

Distributive Politics in Malaysia

Maintaining Authoritarian
Party Dominance

Hidekuni Washida

First published 2019

ISBN: 978-1-138-63451-0 (hbk)

ISBN: 978-1-315-20675-2 (ebk)

1 The puzzling resilience of authoritarian party dominance

(CC-BY-NC-ND 4.0)

DOI: 10.4324/9781315206752-1

The funder of the Open Access version of this chapter is Hidekuni Washida.



 **Routledge**
Taylor & Francis Group
LONDON AND NEW YORK

1 The puzzling resilience of authoritarian party dominance

Introduction

Since the end of the Cold War, it has been increasingly clear that democratic institutions such as legislatures and elections paradoxically contribute to the resilience of authoritarian regimes (Gandhi and Lust-Okar 2009).¹ Legislatures help authoritarian leaders to facilitate power-sharing among elites (Svolik 2012: chapter 4; Wright and Escribà-Folch 2012) and selectively co-opt challengers and opponents (Gandhi 2008). Elections also provide informational benefits to dictators by revealing the distribution of electoral support (Magaloni 2006) and the ability of elites to mobilize electoral support (Blaydes 2011; Reuter and Robertson 2012).

In particular, party-based autocracies are more resilient than other types of autocracies (personalist or military regimes) (Geddes 1999). By tying their own hands with the formal and informal rules of party politics, leaders can credibly commit to sharing power and benefits with elites and masses (Magaloni 2008). Institutionalizing a party also creates a stake in regime survival among junior cadres by exploiting their progressive ambition (Svolik 2012: chapter 6). In addition, a political party helps ruling elites to create a highly advantageous playing field by monopolizing legislative power and state resources (Magaloni 2006; Greene 2007).

However, the mere existence of a party does not assure its enduring dominance, because only a limited number of them can remain in power for a long time. Specifically, despite the aforementioned benefits, multiparty elections lower the likelihood of regime survival (Magaloni 2008: 734–6; Svolik 2012: 184–92). To understand why some parties successfully survive multiparty elections, scholars have paid increasing attention to so-called dominant parties, such as Institutional Revolutionary Party or PRI (Mexico), People’s Action Party or PAP (Singapore), *Kuomintang* (Taiwan), United Russia, Botswana Democratic Party, Socialist Party (Senegal), and *Chama Cha Mapinduzi* (Tanzania).²

In their explorations, major case-focused studies (Magaloni 2006; Greene 2007; Blaydes 2011) have frequently encountered the key role played by resource distribution. Specifically, what is crucial is not the mere dispensation of benefits but the mechanism of controlling the flow of resources so as to cause elites and masses to actively sustain or passively accept the current regime (Slater 2010:

2 *Authoritarian party dominance*

11–12;³ Svulik 2012: 163). Despite the significance of the distributive mechanism,⁴ however, there have been insufficient attempts to untangle the actual flow of resources and the underlying logics.

This book fills this gap by exploring distributive strategies of the former ruling coalition in Malaysia (formerly Malaya), *Barisan Nasional* (BN or National Front, formerly the Alliance) led by the United Malays National Organization (UMNO).⁵ Many studies mention it as the key case of dominant parties (Magaloni 2006: 2, 22; Greene 2007: 16, 268–75; 2010; Reuter 2017: 1, 8).⁶ Although the BN defeated in the 2018 election, its resilience was outstanding in terms of its longevity and competitiveness among other dominant parties.

To explain the BN's resilience, existing Malaysia studies have repeatedly pointed out the key role of patronage distribution (Scott 1985; Shamsul 1986; Crouch 1996; Mohammad 2006), including some quantitative analyses (e.g., Jomo and Wee 2002; Pepinsky 2007; Ahmad Zafarullah 2012). However, there is still room for further investigation of distributive strategies. By utilizing originally constructed datasets, this study examines the distributive patterns of key political resources, i.e., money (development budgets), posts (ministerial portfolios), and seats (districting and apportionment).

The central argument of this book is that efficiency in resource distribution was the key to the BN's resilience. The book argues that the BN leaders had provided effective career incentives for elites to induce electoral mobilization with fewer budgetary resources. A limited pool of electoral support and the lack of self-financing elites induced the BN to develop such a distributive mechanism. The study also examines complementary strategies for intra/interparty conflict management to keep such an incentive mechanism intact and the efficient transformation of mobilized votes into legislative dominance. It also investigates the historical origins and decline of party dominance.

Systematic analyses reveal that the distributive mechanism found in Malaysia deviates from the mechanisms in an electoral theory or a coalitional theory of party dominance. The former (and conventional wisdom of Malaysia studies) attributes party dominance to punitive threatening and the exclusion of opposition supporters. In contrast, the latter expects rewards for autonomous and powerful elites. The problem with these theories is that the former assumes the party discipline as given, whereas the latter consider electoral support to be a secondary accompaniment of elites' support. The study argues that this theoretical division is a diversion from the important aspect of distributive politics in Malaysia, i.e., mobilization agency.

To clarify the aim of the book, the next section demonstrates the hidden vulnerability of the BN's dominance and argues that the conventional view (the electoral theory of party dominance, including the punishment regime theory) cannot fully explain the distributive strategies in Malaysia, because it pays insufficient attention to the incentives of ruling elites. The subsequent section discusses why the coalitional theory of party dominance is also insufficient to understanding the BN's distributive strategy. It explains why bridging the theoretical division helps not only deepen our understanding about the Malaysian politics but also extend the

theoretical scope of distributive politics studies in general. The final section explains the plan of the book.

A puzzle and the shortcomings of conventional view

The merit in focusing on Malaysia stems partly from the outstanding resilience of the BN. As stated earlier, party-based autocracies are more durable than personalist or military regimes. Figure 1.1 illustrates the endurance years (censored at 2010) of different types of autocracies in the dataset of Geddes, Wright and Frantz (2014). It confirms the relative durability of party-based regimes and the BN’s outstanding tenure even within this category.

The longevity of party dominance allows us to examine an optimal distributive strategy for party dominance, because the longevity implies that leaders of ruling parties have/had followed an optimal distributive strategy in specific strategic conditions. A long-term reign structures “a rule of the game” that is shared implicitly or explicitly by participants including politicians, bureaucrats, interest groups, party clerks, vote-canvassers, and electorates. Continuous interaction in turn leads to the specific pattern of distributive politics.

More important, the BN had survived more competitive elections than those of other cases. As seen from the scatterplot of the tenures and the mean scores of the Polity IV index during the tenures of party-based regimes (Figure 1.2),⁷ the degree of political competition is negatively associated with the endurance periods. It shows that the long-lasting cases are rare in relatively competitive regimes. Malaysia, for which the mean Polity IV score is 3.7 (1957–2010), is outstanding for attaining both longevity and competitiveness, as is Botswana.⁸




Figure 1.1 Kernel densities of duration years by regime types, 1946–2010

Note: Based on the data of Geddes *et al.* (2014). They do not differentiate single-party and dominant party regimes.

4 Authoritarian party dominance




Figure 1.2 Scatterplot of longevity and competitiveness of party-based regimes, 1946–2010

Note: Party-based regimes selected by Geddes *et al.* (2014). Polity IV scores from Marshall *et al.* (2016).

Moreover, the Alliance/BN had enjoyed merely a limited pool of electoral support. Figure 1.3 compares the trends of vote shares of leading dominant parties listed by Greene (2010). It indicates that the Alliance/BN had faced tougher competition since the embryonic (democratic) period and its vote shares have hovered at lower scores.

Despite the limited pool of votes, the Alliance/BN had sustained a two-thirds majority except in the 1969 and recent elections (Figure 1.4).⁹ A partial reason lies in electoral rule. Like Botswana, Malaysia uses a single-member, plurality electoral rule, or the first-past-the-post (FPTP), which magnifies lower vote shares into larger seat shares. Yet, at the same time, the FPTP ironically magnifies seat fluctuation by translating the modest level of decrease in vote shares into a significant number of defeating seats.¹⁰ Because the FPTP bonus (seat share minus vote share) becomes smaller as electoral performance deteriorates, the FPTP cannot provide a bulwark against electoral setbacks.

Given the electoral vulnerability of the BN, the theory of punishment regime proposed by Magaloni (2006) cannot sufficiently explain its resilience. This theory attributes the long-term party dominance to punitive threatening. According to this theory, winning a supermajority in the legislature bestows on the winner monopolistic control of state resources. The ruling party then reinforces




Figure 1.3 Vote shares of typical dominant parties, 1946–2018

Note: “x” represents the year of losing power. Cases selected by Greene (2010). Electoral data of other cases from Dieter Nohlen’s handbooks (www.nohlen.uni-hd.de) and other secondary sources, including PARLINE (www.ipu.org).




Figure 1.4 Vote and seat shares of the Alliance/BN, 1959–2018

Source: Election Commission, *Report on the General Election*, various issues.

Note: Vote shares count only the results of contested seats. The values of 1959 and 1964 are based only on the peninsula. The value of 1969 reflects the results of the Sabah and Sarawak elections conducted in 1970.

electoral support by threatening exclusion from distributive benefits,¹¹ which in turn deters pragmatic elites from defecting or seeking political careers outside the ruling party and imposes a serious coordination problem on opponents. Such equilibrium generates “the image of invincibility” (Magaloni 2006: 9) to reproduce party dominance.¹²

Existing Malaysia studies have also highlighted the monopoly of resources that enable punitive exclusion of opposition states, constituencies, localities,

6 *Authoritarian party dominance*

groups, and individuals from various kinds of benefits (e.g., Scott 1985; Shamsul 1986; Jomo and Wee 2002; Mohammad 2006). However, because of the vulnerability, a punitive logic cannot be the core of the distributive mechanism in Malaysia. A narrow and unstable support base made it difficult for the BN to rely on limited safe areas and the punitive strategy that can even consolidate a tentative oppositional swing.

Stable supporting bases for the BN had been restricted to specific parts of the peninsula (e.g., Perlis, Pahang, and Johore). Other areas, except some oppositional strongholds (e.g., Kelantan and Kuala Lumpur), had been much more vulnerable because of the limited and volatile electoral support. Although keeping the oppositional stronghold (Kelantan) in a less-developed status might have some demonstration effect, the exclusion of oppositional areas from the flow of distributive benefits had never suppressed the fluctuation of electoral support.

It is reasonable to think that the strategic condition of the BN differs substantially from that of the PRI. Because the PRI experienced a gradual decline from a highly advantageous position (with its vote share an overwhelming 90%), the distributive strategy of the PRI was defensive in the sense that it focused on the prevention of declining support by threatening punitive exclusion or buying back declining support in marginal (but still affiliated) constituencies (Magaloni 2006). However, a mere defensive strategy is plausibly inadequate to explain the distributive strategy of a more vulnerable party.

More important, the punishment story is silent about how ruling parties discipline elites. Understanding elite-level discipline is essential, because the major backlash for dominant parties results from a party split. The limited attention to elite-level politics stems partly from the fact that the aforementioned studies have focused primarily on presidential or semi-presidential systems, in which the executive-legislative relationships are more independent than in parliamentary systems. However, given the relative durability of parliamentary-based autocracies (Templeman 2012; Roberts 2015; Higashijima and Kasuya 2016),¹³ it is necessary to explore the coordinated distributive strategies for both elites and masses. Considering the aforementioned vulnerability and parliamentary system of Malaysia, an explanation of the mechanism of disciplining the benefit-seeking elites without assuming their loyalty is required.

Actually, the most serious threat for the leadership always came from within (UMNO). The history of the UMNO is filled with anecdotes of internal struggles over distributive benefits. As a cross-national analysis of dominant party splits implies (Reuter and Gandhi 2010), intra-UMNO conflicts often erupted after economic recessions. For example, the group known as Team B challenged the mainstream group (Team A) just after the mid-1980s recession, and some members of the former left the party to form a new party, *Semangat 46* (Spirit of 46) (Shamsul 1988; Hwang 2003). The struggle between the Mahathir and Anwar groups occurred during the Asian economic crisis. Nevertheless, mere coincidence is insufficient to explain the conflict. Likewise, stable economic growth alone cannot explain elites' loyalty. Because elite-level discipline is

endogenous to selective incentives, it is crucial to investigate the distributive strategy of party leadership to discipline competing elites.

In sum, the conventional wisdom about distributive strategy under party dominance cannot fully explain the Malaysian case, which lacks the conditions for the punitive threatening strategy to work effectively and thereby requires endogenizing the elite-level discipline. Although the UMNO is known as a highly centralized and disciplined organization, we cannot presume the leadership's institutional prerogatives and the elites' loyalty. Actually, the UMNO used to be a loosely organized, decentralized umbrella of local associations. Likewise, we cannot assume coalitional discipline, which also depends on the distribution of benefits. To explore an alternative explanation, the following section considers the coalition theory of party dominance.

Searching for an alternative explanation

Comparative studies of party dominance have attributed the resilience of dominant parties to credible power-sharing among elites (and broader masses) (Magaloni 2008). A political party enables the leader to commit to not abusing his/her power and to sharing the power and benefits. Therefore, it reduces the uncertainty for elites and derives long-term cooperation from them. Typically, selective incentives through political appointments provide a means to exploit the career ambitions of practical elites (and active members in society).

Yet, there have been few analyses of the patterns of political appointments, partly because the identification of the criteria for promotion is not an easy task (Svolik 2012: 169).¹⁴ Existing comparative studies have mentioned three criteria for promotion: seniority (individual-level), power balance (faction or party level), and electoral performance (geographic unit level). In any cases, resource distribution based on these criteria often accompanies greater rewards for autonomous and powerful elites who usually represent party strongholds.

As Svolik (2012: chapter 6) points out, seniority-based promotion extends the scope of party members by inducing senior members to stay loyal to recover the investments they have already made and junior members to invest in developing their careers within the ruling party. Actually, seniority-based promotion is frequently observed in various dominant parties, including in democracies, such as the Japanese LDP.

However, there is still uncertainty about its effect on party durability. In particular, whether the strict or rough adherence to the seniority rule contributes to the endurance remains unclear. Because of the scarcity of posts, a simple seniority rule does not necessarily provide sufficient incentive for the substantial numbers of elites, who face impending electoral risks or for those who lack prosperous career expectations (Nemoto, Krauss and Pekkanen 2008). This point is important because such elites are more likely to risk splitting or switching parties.¹⁵

Actually, the BN leaders had not followed a strict seniority rule, and junior members had comprised a substantial share of cabinet positions. For example,

8 *Authoritarian party dominance*

legislators with three-term seniority or shorter had constituted more than half of the post-electoral full-fledged (not deputy) ministers during the BN period. By appointing less-experienced members, leaders can plausibly enhance their leeway in policymaking, curtail the power base of senior rivals, or flexibly invite new groups into the party/coalition. Moreover, rewarding only senior members who represent stable supporting bases may damage the party's resilience.

The allocation of posts based on power balance among competing factions (or parties) is another strategy to discipline elites. Despite the accumulated research on portfolio allocation in democracies, there have been insufficient studies in authoritarian contexts. An exceptional, cross-national study of African countries by Arriora (2009) reveals that increasing the number of portfolios helps co-opt key elites and lower the coup risk. Yet, to understand the leader's strategies, more within-country studies that explain who is to be rewarded based on what kind of criterion are needed. Although the UMNO had dominated the BN, it could not have retained a two-thirds majority without coalition partners. In this sense, the leaders had been required to adjudicate the competing demands from within (UMNO) and outside (coalition partners). Simply rewarding the UMNO's strongholds could have endangered the electoral resilience of the BN.

Given the BN's needs to consider the electoral dimension, the most relevant theory is performance-based appointment under party dominance. Recent studies of party dominance in the Middle East and North African countries (Lust-Okar 2009; Blaydes 2011) and Russia (Reuter and Robertson 2012) argue that the leader of a dominant party can create a centripetal incentive structure by rewarding local elites who can mobilize more votes by using their own resources. In these regimes, self-financing elites play a central role in electoral mobilization in each locality. Because these elites rely on the central leadership for various selective and collective benefits, the distribution of rewards induces them to mobilize electoral support. In such a system, the central leader can focus mainly on this performance-based incentive mechanism, because competition among elites consolidates the party dominance.

Although this study also explores the agency between a central leader and local elites, its argument differs in a significant way. In contrast to the cases above, the leaders of the Alliance/BN could not have relied on local elites who lacked their own resources for electoral mobilization. Nonetheless, the federal structure has allowed local elites to play a significant role in electoral mobilization for national and party elections as well as in effective development planning and implementation.

This study considers such a strategic condition in which local politicians cannot finance their mobilization costs. Introducing a leader's necessity to compensate mobilizing costs requires specific consideration of the strategic dilemma due to the information asymmetry and agency slack. For example, marginal-unit targeting can result in undesirable actions by agents of strongholds, such as sabotage of electoral mobilization. To overcome such problems, the study argues that a leader can use cost-efficiency in mobilization, rather than mobilization

performance *per se*, as the key criterion for evaluating local elites. Stated theoretically, efficiency-based rent distribution can work as the revelation mechanism that derives truthful effort from efficient mobilizers. Systematic analyses reveal that the BN had distributed important portfolios to politicians who could bring more electoral support with smaller amounts of development allocation.

Although this book is a single-case study of an autocracy, its theoretical scope includes distributive politics in general. Existing studies of distributive politics have paid insufficient attention to the agency relationship and a strategic dilemma, in which the optimal strategies for electoral targeting and coalition building can contradict each other. To explore distributive strategies in the dilemma requires bridging the divide between electoral and coalitional theories. By unifying the studies of electoral targeting and portfolio allocation, this study presents a comprehensive framework for the study of distributive politics.

To clarify the map, Figure 1.5 compares the frameworks of existing theories of distributive politics with that of this study. Theories of mass-level electoral targeting focus on the ruling party’s distributive strategy across constituencies; theories of elite-level, coalition building investigate the distributive strategy for politicians, factions, or coalition partners. Although the focus of this study is similar to that of the coalition theory of party dominance in the sense that both focus on the agency between central leaders and local elites, the latter does not consider the important issues in agency. Recent studies of clientelism shed new light on agency relationship (Camp 2013; Stokes *et al.* 2013), but they focus on within-constituency exchange, i.e., grassroots agency between a local party machine




Figure 1.5 Differences in the focus of existing studies and this study

Note: Solid arrows represent direct mobilization/persuasion. Dashed arrows represent agency. This study focuses on bold arrows on the right side.

and electorates mediated by brokers (vote-canvassers). In contrast, agents in this study typically correspond to legislative members. This study examines an across-unit strategy to induce elites to mobilize voters efficiently and effectively.

Plan of the book

Figure 1.6 illustrates how the book proceeds. Chapter 2 presents a general framework that incorporates existing theories of distributive politics and elaborates a new model for considering the optimal distributive strategy in a strategic dilemma, i.e., mobilization incentives with impartial cost compensation.

Before moving to analyses, chapters 3 and 4 explain the historical origins and formal/informal backgrounds of the distributive mechanism. Chapter 3 illustrates how the pressure of electoral politics in the initial stage of party development induced the leaders and key elites to develop a centralized agency structure. Chapter 4 reinterprets Malaysian federalism as the basic structure of the distributive mechanism. In contrast to the existing studies that focus exclusively on the punitive collision between federal and state governments, it highlights the collusive agency between them.

Chapters 5 and 6 investigate the distributive pattern of development budgets and ministerial portfolios and test the key hypotheses elaborated in chapter 2. Chapter 5 reveals how the BN leaders had credibly committed to cost compensation through the impartial development budget appropriation for every affiliated state. Yet impartial cost compensation cannot induce competent mobilizers to make their best effort. Chapter 6 demonstrates that the efficiency-based portfolio appointment provided the incentive for career-seeking elites to mobilize electoral support with a smaller amount of cost compensation. Because the BN is a multiethnic coalition, it is also important to attain some balance among




Figure 1.6 Argument in brief: origins and endurance




Figure 1.7 Argument in brief: decline

coalition partners without endangering the efficiency-based portfolio allocation. The chapter analyzes how the leaders had adjudicated competing demands of electoral and coalitional politics through portfolio allocation.

Chapter 7 reveals how the BN had manufactured legislative dominance by magnifying the limited pool of votes. Specifically, it examines the BN’s gerrymandering and malapportionment strategy by using the originally constructed GIS (Geographic Information System) database. It also discusses the unexpected consequences of redistricting on the electoral setback in 2008.

Figure 1.7 summarizes the argument about declining dominance as a mirror image of Figure 1.6. In particular, chapter 8 focuses on the background of the electoral setback in 2008 and a subsequent survival strategy of the BN (UMNO). The effectiveness of distributive benefits declines under the low saliency of distributive issues among electorates. By using survey data, the chapter explains how a newly emerging, crosscutting issue dimension decreased the effectiveness of distribution-based mobilization. Then it explains why the UMNO turned to a more chauvinistic, authoritarian stance with an aggressive redistribution policy before the 2013 election, although this spatial strategy entailed the risk of abandoning the center. Chapter 9 concludes by summarizing the findings and discusses the implications for comparative studies of distributive politics and authoritarian dominance.

Notes

- 1 This study uses the terms authoritarian regime, autocracy, dictatorship, and nondemocracy interchangeably.
- 2 The definitions of a dominant or hegemonic party regime (Magaloni 2006: 32–42; Greene 2010: 809–11; Reuter 2017: 4–10) vary by authors. Though this study does not promote any strict definition or presume any thresholds of a seat share or longevity as Magaloni or Greene do, it focuses on a multiparty autocracy dominated by a ruling party.
- 3 Also see the contrast between Malaysia and Philippines (Slater 2010).
- 4 A distributive mechanism is a formal and informal rule that constrains who decides whom to reward based on what kind of criterion through which type of resources.

12 *Authoritarian party dominance*

- 5 The BN is a coalition that reflects ethnic (plus religious/geographic) cleavages. Malaysia is a multiethnic society with a federal structure composed of the 11 states on the peninsula and the two states on Borneo Island. According to the 2010 census, it is composed of *bumiputera* (son of soil, including Malays [55.1%] and other indigenous people mainly living in the Borneo states [11.9%]), Chinese (24.3%), Indians (7.4%) and other citizens (1.3%). The Malay-dominated UMNO has led the coalition with non-Malay and Borneo partners. The membership has changed several times. Though these parties are independently organized, they have a coordinating body and run for elections as a single-party with a common banner. Bogaards (2014) calls the BN a typical case of the alliance type of consociational party, which is made of organized entities based on each segment of a divided society but functions as a unity (pp. 13–14).
- 6 Also see Levitsky and Way (2010: 318–28) and Brownlee (2007).
- 7 The Polity IV index (Marshall, Gurr and Jaggers 2016) is a 21-scale of measurement of the degree of democratization (mainly democratic contestation) and ranges from +10 (the most democratic) to the least democratic (-10). Despite various problems (Cheibub, Gandhi and Vreeland 2010), this index provides a rough image of competitiveness.
- 8 South Africa under the National Party depended heavily on the strict control of political participation for nonwhite adults.
- 9 A two-thirds majority is the threshold for a constitutional amendment in the lower house. The Alliance/BN has frequently amended the constitution: for example, to change the provisions of political and civil rights, to intervene in oppositional state governments, and to curtail institutional checks and balances, such as the electoral commission, judiciary, and royal power. For example, see Hwang (2003) and Mohammad (2006).
- 10 For the ambiguous effects of electoral rules, see Templeman (2012: 136–59).
- 11 A highly developed party organization provides the infrastructure for monitoring and screening for punitive exclusion.
- 12 Greene (2007) highlights the importance of resource asymmetry between ruling and opposition parties, which marginalizes opposition parties in the political market by leaving a niche for ideologically radical activists. This makes it difficult for opposition parties to encroach upon the moderate electorates. The logic of punitive threatening also appears in democracies, including the case of Japanese Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) (Scheiner 2006).
- 13 Chapter 9 discusses this issue.
- 14 Existing studies of elite-level politics in Malaysia have focused on the factional infighting within the UMNO (e.g., Shamsul 1988; Hwang 2003), the rent-seeking networks among party cadres and major corporations (e.g., Gomez and Jomo 1999), or the political economy of coalition structure (Pepinsky 2009). However, there have been few analyses about political appointments. An exceptional study of portfolio allocation in Malaysia (Mayerchak 1975) covers only the Alliance period. There is room for further exploration.
- 15 The introduction of a term limit, like the Mexican president has, is one of the remedies for this problem. However, this is not the case in a parliamentary system such as Malaysia.

References

- Ahmad Zafarullah, A. J., 2012. The Political Structures and Subnational Government's Fiscal Behavior in Malaysia. *Procedia Economics and Finance* 1: 203–12.
- Arriora, L. R., 2009. Patronage and Political Stability in Africa. *Comparative Political Studies* 42 (10): 1339–62.

- Blaydes, L., 2011. *Elections and Distributive Politics in Mubarak's Egypt*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Bogaards, M., 2014. *Democracy and Social Peace in Divided Societies: Exploring Consociational Parties*, Hampshire and New York: Palgrave MacMillan.
- Brownlee, J., 2007. *Authoritarianism in an Age of Democratization*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Camp, E., 2013. *Throwing a Wrench into the Machine: The Costs of Brokers*, unpublished doctoral dissertation, Yale University.
- Cheibub, J. A., Gandhi, J., and Vreeland, J. R., 2010. Democracy and Dictatorship Revisited. *Public Choice* 143: 67–101.
- Crouch, H., 1996. *Government and Society in Malaysia*, Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
- Gandhi, J., 2008. *Political Institutions under Dictatorship*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- and Lust-Okar, E., 2009. Elections under Authoritarianism. *Annual Review of Political Science* 12: 403–33.
- Geddes, B., 1999. What Do We Know about Democratization after Twenty Years? *Annual Review of Political Science* 2: 115–44.
- , Wright, J., and Frantz, E., 2014. Autocratic Breakdown and Regime Transitions: A New Data Set. *Perspectives on Politics* 12 (2): 313–31.
- Gomez, E. T. and Jomo, K. S., 1999. *Malaysia's Political Economy: Politics, Patronage and Profits*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Greene, K. F., 2007. *Why Dominant Parties Lose: Mexico's Democratization in Comparative Perspective*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- , 2010. The Political Economy of Authoritarian Single-Party Dominance. *Comparative Political Studies* 43 (9): 1–27.
- Higashijima, M. and Kasuya, Y., 2016. The Peril of Parliamentarism? Executive-Legislative Relations and the Transition to Democracy from Electoral Authoritarian Rule. *EUI Working Papers MWP* 2016/01.
- Hwang, I. W., 2003. *Personalized Politics: The Malaysian State under Mahathir*, Singapore: ISEAS.
- Jomo, K. S. and Wee, C. H., 2002. The Political Economy of Malaysian Federalism: Economic Development, Public Policy and Conflict Containment. *WIDER Discussion Paper* 113.
- Levitsky, S. and Way, L. A., 2010. *Competitive Authoritarianism: Hybrid Regimes after the Cold War*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Lust-Okar, E., 2009. Legislative Elections in Hegemonic Authoritarian Regimes: Competitive Clientelism and Resistance to Democratization. In S. I. Lindberg, ed., *Democratization by Elections: A New Mode of Transition*, pp. 226–45, Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press.
- Magaloni, B., 2006. *Voting for Autocracy: Hegemonic Party Survival and Its Demise in Mexico*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- , 2008. Credible Power-Sharing and the Longevity of Authoritarian Rule. *Comparative Political Studies* 41 (4/5): 715–41.
- Marshall, M. G., Gurr, T., and Jagers, K., 2016. *Polity IV Project: Political Regime Characteristics and Transitions, 1800–2015*, Vienna, VA: Center for Systemic Peace.
- Mayerchak, P. M., 1975. *An Analysis of the Distribution of Rewards in the Malaysian Alliance Coalition (1959–1973)*, unpublished doctoral dissertation, the American University.

14 *Authoritarian party dominance*

- Mohammad, A. Y., 2006. *Malaysian Federalism: Conflict or Consensus*, Bangi: Penerbit Universiti Kebangsaan Malaysia.
- Nemoto, K., Krauss, E., and Pekkanen, R., 2008. Policy Dissension and Party Discipline: The July 2005 Vote on Postal Privatization in Japan. *British Journal of Political Science* 38: 499–525.
- Pepinsky, T., 2007. Autocracy, Elections, and Fiscal Policy: Evidence from Malaysia. *Studies of Comparative International Development* 42: 136–63.
- , 2009. *Economic Crisis and the Breakdown of Authoritarian Regimes: Indonesia and Malaysia in Comparative Perspective*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Reuter, O. J., 2017. *The Origins of Dominant Parties: Building Authoritarian Institutions in Post-Soviet Russia*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- and Gandhi, J., 2010. Economic Performance and Elite Defection from Hegemonic Parties. *British Journal of Political Science* 41: 83–110.
- and Robertson, G. B., 2012. Subnational Appointments in Authoritarian Regimes: Evidence from Russian Gubernatorial Appointments. *The Journal of Politics* 74 (4): 1023–37.
- Roberts, T. L., 2015. The Durability of Presidential and Parliament-Based Dictatorships. *Comparative Political Studies* 48 (7): 915–48.
- Scheiner, E., 2006. *Democracy without Competition in Japan: Opposition Failure in a One-Party Dominant State*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Scott, J., 1985. *Weapons of the Weak: Everyday Forms of Peasant Resistance*, New Hampshire: Yale University Press.
- Shamsul, A. B., 1986. *From British to Bumiputera Rule: Local Politics and Rural Development in Peninsular Malaysia*, Singapore: ISEAS.
- , 1988. The ‘Battle Royal’: The UMNO Elections of 1987. *Southeast Asian Affairs* 1988: 170–88.
- Slater, D., 2010. *Ordering Power: Contentious Politics and Authoritarian Leviathans in Southeast Asia*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Stokes, S. C., Dunning, T., Nazareno, M., and Brusco, V., 2013. *Brokers, Voters, and Clientelism: The Puzzle of Distributive Politics*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Svolik, M. W., 2012. *The Politics of Authoritarian Rule*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Templeman, K. A., 2012. *The Origins and Decline of Dominant Party Systems: Taiwan’s Transition in Comparative Perspective*, unpublished dissertation, the University of Michigan.
- Wright, J. and Escribà-Folch, A., 2012. Authoritarian Institutions and Regime Survival: Transitions to Democracy and Subsequent Authoritarian Regimes. *British Journal of Political Science* 42 (2): 287–306.