**IMISCOE Research Series**

# RicardZapata-Barrero Ibrahim Awad *Editors*

# Migrations in the Mediterranean IMISCOE Regional Reader

IMISCOE Research Series

This series is the official book series of IMISCOE, the largest network of excellence on migration and diversity in the world. It comprises publications which present empirical and theoretical research on different aspects of international migration. The authors are all specialists, and the publications a rich source of information for researchers and others involved in international migration studies. The series is published under the editorial supervision of the IMISCOE Editorial Committee which includes leading scholars from all over Europe. The series, which contains more than eighty titles already, is internationally peer reviewed which ensures that the book published in this series continue to present excellent academic standards and scholarly quality. Most of the books are available open access.

Ricard Zapata-Barrero • Ibrahim Awad Editors

# Migrations in the Mediterranean

# IMISCOE Regional Reader

Editors Ricard Zapata-Barrero GRITIM-UPF (Interdisciplinary Research Group on Immigration), Department of Social and Political Sciences Universitat Pompeu Fabra Catalonia, Barcelona, Spain

Ibrahim Awad Center for Migration and Refugee Studies, School of Global Affairs and Public Policy The American University in Cairo New Cairo, Egypt

ISSN 2364-4087 ISSN 2364-4095 (electronic) IMISCOE Research Series ISBN 978-3-031-42263-8 ISBN 978-3-031-42264-5 (eBook) https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-42264-5

This work was supported by IMISCOE

© The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s) 2024. This book is an open access publication.

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# Funding and Acknowledgements

This volume is one of the key actions of EuroMedMig, a platform of researchers working on Mediterranean Migration created in 2018 on the occasion of the IMISCOE General Conference at Barcelona. EuroMedMig has become an IMISCOE Regional Network. It is also an activity within a three-year (2019–2022) Erasmus+ Jean Monnet Network Program (Project Reference: 611260-EPP-1-2019-1-ES-EPPJMO-NET-WORK) entitled "Mapping European Mediterranean Migration Studies" (Acronym: EUMedMi) and coordinated by GRITIM-UPF.

Aida Casanovas, from the EuroMedMig office, has been co-operating since the beginning. Without her professionalism, motivation and energy, the task of co-editing would certainly have been more difficult and more tedious. At the final stage, we are grateful for the work of Juan Pablo Santangelo in the delicate task of proofreading all the chapters and transforming all the different parts into one manuscript. He has guaranteed the quality of the editing.

# Contents





# Chapter 1 Introduction: Mediterranean Migration Studies – A Research Agenda for the Coming Years

Ricard Zapata-Barrero and Ibrahim Awad

### 1.1 Blurb of This Co-edited Book

This volume seeks to cover the overall Mediterranean regional dimension on migrations. The basic purpose is to provide a basis for future research synergies by showcasing a plurality of perspectives to and applications of Mediterranean Migrations. This provides a direct opportunity and a reflective invitation to think the Mediterranean as a category of analysis for migration studies, which involves both a regional approach to migration and as "scale thinking" of geo-political governance (Zapata-Barrero, 2022). This broad geographical scope, coupled with cross-cutting and inter-disciplinary contributions, as well as the key-fact that this volume seeks to integrate regional, national, and North-Eastern-South complementarities are the distinctive features of its focus. It links Mediterranean and Migration Studies by articulating three sub-regions (Southern Europe, Northern Africa and Middle East) or the so-called Southern and Eastern Mediterranean (SEM) countries in the EU parlance.

This Mediterranean scale of analysis (see special issue co-edited by Zapata-Barrero & Faustini, 2019) invites us to conduct most of our research findings towards a region-making process, detaching what is particular of this region of the world, but also what is common to migration and that we can also encounter in other regions. What is probably the most striking feature of this particular domain of

R. Zapata-Barrero (✉)

GRITIM-UPF (Interdisciplinary Research Group on Immigration), Department of Social and Political Sciences, Universitat Pompeu Fabra, Catalonia, Barcelona, Spain e-mail: ricard.zapata@upf.edu

I. Awad

Center for Migration and Refugee Studies, School of Global Affairs and Public Policy, The American University in Cairo, New Cairo, Egypt e-mail: iawad@aucegypt.edu

research is that in the Mediterranean the mobility of people originates and may have effects in three continents at the same time. This makes it unique.

This volume aims to map and strengthen current research development trends from a multiplicity of disciplines and geographical angles (North and South, East and West). The main ambition is to offer a body of knowledge that responds to the quest of unifying the Mediterranean and recognizes the multiple historical sociopolitical economic and geopolitical relationships that unite the shores. Another main objective is to contribute to knowledge about past and current exchanges in the Mediterranean region, which should foster understanding and cooperation.

This collaborative book addresses a wide range of issues related to the Mediterranean migration research agenda, covering relevant areas and topics in five main parts, going from Geo-political Mediterranean Relations (Part I) and Governance, Policies and Politics (Part II), Taxonomies of Motion and Drivers (Part III), to Cities, History and Social Transformations (Part IV), and Economy and Labour Markets (Part V). By focusing on these multiple angles of the same reality, the volume could make a valuable contribution to migration studies, where the Mediterranean is probably one of the most studied areas, but still considered a weak category of analysis. This is probably one of the reasons why Eurocentrism and state-centrism, Westerncentrism, are still deeply rooted in the political, policy, but also research spheres. If we want to contribute to the opening up of Mediterranean regional studies, we must necessarily question our positionality and adopt an epistemological multipleperspectivism in defining problems, analysing them and envisaging possible future scenarios. The volume aims to articulate a systematic and accessible body of accumulated knowledge capable of developing a comprehensive regional understanding of migrations and related associated population movements in the Mediterranean.1 As a handbook, this volume promotes the potential of migration and human mobility for the economic, environmental, cultural, political and social development of the Mediterranean, and succeeds in placing Mediterranean migration studies within the global migration agenda. It is noteworthy that the vast majority of the authors of the chapters are from Mediterranean countries, on the North, South and East shores of the sea.

Migrations in the Mediterranean will undoubtedly be of interest to a large number of scholars, both junior and senior researchers, as well as policy-makers and senior representatives of civil society organisations, international foundations and organisations. Given the variety of contributors in terms of background, geographical distribution, and multi-varied approaches, it should also be of particular interest to scholars working on the economics, politics, and international relations of the Mediterranean, and social scientists in general.

<sup>1</sup> By "associated population movements" we mean those population movements in which "asylum seekers" request asylum but are unable to do so, thus remaining as migrants. This is quite a mainstream feature in the Mediterranean. There is a growing number of citizens from countries in Africa and even Asia who cross the Mediterranean but are not recognized as refugees. UNHCR refers to these migrant groups as "mixed migration flows".

#### 1.2 What This Book Is About: Main Themes and Objectives

Mediterranean and Migrations are probably two sides of the same coin. Migrations in the Mediterranean is as old as the spatial awareness of the Mediterranean. The movement of populations constitutes the bedrock of Mediterranean history. But patterns and dynamics of this mobility, political and governance reactions have changed over time. Cities, empires, colonial, economic, social and cultural relations of the past still shape current migratory and associated population movement patterns and the geopolitics of governance. Even if today, the views of these flows are mostly unipolar, from South to North, from East to West, reality illustrates that there are some new emerging trends that announce the multipolarity of human movement. These include the return of migrants, transnational relationships linking the shores of the Mediterranean, but also skilled and lifestyle migrants from North to South, from West to East. Different patterns of migration and associated population movements are emerging, and more traditional patterns are analysed within a mix of drivers.

Historically, commercial and religious factors have driven migrations between countries on the Southern Shores of the Mediterranean. For instance, pilgrims from the Maghreb settled in Egypt on their way to or during return from Mecca. Migration also accompanied or was an outcome of colonial enterprises in the Maghreb countries. From Europe, especially Italy and Greece, migrants sought jobs in Egypt or participated in its modernization in the second half of the nineteenth century and first half the twentieth. Factors driving migrations and associated population movements in the Mediterranean today can be mixed: demographics, employment, integration, human rights infringement, instability of governments, climate change and environmental pressures, lifestyle, etc. Employment, specifically youth employment, is a challenge within Mediterranean countries, to the North, East and to the South and constitutes a distinctive feature of the Mediterranean regional system in the third decade of the twenty-first century. These economic, political, cultural and social factors are in need of scientific research, fostering a multidisciplinary debate while avoiding explicit or subtle Euro- and Western-centrism. There is a need to articulate a regional approach, incorporating a multiplicity of perspectives and understandings of the same phenomenon. The mixture of population movements, together with climate change-induced migration are also new drivers of contemporary Mediterranean Migration, as well as different geo-politics of migrations that arise from European Union and European States and other Southern and Eastern states' interest.

The complexity of relations, the uncertainty of political circumstances and the diversity of social regimes around the Mediterranean require a regional approach, while linking the past with the present. There is a need to decolonise the Mediterranean by addressing the current tragic situations of migrant deaths in its waters, but also the blind spots, the amnesias, the silences and the politically constructed ruptures with a past that is still present through migratory and related population movements.

The main ambition of these 25 contributions is to provide a body of knowledge that responds to the quest of unifying the Mediterranean rather than dividing it and recognises the multiple historical socio political economic and geopolitical relationships that unite the shores. To contribute to knowledge about past and current exchanges in the Mediterranean region, which should foster understanding and cooperation, is also our objective.

# 1.3 The Mediterranean Scale: Scope of Migration Studies and Current Research Agenda

The Mediterranean scale of analysis is key in defining the scope of all the contributions. It invites us to disentangle what is specific to this region of the world, but also what is common to migrations and what we may encounter in other regions, and to direct most of the research findings towards a region-making process. It is true, for example, that the multi-scale nature of migrations in the Mediterranean, its unpredictability and its complexity are general characteristics of international migration in all regions. In the Mediterranean, however, migrations originate and can have an impact on three continents at the same time. This makes it unique. The Mediterranean is where three continents meet, but it is also considered the most diasporic region in the world (Gallant, 2016; 205), it remains the least peaceful region in the world (Global Peace Index, 2018) and by far the deadliest zone in the world (number of deaths in attempts to cross the Mediterranean) (latest UNHCR and IOM reports). The Mediterranean is probably also where activism, despite its criminalisation, plays a crucial role in saving lives, but also in shattering consciences and reconfiguring current power relations between and within states.

This volume seeks to map the current research agenda on Mediterranean migration by selecting current innovative perspectives and approaches with promising avenues for further research. It has brought together a community of scholars who are already contributing to the development of this field of research from all shores of the Mediterranean and beyond. The chapters address some of the most pressing issues in the field through both comparative analysis and case studies. The diversity of the authors' disciplines enriches the unity of this co-edited book. This results in a great richness in terms of disciplines, theoretical perspectives, topics and methodologies.

As co-editors, our premise is that, despite the existence of a burgeoning literature, this field is dispersed and unarticulated between the Mediterranean Studies and Migration Studies. The main scholarly purpose of Migrations in the Mediterranean is then twofold: The first is to provide a comprehensive representation of the body of knowledge that has accumulated in the last two decades of the twenty-first century. The second, and probably as a result of the first, it is to leave open this new research agenda on Mediterranean migrations for the coming years. In other words, this volume aims to encourage the reader to think carefully about where and with whom most of our knowledge comes from and consequently informs politics and society. And who can use and benefit from this production of knowledge.

The general horizon is to overcome the fragmentation of knowledge and data and to find exploratory ways to reduce the gap between research findings and knowledge, public opinion and policies. In line with this rationale, we asked the contributors to both take a critical look at the current state of the art on Mediterranean migrations and to prioritise innovative ways of sources and knowledge production. That is, to give voice to what is most of the time silenced and/or excluded from mainstream narratives and practices. We then asked all contributors to engage substantively with Mediterranean migration studies in order to help shape this particular regional field of migration studies.

We have asked all the contributors to end their chapters with some final thoughts on how their own arguments and findings can contribute to the shaping of the Mediterranean region in terms of economic, political, social and cultural identity, and even in terms of shared values.

# 1.4 Summary: Main Objectives and the Rationale of the Edited Book and Basic Areas Covered

We can summarize the objectives following four broad principles: (1) To articulate a systematic, shared, innovative and accessible accumulated corpus of knowledge, capable of developing a comprehensive regional understanding of Migrations and associated population movements in the Mediterranean; (2) To encourage knowledge exchange between senior and young researchers of both sides of the Mediterranean, and of scholars working on Mediterranean Migrations and associated population movements all over the world; (3) To promote the potentialities of Migrations and Human Mobilities for the economic, environmental, cultural, political, and social development of the Mediterranean.; (4) To place Mediterranean Migration Studies within the Global Migration Agenda.

In the last few years, the Mediterranean gained more and more relevance in European and migration studies and, currently, it is a regional focal point where several types of large-scale human displacement converge. This is a multi-scalar (global and local) challenge with major effects on origin/transit/destination countries, border/integration/ diversity policies, and geopolitical strategies. Indeed, if we review the recent European policy agenda on Mediterranean Migrations and associated population movements the keywords identified would probably be unpredictability, complexity, and also lack of evidence-based narratives and policies on current migration dynamics and governance systems.

There is a paradox that, despite the great importance of migrations and associated population movements in the Mediterranean region, a volume tackling that specific research agenda does not still exist. Academic, social and political demands should be better substantiated by covering all the geographical area through a complete focus on Mediterranean Migrations, promoting multi-sited and comparative research, multi-level analysis, and intersectional studies.

This co-edited book is pioneer in this initiative contributing to develop an understanding of the migration dynamics, addressing taxonomies of motion and the diverse manifestations of human mobility, the drivers of migration and their interdependence, while also maximising its benefits to the Mediterranean area and coping policy mechanisms at origin and destination.

What encourage us is to frame this focus through different parts and chapters that may be innovative and may feature the historical Mediterranean time. The general aim is to illustrate the significance of the regional dimension of migrations through the research on the drivers, means and causes of migration dynamics and migration systems. This main goal will allow going a step further by promoting research dissemination contributing to a comprehensive understanding of current research agenda challenges.

#### References

Gallant, T. W. (2016). Afterword: Writing Mediterranean diasporas after the transnational turn. In M. Isabella & K. Zanou (Eds.), Mediterranean diasporas: Politics and ideas in the long 19th century (pp. 205–209). Bloomsbury.

Global Peace Index. (2018). Measuring peace in a complex world. Institute for Economics & Peace.


Ricard Zapata-Barrero Full Professor in the Department of Political and Social Sciences, Universitat Pompeu Fabra (Catalonia, Barcelona). His main lines of research deal with the relationship between democracy, governance, citizenship, and migrations. He conducts theoretical and empirical research in the Mediterranean area. He is the Director of GRITIM-UPF (Interdisciplinary Research Group on Immigration), and of the Master's Program in Migration Studies at UPF. He is a member of the Board of Directors of the largest research network on Immigration in Europe IMISCOE and Chair the External Affairs Committee. He coordinates EuroMedMig (Euro-Mediterranean Research Network on Migration).

For more information about publications: https://www.upf.edu/web/ricard-zapata/

Ibrahim Awad is at present Professor of Global Affairs and Director, Center for Migration and Refugee Studies, School of Global Affairs and Public Policy, at the American University in Cairo. He holds a BA degree in political science from Cairo University and a PhD degree in political science from the Graduate Institute of International Studies, University of Geneva, Switzerland. He has worked for the League of Arab States, the United Nations and the International Labour Organization, holding positions of Secretary of the Commission, UN-ESCWA, Director, ILO Sub-regional Office for North Africa and Director, ILO International Migration Programme.

He is currently Chair of the Global Knowledge Partnership on Migration and Development (KNOMAD), hosted by the World Bank, Chair of the Steering Committee of the EuroMediterranean Research Network on International Migration (EuroMedMig) and Senior Fellow at the Migration Policy Centre (MPC) of the Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies in Geneva. He also serves on the editorial boards of several academic journals. For more information about his research activities and publications see: https://www.aucegypt.edu/fac/ ibrahimawad

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# Part I Geo-Political Mediterranean Relations

# Chapter 2 Looking at the EU-Turkey Deal: The Implications for Migrants in Greece and Turkey

Elif Demirbaş and Christina Miliou

# 2.1 Introduction<sup>1</sup>

The deal on refugees between the EU and Turkey, announced at the end of November 2015 – Turkey will curb the flow of refugees into Europe in exchange for generous financial help, initially of 3 billion Euro – is a shamelessly disgusting act, a proper ethico-political catastrophe... The opportunistic-pragmatic justification of this deal is clear (bribing Turkey is the most obvious way to limit the flow of refugees), but the long-term consequences will be catastrophic. Slavoj Žižek (2017)

The year 2015, known as the year of the global2 reception crisis3 (Amnesty International, 2016), has been marked by countless deaths in the Mediterranean as refugees attempted to pass the borders of the EU. The leading cause of this crisis was the Syrian civil war and the ensuing exodus of millions of refugees toward Western Europe. Due to the unwillingness of EU governments to accept refugees and their lack of preparedness for integration and protection, the magnitude of the Syrian refugee population sent alarm bells all over the region. Due to their

E. Demirbaş (✉)

<sup>1</sup> We would like to thank our supervisors, Michael Collyer, Lizzie Seal, Bal Sokhi-Bulley, Jane Cowan, and Dean Wilson for the support and inspiration, as well as Birce Altıok, Nuno Ferreira, and Ahmet İçduygu for their insightful and detailed recommendations and suggestions in writing this article.

<sup>2</sup> The use of the word 'global' here actually shows how Eurocentric the literature on migration is. In actuality, the effects of the reception crisis have been mainly felt in the Mediterranean region.

<sup>3</sup> The authors prefer the expression 'the reception crisis' instead of 'refugee crisis' to place the responsibility on the receiving countries and not on the migrants themselves. See Christopoulos (2016).

Sociology Department, University of Sussex, Brighton, UK e-mail: e.demirbas@sussex.ac.uk

C. Miliou Law Department, University of Sussex, Brighton, UK e-mail: c.miliou-theocharaki@sussex.ac.uk

geographical locations, Turkey and Greece assumed their roles as transit countries. While Turkey initially opened its borders to Syrian refugees, certain European countries in the EU, like Hungary, built barbed wires across their borders to stem the flow of people crossing (Thorpe, 2019).

Regarding immigration policies, the focus of the EU member states shifted from countries of origin, like Syria, Afghanistan, and Sudan, to transit countries bordering the EU, like Libya and Turkey (Strik, 2019). The EU aims to create a 'buffer zone' around its territory by signing readmission agreements with transit countries. The EU-Turkey deal (or the EU-Turkey Statement) is the product of such intentions (Strik, 2019). Even though EU Member State leaders and their Turkish counterpart signed the statement on 18 March 2016, it has generally been regarded as an EU tactic to slow migration flows.4 With this deal, Greece and Turkey were suddenly positioned as the internal and external buffer zones. As a result, they were placed in the epicentre of managing millions of asylum-seekers and displaced populations, shaping European migration policies, and protecting Fortress Europe.

Readmission agreements have significant consequences for refugees. According to Amnesty International, 'the demands being placed on third countries to prevent irregular departures to Europe put refugees, asylum-seekers and migrants in those countries at risk of prolonged and arbitrary detention, refoulement, and ill-treatment' (2014, p. 13). Upon the sixth anniversary of the EU-Turkey deal, this chapter explores its effects and consequences on the subjects it aims to govern. By problematising it, the chapter demonstrates that the EU-Turkey deal has deep-rooted Eurocentric characteristics that perpetuate precarity. More specifically, through semi-structured interviews conducted in distinct fieldwork in Greece and Turkey, the chapter will scrutinise the deal's implications on migrants' right to seek asylum in Europe in the context of Greece; and, with a focus on migrants' integration into the labour market, their right (or the lack thereof) to integrate within the host country, in the context of Turkey. Through a Foucauldian lens, it will adopt a macro perspective focusing on states' policies towards migrants and a micro perspective, analysing migrants' everyday lives and the precarities therein, exposing the current politico-legal structures that force migrants in both countries to live in a prolonged condition of precariousness. When analysing this topic, we understand the Greek and Turkish narrative as complementary to each other – and, hence, they are not presented as comparisons in this chapter – as the former uses biopolitical strategies to alleviate responsibility and deter future migrants, and the latter governs refugees via precarity to keep them within its borders as cheap labour.5

<sup>4</sup> The General Court of the European Union (2017) declared that the EU-Turkey Statement does not fall under the jurisdiction of the European Council nor any other institution of the EU, under the assumption that the agreement was between Member State leaders and not by the European Union. See NF, NG and NM v European Council (2017) and Gkliati (2017). 5 It is noteworthy to add that similar financial benefits of precarious governance have been observed

in Greece (see Manolada (Amnesty International, 2014), yet in the past years Greece is more prominent in externalising its migration than focusing on exploiting new cheap labour.

The EU-Turkey Statement is, first and foremost, a migration management technique. By identifying other countries as 'safe third countries', it aims to stem the flow of refugees into Europe and transfer the burden of protection to them, in this case, Turkey. Whether Turkey is a safe third country or not attracts a great deal of attention in the literature on migration within the Mediterranean region (see Kaya, 2020). However, like many legal terms, the classification of 'safe third country' hides as much as it explains. We argue that the question is not simply if Turkey is a safe third country or not. Instead, from a Foucauldian perspective, we believe that the crucial question is what the effects of considering Turkey a safe third country are, and, as an adjacent to this question, why the EU is so adamant in 'solving' the 'global refugee crisis' with readmission agreements – such as the EU-Turkey deal – which are nothing but techniques of migration externalisation. This chapter problematises the implications of this deal by observing both sides of the Aegean Sea – Greece and Turkey. Firstly, it will explore the EU-Turkey Statement, elaborate on key concepts like 'safe third country' and 'country of first asylum', and then explore Turkey and Greece separately and in detail.

The two authors of this chapter have conducted fieldwork in Greece and Turkey – by Miliou and Demirbaş, respectively – as a part of their PhD research. Demirbaş looks at the effects of the EU-Turkey deal on refugees in Turkey and shows how refugees experience many forms of precarity, mainly in legal and economic insecurities. This precarity is a form of governmentality that creates and maintains insecurities within a seemingly secure system (Lorey, 2015). Governing through precarity creates a cheap labour force and a reserve army of labour out of refugees, which benefits the government and the capital owners by providing cheap workers and disciplining the native labour force by using migrants as leverage.

Miliou explores how Greece has used biopolitical tactics of selective migration to alleviate the responsibility of protecting refugees and as a deterrence mechanism for future arrivals. Foucault perceives biopolitics as the process of 'making live' or 'letting die' (Foucault, 2003, pp. 62, 241). Jasbir Puar's (2017) understanding of biopolitics suggests that biopolitics is not about 'life' versus 'death' but the debilitation of life. Similarly, while documenting the reception crisis, Pallister-Wilkins, observes that 'human life [is] not considered equal but at the same time not allowed to die' (Minca et al., 2021). Through such a biopolitical lens, it becomes evident that Greece uses the concept of the 'safe third country' as a mechanism of externalising migration by rejecting refugee statuses and avoiding to 'make live' and simultaneously avoiding to 'let die' through simply shifting the responsibility of protection to its neighbouring countries.

#### 2.2 The EU-Turkey Statement

The sudden rise in the arrival of border crossers in Europe via Greece in the summer of 2015 was a significant moment for Europe to expedite and solidify its mechanisms for externalising migration control. With the Syrian war showing no signs of de-escalation, European Union leaders feared that the arrival of asylum seekers would continue at similar rates to those of the summer of 2015. Therefore, under the auspices of protecting the 'disorganised, chaotic, irregular, and dangerous migratory flows', the EU-Turkey Statement was put into effect to have better control and power over who has the right to enter and seek asylum (European Commission, 2016).

As most of the border crossers at the time were Syrian nationals fleeing internal conflicts, the EU-Turkey Statement specifically targeted those individuals. The statement focused on the sea borders between Greece and Turkey and indicated that Turkey would be responsible for taking back every Syrian who crossed the countries' sea borders. Furthermore, the EU offered to accept one Syrian for every returned Syrian by offering regular pathways into Europe, prioritising those who had never tried to cross before (European Commission, 2016; International Rescue Committee, 2022; Smeets & Beach, 2020, p. 147). Additionally, the EU offered Turkey the opportunity of concession talks about a visa-free travel into Europe and an initial monetary aid of 3 billion euros to cover the costs of protection and support of all migrants within Turkey's borders. Since then, though the concession talks have been stagnant, the monetary aid has been renewed for another 3 billion euros in 2018. Finally, an additional 3 billion has been promised to Turkey for 2021–2023 (European Commission, 2021b).

The legality of this statement was based on the concepts of 'safe-third country' and 'country of first asylum', which were grounded on the need for international cooperation to share the burden of responsibility and the protection of people in need (Kaya, 2020). The reasoning behind 'the country of first asylum' is to stop a continuous movement of refugees after having received refugee status or having been given a chance to claim asylum (European Council on Refugees and Exiles & Asylum Information Database, 2021; Strik, 2019). The concept of a 'safe third country' assumes that if a refugee can be granted asylum in a third country, the country initially responsible for them could transfer the responsibility of asylum to a third country. According to Ovacik, the concept did not arise until the 1980s; only when Western countries started worrying about the number of asylum seekers arriving in their territory was the concept first discussed (2020, p. 67; Executive Committee of the High Commissioner's Programme, 1990). For the EU, the notion of the 'safe third country' is stated in Article 38 Directive 2013/32/EU. The Directive states that the sending country needs to ensure the following: (a) the receiving country will protect the life and liberty of the person seeking protection, (b) there is no risk of serious harm to the refugee if transferred to that country, (c) the receiving country follows the principles of non-refoulement, (d) the receiving country protects the right to freedom from torture and against the inhuman or degrading treatment, (e) there is the possibility to seek refuge and, if provided, the same protections are granted as those stated in the Geneva Convention, and (f) there are reasonable enough connections between the applicant and the country to justify their movement to that country. Finally, (g) each applicant needs to be considered case-by-case to evaluate whether that country would be safe for them, and they have the right to appeal against any such decision (Directive 2013/32/EU, 2013).

#### 2.3 The Precarious Lives of Refugees in Turkey

The primary aim of the EU-Turkey Statement is to keep refugees in Turkey. As the most populous refugee group in Turkey by far, Syrians are protected under temporary protection and have rights akin to refugees'. Comparatively, migrants coming from other countries, such as Iraq, Iran, and Afghanistan, are not protected under any legal status nor can seek asylum in Turkey. Even with legal status, however, Syrians' de facto existence demonstrates that their everyday lives are dominated by precarity, as they are often curtailed from enjoying their rights. Their legal status cannot prevent this precarity; rather, the temporality of their legal status contributes to their insecurity (Ilcan et al., 2018). This temporality can be understood as a tool to govern and control refugees. By aiming to keep the refugees in Turkey, the EU-Turkey deal is helping to create and preserve a system within which refugees suffer from poverty and uncertainty. Precarity in this context becomes a form of governmentality (Lorey, 2015) and governing through precarity creates a cheap labour force and a reserve army of labour out of refugees, benefitting the government and the capital owners by disciplining the native labour force while using migrants as leverage.

Until recently, Turkey has been a country of emigration rather than immigration. Its migration policy was based on nationalistic premises that paved the way for full integration of ethnically Turkish people from various countries while declining to recognise non-Turkish people coming from war-torn countries as refugees (Müftüler-Baç, 2021). Turkey is a signatory state to the 1951 Geneva Convention, but its acceptance of refugees is limited by a geographical condition so that only people coming from Europe can be granted asylum in Turkey (Müftüler-Baç, 2021; İçduygu & Keyman, 2000).

Initially reluctant to make dramatic changes in its policy and hopeful for a swift end to the Syrian civil war, the Turkish government referred to Syrians as 'guests' and accepted them with an open-door policy. However, the sheer volume of people crossing the border every day soon proved that Turkey needed a migration policy targeting Syrians, as their 'guest' status, without any legal rights, would not suffice when dealing with millions of stateless individuals. Consequently, Law 6458, the Law on Foreigners and International Protection (Yabancılar ve Uluslararası Koruma Kanunu), was adopted by the Turkish parliament in April 2013 and went into force in April 2014 (Müftüler-Baç, 2021). Simultaneously, a new governmental agency, the Directorate General for Migration Management (DGMM), was created to deal with migration in a centralised fashion. With the formation of the DGMM and coming into force of Law 6458, Syrian refugees acquired certain rights, but their temporary status did not alter. While they have many rights akin to refugees', the whole migration regime is enacted to ensure their temporality as it lacks any clear pathway towards citizenship and, thus, integration. As Rygiel et al. (2016, pp. 316–317) aver, 'temporary protection regimes have been and are typically designed to deter local integration, provide limited protection, and facilitate repatriation.' While their temporary protection status grants them more rights and stability compared to their previous 'guest' status, Syrian refugees are still living in limbo, 'a permanent grey zone,' within which they need to negotiate their access to healthcare, employment, and education (Rygiel et al., 2016).

In addition to the temporality, another contributing factor to the precarity of Syrians is the limitations on their rights. Syrians must register in one of the eightyone cities in Turkey to get an ID card, and can only access work permits, free healthcare, and public education in the cities where they are registered. This rule forces Syrian refugees to live in cities with only few employment opportunities or to travel outside their city of registry to find employment. This often means living without access to hospitals or schools because a lack of access to free healthcare and education means refugees must live without these vital services if they cannot afford to pay for them. Due to the nature of their occupation, this limitation has especially dire consequences for Syrian farmworkers, who lead nomadic lifestyles as they pursue new harvests during warmer months. The interviews done by Demirbaş with farm workers in Eskişehir showed that their access to healthcare is greatly hindered during harvest times and that they must rely on the goodwill of healthcare workers rather than being able to access a right that is due to them without hindrance.

This limitation also inhibits refugees from being legally employed and withholds all the benefits associated with legal employment from them. Even within one's city of registry, obtaining a work permit is a rare occasion for Syrian refugees since the application for work permits are done by employers, not the employees, and the former are usually not inclined to employ refugees legally due to the additional costs it incurs. Thus, informality becomes a defining feature of refugees' labour market experiences (Bélanger & Saracoglu, 2020). Cheap labour is essential in increasing the competitiveness of Turkish employers, both nationally and internationally, and in mitigating the effects of the economic crises that Turkey has been experiencing for years (Abbasoğlu Özgören & Arslan, 2021). When one looks at the number of work permits issued by the Ministry of Labour to Syrian refugees6 and compares them to the number of Syrian refugees that are estimated to be in employment,7 it becomes evident that the supposed desires and actions of the Turkish government to promote and facilitate the formal employment of Syrian refugees are not substantiated by the actual labour market experiences of refugees (Abbasoğlu Özgören & Arslan, 2021). None of the participants in Demirbaş's fieldwork had work permits at the time of the interviews, and very few had ever worked with a permit. Additionally, migrants do not need work permits to work as farm workers, proving that this sector is 'exempted from basic labour standards and rights' (Fudge, 2012, p. 121). There are no legal regulations to ensure that working conditions for migrants are safe in agriculture, and it therefore looks like migrant workers are experiencing socioeconomic exclusion. In fact, this is anything but an exclusion. According to Kavak (2016), the legal and

<sup>6</sup> In 2020 it was 62.369. Work permits have to be renewed every year so this number shows the total number of Syrian refugees who were working with a permit that year.

<sup>7</sup> The number of Syrians working in the informal sector is estimated to be anywhere between half a million and a million (İçduygu & Diker, 2017).

socioeconomic exclusion of migrant workers is an 'adverse incorporation' where refugees 'are not excluded from, but rather integrated into markets in a way that perpetuates their chronic poverty' (Kavak, 2016, pp. 38–39).

Adverse incorporation is evident in general for Turkey's sizable informal sector. Long hours, low pay, unpaid wages, and unhealthy and unsafe working conditions are common difficulties faced by migrant workers (İçduygu & Diker, 2017, p. 24). Demirbaş's research has also witnessed the prevalence of long and unsociable hours without any compensation for overtime in the labour market experiences of refugees. Twelve-hour or even fourteen-hour working days were mentioned during the interviews, and Syrian workers almost always received less than Turkish citizens doing the same job. This fosters 'a sense of loss', first due to the active pauperisation of both migrant and native labour forces, and, second, because workers lose whatever collective bargaining power they have fought for and won (Saraçoğlu & Bélanger, 2019). Against their wishes, Syrians are manipulated as disciplinary mechanisms to govern the native labour forces. Precarity becomes a form of governmentality not just for migrants but for the informal labour force in general. In the agricultural sector, the refugees' 'adverse incorporation... have deteriorated the working conditions and the bargaining power of all the workers in this specific segment of the labour market, one where exploitation was already deep and multifaceted' (Kavak, 2016, p. 51). This is also true for other parts of the informal economy. While no significant negative changes have been observed in the overall levels of poverty, wages, and unemployment in the host society due to the arrival of Syrian refugees, in the informal sectors where precarity abounds, the inclusion of Syrian refugees into the local labour market has the potential to have a significant impact on wage, unemployment and poverty levels of the host community (Saraçoğlu & Bélanger, 2019).

The EU-Turkey deal endorses such precarious living conditions refugees endure by designating Turkey a 'safe third country' to keep refugees out of Europe. In some ways, Turkey is a safe country, especially for people fleeing civil war. Most parts of Turkey have been relatively peaceful for decades, and when compared to some European countries, where draconian measures have been taken to stem the migration flow at the cost of human rights abuses, Turkey stands out as welcoming to Syrian refugees.8 Yet, Turkey is a developing country with a struggling economy and a political scene that is becoming increasingly authoritarian every year. The refugees are governed in Turkey through their precarity and used as cheap labour to bolster the competitiveness of Turkish producers. In addition to such difficulties, refugees face other levels of insecurity such as the increasing anti-immigrant racism among the native population and the human rights abuses done by Turkey's authoritarian state apparatuses. Amnesty International (AI) (2015, 2016, 2017) and Human Rights Watch (2019) have reported the abuses that have taken place against refugees, especially in the border regions of Turkey. Arbitrary and unlawful detention,

<sup>8</sup> Although, not so much to other immigrants coming from Iraq, Iran, Afghanistan or other parts of the Global South.

refoulement, and violation of bodily integrity happen in addition to the everyday precarities that refugees face in Turkey. And there are indications reported by the AI (2015) that the EU-Turkey deal has led to a deterioration in the treatment of asylum seekers and refugees by the Turkish border control. It is no surprise that the de facto end of Turkey's open-door policy, with the increasing militarisation of the Turkey-Syria border, coincides with the negotiations around the EU-Turkey deal.

The deal has been successful in stemming the migration flows from Turkey; but in transferring responsibility to Turkey, EU states shirk away from their obligations toward refugees as signatories to the 1951 Geneva Convention (Rygiel et al., 2016). As a result, those who choose to face dangerous journeys toward Europe join millions who stay in Turkey, and

it is unclear: what they will do in Turkey after having made the dangerous and often expensive journey from Turkey to Greece; what their future holds [upon their return] in a country that provides them with limited citizenship rights and limited opportunities for legal employment, and; how they will confront their subsequent ambiguous status, unpredictable conditions of living, and differential inclusion. (Baban et al., 2017, p. 43)

# 2.4 The EU-Turkey Deal as a Eurocentric Tool of Biopolitical Control and Externalisation of Migration in Greece

The EU-Turkey deal brought a new mechanism to process asylum applications in Greece. Aiming to control the unchecked population crossing into Western Europe via Greece, the EU-Turkey deal birthed the concept of the 'fast-track' process. Syrians who entered Greece via the sea borders with Turkey would be questioned about Turkey being a safe third country and not about the essence of their need for international protection. To better control the returns to Turkey and follow the conditions of the EU-Turkey statement, the Greek government placed all asylum seekers on the islands under geographical restriction. This geographic restriction led to an overpopulation of the island camps that lasted until the end of 2020, with the island accommodations centres reaching 213% over their capacity in 2017, 198% in 2018, 615% in 2019, and 547% in mid-2020 (General Secretariat for Information and Communication, 2017, 2018, 2019, 2020). With the scarcity of resources as an excuse, the Greek government followed patterns of expediting decision processes based on perceived vulnerabilities, with those deemed 'vulnerable' being the only ones who were exempt from the 'fast-track' procedure. Iliadou, while conducting her fieldwork on the island of Lesvos, observed that even within those placed under the vulnerability categories, there was further subcategorisation of higher vulnerability which directly corresponded to their treatment and access to goods and services (2019b, p. 74). Even though relocation schemes were also in place, other characteristics, like age group, gender, or nationalities, were often in place, exposing the neoliberal Eurocentric agendas behind the EU's selectivity of migration (Mavelli, 2017; Mouzourakis et al., 2017; Zablotsky, 2020).

With the governmental directions promoting returns to Turkey, the case handlers became more inclined to deny international protection and declare cases inadmissible. Since the concept of the 'safe third country' had never been used before within the Greek migration system, once the initial decisions of inadmissibility were given to the asylum seekers, many concerns and disagreements arose concerning the legality of those returns (Action for Education et al., 2021; Amnesty International, 2020; Danish Refugee Council et al., 2022). Activists and scholars have tried to highlight how the 'safe third country' concept has been a Eurocentric tactic to externalise the responsibility of asylum at the expense of people's rights and dignity, leaving many without the possibility of seeking refuge (Gkliati, 2017; Iliadou, 2019a, b; Rozakou, 2020). Some of the main arguments focused on rights violations and violence inflicted on Syrian nationals during their transit to Europe, on Turkey's lack of a legal framework for providing refuge to non-Europeans, and, lastly, on what constitutes 'significant connection with the third country' (Action for Education et al., 2021; Greek Council for Refugees et al., 2021; Refugee Legal Support (RLS) & Stiftung Pro Asyl, 2022).

The structural divides concerning the implementation of the EU-Turkey deal did not only emerge within the civil society rhetoric but also appeared within the deciding bodies. Initially, the independent appeal committees shared similar concerns, approving claimants' appeals against their negative decisions under the presumption that Turkey did not have a legal framework for Syrian asylum seekers. Such deviation from governmental policymaking did not last long, resulting in the government's strategic steps toward enhancing its biopolitical control. As positive appeals decisions were becoming the norm, the government decided to change the composition of these independent appeal committees to better align them with its ultimate goal of sending Syrian nationals back to Turkey (Gkliati, 2017, pp. 215–216; Ovacik, 2020, p. 75). Legal changes to the asylum processes are not unusual; the composition of the appeals committee has experienced at least four amendments concerning its operations from 2016 to 2018 (Asylum Information Database (AIDA) et al., 2020, p. 65). During discussions with a lawyer concerning the legal and bureaucratic structures around the asylum processes, they explained to Miliou that the legal structures are changing so fast that even the experts struggle to keep up with the latest regulations. The constant changes can be understood as an effort by the government to find its desirable legal structures to define who is deemed acceptable and who is unwanted. This fluctuating phenomenon creates and sustains misinformation and confusion concerning the bureaucratic mechanisms, not only for the lawyers but also for actors employed by the Greek government.

Until March 2020, 2100 people have returned to Turkey from Greece, but due to escalated disputes between the EU and Turkey, no returns have taken place after Turkey stalled them all (Danish Refugee Council et al., 2022; UNHCR, 2020). These disputes occurred after Turkey expressed disappointment with the benefits it was supposed to receive through the EU-Turkey statement (Terry, 2021). During that time, Turkey opened its borders and did not prevent people from crossing to Greece via the Pazarkule / Kastanies border, after which Greece violently closed the passage to all border crossers (Aljazeera, 2020). Even though the Turkish side decided to close the returning pathways for those the Greek asylum service deemed 'inadmissible', the negative decisions continued to be produced, both in the first and second instance. This exacerbated the legal limbo in which asylum claimants lived. As a result, rejected claimants have their right to cash assistance, medical care, and work permits immediately stripped away, causing indisputable life debilitation. Simultaneously, as the Turkish government refuses their return to Turkey and thus denounces responsibility for securing those retracted rights, claimants have been left in a buffer zone of complete abandonment and neglect for over two years (Danish Refugee Council et al., 2022). Such debilitating conditions can be understood as deterrence tactics of the Greek government to discourage more claimants from entering its territory, assuming that those suffering within Greece will inform and prevent those aiming to travel to Greece (Refugees International & Panayotatos, 2022).

The Greek Minister of Migration declared that Turkey must adhere to its responsibilities under the EU-Turkey statement and receive the 1450 people waiting for deportation (Ministry of Migration and Asylum, 2021a). Additionally, in another statement given on June 1st 2021, the EU Commissioner of Home Affairs, Ylva Johansson, commented on the suspension of returns and responded that the EU remained confident about the future of the statement between the EU and Turkey and that through mutual trust and collaborative efforts, the statement could continue to benefit both countries (European Commission, 2021a). It should not have come as a surprise that Ursula von der Leyen, the President of the European Commission, announced a couple of weeks later an additional three billion euros aid to Turkey (European Commission, 2021b). Interestingly, the initial response of Johansson stated that according to the concept of the 'safe third country',

Greece will need to take into account the circumstances at the time of the (re-) examination of the individual applications, including with regard to the prospect of return in line with the EU-Turkey Statement. In the meantime, applicants shall have access to material reception conditions under the conditions set out under the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights, EU and national law. (European Commission, 2021a)

Despite the two-year blockage from Turkey's side to receive any claimants and the international pressures to respect their life and dignity, the Greek government not only continued to provide negative decisions to those under the EU-Turkey deal, but it took the drastic decision to expand the 'Turkey is a safe third country' idea to other nationalities as well, thus exacerbating the biopolitical control it had over its border crossers. On June 7th 2021, Greece announced through a Joint Ministerial Decision (JMD) that it would be using the EU-Turkey deal as a blueprint and include other nationals coming from Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Pakistan and Somalia as 'inadmissible' applications retroactively, meaning that this procedure would not only apply to those entering after the enacted date, but for those who had already applied before the implementation of the law as well (Law 42799/2021, 2021; Ministry of Migration and Asylum, 2021b).

In 2021, 60% of the claimants came from those nationalities; thus, it is fair to assume that the decision to apply the 'safe third country' concept to claims of nationals from those countries was not because Turkey was safe for them, but because the Greek government was specifically targeting the nationalities which constituted the majority of asylum applications (Danish Refugee Council et al., 2022). From June 7th to December 2021, 12,570 claims were judged on their admissibility. Nearly half of those were deemed inadmissible, were rejected, and deportation mandates for their (unfeasible) return to Turkey were issued (International Rescue Committee, 2022). Overall, there has been an increase of 126% in inadmissible applications from 2020 to 2021 (International Rescue Committee, 2022). As the admissibility interviews are shorter than the substantive asylum interviews, and due to their retroactive application, there has been an expedited process for judging thousands of claimants, with interviews scheduled for 2023 decreasing from 6156 to 4022 (Refugee Support Aegean, 2022). According to statements from the field, there have been occasions where interviews were advanced under short notice, leaving the claimants without enough time to get adequate legal counsel or information concerning the bureaucratic changes caused by the 'safe third country' concept.

It is worth reiterating what was mentioned earlier. Turkey does not have legal frameworks to provide refugee status to claimants who do not arrive from European countries. Turkey allows claimants from non-EU countries to place asylum applications, yet they will be relocated to another country if their claims are deemed positive. Consequently, the Greek policy of considering inadmissible claims from a further four nationalities and deciding to return them to Turkey, implies that, even if Turkey opens its borders to receive them from Greece, the claimants will embark on a long trip from Greece to Turkey, only to do this again later from Turkey to another country. This externalisation of migration control produces something close to a never-ending transportation of asylum claimants from Europe to Turkey and then other countries, legitimising one of the most severe Eurocentric biopolitical controls.

To no one's surprise, despite the European Commission's warnings about Greece not protecting claimants' rights given that Turkey had halted the returns, no sanctions have been enforced against the Greek government (European Commission, 2021a). It is not far-fetched to assume that this is because such tactics benefit the Eurocentric agenda of keeping asylum claimants away from Europe's responsibility. Finally, to place the biopolitical control into a greater perspective, Greece's selective asylum policies became even more striking by the different treatment that nationals of Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Pakistan, Somalia, and Syria experienced versus the treatment offered to nationals of Ukraine following the Russian invasion. In this regard, the then Minister of Migration, Notis Mitarakis, announced that the latter were 'real refugees' in need of immediate hosting and protection (Human Rights Watch & Eva Cossé, 2022). This selective asylum ignores the concept of a 'safe third country' regarding Ukrainian refugees, amplifying the Eurocentric and racist residues behind the Greek biopolitics of asylum.

#### 2.5 Conclusion

The EU-Turkey agreement is not the sole effort from the EU to prioritise the securitisation and externalisation of migration, with humanitarian assistance and rights protection schemes being institutionally suppressed, as observed in the proposed New Pact of Migration and Asylum (Ferreira et al., 2022). Externalisation concepts have dire implications for those whose asylum applications are refused and those forcibly kept within 'safe third countries'. The EU, aware of the conditions under which the refugees live, continues to endorse the concentration of asylum claimants in Turkey, a country with the highest refugee population in the world, through money and political promises, thereby creating and perpetuating a state of precarity. Turkey's role in this externalisation of migration governance reflects its advantageous position. It holds Europe on a tight leash under threats of opening its borders and creates a cheap labour force to provide for Turkey's economy with minimal workers' rights. Governing through precarity has exacerbated the inequality and dangers under which the Syrian population lives, with Europe promoting such precarity ideologically and financially.

The Greek government has deliberately chosen to place under an inadmissibility condition the majority of the claimants arriving through the Turkish border, aware of two major facts: first, that Turkey has closed its borders, which renders the life conditions of those affected extremely precarious; second, that Turkey's legal framework only covers the Syrian population, thus leaving the other four nationalities affected without the possibility of enjoying refuge or any type of protection in Turkey. Considering this through a biopolitical lens, it becomes clear that Greece chooses to control its refugee population by creating a legal limbo zone for which the country declines any responsibility. Such conditions benefit the Greek government, freeing it from its responsibility to protect the 'unwanted' while blaming Turkey for not protecting the claimants' rights after accepting them back. These debilitating life conditions have an additional advantage from the perspective of the Greek government, as they serve as a deterrence mechanism for all those thinking of making the journey to Greece. It is noteworthy that Greece was not satisfied with only declaring Turkey a 'safe third country', so it further strengthened its externalisation of asylum by adding Albania and Northern Macedonia to the 'safe third country' list in December 2021 (Danish Refugee Council et al., 2022).

The decisions taken in the more powerful states in the Mediterranean have reverberating effects on three continents. The hostile environment directed against refugees within the EU and its bordering countries, has created conditions of precarity and hopelessness, especially for refugees fleeing war-torn countries. The consequence is the creation of 'unsafe countries' for refugees only differing in their level of unsafeness. One solution to this crisis of protection is to turn our gaze to countries of origin to eradicate the situations that lead to displacement in the first place, rather than treating refugees as objects of humanitarian aid (Betts & Collier, 2017; Žižek 2017). While doing that, the EU and other powerful countries must acknowledge their past and present involvement in those conflicts and ensure they keep their doors open to protect and shelter those seeking asylum within their borders. Refugees should not be seen as a nuisance; the 'management' of refugee flow should serve all the people concerned and not depend on the political or economic interests of states.

#### References


Elif Demirbaş is a PhD candidate in the Sociology department at the University of Sussex. She holds a BS in economics from the Middle East Technical University in Ankara, Turkey and a master's degree from the same university in political science. Her current research is on Syrian refugees living in Turkey. She is investigating refugees' integration into the labour market and the ensuing precarity in their everyday lives and she is using the theoretical framework of Foucault and, specifically, his concept of governmentality to better understand the disposability of the refugees. She has completed her fieldwork in Turkey and is about to submit her thesis at the moment along with being a doctoral tutor at the department of Sociology.

Christina Miliou is a PhD candidate in the Law department at the University of Sussex. She holds a B.A. in Human Rights from Bard College, NY, US, an MSc in International Relations Theory from London School of Economics and Political Science and an MSc in Social Research Methods from University of Sussex. She conducts socio-legal research in Greece, and is currently focusing on asylum seekers' access to justice. Through a post-structural and feminist lens, she is investigating the consequences and benefits of rights being provided by a humanitarian versus a human rights discourse. She finished her ethnographic fieldwork in September 2022 after conducting non-participant observations and interviews with governmentally assigned lawyers and NGO lawyers in Athens, and non-participant observations in the Greek Appeals Courts.

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# Chapter 3 Hindering Democracy Through Migration Policies? An Analysis of EU External Migration Policies' Impacts on the Democratisation of Morocco

Luisa Faustini Torres

#### 3.1 Introduction

Although democracy promotion is an important element of the EU's external migration policies embedded in the 'root-causes' approach (Faustini-Torres, 2020), there is very little academic knowledge about its effects on this policy field. Within the EU policy narrative, the lack of democracy has been mainly seen as a driver of migration and the democratic development of Southern Mediterranean countries (SMCs)1 as a favourable condition for the EU's goals of stemming migration at the source (Faustini-Torres, 2020). This implies that, at least in rhetorical terms, the EU intends to have a positive effect on the democratisation of these countries. However, when it comes to policy practices, little is known about the impacts of EU external migration policies on the democratisation of SMCs.

According to the literature, a gap between EU rhetoric and action in this field could be expected (Bicchi, 2009, 2010; Dimitrovova, 2010; Völkel, 2014; Kostanyan, 2017), mainly due to the stability-vs-democratisation dilemma faced by the EU in its external action (Khalifa-Isaac, 2013; Börzel, 2015; Kostanyan, 2017). Furthermore, "migration governance is known to be a field where norms and practices diverge dramatically" (Fernández-Molina & De Larramendi, 2020, p. 7). In light of this, this chapter presents itself as an attempt to start uncovering the effects of EU external migration policies on SMCs' democratic development by moving away from policy narratives and focusing on policy practices. The turn to policy practices is done in two stages.

L. Faustini Torres (✉)

<sup>1</sup> Here we focus on the countries of Morocco, Algeria, Libya, Egypt, and Tunisia.

Universidad Autonoma de Barcelona, Bellaterra, Spain

R. Zapata-Barrero, I. Awad (eds.), Migrations in the Mediterranean, IMISCOE Research Series, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-42264-5\_3

The first step consists of suggesting an innovative theoretical framework for empirically analysing the links between these two macro-processes of international affairs. This is done through bridge-building, that is, by bringing together fields of research that have remained rather apart: democratisation, autocratic resilience, and the politics of international migration. The insights, analytical frames and conceptual tools provided by these three bodies of literature combined have allowed the formulation of two arguments that enlighten our theoretical understanding of the mechanisms linking these two macro-processes.

The second step involves applying the suggested framework to Morocco and assessing the validity of arguments for this case-study, which is considered paradigmatic among SMCs (Den Hertog, 2017; El Qadim, 2010). On the one hand, Morocco has been constantly targeted by EU external migration policies and has been "cooperating" with the EU in the management of migration flows for the last 25 years. This does not imply that Morocco should be seen as a mere object of EU policies but rather as a subject with the capacity for action, negotiation, and interests (El Qadim, 2010). Indeed, the "externalisation" of EU migration policies towards this country, should not be viewed as a simple case of policy transfer, but rather as a "border security gaming" (Andersson & Keen, 2019). On the other hand, even though King Mohammed VI adopted some democratic demands made during the "Arab Uprisings", this did not represent a radical step towards political change. In fact, authors refer to Morocco as a case of stalled democratisation (Cavatorta, 2015, 2016) and competitive authoritarianism (Hill, 2016; Szmolka, 2014).2 For this reason, Morocco has also been a target for EU policies of democracy promotion, at least in rhetorical terms.

# 3.2 How "Externalisation" Meets Democratisation: A Theoretical Account

#### 3.2.1 The External Dimension of Democratisation

Democratisation is often seen as a "domestic affair" (Schmitter, 2004). However, in the last two decades, several works have looked at how external actors and factors can influence internal political processes (Leininger, 2010; Burnell & Schlumberger, 2010). According to the model developed by Levitsky and Way (2005, 2006, 2010),3 two main elements explain variations in Western influence on political change: leverage and linkage. Leverage refers to the external actors' capacity to

<sup>2</sup> Even though it is defined as a Parliamentary Monarchy in the Constitution, Morocco is classified as "partially free" (37/100) by Freedom House (2023), a hybrid regime by the EIU Democracy Index (2021), and a closed autocracy by V-Dem (2023).

<sup>3</sup> The work of Hill (2016) demonstrated that such a model could be applied to study the democratisation of Maghreb countries (Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, and Mauritania).

exert pressure on regimes (through political conditionality, sanctions, diplomatic pressure, etc.) and the regimes' ability to resist outside influence. Three main factors determine the level of leverage: (i) the target state's size and military and economic strength, (ii) the presence of competing issues on the Western foreign policy agenda, and (iii) the presence of an alternative regional power that can support the country. Linkage refers to the density of a country's ties to external actors and constitutes a structural variable, shaped by geography, historical factors (e.g., colonialism) and geostrategic alliances. Although these factors are divided into six main categories (Table 3.1), they usually have a cluster effect (Hill, 2016). The main role of linkages is to channel influence by affecting the motivations of decision-makers. Most importantly, linkages increase the effectiveness of leverage (Levitsky & Way, 2005).

Tolstrup's (2013, 2014) contribution is particularly relevant here. His model combines the macro-logic of structural determinants (leverage and linkages) with the micro-logic of domestic actors' agency (gatekeeper elites). According to him, gatekeeper elites are not just the objects of external influence, but can develop and manoeuvre linkages, being "at least as important as geography, history, and culture – they can both condition the relationship given by structural factors and create linkages independently of structural preconditions". In other words, they can facilitate or constrain ties to external actors "based on their main values and/or strategic calculation of both the internal and external costs and benefits of political change" (Tolstrup, 2013, p. 717).

Tolstrup identifies three main types of gatekeeper elites: ruling elites (the core group that is in day-to-day control of the state), opposition elites (leaders of political parties, movements, or NGOs that seek to replace the incumbent regime), and economic elites (leaders of heavyweight business corporations) (Tolstrup, 2014, p. 127). Although the density of linkages could, in principle, be influenced by any gatekeeper elites, he considers that ruling elites – e.g., presidents, prime ministers, and high officials – usually have more power to do so. In sum, in Tolstrup's model, the structure (leverage and linkage) and actors (gatekeeper elites) continuously interact in iterative sequences (see Fig. 3.1).

#### 3.2.2 The External Dimension of Autocratic Resilience

The work of Tolstrup (2009, 2014) puts forward the idea that target states are not passive actors in the "democratisation political game", mainly because "the push [for democracy] is counterbalanced and resisted with every means possible by autocrats, who wish to remain in power" (Tolstrup, 2009, p. 925). This highlights the importance of looking inside-out, paying closer attention to the intra-state dimension and how domestic actors might act and react to external variables (Pace et al., 2009).

The literature on autocratic resilience explains how authoritarian regimes tend to fight to remain in power in an environment with increased pressure for democratic reform (Heydemann, 2007; Schlumberger, 2007; Ambrosio, 2009). The most important variable within this dimension is the regime's organizational power (Levitsky &


Fig. 3.1 Model of how external actors can influence democratisation. (Source: Retrieved from Tolstrup, 2013)

Way, 2010). This variable is determined by three capabilities of unequal importance (from highest to lowest): coercive state capacity, ruling-party strength, and control of the economy. Both coercive state capacity and party strength are determined by two criteria: scope and cohesion. The scope of a security apparatus or party is determined by its breadth and depth. Cohesion is determined by the strength of purpose and degree of unity exhibited by a security apparatus or party. Discretionary control of the economy is determined by the amount of influence a regime has over vital sectors of the economy and sources of finance.

Within this variable, the coercive state capacity is one of the most important features of authoritarian resilience. It refers to the effectiveness and experience of the security forces (e.g. the military, police, gendarmerie, and intelligence agencies) (Levitsky & Way, 2010). In general, effective coercion would depend on funding, equipment, and training as well as robust chains of command. Moreover, a regime's high capacity is evident when it has a "large, well-trained, and well-equipped internal security apparatus with an effective presence across the national territory". This implies that the better able a regime is to physically defend itself the better its stability and chances of survival.

The literature considers that international factors may influence the variables of autocratic resilience both directly and indirectly (Burnell & Schlumberger, 2010; Tolstrup, 2009). A direct effect would involve influencing the country's electoral regime and the elite's effective power to rule. Conversely, different kinds of sanctions and foreign policy instruments might indirectly influence the regime, including its coercive state capacity. Finally, it is important to acknowledge not only how external elements might work in favour of autocratic resilience but mainly "how authoritarian MENA regimes and opposition actors induce external actors, and specifically the EU, to perceive and react to their respective situation" (Pace et al., 2009, p. 8). In other words, how domestic actors might resort to the international sphere to improve and keep their position in the internal political game.

#### 3.2.3 The Politics of International Migration

Several years after Greenhill's (2010) seminal study on the use of displaced people as an instrument of foreign policy, Adamson and Tsourapas (2019) coined the concept of migration diplomacy to explain how cross-border population mobility affects the conduct of states' diplomacy. This term refers to "the use of diplomatic tools, processes and procedures to manage cross-border population mobility, including both the strategic use of migration flows as a means to obtain other aims, and the use of diplomatic methods to achieve goals related to migration" (Ibid, 2019, p. 17). The EU's endeavour to "externalize" migration control towards third countries would provide several examples of migration diplomacy (Adamson & Tsourapas, 2019).

Similar to traditional diplomacy, migration diplomacy is shaped by the interests and existing power relationships between states (Adamson & Tsourapas, 2019). However, instead of looking at economic and military indicators, the position of the country in the migration system (as countries of destination, origin, or transit) determines their interests and power. Furthermore, migration diplomacy relies heavily on a process known as issue-linkage (ibid), which is the simultaneous negotiation of two or more issues with the aim of reaching a joint settlement (Tsourapas, 2017). This entails using migration as a tool to pursue other goals, such as security, economic, or diplomatic ones.

Countries in the Global South have the potential to use migration diplomacy similarly to more powerful states in the Global North. This could take two forms: coercive and cooperative (Greenhill, 2010). The first entails mobilising the "threat of migration" through promoting or facilitating irregular movements. The second involves playing the "efficiency card" (Cassarino & Del Sarto, 2018) by showing compliance and repressing migratory flows. In both cases, countries of origin and transit would be capable of applying a "reverse conditionality" to gain leverage and obtain concessions from the "host state", which could involve moral, political, economic, and/or material support) (Adamson & Tsourapas, 2019; Zardo & Cavatorta, 2018).

# 3.3 How "Externalisation" Meets Democratisation: The Arguments

The framework presented in this chapter outlines two arguments connected to the proposed dimensions. The first highlights the relevance of migration as a central linkage within Euro-Med relations, capable of shaping the motivations, strategic calculations, and leverage of actors involved. Furthermore, the potential effects of migration are amplified when combined with other economic and intergovernmental linkages through issue-linkage. It not only shapes the EU's ability to apply pressure upon SMCs, but can also influence the target regime's ability to withstand external influence. Several authors assert that this shift of power from the core towards the periphery is expected in certain areas of cooperation, and recently, migration has become one of them (Dimitrovova, 2010; Völkel, 2020; Pace et al., 2009). Therefore, migration diplomacy might represent a significant source of power for gatekeeper elites in SMCs.

This last idea is linked to the second argument, which emphasizes that the "externalisation" of EU migration policies can impact the regime's organizational power, influencing power dynamics and altering incentive structures for domestic actors in SMCs. While some authors acknowledge the empowerment of neighbouring countries through migration diplomacy (Cassarino, 2005, 2012; Demmelhuber, 2011; Wunderlich, 2010; El Qadim, 2010; Zaragoza-Cristiani, 2016), scant attention have been devoted to the implications for their internal politics and democratic development (Akkerman, 2018; Prestianni, 2018; Koch et al., 2018; Andersson & Keen, 2019; Völkel, 2020). This oversight stems from viewing targeted states as black boxes, disregarding the diverse aims of different actors within them. Actors negotiating with the EU on migration control often belong to ruling elites and may not always represent the interests of the entire country (Lemberg-Pedersen, 2017). Hence, I argue for the significance of examining the internal dynamics of SMCs and determine which actors are empowered or disempowered by this process, as well as the potential for migration policies to be utilized as a tool for autocratic resilience.

# 3.4 How "Externalisation" Meets Democratisation: The Case of Morocco

The research involved applying the suggested theoretical lens to the case of Morocco and analysing the relevance of the presented arguments in this context. All data was coded and analysed using Nvivo software, following a deductive strategy based on the identified variables, concepts, and elements summarized in Table 3.1. The analysis is structured to reflect the dual nature of the theoretical framework, distinguishing between international/inter-state and domestic/intra-state dimensions.

The analysis relied on desk research and a diverse range of qualitative data. One of the primary sources of information was policy documents related to the EU-Morocco cooperation framework, including the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) and the EU Trust Fund for Africa (EUTF). Specifically, I examined ENP funding documents, progress reports, as well as action documents for the 12 projects implemented in Morocco under the EUTF (refer to Table 3.3 in the Annex), along with available monitoring reports. Additionally, I consulted informative documents from the EU, civil society reports, newspaper articles, and empirical literature. The analysis centered on the five-year period following the "migration crisis" (2015–2020) due to the significance of political events during this timeframe, particularly in terms of democratisation and migration, offering an opportunity for a comprehensive analysis.

# 3.4.1 (Inter-State Dimension) Migration as High Linkage: Hampering the External Actor Leverage While Empowering the Target Regime

#### Hampering the External Actor Leverage: EU Foreign Policy Goals at Odds

The literature widely agrees that historically, the EU has adopted a position towards Morocco that favours "limited democracy" over no democracy at all, with little inclination to exert significant pressure for democratisation (Kausch, 2009; Khakee, 2010). This stance can largely be attributed to the EU's interests and priorities in the field of migration. Morocco has long been a key partner in various EU initiatives related to migration control. Scholars have argued that the EU's reliance on Morocco and the imperative to ensure effective implementation of migration policies have led to a prioritization of maintaining the status quo in the country (Hill, 2016). Despite substantial linkages in other areas and existing power asymmetries, the EU's capacity, and willingness to influence Morocco's democratisation are perceived to be diminished due to the conflicting nature of this issue and the goal of controlling migration (Cassarino, 2012; Noutcheva, 2015; Bauer, 2015).

In general, EU policies in the field of democratic assistance vis-à-vis this country have been deemed either unsuccessful or counterproductive (Van Hüllen, 2012; Khahee, 2017). Similarly, when it comes to promoting democracy through migration policies, the story does not seem very different. Despite the EU's rhetoric focused on tackling the root-causes of migration, its primary emphasis has been towards employing a remote-control approach. This approach is characterized by shortterm measures aimed at curbing migration and securitizing the Moroccan border (Carrera et al., 2015; den Hertog, 2016). This argument can be further supported by analysing the projects implemented under the EU Trust Fund for Africa (EUTF).

Among the seven projects implemented specifically in Morocco, only one (EUTFM04 – Regional migration policy) falls under the broader objective of "improved governance and conflict prevention". This objective aims to support enhancements in overall good governance by promoting conflict prevention, addressing human rights abuses, and upholding the rule of law.4 The remaining six projects aling with the theme of "improved migration management," with the primary objective of developing national strategies for managing migration, enhancing capacities to prevent irregular migration, and combating human trafficking.<sup>5</sup> Within the regional context, all five projects are solely dedicated to the theme of "improved management of migration."

<sup>4</sup> See: https://ec.europa.eu/trustfundforafrica/thematic/improved-migration-management 5 See: https://ec.europa.eu/trustfundforafrica/thematic/improved-migration-management

Additionally, the combined budget allocated to the six EUTF projects6 focused on migrant integration and enhancing their overall situation amounts to €27.6 million. This amount appears significantly smaller when compared to the €184.9 million dedicated to migration management and border control. These budget distributions suggest that the bulk of the EUTF funds allocated to Morocco have been primarily directed towards enhancing the capacity of the Moroccan state and its border control entities to dissuade migration flows towards Europe, particularly in terms of resources, training, and personnel. Typically, the main recipients of these funds are the Ministry of Interior and the security forces.

Another indication of the EU's reduced leverage over Morocco is the fact that, in addition to refraining from exerting significant pressure, the EU seems to be rewarding the country for its cooperation on migration and democratisation matters. Despite the lack of democratic progress, Morocco remains the primary EU partner. For instance, within the ENP framework, Morocco would not qualify for positive conditionality (the "more for more" approach) (Catalano & Graziano, 2016). Nonetheless, the country has become a privileged partner and the largest recipient of EU funds, particularly after the "Arab Uprisings", regardless of its limited progress in implementing reforms (ibid).

In several policy documents (See EUTFM07) the EU praises Morocco for its advancements in terms of democratisation, which seems to be in line with its "applause policy" (Hill, 2016; Catalano & Graziano, 2016). Disregarding evidence provided by the literature, experts, and reports, the EU fails to acknowledge Morocco's backsliding in terms of human rights and basic freedoms (Catalano & Graziano, 2016; Andersson & Keen, 2019; Uzelac, 2020), the consecutive downward trend arrows in its democratic status since 2017 (see Freedom House scores7 ), or the lack of improvement in the Western Sahara dossier. Furthermore, the EU avoids engaging with opposition groups or intervening in contentious issues, as demonstrated by its silence regarding the recent protests sparked by the "Hirak al Rif" movement and the regime's harsh crackdown on protesters, journalists, and activists (Ben Jellou, 2018).

#### Empowering the Target Regime: Migration as Bargain Coin for Morocco

As outlined earlier, linkages between actors are not solely determined by structural factors but can also be manipulated by gatekeeper elites (Tolstrup, 2013). Authors provided evidence of how Moroccan gatekeepers, particularly the ruling elite, capitalized on their increased bargaining power derived from migration linkages to withstand outside influence and exert an inverted leverage over the EU (Cassarino,

<sup>6</sup> EUTFM01 – Live together without discrimination, EUTFM02 – Juridical empowerment, EUTFM03 – Vulnerable migrants, EUTFM04 – Regional migration policy, EUTFM08 – Regional development, EUTFM09 – monitoring and evaluation. 7 Available at: https://freedomhouse.org/country/morocco/freedom-world/2017

2005; El Qadim, 2010, 2015; Wunderlich, 2010; Zaragoza-Cristiani, 2016; Werenfels, 2018). In essense, these studies suggest that ruling elites in Morocco have been empowered by the "border security gaming". The analysis offers several examples of how this empowerment is unfolding.

To assert its demands with the EU, Morocco has employed a combination of two migration diplomacy approaches: (i) a cooperative approach, positioning itself as a "good student" and emphasizing its efficiency in addressing migration issues (Cassarino, 2005); (ii) a coercive approach, leveraging threats to ease migration controls or halt migration cooperation (Zaragoza-Cristiani, 2016). In both cases, Morocco heavily relies on issue-linkage as a strategic tool, often described as a master in "packaging" its interests (Werenfels, 2018), which pursue political, economic, and material goals.

When engaging in cooperative migration diplomacy, Morocco underlines its efforts and ability to manage migration and conducting border surveillance, as well as its willingness to readmit migrants (Wolff, 2008). This strategy is evident in various interviews given by Khalid Zerouali, the director of the Directorate of Migration and Border Surveillance (DMBS), in 2018 and 2019. During these interviews, Zerouali highlighted the work carried out by Morocco in "securing" the EU, emphasizing their effectiveness in preventing irregular migrations and dismantling criminal networks (Telquel, 2018; El Diario, 2019). While he underscores Morocco's proactive stance in this domain, he also acknowledges that the country has already mobilized all available resources and would require budgetary support to sustain the functioning of the implemented mechanisms (Telquel, 2018). This support would entail a cost of over €200 million per year for Rabat (El Diario, 2019).

Even though Morocco relies largely on cooperative migration diplomacy, it does not refrain from using coercive strategies to achieve its goals. The episodes surrounding the Western Sahara crisis that traversed EU-Morocco relations during 2016–2019 provides a clear example of that. This crisis was triggered by a series of decisions from the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) in 2015–2016, ruling that the Western Sahara fell outside the scope of Morocco's Association Agreement (Lovatt, 2020).8 Morocco perceived this ruling as an assault on its sovereignty and territorial integrity, prompting it to engage in issue-linkage strategies and inverse conditionality by issuing threats to the EU regarding their cooperation on migration control. Some observers argue that the successful storming of the border walls in Ceuta in February 2017 as being related with these episodes<sup>9</sup> (Fernández-Molina, 2017; Werenfels, 2018). In fact, these events have been surrounded by the progressive increase of irregular migration from Morocco (See Graphic 3.1).

<sup>8</sup> See Fern<sup>á</sup>ndez-Molina, 2017 and GADEM, 2018 for a detailed account. 9 Although gatekeeper elites cannot directly create migration flows, they can still change the flows, or at least manipulate EU perceptions over them. According to Zardo and Cavatorta (2018) "the bigger the perception of volatility", the bigger the leverage of neighbouring authoritarian countries, regardless of the migration threat being real or not.

Source: Own elaboration with data from the FRONTEX website.

Graphic 3.1 Illegal border crossings on the Western route (sea and land) in numbers

The final decision by the CJEU was made in February 2018, ruling that the fisheries agreements would remain valid as long as it did not apply to the Western Sahara. The decision was considered as fairly satisfying by the Moroccan government and marked the beginning of a new era of EU-Morocco relations and the resumption of political and financial exchanges, mainly in the field of migration. The outcomes have also been advantageous for the EU as it witnessed a decrease in the number of arrivals from Morocco already in 2019 (See Graphic 3.1), indicating that both the agreements and measures implemented by Rabat were proving effective.

In conclusion, both cooperative and coercive migration diplomacy strategies have contributed to the empowerment of Moroccan ruling elites. This is evident in the approval of the two largest EUTF projects, with budgets of €44 million and €101.7 million respectively, which occurred after the episodes mentioned above. Additionally, the EU has allocated an estimated budget of €3.5 billion for Moroccan authorities for the period of 2020–2027. These substantial figures indicate that the EU is heavily invested in maintaining Morocco as a close and longstanding partner.

# 3.4.2 (Intra-State Dimension) "Border Security Gaming": A Tool for Autocratic Resilience?

#### Boosting the regime's Organizational Power

While King Mohamed VI and the ruling elites (the Makhzen) hold a central gatekeeper position within the Moroccan political sphere (Wunderlich, 2010; Feliu & Parejo, 2012; Hill, 2016), they play a pivotal role in the negotiation and implementation of EU external migration policies in the country. In addition to the King himself, the Ministry of Interior and its security bodies10 are the central actors in EU

<sup>10</sup> The Directorate of National Security (DNS), responsible for the Moroccan National Police that control authorized crossing points with the support of the Auxiliary Forces and the Directorate of Migration and Border Surveillance (DMBS), "responsible for the operational implementation of the national strategy to combat human trafficking networks and border surveillance" (Elmadmad, 2007, p. 39).

migration policies (Ibid). Consequently, the domestic actors that are being empowered by the process of "externalisation" are mainly those less inclined to facilitate regime change in this country. They are more likely to use such advantageous position to enhance autocratic resilience, thereby prompting regime stability and survival. At least three types of concessions obtained by Morocco through the "border security gaming" would have the potential to stabilise and reinforce (even indirectly) the regime organisational power in its three dimensions (party strength, control of the economy and coercive state capacity): (i) political/moral, (ii) economic and (iii) material/logistical.

#### (i) Political/moral concessions: increasing ruling elites' legitimacy

Two crucial themes for Morocco's legitimacy are its international image and its authority over the Western Sahara (Hill, 2016; Fernández-Molina, 2017; Werenfels, 2018). Morocco's competitive authoritarianism is highly concerned with international opinion and with maintaining good relations with the West (Hill, 2016, p. 168). The issue of maintaining control over the Western Sahara is contentious due to its territorial and resource significance. Additionally, the counterinsurgency campaign against the Polisario in the 1970s has shaped the security forces' imaginaries and is broadly responsible for the non-materials ties that maintain its high cohesion (Hill, 2016, p. 157).

The previous section already provided several examples of how the EU has been granting political recognition to the Moroccan regime. This recognition takes the form of praising the regime for its democratising efforts in policy documents, when evidence shows otherwise, or by refraining from criticizing human rights and democratic backsliding in the country – despite reports from NGOs and democracy indexes insisting on their severity. To underscore this point further, two additional examples of this sort of legitimacy concessions should be highlighted.

The first example involves the granting of Advanced Status for Morocco in 2008. As the first and only Arabic country to receive such status11 this has been considered as a "gift from heaven" for its capacity of boosting the regime's international reputation. Moreover, it would enable a closer association with the EU, which means more aid and economic benefits for the country (Kausch, 2009). While not at the same scale, the second example indicates a comparable phenomenon, as certain European countries (in concrete Germany and Belgium) are considering designating Morocco a "safe third country". This designation implies that asylum seekers could be quickly and safely returned to Morocco (Concord, 2018). Euromed Rights (2018) has been closely monitoring this topic, contending that giving these countries such "safe" status "means that no risk of persecution exists in principle for nationals of that country or foreign nationals, and that their human rights are effectively respected, including the right of asylum".

In what concerns the autonomy of Western Sahara, Morocco seems to have succeeded until now in maintaining its stance on it. Despite numerous unfavourable

<sup>11</sup> Now being also negotiated with Tunisia.

rulings by the CJEU the EU has broadly remained apart from this contentious "internal affair". According to Lovatt (2020): "Yet while the EU does not recognise Moroccan sovereignty over the area, it has not adopted the UN's characterisation of it as an occupied territory. Instead, the EU has labelled Western Sahara as a "nonself-governing territory" 'de facto' administered by the Kingdom of Morocco – conjuring up a legal concept that does not exist in international law".

In sum, Morocco seems to have succeeded in silencing the EU on human rights, democracy, and self-determination – all of which could potentially contribute to sustaining and even boostering the power of the ruling elites both internally and externally.

#### (ii) Economic concessions: sustaining ruling elites' modernisation agenda

When considering economic concessions, these primarily take the form of monetary aid, either directly related to migration funds (EUTF) or other type of financial instrument/incentives (European Neighbourhood Instrument – ENI). As in the case of political concessions, economic provisions could also have the effect of enhancing ruling elites' power, legitimacy, and control over the economy.

An example of this could be seen in the recent announcement by the EU of a new financial package to Morocco, totalling €389 million. Out of this total, €289 million are destined for bolstering Moroccan reforms and inclusive development, while €101.7 million are allocated as direct budget support for border management (European Commission, 2019). Furthermore, for the period 2014–2017 the ENI had an indicative budget of €728–890 million for Morocco only, which includes funds for migration control and other projects (EEAS/European Commission, 2014). Morocco has also been a beneficiary of the Neighbourhood Investment Facility (NIF), which has financed ten projects thus far, totalling €203.8 million, including the construction of the largest solar power station in Africa (EU Factography – Morocco, 2016).

These resources would serve as an important tool for the Moroccan regime. Since ascending to the throne, Mohamed VI, has engaged in a series of economic and political reforms to aling with his narrative of propeling the country into a "New Era" (Darif, 2012). By investing in modernisation and economic liberalisation, the monarchy created a new source of legitimacy based on political and economic effectiveness (ibid). According to Bogaert (2018, p. 9): "whereas Hassan II ruled with an iron hand, Mohamed VI rules via holdings, funds and new state agencies". This underscores the regime needs for resources to maintain its image of modernising country as a key source of internal power and legitimacy.

Another related concern is that a significant portion of the funds supposedly allocated to support the country's development and address deep structural problems have been expended in large-scale projects, such as the solar power station and improving the country physical infra-structure (Khakee, 2017), including Moroccan highways (Hatim, 2020). As expected, these investments have not resulted in improvements in the country's Human Development Index, which remains the lowest among Arab countries. This index hinges on other issues such as schooling and life expectancy, matters not addressed by this sort of economic investment/ reform. Moreover, given that the Makhzen is widely perceived as benefiting economically from its closeness to the palace (Ibid) this also raises suspicion of corruption and misuse of funds. Likewise, the unconditioned nature and lack of transparency of certain financial aids, such as the EUTFM07 Budget support, could translate into a blank check for the government, potentially fostering more corruption (Fargues & Fandrich, 2012).

#### (iii) Material/logistical concessions: strengthening the coercive state capacity

Apart from economic concessions, the "externalisation" of EU migration policies implies the provision of substantial material, logistic and capacity building support to Morocco, primarily target at its state and security apparatus. Existing literature has already raised particular concern with the effects of this type of support in strengthening the coercive state capacity of authoritarian regimes (Demmelhuber, 2011; Baird, 2016; Koch et al., 2018; Akkerman, 2018; Andersson & Keen, 2019; Völkel, 2020). As explained in the theoretical framework, this dimension is paramount for autocratic resilience. In the case of Morocco, the regime's high organizational power relies largely on this dimension (Hill, 2016), and particularly on the strength of the regime security forces (Dorado-Nogueras, 2011).

The analysis of some EUTF projects provides several examples of the kind of material the EU is financing. For instance, the EUTFM08–Regional development (€30 million) plans the provision of IT infrastructure for collecting, archiving, and identifying digital biometrics, acquisition of vehicles as well as surveillance, intervention and communication equipment for the different field units, and the necessary equipment for aerial surveillance. Similarly, the EUTFM07–Budget support (€101.7 million) aims to enhance the management of land and sea borders, and airports. Lastly, the project EUTFM05–Integrated border management (€44 million) also refers to the same sort of investment, which include the already approved acquisition of 384 vehicles on the value of €26 million (See Table 3.4 in the Annex).

The acquisition of these materials and capacities alone does not necessarily indicate a strengthening of the country's coercive state capacity. However, in the case of Morocco, such enhancement could potentially be leveraged as a tool for autocratic resilience. On the one hand, there is a concern that such enhancement may come at the expense of migrants' rights. Numerous reports from NGOs have documented increased violence against migrants, mass arrests and forced displacements in Northern Morocco, coinciding with the considerable transference of funds and equipment from the EU (AMDH, 2017, 2019; GADEM, 2018; Prestianni, 2018). On the other hand, there is a risk of funds and equipment being misappropriated by the regime to repress and control its citizens (Koch et al., 2018). This is particularly worrisome because the security forces financed by the EU to control migration in Morocco are the same forces responsible for the regime's coercive state capacity. According to Levitsky and Way (2010), effective coercion heavily relies on funding, equipment, and training. Since the EU is providing precisely this kind of support through its migration policies, the possibility of dual use of these resources should be considered. However, only one project (EUTFM12–Dismantling criminal networks) mentions this particular risk.

In contrast, scholars and NGOs have expressed concerns about this possibility, citing the lack of transparency and accountability related with the funds allocated (Wunderlich, 2010; AMDH, 2017; Uzelac, 2020) and the ethical challenge associated with the export of border management technologies, such as biometric control (Wolff, 2008). Given that Moroccan coercive power largely relies on low intensityoperations (Hill, 2016), which involve harassment, intimidation and persecution of the regime's opponents and critics (See Human Rights Watch, 2022), it could be argued that this sort of money and technology transference could significantly contribute to these operations.

#### Opposition Elites' Disempowerment

Finally, it is worth mentioning that by prioritizing state ruling elites as the main actors for cooperation and negotiation in Morocco, the EU may inadvertently sideline opposition elites, mainly civil society actors. This raises two significant concerns. Firstly, this could result in less engagement and fewer resources for the most reform-minded actors within Moroccan society. Secondly, this lack of support and disregard places these actors in a difficult position for challenging and criticizing the regime's abusive behaviour, mainly in the field of migration (Baird, 2016). Therefore, in addition to potentially increasing the power of ruling elites through political, economic, and material means, EU cooperation on migration may also diminish the relative power of opposition elites. Many authors argue that this trend is unlikely to change, as even after the "Arab Uprisings", the EU continues to view ruling elites as the primary interlocutors of migration control cooperation (Demmelhuber, 2011; Dandashly, 2018; Zardo & Cavatorta, 2018). This is further evidenced by the minimal relevance given to civil society organizations in the twelve EUTF projects for Morocco analysed here.

#### 3.5 Conclusion

The main objective of this chapter was to examine the influence of EU external migration policies on the democratisation of SMCs, with a specific focus on analysing policy practices. By introducing an innovative theoretical framework and applying it to the case of Morocco, this study has provided both theoretical and empirical insights into the complex interplay between these processes. While conducting empirical research on authoritarian regimes poses challenges, the analysis of the Moroccan case suggests that EU "externalisation" of migration control may have a negative impact on the country's democratic development, potentially reinforcing or stabilizing autocratic structures. The key findings of the analysis, which are summarized in Table 3.2, highlight these dynamics.

It can be argued that such an outcome would contradict the EU's own narratives and policies regarding democracy promotion, as well as its self-proclaimed image as a regional normative power. The case study presented suggests a wide and deep gap


Table 3.2 How "externalisation" meets democratisation in Morocco: summary of findings

between EU discourses, policy implementation, and their consequences. This gap is wide due to the complete contradiction between policy narratives and practices. Its depth is related to the fact that by strengthening autocratic forces in SMCs, the EU may inadvertently reinforce the very drivers of migration that its policies aim to address, such as the lack of democracy, good governance, and human rights (Andersson & Keen, 2019; Prestianni, 2018). In other words, EU policies would not only fail to address the underlying structural causes of migration but could potentially exacerbate them, thereby risking worsening the migration challenge in the long term (Abderrahim, 2018). Additionally, this would contribute to "process of disillusionment" with the Barcelona Process (Zapata-Barrero, 2020), which, after twenty-five years, has not fulfilled its goal of strengthening democracy and mobility across the Mediterranean region.

#### Annex


Table 3.3 Complete list of EUTF projects in Morocco (2015–)

(continued)


#### Table 3.3 (continued)

(continued)



Source: Author's own elaboration based on the available data on EUTF documents and website

Table 3.4 Material acquired by FIIAPP for Morocco under the project EUTFM05 – Integrated border management


Source: Spanish Ministry Council 2019. Available at: https://www.lamoncloa.gob.es/ consejodeministros/referencias/Paginas/2019/refc20190705.aspx

#### References


Luisa Faustini Torres is a Margarita Salas Post-doc researcher at Universidad Autonoma de Barcelona, where she is a member of TransDeM. She is also an Associate Researcher at GRITIM-UPF, where she conducted her PhD (2021) in the Department of Political and Social Sciences from the Universitat Pompeu Fabra. Prior to that, she completed a master's in Immigration Management at the Universitat Pompeu Fabra (2015) and a master's in international relations at the Barcelona Institute for International Studies (2012), where she specialized in global governance and foreign policy. Her PhD research focused on the nexus between EU external migration policies and the democratisation of countries in the Southern Mediterranean neighbourhood. Her main research interests are migration politics and policies and their relations with processes of autocratization / democratisation in the Euro-Mediterranean region and beyond. She is particularly interested in policy analysis and qualitative research methods (content and text analysis with CAQDAS) as well as discussions on ethics and challenges of conducting fieldwork in authoritarian contexts and over sensitive topics.

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# Chapter 4 Migration Across the Mediterranean: Shaping Italy-Libya Relations Over Time

Mathias Hatleskog Tjønn and Maria Gabrielsen Jumbert

# 4.1 Introduction

The issue of cross-Mediterranean migration into the European Union (EU) has long been contentious. While for many years a matter the Southern EU Member States were left to deal with, the arrivals in 2015 made the rest of the Union become more acutely aware and engaged. The numbers of people crossing the sea were initially rather modest in the 1990s, yet the emphasis put on stricter measures to control the external borders following the Schengen acquis sought to weigh up for the elimination of internal border checks. As migration across the Mediterranean has continued throughout these years, and at times increased despite stricter and more sophisticated attempts to oversee and manage this maritime border, the role of Italy and Libya's cooperation in this, is a central piece of the puzzle. Of the various migratory routes that have been prevalent over these years, the so-called Central Mediterranean route from Libya to Italy has been tainted with tragedies, in terms of human lives lost at sea, and with tensions, in terms of political tugs of war around how to best respond to these migrant crossings. The relations entertained by Italy with Libya in this context have been particularly contentious, due to Libya's long-standing status as a political pariah state. The developments of this cooperation over the last three decades are thus central to understand more broadly Europe's approach to cross-Mediterranean migration.

In this chapter, we begin by drawing up a short history of the political relationships between Italy and Libya, divided into subsections for the country-specific

Norwegian Centre for Humanitarian Studies (NCHS), Bergen, Norway

M. H. Tjønn (✉)

Institute for Social Research (ISF), Oslo, Norway e-mail: m.h.tjonn@socialresearch.no

M. G. Jumbert Peace Research Institute Oslo (PRIO), Oslo, Norway

reasons for their joint migration management expanding. In Sect. 4.3 we then focus on three Italo-Libyan milestone migration-related agreements; the 1998 Joint Communiqué, the 2008 Friendship Treaty and the 2017 Valletta Memorandum, which each ushered in important stages in Central Mediterranean migration management involving Italy, Libya and ultimately also the EU. The final Sect. 4.4 then zooms in on the timeline of naval operations in the Central Mediterranean related to migration and involving Libya.

# 4.2 Brief History of Italy-Libya Relations and Migration Cooperation

Before outlining the three main agreements that have marked Italo-Libyan relations over the past three decades, we start by describing how migration management rose on the Italian political agenda, and then how it emerged as a key point for negotiating external relations for Libya.

#### 4.2.1 Italy's Growing Desire to Manage Migration

The backdrop to Italo-Libyan cooperation on migration can be traced to the 1980s and 1990s. Initially, efforts were quite one-sided, with Italy as the instigator and primary force. The reason for Italy's desire to engage with Libya on the topic of migration was not at this stage due to particularly alarming numbers of migrant crossings across the Central Mediterranean,1 but rather due to both domestic and regional political developments. First, Italy's entrance into the Schengen agreement, signed in 1990 and implemented into both Italian law and the EU's Amsterdam Treaty in 1997 came with new obligations. Second, the first mass-influx of migrants to Italy in modern times – and their subsequent refoulement –constituted a watershed moment, when approximately 20,000 Albanians escaping the collapse of Communist Albania reached Southern Italy on the Vlora shipping vessel in 1991. Both events contributed to shape Italy's rationale for wanting to engage with Libya on migration management – seen as another potential avenue of incoming migrants at a time where the external borders of the EU (then the European Economic Community, or EEC) were under increased scrutiny. During the 1990s, several civil wars on the continent, combined with a pan-African immigration policy pursued by the Libyan leadership, led many migrants towards Libya. A later backlash on immigrants in Libya in the 2000s would push these to other North African countries and towards Europe (de Haas, 2006).

<sup>1</sup> Systematic data collection of number of migration crossings over the Central Mediterranean route only began in 1998. See Fargues, 2017 and https://missingmigrants.iom.int/

The entering into force of the Schengen Agreement marked a first major milestone. In the mid-1980s, Italy (alongside other countries on the periphery of the EEC such as Greece) was kept out of the initial talks to form a borderless area. At first this area was planned to encompass France, West Germany and the Benelux countries, but the idea was later brought into the wider EEC policy field and turned into the foundations of Schengen (Comte, 2015). France's President François Mitterrand and West German Chancellor Helmut Kohl announced the Saarbrücken Accord in July 1984, meant to ease the crossing of both people and commodities by abolishing their bilateral border controls, harmonizing legislation and externalizing security checks to their frontiers with adjacent nations. Italy's Foreign Minister Giulio Andreotti shortly thereafter signaled his country's strong interest in negotiating a similar agreement with France. His French counterpart quickly declined the Italian request, however, as France had concerns about Italian immigration policy and fears of what opening its borders to Italy could entail. The list of French demands for Italy to be allowed into the Schengen deliberations was extensive and included: broad border policing cooperation, a drastic tightening of immigration policy, a harmonization of visa requirements (including demanding visas from countries just across the Mediterranean, hitherto exempted by Italy, including Libya) and, chiefly, a readmission agreement between the two countries, governing any migrants caught illegally or denied admission into France (Paoli, 2015).

Despite initial protests, Italy eventually did cave in to demands and went on to become a full-fledged party to the Schengen acquis, conforming its immigration legislation to the stricter regulations already adopted by the other parties to the agreement. The country signed both the Saarbrücken Accord and the Schengen Agreement itself on November 27, 1990. From there, the controls were implemented swiftly – already the following year as many as ten out of the twelve EEC member states now required visas for citizens of all Arab states (Comte, 2015; Paoli, 2015). Indeed, Pastore et al. (2006) claim that these visa requirements in themselves helped create the Central Mediterranean route across the Sicilian channel by complicating the legal avenues for the seasonal agricultural workers that had long been employed in the Sicilian Agricultural sector, on Corsica and in Southern France, and that were still needed (Alba & Silberman, 2002; Fromentin, 2022).

By the early 1990s the share of foreign-born persons living in Italy was 356,000 or approximately 0.6% of Italy's population, and the first attempts at regularizing their presence took place (King & Andall, 1999). The Martelli Law – named after Vice President of the Council of Ministers Claudio Martelli – entered into effect in February 1990, and it is notable as being postwar Italy's first attempt to properly legislate migration. The law attempted to regulate the arrival, registration, integration and path to citizenship of migrants. The law, however, had significant and important shortcomings that quickly became visible; despite what the legal framework now demanded, there was very little practical preparedness or training of personnel supposed to handle and receive migrants, nor were the facilities to house them ready. The Italian attempts to manage migrant arrivals seemed haphazard and characterized by ad-hoc solutions of sometimes dubious legal standing (Colucci, 2018).

A landmark event that shaped this impression came in the summer of 1991 when the Italian-built ship Vlora, crammed with as many as 20,000 people escaping chaotic post-communist Albania, anchored in the Southern Italian port city of Bari, and brought with it fears of increasing immigration of 'destitute' and 'foreign' people. The Italian government initially housed the arriving Albanians in the city's soccer stadium, orchestrating helicopter drops of food and water as the security situation quickly deteriorated in the overcrowded sports' facility. Within days, any attempts to process the migrants through the system ostensibly set up by the Martelli Law was abandoned and instead the Italian government forcibly returned all arriving migrants to Albania, making it the first documented cases of illegal Italian refoulement in violation of the Refugee Convention (Ballinger, 2018; Fargues, 2017; Triulzi, 2016).

The Vlora incident and its portent of a potential change in migrant arrivals had domestic political consequences for Italy. With the mid-1990s election win for Silvio Berlusconi's Forza Italia, a new incipient foreign policy emerged that was less willing to put European integration above all else. This new 'Euro-realist' political paradigm viewed international and European influence on Italy's political agenda with suspicion, made wider use of bilateral relations to further its own foreign policy, and sought to define and defend Italian "national interests" more vigorously. This last point aimed to curry favor with public opinion and seemingly "stand up" to the EU, criticizing Brussels while still wanting to remain within both Schengen and the Union. Stemming Mediterranean migration figured high among those national interests.

The Schengen system resulted in a complete change of Italy's migration agenda and approach. Italy's immigration situation and attitudes towards migrants underwent further changes after domestic developments in the 1990s, becoming considerably less laissez-faire, more restrictive, and inclined towards refoulement as an acceptable practice. The Italian migration regime would in the coming years undergo a process of externalizing its border controls across the Mediterranean and into Libya.

# 4.2.2 A Gradual Partnership – Migration Control Rises on the Libyan Agenda

As the 1990s came to a close, Italy's new foreign policy priorities led it to seek both a strengthening of economic ties and an introduction of border policing cooperation with countries along the Southern Coasts of the Mediterranean. Libya was gradually becoming more receptive to this conflating of policy fields (Morone, 2017).

After spending much of the 1980s and 1990s as an international pariah due to its antagonistic relationship to both the US and countries in the region because of its support for international terrorism, Libya sought to move back into the orbit of European countries. Italy had maintained a mostly cordial diplomatic relationship with Muammar Gaddafi's Libya since the 1969 coup, keeping the eccentric and autocratic leader's regime at political arm's length, while continuing a gradual expansion of economic involvement in its former colony. This involvement primarily took the shape of Italian multinational oil and gas giant ENI (Ente Nazionale Idrocarburi, or National Hydrocarbons Authority) increasing its importance for both exploration and production in the Libyan sector. But aside from this economic cooperation, the otherwise complex political climate meant there was initially little room for rapprochement. This was made even more complicated by Gaddafi's continuous insistence since his coup that Italy pay reparations for crimes committed during the colonial occupation. There had been a modest one-time payment of Italian ₤5 million agreed with the previous Libyan monarchy in 1956, but the Italian authorities insisted it was not linked to either colonial reparations or damages incurred during the Second World War, but rather a "contribution to the economic reconstruction of the country" (Colafrancesco, 2012; Del Boca, 2011; Morone, 2013; Paoletti, 2011). Indeed, the colonial history of Italy and Libya had mostly been downplayed by a long sequence of Italian governments. This was about to change in the 1990s.

Ultimately, the sanctions and embargo placed upon Libya for the country's rogue policies and terror financing – in combination with low oil prices throughout the 1980s – took their toll on the country's finances. Interestingly, this embargo strongly contributed to an already developing situation where Libya itself became a destination for migrants seeking work. This began in the 1970s and 1980s with the expansion of oil and gas extraction installations in the country and picked up pace with Gaddafi's Pan-Arabist and later Pan-Africanist policies, seeking both labor migration and political support elsewhere as the embargo and Western sanctions started to bite. By 2008, it has been estimated that between 1 and 1.5 million migrants resided in Libya, bringing both much needed labor to the Libyan labor market, but also at times creating friction within Libyan society (de Haas, 2006; Paoletti, 2011). Meanwhile, in Italy the political upheavals of the early 1990s, when the Christian Democratic party (DC) and the Italian Socialist Party (PSI) – which had governed Italy for most of the postwar period – lost power, creating fresh openings for new politicians. Tentative Italian outreach to Libya happened in the first half of the 1990s as a part of the politica del buon vicinato, which translates into "Good Neighborhood Policy." Towards the end of the decade this policy yielded results, with the Joint communiqué and a verbal process alongside it, both signed by the Libyan Secretary of the General People's Committee, Omar Mustafa el-Muntasser, and Italian Foreign Minister Lamberto Dini on July 4, 1998 (Colafrancesco, 2012; Coralluzzo, 2008; Del Boca, 2011; Labanca, 2015; Lombardi, 2011; Ronzitti, 2009). It signaled the first time both colonial history, economic cooperation and migration control were mentioned in any Italo-Libyan agreement text.

# 4.3 Three Key Agreements – Their Consequences and Specifics

The signing of the Joint communiqué in 1998 marked the beginning of a new form of bilateral relation and cooperation between Italy and Libya, enshrined in this agreement, pursued and further consolidated with the 2008 Treaty on Friendship, Partnership and Cooperation – and then renewed within a new and complex political configuration in Libya, with the Valetta Memorandum in 2017. In this section we first describe the political context leading to these three different agreements and what consequences the agreements had for migration management cooperation, before briefly reviewing each agreement.

# 4.3.1 Three Decades Marked by Three Different Bilateral Agreements

The most important and immediate effect of the 1998 Joint communiqué was an evercloser economic involvement of Italian companies in Libya, particularly ENI's role in the petroleum sector. Toward the end of the millennium, ENI was responsible for more than half of Libya's oil exports, and the two economies became ever more intertwined, ensuring an increased importance of Italo-Libyan petroleum industry. The mention of migration was an important first, though in the late 1990s that meant a joint combating of visa forgery, not yet physical patrols or interceptions (Italian & Libyan Governments, 1998a). It would take another decade of Italo-Libyan political negotiations and deliberations to result in a significant milestone in their migration cooperation. The later Friendship Treaty was signed into being when Berlusconi traveled to Libya to meet Gaddafi in Benghazi, on August 30, 2008. The intermingling of issues such as an apology for colonial crimes and related reparations offered to Libya by Italy, the continued expansion of Italian companies'– chiefly ENI's – presence in the Libyan oil and gas sector, and Italy's desire for Libya to take a more active role in policing its borders and cooperating with an Italian migration management agenda, were the key characteristics of this treaty (Italian & Libyan Governments, 2008). Regarding migration, the treaty was also quick to produce effects—between 2008 and 2010, "illegal" migrant arrivals to Italy decreased from 37,000 to 405 (Lombardi, 2011). This also helped Libya being welcomed back into the fold after years of international isolation and ended the long-standing international embargo and sanction regime against the country (Morone, 2017; Triulzi, 2013). In fact, on September 5, 2008 only a few days after the treaty was signed, US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice arrived for a historic visit to Tripoli (Morone, 2013).

This new arrangement would be short-lived, however. The armed opposition to long-time autocratic ruler Gaddafi in the Arab uprisings of 2010–12 and ensuing NATO intervention to unseat him and protect the civilian population threw both regional politics and migration policy cooperation into a tumultuous stage. By 2012 another challenge to Italy and Libya's cooperation came with the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) condemnation in the case of Hirsi Jamaa and others v. Italy. The judgment came after 24 Eritrean and Somali nationals who had been forcibly returned to Tripoli after having been intercepted by the Italian coastguard on May 6, 2009, brought their case before the ECHR (Andrade, 2014; ECHR, 2012; Triulzi, 2016). The interception was probably what the 2008 Treaty was meant to facilitate, but the judgment showed how it in practice was at odds with what European Human Rights law allowed.

Despite the ECHR ruling, Italy attempted to revive the clauses of the 2008 Friendship Treaty relating to migration management just months after Gaddafi's fall in 2011, making new agreements with the National Transitional Council (NTC), Libya's interim government. This was not feasible at the time, as the civil war that erupted after Gaddafi's demise drew in external actors both from the region and internationally. These coalesced into two sides facing off each other; Turkey, Qatar, and Italy supporting Tripoli's UN-recognized government, versus Russia, Egypt, UAE, Saudi Arabia, and France giving their support to the self-declared Khalifa Haftar government. The promise of involvement in Libyan reconstruction and resource extraction after an eventual end to hostilities was a motivating factor in their respective involvements.

The disarray and conflict in Libya notwithstanding, the country remained at the center of Italian and European efforts to externalize the management of migration. The increased numbers of people crossing over to Italy from 2013 and 2014 onwards, led to what has alternatively been called a "refugee crisis" and a "migration crisis" (perhaps mostly aptly called a "reception crisis"). The crisis-rhetoric that followed, mixed with the actual challenges of accommodating the increase in migrant arrivals and concurrent public anxiety, had far reaching consequences. This troubled political atmosphere resulted in the EU trying to immediately limit migrant entries into the union from across the Mediterranean, most (in) famously with the EU-Turkey Joint Statement signed on March 20, 2016. Meanwhile, in the Central Mediterranean a new migration-related agreement building on previous Italian efforts vis-à-vis Libya, was put into place. This was the Valletta Memorandum, signed between the two countries (the deal supported and partially financed by the EU) on February 2, 2017 (Palm, 2020; Thevenin, 2021). This memorandum came to be after the then-Italian Interior Minister and veteran of the Italian secret services Marco Minnitti, first negotiated a deal involving payments to the Awlad Suleiman, Tubu, and the Tuareg – ethnic groups involved in organizing migrant treks across Southern Libya towards the Mediterranean – to stop directing migrants northwards (Larémont et al., 2020). At the same time Rome offered the Libyan government in Tripoli and local militias in cities like Misrata and Sabratha financial assistance to secure their endorsement of the initiative (Morone, 2018: Trew & Kington, 2017). The number of migrants making the crossing across the Central Mediterranean subsequently tumbled in 2016 and 2017. In August 2017, normally a peak season for crossings, the media reported an 85% drop in arrivals to Italy, compared with the previous two years (Walsh & Horowitz, 2017).

Throughout this period, there were also international attempts at securing a lasting peace in Libya. This chiefly happened through the Libya-led and UN-backed Libyan Political Dialogue Forum (itself evolving from prior peace initiatives) through two conferences held in Berlin in 2020 and 2021. On October 23, 2020, a ceasefire stopped the most recent outbreak of hostilities and with a tenuous peace in place there were opportunities for a stabilization of the country, and reconstruction and transition to democracy to begin. These opportunities have unfortunately so far not materialized. Meanwhile, new and old power brokers like Muammar Gaddafi's son Seif al-Islam Gaddafi and Khalifa Haftar, a rivaling warlord based in Tobruk, as well as a competing government based in the same city, now challenge the internationally recognized government in Tripoli.

The impermanence of peace in Libya notwithstanding, the Valletta Memorandum was renewed for an additional three years in February 2020. That year alone, 12,000 migrants were pulled back to Libya by the Libyan Coast Guard, partially equipped and trained by the EU and European countries like the UK and Italy (Ferstman, 2020; InfoMigrants, 2021; Phillips, 2020). The migrants now "contained" in Libya are often kept in squalid conditions in an opaque network of camps and detention centers belonging to a range of different actors, both governmental (keeping in mind that Libya has for most of the past decade had at least two competing governments) and non-governmental, meaning run by tribal factions, city-state militias, armed groups, or NGOs and IGOs from the international community (Larémont et al., 2020; Phillips, 2020). Additionally, the search and rescue capacity (SAR) of the Libyan Coast Guard – itself a much-disputed entity with ties to human trafficking across the Mediterranean and a frequently documented lack of respect for migrants' rights – has been ramped up, as direct official European involvement in naval patrol and rescue operations have been scaled back (Tondo, 2019). Finally, NGOs active in the Mediterranean in the initial years after the 2015 have been curtailed and even criminalized for their activities (Mainwaring & DeBono, 2021). The result is a situation in which so-called "irregular" migrants in Libya are essentially prevented from both leaving Libya and entering the EU, with the renewed 2017 Valletta Memorandum giving highly debatable migration management externalization efforts a veneer of legality, where none should exist if the migration governance processes involved were instead viewed alongside European ideals and stated adherence to human rights standards.

#### 4.3.2 The 1998 Joint Communiqué

On July 4, 1998, a Joint Communiqué and a verbal process were signed by the two countries promoting collaboration in the field of petroleum and gas in exchange for political recognition of Libya, while presenting migration management as a mutual interest (Coralluzzo, 2008; Labanca, 2015; Lombardi, 2011). The 1998 Communiqué framed the collaboration as a mutual desire to leave the negative colonial heritage behind (Italian & Libyan Governments, 1998a, b). Both documents instead look to the future, a future that no polemic, disagreement or contention should mar. The implication is that an acknowledgement of past misdeeds, brutality and imbalance of power cannot coexist with a new future, and that historical memory stands in the way of progress. The political rapprochement hinted at in the Italo-Libyan documents of 1998 would take a decade to mature and come to fruition. It is, however, noteworthy that the number of migrant crossings to Italy from Libya and related drowning deaths the Mediterranean rose significantly, with more than a quadrupling of registered arrivals, from 5500 to almost 23,000 between 1998 and 2005. In the same time period 1641 people died at sea while making the journey. Going as far back as the mid-1990s, Gaddafi had claimed that Libya was simply a transit country for migrants and not itself a destination country. The increase in crossings strengthened this claim, allowing Gaddafi to use it as a bargaining chip to support Libyan demands for a lifting of sanctions and a readmission into the international community. His potential influence over migratory flows towards Europe through Libya, gave Gaddafi another means of pressure in dealing with Italy and other European countries, in addition to their economic interests in Libyan oil and gas, set to grow even further.

As quickly as in August 1999, ENI announced a US\$5.5 billion deal with its Libyan counterpart in the National Oil Company (NOC) to build a cross-Mediterranean gas pipeline called Greenstream, as well as to expand gas and oil exploration and exploitation in the country. At this point ENI was responsible for more than half of Libya's oil exports, and the two economies became ever more intertwined, ensuring an increased importance of Italo-Libyan petroleum industry for their shared migrant policy, as we shall see in the coming subsection.

# 4.3.3 The 2008 Treaty on Friendship, Partnership and Cooperation

The second of the three migration management milestone agreements, the 2008 Friendship Treaty is arguably the most important one. It traded an increase in Libyan border control and a clampdown on "illegal migration" in return for further Italian financial aid and investment. It also created the framework for large-scale refoulement to Libya of migrants en route to Europe intercepted in the Mediterranean. This was done through several major developments: for one, it marked a key step forward in the externalization of Italy's migration regime to Libya, by allowing for joint Italo-Libyan coast guard patrols which quickly led to a much more organized pushback of migrants seeking to reach Italy than the more scattered efforts previously seen. Alessandro Triulzi (2013) called it a "systematic refoulement" of all northbound migrant boats across the Mediterranean. The then serving Italian Minister of Interior Roberto Maroni went as far as praising these harsh tactics as a "model for the whole of Europe". This treaty also intimately tied the colonial past to both economic and migrant policing cooperation through including an apology and promises of colonial reparation. It is notable that no other former colonial power has yet apologized for past wrongdoings or promised reparations as Italy did in that year's treaty with Libya. However, the apology can be read in many ways. In general, Italian and international media at the time accepted it quite uncritically or reacted in somewhat surprising ways, with Italian newspaper Il Giornale arguing that Berlusconi had paid too high a price for the deal, while the German daily Süddeutsche Zeitung lauded the colonial apology and promise of reparation for being "not only morally but also financially expedient" (De Cesari, 2012).

Different scholars have taken an interest in these diplomatic gestures and forms of apology (Ballinger, 2016; Lombardi, 2011), both praising and criticizing it (De Cesari, 2012; Miranda, 2011; Morone, 2013, 2017: Ronzitti, 2009). De Cesari has observed that while the treaty/apology on the surface addresses past colonial misdeeds, it never explicitly points out what they were, nor talks about the damage done concretely. Instead it calls for final closure and an end to contentiousness and heated discussions on the matter of the colonial era, discussions and exchanges that had never taken place. De Cesari mentions the writing of Stoler and her term "colonial aphasia". It implies that there is no lack of societal memory or knowledge on the topic of colonialism, in contrast to the view that there is a reigning colonial amnesia or silence. Rather, colonial aphasia tells us that there is an inability to truly comprehend, reflect and learn from the colonial past. Morone posits that the treaty was quite simply a case of realpolitik. Behind the excuses for Italy's past behavior, their shared history served as political capital. It benefited both the Libyan regime in its desire for international acknowledgement and economic development, and the Italian government in its search to externalize their border further.

#### 4.3.4 The 2017 Valletta Memorandum of Understanding

As we have seen above, the signing of the Valetta Memorandum in February 2017 was the outcome of a longer process, where Italy sought to revive the clauses of the 2008 Friendship Treaty relating to migration management just months after Gaddafi's fall in 2011. This process proceeded unevenly through the handling of increased migration in 2015–2016 and the yet-to-be solved Dublin Regulation debacle, which hindered an intra-European accord on migration matters. This new Valetta Memorandum established "temporary detention centers" and European-paid patrols against "fuel smuggling" (Italian & Libyan Governments, 2017). Despite the difficulty of accessing and assessing the state of migrants in these Libyan detention centers, both media and humanitarian organizations documented the dire conditions that an increasing number of migrants were experiencing, criticizing both the EU and Italy for the human cost of their deal making. The NGOs that chose to work in Libya to better the camp conditions and the lives of those migrants held there, speak of an impossible choice: they do not want to be seen as legitimizing the initiative to construct a network of camps in Libya to retain migrants heading towards Europe, but nonetheless accept funding from Italy and the EU to help improve the situation for detainees. Along the coastline of Cyrenaica in the East, many of these detention centers are located in the same areas that housed internment camps in the 1930s (Tjønn & Lemberg-Pedersen, 2022). Drawing a direct comparison between these colonial internment camps and today's migrant detention centers may be unfounded, yet ignoring this history would also be a grave omission. The fact that the Valletta Memorandum means the EU is now involved in funding the memorandum's end goals – thereby tacitly endorsing its means – also raises a series of moral and humanitarian questions and complications. Aside from EU's involvement in the Valletta Memorandum, the Union has also increased its migration management efforts vis-à-vis Libya in other ways, which we will now turn to in the final section.

# 4.4 The EU's Recent Growing Role, with Italy as an Intermediary

After several incidents in the Mediterranean with large-scale shipwrecks, and many people drowning, different responses were put in motion. Italy set up the navalhumanitarian Search and Rescue operation Mare Nostrum, in October 2013, after a large, overfilled vessel caught fire and went down just outside Lampedusa. The operation was ended a year later and was replaced by the Frontex-led operation Triton – after accusations that the Italian-led operation encouraged more migrants to cross the sea (FRONTEX, 2018). After two large incidents again in April 2015, in a context of steadily increasing numbers of people crossing the Mediterranean, new measures were taken. Triton transited to Triton II, a more robust operation. In June, EUNAVFOR MED was launched as an EU military operation meant to combat migrant smuggling and trafficking. The mission's mandate was:

...to undertake systematic efforts to identify, capture and dispose of vessels and enabling assets used or suspected of being used by migrant smugglers or traffickers, in order to contribute to wider EU efforts to disrupt the business model of human smuggling and trafficking networks in the Southern Central Mediterranean and prevent the further loss of life at sea (Operation Sophia, 2019a).

The mission, also called Operation Sophia – after the name of a baby born onboard one of its ships in August that year (European Commission, 2016) – has later seen its scope of activities be extended twice: first, in June 2016, to include training of the Libyan Coast Guard and Navy, and a mandate to contribute to the implementation of the UN arms embargo off the coast of Libya. In July 2017, the operation was also tasked with monitoring the efficiency of the training of the Libyan Coastguard and Navy, and to gather information on illegal trafficking of oil exports from Libya. Finally, the operation was tasked with enhancing the means of information sharing between member states law enforcement agencies, FRONTEX and EUROPOL, especially relating to human trafficking. Later, the FRONTEX-led border management operation Triton was replaced by Operation Themis, launched on February 1, 2018.

The training of the Libyan Coast Guard (LCG) as part of Operation Sophia had several precedents, including provisions in the 2008 Italo-Libyan Friendship Treaty, and the EU Border Assistance Mission (EUBAM) border assistance mission, initiated in 2013. The training picked up pace after the Valletta Memorandum of Understanding between Italy and Libya and the related Malta Declaration of the European Council, also signed early February 2017 (Cuttitta, 2018, Pianigiani & Walsh, 2017). Operation Sophia was not without its critics: one of the most outspoken of these critics was the former Italian Interior Minister Matteo Salvini. Salvini, according to reports was one of the prime architects behind Operation Sophia losing all its vessels and maritime assets in March 2019, as he claimed Operation Sophia and naval operations like it, acted like 'pull-factors' for migrants. It should be noted this is a claim not borne out by research. Salvini also announced his intention to refuse ships carrying rescued migrants to dock at Italian ports, be they part of EUs officially sanctioned operations, or run by civilian NGOs, so as to eliminate another so-called migrant "pull-factor". Operation Sophia still retained reconnaissance aircrafts and drones, but implicit in this is was a shift towards taking a more "back-seat" position focused on monitoring, to maintain a so called maritime situational awareness and leaving the SAR-work to the LCG (Maccanico, 2019; Mantini, 2019; Pietz, 2019).

#### 4.4.1 The Libyan Coast Guard

There are also other issues that make the LCG a less than ideal partner for the EU in the Mediterranean. The Libyan Government of National Accord (GNA), which the LCG sort under, is the only Libyan government recognized by the international community. It is however, at the moment only in direct control over Tripoli and surrounding towns, with a volatile security situation that has only worsened since Tobruk-based strongman Khalifa Haftar's latest prolonged assault, beginning in 2019 and only ending with the ceasefire of 2020. Haftar leads a rival Libyan powerbase in the Libyan National Army (LNA), with recent developments suggesting the already prolonged conflict only worsening. Underlying these two larger factions, are a myriad of clans, armed groups and city militias, with shifting allegiances and plentiful weapons and munitions (Kirkpatrick, 2019). The EU obviously cannot choose the conditions under which to work, but not much in the current Libyan situation suggests that the LCG or the country as a whole can be considered a stable, responsible and accountable migration management partner.

The practices of the LCG have been quite contested, with histories of torture of migrants upon their return to holding centers in Libya repeatedly surfacing, as well as examples of supposed coast guard associates doubling as migrant smugglers (Pietz, 2019; Tondo, 2019). Despite these incidents, Operation Sophia claimed to have successfully trained 555 Libyan coast guard officers as of October 3, 2019 (out of a personnel total of approximately 1000), and had its mandate furthered until March 31, 2020 (Global Security, 2017; Operation Sophia, 2019b). Operation Sophia was then closed down with grand declarations about its merits, and a new Operation Irini was set in place a few months after. The main task of Operation Irini – to uphold the UN arms embargo put in place after the latest outbreak of violence in Libya – acts as a tacit admission that migrant rescue in the Central Mediterranean is now implicitly seen as a part of the LCG's remit, despite the severe issues described above.

#### 4.5 Conclusion

In this chapter we have seen that the evolution of the joint migration management framework that governs migrant crossings across the Central Mediterranean Route from Libya to Italy today, has a longer history than often acknowledged. Its main actors – Italy, Libya and eventually the EU – all had their specific reasons and rationales for engaging in it. For Italy, it was the need to adhere to the Schengen agreement's requirement of 'harder' external borders in order to loosen up borders internally in the Union, combined with an increasing domestic political concern with migration, as the numbers of migrant arrivals rose. For Libya, the initial desire for political acknowledgement after a time spent as an international pariah, evolved into a need for both political and economic engagement by Italy, as the Gaddafi regime was overturned, and a decade of volatility ensued. The EU, after the political convulsions caused by the "Long Summer of Migration" in 2015–16, urgently signed new deals like the 2016 EU-Turkey Statement or signed on to expanded versions of previous bilateral agreements between Italy and Libya, like the 2017 Valletta Memorandum. This memorandum, and its preceding agreements in the form of the 1998 Joint Communiqué and the 2008 Friendship Treaty, were the focus of our third section. As seen in our third and final section, this cross-Mediterranean relationship has evolved into a new phase in the post-Gaddafi years, with a politically challenging situation in Libya, and a political climate in Europe bent on everstricter migration control, with the EU taking an ever-increasing role. This has in particular affected the physical presence at sea, Search and Rescue efforts in particular, but also the mere presence of border control vessels – with an obligation to provide rescue, all eventually seen as contributing to bringing migrants over to Italy. The quite harsh reception offered by Italy towards NGO-led rescue vessels in recent years is a testimony to this. As the second decade of the twenty-first century came to a close, the Italian-Libyan relationship had thus evolved into one where migration management efforts were increasingly pushed over to Libya, facilitated through funding and training of the Libyan Coast Guard – sanctioned by the EU in EU-anchored agreements and operations. Libya, still divided among two ruling factions, only one being internationally recognized, is in need of international engagement – although the insights brought about how migrants are treated in Libya is likely to still complicate that for some time.

#### References


Mathias Hatleskog Tjønn is a PhD Fellow in history affiliated with the NORMS-project, housed at the Institute for Social Research (ISF) in Oslo. He holds an MPhil in modern international and transnational history from the University of Oslo (2019) and has worked as a research assistant at the Peace Research Institute Oslo (PRIO). Tjønn is interested in migration, migration policy, colonial history and European contemporary history.Website https://www.samfunnsforskning.no/ english/people/res/mathiat

Maria Gabrielsen Jumbert is a Senior Researcher and Research Director at the Peace Research Institute Oslo (PRIO), and co-Director of the Norwegian Centre for Humanitarian Studies (NCHS). She holds a PhD in International Relations and Political Science from the Institut d'Etudes Politiques (SciencesPo) in Paris. Maria's research focuses on humanitarian and security interfaces in the European borderlands, and how they mutually influence each other: from European migration and border management policies to humanitarian responses to the reception crises in countries like Greece, France and Norway. Website https://www.prio.org/Staff/MariaJ

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# Chapter 5 (Im-)Mobility Partnerships: Limits to EU Democracy Promotion Through Mobility in the Mediterranean

Stefania Panebianco and Giuseppe Cannata

# 5.1 Introduction

At critical junctures, the European integration process has often found a new élan to invest in renovated cooperation frameworks of either domestic or international kind. The Arab Uprisings of 2011 were initially regarded as such a critical juncture for both domestic regime change and Euro-Mediterranean relations. The European Union (EU) has struggled to link its external migration governance with policies aimed at democratic governance promotion, assuming the mobility-democracy nexus as a crucial dimension of its relations with the Southern neighbour countries (SNCs). Yet, 10 years later, what prevails in the Southern neighbourhood is authoritarian resilience rather than political change or democratic transition. This chapter explores the links between EU efforts to support democracy in the Southern neighbourhood and EU external migration policy, focusing on mobility partnerships (MPs). MPs belong to what the EU has conceived as a 'new' democracy promotion approach epitomised in its Communication on a partnership for democracy and shared prosperity in the Southern Mediterranean (European Commission, 2011a). The underlying logic of this approach is to leverage the building and consolidation of democracy and rule of law through the EU's conditional support for Mediterranean partners in terms of 'markets, money and mobility.'

This chapter relies upon the research project MORDOR, Mapping and Organizing Research on Dictatorships, Open Access Repository, Erasmus+ Cooperation Partnership in higher education, 2021-1-PL01-KA220-HED-000023034, coordinated by Jeroen Van den Bosch, Uniwersytet Im. Adama Mickiewicza W Poznaniu.

S. Panebianco (✉)

University of Catania, Catania, Italy e-mail: stefania.panebianco@unict.it

G. Cannata Scuola Normale Superiore, Firenze, Italy

More recently, to address the current challenges that the Southern neighbourhood faces in the post-COVID19 era, namely governance, socio-economic, climate, environmental and security challenges resulting from global trends, the EU has proposed 'a new, ambitious and innovative Agenda for the Mediterranean, drawing for the first time on the full EU toolbox and the ground-breaking opportunities of the twin green and digital transitions, in order to relaunch our cooperation and realise the untapped potential of our shared region' (European Commission, 2021: 2). With the new Agenda for the Mediterranean, the EU seeks to adopt, within the framework of the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP), 'a common and people-centred agenda'. Irregular migration across the Mediterranean Sea stays high on the EU's political agenda and avoiding that '[t]oo many people risk their lives by attempting to enter the EU irregularly, fuelling a smuggling industry that is ruthless, criminal and destabilising to local communities' represents a burning issue for the EU and Euro-Mediterranean cooperation (ibidem). Migration and mobility are key issues of current Euro-Mediterranean relations, since enhancing cooperation on migration through comprehensive partnerships remains the preferred EU strategy, addressing the root causes of irregular migration and forced displacement. The EU invests in legal migration and mobility in line with the new Pact on Migration and Asylum (European Commission, 2020). Once more, the EU envisages a comprehensive cooperation framework, including '[a] renewed commitment to the rule of law, human and fundamental rights, equality, democracy and good governance as the bedrock for stable fair, inclusive and prosperous societies, with respect for diversity and tolerance' (European Commission, 2021: 4), relying on an increased allocation of funding and the mobilisation of private and public investments. 'In line with the "EU Action Plan on Human Rights and Democracy for 2020-2024", the EU will step up its engagement with partners to promote the respect for human rights, the rule of law and democratic values.' (European Commission, 2021: 7). The new declared 'people-centred' approach of the Agenda mentions the promotion of human rights, the rule of law, democracy and good governance, gender equality and equal opportunities for all and support to civil society as specific action points.

However, when it comes to a trade-off between cooperation with authoritarian governments to ensure stability and democracy promotion, the EU tends to prioritise the former. Since international cooperation is a process of 'strategic interaction' (van Hüllen, 2015), it is reasonable to assume that the EU's neighbours are not passive receivers of democracy promotion and migration policies: partner countries do have 'agency' in negotiating with the EU. Indeed, they leverage their strategic role as guarantors of stability in the Union's neighbourhood in order to obtain more 'markets, money and mobility' (Reslow, 2012). Looking at the implementation of the MPs with Tunisia, Morocco and Jordan, we aim to critically explore the interactions between mobility cooperation and democracy promotion from this reversed perspective. This allows us to advance some considerations on the extent to which MPs are constrained into a stability-democracy dilemma, that challenges the mobility-democracy nexus portrayed by the EU.

# 5.2 What to Look at? Main Assumptions and Selected Cases

When looking at the EU's external action in the field of migration governance, it is striking to note that most of the countries with which the EU is cooperating fall short of the standards of democracy and human rights that the Union itself predicates as a 'normative power' (Manners, 2002). This chapter departs from the stabilitydemocracy dilemma, focusing on what Cassarino (2007) defined as 'reversed conditionality', and explores the mobility-democracy nexus portrayed by the EU, to assess whether the EU is consistently investing in mutually beneficial partnerships to ensure regular migration. Since the aim is to reconnect mobility and democracy promotion in the broad framework of the ENP, the chapter analyses the potential impact of MPs on SNCs' democratisation processes. It shows that the mobilitydemocracy nexus can also be constrained by authoritarian governments and partner countries' elites, since SNCs have agency in negotiating with the EU. Initially, MPs were not framed as tools associated with democracy promotion. The concept of MPs was established by the European Commission in 2007. The first pilot agreements were concluded with Moldova and Capo Verde and did not target the Mediterranean area. MPs were structured as 'soft international agreements' (Wessel, 2021) aimed at improving the effectiveness of migration management. The EU proposed to invest in improved opportunities in terms of legal migration, visa facilitation and migration management assistance, in exchange for third countries' commitment to step up cooperation on combating irregular migration and readmission (European Commission, 2007).

In the aftermath of the Arab Uprisings, the EU was compelled to deal with the failure of its approach to democracy promotion in the Southern neighbourhood. This approach has proved to be inadequate to live up to the ideals of the Barcelona Process, which was initiated in 1995 with the adoption of the Barcelona Declaration. At the same time, political instability in SNCs resulted in a steep increase of the number of migrants and refugees at the EU borders (see Fig. 5.1). Also in reaction to these developments, in November 2011 the European Commission launched the Global Approach to Migration and Mobility (GAMM), conceived as a revision of the Global Approach to Migration (GAM) of 2005, with the aims of going beyond the fight against irregular migration and establishing a 'coherent and comprehensive migration policy for the EU' (European Commission, 2011b). In this context, the role and objectives of the MPs changed, since these were integrated in the broader framework of the revised ENP.

MPs should thus be situated at a crossroad between the revised GAMM and the new approach to democracy promotion, being at the same time a framework to reorganise external migration policies and an instrument for positive conditionality in the EU toolbox. Based on such an understanding of MPs, this chapter focuses on three crucial cases to analyse how cooperation on migration and mobility, rather than representing a tool to leverage democratic change, can hamper the Union's capacity to reinforce or support democratisation processes in partner countries. The choice to

Source: Our own elaboration of Frontex Risk Analysis Network (FRAN) data.

Fig. 5.1 Detections of irregular border-crossing at the EU borders

look in particular at the Southern neighbourhood is related to the long-standing EU commitment to democracy promotion in the region, dating back to the 1990s, to the ambitious Barcelona Declaration. Since the aim of this research is to explore the role of MPs in relation to the broader framework of ENP and the EU's democracy promotion efforts, the analysis focuses on the three SNCs that have signed MPs, namely Morocco (2013), Tunisia (2014) and Jordan (2014), and are currently implementing the agreements. A similar agreement was offered to Egypt, but the Egyptian government refused to enter negotiations at the time; the 2017 revision of the EU-Egypt partnership priorities in the framework of the Euro-Mediterranean Association Agreements (EMAAs) did not mention MPs, confirming the low interest in considering further negotiations. In 2014, a Dialogue on Mobility, Migration and Security has been launched with Lebanon, with a prospect for the signing of an MP, but no substantial progress has been achieved to date.

In addition, the strategic position along the Mediterranean migratory routes of the selected countries, Morocco for the Western route, Tunisia for the central route, and Jordan for the Eastern one, makes them ideal cases to assess how security concerns about migration management both condition and constrain the EU's democracy promotion efforts.

#### 5.3 The EU Approach: The Mobility-Democracy Nexus

Following the Arab Uprisings in 2011 popular demands for more freedoms and social justice, the EU was compelled to revise its democracy promotion strategy. The EU's Mediterranean policy in general, and the democracy approach in particular, can be conceived of as an adaptive policy, which is shaped more by external systemic events rather than by EU values and principles (Panebianco, 2012: 161). After 2011, the EU has reframed its policy instruments in order to face the most urgent economic and social needs, and support popular democratic requests. Despite the political rhetoric concerning democracy promotion and assistance in the Mediterranean, for several years the EU had been de facto cooperating with powerful authoritarian leaders to achieve political stability and avoid insecurity. This was in line with EU's democracy promotion strategy, which had traditionally relied on three different methods: a) positive political engagement with authoritarian regimes; b) the promotion of economic reforms; c) the strengthening of civil society activism (Pace et al., 2010: 3). Against this backdrop, in 2011 the EU placed the 'more for more' principle at the basis of its renovated approach.

This approach was taking stock of the ENP reform, which was agreed on in the same year. Since the early 2000s, EU relations with the Southern neighbourhood were framed under the ENP, launched in 2004. The original aim of the ENP was to safeguard stability in the border regions of the Union 'by transforming the borderlands in line with European values, improving governance, modernising economies and instilling the rule of law and respect for human rights' (Teti et al., 2020: 5). Such a transformation has been pursued through different 'policy-tools', targeting also migration and mobility governance. It is significant for our argument that the two major revisions of the ENP in 2011, in the aftermath of the Arab Uprisings, and in 2015, during the migration and refugee crisis, correspond to two critical increases of irregular migration towards the EU.

Studies of the revised ENP, indeed, point at a shift towards more short-term stability objectives, de-prioritization of democracy promotion and focus on pragmatic issue-specific cooperation. The underlying logic of this approach is that the more countries are committed to reforms, the greater and broader EU support they achieve. The proposed incentives are extra funding, visa facilitation and liberalization, greater access to EU markets, etc. To leverage the building and consolidation of democracy and rule of law through 'conditional' EU support to Mediterranean partners would imply more money, mobility and markets – the so-called 3Ms (European Commission, 2011c). After the Uprisings, thus, the EU has been endeavouring to establish a nexus between mobility and democracy: for Brussels the facilitation of regular migration through MPs could be a relevant incentive 'to be made available, on the basis of mutual accountability, to those partner countries most advanced in the consolidation of reforms' (European Commission, 2011c).

In this regard, Lavenex and Schimmelfennig (2011) argue that the EU has developed three distinct mechanisms to promote democracy in its neighbourhood, which they label 'linkage', 'leverage', and 'governance'. Drawing on such a framework, the ENP can be considered as situated in-between the two ideal types of 'leverage' and 'governance'. On the one hand, it is based on some forms of 'positive conditionality' through tailor-made incentives and realistic rewards to the Southern neighbours. On the other, it relies on sectoral horizontal cooperation to promote democratic governance and foster the gradual approximation of legal and administrative standards to that of the EU acquis (Freyburg et al., 2009).

External migration governance is one of the sectors in which the EU combined both approaches. On the one hand, there is leverage based on 'positive conditionality', since mobility is one of the 3Ms mentioned above as an element of the 'more for more' approach; on the other, a more fine-grained type of promotion of 'democratic governance' through horizontal cooperation and gradual approximation to EU standards of 'transparency, accountability, and participation' is envisaged (Freyburg et al., 2011). As a result, it is possible to consider MPs within the broader framework of the revised ENP and new approach to democracy promotion. For EU external action to be effective, some conditions have to be satisfied, both at the EU level and at the level of partner countries. For instance, when looking at MPs as a tool for leverage it is useful to assess to what extent the incentives offered by the EU in terms of mobility are 'credible' for SNCs, and whether such incentives meet favourable adoption costs in partner countries to allow democracy promotion to be effective. At the same time, if we consider MPs as a tool to promote democratic governance, in Lavenex and Schimmelfennig's terms, functional cooperation on mobility, through embedding democratic principles in transnational governance rules and practices, can be expected to promote partner countries' socialisation to such principles (Lavenex & Schimmelfennig, 2011: 895).

Based on such an understanding of MPs in the broader framework of the ENP and EU democracy promotion, we suggest exploring the mobility-democracy nexus within the discursive economy and practices of the EU's external action. Since the launch of the Barcelona Process, (lack of) democracy in the Southern neighbourhood has been identified as a critical factor in making sense of migration towards Europe. In the aftermath of the Arab Uprisings, it is possible to identify 'at least a perception that the EU should be cautious when supporting [processes of democratisation], since it [might] have the undesirable effect of producing more instability, and, consequently, more migration' (Faustini-Torres, 2020). This 'counternarrative', as defined by Faustini-Torres, sheds light on an inherent contradiction in the EU approach to democracy promotion in the Southern neighbourhood. The following sections will try to reconstruct EU-SNCs relations along the three dimensions of 'markets', 'money', and 'mobility', situating MPs in the broader context of the ENP and seeking to assess whether these policy instruments are effective in the Southern neighbourhood.

#### 5.3.1 Markets: When Free Trade Is Unappealing

The 'M' of 'markets' was the first to be included in the EU toolbox of democracy promotion. The idea of market liberalisation has been at the core of EU-SNCs relations since the early 1970s, when the European Commission launched the Global Mediterranean Policy (GMP) as a framework for bilateral preferential trade agreements (PTAs). However, it was only in the mid-1990s that EU democracy promotion and trade agendas were explicitly tied, in the context of the so-called Barcelona Process. As part of the Barcelona Process, the EU signed a new generation of cooperation agreements with Tunisia (which entered into force in 1998), Morocco (2000), Jordan (2002) and other SNCs. The EMAAs introduced a new generation of EU-level PTAs, liberalising trade in goods, and established a renewed overarching framework for political cooperation. This can be considered as the first step of a convergence process between the long-standing goal of market liberalisation and the promotion of democracy and rule of law in the EU neighbourhood. Such a convergence of aims is effectively captured by the definition of the EU as a 'conflicted trade power' (Meunier and Nicolaïdis, 2006), which uses market access to leverage changes in partner countries' policies and promote its own norms and standards. In doing so, the EU is caught between economic and security interests and values, which have been at the core of debates on the 'normative power' of the EU (Manners, 2002). The ENP Review, with its renewed focus on the neighbourhood, marked a step further with the introduction of the Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Agreements (DCFTAs), aiming at turning a shallow cooperation on the free trade of goods into a 'deeper' one, including liberalisation of trade in services as well as harmonisation of partner countries' trade-related legislation (Hoekman, 2016). The negotiating mandate for DCFTAs with the first four SNCs – Egypt, Tunisia, Morocco and Jordan – was formulated in the aftermath of the Arab Uprisings, when the Union's concerns about stability and security in the neighbourhood were at their highest. Since then, negotiations with Morocco were suspended in 2014, talks with Tunisia have been stalling and, in the case of Jordan, have not even started. In this regard, Langan and Price (2020) contend that the asymmetry of EU proposals for 'deeper' trade cooperation has been affecting the whole negotiation process, since these are based on leveraging increases in export quotas to European markets in return for fast-paced liberalization of key sectors in partner countries.

Mobility is part of the deal. Although negotiations over DCFTAs are not directly related to EU migration policy, the gradual liberalisation of trade in services has been a rather sensitive issue during the negotiation because it involves the movements of people. Hence, enhanced movement of suppliers is an integral part of this liberalisation of services (Hoekman & Özden, 2010). In this regard, the DCFTAs would allow cross-border movements of workers to provide services in the partner country, but the EU's drafts so far lack specific sectorial proposals. Such labour migration would require EU-level harmonisation of visa and work permit arrangements, which fall under EU member states' competence, thus inevitably exceeding the framework of the DCFTA. This is the inherent link between the EU's external migration policy and DCFTA: for the EU to present liberalisation of services and related cross-border movements as a credible incentive, negotiation on free trade cannot be decoupled from the revision of Member States' legislation on regular labour migration.

The question of mobility of service suppliers was at the core of the fourth round of negotiations with Tunisia, held in 2019, where Tunis demanded the suppression of visa and work permits, along with cooperation on the mutual recognition of professional qualifications. These demands clashed with the Union's will to keep the matters apart, reaffirming the separation between DCFTA and negotiations on visa facilitation agreements (VFAs) (DG Trade, 2019).

In the case of Jordan, despite the fact that negotiations on DCFTA have not yet started, the issue-linkage between mobility and trade has been pursued through a different policy tool, which makes the nexus even more explicit. Indeed, the so-called EU-Jordan compact, signed in 2016 in the aftermath of the Syrian refugee crisis, has been marketed as an alleged EU 'value-based trade policy'. In practice, it offers conditional trade liberalisation and the issuance of work permits to Jordanians in exchange for policies aimed at employment and integration for refugees in Jordan (Panizzon, 2019). This issue-linkage between trade liberalisation – with the opening of negotiation for the DCFTA being part of the deal – and migration, inevitably compromises the EU's ability to leverage 'markets' as a tool for the promotion of democracy and rule of law. In other words, the compact shifts the focus of EU-Jordan relations, prioritising support in relation to Jordan's critical role as a 'gatekeeper' for migration flows over the Union's normative commitments and, thus, de facto leaving democratic reforms on the backburner.

# 5.3.2 Money: Opening the Chinese Boxes of EU External Cooperation Funds

EU foreign policy funding consists of different instruments falling within different policy areas (Table 5.1). EU cooperation on migration and mobility is at the crossroads between different areas of cooperation: from development to humanitarian aid. In the mid-1990s, the EU stepped up its support to the Mediterranean neighbourhood countries. To fund such an increased commitment in the area, the EU was compelled to rethink its funding instruments and develop new ones, targeting different – and yet often overlapping – objectives. These projects and programmes rely on some crucial funding instruments, often based on two or more 'financial envelopes.' A first pivotal instrument, concerned specifically with the EU neighbourhood, was the European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument<sup>1</sup> (ENPI), until 2013, subsequently replaced by the European Neighbourhood Instrument (ENI).

Given the cumulative nature of EU funds and the plurality of objectives targeted by each funding instrument, the projects implemented in a single policy area are often grounded on different financial envelopes, hence resulting in an overlap of legal and institutional frameworks and actor constellations. In the MENA area six main 'financial envelopes' coexist (Table 5.2).

<sup>1</sup> The ENPI has replaced existing regional cooperation programmes on external borders. In the Mediterranean area, the most notable one was the MEDA programme, established in 1996 and involving twelve partners (Algeria, Cyprus, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Malta, Morocco, Palestine, Syria, Tunisia and Turkey), with the aim to support economic transition, sustainable socio-economic development and enhance cross-border cooperation.


Table 5.1 The landscape of EU foreign policy funding

a While the ENPI was created under DG DEVCO, from 2014 onwards DG NEAR is in charge of managing the funds


Table 5.2 Funding instruments involving SNCs in the period 2007–2020 (EUR, million)

a The pledges are based on the financial envelope for the implementation of the legislation establishing each instrument

b Under the SOLID General Programme the EU created four instruments: the European Border Fund (EBF, EUR) with 1,820 mln; the European Return Fund (ER) with EUR 676 mln; the European Refugee Fund (ERF) with EUR 628 mln; and the European Fund for Integration of third-country nationals (EIF) with EUR 825 mln

Although close cooperation between the EU and SNCs has been in place since the very beginning of the European integration process, the emergence of mobility as a critical element of such a cooperation is rather recent. Indeed, the first thematic programme established on the issue was AENEAS, which aimed to provide financial and technical assistance to third countries in the areas of migration and asylum with EUR 250 mln allocated for the period 2004–2006 (European Parliament and Council of the EU, 2004).

Soon after, AENEAS was replaced by the thematic programme for migration and asylum (TPMA) for the period 2007–2013. This latter had its legal basis in Article 16 of the DCI Regulation, and was hence framed in the broader pattern of EU development cooperation. Its general objective was to support non-EU countries in ensuring better management of the different dimensions of migration. At the same time, migration was becoming prominent in other areas of EU-SNCs cooperation. Since the inception of the ENP, specific cooperation on migration was developed within this broader framework, thus including mobility as a critical dimension of external EU policies.

In the last decade, EU foreign aid and funding has been rising considerably, in particular in the aftermath of the Arab Uprisings and, more recently, in conjunction with the so-called refugee crisis in 2015 (see Fig. 5.2). This event has been extremely relevant for the Mediterranean area, since it triggered a rather new form of funding, specifically addressed to emergency relief and thematic support in the domain of EU external action. Indeed, since 2013, the Financial Regulation allows the European Commission to create and administer EU Trust Funds in the field of external action. Since they are conceived outside the framework of multiannual programming as multi-donor ad hoc initiatives, the EU Trust Funds allow for faster decision-making and easier coordination. As far as this analysis is concerned, a first Regional Trust Fund was established in 2014 to respond to the Syrian refugee crisis (MADAD). A second one, the EU Trust Fund for Africa (EUTF), was launched in November 2015 to address the 'root causes' of instability, irregular migration and forced displacement in the region.

Regarding the MADAD, Jordan has been the third major recipient country, after Lebanon and Turkey, benefitting from EUR 187,3 mln of EU aid over a total disbursement of EUR 1,5 bn in the years 2015–2020. On the other hand, since the establishment of the EUTF, Morocco has become one of the main beneficiaries,

Source: Our own elaboration of the EU Aid Explorer database, based on the data reported by the European Commission and other EU donors to OECD.

Fig. 5.2 EU28 foreign aid directed to Jordan, Morocco and Tunisia compared to the broader trend of EU foreign aid in 2007–2020 (EUR, billion)

Source: Our own elaboration of the EU Aid Explorer database.

Fig. 5.3 Funding for projects under the EU Trust Funds (EUR, million)

receiving about EUR 71,9 mln of the EUR 1,2 bn disbursed in the period 2016–2020. Comparatively, financial support to Tunisia has been less significant, despite amounting to EUR 13.3 mln in the same period (Fig. 5.3). These figures are even more relevant when considering regional level projects, which account for a large part of the funding under EU Trust Funds.

The MPs with SNCs should thus be situated in this broader framework. Since their establishment, MPs have been funded through some of the financial envelopes mentioned, such as the DCI, the ENI, and – from 2014 onwards – the AMIF (den Hertog, 2016). The catalogue of funded projects is provided in the Annex to the political declaration signed between the EU and the concerned partner, which is however intended as a 'work-in-progress' document. Hence, the actual projects implemented are not limited to those listed in the Annex, but are re-negotiated on a regular basis and monitored through a specific 'scoreboard', prepared by the European Commission to track activities associated with the implementation of the partnerships (Tittel-Mosser, 2018). More recently, the EU has been striving to foster coherence of its funding and activities associated with the MPs. The launch of the Mobility Partnership Facility in 2016, later renamed as the Migration Partnership Facility (MPF) responded to the perceived need to reduce fragmentation and centralise project management. Indeed, the projects implemented under this funding initiative are implemented by the International Centre for Migration Policy Development (ICMPD) mainly through three DG HOME's financial instruments: the AMIF, the Internal Security Fund for Borders and Visa (ISF-Borders) and the Internal Security Fund for Police Cooperation (ISF-Police). The MPF, which is now in its third phase of implementation, is partially replacing the increasingly 'obsolete' scoreboards, and marks a new phase of EU-SNCs cooperation under the MPs.

#### 5.3.3 Mobility: What Has Changed?

Mobility has been the third and most recent tool for the EU to promote democracy in the Southern neighbourhood. The focus on mobility is rather recent in the framework of the ENP. While migration from (and through) SNCs has been a longstanding concern for the EU until the mid-2000s, cooperation has been focused on control of irregular movements rather than regular mobility, which has long been a competence of EU Member States. This circumstance results in a certain fragmentation in terms of domestic rules of immigration policies, despite Brussels' efforts to harmonize national legislation, which often resulted in the overlap of EU-level and national agreements on visas as well as readmissions. In this regard, the MPs have been presented as a flexible country-specific framework for the global management of migration and mobility, adopting a positive-conditionality approach in response to the pitfalls of EU external migration policy. Through such a flexible soft-law instrument, the EU was able to tie cooperation on the management of regular and irregular migration within an overarching framework, offering visa facilitation schemes, labour migration projects in exchange for concrete achievements in terms of readmission, return and border controls (Seeberg & Zardo, 2022). Until the launch of the MPs in the Southern neighbourhood, the negotiation on EU readmission agreements (EURA) with SNCs had indeed been stalling.

When it comes to actual projects implemented under the MPs, there are some notable differences. While the EU-Morocco MP includes a detailed Annex, in the case of Tunisia and Jordan the projects to be implemented in the framework of the MPs were still under negotiation at the moment of signature, due to enduring debate on the balance between the security-oriented projects and those falling under the three other pillars of the GAMM (i.e., actions promoting legal mobility, international protection, and the developmental impact of migrations). As a result, in contrast to other MPs, those with Tunisia and Jordan, both signed in 2014, did not include a public Annex. As a consequence of this 'work-in-progress character', MPs can be better understood as a comprehensive framework for cooperation on specific issues (e.g., EURAs, VFAs) and projects, so that the implementation of the partnership is the object of continuous negotiation. It is emblematic, in this sense, that talks on EURAs, which had been one of the main goals of the MPs, have been repeatedly interrupted. For instance, Morocco suspended high-level dialogue with the EU – including negotiations on EURA – between 2015 and 2019. Likewise, negotiations with Tunisia, which were smoother for what concerns technical aspects, stalled when the most contentious issues were at stake. Even in the case of Jordan, which was expected to be a rather unproblematic partner due to the relatively small volume of migratory movements, negotiations were suspended soon after their inception, in 2016. Concerning day-to-day cooperation, outside formal agreements, none of the countries experienced noticeable benefits in terms of increased opportunities for legal migration. For instance, if we look at first permits issued to third-country nationals by the EU, their number has been rather stable over time, except in the

Source: Our own elaboration of Eurostat data. For the period 2008-2012, data on Croatia were not available. Likewise, for the years 2019-2020 data on the UK were incomplete.

Fig. 5.4 First permits issued in the EU28 in 2008–2020 by citizenship (total EU28 figures refer to the scale on the right)

case of Morocco, where it went through a steep decrease in the aftermath of the Arab Uprisings (Fig. 5.4).

When looking at the trends of these three countries, it is evident that there has been a rather modest increase in terms of permit issuance in contrast to the bright expectations related to the MPs. Even when looking at short-term visas, which in the context of MPs were one of the crucial tools for leverage identified by the EU, no substantial progress has been made. According to the Schengen Visa Code,2 shortterm visas (STVs) allow their holders to enter and stay in the Schengen area on the basis of family, tourism or business reasons for up to 90 days. The importance of short-term visa for circular migration and even for irregular immigration, in the case of 'overstaying', makes them a crucial element of EU migration and mobility policy. While no agreement has been reached to date on VFAs with the three countries analysed, the MPs should have served as a framework to improve cooperation on this issue. In the framework of the ENP, visa facilitation is expected to be an incentive granted as a consequence of progress on democratic reforms (European Commission, 2011a). However, when looking at data at EU level (Fig. 5.5), the gradual but continuous increase of visa application rejections, in relation to total applications presented each year, indicates a trend towards even more restrictive access after the signing of the MPs. Given this trend, the EU commitment to visa facilitation under the MPs can hardly be credible for SNCs.

In the framework of the MPs, the counterbalance for the EU's stepping-up of commitments on visa and regular immigration is increased cooperation on returns. When looking more in detail at returns, which were a crucial issue in the economy of MPs, the results achieved by the EU are far from positive. As Fig. 5.6 shows, the gap

<sup>2</sup> See the Regulation (EC) No 810/2009 establishing the EU's Visa Code.

Source: Our own elaboration of Eurostat data. For the period 2008-2012 data on Croatia were not available. Likewise, for the years 2019-2020 data on the UK were incomplete.

Jordan

Source: Our own elaboration of Eurostat data. For the period 2008-2013 data from Croatia were not available. Likewise, for the years 2019-2020 data from the UK were incomplete.

Fig. 5.6 Number of 'effective returns' enforced by the EU28 in relation to 'orders to leave' issued in the period 2008–2020

between the 'orders to leave' issued by Member States and the 'effective returns' remains significant, when not widening. Even in the case of Jordan, where the low numbers of the last decade allowed for a higher rate of enforcement, the percentage of third country nationals effectively returned is significantly decreasing. In other words, while the signing of EURA and, more broadly, cooperation on returns was at the top of the EU's agenda during MP's negotiations, the data depict a decrease in the effectiveness of returns, measured as the gap between orders to leave issued by Member States and implemented returns of third-country nationals.

In brief, despite the stepping-up of EU commitments through the MPs, collected data clash with the objectives identified by external cooperation on migration and mobility. No substantial improvements in terms of either legal mobility, visa facilitation or returns have been achieved to date, so that it would be rather more appropriate to speak of MPs in terms of (im-)mobility. Indeed, since MPs have been signed, the EU's offer for 'more mobility' in return for 'more reforms' has been flawed. Not only VFAs and other initiatives offering further mobility opportunities for SNCs' citizens have failed, but even in terms of existing policies, our data support the claim that the EU has embraced a more restrictive approach, promoting de facto (im-)mobility – i.e., discouraging or preventing people in SNCs to move across the Mediterranean.

#### 5.4 Conclusions

In the aftermath of the Arab Uprisings, the EU's 'more for more' approach was presented as an attempt to offer more credible incentives to SNCs, in order to capitalise on the revolutionary moment to stir up democratisation processes. Yet, most regimes in the Southern neighbourhood made rather modest progress in terms of democratic reform. More concerned with control of irregular migration than democracy promotion, the EU's ambitions to steer the 'democratic moment' prompted by the Arab Uprisings led to a dysfunctional interconnection of the three elements of its 'more for more' approach. Neither liberalisation of trade, nor offers for facilitated mobility have been credible incentives for leveraging democratic change, as foreseen in the 2011 review of the ENP. Even in the case of Tunisia – regarded as the enfant prodige of the Arab Uprisings until the autocratic turn of the current regime, improvements on democratic reforms have been limited in comparison to other priorities on the agenda, such as security and migration (Dandashly, 2018), and EU norms are highly contested (Weilandt, 2022). In this context, the lack of credible incentives and the asymmetries between EU commitments and their implementation are crucial to make sense of the ineffectiveness of the EU's 'more for more' strategy. Southern neighbours were offered incentives disconnected from their needs, which were at times deemed to be more advantageous for the EU than for its partners.

The main aim of this chapter was to assess whether in the last ten years the so-called 3Ms approach to democracy promotion through markets, money and mobility adopted in the aftermath of Arab Uprisings, has been implemented by the EU in the Southern neighbourhood. In particular, the EU's assumption that democracy promotion can rely upon more mobility, thus regular flows, is not confirmed by data. Much of the literature on the topic has explored the implications of the EU's 'normative role' in the neighbourhood and the limits of specific forms of support within the ENP. Such a holistic approach allowed us to assess to what extent the EU has been willing to live up to its own commitments in terms of offering more 'markets, money and mobility' to its Southern partners, with a specific focus on migration management cooperation. Considering the cases of Tunisia, Morocco and Jordan, the chapter has highlighted how cooperation on mobility has been inconsistently implemented by the EU, entrapped between security concerns, such as control of irregular migration, and normative aspirations. A decade after the 'democratic moment' of the Arab Uprisings, the EU has not been able to effectively combine the '3Ms' into a coherent tool to support democracy promotion in the neighbourhood.

#### References


Stefania Panebianco is Associate Professor of Political Science at the University of Catania, Holder of the Jean Monnet Chair EUMedEA and Visiting Professor at LUISS-Guido Carli in Rome. She teaches Mediterranean Politics, Institutions of Global Trade and Migration Politics in the Mediterranean. She has been visiting professor at University Pompeu Fabra, Barcelona, in 2019 and 2022. Supervisor of PhD candidates at IMT, Lucca, University of Torino and University of Catania. In the last 10 years served for ECPR-SGIR, EISA and SISP; was among the EISA founding members and is currently member of the Steering Committee of the ECPR-SGEU. Researcher of the TRANSCRISIS and PROTECT consortia, both H2020 research projects. Main research interests: Mediterranean migration, Mediterranean Politics, EU foreign policies, EU-MENA relations. Authored monographic books on Euro-lobbying (Giuffré, 2000), the EU as a divided power in the Mediterranean (EGEA, 2012), the EU as an actor of the global system (CASS, 2009), and edited books on EU border crises (Palgrave, 2022), democracy support in the MENA (Rubbettino, 2012), the Euro-Mediterranean political identity (Frank Cass, 2003). Contributed to Handbooks on EU and Mediterranean politics, published in high-ranking journals and co-edited a Special Issue for International Politics. Website: http://www.dsps.unict.it/docenti/stefania.paola.ludovica. panebianco.

Giuseppe Cannata is a PhD student at Scuola Normale Superiore, Firenze (Italy), where he is enrolled in a joint programme organised in partnership with the Sant'Anna School of Advanced Studies. He earned a double master's degree from the University of Catania and the University of Liège, defending a thesis titled "Tackling the Migration and Refugee Crisis at EU Borders: Patterns of Policy Learning and Change". He is also an alumnus of Scuola Superiore di Catania, the higher education centre of the University of Catania. His research interests range from EU politics and policy-making processes to Euro-Mediterranean relations, with a particular focus on migration and mobility in the Mediterranean region.

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# Chapter 6 The Migration Initiatives encouraged by the Local and Regional Networks and their effects in the Euromed Cooperation

Gemma Aubarell Solduga

# 6.1 The Euro-Mediterranean context of the Migration Networking

Migration policies in the Mediterranean region were confronted with major crises that substantially and simultaneously affect all dimensions of migration strategies. A fundamental change was brought about by the migration crisis of 2015 with the increasing number of refugees caused due to conflicts in the Mediterranean region. From that point on, mobility management required new parameters of response following the request by citizens. Public opinion demanded different solutions to a human drama of the first magnitude. The crisis caused by the COVID-19 pandemic has made the extreme situation even more relevant for those on the frontline of migration movements.

As a response to this situation, which transcends national management boundaries, the multilateral context provides global answers and instruments for regional consensus that could facilitate legal migration. The Global Compact for Safe, Orderly, and Regular Migration (GCM) launched in September 2018 sent a powerful political message: migration and refugee matters have become key issues squarely on the international agenda with a proposed framework to advance the recognition and guarantee of migrants' rights.1 The commitment of all governments opens the door to a greater involvement of the regional and local institutions in the governance of migration. Local authorities, among other stakeholders, were included and

G. A. Solduga (✉)

<sup>1</sup> UN. 2018. Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration (GCM) A/RES/73/195. https://www.ohchr.org/en/migration/global-compact-safe-orderly-and-regular-migration-gcm

IEMed (European Institute for the Mediterranean), Barcelona, Spain e-mail: gaubarell@iemed.org

actively contributed to the global migration agenda.2 Some of these local entities are the United Cities and Local Governments (UCLG), Metropolis, Eurocities, Intercultural Cities, the UNESCO International Coalition of Inclusive and Sustainable Cities (ICCAR), and the UN-Habitat.

When it comes to a regional level, the refugee and migration crisis highlights the shortcomings of the EU's own capacity to provide an effective and coordinated response to migration in terms of asylum management. The New Pact for Migration and Asylum launched by the EU in September 2020 puts forward its vision related to this complex policy area.3 The priorities of the external dimension actions, outlined by this New Pact, expressed the importance of building economic opportunities and addressing the root causes of irregular migration. It also takes into account tackling migratory issues from an inclusive and social dimension standpoint, and not from a securitization perspective.4 At the same time, local and regional bodies started to highlight the inefficiency of the measures adopted by the EU linked to migration. Specifically, the fact that further joint instruments were absent at the European level, including an appropriate distribution mechanism to relocate migrants.5

Twenty-five years after the Barcelona Process, policies in the North and South of the Mediterranean basin have deployed similar strategies when confronted with the reality that mobility is a trend. The EU has strengthened its cooperation with MENA states on migration, security, and development and has drawn on its external migration policy as a method of 'region-building' set to reconfigure a broader EU Mediterranean Neighbourhood (Fakhoury, 2021).6

Nowadays, in European relations with the Mediterranean, the balance of a partnership for mobility is non-existent. The governmental approach has not provided an effective answer, and migrations continue to present an unresolved issue. The Renewed Partnership with the Southern Neighbourhood (a New Agenda for the Mediterranean) proposed by the European Commission in 2021,7 underlined the

<sup>2</sup> OECD. 2020. A gateway to existing ideas, resources and capacities for cities across the world. Local inclusion of migrants and refugees. https://www.oecd.org/regional/Local-inclusion-Migrants-and-Refugees.pdf

<sup>3</sup> European Commission. 2020. Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, The Council, The European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions on a New Pact on Migration and Asylum COM/2020/609 final. https://ec.europa.eu/info/strategy/ priorities-2019-2024/promoting-our-european-way-life/new-pact-migration-and-asylum\_en

<sup>4</sup> European Commission (2020). 5 The European Committee of the Regions (CoR). 2021. Opinion on the New Pact on Migration and Asylum CIVEX-VII/005. https://cor.europa.eu/en/news/Pages/european-committee-of-the-regionscritical-of-new-pact-on-migration-and-asylum-european-parliament-hearing.aspx

<sup>6</sup> Fakhoury, T. 2021. The external dimension of EU migration policy as region-building? Refugee cooperation as contentious politics, Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies. https://www. tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/1369183X.2021.1972568

<sup>7</sup> European Commission. 2021. Renewed partnership with the Southern Neighbourhood. A new Agenda for the Mediterranean. SWD (2021) 23 final. https://eeas.europa.eu/sites/eeas/files/joint\_ communication\_renewed\_partnership\_southern\_neighbourhood.pdf

challenges of forced displacement and irregular migration and the need to facilitate safe and legal pathways for migration and mobility. However, this basic approach of easing restrictions on legal migration seeks to improve control through more effective return and readmission arrangements (Moran, 2021).<sup>8</sup>

Nevertheless, this new agenda recognizes the need for a more coordinated and enhanced policy where all stakeholders are involved, including the private sector, civil society, the city, and other local entities.9 Regional authorities have welcomed the migration and mobility component of the new Agenda for the Mediterranean and call for greater involvement of local and regional authorities.10 These authorities express a clear demand for EU cooperation on migration with third countries, in particular its Southern neighbours, against the instrumentalization of the EU's external development funds for migration control. At the same time, they express their readiness to facilitate dialogue and cooperation with local and regional authorities in migrants' countries of origin and transit countries.<sup>11</sup>

The deployment of these policies has led many public and civil society actors to feel increasingly more legitimized to contribute to this, until now, state-handled field of action. Before 2020, regions and cities held the main responsibility for arrival and integration. This is reflected in the border regions in the South of the EU, which are under greater pressure from migratory flows in the Mediterranean. The lack of an effective and equitable response by states to the crisis meant that regional and local authorities faced the need to innovate in the management of migratory flows that directly affected them.<sup>12</sup>

The traditional focus on nation-state migration management has shifted to an interest in the empowerment of non-state actors as policymakers. Local actors, such as cities, have drawn growing attention from international organizations who are in search of transnational partners beyond European borders (Lacroix & Desille, 2018).13 To be more effective, the action of regional and local authorities has been coordinated with other actors, which in turn created sub-actors of governance: the networks of regions and cities (LRN). In the frame of the Mediterranean migration,

<sup>8</sup> Moran, J. 2021. How new is the EU's new agenda for the Mediterranean? CEPS article 03/3/21. https://www.ceps.eu/how-new-is-the-eus-new-agenda-for-the-mediterranean/

<sup>9</sup> IEMed-ICMPD (2022) "Survey of migration experts in the EU Southern neigbourhood "EMM5- EuroMeSCo Euromed Survey. https://www.icmpd.org/file/download/57378/file/20220407\_ EMM5\_Euromesco\_survey\_Online%2520EMM5%2520version.pdf

<sup>10</sup> ARLEM. 2022. Euro-Mediterranean Regional and Local Assembly. Recommendations for 2022. https://cor.europa.eu/en/our-work/Documents/ARLEM/Recommendations/Recommendations%20 for%202022/ARLEM%20Recommendations%202022\_EN%20(cor-2022-00335-00-01-tcd-traen).pdf

<sup>11</sup> European Committe of the Regions. 2021. Renewed partnership with the Southern Neighbourhood – A new Agenda for the Mediterranean. JOIN/2021/2 final. 12 Chmielewska, A., Dragouni, O., Dicuonzo, V., et al. 2021. Territorial impact of migration on

frontline regions and cities on the EU shores of the Mediterranean. European Committee of the Regions. https://data.europa.eu/doi/10.2863/627667 13 Lacroix, T and Desille, A. ed. 2018. International Migrations and Local Governance: A global

perspective. Palgrave Macmillan.

regional and local actors have become part of the agenda of existing networks that embrace the issue of migration. The emergence of these networks is evidence of their ability to confront the migration challenge and bring the opportunity to the EU instruments to include them as relevant actors for the external dimension of the EU migration agenda.

# 6.2 Migration Network Typology Frame and Euromed Cooperation

There is a collective understanding among researchers who state how, in the last two decades, territorial Networks have emerged as key actors in the governance of globalization, linking local actors across nation-states as well as with supranational governance institutions (Lacroix & Desille, 2018).14 Despite the lack of systematic studies into the scope and impact of governance networks, those have become a common and increasingly important governance mechanism at the local, regional, and transnational levels. In fact, they provide a new paradigm for understanding the emerging forms of multilateral action and pluricentric governance (Torfing & Sørensen, 2014).15 This networking trend is linked to the process of globalization and the consolidation of external actions of LRAs, which in this context we can define as territorial diplomacy, including diverse formulations (para-diplomacy, local and regional diplomacy, and decentralized diplomacy among others) (Wassenberg, 2020).16 This cooperation to bring together regions from different countries to build a shared vision has been encouraged by the EU through the crossborder, transnational, and interregional cooperation of its regional policies.<sup>17</sup>

The partnership between Europe and its neighbours in the Southern and Eastern part of the Mediterranean region during the last twenty years facilitates the implementation of large-scale international projects involving territorial actors. A great number of local and regional initiatives have been contributing to creating a consolidated network for the deployment of territorial cooperation (cross-border, transnational, and lately macro-regional cooperation). This dense network of LRAs in cooperation with public administrations is firmly engaged in strengthening joint

<sup>14</sup> Lacroix, T and Desille, A. ed. (2018).

<sup>15</sup> Torfing, J. and Sørensen, E. 2014. The European debate on governance networks: Towards a new and viable paradigm?, Policy and Society, 33:4, 329–344. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.polsoc.2014.10. 003

<sup>16</sup> Birte Wassenberg.2020. Territorial Diplomacy. Encyclopédie d'histoire numérique de l'Europe [online], ISSN 2677–6588, published on 22/06/20, consulted on 18/05/2022. https://ehne.fr/en/ node/12259

<sup>17</sup> European Union.2009. European Regional Policy, an inspiration for Countries outside the EU? https://doi.org/10.2776/11830 http://ec.europa.eu/regional\_policy/sources/docgener/presenta/inter national/external\_en.pdf

cross-border and transnational activities in many policy areas (sustainable use of water and agricultural resources, climate change, strategic urban planning, local economic development, tourism, education, and culture) (Noferini, 2021).18 Macro-regionalization processes and multi-level governance in the region offer a joint framework that fosters synergies and complementarities among already existing initiatives, programs, and governance structures.19 Such "relational networking" is constructing functional spaces of action that do not need to be locally connected: the networking can be built around a challenge or a physical border. In this context, LRAs are asked to participate in collaborative transnational models characterized by the presence of supranational, national, regional, and other local actors (Noferini, 2021).<sup>20</sup>

We know little about how these territorial networks participate to migration governance and how these alliances are operating in terms of Mediterranean cooperation (Zapata-Barrero, 2020a, b).21 To contribute to this analysis, this work presents a policy framework, based on six outstanding migration initiatives led by a selected LRN. These initiatives are relevant because they transnationally address different aspects of the Euro-Mediterranean agenda previously described.


The frame analysis methodology22 helps us to better identify the policy problems and solutions proposed. Therefore, these migration networks are at the very beginning of their policy-making process in terms of external dimension, and they face a dynamic and interactive process that can be integrated into the frame analysis.23 Our

<sup>18</sup> Noferini, A. 2021. Going Macro-regional? Territorial cooperation, governance and regional and local authorities in the Mediterranean" Government of Catalonia and IEMed, Barcelona 2021. https://exteriors.gencat.cat/ca/ambits-dactuacio/afers\_exteriors/mediterrania/estrategia-medcat-2030/

<sup>19</sup> Government of Catalonia and IEMed. 2021. Mediterranean +25. Priorities and recommendations. Contribution to the renewed Mediterranean Agenda. https://exteriors.gencat.cat/web/.content/ saeue/afers\_exteriors\_cooperacio/04\_arees\_actuacio/Mediterrania/actualitat/prioritatsrecomanacions-en.pdf

<sup>20</sup> Noferini (2021). 21 Zapata-Barrero, R. 2020. Rescaling Mediterranean Migration Governance: Setting a Research Agenda that Establishes the Centrality of Cities for Region-Making." EuroMedMig Working Paper Series, no. 3 (June): http://hdl.handle.net/10230/44978 22 Rein, M., Schön, D. 1996.Frame-critical policy analysis and frame-reflective policy practice.

Knowledge and Policy 9, 85–104. https://doi.org/10.1007/BF02832235 23 Hulst, M. J., & Yanow, D. 2016. From Policy "Frames" to "Framing": Theorizing a More

Dynamic, Political Approach. The American Review of Public Administration, 46(1), 92–112.


Table 6.1 Frame analyses approach

Source: Self-made by the author

interest is not to establish a typology, but to identify their political agenda, and in a similar fashion, the progressive establishment of common strategic representations.<sup>24</sup>

Following previous research (Caponio, 2019),25 we are taking into account the relevance of the interaction factors in the elaboration of their collaborative strategies. In our approach, this has been done through a functional (networking) and multilevel (vertical and horizontal) perspective. On the other hand, the analyses of the Mediterranean agenda (policy actions) and the fields of action (multisector) allow us to identify tendencies in the policy interest of this research, the euromediterranean context (Table 6.1).

# 6.2.1 Interaction Factors: Multilevel Approach and Functional Orientation

One of the preliminary elements to take into consideration is how the migratory field is present in the network's constituency (Table 6.2). When it comes to orientation, the network of Solidarity Cities is the only one that has been promoted exclusively to focus on migration work, and therefore, its ultimate purpose is to change current migratory policies. The second type of network is the one that promotes specific initiatives or platforms devoted to influencing migratory European policies. This is the case of the Cities and Regions for Integration of Migrants (an institutional initiative gathering networks and territorial organizations) and the European Intercultural Regional network promoted by ARE. The rest of the networks are developing their migratory initiatives mainly by searching for opportunities within European projects. This "functional orientation" of the LRN becomes a challenge to assuring the long-term sustainability of their initiatives; all the while, the generation

<sup>24</sup> Tarkosky, A. 2018. https://shared-digital.eu/from-policy-frames-to-framing-what-can-we-learn-

from-an-academic-perspective-on-policy-frames/ https://shared-digital.eu/author/alek/ 25 Caponio, T. 2019. City Networks and the Multilevel governance of migration. Policy discourses and actions RSCAS 2019/08 Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies Migration Policy Centre.


Table 6.2 Interaction factors

Source: Self-made by the author

of new network platforms devoted to migration can be considered the main instrument when it comes to consolidating current territorial synergies.

From a multilevel governance perspective, this incidence in policymaking must be understood in both a horizontal dimension (involving local governance and other public, private, and social actors) and a vertical dimension (with other levels of government) (Zapata-Barrero, 2017).26 In analysed networks, the policy-making impact is limited due to the lack of a consistent multilevel frame of their governance structure (Table 6.2). The relations between the networks are established through horizontal communities of regional and local authorities, which are not benefiting from the synergies of the most-governmental frame because they are acting independently of each other. Social and public stakeholders have limited structural participation, which is mainly prevalent during a program or a project

<sup>26</sup> Zapata-Barrero, R., Caponio, T. and Scholten, P. 2017. Theorizing the 'local governance turn' in a multilevel governance framework of analysis. A case study in immigrant policy', International Review of Administrative Sciences, 83(2): 241–246.

implementation. The weak involvement of other levels of government (vertical dimension) gets constrained in policymaking. Therefore, all these networks have developed their Mediterranean external policies mainly on their own. As has been deeply analysed by different studies in concrete cases of city networks, they are often regarded with enthusiasm and great expectations. Nonetheless, in terms of governance, it is not clear if and to what extent these networks will represent a venue for progressive dialogue and policy innovation on the politically sensitive migration issue (Caponio, 2019).<sup>27</sup>

To understand how outstanding initiatives are handling the issue of migration, we must acknowledge the fact that they do not always bring together actors from both North and the South of the Mediterranean (Table 6.2). Many of them are structured around lobbying in European policies with a moderate impact on the Southern regions. The interest of these networks is based on their ability to influence European policies and programs; however, they do not yet provide opportunities to include actors based in the South. One of the causes of this aforementioned situation can be interpreted as the ineffective multilateral impact of the Euro-Mediterranean migration strategy.

Other serious challenges which remain to be addressed are asymmetric institutional capacities, heterogeneity of interests among networks, and the lack of coherence among territorial programs and initiatives. Firstly, in the Southern and Eastern Mediterranean, while the situation varies from country to country, the autonomy of LRAs is very limited. Secondly, there is no clear partnership with an external approach. Even though the North-South division that until now has characterized the governance of international migration, is slowly fading. In our times, all countries have become emigration and immigration focal points and the management policies seem not been longer a Northern issue. Migratory patterns, experiences, and policies are changing; which creates a need for North-South comparisons, especially at the local level. The subnational level is key in decision-making; however, they do not control immigration policies.

# 6.2.2 Mediterranean Policies: Multi-sectorial Approach and Euromed Agenda

The urban migratory agenda is key in the action policy of the analised LRA (Table 6.3). There is a real change in the agenda when it comes to outsourcing relations between cities and other actors since city networks that work on migration issues emphasize the increasing benefit of local experiences -which in turn links the Mediterranean dimension very clearly to the urban dimension- (Zapata-Barrero,

<sup>27</sup> Caponio, T. 2019. City Networks and the Multilevel governance of migration. Policy discourses and actions RSCAS 2019/08 Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies Migration Policy Centre.


Table 6.3 Mediterranean policies

Source: Self-made by the author

2020a, b).28 Cities are then crucial agents for the implementation of the SDGs and must be regarded as such by the Euro-Mediterranean cooperation actors. There is a context to underline the benefits of supporting more regional and decentralized cooperation, multiplying partnerships, synergies, and building alliances between regional stakeholders to foster the exchange of knowledge and experience, identify and promote best practices, building upon the work of existing networks.<sup>29</sup>

The World Organization of United Cities and Local Governments (CGLU) launched the Mediterranean Cities Migration Project (MC2CM). This project has been founded by EC in conjunction with ICMPD and UN-Habitat in 2015 and is currently in its second phase (2018–2022). The MC2CM project is a practical laboratory that allows cities to exchange their experiences and share good practices favoring the inclusion of migrants involving around twenty Euro-Mediterranean cities. One of the major overcoming aspects of this project is bringing the exchange of good practices for more effective urban migration policies. This also affects directly the Euromed urban agenda by implying effective cooperation between North and Southern cities.<sup>30</sup>

<sup>28</sup> Zapata-Barrero, R. 2020. Towards an Urban Mediterranean Migration Agenda on this 25th Anniversary of the Barcelona Process, Quaderns de la Mediterrània, N. 30–31; 47–54. https:// www.upf.edu/documents/222586661/223539167/2020\_Urban+Med\_Agenda/fb625ba6-ed20-30 99-dbf9-fff94f7cc18a

<sup>29</sup> Government of Catalonia and IEMed (2021). 30 UNHABITAT. https://unhabitat.org/project/mediterranean-city-to-city-migration-project-mc2 cm

MedCites, which is comprised of 63 municipalities from the two shores of the Mediterranean, has progressively integrated urban strategic programs that involve cities and metropolitan areas. Specific projects have been launched allowing the sharing of experiences and capacity-building initiatives about migration management. Namely, the Tanger Accueil project31 aims to promote access for newcomers and migrants to guarantee their rights and services and facilitate their social integration. The bilateral approach of the project is having an effective Euromed potential due to the fact that is framed within the Mediterranean City to City Migration program implemented by ICMPD, funded by the European Union.

In terms of the topic approach (Table 6.3), alternative migration management should be underlined. Grassroots city networks reacted in response to the refugee crisis aim to receive and assist refugees and, crucially, guarantee their rights. While EU-supported networks have been driven by the integration agenda, the second ones responded to the national political limitations (Lacroix et al., 2020).32 Many municipalities in Europe have joined Solidarity Cities, launched in the framework of the Eurocities network.33 In this context of tension, this new generation of city networks, usually integrating civil society movements, appears to face the new upcoming situation of dramatic human challenges presented around the Mediterranean. This is the case of the Palermo Charter Migration Process, a militant and critical voice advocating for alternative migration management and the campaigns like Sea to City. Nonetheless, they still lack connexions with Southern and Eastern Mediterranean cities.

A second element to take into account in terms of policy action (Table 6.3), is Raising awareness of the migration in the European territorial policies. The EU is the major context in which LRAs are collaborating. Some initiatives are aiming to have a clear incidence in the policymaking process, lobbying for more presence of the regions and, for what is relevant to this study, increasing relations with the Mediterranean agenda. The CPMRs (peripheral and maritime regions) set up a task force on migration management in 2015 that has devoted its efforts to highlighting the importance of multi-level governance and a multi-sectoral approach to migration management. They have also raised awareness of the need for regional action in all areas; including those in which they have either formal competence in the field as well as those where regional action is needed to implement EU and national objectives. As the main initiative, this network of peripheral regions around all of Europe is actively promoting the inclusion of migration in the policy cooperative agenda of the regional stakeholders, and the European project REGIN has been its main instrument. As of late, the aforementioned network opened new discourses through global debates that affected regions in Europe such as climate change.<sup>34</sup>

<sup>31</sup> MedCities. https://medcities.org/ca/project/tangeraccueil/ 32 Lacroix, T., et al. 2020. Migration and municipal militancy in the Mediterranean. EuromedMig Working Papers. Number 4 - September 2020.

<sup>33</sup> Solidarity Cities https://solidaritycities.eu/home 34 CPMR. Regin Project https://reginproject.eu/ca/ and https://cpmr.org/wpdm-category/migration/

Pluralism, inclusion, and recognition are emerging as drivers for building spaces addressing major social threats such as climate change, hate speech, conflict, disagreement, and xenophobia. The Intercultural Regions Network in 2019, promoted by the Assembly of European Regions (ARE),35 serves as a support for regions to design, implement and evaluate diversity and inclusion strategies addressed to regional actors. Inspired by the Intercultural Cities Programme (ICC) of the Council of Europe, this Network aims to provide a platform for regions to share knowledge, resources, and experiences to promote intercultural integration at the regional level. There is a potential merging of interest in both CRPM and ARE, to create key crosscutting mechanisms to support partnerships and embedding regional intercultural strategies in clear relation to the intercultural dialogue agenda in the Region.

The Council of European Municipalities and Regions (CEMR) provides a political platform for European mayors and regional leaders to showcase positive examples of integration of migrants and refugees, share relevant information and promote diversity as an added value to building inclusive cities and ensuring social cohesion. The partners of this initiative promoted by the CoR are significant networks such as EuroCities, Conference of Peripheral Maritime Regions, Assembly of European Regions, SHARE Network, and the Centre for Entrepreneurship, SMEs, Regions, and Cities.36 Being acting in the EU framework, these networks are creating new platforms of structured collaboration in terms of trans-regional cooperation.

# 6.3 Networks as Catalysts of Migration Interest in the Mediterranean Region

Bearing in mind the relevance of the narrative in the policy-making process (Triandafyllidou & Fotiou, 1998) 37 once this policy frame has been identified in a second part, we analyse the discourses in the making of euromediterranean policies: what is intended and its implementation, especially through their specific projects.

Regarding the governance of the networks, even in the case of groups with divergent interests, they can present a stable narrative: a common history that defines key problems and proposes solutions that concern them (Torfing & Sørensen, 2014).38 The emergence of a joint narrative of LRNs could be useful to demonstrate

<sup>35</sup> AER. Intercultural Regions. https://aer.eu/interculturalregions/ 36 https://cor.europa.eu/en/our-work/Pages/cities-and-regions-for-integration.aspx

<sup>37</sup> Triandafyllidou, A and Fotiou, A 1998, Sustainability and Modernity in the European Union: A Frame Theory Approach to Policy-Making. Sociological Research Online, Volume 3, Issue 1, March 1998, Pages 60–75. SAGE Publications and the British Sociological Association Article Reuse Guidelines. https://doi.org/10.5153/sro.99 38 Torfin, J and Sorensen, E.2014. The European debate on governance networks: Towards a new

and viable paradigm? Policy and Society, Volume 33, Issue 4, December 2014, Pages 329–344. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.polsoc.2014.10.003

the network's potential to play an increasingly key role in policymaking. What concerns us the most is if the analysed networks are disseminating policy models and good practices, through discourse creation and lobbying: are they developing a common understanding of emerging migratory policy problems? How far are they contributing to adjusting policies within a regional view? According to the narratives presented in the mission of their websites and brochures as well as through the initiatives developed by the analysed LRN, we can summarise three discursive areas around resources, solidarity, and externalization.

#### 6.3.1 Resources

As an immediate result of being at the forefront of this situation, they have embraced a clear stand position in demanding more resources and financial instruments to make their inclusion programs more effective. This narrative links to the challenges, which derive from the reception and integration of migrant people (education, health, social services, housing...).

The Conference of Peripheral Maritime Regions (CPMR) has promoted a relevant policy action. This has been comprised of sending a letter urging the EU to adopt the EU budget and asking for sufficient financial and human resources to address the challenges posed by migration and asylum.<sup>39</sup>

More recently, the Committee of Regions promoted a deep analysis of the territorial impact of migration on frontline regions and cities (Chmielewska et al., 2021).40 This document identifies the need to provide innovative solutions for migration management by LRA, and, in particular, for the critical challenges that they are facing when it comes to social services (education, housing, and accommodation) and the positive narrative about the socio-economic gains from a local perspective.

As of now, LRAs have started to be central on both sides of the Mediterranean. One of the reasons is because in the South, for example, rural-urban migrations and urban growth are already generating a strong demand for housing, facilities, and urban services. While in the Northern and Eastern Mediterranean, the local and regional authorities are key players in the internal dimension of migrations related to common challenges as the management of non-accompanied minors (Noferini, 2021).<sup>41</sup>

<sup>39</sup> CPMR. https://cpmr.org/wpdm-category/migration/ 40 Chmielewska, A. et al. 2019. The contribution of local and regional authorities to regional integration in the Mediterranean. Commission for Citizenship, Governance, Institutional and External Affairs, Committee of the Regions, Brussels. https://cor.europa.eu/en/engage/studies/ Documents/CoR\_Regional-Integration\_Med.pdf

<sup>41</sup> Noferini, A .2021. "Going Macro-regional? Territorial cooperation, governance and regional and local authorities in the Mediterranean" Government of Catalonia and IEMed, Barcelona 2021.

Therefore, these demands have started to take into consideration some of Euromed's challenges. Committee of Regions recalled the EU to allocate sufficient funds for LRAs to roll out their integration and inclusion policies while welcoming the proposal of providing financial support to third countries. These are countries of origin or transit countries that are ready to develop joint policies on migrants.42

In this context, the LRNs appear asking to reinforce the role of the subnational actors and the potential engagement of the EU programs and financial instruments within the external dimension of the EU migration policy.43 All these requests for more effective measures in EU funding are extremely relevant, considering that the networks are applying to these EU programs to implement their joint operations and projects. In this sense, the project-based funding used by the major part of the networks to implement their actions appears insufficient to financing long-term structural policies of inclusion. This is unable to support the objectives of networks' narrative discourse in the long term.

#### 6.3.2 Solidarity

On the other hand, the role of networks as mobilizers of pragmatic solidarity responses to deal with humanitarian crises has become clear. This narrative is no longer supported solely by organized civil society in a voluntary sense, as it is also supported by LRAs, and therefore includes a new and institutional approach. The Solidarity Cities network and the Palermo Migration Process are very representatives of this trend. The appearance of narratives linked to solidarity for better public goodwill also means a break with the binomial responsibility-solidarity (Aubarell & Geha, 2021).44 During this time, many initiatives promoted at a local and regional level, are ensuring that the "refugee crisis" becomes an opportunity to empower local governments, both in the North and the Southern Mediterranean. At the European level the network's mission, such as the Cities and Regions for Integration of Migrants initiative, includes the support of the integration of migrants and refugees, as well as the contribution to presenting a stronger narrative of solidarity and countering disinformation in this field.45 This will be achieved by encouraging cooperation between smaller localities, cities, and regions. Some authors regard the narrative linked to cities of refuge, cities of transit, cities of sanctuary, cities of

<sup>42</sup> Comitte of the Regions.2021. Renewed partnerhip with the Southern Neighbourhood. A new Agenda for the Mediterranean. CIVEX-VII/019. https://memportal.cor.europa.eu/Handlers/ ViewDoc.ashx?doc<sup>=</sup>COR-2021-01952-00-01-PAC-TRA-EN.docx 43 CPMR.2019. The external dimension of the EU migration policy. Issue Paper CPMR Task Force

on Migration March 2019.

<sup>44</sup> Aubarell,G and Geha,C.2021. Policy Conversations across the Mediteranean: Migratory governance. Europe and Lebanon in the spotlight. EuroMedMig Policy Papers Series n.7 (December).

<sup>45</sup> European Committee of the Regions. (n/d). Cities and Regions of Integration ofMigrants. https:// cor.europa.eu/en/our-work/Pages/cities-and-regions-for-integration.aspx

solidarity, and cultural cities as constituent parts of urban systems (regional cities) that, by themselves, build new specific ways of thinking about the Mediterranean (Zapata-Barrero, 2020a, b).46

Nevertheless, these initiatives remain at the European level and there is a lack of Euro-Mediterranean discursive approach. We cannot contemplate a common framework build on solidarity through institutional collaboration around health, education, civil liberties, and mobility in the Southern Mediterranean (Aubarell & Geha, 2021). To overcome this situation, there is a clear need to support programs with structural incentives rather than piecemeal projects. The former programs entice local government entities to design, finance, and implement inclusive programs that take care of refugees and host communities as fellow human beings (El-Mikawy, 2020).47 Job creation schemes for refugees and host communities designed to help Southern countries keep refugees and migrants from crossing the Mediterranean could be part of a new transnational scheme of possibilities with enhanced educational opportunities and social protection schemes.

Some of the networks are including intercultural dimensions as a part of their inclusive and integrative approach (MC2CM, MedCites, CPMR). The Intercultural Regions Network promoted by ARE includes interculturality as a part of the narrative linked to supporting recognition of diversity and positive interactions. Through two AMIF projects (Regin and EU Belong)48 CPMR and ARE are investing in regional integration strategies with a multilevel and multi-stakeholder framework leading transnational exchanges. In the case of MC2CM interculturality at the local level has been included as a part of the exchange between cities on both sides of the Mediterranean from a social cohesion point of view.49 As of now, however, these intercultural relations promoted by these networks, are still in their infancy and have not yet been able to exploit local and regional spaces as Euromed laboratories of innovative social ideas.<sup>50</sup>

#### 6.3.3 Externalisation

Finally, there are the internal and external dimensions of migration management, which are emerging as two sides of the same coin. Regional authorities have no legal competence in migration and asylum; however, they are networking by stressing their fundamental role in implementing several aspects and policies that are connected, directly or indirectly, to migration management. This situation will affect

<sup>46</sup> Zapata-Barrero, R. (2022).

<sup>47</sup> El-Mikawy, N. 2020. From Risk to Opportunity: Local governance in the Southern.

<sup>48</sup> AER EU-BELONG https://aer.eu/eu-belong/and AER REGIN https://reginproject.eu/ca/ 49 Mediterranean City-to-City migration (M2CM). 2020. Cultural Policies: a vector for migrants' inclusion in urban context. Thematic learning report. https://agenda21culture.net/news/mc2cm 50 Zapata-Barrero, R (2020).

the vision of external migration policies because they will add value to the cooperation dynamics. Another relevant challenge faced by the networks when come to building on a shared external dimension is the weak presence of LRA from neighbourhood countries in terms of networks membership, as well as the fact that there is a lack of joint initiatives aiming to promote a regional strategy on migration beyond the EU scenario.

The general approach of the LRN is much more open to collaboration and dialogue between inclusion and citizenship policies than those of management and control. Networking and decentralized cooperation through the implementation of European programs start to bring new spaces of possibilities. A great example of this, in terms of European programs, is the AMIF program. In the frame of the transnational actions of the programme, AMIF projects are not foreseen to apply to non-European partners but, because this need exists and they are implicated, the program should provide a way to facilitate the inclusion of the regional and local authorities and actors involved, as the Shababuna project.51 There is the need to encourage operational frames of external cooperation when it comes to joint networks' interests and the coordination between European programmes, financial instruments, and multilateral cooperation is decisive (i.e MC2CM initiative) and can be a key instrument to reinforce the external dimension of the EU migration policy.

Coming to the new areas of interest, the Mediterranean region is not only the home of the conflict, which induces migration and increases the numbers of refugees and displaced people, but it also faces serious global challenges as the critical environmental situation that will increase the displacement of people (El-Mikawy, 2020).52 Regarding climate change, we must look at solutions in the form of migration as an adaptation strategy and external cooperation to build resilience in vulnerable third countries. This is achieved by linking this to the contribution of regional authorities in localizing the Sustainable Development Goals. Said approach is developed by the CRPM, which is asking for partnerships with Southern neighbouring countries on the issue of climate resilience-related migration. Some networks are encouraging the debate about the potential role of regional and local authorities in the coordination with the new AMIF with the new NDICI-Global Europe Instrument (priority of climate and environment). This interesting approach is including actions led by regions in the field of development cooperation tackling root causes of migration. Some of these are linked to improving climate resilience (food security or water management) among others.<sup>53</sup>

<sup>51</sup> Shababuna is an example project within the framework of the AMIF programme 2014–2020 of the UE coordinated by Catalonia and with the participation of Skane (Sweden). The main goal is to strengthen capacities of local and regional authorities in order to promote awareness-raising and information amongst youngsters in the Region of l'Oriental, Morocco. 52 El-Mikawy, N. (2020).

<sup>53</sup> CPRM (2021) Climate Change and Migration. Policy brief. October 2021.

#### 6.4 Conclusion

We have seen how a migratory crisis has opened the door to collaboration and networking between local and regional authorities. However, this territorial collaboration does not present a solid multilevel framework. One of the reasons is the low joint involvement of both areas, local and regional. The ARN also suffer from a lack of effective impact on state policies that continue to lead the management and control of migration policies. As a positive fact, we were able to observe how the dynamics of networking are related to the Mediterranean agenda and address issues of shared interest. Here we can highlight the urban agenda and inclusion. In this sense, a great difficulty observed is the lack of participation of Mediterranean actors from outside the European borders. In addition, we are seeing that difficulties with funds and projects are forcing the European retreat of new platforms and projects driven by this LRN. There is still to observe if the short-term projects where these networks are applying will become permanent platforms of collaboration. Despite the difficulties, the mobilization of these actors and their networks has led to the entry of a shared narrative on migration issues. The voice of local and regional authorities and their positions have been able to have a repercussion in current debates on migration (and in European regional institutions) through joint network actions. With a clear effect in terms of solidarity and refuge, two dimensions that are already part of the migration management. Some areas, like integration or interculturality, remain a difficult aspect to channel effectively at Euro-Mediterranean level. The emergence of global challenges such as climate change appears as an emerging field of interest in the LRN agenda in the Mediterranean. These global challenges, which affect common areas, are mobilizing networks to cooperate on both sides of the Mediterranean. Potential macro-regional and multilateral alliances beyond the European framework are an issue to be observed in the coming period.

#### References


Gemma Aubarell Solduga is Director of Culture, Gender, and Civil Society at the IEMed (European Institute for the Mediterranean, Barcelona). Former Head of Programme and Networks Unit of the Anna Lindh Foundation for the Dialogue between Cultures (Alexandria, Egypt) 2009–2016 and head of the Mediterranean Relations at the Government of Catalonia (2017–2022). She is associate researcher at GRITIM-UPF, associate professor at the School of Communication and International Relations at the Blanquerna-Ramon Llull University in Barcelona and member of the board of the Global Education Citizenship Fund (Barcelona). With extensive experience in the fields of Euro-Mediterranean relations, migration policies, civil society and intercultural dialogue, she has coordinated research teams, edited publications and directed European projects in the Arab world with a special focus on the issues of intercultural dialogue, civil society, education and youth.

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# Part II Governance, Politics and Policies

# Chapter 7 Migrants and Refugees in the Mediterranean Cities: Reception, Regulation and Actors – Tunisia a Case Study

Hassen Boubakri

# 7.1 Introduction

In today's world cities are the human settlements that host the majority of the world's population. Therefore, cities are more affected by population movements than the countryside, both outward and inward: internal migration, forced internal displacement, international migration, international asylum and asylum-seeking (UNESCO, 2016).

The Mediterranean Cities of North Africa, such as the Cities on the European side of the Mediterranean, and MENA region countries receive or are crossed by a large number of migrants: workers, displaced persons and refugees, both nationals and foreigners (UN-Habitat & ICMPD & UCLG, 2019). These Cities find themselves in the front line of receiving and housing these vulnerable migrants who will be subsumed into the poor and marginalised urban classes in the host cities.

Indeed, at different times in their recent migratory history, Tunisian cities have welcomed or seen a large number of migrants pass through, most of them in an irregular and vulnerable situation, when they had neither the means nor experience to meet the needs of these migrants or to try to organize their integration in these cities as well as possible. Some municipal officials, driven by a very strong personal commitment, have thus launched actions and initiated programs to improve responses to the needs of migrants. But they were faced with the absence of legal texts adapted to the new migratory context which makes Tunisia a country of settlement for migrants from sub-Saharan Africa.

On the other hand, the decentralization process, initiated in 2018 and still at the experimental stage, did not allow local authorities (municipal councils) to have the

H. Boubakri (✉)

University of Sousse, Sousse, Tunisia e-mail: hassen.boubakri@flsh.u-sousse.tn

<sup>©</sup> The Author(s) 2024

R. Zapata-Barrero, I. Awad (eds.), Migrations in the Mediterranean, IMISCOE Research Series, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-42264-5\_7

financial means or the necessary competences to establish the beginnings of local management of migrations. These constraints were amplified in 2021, by the coup of the Tunisian president who changed the constitution and abolished the Ministry of Local Authorities and attached the municipalities to the Ministry of the Interior, which raised fears of a halt to decentralization.

The objective of this chapter is therefore to describe and understand the actions of actors and stakeholders around municipalities, especially since they may no longer be repeated if the control of the Tunisian central power is strengthened.

The chapter is organized around four sections: the first one describes the Mediterranean migration trends and their expected impact on the Mediterranean cities where migrants stop for a little or a long time. The second section will deal with the experience of welcoming migrant workers, refugees and families who fled the war in Libya in 2011. The third section will discuss the partnership between local actors in the cities of Sfax and Sousse to meet the needs of, mainly, sub-Saharan migrants. The fourth section will present the experience of the Tunisian cities during the health crisis of the Covid-19 pandemic, with a focus on the action of the municipality of Sousse. The conclusion is dedicated to current political context in Tunisia and its possible impact on the decentralization process.

# 7.2 Mediterranean Cities at the Crossroads of Migratory Flows in the Region

According to FRONTEX,1 in 13 years (2008–2020) 2.6 million people have landed illegally on the EU's Mediterranean coasts, of whom 2.1 million (or 83%) in 7 years (20142 and 2020), compared to 482,000 (or 17%) in the past 5 years (FRONTEX, 2009...20213 ).

Before reaching European shores, these migrants, whether internal or international, have already spent varying amounts of time in the Cities of North Africa and the Middle East. Once landed on European shores, these illegal migrants will pass, stop or settle in the various Cities where local authorities, often in association with Civil Society Organisations (CSOs), try to respond to the needs of these migrants, a challenge that has already been faced by Cities on the Southern and Eastern shores.

The aforementioned Southern Mediterranean Cities have been asked to assume the role of reception platforms either for irregular migrants intercepted or rescued at sea before reaching Europe, or for those expelled from Europe after reaching European soil. The municipal authorities of these Southern Cities are equally expected to deal with the consequences of migrant shipwrecks by taking in charge

<sup>1</sup> European Border and Coast Guard Agency.

<sup>2</sup> The year 2014 year marks the outbreak of the "Migration crisis" in Europe linked to the massive exile of Syrians and Afghans Nationals.

<sup>3</sup> Frontex. Annual\_Risk\_Analysises (2009...2021)

both the DNA analyses and burials of the bodies of victims brought back from the open sea or washed ashore.

In the face of the increased tightening of entry and residence measures, nationals from Mediterranean third countries as well as from other distant places such as the Sahel and Western Asia are obliged to use third-country Cities either as stopovers or as settlement sites before carrying out their migration journey to Europe. These migration policies consist, on the one hand, of tightening the conditions of entry and residence in Europe, and, on the other hand, of outsourcing border controls to third countries and expanding them to sub-Saharan Africa.

Regarding the central Maghreb (Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia), "[...] the readmission agreements signed by EU Member States and Mediterranean third countries since the end of the 1990s (and until 2020 for Tunisia), have allowed the expulsion, over a span of 9 years (2011–2019), of 118,845 nationals of the three countries: 58168 Moroccans (49%); 33,945 Tunisians (28.6%) and 26,741 Algerians (22.5%) (Frontex, 2010...2020). (Boubakri, 2021).

As far as Tunisia is concerned, "[...] In 10 years (2011–2020), 65,335 Tunisians crossed the Mediterranean irregularly towards Italy, 43% of which in 2011 alone, the year of the Tunisian revolution. Although the flows slowed down in the following years, they have accelerated in the last 4 years, with new peaks in 2020 (14,000 arrivals in Italy) and 2021 (almost 18,000). Except for 2011, these figures are unprecedented since the outbreak of the irregular migration phenomenon in the late 1980s' (Boubakri, Ibid). ¾ of Tunisian irregular migrants come from cities, and especially from working-class neighborhoods (FTDES, 2017).

Thus, the cities of the Mediterranean in general, and specially Tunisian cities, are today faced with an increasingly visible and widespread presence of migrants either nationals or foreigners (mostly Sub-Saharans, but also Syrians) who have often suffered many forms of abuse, violence and sequestration, at the end of long travel routes, crossings, stops and bypassing controls. These precarious conditions have exacerbated the already vulnerable status of migrants, thus requiring Cities of transit or settlement to provide urgent measures to rescue, assist and protect them.

# 7.3 Reception and Assistance to Exiles Who Fled the 2011 War in Libya: The Experience of the Border area's Cities (Actions and Stakeholders)

Since the 2011 uprising, Tunisian Civil Society Organizations (CSOs) have played a crucial and often a decisive role in migration and asylum issues. The emancipation of the associative field has enabled the CSOs, which were repressed during the authoritarian regime of former President Ben Ali, to address issues such as migrants' rights, immigration policies, controlling irregular migration, and dealing with Tunisian missing victims of irregular migration following shipwrecks and tragic sea accidents off Italian islands.

Just after the toppling of the Ben Ali regime, there were unusual waves of migration initiated by young Tunisians who had been desperately waiting for years to cross the borders to Europe.

Initially, the city-port of Zarzis (in South-Eastern Tunisia, not far from the Tunisian-Libyan border) became a real "migratory hub", attracting thousands of young people from the villages and cities of the South-East wishing to leave to Europe. 6300 departures were thus recorded in 15 days (from 15 to 30 January 2011), from Zarzis and its surroundings, i.e. an average of 400 departures per day (Chouat & Liteyem, 2011).

One month after the fall of the Tunisian regime, and the triggering of the first wave of migration to Italy, Tunisia found itself faced with one of the greatest migratory and humanitarian crises of recent decades. In the aftermath of the outbreak of the Libyan conflict on 17 February 2011, a massive exodus of hundreds of thousands of foreign workers including Tunisians left Libya and headed to Italy contributing to the increasing rates of clandestine migration. More than half of them crossed the Tunisian borders, while the rest were distributed between Egypt and other neighbouring sub-Saharan countries (especially Niger and Chad). The importance of crossings to Tunisia is explained by the geographical proximity of the Tunisian border towns (Ben Gardanne, Zarzis, Médenine, Tataouine, and the urban centres of of Djerba island) and the Libyan towns of Western Tripolitania, where more than 60% of the Libyan population resides (Pascal & Moriconi-Ebrard, 2020) and where at least 2/3 of Libya's economic activities are concentrated. In a report published in early October 2011, IOM estimated that 722,000 migrant workers have left Libya since the beginning of the conflict, of which 313,000 have entered Tunisia and 230,000 went to Egypt. The remainder was divided between Niger (83000) and Chad (52000) (IOM., 2011).

As soon as it broke out, this major humanitarian crisis mobilized the new Tunisian authorities, particularly the army, which made a major contribution to managing these flows and organizing the gradual deportation of the majority of these people to their countries of origin.

Four towns in South-Eastern Tunisia (Médenine, Ben Gardanne, Zarzis and Houmet Souk in the Djerba island) played a major role as logistical platforms for the repatriation operations (by air, sea or road) of hundreds of thousands of migrants who fled Libya. This operation, was one of the IOM's largest humanitarian operations involving almost 200,000 migrants repatriated in a few weeks. While the UNHCR took care of the refugees who fled Libya within the framework of its mandate (Geneva Convention), the IOM and its partners had to take care of all the other migrants, especially that neither their embassies in Tunisia nor the host country itself had the means to respond to such enormous needs.

Despite the political instability that followed the revolution, the Tunisian population also mobilised massively to supply and take care of the needs of these refugees. The Tunisian media broadcasted appeals for solidarity: in supermarkets throughout the country, food collections were organised and, for several weeks, food aid convoys, mattresses, medicines and volunteers could be seen on the main road linking the capital to the Southern region (Boubakri & Potot, 2012).

Thanks to the spontaneous and massive surge of the Tunisian population, communities and civil society in the very first weeks of the crisis, humanitarian organizations (UNHCR, IOM, International Red Cross and Red Crescent, international NGOs, etc.) managed to take over and became massively involved in the relief, assistance and repatriation of migrants and refugees.

In less than a year (January–September 2011), Tunisia had to manage several waves of exodus from Libya: Tunisians who had immigrated there, foreign workers and Libyans. It has thus received, housed, cared for and repatriated hundreds of thousands of refugees.

On the other hand, while the vast majority of foreign workers who arrived from Libya were re-routed to their countries of origin, 3000 to 4000 refugees and asylum seekers remained at the Tunisian-Libyan border in camps set up by international organizations, including the UNHCR. The Choucha refugee camp, set up in tents in the middle of the desert, was occupied by refugees and asylum seekers from countries in conflict such as Somalia, Eritrea, Sudan, Côte d'Ivoire, and Nigeria.

After the first two waves of migration in the winter of 2011 (the exodus of Tunisians to Italy on the one hand, and the exodus of foreign migrant workers to Tunisia and other countries bordering Libya on the other), Tunisian cities welcomed a third wave, mainly composed of Libyan families who had fled the armed conflict and the NATO bombings. Since the beginning of the spring, daily entries into Tunisian territory reached a high level of border crossings (as example, between 20 and 21 June 2011, 6700 people were registered at the land border with Libya).

During the summer of 2011, when the fighting intensified and affected the major Cities in North-Western Libya, more than 100,000 Libyan family members were hosted by the Tunisian population and civil society organisations. This number had been growing steadily as the fighting drew closer to Tripoli and the major coastal towns in the West, between Misrata and the Tunisian border.

The border towns in Southern Tunisia in particular were at the forefront of receiving Libyan refugees. Data collected by UN organizations (such as the IOM and the UNHCR), or CSOs, show that the Cities of the Southern Tunisian governorates received 80% of the refugees most of them of modest conditions. Tens of thousands of other, wealthier families and individuals, went directly to settle in the larger coastal cities of the Centre and North of the country (Greater Tunis, Nabeul, Sfax, Sousse, etc.). In the South, especially in the rural areas and in the villages, Libyan families were welcomed within Tunisian families and benefited from independent parts of the houses. The ethnic and cultural proximity and the habits and customs shared by families on both sides of the borders facilitated this propinquity, which was absent in other large coastal Tunisian Cities, where Libyan families rented independent accommodations without mixing with Tunisian families.

# 7.4 Cities of Sfax and Sousse: Dealing with Migrants Needs in Attractive Cities

Located in an attractive coastal area (Eastern Center of Tunisia), Sfax and Sousse are respectively the second and the third Tunisian cities in term of population size. Economic activities and factories in both cities attract several people, Tunisians such as Foreigners.

#### 7.5 City of Sfax: Becoming Sea Border Area with Europe

The second largest city in Tunisia, and an economic metropolis, the city of Sfax is attractive to foreign migrants, as well as to internal migrants. Indeed, the city of Sfax offers many opportunities for informal work, in the industries and factories of the city, in poultry farming, peri-urban livestock, caretaking and personal services in families. Its location as a coastal city opposite the Tunisian island of Querkennah, itself located opposite the Italian island of Lampedusa, makes Sfax a meeting point for migrant trafficking networks and illegal crossings to Italy. Indeed, the foreign presence in Sfax has diversified greatly, especially after the uprising of 2011.

The presence of Libyans is historical. Sfax is usually regarded as the "second city of Libya" after Tripoli. After 2011, in a context of civil war and insecurity that still lasts, Sfax has become the main city of reception and stay of Libyans for reasons related to security, care in the city's policlinics, or sometimes to do business.

The private universities of Sfax welcome more than 2500 students, the vast majority being Sub-Saharans. Since they are not entitled to accommodation in the university halls of residence, they are scattered in many neighborhoods where they rent individual housing or in private homes. But their socialization remains weak and limited.

The third category of foreign migrants strongly present in Sfax is composed of refugees and asylum seekers. Sub-Saharans are the most numerous because of the persistence of conflicts in the Horn of Africa, in the Sahel countries up to the Gulf of Guinea. They flee Libya and arrive in Sfax, which serves for some of them as a platform for preparing irregular crossings of the Mediterranean. Their status is halfway between irregularity and regularity, while their situation or asylum application is being processed by the UNHCR. Their presence in the city is therefore very volatile and changes regularly, which sometimes prevents humanitarian organizations from being able to provide assistance to the most vulnerable among them. Indeed, refugees are often victims of migrant smuggling and trafficking networks and arrive in Sfax after following long, costly, complicated and risky routes.

The fourth category, which is strongly represented in Sfax, is the irregular migrants who shoes to settle in Sfax for economic reasons: workers, cleaning ladies, adventurers, graduate students, many of whom are sub-Saharan, who extend their stay in Sfax to search a job.

Local actors in the city of Sfax have been confronted with the issue of immigration when they have had to respond to the specific needs of migrants with an irregular (and therefore vulnerable) situation in the city. Associative actors and international organizations have acted out of concern for the protection of the human rights of migrants and to provide them with the necessary assistance. This interest was also motivated by the need for migrant labor expressed by the city's entrepreneurs and businessmen.

The regional labor inspectorate conducted a census of the number of migrants who were victims of exploitation and work accidents and classified them by nationality (UN-Habitat & ICMPD & UCLG., 2021a). For its part, the local section of the NGO Terre d'Asile Tunisie (TAT) often welcomes victims of trafficking, the majority of whom are Ivorian cleaning women who flee the families that employ and house them. In order to pay off their debts to the intermediaries of their journey to Tunisia, they work for free for the first 5 or 6 months after their arrival in the families. Half of these women are single, but ¼ of the married women have left their children in their countries of origin, the Ivory Coast in this case. The regional office in Sfax of the "National Instance for combatting trafficking of persons" (INLPT) has launched legal proceedings for the protection of migrants, especially women, who are victims of trafficking (Ibid).

Migrants present in the city, regardless of administrative status, gender, or nationality, are monitored by the Tunisian Association for the Fight against Sexually Transmitted Diseases and AIDS (ATL/MST-Sida). Young men, women and single mothers are the main beneficiaries. The Sfax office of this association has paid, between 2017 and 2019, the costs of care for 19 people with AIDS thanks to the support of the Global Fund to Fight AIDS (Ibid).

To facilitate the registration at the Civil Registry of new births whose parents are sub-Saharan migrants in an irregular situation, the Municipality of Sfax encourages its staff to be flexible in the absence of a marriage contract or proper papers. A residence card is also not required when legalizing rental contracts filed by irregular migrants. The vulnerability linked to the irregular status of these migrants is aggravated by the difficulty of access to the city's schools for the children of these migrants who do not know Arabic or French, the languages of instruction.

The Municipality of Sfax sometimes intervenes with hospitals and private clinics to facilitate the reimbursement of emergency hospitalization costs for migrants without health care cards. It also provides free services such as burial of deceased persons without family or community support among sub-Saharan migrants.

Local actors (State deconcentrated services in Sfax, the Municipality, foreign or Tunisian NGOs) are all subject to legal vagueness or the absence of internal legislation clearly recognizing the rights of migrants in an irregular situation, including the enjoyment of vital services such as health care, food or accommodation, despite the fact that Tunisia has signed international conventions for the protection of the human rights of migrants.

The Municipality of Sfax has been involved in numerous events designed and organized in Sfax for the benefit of migrants, especially sub-Saharan migrants, in partnership with United Nations organizations (such as the IOM or UNHCR), or NGOs such as "Médecins du Monde" (MdM) or Terre d'Asile Tunisie (TAT), or with regional administrations and professional organizations, such as the Farmers' Federations.

Thus, there is a difference in approach between the local level (municipality, NGO) and the central level. The local actors, who declare that they refer to the humanitarian principles of assistance and protection of migrants, act and improvise responses to emergency situations in the urban neighborhoods. For their part, governmental actors (represented by the regional directorates of the Ministries), even if they never deny their attachment to the same humanitarian principles, act rather according to management and security logics.

# 7.6 City of Sousse: When the Commitment of the Partners Allows Good Responses

In Sousse, such as in Sfax, informal urban services such as hotels, restaurants, construction, industry, security guards at gas stations and parking lots, car washing, and home services (gardening, housework, baby-sitting, etc.) are attracting an increasing number of workers, especially sub-Saharans. These are vulnerable workers who do not benefit from employment contracts, social protection, and even less from the possibility of obtaining a residence permit.

Indeed, the rigidity of the Tunisian labor code makes it difficult for employers to declare the recruitment of foreign workers (Boubakri, H. & Potot, S. 2012) and to regularize their administrative situation. While official statistics (UN-Habitat & ICMPD & UCLG, 2021b), place the number of foreign workers who have obtained a work permit at the national level at 5757, these data are not available at either the regional or local level. As a result, local actors in Tunisian cities are still struggling with how to deal with the recurrent vulnerability of foreign workers face to rigid legislation and employers who do not make much of an effort to go beyond the rigidity of the laws and offer decent jobs to these workers.

The city of Sousse was the location of an original action aimed to assist migrants in the city (UN-Habitat & ICMPD, Op. cit.) This initiative demonstrated the strong commitment of local institutional and Civil Society actors.

The action involved three partners: the Municipality of Sousse, the regional clinic of the National Office of Family and Population (ONFP) and the IOM, which signed a partnership agreement in 2018 for assistance and access to health services for vulnerable migrants. The city of Sousse is one of six Tunisian areas that have benefited from this pilot experience to promote the well-being of migrants.

The ONFP opened its doors to foreign migrants in Sousse for consultations and interventions in the field of sexual and reproductive health and the treatment of STDs (Sexually Transmitted Diseases) and AIDS virus. Migrant women, like Tunisian women, benefited from the services of the clinic of the Office for the follow-up of their sexual and reproductive health as well as the medical follow-up of their children. The ONFP has also set aside a "youth-friendly space" (Espace ami des Jeune) frequented mainly by young migrant women, but also by young men, for confidential and anonymous screening for STDs and HIV and their follow up. The majority of young people attending this space were sub-Saharan, but other young people passing through Sousse from other countries (Algeria, Libya, Jordan, Syria... etc.) have benefited from consultations in this space.

In 16 months (September 2018–December 2019),4 the total number of consultations reached 140, with an average of 10 consultations per month at the beginning to reach an average of 30/month during the fall 2019 (Ibid). The trend was on the rise on the eve of the onset of the Covid-19 health crisis, which lasted almost 2 years (2020–2021). The number of migrants who benefited from these consultations increased by 15–20% from month to month on the eve of the outbreak of the pandemic (Ibid).

In recent years, the church of Sousse has reactivated the charity service (CARITAS) which welcomes, guides and provides assistance to vulnerable migrants or those in difficulty (students whom parents have stopped sending money, landlords who have evicted them from their homes, difficulties in obtaining health care or food, difficulties with the police, etc.). The Sunday masses of the Catholic and Protestant churches bring together dozens of faithful from all occupations (students, workers, transients). They are spaces of meetings and sociability between the members of the sub-Saharan national communities of both sexes.

The main Trade Union (UGTT) has slightly evolved in its vision of defending foreign workers in Tunisia. The UGTT was initially hostile to the immigration of foreign workers to Tunisia. The union saw it as a threat to the acquired social rights of Tunisian workers. Nevertheless, its position has changed significantly in response to the abuses suffered by foreign workers without a contract, who live under the double pressure of exploitation by employers and legal proceedings. The UGTT offices in Sfax and Sousse have responded to the call of migrant workers' NGOs by reserving a "migrant space" within their offices in both cities. These spaces aim to be a frame to defend the economic and social rights of migrant workers and offer them "[...] regardless of their status, access to reliable information (legislation governing employer/employee relations, information on basic services, etc.), specific training (financial education, protection mechanisms in case of abuse, etc.) and concrete services (conciliation in case of labor disputes) [...]" (UGTT's internal handwritten memo).

# 7.7 The Covid-19 Crisis: Cities Take Ownership of Migration in Their Local Agenda

Like many countries, the Coronavirus crisis forced Tunisia to declare total containment of the population in March 2020. The entire country was shut down, which cut off the sources of income of many active socio-professional categories. This left the

<sup>4</sup> Data was not updated after the end of the pandemic.

working poor and those in the informal sector without resources. From the beginning of the crisis, many NGOs identified migrants as one of the vulnerable groups in need of assistance. Calls were made for food and cash collections for migrant workers who had lost their sources of income and could no longer feed themselves, their children or pay their rent.

From their side, the government authorities decided that migrants, whether they are single or in families, regular or irregular, will benefit, in the same way as Tunisians, from social assistance (financial and in kind). Operations to collect and distribute aid have been organized in many cities where a large number of migrants are living, particularly sub-Saharan migrants.

Thus, Tunisian and migrant CSOs have joined forces and coordinated with municipal councilors (mayors and deputy mayors, members of councils) to gather information on migrants in need. For their part, UN organizations (IOM, UNHCR), and international NGOs such as "Médecins du Monde", took part in this mobilization and provided the necessary financial means for assistance.

Initially, migrants, who are the target population of these programs and who mostly originate in Sub-Saharan Africa were very reluctant and wary of approaching the municipality building or the NGOs' offices out of fear arrest. However, the hesitation quickly dissipated later giving way to large numbers of migrants seeking to join in to benefit from the assistance programs. Municipality headquarters were the destination of many waiting to be registered for aid. Paradoxically, thanks to social assistance campaigns, this crisis made vulnerable and destitute migrants visible. The number of requests quickly exploded, thus allowing NGOs and municipal authorities to gather the necessary data from migrants to better understand their profiles (administrative status and socio-demographic and economic characteristics).

In order to avoid abuse, the donation campaigns' partners shared the lists and carried out cross-checks in order to obtain reliable lists that allowed for targeted and transparent aid.

Obtaining this data from civilian sources outside the Ministry of the Interior is a precedent in the context of institutional migration management. For example, the figures presented by the Municipality of Sfax included a number of 8000 to 10,000 migrants on the lists which surprised everyone including the Municipal Council itself. Other Municipalities reported an average of 1000 migrants (Sousse, Zarzis, Médenine) to 2000/2500 migrants per commune (La Marsa and Raoued).

# 7.8 "Sousse Solidarity Without Borders", the Response of the Municipality of Sousse to the Crisis of Covid-19

The municipality of Sousse responded to calls from organizations or groups of migrants living in Sousse: students, workers in the informal sector, families. The City Council has thus brought together its local partners around an action named "Sousse Solidarity without Borders". The stakeholders (such as CSOs, regional authorities, professional organizations and international organizations) have designated the Municipality to be the leader of this coordination in order to collect and distribute aid (financial and in-kind donations) to migrants residing in Sousse.

A media campaign was launched to ensure the support of the public opinion and the city's inhabitants. Social networks as well as local and national media were mobilized to support this campaign. A toll-free number was set up for donors and aid seekers to contact the Aid Management committee. An e-mail address was reserved for the transmission of the names of aid applicants in order to centralize the data and avoid duplication of aid or abuse.

Companies and individuals have contributed to these donations. Most have requested to remain anonymous. UN organizations (IOM, UNHCR) have also contributed to this campaign of solidarity with migrants, again through the Aid Management committee coordinated by the municipality. The Tunisian Red Crescent, in addition to providing aid in kind, paid directly to the owners the rents of the housing rented by migrants unable to pay.

The municipality of Sousse has also provided medical assistance to migrants or their families (psychological assistance, payment of the costs of consultations and analyses (doctors, psychologists and laboratories).

The successive waves of the pandemic in 2020 and 2021 pushed the Municipality of Sousse to organize new campaigns to help migrants whenever necessary, always with the support of NGOs and international organizations. More than 95% of the beneficiaries were nationals of sub-Saharan African countries. This health crisis more than the migration crisis presented a unique opportunity for municipalities to demonstrate their ability to rally the energies and efforts of a network of local actors and stakeholders to assist migrants living there.

This new organisational capacity to mobilise and coordinate is perhaps the main lesson to be learnt from this experience. The crisis not only allowed communes to measure and test their organizational capacities but also enabled them to understand the gaps and shortcomings in terms of means and skills to be transferred from the Centre to the local level in order to establish a local governance of migration.

In fact, through this involvement, the medium and long-term objective of the municipal authorities, is to strengthen their demands for a greater degree of decentralization and for providing them with further financial assistance in order to meet the migrants needs.

Officials in some Cities (Zarzis, Médenine and Raoued) complain about the lack of resources and gaps in the legal framework preventing Cities from intervening and deciding freely on their communal territories. The international organizations (IOM and UNHCR) are criticized for the lack of funds and assistance offered to cities to enable them supporting migrants.

#### 7.9 Conclusion: Political and Future Considerations

After the 2011 uprising and the regime change, the implementation of local democracy was considered as a tool to guard against authoritarianism. The Code of Local Authorities (CCL), promulgated in 2018, announced the partial transfer of the power from the central authorities to the local ones. However, in 4 years (2018–2022), no formal competence was transferred to the municipalities.

The 2014 constitution, which reserved an entire chapter (Chap. 7) for local authority, was suspended in July 2021, then abandoned in 2022, and replaced by a new constitution following the referendum organised in June 2022 by Tunisian President Kais Saïed in the context of the state of exception.

The new 2022 constitution almost totally ignored local and regional power. The issue is hardly mentioned in Chap. 7 ("Local and regional authorities"), which contains only one vague article (Article 133), that goes as follows ("Municipal councils, governorate councils and regional councils, as well as structures endowed by law with the status of local authority, shall exercise the local and regional services as determined by law").

The new Constitution can be considered as a serious setback to the already faltering decentralization process adopted between 2011 and 2021. This process has now been interrupted. As in other domains, migration and migrants will be the first losers in this new context which tends to concentrate power in the Tunis Power Centrer at the expense of the lower local levels of the political system (regions and communes) and intermediate institutions (political parties, trade unions and other professional organizations, CSOs, etc.)

More generally, and despite these prospects, migration is emerging as a subject of endless debate among the different segments of society as well as political actors including local authorities, politicians, political parties and organizations. The Cities of the third countries in the Mediterranean have been involved an intrinsic part of the last decades migratory movements which have been characterized by their increasing rates along with their changing origins and destinations controlled by the contingent geopolitical context..

Cities, as well as their governing bodies, are frequently called upon to manage the arising emergencies and to respond to the needs of their citizens, including foreigners. As we have shown throughout this chapter, demands emanate from above; as they mainly come from foreign partners and central governments In order for Cities to become more involved in migrant reception and integration agendas and programs. Likewise, these demands come from below, i.e., from NGOs and foreigners residing in these Cities and seeking to benefit from better urban services (housing, transportation, education, work, etc.).

However, as has been demonstrated, the process of decentralization and transfer of powers to local authorities is still slow in countries like Morocco. As for Tunisia, it is suspended for now and had been reluctant prior to 2022. However, in Algeria, where signs of relaxing the center's grip on power are absent, the process has not yet launched. After the reconciliation of the different warring factions in Libya, which is war-ridden and in total chaos, the process of decentralization will take time to mature. Overall, it seems that time for urban governments to take part in the integration of migrants in Southern Mediterranean cities has not yet come.

#### References


Hassen Boubakri is full Professor of Geography and Migration studies at the University of Sousse (Tunisia), and Part-time Professor at the University of Sfax (Tunisia). He is an International Fellow at the ICM (Institut Convergences Migrations)/Policy Department (CNRS. Paris), the Tunisian partner (University of Sousse) and the Steering Committee member of the EuroMedMig / Jean Monnet Network) (Leader: Universitat Pompeu Fabra/Barcelona). His is also the Tunisian partner of the Horizon Europe "GAPs" Project (De-centring the Study of Migrant Returns and Readmission Policies in Europe and Beyond) (2023–2026), of the European Projects (ERC & Horizon Europe): "Vital Elements and Postcolonial Moves: Forensics as the Art of Paying Attention in a Mediterranean Harbour Town" (2023–2027)/University of Amsterdam (2023–2027), and of the ERC Project. "SolRoutes" (Solidarities and migrants' routes across Europe at large) (2023–2028)/University of Genoa (Italy).

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# Chapter 8 Media, Public Opinion and Migration Policies in Euro-mediterranean Countries: The Case of France

Maysa Ayoub

# 8.1 Introduction

Irregular migration from the Southern shore of the Mediterranean to the Northern shore is on the rise since 2011. The routes used for irregular crossings are the Central Mediterranean route, the Western Mediterranean route, and the Eastern Mediterranean route. Between 2011–2015, migrants crossing the Mediterranean mostly used the Central Mediterranean route extending from Libya and Tunisia to Italy. The highest number of irregular crossings on this route was in 2014 when 170,664 persons were reported to have taken this route. The Western Mediterranean route stretches from North Africa, mainly Morocco and Algeria, to Spain. The use of this route remained averagely stable between 2013 and 2016 with an average of 7000 crossings recorded per year. The Eastern Mediterranean route which extends from Turkey to Greece was heavily used in 2015. The number of crossings along the Eastern Mediterranean route was 885,386 in 2015 compared to 50,834 in 2014 (Frontex: European Boarder and Coast guard agency).

The highest number of irregular crossings through the three routes was recorded in 2015 (a total of 900,000 crossings). While the most commonly used routes in 2015 were the Eastern Mediterranean and Western Balkan routes (from Turkey to Bulgaria), the number of crossings on the Central Mediterranean route, the most dangerous, remained high. The increased irregular crossing in 2015 led to the labelling of the year as the year of Europe' refugee crisis (Ibid).

M. Ayoub (✉)

Unless otherwise indicated by in-text citation, the information provided in this chapter is based on the author' doctoral dissertation entitled "Determinants of asylum policies in Germany and France during the period 2013–2016, with special emphasis on the role of public opinion"

Center for Migration and Refugee Studies, American University in Cairo, New Cairo, Egypt e-mail: maysa@aucegypt.edu

R. Zapata-Barrero, I. Awad (eds.), Migrations in the Mediterranean, IMISCOE Research Series, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-42264-5\_8

This chapter is concerned with how the media and the public in Northern Mediterranean countries reacted to this movement and how such reaction was concurrent with the policy debate. The chapter will focus on France as a case study. Over 50% of France's immigrants originate from other Mediterranean countries. The majority (29%) are coming from Southern Mediterranean countries (Algeria, Morocco, and Tunisia) and the remaining 20% are coming from Northern Mediterranean countries like Italy, Spain, and Turkey (DESA: United Nations Department of Economics and Social Affairs). Moreover, the promotion of a strong union among Mediterranean countries is also a French project. The project by France was originally envisioned as a project encompassing countries bordering the Mediterranean. With pressure from other European countries particularly Germany, it developed in 2008 from a Mediterranean Union to a union for the Mediterranean that includes all EU member states (Ufm) (Tasche, 2010). With its importance in the migration system and its attempt to contribute to a regional-making process, France presents, as such, a good case study to understand how the public and the media perceives immigrants from the other side of the Mediterranean shore.

The findings of this chapter confirm the correlation between public opinion and public policy as it demonstrates that the policy debate and the asylum legislation that followed are concurrent with public perception. The latter, however, is to a great extent influenced by France' collective memory of migration. The first section of this chapter will explain the methodology particularly in terms of selecting the media form. The second section will provide a brief explanation of the meaning of 'collective memory' highlighting France' historical experience with migration. The third and final section will present the findings subdivided into three sub-sections: newspapers findings, public opinion findings, and the policy debate.

#### 8.2 Methodology

This chapter is based on the findings of a larger study carried out by the author on the determinants of asylum policies. The larger study analyzed newspaper articles, public opinion surveys and the French parliament' minutes from 2013–2016.

With regard to newspaper articles, the study adopted a qualitative media content analysis which entails three steps for sampling: selecting the media form, selecting from within the media form and deciding the sample size (Macnamara, 2005). Media forms include traditional media (newspapers, magazines, Television (TV), radio) and non-traditional media (the Internet and the social media platforms). The last Standard Eurobarometer (EB) Survey on media use in the EU revealed that TV is the number one source of news for the majority of adults (81%) followed by the Internet (69%), social media platforms (48%), radio (47%), and finally the written press (26%) (Standard Eurobarometer 92, 2019). Given that most newspapers are switching to digital production (Myllylahti, 2016), it is reasonable to assume that the percentage of EU citizens (69%) who use the Internet, as per the last Standard EB, are using digital newspapers. While the press (written or digital) might affect public opinion differently from social media, the last Standard EB on media use indicated that the level of trust in traditional media is higher than that in social media (Standard Eurobarometer 92, 2019). Moreover, while TV is the most popular media source, the role of newspapers in setting public agenda and impacting policy has historically been regarded as more influential than the TV (Cohen, 1963). Moreover, in recent years, scholars agree that newspaper coverage informs TV broadcasting (Golan, 2007). Given the above, the study upon which this chapter is based chose the press since it is agreed upon that it is the outlet that has the most effect on public opinion. Based on volume of distribution, the three most widely read newspapers in France were selected: Le Figaro (representing the right), Le Monde (representing the center), and Liberation (representing the left). While it cannot be claimed that the three newspapers represent the French press, they offer good representation of press coverage in France given their volume of distribution.

With regard to selection from within the media form, the issues and articles selected for the analysis were chosen using purposive sampling. The issues were purposively selected focusing on Fridays' issues. Since Friday is the end of the week in Europe, the decision to focus on Friday was made on the assumption that Friday issues would probably highlights events happening during the week and would probably discuss policy decisions that were undertaken in this week. In this regard, 600 Friday issues were reviewed to choose the sample of articles to analyze. The researcher looked for key words like 'refugees' 'migrants', 'asylum seekers', and 'Syria' (given that most refugees during the period were from Syria). 299 articles were found including these words, the largest number was in 2015, the year which signified the largest irregular movement towards Europe.

The researcher read the 299 articles to select the sample. The sample (a total of 98 articles) was selected purposively choosing articles that dealt with the conceptual question of the research which is how the media reported on the increased irregular movement to Europe.

While purposive sampling is allowed with qualitative research, the way the sample was purposefully selected for this research has its limitation. A purposive sampling that is based only on the conceptual question without a temporal limitation would have been a better strategy. In other words, the findings might have differed if the chosen sample was not restricted to Friday issues. However, this was not feasible given the limited resources. The aim of the research is only to provide an example of how the most widely read newspapers in France covered Europe's refugee crisis and how such coverage corresponded with the public's perception of the crisis and the legislation that followed.

With regard to public perception, the study analyzed the results of the seven standard Eurobarometer (EB) reports and the results of the European Social Surveys (ESS) published during the period 2013–2016. Moreover, the study analyzed the findings of a public opinion survey with 2000 individuals in France conducted by 'more in common', a civil society initiative, in 2017.

#### 8.3 Collective Memory

There are many different definitions of collective memory. The most widely used definition is the one put forward by James Wertsch and Henry Roediger who define it as "a form of memory that transcends individuals and is shared by a group". They explain that collective memory should not be confused with history because history is an objective and accurate description of the past while collective memory is the past as remembered by a specific group in a way that shape this group' identity. As such, perceiving a historical event in a particular manner, remembering it, and passing on the memory to the next generation is essential for establishing one's own identity. Collective remembering, they argue, rejects any different interpretation of history even if it relies on conflicting evidence (Wertsch & Roediger III, 2008).

The 'Guest worker' model that was implemented in France following World War II represents an important historical event that shaped the public perception towards immigrants as well as immigration policies. The model was based on recruiting workers from sending countries for 2 years nonrenewable so that each worker would have to leave after 2 years and replaced by another one should there be a need. The recruited workers were accommodated in quarters adjunct to factories outside the city and isolated from the local population in an attempt to confirm the temporariness of their stay (Castles, 1986).

The labor recruitment program was initially handled by France' office of national immigration. However, over time, the office was unable to meet the demands of employers because the demand exceeded the office's ability to supply the needed labor. This led to a growing pattern of irregular migration outside the framework of the national immigration office. The supply of irregular migrants also suited employer needs because they accepted lower pay and difficult working conditions. Immigration outside the framework of the office also increased because citizens of French colonies were allowed to enter France without a visa. The end result was that France became home to a large groups of irregular migrant workers from Algeria, Morocco, Tunisia and West Africa who over time became permanent settlers. Moreover, family reunion was tolerated due to the low birth rates in France. The large number of immigrants led to housing shortage which resulted in the growing number of slums areas within France and the burdening of the welfare system. The most disadvantaged members of the French working class were eventually affected leading to economic tension. Cultural tension also existed since immigrants were isolated from the host population which affected negatively their ability to integrate. The image of the migrant as isolated and different and unable to integrate continue to shape the French's contemporary public perception of immigrants as will be apparent in the analysis of public opinion. (Ibid).

### 8.4 Findings

#### 8.4.1 Newspapers' Findings

The study used the analytical tool of framing. The most commonly used frames in media analysis are the problem frame, the human-impact frame, the political frame, the morality frame, the security frame, the policy-prescription frame, and the economic frame. The problem frame is used when the issue is defined as a 'problem' with clear cause and effect. The security frame is used whenever the discussed topic is explicitly defined as a security issue. Both frames are usually used to instigate fear. The human-impact frame or the humanitarian frame is usually used to alert the reader to the human consequences of an issue. The morality frame refers to the framing of an issue from a duty or social responsibility perspective. The economic frame is used when the focus is on the economic consequences of an issue and the policy prescription frame is used when framing the issue through evaluating existing policies or suggesting new policies. Finally, the political frame is used when an issue is discussed focusing on the political considerations surrounding it. (Boydstun et al., 2013).

The largest number of newspapers' articles published on the topic of the increased irregular migration was by Le Figaro (45 articles from a sample of 98). Le Monde and Liberation published 27 and 26 articles respectively. The most commonly used frames by the three newspapers were the human impact frame and the political frame. The analyzed articles covered topics including 'the magnitude of the movement', 'Asylum Policies in the face of the movement', and 'hosting refugees and asylum seekers."

The human impact frame was usually used when reporting on the magnitude of the movement and highlighting the deaths at sea. For example, one article by Le Monde discussed the tragedy of Lampedusa through deconstructing all labels arguing that those who died in an attempt to reach Europe were first and foremost humans, or as the author put it "victims of the Lampedusa tragedy were neither immigrants, refugees, or clandestine: they are humans that died on the move" (Agier, 2013). Throughout the article, the author criticized the anti-migrant discourse and accused France of creating the image of what he described as "an abstract, ghostly and repulsive "foreigner." (Ibid). The death of Alyan Kurdi, the child who was found dead on the shores of the Mediterranean, was covered by many articles. For example, one of Le Monde' articles published a big picture of the child with the following caption: "this photo will be needed for Europe to open its eyes and become conscious of what is happening" (Fenoglio, 2015). Another, article by Liberation reported on the tragical incident by referring to the number of children who die on the road to Europe.

With regard to the political frame, twelve Le Figaro articles, six Le Monde articles, and eight Liberation articles used the political frame. Other frames used included the problem frame, morality frame, economic frame, security frame, and policy evaluation frame. The problem frame was mostly used by Le Figaro (12 articles) while it was rarely used by the other two newspapers (Only one Le Monde article and three Liberation articles used this frame). Two of Le Figaro articles used the security frame and both Le Figaro and Le Monde used the policy prescription frame (five articles from each newspaper used this frame).

Le Figaro articles, were equally divided between articles focusing on the humanitarian aspect of the irregular migration and articles focusing on its impact on Europe. Le Monde and Liberation, by contrast, focused more on the humanitarian aspect and death at sea. However, when discussing Merkel's reaction to the increased irregular movement of 2015, Le Monde's articles were divided. Some of Le Monde articles supported Merkel' decision while others were critical of the decision and its impact on Europe.

Issues concerning policies towards irregular migration or migration in general were not found in the Liberation sample. With regard to the two other newspapers and with the exception of a few Le Figaro articles that discussed the political role of France in the Syrian conflict, the focus was not on France, Le Monde articles were divided between those critical of the EU's policy which was described by one article as 'inhumane,' and those externalizing the refugee problem by advocating increasing development aid to neighboring countries to decrease refugee inflow to Europe. Some of Le Figaro articles focused on Germany and were implicitly skeptical of Merkel's policy. Newspaper articles belonging to the three newspapers were divided with regards to the EU-Turkey agreement between opponents and supporters. Surprisingly, there was almost no discussion of the amendments made to the French asylum law that was adopted in July 2015.

Finally, with regard to the topic 'hosting refugees and asylum seekers', the discussion focused on the hosting of migrants in other countries. Even though France did not receive a large number of asylum applications during the period that witnessed the large influx of irregular migrants, the absence of issues concerning migrants in France is astonishing given the large number of immigrants in France. Some articles discussed the situation of refugees in developing countries like Lebanon, Jordan and Turkey. These articles used the human-impact frame to describe the dire conditions and the implications on both refugees and host countries. Other articles focused on Germany and the economic impact of hosting Syrian refugees as well as on the rise of the rightwing and its possible implications on Germany's asylum policy. The situation of the Calais jungle and/or its evacuation was not heavily discussed even though it is a significant migration issue in France. In the sample of 98 articles, only three discussed the situation of Calais: two articles from Le Figaro and one from Le Monde. The Liberation sample did not include any articles on Calais. The article by Le Monde used the human-impact frame to describe the dire living conditions in the Calais Jungle. However, the two articles of Le Figaro focused on the impact on the local population and how the evacuation divided the people into those supporting it and others against it.

It is therefore clear that the impact of the newspaper's political orientation on how topics were framed is not significant. Le Figaro's articles were divided in the way they covered irregular migration between those stressing the humanitarian dimension and those problematizing the phenomenon. Le Monde's articles were also divided in their coverage of policies between those encouraging liberal policies and those advocating for externalizing migration. The situation in Calais was completely absent from Liberation's coverage. Likewise, and while it was expected that a leftoriented newspaper would discuss immigration and asylum policies, such discussion was also absent from Liberation's sampled articles.

#### 8.4.2 Public Opinion's Findings

Immigration was listed as one of the most important issues facing the EU as well as the respondents' countries in the standard EB surveys on public opinion during the period 2013–2016. From among the 28 European countries surveyed during 2013–2016 (including Croatia which joined the EU on July 1st, 2013 and the United Kingdom which left the union in January 2020), France ranked between the 8th and 15th in terms of perceiving immigration as an important issue. The highest percentage of the population who perceived immigration as the most important issue was in fall 2015 when 22% of the respondents ranked immigration as the most important issue facing France. This was expected as fall 2015 witnessed the highest number of irregular movements to Europe. However, in comparison to the perception of the population of other European countries during the same year, France ranked among the lowest countries in terms of how important its population perceived immigration. For example, while 22% of its population ranked immigration as the most important issue facing France in fall 2015, the issue was ranked as the most important by 76% of the German population, 60% of the population of Denmark, 56% of the population of Netherlands and Austria, and by 53% of the population of Sweden. With the exception of Germany that received the largest claims for asylum in 2015, the four other countries, unlike France, are not major migrants' receiving countries (European Commission: Standard Eurobarometer). However, in the survey conducted in 2017 by 'more in common', immigration was ranked as the third most important issue for French citizens after terrorism and unemployment where 37% of the sample ranked immigration as the most important issue facing France (Beddiar et al., 2017).

As such, immigration was not salient to the French public during the period 2013–2016, a finding that correlates with the newspaper' findings which attempted to externalize Europe' refugee crisis. Immigration, became increasingly important to the French public in 2017 as indicated by the survey carried out by 'more in common'. The increased salience of the issue in 2017 could be attributed to a number of reasons including the rise of Marine le Pen (president of the National Front, the far-right party) to the last round of the presidential election of 2017 and the centrality of immigration in her campaign as well as to series of terrorist attacks that were extensively covered by the French and European media (Ibid).

With regard to perception towards immigrants and refugees, public opinion polls in the EU indicate that EU citizens tend to overestimate the number of non-EU immigrants as a percentage of the population in their countries and to overestimate the number of irregular immigrants in comparison to regular immigrants. With regard to France, the difference between the actual and perceived number of immigrants was very high in comparison to other European countries (European Commission: Special Eurobarometer).

Public opinion polls in the EU also highlight that Europeans perceive immigration within the EU and immigration from outside the EU differently. France belonged to the vast majority of European countries where the majority of its population expressed positive sentiments about immigration from other EU Member States but negative sentiments about immigration from countries outside the EU. (European Commission: Qualitative Study). The percentage of the French citizens perceiving immigration from other EU countries positively decreased from 51% in fall 2014 to 45% in summer 2015 but increased again to 55% in fall 2016. In terms of perception towards immigration from outside the EU, slightly over 50% of French citizens perceived immigration from outside the EU negatively. The highest negative perception (64%) was recorded in fall 2015 (European Commission: Standard Eurobarometer).

According to the study by 'more in common', thirty per cent of the French population holds positive views of migration while seventeen per cent of the population opposes it believing that migration poses a threat to national identity. The majority of the French population (53%) holds conflicting views on migration. Their views are influenced by specific situations rather than a result of a fixed ideology about immigrants. Some are driven by the humanitarian situation and the moral obligation to help while others are driven by the economic situation in the country. However, when participants were asked whether France should respond to the refugees' crisis by providing asylum opportunities, only eighteen per cent of the respondents indicated that France can afford to host refugees while sixty per cent highlighted that the economic situation of France does not allow it to host refugees. Moreover, fifty-one per cent of those surveyed believed that the vast majority of irregular migrants are abusing the asylum channels and 45% agreed that borders should be completely closed and attributed terrorist threats to the refugee influx (Beddiar et al., 2017).

According to the EB survey, the public believes that the most important conditions for the successful integration of immigrants into host countries were learning the language of the host country, contributing to the welfare system, and committing to the values and norms of the host society. The most important obstacles to integration are limited efforts on the part of immigrants to integrate and discrimination against immigrants. Half of the respondents in France believed that the little efforts exerted by immigrants and refugees is the main reason behind their failure to integrate while the other half cited discrimination against immigrants (European Commission: Special Eurobarometer). Only sixteen percent believed that immigration has positive impact on French society while the majority (56%) believed that it has negative impact. (Beddiar et al., 2017).

The survey by 'more in common' concluded that the overall perception of the French public towards immigrants from outside the EU is negative. The study attributed that to the increased rate of terrorist attacks, increased crime rate, economic decline, and the success of the National Front party in linking these issues to immigration. Another reason given by the study to explain French citizens' negative perceptions is the belief that France has failed to integrate older immigrants. This negative memory of migration came up in the survey where participants argued that the failure to integrate older groups of migrants would make them reluctant to accept more new arrivals, even those seeking asylum. The study concluded that the French people perceived the refugee crisis through the public' perception of the failure of immigration policy (Ibid).

According to the EB survey, immigration was not that salient to the French public during the period of the increased irregular migration, a finding that correlates with the newspapers' externalization of the refugee' crisis. Despite that, the French public believe that the number of immigrants in France is high, do not welcome the reception of refugees, are with border control, and link Islam to terrorism. Since Southern Mediterranean countries (Tunisia, Algeria, Morocco, Egypt, and Libya) are Muslim countries. This means that the perception of the French public to immigrants from these countries is predominantly negative.

#### 8.4.3 The Policy Debate

The minutes of the parliamentary sessions of the French parliament during 2013–2016 were reviewed to understand the policy debate. During this period, the Socialist party constituted the majority of France's National Assembly (Gueugneau, 2012). The president during the research period, François Hollande, also belonged to the Socialist Party. While announcing for economic and labor reforms during his campaign, he shifted course after 1 year in office and embraced pro-business policies. This was due to the increased levels of unemployment and the series of terrorist attacks that affected his popularity and increased anti-immigrants' sentiments. The destruction of the Calais camp took place during his presidency, the initial decision to relocate 24,000 refugees from Italy and Greece was never realized, and the EU's suggestion of a permanent quota system was rejected (Brochet, 2015). These restrictive immigration policies, unexpected from a socialist party and a socialist president, resonate with the negative public opinion explained above.

The review of the parliamentary sessions indicated that migration issues were rarely present in the parliamentary debates and discussions of 2013 and 2014 and were only comprehensively discussed in the framework of law no. 925 on Asylum Reforms which was introduced in December 2014. As with the case of the media, this is surprising given that France hosts large numbers of immigrants. It is also surprising because migration issues are assumed much importance during political campaigns in France by most political parties. The far right in France constantly links immigration to France's social and economic problems. As such, it was expected that more attention would be given to migration issues in the policy arena.

France adopted Law no. 925 on Asylum Reforms in July 2015. The new law incorporated both the EU asylum and reception directives focusing on improving the asylum process and reception conditions. The law also introduced measures like accelerating the asylum process and introduced a compulsory accommodation system for asylum seekers across the entire country to avoid regional concentrations. Moreover, the new law allowed asylum seekers to access the labor market 9 months after lodging the application. In addition to law 925, decree no. 2014–301 of March 2014 also modified the Code on the Entry and Residence of Foreigners and the Right to Asylum by extending the right of long-term residence to those who are granted refugee status as well as subsidiary protection.

The first reading of Law no. 925 took place in the National Assembly on December 9, 2014. Examining a bill during the plenary session of the National Assembly or Senate takes place over two phases: a general review phase and a detailed review phase. During the general review phase of the first reading of Law no. 925, the minister of interior presented the bill. Following this presentation, the rapporteurs of the four committees, to which the bill was transferred, commented on the bill and provided their recommendations. The debate during both the general review phase and detailed phase was between the rapporteurs and the government on one hand and the opposition on the other hand. The government represented by the Socialist Party (PS), presented the bill as an attempt to improve the reception of refugees and contribute to the responsibility sharing for the refugee problem facing Europe. For its part, the major opposition party, Union for a Popular Movement (UMP), thought the bill was too liberal and called for rejecting it. When the request was voted against, the UPM requested to transfer the bill to a committee, a request that was also voted against. The UMP opposed the following suggestions: shortening the asylum process, facilitating access to the labor market, and the right for longterm residence. The rationale presented by the UPM was that these provisions would encourage more immigrants. The UMP also believed that the asylum channel was being abused with the proof being that asylum applications are increasing but the number of asylum seekers accepted as refugees is decreasing. The UPM believed that more restrictive measures were needed and criticized the bill for not including a strategy to combat irregular migration and/or deportation of rejected asylum seekers. The response of the government to these criticisms was that the bill was only concerned with asylum issues and not immigration issues. Combating irregular migration and deportation, the government argued, should be covered by a legislation concerning immigration. The government also stressed that the number of asylum applications in France is not comparable to other European countries, like Germany and Sweden.

When comparing the issues debated in the parliament to the newspapers' coverage, differences were observed. As explained, the newspaper articles rarely discussed issues concerning immigrants' integration or refugees' reception facilities. The policy debate, however, tackled issues related to immigrants in France, including reception facilities in the country and shortening the asylum process. During the policy debate, the opposition highlighted the security implications of the crisis as well as the misuse of the asylum channel, two issues that were sometimes highlighted by the media. However, unlike the media, the humanitarian dimension of the crisis that was highlighted by some newspaper articles were absent from the policy debate.

The analysis of the newspaper articles and public opinion surveys indicated that both acknowledge the seriousness of the issue of migration, the right of people to seek asylum, and the responsibility of Europe to help. At the same time, both the media and the public agree with tightening border control to curb further inflow of immigrants for security, cultural and economic reasons. The new asylum legislation reflects this attitude of the media and the public. The new legislation includes provisions to facilitate the integration of immigrants and refugees and improve reception conditions and access to the labor market. However, at the same time it includes provisions that restrict further entry to France.

#### 8.5 Conclusion

Aiming to contribute to the discussion concerning the relationship of media and public opinion to migration policies in the Mediterranean region, this chapter reviewed newspapers' coverage, public opinion surveys as well as the parliamentary debates in France between 2013–2016 which signified the peak of irregular migratory movement to Europe from outside the continent. The review indicated that the policy debate as well as the legislation adopted were concurrent with the media and public opinion.

The analysis of the parliamentary minutes indicates that migration- related issues were only thoroughly discussed with the introduction of the new law in December 2014. The lack of discussion of migration related issues before 2014 echoes the low coverage of migration related issues in the media. As highlighted in the section concerning the analysis of newspapers, out of 600 Friday issues, only 299 articles dealt with the increased irregular movement labeled as 'Europe's refugee crisis.'

Migration issues were only debated in the framework of the new law. The debate which was between the Socialist government and the opposition represented by the UMP focused on problematizing the increased irregular crossings, the misuse of the asylum channel, and the humanitarian consideration of the increased movements and deaths at sea. These represent the same issues that the media and public focused on.

The review of public opinion surveys indicated that perception towards immigrants differed according to whether they are immigrants from within the EU or outside the EU. As highlighted earlier, with the exception of Sweden, the majority (over 50%) of EU citizens across all other EU countries, including Northern Mediterranean countries, perceived immigration from outside the EU negatively. The period that this research covered signifies the period that witnessed the highest irregular movements from the Southern shore of the Mediterranean to the Northern shore. Public opinion, as the chapter highlighted, during this period indicated an unwelcoming attitude towards refugees from the South, a belief that many among them are abusing the asylum channel, a conviction that the increased terrorist threats is correlated with the refugee influx, and an assumption that Islam and Western societies are incompatible with one another. As such, the importance of analyzing the perception of the media and public opinion during this period is that this period could represent a shift towards a more radical opinion on migration.

This perception of immigrants from Southern Mediterranean countries as the 'Other' and the associated policies that encourage the free movement of goods and capitals but not labor is a reflection of the asymmetrical power relations between the two shores of the Mediterranean. Throughout the colonialization era, countries of the Middle East and North Africa were transformed into suppliers of raw material for the European colonial powers (Tramontana, 2018). And after World War II, the 'Guest worker' model of labor recruitment represented a continuation of such asymmetrical relationship where the workers were recruited on temporary basis and isolated from the local population. This chapter explained the social problems associated with the way the 'Guest worker' program was implemented in France and the tension it created between the local population and immigrants.

The social and cultural tension that emerged as a result of the implementation of the guest worker program is currently shaping the French' public perception of immigrants from Southern Mediterranean countries. As this chapter demonstrated, the survey in France indicated that the current perception of immigrants is directly linked to past experience. The chapter also highlighted the correlation between public opinion and immigration/asylum policies. Realizing that the former is affected by the collective memory of migration pinpoints to the importance of approaching migration in the Mediterranean from a historical perspective.

#### References


Maysa Ayoub is the Associate Director of the Center for Migration and Refugee Studies at the American University in Cairo. She has over 15 years of research and teaching experiences in the field of migration and refugee studies. She researched and published in the field on issues related to asylum policies, livelihoods of refugees, and public opinion and media attitude towards refugees and immigrants. Her PhD in Political Science (Euro-Mediterranean program) is from the faculty of Economics and Political Science of Cairo University and her MA in Sociology is from the American University in Cairo.

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# Chapter 9 Gendered Asylum in the Black Mediterranean: Two Nigerian Women's Experiences of Reception in Italy

Eleanor Paynter

# 9.1 Introduction: Race and Gender in Central Mediterranean Border Spectacle

In the last decade, increased sea crossings to Europe by people from multiple regions and with varied backgrounds have positioned the Mediterranean as a key site for global debates about migrant deservingness—who merits asylum and other forms of legal and social recognition in Europe. This chapter contributes to the growing recognition that these debates are both racialized and gendered. Women consistently comprise less than 15% of people crossing the Central Mediterranean, yet their representation in or erasure from media and popular accounts of precarious migration influences public notions of deservingness in critical ways. For instance, Nigerian women are alternately featured in narratives of vulnerability or presumed criminality, in particular through their sexualization in relation to accounts of trafficking (Lynes, 2020).

These dynamics became especially salient during Europe's recent so-called "refugee crisis." Following increased arrivals in 2014, popular and political attention focused on the distinction between refugees and economic migrants. The hyperfocus on surveillance and death at sea underscored this dichotomy as corresponding to legitimate need (refugees) and manipulation (economic migrants). This border spectacle fed a culture of suspicion towards Black migrants, whom popular discourses generally presume to be economic migrants and undeserving of protection (De Genova, 2018). As I have argued elsewhere, these narratives effectively racialize asylum, as Black African journeys are seen with less empathy, often framed in terms of a perceived threat to Italian security and ways of life (Paynter, 2022).

E. Paynter (✉)

Department of Italian Studies and the Cogut Institute for the Humanities, Brown University, Providence, RI, USA e-mail: eleanor\_paynter@brown.edu

Within a context so focused on spectacle, women's experiences are especially invisibilized: in discursive terms, media and political narratives generally don't attend to gender and feature women only periodically, in ways that reiterate the extreme stereotypes of vulnerable victimhood or sexualized criminality. In spatial terms, in large migrant reception centers throughout the country where migrants live while awaiting a decision on their claims for asylum or other forms of humanitarian protection, women's presence is less marked, or differently marked – a point I take up directly.

Stereotypes about migrant identities shape not only the crucial rights issues that arise with regards to sea crossing, rescue, and detention, but also the post-arrival reception period. This chapter posits reception as a critical site of negotiation of notions of deservingness and a space where racialized and gendered ideas of migration shape how newcomers spend their time and plan for the future. Drawing on ethnographic research I conducted in reception centers called CAS in Central and Southern Italy in 2017, 2018, and 2019, I advocate for an intersectional approach to the study of Mediterranean migration, engaging intersectionality, a concept developed by Black feminists (Crenshaw, 1989), to understand migrant reception as a racialized, gendered set of processes. As migration scholars increasingly recognize, "gender aggravates established racial divides in which immigrants are classified the moment they arrive" (Grosfoguel et al., 2015, p. 644).1 Focusing on oral history interviews I conducted with two Nigerian cisgender women in a CAS (Centro di Accoglienza Straordinaria, or Center for Extraordinary Reception) in the Southern region of Molise, I reflect on how the women's awareness of multiple assumptions about their past, present, and future by locals, center staff and residents, and relatives abroad affect how they position themselves in relation to different actors and how they access particular spaces while awaiting a decision on their claims for protection.<sup>2</sup>

I situate these two cases within the Black Mediterranean, an analytical framework and political praxis that understands Europe's violent border regimes in relation to histories of racial capitalism that have long shaped mobilities and notions of otherness across the Mediterranean region (Proglio et al., 2021). In Italy, Nigerian women who arrive by sea are often survivors of sex trafficking (European Asylum Support Office, 2021, pp. 30–31). Yet their association with sex traffickers, including the Nigerian madam to whom they report, is rarely a straightforward victimperpetrator relationship (Baye & Heumann, 2014; Belloni et al., 2018, p. 231; Campana, 2016, p. 4; Esposito et al., 2016; Giordano, 2008). My discussion of two migrants' narratives extends recognition of women's agency in precarious migration and trafficking to the reception period, where women present their

<sup>1</sup> While this chapter focuses on questions of race and gender, as well as religion, class also certainly plays a role, including in terms of financing the journey and what newcomers can access once they arrive (Giansanti et al., 2022, p. 14). 2 From here on I use "women" and focus on the experiences of cisgender women. Trafficking is not

limited to cis women, however. On the challenges that transgender people confront, and on gender, trafficking, and asylum more broadly, see McKinnon, 2016; Newman-Granger, 2021.

experiences in terms of a series of choices and challenges. I call these challenges "invisible obstacles": unlike the explicit legal issues or questions of location that overtly affect people's experiences, the stereotypes that many migrants confront operate as unseen and sometimes unspoken challenges – a series of assumptions made inside and outside the reception center about migrants' identities, past experiences, and motivations. Migrants' awareness of these invisible obstacles, I argue, shapes how they navigate the reception period. The two cases I discuss here suggest that, no matter their actual connection with traffickers, Nigerian women in Italian reception centers confront invisible obstacles related to widespread assumptions that they are sex workers. Their experiences illustrate how, in the Mediterranean, "Blackness is connected to the symbolic and discursive instruments of a captive society, in addition to the physical instruments used to control Black people" (Proglio et al., 2021, p. 14).

This chapter also recognizes the post-arrival reception period as one of active, rather than passive waiting. While residents await legal decisions and adjust to life in Italy, they also navigate invisible obstacles. Recognizing reception as an active time helps counter the pervasive erasure of women's agency in popular narratives (Belloni et al., 2018, p. 231). Women who remain mostly in their rooms, for example, may appear to be passively waiting. On the contrary, accounting for invisible obstacles reveals reception to be a time of ongoing reflection and careful decision-making.3 What outwardly appears passive involves a great deal of strategy and care. Understanding the activity of this time reveals how the racialization and gendering of migration discourses shape women's day-to-day experiences. The two interviews I discuss here are illustrative, rather than generalizable; that is, they demonstrate multiple ways in which invisible obstacles shape experiences of reception. Moreover, these narratives speak to the heterogeneity of experiences for African women recently arrived in Italy and, more broadly, to the significance of intersectional approaches to the study of Mediterranean migration.

The chapter proceeds as follows: First I present an overview of Mediterranean migration to Italy and trends in Nigeria-Italy migration, focusing on gendered migration and racialized tropes in the context of the Black Mediterranean. After outlining Italy's contemporary migrant reception context, I discuss key themes that emerged in the very different narratives shared with me by two women, following the approaches of oral history and linguistic anthropological narrative analysis (Baird, 2012; Labov & Waletzky, 1997; Shuman & Bohmer, 2004). These interviews were among 39 I conducted between 2017 and 2019 with staff, volunteers, and residents of Italian reception and work sites, for the larger project of which they are part, following the ethical guidelines of the Oral History Association (Principles and Best Practices, n.d.). Throughout the chapter, I avoid referring to trafficking and sex work in ways that criminalize people's movements and erase individual agency. In line with feminist scholarship (Pinelli, 2021; Rigo, 2017), I understand trafficking

<sup>3</sup> My understanding of waiting as an active process is informed by the work of Shahram Khosravi, e.g. in Jacobsen et al., 2021.

as a complex transnational network of relations, and I prioritize using the language offered by the women whose narratives inform this study. To that end, I have edited interviews minimally for clarity; both narrators opted to conduct interviews in English, a primary language for both women.

#### 9.2 Nigeria-Italy Migration and the Black Mediterranean

While news stories occasionally feature a rescued woman or young mother who survived the crossing, most images of Central Mediterranean migration focus on crowds of men. Given popular associations in Europe of young Black border crossers as economic migrants, these images often implicitly affirm pervasive ideas that those reaching Italian shores are undeserving of protection or residency. These representations become further complicated in the context of trafficking. In the limited public and media discourse focused on sex trafficking, "victims" are often sexualized, simultaneously occupying positions of helplessness and threat or problem in the public imagination (Ifekwunigwe, 2004; Ponzanesi, 2017). Some media coverage of women migrants has sparked sympathy, for instance when Italy held a state funeral for 26 Nigerian women who drowned in November 2017 (Lynes, 2020). Yet the general mistrust of Black migrants has bolstered stereotypes about Black African women as prostitutes, and therefore dangerous and undesirable foreigners.

In this context, women's migration, which consistently comprises less than 10–15% of sea arrivals to Italy, appears as an exception to the norm. Yet in terms of sheer numbers, during the "crisis" following 2014, women crossed at higher rates than previously. For instance, between 2013 and 2014, as arrivals to Italy increased fourfold, the number of women crossing more than doubled, from 7658 to more than 16,800 ("More Women," 2014).4 Arrivals of Nigerian women increased more than sevenfold between 2014 (1454) and 2016 (11,099) (IOM, 2017).

Gendered representations of sea crossing also de-emphasize the longer history of women migrating to Italy. Women's mobilities shaped the country's 1980s transition from one of primarily out-migration to a migrant destination, especially through the arrival of domestic workers including badanti – nannies and caregivers (Angel-Ajani, 2000, p. 335; Olivito, 2017, p. 45). Nigeria–Italy migration is one of the oldest trends in this period and has long been associated with trafficking, through both survivor advocacy and popular stereotypes about African women.

Today's sea crossings should be understood in terms of their continuity within this longer history, rather than as a rupture of norms, as crisis rhetoric suggests. By the 1990s, Africans comprised at least one third of Italy's foreign residents, with a majority from West and North African countries. While precise numbers are difficult

<sup>4</sup> In the post-2014 period, youth have generally comprised up to 20% of those crossing, and men 60–70% (UNHCR, 2021).

to ascertain, scholars maintain that in the 1990s, most West African women arrived with visas, often as domestic workers (Angel-Ajani, 2000, p. 335). Today's arrivals underscore the extent to which, over the last two decades, often in the name of security, Italy and the EU have tightened immigration laws and bordering mechanisms to such a degree that crossing the sea and entering the reception (accoglienza) system is now one of the only feasible means of reaching Europe.

In the case of Nigeria–Italy migration, sex trafficking networks have long facilitated these mobilities and have adapted to shifting border and immigration policies. According to IOM, up to 80% of Nigerian women and girls crossing the sea to Italy may be "sex trafficking victims" (IOM, 2017). Women may initially take up sex work by force or by choice, to pay off debts to the people who arranged their travel. Since 1998, Italy has recognized temporary, renewable protection for "social reasons," applied in cases of suspected or declared human trafficking (Decreto Legislativo 25 Luglio 1998, 1998). Yet people who might seek protection via the 1998 decree sometimes opt not to do so. The decree stipulates that claimants must enter a state-funded program, often run by nuns, oriented around rehabilitating "victims of human trafficking." They also must file criminal charges against their traffickers (Giordano, 2008, p. 588). Survivors often fear consequences from traffickers themselves, especially given the thousands of euros they likely owe for their journey, and because in many cases they have sworn an oath to traffickers. Applying for protection via the 1998 law positions these border crossers to obtain what Cristiana Giordano terms "confessional citizenship," that is, legal recognition that depends on (often) women initiating their relationship with Italian society through criminal proceedings, while also conforming to the views of good behavior emphasized in rehabilitation programs (Giordano, 2008, p. 589). In informal interviews I conducted in Italy's Molise region, CAS operators and cultural mediators told me they knew women who had refused the offer to enroll in rehabilitation, even if it promised a stronger likelihood of obtaining protection, because they did not trust a system that would single them out in such a way. According to these staff, the women – including those I interviewed – felt that staying in the CAS offered the safety of a kind of anonymity, blending into a larger group of asylum seekers.<sup>5</sup>

A Black Mediterranean lens prompts us to recognize how the invisible obstacles that women nonetheless confront in reception highlight how colonial notions of race and sexuality in Italy inform the present-day treatment of foreigners. The seeming anonymity of the CAS doesn't protect migrants from racist discourses or stereotypes targeting Black women. Stereotypes about Nigerian women conflate the categories of trafficking and sex work, problematically positioning migrants as simultaneously victims and criminals, without regard for individual agency (Giordano, 2008; Pinelli, 2021, p. 18). In this way, they perpetuate the sexualization of African women in Italy, continuing a tradition traceable to the colonial racial logics that labeled the

<sup>5</sup> Women in larger cities may find support through NGOs and activist organizations as they determine which legal route to pursue. Organizations like Donne di Benin City (Women of Benin City) in Palermo support women's integration into life in Italy as they exit sex trafficking networks.

bodies of colonized women as "dangerous" (Carter, 1997, p. 187). Migrant women are seen to pose dangers "to the stability of the Italian family," with African women seen to pose a particular danger, through their eroticization (Cariello, 2021, p. 167). Italy's well-documented lack of reckoning with its colonial history and the entanglements of colonialism, contemporary migration, and racism (Lombardi-Diop & Romeo, 2012) enable these notions to continue to circulate relatively unquestioned in public consciousness, rendering the Black Mediterranean a site where colonialism's longue durée shapes lives through widespread disregard for its influence (Lombardi-Diop, 2021, p. 3).6 Nigerian women in Italy's reception system at the height of the recent "crisis" thus navigated a complex web of stereotypes as they awaited an asylum decision and sought to establish independent lives in Europe.

#### 9.3 The Italian Reception System and the CAS in Molise

The narratives I discuss here are taken from oral history interviews I conducted in English in May 2018 at a CAS (Center for Extraordinary Reception) in a city in the Southern Italian region of Molise, where I carried out ethnographic research including observations and interviews over multiple visits in 2017–2019.

CAS are locally-managed, state-funded centers often established in repurposed buildings, including former hotels, schools, and gyms. While Italy manages multiple center types, during the period covered here, a majority of newcomers were sent to CAS after completing prima accoglienza, or the first-stage reception that includes identification upon arrival (Che cosa sono i CAS, 2021). The staff-to-resident ratio is much higher in the CAS than in reception models that predate the "crisis," and the support CAS offer residents varies significantly, beyond the required basic legal, mental health, and language course access. Some CAS offer cultural programming and job training; others operate with minimal resources; and some management teams have been indicted for corruption. In addition, as my interviews in Molise suggested, center residents often view staff as their only reliable contact with authorities and local communities, and as such, they are cautious about what they confide in them.

While observing Italian language classes offered at the CAS, I was struck by the near-total absence of women students. They rarely joined the classes, which were offered six days per week but not required. Given that women comprised only 10% of all those crossing the sea to Italy in 2018 (men 72%; youth 18%), I would not have expected a significant turnout, but the lack of women students was noticeable enough that I asked about it to male students, teachers, and center staff—also male. Their explanations ranged from women's presumed lack of interest in learning

<sup>6</sup> This is not to discount the numerous critical efforts by organizations and activists, but to recognize that dominant cultural narratives still cling to fascist-era songs about Black women, and sexualized language about the Black body still appears in mainstream cinema and television.

Italian, to assumptions that women were out working or searching for work. While no one cited sex work in connection with specific residents, staff mentioned trafficking as a general concern. Exchanges I observed between women and male residents and staff included some innuendo, including teasing women as they entered and exited the CAS.

While class attendance fluctuated daily, the absence of women made me wonder what factors influenced their decision to attend and, more generally, how experiences in the CAS differed for women. I met Joy and Samanta (pseudonyms), both in their early twenties, while observing Italian classes, which took place at one end of the CAS cafeteria. Joy, a Christian woman from Edo State in Nigeria, often passed by the class while cleaning the center's communal spaces. Samanta, a Muslim woman from Lagos, attended the class once during my May 2018 visit, and I wondered why she hadn't returned.

Their narratives illustrate how women in reception confront invisible obstacles, which manifest through how they use the center space and interact with others both there and, at a distance, in Nigeria. These accounts also evidence women's strategic agency across what is in fact a heterogeneous set of experiences shaping Central Mediterranean migration. In the following section, I discuss Joy and Samanta's narratives thematically, moving from the journey to Italy, to their experiences of reception.

#### 9.3.1 The Journey

Samanta and Joy both navigated multiple challenges in Nigeria and in Libya, before fleeing unsafe and precarious conditions in Libya and crossing the sea to Italy. Though the women position themselves differently in relation to sex work and victimhood, both describe reaching Italy through deliberate decision-making. Through different accounts about how these journeys took shape, both women underscore Italy as a site of freedom.

#### Samanta

At the time of our interview, Samanta was pregnant with her second child; her boyfriend, the baby's father, was another CAS resident she met after her arrival. Reaching Italy was not initially in her plans, but she recognized it as an opportunity and was careful in her use of space and time so as not to lose the freedom it represented for her.

In Nigeria, Samanta's ex-boyfriend's family took their daughter and kicked her out of their home. While struggling to survive on her own, she met a man who ostensibly hired her, along with three other women, as housekeepers in his home, but the situation was not what he promised. Samanta said that after a few days he told the women, "It's not here [you're] going to work. I said where; he said Europe." Samanta pleaded with him, understanding the journey could be dangerous.

Samanta described the forced journey as a violent experience, including sexual abuse by "the man" and, later, in Libyan detention centers. Held captive there by traffickers, she escaped by sneaking onto a boat she had heard would soon depart for Italy.

Samanta: I thank God as the man['s] number I don't have, the woman I was gonna meet [in Europe] I don't have, so I thank God that I'm free. I don't have anybody that I want to go and meet. It's God who helped me [evade] them because he know what I passed where I suffered and lost so I don't – I'm just thanking God every day... .

Samanta recognizes the reception center as a site of freedom: like other center residents, she is an asylum seeker, awaiting a decision on her case. Unable to contact the madam she was supposed to connect with once in Italy, or the man who arranged her travel out of Nigeria, she views herself as free from the life they represented – one likely defined by debt and forced labor. She has lost "the man['s] number" and the number of "the woman I was gonna meet... so I thank God that I'm free." But as we will see, she also recognizes this freedom as conditional.

#### Joy

Like Samanta, Joy initially traveled from Nigeria to Libya in connection with sex work and eventually crossed from there to Italy. Unlike Samanta, who described being trafficked against her will, Joy was recruited into sex work at her school, where:

One day a lady came to my school who was like, I'm going to Italy. I'm looking for somebody else to go with me for prostitution. I was like, huh, this kind of condition – then I'm still very young... Then I was 20. And I was like, prostitution. [She said] I'm looking for some girls to come here for prostitution. I was like, ah, my mother is suffering. My siblings. I'm not the first. I'm the [younger of several children]. So I was like, I have to help my parents. This is not the house we are meant to sleep in. So I tell her I will go.

While Joy initially chose to work for the madam and travel to Italy to become "a prostitute," her story exemplifies the additional risks that people undertake, including her kidnapping en route and subsequent captivity in Libya:

There's a place they call Atlantis if you are coming from Nigeria. We got there and that place is very, very – it's not safe. The people there are somehow bad, wicked, so they kidnapped us. Kidnapped even the woman that was bringing us, they kidnapped all of us, and they took us to different locations.

Joy's kidnappers separated her from the woman who initially contracted her and took her to a "ghetto" she described as run by Gambian men who forced her into sex work. Joy protested conditions in the ghetto and negotiated her way into a safer position, becoming the girlfriend of the ghetto boss. But, unable to support her family in Nigeria, she continued to think about reaching Europe. Finally, her boyfriend insisted she go.

#### 9.3.2 Negotiating Stereotypes and Physical Spaces

Despite their different journeys, both women understood Italian reception as a site of freedom, disconnected from trafficking networks. Yet this was conditional freedom – not the confessional citizenship Giordano describes in the cases of women joining rehabilitation programs, but nonetheless dependent on a series of factors (Giordano, 2008, p. 589). Neither woman remained in touch with her trafficking contacts, but their experiences in reception were still shaped by multiple invisible obstacles that emerged through stereotypes and associations of Nigerian women with sex work.

In particular, both women were careful about where they spent time. As Samanta explained:

Samanta: I thank God for all the things you do in my life because since when I leave Nigeria also I've been thanking God I don't have any problem with anybody, I don't travel. I don't go anywhere. If I leave... I'm playing in the [city] garden. You know the garden?

Me: Yes, the villa comunale [municipal park].

Samanta: In front of comune [city hall]. I would just sit down there, be looking at those Italian children playing. After that I will leave there, I'll come back [to the reception center]... I don't know any place other than that."

While Samanta considers herself free from trafficking debt, she recognizes that her experience in the CAS, during the limbo of reception, remains shaped by pervasive stereotypes about Nigerian women in Italy. Specifically, Samanta remains selfconscious of how locals, center residents, and me as an interviewer and observer may perceive her presence and movements in different spaces. In emphasizing that the only place she frequents outside the reception center is the public park, she portrays her own movements in relation to the site where local children play. Samanta marks the normalcy of this scene by underscoring the villa comunale as the only place she knows beyond the reception center.

Samanta's concern that people viewed her movements about town with suspicion aligned with what I heard in informal exchanges with locals: people regularly remarked with surprise at the presence of migrants in the local mall, for example, or in the city center more generally, as if migrants had no reason to frequent these places. Yet moving within these spaces of local city life was also, for many, an attempt at building a life of their own there, potentially practicing the language and observing local culture. Moreover, in the heat of summer, locals and migrants alike took advantage of the mall's air-conditioned corridors.

Yet both Samanta and Joy confirmed my observation that many women staying in the CAS kept to themselves, explaining that they did not want CAS staff and residents to have any reason to suspect them of problematic behavior.

Joy: Most of them don't like coming out. Because in this place, there are some rules that if you come out of the camp, you don't always stay inside [meaning you might sleep elsewhere]. If you don't always stay inside that means you go out for prostitution. So we're the guests, we're like, okay, we don't want to be a problem. We want our documents, so we have to stay in the room. So that the people working [at the CAS] will not think we are doing prostitution. [So we] sleep, stay in your room, eat your food come out, take food. Go back to your room.

Samanta made similar observations:

Samanta: [Since September] I was in this place, in [my] room, but I'm okay with it and with the girls I'm living with, I'm okay with this. You understand. So there is no problem... Focus on what I came here to do. And it's time just to go to school. Come back. So I will stay in my room...

I don't do the business... They always said girls in [this reception center] they are not good. They are doing this, they are doing that. But I said, I'm proud of myself. Because there is no boy that can say, Okay, this girl, I've seen her finished, I've done everything to her – Alhamdulillah. [I] just enter my room. Maybe it's time for prayer. Go to prayer. Come back.

The women's concerns that people would assume they were "doing the business" mark invisible obstacles that affected their use of space, as well as their relationships locally and across borders. For Samanta, staying in touch with her daughter in Nigeria was especially difficult, due not to distance, but to assumptions people made about her in Nigeria. Specifically, her ex-partner's family assumed Samanta had gone to Europe to become a sex worker and prohibited communications between Samanta and her daughter:

Before I used to talk to her [my daughter]. When I [first] come here, I talked to them. But after if I call this father he says his mother don't want me to talk to [the daughter]... Because they said any girls that go to EU, you understand they went to go and do – prostitute. I said, God forbid, what you know the kind of person I am? Even if you told my parents they are going to tell you, 'I know the kind of daughter I have. And I give birth to. So. That is it. I'm proud of my daughter.'

Samanta appeals to her own reputation in and relationship with her own immediate family. She is a daughter to be proud of, a good daughter and a good woman.

The subjects of sex trafficking and sex work shape these interviews, despite being named in mostly oblique ways. Both narrators used euphemisms for sex work. Samanta said, "I don't do the business." Joy explained that she knew she was hired for "prostitution" but then generally talked around the subjects of sex trafficking and sex work. Samanta, too, used the word "prostitute" only once. The silent presence of trafficking and sex work in these exchanges linguistically mirrors the ways the women must carefully navigate the physical and social spaces of reception and the local community, tiptoeing around assumptions they both know and fear people will make about them, so as not to appear as dangerous, or undeserving of protection and residency in Italy.

#### 9.3.3 Deservingness and Agency

Migrant "deservingness" often refers to popular and politicized narratives about who merits legal protection (Abdelaaty & Hamlin, 2022; Zetter, 2007). Joy and Samanta's accounts of their journeys and navigation of reception suggest another reading of deservingness, in addition to legal status: that of being regarded without suspicion, as a potential resident of Italy or at least not as a deviant migrant. Here the women's agency in responding to racialized and gendered stereotypes and racist remarks about their presence in Italy includes their navigation of invisible obstacles: decisions about which spaces to frequent, how to advocate for their own safety and well-being, and how to position themselves in relation to notions of "good" versus "dangerous" behavior.

For Samanta, her deservingness of protection and of being treated without suspicion concerns how she reached Libya and the fact that she had to flee Libya for safety. Unlike Joy, she did not know the nature of the work she would be forced to do, nor did she anticipate that the man who arranged her travel to Libya would abandon her there with traffickers. She also cites her faith to describe how she resisted her captivity and forced labor:

I'm a Muslim. I can never do this thing. My religion don't tolerate nonsense like this. He said if I go out [leave the house where the man was holding several women] it's a problem for me so I should just follow. I said, okay. I don't have any choice. So do it. After doing it. I said okay. No problem but I know I – my faith is with God. And I know there's nothing that is not possible in front of Allah.

Samanta also described reciting prayers. She positions herself as a Muslim woman, countering potential suspicion about her character through references to her virtue as a good woman and a good Muslim.

Joy's employment as cleaning staff for the center kept her from attending language classes but offered a small salary. She described her time in reception in largely positive ways; she was able to earn money and was on good terms with CAS staff, whom she trusted. Joy's employment at the CAS is another example of how she exercised agency despite stereotypes, and how she recognized deservingness through the right to be treated without suspicion. By law, CAS residents can work part-time, but there are strict limits on hours and wages. Finding contracted work can be especially difficult for those without legal papers and, in particular, for Black migrants. Joy was determined to find employment:

Joy: When I [arrive], I was talking to the main boss [CAS manager]: please, I need work. [He] was like, No, it's not possible. So I have to go and look for work outside [the CAS] myself. I go to a carwash... and I started working there. Yes, I worked there for two weeks. [The CAS manager] came. '[Joy], this work is for boys not for you. You have to leave this work... I'll give you a job.' That's how I got this job.

Me: Can I ask how much they pay?

Joy: Yes. 350. 350. A month, okay. And I'm very okay with that. Because I'm a refugee. Even if he gives me a hundred, I don't mind I will take it because I'm not a citizen of this country... I'm very grateful because they are so kind. I don't know, people are so kind like this [I didn't know people were so kind like this.]

Joy positions herself as a grateful refugee, but not a helpless victim; she simultaneously underscores her own agency in reaching Italy and establishing a life there.

In addition to language classes, beginning in 2018, students could attend a school for adults (CPIA), earn an Italian middle school diploma, and potentially, meet locals. CPIA classes were an opportunity for the women to leave the CAS without concern about stereotypes related to their whereabouts. Yet it was also one of the places where they perceived stereotypes that circulated about them more broadly, especially in a period marked by the rise of right-wing politicians elected on anti-immigrant platforms. Joy described standing up to racist comments from Italian classmates.

Joy: [Some of the Italian students] were saying Africans came here to give us sickness. They steal our money... They use more smartphone than us. They steal our husbands, they steal our wives, and they give them thirty-five euros in the camp.

Once again, Joy chose to respond directly:

And I stood up I say why are you saying this? It's not true! There was arguments that day. It's true! It's not true, it's true, it's not true! Don't say that. If that is what you hear from other people, you need to call an African person and listen or hear from the person. They were like arguing, yes, [he posted] you give us sickness, you steal our husbands, and I told them, it's not true.

Joy's caution about her presence in public and communal spaces was not passive; she readily advocated for herself, as exemplified in these exchanges.

For both Samanta and Joy, the CAS staff are exceptions to the standard, everyday racism and xenophobia the women encounter in the city and in their travels within Italy.

Joy: Most of [the Italian locals in the class] believe. Most of [the CAS staff] don't believe. I know somebody like [the CAS manager] don't believe. People that work here don't believe [those lies]. Because if they believe they will not come here and work with us. Because if they believe we give them sickness, they can't stay here.

Joy underscores that CAS staff differ in their behavior and beliefs from locals. Unlike local men who told Joy, "I hate Africa," CAS staff "are very good." Joy remarked that the language teacher "even eats my food if I cook. [The other CAS staff], they eat. They are very good. They don't behave strange. They take you as one."

Through gestures such as sharing food, Joy and Samanta both viewed the CAS staff as trustworthy. It was important to the women not to behave in ways that CAS staff might view as questionable, and this shaped their use of space within the CAS. In other words, they understood performances and perceptions of deservingness as directly related to maintaining trust with staff.

#### 9.3.4 Conclusion

My interviews with Joy and Samanta took place soon after right-wing politician Matteo Salvini became Italy's interior minister, a position he would use to close Italian ports to rescue ships and limit asylum applications within the country. The racist, gendered attitudes these women perceived in interactions with locals were amplified in national dynamics. As anti-immigrant discourse and physical attacks on people of color have increased in Italy and across Europe (Office of the High Commissioner, 2019), it remains crucial to understand how discursive and material violence shapes the lives of migrants overtly and through invisible obstacles they must anticipate, respond to, or avoid.

Beyond legal processes, the reception period is understood to be one of adaptation to Italian culture – a time when residents learn the language and how to handle various aspects of Italian life, from obtaining employment and housing, to understanding cultural customs. Joy and Samanta's narratives illustrate that these processes are neither straightforward nor guaranteed, but require that CAS residents navigate the anxieties of waiting, as well as racialized and gendered stereotypes and potential discrimination. These dynamics are especially fraught for Black African women who are alternately sexualized and viewed as victims, and who weigh the need to find work, learn the language, and build networks, with social pressures to remain relatively invisible.

A focus on invisible obstacles in reception thus offers important perspectives on Black women's navigation of reception and underscores the relevance of Black Mediterranean perspectives for understanding today's precarious mobilities within longer histories of discrimination and exploitation. Intersectional approaches to the study of Mediterranean migration reveal reception as a set of heterogeneous experiences and as a critical site for understanding how longstanding stereotypes about foreignness, race, and gender shape the lives of newcomers awaiting status determination. Reception is a site upon which colonial notions of otherness act, yet for center residents, it remains also a time of negotiation and active decision-making. By demonstrating how race and gender – as well as religion – shape Joy and Samanta's self-positioning and decision-making, this chapter highlights the need for intersectional study of reception, to enable deeper understandings of migration in Italy that do not rely on homogenized or generalized notions based on gender or race. In this context, the Mediterranean also figures as a critical site for understanding migration in intersectional terms.

Acknowledgements This research was supported by grants from Ohio State University's Mershon Center for International Security Studies, Office of International Affairs, and an Alumni Grant. Thanks to Gabriella Soto and Ibrahim Awad for feedback on earlier drafts.

#### References


Eleanor Paynter is Mellon Postdoctoral Fellow in Italian Studies and at the Cogut Institute for the Humanities at Brown University. She recently served as Postdoctoral Associate in Migrations with Cornell University's Mario Einaudi Center for International Studies and holds a PhD in Comparative Studies from the Ohio State University. Her research engages narrative and ethnographic methods to study asylum, testimony, and migrant rights in the Mediterranean. She focuses on African migration to Europe via Italy and how migration shapes and reveals a (post)colonial Europe. Her academic work has appeared in journals including the Journal of Immigrant and Refugee Studies and Migration and Society, and she has also written for Forced Migration Review and venues including The New Humanitarian and the LA Review of Books.

Website: http://eleanorbpaynter.net/research/

Open Access This chapter is licensed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits use, sharing, adaptation, distribution and reproduction in any medium or format, as long as you give appropriate credit to the original author(s) and the source, provide a link to the Creative Commons license and indicate if changes were made.

The images or other third party material in this chapter are included in the chapter's Creative Commons license, unless indicated otherwise in a credit line to the material. If material is not included in the chapter's Creative Commons license and your intended use is not permitted by statutory regulation or exceeds the permitted use, you will need to obtain permission directly from the copyright holder.

# Chapter 10 Activists Escaping Lebanon: Disruption, Burnout, and Disengagement

Carmen Geha

# 10.1 Introduction

This chapter captures an era in which the world is experiencing a mass wave of forced migration; (Europe's biggest since World War II) following the largest flow of refugees from the Middle East also since World War II. Refugees from Syria have been escaping mass atrocities for over a decade now as millions of Ukrainians begin to flee from the Russian invasion. In this moment of time, data is missing on the longitudinal impact of forced displacement from both the Middle East and Europe. One day we will, and for that purpose it is important to capture moments in the experiences of migrants forced to flee violence and begin to rebuild their lives. This chapter is written from the perspective of Lebanese activists who purposefully decided to settle around the Mediterranean. Many of whom recognize that they are not refugees legally but report feeling "forcefully displaced" from one of the worst economic crises in the century; caused by deliberative inaction by the ruling regime.<sup>1</sup>

The chapter explains the evolution of collective action and protests in and around Beirut, linking perceived opportunities for actions with a generation of activists who tried to challenge the political system in different ways. The study analyzes the decisions and trajectories by activists who are resettling from Lebanon after 2018 by conceptualizing the Mediterranean as a politically symbolic space where migrants feel "at home." The cut-off date of 2018 corresponds to a series of deadly events including economic collapse, COVID pandemic, political repression, and the port explosion as experienced by activists in Lebanon. To be able to capture this moment in time and conceptualize the Mediterranean as a politically symbolic space or

C. Geha (✉)

© The Author(s) 2024

<sup>1</sup> https://www.worldbank.org/en/news/press-release/2021/05/01/lebanon-sinking-into-one-of-themost-severe-global-crises-episodes

Universitat Pompeu Fabra, Barcelona, Catalonia, Spain e-mail: carmen.geha@upf.edu

R. Zapata-Barrero, I. Awad (eds.), Migrations in the Mediterranean, IMISCOE Research Series, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-42264-5\_10

object, this chapter shares findings from in-depth interviews with 24 activists. The interviewees were part of a purposeful sample of a group that had left to Mediterranean cities in countries including Turkey, Greece, Portugal, Italy, and Spain. This is an exploratory study that seeks to build a broader research agenda relaying the voice of activists – not just Lebanese – who are resettling purposefully on cities across the Mediterranean.

The chapter has three inter-linked objectives. The first objective is to contribute to the debate on migration and the disruption of social movements by trying to locate how individual activists make choices about how and when to engage in politics of their home countries. The second objective is to conceptualize moments in the lives of migrants when activists experience burnout that pushes them to disengage in the hopes to rebuilding their own personal safety and careers after they migrate. Finally, the chapter provides evidence of how Mediterranean cities are seen as havens by activists, not only as geographical locations receiving Lebanese activists but as symbolically familiar objects of home and belonging.

#### 10.2 Uprising and Hope on the Mediterranean

More than a decade has passed since the Arab uprisings sparked a wave of discontent and created political, social and security ripple effects across the region. The trajectories of these protests, their composition and responses from Arab regimes were distinctly different but the narratives of protestors had elements of great similarity including demands for freedom, gender equality economic opportunity, and social justice. Widespread corruption, discontent and marginalization drove millions of Egyptians, Syrians, Yemenis, and Libyans to the streets. People were either met with oppression and mass violence as in Syria and Egypt; or faced uncertainty after regime change with procrastinated conflict and collapse in Libya and Yemen.

Until 2019, both Iraq and Lebanon had escaped this mass wave of popular mobilisation. Authors cited that the forces of deeply entrenched sectarianism and widespread clientelism could justify why a revolution in the Lebanese context was not possible. Fakhoury (2014), for instance argued that power-sharing along sectarian lines hampered the sort of collective action and protesting that we see in other Arab states.2 The discontent that sparked a wave of great hope and exuberance in October 2019 created a rupture from the bleak history of war and post-war sectarian politics in Lebanon. The country ruled by a century-old power-sharing agreement had endured a civil war for 18 years that ended with amnesty for war crimes in 1990. No truth and reconciliation took place and the same militia leaders partnered with

<sup>2</sup> Fakhoury, Tamirace. "Do power-sharing systems behave differently amid regional uprisings? Lebanon in the Arab protest wave." The Middle East Journal 68, no. 4 (2014): 505–520.

financiers and became Ministers and Members of Parliament.3 The Syrian regime then effectively occupied and ruled Lebanon until 2005. The post-war order was that of corruption, clientelism, repression, and neo-liberalism that marginalized people and purposefully impoverished a population that needed to show loyalty to warlords in exchange of basic rights and services.

In 2019, and rather unexpectedly a great deal of hope through collective mobilizing suddenly sparked new questions for activists and researchers. Could the Lebanese people finally put enough pressure to transform the politics of clientelism and sectarianism that plagued the country for three decades?4 We will never know. What followed, from mass repression, financial collapse to the covid-19 pandemic leading up to the Beirut port explosion on 4 August 2020, crushed the spirit and momentum of revolt. The magnitude, timing, and nature of the explosion also transformed the narrative and strategies from street protest to widespread solidarity as 300,000 people lost their homes. Activists that were shouting for reform and accountability now had barely escaped death, attended mass funerals for friends and neighbours, carried brooms to clean glass off the streets, and gave away what they had from food, shelter and medical equipment. Hospitals, schools, shops, and entire buildings fell to the floor just moments after the explosion taking away 210 lives and destroying Beirut's infrastructure. This, at the backdrop of one of the worst economic collapses worldwide, transformed collective action from revolt to anger and disdain. By 2021, Gallup news reported nearly 70% of people wanting to leave Lebanon and nine out of ten people were struggling to get by.5 The following section historicizes how activists framed their strategies and narratives prior to the collapse that would ultimately push many of them to leave the country. I argue that this moment unlike other times when movements would enter periods of abeyance,6 this is rather a movement of true disruption and deliberative disengagement.

Lebanon, unlike other countries in the region, has held elections since 1947 but maintained through an electoral system that normalizes violence, vote-buying, fraud, and a sectarian gerrymandering of districts designed to keep the same ruling elite in power.7 Sectarian power-sharing enabled a group of warlords to turn into politicians and to create a system that is the anti-thesis of any democratic rule. They govern through impunity and have managed to evade necessary economic, social, and

<sup>3</sup> See Hudson, M. C. (1999). Lebanon after Ta′if: another reform opportunity lost?. Arab Studies Quarterly, 27–40. 4 See for example AlJazeera: https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2019/11/17/one-month-on-hope-

defiance-as-lebanon-protests-persist 5 Leaving Lebanon: https://news.gallup.com/poll/357743/leaving-lebanon-crisis-people-looking-

exit.aspx

<sup>6</sup> Abeyance defined here as a holding process by which movements sustain themselves in nonreceptive political environments and provide continuity from one stage of mobilization to another; from Taylor, Verta. "Social movement continuity: The women's movement in abeyance." American sociological review (1989): 761–775. 7 El Machnouk, S. (2018). Electoral system reform in Lebanon: dilemmas of a consociational state.

Ethnopolitics, 17(1), 1–20.

security reforms for three decades. Due to this system, ample challenges have pushed activists to take to the streets, to no avail eventually leading to many activists choosing to immigrate and withdraw from political life following repression, impoverishment and a series of missed opportunities.

I define activists and activism here in the broad sense as strategic actions and initiatives by individuals and collectives that seek to bring about social justice and political change. Because Lebanon suffers from the politicization of its labour unions, collectives are difficult to build and sustain in the face of sectarian political parties led by corrupt individuals and former warlords. Organizing is a form of activism for collective interests including a range of absent basic rights from education to healthcare to political participation. Political activism therefore is inertia directed against the repercussions of sectarian power-sharing by demanding equal rights and accountable democratic institutions. This is symbolized by movement leaders that engrained the values of equity, participation, and secularism as a countering power to the state that runs deep in society spreading intolerance, violent conflict, and inequality. In a sense, Lebanese activists who recently fled to cities across the Mediterranean did so because they sought places that provided refuge but also meaning for themselves and a sense of safety. It remains to be seen in what ways this new Lebanese diaspora will be able to engage and redefine activism from across the Mediterranean. This section presents the activists' past use of protests, coalition building, and advocacy to try to influence political reform in Lebanon.<sup>8</sup>

Here I highlight the generation of activists who had gained a sense of a shared and collective consciousness around the time of the Cedar Revolution in 2005; which mobilized enough support back then to end Syrian occupation of Lebanon.9 "I thought in 2005 that real change could happen but even as the Syrians left, the Lebanese warlords came back to power using the same old ways of governing through impunity." 10 Many of the protestors that organized sit-ins and marches in 2005 wanted more than the Syrians to leave, they aspired for reforms. "We knew that the civil war could not come to an end, as long as the war zu'ama (leaders) were still in power and so after the Syrians left, we started organizing civil society associations to work on political reforms like elections, access to information, and women's rights." 11 This period of organizing by activists between 2005 and 2011 following the Syrian regime military withdrawal, was a period of neglect and lack of response by Lebanese state institutions. A series of assassinations of some of the main leaders of the Cedar revolution set-back collective action and pushed many activists to fear for their lives. "Essentially all we did was jolt and develop anxiety whenever we

<sup>8</sup> For a history on these groups see Geha, C. (2016). Civil society and political reform in Lebanon and Libya: Transition and constraint. Routledge. 9 Kurtulus, Ersun N. "'The Cedar Revolution': Lebanese Independence and the Question of

Collective Self-Determination." British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies 36, no. 2 (2009): <sup>195</sup>–214. 10 University professor, interview with author, February 2022.

<sup>11</sup> Lebanese reporter, interview with author, August 2022.

heard any sound; it felt like an explosion could happen anywhere and at any time," 12 The string of assassinations further enshrined impunity with nobody being held accountable for these murders and no justice delivered to the families of the victims.13 There were also frequent detaining of activists, shutting down civil society associations, and a series of assassinations on journalists, Members of Parliament, and academics who sought to challenge the system.<sup>14</sup>

As a reaction, many activists saw that organizing through civil society associations and advocating for change was not the appropriate way to address the issue. Instead, activists described a need to take to the street and be more confrontational with the system and politicians. This lead to a series of mass mobilizing. The first wave of protests was framed by activists the movement of Isqat al-Nizam al-Ta'ifi (bringing down the sectarian regime) inspired by the uprisings in Egypt and Tunisia in January–February 2011. The movement was much smaller than in Egypt and Tunisia but organisers were able to articulate a Lebanese version of bringing down the system that mobilised people to the streets.15 The movement organisers chanted slogans calling for the end of the regime "and its symbols" (wa-rumuzih), referring to those who protected and supported the sectarian system. For example, the head of Hezbollah leader Nasrallah is not a governmental official but controls the state as if it were his party's backyard. In interviews, protest leaders explained he conundrum of organizing a mass movement against multiple warlords and armed militias, which made it difficult to create a narrative. "We tried to frame our collective again against a regime, but the sectarian parties jumped to agree with us, suddenly they all agreed there was a problem but none took responsibility. This shattered the movement and split the ranks, eventually we were too exhausted and the protests subsided." 16

In summer of 2015, a combination of garbage crisis, hot weather, electricity problems and governmental deadlock following the second postponement of parliamentary elections triggered a next wave of mass protests in Beirut. A trash crisis began because people living near the Na'ama landfill protested and refused to let garbage dumpsters into their area due to overflow of garbage. The landfill which opened in 1997 was intended to be a two-year temporary solution for trash in Beirut and Mount Lebanon.

The landfill was still being used two decades later despite numerous smaller protests by affected residents of Na'ama.17 Trash eventually started piling up and anger on the part of residents of the peripheral town Na'ama reached Beirut, leading

<sup>12</sup> Lebanese reporter, interview with author, August 2022.

<sup>13</sup> See Knudsen, Are. "Acquiescence to assassinations in post-civil war Lebanon?." Mediterranean

Politics 15, no. 1 (2010): 1–23. 14 On constraints see Härdig, Anders C. "Beyond the Arab revolts: conceptualizing civil society in the Middle East and North Africa." Democratization 22, no. 6 (2015): 1131–1153. 15 Sami Hermez, "On Dignity and Clientelism: Lebanon in the Context of the 2011 Arab Revolu-

tions", in Studies in Ethnicity and Nationalism, Vol. 11, No. 3 (2011), p. 527–537. 16 Interview with author, protest organizer, Beirut April 2022.

<sup>17</sup> See Human Rights Watch, "As If You're Inhaling Your Death", www.hrw.org/report/201 7/12/01/if-youre-inhaling-your-death/health-risks-burning-waste-lebanon

a group of activists to mobilise with the slogan tol'it rihitkum literally meaning "your stench has emerged" – rendered in English as "You Stink". 18

The protest organisers of You Stink identified the garbage crisis as a political crisis, a failure and a result of corruption and negligence. This was a first mass articulation of trash, electricity, unemployment and inflation as resulting from political failure and corruption.

More 200,000 people joined the protests, making it one of the largest street protests in Lebanon's recent history. Following the protests, the Beirut Madinaty (Beirut My City) electoral campaign was founded by a group of activists, professionals, artists and university professors. This group articulated the need for a political opposition group to take the momentum from the streets to the competition in elections for the seats of the Beirut municipality. Beirut Madinaty won 30 per cent of the votes but no seats due to the majoritarian municipal electoral system, but it gave birth to subsequent movements in other areas and set a historical precedent encouraging other opposition groups to run for parliament in 2018. Never before was there a single opposition list made up of leaders who had emerged from a collective protest and seeking to compete with mainstream corrupt parties.19 Organizing between 2011 and 2016 reveals that movement mobilizing and movement abeyance was still taking place; social networks among activists met regularly to plan and strategize. "When we were not protesting, we took the time to reflect, learn, fight a lot among ourselves, and then work on new campaigns. It was a very different time; we had the headspace and means; now (in 2022) there's nobody left." 20

The 2019 October revolution was the most historical juncture for anti-regime protests and activists. Some debate on whether it was an uprising or a revolution often takes place in media and academic spheres; but I use the word revolution because people referred to it in such a way. These protests gave the largest number of people the opportunity to be seen and heard by local and international media. The Lebanese were suffering, they were burdened with the weight of corruption and wanted to see accountability for those who stole their dreams and oppressed them for so long. Many Lebanese in the diaspora flew back into Beirut just to participate in these protests. "I could not believe that we were seeing on the streets what I had dreamt of my entire life, I booked the first ticket back and never regretted it." 21 One analyst explained the sentiment by describing the images as "bringing back life to a place that was dead for so long reeling under the impact of criminals." 22

The revolution was framed by protestors as a revolt against criminals who mismanaged every aspect of public life. The streets filled with women, children, young and old around the clock organizing debates, chants, marches, and expressing

<sup>18</sup> Geha, C. (2019). Politics of a garbage crisis: Social networks, narratives, and frames of Lebanon's 2015 protests and their aftermath. Social Movement Studies, 18(1), 78–92. 19 Ibid. 20 Activist, founder of collective for disappeared persons, interview with author, August 2022.

<sup>21</sup> Feminist organizer and protestor, interview with author, March 2022.

<sup>22</sup> Lebanese in French diaspora, interview with author, February 2022.

their anger. This opened up the space of political participation that had thus far been monopolised by sectarian parties. New competent reformist men and women emerged at the centre of not only every protest, public dialogue, media appearance and police station where activists were illegally detained or arrested. They succeeded in putting forward, to a large extent, an intersectional narrative that was inclusive of migrant workers, refugees and members of the LGBTQ community.23 "We protested for our dignity, life under a criminal regime stripped us of dignity and we took to the street altogether for dignity. Every march restored a piece of our long-lost dignity and gave me a sense that we were citizens united for the first time." 24

The revolution was a critical juncture for collective action in three ways. Firstly, it cemented a narrative all warlords and sectarian parties were responsible for the crimes and corruption of the latest three decades. The phrase "kellon yaaneh kellon" (all means all of them) became a mainstream slogan and approach to holding all politicians accountable is a sign of social transformation unlike any other in the country's history. "Everyone agrees that there is corruption but sees their leader (za'im) as innocent so for millions of people to condemn all of the leaders (zu'ama) this meant that the time for fear had ended and this was a time of unity and hope." 25 The protestors cursed all politicians and held showed their faces and names across the city.

Secondly, it decentralized protests not just in Beirut, but spread from North to South of the country expressed a national outcry, demands for accountability, and desire for new competent political leadership.26 The movement was also purposeful in that it confronted government, parliament, banks and politicians' homes – linking the power of corruption, money, and violence to the impeding economic collapse that destroyed the middle class and impoverished the country.27 Politicians responded by sending party loyalists to beat and kill protestors, burn tents, and shut down TV stations reporting the protests. Thirdly, in a country of all forms of gender-based discrimination, the revolution was gendered not only in terms of women's leading participation and main roles as mobilisers, spokespersons and advocates, but also in putting the issues of gender equality on the table.28 Throughout these waves of protests, it is possible to trace movement mobilizing and periods of movement abeyance. Even in times of abeyance, political discontent existed and activists managed to get organized and re-organized to address different shared grievances. This ability and interest in taking an active stance and the inertia created around that mobilizing is lost after 2018 and utterly disrupted after the explosion and economic collapse.

<sup>23</sup> Lebanese law still criminalises homosexuality.

<sup>24</sup> Student organizer, interview with author, February 2022.

<sup>25</sup> Mid-career professional, interview with author, April 2022.

<sup>26</sup> For analysis on the protests see Lebanese Center for Policy Studies, "Why Did the October 17 Revolution Witness a Regression in Numbers?", 31 October 2020, https://www.lcps-lebanon. org/agendaArticle.php?id<sup>=</sup>199 27 See UN Office for Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs: https://reliefweb.int/report/lebanon/

lebanon-s-economic-crisis-spirals-out-control-pushing-children-further-hunger-2022

<sup>28</sup> See Carmen Geha, "Our Personal Is Political and Revolutionary", in Al-Raida Journal, Vol. 44, No. 1 (2020), p. 23–28.

# 10.3 An Abusive Home to the Largest Population of Refugees

The Mediterranean remains the deadliest place in the world and protracted conflict and state repression accounts for the most forcefully displaced persons escaping from the Southern Mediterranean. Lebanon is home to the largest refugees per capita in the world. Palestinians and Syrians however that sought refuge in Lebanon found a new home that was abusive and politically exploitative. The Lebanese state allows UNHCR to operate and receives hundreds of millions in aid without being signatory to the Geneva convention. Lebanon's political system remained non-reformist and showed resilience to the detriment of people, even with the outbreak of civil war in Syria starting in 2011. The Lebanese state does not recognize the one million – or so – Syrians as refugees.29 Their fate is left to the hands of local associations, some international agencies, and UNHCR.

At the backdrop of local organizing and protesting, activists across Lebanon also showed solidarity and support for the multiple waves of Syrian refugees who had to settle in Lebanon. This included symbolic initiatives to welcome Syrian refugees, denouncing acts of discrimination, and working with authorities to try to change policies that incite violence against Syrian refugees. The sectarian warlords and parties exploited Syrian refugees to their own gains. For example, Christian rightwinged former militia leaders complained that the refugees were changing the demography in Lebanon and blamed refugees for stealing jobs. Hezbollah, actively fighting in Syria alongside the Asad regime since 2013, blamed Syrian refugees for importing violent extremism to justify its alliance with the Syrian government. Unlike refugees in Turkey and Jordan, Syrians in Lebanon are housed in volatile environments subject to exploitation and played out as a political card by local authorities. This often resulted in burning refugee tents, every winter storm led to refugees dying, and each election the refugees were used to entrench the rule of warlords. This normalization of discrimination was the result of an evolution of policy responses to the Syrian refugee crisis. Instead of insisting on social justice policies, the United Nations' Secretary General stated that "Lebanon is a key pillar in the international framework for the protection of Syrian refugees, and without it, that entire system would collapse." 30 After the port explosion, the situation of refugees was exacerbated by the mass destruction resulting in increased financial collapse, the collapse of the health system, and further unemployment.

<sup>29</sup>"Or so" deliberatively here to say that there is absence of reliable data on purpose by politicians to exploit this issue and use refugees to incite hatred and fear, UNHCR officially accepted the government's request in 2015 to stop registering newborns. The "or so" is part of the problem. 30 UN news report, 2014.

# 10.4 Explosives, Narcotics, and Terror on the Mediterranean

The date of August 4th will go down in history as the largest non-nuclear explosion the world had seen in a century. Amidst Lebanon's year of hell, came a mass wave of community organizing to try to fix what was broken, pull bodies from under the rubble, and fundraise for local associations. The narrative of Lebanese people, inside and outside Lebanon, focused immediately on condemning a corrupt government that had stored explosives near people's homes. A protest sign, five days after the explosion amidst public funerals that would go on for days, read "we do not need an investigation to know who did this" and showed the faces of politicians. The protestors hung poles with puppet enactment of politicians in a sign to say that they wish to see them hung dead. International condemnation from governments, UN agencies, embassies, businesses, artists, and the Vatican went on for weeks, and months to no avail.

The evidence was that the Lebanese government had knowingly stored explosives on the port.31 Moreover, due to decades of corruption and mismanagement, state institutions had been purposefully emptied of competence, data, capacity and leadership to help with the disaster. The state was subservient to the political will of warlords who had for years acquiesced to keep each other in power obstructing any attempts at reform. For 15 days, people picked up rubble, dead bodies, and glass with their barehands. Young people flocked to sweep the streets, experts warned that breathing glass dust is dangerous and can damage the eyes. But people kept coming in to see Beirut and countless of community assistance programs and initiatives were launched. These can be grouped into a four-fold typology of work that focused on relief and humanitarian assistance, advocacy and human rights, fundraising platforms, and political organizing.<sup>32</sup>

At the time of writing, more than two years after the explosion, not a single arrest has been made and the politicians have successfully stifled any attempt for a judiciary investigation. At the time of the explosion, a UN special tribunal for Lebanon issued a verdict accusing a Hezbollah operative of the assassination of Prime Minister Hariri back in 2005. No single arrest was made and no local investigation launched into the assassination that rocked the city and took away 25 innocent lives alongside the Prime Minister. No other assassination from the tens that claimed the lives of intelligence officers, journalists, activists and reporters has ever been investigated. The latest of these has been the killing of Lockman Slim, intellectual, civil society activist, and Hezbollah critic shot dead in February 2021.

Three current Members of Parliament accused by a Lebanese judge of the explosion are ran successfully for parliament, they enjoy the same immunity now

<sup>31</sup> See "Exclusive: Lebanese Leaders were Warned in July," 10 August 2020, Reuters. https://www. reuters.com/article/us-lebanon-security-blast-documents-excl-idUSKCN2562L7

<sup>32</sup> Geha, C. (2021). From Revolt to Community-driven Resistance: Beirut's Year of Hell. Istituto Affari Interanzionali (IAI).

and have refused to show up to the assigned court investigating the explosion. Lebanon is a rising narcotic state with shaky diplomatic ties to its Arab and Gulf neighbors. Several tons of keptagon are being exported to neighboring countries to fund ongoing conflict and account for the losses due to corruption to keep sectarian parties in power.33 The banking crisis has impoverished what used to be a middle class pushing more than two-thirds of the population into poverty.34

# 10.5 Activists Escaping for a New Home on the Mediterranean

To be able to capture this moment in time and conceptualize the Mediterranean as a politically symbolic space of mobility, this section presents findings from an ongoing research project using interviews with 24 Lebanese migrants who self-identified as activists, most of them referring to themselves in fact as former activists – insisting that they have given up. In many ways, this section highlights the agentic role of activists in moments of disruption that do not lead to abeyance but rather deliberative disengagement. "We are scattered across the world really; we can't meet even if we wanted to; us and our parents have now lost all savings in the banks. This is time to survive to put food on the table and pay rent, it is not time to protest especially not against authorities who could care less if we all died." 35

The temporal aspect here is important to stress. The interviews are with Lebanese who fled very recently who are still trying to re-locate their ideas of themselves as they watch ongoing multiple crises back home. Østergaard-Nielsen has written about existing migrants and diaspora communities who engage in political activities back home. Other scholars trace political choices of migrants in the diaspora to connections with their home countries.36 We know for instance that Turkish and Kurdish migrants purposefully engage in trans-national political practices seeking to contribute to political change in both the sending and receiving countries.37 Another example are Israeli migrants in Mexico who express conviviality with the local Jewish community as a means of connecting to their roots and a show of community outreach.<sup>38</sup>

<sup>33</sup> See: The Arab News https://www.arabnews.com/node/2006906/middle-east 34 See United Nations estimates in September 2021: https://news.un.org/en/story/2021/09/1099102 35 Business owner, interview with author, August 2022.

<sup>36</sup> For example, Müller-Funk, Lea. "Diaspora mobilizations in the Egyptian (post) revolutionary process: Comparing transnational political participation in Paris and Vienna." Journal of Immigrant & Refugee Studies 14, no. 3 (2016): 353–370. 37 Østergaard-Nielsen, E. (2003). The politics of migrants' transnational political practices. Inter-

national migration review, 37(3), 760–786. 38 Aizencang Kane, P. (2021). Jewish Diaspora, Israeli Diaspora, and Levels of Conviviality.

Contemporary Jewry, 41(2), 387–409.

The findings below identified three patterns that emerge after I conducted a content and thematic analysis of the interview transcripts.39 The 24 individuals interviewed are all high-skilled migrants who used to be considered part of Lebanon's middle and upper-middle class. They are educated –university and graduate studies – and used to afford to live in the Beirut area. Some had foreign European passports but most only had Lebanese passports. They also constitute a community of "epistemic privilege;" 40 they were journalists, professors, business owners, artists, and saw themselves as people who could afford time and resources to dedicate for civil society and collective mobilizing. They were also among the generation that grew into political consciousness around 2005, so they were within an age group of 25- to 48-year-old men and women. They had all actively participated in the waves of protests discussed here, organized election campaigns, launched civil society networks, and expressed publicly their outcries and opposition to the Lebanese political system. Three sets of findings capture this moment in the lives of activists who are choosing to migrate from Lebanon to other Mediterranean cities. The evidence here from narratives and lived experiences reveals three interlinked realities that are important for conceptualizing the Mediterranean as a symbolic place for mobility: (1) Lebanese activists deliberatively wanted to settle across the Mediterranean, (2) Lebanese activists are purposefully cutting ties with transnational political networks back home, and (3) Lebanese activists report the toll that political organizing takes on mental health and well-being.

# 10.5.1 The Mediterranean Is Like Home: Familiarity as a Determining Factor

After experiencing trauma and disappointments, the participants in the interviews all expressed a sign of relief that they had the opportunity to re-settle a place that was close enough to Beirut and yet felt safe and welcoming. One salient answer about choosing certain cities in the Mediterranean had to do with how these cities were perceived as having welcomed other forcefully displaced people including Syrians. Referring mainly to their experience in Istanbul, some activists interviewed explained how seeing the precedent of the Syrian evolve over the past decade made them feel less lonely in Turkey and that they can learn from the experience of Syrians about integration, what to do or not to do. The participants in the interviews all had a geographically symbolic reference to the Mediterranean as "being closer" and contrasted it with Canada and the United States. For instance, Rima (36 years old, Istanbul, development expert), explained:

<sup>39</sup> Adapted from: Gioia, Denny. "A systematic methodology for doing qualitative research." The Journal of Applied Behavioral Science 57, no. 1 (2021): 20–29. 40 See Janack, Marianne. "Standpoint epistemology without the "standpoint"?: An examination of

epistemic privilege and epistemic authority." Hypatia 12, no. 2 (1997): 125–139.

"We had been planning our paperwork to leave to Canada anyway since 2018 but when the explosion happened, we packed and now we plan to stay longer. It's like Istanbul adopted us. People were warm and here we can swim on the Mediterranean and have everything we could have wishes for. It is also very affordable."41 Another participant (Makram, 42) explained that the presence of Syrian refugees was somehow reassuring, "it is amazing to walk the streets in Istanbul and hear Arabic being spoken in most restaurants and cafes; I felt like if the Syrians could come here and begin to rebuild their lives then I could do it as well. For now, I can't imagine being somewhere else." 42

All of the participants interviewed explained that it was not the explosion only but its aftermath as being the main trigger for them wanting to pack and leave to the nearest place. The fact that Lebanese do not need a visa to Istanbul was also a major reason for some, including couples who found it easy to marry there in a civil court as opposed to Lebanon's segregated court system. For Fadia (31 years, consultant), "Istanbul is an easy transition and makes us feel safe. I might consider Canada or the US in the future but for now this is home because it is a feasible escape and a metropolis that reminds us of Beirut. Even before I had visited it, I felt that I knew it from people's stories and experiences." 43

The regulatory framework of visas and ease of doing business was another attraction in Portugal. One migrant (Joanne, 31, architect) explained to me how she felt that the Portuguese people were more desirable to her culturally than any Arab of Gulf country. "Portugal offers free-lance visas allowing me to live there and work remotely. I had the chance to visit Saudi Arabia, Germany and Amsterdam but felt that I would be an outsider there. In Portugal I felt people looked like me and felt like me." 44 Connectively to people and a shared appreciation for culture kept coming up as a repeated pattern here. Joanne explained that in Portugal she felt "simplicity of life. Lebanon's economic model was a disaster and Portugal gave me the opportunity to spend money to enjoy beach and leisure in a way that Lebanon never did." Also speaking on Portugal, Hadi (42, trader) explained that he had to make little effort to fit in the culture and that ease of doing business was a welcome relief after decades of suffering in Beirut. "I cannot count the number of times we had to open and close the business, and when I came here, I found I can achieve so much in so little time, without feeling like a stranger." Besides the explosion, many interview participants explained that the economic model was suffocating and Lebanon's lack of any infrastructure from fuel to electricity had pushed them out. All of them explained that they felt they were forcefully pushed out of the country and how before the collapse and destruction they had all wanted to stay. All of the people interviewed are above 30 and consider themselves mid-career professionals who had tried to build homes and contribute to changing Lebanon, all to no avail. "Life became intolerable and I felt stuck so I obliged myself to leave, I would have endured a war but not this purposeful destruction and imposed crisis on me. why should I stay and

<sup>41</sup> Rima, NGO worker, Istanbul, interview with author, April 2022.

<sup>42</sup> Makram, academic, Athens, interview with author, July 2022.

<sup>43</sup> Fadia, consultant, Istanbul, interview with author, April 2022.

<sup>44</sup> Joanne, architect, Lisbon, interview with author, April 2022.

live in the dark?" (Joanne, 31, architect). According to Zeina, "In Cyprus, just a 40-minute flight from that place of death (Beirut), I don't have to worry about electricity, internet, or that someone might randomly attack us. I can send my kids to school and safely work from my house. I am close enough geographically to still eat the same food and enjoy the same weather, but without the daily threat and heartache of life in Lebanon," 45

The familiarity of a place that reminded them of home was a major factor in choosing cities, especially cities that migrants could invite their elder parents to. Another was personal freedom, Viviane (40, business manager, Athens), "as a queer person it was clear to me in 2018 that I did not belong anymore and felt that I needed to leave. I had worked in London, Amsterdam, Germany, Austria and Paris for as long and after returning to Beirut I decided that I always wanted to live somewhere sunny. Greece has no grey skies and it is ideal as it is just two hours away from Beirut. Its beauty reminds me of Lebanon and people are close enough for me to relate to. I made a new home here." 46 Freedom was a recurring theme, "at the end and especially after 2018, I felt trapped, like my choices were limited, even my choice of conversation someone was forcing me to speak about sects and religion and limited mobility. Here in Spain, I can talk about whatever I want and engage on various issues, feminism here is a productive conversation but in Lebanon it is toxic." 47

# 10.5.2 Enough Deception: Rationalizing Political Opportunity

In a most sobering recount of events, the participants interviewed here present the portrait of what can only be described as a heartbroken emerging diaspora that is strategically seeking to cut dies from political life in Lebanon. If activists display agency in trying to frame movements and engage with political opportunities, then in this research it is evident they also practice agentic choice in disengagement and pursuit of personal safety. Here participants repeatedly used the word dignity and loss of dignity in Lebanon. "I was throwing my life away, volunteering here and there, spending days on the streets. At the end of the day, I need to provide for my family and recover decades of money lost to the banks. Now is not the time to work on elections in Lebanon, now is time to win back my lost dignity and mental sanity. Athens is offering me that choice by making me feel like a human being again." 48 They all relayed a sense that they had self-deceived themselves into expecting change while in parallel also having been deceived by their own government and

<sup>45</sup> Zeina, reporter, Nicosia, interview with author, July 2022.

<sup>46</sup> Viviane, company manager, Athens interview with author, April 2022.

<sup>47</sup> Amanda, entrepreneur, Barcelona, interview with author, July 2022.

<sup>48</sup> Fouad, entrepreneur, Athens, interview with author, July 2022.

international community. The participants, all but one, saw themselves as activists and movement organizers.49 In this section, they insist on a crossroads in their lives symbolized by the explosion and explained what came after it as the political system re-enshrined impunity and continued with systematically collapsing the state. Here there was conscious desire to disconnect from politics at home, "I don't want to be tied to this deadly geography anymore. I deceived myself for decades, it is time to move on," explained to me a long-time activist and organizer.<sup>50</sup>

The overwhelming repeated statement in this set of findings was giving up. It was an accumulation and not a one-time decision. "I organized protests day in and day out, we shut down roads, I joined a political platform, and worked non-stop even under COVID. But then I had to attend to my job and MA studies, still I did not lose home. But after August 4th, I was done. My husband and I were at a shooting in a gas station during the fuel crisis, and immediately after it we started applying to leave. After that, I really lost hope and felt people were polarized among the old sectarian parties again. There was nothing left for me to do." 51 In many interviews, participants relayed a feeling of guilt, "I know many who have decided to stay and keep helping, but I have decided to turn my back for now. It feels like we were raped over and over again, and I see no chances for me to survive back there. Seeing the news makes me sick to my stomach, I stopped following the news." 52

For others, this deception had caused them to put their private lives on hold. "I have missed every family event for the last ten years, I constantly refused jobs abroad including a very well-paid position in Dubai. I was always involved in any campaign; we protested an entire summer just for garbage. Then to watch the city explode and no change happen, that was it for me, I may be emotional but I am not stupid, there is no way I am spending another hour trying to fix this mess," explained one activist to me.53 Another spoke about geo-politics and the feeling that change was bigger than one group of people can handle, "with no money in my bank account and my father losing his pension, it would be silly for me to stay and try to fight. There are larger forces at play preventing real change from happening. Without a major transformation I have no more hope that our innocent grassroots work can lead to anything." 54

There was a fleeting hope that some of them could be mobilized again in the future but that this was not a priority right now. In fact, disengaging and recovering from loss of financial power to loss of dignity was the priority. "You can be an activist everywhere, I don't need to be in Beirut as a location, I feel close enough from where I am. But right now, I am allowing myself to lose hope, we did

<sup>49</sup> In most interviews, the participants cried when asked about this, and as author of the chapter I also cried twice listening to this side of the story.

<sup>50</sup> Malek, entrepreneur, Istanbul, interview with author, April 2022.

<sup>51</sup> Fadia, consultant, Istanbul, interview with author, April 2022.

<sup>52</sup> Layal, hospitality industry, Barcelona, interview with author March 2022.

<sup>53</sup> Mirna, artist, Italy, interview with author, February 2022.

<sup>54</sup> Rabih, journalist, Italy, interview with author, March 2022.

everything we can. I need to take care of my family right now." 55 For others this was also a move for self-preservation. "When the Tayyouneh attacks and shootings happened, I could not go to work and spent the day glued to my social media, counting the deaths and feeling shocked. To save my sanity, I don't read the news anymore. I can't afford to lose a day of work and I live in a city with too few Lebanese so nobody really understands it. What use am I without income to my parents? That's why I prefer to keep myself distant from events there and this distant does not allow me to be active in any of the political groups I was part of before I left in 2020." 56

#### 10.5.3 Fatigue and Burnout in Isolation

In migration studies, networks and interpersonal ties play an important role in the ability of new migrants to integrate. Career choices often affect the types of locations that migrants choose to move to, particularly in the cases of high skilled migrants who may move for better opportunities or to join professional networks abroad. The severe context of Beirut in the migration episode after 2018 caused many to lose their networks of support therefore adding to the feeling of isolation and needing to start over. This was, for activists, a time of a lost collective. "We used to be altogether involved in each other's lives and work, we became friends during sit-ins and survived bullets and tear gas. I am glad we are still alive even though we are all over the place and will never live near each other again." 57 These impressions of being alone appear to be somehow mediated by the feelings of belonging and familiarity that Mediterranean cities could offer Lebanese activists. The isolation undoubtedly made worse by the COVID 19 pandemic was briefly interrupted by the idea that at least in Mediterranean cities they were close to home. "I could not have imagined passing the pandemic while being in a different time zone than my parents. Also, seeing thousands of people leave Lebanon, I did not feel too alone here, I felt that I was part of a wave of migrants that now at least had landed close to Beirut and somewhere where the climate was bearable. I imagine it was harder for people in places like Sweden and Denmark." 58

Another activist explained to me that even though she was new to Barcelona, her own network back home no longer was available to her, "all my friends left and so this isolation had nothing to do with being in Spain, on the contrary people were nice here. The isolation came from the feeling that I had nobody to come back to in Beirut anyway." 59 Others spoke about an intentional disconnect, "because I am hurt I

<sup>55</sup> Fadia, 31, consultant, Istanbul, interview with author, April 2022.

<sup>56</sup> Rabih, 43, journalist, Italy, interview with author, March 2022.

<sup>57</sup> Makram, academic, Athens, interview with author, July 2022.

<sup>58</sup> Omar, 38, business owner, Istanbul, interview with author February 2022.

<sup>59</sup> Layal, 45, hospitality industry, Barcelona, interview with author March 2022.

decided to emotionally disconnect from what is happening in Beirut and now I find it very difficult to talk to people there. It is as if by moving I was abandoning the privilege I had to make my voice heard about Lebanon. I feel here I must work alone now and I feel very isolated." 60

Activists also spoke to the toll that burnout does to them. "From elections to protests to raising money after the explosion, it affected my psyche, I went to very dark places. After the war, I grew up with a sense of responsibility that I had to do something but with time I realize I was just deceiving myself. The older I get the worse the situation got." 61 They described a series of realizations that they needed to start over in the pursuit of citizenship, bank accounts, safety and income for their family members still stuck in Lebanon. They described feeling grateful to cities and new regulations, having to learn a new language and a new tax system. "Adjusting and learning to slowly integrate is much more important to my wellbeing than what is happening back home, in fact I read the news with disgust these days." 62

#### 10.6 Conclusion

The older Lebanese diaspora is featured in many studies on migration and forced displacement. Dating back to the Ottoman era, Lebanese migrants have been documented to contribute economic remittances back home and contribute positively to their receiving countries. This chapter however has sought to document and begin to theorize a specific episode in migration by a selected sample that was very active in public life and politics in Lebanon. It captures a moment in time when 'new' migrants choose to stay geographically close but political distance from their home countries due to conditions of violence, economic collapse, and continued lack of accountability of the political regime. Activists in this chapter explained a rational choice of withdrawal that merits further analysis. In their temporalities, these narratives emphasize that some migrants may stop wanting to be activists and that the pursuit of personal safety and wellbeing can be main drivers for migrants resettling in cities across the Mediterranean.

The narratives of activists point to a political choice of self-exile as the only path for recovering personal well-being, dignity, mobility, employment, and safety. Exile appears to be a retreat for activists, and in time we will demonstrate whether such a choice of disengagement from politics back home is permanent. But what we know from these narratives is that there is a distinct choice of forsaking attempts at political activism rationalized by lack of opportunity, continued impunity, and loss of personal wellbeing. One of the major conclusions therefore is that political movements can de-mobilize in moments of migration by activists and that this can have

<sup>60</sup> Fadia, 31, consultant, Istanbul, interview with author, April 2022.

<sup>61</sup> Malek, 46 years old, interview with author, April 2022.

<sup>62</sup> Mirna, 39, artist, Italy, interview with author, February 2022.

destructive effects of politics back home. From portraits of hope put together by collective networks to descriptions of hell, activists engage and disengage in shaping political movements. Activists also see the Mediterranean as a potential safe alternative to life in Beirut.

The chapter captures the Mediterranean as a space of mobility towards cities that appear to provide safety as well as familiarity. It remains to be seen whether this "new" Lebanese diaspora emerging after 2018 will resort to collective organizing and new forms of influencing politics back home. For now, activists perceive the truth to be bleak and this bleakness of a severe context of crisis may be helpful to explain the behavior and political choices of other activists seeking to escape what appears to be impossibly rigid structures It appears that these narratives tell the story of the evolution of multiple crises in Lebanon and the way that activists try to adjust, to the point of no adjustment. It highlights rational choices people make to preserve their survival and also shows that activists, who are also high skilled, can choose the Mediterranean as a second home.

#### References


Carmen Geha is a political activist and organizer with extensive experience in collective mobilizing, international advocacy, and coalition building for social justice, political accountability, gender equality and refugee protection. She holds a PhD in International Relations from the University of Saint Andrews (United Kingdom). Carmen is currently a faculty member in the Master's in Migration Studies and a Senior Member in the Interdisciplinary Research Group on Immigration (GRITIM-UPF), at Universitat Pompeu Fabra, Barcelona, Catalonia, Spain. She is recipient of the Maria Zambrano (Spanish government award), for international scholarly talent. Carmen specializes in policies of inclusion and exclusion with expertise in refugee policies, gender inequalities, and social movements. Prior to joining GRITIM-UPF she was a tenured Associate Professor of Public Administration, Leadership, and Organizational Development at the American University of Beirut (AUB) and a co-founding member, as well as Director of Communications, at the Center for Inclusive Business and Leadership (CIBL) for Women at the Olayan School of Business in AUB, twice awarded by AACSB as Innovations that Inspire. Carmen is also Founding Director of the "Education for Leadership in Crisis" scholarship program for Afghan Women at AUB (2018–2020). Carmen has received the Fullbright award as a visiting scholar at Harvard University, the Mellon Grant as a Visiting Scholar at the Institute for Advanced Study, and the Brown International Research grant as a Visiting Scholar at the Watson Institute in Brown University.

Open Access This chapter is licensed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits use, sharing, adaptation, distribution and reproduction in any medium or format, as long as you give appropriate credit to the original author(s) and the source, provide a link to the Creative Commons license and indicate if changes were made.

The images or other third party material in this chapter are included in the chapter's Creative Commons license, unless indicated otherwise in a credit line to the material. If material is not included in the chapter's Creative Commons license and your intended use is not permitted by statutory regulation or exceeds the permitted use, you will need to obtain permission directly from the copyright holder.

# Chapter 11 Ecologies of Conflict and Coexistence in the Mediterranean: Seeking Refuge in post-war Lebanon

Tamirace Fakhoury and Miriam Aitken

### 11.1 Introduction

The Mediterranean has historically developed into a continuum of conflicts, connections, and entanglements (Tucker, 2019). Within this continuum, spaces of solidarity but also of struggle have deeply shaped the (un)making of borders, sovereignties, and governments. In a wider patchwork of "collective destinies" (Tucker, 2019, p. 2) that have nonetheless collided, the Eastern Mediterranean region, commonly framed as the Levant, has emerged as a diverse geoscape where states and societies have wrestled over the construction of borders and national pacts. A myriad of geopolitical and colonial dynamics has deeply marked the making and unmaking of such national pacts. Fairly young nation-states such as Lebanon, Syria, or Jordan were established in the context of longstanding struggles. Their postcolonial orders have contended with various political imaginaries over borders, citizenship, and otherness. In Lebanon, the 1943 National Pact or Mithaq el Watani, as Ussama Makdisi (1996) argues, comes as a historical development that not only seeks to establish the Lebanese nation-state but also to articulate a response to colonialism and citizenship in the context of dizzying struggles over sectarian representation. Similarly, in Jordan, struggles over the Hashemite Kingdom's identity in the context of contending tribal and regional allegiances have deeply shaped state-building (Valbjorn, 2019).

In addition to representing a complex terrain of shifting borders and belongings, the Levant has historically hosted millions of displaced individuals mostly from the region (Yahya & Muasher, 2018). Conflicts, cross-border struggles, and occupation

M. Aitken Modern Middle Eastern Studies at St. Antony's College, University of Oxford, Oxford, UK

T. Fakhoury (✉)

Department of Politics and Society, Aalborg University, Copenhagen, Denmark e-mail: talfa@dps.aau.dk

have spurred the mass flight of individuals, leading to a paradoxical phenomenon of open borders versus "closed citizenries" (Fargues, 2013). Indeed, states such as Lebanon and Jordan have welcomed displaced individuals but have treated them as temporary guests. At the same time, they have refused to grant them citizen status, leaving refugees in a state of liminality (Fakhoury, 2019). A prevalent policy narrative depicts incoming others as a threat to the societal and state structures that accommodate already existing communities (Yahya & Muasher, 2018).

This chapter draws on the example of refugee displacement in Lebanon to derive broader conceptions on how notions of national identity and otherness materialize, interlace, and collide in the Mediterranean. We argue that Lebanon's political system has constructed the figure of the refugee as a disrupter to Lebanon's national identity, framed in the political rhetoric as a static bond structuring relationships between already existing sectarian communities. This bond revolves around a century-old sectarian power-sharing formula in which eighteen confessions are supposed to divide political offices and resources. At the same time, refugee-centric spaces have contested such ossified conceptions of identity. Various civic and humanitarian actors have "curated" alternative spaces of hospitality. Moreover, contentious episodes including Lebanon's 2019 iconic protest movement as well as smaller-scale refugee-led protests have called for debunking the conception of a closed, exclusionary, and sectarian-tied citizenship. Protests have embraced a dynamic conception of belonging in which both citizens and non-citizens including migrants, displaced individuals and stateless persons enact citizenship (or the bond between the individual and the state) by (re)claiming their rights in their daily realities (Fakhoury & Icaza, 2023).

The chapter is structured as follows. First, we account for how Lebanon's sectarian-led model of politics has constructed Syrian displacement as a menace to the components of citizenship and sectarian coexistence. To that end, we trace the government's securitized policies since the onset of Syrian displacement in 2011. We show how they have entrenched spaces of exclusion and cast refugees as threats to the infrastructural power of Lebanon's sectarian model of politics. We then deflect focus from the policy field. Instead, we explore how humanitarian spaces, bottom-up contention, and coalitional politics from below have sought to reconfigure this politics of exclusion. In so doing, we attract attention to how the politics of refuge unlocks a heterotopic space where conflict and coexistence, exclusion and inclusion co-constitute each other, and where static and dynamic conceptions of citizenship interlace (Ataç et al., 2016; Isin & Nyers, 2014).

### 11.2 Lebanon's Policy Response to Syrian Displacement

Since the onset of Syria's lethal conflict in 2011, Lebanon has received over 1.5 million refugees (UNHCR, 2022a, b). The Lebanese state's policy response to the issue of Syrian displacement evolved from what was characterized as a "policy of no-policy" (Mourad, 2017; Geha & Talhouk, 2018; Nassar & Stel, 2019) to a more assertive stance in which the state took on an active role in shaping refugee issues (Geha & Talhouk, 2018). Lebanon's initial response to the arrival of refugees from 2011 onwards was widely lauded for its open borders. Assuming Syrian displacement to be short-term, the Lebanese government allowed Syrians to enter Lebanon freely under the terms of a previous agreement with Syria, the Treaty of Brotherhood, Cooperation and Coordination (Dionigi, 2016). Norms of hospitality and traditions of transborder loyalties framed Syrians as "brothers" (Knudsen, 2017, p. 149) and guests, notably, however, temporary ones (Fakhoury, 2017). In this initial phase, the UNHCR took charge of coordinating the response to Syrian refugees and was given a high degree of autonomy by the government (Dionigi, 2016). In 2014, as Syrian displacement became protracted, the government led at the time by former Prime Minister Tammam Salam took a more active stance against Syrian refugees. Subsequently, it imposed restrictive border controls, residence, and work regulations and in May 2015, called on the UNHCR to stop refugee registrations. In 2015, the UNCHR and Lebanon issued the first Lebanon Crisis Response Plan which officially enshrined the government's rejection of Syrian settlement in Lebanon (Janmyr, 2018). Since then, Lebanon's successive governments have scaled up their calls for refugee return. In 2022, Lebanon formally announced to the UNHCR that it can no longer host Syrian refugees in the context of its compounding crises and its deteriorating infrastructure (UNHCR, 2022a, b).

Two background factors help us to understand Lebanon's general policy framework towards Syrian displacement: The country's historical framing of its status as a non-asylum country and the politicization of Syrian displacement in Lebanon's political landscape. Historically, Lebanon has defined itself as a transit country, and has been adamantly opposed to signing the 1951 Refugee Convention or develop domestic legislation regulating refugee affairs (Janmyr, 2017; Knudsen, 2017). Indeed, the Lebanese government refuses to use the term 'refugee' (laji'). In the context of refugee displacement from Syria, it has recurrently insisted on framing Syrians as 'displaced people' (naziheen) bound to return or be resettled (Mourad, 2019, 2020). As many argue (Janmyr, 2017; Fakhoury & Abi Raad, 2018), Lebanon has justified its reluctance to ratify the Refugee Convention by fears that local integration of refugees would upset the fragile demographic balance at the heart of its consociational model of sectarian power-sharing.

Regarding the issue of Syrian refugees in particular, Lebanon's response must be seen in the context of the governing parties' polarization over the war in Syria (Fakhoury, 2017, 2021a). Relations with Syria have historically evolved into a major contentious issue, notably in light of Syria's occupation of Lebanon between 1976 and 2005. After the contentious withdrawal of Syrian troops in 2005, and with the emergence of two contending Lebanese political alliances (the pro-Syrian March 8 and the largely anti-Syrian March 14 blocs), support for or opposition to the Syrian regime became a major fault line in Lebanon's domestic politics. This polarization generated a myriad of party-driven rather than nationally coherent stances vis-à-vis the war in Syria and consequently the issue of Syrian refugee displacement (Knudsen, 2017; Fakhoury, 2017; Geha, 2019). In 2012, the Baabda Declaration affirmed Lebanon's disassociation from the conflict in Syria. In practice, however political parties have instrumentalized Syrian refugee presence to garner electoral support and maintain their positions of power (Fakhoury, 2021a). In this regard, a key political tactic lies in framing refugees as political and economic threats.

In the next sections, we show that Lebanon's securitized refugee positions in addition to its recalcitrance to endow Syrian refugees with rights must be contextualised in the wider set-up of its sectarian power-sharing system (Fakhoury, 2017; Geha, 2019). We first conceptualise the linkages between Lebanon's sectarian model of politics and its framings of refugees as threats to its political system and social fabric. Departing from this framework, we argue that framing refugees as a threat provides ruling elites with a core narrative to equate citizenship – defined here as the bond between an individual and a nation-state (Isin & Neyers, 2014) – with belonging to the sectarian mould. Second, we show the many benefits that the Lebanese state derives from constructing refugees as a threat on the one hand, and from strategically crafting ambiguous policymaking over displacement on the other.

# 11.2.1 Refugee Framings in the Context of Lebanon's Sectarian Power-Sharing System

Lebanon's power-sharing system is described as a form of corporate consociational democracy that institutionalizes power-sharing between different sectarian groups (Nagle, 2016). First made official in the 1943 National Pact after Lebanon's independence from the French mandate, the power-sharing formula was revised in the 1989 Ta'if Agreement that provided the basis for ending the 1975–1990 Lebanese Civil War. It stipulates quotas for Lebanon's eighteen recognized sects in legislative and executive positions, most notably reserving the Presidency for Maronite Christians, the position of Prime Minister for Sunni and the Speaker of Parliament for Shia Muslims (Fakhoury, 2014). Quotas are also increasingly applied to public sector jobs (Salloukh, 2019). Moreover, public status laws including the regulation of marriage, divorce or inheritance are the prerogative of confessional courts. The sectarian system thus pervades the Lebanese state and state-society relations on all levels (Nagle, 2020).

While intended to provide stability and foster harmony between Lebanon's confessional groups, the power-sharing system has strengthened sectarian identities and perceptions of difference. Moreover, the institutionalised power of sectarian leaders has fostered clientelism, corruption and elite bargaining. It has also entrenched hybrid forms of governance in which the line between formal and informal power is blurred (Huber & Woertz, 2021). In this setting, the system, which is supposedly based on consensus decision-making, results in a slow, cumbersome, and largely dysfunctional process of governance in crisis situations (Dionigi, 2016). This deadlock in formal state institutions prompts political officials to reach decisions and craft agreements informally (Geha, 2019). Negotiations are mainly driven by sectarian governing parties' interests rather than by a unified national interest.

In this regard, the state's response to Syrian displacement reflects and reproduces the logic of Lebanon's sectarian power-sharing system, both in its premise of sectarianization and in its strategies of governance (Fakhoury, 2017). As we show below, the state has reified a sectarianized and static conceptualization of citizenship, linking it to the existing parameters of power-sharing in which coexistence between sectarian communities must prevail. In this regard, the incoming other who is seeking refuge is framed as a political, economic and security threat that destabilizes the infrastructural and ordering power of sectarianism. Within this climate, the incoming other is barred access to citizenship framed herein as the negotiation of "reciprocal rights and duties between the state and the individual" (Owen, 2018).

# 11.2.2 Refugees as Threat to Lebanon's 'Cementing Glue': Securitizing Citizenship

Since the inception of the Lebanese nation-state in the wake of the French mandate, Lebanese notions of citizenship have evolved into a battleground. Sectarian groups' divergent state-building ambitions and the lack of a decolonisation struggle have undermined a unified national consciousness. This has shaped sectarian belonging as the most salient identity in Lebanese's everyday lives (Serhan, 2019). However, sectarian belonging goes beyond a simplistic reading of entrenched sectarian identities. A weak central state that fails to provide many essential services, paired with a highly patrimonial bureaucracy in which the government relies on informal sectarian power bases to exercise its functions, has strengthened sectarian belonging (Atzili, 2015). Most importantly, the political system itself defines pre-determined sectarian identities as the only possible basis for political power. This creates an exclusive notion of citizenship that discriminates against alternative identities, such as gender and sexual identities, and ideological, religious, and ethnic identities that do not fall within the clearly defined sectarian groups institutionalised in the system (Salloukh & Verheij, 2017). This is reflected in Lebanon's civil society which historically has been dominated by community-based rather than interest-based organisations (Clark & Salloukh, 2013). Against this background, the systemic power of sectarian elites and clientelist networks have enabled ruling incumbents to undermine alternative grassroots mobilisation seeking to challenge the system while NGOs and civil society organisations have relied on sectarian elites to access resources and influence. For example, Lebanon's 1909 Law on Associations requires organisations to notify and receive a notification receipt from the government, a process which is often delayed and without which the organisation cannot carry out key activities that allow it to fully operate such as opening a bank account or accessing international funding. The government also does not have any dedicated budgetary support for NGOs, leaving many reliant on private funding which often falls along sectarian lines (ICNL, 2021). Moreover, incumbent sectarian leaders have used their positions of power in state institutions and over the media to block or obstruct alternative NGOs work, for example by controlling media coverage (Clark & Salloukh, 2013). To conduct many activities such as public events, NGOs tend to rely on sectarian leaders who hold either formal or informal power over local authorities and institutions. This in turn leads many NGOs to "court" sectarian leaders to facilitate carrying out their activities. The dual dynamic of political elites undermining civil society organisations and NGOs themselves instrumentalising sectarian structures to advance their goals, creates a dependency in which NGOs rely on the power dynamics of the sectarian power-sharing system or are co-opted into it. This dependence on sectarian power structures has substantially undermined the agency of cross-sectarian actors or other identity-based groups within Lebanon's powersharing system (Clark & Salloukh, 2013; Salloukh & Verheij, 2017; Nagle & Fakhoury, 2021).

Within this context, the figure of the refugee which falls outside these pre-determined identity categories, embodies a "new" disruptive "minority" (Fakhoury & Abi Raad, 2018, p. 43) that transgresses Lebanon's sectarian powersharing system. Indeed, the notion of citizenship as intrinsically linked to confession has provided a fertile ground for securitizing the figure of the incoming refugee. The latter has been depicted as a demographic threat to Lebanon's delicate confessional balance that underpins its political system (Fakhoury & Abi Raad, 2018). In the eyes of key governing coalitions, the integration of 1.5 million Syrians, who are mostly Sunni Muslim, would have a significant impact on the confessional balance of Lebanon's power-sharing system. For Christian, and to a lesser extent Shia parties, this prospect poses a serious threat to their position within the political system (Fakhoury, 2017). As it became increasingly clear from 2014 onwards that Syrian displacement is protracted, elite discourse began constructing the long-term Syrian presence not simply as a crisis, but an "'existential threat'" (Dionigi, 2016, p. 20). Christian parties, including the Lebanese Forces, Kata'ib., and the Free Patriotic Movement (FPM), despite their positions on opposite sides of the March 8/March 14 fault line, all evoked the threat of Syrian refugees to Lebanon's demographic balance. In particular, the FPM who forms a major part of the pro-Syrian March 8 bloc and is allied with the Shia Hezbollah has painted the largely Sunni Syrian refugees as a threat to the balance between Christians and Muslims in Lebanon (Fakhoury, 2017). In this context, government officials have repeatedly voiced to international organisations such as the United Nations (UN) Lebanon's categorical rejection of refugee naturalization (Fakhoury & Abi Raad, 2018).

The securitisation discourse around Syrian refugees however is not new. It has a striking precedent in the historical narrative of Palestinians in Lebanon (Fakhoury, 2021a). In the wake of Palestinian displacement after the 1948 Nakba, there emerged a cross-sectarian consensus amongst Lebanon's political elites to reject the naturalization of Palestinians (Serhan, 2019). This has been enshrined in Lebanon's political order through the repudiation of 'tatween', literally 'implantation'. The term's exact meaning is ambiguous (Janmyr, 2017). In Lebanon's dominant political discourse however, tatween is equated with the naturalization and permanent settlement of Palestinian refugees in Lebanon (Serhan, 2019). While this stance has, in part, been justified by Lebanon's geopolitical positioning vis-à-vis Israel and the claim to uphold Palestinians' right of return (Fakhoury, 2021b; Sanyal, 2017), it also reflects politicians' attempt to construct the Palestinian presence as a threat to "the very existence of Lebanon and the Lebanese people" (Serhan, 2019, p. 249). Indeed, as Serhan (2019) argues, this narrative cannot be explained by the demographic threat alone. It serves a wider governance logic. By crafting consensus around the rejection of Palestinian naturalisation, the usually deeply divided political class performs unity and coherence, buttressing Lebanon's power-sharing system as an ordering and unifying frame. In other words, the exclusion of the Palestinian 'other' gives the Lebanese power-sharing system a means of consociational consensusbuilding. Moreover, the rejection of Palestinian naturalization provides an element against which Lebanese identity, as a static bond between the citizen and the state, is constructed (Ibid.). This same self-legitimizing dynamic can be seen in the political elites' unified rejection of permanent settlement for Syrians, despite initial discourses of solidarity uttered by some political parties (Fakhoury, 2017). As in the Palestinian precedent, politicians' framing of Syrian refugees as a threat provides them with an instrument for sustaining the robustness of Lebanon's sectarian model of politics. It boosts their ability to brand this model as a cementing glue that is able to produce consensus on the rejection of refugee naturalization. In this context, the refugee 'other' provides a contrasting backdrop against which the state reifies an otherwise divided Lebanese identity.

In addition to portraying refugees as a threat to Lebanon's conception of citizenship, key governing coalitions have portrayed Syrian displaced individuals as a core economic and security threat that destabilizes the nation. Depicting refugees as an economic burden to existing resources allowed political leaders to mobilize their constituencies. It also allowed them to leverage the refugee issue vis-à-vis international donors without making any efforts to improve the country's deteriorating infrastructure and service provision.

Governing parties have also made sure to portray protracted Syrian displacement as a potential avenue for conflict spill-over from Syria to Lebanon. This narrative strongly draws on Lebanon's history of Palestinian refugee militarization to justify its credibility. When the Palestinian Liberation Organisation was based in Lebanon after the 1967 Six-Day War and until 1982, Palestinian groups used refugee camps in Lebanon as a base for guerrilla warfare against Israel. Moreover, some parties used Palestinian militias as scapegoats, blaming them for the Lebanese Civil War which further underscored the marginalisation of the Palestinian community in Lebanon and the denial of their basic rights (Sanyal, 2017). Against this backdrop, some political coalitions evoked in various instances the risk that Syrian refugee settlements could provide a base for radicalised extremist groups (Fakhoury, 2017). The predominant perception of refugees as a threat to national security was further exacerbated by several security incidents along the Syrian border in Northern Lebanon, notably the 2014 cross-border clashes between Lebanese security forces and militant Islamist groups from Syria around the Lebanese border town of Arsal (Fakhoury & Abi Raad, 2018). Building on the narrative of Palestinian refugee militarization and on the likelihood that refugee camps evolve into conflict enclaves, most of Lebanon's political coalitions have vehemently refused to set up camps for Syrian refugees (Turner, 2015; Içduygu & Nimer, 2020; Sanyal, 2017). While international organizations and NGOs initially praised Lebanon's decision not to restrict refugees' housing to closed camps, it is important to contextualise this policy within Lebanon's repertoire of securitization (Turner, 2015; Fakhoury, 2017). Indeed, the perception of encampment as a step towards permanent settlement and the alleged fear that camps represent a security threat led the government to formally reject the establishment of formal camps (Nassar & Stel, 2019). This, however, prompted the mushrooming of informal settlements which has provided a rationale for security forces to enforce housing demolition orders.

#### 11.2.3 Securitization through Ambiguous Policymaking

As underscored, Lebanon's severing of the bond between displaced individuals and their access to rights must be contextualised within the state's strategies of sectarian governance and the ways it draws on displacement to assert sectarian citizenship as a governing tool. At the same time, as various scholars have shown (Sanyal, 2017; Mourad, 2019; Nassar & Stel, 2019), a reading of Lebanon's reaction to refugee displacement must go beyond a cursory analysis of securitization through deterrence measures and restrictions. An important characteristic of Lebanon's politics towards Syrian refugees consists in producing, reproducing, and performing informalized and ambiguous policies. The latter have paradoxically reinforced the state's apparatus of securitization. Indeed, this informality coupled with "institutional ambiguity" (Nassar & Stel, 2019, p. 44) has translated into greater marginalization of refugees. At the same time, ambiguous and informal policies have allowed the state to derive various strategic benefits (Fakhoury, 2021a, b). Examples abound.

On a local level, the state has tacitly authorized Syrian settlements. It has also devolved responsibilities regarding service provision and security to municipal and non-state actors operating independently and arbitrarily (Mourad, 2019). This ambiguous enforcement of regulations regarding registration, residence, and the right to work have further pushed refugees into illegality, allowing the government to avoid responsibility for the displaced population (Nassar & Stel, 2019). Scholars have contested the notion that this approach is a result of state weakness (Geha & Talhouk, 2018) or mere incapacity in the face of crisis (Nassar & Stel, 2019). Instead, the exercise of informality is seen as a deliberate strategy in what Carpi (2019, p. 92) calls a policy of "state liminality" that forms a "specific character of the Lebanese state's agency" (p. 83) and practically translates into violent repression and state neglect. Relatedly, Nassar and Stel (2019, p. 46) argue that the Lebanese state exercises a "strategic ambiguity" that aims to deter refugees through precarity and preclude long-term settlement.

On a supra-national level, Lebanon's ambiguous state response allowed it to outsource its refugee management to international organisations, particularly the UNCHR and the European Union (EU). For years, the government's depiction of refugees as an economic and security threat enabled it to deflect focus from its own collapsing system. Decades of corrupt and incompetent governance, however, have come to a head with Lebanon's financial meltdown and concomitant crises such as the 2020 Beirut Port explosion. This has cost the political elites much of their credibility in the eyes of the international community (Fakhoury, 2021a). Moreover, large parts of the Lebanese population have come to see the entrenched sectarian power structures as well as corrupt officials, rather than refugees, as the main threat to their lives and livelihoods. Nevertheless, this has not translated into changes in policies. Refugees' lived realities have continued to deteriorate in light of Lebanon's economic and financial collapse.

# 11.3 Transgressing Securitization: Refugee-Centric Spaces and Acts of Everyday Resistance

Much has been written about how Lebanon's securitized policies have constructed refugees as disrupters to conceptions of citizenship stunted within a century-old sectarian form of governance. We know however less about refugee-centric spaces and their implications for Lebanon's sectarian-centric notion of citizenship. In particular, we know less about how various actors, who by unsettling the state's politics of securitization, have unlocked alternative notions of belonging between the individual and the state.

Countless practitioner and policy reports have documented how actors including international organizations, NGOs, and religious organizations have sought to curate refugee-centric spaces and practices (UNHCR, 2017; Yassin & Chamaa, 2016; Gutkowski & Larkin, 2021). As mentioned above, the Lebanese state has in this regard outsourced key responsibilities to non-state and civic spheres in areas related to refugee livelihoods and protection. The civic sphere has played an instrumental role in filling the cracks of Lebanon's politics of reception. One of its merits has been to craft participative community solutions with a view to defusing tensions between refugee and host communities. In the last years, external and local NGOs have worked together, privileging projects that bring joint economic and social benefits for both Syrians and Lebanese.1 Local religious institutions and faith communities have established themselves as core alternative actors that have upheld a politics of hospitality (Gutkowski & Larkin, 2021; Kraft, 2015). In December 2017, Lebanese and international stakeholders adopted the Beirut declaration which seeks to turn universities into places of sanctuary as well as platforms where fact-based knowledge is produced to alter policy discourses (ALUM, 2017a, b). Referring to informal customs of hospitality or to international treaties that stress non-refoulement and dignified treatment, grassroots NGOs as well as local judges and civil society actors

<sup>1</sup> Interview with Lebanese practitioner, April 2017, Beirut.

have reasserted refugees' access to rights, disputing Lebanon's representation of itself as a non-asylum country.2

In this context, multiple actors ranging from international organizations, Lebanese community-based organizations and Syrian civil society have coalesced to carve – albeit in limited ways – spaces of hospitality in which displaced individuals have claimed their access to rights. Refugee-centric projects go beyond relief aid, service provision and legal advice. Some organize cultural initiatives showcasing refugee contributions to art and theater or debunking stereotypes about tensions between refugee and host communities. For example, the NGO Basmeh & Zeitooneh, launched in 2012, works through community centres with some of Lebanon's most marginalised refugees to provide livelihood and protection needs, but also art and cultural activities such as theatre, visual art and sport programs. Another example is Seenaryo which runs threatre and play-based learning programs with vulnerable communities in Lebanon and Jordan (Basmeh & Zeitooneh, 2022; Seenaryo, 2022). Other initiatives have launched refugee productions and art residences like the non-profit theatre company Masrah Ensemble or the Arab Puppet Theatre (Arab Puppet Theatre, 2022; Masrah Ensemble, 2022; Houssami, 2016). In a yet different perspective, some civic platforms have positioned themselves as alternative voices in humanitarian governance. They have criticized the politics of short-term humanitarian aid and diffused new scripts that frame refugees as core humanitarian actors rather than mere aid recipients (Fakhoury & Icaza, 2023; Fiddian-Qasmiyeh, 2020).

The role of civic coalitions and humanitarian actors in challenging the state's politics of securitization and thereby crafting alternative notions of belonging is important. Yet, it is equally critical here to mention how ordinary citizens and refugees as political subjects have reconceived "citizenship from the margins" (Ataç et al., 2016) by engaging in everyday acts of resistance. Contentious performances such as protests have unsettled – at least symbolically – policy scripts opposing the citizen to the external other.

Research has shown that refugee mobilizations in Lebanon have been less successful than in Turkey and Jordan (Clarke, 2018). Yet displaced Syrians have not remained passive spectators in the context of deteriorating rights and livelihoods. With Lebanon's economic collapse, they have organized week-long mobilizations in front of the UNHCR offices in Beirut. During those sit-ins, they have pointed to structural deficiencies barring their access to rights: shrinking freedoms, underfunded aid programs, lack of housing options, and absence of durable solutions for their displacement (Alfaisal, 2020; ACHR, 2020).

With Lebanon's 2019 uprising, this politics of resistance, which questions the binary between the citizen and the other, reached new heights. Throughout the uprising that initially focused on dismantling sectarian rule, protesters dispelled through marches, graffiti, and slogans the refugee crisis imaginary that incumbents have sustained over the years. Marches rallied not only for Lebanese citizens but also

<sup>2</sup> One of the authors' participant research, 2012–2020, Beirut.

for women's, LGBTQ, workers', refugees', and migrant workers' rights (Nagle & Fakhoury, 2021). In those protests, refugees shied away from direct action. Yet by highlighting transversal and subaltern struggles, protesters managed to discredit prevalent narratives of the "other" as a liability. Instead, they riveted attention on Lebanon's political regime as the key threat (Fakhoury & Icaza, 2023).

While it is hard to assess the policy impact of such acts of contention, it appears necessary to account for their symbolic and cognitive implications. As argued by Ataç et al. (2016), such performances yield consequences. By contesting exclusion or calling for social justice and fairer human rights regimes, such struggles enact a conception of citizenship dissociated from passports, borders or from the narrow focus of national institutions (Ataç et al., 2016). They also attract attention to how rights and citizenships may be "enacted" beyond territoriality (Isin & Nyers, 2014, p. 7).

#### 11.4 Conclusion

In this chapter, we looked at ecologies of conflict and coexistence as well as inclusion and exclusion through the lens of refugeeness. We explored how the sectarian-based Lebanese political system has shaped the figure of the refugee as a disrupter to the notion of citizenship. The latter defines the bond between the individual and the state primarily through the lens of the territorially bound sectarian formula. At the same time, we explored how humanitarian and refugee-centric spaces have challenged such static conceptions of identity and citizenship and negotiated alternative visions of belonging with refugees and civil society actors as active agents. Indeed, through a variety of repertoires ranging from solidarity networks to protests, refugees and citizens alike have re-envisioned alternative framings of citizenship for Lebanon. Such framings defy exclusionary understandings of reciprocal rights and duties negotiated between the individual and the state within the confines of the nationstate. Here, we attracted attention to how such contending visions of crafting citizenship from below shape, contest, and coexist with spaces of securitisation.

The Lebanese case is no exception. For centuries, migration across the Mediterranean has conjured key questions at the heart of active inclusion and exclusion. The enduring displacement of Syrian refugees both in Syria's neighboring countries and in Europe has brought to the fore a myriad of unresolved dilemmas about belonging and identity. At the same time, refugee humanitarian and activist spaces are evidence that the notion of belonging is so much more than a static bond between the individual and the state within territorial confines (Selim, 2021). Notions of belonging may represent strategies for survival but may also indicate the quest for dignity and community (Pearlman, 2021). The Lebanese case thus has broader relevance for understanding what appears to be a discrepancy between the Mediterranean's hospitable and securitised spaces (Tucker, 2019). Refuge emerges here as a shifting terrain where the volatile relationship between open borders and exclusionary meanings of citizenship is tested on an everyday basis.

#### References


Tamirace Fakhoury is Associate Professor of Political Science and Global Migration and Refugee Studies at Aalborg University in its Copenhagen Campus in Denmark, visiting Professor at Sciences Po (Paris) and former Kuwait Chair at Sciences Po. Previously, she was Associate Professor of Political Science and International Affairs at the Lebanese American University and the Director of the Institute for Social Justice and Conflict Resolution. Tamirace has recently earned the Carlsberg Monograph Fellowship to write a book on political systems, conflict and time. Her core research areas are power-sharing and post-conflict governance, refugee and migration governance, norm contestation in the international system, and the European Union's conflict resolution and migration policy.

Miriam Aitken is an MPhil candidate in Modern Middle Eastern Studies at St. Antony's College, University of Oxford. She holds a MA in Human Rights and Humanitarian Action from Sciences Po Paris and a BA in International Relations from King's College London. She is currently a Research Associate at the International Crisis Group and previously worked as a Research Assistant at the Kuwait Chair at Sciences Po Paris. She received the Kuwait Program at Sciences Po Student Paper Award for her paper "From Martyr's Square to the Global Stage: An Analysis of the Spatial Dialectics of the 2019 Lebanese Thawra". She has also published in the Oxford Middle East Review and with the International Crisis Group.

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# Part III Taxonomies of Motion and Drivers

# Chapter 12 Root Causes of Irregular Migration in the Eastern Mediterranean: The Case of Afghans and Syrians

Ahmet İçduygu and Birce Altıok

### 12.1 Introduction

Over the last four decades, conflict, political turmoil, and economic devastation in Afghanistan and, more recently, in Syria, have resulted in the emergence of numerous irregular migrants and refugees. Initially, they sought refuge in neighbouring countries such as Iran and Pakistan (in the case of Afghanistan) and Turkey, Lebanon, and Jordan (in the case of Syria). Subsequently, they embarked on a journey to enter Europe through a migration corridor that developed in the Eastern Mediterranean. However, faced with the stringent policies of "Fortress Europe," the majority of these migrants and refugees find themselves compelled to enter Europe without proper authorization, thereby placing them in an irregular migratory context.

This chapter evaluates the initiation and perpetuation of migratory flows from Afghanistan and Syria to Europe, which operate through the Eastern Mediterranean corridor over the decades. It establishes a connection between the root causes of migration and the notion of fragile or weak statehood, as well as protracted refugee situations. It is important to note that other countries, such as Iraq in the Middle East, can also be examined within the framework of weak statehood, considering their migratory flows spanning over three decades. Therefore, the theoretical and analytical framework presented in this chapter can be extended to encompass other countries and regions. The selected cases, focusing on migration flows from Afghanistan and Syria to Europe via the Eastern Mediterranean, provide a valuable

A. İçduygu (✉)

The Department of International Relations and the Department of Sociology, Koç University, Istanbul, Turkey e-mail: AICDUYGU@ku.edu.tr

B. Altıok

Migration Research Center at Koç University (MiReKoc), Koç University, Istanbul, Turkey e-mail: baltiok@ku.edu.tr

framework for understanding the root causes of irregular migratory flows that have significant impacts on the Eastern Mediterranean region and Europe as a whole. Although the concepts of "root causes" and "fragile or weak state" may be subjects of debate, they possess analytical value by connecting to various aspects of the irregular migration systems between the Global North and Global South. Given the scarcity of research on the relationship between weak statehood, refugee flows, and irregular migration, and their implications for migratory systems between the Global South and Global North, exploring this connection through an analytical framework applied to selected case studies is crucial. By focusing on weak statehood, this chapter delves into the dynamics and mechanisms behind the root causes of irregular migration and asylum flows, providing insights into why and how people choose specific migration routes over time. The resulting discussions also contribute to the assessment of policy outcomes for the effective governance of irregular migration and refugee flows.

Within the framework of a historical and comparative study, this chapter first presents an analytical framework that establishes a relationship between the notion of state fragility and the root causes of migration. This framework aims to explain the initiation and perpetuation of irregular migration and refugee flows over time. Secondly, at a macro level, drawing upon desk research and secondary data, the chapter evaluates the formation of a migratory system between these selected fragile states and Europe. It specifically focuses on the transit country role of Turkey, situated in the Eastern Mediterranean. Lastly, at a micro level, the chapter examines the linkages between the situation in fragile states, the individual intentions of movement, irregular journeys, and destination choice based on in-depth interviews conducted with Europe-bound Syrian and Afghan migrants in Turkey.

# 12.2 Linking the Concept of State Fragility with Root Causes of Migration

The analytical and theoretical framework of this study explores the concept of weak statehood as a fundamental driver of migration, examining two critical country cases—Afghanistan and Syria—from three key perspectives. Firstly, by considering weak statehood as a root cause, we gain a valuable tool that not only explains the initiation of migratory flows but also sheds light on their perpetuation over time. In this context, migration from Afghanistan and Syria, with a subsequent direction towards Turkey and the Eastern Mediterranean, is viewed as a consequence of weak statehood stemming from social, economic, and political turmoil in these countries. Secondly, linking weak statehood to the underlying causes of migration enhances our understanding of the dynamics and mechanisms of mixed flows, encompassing irregular migrants, asylum seekers, and refugees. Lastly, this connection carries significant policy implications and serves as a critical instrument for fostering improved governance of migration. Within this framework, we commence with an examination of the concept of weak statehood and its various interpretations in the literature, subsequently establishing its relevance within the theoretical context through the aforementioned three main arguments.

Over the past two decades, the concept of "fragile states" or "weak statehood" has become widespread within the developmental and policy-oriented sectors, yet its analytical adaptation has been lacking. The concept has been defined in multiple ways, leading to considerable criticism due to its lack of clarity, susceptibility to political motives, and its emphasis on Western governance standards (Fisher, 2014; Nay, 2013). Within the academic literature, a significant range of definitions for "fragility" can be found. These definitions primarily revolve around the state's performance in what is perceived as its core tasks. However, disagreements arise when it comes to identifying these core functions and the necessary capacities for states to effectively carry them out. While acknowledging the criticisms expressed by others, this study adopts the concept of weak statehood to refer to a statehood that is dysfunctional. In general, the determinants of weak statehood can be categorized into three main groups: (1) social aspects, which encompass the large-scale movement of individuals into and out of the country, resulting in a humanitarian crisis and the deterioration of the state's social infrastructure; (2) economic factors, which involve uneven economic trajectories that favour specific groups or significant disruptions leading to a decline in state capacity; and (3) political indicators, which include the overall delegitimization of the state, criminalization, failure to provide public services, arbitrary enforcement of laws, human rights violations, and the control of coercive means by certain groups. (Sekhar, 2010). A closer examination of the literature reveals further exploration of alternative definitions and categorizations. Ferreira (2017) distinguishes between two groups of fragility definitions based on the latter component. One set of definitions assesses the strength of a state (as opposed to its fragility) based on state effectiveness and legitimacy, while others utilize a three-dimensional framework that incorporates, with some variation, the concepts of legitimacy, capacity, and authority. (Ibid).

Building upon the aforementioned definitions, weak statehoods are conceptualized here as governments that lack the necessary legitimacy, capability, and authority to effectively fulfil their essential functions. The fragility of nations is closely associated with political unrest, social conflicts, and economic instability (Bissell & Natsios, 2001; Guillaumont & Guillaumont Jeanneney, 2011), which also contribute to the emergence of migration flows. When states fail to protect their citizens or meet their basic needs, individuals residing within the country may feel compelled to leave the country. Migrants in this category, who depart due to the inability to maintain their basic living conditions caused by insufficient governance, can be classified as "survival migrants" (Betts, 2013). Up until this point, weak statehood has proven valuable in explaining the initiation of migratory flows as individuals seek refuge from volatile situations in their respective countries. However, the concept is equally instrumental in comprehending the continuation of migratory flows over time. For instance, the study conducted by Martin-Shields (2017) has offered preliminary evidence of this relationship through a descriptive analysis of data from UNHCR and IDMC. The findings reveal that countries lacking significant deficiencies in terms of state authority, capacity, and legitimacy experience notably smaller flows of internal displacement and refugees compared to states with deficiencies in at least one of these aspects. Furthermore, the study suggests that low authority and capacity play a more prominent role in conflict-driven internal displacement compared to low state legitimacy. The lack of state authority can manifest in violent local conflicts, triggering migration flows between different regions within a country. If the state fails to effectively address these internal migration flows, it can lead to further displacement. This means, while weak statehood can trigger refugee flows, particularly when a state's weak authority and capacity result in economic and social unrest (Martin-Shields, 2017), this also impacts the perpetuation of migrant flows over time.

By applying the analytical framework of weak statehood and migration to the Mediterranean region, a growing dichotomy has emerged between migrants who are in a favourable situation and those who are considered unwanted (Van Mol & de Valk, 2016, p. 53). In this context, the link between weak statehood and different categories of migrants from the same origin country provides an explanation for the occurrence of such divergences. For example, the relationship between unwanted and accepted migrants mirrors the relationship between non-failed states and failed states, which plays a significant role in understanding irregular migration in the Mediterranean, where irregular entry is prevalent (Wolff & Hadj-Abdou, 2018, p. 384). The issue of skilled and unskilled migrants, as well as the categorization of migrants as "accepted" with regular status, prompts us to explore the connection between weak statehood and mixed flows. The connection between weak statehood and the perpetuation of migratory flows over time gives rise to overlapping categories within migration movements, including irregular migrants, asylum seekers, refugees, migrants with residence or work permits from the same origin country, and so on. Therefore, considering weak statehood as a root cause of migration provides a crucial qualification to understand not only refugee flows but also their connection to mixed migratory flows.

The final aspect of considering weak statehood as the root cause lies in its link to policy relevance and the promotion of good governance in migration. As discussed earlier, the conditions that give rise to weak statehood not only impact the initiation of migratory flows but also contribute to their persistence over time, resulting in diverse dynamics and mechanisms within mixed flows. Hence, within the framework of fostering good governance in migration, comprehending the connection between weak statehood as a root cause of migration becomes essential for effective policy governance. This is particularly crucial within the institutional framework for establishing legal norms, policies, and practices that regulate and manage migration while addressing the underlying drivers of migration through good governance. In this regard, well-established and well-managed migration policies necessitate the involvement of various stakeholders. In situations characterized by weak statehood, macro-scale interventions and assistance are considered as mechanisms to address the root causes of migratory movements and reduce the flow of refugees. If appropriately managed, such interventions can serve as tools for promoting good governance in migration. However, the effectiveness of these mechanisms in weak statehood contexts remains a subject of intense debate.

The question of aid and its impact on the continuous flow of refugees has been examined by various scholars, including Dreher et al. (2019), who found no evidence suggesting that total aid provided to origin countries reduces the overall outflow of refugees in the short term. In the case of Afghanistan, a protracted conflict following the Soviet invasion in 1979 severely disrupted the country's public institutions and economy. During the Taliban regime from 1996 to 2001, the state failed to effectively deliver services. Recognizing the significance of Afghan stability for regional and global security, the international community made political and financial commitments to reconstruct the country. This situation made the role of aid increasingly important. However, donors adopted different modes of aid delivery but as far as the total aid is concerned, a large portion of aid flew outside the government budget and national procurement system. Consequently, a parallel public sector emerged, surpassing the size of permanent state institutions and diverting significant political and financial resources away from the development of effective state institutions (Bizhan, 2018; Marquette, 2011). Although aid contributed to economic growth and the expansion of public services, post-2001 Afghanistan faced challenges in maintaining its pre-existing military and administrative capacity. Statebuilding strategies and the aid regime did not effectively foster the development of a strong state. Despite heavy reliance on foreign aid, with over \$150 billion sent for non-military purposes from 2001 to 2020, in addition to substantial contributions from allies and international organizations (Shah, 2021), the absence of adequate checks and balances contributed to systemic corruption, economic mismanagement, and the president's exclusive and unrestricted access to a significant share of government funds (Ibid). Consequently, Afghanistan continues to be characterized as a failed, weak, and fragmented state, unable to provide effective services or protect its citizens. In the context of our case studies, the effectiveness of aid mechanisms as part of good governance contributes to the perpetuation of weak statehood and has a causal effect on the persistence of migration flows.

In a nutshell, these three aspects of weak statehood connected to the root causes of migration are, first, linked to the initiation as well as the perpetuation of migratory flows, second, linked to the divergence of mixed categories of migrants, and finally to the good governance aspect connected to weak statehood. To provide a better understanding of the indicators observed in the cases of Syria and Afghanistan, and their connection to the Eastern Mediterranean over the past few decades, this chapter adopts Carling's model (2002, 2014), which outlines the "conditions" and "prospects" that drive aspirations for migration, eventually leading to migration outcomes. As previously mentioned, the economic, social, and political conditions associated with weak statehood create discomfort for individuals. As migration outcomes persist and interventions continue, they influence the "drivers" and "determinants" of migration, perpetuating a cycle of migratory flows. This can also be seen in the networks that assist or resist migrants, providing them with opportunities to settle and maintain connections with their home countries (İçduygu & Karadağ, 2018). These opportunities can result in the formalization of different migrant categories, which can be linked to weak statehood. Therefore, any attempts that reproduce weak statehood, such as external interventions that fail to address structural fragility, further contribute to the "conditions" and "prospects" for increased mobility and, consequently, more migratory flows.

# 12.3 Weak Statehood as the Root Causes of Perpetuating Migratory Flows – Historical Evidence from the Cases of Afghanistan and Syria

This section aims to provide a historical perspective on migratory flows originating from Afghanistan and Syria, passing through Turkey, and reaching the Eastern Mediterranean and Balkan regions, eventually arriving in Europe over the past few decades. It also aims to contextualize more recent migratory flows from Afghanistan and Syria to Europe, with a particular focus on the last decade. Understanding this history is crucial for developing a more critical understanding of current border and migration politics in the Eastern Mediterranean region as a whole, and specifically between the EU and Turkey, which plays a central role in shaping migratory dynamics in the Eastern Mediterranean.

Chronologically, to start with the Afghan case, since the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979, Afghans have experienced prolonged displacement for over 40 years. In 2020, there were more than 2.8 million registered Afghan refugees, constituting the second-largest group of refugees in protracted displacement, defined as displacement lasting over five years (UNHCR, 2018). This displacement has been primarily driven by cyclical conflicts and violence. Initially, the Soviet invasion and subsequent Soviet-Afghan War prompted the exodus of 6.3 million Afghans to neighbouring countries such as Iran and Pakistan (Schmeidl, 2002, 2011; Wickramasekara et al., 2006). Following the withdrawal of Soviet forces in the early 1990s, there was a period of relative improvement in political and social conditions within the country. Emigration rates declined, and there was an increasing trend of refugees returning to Afghanistan. However, a civil war erupted between various U.S.-sponsored militia groups from 1992 to 1996, which not only deepened the collapse of the state apparatus but also triggered new waves of emigration among Afghans. The civil war and the subsequent rise of the Taliban regime resulted in another massive wave of displacement, with several million Afghan refugees seeking refuge primarily in Iran and Pakistan, and also leading to spill over effects in other parts of the world. This further exacerbated the already complex and protracted case of the Afghan displacement.

The U.S. invasion of Afghanistan and the subsequent overthrow of the Taliban regime in 2001, along with the promise of peace through a new state-building process, led to the voluntary return of over 4.6 million refugees to Afghanistan in the following decade (Schmeidl, 2002, 2011; Wickramasekara et al., 2006). However, the second decade of the U.S. War in Afghanistan has been characterized by a resurgence of the Taliban, increased opposition to foreign military forces in the country, a significant rise in civilian casualties, and a new wave of forced displacement both within and outside of Afghanistan. This period also witnessed the failure of the new state-building efforts in Afghanistan, resulting in the continuation and worsening of weak statehood in the country. As a result, during the 2010s, new waves of displacement occurred. Many Afghans sought to leave the country, not only heading to neighbouring Pakistan and Iran but also venturing further, such as irregularly crossing borders into Turkey and then making their way to European countries. In fact, the movement of Afghans along this migratory corridor to Turkey and Europe was not something new, it had a long history since the early 1980s (İçduygu & Karadağ, 2018). In this movement, migrants were not only originating directly from Afghanistan but also included Afghan refugees from Iran and Pakistan who were attempting to reach other countries. While both Iran and Pakistan initially had an open-door policy for Afghan refugees in the 1980s and 1990s, providing them with basic protection and certain services for employment, education, and healthcare, the situation gradually became more difficult for many Afghans. Since the early 2000s, deportations and forced returns of Afghans from Iran and Pakistan have become routine (Simpson, 2017). As a result of the increasingly dire conditions faced by Afghans in Pakistan and Iran in recent years, more and more Afghans have chosen to seek protection in Turkey or use it as a transit point toward EU territories, utilizing the Eastern Mediterranean and Balkan migratory corridors in the 2000s.

Concerning the Syrian case, the conflict that began in 2011 sparked one of the largest refugee crises since World War II. Apart from the internally displaced people within Syria, refugees primarily fled to neighbouring countries, including Turkey, Jordan, Lebanon, and to a lesser extent, Iraq and Egypt (İçduygu & Nimer, 2020). Initially, these countries responded by maintaining an open-door policy and allowing the flow of refugees. As a result, according to UNHCR figures in 2013, the number of Syrian refugees in Turkey, Jordan, and Lebanon exceeded a quarter of a million (UNHCR, 2022a).

In 2015, the number of registered Syrian refugees in Turkey exceeded 1.8 million, with just over one million in Lebanon and more than half a million in Jordan (Ibid). Initially, during the first few years of the conflict, the policies of these three countries emphasized the temporary nature of the refugee situation, assuming that the crisis would be resolved within a relatively short period and the refugees would eventually return (İçduygu, 2015). However, as the years passed, the approaches of these countries started to diverge. Turkey initially responded positively to the influx of Syrian refugees, viewing it as a humanitarian issue. The official discourse focused on the notion of hosting guests. On the other hand, the Lebanese government did not establish a formal national response to the refugee presence and instead delegated responsibility to organizations such as the UNHCR.1 The option of permanent settlement and integration was never considered viable. Likewise, in Jordan, Minister for International Cooperation and Planning, Imad Fakhoury, made it clear that

<sup>1</sup> The collaboration between the UNHCR and Lebanon and Jordan was regulated by the terms of a Memorandum of Understanding signed to govern the key aspects of refugee protection.

the level of integration enjoyed by Palestinian refugees from 1948 would not be repeated (İçduygu & Nimer, 2020). However, the government views the refugee population as an opportunity for national development, emphasizing the economic aspects of their presence. As time passed, the increasing number of refugees, coupled with concerns about potential security threats and the spill over of war from members of the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) across the border, led to the securitization of borders. Strict visa requirements and surveillance mechanisms were implemented to prevent migrants from accessing these three countries. Entry for Syrians was limited to extreme humanitarian cases.

In 2015, while the three neighbouring countries of Syria – Turkey, Jordan, and Lebanon – were hosting nearly four million refugees, the EU countries were greatly alarmed by the mass arrivals of refugees, most of whom were entering through Turkey and the Eastern Mediterranean and Balkan migratory corridors. Over one million refugees and irregular migrants had arrived on European shores during 2015, and tragically, nearly 4000 lives had been lost during the perilous journey (Spindler, 2015). Over 75% of those arriving in Europe had fled conflict and persecution in Syria, Afghanistan, or Iraq. This immediate development raised the question of "responsibility sharing versus responsibility shifting" between the EU member states and Turkey (and to a lesser extent, Lebanon and Jordan). Consequently, the EU and Turkey engaged in a lengthy and controversial negotiation process, resulting in an agreement known as the EU-Turkey Statement or the EU-Turkey Deal (Smeets & Beach, 2020). This agreement addressed several issues, including the return of irregular migrants crossing from Turkey to the Greek islands, the establishment of a resettlement scheme for Syrians, the prevention of new irregular migration routes, the activation of a voluntary readmission scheme which the EU member states would contribute on a voluntary basis, the acceleration of visa liberalization for Turkish citizens, and the disbursement of 3 + 3 billion euros for refugee projects (Aksel & İçduygu, 2019). As a result of this agreement, EU-funded initiatives were introduced in 2016 to facilitate refugee access to education and employment. These developments indicate that Turkish authorities indirectly accepted the possibility of longterm settlement for Syrians and took concrete steps toward their integration, although not explicitly referring to it. However, since 2016, the option of return has been frequently and strongly voiced in Turkey, particularly in the context of creating "safe zones" in Syria for refugees to return to (İçduygu & Nimer, 2020; Altıok & Tosun, 2020).

Similar trends were also observed in Jordan and Lebanon. Jordan, citing an ongoing security threat, closed its border and transitioned from a liberal employment policy for Syrians to a stricter one. However, since 2015, Syrians have been granted access to the labour market, and various measures have been implemented to facilitate permit issuance as part of the 2016 Compact deal, which involved receiving billions of dollars in grants, loans, and preferential trade agreements with the EU (Barbelet et al., 2018).

In Lebanon, the government assumed greater control over the presence of Syrians and established its first clear policy in 2014 to reduce their numbers by limiting access to the country and encouraging returns to Syria. In May 2015, the Lebanese government instructed the UNHCR to suspend the registration of Syrian refugees, accompanied by additional restrictions on labour policies and stricter oversight of informal employment at the municipal level. Consequently, the percentage of Syrian refugees with residency permits decreased, leaving them in a precarious position. In 2017, the government established a State Ministry for Refugee Affairs and partially relaxed registration and labour policies (Atallah & Mahdi, 2017). Nevertheless, Lebanon continued to receive humanitarian assistance due to its status as a host country for refugees.

The policies of Turkey, Jordan, and Lebanon, concerning reception, encampment, and integration, have undergone a shift from an open-door policy to a stricter political stance (İçduygu & Nimer, 2020). Each country has developed strategies, considering domestic and international constraints, while weighing the costs and benefits associated with hosting refugees. However, in all three countries, both the state and society began to feel the growing burden of hosting large numbers of refugees, leading to discussions about the issue of return in the absence of responsibility sharing from developed countries. In the context of limited local integration and the absence of a viable return option, many Syrian refugees in Turkey, Jordan, and Lebanon have expressed their intention to seek asylum in developed countries. Consequently, these developments have had a spill over effect, impacting other parts of the world, including Europe, in terms of the local refugee question and irregular migration.

In 2020, just five countries accounted for over two-thirds of all refugees worldwide: Syria, Venezuela, Afghanistan, South Sudan, and Myanmar (UNHCR, 2022b). Within this global context, Afghanistan and Syria hold a prominent position as the top countries of origin for refugees to Europe since the early 2010s. For instance, in 2012, approximately 16% of asylum seekers to Europe were from these two countries, a proportion that increased to nearly 26% in 2014, 17% in 2016, 21% in 2018, and 23% in 2020.2 In other words, over the past decade, Afghan and Syrian asylum seekers have accounted for more than one-fifth of all asylum seekers to Europe, predominantly arriving through migratory routes passing through the Eastern Mediterranean and Balkan regions. These two migratory routes have been the most prominent and active compared to other routes into the continent, mainly due to the significant flows from Afghanistan and Syria in the European migratory system of the past decade.

Over the years, migratory flows from Afghanistan and Syria to Europe have not been limited to asylum seekers alone. Irregular migratory flows from these two countries through the Eastern Mediterranean and Balkan regions also constitute a significant part of these movements towards Europe. According to FRONTEX

<sup>2</sup> These figures have been calculated by the authors using the EUROSTAT Asylum quarterly reporting system. For more details, please refer to the source, https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/ statistics-explained/index.php?title=Asylum\_quarterly\_report

figures3 in 2015, one-third of the detected irregular border crossings to Europe occurred along the Eastern Mediterranean and Balkan routes, with the majority of cases involving Afghans and Syrians. This proportion increased to nine-tenths of the irregular border crossings in 2015, with the vast majority still being Afghans and Syrians, during what European countries labelled as the migration or refugee crisis. Specifically, in that year, the Eastern Mediterranean witnessed 885,386 people disembarking on its coasts (mainly Greece), accounting for 84.6% of all irregular landings in the three Mediterranean basins (Eastern basin: 84.6%, Central basin: 14.7%, Western basin: 0.7%) (Frontex, 2022). This number also represented 57% of the over 1.5 million irregular border crossings recorded in the Eastern basin between 2008 and 2020 (Ibid). Due to increased border controls, restrictive policies, and practices in Europe, as well as the EU-Turkey deal of 2016 aimed at curbing refugee and irregular migrant flows through Turkey to the Eastern Mediterranean and Balkan regions, there was a relative decline in the number of irregular border crossings from these regions in 2016 and 2017. However, the figures remained significant, with nearly three-fifths of the irregular border crossings in 2016 and over a quarter of them in 2017 still taking place through these routes, primarily involving Afghan and Syrian citizens. In 2020, approximately seven-tenths of the irregular border crossings to Europe were detected along the Eastern Mediterranean and Balkan routes, once again predominantly involving Afghans and Syrians.

The cases of Afghanistan and Syria illustrate that extended periods of civil war and political turmoil, resulting in weak statehood, lead to population displacements and large-scale refugee movements across national borders. Naturally, neighbouring countries are primarily impacted by these movements as people flee their homes in search of safety elsewhere. However, the prolonged refugee situations caused by deteriorating weak statehood also have a spill over effect, affecting not only local regions but also larger parts of the world. Another consequence of these situations is the emergence and continuation of mixed migratory flows. Weak statehood contributes to the complexity of these flows, which involve various types of population movements, such as refugees, asylum seekers, economically motivated irregular migrants, unaccompanied minors, environmental migrants, smuggled persons, and victims of trafficking.

# 12.4 Micro-level Evidence: Perspectives from Migrants and Refugees

How do Afghan and Syrian migrants themselves, whether irregular migrants or refugees, experience and perceive their migratory journeys and their intentions for settlement? And how do they relate these experiences to the concept of weak

<sup>3</sup> These figures are also complied by the author from FRONTEX statistics; for details, see https:// frontex.europa.eu/documents-and-publications/

statehood as a fundamental factor behind their movements? This section presents micro-level ethnographic evidence based on selected interviews conducted with Afghan and Syrian migrants in Turkey between 2018 and 2020. These interviews shed light on the connection between weak statehood and the root causes, drivers, and determinants of migration. The insights from these interviews provide references to a migratory system that encompasses the regions of Afghanistan and Syria, through Turkey, and ultimately towards the Eastern Mediterranean migratory corridor leading to Europe.

The literature highlights the correlation between prolonged wars and the protracted flow of migration (Harrell-Bond, 1989). Similarly, the argument of weak statehood presented here offers evidence of migrants' aspirations and the perpetuation of migratory flows in situations of prolonged weak statehood. The migrant interviews provided below present parallel arguments that are connected to weak statehood and its impact on their migration aspirations.

"...When I was a child, I started to think about what kind of country I live in, the state cannot provide me with education, security, and job opportunities. I thought that it would not be possible to live in such a country. I want to go to the country that will provide good opportunities... I do not want to live in a country where there is constant uncertainty and insecurity. In Afghanistan, the state does not even meet basic needs such as water and electricity..." Interview 1: 39 years old Afghan man, married, 4 children, living in Istanbul, arrived in 2014, interviewed in 2019

A state that fails to meet basic needs and is deemed weak and failed, becomes a root cause of migration and even chain migration. The protracted situation in Afghanistan, as highlighted in the interview below, further underscores how migration flows persist due to weak statehood.

"... I am told that my grandfather fled from Afghanistan to Iran in 1985 to escape from clashes and to provide education to his children... my father was born in Iran in 1987... then my father, together his parents, returned to Afghanistan in 2002 when the situation in Afghanistan improved a bit... . I was born in Afghanistan in 2003... when I was 10, with my parents we moved to Iran... . because there were clashes, the Afghan state was not able to provide security... even finding food has become difficult... and have no opportunity of school, no job... From Iran, I came to Turkey... Iran state provides us nothing... I want to live in a place where the state makes life easier... I feel more comfortable here... .in Turkey... If Afghanistan becomes a real state where I feel secure, water, electricity, jobs, schools get better, of course I wish to go there... But European states better to provide everything to their citizens... I also want to go there..." Interview 2: 17 years old Afghan man, single arrived in 2018, interviewed in 2020

The ongoing failure of the state to ensure the safety of its citizens in an insecure environment is considered a key determinant and driver for migration. The forced migration from Syria, caused by the devastating effects of war, leads people to perceive the idea of return as futile due to the state's incapacity and inability to protect and provide for its people:

"... . After 3 years of war in Aleppo, I felt that my life has become unbearable, there is no electricity and water, the streets are filthy and destitute, children can't go to school, there is no state... there is no security without the state...then we said we must escape from here... And we did, we came to Turkey ...We will not return to Syria unless there is a state that

provides us with everything to live in happiness... There must be peace and a state together in Syria, then everything will be fine to return..." Interview 3: 24 years old Syrian women, married, 3 children, living in Gaziantep, arrived in 2013, interviewed in 2019

The distinction between a weak statehood and a 'good' and 'providing' state in the minds of individuals further diminishes the desire to return:

"... . We are now three generations of family members here. My parents, my wife, and I myself and our children... If Syrian state does not protect its citizens and there is not only one state and society, there will be no peace there. There will be no prosperity... It is the state that brings us opportunities. ... schools, roads, water and electricity, and safety... when the state collapses, everyone tries to escape from there... For my father and mother, their memories and past, their lands and home are there, but they do not want to return if there is no peace and no good Syrian state there..." Interview 4: 42 years old Syrian man, married, 4 children, arrived in 2014, interviewed in 2020

The interviews presented here aim to provide insight into how macro-level weak statehood is perceived by individuals, influencing their aspirations and migration experiences. These accounts highlight the everyday discussions surrounding the economic, social, and political conditions that contribute to weak statehood, causing discomfort for individuals. Consequently, due to these protracted cases, migration persists, and the ongoing impact of weak statehood influences the "drivers" and "determinants" of migration, perpetuating a continuous cycle of migratory flows.

#### 12.5 Conclusion

There are several primary factors that can be identified as drivers of migration and the perpetuation of people's movement. This chapter aims to shed light on the root causes of migration and examines the various ways in which they can manifest. It has been well-documented that different combinations of these factors can intertwine to shape the ultimate direction and nature of migration. Within this context, the primary challenge lies in understanding why certain causes carry more significance than others. By examining the movements of Afghans and Syrians, including irregular migrants, asylum seekers, and refugees, and considering the concept of "mixed migration", this article highlights that persistent weak statehood, coupled with prolonged conflicts and refugee situations, appears to be the primary driver behind the sustained flow of people over several decades.

One could argue that while the scale, diversity, geographical dynamics, and overall complexity of migratory flows from Afghanistan and Syria to Turkey and then to the Eastern Mediterranean have evolved over the years, a migratory corridor has been established within this larger region, perpetuating the movement of people. It appears highly unlikely that any constitutional transformation in Afghanistan and Syria will occur in the near future that could rebuild central authority and strengthen security structures. A significant portion of both countries' populations have been living abroad as refugees, and the ongoing weak statehood situations continue to contribute to the outflow of citizens from these nations. There is no guarantee that returnees would be able to establish a stable life given the social, economic, and political contexts that have been heavily disrupted by interventions, wars, and power vacuums with an excessive concentration of authoritarian power. The reluctance to return is closely intertwined with the choices made by those who are able to flee, all of which align with the weak statehood argument presented in this chapter.

In recent years, European countries have expressed increasing concern about irregular migration, as well as asylum and refugee flows, originating from Afghanistan and Syria. These movements have been viewed as both a security risk and a humanitarian challenge. In response, European countries have intensified their efforts to secure their borders in the Eastern Mediterranean and Balkans. However, within these contexts, similar migratory movements have been continuously evolving. The interplay of weak statehoods, protracted refugee situations, and mixed flows of migrants contributes to a well-established migratory system that connects countries with weak states to the European geography. This chapter highlights the significant role of weak statehood in generating ongoing flows of irregular migrants and refugees. We argue that weak statehood forms part of the migration infrastructure that continues to shape migration aspirations and outcomes. Given the persistence of weak or fragile statehood in countries such as Afghanistan and Syria, it is highly likely that prolonged refugee situations and persistent mixed flows of migrants and refugees will persist, as exemplified by the Eastern Mediterranean migratory corridor over the past four decades.

#### References


Ahmet İçduygu is a Professor at Koç University in Istanbul, Turkey, in the Department of International Relations and the Department of Sociology. He also serves as the Director of the Migration Research Center at Koç University (MiReKoc). He obtained his PhD in Demography from the Australian National University and is an elected member of the Science Academy in Turkey. In addition to his own individual research projects, Prof. İçduygu has conducted various research projects for international organizations such as IOM, UNHCR, EU, OECD, and ILO. He specializes in teaching subjects related to migration studies, theories and practices of citizenship, international organizations, civil society, nationalism and ethnicity, and research methods.

Birce Altıok is a Coordinator and post-doctoral researcher at the Migration Research Center at Koç University (MiReKoc) in Istanbul, Turkey. She completed her PhD in Political Science and International Relations at Koç University in 2021, focusing on forced migrant groups' access to activism practices in Turkey and Greece after 2010. She received the 2022 APSA Migration & Citizenship Section Best Dissertation Prize for her work titled "Refugee Activism and State Policies in Comparative Perspective: Contentious Voices from Greece and Turkey." With an MA in Human Rights Studies from Columbia University (2011) and a BS in Global and International Affairs from Binghamton (SUNY) and Boğaziçi University (2010), she has been involved in various research projects funded by TÜBİTAK, Erasmus+, Cost Action, and Horizon. She is currently a post-doc researcher in the H2020 project "Key Inclusive Development Strategies for Lifelong Learning" and a project researcher in the TÜBİTAK-funded project "Foreign Students in Turkish Higher Education: Structure, Institution and Actor Interactions in Policy-Making Processes." Previously, she contributed as one of the country members to the Cost Action "International Ethnic and Immigrant Minorities' Survey Data Network" (2017–2021). She has publications on foreign policy, social cohesion, and civil society.

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# Chapter 13 Mobilities Among Marginalized Youth in Morocco: Precariousness, Agency and Networks

Boutaina Ismaili Idrissi, Rachid Touhtou, and Carles Feixa

### 13.1 Introduction

Post-Arab Spring youth were disillusioned with the failures of youth led uprisings to democratize regimes and social life in the Arab countries (Belghazi & Moudden, 2016; Bayat, 2010a; Bayat, 2010b; Bogaert & Emperador, 2011; Catusse & Blandine, 2016). This disillusionment led to lack of belief in the future of Arab states and the impossibility to reform Arab authoritarian regimes; hence the idea of migration was renewed as an individual project to escape post Arab spring state failures to secure employment and dignified life for these youth (Fargues & Fandrich, 2012). Covid 19 pandemic exacerbated the youth precariousness and lack of opportunities. The closure of borders decreased mobility of migrants and youth searching for a better life (Schofberger & Rango, 2020). the post Covid waning of mobility measures opened new hope for migrants to move. Stories started to be reported on the waves of irregular migrants crossing the Mediterranean.1 The parenthesis of Covid-19 ended and massive waves of irregular migrants from the

B. I. Idrissi (✉)

Faculty of Law, Economics & Social sciences of Agdal, University Mohammed V Rabat, Rabat, Morocco

e-mail: b.ismaili@um5r.ac.ma

C. Feixa Pompeu Fabra University, Barcelona, Spain e-mail: carles.feixa@upf.edu

<sup>1</sup> Selected news on the rising waves of irregular migrants across the Mediterranean post COVID: https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-57168701; https://www.europol.europa.eu/ media-press/newsroom/news/28-arrested-for-smuggling-migrants-in-rubber-boats-morocco-to-spain;

R. Touhtou National School of Statistics and Applied Economics, Rabat, Morocco e-mail: r.touhtou@insea.ac.ma

Southern Shores of the Mediterranean began the endless crossing of the Mediterranean. Stierl & Dadisc states that, "The Mediterranean border zone has received considerable attention over the past decade, especially since the turmoil of the Arab Uprisings "re-opened" the central Mediterranean corridor in 2011, leading to increased migrant crossings" (2022, p. 1456). In this context, recent trends in the migratory trajectories of individuals in Morocco reveal new forms of migration regimes as well as new migrant subjectivities. Our focus would be to analyze youth narratives on migration. Despite the disappearance of migrants crossing to Europe, the visibility of fragility and precariousness in sending countries became the visible consequences on mobility restrictions.

Based on narrative interviews among 22 young people from the neighborhood of Sidi Moussa in the city of Salé, twin city of Rabat, the Capital of Morocco, our paper argues that these marginalized youth in marginalized neighborhood express their disillusionment through a wish to migrate. The social pressure on these youth to succeed socially and the inability of the State to provide them with a decent life intensify the migration dream. The social expectations dimension to succeed pressurizes migrants and produces youth as agents of change in their families and in their society (intersectional dimensions of youth and social practices). Marginality and illegality are key concepts in our paper when dealing with young people wish to realize the migration project.

#### 13.2 A Theoretical Framework

How to capture the multidimensional levels that influence the migratory regime is a question that is now being addressed by scholars from different disciplines (Bakewell & Jónsson, 2013; Berriane & De Haas, 2012; Berriane et al., 2015). Therefore, researchers tend to classify migration theories according to various factors such as the origin of such theories, migration patterns, relevant disciplines, and application of such theories in the present context. Hammar et al. (2021) attempt to classify theories by using levels of migration. As per Hammar et al. (2021) and Faist and Faist (2000), migration theories are divided into three main categories as micro-level, macro-level and meso-level of migration (Fig. 13.1). Micro-level theories consider migration decisions from an individual's perspective i.e., a person's desires and expectations. Macro-level theories consider migration decisions from an aggregate point of view, i.e., the economic structure of the country. Meso-level is where migration decisions lie in between the two former theories, i.e., family bonds, social networks, peer groups and isolated minority communities (Wickramasinghe & Wimalaratana, 2016).

https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/over-2700-migrants-illegally-enter-spains-ceuta-enclavereports-2021-05-17/

Source: Wickramasinghe, A. A. I. N., & Wimalaratana, W. (2016:18)

Fig. 13.1 Migration theories: level based analysis. (Source: Wickramasinghe, A. A. I. N., & Wimalaratana, W. (2016:18))

Table 13.1 Motivations for migration


Source: Migration and Remittances. Eastern Europe and the Former Soviet Union, (Eds.) A. Mansoor, B. Quillin, World Bank, 2006

In connection with this conceptual framework, the World Bank proposed a catalogue of factors encouraging mobility. They were classified according to various reasons, i.e. economic and demographic, political, social and cultural (Table 13.1).

In the same line of reasoning, Castles (2012) argues that "A key dimension of migration theory lies in conceptualizing the way social transformation processes act at different spatial levels (local, regional, national and global). Analyzing the mediation and transformation of global forces by local or national cultural and historical factors can help overcome the division between top-down and bottom-up approaches. This implies that attempts to create a 'general theory of migration' are unlikely to be helpful, because such a theory would be so abstract that it would give little guidance to understanding any real migratory processes. Rather migration theory needs to be historically and culturally sited, and to relate structure and action" (p. 30). The connection among "location" and "translocation" as push factors in the migration model of these youth is context-dependent on their social situation and global influences as well. Micro analysis provides depth in understanding the logic underneath decisions to migrate. Added to the micro level analysis, migration research should take into consideration "intersectionality" as theorized by (Collins, 1998; MacKinnon, 2013) where examining the interrelatedness of gender, race, class and nation not as distinctive social hierarchies but using intersectionality as a means of examining how they mutually construct one another. Being young and marginalized intersect to create resilient push-factors to migrate.

While youthfulness and marginalization play a role in the desire to migrate, Van Hear (1998) talks about two main other aspects as part of the approach to understand the migration regime: (1) Individual decision-making and motivation where the nexus cost-benefit judgments are made in economic terms; also, social and cultural motivations to enhance status are at play. (2) Household decision-making and strategies where the household as the key focus of decision-making interacts with the agent.

However, Van Hear (1998) is not satisfied with only these aspects but adds that human agency shapes such decisions through force and choice as elements of change. Bakewell and Jónsson (2013) used the concept of "iterative agency" to argue for an expansion of the agency model in order to integrate with the migration system. In the same way, Russel and Michael (1992) that, "International migration trends are rather like aggregate fertility rates, which although heavily influenced by societal and governmental forces, ultimately are determined by the rather intimate decisions of individuals". (p. 5).

Intimate decisions to migrate are at stake when two transformative processes happened in the Southern countries of the Mediterranean, Revolutions and the Pandemic; the intimacy is a desire to migrate as an individual to escape precariousness; however, the migratory project is interlaced with the social environment where the individual survived; to escape marginalization and to save the whole family became intertwined in the migratory project (Sadiqi & Ennaji, 2008). For a sociological understanding of agency, we refer to Saba Mahmood (2005) who argues that Agency is understood as the capacity to realize one's own interests against the weight of custom, tradition, transcendental will, or other obstacles (whether individual or collective). Thus, the humanist desire for autonomy and self-expression constitutes the substrate, the slumbering ember that can spark to flame in the form of an act of resistance when conditions permit. (p. 9).

The agency perspective (Katherine, 2006) recognizes the young migrant as socially embedded, active, intentional agent who influence as much as they are influenced by the social context in which they are located. In an attempt to rethink agency in migratory processes, Hein De Haas (2021) brings two concepts to the migratory agency and mobility to open up new horizons in understanding 'im'mobilities. He argues that aspirations and capabilities dynamize the subjective aspects related to agency by expanding people's aspirations to migrate; moreover, increasing capabilities expand aspirations. Hein De Haas argues that "international migration had become so strongly associated with material and social success that many youngsters had become virtually obsessed with leaving". This is an example of this growth in aspirations as result of increase in the capabilities. Despite growing local access to materialism and wealth in some regions in Morocco, international migration did not stop. On the contrary, the aspirations to migrate grows because people have access to money, information and positive feedback mechanisms. Hein De Hass argues that aspirations/capabilities approach takes into consideration both processes related to migration, mobility and immobility. Furthermore, he brings another important example related to our fieldwork, which is the inability to migrate because of lack of resources. He argues that "if people feel deprived of the capability to move, the concomitant frustration of being 'trapped' may fuel migration aspirations and can even create an obsession with 'getting out'".

It is an approach which highlights the process of self-reflection of potential migrants and attempting to relate their actions, feelings and thoughts to the wider socio-cultural context of their changing place and positionality. Migration in this context should be understood as a dynamic process within dynamic circumstances. The migratory project is a manifestation of agency in the interactive process between actors and structures. The voices of these youth in the narratives express Beliefs about the social world at large. Young people dreaming of migration and talking about their (un)fulfilled dream construct and alter the dream by dialogue and experiences with others. Life experiences and accounts of individuals' interpretation of such reflects the society they reside and fully live in. This is the reason why it is imperative to listen to the participants' own voices in studying youth dream to migrate constructions of their identities (Mouna et al., 2017; Murphy, 2012; Paciello, 2012).

#### 13.3 Context of the Study

Situated in front of the Western coastal shores part of the Atlantic Ocean, Sidi Moussa, one of the marginalized neighborhoods "Houma2 " where the fieldwork was conducted (Touhtou, 2021), it is a changing "Houma" from a chanty town to social affordable housing. The research is focusing on 14 streets of Sidi Moussa located in the twin city of Rabat, and outside the walls of the old city Salé called the City of Corsairs as well; the Republic of Sale or the Republic of Bouregreg founded during the seventeenth century which was well-known by the corsairs' activities as a

<sup>2</sup> Neighborhood in Moroccan Arabic.

retaliation of the Reconquista that have shaped the seventeenth century (Ismaili Idrissi, 2021).3,4

Sidi Moussa is considered as one of the unsuccessful examples of neighborhood that reflects the bad local governance of the municipalities in dealing with the extension of the city and/or with internal movement of population coming from other poor areas in Morocco that was exacerbated by periods of drought, low economic performance of the country since 1980. Despite institutional efforts to get these young people from street, many are still stuck in the neighborhood with drug dealers, illegal alcohol smugglers and narcotics addicted. The dominance of street vendors and informal sector survival worsens the situation of these young people and their surroundings.

Sidi Moussa youth are not at all known in the landscape of youth either in Morocco or worldwide. Apart from moments where big movie industries came to shot in the neighborhood. Sidi Moussa was deemed to be pretty like Mogadishu, where the working-class district was transformed into the Somali capital.5 These youth create their own performances of survival and resistance. Lives of "bricolage", precariat beings are struggling to stay alive, resisting the stereotypes and the circulating images on their existence.

The only available informal work they can do is to work in the Joutia; it is made up of trash and unused goods that are given value and sold for people who cannot afford buying new brand items; traders bring secondhand goods from the EU or locally; it is famous among people with limited incomes. Sidi Moussa neighborhood looks like Joutia, hence trash and the youth stuck here are trapped in trash. When the police talk to the youth, they call them "makaribs", plural of Microbes in Moroccans Arabic. The trash neighborhood and the microbe youth are either disposable or unseen. The invisible young people from the Streets without names are fighting to be visible and seen. Even the streets they live did not have names; their streets do not exist as names because naming is human and their case "trash" which is disposable is numbered. They live in street 0, one until fourteen. It is classifying the unwanted by giving them secret codes.

<sup>3</sup> At that time, the port of Salé was the main location of captures of Christians considered as prisoners of war (up to 800 Christians annually between 1618 and 1626). In 1635, 1500 of Christians slaves were captured at Salé which represented nearly 9% of the local population of the city (nearly 16,000 inhabitants). This number has reached a maximum figure of about 3000 captives in 1690.

<sup>4</sup> www.upf.edu/web/euromedmig/policy-paper-series

<sup>5</sup>"Black Hawk Down" was shot in Sidi Moussa in 2001.

#### 13.4 Data and Methodology

This paper is based on interviews conducted between 2020 and 2022 with 22 young people from the Sidi Moussa neighborhood (Sánchez-García et al., 2021).6 The sample was drawn using a non-probability sampling because the population base is not easily identifiable, and the method used is called "snowball". It asks first a subgroup of the population, which identifies other group members which, in turn are interviewed, and designate other persons in the population, and so on. Though this method remains not extensive, fast and easy to use, it does not allow for the statistical margin of error and thus the accuracy of the estimates produced is unknown, hence we cannot extrapolate the results to all the population and individuals interviewed represent only themselves. This sampling method is particularly suited to our research objectives: individual motivations to migrate outweigh the degree of the phenomenon itself and its characteristics and will also enable us to grasp the meaning and interpretation of the migration experience explained by individuals belonging to various strata. During the interviews, migration as a project became visible in their narratives. Migration is a means to escape the neighborhood, escape marginality, violence, poverty and lack of future. Prior to interviews, observation and participant observation were conducted to understand the youth mobility situation.

The youth interviewed are all from one neighborhood aged between 20 and 30. They are youth transitioning to adulthood, the social pressure hence on the youth to succeed and think of independence is weighing on their subjectivities. Majority are males as it is a male-dominated neighborhood where access to females was difficult; however, we could interview five females among the groups, they were either wives of interviewees, their sisters or their cousins. Majority of them are single; only two interviewees were married and have kids. They are all working in the informal sector, either as street vendors or selling drugs or jobless. All of them belong to low social classes.

The lives of these youth stuck in this neighborhood and wish to migrate by any means is the purpose of this paper to capture the intricacies involved in such decisions; poor, marginalized family households have strategies for their kids to migrate to save the whole family and succeed socially in the neighborhood. As Brettell and Hollifield (2000) declare: "While it may not be the basis for extensive theory construction, the life history method has been employed to access the rich texture of the lived experience of being a migrant and the cultural context of decision making" (p. 11). Qualitative methods such as in-depth interviews and narratives are much better suited than quantitative methods to address and further explore meanings, processes and experiences of individuals' lives. These methods are consistent with social constructionism as they provide the participants with the opportunity to account for their own experiences in their own words and further to account for how

<sup>6</sup> The data collected was under the Transgang project (2018–2022) funded by the EU and Commissioned by UPF in Barcelona.

the social world is reflective of their own perceptions of that world. Benmayor and Skotnes (1994) are very clear in presenting the way personal testimony "speaks...to how im/migrant subjects constantly build, reinvent, synthesize, or even collage identities from multiple sources and resources, often lacing them with deep ambivalence. Knowing something of the utter uniqueness of particular individual migrant experiences certainly enhances our generalizations about the group experience, but it also elicits humility about the adequacy of these generalizations and a realization that few actual individual lives fully conform to the master narratives" (p. 15).

#### 13.5 Analysis and Discussion

#### 13.5.1 Resisting Invisibility Through illegal Migration

Stories of Yassine, Ahmed, Nourredine, Fatima and others are stories of a trapped youth stuck between invisibility and trash in Sidi Moussa and open space of the Atlantic where the grass is greener on the other side. Youth were victims of a public educational system that has weakened significantly due to the shortage of resources induced by the implementation of the structural adjustment plan (SAP) in Morocco in the 80's, imposed by international organizations mainly IMF and World Bank. The shift toward a neoliberal model in the aftermath of the SAP significantly affected the quality of public services, including the education system,7 fueling a 'multi speed' society and consequently inequalities as the private sector becomes a key provider of quality schooling that leads to employment and better professional careers. These generations were left to their own destiny. Dropping from school is the first cause of street groups' existence and the search for alternatives outside the public sector recruitment. This transformation towards market economy encouraged these youth to seek contractual and intermittent jobs, almost without any safety valve mechanisms.

Yassine and his friends in Sidi Moussa have lost faith in anything in Morocco; they have one left "Forsa" (meaning opportunity in Arabic) is to migrate; the word "Forsa" have been used a lot by these young people to describe their stiffened choices to change their lives. "I will not stay here without any income, house, future; I will risk my life and migrate; I will do anything to join Spain or Italy"; "young people like in Sidi Moussa die bit by bit; we use Hashish, Narcotics to forget our hard lack; look people that pass every day from our neighborhood to join their jobs in Rabat; look at their cars, children go to the private school and they have clean clothes; we here are stuck in filth, poverty and misery; I have travelled to Libya before the Arab Spring but I was caught and deported; I have tried Turkey and I have been deported too; now I am preparing for the last journey to Spain, die or be saved".

<sup>7</sup> Private actors enjoy government support, including administrative and financial assistance.

The bricolage existence, "Zettat Rasek" do it yourself, made these youth lose support mechanisms from their already marginalized, poor families. The community is no longer able to offer these protective strategies for their survival. Many young people became potential migrants do not hesitate to enter marriages called "whites" with strangers who guaranteed them a free legal status in the country of destination or cross Gibraltar. Nourredine moved to Tangier and survived as informal street vendor waiting for the occasion to migrate illegally. He is divorced with a daughter who lives with his mother; his wife quitted him because he could not support her and his daughter. He tried many times to cross but failed. Nourredine expressed himself that, "in Tangier, I smuggled in drugs and narcotics and selling used clothes to save money to pay for the Boat". The story of Nourredine is known for thousands of youths who have no choice but to migrate illegally as legal mobility is expensive and very selective.

Yassine is a young rapper with a diploma who refused to work in Morocco; for him Migration is dignity and climbing the social ladder quickly and decently. It was his family who decided that they will pay for his eldest brother first to migrate to the Emirates to work and then his brother would help migrate and join his brother. Yassine is doing nothing now; he and a group of young people make rap songs and post them in YouTube; he is waiting for his brother to send him a job contract to join him. "Although I have a Diploma, I refuse to work here in Morocco; salaries are very low; you cannot lead a good life; you cannot get married and have a good future for your kids; my family encourages us to migrate to make our families live an upper middle life". Yassine and others dream of migration because for them migrants have a stable, comfortable life.

The young people interviewed have experienced illegal migration; they are called "Harragas", literally meaning the burners; they cross the Mediterranean ocean illegally; they tried to migrate many times; failure, imprisonment but they are not deterred to stay. It is a question of existence; either they migrate or die in the ocean; "we die here every day", as Mohamed mentioned; "I am not afraid from being eaten by a shark or drown in the ocean; but I will try tens of times and never cease of attempting to migrate". Mohamed and other are on the dole, spend the whole day sleeping and wake up at night just to smoke drugs and drink Alcohol and prepare for their next trip to the ocean. Boats of illegal migrants are also in Rabat/Salé shores; young people pay about 3000 euros to get in the boat to cross to Spanish shores.

Ali is a young person from the neighborhood who acted in many international movies shot in Sidi Moussa; he got the virus of migration from being exposed to these movies; he played as a sidekick and then was convinced that migration is the best solution for him. Ali lost any link to social life with his family and his neighbors; he is obsessed with migrating to Europe. He refuses to work here in Morocco. "I will migrate legally or illegally; I will try and try until I realize my dream, or I will commit suicide". "I cannot live here in Morocco; I was born for Europe". The migration dream in this case is becoming an obsession and an obstacle to integrate and lead a normal life in the country of origin.

# 13.5.2 Trapped Lives: Migration as Household Strategy of Survival

The experience of migration is generally perceived by the migrant or the potential migrant as an opportunity to improve his or her economic situation, to open up new horizons and allow their children to receive a good education and health system that will allow them to succeed. Fatima has daughters in the Gulf countries; for Fatima, migration has saved her from prostitution and networks of drugs and narcotics; she is a famous woman in the neighborhood; through her connection, she could secure rich marriages for her beautiful daughters with men from Gulf countries who used to come to her house for prostitution. Fatima, through her daughters, bought a big house in the neighborhood, a four-wheel new brand car and lead an upper middle status through her spending and style of life. "My two daughters are my life; they saved me from poverty and marginality; they send me lot of money; I invested their money in two projects for my two other sons; without migration, I would still be a pimp and my daughters would be in the prostitution and my sons in prison". The story of Fatima is similar to other cases of other parents that are household heads invest in their sons and daughters to migrate to change their social situation.

Migration for these trapped lives in this poor neighborhood is a saving strategy for the whole household, securing the future of the whole family. Another woman, Hajja Fatima, has a daughter in Sweden; her daughter is the only breadwinner for the whole 7-member family household in Sidi Moussa. Her daughter met her future husband here in Morocco and married him and took her to Sweden. Hajja Fatima's daughter was already a divorced woman with a daughter, left with Hajja; the migrant daughter spends a monthly salary for Hajja to care for the other sons and daughters. This is also a case of one person sacrificing his whole life for the well-being of his family in the country of origin. Sidi Moussa families who are well off have their sons and daughters abroad and lead a good life thanks to the remittances they receive. Being trapped in a marginalized neighborhood with no resources and lack of opportunities, migration became a whole family project to save the family. Migration opens up horizons of social change for these families.

#### 13.5.3 The Migration Culture and Agency

The migration culture existing both in the Household or the location where the interviewee lives is a push factor for migration. Migration culture intermingles with individual decision and Household decision produce a permanent migratory process with one family but with diverse extensions to family members, relatives and neighbors. The migratory regime when it demonstrates through cases motivations to non-migrants, it then launches the system. Ahmed have never thought of migration; but seeing his neighbors live a good life because of migration convinced him that migration is the best way to lead a dignified life. Ahmed expressed his wish "look at the families next to us; they have their daughters and sons in Europe and the Gulf; they have nice houses, nice cars, nice clothes, they eat well; but my family and I do not have this; we are very poor; I must migrate legally or illegally; I talked to Hajja Fatima to convince her daughter to convince a European woman to come and marry me; I talked also to Fatima for a contract; they asked for money; I need to work and save money; it is hard; I tried boat crossing; however, the police caught us and I spent three months in prison; but I will try again and again". For Ahmed, positive feedback mechanism is surrounding him to migrate; the influence of neighbors is very string in this case.

Many youths in the neighborhood grew up with these motivations. The feedback mechanisms (de Haas, 2007; Bakewell & Jónsson, 2013) works in the process of producing conducive motivations because of the availability of information and help on the migration project. The system perspective here works through creating a "unified space" (Van Hear, 1998) between origin and destination. We argue that the individual as agential deciders on their fate create their own spaces between the system itself as it unfolds and the outcome of the system. Van Hear (1998, 23) argues for conceptualizing the system at times of "crises". At times of "crisis", like Arab spring or Covid19 in this case, the system launches a negotiation process culminating in a decision of moving in all the cases we have mentioned.

Ahmed narrative is a self-reflection on the migration experience; Ahmed experience fluctuates between failure and success; the social and the cultural practice of migration as a success model is questioned; human agency here plays a decisive role in altering the process (Engbersen et al., 2013). Individuals as agents in the migration system rationalize their decisions when other options are available. Hamid explains that "The impact of migration, just taking my family as a case study, is that it takes families out of poverty and this in turn influences their families because it opened their eyes to the way life should be, to democracy and to freedom. Migrants and their families speak languages; they are more open-minded; they live a decent life a standard. Their houses are clean and comfortable. Migration first impacts people and then people impact their environment. I was born in a migration family; I cannot escape it".

Any migration system must account for notions of "mobility" and "immobility" (Van Hear, 1998:38). Why are some individuals can move and others cannot despite the existence of the same migration culture and motivations? Non-movement (Van Hear, 1998, p. 41) is an aspect of agency where rational, cultural and economic calculations are made to counter migration as a choice. For Hassan, "I sacrificed for my sister; I work here in Morocco and I have a permanent salary with the government; I asked for a credit from the bank and I paid for my sister to migrate to Spain; she worked in the strawberry field in the first three months and then she stayed there illegally; we know a person from our neighborhood who is residing legally in Spain and we convinced him to marry her there and help her get the legal documents and then divorce her later and in return we gave him 5000 Euros". When the migration system is durable, individuals create their own trajectories and choices; despite the crisis that can occur, individuals alter the dynamics of migration into various forms of movement. Stagnation of the movement or the difficulty to move is only a momentum to agency to perpetuate migration.<sup>8</sup>

Households and individuals make choices according to their situation. There is a sort of selection among households when it comes to migration. We have cases where the whole family chose one daughter to migrate and then the chain migration process happened. Other case it is the illegal young person who risked his life and reached Spain and now he is supporting his family. Many youths in the neighborhood dream of migration because they see the benefits in other experiences. Being young and marginalized are two factors that can push migration project for its materialization. However, individual factors can also play a role in the dream to migrate.

The story of Street performer, Ayoub, is an example of a young person who dream of migration because of his gender identity. Ayoub is a gay and street performer in the city of Salé; he does acrobat in the circus; he claims homosexuality; he earns his living as street performer. He tried twice and succeeded to travel legally to France and to Italy; he met a French owner of a circus in Tangier and got a job contract and migrated to France to perform with a circus. When in France, the owner wants to abuse him sexually, but Ayoub refused and then he canceled his contract and returned to Morocco. The second contract was for an Italian circus; he traveled and met his friend who wanted to marry him, but Ayoub refused and then returned. Ayoub now is waiting for another contract to the UK. He is in the process to prepare VISA documents. Ayoub expressed himself, "In Morocco, I suffer as they do not recognize homosexuals; I have to look for my own freedom in Europe". Agency plays a crucial push factor in the case of Ayoub. However, migration culture influences youth to migrate. Factors of disillusionment combined with precariousness and weak or inexistent safety nets among these youth produce a string culture of mobility to be saved and not stay stuck in the neighborhood.

#### 13.6 Conclusion

Post Arab Spring revolts failures to enact social changes necessary to meet the needs of the youth in the region, created forms of disillusionments among the young people aspiring for dignity and social justice (Sánchez-García & Touhtou, 2021); these youth stopped to believe in making their futures in their countries of origin and begin their projects of migration by any means even to die while attempting to cross to the Eldorado. The pandemic of COVID in 2019 aggravated youth precariousness, lack of employment and a decent life (Stierl & Dadusc, 2022). Both processes produced

<sup>8</sup> During the fieldwork, we interviewed many cases of individuals who chose not to migrate until they saved some money to enable them to migrate and support themselves without relying on anyone, cases to Spain, Italy, Belgium, USA and Canada. These individuals have stable jobs here and the decision to migrate was only congealed; some cases have migrated and returned and remigrated again.

the youth category as a precariat class in the Southern countries of the Mediterranean (Hegasy, 2007; Khouri & Lopez, 2011; Wacquant, 2016). The dream of migration was renewed, taking classical forms of crossing and intensified the wish to fulfil this dream.

The youth interviewed in the Sidi Moussa neighborhood have one thing in common; marginalization as a push factor to escape from their social conditions; left without any safety nets, these youth dream of migrating to any country, mainly the European countries or the Gulf Countries in order to lead a life worth living. Lack of quality education, lack of job opportunities and State poverty-reduction strategies, these youth lagging behind and being forgotten in urban restructuring are the precariat of the urban marginalized, poor families fighting to survive during times of crisis.

"Migration is a dream", "I will migrate despite restrictions", "I will cross to the other side and make a new life", "I do not want my children to undergo the same marginalization", these phrases summarize the aspirations of the youth to mobility to save their lives and the lives of those who share their situation with (Vacchiano, 2014). The loving conditions of the neighborhood leave the youth with few options to climb the social ladder; either escape the neighborhood or get stuck among jobless youth addicted to drugs, forming groups to aggress and steal others to survive, or earn a living thanks to informal sector where street vendors fight every day for a spot to steel their used goods or flee from police chasing them. The youth of Sidi Moussa are in the process of renegotiating their migration aspirations against their social conditions.

Precariousness and marginalization among youth in big urban spaces are worsening youth conditions and creating resilient motivations for migration. State Institutions and other stakeholders should be aware of the instability this might have on the social cohesion in poor, marginalized neighborhoods in the outskirts of metropoles. Local development and public policies targeting shanty towns or social housing neighborhoods should not provide only decent housing of living but income generation should be part of the whole policies in these neighborhoods. The context now is that migration as a form of resilience in the face of poverty and marginality is the process of being formed as new ways to study advanced urban marginality and the project of migration. Government, Non-government and international organizations working to alleviate poverty and fight against "illegal" migration should understand the aspirations pushing the youth to migrate, mainly to Europe to understand the origin countries social fabric conducive to mobilities and account also for factors hindering immobilities which might intensify migration and produce "warfare" at frontiers between South and North Mediterranean basin.

Acknowledgments This project has received funding from the European Research Council (ERC), under the European Union's HORIZON 2020 research and innovation programme under grant agreement 742705: TRANSGANG: Transnational Gangs as Agents of Mediation: Experiences of conflict resolution in youth street organizations in Southern Europe, North Africa and the Americas (2018–23). European Union: HORIZON-2020, European Research Council - Advanced Grant [H2020-ERC-AdG-742705]. PI: C. Feixa. www.upf.edu/web/transgang.

#### Bibliographical References


Boutaina Ismaili Idrissi is Professor of Economics at Faculty of Law, Economics & Social sciences of Agdal -University Mohammed V Rabat-, She holds an MBA from the University of Central Lancashire (United Kingdom) and a PhD in economics from the University of Perpignan (France). She is also teaching courses in economics for American Universities Education Abroad programs in Rabat. Besides her previous professional background in the public sector where she was close to social economy sector and SME's in Morocco. She conducted various researches and participated in several national and international conferences on her main research interests related to the major issues of the Moroccan economy, euro-Mediterranean relations, entrepreneurship, remittances, migration and refugees.

Dr Ismaili is also a professor in the Master degree of "Migrations and societies" and supervises researches within the Master and PhD degree at the same University on issues related to migration some of which are based on field surveys or econometric analysis. She is also member of the Euro-Mediterranean Research Network on Migration (EuroMedMig) coordinated by GritimUpf, Pompeu Fabra University in Barcelona since 2019.

Some of her major researches, publications & communications on migration area are as follows: the research titled "transferts de fonds des marocains résidant à l'étranger : Contexte, évolution et perspectives de renforcement"for UNECA in 2015, the "Euro Mediterranean migration dynamics: the role of the Southern and Eastern Mediterranean countries" published by IEMED in 2019 , "the impact of covid-19 on Refugees & Asylum seekers in North Africa", "the impact of international remittances: evidence from the North & South East Mediterranean countries", "New patterns of migration in the Mediterranean: North-South: the case of Morocco" in 2021 and the latest communications in the last International Migration Conference 2022 held in Rabat "l'intention migratoire des professionnels de la santé publique au Maroc: Résultats d'une enquête" published in 2023, "The impact of remittances on household consumption in Morocco: a micro econometric analysis" and "Quel apport de la migration Nord-Sud à l'économie marocaine?".

Rachid Touhtou Full Professor and member of the Social Sciences, Languages and Communication Department at the National School of Statistics and Applied Economics (INSEA) in Rabat since 2008. He is the Acacemic Coordinator of Amideast Education Abroad program in Rabat and Area Studies professor (MENA Studies) for American Universities Education Abroad programs in Rabat. He has conducted extensive qualitative fieldwork in several parts of Morocco as part of international projects. Between 2019 and 2022, He is conducting qualitative fieldwork and producing research for Transgang, an international project funded by the EU and delivered by the Pompeu Fabra University in Barcelona. Rachid Touhtou's main research interests are youth, social movements, Migration, NGOs' impact on public policies, gender in post-Arab spring and youth in the Arab world. His forthcoming chapters are on social movements and policy reforms in Morocco, dissidence in post-Arab spring in Morocco and a methodological chapter on youth street groups in Morocco part of an international funded research.

Carles Feixa is full professor of social anthropology at Pompeu Fabra University (Barcelona). He has a PhD from the University of Barcelona and an Honoris Causa from the University of Manizales (Colombia). Former professor at the University of Lleida, he has been visiting scholar in Rome, Mexico City, Paris, Berkeley, Buenos Aires, Santiago de Chile, Newcastle and Lima. He has specialized in the study of youth cultures, conducting fieldwork research in Catalonia, Mexico and Colombia. He is author or coauthor of more than 50 books, including De jóvenes, bandas y tribus (Barcelona, 1998, 5th ed. 2012), Jovens na America Latina (São Paulo, 2004), Global Youth? (London & New York, 2006), Youth, Space and Time (Boston & Leiden, 2016), La imaginación autobiográfica (Barcelona, 2018), Oltre le bande (Rome, 2020) and El Rey. Diario de un–Latin King (Barcelona, 2020). He has been co-editor of the journal Young (UK) and member of the editorial board of Nueva Antropología (México), Revista Latinoamericana de Ciencias Sociales, Niñez y Juventud (Colombia), Última Década (Chile), Mondi Migranti (Italia), Analise Social (Portugal), among others. He has been a consultant on youth policies for the United Nations and VP for Europe of the research committee "Sociology of Youth" of the International Sociological Association. Nowadays he is coordinator of the Youth and Society Research Network and Principal Investigator of the European Research Council project TRANSGANG.

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# Chapter 14 The Continuity of Migration Drivers: A Historical Perspective on Spanish Social Transformations

Naiara Rodriguez-Pena

### 14.1 Introduction

What mechanisms explain migration transitions? And how can we explain (quasi-) reversals of migration patterns? Do different mechanisms come into play as countries develop, or is there a continuity in the factors affecting migration? These questions tackle the core of the scholarly debate on the non-linear relation between migration and development.

This chapter addresses these questions by reviewing the Spanish migration transitions. For this, I adopt a social transformation perspective and analyze how change at the political, economic, technological, demographic, and cultural levels impacts the timing, volume, and direction of Spanish national and regional1 migrations (Fig. 14.1). This is relevant because research has, to a great extent, focused on low- and medium-income countries (see Berriane et al., 2021 for an analysis of Morocco, and Schewel & Legass Bahir, 2019 for Ethiopia), or they conclude in earlier decades (see Vezzoli, 2020a for an analysis of Italy until the 1970s). So, while we know that development reshapes migration in patterned ways (see MADE Research Team, 2021), we still know little about the mechanisms leading to a (quasi)reversal of migration transitions from net emigration to net immigration,

<sup>1</sup> I differentiate six major Spanish areas: (1) North-West, which includes Galicia, Asturias and Cantabria; (2) North-East, including the Basque Country, Navarre, La Rioja and Aragon; (3) Center, composed of Madrid, Castile and Leon, Castile-La Mancha and Extremadura; (4) East, including Catalonia, the Valencian Community and the Balearic Islands; (5) South, which includes Andalusia, Murcia, and Ceuta and Melilla; and (6) the Canary Islands.

N. Rodriguez-Pena (✉)

University of Kent, Canterbury, UK

University Paul-Valéry Montpellier 3, Montpellier, France e-mail: nr320@kent.ac.uk

Fig. 14.1 Map of Spain with its regions. (Source: Own elaboration. The map was created using Microsoft Excel)

Note: The autonomous cities of Ceuta and Melilla in North Africa are not pictured in the map

and the factors triggering increasing emigration patterns, especially in high-income economies.

This is pertinent considering recurrent emigration patterns in consolidated immigration regions, such as Southern Europe, particularly since the 2008 economic crisis (Bartolini et al., 2016; Caro et al., 2018). In the Spanish case, emigration surpassed immigration flows in 2010, and, although the trend was reversed in 2015 (INE, 2022a), emigration levels have remained high compared to the pre-2008 crisis period (González-Ferrer & Moreno-Fuentes, 2017). On the one hand, this challenges assumptions about the interpretation of history as a sequence of improvements, and, on the other, about the deterministic nature of migration dynamics (see Skeldon, 2012).

This chapter reviews migration patterns, trends, and drivers within and from Spain since the early 1880s. By doing so, I investigate the temporality of migration drivers, and I shed light into their (dis)continuity. Inspired by previous research (see MADE Research Team, 2021), this chapter calls for further investigation on the (dis)similarity of migration drivers across time and regions, including the Mediterranean coastline.

# 14.2 Adopting a Social Transformation Approach to Understand Migration Transitions

This chapter engages with the non-linear relation between migration and development, which gained momentum with the mobility transition theory pioneered by Zelinsky (1971). According to this theory, 'modernization' processes initially trigger higher emigration levels and mobility overall (de Haas, 2010; Skeldon, 2014; Zelinsky, 1971) as the welfare state and capitalist structures expand, in turn jeopardizing traditional, rural livelihoods while concurrently stimulating urban employment. Over time, these transformations spur the rural exodus, increasing international migration, and, at a later stage, commuting patterns. While recent quantitative research has greatly enriched and nuanced the debate (see Clemens, 2014; de Haas & Fransen, 2018), investigations on how changes at the economic, political, cultural, demographic, and technological levels influence migration dynamics remain scarce.

In an effort to overcome this limitation, migration scholars have applied the social transformation perspective, which investigates long-term change processes that lead to fundamental societal shifts at the structural level. The framework is a metatheoretical perspective concerning changes at the economic, political, cultural, demographic, and technological levels (de Haas et al., 2020) that uncovers patterned complexities and ramifications of migration over time (Castles, 2010). In this manner, scholars have stressed how nation-state building processes trigger a transformation from (semi-)nomadic to sedentary communities (Schewel & Legass Bahir, 2019), and how welfare state consolidation and industrialization processes affect internal and international migration patterns (Vezzoli, 2020a). The adoption of a social transformation perspective has also shown that development overall shapes migration in patterned manners, and how different transformation trajectories can affect the composition, volume, and timing of migration. For instance, as countries develop and local options to fulfill life aspirations increase, emigration patterns tend to decrease, though the transition from emigration to immigration is not inevitable (MADE Research Team, 2021). In fact, scholars have also highlighted occurrences of plateaued emigration rates as the economy improves, which contradict theoretical predictions for a decrease in emigration rates (Berriane et al., 2021). This illustrates that economic development alone is not enough to explain migration transitions.

To analyze the transition from net emigration to net immigration, and the quasireversal of trends, I analyze statistical data on Spanish migration and societal indicators,2 and existing literature on Spanish social and migration history. The chapter proceeds as follows: after reviewing the Spanish internal and international migration trends, I disentangle the drivers of these migration patterns and analyze how fundamental social transformations explain the country's migration transition. The chapter ends with a discussion and overview of the implications of these findings.

<sup>2</sup> I collected longitudinal datasets on internal and international migration and return patterns, population estimates, vital statistics, unemployment rates, governmental expenditure, GDP components, occupation by sector and GDP per capita, cultural and individual orientations and data on political structures, among others. Most of the data was collected through the INE – Spanish Statistical Institute –, although data were also extracted from Mitchell (2013), DEMIG (2015), Guindo et al. (2007), the World Bank, and from Prados de la Escosura (2017). Portions of migration data were also retrieved from Martínez Cachero (1965), Palazón Ferrando (1991) and from Silvestre (2001, 2002).

# 14.3 An Historical Overview of Spanish Migration Patterns<sup>3</sup>

I emphasize four turning points in Spanish mobility patterns (Fig. 14.2). The first is between the 1880s and mid-1910s, when international emigration increased and peaked in 1912 with 245,470 departures, primarily from Northern regions and the Canary Islands towards Central and South America (DGM, 2016). Although less voluminous, this period also witnessed increasing migrations to Algeria from Spanish Southern regions (Bover & Velilla, 1999). Emigration to Morocco, though lower in number, also increased continuously since the beginning of the twentieth century, especially from Andalusia and the Canary Islands (Garrigues, 2008).

Secondly, between the mid-1910s and late 1940s, when international emigration rates reduced significantly following World War I and the Spanish Civil War. The 91,616 departures in 1915 dropped to 9,831 by 1942. Internal migration also slowed down, and the rate of inter-regional migration remained stable at around 10/1,000.

Fig. 14.2 Annual migration of Spanish emigrants, returnees, foreign immigrants and internal migrants, 1880–2017 (absolute numbers). (Sources: DEMIG (2015); INE (2022b) Historical Data from 1960 onwards; Guindo et al. (2007))

<sup>3</sup> This chapter focuses on Spanish migration patterns since the 1880s for two reasons: (1) it is when Spanish mass emigration began (Sánchez-Alonso, 2000), and (2) annual statistical emigration reports started being published in 1888. However, the years themselves are not significant since there was migration before (see, for example, Alemán, 2003, 2019; Castelao, 2003; Cura, 1993; Fagel, 2003, or Lopo, 2003).

Fig. 14.3 Annual migration of Spanish emigrants to Latin America and Europe and Spanish returnees from Latin America, 1946–1974. (Sources: INE (2022b); Martínez Cachero (1965); Palazón Ferrando (1991))

Moreover, during this period we observe a reverse flow from urban to rural areas, which was reverted in the late 1940s (Bover & Velilla, 1999; Silvestre, 2002).

The third turning point occurred between 1950 and the late 1970s, when the orientation of international emigration shifted. While emigration to Latin America increased again in the mid-1940s, it rapidly lost importance in the late 1950s, as Western Europe and other destinations such as Australia or Algeria became popular (Fig. 14.3). There are important regional variations in these international emigration rates: whereas Galicia and the Canary Islands presented more voluminous emigration flows, with 76/1,000 and 73/1,000 emigration rates respectively in 1950, the international emigration rates of Aragon, Castile-La Mancha, Extremadura and Murcia did not reach 5/1,000 (Palazón Ferrando, 1991, p. 221). The 1950-to-mid-1970s period also experienced intense return dynamics and a rapid growth in ruralurban migrations and inter-regional flows, especially from the South and Center to the more dynamic North-East and East (Bover & Velilla, 1999).

Lastly, by the late 1970s, we observe the fourth turning point: a transition from net emigration to net immigration. This transition was questioned during the 2008 economic crisis, when immigration flows began to gradually decrease while emigration increased rapidly, ultimately peaking in 2013 with 532,303 total departures<sup>4</sup> (INE, 2022a). While disaggregating emigration patterns by nationality indicates that

<sup>4</sup> This accounts for both Spanish nationals and non-nationals. The peak of the emigration of the former happened in 2015, with 94,645 departures (INE, 2022a).

the emigration flows of non-Spanish citizens have been more voluminous in absolute terms, the percentage increase of Spanish emigrants has been greater: Spanish emigration grew 118.86% between 2008 and 2013,5 whereas the emigration of non-Spaniards did so by 80.04%. Additionally, given the lack of mechanisms to correct Spanish citizens' registration figures (González-Ferrer & Moreno-Fuentes, 2017), data reliability has been contested, and González-Ferrer (2013) calculated that around 700,000 Spaniards emigrated between 2008 and 2013, which more than doubles official figures.6 During this period, internal migrations also increased, peaking in 2007 with 1,795,353 movements, at a rate of 40/1,000 (INE, 2022a). The composition of internal migrants nonetheless changed in comparison to previous decades due to the higher mobility of both civil servants and highly educated individuals (Bover & Velilla, 1999). Moreover, while inter-regional migration decreased, intra-regional, intra-provincial and short-distance movements increased since the early 1980s, when the growth of the service industry triggered new regional employment opportunities, especially within larger cities (Bentolila, 2001).

What encouraged migration during each of these turning points? Most importantly, do we observe similarities in migration drivers over time? Or did new factors gain momentum as Spain developed? While this section has presented four turning points in Spanish mobility patterns, the following section examines Spanish migration drivers. For this, I focus on how social transformations have shaped migration within and from Spain across the twentieth century. The long-term perspective allows to map fluctuations in internal, international and non-migratory mobility, as well as the (dis)continuities behind migration drivers.

#### 14.4 The Drivers of Spanish Migrations

Since the late nineteenth century, I present four periods of social transformation with distinct migration dynamics:


<sup>5</sup> The emigration of nationalized individuals contributed to the increase in numbers, as certain emigration flows, such as migration to Ecuador, are primarily composed of nationalized and second-generation migrants (Gonz<sup>á</sup>lez-Ferrer, 2013). 6 The official statistic for the period is 295,720 (INE, 2022a). 7 I use the terms in- and out-migration to refer to the immigration and emigration of internal

migrants, respectively, to distinguish between international and internal migration dynamics.

processes and the role of the state as provider of guarantees stopped. This period implied worsening living conditions and the halt of migration patterns;


Throughout these periods, three factors explain the Spanish migration transition: (1) the consolidation and weakening of the state; (2) economic fluctuations; and (3) the uneven urbanization process. Together, these processes triggered the peripheralization of Southern and Central Spain, and important changes in migration dynamics.

# 14.4.1 Incipient Industrialization and Fragmented State Expansion, Early 1880s to Mid-1930s

Starting in the early 1880s, Spain's productive structure experienced an emerging industrialization process (Fig. 14.4). This triggered more permanent forms of movement and changed the geographical orientation of migration. Traditionally, Southern Spain presented voluminous short-distance rural-rural migrations and interprovincial in-migration patterns due to latifundiums (Domenech, 2013; Silvestre, 2007). In contrast, Northern Spain was typified by longer-distance, seasonal out-migrations as familial holdings were highly divided and presented fewer

Fig. 14.4 Economically active population by economic sector, 1860–1920. (Source: Mitchell (2013))

opportunities8 (Martín, 1994). However, traditional destinations in Southern Spain lost importance in the early twentieth century, when in-migration rates (per total population) doubled in North-Eastern and Eastern regions (Silvestre, 2002, 2005, 2007), whereas in-migration rates decreased 2% in Southern Spain (Silvestre, 2007). Three factors influenced these shifts: (1) an incipient industrialization process; (2) increasing urbanization rates; and (3) state expansion.

First, starting in the second half of the nineteenth century, a process of trade openness and internationalization began (Prados de la Escosura, 2017), eased by advancements in the railway system (Herranz Loncán, 2004). Important regional inequalities in infrastructure distribution shaped regional economic differences (Herranz-Loncán, 2007), and shifts in the geographic orientation of migration (Franch et al., 2013; Mojica & Martí-Henneberg, 2011). In certain areas, such as northeast Spain, Madrid, the Mediterranean coast or Western Andalusia, the railway expansion contributed to the development of emerging industrial and service activities (Franch et al., 2013; Gómez Mendoza, 1982), and increasing rural-urban migrations (Clar, 2008; Osuna, 1983). In comparison, the economic structure of other areas was strongly affected by poor integration into the national rail network, which encouraged out-migration patterns and a decline in (seasonal) in-migration in Center and Southern regions (see Alonso González & Álvarez Domínguez, 2015).

Secondly, during the 1860–1930s, the urbanization process consolidated, reinforcing the shift in the orientation of migration flows. While the traditional agricultural nuclei in Andalusia stagnated, cities along the North-Eastern and Eastern coasts grew rapidly. Industrial concentration encouraged intense rural-urban migrations (Recaño Valverde, 1996) and the development of satellite towns (Le Gallo & Chasco, 2008). Excluding Madrid, which consolidated as the capital city, central regions did not experience an urban concentration either (Cardesín Diaz & Araujo, 2017). Despite the expansion of inter-provincial in-migrations, the main destinations and the geographical orientation of out-migrants remained limited to close-by provinces (Fig. 14.5; Recaño Valverde, 1996).

Finally, increasing rural-urban migrations were also driven by state expansion. After the Peninsular War (1807–1814) and the 1812 Spanish Constitution, efforts to consolidate a centralizing unitary state were made. Despite system fragmentation and regional and rural/urban differences (Vilar Rodríguez, 2007, p. 180), state expansion impacted migration in four manners. First, new taxes increased fiscal pressure, and impediments to accessing communal lands triggered important social unrest and protests (Da Orden, 2005). In particular, small agricultural producers and day laborers in northwestern regions experienced high unemployment, difficulties to commercialize their products and low wages, boosting emigration rates (Vallejo Pousada, 1996). Secondly, state expansion particularly benefited skilled workers and middle-class members in Castile and Andalusia, who found stable jobs in the civil

<sup>8</sup> Temporary migrations to North and South Castile, Andalusia and the North of Portugal were common, especially among skilled artisans (Reher, 1990), rural young women (Poska, 2005; Reher, 1986), and North-Western rural peasants (Cura, 1993; Lopo, 2003).

Fig. 14.5 Main regional migration corridors in 1930. (Source: Author's elaboration based on Silvestre (2001))

Note: The map presents the first destination for each province in 1930. The main destinations for some provinces are different (not pictured in the map): for Navarre the main destination is Gipuzkoa, for Malaga it is Cadiz, and for A Coruña it is Pontevedra

Table 14.1 Number of active charitable foundations by region, 1915–1930


Source: INE, Historical Data, Chapter VII, Table A.1 – Table by concept, number of charitable foundations, classified as active or inactive

administration and perceived the state as a major source of opportunities (Moreno, 2001). Relatively low out-migration dynamics in these regions, despite increasing unemployment rates and low economic productivity (Silvestre, 2005), might be due to the opportunity to rely on security nets, as they presented greater numbers of charitable foundations than Northern Spain (Table 14.1). Thirdly, efforts to regulate labor relations and protect the working class were made (de la Calle Velasco, 1997; Guillén, 1990, 1997). In the early 1930s, municipal districts implemented prohibitions on the employment of migrant laborers if local unemployed rural workers were available (Casanova, 2010, p. 44). Consequently, employment opportunities for temporary migrants in Southern regions decreased (Domenech, 2013) along with their migration (Silvestre, 2007). Finally, increasing governmental intervention also impacted international migration policies, as in the mid-1920s highly restrictive conditions to enter North Morocco were implemented.

Overall, unequal industrialization and urbanization processes, together with the fragmented provision of social security nets and infrastructure networks, generated regional and class differences. These dynamics shaped migration differently across Spain and facilitated the re-orientation of in-migration dynamics from Southern to Northeastern and Eastern Spain. Unequal bargaining power between regions proves to be a distinguishing feature for comprehending the country's social and migratory history throughout the twentieth century.

# 14.4.2 Post-Civil War and Autarchy: Rapid Deterioration of Living and Working Conditions, Mid-1930s to Late 1950s

The establishment of Franco's dictatorship in 1939 significantly deteriorated living and working conditions. In turn, international emigration decreased 77.31% between 1931 and 1941 (DEMIG, 2015) and internal migration decelerated. Throughout the 1940s and 1950s, the migration capabilities of the Spanish population decreased heavily, as (1) economic structure and purchasing power experienced an impasse, (2) national-Catholicism restricted the population's autonomy, and (3) legal barriers to migration were established.

Firstly, throughout this period, Spain was characterized by high governmental intervention, autarchy, and ration books. Social security programs shrank (Guillén, 1997), and the imposed wage levels were not modified, despite increasing living costs (Benito del Pozo, 1990). Private consumption fell and both GDP and private consumption per capita rates did not recover to their pre-war levels until 1954 and 1956, respectively9 (Prados de la Escosura, 2017).

Secondly, the efforts of the Second Republic to separate state and religion were truncated (Casanova & Sanchis, 1999), as national-Catholicism became an ideological cornerstone of Franco's regime, and a mechanism to gain hegemony over public and private life. Strict censorship was established and the public sector was purged, trigerring political and intellectual exile (Frago, 2014; Oliver, 2008). Traditional codes of conduct and values were also institutionalized and legislation to protect the family were introduced (Nicolás, 1971; Valiente Fernández, 1996). Other Republican policies and rights, including divorce, civil marriage and female full-access to the workforce, were also revoked. Furthermore, trade unionism, associationism and

<sup>9</sup> The slow recovery has been linked to exiles and internal displacements following the Civil War (Núñez, 2005; Prados de la Escosura, 2017).

collective negotiations were prohibited, and labor discipline was maintained through strike repression, vertical unions and the control of cooperatives (Balfour, 1990; Igual & Vidal, 2001).

Finally, the regime aimed to control internal and international migrations. Immediately after the Civil War, emigration was de facto prohibited10 and decrees regulating emigrants' repatriation were established. In the mid-1940s, this prohibition was lifted; however, restrictive provisions, including limitations on the issuance of passports and increasing military border controls, continued (Kreienbrink, 2009). Likewise, efforts to control internal migration were made: (1) internal travel documents were introduced; (2) bureaucratic hurdles, such as requiring official work visas, were established to move into the main cities; and (3) probation provincial boards spread, impeding the movement of those who opposed to the regime during the Civil War (Corbera, 2015; Díaz Sánchez, 2016; Teijeiro, 2012). This way, migration dynamics halted during the 1930s, and, due to the increasing insecurity and unemployment rates, urban-rural migrations exacerbated (Domenech, 2013). This resulted in the revival of agricultural activity at the expense of industrial production (Prados de la Escosura, 2017) and urban growth (Le Gallo & Chasco, 2008). Despite these measures, some internal movements persisted (Corbera, 2015) as internal migrants left certain regions in southwest and northwest Spain and moved towards the more industrialized provinces of Barcelona and Madrid11 (García Barbancho, 1967). Additionally, the different allocation of food quotas between rural and urban areas sparked pendular migration until more restrictive measures were introduced in the mid-1940s (Moreno Fonseret, 1993). However, mobility flows recovered in the late 1950s.

# 14.4.3 New Economic and Political Models: A Path Towards Increasing Liberties, 1960s to Mid-1970s

The economic unsustainability of Franco's regime brought about policy shifts from the late 1950s onwards (Balfour, 1990) that began a gradual liberalization process (Fig. 14.6). Life quality and healthcare coverage expanded slightly, even though public administration remained fragmented and social policies limited.12 In addition, by the early 1960s, the volume of internal and international migrations increased rapidly, the orientation of international migrations shifted towards closer-by

<sup>10</sup> According to the statistics of Latin American countries, between 1939 and 1945 over 20,000 people left Spain (Yáñez, 1993, p. 120–123); this is despite the insignificant emigration flows that national statistics reflect (see Fig. 14.2) and difficulties to account for migration flows during these years.

<sup>11</sup> For micro-scale analyses of internal migrations during the 1940s see Marín Corbera (2006) for the town of Sabadell and Díaz S<sup>á</sup>nchez (2016) for out-migration from Murcia to Barcelona. 12 In 1975, there were ten million taxpayers and retirement pensions were taken by 3,5 million

people, around 28% and 10% of the total population, respectively (Guillén, 1997).

Fig. 14.6 Freedom of expression and political liberties in Spain, 1940–1975. (Source: V-DEM (2022))

destinations, and the origin of internal out-migrants diversified. These migration configurations were shaped by three important economic and social shifts: (1) the transition to an industrialized and service economy; (2) technological innovation; and (3) important shifts in migratory policy.

First, during the 1950-to-mid-1970s period, the economy experienced its fastest growing rates: agriculture underwent a sustained contraction and industrial sectors continued their sharp increase and plateaud at around 30% of the GDP, peaking in the mid-1960s (Fig. 14.7). The service sector also experienced a continuous expansion. US Government economic aid in the mid-1950s and the 1959's Stabilization and Liberalization Plan favored foreign investment, technological innovation, and changes in the occupation structure (Collantes, 2007a; Lieberman, 2005). Despite these economic reverberations, most urban growth and in-migration patterns were still concentrated in a small number of industrialized destinations along the northeast, Madrid, and the Mediterranean coastline (García Barbancho, 1967; Hoggart & Paniagua, 2001; Le Gallo & Chasco, 2008).

Secondly, agricultural mechanization, together with growing non-agricultural employment, triggered a rural exodus (Collantes, 2007b). The volume of internal out-migrations increased from 254,011 movements in 1945 to 545,365 in 1955<sup>13</sup> (Guindo et al., 2007) and the geographical orientation of out-flows expanded (Fig. 14.8; Paluzie et al., 2009). While mechanization reduced the need for peasants and laborers in Southern landholdings and encouraged migrations to sub-urban and

<sup>13</sup> Internal out-migration increased particularly in the South: out-migration from Andalusia increased by 101.89% between 1901–1930 and 1931–1960 (García Barbancho, 1967).

Fig. 14.7 Shares of output components in GDP (%) (current prices), 1850–1980. (Source: Prados de la Escosura (2017, p. 296–300))

Fig. 14.8 Net internal migration by main region, 1961–1978. (Source: INE (2022b) Historical Data, Table 3.3. Internal migration – National summary of emigrants, classified by province of origin and destination)

urban sites (Clar, 2008; Clar et al., 2015), the extensive irrigation systems in the Mediterranean created dynamic agricultural areas attracting migrants. Additionally, new track stretches were constructed to connect main population centers, such as Seville, Madrid or Valencia, more efficiently, easing mobility to those locations and their surrounding areas. Small municipalities connected to the national railway networks experienced significant population increases in contrast to those poorly integrated into the structure (Franch et al., 2013).

Finally, there was also a shift in the migratory policy. To alleviate the pressure on the labor market and obtain foreign currencies, the Spanish Emigration Institute (IEE) was created in 1956 (it remained active until 1984), which strengthened the state's tutelary character regarding international movement. Its objective was to gather and channel overseas employment, especially in Western Europe, and match it with Spanish applicants (Sánchez Alonso, 2011). The assisted continental emigration, together with restrictive measures in Latin American countries, implied a gradual decrease on transoceanic migration flows (Kreienbrink, 2009; Valero Matas et al., 2015, p. 59–60), while continental migration increased rapidly (Fig. 14.3). Assisted emigration peaked in 1971 with 213,930 departures and the main destination countries were France, Germany, and Switzerland (INE, 2022a); emigrants were mainly low-skilled workers leaving Northwest and Southern Spain (see Fig. 14.9).14 These mass emigration flows to European countries lasted until the petroleum crisis in the early-1970s, when state control on movement decreased (V-DEM, 2022).

While migration was affected by important social reverberations, migrants also encouraged incipient vectors of bottom-up cultural and political change. Indeed, internal migrants, who did not share the culture of traditional urban working classes (Balfour, 1990), created new spaces for organization through neighborhood associations and regional centers (Sampere, 2003). Additionally, emigration patterns to

Fig. 14.9 International emigration by region, 1950–1982. (Source: INE (2022b) Historical Data, Table 3.3.1 – Emigrants by province of origin, gender, age, civil status, and economic activity)

<sup>14</sup> Granada in the southeast and Ourense in the northwest were the provinces with the highest emigration rates during the 1960s (INE, 2022b); yet, official Spanish emigration data are incomplete, as they only capture assisted emigration (Kreienbrink, 2009).

Western Europe facilitated associationism, particularly in France, where political exiles had dense pro-democratic networks that confronted migrants with better life conditions and ideas on socio-political liberties (Lillo, 2011).

# 14.4.4 Welfare State Consolidation, Economic Swings, and Shifts in the Meaning of the 'Good Life', Mid-1970s-Present

Since the mid-1970s, Spanish societal structures have been marked by important economic and political instability. The country began transitioning towards a democracy in 1975, and despite temporal contractions, the economy experienced spectacular growth since the mid-1990s, when the construction and the service sector took off and spread across the territory (Prados de la Escosura, 2017). This lasted, approximately, until 2008. This development was accompanied by an exponential increase in internal migration patterns and by a migration transition, as immigration surpassed emigration flows in 1988. The reduction in income differentials between Spain and Western Europe favored this transition and, as a result, the accession to the EU in 1986 was not accompanied by high emigration flows (Dustmann et al., 2003). In fact, as mentioned below, the EU accession involved positive socio-economic spillovers favoring the transition from net emigration to net immigration.

The migration configurations of the last 45 years have been shaped by: (1) fluctuations in the national economy; (2) the expansion and contraction of the welfare state; and (3) a changing meaning of the 'good life and work'.

First, while the early-to-mid-1970s were characterized by rising inflation rates and a surge in unemployment (Prados de la Escosura, 2017), economic growth since the mid-1990s triggered slight reductions of inter-regional inequalities (Hierro et al., 2019). Apart from the spread of the service sector, the increasing foreign direct investment after joining the European Single Market provoked important positive spillovers (Barrios et al., 2004) with migration effects. Indeed, economic growth has been linked to (1) decreases on inter-provincial migrations, (2) increasing intraprovincial movements (Bentolila, 2001; Silvestre, 2002), and (3) a diversification of the geographical concentration of internal migration (Fig. 14.10; Hierro et al., 2019; Paluzie et al., 2009). Similarly, the reduction in wage differentials between Spain and main European destinations minimized aspirations to migrate internationally (Bover & Velilla, 1999). Still, the important Spanish spatial division has impacted its economic restructuring, as well as migration dynamics: The metropolitan areas of Madrid and Barcelona and key Eastern and Southern tourist enclaves are key socioeconomic locations concentrating services and industries, and are thus the main destinations for migrants. In contrast, towns in the Northwest, Center and Inland South (the so-called 'emptied Spain') are characterized by the predominance of agricultural workers (Serra et al., 2014) and present high out-migration patterns.

Fig. 14.10 Net internal migration by main region, 1980–2018. (Source: INE (2022b). Historical Data, Table 4.1.1. Internal migration – Migrants classified by provinces of origin and destination)

Secondly, the democratic transition was accompanied by a welfare state consolidation, and decentralization and regionalization processes (Moreno, 2001). Nevertheless, these were not accompanied by an equal regional distribution of resources and social guarantees: the number of workers affiliated to social security remained below the national average in the South and Center, in contrast to the Northeast and Madrid (Guillén, 1997). As a result, informal social networks have remained important, especially in the Canary Islands and Southern Spain, and EU regional development funds15 have contributed to regional development, especially in Andalusia (Lima & Cardenete, 2008; Palacios, 2007). Formal and informal welfare protection mechanisms might explain low interregional migration dynamics, despite regional differences in unemployment rates and rent per capita (Bentolila, 2001).

Despite economic and political development, the 2008 economic crisis marked a turning point. Household indebtedness increased significantly and unemployment rates grew 13.16% between 2007 and 2011. Youth unemployment rates increased 28.1% during the same period, reaching 55.50% of the total labor force (ages 15–24) in 2011 and remaining around 30% since then (World Bank, 2022). As such, the economy has been characterized by job destruction, informality, the stock market collapse, and drops in the GDP annual growth rate. In addition, shifts in the political economy since 2010, including austerity measures, welfare cutbacks and fiscal tightening, have negatively affected the welfare state, triggering increasing inequality rates and growing disparities in rent distribution (Múñoz de Bustillo, 2013). The

<sup>15</sup> From 1989 to 2000, EU Structural Funds were first devoted to territorial infrastructural modernization and then to human capital and innovation (Medeiros, 2017).

dismantlement of the welfare state together with the economic deceleration resulted in increasing international emigration (Bygnes & Flipo, 2016): the 28,091 departures in 2007 increased to 52,841 in 2011 (DEMIG, 2015), the majority being highly educated young people migrating to the UK, France and Germany (Izquierdo et al., 2015) from Madrid, Galicia and Tenerife (Ortega-Rivera et al., 2016), while emigration from Southern and Northeastern regions has been more moderate (see Fig. 14.11 for a comparison of emigration pre- and post-2008). The directionality of internal migration flows has also changed slightly, and previous spatial diversification of out- and in-migration patterns has been somewhat paused (see Fig. 14.10 for a comparison of internal migration pre- and post-2008). Overall, main metropolitan industrial cities, including Madrid and Barcelona, have received a higher share of migrants, whereas the Canary and Balearic Islands and provinces along the Mediterranean coast lost attractiveness (Hierro et al., 2019).

Finally, value shifts have led to changes in understandings of a 'good life' and 'good work', also leading to internal and international migrations. Limited services in small and rural municipalities and the consideration of farming as a demanding, low-status job have contributed to growing aspirations for urban jobs (Hoggart & Paniagua, 2001). As a result, the number of agricultural workers decreased from 4,672.3 workers in 1960 to 1,842.2 workers (per thousand inhabitants) in 1981 (INE, 2022b). Despite this decline, aspirations to reside in mid-sized cities remain high, as an incipient counter-urbanization process started gaining momentum in the 1980s (Le Gallo & Chasco, 2008). Dynamic municipalities, primarily along the Mediterranean coast (Hoggart & Paniagua, 2001) and the Cantabrian range (Serra et al., 2014), remain desirable alternatives, especially for women (Navarro Yáñez, 1999)

Fig. 14.11 International emigration by region, 1990–2019. (Source: INE (2022b). Historical Data, Table 3.3.1 – Emigrants by province of origin, gender, age, civil status, and economic activity; INE (2022a))

and, after the 2008 crisis, for highly-educated entrepreneurial youth (Baylina Ferré et al., 2019). In contrast, economically depressed rural areas, including Southern Galicia, parts of Aragon and the central regions, have experienced intense population de-concentration (Serra et al., 2014).

Overall, regional inequalities and corruption have led to important social concerns, including low social capital endowments (Pérez et al., 2008) and a loss of trust in public institutions, especially after 2008 (Bolancé Losilla et al., 2018). Increasing frustration with the socio-political and economic environment, and low life satisfaction (INE, 2022c) stimulated social mobilizations, political protests (Lima & Artiles, 2013), and internal and international emigration (Bygnes, 2017; González Enríquez & Martínez Romera, 2014). Internal migrants left center and, to a lesser extent, Southern regions for Madrid and Eastern Spain, and the Eastern and Central regions have experienced the highest volumes of international emigration post-2008 (INE, 2022a).

#### 14.5 Concluding Insights

The social transformation framework introduces how change at the economic, political, cultural, demographic, and technological levels explains the nature of migration transitions. Recently, scholars have applied a long-term perspective to investigate how social transformation processes have impacted migration dynamics in developing countries (Berriane et al., 2021; Schewel & Legass Bahir, 2019; Schewel, 2020; Rodriguez-Pena, 2020; Osburg, 2020), although efforts to map migration patterns in high-income countries have also been made (see Wielstra, 2020 for an analysis of a Dutch village or Vezzoli, 2020a, b for Italy). Yet, little is known about the (dis)continuities of migration drivers, especially in those countries where the transition from net emigration to net immigration has been questioned. This chapter has focused on Spanish migration transitions, and presents four periods of social transformation since the 1880s. Throughout these, three factors affecting mobility are consistently raised: (1) state consolidation and weakening; (2) economic instability; and (3) unequal urbanization processes.

First, state expansion and contraction shaped migration processes during the four periods under study. While the expansion of the state generated safety nets during the first decades of the twentieth century, it also imposed taxations and employment regulations, negatively affecting temporary laborers, and concurrently encouraging emigration and immobility patterns (Vallejo Pousada, 1996; Moreno, 2001). The tutelary character of the state during the Francoist regime initially banned migration, while, later, it facilitated state-assisted migration, shifting the orientation of international flows to closer-by European destinations. Since the mid-1970s, social protection mechanisms and economic stimuli reduced migration, although poor governance and negative state perceptions have encouraged emigration post-2008 (Bygnes & Flipo, 2016). The role of the state has partially precipitated the peripheralization of Southern and Central Spain, given the unequal distribution of resources.

Second, since the 1880s, the incipient industrialization and urbanization processes caused shifts in the orientation of internal migration, and more voluminous flows. Southern agricultural destinations and urban nuclei started losing momentum in the early twentieth century, while cities along the Northeastern and Eastern coastlines accelerated. Despite the impasse experienced during the first decades of the dictatorship, inequalities in urban growth, technological innovation and the consolidation of industrialization since the early 1960s further exacerbated the dynamism of the Northeast and the Mediterranean coastline at the expense of Southern landholdings. Spain is, therefore, characterized by an important spatial division that has been further aggravated since 2008, when job destruction and informality grew, encouraging the emigration of immigrants and skilled youth and the depopulation of central regions.

Altogether, these factors led to the marginalization of Southern and Central Spain and to changes in the nature of migration flows. These factors resemble those highlighted by other researchers applying the social transformation perspective (see MADE Research Team, 2021), but they particularly feature the migration drivers pointed by Vezzoli (2020a) for the Italian case, raising questions about the similarity of drivers within regions, such as the Mediterranean. While this research supports recent literature regarding how different developmental trajectories affect migration trends, it also opens the possibility to inquire whether countries in the same region present more similarities in their migration drivers. Finally, this chapter brings together the social transformation framework and migration temporalities to show that regardless of societal change, migration drivers may remain consistent throughout time.

Acknowledgements I thank the MADE team for the support and inspiration, and Álvaro González de Arrieta, Amanda Klekowski von Koppenfels, Boutaina Ismaili Idrissi, and the BSIS PGR seminar for their helpful feedback. This research was supported by MOVES EJD, which has received funding from the European Union's Horizon 2020 program under the Marie Skłodowska-Curie grant agreement No. 812764.

#### References


Nicolás, J. D. (1971). La Transición Demográfica en España. Revista de Estudios Sociales, 1, 3–72.


Naiara Rodriguez-Pena holds a PhD in Migration and Modernity from the University of Kent (UK) and the University Paul-Valéry Montpellier 3 (France). Her research rethinks dichotomous migration categories, and, by researching migration aspirations, capabilities, and adaptation mechanisms, she criticizes simplistic distinctions, such as the 'Global North' and the 'Global South' or often-assumed migration motives. Naiara is currently a lecturer on migration and sociology at UBIS University (Switzerland). Previously, she was an ESR within the EJD MOVES programme, a coder analyst for the ERC Europinions project and a post-graduate student researcher at the University of Amsterdam (the Netherlands) as part of the MADE project. At MADE, she explored the migration history and social transformation of the frontier town of Caracaraí (Roraima, Brazil). In her chapter she follows the MADE social transformation approach, and she combines it with migration temporalities to investigate the (dis)continuity of migration drivers in Spain from a historical perspective. Her research interests include (im)mobility aspirations, capabilities, immobility patterns, and the adaptation mechanisms followed by migration and return processes.

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# Chapter 15 Capturing Irregular Migrations Through a Macro-sociological Lens: The Harga Process in Twelve Steps from North Africa to Europe

Mohamed Saib Musette and Mohamed Maamar

#### 15.1 Introduction

Migration is induced by a broad variety of reasons including the search for better economic or educational opportunities, the desire for family reunification, climate change or natural disasters and so on...In response to the growth of irregular migratory movements many countries are looking towards border control as a solution: closing all gates (land, sea and air) of entry to deter migration.

Actually, the phenomenon of illegal immigration has acquired extreme importance in the Mediterranean Sea Basin, propelled by media interest and the increase in the number of bodies recovered from the sea. The phenomenon represents a basic issue for countries around the Mediterranean Sea: France, Italy, Spain, Greece, Malta, Algeria, Morocco, Egypt, Libya and Tunisia.

In this chapter, we develop a model to measure the process of maritime illegal migration in twelve steps for Maghreb countries to European shores.1 These steps provide a global view of this form of migration on both sides of the Mediterranean Sea, which is lacking up to now. The current literatures have constructed models highlighting only European actions and evidences. Southern countries are supposed to be passive actors. Our model covers each step of this migration process, with evidences from both Northern and Southern data: from the departure, through the

M. S. Musette (✉) CREAD, Algiers, Bouzaréah, Algeria

M. Maamar University Abu Bakr Belkaid, Tlemcen, Algeria

<sup>1</sup> The same model can be replicated for other sea routes, which is quite particular compared to air or land migration routes to Europe.

journey, at the arrival, during the stay as well as return from the host countries to the country of origin and even re-immigration.

#### 15.2 Theorical Backgrounds

Many definitions of irregular migration have been suggested by analysts. Our definition is derived from three international conventions. First, the International Labour Organization (ILO) Convention 143 (1975), in its article 2, sets out the different forms of irregularity: from the country of departure, during their journey, on arrival or during their period of residence and employment mainly for workers (ILO, 1975). Second, the UN Convention on Migrant Workers and Members of their Family (1990) states that irregular migrants must have the same basic human rights as nationals (UN, 1990). Third, the Protocol against the Smuggling of Migrants by Land, Sea and Air, supplementing the UN Convention against Transnational Organized Crime (2000) considers smuggling as a criminal action. Smuggling of migrants is defined in article 3 of the Protocol supplementing the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime, as "the procurement, in order to obtain, directly or indirectly, a financial or other material benefit, of the illegal entry of a person into a State Party of which the person is not a national or a permanent resident (...) Article 6 of the Protocol requires the criminalization of such conduct and that of enabling a person who is not a national or a permanent resident to remain in the State...". (UN, 2004).

In contrast to the wealth of literature on irregular migration by qualitative tools (Zapata-Barrero & Yalaz, 2018), we can note a paucity in terms of measuring this phenomenon. A handful of analysts have made an attempt to measure the phenomenon, albeit with difficulties due to lack of data.

Delaunay and Tapinos (1998) provide a first attempt to measure irregular migration, in the USA and in a sample of European countries. These authors suggest two methods to capture irregular migration, directly or indirectly through three main steps in the eight selected countries of destination in Europe exclusively (Delaunay & Tapinos, 1998). Irregular migrations are measured by identifying various information sources, at the entry, during the stay and their exit through expulsion. These three phases (Entry, Stay and Exit) are now fixed as basic insights. However, in this attempt, actions taken by the country of origin, either before the entry, on the journey or after the exit from the host country, are missing. Europe is seen as a fortress, with check in at entry points and at exit borders.

The essay of UNODC, one of its first reports on smuggling of migrants into, through and from North Africa, is rather descriptive. The attempt to measurement is just approximative and is well resumed by the authors "An overall estimate of smuggling of migrants into, through and from North Africa has not yet been made" (UNODC, 2010, p. 5). Partial estimations or guestimates are reproduced by the description of migrants and smugglers arrested at sea borders. The introduction of sea borders provides another interesting picture of flows for harga form North Africa to Europe.

Tools to measure undocumented migrations (Massey, 2004) have been developed also in America, particularly from Mexico to the United States of America. The author reviewed data used by demographers and statisticians to measure immigration and suggest a new model based on ethnosurvey to study patterns and process of undocumented migration. The ethnosurvey is based on triangulation approach, using survey and life stories, compiling data not only on migrants, households but also on their communities and the origin nations. This method was first invented in 1987 and tested in the USA and other countries in South America.

Many countries have also developed surveys to capture irregular migration in North Africa. A regional survey on sub-Saharan in irregular situation, run with only a questionnaire, has been carried in Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia in 2007 by an Italian NGO, funded by EU. (CISP/SARP, 2007).

A survey tools has been developed by EUROSTAT as part of the New Neighbourhood European Policy, known as MED-HIMS (Household International Migration Surveys in the Mediterranean countries). Such survey has been implemented in Egypt, Morocco, Tunisia.<sup>2</sup>

The ethnosurvey model or MED-HIMS survey are costly and cannot be implemented as a permanent tool to collect and observe irregular migration. The UN just release an updated handbook to include migration module in censuses (UNDESA, 2020).

Another paper on irregular migration discards general estimations produced by various authors, and selects data on "apprehensions, regularisations and migration statistics to assess the magnitude and recent evolution of irregular migration from West Africa to North Africa to Europe" (De Haas, 2007, p. 37). In this paper, data produced by North African states on apprehension is deliberately undermined as "they are not verifiable". Such assertion is questionable. The authors deduce an estimation of irregular migrants during regularisation process. They compare released data on migrant's status and migration statistics. In this model, three sources, only in Europe, are supposed to be reliable.

A further model of measuring irregular migrations, designed some years later, is based on population statistics in three groups of indicators in two dimensions, inflows and outflows (Kraler & Reichel, 2011, p. 101). The three population components are: migration flows (immigration on entry and return on exit); demographic vital events (birth and death); and migration flows related to status change (from regular to irregular or vice-versa). This attempt to measure irregular migration contrasts with existing European statistics and provides a new dimension of irregular migrants, particularly from new countries admitted to the EU. That's why history matters. The changing status of a country, where their citizens were considered to be in irregular situation became regular de facto after their admission in EU...An attempt to measure maritime migration, quite in line with our object, deserves to

<sup>2</sup> Cf. https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/european-neighbourhood-policy/enp-south/med-hims

be mentioned, as this form of migration is mainly a South-North movement. The authors argue that this maritime migration is quite well documented by Northern countries all over the world "irregular maritime migration is able to be quantified in specific locations, namely the Caribbean Sea to the US, the Mediterranean Sea to Europe and the Indian Ocean to Australia" (McAuliffe & Mence, 2014, p. 20). It is also noted that data on detections may not capture successful attempts. This paper quotes mainly data provided by International and Regional Agencies.

There is no doubt that the process of irregular migration is a complex one. These contributions are important progress made to measure the phenomenon in all its forms and facets. That said, maritime migration is quite challenging and a powerful insight for all actors involved in the process, McAuliff & Mence have tried to seize and updated a world picture (Macauliff & Koser, 2017). This global picture is again viewed strictly through Northern lenses. Southern countries remain blind spots and passive actors yielding only emigration flows threatening the security of Northern countries. These studies, whilst progressing in measuring the process of irregular migration, overlook important factors driving people at home countries to move through illegal channels to Northern countries.

Drivers of irregular migration are not the same as those of regular migrations. There is a third active actor involved in the process: smugglers. In this paper, we deliberately limit our analysis to migrants. The business of smugglers needs other tools for the quantification of many outcomes: the benefits of the business, their networks including transnational actors providing travel documents, logistics and lodgings.

First, it is important to know what we are measuring: stock or flows of migration? Inflows or outflows? Both measurements are important and must be done at the appropriate step. Measuring stock relates to the number of irregular migrants, as defined by the United Nations recommendations (UNDESA, 1998), either short- or long-term migrants, those staying over 90 days without a legal residence permit. Measuring flows is quite different. Irregular migration refers to the rule of law from the country of departure to the country of arrival.

Our attempt to measure is based on capitalising existing literatures. We have developed a global vision of the process of irregular migrations in twelve steps, with a focus on harga from North Africa to Europe crossing the Mediterranean Sea, grouped in three phases.

The notion of "harga" generally comes from the Maghreb countries, particularly Algeria, Tunisia, and Morocco, with only its pronunciation differing in the three countries. It means irregular immigration.

The word "haraga" denotes that the irregular immigrant does not respect the phases of legitimate or lawful immigration, i.e., the procedures and laws. They hide their identification papers, not show them, and sometimes do not carry them on their trips to Italy, or Spain, hoping to acquire a new identity.

The term "haraga" has become widespread in Algeria. It is no longer a term used by the youth only, particularly males, but has come to be used by females and even children. It is no longer a term denoting irregular immigration in the media, e.g., newspapers, but has become a term used in Algerian and Moroccan songs to express the phenomenon.

Fig. 15.1 Mapping the process of irregular migration process by sea in twelve steps

The process of irregular migration can be modelized in 12 steps and three phases. The first phase has three steps. Migration, regular or not, begins at the entry box with the intention to leave, then the decision-making begins with the first prospections and finally the departure starts with the choice of the route and the mode of departure. The final phase has three options: installation, return to the country of origin or new departure. Between these two phases, there is the "black box" that each analyst observes on its multi-facets' aspects. The measurement of migration flows (entry/exit) is carried out according to the regularities of border crossing. The detection of irregularities is done in the home country, during the journey, on arrival to and during the stay or overstay in the host country (Fig. 15.1).

This construction provides a macroscopic view of the process of irregular maritime migration. This means that a single small rotation of the view gives a shift of all narratives, myths and options and can transform irregular into regular migration.

The economic situation in 2019–2020, coupled with the effects of the ongoing COVID-19 pandemic, has given rise to temporary border closures. The strict control of border movements has significantly changed the perception of regular and/or irregular migration. This change brings to light another paradox: an upsurge of irregular migration by sea from Maghreb countries to Europe (Boubakri et al., 2021). While the COVID-19 pandemic has brought unprecedented travel restrictions, criminal networks active in smuggling and trafficking in human beings have continued to thrive (EUROPOL, 2022).

The three following sections give a deep insight of our model: the entry box, the black box and the final exit phase with their detailed steps. At each step, we provide evidences produced and data released by all actors.

# 15.2.1 Entry Box with Three Steps, Mainly Observed in the Country of Departure

These first steps are not relevant to the stock of migrants. Persons involved in are not yet migrants but potential migrants or migrants to be. As we focus on North Africa, this concept comprises also "transit migrant", coming from a third country (Sub-Sahara but also from Asia).

Step one relates to the desire or the aspirations expressed by people to migrate. The intention of migration provides the intensity of expected flows, quite different to prediction. Many surveys have been carried on this topic. Gallup runs a world survey on potential migration: more than 750 million persons would move if they could, an average of 15% worldwide. Middle East and North Africa (MENA) countries account for 24%.<sup>3</sup>

A recent survey shows a decline in global talent's intention to move, from 63% in 2014 to 50% in 2020. The rates of potential migration are above world's average for Maghreb countries: 92% for Tunisia, 84% for Morocco and 83% for Algeria (BCG, 2021). Other regional surveys (Afro & Arab Barometers) also provide data on the intention to move. The Arab Barometer survey4 (wave 5) released a global migration intention rate of 30% in 2018–2019. The first three North African countries registered a rate above the average: 39% for Morocco, 34,5% for Algeria, 30,3% for Tunisia and only Egypt is under the average, with 22,9%. The Afro-Barometer also computed data on the desire to move to other countries with an average of 21% for North African countries.5 We note a difference of 9 points between the means of these two surveys for North Africans.

The SAHWA survey (2015), targeting youths, goes deeper to capture the intention to move, even irregularly, if there is an opportunity to do so. Youth (15–29 years' old) willing to migrate irregularly are from Lebanon, 15.6%, from Egypt 4.5%, from Tunisia 16.9%, Algeria 27.2%, and Morocco 35.5% (Dibeh et al., 2018).

Step two goes further behind the intention, the dream or the aspiration to migrate by detecting whether there is a plan or an action taken to move. People who desire to move may be just dreaming and others are lacking the means to do so. The preparedness to move is also an important step, because the target country and the route are identified. So, there is an awareness of the cost and the risks of irregularity. This step is sometimes underscored - only desire and capabilities are supposed to be the core momentum (Carling & Collins, 2017; Carling & Schewel, 2018). Three degrees of preparedness can be identified, in the same model as for return migration (Cassarino, 2008). The first degree is closer to capabilities (concept of Sen) and migration habitus (concept of Bourdieu). Migration is a family tradition or a tribal ritual initiation to adulthood. The second degree pertains to the deep aspiration of people to change their social status and climb the class ladder faster (concept of Sayad). The third degree refers to individuals who are forced to move due to an

<sup>3</sup> Gallup website: https://news.gallup.com/poll/245255/750-million-worldwide-migrate.aspx 4 https://www.arabbarometer.org/surveys/arab-barometer-wave-v/

<sup>5</sup> Cf. afro barometer website: https://afrobarometer.org/publications/updata-ing-narrative-aboutafrican-migration

unexpected event. Even, in this case, the readiness to move is conditioned by the level of resilience. There is a psychological preparation to move. By measuring the preparedness to move, any change in the environment, as well as in social conditions, is taken into account.

The Gallup Survey provides such data: the preparation rate worldwide is 7.6% for those who hope to move during the next 12 months, but only 3% have really taken some initiatives to do so. The Afro-Barometer, as stated above, reveals that, out of 21% of North African citizens having the intention to move, 24% were rather passive, 36% were planning to move by the next 12 months and 38.4% were currently making preparations to move (like applying for a visa...). On the whole, the Afro-Barometer confirms that 2.7% of North Africans are actively planning to move, the most important for European or North American countries. There is a high probably of visa refusal for the Maghreban particularly. The two surveys (Gallup and Afro Barometer) conclude with a quite similar rate: around 3% of people have engaged in active preparation.

Step three concerns the decision to move. There are many theories on the determinants of the decision to migrate. No need to recall these theories. The best decision's tool to measure the probability of migration from North Africa to Europe is the visa application particularly for European Countries.6 Failing to have a visa to travel to Europe can change the decision to migrate and the route chosen may be reconsidered. The latest trends from EU Statistics show around 25% of visa applications were refused (2019), with Algeria the top Maghreb country (40%).

The decision to migrate by sea, during the COVID-19 pandemic, with closed borders and visa application centres, seems to be the only option left for potential migrants. As with prohibition, during this period, organized criminal groups react quickly, adapt and thrive. Demand for smuggling services for harga was very high; and a low risk of detection and punishment for the criminals behind this crime. Jet Ski was used to cross the Detroit of Gibraltar...

This tool (visa) is used also in political negotiations or trade-offs between states for mobility. EU negotiations with third country to give more or less visa sometimes depends on readmission agreements. The action taken by the French government to reduce visa is quite eloquent.7 The number of visa deliveries to Algeria and Morocco was to be halved from 2020 levels, and by a third for Tunisia, after diplomatic efforts with the three North African countries failed. This drastic decision is taken by the fact that these countries are refusing to take back their nationals in irregular stay in France.

<sup>6</sup> It is quite evident that Europe is the most important destination for North African, surely less for Egyptians who move to KSA and other Arab Gulf countries. Within Europe, France remains the main destination country for the three ex-colonised maghreban countries.

<sup>7</sup> https://www.schengenvisainfo.com/news/france-to-grant-fewer-visas-to-countries-like-algeriamorocco-tunisia-for-refusing-to-take-back-illegal-migrants/

# 15.2.2 The Black Box: Six Steps from Country of Origin Through the Mediterranean Sea to Europe

These steps are very important as they concern both the "migrant to be" and people staying over three months with an irregular status. This sequence provides first, information from the country of departure's efforts to combat irregular migration on different routes (land, air and sea). The other steps are based on data collected by international institutions and by the host country.

Our focus will be on the sea route, though a combination of routes is also possible. Some people are arrested on the Southern Mediterranean shores before boarding. Others are rescued, drowned or reported as "missing migrants". The successful travel does not mean successful entry in the country of arrival. Some people are arrested at entry. Others are arrested on land, after their arrival by sea. These people arrested may claim for asylum and are classified as asylum seekers and finally many others are invited to leave the host country after a fixed period. Only, those who sojourn more than three months without leaving the country are considered as irregular migrants, are recorded in annual flows in institutional statistics. The stock, as we will see later on, remains unknown and is revealed partially under a regularisation process.

Step four sets up the scene for migration routes and focus mainly on sea routes. Statistics are produced by the countries of departure on the maritime migration irregular process on Haraga and smugglers. These data reflect North African countries level of management of sea border control. Morocco detected 27,000 irregular migrants and dismantled more than 60 smuggling networks in 2019.8 In Algeria, official statistics report that 8184 Algerian haraga and 3085 foreigners were arrested, and 190 smuggling networks dismantled.9 A recent report, published on Tunisia, reveals that "Between January 2020 and mid-December 2021, Tunisian security and defence forces intercepted 35,040 irregular migrants in the country's littoral areas and off its shores, two-thirds of whom were Tunisian nationals. Over the same period, authorities in Italy recorded the disembarkation of 28,124 Tunisians, as well as roughly 6000 migrants from other countries who left from the country" (Herbert, 2022). On the whole, for Tunisia alone, more than 60,000 people were engaged in harga during 2020 and many others were missing. It should be noted, also that Maghreb security coastal forces provide data on haraga bodies that are washed ashore.

Step five informs on missing migrant on the journey: how many migrants have disappeared or drowned? This gap has remained undocumented for long. The

<sup>8</sup> The press reports that "The Moroccan police have dismantled 150 criminal networks that were active. These networks allegedly belonged to irregular migration organisations, an illegal movement that attempts to organise the movement of migrants outside the rules of the countries of origin or host countries" https://atalayar.com/en/content/morocco-dismantles-150-networks-involved-

irregular-migration, access on 24th December 2021. 9 Data released by the Algerian "Gendarmerie" in 2019.


Table 15.1 Evolution of refusal at entry border from 2011–2019

Source: Eurostat (2022)

Mediterranean Sea is described as the deadliest zone in the world. Attempted crossings since 2014 rise up to 23,859 missing – i.e. an average of nearly 3000 per year (2014–2021). The main missing cause is people "drowned at sea" with 92%.<sup>10</sup> Apart from IOM collected facts, other non-governmental organizations (NGOs) help rescue "migrants to be" in the Mediterranean Sea. No data are disclosed on these people rescued and the outcomes.

Step six records entries in Europe by travellers coming from North Africa. Data are collected by Eurostat on different routes (by sea, air or land). Refusal at entry is well documented. Eurostat published data on migration by different routes. An assessment of the main migration routes is possible using the refusal at entry as a proxy. Refusal at entry, from 2013 to 2020, with an average of 83% at the land border, 14% at the air border and only 3% at the sea border.

Eurostat data records an average of 74% for Morocco from 2011 to 2019, and 26% for other North African countries. Refusal at sea border for passengers embarking on regular move but with no or falsified documents and visas (Table 15.1).

Step seven brings us again to the arrival in Europe, focusing now only on the irregular flows by sea routes, as compiled by the FRONTEX for Maghreb countries. According to data released by this EU agency in 2020, out of 42,000 haraga arrested by sea at European Borders, nearly 40% came from Morocco, and 30% from Tunisia and Algeria (Fig. 15.2).

The trends of apprehension of harga during 2021 coming from North African countries11 by sea, through all routes, to Europe show a high intensity of flows by month even during the COVID19 pandemic. Figure 15.3 shows the trends the flows from 2018 to 2021.

Step eight relates to asylum seekers from North Africa in Europe. According to United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) data (Table 15.2), the refusal rate of asylum in 2021 is 54% on average for the Maghreb countries, with a highest rate for Tunisia.

Algerian asylum demand in the EU is increased by twofold from 2014 to 2016 and then progressively slopes downwards. Moroccan demand multiplied by five

<sup>10</sup> Cf. IOM website, https://missingmigrants.iom.int/fr/donnees 11 ISO Codes for North African countries are used: Algeria (DZA), Egypt (EGY), Libya (LBY), Morocco (MAR) and Tunisia (TUN).

Fig. 15.2 Mapping mixed migration flows to South Europe. (Source. Risk Analysis Report 2021, FRONTEX (Cf. https://frontex.europa.eu/assets/Publications/Risk\_Analysis/Risk\_Analysis/Risk\_ Analysis\_2021.pdf))

This map gives an insight of mixed migration flows in 2021 from Africa and Asia, though North African countries and the Mediterranean Sea to South of Europe, mainly to Italy and Spain. It is clear that Maghreb Countries are used as gateways to Southern Europe

Fig. 15.3 Apprehension of haraga by sea (2018–2021). (Source: Data extracted from FRONTEX, 2022)

Out of 53,330 persons arrested at sea border, 29,4% came from TUN, followed by MAR with 28,2% and DZA and 16,3 from EGY and only 1% form LBY. A peak is observed for TUN during the summer with more than 4000 interceptions


Source: Data extracted from UNHCR

Fig. 15.4 Asylum trends (2014–2021)

during the same period. Tunisians falls lightly after the exceptional upsurge in 2011 but finally rises up, as well as Moroccan in 2021 (Fig. 15.4).

Step nine deals with flows of irregular migrants in Europe. Up to now, we don't have a global stock of irregular migrants in Europe. Data on flows are collected and released by Eurostat (Fig. 15.5).

Out of a flow of 618,000 migrants in irregular situation (2017), 13% came from North Africa. A 10-year trend shows that Morocco stands alone, with more than 40% of all North African migrants. A recent study on the stock of irregular migrants in Spain has approximately the same structure: less than 10% of migrants are from Africa, half of migrants came from Morocco (Fanjul & Gálvez-Iniesta, 2020).

Statistics on flows do not give the real size of irregular migrants in Europe. During the COVID19 pandemics, some EU countries have considered an exceptional regularisation process for migrants.

# 15.2.3 Exit Box: Settlement, Return Migration and New Departure

The exit box deals with establishment of migrant in the host country under a regularisation process. The change of status means an exit of irregularity. Second

Fig. 15.5 Irregular Migration Flows from NA to EU (2011–2020). (Source: Extracted from Eurostat (2022))

These data shed light on the irregular trends during the last decade, including not only the post Arabs' uprising, the Hirak in Algeria but also the COVID19 pandemic. The annual flow of irregular migration for DZA is on a constant rise since 2013 and will probably join the Moroccan trending

auto-exit or forced exit are return migration and reintegration in the country of origin. The final step concerns those migrants who leave again the country of origin for overseas. It is not surprising that returnees try again to migrate (with or without visa) to the same target country or other destinations.

Step ten deals with the regularisation of the stock of irregular migrations. Exceptional data are provided by Italy and Spain, in response to migrant demands but also to the economic needs for seasonal labour during the COVID-19 pandemic. Regularisation refers to the process of offering migrants who are in a country illegally the opportunity to legalise or normalise their immigration status, whether it is on a temporary or permanent basis. Regularisation does not mean granting citizenship (naturalisation). There are many types of regularisation. There is also a wide range of criteria required of migrants, distinguishing these programmes from general amnesties applied to all irregular migrants. Regularization process exist in all countries.

Overall, 220,000 people applied for regularisation in 2020, just under a third of the estimated stock of 690,000 undocumented migrants in Italy.12 This policy does not yield the expected results.

In the case of Spain, there have been two types of measures concerning the treatment of migrants during the COVID-19 outbreak, concerning work and residence permits and the use of immigration detention centres. Approximately 430,000 immigrants currently reside irregularly in Spain, or 12% of the total migrant population.

The whole of the African continent contributes 9.2% (around 43,000 people) of irregular immigrants residing in Spain. Of these, more than half come from a single country,

<sup>12</sup> https://reliefweb.int/report/italy/italy-flawed-migrant-regularization-program

Morocco, which also accounts for one in four non-EU foreigners residing in Spain. Nigerians and Senegalese constitute the only prominent Sub-Saharan nationalities, with inconsequential irregular immigration figures when compared to other origins. (Fanjul & Gálvez-Iniesta, 2020, p. 9)

Step eleven introduces return migration. There is a wealth of literature on returnees from Europe. In North Africa, we have run a survey, some fifteen years ago, on Maghreban returnees from Europe (MIREM, 2008). This survey designs a threestages questionnaire, capturing the different phases: entry, stay and exit. In this survey, returnees were not all in irregular situation. Voluntary return of irregular migrants must not be confused with harga. Return of haraga is quite different. Some of them, intercepted on arrival by sea, are not migrant. During the COVID pandemic, these haraga were ordered to leave.

Deportation is an act of a state in the exercise of its sovereignty in removing a foreigner from its territory to another place after the refusal of admission or termination of permission to remain. The trends of deportation from Europe of Maghreban are as follows (Fig. 15.6).

Official data release by FRONTEX reports that 298,190 irregular migrants were given a "return decision" by EU member states in 2019. Out of this, 138,860 people were effectively returned (either forcibly or voluntarily) i.e. 46% due to the world health crisis and closed borders.

Step twelve is related to re-emigration after spending a time lapse without any change in their status. The change of countries may also include change of identity and nationality. Returnees, as well as people deported to the country of origin, may also try again to migrate by other routes or other destinations. Re-emigration is not fairly documented. Data are nowadays collected by all countries with biometric travel document and the use of artificial intelligence in the management of migration (OECD, 2022). The likelihood of these policies is not far from the technique of marked-recapture used for animals in migration and re-immigration. Border control system can detect false or true travel document with false visa. An example of re-emigration pattern is provided by a study in Sweden (Monti, 2019): 10% of North African returned to their home country whilst 6,9% were on route to unknown

Fig. 15.6 Trends of Maghreban deportation from EU27 (2010–2019). (Source: Eurostat Data, 2020)

destination. It is quite relevant to weight re-emigration of former irregular migrants and the more so, for haraga. Some life stories report that haraga, even intercepted, do not give up easily and try again to reach the Northern Mediterranean shores. New field studies are running on re-integration of haraga in their home country. Failures of re-integration may also be a driver to re-emigration.

#### 15.3 Conclusion

In this paper we have attempted a synthesis of the different stages of the process of irregular migration. Further in-depth studies will be necessary to consolidate the model, to estimate the volume of irregularities observed to achieve this global vision.

A first simulation of the model gives a share of around 3% of potential migrants who have taken the initiative to leave. We have also seen that the plan may not be successful: the decision can be revised. A third of potential migrants will be intercepted and thus experienced the end of the dream. Some will meet their death; some will be saved in extremis by NGOs in the Mediterranean Sea. The Mediterranean Sea has become an open-air cemetery. Others will be apprehended on entering the Northern shores. There are also many more unknowns. They can also be arrested, after a successful entry by sea, during transit at land borders. Finally, migrants may be regularised (perhaps naturalised in the long run) and some migrants will be deported or return voluntarily and get out of the exit box. The return process in the country of origin needs also to be evaluated- Returnees, if not well integrated, will try again to migrate regularly or irregularly.

A focus on each step of the irregular migration process offers several avenues for not only a mutual understanding of the drivers acting behind the scene either in Northern or Southern Mediterranean countries. Hence, strategical and global actions can be devised to cope with this phenomenon and to develop secure and sure migration paths.

#### References


Mohamed Saib Musette is an Algerian sociologist, born in Mauritius. He has worked as Researcher at the CREAD (Algiers) for more than 30 years. He serves as an expert for the Algerian government, the European Union and the United Nations in the fields of International Migrations, Labour Market and Youths for Maghreb Countries (North Africa). He is the focal point on Sustainable Development Goals for the Ministry of Higher Education & Scientific Research in Algiers. He has delivered a hundred lectures at universities in Africa and Europe. He has edited twelve collective books, published more than fifty articles in national and international scientific journals and thirteen books' chapters as well as thirty three Technical Reports.

Mohamed Maamar holds a PhD in Demography (2019) and acts as lecturer at University Abu Bakr Belkaid of Tlemcen (Algeria). He has an in-depth knowledge in statistics and irregular migration. He has followed a training session at St John University in the USA from 2014–2017. As an academic, he performed as Training Director and coached up to some 60 students for the Bachelor and Master degrees at University of Tlemcen. He joins the CREAD Migration team (Algiers) as Associate Research Master in 2020, he has acted as a migration expert for the International Centre for Migration Policy Development ICMPD 2022.

Open Access This chapter is licensed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License ( ), which permits use, sharing, adaptation, distribution and reproduction in any medium or format, as long as you give appropriate credit to the original author(s) and the source, provide a link to the Creative Commons license and indicate if changes were made. http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/

The images or other third party material in this chapter are included in the chapter's Creative Commons license, unless indicated otherwise in a credit line to the material. If material is not included in the chapter's Creative Commons license and your intended use is not permitted by statutory regulation or exceeds the permitted use, you will need to obtain permission directly from the copyright holder.

# Part IV History, Cities and Social Transformations

# Chapter 16 Connecting Places, Connecting to Place: Migrants' Use of ICTs for Exploring Lisbon

Franz Buhr , Amandine Desille , and Maria Lucinda Fonseca

# 16.1 Introduction

"I guess seventy percent of the places I go here in Lisbon I found through Facebook," said Karen. She started by 'liking' the Facebook pages of the places she already knew in the city, and then the social network began recommending her new venues, concerts, and workshops. "I even discovered a cultural association right next to where I live because of Facebook, as a friend of mine confirmed her presence online at an event that would take place there and I saw it on my newsfeed". The passage above is a story about the power of algorithms, and about the fluid frontiers between the digital and the material spatial experience. It is also a story about migrant emplacement, as Karen is a migrant living in Lisbon since 2015, and her use of Facebook and other social media has directly shaped her knowledge about Lisbon's urban resources.

The use of information and communication technologies (ICTs) is not a new topic in migration and integration studies. Since the early 1990s, transnationalism literature has explored the ways migrants utilise digital resources to stay connected with distant family members and friends, to provide support to other migrants, or send money abroad (Glick Schiller et al., 1992; Portes et al., 1999; Vertovec, 1999). More recently, researchers have also looked at migrants' mobilisation of digital tools to carry out the actual physical migration journey, whether to plan migration prior to departure or to obtain information en route (Frouws et al., 2016). Yet, very little attention has been paid to understanding the role ICTs play in the process of settlement. While there have been studies about technologies and digital tools facilitating migrants' arrival, including apps designed to help newcomers navigate local bureaucracy and speed up paperwork (Benton, 2014), scholarship has largely

F. Buhr (✉) · A. Desille · M. L. Fonseca

Institute of Geography and Spatial Planning, University of Lisbon, Lisbon, Portugal e-mail: fbuhr@campus.ul.pt

R. Zapata-Barrero, I. Awad (eds.), Migrations in the Mediterranean, IMISCOE Research Series, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-42264-5\_16

ignored how migrants' digital connections may impact longer-term processes of integration.

The need for a deeper glance at the relationship between ICTs and migrant emplacement also stems from the fact that our urban experience has become increasingly mediated by digital technologies, whether we have experienced migration or not. As Gordon and Silva (2011) stated, cities have become networked localities. The places we visit on a daily basis, they argue, are now filled with infinite virtual data (e.g. reviews, pictures, thoughts, etc.), which are geo-referenced, accessible, and constantly being updated by users. Moreover, as digital algorithms become ever-more sophisticated, technology has taken an active role in channelling our attention to specific urban resources (such as restaurants, shops, cinemas, etc.), or to specific activities (events, concerts, meetings, etc.), based on the data we generate as Internet users and on the segmentation of digital marketing.

Yet, we should be careful not to essentialise the ways migrants use ICTs. As digitally-connected urban inhabitants, there is nothing different about the ways migrants access Facebook, post pictures on Instagram, or join WhatsApp group conversations (Dahinden, 2016). Instead, our analytical efforts should rather focus on the extent to which ICTs may perform a key role in processes that are of particular significance to migrants (and other kinds of newcomers), such as learning to navigate and use an unfamiliar urban context. To be aware of the city's resources and of how to use them has a fundamental role in terms of migrant integration (Buhr & McGarrigle, 2017). Furthermore, ICTs may function as fundamental tools for migrant place-making, as Facebook pages, blogs and other news clips can work to reinstall marginalised migrant groups into local narratives (Desille, 2019) or, on the contrary, consolidate dominant discourses over excluded/displaced populations (Desille & Sa'di-Ibraheem, 2021).

This chapter discusses the use of ICTs by migrants living in Lisbon, Portugal. It focuses on the ways newcomers have relied on digital tools to connect to the city's resources, as well as to share information online about their personal experiences. We have looked at ICTs as an increasingly important interface mediating migrants' relationships with urban space, whether it works as a simple wayfinding tool, or as a crowd-sourced information pool supporting migrants' everyday practical decisions. Empirical data was generated as part of a pilot study including 8 migrant individuals. Research participants were interviewed but also joined a purposefully-created WhatsApp group, an innovative qualitative method allowing participants to contribute to the research objectives on their own time, as well as to interact with each other. Participants were able to circulate pictures and posts from social media, screenshots of their apps, links to websites they thought were particularly relevant to their everyday urban life, and other urban/digital resources.

In its first section, the chapter situates the role ICTs play in wider discussions about urban experience and migrant integration. We argue that, although urban embodied navigation cannot be reduced to its digital component, ICTs are fundamental tools mobilised by migrants in order to go about their everyday urban lives. In the subsequent section, we turn our attention to Lisbon and to our empirical data analysis. The section discusses Lisbon's contemporary urban change and migration patterns, introduces our research design and methodology, and, finally, thematically explores our main findings. We end the chapter by summarizing its potential contributions to the field of migration and integration studies, and by proposing pathways for future research.

# 16.2 Learning to Use the City: ICTs and Embodied Navigation

Looking back at Diminescu's (2008) epistemological manifesto claiming a 'connected migrant paradigm' helps elucidate how information and communication technologies have impacted migration since then. Today, some of the most disseminated images about migration, including Stanmayer's World Press Photo of the Year in 2013, portray asylum seekers carrying almost nothing but their smartphones. 'Migrating the WhatsApp way' (Frouws et al., 2016) has come to represent contemporary forms of border crossings for which the use of social media platforms and geolocation apps became a defining feature.

Three decades of transnationalism studies and its ramifications have paved the way for a renewed understanding of migrants' connectedness. In addition to the use of ICTs by people on the move, we have learned how digital social media and virtual communication tools have proved crucial for sustaining long-distance family and kinship ties (Baldassar, 2016; Baldassar et al., 2016; Dekker & Engbersen, 2014; Nedelcu & Wyss, 2016), managing remittances (Elmi & Ngwenyama, 2020), enhancing migrants' political action and mobilisation across borders (Kissau, 2012), or building a sense of self and class identity (Sun & Qiu, 2016). Likewise, the mainstreaming of ICTs has even reformed our very notions of family and its related administration of care (Kofman et al., 2022), just like gender roles have been reproduced or challenged through new transnational media channels (Miller & Madianou, 2012; Cuban, 2018).

While a transnationalism perspective has demonstrated that ICTs are effective instruments helping to sustain families, communities, and diasporas across borders, less attention has been given to the role these technologies play in the ways migrants manage life locally (Lingel, 2015 and Kim & Lingel, 2016 are notable exceptions). This may be partially explained by an enduring (mis)understanding of the local level as self-contained and self-constituting places. Along with Smith (2001), Massey (2005), and Conradson and Latham (2005), we believe that looking at the local level does not imply a simplification of the empirical realities studied. On the contrary, these and other scholars have claimed a complex understanding of the 'local', which is crisscrossed by transnational processes and practices. As Buhr (2018a, 216) summarised, 'we can argue that being local has less and less to do with being provincial, as the local level and the local experience are increasingly permeated by translocal connections and [digital] channels through which even practical urban knowledge is transmitted and shared'.

Following Glick Schiller and Çağlar's (2016) call for a global and relational perspective on the structural shaping of localities, migration scholars have turned to the local level as entry points for discussing the ways migrant newcomers 'fall into' pre-existing local urban dynamics, or else take part in new ones. In this sense, migrants' emplacement becomes a process through which individuals build or rebuild networks of connection within the constraints and opportunities of a specific city (Glick Schiller & Çağlar, 2013). This chapter's concern with the ways migrants learn to use a new city and become aware of its resources stems from an understanding that migrants are full urban inhabitants – affected by cross-cutting global and local processes of inequality, yes, but still city dwellers who are ultimately enmeshed in the work of carrying a life locally.

A rich body of scholarship has taken up the task of exploring the various dimensions of migrants' interactions with the urban local level. The idea that migrants become grounded in the local through their everyday practices (van Riemsdijk, 2014), whether by creating affective ties toward a new city (Kochan, 2020), establishing networks of support (Wessendorf, 2018), or by learning to navigate and use local urban resources (Buhr, 2018b) has shed light on the manifold meanings, qualities, rhythms, and affordances of local life. Nevertheless, these studies have mostly relied on an offline approach to migrants' urban experience and rarely engaged with the potentialities of ICTs in shaping migrants' relationships with the local.

Learning to use a (new) city is both an online and an offline endeavour. A lot has been argued about how embodied navigation, that is, the actual practice of going around (or wayfaring) is at the basis of how we produce urban knowledge and practical skills (Ingold, 2011). The art of dwelling in cities (Certeau & Rendall, 1984) has increasingly come to encompass navigating through digital resources, whether for wayfinding (e.g. Google Maps, Waze, CityMapper, etc.), for sharing urban information (WhatsApp, Telegram, but also TripAdvisor, and other reviewbased websites), for finding a place to live (real estate agencies' websites), or simply to find out 'what's on' (online festival agendas, cinema, and leisure activities in general). The frontiers between embodied and virtual navigation, or between online and offline urban experience are blurred.

As digital technologies become so ingrained in everyday urban experience, they also raise the question of autonomy. While using our smartphones to check the working hours of a café or the timetable of a bus line facilitates our use of urban spaces, some of our research participants, as we will see in the following section, shared a sense of gratification by not relying on ICTs to find their way through Lisbon. In a context of growing technology dependence, the capacity to mobilise urban resources autonomously and without recourse to apps or smartphones is often felt as a testament to the level of familiarity one entertains with one's local surroundings.

#### 16.3 Emplacement and Connectivity in Lisbon

#### 16.3.1 Migration in Lisbon

During the last ten years, the stock of documented foreign residents in Lisbon more than doubled, changing from 44,784 in 2010 to 107,238 in 2020, and increasing its proportion in the total population from 8.2% to 19.6%. The increase in the number of foreign citizens in the Portuguese capital was followed by the diversification of their geographic and social-cultural origins. In 2020, according to the registries of the Foreigners and Borders Office (Serviço de Estrangeiros e Fronteiras – SEF), documented migrants of 171 nationalities were living in the city.

While Brazil has traditionally been (and still is) the most representative singleorigin country of documented migrants in Lisbon, its relative weight in the total foreign population reduced from 29.8% in 2010 to 17.6% in 2020. In this period, the city has seen its postcolonial migration patterns decrease in proportion, while intra-European migration became more and more important. In 2010, migrants from Brazil and from the Portuguese-speaking African countries accounted for half (49.7%) of the stock of documented foreign residents in Lisbon. This number decreased to 24.7% in 2020. In contrast, migrants from EU countries and from the UK, taken together, amounted to 20.7% of the city's total foreign residents in 2010, and 37.4% in 2020, becoming the most expressive foreign group in the city. Among intra-European migrants, the main nationalities are French, Italian, Spanish, and German.

The increase in the foreign resident population observed in Lisbon from 2015 onwards, and the changes already mentioned in terms of main origin countries were paralleled by a growing proportion of international students, researchers, highly skilled workers, independent workers, investors, and retirees (Fonseca et al., 2016; Oliveira, 2021). The recent expansion in the number of highly skilled and lifestyle migrants is largely due to the perception of Portugal as a safe country, friendly to (privileged) immigrants, and to the tax advantages from which they may benefit (Montezuma & McGarrigle, 2019; McGarrigle, 2021). In this context, Lisbon became a new hotspot not only for lifestyle migrants (who have traditionally headed to the South of Portugal) but also for digital nomads and other transnational remote workers, whose presence has notably increased since the COVID-19 pandemic.

#### 16.3.2 Methodology

This project produced empirical data based on a qualitative mixed-methods approach. First, our pilot study comprised semi-structured in-depth interviews with eight migrants who moved to Lisbon from 2014 to 2019. This time period was set for two reasons: one is that participants all had the chance to experience life in the city before and during the pandemic-related mobility restrictions. The other links with the recent level of urban transformation Lisbon has experienced in this period – which includes the proliferation of digital tools facilitating visitors' and newcomers' experience of the city. Moreover, as the project sought to capture the manifold ways migrants employ ICTs to establish a connection to Lisbon's urban resources, the recruitment process was designed to account for the many spatial roles people play out every day (as neighbourhood residents, shoppers, parents, and commuters, etc.). In this sense, research participants were recruited following a purposive sampling rationale ensuring gender balance (four women and four men), professional diversity (presential and remote workers), and household composition (single, in cohabitation, with/without children). In addition, we strove to gather a sample of participants that resembled the current migration patterns to Lisbon in terms of origins. Table 16.1 summarises the research participants' details (see Annex below).

All eight participants were approached through the researchers' both physical and virtual networks of contacts. Given the exploratory nature of the project, we decided to approach only middle-class migrants.1 On the one hand, it is safe to assume that middle-class individuals possess a minimum standard of digital literacy and familiarity with apps, social networks, and other digital tools. On the other hand, middling migrants are often studied in rather segmented ways (highly skilled, lifestyle, academic/student migration, etc.), which makes them an underexplored category as such within migration and integration studies (Conradson & Latham, 2005). Interviews aimed at obtaining information about participants' migration trajectories, residential history, urban habits, and professional activity. Then, participants were asked about their historical use of ICTs (social media, time spent on phones, apps, etc.) and about the extent to which the digital has channelled their knowledge and use of Lisbon's urban resources. The interviews lasted approximately one hour each, and were then transcribed and coded.

The second phase of fieldwork consisted of a closed WhatsApp group discussion created by the researchers and involving all eight participants. In our WhatsApp research group, participants received questions and tasks on a daily basis. They were able to share pictures and posts from social media, screenshots of their apps, links to websites they thought were particularly relevant to their everyday life, and other urban/digital resources. While Datta argued for her own project on women's perceptions of safety/fear in Indian marginal city spaces (2020, 1324) that this research method resulted in 'a rich multimedia sharing of experiences of moving around the city', in our study it also functioned as a platform for more extended contact with participants (and among participants themselves), in which we could introduce tasks and follow-up questions. Our WhatsApp research group lasted 4 weeks, and all entries were exported and coded. Different from face-to-face focus groups, this technique grants participants the flexibility to reply to questions whenever they deem convenient. This allowed participants to take the time to share very detailed

<sup>1</sup> Given his level of literacy – he speaks Urdu, English, Portuguese and German -, his status of shop owner, and his belonging to middle-class Pakistan, we have considered Mohamed a middling migrant, even though he does not hold a higher education degree as the rest of the participants.

accounts of their experiences in Lisbon. However, not all participants had the same degree of engagement. Thomas, who got COVID-19 during the WhatsApp group duration, and Mohamed, who travelled back to Pakistan for a family visit, had a lower level of contribution to the group's discussion. All fieldwork took place in the first semester of 2022.

#### 16.3.3 Findings

#### 'The Almighty WhatsApp'

WhatsApp was the first and most used application among all research participants. They use the app on their smartphones, and a few also have it open as a tab on their personal computers. All of them spend a great amount of time on WhatsApp to interact with family and friends in Lisbon and in other cities in the world. As Armando justifies: "since I am a foreigner [...] most of the people I interact with are not here, but there. So the only way to interact is through the Internet". We verify here the importance of ICT-based co-presence or mediated co-presence (Baldassar, 2016; Baldassar et al., 2016; Cuban, 2018; Dekker & Engbersen, 2014; Miller & Madianou, 2012), an argument that has gained thickness in the last years in the field of migration studies.

Communication with friends and relatives is not the sole use of WhatsApp. Participants point out their involvement in groups beyond their own closed ones: groups composed of alumni, current peer students, Mozambican students in Portugal, work colleagues, church members, Brazilian women in Portugal, Italian parents in Lisbon, parents from the same school, and more. Here, Facebook comes into the picture too: its pages and groups function as online fora on a range of topics. As Iorio already argued in her study about Brazilian students in Lisbon, Facebook is crucial before and at the time of migration (Iorio & Fonseca, 2017). Participants follow specific pages or are members of groups, such as groups where migrants from common origins (e.g. Israeli, French, or South-East Asian) share tips and recommendations before migration or during the first months of settlement; groups where available rooms and flats in Lisbon are advertised; groups for swaps and donations such as Buy Nothing Lisbon; and pages of cultural, militant or leisure organisations. For instance, Flora shared:

So I wanted to know what was there in the city and it was all through the Internet. All through... Facebook itself, to see what events there were or... even the Festival Feminista was a call that was made on Facebook and I came across the call and went to these Festival Feminista meetings.

Few have attempted to escape the WhatsApp/Facebook monopoly. Rachel tried to move her contacts to Signal, and Thomas mentioned Telegram, but, in general, their use is rare. WhatsApp and Facebook are more widely used to link with other migrants or with Portuguese people than dedicated platforms, such as the social media Meet Up which enables the organisation of city-based meetings and events

Image 16.1 Screenshot from Tal. Tal posted in the Facebook group "Israelis living in Lisbon": "Hi everyone, is there anyone here who knows if the Israeli Embassy went back to work or that has any interesting strategy to make them answer?". Fifteen answered with a comment, and he eventually managed to contact the Embassy and solve the issue

along its users' specific hobbies and interests. If Andrea and Tal have used Meet Up when arriving in Lisbon, they have eventually switched to WhatsApp or Facebook. Participants seemed to recognise a certain 'social media stratification' by linking the Meet Up platform as a preserve of European and North American relatively privileged migrants, or as Flora puts it, "Global North" migrants.

For their socio-cultural needs, participants mentioned the restaurant aggregator Zomato and the restaurant booking service The Fork. More broadly, the photo and video sharing social media Instagram – another brand of the Meta conglomerate also owning WhatsApp and Facebook – is indeed used to look for events, restaurants, places to visit, and more. Commonly, participants are redirected to certain events or places of their liking by Facebook or Instagram based on their embedded algorithmic calculations.

For this research project focused on digital urban resources, we also enquired whether participants used geolocation apps. Overwhelmingly, they used Google Maps (and sometimes City Mapper). Several pointed out that they "save" places they liked or would like to visit on Google Maps while Tal remembers that he and his partner created layers on the Google Maps' feature MyMaps registering their exploratory walks in Lisbon. All research participants also downloaded Uber and/or Bolt apps and use them for car rides, to use the bikes or electric scooters available in Lisbon, and to order food.

When it comes to employment, LinkedIn is the professional social media used by a few. Although they mention locally-used platforms, Andrea, Thomas, and Tal have mostly relied on LinkedIn when looking for a job. They simply switched their location to Lisbon and began receiving job adverts for Lisbon-based posts.

Apps have not replaced browser-based searches. Google was mentioned when it came to scan universities and education opportunities; to check the requirement for visa and social security upon arrival; to look for housing (Couch Surfing, AirBnb, Uniplaces and Lovely Place for short-term rental before settling; and Idealista and Imovirtual when the stay extends); to sell and buy second-hand (such as the Portuguese Website OLX); and later on for events (TimeOut, TripAdvisor, and specialised website for families such as Estrelas e Ouriços).

Following such descriptive overview of ICTs use among the group members, there is little that differentiate migrants from other locals or short-term visitors/ tourists. The technology and the type of apps and websites mobilised by research participants are based on general needs or solution-based tools that are used transversally by urban residents, regardless of origin or length of stay.

#### Embedded Digital Urban Lives

Participants (and researchers) spend a lot of time in front of a screen. Andrea, Thomas, Tal, Flora, and Karen work at home from their computer, Armando and Rachel are students and are therefore required to spend a good part of their day in front of a monitor, and Mohamed is constantly checking his smartphone throughout his 14 h-work shift (he does not own a computer). Yet in the interviews, they also describe at length a wealthy family, social, and/or cultural life. In that sense, an intensive digital presence was in no way related to a weak level of in-person interactions with people and with the resources of the city of Lisbon.

What's more, the interviews we recorded demonstrate that digital and urban resources are in fact mutually constitutive. Sometimes, ICTs facilitate city exploration, while at other times, participants experience the city before they look for further information online. But no matter the order – digital/urban or urban/digital -, it makes no doubt that digital resources influence our urban experiences; that our experiences will influence what content we feed online; and eventually, this will, in turn, have an impact on the ways migrant persons use certain urban resources.

Rachel wrote in our research WhatsApp group that "Google, apps, internet, etc. are helpful in finding the big picture... and then you, of course, by yourself, through trial and error, navigate the details". As we pointed out in the introduction, Karen discovered the cultural association Sirigaita a few hundred metres from her home thanks to a suggestion made by Facebook. Proximity does not necessarily mean familiarity – it was Facebook that made her discover the place, not the fact that she lived nearby. She admits in the interview that 70% of the cultural events she takes part in are Facebook suggestions and this is how she, in her words, builds her "cultural agenda". On a similar note, Rachel remembers that another geolocationbased app was helpful in getting to know what the city had to offer: dating apps.

So, I met a guy, like, just met him, it was like potentially romantic at the beginning and then I was like "Yeah, I'm not interested", but we realised that we both loved football so he was like "Wow, well, if you love football then you should come play with me!" and I was like "Oh, where do you play?", so "It's with this group...", and then he took me there. [...] I got to see a lot of different places that I had never seen before, you know?

Other times, participants rely on offline knowledge, and only later verify information online. Tal remembers the bus lines by heart, but uses the app Move it to look up the schedule. Rachel first sees flyers or billboards in the street with cultural events, takes a picture of them, and looks up the details on the Internet once back home. And Andrea saves places she has discovered wandering around on her Google Maps. This corroborates Gordon and Silva's argument (2011) that "we used to talk about the World Wide Web as an interconnected information space set aside from the world we live in, but the world we live in and the web can no longer be so easily separated" (2011, p. 1).

Indeed, there is an emerging body of research in Lisbon looking at the ways the online and the offline imaginaries of the city are brought together. Baumann et al. (2017), Riboldi (2018) and Feijó and Gomez (2018) have constituted samples of Instagram images to sketch a visual imaginary of Lisbon, either by locals or tourists. As Massey et al. (1999, 107) have argued, "placemaking is a localised process which participates in the production of places. It is, precisely, a reorientation of the city within a restructured wider geography. And that restructuring of the wider geography, of the networks within which the city is set, provokes effects within the city itself". The data we collected here hints that the embeddedness of digital and urban resources affects people's experiences and the very production of the places that make up Lisbon.

As a freelance family consultant, Andrea shares information about Lisbon for new families settling in the city. Since 2017, Andrea has been the administrator of 4 Facebook groups for (mostly foreign) parents in Lisbon. The success of these groups lies in the English-speaking peer support offered to foreign residents with children, from medical services to playdates or second-hand children's clothes. Thomas is part of a Facebook group where French nationals share experiences in Lisbon. He affirms that the questions are always the same, e.g. "in which neighbourhood should I live?", "how much does one need to survive in Lisbon?", etc. Thomas's opinion is that French newcomers, therefore, tend to settle in neighbourhoods recommended to them by other fellow French. Would they choose these areas if it was not for tips collected online? He says the comments following the posts are often complaints about the pressure put on rents by French newcomers. The anger of certain members is related to processes of gentrification that foreign newcomers – particularly from European countries with a higher purchasing power – take part of (Buhr & Cocola-Gant, forthcoming). Thomas humorously refers to the process of gentrification many neighbourhoods of Lisbon are affected by, and says: "Lisbon became a city much more... I don't know, with brunch and all this". Yet, he admits he himself takes advantage of the new commercial offer by frequenting bars and restaurants catering to international customers.

Against running the risk of techno-optimism (Leurs & Smets, 2018), participants also shared a sense of resistance to ICTs. Rachel expressed a lot of concern regarding privacy in the interview, as well as Tal who said: "It doesn't interest me to expose or tell the world what I am doing or where I am going...". All participants have given value to an offline exploration of the city. Armando finds it better to ask people for directions or to call restaurants rather than check comments online. Tal uses "the rule of the street", meaning that he checks if a café or a restaurant is busy to assess its success. As for Karen and Rachel, they both dedicate specific leisure time to purposely getting lost. Karen acknowledged to sometimes leave her place in advance to try and get someplace else in the city by wandering around. Rachel and her daughter take public transport to other neighbourhoods, and walk around to explore new places. In that sense, both suggest that leaving their smartphone behind and getting to know a place without the support of a GPS is a way to reclaim control. The satisfaction that follows is an empowering moment for them.

#### Using Community Digital Urban Resources

Although our research participants' use of ICTs seem to differ little from that of other Lisbon residents, or even visitors, part of their urban resourcefulness may be labelled migrant-specific. Namely, WhatsApp groups formed by Mozambican students or Brazilian women in Lisbon, Facebook groups of French (wannabe) residents, or of Asian migrants in Lisbon which Mohamed is a member of: the participation of Portugal-born locals in these groups is very rare. Other groups that seem more centred on interest/status such as the various Facebook groups of foreign parents administered by Andrea, or the Facebook donation group Buy Nothing Lisbon used by Flora have English as an official language. Even if some Portuguese members take part in the discussion, the majority of members are migrants.

Data collected by social media on the users themselves enables them to target advertisements more effectively. The so-called Facebook "suggestions", may, therefore, reinforce this migrant-specific trend, channelling migrants to their own national- or ethnic-related urban resources or activities. For instance, Flora shares: "Recently Instagram has been showing me advertisement about Brazilian restaurants that seem interesting too".

It makes no doubt that migrant users leave digital traces, which in turn are harvested by big tech corporations. The exploitation of "big data" by the scientific community itself to learn more about migration remains problematic (Taylor & Meissner, 2020) and is far beyond this pilot study's reach (Image 16.2).

In contrast to the claim that migrants have more digital interactions with relatives and friends in their regions of origin rather than in the place where they settled, we

Image 16.2 Screenshot from Flora's smartphone. The restaurant's description is 'A Bahia em Lisboa', which means 'Bahia in Lisbon'. Bahia is a state in Brazil known for its African gastronomic heritage

find that even these migrant-specific resources are based in the city of settlement. Gordon and Silva (2011) make a compelling argument: "Net locality is, indeed, a global phenomenon, but it needs to be considered locally. How specific cultures appropriate technologies, adapt social practices, and produce cultural references, are going to influence the meanings of location." How does this unfold in practice?

One, participants join digital resources that are Lisbon-specific. The Facebook page Lisboa para pessoas, or that of the Festival Feminista where Flora interacts, the cultural activities Karen adds to her agenda – all eventually translate into physical encounters and embodied navigation. Facebook's Marketplace which was mentioned by a few participants to sell and buy second-hand goods is geolocated too and entails a physical meeting to exchange the purchased object.

Two, the digital resources developed by the participants are not always portable to other cities. This part of the interview with Flora was enlightening:

I developed Twitter in Spanish, so when I arrived here, people... that community that I had built on Twitter had nothing to do anymore! That is, nothing to do... If I would continue speaking Spanish, I would never talk to people here, right? With this tool. So I ended up leaving the tool aside [...].

Flora moved away from Twitter when her geographical/linguistic network did not match her new location. Tal gave a similar example with LinkedIn. By changing his location to Lisbon, he got much fewer job offers: the professional network he developed back in Israel did not match his new geographical location, hence the platform could not effectively advertise relevant jobs to him. This hints to a perceived limitation of the transnationalism paradigm, inasmuch as Flora's and Tal's connections elsewhere actually hindered opportunities in their new place of residence, rather than benefiting them.

#### 16.4 Discussion and Conclusions

In line with the transnationalism paradigm, this chapter has shown how migrants' use of ICTs to manage local life is place-binding but not place-bound (Ingold, 2011, 148). The ways migrant individuals construct their own urban resourcefulness does not only mean knowing by heart where to go or how to go, but increasingly implies the capacity to mobilise the digital realm in ways that respond to their daily practical needs. By resorting to ICTs, the circulation of urban knowledge is rescaled – and may include the support of neighbours and acquaintances on WhatsApp, but also transnational crowd-sourced information produced by other residents, other migrants, and city visitors alike, which is the case of Google reviews, TripAdvisor, or Facebook fora.

It is evident that this pilot research, both because of the number of participants, and the exceptional circumstances of a global pandemic only enables us to draw potential pathways for further research. Yet we trust that these preliminary comments are of great interest to those engaging with the intricate connections between migration, emplacement, and ICTs.

Firstly, our findings reinforce the argument that we cannot essentialise migrant persons in terms of their use of ICTs. ICTs often blur the established versus newcomer divide. The urban penetration of ICTs – the most visible of their powers being the so-called "algorithm" – is mentioned by participants concerned about data collection and privacy in general. Interestingly, while ICTs facilitate migrants' emplacement process, the search for autonomy involves asking people in the street rather than the GPS, or purposefully getting lost in the city. This has been perceived as an empowering and freeing moment by our research participants.

Secondly, as finely argued by Gordon and Silva (2011), this chapter provides further evidence that digital and urban resources are intertwined. Spatial apprenticeship (Buhr, 2018a) is increasingly supported by ICTs. Online navigation can actually shape the offline experience of using the city and vice-versa. But the fact that (migrant) urbanites provide feedback online produces new ways to imagine Lisbon, and in turn, can affect the ways the city is experienced by non-migrant locals and visitors. Previous works have highlighted the extent to which migrants are citymakers (Çaglar & Glick Schiller, 2018). Migrants' practices alter the structure of places (Desille, 2019). What we come to see is that their digital traces and the way they portray the places they use – by posting, commenting, sharing, and leaving reviews online – add up to an ICT-supported imaginary of the city fed by residents, migrants and tourists alike.

Thirdly, we found that certain digital urban resources may indeed be migrantspecific. There exist parallel WhatsApp and Facebook groups seldom used by Portuguese residents and in languages other than Portuguese. The "algorithm" can reinforce a rather migrant-specific use of space by directing users to places, events, or to groups used mainly by other people who have experienced migration in similar conditions or belonging to the same ethnic population.

The participants of this study are highly educated and highly mobile, and most of them have come of age with Internet at home and a smartphone. In their cases, rich social networks translated into more intense online activities and resources. In a context where access to education, the labour market, as well as cultural and social activities are increasingly mediated by ICTs, the lack of access to them – or low levels of digital literacy – could potentially represent a factor of double exclusion for more vulnerable and marginalised groups – including migrants.

Annex


The intensity of ICT use was self-determined (by research participants) based on daily screen time and number of online/app-based services used

#### References


Franz Buhr is a research fellow at the Centre of Geographical Studies, University of Lisbon, where he obtained a PhD degree in migration studies. He was formerly a Marie Sklodowska-Curie junior researcher and his work lies at the intersection between migration and urban studies. He is particularly interested in migrants' roles in transforming urban space, their urban mobilities and place-consumption practices. He has recently conducted research for the H2020 SMARTDEST project, in which he examined the commercial landscape transformation driven by the demands of lifestyle migrants and digital nomads in Lisbon. He is co-founder and coordinator of PriMob, the IMISCOE research initiative on privileged mobilities. His work has been published in the Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies, Mobilities, and in various edited volumes.

Amandine Desille is a postdoctoral researcher for the Horizon project Re-Place Reframing Non-Metropolitan Left Behind Places Through Mobility and Alternative Development, at the Institute of Geography and Spatial Planning at the University of Lisbon. Her research addresses international migrations, return migrations, local governance and ordinary cities. She co-authored the volume International Migrations and Local Governance: A Global Perspective, published at Palgrave Macmillan in 2018; as well as the volume Visual Methods in Migration Studies: New Possibilities, Theoretical Implications, and Ethical Questions, published at Springer in 2021 and winner of the IMISCOE book competition. Her research was also published in Political Geography and Territory, Politics and Governance, among others. She holds a PhD in geography from the University of Poitiers (France) and the University of Tel Aviv (Israel). Previously, she has worked with NGOs and UN agencies on topics related to immigration, local economic development and urban planning.

Maria Lucinda Fonseca is a Full Professor of Human Geography and Migration Studies at the Institute of Geography and Spatial Planning (IGOT), University of Lisbon. She is the Coordinator of the Research cluster MIGRARE – Migration, spaces and societies at the Centre of Geographical Studies (CEG) and the Director of the PhD programme in Migration Studies at the University of Lisbon. She is a member of the Board of Directors of IMISCOE. She is, moreover, a member of the Lisbon Academy of Sciences and a member of the International Steering Committee of the Metropolis International Project and EuroMedMig (Euro-Mediterranean Research Network on Migration). She coordinated and participated in several EU and NORFACE funded research projects and has wide experience in research training. She has published extensively in Portugal and abroad in the fields of international migration, migration and integration policies, urban transformation dynamics, migration, ageing and depopulation of low density areas.

She has been an advisor of a wide array of local, national and international governmental organizations and civic society institutions, including the Portuguese Observatory of Migration, the Gulbenkian Foundation and the Brazilian Observatory of International Migration (OBMigra).

She has served on numerous management and leadership positions at the University of Lisbon, namely the following: Dean and President of the Scientific Council of IGOT (2013–2019); Member of the General Council of the University of Lisbon (2010–2013); Pro-Rector (1998–2002); Board Member of the Faculty of Letters (1991–93).

Open Access This chapter is licensed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits use, sharing, adaptation, distribution and reproduction in any medium or format, as long as you give appropriate credit to the original author(s) and the source, provide a link to the Creative Commons license and indicate if changes were made.

The images or other third party material in this chapter are included in the chapter's Creative Commons license, unless indicated otherwise in a credit line to the material. If material is not included in the chapter's Creative Commons license and your intended use is not permitted by statutory regulation or exceeds the permitted use, you will need to obtain permission directly from the copyright holder.

# Chapter 17 The Fenced Off Cities of Ceuta and Melilla: Mediterranean Nodes of Migrant (Im)Mobility

Xavier Ferrer-Gallardo and Lorenzo Gabrielli

# 17.1 The Iconic Fortification of Ceuta and Melilla

Since their building in the mid-nineties, the border fences around the North-African enclaves of Ceuta and Melilla have become icons of what has been popularly known as "Fortress Europe". They have also been central stages of what academics and activists have critically denounced and referred to as the external EU 'border spectacle' (Andersson, 2014; Brambilla, 2021; Cuttitta, 2012; De Genova, 2013; Gabrielli, 2021a; Van Reekum, 2016). For years, the fences have symbolized the harshness with which the European Union has tackled irregular migration flows across its external borders.

Back in the nineties, the fences represented a poignant visual counterargument against the then widespread rhetoric of a "borderless Europe" -to be built in what was supposed to become a "world without borders". Later, border reinforcement processes similar to those triggered in Ceuta and Melilla in the mid-nineties were developed, even on a major scale, in other segments of the EU external border (at the land border between Greece and Turkey, at the Hungarian border with Serbia,1 or at the Polish border with Belarus,2 amongst others). Certainly, the imagery of walls, sealed off and heavily securitized borders (Jones, 2016; O'Dowd, 2010; Vallet, 2016; Coleman, 2020) has only but proliferated in Europe and elsewhere since the

X. Ferrer-Gallardo

Researcher at the Humanities Department, Universitat Pompeu Fabra, Barcelona, Spain

L. Gabrielli (✉)

<sup>1</sup> https://www.reuters.com/article/us-europe-migrants-hungary-fence-idUSKBN1692MH 2 https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/1/25/poland-begins-work-on-400m-belarus-border-wallagainst-migrants

Senior Researcher at GRITIM - Universitat Pompeu Fabra, Barcelona, Spain e-mail: lorenzo.gabrielli@upf.edu

fortification of the EU land borders in Africa started. Thus, the border fences from Ceuta and Melilla do not seem to be an anomaly within the contemporary global border order anymore.

Somehow it could be argued that the fences of Ceuta and Melilla acted as forerunners, as precursors in the radical anti-immigration and securitization turn EU borders have gone through over the last decades. And probably also because of that, for years they have gained widespread media attention and uninterrupted scholarly focus (Acosta-Sánchez, 2022; Driessen, 1992; Barbero, 2021; Castan Pinos, 2014; Coleman, 2020; Español Nogueiro et al., 2017; Ferrer-Gallardo, 2008, 2011; Ferrer-Gallardo & Albet-Mas, 2016; Johnson, 2013; Gabrielli, 2015; Saddiki, 2010; Scott et al., 2018; Soddu, 2002; Fuentes Lara, 2018, 2019; Planet, 1998; Pallister-Wilkins, 2017; Queirolo-Palmas, 2021; Suárez-Navaz & Suárez, 2022).

Building on the already vast body of academic literature about border governance and migration management in Ceuta and Melilla, this contribution situates the border regime of the EU-African cities within the broad research agenda on Mediterranean migration studies. The chapter traces the evolution of these cities' border regimes since they joined the European Union in 1986 and gradually became crucial Mediterranean nodes of migrant (im)mobility towards the Schengen Area. The text highlights that the functional and symbolic role played by Ceuta and Melilla echoes that played by other EU external border territories like Lampedusa, Lesvos, Samos or even the Canary Islands (Cuttitta, 2012, 2014; Dines et al., 2015; Kalir & Rozakou, 2016; Tsoni, 2016; Vives, 2017), which have respectively acted as migrant (im)mobility nodes within the Central, Eastern and Western Mediterranean and Atlantic migration routes towards Europe. These territories embody manifestations of socio-spatial exceptionality which are part and parcel of what Alison Mountz (2011) has labelled as the "enforcement archipelago" vis-à-vis global dynamics of border/migration control.

For years, the preponderant media and scholarly focus on the excesses of border management has perhaps eclipsed the fact that the borderwork assemblage operating around the North-African cities has not been exclusively characterized by securitization practices but has also witnessed the increasing intervention of humanitarian actors. However, a recent wave of academic contributions has addressed this gap in the literature and has highlighted how the logic that characterizes the border regimes of these territories is sourced in a permanent tension between securitarian and humanitarian approaches (see for example, Sahraoui & Tyszler, 2021; Aris Escarcena, 2022; Sahraoui, 2020; Pallister-Wilkins, 2017, Cuttitta, 2018; Garelli & Tazzioli, 2018; Gorrín & Fuentes Lara, 2020; Vaughan-Williams, 2015).

On the other hand, these dynamics have been deeply influenced by Morocco's postcolonial claim of sovereignty over the cities as well as by Rabat's growing relevance as a partner within the EU border externalization strategy. Gradually, and even without its authorities officially recognizing the legitimacy of the EU land borders in Africa, Morocco has become an indispensable actor when it comes to deploy the EU migration control strategy at the borders of Ceuta and Melilla. EU foreign dependency vis-à-vis migration and border control has only but grown over the last years. And Morocco has skillfully used it as strategic advantage in its bilateral relationships with Spain and with the EU (Ferrer-Gallardo & Gabrielli, 2022; Okyay & Zaragoza-Cristiani, 2016).

Over the last decades, as the externalization logic has been intensifying, a joint EU-Spanish-Moroccan political strategy has paved the way to diverse controversial practices of border management in Ceuta and Melilla. These practices have been closely scrutinized from academic, journalistic and activist perspectives. The logic of exception that drives the EU border regime as well as how migrants have challenged it is examined in this contribution. The chapter ends by highlighting that, more than three decades after the fencing off of the cities started, the consequences of the growing foreign dependency vis-à-vis Morocco, together with the impact of the Covid-19 pandemic in cross-border mobility dynamics, has contributed to yet a new reconfiguration of the Ceuta and Melilla border regime. As the deadly events at the Melilla fence in June 2022 illustrate (Guardian, 2022), these two interrelated factors have acted as vectors of change, and have toughened the practices of migratory obstruction at the external borders of the EU. In this light, the iconic strength of their border fences remains, and so does its explanatory power both as an illustrative sample of the general EU external border and of its footprint in the Mediterranean migration system.

# 17.2 Ceuta and Melilla into the EU (1986): Crucial Mediterranean Nodes of Migrant (Im)mobility Towards the Schengen Area

When Spain joined the Schengen Agreement in 1991, the geopolitically contested cities of Ceuta and Melilla started to gradually turn into key hubs of – mainly but not only<sup>3</sup> -sub-Saharan migration to the European Union. The reconfiguration of the Spanish border regime which followed Spain's EU entrance in 1986 ran parallel to the reshaping of migratory dynamics in the North of Africa. In the mid-nineties, the growing flows of sub-Saharan migrants heading the EU implied that Libya, Algeria, Tunisia and Morocco started consolidating as key transit countries, but also as destination countries (Iranzo, 2021; El Ghazouani, 2019; Lahlou, 2015; Collyer, 2007; De Haas, 2007; Schapendonk, 2012). Consequently, migratory dynamics in Ceuta's and Melilla's hinterlands went through huge transformations. The land borders of Ceuta and Melilla emerged as new, but relatively low thresholds to be crossed within the trajectories of sub-Saharan migrants to the EU. Increasingly, the Spanish African cities would be perceived as a less dangerous irregular gate to the

<sup>3</sup> Refugees and migrants from other origins (Syrians, Bangladeshi, Pakistanis, etc.) had also used this route towards the EU (See Barbero, 2021). During the year 2015, for instance, 7189 Syrians crossed the borders in Ceuta and Melilla, as well as 4.435 people of other nationalities (see Fig. 17.1).

EU. Entering Ceuta and Melilla would therefore become a relatively safer and more attractive alternative to the clandestine crossing of the Mediterranean.

In 1995, the irregular access of sub-Saharan citizens to Ceuta and Melilla (that were not repatriated to their countries of origin nor allowed to cross the maritime border toward the Iberian Peninsula) had already become a frequent phenomenon. Many migrants were stranded in Ceuta and Melilla for long periods of time, and this became a source of social tensions in the city, where racist attacks and migrant protests claiming for their rights proliferated (see Gold, 1999, 2000; Planet, 1998). In this context, Spanish and EU authorities decided to undertake the fortification of the land perimeter of the cities. The range of legal modifications associated to the Schengenization of the Spanish-Moroccan border came together with the physical reshaping of the border. In order to halt the increasing flows of irregular immigration, a double metal fence –whose height would later on reach 6 meters (Saddiki, 2010; Ferrer-Gallardo & Gabrielli, 2018), then 7,20 meters, and subsequently 10 meters in some segments – was erected between the cities and Morocco. This is how the borders of Ceuta and Melilla started to become paradigmatic examples of the EU's sealing off of its outer perimeter. Parallel to that, the Spanish Government began creating the reception system within which the involvement of humanitarian actors would become essential (Aris Escarcena, 2020: 5). And this is also the moment when the hybridisation process of the securitarian and humanitarian logic of the border regime started.

Over the years, due to the implementation of a variety of Spanish, EU and Moroccan policies of deterrence, dissuasion, containment, detention and even abandonment (Gross-Wyrtzen, 2020; López-Sala, 2015), the cities were gradually transformed into crucial Mediterranean nodes of migrant (im)mobility fulfilling a significant role within the contemporary system of Mediterranean migrations (Panebianco, 2022; Zapata-Barrero, 2020). Since the (EU)ropeanization of the cities started, both the increasing securitisation of their land perimeters and the fluctuant – though persistent – arrival of migrants (see Fig. 17.1) have transformed the sociospatial nature of these Spanish territories and that of its Moroccan surroundings.

#### 17.3 Border Acrobatics

After Spain's EU entrance in 1986 divergent patterns of cross-border (im)mobility of people and trade have coexisted in the region. Despite the territorial dispute and the spatial constraints arising from the securitization of their perimeters, socio-economic interaction between the cities and their local environment has been profound. For decades, the harsh though ineffective attempts to completely obstruct the mobility of some "undesired" non-EU citizens across the borders of Ceuta and Melilla contrasted with the elasticity that EU legislation showed when it came to facilitate the free cross-border flow of "desired" non-EU citizens (see Ferrer-Gallardo, 2011; Krichker, 2020; Fuentes Lara, 2019). The rational of this acrobatic border regime of "exceptional Schengenization" lies in the fact that the economic sustainability of Ceuta and Melilla has been largely dependent on the interaction with its hinterlands. For this reason, Spain exempted the visa requirement to the citizens of the neighbouring Moroccan provinces of Tétouan and Nador.4 The coexistence of daily crossings of workers and porteadoras5 (Fuentes Lara, 2019) from one hand, and of migrants and refugees' crossings from the other, underlines the porosity of borders in the enclaves and illustrates the existence of selective and differential cross-border (im)mobility patterns.

As explained later in this chapter, these dynamics were deeply affected by the Covid-19 pandemic as well as by Morocco's unilateral decision to close the borders and freeze all types of trade and human flows across them in March 2020. Borders were only reopened in May 2022, after Spanish-Moroccan diplomatic frictions related to the Western Sahara conflict were smoothed out. The consequences of the two-year border closure deeply impacted in the complex amalgam of political and socio-economic interdependencies between Spain and Morocco. Irregular entries of migrants persisted though (see Fig. 17.1).

In 2014: 3305 Syrians and 4180 from other nationalities; in 2015: 7189 Syrians, 4.435 other nationalities. In 2020, it has to be considered the COVID-19 pandemic impact. Data of 2021 do not include May 18th–19th crossings in Ceuta

Source: Ministerio del Interior, Balances y Informes, 2005–2021. https://www.interior.gob.es/ opencms/es/prensa/balances-e-informes/

<sup>4</sup> This exception was incorporated into the Protocol of Accession of Spain to the Schengen Agreement in 1991 with the commitment to maintain tight identity controls to those wanting to travel to the rest of Spanish territory (Planet 2002).

<sup>5</sup> This Spanish expression to define women carrying on their shoulders large bundles of products is commonly translated as 'female porters' or 'mule woman'.

# 17.4 Cracks in the 'Fortress': The Agency of Migrants and the Agency of the Neighbours

Since the mid-nineties, the fortress-like EU border regime has had to functionally, geopolitically and symbolically cope with a series of cracks in its walls. Despite the growing geopolitical, economic and human cost of EU border control policies (Ferrer-Gallardo & Van Houtum, 2014), irregular entries to Ceuta and Melilla have never stopped.

Due to the Ceuta border "crisis" of May 18th 2021 discussed later in this chapter, more than ever before, the metaphorical and material expanding cracks in the fortress became blatantly visible. For the umpteenth time, it was made clear that irregular border crossings in the region do not exclusively depend on the height of the fences, on the millions of euros invested in innovative securitization measures (see Akkerman, 2019; Andersson, 2014; López-Sala & Godenau, 2022; Migreurop, 2020; Statewatch, 2021), or on the degree of inflammation of the anti-immigration political rhetoric manifesting in each member state's electoral microcosmos. In order to fully grasp what was going on during this and similar border "crises", other equally important variables –still often overshadowed- must be taken into consideration.

One of these variables is encapsulated in what migration/border scholars have traditionally referred to as the "agency of migrants". This can also be read through the lens of the now more widespread notion of "autonomy of migration", which, as Casas-Cortés et al. (2015: 895) explain, contributes to shift the analytical focus from the apparatuses of control to the multiple ways in which migration responds to, operates independently from, and in turn shapes those apparatuses. As Mezzadra (2010: 121–122) suggests, it is necessary to look at "the subjective practices, the desires, the expectations, and the behaviours of migrants themselves" and at how their struggles to overcome border restrictions foster a tense conflict-driven process in which "the 'politics of control' itself is compelled to come to terms with a 'politics of migration' that structurally exceeds its (re)bordering practices". Over the last decades securitarian and humanitarian practices in Ceuta and Melilla have been continuously adapting to counteract the new challenges posed by migrant struggles as well as by the action of solidarity networks. The action of migrants has responded to growing border securitization measures, and, in particular, to the wide range of costly and often externalized apparatuses of control by means of which the border regime operates (Casas-Cortes et al., 2015; Andersson, 2014; Tiszler, 2019).

Since the middle of the 1990s, events in Ceuta and Melilla demonstrate how migrants are constantly updating their tactics in order to confront infrastructural innovations. The cyclic reinforcement of border-fences, as well as the action of security forces on both sides is constantly translated into new ways to overcome them.6 As argued by Pallister-Wilkins (2017) the North-African border fences are producers and sites of resistance. Moreover, as Scheel (2018) underlines, the

<sup>6</sup> Migrants react to update of the border apparatus utilizing in turn wooden ladder to overcome the growing height of fences, harpoons for shoes and hand hooks to climb the 'anti-climb netting', as

European border regime is "a parasitic and precarious apparatus of capture" recuperating tactics and practices implemented by migrants at the borders in order to use their creativity and knowledge to update its own control apparatus and sustain its existence and development.

In other words, what we want to remind here is that, for years, many of the cracks in the EU-African "fortresses" have been repeatedly produced by the capacity of initiative, organization, resistance and subversion of migrants and refugees (Scheel, 2019; De Genova, 2017; Papadopoulos & Tsianos, 2008; Mazzara, 2019). The yearning to seal off the borders is also related to another factor: the increasing dependency of Spain and the EU in their attempt to stop migrants before they enter in Ceuta and Melilla, and to reaccept them expeditiously after they eventually cross the fences. Certainly, the "weaponization of migration" strategy (Greenhill, 2010) or, differently said, the instrumentalization of border control and migrants' crossings has been increasingly used as a resource for foreign policy purposes within the EU and elsewhere. It is true that migrants can be (and in many cases are) used as pawns, and they are instrumentalized in the framework of long and remotely played geopolitical games. Notwithstanding that, it should not be neglected that these so-called pawns are not passive actors on a chess board. Migrants make their own decisions, and unlike what happens in chess, these pawns do not require the hands of any player to move themselves around. They can design their own strategies and trajectories; they can choose their allies. And, clearly, they can even individually or collectively defeat the adversary and subvert the mechanisms of control of the border regime. This, in turn, sheds light on the porosity of the EU external borders in Africa – which are far from being impermeabilized (Ferrer-Gallardo & Gabrielli, 2018) – as well as on the performative dimension of the costly (in human, diplomatic and economic terms) securitization apparatus.

# 17.5 Permanent Crisis and Exceptional Migration Management Policies

The cases of Ceuta and Melilla clearly exemplify the rhetoric of "emergency" that time and again informs the management of irregular migration flows towards the European Union. The arrival of migrants in Ceuta or Melilla is often constructed by the Spanish authorities as an unpredictable phenomenon which falls into the "crisis" category (New Keywords Collective, 2016; Jeandesboz & Pallister-Wilkins, 2016; Scott et al., 2018.). However, the word "crisis" refers to a break from the status quo, a crucial and decisive point, a climax. A brief chronology of irregular migration at the Spanish border in the past two decades clearly shows the structural nature of this phenomenon (Gabrielli, 2015). It is hence clear that the arrival of migrants to Ceuta

well as hiding in cars, swimming, using "fake passports" (in the case of Syrians and Algerians), among other creative means.

and Melilla is by no means exceptional. Nevertheless, treating the structural phenomenon of irregular migration as an emergency has for years constituted an essential feature of the Spanish immigration and border policy which, in turn, overfocuses media and policy attention to specific segments of the border.

Elsewhere it has been argued that both the practices and the rhetoric of securitization and humanitarianism at the borders of the North-African enclaves have unfolded within the framework of a political imaginary of permanent crisis (De Genova & Tazzioli, 2022; Gabrielli, 2021b, Gabrielli, 2015, Scott et al., 2018). This imagery has paved the way to the implementation and chronification of exceptional and costly migration management policies (Ferrer-Gallardo & Gabrielli, 2018), in human, economic and diplomatic terms.

The deployment of exceptional border/migration control practices has transformed these cities into what in Agambean terms could be defined as "pieces of land placed outside the normal juridical order" (see De Lucas, 2015: 19). This gives rise to a de facto state of exception, which is even outside the legal framework of the exception itself. We refer not only to 'devoluciones en caliente' (express deportations) that for several years have been practiced outside any existing legal framework (and also actually these practices, despite their inclusion in a law, are deeply criticised by CSO and human rights activists), but also to the immobilisation of asylum seekers (now sanctioned by several judgments of the Supreme court7 ), or to the use of counter-riot devices against migrants swimming to cross the border, among other examples. This entails a clear example of how borders are used strategically to shift the balance between security and freedom through the non-coincidence between the space for State action and this of fundamental rights (Basaran, 2008).

As explained by Cuttitta (2012: 20), the emergency has to be considered as "an essential characteristic of the current migration regime, an essential part of the border spectacle." Similar to Cuttitta's characterization of Lampedusa (2012, 2014), the borders of Ceuta and Melilla also represent symbolic scenarios where the fiction of the efficient response to the 'unexpected' migration crisis is represented. Exceptionality also applies to the Spanish government's actions concerning its legal obligations vis-à-vis the rights of refugees and potential asylum seekers (Ferrer-Gallardo & Gabrielli, 2018). Immediate and indiscriminate push-backs which have been documented in Ceuta and Melilla constitute a clear violation of the 1951 Refugees' Convention. This produces not only a "neo-refoulement" practice8 (Hyndman & Mountz, 2008) but also a situation in which refugees entering informally through the Spanish borders are thus in a zone of rights exclusion, in legal black holes, in real "areas of pure sovereign power" (Basaran, 2008).

<sup>7</sup> See: https://www.cear.es/nuevo-a-favor-de-la-libre-circulacion-de-las-personas-que-solicitanasilo-en-ceuta-y-melilla/

<sup>8</sup> This concept is defined as the "rights-based legal instruments are trumped by geographic strategies that constitute neo-refoulement, the strategy of preventing the possibility of asylum by denying access to sovereign territory" (Hyndman & Mountz, 2008: 268).

Emergency and exceptionality become, on the one hand, permanent, as do the reassertion of state power, backed by violence and extra-legality. Permanently exceptional management of migration by Spanish governments has been implemented in close cooperation with Morocco and has entailed fast and slow forms of violence (from beatings to abandonment, etc.) (MSF, 2013; Gross-Wyrtzen, 2020). As Schindel (2019, 146) argues, episodic, recurrent, but isolated media, activist and academic references to border-related deaths should be put in relation to the rather invisible, daily, silent forms of violence migrants and refugees are exposed to on their journeys to Europe.

Over the last decades, the increasingly intensive monitoring of these "exceptional" border management practices by activists, journalists and critical scholars has unveiled the existing juridical void surrounding migration/border control dynamics – such as those related to the irregular push-backs of sub-Saharan migrants (Escamilla et al., 2014) and the refusal of entry to Syrian refugees.9 Interestingly, the visibilization of these practices and the multiplication of expressions of resistance to official understandings of the EU Southern border has shed valuable light on the logic of permanent exceptionality that governs the land borders of the EU in Africa.

# 17.6 The Externalities of Externalization ("Crisis" of May 2021)

During nearly two decades, EU border control policies have pursued the involvement of third countries like Morocco in the management of irregular migration beyond the EU external border. This has been translated into political pressure vis-à-vis these countries. As Saddiki (2022) reminds, in order to implement the border controls outsourcing agenda, in the 2002 Seville summit of the European Council, EU member states concluded that any future association agreement between the EU and any third country should include a clause on joint management of migration flows and on compulsory readmission of "illegal migration" (Council of the EU, 2002).

The somewhat Eurocentric lens through which Ceuta and Melilla border dynamics have been often scrutinized has tended to overshadow Morocco's political agency and its crucial ability and capacity to set (or at least influence) the agenda of border/migration control. Securitarian and humanitarian borderwork in the region has been clearly operating in growing cooperation with Morocco, which has become an indispensable partner in the EU border externalization strategy. The same has occurred with other neighboring countries like Turkey, Libya and Egypt (Bachellerie, 2021; Tsourapas, 2017) vis-à-vis the management of other Mediterranean migration routes towards the EU.

<sup>9</sup> I.e., see: https://elpais.com/elpais/2015/09/21/fotorrelato/1442847540\_598870.html

What happened in May 2021 in Ceuta is a paramount example of this. On may 18th 2021, more than 8000 people irregularly crossed from Morocco into Ceuta in a single day (Ferrer-Gallardo & Gabrielli, 2022; Saddiki, 2022). Morocco was accused of encouraging its own population -minors included (Independent, 2021)- to irregularly cross the border (Casey & Bautista, 2021), or, more subtly, of not acting diligently enough to prevent the irregular crossings. Migrants were not stopped at the Moroccan side of the fence. One of the main partners in the EU border externalization venture seemed not to be cooperating at all.

After more than two decades of border externalization policies, these events transparently showcased the rising EU dependency on some of its neighbouring countries. Hence, at first sight the events of May 2021 looked like the same old song, like the classic "border crisis". However, on this occasion events unfolded on a much bigger scale. Unlike what had occurred many times before in this very same spot, migrants were not immediately and irregularly pushed back or even shot with rubber bullets (Ferrer-Gallardo & Gabrielli, 2018). Instead, on this occasion migrants were somehow being irregularly pushed forward. Thousands made it across by swimming from Morocco, others were even allowed to access Ceuta via the literally open doors of the iconic securitization fence that was supposed to stop them (FaroTV Ceuta, 2021).

In so doing, and although many of these migrants would be subsequently pushed back during the following days, Morocco seemed to be unilaterally and temporarily suspending the border control outsourcing deal it agreed with its EU neighbors. It seemed to be launching a clear warning message northward (Garcés, 2021). Similar messages had been launched before in a more discrete way (Águeda, 2021), but this time the volume in which the message was projected was stridently louder. Spanish and EU authorities "timidly" described this as blackmailing (Adami, 2021).

# 17.7 The Western Sahara Conflict and Covid 19: Catalysts of a New Border Reconfiguration

The Ceuta border "crisis" of 2021, of course, did not happen in a vacuum. The chapter must be read in light of both the effects of the Covid 19 pandemic in the border region and the deterioration of the traditionally tense Spanish-Moroccan diplomatic atmosphere (Serón & Gabrielli, 2021). The crucial point here is that this already tense bilateral relation was further tensed by the Trump's administration recognition of Moroccan sovereignty over the Spanish former colony of Western Sahara, in December 2020 (USEM, 2020).

This last-minute diplomatic "gift" was offered by Trump to Rabat just after Biden had won the presidential elections in the US in November 2020. In exchange, and by acrobatically merging US recognition of Moroccan sovereignty over Western Sahara with the "Abraham Accords", Morocco would restore diplomatic relations with Israel (Joffé, 2021). Trump's move was a potential game-changer in the region. Morocco's position vis-à-vis the Western Sahara conflict (Kutz, 2021) was significantly reinforced. And the positions of the Polisario Front, and of those countries in tune with UN resolutions regarding the decolonization of the non-self-governing territory of Western Sahara – like Spain's position back then – were fragilized. The seismic waves of this unexpected geopolitical earthquake in the Sahara just came to further embroil a series of Spanish-Moroccan unresolved territorial disputes and postcolonial diplomatic frictions. Things reached a peak of complexity when Brahim Ghali, the secretary-general of the Saharawi Polisario Front, travelled to Spain in order to receive treatment for COVID-19 in April 2021. Morocco interpreted this as an affront and reacted.

After the events in Ceuta on May 18th 2021, the Moroccan ambassador in Spain, Karima Benyaich, established a crystal-clear link between Ghali's presence in Spain and the irregular entries across the Ceuta border which quite evidently sounded like retaliation. She declared that "there are acts that have consequences in relations between countries" (Kasraoui, 2021). This constituted a handbook example of how to use the European obsession on border and migration control for foreign policy purposes, and how to manufacture a border/migration 'crisis'. 10

Significantly, the Moroccan ambassador would only travel back to Madrid after Spain (although not officially supporting Morocco's sovereignty over Western Sahara) diplomatically suggested that Morocco's proposals were "the most realistic ones" vis-à-vis the resolution of the conflict. The "Joint Statement" published on April seventh 2022, after the talks between King Mohammed VI and the President of Spanish Government Pedro Sanchez, notes that.

Spain recognizes the importance of the Sahara issue for Morocco, as well as Morocco's serious and credible efforts in the framework of the United Nations to find a mutually acceptable solution. As such, Spain considers the Moroccan autonomy initiative, presented in 2007, as the most serious, realistic and credible basis for the resolution of this dispute (Kingdom of Morocco, 2022).

This unexpected and significant turn in Spain's foreign policy triggered a new geopolitical tension (now between Spain and Algeria and the Polisario Front), but in a rather illustrating way, led to a new diplomatic "honey moon" between Spain and Morocco. This implied the possibility of reopening in the short term the land borders between Ceuta/Melilla and Morocco, even if with certain restrictions,11 and new border/migration control deals (Migreurop, 2022; Saddiki, 2022). This also implied the reestablishment at a cruising speed of deportations to Morocco.<sup>12</sup>

Beyond the above-described grand geopolitical turbulences, what happened in Ceuta in May 2021 should also be interpreted in light of the specific local

<sup>10</sup> For further discussion on the critical analysis of the so-called "crisification of migrant arrivals", see Gabrielli (2015) and Jeandesboz and Pallister-Wilkins (2016). 11 https://elpais.com/espana/2022-04-30/espana-y-marruecos-mantienen-sus-diferencias-para-abrir-

la-frontera-con-ceuta-y-melilla.html

<sup>12</sup> https://www.eldiario.es/canariasahora/migraciones/grupos-semanales-20-migrantes-derechosegundo-abogado-son-deportaciones-canarias-sahara\_1\_8934471.html

circumstances that had been affecting the Ceuta and Melilla border region before and after the closure of the border due to the Covid 19 pandemic (Latmani, 2021). The pandemic brought with it the complete disruption of all forms of cross-border mobility between Morocco and Ceuta and Melilla in early 2020. This is was translated into new forms of forced (im)mobility at the borders of Ceuta and Melilla, the disruption of existing daily cross-border flows; as well as changes in informal migration trajectories.

The COVID-19 outbreak also produced a sudden change in polarity between Spain, and particularly Ceuta and Melilla, and Moroccan territory. This was illustrated by a number of border significant incidents. For example, at the end of March, a group of about a hundred Moroccans boarded two inflatable boats to return illegally to their country and circumvent the restrictions.13 A bit later, in early April 2022, the Spanish police forces blocked a group of five Moroccan citizens -who found themselves trapped in the city- while trying to leave Spanish territory to enter Morocco, by swimming back from Ceuta's Tarajal beach.<sup>14</sup>

On the other hand, the COVID-19 pandemic drastically reduced, at least during an initial period, attempts to enter Spain via Ceuta and Melilla. This occurred mainly due to the tightening of controls on the Moroccan side of the border, not only at the exit, but also at the entrance, and to the lock-down that made movements inside Morocco difficult.15 The closure of the Moroccan borders entailed another effect associated with informal migration flows: the temporary blocking of forced returns, both of Moroccan nationals and of those from sub-Saharan African countries.

But in order to fully grasp the impact this had in regional border dynamics (Ferrer-Gallardo, 2011), it must be taken into account that the Covid crisis became an opportunity for the Moroccan authorities to fully implement an ongoing agenda that aimed to put an end to the so-called atypical trade (irregular cross-border commercial flows) between the two cities and Morocco (Gabrielli, 2021b). Indeed, on 9 October 2019, in a unilateral -and apparently unexpected decision on the Spanish side-, Morocco sanctioned the end of 'atypical' economic trafficking related to the transit of porteadoras women in Ceuta. In practice, the burst onto the scene of COVID-19 and the subsequent closure of the Moroccan borders totally blocked these 'atypical' or informal trade flows even also in Melilla, de facto spurring the implementation of Moroccan plans.

As Goeury (2020) highlights, the irruption of Covid-19 acted as an accelerator of an ongoing process of border reconfiguration that had been put into operation by Morocco earlier in 2019. In this context, the Covid related border closure aggravated the severe socio-economic unrest at both sides of the border (Martínez, 2021), particularly affecting Moroccan cross-border workers and those directly or indirectly

<sup>13</sup> https://elpais.com/espana/2020-04-23/mas-de-5000-euros-por-escapar-de-espana-en-patera.html 14 Ibidem.

<sup>15</sup> If we widen our gaze, we see that instead migrant arrivals seem not only to continue but also to grow considerably in the Canary Islands archipelago, reinforcing a trend that had already emerged in 2019.

making their living out of informal cross-border trade. Interestingly enough, as it has been pointed out earlier, the borders of Ceuta and Melilla would only reopen in May 2022, once the Western Sahara related diplomatic conflict was readdressed.

# 17.8 Conclusion: The Postpandemic Externalized EU Borders in Africa

What happened in Ceuta on May 18th 2021 was a clear example of Morocco's ability and capacity to influence EU border management dynamics, as well as of the increasing foreign dependency of EU border control policies. Once again, the vulnerabilities of the European Union's border regime were staged in one of the most heavily securitized segments of the Union's outer perimeter.

It was of course not the first time that something like this happened. In fact, over the last decades the aforementioned iconic "fortress" dimension of Ceuta and Melilla has been reinforced by a range of so-called migration "crises" that have been taking place in the region, the most significant ones being those of 2005 (Ndaw, 2022) and 2014 (Gabrielli, 2015), in which attempts of entry by migrants were responded by violent actions (with deadly consequences) to deter them by the border authorities. This was also the case in June 2022, when an attempt to cross the fences at the Melilla border which was violently addressed by Moroccan border authorities ended up with 23 people dead – other sources from CSOs rise this number to almost 40 (Lema, 2022).

What these episodes of "crisis" reveal (be it in Ceuta, Melilla, the Canary Islands, Lampedusa, Lesvos or even Poland) is that the EU forged apocalyptic narratives of migratory invasions are increasingly recycled and transformed into bargaining tools at the other side of the border. The EU-forged political rhetoric of migratory dystopias, and the social construction of migration as a security threat have become a really useful instrument for some EU neighbours. These neighbours, be it Tunisia, Libya, Egypt, Turkey or Morocco, in turn, have been geopolitically empowered by means of years of border externalization deals, and, in a certain way, they are claiming their right to be able to set the EU border agenda too (Sanz, 2021; see also Gabrielli, 2016; Bialasiewicz, 2012; Okyay & Zaragoza-Cristiani, 2016; Afailal & Fernandez, 2018; Triandafyllidou, 2014).

What happened in Ceuta in May 2021 highlighted the rising feebleness and counterproductive logic of the current general EU bordering regime and resonates with similar unexpected episodes unfolded at other segments of the EU perimeter. The increasing foreign reliance vis-à-vis EU migration and border management policies became apparent.

And in so doing, it points at two mutually reinforcing consequences of outsourcing strategies, which we have elsewhere referred to as the "externalities of externalization" (Ferrer-Gallardo & Gabrielli, 2022). These sequels are: on the one hand, the EU-wide electoral growth of far-right, anti-immigration political discourses advocating for more strictly securitized border practices (Van Houtum & Bueno Lacy, 2020), and on the other hand, the growing diplomatic leverage at the disposal of neighbouring gatekeeper-countries like Morocco, Turkey, Libya, Egypt or Belarus. As argued during this chapter, this diplomatic leverage was clearly put at work by Morocco during the Ceuta border "crisis" of May 2021. And its output helps understand the subsequent deadly border "crisis" in Melilla in June 2022 (BBC, 2022), when, after Spain's significant turn in its foreign policy vis-à-vis the Western Sahara conflict, Morocco was much more eager to cooperate in EU external border control practices. It also helps understand the terms in which the border was reopened two years after its Covid-19 pandemic related closure.

Spain and Morocco's land border reopened on May 17, 2022, although only those possessing Spanish citizenship, EU passports, Spanish residency and/or working permits, or Schengen visas were permitted to walk through. At the time of writing this chapter, the Schengen exception that allowed citizens from the Moroccan provinces of Tétouan and Nador to enter the cities had not been reinstated. But it was politically foreseen, as it was also the establishment of official customs at the borders of Ceuta and Melilla.<sup>16</sup>

More than three decades after the fencing off of the cities, the growing foreign dependency vis-à-vis Morocco, together with the impact of the Covid-19 pandemic in cross-border mobility dynamics, have contributed to yet a new reconfiguration of the Ceuta and Melilla border regime. The iconic strength of their border fences remains, and so does its explanatory power as an illustrative sample of the general EU external border and its footprint in the Mediterranean migration system.

#### References


<sup>16</sup> https://www.ceutaldia.com/articulo/politica/albares-traslada-vivas-detalles-acuerdo-marruecosapertura-aduana-comercial/20220928171645251868.html


Vallet, E. (2016). Borders, fences and walls: State of insecurity? Routledge.


Xavier Ferrer-Gallardo is a Beatriz Galindo Researcher at the Humanities Department of Universitat Pompeu Fabra, Barcelona. At the cross-roads between Human Geography and Political Science, Ferrer-Gallardo's research focuses on the geopolitics of borders and migration dynamics. He completed his PhD in Geography at Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona. During his doctoral research period he conducted research stays at Queen's University Belfast, UK, and at Université Abdelmalek Essaadi, Tetouan, Morocco. He subsequently worked as a postdoc researcher at Radboud University Nijmegen, The Netherlands. Recent publication: Ferrer-Gallardo, X., & Gabrielli, L. (2022). The Ceuta Border Peripeteia: Tasting the Externalities of EU Border Externalization. Journal of Borderlands Studies, 37(3), 645–655

Lorenzo Gabrielli, Ph.D. (with honors) in Political Science from LAM (Les Afriques dans le Monde) – Science Po Bordeaux, France, is Senior Researcher at GRITIM-UPF and Joint Professor at the Political Science department of UPF. He is also Associate Researcher at GEA (Group of African Studies) – UAM. His research focuses on the external dimension of migration policies, as well as bordering processes in the Euro-African space, among others. Dr. Gabrielli has been a member of several European research projects, visiting Researcher at the UNU-GCM, senior research fellow at the IEMed, as well as researcher for EUI, ITC-ILO, Oxfam-Intermón, CIDOB, Euromesco, EUNOMAD, among others.

Open Access This chapter is licensed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License ( ), which permits use, sharing, adaptation, distribution and reproduction in any medium or format, as long as you give appropriate credit to the original author(s) and the source, provide a link to the Creative Commons license and indicate if changes were made. http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/

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# Chapter 18 Mediterranean Migrations and Cities with Their Cultural Histories and Imaginaries: The Case of Marseille

Yvan Gastaut

# 18.1 Introduction

History reveals that Mediterranean cities have been formed from the significant mixing of populations since very ancient times. This means that the Mediterranean area has become a kind of universal model in terms of cosmopolitanism, which makes it possible to focus on the multiple identities of the cities from the South and North of the basin between the colonial period and decolonization. Using the case of Marseille, our aim is to reflect on the way in which the major cities in the Mediterranean, both by their past and current activities, have played a fundamental role in how migrants are perceived, and how a positive cosmopolitan imaginary has been constructed at a time when the movement of people is simultaneously encouraged and discouraged. Marseille is not the most prominent city in the National Association of Welcoming Cities and Territories (ANVITA), an organization founded in September 2018 by nine French cities, and which brings together local authorities, groups of authorities and elected officials who seek unconditional migrant reception policies, to include exiled populations, and for hospitality to be shown on their territories. However, its role is essential, as is the evolution of its political situation after 25 years under the management of Jean-Claude Gaudin (1995–2020). Indeed, being able to showcase the historically cosmopolitan dimension of Marseille appears to be a fundamental issue in the implementation of migrant reception policies. Marseille has often been considered as rebelling against Paris, and more broadly, against the French state, even though President Macron is keen to make the city more attractive in the eyes of the rest of the country.

© The Author(s) 2024

Y. Gastaut (✉)

University of Côte d'Azur, Nice, France e-mail: Yvan.GASTAUT@univ-cotedazur.fr

R. Zapata-Barrero, I. Awad (eds.), Migrations in the Mediterranean, IMISCOE Research Series, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-42264-5\_18

The history of Marseille is not necessarily that of a welcoming city, but rather of a city which has had to contend with the issue of migration over a very long period of time. The intensity of mixing different migrant populations has produced different types of showcasing, and therein lies the challenge of studying the city. In some situations, it is the rejection of migrant populations that takes prominence, whereas in others it is the welcome. Thus, the city constantly swings between positive and negative representations of its migrant presence. The 1980s and 1990s represented the showcasing of cosmopolitan Marseille, notably through the work of Emile Temime, a leading historian from the city. He is the author of four volumes entitled Migrance, histoire des migrations à Marseille, published between 1989 and 1991, and successfully undertook the vast project of tracing the history of migration in relation to Marseille as far back as the origins of the city, while emphasizing the astonishing diversity of this migration. Until then, migration had been dealt with in various historical texts about Marseille and Provence, but never in a specific way. The study by Emile Temime and his team has provided a solid base of knowledge, and has been supplemented by various scientific works that address, in whole or in part, the question of migration for the city of Marseille alone. The bibliography at the end of this chapter demonstrates the omnipresence of Marseille among researchers addressing this subject. A new generation of researchers, led by Pascal Blanchard and Gilles Boëtsch in 2005 with Marseille Porte sud, which uses the title of an Albert Londres' book, have complemented Emile Temime's work, particularly in terms of iconography, as have all the more detailed approaches proposed by the collection under the direction of Emile Temime and Pierre Milza, Français d'ici, peuples d'ailleurs, which was published by Autrement at the end of the 1990s. Different places and/or nationalities, such as the Belsunce district, the camp at the Grand Arénas, the Comorians and the African peddlers, have been studied over given periods of time. The work of economists, such as Bernard Morel, and sociologists, such as Jocelyne Cesari, Véronique Manry, Jean Viard and Michel Péraldi, is also very useful, and reveals that for the past twenty years, the abundant issues surrounding migration in relation to Marseille have been feeding the interest of human and social sciences. The universities of Côte d'Azur and Marseille have been conducting a range of projects on how Mediterranean cities showcase their relationship with migrants. More recently, new work has supplemented this reflection on migration in Marseille, such as that by Céline Régnard with an original study on nineteenth century Marseille entitled Marseille la violente, and the collective research by Stéphane Mourlane, entitled Les Batailles de Marseille. In 2019, Judith Aziza also wrote a history of Marseille through place. Moreover, a number of research projects are ongoing, for example, MedMed, a website containing the memories from the Mediterranean area since 20081 on various types of media; MiMed (Lieux et territoires des migrations en Méditerranée)2 since 2009, MonuMed

<sup>1</sup> http://www.medmem.eu/

<sup>2</sup> https://mimed.hypotheses.org/

about the contribution of memories and monuments to cities since 2019,3 and more recently, Mars Imperium, a project about imperial Marseille: (post)colonial history and memories nineteenth to twenty-first centuries) between 2021 and 2024 from the TELEMME laboratory in Aix-en-Provence.<sup>4</sup>

# 18.1.1 The Central Role of Marseille in the Management and Showcasing of the Immigrant Presence Over the Long Term

Marseille has made migration an integral part of its identity.5 Foreign nationals and migrant workers from around the world have always been present in the city. This cosmopolitanism is obvious to casual observers across its various contexts.6 Following the great plague of 1720, which devastated Marseille, a merchant noted in 1726: "Although Marseille is in France, it may be perceived as a little Turkey, a little Italy, a little Barbary, or an embodiment of all these countries, both good and bad".

<sup>3</sup> At a time when Europe and the Mediterranean seem to oscillate between collective amnesia and commemorative hypersensitivity, research on memories, on monuments and on the whole process of urban "monumentalization" enables us to analyze the creation of culture. Since 2019, the MonuMed project has been endeavoring to enrich this material, which is essentially multiform, by linking it to geopolitics, history and art history, in order to shed light on the construction of artistic practices and discourses at a time of globalization. The dialogue between researchers and artists constitutes an instrument that will facilitate the reformulation of the achievements of academic efforts, as well as common sense categories.

<sup>4</sup> The Mars-IMPERIUM project ("Imperial Marseille: (post)colonial history and memories 19th– 21st centuries") brings together five joint research units: (UMR) from Aix-Marseille University (IrAsia, IMAF, IREMAM, TELEMMe, LPED) and ten socio-cultural partners (ANOM, Archives municipales de Marseille, Bibliothèque Municipale à Vocation Régionale de Marseille, la Bibliothèque numérique Odyssée, Ancrages, INA-Méditerranée, the Archives de la Chambre de commerce de Marseille, the MuCEM and the Musées de Marseille). The aim of the project is to investigate the imperial history of Marseille as a long-lasting "total social fact" and to present the research results through a web portal showcasing a vast array of resources (web documentary films, virtual exhibitions, heritage walks, archive index) contributed by all the consortium members. Situated at the crossroads of the latest research in imperial history and ICT enhanced social sciences and humanities, Mars-IMPERIUM will enable the Aix-Marseille University to position itself in the fields of Global History and Digital Humanities, to promote and enhance the university's scientific heritage and its social visibility, to intensify its relationship with the main socio-cultural partners of its environment, to dynamically rethink the way social sciences and humanities are structured, and to act as a catalyst for international cooperation on these topical issues.

<sup>5</sup> Legend has it that Phocaea, a Greek maritime city in Asia Minor, created a trading post known as Massalia around the sixth century B.C.: the leader of the Phocaean expedition, Protis, married the daughter of the king of Segobrigia, Gyptis. It is hence a couple, consisting of a native and a foreigner, which founded the city. According to Herodotus, when the Persians wanted to seize Phocaea, the inhabitants took refuge in Massalia and hence populated it definitively. 6 For example, Philippe Joutard, "Marseille cosmopolite. Mythes et réalités" in Hommes et migra-

tions, n°1092, 1986.

At the end of the eighteenth century, half of the population was not Marseillais in origin: among the main groups of foreign nationals were Italians (Genovese and Piemontese for the most part) and Gavots (peasants from the Alpine valleys), as well as Spaniards, Greeks and Levantines (a term that covers Syrians, Greeks and Armenians). A 1754 painting by Joseph Vernet, Intérieur du port de Marseille, which is kept in the Musée de la Marine, Paris, shows a colorful crowd on the Canebière, the central avenue of Marseille.

#### 18.2 Marseille, Diversity as a Historical Landscape

During the French Revolution, the cosmopolitan nature of the city is reflected in the revolutionary discourse of 1792–93, which often denounced "bands of foreigners" led by counter-revolutionaries: "Marseille is the city where we constantly see the ferment of the scum hurled forth from the prisons of Genoa, Piemonte, Sicily, the whole of Italy and Spain, and finally, the archipelago of Barbary. This is the deplorable flaw of our geographical position and our commercial relations". 7 We must also add the Mamelukes at the time of Napoleon 1st. In 1844, Flora Tristan, a French observer at Le Tour de France mentioned the same phenomenon: "The more I see of Marseille, the more I dislike it. The city is not French. Here there is a ragbag of nations: Italians, Greeks, Turks, Africans, and all those from the Levantine coast. Have they done bad business here?". 8 Later, in 1922, the journalist Ludovic Naudeau wrote of "a formidable workshop where the human races are constantly condensed, mixed and condensed again" 9 in L'Illustration, while in 1927, the great reporter, Albert Londres, in his article Marseille porte du Sud, pointed out the same reality: "Do you want to see Algeria, Morocco or Tunisia? I'll take you to rue des Chapeliers. Here you'll find the "gourbis", the "Bicots" and the "mouquères". Stay off the footpath, and if you want to avoid a fight, don't talk to their women (...)". 10 In confirmation of these observations, statistical sources remind us that the city of Marseille has welcomed different national groups over time: poor Italians and Greeks from the end of the nineteenth century, Russian emigrants in 1917, Armenians in 1915 and 1923, Spanish refugees after 1936, North Africans during the interwar period, Africans after 1945, and "Pieds-Noirs" after 1962. The creation of the industrial port of Fos-sur-Mer, which coincided with the end of the French empire in the early 1960s, created a strong attraction for foreign nationals and made Marseille a real metropolis.

The dividing lines between people have not necessarily been drawn according to their membership of a particular national or religious group. The social and

<sup>7</sup> Michel Vovelle, De la cave au grenier, Québec, Fleury, 1981. 8 Flora Tristan, Le tour de France, journal 1843–<sup>44</sup>, Maspero, Paris, 1980, rééd. 9 Ludovic Naudeau, L'Illustration, 21 October 1922. 10 Albert Londres, Marseille, porte du Sud, Paris, Editions de France, 1927.

professional divides that have become significantly more pronounced in contemporary times have forced us to question certain community ties. If the city is denoted by migrants from North Africa, who have arrived relatively recently and who are generally not very wealthy, it is because this population has partially covered up, or even erased, the traces left by the previous migrant populations, especially in the city center, where the buildings are often in a dilapidated state. If you linger in the streets, you will see Tunisian restaurants and Algerian cafés, bazaars, and Armenian and Lebanese stores; you will pass from a former Roman Catholic church to Jewish and Muslim places of worship, all close to each other. These are obvious signs, even if they are generally fragile and fleeting, of an ancient coexistence, born from the settlement of successive migratory waves that have left their mark on the city, but whose particularities often fade with the years.<sup>11</sup>

In the nineteenth century, the importance of migrants became decisive in a Marseillais system based on the precariousness of employment and the low qualifications of employees. The port was a source of raw materials for a French industry which was in constant expansion. This is why Marseille became the natural outlet for the Mediterranean, as it sat along a shipping corridor between East and West, and hence benefited from the development of the Suez Canal. The economic system of the city operated solely according to the existence of a cheap and renewable workforce, for example, from 1830 to 1860, the city's growth rate averaged 3% per year. Marseille was both a place to bring in and a place from which to send out. In the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, goods arrived on the Quai de la Rive Neuve, but were then stored in warehouses so that they could be shipped on. People were the same: they were also brought in and shipped on, sometimes covertly.

The city and its port can be considered as both a passageway and a fixed abode for the migrant population. Emile Temime insists on the transit function of the city: it is a crossroads, and the port is the epicenter of industrial life, supported by the figure of the docker whose role evolves throughout contemporary history. Although the growth of port activity played an important part in the development of a migratory movement towards the city, the tremendous acceleration of this trend occurred during the nineteenth century because of numerous advances in communication techniques which generated the setting up of new continental links. Marseille was therefore a city of two dimensional migration. On the one hand, the departure of Europeans to America had begun in previous centuries, but increased considerably from 1830 to 1840. This East-West movement progressively affected the entire Mediterranean world, and even though Marseille, which was competing with Le Havre, was not the only port to benefit from this migration, it became a major hub. On the other hand, the constitution of the colonial empire provoked a movement of populations towards Algeria, then Tunisia, Sub-Saharan Africa, Indochina and Morocco.

<sup>11</sup> Emile Temime, "Des solidarités anciennes au brassage culturel", in Confluence Méditerranée, n° 10, Spring 1994.

#### 18.3 The Making of an Image: Cosmopolitan Marseille

Accompanying the new maritime routes were new forms of relations which came about after national companies set up in Marseille and opened lines to other continents, thus ensuring a worldwide influence for the city. From 1850 onwards, the growth of the port was remarkable, as 50 million Europeans emigrated between 1800 and 1914. Although Northern Europe provided the majority of these emigrants, the Mediterranean basin also contributed. The Italian and Iberian peninsulas saw large contingents leave for America, particularly Latin America. 6.5 million Italians, mostly from the Mezzogiorno, emigrated between 1851 and 1910. Very early on, the Levantines participated in the migratory movement, and although Marseille could not claim to be a source of emigrants from Northern and Eastern Europe, it was a logical and unavoidable stopover point when it comes to people on the move from the Mediterranean towards the New World.

All this may give the impression that Marseille was only ever a stopover point, but the reality is different, as by its very presence, the ebb and flow of migration helped develop the local economy. Emigrants were the driving force behind the prosperity of the shipping companies, holding maintenance and service jobs in the port and providing a living for the city's hoteliers and merchants, not to mention the intermediaries and traffickers of all kinds who offered the passing traveler a wide variety of services. The growth of Marseille, as well as its unique character, cannot be understood without reference to this continuous flow of people from the middle of the nineteenth century to the middle of the twentieth. The journey to the New World was not a one-time event: after leaving from Constantinople, Beirut and Alexandria, the Levantines would stop over in Italian ports or in Marseille. It was then possible for them to reach the Baltic and North Sea ports by train. Marseille was therefore in competition with Genoa, Livorno, and even Hamburg, Antwerp and Le Havre. However, certain shipping companies established themselves in the port, and opened transatlantic lines so as to be able to keep a tight control of the migration chain. From the Second Empire onwards, the French State sought to organize the flows of people crowding into the country's major ports, as there was a concern that a floating population could be a potential source of disorder. The State also wanted to ensure that the national economy would benefit from the consequences of this movement. An important decree of 1855 imposed duties on the shipping agencies in terms of hygiene and quotas, and hence "emigration commissioners" were appointed, initially in the North, and then in Marseille as of 1878. The commissioner's job was to inspect each ship in order to verify that the emigrants would be traveling in decent conditions. The archives show that these conditions were not always decent: there are numerous complaints from unfortunate emigrants, indicating the dubious and often degrading practices of the carriers, which could be compared to human trafficking. From the point of departure to the point of arrival, the emigrant risked being held for ransom, and sometimes even raped or killed.

Nevertheless, Marseille was not restricted to the role of a transit port in the globalized trade network that was being developed in the nineteenth century.<sup>12</sup> The movements of people caused ramifications, insofar as some of these populations, for very different reasons, settled permanently or were permanently housed, hence accentuating the cosmopolitanism of the city. The great migratory currents that traversed the city-port in the nineteenth century brought together groups from very different backgrounds, and included both the established communities and the communities who were passing through. The former comprised a large number of Italians, but also "People from the North", such as Germans, Swiss, Belgians, Dutch and even Scandinavians, some of whom had already been present in Marseille since the seventeenth century, as well as Sephardic Jews and Armenians who had settled under the Ancien Régime, and Levantines who had arrived after 1789. All of this international migration was combined with domestic migration, often involving Gavots13 and Corsicans who had been attracted by the port activity.

The very nature of the city changed dramatically from the middle of the nineteenth century onwards, although the old city was not completely replaced. It was at this time that the city expanded in an anarchic way to be able to adapt to its current function; at the same time it experienced significant demographic growth. Based on data collected by Emile Temime and Renée Lopez, in particular data from the 1851 census, which show the details of the distribution of the various foreign communities in the city (10% of the total population), a brief geography of the migrant settlements reveals a number of strong trends. The city was divided into three parts: (1) the furnished quarters of the wealthy neighborhoods, which housed a composite population, the majority of whom were characterized by a certain material affluence, (2) the garrisons of the Grand Puits district, which covered part of Old Marseille and housed workers from the working classes, and (3) a mass of underprivileged people living in particularly precarious conditions on the outskirts of the city in the extramural territory of Marseille.

More specifically, different writings by Emile Temime on Belsunce, and by Anne Sportiello on the Vieux-Port, have highlighted a logic of "ethnically-dominated neighborhoods" in the urban fabric of Marseille: a mosaic of small "villages", or a "city of 111 neighborhoods". This fragmentation reflects a grouping of populations belonging to national and/or religious groups. New monographic research would make it possible to refine our knowledge of migration on this scale through ethnological studies based on life stories and oral archives.

This phenomenon did not prevent the development of meeting places and neighborhoods, for example, in the arteries of the Panier district, and in particular the rue des Chapeliers, the study of different sources, such as census tables and police reports, brings to light a zone of intercultural sociability. On the footpaths, in the cafés, in the shops, at the washhouse, and at the Place de Lenche where women had

<sup>12</sup> Suzanne Berger, Notre Première Mondialisation: leçons d'un échec oublié, Paris, Seuil, 2003. 13 Michel Vovelle, "Gavots et Italiens: les Alpes et leur bordure dans la population marseillaise au XVIIIe siècle", Provence Historique, 1977.

their market stalls, people from different countries met and chatted. Albeit that the Italian population was present everywhere, but especially around the port and in the extra-mural Northern districts, the Swiss and German populations were concentrated in the bourgeois part of the city. Emile Temime emphasizes the permanence of the distribution of foreign nationals in the city, notably on the basis of social distinction, and hence, over and above ethnic affiliations, the other two major forms of settlement were that of higher and lower income populations. The higher income group consisted of traders, shipowners, brokers, port masters and industrialists, whereas the more numerous lower income group includes the migrant workers.

# 18.3.1 The Cosmopolitanism of Marseille in the Face of Postcolonial Events

Evidence displays that these were the realities of cosmopolitanism in Marseilles, and indeed, other French Mediterranean cities experienced similar patterns of population mixing. However, the reality of cosmopolitanism ignores the imaginary and consciousness of the lived experience, and its links to the feelings of the population, including its communal elites. After decolonization, the presence of North African populations became a manifold issue with multiple consequences. As the Mediterranean capital of migration, Marseille is the city to which all eyes turn when deploring racism or when considering interculturality. Therefore, as in the past, the postcolonial situation of Marseille compelled the city and its inhabitants to become acutely aware of cosmopolitanism, for better or for worse.

#### 18.4 Marseille and the Shock of Racism (1970s)

At the beginning of the 1970s, the advocates of a Marseillais identity were attempting to place cosmopolitanism at the center of shared local values. The argument was that the Marseillais inhabitants were traditionally welcoming and willing to accept the mixing of populations. In 1972, the anthropologist, Francis Lesme, a specialist in migration, saw his city as the place of "living together" par excellence.14 He maintained that every migrant was sure to find a roof over his or her head and food in the home of a "brother or sister", especially in the Porte d'Aix neighborhood, which he considered to be the most intercultural place in Marseille: "People manage to get along (...) this neighborhood has gradually taken on an international vocation, which it lives up to today and which is its raison d'être (...) Israelis, Arabs, Africans, Italians, French citizens from modest backgrounds... live together. It is their complementarity that gives the district its dynamism". The

<sup>14</sup>Provence, bulletin de l'association des anciens élèves, Marseille, n°4, May 1972.

cosmopolitanism of the Belsunce-Porte d'Aix district appeared to be a specific asset for the city of Marseille, attracting visitors and the curious alike, who came at the weekend from other districts and communes to shop or participate in festivals and cultural events.

Several local texts and brochures published at the turn of the 1970s went beyond a simple viewpoint to present the city of Marseille as essentially cosmopolitan: a study by Dr. Joseph Alliez, a psychiatrist from Marseille, on "L'Homme provençal", 15 an investigation by the Le Provençal journalist Constant Vautravers, Marseille équilibre du Sud, an article by Jean Contrucci, editor-in-chief of Provence-magazine and writer on the "Marseille personality" 16 in the Tout Marseille review, and above all, a brochure, L'Homme de Marseille, published by Le Pêcheur d'hommes and promoted by the Marseilles Diocesan Center. Envisaging the existence of "l'âme de Marseille" (soul of the city) gave rise to the constructed image of a tolerant city enriched by a secular mixing of populations: "Is there not a Marseillais coloring that marks the sensibility, the behavior and the reactions of these millions of people crowded in the narrow perimeter of our hills facing the sea (...) the soul of Marseille is the history of the city that has left behind some deposit, silt or humus that interferes with the multiple influences on the present form of our collective unconscious". 17 According to the same brochure, which was widely distributed in the city and in the Provence region, Marseille was a "crossroads of the world": "all the Mediterranean is there: Marseille is the first Corsican city, the second Armenian city of France, a large Italian agglomeration, one of the first Pied-Noir cities, an important Hellenic colony, a real kasbah and an African capital". There was a feeling that the whole world was represented in this kaleidoscopic urban space, and the tolerance of the Marseillais was self-evident: "Metropolis or cosmopolis? This human cocktail is our strength; it saves us from sclerosis; it gives us a never-ending supply of imagination". In short, this portrait led to a definitive statement: "the Marseillais is not racist, at least not congenitally. But he or she is, however, a racist from the point of view of crime". If most of the vectors for the construction of the Marseillais identity were traditionally the prerogative of the socialist/communist left and Christian militants, economic and conservative circles also made their contribution at that time. The consensus favored the saturation of this discourse, and thereby ignored certain harmful aspects of Marseille's cosmopolitanism, retaining only a watered-down reflection. Convincing public opinion conveniently avoided taking into consideration the more painful realities of the city's relationship with migrants, as studied by Claire Paris through the analysis of the image of the "North

<sup>15</sup> Joseph Alliez, "L'Homme provençal", in Marseille, revue municipales, n°75, 1968, 16 Jean Contrucci, "Enquête sur la personnalité marseillaise", Tout Marseille, 1st, 15th, 22nd and 29th March 1971.

<sup>17</sup>L'Homme de Marseille publication du Pêcheur d'hommes, Centre diocésain marseillais, 1st semester 1972.

African" in the daily Le Provençal between 1970 and 1974.18 The context of the "shock of decolonization", which deeply marked the city of Marseille when it occurred and which continued into the early 1970s, offers a major key to understanding the changes to the Marseillais identity in terms of tolerance.

Any optimism was swept away by the racist outbreak of 1973.19 The murder on August 25 in the city center of streetcar worker Emile Guerlache by a mentally ill Algerian worker, Salah Bougrine, triggered an outbreak of xenophobia which had not been seen in France since the end of the Second World War. There was a very real prospect of ethnic confrontation, which was not helped by incitement in the form of leaflets, press conferences and articles in the local press, in particular in the columns of Le Méridional under the pen of its editor, Gabriel Domenech. In one month, a dozen North Africans were victims of racist attacks in the city. The real targets were Algerian, as the still raw resentment and hatred arising from the loss of French Algeria could now be expressed in a different context which was just as sensitive to the relationship with the Other. The "ratonnades" (racist attacks), which were modeled on those carried out during the Algerian war, reanimated certain former actors of the conflict who had been struggling to accept its epilogue. The consequences of this xenophobic agitation went far beyond the local framework20 : the French government was obliged to condemn the drama unfolding on its soil, while Houari Boumedienne, the Algerian president, decided, in an expression of discontent, to suspend emigration to France as long as the safety of Algerian nationals was not assured.

The cosmopolitanism of Marseille suddenly seemed disturbing and dangerous. In an attempt to find explanations, observers and experts put forward the idea of exceeding a "seuil de tolerance" (threshold of tolerance),21 i.e. racism was inevitable because there were too many immigrants in Marseille. Far from typifying the utopian vision of a city of different nationalities living in harmony, the racist outbreak, which was accompanied by a murderous attack against the Algerian consulate on December 14, 1973 (4 dead and more than 30 wounded) by the Charles Martel Club, an extreme right-wing group, fueled a totally negative image of harmonious mixing. In the national press, a number of articles began to speak of Marseille as the "capital of racism". The city had become undignified and a sort of isolate within the Hexagon, allowing the rest of the country to ease its conscience. The charge was so strong that Jean Rambaud from Le Monde attempted to mitigate the discredit poured on the city of Marseille with the headline: "If Marseille were racist, it would not exist..."; "All the same, Marseille and its thousand-year-old tradition of racial and

<sup>18</sup> Claire Paris, Le Nord-africain dans les quotidiens provençaux (1970–1974), mémoire de maîtrise, University of Avignon, 2001.

<sup>19</sup> Yvan Gastaut, "La flambée raciste de 1973", in Revue Européenne des Migrations Internationales, third trimester 1993. 20 Le Monde, 1st September 1973. 21 This notion is used with quotation marks insofar as it is not based on any scientific research, but

rather on an ideological argument that claims to be scientific.

religious tolerance. Marseille, the cosmopolitan, has suddenly become racist. Shouldn't we do more than treat it as an anathema?". The events in Marseille shocked the public to such an extent that an introspection on racism began. Suddenly, the phenomenon seemed to be of an unsuspected magnitude in France. The question, "Are the French racist?" emerged in the media.22 The image of a worrying cosmopolitanism kept the benevolent speeches on the welcoming nature of the people of Marseille tucked away in filing cabinets for several years. From 1973 onwards, in a context of economic crisis that made immigrant workers undesirable, the city was considered to be a potential site for intercommunity confrontation. The local authorities, which had been convinced by the "threshold of tolerance" argument, paid attention to the problem of cohabitation between French nationals and migrants by elaborating a coherent housing policy. In 1974, the mayor, Gaston Defferre, commissioned a survey on the issue of slum clearance and the improvement of housing for migrants. Concerted action between the city and the new Secretary of State for Immigrant Workers led to the signing of a "program contract" in December 1975 in favor of migrants, and represented the first steps of the city's future policy on migration.

# 18.5 "Proud to be Marseillais" and Citywide Action: Promoting Positive Cosmopolitanism in the 1990s

According to numerous articles in the press, Marseille was "sick of its immigrants" 23 : racist murders, xenophobic behavior on the part of police officers and cab drivers, attacks such as the one at the Gare Saint-Charles in 1982, which was attributed to Muslim fundamentalists, and campaigns linking insecurity and immigration from 1983 onwards. However, some Marseillais residents, generally representing left-wing and Christian thinking, refused to give in to catastrophism. A symposium organized by the UFCV (Union Française des Centres de Vacances) and the University of Provence in May 1986, entitled Marseille cosmopolite, gave the floor to local academics Philippe Joutard, Lucien Tirone and Alain Hayot, along with representatives of the different communities, to remind the audience that the Marseillais identity was based on mixing populations. In November 1986, a group of associations distributed leaflets and posters on the theme of Marseille, city of immigration, which was relayed by the local press, but above all, a large demonstration organized for June 23, 1987, consisted of 25,000 people, including Lionel Jospin and Jack Lang, on the Canebière under the banner of "Marseille fraternité",a collective of 120 associations whose aim was to shatter the racist image of the city: "Because we can no longer stand Marseille being presented as the capital of racism;

<sup>22</sup>Le Nouvel Observateur, 3rd September et Paris Match, 4th September 1973. 23 La revue de l'union française des centres de vacances, n°227, May 1986, dossier, "Marseille, malade de ses immigrés".

because Marseille is worth more than these extreme right-wing politicians who only know how to reject, exclude and banish; because we believe that it is in Marseille today that we must affirm the values of equal rights and fraternity (...), together for fraternity in Marseille". 24 There was a clear desire to reclaim cosmopolitanism as a positive value in the Phocaean identity. Imbued with political meaning, the version of cosmopolitanism defended by the progressive thinkers close to the Socialist Party, was one of integration, which featured prominently in both national and local programs. After the death of the emblematic socialist mayor, Gaston Defferre, in 1986, the electoral victory of Robert Vigouroux, a professor of medicine, in the 1989 municipal elections was largely built on the values of a cosmopolitanism based on tolerance. As early as 1990, the new mayor decided to set up a specific structure in the form of an association, "Marseille Espérance", which aim was to promote intercultural encounters and avoid racial tensions. The association regularly brought together representatives of the different religious communities to engage in a dialogue about the social and cultural nature of the management of the city. However, the context was not very favorable: terrorist attacks and the debate over the wearing of the headscarf led to a rise in the fear of Islam; there were concerns about the Middle East, and there was the issue of the "banlieues" (suburbs).

What Robert Vigouroux wanted was for the people of Marseille to see themselves first and foremost as being from the city: "I am not in favor of integration at any price. The important thing is to have the common goal of being "Marseillais"". 25 The initiative was a success: "Marseille Espérance" became a regulatory body which was respected by the people of Marseille, and always called upon when local, national or international events risked provoking community tensions. However, the city's cosmopolitanism proved difficult to manage, and progress remained limited, for example, problems surrounding the mosque were not resolved, and the presence of migrant populations on electoral lists remained rare. In addition, racism persisted, as illustrated by the tragic death of a 17-year-old Comorian, Ibrahim Ali, on February 21, 1995, at the hands of National Front supporters. Nevertheless, during the 1990s, the image of Marseille evolved differently from this violent reality. Through the cumulative effect of cultural productions, political will and the input from associations, the city assumed openness and tolerance, giving its cosmopolitanism an opportunity to thrive.

The promotion of "mixing" has helped to forge a Marseillais identity based on particularism and tolerance, for example, the slogan "Proud to be Marseillais" invites people to place themselves on the margins of their national identity. Marseille was also being presented as cosmopolitan again via national media, and what had begun without much success in the early 1970s found a much stronger echo twenty years later in a more favorable context. Among these efforts, besides the works of Emile Temime quoted above, we have to mention the success of the detective novels of Jean-Claude Izzo who told the adventures of Fabio Montale, a police officer in a

<sup>24</sup>Le Provençal, 11th June 1987. 25 Le Monde, 27th September 1993.

diverse Marseille.26 In 1999, in the novel Le soleil des mourants, the author evokes the wanderings of a homeless man who comes to die in Marseille because "here it looks like it could be anywhere". 27 Robert Guédiguian's films, including Marius et Jeannette, which was released in 1998, were equally successful in resonating with the French public, whereas they had previously been shunned. A few years earlier, in 1993, Bertrand Blier's 1, 2, 3 Soleil presented a fable of miscegenation in Marseille, as did director Karim Dridi's Bye Bye in 1997. At the same time, Marseille's "mixed" musical groups, such as IAM, whose lead, Akhénaton, is the son of an Italian immigrant, and the "raggamuffin" group, Massalia sound system, developed a huge fan base. Television also made its contribution, notably through the thematic evening, 1, 2, 3 Marseille, shown on Canal+ in October 1999, which included a documentary on positive intercultural relations entitled Tellement Marseille.

Olympique de Marseille, the soccer club which won the UEFA Champions League in 1993 with Bernard Tapie as club president, crystallized local opinion. The matches at the Velodrome stadium gave the opportunity for scenes of fraternization in the stands which represented a truly positive cosmopolitanism. Christian Bromberger's studies on supporter groups in Marseille during the 1990s indicate that intercommunity tensions tended to fade at the Velodrome Stadium. Among the seven main fan groups, the "Winners" based their existence on "interethnic fraternity" and solidarity. In 1998, during the World Cup, several matches were scheduled in Marseille: during the Tunisia-England match, Marseille supporters fraternized with Tunisian supporters even though clashes were breaking out in other parts of the stadium.

Festivals also showcased Marseille's "mixing". Massalia, a festival financed in large part by the city in June 1999, was organized to commemorate the city's 2600th anniversary. Every component of local cosmopolitanism was brought together: 6000 artists of all nationalities offered performances as diverse as oriental dances, hip-hop, rap, Provençal songs, techno, African percussion, Corsican polyphonies and French variety as a way of affirming their pride in being Marseillais. The success of Massalia was made possible through the efforts of artists, teachers and city hall employees, all of whom volunteered their time. It was the occasion for Jean Contrucci to publish, alongside Roger Duchêne, a history of Marseille with a special emphasis on the mix of cultures. This solidly organized collection helped to present the city of Marseille as a real "laboratory for cohabitation between communities". As Michel Samson, a journalist from Le Monde, notes: "The major question that Marseille is asking is how do we achieve cohabitation between communities? As a frontier city, it has been welcoming the world's most miserable and most adventurous for centuries, willy-nilly. It must therefore invent and reinvent a style of cohabitation with each new wave of immigration, and above all, reflect on how to

<sup>26</sup> Jean-Claude Izzo (1946–2000), Total Khéops, Paris, Gallimard, "Série noire", 1995; Chourmo, Paris, Gallimard, "Série noire", 1996; Soléa, Paris, Gallimard, "Série noire", 1998. 27 Jean-Claude Izzo, Le soleil des mourants, Paris, Flammarion, 1999.

integrate people from other economic, social, cultural and religious worlds". 28 The same Michel Samson had already noted in 1998 that "the Marseille identity is to welcome the Other". 29

In the post-colonial context, the mixing of populations has been the object of a political and cultural investment to construct an identity in the delicate context of a Mediterranean undergoing constant transformation. The image of "cosmopolitan Marseille" is as much about welcoming foreign nationals as it is about racism. Since 1962, these two sides of cosmopolitanism have collided and succeeded each other according to the circumstances. At times, racism has triggered intercultural tensions and conflicts, whereas at others, the welcoming nature of the city has led to intercultural harmony and wellbeing. Indeed, the cosmopolitanism of this Phocaean city has a dual foundation: there is the reality, which is based on precise and rigorous indicators demonstrating an effective mixing of populations during a given period and in a given space, and there is the imaginary, which brings into play a process of identity creation. Since the modernization of part of the city, the appearance of the Mucem Museum (Museum of European and Mediterranean Civilizations) in 2013, the year of the "European Capital of Culture" label, and the arrival in 2020 of a new municipal team under the left-wing mayor, Benoit Payan, the representations of the city are gradually evolving, but the cosmopolitanism of Marseille remains blurred between the image of economic modernization and the altogether different image of neighborhoods trapped in precariousness.<sup>30</sup>

Yvan Gastaut is involved in the Jean Monnet Network as representative of the URMIS, France. Lecturer in History, University of Côte d'Azur, Nice. He works in the laboratory URMIS, The Migrations and Society Research Unit, based in Nice and also in Paris VII. He is a member of the National Museum of History of Immigration in Paris Advisory Committee and also a fellow in the French Institute of Migration Convergences, Paris. His main line of research is the issue of migration in the Mediterranean area between the nineteenth and the twenty-first century. In particular, Yvan Gastaut is interested in questions of representation imaginaries, sport, identity, stereotypes that flow between the two Mediterranean shores, racism vs antiracism, public opinion and memory conflicts. He was the director of a Program of Agence Nationale de la Recherche in France "Ecrans et Inégalité" (ECRIN 2013–17) about the image of "Arabic" people in TV, cinema and internet (1962-2001). He is teaching a Master in Migration in Nice and CIFE formation (Nice-Tunis-Istanbul) as well as Master in Migration (ORMES) in Agadir University. Yvan Gastaut has 25 years of experience on the issue of representation of migration. Mediterranean has been taken as a space of reference in his research. Themes related to his current research: History of migrations in the nineteenth and twentieth century in the Mediterranean area – Intercultural relations in the Mediterranean: diplomacy, politics, and culture – Racism and anti-racism/Rejection and hospitality – Representation of the 'others'/public opinion - Media and Migration in the Mediterranean – Sport and Identity.

<sup>28</sup>Le Monde, article by Michel Samson, 22nd June 1999. 29 Le Monde, "Vivre Marseille", 15th October 1998. 30 Gilles Suzanne, "La controverse du cosmopolitisme marseillais", in Terrains & travaux, vol. 13, n°2, 2007, pp. 149–168.

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# Chapter 19 Infrastructure Development and Environmental Change: A Case Study of Forced (Im)mobility in the Mhamid Oasis (Southern Morocco)

Karolina Sobczak-Szelc

# 19.1 Introduction

Migration from areas on the Southern Shore of the Mediterranean usually are perceived as a result of historical connections enforced by economics and politics (De Haas, 2007; Lahlou, 2021). The reasons for this phenomenon, however, are much more complex and interlinked not only with those issues but also with the implications of climate change and the less obvious consequences of development investments visible through environmental and social changes (de Haas, 2001; Sobczak, 2008, 2012). Projects such as highways, mines, and urban infrastructure are significant drivers of displacement and forced migration (Randell, 2016). In fragile, semi-arid and arid areas, attention should be given to the impact of hydropower infrastructure investments.

Various groups perceive the significance of large investments differently. The positive impact of these projects is appreciated mostly by actors outside the area, such as industries, mega-cities and even countries. Those living in the affected territory face, however, most of the negative consequences (McCully, 2001; Sneddon & Fox, 2008; WCD, 2000). Urban or national access to electricity typically is a higher priority than the needs of fishers, farmers, and peasant subsistence agriculture. Such inequality of values makes the results of negotiations over potential compensation and benefit-sharing asymmetrical (Duarte-Abadía et al., 2015; Martinez-Alier, 2014).

K. Sobczak-Szelc (✉)

Centre of Migration Research, University of Warsaw (UW), Warsaw, Poland

Centre for Advanced Studies of Population and Religion, Cracow University of Economics, Kraków, Poland e-mail: k.sobczak-szelc@uw.edu.pl

The literature describing the influence of hydro-power investments usually focuses on societies living in close proximity to the affected area and indicate consequences such as a decline in fish stocks, episodes of fish kills, loss of habitat due to the influx of workers during construction, loss of inter-generational transmission of traditional farming knowledge (Hanna et al., 2016), or the developmentinduced forced migration of inhabitants (Hitchcock, 2015; Randell, 2016). Some publications describe how dam-induced alterations of river flows affect the livelihoods of those living downstream (e.g. Richter et al., 2010) and those who are pushed or forced to move due to further changes taking place in the natural and social environments, not always in the direct vicinity of the investment (Beirne, 2014). People who are displaced due to construction of the dam and filling of the reservoir often receive compensation meant to help them settle in a new region (Randell, 2016; Vaughan, 2020). However, Cernea (2008) indicated that compensation for those resettled and displaced from affected areas is insufficient and called for investments additional to compensation, financed from benefits generated by the projects that require resettlement. Also, more and more research calls for long-term benefit-sharing (Cernea, 2008), though, again, the focus here is mostly on populations living in close proximity to the investment (Schulz & Skinner, 2022), leaving those affected in distant places without adequate support. Therefore, the chapter proposes a new approach in benefit-sharing called extended benefit-sharing, where the perception of locality is extended to the environment and communities that, despite being further from the investment areas, share the project's negative consequences (cf. Vanclay, 2002).

Growing hydropower production causes changes in both the social and natural environments and pushes populations to migrate (Kirchherr & Charles, 2016). Responding to the need for better attuning the environmental change-migration nexus 'to the actual practice and needs of those affected' (Wiegel et al., 2019, p. 2), I intentionally use the term 'mobility' instead of 'migration'. To fully capture the reality of such cases, however, the theme of immobility is also discussed. Contrary to mobility, immobility has more of a binary perspective, 'either someone chooses to stay or is forced to stay, which is too simplistic to capture the complexity of the real world' (Zickgraf, 2021, pp. 125–126, see also Mallick & Schanze, 2020). An approach in which a 'mobilities perspective centres on the practices, motives, and experiences of mobility1 and immobility in the context of environmental change' allows for a deeper understanding of (non)movement itself (Wiegel et al., 2021, p. 11).

This chapter discusses ideas around development-caused changes in the social and natural environments and their complex relationship influencing (im)mobility with the example of changes and behaviours triggered in Mhamid Oasis in Southern Morocco by the construction of the Mansour Eddahbi Dam. A deeper understanding

<sup>1</sup> I use the term 'mobility' for all types of movement: forced and voluntary, internal and international. Only in the case of more relevant situations, terms such as 'relocation', 'displacement', or 'migration' are used.

of past and current mobility trends caused by the dam can make it possible to predict patterns of future population mobility in the Mediterranean and implement adequate policies to manage challenges caused by such investments.

The chapter is structured as follows. The first section below shows the broader context of large dam and hydropower investments that trigger environmental, economic, social, and cultural transformations. It also proposes a conceptual framework for analysing the role of such developments and their environmental, social, and economic changes in an extended understanding of locality. The subsequent part describes research methods, followed by a description of the environmental and socio-economic transformations caused by the Mansour Eddahbi Dam in Mhamid. This is followed by a results section, which is dedicated to research conducted in the investigated area. Discussion and conclusions close the chapter.

# 19.2 Hydropower Infrastructure and Benefit-Sharing

The consequences of environmental change are often perceived as a major reason for migration in many regions of the world (Black et al., 2011; Entzinger & Scholten, 2022; Ionesco et al., 2017). Less attention is paid to development projects, although 'approximately 300 million people have been involuntarily displaced from their homes' by such investments, with over a quarter of them displaced by large dam constructions worldwide (Yue-fang et al., 2021, pp. 3511–3512). A variety of papers describe the results of the construction of large-scale water infrastructure (e.g. Hanna et al., 2016, Li et al., 2013; Wu & Liu, 2017), as well as the effects of expected changes in the environment and life conditions of the affected population (Sayektiningsih & Hayati, 2021). Apart from directly causing the resettlement of inhabitants of the area flooded for the reservoir, large-scale infrastructure also has a huge social and environmental impact (Duarte-Abadía et al., 2015; Molle & Floch, 2008). Its most significant aspects are the change of hydrological regimes, which irreversibly influences the life of local communities. Its significant impact on livelihoods is seen not only in the loss of residence and resettlements of inhabitants but also through the loss of access to areas of arable land as well as the various resources needed for grazing, agriculture, or fuel (Hitchcock, 2015; Ryser, 2019).

The World Commission on Dams (active between 1998 and 2000) evaluated that approximately 50,000 large dams have displaced 40–80 million people globally (Randell, 2016; Scudder, 2005). Most of those investments were described as having a balanced (50%) or negative (44–46%) social impact (Kirchherr & Charles, 2016). The limited positive impact was usually related to infrastructure, such as improved flood control and increased electricity production (Kirchherr et al., 2016; Schulz & Adams, 2019). Nowadays, dams, particularly those generating electricity, have again become an investment hotspot (Kirchherr & Charles, 2016) and are perceived as a climate change adaptation strategy and an important part of the new 'green economy' (Sneddon & Fox, 2008; Swyngedouw, 2014).

The construction of dams usually impacts communities living both up and downstream (Beirne, 2014). Those inhabiting deliberately flooded areas usually face displacement. Those living in areas below the dam may benefit from irrigation water and flood protection, however, the impact is not clearly positive. It often correlates with the destruction and/or enclosure of resources, which are local common goods (Blaser & de la Cadena, 2017), and results in an underestimated impact on local populations (Hitchcock, 2015). It was estimated that by 2009, 472 million people living downstream of dams were affected by their construction (Richter et al., 2010) or suffered from insufficient water for irrigation, changes in soil fertility, or an increase in erosion (Beirne, 2014). This is justified by the greater national good, i.e., electricity or extensive exploitation of natural resources, which are a national common good (Blaser & de la Cadena, 2017; Ryser, 2019). Control over nature is presented as progress and civilisational (Duarte-Abadía et al., 2015), yet the threat that people living downstream will be excluded from this development is a violation of human rights (World Commission on Dams, 2000). Therefore, their participation in 'benefit-sharing is a logical consequence of such normative considerations' (Schulz & Skinner, 2022, p. 7).

To mitigate the negative consequences of such investments, affected populations receive compensation. However, this approach is often criticised because 'compensation alone cannot mitigate the impoverishment risks and resettlement should be treated as a development opportunity for affected population' (Yue-fang et al., 2021, p. 3512). Compensation should outlast the project implantation and enable the affected population to take part in decision-making regarding the division of profits from the investment even a few years after the investment. Therefore, more attention should be paid to the 'time value' of the consequences and benefits of hydropower projects, which most often go to stakeholders instead of toward new settlements established after the relocation or displacement of residents (Schulz & Skinner, 2022; World Commission on Dams, 2000). Such an approach demands, however, policy that incorporates the different needs of people affected by the investment to support either their adaptation strategies or the decision to move (Thornton et al., 2021).

In Morocco, the pressure to obtain the energy received from renewable sources is high as well. New solar energy plants are established alongside previously built big dams, such as those on the Dades-Draa or Todra-Ziz rivers. More recently, they have been followed by big solar power plants, such as Noor I, II, and III, established near the Mansour Eddahbi Reservoir on the Dades-Draa river. This case, like the others previously discussed, has consequences for areas located even 300 km farther downstream. In this context, it is important to discuss dam-induced changes occurring in area of the oasis located below the dam in a way conceived as outcomes of socio-environmental interaction processes through descriptions of residents' everyday life experiences and to show the need for distant benefit-sharing.

#### 19.3 Methodology

This chapter relies on research carried out in the Mhamid Oasis in Southern Morocco (Fig. 19.1). The author undertook this research in 2004. Since then, both the environment and inhabitants of the oasis have been investigated with the use of different methods grounded in physical and social geography. Most important for this chapter is the research carried out between 2015 and 2019. The analysis was started with extensive desk research on relevant social and environmental contexts to understand the natural conditions as well as historical and social backgrounds of the investigated area and society. The literature review was followed by quantitative and qualitative research.

#### 19.3.1 Quantitative Research

The quantitative part of the research was divided into two stages. The first was a micro-questionnaire conducted in 120 households of the oasis. This allowed to select 48 households for an extended questionnaire interview with the heads of households. Although the number of households investigated in the second stage was influenced by the low response rate, the team made every attempt to ensure that chosen

Fig. 19.1 Location of field research. (Prepared by. P. Jaczewski)

households differed in the number of inhabitants, size of owned and cultivated land, type of environmental hazards affecting agriculture, share of income from agriculture in total household earnings, as well as the presence of internal and international migrants among household members. Trained local interviewers helped implement PAPIs (paper and pen personal interviews).

### 19.3.2 Qualitative Research

The aim of the qualitative study was to understand the relationships between the environment, regional development and migration. Preliminary analysis of the results of the questionnaire allowed us to pinpoint the households with the highest value regarding environmental factors causing limitations in income from agriculture. In-depth interviews were carried out with 12 household heads of families and/or adult children, then the level of saturation was reached. Farms were selected based on their location in various ksars,2 differentiated in terms of area of arable land, income obtained from agriculture, and number of farm members. As part of the interview, questions were asked about changes in the natural environment and their impact on agriculture and income obtained from it, alternative sources of revenue for households, migration of farm members, and whether and how it was related to limitations caused by the natural environment.

The team conducting the research comprised a social and physical geographer and a local gatekeeper, who also acted as interpreter. The interviews were conducted in Darija and/or in French with an interpreter. Due to the very traditional cultural approach of Mhamid inhabitants, interviews were not recorded, but meticulous notes were taken and subsequently analysed using AtlasTi.

The team also worked within the target area performing non-participatory observation, compiling photo documentation, etc. Changes to the surface land cover were additionally analysed based on Landsat TM/ETM + data.

The use of a variety of methods and data approached resulted in a multidimensional analysis that allowed for an understanding of the correlation between different factors and complemented the existing data with a bottom-up perspective.

<sup>2</sup> In North Africa, a ksar is a fortified village, usually with adjacent buildings, a mosque, and a granary. In Mhamid oasis, there were six ksars, after which parts of the oasis were named.

### 19.4 Area Description

#### 19.4.1 The Environment and Its Changes

Situated next to continuous desert and Algeria, Mhamid Oasis is the last of six oases in the Draa Valley. In the desert climate where temperatures can exceed 50 °C and fall below -5 °C, and where average yearly precipitation is below 50 mm (Ait Lamqadem et al., 2017; Bentaleb, 2018; Johannsen et al., 2016), oasis agriculture is strictly dependant on irrigation. Before 1972 when the Mansour Eddahbi Dam was constructed, the main source of water for irrigation of fields in the oasis was the Draa River. As its sources are located in the High Atlas, its flows were strictly dependent on the timing of snow melting and autumn rainfalls (Klose, 2013; Pletsch, 1971). The river flows were also essential for recharging the alluvial waters, which were the source of additional irrigation water for the local population. After the construction of the Mansour Eddahbi Dam, both melting snow and autumn rains were first used to recharge the dam reservoir. Due to climate change and resulting variability, the time of rainfall and amount of precipitation significantly decreased along the entire river basin and drought years became more frequent (Schulz et al., 2008). The quantity and quality of water accumulated in reservoirs is additionally influenced by evaporation, which may reach even 3000 mm/year (La Region De Draa – Tafilalet Monographie Generale, 2015). In the case of the Mansour Eddahbi Reservoir, this means a loss of approximately 24% of the water volume of the dam reservoir (1980–1999 average) (Benmohammadi, 2001). Further, high evaporation promotes the accumulation of salt in the reservoir itself, and subsequently in the soil, leading to secondary salinity, which in turn results in deterioration in the quality and size of crops (Dłużewski & Krzemień, 2003). Evapotranspiration is also influenced by two dominant winds: the North-Eastern dry and hot Chergui, and South-Western fresh Sahili (Ait Lamqadem et al., 2017; Bentaleb, 2018).

All these factors have meant that since 1972, both the quality and quantity of water reaching Mhamid has decreased. Five times a year, the oasis received water supplies from the dam for irrigation. This was significantly less than assumed at the time of the dam's construction, and much less than before its construction when the Draa River had a periodic character (Karmaoui, 2015; Sobczak, 2008, 2012). According to preliminary estimations, with a water discharge of 300 NM/year, approximately 250 NM/year should be used to irrigate the fields below the dam (IMPETUS, n.d.). During years when the reservoir is not sufficiently replenished, water deliveries are limited both in terms of the time of the first flow and the amount of water reaching the oasis. Timeliness of rainfall and irrigation are vital for the quality of crops. If they start too early, the grain will be defective, if too late, it may dry out (Dłużewski & Krzemień, 2003).

Due to limited delivery of both surface and alluvial water, the first water level decreased and became saline. As far back as 1967, the depth of the groundwater table varied from 2 to 8 meters (Pletsch, 1971), in 2005 it was 3 to 12 meters, and in 2015 it ranged from 6.5 to 17 meters (field observations). Deeper wells necessitate mechanical pumping, and the number of such wells increased from 10 in 1977 to 60 in 2005 (Heidecke, 2009; Heidecke et al., 2008). This solution is expensive, so only slightly over 10% of the fields are irrigated with these water resources (Dłużewski et al., 2017). Further climate scenarios show that available underground water will decrease significantly by 2029 and will not meet the growing demand for irrigation, especially during years of drought (Johannsen et al., 2016).

Due to limited access to underground water, the vegetation cover of Mhamid Oasis decreased by 23% between 1984 and 2017 (Lamqadem et al., 2019), which facilitated deflation of the material. As a consequence, Mhamid struggles with the advancement of aeolian forms, which encroach on fields and houses and hamper local activity (Ait Hamza et al., 2009; Sobczak, 2008).

As for the quality of the soil, it is sandy and fertile. However, irrigation of fields with mineralised waters increased soil salinity and its further degradation, which significantly affects crop quality. Another challenge is the spread of a fungal disease of date palm trees called bayout (Benzohra et al., 2015), which limits income from the traditional cultivation of date palms. All this significantly limit agriculture's ability both to provide a source of income and to meet the needs of the decreasing number of oasis inhabitants.

#### 19.4.2 Social Background

Inhabited mostly by the Aarib tribe, Mhamid is an old, traditional oasis on a former trade route to Timbuktu, dating as far back as 3000 BC. Already then, circulation of people was a constant element of the life of the inhabitants, although migration to Europe from Mhamid developed later than in other Maghreb regions. Operating in the 1970s, Morgha, who recruited tens or even hundreds of people in other areas of Morocco, chose only a few persons from Mhamid. Therefore, the migration of the 1970s and 1980s was mostly internal (information from interviews).

In the 1970s, Mhamid faced an increase of inhabitants due to both a demographic boom and the settlement of breeders who established the main habitats for their families in the oasis (Amsidder et al., 2021). In 1971, the oasis reached a population of 9090 (Ait Hamza et al., 2009). Such a change in the number of inhabitants increased the pressure on meeting their growing needs. However, already in the 1980s, due to a high emigration rate, the population started to decrease, falling to 5857 in 2014 (RGPH, 2019a).


Source: CMV-ORMAVO (2004), RGPH (2019b), and Ait Hamza et al. (2009)

Today, youth below 15 years of age comprise 30% of the total population of Mhamid where people of working age make up 63% of its inhabitants. Such an age division places great economic responsibility on the latter group. Yet, limited work opportunities mean unemployment is high, reaching 74% among women and 59% among men. High unemployment translates into a demand for mobility. People migrate to increasingly urbanised communes along the Draa and the Dades rivers. These regions offer income alternatives, particularly in the tourism sector, to subsistence agriculture (Rössler et al., 2010). As migration is undertaking mostly by males in Mhamid, the number of women (3156) exceeds the number of men (2701). The high migration rate is the main reason for the negative population growth in Mhamid (RGPH, 2019b).

Also significant is the differing education level of women and men. Most women are not at all or poorly educated (48% with no education and 22% with primary education). Among men, the situation is slightly better as 23% receive no or primary education, and 52.1% finish at least secondary education (RGPH, 2019b). Such an education structure influences possibilities for employment both outside agriculture and in the broader Mhamid Oasis.

# 19.5 Transformation of the Oasis Through Environmental Changes—Bottom Up Perspective

In everyday life in Mhamid, the deep intertwining of water and community comes to the fore. Since the dam was built, water to Mhamid has been delivered five times a year. If there was a great deal of rain and the dam was full, in October—the first month of the agricultural year—water flowed to the oasis. However, due to insufficient rainfall and rising water demand above and around the dam, water supplies have become increasingly limited in terms of both intensity of flow and frequency of discharges, as an interviewee explained:

In the past, there was always water. Now [2016], from the dam you can only have water 3 or 4 times a year. (HC152)

The influence of the change of flows on the ecosystem, particularly on access to alluvial waters, is visible and obvious for oasis inhabitants, who remember times when there was water in the riverbed. One of them reflected:

Before the dam, the wells were shallow, maximum 1 m deep. Each rain caused water to flow in the riverbed. Additionally, in the summer there were small springs in the riverbed. They caused the formation of lakes, which also provided water to the oasis. There were a lot of birds. There was Iriki Lake. (HB141)

Over the past 50 years, the groundwater level has dropped significantly from 1 m in the 1970s up to 15–16 m now (2016). Those who can afford it try to dig deeper, looking for water of better quality, but this further influences the levels of the shallower wells. As the quality of water decreased as well, the irrigation with saline

Fig. 19.2 The change in cultivated area in Mhamid Oasis between 1984 and 2016. (Calculated by K. Skocki)

waters influence soil quality. Economic reasons (high costs of pump operation) are mentioned much more often as the reason for the abandonment of irrigation than environmental ones (poor water quality). Lack of water contributes to a reduction of both the cultivated area (Fig. 19.2) and the diversity of crops. In the oasis, vegetables are not cultivated any more, even those grown for the inhabitants' own needs.

In time, the challenges for agriculture increased. The most recent one stems from the construction of the Ouarzazate Solar Power Station (OSPS), also called the Noor Power Station, near the Mansour Eddahbi Dam. This further limited water delivery and worsened the situation, as one of our interviewees explained:

Last year [2015], there was water from the dam. The first was in December, the last in July. Usually, the first water came in October. But for three years they have not released water in October because they have built a farm of solar panels near Ouarzazate and that consumes a lot of water. (...) The solar farm uses so much water that there is not enough for agriculture. (Mhamid HC1)

Currently, none of the farms cultivate the entire agricultural area belonging to them. The most common reasons for this are the insufficient water in the discharges and the distance of the fields from the irrigation canal and the house. Usually, the kaid<sup>3</sup> receives information on the amount of water and, on this basis, farmers decide on the size of the fields that should be prepared for sowing. If a small amount of water is to be let from the dam, the selection of fields to be cultivated is determined by their proximity to the irrigation canal and the farm. In the interviews, farmers explained:

<sup>3</sup> The head of the commune.

I don't farm there [3 km east of Talha, one of Mhamid's ksars] because there is no water, and it's far away and I'm tired, I don't want to go there. It's hard to go that far. (HH44) There was no water in September, October, and November [2016]. This means that the year will be worse, so we have only prepared fields near [home]. (HC1)

Finally, there are not enough people willing to work in the fields. Those who had been taking care of the farm have grown old and the youth have left or have other jobs. People who found employment outside agriculture are not able to support their family in carrying out even seasonal work in the field:

All current members of the farm who could work [in the field] have left. [...] There is no one to work, there are no conditions. (HH20)

These statements by Mhamid residents illustrate that with the construction of the dam they had to face a profound transformation of the local ecosystem on which their livelihood depends (cf. Duarte-Abadía et al., 2015). The changes they mention, such as the disruption of water flows, or water use systems, should be understood as a re-patterning of the existing hydro social network and thus conceptualised inseparably from concomitant social changes such as leaving in search of work. Therefore, to understand the complexity of the impact of the dam on the oasis, it is necessary to trace the attempts to adapt to new environmental conditions, including emerging patterns of (im)mobility that emerged with the effects of the dam and began the process of reformulating local social structures.

# 19.6 Transformation of Local Society Through (Im)mobility

In the analysis of the changes taking place in Mhamid Oasis, a local lens on the concept of community is applied, which, as the collected data indicate, is co-created by forced (im)mobility. In Mhamid, we can observe the complexity of the (im) mobility decision framework, including attachment to places and societies in which the inhabitants live.

Income in Mhamid has been strongly influenced by the changes in the environment, which have pushed inhabitants towards the so-called patchwork economy, more and more typical for households that rely on agriculture in fragile arid and semi-arid areas (see e.g., Sobczak-Szelc & Fekih, 2020). Looking for sources of revenue outside of agriculture, inhabitants of Mhamid primarily found them in the army and in tourism. Changes in the global economy, first due to the 2008 economic crisis and then the Arab Spring in 2011, influenced tourism and resulted in a further worsening of the economic situation in the region and lack of possibilities for in situ diversification of income. In 2016, over 90% of the households investigated in the survey reported at least one source of income other than agriculture, and over 54% indicated two or more additional sources of income. These sources of additional revenue were also more diversified than in the past. Still, employment in the army (68%) was the most reported, with other services also being significant (23%). The importance of tourism decreased and was equal to the role of the construction sector (17%). The main sources of additional income became migration and remittances from those who left for the big cities of Morocco (65%).

Mobility as part of the patchwork economy, which allowed earning additional resources, was visible already in the 1970s when the effects of the dam's construction in conjunction with a drought caused the departure of a brother of one head of household, who revealed:

Before the dam was built, we cultivated all the fields, and there were a lot. After the dam was built, there were years with rain and dry years. (...) There was a drought for 5 years. In 1977, I left. There was no river, no water, no rain, you had to go away to live. (HB141)

Another interviewee mentioned in his testimony:

The reason for (my) departure was the drought. There was a drought, everything was dry, there were no dates. The drought appeared when the dam was built. Then the Oued Draa dried up and there was no water for 6–8 years. (HH142)

With time, agriculture became rather a traditional and sentimental endeavour than the main source of income. Young people do not want to work hard on the farm and wait for water and uncertain wages. Instead, they look for other solutions to meet their needs and aspirations, as explained by a father of two sons:

You can't work anymore in agriculture due to climate change. One year is good and then you have 5–10 years of drought. That's why my sons won't stay here. (...) In Mhamid, a large amount of water is occasional. It is unprofitable to quit your job for one moment that there is water. The sons decided that they would not stay here, because if it is good for two years, it is good, but then the drought will come and there is no job. (HH44)

Few have the chance and opportunity to go abroad. However, it happens mainly thanks to marriages with citizens of European countries, such as tourists or daughters of former emigrants.

Some similarities are visible between the migration of the 1970s and 1980s, and that of today. Migration is also the domain of young men aged around 21 who move to the large cities of Morocco, such as Casablanca, Tangier, Marrakesh, and Rabat. Nearby towns are destinations for migration due to family and neighbourly contacts. Sons, like their fathers, return home during holidays and maintain permanent economic ties with family farms. However, unlike in the past, today's migrants more often make their own decisions, not always in accordance with their parents' will:

Father wanted [the brothers] to stay and help in the field, but they did not want to. The brothers went to Casa because they wanted to work and have money, they didn't want to work hard on the land and wait for water. (...) [Before leaving] they did nothing, they were unemployed, so they went. They earn money to live. (...) If there were any other work than agriculture here [in Mhamid], they would stay, or they would come back. (HC141)

Cultural conditions and the structure of the farm affect the duration and termination of mobility. Families where women are left without a male guardian are very rare; if the only man in the family leaves, the likelihood of his long-term mobility is low. Starting a family outside of Mhamid or the departure of all its members severs economic ties with those who remain in the oasis. In fact, it means that migration becomes constant. An extreme example is the ksar Oualad Mhaya where the number of families decreased from 140 in the 1980s to 34 today. Current residents say that these families left due to both lack of water and the encroaching sand, which began to cover the fields.

At the same time, cultural conditions and traditions prevent the inhabitants of Mhamid from selling their fields. It is perceived as better to find someone who will cultivate them rather than sell the children's heritage, as one interviewee indicated:

We are looking for someone who will lease a field and share the crops, but no one comes forward. (...) If we don't find them, we just leave the field. (...) We will not sell the land because it is the result of the father's division. Because we have children, and this is their inheritance. (HH126)

Some of the youth have a long-term plan to invest in improving their qualifications through vocational training and studies. This group also comprises women, although they are decidedly a minority. Some of them will have the opportunity to return to Mhamid, although most are likely to leave for good and live in different parts of Morocco.

In the case of Mhamid, mobility used to be part of an adaptation strategy that was to make it possible to obtain income and gain additional sources for investments that would allow the development of further adaptation strategies (see also Stoler et al., 2021). Now, mobility has become the last resort (environmentally forced migration) (Ionesco et al., 2016; Renaud et al., 2011) because for many people, it is not possible to continue living in Mhamid. Those who leave, root themselves in new areas and, as soon as they start a family there, their main interest is no longer centred in Mhamid. The remittances have become limited as well, which decreases the mitigation and adaptation possibilities of those who remain. Thus, Mhamid is an example of people becoming both stuck and pushed out by the changes taking place in a community that is located far from an investment meant to be developmental.

#### 19.7 Discussion Projections

In the concluding discussion, we reflect on the community transformation and importance of its categorisation in the context of forced (im)mobility under environmental change induced by a faraway development investment. This leads us to revisit the issue of benefit-sharing, particularly in the region of the Mediterranean where a growing number of investments are funded by European or international organisations.

Those who are resettled due to development are categorised using various terms—internally displaced person (IDPs), development-induced people (DIP), development-induced displaced (DID), or development-caused forced displacement and resettlement (DFDR). The definition of those terms partly overlap, as most of those displaced due to development lose their homes and assets and are forced to move (Polzer & Hammond, 2008). Discussion over their rights to compensation and benefit-sharing is pending. However, those who are at a distance from the investment remain on the margins of this discussion. In their book, Jesper Bjarnesen and Simon Turner (2020) discuss the issue of 'blind spots' in policy regarding (forced) migrants. They focus mostly on those who do not fit into the category of 'directly displaced' or 'displaced for development', but who are displaced indirectly. The authors indicate that 'displacement by development takes place when people are excluded from use of territory on which they relied' (2020). This includes exclusion of the territory that constituted the basis for their survival and income, even if they do not lose their homes directly. In other words, mobility is not the only condition for being included in one of those groups, and there is a call for inclusion of this group in the IDP category. Contrary to those who have lost their homes, forced mobility of those who face the loss of their assets can be prevented by increasing their ability to mitigate changes taking place in the environment, and to adapt to the new situation. Therefore, there is a clear need to develop policies at different scales that support in situ adaptation for those who choose to remain. With such an approach, even the potential future risk of deterioration of living conditions should be enough to include people affected by development in the benefit-sharing system.

Also, Mhamid does not fit the most-often-used categories of areas affected by such investments, although results of the research show socioecological impacts of the dam's construction and further investments on this community situated 300 km away. Mhamid is just one of many examples where such infrastructure is presented as progress and the national common good receives higher priority than the local common good, and where users rarely receive a benefit-sharing guarantee, if they are included in the compensation system at all (Duarte-Abadía et al., 2015). This is a double structural exclusion, both during the planning regarding potential consequences of the investment and in the later benefit-sharing when changes occur.

This chapter shows the necessity to include those who are forced into (im) mobility due to development investments in the discourse, policy, and practice. This change is particularly important as the frequency and number of forced displaced are increasing, and most countries of the Global South lack 'protective, robust, and binding legal frameworks' (Cernea & Maldonado, 2018, pp. 4–5). Changes in the environment, life quality, and culture should justify the inclusion of populations living in distant, nonetheless affected areas, and their rights to distant benefit-sharing should be recognised. This should be grounded in recognition and protection of human rights. Such extended benefit-sharing should mitigate the negative consequences of an investment in all aspects: economic, cultural, and environmental. The proposed approach is even wider than the "resettlement with development" defined by Cernea and Maldonado (2018) as it completely reframes the idea of benefit-sharing or hydropower-benefit-sharing (Schulz & Skinner, 2022), extending it according to the scope of its influence, which may change over time. This perspective gives an additional argument in the discussion undertaken by Bjarnesen and Turner (2020) regarding the visionary limitations of those who design large investments associated with the displacement of thousands of people. Such investments are repeatedly implemented with insufficient or even erroneous estimations of the long-term effects, whether spatial or temporal. If significant steps are not taken to change the social differences between various types of beneficiaries of development, the effects will multiply (Price et al., 2020, p. 456).

#### 19.8 Conclusion

The research conducted in Mhamid shows the strong impact of one dam's construction on the deterioration of living conditions of the oasis inhabitants as changes in the environment and limitations regarding agriculture push people to seek for different sources of income through mobility. Unpredictability discourages inhabitants from continuing to work in agriculture. While limitations regarding the natural environment (low quality and quantity of water, and accumulation of aeolian forms in the fields) affect the decision to leave, the nature of migration (temporary or permanent) is influenced by age, gender, and family situation. In the past, migration made it possible to create patterns of behaviour that, given the current limitations of the natural environment, facilitate the decision to leave. The risk related to farming reduces the likelihood that those who have left will ever return. The condition for returning or staying is the possibility of finding a job other than in agriculture on the spot. Those who stay or wait their turn to leave, remain either due to social norms (women and those caring for children or the elderly) or because they have other sources of income (military, retirement or other services). Without adequate distant benefit-sharing local development is impossible and inhabitants are forced to move to other regions of Morocco or, if possible, abroad.

The Mediterranean is particularly attractive for different power investments, both hydro and solar. They will continue to influence the living conditions of both local and more distant societies. Depending on the approach implemented when it comes to compensation and benefit-sharing, there may be different regional development and migration scenarios. The cultural context is also significant here, as without its proper consideration, even well-intentioned mitigation measures can foster unintended impacts (Hanna et al., 2016; Vanclay, 2002, 2012).

Acknowledgements Although the content is solely the responsibility of the author and does not necessarily represent the official views of the Centre of Migration Research of University of Warsaw, the discussions within its Integration and Ethnic Relations Unit had crucial value for the latest shape of this article, with a particular mention of Dr. Magdalena Chułek, as well as the editors and reviewers of the book who read and commented on the final draft. The author wish also to thank Dr. hab. Maciej Dłużewski for help during the field studies.

Funding The research on which this paper is based was funded by the National Science Centre, Poland in the frame of the project 'Environmental determinants of migration from countries of North Africa' (grant no. 2014/13/D/HS4/03644).

#### References


Karolina Sobczak-Szelc is an Assistant Professor at the Centre of Migration Research, University of Warsaw (UW) and the Centre for Advanced Studies of Population and Religion, Cracow University of Economics. In 2012 at the Faculty of Geography and Regional Studies, UW she defended her PhD thesis entitled 'Migration of people of Southern Morocco versus changes of natural environment'. She combines earth science, social geography, spatial development, and sociology to study forced migrations both in countries of origin and destination. Her knowledge of this subject is supported by numerous studies conducted in Poland, countries of North Africa, particularly in Egypt, Morocco, Tunisia, as well as in Tanzania and Bangladesh. Currently, she leads social research team in the ARICA—A multi-directional analysis of refugee/IDP camp areas based on HR/VHR satellite data (2020–2024) financed by the Norwegian Founds and is a key staff member in the project MICLACAS—Migration Crisis in Latin America – coping and adaptation strategies of Venezuelan migrants and their families and the risk of global migration crisis (2022– 2025) financed by National Science Centre, Poland. Her main research interests include forced migration studies, environmental migrations, and strategies of adaptation to environmental changes and limitations. She is member of various international organisations i.e. IMISCOE (International Migration, Integration and Social Cohesion in Europe), PERN (International Union for the Scientific Study of Population) and EuroMedMig (Mediterranean Research Network on Migration).

Open Access This chapter is licensed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License ( ), which permits use, sharing, adaptation, distribution and reproduction in any medium or format, as long as you give appropriate credit to the original author(s) and the source, provide a link to the Creative Commons license and indicate if changes were made. http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/

The images or other third party material in this chapter are included in the chapter's Creative Commons license, unless indicated otherwise in a credit line to the material. If material is not included in the chapter's Creative Commons license and your intended use is not permitted by statutory regulation or exceeds the permitted use, you will need to obtain permission directly from the copyright holder.

# Part V Economy and Labor Markets

# Chapter 20 The Political Economy of Egyptian Migration to Europe in the 2020s

Ibrahim Awad

# 20.1 Introduction

Elements of neoclassical economics inform Egypt's and the European Union's (EU) perspectives on Egyptian migration to Europe. In these elements, migration results from the uneven geographical distribution of labor and capital. Economic and demographic factors are assumed to push workers to move from countries, where labour is abundant and wages low to labour-scarce countries, where wages are high (Massey et al., 1993). Egypt is one of the former countries, while the EU is in the latter category. Faced with high labour force growth rates, and low domestic employment growth rates, Egypt has sought to reduce pressures on its labour market in the international migration of its workers. International migration is also a source of precious financial remittances. In contrast, the EU has consistently sought to curb, if not to stop, fresh international migration and to encourage the migrants' return to their countries of origin. For the EU, exploiting the economic drivers in Egypt, criminal networks illegally smuggle fresh migrants to Europe. The theoretical foundation of this claim is signaled in Sect. 20.2.

Thus, Egypt and the EU look as having conflicting objectives. However, for this chapter in their actual handling of migration, the two parties reached understandings that seem to satisfy them both. In a neoclassical rationale, Egypt should have sought to promote migration to the EU. But this economic rationale was superseded by political considerations. Egypt accepted the EU's insistence on curbing and reversing migration, went along with it and sought to make gains in return. Rather than a labour market and economic issue, migration to the EU became a foreign policy one

I. Awad (✉)

This chapter specifically takes up Egyptian labour migration to the EU.

Center for Migration and Refugee Studies, School of Global Affairs and Public Policy, The American University in Cairo, New Cairo, Egypt e-mail: iawad@aucegypt.edu

for Egypt. This acceptance of the EU's insistence may be considered as expressing the asymmetry of relations between the EU and its member states, and Egypt. The former are all OECD industrialized countries, including three members of the G7 and G20. They are sources of financial aid, technical assistance, and weapons to Egypt. In contrast, Egypt is a developing country with chronic budgetary and balance of trade deficits. Nevertheless, it is argued here that Egypt could balance this asymmetrical power relation. Balancing power asymmetry is done through the use of means other than material resources (Pfetsch, 2011). The mentioned EU fixation on irregular migration was used by Egypt as a nonmaterial resource that reinforced its bargaining power.

Egypt's attitude was to the liking of the EU which rewarded it for it. The institutional, policy and operationalization construct of the migration relations between the two parties served to put in practice the agreed exchange of benefits. The outcome was satisfaction with this exchange and an intensification of relations in other areas. Yet, loopholes exist. This chapter seeks to bring evidence in support of this proposition.

Therefore, after this introduction, Sect. 20.2 elaborates on the two parties' perspectives on Egyptian migration to Europe. Section 20.3 places Europe within the larger context of Egyptian international migration. It also reviews the Egyptian institutional structure of migration to Europe. Section 20.4 deals with the policy framework for migration to Europe, agreed by the EU, its member states and Egypt. Section 20.5 reviews the operationalization of the policy framework through EUand member states-funded projects and other relations. It also reviews the outcomes of this operationalization, which reveal the two parties' satisfaction with their approach to migration and growth in their relations in other areas. But it equally uncovers loopholes in the outcomes of the agreed approach to migration. Conclusions will be finally drawn. The chapter draws on published research and accessible unpublished documents; it also benefits from a series of interviews conducted, as a triangulation method, with researchers and officials familiar with its subject.

# 20.2 Egyptian Migration to Europe: The Two Parties' Perspectives

For the EU, Egypt is a country of origin, transit, and destination. The Egyptian jobseekers outflow from Egypt irregularly reaching Europe and engaging in informal employment there. In-transit migrants and refugees in Egypt, suffering poor living and working conditions, also wish to irregularly reach the European shores. Rings of smugglers and traffickers exploit the jobseekers, and through unauthorized crossings of the Mediterranean make them land on the shores of Southern European countries. These migrants should be protected from smugglers and traffickers. They should also be returned and Egyptians among them reintegrated in Egypt, which accepts the EU's smuggling and trafficking discourse. For the EU, the root causes of migration from Egypt lie in a shortage of decent jobs in the Egyptian labour market. They should be remedied through promoting development, employment creation and better matching supply and demand in the Egyptian labour market. Depending on demand in the EU labour markets, in principle, legal migration opportunities could be available to Egyptian jobseekers. Migrants and refugees in Egypt should be protected and their livings and employment improved. This conceptualization of migration from Egypt is clear in the document adopted in 2022 by the EU heads of mission in Egypt (Delegation of the EU to Egypt, Unpublished). The issues it raises and the remedies it suggests are in line with the EU's Global Approach to Migration and Mobility (GAMM) adopted in 2005 and revisited in 2011 (EC, 2011). Two observations should be highlighted in their respect. The remedies mostly emphasize denial of migration. Combating irregular migration, fighting smugglers and traffickers, return and reintegration, addressing root causes, and fixing migrants and refugees in Egypt are the essential conceptual foundations on which the EU attitude and policies rest. This may be explained by the second observation. As mentioned in the introduction, the EU, in its general approach to migration from Egypt is strictly attached to the neoclassical interpretation, which emphasizes countries of origin's excess labour supply that is attracted to and aims at taking advantage from the high wages and other benefits offered by its labour markets (Massey et al., 1993). The neoclassical explanation is grafted with the networks theory so as to give foundation to combating smuggling and trafficking, considered as major conduits of irregular migration to Europe. In this theory, human smuggling is a criminal activity committed in well-organized networks with links to the trafficking of other goods and services, such as women, weapons or drugs. These networks' operations are supposed to involve a central command and control structure where a central 'smuggler' dishes out commands and enforces the rules in a social hierarchy (Baird, 2013). The explanations provided by such perspectives as the dual labour market or world system theories are not drawn upon to interpret international migration. Demand for migrant labour generated by the Southern European countries' informal economies, for example in the agricultural and service sectors, is not referred to. Addressing informality in these labour markets is not considered as a means to reduce irregular migration.

In line with the neoclassical rationale, the 1971 constitution provided for the right of Egyptians to temporary and permanent migration1 (ARE, 1971). The 1983 migration law gave facilities and privileges to the Egyptians wishing to migrate permanently or temporarily (MEEEA, n.d.). Faced with high population and labour force growth rates, the constitution and the law considered external labour markets as outlets for the Egyptian jobseekers. But there was also a political rationale for the shift in migration policy relative to the 1960s. In 1971, the new president, Anwar Sadat, wanted to signify to Arab oil-exporting countries and to the Western traditional immigration countries that Egypt's antagonistic relations with them had been

<sup>1</sup> Article 52.

abandoned. Europe did not figure in Egyptian migration at the time. A new political economy of Egyptian migration thus started to take shape.<sup>2</sup>

Egypt did not publish a conceptual document outlining its understanding of Egyptian migration to Europe, its causes, and the issues it raises. The Egyptian priorities can be gleaned from an informal document cited in minutes published by the European Union Trust Fund (EUTF). Four thematic areas are defined in the non-paper "Egypt Framework Paper on Cooperation with EU on Migration", presented by Egypt to the EU in 2017 (EUTF, 2019). These are development cooperation; vocational and technical education; institutional capacity building in the field of migration; and supporting Egypt's efforts to host refugees. Actually, all four thematic areas can be considered development cooperation. At the same time, as will be seen in Sects. 20.4 and 20.5, Egypt accepts that halting irregular migration and migrants' return be the first priorities in its migration cooperation with the EU. Legal migration opportunities are absent from the thematic areas identified by Egypt.

In fact, Egypt places cooperation on migration within the larger framework of its system of relations with the EU and its member states. These had been critical of the political changes in Egypt in 2013, characterizing them as a "coup". With time, these criticisms ceased, support by the EU and its member states in a variety of policy areas increased, and exchanged visits multiplied. The legitimacy of the 2013 changes is no longer in question. In its cooperation on migration with the EU, Egypt looks like having resorted, rather successfully for its purposes, to issue linking.3 The EU's heightened and reiterated concern with irregular migration, and its salience in its member states' domestic politics, have provided Egypt with a resource with which it balanced the power disparity with its counterpart.4 An interdependent relationship between the two parties emerged.

#### 20.3 Europe in Egyptian Migration

The Sect. 20.3.1 below discusses the significance of migration to the Egyptian economy and Europe's limited place in it. The Sect. 20.3.2, about its institutional framework, supports the contention that for Egypt migration to Europe is considered a foreign policy issue.

<sup>2</sup> On the political economy of Egyptian migration in the 1960s, see Tsourapas, 2019. For a divergent perspective, see Awad, 2019. 3 On issue linkage in managing migration, see Lavenex & Jurge, 2013; on issue linkage in

international negotiations, see Tollison & Willett, 1979. 4 On symmetry and asymmetry and balancing power disparities, see Pfetsch, 2011.

#### 20.3.1 Europe's Significance in Egyptian Migration

In the last decades, the Egyptian labour force suffered from unemployment, underemployment and deficient terms and conditions of employment. Labour force growth was consistently above employment growth. For instance, between 2008 and 2011, the growth in labour force reached 8.7% whilst employment growth stood at 4.8% only (Awad, 2013). Low-quality and informal employment epitomize the state of the Egyptian labour market. An analysis of the findings of a school-to-work transition survey (SWTS) carried out in 2012 by the International Labour Office (ILO) was eloquent as to the quality of work available to youth in the domestic labour market (Barsoum et al., 2014). In 2012, a majority of young employees in Egypt (75.7%) had no contract. The corollary was that 91.1% of young workers surveyed were classified in informal employment. Beyond salary, access to benefits was quite limited. One quarter of wage and salaried young workers only had access to paid annual leave. The wages of a similar proportion were below the average wage. In these conditions, it is not surprising that Egyptian workers at all skill levels seek external employment.

Migration engenders financial remittances that reduce poverty of beneficiary families and contribute to meeting their needs. Remittances are spent on consumption, and on education and health, thus improving standards of living and helping build human capital (Farid & Elbatrawy, 2015). At the macro level, remittances inject Egypt's balance on current account with foreign exchange necessary to close the chronic deficit in its balance of trade. In the 2010s and 2020s, remittances sent to Egypt by its migrant workers in all destinations significantly grew from \$12.5 billion in 2010, to \$25.5 billion in 2018 and to \$26.8 billion in 2019 (World Bank, 2020). In sum, in Egypt's perspective since the early 1970s, migration's economic benefits are greatly significant.

Various estimates of the Egyptian migration volume exist. National estimates put it at 10.25 million in 2017. The United Nations estimated it at only 3.5 million in 2019. According to the work permits issued by the Ministry of Interior, 68.4% of Egyptian migrant workers were employed in Arab countries and 31.6% in non-Arab countries in 2017. Among these, only 9.1% were employed in the seven foremost European destinations (Zohry, 2020).5 World Bank estimates for 2018 put remittances from these seven countries at US\$1.8 billion, representing 7% only of the total received by Egypt during that year (World Bank, 2019). Estimates for the distribution of migrants and the remittance origins reveal the modesty of migration to Europe for the Egyptian labour market and economy.

In this light, for Egypt, it is migration to the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) and other Arab countries that really releases pressures on its labour market and provides it with remittances. This migration is therefore tackled as a labour market issue. The

<sup>5</sup> In order of importance of the volumes they hosted in this estimate, these were Italy, France, and far behind the United Kingdom, Germany, Austria, Greece and the Netherlands.

evidence is in its location in the Egyptian institutional structure, which differs from that of migration to Europe.

# 20.3.2 Europe in the Institutional Structure of Migration in Egypt

The Egyptian migration institutional structure traditionally included two ministries: the Ministry of Manpower and Migration (MOMM) and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) (Awad & Hedayat, 2015). The migration sector in MOMM regained its autonomy, lost in the early 2000s, and was reconstituted as the Ministry of ٍState of Emigration and Egyptian Expatriates' Affairs (MEEEA) in 2015. This separation did not cause any change in the labour migration functions of the now simply Ministry of Manpower (MOM). These include vetting and approving migrant workers' employment contracts and providing them with protection through its labour attachés who are also expected to promote demand for Egyptian labour. Egypt has two labour attachés in EU member states, Greece and Italy.

Until the early 2010s, the MFA, through its embassies and consulates in Europe, provided diplomatic protection to Egyptian migrants and dealt with local authorities on irregular migration. In 2011, the Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) in implementation of the 2005 Labour Agreement between Italy and Egypt, though contracted between the Italian Ministry of Labour and Social Policies and the Egyptian MOMM was signed for Egypt by the Minister of Foreign Affairs (Governo Italiano, 2011). In the late 2010s, although the MOM maintained its representatives in Greece and Italy, the responsibility for migration to Europe shifted completely to the MFA. The Ministry of Manpower remain in charge of migration to Egypt's principal external labour markets in Arab countries.

Within the MFA, the location of the unit responsible for it confirms the high political significance Egypt gives to migration in the international system generally and towards Europe in particular. Migration, in the early 2010s still attached to consular affairs, was shifted to the multilateral affairs sector in the late 2010s. This is the sector in charge of international organizations, which also emphasizes the foreign policy perspective on migration when discussed in multilateral fora. The EU-Egypt Migration Dialogues, to which it will be reverted later, are launched by the Minister of Foreign Affairs and the EU Commissioner for Migration, Home Affairs and Citizenship (EU External Action, n.d.). The technical aspects of the Dialogues are addressed by EU senior officials, whose Egyptian counterparts were led in the past by either the assistant minister for multilateral or for European affairs. Ad hoc coordination meetings are held with other government ministries and agencies, but they are only convened by the MFA's migration unit, which also conducts negotiations with the EU and represents Egypt in concerned multilateral fora. Issue linkage in foreign policy may relegate migration concerns, or some of them, to a secondary rank of priorities.

MFA also hosts an inter-ministerial organ, the National Coordinating Committee on Combatting and Preventing Illegal Migration and Trafficking in Persons (NCCIM & TIP), established in 2016. The Committee's title perfectly coincides with the EU concerns. The NCCIM & TIP is managed by a former high-ranking ambassador.

The restored MEEEA chiefly deals with the last part of its title, Egyptian expatriates. Its resources are limited. However, it has made an incursion in Egypt's migration relations with the EU. For Egypt, it is responsible for the implementation of a regional labour migration project, funded by the EU and Germany. In the early 2020s, two successive Ministers and their adviser are active and former ambassadors.

#### 20.4 The EU-Egypt Migration Policy Framework

In the EU-Egypt agreed policy framework, as it stands in the 2020s, fighting irregular migration, smuggling and trafficking, and migrants' return prevail over all objectives. Egypt's assumed interest in labour migration is not a priority. The reference to it is symbolic.

This section reviews the EU-Egypt 2002 Association Agreement, the EU-Egypt Partnership Priorities 2021–2027 and the press releases issued after two rounds of the Egypt-EU Migration Dialogue.6 It also takes up Egypt's bilateral agreements and understandings on migration with a few member states.

The EU-Egypt Association Agreement takes up migration in two chapters and nine articles under Title IV. In Chap. 1, "Dialogue and cooperation in social matters", article 63 refers to conducting regular dialogue on social matters, including migration and "illegal" migration among five issues of discussion. The article refers to achieving progress in the movement of workers and equal treatment and social integration of each party's nationals legally residing in the territories of their host countries. It does not indicate creating or broadening channels of legal migration. In contrast, the agreement dedicates the four articles of Chap. 2 to cooperation for the prevention and control of "illegal migration" and other consular matters. The differential treatment of legal and "illegal" migration is expressive of the EU priorities and their acceptance by Egypt.

In the EU-Egypt Partnership Priorities 2017–2020 and 2021–2027 documents, the priorities are listed under three headings: Egypt's modern economy and social development; partnering in foreign policy; and enhancing stability. Migration and mobility are neither included under the Egyptian modern economy and social development nor foreign policy. This is striking given the EU 2016 Migration Policy Framework that announces the full integration of migration in the Union's foreign policy, on the one hand, and Egypt's institutional location of migration in its MFA, on the other (EC, n.d.). Migration and mobility are rather taken up under the

<sup>6</sup> Full references are at the end of the chapter.

"enhancing stability" heading, as a further sub-division along with "good governance" and "security and terrorism". Migration can thus be seen as a security question to be addressed chiefly by good governance. Lavenex and Jurge had already considered the EU migration policies were of the security type Lavenex and Jurge (2013). In the priorities document, both parties pledge to continue working together "to jointly address in an efficient and effective manner the challenges of irregular migration". It is only in second place that "all other aspects of migration and mobility, including legal migration" are mentioned. Several issues for cooperation stand out. The EU pledges to support the strengthening of migration and asylum governance in Egypt and "its efforts to prevent and combat irregular migration, to strengthen border management, as well as to combat trafficking and smuggling of human beings". Egypt thus accepts border externalization through border management.7 The two parties also commit to foster their cooperation in return, readmission and the reintegration of irregular migrants. The EU pledges to seek to support and strengthen Egyptian capacity to provide protection and to safeguard the rights of refugees, migrants and asylum-seekers, and their access to basic services, such as education and health. Laudable as the refugees', migrants' and asylum-seekers' protection and the safeguarding of their rights are, the intention is clearly to stabilize them in Egypt and to prevent their migration to Europe. In this way, the two parties extended their discussion of Egyptian migration as a priority to all migration from Egypt. The priorities review brings out the primacy given to combating irregular migration, and to keeping potential migrants from attempting to migrate. Legal migration is drowned among the priorities. No useful information can be drawn from the press releases issued after the Migration Dialogues (Delegation of the EU to Egypt, n.d., n.d.).

With EU member states, Egypt has bilateral labour agreements (BLAs) with Bulgaria, Greece and Italy.8 Concluded in a long-gone era, the 1972 agreement with Bulgaria is outdated (Egypt: Al-Waqa'u al-Misriya, 1972). The 1981 agreement with Greece focuses on the employment rights of each party's workers employed in the other's labour market. The most recent is the agreement with Italy, adopted in 2005, and followed upon in 2009 with an implementation protocol and then the above-mentioned MOU in 2011 (Accordo, n.p, n.d.; Governo Italiano, 2011). The three instruments call on their parties to regulate migrant flows in accordance with demand and supply in their respective labour markets. The agreement provides that the state of origin ensures that its migrant workers are not a threat to the security and public order of the state of destination. This security perspective contrasts with the positive reference in the same agreement and in the protocol to opening up channels for legal migration for Egyptian workers.

Egypt signed in 2017 an agreement establishing a bilateral dialogue on migration with Germany (the German Federal Government, 2017). The dialogue seeks to tackle the root causes of migration and emphasizes repatriation of irregular migrants.

<sup>7</sup> On the externalization concept, see, for example, Stock et al., 2019. 8 Full references at the end of the chapter.

Germany pledges investments in professional training, support to the Egyptian educational sector and scholarships for young Egyptians to study in its institutions. Legal migration is not addressed. The signature of the agreement by the two countries' foreign ministers signals its foreign policy perspective.

In 2021, Egypt and the Netherlands signed a letter of intent on cooperation on migration. The letter points out strengthening cooperation in tackling irregular migration and repatriation, and the parties' interest in minimizing irregular migration. For the letter, the only means to realize this end is to provide better information on legal migration possibilities (Government of the Netherlands, 2021).

Egypt has only one readmission agreement, with Italy, adopted along with its executive protocol in 2007. The agreement is about the return of nationals only and elaborates on the means to prove their nationality in case of doubt (The Rights Angle, 2014).

Reacting to the EU's concern with transit migration, Egypt is also party to the EU-Horn of Africa Migration Route Initiative (the Khartoum process) that specifically focuses on fighting smuggling of migrants and human trafficking (EC, n.d.-a). Egypt hosted the first meeting of the Initiative's steering committee in April 2015 and co-chaired it throughout that year.

# 20.5 The Operationalization of the Policy Framework and Its Outcome

The EU, its member states and Egypt articulate the agreed policy framework in specific actions. These actions take the form of projects implemented in Egypt, funded by the North African window of the European Union Emergency Trust Fund for Africa (EUTF), and by member states.9 The implementation is carried out by donors' agencies, international organizations or Egyptian institutions. Egypt also takes action on its own, at times in cooperation with member states.

Section 20.5.1 signals a number of these projects, including all those ETUFfunded, sufficient to support its contentions.10 It also refers to examples of specific Egyptian actions. Section 20.5.2 takes up the outcomes of the policy framework operationalization.

<sup>9</sup> The European Union Trust Fund for stability and addressing the root causes for irregular migration and displaced persons in Africa was established following the Valetta Summit in 2015.

<sup>10</sup> None of the projects that are not taken up by the subsection refutes the chapter's contentions.

#### 20.5.1 The Operationalization of the Policy Framework

In the early 2020s, the EUTF finances seven projects that give expression to the agreed policy framework. These projects seek to realize three specific objectives: to enhance Egypt's migration management; to address the root causes of irregular migration; and to support Egyptian communities hosting migrants and refugees (EUTF, 2017). The objectives of projects bilaterally funded by member states are no different. Legal migration opportunities do not figure among them.

To enhance Egypt's migration management, the first project "Enhancing migration management through institutional support" seeks to contribute to enhancing migration governance and management in Egypt through institutional strengthening and capacity building. The project supports "the objectives of the National Strategy for combating and preventing illegal migration, as well as human trafficking". These latter objectives coincide with the EU' Migration Policy Framework's aims, at a time the project corresponds to the institutional capacity-building in the field of migration thematic area defined by Egypt.

To address the root causes of irregular migration, the EUTF-financed action encompasses four projects that contribute to realizing the EU's Migration Partnership Framework aim of "preventing irregular migration and enhancing cooperation in return and readmission of irregular migrants". They are all implemented in regions that are sources of migrants. "Addressing root causes of irregular migration through employability and labour-intensive work" is a project designed to create short- to medium term-employment opportunities and to building the skills of youth. It corresponds to Egypt's development cooperation, and vocational and technical education thematic areas. The second project, "Addressing the economic drivers of irregular migration", should create enterprises and work opportunities for women and youth. It corresponds to Egypt's development cooperation thematic area. The third project, "Multi-educational Programme for Employment Promotion in Migration-affected Areas", seeks to facilitate the access of vulnerable populations to upgraded vocational and technical training. It also corresponds to Egypt's vocational and technical education thematic area. The fourth project is "Tackling the root causes of irregular migration and supporting integrated communities in Upper Egypt". Implemented in two high poverty rates governorates, the project seeks to create employment opportunities for vulnerable young women and men through enterprise creation and skill upgrading, and to raise awareness about the risks of irregular migration. This project is also in line with Egypt's development cooperation thematic area.

The last two projects serve the specific objective "Support the Egyptian communities hosting migrants and refugees". Their titles are "Capacity-building through urban infrastructure development in migration-affected urban areas" and "Supporting communities – Health for all", the latter seeking to improve the access of vulnerable migrant and refugee communities to primary and secondary health care services. By improving the employment prospects, living conditions and health services available to migrants and refugees hosted in Egypt, the two projects preempt their secondary migration. They thus contribute to realizing the Migration Partnership's aim of preventing irregular migration. They both correspond to Egypt's "supporting efforts to host refugees" thematic area. However, in the absence of sufficient resettlement opportunities, they may also be seen as contradicting Egypt's long-standing rejection of local integration as a durable solution for refugees.

In addition, Egypt is a beneficiary of a project co-financed by the EUTF regional window for North Africa and the German Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ) that also covers Morocco and Tunisia. This project, "Towards a holistic approach to labour migration governance and labour mobility in North Africa" (THAMM) exceptionally, but only symbolically, provides for the placement of 200 Egyptian workers in Germany. Apart from skill and qualification recognition activities, which may facilitate workers' mobility, the project is active in migration governance, statistics, and information systems (ILO and IOM, 2021). THAMM addresses the EUTF's objective of supporting migration management, which makes it fall in the institutional capacity-building area defined by Egypt.

At the bilateral level, the Egyptian German Centre for Jobs, Migration and Reintegration is part of the global Programme Migration for Development, Voluntary Return and Reintegration (MPD), financed by Germany and implemented in 12 countries. The center focuses on the reintegration of the repatriated Egyptians. Curiously, it performs functions of an employment service guiding jobseekers to training and matching them with demand in the Egyptian labour market. Interestingly, Egypt could keep the center from starting to function until its program included a component on legal migration. However, this component is only about assisting workers wishing to migrate in preparing their files, which it later sends to the German public employment service.

Still bilaterally, EU member states fund a large number of projects implemented by IOM. Ten projects are about the stabilization and protection of migrants in Egypt, cooperation in sustainable solutions, integration of Egyptian returnees, and local development. None is about legal migration opportunities (IOM, n.d.(a)).

On its part, to prevent unauthorized departures towards the EU, Egypt patrols its land borders and Mediterranean shores. To effectively do so, Egypt was reported to have bought border control devices from EU Member States. As examples, in 2020, an Egyptian source, citing the Italian Newspaper La Repubblica, referred to a mega defense project that included the sale by Italy of 20 patrol boats to Egypt (Egypt Defense Expo, 2020). In the same year, Germany approved the sale of naval equipment to Egypt, which included nine patrol boats and a coastal defense ship (The Middle East Monitor, 2020). IOM supports Egypt in training for border control.

Egypt adopted laws in 2010 on Combating Human Trafficking and in 2016 on Combating Illegal Migration and the Smuggling of Migrants (ARE, 2016; 2010). To put the two laws in practice, the NCCIM & TIP adopted a National Strategy for Combating and Preventing Illegal Migration 2016–2026 and a National Action Plan 2021–2023 for the same purpose. The two documents fall squarely within the EU priority concerns. It is noteworthy that neither a strategy nor an action plan exists for the promotion of labour migration and the welfare of Egyptian migrant workers. In 2018, Egypt also amended its law on foreigners' entry, exit and residence, imposing fines for its violation (ARE, 2018).

#### 20.5.2 The Outcome

The EU is satisfied with its cooperation on migration with Egypt. In 2018, after a visit by the president of the European Council and the rotating president of the Council of the Union, the EU praised Egypt and wished to deepen its relations with it. It was recalled that the Egyptian authorities had made the fight against smuggling and trafficking their priority and, hence, there had been no irregular departure from Egypt in 2017 (EU Observer, 2018). In 2019, half of the EU member states assessed the overall cooperation with Egypt as good to very good in the procedures of identifying irregular migrants ordered to return. This cooperation was considered average by five member States (EC, 2021).

By 2022, the situation praised by the EU in 2018 had not been altered. No sea departures from Egypt had been registered since 2016. In June 2022, in comments made in Cairo during the signing ceremony of the trilateral MOU on the trade and transport of natural gas between Egypt, Israel and the EU, the president of the European Commission expressed anew the Union's satisfaction with the Egyptian overall attitude (Egypt, EU, Israel, 2022). She said "we want to diversify to trustworthy suppliers, and Egypt is a trustworthy partner." (Haggag & El Nashar, 2022).

Against its recognized efforts for realizing the EU's interests, Egypt made benefits. It gained tens of millions of Euros in financial assistance from the EUTF and from the EU member states to fund projects in support of its policies and migration governance institutions.11 At least some of these policies and institutions should have been funded by the state budget. It needs to be emphasized though that these funds only concerned fighting smuggling and trafficking, stabilization of potential migrants in Egypt, the creation of job opportunities, and migrants' return and reintegration. Cooperation on migration is part of the larger collaboration under the Association Agreement. Therefore, the bilateral assistance provided to Egypt under the latter, from the European Neighborhood Initiative (ENI), cannot be dissociated from the cooperation on migration. For the period 2014–2016, the committed EU's bilateral assistance to Egypt amounted to €320 million and increased in 2017–2020 to €432–528 million (Delegation of the European Union to Egypt, 2021).

Egypt contracted mega projects with EU companies. Starting in 2016 with an € 8 billion contract, it agreed on several power generation projects with the German Siemens until 2019 (Egypt Today, 2021). Weapon sales were signaled above. Between 2013 and 2020, France was the second largest weapons exporter to

<sup>11</sup> The EUTF bilateral funding to projects in Egypt for 2017–2021 amounted to €60 million.

Egypt, right behind Russia. Germany, Italy, Spain and the Netherlands came in fourth, fifth, sixth and seventh positions (SIPRI, 2022).

In addition to those signaled above, EU member state president, prime ministers, ministers and the EU high representative for foreign affairs successively visited Egypt. Similarly, visits by top Egyptian officials, including the head of state, to the EU and EU member states multiplied. The critiques addressed to the 2013 events vanished.

The Egyptian and European parties are content with the exchanged benefits. Yet, failings exist in the outcomes of their cooperation. The total of Assisted Voluntary Return and Reintegration (AVRR) to Egypt from 2019 to mid-2022 amounted to 869 persons, including 454 from EU member states (IOM, n.d.(b)). Seen from the EU perspective, this is quite a modest volume relative to what it may have expected. Not departing from Egypt, but rather using the Central Mediterranean route, from January to end of June 2022, 4154 Egyptian migrants arrived on the Italian coasts. They represented 15% of total arrivals to Italy, right behind the Bangladeshis with 16%. (Panara, 2022). Until May, Egyptians had been the first national group to arrive irregularly to Italy. By the end of August, they were 10.902 representing 28.2% of arrivals through this route, ahead of Bangladeshis and right behind Tunisians (European Council, 2022). Besides, the agreed policy framework having not addressed it, Egyptian highly-skilled migration (HSM) proceeds without response. Docquier et al. stress that the loss of human capital, scarce in developing countries, creates shortages in specific occupations, such as medical doctors (Docquier et al., 2007). Egyptian doctors have been migrating in large numbers recently (ECES, 2021). According to the latest Health Workforce Migration updates, Germany is at the top of OECD and EU countries Egyptian doctors migrate to (OECD Statistics, 2021). It was pointed our under 3 above that Germany only included the facilitation of the migration process in the project it finances in Egypt under pressures from the Egyptian Government. Medical doctors migrate outside the scope of this project.

#### 20.6 Conclusions

Egypt realized that the EU's deeply held concern in the migration area is to stop irregular flows and to return irregular migrants. It accepted this concern and cooperated in defusing it. The EU-Egypt cooperation is based on the shared neoclassical understanding that Egyptian migration is caused by the Egyptians' search for the employment and wages that their domestic labour market fails to generate. For the EU, uncontested by Egypt, criminal networks profit from this situation, smuggling migrants and trafficking in humans. The EU and Egypt agreed a policy framework that address these causes. The EU and its member states fund projects to operationalize it. Egypt takes measures of its own to put it into practice. The EU is satisfied with the cooperation shown by Egypt, irregular departures from its shores having ceased. In return, considering migration to Europe a foreign policy issue, Egypt also benefitted from its cooperation with the EU. Giving up on legal migration to Europe, considered marginal anyway, it turned to its advantage the EU's emphasized concern with irregular migration. Linking issues, it benefitted from funds for its migration governance and for locally-focused development. The issue linking also exceeded the narrow migration field to reach other areas and the overall level of relations between the two parties. A causality link is difficult to establish between the joint approach to migration and the development in relations in other areas. However, a correlation between them is obvious and a mutual reinforcement may have been in operation.

The mutual benefits notwithstanding, irregular migration continues via third countries. The entire assistance Egypt receives from the EU, for migration purposes and under the association agreement, cannot quell the causes of migration in this over-100 million population country. HSM, likely to penalize Egypt's development if left unaddressed, also persists. For the loopholes in the outcomes of their cooperation not to widen, the two parties may be well advised to reconsider the causes of Egyptian migration at origin and destination. This should require going beyond neoclassical economic explanations.

#### References


Ibrahim Awad is at present Professor of Practice of Global Affairs and Director, Center for Migration and Refugee Studies, School of Global Affairs and Public Policy, at the American University in Cairo. He holds a BA degree in political science from Cairo University and a PhD degree in political science from the Graduate Institute of International Studies, University of Geneva, Switzerland. He has worked for the League of Arab States, the United Nations and the International Labour Organization, holding positions of Secretary of the Commission, UN-ESCWA, Director, ILO Sub-regional Office for North Africa and Director, ILO International Migration Programme.

He is currently Chair of the Labour Migration Thematic Working Group of the Global Knowledge Partnership on Migration and Development (KNOMAD), hosted by the World Bank, Chair of the Steering Committee of the Euro-Mediterranean Research Network on International Migration (EuroMedMig) and Senior Fellow at the Migration Policy Centre (MPC) of the Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies in Geneva. He also serves on the editorial boards of several academic journals. For more information about his research activities and publications see: https://www.aucegypt.edu/fac/ibrahimawad.

Open Access This chapter is licensed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits use, sharing, adaptation, distribution and reproduction in any medium or format, as long as you give appropriate credit to the original author(s) and the source, provide a link to the Creative Commons license and indicate if changes were made.

The images or other third party material in this chapter are included in the chapter's Creative Commons license, unless indicated otherwise in a credit line to the material. If material is not included in the chapter's Creative Commons license and your intended use is not permitted by statutory regulation or exceeds the permitted use, you will need to obtain permission directly from the copyright holder.

# Chapter 21 The Institutional Channeling of Transnational Economic Mobilization in Three Moroccan Regions

Hassan Bousetta, Hicham Jamid, and Ismaïl Oubad

# 21.1 Introduction

Whether from, to, or through Morocco, international migration is a structural component of the evolution of the Kingdom's economy, demography, society, and territorial organization. Throughout the twentieth century, Morocco has experienced several "ages of emigration" (Sayad, 1999), with varying rhythms and trends. Since then, Moroccan international emigration has been undergoing complex sociodemographic changes that are accelerating in relation to global developments.

After its independence in 1956, Morocco became one of the main emigration countries in the world and the number of Moroccans residing abroad (MRA) is constantly increasing. This phenomenon now concerns all Moroccan social strata and practically all regions of the country. This generalization of emigration has resulted in a globalization of destinations; while the Moroccan emigrations was essentially directed to the Western European countries, now this emigration concern the five continents.

The High Commission for Planning (HCP, 2020) estimates the number of Moroccans living abroad at five million, equivalent to 13% of the country's total population, spread over more than 100 countries around the world. Europe remains by far the continent where the majority of the Moroccan expatriate community is settled, and France remains the country of immigration where the largest number of MRAs reside. According to OECD data for the year 2020, there are just over one million of them living in France, 935,000 in Spain and 440,000 in Italy. These three countries account for nearly three-quarters of all Moroccan emigrants living in OECD countries.

H. Bousetta (✉) · H. Jamid · I. Oubad

FNRS Fellow (National Fund for Scientific Research) Fellow, University of Liège, Liège, Belgium

e-mail: hassan.bousetta@uliege.be; hicham.jamid@ird.fr; ismail.oubad@edu.unige.it

<sup>©</sup> The Author(s) 2024

R. Zapata-Barrero, I. Awad (eds.), Migrations in the Mediterranean, IMISCOE Research Series, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-42264-5\_21

Like many diaspora communities, MRAs have developed and continue to maintain economic, financial, social, and cultural ties with their country of origin. Indeed, for several decades, MRAs, on their own initiative, have been investing in the development of their territories of origin by building basic infrastructure in various fields (electrification, drinking water supply and sanitation, construction of roads and dispensaries, rehabilitation of schools, development of agricultural projects and income-generating activities, etc.). Considering their multidimensional contributions, particularly the importance of their remittances in the balance of payments, the Moroccan government has been deploying diaspora policies since the early 1990s (Dufoix, 2010) that aims to make these expatriates agents for the socioeconomic development of their country of origin.

For many sending countries, identifying, organizing, gathering and mobilizing the diaspora are major concerns in their international migration governance strategies. This chapter aims to identify a series of state practices designed to promote the contribution of migration to local and regional development, both in countries of departure and destination. The objective is to reflect on the Moroccan strategy towards Moroccans living abroad (MRAs).

In order to analyze the regional deployment of Morocco's migration policy towards its citizens living abroad, the paper proposes an analysis of projects and initiatives implemented in the three regions and seeks to grasp their contributions but also their limitations. The paper is based on semi-structured interviews conducted between 2021 and 2022 with local actors concerned with the mobilization of Moroccans living abroad for regional development.

# 21.2 Morocco: A Crossroad at the Heart of an Old Tradition of Migration

Due to its geographical location, at the junction between the African and European continents, and following the successive conquests and colonizations (Phoenician, Roman, Arab, Spanish and French), Morocco has always been a crossroads of civilizations and a territory of population mixing, meeting and cohabitation of cultures as diverse as they are different. Michel Abitbol's work (2009) provides an original "biography" of Morocco from antiquity to the present day. He traces the various tributaries that have shaped its history and identity, making it a plural country, at once "Berber", Arab, African and Mediterranean. The movements of the people from, to and through the Moroccan territory occupy a prominent place in this narrative.

Moreover, Moroccan society has always experienced, in one way or another, international migration, with inconstant forms and orientations. The very distant past of this phenomenon goes far beyond the time of the French protectorate in Morocco (1912–1956) and even the colonization of its neighboring country, Algeria, in 1830. Indeed, for a long time and until the middle of the nineteenth century, Moroccan international migration was South-South oriented. Throughout this period, movements of people were structured along two distinct axes: one joining the Middle East through North Africa and the Levant, the other joining West Africa through the Sahara. The first axis, probably the oldest and most important, is inseparable from the spread of Islam. Several testimonies attest to the definitive settlement of pilgrims along the route leading to Saudi Arabia and their progressive insertion into the exchange networks leading to Mecca. The second axis is oriented North-South. It linked Morocco to what was then known as Bilad es Soudan, the countries of the Sudan, known today as the countries of the Sahel and West Africa, via the Atlas Mountains, the Saharan oases and a series of mythical cities such as Sijilmassa or Timbuktu (Charef, 2003).

Thus, the ancient trans-Saharan caravan trade routes, linking Morocco to the Sahelian empires (Abitbol, 1980; Pascon, 1980) have generated, on the margins of the economy, a great migratory dynamic between the two shores of the Sahara, leading Moroccan traders to settle since the mid-nineteenth century in West Africa, particularly in Senegal, Mali and Côte d'Ivoire (Abou El Farah, 2007; Lanza, 2011), but also the anchoring of a population of sub-Saharan origin in various regions of Morocco. Moreover, this sub-Saharan population was not the only one to choose Morocco as a place to settle. The history of emigration, or rather of expulsion and exile of Muslims and Jews from Spain, shows how the latter took refuge in Morocco between the fifteenth and seventeenth centuries, and settled in certain cities such as Tetouan, Fez, Salé or Meknes (Kenbib, 1994).

If the long history of these population movements approves the position of Morocco as a great Mediterranean migratory crossroads, it is since the beginning of the twentieth century that the migratory flows from this country towards Europe, particularly towards France, will take an unprecedented scale.

Like all international migrations, the one originating from Morocco is constantly undergoing complex socio-demographic changes, which are accelerating in relation to world developments. Throughout the twentieth century, Morocco has become one of the main countries of emigration on an international scale. Since the country's independence in 1956, the number of emigrants has not stopped growing and the social base of emigration has widened until today it concerns practically all social strata and all regions of the Kingdom. This generalization of emigration is accompanied by a globalization of destinations. It is no longer limited to Western European countries, where Moroccans rank among the leading immigrant communities in France, Belgium, the Netherlands, Spain and Italy, but now concerns all five continents.

It is difficult to obtain accurate statistics on emigration from Morocco since there is no systematic monitoring of the phenomenon. Therefore, for this section, we have used the latest information note on migration data prepared by the OECD. It has the merit of providing updated statistics on the number of Moroccans residing mainly in OECD member countries, disaggregated by gender and education level. These statistics are collected and compiled by the OECD from the database of population censuses or population registers of its member countries. It should be noted that the data in this note refer only to Moroccan emigrants, i.e., those who were born in Morocco and reside in another country, in this case an OECD country.

According to OECD data, in 2020 there were about 3.3 million Moroccan emigrants residing in the OECD member countries, up from just over 3 million in 2015–2016, an increase of 8% over the past 5 years. In relative terms, this increase in the Moroccan emigrant population is more modest than that observed in previous periods (+25% between 2005 and 2010, then +13% between 2010 and 2015). Indeed, over the past 20 years, the total number of Moroccan-born emigrants residing in OECD countries has doubled. France remains by far the country where the largest number of them reside, with just over one million Moroccan emigrants, followed by Spain (935,000 Moroccan emigrants) and Italy (440,000 Moroccan emigrants). These three countries account for nearly three-quarters of all Moroccan emigrants living in OECD countries.

Spain and Italy are also the countries where their numbers have increased most rapidly over the last 20 years, with a more than threefold increase in both countries, while the Moroccan diaspora in France has seen its numbers increase by about 50% over the same period. The other main destination countries for Moroccan emigrants are Belgium (nearly 230,000 Moroccan emigrants in 2020), Israel (which is the only country where the number of Moroccan-born has decreased since 2000, due to the drying up of flows and the aging of this group), the Netherlands, and Germany (where the number of Moroccan emigrants has more than doubled in 20 years) (Fig. 21.1).

Among Moroccan-born migrants residing in OECD countries in 2015–2016, nearly 48% were women, a share that has been steadily increasing since the early 2000s. This trend is also observable in France, the main country of settlement for Moroccan migrants: between 2000 and 2019, the share of women among Moroccanborn individuals aged 15 and older increased from 47% to nearly 51% (Fig. 21.2).

Fig. 21.1 Moroccan immigrants in the main OECD destination countries, 2000–2020 Source: Database on immigrants in OECD countries (DIOC) See: Information note on migration data, March 2022

Fig. 21.2 Share of women among Moroccan-born persons living in France aged 15 and over, 2000–2019

Source: Database on immigrants in OECD countries (DIOC), INSEE, French population census See: Information note on migration data, March 2022

This evolution reflects both the feminization of migration flows from Morocco in recent years and the aging of the cohorts of emigrants who arrived in OECD countries several decades ago, mostly men who arrived as labor migrants.

Education is also one of the key characteristics for diaspora analysis, as it largely conditions the socio-economic integration of émigrés in destination countries, as well as the contribution of émigrés to the development of their country of origin. As far as Moroccan emigrants are concerned, the share of graduates has increased over the past 15 years, from 14% to 17% between 2000–2001 and 2015–2016. However, Moroccan emigrants in OECD countries remain on average less educated than immigrants overall and natives of OECD countries. Moreover, among Moroccan emigrants, women have a slightly less favorable education distribution than men. For example, in 2015–2016, about 16% of Moroccan emigrant women and 18% of Moroccan emigrant men had a tertiary degree, while these proportions were 34% and 32% among all immigrants residing in OECD countries (Fig. 21.3).

At the same time, the share of Moroccan emigrants with a low level of education (59% among women and 56% among men) is significantly higher than that observed among all immigrants (31% for both men and women) or among natives (36% among women and 34% among men). However, there are major differences according to the country of destination. For example, among Moroccan emigrants living in France in 2015–2016, nearly a quarter had higher education degrees. This proportion was much lower in Spain (6%) and Italy (5%), as well as in Belgium (10%) and the Netherlands (14%). In the case of France, the magnitude of student mobility from Morocco to France offsets the large number of poorly educated Moroccan emigrants residing there. Yet, Moroccan emigrants living in North America are, on average, much better educated than those living in Europe: more than 40% have a college degree in the United States, and more than 70% in Canada.

Fig. 21.3 Distribution of educational attainment of Moroccan emigrants and several comparison groups in OECD countries, 2015/16

Source: Database on immigrants in OECD countries (DIOC) See: Information note on migration data, March 2022

#### 21.3 Moroccan Diaspora Policies

For a long time, the stay of Moroccans and their families abroad was considered temporary or provisional. In this perspective, efforts were made to strengthen their sense of attachment to their country of origin, at least in discursive terms. Thus, until the mid-1970s, Moroccan international migration, which was already a social phenomenon, did not receive the attention it deserved from the public authorities. Certainly, it was managed through conventions with host countries and efforts were made to develop the repatriation of foreign currency since 1966. In reality, it can be said that this period was marked by a passive, even distrustful attitude of the Moroccan state towards its nationals abroad. It was not until the early 1990s that the beginnings of a tangible policy towards them were noticed. This chapter therefore provides an overview of the evolution of the Moroccan government's interest in its expatriates, while analyzing the terms by which they are referred to and the institutions set up to manage the affairs of MRAs.

Until the early 1970s, Moroccans living abroad were referred to as "Moroccan workers abroad" (MWA). In fact, most Moroccan international migration during the 1950s and 1960s was economic, involving low or unskilled labor. This was largely ordered through several bilateral agreements signed between Morocco and certain Western European countries, such as France (in 1963), Belgium (in 1964) and the Netherlands (in 1969). In this context of strong demands from the host countries, Moroccan migrants were reduced to the exclusive contribution of their labor force. This was intended to meet the needs of European industry on the one hand, and to see the country of origin benefit from their remittances on the other. These emigrants, temporarily installed abroad to work, were for the most part keen to return to their country as soon as their contracts expired and some savings were made (Sayad, 1999). As a result, they were always considered and perceived as foreigners in the places where they settled and, in official Moroccan discourse, as eternal "subjects" of the King, bound by the act of allegiance to his sovereignty. Circumscribed in this perception of an obsolescence of the presence and of a look purely articulated to the utilitarianism of the work in the chain in emigration and to the returns in economic resources towards the country of origin, neither Morocco, nor even the countries of immigration were concerned about the conditions of life and work of these Moroccan workers abroad. Their civic and political rights, as well as their social and cultural life, thus remained in the blind spot of public policies "here" and "there" (Brand, 2010).

After the unilateral cessation of labor immigration by host countries (1972–1973), Moroccan international immigration underwent considerable structural changes. From a labor immigration composed of young, single, isolated men, it was transformed into a "settlement immigration" (Sayad, 1999). The latter was reinforced by the rise of family reunification, the birth of children abroad and the arrival of new profiles of Moroccan migrants. With the lasting and definitive settlement of Moroccan migrants, as well as the social and demographic transformations of their immigration, it is no longer possible to think of this phenomenon solely in terms of work and thus reduce Moroccans living abroad to a simple group of temporarily present "workers" or "subjects" of the King from a distance. The evolution of this situation will cause the conceptual term to evolve in the same vein. Thus, the acronym changed from MWA (Moroccan Workers Abroad) to MLA (Moroccans Living Abroad).

The management of the affairs of the MRAs and their descendants were, until then, essentially the responsibility of the Ministry of Labor and Foreign Affairs and was thus channeled through the Moroccan consular authorities in the countries of immigration. Morocco's main concerns during this period were to manage its migrant population, optimize its economic contribution, maintain its allegiance to the Kingdom, and monitor the political and trade union activities of activists or opponents in a context of political tensions.

To ensure the observation of the dynamics of MRA, the Moroccan consulates set up a network of associations, known as "Amicales des Travailleurs et Commerçants Marocains à l'Étranger". Their mission was to "maintain the link between migrants and Morocco, and to control [their] political trajectories" (Lacroix, 2005: 93). As the economist Abdelkrim Belguendouz points out, these associations "functioned [rather] as instruments of the Moroccan consulates to supervise, enlist and monitor migrants, even preventing them from participating in claims and labor struggles to protect their rights or to have equal treatment with the natives" (Belguendouz, 2006: 4). The security aspect of the "Amicales" will therefore end up taking precedence over the cultural activities and animations. The latter were supposed to strengthen the bond of allegiance of Moroccan migrants with their country of origin, but the achievement of the expected objective remained unattained.

If this pioneering period was marked by the passive, disinterested, distanced and even distrustful attitude of the Moroccan state towards its nationals living abroad, the beginning of the 1990s will initiate an important institutional change in the relationship with those who will end up being called Moroccans residing abroad (MRA). This new political trend initiated the beginnings of an active institutional approach. For example, in July 1990, the King of Morocco created the Hassan II Foundation for Moroccans Living Abroad (Fondation Hassan II pour les Marocains Résidant à l'Etranger-MRE) by law 19–89, promulgated by dahir (royal decree). The main objective of this non-profit institution was to "consolidate the socio-cultural links between Moroccan migrants and Morocco by sending imams to mosques and teachers to teach language and culture of origin, as well as organizing vacation camps in Morocco, providing financial, legal and technical assistance to migrants wishing to invest in Morocco, and financing associative, festive and sports activities" (Dumont, 2007: 338).

It is notably through the Hassan II Foundation that the new name of Moroccan migrants (Moroccans living abroad-MRE) has become established. It contains a significant nuance and attests to the new approach of Morocco's migration policy, which is aware of the indefinite duration or irremediable settlements of the descendants of early migrants. Still relying on the link with the country of origin and the indefectible Moroccanity, the new policy aimed at the reinforcement and the perpetuation of the ties of the MRA with their country of origin. This relationship between the State and its diaspora is based on the preservation of the Moroccan national and cultural identity. It takes various forms such as the promotion of Koranic reading in the Moroccan style, the animation by the folklore and the cultures of the country and by the teaching of the national anthem to the young vacationersscouts.

In the wake of the launch of the Hassan II Foundation for Moroccan expatriates, the Moroccan government appointed Rafik Haddaoui, then Moroccan ambassador to Moscow, as Minister Delegate in charge of the Moroccan community living abroad, reporting to the Prime Minister. This was at the end of July 1990. In collaboration with the country's other institutions, the prerogatives of this new ministry consisted of "promoting social, economic and cultural action in the direction of MREs, monitoring the migratory movements of Moroccans, participating in negotiations relating to emigration and the living conditions of Moroccans abroad, as well as setting up programs to ensure their effective reintegration upon their final return to Morocco" (Brand, 2010, p. 134).

However, the Ministry of Rafik Haddaoui, later taken over by Ahmed El Ouardi, did not succeed in creating harmony among the multiple bodies in charge of the Moroccan international migration file. Indeed, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Cooperation was quite hostile to what it considered to be a loss of prerogatives. Belguendouz illustrates this gradual loss of momentum of a dedicated ministry and the forces that participated in one way or another in its reconsideration: "the status of the ministry [in charge of the affairs of the Moroccan community residing abroad] was quickly distorted and its experience halted due in particular to the susceptibilities of certain central officials of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, certain ambassadors and consuls posted in the countries of immigration who reproached it for taking up the cause, (in parliament in particular) in the defense of the rights of Moroccan emigrants, implicitly laying bare the shortcomings of diplomatic and consular action in this area" (translated from French to English by the Authors 2009, p. 6).

Thus, in February 1995, this Ministry was eventually attached to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Cooperation and dissolved into an Under-Secretariat of State in charge of the Moroccan community abroad. Taking advantage of the 1997 ministerial amendment, the Prime Minister, Abdellatif Filali, who was also Minister of Foreign Affairs, put an end to this Under-Secretariat of State and attached its attributions to a department of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs through decree that was never published in the Official Bulletin (Op.cit., p.10).

The government of "consensual alternation" (1998–2002), presided over by the socialist Abderrahmane El Youssoufi, a long-time opponent of King Hassan II, did not re-establish the Ministry in charge of the Moroccan community abroad, and its entire term of office was marked by indecision on the subject of MRAs. It was the Prime Minister of the following government (2002–2007), Driss Jettou, who supported the filling of this institutional void by restoring the Ministry of MRAs and appointing the socialist Nezha Chekrouni as its head. If a framework was more or less revisited to give image to the institutional management dedicated to the MRAs, the margin obtained by Nouzha Chekrouni remains modest, even weak, leaving little room for a real and efficient political action.

It was not until the government of Abbas El Fassi, Prime Minister appointed by King Mohamed VI in 2007, that a new chapter in the Moroccan state's policy towards Moroccans living abroad took place. One of the portfolios of this government will be assigned to Minister Mohamed Ameur, in charge of MRAs and, this time, directly delegated to the Prime Minister. This shift in responsibilities reflects a tangible change in the way affairs related to Moroccans living abroad are handled. It is also felt at the political, institutional and organizational levels. Thus, the new Ministry of MRAs is required to set up a real government policy towards Moroccan communities living abroad, most of which are in Europe. In order to achieve the objectives set, Mohamed Ameur will develop a five-year action plan. It is then called: "Preliminary Action Plan for the promotion of the situation of Moroccan citizens abroad 2008–2012". It is structured in four pillars-missions: "(1) Support the rooting of new generations in host countries, without uprooting from the country of origin; (2) defend the rights and interests of MRAs both in Morocco and in host countries; (3) involve high-skilled Moroccans abroad in development projects in Morocco; (4) encourage productive investment of Moroccans abroad in the country of origin.

The year 2007 also corresponds to the establishment of the Consultative Council of Moroccans Abroad (CCME). Indeed, it was in his speech of November 6th, 2006 delivered in Agadir on the occasion of the 31st anniversary of the Green March that King Mohamed VI announced the creation of this dedicated institution. To do so, he entrusted the Advisory Council on Human Rights (CCDH) with the task of conducting broad consultations with all parties concerned in order to issue an advisory opinion on the creation of this new Council, which must combine, in its composition, the requirements of competence, representativeness, efficiency and credibility. In light of the CCDH's opinion, King Mohamed VI, by dahir n°1.07.208, appointed Driss El Yazami on December 21, 2007 to head the CCME. 37 members will join him to carry out a first transitional mandate of 4 years. Established in the Constitution in July 2011, the CCME is an institution in charge of "monitoring and evaluating the Kingdom's public policies towards its nationals abroad". Its mission is also to issue opinions to ensure the defense of the interests of Moroccans abroad inside and outside Morocco, to strengthen their contribution to the economic, social and human development of the country and to consolidate relations of friendship and cooperation between Morocco and the countries of residence.

The CCME, the Ministry in charge of the Moroccan Community Abroad, and the Hassan II Foundation remain the main institutional actors directly dedicated to the affairs of Moroccans living abroad. The chronology of the creation of these three institutions undoubtedly embodies an evolution in the relationship of the Moroccan state with its international migrants and reflects the refinement of the term that designates them. From Moroccan Workers Abroad (MWA), to Moroccan Nationals Abroad (MNA), we have arrived to Moroccans Residing Abroad (MRA), and even Moroccans of the World (MoW).

# 21.4 The Regional Turn in Moroccan Diaspora Policies: Three Case-Studies

As early as 2014, Morocco launched a new National Strategy for Moroccans Residing Abroad (SNMRE). This strategy was developed as part of the new immigration and asylum policy, initiated in September 2013 by King Mohammed VI and formally adopted in 2014. The strategy has three strategic objectives: (1) Preserve the identity of MREs; (2) Protect the rights and interests of MREs; (3) Encourage the contributions of MRAs to the country's development. This latter objective is particularly aimed at mobilizing "skills", attracting investment from MRAs and improving their access to public services.

The SNMRE aims to mobilize different national and international institutions working on the link between migration and development, in order to create synergies and capitalize on past actions and initiatives. The challenge for the SNMRE today is to develop its objectives according to the logic of the "advanced regionalization" project adopted by Morocco since 2011.

The institutional channelling of MRAs' investments is increasingly associated with these regional approaches. A quick scan of the various initiatives and programs set up at regional level to achieve the objectives set out by the SNMRE show that these programs are often carried in partnership with international cooperation agencies (the Belgian Enabel, the French AFD or the German GIZ). National institutions (CRI, CGEM), NGOs (national and international) are also involved in these territorialization of Moroccan diaspora policies, as shown in the three case-studies presented below.

#### 21.5 The Oriental Region

The Oriental is a former emigration hotspot towards Belgium, the Netherlands, Germany, France and since the 1980s to Spain. One of the specificities of the region is its geographical position, on the border with Algeria and the Spanish enclave of Melilla. According to existing documentation and exchanges with many interlocutors, Moroccan migrants from this region are mainly young people, investors, highly skilled people and retired migrants. Migration in this region is characterized by its movement between the two shores of the Mediterranean. It constitutes a development potential for the region, particularly in the information technology, real estate and agri-food sectors. However, as in other regions, public authorities and national and international organizations have always sought to take better advantage of the potential of international migration and benefit from its contribution to territorial development.

The Oriental region have signed several national, international and local conventions on the mobilization of MRAs. These conventions have resulted in the creation of spaces of consultation. These spaces aim to bring together the key in public and non-governmental action aimed at mobilizing the skills of MRAs. However, these spaces for dialogue between stakeholders are not institutionalized on a permanent basis. They are mainly dependent on initiatives carried out in the framework of specific cooperation projects.

We have noted that these spaces of consultations are sidelines, as the participations of the public directly concerned (MRAs) is inexistant. This is due the lack of links with this population by the side of regional actors of diaspora mobilization. Beyond these shortcomings, the mobilization of MRA skills is an issue that is beginning to take its place in the actions of public institutions. To Draw on this path, the Regional Investment Center (CRI) offers a reception and orientation unit for investors, with a focus on sectoral activity and associated investment opportunities. According to the interlocutors we met, the interest is to channel the investment potential of Moroccans living abroad, considered as a resource to be valorized for the territorial development.

The findings arising from the field noticed that the offer provided by the decentralized services do not distinguish between "Moroccans living abroad" and "Moroccans living in Morocco", despite the specific needs of the migrant population. The interlocutors have informed as well that frequency of recourse by Moroccan living abroad to the initiatives deployed to mobilize their investment potentialities is not optimal. According to them, this is due to the mistrust of the MRAs towards the administrations in charge of their affairs. According to our respondents, the challenge today in the region is to think and establish strong and durable ties with the MRAs who have investment potential and to provide them with information on the territorial offer and existing investment opportunities.

#### 21.6 The Beni Mellal-Khenifra Region

The Beni Mellal-Khenifra region is a hotspot of international emigration and an emerging circulation space associated with South/North mobility. Its transnational connections are mainly linked to the traditional destination countries of MRAs, namely Italy, Spain and France. Emigration is closely associated with the transformations of the rural world of the region. Indeed, it is estimated that the profiles of emigrants are mainly composed of former farmers and agricultural workers, skilled workers and micro-entrepreneurs. According to some interlocutors, the new generation of returnees also includes investors and entrepreneurs who constitute a potential for the territorial development of the region.

Channeling the skills of MRAs is an emerging issue in the BMK region. With the DEPOMI project, the mobilization of MRA investors has taken on a new dimension with the involvement of several institutional actors, such as the CRI. The latter recently launched Izdihar, a program dedicated to supporting entrepreneurs. Within this program, a component called Izdihar MdM is specially dedicated to MRAs with investment projects in the region.

In the region of Beni Mellal – Khénifra, the CRI and the Maison des MRE in Beni Mellal and Khouribga are the actors who officially adopt the vocation of mobilizing the skills of the MRA for territorial development. If the CRI is in charge of accompanying the investments of the MRAs, the main mission of the Maison des MRE includes their reception and orientation.

Given the diversity of the dynamics observed in the region, it is difficult to reach a consensus on the definition of the public problem around which local and regional actors should be federated with regard to the mobilization of MRA skills. The question of support for MRAs is not posed in the same way as in other regions. While in other regions, the mobilization of MRA investors is the focus of deconcentrated services, the region of Beni Mellal-Khénifra faces a plurality of processes around which it is necessary to federate actors (return migration, the problems of reintegration of returning migrants and their children, internal and international migration of Moroccans, irregular emigration of young people, etc.) This specificity is undoubtedly due to the conditions under which return migration of MRA families, mainly from Italy and Spain, took place after the economic and financial crisis of 2008.

International cooperation actors stimulate and animate the dynamics of governance and the positioning of actors in relation to the issue of channeling the potential of MRAs for development. However, at the time of our observation, the governance of migration had not yet been integrated into planning documents such as the RDP (Regional Development Plan).

The actors involved in the channeling and mobilization of MRAs for development, with the DEPOMI project, have initiated a Regional Consultation Space on Migration which brings together actors to plan the mobilization of migration for regional development. According to some interlocutors, there is a lack of communication on the territorial offer that can stimulate the interest of MRAs. Indeed, the latter are unaware of the opportunities and development sites that exist in the region. One of the interlocutors we met said that the projects of the MRAs, which are likely to play an important role in the development of the region, are often confronted with dysfunctions of the channels of support and guidance. The projects of the MRAs are thus hindered by the inadequate offer of the competent administrations.

There are indeed individual investments of the MRAs in the region, but the lack of initiatives and an adapted accompaniment represents a real constraint, hindering in addition the objectives of local development. In terms of mechanisms, there are relatively few mechanisms that are entirely and exclusively dedicated to channeling MRAs' investments (with the exception of the Izdihar MdM program). Currently, international cooperation plays a role in stimulating reflection on this subject. However, these are generally initiatives that follow the logic of one-off projects. These actions stimulate dialogue between regional and local actors, but to continue to fulfill this function, a capitalization system is necessary.

#### 21.7 The Souss Massa Region

For centuries, the Souss region has played the role of an important crossroads linking the Mediterranean world and sub-Saharan Africa. The geostrategic situation of this region has made it a gathering for civilizations and a crossroads of caravan routes that have played an important role in the history of Morocco (Lahnite, 2011). In one of his publications where he analyzes the archives entrusted to him by one of the heirs of the last lords of the Zaouia of Iligh, Paul Pascon shows the place of the Souss – through the kingdom of Tazerwalt – as an international platform for trade and as a departure and arrival point for the great caravans of the Southern Sahara. At the regional and national level too, the Souss has shown great economic and commercial dynamism, as evidenced by the many souks and Moussems held there, and even to this today.

The Souss-Massa region is also an ancient focus of internal migratory dynamics. In Morocco, the Soussis, known as "Chleuhs", are present in all regions of the Kingdom, particularly in Casablanca. Their emigration to this large city dates back to the beginning of the last century. Many young Soussis, attracted by the arrival of Europeans, the expansion of urban centers and the development of the modern economy, left their poor villages to work in the metropolis. In Casablanca, the Soussis took over the food trade, first in retail and then in wholesale. Renowned for their community solidarity and hard work, some of them became great businessmen. In nearly three quarters of a century, they have gone from being simple middle men to businessmen, managing fortunes and leading family businesses.

The international emigration of the Soussis has been taken place well before the establishment of the protectorate over the Kingdom. Initially, towards the end of the nineteenth century, they were seasonal workers who went to Oranien and Tunisia. In Europe, Joanny Ray asserts the presence of this ethnic group in France since 1910. After 1912 and until the end of the 1950s, the Souss region remained the main source of emigration to Europe, mainly to France. Whether it was military or labor migration, colonization was the factor responsible for the proliferation of the migration process from this region (Atouf, 2009). As soon as the first conventions on the export of labor to other European countries were signed, the Souss region was no longer the only departure point for Moroccan migrants; the international migratory field extended to other regions of the country.

In spite of the age and depth of migration in the Souss-Massa region, the MRAs have always established a unique and lasting relationship with their territory of origin or that of their ancestors. They represent a key partner able to provide a structuring response to development and migration issues, particularly at the local and regional levels. Thus, most of the founders of village associations for local development from migrant backgrounds confirm that their initial motivation was to contribute to improving the living conditions of their relatives in villages where there was neither water nor electricity. An example to this, is the association Migrations et Développement. This association have focused on electrification, access to potable water, access to sanitation and the construction of dams. The projects are often adapted to the reality of each village in the region.

The channeling and mobilization of MRA resources for development is carried, in large part, in the Souss Massa region by a proactive associative fabric. The association Migrations et Développement represents, since its foundation, a locomotive of co-development initiatives carried by migrants in the region. Through the know-how it has accumulated over more than thirty years now, and the professionalization of its agents, particularly in the mastery of project design and management and the mobilization of national and international donors, the Migrations et Développement association presents itself as a central animator and channeler of the skills of the MRAs.

In the region of Souss Massa, we notice the pro-active role of academicians and researchers in the reflection of matters related to migration and development. The Regional Observatory of Migration Spaces and Societies (ORMES) created in 1996 at the Faculty of Arts and Humanities of the University Ibn Zohr, Agadir is a major research structure in this sense. ORMES is a forum for study, research, training, information and animation at the service of the scientific community, migrants and decision makers. It monitors the evolution of the migration movement. There is also a Master's program "Migration and Sustainable Development" at the Faculty of Letters and Humanities (FLSH) of the University Ibn Zohr of Agadir.

The channeling of MRAs potentials essentially involves consultation between the actors animating this dynamic in the Souss region. Recently, with the DEPOMI (Enabel) and PRIM (Expertise France/AFD) projects, we have seen the multiplication of consultation spaces animating dynamics such as the conception, coordination and communication of the territorial offer towards expatriates.

Issues related to the mobilization of skills and the attraction of MRA entrepreneurs are strongly represented in the words of elected officials and decentralized services. Nonetheless, the consultation spaces for federating the action of public institutions are ad hoc spaces, hence not institutionalized in a durable way. They depend on the temporalities of international cooperation programs and projects.

We have raised the point that there are relatively few support mechanisms set up to attract and channel MRAs for development. The mechanisms proposed to facilitate the investment of MRAs fall under the offer of the CRI. The latter intervenes mainly on the problem of land lots faced by the MRAs.

With the DEPOMI project, a network of the economic ambassadors of the Souss Massa region was created. This network seeks to optimize the circulation of information on the territorial offer and investment opportunities in the region. It also focuses on promotional activities, sponsorship of entrepreneurs and networking serving the interests of their members. However, the fruit of this network is to be observed in the coming months/years.

Overall, with the exception of the M&D association, there are few organizations specialized on the issue of mobilizing MRAs for local development. In light of the interviews conducted with elected officials, actors from the deconcentrated services and civil society, the link with the MRAs in the region is always maintained through the development networks run by local associations. However, the link with expatriates bringing productive investments is yet to be strengthened. Interlocutors also emphasize that the mobilization of MRAs for local development can be envisaged through a multiple approach. In addition to solidarity and productive action, the region can rely on the social capital available to the MRAs and integrate their capabilities in the initiatives conducted by official actors.

#### 21.8 Conclusion

In Morocco, diaspora policies are emerging in various forms. Government initiatives and programs have multiplied to encourage expatriate nationals to engage in development actions in their country of origin. Today, the multiple contributions of Moroccan expatriates to the development of the territories of origin, their power and their developmental potential are obvious: financial remittances, productive investment, scientific and technical remittances, etc. Following this logic, many programs are structured to channel the productive investment of the diaspora on the three regions examined, federating project committees, various stakeholders and different profiles of actors from deconcentrated services of the State. Notwithstanding their relevance, these interventions are on the one hand few in number and on the other hand dependent on their main funders, namely European governments and/or international organizations. Also, the majority of the offers proposed by Moroccan public institutions for the channeling of MRA's investments have currently a limited geographical range. They are located in the main cities of the regions. Thus, investments carried in peripheral cities are out of the scoop of the institutional accompaniment emerging offer.

We have noticed that the channeling of MRA's investment consists of technologies deployed by the State and international NGOs and other bodies to (re)configure how migrant investors and entrepreneurs are managed and their contribution to development agenda. Be that as it may, this form of channeling must not be understood as a fixed and objective reality, but instead to be the effect and the product of an ongoing governance dynamics of migration.

In this respect, the field of diaspora mobilization is a key site where the fabrication of migrants' categories is realized and made manifest. Likewise, both the proliferation of initiatives to mobilize Moroccan migrant investors and entrepreneurs and the increasing consolidation of supra-national cooperation on the matter, which encompasses and integrate multiple states and non-governmental organizations, emerge as complementary sites for the State's unfinished work of diaspora mobilization. As the programs of diaspora mobilization seek to canalize and stimulate certain migratory movements deemed useful for the development of certain territories, we observe that the various practices involved introduce new configurations in the territories concerned, with the aim of involving people into processes of co-development. These dynamics notably should be recognized as variable forms of migration governance, through fluxes stimulation and investment opportunity creation. Indeed, these measures that seem to govern the movement of people are arguably examples of a mode of migration governance in the Euro-Mediterranean sphere.

#### References


Hassan Bousetta (1970) is doctor in Social Sciences from the Katholieke Universiteit Brussel (Belgium). He is currently a FNRS (National Fund for Scientific) Research Associate at the University of Liège (Belgium). He joined the CEDEM at the university of Liège in February 2003. He was previously at the Katholieke Universiteit Leuven and is a former Marie Curie Visiting Fellow at the Centre for the Study of Ethnicity and Citizenship in the Department of Sociology of the University of Bristol (UK). Hassan BOUSETTA holds an MA in Political Science and Public Administration and an MA in the Sociology of Developing Countries, both from the University of Liège (Belgium). Between 1994 and 1997, he was a visiting fellow at the European Research Centre on Migration and Ethnic Relations at the University of Utrecht (Netherlands) and held a Human Capital and Mobility Fellowship from the European Commission. From January 1997 till September 2000, he was involved in the Institute for Political Sociology and Methodology of the Katholieke Universiteit of Brussel where he completed his PhD on the political mobilisation of Moroccans in European cities. His work focuses on the political participation of immigrant minorities and on local multicultural policies. Hassan Bousetta has also collaborated on a number of consultancy projects both for private foundations (King Baudouin Foundation), international organisation (Council of Europe), cities (Paris, Antwerp, Bristol) and networks of cities (Eurocities).

Hicham Jamid is a sociologist and post-doctoral researcher at the Institut of Research for Development in Marseilles. His work focuses on the migration and professional trajectories of highly skilled Moroccan migrants. Hicham Jamid is a fellow at the Convergences Migrations Institute. He is also an associate researcher at CEDEM (The Centre for Ethnic and Migration Studies) of the University of Liege.

Ismaïl Oubad is a doctoral researcher at the University of Genoa and visiting researcher at the Centre for Ethnic and Migration Studies (CEDEM) of the University of Liège where works within the ERC AdG SOLROUTES Project (Solidarities and Migrants' Routes Across Europe at Large). Currently, his research interest and PhD thesis focus on the solidarity actions and support networks to the journey of unauthorised migrants within and across the Belgian borders, adopting ethnographic methods. Previously, Ismail has conducted research on the entrepreneurial quests of Moroccan diaspora entrepreneurs in Morocco and on the experiences of Sub-Saharan protection seekers with the asylum determination procedures in Italy.

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# Chapter 22 'No Man's Land': Reflecting on and Theorizing Migrant Labour in the Mediterranean Agriculture

Apostolos G. Papadopoulos and Loukia-Maria Fratsea

### 22.1 Introduction

Connecting three continents and bridging a multiplicity of cultures, the Mediterranean Basin is a major migration arena globally. Moreover, the Mediterranean contains one the greatest lines of divide and proximity in the world with regards to migration, while also posing significant challenges for establishing connections between its Northern and Southern shores (Wihtol de Wenden, 2015; Zapata-Barrero, 2020; Montanari, 2021). Being physically unique in the manner of most geographical regions, the Mediterranean needs to be considered both as a bioregion and as a spatial system (Cooke, 1999). Braudel's name is interwoven with the Mediterranean, and his legacy remains strong when delving into the region's turbulent history, socioeconomic developments, political deliberations, and environmental changes. There has been an extensive discussion on the characteristics of 'Mediterraneanism', the Mediterranean exceptionalism, together with the particularity of the Mediterranean Sea in terms of bioclimate, geomorphology, landscape, cultural diversity, and human geography (King et al., 1997a; Horden & Purcell, 2000; Harris, 2006; Chambers, 2008; Burke, 2012). Whether the Mediterranean is seen as an entity with a capacity for 'homogenizing diversity' (Cooke, 1999), as densely fragmented and approachable only through an ever-shifting kaleidoscope (Horden & Purcell, 2000), or whether it is perceived as an arena for building an intermediate perspective aiming at balancing local ecologies with the whole region (Albera, 2020), the Mediterranean offers fertile ground for researching human (im) mobility, connectivity, and cultural exchanges.

A. G. Papadopoulos (✉)

National Centre for Social Research (EKKE) and Harokopio University, Athens, Greece e-mail: apospapa@hua.gr

L.-M. Fratsea Harokopio University, Athens, Greece

In this context, it is important to give equal credit to the urban and rural transformations in the Mediterranean region, and to problematise the complexity of social change. Investigating Mediterranean 'rurality' (or 'ruralities') becomes a manifestly fruitful path towards researching places and localities in their interaction with wider processes and scales (Papadopoulos, 1999; Albera, 2020). Interestingly, despite his explicit skepticism regarding the essentialist 'Mediterraneanism', Herzfeld (2006: 58) invokes the idea of the Mediterranean culture area "as a heuristic device in which its inherent limitations are turned to advantage, [and] gives way to a sophisticated rethinking of globalization from the perspective of the regionalisms". In terms of its rural landscape and agriculture, the Mediterranean region has been shaped by human activities, while these have also been maintained by traditional land use practices over centuries. However, in recent decades, rapid changes have occurred in the Mediterranean's natural and rural environment which have affected the traditional landscape, the cultural environment, and the human perception of nature, as well as having an immense (modernising) impact on agriculture (Pratt & Funnell, 1997; Moragues-Faus et al., 2013; MediTERRA, 2019).

In this chapter, our approach to migration in the Mediterranean region postulates two major components: The first is the socio-spatial aspect, based on the historical and geographical long durée perspective of the Mediterranean. Understanding the region as conflating diverse (or rather opposite) features such as water and land, shores and hinterland, fixity, and fluidity, etc. leads us to illustrate it as a network of reflections, connections and intersubjectivities coupled with a geopolitical site (King, 1996; Cooke, 1999). Chamber (2008: 5) offers an ingenious formulation to reflect this socio-spatial element: "So the borders are porous, particularly so in the liquid materiality of the Mediterranean. The outcome of historical and cultural clash and compromise is that borders are both transitory and zones of transit".

The second aspect concerns the fragmented rurality and low-intensity agriculture of the region which, together with the close interconnections between urban and rural areas, is considered part and parcel of the Mediterranean landscape imaginary. Moreover, in terms of agriculture, just 14% of land overall is suitable for cultivating crops, with this figure averaging more than one third (over 34%) in the Northern Mediterranean countries (EUMed) and just 5% in the Southern and Eastern Mediterranean countries (MENA). Specifically, nearly two thirds of these territories are 'marginal land' which, being characterised by natural constraints -it is mountainous, isolated, or semi-arid--cannot be used for intensive agriculture (Nori, 2019).

Aside from being a manifestation of diversity across urban and rural settings, migrants are also considered as a key labour force in the rural Mediterranean. Since the early 2000s, international migration to rural areas in Greece has emerged as a major research field for the study of migrant labour in non-urban, peripheral, agricultural, and/or remote regions (Kasimis et al., 2003; Kasimis & Papadopoulos, 2005). It would not be long before the increasing role of migrant labour in agriculture drew the attention of scholars in other European countries within the Mediterranean area and the rest of Europe. The broadening of the relevant discussion has included various new aspects, while it has also led to the discarding of the wider socioeconomic, political, and cultural features that underlie this process. Meanwhile, migrant labour is now treated predominantly as a leverage for intensive agriculture, and is therefore being problematised in sectoral terms, as if rurality and agriculture were overlapping realities (Gertel & Sippel, 2014; Corrado et al., 2017; Nori & Farinella, 2020; Rye & O'Reilly, 2020). Overall, a more nuanced approach to migrant labour in Mediterranean agriculture is needed, which would take care not to merge socio-spatial and/or agricultural features, while remaining attentive to Mediterranean 'rurality' (or 'ruralities').

# 22.2 Reflections and Theorisation on Migrant Labour

Since the late 1980s, some theorists have been seeking to explain the new international migration flows towards Europe in relation to the increased demand for low-skilled labour. Meanwhile, migrant labour was linked to the operation of the informal economy and to the increased fragmentation in Southern European societies (Pugliese, 1992; Mingione, 1995). The Southern European countries that received most of these flows had recently joined the EU and were concerned with comparable sectoral and labour market needs. Similarly, these countries were transformed into new immigration countries, due to their demographic, social and economic structure characteristics, along with their interconnections.

A "Mediterranean model of migration" was suggested, as it combined major aspects of the new developments which were enabling and facilitating migrant labour flows into Southern European countries. This model, introduced and elaborated by Russell King and various co-authors (King et al., 1997b; King, 2000), was further discussed (Ribas-Mateos, 2004; Peixoto et al., 2012) and criticised in terms of its heuristic value (Baldwin-Edwards, 2012). Despite its difficulties explaining the migrant labour flows into Greece, Italy, Portugal and Spain, the model later included Cyprus, Malta, Slovenia, and Croatia (King & Thomson, 2008). More recently, the model was reiterated to integrate changes brought about by the economic recession (King & DeBono, 2013).

Attempts to understand and theorise the role of migrant labour in rural areas in Southern Europe were initiated by Hoggart and Mendoza (1999), who utilised Piore's (1979) approach. They argued that the availability of migrant labour was crucial for filling the existing 'holes' in rural labour markets. Such arguments were also relevant to Greek agriculture, where migrants responded to the demand for low-skilled migrant labour (Kasimis et al., 2003; Kasimis & Papadopoulos, 2005). In addition, systematic empirical studies illustrating various aspects of the inclusion of migrant labour in the rural labour market. Due to the demographic, social and economic challenges, migrant labour is considered important not only for assisting small family farms to cope with labour demands, but more importantly for increasing the competitiveness of medium and large family farm businesses. When migrant labour is institutionalised in the agricultural sector, it is possible for migrants to seek opportunities to pursue their social and spatial mobility, either within agriculture or across other economic sectors. Two factors are considered relevant here: (a) permanent / seasonal employment in agriculture offers an axis around which researchers can explore divisions and hierarchies among migrant labourers; and (b) the socio-spatial mobility trajectories of migrants need to be viewed within agriculture, across economic sectors, and across the urban/rural space (Kasimis et al., 2010).

In this context, ethnic migrant labour networks are created and sustained by labour contractors and employees to ensure that agricultural labour market needs are covered. In practice, migrant labourers are recruited by ethnic social networks, so they are 'matched' with specific jobs in the secondary labour market (Parks, 2005). There are two interconnected aspects in the functions of migrant social networks: First, migrant social capital is a resource which is often used both to gather knowledge about living abroad and to facilitate job seeking in the host country. This social capital allows them to be placed in specific job positions in the labour market in the host country (Lusis & Bauder, 2010). Second, migrant social networks are important as recruiting mechanisms which function to the benefit of the agricultural employers, while the latter organize themselves, so they behave in a unitary way towards migrant labour (Krissman, 2005). Labour contractors ensure that migrant labourers are connected to employers, but also the labour arrangements determine what information is given to the prospective labourer and what negotiating space is allowed. Bargaining before and after the harvest determines the labourers' daily earnings, but if these earnings are perceived as being 'too low', unsuitable labourers may respond with sloppy work, absenteeism or other 'everyday forms of resistance'. There is a literature on migrant labour control that highlights the connection between modes of control, contestation, and confrontation with social realities beyond the workplace (Ortiz, 2002).

In fact, migrant practices and strategies are continuously reconstructed based on the available policy measures, which are--directly or indirectly--pivotal in creating regular, semi-regular and irregular tiers within the migrant labour force (Papadopoulos et al., 2018). The capacity of migration policies to allow for regularized migrant labour and/or to cater for various seasonal, temporary or ad hoc requirements, therefore creates a complex canvas for employing migrant labourers (Castles, 2006). Policy schemes allowing for seasonal, flexible, and temporary migrant labour are particularly relevant in the case of Mediterranean agriculture, which requires a sizeable labour force to accomplish its role within an increasingly globalized economy (MediTERRA, 2019).

It is well-documented that migrants' "illegality" and/or irregularity leads to the construction of a cheap labour reserve army that is also flexible, vulnerable, and prone to heavy exploitation (De Genova, 2002). There is a rapidly expanding discussion on the precarious migrant status which includes undocumented and documented 'illegality' as well as other forms of insecurity and irregularity (Goldring et al., 2009). Migrant labourers are increasingly undertaking precarious jobs, meaning that their work is uncertain, unpredictable, and risky (Kalleberg, 2009; Anderson, 2010). Precarious employment refers to engagement in non-standard and contingent work; its main component is the employment insecurity that arises from at least four types of employment: part-time, temporary, own account, and multiple job holding. The increasing casualisation of employment, increasing job insecurity, and the downward pressure on earnings and conditions of work reflect much of what is described by 'precarious employment'. The precariousness of migrant labour becomes a wider trend reflected in the proliferation of precarious migrant statuses and employment (Goldring et al., 2009; Arnold & Bongiovi, 2013).

Intensive agricultural production necessitates labour control, which remains the main instrument for governing migrant labour; life precariousness and labour precarity thus remain key components of labour control (Papadopoulos et al., 2018). Recent research conducted in an intensive agricultural production area in Western Greece depicted a situation where the exploitation of migrant labour has been a central feature of agricultural intensification and specialisation (Kasimis et al., 2015; Papadopoulos & Fratsea, 2017); at the same time, there is evidence that apart from subjugating and controlling the work of migrants, migrant labour precarity also triggers the political mobilisation of migrant workers, whose position and functions in the productions system shapes their agency.

In those Mediterranean areas where intensive agricultural production functions in particular export-oriented rural localities, the presence of large numbers of migrant labourers has been instrumental in strengthening the production dynamics by keeping labour costs low and securing an adequate supply of medium- and low-skilled labour (Gertel & Sippel, 2014; Corrado et al., 2017; Rye & O'Reilly, 2020); both are needed, since the agricultural producers seek to be competitive in international markets. This intensive agricultural production regime is supported by formal networks of labour recruitment, but informal brokers who organize and secure the continuation of new migrant flows into those areas also play an important role (De Genova, 2002; Krissman, 2005).

In tandem with the notion of precarity, the notion of 'mobilities' has become central to the structuring and enacting of people's lives. Far from simplifying migration to movement, we argue that the discussion around the dynamics of mobilities is informative for the study of the socio-spatial mobilities of migrant labour. There is frequent reference to the 'mobility turn' in sociology (Urry, 2007) and to the 'new mobilities paradigm' (Sheller & Urry, 2006), which have sparked certain inspiring modes of thinking and looking at social phenomena--and specifically migration--through the lens of movement (Hannam et al., 2006). Mobilities need to be seen as a complex assemblage of movement, social imaginaries and experience (Glick Schiller & Salazar, 2013; Salazar, 2017), while they aim to bring together the purely 'social' concerns of sociology (inequality, power, hierarchies) with the 'spatial' concerns of geography (territories, borders, scale) and the 'cultural' concerns of anthropology (discourses, representations) (Sheller, 2011, 2014).

Overall, the above discussion on migrant labour in Mediterranean agriculture has highlighted two major strands in the relevant literature: The first strand underlines the key role migrant labour plays in intensive agriculture, which in turn prioritises specialised agriculture and export-oriented production and instrumentalises migrant labour to increase its effectiveness through (highly or less) sophisticated control mechanisms that include variable types of precarity, ethnic hierarchies, racialisation, manipulation, and exploitation (Rye & Andrzejewska, 2010; Gertel & Sippel, 2014; Kasimis et al., 2015; Corrado et al., 2017; Kilkey & Urzi, 2017; Papadopoulos et al., 2018; Rye & O'Reilly, 2020; Kalantaryan et al., 2021; King et al., 2021; Fonseca et al., 2021; Pereira et al., 2021; Rogaly, 2021). This strand has been more popular in recent years, due to its visibility and those global features that connect Mediterranean agriculture to the international agri-food markets. The second strand underlines the multifunctionality of migrant labour in Mediterranean rural areas which connects migrants to the socio-spatial and agricultural characteristics of places (Kasimis & Papadopoulos, 2005; Papadopoulos, 2009; Kasimis & Papadopoulos, 2013; McAreavey, 2012; Hedberg & do Carmo, 2012; McAreavey, 2017; Papadopoulos et al., 2021). In this connection, migrant labour is seen from the perspective both of the host places and the migrants' own needs, expectations, and aspirations (Papadopoulos & Fratsea, 2022). Finally, this strand maintains its focus on the interactions between the receiving rural society and the migrants, the responses of migrants to external conditions, their agency, and the rural well-being of migrants and locals.

#### 22.3 Migrant Labour in Greek Agriculture

Greece has major comparative advantages in the agri-food sector which can be attributed to the Mediterranean climate, the favourable conditions in the natural environment of its plains, the significant variety of agricultural products that grow here, the quality and nutritional value of a relatively wide spectrum of agricultural products (olives, grapes, legumes, citrus fruits, etc.) and the country's internationally recognized food traditions. It is often said that several persistent structural weaknesses need to be addressed vis-à-vis the modernisation of the agri-food sector in the country (IOBE, 2020). The main weaknesses include the small and fragmented farm holdings, low productivity, inefficient organization, the low integration of new technologies and equipment, insufficient vocational training, a low level of R&D, a dependency on subsidies, and a lack of branding. In various ways, agriculture is the country's 'reference point', alternating between being a 'sector of departure'--in times of rapid economic modernization and economic expansion--and occasionally serving as a 'sector of arrival', especially for those seeking a better quality of life and agriculture as a gateway to it, but also in times of economic crisis when agriculture is linked to an alternative development pathway (Papadopoulos et al., 2021).

When reviewing the characteristics and role of agriculture in the Greek economy and Greek society, we see that agricultural employment has declined significantly since the mid-1990s, due to agriculture's low attractiveness for young people and to older generations of farmers retiring. However, the share of wage labour in agriculture has increased, a fact related to the increased contributions of migrant labour in the sector. While agricultural employment accounted for 10.9% of total employment prior to the economic crisis, by 2013, it had risen to 12.3%, but had dropped back to 10.9% by 2019. Currently, the agricultural sector employs around 516,000 people and contributes approximately 4% of the country's GDP. More specifically, salaried employment accounted for between 19.1% and 19.8% of total agricultural

Fig. 22.1 Evolution of primary sector employment, salaried labour, and contribution to GDP, 1995–2021. (Source: ELSTAT, National Accounts, 1995–2021 (authors' own elaboration))

employment in the period 1995–2004, before declining for a few years due to the rise of the construction sector. By 2010, salaried agricultural employment had climbed back to its previous level (20.2%) and has since increased. By 2019, salaried employment accounted for 30.5% of agricultural employment, which is the highest it has ever been (Fig. 22.1).

The size and characteristics of agricultural migrant labour have changed a good deal over the last two decades. Papadopoulos et al. (2021) identify the following factors that contributed to these changes: First, the Greek legalization programmes of 2001 and 2005/2007 allowed a significant proportion of the migrants living and working in Greece to legalize their residence/status; this was followed by an increase in an intra-sectoral (within agriculture) and/or inter-sectoral occupational mobility (moving from agriculture to construction and services). In this way, agriculture served as a source of secondary income for many migrants in low constructionseason periods. Second, by the beginning of 2000, migratory flows towards Greece had become highly differentiated as geographic accessibility steadily replaced geographical proximity to Albania, Bulgaria, and Romania as the key factor in shaping these flows (Papadopoulos, 2012). Albanians remained the predominant nationality, while the numbers of A2 migrants (Bulgarians and Romanians) and Asians increased considerably. Due to their unstable legal status, many of the recentlyarrived migrants found work in agriculture, where they frequently performed the more dangerous, unskilled and low-paying jobs. The continuing abandonment of agricultural employment by young people and women, especially in rural areas where the local economy had begun to offer more employment possibilities beyond agriculture, was paralleled by the entry of migrant workers into the primary sector. In the years following the 'migration/refugee crisis' (2015–2019) which resulted in many asylum seekers and refugees being stranded in Greece, agriculture was offered as an option for those who sought employment opportunities as low-skilled and precarious labour.

Before discussing the empirical findings in detail, it is worthy briefly referencing the three periods in the study of migrant labour in Greek agriculture. In the late 1990s, the theme of migrant labour in rural Greece was introduced and emphasised their role as 'saviours' of Greek agriculture who provided the main source of low-skilled 'hands' in rural areas (Lianos et al., 1996; Vaiou & Hadjimichalis, 1997; Kasimis et al., 2003; Kasimis & Papadopoulos, 2005). In line with a state immigration policy that treated migrants in the light of their purely economic functions for the national economy, irregular migrant labour was seen as a 'labour reserve army' that contributed to low production costs. However, it became evident that migrant labour was not a unified category, but rather an aggregation of different migrant nationalities and/or migrant groups who constructed more elaborate coping strategies within local/rural societies. The first regularization schemes launched in the second half of the 1990s offered an opportunity for migrant labour inclusion, allowing the migrants to gain respect and a more secured position in the host country.

In the 2000s, the study of the dynamics of migrant labour showed that there were increased benefits for migrant labourers who remained in local/rural labour markets long-term, either allowing them to move up the social ladder in rural areas or to move out of the agricultural sector (Papadopoulos, 2009; Labrianidis & Sykas, 2009). The continuation of migrant flows allowed for the-low status tasks to be allocated to the newly arrived and more vulnerable migrants. In this context, ethnic employment networks were pivotal for securing upward social mobility for migrants and consolidating longer-resident migrant labourers as a 'labour aristocracy' (Papadopoulos, 2012; Papadopoulos & Fratsea, 2017). For spatially mobile migrant labour, participation in ethnic labour networks enabled them to remain in employment and, in some cases, also implied medium-term gains. By 2008/9, the economic and social gains migrants had made which enabled them to be emplaced in local societies were jeopardised due to the economic crisis, which affected both Greek nationals and migrant labour.

In the 2010s, the economic recession acted as a catalyst for the dynamics of migrant labour in rural Greece (Papadopoulos et al., 2018). The insecurity and precarity of migrant labour increased considerably, surpassing that of Greek nationals, while the size of the informal economy increased due to the country's economic contraction. It became evident to migrants themselves that they needed to come up with effective resilience strategies for their own and/or their families' survival/ wellbeing; they also mobilised to defend their incomes and maintain their dignity in the face of employer pressure to reduce their wages further. At the same time, migrant labour and mobility depended on social and regional inequalities, while the latter increased or diminished migrant flows.

# 22.4 Outlining Mediterranean Migrations in Greek Agriculture

Even though rural areas were an important halt and/or destination for various migrant groups originating from the Mediterranean or crossing the Mediterranean on their way to other European countries, international migration into rural parts of Greece would not become the subject of systematic study until recently. In what follows our analysis draws on two multi-sited studies conducted consecutively in rural Western Greece in 2017–2021: One examines the social and spatial trajectories of migrants over the course of their lives in rural and urban areas, while the other focuses on the relationship between different forms of mobilities and spatial inequalities. In both studies, data collection was mainly qualitative, while statistical data from Eurostat and censuses were used to triangulate information from the interviews. Approximately 60 qualitative interviews, life histories, and semi-structured interviews were conducted with migrants originating from Mediterranean countries (e.g., Albanians), transiting Mediterranean countries towards Western Europe (e.g., Syrians), and/or settled in Greece. Similarly, interviews were conducted with EU migrants, internal migrants, especially from urban centres to rural areas, and locals in rural areas. Ethnographic observations and interviews with stakeholders and key informants such as farmers and local authorities at the national and local level were used to triangulate the information from the interviews.

For more than a decade, the region has been the focus of the authors' studies and analysis of socio-spatial mobilities and rural change. In combination with our longstanding presence in the region, recording migrants' experiences by tracing their trajectories along the Mediterranean has enabled us to closely monitor and critically assess social trends as well as national political and economic developments; we have thus responded to the need of including historical perspective in Mediterranean migration research (Zapata-Barrero, 2020).

Our familiarity with the region, as well as the fact that our research team represented a wide range of personal characteristics in terms of gender, languages spoken, age group and rural/urban background, contributed to a climate of trust and connectedness among research participants. What is more, this type of collaboration is thought to combine the benefits of easy access to 'insiders' with the fresh perspective of 'outsiders', especially when research is conducted in multiple locations and languages (Fitzgerald, 2006; Wong & Poon, 2010).

International migration into the region began in the early 1990s, mainly due to the fall of socialist regimes. Hence, a small number of Albanians, Egyptians and a few Bangladeshis arrived in the area, followed by Romanians and Bulgarians. Albanians currently make up the largest share of migrants, followed by EU migrants and Asians. In 2016, a refugee camp was established in the village of Myrsini, a former tourist resort called "LM Village", after the Syrian refugee/migration crisis in 2015. This small camp now houses 280–300 Syrian refugees. The following two sections shed light on the ways the various mobilities and trajectories intersect in the Mediterranean.

# 22.4.1 Illustrating the Contribution(s) of Migrant Labour to Mediterranean Agriculture

The contribution of migrant workers to Mediterranean agriculture in Greece has provoked heated debate, especially during the years of economic crisis in the country. From the interviews conducted with farmers, key informants, and residents of rural areas, it appears that immigration (i.e., the influx of people into rural areas from both other parts of the country and other countries) is seen by the majority as beneficial to the rural economy. In this context, residents emphasise the impact of the migrants' presence on well-being in rural areas in terms of demographic rejuvenation, especially in more remote places and small villages which the younger generation has abandoned. Furthermore, residents emphasised the migrant's contribution to the local economy in terms of increasing consumption and supporting other seasonal activities (e.g., tourism) during peak periods (Papadopoulos & Fratsea, 2021). In this respect, some locals look back with nostalgia at the earlier years when the village was "full of life", there were children playing in the playgrounds, and the economy was flourishing. This image is in stark contrast to the picture they paint of the situation in small villages, especially in the winter months when tourism is limited. Aris (73 years old) says emphatically, "[in the late 1970s] it was a different village, there were people moving around ... it was a lively village, it had young people, lots of them ... now it's a graveyard ... you go to the cafeteria, 2 to 3 people, the same people every day. You never meet a new person".

In this discourse, Albanians are usually presented as part of the local community, as 'people like us'. Unlike other migrant groups living in the area, Albanians are married and have their families with them in the village. Their children attend the school, and over their long presence in the area they have learnt the Greek language and established strong ties with locals. Equally, Albanian's strategies for career advancement within agriculture and/or in other economic sectors is recognised as evidence of hard work and commitment.

A more 'utilitarian' approach is taken, however, to migrants who have recently arrived in Greece by crossing the Mediterranean, and who work in intensive agriculture. These migrant groups are mainly represented by single men who -on their way to Western countries- found temporary employment in local agriculture. They have a limited presence in the everyday life of the village. Although their contribution to the local agribusiness is often acknowledged, their presence in everyday life is often overlooked or seen as temporary. Issues relating to the integration of the different migrant groups in the region, and concerns about the migration's future contribution, are evident. Thus, as agriculture is the cornerstone of the local economy, residents emphasise the role of migrants in providing the necessary labour in a sector in which local youth are reluctant to work: "... with migration things have changed, ... the farmer who has the harvest has no problem finding workers. If he waited for the Greeks, everything would have rotted in the fields ... there are no Greeks for that... [task]" (Aris 73 years old).

Farmers, on the other hand, often point to the expansion, intensification, and increased competitiveness of farms, as well as to the crucial issue of labour availability, particularly in harvesting seasons. Issues of migrant labour quality and ethnic hierarchy, segregation, and housing conditions, are equally important. For instance, it was argued that the expansion and competitiveness of intensive agriculture in Western Greece is highly dependent on the availability of cheap and 'just in time' labour. "This is a key to developing the export-oriented market for fruits and vegetables" (Key Informant ID 58, farmer).

During the interviews, farmers often emphasised that migrants working in Mediterranean agriculture are a highly heterogeneous group. A distinction is made between the permanent agricultural workers and temporary/seasonal agricultural workers. Within agriculture, there is also an ethnic and occupational hierarchy: Often the more skilled and specialized tasks are assigned either to a small number of Greeks who returned to agriculture during the years of recession (Papadopoulos et al., 2019), or to migrants with a better knowledge of Greek, who have been living for longer period in the area and are more 'trusted' by the farmer.

Migrant workers in Mediterranean agriculture are praised as 'good workers', but this description carries a different meaning, depending on the migrant group the workers belong to. Thus, 'good worker' can relate to the quality of work and to increased productivity, which is implicitly linked to other features of labour division and social position in the occupational hierarchy within agriculture, such as income, prestige, power, and trust: "A good worker gets a good wage" (Key Informant ID 58, farmer). These workers, mainly of Albanian origin, are long-term employees. They are trusted by the farmers, who have invested time in passing on their knowledge and expertise to them. As time goes by, this permanent personnel climbs the agricultural ladder and starts to supervise the temporary workers on the farm. They thus become important human capital for the farm's operation: "We do not change them over the years ... we work with certain people... because if you change the permanent workforce, you cannot pass on the know-how in farming practices" (Key Informant ID 58, farmer).

However, in other cases, 'good worker' can mean cheap, exploitable, disciplined and 'just in time'. As they are often seen as temporary in the region, the precarious situation of the workers and their uncertain legal status as undocumented immigrants detracts from their position when it comes to their claiming payments and social rights. As we will see in the next section, there are cases where Syrian refugees working in the fields have not been paid by farmers, creating a vicious circle of uncertainty, limbo, and precariousness.

For migrant groups crossing the Mediterranean to reach Europe, such as Asian migrants, their housing and living conditions are often poor and their inclusion in the lower strata of the labour market is accompanied by spatial segregation; they live in huts near the greenhouses, away from the daily life of the village.

#### 22.4.2 Narratives of Mediterranean Trajectories

This section focuses at the trajectories of migrants originating from Mediterranean countries, crossing Mediterranean countries towards Western Europe, and/or settled in Greece. Agriculture is perceived differently in the context of their social and spatial journeys: either as a sector of arrival, offering a springboard for their integration into the labour market, or as a sector of departure, serving as a steppingstone for career advancement into other sectors of the economy. To illustrate the characteristics of the trajectories, this section uses emblematic vignettes of Albanian and Syrian migrants that shed light on the complex interplay between mobilities in the Mediterranean.

Nikos was born in 1960 in a town in Northern Albania. After graduating from university, he was placed in Southern Albania to work. Like other Albanian migrants at the time, after the collapse of the socialist regime, he takes the decision to come to Greece in 1994. Through family networks and acquaintances, he finds work in a village in Western Greece. Over the years, Nikos lives and works in Western Greece, but also moves around rural areas in mainland Greece, harvesting cotton, apricots, and vegetables. Along with a group of other Albanians, he follows the crops and moves wherever there is an opportunity for work. After a few years, he legalises his status and brings his wife and children to Greece. Starting from agricultural employment, he gains experience of working in Greece and slowly learns the Greek language; after some years building networks with both Albanians and Greeks, this leads to him finding a job in construction. Fifteen years later, his occupational trajectory takes on a new dynamic: "Then I started working on my own, because I met people in the industry, I also learned the craft of painting houses, and little by little I took on my own projects". Nevertheless, employment in agriculture remains a safety net for Nikos, a secure job and income in times when employment in the construction sector is limited. However, he argues that his employment in agriculture has different characteristics now. By earning a reputation as a hardworking and trustworthy member of the local community, by learning the language and expanding his social network, Nikos returns to agriculture as a foreman, supervising other migrant groups who are 'trying to get ahead' by working in the fields.

Nikos' life story sheds light on the role agriculture plays in integrating migrants into the labour market. While agriculture was initially a sector of arrival, over time it was transformed into a sector of departure, towards other sectors in the economy. However, unlike other migrant groups, Nikos saw his future in rural Greece. By combining agricultural employment with secondary employment in rural areas, Nikos' trajectory illustrates how migrant workers can become a multifunctional labour force for rural Greece (Kasimis & Papadopoulos, 2005), meeting needs beyond the primary sector.

Unlike the Albanian immigrants in rural Greece, for most Syrian refugees the country was a stopover on their journey in search of safety and a better life in Western Europe. According to our research, for a significant number of the Syrians interviewed, agriculture was either their main occupation in Syria, a casual job they did during their stay in Turkey to raise the necessary financial capital to move to Europe, or a temporary occupation during their stay in Greece pending recognition of their refugee status and resettlement in other countries.

Mohammad was born in 1979 in a village near Latakia. In 2007, he moved to Damascus to work in public relations. "It was a good job... until the war. Then all the companies closed". In 2017, he makes the decision to leave Syria. As it was for many other Syrian refugees, Turkey served as a 'migration hub' where he could gather information about routes to Europe (Papadopoulos & Fratsea, 2019). After crossing the Aegean, Mohammad reaches Chios and is resettled in the Myrsini camp. Two years passed as he was waiting for his asylum application to be processed. However, he did not attend the Greek classes offered in the camp during this time, preferring English classes, as he considered his stay in Greece to be temporary.

During our conversation, he emphasised that it was difficult for him to find a job due to the economic crisis. He received monthly support from the CASH programme but was looking for alternative employment opportunities to increase his income and finance his migration plans. "There was no way to find work... I just took the 150 euro and waited...".

Eventually, he found a job in local agriculture. However, he felt exploited. His experience sheds light on the precarious and vulnerable situation of Syrian refugees working in agriculture (see also Pelek, 2019). "[I was]... talking to people and trying to find work, but I had no luck. Someone offered me work. Olive trees. We worked for about 20 days, and he did not give any money... [he said] I'll pay tomorrow, I'll pay tomorrow, 20 days and he disappeared. ... We worked for 20 days for nothing. That's what happened. We cannot work on contract".

These life stories illustrate aspects of the ethnic hierarchies that emerge in the Greek agricultural sector. For some migrant groups, employment in agriculture is a strategy that allows them to integrate into the labour market and find new opportunities to survive and improve their social and economic status. For others, it is a temporary solution to support the move on to other migration destinations.

#### 22.5 Conclusion

The Mediterranean region is a prominent field for addressing the contribution of migrant labour to agriculture and rural areas more generally. Given the truism that migrants mostly contribute to economic development in urban settings, it took time for researchers to begin investigating the impact of migrant labour in rural areas.

A review of the relevant literature reveals two major strands of thought in the field: the first underlines the key role migrant labour plays in intensive agriculture, and the way in which farmers instrumentalise migrant labour to increase the effectiveness of specialised agricultural and agri-food systems; the second emphasises the multifunctionality of migrant labour in rural areas and sheds light on the interactions between receiving rural areas and the migrants themselves, while also delving into the migrants' agency and aspirations. Both perspectives are valid and relevant for researching Mediterranean migrations and their effect on agriculture and rural areas, but it is important to differentiate analytically between agriculture and rurality as relatively distinct research domains. Migrants' employment and/or movement (s) within agriculture and/or among different sectors across rural areas or across the urban/rural divide remains important in the Mediterranean context.

Our empirical research indicates the interactions between the socio-spatial and the agricultural aspects which remain as essential components of rurality. Specifically, the functionalist understanding of migrant labour as a key factor for intensive agriculture remains important albeit partial because it offers a fragmented interpretation of migrants' real contribution to the receiving societies. We suggest that the contribution of migrant labour to agriculture should be seen in the light of the interplay between the receiving society and the migrants themselves, and by looking more deeply at how migrants aspire and take actions impacting on their present and future.

In addition, the various waves of migration into the Mediterranean region and receiving rural areas should be seen in tandem with the structural characteristics of the agricultural sector. The desires and aspirations of the migrant groups themselves, for social advancement or movement into other economic sectors and places in Greece and abroad, give rise to the emergence of different ethnic hierarchies. To explore the migrant contribution to Mediterranean agriculture, we therefore need to understand how that contribution is perceived by employers and rural residents. We should pay greater attention to the experiences and trajectories of migrants originating from Mediterranean countries, crossing the Mediterranean and/or settled in Greece.

Acknowledgements The authors would like to thank the Book Editors and the reviewer(s) for their valuable comments. The 'Integrative Mechanisms for Addressing Spatial Justice and Territorial Inequalities in Europe IMAJINE' project has received funding from the European Union's Horizon 2020 Research and Innovation Programme under Grant Agreement No. 726950. This paper reflects only the author's views. The Commission is not responsible for any use that may be made of the information it contains.

#### References


(Eds.), The new social division: The making and unmaking of precariousness (pp. 101–119). Palgrave Macmillan.


Apostolos G. Papadopoulos studied Sociology in Greece (Panteion University of Political and Social Sciences) and in the United Kingdom (London School of Economics and Political Science) and holds a DPhil in Geography (University of Sussex). He has worked as a researcher/staff member at the National Centre for Social Research (EKKE), University of Patras, University of Ioannina, and Agricultural University of Athens. He is currently Professor of Rural Sociology and Geography at Harokopio University of Athens and at the same time Director of the Institute of Social Research of the National Centre for Social Research (EKKE). He has coordinated as project leader several research projects funded by the European Commission, the Greek State and other organisations, and has also served as a senior researcher. He is editor or co-editor of ten edited volumes (two of which were published by Ashgate Publishers) and co-author of one book. His research has been published in Greek, English, Italian, and Portuguese. As President of the Hellenic Sociological Association (HSS), he has taken on the task of organising one of the largest social science congresses in Greece (13th European Sociology Association Conference, Athens, 2017). He is currently Editor-in-Chief of the international journal Sociologia Ruralis and Associate Editor of NEW MEDIT: Mediterranean Journal of Economics, Agriculture and Environment. His research interests include: social class and social mobility; rural change and social inequalities; rural development and policy; family farming; labour market and economic restructuring; labour migration and integration; migration policy; mobilities and spatial justice; social impact of social research.

Loukia-Maria Fratsea is an experienced researcher at the Department of Geography, Harokopio University in Athens, Greece. She holds an Integrated Master in Agricultural Economics and a M.Sc. in Rural Development, both from the Agricultural University of Athens. She holds a PhD in Social Geography, jointly supervised by Harokopio University (Greece) and the University of Calabria (Italy). She has worked as a researcher and project manager in numerous research projects funded by Greek national authorities, the European Commission and international organisations. She has many years of research experience in the fields of social stratification and international migration, socio-economic development, socio-spatial mobilities and rural/coastal transformations, and migrant integration, and has published in Greek and international journals and edited volumes. In addition to Greek, she is fluent in English, French and Romanian. In 2021, she was elected to the Executive Committee of the European Sociological Association (ESA) for the term 2021–2024. Her research interests include rural transformation, migration and social change and social stratification and mobility.

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# Chapter 23 Transnational Migrant Entrepreneurship Policies in the Maghreb Countries: Tunisia, Algeria, and Morocco

Samir Djelti and Ricard Zapata-Barrero

# 23.1 Introduction: Setting the Debate on the Political and Economic Mutual Interface in Shaping Mediterranean Migration New Patterns

The transnational dimension of migrants entrepreneurship, which involves a crossborder business activity relying on resources and opportunities in the countries of origin, is capturing more attention of scholars working on transnationalism and entrepreneurship dimensions within migration studies (Drori et al., 2009; Agunias & Newland, 2012; Zapata-Barrero & Rezaei, 2020). Until now, the focus has been mostly concentrated on analysing patterns and defining hypotheses on the favourable and non-favourable factors promoting these new dynamics, mostly at the micro level (Carmichael et al., 2010).

The abundant economic literature considers Transnational Migrant Entrepreneurs (TME) as an opportunity for migrants' personal social mobility but also for the economic development of the origin countries. However, in the political sciences, there are few researches on how the origin countries are capturing the transnational patterns of migrants. This trend of better linking diaspora to development through different practices than the traditional remittances, which was the nuclear argument of the migration/development debate is present in most of the latest international reports (IOM, 2020; World Bank, 2020; Boubakri et al., 2021; Djelti, 2015) and it is

S. Djelti

Mustapha Stambouli University, Mascara, Algeria

R. Zapata-Barrero (✉)

GRITIM-UPF (Interdisciplinary Research Group on Immigration), Department of Social and Political Sciences, Universitat Pompeu Fabra, Catalonia, Barcelona, Spain e-mail: ricard.zapata@upf.edu

included in the agenda of the Global Compact on Migration.1 The shared premises are that migrants have experience and funds, which help them to carry out transnational projects with their country. Currently, many states have turned to this economic target by setting up processes to motivate migrants to build entrepreneurship projects with their origin country.

By coupling the economic literature about migration & development and the political/business studies on TME, the rational of this chapter is to explore how the economic context shapes the TME policies in the Maghreb countries? More precisely, what is the role of economic dependence to migration and business climate when it comes to choosing between national, migrants and/or TME policies building? Contextually, we will concentrate on three Maghreb countries; Tunisia, Algeria, and Morocco. There are already some works focusing on this subregion, which analyse the entrepreneurial ecosystem (Faghih & Zali, 2018); there are also other studies which have focused on how migrants develop entrepreneurship skills and projects in the host countries (Kloosterman & Rath, 2003). But this transnational dimension of migrant entrepreneurs is still in need of more research.

Tunisia, Algeria, and Morocco are neighbouring developing countries with similar colonial history and geographical features (Brett, 1976). They are concerned by shared geopolitical challenges towards the European Union and neighbourhood with the Northern Mediterranean countries, with similar socio-economic problems and political challenges migration-related (Boubakri et al., 2021). Even the migration corridors follow likewise patterns, and they are usually categorised by leading reports as a micro-Mediterranean Western region for the migratory of routes and corridors (Mcauliffe & Triandafyllidou, 2021). They also share a colonial past with Francophonie (France) and political history, as it is the case with Spain (Morgenthaler García, 2016). Such facts make them a micro-region within the whole Mediterranean region (Chambers, 2008).

# 23.2 Migration and Development Nexus, and Its Renewal Through TME's Debate

Migration, development, and entrepreneurship have complex theoretical connections that have evolved during the second half of the twenty-first century. This section overviews the evolution of remittance as a source of the national economy to a skills-based approach within the framework of migration & development nexus and TME. It is worth noting that business climate could encourage or not this evolution.

Traditionally, migration and development studies have been ranked in three schools of thinking, namely: the optimistic, the pessimistic, and the new economics

<sup>1</sup> From the 18th (skills development and recognition) to the 23rd objective (international cooperation) https://www.iom.int/global-compact-migration

of labour migration (De Haas, 2010). Such categorization is the result of a scientific debate that reflect two different ideologies. Initially the migration and development nexus represent a continued debate between the pessimistic and the optimistic scholars. The optimistic school of thinking, initiated by Grubel and Scott (1966) have predicted that migration can be beneficial for the origin countries through remittances, return migration, and socio-professional networks. Meanwhile the pessimistic one thought that brain-gain is harmful for the economics of the origin countries. Followed by a community of authors, Bhagwati and Hamada (1974) has demonstrated, through microeconomic model, that the brain-drain puts the origin countries in the trap of poverty, rendering their development impossible. They consider the brain-drain as a rude factor that develop the economies of the destination countries by under-developing those of the origin.

Based on the new economics of labor migration (Stark & Bloom, 1985), new studies have reconsidered the optimistic school of thinking during the 90s. Based on the same logic of the pessimistic models, Stark et al. (1997) have demonstrated the potential positive effects of migration on the economics of the origin countries. This new optimism has led to an explosion of literature about migration and development. In this context, migration effects have been connected with trade (Ruiz & Vargas-Silva, 2018), foreign investment (Cuadros et al., 2019), innovation (Bahar & Rapoport, 2018), tourism (Djelti et al., 2021), democracy (Rapoport, 2015), and women empowerment (Sinha et al., 2012).

In this framework, the emergence of TME debate is the result of the evolution of studies on the main channels of migration and development namely; remittances, returns, and networks. Observed in the majority of the world origin countries, return migrants use skills and remittances to establish entrepreneurial projects. Such observation has triggered researchers' thinking to consider migrants' entrepreneurship as a development pillar in the origin countries. Regarding remittances, the New Economic of Labour Migration has included its determinants into the family contract framework. Stark (1991) have distinguished four motivations of remittances: the altruistic,2 the self-interest,3 the loans repayment,4 and the coinsurance motivation.5

Taking stocks of more recent works, Portes et al. (2002), Carling (2004), and Portes and Martinez (2021) have theorized the relationship between migration and development through the entrepreneurship channel. Empirical studies (Todorov

<sup>2</sup> The migrants transfer money to the rest of the family members in the country of origin because they look after the wellbeing of them.

<sup>3</sup> It pushes the migrant to transfer their savings to a safer place and invest them. The remittances and investments are generally administered by one or more members of the family remaining in the origin country.

<sup>4</sup> First, the family invests in the education and the emigration of a member, then the debt repayment starts.

<sup>5</sup> On the one hand, the emigrant must support the family members in the difficult times, on the other, the family represents also an insurance for the migrant. The exchange of services has been developed as a new motivation of remittances to pay brother because of his management of the migrant's goods in the origin country (Hoddinott, 1994; De la Brière et al., 1997).

et al., 2018; Kakhkharov & Rohde, 2020) and practical initiatives are now spreading.6 These approaches share the premises that entrepreneurship is a channel that connect migration to development. In practice, the new optimism reconsiders remittances, return migration, and networks, which represent the pillars of migrants' entrepreneurship. Based on the migrants' entrepreneurship experiences in the origin countries, diaspora policies have been developed. To sum up, the optimism in migration and development will support better diaspora policies such as TME patterns, whereas the pessimism will range towards less developed TME's policies. Then it can be stated that there is a link between these classical approaches towards the Migration & Development nexus and the fact that some countries incorporate more explicit and define better their diaspora policies towards TME.

The first literature examining the policy paradigm changes from a remittancesbased approach to skills-mobilization-based approach shares the diagnosis that after some decades of implementation, this policy has become much more a policy rhetoric than efficient policy (Boukharouaa et al., 2014). There is still a policy gap and governance problem between expectations and outcomes of this new policy focus. There is a need to analyse in depth home government programs, how they include this transnational practice into their diaspora policy agenda? and how they understand transnationalism as an asset and diaspora as a capital? From this home perspective, some avenues of the debate wonder how these diaspora policies are drawn strategically and if they meet the TME needs or not. The literature is also interested in why some TME enter in relation with their countries and other prefer to follow an international entrepreneurship venture (Solano, 2021).

# 23.3 The National Economic Challenges and Policy Priorities Approach

Based on the above theoretical background, the economic context is strongly connected with the political priorities in general and migration policies in particular. Put it another way, the general economic context can influence policy makers views and then their decisions to consider, or not, their own nationals living abroad as a source of development, through entrepreneurship migration policy. Based on this hypothesis, the analysis will be introduced by the economic situation in which remittances and business climate are considered as the important motivational factor for the development of entrepreneurship's national policies. The economic dependence to remittances trigger the development of migrants' entrepreneurship policy and the favourable business climate motivate migrants investment. Then, the priority will be given to the national entrepreneurship as a policy for both nationals and be-nationals.

<sup>6</sup> https://ec.europa.eu/international-partnerships/projects/platform-remittances-investments-andmigrants-entrepreneurship-africa-prime-africa\_en

Finally, the transnational entrepreneurship priority is concretised by the definitive incorporation of TME into their agenda and focus on the cultural, economic, and social capacities. The evolution of migrants' entrepreneurship policy, in the context of migration & development nexus enlarge its objectives.

It is worth noting that the policies that engage migrants in transnational activities are not only those encouraging entrepreneurship. We have been especially sensitive to identify the practices of these policies and the main public/private actors involved in their implementation. In the same vein, we have not distinguished general policies promoting entrepreneurship and those specifically targeting migrants. Migrants are be-nationals, that is why they can take advantages from the national, the international and the migrants entrepreneurship policies. In this work, all the policies that foster migrants' entrepreneurship are considered, including migrants' specific policies, those for nationals, and for Foreign Direct investment.

#### 23.4 Subregional Analysis: Tunisia, Algeria and Morocco

This section is devoted to case studies showing how the economic dependence to migrants and the business climate influences policy makers to consider diaspora in their political agenda.

# 23.4.1 The Tunisian Case: A Step-by-Step Entrepreneurship Migration Policy Building

In 1986, Tunisia has adopted a market economic model and signed a free trade agreement with the European Union in 1995. Its economy is historically based on agriculture, energy, tourism, and industry. According to the Doing Business Report (2020), Tunisia has received 2 billion US Dollars of remittances in 2018, which represents 4.9% of its GDP. The importance of remittances in the Tunisian income shows the relevance of the development of this financial source.

Regarding its national entrepreneurship policy, the Promotion Agency for Industry and Innovation (APII), represents the first network that provides services for the Tunisian industrial enterprises. Created in 1972, APII is a public institution that realises the government policy related to the promotion of industries and innovation by assisting the entrepreneurs. It also offers information, support, assistance, partnership, and studies. Between 2001 and 2005, 12 nurseries of company have been created, and in 2005 the national network of nurseries has borne by generalising these structures in the Tunisian territory in order to boost and accelerate enterprises creation (Ouanes, 2016).

The Promotion of Agricultural Investments Agency APIA was founded in 1983, in order to promote the private investment in agriculture, fisheries, and first transformation activities related to the agricultural sectors. In the same vein, the National Agency for Employment and Independent Labour ANETI, the Centre for the Promotion of Exportation (CEPEX), Technical Centres, Technic-poles, and Business Centres have been created. These structures provide specialised trainings, assistance for the realisation of business model and business planning, personal coaching, technical assistance, facilitation for company creation, networking, and control.

In addition to these public institutions, independent initiatives of the civil society have supported the entrepreneurship process. In the context of new Tunisia, numerous associations have been created, among them 1826 are active in the sustainable development field, with a focus on entrepreneurship. These associations focus on the culture of entrepreneurship, through sharing information, awareness campaigns, reception and orientation of entrepreneurs, trainings for the creation of enterprises, help before creation, assistance for finance, advice and coaching in the beginning, and the monitoring in the post creation (Ouanes, 2016).

Regarding funding, the Tunisian legislation have created structures for entrepreneurs by according rational interest rate credits. Two public banks have been mobilized: First, the Tunisian Bank of Solidarity BTS specialized in funding small and medium projects both, directly or via the Microcredit Associations. It allows credits with a maximum of 150 thousand Tunisian Dinars, with a 5% rate of interest, without a real guarantee and with facilitation in reimbursement. Second, the Bank of Small and Medium Companies BFPME, specialised in funding investment projects with global cost between 150 thousand and five million Tunisian Dinar. This bank requires real and personal guaranties and request other credits confirmed by commercial banks. In addition, the government has reinforced the own funding FONAPRAM & FOPRODI, the microfinance institutions Tayssir, Adavans, Enda, the investment companies IntilaQ, Faster Capital, UGFS NA, Carthage Business Angels, and the enterprises with risky capital SICAR.

In order to deal with the issues related to competences and soft skills, the public institutions have focused on providing trainings since 2013. The National Agency for Employment and Independent Work ANETI has offered trainings for the creation of enterprises and entrepreneurs, the evaluation of enterprises, searching ideas, capacity building, languages, TIC, communication, and vital behaviour. In the same vein, Business Centres, Nursery of Companies, incubators, and civil society have also proposed trainings (Khaddamni tarba7, Build your Business, Mashrou3i. etc.) for the transmission of experience and competences. According to Ouanes (2016) the young were not motivated, funds were insufficient, the programs were not up-to-date, and the implicated actors were not collaborative. In parallel, the training and coaching opportunities are dependent to internet and social networks, which are not available for the whole Tunisian population. Furthermore, the proposed trainings have decreased in 2016, especially with the disappearance of numerous competitions of the best projects selection, which beneficiate of funding.

Regarding the entrepreneurship environment based on the World Bank Doing Business Report (2020), Tunisia is ranked in the 78th place. According to Transparency International (2020), it is ranked 74th, and 87th according to the World Competitively Indicator published by the World Economic Forum (Băhnăreanu, 2019). In terms of innovation, the world organization of intellectual property has ranked Tunisia in the 65th place. Tunisia has a medium entrepreneurship climate that could trigger the motivation of both migrants and international entrepreneurs.

Regarding return migration and entrepreneurship in Tunisia, Cassarino (2015) warns that there are few official statistics for the evaluation and the comparison of the return migrants' reintegration. The author has conducted a survey in 2006 and 2012 in Tunisia that has revealed that 31% of the sample are entrepreneurs and independent workers. More precisely, 16% are working in the informal market without creating employment. In addition, becoming an employer is diminishing for the young generations initially because of the institutional and the structural factors in the Tunisian economic system, the limited access to finance and information resources, the administrative and customs bureaucracy, the fiscal hostility, the political and economic imbrication, and the controlled expansion of the private sector. Such analysis confirms, also, the orientation of return migrants to the selffinance and to the family support.

Apart of some initiatives of facilitating the investment of the Tunisian migrant to invest in agriculture, we have not noticed the existence of a national policy. Whereas, the Tunisian international openness and relations has established mechanisms for the management of temporary migration. Started from about two decades, it is summarised in bilateral agreements with the EU. The aim of such partnership is the assistance of the Tunisian students and workers for the acquisition of the necessary professional and academic skills for the development of economic activities once returned back in Tunisia (Cassarino, 2015).

In March 2019, a recent agreement between IOM Tunisia and the African Business Leaders, have announced the execution of a social incubator for migrants' entrepreneurs KUFANYA. This project is registered in the Regional Program of Development and Protection of North Africa RDPPNA. It is funded by the European Union and realised by IOM. In practice, the project KUFAYNA is incubated in an accelerator of social innovation called Lab'ess. The incubator promotes, facilitates, and assists the migrant's entrepreneurship in EU and Africa. It also helps to create structures of migrants' entrepreneurship assistance in the African countries. In addition, it provides an assistance for the research of finance, structures, and the entrepreneurship project holders. KUFNAYA promotes also entrepreneurship and investment for the young population in some African countries.

Regarding the political institutions, the Office of Tunisians Abroad OTE, founded in 1988 has the general mission of offering services to the living abroad Tunisians. In the office web,7 they promote investment by presenting the same opportunities of the residents. In addition, the Tunisian National Observatory on Migration8 analyses migration, collects information, establishes studies and evaluations, and cooperates with the other institutions. Furthermore, the ministry of Foreign Affairs, Migration,

<sup>7</sup> https://ote.nat.tn/investir-en-tunisie/

<sup>8</sup> http://www.migration.nat.tn/fr/presentation/missions

and Tunisians Abroad9 supports the Tunisian expatriates worldwide and protect their business interests.

To sum up, the overview about entrepreneurship and return migration shows the weakness of entrepreneurship in Tunisia and the governmental struggle with the issues that can develop this pillar of development. Regarding the entrepreneurship of migrants in Tunisia, it remains individual initiatives, without a developed national strategy to take advantage from this source. The government, with bilateral agreements and cooperation with the EU and NGOs, have initiated projects that can represent the first step for migrants' entrepreneurship policy. To sum up, because of the economic contribution of migrants and the medium business climate, Tunisia is experiencing a step-by-step entrepreneurship migration policy building.

# 23.4.2 The Algerian Case: a Two-in-One Entrepreneurship Policy

The Algerian economy is strongly dependent on natural resources. Its economic case has been widely studied in comparison with "the Dutch disease" and under the "curse of natural resources" topics. The Oil and Gas prices are the main factors that determine the health of its economy, that is why the nowadays most important priority is the diversification of its resources. The Doing Business Report (2020), shows that Algeria received 1.9 billion US Dollars in 2018, which represent 1% of the Algerian GDP this year. Moreover, the majority of remittances circulate in the informal channel. According to Djelti (2015), the informal Algerian inflow of remittances is nine times more important than the formal one. The weakness of remittances in the Algerian economy explains the neglected interest given to migration as an economic opportunity in the political agenda.

During the 90s, in the context of the IMF imposed reforms for the orientation to the market economy, the government has adopted different programs for encouraging entrepreneurship. To do so, structures and funds that motivate, orientate, finance, and assist entrepreneurs have been created. The national unemployment insurance fund CNAC was founded in 1994 as a dispositive for supporting the entrepreneurship activity. This structure supports entrepreneurial activities with a maximal amount of 10.000.000 DA of credit without remuneration. Two years later, the National Agency for the Support of Young Employment ANSEJ was created to encourage all activities that revive the young employment sector. It has focused on funding investments that produce goods and services that do not exceed 10.000.000 DA. The credits are zero interest and guaranteed by a national insurance.

In the same vein, the National Agency for the Support of Investment ANDI, was founded in 2001. Its mission is the promotion of investment and the facilitation of the entrepreneurship activity through the decentralisation of its administrative

<sup>9</sup> https://www.diplomatie.gov.tn/

services. More recently, in 2004 a new structure was established in order to focus on the micro credit ANGEM. Its main objective is the insertion of the needy people into the socioeconomic life by creating their own entrepreneurial activity. It funds a maximum amount of 1.000.000 DA guaranteed and without remuneration.

The incubators of companies have appeared in Algeria for those who have investment ideas, these structures offer the physical accommodation for the company from its birth until three years after its registration. It provides assistance by advising, funding, and networking the company. The first incubator has been created in 2004 at Sidi Abdellah. It is a public industrial and commercial company. Five years later, the first private incubator « Alinov » has been created. New public incubators have also been founded in order to assist start-up in the frame of E-Algeria (Cyberparc de Sidi Abdellah (2010), the incubator of Ouargla (2012), Technobridge of l'INTTIC Oran (2013), the incubator of the university of Batna (2013), IncubMe, and ACSE). In order to encourage this sector, the government has, recently, created a ministry for boosting entrepreneurship and start-up.

The concept of Nursery of Company has been adopted in Algeria in 2009 with slight difference from incubators, which represent structures of assistance that concern all the existing companies from one to five years. Like the business incubators, companies can have technical, financial, and advice facilities. In addition, the companies' accelerator structure also concerns the existing companies that target strong growth. They propose programmes of training animated by serial entrepreneurs, with a high level of experience in the creation and the development of companies for the technological start-up. Sylabs, Institut Haba, and the Pivot are the most known accelerators.

The Algerian entrepreneurship structures, especially the first one, have contributed to an increase in the number of created companies. In 2016, 108,538 companies were created. The total number of companies has registered a growth rate of 84% between 2010 and 2018. In general, ANSEJ has consumed about 70% of the budget destined to boost entrepreneurship in Algeria. By the first semester of 2019, Algeria counted about 1.171.945 small and medium companies. Among them, 97% are very small companies with less than ten employees. The small companies and the medium ones represent respectively 2.60% and 0.40%.

Regarding migration and entrepreneurship, the MIREM10 survey has concluded that 13.5% of the migrants have realized one investment, 1.5% have realized two, 0.9% have realized three, and 1.2% have realized more than three investments. Djelti (2015) has conducted a survey on 200 Algerian migrants in France, the study has estimated that the main destinations of these remittances are buying real estate, saving, spending holidays in Algeria, investment, family consumption, and family investment.

Actually, Algerian migrants can take advantages of the return facilities and motivations (Certificat de Changement de Residence CCR). In addition, because of their social ties, the Algerian migrants are more appropriate to benefit from the

<sup>10</sup> http://rsc.eui.eu/RDP/fr/research-projects/mirem/

wide above-cited entrepreneurial structures advantages and facilities. The informal sector is crucial in Algeria, that is why this topic needs profound studies to determine the efficacity of this double sides policy (for nationals and be-nationals).

The diversification of the Algerian economy strategy enhances the internal entrepreneurship policy. Such policy provides opportunities for both residents and migrants rather than looking for specific policy for migrants' entrepreneurship. In general, for nationals and be-nationals, a two in one entrepreneurship policy is adopted in Algeria.

# 23.4.3 The Moroccan Case: National and Migrants' Entrepreneurship – Two Parallel Policies

The Moroccan economy is characterized by large tertiary sector (trade and tourism), followed by a secondary (industry and construction), and a primary sector (agriculture).11 According to the Doing Business Report (2020), Morocco has received 7.4 billion US Dollars in 2018, which represents 6.2% of its GDP in this year. The importance of remittances in the Moroccan income has pushed the government to, at least, maintain this economic source. This necessity has triggered the development of the government's will to manage and invest in this economic opportunity.

In addition, regarding the entrepreneurship environment, based on the World Bank Doing Business Report (2020), Morocco is ranked 53rd and 80th according to Transparency International (2020). Furthermore, according to the World Competitively Indicator, published by the World Economic Forum (2019), Morocco is in the 75th place. In terms of innovation, the world organization of intellectual property has ranked Morocco in the 75th position. The medium above rankings makes Morocco attracting foreign investments including migrants. Such a favourable climate has helped the development of migrant's entrepreneurship policies.

The fact that OECD released two reports on Moroccan public policies development and skilled migrants in 2016–17 is an indicator of its strong ties. The diaspora adopted policies consisting of an array of measures, including ministerial and consular reforms, and investment policies to manage a specific profile of the "Moroccans Living Abroad" (MLAs). The Moroccan case illustrates the evolution of a diaspora policy implemented since the 1990s, and now seems to have the shape of a "governance of a structure of opportunities", engaging Moroccan authorities, as well as private and public partnerships, programmes, institutions and government departments.<sup>12</sup>

<sup>11</sup> https://www.finances.gov.ma/Publication/depf/2019/Tableau\_de\_bord\_sectoriel\_janvier%20201 9.pdf

<sup>12</sup> A Mapping of the institutional diaspora governance evolution can be found in Zapata-Barrero and Hellgren (2020, 2033–2036).

The advancement of capacity building policies to govern the diaspora is situated in the broad process of change in Morocco already described by De Haas (2007), which explored the shift from controlling the diaspora to including it given the high contributions of their remittances. In this framework, some years ago, Morocco is gradually entering in a second phase, by a focus on the mobilization of skilled MLAs in general. This policy shifts from a guest-workers policy narrative (remittancesbased approach) to a much more defined transnational policy narrative (skillsmobilization-based approach). Such transformation must be understood as the broad mainstream focus of Moroccan diaspora governance today.

Three basic pillars sustain the Moroccan diaspora engagement policy philosophy (RdM, 2016): (a) Preservation of the identity of the Moroccans of the World; (b) Protection of rights and interests of MLAs; and (c) Contribution of MLAs to the development of the country. This diaspora policy focus seeks to profit from the know-how accumulated by MLAs for the benefits of Morocco. This policy belongs to its most important strategy regarding their diaspora in Horizon 2025 (Belguendouz, 2010: 29).

This mobilization strategy is explicitly a policy of attraction (Marhaba) of highskilled Moroccan migrants that have acquired a social and cultural capital abroad, and that now are "seduced" to contribute to the national economic development.<sup>13</sup> Some recent researches however argue that the Moroccan policy initiatives to attract their skilled nationals reflect a gap between expectations and outcomes (Zapata-Barrero & Hellgren, 2020). Most authors point out that the lack of an integrative view of the different policy initiatives, and the incoherence between different departments and institutions and programmes seeking to create a structure of opportunities for their nationals living abroad, may be some of the main causes (Boukharouaa et al., 2014; OECD, 2017, p. 55). It is considered that the rich and diversified expertise accumulated by Moroccan skills residing abroad can advantageously be involved in the national development process (Belguendouz, 2010).

The Moroccan policy has triggered the development of both a national entrepreneurial policy and a migration policy for the attraction of entrepreneur migrants. Studies have shown that this policy has not achieved its strategic objectives. Like the case of the other Maghreb countries, more studies are needed to evaluate the implemented policies. In the end, a national and migrants' entrepreneurship are two parallel policies sparked by Morocco. The economic importance of migration returns as an economic source has triggered MIP and the medium business climate have been favourable for its development to TMP.

<sup>13</sup> This justify, Operation Marhaba, which is under the effective presidency of HM King Mohammed VI, highlighting the logistical, human, material and technical resources mobilized, in particular by the Mohammed V Foundation for solidarity, in order to ensure the operation. http://www.ccme. org.ma/en/what-s-new/53253

# 23.5 Different MEP Approaches for Different Economic Contexts

The micro-regional approaches for presenting findings are difficult to achieve since we have three countries with different economic contexts that behave towards their own nationals living abroad differently, and have incorporated entrepreneurship into their diaspora agenda following diverse policy sensitivities. In reality, the three countries still struggle with their national economic problems, they are in a continued process of development, implementation, evaluation, and adjustment of their local entrepreneurship policies. Likewise, the national priorities regarding the entrepreneurship strategy represent an important factor of migrant's entrepreneurship policy. In other words, the countries can focus on the development of a strong national and be-national entrepreneurship policy, or opt for the openness and the attraction of the foreign entrepreneurship, in both cases migrants are included.

In Tunisia, because of the economic structure, the relatively more favourable investment climate, the open policy for cooperation with the European countries, and the active civil society, some initiatives have shown the interest for the development of migrants' entrepreneurship policy. Tunisia is strengthening its relations with the diaspora by creating special structures and going step by step to an entrepreneurship migration policy.

The natural resources returns, not only make migrants contribution neglected, but orientate all the policy priorities to the diversification of the economy. Despite the governmental will to develop entrepreneurship migration policies and the experiences of attracting its skilled migration, the authorities are focusing on the national entrepreneurship by providing funding, trainings, finance, and administrative facilitation. A national entrepreneurship policy that offers the same opportunities for nationals and be-nationals is the choice of policymakers in Algeria.

In Morocco, migrants are considered as an important economic asset from the very beginning. Their remittances, skills and entrepreneurship are now in the governmental agenda. In addition, the relatively favourable investment climate and the international cooperation have attracted important foreign investments, thus encouraging Morocco to engage the national and the migration entrepreneurship policy in the same time.

#### 23.6 Conclusion

The most important of these research findings is that we can build some knowledge through exploring three countries with initial similarities and differences. In spite of these contextual affinities, the way these three countries are related to their diaspora and how they incorporate the logic of considering the capacities of their expatriates as a resource for their own economic development into their agenda clearly differs. This knowledge takes the form of a hypothesis: the economic context is connected to the migration entrepreneurship policy approach.

The working argument is that in spite of similarities in the past and the present link with several European countries, the different migrant's entrepreneurship policies are due to the diverse economic systems: their dependence to remittances and the entrepreneurship business climate. These global economic factors could be the main contextual factors for the different entrepreneurship migrant's policies of the Maghreb countries.

Findings have revealed that, based on the different economic contexts, Tunisia has adopted a step-by-step entrepreneurship migration policy building, Algeria is focusing on a two in one entrepreneurship policy for nationals and be-nationals, and Morocco has chosen to trigger two parallel entrepreneurship policies for nationals and Migrants. The discussion of results has concluded that shaping the migrant's entrepreneurship policies in the three Maghreb countries is strongly related to the economic factors; the economic dependance to remittances trigger MEP and the entrepreneurship climate foster its development to TME policy.

#### References


Stark, O. (Ed.). (1991). The migration of labor. Wiley Blackwell.


Samir Djelti is Professor of Economics at Mustapha Stambouli University-Algeria and associate researcher at the Applied Centre of Development in Algiers (CREAD). He is also a member of EuroMedMig steering committee. He has hold a Master degree in Economics of Migration (causes and consequences) and a PhD in Migration and Development in Algeria. He has developed the osmosis theory of human migration. In addition, he has participated in more than forty national and international conferences and published about twenty papers in the field of Migration Studies. He has been a member in five migration research projects (Doctors' migration, migration and tourism, labour migration, and migration and public health). He has also acted as a migration expert for the United Nations University UNU-GCM, the International Organization of Migration IOM-Algiers, the International Centre for Migration Policy Development ICMPD, and Médecins du Monde MdM. His current fields of interest cover migration methodology, the osmosis theory, the colonial migration, migrants' trajectories and settlement, migration and cities, and migration and access to health services.

Ricard Zapata-Barrero Full Professor in the Department of Political and Social Sciences, Universitat Pompeu Fabra (Catalonia, Barcelona). His main lines of research deal with the relationship between democracy, governance, citizenship, and migrations. He conducts theoretical and empirical research in the Mediterranean area. He is the Director of GRITIM-UPF (Interdisciplinary Research Group on Immigration), and of the Master's Program in Migration Studies at UPF. He is a member of the Board of Directors of the largest research network on Immigration in Europe IMISCOE and Chair the External Affairs Committee. He coordinates EuroMedMig (Euro-Mediterranean Research Network on Migration).

For more information about publications: https://www.upf.edu/web/ricard-zapata/

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# Chapter 24 Concluding Remarks: Applying Med-Thinking Proviso to Set a Research Agenda on Mediterranean Migrations

Ricard Zapata-Barrero

# 24.1 What Are the Main Research Frameworks that Link the Different Contributions?

Quickly reviewing images on "Mediterranean migrations" in Google Analytics (November 2022) and even going through Google Scholar Analytics, we can infer several premises. First, negative aspects by far dominate the public representation and research narrative over the positive ones, ruled by the same rhetoric most governments have constructed: crisis and instability, Mediterranean "dis-ordered" migration. This may invite us to reflect on the extent to which a research agenda, which is too often conflict-driven, may fuel mainstream policies and hegemonic reactive governance narratives. This concurrency between the political, the media and the social negative agenda is denounced in most contributions (directly in by Ayoub's contribution in the case of French's Euro-Mediterranean policies), and there is a general claim for a more encouraging or at least independent Mediterranean migrations agenda from scholars, highly contaminated by political decisions.

The second premise we can infer from the Google Scholar screen is that current Mediterranean migrations research is still too state-centric, dominated by national concerns on border control, national identities, social sustainability, regional geo-political considerations related to insecurity, and ideological binomial views in pros and cons. The leading argument here highlights that the dangers of a hypercrisis narrative can legitimise rapid, informal, and flexible policy instruments and legislative proposals that are often at odds with democratic principles and fundamental rights. The crisis narrative simply paints a scenario of exceptionalism in border regimes (as Ferrer/Gabrielli show in examining the evolution of Ceuta and

R. Zapata-Barrero (✉)

GRITIM-UPF (Interdisciplinary Research Group on Immigration), Department of Social and Political Sciences, Universitat Pompeu Fabra, Catalonia, Barcelona, Spain e-mail: ricard.zapata@upf.edu

Melilla), that can justify acting beyond the usual social and political norms. It can also legitimise the lack of regular channels or in practice, for instance, hotspots system (detention centres without regulation), jungle practices and an overall absence of a humanitarian approach. In fact, we learn from the different contributions that migration cannot be the main object of crisis but rather part of broader crises within politics, morality, the project of modernity and the Enlightenment vision of humanity progress. For example, the geographical European deterritorialization of "problems", creating non-European emplacements in Turkey and Maghreb countries, is also a major trend visible in the first webpage of Google image search. This conveys a key message, particularly valuable for researchers: there is a lot to do to reverse this Google trend, with an algorithm dominated by politics and media.

The contributions in this co-edited book provide a range of insights that can help shape this alternative narrative in Google. Ultimately, what this volume shows is that any research on Mediterranean migrations necessarily becomes critical, (quasi) activist, because any researcher is engaged against the dominant narrative wall. As has been noted, there is a need for a "variable focal length" in the study of Mediterranean migrations (Zapata-Barrero & Faustini, 2019). The various contributions in this volume certainly help to take a step forward in framing an independent research agenda. But we should also recognise that these contributions are in part also Google-dependent since they confirm that the link between the Mediterranean and Migration invites us necessarily to address border regimes and the relation between border, human (im)mobility, and society/politics, about asymmetries of power and inequalities between different cardinal points. The Mediterranean as a geographical contact area between Global North, Global East and Global South is the clear scenario that still polarizes us. It is to speak about viewing critically how states are shaping the current history of restrictions and lockdowns of (im)mobility and how this creates a "disquieting account" in Chambers' terms (2008, 3). With new and constructed spaces of legality, the current Mediterranean scenario is more a geopolitical space for a chess game than a human and (inter)cultural area of mutual understanding.

However, even if there is awareness that the Mediterranean is a space of diversities (intentially in plural), there is still no recognition that diversity can be a resource for transforming the current trans-Mediterranean relations. The different contributions of this volume take a critically distant position from this methodological nationalism that can be found on Google and embrace multi-scale thinking. This is an epistemological claim that knowledge production must be detached from the current domination of states and all their alliances. We also need to incorporate into the agenda more perspectives and visions from other scales (territorial and actors involved in migration dynamics and governance, Southern and Eastern visions of the Mediterranean, the view for departure rather than arrivals, etc). In the words of Musette/Maarmar, there are still too many black boxes that deserve to be explored and that call for data production, which is technically possible only in combination with political will. This "multiple voices framework" should address the epistemology of ignorance that shapes the migration agenda and should also demand that any research finding needs to be strongly connected with the history of migrations and the colonial past. Decolonising current migration governance in the Mediterranean may be the most appropriate approach. This means incorporating what Foucault (1991) refers to as a "polyhedron of intelligibility", and we can also add "heterochrony" and "heterotopia", other Foucauldian notions. The first refers to the idea that there is always a variety of rationalities behind an event or a process that is being scrutinised. This involves the need to consider a mixture of causal factors. In Foucault's own words, it is about understanding and considering the wider influences which contribute to what may appear at first glance to be 'normal' (Foucault, 1991; 77). This describes the need to examine the subject of inquiry in a multi-directional manner rather than solely from "one direction" (Khan, 2016; 67). This also invites Mediterranean migrations researchers to combine in an interdependent way the different levels of analysis, such as micro, meso and macro levels.

On the other hand, heterochrony is a way to indicate that an event is the result of evolution and it is part of an accumulation of different historical layers. To frame a Mediterranean migrations agenda, we need to zoom out historically, because the premise is always that there are many historical narratives behind a given reality. Finally, heterotopia is a notion that seeks to find room to break the usual binomial utopia/dystopia and designates the fact there are spaces that are simply different, literally "in other spaces". Taking the Foucauldian power relation focus, this means looking at alternative spaces, separate from the mainstream. It describes certain cultural, institutional and discursive spaces that are somehow 'other': disturbing, intense, incompatible, contradictory or transforming; a world off-center with respect to normal or everyday spaces, one that possesses multiple, fragmented, or even incompatible meanings (Dehaene & De Cauter, 2008).

"Polyhedron of intelligibility", heterochrony, and heterotopy, are then notions that can help us underline two main final arguments that frame the different contributions of this co-edited book. First, any Mediterranean migrationsrelated topic is always multi-faceted and we need to have a holistic view, as the historical dimension and accumulation of historical moments are key for its understanding. In Braudel philosophy of history's terms, what we can learn from the different contributions is the need to place any topic within a longue durée history rather than within a short-term and event-driven (événementiel) understanding that governs most of today's dominant vision. What we always see as a research pattern connecting all the contributions, and probably closely related to the previous dimension, is the importance of multi-scale approaches in conducting Mediterranean migrations research, which includes looking at "other spaces" instead of the mainstream spaces of research. This means that this volume manages to contribute to knowledge production from the local and regional perspective, reflecting South/ North/East and West geographical perspectives, from receiving and departure countries, and even social actors' views, and incorporating new spaces of exploration. Epistemologically speaking, all these different visions and positions produce different types of knowledge, because they contextualise different kinds of information related to the same topic.

This first reading invites us to a second and final argument: to take seriously the "multi-scale approach" in the study of migrations in the Mediterranean. This is the outcome of putting at work reflexivity in conducting research, and being aware that we should receive different answers to seminal questions such as what is happening, what are the current main patterns, how to understand drivers and mechanisms of Mediterranean migrations, how can we place a determinate topic or event within a longer temporal and spatial continuum, how can we draw future scenario of human (im)mobility in the Mediterranean. Given the negative narrative context, these chapters also offer some paths for optimism, for thinking Mediterranean migrations in positive terms. The different conclusions strive to provide some orientations on how processes of changes should be conducted, and strengthen the view that the Mediterranean needs to be considered as a regional area of co-production of knowledge.

These different contributions display then particular epistemological manifestations of Med-thinking (Zapata-Barrero, 2022), which include both taking seriously multiple-perspective and rejecting Euro-centrism, Western-centrism, and decolonising existing prejudgments around migration in the Mediterranean. The different chapters also invite us to frame migration research with a particular methodological regional lens. Applying this Med-thinking lens to guide the conclusions of this collective book involves then putting into practice at least four main pillars that interact: epistemic solipsism, holism, homeostatic and positive thinking on migration.

A good example of solipsism is the credo that "there is no civilization outside of White-Christian European tradition". Epistemic solipsism shows us how knowledge production is related to (national) self-interest and legitimates fixing binary categorisations and monolithic constructs of the Mediterranean, which we need to problematise. Holism pictures an organic system view of the Mediterranean and establishes that we cannot understand the whole by knowing the components in isolation from each other. This involves that the knowledge we may produce also needs to be framed within a given relational space, and that migrations-related topics cannot be analysed out of a contextual reference framework. Taking again Foucault's (2008) reflections on space, holistic thinking considers space as "emplacements" rather than "localizations". Emplacements are sites that can only be thought of if they are in relation to other sites. Emplacements are context-based locations. Applied to Mediterranean migrations concerns, this also involves including as many aspects as we can from the given topic, ethical, political, economic, legal, sociological, psychological, anthropological, etc. Holistic thinking requires both interdisciplinarity and intersectionality and most of the contributions of this co-edited volume meet this Med-Thinking proviso. As a third pillar, the concept of homeostasis is a way to leave aside presentism and event-based concerns and place migration issues within a long durée continuum. There is a widespread tendency in migration studies to focus research on social, political, economic, cultural changes, leaving aside and even disparaging what remains after a process of transformations. This is probably because most background research assumes that migration and the diversity that follows is one of the key drivers of change today. Within this mental framework, most of these contributions enrich what Med-Thinking claims to be a Copernic turn in Mediterranean migrations research (Zapata-Barrero, 2022; 6), inviting the researcher to focus on continuities over changes. In Weberian terms, to have more of a historical than sociological approach in conducting research. Of course, most of these contributions reject the trend of researching Mediterranean migrations in good or bad, in pros and cons terms. The different chapters invite us to carefully avoid falling within a dialectical approach that links directly research with ideologies. The research frameworks in Mediterranean migrations studies are much more complex and related to different forms of articulating the consequences and impact of migrations. It is not the same to assess migration in positive terms from the country of reception than from the vantage point of the departure country; it is not the same to build a research design from the position of the migrant than from a particular state's interests. Finally, most contributions display what we may call "hybrid research", in the sense that they necessarily combine descriptive and explanatory arguments with normative claims, at different grades and intensity. In other words, it is very difficult to disentangle the "is" from the "ought to be" in Mediterranean migrations research.

# 24.2 What Are the Main Lines of Research That Intersect in the Different Contributions?

Adopting a qualitative conceptual strategy allows us to identify the main keywords in this volume that make up the research map of Mediterranean migrations. These chapters also show how concepts shape representations and perspectives, and how we classify them as a tool of analysis into political (power relations), social (inequalities), cultural and ideological strands. Considering the above preliminary frameworks and focusing on the rationale of each chapter, we can deduce at least seven main avenues for future research on migrations in the Mediterranean. These avenues are not ranked and we will start with the most general and then narrow the focus.

1. Need to review traditional theories and explore new ones, according to new trends and practices, considering Med-thinking lens: What becomes clear is that most theories that shed light on Mediterranean migrations patterns have been constructed without Med-Thinking provisos, always from the point of view of countries of reception, in terms of gains/benefits, political solipsism and Eurocentrism. Many chapters address the tension there is between traditional theories and new migration dynamics in Mediterranean migrations that challenge the functioning of traditional theories. For instance, Awad's contribution discusses how the EU and Egypt share a neoclassical conceptual understanding of Egyptian migration, grafted by the network theory, in its criminal shape. Since the 1970s, Egypt sought to promote labour migration so as to release pressures on its labour market and to bring it valued remittances. However, in order to help meet the EU's aim of stopping migration, it has now given up promoting its labour migration to Europe in return for development cooperation. Awad claims that the EU-Egypt agreed conceptual framework and derived policies achieved their objectives, on the surface, but in reality failed to meet the two parties' real concerns. Awad then argues that the EU-Egypt conceptual framework should go beyond the neoclassical theory and the arguments advanced by approaches such as the dual labour market and world systems theories, and devise corresponding policies and actions. Djelti and Zapata-Barrero's contribution explicitly discusses the traditional migration and development debate incorporating new recent discussions coming from business and migration studies connecting migration, transnationalism, and entrepreneurship. They suggest incorporating migrant's capacities and social/cultural capital to the mutual benefits of countries or the development of their countries of origin. This need to review the dominant and traditional migration-development nexus incorporating different angles of exploration is also claimed by Rodriguez-Peña's contribution, stating that its focus is often shortsighted or primarily on developing countries. This is also the main path articulated by Içduygu/Altiok's contribution. In analysing the irregular migration in Eastern Mediterranean, in particular the case of Afghans and Syrians, they argue that linking the concept of weak statehood with the root causes of migration helps us to better understand the dynamics and mechanism of mixed flows, mainly including irregular migrants, asylum seekers and refugees. This may also explain also new questions such as why and how people move through particular routes over time, trying to understand the particular geography of the Eastern Mediterranean. The need to theorize "black box" situations enhancing evidence-based research deficits and avoiding blind-shooting policies is also addressed by Musette/Maamar's exploration of irregular migrations from North Africa to Europe. They even propose a global view (directly related to a holistic view in Med-Thinking terms) considering all the actors and new data methods to measure the process of irregular maritime migration into several steps, from having a global stock of irregular migrants to how to measure statistics of the sea routes from the countries of departure rather than arrival and even to how to have information of missing migrants (disappeared or drowned). Again, from the perspective of the countries of departure and from the point of view of new emigration policy configurations, Bousetta et al. also identify new migratory dynamics that request a revision of diaspora theories informing policies in Morocco.

2. Need to follow a Mediterranean reading of Methodological nationalism's critical approach and adopt a multi-scale approach: Most contributions take a critical path toward states as the only legitimate actors of knowledge production. This epistemological positionalism takes different forms of expression. From the already mentioned Musette/Maamar's claim for exploring different evidences that are missed by states' dominance of data to Aubarell Solduga's contribution overviewing the Local and Regional Networks and their effects in the Euromed cooperation. These current research trends challenge the limits of the multilevel governance and the absence of Southern Mediterranean engagement. Fakhoury/ Aitken's Lebanese case study also addresses these issues wondering how notions of national identity and otherness materialise, interlace, and collide in the Mediterranean. They exemplify Lebanon's political regime as a system that contributes to building the figure of the refugee as a disrupter to Lebanon's national identity. Finally, even if it is not the central focus, Boubakri's contributions deal with the issue of how the fact that Southern countries are becoming countries of migration may affect hierachical political structures and division of competencies, contributing to a much more decentralised political regime such as Tunisia.


Demirbas/Miliou-Theocharaki's case study analysing the EU-Turkey Deal. Their contribution highlights how political solipsism is not only a narrative-building denunciation but have also practical consequences. This is not only a matter of tightening border regimes and new laws of deterrence, but how Eurocentrism perpetuates precarity when it grounds externalisation and selection of migrants. Within this same research avenue, we can place Panebianco/Cannata's contribution on (im)mobility partnerships. The democratic argument here continues to play a vital role but under a different complementary angle. They highlight how European Neighbourhood Policies (ENP), focusing on the case of Mobility Partnerships (MPs) in the Southern neighbourhood, are in fact trade-offs between cooperation with authoritarian governments to ensure stability and democracy promotion. This can be better framed, they argue, under a stability-democracy dilemma, contending that the EU is unable to promote democracy in the Southern neighbourhood via 'more mobility'.


focuses on how this particular profile of migrant constructs their lives incorporating the will to migrate as a socialization process. This migration culture is reproduced by institutional agents in Morocco and then a certain link exists between mobility culture, structural reproduction and youths' agency. Following a similar rationale, Paynter's contribution to gendered asylum in the Black Mediterranean also illustrates the need to work on particular profiles. In this case, intersectionality also plays a relevant role in fixing her focus: sex trafficking is the outcome of border-gendered and racialised policies.

7. The need to re-interpret the Mediterranean in light of migrations: Most contributions invite us to explore new ways of interpreting the Mediterranean as a space of interconnection through human mobilities. Geha, for instance, argues that the diaspora frames the Mediterranean as a symbolic and activist space of relations. This new space of interpretation also frames the contribution of Fakhoury/Aitken, who suggests handling the Mediterranean through alternative spaces of hospitality incorporating the activity of civic and humanitarian actors, refuting the conception of a closed, excluding citizenship and linked to sectarianism. The Mediterranean as a heterotopic space where exclusion and inclusion co-constitute each other is also addressed. This new way of interpreting the Mediterranean space drives also Buhr/Desille/Fonseca's contribution. In this case, the focus points towards trans-Mediterranean digital space of communication, where time and space become unidimensional realities. These contributors state that ICTs have proved crucial for the maintenance of long-distance familial arrangements, for the mobilization of migrants' social networks, and for managing remittances, but also for shaping migration decisions and the choice of destinations. Migrants' digital practices and the ways they portray the places they use - by posting, commenting, sharing, and leaving online reviews – add up to an ICT-supported imaginary of the city fed by residents, migrants, and other visitors alike.

A scientific disclaimer terminates these conclusions. The fragmentation of knowledge, without its accumulation, hinders the construction of theory and the scientific development of any study. In fact, this volume has attempted to take a step forward in the improvement of research on Mediterranean migrations by bringing together in a single book the new trends in the research agenda on Mediterranean migrations. Of course, they are not exhaustive, but merely indicative, and much remains to be done to develop Med-Thinking in migration studies.

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Ricard Zapata-Barrero Full Professor in the Department of Political and Social Sciences, Universitat Pompeu Fabra (Catalonia, Barcelona). His main lines of research deal with the relationship between democracy, governance, citizenship, and migrations. He conducts theoretical and empirical research in the Mediterranean area. He is the Director of GRITIM-UPF (Interdisciplinary Research Group on Immigration), and of the Master's Program in Migration Studies at UPF. He is a member of the Board of Directors of the largest research network on Immigration in Europe IMISCOE and Chair the External Affairs Committee. He coordinates EuroMedMig (Euro-Mediterranean Research Network on Migration).

For more information about publications: https://www.upf.edu/web/ricard-zapata/

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