 1965; in this curriculum, *Manipol-USDEK* indoctrination was not only conducted via courses of *Pancasila* and *Manipol* RI but also supplemented with other subjects, comprising *Sejarah Pergerakan Nasional* (History of the National Movement), *Sejarah Pergerakan Rakyat-Rakyat Nefos* (History of the People's Movement of Nefosi), and *Ekonomi Politik, dan Sosialisme Indonesia* (Political Economy, and Indonesian Socialism) (*PTIP*, 1965, p. 249). Sjarif also increased the status of a special division that handled indoctrination in higher education. Through *Keputusan Menteri* (Ministerial Decree) of *PTIP* No. 197, 1965, dated September 20, the *Pancasila* and *Manipol* RI Coordinator, which was established during the leadership of Tojib, was upgraded to *Biro Pembina Jiwa Revolusi Indonesia* (Bureau of the Soul of the Indonesian Revolution).

A series of efforts of *PTIP* in implementing *Manipol-USDEK* indoctrination from 1961 to 1965 demonstrated the seriousness of the government regarding indoctrinating students. In addition to instilling students with the ideology of *Manipol-USDEK*, this effort was also conducted to avoid the emergence of counterrevolutionary groups in the higher education environment. However, the implementation was not as smooth as the government had hoped.

# Responses of Higher Education Students to *Manipol-USDEK* Implementation

Guided Democracy reaped pros and cons among university students. Those who belonged to extra-campus organizations, such as *Pergerakan Mahasiswa Islam Indonesia* (the Indonesian Muslim Student Movement), which was close to the *Nahdlatul Ulama* (*NU*), *GMNI*, and *CGMI* parties, gained favored positions because the three organizations were affliated with political parties supporting the government and its implementation of *Manipol-USDEK* indoctrination.

By contrast, *Himpunan Mahasiswa Islam* (the Islamic Student Association), which is close to *Majelis Syuro Muslimin Indonesia* (*Masyumi*, the Council of Syuro Muslimin onesia), and *Gerakan Mahasiswa Sosialis* (*Gemsos*, the Socialist Student Movement), which is close to *Partai Sosialis Indonesia* (the Indonesian Socialist Party), both rejected *Manipol-USDEK* indoctrination. However, the counterpositions of *Pemerintahan Revolusioner Republik Indonesia* (the Revolutionary Government of the RI) and *Perdjuangan Rakjat Semesta* (*Permesta*, the Struggle of the People of the Universe) were judged as loyalty to two already banned parties because their association with two political parties is considered rebellious.

Extra-campus organizations made campus political life dynamic during the aforementioned time. Competition for and seizure of student positions in intra-campus organizations, such as university student councils or faculty senates, became increasingly popular. The power struggle continued at the national level for positions in the *PPMI* and *MMI*. In addition, conditions of student life were still colored by Western lifestyles and/or cultural infuences. Western cultural products, such as party activities, dances, and rock "n" roll music, were considered neocolonialism or forms of cultural imperialism. Soekarno repeatedly denounced such cultural products as incompatible with *Manipol-USDEK* because they did not refect *Kepribadian Nasional Indonesia* (the Indonesian National Personality) (Feith, 1995, p. 83). However, students at that time loved products of Western culture. The vibrant condition of campus politics and the presence of Western lifestyles demonstrated the freedom of *Kepribadian Nasional Indonesia* in the student world. This freedom resulted in students receiving *Manipol-USDEK* indoctrination with hostility, cynicism, and even indifference (Feith, 1995, p. 84).

The indifference of students to *Manipol-USDEK* ideology is evident from their unresponsiveness to the criticism of Soekarno of Western cultural products. Extra-campus student organizations in Jakarta established only on regional or friendship bonds, such as the Djakarta Student Association (*Imada*) and the Djakarta Student Movement (GMD), still held parties and dances. Meanwhile, students held parties and dances quietly in other areas because they would have been immediately disciplined if such events became known. This situation occurred at the Indonesian Student Association (*Perhimi*) meeting in Yogyakarta on December 26, 1961, because parties and dances were held after the event (Warta Bhakti, 1961a, p. 3). Thus, students showed minimal acceptance of *Manipol-USDEK*.

The diary of Soe Hok Gie, Faculty of Letters, Universitas Indonesia Department of History 1962–1969, exemplifes unfavorable responses to the *Manipol-USDEK* ideology in the academic world. In his notes, Gie responded to a scientifc speech by Sutjipto Wirjosuparto during his inauguration as professor on January 27, 1962. Gie considered Prof. Sutjipto as shackled by extreme *Manipol-USDEK* ideology because Sutjipto criticized the opinion of Resink that Indonesia was not colonized for 350 years as "a big mistake" because it contradicted the opinion of Soekarno. The statement of Gie is as follows:

But the way he [Sutjipto] is oriented is very naive and a scientifc decadence. He says that they are not in line with *Manipol-USDEK*, not in accordance with the *Pancasila* interpretation and so on. It is a matter of politics, and in that situation, there is no place to accuse someone as "an *USDEK.*" *USDEK* brings trauma as anyone stamped as non-*USDEK* will face a dangerous situation. And he said "In other words Resink said that 350 years of colonial occupation is not true, whereas His Excellency President Soekarno has acknowledged it as such, on page this and so on." So many times he quotes and uses Soekarno as a pretext for reinforcing his theory. Soekarno is a man at odds and Sutjipto has treated him like a prophet, even a source of truth. This tone is the tone of the author / scholar sycophant. (Maxwell, 2001, p. 97)1

1Translated by the author from the following quote:

Tetapi caranya ia (Sutjipto) berorientasi sangat naif dan merupakan dekadensi ilmiah. Ia berkata bahwa mereka tidak Manipol-Usdek, tidak sesuai dengan tafsiran Pancasila dan sebagainya. Ini adalah soal politik dan dalam situasi itu tidak ada tempatnya menuduh seseorang 'A USDEK'. USDEK merupakan trauma dan siapa yang di-cap non-USDEK maka berbahayalah situasinya. Dan ia berkata 'Dengan perkataan lain Resink berkata bahwa tidak benar penjajahan 350 tahun, padahal Paduka Yang Mulia Presiden RI Sukarno telah mengakui itu dalam anu, halaman anu dan lain-lain.' Entah berapa puluh kali ia mengutip, dan menyertai Sukarno sebagai dalih penguatan atas teorinya. Sukarno adalah manusia kepalang tanggung dan Sutjipto memperlakukannya seperti nabi, bahkan sumber kebenaran. Nada ini adalah nada penulis/sarjana penjilat. (Maxwell, 2001, p. 97)

According to this passage, Gie intensely blamed Sutjipto for contradicting the opinion of Resink simply because it differed from that of Soekarno, who was not a lawyer or a historian. He considered Sutjipto to have acted similar to a sycophant instead of a scientist. This response illustrates the cynical attitudes of students toward *Manipol-USDEK*, which became the scourge of lecturers.

An ensuing contradiction also occurred during the transition from the free study system to the system of Iwa's leadership as Minister of *PTIP* (Hutagaol, 1985, p. 146). Many senior students enjoyed the free study system during that time. They generally had considerable infuence and held important positions in intra- and extra-campus student organizations. They also considered a guided system of study to be a form of restraint because it required regularly attending classes, taking examinations, and completing studies within a certain period. Therefore, they protested the enactment of a system that was considered restrictive. They also attempted to negotiate with key fgures to pressure the government to cancel the guided study system. The rise of protests that rejected the implementation of guided study was worsened by the unpopular approach of Iwa; he refused to engage in dialogs with students. This situation encouraged President Soekarno to replace Iwa as Minister of *PTIP*.

According to Herman Lantang, a former student of Anthropology, Faculty of Letters (FSUI) of 1960, and also a former senate chairman of the Faculty of Letters, Universitas Indonesia (1965–1966), the *Manipol-USDEK* course was uninteresting and was indeed boring but still had to be taken before graduation (Bachtiar, 1975, p. 76; Herman Lantang Interview, April 27, 2017). Kresno Saroso, a *CGMI* activist, expressed a similar statement in his memoir:

We do not realize when the frst semester ends and come the second semester, study subjects change. For the second semester we must learn the "*Manipol*" or "Political Manifesto of the Republic of Indonesia". This is the fruit of the struggle of certain people in my own group. Although the people of my own group fought for it, for me personally, the subject was burdensome. Inevitably, I was forced to study the course, which, incidentally, I had already learned while still in high school. The high school subject "Civics," had included *Manipol*. (Saroso, 2002, p. 23)

Similar to Herman, Kresno Saroso was a *CGMI* activist who also felt resentment toward indoctrination lessons. *CGMI* activists were still deemed to have set a good example by passing the course despite their attitudes; *CGMI* was among the organizations that supported *Manipol-USDEK* indoctrination (Saroso, 2002, p. 23). Ironically, Kardi, a CGMI member, failed the *Manipol-USDEK* exam. He had to take a remedial exam to improve his score and move up to the next level (Saroso, 2002, p. 23).

An accumulation of student objections to *Manipol-USDEK* indoctrination occurred at the end of 1965, along with rising infation, with the last straw in the aftermath of the 1965 political crisis. The government of President Soekarno began to lose credibility, thus encouraging student actions that merged in *Kesatuan Aksi Mahasiswa Indonesia* (the Indonesian Students Action Unity) and in attacks on the government, proving that *Manipol-USDEK* indoctrination had failed. *Manipol-USDEK* student indoctrination completely disappeared after the Guided Democracy government was replaced by the New Order government (Warta Bhakti, 1961b).

# Conclusion

Soekarno imposed the indoctrination of *Manipol-USDEK* to university students due to several reasons. Among these reasons was the need for educated experts to continue the socialist development plan of Soekarno called the Indonesian Revolution. This plan was formulated in the development mandate of the President. In addition, indoctrination was performed to facilitate the internalization of *Manipol-USDEK* ideology by students. In this case, indoctrination is inseparable from the efforts of Soekarno to maintain his power by controlling the minds of students.

Various efforts had also been conducted by the Department of PTIP in implementing indoctrination in the college environment. Such an implementation was performed by modifying the curriculum of the undergraduate colleges, inserting *Manipol-USDEK* values, making the education system effcient, and providing Western infuences in the lifestyle of students.

From the outset, the response of the academic world to indoctrination in higher education was negative as expressed by some students who supported and rejected *Manipol-USDEK*. They considered that the burdensome *Manipol-USDEK* indoctrination course did not contribute to the knowledge of lecturers and students. One of the most unpopular rules among students was the prohibition of parties and dances because they were considered to be the lifestyle of Western culture (*ngak-ngik-ngok* culture, a condescending term for useless activities, without clear purpose), which was deemed as neo-colonialist. Scientifc-minded people rejected *Manipol-USDEK* on academic grounds due to its overly political reason, and its sycophantic nature (as in the case of Sutjipto) became increasingly visible.

Similarly, in the implementation of a guided study system, several protests from senior students resulted in the replacement of Iwa as Minister of PTIP. Therefore, students still demanded freedom in running their studies. The application of compulsory subjects of Pancasila and Manipol RI did not generate the expected outcome. Even student bodies that initially supported the program, such as CGMI, did not provide positive evaluations.

As political tension reached its climax in the 1965 crisis, the emergence of student protesters at the time showed the failure of *Manipol-USDEK* indoctrination. Instead, of forming a body of supportive students of Soekarno's dream, the result of the indoctrination was the opposite, accumulating resentment and opposition toward the Soekarno government. Overall, *Manipol-USDEK* indoctrination did not take root among academicians.

The result contradicts all efforts that had been performed in manipulating Pancasila as the nation's foundation to legitimize existing power through censorship and repression. Books on economics, politics, and culture, which were deemed to carry values of Liberalism and Capitalism, were banned to encourage students not to be textbook-oriented but grounded revolutionists to create a socialist society according to Indonesia. As previously mentioned, the Guided Democracy fell in 1967 after President Soekarno's report of accountability was rejected by the temporary People's Consultative Assembly (MPRS). *Manipol-USDEK* indoctrination met its end with the Guided Democracy of Soekarno. However, the cycle of "Pancasila" indoctrination continued because the New Order government introduced its interpretation and formed a special curriculum in secondary and higher education and Pancasila indoctrination workshops (P4) to Indonesians from various professions.

P4 indoctrination also disappeared with the fall of the New Order regime. The subsequent government amended the 1945 State Constitution, and they were arguably suffciently wise not to follow suit. However, the anxiety over *Pancasila* as the foundation of the state and anchor for the people's concepts of nationalism and statehood remained. On May 19, 2017, President Joko Widodo then signed Presidential Regulation No. 54 Year 2017 regarding the Presidential Work Unit on Education of Pancasila Ideology (*Unit Kerja Presiden Pembinaan Ideologi Pancasila*), which was then followed by Presidential Regulation No. 7 Year 2018 regarding the Educational Body of Pancasila Education (*Badan Pembinaan Ideologi Pancasila*). With the revitalization of the work unit into a formal body, BPIP is expected to remain despite possible changes of governments in the future.

One BPIP leader, Yudi Latif, indicated that BPIP is different from the BP-7 of the New Order (the indoctrination unit). Evaluating the differences between the two bodies is still too early. However, controversies and pro and against sentiments were abundant, not unlike the past situation. The contestation over Pancasila is currently heightening in the clash between the "Khilafah" (Islamic state defender) and "NKRI harga mati" (United Indonesia, no compromise). Soekarno had advised in his *JASMERAH* (do not forget history) speech that one must indeed remember and learn from the past, demonstrating a critical stance.

**Acknowledgment** This work was copyedited by ENAGO. This chapter was supported by Research Grant for International Publication managed by Universitas Indonesia Year 2017 (Grant Number: NKB-476/UN2.R3.1/HKP.05.00/2017).

# References


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# Indonesia's Student and Non-student Protesters in May 1998: Break and Reunifcation

*Jonathan Peter Tehusijarana*

# Introduction

The fall of Suharto in 1998, the violence that surrounded it and the period of *reformasi* that followed are among the most important events within Indonesian history. It marked the end of the 32-year-long New Order regime and would precipitate events like the country's frst democratic elections since the 1950s, as well as the secession and independence of East Timor.

By its 20th anniversary in 2018, the ways in which Indonesians remember *reformasi* have become more complex, refecting the different ways in which Indonesians have experienced the post-Suharto era. On the one hand, Suharto's image has become increasingly rehabilitated after his death in 2008, as evidenced by the nostalgia that many Indonesians continue to hold of his rule (Strangio, 2017).

School of Historical and Philosophical Studies, University of Melbourne, Melbourne, VIC, Australia e-mail: jpeter@student.unimelb.edu.au

© The Author(s) 2023 M. Budianta, S. Tiwon (eds.), *Trajectories of Memory*, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-99-1995-6\_13

J. P. Tehusijarana (\*)

On the other hand, the student movement that helped topple the Suharto regime, as well as the non-student protesters and organisations that it worked together with, has been largely ignored in popular memory. While still remembered by commemorations on university grounds to acknowledge the role of the so-called 'heroes of reform' (Astuti, 2018), or through the weekly *Kamisan* protests held in front of the Presidential Palace to pressure the government on past human rights violations (Thomas, 2019), such practices remained confned to either university or activist circles. Most interactions between these groups and the government either have failed to gain much traction (Jordan, 2018) or are token at best (Thomas, 2019).

Within Indonesian history, university students, with their combination of youth and intelligence, have often been viewed as important historical agents. In 1945, youth leaders kidnapped nationalist leaders Sukarno and Mohammad Hatta, eventually becoming Indonesia's frst president and vice president respectively, in an ultimately successful effort to encourage them to declare independence from the Japanese. During his presidency, Sukarno famously proclaimed, 'Give me ten youth, and I will shake the world.' In this manner, students have often been the movers and shakers of Indonesian history, which thus puts them into proximity with the Indonesian people, or *rakyat.*

The term *rakyat* is prominent within Indonesian history postindependence, as various groups, such as the government and even the student movement, have proclaimed that they act in the interests of the *rakyat*. Benedict Anderson argues that the term itself holds power, calling the *rakyat* a 'Power-full collectivity,' referred to in political speeches to convey the power of the speaker (Anderson, 1990, pp. 26–27). The composition of the *rakyat* is 'without sociological contours,' comprising the common people as a whole (Anderson, 1990, p. 61).

With the centrality of the *rakyat* to Indonesian history and politics, many groups have sought to claim legitimacy from the *rakyat* to advance their interests. It was in the name of the Indonesian *rakyat* that Sukarno and Muhammad Hatta proclaimed independence in 1945 and the subsequent war of independence was fought (Anderson, 1990). During the Indonesian revolution, Sukarno's idea of Marhaenism was essentially a populist amalgamation of Marxist ideals adjusted to embrace the *rakyat* (Lane, 2008). While the legitimacy of the New Order was based upon notions of a chaotic Old Order, the concept of the *rakyat* was one of the few aspects of the Old Order stood for that the New Order could not distance itself from (Lane, 2008). In the New Order's political lexicon, the ideals of development and stability were for the *rakyat*'s beneft.

In this way, the student movement of 1998 and its participants sought, and in some ways continue, to seek to represent the interests of the *rakyat*. The 1997 Asian fnancial crisis highlighted cracks in the New Order's developmentalism, which in turn caused many Indonesians to oppose them. Students rallied around this discontent in 1998, starting a movement of protest and disobedience which would ultimately play a large role in unseating Suharto.

The relative success of student efforts to both represent and cooperate with the *rakyat*, however, was neither an instantaneous occurrence nor one that was solely motivated by a desire for political gain. Instead, the student-*rakyat* relationship was one that was built over time, involving a signifcant investment from both sides in a process known as *bunuh diri kelas* (class suicide). Indeed, in remembering their pathways to activism, former members of the student movement continue to cite their experience of *bunuh diri kelas* as a stage where they were able to truly understand the lives of ordinary Indonesians.

While the close relationship forged between student and non-student protesters was visible in the protests leading up to the fall of Suharto, it would ultimately face its greatest challenge in the form of extreme violence.1 This chapter aims to chart the changing student perceptions of non-student protesters in the wake of *bunuh diri kelas* until its ultimate event: the fall of Suharto in 1998 and the violence which surrounded it. Through an examination of the memories of some students about the different interactions between the students and the non-student protesters before and throughout the violence, we can achieve a better understanding of how the students perceived non-students and the nature of the change in their relationship with each other.

1Note that by 'non-student protester,' I refer to those who participated in street protests with students but cannot be categorized as university students. This is a wide term, and its coverage includes civil society organizations that aided students, as well as participants in the looting and violence that occurred in May 1998.

# *Rakyat, Massa* and the Shift in Student Activism

Before going further into the relationship between the *rakyat* and the student movement, it is important to understand the ease with which the *rakyat*, with its varied composition, can be confated with other terms within Indonesian history. *Rakyat* as a term and as an entity has made it the subject of confation with the *massa*, or masses. While *massa* can be understood as a *rakyat* who are now more politically active, often seen participating in self- or even student-organised protest, their alternative defnition as a 'mob' has also led to a more negative connotation to term (Siegel, 2001). The composition of the *massa* which often accompanied student protests throughout Indonesia varied from place to place, rendering any generalisation potentially inaccurate. Indeed, the most detailed defnition that Lane (1999, pp. 246–247) can give of the *massa* involved in mass 'grassroots politics' is that they are composed of 'workers, poor farmers and other … exploited sections of the Indonesian population.' This is subject to confation with sections of the *rakyat*, evident when Lane uses an activist's defnition of the 'urban poor' to describe the economic circumstances that underlay the entirety of mass, grassroots politics.

Historically, previous iterations of the Indonesian student movement could not truly boast of being so 'close' to the *rakyat*. Throughout the 1960s and 1970s, student activists and groups opposed to the New Order regime, be it to corruption, foreign investment, and so on, always sought to display themselves as a 'moral force,' above the plight of the common people and the apparent dirtiness of practical politics (Aspinall, 2005, p. 118). In her study of interactions between the Indonesian intelligentsia and labour unions, Ford (2009, p. 8) called this belief 'classical intellectualism,' whereby middle-class activists understood themselves as being 'separate from the workers they championed' due to class differences. This idea of the role of the Indonesian intelligentsia as leaders of a backwards people was also argued by Mohammad Hatta (1984, p. 23), who said that

When most of the people are blanketed in darkness, it is the intelligentsia who open their eyes.

This changed following the implementation of the Normalization of Campus Life/Body for Student Coordination (NKK/BKK) (Rudianto, 2010). The NKK/BKK included policies designed to limit on-campus student politics. Among these included an effective ban on student political organisations, and a more stringent grading system which was imposed to force students to focus more on their academic life (Aspinall, 2005).

While the NKK/BKK killed campus politics, the student movement continued to thrive through informal, off-campus study groups. These were study groups in name only, often becoming places where students could discuss politics clandestinely (Denny J.A., 2006). By operating off university grounds, students were exposed to the plight of the common *rakyat*, many of whom found themselves struggling to adapt to changes brought about by the intensifcation of infrastructure development and capital infows supported by the New Order's developmentalist economic policies (Vatikiotis, 1998). It was in these study groups that the frst instances of *bunuh diri kelas* can be seen.

# *Bunuh Diri Kelas* and the Kedung Ombo Incident

Though the phrase *bunuh diri kelas* has strong left-wing political connotations, a danger in the violently anti-communist New Order, many students adopted the practice wholeheartedly. A large part of what caused this was the increasing popularity of leftist literature amongst university students during the mid-to-late 1980s. The works of authors like progressive Brazilian educator Paolo Freire became more widely read (Hartoyo, 1989), while ideas like liberation theology and dependency theory were cautiously taken up by students (Gunawan et al., 2009). Some students found that the ban on the dissemination of these ideas made them all the more attractive, especially in the face of the emergence of what they viewed as 'social issues' caused by development (Hartoyo, 1989, p. 33).

Ibeth Koesrini, a student activist based in the Palembang LMND in the 1990s, argued that the purpose of *bunuh diri kelas* was to establish an 'emotional connection' between them and the impoverished *rakyat* (I. Koesrini, personal communication, July 10, 2015). Sinnal Blegur, another student activist, described the process of establishing the connection as involving more listening than preaching on the part of the students, who came to appreciate and attempt to understand the experiences of the *rakyat* they connected with. While one could argue that simply a part of student 'interest in the working class as a potentially political force,' (Aspinall, 2005, p. 141) perhaps as a source of legitimacy for the nascent student movement, the realities described by many activists refect a far deeper desire to engage and understand poorer Indonesians.

Though the details of its practice vary between student organisations, there were some general practices that *bunuh diri kelas* involved. Students, often predominantly middle class, would 'live-in' with the *rakyat*, often for extended periods of time. In line with the vague defnition of the *rakyat*, students would live-in with several different groups, ranging from the rural peasantry to the urban poor. These efforts, and the relationship between students and *rakyat* that it built, would come to national attention in the Kedung Ombo case.

The Kedung Ombo case was an incident in early 1989 where inhabitants of Kedung Ombo village in Central Java opposed the government's construction of a dam in the area. The villagers were defant, staying in designated food zones even when the foodgates had been closed and the waters began to rise. The case attracted student support due to the corrupt circumstances which surrounded the acquisition of the land where the dam was built, indicative of the endemic corruption in the New Order. Villagers who refused to leave were subjected to state-backed intimidation from both civilian and military authorities. By the time the foodgates were opened, more than 1400 families were still living in designated food areas (Stanley, 1994).

As the foodwaters began rising, the villagers found support from university students. Initially formed by students from Salatiga, Yogyakarta and Surabaya on February 6, 1989, the Solidarity Group for the Kedung Ombo Victims of Development (*Kelompok Solidaritas Korban Pembangunan Kedung Ombo*, KSKPKO) grew to encompass students from other cities across Java (Stanley, 1994). The KSKPKO used a variety of methods to aid the villagers, ranging from awareness-raising actions in cities to direct aid to the villagers. In this, they cooperated with other organisations and individuals, such as the well-known Father Y.B. Mangunwijaya and the International NGO Group on Indonesia (Stanley, 1994). Overall, the joint efforts of these different groups pressured the government into providing a better settlement for the remaining villagers (Aspinall, 1993).

Letter-writing was a common fxture of the KSKPKO's activism, used to symbolically address those in positions of power, or as statements of the group's belief at press conferences. The wording of letters and other documents written by the KSKPKO gives some insight into how they viewed their interaction with the people. A press release from the KSKPKO (1994b, p. 460) stated that the group was formed 'on the basis of sympathy for the *rakyat kecil* (little people) living in the Kedung Ombo food areas.' On the other hand, the opening sentence of its 'statement of concern' identifed the KSKPKO (1994a, p. 476) as being comprised of people who 'stand tall in loyalty to the people of Kedung Ombo.' Both these statements indicate the importance of the principal of intellectuals' moral obligation to the people as espoused in the classical intellectualism of Hatta and older Indonesian intellectuals as well as the new efforts at understanding the common people brought about by *bunuh diri kelas*.

The Kedung Ombo case became an important milestone in understanding the importance of *bunuh diri kelas* to the changing relationship of students and the *rakyat*. An edition of *Tempo* magazine published some in April 1989, only a few months after the initial student actions which brought the Kedung Ombo case national notoriety, identifed the case as being the starting point in a series of other incidents of student participation in local issues (Nasution, 1989). Immediately after the formation of the KSKPKO, in March 1989 students in Bandung began protesting a case in Badega, West Java, where local farmers were driven from their land (Nasution, 1989). The motivations behind many of these student actions remained partially consistent with the original student involvement in Kedung Ombo. Political scientist Arbi Sanit observed that the student movement was, for the frst time in its history, concentrating its efforts on the 'bottom 40% of society, whose living standards haven't been improved even after 20 years of development' (Nasution, 1989, pp. 25–26). He attributed it to students now 'looking more critically at inequality and injustice, more courageously' (Hartoyo, 1989, p. 31).

# The Asian Financial Crisis and the Widening of the Student Movement

Though the Kedung Ombo case and *bunuh diri kelas* allowed students to consolidate and rally around the cause of poorer Indonesians, repressive government policies would once again make student activism diffcult. After a brief period of 'openness' in the mid-1990s, the New Order would crack down on political opposition in 1996. Opposition to the government, ranging from university students to the urban poor, rallied around Megawati Soekarnoputri. The daughter of the country's frst President, she managed to ride on a wave of popular support to the leadership of the Indonesian Democratic Party (Partai Demokrasi Indonesia, PDI), a government-sanctioned opposition party. Her attempt to galvanise opposition to the government by occupying PDI headquarters with her supporters was violently suppressed when government-backed thugs moved against them on July 27, 1996, effectively ending *keterbukaan* (Eklof, 1999). This period of suppression continued until the outbreak of the 1997 Asian fnancial crisis.

While many countries suffered from the crisis, Indonesia was among the worst affected. The Indonesian currency, the rupiah, rapidly devaluated against the US dollar while efforts by the central bank to improve the rupiah's standing exhausted the country's foreign currency reserves. The devalued rupiah severely hampered the businesses of the Indonesian private sector, many of which had taken out large loans in the US dollar. With crisis looming, the government was forced to look to the International Monetary Fund (IMF) for fnancial assistance. The IMF agreed to providing assistance after the government agreed to a package of fnancial reforms and subsidy cuts, including the important subsidy of petrol (Feith et al., 1999). These austerity policies caused massive infation and price rises to basic goods, which caused widespread popular discontent against both Suharto and the New Order regime.

By early 1998, the turmoil brought about by the Asian fnancial crisis allowed for the previously dormant student movement to resurface openly. As university students as a whole felt the economic hardships brought about by the crisis, they became increasingly vocal critics of the government, calling for economic, social and political reform (*reformasi*) (McRae, 2001). *Reformasi* became the rallying cry of the resurgent student movement, crossing pre-existing political boundaries and thus uniting progressive, conservative and apolitical students in an effort to achieve total reform (Adnan & Pradiansyah, 1998). Students also went beyond their own ranks, and many sought to actively include the *rakyat* into the new discourse of *reformasi* (McRae, 2001). Students spoke of wanting to 'embrace the *rakyat* in their entirety,' knowing that both the students and the *rakyat* felt the negative effects of the crisis (Bachtiar et al., 1998, p. 67).

Though there was never any offcial alliance between the student movement and the *rakyat*, students took active steps to cement the relationship and practice their ideological pronouncements. Open instances of cooperation between the two groups became increasingly common, and came in many forms, such as the distribution of essential supplies to the poor (Bas, 1998) and increased interaction between student and non-student protesters on various university grounds (Amel et al., 1998).

Other forms of student-people cooperation could be seen as organised civil society groups that were composed of the *rakyat* began to provide support for protesting students. This went as far back as the immediate aftermath of the July 27th incident, where students who fed police persecution found aid and support from the *Tim Relawan untuk Kemanusiaan* (Volunteer Team for Humanity, TRuK). Formed by Father Sandyawan Sumardi, a Catholic priest, TRuK went as far as to harbour pro-Megawati students and activists, often in the face of threats from the police and military (Purdey, 2006).

In the aftermath of the fnancial crisis, the economic pressures it posed on the Indonesian people would bring students into contact with even more civil society organisations; notably, *Suara Ibu Peduli* (Voice of Concerned Mothers, SIP), an organisation founded by mothers in February 1998 concerned with rising food prices, provided several student demonstrations with logistical support (Budianta, 1999). These interactions and the relationship it built would be tested in May.

# Sparks of Violence in May

May 1998 was particularly notable for the student movement because it was met with unprecedented levels of violence. The violence started in Medan, North Sumatra, on May 2, when students taking their protests into the streets came into contact with violent non-student protesters (Soedjiartono, 1998). The group, described in *D & R* magazine as a *massa*, or mob/masses, did not target the students, instead taking their anger out against businesses owned by members of Suharto's family and Chinese Indonesians (Soedjiartono, 1998). Similar incidents of violence would occur again in other major cities throughout Indonesia.

Anti-Chinese violence was not a new phenomenon in Indonesia. Chinese Indonesians were one of the most marginalised ethnic groups under the Suharto regime. While the regime fostered Chinese Indonesian businesses via patron-client relationships, Chinese Indonesian prosperity incurred jealousy from the *pribumi* (native) population (Reid, 2001).

While violence occurred in other cities, events in Jakarta remained at the forefront of national attention. These came to a head on May 12, when 6000 students of Trisakti University began to march towards Parliament under the watchful eyes of protest coordinators (Feith et al., 1999). Protesters were stopped short by police outside of campus grounds. While the leaders of the march began reasoning with the police, a man broke from student ranks into police lines (Feith et al., 1999). Some accounts identify him as a former Trisakti student who was suspected to have been an undercover military agent (Mad, 1998a). Whatever his identity, it is clear that his escape into police lines triggered student anger. While leaders calmed down their fellow students, shots were fred. Many students retreated into their campus, and four of whom would eventually die of bullet wounds (Mad, 1998a).

The deaths of the four Trisakti students marked not only the frst fatal incidence of student-police confrontation in Jakarta, but also the start of a wave of mass violence which engulfed the capital. The frst instance of violence came from around Trisakti, as gathering *massa* tried to persuade grieving students to join them on May 13 (Simanjorang, 2008). The students refused (Simanjorang, 2008). As the violence spread throughout Jakarta, students were shocked as stores were looted, buildings were burned and as people, mostly Chinese Indonesians, were killed, beaten and raped. Security forces were slow to respond and only began efforts to contain the violence on May 15 (Simanjorang, 2008). By then, the fgures of those killed, injured and missing were in the thousands. The government sponsored TGPF (Joint Fact-Finding Team), formed to investigate the violence, gave fgures ranging from 288 to 1217 dead (TGPF, 1998a).

The Trisakti incident and the violence that followed were directly responsible for Suharto's resignation. What remained of public confdence in the government, already wavering due to its inability to provide the economic prosperity that had long been its *raison d'etre*, vanished with the violence. Though Suharto tried to respond to demands, his efforts ultimately failed (Feith et al., 1999). Few people were now willing to associate themselves with the regime. Many of those who met with Suharto urged him to step down (Feith et al., 1999). On May 21, Suharto heeded their advice and resigned. The presidency was assumed by former Vice President B.J. Habibie, who, in spite of his close ties to Suharto, proclaimed to be on the side of *reformasi*. His appointment caused the frst major fracture in the 1998 student movement and can thus be seen as the end of the movement's short-lived unity (Forrester, 1998).

# Suspicion, Distrust and Non-Cooperation

During the violence in Jakarta and elsewhere, there were different instances of non-student protesters coming into contact with the students. Mentioned earlier was one incident of this interaction between non-student protesters and students at Trisakti University, the frst during the Jakarta violence. Several similar interactions would follow.

One of the most notable incidents of student-people interaction in Jakarta during the violence occurred at the Universitas Indonesia (UI) campus in Salemba, Central Jakarta. The May 14 gathering there was massive. The UI student magazine *Bergerak!* claimed that more than 10000 UI students, lecturers and alumni were present at the campus (Mad, 1998b). The gathering was an 'expression of sadness' in response to the Trisakti incident (Mad, 1998b, B). In addition to the UI students, there were students from other universities gathering outside of the campus (Sulistyo, 2002). The gathering started peaceably enough, with a series of speakers from both student and non-student opposition groups (Bas, 1998).

The interaction with the non-student protesters gathering outside of the Salemba campus was, however, less peaceable. This group arrived at the campus at around noon (Mad, 1998b). Some non-student protesters tried to convince students in the Salemba campus to join them on the streets (Mad, 1998b). Just as in Trisakti, the students refused (Mad, 1998b). This angered non-student protesters, who accused the students of cowardice (Mad, 1998b). Students from the other universities began feeing into the UI campus in the thousands. In the words of *Bergerak!*, the campus became 'a safe haven for anyone who didn't want to involve themselves with the destructive wave of massa anger' (Mad, 1998b, C). Non-student protesters began attacking the campus gate, only to be stopped by alarmed journalists and newly arriving students (Nday et al., 1998). These students organised a free speech forum outside of the campus, calming the non-student protesters (Nday et al., 1998). Things began improving after the arrival of speakers who were more popular with the non-student protesters (Sulistyo, 2002). Other instances of student interaction with non-student protesters even turned into physical confrontations between the two, such as when students from the Indonesian Institute of Technology in Serpong attempted to stop non-student protesters from looting a supermarket (Sembiring, 1998).

Outside of Jakarta, though interaction between students and nonstudent protesters did not materialise as clearly as they did in the capital, they happened, nonetheless. In some cities, a common theme was identifed with regard to the actions of the *massa* (Simanjorang, 2008). These actions initially began with students protesting off-campus, with the *massa* joining in and eventually setting itself apart from the student body by their violent actions (Simanjorang, 2008). The students themselves did not follow the *massa* in these actions. Violence often continued to occur in all these cities long after the students retreated into their campuses and homes (Simanjorang, 2008).

This new trend of suspicion, distrust and non-cooperation in interactions between student and non-student protesters would occur even after most of the violence had been contained. In Jakarta, after the violence and before Suharto's resignation, the major interaction between the nonstudent protesters and the students occurred when students began occupying the grounds of Parliament on May 18 (Cokro, 2008). The occupation was staged to pressure the legislature into putting forward a vote of no confdence against Suharto. As students streamed onto Parliament, it became increasingly clear that the occupation would be a massive spectacle. Thousands of students from different universities would enter the compound over 4 days (Erd & Ast, 1998).

The interaction between student and non-student protesters during the occupation portrayed the changing nature of student perceptions in the wake of the May violence. As students gathered, some non-student protesters assembled immediately outside the parliamentary building. It was from this position that some non-students voiced their support for the students. One non-student protester shouted, 'Why aren't the students allowed to enter the house of the people?' in response to the initial reluctance of security forces to allow students entry (Erd & Ast, 1998, B). However, while this occurred, student protest coordinators also took pains to prevent the non-student protesters from entering the compound. It was common practice among the coordinators to check new entrants for university identifcation cards and dismiss those who did not possess one (Cokro, 2008). The students organised patrols for their own safety, and one suspicious person who was caught out by one of these teams was almost beaten (Cokro, 2008).

# Fears of Infiltration

In the early morning of May 13, immediately after the shootings, Trisakti students had expressed fear that an escalation of the situation, similar to the Malari riots, would occur if they were to march out into the streets (Simanjorang, 2008). The Malari riots occurred on January 15, 1974, when university students organised protests against what they viewed as excessive foreign capital infows into the Indonesian economy. The protests occurred in conjunction with the visit of Japanese Prime Minister Kakuei Tanaka to Jakarta, whose government encouraged Japanese frms to become some of the largest foreign investors in the Indonesian economy at the time (Agustina & Zulkifi, 2014). In the subsequent crackdown, the government squarely blamed the students for the violence. On the other hands, the students argued that the violence was instigated by a handful of non-student protesters, who they further claimed were in the employ of the New Order regime (Agustina & Zulkifi, 2014). While these accusations remain unproven, the trials of the student activists themselves proved to be rather inconclusive. For example, Hariman Siregar, a leading activist, was sentenced to six years in jail for 'negligence,' with the presiding judge failing to link him directly with the violence (Agustina & Zulkifi, 2014, p. 101). Even as late as 1998, the event remained a signifcant part of the collective memory of politically active students, and the belief that external infltration caused the Malari riots was one that was shared by many of students in May 1998.

For the students, the idea of a Malari-esque escalation was synonymous with that of a government infltration of their ranks. Such sentiments were expressed by the student-writers of *Bergerak!* (Editorial Team, 1998, A), who wrote that the 'people's emotions are easily provoked, and they are easily infltrated,' and that the violence that occurred was 'proof that someone wanted to exploit the movement for peaceful reform.' Though these Trisakti students did not experience Malari frsthand, their respect for past movements allowed for a shared historical experience of the student movement as a whole.

Sinnal (personal communication, July 7, 2015) stated that she and her colleagues were always wary of infltration by undercover military agents. This also explains the especially violent reaction that the Trisakti students displayed against one suspected military agent before the shootings on May 12, as well as the policy of denying entry to non-students into Parliament during the occupation.

Such expressions highlight the different meanings that the terms *rakyat* and *massa* held for the student movement. As mentioned earlier, though the terms were often used interchangeably, the composition of the *massa* is much more fuid than the *rakyat*, and is, to an extent, more negative (Siegel, 2001). The differences in understanding the two terms, though subtle, became more and more apparent as the May violence continued. Some students testifed that they felt threatened by the *massa*, while student publications have repeatedly used the term *massa* instead of *rakyat* in describing the groups of people who carried out the violence (Siegel, 2001). Additionally, many students perceived the *massa* as being unruly. Student activists who worked with spontaneously formed *massa* have stated that they could never really know what the *massa* had in mind, especially when compared to groups which they had organised themselves (S. Blegur, personal communication, July 7, 2015).

This view was echoed by Ibeth. Though she was not based in Jakarta during the fall of Suharto, her experiences in organising resistance against the regime in Palembang speak to the similar struggles faced by student activists, especially with regard to their fear of infltration by elements of the Indonesian military and intelligence. Ibeth was certain that joint student and non-student actions in Palembang attracted undercover military agents, ready to provoke chaos on behalf of the regime (I. Koesrini, personal communication, July 10, 2015). It was through the *massa* that the students expected to be infltrated and provoked by external forces, which explains the wariness with which most students approached them.

Further investigations into the May violence have supported the students' viewpoint. These investigations uncovered a number of major themes which underlay almost all of the violence in the major cities where it occurred. Though the violence in the different cities were subject to some minor differences in how it was conducted, it was concluded that organised provocateurs were involved in instigating the violence in all six cities (Simanjorang, 2008).

Witnesses who saw the provocateurs indicated that the men described were most likely members of the armed forces. This was because they were identifed in a number of cities as being tall, muscular men, possessing various types of equipment with which to conduct the violence, most notably walkie-talkies for communication (Simanjorang, 2008). The provocateurs issued commands to the *massa*, ordering them to loot certain shops while preventing them from looting others (Simanjorang, 2008). The speed and skill with which they conducted themselves led some witnesses to describe these men as having been trained for the task (Simanjorang, 2008).

The aforementioned TGPF was formed by the Habibie administration in response to pressures from sections of Indonesian society who wanted a thorough investigation into the May violence, as well as to uphold their reformist credentials. While well-intentioned, the TGPF faced many issues from the outset of its formation. Its members, coming from backgrounds as varied as human rights groups to the armed forces, were often at odds with each other (Purdey, 2006). Additionally, the three-month deadline given by the government for the investigation was arguably too short, especially considering the scope of the violence they investigated.

Given these circumstances, that the TGPF was even able to complete a report by the October deadline was impressive. While arguably lacking in some areas, the report was able to provide a degree of insight into the motivation and methods of the May violence. These results, however, were largely ignored by the government, while the armed forces, whose members were said to be heavily involved in the planning, instigating and carrying out of the violence, fatly denied the report's allegations (Purdey, 2002).

The team's most important fnding (TGPF, 1998b) confrmed student suspicions that the May riots had 'elements of intentionality.' Their report connected the potential presence of military men in the Jakarta riots to a meeting that was organised by Major General Prabowo Subianto in his offce on May 14 (the D & R Team, 1998). Prabowo, then-Commander of the Army Strategic Reserve, was certainly capable of conducting covert operations, owing to his experience as commander of the Kopassus special forces unit (Eklof, 1999). Prabowo was also implicated in the kidnapping and torture of several dissidents earlier in 1998 (Friend, 2003). The TGPF argued that the meeting, which also involved the Commander of the Jakarta Garrison and the Commander of the Kopassus, was a 'missing link' which directly connects Prabowo to the violence (Eklof, 1999, p. 193).

These events have never been subjected to a thorough investigation. Prabowo Subianto (2000) and his allies (Zon, 2004) continue to refute these allegations. Prabowo was only ever brought before an Offcer's Honour Council (Dewan Kehormatan Perwira, DKP), which investigated his role in the aforementioned kidnappings ("Prabowo diberhentikan," 1998). While the DKP ultimately recommended Prabowo's discharge from the military, he was never brought to trial for his alleged actions. He would go into self-imposed exile to Jordan not long after his discharge, stalling any further investigation into his role in the May violence. To this day, Prabowo continues to hold much infuence in Indonesian society. His candidacy in the 2014 (Jennett, 2014) and 2019 ("Early results," 2019) presidential elections, garnering signifcant amounts of the popular vote, refects this. In spite of this lack of progress in the investigation, the notion that the May violence was indeed instigated and/or manipulated by Prabowo and other elements in the armed forces is a view that is commonly held among former student activists (S. Blegur, personal communication, July 7, 2015).

# Provocateur Violence and 'Expected' Violence

In spite of the important role played by provocateurs, the TGPF (1998a) also concluded that much of the violence was genuinely conducted by socalled 'passive' and 'active' *massa*. The 'passive' *massa* describes people who were gathering around a certain area prior to rioting without for no particular reason, mainly members of the urban poor (TGPF, 1998a). The 'passive' *massa* would become 'active' after instigation from the provocateurs (TGPF, 1998a). Thus, non-student protesters remain, to an extent, active agents during the violence, committing acts of looting and arson. The students were not included in the defnition of the *massa* because they were not directly involved in the violence.

This conclusion on the part of the TGPF has led to an important question with regard to the more brutal acts of violence, specifcally the rape of Chinese Indonesian women. Investigations into the Jakarta rapes found that they occurred at around the same time around different areas of the cities, thus suggesting that the rapes were centrally planned and organised (TGPF, 1998b). However, external pressures from institutions like the police and armed forces who openly denied the rapes from occurring, made investigation into these incidents diffcult (Purdey, 2002). This was exacerbated by open acts of intimidation against those who investigated the rapes, such as the murder of human rights activist Ita Martadinata (Purdey, 2006). All this meant that no conclusive evidence has ever been presented in offcial space. Even the TGPF (1998b) would go on to state that, in spite of its fndings, it could not fnd specifc evidence pointing to this conclusion.

For their part, the former student activists interviewed for this chapter all believed that the *massa* of the TGPF reports were not responsible for these acts of ethnic violence. Testifying from their own experiences, they did not believe that there was any longstanding resentment against Chinese Indonesians as a racial category. Though they conceded that Chinese Indonesians were marginalised under the Suharto regime, in their view, 'there was no [Chinese] problem' (I. Koesrini, personal communication, 2015). They tried to support this by citing examples of personal experience where they witnessed native Indonesians protecting Chinese Indonesian homes during rioting, or from their childhood where they experienced cordial relations between Chinese Indonesians and native Indonesians (S. Blegur, personal communication, July 7, 2015). Others would recall interactions with non-students, where the issue of Chinese Indonesian wealth never came to mind. 'For the farmers,' said Ibeth (personal communication, July 7, 2015), 'the enemy was, for example, a corporation. They didn't care if the boss was Chinese or not. It was still their enemy.' This led some activists to conclude that the anti-Chinese nature of the May violence was a 'sudden' development and was thus part of a 'predesigned pattern' of events (S. Blegur, personal communication, July 7, 2015).

Instead of seeing the *massa* as being motivated by racism, student activists argued that what *massa* agency present in the May riots was spurred on by economic factors more than anything else. In their view, anger at the 'economic gap' between most native Indonesians and the ethnic Chinese was 'easily sparked, especially in times of crisis' (I. Koesrini, personal communication, 2015). For some activists, the looting of luxury goods by non-students was second nature. As Sinnal (personal communication, July 7, 2015) argued, the main problem faced by the urban poor was the problem of the 'stomach.' 'If they were given the chance [to take items], they would certainly take it,' she said. 'They couldn't even touch these things before. Now they could take them for themselves!' (S. Blegur, personal communication, July 7, 2015).

In the eyes of the student activists, the guilt of the looters was further dampened by the fact that they too were victims of the violence. This fact was confrmed by civil society organisations, such as Wardah Hafdz's Urban Poor Consortium, which argued that many urban poor died in 'shopping mall fres' during the riots ("Not a rabble," 2001). For Sinnal (personal communication July 7, 2017), defending those who died looting was quite different from defending those who committed other acts of violence, because the former was 'innocent.'

It was in this spirit that the student movement could continue to maintain its close relationship with the non-student protesters after the violence. While the student occupation of Parliament prior to Suharto's resignation actively excluded non-student protesters from student ranks, events after the fall of Suharto led to student perceptions of non-student protesters returning to some form of normalcy. Active forms of this cooperation were shown in how they interacted with civil society organisations after the May violence. For example, some students volunteered to join SIP, after feeling admiration for their role in aiding both students and civil society at large (Kartika, 1999). Other students joined TRuK to help aid victims of the May violence (Andalas, 2009).

Especially memorable to Sinnal (personal communication, July 7, 2015) were the Semanggi I and Semanggi II incidents, where she (and other students protesting against President Habibie) once again came under fre from security forces. She recalled that, while feeing police arrest, 'people opened their doors for us … they were out on the streets and we were greeted like heroes.'

In essence, the students initially responded to May violence by reducing their interaction with the non-student protesters, whom they saw as the violent offenders. To the students, the non-student protesters were a *massa* through which military agents could infltrate their ranks. However, these perceptions changed as events unfolded. After it was revealed that provocateurs were instigated the violence, the students came up with a more complex interpretation of the events of May. While the exceptionally brutal aspects of the violence, such as the rape of Chinese Indonesian women, took parts of the student movement by surprise, they were ultimately blamed upon external provocateurs and those in league with them. The looting, on the other hand, was seen as an expression of anger by a populace bearing the brunt of the Asian fnancial crisis and was disenchanted with the Suharto regime. Thus, the students did not fnd it diffcult to work with non-student protesters after the May violence had settled and the fear of provocateurs had died down.

# Conclusion

The emergence of *bunuh diri kelas* and its manifestation at the Kedung Ombo incident can be described as the formative action of the relationship between the *rakyat* and the student movement, while the Asian fnancial crisis served to further strengthen the relationship. However, the events of May 1998 demonstrated the relationship's fragility.

The violence of May 1998, done by non-student protesters as *massa*, damaged the relationship. Students became suspicious of non-student protesters during this period. However, relations improved as the students became more informed. The students eventually perceived the events of May 1998 as being masterminded by provocateurs, who they believed were responsible for the most reprehensible acts of violence, such as murder and the rape of Chinese Indonesian women. The non-student protesters of the *massa*, in their responsibility for more acceptable acts of violence such as looting, were perceived by the students as being innocent, their hands being forced by the economic oppression of the New Order regime. For the students, these people were the *rakyat* they believed they were fghting for.

Though some have argued that student perceptions of non-student protesters underlie a sense of superiority felt by the students, this argument does not tell the complete story. These negative perceptions of nonstudent protesters were adopted in May 1998 because students recalled the historical experiences of the Malari in 1974. Though the students of 1998 were not the students of 1974, it was clear that they inherited the experiences of their older counterparts when they were faced with the violence of non-student protesters in May. The circumstances they faced were similar in that they were confronted by large groups of non-student protesters. However, unlike the students of 1974, the students of 1998 were, for the most part, inside their campuses, and were thus able to analyse these groups from relative safety.

While the non-student protesters were comprised largely of the urban poor, with whom the students worked with during *bunuh diri kelas*, they were unrecognisable to the students. The students were unable to interact with these non-student protesters with the level of intimacy that *bunuh diri kelas* provided. For the students, the large groups were a *massa* that was easily infltrated by provocateurs or members of military intelligence who could inspire the group to violence or use the group to infltrate student ranks, just as in the Malari case. The students thus elected to view the non-student protesters with suspicion. The brutality of the May violence, and the investigations which pointed to the involvement of provocateurs, supported the students' conclusions. After the May violence, the students were able to sift through the groups of non-student protesters and distinguish provocateurs from those who were not. It was through this procedure that they were able to confdently cooperate with non-student protesters in a number of incidents after May 1998.

In conclusion, student perceptions and attitudes towards non-student protesters were dynamic and varied in accordance with the circumstances they faced. This shaped their relationship, which was just as dynamic. Historical experience and circumstances led students to espouse populist rhetoric. They were able to practice this rhetoric through intimate connections with non-student protesters during *bunuh diri kelas*, and through cooperation in several cases before and after May 1998. All these point to positive perceptions of non-student protesters, the *rakyat*, on the part of the student movement. However, the students remained suspicious of larger, uncoordinated groups of non-student protesters due to the negative historical experience that the student movement had vis-à-vis these groups. To the students, these groups, though largely comprised of the same *rakyat*, were a *massa* infltrated by provocateurs that could lead to their ruin.

# References


Crimes Against Humanity). Solidaritas Nusa Bangsa (SNB) and Asosiasi Penasehat Hukum dan Hak Asasi Manusia Indonesia (APHI).


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# Curating Memory

# Youth Visitor's Meaning-Making During Visit to the National History of Indonesia in The Museum Sejarah Nasional: Study of Constructivist Learning

*Suprayitno and Kresno Yulianto Soekardi*

# Introduction

Museum Sejarah Nasional (MSN/National History Museum) in the National Monument (Tugu Monas) is the frst modern museum in Indonesia and was initially proposed by the frst President of Indonesia, Soekarno. The museum displays its main collections as diorama, a model commonly used in the late nineteenth century because it stimulates visitors' curiosity (cabinet of curiosity/*wunderkammer*) through "evocative," "beautiful," and "powerful" ways (Schwarzer & Sutton, 2009, pp. 1–9).

President Soekarno was known for his love of history that can easily be identifed from his famous jargon *Jas Merah* (*Jangan Sekali-kali Meninggalkan Sejarah,* never ever forsake history). For him, Tugu Monas

Suprayitno (\*) • K. Y. Soekardi

Archaeology Department, Faculty of Humanities, Universitas Indonesia, Depok, Indonesia

e-mail: suprayitno@ui.ac.id; kresno.yulianto@ui.ac.id

<sup>©</sup> The Author(s) 2023

M. Budianta, S. Tiwon (eds.), *Trajectories of Memory*, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-99-1995-6\_14

must instill a sense of patriotism among Indonesian youth as stated in his speech in 1963:

to raise the spirit of patriotism among Indonesian youth in the future, we are building a monument in the form of Tugu. This monument must show our patriotic spirit, particularly as a nation who has survived the age of colonialism. (Naskah Pelaksana Pembina Tugu Nasional, as quoted by Hariyani, 2013, p. 57)

For Soekarno, the Indonesian youth must embrace the spirit of patriotism as they are the ones who will determine the future of the country. The president used two important terms to describe the spirit of the youth. First is the term s*emangat* (roughly translated as "spirit" or "passion"), which denotes a more radical potential and will power than the sanitized fervor of "teen spirit" (Lee, 2016, p. 11). Second is the term *generasi pemuda* (youth generation), which refers more to their enthusiasm rather than their age (Frederick, as cited by Lee, 2016, p. 11). Similar to other historical museums, MSN serves as a medium for public education through exhibits offering a vision of progress, victory, and national excellence (Trofanenko, 2010, p. 270).

In his original vision, Soekarno expected the MSN diorama to depict three historical phases, namely, how the colonial era interrupted a glorious past, which will be regained after national awakening. He clarifed this perspective in one of his speeches in 1964.

under the monument, there will be a historical museum in which you will see stages, phases of Indonesia's history: the greatness of the Maritime age; the dark age of Dutch imperialism; and the resurrection to greatness. You will fnd all of these in the museum. (Soekarno, President of the Republic of Indonesia, 16 August 1964)

Soekarno conceived the idea of MSN after taking inspiration from his visit to Mexico in the 1960s. As a fan of history, Bung Karno was impressed by Mexico's National Museum, particularly the writing inscribed on a wall in the exit path of the museum ("We left behind the museum, but not the history"). This realization motivated Soekarno to build a museum underneath the National Monument (Rahardjo & Kanumoyoso, 2013, p. 115).

At the time of plan implementation, President Soekarno was replaced by President Soeharto. MSN then became the arena of ideological contestation between the two presidents, from Soekarno's emphasis on socialism to Sohearto's foregrounding of Pancasila (McGregor, 2003, p. 93). The committee selected by Soekarno in 1964 designed 40 sets of dioramas, and the New Order's new committee prepared 48 dioramas (Museum Content Designer Team). Together with the three dioramas made in 1998, the fnal collection comprised 51 dioramas.

The dioramas established during Soeharto's period were discontinued at the glory of the New Order (the 51st diorama). The New Order regime was toppled by the Reformation movement in 1998, but no other dioramas have been installed in the new era. Today's youths are not the same as those who were raised in either Soekarno's or Soeharto's era. The majority of present MSN visitors are the youth raised during Reformation era. Hence, studying their process of meaning-making on Indonesia's national history as depicted by MSN's dioramas will be meaningful.

In this research, constructivism would be the most appropriate approach because visitors generate meaning that is based on their own selfconstructed understanding and might not be in line with the framework provided by the museum. Therefore, MSN's diorama can be interpreted in various ways, and such proposition is related to the interpretation concepts of pluralistic artifacts (Varheyen, 2010, p. 37) and mediated learning (Jakobson and Davidson 2012 as cited by McGregor & Gadd, 2019, p. 140).

The hypothesis is that young visitors conduct alternative meaningmaking upon seeing the dioramas in the MSN. Museums are specifcally designed to attract, involve, and stimulate visitors with limited knowledge (Falk & Adelman, 2003, p. 172). These informal educational institutions differ from schools (formal education) that are planned around a curriculum with a pedagogical approach. Visitors who come to history museums do not intend to become historians. History museums can be visited by a variety of people from different backgrounds and with varying levels of history knowledge. Some think of themselves as experts or merely novices. The constructivist approach assumes that visitors come to museums with different knowledge levels (Adams et al., 2003, p. 22).

Many history museums have previously adopted a didactic model of education. Visitors must be provided with historical information to create a new bank of knowledge upon leaving the museum. This didactic educational model implies that learning is a one-way model of communication with the museum as the giver and the visitor as the receiver. Here, the visitor is assumed to be a passive recipient of knowledge without any power to provide different meanings in the museum context.

This didactic learning model has the disadvantage of making the learner passive. In general, its critics come from constructivist circles. The theory of constructivist learning posits that learners who visit the museum do not arrive with an empty mind; they bring previous knowledge with them. Learning is defned as an ongoing and highly personal process. Learners have different cognitive levels and build learning experiences to create unique and highly individualized learning schemes (Adams et al., 2003, p. 17).

MSN, which has existed for more than 50 years since the Old Order (*Orde Lama*) in the 1960s, has received many criticisms from the public as well as the government. When Basuki Tjahaya Purnama, known as Ahok, was the Governor of Jakarta in 2015, he questioned the absence of diorama about a signifcant milestone of Indonesian democracy, that is, the frst direct general election in the Reformasi era during President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono's term (Wahyudi, 2015).

A number of research related to the National Monument in Monas, Jakarta, Indonesia, has been conducted. Katherine McGregor (2003) examined the contesting ideologies between the dioramas designed by Soekarno's team and implemented by Soeharto's team. Murwaningrum (2007) analyzed the dioramas of MSN from a historian's perspective and evaluated how they represent historical facts. Hariyani (2013) reviewed the National Monument in an integrated manner from a museum management approach. From the visitor's perspective, Darmintono (2004) determined the general visitor satisfaction of the National Monument. None of the above studies examined the meaning-making of youth visitors for the MSN dioramas. Therefore, this chapter tries to fll the gap of research in Monas, especially in the MSN, by using the concept of constructivist learning.

This work aims to analyze the meaning-making of youth visitors looking at the MSN dioramas in terms of constructivist learning and reconstruct this process on the dimensions of extent, breadth, depth, and mastery.

One of the methodologies used to measure the results of constructivist learning in museums is Personal Meaning Mapping (PMM) developed by John H. Falk from the Institute of Learning Innovation, United States. This tool does not emphasize the characteristics but rather the rate of change in learning. The main understanding of PMM is that the quality of learning experience can change a person; the better the experience, the greater the change. Instead of measuring what visitors learn, understanding the amount, depth, and extent of their learning is highly advantageous (Falk et al., 2006, p. 333). PMM employs the following four dimensions to evaluate the learning process in museums: *extent* that measures the variance of the vocabulary, *breadth* that measures the breadth of a concept, *depth* that measures the depth of knowledge, and *mastery* that measures the mastery of a visitor's understanding of a theme/material to be tested.

This study combines quantitative and qualitative (mixed-method design) approaches using PMM for a holistic analysis (Creswell & Clark, 2007). Data collection techniques in PMM consist of two stages: before (pre-visit) and after visiting dioramas (post-visit). For pre-visit, we ask visitors to write any words, ideas, pictures, phrases, or thoughts related to "National History of Indonesia" on a sheet of paper with a prompt written in the middle of the questionnaire sheet. Concepts must be written with a green ballpoint pen. Afterward, we interview the visitors by asking their opinion about what they just wrote. These interviews are recorded using a voice recorder and accompanied by notes containing key words, written by us with a black pen under the visitors' answers in green ink.

We then invite the visitors to enter the MSN to see the dioramas. Before the visitors enter the museum, we ask them if they would be willing to complete the notes and be interviewed again upon leaving the museum. After the visit to the MSN's dioramas, we immediately distribute the PMM sheet (Fig. 1) and ask the visitors to review what they had previously written and change, delete, or add another word/phrase/thought to the same PMM sheet using a different colored ballpoint pen. Afterward, we conduct another open interview by asking the visitors to explain the newly written words/phrases/thoughts. This explanation is recorded using a different colored ballpoint pen on the same PMM sheet. We also ask for the demographic data of visitors, such as age, education, regional origin, visit frequency, and historical interest.

Given that the target participants are youth visitors, we select students for the sample group. Study population is based on the student visitors who visited the MSN in February, March, and April of 2017. The number of student visitors was 218 in February, 267 in March, and 65 in April. The total number of student visitors from February to mid-April is 550 people. Hence, the average number of student visitors is 183 people. Sample size is calculated using the method of Isaac and Michael (Sugiyono., 2013, p. 126) with a 10% error rate as follows.

**Fig. 1** Example of PMM Sheet. (Note: The green writings represent the visitors' answers before looking at the dioramas of MSN, and the red writings are the visitors' answers after looking at the dioramas. Writings in **black ink** are the researchers' explanations on the green writings, and those in blue are the researchers' explanation on the red writings)

$$\mathbf{S} = \frac{\boldsymbol{\aleph^{2}} \text{ .N.P.Q}}{\mathbf{d}^{2} \left(\text{N} - 1\right) + \boldsymbol{\aleph^{2}} \text{.P.Q}}$$

<sup>2</sup> dk = 1 1 , % error level might be , %5 1, %0

$$P = Q = 0, \text{S d} = 0, 0 \text{S } \text{ S} = \text{Sample}$$

$$\mathbf{S} = \frac{3,841 \ge 183 \ge 0, 5 \ge 0, 5}{0,1^2 \left(183 - 1\right) + 3,841 \ge 0, 5 \ge 0, 5}$$

$$\underset{\square \square}{\mathbf{S}}$$

$$\mathbf{S} = \frac{175,72575}{1,82 + 0,96025}$$

$$\underset{\square \square}{\mathbf{S}}$$

$$\mathbf{S} = \frac{175,72575}{2,78025}$$

$$= 63,20$$

$$= 63 \left(rounding\ result\right)$$

If the average population is 183 people, then the total sample size is 63 people. Here, we apply incidental sampling, a determination technique based on chance; that is, anyone who accidentally meets us can be used as a sample (Sugiyono., 2013, p. 124). Suitability as a data source is determined at the time of meeting. We ask the person if he/she is a student and accordingly if he/she is willing to be part of the study. Those who agree are categorized as the research data.

As described by Adams et al. (2003), the fnal data from PMM is a series of change scores based on the rubrics developed for each review. Hence, a clear, concise scoring rubric is developed for each dimension. This score can be used as a dependent measure that can be compared with the extent of free variable variability (e.g., learning intervention, age, gender, amount of experience).

This version of PMM analysis is used to identify and categorize the theme patterns of visitor response in the form of concepts related to NHI understanding. The four PMM scales to be analyzed are *Extent*, *Breadth*, *Depth*, and *Mastery* (Foutz & Luke, 2005) as described below.

#### 1. Extent/Fluency

Extent reveals changes in the number of relevant vocabularies used and measures the extent to which one's knowledge and feelings change. Change score is determined by counting the number of relevant words/phrases written by visitors before and after the visit. This scale measures changes from two aspects of the words/ideas that visitors write on the answer sheet: response type (concept and single word/phrase) and number of words/ideas. Because the prompt is NHI, this vocabulary scale only covers what the visitor actually wrote, both before and after seeing the dioramas, and not the response from the interview with us. Only relevant words are calculated.

In scoring, the words written by visitors are distinguished by the "before" category to count the words written before the visit. The category "new" is to count words after the visit, and the category "after" counts the total answers ("after" is the cumulative score*)*.

2. *Breadth/Concept Categories*

This scale represents a change (between before and after the visit) in the conceptual categories used by the visitors to describe their thinking about the NHI. With this scale, we will subsequently arrange several categories based on the extent of the results that form certain conceptual patterns. Each category is labeled and defned.

Every idea written by a visitor is scored based on a number of existing categories. In the dimension of breadth, the following four concept categories are mapped: (1) Maritime Age, (2) Dark Ages of Dutch Imperialism, (3) Time of Resurrection to the Greatness, and (4) Miscellaneous (other than the numbers 1–3 above).

3. Depth

This scale gives a score on the amount of detail of visitor's understanding of the conceptual category and scale measures the depth of the visitor understanding. We count the scores from before/after PMMs that match the actual diorama pictures.

The same word/phrase (before and after the visit) is given the same score. Each of the conceptual categories given by visitors or the answers to our questions is scored 0–3. The score categories are as follows:

0: if the response is not related to the purpose/concept of NHI;

1: minimal response, which shows no understanding related to the given concept;

2: wide response, which refects general understanding or knowledge limited to the given concept; and

3: shows the best understanding of the given concept.

4. Holistic Mastery

This dimension explores the mastery of descriptions in accordance with the visitors' understanding of NHI in the pre- and post-visit stages and measures whether the visitors' understanding is similar to that of a novice or an expert.

All PMM visitors are scored using the letters D, C, B, and A. Answer sheets are annotated by circling these letters with a pencil/ballpoint.

D: New understanding/novice: signifes an inaccurate understanding; no references to related concepts.

C: Some accurate understandings: recognizing one or two concepts; answers are related to common knowledge.

B: Accurate understanding: can name one or two concepts as appropriate.

A: Expert understanding: accurate understanding of three or more appropriate concepts; deeply referring to two or more concept.

# Findings

1. Sample Characteristics

Participants' characteristics are divided into several categories, such as sex, education level, residence/regional origin, age, frequency of visits to MSN, and interest in history. The number of female visitors is higher (35, 55.56%) than that of males (28, 44.44%). For education level, 15 people (23.82%) have a diploma 3, 40 (63.45%) are undergraduates (S-1), and 8 (12.70%) are graduates (S-2). Origin is dominated by Jakarta, Bogor, Depok, Tangerang, and Bekasi (Jabodetabek) (26 people, 41.27%); Central Java and Yogyakarta (11 people, 17.46%); West Java and Banten (11 people, 17.46%); Sumatra (seven people, 11.11%); East Java (fve people, 7.94%); NTB (two people, 3.18%); and Sulawesi (1 person, 1.59%).

For the number of visits to the MSN, 13 people (20.64%) have never visited MSN, 43 people (68.25%) have visited MSN 1–3 times, and 7 people (11.11%) have visited four times or more. When asked whether they like history, most participants claimed to like history, that is, 46 people (73.02%). Only 17 (26.98%) people claimed to dislike history (Table 1).

2. *Extent* Dimension

In extent dimension, most visitors mentioned fve words about the NHI before seeing the dioramas. After seeing the dioramas, most visitors added three new concepts. On average, nine words/phrases (rounded) are mentioned after seeing the dioramas. As illustrated in Fig. 2, the visitors write 339 words/phrases before seeing the dioramas and 215 additional (new) concepts. Hence, the total of words/phrases in the post-visit of the dioramas is 554 words/phrases.


**Table 1** Characteristics of visitors who participated in the study (*n* = 63)

**Fig. 2** Change of Vocabulary Quantity in Extent Dimension

In terms of sex, the number of NHI-related words written by female visitors is more than that of males in pre-visit and post-visit. At the previsit, the number of words written by men is 46.90% and that of females is 53.10%. For the acquisition of new knowledge, the rate is 46.98% for men and 53.02% for women; for words, the rate is 46.93% for men and 53.03% for women at the post-visit.

On the basis of visit frequency, the number of words written by visitors who have never previously been to the MSN decreases from 21.24% before seeing the dioramas to 20.22% after viewing the dioramas. For the visitors who have been to the MSN one to three times before, the average acquisition of words increases from 68.73% before seeing the dioramas to 68.77% after seeing the dioramas. The increase also occurs in visitors who have been to the MSN, four times or more than before. The number of written words is 10.03% before seeing the dioramas and 11.01% after seeing the dioramas.

Visitors who claim to like history increase their number of words from 78.17% before seeing the dioramas to 78.52% after seeing the dioramas. For the visitors who claimed to dislike history, the number of words they write down decreases from 21.83% before seeing the dioramas to 21.48% after seeing the dioramas (Table 2).

Table 2 shows that in the dimension of extent, the average number of words related to NHI shows an increasing trend from pre-visit to postvisit stage. This result confrms that learning in museums is infuenced by the personal context. Meaning-making, in the form of visitor's


**Table 2** Cross Tabulation of the Dimension of Extent

knowledge, is infuenced by prior knowledge and experience and combined with new knowledge when visiting a museum. Therefore, the meaning-making of visitors in the museum constitutes a mixture of prior and new knowledge mediated by their experience with physical reality in the form of MSN dioramas.

Visitor #40 (before entering MSN): "As far as I know, there was the Kingdom of Sriwijaya, mmm … which propagated Hindu teachings."

Visitor #40 (after exiting from MSN): "I'm sorry. It turns out that Sriwijaya is a Buddhist Kingdom."

Visitor #59 (before entering MSN): "I know a hero called Imam Bonjol, from Java."

Visitor #59 (after entering MSN): "Now I know he's from West Sumatra."

Meaning-making can also occur in the form of correction of confrmation as shown by the statements of visitor #40 and #59 above. The MSN dioramas can confrm visitors' prior discourses.

#### 3. Dimension of *Breadth*

The theme of "The Greatness of the Maritime Era" is more often mentioned by males than by females with an increased usage by men, that is, from 51.11% in pre-visit to 55.55% in post-visit. Meanwhile, this theme is less mentioned by women from 48.89% before seeing the dioramas to 44.45% after seeing the dioramas.

Conversely, the theme of "Darkness of Dutch Imperialism" is more often named by women than by men. An increase in usage by women is observed, that is, 53.70% in the stage before seeing the dioramas to 58.49% after seeing the dioramas. For men, its usage decreases from 46.30% in the stage before seeing the dioramas to 41.51% after seeing the dioramas.

The theme of "The Age of Resurrection to Greatness" is more often named by males than by females. An increase in usage by men is noted, that is, from 32.05% in the stage before seeing the dioramas to 53.06% after viewing the dioramas. For women, its usage decreases from 67.95% in the stage before seeing the dioramas to 46.94% after seeing the dioramas.

Visitors who like history mentioned more NHI themes than visitors who dislike history. The percentages of NHI themes described in three history phases are as follows: Maritime Age and Dark Age of Dutch Imperialism, both 77.78%; and Resurrection to Greatness, 80.77%.


**Table 3** Cross Tabulation of Dimension of Breadth

On the basis of this dimension, the themes of Greatness of the Maritime Era and Resurrection to Greatness are preferred by men rather than women. Therefore, the themes of maritime and grandeur that described greatness and strength represent the characteristics of masculinity. The themes of the Darkness of Dutch Imperialism are appealing to women, implying their long, deep-seated memories of imperialism or oppression (Table 3).

In addition to the three NHI themes, a "Miscellaneous" theme describes concepts of these three phases. Here the mention of "Miscellaneous" theme increases from 59.57% to 61.54%. The words/ phrases that are frequently mentioned in the Miscellaneous theme are Gus Dur, Reformation Order, and Monetary Crisis. Their mention indicates the expectation of young visitors (most of them are from the Millennial generation) to include the Reformation Order in the MSN dioramas. The word "Gus Dur," for example, is mentioned by visitor #10 (female, 19 years old), and visitor #33 (female, 33 years old). "Reformation Order" and "Monetary Crisis" are mentioned by visitor #15 (male, 19 years old), visitor #20 (male, 25 years old), visitor #27 (male, 19 years old), visitor #42 (female, 20 years old), and visitor #53 (male, 21 years old). The meaning-making of visitors dealing with Reformation Era, for example, comes from visitor #33. Before entering MSN, he acknowledged that it was his frst-time visiting MSN. When asked about National History of Indonesia, he said:

From what I know, there is a historical depiction of Gus Dur, who made a great contribution to the nation by recognizing the Chinese New Year as one of the National Holidays.

After exiting MSN, visitor #33 wondered: "Why can't we fnd Gus Dur in this MSN? If I'm not mistaken, during the Reformation era, there were Gus Dur and Megawati." Visitor #33's meaning-making can be categorized as a criticism of MSN's diorama. Coincidentally, visitor #33 is a student of Chinese descent who was fond of Gus Dur for recognizing the Chinese New Year as a national holiday. Such meaning-making confrms that a visitor's prior discourse (for instance, knowledge of Gus Dur) will affect his or her judgment on dioramas in MSN. This result excludes the existence of particular groups.

Criticisms of the MSN dioramas also come from general visitors. Bayu, a senior high school teacher from Depok, West Java, criticized the contents of the dioramas that are still narrated under the infuence of the New Order. Bayu said that:

Soeharto is depicted to receive Supersemar. This event is still debatable, you know. In the diorama, Soeharto is depicted to be lying sick on his bed while three Army Generals sat on chairs next to the bed. Well, this is the New Order's justifcation of Supersemar. (Detiknews, 2015)

He criticized the role of Soeharto who was behind the Command Letter of March 11, 1966 (*Supersemar*) (Detiknews, 2015). The above critics of the content of the MSN dioramas show that the meaning-making, as experienced by the public, means that visitors do not just receive the messages of the museum and take them for granted.

4. Dimension of *Depth*

The average increase in both genders is in score 2 (broader answer) and 3 (the answer indicating the best understanding). For male visitors, the increase in score 2 is 21.43% before seeing the dioramas and 42.86% after seeing the dioramas, and that in score 3 is 7.14% before seeing the dioramas and 21.43% after seeing the dioramas. For female visitors, the increase in score 2 is 51.43% before seeing the dioramas and 77.14% after seeing the dioramas.


**Table 4** Cross Tabulation of Dimension of Depth

Visitors who like history experience an increase in the depth of knowledge in scores 2 and 3. For the visitors who like history, the increase in score 2 is 41.30% before seeing the dioramas and 65.21% after seeing the dioramas, and that in score 3 increases from 6.52% before seeing the dioramas to 15.21% after seeing the dioramas. For visitors who do not like history, none of them meet score 3 in the stage before seeing the dioramas. However, an additional depth of 5.88% knowledge has appeared after seeing the dioramas (Table 4).

#### 5. Dimension of *Mastery*

Among the 63 visitors, the average mastery of understanding before seeing the dioramas is B (the answer illustrates an accurate understanding of the NHI, referring to 2 or 3 concepts specifed, but does not show the depth of the concept of the NHI in the dioramas of the MSN, or describe one concept in more depth). After viewing the MSN dioramas, the average depth of visitor knowledge is constant (B).

For the visitors who have not visited the MSN before, the scores (from A to D) are diverse. An increase occurs in D (from 0% to 3.57%) and score A (from 3.57% to 17.85%). A decrease occurs in the C score (50% to 3.14%), and the B score remains the same (46.42%) before and after viewing the dioramas. Visitors who have visited the MSN one to three times mostly show an increase in score D (from 0% to 6.45%), score B (from


**Table 5** Cross Tabulation of Dimension of Mastery

53.48% to 65.12%), and score A (from 2.32% to 13.95%) and a decrease in score C (from 44.19% to 16.27%). Visitors who have visited the MSN four times or more show a constant status on score B (57.14%) and A (14.28%) before and after seeing the dioramas.

For the visitors who love history, the mastery of understanding NHI is improved as evident by the increase in score D (0% to 4.34%), score B (from 54.34% to 67.39%), and score A (from 4.34% to 15. 21%). For the visitors who do not like history, an increase is observed for score D (from 0% to 5.88%) and A (from 0% to 5.88%). The B score remains fxed (52.94%) before and after viewing the dioramas (Table 5).

# Conclusion

Falk, Dierking, and Adams stated that PMM, which is based on the constructivist approach, assumes that the learners who come to the museum do not come with empty minds resembling empty bottles that must be flled or blank paper (*tabula rasa*) that must be written on. Instead, they bring their previous knowledge. Its priority is the rate, not the characteristics, of learning changes. The main understanding of PMM is that the quality of learning experience can change a person; the better the experience, the greater the change. Instead of measuring what visitors learn, understanding the amount, depth, and extent of their learning is highly advantageous (2006, p. 333). PMM underlines the constructivist theory of education, a philosophical approach that is opposed to positivism. The latter seeks to understand the objective phenomenon that exists outside the human construct, and the former aims to understand a social space as experienced by human flters (Lindauer, 2005, p. 144). In the context of learning during a museum visit, the visitor's meaning-making is personal.

This research shows that in *extent* dimension, the changes of words/ phrases show an increasing trend before and after the visit to the MSN dioramas. In *breadth* dimension, the percentage of visitors who mention three phases of history also increase at post-visit. In *depth* dimension, an increase is also observed from bare minimum to a wide knowledge. In *mastery* dimension, the score is dominated by category B (accurate comprehension, can accurately mention one to two concepts). Therefore, the meaning-making of visitors to the MSN in the Tugu Monumen Nasional shows an increase in phrases/vocabulary, depth of knowledge, and mastery of understanding about NHI.

Constructivist learning in the form of meaning-making by visitors in Tugu Monas is personal. All visitors have a prior diverse knowledge, and this diversity greatly affects what and how visitors learn from their experience. Visitors of the MSN can be categorized as experts or novices. Thus, the challenge for educators is to accommodate this variability in a meaningful way.

From the methodological perspective, learning outcomes using PMM cannot be generalized similar to those in a positivist approach because the philosophical foundation of PMM questions positivism. PMM looks for particularities, not generalizations. Although many PMMs reject the ideas of a positivist approach, most of them still use quantitative positivist methods in data collection and data analysis. For example, Adams, Falk, and Dierking (2003, p. 24) did not explicitly reject the use of established samples conducted in a positivist approach. In the current work, the sample size is also calculated using Isaac Newton's highly positivist formulas.

Given the lack of guidelines for its usage (Adams et al., 2003, p. 30), PMM remains an option but not necessarily the best method. Resource availability is an important factor when deciding to use PMM. Our experience in implementing PMM research shows that it is time consuming and resource demanding. When the situation is normal, interviews with visitors run as expected. However, for visiting families, PMM is not suitable because the level of visitor refection to answer the PMM might not reach the required level. Thus, PMM makes strong demands on our ability and experience to make the interview atmosphere relaxed and fexible.

As a relatively new methodology, PMM facilitates the interpretation of museum visitor responses and how we understand and think about the way visitors harness their learning in museums. PMM has also contributed to a constructivist learning approach in informal education environments (museums, galleries, zoos, and science centers) to understand the rich and complex learning experiences resulting from a museum visit. Thus, the study of learning in Indonesian museums using PMM must be further developed.

In Indonesian schools, students learn history taught with a positivist approach of "right" and "wrong" answers, on a linear scale of "unknowledgeable" to "knowledgeable" content. By contrast, history museum is an informal institution that is principally intended to attract, engage, and stimulate visitors with limited knowledge and thus can be used to balance the formal positivist learning.

For the museums, the practical implication of this work is that the diversity in visitor knowledge levels can be used as an evaluation index to improve the quality of the exhibition. Based on the fndings, the mastery of the visitor understanding of the concept of the NHI varies from a novice understanding with D score to an expert understanding with A score. Therefore, the museum needs to work diligently to target novice visitors and stimulate their interest in the subject and increase their knowledge.

The fndings also refect the youth's critical response to the museum exhibit. These young visitors live in an era different from the drafter and implementer of the MSN, Presidents Soekarno and Soeharto. The Indonesian youth visitors were born and raised during the post-Reformation and expected diorama relevant to their era. Regarding the theme "Miscellaneous," the young visitors mentioned the absence of the Reformation-era theme in the MSN.

The following are the recommendations of this thesis: (a) On the basis of the fndings on *breadth* dimension, the MSN should conduct a recontextualization of its exhibition by incorporating Reformation era into the dioramas. (b) On the basis of the fndings on *mastery* dimension, the MSN should improve the quality of the dioramas to ensure that novice visitors can enhance their critical understanding of history. From this aspect, interactive and participatory activities in discussing the dioramas will be of great beneft. By accomplishing these goals, the MSN, as imagined by President Sukarno, can invigorate nationalistic passion and balance it with the critical perspective that behooves the youth spirit in the post-Reformation era.

**Acknowledgments** This work was copyedited by ENAGO. This chapter was supported by Research Grant for International Publication managed by Universitas Indonesia Year 2017 (Grant Number: NKB-461/UN2.R3.1/HKP.05.00/2017).

# References


*and Society, 3*(3), pp.137–152. https://journals.le.ac.uk/ojs1/index.php/ mas/article/view/66


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# Engaging with the Public: Comparing the National Museum of Indonesia and the Kolong Tangga Museum from the New Museology Perspective

*Mawaddatul Khusna Rizqika and Wanny Rahardjo Wahyudi*

# Introduction

Nowadays, the views of new museology bring changes to museum management in various countries. This concept is deemed to optimize earlier theories and can accommodate the current needs of museums and the society. In Indonesia, new museology is a relatively new theory, although it originated in the 1970s within the international museum sphere. In the past, museums focused on their collections. At the moment, however, they have shifted their orientation to the society. Information dissemination becomes a priority and is related to surrounding social climates. Something similar has also occurred in the aspects of curatorial

M. K. Rizqika (\*) • W. R. Wahyudi

Archaeology Department, Faculty of Humanities, Universitas Indonesia, Depok, Indonesia e-mail: wanny@ui.ac.id

© The Author(s) 2023 M. Budianta, S. Tiwon (eds.), *Trajectories of Memory*, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-99-1995-6\_15

management. Curators have had to extend focus from only the material aspect of collections to also the meaning behind them.

The contemporary stance of new museology has brought forth changes in museum management in many places. Nowadays, curators do not emphasize the materialistic side of collections, but instead their interpretations. This study focuses on the curatorial management of two museums, which are Museum Nasional Indonesia (hereinafter, National Museum of Indonesia) and Museum Pendidikan dan Mainan "Kolong Tangga" (hereinafter, Kolong Tangga). The management is compared on the basis of existing elements within the new curatory paradigm, particularly the functions of curators and public participation. The two museums have strikingly different backgrounds. The National Museum of Indonesia is a state-owned formal museum, whereas Kolong Tangga is privately owned and managed. Each has its own policies and ways of managing the interaction between its visitors and its collections. By comparing the two, how strong the concept of new museology infuences the curatorial management of both museums can be analyzed. Rooting this study in qualitative approach, observation, literature review, and interviews with not only curators but also various parties related to both museums are conducted.

# Curatorial Management in the New Museology Paradigm

Hauenschild (1988) stated that new museology views museums as educational institutions with the capability to directly contribute to social development. The last decade saw more intense competition with rising numbers of museums and other tourism destinations, resulting in the greater need of organization control and management. Excellent management in museums is indicated by their ability to demonstrate the most effective and effcient possibilities to utilize available resources (Weil & Cheit, 2000). Lord and Lord (2000) wrote, "The purpose of management in museums is to facilitate decisions that lead to the achievement of the museum's mission, the fulfllment of its mandate, and the realization of the goals and objectives for all of its functions."

Curatorial management in the context of new museology is divided into the following aspects:

	- Museums have three basic functions, namely, preservation, research, and communication (Van Mensch, 2003). The International Council of Museums (2007) set forth the defnition and function of museums as follows: "A museum is a non-proft, permanent institution in the service of society and its development, open to the public, which acquires, conserves, research, communicates and exhibits the tangible and intangible heritage of humanity and its environment for the purposes of education, study and enjoyment."

The duties of museums are collection, documentation, research, conservation, mediation, continuing education, and evaluation (Hauenschild, 1988).

(c) Social Function

Curators and museums are parts of the social life of world society. They are advised to be actively involved in society's social and cultural lives (Sola, 1991).

(d) Society Participation

Curators play their role as facilitators in conducting research with other parties, such as communities that are related to the research theme. Community involvement can enrich data and information and can help curators obtain the native's point of view about a certain thing (Cameron, 2008).

(e) Defnition of Collection

The reason an object can become part of a museum's collection is its potential value including aesthetic and educational values (Burcaw, 1997).

(f) Defnition of Curator

The International Council of Museums stated that "the curator reports to the director and is responsible for the collections in his/ her charge. Duties include the care, development, study, enhancement and management of the collections of the museum." Curators are responsible for planning and implementing programs for storage room, catalogizing, supervising conservation procedure, ensuring the process is recorded and documented, and providing input to the director about collections development. Curators also perform collection study, determine, and conduct research, and serve the circulation of information and documentation of collections and exhibition materials. In addition, curators administer budgets and staff under the director's supervision. In terms of formal education, curators who are graduates of master studies from programs that are related to museum collections and have been trained or experienced in museology are desirable (Ermert et al., 2008). Meanwhile, the American Association of Museums stated that "curators are highly knowledgeable, experienced, or educated in a discipline relevant to the museum's purpose or mission." The activities of curators are oriented on presenting the results of interpretations (Magetsari, 2016).

(g) Study

According to Cameron (2008), curators play the role of facilitators when studying collections. Interaction with other parties is crucial in this activity and can be accomplished by involving communities and experts from disciplines that are related to the topic of the study, so that data and information can be comprehensive. The American Association of Museums explained that the study of collections is conducted to identify them and to document their histories.

(h) Collection Procurement

One of the duties of curators is making recommendations for collection acquisition.

(i) Inventory

The Metropolitan Museum of Art (2015) specifed that regularly, each department that conducts curatorial works must create an inventory, particularly on the content of collections.

(j) Collection Borrowing

Curators participate in formulating institutional policies and procedures in conserving collections on the basis of professional standards. Curators also discern the objects to be borrowed by the museum.

(k) Collection Removal

Curators regularly review collections to assess their relevance to museums' missions. The collections are then sorted, and the recommendations of their removal are proposed. Collection removal is conducted to improve museums' missions. Curators explain to museum supervisors the considerations that ensure that their museum will not experience loss caused by collection removal.

(l) Coaching and Monitoring

The competence of curators is improved by coaching in the form of providing access and opportunity to higher formal education within the discipline related to museum collections and joining training about museology. Meanwhile, museum directors or other higher institutions monitor curators' performance to ensure that museums are run effectively and effciently (International Council of Museums, 2007).

Table 1 lists in brief the aspects of curatorial management based on the new museology paradigm.

As institutions, the primary element of museums is the aspect of education and other practical benefts for the public. Museums take care of not only tangible issues related to objects, but also intangible issues related to nonobjects. Another role of museums is to show the two-way relationship between itself, and this role is particularly performed in three aspects: *mediation*, *continuing education*, and *evaluation*. New museology positions museums as educational institutions, which give direct contributions to social development (Hauenschild, 1988).

In terms of social function, curators and museums are an inseparable part of the life of the society. Sola (1991) argued that new museology serves as a bridge that connects museums and people. In the era of information technology (IT), museums provide a space for people to take an


**Table 1** Aspects of Curatorial Management in the New Museology Paradigm

active role in managing itself. Not only do museums give something to people but also people can give something back to museums. Cameron (2008) further elaborated that community involvement not only enriches data and information but also helps curators gain practical perspectives.

In the concept of new museology, collections are objects that are gathered and preserved for their intrinsic values, such as aesthetics and education (Burcaw, 1997). Such values distinguish the collection of museums from objects in antique shops. From the perspective of museology, the responsibilities of curators are focused on studies, interpretations, and concepts related to museum programs. Curators must be well-educated (at least graduating with a postgraduate degree), have adequate knowledge pertaining to collections, and must comprehend museology. Gurian added that in the era of IT, while curators are no longer the sole information source for visitors, they still wield intellectual authority over collections.

Collection review is an activity that curators should do. As facilitators, curators conduct reviews with other parties, so that a reciprocal relationship may be developed. Importantly, reviews must not only cover the collections themselves but also their interpretations. From an academic perspective, the process of acquiring collections involves curators while considering the objectives of museums. Curators give recommendations to their supervisors and participate in the formulation of policies, which are related to collections and compliant with existing procedures (including the fee of collection acquisition or insurances required whenever collections had to be lent to other parties).

In terms of collection inventory, curators are responsible for material aspects. Curators participate in making sure that the preservation of collections (including the decision of lending collections) is conducted according to professional standards. Curators also periodically review collections to assess their relevance with museums' objectives. In this stage, collections are sorted before curators recommend whether they should be taken away or kept as exhibits. The erasure of collections is executed to support the progress of implementing museums' missions. For supervisors, curators explain aspects to be considered in ensuring that museums will not suffer from signifcant losses after particular collections are erased.

With such crucial responsibility, curators must remain competent in executing their tasks and responsibilities. Therefore, curators must be equipped with trainings related to museology or given access to higher formal education.

# Curatorial Practices at the National Museum

The National Museum is owned by the government of Indonesia. It has the largest and most comprehensive collections in Indonesia, exhibiting approximately 160,000 items. The diversity and richness of its collections have garnered international attention. The genesis of the museum was the establishment of a scientifc organization called *Bataviaasch Genootschap voor Kunsten en Wetenschappen* (BG) or Batavia Society for Arts and Sciences on April 24, 1778 (Hardiati, 2014). At that time, its members were Dutch scientists interested in knowledge and culture of the Dutch East Indies. After independence, the museum experienced a shift of ownership to the Indonesian government. Currently, the vision of the National Museum is as an "International-Level Museum of Indonesian Cultures." The National Museum serves as a source of cultural education, inspiration, and recreation. It is also a means to enlighten the nation, reinforce its identity, and improve the spirit of unity (Museum Nasional, 2016).

Currently, its mission is to become a "Museum of Indonesian Culture with international standards through persons and ecosystems characterized with the spirit of cooperation (*gotong-royong*)." Meanwhile, the mission statements of the museum consist of fve points: (a) implementing collection management according to international standards; (b) giving premium services; (c) making the museum a space for education and recreation; (d) executing high-quality research on museum development; and (e) implementing good management through the involvement of the public. The National Museum of Indonesia presents Indonesian cultures, which can be understood as products and processes. As products, Indonesian cultures refer to unique forms and characteristics that appear in particular eras, from the emergence of human beings in Nusantara to the twentieth century (Museum Nasional, 2016).

The principles of the National Museum of Indonesia's curatorial management are based on government regulations, particularly Law No. 11 Year 2010 on Cultural Properties (*Cagar Budaya*), Government Regulation No. 66 Year 2015 on Museum, the Ministerial Regulation of the Ministry of Education and Culture No. 28 Year 2015 on Organization and Work Procedure of the National Museum, and the Ministerial Regulation of the Ministry of Education and Culture No. 8 Year 2015 on Job Descriptions in the Sectors of the Ministry of Education and Culture. Offcially, the position of curators in the National Museum of Indonesia started to be recognized in 2012.

The National Museum of Indonesia is a Technical Implementation Unit (*Unit Pelaksana Teknis*) of the Ministry of Education and Culture in the Museum sector. Being under the supervision of the Directorate General of Culture, the museum regularly reports to the Directorate General. The National Museum of Indonesia is led by a Head. Specifcally, its organizational structure is as follows:


According to the Ministerial Decree of the Minister of Education and Culture No. 28 Year 2015, curators are functional offcers supported by the Department of Collection Examination and Acquisition (*Bidang Pengkajian dan Pengumpulan*). The department itself consists of three sections, which execute their respective role and function in executing curatorial tasks. First, the Section of Identifcation and Classifcation has a curator with a degree in archaeology (with the specialization of epigraphs) carries out his/her responsibilities. Second, the Section of Search and Collection has a curator educated in the background of social anthropology. Third, the Section of Cataloging should have two curators with the following specifc requirements: one curator with a bachelor's degree in anthropology, and another with a bachelor's degree in anthropology and a postgraduate degree in museology.

The curatorial practices of these curators are described in the Ministerial Decree of the Ministry of Education and Culture No. 8 Year 2015 on Job Descriptions of the Ministry of Education and Culture. One of the stated points is to prepare work plan materials according to annual strategies. Supervisors and heads of each department should be consulted in the formulation of work plans. Curators also arrange the concepts of instruments utilized in data identifcation and classifcation, search and collection, and cataloging according to existing needs and data types. Each curator must organize a concept on which instruments are required for the execution of the works before the concepts are submitted to Section Heads. These Heads synchronize and synthesize the concepts and transform them into a general notion, which applies for the whole department, not just one section.

Another work of curators is to identify artifacts with nationwide cultural value according to the needs of the museum. Although the identifcation of collections is the task of the Section of Identifcation and Classifcation, curators from other sections are also involved in this task. The ability to identify collections is one of the basic competences of curators. Specifcally, each curator identifes different types of collections, according to their educational background and area of interest. Unfortunately, with the limited number of curators, many instances occur, in which collections are identifed by curators with unsuitable educational qualifcation.

Moreover, curators classify objects with cultural values of national standard. The classifcation is conducted according to existing needs. It is also an attempt at sorting collections based on particular criteria, such as academic discipline, material, origin, or historical period. With the collections being sorted under certain classifcations, the museum benefts various parties who are interested in utilizing the collections for different purposes, such as artifact studies, academic research, and exhibitions. This task should be executed by the Section of Identifcation and Classifcation. However, in practice, the lack of curators also forces curators from other sections to be involved in this activity.

Data related to objects with cultural values of national standard are analyzed according to the results of identifcation and need-based classifcation. The analysis is conducted after a collection has its type identifed and its category determined. The depth of analysis is determined based on the objective of the analysis itself, which may be book publications, feld observation reports, modules to be given in seminars or academic conferences, journal articles, calendar production, leafets, news on websites, label production, and information center services.

The most important curatorial work is collection examination. Curators organize the materials of analysis of objects with cultural values of national standard as a foundation of information development. Collections are examined for different purposes: conducting preliminary study for collection provision, adding the value of information related to a particular collection, and documenting every aspect related to a collection. The lack of descriptions in collections causes diffculties to curators in doing curatorial works (identifcation, classifcation, cataloging, inventory update, labeling, and narrative arrangement). Most of the current collections of the museum have lost their original contexts when these contexts are required for the development of collection-related information. It explains why collections must be examined. Collection examination comprises two activities: feld study and literature review. Field studies are conducted in a collection's area of origin by gathering data from primary sources. This activity requires the assistance of other academic disciplines, such as chemistry and biology. Meanwhile, literature reviews also possess a signifcant infuence. In this activity, curators beneft from secondary sources, such as books; BG documents; examination results belonging to other institutions; and other types of documents, including digital books.

The next curatorial work is to organize materials required for searches and to gather objects with cultural values of national standard in the context of utilization. This task is the responsibility of the Section of Search and Collection. As for other tasks, curators from other sections are also involved in this activity despite the task being the responsibility of the Section of Search and Collection. Here, curators organize the materials for the provision of objects with cultural values of national standard in the context of collection development. Objects exhibited in the National Museum of Indonesia must follow certain criteria, such as being in accordance with the museum's vision and mission statements and possessing information with clear origin. The provision of collections can be conducted through discoveries, searches, grants, gifts, exchanges, purchases, inheritance, or conversion. In executing this role, curators become members of the collection provision team for their academic capabilities.

Furthermore, curators estimate the economic value of objects with cultural values of national standard. The task of estimation is executed in relation to the provision of new collections or collection lending for exhibitions abroad. Once again, this task is the responsibility of the Section of Search and Collection. The estimation is performed on the basis of certain criteria. When collections are lent for local or international exhibitions, there needs to be insurance cost for these collections. The value of the cost is determined by the heads of various sections: Examination and Collection, Search and Collection, Identifcation and Classifcation, and Cataloging. Curators are involved in this activity, but with limited roles because curators are considered to have merely rudimentary knowledge on insurance cost.

Curators also update inventory logs of objects with cultural values of national standard in ensuring that existing data are valid. At the moment that this article is written, the National Museum of Indonesia is updating its inventory log (*reinventarisasi*). Inventory update is a complex activity that is related to not only quantitative aspects but also the physical and nonphysical conditions of collections. In this activity, the conditions of collections can be monitored thoroughly. As their number is limited, all curators are involved in this task without considering the compatibility between their educational qualifcations and the types of collections. Data analysts and nonpermanent staff members also take part in this role.

The cataloging of objects with cultural values of national standard is a curatorial responsibility of the Section of Cataloging. In this task, "catalog" is related to information or exhibition. Information-related catalogues ideally include catalogue cards and books, which are produced according to specifc criteria. Nonetheless, it has not been implemented by curators. Meanwhile, exhibition catalogues have been made. Appointed curators are assigned to write articles and captions of collections. The task is ideally assigned to curators with relevant academic background; however, similar to other tasks, other curators may be involved when the deadline is tight.

In the context of collection information development, another task of curators is to write academic, semi-academic, and popular writings for the museum's publication. The writings are based on the results of collection examination. Curators and structural offcials of the Department of Examination and Collection have published free academic books, which have been distributed to the public through the Department of Partnership and Promotion. Some writings of the curators have also been published in academic journals. Meanwhile, popular articles are published on websites and other media. In publishing the writings of curators, the National Museum of Indonesia also works under partnership with other local and international institutions.

For utilization, curators develop concepts, themes, and materials of exhibition of objects with cultural values of national standard. The arrangement of narratives (and their chronology) is mainly the responsibility of the Section of Cataloging, but this task frequently involves curators from other sections. Arranging narratives is a work with a scope that is too broad for curators of one academic discipline. Therefore, in doing this task, curators work with different sources by discussing prospective themes. If a collection is deemed not to contribute much to the determined storyline, then curators will replace it with a replica. Curators also have the authority to determine the use of other media, such as videos or photos, so that the main storyline is supported by exhibited artifacts.

In addition, curators are assigned with supporting works, particularly technical support in the felds of identifcation, classifcation, search, gathering, and utilization of objects with cultural values of national standard. The underlying goal for this assignment is educational and general services, as instructed by the supervisors of curators, and it includes information service. Different parties, such as researchers, students, other institutions, or the public, often require in-depth information related to collections. Curators are also obliged to educate people about collections and curatorial practices in forums related to the museum. Special visitors, such as offcial guests or other curators, should also be accompanied with the curators in exploring the museum.

For matters related to accountability, curators are also obliged to make verbal or written reports on task execution to their supervisors. Written reports are typically included in the form of notes in *Buku Berita Acara Kegiatan*. For reports on activities with a limited amount of time (e.g., external duties), curators submit written reports to their supervisors, the Head of Finance and Employment Affairs Subsection, and the Administration Department. Curators also perform other duties as instructed by supervisors, such as attending conferences, seminars, workshops, and focus group discussions on addition to improving their educational qualifcation to a higher stage. Specifcally, curators are often assigned to participate in exclusive cultural trainings.

By assessing the daily tasks of curators, the curatorial practices in the National Museum of Indonesia are found structured and organized. The permanent exhibitions of the museum are also displayed in a formal manner, signifying its status as a formal institution. For security purposes, vitrines are used to display collections, especially since some collections are registered as national cultural heritages (*Cagar Budaya Nasional*). Moreover, all collections are registered as inventorial assets of the state. Therefore, an enhanced alarm system, CCTV surveillance, and security are installed with the purpose of guarding the collections.

The National Museum of Indonesia thrives on its collections, which excel not only qualitatively but also quantitatively. Such excellence can be achieved because since in the past, BG has been acquiring collections that bear important values or represent the style of a specifc period. Some of these collections are rare to the point that they do not have any other counterparts. These collections can be assumed to be the best that BG members have ever collected. Having been stored in the museum and examined by experts, these collections are material pieces of evidence that record the historical journey of the nation.

Collection study is the most important task of curators of the National Museum of Indonesia. In the past, collections were acquired within the framework of colonialism, where such acquisition was necessary for the colonial government to understand its colonies and, eventually, sustain its power easily. These objects, most of which are royal artifacts of various kingdoms in Indonesia, were looted during the attacks on several regions in Nusantara. They were then stored in the BG museum as pieces of evidence of the colonial government's successful conquest on a Kingdom.

Such a context of acquisition is no longer relevant, as it has been replaced by the new context given by curators during the process of *musealization*. This context is adjusted to the vision and mission statements of the National Museum of Indonesia, which itself is a formal institution under the supervision of the government of post-independence Indonesia. However, curators often have a diffcult time detaching existing collections from the looming shadows of colonialism in the past. This diffculty is partly caused by the condition in which data, information, and photographs of collections are not well-documented in the frst place. Moreover, the amount of data and information on collections is limited. In dealing with such circumstances, curators study collections to add informational value, and seeing how common people are involved as information sources is normal.

An example of such a practice is the research on ethnographic collections. As people commonly still utilize some cultural objects, the context surrounding some ethnographic collections can be easily understood. In understanding such a context, curators attempt to understand the point of view of people whose daily lives involve the existence of these objects. Curators also have to ascertain that the gathered information accurately represents people's perspectives. The National Museum has conducted several feld observations on ethnographic collections. These studies have been conducted on Mamuli in Sumba, Seraung in East Kalimantan, the Phinisi Boat in South Sulawesi, and wooden handicrafts in Papua, Central Sulawesi, Mentawai, and Nias.

The fndings of these studies are then published to the people in various media, such as books, seminars, journals, web contents, and other media, which support the exhibition. In writing the narratives that result from the fndings, curators lean on to formal, academic language style, complying with the museum's market segment, which is not limited to particular types of visitors. An example is the label of Janggolan boat, a collection exhibited on Building B, second foor:

*Kata janggolan berarti berhubungan. Perahu janggolan merupakan perahu niaga untuk jarak sedang. Perahu ini biasanya digunakan untuk mengangkut garam dari lading. Selain itu, juga digunakan untuk mengangkut kelapa yang banyak dihasilkan di sepanjang pesisir Madura. Perahu ini diberi nama "Si Fanili".*

[Trans.]

The word "janggolan" means "connected". Janggolan boat was a merchant boat for medium-distance trade. The boat usually carried salt from Lading. Occasionally, the boat transported coconut harvested along the coast of Madura. This boat, in particular, was named "Si Fanili".

Although people have made contributions to these collections, their role is still confned to being information sources. Intellectual authority on collections still lies on the hands of curators. In the narratives shown by curators, they evidently have not completely oriented themselves to people, but to the collections themselves. A gap exists between collections and people. In terms of social function, the fow of information occurs in one direction. Specifcally, curators shape visitors' opinions in understanding collections (Fig. 1).

# Curatorial Practices at the Kolong Tangga Education and Toy Museum

This chapter examines the curatorial practices of the Kolong Tangga vis-àvis the concept of curatorial management in the new museology paradigm. This explanation illustrates the simpler curatorial practices in a privately owned museum than in the National Museum with regard to structure and daily management. Kolong Tangga is a private museum under the management of the Dunia Damai Foundation, a nonproft organization focusing on the felds of art, culture, and alternative education for children. Its mission is to promote and introduce old-fashioned games in Indonesia and the world through various work programs. The museum was offcially opened on February 2, 2008, by occupying a unique area under the stairs of the Taman Budaya Yogyakarta Building (Museum Pendidikan dan Mainan Kolong Tangga, 2017).

**Fig. 1** Collection and its information label at third foor

The signifcance of preserving toys lies on their embodiment of historical value, meaning, and relation to social life. Toys are part of a culture. Currently, the collections of the museum have reached approximately 16,000 items in the form of toys and items related to children. Due to the limited exhibition space, only 400 items of their collections are displayed. The museum has one curator who is also its head, named Rudi Corens. In the museum, the curatorial duties are related not only to the collections but also to the coordination of the functions of the museum activities in general. Technically, the Museum Division is coordinated by the work committee, and the program executors are the volunteers who join the museum through a recruitment process. Each division has the freedom to create public programs with the curator's approval. The volunteers are passionate about the dissemination of educational values to children through the collections and public programs of the museum. Hence, the museum values social function and community participation in museum management.

The curator's work in Kolong Tangga is planned for one program year, although funding problems occasionally happen and cause programs to deviate from the plan. The curator prepares the plan for collecting and processing identifcation and classifcation data, search and collection, and catalogization. Programs are adjusted to existing necessities and data types; for example, for annual exhibitions or materials to be written in magazines. Volunteers assist Corens in the technical implementation of programs.

Another curatorial practice is collection identifcation based on specifc criteria, drawing on the curator's background and experience as an artist. In Kolong Tangga, the collections are classifed based on their types (e.g., dolls, then ceramic dolls) to facilitate the study of the collections and their utilization.

In this subchapter, curatorial practices in Kolong Tangga are elaborated through the curatorial management concept under the new museology paradigm. Compared with the structure and daily management of curatorial practices of the National Museum, those of Kolong Tangga are simpler. Kolong Tangga is a private institution, which operates under the management of Yayasan Dunia Damai, a nonproft organization focusing on the felds of art, culture, and alternative education for children.

As an organization, Yayasan Dunia Damai has been offcially registered in the database of the Ministry of Law and Human Rights, with registration number 42/16 June 2008/No.AHU-4311.AH.01.04.Year 2009. Founded by Rudi Corens, Dyan Anggraini (Director of Taman Budaya Yogyakarta), and Anggi Minarni (Director of Karta Pustaka), the institution is led by Poppy Darsono, the President Director. Four work divisions operate within the institution: Museum Division, Workshop Division, Burung Biru Library Division, and Kelereng Magazine Division. All of them are interconnected and work together in implementing the programs of the institution.

Kolong Tangga is the frst and only children museum in Indonesia. It carries a mission of bringing forward and introducing Indonesian games from the past through several work programs. A Belgian artist who has been living in Yogyakarta since 1991, Corens (86 years old) is the most important fgure who laid the foundation of the museum, which was established based on the fact that there have been merely few concerns about the world of child's play in Indonesia. Currently, he is the only curator of Kolong Tangga.

Offcially opened on February 2, 2008, the museum was in a unique area: under a staircase in the building of Yogyakarta Cultural Park (Museum Pendidikan dan Mainan Kolong Tangga, 2017), hence the name "kolong tangga" (Literal: "under staircase"). After a dispute with the building management, which decided that the building could only be used for artrelated activities, the exhibition area of the museum has been closed since July 2017. Nonetheless, Kolong Tangga's secretarial works still operate on Jalan Tirtodipuran 26, Yogyakarta. In addition, the museum regularly holds temporary exhibitions in several locations. In April 2018, the collections of the museum contributed to a temporary exhibition titled "Playing with Culture: Traditional Asian Play and Games," which was held in Asia-Pacifc Museum, Warsaw, Poland.

For Corens, preserving playthings and games is important, as both are imbued with history, meaning, and relationship to the social life of the society. That is, playthings are a part of a culture. In addition, collections are presented for their ability to represent an era. Therefore, children can be educated through playthings and games. That is, playthings are media with the capability of introducing values. Differing from adults, children are honest, responsive, and rather direct in doing anything. Without distance from children, toys can be effective educational instruments for children who are the target audiences of Kolong Tangga.

Through the museum, Corens hopes that visitors may acquire knowledge and learn further about life. The museum also operates with a caring and joyful spirit of sharing. He emphasizes that the museum believes in a particular value: befriending every child without looking at skin color, area of origin, occupation of parents, or religious beliefs. Everyone is equally accepted by the museum. A life of tolerance and peace is the message that the museum wishes to convey.

The museum's early exhibits consist of Corens' 900 personal collections, all of which were donated to the museum. These collections were obtained from all around the world, including remote areas in Indonesia. As time goes by, the collections of Kolong Tangga diversify and increase to the point that the collections consist of not only playthings but also all things related to the world of children, including story books, posters, and pictures. At this point, the number of its collections has reached as many as 16,000 items. New collections have been acquired by purchases, grants, or exchanges with other museums, of which is a museum in Hungary.

The tasks of curators are limited not only to collections but also to the overall management of museum activities. As part of his duty as a curator, Corens also leads the museum. Its divisions are technically coordinated by a work committee, whereas programs are executed by volunteers. Each division is granted the freedom to design public programs with the approval of the curator. Most recruited volunteers are youths with idealism of educating children through the collections and public programs of the museum. Here, the museum pays attention to people's social function, and participation in museum management is evident. Kolong Tangga's operation depends on funds gathered from different sources: Corens' funds, donors, sponsors, product sales, and garage sales.

A program listing the curatorial works of Kolong Tangga is planned annually despite fnancial limitations frequently obstructing the realization of programs. The curator also formulates concepts on instruments of data collection, analysis, identifcation, classifcation, and catalogization. In doing so, Corens is assisted by volunteers, and the concepts are adjusted to data types and existing needs, such as yearly exhibition or magazine publication.

The next curatorial practice is the identifcation of collections. As an artist and a former teacher, Corens is an expert in identifying collections. It is then continued by classifcation, which is an activity of grouping collections based on specifc criteria. In Kolong Tangga, collections are usually classifed according to their types (e.g., porcelain dolls). Identifcation and classifcation help future studies on collections and their uses.

The curator also analyzes data related to collection studies, and the analysis conforms to existing needs. He decides and conducts research in addition to taking care of information circulation and documentation of materials pertaining to collections and exhibitions. Analysis is the phase after identifcation and classifcation. In this museum, the curator's examination of collections has reached the stage of interpretation, which correlates with the present condition of the society. The interpretation of the curator is manifested within public programs, in which he and the public interact in a two-way communication in the form of discussions.

Moreover, Corens organizes necessary materials for collection search and gathering (which are necessary for various needs, such as collection addition). Volunteers also assist the curator in executing this task, which is in line with the perspective of new museology, where curators decide which objects are worthy of exhibition. Coming from purchases, grants, and exchanges, objects acquired by Kolong Tangga contain values related to the world of children and education. These collections may come from any region and any period.

Next, Corens organizes price estimation, and the resulted document is used for collection addition or lending. Having decades of international experience in the world of art, Corens is fully equipped for this curatorial practice. However, the insurance fees of collections have not been estimated because the objects have never been listed for insurance services. With the help of volunteers, the curator creates an inventory list of collections to cross-check data accuracy and reliability. Here, Corens is responsible for content-related matters, whereas volunteers are responsible for technical aspects, such as record writing and collection documentation.

Curators are ideally in charge of collection cataloging, which is typically related to the informational aspects of collections. Cataloging also includes the creation of catalogue cards and the publication of catalogue books, in which collections are sorted according to specifc types or criteria. However, in Kolong Tangga, the task of cataloging is not taken by the curator. Instead, through the museum, Corens publishes academic, semiacademic, and popular writings to complement and improve existing information related to collections. He also writes collection descriptions in exhibition rooms, in the magazines of the museum, and other publications. That is, his interpretations on collections are transformed into writing.

Organizing concepts, themes, and materials of exhibitions are additional curatorial practices pertaining to collection presentation and utilization. Here, Corens selects, identifes, classifes, and labels collections. Similar to other tasks, he is assisted by volunteers in this activity. With a duty to serve the public, Corens also gives information-related services, such as becoming a guide for the visitors. In addition, he provides information inquired by external parties, such as researchers, students, and the public.

Moreover, Corens supervises collection conservation in the exhibition and storage room. Tasks indirectly pertaining to collections, such as being a public speaker, doing interviews with the media, and organizing public discussions, are also taken by Corens. Moreover, he is the leader of the museum, and his task reporting is coordinated with the President Director of Yayasan Dunia Damai. Therefore, the functions of supervision, education, management, and collection expertise are intertwined with one another, resulting in an unclear division of responsibilities.

The curatorial practices of Kolong Tangga emphasize social function (particularly public participation) in their exhibitions. An example is the exhibition *Aku Cinta Kodok* ("I Love Frogs") held from February 16 to 25, 2018, in Lippo Mall Yogyakarta. The exhibition came from the curator and the volunteers' concern about environmental issues happening lately. Environmental pollution occurs as people ignore environmental issues while focusing too much on the economic aspect of life. As a species that relies heavily on the nature for their existence, frogs are among the frst victims of environmental pollution. The narrative of the exhibition was organized according to data gathered and examined by Corens and a team of volunteers. Referring to a 2015 report issued by the Ministry of Environment and Forestry's Directorate General for Pollution and Environment Degradation Control, almost 86% of river water quality in 33 provinces in Indonesia is heavily polluted. The report raises an alarming concern, as the river is one of the primary sources of water and the ecosystem of many life forms. Polluted water poses a threat to not only human health but also the survival of many animals. Such an issue found in a formal database was then studied by the curator and then presented lightly to the children in the form of exhibition.

The exhibition also displayed an intriguing collection, which is a taxidermic comparison between two frogs, in which a frog is depicted to have a normal body, whereas the body of the other has been damaged. The collection is equipped with a narrative, which argues that frogs are benefcial for the environment. Their habitats are rivers, ponds, and other regions overgrown with plants and equipped with puddles. Frogs eat potential carriers of diseases: larva, insects, mosquitoes, termites, and cockroaches. That is, frogs are important guardians of ecosystem. The fact that some frogs' bodies are damaged shows human errors and interventions. In the label attached to the collection, the frog died because of being run over by a passing vehicle.

Although heavily loaded with environmental messages, the campaign was presented in such a light atmosphere using a panel with inscription of words formulated by the curator: "I LOVE FROGS. The existence of frogs is the sign of clean water and air. Those who care about frogs, care about the nature!" (*AKU CINTA KODOK. Kehadiran kodok sebagai pertanda air dan udara yang bersih. Mereka yang peduli dengan kodok, peduli terhadap alam!*). The diction of the panel, number of words, and design

**Fig. 2** Narrative written by the curator of Kolong Tangga Museum

show that the curator and the volunteers understand that the exhibition specifcally targets children. Despite voicing out concerns about a complex issue, the message of environmental awareness was presented in a simple way that effectively reaches its audience (Fig. 2).

The museum also found another way to raise children's awareness of the environmental issue. In the exhibition, a pile of garbage was displayed. A label was available in front of the exhibit with the following statement:

*Ini adalah kumpulan sampah dan limbah berbahaya, berbahaya bagi lingkungan, berbahaya bagi tanaman dan kehidupan binatang, berbahaya bagi sumber air dan tanah. Sampah ini dikumpulkan pekan lalu kurang dari 30 menit di suatu tempat umum di Yogyakarta*.

[Trans.]

This is a pile of garbage and hazardous pollutants that pose threats to the environment. They threaten the life of plants and animals, water sources, and our soil. In less than 30 minutes, they were collected last week from a public place in Yogyakarta.

The narrative above invites visitors to become aware of how an excessive amount of trash has surrounded and jeopardized human life and the environment. Visitors are invited to further interpret the exhibit independently. Examined from the perspective of new museology, such an exhibit shows that the curator has executed his function as a facilitator who brings visitors closer to contemporary issues, which intersect with the social life of the visitors themselves.

While in most museums, the instruction "No Touching" can be commonly found, Kolong Tangga uses a different way to inform visitors about the restriction. The curator and the team of volunteers have replaced such a straightforward expression with the text "Look at the collections with your eyes, not with your fngers" (*Lihat dengan mata, bukan dengan jari*). When the two are compared, the more conventional statement of "No Touching" proclaims the authority of the museum and considers visitors "unworthy of approaching the collections." While Kolong Tangga still considers the aspect of collection preservation with such a restriction, the subtler expression (through a narrative that reaches the mindfulness of visitors) in fact welcomes visitors to enjoy the collections (Fig. 3).

In every exhibition, the curatorial practices of Kolong Tangga tend to discuss contemporary issues frequently. These issues are close to people's lives. Hence, the museum orients itself to people, and not merely to collections. The curatorial practices of Kolong Tangga have provided a new space for interactions between the museum and the collections. In the created space, people are brought close to the collections and vice versa.

# Analysis of Curatorial Practices and Curatorial Management in the New Museology Concept

Based on the explanation of the curatorial practices of the National Museum and Kolong Tangga, there exist conformity and inconformity with the aspects of curatorial management in the new museology concept. They are illustrated in the matrix below (Table 2).

The matrix above lists the results of the observation on the curatorial practices of the two museums as understood from the perspective of new

**Fig. 3** Informative narration for visitors telling them not to touch the collection

museology. The National Museum of Indonesia has covered eight aspects, whereas three ongoing aspects have not complied with new museology. In Kolong Tangga, the execution of nine aspects has complied with the concept of new museology, whereas the management of two aspects has not conformed to the concept. Both museums have not covered one aspect, which is collection removal.

# Conclusion

Conformity and inconformity exist with the curatorial management concept under the new museology paradigm in the curatorial practices of the National Museum and Kolong Tangga. The latter seems to have more

**Table 2** Matrix of Conformity and Inconformity of Curatorial Practices in the National Museum and Kolong Tangga Education and Toy Museum with Curatorial Management in New Museology Concept


Notes: √ = present/conforms; x = inconforms; − = not present

capability to conform its curatorial practices with aspects of curatorial management in the new museology paradigm than the former, which is more institutionally complex. The curatorial management concept of new museology can be a guideline for museum leadership in the administration and development of institutions. This guideline certainly needs to be adjusted according to the conditions and necessities that may be different from one museum to another.

In the curatorial practices of the National Museum of Indonesia and Kolong Tangga, conformity and inconformity to how new museology defnes curatorial management exist. Nevertheless, the latter appears to adjust its curatorial practices to the new museology paradigm more than the former, in which there exists a more complex institutional structure. The curatorial management concept of new museology can serve as a guideline to museum management to maintain and improve museum operation. It certainly cannot neglect particular conditions and various needs of museums, which differ from one another. The application of such curatorial management is expected to result in the realization of museums' visions while upholding the principle of beneftting people.

The curatorial practices of the National Museum of Indonesia still leave a wide gap between the collections and the public who act as the visitors of the museum. To bring the collections close to the public, the National Museum may learn from Kolong Tangga, which utilizes the power of narratives. Such narratives would not mean anything without rigorous studies. In conclusion, after comparing the curatorial practices of the two museums, this research can infer that studies and narratives are powerful factors, which bring visitors close to museums, so that the messages of these museums may be effectively communicated to the public.

**Acknowledgment** This work was copyedited by ENAGO. This chapter was supported by Research Grant for International Publication managed by Universitas Indonesia Year 2017 (Grant Number: NKB-507/UN2.R3.1/HKP.05.00/2017).

# References

Burcaw, G. E. (1997). *Introduction to Museum Work* (3rd ed.). Altamira Press.


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# Filling the Hollow Narratives in the Presidential Museum of the Republic of Indonesia Balai Kirti

# *Putri Haryanti and Irmawati Marwoto*

# Introduction

The Presidential Museum of the Republic of Indonesia, Balai Kirti (abbreviated as PMRIBK), is located within the Bogor Presidential Palace Compound. It was inaugurated on October 18, 2014, by President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, who frst proposed ideas for the museum in 2012. As he explained, the existing museum and library at the Bogor Presidential Palace did not fulfll the standards for a historical tourism destination. At the time, he designated the Bogor Presidential Compound as the location for the PMRIBK.

As the offcial website explains, the PMRIBK functions as a place for recreation and education, offering information through the management of exhibits that provide memorabilia and visuals of all the Indonesian presidents. Through these recreational and educational offerings, the PMRIBK hopes that visitors will be able to experience, appreciate, and follow the

P. Haryanti (\*) • I. Marwoto

Archaeology Department, Faculty of Humanities, Universitas Indonesia, Depok, Indonesia

<sup>©</sup> The Author(s) 2023

M. Budianta, S. Tiwon (eds.), *Trajectories of Memory*, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-99-1995-6\_16

example of the achievements of each of the Indonesian presidents. For recreational and educational purposes, several historical interests that belonged to each president are placed in the museum. These objects are arranged in a particular room, also known as the Hall of Fame, to preserve their memories.

The term "Hall of Fame" can be translated into Indonesian as Balai Kirti. Kamus Besar Bahasa Indonesia defnes "Balai" as a hall. The word "Kirti" is derived from Old Javanese Sanskrit and has several meanings: great deeds or an action that accrues fame. Thus, Balai Kirti means a hall that stores and exhibits historical objects that mark the journeys of the presidents of the Republic of Indonesia.

As in a Hall of Fame, the second foor of the PMRIBK, which is the Presidential Gallery, the focus of this chapter, presents paintings of each of the presidents, their memorabilia, items of clothing chosen for how they characterize individual presidents, photographs, videos, and awards received. The library is located on the same foor as the Presidential Gallery and displays presidential busts, while full-length statues representing each president are situated on the ground foor.

Although the PMRIBK is designed as an educational site, its exhibits do not offer informative historical narratives. Whereas museums function to disseminate historical narratives that aim to leave a lasting impact on visitors (Friss, 2006). And this does not only apply to museums because a hall of fame also has the same function, which aims to archive historical narratives.

Visitors can discern the hollowness in the narrative of the Presidential Gallery from the lack of thematic material for each of the presidential exhibits. In a museum display, such themes can mobilize at least part of the museum's message about the past (Burgoyne, 2003). The museum exhibit can also be understood as an activity to remember or memorialize what it organizes since a museum also serves to mobilize discourses and messages about the past and frame how people remember them. In other words, a museum constitutes public memory itself.

Apart from the museum, public memory is also frequently linked to monuments, cultural parades, and other cultural heritage celebrations. For this reason, this chapter aims to offer recommendations for themes that highlight the outstanding aspects of each presidential exhibition and suggests that such themes can be inspired by existing popular memorialization.

History is the teacher of life (*historia magistra vitae*). For this reason, historical narratives that convey specifc values offer lessons important to the nation. Frequently, a historical narrative is rooted in stories about heroic acts by culturally signifcant fgures, including presidents. These narratives are to be found not only in written texts but also in monuments or museum exhibits. This chapter thus also offers a compilation of monuments, museums, and other memorabilia found in different places in Indonesia and suggests that PMRIBK uses existing knowledge to construct the narratives of each president.

# Hollow Narratives in the Arrangement of Presidential Galleries

The lack of narratives in each gallery proffers a blank slate for the process of meaning-making. Such a process can be facilitated by depicting resonance and wonder in the organization of the museum. According to Greenblatt (1990), resonance is the power of a displayed object to transcend its formal limitations and arouse visitors' interest through complex and dynamic cultural abilities so that visitors understand their positions. On the other hand, wonder is the power of a displayed object to capture a visitor's gaze by constructing a uniquely alluring atmosphere that produces an elevated sense of intrigue. Visitors are expected to resonate with the collections' sets and leave the museum with a more profound comprehension upon emerging from the interaction with the collections. After going through resonance, visitors are expected to experience and feel the wonder of the collections, or even of the museum itself.

The organization of the exhibits may move from wonder to resonance instead of from resonance to wonder (Greenblatt, 1990). Greenblatt calls boutique lighting a technique that allows this to happen, utilized to spark wonder by creating a sense of mystery from without (not within) the object, specifcally using lighting equipment. This technique then constructs the mystical aura of the object. The use of boutique lighting is also strongly related to the element of the museum's ownership, which is why museums warn people not to touch objects or take them home. If we take the lighting, a displayed object will lose this sense of wonder and once again become something ordinary. Apart from lighting techniques, wonder can be evoked by representing an object within a cultural frame that dynamically changes through time and space. In other words, it is not only the use of aesthetics (e.g., lighting) but also the cultural framing of a particular collection that can produce wonder.

The Presidential Gallery displays its collections through glass cases and lighting. There are two collections in each gallery, and each of them is placed inside a glass case. The Galeri Sukarno uses glass cases to show two collections: a piece of paper attached to a wooden board and a series of stamps. The former lists all the honorary doctoral degrees granted to Sukarno, while the latter are rare stamps commemorating Asian Games IV produced during the 1962 event. Two collections are also displayed in a glass case in the Galeri Soeharto. Both show awards granted to President Soeharto for his work respectively in health and education. In Galeri B. J. Habibie, the collections housed in the glass case are special awards, the 1992 Von Karman Award (ICAS) and the 1994 Edward Warner Award (ICAO Medal), as well as Habibie's diary of his service as Minister of Research and Technology. For the Galeri K.H. Abdurrahman Wahid, the two special exhibits displayed in the glass case are the 1993 Magsaysay Award and the Honoris Causa Doctorate from Pantheon Sorbonne University, Paris, France, granted in 2000. Meanwhile, a vase and a tea set are displayed in two glass cases in the Galeri Megawati Soekarnoputri. Both artifacts were regularly used whenever President Megawati made an offcial visit to the Bogor Presidential Palace. As for the Galeri Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, visitors will fnd two objects displayed in glass cases: an award from the United Nations in the form of the helmet of peace and a mobile telephone the president used to communicate directly with the people through text messages sent to the number 9949.

In addition to the special collections displayed in the glass cases, the museum displays other memorabilia of the presidents in vitrine cabinets. However, being displayed in either a glass case or a vitrine, they are presented using lighting that enables visitors to gaze unimpeded. In addition, the lighting is also useful for maximizing the collection's charisma. Glass cases and vitrines also work to construct the aura of the collections, but since there are no given narratives for the visitor to understand the context, the element of wonder remains elusive. Evoking wonder successfully can only be achieved when explanations are accompanying the exhibits' arrangement regarding continuity and difference between aesthetics and contexts (Greenblatt, 1990). Until 2016, PMRIBK displayed as many as 276 collections, 70% of which are merely paper replicas.

While the core of mystery lies in the uniqueness, originality, and visual power of a collection (Greenblatt, 1990), resonance can only be achieved by arranging collections following particular characteristics. Besides uniqueness and originality, the idea of the fragility of a collection can also become a factor contributing to resonance. These qualities (especially fragility) can present a series of implied messages and questions through a displayed object.

The arrangement of the Presidential Gallery collections has not successfully presented a solid historical narrative about each president. There are attempts at flling the narrative hollowness using collections, but most of the exhibits are paper replicas. Therefore, the effects of resonance and wonder are not manifested. Because most of the collections are replicas, strong historical narratives are needed to accomplish the museum's goal. This goal is stated in the Academic Script of the PMRIBK inauguration (*Naskah Akademis Pendirian Museum Kepresidenan Republik Indonesia Balai Kirti*), which is to recognize and honor the presidents of the Republic of Indonesia, as well as to introduce and preserve the different ideas, policies, and strategies made during their times of service.

# Popular Monuments, Narrative Themes

Although not all the presidents have a specifc museum dedicated to them individually, some have sites of memory consisting of tombs or places of residence closely associated with them. Such sites and monuments are spread across Indonesia. These memorabilia offer possibilities for constructing narrative themes to fll in the meaning that remains hollow in the Balai Kirti.

# Sukarno

President Sukarno, the frst president of the Republic of Indonesia, was buried in his hometown, Blitar. Unlike Lenin, who is buried in the mausoleum in the Red Square of the Kremlin, Sukarno is buried under a shady tree in a humble cemetery. In his last will, Sukarno also specifcally asked that his tombstone be inscribed, "Here lies Bung Karno, the messenger of the people." The words can now be found on Sukarno's grave, inscribed on a large slab of black marble.

Not far from the location of Bung Karno's grave, the National Library of the Republic of Indonesia has set up a Technical Implementation Unit (UPT), the Independence Proclaimer Bung Karno Library, which contains a collection of books on Sukarno's thoughts as well as some relics: the dagger named Kyai Sekar Jagad, an ARCO-branded briefcase which Sukarno constantly carried in and out of prison, his tuxedo, and the gong named Kyai Djimat formerly owned by Sukarno's family.

There are historical traces of President Sukarno's legacy in the Sukarno Center, located in Tampaksiring, Gianyar, Bali. Managed by Yayasan Sukma Sukarno Indonesia, the Sukarno Center displays collections of President Sukarno's photographs and belongings. Another monument located in Bali, in South Denpasar, is the Great Bung Karno Museum (Museum Agung Bung Karno), which is managed by Yayasan Kepustakaan Bung Karno. This museum also displays collections of paintings, photographs, books, speeches, and belongings of Sukarno.

One of the most pronounced attributes of President Sukarno, based on historical resources and popular memory, is his role as founder of the nation. His recorded voice declaring the Indonesian Proclamation of Independence is replayed for visitors to the National Monument in the square across from the Presidential Palace in Jakarta. The proclamation monument is also one of the places people visit during the celebration of Indonesian independence. Hence, one strong theme is Sukarno as a proclamatory of sovereignty and founder of the nation. Other than that, Sukarno's heroic fgure has grown out of many myths and attributes; some self-announced, like the titles "penyambung lidah rakyat" ("extension of the people's voice"), "pemimpin besar revolusi" ("great leader of the revolution"), "waliyul amri" ("leader of the community"), and "Panglima Tertinggi" ("Supreme Commander"), were intended to describe Sukarno's greatness (Salahudin, 2018).

The themes linked to Sukarno are the following:


take us to the fulfllment of our dream: Free Indonesia!" (Salahudin, 2018).

Even when he transferred power to General Soeharto, Sukarno called for unity. He called on the Indonesian people as a whole, on all leaders of society, all state institutions, and all members of the Indonesian Armed Forces, to continue to strengthen unity, guard and reinforce the revolution, and facilitate the execution of the bearer of Decree number IX/1966 of the Provisional People's Consultative Assembly (MPRS) ("Penyerahan Kekuasaan kepada Jenderal Soeharto", 2017) fully.

# Soeharto

Soeharto is the second President of the Republic of Indonesia, and sources for constructing his image can be found in the Museum Purna Bhakti Pertiwi (MPBP), located in the Taman Mini Indonesia Indah (Widodo, 2010). The museum's 22,406 displayed items are classifed into three types: non-souvenirs, souvenirs, and awards. However, the existing collection cannot construct President Soeharto's image fully since the collections of the MPBP have not been arranged according to a collection-based classifcation system. There have been no studies of the collections in the context of the museum. In other words, the arrangement of collections in the MPBP cannot convey any relevant information or knowledge that complies with the museum's vision and mission statement. Furthermore, the MPBP has been closed to the public for management restructuring.

A counterpart of the MPBP would be the Museum Memorial Jenderal Besar H.M. Soeharto, which is in the village of Kemusuk, Bantul, Yogyakarta. Established at the initiative of Probosutedjo, President Soeharto's younger brother, and managed by the Yayasan Wangsa Manggala, the displayed collections consist of Soeharto's belongings during the period spanning the years between his military duty and his presidency. One remarkable collection is a diorama of resistance, which depicts his coordination with the Great General Sudirman during the armed offensive of March 1, 1949, against the Dutch. Another diorama depicts the time when President Soeharto was invited by the FAO to Rome in 1985 to receive an award for achieving food self-suffciency. This event was followed on July 21, 1986, at the Binagraha building in Jakarta, when Soeharto hosted the Director General of the FAO, Edward Saouma, and offcially accepted the gold medal from the FAO (Pour et al., 2014).

As part of nation-building, a country's leaders make efforts to project symbols of unity by constructing popular sites like theme parks, establishing schools and universities, and public museums (Hitchcock, 1998). In Indonesia, the Taman Mini Indonesia Indah is such an example. Built by order of President Soeharto and his wife, Tien Soeharto, Taman Mini Indonesia Indah is a hybrid form of a famous national structure combining an open-air museum with a recreational park.

Taman Mini Indonesia Indah was designed to display the diversity of Indonesian ethnic groups and cultures and as an exhibit of the Pancasila state philosophy; it was also intended to enhance national consciousness (Hitchcock, 1998). A powerful theme of nation-building is found in a speech contained in the offcial guide, in which Soeharto emphasizes that Taman Mini Indonesia Indah is an effort to strengthen national development now and, in the future, (Hitchcock, 1998).

Possible narratives for Soeharto are, frst, "Pak Harto Who is Never Far from the Peasants" (*Pak Harto Tidak Pernah Jauh dari Petani*). According to Gunawan Wahyu Widodo, curator of MPBP, Soeharto once declared, "my roots are in the village," and he knows what the peasants need. This enabled him to launch a policy early in his tenure in which he prioritized the agricultural sector intending to achieve rice self-suffciency. As one born and raised within the environment of a farming village, Soeharto understood the lives of the peasants. In the mid-1970s, Soeharto wished to gain information directly from the people through dialogues. He used the outcomes of these dialogues to plan several economic policies. He would visit the people by incognito trips to villages using a hardtop Toyota all-terrain vehicle rather than the presidential car. The incognito Presidential group never used more than three cars, including his adjutant and bodyguards, and traveled without ministers or even local offcials" knowledge (Pour et al., 2014).

Second, Soeharto has been named The Smiling General, which suits him well. It was the German *Handelsblatt* newspaper that called him "Der lachende General" or, *The Smiling General* in English (Johnny, 2019). Soeharto's characteristic smile is seen in every one of his portraits. Despite this, his smiles are not always easy to understand, and people may even misinterpret them. For example, Hayono Isman, Minister of Youth and Sports in Development Cabinet VI (1993–1998), thought that Soeharto approved of his organizing a seminar about the Nawaksara, when, in fact, he thought the opposite (Johnny, 2019). Meanwhile, Nawaksara is Soekarno's accountability speech in front of the MPRS General Assembly on June 22, 1966. The speech contains the situation in Indonesia throughout 1965/1966 (Danang, 2021).

# B.J. Habibie

According to the data in the museum repository owned by the Ministry of Education and Culture, there has not been any museum that depicts the fgure of Prof. Dr. (HC). Ing. Dr. Sc. Mult. Bacharuddin Jusuf Habibie (B. J. Habibie), the third President of the Republic of Indonesia. The story about him is instead portrayed through a movie titled *Ainun dan Habibie*. In addition to the silver screen, the love story between B.J. Habibie and his wife Ainun is also commemorated by a monument in the former president's birthplace, Parepare, South Sulawesi. This monument was built in 2015 and is known as the Monument of the True Love between Habibie and Ainun. It is now a site to remember and pray for B.J. Habibie (Monumen Cinta, 2019).

In addition, another site linked to B.J. Habibie in the popular imagination is the house where he was born in Pare-Pare, which is about to become a B.J. Habibie Museum, was built in 2020, not far from the Habibie-Ainun True Love monument ("Rumah Kelahiran BJ Habibie di Parepare akan Jadi Museum," 2019). In Gorontalo, the construction of a statue of B.J. Habibie holding an airplane was proposed to memorialize the fact that the third president of the Republic of Indonesia hailed from Gorontalo. His desire to offciate at the opening of the monument and park remained unfulflled because he passed away before that (Dwinanda, 2019). He was replaced at the ceremony by his eldest son, Ilham Akbar Habibie, who formally opened the B.J. Habibi monument and park in Gorontalo in November 2019 (Dwinanda, 2019).

Yet another popular site for the memory of B.J. Habibie is the Habibie-Ainun Library in Patra Kuningan, Jakarta. This library is attached to the B.J. Habibie residence and holds the thousands of books that Habibie owned. It was his favorite spot to spend time. The books do not only cover subjects relating to machinery and airplanes but include a variety of subjects including arts and culture. The library also functions as a location for discussions and musical performances (Sukarlan, 2020).

Habibie also established the Habibie Center on November 10, 1999, in Jakarta. The offcial site for the place, habibiecenter.or.id, states that the Center was dedicated to the promotion and development of democracy in Indonesia because for B.J. Habibie democracy needed to continue to grow in a modern Indonesia.

These monuments and the popular imagination surrounding the fgure of B.J. Habibie mean that there are several narratives possible about him: frst, B.J. Habibie as the Father of Technology. The third president was an engineer and a true technologist. As president, he frequently described Indonesia through the analogy of a stalled aircraft that was pointing sharply downward and the only way to save this aircraft (Indonesia) was to end the stall and point it back up (Leksono, 2019). He also understood that, like an automobile, a country's system could not properly be accelerated when the economy was running at 100 kilometers per hour while the political aspect was running at 40 kilometers per hour. Like a system built on many engines, all must move at the same pace. Thus, because of his love of science and technology, which he implemented for the sake of Indonesia's greatness, Habibie is deserving of the title "Father of Technology" (Bapak Teknologi), as President Joko Widodo declared on his visit to the hospital upon learning of Habibie's passing, "As many people recognize, Pak Habibie, who for a quarter-century carried the banner of technology, deserves to be named 'Father of Technology'" (Leksono, 2019).

Second, as an aerospace engineer, B.J. Habibie earned the designation "Mr. Crack" because of the theory of Crack Propagation he developed on the progression of cracks in aircraft wings (Pour et al., 2014). He also developed the Method, Function, and Habibie Theory in the AGARD (Advisory Group for Aerospace Research Development) book (Pour et al., 2014).

Third, his extensive library collection shows that Habibie was not only a technocrat but also a man of letters (Sukarlan, 2020). He promoted the B.J. Habibie principle that a developed country needed both "hi-tech & hi-touch," that is, sophisticated technology as well as high levels of culture and art. Through the Habibie-Ainun Foundation, he showed that the world of art held an equally important place as technology in his heart. For this reason, the Habibie-Ainun Foundation is dedicated to flm, photography, literature, and music.

# Abdurrahman Wahid

The fourth president of the Republic Indonesia, Kiai Haji Abdurrahman Wahid (also known as Gus Dur), is one of Nahdlatul Ulama fgure, the biggest Islamic organization in Indonesia. He also founded the National Awakening Party (Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa). He is commonly remembered through the pilgrimage to his tomb, which is in the family cemetery in the Tebuireng Pesantren, in Diwek, Jombang, East Java. As many as 2000–3000 pilgrims visit the tomb daily, and the numbers rise steeply to a high of 10,000 shortly before and during Ramadhan. Such increase is attributed by two factors: frst, Gus Dur was an *ulama* (a religious teacher), who was also respected as a *wali* (leader). Second, pilgrimages to the tombs are an annual Muslim ritual, usually taking place in the holy month of Ramadhan. These pilgrimages, however, are not restricted to Muslims; people from different religions and ethnicities also make the pilgrimage to Gus Dur's tomb. Notably, during *Imlek*, the Chinese New Year, scores of Chinese citizens from the town of Jombang pay their respects and pray at his tomb to commemorate his ferce defense of Indonesians of Chinese descent's rights ("Imlekan, Warga Tionghoa Jombang Ziarahi Makam Gus Dur", 2015).

Gus Dur has also left a living heritage in the form of the Gusdurian network of followers and admirers. The Gusdurian network arose a few months after his death in December 2009 ("They Work at Grassroots Level", 2017). This network now covers more than a hundred Indonesian cities and regencies. Coordinated by his eldest daughter, Alissa Wahid, the network is focused on social empowerment, strengthening civil society, disseminating Gus Dur's ideas, and the formation of social leaders through capacity-building programs and advocacy on strategic issues.

Rumah Pergerakan Griya Gus Dur (Home of the Gus Dur Movement), located at Jalan Taman Amir Hamzah 9, Menteng, Central Jakarta, was the family home of KH Abdul Wahid Hasyim, Gus Dur's father (The Wahid Institute, 2016). In January 2016, the residence was formally declared as the Home of the Gus Dur Movement by his wife, Shinta Nuriyah, and their four daughters, Alissa Wahid, Yenny Wahid, Anita Wahid, and Inayah Wahid. The Gusdurian Network Indonesia and the Wahid Foundation (formerly the Wahid Institute) currently have their headquarters at this home.

The Wahid Institute was established on September 7, 2004, as an organization to represent Gus Dur's principles and intellectual aspirations (Wahid Institute, n. d.). It was initiated by Gus Dur and has now changed its name to Wahid Foundation. As explained on the website, Wahid Foundation remains true to the promotion of Gus Dur's intellectual vision of humanity and the tolerance, social diversity, improving the welfare of the poor, developing of democracy and fundamental justice, and the growth of the values of peace and non-violence in Indonesia and throughout the world.

The fourth Indonesian president was steadfast in his love of democracy, humanity, and pluralism, as Gus Solah explained (Osdar, 2017). His love for humanity is also refected in the vision of Wahid Foundation. His love of pluralism continues to spread even after his death and is memorialized by the Gus Dur Library, located in the Chinese Cultural Park in the Taman Mini Indonesia Indah park. The library was built by the ethnic Chinese to honor Gus Dur's respect for pluralism (Khaerudin, 2019).

The narrative about Gus Dur should remain linked to the public memory of this multi-faceted man during his life. First, he is remembered as humorous person, who eased tensions with his frequent, spontaneous jokes (Hakim, 2018). Second, he is known as a humanist *ulama* with a deep concern for humanitarian values. Gus Solah, Gus Dur's younger brother, said of him that he was steadfast in his love of democracy and pluralism (Osdar, 2017). Third, Gus Dur's stature as a leader who promoted tolerance and universalism. His thinking that went beyond the symbols is rooted in universalist and tolerant Islam (Ibad & AF Fikri, 2012). For Gus Dur, the universal and tolerant values of Islam are teachings that promote openness to the inclusion of cultural and intellectual values. He was the protector of minorities, whether ethnic, religious, or other cultural aspects, a role that he understood as the manifestation of Islamic doctrine to be a blessing for all of the world (Pour et al., 2014). Fourth, Gus Dur is also known as the Father of Pluralism, which he manifested in pilgrimages to the tombs of individuals known for their service to humanitarian principles, be it the tomb of a Buddhist, or graves of individuals who might otherwise have been forgotten (Pour et al., 2014). He made efforts to end the violence in Aceh and did not hesitate to designate Papua for Irian Jaya, as a more culturally accepted by the people of that island. His pluralism extended also to an eclectic taste in food. Fifth, Gus Dur is also named a *waliyullah* (Hakim, 2018), for which reason people make ritual pilgrimages to his tomb, although some of his ideas were not easily understood and were at times considered controversial. As Pour et al. note (2014), Gus Dur was larger than life, and his thinking, attitudes, and actions were often ahead of his time.

# Megawati Soekarnoputri

The ffth President of Indonesia, Megawati Soekarnoputri is the frst female president of the country, and the daughter of Sukarno, the frst president. However, there is as yet no museum dedicated to her. She has been a strong infuential fgure in the Partai Demokrasi Indonesia Perjuangan (PDIP, or Democratic Party of Indonesia for Struggle). The party is headquartered on Jalan Diponegoro, in Menteng, Central Jakarta, and she has been party head since 1999.

Some possible themes for Megawati are, frstly, as the First Female President of Indonesia and, secondly, as the Steadfast Woman. When Megawati became leader of PDIP in 1999, she took charge of a party with an enormous and unwieldy organizational structure with millions of members and cadres spread throughout Indonesia, including people of different religions, ethnicities, cultures, and backgrounds. Her leadership of the party has prevailed through serious tests and elections. She has also displayed integrity, refusing to compromise, and choosing instead to function as opposition (de Fretes & Hastuti, 2012). Her integrity is of particular importance as she faced electoral maneuvering that questioned the right of women to be president. Her strong will was evident early on in her political career when she shocked people with her decision in the early 1990s to join PDI (Democratic Party of Indonesia) as there had been a generalized commitment in 1982 that Sukarno's children should refrain from political activity. Yet, when she was asked why she chose to join the PDI she smiled and calmly replied, "I am on the way to Merdeka Utara" (the location of the Presidential Palace). In other words, "I am making a great effort towards the Palace" (de Fretes & Hastuti, 2012). Thirdly, "The Brave Lady" is another appropriate theme. This was the title of a book launched by the former ministers of the Gotong Royong Cabinet on her 72nd birthday (Theodora, 2019). One of these was Purnomo Yusgiantoro, who served as minister of energy and mineral resources in her cabinet. He said that he had suggested the title "The Brave Lady" because of the courage she showed in making decisions. One example was the decision that she made to visit the United States immediately after the September 11, 2001, tragedy. As a result, Indonesia secured a commitment of Rp. 200 trillion in investments, an enormously signifcant amount at the time (Theodora, 2019).

# Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono

Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, popularly referred to by his initials, SBY, became the sixth President of Indonesia, having won the majority of votes in the second round of Indonesia's frst direct presidential election. Following the examples set by Sukarno and Abdurahman Wahid, he chose to take up residence at the Merdeka Palace for the duration of his presidency ("Presiden yang Tak Tinggal di Istana", 2014), only moving temporarily to his residence in Cikeas, Bogor, to conduct party business involving political rather than national interests (https://kompas.id). This private residence in Cikeas has been the scene of many historical events including the idea to create the new political party, Partai Demokrat, that carried him to the Indonesian Presidency in 2004 and 2009 "SBY dan Kenangan Jejak Bersejarah Rumah Cikeas", (2017) However, Cikeas also bore witness to the party's loss in the 2014 General Elections.

Some themes are appropriate for Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono: the frst being his popular designation as The Thinking General (Jenderal yang Berpikir) for the intellectual acumen he had displayed early in his life, and the fact that he ranked best in class throughout his education at the AKABRI, the Indonesian Armed Forces Academy from which he graduated with the prestigious honor of the Adhi Makayasa awarded to him by President Soeharto, as the best graduate of the Academy in 1973 (Pour et al., 2014). He further won recognition as the best military instructor at the Staff and Command School of the Army (SESKOAD) and continued to build his intellectual record throughout his military service and into his presidency, when he earned the Master of Arts in Management from Webster University and a Ph.D. in Agroeconomics from the Bogor Institute of Agriculture (Pour et al., 2014).

As a military instructor, he flled his time by working, reading, and writing articles. One of his works, a book that has been published by Army Command and Staff College in 1990, *Professionalism of the Indonesian Armed Forces, Now and in the Future*, was deemed "too progressive" because at the time he wrote it the Indonesian Armed Forces were still deeply committed to the Dwifungsi, or dual function in civil as well as military affairs. When he was appointed Chief of Staff for Social and Political Affairs (Kassospol) of the Armed Force, he oversaw transitioning the military to meet the demands of reform during the Reformation era. A paper he wrote in November 1998, "The Role of Military in Modern Society: ABRI in the Transitional Period in Indonesia" contributed to the conceptualization of the Indonesian Military (TNI) of the future (Pour et al., 2014).

A second possible narrative theme for SBY is "The Perfectionist." Jusuf Kalla, who served as his Vice President during SBY's frst term, described him as a perfectionist ("JK Bandingkan Cara Kerja 2 Presiden: SBY Ingin Perfect, Jokowi Detail," 2019). The desire for perfection is probably rooted in the need to preserve a balance between the physical and the spiritual and has led to a very careful, calculating attitude (Maeswara, 2009).

During the fnal moments of his presidency, SBY inaugurated the Museum Kepresidenan RI Balai Kirti in the Bogor Presidential Palace, and visitors to the museum encountered a plaque in the courtyard bearing an inscription of his statement:

#### *Setiap Presiden ingin berbuat terbaik untuk bangsa dan negaranya* [Trans.]

Every President wishes to do the best for his/her nation and country

PMRIBK is not simply about presidential collections but also about memories. When the museum was frst established, it served as a holder of memorabilia of SBY's presidency. In the Ruang Epilog/Interaktif (Epilogue/Interactive Hall), visitors can watch a video showing photos of the inauguration of the PMRIBK. In addition, an examination of the exhibitions shows that the majority of collections are found in the Gallery of President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (17%), which is also equipped with two video presentations in addition to the mandatory video wall found in each presidential gallery. The frst video projection shows programs and achievements of SBY's presidency; the other shows his life before being elected president.

Whether directly or indirectly, presidential monuments have constructed the fgure of each president. Sukarno's tomb, Soeharto's MPBP, Pare-pare's Monumen Cinta Sejati for Habibie, Gus Dur's tomb, the PDIP headquarters for Megawati, and SBY's residence in Cikeas each has its narrative centered on a particular president. The monuments are scattered in different locations, and none is dedicated to the memory of all Indonesian presidents. It is important to note that collective memories related to each president are infuenced by different historical moments, including those that do not carry positive meanings, such as the fall of Soekarno, Soeharto, and Gus Dur. Considering the widespread locations of the monuments and the fact that the memories are not always positive, the PMRIBK museum might be understood as an attempt at depicting all presidents of Indonesia within a common framework, though not necessarily limited to a single narrative.

# Critical Reflection: Redesigning the Gallery of Honor

Museums and halls of fame will change following societal shifts as they attempt to capture the social imagination through their visitors. How do these institutions serve their cultures and societies over time? They must of course carry a wide array of educational offerings as individuals have different ways of learning. This is in line with the constructivist theory of education that shifts the focus to the learners in the educational process and more varied ways of learning (Hein, 1998).

The monthly record of the PMRIBK visitors shows a high number of students compared to the general public. Yet, PMRIBK has no special place for the students, the majority of whom are elementary school students. The writers suggest in this chapter that a special space be reserved for elementary students to allow them to roam around freely. The space inside PMRIBK also needs to be designed in such a way as to make it more friendly and intimate, so that visitors feel free to explore and seek knowledge.

At present, there are three video walls with one flm projected on the white wall for each president. However, the visitors have not been able to make use of the sense of smell (olfactory) and sense of touch in the museum. PMRIBK could provide a collection of each president's favorite snacks or personal choice of perfumes. PMRIBK curators can recommend some collections that are safe to be touched by visitors.

To invite participation, an opinion board could be installed in PMRIBK. For example, in the gallery of President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, who was the initiator of the Bidikmisi scholarship, a question could be posed on the opinion board: "Are you the recipient of the Bidikmisi scholarship? Share your experience here." By sharing their personal experience, visitors could directly make meaning out of the theme provided by the museum. At the same time, the curator could make use of the stories as an additional narrative relevant to the exhibition theme.

One social media used by PMRIBK is Instagram. Through Instagram, PMRIBK provides information about public programs and updated news about the Indonesian presidents. However, PMRIBK has not made use of Instagram as a medium to invite public dialogue. The social media account of PMRIBK has not served as a channel for public opinion. PMRIBK curators could open dialogue through their Instagram accounts by discussing their collection and inviting responses from the wider public about the exhibit. The responses can incite inter-follower dialogue globally, which can be used by curators to extend the content of the narratives according to the theme of the exhibition.

# Conclusion

The lack of a theme for the galleries of the presidents shows that PMRIBK is still oriented toward its collections, although the theme of the exhibits are messages that ought to be conveyed by the museums, and how these messages are to be remembered. By including the idea of a hall of fame in its name, PMRIBK has created an opportunity to present historical memories that can be chosen from a wealth of existing popular memories. Because some of the memories surrounding each president may not be entirely positive, the hall of fame provides a space to preserve the fame of each president by choosing, organizing, and describing the past from all the different memories. This chapter has opened up several possibilities that may be activated by the PMRIBK through participatory activities involving visitors from all societal backgrounds to ensure that what is presented is not merely a collection of objects but also the collective memory of a nation.

The presentation of narratives based on themes can make it easy for visitors to obtain information and can provide them with the free choice of learning style. Visitors can choose and decide what subjects and practices they like to use to produce meanings. Thus, the aspect of poetics running through the themes that are embedded in the narratives and the constructivist approach can be interconnected to achieve meaning-making.

This constructivist approach assumes that museum visitors already have a background of knowledge, and the museum can expect to receive visitor feedback as a meaning-making activity through a physical dialog path using the Dialog Room and a virtual dialog path in cyberspace by utilizing social media that can reach out to the wider community.

The effort to hold a dialog between the museum and the visitors/community through the Dialog Room or social media provides space for the active engagement of visitors/community to participate in interpreting the meanings of the narrations and the museum collections as a result of meaning-making. The dialog becomes a means to interpret meanings through intellectual negotiations.

The presentation of theme-based narratives allows visitors to obtain information and grant them free choice of learning, particularly in determining and deciding what subjects and which practices they apply during the meaning-making process. Therefore, meaning-making is a perpetual process, in which meaning is continuously assembled due to the inexistence of constant meaning. With that said, the meaning-making process will always be ongoing. It is the space where the element of poetics is applied to a museum's arrangement of exhibits.

**Acknowledgment** This work was copyedited by ENAGO. This chapter was supported by Research Grant for International Publication managed by Universitas Indonesia Year 2017 (Grant Number: NKB-458/UN2.R3.1/HKP.05.00/2017).

# References


umum/19/11/25/q1j319414-patung-dan-taman-bj-habibie-di-gorontalodiresmikan?


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