Timothy Gitzen

Banal Security

Queer Korea in the Time of Viruses



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For Jaewon and a friendship as brilliant as the cosmos

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The profound effect those friendships and stories had on me and my work is telling, but also fits within the training I was receiving at the University of Minnesota under the guidance of David Valentine. In hindsight it should have made sense at the time of research that I was drawn to queer activism given David's own work and influence on my methodological and theoretical disposition. David did more than just ask a few inquisitive questions: he took the leap with me. His mentor-

ship, keen writerly eye, and adaptability over the years were part and parcel of my training, fieldwork, and writing of this book. But, above all, he taught me perhaps the most important lesson that I share with colleagues, mentees, and students: lead through kindness. In these pandemic and politically insecure times, such a lesson matters even more.

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Korea Foundation, the University of Hong Kong, and the University of Minnesota. I use known or preferred spellings of Korean names throughout the book. Other transliterated Korean names or words follow the McCune-Reischauer Romanization system. All usages of "Korea" refer to South Korea. All Korean translations are my own, assisted by dictionaries and friends, unless noted otherwise.

Map of South Korea. Map designed by Hannu Linkola.

Preface

The Time of Viruses

The Covid-19 pandemic seemed to usher in the time of viruses. Sitting comfortably in a predominately maskless North Carolina, United States, in December 2022, four vaccination shots deep, I look back at the pandemic's dominance and the multiple millions of people dead in the last three years while also looking forward at a guaranteed uncertainty about the future: what happens when the next one hits? Many scientists claim that this pandemic was just the beginning; not only is the next virus on the horizon but it is most likely already here. While the 1918 influenza pandemic that saw a third of the world's population infected may have left a viral mark on the 20th century, the quickening of different viral outbreaks in the 21st century—from various animal influenzas (e.g., swine flu and bird flu) to the severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus (SARS-CoV)—frames the Covid-19 pandemic as the latest, albeit significantly more intense, biosecurity threat facing the world. It is this turn to the virus and its biosecurity implications, the threat it poses to national and even global populations, that engenders a sense that we have truly entered the time of viruses.

Yet, while Covid-19 seemed to usher in the time of viruses, for queer communities that era began long ago. For queer men in the United States, the time of viruses often meant a literal death sentence. Indeed, the 1980s and early 1990s saw the rise of the AIDS epidemic, caused by the human immunodeficiency virus (HIV), with hundreds of thousands of deaths while the Reagan administration did little to address the situation. That said, the social and political effects were more ambiguous. While social stigma made the queer body a vector

of disease through HIV from the 1980s onwards, activist groups such as Act Up politicized the virus and created communities of solidarity.

For South Korean queer men, by contrast, HIV did not provide the opportunity for such rehabilitation. This was due to the restriction of the public sphere and a collective hatred of homosexuality that ran even deeper than in the United States. What was worse, where American men with HIV bore no impact on security concerns, this book demonstrates how the mundaneness of national security in Korea, brought on by over half a century of perpetual North Korean threats, transformed queer men through HIV into a threat to the very survival of the nation. I argue that it is this context, what I call *banal security*, that compels queer Koreans to participate in their own securitization for the sake of biopolitical inclusion into the Korean citizenry. This intervention facilitates connections to other contexts where similar features inhere, providing the ethnographic material herein a trajectory outside the silo of Korea.

HIV became one way for the South Korean government and Korean citizens to interpret queer Koreans as disruptions and threats to the nation's security, but it is not the only one. Not only are the bodies of queer men—assumed to be HIV-positive—considered biological threats to the purity of the Korean family and nation, but queer soldiers supposedly leave the military compromised and open for an attack. Queer soldiers do this, judicial rulings stipulate, by distracting other soldiers with their nonnormativity and the possibility of sex, and such distraction pulls otherwise capable and loyal soldiers, read as straight, away from their duties. Consequently, queer cultures and peoples are equated to threats to Korean culture, and queer festival participants require constant police supervision as potential disruptions. The Covid-19 pandemic certainly exacerbated some of these threat associations with an early May 2020 outbreak inside gay bars and clubs, as I explore in a subsequent chapter. Not only was this outbreak not the first viral epidemic in Korea to entangle queer Koreans to viruses and stigmas at the microbial level but it fit within a more convoluted narrative and framing that saw queer Koreans, queer activism/politics, and national security uncomfortably entwined. While uncomfortable for queer Koreans and activists, especially as national security compels participation from all national subjects, I demonstrate in the chapters that follow how this seemingly bizarre entanglement of sexuality and security speaks to a sociocultural logic in Korea that builds on over 70 years of history.

To speak of the time of viruses in South Korea, then, is to both centralize the queer Korean body as *the* viral figure—the queer body as the threat from within that corrupts "healthy" Koreans—and trace the immediate antecedents of this current (and future) viral era. It is to expand the parameters of the time of viruses to before the Covid-19 pandemic, recognizing that the discrimination that befell queer folks in the wake of that May 2020 outbreak was part of a wider enlacement of security and sexuality that routinely produces security-laden discrimination.

***

The work for this book began from earlier stories shared with me by college-aged queer South Korean men about their relationships with each other and their families. I was a graduate student from the US learning Korean and Korean Studies when I met them, navigating my own relationships as a gay man who had recently come out. I watched as they began talking about military service, the dread that they faced in anticipating their service as queer men. Yet what started as an ethnography of the military transformed in scale and scope during fieldwork in 2013, as the object of national security came into focus despite how mundane national security had become as a result of continuous North–South tensions.

North Korea does pose a legitimate threat to the South insofar as North Korea has attempted presidential assassinations; has taken South Koreans hostage; presumably sank the ROKS *Cheonan* in 2010, killing 46; bombarded Yeonpyeong Island in 2010, killing five to ten individuals; and continues to enunciate threats against South Korea. But these threats have existed since the armistice agreement between North and South was signed in 1953, and, while the South's authoritarian decades from the 1960s to the 1980s witnessed most of the North's provocations, the threat is always there, mere miles from South Korea's capital. These reminders of the military, security, and the threat of North Korea pervade South Korea, but the discourses surrounding these infrastructures, policies, and events—that the threat from North Korea is imminent—equally contribute to not only their pervasion but their usage in Koreans' daily lives. More surprising, citizens, politicians, doctors, military officers, judges, and presidents were mobilizing national security to target queer Koreans, claiming that queer

soldiers disrupt military readiness, that homosexuals are carriers of disease, and that queer folks are threats to familial, ethnic, and cultural purity. In part, this book asks how this happened: how did national security become a discourse to be mobilized against gender and sexual minorities? What does such mobilization and treatment of queer folks as national security disruptions and threats say, then, about Korea, the nation, and security? And what does an anthropological approach to national security in Korea entail? Queerness became my answer and my method, the way to *see* national security as an object in dire need of excavation and critique. Queerness compels me to challenge the totalizing and mystical qualities of national security by looking to those deemed disruptions and threats—and the margins whence they came. Doing so traces the ways national security manufactures normativity that enables security institutions, states, and citizens to thus target the nonnormative as disruptions and threats.

Methods and Ethics

This book is the result of an amalgamation of different research methods spanning from 2013 to 2021, combining ethnography with qualitative interviews, analysis of science and technology studies, critical legal analysis, queer theory, and discourse analysis.

The ethnographic fieldwork that punctuates the book began in the summers of 2013 and 2014, continuing through 2015 and 2016, with follow-up trips in the fall of 2019. It consisted primarily of participant observation at protests, workshops, symposiums, gatherings, discussions, parties, festivals, and press events related to queer people and issues. This included events such as the discussion by South Korea's Human Rights Organizations Network of the UN Human Rights Committee's 2015 report into civil and political rights in the country, the LGBTI Human Rights Forum, and the Korean Queer Culture Festival. I was also involved in queer activist organizations, and as a result I met several key activists. Interviews thus emerged primarily out of my participant observation and happened intermittently throughout my fieldwork. Here, it is important to recognize my positionality as a cisgender white man with US citizenship; this facilitated some of my relationships and conversations while at times hindering others.

Engagement with interlocutors and interviewees took place in conjunction with both the University of Minnesota's Institutional Review

Board (IRB) and the University of Hong Kong's Human Research Ethics Committee (HREC), both of which I was affiliated with while conducting my research. My dissertation (2018) and a book chapter based on it were also derived from this fieldwork. I was publicly accused of ethical lapses in those writings, a situation which I addressed in a statement available on my website (www.timothygitzen.com/statement). The present volume does not include any mention of individuals discussed in this online statement or the stories they shared with me.

All of those I interviewed during my fieldwork knew who I was and about my research given my growing reputation as a researcher with activists and organizations. I obtained verbal informed consent from my interlocutors, some of whom also provided written consent. All names of interlocutors and interviewees used in this book are pseudonyms that I created. In some cases I have credited different data obtained from a single interlocutor or interviewee to multiple individuals, while in other instances I have merged multiple interlocutors or interviewees into a composite character. The purpose of both of these strategies was to further anonymize interlocutors and interviewees. Observations of public events, particularly those in outside public spaces, did not focus on individuals, and I do not include any identifying information in my accounts of those events.

One subset of qualitative interviews featured in Chapter 3 was collected between 2020 and 2021 during a collaborative project with my colleague in Korea, Wonkeun Chun. Twenty-four Korean individuals were interviewed about the May 2020 outbreak of Covid-19 that happened in gay bars and clubs in the queer districts of Itaewon (It'aewŏn) and Jongro (Chongno) in Seoul, South Korea. Most interviewees were gay, they ranged in age from their early 20s to their mid-40s, and they either frequented these spaces or worked with individuals who did so. Interviews and transcriptions were completed by Chun and three research assistants in Seoul, while I conducted all the data analysis and writing associated with the interview data. All interviewees featured in Chapter 3 provided written informed consent, and Chun is in possession of the consent forms. All the transcribed interview data was anonymized by Chun and the team prior to my analysis and writing.

The inclusion of Covid-19-related data made sense for multiple reasons. Not only were the surveillance practices I had witnessed earlier, between 2013 and 2016, intensified after the May 2020 Covid-19 outbreak, but there was a return of the medical discrimination and

association of queer folks with biosecurity logics and practices evident during the 2015 outbreak of Middle East Respiratory Syndrome.

I consider analysis of science and technology studies, critical legal analysis, and discourse analysis part of the anthropological toolbox, but they also appropriately intersect with feminist and queer studies. I examine laws and judicial rulings (Chapter 1), the use of surveillance technologies (Chapter 3), public health and medical policies and practices (Chapter 4), elections and an antiterrorism bill (Chapter 5), and a variety of recent media reports pertaining to security, protests, and viral outbreaks (throughout each chapter). I mention these different methodological and analytical forms to state that while I identify as a queer anthropologist, this book targets a wider audience beyond anthropology. I consider it a transdisciplinary book, especially given the queer theorists that fundamentally inform it (as I explore in the Introduction).

***

Most of my fieldwork took place in Seoul during the presidency of Park Geun-hye (Pak Kŭn-hye) (2013–2017) and the control of the National Assembly by her conservative party (Liberty Korea Party). Park was impeached in early 2017 after months of historic candlelight vigils denouncing her corruption. At the time of my fieldwork, however, Park's unpopularity was still growing, mobilizing in response to her perceived mishandling of the 2014 Sewŏl ferry disaster, in which 304 people died when the ferry sank, including 250 high-school students. Under Park, Korea experienced a resurgence of authoritarian policies, including the growing authority of the executive branch and the National Intelligence Service, but also increased demonstrations and political activism. Park's presidency and the tensions, frustrations, and uneasiness it created for progressives and my interlocutors color my ethnography and this book.

More importantly, the years of her presidency were formative in both the development of the national security assemblage and the mobilization of that assemblage to target queer people and bodies. It would be easy to assume, given Park's impeachment and the defeat of the Liberty Korea Party in the National Assembly in both 2016 and 2020, that things will "get better" for queer people, but that implies that conservatives and anti-LGBT protesters alone are to blame. They may

certainly incite a great deal of homophobia, but part of my argument is that when the treatment of queer folks is tied to national security, these queer folks are enmeshed into a living memory of fear and uncertainty around peninsular destruction and material existence. Those feelings and memories of fear infiltrate the daily lives of all Koreans in a myriad of ways and have become banal. Such banality is palpable in the ethnographic encounters, stories, and experiences that weave through this book, often trading the sensational for the mundane to accentuate the ordinariness of national security.

Introduction

(B)anal Security

Panic has descended onto South Korea's landscape. Fear permeates Korean laws, policies, and social discourse over conscripted male soldiers having sex with each other to the extent that military courts have sentenced soldiers as recent as 2017 to prison time for having consensual sex with other male soldiers in the privacy of their own homes. One army captain, days before his set discharge date from mandatory military service—a requirement for all able-bodied South Korean men—was arrested on these exact charges on May 24, 2017. This case ignited a firestorm of queer and anti-militarization activism that claimed that this army captain was part of a much larger blacklisting of male soldiers for their sexual practices (Park 2017; Choe 2017). The Military Human Rights Center, in particular, provided evidence to the press of a broader conspiracy to coerce soldiers to track, out, and arrest queer male soldiers, supposedly orchestrated by Army Chief of Staff Chang Chun-gyu. The center even provided screenshot evidence of Jack'd, a gay dating application, featuring soldiers attempting to out other soldiers on the application (Park 2017). The pretense of the military's denial is set against laws that punish same-sex sex for soldiers. Article 6 of Section 92 of the Military Penal Code, instituted in 1962, outlaws anal sex and other "indecent sexual acts," and under this clause the unnamed army captain was arrested and convicted with jail time.

While there have been past cases of soldiers charged under the anti-sodomy law, this was the first reported incident of the military proactively seeking out suspected queer soldiers. This is a form of queer entrapment, whereby the military coerces known queer soldiers to trick other queer soldiers into outing themselves to then be pros-

ecuted. The law itself is horrendous, queer and human rights activists contend, but the flagrant use of military authority and coercion to prosecute under this law sets a dangerous and violent precedent. This amid the fact that these entrapment practices are being carried out on young men required by law to serve, many of whom are between the ages of 18 and 24.

The experience of mandatory military service is more than an 18-month experience; it is a lifetime-making, gender-making, and society-crafting endeavor. Not only are all boys oriented toward their service from a young age but men consistently refer to their military service for the rest of their lives. Perhaps more materially, men are required to serve in the military reserves until their 40s, participating in yearly reserve training. Yet queer Koreans are in a far more vulnerable position as they face both the legal requirement of their service and the legal outlawing of their sexualities. This is what they have to look forward to, what they have to experience, what they remember. And this is all set against a social context where employers, schools, businesses, and even hospitals can openly discriminate against queer people, where few come out for fear of not just stigmatization but a collapse of their social, professional, and personal lives. Their bodies, their health, their lives, all at stake.

The army's attempt to root out queer soldiers mirrors South Korean authoritarian practices of the 1950s to the 1980s that sought to uncover suspected communists and North Korean sympathizers in the country, a project motivated by the ongoing North–South conflict. These practices often targeted political dissidents and protesters denouncing the authoritarian military regimes of the time, leading to imprisonment, torture, and even death. Decades later, the same logic was being applied to queer soldiers. They, part of the very organization fighting the North Korean threat, were refashioned as now posing a similar disruption to national security.

Judges, politicians, the military, and politically and socially conservative Koreans have all claimed that the clause is necessary for the stability of the military and defense of the country. They often cite the continued threat of North Korea—mandatory military conscription still exists primarily because North and South Korea are still technically at war—and the presence of queer soldiers would disrupt unit cohesion and leave the military vulnerable to a North Korean attack.[1]

Queer soldiers *must* be expelled because North Korea is knocking at the door.

In recent years, scholars have demonstrated how often post-9/11 (September 11, 2001) national and global security logics operate through fear, doubt, and vulnerability. National security logics commonly generate fear and vulnerability by targeting certain marginalized bodies. In the United States, Muslims and Latin and South American immigrants bear the current brunt of national security anxieties. In China, it is the predominately Muslim Uyghurs. In South Korea, it is, surprisingly, queer Koreans. What does it mean to be perceived as a national threat simply based on who you would like or not like to sleep with? These days, national security in South Korea indexes not only war and the military but the family, public health, and national unity. Being queer supposedly threatens the traditional heterosexual family and marriage. Queer bodies harbor deadly viruses. And, from this perspective, the queer battle for rights is a form of terrorism threatening the purity of the Korean nation and culture. Each of the above claims asserts that queer bodies threaten the nation in a different way. But, in South Korea, the solutions to these threats all end up looking the same: queer folks become targets of a routinized national security.

Banal Security: Queer Korea in the Time of Viruses interrogates the connections between queerness and national security in South Korea on two fronts. The first is to explicate how and why Korean institutions and citizens mobilize the threat of peninsular destruction—fears over not only North Korea but viral epidemics, declining birth rates, and national unity—to interpret and treat queer folks as disruptions and threats to security. The second is to explore the important work of queer activists as they navigate security-laden discrimination alongside the biopolitical imperative to partake in securitization. Both fronts intertwine, for the social justice imperative that lies at the heart of this book emerges in heuristically disentangling security and sexuality—to demystify the seemingly totalizing logic and presence of security—while attending to the ways queer activists, conceptually, position their work as the antidote to the radical desociality immanent to their security-driven discrimination and oppression.

For more than 70 years, the possibility of another war engulfing the Korean peninsula has woven through both the physical landscape of Seoul and the everyday experiences of South Korean citizens. Road overpasses leading in and out of the city, for instance, were built so

that, if defenders of the city destroyed the support beams, the top layer of the overpass would fall to the road below, barricading the city and restricting tank access from a possible invasion. Closer to the highly militarized Demilitarized Zone (DMZ)—a stretch of uninhabited land along the 38th parallel that separates North and South, home to both incredible wildlife and landmines—shorelines are covered in metal fences and barbed wire with signs warning individuals not to trespass. The authoritarian regimes from the 1950s to the 1980s intensified the rhetoric of peninsular destruction and the measures to be taken to prepare for the seemingly inevitable attack. During the height of the Cold War, mutually assured destruction continued to be a possibility, suffusing daily life as well. Koreans' fears were predicated on experiences, memories, and physical reminders of the Korean War (1950–1953) and the unmovable fact that North Korea is but 40 miles north of Seoul. More importantly, it is impossible to speak of the "end" of the Cold War on the Korean peninsula (Kwon 2010), for the specters and (infra)structures cultivated at the height of North–South (and Soviet Union–US) confrontation persist and haunt South Korea today, organizing and intimately informing the intertwined realms of the political, economic, social, and cultural. These (infra)structures include the National Security Law, the military's anti-sodomy clause, and civilian drills.

Queer Koreans become instrumental to the goal of national security as the state and citizens mobilize the North Korean threat to justify queer oppression and thus implicate the existence and experiences of queer peoples in the decades-long history, archive, and memory of peninsular destruction. It involves (re)animating fears over destruction and everyday uncertainties to target already-marginalized peoples and bodies in ways that make those peoples and bodies disruptions, vectors of uncertainty and destruction. When a nation has experienced a literal existential crisis for decades, uncertainty (over jobs, education, family, existence) is simply part of that landscape. This is what I call *banal security*, the making of security—and the destruction it professes to prevent—a natural and normative part of daily living to the extent of its unconscious erasure. Trading the extraordinary for the ordinary, banal security operates in a world where "that's just how it is" suffuses the psychic terrain. The effect of making security banal, honed over decades of anticommunist ideology and fears of peninsular destruction, is that stories, experiences, memories are exiled, entire swathes

of people made vulnerable in an attempt to protect the security of the nation. Banality is insidious and violent, for, as Hannah Arendt (1964) reminds us, "that's just how it is" could easily be rearticulated as "he was just following orders," in which "thoughtlessness" transforms innocence to evil, or vice-versa.

It is important to also recognize that both the process of banalization and the outcome of banality are captured in my notion of banal security. Elliott Prasse-Freeman (2023a, 98) distinguishes between banalization and normalization in his account of the circulation of anti-coup images in the wake of Myanmar's military coup d'état, for in the process of banalization the image "still registers intersubjectively with interpreters as desiring to interpellate; it just fails to do so because it has already failed, and hence it is no longer affectively potent." Crucial in Prasse-Freeman's explanation is that objects (for him, images) that are in the process of becoming banal still resonate "intersubjectively" with individuals, but, as he notes elsewhere, "the once-demanding sign becomes dulled" (2023a, 76). I complicate his claim of affective potency, however, for not only is the ordinary replete with affectivity (Stewart 2007) but the affect changes, as dullness is itself an affective experience that has its own potency. Therefore, the potency of dullness—the saturation of banality—within the realm of security and its practices renders that realm and associated practices not only ordinary but also not necessarily worthy of conscious thought.

Banal security relies on the ever-present threat for people to simultaneously give over their protection to national security assemblages and then ignore or routinize the cost of security. In Ursula K. Le Guin's (1975) famed short story "The Ones Who Walk Away from Omelas," the prosperity and security of the nation hinge on the single atrocity of keeping a child from Omelas locked away in a dark, miserable broom closet. In the story, Omelas prospers because a belief that keeping a child locked away in a room enables prosperity. All citizens, despite each one's initial shock upon learning of the child, come to accept its necessity and even forget about its presence in the broom closet to stay and feel safe and secure. The child in the broom closet of banal security is the queer Korean, framed not as an atrocity but as a moral good. Even though the truth of the child's existence is seen, it is structurally made to be ignored or just outside of one's perception, something in the corner of one's eye that never quite comes into focus. The child is queer, already at the margins of society, but now being shoved into a

broom closet, labeled a threat, and looked on with even more disgust than before. The queer soldier, hiding in the margins, is dragged out and thrown into the broom closet-cum-prison cell, exemplified as a destructive force in the military and South Korea more broadly. What other threats are hiding in the shadows of society and the state? If the queer soldier resided in those margins, who else need be dragged out and thrown into broom closets? The margins supply the perennial fodder for national security's incessant need to make threats. The treatment of queer Koreans as security disruptions, I argue, illustrates not only that queer folks are useful and productive in perpetuating the national security assemblage but that banal security erases the actual atrocity: the association of queer Koreans with threats and disruptions in the first place. *Banal Security* is an excavation of that broom closet, an account of what happens when security is made both central and banal, when the experiences of queer marginalization that are part and parcel of insecurity are lost in the saturation of ordinariness.

Banal security relies on a repetition of signs over time that fleetingly call attention to security's existence, only to then relegate it to the mindset of the ordinary. Part of my argument is that the repetition of these moments and saturation of ordinariness effectuate violence against marginalized people—here, queer people—to the extent that such treatment is normalized as itself *ordinary*. This is not a one-to-one correlation, that any single moment alone enables mass violence; as I theorize banality, the correlation is between decades of these repeated moments and the violent making and unmaking of marginalized peoples.[2] These relationalities evolve temporally beyond singular data points, events, and bodies. The broom closet, in other words, has been around for decades, but the child residing inside changes to meet the needs of the time. The communist *becomes* queer, as queer becomes the new relation to which the communist can be reinvented or recast.

Consider the following moment of ordinariness for how it contributes to making security banal.

My bus had stopped, and a siren blared through the streets of Seoul. I was on my way home from the Itaewon district with my Korean American friend, Alex, when traffic came to a standstill on the precipice of the Shinchon (Sinch'on) district rotary. Alex and I were the only two on the bus, and, as we looked out the bus windshield, we saw cops standing in the middle of the sprawling intersection, blocking traffic. Pedestrians, too, were unable to cross the streets. When the siren finally

stopped, the bus driver looked back at the two of us and explained that this was a "civilian drill." Our driver turned the bus off, opened the door and walked outside, taking a cigarette from his pocket and lighting it as other drivers did the same. The pedestrians on the streets looked visibly annoyed but found solace in their phones as they waited. Alex and I debated simply walking home, but the sun and humidity were particularly unkind this summer afternoon. Alas, we sat there waiting with the rest of Seoul from 2pm to 2:15pm until the drill ended. Unable to move, people just waited. I could feel the creeping discomfort of the rapidly heating bus. The anxiety of waiting coupled with the increasingly hot bus made the 15 minutes feel unending. I was not used to it. But for most Seoulites it was predictable and routine, so people simply dealt with it—a mild inconvenience. Once the police officers in the center of the intersection walked off for traffic to resume, our bus driver took one last drag before tossing the butt and reboarding the bus. He turned the bus back on, closed the door, and slowly followed as the cars in front began to move. For 15 minutes, one of the largest and most globally recognized cities stood still. And then it didn't.

The specter of peninsular destruction is spectacular, and yet, now, it is also utterly routine. For 15 minutes, Seoul stood still during the civilian drill; for 15 minutes, my bus driver simply smoked. We were supposed to be readying and preparing ourselves, but, for most, those 15 minutes seemed more bothersome than anything else. This decades-long practice of national security was no longer a method of training citizens; it was now a symbol of just how ordinary security and peninsular destruction have become.[3] Fifteen minutes symbolizes the more than 70 years of continuous uncertainty and national security practice. The border skirmishes, presidential assassination attempts, kidnappings, infiltrations and tunneling, and terrorist bombings—in addition to bellicose posturing toward North Korea and communism—that gave cause to the authoritarian regimes' disciplining of South Korean citizens into vigilant subjects are now specters of a past still very much alive and embedded in memories and landscapes.

But those 15 minutes equally represent the violence of uncertainty and national security practice within South Korea, from earlier authoritarian measures of torture, imprisonment, and murder to contemporary policing of queer peoples and bodies. This is not a moment of silence to remember the victims of South Korean state violence, or even a remembrance of those lost in active combat during the Korean

War. Instead, this is a moment of *forgetting*. Those waiting forget the lives lost, the torture enacted, the bodies made vulnerable—those waiting forget why they are waiting as they are bored of waiting. It is remembering that one must get to an appointment, pick up the children, plan the vacation, exercise more once the drill ends while forgetting that bodies are being made vulnerable in the present by the very national security assemblage tasked with keeping them safe. People are simply waiting for the drill to end. The structural conditions that engender the waiting simultaneously bring forth the forgetting, and in that forgetting people become disposable. The drill and 15 minutes of waiting are not considered astonishing, just as the oppression and dispossession of queer people are often overlooked and just out of the public's view. They move with the ebb and flow of security's banality, moments to encounter and move through, but never events warranting continued thought or care.

There are moments when the supposed threat of North Korea is too great to risk ignoring or overlooking, but there are other moments, as with the civilian drill, when North Korea is more of a nuisance than a threat in the South Korean psyche. The place of North Korea in South Korea's political and social imaginary has shifted since democratization in 1987, which "ushered in an era of unprecedented confusion and uncertainty in South Korea over whether to define North Korea as friend or foe" (Son 2006, 4). Confrontations still occur, but they no longer carry the same political, social, or even psychic weight they once did; as countless South Koreans have told me over the years regarding North Korea's acts of belligerence, "that's just what North Korea does."

Those words lie at the heart of banal security, but they also signal two interlaced notions: that citizens are participating in their own securitization and that a variety of new national and global situations have influenced national security policies and practices. A declining population, national and global viral epidemics, concerns over Muslim migrants and refugees, and the growth of antigovernment sentiment have all come to matter significantly to South Korean perceptions of national security. Simultaneously, these emerging contexts provide new interpretive models for the state and citizens to categorize queer people within regimes of biopolitical regulation. Targeted not only as disruptions to military readiness and unit cohesion but also as carriers of deadly viruses, threats to the traditional family, and disruptions to national unity, queer Koreans embody culminating anxieties of penin-

sular destruction and a crossroads between deep-seated Cold War ideologies and post-9/11 (September 11, 2001) global security logics and technologies that operate through fear, doubt, and preemption. The treatment of queer folks as national security disruptions and threats demonstrates the malleability of security, adaptability of the state, and survivability—even fugitivity—of queer people themselves.[4] At its core, this book asks a simple yet enduring question: safety and security for whom?[5] The answer not only precludes queer Koreans—safety and security are not for them—but it requires their presence as disruptions and threats to national security and contributors to peninsular destruction.

The Biopolitical Divide

Security, I argue, is dialectical. Lives are becoming more insecure, more precarious, as threats multiply from North Korea, declining birth rates, terrorism, and viruses. Security institutions, such as the military, must respond to this insecurity with action while instilling confidence in the general population as to the security institution's efficacy (feelings of security). For instance, Korea continuously finds ways to incentivize having children for heterosexual couples while also raising the bar on military service exemption so that the military does not lose potential soldiers. Heightened moments of insecurity and precarity simultaneously become heightened moments of securitization. For some, their lives become more secure, while others become objects of disruption and threat crafted by the security apparatus. I contend that queer Koreans have become those objects of disruption and threat as they are further divided from the national, Korean population. For those latter objects—for queer Koreans—they must participate in their own securitization not simply to protect their lives but to transform their status: from objects of threat and disruption to those of care. Such participation, though, has a double edge because assimilation into the biopolitical population deserving of care and security effaces their queer identities. Queer folks are partaking in a process responsible for their continued vulnerability and marginalization, and yet they do it because they seek membership of a polity of care and security.

The story of Noncommissioned Staff Sergeant Pyŏn Hŭi-su (Byun Hee-soo) as reported by the media bears witness to the ways both queer and trans soldiers can participate in a regime that outlaws them.[6]

She was discharged from the army in January 2020 after receiving gender-affirming surgery in Thailand, despite expressing a strong desire to serve in South Korea's female unit following her return (BBC 2020; Ock 2020).[7] She was supported by her unit and her superiors, but the army ruled that the case "constitutes a reason for being unable to continue to serve" because a loss of male genitals is classified as a physical impairment (ibid.).[8] As Pyŏn expressed during a press conference with the Military Human Rights Center, "since I was a child, it's been my dream to become a soldier protecting this country and its people" (Kim and Noh 2020). She even believed that she could be a symbol for both queer and trans soldiers, that "people of every sexual identity can become outstanding soldiers who protect their country" (ibid.).[9]

The childhood dream of becoming a soldier names the stakes of the soldier's participation in the military–security regime: "protecting this country and its people." For Pyŏn to narrate this past dream in her post-transition present where she was outlawed by the military—her body interpreted as physical impairment—is a participation that exceeds the boundaries of military service itself. No longer a soldier, Pyŏn still dreams of service, of protecting the country and its people, despite that same military targeting queer and trans soldiers for their impairments and disruption that leave the unit, military, and nation vulnerable. I do not mean to diminish Pyŏn's experience; rather, securitization works in this manner, down to the very stories we tell ourselves about our own desires. Her narrative naturalizes military service and securitization, where it is my goal to draw out the ways such naturalization enthralls queer folks to participate in their own securitization. For, while Pyŏn wants to serve to protect the country and its people, such protection is not meant for her or queer Koreans; in fact, queer Koreans are part of the extended body of threat and disruption she is enticed to protect the country against. "People" must be qualified, for not all people are protected by the military–security regime given that some people internal to the nation are the target of the regime.

Pyŏn's narrative thus creates friction between a yearning to participate in military service and security practices and the continued securitization and targeting of queer Koreans as security disruptions. How might we interpret Pyŏn's wish to be a symbol to gender and sexual minorities in the military through her service when service itself is antithetical to the existence of gender and sexual minorities? Can her wonder truly supplant the disruption presented by queer soldiers?

And, more pointedly, how are we to understand her desire to participate in securitization despite the very institutions she wishes to serve imprisoning queer soldiers and treating queer Koreans more broadly as security disruptions?

Given that queer Koreans are motivated by a desire to be part of the national population, to be privy to the safety and security of the nation, I demonstrate the ways queer Koreans partake in securitization. Not only does this participation act as a method of staying safe; in their move for safety, queer Koreans demarcate that they exist. I argue that rendering existence through claims to safety is simultaneously a claim to citizenry membership—citizens are entitled to safety and security—and, by participating in their own securitization, queer folks are attempting to dissolve that very distinction, to blend back into the citizenry population. This creates friction between a desire to be part of the national population and queer folks' status as a security disruption, a tension that emerges out of South Korea's regimes of biopolitical regulation.

The turn to populations evokes Michel Foucault's biopolitics, as "the objects of biopolitics are not singular human beings but their biological features measured and aggregated on the level of populations" (Lemke 2011, 5).[10] Biopolitics, unlike the regulation of everything for disciplinary power, operates through the apparatus of security that "lets things happen," collecting details "that are not valued as good or evil in themselves … to obtain something that is considered to be pertinent in itself because situated at the level of the population" (Foucault 2007, 45). For Foucault (2003, 2007), there is both an external division between different states' respective populations and an internal division of a given state's population into subpopulations, where a bar divides the good life and that which is seen as preventing the good life from flourishing and so must be targeted. This is found particularly in the ways "races are a biopolitical way to divide the human species into sub-groups" (Lemm and Vatter 2017, 43). According to Foucault (2003, 255), dividing the population at the biological level enables the dominant group(s) to outlive others interpreted as "inferior" and thus promulgate a "healthier and purer" population. Death and killing include not only murder and exposure to death but also "political death, expulsion, rejection, and so on" (Foucault 2003, 256). These divisions are also driven by technologies of security that focus on "'should-be" value' that "do not draw an absolute borderline

between the permitted and prohibited; rather, they specify an optimal middle within a spectrum of variations" (Lemke 2011, 47). In Korea, this manifests as a division between the general population that strives for a good life and the queer subpopulation that stands in its way. The general Korean population, importantly, labors for security; given the conditions of banal security, Koreans participate in national security practices. Queer Koreans, however, are treated as a vector of potential destruction, a roadblock to the good life: the existence of queer soldiers challenges military morale and destabilizes unit cohesion, thus leaving the military vulnerable to a possible North Korean attack, while their bodies harbor deadly and destructive viruses that threaten the health and safety of the national population. Furthermore, given the declining birth rates and population crisis in Korea, the mere existence of queer Koreans is construed as literally preventing the reproduction of citizens, workers, and soldiers. The good life here is heteronormative and patriarchal, whereby queer as nonnormativity is intrinsically dangerous to the promulgation and even ideology of the "good life" (see Berlant 2011; Povinelli 2011).

By focusing on the experiences of queer folks within South Korea's biopolitical security regime, I illustrate not only how security is a response to potential threats but how it manages internal disruptions. Here I draw a semantic distinction between *threat* and *disruption*. I do not preclude the overlap between threat and disruption—there are instances where I detail such overlap. But I suggest that recognizing the terms' different denotations leads to a more nuanced understanding of security vis-à-vis the internal/external matrix. Threats are literal enemies, like the North Korean agent. But queer Koreans are of a different order, one step removed. They lead to a lack of morale or distraction in the military given their sexual difference—judicial rulings cast them as always wanting sex, thus making interactions with nonqueer soldiers seemingly uncomfortable. This allows the North Korean agent to run amok, allowing the quick strike. Queer Koreans are more embedded and "inside" South Korea than North Koreans, but, as such, they pose an even greater risk to the nation and its people given that they can more secretly and insidiously infest the population, leading to disruptions that then enable threats to manifest.

This semantic distinction relies also on a method of relationality that brings threat and disruption together. In discussing the use of data in assessing future threats, Louise Amoore (2013, 133) observes

that the specific "nodes" or "dots" of data matter less than "the inferred relations across those nodes ('connecting the dots')." Emergent threats manifest from within the "form" or system of security itself, "in the links and patterns that materialize and take shape." Correspondingly, Sara Ahmed (2006, 119) writes of the "sociality of lines," as both "worldly and social; they are not only accumulations of points, but also of modes of following. It might be the very act of attention—of attending to or facing this or that direction, or toward this or that object—that produces 'a sense' of a collective or social group." I interpret these lines as relations between points—the relation, for instance, between the queer soldier and the North Korean attack—whereby connecting the dots or following the points on the line engenders a relation between those points (i.e., the line). For Amoore, that relationality is defined vis-à-vis threats. Relationality has the potential to be both threatening/disruptive and transformative, oftentimes simultaneously.

This duality is particularly potent when bodies are made into disruptions and threats. A (human) body in and of itself is difficult to assess,

> until we know what it can do … what its affects are, how they can or cannot enter into composition with other affects, with the affects of another body, either to destroy that body or be destroyed by it, either to exchange actions and passions with it or to join with it in composing a more powerful body. (Deleuze and Guattari 1987, 257)

The Korean queer soldier is an illustrative example. As a stand-alone body, the queer soldier is seemingly benign. Only when the queer soldier encounters another queer soldier does the possibility of action thought to be dangerous and disruptive to the military and the nation emerge. The (sexual) relation and what it produces are the disruption, but the fact that the queer soldier has the capacity to form such a relation becomes a potential that must be handled in the present (with laws, categorization, imprisonment). The fear is that queer soldiers make the military vulnerable to North Korean attack, and thus the disruption of the queer soldier engenders the possibility for the threat of a North Korean attack.

This book therefore weaves through both the making of the queer disruption and the participation of queer Koreans in their own securitization. It draws attention to the biopolitical divide that bifurcates

the general Korean population from queer Koreans and the attempts by queer Koreans to be part of—perhaps even transform—the general population. Doing so requires unique maneuvering and often special treatment, thus instantiating one of the chief frictions of this book: queer Koreans' desire to belong (to the normative, to the biopolitical population, to the citizenry) and their simultaneous desire—or, in some cases, need—to be treated as different (socially and legally) and thus set apart. One example not necessarily restricted to Korea is the perceived need for an antidiscrimination law, for, while queer Koreans want the same rights and privileges as all other Koreans, they also identify the need for an antidiscrimination law, a law that pivots on their inherent difference, to have access to the same protection (read as unmarked) that other citizens have.

In theorizing queerness as a praxis in which queer Koreans oscillate between different subject positions, I follow queer theorist Kadji Amin (2017, 10) to engage in a form of what he calls "deidealization." This method "deexceptionalizes queerness in order to analyze queer possibility as inextricable from relations of power, queer deviance as intertwined with normativity, and queer alternatives as not necessarily just alternatives" (ibid.). Mobilizing this method means recognizing that queer Koreans are caught in the same thrall of banal security as all other Korean citizens, and so we ought not be surprised at their participation or desire to be part of the general population. But the relations of power that enthrall citizens affect queer Koreans differently, undeniably so, and thus their participation in security-making is uneasy—making some physically nauseated, as I detail in Chapter 2—given their biopolitical position as disruptions and threats. Such relations of power also account for the social justice work of queer activists attempting to counteract discrimination.

These overlapping feelings of unease, discomfort, and even liberation are where I locate a queer heuristic, attentive to contradictory practices but more attuned to the feelings and affects that emerge within the contradiction. Queer is the relationship between these seemingly contradictory desires—to belong and to be different, where belonging is not assimilation—as it pivots on an understanding of queer as odd, weird, uncomfortable, and also liberating. While José Esteban Muñoz (2009, 20) espouses a queer utopic underpinning of such "belonging-in-difference," I focus instead on how there is liberation in unease and discomfort. Indeed, comfort and assurance are normative feelings not

necessarily accessible to queer people, and so to marshal both one's uneasiness and the discomfort of others within a zone of liberation is itself the work of social justice. This is certainly not a universally queer Korean experience; some, as I index throughout, are outwardly content with the bifurcation of peoples and either their attempted assimilation to the general population or affiliation with the queer community. Yet the narratives, experiences, and examples collected herein focus on the friction of wanting to be part of both, the requirements that come with both, and the queer feelings inherent in the relationship between these desires.

I, too, "inhabit unease … rather than seeking to quickly rid [myself] of it to restore the mastery of the critic, the unassailability of [my] politics, and the legitimacy of [my] trained field expectations" (Amin 2017, 10). As the anthropologist looking in, uneasiness abounds: I existed in an uneven power differential as a cisgender white man conducting fieldwork with queer Koreans. To thus focus on contradictions, frictions, and uneasiness among queer Koreans and within the queer community—to write about the ways queer folks contribute to their own securitization (and, by extension, oppression)—is to potentially make a vulnerable population that much more vulnerable. And yet, this potential is part and parcel of fieldwork and a broader queer anthropological history (see Weiss 2022; Boellstorff 2007; Valentine 2007).

The Nation in Security

National security is a multidirectional and multiscalar assemblage of practices, ideologies, and bodies that seeks knowledge of, and for, the entity called "the nation." On one hand, national security is an epistemological conundrum: the laborious accumulation of knowledge may be totalizing, but it is never total, as each marginal unit of additional information indexes the partialness of knowledge that then necessitates the collection of even more information. It is a self-propelling mass that generates its own energy. Yet, on the other hand, this totalization is precisely where the effects of national security are located: the insatiability for and fetishization of knowledge operationalize and justify national security practices. The need for more data to make more accurate predictions as to potential terrorist attacks, for instance, widens and deepens surveillance practices and data collection (see Chapter 3).

And yet, the total knowledge purchased does not assure total security. National security's fetishization of accumulating knowledge stems from the need to keep the nation from harm, protected from both internal and external threats. Even if total knowledge is achievable, with it does not come total or complete security; instead, the best possible chance to protect against potential harm is the outcome (Hacking 1990). In other words, national security must be understood through gradation (Kockelman 2016), both conceptually and actually, in part because the world is never without insecurity but also because security operates through the speculative and the potential future—actualized in the present—and so knowledge does not automatically equate to protection but rather the ability to more adequately and appropriately plan for that future. Ian Hacking (1990, 5) refers to this as the "imperialism of probabilities" that took root in the 19th century's "avalanche of enumeration" to create and manage populations, whereby "there is nothing to fear … but the probabilities themselves." National security is part divination and part gambling: it is a process that tries to tell the future, but does so through the accumulation of knowledge, and the more knowledge gathered, the better chances it has in correctly or appropriately guessing that future. Its failures become data for the system. The perpetual need for more—more data, input, information—betwixt a promise of eventual total knowledge and ever-encroaching precarity apotheosizes national security into that which is simultaneously feared and revered the most. National security is a Cthulhu, an old god mythologized with tentacles, appendages, and entranced followers penetrating all aspects of society, every bit as problematic as its creator, H. P. Lovecraft, himself.[11]

Perhaps ironic that the almost gruesome metaphor I use to illustrate national security would itself be classified as a threat to the nation: the water deity just off the shores of New England made all the more littoral when transplanted to peninsular thinking. Yet the Cthulhu metaphor intentionally invokes this duality as both the arbiter of national security and the source of continuous threat and insecurity. The spectacularization of national security since the Cold War, particularly with the proliferation of nuclear weapons and nuclear economies (Masco 2006; Gusterson 1996), makes this Cthulhu even more totalizing and violent. National security winds itself into the human nervous system and attempts to stitch shock and terror with affective responses (Masco 2014). Yet, within the workings of banal security, new forms of shock

and terror can become dull, for, as Prasse-Freeman (2023a, 96) writes of the "intensity/banality paradox, … every intensification of affect risks the opposite of its intended aims: rather than mobilizing the additional person to the cause, the marginal person not only turns away ('even after that, nothing changes?!') but hazards the exhaustion of those already committed." Given that South Korea has lived for decades in a continuous state of shock and terror, the state's affective potency shifts, and shock and terror become the banal underpinnings to social, political, economic, and even cultural life.[12] This more than 70-year precipice on which South Korea has resided intersects with Ronak Kapadia's (2019, 8–9) study on artistic and sensory interpretations by "citizens, subjects, survivors, and refugees of US empire" since the United States' War on Terror and Kapadia's notion of the "forever war." While the generational war on the Korean peninsula—actual generations of Koreans have experienced this never-ending war—elicits an "abstract sense of temporal limitlessness" among citizens of anticommunist policies and posturing rooted in a North–South standoff, "the nation as a 'forever war' machine" espouses the nation as "seemingly enduring, mutable, and eternal."

I therefore search for the nation in security, valuing the vernacular phrase for "national security" (*kukka anbo*) as it linguistically and conceptually names the stakes of security practices and ideologies. Doing so situates this book within broader critiques of the nation that draw attention to the gendered and racialized formations of governance. Fundamentally, nations embody a politics of alterity and exclusion, for "the nation-form produces and perpetuates a differentiation that it must defend" (Balibar 2004, 23). This is further encapsulated in Étienne Balibar's consideration of nationalism as "the organic ideology that corresponds to the national institution [that] rests upon the formulation of a *rule of exclusion, of visible or invisible 'borders,'* materialized in laws and practices" (ibid., emphasis in original).[13] Defense and exclusion are particularly salient at national borders, but I would add, following Veena Das and Deborah Poole (2004), that the need to defend difference is a technology of governance that engenders exclusionary practices within all margins and peripheries. This book examines the queer peripheries of South Korea as target for national exclusion and differentiation quintessential to the social and cultural hierarchies that are formed and perpetuated by the Korean nation.

To understand the queer peripheries of the Korean nation, I must first sketch out how the nation structures social and cultural hierarchies

vis-à-vis race, gender, and sexuality. Balibar (1991) draws attention to the production of national peoples through what he calls "fictive ethnicity," a fabulation of a community instituted by the nation-state. Fictive ethnicity enables the people and the nation they comprise to exist "in the past or in the future *as if* they formed a natural community, possessing of itself an identity of origins, culture and interests which transcends individuals and social conditions" (ibid., 96). Ethnicity is partially equated to race, whereby the representational "unity of race to oneself" is the "origin or cause of the historical unity of a people" (ibid., 99). This "second-degree fiction" distinguishes "genuine" and "false" nationals because it is a blueprint of genealogy: "the idea that the filiation of individuals transmits from generation to generation a substance both biological and spiritual and thereby inscribes them in a temporal community known as 'kinship'" (ibid., 100). Balibar's use of the term "substance" with relation to kinship invites comparison to anthropological studies of kinship, but, whereas scholars like David Schneider (1980) posit a separation between substance as biogenetic material (often meant to be blood) and "code of conduct," substance for Balibar is both biological and spiritual, nature and culture. Both are transmitted and circulated within kinship genealogies but, as Janet Carsten (2004, 132) deftly explicates, anthropologists' variable usage of substance to comprehend different cultural systems of kinship correlates to how they analyze relationships between persons and bodies. We should also add nation to this set of relations, whereby the substance crucial to the genealogical blueprint that weaves through kinship and gives credence to a "common race" is therefore the substance of the nation itself.

Central to Korea's national project is family and kinship as they facilitate the ideology of common race and homogenous ethnicity, produce and maintain gender and sexual hierarchies, and institute the nation-as-family and family-as-nation idiom. The biological and spiritual "substance" passed through the generations of a kin group (Balibar 1991, 91) is read in Korea as blood. Blood floods; it flows through the veins of the people, the genealogies of the family, and arteries of the nation. Gi-Wook Shin (2006) finds that an overwhelming majority of Koreans believe in a single, shared bloodline, thereby making them "Korean." The blood of the individual is the blood of the family, a gendered institution held together by the promise that mothers will provide the familial body with a future via children, ideally male (Gitzen

2014). Blood's primacy to the family and national genealogy, its purity, is at once an indication of ethnic and racial purity, that Koreans marry Koreans and produce more Koreans. Mixed-raced children, often the offspring of Korean women and American soldiers stationed in Korea from 1945 onward, continue to be routinely discriminated against for not only their phenotypical appearance but their lack of "pure" Korean blood (Nadia Kim 2008).

Carsten (2004) is keenly aware that substance and kinship are also contingent on gender hierarchies and power, particularly as substance moves through the genealogies and generations. The primacy of family and kinship to the national project thus elevates the gender hierarchies cultivated within the family to the national level, for, as Ann McClintock (1995, 358) contends of South Africa, naturalizing and making familial social/racial hierarchies at the national level—the "national family"—relied on first routinizing and naturalizing women and children subordination in domestic life. Patricia Hill Collins (1998, 66) is even more pointed in the recursivity of hierarchies, arguing that hierarchies within racial groups resonate across groups, whereby "family rhetoric" justifies racial inequality and oppression. In Korea, given that family is an idiom for the nation, gender refracts through both prisms, manifesting and perpetuating intersectional hierarchies. The point is not to ask why female subjugation and subordination exists in Korea, but how intersectional hierarchies weave through cultural and social institutions, practices, and discourses in complex and often contradictory ways (Kendall 2002).

Feminist scholars thus detail how nationalism must be understood alongside a "theory of gender power" (McClintock 1995, 355). This includes depictions of men as national beings and representatives (ibid.) and manliness as symbolic of the nation's vitality (Mosse 1985), while women are interpreted as reproducers of the national collective, culture, and boundaries (Anthias and Yuval-Davis 1989, 7). These gendered discourses tie to the colonial legacies and imperial presents of Western nations, particularly in the intricate relations between feminist and anticolonial nationalist movements that formed in former colonies (Jayawardena 1986; Puri 2003). As Chungmoo Choi (1998, 14) posits, the condition of postcolonial and US imperial "mimicry" in South Korea means that "colonized Korean men not only deny feminine subjectivity but oppress Korean women, to shed their emasculated and infantilized image and prove their masculinity to a degree of exag-

geration that may include violence against women." Gendered national discourses are also found within multiethnic countries, for, as Louisa Schein (2000) writes of the Miao minority population in China, non-Han populations and cultural materials were often cast as feminine, exotic, and even sexually fluid and transgressive. Non-Han women in particular "constituted counterpoints to urban elite culture, signifying both a trajectory toward a modernity already claimed by the metropolitan class and evoking the 'imperialist nostalgia' … which one mourns the loss of precisely that what has been destroyed through the 'progress' one has wrought" (Schein 2000, 120). Schein terms this "internal orientalism" to describe the fascination that urbanites and self-identified cosmopolitan Chinese have for minority peoples and cultures.

Sexuality is equally imperative to the national project and crucial as a site of exclusion and alterity, whereby heteronormativity is the standard bearer of the proper national subject (Berlant 1997; Duggan 2003). Akin to Schein's (2000) transmutation of Saidian orientalism, Tom Boellstorff (2005) details how *gay* and *lesbi* Indonesians "dub" global categories of "gay" and "lesbian" into the Indonesian nation that adheres to the image of the Indonesian nation as unified in diversity. Boellstorff (2005, 188) departs from other works on sexuality and nationalism by exploring how "the state can shape subject positions that it neither incites as normative nor calls into being through oppression." It does this through the heteronormative nuclear family, insofar as *gay* and *lesbi* Indonesians will marry non-*gay* and *lesbi* men and women given that heterosexual marriage is what makes an individual a citizen and national subject. John (Song Pae) Cho (2009) makes an analogous observation in Korea, where gays and lesbians will engage in contract marriages with each other to provide the cover of a heterosexual marriage for family and society while still engaging in closeted queer relations.

The exclusionary practices at the center of the Korean national project are immanent to the ethnonational entity. Queer Koreans exist within the national project, within the ethnonational, and yet are treated as other to the nation, relegated to the nation's margins and borderlands. Exploring the contours of the Korean nation and nationalism also requires attention to the role of anticommunism in the ethnonational project and governance as the original politics of exclusion in postliberation Korea. Formed in the crucible of US military occupation (1945–1948) and the authoritarian decades that followed, anti-

communism still embodies a type of religiosity, in some cases quite literally (Lee 2010; Park 2003). The anticommunist ideology quintessential to both nation-building and nationalism, promulgated further through mandatory military service (Moon 2005), sieved the communists—read as pro–North Korea, liberal, spies, and antigovernment—from the national body. But the broom closet of communism only expanded as the authoritarian years passed, for if the South Korean nation is foundationally anticommunist, then, as Balibar (2004, 23) reminds us, the exclusionary practice of the nation must be defended. Herein lies the analytic value of *national* security, as it indexes both the national project of exclusion and the means to defend and perpetuate that project; kukka anbo (national security) is thus a constant linguistic reminder that "the nation" (kukka) provides justification for security (anbo) in Korea.

Queering Security Studies

Daniel Goldstein (2010, 489) implores scholars to utilize anthropology's "long-standing modus operandi of situating local realities within broader national and transnational contexts to examine the mutually constitutive effects of each on the other." For Goldstein, the global/local articulations permeating anthropological research make anthropologists well-suited to address "global security questions."[14] Goldstein's (2010) call for a critical security anthropology is equally an intervention into the growing field of critical security studies that moves beyond traditional security studies concerned with political realism (Peoples and Vaughan-Williams 2010). Where traditional security studies focus on the state as referent object and armed conflict as the primary mechanism, critical security studies often take a more constructivist approach in recognizing that "threats to security are not automatically given but produced through inter-subjective interaction; that is, through dialogue and discourse between individuals and groups" (ibid., 5).[15]

Other scholars also depart from more institutional and genealogically beholden critical security studies in favor of innovative approaches that, too, expand the field (e.g., Besteman 2020; Diaz-Barriga and Dorsey 2020; Zeiderman 2016). Paul Amar (2013), for instance, finds fault in critical security studies for often ignoring the unique experiences and structures emerging from the Global South as he favors

attention to what he terms the "human-security state." Amar considers how these new forms of human security—pivoting on specific formations of "humanity"—are rooted in systems of power that are tied to normative iterations of sexuality, gender, race, and class. This crucial point cannot be understated, for, as Sylvia Wynter (2003, 260) reminds us, the very conception of the human, what scientists and academics have termed "man," is a gross overrepresentation of "the human itself" given that man signifies "our present ethnoclass (i.e., Western bourgeois)."[16] Therefore, human security is not universal because the categories of "human" and "humanity" are fundamentally imbued with gendered and racialized meanings and hierarchies. Only some would be included in "human" security.

Positioned as emerging in the wake of the decline of neoliberalism in the Global South, the human-security state relies on four intersecting logics: that the process is moralistic (rooted specifically in Christian and Islamic piety discourses), that it focuses on the juridical-personal (including private property and individual rights), that it includes attention to labor (particularly with collective and social security), and that it involves the paramilitary (as a masculinist and territorially centralized enforcement logic) (Amar 2013, 6). However, Amar's articulation of the human-security state as *not* a neoliberal state presents a rather flat understanding of neoliberalism that elides studies detailing the sometimes contradictory practices and philosophies that get named "neoliberal" (Greenhouse 2010; Shever 2012; Muehlebach 2012). I am concerned less with the "end of neoliberalism," to use Amar's (2013) phrasing, just as I distance myself from epochal formations of security: from the Cold War to the War on Terror to human security. Rather, I contend not only that these forms of security interweave in sometimes contradictory ways because states themselves are "inherently contradictory and internally fractured" (Goldberg 2002, 7) but also that banal security moves through temporal security fixtures to assess the *longue durée* of security and its slow shaping of a nation and its peoples at the level of daily life. What goes unsaid, or perhaps implied in the nomenclature of "national security," is that the motivation that encourages citizens to act is a belief that the nation ought not be under threat, ought not be insecure (Grewal 2017).[17]

At what expense, though, does this belief in the security of the nation come? For instance, Masco (2014, 28) notes how, in the US Department of Homeland Security's "If You See Something, Say Some-

thing" campaign, citizens are invited to report on potential threats, but the campaign limits what citizens can report; homelessness, for instance, is not reportable. This distinction between what can and cannot be reported represents the ways national security calculates risks and threats as acceptable or not, but also symbolizes how "social structures of abandonment" are not addressed by national security (ibid.). However, lost in Masco's distinction are the ways whole swathes of minority populations *are* reportable through these security configurations.[18] Writing also about the "If You See Something, Say Something" campaign, Toby Beauchamp (2019, 10) describes a mid-2008 American Express commercial where a man dressed in a suit presents the airport counter with a kitten-decorated credit card and is then whisked away by airport security while an identical man presents the plain style of the American Express Business Gold card and is happily greeted by airport staff. Beauchamp notes that national safety and security render gender nonconformity suspicious, alarming, and even threatening.[19]

Further nuancing the ways gender, race, and sexuality intersect security practice, Jasbir K. Puar (2007) details how the post-9/11 (September 11, 2001) US political, social, and security landscape positions terrorist bodies against what she calls "properly queer subjects," predominately white gays and lesbians that uphold American nationalism and patriotism. This "homonationalism" is rooted in the ways proper queer subjects come to be normative in the US, inculcated in race, ethnicity, ability, gender, language, and class. They are "ammunition to reinforce nationalist projects" (ibid., 39). To have the properly queer subject, though, the improper or nonnormative queer body must simultaneously exist, and it is that body that gets likened to the terrorist body. White gays and lesbians participate in this threat-making process and orientalization of primarily Muslim (male) bodies, while simultaneously having their own sexualities and the gay sex that they have (namely anal sex) denigrated.[20]

Puar's assessment resonates within Korea in the ways that security as a technology of governmentality interprets, categorizes, and manages certain gendered, sexualized, and raced bodies as threats.[21] The key is variability: not *every* person of color will be stopped for additional security screenings in the airport; not every queer soldier will be imprisoned. That variability or uncertainty engenders tremendous fear for queer folks, living forever on a precipice. Returning to Kapadia (2019, 21–22) proves useful in assessing life on that edge: employing

his concept of "queer calculus" to "unsettle normative analyses of the forever war and outline blueprints for utopian future imaginings amid limitless violence" allows me to both investigate a "slantwise relation to how … warfare has been measured conventionally"—meaning how queer Koreans get caught in the banal underpinnings of national security—and explore how queer Koreans, especially activists, maneuver through and endure such banality.

Yet where I depart from Puar is in the possibility of "properly queer subjects," for, while there are enclaves of homonormativity within Korea, none are elevated to a national level, let alone used as a mechanism for security. For Puar, queerness is used to interpret the terrorist to qualify their threatness through ascribed queerness. In Korea, however, queer folks are disruptions because they are queer, because the state and citizen interpretation of their queerness resides within a threat/disruption matrix emerging out of banal security. As such, banal security intervenes in queer security studies in two ways. First, banal security compels queer Koreans' participation in national security ideologies and practices, and, while Puar (2007) specifically recognizes the participation of white gays and lesbians in the threat-making endeavors of the US security state, those participating are themselves not necessarily disruptions or threats the way queer Koreans are disruptions and threats. And, second, as I elaborate below, banal security engenders a form of governance reliant on decomposing Cold War and authoritarian policies and ideologies, a form of governance that targets marginality.

Peninsular Thinking

Banal security begins first with placing the "peninsula" and recognizing the relationality between South Korea and North Korea.[22] Prior to 1945, there was no North Korea or South Korea; the demarcation of two countries separated by the 38th parallel was a US-led initiative as World War II ended to "buffer" the encroaching communism of the Soviet Union, where the US occupied South Korea while the Soviet Union took charge in the North. While indexical of geopolitical nomenclature, peninsula and peninsular are not modes of essentializing security crises or compounding countries together, nor is it a culturally relativistic interpretation of modern Korean history (where there was no North or South) to discuss them as one space. Rather, peninsular destruction is an invocation of the potential mutually

assured destruction inevitable in future full-scale outbreaks of war on the peninsula; the years of fighting during the Korean War saw incredible destruction and decimation of both people and land, not to mention that any use of nuclear weapons (which North Korea professes to possess) would result in peninsula-wide destruction in some capacity. As an analytic, though, peninsular destruction embodies the tensions and historical conditions of the South Korean present—including Japanese colonization (1910–1945) and the authoritarian decades that followed—while also gesturing toward a broader (East) Asia narrative. It is a reminder that the Korean War remains "unending" (Hong 2015). How does this unending war, and in it the potential for peninsular destruction, infiltrate state policies, national sentiment, and individual experience in the present, and what do these garrisoned discourses say about broader Asian and even global realities?

As Heonik Kwon (2010, 7) insightfully argues, given the multiplicity of cold wars—plural—the self-evidentiary nature of the "end of the cold war" relies on an ungrounded and "abstract notion of the global … oblivious to the radical diversity in human communal experience of bipolar history." He also argues that the notion of "ends" is nondescriptive of actual experience and ignores the residues inherent in such *longue durée* processes like the Cold War. Therefore, Kwon (2010, 8) writes of the "decomposition of the cold war" to refer to both the "phenomenological approach to the temporality of the cold war … and to a rigorously comparative approach to its historical spatiality." For Kwon (ibid.), this spatiotemporal concept of decomposition is an anthropological question that enables a comparison between peripheries and cores. What, then, would it mean to consider the politics of decomposition, the act of decomposing Cold War logics, governance, and experience into the building blocks of present and future states, nations, and societies? The Cthulhu of national security builds its form and followers through decomposing bodies and ideologies scattered across the peninsula. Security becomes banal through this decomposition; it mobilizes those familiar building blocks into contemporary logics and practices.

Decomposition works at multiple scales, and, while the periphery/core dyad involves the separation of global powers, a margins–center gradation optic better encapsulates the spatiotemporal conditions and effects of decomposition. There is no single cold war but granulated experiences spread across differentiated groups of people. How Kore-

ans continue to experience the Cold War is not universal; those at the margins (of the state, the nation, culture, society) are peripheral to how normative subjects experience the Cold War. I demonstrate in this book, however, how decomposition engenders a form of governance that uses Cold War logics and experiences to target the margins.

If the Cold War decades in South Korea are marked by both the Korean War and authoritarian rule—including US military occupation and two military dictatorships—then the years since democratization in 1987 encompass economic collapse, restructuring, and neoliberalization following the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) bailout of USD 58 billion to avoid government bankruptcy. The crisis emerged after several large family-owned corporations and national banks filed for bankruptcy. The IMF bailout package required neoliberal reforms aimed at uprooting the developmental state and morphing the strong business–government relationship. This included the deregulation of banks and the market into a free-market system, the creation and use of a flexible labor force, and the integration of Korea's economy into the global economy. The 1997 Asian Financial Crisis is a clear indicator of decomposition: collapse is just a quicker and more violent mode of breaking apart.[23] Following historian Henry Em (2016), I recognize that "governmentality in South Korea today is structured by both a totalizing logic (*raison d'ĕtat*) that aims for obedience, and a neoliberal (individualizing) logic that aims to create self-governing subjects who, following their 'self-interest,' do as they ought by managing and 'investing' in themselves" (ibid., 53). Decomposition—the breaking down decades of policies, social and cultural signs, and ideologies into the building blocks of something else—ties the totalizing logics of obedience and control to the neoliberal objects of individual and economic freedom as part and parcel of an assemblage of governance. It also facilitates banality, not only in the repetition of signs but by embedding those building blocks into other aspects of daily life: the signs repeat themselves, but take differentiated forms. I interrogate how the governmentality that forms in decomposition—an art of governance built from the broken-down parts of Cold War logics and entangled with neoliberal security logics—fuels a national security assemblage that targets marginality, namely queer folks.

The governmentality of decomposition takes seriously Kwon's (2010, 8) argument that "the end of the cold war is actually an extended horizon of 'what is not yet.'" Part of my claim is that the "what is not

yet" is governable and actionable, whereby queer soldiers are surveilled and imprisoned, for instance, as their potentiality for disruption and destruction necessitates action. Such governmentality is also discernable in an array of ethnographies that focus on South Korea, especially those that coalesce around flashpoints, from democratization in the late 1980s to the IMF crisis in the late 1990s, and the more recent global financial crisis in 2008. Pivotal have been the feminist anthropologists querying power at times and in places most crucial to the development of Korea. The path-breaking ethnographies of Nancy Abelmann (1996) and Seung-kyung Kim (1997)—the former about social movements and the latter about female factory workers—took place from 1987 to 1988, during democratic transition and the lead-up to the 1988 Seoul Olympics.

These were ethnographies of Korea *at the margins*, some of the first that spurred future anthropologists of Korea—me included—down similar paths. Feminist anthropologists in the 1990s and 2000s provided ethnographically rich windows into spaces and customs in transition and contending with a now-democratized landscape, increased consumption, and class mobility, including weddings (Kendall 1996) and middle-class homes (Nelson 2000; Abelmann 2003). They also began exploring the effects of the 1997 IMF crisis from the margins and how those most vulnerable are made even more precarious during this period (Song 2009). The focus on precaritization also sets the tone for the following decade of anthropology, particularly the transnational routes of migrants entering Korea (Vogel 2020), including female migrants (Freeman 2011; Cheng 2010) and transnational Korean adoptees (Kim 2010). I locate this book within this field of feminist anthropology of Korea. Laurel Kendall's (2002) insistence that gender subordination and subjugation must be located within webs of social and cultural institutions, practices, and discourses in Korea also resonates with Abelmann and Song's (2012, 247) point that "normative social organization and conventions" have incredible "sway" over people and practices. Feminist anthropology of Korea thus seeks to unveil how oppression and dispossession operate within systems of power, and, inspired by Abelmann and Song, a *queer* anthropology of Korea locates these systems of power within normativity, be it the family, religion, education, medicine, or national security.

My use of the word "queer" is intentionally contentious and uncomfortable. On one hand, queer indexes both how certain marginalized

peoples are treated and what those peoples do in response to marginalization. On the other hand, the queer heuristic I introduced above pivots on the uneasy, yet liberating, relationship between queer Koreans contradictory desires of belonging to the general population and seeking special treatment. Queer is not, however, identarian. Much of the Korean media, anti-LGBT protesters and Protestant right, and government refer to these marginalized peoples as homosexual (*tongsŏng aeja*), an older and more clinical-sounding term that on the surface is gender-less: *tongsŏng* means same-sex but does not specify which. Some more recent reporting around the 2020 Covid-19 outbreak has specified "gay clubs," where "gay" is a borrowed word from English. However, these terms primarily target gay men. Human rights and progressive activists, including queer activists, primarily use the term *sŏngsosuja*, or sexual minority, for several reasons. Not only does the term attempt to escape the clinical roots of homosexual and male-centered discourse surrounding it, but *sosuja* (minority) is a commonly used term to refer to the socially marginalized. This is an emic term, used within activist circles and networks to describe themselves and the peoples for whom they profess to work and fight.

I bring up these identification messes not to neatly wipe them away with the term queer; that is not where the analytical power of queer lies, nor is that the objective of this book. My concern is not how people identify but rather how national security interprets and targets peoples and bodies *it identifies* as a disruption. Queer is thus useful: it accounts not only for the nonnormative but brings the perspective or position of all parties involved into conversation. Despite its genealogies, queer does not always prioritize Western notions of gender and sexuality—a queer theory from "elsewhere" (Mikdashi and Puar 2016)—and yet, as Margot Weiss (2022) insightfully argues, queer has a way of returning to gender, sex, and sexuality without fully being grounded in those categories. For me, queer is not absolution. It is tension, discomfort, anxiety, affective, liberatory, and a tad bit existential. Queer is purposefully contradictory, and it is in those contradictions, I suggest, where queer thrives for alignment is quite the normative disposition.

Queerness compels a different reading of Korea, one attuned to the ways difference and nonnormativity emerge in systems of power and inequality. To interrogate the object of national security through queerness means telling a different kind of story and making connections across the security assemblage that may be unconventional. It

involves an unfolding of knowledge through pieces of data in the construction of a narrative predicated on the relations of data. Queerness and the experiences of queer people emerge gradually but are never complete as experiences are never complete. This is in part a result of my research networks but it is also a confrontation with the normative fetishization for total knowledge driving national security itself.

Kwon's "extended horizon" is also a profoundly queer notion, an invitation to imagine a human and a world that is "not yet here" as "objects and moments … burn with anticipation and promise" (Muñoz 2009, 26). Decomposition has within it queer potential in its "extended horizon" insofar as elements might be related in ways beyond what might be intended by the state. To break down is to create pieces to build back up, but there are no limits to who can mobilize the building blocks, who can engender relationality, and so, while the state and some citizens may use these pieces to correlate queer Koreans to disruptions and threats, queer activists themselves can use the same decomposed elements for their own queer purposes. The governance of the "not yet" is thus only a piece of the story—one that indeed entitles queers to no future (Edelman 2004)—for the other pieces arise in the "still forming" precipice of something else, something emergent (Muñoz 2009, 29). There is maneuverability of queer Koreans in the pages that follow, forms of resistance, refusal, and endurance in the thrall of banal security as queer Koreans navigate a "poisonous and insolvent" present (ibid., 30) in the hopes of what might be if acted upon *collectively*.

Mapping the Book

Each of the following chapters weaves ethnography together with science and technology studies, critical legal studies, queer theory, and critical security studies. While anthropology and ethnography anchor the chapters and this book as a whole, the interdisciplinary strides I make throughout speak to the necessity of engaging with multiple fields to provide a more nuanced understanding of banal security, Korean queer activism, and the intersection of sexuality and security more broadly.

Chapter 1 situates readers in Korea's post-1945, Cold War–era security landscape. I contend that the North Korean other produced in this landscape has laid the foundation for the treatment of queer bodies as security threats. I trace the genealogies of the 1948 National Security

Law (NSL) and the 1962 anti-sodomy clause in the Military Penal Code to Japanese colonial law and US imperial law as they inform a legal theory of queer bodies. I detail how a politics of exclusion was written into national security and military laws, practices, and the social life around these laws. Korea's politics of exclusion centers on both the ethnic and cultural sameness of North and South Korea. This extimacy, or the intimate other, implies that, when the enemy is just like the self, then by extension the enemy can be the self as well. I demonstrate how the NSL created the North Korean other, and how that figure became a tool for organizing national security during the height of authoritarian rule (1950–1987). I then show how the military's anti-sodomy clause and subsequent court rulings all invoke the North Korean other as reason to ban male-on-male sex acts among soldiers. Given that all able-bodied men must serve in the military, usually between the ages of 18 to 24, the military's anti-sodomy clause affects virtually all Korean men.

I open Chapter 2 with a sensory experience of the June 2015 Korean Queer Culture Festival at Seoul City Hall Plaza. I use this historic festival and Pride march to interrogate policing and border-making. The chapter zooms in on the ad hoc checkpoint the police and festival organizers created to let in queer and queer-friendly participants while keeping out potential anti-LGBT protesters. This made the festival both a queer and security space. The festival boasted record participation but relied on organizers' profiling of participants as queer or queer-friendly based on appearance. I use this checkpoint to examine the space and temporality of the festival as they intersect with a contentious history of the police, increased surveillance, and reminders of the North–South Demilitarized Zone (DMZ). Doing so highlights what I call "queer states of security," a contradictory feeling of physical safety and structural insecurity of festival organizers, volunteers, and participants.

Chapter 3 details the aftermath of the outbreak of Covid-19 in queer bars and clubs in May 2020. It begins by sketching out the rise of surveillance technologies and pandemic surveillance in Korea, predating the global pandemic, and how such technologies were coalesced in prodigious fashion to contact-trace and police suspected viral carriers in the early months of the pandemic. These technologies were thus targeting queer folks as vectors of disease after the May 2020 outbreak, blaming them for the latest outbreak by virtue of being homosexual.

Based on qualitative interviews with predominately gay men who were either in those spaces during the outbreak or often frequenting those spaces, this chapter examines how some queer Koreans support the mass mobilization of pandemic surveillance and how others are critical of surveillance. The former attempted to narrate their participation in security and membership of the general Korean population, while the latter pointed toward the exceptionalization of queer Koreans. I illustrate how this division arises in both the queer community and in individual queer subjectivity.

I move backward in time in Chapter 4 to an earlier viral outbreak in 2015 and the companion narrative to the 2015 Korean Queer Culture Festival through the lens of a public health outbreak. The festival occurred in the middle of an outbreak of the Middle East Respiratory Syndrome Coronavirus (MERS-CoV) in South Korea and the government's volunteer quarantine procedures. Anti-LGBT protesters used the outbreak to claim that MERS-CoV and HIV combined in the bodies of homosexuals to produce a "super virus." This chapter taps into fields of biosecurity, HIV/AIDS, and viruses/microbes to interrogate how the public health crisis was used to interpret queer bodies as biological threats. It simultaneously details the queer and HIV/AIDS activist response to this threat-making. I demonstrate how threads of relationality between bodies, viruses, and people weave through the public health crisis. But activists use these threads to advocate for better treatment of HIV-positive people as the quarantine practices of the MERS-CoV outbreak mirror the daily lives of those who are HIV-positive.

In the final chapter, I chart the rise of Islamophobia in South Korea and the ways it is intimately tied to existing homophobia. I detail how a terrorism zeitgeist emerged, rooted in so-called "Islamic terrorism" from 2015 onward, and the legal and political maneuvering of the government to further empower national security institutions. Tracing the rather late origins of the terrorism zeitgeist, the chapter focuses on the April 2016 National Assembly elections and a conservative platform opposing both homosexuality and Islam. It also follows the fallout of the election and this platform, exploring queer activist responses to being turned into a new type of threat. I demonstrate how both homosexuality and Islam occupy the same conceptual space, how both challenge the purity of the Korean nation, culture, and blood. Yet, as the rhetoric associating homosexuality to terrorism intensified, activ-

ists participated in anti-pinkwashing and pro-Palestine activities and movements to undercut the queer/terrorist association.

The book ends by meditating on how security might be undone. I discuss the Democracy and Human Rights Memorial Hall in Seoul as a site that challenges the banality of security outlined above. I connect this discussion to the ways queer Koreans navigate their treatment as security disruptions and threats to conclude that these may be instances where, in challenging the mundaneness of security, cracks may form that lead to its undoing.

By navigating through the Covid-19 pandemic, the MERS-CoV epidemic, queer festivals, military and national security laws, and terrorism alongside queer activism, I aim to tell a different kind of story of Korea—a queer story—in the time of viruses. While I certainly attend to the panic, uncertainty, and precarity immanent to this new era of viral pandemics, I do not limit my analysis to viral outbreaks alone. The epidemic of homosexuality, as some in Korea would certainly frame it, requires greater attention and exploration, particularly as it coconstitutes national security. And it is there, in the throes of security-laden discrimination, where we find queer activists protesting and living fugitive lives (Sojoyner 2017).

CHAPTER 1

Of Specters, Soldiers, and Sodomy

I was sitting in the gallery of South Korea's Constitutional Court on April 28, 2016, waiting for a ruling regarding the constitutionality of the military's anti-sodomy clause (Article 6 of Section 92). Military service has been mandatory for all able-bodied Korean men since 1957, and there has been a version of this anti-sodomy clause in the Military Penal Code since 1962, though earlier versions appeared in the Japanese codes during their colonial rule of Korea (Lee 2010, 73).[24] I gathered with queer activists earlier in the morning outside the Constitutional Court, chatting about the impending ruling and response, as they figured the court would uphold the constitutionality of the clause yet again. The court is walking distance from An'guk Station in Seoul, located between Kyŏngbok Palace and Ch'angdŏk Palace with its famed Secret Garden. Mornings still had a chill to the air, but I knew that as the day progressed the temperature would rise. We were eventually allowed to pass through the gates, presenting forms of identification as we made our way to the side of the building, police and metal detectors waiting once we arrived. I was instructed to put my bag in a locker and given a number in return, walking from the checkpoint to the gallery doors and led to my seat. As I sat there, waiting for the justices to enter, I thought about how instrumental this court had been since its creation in the postauthoritarian era of 1988, including the very recent dissolution of the Unified Progressive Party, a staunch critic of then President Park Geun-hye and a suspected North Korean infiltration political party despite having a substantial number of members. The court would later play an important role in the impeachment process of that very same president in 2017. It would uphold the National Assembly's impeachment of Park and remove her from office, thus putting

into motion an early presidential election. As the nine justices, clad in black and maroon robes, entered the courtroom, everyone stood until they took their seats. Before even speaking, however, the justices sat in silence while the fury of camera flashes filled the courtroom. The press snapped pictures of the sitting justices while everyone waited for the veritable show to both end and start. Eventually the flashes stopped and the chief justice announced the docket of rulings. The anti-sodomy clause was not part of their scheduled rulings. The queer activists in attendance, myself included, stood and exited the courtroom; several anti-LGBT protesters exited the courtroom as well.

Once outside, queer activists and anti-LGBT protesters began their respective public press events. A series of impassioned anti-LGBT speakers praised the military's anti-sodomy clause while criticizing the immorality and perils of homosexuality, citing the connection between homosexuality and HIV/AIDS. They also directly addressed those who claimed that the anti-sodomy clause violated the human rights of sexual minorities. They explained that, given the more immediate concern and threat of North Korea, South Korea could not worry about a small subset of individuals who claimed that their rights were being violated. As one mother of a "young male child" concluded, "for the sake of national security, we cannot repeal this law and must continue to ban anal sex." When the Constitutional Court did eventually hand down its ruling in July 2016 upholding the constitutionality of the clause, one of the key points it made, echoing an earlier 2011 ruling and anti-LGBT protesters, was that "our country's state of security" and "our history and culture" are necessary to consider when adjudicating both the legality and punishment of Article 92-6 (Constitutional Court 2012 hŏnba-258, 2016).

The legacy of the anti-sodomy clause in South Korea's Military Penal Code intertwines threads of Japanese colonialism, US imperialism and militarization, and anticommunist ideology that make sodomy itself a national security disruption. The mother's invocation of national security alongside military law and anal sex is both exceptional and mundane. Her ability to mobilize national security discourse in daily life weaves through the routinized fear of another North Korean incursion. The Constitutional Court has upheld the constitutionality of the anti-sodomy clause on three separate occasions since 2008, each majority opinion including reference to national security and unit cohesion. These references point to a more than 70-year Cold War fear

of an impending North Korean attack, solidified first and foremost in the 1948 National Security Law (NSL). The NSL outlaws a broad array of "antistate" activities, including sympathizing with and praising antistate groups, primarily taking aim at communist and pro–North Korean collectives within South Korean borders. The enactment of the NSL conjured what I refer to as the *North Korean other*, reinforced by authoritarian practices from 1961 to 1987 that weaved the threats of North Korea and communism into daily life.

The North Korean other continues to be a specter that haunts South Korean institutions, law, and society more broadly as both the external threat of North Korea and the potential internal fear of possession, or spies. The ambiguity of the other is both the root of its danger and the core of its usability: it is dangerous because it is ubiquitous and nearly invisible, and yet its mutability allows for it to fit any mold, act as foil or rationale for any legal or state action. Characterizing the North Korean other as a specter draws attention to that mutability and ability to phase through while still retaining some semblance of figuration, porously so. This other is the engine of peninsular destruction, and thus following this ghost is my attempt at hauntology, Jacques Derrida's (1993, 10) method of comprehending "the discourse of the end or the discourse about the end." The North Korean other is more than a herald of the end of history or a ghost of the dead destined to continuously return; it is the fuse, fire, and explosives of peninsular destruction. And yet it is a tool, a social, cultural, political, and legal mechanism whereby the curtailment of (sexual) freedoms alongside the targeting and exclusion of difference intertwines with this ghostly figure. The North Korean other thus embodies the spectral force of exclusion—a politics of exclusion—predicated on extimacy, or the intimate other.[25] Extimacy implies that when there is likeness between the enemy and the self—ethnic and linguistic similarity between North and South Korea, but also between queer and nonqueer Koreans—the enemy can be the self as well.

For the Constitutional Court and even anti-LGBT protesters to thus tap into that national security paradigm to continue to ban sodomy in the military is to otherize queer Koreans and make them a disruption. This othering process is reinforced by the Constitutional Court's reference to unit cohesion, a time-tested justification the US military and Congress historically used to racially segregate military units and to ban gays and lesbians from openly serving in the military. The assumption in Korea is that queer soldiers will disrupt unit cohesion

because other soldiers will feel uncomfortable—because other soldiers are decidedly heterosexual—and focus more on the soldier's nonnormativity than on their duty. As I also explore below, part of the seeming disruption emerges from the possibility of sexual relations between soldiers, as the soldier's attention shifts from duty to sex. This chapter maps the making of queer disruptions by examining the interstitial space of military law, national security, and sexuality in South Korea, following the ghost of the North Korean other as the social, political, and legal impetus for targeting queer folks. It also weaves through that space queer men's narratives of soldiering, tracing the banality of militarization and securitization alongside the seeming ordinariness of a (queer) soldier's life.

National Security and the North Korean Other

In 2013, the National Intelligence Service (NIS), the chief intelligence and security institution in South Korea, arrested Lee Seok-ki (Yi Sŏk-ki), a lawmaker with the small opposition party Unified Progressive Party (UPP), for violating the NSL by conspiring to overthrow the South Korean government if war with North Korea broke out (Kwaak 2015). Months later, the justice minister filed a lawsuit with the Constitutional Court to have the UPP disbanded. The justice minister, who later became prime minister and interim president following President Park Geun-hye's impeachment in 2017, claimed that the party supported "North Korea-style socialist systems" and thus posed "a threat to South Korea's liberal democracy" (*The Guardian* 2014). The Constitutional Court disbanded the UPP, the only time it had dissolved a political party since its creation in 1988. With roughly 100,000 members, the UPP was one of former president Park Geun-hye's most vocal critics (Choe 2014). Lee Seok-ki and the UPP claim that the NIS fabricated evidence to divert attention away from the ongoing NIS election scandal. Roseanna Rife of Amnesty International expressed serious concern for the ruling, stating that "the authorities are using the NSL to suppress dissent and persecute individuals with opposing political views" (Yi 2014).

The NIS election scandal, Lee Seok-ki, and the UPP invoked concerns over the election of the socially and politically conservative Liberty Korea Party presidential candidate Park Geun-hye in 2012, the daughter of former president and military dictator Park Chung-hee

(Pak Chŏng-hŭi). Her election brought a resurgence of draconian policies and accusations of authoritarianism from the opposition parties and protesters, beginning with her very election. Investigators discovered that the NIS used its technological reach and authority to manipulate the 2012 election, including the spread of 1.2 million tweets smearing Park's opponents (Choe 2013). Those tweets included "describing left-leaning candidates as North Korea sympathizers" (Harlan 2013). The Seoul Metropolitan Police Agency began investigating the NIS actions prior to the election, but police-officer-turned-politician Kwon Eun-hee (Kwŏn Ŭn-hŭi) testified that she was instructed by the then chief Kim Yong-p'an to cease her investigation (*Yonhap* 2016a). Simultaneously, military investigators began examining Korea's Cyberwar Command, a military institution created in 2010 to safeguard against North Korean hacking threats, as it was revealed "that some of its officials had conducted a similar online campaign against opposition candidates" (Choe 2013).[26] This election scandal converges on former NIS director Won Sei-hoon's (Wŏn Se-hun) own admission of guilt: "What I did was for the nation and for the people" (Choe 2015). Won's words are legible within the context of some of the tweets that claimed Park was "the only answer" to the threat of North Korea and that she had "solid and right views on national security" (Choe 2015). Election interference (or even suspension) was common during the authoritarian years of Park's father and is now a well-discussed issue in the wake of Russian interference in other countries' elections. At the time, though, critics of Park interpreted this as the start of an authoritarian resurgence in South Korea, some even considering it a veritable intelligence community coup.

Both the election scandal and the dissolution of the UPP embody the continued presence of anticommunist and anti–North Korea sentiment and ideology within the national security assemblage, intertwining security with the continued othering of North Korea. This North Korean other is simultaneously the actual country of North Korea, but a few miles from Seoul, as well as the specter of North Korea and communism that haunts and *possesses* those within South Korea's borders. It is a legal, political, social, and even cultural embodiment of difference that allows for the exclusion and prosecution of *difference* based on the nation's collective stance against North Korea and communism.

The North Korean other and the possibility of possession—of spies—represents a long-standing Cold War fear that the enemy is

among us, hiding and blending to the point of invisibility. This fear of extimacy intensifies as more North Korean defectors spill into South Korea; as of 2022, more than 33,000 North Koreans had entered South Korea (Ministry of Unification 2022). How, then, does one reconcile the existential fear over the North Korean other and the reality of North Koreans living in South Korea, racially, physically, and even linguistically indistinguishable? In many ways, this conundrum inspired the NSL's creation, its strict usage during authoritarian regimes, and continued existence in the postdemocratic turn. The 1948 enactment of the NSL is the centerpiece of the anticommunist, anti–North Korean national security ideology that still permeates through social and political life in South Korea.

The foundation for this security state was not only borrowed from the Japanese colonial security state (1910–1945) but further driven by the needs and visions of the United States during the post-1945 rebuilding era (Moran 1998; Cho 1997). "Japanese colonial dominance," Gi-Wook Shin and Michael Robinson (1999, 5) remind us, "must be considered a unique phenomenon; it resembled other colonialisms, yet its construction and evolution in Korea provided multiple stimuli for other processes." Shin and Robinson continue: "colonial evolution was dynamic: it had to adapt to the responses of Korean society and, in doing so, reflected this experience back into the construction of Japanese identity and modernity" (ibid.). In contrast to a duality of "assimilation versus differentiation (during the colonial period), or collaboration versus resistance (in later postcolonial assessments)," Nayoung Aimee Kwon (2015, 8) introduces the notion of intimacy within the "confluence of cultures under imperialism." Doing so, Kwon argues, "allows us to cut across the impasses of imperial and nationalist binary rhetoric to redefine intimacy as an unstable play of affects informed by desire, longing, and affection—all of which coexisted with the better-known violence and coercion undergirding empire" (ibid.). The interplay between intimacy and violence of the Japanese empire emerges in reverberations in Korean history and ruinations in its physical and psychic landscape (Stoler 2013), from colonial buildings turned museums (Gitzen 2023) to the actual violence of forced intimacy with comfort women (Soh 2008).[27] Yet the security state itself—including laws like the NSL, the military's anti-sodomy clause, and the Korean military system—is an intimate reverberation and ruin of Japanese colonialism that hinges on violence.

Architects of the NSL modeled the law after colonial Japan's 1925 Security Maintenance Law (formally, the National Maintenance of the Public Order Act), which had been used as "a tool to repress the Korean liberation movement during the Japanese occupation of Korea" (Cho 1997, 132). The act focused specifically on communists and Korean anarchists fighting against the Japanese imperial system, carrying a maximum sentence of death (Kang 2016).[28] One notable continuation between the colonial Japanese law and the NSL was the conversion (*chŏnhyang*) system, requiring oftentimes long-term political prisoners to sign statements claiming that they had "'converted' to anticommunism," formally reinstituted in 1956 (Lee 2007, 102). The conversion system in colonial Japan's Security Maintenance Law had a similar aim of converting communists to imperialists that supported the Japanese emperor and emperor system, resulting in the eradication of the Japanese Communist Party during World War II.[29]

More than a legacy, colonial Japan's Security Maintenance Law provided a legal framework and apparatus for handling suspected communists and anarchists, but now coupled with the US imperial state-building project of anticommunism driven by "the threat of subversion from North Korea" (Kraft 2006, 630). The United States' quest to build a Korean nation-state, and its commitment to both South Korea and the peninsula more broadly, solidified with policymakers' decisions from 1945 to 1953 (Brazinsky 2007, 1)—both the immediate postwar US occupation period (1945–1948) and in the active fighting during the Korean War (1950–1953). Rather than siding with the leftist "indigenous mass-based movement" in South Korea, the United States favored the Korean conservatives, "many of whom had collaborated with Japanese imperialists" (Brazinsky 2007, 4). This resulted in a "strongly anti-Communist but highly autocratic South Korean state," epitomized in its first president, Syngman Rhee, who governed from 1948 to 1960 until overthrown by student protests (ibid.). This period was followed by a short interim of democracy until Park Chung-hee's military coup in 1961 ushered in over 25 years of authoritarian governing, much of which was supported by the US government. Despite these regimes finding support from the US government, "Americans working on the ground in South Korea created new institutions ranging from the military, to schools, to academic organizations through which they attempted to strengthen the indigenous demand for development and democracy" (ibid., 6) While there are "disturbing assump-

tions of cultural superiority" that underpin US-led initiatives inside South Korea (ibid.), these initiatives are the types of practices that equally worked to solidify US military, intellectual, and imperial presence in Korea and on the peninsula. Working to craft an anticommunist state in the South was part and parcel of the US imperial project, and these reverberations, like the intimate ones of Japanese colonialism, are as psychological and emotional as they are bureaucratic and juridical. One example that enjoins intimacy and violence is camptown sex work, where the towns surrounding US military bases were historically home to brothels of Korean women that existed somewhere between the US military and the South Korean state (Moon 1997).[30] Even marriages between Korean women and US servicemen intimately connects US imperialism to South Korean development.[31]

I return to the NSL and "the threat of subversion from North Korea" (Kraft 2006, 630). When that threat of subversion can simultaneously arise from inside the nation—be they North Korean spies, sympathizers, or closeted communists—national security recalibrates as both an internal and an external ideology and practice. The NSL targets "domestic or foreign organizations or groups whose intentions are to conduct or assist infiltration of the Government or to cause national disturbances" (National Security Law, cited in Kraft 2006, 628–29). Vagueness intentionally punctuates the NSL. Article 7, for instance, punishes those who "praise, encourage, disseminate or cooperate" with the aforementioned "anti-state groups"; "create or spread false information which may disturb national order"; and "create, import, duplicate, possess, transport, disseminate, sell, or acquire documents, arts or other publications" that violate the NSL (ibid.). This laundry list of supposed antistate activities makes the category of national security threat mutable and absolute, much like the North Korean other. The North Korean other is both internal and external—here and over there; Korean and not Korean—and yet still absolutely a threat, in part because of its porousness and ambiguity. In the more than 70-year history of the NSL, countless South Koreans have been imprisoned, tortured, and killed for violating the NSL and branded traitors or antistate agents.

Use of the NSL intensified after the initial years of the Korean War and made possible the 1961 military coup by General Park Chung-hee, evidenced in three of the six pledges of the military junta: anti-communism, pro-Americanism, and "construction first, reunification

next" (Cho 1997, 133). The pro-America sentiment is relevant given the United States' continued military presence, monetary aid, and development support following the Korean War. As Christine Hong (2015, 598) argues, "crucial to US imperial state building and global capitalist hegemony from mid-century onward, the Korean War has fostered a formidable, crisis-generating, self-perpetuating, institutional architecture—the national security state, the military industrial complex, and the perpetual war economy, all cushioned within a self-serving regime of forgetting." Banal security explains this act of forgetting, for when crisis is modus operandi for more than half a century and in turn becomes mundane, ordinary even, banal security as a mode of governance compels such forgetting in order to secure the nation.

The constant state of national security crisis intensified over the years with several small-scale North Korean infiltrations following the Korean War—from the 120 North Korean agents who landed on the east coast of South Korea in 1968 and the bombing of a Korean airliner in 1987 to assassination attempts of President Park and then President Chun Doo-hwan (Chŏn Tu-hwan). President Park thus formed the Korea Central Intelligence Agency (KCIA), the institutional antecedent to the NIS, to both collect intelligence on potential external threats—namely North Korea—and to "eliminate all obstacles" standing in the way of Park's junta (Hyung-A Kim 2011, 91).[32] In other words, South Korea's national security apparatus—a system and network of experts still in place today—is predicated on external threats *and* internal threats or disruptions to not just state stability but the stability of a particular authoritarian regime. Under both the KCIA and the NSL, these terms were intertwined and synonymous with one another; state stability *is* regime stability, which is then the key defense against communism and North Korea. This South Korean style of Cold War authoritarianism, driven by an internal/external threat embodied in the North Korean other, allows for the curtailment of civil rights and liberties as North Korean spies and political dissidents may be using those rights to destabilize the nation for the sake of the North Korean regime. Freedom, for the authoritarianism of the 1960s to the 1980s, thus stood in contradiction to national security.

While the US imperial project of anticommunism drives the logic of both the NSL and national security more broadly in South Korea, it was the Japanese colonial architecture of the NSL that enabled the legal justification for using the ideology of anticommunism to curb pro-

tests and demonstrations seeking the democratization of the nation. My point is that the North Korean other that materialized within the NSL was and continues to be mobilized in the contours of daily life to surveil, discipline, and target difference. This included the 1962 resident registration law and system that required the issuance of unique identification numbers at birth, used "to monitor the population's movements for a wide range of purposes, including military service, taxation, criminal investigation, and … social welfare," and includes "the collection of 140 different items of individual information" (Moon 2005, 28). The goal of the law and system—and the subsequent revisions in the 1980s—was to track and root out potential North Korean spies and elements of communism from within. Yet these early forms of documentation, identification, and surveillance create a profile of what a good, upstanding South Korean citizen looks like (physically and socially) while also creating the antithetical profile of the spy, sympathizer, and other. While the histories of how these forms of identification and surveillance are still being excavated, the implication is that South Korea's bureaucratic attempts at managing categorical difference are recursively connected to the ways the state manages the North Korean other. Virtually any citizen can be "possessed" with the spirit of North Korea and communism. Yet, more than a side effect or unintended consequence of mass surveillance and documentation, managing categorical difference became itself a practice of national security. Understanding how sexual difference operates within bureaucratic, legal, and military institutions is quintessential to comprehending the role that difference and othering play in national security ideology and practice.

Militarizing the Ordinary

The staple of the anticommunist ideology and national security state continues to be the military and military service. The military institution, much like other national security institutions, was modeled after both the colonial Japanese military (especially training and hierarchy) and the US military, made more absolute with the US Military Government in Korea (USAMGIK) and continued presence of US military bases (Brazinsky 2007). While the US military occupation of South Korea (1945–1948) focused on building a self-sufficient military in order to strengthen the Korean government, Park Chung-hee and

Chun Doo-hwan's authoritarian years interlaced military service with economic development (Lee 2010; Brazinsky 2007). Seungsook Moon (2005) details specifically how the military allocated army divisions to factories, to labor-intensive jobs, and to research institutions as engineers, paying the men low wages and thus creating a nearly free labor "market." Moon calls this "militarized modernity" as this nearly free labor pairs with a growing male population that thus contributes to South Korea's industrialization and modernization.

Militarized modernity thus directly linked the security of the nation with economic development, soldiering, and labor. Historically, mandatory military service affected one's job and trajectory once one finished service. Completion of one's military service was often a prerequisite for employment and was also acknowledged as work experience to the extent that, prior to its 1999 elimination, those who served were guaranteed certain advantages in employment for both the public and private sector.[33] Industry and labor, then, are militarized systems, but if the driving force behind continued militarization—particularly during the Park and Chun authoritarian regimes—is the national security threats of the North Korean other and communism, then industry and labor are crucial arenas for national security. Under Park's 1960s motto of "Let us build our nation as we fight" (*Ssaumyŏnsŏ kŏnsŏl haja*), Korea was to simultaneously build and fight, both going hand in hand and at the center of his national security anticommunism ideology (Lee 2010, 40).

I suggest that the military within contemporary South Korean society constitutes a "total social fact" given that it "involve[s] the totality of society and its institutions" (Mauss 1990, 78). Yet total social facts can "set in motion society and its institutions as a totality," meaning that they do more than "involve the totality of society" but are the engine behind social cohesion, production, and also collapse (Valeri 2013, 266). The intermingling of the civilian with the military illustrates the lack of separation between the two, apparent even in the fact that civil law engenders the military and its laws/policies—military law is civil law. As such, the military does more than make soldiers; the military produces and disciplines an entire male citizenry through the expectations, practices, and experiences emergent in military service (Moon 2005). Chungmoo Choi (1998, 12) frames these decades of modernization and "capitalistic nationalism" as "legitimatized by anticolonial discourse, which paradoxically claimed spiritual superiority

and masculine integrity, while imposing chastity upon its women." Yet I take this a step further, for the military not only instantiates a rigid sex/gender system predicated on the perceived anatomical correctness of males and females (Yi and Gitzen 2018); it also sets in motion the heteronormativity that permeates and embeds itself within Korean society. Soldiers are to be masculine; they are to be healthy and able-bodied, but what equally defines these characteristics is the man's ability to be heterosexual.

There is growing dissatisfaction with mandatory military service, especially among the younger generations since the 1990s, many of whom perceive conscription as throwing one's prime years away, interfering with their normalized economic comfort (Moon 2005). Both dissatisfaction and annoyance with conscription has not abated (Joo 2012), particularly given the rarity of service exemptions.[34] Korea's population crisis and declining birth rates mean that fewer boys grow into soldiers, and thus has led to revisions in the medical standards determining service exemption (*Yonhap* 2019), despite controversy around athletes and K-pop stars' exemptions, or lack thereof (Padilla 2019; Robertson 2018; *Yonhap* 2018). Conscientious objectors, common among religious minorities like Jehovah Witnesses, also divide the public particularly given the newly minted three-year service option that entails working in detention centers and prisons rather than the individual's own imprisonment if they object to military service (Gibson 2020).

There has also been increased criticism of the daily life of soldiers following cases of bullying and murder. One case that received international attention was the 2014 death of a conscript bullied to death by other soldiers, including his superior; he was repeatedly struck in the chest while eating, whereby food blocked his airways and caused asphyxiation (BBC 2014; Choe 2014).[35] Another such case from 2014 involved an army sergeant who fired openly on other members of the 22nd Infantry Division stationed at Kosŏng-gun, in Gangwon (Kangwŏn) Province at the border with North Korea, killing five and injuring seven. During the trial, the sergeant claimed that he had been bullied (Lee 2015), and he had previously been considered at risk of suicide for his "difficulty adapting to military life" (McCurry 2014). Equally troubling is the number of suicides in the military, consistently their leading cause of death since 2010, accounting for 73 percent of all soldier deaths from 2010 to 2019 (Ministry of National Defense 2021).

Critics have thus focused attention on the Korean military's "barracks culture," which also includes poor sleeping conditions, poor mental health, and malnourishment (Williamson 2014). I translate these historical developments into ethnographic reality as I explore how some of my queer interlocutors maneuvered through their mandatory military service.

Ordinary Soldiering

I first met Min-sŏk in the spring of 2016 on Facebook; we had seen each other in passing at a couple different queer events and I decided to reach out to the gay man in his early 20s to discuss his experiences in queer activism and participation in queer events. He has a deep interest in American culture, speaking rather fluent English. We stayed in touch over the years, even talking throughout his military service. He would often regale me with rather benign stories of military life, but over time I realized that these mundane stories were about Min-sŏk's daily quest to survive the ordinariness of militarization and security. Sharing them was a way for me to bear witness to that endurance. During my time in Korea, I have listened as several men recounted stories of their military experience.

During one of Min-sŏk's midnight patrols of the outskirts of the military base where he was stationed, a fellow unit member picked him up in a patrol car. It was around 4am and just the two of them were in the car—they had no supervisor with them. The two started to listen to music from their phones, which they used in secret; cell phones were forbidden. Min-sŏk remembered listening to "Slow Dancing in the Dark" by Joji because his fellow unit member was "from Canada, so we had similar taste in music." He remembered the event because "that was one of the few good memories" Min-sŏk had of his military service. His positive memory and feelings, however, were based on an unallowed act of using his phone to listen to music. As they were patrolling and securing the military base, they maneuvered from within that action to find a moment of relief, of breathability in what was normally an exhausting practice—midnight patrols—and service.

The story struck me as odd… I had to admit, I was waiting for the punchline, for the action that would break this musical reverie, making the story an event worth relaying to me. But it did not come. The seemingly forgettable act was memorable to him for a similar reason that

the civilian drill I recounted in the Introduction left such an impression on me: the ordinariness was incredibly potent. If banal security transforms extraordinary security events and processes into mundane and routine happenings, then this moment was equally impactful because of its banality.

These moments of breathability are often simple, nearly as invisible as the space between the inhale and the exhale. These "ordinary affects," to invoke Kathleen Stewart (2007, 2), might "begin and end in broad circulation, but they're also the stuff that seemingly intimate lives are made of." They are "a shifting assemblage of practices and practical knowledges, a scene of both liveness and exhaustion, a dream of escape or of the simple life" (Stewart 2007, 1). These are not the extraordinary moments of a protest or queer festival. On the contrary, these moments render the ordinary affectual insofar as "they can be seen as both the pressure points of events or banalities suffered and the trajectories that forces might take if they were to go unchecked" (Stewart 2007, 2). The fleeting intimacy that Min-sŏk and his fellow unit member experienced in the moment of listening to Joji surged with an electricity emergent only in those transient moments when people are caught up "in something that feels like *some*thing" (ibid.). The friction, awkwardness, and uneasiness explored in this book focuses on the ways queer folks participate in their own securitization, and are similarly caught up in these ordinary affects given how security itself has become banal. As Stewart (2007, 128) writes:

> Ordinary affect is a surging, a rubbing, a connection of some kind that has an impact. It's transpersonal or prepersonal—not about one person's feelings becoming another's but about bodies literally affecting one another and generating intensities: human bodies, discursive bodies, bodies of thought, bodies of water.

Participation in security not only contributes to its banality but invites the possibility of unintended intensities, surges, and even enclaves. Min-sŏk and his colleague were using their security patrol—a moment of security participation and banalization—to listen to music, to discover other potentials of the moment that may exist outside the intention of the security practice but are nonetheless *immanent to* security itself. While Stewart wishes to occupy the in-between of the abstract and concrete where ordinary affect resides, my goal in attending to

these moments of ordinary affect or reprieve is to ultimately navigate through spaces of survival, instances where moments of securitization can become something *else*.

The friction of security participation thus collides with the intensities of these moments. "Wake up at the same time, eat at the same time, work out at the same time, sleep at the same time." An-so, a composite character of several queer men who had served in the military within five years of interviewing each man between 2015 and 2016, explained to me how he liked the regularity of military life and how little he had to think or worry about things like securing gainful employment. He also found the homosocial environment appealing and inviting. The homosocial bonds he formed with other male soldiers provided him the necessary support to endure his military service to the point that he even enjoyed it. I often interjected, noting that most of the queer men with whom I spoke dreaded their service and found it bothersome if not painful. These interlocutors were fearful of being outed because of the military's anti-sodomy law, as I elaborate below. An-so typically shrugged, chuckling a bit. On one hand, An-so—closeted throughout the duration of his service—is considered a disruption because of his queerness, and if he ever came out, he could potentially face imprisonment. But, on the other hand, the homosocial bonds An-so formed with other male soldiers were so intense and intimate that he derived enjoyment, even pleasure, from service.

The Threat of Sodomy

That anti-LGBT protesters, politicians, and judges invoke national security to justify the continued presence and constitutionality of the military's anti-sodomy clause makes sense given the primacy of military service in South Korea and the ways the military intertwines with national security. However, further explanation of the anti-sodomy clause itself is necessary to ascertain the full impact both the clause and the invocation national security have for queer Koreans. Most importantly, the military uses the fear over the North Korean other to justify the constitutionality and necessity for the anti-sodomy clause in the Military Penal Code.

The language of the clause and its placement is significant to both the jurisprudence of the Military Penal Code and the social implication of the clause. The original wording of the clause states: "A person

who commits sodomy or other forms of sexual harassment will be sentenced to no more than 2 years in prison." Sodomy is a colloquial translation of the Korean word *kyegan*, which translates to "sex between chickens" and crudely refers to sexual acts between two men.[36] The translation of kyegan into sodomy is rather fitting given the linguistic genealogy of sodomy itself to include anal sex, oral sex, bestiality, and, more generally, nonprocreative sex acts. The translation of "sex between chickens" and implication of bestiality is not an uncommon association for sodomy or homosexuality. Animality is routinely used to categorize, comment, and interpret forms of queerness, be it linguistically, discursively, or materially. Perhaps, as Mel Y. Chen (2012, 99) suggests, we ought to also take seriously the chicken in this scenario with which one is supposedly having sex, to consider "what the animal means, what it does, what kind of sex it has, what it wants."

The National Assembly slightly altered the wording of the clause in 2013, along with other changes in the Military Penal Code, to read: "A person who has anal sex with or sexually harasses a person … will be sentenced to no more than 2 years in prison." The change replaced kyegan with "anal sex" (*hangmun sŏnggyo*), a move that queer activists claim did nothing to change the antihomosexuality undertones of the law. Yet perhaps more telling in both versions of the clause is that Section 92 of the Military Penal Code focuses on "rape and sexual harassment (*kanggan kwa ch'uhaeng*)." The other clauses specifically address acts that are either forced or committed under forms of coercion; article 92-6 (and the original 92-5) is the only article of Section 92 that does not specify the use of force or coercion. These are *willing* sexual acts between two consenting adult soldiers, but categorized as sexual harassment. As such, prosecutors will often use this clause to charge soldiers with forms of sexual violence because they do not need to prove force, only that sexual interactions occurred. In other words, the requirement for the burden of proof is much lower, as known cases of soldiers being charged under the anti-sodomy clause included eyewitness accounts and testimony from soldiers involved (see Lee 2010).

The (mis)use of the anti-sodomy clause in sexual violence cases can be seen in the first ruling of the clause in 2002, when a lawsuit was filed with the Constitutional Court by an army corporal indicted for touching his subordinate's penis in the barracks (Constitutional Court 2001 hŏnba-70, 2002). The background of this ruling couples with the intentional vagueness of both the law and ruling. The army corporal

allegedly sexually assaulted his subordinate, but the military courts indicted the corporal under article 92-5. The prosecutor did not have to prove the use of force or violence. The father of the army corporal, however, hired a lawyer who advised the father and corporal to file a lawsuit with the Constitutional Court to decide the constitutionality of the clause. The complainant (the army corporal) argued that the proscription of "other acts of indecent sexual conduct/behavior" as stated in article 92-5 violated the "principle of clarity" (*nulla poena sine lege*). The scope of this regulation and language was argued to be too broad and "that the punishment of such minor sexual harassments … would violate the principle of proportionality" (Constitutional Court 2001 hŏnba-70, 2002). Stated alternatively, the scope of article 92-5 is so wide and vague that anything could fall within its purview and the punishment for such infractions would be unproportionable to the actual acts (or crimes).

The majority opinion of the decision to uphold the constitutionality of the article pivoted on the soldier's "common sense and ordinary sensibilities" to "predict who would be subject to the statute and what conduct would be prohibited under the law" (ibid.). The assumption was that soldiers know what constitutes "indecent sexual acts" and, as the court stated, what acts are constitutive of "ordinary sexual satisfaction." In other words, "indecent sexual acts" are those that "an ordinary citizen" recognizes as contrary to "ordinary sexual satisfaction," but also that these acts somehow violate "the sound living conditions and morale with the community of the armed forces" (ibid.). The court, however, did not specify how such acts violate these living conditions or morale.[37]

The 2002 Constitutional Court ruling was short, vague, and focused only on the principle of clarity in article 92-5. The 2011 Constitutional Court ruling of the anti-sodomy law was broader in its scope. In 2014, Gunivan, the Network for Reporting Discrimination and Human Rights Violations against LGBTI in Relation to the Military, collected the legal and social history of attempts to abolish the 2011 Constitutional Court ruling on the anti-sodomy law in a nearly-500-page white paper spanning six years from 2008 to 2014. The intention of this report was to "trace the effort" of the activist work around the issue and to "understand what role we [the activists] should play in the future" (Gunivan 2014, 3). The white paper details how the 2011 ruling emerged from a June 2008 Supreme Court ruling in favor of the anti-sodomy law and an August 2008 ruling by the Korean Army's Nor-

mal Military Court of the 22nd Infantry Division in opposition to the law. The Korean Army's Normal Military Court of the 22nd Infantry Division's August 2008 lawsuit argued that article 92-5 "violates equal rights, the right to sexual self-determination, and the right to privacy," and that "this hateful language [of sodomy] designates even a consensual sexual act as an 'indecent act,' as if homosexuality itself were but a type of sexual violence" (ibid., 54). In response, the government filed a lawsuit with the Constitutional Court to rule on the constitutionality of the law. Nearly three years after the filing, in 2011, the court ruled that article 92-5 is constitutional.

Part of the Korean Army's Normal Military Court of the 22nd Infantry Division's case rested on the notion of "individual sexual freedom," arguing, as mentioned, that article 92-5 violates the privacy and sexual freedom of the individual. Yet the court claimed that, because the Military Penal Code seeks to regulate "sound public life inside the military," restricting the individual's sexual freedom and privacy are *not* the aim of these laws (Gunivan 2014, 334). Similar to the 2002 ruling, male-on-male sex is argued to disrupt that community and its discipline and therefore must be outlawed. However, the 2011 ruling provides far more detail as to both its judicial reasoning and, ultimately, why male-on-male sex is problematic. The majority opinion claimed that the likelihood of "unusual sexual intercourse" between male soldiers is high in the military—that superiors are more likely to engage in homosexual sex acts with subordinates—and, "if neglected, there is great risk of direct harm to the military's fighting power" (ibid., 336). Part of the rationale the court provided for the higher frequency of male-on-male sex acts is the lack of opportunities for male and female soldiers to meet and work together compared to civilian life (ibid., 336). Within the court's reasoning—and within military law more broadly—the role of women, their *raison d'ĕtre*, is to sexually please men, and *only in their absence* do men turn to homosexual sex.

The problem lies not only in the sex act itself, which the court finds "immoral" and "abnormal," but in the *possibility* of men's desire to have sex with each other to manifest and the sex act to occur. This possibility of and desire for homosexual sex are a concern when assessing the "military fighting power" of the unit because soldiers are not able to properly fight and serve if the possibility of sex looms overhead, let alone if they are having sex with each other. In short, the possibility for male-on-male sex challenges the military readiness of the unit. As

Judge Kim Chong-dae plainly stated, "in order to intensify the spiritual military combat power, the curtailing of homosexuality in the military is needed" (Gunivan 2014, 326). This is, therefore, part of the legal rational for not only upholding the anti-sodomy clause as constitutional but how judges, politicians, and anti-LGBT protesters equate queer Koreans to national security disruptions and threats.

The ruling continues, stating that the individual's sexual freedom and privacy are not the aims of the law but moreover, that such freedom must be limited to safeguard the communal health of the military because "it cannot be said that they [the individual's sexual freedom and privacy] are greater than the public interest of 'national security,' the precondition of existence and all freedom" (Gunivan 2014, 335). The original lawsuit brought to the Constitutional Court in 2008 pivoted on the individual's sexual freedom and privacy. The court's constructed hierarchy of placing national security above freedom and even its existence alludes to the authoritarian regimes of Park and Chun, when freedom stood as possible foe to national security. This has been reformulated as a precondition: to ensure *all* freedom (including sexual freedom and privacy), a nation must be secure. More insidious is the claim that *national* security precedes existence itself, that for the individual and the individual's sexual freedom and privacy to exist at all the nation must first exist and be secure. Freedom and existence are conditional and, yet, only male-on-male sex and queerness are determined to be illegal and a disruption to national security.

The North Korean other haunts the Constitutional Court's 2011 ruling with both the necessity of article 92-5 and its punishment without ever being mentioned. In addressing the punishment for violating article 92-5, codified as less than two years but often equating to less than a year, the court claimed that the punishment is proportional to the crime in part because of "our country's state of security and conscription system" (Gunivan 2014, 335). The use of this demarcated language—"our country"—requires contextual knowledge of Korea's national security landscape and conscription system. The continued rationale for conscription, along with the chief concern for national security, is North Korea. Hence the justification for banning sodomy is the continued threat of North Korea. Yet, more than simply using North Korea as a patsy in judicial reasoning, the work of alluding to a context without naming what exactly "our country's state of security" is conjures the specter of the North Korean other as not a physical body

but an ideology, a fear of communism that can be both internal and external. It phases through—through bodies, institutions, laws, time—not unlike Marx's specter of communism haunting Europe (Derrida 1993). And, thus, its spectral quality is both the cause of its danger and its usefulness in upholding national security discourse: we fear the specter, but its amorphous and even porous figure can easily be fit into any given situation, context, or landscape.

Categories of Exclusion

The invocation of military readiness and military fighting power is a familiar claim within US legal history, namely the long-fought battles over the 1993 implementation and then 2011 repeal of the US military code "Don't Ask, Don't Tell" (DADT) and the earlier precedents of segregation/desegregation in the US military. These are significant cases because not only does the South Korean Constitutional Court's ruling tap into similar rhetoric of military readiness, discipline, and security—central to both DADT and racial segregation in the military—but the continued presence of US military bases and soldiers in South Korea cannot be overlooked. Both the US and South Korean militaries routinely engage in joint military exercises—often denounced by North Korea—including the annual operations of "Foal Eagle" and "Ulchi Freedom Guardian" that see hundreds of thousands of military and civilian personnel engage in operations.[38] Furthermore, since July 1950, a small number of drafted Korean personnel have served in the Eighth United States Army, stationed in P'yŏngt'aek-si, known as the Korean Augmentation to the United States Army (KATUSA).[39]

Earlier bans on homosexuality in the US military claimed that "homosexuality is incompatible with military service" because the mere presence of homosexuals would "adversely affect the ability of the Armed Forces to maintain discipline, good order, and morale," resulting, among many things, in "breaches of security" (Department of Defense cited in Sinclair 2009, 704–5). The crucial point in this directive and DADT—where one is not asked about one's sexual orientation and thus one need not reveal that sexual orientation—is that 'group cohesion and unity are paramount institutional needs for maintaining "discipline, good order, and morale"' (Davis 1993, 24).

The need for maintaining "discipline, good order, and morale" within the military was also the justification for racial segregation in

the US military until President Truman's 1948 Executive Order 9981 desegregating the US armed forces. In response to a proposed piece of legislation in 1940 that would have essentially desegregated the military, the secretary of war warned that such legislation would "demoralize and weaken the effect of military units by mixing colored and white soldiers in closely related units, or even in the same units" (Dalfiume 1969, 46). Furthermore, feminist historian Margot Canaday (2009) details how the rise of the US bureaucratic state in the 20th century also led to the systematic targeting of homosexuality in the institutions of welfare, immigration, and the military. The racialization of bodies was intimately tied to the simultaneous sexualization of bodies (Sommerville 1994), but Canaday illustrates that the state crafted a closet (of homosexuality) through the lens of citizenship that relies on mechanisms of inclusion and exclusion.

My point is that we must read the South Korean Constitutional Court's rulings through this US legal and military history because the court and the South Korean state use military law to create categories of exclusion much in the same way the NSL carves out exclusionary categories through the specter of the North Korean other. Given that military service is a requisite for Korean citizenship for men, the antisodomy clause in the Military Penal Code excludes queer folks from Korean citizenship. Coupled with the specificity of South Korea's "state of security" and "national security" mobilized in the court's 2011 ruling, homosexuality is not only a disruption to national defense and security but akin to the North Korean other that exists to target and exclude. Homosexuality is a legal category of exclusion outside the confines of Korean citizenship.

As established, the North Korean other relies on both the physical "over there" place of North Korea—an external enemy to be defined—and the possibility of infiltration and possession within South Korean borders. This other is indistinguishable, ambiguous, and thus dangerous in a Cold War–born system that requires distinction and fears ambiguity for its possible enemy possession. Queer Koreans operate in a similar jurisprudence given that they are also indistinguishable from nonqueer folks. If pro–North Korean sentiments and ideologies constitute evidence of North Koreans or at least spectral possession for the NSL, then sodomy is the corresponding evidence for identifying queer Koreans for military law.

However, the interstitial space of military law, national security law, and othering still yields a jurisprudence of queer folks that forms the basis of their categorization, treatment, and even abuse. Their ambiguity of being both Korean and somehow different in part manifests their danger. This danger also yields a question of ethnicity and racialization, where queer Koreans are racially the same as all other Koreans and yet their sexuality marks them as different. The danger and disruptive capacity of homosexuality first and foremost lies in the ambiguity of queer Koreans being both this and that, here and there, internal and external, Korean and queer. This is a central threat in postwar South Korea, instantiated in the North Korean other's ability to be both internal and external. The North Korean other's ambiguity fuels the perpetual fear of peninsular destruction, where queer Koreans are not a cause but a symptom of this fear, illustrative of how far-reaching national security and anxiety are in the daily lives of South Koreans. Both occupy the same conceptual security space of internal/external, self/other, and both continuously haunt postwar Korea. More than a phantom limb, this other acts as doppelgänger, too uncanny for reflection and thus categorized as a disruption or even threat.

The doppelgänger effect—a self/other dichotomy latent in modern Korean society, culture, and national consciousness—manifests even in common slogans used in contemporary protests. These slogans follow the same linguistic pattern of combining that which is being protested against and either the English or the transliteration of the English word "out." This has been used with political or public figures, such as "Park Geun-hye out" during the 2016–2017 candlelight vigils that eventually led to the impeachment and imprisonment of former president Park Geun-hye. Yet this type of slogan is also commonplace in anti-LGBT protests and the Protestant right, such as "LGBT-OUT." The expulsion of these nouns from one space to another demarcates movement from an internal to an external, such as from president to civilian (and, thus, able to be prosecuted). Yet within anti-LGBT protests that call for the expulsion of "LGBT," the metaphor of "out" taps into the exclusionary ideology of the military's anti-sodomy law, national security, and the North Korean other. "Out" is thus an expulsion from not only the military but also the nation and even the perceived ethnic homogeneity of the Korean people.

Ordinary Soldiering, Redux

Kang-t'a looked content when I saw him in the summer of 2013 at a coffee shop, as if everything was in its rightful place: "*hago sip'ŭn kŏt ŏpsŏ, kago sip'ŭn kot ŏpsŏ*" ("I have nothing I want to do, I have nowhere I want to go"). My gay longtime friend and interlocutor did not look much different, except for the braces, and still managed to frequently smile during our conversation. Seeing him, falling back into step with our conversations, I realized that I had missed him; it had been nearly two years since I had last seen him. We first met when I was a graduate student in Korea and he was just starting college, joining the same queer club. The two of us immediately hit it off as the "newbies" to the club. When talking about his military service he explained that the lifestyle appealed to him because he was never alone: he never ate, slept, or did anything by himself. Everything he did was with other men, and, while he noted that he liked the idea of having many attractive and muscular men surround him, it was more than that—it was camaraderie. Kang-t'a compared his group of friends or fellow soldiers with friends in school or the same club or major, noting that what was impressive about his military friends is that they come from all walks of life throughout Korea. There is something powerful for Kang-t'a in this experience, especially as the men do everything together. Homosocial intimacy gives space for soldiers to cope with the difficulties of the military. Such spaces of exposure leave the military and security vulnerable but are seen as necessary to build camaraderie, which in turn secures the ability for the army to secure the nation (Gitzen 2022).

Interestingly, Kang-t'a was not particularly frightened by the prospects of being outed or arrested for being gay despite this being a distinct possibility. While Kang-t'a was well-aware that his sexuality was outlawed by the military, he admitted that he did not feel sexual during his conscription. Several of my queer interlocutors made a similar point, that during their conscription years their typical thoughts of sex were primarily displaced by physical exhaustion.

There were, however, notable exceptions. As I explore elsewhere, I noticed a proliferation of stories within Korean queer films, magazines, and the community that narrate male soldiers having sex with one another on base (Gitzen 2022).[40] Suggesting that this narrative provides space within the military for the survival of closeted queer soldiers bombarded by "toxic masculinity" and homophobia, the cir-

culation of this narrative is immanent to the inner workings of the military itself. While the line between homosocial intimacy and romance/sex is often vague, the latter is criminal, while the former is encouraged. The very tools used to facilitate unit cohesion and thus security are the same tools appropriated for survival, essentially queering the very foundations of military sociality and Korean male sociality more broadly.[41] Both Kang-t'a and An-so's experiences contribute to the ordinariness of soldiering and the banality of security.

Min-sŏk had a boyfriend during his military service, a fact that he said helped him cope with his two-year service period. The unit knew he was in a relationship; they just did not know it was with another man. Given that the military surveils phone calls and letters, one of Min-sŏk's strategies was to mask the language he used with his boyfriend in communication so as not to reveal either that his partner was male or that he was his boyfriend. This is a rather common practice for queer soldiers in relationships. Queer Koreans find ways to express affection through alternative forms of language; they employ codewords to express love, for instance, to avoid detection. These linguistic practices subvert the very apparatus of security.

While letters and phone calls to friends and family are a common part of soldiering, queer Koreans are also using that system of communication to express affection for their loved ones that bypass the illegality of their existence. They can move within the system to stitch together their own forms of expression and living, using the system to their advantage. Similar to those queer soldiers who co-opt homosociality and transform it into forms of homoeroticism and sexual release, Min-sŏk and other queer soldiers co-opted communication as a mode of endurance. This is also true of the regular leaves that soldiers are provided throughout their service tenure. These leaves range from a day to a week or so, and for queer soldiers like Min-sŏk these are periods when they get to see their boyfriends, their queer friends, visit gay bars and clubs, and have sex. As the opening story from the Introduction makes clear, soldiers are still considered part of the military during periods of leave, and so they are still governed by military law. Therefore, some of these acts—namely, having sex with other men—are considered illegal even on leave. But queer soldiers do it anyway.[42]

As with the memory of listening to music at 4am while patrolling, queer soldiers must find ways to operate within the military–security regime itself, a regime that targets them as disruptions, to simultane-

ously hide and live a life. When one is treated as a threat or disruption, one must make do with what one has, and oftentimes, as participants in their own securitization, they must mobilize the very tools that make them insecure for the sake of their livelihoods.

A Space for Justice

The stress of military service for queer Koreans does not go unnoticed by the human rights community. Some organizations have instituted workshops and camps for soon-to-be soldiers, friends, and family members wishing to navigate the fear they may have with regards to military service. The Military Human Rights Center's camp, operating since 2009, captures this anticipation well on their website in 2016: "Are you really worried before going to the military? All you've heard about is torture…[A]re you insecure?" (Military Human Rights Center 2016). Queer soldiers are anticipating a difficult time, torture and violence even, and given the cases of bullying and even murder among conscripted soldiers coupled with the military's anti-sodomy law, such anticipation is more than understandable; it is to be expected.

There have been attempts to institute and reform regulations to protect the well-being of conscripted soldiers, known as the Subsidiary Management Ordinance. Among the many regulations, homosexual soldiers are identified as a population to protect against discrimination, differentiating between one's identity and one's (homo)sexual practices, for while the former ought to be protected against discrimination, the latter is still regulated by article 92-6. However, queer and human rights activist cry foul as these regulations are thought to not go far enough and those regulations that do exist are often overlooked or ignored by the military (Kim Tong-gyu 2011). This then led to a revision of the regulations in 2016, the revised ordinance forbidding the hospitalization of homosexual soldiers in an attempt to isolate soldiers that the military thought to be "incompatible with active-duty service." And yet, military doctors still preside over much of a soldier's mental and physical health, and as such if a military doctor determines that there is a "likelihood of an accident such as suicide," then the doctor can treat the soldier in a military hospital while also informing parents and superiors to prevent such "accidents" from happening (Pŏpchechŏ 2016).

When paired with the military's anti-sodomy law, the military goes to great lengths to find ways to interpret and treat queer soldiers as disruptions. In particular, the Constitutional Court's invocation of South Korea's "state of security," "national security," and "our history and culture" in the 2011 and 2016 rulings indexes the still present anti-communist ideology weaved through the very fabric of South Korea's national security, military, and legal systems. These rulings conjure up the specter of the North Korean other as a necessary spirit to legally justify punishment under article 92-6, not necessarily because those who partake in male-on-male sex acts are considered communists but because the ever-present threat of North Korea makes disruption within the military that much more immediate and in need of regulation. The in-betweenness of queer Koreans and male-on-male sex mirrors that of the North Korean other, being both internal and external, and therefore in need of careful regulation.

The space of justice emerges not only out of the growing activist response to the existence of the anti-sodomy law in the Military Penal Code and persecution of queer soldiers under the auspices of this law, but from the decolonial work of recognizing that national security and military law are colonial and imperial mechanisms predicated on excluding difference. Military conscription itself relies on a gendered politics of exclusion, as only able-bodied men are required to serve, but the *need* for conscription escapes consideration for that need is what truly impedes the work of justice. The thrall of banal security, embodied in the perpetual fear over North Korea and peninsular destruction, remains. The colonial legacy of the anti-sodomy law demonstrates that sexual difference was always a target for security and the Korean state. As long as the NSL exists in any fashion and the specter of the North Korean other haunts the social and legal landscape, difference will continue to be excluded. While such exclusion may be the cornerstone of other nations and the driving principle of citizenship, South Korea's politics of exclusion and difference rely on the continued presence of the North Korean other to fashion national security disruptions out of difference. How is justice possible when the infrastructures and ideologies of national security—meant to ensure safety—are predicated on quelling liberation?

Perhaps the starting point for justice lies in the project of exorcising from law, institutions, and society more broadly the North Korean other and all entanglements that made such specter possible. Or maybe

exorcism is too far gone, and we need only follow the ghost in the Derridean sense. Justice is in the queer reading of national security and military law that requires gender and sexual sameness for the sake of security and defense, when those were historically colonial and imperial requirements used to subjugate colonial and imperial subjects. Justice is in the voices and experiences of those affected and excluded, those who live through violence as a condition of daily life.

CHAPTER 2

Queer States of Security

Drumming: that is what I remember first. The anti-LGBT protesters were already present when I arrived at Seoul City Hall Plaza for the 2015 Korean Queer Culture Festival (KQCF) on June 28.[43] They gathered both across the street in front of Tŏksu Palace and crammed together in the space between exit 5 of the City Hall subway station and the six-foot-tall police barricades encircling the plaza and festival space. Small children enthusiastically beat large drums, and they were loud. As I looked closer, I realized that the drums made the hate explicit, their bodies adorned with opposition to homosexual equality. Soon after, young girls in white dresses and blue sashes, began a dance routine to a piece of classical music, and, while I recognized the musical score, I could not immediately identify the piece. It was 11 in the morning on a Saturday and I wondered, albeit fleetingly, what these kids would have rather been doing instead of this.

I moved in front of the protesters and followed the police barricades that ran parallel to the plaza—the KQCF space inside the barricades—and the main road that connected Seoul Station to Gwanghwamun (Kwanghwamun) and Gyeongbok (Kyŏngbok) Palace. A string of police officers also stood against the barricades, *looking inwards*, as large police buses with bars on the windows lined the street. Why were the police looking inwards if their task was to keep protesters out? I turned another corner and freely entered the festival space. Booths lined the inside border of the plaza, a stage was erected to the right in the southeast corner of the space, and a few participants milled about. I walked around the sparsely populated space, intentionally early to watch the transformation of the space as more participants arrived. A few hours later, the sun unrelenting and the crowd growing dra-

matically, I made my way back to the entrance to search for a friend. What had been a wide-open entrance with participants coming and going as they liked now resembled a border checkpoint. The number of protesters had grown and they began to try to enter the festival alongside new participants. The police thus charged festival organizers with determining who could enter and who could not, the entrance bottlenecking significantly and movement constricted. Nearby, police officers had shrunk the entrance into a checkpoint and helped, but it was up to the festival organizers to decide who was sufficiently queer enough to enter.

However, the police's drastic action to quarantine the festival with barricades, bodies, and buses is not only reminiscent of police quelling protests during the Park Geun-hye era but marks a contrast with the police response to protesting during the authoritarian and immediate postdemocratization years (1961–1992). The techniques the police used to keep the festival space free from anti-LGBT protesters and, in a sense, safe are familiar within the broader schematic of national security and police intervention. By intervening in the 2015 KQCF through these techniques, the police instantiate queer events and spaces—spaces that are already marginal and marginalized—as national security spaces and ground zero for disruption. These techniques and police involvement move beyond this single iteration; they are still being used in the burgeoning Pride festivals across Korea. The paradox of police intervention is that, whether the police intervened or not, the festival and its participants would be vulnerable.

The checkpoint, though, is a telling departure from rampant police crackdown of protests since the 1960s as it temporarily transfers entrance authority to festival organizers. It is an embodiment of neoliberal security governance, driven by the illusion of freedom. The very possibility of assemblies, rallies, and protests were foreclosed during the authoritarian and immediate postdemocratization years as their critique of the government was interpreted as a national security threat. Direct presidential elections in 1987 and sustained democratically elected representatives, however, symbolized freedom from dictatorial oppression and ushered in new assembly and protest laws and opportunities. Where such events were barred in the past, organizers now attained permission from local governments and the police. Freedom of assembly, however limited, continues to be quintessential to the contemporary moment generated by the role protesting

and assemblies played in both democratization in the 1980s and the impeachment of Park Geun-hye in 2017.

Yet the liberal democratic promise of freedom in Korea relies on policing—on its history, practices, and technologies—to assuage threats to freedom. As Wendy Brown (1995, 5) reminds us, "'freedom' has shown itself to be easily appropriated in liberal regimes for the most cynical and unemancipatory political ends." In practice, the freedom for groups like the KQCF to hold assemblies and events is contingent on the need to seek and receive approval. It is not that freedom is limited by the state; rather, freedom is itself a technique *of* neoliberal security governance. As Timothy Mitchell (2006, 179) writes of Foucault's notion of government, "the word refers not to institutions of the state, but to the new tactics of management and methods of security that take the population as their object … government refers to power in terms of its methods rather than its institutional forms." The checkpoint is an apt representative of this governmentalization and appropriation of freedom as it demonstrates that freedom does not operate outside of power, for "freedom is nothing else but the correlative of the deployment of apparatuses of security" (Foucault 2007, 48). By providing KQCF organizers with the authority to determine entrance to the festival while physically barring others, the police allow for the movement of people, albeit surveilled and scrutinized. Doing so supposedly prevents confrontation and escalation.

The at-times-delicate dance of freedom, protest, and policing—and, at other times, bluntness of the state apparatus—is both symptomatic and diagnostic of banal security and indicative of South Korea's regimes of biopolitical regulation.[44] The script that narrates the genealogy of contemporary South Korea as a flood of protests for democracy and freedom amid state or imperial policing is tied to the very foundations of national security. Even if the ruling government uses the familiar justification of the North Korean threat to police and limit protests and demonstrations, banal security also operates in ways that are not so overtly security-driven. Policing takes on the role of freedom's champion, not its adversary. The checkpoint at the KQCF elucidates this point and the uncomfortable work of police collaboration—that KQCF officials made entry decisions, supported by police presence—in the work of national security. Queer Koreans are invited (with little other alternative) to collaborate with the police to guarantee

their safety. Marginalized peoples policing marginalized peoples: freedom in all its splendor.

Collaboration between police and queer Koreans during the KQCF, most notably the checkpoint, transforms the festival into simultaneously a queer and security space. The impermanence and simultaneity of the space creates what I call a *queer state of security*. Embodying the dual meaning of "state" as a polity and a mode of being, queer states of security index both the collaboration of KQCF organizers and police to use security technologies to construct the festival space and the simultaneous feeling of contingent and provisional safety and structural (or institutional) insecurity of festival organizers, volunteers, and participants. The presence and participation of the police at the festival illustrates how the liberal conception of occupying public space still requires anointment from the state. It is this dual capacity of police participation, to chaperone or to quell, that makes the police and security ambiguous and conflicting for protests. Queer states of security, in addition to being inherently transient, are also precarious because, while participants feel safe and secure in the space, it is not easily replicated and does not protect against the constant barrage of hate speech, homophobic policies, and general policing of their sexualities.

Yet when considered from the perspective of the police, that queer folks are participating in their own securitization by both quarantining themselves inside the enclosed space and operating the checkpoint, queer states of security enable queer Koreans to stake claims to their general population membership and citizenship. By requiring the police for the sake of their safety, they not only draw attention to their existence *as queer* but their entitlement to safety as citizens of the nation. An uneasiness sets in, however, in the queer production of security. The conflicted feelings that many participants felt—such as joy and terror, liberation and containment—arose from their participation in the production of security. Queer peoples and bodies are perpetually targeted as disruptions, and, while their target-ness and disruptiveness are caught up in their sexualities, being targeted also indicates that security and safety are heteronormative processes.

Increased police presence and action likely resulted from the clash of anti-LGBT protesters and festival participants during the 2014 KQCF in the Shinchon district when anti-LGBT protesters laid down in front of the parade floats and refused to move for hours (Kim 2015). The KQCF, which started in 2000, has attracted more and more partic-

ipants—both in number and variety—each year. The 2014 KQCF was a watershed moment for anti-LGBT obstruction and police intervention, and, according to festival organizers, the 2015 KQCF was meant to both reclaim the narrative and take a stand against anti-LGBT protesters and violence. This was also the first time the KQCF was to be held at Seoul City Hall Plaza, a widely visible space for demonstrations, festivals, recreational activities, and the annual ice-skating ring. The festival has been held at the plaza every year since. For festival organizers—and, indeed, participants and Seoulites alike—holding the KQCF at the plaza was immensely symbolic and made visible that which had often been kept hidden: queerness. As such, festival organizers chose the theme "Queer Revolution!" for the 2015 KQCF, embodying what they believed to be the start of an actual revolution of visibility, acceptance, and "freedom." A year later, the 2016 KQCF followed suit with the theme "Queer I Am: Fighting for Our Existence." Organizers knew they risked insecurity, that "revolution" and "fighting" are not without casualties. Despite the affective connections forged during the festival and parade, the excitement of being so visible while surrounded by anti-LGBT protesters who wished nothing more than for them to disappear, laying bare the insecurity implicit in greater visibility and police intervention, moves this chapter forward.

Stateful Things

In his essay on corruption and the state, Akhil Gupta ([1995] 2006, 226) challenges us to move away from "the state" as our "point of departure" and instead "leave open the analytical question as to the conditions under which the state *does* operate as a cohesive and unitary whole." For Gupta, there is never truly closure, ethnographically, to this imperative because contradictions and fractures flourish. It is this fractured and contradictory nature that leads Carol Vance (2011, 934) to surmise in her study of trafficking that, "in studying the state, one always muses whether the state is a lumbering beast or an efficient missile, swiftly implementing surveillance, securitization, and control, particularly of bodies?" Similarly, Mitchell (2006, 180) demonstrates the "structural effect" of the state, a "distinctiveness of the modern state, appearing as an apparatus that stands apart from the rest of the social world." Mitchell (2006, 176) notes the assumption of the state's cohesion and autonomy presumed in "the state," linking this again to its structural

effect, whereby our task is to "examine it not as an actual structure, but as the powerful, apparently metaphysical effect of practices that make such structures appear to exist" (180). The folly we continuously face is to assume that national security is an institution or assembly "out there" in its own right, with its own coherencies and self-contained ideologies, and managed under the purview of "the state." Secrecy enables this mysticism around national security (Masco 2006; Gusterson 1996), akin to the thralldom Michael Taussig (1992) describes of "state fetishism." That national security is traditionally believed to solely be managed, produced, and directed by the state reifies the closed and holistic image of both national security and the state. Rather, both security and the state are participatory, and thus it is crucial to examine the ways people produce and perpetuate the state and security in their lives (Navaro-Yashin 2002; Masco 2014).

In furthering a more complex understanding of the Korean state, I follow Mitchell's (2006, 176) insistence that we ought not separate the state from society given that "such agency [of the state] will always be contingent on … those practices that create the apparent boundary between state and society." This is evident in the contextualization of Korea's anti-LGBT protesters and Protestant right. My intention is to demonstrate that the history of Protestant Christianity in Korea is very much a stateful thing, intertwined in ways that nuance policing, anti-LGBT protesting, and queer spaces. At times Protestant Christianity's political theology may be at odds with social justice organizations' ideologies, for, even during the democracy movements of the 1970s and 1980s, few churches or denominations involved themselves in the movement because "the Korean Protestant church became a religion of the social establishment" and thus "tended to avoid controversial issues and actions" (Chung-Shin Park 2003, 95–96). Fault lines are growing in Protestantism, particularly in the wake of the 2017–2018 candlelight protests that led to the impeachment and removal of former president Park Geun-hye, as there were those who participated in the protests and supported Park's removal, while others still opposed Park's removal and believe her to be the legitimate president of Korea (Choi 2020). These fault lines seem to straddle the lines of Korean democracy, not only in practical matters, such as what leaders to support and what issues on which to weigh, but on the fundamental ideologies of what counts as Korean democracy. Here, too, lies my intention in bringing these contexts together, for the transition from

authoritarian to democratic governance has the potential to lay bare the frictions of state and society, Protestantism and secular ideology, anti-LGBT and social justice.

In her explication of the Protestant right in South Korea, Nami Kim (2016, ix–x) writes, "although the Protestant Right has been the subject of grave concerns and even ridicule among concerned Christians and non-Christians alike because of its insidious rhetorics, divisive stance, and aggressive actions on varied social and political issues, it is, nonetheless, difficult to dismiss or ignore its presence and influence." This was the feeling I had whenever I saw anti-LGBT protesters at queer events, what Kim (2016, ix) calls the Protestant right—"a subset of Korean Protestant Christianity that combines conservative evangelical/fundamentalist theology with social and political conservativism"—because I started to recognize them, recognize the names of their various organizations, hear the same rhetorics used to position themselves against what they perceived as the immorality and threat of homosexuality. Kim (2016, x) suggests that the Protestant right are to be taken seriously because of their resources, networks, and collectivity that they actively mobilize for social issues they deem important. These social issues, Kim (2016, 151) emphasizes, coalesce around the other, most significantly women, Muslim men, and sexual minorities, and, in Kim's estimation, "heterosexism, sexism, homophobia, racial prejudice and discrimination, and intolerance toward the 'other,' all of which have been foundational to the Protestant Right's politics, continue to exist and even expand through the tacit approval or silence of various social constituents, including individual Christian bystanders." I witnessed this network and collectivity firsthand at the 2015 KQCF, as what was typically a core group of anti-LGBT protesters grew exponentially in size as the hours passed. The political force and mobilization prowess are not unique to the Protestant right, for, as I detail below, the history of Protestantism in Korea in the 20th century illustrates the importance of mass mobilization.

The postcolonial period began to see not only an incredible growth in the Protestant Church in Korea, often breaking world records for the largest church or largest evangelistic gatherings (Lee 2005, 85–86), but also the dispersal and embedding of Protestantism into Korean institutions and daily life.[45] In his exploration into the history of Evangelicalism in Korea, Timothy Lee (2010, 90) writes of proselytizing and establishment of chaplaincies in police departments, prisons, and the

armed forces following the Korean War. Fervent in their anticommunist belief, Evangelicals were often deferential to the government, thus providing them with a "good footing" with Korea's authoritarian leaders (Lee 2010, 100). As Lee points out, their government support was always "conditional … so long as the government did not encroach on their religious prerogatives … they did not hesitate to confront the government."[46]

There were those dissenting liberal Christians in the late 1970s protesting authoritarian rule that formed a "systemic liberation theology," termed minjung theology, from concerns regarding Korean people's social welfare (Chang 2006, 196). As Paul Chang (2006, 205) explains, "the notion of *minjung* identified all those in Korean society who were suffering oppression at the hands of Park's dictatorial regime … [minjung] was transformed into a *populist* theology as theologians started to use it as the master symbol in the construction of their liberation theology." Minjung theology was built upon the already existing minjung movement from the 1970s and 1980s concerned with democratization (Lee 2007).

In the postdemocratized landscape, though, we still must reckon with the sheer force of Protestantism in Korean society and politics. For instance, during Kim Young-sam's (Kim Yŏng-sam) presidency (1993–1998), around half of those serving in the National Assembly were Protestants and more than half of his ministers and vice-ministers were Christians (Lee 2010, 143). Even the former Catholic president Kim Dae-jung (Kim Tae-jung) (1998–2003) paid deference to Evangelicals by visiting pastors and churches with special attention paid to the ministers of large churches and Evangelical broadcasting networks (ibid., 144–45). It is necessary to recognize that the influence Evangelicals have in politics, the economy, and society more broadly (Lee 2010), so that, when speaking of the Protestant right—those even more conservative than Evangelicals—there is fundamental overlap (both systemically and theologically).[47] Moreover, the social consensus and acquiescence to conservative Christian demographics has equally stalled antidiscriminatory and queer-friendly policies, including Seoul human rights ordinances.

While the Protestant right may be even further right than Evangelicals, patriarchy and traditional gender roles also easily lend themselves to anti-LGBT beliefs. It may very well be the Protestant right and anti-LGBT protesters that are most physically present, but anti-LGBT poli-

cies and posturing have wide circulation as currency for any and all to use. While Kim (2016) focuses on the prowess of the Protestant right itself, I am concerned more with how anti-LGBT belief is not located within one group or even one religion. It is certainly monopolized by the Protestant right, as Kim (2016) demonstrates, and I would venture to suggest a core belief in Evangelicalism in Korea more broadly, but indexing the act or belief (anti-LGBT) rather than the religious belief (Protestant right) draws attention to the mobilization power of homophobia.

In the previous chapter, I detailed two key state and security institutions—the law and the military—as sites where a politics of exclusion, categorization, and marginalization takes place, sites where queer folks are directly and indirectly crafted into national security disruptions. This chapter examines an additional state institution, the police, and social interactions with the institution in both protest and collaborative forms. My focus on the collaboration between the police and the KQCF organizers at once indexes Yael Navaro-Yashin's (2002, 4) point about secularism and public culture in Turkey, that "the very people who critique the state also reproduce it through their 'fantasies' for the state." Navaro-Yashin's (2002, 4) analysis of fantasy, inspired by both Taussig and Slavoj Žižek, mirrors my conception of banality, for it "generates unconscious psychic attachments to the very object (e.g., the state, the nation, public discourse) that has been deconstructed in the domains of consciousness … [it] is what reconstitutes and regenerates state power. Fantasy does everyday maintenance work for the state." Contrary to Marx's false consciousness, Žižek contends that "they know very well what they are doing, but still, they are doing it" (Žižek cited in Navaro-Yashin 2002, 159). This constructs the fantasy of the state as it allows for greater agency for citizens in their reproduction of "the state." KQCF organizers had previously critiqued the police's initial rejection of the festival's signature parade only to then collaborate at the actual festival. Yet queer states of security also extend beyond critique and fantasy by entering the realm of survival and endurance: to rephrase Žižek, queer Koreans know very well what they are doing, but they believe they have no other choice. States are contradictory, both meanings; those individuals involved in the collaboration expressed ambivalence toward the collaboration, but they also felt that they had no choice. This is one way the structural effect of the state

manifests, as citizens believe that the arbiter of protection, safety, and, ultimately, security lies squarely with the state (Brown 1995).

Road Rules

On November 14, 2015, roughly 70,000 people from the civic, labor, and farming sectors gathered in downtown Seoul to protest then President Park Geun-hye's labor and education policies (Jung-a Song 2015).[48] The government deemed the demonstration illegal because neither the Seoul city government nor the police had given them permission, and so more than 20,000 police officers with nearly 700 police buses descended onto the scene. They lined the streets with the buses and prevented protesters from marching toward the Imperial Palace and Blue House, the president's office and residency (Kyung-min Lee 2015). Some of the protesters described the scene as a "war zone" (Heo, Choi, and Park 2015). Forty-nine protesters were arrested at the demonstration, overpowered by the hordes of young policemen, and carried off into the blacked-out police buses with bars on the windows (Jhoo 2015).[49] Yet, the police actions during the protest caused intense scrutiny and criticism from domestic and international human rights groups, particularly for the police's use of water cannons. The police used 182,000 liters of water mixed with 432 liters of PAVA, a compound of capsaicin (an active component in chili peppers), to disperse the protesters (ibid.).[50]

In the aftermath of the protest, president Park remarked during a cabinet meeting that "it's intolerable that such protests took place here, considering inter-Korean tensions still remain across the border and the whole world is in mourning over the increasing number of victims of terrorist attacks" (Whan-woo Yi 2015). Park is referring specifically to the November 13, 2015, ISIS attacks in Paris. Park's invocation of North Korea and terrorism attempts to legitimize the use of police force against protesters, including the use of water cannons, tear gas, and police buses.[51] While several human rights organizations and international newspapers criticized these tactics and justifications (e.g., *The New York Times* 2015; Kiai 2016), Park's logic and the police's actions pivot on a principle of preemption. To safeguard against potential terrorist and North Korean attack at the national level, the police must bar protests that could destabilize the landscape of Seoul and the "democracy" that could prevent attack.

The Korean public continues to have profound distrust and "deep antagonism" for both police corruption and historical (and contemporary) acts of police brutality (Moon 2004). Brutality is written into the history of the police in modern South Korea: "until the end of the 20th century, the Korean police had been largely distrusted and hated by the public for its unwashed remains of the oppressive Japanese colonial policing, deep rooted corruption problem, sporadic human rights violation cases and inefficiency caused by generally low morale" (Pyo 2003, 127). The deep-rooted corruption and human rights abuses emerge from the perceived need to surveil and purge all political dissidents: "with a lack of legitimacy to govern the people, these regimes [from the 1950s to 1980s] were heavily dependent on the criminal justice system, especially the police, to suppress anti-government demonstrations and restrain citizens and political opponents" (Moon 2004, 130–31). Political opposition became synonymous with antistate, pro-communist, and pro–North Korean dispositions, thus necessitating police intervention. This intervention included disappearing and jailing political opponents, and physically clashing with student and labor protesters, particularly in the 1970s and 1980s. As Walter Benjamin (1978, 287) contends, "security reasons" rather than legal justification sustains police intervention, and thus "a consideration of the police institution encounters nothing essential at all" because "its power is formless, like its nowhere tangible, all-pervasive, ghostly presence in the life of civilized states."

The invocation of "security reasons," as with president Park's statement following the November 2015 protests, is a common mechanism for preventing or limiting queer events and protests. Originally, the police did not sanction the 2015 KQCF and Pride March. New police rules that year dictated that in order to file a notice of assembly—the document needed for any outdoor rally—representatives needed to form a line outside the district's police station one month prior to the scheduled assembly; notices are accepted and approved on a first come, first serve policy. The Korean police traded blatant oppression and rejection of assembly with bureaucratic loopholes and ordinances that made demonstrating and protesting a bureaucratic nightmare for participants. Citizens might be "free" to assemble and protest, but they must first seek approval from the police, making this state institution an arbiter of Korean democracy.

KQCF organizers maintain that the police were bending to the pressure of anti-LGBT organizations to forbid any KQCF. They also claimed that the police colluded with these groups to provide the groups advance notice of these regulation changes so that they could line up first and schedule their "events" on the same day and place as the KQCF. As a result, beginning on May 23, groups of outraged queers and allies occupied the outside space of the Namdaemun Police Station to simultaneously file their notice and protest what they saw as unethical and biased police actions.

This was unexpected, on all fronts. When I spoke with Nam-hŭi, an activist with a local queer organization, about the incident, they admitted that they were surprised by how many individuals showed up to the impromptu protest. Nam-hŭi was particularly struck by the number of non-Korean individuals that came, for Nam-hŭi had initially thought of these individuals as "guests" to the KQCF, but now Nam-hŭi thinks that their consistent participation in events like this indicates that they are part of the Korean queer community. Queer activists and supporters had turned the filing of a notice to hold an assembly into a protest, using the space of the line outside the police station as a space of resistance. As activists and supporters waited, they chanted, sang, talked, ate, and shared with each other, covering the edifice of the police station with Post-it notes. Some took turns waiting in line, while others brought the protesters food and beverages in a show of support. Social media was in a flurry with posts and pictures of the veritable sit-in, many sharing images of the different-colored Post-it notes and messages written therein. The very means by which the police tried to limit their right to assembly became both the mechanism and the spatiality of their protest. Nam-hŭi wondered if such protesting would be sustainable, but the outpouring of people and support was "inspiration for my movement" and gave Nam-hŭi enormous "strength."

The KQCF organizers were able to file the necessary paperwork. On May 30, the Namdaemun Police Station rejected the KQCF notice of assembly. The two primary reasons given were that there were three events already scheduled ahead of the KQCF and that a parade through downtown Seoul would be too much of an "inconvenience" for drivers and pedestrians. In contrast, Korea regularly holds cultural festivals and parades that march through the streets of downtown Seoul, such as the Lotus Lantern Festival. Even the 2016–2017 candlelight protests flooded downtown Seoul, making through-traffic impossible.

Embedded in this language of convenience, then, is normativity, where the police determine which citizens are "convenient" and which are "inconvenient." These decisions are mapped onto roads, attached to ordinances, and interlaced with the movement of people.

Beyond the question of normativity and bourgeois convenience, preventing the KQCF because of traffic indexes the security imperative to regulate both the movement of people and their technologies of movement. Born out of a Cold War security technique that ceased all pedestrian and transportation movement, regulating traffic is reminiscent of the civilian drills discussed in the Introduction and the temporal freeze of Seoul. While the frequency of the drills has radically decreased since the 1980s, and citizens regard them more as nuisance than security necessity, they still routinely occur as a banal but spectral reminder of potential attack and destruction. Both the history and contemporary occurrence of civilian drills ties traffic to national security and the temporal politics of imagining future catastrophe or peninsular destruction and preparing for it in the present through routine and embodied movements and practices.

This security-making technique also leads back to former president Park's criticism of the November 14 protest, when she asserted that protesters should be ashamed because "inter-Korean tensions still remain across the border." If such a large-scale demonstration were to take place and traffic were tied up and halted for a prolonged period, and North Korea were to attack at that exact moment, Seoul would not be as prepared as it ought to be. While such a deduction may sound alarmist and unrealistic, this is the logic used by the former president, by various ministers in her cabinet, and by anti-LGBT protesters, and it evokes Benjamin's (1978) invocation of "security reasons" as justification for police intervention. Police violence is both lawmaking and law-preserving, as the "'law' of the police really marks the point at which the state, whether from impotence or because of the immanent connections within any legal system, can no longer guarantee through the legal system the empirical ends that it desires at any price to attain" (Benjamin 1978, 287). Such legal mobilization of the police happens not only during protests or civilian drills but in ordinances and bureaucratic loopholes that delimit movement and assembly.

However, large-scale traffic-affecting protests and events now overtake the frequency of civilian drills, as stopping traffic and halting

the movement of people is a common protest tactic, both in South Korea and many other places. The main thoroughfare that connects Seoul Station to Gwanghwamun and leads to the Blue House is the site of countless protests in Seoul. Civilian drills and analogous practices deeply embed traffic and its regulation, common characteristics of Seoul living, into the city's urban infrastructure as technologies of security. Protests to stop traffic take aim at the "convenience" and free mobility of the Seoulite; not everyone can freely move about the city. Disruption of traffic becomes a key technique of protest that aims to mirror the disruption and marginalization of certain oppressed peoples. My point is that the initial rejection of the KQCF parade is not a tacit form of suppression or even rejection; rather, it is a political and bureaucratic jockeying that creates a hierarchy of movement. Traffic and bourgeois convenience are more important than the parade (and what the parade represents), and thus the police's initial rejection is to be read not as a rejection of the parade but as the protection of traffic and bourgeois convenience. Both rejection and protection happen, but that contradiction always exists within policing.

Barricades and Bodies

Queer folks from Seoul piled into two chartered buses early Saturday morning in late June 2016 for a rather long ride to the southern city of Daegu (Taegu). We arrived around noon and made our way to the space where the Daegu Queer Culture Festival (DQCF) would be held, a pedestrian street with shops and restaurants where young Koreans would hang out on the weekend. On the way to this street, boxes and carts of things in tow, we passed rows of police officers on the side streets, lined up in rows of two, waiting to be mobilized, and groups of anti-LGBT protesters waiting to do the same. Once we made it to the location of the DQCF, the first thing I noticed was that there were no barricades and no police in the actual space; there was no separation between people on the street and our booths. The DQCF was significantly smaller in size than the KQCF, though it did remind me of some of the early iterations of the KQCF that I had gone to over the years: free-flowing people, little interruption from police or protesters, and just talking with people.

Yet, as the DQCF carried on and performers took the stage, more and more anti-LGBT protesters arrived and began walking up and

down the street with their signs and megaphones. While we did our best to ignore these blatant forms of homophobia, some found it difficult to come to terms with rather targeted attacks on the parents of queer people and the inability to conceive of queer people as humans. This was particularly salient for Korea's PFLAG group and the parents that had traveled with us to Daegu to partake in the DQCF. There were a couple of heated shouting matches between parents and protesters, and between the sons and daughters of the parents and protesters, climaxing with one physical altercation where an older female protester smacked a DQCF participant. The police had to come over to break up the altercation and separate the two, telling the woman to leave, while other protesters shouted at both the police and the DQCF participants that such a demand was unfair.

The DQCF culminated in a parade through the streets of Daegu, police lining the streets and sidewalks, *facing inwards* toward the parade participants, to both direct DQCF participants in the proper direction and to prevent anti-LGBT protesters from entering the parade. The past five years in Seoul has seen an incredible increase in the number of festival and parade participants, and so they have taken to marching through downtown Seoul with rather wide margins for both the floats and the tens of thousands of people marching. In those parades, unless keenly aware and watching for protesters and police, participants barely feel the effect of the guided hand of the police and the uproar of protesters. But the DQCF made all that far more visceral and apparent as the margin for marching continued to shrink as the parade marched forward with the police to both our left and right, with no place to go except forward. A feeling of claustrophobia bubbled up as I had the distinct urge to push back against the police. I often did and, while they tried to move me back into the center, I continued to have this desire to rebel, to not listen, and to be as defiant as I could.

Protesters followed the entire length of the parade route—which was the second longest queer parade in the world that year due in part to protesters blocking certain intersections whereby the police had to direct us in other directions—and because I marched with the PFLAG parents and participants I heard constant shouting from protesters. Some protesters took extreme interest and concern with the fact that parents were supporting queer people; for the protesters, this was unthinkable, immoral, and wrong. The affect of the crowd and chanting took over as I began to shout back at the protesters, telling some

of the younger protesters holding factually incorrect signs about HIV/AIDS to go back to school and study harder. We marched, danced, sang, and shouted the entire time, so, once I climbed back onto the bus, I realized not only that I had lost my voice but that I was beginning to get sick.

It is not clear to me why the DQCF lacked barricades, especially given the police presence around the corner as if they expected a confrontation to take place. The confrontation that did take place, the physical altercation, became a clear justification for then regulating the parade. In some ways, the festival was an experiment in "letting things happen," to invoke Foucault (2007), where queer folks could revel in both being part of the general population and demonstrating to onlookers the lack of separation between queer and nonqueer folks. Yet the confrontation that transpired came to prove that such claims of citizenry membership were dangerous and disruptive as they led some to violently confront these claims. "Letting things happen" thus became the way the state and police enabled even tighter restrictions and disciplinary regulations on queer folks during the parade. The position of the police officers—*faced inward* toward parade marchers—compares to those police officers at the 2015 KQCF in Seoul who were also faced in toward the festival space: it again instantiates queer folks as disruptions. At the DQCF, queer folks were literal disruptions to city traffic, for, while we marched, the traffic around us stopped. What might be interpreted by some as a safety mechanism for parade marchers was another instance of a quarantining procedure. This one was mobile, as we were instructed by police to stay within the confined space and to keep moving, as if cattle being herded through the twists and turns of a pen.

Protesters, police, barricades. Since 2014, the growth of South Korea's queer culture festivals and parades—in the number of participants, the size, and number of events—has been met with increased anti-LGBT protesting, greater police presence, and the use of barricades to physically divide the population into queer and queer-friendly people inside the festival space and the general population on the outside. The 2015 KQCF made this rather apparent with the nearly six-foot-tall metal police barricades encircling the festival space to both quarantine the festival space and sustain a firm distinction between queer folks inside the space and the general population on the outside. Likewise, police were stationed all around the barricades, *facing*

inwards toward the festival space. The police were attempting to prevent confrontations between festival participants and anti-LGBT protesters.

When I asked Chun-sŏk, a former early 20s queer activist I met in 2016 at a queer activist forum, of this securitized setup, he observed that "it was for literal safety of festival participants." Safety for whom, though? Chun-sŏk implied that the safety was for the festival participants, those on the inside, a sentiment that several festival participants shared when I asked them about the police and barricades. Yet barricades encircled the festival space, not the anti-LGBT protesters, as police faced inwards toward the festival and its participants. If the police were present to prevent confrontations, they did so under the assumption that queer folks were the agitators in the equation. The act of facing inwards indicates that the police were concerned with what was happening inside, that their task was to both surveil those inside and keep queer folks inside the festival space rather than preventing anti-LGBT protesters from sneaking in. Soldiers in watchtowers or guards at checkpoints face the direction of danger and disruption, as Transportation Security Administration (TSA) agents, for instance, are *not* positioned facing the terminal but are instead facing the lines of passengers seeking access to the terminal.

In this scenario at the 2015 KQCF, the police were upholding the quarantine of queer folks because the safety Chun-sŏk noted was not for festival participants but for the general population. Anti-LGBT protesters were stationed all around the festival space, drumming and singing as they tried to compete with the music coming from within the festival. They eventually tried to gain access to the space to disrupt festivities, and yet the police were faced inwards, their backs to the protesters. However, these protesters—though boisterous and viscerally present—were but a small fraction of the greater Korean population that the police were keeping separate from the queer folks inside the festival. While countless festivals and events are held throughout the year at Seoul City Hall Plaza for the public to attend with little to no police involvement, this festival required such stringent demarcation between the festival and the population. Despite being fashioned as a public festival, as, in theory, anyone could enter the space, entrance to the festival was highly regulated and, once inside, it was nearly impossible to leave.

Yet Chun-sŏk's earnest belief that such division was for the "literal safety" of queer folks is quintessential to the construction of these

spaces as security spaces and the queer participation in such self-quarantining measures. On one hand, Chun-sŏk is right: these divisions did keep queer folks and participants "safe" insofar as there were no violent confrontations like those at the DQCF. Festival and event participants could enjoy the events without fear of being harassed. But, on the other hand, the safety of queer folks is a tertiary effect of this setup. Preventing confrontation is the chief motivating factor for police, but queer folks and participants are treated as the instigators of such confrontation, disruptions to public security. During the May 2015 International Day Against Homophobia, Transphobia and Biphobia (IDAHOT) event organized in front of Seoul Station, I observed an event participant walk up to one of the few anti-LGBT protesters present to ask about the protester's sign (the sign spoke of loving homosexuals and opposing AIDS). There was no shouting or raised voices; the conversation was calm and collected, even if the protester did look fidgety. Eventually, the police insisted that the event participant return to the event space, escorting the participant back to the space. What was essentially a civilized conversation was interpreted by the police as the prelude to a potential disruption.

While queer folks and festival participants *felt* safe inside these different queer culture festivals and events, my question becomes: at what cost?

Therefore, such division of space and people kept festival participants safe through a heightened practice of security that not only contributes to queer structural insecurity—they are beholden to the very apparatus targeting them, including the police—but instantiates a politics of safety and security that illustrates that they are not recipients of safety but the entity from which the population must be kept safe. It is also important to remember that the festival aims to be spontaneous and public, such that anyone could wander in and see queer folks as part of the fabric of everyday sociality. The festival was to present queer folks as part of the population. To do this, however, they had to attempt to preempt disruptions, thus introducing tension.

Quarantining queer folks is thus an attempt to mitigate queer disruption and safeguard against confrontation. Queer folks can justify self-quarantining participation by invoking their own safety. While seemingly counterproductive to the professed publicness of the festival, the claim to safety is simultaneously a claim to citizenship and membership of the population. Only citizens are protected by the state

and are entitled to safety, and so, interestingly enough, by participating in their own self-quarantining and framing it as a mechanism of safety, queer Koreans are in fact attempting to reintegrate themselves into the general Korean population.

Checkpoint Nation

The space continued to get smaller as my friend Jonah and I were backed into a corner of Seoul City Hall Plaza, sweat dripping from my face as June evenings were as punishing as their days. It was the opening ceremony of the 2015 KQCF and, while the KQCF organizers had legally reserved City Hall Plaza for the opening ceremony, anti-LGBT protesters began gathering in the morning to hold concurrent events to try and stifle and dissuade both the Seoul city government and KQCF-goers (see Figure 1 for a map of the area). They occupied much of the plaza space; more and more protesters arrived once work and school let out, meaning more police had to show up and form their own barrier around the plaza, all while KQCF organizers set up the necessary materials in a corner of the plaza. At about 5pm a ring of protesters formed around the entire plaza, preventing the KQCF organizers from setting up for the event. The ring of protesters, many of them college-aged students, wore masks with a black "X" over the mouth and held pickets, some criticizing government subsidies for HIV/AIDS, while others warned that homosexuals and the KQCF are dangerous for children. More police arrived to break up some of the minor confrontations between organizers and protesters.

As more protesters arrived, the police moved closer to the corner of the plaza the KQCF organizers used as though they were sacrificing the rest of the plaza to keep but this one section free of protesters, despite the protesters' best intentions. Early evening transitioned to night, and the line between festival participants and anti-LGBT protesters became more pronounced with police presence. I was roaming through the anti-LGBT crowds; Jonah followed like an older Korean brother (*hyŏng*) looking out for my best interests. By that point we had known each other for more than seven years; I had met him randomly as I still spoke little Korean at that point in 2008 and he spoke fluent English, so we struck up a conversation that spilled into dinner and a friendship. He was curious about the opening ceremony and met me at Seoul City Hall Plaza once he finished work, right as more police



Figure 1: 2015 KQCF Diagram. Map of the 2015 KQCF with an inset of the checkpoint/entrance.
Image: Samantha Porter.

arrived. We artfully moved through the crowds and back into the "safe space" of the KQCF opening ceremony, our makeshift entrance dissolving into the hordes of police and protesters. The ability for festival participants to enter and exit had become increasingly more difficult and even dangerous as we had to move out into the busy streets to walk around the blockade.

"I felt anxious and almost sick," So-hŭi explained, noting that the atmosphere of police officers, loud and intense protesters, and the few queer people seeking access were overwhelming for one person to handle. There was but one port of entrance with a single volunteer, So-hŭi, endowed with police authority to usher the relevant people in and deny entrance to people they deemed not queer. I found out about So-hŭi's predicament online before experiencing the checkpoint, as So-hŭi was tasked with operating the ad hoc checkpoint. So-hŭi was in their mid-

30s, an activist with one of the local queer organizations and frequent volunteer at the KQCF. We met a couple times in passing before that night, their uplifting disposition always casting a sense of joy and hope onto those they meet. We were also both active in the queer online circles, so when Jonah and I left the opening ceremony, passing out of the checkpoint, So-hŭi and I embraced—we always hugged, a practice I noticed because few others were as affectionate as So-hŭi was with me—and I wished them luck. I checked online once Jonah and I were clear of the checkpoint and the swarm of protesters clamoring to enter the space, some foreign queer folks at the opening ceremony replying to So-hŭi's post asking if So-hŭi needed anything and indicating that they were on their way to help. I later spoke with So-hŭi and they explained that none of the KQCF organizers had intended for the scene to turn chaotic with a checkpoint for access, let alone that So-hŭi would be the one tasked with letting certain people in and denying entrance to all others. The arbitrariness with which So-hŭi had to dictate entrance made them feel "incredibly uncomfortable." But, as they also noted, there seemed to be no other alternative. The decision was so sudden and in response to the overwhelming presence of protesters that this presented as *the* choice, despite the seeming lack of choice. This perceived lack of an alternative is itself a technique of neoliberal security governance, as alternatives can only arise within a prearranged template.

The checkpoints at both the opening ceremony on June 9 and the Pride Festival on June 28 reverberate throughout South Korea and call forth analogous spaces that also regulate people's movement from outside to inside. Checkpoints as points of entry into (or out of) South Korea are scattered throughout the country, but two move in contrast to one another: the visa-free tourist and resort destination Jeju (Cheju) Island and the impenetrable (or unmovable) Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) that separates North and South Korea along the 38th parallel. The spatial imagining of South Korea sandwiched between the uncrossable DMZ and a more fluid point of entry on Jeju Island—all while being surrounded by water—makes South Korea itself a checkpoint nation.

Checkpoints at first draw attention to the borders that separate. Be they ports of entry to a country or to the KQCF, checkpoints rely on physical, ideological, and even juridical modes of separation. As Daphne Berdahl (1999, 8) demonstrates of the borderland in the Ger-

man town of Kella immediately following the fall of the Berlin Wall, "borders … are contested and negotiated in culturally specific ways by individuals and the state … they are sites of surveillance, control, regulation, and inspection; and they are places of secrecy, fear, danger, and desire." They embody these struggles because they are on the margins of both society and the state, "both a real place where roads do not penetrate, commodities seldom reach, and schools barely exist, and a discursive and ideological position from which people learn how to speak about things like justice to the state and among themselves" (Poole 2004, 38). Struggles at the margin, in the borderland, thus represent "a constant state of transition" made even more apparent in the continuous toggling between inclusion and exclusion (Anzaldúa 1987, 3). Borderlands index both the in-between space of the physical border—such as the DMZ and the Berlin Wall—and reverberations of the border into lived experience.

Crossing the border, passing through the checkpoint, is a choreographed movement over a threshold with transformative power to transport individuals from one place to another, one spatial existence to another (Van Gennep 1960). Yet checkpoints are different; they are more than a threshold of a house or building. As Pradeep Jeganathan (2004, 69) writes of military checkpoints in Sri Lanka, "to pass through a checkpoint is to remember why checkpoints exist—it is to recall the possibility of a bomb." The checkpoint "delineates and focuses attention on the target" (ibid.). The perpetual target-ness of the checkpoint in part emerges from heavy police (or military) presence, and, for the KQCF, target-ness relies on the temporary authority police bestowed onto KQCF organizers and volunteers to allow or deny entry. Encircled by police barricades and police officers with but a single point of entry and exit—a single checkpoint—makes not only the checkpoint but the bounded space itself a target. Invoking Henri Lefebvre's consideration of spatial sovereignty, political geographer Stuart Elden (2009, xxx) contends that "creating a bounded space is already a violent act of exclusion and inclusion; maintaining it as such requires constant vigilance and the mobilization of threat; and challenging it necessarily entails a transgression."

The in-between space of the checkpoint is crucial to the construction of the KQCF and the outside space, for this liminal space materializes the border as the point where one is transported from one place to another. In the margins, transformation takes place, but margins, like

checkpoints, are dangerous not only for their in-between status but for their pronouncement that "this is a target" (Jeganathan 2004, 69). This reverberates throughout the borderland, both into the KQCF space and outside into the surrounding city. Reverberations through the city resulted not only from the centrality of the KQCF and checkpoint in Seoul's geography and social significance but also because, once the parade began marching through downtown Seoul, the checkpoint and borderland mutated into a moving target physically echoing through the city's streets.

Prior to the parade, however, the spatiality of the KQCF as a *security* borderland was contingent on the police and their barricades alongside the queer activists operating the checkpoint. Even during the parade, police lined both sides of the marching participants and floats to keep participants "in" and protesters "out." So-hŭi described the scenario of the barricades and checkpoint as awkward for having to make such proclamations as to who could enter and who could not while surrounded by countless police officers. Other queer participants described that the physical separation between participants and protesters with these police barricades made them and others feel isolated, though they recognized that many others felt the separation was *p'yŏnhada* (convenient). However, it was the act of gatekeeping that made some most uncomfortable. These individuals explained that not only was the position arbitrary but the rubric by which those select few would judge people was also arbitrary, based on age and how someone looks. This was the ad hoc litmus test for being queer and trans or queer-/trans-friendly: questions were (usually) not asked and these "guards" were making snap decisions based on appearance. They were, essentially, profiling. They were fully aware and completely uncomfortable with this task but could not think of a "better way" to do what they felt had to be done. It had to be done to keep participants physically safe.

The police relied on organizers and volunteers to make visible other queer folks, to use their knowledge and expertise as queer Koreans to identify other queer folks and thus be counted, surveilled, examined, and analyzed. Stated alternatively, the police are making national security experts out of civilians, not simply in their daily practices but in moments when the police's actions are dependent on the civilian's expert knowledge of the everyday. Where national border checkpoints rely on both documentation and the physical presence of the

individual to pass through—and those who regulate the borders are perceived as experts in detecting fraudulence—participants entering the KQCF space have no such documentation. Instead, their bodies are their passports: "the body and the appearance of the individual are continuously being regarded, problematized, and questioned, leading to a maze of visual, social, and technical information that may not cumulate in a coherent conclusion" (Jacobsen and Rao 2018, 27). Their bodies contain everything necessary for one to read and determine their nonnormativity and thus "produce powerful narratives of identity" (ibid.). While surveillance weds identity to action, as I discuss in Chapter 3, profiling essentializes nonnormativity—the queerness, transness, gender nonconformity—in the body, making one's gender and sexuality observable and capturable information. Queer and trans people profiling queer and trans bodies—surveilling, analyzing, acting—indicates that knowledge is presumed to reside inside the festival volunteer that facilitates "successful" profiling, that queerness and transness are knowable and capturable data, but, more insidiously, it obfuscates the ascendancy of police power.

Shifting the Gaze

I made my way out of the subway station in the southern city of Gwangju (Kwangju), in October 2019, pulling the hood up on my gray hoodie given the slight chill in the air. I looked to my left and was met with a children's taekwondo demonstration in the street in front of me. Parents and onlookers sat on the sidewalk, watching the demonstration, as an emcee and group of elderly men—likely Christian pastors—sat facing the children. The demonstration was part of a "martial arts festival" that was held, as the festival's sign read, as a "healthy youth culture festival for the sake of confronting the homosexuality rally." More pointed were the signs that some onlookers held reading "*tongsŏngae* out," or "homosexuality out," a common slogan of Korean anti-LGBT protesters (as described in Chapter 1). The "homosexuality rally" the sign referenced was the reason I traveled the nearly two-hour express train from Seoul, to attend the second annual Gwangju Queer Culture Festival. I expected some anti-LGBT protesters and demonstration, so I snapped a couple pictures with my phone and continued walking in the direction of the festival.

Close to one of the other exits I came upon a line of police spanning the length of the road and sidewalk, blocking both traffic and pedestrians. This, too, was unsurprising. I found a way around the police blockade and finally arrived at the backside of the Gwangju Queer Culture Festival. Walking alongside the festival, I immediately noticed the fences lining the backside of the booths to contain the festival space. Another common feature of queer festivals: be they yellow plastic police fences, metal chest-high fences, or nearly six-foot-tall police barricades, these technologies kept protesters out while sequestering queer and queer-friendly participants within. The presence of barricades and police at the 2019 Gwangju Queer Culture Festival was much tamer than the festivals and events I had experienced between 2015 and 2016. Everything seemed calmer in Gwangju, a city still haunted by the 1980 Gwangju Uprising and massacre that saw the authoritarian government slaughter over 150 prodemocracy protesters, wounding and arresting thousands. Pictures of the uprising, or massacre, captured not only mass mobilization but streets covered in tear gas, police beating protesters, and a city in chaos.

The fact that the anti-LGBT protesters and police were in separate locations initially surprised me, as this was certainly different from past festivals I attended. I eventually made my way into the festival and met some old friends and interlocutors, remarking how these festivals had turned into a predictable and well-oiled machine, even outside of Seoul.

Inside the festival, I noticed some individuals wearing bright yellow flak vests near the entrance, the stage, and some of the borders of the festival. These individuals are known as *in'gwŏn ch'imhae kamsidan*, a human rights violation monitoring group or individual. These are volunteers who patrol the festival space, particularly around the borders and entrances, to identify potential violators of the festival's "safe space" policy. They identify mostly anti-LGBT protesters who are handing out homophobic pamphlets, harassing festival participants, or carrying homophobic signs. These festival organizer-appointed volunteers, complete with flak vests inscribed with "in'gwŏn ch'imhae kamsidan," identify the disruptions and then inform the police, who will then address the disruption. So-hŭi and the checkpoint operators discussed above are also considered in'gwŏn ch'imhae kamsidan volunteers, though not necessarily adorned with the bright yellow vests. The general concept of the in'gwŏn ch'imhae kamsidan is not unique to queer culture festivals or the other queer events, but the permu-

tation that it takes in these queer events is exceptional. Other iterations of the in'gwŏn ch'imhae kamsidan volunteers exist to witness and record police and state violence against citizens. For instance, in'gwŏn ch'imhae kamsidan volunteers were present during the November 14, 2015, protest to document the police's use of barricades and water cannons on protesters in Gwanghwamun, coalescing pictures and information into a resource book that was later released in conjunction with a November 20 press conference (Public Power Surveillance Response Team 2018). However, the queer volunteers exist to witness, record, and report suspected human rights violations made by other citizens against festival participants within the festival space.[52] The police become the institutional body to which these grievances and abuses are reported and handled, the momentary arbiter of human rights.

These volunteers still rely on the police as the institutional body ultimately arbitrating the safety of all individuals. These volunteers are participating in securitization by both patrolling the festival space for disturbances—the very notion of disturbance cannot be disentangled from its meanings within the security machine—and relying on the police, a state security institution, to resolve the disturbances.

However, the question of disruption shifts with in'gwŏn ch'imhae kamsidan volunteers. If police typically face inward toward queer folks and festival participants as the disruption, then these volunteers face outwards toward the general public and, most notably, anti-LGBT protesters. The inside and outside have switched places, as the general public is now the outside rather than that which must be defended. These volunteers recognize that the disturbance is coming not from within the festival space but from the general population. Though the police still arbitrate the resolution of the disruption, the question of safety is driven by the volunteers and queer folks themselves. Their patrolling is keeping those on the inside safe from disturbance and confrontation, while the simultaneous police presence renders the question of "safety for whom" murky at best.

The gaze shifts in these instances, the panopticon transforming. According to Foucault (1995), the gaze's quality—the details found within the gaze itself—is necessary for situating both the meaning and the work of the gaze. The gaze of the police, focused *on* queer folks, denotes that the details apprehended pertain to the queerness of the individuals; they are surveilled as simultaneously queer folks and disruptions, and thus the data accumulated from this surveillance per-

tains to their queerness as disruption. With the introduction of biopolitical governance, that queerness ascertained in the physical bodies of queer folks becomes data for a generalizable understanding of the queer subpopulation writ large.

Yet the gaze of in'gwŏn ch'imhae kamsidan volunteers does not reverse or invert the gaze but shifts it. This is a crucial distinction, for reversing the gaze would mean that the in'gwŏn ch'imhae kamsidan volunteers are surveilling the police who are surveilling them. It would be a form of sousveillance, insofar as it would be an act that attempts to "neutralize surveillance" (Mann cited in Browne 2015, 21). But that is not what the volunteers are doing. Instead, their gaze is fixed on potential disruptions from the general population, most notably anti-LGBT organizations and protesters. Police power may go unchecked—especially given that the ability for the in'gwŏn ch'imhae kamsidan volunteers to gaze or surveil at all is wholly dependent on the police intervening in what the volunteers deem moments of disruption. But queer states of security expect uneasiness in these instances given that the motivation behind the checkpoints and the work of volunteers is to keep queer folks safe (or at least instill a feeling of safety).

These moments of safety are fleeting, but by allowing the exception to persist inside of the festival the in'gwŏn ch'imhae kamsidan volunteers are meant to make fleeting safety feel ordinary. There were no confrontations, no overtly visible police presence, exceptionally tall police barricades, or deluge of anti-LGBT protesters at the 2019 Gwangju Queer Culture Festival while I was present. Perhaps such a calm atmosphere is a sign of the times, or that enough festivals have taken place in Korea to warrant a blueprint. Regardless of the reason, the work of the in'gwŏn ch'imhae kamsidan volunteers to foster safety within the festival space is yet another instance of finding a way to maneuver within banal security. We need only walk a block or two to see the amassed police present to mitigate confrontations, once again making the festival into a security space. But these volunteers were using the police for their own agenda, mobilizing a technology of security to, quite literally, carve out a space for queer Koreans to not only exist but feel safe. As I argue throughout this book, safety and security are not for queer Koreans because queer Koreans act as disruptions to both. Other Koreans may routinely feel safe and secure but I suggest that queer Koreans never can fully claim such a feeling as *ordinary*.

Shifting the gaze also shifts the narrative of security. When police face inward toward queer folks they are identifying queer folks as a disruption in need of surveillance. The fact that police are mobilized to surveil these supposed disruptions thus inculcates queer folks into the national security machine. However, by shifting the gaze to the general population, the in'gwŏn ch'imhae kamsidan volunteers are identifying the potentiality for disruptions emerging not within the festival space and among queer folks but within the population itself. These volunteers take the safety of queer folks into their own hands, and thus exist as a citizenship-making technology, a mechanism that enables their membership within the population. By identifying the disruption outside the queer festival and population and relying on the police to arbitrate said disturbance, they make the police work *for* their safety rather than *alongside* their safety. If, as with the festivals and events in Seoul and Daegu, queer safety was an epiphenomenal effect of police action and regulation, these volunteers are introducing queer safety as a fundamental concern for the police and the state. Doing so at once arbitrates a new narrative of security, whereby queer Koreans are not objects to target but a population to protect. And as such, this renders queer Koreans members of the polity, worthy of state protection—if only in these spaces of exception.

When the veil of secrecy is (temporarily) lifted at these queer festivals, the need for safety becomes that much more paramount, but likewise citizenship and membership of the polity are challenged.

Queer Koreans are strategists in how they navigate Korean society and culture, for there are those in the military, as discussed in Chapter 1, who keep their sexualities hidden for the sake of individual safety. In so doing, they have access to Korean male citizenship (see Moon 2005). For those at the festival, their sexualities are on display, and thus foreclosed from membership of the polity. They become objects of disruption or threat within the security apparatus for the sake of the general population. But the labor of the in'gwŏn ch'imhae gamshidan volunteers transforms queer Koreans from objects of disruption into those of care, bodies in need of safety and security. Doing so works to make citizenship available to those queer folks at the festival and, I suggest, queer Koreans more broadly.

The interplay between threat and safety for festival participants draws attention to the ways citizenship and security are constitutive of one another, particularly in South Korea. The more than 70-year

possibility of another North Korean attack and subsequent banality of security discourse, ideology, and practices make citizenship and security conditions of one another. Queer Koreans are thus harnessing this security–citizenship matrix—citizens are under threat and entitled to protection and care—for their own benefit by demonstrating how queer folks are under threat and making the police care for their protection.

Queer States of Security

Weeks after the 2015 KQCF, participants beamed with smiles while recalling a sense of solidarity, an affective connection formed in that space with other participants lingering in how they spoke of the festival. Yet, as some of the checkpoint operators noted, even though the separation was convenient, it was also unnatural. So-hŭi expressed a similar set of contradictory feelings, for they were overwhelmed with having to operate the checkpoint but overcome with excitement while talking about the record number of participants.[53] So-hŭi outwardly wondered over dinner in the fall of 2015 if the KQCF had any lasting change, except in mobilizing anti-LGBT contingencies. So-hŭi was always jubilant and energetic, but they were also realistic. They witnessed the daily struggles activists and queer folks face and interacted with these individuals on a regular basis, so they understood the exhaustion.

In the years since the 2015 KQCF, a number of similar Pride festivals have spread across South Korea to the cities of Incheon (Inch'ŏn), Taegu, Busan (Pusan), and Gwangju. The now-renamed Seoul Queer Culture Festival (formerly the KQCF) has grown so large that the makeshift checkpoints and overwhelming police presence are no longer regularly part of the experience, but both are still built into the smaller and newer Pride festivals in the other cities. During Incheon's first Pride festival in September 2018, anti-LGBT protesters snatched signs and placards from festival attendees, attempting to overpower the ill-equipped and ill-managed police present, and effectively blocked the Pride march from taking place. Yet the 2019 Incheon Queer Culture Festival was seen by many as a more successful and well-functioning event, complete with police and barricades.

Yet relying on the police for arbitration is a slippery slope, for, as Brown (1995, 170) notes about women seeking protection from the

state, "indeed, to be 'protected' by the same power whose violation one fears perpetuates the very modality of dependence and powerlessness marking much of women's experience across widely diverse cultures and epochs." Brown's point is that the perceived lack of choice in these interactions is actually part and parcel of freedom. We need only look inside the KQCF space to witness that supposed freedom, where participants are *free* to be who they are without fear of ridicule or outing. The spatiality of this event is tied to the role of freedom in the distribution of power, for inside the festival participants "felt safe," as some explained to me, but at what cost? Brown (1995, 25) notes that "freedom is a project suffused not just with ambivalence but with anxiety, because it is flanked by the problem of power on all sides [these are] the powers that situate, constrain, and produce subjects as well as the will to power entailed in practicing freedom." The KQCF is literally surrounded by the problem of power on all sides, producing exceedingly ambivalent and anxious feelings of insecurity alongside transient assurances of safety.

Returning to Foucault's (2007) pairing of security mechanisms with neoliberalism is useful. Participation in security practices, whereby queer Koreans might be considered good neoliberal subjects for both their self-quarantining measures and regulation of the borders, is ultimately a tacit approval of state and police action. Approving of their own quarantining for the sake of safety renders the biopolitical separation of queer Koreans and the general population an interesting, though uneasy or awkward, situation. As noted above, by invoking safety, queer Koreans are making citizenship claims, carving out space within the population for their existence as queer citizens in need of safety from the state.

This set of feelings, what I am calling queer states of security, originates from a dependence on the very institutions responsible for queer Koreans' continued insecurity. Queer states of security are a sense of assurance that participants will not be killed or physically brutalized by protesters or the state for their activities, while still recognizing that the police are *never* on their side, the state is *always* against them, and their civil rights are *not* guaranteed. They capture that contradictory set of feelings So-hŭi experienced and expressed, of both anxiety/exhaustion and hopefulness. Yet queer states of security also involve the use of queer activists and KQCF organizers in the production of this national security space; they are responsible for operating the check-

point, while in'gwŏn ch'imhae kamsidan volunteers also surveil protesters and police. This is not to say that the collaboration between the police and the KQCF is of equal footing; the relationship is inherently uneven. Collaborations are multifaceted and precarious because they are productive, and only in recognizing the multiple actors involved in the collaboration can we grasp that the production of the checkpoint and police barricades is itself both a form of safety and violence felt together. These collaborations are justified in not only imaging the possibilities of confrontation and violence but actual instances of violence, as with the 2016 DQCF.

Queer states of security are not prolonged or stable feelings but transient and malleable. The borderlands of the KQCF lasted only hours, and so the safety felt inside the KQCF space was punctuated by its short-term existence. In actuality, the queer states of security in the borderlands of the KQCF seep into the daily lives of many queer folks. In many ways, other queer spaces—such as gay bars, clubs, or even activist offices—have become reverberations of the KQCF through time and space. In these spaces, as several interlocutors and queer friends expressed, queers felt more comfortable, more at ease with other queer Koreans. The potential for safety despite mounting structural insecurity that weaves through the KQCF space also weaves through these other queer spaces. Many of these spaces, be they businesses or organizations, sponsor booths at the KQCF. The KQCF represented the work necessary for safety and the inherent violence in that work. While queer activists, KQCF organizers, and participants are all contributors and producers of national security, the KQCF made that role more apparent with the deployment of police (and police barricades) and the operation of the checkpoint. These security technologies and techniques are less apparent with other queer spaces, precisely because they are meant to be unremarkable. Security has become banal, mundane to the point of invisibility. This makes the KQCF even more exceptional as the messiness of security production is thrust upon them and downtown Seoul in spectacular fashion. The exceptionality of the KQCF is found in taking the daily life of national security production and making it extraordinary in scale, place, number of participants, and time. Analogously, the spatiality of the KQCF is exceptional for being a simultaneously queer and security space, where queerness is interpellated as a space of security.

Reverberations are also embodied; they are felt by participants. When Gloria Anzaldúa (1987) spoke of borderlands, she was speaking of not only the physical space but the internalization of that space and how one feels in that space. The borderland is something one carries with oneself, part of the self and in relation to other iterations of identity. It is also a reminder, be it conscious or not, of the self's perpetual target-ness and that the self is always already a threat. The queer states of security that weave through both the external and internalized borderlands may be a form of what Lauren Berlant (2011) calls "cruel optimism" insofar as a continued desire to feel safe is consistently met with the cruelty of insecurity. For the KQCF and its organizers, the struggle and insecurity are acceptable risks for increased visibility that they believe will compel the public and state to *see* them and, they hope, change their collective minds.

Borderlands, though, operate as in-between spaces, as an inescapable margin or liminality that encompasses the "not quite" or "not yet" of daily life (Muñoz 2009). Queer Koreans are not quite safe or not yet secure, and in this way queer states of security are similar to Berlant's cruel optimism because there is a liberal promise of safety and security. But these are not blind forms of optimism, blanket promises that things will get better because the festival organizers and volunteers—and, indeed, the majority of queer activists—are not so naïve. Police collaborations serve a purpose, for both sides, unevenly so but the event still took place. These are situated forms of optimism, rooted not in a hope that things will get better but in a recognition that the human relations forged in these queer states of security are themselves transformative. Reverberations allow for both attention to the temporal ripples of spaces and transformations while holding fast to the presentism of events, of feelings and affect.

CHAPTER 3

Narratives of Biopolitical Surveillance

In the early days of Covid-19, the public followed individual outbreaks as if they were exceptional, perhaps not fully aware of what was to become a multiyear global pandemic. While there were a handful of cases in January and early February 2020 in South Korea, the first mass outbreak began on February 18, linked to the Shincheonji (Sinchŏnji) church in the city of Daegu. By March, nearly 80 percent of cases related to mass infection, with around 63 percent of cases linked to the Shincheonji church cluster (Bahk 2020). Rumors encircled the church as to who knew what with regard to transmissions, member lists, and the very nature of the church: was it a sect of Christianity or a cult? As new cases began to dissipate, the government eased social distancing restrictions around clubs and bars at the end of April, resulting in people flocking back to these entertainment spaces that had been closed for months. In that first weekend, however, cases once again spiked, this time in the Itaewon district of Seoul, one of the city's queer districts.[54] It was soon evident that this spike would be South Korea's second Covid-19 outbreak, the May 2020 outbreak.

If news swirled as to the ethicality of churchgoers attending religious meetings despite being sick in the wake of the first outbreak, the second outbreak instigated a series of moral questions as those infected were frequenting gay bars and clubs. When the media reported on the case, some outlets included the names of the clubs, while others labeled them specifically as gay clubs (Kwon and Hollingsworth 2020). As the number of cases increased, Korean citizens and news agencies targeted queer folks and their so-called "immoral practices" as viral vectors.[55] In many ways, the treatment of queer folks during this Covid-19 outbreak intensified how queer folks and people living with HIV/AIDS (PLWHA)

were treated during an outbreak of the Middle East Respiratory Syndrome (MERS) in 2015, as I explore in the next chapter. The virus was taking on a moral quality in South Korea, tied to one's sexuality.

During an interview with Hyŏn-su, a gay man, he initially spoke of his family and work before switching topics to the Covid-19 pandemic and the May 2020 outbreak. While Hyŏn-su did not visit Itaewon that weekend, he was at a bar in the Jongro district, another queer area in Seoul. He expressed concern that he would have to take time off work if he had to get tested and was quarantined because of the outbreak, neither of which happened. But he recounted friends' experiences: "I heard that there were friends who took time off from work because they had gone [to the clubs], and just like that they quit their job. It's unfortunate that I have a friend who said that he would quit his job rather than inform the company [of his status]." His friend was so terrified over the association between Covid-19 and homosexuality that he would rather have quit his job than have his colleagues discover that he had Covid-19 and was gay.

Furthermore, Hyŏn-su had a clear aversion to the government's use of surveillance technologies during the pandemic. These technologies and techniques include mandatory testing, collecting financial data, mapping social media data, tracking mobile phone GPS, and reporting the details of infected individuals to the public.[56] He explained that, "personally, I feel bad when I find out that my personal information is being provided as information for a specific investigation or the management of diseases or epidemics in such a novel way." Finding the efficiency of such surveillance questionable, Hyŏn-su worried that his private information might be leaked or used in ways that he might not find suitable. When asked where he would draw the line on what information ought to be collected and shared, he immediately mentioned that gender and sexual identity were unnecessary details.

However, when asked about his thoughts on the government's handling of the spread of the virus and what the government, media, and citizens referred to as "K-Quarantine"—nomenclature that denotes a Korean-style quarantine— Hyŏn-su suggested that the government "could have taken measures such as locking the borders, but it's a pity that it failed to do so."[57] When pressed on how such actions could be justified, Hyŏn-su explained that "it's not that we're permanently limiting our freedom, we're just putting up with each other a little bit for the moment. We do it without consent, but it is necessary [I think]."

Hyŏn-su had rather contradictory sentiments on surveillance and K-Quarantine within his own narrative. On one hand, Hyŏn-su was critical of the government's collection and use of personal data, especially as it pertained to Hyŏn-su himself and the identity markers of gender and sexual orientation. On the other hand, Hyŏn-su believed the government could have done more to mitigate the spread of Covid-19, believing that temporarily limiting freedom was a necessary vice in pandemic times. How, then, to explain this apparent dissonance?

This book continues to detail the ways Korean queer folks, deemed disruptions to national security, participate in security-making and their own securitization in order to be part of a general population that partakes in security practices. This, I contend, is indicative of good citizenship. They exist in this split capacity, with a *divided subjectivity*, as a queer subpopulation continuously targeted and treated as disruptions but ultimately yearning for membership in the national, general population. This is a biopolitical divide, I argue, that permeates the Korean queer community, down to the very narratives queer folks tell of their experiences and lives. I therefore analyze the apparent dissonance of Hyŏn-su's narrative by drawing attention to not only how this division of populations and subjectivity are immanent to biopolitics writ large but, more specifically for this chapter, how pandemic surveillance technologies and K-Quarantine are fundamentally regimes of biopolitical regulation. Hyŏn-su is split between seeing himself as part of two populations—queer Koreans who ought not be targeted and Koreans who do in fact want to have queer Koreans targeted. The former is exploited in pandemic surveillance, while the latter is so broad that queer Koreans assimilate themselves into normative Korean personhood; everyone is tracked and so they forget they are also specifically targeted.

What arises in Hyŏn-su's narrative—a friction between seemingly opposing viewpoints demonstrative of a divided subjectivity—manifests more broadly in Korea's queer community. In interviews with queer Koreans, some were critical of the government's surveillance technologies and practices, particularly as they applied to the movements of queer Koreans. Yet several individuals were either complacent about the technologies and practices or even supportive of them, echoing a similar sentiment to Hyŏn-su—that pandemic times call for exceptional measures and the limitation of freedom. That these queer Koreans were split over issues of surveillance, privacy, and K-Quaran-

tine in the aftermath of the May 2020 outbreak posed a similar apparent contradiction akin to the one immanent to Hyŏn-su's individual narrative. How could queer Koreans, targeted by the state, media, and indeed the national body, find validity in the very system targeting them?

If queer Koreans are internal to the national, Korean population—as I suggest they are—then even though they are continuously targeted as national security disruptions they still have a fundamental yearning or desire for membership of the nation and the population.[58] In the previous chapter, I grappled with a similar question with regard to the collaboration between the police and participants of the Korean Queer Culture Festival, suggesting that the queer states of security formed in these instances of participation and collaboration are punctuated by tension and uneasiness given that they move with the ebb and flow of biopolitics and neoliberal governance. In this chapter, I invoke my queer heuristic discussed in the Introduction that accounts for the contradictory desires, and accompanying affects, of being part of both a queer population and a national citizenry that targets queer Koreans as disruptions. Queer allows for the uneasiness to sit with queer Koreans, and with scholars yearning to sweep the unease away, but it is also equal parts liberatory precisely because resolution may itself be normative.

I want to carry this queer heuristic as I navigate the narratives of the queer Koreans and their divided subjectivities—a manifestation of my queer heuristic—in this chapter that details either queer Koreans' aversion to or support for surveillance technologies following the May 2020 Covid-19 outbreak. In the wake of this outbreak, the Korean state mobilized its massive pandemic surveillance assemblage to protect the general population from the Covid-19 outbreak. The state's information sharing policy coupled with the media's reporting led to some queer folks losing their jobs or quitting their jobs as a result, some were publicly outed online, and there was a definite uptick in homophobia and stigmatization, as reflected in the interviews. For instance, Hyŏn-bin explained that he had been serving his mandatory military conscription at the time of the May 2020 outbreak and "almost 99%" of his fellow soldiers cursed the "gay bastards" when the news broke.

That South Korea mobilized different technologies into a unified surveillance machine was not all that surprising, for I witnessed the early start of such heavy reliance on surveillance and data in 2015.

Returning, at least briefly, to the 2015 Korean Queer Culture Festival (KQCF) is useful in explicating the ways surveillance and data weave through queer spaces, queer lives, and South Korean society more broadly. It offers a conceptual roadmap for both the pandemic surveillance context and the queer narratives that follow.

Biopolitical Surveillance and the Data It Captures

KQCF organizers did not arrive at Seoul City Hall Plaza in downtown Seoul until roughly 5pm for the opening ceremony on June 9, and so anti-LGBT protesters camped out in various events both on the plaza and in nearby public locations. I moved from location to location, attending to the different speakers, chanting, and protest styles. The protesters were boisterous, and hours into their events I was exhausted and KQCF organizers had yet to even arrive. I was not necessarily the target of their vitriol, despite being gay, given that I was not Korean. The exhaustion and hopelessness I felt in those moments must have been amplified exponentially for Korean queer folks, I told myself. My whiteness cast me as outside observer in those moments, perhaps even a tourist roaming the streets of downtown Seoul, momentarily drawn to the loud noise and crowds. For some Korean queer folks, though, these were difficult moments, but what I learned through my involvement with queer activism is that activists in particular have thick skin. Though they find such "hate speech," as they call it, disgusting and dangerous, they learned to let those feelings wash over them; there are more important things to do.

Once the KQCF organizers arrived, so too did the police as anti-LGBT protesters refused to move from the plaza despite the KQCF having properly reserved the space. Police therefore removed all the protesters' materials and belongings from the plaza, making piles on the concrete space surrounding the plaza, before physically removing protesters. In a now-characteristic move of anti-LGBT protesters, several began to lie down on the plaza and refuse to move, only to be picked up and dragged off by the young police officers. Many of these instances resulted in a multilayered surveillance apparatus of protesters, police, reporters, KQCF organizers, and me. At each layer, though, participants wielded cameras and recording devices, capturing both the protest and police response.

Such forms of surveillance and documentation are common at all forms of contemporary protests, as police and protesters alike document protests as a method to surveil each other while also creating publics beyond the immediate audience. Police, for instance, erect both cameras and noise meters on poles and point them into the crowds of protesters, at times instructing protesters to turn down the volume on speakers. Eun-Sung Kim (2016) refers to the combination of video surveillance and noise regulation as "sensory power" that aims to discipline action and self-govern through surveillance. Queer activists, comparable to KQCF organizers and human rights violation monitoring volunteers (*in'gwŏn ch'imhae kamsidan*) in flak vests, usually direct their cameras toward anti-LGBT protesters and the police, documenting and archiving their actions to primarily safeguard against any potential future accusations of misdeeds by queer activists.

These practices of surveillance, particularly the sensory power of police surveillance, are nested within a broader politics of visibility and emerge within a state-wide "surveillance assemblage" with a growing number of closed-circuit television cameras (CCTV), estimated at over eight million in number (Sonn 2020). Historically, the Korean state used surveillance, including plainclothes police and military personnel scattered throughout college campuses, as a method of regulating morality during the 1970s as part of former president Park Chung-hee's purification campaigns, such as measuring the length of women's skirts and men's hair (Namhee Lee 2007; Kim 2009; Ryu 2018). Ilana Feldman details similar actions in her study of policing and security in Gaza under Egyptian rule (1948–1967), noting that private behavior was subject to surveillance that enforced conformity to the "national interest" because keeping order and policing morality were linked "security valences" (2015, 16–17). Surveillance was thus a pivotal technique that the police used because, while surveillance might target individuals, it was done "as a means to understand, and thereby control and contain, a collective category" of concern within a biopolitical population (ibid., 54). Yet crucial for both Feldman and the rapidly growing surveillance assemblage in Korea is what Feldman calls "a practice of expansive uncertainty" that "approached the population horizontally" (ibid.). The use of uncertainty in surveillance means that anyone could be under surveillance and so the uncertainty over whether one is being watched or not—and whether the police will act or not—compels one to self-regulate. The horizontal approach,

likewise, denotes citizens surveilling each other, thereby further compelling one to self-regulate.

However, surveillance, like morality, is not an objective practice or mode of seeing. As Rachel Dubrofsky and Shoshana Magnet (2015, 9) write, "the production of knowledge, when it comes to vulnerable bodies, is always already bound up with gendered and sexualized ways of seeing." A queer approach accounts for the qualitative difference between police surveilling queer bodies at protests and queer activists documenting the police and anti-LGBT protesters because police and state surveillance, especially, "*remake* the body as a social actor, classifying some bodies as normative and legal, and some as illegal and out of bounds" (Nakamura 2015, 221). The police documenting participants during the KQCF—recall that they are facing *inwards* toward festival participants—directly invokes the boundaries the police constructed to keep participants inside while denying access to protesters on the outside. Surveillance concretizes observation as the means to know queerness, a biopolitical mechanism that instantiates normative and nonnormative populations.

Bodies that are out of bounds, that are illegal, are coded as bodies that are criminal, threats even. These surveillance technologies and practices, Simone Browne (2015) illustrates, are fundamentally grounded in the surveillance of blackness from the era of transatlantic slavery and the colonial expansion of Europe in what she terms "racializing surveillance."[59] Driving these practices and technologies are "ways of seeing and conceptualizing blackness through stereotypes, abnormalization, and other means that impose limitations, particularly so in spaces that are shaped for whiteness … how some acts and even the mere presence of blackness gets coded as criminal" (ibid., 20). Taken together, a queer approach to surveillance considers how surveillance technologies and practices produce and regulate normativity by interpreting nonnormative bodies as criminal. I am not claiming that the criminality of queerness or nonnormativity is wholly comparable to the criminality of blackness. My point is that bodies deemed or interpreted as nonnormative (or queer) are not always automatically interpreted as criminal or threatening. White queer bodies are certainly not treated the same as queer BIPOC (Black, Indigenous and People of Color) bodies. Given that policing and surveillance in modern Korean history were predicated on linking immoral and nonnormative behaviors and bodies to communism and criminality, surveillance and polic-

ing today are rooted in the nexus of morality, anticommunist ideology, normativity, and criminality. Queerness, then, is interpreted through these practices and technologies as a disruption.

A queer approach to surveillance must also consider the fraught relationship between surveillance—the act of seeing and documenting those observations—with the question of anonymity. In former president Park's response to the November 14, 2015, protests discussed in the previous chapter, Park levied heavy criticism against those protesters wearing masks. While she invoked the tensions with North Korea and threat of terrorism during a cabinet meeting, she also added that "some terrorist elements may sneak into such protests and pose a threat to the lives of our people … masks in protests should not be tolerated. Isn't that what the ISIS is doing these days, with their faces hidden like that?" (*The Straits Times* 2015). Park's rhetoric makes all protesters, particularly those in masks, potential terrorists. Critics were quick to see through the bait-and-switch as Park was actually taking aim at protests and general criticism against her government, with one critic writing, "so they want to pass a law banning the use of masks? In that case, let's have a mask ball!" (Park and Song 2015).[60]

While the conservative ruling party introduced legislation to ban face masks at protests, the measure did not pass, echoing the 2012 Constitutional Court ruling that deemed a 2007 law requiring Internet users to use a real-name identification system for nearly 150 popular websites unconstitutional (Choe 2012). That law had been introduced by former conservative president Lee Myung-bak (Yi Myŏng-bak) to crack down on Internet freedoms and to hold commentators online accountable for their criticism of the government. There continue to be real concerns with the spread of false rumors and cyberbullying, but free-speech advocates argued that the real targets were netizens who post anonymous comments criticizing the conservative government.

Absent, though, are the experiences of marginalized populations in laws and procedures that essentially erase anonymity and solidify one's identity in relation to a set of actions, such as visiting certain websites or buying particular clothes. Anonymity for the marginalized, especially for queer and trans people, is a survival strategy that safeguards against discrimination and violence while providing space to act without the *fear* of identification. As Toby Beauchamp (2019, 49) writes of "going stealth" for trans and gender-nonconforming people in the US, this technique is not available to all gender-nonconforming peo-

ple and in fact implies both a practice of concealment and of "maintaining legibility as a good citizen … providing evidence of legitimate transgender identity that erases any signs of similarity to the deviant, deceptive terrorist figure." For queer and trans people in Korea, anonymity is crucial for daily living, as most have not "come out" to family or friends. Since the first KQCF in 2000, many participants would wear face masks or costumes to conceal their identity, tactics common in protests to hide one's identity while still giving one's body to the movement. Face masks are particularly common in queer activism and protesting, as many press and protest events contain a handful of participants donning face masks. Surveillance or documentation, even with the masking of identity, presents an added problem and analytic.

Surveillance is not simply the gaze, the watching of bodies, but the collection and documentation of that watching: the production of data. The act of watching certainly elicits anxiety—who is watching whom?—but perhaps the more immediate and pressing question is: for what purpose? Surveillance combines these questions and adds the extra layer of documentation: who is documenting who, and to what end? Foucault (1995, 2007) contends that the productivity of surveillance as statecraft technology makes bodies docile, that the fear of being watched compels bodies to self-regulate, but also that surveillance as biopolitical practice shifts governance from the individual body to the national body. However, surveillance is not only a tool of the state. KCQF organizers and activists surveil events and protests as a mechanism of protection against complaints that may be levied against them, nestled again within a larger politics of visibility. These queer practices of surveillance exist somewhere between Steve Mann's concept of sousveillance—a way of "enhancing the ability of people to access and collect data about their surveillance and to neutralize surveillance" (cited in Browne 2015, 21)—and Browne's (ibid.) notion of "dark sousveillance" as a "site of critique, as it speaks to black epistemologies of contending with antiblack surveillance, where the tools of social control in plantation surveillance or lantern laws in city spaces and beyond were appropriated, co-opted, repurposed, and challenged in order to facilitate survival and escape." The practices of KCQF surveilling police and the anti-LGBT protesters present are, perhaps, a mode of fugitivity that "highlights the tension between the acts or flights of escape and creative practices of refusal, nimble and strategic practices that undermine the category of the dominant" (Campt in

Sojoyner 2017, 516). Such practices are a way to hold those in power (with authority) accountable while safeguarding the mere existence of queer Koreans.

The "to what ends" condition of surveillance is difficult to ascertain. The most immediate and, frankly, unsatisfying answer is that surveillance produces security. Expanding surveillance techniques and technologies in Korea and around the globe contribute to the myth that there is a correlation between the amount of surveillance and visibility and the level of security, that greater visibility means greater security. Beauchamp (2019, 119) challenges this assumption with the case of Chelsea Manning, a former military intelligence analyst who leaked classified information to WikiLeaks, for:

> the very fact that the U.S. military held Manning so close—that the army had screened, trained, and officially approved this individual service member, who then went on to publicize materials meant to be kept secret—indicates that increased visibility is not the panacea that state policies so often claim it to be.[61]

And yet, increased visibility and surveillance are still the proposed remedy for uncertainty, risk, and threats.

The Korean National Police Agency (KNPA) recently implemented a "big data program" aimed at predicting the likelihood of future crimes as they "have listed a 'preemptive' response to crime as one of the targets of its new big data analysis-based system" (Kwon 2016; Koo 2015). The data in question center on three sources: the police's internal databases (including data from the Korea Information System of Criminal Justice Services), public data, and shared private data (i.e., blogs, Facebook, Twitter). The spectrum of future crimes includes sexual assault, robbery, and drugs, but, as one critic argues, "the unapproved collection and use of personal information from online sources is particularly illegal … the fact that they're doing this out of nowhere, without any real consideration or societal discussion of such a sensitive issue, is a serious problem" (Kwon 2016).

Surveillance and big data are coconstitutive processes, where big data includes "the mobile and digital computational systems that permit the large-scale generation, collection, and analysis of information about people's and devices' activities, locations, and transformations … the social and technical effects of those systems and data, and the spec-

ulative hype, hopes, and futures that accompany them" (Boellstorff and Maurer 2015, 1). Big data is not a new phenomenon (Bell 2015). Yet, as Tom Boellstorff and Bill Maurer (2015, 1) argue, "big data" is often paired with a predilection for "trending" and "claims about the future rather than accuracy in explaining the past or present." They aim to challenge this preoccupation with the unknowable in favor of one that attends to the emerging present, but, as the example of the KNPA's big data program demonstrates, the intervention against the unknowable often becomes actualized in the emerging present through preemption.

Even though the KNPA claims that their big data program is "restricted to" certain crimes, data are never without context, never without a framework and algorithms (Amoore 2020; Biruk 2018). Consider, for instance, the subfield of visual analytics in computer science that applies information visualization to sprawling databases. Warren Sack (2019, 175) delineates how the emerging field of visual analytics, funded in large part by the United States Department of Homeland Security, pivots on seeking out and stopping emerging attacks before they happen: "visual analytics is thus characteristic of contemporary abductive demonstration, an effort to see something that does not exist in a mass of data too large for anyone to carefully examine … a practice of 'seeing things' … that may or may not be there."[62] To see things that may not even be present complicates the very concept of visibility, for both surveillance and data, especially biometric data, do not require one to be visually seen as the body as data makes visible that which might go unseen. But this practice also nuances my notion of banal security for part of my explication of banality is of that thing in the corner of one's eye that compels one *not* to look—a perception filter erected around the object without necessarily hiding it or concealing it away.[63]

A queer approach to both surveillance and big data not only attends to the social life of data and its algorithms (including visual analytics and metrics) but recognizes that these seemingly neutral systems or assemblages are built through normativity with the categorization of bodies through systems of deviance and criminality. Beauchamp (2019, 2) demonstrates that the US surveillance of transgender and gender-nonconforming bodies is rooted in regulating and maintaining gender normativity but doing so "produces the very categories and figures of gendered deviance that they purport to simply iden-

tify." Yet, when surveillance and data integrate into broader biopolitical security governance, the categories produced move beyond gender or sexual deviance; they are categories of disruption, uncertainty, fear, and, ultimately, threat. They are produced through surveillance and data. These categories, however, are inherently unstable and malleable because the more surveillance and data gathered, the more nodes there are to connect and inferences to make (Amoore 2013). But that is the point of security and the trick of visibility.

A Turn toward Pandemic Surveillance

When the Covid-19 pandemic first hit Korea, many around the world lauded the country's quick response and innovative contact-tracing techniques.[64] Several countries also borrowed some of the innovative testing techniques first utilized in Korea, namely drive-thru testing. Korea was able to contact-trace and quarantine individuals without locking down towns, cities, or the entire nation, as other countries did. Jung Won Sonn (2020) notes that Korea did not need to resort to the "authoritarian measures" commonplace in the Chinese response, writing that Korea's response "certainly looks like the standard for liberal democratic nations."[65] Eun A. Jo (2020) goes further, labeling Korea's response "democratic … a result of public solidarity" and ultimately that the pandemic "could serve as such a harbinger for democracies around the world." Jo similarly juxtaposes Korea's "democratic response" to China's "forceful measures"—and, granted, Chinese police locking residents in their homes in forced quarantine measures might very well be the epitome of "authoritarian measures"—but mass surveillance and datafication of all citizens in an effort to stop the spread of Covid-19 is born of an analogous logic and fueled by a similar desire of total and absolute control.

Indeed, much was to be learned from South Korea's approach to the pandemic, especially following the former president Park Geun-hye administration's mishandling of the 2015 MERS-CoV epidemic (as I discuss in the next chapter). A chief critique of the management of the MERS-CoV epidemic was transparency and the sharing of information with the public, and so not only did policies and laws around pandemic response change but president Moon Jae-in's (Mun Chae-in) administration vowed to keep the public informed with regular press conferences coupled with text messages providing details on suspected

Covid-19 patients. These messages were sent to all individuals with a cell phone, the rationale being that more information is better. Transparency, however, can be a dangerous tool. Not only were Korean citizens finding the constant barrage of text message updates exhausting but some began questioning why certain details were being shared by the government with the public.

South Korea is sophisticated in its institutional digitization of personal information. Even prior to digitization, the 1962 resident registration law and system discussed in Chapter 1 collected 140 different forms of individual information of residents, corresponding with a unique number assigned at birth, as method of observing and surveilling the population (Moon 2005, 28). Many of these identifying features are now digitized, easily accessible to the relevant government agencies at a moment's notice. However, with the onset of the Covid-19 pandemic, the Ministry of Science and ICT (MSIT), Ministry of Land, Infrastructure and Transport (MOLIT), and the Korea Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (KCDC) created and operated the Epidemic Investigation Support System (EISS). The EISS is an "online system that can rapidly collect and analyze data from related agencies and quickly identify the movements of confirmed Covid-19 cases, using functions such as transmission route analysis and infection risk area analysis" (Ministry of Science and ICT 2020, 26).

The EISS emerged from both the aftermath of 2015 MERS-CoV epidemic and the 2017 Data Flagship Project. In the wake of the government's perceived mishandling of the MERS-CoV epidemic, the government amended the Infectious Disease Control and Prevention Act (IDCP Act) to allow relevant public health agencies the ability to request certain personal information for public health and scientific purposes. Under Article 76-2, the KCDC was allowed to make requests through the KNPA for personal information and for location-based data from telecommunication companies, along with financial data (such as credit card transactions). The information would then be sent back through the KNPA to the KCDC (Government of the Republic of Korea 2020, 45). However, a 2020 presidential decree amended the IDCP Act to enable the KCDC to receive the relevant data directly from the telecommunications and credit card companies after passing the request through the KNPA and relevant financial association via the EISS.

Much of the development of the EISS stems from a collaboration between MSIT and MOLIT and "a data collection and analysis platform for its smart city development project" (MSIT 2020, 27). The 2017 Data Flagship Project also led to the 2018 Act on the Promotion of Smart City Development and Industry, which encouraged the creation of new technologies and modes of datafication to be deployed in smart cities (Intralink 2019, 7–8). Thus the ministries chiefly responsible for the development, deployment, and operation of EISS are the same ministries involved in the development of datafying cities across Korea as they retooled the technologies being developed to make cities smart for nationwide pandemic surveillance. Few checks and balances exist as power becomes centralized within a few executive branch ministries.

As MSIT writes of "how we fought Covid-19," an epidemiological investigation begins with the transmission route, "location data gathered from a variety of sources, including cellular base stations, credit card transaction records, public transportation use history, arrival and departure history, and medical institutional visitation history" (MIST 2020, 27). This requires, then, institutions across Korea—including immigration, hospitals, police, financial institutions, telecommunication companies, and the KCDC—to regularly input information into the EISS. While CCTV footage is not yet (as of 2020) incorporated into the EISS, it is easily accessible and often used to corroborate EISS analysis. The collection of such detailed information is done under the auspices of public health protection and limiting viral infection, yet large amounts of personal data are passing through the hands of many individuals. Furthermore, some of this data, including "movement paths, transportation means, medical treatment institutions, and contacts of patients of the infectious disease," are required to be disclosed to the public under Article 34-2 of the IDCP Act. The rationale for such public disclosure again dates to the government's perceived mishandling of the MERS-CoV outbreak, the lack of transparency in government procedures, and the lack of public information around which medical institutions were treating MERS-CoV patients.

Yet the National Human Rights Commission of Korea (NHRCK) criticized the government's disclosure of personal information. The NHRCK claims that, while "it is hard to dispute the need for disclosing the time and names of the places they visited to help prevent further spread of the virus," they find that "authorities are currently providing

more information than is necessary … leading to a violation of privacy and human rights of an infected person" (NHRCK 2020). As such, the NHRCK advises authorities to "publish the time and names of locations … rather than providing the travel history of each individual" in addition to devising "measures that will ease public fears and protect the privacy of patients." The NHRCK cites a February 2020 Seoul National University study that found that individuals are "less worried about contracting Covid-19 than they are about the criticism that they might receive from their community if they are infected."

The Creep of Surveillance

Of all the queer individuals interviewed, Min-gi provided one of the most embodied responses. When asked about the use of QR (quick response) codes in clubs, bars, and other queer spaces to track patrons, Min-gi responded that "I don't write down my information … but it automatically exists. It's a bit creepy." The translation of creepy comes from the Korean verb that literally means "to give one goosebumps" (*sorŭm i totta*). Min-gi repeated this same phrase when asked about the government tracking and revealing the routes of suspected patients, answering that "I think that was a bit creepy. Of course, I wish my route was not disclosed." Not only did the government's mobilization of QR codes—an instance of citizen engagement with surveillance—elicit an affective response (in the form of goosebumps) from Min-gi, but the possibility that their personal information and route were ascertained and shared by the government was equally creepy. Min-gi was quite critical of surveillance and quarantine measures more broadly because "in a way [those practices] stigmatize a specific group in the name of quarantine … because we witness the measures taken in a way that [makes us] feel shameful." Yet most problematic were the disclosures of public movement: "I don't really understand why they're doing this … after the Itaewon incident [the May 2020 Covid-19 outbreak], what if the people around me actually get outed because of the opening of the route … what if [they] get fired … it's really nonsense." Recall Hyŏnsu's friends' concern over their employers potentially discovering that they sought a Covid-19 test and that just getting tested could be linked to one's sexuality.[66]

Min-gi's dissatisfaction and criticism emerge from the policing of queer people and queer spaces, particularly the use of QR codes. Their

criticism of QR codes stems from the government requiring entertainment establishments such as clubs, bars, and karaoke rooms to register visitors through QR codes, a direct result of the May 2020 outbreak and queer Koreans providing false information in the written visitor registries (Kim 2020). Debates arose online over queer visitors providing false names, typically the names of famous singers and actors. Queer folks were split over both the efficacy and ethicality of providing false names, but Min-gi squarely believed that "people who used fake names like 'Lee Hyori' [a K-pop singer] were wise. [They] did a good job not disclosing their name." Min-gi's criticism cuts deeper, when they lament:

> It's like, how could the government official who thought of obtaining a roster from a gay club come up with such a stupid idea? How do you make a list in a gay club, ask them to write a list [of patrons], and think people will be honest with you? I don't understand the idea. Of course, I don't use it, and I don't think I have the right to criticize people who didn't write in [their actual names].

For Min-gi, there is too great a risk for people to write their actual name, especially people losing their jobs if they are revealed to have been frequenting gay clubs and bars. The lack of foresight of workplace—and, indeed, societal—homophobia is what particularly troubles Min-gi, singling out the government official who thought of the "stupid idea." Equally telling, however, is that Min-gi also locates aversion to the roster and QR codes within the individual experience of not using these technologies and not cursing those who write fake names. It is Min-gi's individuated experience as a queer patron of queer clubs that incites their criticism toward these specific surveillance technologies. Min-gi is locating the self within a queer population policed by pandemic surveillance, recognizing that quarantines and surveillance "stigmatize" the group in question. But, more insidiously, such stigmatization and policing are done so that the general Korean population can be protected and flourish; blame and subsequent policing are levied against the queer community for the Korean population to carry on without heightened quarantine procedures.

For instance, health workers at several regional testing facilities, including those in Seoul, began inquiring about an individual's HIV status following the May 2020 outbreak (Queer Action Against Covid-19 2020, 57–58). In Korea, HIV/AIDS is linked to homosexuality—

thought to be a gay disease, as I explore in the next chapter—and so, when public health workers asked individuals of their HIV status after the May 2020 outbreak, they were not only assuming that those getting tested were gay but also stereotyping gay men as being HIV-positive. This confluence of viruses, of HIV and SARS-CoV-2 in Korea, runs deeper, for there was one HIV-positive interlocutor who feared becoming a "super spreader" if he contracted SARS-CoV-2 during the early months of the 2020 pandemic.

In a similar narrative, the gay bar owner Otis explained that he did not use a guestbook in his bar because it was a government "recommendation" for spaces smaller than a certain size. Otis laughed, noting that "in a way, it's good. And the customers said [the guestbook] was a burden." For instance, T'ae-min, a gay man who frequented Itaewon, admitted that "I don't go to clubs that use QR codes. Thanks to that, it seems that there is no one around me but me." Otis also pointed out that he noticed more patrons using cash rather than credit cards to settle their bills: "there are some people who say they intentionally use it [cash] now." It is important to remember that the government can track suspected SARS-CoV-2 carriers through credit card transactions, so the intentional usage of cash is a direct response to these pandemic surveillance technologies.

While many actively eluded "creepy" surveillance, others conveyed that, in the words of U-sŏng, the government "already knows everything." Synonymous with this thought was the inevitable affect transmitted through pandemic surveillance and government tracking: "at that time, all the texts [from the government] were sent to those who had their cell phone transmission records in the vicinity [of Itaewon] for more than 30 minutes at that time … so it was *unavoidable*." Despite this unavoidability, U-sŏng believed that such surveillance is "unacceptable in a democracy." U-sŏng continued, with rather poignant brio:

> From the beginning, my country has been pretending to be a democracy. It is no different from North Korea. That's what I thought. I've had that thought since yesterday, because I've lived in a country that is a model of democracy. So, since I know exactly what democracy is, I have always had a strong sense that Korea is a democracy only in words, and a democracy only in appearance. But now, beginning with announcing

> personal [information], I felt that once again our country is too far from a real democracy.

The comparison to North Korea is biting, given that, as discussed in Chapter 1, North Korea is mobilized not as a general icon of authoritarianism but as the specific foil or specter that South Korea organized its national development and security apparatus against. U-sŏng later compared Korea to China because "I thought that my personal information would not be protected." That U-sŏng invoked both the faux democratic posturing of South Korea and its similarity to both North Korea and China is not all that surprising given the deluge of articles, as mentioned above, comparing the seemingly "democratic response" of Korea to the "authoritarian response" of China. U-sŏng used the available framing of Korea's democratic response compared to China's authoritarian response, but transformed it, asserting that there is no difference between these responses.

Invoking democracy inculcates Korea and its people in a liberalism captured so well by biopolitics. Wendy Brown (1995, 5) writes that democracy is "a way of constituting and thus distributing political power," whereby "freedom is a sign—and an effect—of 'democracy.'" Yet, as Brown (2018, 19) later demonstrates, the rise of neoliberal economic privatization actually subverts democracy: "expanding the 'personal, protected sphere' and curtailing the reach of democracy in the name of freedom develops a new ethos of the nation, one that replaces a public, pluralistic, secular democratic national imaginary with a private, homogenous, familial one."[67] As neoliberalism braids into the very mechanisms of decision making and elections, it is more apparent that "fascism does not mark a radical break from mass democracy but rather emerges as an intensification of its inner pathologies" (Brown, Gordon, and Pensky 2018, 4). In Korea, those pathologies intertwine with a remembered history of former authoritarian leaders, rapid industrialization and urbanization, and an anticommunist orthodoxy that positions citizens against the perpetually encroaching threats of North Korea and communism. Hindsight makes abundantly clear that anticommunism was a method meant to consolidate power and prolong individual rule in the Cold War decades, but it wove into public consciousness as a social good.

U-sŏng's contempt for Korea's quarantine and surveillance techniques as undemocratic—downright authoritarian, by invoking North

Korea—while pointing specifically to the protection (or lack thereof) of his personal information attempts to locate the queer community within the general Korean population that ought to be protected by democracy. In actuality, the bifurcation of populations—queer folks and Koreans—is quintessential to biopolitical regulation at the helm of both the politics of freedom and neoliberal democracy.

Herein lies the queer friction and divided subjectivity that permeates the community, for more than a difference in perspective of those who are critical of quarantine and surveillance, as discussed above, and those more complacent or supportive, as I explore in the next section, this split in subjectivity is a recognition of a divide in the biopolitical makeup of the Korean population. To again return to Min-gi, who recognized that those quarantined (namely queer Koreans) would be stigmatized *as a group* separate from the general population, near the end of the interview they also noted that "everyone's privacy is important, but some people's privacy should be more important," thus separating these two biopolitical populations. U-sŏng's outrage as well demonstrates the friction of this split, for he labeled Korea undemocratic because policing of the queer community separates queer folks from the general population. He makes this even clearer when he asked rhetorically, "can sacrifices for the many be justified?" The discursive work of democracy and freedom therefore attempts to combine two populations when in fact it facilitates their continued separation within regimes of biopolitical regulation.

Emergency and the Unavoidable

That both Hyŏn-su and Min-gi find pandemic surveillance troubling given their own individual experiences and feelings—Hyŏn-su's realization that his individual data was being used in contact-tracing cases, and Min-gi's aversion to QR codes—is contingent on their membership within the queer community. While individuated experience does index the biopolitical separation of populations, as mentioned above, it is the individuated experience as rooted in queerness that contributes to their antisurveillance perspectives. For Hyŏn-su, his simultaneous attempt to include himself in the general Korean population engenders a collision of his divided subjectivity that falls along such biopolitical lines. Interestingly, Min-gi made a similar move. When asked if Min-gi was worried that their movements would be revealed, they responded:

"I don't care. It doesn't matter if my route is revealed … just because it's revealed doesn't mean I'm going to take a lot of damage. I feel bad. However, there are people whose [route] shouldn't be revealed." Min-gi believed they were both part of a vulnerable population—queer Koreans—and part of the general population not particularly worried about their movement being publicly revealed. Min-gi found it "creepy," no doubt, but seemed complacent with it in comparison to those "who shouldn't be revealed." As I explore below, part of Min-gi's complacency, like Hyŏn-su's, emerges from a belief that not only are pandemic times exceptional times and thus surveillance is unavoidable, but also that the general Korean population has little to worry about from pandemic surveillance.

Sin was tested for Covid-19 after he visited Itaewon in May 2020. He thus had a rather intimate experience of both K-Quarantine and its pandemic surveillance technologies. Yet, when asked about quarantine measures and surveillance, he was rather upbeat: "I think it's going well." He mused that "I don't know if it's because I'm used to it these days … but it's not like I'm going to die because of Corona," repeating a sentiment that several interlocutors shared about the banality of K-Quarantine and pandemic life, for the pandemic is certainly part and parcel of contemporary Korea's experiences with banal security. Critics like Min-gi, for instance, invoked this mundaneness with regard to the barrage of text messages the government sends about suspected and confirmed cases to all cellphone users: Min-gi "turned [notifications] off too. It's like spam … and I think this reduces awareness [because it] comes too often." Yet Sin found the "talk of human rights violations and stuff like that" to be "unavoidable" in part because pandemic surveillance is equally unavoidable. The rationale that pandemic surveillance practices are unavoidable emerges, too, out of banal security and neoliberal security governance as citizens, like Sin, interpret these practices as the only option available (and thus unavoidable).

Wŏn-sŏk, a gay man who was also tested after having visited Itaewon in May 2020, fluctuated between the necessity of pandemic surveillance and its unavoidable quality. He initially recognized that "from the perspective of sexual minorities, that kind of [government tracking] hurts a little bit more, right?" But he continued:

> It may have been a bit necessary in the beginning. And the government was in a situation where it was building a system that it didn't have, right

> from the start … I think it was necessary. Rather than necessary, it was just *unavoidable*. So, the process of building the system was necessary, but it [moved] a bit faster.

Wŏn-sŏk was commenting on the very impetus and development of the pandemic surveillance system, that it was necessary to construct such a system but the speed at which it was built and grew may have been slightly problematic. For Wŏn-sŏk, the impetus for pandemic surveillance was necessary, but the form it took—its speed, size, coverage, and troubles—was unavoidable. In-hwan made a similar observation, for, when asked about the government's attempts to track individual movement, In-hwan likewise characterized the practice as "unavoidable." He added that the government's responses to the Itaewon outbreak was "not bad. It was okay. If this had happened in a regular club, wouldn't you provide the name of the club?" In-hwan was explicitly locating the queer experience within the broader experience of the general population by offering a counterhistorical rhetorical question. His assessment of the government's pandemic surveillance of the Itaewon outbreak emerged from his implicit belief that queer clubs and "regular clubs" are comparable and of the same biopolitical order. What I mean by this is that where those interlocutors in the previous section rooted their criticism in the separation of queer Koreans from the general population, In-hwan's support of pandemic surveillance is instead rooted in conjoining these biopolitical populations into a single, general population; there ought to be no difference between the treatment of queer and nonqueer Koreans.

Others also drew connections between queer Koreans and the general population in ways that subsumed queer Koreans into the category of population. A frequent patron of queer clubs, Chi-hun thought that government tracking was necessary. He was critical, for instance, of writing one's name falsely in the club's guestbook, but acknowledged that, "due to the nature of the gay club, it was somewhat inevitable." Both tracking and evasion are thus seen as inevitable. Though he expressed some concern over the guestbook, it mostly stemmed from "who can see the list and who can abuse it … someone can pass by and take a picture with their cell phone." But still, Chi-hun supported the government's response and was quite specific in his explanation, invoking the science of SARS-CoV-2:

> First, since it's a droplet infection, it does not require physical contact with the air for one to become infected … also, due to the nature of the club, it is a place that is closed underground and [contains] heavy breathing, but since it is a droplet infection, there are many such deaths. I think that such a response was necessary because it is a virus with no known cure. And I think they [the government] did a good job in doing what they did.

SARS-CoV-2 spreads through droplets, hence the call by doctors early on for individuals to wear masks, especially when near others. Chi-hun's justification for pandemic surveillance, especially after the May 2020 outbreak, stems from this very fact and that, at the time, there was also no vaccine. Akin to In-hwan's more direct bifurcation of gay clubs and "regular clubs"—whereby all clubs are the same in his estimation—Chi-hun uses the scientific reality of the virus and of common human respiratory anatomy to conjoin queer Koreans with the general population. Regardless of one's sexuality or community, SARS-CoV-2 is itself indiscriminate and so, for Chi-hun, indiscriminate action is necessary. There ought not be a separation between the queer community and the general population because the virus itself makes no separation, and thus the general population subsumes queer Koreans into it under the auspices of public health.

A more forceful response came from co-workers Sang-hun and Sŏng-ho, interviewed together. These gay men were critical of club-goers, admitting that, when the news broke of the outbreak, they "cursed, cursed a lot," as Sang-hun stated. In Sŏng-ho's words, "Ugh, those fuckheads. Why did they go out and act rashly with this situation?" Their initial response indexes a gay respectability politics made famous by Lisa Duggan's (2003) notion of homonormativity, insofar as the respectable homosexual would *not* frequent clubs and bars, particularly during a pandemic. Both then continued to support the government's pandemic surveillance practices, namely tracking individuals and texting them, because, as Sŏng-ho stated, "it's an emergency, anyway." As such, "it's not a human rights violation" to track individuals. Similar to Chi-hun's invocation of the science of the virus, Sŏng-ho's use of emergency to justify government tracking recognizes both that queer Koreans were being tracked and policed but also that pandemic emergency and the general public takes precedence over the individual, queer experience.

Revisiting Hyŏn-su's narrative and invocation of freedom is useful. For Hyŏn-su, limitations on freedom are not permanent, but "we're just going to have to put up with each other's pain for a little while." Sŏng-ho's narrative resonates here as he offers a justification for Hyŏn-su's temporary limitation of freedom: pandemic emergency.[68] To return to Brown (1995, 25), freedom "requires for its sustenance that we take the full measure of power's range and appearances—the powers that situate, constrain, and produce subjects as well as the will to power entailed in practicing freedom." Hyŏn-su's narrative captures this ambivalence and anxiety, for freedom must be limited in certain circumstances, but doing so draws attention to the role of power. For Foucault, such ambivalence and anxiety are a confrontation of discipline and security, for in limiting freedom we are witnessing a hyperregulation that occurs in queer spaces.

Therefore, whereas the narratives in the previous section drew attention to the policing of the queer community as cause to criticize pandemic surveillance, the narratives in this section primarily conjoined the queer community with the general Korean population as method of supporting pandemic surveillance. While the pandemic surveillance indeed targets the queer community—separate then from the general Korean population—particularly following the May 2020 outbreak, several of those queer Koreans interviewed in this section argued for the inclusion of queer folks in the general population. In contrast to U-sŏng's attempt to do just that in discussing democracy, the move to enlace populations in this section was done to justify policing—all Koreans are being tracked, so queer Koreans are no different. For Sŏng-ho and Sang-hun, queer clubgoers brought it on themselves for frequenting clubs during a pandemic.

We thus witness the other side of divided subjectivity, of this tension in both individual subjectivity and the subjectivity (or subjectivities) of the community (or communities). This other side recognizes the difference between the queer community and the general population but, rather than keep them separate, some have attempted to incorporate them into one another. Biopolitics weaves through pandemic surveillance and the narratives of these queer individuals as, within these narratives, queer Koreans are making claims along biopolitical lines of a queer population versus a general Korean population. The reason, I argue, is that doing so enables those queer Koreans to stake claims to their membership in the general population, the nation, and

ultimately the citizenry. By making themselves vulnerable as queer for the sake of the national population, they are partaking in their own vulnerability and disruptive quality and good (neoliberal) citizenship. But individuals like Sŏng-ho and Sang-hun take it one step further. They actively distance themselves from other queer Koreans by pointing to bar- and clubgoers as the disruption to security. While one may venture to note that such maneuvering is akin to Jasbir K. Puar's (2007) notion of homonationalism, or at the very least a form of homonormativity, I suggest that this is premature. Indeed, the attempts by some queer Koreans to fold themselves into the general population is a claim to good citizenship, but homonationalism, as I understand it, requires some national recognition to the (homo)normativity of some queer individuals (namely, middle-class, white gays and lesbians). Such recognition does not exist in Korea as all queer Koreans are considered disruptive bodies in the national security machine.[69]

Pandora's Box Is Already Open

The phenomenon outlined here reflects more than a difference of opinion with regard to pandemic surveillance and K-Quarantine; it is a labor of differentiating an individual's self-perceived location in two biopolitical populations. The difference of opinion emerges from this separation of populations. Criticism of pandemic surveillance is rooted in a belief that the queer community is being targeted and ought to be provided special affordances and protections, that they are exceptional. As Min-gi stated, privacy is important, but the privacy of some (i.e., queer Koreans) is more important. In comparison, appeals to the general Korean population and either one's membership within it or a broader configuration of the queer community's location within the general population pivot not on an exceptionality of queerness but on the generalness of the Korean population. Here I witness queer Koreans' complacency or even support of pandemic surveillance and K-Quarantine tied to the invocation of the general Korean population. Some thought of themselves and queer Koreans as no different from the general population—if the general population is subjected to pandemic surveillance, then surely I/queer folks are no different—while others, like Hyŏn-su, expressed that the types of surveillance and quarantine measures that they support affect others, not queer Koreans.

Explicating this tension within Korea's queer community illustrates the way regimes of biopolitical regulation and governing manifest within individual narratives. We can witness individual narrativization and even participation in biopolitics, heightened no doubt by both the broader pandemic and the specific May 2020 outbreak in Itaewon. Both also demonstrate how queer Koreans are targeted, tracked, traced, and quarantined so that the general Korean population can flourish. Some queer Koreans conceive of the queer population as being includable, while others hold queer folks separate from the general Korean population.

The Covid-19 pandemic has heightened the models and mechanisms of (national) security outlined in this book, no doubt, but it has also drawn greater attention to the work of relationality to not only foster vectors of transmission but be the salve for Covid-19 fatigue and loneliness that often followed. Korean queer folks targeted as security disruptions and threats had once again been vilified as immoral and hedonistic in the wake of the May 2020 outbreak of Covid-19 in queer spaces, whereby their social relations were interpreted as causes of disease. The queer activist response by Queer Action Against Covid-19, comprised of 23 different organizations, was in some ways attempting to suture the queer community back together while seeking recourse from both news outlets publishing homophobic or factually false claims and public health procedures that they felt overstepped their boundaries with overly personal questions during testing. In their white paper that details the work they did on multiple fronts, they write, "the infrastructure to live safely is not equally provided to all. Social minorities, those vulnerable in disasters, are susceptible to disease, and so they are often morally attacked as the cause of the disease" (Queer Action Against Covid-19 2020, 1). The collective not only encouraged queer Koreans to get tested once they successfully lobbied the government to institute anonymous testing; they also met with various local and national government and public health representatives to address amending testing and surveilling procedures.

At the height of crisis, queer activists got to work. That is what they do. That is one way that they help provide queer Koreans the ability to live and breathe despite the onslaught of hate speech, structural violence, and desociality brought on by being treated as a disruption to national security. This is what the Korean Queer Culture Festival organizers did in 2015 in collaborating with the police to set up a

makeshift checkpoint, as discussed in the previous chapter, a stopgap solution to make sure those inside the festival felt safe. And, as I discuss in the next chapter, this was also what queer and HIV/AIDS activists did following the 2015 MERS-CoV outbreak and rumors surrounding MERS-CoV, HIV, and homosexuality.

I end by contemplating pandemic surveillance in the future and the mobilization of these technologies outside of pandemics. We ought to recall that Korea's pandemic surveillance assemblage was brought together from laws, technologies, policies, and visions that predated Covid-19. Korea's attempts to make a smart city, for instance, compels one to wonder if the smart city of the future is comparable to a K-Quarantine and mid-pandemic Korea. If so, then one must also recognize that the regimes of biopolitical regulations made so palpable in the wake of the May 2020 outbreak will only intensify as time passes. Tong-hae, a gay man tested for Covid-19 after he visited Itaewon in May 2020, expressed a similar sentiment, stating that "I have no guarantee that once the government understands that it is possible [to track people] … that it will not do it again in the future." He is skeptical as to the extent of the government's pandemic surveillance technologies but recognizes that, regardless, it acts as a Pandora's box that ought not be opened.

The problem: Pandora's box has already been opened. As I detailed in this chapter, the KNPA had been contemplating and organizing around big data programs for some time, prior to the Covid-19 pandemic. And as I interrogate in the next chapter, Covid-19 follows on the heels of the 2015 outbreak of the MERS-CoV in South Korea. As Covid-19 becomes endemic, scientists also claim that this pandemic is just the beginning; the next one is on the horizon. Surveillance never moves backward, as it only uses the past to make predictions of the potential future. Yet, as I also argued in this chapter, following feminist, queer, and trans scholars, surveillance is not a view from nowhere—that is merely a "god trick," to invoke Donna Haraway (1988)—but situated and intersectional. Some bodies are surveilled to a greater degree—and in more invasive, more intentional, and more violent ways—than others. As such, Pandora's box is not as scary or fearsome for some as it is for others; banal security has made sure of that. Indeed, surveillance as a technique of national (and neoliberal) security in South Korea further entrenches security's banality, in part evidenced by some of the narratives discussed above.

Pandora's box is already open. The question we are left with is how those most vulnerable will respond.

CHAPTER 4

Relationality in the Time of Viruses

> We evolve and die more from our polymorphous and rhizomatic flus than from hereditary diseases, or diseases that have their own line of decent.
>
> Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari,
> *A Thousand Plateaus*

At the height of the spring 2015 Middle East Respiratory Syndrome coronavirus (MERS-CoV) outbreak and epidemic in Korea, I knew of many individuals staying home and avoiding contact with others to safeguard against possible infection. Some of those staying home, even from work, were people living with HIV/AIDS (PLWHA), fearful of the MERS-CoV because there were rumors spreading of a supposed AIDS–MERS "super virus." Moreover, HIV-positive individuals in need of long-term nursing care unrelated to the MERS-CoV were turned away from the National Medical Center, the designated central hospital for MERS-CoV treatment, and struggled to receive treatment elsewhere (Kwŏn 2015). Thousands of schools closed, and the Korean government's volunteer quarantine procedures led to thousands self-quarantining at home alongside those quarantined in hospital wards. PLWHA were navigating an uncertain biosecurity context alongside growing economic and ontological precarity sweeping Korea, but from an even more uncertain position being HIV-positive. Their fears embody not only a common experience of being HIV-positive in Korea—and, indeed, around the world—but the collection of fears that lie at the heart of the experience and treatment of PLWHA: fear over HIV and the propinquity of the queer body to other bodies. Many PLWHA internalize the stigmas of their HIV status and isolate themselves away from friends and families (KNP+ 2017), while many queer folks also fear and stigmatize HIV and PLWHA. As I demonstrate in

this chapter, confronting these fears motivate HIV/AIDS and queer activism in Korea, and in the aftermath of the 2015 MERS-CoV outbreak, that rehabilitation took on a new, *viral* quality.

In recent years, scholars of pandemics have demonstrated how uncertainty is the "new normal" for both lived experience and governance (Caduff 2015; Lakoff 2017). In turn, "the securitization of the *bios* has become the dominant response to uncertainty, globalization, rapid mobility and circulator crises, and terrorism and insecurity" (Barker, Taylor, and Dobson 2013, 9). "Biosecurity" is both a discourse and a practice, "the attempted management or control of unruly biological matter, ranging from microbes and viruses to invasive plants and animals" (ibid., 5). If biosecurity is predicated on uncertainty and fear, then to govern through uncertainty is to prepare for an unknowable future, "to bring these potential events into the present as potential future disasters that expose current vulnerabilities" (Lakoff 2017, 15). Anthropologists have long studied the "control of unruly biological matter," from Mary Douglas's (1966) distinction between dirt and purity to Claude Lévi-Strauss's (1969) work on the incest taboo—in many ways, governing the present by preempting the future mirrors kinship practices, where decisions over marriage and reproduction are made based on future planning. The very notion of "contagion," Priscilla Wald (2008, 15) details, occupied the minds of scientists and social theorists alike from the advent of bacteriology in the 20th century until today, as "categories of belonging and theories of microbial infection came together in that most mythic—and most scientific—figure, the human carrier." Likewise, Emily Martin (1994, 32–36), writing of the development of bacteriology, sketches out how microbes and the common invocation of germs act as invaders to the body, where the body represents fortification that is under attack by microbes and disease. "Our bodies are faced with masses of cells bent on our destruction," Martin (1994, 53) writes, for "the notion that the immune system maintains a clear boundary between self and nonself is often accompanied by a conception of the nonself world as foreign and hostile." Biosecurity inflects the management or control of that human carrier and self with fear and uncertainty, whereby the virus is interpreted as a foreign biological agent to thwart and preempt. In Korea, these biosecurity practices expand the country's national security assemblage to target infectious disease carriers as not only national security disruptions but threats. Health and viruses, too, have come under the thrall

of banal security. Here we see the convergence of disruption and threat in the body of viral carriers.

The MERS-CoV outbreak as a biosecurity event indicates how the "scalar articulations" of this epidemic, from government treatment of the outbreak to daily life, intersect in a myriad of ways (Cohen 2011, 17). They "emplot" Koreans in a narrative of disease proximity and "viral containment" that in turn spurs (or fabricates) stories and concerns over HIV and queer bodies (ibid.). Proximity refers to both material contiguity and social closeness, used not only with bodies and people but with humans and viruses as well given that "viruses draw organisms together through shared histories, spaces, and bodily substance" (Porter 2019, 19). Containment and isolation thus act as the antithesis to proximity, not just a response to an outbreak of infectious diseases but a biopolitical enactment of difference. The multiscalar Korean response to the MERS-CoV outbreak emulates the continued treatment of HIV and PLWHA in Korea, a point queer and HIV/AIDS activists themselves noticed, suggesting not only that biosecurity governs the response to HIV despite relatively low rates of infection and chronicity of HIV but that queer bodies as *potential* carriers in particular are targets of biosecurity. The fear of proximity tied to the stigmatization of PLWHA and queer bodies intensified during the MERS-CoV outbreak. Bodies were made into threats through isolation and containment, stripping people of the social and embodied relations that made them persons. Yet these seemingly temporary measures of containment during the outbreak cross into an onto-political condition, protracted into daily life as a queer person or PLWHA. In response, queer and HIV/AIDS activists critiqued the methods of isolation that make people into threats and reify structural violence, articulating a form of relationality that draws infected and noninfected, humans and viruses, together. By advocating for proximity and inviting relationality, activists mobilize the same security relations thought to be dangerous. The problem of proximity not only becomes the solution; it also becomes an activist tool of social justice.

Exploring the relationality between humans and between humans and viruses requires an ontology of the virus itself, to "seriously, stubbornly, rethink and rearticulate the human—all of it—in terms of the microbial unfolding of the world" (Rees 2019). Viruses entangle. In the human genome, in blood, between bodies: viruses connect across and between species. They challenge the very categories of human,

life, death, health, and the body as entities that straddle the lines of life and nonlife. Many scientists contend that the viruses inside our bodies and genome have been essential to human and cellular evolution (MacPhail 2004; Villarreal 2004). As science writer Dorion Sagan (2013, 20) espouses,

> Viruses "R" us: They have moved into our genomes. Viral structural proteins have been "hijacked" and integrated into mammal reproductive tissues, immune systems, and brains. Some retroviruses disable receptors that lead to infection by other retroviruses … at bottom we are part virus, the offspring not just of our parents but of promiscuous pieces of DNA and RNA. The road to humanity is paved with genetic indiscretions and transgressions, no less than sheep would not be sheep without their acquired enJSRV.

Anthropologists and science studies scholars have similarly examined the effects and meanings of human–virus and human–microbe relations (e.g., Greenhough 2012; Wolf-Meyer 2017; Lorimer 2018), building on earlier anthropological studies of the body and embodiment that work in multiple registers (Scheper-Hughes and Lock 1987). Rather than contain the human body to the limits of its flesh, the confines of its physical presence in space, human–virus relations infinitely expand the potential and capacity of the body, tapping into the virtual existence of the body that Giles Deleuze and Felix Guattari (1987) refer to as a "body without organs." Writing of Sagan's "uncanny take on the microbial constituents of human bodies," Stefan Helmreich (2016, 62) describes humans as "tangled mixtures, Frankensteins, of a welter of teeny microbial friends and enemies," tracing what he calls the *Homo microbis* through works like Sagan for their "microbiomania." The social and cultural interpretation of the human body and its relation to microbes and viruses, such as the idioms of containment and proximity, invoke Heather Paxson's (2008, 16) notion of microbiopolitics as method to "call attention to the fact that dissent over how to live with microorganisms reflects disagreement about how humans ought to live with one another."[70] Microbiopolitics at once invokes Foucault (2007) on biopolitics, calling forth a separation of the population—the general population and the queer subpopulation—and the notion that knowledge ascertained from physical bodies can be coalesced and used to make claims about the population. Thus, microbiopolitics also

indexes Douglas (1970, 77) on the distinction between the physical and social body, suggesting that "the physical body is a microcosm of society, facing the centre of power, contracting and expanding its claims in direct accordance with the increase and relaxation of social pressures" (see also Scheper-Hughes and Lock 1987). Furthermore, viral entanglements during epidemics must also contend with biosecurity practices and networks that seek to interpret and manage the relationship between humans and between humans and microbes/viruses (Lowe 2010; MacPhail 2014). As Natalie Porter (2019, 19) asserts in her multispecies ethnography of bird flu in Vietnam, the unequal distribution of "microbial exchange relations" across different communities of people means that "viruses shape different worlds differently."

The entanglements I examine in this chapter coalesce around the figure of the *human–virus hybrid*, bodies that form social and microbial relationships between humans and viruses. As an analytic, the human–virus hybrid encompasses queer and HIV/AIDS activists' reformulation of proximity into a method of social justice in addition to the originating biosecurity management of human carriers, even accounting for the rumored AIDS–MERS "super virus." It is both precarious and transformative, a queer figure that again straddles feelings of unease and liberation captured by my queer heuristic. Hybridity is dangerous "because it combines newness and familiarity": here, the virus with the human body (Wald 2008, 260).[71] It confronts the modernist's fantasy of purity, where microbes in particular affect the purity of social relations (Latour 1993; Paxson 2008). In Korea, that purity broadly equates to the purity of blood and consanguine kinship, but it also stands as metaphor for health, ethnicity, and the nation as discussed in the Introduction. The human–virus hybrid challenges the still-powerful discourse of embodied purity in Korea and thus expands relationality by shrinking the conceptual, emotional, and physical distance between people and between humans and viruses.

Interrogating the ways queer bodies are made biological threats and the subsequent activist responses prioritizes the experience of living as a (potential) biological threat while simultaneously reframing the very contexts of biosecurity and epidemics around the individual as both a person and a threat. The implications lie in how people considered threats during public health crises *live*, how viruses are often a means to further stigmatize already-marginalized peoples and justify the extant stigmatization, and how those peoples find innovative methods

of endurance.[72] These methods of endurance, as I demonstrate in this chapter, revolve around the subjectivity of queer Koreans, interpreting them not as bodies embedded in relations of threats but as social persons entwined with relations of care.

Infectiously Queer

I was standing in the center of Seoul's City Hall Plaza in June 2015 when I was approached by an older woman who handed me a pamphlet. She was likely part of one of the anti-LGBT protesting groups at the plaza protesting the Korean Queer Culture Festival, though she did not say a word to me. As she walked away, I read the English-language pamphlet addressed to "the ambassadors of foreign countries who support [the] homosexual party." The handout claims that "many young people in Korea fall into homosexual addiction because of curiosity.

Figure 2: Homosexual Disease. Picture of an anti-LGBT protest sign at the 2015 Korean Queer Culture Festival opening ceremony, June 9, 2015. Photo: author.

More than 1,000 Korean youth are getting infected with AIDS because of it." The ease at which young, curious boys are supposedly afflicted with the "addiction" of homosexuality matches the analogous infection of AIDS. These dangerous claims pivot on a litany of scientifically inaccurate assumptions: that homosexuality is an addiction, that all homosexuals are HIV-positive, and that homosexuals can easily "catch" HIV. Dr. Yŏm An-sŏp, a doctor in Yonsei Severance Hospital's hospice service, uses his experience working with PLWHA in hospice to claim that homosexuality is causing HIV/AIDS. He argues that "the main route of AIDS infection is homosexuality," that homosexual men are "addicted to anal sex," and that "homosexuals affected by HIV/AIDS were really miserable because they could not open their eyes" to their addiction (Yŏm 2016a, 2016b). Framing homosexuality and anal sex as an "addiction" enables anti-LGBT protesters and individuals like Yŏm An-sŏp to medicalize homosexuality despite homosexuality no longer being part of the *Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders* (DSM). Such a framing also indexes the Constitutional Court's 2011 ruling discussed in Chapter 1 that spoke of the likelihood of male soldiers engaging in "unusual sexual intercourse"—thereby disrupting the military unit and leaving the military vulnerable for possible attack—to further justify the constitutionality of the military's anti-sodomy law (article 92-6).

HIV is as much about the virus as it is about the carrier, and, for anti-LGBT organizations and certain doctors, the disease that can easily be "caught" is simultaneously HIV and homosexuality. Equating HIV to homosexuality is common, as HIV/AIDS was historically conceived of as a "homosexual disease," evidenced through signs like those in Figure 2 and claims by doctors like Yŏm An-sŏp and lawmakers like Yi Hye-hun of the former liberal conservative Parŭn Mirae Party. These claims conflate the social type or sexuality (homosexual) with a particular kind of behavior (unprotected sex).

More insidious is that the language many Koreans use to describe the transmission of HIV mirrors that of the common cold (and other illnesses and diseases): to catch (*kŏllida*). The language of HIV transmission and AIDS matters, as Paula Treichler (1999) demonstrates, because it shapes the narrative told of HIV, and thus indexes a violent reality for PLWHA and queer people. For example, a full-page advertisement in the September 4, 2014, issue of the newspaper *Dong-A Ilbo (Tonga Ilbo)* claims in Korean that "over 1,000 young men catch AIDS

every year due to homosexuality" (SOGILAW 2015, 67). This terminology linguistically enacts the assumed communicability of HIV, where "catching" HIV/AIDS is as easy as "catching" a cold. And as with colds, proximity is the problem. As of 2017, there were a total of 12,320 people living with HIV/AIDS in South Korea (KCDC 2018).[73]

In addition to the newspaper advertisements, flyers, and rumors concerning homosexuality and HIV/AIDS, doctors like Yŏm An-sŏp, hospitals, and medical centers promulgate similar stigmas, conflating the medical facts of HIV with vernacular understandings. For example, the Ministry of Health and Welfare removed HIV/AIDS from the list of diseases that would warrant exclusion from nursing home admission in the 2015 revision to the "Enforcement Regulation of the Medical Service Act." However, the Korean Association of Geriatric Hospitals opposed this revision, claiming that their opposition stems from "the risk of infection to elderly patients who have weak immune systems, safety accidents caused by AIDS patients, and the risk of sexual assault by AIDS patients who are predominately homosexual" (SOGILAW 2017, 165). While it is unclear what exactly constitutes "safety accidents," this reason is nestled between claims that equate HIV/AIDS to homosexuality, homosexuality to sexual assault, and easy transmission due to a weakened immune system.

Furthermore, there have been several cases over the last five years where PLWHA were refused various medical treatments and surgeries at Korean hospitals. In 2015, for instance, an HIV-positive individual was refused kidney dialysis at Seoul Severance Hospital because it would be "necessary to purchase separate dialysis machines and hire specialized staff in order to treat HIV-infected patients, but [the hospital] does not have the resources" (SOGILAW 2017, 161). This patient had received treatment at this hospital for nearly 15 years, but, over the years, Severance Hospital has had numerous complaints of HIV-related discrimination, from refusing hip surgery in 2011 to refusing an ear infection surgery in 2015 (SOGILAW 2016). In each case, there was no medical necessity for having specialized equipment or staff to treat PLWHA, but the fear of HIV and the assumed ease of its transmission organize hospital resources and attitudes against PLWHA.

Anxiety and doubt over HIV/AIDS also seep into government regulations, for, as multiple activists explained to me, the government worries about HIV/AIDS spreading; it fears an outbreak. This fear led to subsidizing drugs for PLWHA, but it also led to mandatory HIV testing

for several institutions and professional fields. There are numerous job categories that are legally required to refuse employment to PLWHA, including cooks, pilots, nutritionists, and those working in the service industry. Furthermore, the Korean military has required HIV testing during the mandatory enlistment physical for Korean men (National Law Information Center 2021). If a prospective conscript tests positive, he is not only exempted from military service but also his name and status are reported to the relevant health and military officials.[74]

For HIV/AIDS to be so easily "caught" as to warrant these practices is to stigmatize those who are HIV-positive as "unruly biological matter" that must be managed and controlled (Barker, Taylor, and Dobson 2013, 5). Queer and HIV/AIDS activists claim that these are acts not of precaution but of discrimination given that doctors, health professionals, and even the military are promulgating medical falsehoods regarding HIV transmission. Precautionary acts, though, are often discriminatory because not only are they informed by uncertainty and fear but they also justify present violence to preempt future possibility. This means that, while health workers and the military attempted to foreclose the possibility of HIV transmission, they also imagined scenarios where transmission might occur and incorporated those imaginings into their planning for the present. Here we return to the uncertainty that engulfs biosecurity logic, for it is the uncertainty of how an event will transpire that necessitates the added precautions. Uncertainty requires a particular kind of biopolitics that justifies the violence done today to certain populations deemed *potentially* risky to the entire population.

Perhaps the most immediate and culturally situated concern over this uncertainty and HIV transmission is the perceived threat that the virus and queer body/carrier pose for the Korean family and nation. The flyer the elderly Korean woman handed me continued, stating that "homosexuality is spreading AIDS and killing Korean people. It is destroying traditional marriage and family system [sic]." The fear of this woman, and indeed many Koreans (especially anti-LGBT protesters and the Protestant right), is that HIV/AIDS will somehow corrupt the family and the purity of Korean kinship. South Korean kinship is legally and culturally understood through heterosexual marriage and sexual reproduction, embodied in a 2016 Seoul Western District Court decision that ruled against marriage equality. As the chief justice argued, gays and lesbians are unable to heteronormatively repro-

duce and therefore cannot constitute a married couple or family. The ruling illustrates the pervasive idiom of kinship in Korea, that sexual reproduction between a man and woman constitute both marriage and family. In this way, the family unit, comprised of mother, father, and children, are enacted once again in judicial rulings much in the way they are produced culturally, politically, economically, and legally (see Song 2009; Kim 2010; Freeman 2011). Embedded in this idiom is the "substance" (Carsten 2004) of blood as the marker of family—children born of a married husband and wife are a requisite—and facilitator of ethnic and cultural homogeneity (Shin 2006). The hierarchies formed within the covalence of ethnicity, nationalism, and family often fall on gendered and sexualized lines, even as the Seoul city government, for instance, urges pregnant women to prepare meals "that their husbands, 'who are unaccustomed to cooking,' can simply heat up while they are fending for themselves" (McCurry 2021).[75] Here we can glean the still-powerful gendered discourse of women as homemakers and caregivers (see Abelmann 2003; Freeman 2011), given a role and status through labor as a wife and mother. While this is certainly changing, particularly as fewer women are getting married, the prevalence of such a cultural familial system, intimately producing gendered and sexualized expectations and identifications, is still quite palpable in contemporary Korean society. This then permeates the very conception of the nation, not only as this family unit forms the backbone of the nation but also because such gendered expectations of reproduction give way to more ethnic Koreans sharing that supposedly "single bloodline" (Shin 2006).

South Korean kinship is a spectral force that moves through and haunts the pages of this book, much in the way North Korea does. The manifestation of queer bodies as national security disruptions may move through the ranks of the military, but the interpretation of queer bodies as reservoirs of viruses and disease, especially HIV/AIDS, ties the intimate space of the family to biological and national security. Direct claims made by South Korean politicians, bureaucrats, military officers, doctors, Protestant right pastors, and moderate and conservative citizens that homosexuality is a danger (*wihŏm*) or threat (*wihyŏp*) to the family embodies an eventfulness in Korea that weaves the family and sexuality into discourses, practices, and technologies of national security. In the aftermath of the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis that nearly bankrupted the country, the emergence of "family

breakdown" discourse pivoted on this conservative family ideology, demonizing "sexual relations outside of marriage, sex work, rising divorce rates, and emerging same-sex unions" (Song 2009, 52).[76] Amid South Korea's neoliberalization stipulated in the International Monetary Fund's bailout package, the government targeted certain populations as "deserving" of state welfare and others as "undeserving," but the state's decisions were predicated on those who could recuperate the broken family. Homeless policies, for instance, focused specifically on short-term homeless men because they were "employable and capable of being 'rehabilitated' into a heteronormative family" (Song 2009, 20). Particular groups of underemployed youth—namely those with skill-sets that made them "productive" in the information technology and communications fields—were also treated as "deserving" because they represented the ideal neoliberal subject and embodied the future middle class. Women, though, are missing from these policies.[77]

The 1997 Asian Financial Crisis and its aftermath remain an intense physical and psychic scar for most Koreans, many of my queer interlocutors remembering vividly the way their lives changed after the crisis. Similar to the Korean War, the Asian Financial Crisis became a touchstone for near destruction or collapse that would then fuel future preventive logics and technologies. Simply put, Koreans did not want to experience another crisis like that, and so invoking the specters of the crisis—the destruction of the family—is more than discourse; it is threat-making. Claims that homosexuals are disruptions or threats to the family also embody a population crisis that began around 2005 when the government announced a plan to address the simultaneous low birth rates and aging society between 2006 and 2010. More people are living alone than before, people are getting married at a later age or not marrying at all, and couples are having fewer children or no children (*Yonhap* 2016b; Song 2014).[78] The population crisis as a perpetual crisis of the family also results in fewer boys growing up to be soldiers in the conscripted army.[79] Queerness—which includes HIV/AIDS, especially given the common assumption that all homosexuals are HIV-positive—is thus more than a representation of the continual upheaval and collapse of a more traditional family unit; it is a national security threat. The two are inextricably linked as familial production and existence propels national existence into the future.

These acts of exclusion and expulsion—from hospitals, jobs, the military, and even families—tie the health of the body to the health

of the nation. Blood is a national and biosecurity pathway, whereby the transmission of the family and the nation is shared with the cause of its alleged microbial destruction: viruses. Ed Cohen (2009) demonstrates how biological immunity gets inscribed with metaphors of self-defense, but my point is that security seeps into the bloodstream of the body because it is the avenue of both a perceived future and destruction. The purity of the body, of blood, is questioned, and so the risk of HIV and queer bodies stems from an inability to be certain about the future. While individuals may succumb to AIDS-related complications and comorbidities, the incurability of the virus means that the body will forever be marked with disease and that one's own offspring have the *potential* to be marked as well. Despite advancements in the prevention of mother-to-child transmission (PMTCT) of HIV, the potential of inheritance and purity contamination is as dangerous as any actual infection, thus making queer bodies a wholescale biosecurity concern.

Microbial Maneuvering

MERS was first reported in September 2012 in Saudi Arabia, though health officials later identified cases as early as April 2012 in Jordan (CDC 2017). The MERS-CoV, as with other coronaviruses, is thought to spread through respiratory secretions, causing lower-respiratory tract illnesses like pneumonia.[80] MERS was first reported in Korea on May 20, 2015, when a 67-year-old man was diagnosed with the MERS-CoV after returning from the Middle East earlier in May. By July 5, there were 186 confirmed cases of MERS, about 2,700 schools closed at some point during the crisis, and more than 14,000 people were quarantined in hospitals or quarantined themselves at home (Kim et al. 2016; Reuters 2015). Samsung Medical Center's emergency room was shut down—along with dozens of other clinics and hospitals—where more than half of the total infected individuals contracted the virus (ibid.). Many critics claimed that the government did not disclose which clinics and hospitals infected individuals or suspected patients visited until June 7, after the disease had spread (Rahn 2015). In the aftermath of the outbreak, the Korean Health Minister, Moon Hyung-pyo (Mun Hyŏng-p'yo), resigned to take responsibility for the government's response.

The government's perceived failure to prepare for and adequately address the MERS-CoV outbreak invited contrasts to Korea's response

to the 2003 SARS-CoV outbreak, when only three people were diagnosed in Korea and, after 100 days, the WHO declared that "Korea had won the war against SARS" (Lee and Jung 2019). It also acts as a significant touchstone for president Moon Jae-in's administration's handling of the Covid-19 global pandemic, spurring revisions to public health policies and laws, including increased public health surveillance and personal citizen information sharing between the police and relevant agencies and individuals (Kim et al. 2020). Infrastructure existed in 2015 to prepare contingencies for emerging infectious diseases, including the Division of Public Health Crisis Response in the Korea Centers for Disease Control (KCDC) established in 2007 in response to the World Health Organization's recommendation that member states create systems of preparedness for pandemic influenza (Lee et al. 2013). Yet the incongruencies, misalignments, and, indeed, failures of public health infrastructures during "epidemic events" heighten the uncertainty of crisis while further entrenching biosecurity logics and practices, both in Korea and globally. This may be a case of what Rodrigo De La Fabian (2020, 343) describes as governing through the complexity of life (rather than over it) in resilience governance, as disasters are not sought to be avoided as this "prevents subjects from learning new adaptive strategies from the past."[81] Failures thus become data for the national security assemblage.

The uncertainty and fear engulfing this public health crisis could be felt throughout much of Seoul, infecting my day-to-day activities as an ethnographer in the midst of an unexpected and unfolding epidemic. My university in Korea, for instance, had signs in every classroom that instructed students, in four separate languages (Korean, English, Chinese, and Japanese), in proper preventive actions and information regarding MERS. Students were terrified, many not attending class, others wearing face masks during classes to safeguard against possible infection. Walking through Seoul also precipitated uncertainty and fear as most people wore facemasks. These face masks epitomize Wald's (2008, 4) rather sobering observation of photographs of people wearing facemasks during the SARS-CoV outbreak, that "the masks depicted what SARS threw into relief: human beings' futile efforts to defend themselves against the threat of illness in the daily interactions made global by contemporary transportation and commerce." Little did I know then that face masks would become a prolonged part of daily public life throughout much of the world with Covid-19. At the

time, masking was normative but not yet banal. In a global pandemic world, it is both.

The face masks were part of the government's broad set of volunteer quarantine procedures meant to both address the virus and the fear surrounding the virus. While these procedures were met with a range of opinions and criticisms, several of my queer interlocutors spoke of the necessity for such procedures given their own fears surrounding MERS. Ch'ang-min, a composite character of several queer individuals, worried about MERS because they had family members in hospitals, and there were rumors spreading throughout the hospitals about the virus. Given that the government only disclosed infected hospitals *after* MERS-CoV spread, Ch'ang-min's concerns are understandable. Ch'ang-min's worry demonstrates that the MERS-CoV outbreak, as with most public health crises, seeped into intimate spaces, threatening the life of family members while sowing seeds of uncertainty into proximity to illness. To wit, the 2015 Korean Queer Culture Festival decided to live stream the opening ceremony on June 9, 2015, rather than hold a sprawling event with tens of thousands of participants. The more traditional festival and Pride march was held later in June at Seoul City Hall Plaza, with tens of thousands in attendance, but June 9 was still in the early weeks of the MERS-CoV outbreak and many were fearful of both MERS and the potential ramifications of not adhering to the volunteer quarantine procedures.

In a perceived failure of government response, the public was left to fill in the gaps of knowledge with their own vernacular understandings. Much of the public shared MERS-related information with friends and family through social networking services (Yoo, Choi, and Park 2016). Yet this climate is also where uncertainty multiplies exponentially, fear itself becoming a contagion in need of attention and explication. On June 9, the same day as the Korean Queer Culture Festival's opening ceremony, individuals and organizations opposing the festival circulated a text message that claimed that an "AIDS specialist [or doctor]" believes that "the combination of the MERS virus and AIDS virus can cause the virus strain to become a super virus, thereby becoming a national disaster [*kukkajŏk chaeang*]" (Periťasŭ 2015). Furthermore, anti-LGBT protesters held signs at the Opening Ceremony that read "MERS + AIDS lethal virus." Here "super" is replaced with "lethal," emphasizing not only the virulence of this supposed joint virus, but that such a virus will kill anyone who contracts it. Other anti-LGBT

blog posts, no longer accessible (in 2023), circulated with similar claims. Mainstream media also reported on these claims of a so-called "super virus" (e.g., *Yonhap* 2015).

The immediate goal for these individuals and organizations was the cancellation of the 2015 Korean Queer Culture Festival. Yet utilizing language like "national disaster" calls forth the national security fear of destruction, as anti-LGBT protesters mobilize the so-called "super virus" to target who they believe to be the actual threat to public health and the nation: queer bodies. It is again important to note that most of the individuals and organizations believe that all queer bodies (primarily, all homosexual bodies) are HIV-positive. Similarly, invoking scientific expertise and language with the inclusion of the "AIDS specialist" further attempts to legitimize their claims. There is no etiological evidence to suggest that PLWHA are more prone to a MERS-CoV infection than other people with compromised immune systems, or that the pathology of HIV predisposes the individual to a higher probability of a MERS comorbidity. Genetically, it is unlikely (perhaps even nearly impossible) for HIV and MERS-CoV to combine and produce something more virulent. Both belong to different virus groups and have different physiopathologies, meaning that they infect different cell types and reproduce differently. However, the discussion of a fictitious "super virus" and viral mutations does index, intentionally or not, a social fear surrounding viruses and the growing global concern with more virulent strands of diseases. Especially in popular culture, like the 2011 US film *Contagion*—with the tagline "nothing spreads like fear"—and the 2013 Korean film *The Flu* (*Kamgi*), viruses continuously mutate into more virulent infectious diseases that some refer to as "superbugs" (e.g., Chou 2014; McKay 2018). Public health officials, doctors, and researchers, however, have been communicating fears of drug-resistant and emerging infectious diseases for some time (Briggs 2011; Koch 2008). Part of the fear in emerging infectious diseases is the possibility that the disease will have multidrug resistance. These multidrug-resistant diseases then get named "super virus" or "superbug" to inject more fear into an already-uncertain context.[82]

Explicating the global context of emerging infectious diseases illustrates the intersecting valences of uncertainty that operate within biosecurity contexts. The so-called AIDS–MERS "super virus" need not be even remotely epidemiologically possible for it to have been discursively or politically effective in operating within the uncertainty

of an epidemic. My concern is that the realm of possibility expands during these exceptional times as the rumor spread throughout Seoul, itself a contagion, as virtually everyone I encountered—from language teachers and students to interlocutors and foreign friends—knew of the rumor: the spread of rumors induces greater forms of uncertainty, fear, and structural violence (see Scheper-Hughes 1993; White 2000; Stewart and Strathern 2004). What marks these claims as more than filling in knowledge gaps is what those who proffered the supposed "super virus" did with these claims: they marshaled uncertainty about MERS and used it against queer folks, tapping into fears of superbugs

Figure 3: Conquering MERS. A sign at the 2015 Korean Queer Culture Festival, which reads: "Please gather your strength as citizens to conquer MERS." June 28, 2015.
Photo: author.

and the bioinsecurities of contamination and proximity to the (possible) infected. Not only were they demanding that the Korean Queer Culture Festival be canceled but they further stigmatized queer folks (and PLWHA) as threats to public health at a time when public health was under siege. The claim of a "super virus" was an attempt to, at the microbial level, expand the danger and threat of HIV, PLWHA, and queer bodies to public safety and the nation, to make it pullulate. Such microbial maneuvering embodies the protracted medical treatment of marginal communities in Korea, including US military camptown

Figure 4: Quarantine Barricades. Picture of metal police barricades police erected around the 2015 Korean Queer Culture Festival at Seoul City Hall Plaza. June 28, 2015.
Photo: author.

sex workers and venereal disease policies (Moon 1997), along with the management of disabled Koreans (Kim 2017).

While the festival was not canceled, there were constant reminders of the MERS crisis looming overhead. The sign in Figure 3 hung above the old City Hall building and festival, encouraging Korean citizens to marshal their strength to fight and overcome MERS, pivoting on the metaphor of "conquest" (*kŭkpok*), akin to Western metaphors surrounding the immune system and diseases. As imposing as the blue sign was, the nearly six-foot-tall police barricade in Figure 4 encircling the festival space—with festival participants on one side and anti-LGBT protesters on the other—contained participants into a single, encapsulated space, not unlike those quarantined due to risk of infection. Participants inside the festival were aware of the effects the MERS-CoV outbreak had on the entire context of the festival as entering the festival meant passing through the makeshift checkpoint guarded by police and police barricades described in the previous chapter.

The "Walking Bomb"

For queer Koreans and PLWHA, navigating the 2015 MERS-CoV outbreak was as familiar as it was spectacular. Queer and HIV/AIDS activists contend that the acts of exclusion discussed above adversely affect the quality of life of queer people and PLWHA. In mid-July 2015, after both the 2015 Korean Queer Culture Festival and the decline of MERS-CoV infections, HIV/AIDS and queer activists gathered for the public forum "MERS and Human Rights." The event took place at a local human rights organization's office and included presentations and commentaries from 12 activists and public health professionals. Presentation topics included critiques of the government's handling of the MERS outbreak, treatment of MERS patients, the prevalence of stigmas the government and medical centers place on diseases and infected peoples, and the effect MERS had on the 2015 Korean Queer Culture Festival.

One of the speakers at this event, Kwŏn Mi-ran (2015, 2), an HIV/AIDS activist, described citizens' fears and uncertainty in the wake of the 2015 MERS-CoV outbreak before stating that this situation is "usually scary" and "familiar to HIV-infected people":

> HIV-infected persons have been reported to the Centers for Disease Control … they are regularly contacted, tracked, quarantined, punished for sexual acts without condoms, AIDS tests have been requested [or required], and for foreigners, if they test positive, they have been forced to leave the country to prevent AIDS. An HIV-infected person is likened to a "walking bomb."

Kwŏn (2015, 2) compares the familiar social and medical experiences of PLWHA with the "isolation, epidemiological investigations, lies, punishment, pest control, [and] tracing" of both MERS and suspected MERS patients. Kwŏn's point is not only that the epidemiological response of the MERS-CoV and HIV are similar but that the treatment and stigmas of suspected patients overlaps with experiences of PLWHA. Her analogy of the "walking bomb" is poignant, apropos of bomb metaphors used in recent years to describe pandemic influenza in the United States (Caduff 2015) and the materiality of landmines that once saturated the Demilitarized Zone separating North and South Korea following the Korean War (Kim 2016). The "walking bomb" implies that HIV-positive people are thought to be biosecurity threats: they can devastate those close by (in close physical and social proximity) while also threaten at a distance with both collateral damage and in its mobility (a *walking* bomb). As a bomb, their telos is to explode; their destiny is to destroy themselves and everyone around them. Their danger necessitates their treatment, much in the same way the MERS-CoV and patients are considered threats in need of regulation and isolation.

But the public knew so little about MERS at the time. People knew of MERS but did not know much beyond that because of the lack of government information sharing during the MERS-CoV outbreak. Rumors thus spread, like the supposed MERS-AIDS "super virus," and the media dubbed these rumors "ghost stories" given that they are meant to scare people rather than properly inform the public with facts (Pak 2015; Yonhap 2015). There were also rumors regarding preventative measures, such as the rumor that onions and salt can absorb the MERS-CoV so one should place these in a room to decrease the possibility of infection (Pak 2015). But the ghost story of the so-called "super virus" only intensifies Kwŏn's (2015, 2) "walking bomb" metaphor, tied also to the cleanliness of hospitals. Kwŏn (2015, 3) explained that a few years prior at Severance Hospital there was a sign that read "our

hospital is an AIDS-clean area." The focus on cleanliness is important, for, as Kwŏn rhetorically asks, "who wants to be a source of pollution?" Asked another way, who wants to be a "walking bomb"?

Activists, though, continue to draw attention to how being HIV-positive is now a chronic condition in Korea, as in most industrialized countries. Medical advances in antiretroviral therapy since the mid-90s have reduced AIDS-related deaths, and the more recent development of preexposure prophylaxis (PrEP) allows for the prevention of HIV transmission to HIV-negative individuals. These developments have also led to high enough viral suppression to make HIV undetectable, leading to the 2017 "undetectable = untransmittable" global campaign. PrEP was approved by South Korea's Ministry of Food and Drug Safety in 2017. However, even though an HIV undetectable status is possible, this goes unacknowledged in Korea. Any viral presence marks the body because it is incurable: "when bodies are pronounced 'incurable,' they are read as being in a condition of a 'nonlife'—without a future and denied meaning in the present" (Kim 2017, 7). Curability instantiates a confluence of temporalities that look to the past as a means to correct the present and propel the body into the promise of a cured future (Venkat 2016, 2018); cure as "restoration" implies embodied damage wholly contained in an individual's "own ecosystem," that the "original state of being" is superior, and thus aims to restore the present self to a former state of being in the future (Clare 2017, 15).

Viral incurability, especially HIV incurability, also encompasses a different set of concerns and experiences that mark the body as an active agent in the destruction of life. The neoliberalization of health care may place the burden of illness at the feet of the individual's "carelessness," but presenters alluded to the intentionality assumed in the infected. PLWHA and queer people are perceived as willfully recalcitrant, even truculent, to the Korean family and consanguine kinship system. Yet the metaphor of the walking bomb demonstrates that PLWHA and, by extension, queer people are assumed to be using their bodies as weapons to attack, corrupt, and destroy life in Korea.[83] Viral incurability could thus be likened to Elizabeth Povinelli's (2016, 19) figure of the virus as diagnostic and symptomatic of geontopower—an analytic to understand late liberalism's management between life and nonlife—for the virus is "an active antagonistic agent" that disrupts divisions or "arrangements" of life and nonlife. Povinelli likens the virus to the zombie, "the aggressive rotting undead against the last

redoubt of Life," as the virus exists between life and nonlife. Even as a figure, though, the virus must always rely on a host, especially if the virus is to be interpreted with intent and as active. As a human–virus hybrid in particular, viruses within the human genome, what Theresa MacPhail (2004, 340) terms the viral gene, "represent non-life with the potential of becoming life." Potentiality is a source of danger and threat, as I have examined above, because that "becoming" is uncertain, but, as I explore below, "becoming life" or becoming person are intentional processes and social justice tools for activists.

Living Together With

The violence of the cure, Eunjung Kim (2017) demonstrates, in part emerges from the present existence the cure seeks to displace: the process of *becoming* cured is inconsequential to *being* cured in the future. This was a point that activists rallied around, that the experience of MERS-CoV patients from the moment of infection to the moment of their cure (or being virus-free) is ignored because the supposed greater good is being cured. But what of life *with* the virus? As Kwŏn (2015, 4) boldly states, "The MERS response was unsuccessful if MERS patients were cured but not relieved or encouraged." The uncertainty surrounding the MERS-CoV outbreak precipitated containment; suspected patients were quarantined and isolated with no outside contact. Students avoided school, employees stayed home from work, and large gatherings were advised to disperse. Self-imposed isolation became a theme for MERS, but it also became representative of social relations at the time. People were avoiding each other for fear of possible infection. Human networks and interactions became perceived as what Wald (2008, 4) calls a "conduit of viral destruction."

The temporary experiences of those living with the MERS-CoV, activists contended, is a protracted experience for PLWHA: the MERS-CoV outbreak became an opportunity to elucidate a different kind of living, one that involves the person, the virus, and human interaction. This way of living pivots on Kwŏn's (2015, 4) admission that the goal for countries seeking to keep their citizens healthy and safe should *not* be a clean or pure geographic area (*chŏngjŏng chiyŏk*) because that is impossible. Instead, "prevention of infectious diseases gains strength when it comes to finding and implementing a way to *live together*, rather than setting the infected person and non-infected person at

opposite points [or sides]" (ibid., my emphasis). If absolute cleanliness and purity are impossibilities, then, for Kwŏn, public health institutions and the general public need to learn how to grapple with that fact, incorporating the perspectives and lives of infected as quintessential to health care and sociality more broadly. Kwŏn's statement of finding a way to live together is linguistically multiscalar—to live (*salta*) denotes biological existence and living, to dwell or reside, to populate, and to inhabit—while also being spatially ambiguous. Living together need not be indicative only of physical proximity but social closeness as well.

Although the activist presenters at the forum spoke of necessary reforms within hospitals, public health institutions, and the broader Korean society, they must contend with the politically influential anti-LGBT organizations seeking to defund HIV/AIDS organizations and subsidies—the same churches and organizations that spread rumors of the supposed AIDS–MERS "super virus"—and conservative president Park Geun-hye's administration's willingness to oblige. The more immediate audience and subsequent impact was thus the activist and queer communities, represented by those in attendance. The forum facilitated nuanced and, for some, novel approaches to HIV/AIDS and the treatment of PLWHA, particularly within their own communities. The isolation and containment activists critiqued throughout the forum resonate with how PLWHA are treated within queer and even activist organizations. Stigmatization within queer communities and organizations emerges from the broader social stigmas and discrimination discussed above, as the decades of being told that HIV is dirty, deadly, and destructive—and that queer folks are the nexus of this threat—embeds within queer communities and experiences.[84]

For instance, from my time as a graduate student in Korea to my time with activists, I witnessed as some queer men would disappear from groups and organizations and never return. Some activists explained that, when friends stopped attending events, they were often sick but did not return because they believed people in the organization would joke that they had AIDS. They would stop attending the meetings and events to avoid questions of their absence and the stigma of *potentially* being HIV-positive. Stories like these build on nearly 25 years of stigmatization of HIV/AIDS and PLWHA in Korea's queer community.

I first learned about Jin-min long before I actually met them, a common experience in my time with queer activists: I often read their writ-

ings, saw their social media posts, and heard about them from other activists before I met some of the older queer activists. Jin-min is a longtime activist who had many stories to share. Every time I saw them at an event, they would smile and say, "you should really interview me," to which I would reply, "anytime." But Jin-min, easily the most generous activist I met, was busy, and finding time proved difficult. We eventually found a time that worked, and so I made my way to their office in spring 2016 for a conversation. During that interview, they told me about their friend. "It used to be that when someone would disappear [from the community], people would joke that he had AIDS … so when [my friend] had disappeared for a while, people started to worry [that he had AIDS]." Jin-min even explained that this "joke" was simultaneously a fear that queer men had/have—other activists, as noted above, confirmed that such a joke/fear still existed—as it meant that HIV was close, both socially and physically. Yet the MERS-CoV outbreak provides a radically heightened landscape to address these issues. The stories of PLWHA avoiding work bridges the short-term concerns over isolation during epidemics with the long-term (potential) trauma of being HIV-positive. This trauma also emerges in the other stories of queer men "disappearing" from queer organizations. Both sets of stories demonstrate that some queer folks internalize stigmas so that they disappear from the community because it is expected of them. They cut off ties, isolate themselves, and reduce themselves to what public health institutions, the general public, and their own community believe them to already be: a threat.

The forum and the MERS-CoV outbreak were thus opportunities for activists and queer communities to confront their own biases, presented with an intensified form of containment stigmatization and procedures that PLWHA must navigate daily. Yet they were also presented with a solution to the perceived inhumane treatment of those infected with the MERS-CoV and PLWHA: find ways to live together with each other and the virus because absolute cleanliness and purity are impossible. In other words, those in attendance were confronting the fictionalization of purity—the violence that manifests in that narrative—and working toward a method of cohabitation that more closely resembles lived reality. Living together, in its multiple iterations, simultaneously transforms the infected body from threat to person as the key mechanism of threat-making—the virus—is no longer a marker of destruction and incurability but part of the human experience. As

Kwŏn (2015, 4) declares, "HIV, in particular, affects the closest human relationships, such as love, childbirth, and childcare, because it can be transmitted through blood, semen, vaginal secretions, and breast milk. If so, is it right to tell people not to love and give birth to HIV-infected people?" The implication is that the person is not reducible to the virus, nor should the virus deter equal treatment of the person. Yet it also denotes that the person is comprised of, even molded by, their relationship with the virus.

Heightened and intensified during the MERS-CoV outbreak, the emphasis on *persons* living with viruses has been evident in broader HIV/AIDS activism over the last decade. In 2013, the organization Solidarity for LGBT Human Rights of Korea published an educational program book entitled *RECIPE: The AIDS Salon*. An early part of the book details a workshop plan that focuses on the stigmas attached to PLWHA and the experiences being HIV-positive. The way those who wrote this book titled an early section of the book—"Nanŭn HIV/AIDS wa hamkke sara ganŭn 'han saram' imnida"—is interesting (2013, 19). The Korean title also has an English title attached, "I AM 'a Person' Living with HIV/AIDS," and focuses on teaching participants about life as an HIV-positive person through documentaries, case studies, and discussion. The English translation is slightly off, for it would be better translated as: I am a person, or one person (*han saram*), *living together with* HIV/AIDS. The difference here matters because this is not how activists or HIV-positive people traditionally refer to PLWHA or themselves. The more common way to refer to PLWHA is to either state that one is HIV-positive (*HIV yangsŏng ida*) or that one is infected (*kamyŏmin*), both of which also appear throughout the program book.[85] For the authors to forgo common nomenclature for a more descriptive statement is to reformulate consideration of the individual as more than "infected." Declaring "I AM" is the quintessential starting point in asserting that the individual is living and a person (rather than dead or a nonlife). For, as Achille Mbembe (2019, 156) posits of the autobiography as some of the first Afro-American writings, "is not saying 'I' the first of all spoken words by which humans seek to make themselves exist as such?" Given that "a person" is in quotations in both the Korean and English translation it engenders speculation as to what constitutes this person; it is not necessarily a stable category or construct. The phrase "living together with," then, linguistically enjoins the subject "I" with HIV/AIDS and forges a rela-

tionship between the individual and the virus. In this configuration, they are not separate but exist in the same body and person: a person that lives together with a virus as a human–virus hybrid.

This emergent conceptualization of subjectivity (or, even, personhood) represented in the *han saram* and living together (with peoples and viruses) counters the presumed purity of the Korean person, that to be Korean is to somehow be biologically, ethnically, and culturally pure. Activists assert that the han saram is not fractured or damaged; it is as much a Korean person as any other, because not only is purity impossible but the person, like the virus, is an ever-evolving set of entanglements and relations. Queer and HIV/AIDS activists' focus on proximity and relationality during this epidemic addressed the physical and emotional isolation many felt at the time, while remembering the loneliness and stigmatized experiences of PLWHA and those queer individuals who disappear from public spaces. Living together thus operates by not only reorienting the fear and danger of proximity within biosecurity toward patient- and care-centered approaches to infectious diseases but by fostering potentially transformative relations between humans and between humans and viruses. Doing so challenges the threat-making mechanisms discussed before with a model of subjectivity.

Social relations and living together continue to be crucial for HIV/AIDS activism, for, when I asked other individuals involved in HIV/AIDS activism how they became involved in this activism, they responded that "good friends who were HIV-positive" asked them to get involved. They explained that their friends felt isolated and lonely, remarking they always emphasized the necessity of social relations in their activism. Recall also Jin-min's remarks about the joke surrounding their good friend disappearing from the queer organization; such experiences are what propelled Jin-min forward in their own activism. Similarly, the queer and HIV/AIDS activist Chŏng Yol (2011, 187–92) writes in his autobiography that it was his friendship with HIV/AIDS activist and author Gabriel Yoon that taught him "hope" and provided him the encouragement to fight harder, fight longer, and fight *together*.[86]

On Solidarity and Relationality

The focus on social relations and living together equally manifests in activist and community groups. Organizations such as KNP+, the Korean HIV/AIDS Patients' Association, have not only counseling services and support groups but regular trips that facilitate gatherings of PLWHA—particularly those with little offline meeting experience—to ward off loneliness by socializing and visiting mountains and beaches. These programs and services attempt to materialize the notion of living together with other PLWHA and with HIV, one's status not deterring one from activities and social gatherings. More HIV/AIDS organizations have emerged, and more younger queer people have involved themselves in queer and HIV/AIDS activism. Attention to HIV stigmatization, the experiences of PLWHA, and navigating ways of living together continue to expand and diversify. HIV stigmatization still exists within queer communities, and attempts to foster relationality sometimes fail, especially as homophobia and discrimination continue to inundate Korean society and seep into queer communities.

An important organization that works to foster relationality with PLWHA and, more broadly, render the queer threat back into a person is PFLAG Korea, an organization that began as an incubation program with another activist organization in 2014.[87] As a former member of PFLAG Korea, Kyŏng-tae, explained in English, PFLAG Korea is:

> the most Korean LGBT organization out there. Because like any other Asian countr[y], people value traditional family and its values. So amidst … this social climate, parent activists can be powerful and versatile for both [the] LGBT community and non-LGBT people who prioritize traditional values. Queer people yearn for positive family coming out feedback or experiences, and straight people listen at least to parents about how they co-exist and accept queer people in their families.

For Kyŏng-tae, PFLAG Korea pivots on challenging and even upending the values of "traditional family" by appealing to nonqueer people's valuation of family. Both challenging and reifying the value of family contributes to the organization's versatility, for, as Kyŏng-tae also notes about PFLAG Korea's goal and their future, it is its aim to "be a versatile LGBT organization by comforting and reaching out to the community and speak up to the world outside the community and

show people those parents have changed so far, and so can you." Here versatility represents both the inward direction PFLAG parents orient toward queer communities and the outward pivot to showcase not only parents who love their queer (and trans) children but also families that incorporate those children. PFLAG Korea has also stressed in press conferences, workshops, and regular meetings that families must not exclude PLWHA and that parents of PLWHA should offer support to their children.[88]

These parents provide a powerful counternarrative to the more dominant homophobia and transphobia that circulate through Korea, particularly because theirs is rooted in the same idiom of family that others use against queer Koreans. It also counteracts the assumptions discussed above that queer bodies, presumed to be infected with HIV, are threats to the purity of the Korean family. During the June 2016 Korean Queer Culture Festival, for instance, some of the mothers stood in front of their booth with signs that said, "free hugs" and "I love you just the way you are" (*nŏl innŭn kŭdaero sarang handa*). Festivalgoers were in tears as they fully embraced the cheerful mothers, each no longer strangers but affectively connected in a bond for which they both yearned. These mothers are transgressing the biopolitical boundaries that separate the general population from the queer subpopulation, as embrace is a way to contest assumptions that queer folks are vectors of disease.

These constitute acts of "solidarity" (*yŏndae*), according to Kyŏngtae, who on one level describes solidarity as a type of empathy—"standing by with people who are feeling pain or having problem[s], and consider those hardships as if it's mine"—while also recognizing the importance of *relationality*: "solidarity is all about caring, listening to others, and not ignoring their voices, all because their rights are my rights, and their pain is mine too." The organization holds monthly meetings where parents (and some queer children) share stories about "coming out," either as a queer child or as a parent narrating when their queer child came out. Practices such as these involve creating spaces to share in addition to sharing stories and thus affectively connecting with one another. Solidarity expands and transforms at different levels, but the empathetic constant foundational to solidarity remains unchanged. PFLAG Korea's solidarity works to dismantle a widely circulated narrative that queer Koreans are destroying families, a biopolitical account that further separates queer Koreans from the general

population. In Chapter 1, I told the story of standing outside the Constitutional Court while the self-identified mother of a "young male child" claimed that the military's anti-sodomy clause must remain in place "for the sake of national security." The mobilization of one's status as a parent, along with the physical mobilization of children at such anti-LGBT events, is common. The parents of PFLAG Korea use a similar strategy, as they refer to themselves as a "mother of a lesbian daughter" or "father of a gay son."

Naming matters, but so do the stories. The stories that both parents and children share humanize queer individuals and PLWHA. When a dominant narrative in Korea is that these individuals are disruptions, that their practices endanger national security, and that their bodies harbor deadly viruses that pose a public health risk to the entire population, queer subjectivity is defined through vectors, nodes, corporeal threats. They are people in the sense that the vector is a living human (and not, say, a bird or a bomb, though comparisons are made). Yet they embody a disposable subjectivity, harbingers of insecurity. Stories that humanize, that tell of the vulnerability of being queer or PLWHA, especially from the perspective of parents, thus work to counteract the narratives of their danger and disposability. These stories work to upend the banality of security through solidarity and social relations.

Sharing stories forms affective bonds that have the power to rectify the radical isolationism brought on by the experience of being queer or PLWHA in Korea. For parents and children to gather every month and share stories about their experiences has a similar effect to the mothers at the Korean Queer Culture Festival providing hugs to all who want them. On one hand, the sharing of stories and hugs are about acceptance; parents—here installing themselves as icons of Korean parents writ large—accept these queer children and PLWHA, even if the children's *own* parents do not. Yet, on the other hand, what is built in those moments between these people exceeds both these moments and the concept of acceptance. It is the formulation of a new subpopulation: not just sexual minorities but a population defined by their rejection of heterosexual reproduction as quintessential to the polity (Edelman 2004). This truly is, then, a *queer* population. If, as I argue, stories and solidarity build relationality that then works to rectify radical isolationism, then bodies together, working together, sharing stories, is the most fundamental practice of relationality. These practices, be they intentional or not, work to stitch people back together through the

family. Rather than forming what Kath Weston (1991) famously called "chosen families" between members, these practices rewrite the very terms of family in Korea as heteronormative and patriarchal, seeking "new ways of being in the world" along with "the courage and sustenance to act where there are no charters" (Lorde 1984, 111).

Something Else

The MERS-CoV outbreak intensified the rapid disintegration of social relations through containment and quarantine procedures, but, for queer Korean and PLWHA in even more precarious and relationally tenuous positions, responses to the outbreak separated their bodies from their sense of self, their personhood. They were no longer persons in need of care; they were potential hosts and vectors in need of containment, overlaying existing structures of isolation and "ontological aloneness" (Lester 2013, 754). The 2020 Covid-19 global pandemic facilitated an even more widespread and public targeting of queer bodies as viral vectors and biosecurity threats given the May 2020 outbreak of the virus in gay bars and clubs in the district of Itaewon. Rather than mobilizing an absurd claim of a supposed "super virus," many blamed the then-recent May 2020 outbreak on queer people because it was happening in reported gay bars and clubs, as discussed in the previous chapter. Proximity was again the problem but, to assuage further outbreak and uncontrollable escalation of viral dissemination, public health officials needed to identify and test thousands of queer people. Yet the media had already reported that the outbreak was in queer spaces—they already equated queerness to yet another virus—and so many queer Koreans were understandably scared more of the social and economic repercussions of getting tested than the virus itself. As I explored in the previous chapter, many queer Koreans feared that they would lose their jobs, that they would be socially ostracized, if they even got tested (let alone tested positive). In the context of the MERS-CoV outbreak and security-driven homophobia fostered by banal security, the association of queer bodies to (another) coronavirus is more than blaming a group for a recent cluster of infections. It is deliberately targeting already-marginalized, already-targeted peoples and bodies as security threats.

However, queer activists acted. They formed Queer Action Against Covid-19 to respond with policy recommendations, protests, press

conferences, counseling services, and information on testing. Even in these initial and reactive modes of action, queer activists looked toward the power of sociality and relationality as key interventions in the security-driven homophobia then saturating the coronavirus pandemic. Fostering social relations during public health crises and through biosecurity landscapes is an exercise in social justice, a transformative endeavor that opens new avenues of relationality and entanglements. But this is an ongoing discursive and material process, found in the work of the growing number of HIV/AIDS organizations to forge relations between PLWHA and between HIV-positive persons and queer communities. However, the process of fostering social relations and thus reformulating corporeal threats into people pivots on activists' interpretation and treatment of HIV and viruses more broadly. Rather than focusing on the elimination of viruses and purification of the population, ideologies and practices that drive biosecurity and typical social response to viruses, activists query what it means for people to *live together with* HIV. This cohabitation and coexistence often lead to isolation and stigmatization, but rectifying those stigmas results from telling different stories about HIV.

Two years after the MERS-CoV outbreak, Na Yŏng-chŏng (2017) reflected on queer and feminist politics in a moment of expanding precarity and isolation. Na writes about the ways recent metaphors of "contamination" (*oyŏm*) and "dirt" (*tŏrŏum*) have been used against queer people. Na (2017, 103) notes that "these days I feel that in order to fight against hatred, paradoxically, we need to actively consider these words and carry them with us." Dwelling on these metaphors and words, Na writes, brings with it both pain and strength, feelings that can be mobilized in a collective effort to work against the very hatred that spurred such language. This "reappropriation" of language, to invoke Judith Butler (1997, 161), demonstrates "the vulnerability of these sullied terms to an unexpected innocence; such terms are not property; they assume a life and a purpose for which they were never intended … and this will be a politics of both hope and anxiety, what Foucault termed 'a politics of discomfort.'" Read against a backdrop of the MERS-CoV outbreak and the continued stigmatization of PLWHA, contamination and dirt are more than just metaphors for queer bodies; they are biosecurity categories of threat. Inhabiting these categories is equal parts emotional and physical precarity, a move

from isolation to proximity that is not only emotionally draining but physically dangerous.

To inhabit these categories, as Na (2017) proffers, or to consider life with viruses, as per Kwŏn's (2015) suggestion, is dangerous not because they foreclose productivity or even life. They are dangerous because *what* they produce, and the life as seen through the human–virus hybrid challenges, even rescripts social and cultural order. This is Douglas's (1966, 196) observation with regard to dirt: It has the possibility to be creative and transform the system and mechanisms immanent in what a culture considers "dirt" and "purity." Yet purity always falls short because our most fundamental object of knowledge, the human body, is already a hijacked hybrid (Sagan 2013). The human–virus hybrid is less a declaration of a new iteration of embodiment and more a social commentary on a biological fact: the human body is filled with viruses, foreign bacteria, and microbes that have microbiologists reformulating the very categories of human and life. Even Kwŏn (2015) makes the analogous point that clean or pure geographical areas are an impossibility. More immediate, the human–virus hybrid produces relations and a concept of living—both as biological existence and livelihood—that disrupts kinship idioms, consanguine purity, and sexuality. Queer and HIV/AIDS activists' work represents new directions in relationality in Korea; "living together with" implies not only a relationship between the two parties involved, say human and virus, but it posits a unit that then experiences the world as that hybrid being. All other (social) interactions thus incorporate that hybridity and transform into something else.

CHAPTER 5

The Terrorism Zeitgeist

T'ae-yŏn and I left her office to grab dinner before she had a queer activist meeting in March 2016. I first met T'ae-yŏn, a queer activist in her mid-30s, the day I first visited her organization as she was running a new member meeting. I remember walking into the office, nervous as to how people would respond, but Sŭng-min—a younger queer activist I met earlier—encouraged me to visit the organization. While Sŭng-min did not arrive until halfway through the meeting—smiling briefly when I waved—I sat at a back table next to other new members and began chatting. After all the years, I still remember how uncomfortable and awkward the chairs in the office were, an ugly color that could fold and stack against the wall when not in use. On that day in March 2016, we settled on the *ttŏkpokki* (spicy rice cakes) place around the corner, so we made haste. Yet, once outside, we noticed a banner (Figure 5) hanging across the street from the office. We were less than a month away from the 2016 South Korean National Assembly elections, and so it was common to see banners for different political parties hanging throughout the city. I turned to T'ae-yŏn, curious about its proximity to the office, and asked, "Do you think they hung this because the office is right here?" She responded, equally confounded, "I don't know if they even know where the office is." We found one or two more of the same banners in the neighborhood while walking to get dinner before returning to the office. We told Sŭng-min about the banners and he said that someone had put the same banner near other queer organization and activist offices in Seoul. I could not help but be even more suspicious of their placement. These banners are products of the newly formed Christian Party (Kidoktang), which is opposed to: the lack of regulation regarding sex advertisements online, an antidiscrimination

Figure 5: Christian Party Platform. The Christian Party erected a banner in March 2016. The banner lists all of the things that the Christian Party opposes: "Islamic terrorism" (ISIS), lack of regulation regarding sex advertisements online, the establishment of a halal production factory, antidiscrimination law, the legalization of homosexuality, legality of prostitution from the age of 13, and the legalization of homosexuality in the military.
Photo: author.

law, the legalization of homosexuality, legality of prostitution from the age of 13, the legalization of homosexuality in the military, "Islamic terrorism" (ISIS), and the establishment of a halal production factory in South Korea.

For the remaining short election cycle, I saw variations of the above banner throughout Seoul, in blog posts online, and invoked by major politicians in both ruling and opposition parties. The majority focused on an opposition to both homosexuality *and* Islam, usually subsumed by "Islamic terrorism" (ISIS) and halal markets. Buried in this association is the implication that both homosexuals and Muslims—homosexuality and so-called "Islamic terrorism"—are national security

threats. By the time of the 2016 National Assembly elections, the same anti-LGBT organizations and politicians that raised the call in opposition to homosexuality and Islam had already claimed that homosexuals were biosecurity threats housing "super viruses" and that homosexuals erode national defense while serving in the military. These claims were not exclusive to ultraconservatives, the Protestant right, or anti-LGBT organizations, as the Korean government and courts made analogous claims. Therefore, the joint opposition to homosexuality and Islam is more than the imagining of a good Christian nation; it is the instantiation of national security relationality concealed within claims of ethnicity, culture, and nation.

This final chapter details the emergence of the terrorism zeitgeist and constitutive relationality of homosexuality and Islam as national security threats, rooted in liberal promises of multiculturalism and sociopolitical realities of ethnic nationalism. Foundational to this emergence is the simultaneous rise of Islamophobia. The November 14, 2015, ISIS attacks in Paris spurred a response by former president Park Geun-hye and the ruling conservative party (Liberty Korea Party). The Paris attacks occurred within one day of a large-scale labor protest in downtown Seoul that resulted in several protesters being jailed and one dying at the hands of a police water cannon (see Chapter 2). In response, Park claimed that the Paris attacks required renewed vigilance as so-called "Islamic terrorism" was knocking on their door and these protests made Korea woefully unprepared for a potential attack. At the end of 2015, the Liberty Korea Party proposed an Anti-Terrorism Act to prepare South Korea against the encroaching reach of "Islamic terrorism" by giving national security institutions more authority *within* the country.

I contend, however, that the emergence of the terrorism zeitgeist—a forward-looking ideology and set of practices that must preemptively "fabricate, organize, and plan a milieu" (Foucault 2007, 21)—must be understood as a technology of the neoliberal security state alongside the context of homophobia. How did Islam and homosexuality get haphazardly thrown together in not only the Christian Party platform but in several other platforms, speeches, blog posts, and discourses during and after the 2016 National Assembly election? These political parties, protesters, and politicians do not believe that Islam and homosexuality are the same, that all Muslims are queer, or that Islam as a religion is predisposed to homosexuality. Rather, both occupy similar conceptual

spaces of national security: both are perceived as threats because they cannot configure within the ethnonationalist ideologies of "Korean culture." As I demonstrate below, queer Koreans exist as "inside outsiders" to culture, while Muslims occupy an "outside outsider" position. National security is an ideology and practice that operates through exclusion and difference; the North Korean other, as discussed in the first chapter, is a specter that targets (or possesses) political, economic, and social difference thought detrimental to Korea's development. As tensions have routinized between the North and South over the past two decades, and the fear the North Korean other once held over the population begins to wan, new vehicles of fear and uncertainty emerge, be that a virus, terrorists, or homosexuals.[89] The terrorism zeitgeist is thus in part opportunistic, "Islamic terrorism" a scapegoat for quelling political dissent while mobilizing this perceived threat to shine a light inside the nation's margins at queer Koreans. Yet, rather than mobilizing the North Korean other to remind citizens of the devastation of the Korean War and potential for future devastation, the terrorism zeitgeist acts as a temporal slingshot into a future where threat is "pure potential" (Masco 2014).

The Terrorism Zeitgeist

As the HIV/AIDS activist meeting I attended was wrapping up, the physical and mental exhaustion began to set in. I could not bring myself to stay after the meeting for the standard after-meeting party (*twip'uri*), but, unbeknownst to me, the other activists had already settled on an activity for the twip'uri. While we would often go to a nearby restaurant after a meeting, on this particularly cold Tuesday in February 2016 the activists in attendance decided to eat fried chicken while watching the now-infamous National Assembly filibuster on television at their office. I decided to head home, but on the bus I saw online that one of the activists in attendance had posted a picture of activists watching the filibuster, and, besides the pang of regret at not staying, I thought about the act of watching this filibuster. Many Korean citizens went to observe the eight-day filibuster at the National Assembly that attempted to stop a vote on and passage of the controversial Anti-Terrorism Act. I also found myself yearning to *watch* the filibuster, not because it was history-making (which it was, as the longest filibuster in Korean history) but because my queer interlocutors considered it a

form of modern-day political protest to both participate in and construct counterpublics online by watching the filibuster.

Former president Park Geun-hye's ruling conservative party proposed the Anti-Terrorism Act (the Act on Anti-Terrorism for the Protection of Citizens and Public Security) at the end of 2015, the act eventually passing on March 3, 2016, despite the 192-hour filibuster. The act significantly expands the authority and reach of the National Intelligence Service (NIS), the primary intelligence and national security apparatus in South Korea, by allowing it to wiretap communications, examine financial transactions, and heighten forms of surveillance without a warrant.[90] The breadth of new powers given to the NIS equate the Anti-Terrorism Bill to the US Patriot Act, passed in October 2001 following the September 11, 2001, attacks. Much of this "new" authority is not all that new, given that the government has been cooperating with different mobile carriers and online communications media to collect data on its own citizens for some time (Kim 2015).[91]

The ruling party's proposal was motivated by the November 14, 2015, ISIS attacks in Paris and gained particular traction in January 2016 following an ISIS attack in Jakarta that injured a South Korean tourist (Shin 2016; BBC News 2016). During a National Assembly session discussing the proposed bill, the NIS revealed that seven workers who had been deported since 2010 had reportedly joined ISIS, and, coupled with the Jakarta case, the former vice foreign minister Cho Tae-yul believed that "the passage of antiterrorism bills is now even more vital given the possibilities for a spread of terror threats to East Asia" (Shin 2016). The NIS, the former vice foreign minister, and the ruling party all recognized a changing global security landscape, one not necessarily new but now becoming relevant to South Korea given the proximity to the "spread of terror threats to East Asia." Since the passage of the 1948 National Security Act, the primary national security threat had always been North Korea. They were the specter thought to bring about potential peninsular destruction, and thus an entire social and cultural zeitgeist organized around anticommunism. While in 1988 the US government classified North Korea as a state sponsor of terror, it eventually removed the country from that list in 2008 (Goedde and Kim 2017). South Korea primarily referred to North Korea through the language of the National Security Act and anticommunism in how it interpreted acts like the Korean Air Flight 858 bombing in 1987 and assassination attempts on the former author-

itarian leaders Park Chung-hee and Chun Doo-hwan. However, the use of "terrorism" (*t'erŏrijŭm*), borrowed from English, increased significantly following September 11, 2001, to mark specifically "Muslim terrorists" (ibid.).

The national security threat is no longer solely North Korea but now includes a ubiquitous, existential, and hard-to-define terrorist threat:

> while the definition of terrorism under the *Anti-Terrorism Act* seemingly focuses on the Islamic State and other Muslim extremists, textual ambiguities, legal loopholes, and public distrust against the National Intelligence Service have raised fears of discretionary, broad surveillance against the general South Korean populace and unnecessary targeting of innocent migrants and asylum-seekers. (Goedde and Kim 2017, 68)

The vagueness of "terrorism," again, is not entirely new in Korea, and "targeting legitimate threats to the state" does not erase state violence and the marginalization of vulnerable populations that is quintessential to the security state (Fattig 2016). Terrorism, though perceived as an existential threat, still indexes the racialized Muslim other. In the wake of the November 14, 2015, Paris attacks, former president Park conjured fears surrounding the "extremists of the Islamic State (IS) group" and their proclivity to "hide their faces" to forcefully suggest that "we should ban demonstrators from wearing mask[s] in the future" (Yi 2015). Park warned that "'terrorist elements' may infiltrate demonstrations" (*The Straits Times* 2015), and the ruling conservative party went so far as to introduce legislation that would make it illegal to "cover one's face during a demonstration" (Park and Song 2015).

The fear shared by opposition parties and many Koreans is that "terrorism" will be co-opted by the NIS and the ruling conservative government the way the former authoritarian regimes used the fear of communism and the North Korean other to violently control the population. As Patricia Goedde and Weonwu Kim (2017, 68) write of the conception of terrorism in the wake of the Anti-Terrorism Act, "contemporary terrorism discourse has become a political expedient to give more power to the state to control threats not just from Muslim terrorists and the North Korean state but also, by extension, foreigners with Muslim backgrounds and protesting citizens painted as pro-North." The Anti-Terrorism Act and the fervor surrounding terror-

ism may have responded to particular acts of terrorism but they were opportunistic for a besieged president criticized for her draconian crackdown on protests, assemblies, and other civil liberties. Therefore, opposition parties (Democratic Party of Korea, People's Party, and Justice Party) began the eight-day filibuster to protest this bill.

With the passage of the Anti-Terrorism Act, and the emergence of the terrorism zeitgeist in South Korea, "threat (as pure potential) is used to enable a radically active and ever emerging counterterror state, allowing action to be favored over restraint, possibilities over capabilities, hypotheticals over knowledge" (Masco 2014, 17). The practices and technologies of the terrorism zeitgeist are not altogether new. South Korea already had a well-oiled national security machine curtailing civil liberties in the name of national defense, safety, and interest, but the routinization and subsequent waning of fear surrounding North Korea precipitated the need for identifying new threats. The ubiquity and indiscriminate nature of terrorism now justifies the seeming ubiquity and indiscriminate practices of national and global security.

However, security practices have never been indiscriminate. Cultural discourse of terrorism is racially marked, and this is the case now also in Korea, and thus specific racialized bodies generate an entire apparatus of counterterrorism. The authoritarian security practices from the 1960s to 1980s used the threat of communism and the North Korean other to specifically target opposition to the authoritarian government, namely laborers and students. In many ways, security has always been an opportunistic discourse and practice as it allows states to justify violence against specific, often marginalized populations through the logic of state and national security.

Yet the veil of secrecy surrounding national security technologies, practices, and analysis—especially in the contemporary moment with a focus on the ubiquity of the terrorist threat—makes it both out-of-sight-out-of-mind and doubly dangerous. The intensity with which queer activists watched the filibuster illustrates that the technological ability to bring threats into relation with one another in ways that were simply not possible during the authoritarian years renders an even greater sense of precarity and uncertainty for not only queer peoples but all minority populations. Part of this uncertainty lies in the citizen's inability to precisely know how objects are brought together, the algorithms used to instantiate relationality and define the threat. As

members and other queer people would discover only a month later, they now posed a threat akin to Islam and terrorism.

Islamophobia in a Multicultural Korea

April 13, 2016, was election day: queer activists had much riding on this National Assembly election. Various activists and organizations formed the collective "Rainbow Vote" to encourage gender and sexual minorities to register to vote while also educating them on the different policies and standpoints of the politicians.[92] Queer activists and Rainbow Vote volunteers feared that the Christian Liberty Party (Kidok Chayudang)—different from the Christian Party—would gain enough votes to hold a seat in the National Assembly.[93] While many of the representatives in the National Assembly oppose homosexuality, the Christian Liberty Party's very foundation is antihomosexuality and pro-Christian policies. These policies are not all that new in Korea, but the Christian Liberty Party also infused their platform with Islamophobic positions and images. The end of the eight-day filibuster on March 1 brought serious backlash against liberal party members who participated in the filibuster. They were chastised for delaying a bill for district finalization for the April 13 National Assembly elections. Yet proponents of the Anti-Terrorism Act painted those opposing it—especially those individuals involved in the filibuster—as proterrorism. The rise, then, of anti-Islam posturing by politicians from conservative and liberal parties in the short election cycle spoke to both the fallout of the Anti-Terrorism Act's filibuster and to the terrorism zeitgeist. Partnering opposition to Islam and terrorism with opposition to homosexuality is politically expedient—akin to the "super virus" from Chapter 4—but it also speaks to the relationship of homophobia and Islamophobia and the imagining of South Korea as a good Christian nation.

In recent years, scholars have demonstrated the rise of Islamophobic sentiments in Korea tied specifically to Evangelical theology, building on earlier studies of Korean reception and attitudes toward Muslims and Islam (e.g., Cho et al. 2010; Jeon 2011; Su-wan Kim 2013). Muslims have been living in Korea since the 1950s, a result of Turkey's involvement in the Korean War and subsequent formation of a Korea Muslim Society (Baker 2006). Part of the growth of Islam in Korea was due to the conversion of Korean construction workers in the 1960s and 1970s who worked on construction projects in the Middle East (ibid.).

Eventually, the Korean Central Mosque opened in the Itaewon district in 1976. Currently there are roughly 150,000 Muslims living in Korea (Sung 2016), with 35,000 to 40,000 being ethnically Korean (Baker 2006). More Muslims have been slowly trickling into Korea since the mid-2000s, as not only laborers and family members but tourists wishing to experience the birthplace of the Korean Wave and Korean popular culture (Eum 2017). Earlier studies demonstrate how "Koreans associate Islam with religious fanaticism, brutality, and violence" to the extent that "Muslims became an anonymous mass; Koreans fantasized about, feared, pitied, and ridiculed them" (Eum 2017, 836, 837). As with most of the Western world, the rise in Islamophobia in Korea is tied to a post-September 11, 2001, geopolitical landscape, and thus "Islamophobia in Korean society is similar to that of the West in that Islam is often understood as an isolated, monolithic, and violent political theology, while the internal pluralism of the Islamic world is not acknowledged" (Koo 2018, 166).

The terrorism zeitgeist emerged within a specific set of events surrounding ISIS attacks that hit too close to home for Korea, and thus intensified the Islamophobia slowly creeping through the country. This also paired with a growing concern around the Korean government's interest in the global halal economy, as the Ministry of Agriculture, Food and Rural Affairs' Halal Division, founded in March 2015, exported Korean halal foods to Islamic countries (Eum 2017, 827). As a result, however, "some Koreans became increasingly concerned … these people worry about the influx of Muslims and their religious influence within Korea, as well as possible terrorist attacks" (ibid.). Islamophobia was not fully inculcated in a securitization or military–industrial apparatus before the terrorism zeitgeist took hold. While these studies demonstrate the prevailing stigmatized sentiments of Islam and Muslims in Korea, much of this rhetoric was promulgated by and thus remained tied to Evangelicals. In explicating the ways the Protestant right have marshaled support against Muslims and Islam, Nami Kim (2016, 127) contends that "much of today's racial prejudice and discrimination against people of color in general since the beginning of the cold war period can be construed in relation to the white-over-black racial order." For Kim (2016, 128), this nuances how Protestantism in Korea, "introduced … by Western (white) missionaries … can also be considered a contributing factor for the reinforcement of the US racial ideology" through a Christian education of America as

good and moral coupled with media representations of a white Jesus. Therefore, Muslims' dual threat of religion and racial difference fashion to an Evangelical theology of an ethnically homogenous Korean nation driven by a pure and moral religion.

The emergence of the terrorism zeitgeist must then be charted in tandem with the localized rooting of Islamophobia as driven primarily by Korean Evangelicals and the development of racial and multicultural discourse in Korea, along with global forms of Islamophobia that took hold following September 11, 2001, that are decidedly securitized and which weave through the contemporary US-proffered military–industrial complex. This is currently missing from the literature on Islamophobia in Korea, for, while much of the literature rightly addresses the connections between multiculturalism and the whiteness of Korean Evangelicals, none considers, as I do in this chapter, how current iterations of Islamophobia since 2015 index national security. The invocation of terrorism in recent years works to permanently wed Muslims to terrorist acts of violence. Important, then, is the continued recognition that Islamophobia today, entangled with the liberal and civilizing discourse of multiculturalism, is produced through both a national and global security apparatus, often led by US-driven (or -backed) militarization.

To wit, the image of the good Christian nation that the Christian Liberty Party attempted to promulgate during the 2016 National Assembly Election is not only religiously pure but culturally and ethnically homogenous as well. Complicating this narrative, however, is the growing number of migrant laborers, spouses, and students since the 1980s (Shin 2014), precipitating government language of and policies for "multicultural families" in the mid-2000s (Kim 2009). The emphasis on family within multicultural (*tamunhwa*) discourse emerged specifically from the active recruitment of migrant brides to address the shortage of potential brides in rural Korea (see also Freeman 2011; Kim 2018). Broader attention to the increased migrant presence and government policies on multiculturalism also include migrant laborers, many engaging in jobs Koreans no longer wish to do (Kim 2009). With increased labor migration—including the reproductive labor of migrant brides—multiculturalism discourse itself became a cultural practice and ideology from the mid-2000s, with the Roh Moo-hyun (No Mu-hyŏn) (2003–2008) administration's "multicultural governance," which focused on "the biopolitical governance of the 'mul-

ticultural population' and the disciplining of the 'nonmulticultural population' through their multicultural 'reculturization'" (Jun 2012, 101). These twin projects, Euyryung Jun (2012, 103) argues, inform one another, specifically as "the necessity of resocializing the general population into the virtues of multicultural tolerance and respect actively constituted not only the state interest in securing social harmony—and minimizing social conflicts—but also its ongoing project of self-improvement and development."[94] Tolerance is *not* premised on sameness, akin to liberal equality, but upon difference, "deployed to handle the differences that liberal equality cannot reduce, eliminate, or address" (Brown 2006, 36). Difference remains, incorporated into the body politic and social body, but it stays differentiated, unequal and signaling "the presence of the threatening Other within" (ibid., 27).[95]

Minjeong Kim's (2018, 19) ethnography of Filipina migrant brides in rural Korea contributes a much-needed analysis of race within Korea's multiculturalism discourse, framing multiculturalism as a form of hospitality and gratitude (ibid., 119–20)—migrants ought to feel at home while simultaneously being grateful for what they are being given—but which "ultimately fails to challenge ethnonationalism," instead maintaining "that Koreans are the true owners of the country but 'foreigners' are guests at best." The lack of attention to racial difference and racism, focusing instead on "cultural difference," "maintains the assimilationist illusion that immigrants can overcome differences and discrimination by working toward cultural assimilation" (ibid., 20).

Taken together, multiculturalism is a liberal and neoliberal discourse and practice that not only targets the migrants themselves (Kim 2018) but also, by acting as an ethics of self-cultivation, orientalizes and fetishizes the migrant as an object for Korean growth (Jun 2012). Kim (2018, 19) rightly insists that "the liberalism of the welfare state, its emphasis on cultural difference, and the fantasy of cultural assimilation preserve Korean identity and obscure racism against immigrants." Charting racial difference along the white-versus-black racial spectrum (Nami Kim 2016; Nadia Kim 2008) brings with it moral implications that correspond to cultural and religious norms. Many of the independent marriage brokers and nongovernmental organizations aimed at migrant brides and workers operated by local Koreans are affiliated with churches or decidedly Christian-oriented, often adopting a paternalistic disposition toward migrants (Kim 2018; Choo 2016). Yet the emphasis on multicultural families is bound to specific Korean

men and migrant women from particular locations, for the possibility of Korean women marrying Muslim men presents as a danger and a threat. Eum (2017, 840), for instance, discusses the experience of one Muslim woman who was stopped on the street and told to "please tell your men not to marry our women." This followed the experience of another Muslim woman who overheard middle-aged Korean women speak behind her back: "Those Muslims will engulf Korea; they will make Korea like their own country" (ibid.). The rise of Islamophobia within the terrorism zeitgeist demonstrates how, in securing harmony (Jun 2012) and cultural sameness (Kim 2018), multiculturalism is also securing the kinds of diversity to be included within Korea's multicultural society. The fact that churches, pastors, and Christians are operating many of the migrant centers and organizations no doubt influences what counts as diversity. Muslims and Islam are kept separate, but so too is sexual difference, neither being included in the bounded diversity of Korea's multicultural society.

Whither Marxism?

While walking past Seoul's City Hall on March 28, 2016, my shoelaces came undone and as I stood up from tying them I noticed a bright yellow sign with red and black wording along with a group of people holding smaller placards. The bright yellow sign read, in Korean, "Queer festivals promoting homosexuality are cultural Marxist social movements, not art festivals." The sign also implored Seoul's mayor, Park Won-sun (Pak Wŏn-sun), to "immediately halt the culturally Marxist homosexuality policy." I was not sure what inspired this protest, but the annual Korean Queer Culture Festival (KQCF) is a common target for anti-LGBT protesters. I found it interesting that the sign and protest compared the KQCF to Marxism and claimed that Seoul's mayor's "homosexual policies" are "culturally Marxist." Though seemingly an odd and unprompted invocation of Marxism—and despite the lack of qualifying information from protesters—it is not a surprising comparison. Anti-LGBT protesters and the Protestant right often berate queer activists and homosexuals as being sympathetic of North Korea and communists. This particular organization, National Solidarity for a Healthy Society, often partners with other anti-LGBT and Protestant right organizations, including the Christian Liberty Party and Christian Party, for rallies and campaigns.

None of the speakers at this event seemed to know much about Marxism, but that did not seem to be the point. Rather, I inferred that their goal was to paint both the mayor of Seoul and the KQCF as nondemocratic, as socialists, as communists. Several queer activist interlocutors explained that this was a common tactic for these types of Protestant right and anti-LGBT organizations. When I posted a picture of the sign online, many activists shared and commented on the absurdity of the picture. They found it laughable because the queer activists knew that these anti-LGBT protesters knew little of Marxism.

The phrase "cultural Marxism" (*munhwajŏng Marŭk'ŭsŭjuŭi*), described by the Southern Poverty Law Center in the United States as "a conspiracy theory with an anti-Semitic twist" (Berkowitz 2003), emerged in the United States following the fall of the Berlin Wall "as a consequence of the disappearance of the 'red menace' of Communism" (Jamin 2014, 85). Indexed by those who claimed that political correctness was overtaking free speech, "cultural Marxism" has since been used by the July 2011 Norwegian mass shooter Anders Breivik to justify his massacre of young social democrats for undermining so-called traditional European values (Jamin 2014). These individuals claim that Cold War Marxists needed to recuperate their image and thus redefined the proletariat that they fought hard to liberate into the new proletariat: "women to be protected against 'macho men'; foreigners protected from 'racist nationals'; homosexual people from 'homophobes'; humanists from 'Christians'; juvenile delinquents against 'violent and aggressive police'" (Jamin 2014, 86). These new cultural Marxists thus supposedly take aim at American and European culture, the nation, Christianity, family, patriarchy, and traditional morals and values—claiming that their so-called enemies are "racists, anti-Semites, homophobes, fascists, Nazis and conservative"—in favor of "the emergence of an ultra-egalitarian and multicultural, rootless and soulless global nation" (ibid.). In Breivik's own manifesto, "cultural Marxism" is synonymous with political correctness and multiculturalism; his manifesto and subsequent massacre are a direct response to what he called "an Islamization of Europe" where the "rise of Islam" precipitates "the disappearance of Judeo-Christian values" (Jamin 2014, 93).

That Korean anti-LGBT protesters mobilized the phrase "cultural Marxism" to describe the mayor of Seoul, the KQCF, and queer folks is both characteristic of their protests and undeniably dangerous. More than coincidence, the use of "cultural Marxism" must be read along-

side the rise of the ultraconservative, Islamophobic, and anti-immigration movements in the United States and Europe. This particular organization, National Solidarity for a Healthy Society, has routinely shared translated articles on their website from ultraconservative and anti-immigration Western sources, as well as conspiracy theories on queer and trans people. These protesters *enregister* "cultural Marxism" as meaning a threat to the nation with the disappearance of traditional Korean culture and values, what they interpret as good Christian morals and the value of the traditional family (see Silverstein 1995; Agha 2003). It conjures queer Koreans and the KQCF as threats to the nation,

Figure 6: LGBT Out. Picture taken of an exhibit called "Pure Culture Campaign" by Choi Jin Yong at the Seoul Museum of Art in 2016. The poster reads "Clean Street Campaign" and, below it, "LGBT-OUT desperately opposes LGBT culture's destruction of South Korea."
Photo: author.

and, within the context of the emergent terrorism zeitgeist, these "cultural Marxists" are opening the doors to Muslims.

On April 4, 2016, I visited the Seoul Museum of Art to peruse the exhibits part of the special "Seoul Babel" collection and happened upon the exhibit depicted in Figure 6, entitled "Pure Culture Campaign" (in Korean, "Clean Space Campaign"). The artist, Choi Jin Yong, collected materials from this particular anti-LGBT campaign. The exhibit details a "clean street campaign" that likens "pure culture" to the expulsion of LGBT people and culture.

The emphasis on cleanliness and purity indexes a purity of blood and healthiness. As with the toxins of the body, expelling "LGBT" from the streets and culture is an attempt to purify a geography and a nation still coming to terms with the deepening schisms of multiculturalism. A call to purity reminds us, as Balibar (1991, 49, emphasis in original) does of Europe, that "no nation … has an ethnic basis, which means that nationalism cannot be defined as an ethnocentrism except precisely in the sense of the product of a *fictive* ethnicity … but they do have to institute in real … time their imaginary unity *against* other possible unities." In the exhibit, the "imaginary unity" of "pure culture" must protect again the "other possible unit[y]" of a Korean culture that includes LGBT culture. Balibar (1991, 59–60) continues: "racism constantly induces an excess of 'purism'" within and through the nation; "for the nation to be itself, it has to be racially or culturally pure. It therefore has to isolate within its bosom, before eliminating or expelling them, the 'false,' 'exogenous', 'cross-bred', 'cosmopolitan' elements." This results in the "racialization of social groups whose collectivizing features will set up as stigmata of exteriority and impurity, whether these relate to style of life, beliefs or ethnic origins" (ibid.). Therefore, both queer Koreans and Muslims challenge the purity of Korea for their differences in "style of life," "beliefs," and "ethnic origins."

The racialization and ethnicitization of cleanliness and purity invoked in this exhibit are also encapsulated in the figure of Jesus, a decidedly whitewashed and Euro-American image of Christ. Similarly, Nicholas Harkness (2014, 6) demonstrates how Evangelical Christians in Korea emulate "European-style classical singing" and thus aim "to cultivate a 'clean' voice" in singing, "a specific cultural form of aesthetics and ethics, expression and embodiments, which comes to stand for Christian progress more broadly." This progress emerges from "purifying the nation of residual elements of a superstitious, unenlightened

Korean past and by softening the feelings of suffering and hardship that can be heard in the voices of older generations" (ibid., 7). For Harkness (2014), the unclean or othered voice represents Korea's past suffering, whereby to cleanse the voice and the soul is to cleanse the nation and its people. A comparable argument can be made of the exhibit above, as expunging the nation of LGBT peoples and cultures will rid it of its suffering.

The artist also points out that those individuals responsible for this campaign masqueraded as a fictitious government ministry called the "Ministry of Culture, Living, and Tourism" (compared to the actual Ministry of Culture, Sports and Tourism). The makers of this material—it is unclear who was behind this campaign as the Ministry of Culture, Living, and Tourism website has been since taken down—equate the purity of Korean culture with Christianity, cleanliness, and the traditional patriarchal family. A family—the taller father, slightly shorter mother, and small child—is silhouetted between two protective hands and placed next to the word *kŏri* or street. The campaign makes clear what constitutes "pure culture," but it simultaneously paints a picture of "LGBT culture," stating that LGBT culture includes the Korean Queer Culture Festival, music concerts, art shows, and film festivals.

The core claim of the Ministry of Culture, Living, and Tourism and the "Clean Street Campaign" is that LGBT culture is dangerous to the family, Christianity, and, ultimately, the "pure culture" of the nation. The invocation of purity suggests that the purity of culture links to both the purity of blood and nation. Blood connects family, culture, and nation together, where the impurity of one comes to make all others impure. For the Ministry of Culture, Living, and Tourism to speak of "LGBT culture" is to illustrate how its impurity leads to the "destruction" of the Korean family and nation. The impurity of LGBT culture also emerges in public health, for, as elucidated in the previous chapter, anti-LGBT organizations used the 2015 MERS-CoV outbreak to decry the dangers of HIV/AIDS and queer people as biosecurity threats to the nation's reproductivity. The way to simultaneously halt this destruction and purify Korean culture is through the physical expulsion of queer folks ("LGBT-OUT"), evoking Balibar's (1991, 60) explanation of how the nation addresses racial and cultural impurity.

Interpreting LGBT culture through frameworks of multiculturalism and tolerance illustrates the contingency of culture and liberalism (and liberalism as culture), that internal to the (neo)liberal state,

multiculturalism, and tolerance is a politics of exclusion (Brown 1995, 2006; Povinelli 2002). Aligning homosexuality with Islam, the Protestant right and anti-LGBT organizations, parties, and politicians tap into the fears around terrorism while simultaneously equating homosexuality to the spectacular outsider position, an other that is simultaneously internal to the nation while outside or in excess of its project. A return to Balibar (1991, 53) is instructive, for the recursivity of racism and nationalism denotes not only racism's centrifugal force—focused on those to keep out, for instance—but also its corresponding operations directed internally, on those already inside. Emphasis on the internal and external other dichotomizes, then, true and false nationals, whereby "the racial-cultural identity of 'true nationals' remains invisible, but it can be inferred (and is ensured) *a contrario* by the alleged, quasi-hallucinatory visibility of the 'false nationals' … in other words, it remains constantly in doubt and in danger" (Balibar 1991, 60). Racism is a necessary "*supplement internal to nationalism*, always in excess of it, but always indispensable to its constitution and yet always still insufficient to achieve its project" (ibid., 54, emphasis in original). That there is constant "doubt" and "danger" over true and false nationals demonstrates how the insufficiency of racism is actually what makes it indispensable to nationalism, as it can never fully promise absolute assurance of the other, the false national, and so it must be permitted to continue its operation in service to the national project. LGBT culture, and homosexuality more broadly, as an "inside outsider" to cultural purity thus exists in recursive relation to the "outside outsider" position of Muslims, as LGBT culture and homosexuality become inundated with the terrorist elements of Islamophobia.

The Queer Terrorist

The failure of the filibuster and the proximity to the election meant that many politicians felt the need to apologize for their participation in the filibuster while doubling down on rhetoric that played well to their base. Park Young-sun (Pak Yŏng-sŏn), a politician with the liberal opposition who participated in the filibuster, later apologized over her involvement, famously weeping on camera in her plea for reelection. She is also known for her opposition to homosexuality, and during her reelection campaign she discussed with supporters her opposition to

an antidiscrimination law that includes gender and sexual minorities (what she also refers to as a "homosexuality law"), in addition to mentioning Islam. She said:

> The Anti-Discrimination Law, Homosexuality Law, and laws related to Islam and human rights will absolutely not be accepted. In particular, the Homosexuality Law is a law that goes against the providence of God and nature. With this kind of law, the Democratic Party of Korea will join with the goal of The Christian Council of Korea and all pastors [to oppose homosexuality and Islam]. (Rainbow Vote 2016, 8)

The antidiscrimination law is a key piece of legislation that queer activists continuously advocate for and which anti-LGBT protesters decry as both unnecessary and dangerous. Park's opposition to homosexuality and Islam invokes the platforms of both the Christian Party and the Christian Liberty Party, contributing to the image of the good Christian nation. Park's aversion to human rights ought to be read in the context of her opposition to homosexuality and Islam, alongside her participation in the filibuster. Those politicians who participated in the filibuster were concerned about creeping infringement of individual privacy and curtailing of civil liberties, and yet Park's opposition to laws related to human rights, Islam, and homosexuality orients "human rights" toward normative citizens. Those who may in fact "need" human rights are often denied them.

Human rights (*in'gwŏn*) discourse entered the South Korean public and political spheres in the mid- to late 1990s in the aftermath of the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis coupled with then president Kim Dae-jung's emphasis on friendlier engagement with North Korea and call for greater human rights on the peninsula (Lee-Gong 2011). Part of the emphasis on human rights came from nationwide attempts to revisit the authoritarian years of South Korea given that Kim Dae-jung, a former prisoner under the authoritarian dictators, was now president.[96] By reexamining South Korea's own history, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and the state use human rights discourse to construct the liberal democratic state. The fact that the Korean state embraced a language of human rights to examine its own history, establishing the National Human Rights Commission of Korea in 2001 to safeguard against human rights violations of those living in Korea, demonstrates that human rights is a state discourse (Koo 2011).[97] In the United

States, human rights discourse is a mechanism to look outwards, where in Korea it is primarily a process of looking inwards. However, the Korean state's embrace of human rights discourse to interpret the past while engaging North Korea makes the state the sole arbiter of rights and what constitutes violations.

Park Young-sun's denial of human rights laws for homosexuals and Muslims configures these groups outside the "community" of rights-bearing individuals.[98] In Hannah Arendt's (1979, 295–96) estimation, "their plight is not that they are not equal before the law, but that no law exists for them; not that they are oppressed but that nobody wants even to oppress them." The denial of laws that include them—that law itself does not render them part of the Korean national community (i.e., citizenship)—is done so for the rest of Korea. Park can justify her opposition and denial because human rights are not *for* queer Koreans and Muslims; they are for North Koreans and historically oppressed Koreans under authoritarian rule. But, more insidiously, Park's invocation of nature and God renders opposition and denial of rights the moral and just course of action: "the crimes against human rights … can always be justified by the pretext that right is equivalent to being good or useful for the whole in distinction to its parts" (Arendt 1979, 298–99). What is good for Korea, what is right for Korea—and, incidentally, what is good for Christians—is the denial of human rights for queer Koreans and Muslims. Both the Constitutional Court and anti-LGBT protesters—and, indeed, politicians like Park Young-sun—agree that national security takes precedence over human rights.

Park's denial of human rights indexes anti-LGBT positions that more forcefully equate the passage of an antidiscrimination law and pro-LGBT policies to security threats. Christian author Kwŏn Yŏn-wŏn stated, during a discussion on the perils of homosexuality and AIDS,

> The anti-discrimination law must be prevented. Originally, Islam and homosexuality had an irreconcilable relationship. Islam kills homosexuals by pushing them out of tall buildings … In order to swallow Korea, Islam uses the human rights and anti-discrimination law promoted by homosexuals. If the anti-discrimination law is passed, Islam can come flooding in. Therefore, we must stop the anti-discrimination law from ever passing at the risk of our lives. If the anti-discrimination law is

> passed, Islam will enter, trampling the church and killing pastors and believers. And Sharia law will rule this country. (*News Win Korea* 2016)

Kwŏn recognizes the tenuous relationship between Islam and homosexuality, but paints homosexuals as unwitting (or, perhaps, willing) participants in Islam's seemingly true purpose: transforming the laws of Korea into Sharia law. In many ways, this is a well-rehearsed line of thinking that is repeated throughout Europe and North America to favor anti-immigration and anti-Muslim policies. However, the mention of homosexuals as those promoting antidiscrimination laws and human rights is to inculcate them in this securitized discourse of threat, for it is their support of such laws and institutions that will supposedly pave the way for Islam to "come flooding in." Other Christian Liberty Party banners and advertisements that circulated during the election cycle claimed that Islam spreads terrorism, and that supporting an antidiscrimination law is tantamount to "promoting homosexuality and Islamic proliferation." The proliferation of Islam is equated to the proliferation of homosexuality, both perceived as dangerous, but the movement implicit in proliferation—a spreading, not unlike a viral infection—renders homosexuality and Islam security threats. It is important to remember that Kwŏn is speaking at a church in the context of a discussion about the dangers of homosexuality and AIDS, and so the work Islam does for Kwŏn in instilling fear is ultimately in service to a more generalizable fear around homosexuality: If AIDS is not scary, certainly the mass influx of Muslims bent on destroying churches, killing believers, and enacting Sharia law will be. This violent future gets laid at the feet of homosexuals. As I demonstrate below, the association between homosexuality and so-called "Islamic terrorism" intensified only months after the 2016 National Assembly elections.

From September 17 to September 19, 2016, three bombs exploded within the New York metropolitan area, leaving several people wounded with no fatalities. While the suspect had no official ties to terrorist groups, it is believed that his actions were influenced by the terrorist group al-Qaeda. In the wake of the bombing in Chelsea—a neighborhood in Manhattan—later in the day on the 17th, the *New York Post* investigated a Tumblr page that took credit for the bombing on behalf of "the LGBTQ+ community," a page that was deemed "not credible" by investigators (Schram, Celona, and Saul 2016). Despite this, National Solidarity for a Healthy Society authored a blogpost

claiming that "homosexuals have always claimed to be victims. But now the time has come that homosexuals kill the general public in a loathsome way. It was like watching an Islamic bombing" (Kŏnsayŏn 2016). National Solidarity for a Healthy Society may not be representative of all anti-LGBT protesters, political parties, organizations, or politicians, but the intertextuality of statements that correlate homosexuality, Islam, and terrorism invariably links these organizations, protesters, parties, politicians, and even the government together. National Assembly member Park Young-sun was not directly claiming that homosexuals are terrorists in the way National Solidarity for a Healthy Society does, but her rhetoric contributes to that imagining and to the relationality of homosexuality and Islam.

National Solidarity for a Healthy Society's claim is in part a culmination of building and intersecting discourses from the November 14, 2015, Paris attacks and the Anti-Terrorism Act to the 2016 elections and growing opposition to the then-Park Geun-hye administration. While the organization is not referencing a specific incident in Korea, the false assumption that homosexuals were responsible for the Chelsea bombing implicates all homosexuals in the bombing. Homosexuals represent the "pure potential" of threats (Masco 2014), as their Janus-faced presentation as victim and terrorist enables them to "kill the general public *in a loathsome way*" (Kŏnsayŏn 2016, my emphasis). The invocation of the general public reminds us that terrorism is believed to be indiscriminate and ubiquitous: the threat could be anywhere and the target is never a single person but the "general public"—such that, when individuals die, they do so only as synecdoche of the broader group. The "pure potential" of the queer terrorist requires that all queer bodies be read as *potential* terrorists and threats. This is not unlike the way, both in Korea and elsewhere, that all of Islam and all Muslims are implicated in acts of terrorism carried out by individuals who claim to be Muslim. Even the organization's metaphor—"it was like watching an Islamic bombing"—makes that comparison evident.

The organization—and, indeed, the protesters, political parties, or politicians—is not claiming that homosexuals are Muslims or that Muslims are homosexuals. Rather, they both occupy the same national security conceptual space and fit similarly within the algorithms that render their bodies threats for the security state. For these organizations and political parties, predicated on national/cultural purity and Christian doctrine, Muslims and homosexuals both pose a threat to the

religiosity of the South Korean nation and culture. As politicians, essentially, want to get reelected—this was certainly the impetus for Park Young-sun's statement—anti-LGBT and anti-Islam played well in 2016.

The assertion, however, that "homosexuals have always claimed to be victims" reformulates not only the perception of homosexuality but also the conception of the victim and victimhood. In part, the organization is indexing queer activists' insistence that they be afforded the same rights and liberties as all other Koreans, and that measures must be taken to curb gender- and sexuality-based discrimination (such as the passage of an antidiscrimination law). The organization thus equates these demands for equal rights and protections under the law with being a "victim." Yet the rejoinder of National Solidarity for a Healthy Society's claim is that "victim" is but a mask to hide the true intentions of homosexuals: the killing of the "general public."

In actuality, queer folks are made victims, not only in the National Solidarity for a Healthy Society's interpretation but also in the barrage of hate speech and structural violence by anti-LGBT protesters, politicians, and state institutions. They are relegated to the margins of the state, but the margins are dangerous places that give rise to threats to national security. My point is that those margins are growing to account for racial and cultural difference, whereby those relegated to these particular margins—queer Koreans and Muslims—are interpreted through one another. Yet, as I demonstrate in the next section, this national security relationality becomes a tool for queer activist response and resistance.

Petitions

In the days following the April 2016 elections, queer and immigrant organizations filed a petition with the National Human Rights Commission of Korea (NHRCK) that took aim at the newly formed Christian Liberty Party and associated parties and politicians. The petition claims that these parties and politicians actively engaged in "promoting discrimination against minorities," particularly against queer and Muslim populations (Kal 2016). The Christian Liberty Party garnered 2.64 percent of the votes, and, while that precluded them from representation in the National Assembly, it did guarantee them state subsidies for the 2017 presidential election cycle (ibid.). In addition, the petition suggests that the South Korean government will be respon-

sible for directly financing the active spread of discrimination and hatred from a hate group.

During the 2016 May Day rallies in the Taehangno area, I worked with queer activists interested in labor rights. It was my first May Day rally, and I really did not know what to expect. Activists held signs that addressed labor rights, transgender rights, and the rights of sexual minorities. I called people over to sign the petition, swaths of workers roaming the streets and the occasional foreign visitor curious as to the rallies and our rainbow flag. I was surprised at both the number and diversity of the people that visited our booth, ranging in gender, age, sexuality, affiliation, and ethnicity. An older Korean man, for instance, said that, even though he was Christian, he did not believe the things the Christian Liberty Party said. He did not believe them to be authentic Christians and gladly signed the petition.

Several of the labor organizations sent members to collect one of the five petition files and passed it through their seated members, returning with a few dozen more signatures. T'ae-yŏn and Sŭng-min also took a petition file each and weaved in and out of the crowds to have those sitting and participating in the rally chants and gesticulations sign the petition as well. We collected 589 signatures on that day. In total, the petition garnered support with nearly 3,200 individual signatories and 62 organizations (Kal 2016). It is difficult to say what effect, if any, the petition had, particularly in future election cycles. However, be it connected or not, a 63-year-old female pastor was arrested in May 2016 for violating election law. She was accused of distributing more than 190 flyers that targeted candidates that promoted an antidiscrimination law, revision to the Military Penal Code, and equality for homosexuals. The flyers were "propagating hate against homosexuality and Islam on the day of the election" (Lim 2016). The Suwŏn District Prosecutor's Office also said that there are more than 250 other individuals currently under investigation for a similar breach of election law given that maliciously defaming candidates is illegal (ibid.).

The petition was the start of a series of moves by human rights and queer activists and organizations that took aim at the rise of Islamophobia in South Korea. Working on a petition that opposes both homophobia and Islamophobia thus fits within their dossier of activism. While the petition addressed specifically a Korean political party's mobilization of antihomosexuality and anti-Islam rhetoric, it also ini-

tiated a conversation more broadly on the relationship between homosexuality and Islam, queer Koreans and Muslims.

Pinkwashing and Solidarity

T'ae-yŏn knew something about everything. As a queer activist, she stayed apprised of different human rights issues in which queer activists might potentially participate. But, for T'ae-yŏn personally, recognizing the resonance across issues was part of her activist subjectivity. Her narration of queer activism consistently led back to the student activists of the 1990s and the way that discussions of democracy led some to talk about human rights and thus question their own human rights. This is a dialogical endeavor for T'ae-yŏn, for in recognizing the human rights of—or lack thereof—the self, one is brought into relation with all others similarly questioning and lacking human rights and their marginalization. Even more poignant is that T'ae-yŏn articulated this point while we sat drinking with fellow queer activists at a fundraiser for disability activists.

In one of our initial meetings, T'ae-yŏn spoke of all the international activist listservs to which she subscribed, hoping to one day create one about Korean queer activism for an international audience. Domestic networks were important, but T'ae-yŏn also labored to forge international connections, even if only across issues. For instance, during the 2016 Daegu Queer Culture Festival, T'ae-yŏn brought placards that read "Korea in Solidarity with Istanbul LGBTI Pride" for participants to hold as she took pictures and uploaded them to social media. The placards and pictures were to show support and solidarity (*yŏndae*) for Istanbul LGBTI+ Pride Week after the Turkish government violently banned the Pride march within days of the Daegu Queer Culture Festival. I often found myself, then, asking T'ae-yŏn about not only the goings-on of Korean queer activism but other domestic and international human rights issues as she almost always had something to say.

Over lunch in May 2016, I asked T'ae-yŏn about pinkwashing. I had earlier read an article about the Seoul Human Rights Festival canceling their showing of the Israeli film *Third Person*, a 2015 documentary about intersex people in Israel. While waiting for T'ae-yŏn, I looked through the bulletin boards plastered in her office and recognized the Seoul Human Rights Film Festival logo. I began flipping through the posted list, reading the films to be shown, and noticed that they would

be screening *Pinkwashing Exposed: Seattle Fights Back!* When T'ae-yŏn and I began talking over lunch, I broached the subject of the Seoul Human Rights Film Festival and asked her about both the canceling of the Israeli film and the showing of the pinkwashing film. T'ae-yŏn nodded, showing her interest in the topic, and explained that there has yet to be a sustained conversation regarding Israeli pinkwashing in Korea among queer activists or organizations, but she thought that this issue was important and needed to be addressed. The Seoul Human Rights Film Festival actively began this discussion among queer activist organizations by canceling the screening of *Third Person* and declaring that they would participate in the Palestinian Campaign for the Academic & Cultural Boycott of Israel and the larger Boycott, Divestment, Sanctions (BDS) movement. T'ae-yŏn also noted that the Israeli embassy called the Seoul Human Rights Film Festival participation in BDS "counterproductive." Elsewhere, the Israeli embassy referred to BDS as "greater than Apartheid" (Chŏng 2016). T'ae-yŏn said that she was not surprised that there was no previous discussion of BDS as the Korean government is "pro-Israel given the anti-Islam and anti-Muslim stance and statements made by conservatives."

In this context, pinkwashing denotes a "deliberate strategy to conceal the continuing violations of Palestinians' human rights behind an image of modernity signified by Israeli gay life" (Schulman 2011). Central to this strategy, which includes the dissemination of cultural products and the attraction of gay tourists to Israel, is an effort to showcase Israel as the sole democracy in the Middle East, one so "advanced" and "modern" that gay soldiers and officers can serve openly in the Israeli military. As Jennifer Lynn Kelly (2020, 160) argues, Israeli strategies of pinkwashing, particularly those that target queer tourists, "celebrate Israeli soldiers and inoculate against critiques of militarized violence by positioning it as integral to both the maintenance of diversity and the promise of safety from violence against queer tourists—a safety that pivots on racialized and Islamophobic constructions of Palestinians." Showcasing Israel's gay-friendliness thus comes at the expense of Palestinians, not only in an attempt to erase Israeli state violence against Palestinians but in comparing the liberalism of Israel to the barbarism of Palestine.

Jasbir K. Puar (2017, 96), however, suggests that tourists may not be the most important targets of pinkwashing: "it functions dually, as a form of discursive preemptive securitization that marshals neo-ori-

entalist fears of Palestinians as backward, sexually repressed terrorists, and as an intense mode of subjugation of Palestinians under settler colonial rule." This while "Israeli intelligence and security service have targeted queer Palestinians and used homophobia as a weapon, threatening to out them to their families and communities if they do not serve as informants and collaborators" (Atshan 2020, 2) This thereby "contributes to the further stigmatization of queerness in Palestinian society because of the subsequent association of homosexuality with betrayal and collaboration with Israel" (ibid., 5). Important to note, as Sa'ed Atshan (2020, 7) does, is that the queer Palestinians Atshan features are "committed to an emancipation from Zionism as mediated through Palestinians' experiences of being among its primary targets and, often, its victims," where Atshan characterizes Zionism as "rooted in ethnocracy," or a "regime [that] facilitates the *expansion, ethnicitazation,* and *control* of a dominant ethnic nation … over contested territory and polity" (Yiftachel in Atshan 2020, 6, emphasis in original). Queer Palestinians thus face the "dual system of ethnocracy on the one hand and heteronormativity and toxic masculinity on the other" (Atshan 2020, 10).

The Seoul Human Rights Film Festival's cancellation of the Israeli film and support of the BDS movement emerges both within the increased Islamophobia discourse in Korea and continued expansion of Israeli settlements, for as the festival explained, pinkwashing "blurs … Israel's occupation and discrimination against Palestinians" whereby it stands as a "semblance of Israel propaganda … to wash the illegal occupation, inhuman image of the country" (Seoul Human Rights Film Festival 2016). By supporting the LGBTQ+ movement, peoples, and rights, the Israeli state produces an "image of a 'pink country to encourage diversity'" while not only continuing their illegal occupation of Palestinian land but also discriminating against Palestinian sexual minorities (ibid.). Yet the film festival is also cognizant of the Israeli embassy's claim that the cancellation of the film violates freedom of expression, that the BDS movement targets racial and religious identities. The film festival carefully delineates the financial ties between the film's producers and the Israeli Foreign Ministry, including the contracts cultural workers must sign that requires the cultural products made with state funding to "promote the policy interests of the State of Israel via culture and art, including contributing to creating a positive image for Israel" (ibid.). The Seoul Human Rights Film

Festival's continued involvement with BDS thus pivots on funding issues and projects that attempt to normalize Israeli occupation. Several queer activist organizations also cosigned the initial statement by the film festival explaining the cancellation of the film *Third Person* and officially joining the Palestinian BDS Campaign.

The Seoul Human Rights Film Festival continues to be a leading voice in the BDS and anti-pinkwashing campaigns in Korea, often working in tandem with Palestine Peace and Solidarity in South Korea.[99] Both jointly operate a booth at the annual Seoul Queer Culture Festival, proclaiming in brochures and banners in 2019 that "queer liberation and Palestinian liberation are connected" (Seoul Human Rights Film Festival 2019). At the 2017 LGBTI Human Rights Forum in Seoul, both the Seoul Human Rights Film Festival and Palestine Peace and Solidarity in South Korea organized a panel on Israeli pinkwashing. After their presentations, the panelists solicited questions from the audience. The first person to ask a question (or provide a comment) identified as an Israeli and, as the Seoul Human Rights Film Festival (2017) later wrote after the panel, this individual argued that the presentations were anti-Semitic, and that Israel guaranteed the rights of women and queer folks. The second audience member to speak identified as a "friend of Israelis" and criticized the presenters' use of the phrase *chŏnbŏmguk* (literally, "war criminal country") to talk about the Israeli state's occupation of Palestine (ibid.).

In response, the Seoul Human Rights Film Festival (2017) writes, the presenters made clear that their object of critique was not the Jewish people but the Israeli state and its expansionist practices and ideologies. Furthermore, the film festival notes, the use of the phrase "war crime" or "war criminal country" is a phrase used by the United Nations in criticizing the construction of Israeli settlements on Palestinian lands. The presenters argued that something as seemingly benign as attending Tel Aviv Pride is actually a sanctioning of the occupation of Palestine and Israeli state violence. This is a key point in anti-pinkwashing materials, particularly in Korea. For instance, one queer activist writes how they pictured Tel Aviv Pride as a place with "the blazing sun, shining sand and dynamic beaches, people marching with rainbows … I thought I'd definitely want to go if I had the chance" (Ruk'a 2016). Yet, after watching a Tel Aviv Pride boycott video, they realized that their "pride was shaken by the idea that everybody's equal love and cry for life are being used to maintain violence and discrimination" (ibid.).

Prior to the April 2016 elections, though, there was little mention of Islamophobia. Part of this results from a lack of strong anti-Islam, anti-Muslim, or terrorism-related discussions or conversations. Queer activist organizations did not engage in any anti-Islamophobia activities or work because terrorism was not part of the national conversation before the 2016 elections or before the November 13, 2015, Paris attacks. Yet anti-Islamophobia and anti-pinkwashing are now part of the queer activist archive, both part of its genealogy and thus tools and frameworks to work with and through. This given the fact that Islamophobia has not gone away in Korea because attention to increased terrorist attacks alongside anti-LGBT protesters' work produces more extreme Islamophobic claims (as evidenced with the Chelsea bombings). Neither pinkwashing nor BDS is recent, and Palestine Peace and Solidarity in South Korea has been working on anti-pinkwashing and BDS issues since at least 2013. The emergence of the terrorism zeitgeist allowed politicians, political parties, and even the former president to mobilize anti-Islam discourse for political gain—quelling labor and antigovernment demonstrations while also decrying the threat of homosexuality. Islamophobia is thus a product of the terrorism zeitgeist, coconstitutive of homophobia. It is this complex relationship that provides a more dialogical analysis. The relationship between homosexuality and Islam forged through national security invites—and, for queer organizations predicated on domestic and international solidarity, compels—queer activists and allies to interpret and produce meaning in this relationship.

The Absent Presence of Muslims

The rise of Islamophobia in the United States and Europe following the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks relied on both the "over there" orientalizing characteristic of the origins of so-called radical "Islamic terrorism" in the Middle East and the racialized presence of Muslims "over here." Violence against anyone who "looked" like a terrorist—interpreted through a racialization of bodies not limited to individuals specifically from the Middle East—localized the threat within the nation's borders. In South Korea, Islamophobia relied on the absent presence of Muslims, given not only the low number of Muslims in Korea but the lack of non–North Korean terrorist attacks on South Korean soil. By absent presence I am denoting a specter of sorts, a

ghostly presence that still influences without taking material form, despite, of course, those actual Muslims in Korea.[100] Former president Park Geun-hye used the November 13, 2015, Paris attacks to suggest that terrorists *could be* hiding in crowds of demonstrators—fear and action driven by their potential existence—but much of the Islamophobia I detail in this chapter did not necessarily rely on the presence of Muslims in South Korea. This is not to say that that Muslims in Korea were not targets; opposition to halal production and representative Park Young-sun's opposition to laws pertaining to Islam and human rights indexes the existence of Muslims in Korea.

The absent presence of Muslims compares to the specter of the North Korean other discussed in Chapter 1, whereby the existence of the other "out there" with the possibility of infiltrating the "here and now" engenders a national security milieu reliant on a politics of exclusion. Yet, where the North Korean other occupies an in-between space of internal and external to Korea given the racial and linguistic congruencies, the absent presence of (non-Korean) Muslims remains outside both the nation and its project. Even though both Muslims and North Koreans reside in South Korea, these national security ideologies driven by exclusion inundate the threat with an appeal to both historical moments (the Korean War) and future possibilities (terrorist attacks or another North Korean invasion). In other words, while the actual presence of Muslims and North Koreans influence the situation, national security ideologies are driven by their ghostly synecdoche, "Muslim" and "North Korean." This meeting of the absent presence of Muslims with the North Korean other is evident in the Anti-Terrorism Act, as proponents of the act drew on the ever-present fear of North Korea in addition to the encroaching reach of so-called "Islamic terrorism" to the region and peninsula.

Banal security has made the North Korean other a specter haunting the ideologies, practices, and technologies of national security, effectively and affectively ordinary while still necessitating legal, political, and social attention. The emergence of the terrorism zeitgeist infuses sensationalism and visceral fear back into the national security apparatus, whereby the potential of an unnamed and indiscriminate terrorist attack requires equal measure of preemptive planning and response. In many ways, these two security concerns—North Korea and terrorism—are pronouncements on the temporal directions of national security in South Korea. If the threat of North Korea and the North

Korean other pivots on the insurmountable atrocities of the Korean War and subsequent North Korean attacks, then the terrorism zeitgeist operates through a future imagined and enacted in the present.

The emergence of the terrorism zeitgeist in South Korea is in part opportunistic, responding to the growing ineffective reach of the North Korean other. As with the North Korean other, the terrorism zeitgeist relies on the absent presence of Muslims, again sidestepping the actual presence of Muslims in South Korea in favor of an empty vessel of fear and uncertainty.

The effect of mobilizing an empty vessel to power national security ideology is that it can also encompass populations on the periphery and in the margins. National security operates through the production and exclusions of state margins, and the use of empty vessels helps make this a reality. By not focusing on the actual presence of Muslims in Korea, conservative politicians and anti-LGBT protesters were able to draw connections between so-called "Islamic terrorism" and Islam with homosexuals and homosexuality. Again, their point is not that Islam and homosexuality are the same—that Muslims are queer folks or that Islam promotes homosexuality. Rather, both occupy the same problematic and threatening space of cultural difference predicated on ethnonationalist claims of purity (of culture, of race, of blood). In these moments of connection—during the 2016 National Assembly election and the months that followed—the absent presence of Muslims became the actual presence of queer Koreans.

Epilogue

Security's Undoing

As queer Koreans continue to be interpreted as disruptions and threats through national security discourse, radical isolation and even suicide have become a condition of Korean society. Suicide is the leading cause of death for South Koreans between age ten and 30—among the highest percentage in the world (Brown 2013; Jun 2013). Studies also illustrate that suicide ideation is higher among youths with same-sex intercourse experience (and, presumably, attraction) than opposite-sex intercourse experience (Kim, Ahn, and Kim 2016; Kim and Yang 2014; You 2013). In a way, South Korea is compelling biopolitical rejects to kill themselves (or at least consider doing it), removing their seemingly polluted and useless bodies from the population. Those most vulnerable become more so during heightened times of insecurity, as the precarity of some become justification for either ignoring others or precaritizing them. The threat is always immanent, destruction on the cusp, but, in that temporal space of potential peninsular destruction, a great many things can transpire. Bodies are made disposable, stripped of subjectivities to be transformed into disruptions and threats, nodes of data, bodies of evidence; they are folded into the mundane of daily life through the banality of security. Citizens interpret their lives through the discourse of national security, experts in their own right, and charged with the continual protection of the nation and deferment of peninsular destruction.

But this is a tale of two stories that occupy the same space. The first weaves through this book about not only the ways queer Koreans

get treated as security disruptions but how queer Koreans themselves partake in security practices and even their own securitization. Their participation engenders a sort of uneasiness for not only queer folks but, I imagine, readers as well. We experience a kind of "nausea" that invites, again, what Kadji Amin (2017) refers to as deidealization: we ought not idealize queerness as a cut above the rest or morally exceptional. Queer Koreans are instead trying to figure out how to live "with damage in a damaged world" (2017, 10).

This leads to the second story, an ethnographic rejoinder made throughout this book. This is a story of how queer Koreans, despite being treated as security disruptions and threats, despite their participation in security-making and self-securitization, are finding ways to live meaningful and resilient lives. They find endurance, and they find it together with other queer folks as "bodies literally affecting one another and generating intensities" (Stewart 2007, 128). This endurance is predicated on a stitched-together relationality that emerges in ordinary moments of soldiering, in finding ways to keep queer festival participants safe, in responding to stigmas in public health, and in the sharing of family coming out stories. Each instance may differ in duration, setting, intention, and intensity, but each affectively connects bodies together in ways that enable their perseverance.

The second story is certainly not meant to wipe clean the first, or somehow rectify the issue of security participation. Banal security is not so easily "fixed," if such an act is even possible. The point of banal security is that no one is above the thrall of national security.

Yet what this second story does is it enables us to bear witness to how those individuals treated as threats and disruptions are still able to find ways to maneuver within these categorizations and treatments. And, more extraordinarily, such living, made possible by the tools of security itself, can potentially challenge the very contours of the biopolitical divide of security in the first place. The fact that the *in'gwŏn ch'imhae kamsidan* (human rights violation monitoring) volunteers reorient the gaze to the general population and away from queer folks while mobilizing the police for their own goals simultaneously reorients the very narrative of security that considers queer Koreans *the* disruptions. Doing so stakes a claim to queer Koreans' citizenship and membership in the polity.

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Figure 7: No Entry. Image of a black gate that can move to prevent passage into the Democracy and Human Rights Memorial Hall in Seoul.
Photo: author.

Google Maps indicated that the building was close to Namyeong (Namyŏng) Station, near the center of Seoul, and so I exited the station and followed the map down the side streets. I had been able to see the barbed wire and building from the station platform, but once I made my way through the streets it became elusive. Numerous times I became turned around looking for the building, indicating just how well blended to the cityscape it had become. Eventually I spotted the signature barbed wire atop the concrete wall and knew I was at the right place: the Democracy and Human Rights Memorial Hall. It seemed that both democracy and security hide in the interstices of the city. Once I passed through the gate I turned around and saw the rather intimidating black gate pictured in Figure 7, indicating that I had stepped into the courtyard of not just a museum but a former Korean National Police Agency (KNPA) torture black site from the late 1970s to the 1980s. The building was supposed to be, partly, unremarkable given that it was initially disguised as a marine research institute, and

so, even as office workers nonchalantly passed by the building on a regular basis, civilians were compelled not to look. This building is the epitome of banal security, "spun from a network under tension with the landscape … it is an invisible and immaterial network that escapes our gaze and enables the [building] to hide from view and to avoid shocks" (Virilio 1994, 44). Even though barbed wire adorns the tops of its walls, barbed wire is rather mundane infrastructure in Seoul.

The further inside the courtyard I went, I began to see how the Korea Democracy Foundation—the current operators of the building and space—reimagined the erstwhile torture site as a museum and memorial to political violence, democracy, and human rights. The original purpose of the KNPA-operated building was to detain and interrogate prodemocracy activists and political dissidents, famously interrogating the late Kim Geun-tae (Kim Kŭn-t'ae), a prodemocracy activist who later became minister of health and welfare under liberal president Roh Moo-hyun, and torturing to death Seoul National University student Pak Chong-chŏl in 1987, sparking the June protests that eventually led to democratization. The building changed its name from an anticommunist department to a security department to the Human Rights Agency within the KNPA before the building's ownership transferred to the Ministry of the Interior and Safety in 2018, managed by the Korea Democracy Foundation. Korean civil society provided input for the repurposing of the building and eventually settled on a memorial that, according to its English brochure, "opens up the future of democracy while remembering the painful history of the past." I visited the site during its preparatory period in 2019, open to the public to provide a working design of the space, and so exhibits were not necessarily complete but did focus on Korea's march toward democracy—also incomplete—and the political violence that ensued under authoritarian rule. Perhaps the great draw of the memorial was the interrogation rooms (Figure 8), museum staff hanging pictures as I made my way through the different rooms. Two rooms were already decorated, one a memorial to Pak Chong-chŏl and one a "study" dedicated to Kim Geun-tae. The other rooms were rather sterile, the specters of those interrogated and tortured not completely gone as the eeriness of transforming security infrastructure into a museum was made all the more apparent in this transitory state I was witnessing.

Transforming security infrastructure into something else, into a memorial of not the supposed good of national security but the violence

Figure 8: Interrogation Room. Picture of an interrogation room on the fifth floor.
Photo: author.

stitched into its fabric, reminds patrons of the human cost of anticommunist ideology. The very infrastructural brutalism of the interrogation rooms in particular, to invoke Michael Truscello (2020, 2)—infrastructure that "isolates, toxifies, dispossesses, and immobilizes"—animates their continued relevance and patrons' acts of remembrance. As I detail elsewhere (Gitzen 2023), this transformation happens in other spaces in Korea, from former colonial buildings to repurposed military bunkers, each beckoning forth a past and inviting an imagining of a future arbitrated in the present. In comparison, military bunkers, another form of security infrastructure, represent a past that "is not over but remains the condition of possibility within which the present must be apprehended" (Beck 2011, 82). Throughout this book, I have also sought for pathways toward "the condition of possibility" within Korea's national security assemblage, instances of maneuverability, fugitivity, and even recoding of security algorithms that move queer Koreans out of categories of threat/disruption and refashion them with

invigorated forms of queer subjectivity. The transformation of security spaces like this former KNPA interrogation center into places of active remembrance are of a similar order, for, even while they tap into the liberal promises of democracy and human rights that I have critiqued in previous chapters, there is still a profound effect and affect to the act of bearing witness to political violence.

I thus end by asking—without fully answering, I admit—how Koreans confront banal security, how they learn to recognize and reorient their perspectives toward the practices of erasure and hiding that are part of the process of banalization and securitization. The Democracy and Human Rights Memorial Hall illustrates the friction and contradictions implicit in this agentive confrontation, for while the exhibits aim to bring to light the history of Korean political violence during the authoritative decades, the ordinariness of the building's placement still works to elide recognition. Perhaps I am directionally challenged, or perhaps once the site moves from its preparatory stage to its formal opening the space will be more fully marked, but its hidden façade that blends so well into its surroundings demonstrates the enduring legacies and Cold War ideologies that are difficult to overcome. Quite literally built into the environment, these legacies and ideologies are not easily exorcised; it may, perhaps, require complete destruction, but, even then, ghosts—especially when banished without their consent—find a way to haunt.

Friction and contradictions also prevail given that the War Memorial of Korea, located in the Yongsan District of Seoul across from the Ministry of National Defense, tells a rather teleological history of war and military development from premodern to contemporary (and even a speculative future) Korea. A memorial dedicated to war and a memorial dedicated to democracy and human rights: on the surface, they play off each other insofar as the War Memorial promulgates, quite explicitly, anticommunist ideologies and an anticommunist nationalism that has weaved through Korea since the 1940s, thus giving rise to banal security. In comparison, the Democracy and Human Rights Memorial Hall attempts to walk some of that fervor back, instead sublimating it with fervor over human rights and democracy. These are not necessarily antithetical concepts in Korea but they are dialogical in their formation and understanding. And yet, repurposing the interrogation room as a site of remembrance and mourning, of the violence attached to anticommunist policies and ideologies, challenges, I suggest, the anti-

communist nationalism pulsating from the War Memorial and made mundane throughout Korea. The interrogation room compares to the expansive architectural feat of the War Memorial's actual memorial for those primarily lost during the Korean War (rather than the three floors of museum exhibits): both memorialize the dead, but only the interrogation room invites contemplation of the atrocities carried out by the South Korean government on South Koreans; North Korea and communism are the perpetrators in the War Memorial's memorial.

Again invoking bunkers, they provide:

> a dubious ambient gravitas to even the most anodyne collection … the liberty to restore a bunker as museum or gallery and the ingenuity with which concealed or feared sites of terror have been recuperated as spaces of cultural speculation is a freedom to enter and look upon what is constructed as a lost world. (Beck 2011, 96–97)

The same, I would argue, is true of the interrogation room and other sites of security, for their transformation from sites of terror to exhibits of that former terror does recuperate them as spaces and sites of "cultural speculation," querying not "the way things *ought* to be, but, instead, imagining what things *could* be" (Duggan and Muñoz 2009, 278). For John Beck (2011, 82), the act of making the "invisible visible is a sign of security's undoing" given that such military and security infrastructures and technologies are meant to remain hidden, or, as with banal security, saturate the landscape and history to the extent of conscious and unconscious erasure. Be it unveiling the hidden infrastructures or actively perceiving their existence and saturation, "security's undoing" resides in the change in perception: individuals must learn to see, to interpret, and to subsequently challenge that which is mundane and goes unnoticed, to engage in the heterotopic imagination.

And so, queer Koreans finding ways to maneuver within their disruption/threat treatment, methods of endurance, is illustrative in more generative understandings of "security's undoing" and heterotopic imagination. I argued, in Chapter 1, that national security is predicated on a politics of exclusion and difference, solidified in the North Korean other that has since transformed over the years to include a whole host of individuals at the margins of the state and society, now including queer Koreans. These exclusionary practices render these

bodies national security disruptions and threats, but, as I have also shown throughout this book, queer Koreans continue to labor for a reconfiguration of this security calculus, reorienting the dangers of security relationality with what José Esteban Muñoz (2009) calls "educated hope." The fight against security-infused discrimination, whether it happens consciously or not, is a move toward "security's undoing." These are not wholescale changes—security will not ever be completely undone—primarily because working within liberal democratic systems yields only so much *acceptable* wiggle room; normativity, like security, does not so easily come undone.

But Muñoz (2009) asks us to think big while staying grounded, to be utopic (or heterotopic) insofar as it leads to actionable change, acknowledging that change takes time, it takes effort and people, but steadfastness is rarely so easy. For instance, the human–virus hybrid from Chapter 4 enabled the radical queer activist insistence that relationality between humans and between humans and viruses must form the basis of a viral epidemic (and now pandemic) response. This hybrid and relationality are more than an event-specific response or limited only to epidemic and pandemic times; they are a platform for "new ways of being in the world … where there are no charters" (Lorde 1984, 111). In the wake of the Covid-19 pandemic, *any* relationality that tethers bodies together with supposed threats is potentially dangerous. This very act of tethering, itself a fundamental practice of relationality, is disruptive. But, as Audre Lorde (1984, 112) famously declared, "the master's tools will never dismantle the master's house."

Creative, transformative, downright fugitive thinking and action must thus be taken. A human–virus hybrid. A checkpoint. A group of volunteers surveilling the general population. These revolutionary tools take many forms because these are not necessarily suburban, cookie-cutter houses. Heterotopic imagination begins with stories: the stories we tell of our families and relations, the stories Korea tells of its histories and ideologies. Queerness and the Democracy and Human Rights Memorial Hall both work to tell a different story of Korea, one predicated on a politics of inclusion rather than national security's politics of exclusion. And this, I dare to say, is the crack that might lead to security's undoing.

Notes

1 Only an armistice agreement was signed in 1953.
2 This is partly inspired by Judith Butler's discussion of gender as iterative and repeated, as they argue that gender is a doing, "a kind of becoming or activity … an incessant and repeated action of some sort" (1990, 143). Inspired by Foucault, subjects do not simply exist with essences but are produced through iterative processes, through the repetition of (gendered) norms, through discourse.
3 This compares, for example, to Joseph Masco's (2014, 18) notion of "national security affect" whereby "the goal of a national security system is to produce a citizen-subject who responds to officially designated signs of danger automatically, instinctively activating logics and actions learned over time through drills and media indoctrination."
4 Laura Meek first pointed out the "fugitivity" of queer people and activists. My use of fugitivity is inspired by black fugitivity, particularly around schooling in the United States (Sojoyner 2017).
5 And to borrow from Ronak Kapadia (2019, 16), "who does it [security] target for killing, abandonment, or humiliation?"
6 Pyŏn was found dead in her home in March 2021.
7 Women are not required to serve in the military.
8 It is difficult to ignore the Freudian and Lacanian history of thought indexed in the claim that the loss of the phallus equates to a disability.
9 Pyŏn's discharge was posthumously ruled unlawful by a South Korean court in October 2021 (Kim 2021).
10 Thomas Lemke (2011, 36–37) notes that, for Foucault, population is not "a legal or political entity … but an independent biological corpus: a 'social body' that is characterized by its own processes and phenomena, such as birth and death rates, health status, life span, and the production of wealth and its circulation."
11 Lovecraft was often criticized for his treatment of people of color in his stories, especially people from Asia. Cthulhu is here a reference to Lovecraft's monster and not Donna Haraway's (2016) Chthulucene, which is spelled differently and which Haraway explicitly states is different from Lovecraft's Cthulhu.
12 Geographer Cindi Katz (2007, 350) makes an analogous observation in the post-9/11 United States landscape with the "always already presence of terrorism in our mind," relying on the "barely noticed reminders of terror."
13 Balibar (2004, 23) is even more forthright: "Exclusion … is thus the very essence of the nation-form."

14 Anthropologists following Goldstein have reexamined classic studies in anthropology through the lens of security (Pedersen and Holbraad 2013; Maguire, Frois, and Zurawski 2014).
15 Three main schools emerge within critical security studies: one focused on the conditions that threaten individual security (Aberystwyth School), one concerned with the invocation through discourse of security (Copenhagen School), and one concentrated on security professionals and individuals that "do" security (Paris School).
16 The very category of the human was crafted—with the development of physical sciences and then biological sciences (what Wynter calls the invention of "Man1" and "Man2")—to naturalize racial difference, insofar as race became "the non-supernatural but no less extrahuman ground … of the answer that the secularizing West would now give to the Heideggerian question as to the who, and the what we are" (Wynter 2003, 264).
17 This belief, Inderpal Grewal (2017) argues—a condition of "advanced" neoliberalism—compels the exceptional citizens to "save the security state," and subsequently fuels an entire security infrastructure, economy, and culture.
18 This is certainly true for black bodies, for, as Simone Browne (2015, 140) demonstrates, "cases of flying while black reveal the ways in which certain bodies, particularly those of black women, often get taken up as publicly available for scrutiny and inspection, and also get marked as more threatening."
19 In fact, as Beauchamp (2019, 9) argues, greater surveillance and security measures exist for gender-nonconforming individuals in the US, not because of their particular identifications—though this certainly contributes—but because these individuals are read and perceived as deceiving the public, the state, and the nation through "transgressive gender presentation."
20 Gay sex became a mechanism of sexual torture against those Muslim bodies interpreted as terrorists, but in so doing gay sex also became "the worst form of torture, sexual or otherwise" (Puar 2007, 111).
21 Tallie Ben Daniel and Hilary Berwick (2020, 129) also aim to provide introductory points for what they call "queer security studies" that displace the seeming flatness of "safety" and "security," claiming that "security functions as palimpsest: beneath queer, trans, and feminist definitions of bodily autonomy and safe space, one invariably confronts histories of colonialism, slavery, and national security."
22 Hoon Song (2020) refers to this relationality as "Cold War-informed bipolarity."
23 Sociologist Kyung-sup Chang (1999) argues that the mechanisms that facilitated rapid industrialization during the developmental or authoritarian years, what he calls "compressed modernity," were also responsible for the collapse that followed.
24 Article 39 of the Constitution of the Republic of South Korea requires that all citizens have a duty of national defense, though it was the Military Service Act of 1949—implemented in 1957—that specified that all able-bodied Korean men over the age of 19 are required to serve (Lee 2007).
25 Extimacy is made famous by Jacques Lacan and is often imagined as a mobius strip that connects "inside" to "outside" along a continuum that at any given point presents as separate but in reality is the same.

26 In the wake of this scandal, the NIS declassified a 2007 transcript that shows former liberal president Roh Moo-hyun "pressing to create a peace zone along a maritime border disputed with the North." While conservative politicians claim that Roh cared more about cooperating with North Korea than security, liberal politicians said that "the spy agency, instead, was manufacturing one controversy to distract from the other" (Harlan 2013).
27 The issue of comfort women, or Korean sex slaves mobilized by the then Japanese Empire, is still rather contentious today, creating friction between South Korea and Japan.
28 In 1930, for instance, six million Koreans—against a population of 18 million—were either serving a prison sentence or finished serving a previous sentence. That same year, 1.6 per cent of 179,300 Koreans arrested were recorded as being in violation of the Security Maintenance Law (Kang 2016, 422–23).
29 Namhee Lee (2007, 102) points out that the term "conversion" (*chŏnhyang*) was originally used by Japanese Marxists to speak of going "beyond narrow personal experience and to develop a 'firm and autonomous' stance both in theory and in practice."
30 As Sealing Cheng (2010) demonstrates, many of these entertainment establishments now employ Filipina migrants.
31 Grace Cho (2008, 8) is explicit in her dissection of US imperialism on the peninsula, noting that "in the context of the making of the yanggongju, September 1945 signaled the transition between the system of sexual slavery set up for the Japanese Imperial Army (the comfort stations) and the system of camptown prostitution set up for the U.S. military (*gijichon*). It was a moment in which the traumas from the past encountered the traumas from the future."
32 The KCIA (*Chungang Chŏngbobu*) later changed its name to the Agency for National Security Planning (*Kukka Anjŏn Kihoekpu*) after the Chun Doo-hwan military junta in 1981 (Moran 1998). The organization has since changed its name to the National Intelligence Service (*Taehan Min'guk Kukka Chŏngbowŏn*).
33 This "extra points system" was eliminated in 1999 as a result of protests from various women's groups and the "democratizing court system" (Moon 2005, 40). The military institution affected not only a newly emergent laboring class but it also shaped industry and how businesses were managed, particularly the large family-owned corporations. The management style of these larger companies was modeled after military hierarchies, and so military service was supposed to prepare men for jobs in familiar environments (Lie 1998).
34 Out of nearly 351,000 conscripts in 2015, roughly 1,000 men were fully exempt from service. There were an additional 7,200 men that received a second eligible conscription status, which means that they were exempt from the two years of active service and instead were assigned to the Civil Defense Corps. There are inherent problems and violence in South Korea's military exemption system, especially for trans women as their anatomy does not enable them to obtain exemption (Yi and Gitzen 2018).
35 The soldiers responsible for the conscript's death were eventually charged with the murder and imprisoned.
36 *Kyegan* is based on the Japanese *keikan*, which also translates as "anal intercourse." Historically, *keikan* was used to also refer to male–female anal inter-

course, but Gregory Pflugfelder (1999, 159) contends that the Meiji legal discourse where *keikan* emerged implies male–male sexual relations.

37 The dissenting opinion claims that the clause does not specify the perpetrator or victim of the "indecent sexual act" because the provision excludes mention of force or coercion. Therefore, they conclude, the clause does violate the principle of clarity (Constitutional Court 2001 *hŏnba*-70, 2002).

38 Both Foal Eagle and Ulchi Freedom Guardian are considered by some to be the largest military exercises in the world. Lasting nearly two months, Foal Eagle is a "combined field-training exercise" comprising "smaller exercises in the air, at sea, and on land," while Ulchi Freedom Guardian is a "computer-assisted command post exercise" (Engman 2018, 2). While the Trump presidency has effectuated fluctuations to joint military exercises in an attempt to appease or negotiate with North Korea, these military exercises have lasted since 1976 and the Park Chung-hee regime.

39 KATUSA was originally created at the start of the Korean War to address the temporary shortage of US Army personnel in South Korea, but has since formed its own discursive and material place in the South Korean military and among Korean citizens: "in this ambiguous space, KATUSAS live with the imperial power that GIs embody in their pervasive sense of superiority toward KATUSAS" (Moon 2010, 232).

40 See also Chun (2022) on his interpretation of images of kissing Korean soldiers.

41 For a more detailed exploration of male sociality and the construction of masculinity in the military, see Moon (2005). For an exploration of the aftereffects of military service on the construction of masculinity, see Cheng (2000) and Lee et al. (2019). Finally, for a discussion of masculinity and queer soldiers, see my piece on narratives of homoeroticism in the military (Gitzen 2022).

42 The 2009 short film *Just Friends?* (*Ch'in'gu Sai?*) by director Kim Jho Kwang-soo (Kim Cho Kwang-su) features such a scene, as Sŏ-gi reunites with his soldier boyfriend, Min-su, during one of Min-su's leaves. The film takes an unexpected turn when Min-su's mother also shows up and Sŏ-gi is introduced as a friend.

43 The festival formally changed its name to Seoul Queer Culture Festival in 2018 after more pride festivals arose in other South Korean cities.

44 Elliott Prasse-Freeman (2023b) refers to this bluntness of the state apparatus as "blunt biopolitics."

45 With Western missionaries entering Korea in the late 19th century, Protestantism influenced both progressive reforms in the late Confucian period of Korea (1884–1905) and the anticolonial nationalist movement during Japanese colonialism (Park 2003, 4).

46 There are instances when evangelicals "confronted" government policies or actions with which they disagreed, often including prayer events with thousands or tens of thousands (if not more) in attendance (Timothy Lee 2010, 101–2).

47 Timothy Lee (2010, 139–40) notes that "evangelicalism has so predominated the Korean church that evangelicalism and Protestantism are often synonymous in Korea."

48 Issues raised at this demonstration include the government's replacement of independently written and produced history textbooks with government-issued textbooks, and the changes to labor laws that make it easier for con-

glomerates (many of which are family-owned) to fire workers (*New York Times* 2015). Also, while the police report that 70,000 people were in attendance, other organizations say that closer to 130,000 people were in attendance from 53 different labor unions and civil groups (Kyung-min Lee 2015).

49 Some of the protesters did carry iron bars; 100 policemen were injured while roughly 40 police buses were damaged (*Economist* 2016).

50 Among those struck with the water cannon was 68-year-old farmer and activist Baek Nam-gi, who was hit in the face and rushed off to the hospital as he slipped into a coma. He remained in that coma from November 2015 to late September 2016, when he eventually died (Choe 2016).

51 The police are not governed by municipalities but nationally centralized with strong ties to the executive branch of the government (Moon 2004).

52 This is not to say that queer *in'gwŏn ch'imhae kamsidan* volunteers never surveil and document police actions.

53 Some interlocutors and KQCF organizers estimate between 20,000 to 30,000 participants. For the 2016 KQCF, estimates run as high as 50,000 participants (Ock 2016).

54 This is the same district as the October 2022 Halloween stampede that killed over 150 individuals.

55 Some citizens even took to publishing personal information and pictures of suspected queer patients online (Gitzen 2020).

56 South Korea, proportionally, has more cashless transactions than anywhere else in the world. Furthermore, they have one of the highest mobile phone ownership rates in the world, and, given that one is required to use one's real name and Korean registration number (akin to a social security number) in mobile phone contracts along with the roughly 860,000 4G and 5G transceivers spread throughout the country (providing accurate phone locations), public health officials and the government can track phones (and patients) in real time (Sonn 2020).

57 The nomenclature K-Quarantine was first used by Korea's Ministry of Health and Welfare. In Korean, however, the phrase is "K-*pangyŏk*," where *pangyŏk* translates to preventative measures and not quarantine (the Korean word for quarantine, also circulating at the time, is *kyŏngni*). The original Korean K-*pangyŏk* is a more accurate reflection of the pandemic surveillance technologies and procedures mobilized. For some time now, Korea has affixed the English letter "K" to words—in Korean and English—to denote a Korean-style version of that word. This follows the popularity of K-pop music, or Korean popular music.

58 I draw particular inspiration from Lisa Rofel's (2007) usage of "desire" and "yearning" to explain both an internal restructuring of the self and an external national project amid neoliberal experiments in contemporary China.

59 For Browne (2015, 17), racializing surveillance "suggests that how things get ordered racially by way of surveillance depends on space and time and is subject to change, but most often upholds negating strategies that first accompanied European colonial expansion and transatlantic slavery that sought to structure social relations and institutions in ways that privilege whiteness."

60 An interesting aside: the incredibly popular, and now global, television show *The Masked Singer*—or, in Korea, *King of Mask Singer*, began in April 2015. I

make mention of this because the show, popular even then, is premised on the concealment of identity. The concealment of identity is a common theme in Korean television programs, but also a common practice in news television as citizens' identities are typically concealed.

61 Prosecutors in the case would go on to claim that Manning's deception was part of her character, using the defense's revelation that Manning is trans and that being secretly trans in the military created incredible stress that led her to leak the materials to argue that Manning was doubly deceptive.

62 The metrics and "quantification strategies" used in global health "to *avoid* politics often do not avoid politics at all; they become a form of politics in their own right, augmenting the political stakes and political underpinnings of health projects in a manner that is frequently invisible to those who believe in these exercises in calculation and counting" (Adams 2016, 8–9; see also Merry 2016).

63 My use of "perception filter" is inspired, in fact, by the long-running BBC television show *Doctor Who*. There are several episodes where the Doctor speaks of a perception filter around his/her spaceship, the TARDIS.

64 This section was originally published in *Items: Insights from the Social Sciences* on September 23, 2021, as part of the series "Covid-19 and the Social Sciences. Reprinted with permission. Items is a digital publication of the Social Science Research Council (SSRC).

65 Perhaps an obvious statement to make, but one that, mid-pandemic, many have seemed forgotten: South Korea has a population of roughly 51.5 million people, the United States around 327 million people, and China more than 1.3 billion people. What works for Korea may not work for the United States, and what works for China, similarly, may not work elsewhere.

66 Being "outed" equates to having sought a Covid-19 test—or even testing positive for Covid-19—along with being "outed" as queer given that the only Koreans getting tested, let along testing positive, at that particular time were those individuals associated with the Itaewon outbreak and decidedly queer.

67 Brown (2018) delineates in her piece on "neoliberalism's Frankenstein" and the rise of authoritarianism how early neoliberals like Hayek believed that democracy actually limits freedoms because it does not always consider the primacy of the market or the "personal, protected sphere."

68 For more on the contours of what may constitute a "pandemic emergency" from the perspective of government institutions, see Lakoff (2017) and Collier and Lakoff (2021).

69 Some have attempted to mobilize Puar's notion of homonationalism inside Korea (Han 2018), but I am critical of such usage given the lack of a sustained homonormative population in Korea that would then be needed for homonationalism to operate. We may think of the examples above as a form of proto-homonationalism, a nationalism not predicated on the inclusion of queer Koreans but one mobilized by queer Koreans for their own sake. While certainly upholding, in part, the contours and ideologies of the nation in this instance, queer Koreans are still the necessary fodder for disruption and threat-making in the throes of banal security.

70 Paxson (2008, 17) continues: "biopolitics, then, is joined by *microbiopolitics*: the creation of categories of microscopic biological agents, the anthropocentric

evaluation of such agents; and the elaboration of appropriate human behaviors vis-à-vis microorganisms engaged in infection, inoculation, and digestion."

71 I recognize that hybridity is a fraught term, particularly in postcolonial and globalization studies, as it can be read as positing two essentialized categories that then combine to form something different. My usage of hybridity was at first inspired by Wald's (2008, 260) discussion of the dangers of viral hybridity for microbiologists and virologists, particularly with emerging infectious diseases. It is the multiplicity of the hybrid to be dangerous and creative—and dangerous for being creative—that I find generative.

72 HIV/AIDS is still highly stigmatized in Korea, as it is across East Asia, often intersecting with issues of gender, sexuality, class, and labor (Hyde 2007; Zhou 2010; Cheng 2004; Cullinane 2007).

73 The 12,320 people living with HIV/AIDS in South Korea breaks down to 11,458 men and 862 women. This number is set against a national population of nearly 52 million, with a little over 1,000 new cases reported each year since 2012 (KCDC 2018). These statistics do not distinguish between HIV and AIDS.

74 Those who test positive are not able to rejoin the military or advance as a military officer. While the effects of a referral to the KCDC may not be immediately known, the KCDC does continuously monitor and surveil those who test positive and are thus enumerated within a political system that already stigmatizes them and holds them accountable for their HIV status.

75 This advice was uploaded to a government-run website providing guidelines for "expectant South Korean mothers at different stages of their pregnancy," including how to maintain a healthy weight and one pointed piece of advice: "buy a hairband so that you don't look disheveled after having the baby" (McCurry 2021).

76 Jesook Song (2009, 53) details the case of actor Hong Sŏk-chŏn, who was rumored to be gay and frequent gay bars in 2000. He then publicly announced that he was gay, whereby the broadcasting company fired him "because he was supposedly setting a bad example for children[. The broadcasting company was] responding to the complaints of parents and pressure from the Broadcasting Ethics Committee (Pangsong Yulli Wiwŏnhoe) that called Hong's presence on TV an 'obscenity'" (ibid.). The editorials that followed Hong's (forced) admission "implied that gayness was critical evidence of family breakdown" (ibid.).

77 Homeless women, for instance, are not only invisible but thought not to exist because, as one city official asked, "how can women with children run away from home and leave their children? Mothers cannot be that irresponsible. Women who do that could only be insane" (Song 2009, 60). The gendered dynamic of family and kinship are thus found in homeless policies, as Jesook Song demonstrates, as men are recuperable as breadwinning husbands and fathers, while the very conception of homeless women is unintelligible in this idiom.

78 The concern in these policies and in the language of reproduction is often young women, either unmarried or without children (Song 2014; Paik 2009).

79 To sustain the 690,000-man force, at least 400,000 20-year-old males must be eligible each year (Bennett 2006; Han 2006).

80 Six hundred and eighty-three people have died worldwide from MERS since 2012, with a 40% mortality rate (Rasoolden 2017).

81 For De La Fabian (2020), however, resilience is critical of future-oriented modes of governance that have become a hallmark for security (as inspired by Foucault). He argues that resilience moves governance from fear and negativity to the "resignification of trauma" for productive ends, in part a "bouncing back" disposition. Yet, like Foucault's distinction between discipline and security, resilience often operates alongside modes of security in both complementary and contradictory ways.

82 "Superbugs" also compare to "superspreaders," a term media used during the SARS outbreak to denote "hyperinfective" individuals who are depicted as intentionally and willfully spreading the virus to many people (Wald 2008, 4). The more recent outbreak of Covid-19 has similarly facilitated language of superspreaders by epidemiologists, public health officials, and the media (see Siddique 2020).

83 Queer bodies could thus be likened again to SARS "superspreaders," as the "metamorphosis of infected people into superspreaders is a convention of the outbreak narrative, in which human carriers rhetorically (or, in some of the fiction, literally) bring the virus itself to life" (Wald 2008, 4).

84 It is not always clear if queer folks or men who have sex with men fully understand the etiology of HIV and its transmission, given that much of the social discourse surrounding HIV/AIDS includes medical falsities.

85 There are instances in HIV/AIDS activism where activists and organizations will translate *HIV kamyŏmin* as person living with HIV/AIDS (PLWHA) into English. Some will also use either PL or PLWHA abbreviations in Korean texts. These terms all reference the same person for activists, but my point again is that the Korean phrasing of the above title heading is unique because that phrasing is not really used in Korean.

86 The affective connections that activists like Jin-min and Chŏng formed with PLWHA ought not be overlooked; indeed, many participants in the HIV/AIDS activist group ACT UP in the late 1980s to early 1990s formed intense affective connections with each other (Cvetkovich 2003; Gould 2009). Those connections of PLWHA and nonpositive queer people became transformative at a time when "kin ties were reevaluated, constituted, or alienated in the act" of individuals telling their relatives that they had AIDS (Weston 1991, 186).

87 The Korean name of the organization, Sŏngsosuja Pumo Moim, does not actually translate to PFLAG Korea but to Parents' Group for Sexual Minorities. The organization itself translates their name in some publications and on their flag and banner as Parents and Families of LGBTAIQ People in Korea, but they also use the nomenclature PFLAG Korea as shorthand.

88 The group has received national attention, as countless newspaper articles and interviews have circulated, along with television appearances in 2017 and 2019 on three major Korean television channels. Furthermore, the documentary "Coming to You" was released in 2021, which focuses on the journey of two mothers in accepting their children's sexual identity alongside their queer activism.

89 I refrain from referring to a "cooling" of relations between North and South Korea, especially given the North Korean missile tests, but instead recognize that the tension itself is mundane, thus contributing further to the banality of security.

90 The former liberal government of President Roh Moo-hyun substantially reduced the authority and human rights infringements of the NIS, beginning in 2003 with the appointment of human rights lawyer Ko Young-koo (Ko Yŏng-gu) as head of the NIS (Fattig 2013).
91 In October 2014, stories broke that the government was surveilling the popular mobile messenger application Kakao Talk, leading to over one million users switching to the German application Telegram. While Kakao Talk had initially refused to cooperate with wiretapping warrants, it began cooperating with investigators in October 2015 (Kim 2015).
92 Rainbow Vote successfully registered 5,664 gender and sexual minorities to vote in the April 2016 National Assembly election (Rainbow Vote 2016).
93 The Christian Liberty Party later changed its name in 2020 to the Christian Liberty Unification Party.
94 Jun (2012, 103) continues, "in a country where 'development' is constantly a present continuous project, the multicultural mantra of respect for cultural diversity and difference has become a new modality of 'growth.'"
95 Interesting in Jun's analysis is the way civil society groups and actors critique the government's policies as focusing almost wholly on multicultural families and interventionist practices only to reify a liberal developmentalist discourse of multiculturalism and tolerance through an ethics of self-cultivation (Jun 2012, 106).
96 This included a reassessment of the Gwangju Uprising in 1980, when hundreds of Koreans were killed by the military during and after a series of demonstrations demanding democracy (Lee 2007), the enactment of a Presidential Truth Commission on Suspicious Deaths in 2001 to investigate state-sanctioned killings during the authoritarian years, and a series of laws and acts that assessed the human rights violations of the former authoritarian regimes against its own citizens (Cho 2007).
97 The National Human Rights Commission of Korea can only make recommendations. They have no jurisdiction to speak of and both the state and other organizations are under no legal obligation to adhere to the recommendations.
98 Hannah Arendt (1973, 296) writes that depriving one of community belonging means that "they are deprived, not of the right of freedom, but of the right to action; not of the right to think whatever they please, but of the right to opinion."
99 Palestine Peace and Solidarity in South Korea was the first Korean organization to join the BDS movement as they successfully boycotted the Israeli Special Exhibition at the EBS International Documentary Film Festival (EIDF) in 2013 (Ruk'a 2016).
100 Absent presence is also meant to index Jacques Derrida's (1976) deconstructivist critique of the metaphysics of presence, taking aim at the possibility of an outside source to truth and knowledge, famously quipping that "there is nothing outside the text" (158).

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The decades-long fear of South Korean national destruction has routinized national security and the sense of threat. In present day South Korea, national security includes not only war and the military, but national unity, public health, and the family. As a result, queer Koreans have become a target as their bodies are thought to harbor deadly viruses and are thus seen as carriers of diseases. The prevailing narrative already sees being queer as a threat to traditional family and marriage. By claiming that queer Koreans disrupt military readiness and unit cohesion, that threat is extended to the entire population. Queer Koreans are enveloped by the banality of security, treated as threats, while also being overlooked as part of the nation.

What does it mean to be perceived as a national threat simply based on who you would like to sleep with? In their desire to be seen as citizens who support the safety and security of the nation, queer Koreans placate a patriarchal and national authority that is responsible for their continued marginalization. At the same time, they are also creating spaces to protect themselves from the security measures and technologies directed against them. Taking readers from police stations and the galleries of the Constitutional Court to queer activist offices and pride festivals, *Banal Security* explores how queer Koreans participate in their own securitization, demonstrates how security weaves through daily life in ways that oppress queer Koreans, and highlights the work of queer activists to address that oppression. In doing so, queer Koreans challenge not only the contours of national security in South Korea, but global entanglements of security.

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