PALGRAVE STUDIES IN THIRD SECTOR RESEARCH

# Civil Society Elites

Exploring the Composition, Reproduction, Integration, and Contestation of Civil Society Actors at the Top

*Edited by*  Håkan Johansson · Anna Meeuwisse

# Palgrave Studies in Third Sector Research

**Series Editors** Bernard Enjolras Institute for Social Research (ISF) Oslo, Norway

> Håkan Johansson School of Social Work Lund University Lund, Sweden

Karl Henrik Sivesind Institute for Social Research Oslo, Norway

Tis book series focuses on the third sector—the sphere of society that is distinct from the family, the market economy, and political power/the state. Te third sector has been historically institutionalized in diferent ways across countries and is subject to diferent scholarly traditions. Palgrave Studies in Tird Sector Research addresses contemporary themes related to this societal sphere and its components.

Tis series has three main editorial aims; the frst is to facilitate the dialogue across institutional contexts and scholarly perspectives, and will therefore publish studies of the third sector, the social and solidary economy, civil society, voluntary sector, non-proft sector, philanthropic sector and other related concepts. Te second aim of the series is to publish contributions from all the regions of the world, including the Global South, and to foster comparisons across countries and global regions. Te third aim of the series is to stimulate new thematic, theoretical and methodological developments related to both long-standing scholarly and emergent themes.

# Håkan Johansson • Anna Meeuwisse Editors

# Civil Society Elites

Exploring the Composition, Reproduction, Integration, and Contestation of Civil Society Actors at the Top

*Editors* Håkan Johansson School of Social Work Lund University Lund, Sweden

Anna Meeuwisse School of Social Work Lund University Lund, Sweden

ISSN 2662-690X ISSN 2662-6918 (electronic) Palgrave Studies in Tird Sector Research ISBN 978-3-031-40149-7 ISBN 978-3-031-40150-3 (eBook) https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-40150-3

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# **Preface**

Tis book is the result of collaborative eforts to combine research on civil society and elites. Te concept of 'civil society elites' is based on our experiences and refections during feldwork in Europe. As we attended conferences and conducted interviews with civil society representatives and political leaders, we noticed that a few dominant civil society organisations consistently held signifcant power in diverse contexts. We also observed that the same individuals held multiple leadership positions, representing diferent organisations at diferent times. We began to conceptualise these leaders as civil society elites, which proved to be a fruitful analytical framework.

Many of the contributors to this volume participated in a research project at Lund University, Sweden, supported by Riksbankens Jubileumsfond (www.rj.se). Te project, titled 'Civil Society Elites? Comparing Elite Composition, Reproduction, Integration and Contestation in European Civil Societies' (M17-0188:1), included studies of civil society elites in four European countries (Italy, Poland, Sweden, and the UK) and at the EU level. All research conducted as part of this project was approved by the Swedish Ethical Review Authority (for detailed information see www.civilsocietyelites.lu.se). We gratefully acknowledge the Foundation's generous support, which has made this book and extensive research activities possible.

In addition, we would like to thank our colleagues who contributed their expertise on civil society elites in the United States, Denmark, and Hong Kong. Teir insights have helped to make this book an original contribution to the feld.

Lund, Sweden Håkan Johansson December 2023 Anna Meeuwisse

# **Contents**





# **Abbreviations**




# **Notes on Contributors**

**Niklas Altermark** is an associate professor in political science at Lund University. His research focuses on welfare state reform, disability policy, and civil society. He is part of the research project 'Civil Society Elites? Comparing Elite Composition, Reproduction, Integration, and Contestation in European Civil Societies'.

**Paola Arrigoni** is a political sociologist working at the 'Center for Documentation and Research on Foundations and Civil Society' at the Department of Culture, Politics and Society of the University of Turin. Her research interests extend in four directions: novel perspectives on studying elites; civil society elites and political change; organised philanthropy and policymaking; the green transition, regional divides, and elites. She is a member of the 'Sui Generis sociology for public action' research group and the Foundational Economy Collective.

**Malin Arvidson** is an associate professor at the School of Social Work, Lund University. Her research interests concern civil society organisations, how organisations respond to expectations and requests by outside stakeholders to conform to ideals of transparency, efciency, and accountability. She is currently engaged in research on power, status, and elites in civil society. She participates in the research project 'Civil Society Elites? Comparing Elite Composition, Reproduction, Integration, and Contestation in European Civil Societies'.

**Håkan Johansson** is a professor at the School of Social Work, Lund University. His research deals with civil society in national and international contexts. He has published extensively on issues relating to advocacy, protest participation and representation, and has been engaged in projects on Europeanisation of national civil societies. He leads the project 'Civil Society Elites? Comparing Elite Composition, Reproduction, Integration and Contestation in European Civil Societies' (2018–2023).

**Sara Kalm** is an associate professor in political science, Lund University in Sweden. Her research concerns social movement actors in global governance, but also migration and citizenship policy. She also participates in the research project 'Civil Society Elites? Comparing Elite Composition, Reproduction, Integration, and Contestation in European Civil Societies'.

**El**ż**bieta Korolczuk** is an associate professor in sociology working at Södertörn University in Stockholm and the American Studies Center at Warsaw University. Her research interests involve social movements, civil society, right-wing populism, and mobilisations against 'gender'. Her most recent publication is the monograph *Anti-gender Politics in the Populist Moment* written with Agnieszka Graf (2021, Routledge). She is part of the research project 'Civil Society Elites? Comparing Elite Composition, Reproduction, Integration, and Contestation in European Civil Societies'.

**Pui Chi Lai** holds a PhD in political science from the University of Macau in Macau SAR and is currently afliated with Leiden University in the Netherlands. Her research interests include the power elite, elite organisations, changing civil society and the political development of colonial and post-colonial Hong Kong.

**Laura Landorf** holds a PhD in political science from the Bremen International Graduate School of Social Sciences (BIGSSS), Germany. She is a researcher at the Department of Political Science at Lund University, Sweden. Her research interests focus on EU institutions and politics, civil society, and sociological approaches in EU studies. At Lund University she is involved in the research programme on 'Civil Society Elites'.

**Jayeon Lee** is a postdoctoral researcher at the School of Social Work at Lund University and a senior lecturer in social work at University of Gothenburg in Sweden. Her research within the project 'Civil Society Elites' is focused on understanding social composition, career patterns, and attitude and values of civil society leaders in several European countries.

**Jacob Aagaard Lunding** is a PhD fellow at Copenhagen Business School. His main research interests lie within the sociology of elites and power. With a prosopographical approach to historical sociology he is currently a working on a database built on the entries in the volumes of Danish Who's Who (1910-today) in order to study the formation and transformation of Danish elites during the twentieth century, using relational methods such as Social Network Analysis and Geometrical Data Analysis.

**Anna Meeuwisse** is Professor of Social Work at Lund University, Sweden. Her research interests include transnational social movements and the role of civil society in changing welfare states. One of her previous research projects concerned the Europeanisation of Swedish civil society and she is currently engaged in the research project 'Civil Society Elites? Comparing Elite Composition, Reproduction, Integration and Contestation in European Civil Societies'.

**Daniel Platek** of the Institute of Political Studies, Polish Academy of Sciences is a scholar specialising in protest movements, collective actions, and historical sociology. He is the author of several papers tracking extreme-right mobilisations in Poland. He was a postdoctoral fellow at Lund University within the 'Civil Society Elites' project.

**Cecilia Santilli** is a researcher at the School of Social Work at Lund University. She holds a PhD in Anthropology from the University of Aix-Marseille. As a research assistant at CEVIPOF of Sciences Po, Cecilia participated in the European research projects LIVEWHAT (EU FP7) and TransSOL (Horizon 2020 grant). Her main interests include migration, social policies, and civil society.

**Roberto Scaramuzzino** is an associate professor at the School of Social Work, Lund University in Sweden. His research interests include changes in the welfare and integration systems and the role of civil society organisations from a cross-national comparative perspective. He has been engaged in studies of civil society actors' mobilisation, advocacy activities, and collaboration with public authorities. He has also conducted studies on the Europeanisation of Swedish civil society and is part of the 'Civil Society Elites' project.

**Anders Sevelsted** is an assistant professor at Copenhagen Business School and has been a postdoctoral student at Lund University. His research interests are mainly within historical sociology and cover welfare state history, social movements and voluntarism, religious revivalism, and elite studies. He currently studies the 'moral elites' that shaped the normative fabric of the modern welfare state as well as the historical civil society elites in Denmark and Sweden.

**Anders Uhlin** is Professor of Political Science at Lund University. His main research interests are in the felds of civil society and global and regional governance. Recent publications include *Civil Society Elites: Field Studies from Cambodia and Indonesia,* (NIAS Press 2023) (co-edited with Astrid Norén-Nilsson and Amalinda Savirani) and *Legitimation and Delegitimation in Global Governance: Practices, Justifcations, and Audiences* (Oxford University Press 2022) (co-edited with Magdalena Bexell and Kristina Jönsson). He is part of the 'Civil Society Elites' project.

**Andrea Voyer** is an associate professor (docent and senior lecturer) in the Department of Sociology at Stockholm University. Her work examines the reproduction of social inequality in everyday settings. She is conducting a study of everyday inequality in three civic organisations in New York City: a parent teacher organisation, a church, and a community board.

# **List of Figures**


# **List of Tables**



# **1**

# **Civil Society Elites: An Introduction**

**Håkan Johansson and Anna Meeuwisse**

# **Introduction**

Tis book introduces the concept of civil society elites. Despite a long fascination in the social sciences regarding the processes leading to the concentration of power and resources in diferent arenas of social, political, and fnancial life, scholars have not explored this concept, the possibility of a civil society elite, or the implications of this for the roles that civil society can and is expected to play. Te reason for this may be that the concept comes across as counter-intuitive, or even paradoxical. It goes against mainstream understandings of civil society as a sphere for citizen mobilisation and participation. However, contemporary civil society shows anti-democratic tendencies, and an increase in illiberal civil society has been noted. Tese conceptual inconsistencies and societal developments make civil society elites even more relevant and scientifcally important to explore. Trough a series of theoretical and empirical

H. Johansson (\*) • A. Meeuwisse

School of Social Work, Lund University, Lund, Sweden e-mail: hakan.johansson@soch.lu.se; anna.meeuwisse@soch.lu.se

H. Johansson, A. Meeuwisse (eds.), *Civil Society Elites*, Palgrave Studies in Tird Sector Research, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-40150-3\_1

investigations into how civil society elites can be understood and examined, and in which situations they are challenged, this book provides novel insights into current debates on elites, populism, and the role of civil society in contemporary liberal democracies.

## **Civil Society in Transformation**

It is widely held that civil society performs key functions in liberal democracies (Diamond, 1994; Habermas, 1998). Scholars, activists, and politicians alike praise its signifcance as a sphere for citizen mobilisation and participation in-between political elections and alongside political institutions (Keane, 2009; Rosanvallon & Goldhammer, 2008). Trough associations, movements, cooperatives, charities, and philanthropy, civil society functions as an intermediary between states and citizens. A vibrant, inclusive, and pluralistic civil society enables citizens to come together and mobilise common concerns, without which citizens risk losing trust in political institutions and decision-making procedures. It is therefore no surprise that the concept of civil society is associated with values of human rights and civility (Shils, 1991), bottom-up processes of self-organisation (Tocqueville, 2003), and deliberative decision-making (Cohen & Arato, 1992).

At the same time, civil society shows elitist tendencies as resources are concentrated into the hands of a few powerful organisations and their leaders (Altermark et al., 2022b; Nye, 1977). Civil society organisations (hereafter CSOs) build hierarchies that form civil society elites who are socialised into powerful institutions (Michels, 1962; Mills, 2000) and who interact and integrate with other elite groups. Research points to a growing concentration of political and economic resources in the hands of a small group of major organisations (Johansson & Uhlin, 2020; Lindellee & Scaramuzzino, 2020). Civil society actors like the Red Cross, Caritas, Barnados, Oxfam, and the World Wildlife Fund are all recognised brands with millions of members, generous donors, extensive turnover, and signifcant access to corridors of power (Guo & Saxton, 2020). Teir leaders tend to enjoy status and prestige from other civil society leaders, the public at large, and leading politicians. Some are active at national levels, while others are part of a 'European' or 'global civil society' and frequently meet with political and business leaders to discuss societal challenges and the role that civil society can play (Johansson & Kalm, 2015). Teir powerful positions allow them to shape decisions that afect not only their members and benefciaries but also society more generally (Guo & Saxton, 2020).

Oligarchic tendencies (Michels, 1962), in the form of the widening gap between leaders and their constituents (e.g. Hwang & Powell, 2009; Van Deth & Maloney, 2012), have increased the importance of these actors. Major CSOs ofer a competitive salary, specialised posts, and promising career prospects (Bovens & Wille, 2017; Hilton et al., 2013). Notions like 'professionalisation' and 'NGOisation' suggest increasingly distant relations between leaders and members. As professionals take over key areas of decision-making in major CSOs, benefciaries and members risk being reduced to 'donors', 'checkbook participants', or 'credit card suppliers' (e.g. Skocpol, 2003). Tese trends suggest greater disparities and social distance between members and civil society elites who are welleducated professionals or philanthropists and who feel at home in elite circles (Heylen et al., 2020; Jordan & Maloney, 2007). At the same time, the elected presidents, hired CEOs, and wealthy philanthropists owe their status and power to the democratic expectations of civil society.

As a sign of elite domination, we fnd contestations inside civil society on who is a legitimate civil society leader. Today's activists and movements not only mobilise against felt injustice caused by states, markets, or other elite groups but also claim that civil society leaders and elites must 'hold up the mirror' to themselves (Civicus, 2020). Rather than being a vibrant sphere where people come together to address common concerns, these critics argue that civil society is shaped by closure and discrimination on the basis of class, gender, and ethnic lines, thus making it difcult for many people to engage with or take up leadership roles in civil society. Scholars have also found that leaders of major CSOs tend to be white, older, male, and educated at elite universities (Dale & Breeze, 2022; Gibelman, 2000; Lindellee & Scaramuzzino, 2020; Santilli & Scaramuzzino, 2021). Tese critics may want to revitalise democracy by developing new, more inclusive ways of working in civil societies (Jacobsson & Korolczuk, 2017), but the challengers may also be politically driven or driven by competition for resources or leadership positions (Engelstad et al., 2019).

In today's political climate, civil society leaders are increasingly accused of being partisan political actors disguised as non-partisan civic actors (Brechenmacher & Carothers, 2018; Toepler et al., 2020). In particular, international organisations such as the United Nations and the European Union, and their afliated CSOs and leaders, are distrusted. At the same time, critics of these institutions and CSOs have increasingly set up their own CSOs and are also networking at the supranational level. Attacks on liberal civil society are mobilised by various right-wing populist actors who actively oppose liberal CSOs. Following a populist frame, major CSOs—and their leaders—are portrayed as extremely powerful, bureaucratic, and unresponsive to the problems of 'the people' (Graf & Korolczuk, 2022; Kalm & Meeuwisse, 2020; Ruzza & Sanchez Salgado, 2021). Paradoxically, populist challengers who claim to represent the people often pursue political changes that also concentrate power in the hands of a narrow elite (Engelstad et al., 2019; Ivanovska Hadjievska, 2022). It is therefore important to avoid the sweeping and often unfounded accusations against actors in civil society that are now often made by right-wing populists for political reasons to justify a 'shrinking civil space'. Te political and cultural context in which civil society is embedded greatly infuences the policies that are pursued and the consequences they have.

## **Aim and Purpose**

Te purpose of this book is to theoretically explore and empirically analyse civil society elites. We investigate civil society elites as an elite group alongside other elite groups (e.g. political or economic elites) and address questions like who the elected presidents, hired CEOs, and wealthy philanthropists are, where they come from, and what factors explain their power and privileged position. We defne civil society elites as actors 'who have vastly disproportionate control over or access to a resource' that is valued by others (Khan, 2012a, p. 362). Civil society elites occupy positions that provide them with access, control, or possession of valuable resources that bring advantage and infuence inside or outside of civil societies (Hartmann, 2007). However, unlike other elite groups their position is inherently paradoxical because civil society elites represent members, benefciaries, and constituencies against powerful groups, while at the same time benefting from their elevated position because they are socialised into elite circles. Tis position raises questions about whether these leaders embrace particular civil society values and about how well they represent their constituencies.

Tis book takes a comparative approach and investigates civil society elites across national contexts and thereby draws attention to how structural and contextual features shape the position that civil society elites occupy. Contributions include studies of countries such as Denmark, Italy, Poland, Sweden, the US, the UK (including a study of Hong Kong), and civil society elites at the EU level as a refection of the supra-national characteristics of civil society elites (see also Altermark et al., 2022b; Johansson et al., 2022; Korolczuk, 2022; Santilli, 2022; Uhlin & Arvidson, 2022 for related studies). By using diferent research methods and studying civil society elites in diferent countries and contexts around the world, this book draws attention to the importance of social, political, and economic structures and the particular organisation and orientation of civil societies in diferent countries. Following discussions on civil society regimes that have shaped comparative civil society research (Salamon & Anheier, 1997, 1998; Salamon et al., 2003), this book seeks to advance knowledge on the contextual factors that shape civil society elites.

### **Key Contributions**

Tis book makes a series of original contributions. First, through our analytical and empirical explorations of the concept of civil society elites, we seek to bridge elite studies and civil society studies. Elite research has seen an upsurge in recent years (Cousin et al., 2018; Gulbrandsen, 2019; Khan, 2012b, 2016; Savage & Hjelbrekke, 2021), and there are many reasons why social sciences should continue to pay attention to the people at the top of institutional orders (Denord et al., 2020; Engelstad et al. 2019; Korsnes et al., 2017; Savage & Williams, 2008; Vogel et al., 2019). Elite theory posits that a minority of individuals hold the most power in society and are at least partially separated from a state's democratic election process. Scholars defne elites as having key positions in powerful organisations and whose resources and power are institutionally and organisationally embedded (Michels, 1962; Scott, 1996, 2008). Elite research distinguishes between diferent types of elite groups. Studies into an economic elite refect the distribution of economic resources and rising inequalities (Friedman & Laurison, 2019; Friedman & Savage, 2017), for instance tied to the 1%, the 0.1%, or the super-rich (Piketty, 2013). Studies into political elites (presidents or ministers) address political leaders' ambitions to tie resources and power under personal control (Best & Higley, 2018; Best & Hofmann-Lange, 2018; Vogel et al., 2019) and how this is associated with declining trust in public institutions, decreasing political participation, and growing populism (Conti et al., 2016). Few, however, have investigated civil society elites, although elite philanthropy and private donations have been a long-standing feature of most civil societies, suggesting that there have always been elites in civil society (Barman, 2017; Maclean et al., 2021; Vogel, 2006; Zald & Lounsbury, 2010).

Civil society research mainly conceptualises civil society as a sphere for citizen participation, mobilisation, and expression of interest against states and markets (Alexander, 2006). While such functions are certainly relevant, both theoretically and empirically oriented civil society research tend to downplay the competition and conficts among civil society actors over resources and the ordering, stratifcation, and hierarchies among civil society actors (collective or individual) that emerge (see, however, Gulbrandsen, 2020; Johansson & Uhlin, 2020; Lindellee & Scaramuzzino, 2020). Liberal civil society theory tends to regard civil society as something normatively good, thereby downplaying conficts and power inequalities. Although Marxist and Gramscian theorists see civil society as a sphere of indirect domination entailing both hegemonic and counter-hegemonic forces (Buttigeg, 1995), elites have not received much attention here either. Similarly, post-structural or Foucauldianinspired perspectives appear to disregard the idea of civil society elites (Dean & Villadsen, 2016).

Moreover, much civil society research has sought explanations and understandings of civil society, its actors, and its practices in states or in markets. Empirical studies that come under labels such as third sector, non-proft, or voluntary sector studies have focused on what takes place within organisations and have paid less attention to leaders of major CSOs and movements. Tis book ofers a diferent perspective as we investigate competition over valuable resources, forms of social stratifcation, and power asymmetries inside the feld of civil society. Tis suggests that knowledge on civil society's democratic potential cannot only be sought after in studies of what government or businesses do (or do not do), but must also include how civil society is internally structured.

Te concept of civil society elites allows us to understand transformation processes in civil society diferently. While many scholars have acknowledged the growing divisions between actors in the sector, divisions between leaders and members, and increasing ideological polarisation, mainly driven by external actors, few scholars have captured these as trends of elitism. Much previous research has examined how changing relations between states, markets, and civil societies afect CSOs and social movements, but few have focused attention on those who lead large organisations and movements and the power and infuence they can exert because of such transformational processes. Tis book therefore provides and promotes knowledge about the mechanisms behind elitisation processes as a new approach in public and academic debates about the transformation of civil societies.

### **Themes of Investigation**

Tis book puts forward four broad themes for empirical and theoretical inquiry of civil society elites, namely the *composition*, *reproduction*, *integration*, and *contestation* of civil society elites. Based on a wide range of empirical cases and original cross-country investigations, we will be able to draw conclusions on the phenomenon of civil society elites beyond current debates on civil society regimes, country models, or political contexts. Each theme is analytically separable, yet empirically integrated, and thus constitutes the logic by which the book is organised.

#### **Civil Society Elite Composition**

Elite composition constitutes a cornerstone in elite research because it attracts attention to the social profle of people at the top of diferent social orders. Elite research has typically focused on types and models of elite groups, often in a comparative fashion. Tis includes the investigation of national models of elites and their composition, size, and formation related to political, social, and cultural systems (Dahl, 1961; Mills, 2000; Useem, 1984). Much research has explored national elite types aimed at country case analyses and cross-country comparisons (e.g. Gulbrandsen & Engelstad, 2005; Larsen, 2016; Ruostetsaari, 2007).

A series of chapters in this book compare civil society elite composition across countries and civil society regimes. In Chap. 2, Sevelsted and Lunding investigate the composition of civil society elites in Denmark. Te chapter gives an original historical account on the changing nature of civil society elites using data from the Danish Who's Who since the start of the twentieth century. Te chapter notes that the Danish civil society elite has a more elite background and that more of them were born in the capital than other elites. Tey are increasingly well integrated with the state and the education sector, but to a lesser extent with politics. Tis historical account thus shows that composition, reproduction, and integration are interlinked and mutually reinforcing.

Chapter 3, by Lee and Scaramuzzino, takes of where the previous ended. Instead of addressing elite composition in a historical sense, Lee and Scaramuzzino provide an original comparison of civil society elite composition in Italy, Poland, Sweden, and the UK and in connection to the general population. Te chapter explores an elite survey with leaders of top CSOs in the abovementioned four countries and investigates the so-called 'civil society elite-masses gap'. Te authors draw attention to the paradoxical position of civil society elites, who are expected to be representative of the people despite the exclusive social composition of the top-level leadership strata.

In Chap. 4, Santilli and Scaramuzzino explore elite composition from a methodological point of view. Alongside studies of elites at the top of institutional orders, the so-called positional method in elite research, they suggest that civil society elites should also be captured through a reputational approach and an analysis of claims-making. Te chapter explores these diferent approaches in the context of Italian civil society and investigates what elite composition each model captures. Teir application fnds that method selection is crucial regarding the key question on drawing the horizontal and vertical boundaries of an elite.

#### **Civil Society Elite Reproduction**

Studies into elite reproduction fall back on the distinction between reproduction and circulation, where the former suggests stability at the top and the latter suggests changes within a group of elites. Michels (1962), who studied trade unions and the German Social Democratic Party, pointed to elite reproduction when new groups were assimilated with old groups due to socialisation into organisations and leadership (Diefenbach, 2019; Heylen et al., 2020). With regard to elite circulation, Pareto (1991) argued that history constitutes a 'graveyard of aristocracies' as elite groups are always replaced by new elites. Others have put more stress on the signifcance of class structures or educational systems as factors that drive elite reproduction and homogeneity at the top (Hartmann, 2000; Karabel, 2005; Khan, 2012b, 2005; van Zanten, 2014). Scholars have also investigated how associations, social clubs, and social networks allow and/or restrict access into elite groups and top positions (Bond, 2012; Cornwell & Dokshin, 2014; Denord et al., 2011; Kadushin, 1995). Some have focused on norms, attitudes, and preferences as means for selecting some while excluding others (Ellersgaard et al., 2019; Ruostetsaari, 2007, 2015). Others have investigated leadership training as a mechanism of elite reproduction of civil society leaders (Altermark et al., 2022a; Ivanovska Hadjievska et al., 2022).

Tree chapters in this book investigate civil society elite reproduction. In Chap. 5, Altermark and Johansson provide an analysis into prizes and awards as a means by which civil society leaders are consecrated into a group of extraordinary citizens in society. However, they fnd that such consecration difers across national contexts. Civil society elites are praised by the state (through royal honours or presidential medals) in some cases, while they are praised by their peers (civil society prizes and awards) in others. Following Bourdieu's notion of symbolic capital, the authors claim that these patterns lead to diferent modes of elite reproduction.

In Chap. 6, Voyer addresses civil society elite reproduction through a diferent approach as she investigates the social and cultural reproduction of economic elites as they engage as volunteers in elementary schools in the city of New York. Rather than investigating the reproduction of a civil society elite, she shows that civic activities and arenas allow a social glue that binds other elite groups together and provide a means for economic elites to legitimise their wealth through their charitable work.

In Chap. 7, Chi Lai expands this further through an analysis of the Hong Kong Jockey Club. She shows that the club developed into one of the world's largest charities and functioned as a place for bringing economic and political elites together as an elite of civil society. Te empirical material for her chapter consists of an analysis of club leaders' personal and professional backgrounds, showing stability at the top for more than a century. Chi Lai fnds that civil society elites come from privileged backgrounds and with extensive access to valuable resources, such as money or political capital, and that voluntary engagement and key leadership in CSOs binds them even closer together.

#### **Civil Society Elite Integration**

Integration is a central concept in elite research, often related to studies of elite interaction and interlock (Burris, 2005; Edling et al., 2014; Gulbrandsen, 2012). Here we fnd Mills' classic notion of 'the power elite' (2000) referring to elite integration across diferent sectors. Notions like 'revolving doors' or 'pantoufage' ofer a diferent approach as they stress mobility between sectors (van Zanten, 2014). Others have put more stress on elite integration as a practice as elites engage in loose networks and shift positions (Wedel, 2009, 2017), for instance, through notions like boundary crossing and boundary-spanning practices as elites move between elite positions in diferent sectors or felds (Lewis, 2008, 2012; Reed, 2012). Studies into elite philanthropy is illustrative as philanthropists take up key positions on boards (Ostrower, 2002) and by doing so exchange money for the 'do good' capital that civil society ofers (Dean, 2020; Maclean et al., 2021). Some have also studied civil society elite integration, for instance, tied to EU institutions (Uhlin & Arvidson, 2022).

In a series of chapters, the authors analyse patterns of elite integration and factors enhancing and/or restricting integration across sectors and groups. In Chap. 8, Arvidson and Uhlin investigate the motivation of elite boundary crossing and how this leads to inter-elite integration. Te authors provide an analysis of drivers and motivations related to an elite boundary-crossing career and fnd three ideal types of border crossers, namely elites who move to impose values from their sector of origin, elites who leave a sector where they no longer feel at home, and elites who move back and forth across sector boundaries to gain infuence.

In Chap. 9, Arrigoni investigates a particular type of Italian foundation, foundations of banking origin (Fobs), as a case of elite integration. She illustrates how a set of people, who are already powerful in other felds, constitute themselves as a new political elite by virtue of their leadership role in civil society. Her prosopographic study shows what felds they came from and the capital they possessed before entering elite roles in Italian civil society. However, instead of defning them as moving from one feld to another, Arrigoni proposes that these types of civil society elites gain their power from mixing logics from diferent felds and by operating both within and outside of formal structures. Tey form an interstitial elite in between felds.

In Chap. 10, Lee, Platek, and Scaramuzzino pay interest to a classic theme in elite integration, namely interlocking boards. Te authors analyse the inter-organisational networks emerging from interlocking leaders among the most resource-rich national-level CSOs in four countries. Based on a social network analysis, the authors fnd small components of tightly connected organisations in the Italian and Polish cases, mainly around similar policy areas. In Sweden and in the UK, they fnd a handful of key CSOs that link the majority of the resource-rich organisations, thus occupying powerful network positions.

#### **Contestation of Civil Society Elites**

Elites are contested because their resources and positions are desired by others. Elites face counter-elites, referring to individuals whose 'views and goals difer signifcantly from those of the ruling body of a country' (Sekeris, 2017, p. 152). Due to the reproduction of elites and their protective practices, new non-institutional challenger actors often arise (Graf & Korolczuk, 2022; Hutter & Borbath, 2019; Norris & Inglehart, 2019). Civil society leaders have almost by default been understood as elite challengers, as 'non-established elites', or as 'counter-elites' (Domhof, 2009; Etzioni-Halevy, 1993, 2001). However, the boundaries have been blurred by the rise of populism (Engelstad et al., 2019) as populist leaders claim to be by and for 'the people' and accuse civil society of being elitist (Korolczuk, 2022) and have investigated the divides between conservative and liberal elites (Kalm & Meeuwisse, 2022).

In a series of three chapters, this book investigates by whom and on what grounds civil society elites are challenged. We use the term 'elite contestation' in a dual fashion because civil society elites can be contested while they themselves contest other elite groups. In Chap. 11, Kalm and Meeuwisse explore what types of contestations civil society elites face across Europe. Te background to their investigation is the major structural trends of a shrinking civic space and marketisation processes. Te chapter benefts from a survey of civil society elites in Italy, Poland, Sweden, and the UK. Kalm and Meeuwisse fnd that the elites seem to be challenged most often from within their own organisations and on professional rather than ideological grounds. More profound contestations tend to be directed at the organisations they lead rather than at them as leaders. Te diferences observed refect the structural orientation of national civil societies.

In Chap. 12, Korolczuk explores elite contestation in a particular fashion as she investigates the increased pressure on liberal and left-leaning civil society actors by the state. Instead of addressing civil society elites as challenged by other civil society groups, this chapter analyses the strategies employed by the ruling party in Poland to marginalise the position of some civil society actors while promoting others. Te chapter fnds that although the state has limited tools to promote elite change within civil society, its challenges of independent CSOs contributes to the process of democratic erosion, which undermines democratic values and civil society as an independent sphere in society.

In Chap. 13, Landorf investigates elite challenges as competition over valuable positions in institutionalised felds. Trough an empirical investigation of the European Parliament's public hearings in the feld of animal welfare, the chapter explores which civil society actors occupy incumbent elite positions and which civil society actors act as their challengers. Te chapter shows how animal welfare organisations act as challengers to established civil society practices in the European Parliament by using the Intergroup as a venue to facilitate cooperation, resource concentration, and access to political elites beyond ofcial parliamentary structures.

In the concluding Chap. 14, Johansson and Meeuwisse use Michels' concept of 'oligarchic elites' and Mills' theory of a 'power elite' to refect on the volume's main fndings and the paradoxical meaning of the concept of civil society elites. For example, the two approaches prove useful in distinguishing between the elites *of* civil society ('oligarchic elites') and the elites *in* civil society ('power elites'). Some themes for further research on civil society elites are also suggested.

Te volume also contains an appendix that describes the data produced in the research programme 'Civil Society Elites? Comparing Elite Composition, Reproduction, Integration and Contestation in European Civil Societies', on which several of the chapters in the volume are based.

**Acknowledgement** Tis research was supported by Riksbankens Jubileumsfond (project grant M17-0188:1) for the project titled 'Civil Society Elites? Comparing Elite Composition, Reproduction, Integration and Contestation in European Civil Societies'.

## **References**

Alexander, J. (2006). *Te Civil Sphere*. Oxford University Press.


**Open Access** Tis chapter is licensed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/ by/4.0/), which permits use, sharing, adaptation, distribution and reproduction in any medium or format, as long as you give appropriate credit to the original author(s) and the source, provide a link to the Creative Commons licence and indicate if changes were made.

Te images or other third party material in this chapter are included in the chapter's Creative Commons licence, unless indicated otherwise in a credit line to the material. If material is not included in the chapter's Creative Commons licence and your intended use is not permitted by statutory regulation or exceeds the permitted use, you will need to obtain permission directly from the copyright holder.

# **Part I**

**Civil Society Elite Composition**

# **2**

# **The Danish Civil Society Elite 1910–2020: Continuity, Reproduction and Integration**

**Anders Sevelsted and Jacob Aagaard Lunding**

# **Introduction**

Several scholars have described how elites act *in* civil society. Elites engage with civil society to gain social capital through meeting places such as clubs or charities (Mills, 1999). Te rich gain symbolic benefts by engaging in charity (Maclean et al., 2021), especially high-status causes like museums and universities (Monier, 2019; Ostrower, 1995). Tey also get to mingle with actors and celebrities (Brockington, 2014). Less attention, however, has been paid to the elites *of* civil society, that is, the elite that is defned by its leadership within civil society. As described by Michels at the start of the twentieth century (Michels, 1968) and in the introduction to this book, organised civil society tends to build its own elite.

Because these elites claim to be working on behalf of society and vulnerable groups, it is of both academic and public interest to understand who the leaders of civil society organisations (hereafter CSOs) are.

Lejre, Denmark

A. Sevelsted (\*) • J. A. Lunding

e-mail: ase.bhl@cbs.dk; jlu.ioa@cbs.dk

<sup>©</sup> Te Author(s) 2024 **25**

H. Johansson, A. Meeuwisse (eds.), *Civil Society Elites*, Palgrave Studies in Tird Sector Research, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-40150-3\_2

Transparency and accountability are furthered by knowing this elite's descriptive characteristics (gender, age, education, class background, geography, etc.), the causes they support, their reproduction, and their integration with the rest of the elite.

In this chapter, we explore the causes, composition, reproduction, and integration of civil society elites in Denmark. We analyse the following questions: (i) What types of causes have Danish civil society elites historically been engaged in? (ii) How has the composition and reproduction of this elite changed over time? (iii) How integrated has the civil society elite been with the general elite and other sector elites in Denmark? Tese questions are answered by using historical data from three publications of the Danish Who's Who (1910, 1965, and 2020) and performing social network analysis (SNA).

We will frst review the literature on civil society elites in general and the Danish and Nordic civil society elites specifcally. We then introduce the characteristics of historical Danish civil society before we describe the study's operationalisation, method, and data. Ten follows the analysis of causes, composition, reproduction, and integration of the historical Danish civil society elite before we conclude and discuss the fndings.

# **Literature on Civil Society and Elites**

Te *elites of civil society* perspective focuses on the elite of the central organisations of the sector. Classically, Michels described the estrangement of the elite of political parties (Michels, 1968), and Mills portrayed union leaders as a sub-elite that stood between the elite and the masses (Mills, 2001). More recent studies have portrayed this elite as taking part in the general elite exchanges of economic and social resources (Gronbjerg, 1998; Ostrower, 1995; Useem, 1987, 1988), while others have found less integration through board interlocks than in other sectors (Moore et al., 2002).

In Denmark and Scandinavia, academic interest has overwhelmingly focused on the relationship between civil society and the state at the organisational or the sector level. Tis is perhaps unsurprising because from the perspective of 'crowding out' theories (Boli & Wuthnow, 1991) it constitutes something of a paradox that the emergence of large welfare states has not led to decreased volunteering or donations in socialdemocratic regimes. Quite the opposite has occurred, and when looking at the general population, the Nordic countries along with the Netherlands score the highest on these parameters (Henriksen et al., 2019). If one measures Nordic civil societies in terms of volume, organisational density, local organisational activity, and number of volunteers, the sector is large (Boje et al., 2006; Ibsen et al., 2008; Selle & Wollebæk, 2010).

Te emergence of welfare states has, however, formed the opportunity structures for civic engagement. Whereas volunteering in the US is oriented towards the poor and people in need, Danish volunteering is oriented towards leisure activities and political engagement such as political parties or advocacy. Donations are typically small, and there is a high degree of gender equality (Henriksen et al., 2019). Tis also means that measured in terms of paid employees, the Nordic sectors are small when compared to Germany or France (Salamon & Anheier, 1998; Salamon et al., 2003).

Understandably, then, plenty of scholars have studied the development of the relations between Nordic civil society and the state in the past 150 years (Bundesen et al., 2001; Henriksen & Bundesen, 2004; Klausen & Selle, 1995; Kuhnle & Selle, 1992; Lundström & Svedberg, 2003; Selle & Wollebæk, 2010; Trägårdh, 2007a, b, 2010). Tis has, however, led to a neglect of relations to other sectors (Henriksen et al., 2019). Moreover, an elite focus is absent—probably due to the mostly egalitarian and negotiated character of the sector. A single study has shown the centrality of union leaders in the Danish elite network (Ibsen et al., 2021). Non-contentious third sector organisations are only represented to a very small degree in the Danish elite, with only a few umbrella organisations (Steinitz et al., 2019).

In the following, we sketch the historical development of Danish civil society before turning to issues of method.

# **Historical Danish Civil Society**

Present-day Danish civil society is part of the Nordic welfare state regime. It has high public social welfare spending and a non-proft sector that is small in terms of employees but large in terms of volunteers. Volunteers are mostly engaged in sports and leisure activities (Henriksen et al., 2019). At the risk of oversimplifcation, this state of afairs can be boiled down to four key developments (Sevelsted, 2022). First, there is the infuence of the traditional elites of the eighteenth- and nineteenth-century absolutist state and emerging civil society. With the 1849 constitution that gave the vote to propertied men over the age of 40, the bourgeoisie came into power and were faced with a growing urban proletariat. Public and private relief were mutually constitutive in supporting, deterring, and disciplining the poor. 'Pioneer philanthropy' targeted disabled groups and health issues (Henriksen & Bundesen, 2004).

Second, there was the infuence of the classic social movements of the late nineteenth century, especially the labour movement, but also the women's movement, the temperance movement, and religious revivalism. Tese movements form the basis of Nordic civil societies and have created a tradition for membership and volunteering. Denmark and the Nordic countries thus have both strong social movements and strong state traditions (Sevelsted, 2019).

Tird, the mid-twentieth century saw the statisation of many areas and a concomitant change in professional dominance from the traditional elite (lawyers, theologians, and medical doctors) to new professions (social scientists and social workers). Te social reform of 1933 meant increased centralisation of social services and regulation of the third sector. From the 1960s, social welfare was increasingly delivered by the public system through universalistic principles of eligibility, professionalisation, and specialisation of services and the decentralisation of services from the state to the municipalities.

Fourth, from the late twentieth to early twenty-frst century there was a (neo)liberal rediscovery of the third sector and the dominance of the economist profession. Te 'third sector' was praised for its fexibility and proximity to the recipients of benefts—in contrast to the bureaucratic state—and was probably viewed as a cost-efcient way of handling the perceived fscal and legitimacy crisis of the welfare state (Sevelsted, 2020). Many organisations saw a decrease in membership and a move towards drop-in volunteers with no organisational afliation, even if membership numbers continue to be high when compared to other countries (Henriksen et al., 2019). Te period also saw the emergence of the socalled new social movements that focused on life politics rather than material interests—even though the causes of Greenpeace, Amnesty International, and the gay rights movement were hardly new (Ofe, 1985).

### **Operationalisation and Method**

In order to study the role and position of the elites of historical Danish civil society organisations within the broader elite settlement in Danish society throughout the twentieth century, we use three publications of the Danish Who's Who (*Kraks Blå Bog*).

Since the frst edition in 1910, *Kraks Blå Bog* has provided the public with small biographical entries on notable and powerful individuals in Danish society. Te book has been printed every single year with the exceptions of 1944 and 1945, which were the last two years of the Nazi German occupation (where the publishing house briefy discontinued the publication in response to the pressure from the Nazi German authorities in occupied Denmark to remove all Jews). Te selection of individuals is made by the editorial team and a body of consultants. If we trust the sources (interviews and ofcial statements), the method of selection has been fairly stable throughout the years. Te editors survey the press to collect new names of importance, but they accept suggestions from external sources. In this way, the publishing house keeps a database of potential individuals covering diferent areas of society, and on that basis 35 (in 2013) voluntary anonymous consultants with knowledge of the diferent areas weigh in on the fnal selection. In that sense the sample of individuals is based on the reputational method (Hofmann-Lange, 2018). Because the editors and consultants then select individuals based on their position within sectors and organisations, the selection criteria used by editors in practice is a combination of reputational and positional approaches, akin to the British Who's Who (Reeves et al., 2017). A downside of this method is that we are at the mercy of the editors' possibly changing inclusion criteria over time. Tese criteria have become more 'popular' over time and now include, for example, media personalities and top athletes.

From these biographies, we constructed a cleaned and matched list of organisational afliations for each individual for each year. If a person mentions an organisational afliation in the career or membership section of their entry—the biographies are fairly standardised across editions and individuals—a link between the individual and the organisation is made. Tis provides us with a two-mode 'career network' of individuals and the organisations to which they are or have been afliated. Tis means that the 'projected' individual-by-individual or organisation-byorganisation networks are both ontologically ambiguous. Tat is, the ties can be either synchronous, social connections (for individuals the copresence in the same organisations, and for organisation the simultaneous 'employment' of the same individual) or diachronic, symbolic connections (for individuals this means having careers through the same organisations, and for organisations this means having engaged the same individual at some point—and they are symbolic because individuals have not been employed at the same time). Given the ontological ambiguity of the ties, we propose a novel approach to network decomposition, which we call k-circle decomposition. Inspired by the 'minimum degree' based k-core decomposition (Seidman, 1983), this new approach is a minimal membership decomposition, suitable for two mode afliation networks.

In practice, this means that we perform an iterative pruning of the network in order to maintain only the most densely connected afliations and actors, that is the 'overlapping social circles' akin to those described by Mills (1999) in his studies of power elites. In each iteration, only the organisations with more than *k* linking members are retained, where a linking member is defned as an individual with afliations (past or present) to at least *j* of the remaining set of organisations. In this analysis, we fx the threshold for linking individuals, *j*, at three.

Tus, in the frst step, when we go from *k-score = 1* to *k-score = 2*, only organisations with at least two linking members are retained. In the next

#### **2 The Danish Civil Society Elite 1910–2020: Continuity…**

step, from *k = 2* to *k = 3*, only organisations with at least two members among the remaining linkers (i.e. individuals with three or more afliations in the remaining set of organisations) are retained, and so forth. Although *j* is a constant, the quality of being a linker becomes increasingly rare as the set of organisations becomes more exclusive.

Tis leaves us every year with a *k-score* for individuals and organisations, which is a measure of how many iterations they 'survive'. Tus, the k-score refects the level at which the individual or the organisation is 'deleted'. In order to get a proper continuous centrality measure, we propose ranking the individuals by their *k-sum*—that is, the sum of k-scores of *all* of his or her afliations minus the number of members. Similarly, the k-sum of an organisation is the sum of k-scores of all its members minus the number of members. In that way the decomposition results in two centrality measures (for individuals and for organisations) that refect how well organisations are at integrating or tying up the careers of central individuals who, for their part, leave a connecting trace between the organisations they are involved with throughout their careers.

In order to fnd the group of individuals who can be described as the elite actors of and in civil society organisations, we take a two-step approach to fnding (1) the right organisations and (2) the right individuals.

(1) From the k-circle decomposition described above, all organisations or entities in the entire corpus of the Danish Who's Who (1910–2020) have been assigned an annual rank based on their k-sum in the given year. Civil society organisations have been included on the basis of an adapted version of Salamon et al.'s coding schema (Salamon & Sokolowski, 1999). Specifcally, we have excluded religious organisations, except for religious organisations devoted mainly to social work, as well as political parties, business and professional associations, trade unions, and other organisations primarily established to further their members' interests. We defne the most central CSOs throughout the entire period from 1910 to 2020 by taking all the organisations that for at least one year are in the top 25 among the subset of organisations coded as civil society. Tis leaves us with a sample of 105 organisations (out of 2725, if the top 25 had been unique in being included every year in the Whos' Who).

(2) Te text corpus of the 1910, 1965, and 2020 editions (~1000 pages each) provides us with a rich historical description of the career paths of a diverse set of elite individuals. In total, the corpus contains biographies on 18,767 notable individuals from civil service, politics, business, the judiciary, the military, culture, science, and civil society. From these individuals, we sample the individuals with a leading position (director, president, chair, etc.) in at least one of the 105 most central CSOs.

# **A Civil Society Elite Prosopography**

Relative to the number of individuals portrayed in Who's Who, we fnd almost the same share of individuals with at least one leading position in a top CSO in each of the chosen periods. As seen in Table 2.1, the population develops from 2.2% (67 individuals) in 1910 to 2.5% (181 individuals) in 1965 to 1.7% (143 individuals) in 2020.

In the following three sections, we present three elements regarding historical changes in the prosopography of the civil society elite. Looking at the selection of CSOs represented in the three diferent editions of Who's Who by a past or present leader, we describe the representation of causes in the elite. In the next section, we focus on the social reproduction of the elite in terms of social background, demography, and gender. In the fnal section, we study the changes in the relationship between the civil society elite and the rest of the societal elite.


**Table 2.1** Overview of Who's Who civil society elite

Sources: *Kraks Blå Bog 1910*, Copenhagen: Kraks Forlag; *Kraks Blå Bog 1965*, Copenhagen: Kraks Forlag; *Kraks Blå Bog 2020,* Copenhagen: Gads Forlag

#### **The Causes of Civil Society Elites**

How has civil society elites' engagement in diferent causes changed over time? In order to answer this question, we have coded all CSOs in the sample according to their primary cause. We have coded according to ten categories (the adaptation of Salamon et al. 1999 mentioned above). Figure 2.1 depicts the relative ranking of categories based on the number of individuals engaged in the cause in the particular edition of Who's Who. Despite fundamental changes to Danish society over time, there is much continuity in the elite's engagement. Tis is evident when we take a look at the causes that have attracted the most individuals. Please note that one Who's Who individual may represent more than one organisation and thus more than one cause within and/or across categories.

**Fig. 2.1** Ranking of Causes, by share of CSO leaders affliated with a cause. (Sources: *Kraks Blå Bog 1910*, Copenhagen: Kraks Forlag; *Kraks Blå Bog 1965*, Copenhagen: Kraks Forlag; *Kraks Blå Bog 2020*, Copenhagen: Gads Forlag)

Te three categories of 'Children, mothers and women', 'Health', and 'Humanitarian aid and poverty alleviation' are among the top causes throughout the study period.

Te cause of 'Children, mothers, and women' (causes that were intrinsically linked in the beginning of the period, but are now more separate issues) is in the top three throughout the period. Tis is not least due to the Danish Women's Society (est. 1871) that from its founding worked for gender equality and spearheaded the struggle for women's sufrage. Tis speaks to elite continuity of the women's movement in Denmark at least at the organisational level.

In contrast, the organisations in the 'Health' category are replaced over time. Central health issues in 1910 were tuberculosis and temperance (each cause represented by four CSO leaders). In 1965, top health causes were polio and mental hygiene (as mental illness prevention was called at the time). In 2020, leaders of CSOs concerned with fghting cancer and heart disease were the most represented. In other words, the prominent health issues 'of the day' have always been a concern for the civil society elite.

Elite engagement in humanitarianism and poverty alleviation was dominated by the Danish Red Cross in 1910 and in 1965. However, in 2020 the organisation was overtaken by three other foreign aid organisations led by the umbrella organisation Danish Refugee Council.

Te Danish elites have been engaged in organising the novel phenomenon of mass sports and leisure that emerged in the nineteenth century. In 1910, the national sports association and the YMCA/YWCA were present in the sample. In 1965, the YMCA/YWCA was by far the largest organisation with 20 leaders represented. In 2020, engagement in Sports and Leisure fell. In part, the fall is caused by a decline in religious engagement, that is, in individuals with ties to YMCA/YWCA. In part, elite sports seem to crowd out the traditional movement-based organisations—evidenced by the fact that the quasi-NGO Team Denmark that organises elite sports is present in 2020 with seven individuals. Team Denmark is not included as civil society because the organisation was founded by the central administration that still appoints half the board (while the other half is appointed by the Danish Sports Association).

#### **2 The Danish Civil Society Elite 1910–2020: Continuity…**

Especially 'Housing' and 'Crime prevention and rehabilitation' stand out as causes that are falling out of elite grace. Housing drops from 10.4% to 1.4% during the period. Te category is dominated by both bourgeois philanthropists and leaders of labour movement-related housing cooperatives. Two of the three organisations in 2020 are cooperatives. 'Crime prevention and rehabilitation' similarly drops to 1.4% from 6%. Also 'Education and Enlightenment' sees a minor relative drop (from 9% to 4.2%) during the period—even if they are relatively stable in absolute numbers. Te beginning of the period contains leaders of philanthropic eforts to educate the working class. For the latter two periods, this sector is increasingly linked through representatives of the politically linked educational associations such as Folkeligt Oplysnings Forbund (FOF) and Arbejdernes Oplysningsforbund (AOF), connected to conservatives and the labour movement, respectively. Interestingly, 'Religion, culture, and charity' has steadily increased owing to the steady representation of the socially engaged revivalist milieu around the Copenhagen Home Mission as well as charitable foundations.

Finally, environmental issues have experienced the greatest relative rise over the period. Te Danish CSO Animal Protection is represented throughout the period. In fact, in 1910 it was the sole representative of environmental issues among the CSO elite. In 1965, Animal Protection was joined by the Nature Preservation Association. In 2020, WWF joined in with 6 people, meaning that the cause is now quite well-represented among the elite with 14 CSO leader positions.

Some of these developments can be explained on the basis of the development of Danish civil society described above. Increased state involvement in education, housing, and rehabilitation of criminals has most likely 'crowded out' civil society elite engagement in this area. Tis is exemplifed through the organisation Help For Mothers (*Mødrehjælpen*) that was established in 1924 as a philanthropic organisation, only to become part of the public system in 1939 and then closed down in 1976. Unlike many other organisations, however, this CSO then re-emerged in 1983 on the initiative of prominent left-wing public fgures. Te crowding-out thesis might also be supported by the observation of sustained engagement in sports and leisure as well as humanitarian aid. Elites may have looked to sports and leisure activities that continued to be organisationally independent of the state—despite being heavily subsidised by gambling taxes. Similarly, organisational elites in CSOs like the Red Cross may have looked to steer their CSOs' mission abroad as the public system increasingly cared for the national population.

Other trends run counter to the 'crowding out' thesis. For example, the elite has continuously been engaged in health care even though the public system has been heavily involved in this area at least since the 1960s. Tis may be an attractive area for elites to engage in because it is in a sense 'insatiable' and will as such always have a pioneer tinge—there are always new diseases, and new research is always needed to cure cancer, fght obesity, tackle mental illness, and so on. Tis also seems to be the case for humanitarian assistance. Here, the emergence of humanitarian state agencies has not meant the end of the need for assistance abroad. Seemingly, sufering beyond national borders cannot be crowded out. Environmental concerns also seem to provide continued positions at the top of CSOs. Te current crisis is seemingly so deep that elites can continue to wield support for this cause, even as the cause is prioritised by political parties (at least rhetorically).

Tere does seem to be a development in the kinds of causes elites engage in. Whereas the elites of 1910 and 1965 were concerned with diseases and illnesses of the lower classes, today the focus of the elite is on diseases that can afict all of the population. Te elite thus seem to refect the broader concerns of their time, which explains the decreasing engagement in defence and nationalist causes.

Tere might also be a mechanism of covariance between professional 'jurisdiction' (Abbott, 1988) and elite involvement meaning that when a lower-status profession takes over the leadership of organisations in certain causes (e.g. crime rehabilitation no longer being a cause for judges, but instead for semi-professionals), then these organisations are at risk of losing access to elite circles.

#### **The Composition and Reproduction of Civil Society Elites**

Before turning to the analysis of the changing composition of the civil society elites, let us refect for a moment on a methodological difculty that arises from the choice of taking not calendar years, but specifc editions of the Who's Who, as the point of departure for the analysis. As a result of this, the elite group we identify for each period is made up of multiple generations. Tat is, they are in fact born in quite diferent times. Te 1965 group, for instance, is composed of individuals born in the 1880s as well as in the 1920s (see Fig. 2.2).

To take this into account, in the following analyses of social background we split the results according to age (above vs below the median age) in order to distinguish between the 'older' and 'younger' generation within the period.

For the entire Who's Who population, we observe a decrease in elite reproduction—from around 48% to around 35% (with no signifcant generational diferences). Comparatively, for the CSO elite we also observe a total decrease, but starting from a higher level and being less strong for the later period. Here, however, there are signifcant generational diferences. For all periods, and especially in 1910 and 2020, the

**Fig. 2.2** Birth cohorts within the three periods. (Sources: *Kraks Blå Bog 1910*, Copenhagen: Kraks Forlag; *Kraks Blå Bog 1965*, Copenhagen: Kraks Forlag; *Kraks Blå Bog 2020*, Copenhagen: Gads Forlag. Note: Horizontal lines represent the median birth year in each sample (1910, 1965 and 2020))

**Fig. 2.3** Share with elite social background. (Sources: *Kraks Blå Bog 1910*, Copenhagen: Kraks Forlag; *Kraks Blå Bog 1965*, Copenhagen: Kraks Forlag; *Kraks Blå Bog 2020*, Copenhagen: Gads Forlag)

level of elite reproduction in the older generation is much higher (Fig. 2.3).

Tat is, although the level of elite reproduction in the CSO elite has been in decline over the century, it has been less so, and from a much higher level and with stronger generational delay, than for the rest of the societal elite. Tis could be the result of a covariation in the social backgrounds of elites involved in civil society and most other established elite groups (e.g. medical doctors). It could also be the result of selection bias because we have selected the 'elite of the civil society elite', that is, only leaders and not ordinary members of CSOs in the Who's Who (Fig. 2.4).

Taking into account that social class is not just a hierarchy, but rather a feld of class struggles (Bourdieu, 1984) stratifed in terms of capital volume as well as composition, we rely on the Oslo Register Data Class Scheme (ORDC) in order to divide the elite into a cultural fraction, a

**Fig. 2.4** Relative size of elite fractions. (Sources: *Kraks Blå Bog 1910*, Copenhagen: Kraks Forlag; *Kraks Blå Bog 1965*, Copenhagen: Kraks Forlag; *Kraks Blå Bog 2020*, Copenhagen: Gads Forlag)

professional (balanced cultural and economic) fraction, and an economic fraction (Hansen et al., 2009).

A closer look then at the internal dynamics of elite reproduction reveals that those within the civil society elite whose parents were elite are predominantly from the professional fraction (i.e. their parents were, for example, high judges, politicians, higher civil servants, leading doctors, or military leaders). Tis is true for the entire period, although the size of the economic fraction increases at the expense of the cultural fraction.

Adding the question of generations, some interesting diferences can be seen. While the elite background of the older cohorts of the 1965 sample resembles the overall Who's Who composition, with a slight overrepresentation of the economic fraction, the share of the 'younger' (born after 1901) cohorts of people from the professional fraction is very large. Tis is largely due to the fact that sons of the early twentieth-century judiciary at this point began to become engaged in CSOs. Of the 'elite-born' CSO leaders from the younger generation in the 1965 sample, 26% were sons of the judiciary.

In terms of inclusion of women, the CSO elite has been more open than the general Who's Who elite. Already in 1910 the share of women was higher, although still only around 10% for this particular elite (Table 2.2).

Geographically, we observe a similar development. From the outset the leaders of central CSOs are almost all Copenhagen live, predominantly in central Copenhagen. Also, although the centralisation of the capital city declines over the century, it does so more slowly and to a lesser extent than the broader elite. Following the trend of the elite in general, they are increasingly—and even more so—born in the upper-class and uppermiddle-class suburbs north of Copenhagen (e.g. the municipality of Gentofte). At the same time, as a general observation over the entire period, we fnd much fewer foreign-born individuals in the civil society elite compared to the general Who's Who population.


**Table 2.2** Gender and birth place

Sources: *Kraks Blå Bog 1910*, Copenhagen: Kraks Forlag; *Kraks Blå Bog 1965*, Copenhagen: Kraks Forlag; *Kraks Blå Bog 2020*, Copenhagen: Gads Forlag.

Overall, we see how the civil society elite in some respects follows the general historical trajectory of the Who's Who elite as such—fewer people have an elite background, more women are represented, and fewer individuals live in the capital city. However, it seems that the civil society elite is even more 'distinguished' than the elite in general: More people have an elite background and more live in the capital. Interestingly, the 'sons of the judiciary' have played a disproportionately large role in the Danish civil society elite.

#### **The Integration of Civil Society Elites**

As introduced in Chap. 1, the literature has described how CSOs become more professionalised (Skocpol, 2004) and more consolidated and how civil society is increasingly disconnected from party politics (Katz & Mair, 1995). How might these trends afect civil society elites? On the one hand, one could imagine a sector whose elite would be increasingly disconnected from other elites because they would be 'sectorially isolated'. On the other hand, one could also imagine further integration at the top, as CSO leaders would increasingly be recruited from outside the organisation—what has been described as 'diploma democracy' or the rule of an educated elite (Bovens & Wille, 2017). We cannot ofer any defnitive answer here as to the most viable hypothesis, but we can ofer insight into changes in civil society elite integration in Denmark over time.

In the following, we show integration by looking at the share of positions that CSO leaders have held in the most central organisations in other sectors. Specifcally, we have taken the same approach here, creating a list of the organisations in the top 25 within their respective sector for at least one year throughout the century. Afliation with a sector is then defned as having one or more positions in a central organisation in a given sector.

Te overall development points to an increasing integration with the rest of the elite from the beginning to the middle period, and then little change between the middle and latest period. In 1910, 24% had more than one position in another sector. In 1965 and 2020, 50% and 42% had more than one position in other sectors, respectively. Civil society has thus seemingly become more integrated at the elite level. Moreover, the biographies in 1910 were often shorter, which might be a part of the explanation of the lower share that year. Tere is, however, a quite uneven integration across sectors, as is evident in Fig. 2.5.

Troughout the period, there has been close integration with the state. Much of this integration has taken place through 'quangos' or quasi-NGOs such as commissions and other organisations with an advisory capacity. In the early period, this was the Tuberculosis Commission, and in 2020 the Refugee Council, Ethical Council, and UNICEF (United

**Fig. 2.5** Affliations to other sectors, ranked by share of CSO leaders with more than one leading position in a sector. (Sources: *Kraks Blå Bog 1910*, Copenhagen: Kraks Forlag; *Kraks Blå Bog 1965*, Copenhagen: Kraks Forlag; *Kraks Blå Bog 2020*, Copenhagen: Gads Forlag)

Nations Children's Fund) had this function. Te national bank has connected the sectors throughout the period. Tis seems to indicate a career path of 'issue professionals' who are not concerned with sector borders, but who pursue careers across the public and third sector, for example in relation to foreign aid or diseases.

It is in this respect interesting to note that there is a lower level of integration of careers between politics and civil society. Tis integration has stagnated at 7.7%. To native Danes, this would probably seem surprising because a number of prominent politicians have taken up leadership positions in organisations such as Save the Children (Helle Torning-Schmidt and Johanne Schmidt-Nielsen) and the Danish Society for Nature Conservation (Maria Reumert Gjerding). It thus seems that there is a 'publicity bias' at play here.

While the revolving doors are seemingly at a set pace between politics and the third sector, the mutual afliations between civil society and science and education have risen from 3% to 8.4%. Tis could indicate that Denmark in some areas indeed has developed a kind of third sector 'diploma democracy' with a close relationship across sectors where individuals pursue careers across the public and the third sector in research, advocacy, and professional societies. More than 90% of the civil society elite have a university degree throughout the period. Te diploma thesis is supported by the development of integration with unions. While union integration is consistently non-existent or very low throughout the period, the unions that integrate the elite change—from nurses' unions in the early period to umbrella organisations (the Danish Confederation of Trade Unions and the State Ofcial's Union) in the middle period, and fnally the Lawyers and Economists' Union (DJØF). Tis may indicate that issue professionals may have dominated the early period, while the later period is increasingly dominated by generalist professionals. It also appears that there is an inverse relationship between business associations on the one hand and unions and interest groups on the other that matches the waning and waxing of social-democratic ideology over the period. Tis could possibly indicate something about the hegemonic struggle between business elites and union elites.

Te business sector is closely integrated with civil society throughout the period. Banking and insurance are present throughout, while the shipping giant Mærsk enters the scene in 2020. Tis could indicate a lessthan-clear separation between business and philanthropy—or maybe a demand from the private sector for a certain kind of status and expertise.

Te culture/media category is interesting. Te category is the result of a complexity-reducing efort to have a manageable number of categories, and so it contains both media personalities and individuals involved in religious social work. Somewhat surprisingly, the category was absent in 1910, but rose to 7.2% in 1965 and then to 12.6% in 2020. Tis development seems to be driven by religious social work and museums in the middle period and by newspapers and television in the later period. In other words, within this category, there is a story of disintegration of the religious elites and an integration of news media elites. From the same starting point, the sector of law experienced its zenith in 1965, only to decline again in 2020. Te category is dominated by individuals in relation to legal courts.

## **Conclusion**

In this chapter, we have described the historical trajectory of the *elites of civil society* in Denmark from 1910 to 2020 using data from the Danish Who's Who publications from 1910, 1965, and 2020. While most studies tend to focus on the elites *in* civil society, we have looked at the elites *of* civil society, that is, individuals in CSO leadership positions.

Troughout the period, civil society elites have constantly been involved in certain causes, and leaders of organisations dealing with health issues, children, mothers, and women, as well as humanitarian aid and poverty alleviation have been the best represented throughout the period. Other causes have been increasingly less represented by the elite. Tis goes for education, housing, and the rehabilitation of criminals. Possibly, there has been a crowding-out efect as the state has become the dominant provider. Alternatively, civil society elites may have focused on areas in which crowding out is not possible, and the sick at home and the poor and unfortunate abroad, and increasingly the degradation of the environment, seemingly provide endless opportunities for charity. A third interpretation could be that certain causes have experienced a loss of status as low-status professions have taken up leadership positions.

Interestingly, the composition and reproduction analyses show that the civil society elite on the one hand has historically been more distinguished than the rest of the elite: more people have an elite background and more live in the capital. Tere might be some selection bias involved. On the other hand, the civil society elite has included more women throughout the period. Like the rest of the elite, but to a lesser extent, it has become slightly less 'elite' over time. A particularly interesting fnding is the 'sons of the judiciary' efect. Tis group became particularly dominant in the middle period.

Tis civil society elite has become more integrated with the elite of other sectors over the century. Troughout, the sector elite was closely connected with the state elite, testifying to this Nordic strong state/strong civil society tradition. Interestingly, the integration with politics has not been particularly strong, while the integration with education has strengthened. Tese trends may be indications of a continued 'issue professionalism' across state and civil society as well as a kind of 'diploma democracy' where educational credentials and positions become more important. Te reproduction efect of the 'sons of the judiciary' and the strong state and educational integration fts with other fndings that civil society elites are in fact rooted in a 'moral elite' inherited from the nineteenth-century absolutist state, thus organising across state and civil society spheres (Sevelsted, 2022).

Looking ahead, the study of elites beyond the political and economic spheres that have traditionally been the central focus of elite studies is a promising research avenue for understanding how old aristocracies are reproduced in new arenas. Future research questions should include: How have the children of the administers of the old societies (the absolutist state in the case of Denmark) found new functions in the new society? How have elite members of (relatively) declining sectors such as theological, judicial, and medical dynasties been reproduced in (relatively) ascending sectors such as the political system, civil society, the public sphere, and popular culture?

**Acknowledgement** Tis research was supported by DFF grant no 8019-00021B; Carlsberg Foundation grant no CF17-0386.

## **References**


**Open Access** Tis chapter is licensed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/ by/4.0/), which permits use, sharing, adaptation, distribution and reproduction in any medium or format, as long as you give appropriate credit to the original author(s) and the source, provide a link to the Creative Commons licence and indicate if changes were made.

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# **3**

# **Mirroring the Masses? A Cross-National Comparison of Civil Society Elite Composition**

**Jayeon Lee and Roberto Scaramuzzino**

# **Introduction**

Addressing the composition of elites is a task common to many elite studies (Hofmann-Lange, 2018). Tis approach is about identifying who the elites are and what characterises them. In this chapter, we study the composition of civil society elites in four national and one supranational context in Europe, using a novel comparative dataset based on surveys of the top-level leaders of the most resource-rich civil society organisations (hereafter CSOs).

Tis study draws on a particular strand of research in elite studies focusing on the 'elite-masses gap'. Te basic assumption is that elites are diferent from the rest whether formulated in terms of 'elite-masses gap'

J. Lee (\*)

R. Scaramuzzino School of Social Work, Lund University, Lund, Sweden e-mail: roberto.scaramuzzino@soch.lu.se

© Te Author(s) 2024 **51** H. Johansson, A. Meeuwisse (eds.), *Civil Society Elites*, Palgrave Studies in Tird Sector Research, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-40150-3\_3

Department of Social Work, University of Gothenburg, Gothenburg, Sweden e-mail: jayeon.lee@socwork.gu.se

(Müller et al., 2012), 'elite-citizen gap' (Dellmuth et al., 2022), or 'elitepublic gap' (Kertzer, 2020). To study this gap, it is common to compare the composition and/or attitudes of an elite group with that of the general population (e.g., Dellmuth et al., 2022). A large gap between representative political elites and citizens has been suggested to potentially challenge well-functioning democracies. Best and Vogel (2018) link this gap to 'political professionalisation', which can be understood as a process at both the individual level and the structural level. While at the individual level representatives tend to become part of an occupational group, at the structural level the same group becomes established by formal and informal rules that defne the group's boundaries and collective identity. Te creation of a 'closed group' of representative elites, for instance, makes some groups of citizens more likely to be selected into this elite group than others. In this sense professionalisation increases the autonomy of representative elites compared to their constituencies, thus making them less accountable (ibid.).

While the issue of the elite-masses gap has been particularly studied regarding political elites (Kertzer, 2020), it is also relevant for studies of the composition of civil society leaders. CSOs and their leaders are supposed to play a crucial role in bringing the voices of diverse groups into the political arena for a well-functioning, pluralistic democracy (Guo & Musso, 2007; Kohler-Koch, 2010; Smismans, 2003). Many CSOs claim, in fact, to represent the interests of specifc social groups and to speak on their behalf. Tey seldom aim to represent the interests of the elites, but rather those of specifc interest groups such as people with certain types of disabilities, retirees, sexual minorities, tenants, the homeless, and so on. Many others claim to be advocates for certain social causes, such as traditional values, social justice, gender equality, environmental protection, children's rights, and so on. In both cases, CSOs and their spokespersons claim representativeness as a way to strengthen their leverage in communicating core messages in the public arena and in pursuing their missions, claiming to act as 'transmission belts' between citizens and policymakers (Albareda, 2018; Halpin, 2010). Although the leaders of CSOs are not necessarily appointed through formal elections by the masses in the same way as elected politicians, CSOs strive to establish ways of ensuring representativity of their leaders vis-à-vis their constituencies (Johansson & Lee, 2014).

Besides representativity based on internal democratic elections, claims of representation based on having a leader with shared characteristics and identities as those they represent can be justifed in the representation of marginalised social groups. A descriptively representative leader can potentially bring the perspectives and experiences of disadvantaged groups directly into the political arena (Pitkin, 1967). In a similar way, Saward (2010) includes 'mirroring' as one sub-type of representative claims where a representative appeals to the similarity between the claimant and the constituency he or she claims to speak or stand for. An illustrative example of such an efort to achieve descriptive representation might be found in a federation type of organisation for people with disabilities, where the organisation makes sure that its executive board consists of persons with diferent types of disabilities (Johansson & Lee, 2014).

While we expect that CSOs will strive for diversity and inclusiveness in the social composition of their leaders, we expect the leadership positions of the most resource-rich CSOs in each national context to be mostly occupied by people belonging to the social categories that are often found in positions of power in society.

Based on these debates, we argue for the relevance of addressing the elite-masses gap concerning civil society elites. A key empirical question here is about the composition of civil society elites and how well they refect the characteristics of and attitudes held by the general population. We thus study the civil society elite-masses gap as a representation of the diferences between civil society elites and the general population in terms of socio-demographic characteristics and attitudes in four national contexts (i.e., Italy, Poland, Sweden, and the UK) and at the EU level. Te research questions are as follows:


#### **54 J. Lee and R. Scaramuzzino**

Tese questions are of key importance for civil society research. In fact, as with representative political elites, trends of professionalisation and long chains of representation might have contributed to creating a closed group of civil society elites. In line with Michels' (2001) theory of the 'iron law of oligarchy', concerns have been raised as to the representativeness of leaders of major CSOs, thus problematising the possibly increasing distance between the leadership strata of civil society and their constituencies (Skocpol, 2003). Te emergence of the skilled, professionalised civil society leaders, possibly resembling other political elites in their socio-economic disposition and career paths, raises the question of the capability of civil society leaders to actually deliver on the promises of democratic and pluralistic representation for their causes and constituents. In Michels' (2001) view, the professionalisation of leaders would involve civil society elites becoming increasingly conservative towards societal change when it comes to their attitudes.

# **Method**

Empirically, we analyse the composition of civil society leaders using cross-national survey data from the Civil Society Elite Survey (see the Appendix to this volume by Scaramuzzino and Lee) carried out within the research programme 'Civil Society Elites? Comparing Elite Composition, Reproduction, Integration and Contestation in European Civil Societies', funded by Riksbankens jubileumsfond 2018–2023. Te respondents (N = 897) are top-level governing and executive leaders of resource-rich CSOs in Italy, Poland, Sweden, and the UK and at the EU level using a set of common indicators measuring fnancial and political resources. Our contribution is to empirically determine the composition of the group of leaders as a de facto civil society elite who occupy the highest leadership positions in the most resource-rich CSOs in the fve contexts.

We focus both on the socio-demographic characteristics of the leaders (see the Appendix to this chapter) and on their attitudes regarding four core sociopolitical issues. By mapping out the composition of civil society elites in relation to that of the general population using another set of comparative data (the European Social Survey, 2018, Round 9 data), we are able to explore the civil society elite-masses gap. Te cross-country comparison allows us to address both general patterns in civil society elites regardless of contexts and diferent patterns that can be understood through the lens of civil society regime theory and levels of professionalisation, as will be discussed later in the chapter.

In our analysis of the composition of civil society elites across the fve contexts, we consider two sets of variables that are connected to the leaders' socio-demographic background and to the leaders' attitudes (see Table 3.1).

Te socio-demographic variables include age, gender, education, and country of birth and relate directly to the issue of homogeneity and to how inequality in society is reproduced based on specifc categories (Tilly, 1999). Tey also relate to theories about resources and capital that diferent individuals control based on their social position, such as cultural and social capital (Swartz, 1997). Based on a common understanding of political elites, which dates back to the work of Pareto in the nineteenth century, we expect a certain level of homogeneity among our leaders when it comes to socio-demographic characteristics (Best & Higley,


**Table 3.1** Variables used in the analysis of civil society elites' composition

Source: The Civil Society Elite Survey; European Social Survey Round 9 Data (2018). Data fle edition 3.1. Sikt—Norwegian Agency for Shared Services in Education and Research, Norway—Data Archive and distributor of ESS data for ESS ERIC. https://doi.org/10.21338/NSD-ESS9-2018

2018) and attitudes (Best et al., 2012; Gulbrandsen, 2019; López et al., 2020).

Te attitude variables focus on the leaders' attitudes concerning issues of democracy and equality. Among these variables, we consider social trust, ideological position, satisfaction with democracy, and gay and lesbians' rights. Te variables have been chosen partly because they allow us to compare the attitudes held by civil society elites with the general population in each national context through the European Social Survey (ninth round). Social trust relates to a classical outcome of civil society participation and engagement (Putnam, 2000). Ideological position, as a variable, places the respondent on a classical left-right continuum with a middle point. Satisfaction with democracy can be related to the classical function of civil society as a critical voice, watchdog, and counterweight to the state (Arvidson et al., 2018). Finally, gay and lesbian rights is an important dimension of human rights that creates polarisation in the public debate and that is not directly overlapping with an ideological positioning on a left-right scale.

Te analysis is built around a bivariate analysis comparing the civil society elites with the general population in each national context. Measures of associations are presented for the correlation between the specifc variable and national context of the civil society elite. As a measure of diference or distance between the civil society elite and the general population, we present a 'gap-measure' (cf. Müller et al., 2012) that we calculate as the diference between the mean value for the elite and the mean value for the general population.

Before we delve into the analysis of our data, it is relevant to briefy discuss the types of organisations that are represented in the sample that the leaders in the survey are leading. To the extent to which civil society leaders are expected to descriptively represent their constituencies, the type of organisations they lead will give some insights into what constituencies they are expected to mirror. Unfortunately, due to anonymity in our survey study, the responses of the leaders cannot be directly linked to a specifc organisation or type of organisation. However, by looking at the sample of organisations in each of the national contexts, we can understand which types of organisations are represented among our respondents.

#### **3 Mirroring the Masses? A Cross-National Comparison of Civil…**

First of all, we fnd quite similar types of organisations and movements in all national contexts. Most of them work with general and broad issues such as health, social justice, poverty alleviation, the environment, human rights, international aid and development, sports, and so on. Tese organisations would have, in terms of the socio-demographic composition, broad constituencies involving diverse social categories. A very small number of organisations in our sample would relate to constituencies that are clearly defned in terms of socio-demographic characteristics, for example pensioners' and youth organisations for age, women's organisations for gender, and ethnic organisations for country of birth. Te samples do not generally include any organisations that would have an over-representation of people with a higher education background (e.g., professional organisations). Hence, from a socio-demographic perspective, we would expect a large majority within the civil society elite in our study to represent constituencies that are diverse concerning our four variables of gender, age, country of birth, and education.

When it comes to attitudes, however, we would expect the leaders to embody the values and missions of the organisations they lead (and of their constituencies). Te majority of the organisations in our sample have a progressive and solidaristic stance towards issues of social justice, equality, anti-discrimination, and human rights, although we fnd both organisations belonging to more traditional movements such as the Catholic organisations and organisations belonging to more secular and progressive movements (Santilli & Scaramuzzino, 2021).

## **Different Civil Society Contexts**

#### **Civil Society Regimes**

One way of understanding diferent roles and ideals related to civil society across national contexts is through the concept of 'civil society regimes'. Te four countries considered in this study are often placed as examples of diferent civil society regimes, and their civil society sectors have diferent characteristics. Sweden, as an example of a Nordic or social democratic regime, has a mostly advocacy-oriented civil society sector with a relatively large workforce mostly made up of volunteers rather than paid staf. Te Italian civil society sector, as an example of a continental or corporatist regime, is mostly service oriented with a larger share of paid staf compared to Sweden. Likewise, the UK's civil society is an example of an Anglo-Saxon or liberal regime and is characterised by the prominent role of civil society as service provider, with a larger proportion of paid staf than Italy and Sweden. Finally, Polish civil society, as an example of the Eastern or post-communist regime, is also service oriented, but with smaller workforce than the other countries and with a very small share of paid staf (Archambault, 2009; Salamon et al., 2017; Salamon & Sokolowski, 2018).

Based on this comparative contextual information, we argue that the civil society sectors in diferent countries can be understood as a segment of the professionalised labour market to varying degrees, which could entail more or less stratifcation and hierarchisation between the organisations with implications for the composition of the leadership strata. If we understand professionalisation of the sector as a precondition of elitisation, we expect that a civil society sector characterised by a larger employed workforce and a pronounced role as service provider—hence comprising a relatively well-defned labour market—is characterised by a leadership with a more pronounced elite status. From this point of view, we can expect the top-level leaders of the most resource-rich CSOs in Italy and the UK to be characterised by higher social positions and elite characteristics in their composition compared to Sweden and Poland. Italy and the UK would thus present a larger elite-masses gap compared to Sweden and Poland.

### **Conditions of Engagement of Civil Society Elites**

We should, however, keep in mind that the regime-level characteristics from the existing literature relate to the civil society sector as a whole, while our survey respondents represent the most resource-rich organisations at the national level. Terefore, we complement the cross-contextual expectations based on the civil society regime literature with our frst-hand survey data. Our data can provide us with relevant information about the conditions of engagement of the civil society leaders, which can be used to understand similarities and diferences between the countries when it comes to the composition of civil society elites.

In Table 3.2, we present how the conditions of engagement among our respondents difer across our contexts in relation to a few variables that we operationalise as tokens of professionalisation. We look, for instance, at the extent to which the leaders receive economic compensation and if they support themselves mainly through their engagement in civil society. A larger share of leaders receiving economic compensation and supporting themselves with such compensation would indicate a more professionalised civil society sector. We also want to see how long they have been in the position of leadership and how long they have been engaged in the organisation. Shorter time in the position of leadership and shorter periods of engagement in the organisations are interpreted as tokens of professionalisation, in a sense that leaders are hired based on their competences and merits rather than their long-time commitment to the organisation. We also look at the share of executive leaders (e.g., secretary generals, directors, and CEOs) compared to representative leaders (e.g., spokespersons, chairpersons, and presidents), and a larger share of


**Table 3.2** Conditions of engagement of the civil society elite by national context

Source: The Civil Society Elite Survey (Sig. †: P=<0,1 \*: P=<0,05 \*\*: P=<0,01 \*\*\*: P=<0,001)

the former category of leaders is seen as a sign of a more professionalised civil society sector.

Te economic compensation of the leaders shows a higher level of professionalisation in Sweden and the UK than in the other contexts. Sweden has a higher share of leaders who receive economic compensation than the UK (75%), but the UK has a higher share of leaders who support themselves through their engagement in civil society (54%). Tis suggests that a larger share of Swedish leaders receive economic compensation of more modest amounts, often in the form of an honorarium rather than a salary. Te UK is the only context in which a majority of the leaders support themselves through their civil society engagement. Leaders at the EU level are placed more in the middle on a continuum, while Poland and Italy have less professionalised leaderships with a minority of leaders supporting themselves through their engagement in civil society, specifcally one in three for Poland and one in four for Italy.

We fnd a similar pattern when it comes to career trajectories with Sweden, the UK, and the EU presenting shorter trajectories both concerning how long the leaders tend to have held their positions and how long they have been engaged in the organisations they lead. Te frst measure suggests more frequent turnovers and possible labour market dynamics with individuals having occupied leadership positions for an average of fve to six years in Sweden, the UK, and the EU. Italian and Polish leaders have on average been in leadership position for nine years. We fnd a similar pattern when it comes to the internal career trajectories in particular for the UK and the EU, with leaders having been involved in the organisations for 11 years, followed by Sweden with 14 years. For Italy and Poland, we fnd longer internal trajectories with Polish leaders having been involved for 17 years and Italian leaders for 21 years on average. Shorter internal trajectories can once again be understood as tokens of professionalisation and labour market dynamics, while longer internal trajectories can be understood as the opposite in the sense that qualifcations related to long-term commitment to the organisation and the cause play a more important role. Finally, the share of directors among the respondents across the contexts points to similar comparative conclusions, with a greater share of executive leaders in the UK, the EU, and Sweden on the one hand and a smaller share for Italy and Poland on the other.

In conclusion, looking at the conditions of engagement among the civil society leaders who participated in our study we would expect more elite status of leaders and hence a larger elite-masses gap in the UK, the EU, and Sweden and less so in Poland and Italy. Tis expectation is considered in the following section where we analyse the socio-demographic composition of civil society elites in relation to the general population.

## **Socio-Demographic Background of Civil Society Elites**

We address the socio-demographic background of the civil society leaders and the elite-masses gap in Table 3.3. First, we compare the mean age of our civil society leaders in relation to that of each context using European Social Survey data. We fnd signifcant diferences between the civil society elites across the national contexts in this respect. Te Italian leaders are the oldest on average (59 years old) followed by Sweden and the UK (57 years), the EU (53 years), and Poland (51 years). Tese diferences between the mean values are statistically signifcant.

If we look at the average age in the general population in each context, however, we get a slightly diferent picture. Here it is important to remember that the European Social Survey includes only people aged 15 and older. Te Swedish population is the youngest of all the contexts, and thus it is in Sweden that we fnd the largest age gap (12 years) between the civil society elite and the population, followed by the UK (10 years), Italy (9 years), the EU (5 years), and Poland (4 years).

Te age span can be quite large, and thus it is relevant to also look at the age distribution to see to what extent the leaders' ages tend to concentrate around the mean or if they are more dispersed. As it usually takes time to get access to elite positions, we expect the standard deviation of the age among our respondents to be smaller than in the general population, which is confrmed by our analysis of the data. Te smallest variation we fnd is in the UK followed by Italy, the EU, Sweden, and Poland.


**Table 3.3** Comparison of civil society elites and the general population across contexts: Socio-demographic background

Source: The Civil Society Elite Survey; European Social Survey Round 9 Data (2018). Data fle edition 3.1. Sikt—Norwegian Agency for Shared Services in Education and Research, Norway—Data Archive and distributor of ESS data for ESS ERIC. https://doi.org/10.21338/NSD-ESS9-2018; (Sig. †: P=<0,1 \*: P=<0,05 \*\*: P=<0,01 \*\*\*: P=<0,001)

Te second socio-demographic variable we consider is gender. When it comes to gender distribution, there are stark diferences across the contexts. While it is only in Sweden that we fnd a higher share of female leaders among our respondents (58%), Poland is in second place with an almost equal representation of male and female leaders among the respondents (49% and 51%, respectively). Both sexes are also rather equally represented in the EU context (44% female and 56% male). In the UK and Italy, female leaders are the minority among our respondents—40% of our British respondents are female, while only 28% are female in Italy.

Because the share of the male population is very similar across the national contexts, variations between national contexts when it comes to the share of male leaders is a direct indication of diferent gender gaps across the contexts. We measure the gender gap as the diference between share of males in the general population and the share of males among our respondents. Only one country context, Sweden, presents a negative gender gap with a 9% lower share of males in the civil society elite than in the general population. We fnd a small gender gap in Poland with only 3% fewer males in the civil society elite than in the general population. We fnd larger gender gaps at the EU level (6%) and in the UK (11%) and especially in Italy (24).

Studies of elites have found extensive evidence for the importance of educational capital, and in some contexts even attending specifc higher education institutions, for becoming part of the societal elite (e.g., Ellersgaard et al., 2013). It turns out that the absolute majority of leaders of resource-rich CSOs in all of our contexts have had higher education. Poland and the EU level stand out to some extent, with over 90% of all respondents having had higher education. Next follows the UK (88%), Italy (79%), and Sweden (77%). Te lowest share of leaders with a higher education background found in Sweden might be explained by the democratic ideal upheld in the popular movement tradition characterising Swedish civil society (Lundström & Svedberg, 2003). Compared to the general population, the education gap is larger in Italy than the UK due to the smaller share of highly educated people in society at large in Italy.

Te last socio-economic variable is place of birth, and we look at the share of leaders that are native born in each national context. We fnd the smallest share of native-born leaders at the EU level with 80% of leaders born within the EU, a fgure that is 8% lower than the average in the EU's general population. Tis might be explained by the large number of international organisations present at the EU level. Poland also has a negative foreign-born gap (−1%), but the numbers are very small both in terms of share in the civil society elites (98% native-born leaders) and in the general population, so the pattern must be taken cautiously. Te UK has the lowest share of native-born leaders (87%) among the national contexts and also a relatively small gap of only 4%. Te same goes for Italy due to the larger share of native-born persons in the general population. In Sweden, we fnd a relatively small share of leaders born in Sweden (91%), but considering a relatively higher share of foreign-born persons in the general population we fnd the largest gap in Sweden.

In sum, we fnd that each of the socio-demographic characteristics of the civil society leaders we looked into has its own pattern when it comes to the diferences across the national contexts and in relation to the general population. A higher gap concerning our variables suggests that the civil society elite can be characterised as 'exclusive', in the sense that there is an over-representation of dominant groups in society (older, male, highly educated, and native-born leaders), while a lower gap might imply a more 'inclusive' national context in terms of the composition of civil society elites. Te results show no uniformly cross-cutting pattern for any of the variables considered. Sweden stands out as being the most inclusive when it comes to gender and education but the most exclusive when it comes to age and country of birth. Also, Poland and the EU level have mixed results showing an inclusive tendency in terms of age but an exclusive tendency in terms of educational background. A pattern common to all national contexts is that the civil society elite tends on average to be older than the general population and that they are to a larger extent highly educated. When it comes to gender and country of birth, we fnd diferent patterns in the national contexts.

# **Attitudes of Civil Society Elites**

We address the attitudes of the civil society leaders and the elite-masses gap in Table 3.4. Te frst variable that we focus on is social trust. A general pattern found across contexts is that the level of social trust among the civil society elites follows the national pattern, and the civil society elites in low-trust countries, for example Italy and Poland, have lower trust than the civil society elite in high-trust countries like the UK and Sweden. It is also clear in all national contexts that the civil society elites have higher social trust than the general population and that the gap is larger in low-trust countries.

Te second variable we focus on is ideological position on a left–right scale represented by numbers ranging from extreme left (0) to extreme right (10) with a middle point (5). We fnd that civil society elites in all contexts position themselves more to the left compared to the general population. In addition to this commonality, we fnd diferences between


**Table 3.4** Comparison of civil society elites (CSE) and the general population (POP) across contexts: Attitudes

Source: The Civil Society Elite Survey; European Social Survey Round 9 Data (2018). Data fle edition 3.1. Sikt—Norwegian Agency for Shared Services in Education and Research, Norway—Data Archive and distributor of ESS data for ESS ERIC. https://doi.org/10.21338/NSD-ESS9-2018; (Sig. †: P=<0,1 \*: P=<0,05 \*\*: P=<0,01 \*\*\*: P=<0,001)

the contexts with the Italian leaders being more to the left in terms of a larger gap, followed by the EU level, the UK, Poland, and Sweden, whose civil society elites are comparatively closer to the middle point of the ideological scale.

With regards to the variable measuring the extent to which respondents are satisfed with the ways in which democracy functions in one's country, we fnd a consistent pattern across the contexts where civil society elites are less satisfed than the general population (except for Italy where the mean value is the same). Te most satisfed with how democracy works in their country are the Swedish leaders, followed by Italian, EU-based, British, and fnally Polish leaders, who are least satisfed. It is also clear that the gap in relation to the general population is not that large except for in Poland where civil society leaders are on average 2.1 points less satisfed on a scale from 0 to 10.

Te last variable we compare is the extent to which respondents endorse equal rights for the gay and lesbian population, and we fnd that in all national contexts the civil society elites are more progressive on average than the general population. Following the national pattern, we fnd slightly more conservative views among our leaders in Italy and Poland than in the other national contexts. Te largest gap we fnd is in Poland where we observe the most conservative attitude towards this issue. In fact, Polish civil society elites are on average 1.1 points more progressive than the general population on a scale from 1 to 5.

When it comes to attitudes regarding key issues of democracy and equality, we thus fnd a much clearer pattern with Poland being the national context with the largest gap between the civil society elites and the general population (except for ideological position) and Sweden being the context with the smallest gap. Furthermore, we consistently fnd that the civil society elites tend to have higher social trust, are more leftist, are less satisfed with democracy, and are more progressive towards gay and lesbians' rights than the general population in all national contexts (except for satisfaction with democracy in Italy).

# **Conclusion**

In this chapter, we set out to explore the composition of civil society elites across diferent countries and at the EU level in comparison with the general population in each context in order to address the civil society elite-masses gap. We depart from a theoretical perspective where the civil society elites are expected to be representative of the general population in terms of their social composition and attitudes. At the same time, we expect the empirical results of our analyses to be more complex, informed by the perspective of a possible tendency of elitisation of civil society leaders driven by professionalisation of the top leaders in the sector. In this concluding section, we discuss the main results of our analysis of the composition of civil society.

When it comes to the socio-demographic backgrounds of the civil society leaders, we fnd both inclusive and exclusive patterns in three of the contexts, that is, in Poland and Sweden and at the EU level. Tis shows that civil society elites can be characterised as both inclusive and exclusive social groups when it comes to diferent dimensions and diferent contexts. With respect to age, civil society elites in all contexts are of older age, and this can be related to the long career trajectories that are required for people to reach the leadership positions of the most resourcerich national-level CSOs. Te fact that civil society elites in all contexts have partaken in higher education to a much greater extent than the general population can be related to a demand for certain knowledge that is best acquired through academic degrees.

Two of the country contexts present exclusive patterns concerning all of the socio-demographic background variables among the civil society elites, that is, Italy and the UK. Te leadership strata in these contexts are characterised by an over-representation of male, older, highly educated, and native-born leaders. Tese exclusive patterns are partly in line with our expectations based on these countries' civil societies being more service oriented and professionalised to a higher degree compared to Sweden and Poland. When it comes to the UK, it is also in line with our own survey data regarding the conditions of engagement of civil society leaders.

We fnd a clearer pattern across countries when it comes to the civil society elite's attitudes and how they fare in relation to those of the general populations. A consistently higher level of social trust among our leaders compared to the general population can be interpreted from the perspective of a widely understood role of civil society as the fabric of social trust in society (Putnam, 2000). Te more leftist positions of the leaders compared to the general population can be related to the historical development of many CSOs, originating from progressive social movements engaging for social justice and the emancipation of diferent minority groups (Ruzza, 2020). Dissatisfaction with democracy among the leaders can be understood in relation to the critical role that is ascribed to civil society actors in liberal democracies. It could also be seen in light of the neoliberal turn of the last decades in many countries' social policies that has negatively and disproportionately afected the weaker social groups for which many CSOs advocate (Chancel et al., 2022; Piketty, 2014). Increased inequalities both globally and within countries have been reported over the last 40 years (Chancel et al., 2022). Finally, progressive attitudes towards gay and lesbian rights can be related to the historical legacy and focus on human rights and the fght against discrimination as discussed above.

An elitisation of civil society leaders would, in accordance with the elite literature, suggest that the elite-masses gap is more in the direction of the elites being more conservative and satisfed with the status quo than the masses. In fact, this is the thesis brought forward by Michels (2001) as part of the 'iron law of oligarchy'. Compared to the general population, our data tend to contradict such expectation, suggesting instead that civil society elites have more progressive attitudes and are less satisfed with democracy than the general population. It would of course be interesting to see to what extent the volunteers and activists within CSOs would have even more 'radical' attitudes.

Comparing our results concerning the two sets of variables in our study, we thus fnd a certain homogeneity across countries when it comes to the civil society leaders' attitudes rather than their socio-demographic backgrounds. Trying to empirically explain this result would require another round of study, but there are some possible explanations. One hypothesis would be that the composition in terms of socio-demographic background is partly a product of exogenous factors, for instance gender and ethnic-based relations in each national context. Te large share of women at the top of Swedish civil society could be a consequence of both exogenous factors such as the stronger position of women in society as well as endogenous factors such as the focus on voluntary engagement rather than professional engagement in the civil society sector. Following a similar logic, Italy would be the opposite case with a low share of women at the top due to a generally weaker position of women in the labour market and in positions of power as well as a more professionalised, service-oriented civil society sector.

Te composition in terms of attitudes and the more homogeneous pattern that our results show in this respect could be interpreted as a consequence of endogenous factors within the civil society sector, such as the historical legacy and ideological profle of the organisations. Here, two separate and not mutually irreconcilable hypotheses could be put forward. On the one hand, it is possible that holding a certain set of attitudes is an important selection criterion for becoming a leader, creating mechanisms of 'ideological control' of the people who are appointed, elected, or recruited to higher positions in the organisations. Tese mechanisms would function in a similar way as other requirements such as higher education, thus creating more or less formal selection criteria for career advancement (cf. Johansson et al., 2022). On the other hand, it is also possible that a mechanism of socialisation as well as long internal career trajectories (between 5 and 12 years before becoming a leader on average) contribute to shaping the relatively homogenous attitudes among the civil society leaders. Adhering to these attitudes could become part of a collective identity that is also part of a professionalisation process, as described in the introduction to this chapter.

Te similarities in terms of attitudes considered in our study cut across diferent civil society regimes as well as the diferent degrees to which civil society sector is professionalised. Tis suggests that there exists a possible core value community of the civil society elites beyond specifcities of diferent national contexts that shapes the composition of the top-level civil society leaders. What might be called a 'civil society ethos' could possibly distinguish civil society elites from other elites.

**Acknowledgements** Tis research was supported by Riksbankens Jubileumsfond (project grant M17-0188:1) for the project titled 'Civil Society Elites? Comparing Elite Composition, Reproduction, Integration and Contestation in European Civil Societies'.


## **Appendix**

(*continued*)


(continued)

# **References**


**Open Access** Tis chapter is licensed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/ by/4.0/), which permits use, sharing, adaptation, distribution and reproduction in any medium or format, as long as you give appropriate credit to the original author(s) and the source, provide a link to the Creative Commons licence and indicate if changes were made.

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# **4**

# **Organisational, Reputational, and Visible Leaders: A Comparison of Three Approaches to Civil Society Elite Identifcation**

**Cecilia Santilli and Roberto Scaramuzzino**

# **Introduction**

In recent years there has been a growing interest in the notion of civil society elites and in the process of civil society hierarchisation. Excluded for many years from classical elite studies, recent research in this feld has shown that civil society, as with other sectors, embodies actors with different interests who might compete for controlling 'valuable resources, such as money, information, expertise and knowledge or ability to mobilize extensive numbers of people to push for policy change' (Johansson & Uhlin, 2020, p. 83).

R. Scaramuzzino (\*)

© Te Author(s) 2024 **75** H. Johansson, A. Meeuwisse (eds.), *Civil Society Elites*, Palgrave Studies in Tird Sector Research, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-40150-3\_4

C. Santilli

School of Social Work, Lund University, Lund, Sweden, Sweden e-mail: cecilia.santilli@soch.lu.se

School of Social Work, Lund University, Lund, Sweden e-mail: roberto.scaramuzzino@soch.lu.se

Starting from this point, we apply and critically evaluate the results of three diferent elite identifcation methods—the positional method, the reputational method, and claims-making analysis. Te aim is to address the implications of diferent methods of elite identifcation for our understanding of civil society elites and to refect on the methodological challenges in the study of civil society elites. Hence, we focus on comparing both the application and operationalisation of the methods and their results in terms of which actors are identifed. We are interested both in the extent to which the identifed actors overlap between methods and in the types of actors that tend to show up with one method and not the other.

Te methods are applied to the context of Italian civil society. Common to all the three methods is that they address power stratifcation in Italian civil society by exploring the accumulation of diferent types of resources whose uneven distribution can give rise to civil society elites. Te main contribution of the chapter is thus methodological. Two of the methods, the positional and reputational methods, are directly derived from elite studies (see Hofman-Lange, 2017), while the third is 'borrowed' from social movement studies (e.g. Cinalli & Giugni, 2013). We will refer to this third method as 'the visibility method'.

Tere is a clear link between the method of elite identifcation and the understanding of resources, power, and infuence as expressed by Ursula Hofman-Lange (2017) concerning political elites: 'Te choice of method for identifying and studying elites is associated with theoretical diferences about the loci of power and infuence in modern societies and also with diferent objectives of elite research' (p. 86). Hence, we will briefy discuss some of the theoretical assumptions about resources and power for each method before delving into the application of the methods in the Italian context. We depart from the assumption that civil society is a heterogenous feld made up of many diferent actors with diferent aims and characterised by soft and indirect forms of power (Scaramuzzino, 2020), which is why its stratifcation is based on diferent sources of power such as economic, political, organisational, individual, formal, and informal power.

Italian civil society is characterised by high degrees of informality in its governance (Polizzi & Bassoli, 2011). Recent studies have shown that access to arenas for decision-making and positions of power and infuence is regulated by complex, opaque, and corporatist structures and procedures (Polizzi & Bassoli, 2011; Santilli & Scaramuzzino, 2021). Tese specifcities make it evident that diferent methodologies for the identifcation of civil society elites can provide diferent understandings of who the elites are, for instance, depending on whether we focus on formal positions of power or on reputations of being powerful. Te visibility method from social movement studies adds an important perspective to the study of civil society elites. In fact, there is a lack of systematic analysis of how these three aspects of power, that is, formal position, reputation, and visibility, tend to contribute to the stratifcation of power in civil society and can be used to identify the elites.

### **Methods of Elite Identifcation**

#### **The Positional Method**

Te positional approach in this chapter draws on a large-scale mapping of civil society organisations (CSOs) and their leaders at the national level based on indicators of resources (see the Appendix to this volume) that allow us to identify resource-rich organisations and their leaders.

In elite studies, there is a broad agreement with the assumption that formal leadership positions, or 'command posts', as termed by Mills (1956), are a relevant element for the identifcation of elites. In the last century the dominant theories on elites have defned and analysed elites as those occupying prestigious and stable positions in both the public and the private sectors (Schjif, 2013; Wedel, 2017). In fact, since the work of Robert Michels (2001) on the 'oligarchical tendencies of modern democracy', many strands of elite theory have related elitism to top positions in organisations. It was, according to Michels, within the complex, largescale organisations of the labour movement that individuals monopolised and hoarded organisational means and resources thus producing an internal stratifcation that distanced the leaders from the masses. According to this assumption, resources are largely tied to positions of leadership in organisations of national relevance (Hofman-Lange, 2017), and elites are those who can exert infuence through their strategic positions in powerful organisations (Higley & Burton, 2006).

Tis approach has some pitfalls in the sense that it does not give any specifc guidelines for specifying either the horizontal boundaries (i.e. the boundaries between civil society and other sectors) or the vertical boundaries (i.e. the boundaries between the elite and the non-elite). 'Te inclusion of elite sectors and the choice of cut-of criteria for distinguishing elite and non-elite positions have to rely on the results of previous research into the importance of diferent sectors, organisations, and leadership positions' (Hofman-Lange, 2017, p. 82).

Following this method, we choose as our point of departure to focus on the formal leaders of CSOs of national relevance. Tis study draws on a sampling of relevant organisations active at the national level in Italy. Te organisations were selected because of their high level of status and recognition both in civil society and by the state. In order to identify these organisations, we used fve indicators that allow us a broad and complex interpretation of organisational resources following the Multi-Dimensional Measure of Resource Stratifcation in Civil Society and adapted to the Italian context (see Santilli & Scaramuzzino, 2021; Scaramuzzino & Lindellee, 2020).

Te civil society elites would then be identifed as the top leaders of the CSOs identifed, which could include people in the following positions: the top representative leaders such as presidents, chairpersons and their deputies, and board members as well as the directors, secretary generals, and their deputies.

Te method is considered to be quite inclusive leading to an overestimation of the size of the elites and thus leading to the inclusion of individuals whose actual power and infuence can be questioned (Hofman-Lange, 2017).

#### **The Reputational Method**

Te reputational approach is based on an analysis of the perception that civil society leaders have on which actors are infuential in society. Te reputational approach is thus not directly bound to the organisational resources but rather to a subjective understanding of the power dynamics and power distribution by actors in the feld. In fact, infuence and power can also be informal and linked to other elements (e.g. indirect forms of infuence, personal reputation, centrality in networks, and specifc or exceptional skills) rather than to formal positions and to organisations or institutions (Wedel, 2017). Tus, the reputational method potentially takes into account both positional and personal resources (Hofman-Lange, 2017).

Te coexistence of informal charismatic and formal bureaucratic rules was already highlighted by Weber (1997), but classical elite studies have predominantly focused on formal organisational roles (see North et al., 2009, for an exception). Mainly associated with Floyd Hunter's (1953) works, the reputational approach is often used in elite studies for identifying elites. It relies on experts' opinions for defning elites and powerful actors. Some scholars have criticised this approach (Dahl, 1961; Scott, 2004) because it seems applicable only in relatively small communities where everyone knows each other, for example within an organisation or a specifc policy feld.

Te method also has some pitfalls that can be described as the need for a broad range of experts in the feld as well as a list of potential elite people for the experts to select from or with whom to rank the elite. Tis creates some methodological challenges in terms of setting up a representative and diverse expert group that covers diferent sub-felds as well as requiring them to assess a long list of names. Tus, the method has often been used in combination with other methods of elite identifcation. 'In combination with the positional or decisional methods, however, asking respondents to identify top infuencers in their own organisations or in policy decisions in which they have been personally involved makes sense and has been successfully applied by Laumann, Knoke, and others as a form of snowball sampling' (Hofman-Lange, 2017, p. 86).

To operationalise the reputational approach and to identify the power that derives from personal reputation, we rely on survey data focusing on the perceptions of national Italian leaders. Te survey was conducted in 2021 and targeted 680 civil society elites, namely presidents, directors, and deputies of CSOs, based on the same mapping as in the positional approach. Te survey received 133 answers (19% response rate). Te survey was carried out based on the same mapping as in the positional approach but leaving it up to the leaders that responded to the survey to name who they consider to be infuential and thus to be the elite. Due to the lack of previous studies about civil society elites, we chose the positional elite as our experts for applying the reputational method.

For similar reasons and for the purpose of potentially identifying individuals that the positional method had missed, we chose not to present a list of possible elite persons but to leave the respondents free to identify whomever they wanted. Tey were asked to identify three people. Also, the survey question used for the reputational approach was formulated in a quite open statement including both power, resources, and infuence. Because we assumed that many individuals in civil society do not have a complete overview of the whole sector, we chose to narrow down the question to the issues with which they worked. Te question also allowed us to indicate individuals by name or position and organisations. Te question was the following: 'Which three individuals in civil society do you consider to have most power, resources, or infuence concerning the issues you work with? Please state names/positions and organisations'.

Te method thus does not rely on actual resources wielded by the elite, as in the positional method, but rather on who has the most power, resources, or infuence in the eyes of the positional elite (i.e. the leaders of the elite organisations).

#### **The Visibility Method**

Te visibility method that we adopt in this study draws on a claimsmaking analysis that focuses on civil society actors' interventions in the public domain. Tis approach is based on the assumption that public visibility, and not only formal positions or reputation, can contribute to leaders' authority and legitimacy. Departing from this point, we can say that visibility is at the same time a sign and a result of power and infuence. Te individuals who have access to the public sphere are those with more power, and at the same time visibility gives them more infuence and legitimacy. By focusing on individual political claims, in this case in national newspapers, as units of analysis, we can identify a group of civil society elites who are the most present in the public debate and thus potentially are the most infuential when it comes to public opinion. In fact, many civil society organisations might be as interested in infuencing public opinion as in infuencing politicians and public policy. Tis is true for both interest groups and for social movements (Johansson et al., 2019).

Te correspondence between the formal position, reputation, and public visibility of leaders in a movement or an arena is a central question in social movements analysis (Bassoli et al., 2014; Malinick et al., 2011). In the feld of elite studies, as discussed above, the formal leadership position is considered the sign of elite status (Hofman-Lange, 2017; Michels, 2001). Some recent studies, however, have shown that the correspondence between formal positions of leadership and actual power and infuence is not always obvious in social movements (Diani, 2003; Malinick et al., 2011), thus stressing the complexity and multi-dimensionality of the infuence, representativity, and legitimacy of leaders.

In recent years there has been a growing research interest in how visibility in the public sphere might contribute to achieving social groups' and leaders' authority and legitimacy (Cinalli & Giugni, 2013; Nepstad & Bob, 2006). Studies in the feld of social movements have shown that not only is the institutional dimension of political context relevant (i.e. structural opportunities), but public discourse (i.e. discursive opportunities) matters too when it comes to gaining infuence and mobilising social groups (Benford & Snow, 2000; Cinalli & Giugni, 2011). Cinalli and Giugni (2013) in their research about Muslims' political participation in Europe showed, for instance, that the institutional and discursive dimensions are interconnected and that Muslims' political participation stems 'not only from the openness or closeness of the institutional settings' but also from access to the public debate (ibid, p. 150). Tat is, visibility participates in the political prioritisation or de-prioritisation of a specifc issue or group.

In order to capture the civil society actors who are most visible in the public debate, we rely on the method of claims analysis that consists of retrieving interventions in the public domain on a given issue by drawing from media sources, in this case newspapers (Cinalli & Giugni, 2011; Koopmans & Statham, 1999). To be operationalised, this method needs a specifc issue on which the actors can construct their claims. Tis is of course also part of the method's limitation because it will tend to only identify civil society elites based on visibility concerning specifc policy issues. As will be discussed below, we chose to operationalise the method concerning one specifc policy issue. However, an analysis based on a wide range of policy issues would have given a more complete picture of the 'visible' civil society elite.

# **Three Types of Elites**

### **The Organisational Elite**

Indicators of resources, as explained earlier, identify the organisational elite. Te frst two indicators that we used measured diferent forms of status and recognition internal to civil society: (1) organisations that held posts in decision-making bodies within umbrella organisations in specifc policy areas and (2) organisations that were members of umbrella organisations representing the civil society sector. Te last three indicators measured status and recognition external to civil society: (3) organisations that were included in the tax deduction scheme for private donations, (4) organisations that were included in specifc ministries' registries for consultations, and (5) organisations that held posts in the Council for the Tird Sector, which is the consultation body between the state and civil society.

Tese indicators can thus be understood as conditions for the inclusion of specifc organisations among the elite. Following the Multi-Dimensional Measure of Resource Stratifcation in Civil Society (see Santilli & Scaramuzzino, 2021; Scaramuzzino & Lindellee, 2020), we see these indicators as 'conditions' for organisations to be included in the sample. Based on an approach of including all organisations that fulflled at least one condition, a total of 293 organisations were identifed. Some organisations were identifed by more than one condition.

If we were to assume that all of these 293 CSOs are elite organisations and that the elite positions are the top representative leaders ('presidente') and executive leaders ('direttore') and their deputies, we end up with quite a large population of civil society elites. Although we were not able to retrieve the names of the leaders of all organisations, we still ended up with a population of 680 leaders. Tis confrms that the positional method is potentially very inclusive in terms of how many resources are required to be considered part of a civil society elite.

#### **4 Organisational, Reputational, and Visible Leaders…**

However, our method allows for a more exclusive approach to elite identifcation. If the conditions are the operationalisation of the indicators of resources, then resource accumulation could be measured by how many conditions the CSOs fulfl (Scaramuzzino & Lindellee, 2020). Te accumulation of these indicators can thus be interpreted as an 'elite score' for an organisation. Te organisations with elite scores of 4 or 5 (N = 15) would be at the top of the pyramid, those with an elite score of 3 (N = 35) would be in the middle, and those with scores of 1 or 2 would be at the base (N = 243). Using this elite score, it is possible to take a less-inclusive approach and to draw the vertical boundaries in a way that allows for the identifcation of a smaller group of high-score organisations and thus a smaller group of leaders comprising the civil society elite.

We chose the inclusive approach by sending out the survey to all 680 leaders. Although the survey, due to anonymity, would not allow any link between the respondent and their organisational afliation, we were able to determine if the respondent was selected from an 'elite score 1', 'elite score 2', or 'elite score 3' organisation. Te results of the survey clearly show that the elite score matters for some status-related variables. For instance, Italian leaders of organisations with higher scores have on average higher income than leaders of organisations with lower scores. Tey also tend to have networks of collaborations that span across multiple organisations.1 Tese results, although only based on bivariate analyses, suggest that indeed the elite score of the organisation, which measures organisational resource accumulation, refects the amount of resources that the leaders control.

Looking at the top elite organisations, that is, the organisations with an elite score of 4 or 5, we fnd 15 CSOs in Italy. Teir 35 leaders could be seen as the positional civil society elite in Italy based on a very restrictive understanding of its boundaries.

<sup>1</sup>Based on bivariate analyses of survey data concerning the elite score variable and two survey questions: 'Please indicate your total average monthly income' and 'In your professional/private network, are there individuals with a central position in the following institutions/organisations?' with 21 alternatives (e.g. 'national parliament', 'think tanks', 'banks and fnancial companies'). Te correlations based on comparisons of mean values are signifcant.

#### **The Reputational Elite**

Te reputational method draws on a survey of the civil society leaders of the organisations identifed through the positional method. Only 60 individuals chose to answer the reputational question, and a few did not fll in all the information for all three suggested individuals. For the purpose of the reputational method, the level of analysis is not the respondent but rather the answer in terms of the identifed elite. In this logic, each respondent gets three 'votes' that can be assigned to any individual they know of. Because no respondent would give more than one vote to the same person, a single individual would not be able to receive more than 60 votes. In our analysis, to be considered complete the answers should contain enough information to be able to identify at least the sector/organisation that the respondent had indicated for the elite person. After removing the answers that were not complete, we were left with 149 complete answers, which means that our 60 respondents had given 2.5 votes each on average.

In the reputational study, the respondents were asked to name three individuals *in civil society* whom they considered to have the most power, resources, or infuence concerning the issues they work with. Te question was clearly pointing at individuals within the sphere of civil society, although it left open the respondent's interpretation of what it means to be 'in civil society'. A sectoral analysis of the reputational elite, based on our theoretical understanding of the boundaries between societal sectors, in fact shows that many respondents tended to identify individuals belonging to other sectors.

Following a similar defnition of the sector as we have used in the positional method (see method Appendix), 91 named individuals belonging to the civil society sector. It is clear, however, that 58 individuals identifed by our respondents did not fall into our defnition of organised civil society used in the positional method. However, in a broader understanding of civil society, we fnd leaders of three trade unions. We also fnd a hybrid organisation, Equo Garantito, that organises and represents fair trade producers and retailers that are both non-proft and for-proft. Finally, we also fnd three individuals engaged in civil society with no clear strong organisational afliation. One is a university professor in physics who has been engaged in mobilisation and movements for world peace and the environment. Te second is a former member of parliament and is engaged in many organisations working with issues of civil society and welfare. Both of these individuals can be considered examples of charismatic leaders whose role transcends their organisational afliation. Te third individual is not named but has a role in coordinating a consultative body for CSOs engaged in social promotion.

Te second largest sector that is identifed as the organisational afliation of the civil society elite is the public sector (N = 41). Here we fnd both political and administrative positions at all levels of administration, including local, regional, national, and EU level. A small number of individuals identifed by the respondents (N = 5) we would categorise as belonging to the business sector. It is interesting to note that these individuals tend to serve either representative bodies for the business sector, for instance employers' organisations (and hence formally associations of employers), or parts of the business sector that are close to the civil society sector, and they are characterised by elements of idealism and a strong value base such as the fair trade movement. Close to this sector we also fnd one individual representing an umbrella organisation for public and private for-proft landlords. Other smaller categories that could belong to diferent sectors are the media (N = 2) and universities/research institutes (N = 2). Tese categories might include public, business, or civil society organisations. Te largest group, however, consists of individuals holding positions in civil society organisations.

Compared to the positional method, we fnd that our approach using the reputational method allows us to question the self-evidence of the concept of 'in civil society' as a sector characterised by clear demarcations and to instead suggest blurred horizontal boundaries of the elites. Te understanding of 'civil society' in the Italian context among the positional elite seems to be broader than the academic understanding of it, including not only people with less clear organisational afliations (the non-organisational civil society elite) but also trade union representatives, representatives for business interests, and political leaders.

Among the 91 individuals who were stated to be afliated with the civil society sector among the reputational elite, we were able to link 89 individuals to a specifc CSO (based on our defnition of civil society). Some CSOs turned up more than once, resulting in a total of 56 CSOs whose representatives were deemed to be a civil society elite. As in the positional method, the number of mentions in the reputational method can also be seen as an indicator of the accumulation of reputational resources. If we look closer at the organisations that got at least two mentions, we fnd 12 CSOs.

Among the 56 CSOs identifed by the reputational method, the number of organisations also identifed through the positional method is 24, which means a consistent overlap with the positional method. However, among the 12 CSOs mentioned more than once in the reputational method, the overlap is even larger. In fact, eight of them were also identifed through the positional method. Te fact that many of the civil society actors identifed through the reputational approach overlap with the more resource-rich organisations identifed through the positional approach suggests that the resource indicators applied in the positional method and the inclusive approach that was adopted here tend to draw vertical boundaries between the elite and the non-elite, who also include the reputational elite to a large extent.

It is, however, also interesting to look at what the reputational approach adds in terms of vertical boundaries. What actors do we identify in terms of having the 'most power, resources or infuence' that we do not capture with our indicators? A few CSOs (N = 6) that were identifed through the reputational method could not have been included in the positional method due to the fact that the positional method was targeting CSOs active at the national level, while these organisations were local or based at the EU level. Tis of course challenges the assumption that the civil society elite are by defnition a national phenomenon.

Te other CSOs (N = 26) could have been included in the positional method but were not, supposedly because they did not fulfl any of the conditions determined by the organisational resource indicators. Among these, a large category are the bank foundations (N = 8) whose infuence on civil society is mostly based on their control over funding. In this sense they tend to function in a similar way as public funding, although they are themselves civil society actors (see Chap. 9 in this volume).

It is interesting to note that, although our question would allow the identifcation of charismatic leaders whose elite status would not be linked to organisational afliation, we only fnd three individuals among the reputational elite with no clear organisational afliation. Tis suggests that the positional elite tend to share a view of civil society elites as organisational rather than individual.

#### **The Visible Elite**

As discussed earlier, claims-making analysis requires a focus on a specifc issue for which the claims are made. Te issue considered in our study is that of migration, which is one of the main contentious public issues in recent years in Italy (Della Porta, 2018). Tere is, in fact, an open confict between many civil society actors (not only actors belonging to the migration sub-feld) and the government since the so-called refugee crisis in 2015 (Santilli & Scaramuzzino, 2022). Te data were gathered following a two-step procedure normally used in claims-making analysis (Cinalli & Giugni, 2011, 2013). In the frst step, we selected the following four national newspapers (available online through the source Factiva): *Il Corriere della Sera*, *Il Fatto Quotidiano*, *Il Giornale*, and *La Repubblica*. Te choice of newspapers was to ensure a sample as representative and unbiased as possible. *Il Corriere della Sera*, *La Repubblica*, and *Il Fatto Quotidiano* are the most relevant newspapers in Italy. Te frst historically represents the moderate Italian bourgeoisie, the second has a progressive centre-left orientation, and *Il Fatto Quotidiano* is a relatively recent newspaper that has a liberal orientation. *Il Giornale* is a conservative newspaper. Te articles were harvested by using relevant keywords (focusing both on the actors and the issue) for the period 2015–2019, starting in the year when the debates around the so-called refugee crisis began until the year of the greatest clash on the issue and its spillover to the whole civil society sector (Santilli & Scaramuzzino, 2022).

With this method the unit of analysis is the single claim, which is an intervention made by any actor in the media linked to the issues of migration and civil society. One article may of course include more than one claim, and one claim could be made by more than one actor. In total, 400 claims were coded by random sampling of 701 claims selected from the newspapers. For each claim, we identifed the claimant, the form, the addressee, the content, the object, and the framing. Tis methodology allowed us to analyse which actors have visibility in the public debate.

A sectoral analysis of the most relevant actors of the claims across the timespan from 2015 to 2019 shows that the most common types of actors were civil society actors amounting to 68% of all claims. Tis category includes CSOs, informal actors, non-organised actors, trade unions, and civil society as an unspecifed actor. Te second most relevant actors are state and political actors, making up 30% of the claims. Te third group present in the sample are international public actors with 2% of the claims. Similarly to the reputational approach, we fnd mostly claims by civil society actors, but also claims by public national (mostly) and international political actors. Tis shows that civil society elites tend to appear in the public sphere in dialogue and interaction (more or less contentiously) with public authorities.

In Table 4.1, we look at the civil society actors' claims (N = 274). Te columns distinguish between collective actors and individual actors as claimants.

As shown in Table 4.1, we found 162 claims by collective actors (59%) and 112 claims by individuals (41%). Among the group of collective actors, the main actors were CSOs (59%) followed by unspecifed actors, for instance 'a group of citizens' or 'civil society' (25%), specifc citizens groups (9%), and trade unions (7%).

In the remaining 112 claims, the main actor is an individual. Analysing this group, we can see that some individuals represent a specifc


**Table 4.1** Number of claims by type of civil society actor

Source: Authors' own calculations

organisation or citizens' group in the claim. In the case of these 45 claims, the name of the person is followed by the name of the organisation she or he represents (33 claims refer to CSOs). Hence, in 67 claims we fnd as main actors individuals without any reference to an organisation. Among these claims, a majority of individuals (N = 37) clearly belong to one or more organisations, while the rest (N = 30) do not belong to a specifc CSO. Te claims-making analysis thus seems to open for a less-organisational understanding of civil society elites. Tis is evident both in terms of identifying individual leaders making claims without mentioning which CSOs they represent and individuals who are not immediately linkable to a specifc CSO.

In order to see if there is any correspondence between the three types of elites, we look at the CSOs that are present in at least one claim. Tis analysis includes the organisations mentioned in the claims, the individuals mentioned in the claims with organisational afliation, and the individuals for whom we are able to identify an organisational afliation. We can identify 42 CSOs through the claims-making analysis, 26 of whom are also identifed by the positional approach with an overlap of 61%. Te overlap with the reputational method is nine CSOs, corresponding to 21%. It might be important, however, to keep in mind that the inclusive approach in the positional method produced a much larger group of organisations (293) than the reputational method (56).

As with the other methods of identifcation, we can use the number of claims made by a specifc actor as a measure of resource accumulation. We fnd 23 CSOs that are involved in at least 3 claims with 2 actors having 30 claims each. Compared to the positional elite and the reputational elite, we fnd a larger overlap among these highly visible CSOs. Te overlap is 69% (N = 16) for the positional method and 35% (N = 8) for the reputational method.

Te horizontal boundaries of this visible elite are not only defned by the defnition of civil society but also defned according to the issuecentred method, in our case with a focus on the migration issue. Although it is clear from this analysis that many of the representatives of the visible elite are organisations that are working with many diferent issues, the bias towards the migration policy area is evident from the presence of some specifc CSOs that are working mostly with refugees. Among these we fnd CSOs such as Seawatch and Mediterranea running rescue operation in the Mediterranean Sea and local associations such as Centro Astalli running refugee centres in Rome and Baobab working with social inclusion mostly with migrants. Some CSOs also tend to gain visibility though charismatic leaders who are present in claims sometimes as individuals without any reference to the organisation. Here we fnd leaders such as Pope Franciscus I, don Ciotti, a Catholic priest involved in the fght against organised crime, Gino Strada, a doctor and founder of Emergency, an organisation giving humanitarian medical help to victims of conficts, and Carola Rackete, the captain of a rescue ship that challenged the Italian government's attempt to enforce the blockade of all ports for migrants.

Moving from the organisational level to the individual level, the individuals who have made more than one claim in the media without any reference or clear afliation to an organisation are all public fgures who have been visible in the debate but do not have a clear sectoral position. Roberto Saviano (N = 7) is a famous journalist and writer, Luigi Manconi (N = 7) is a former politician, MEP, and academic (sociology), Mimmo Lucano (N = 5) is a former politician at the local level and mayor of a small town in southern Italy, while Aboubakar Soumhaoro (N = 2) is an activist for migrants' labour rights.

Te visible elite thus seem to be less bound to organisations, and this might have to do with the personifed public debate (Andrews & Caren, 2010) suggesting the need for a 'face' in claims-making, even when the statement comes from a collective actor. It also suggests that while some institutional channels for resources and infuence might be reserved for formal organisations (e.g. funding, interest representation), the public debate is much more open for individual charismatic leaders.

# **Conclusion**

Te application of the three methods of elite identifcation have highlighted some crucial challenges when it comes to civil society elites. Te frst challenge relates to the issue of the *horizontal boundaries of the elite*, that is, the boundaries of civil society. In our operationalisation of the approaches, the positional and the claims-making approach require that a sectoral delimitation be applied by the researcher. Where to draw the line for the civil society sector is a methodological challenge common to both approaches. Te reputational approach, in our application, instead leaves the defnition to the respondent, and from our study it is clear that the respondents' understanding of 'actors in civil society' did not match our expectations. In fact, many respondents identifed politicians and representatives of the state as civil society elites. Tis suggests a lack of consensus around the sphere of civil society and its boundaries. Tere is probably also a tension between 'elites in civil society' as elite groups that have infuence in civil society and 'civil society elites' as elites whose societal infuence is derived from a position in civil society. Although our understanding is the latter, it is possible that some respondents interpreted our question as referring to the former defnition.

Another relevant challenge can be related to the *tension between individuals and organisations* when it comes to civil society elites. As an elite, the civil society elite is made up of individuals, while civil society is most often described as being composed of collective actors. Tere is thus a need for handling the tension between a sector in which 'belonging' is often ascribed through membership or afliation with a collective actor (organisation or movement) and a category (elite) that defnes a group based on individual characteristics. It is clear that the positional approach subordinates the identifcation of individuals to the identifcation of organisations while the reputational and the claims-making approaches allow more fexibility when it comes to what type of actor can be identifed, including individuals with no clear organisational afliation.

A third methodological challenge is related to the *segmentation of civil society in policy areas*. We fnd this challenge in all of our methods. Some of the indicators are bound to specifc policy areas when it comes to both public consultations and umbrella organisations. Te reputational method needs to take into consideration that civil society actors might not have an overview of the power relations in the whole sector but rather a more narrow view linked to their specifc issue. Te claims-making analysis needs to be linked to a specifc issue, and thus any selection of policy areas, no matter how numerous, is potentially biased.

#### **92 C. Santilli and R. Scaramuzzino**

A fourth challenge that we can identify is related to the *vertical boundaries of the elite*. In our application, all three approaches are more or less inclusive based on measures of accumulation in terms of numbers of conditions fulflled, votes given by respondents, or claims made in the newspapers. Because the approaches measure status, resources, and power diferently, they can also be used in combination by looking at diferent forms of overlap between the elites. Also, because power is more difuse in the sphere of civil society than in other spheres, we can see the methods of elite identifcation as complementing each other and allowing us to identify an 'inner-core' elite drawing on all three types of power positional, reputational, and visible. Accordingly, it is at the intersection and overlap of these elites that we need to look in order to be able to identify the 'inner-core' (see Fig. 4.1).

Te model illustrates our fnding that the three elites, identifed with the three methods, tend to overlap. In our case we fnd, for instance, eight CSOs that are identifed as part of all three elites and that in our understanding could be seen as an 'inner-core'. It should of course be kept in mind that the visibility approach in this chapter has a bias towards the

**Fig. 4.1** Methods of elite identifcation and their intersection. (Source: Figure made by the authors)

migration policy area. To be more representative of the civil society sector in Italy, our study should have been complemented with a claims-making analysis focusing on other important policy issues (e.g. welfare, environment, and international solidarity). Such claims-making analyses would probably have allowed us to identify other CSOs and their leaders as the visible elite and thus to expand the 'inner core'.

More in general, one of the challenges of identifying civil society elites boils down to the fact that 'civil society', although a concept frequently used in research, is not self-evident for many actors and not easily circumscribed in the feld work. Although drawing the boundaries of the elite is acknowledged as a main methodological challenge by many elite scholars, it might be an even greater obstacle when it comes to civil society.

**Acknowledgement** Tis research was supported by Riksbankens Jubileumsfond (project grant M17-0188:1) for the project titled 'Civil Society Elites? Comparing Elite Composition, Reproduction, Integration and Contestation in European Civil Societies'.

### **References**


**Open Access** Tis chapter is licensed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/ by/4.0/), which permits use, sharing, adaptation, distribution and reproduction in any medium or format, as long as you give appropriate credit to the original author(s) and the source, provide a link to the Creative Commons licence and indicate if changes were made.

Te images or other third party material in this chapter are included in the chapter's Creative Commons licence, unless indicated otherwise in a credit line to the material. If material is not included in the chapter's Creative Commons licence and your intended use is not permitted by statutory regulation or exceeds the permitted use, you will need to obtain permission directly from the copyright holder.

# **Part II**

**Civil Society Elite Reproduction**

# **5**

# **Consecrating Civil Society Elites in Europe: Examining Civil Society Prizes**

**Niklas Altermark and Håkan Johansson**

# **Introduction**

Prize-giving is one of the most common mechanisms for the consecration and formation of social hierarchies. Prizes are cheap ways of paying tribute, and because they rarely disappear there is an accumulating number of prizes and awards within diferent social felds (Asante et al., 2020; Best, 2008). Prizes have played, and continue to play, a key role in flm, literature, arts, and academia. Status in such felds tends to be closely linked to the recognition of certain prizes as particularly prestigious and awarding (e.g. Inglis, 2018; Lincoln, 2007). Being awarded a Nobel Prize, a Booker Prize, a Pulitzer Prize, or a Golden Palm provides the awardee with extensive prestige and public recognition. Tey place the

H. Johansson (\*)

© Te Author(s) 2024 **99** H. Johansson, A. Meeuwisse (eds.), *Civil Society Elites*, Palgrave Studies in Tird Sector Research, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-40150-3\_5

N. Altermark

Department of Political Science, Lund University, Lund, Sweden e-mail: niklas.altermark@svet.lu.se

School of Social Work, Lund University, Lund, Sweden e-mail: hakan.johansson@soch.lu.se

receiver in a group with other prominent and admired individuals. Although most other prizes are less known, they also grant awardees recognition, albeit among a smaller circle of peers (e.g. Berry, 1981; Volz & Lee, 2012; Zuckerman, 1977).

Although we fnd extensive studies of prizes in a wide range of social felds, few have explored civil society prizes, that is, when leaders, employees, or volunteers win prizes for their engagement within civil society, and even fewer have studied prizes aimed at top civil society leaders. Te purpose of this chapter is to address this gap by answering the following research questions: How common are civil society prizes among top civil society leaders across European civil societies, and who are granting prizes in diferent societal contexts? Based on sociological approaches to prizes and awards, we assume that prizes function as mechanisms of status formation and status diferentiation within social felds. Our study of prizing 'at the top' aims to advance our understanding of the formation of civil society elites in Europe (e.g. Altermark et al., 2022; Johansson & Uhlin, 2020).

Tis chapter draws on a comparative study of civil society prizes in Italy, Poland, Sweden, and the UK. Our data consist of a survey targeting the civil society leaders of major, resource-rich, and national civil society organisations (CSOs) in these countries (see Appendix for further clarifcation). Our comparison of the frequency of awarding prizes among top CSOs as well as who praises top leaders allows us to explore the consecration of civil society elites across country contexts and civil society regimes. Te four countries studied here ofer extensive variation regarding how civil society is organized and its relations to states and markets. We draw on the sociological literature on prizes and awards as well as Bourdieu's theory of felds and capital. However, our study comes with some limitations. Although explaining prize reception has been a key focus in the sociological literature on prizes, this lies beyond the scope for this chapter. Tis also includes explaining why people win a prize or the efects such prizes might have on individuals' careers or status positions (e.g. Benveniste et al., 2022).

Te chapter is structured as follows. First, we provide an overview of the existing literature on prizes as a tool of stratifcation and feld constitution before presenting our survey data and methodological choices. Tereafter follows our descriptive analysis of prizes and awards among top civil society leaders in Italy, Poland, Sweden, and the UK. In the discussion, we explore country-specifc diferences as a refection on the role civil society plays in each context and discuss the need for further research.

### **Theorising Prizes and Awards**

A common starting point for much theorising on prizes and awards is that they operate by separating extraordinary individuals from ordinary people (see Bourdieu, 1984, 1996). Tey construct the category of a 'winner', while others are made into 'losers' (Childress et al., 2017, p. 48). Such roles are of special importance in cultural felds where prizes function as a form of symbolic capital, equal to money in the feld of business (English, 2005).

Prizes include the transformation of economic capital into symbolic capital. Awards might come with low fnancial costs, 'the value may be very high for the recipient. Te costs mainly consist in the selection and presentation at a special ceremony' (Frey, 2007, p. 7). Although prizes contain important elements of economic gain, both for receivers and for givers, this is not what structures the feld of civil society. People are instead praised for their commitment to a common cause or to a good cause. We suggest that prizing in the feld of civil society shares similarities to those in the felds of arts and culture since people engage on the premises of doing good deeds for a public purpose rather than for personal proft. It thus appears reasonable to interpret prizes as a form of symbolic capital in this sector, like cultural felds.

Some prizes are however more prestigious than others because they provide more symbolic capital, but the symbolic value of a prize depends on set of factors. Its value corresponds with the reputation of the prizegiver because the symbolic capital that comes with prizes and awards is closely connected to the status of the awarding organisations (Allen & Parsons, 2006). Te status of a prize may also be dependent on the composition of the jury because prominent juries appear to increase the status of a prize. Tis implies that the symbolic value of a prize is linked to the status of the people who are connected to the prize (Pallas et al., 2016, p. 1074). Te status of a prize similarly depends on the status of previous awardees because admired individuals tend to shine also on future generations. Tis goes both ways as despite being individually praised, the awardee has incentives to stay loyal to the prize-giving organisation 'because doing otherwise would reduce the value of the reward received' (Frey, 2007, p. 7).

While this strand of research focuses on prizes as a system of capital exchange, other studies capture the determinants of being awarded. Childress et al. (2017) point to the signifcance of the status of the individual being awarded and the organisation that they are representing as important factors, that is, high-status individuals or individuals belonging to high-status organisations are more often awarded prizes compared to those lacking such recognition. In a study of flm prizes, Rossman and Schilke (Rossman & Schilke, 2014, p. 32) found a spillover efect with regard to networks and collaborators. Tis suggests that people are more likely to be awarded prizes if associated with high-status individuals.

Prizes also have feld-constituting efects, especially in areas characterised by weak professional development. Anand and Brittany (2008) suggest that prizes confgure felds by creating ceremonial spaces of interaction and by organising participants around common and particularly worthy interests. Rituals at prize events produce and consolidate hierarchies. Instituting a prize may also give the founding organisation status and help them draw attention to certain issues. Prizes and awards can also strengthen the legitimacy of a social feld and reafrm its boundaries (Anand & Watson, 2004). Sapiro (2016) argues that literary prizes consolidate the autonomy of the world of literature by highlighting aesthetic merits. Tis separates the literary felds from business (which allocates status by merit of sales) and politics (where ideology appears as a prime value). Cultural felds share some similarities to civil society, with respect to both the insistence on autonomy from other felds and the lack of widely recognized status hierarchies. Against this background, Boli's (Boli, 2006, p. 106) work on the constitution of a global moral order is relevant, suggesting that award ceremonies in the global humanitarian feld serve the purpose of elevating prized individuals and of dramatising a commitment to the global moral order. Tereby, prize ceremonies contribute to establishing a certain ethos in the feld.

#### **5 Consecrating Civil Society Elites in Europe: Examining Civil…**

Based on this literature review, we distinguish four propositions that will inform our empirical analysis of prizes and awards. First, prizes and awards have feld-constituting efects through feld diferentiation (see Best, 2008). Tey produce and reproduce what is considered particularly worthy by highlighting individuals and their achievements as worthy of appraisals. Tis occurs by legitimising certain issues, practices, and values, thus separating this feld from what is valued in other felds. Second, prizes create hierarchies as certain individuals are separated from a larger group and are defned as extraordinary. Tis is of particular importance in felds with weak formal structures, like civil society. Tird, prizes provide symbolic capital to the awarded individuals, and potentially also to the awarding institution depending on the status of the awardee. Symbolic capital works as a non-monetary but widely recognised resource within the feld, but also outside since it can be traded for political or economic capitals. Fourth, the status of a prize depends on the status of givers and receivers and less on the sum of money provided. Tis suggests that the symbolic capital gained is higher if a person receives a prize or an award from an organisation with high status and if previous laurates come with high esteem.

## **Data and Methodology**

#### **Selection of Countries**

Tis chapter draws on a study of prizes to top leaders in Italy, Poland, Sweden, and the UK. Te countries included difer across several dimensions, including how civil society is organised and its main functions with regard to states and markets. It is, however, a delicate issue to both analyse and fnd comparable dimensions because national civil societies come with great diversity. Social origin theory ofers some help in this respect because it provides us with a way to categorize civil societies based on their macro-level characteristics (Anheier & Salamon, 2006; Salamon & Anheier, 1998). Studying diferent countries' levels of public welfare spending (relating to the core function that CSOs play as engaged either in public service provision or in advocacy) and the size of the sector as a 'job market' (refecting sector-level professionalisation) allows for a distinction of types of civil societies, which are sometimes referred to as civil society regimes (see also Arvidson et al., 2018). Te liberal regime type is connected to low government spending and a high degree of social service orientation among CSOs, and this is linked to high levels of volunteerism. Te corporatist regime type refects extensive cooperation/ consultation between state and civil society, often regarding social services. And in the social democratic regime type, service provision is mainly provided by the state and civil society mainly performs advocacy functions.

Tese regime diferences have informed our choice of countries in terms of Italy (corporatist), Sweden (social democratic), and the UK (liberal). UK civil society (or the charity sector) stands out as highly professionalised, with a small set of large CSOs (or charities) that have extensive staf and are highly involved in service delivery, yet also receive substantial donations from the public in general and from philanthropists. A legacy of popular movements continues to shape Swedish civil society, dominated by historically large membership-based organisations that are mainly engaged in advocacy. Civil society in Italy has historically been corporatist and has been highly involved in service provision in close connections with the state. Te decentralised structure of organisations and the local orientation of activities is also worth mentioning. Our fourth case, Poland, can be described as an example of a hybrid regime, shaped by the fact that CSOs served key functions in the democratisation process. Recent scholarship describes Polish civil society as 're-combined', suggesting that new and old forms of engagement and organisation coexist and compete (see Ekiert & Kubik, 2014). Others stress the weak organisational structure of Polish civil society with many small organisations, albeit dominated by a few large and resource-rich actors (Jacobsson & Korolczuk, 2017).

#### **Data Collection**

Tis chapter builds on a survey targeting top civil society leaders in the above-mentioned countries (see Appendix 1 of this book for details on the sampling process, survey design, response rate, etc.). Our analysis draws on the survey item: 'Have you ever been awarded any prize or award for your engagement in civil society?' Respondents could answer this question by yes/no, which in turn was followed by an invitation to specify which awards and prizes they had received. We coded this open question in the following manner. First, we coded the listed prizes and awards into a numeric variable refecting how many prizes and awards they had received. To capture a cumulative efect, we coded each prize as a unique prize; and the more listed unique prizes, the higher was the number of prizes. Te country-specifc coding was conducted by scholars with sufcient knowledge about each nation and who were internally coordinated to ensure inter-coder reliability.

We furthermore coded the listed awards and prizes into type of prize providers based on the background of the giving organisation. Te following categories were identifed during the coding process: (a) state awards, that is, national awards given by a state body (e.g. royal, presidential, and military awards); (b) local public prizes, that is, given by local or regional governments; (c) business awards, that is, given by business/forproft entities; (d) civil society prizes, that is, prizes and awards given by civil society actors within the country; (e) international prizes, that is, given by international governmental organisations or international CSOs (i.e. foreign based); (f) academic awards, that is, given by higher education institutions and other educational bodies for research/academic/ education-related achievements; (f) media awards, for example prizes for civil society given by online media or newspapers. Each prize listed was coded into one category, implying that each respondent could receive prizes from diferent types of prize-givers. Answers that did not contain sufcient information were coded as missing, for instance, when respondents stated that they had received an award, but their answer did not clearly spell out the prize-giver (e.g. answers like 'I don't know' or 'Te prize was for an inclusive project').

# **Distribution of Prizes across Countries**

Top leaders of major national CSOs tend to be praised individuals. Our study shows that about 30% of the leaders had received a prize for their engagement in the sector. At the same time, almost two-thirds had not received a prize. It is most common to receive a prize in Poland, as almost half of the Polish leaders are awarded a prize for their engagement in civil society. Leaders are less often prized in Italy, Sweden, and the UK. One possible interpretation is that prizes and awards are a more frequent currency in Poland or that the Polish civil society sector is smaller such that there are fewer people to award prizes to (Table 5.1).

Our study moreover allowed us to compare how often leaders gain prizes, that is, the cumulative efect of awarding prizes. Most respondents who had received a prize or an award had only received one or two. A smaller group of leaders had, however, received a larger number of prizes and awards. Although it lies beyond the scope of this chapter to explain why some leaders gain several prizes, scholars have suggested that prizes often come with a so-called Matthew or Matilda efect (Merton, 1968). Tese notions refer to the mechanism of cumulative recognition. In other words, if you already have received a prize, it is highly likely that you will receive another one (DiPrete & Eirich, 2006). Being awarded implies a sign of consecration, that is, defned as an awardable civil society leader. Several prizes might also refect long and successful careers, that is, leaders with a large number of prizes have been active in the sector for a long time, providing them with more 'opportunities' compared to newcomers in the feld. While these are relevant individual-level factors, we also fnd



Source: The Civil Society Elite Survey. Note: The measure of association between the variables is Cramer's V. \* = 5%, \*\* = 1%, and \*\*\* = 0.1% signifcance. n.s. = not signifcant. The association was signifcant to the level of \*\*\* and 0.163 for Cramer's V

diferences across country contexts. Once again, Polish civil society leaders stand out as being most frequently awarded. Te average number of prizes in this context is around 1.9 prizes per leader. Italian leaders are awarded prizes almost to the same degree, as they receive an average of 1.79 prizes. Leaders in the UK receive on average 1.62 prizes, and Swedish civil society leaders receive the least with an average of 1.40 prizes.

## **Who Consecrates Civil Society Elites**

Te sociology of prizes assumes that the type of giver and the status of the prize are key elements concerning the amount of symbolic capital that is awarded to the prize receiver. Our analysis does not ofer us the possibility to analyse the motives of the giving organisation, but we can still analyse the type of organisation that dominates prize-giving to top civil society leaders in each respective context. Te distinction between internal and external recognition is a useful analytical distinction in this respect. Civil society leaders might be awarded a prize from their peers, colleagues, and fellow civil society leaders, but they might also be awarded a prize from actors external to the sector like the state, business, media, or academia. Table 5.2 shows the distribution of prize-givers for each context.

Our study illustrates some interesting diferences regarding which type of actor is awarding prizes to top civil society leaders. Te state (or other public agency) is a central producer of symbolic capital, and this is especially evident in Italy. Although we fnd that Italian civil society leaders receive prizes from a wide range of actors, a state prize is the most common. Almost 40% of the awarded Italian civil society leaders had received a state award. Te most common award is a state medal, albeit not of the highest order. Top civil society leaders are hence given tribute by public honours system that annually awards individuals for their services to the country. It appears to be relatively common for civil society leaders to gain such awards, which refects the country's corporativist tradition. Local and regional prizes were also often mentioned. Public actors are thus the key sources of recognition for top civil society leaders in Italy. A signifcant share of the Italian leaders also receives awards from peers, that

#### **108 N. Altermark and H. Johansson**


**Table 5.2** Types of awards to civil society elites (percentages). Note that the total percentages for each country sums up to a larger number than 100% as prizereceivers may be awarded prizes from several different actors

Source: The Civil Society Elite Survey. Note. The columns report the number of leaders who have received an award in one country

The number of analysed cases are the total number of individuals having received a prize and provided examples of the prize received.

The table does not report those who have not received an award. The measure of association between the variables is Cramer's V.

\* = 5%, \*\* = 1%, and \*\*\* = 0.1% signifcance. n.s. = not signifcant

is, civil society prizes. Tey are to lesser extent awarded by academia, and prizes awarded by media or businesses are insignifcant.

In Poland, the state is also the dominant actor in giving prizes to top leaders in civil society. More than half expressed that they had received a prize from the state. Most examples of state prizes listed were medals of honour, refecting that civil society leaders have been seen as worthy of state recognition. Te Polish constitution (Article 138) grants the president the right to confer orders and decorations as 'the supreme honour for the civil and military merits, during the time of peace and war, for the glory and development of the Republic of Poland' (www.president.pl). It is moreover common to have received a prize from local authorities or public agencies. However, Polish civil society leaders also receive awards from the business sector, but to a lesser degree compared to state or public authorities.

Te UK follows a similar pattern with strong emphasis on state recognition of top leaders (see Harper, 2020). Te most frequently listed prize is a royal honour. Leaders of major organisations have frequently received an Order of the British Empire or a Commander of the British Empire. Te royal honours system was historically an exclusive prize given to distinguished groups of individuals who had performed service to the country. Since the early 1990s, the system has been democratised by increasingly awarding prizes to people engaged in charities and the voluntary sector (ibid.). Te honours go to people who have made achievements in public life and/or committed themselves to serving and helping Britain. People are nominated and selected by an honours committee, and the fnal decision is made by the queen, who also hands over the honour. Top leaders in the UK are less awarded by business, academia, or the media. Tey are also rarely awarded by local authorities.

Sweden difers to the other countries in that a small part of the top leaders have been awarded a prize from state or local public authorities. For instance, approximately one-quarter of the awarded Swedish leaders had received a prize from the state and local authorities. In Italy and Poland, the same number exceeded 70%. Swedish leaders are instead praised by their peers, as a large majority received their award from actors within the civil society sector. Swedish civil society leaders moreover most often only receive one prize, that is, there is a low degree of prize accumulation. Few Swedish civil society leaders stated that they had received a corporate award, an international award, an academic award, or a media award. Tis is logical considering that Swedish leaders are less awarded in general compared to leaders in Italy, the UK, and in Poland. Swedish leaders are in that respect less often awarded prizes, and when they receive a prize, it is mainly from within their own sector. Tis implies that symbolic capital in Swedish civil society is an 'internal afair'.

Sweden moreover difers from the other countries in that leaders are rarely awarded the same prizes. Quite remarkably, of the total examples of prizes expressed in the survey, only one prize appeared more than once (a civil society leadership prize). Te pattern is instead a wide variety of intra-organisational, local, and national prizes. Tis suggests that the prize ofering is weakly consolidated as there is no dominant prize reappearing in the material. Compared to Italy, Poland, and especially the UK, leaders rarely receive a state honour despite Sweden having a welldeveloped system of royal honours. Te Swedish royal house hands out medals to citizens who have made extraordinary achievements in Swedish society, and about 100 citizens receive such a royal medal every year (see http://www.kungahuset.se). Despite civil society leaders being eligible to be awarded a royal medal, only two of our respondents reported that they had received such a medal. Tis suggests that civil society leaders are not recognised as making a valuable contribution to society to the same extent as in the other countries. State medals are instead mainly given to leaders from academia, business, politics, literature, and sports (based on analysis of data from the royal house, see http://www.kungahuset.se).

# **Discussion**

Te sociology of prizes has long shown that prizes, and above all highly recognised prizes like a Nobel Prize, a Booker Prize, or the Golden Palm, bring symbolic value to those who receive them. Awardees gain recognition in the eyes of their peers and competitors, but also among the public in general. Some prizes hand out a substantial sum of money, yet the symbolic capital that they bring separates the receivers from other actors. For instance, only one-third of the leaders in our sample had received a prize for their activities within civil society, suggesting that this is an exclusive event that distinguishes them from other civil society leaders.

Who provides a prize is a cornerstone for understanding the status remitted with a particular prize. Several of the leaders had received widely recognised and highly honoured prizes like a royal honour or a presidential medal. In Italy, Poland, and the UK, the state appears to be the bank of symbolic capital as leaders in these countries are primarily awarded by the state. Tese state prizes are not targeting civil society exclusively but are highly recognised societal prizes. Te high status of the prize-giving organisations implies that the prize comes with high symbolic value for those being recognised. Its symbolic value brings recognition across felds, can be translated into other forms of capital (economic, social, or political), and can thus provide social advantage compared to others. Or to put it diferently, in Italy, Poland, and the UK the state elevates civil society leaders into becoming members of a national elite because they are being recognised for their services to the country. Tey are symbolically included in a group of other societally recognised leaders through the medals and titles they are now allowed to use.

Sweden stands out as diferent in this respect because Swedish leaders are rarely praised by the state or the royal family. Instead, they tend to be prized by small and local prize-givers that exclusively target civil society or their own CSO. Te recognition they gain and the symbolic capital that they possess is in this respect primarily produced by their peers and brings limited societal recognition. Compared to the civil society elites in Italy, Poland, and the UK, Swedish civil society leaders are not integrated into a societal elite to the same extent. Te dominance of internal prizegiving suggests that in Sweden civil society appears to be its own bank for the production and distribution of symbolic capital.

Tese diferences have implications for the exchange value of the symbolic capital in national civil society felds. Leaders in Italy, Poland, and the UK (above all those being awarded by the state) control not only a high volume of symbolic capital but also a type of symbolic capital that allows them to enter systems of capital exchange with other societal elites. Te titles they carry provide them with recognition from leaders in other sectors, partly because of the recognition of the prize or that other elites have been awarded the same prize. Top civil society leaders in Sweden enter into a diferent system of capital exchange. Te prizes they have received provide them with a particular peer recognition that signals that they have extensive peer support for the work they carry out. Instead of an entry ticket into a societal elite, local prizes confer upon them the status of being one among peers rather than one among a societal elite. Tese fndings suggest a higher degree of symbolic stratifcation within Italian, Polish, and UK civil societies as some leaders gain societal recognition, whereas others do not. Tis type of stratifcation is less apparent in the Swedish context because almost no civil society leader gains the opportunity to beneft from the state as a bank of symbolic capital.

Teories on prizes suggests that these can have feld efects. Te observed prize patterns in Italy, Poland, and the UK suggest civil societies in these countries to be more interlinked with other felds. In the UK, these are tied to the state, while in Italy and Poland these are also tied to business, media, and academia. Tis shows feld integration at the top between civil society and other social felds. UK civil society appears to be closely and symbolically tied to the state through the royal honours, following the country's long tradition of charitable giving and social class structure. Although leaders also win internal prizes from their peers (civil society actors praising civil society leaders), we did not fnd any civil society prizes that seem to come with a particular status. Te strong internal orientation of prize-giving in Sweden suggests that this is a feld separated from other felds, but internally fragmented due to the wide variety of internal prize-givers. What counts as symbolic recognition in Swedish civil society thus difers from what counts as symbolic recognition in other felds because the sector is its own bank of symbolic capital. Similarly in the other countries we did not fnd a dominant civil society prize with extraordinary status. Tis suggests that in all countries the question of what issues, practices, and values should be valued through prize-giving practices is less institutionalised within civil societies compared to other felds such as the arts, culture, or academia.

Similarities across country contexts do, however, provoke questions concerning how to theoretically understand civil societies and their relations to states and markets. Established theories like social origins theory assumes that civil societies follow regime diferences. While this might very well be true regarding some aspects of how civil societies are organised, this appears to be less signifcant with regard to the function of civil society prizes awarded to top leaders. Despite regime diferences, we fnd a similar dominance of state prizes in Italy, Poland, and the UK. Although the sector serves diferent purposes in these countries and has distinctive histories and relations to other sectors, leaders are mostly awarded by the state. In addition, the most dominant prizes are largely comparable despite country-specifc diferences, and these consist of state medals and honours that are widely recognised in each society. It thus appears that a well-established honour system structures symbolic capital also in civil society rather than the specifc national characteristics of civil society. Te relative lack of medals and honours in Sweden, on the other hand, might indicate that the higher 'exclusivity' of the Swedish honours means that it is hard for civil society leaders to be consecrated by the state, and instead they must consecrate each other. Tis can be seen as refecting the general status of the sector, or what counts as status in society at large considering Sweden's egalitarian ideals.

# **Conclusion**

Tis chapter provides an original empirical investigation into civil society prizes in a cross-country comparative perspective. Although we have extensive knowledge of the role of prizes and prize-giving with regard to other felds, scholars have not paid much interest to civil society prizes or the capital and feld-constituting efects of prizes in civil societies. Our results show considerable diferences across countries, although not with respect to the established civil society regime types. Te observed patterns depend on the dominant prize systems in each respective country rather than the internal features of civil societies.

Civil society elites in Italy, Poland, and the UK have a type of symbolic capital that ties them into other elite groups in society due to their recognition by state honours or presidential medals, while civil society elites in Sweden are primarily praised internally by their peers. Top leaders in Italy, Poland, and the UK are symbolically integrated into other elite groups, while Swedish civil society leaders appear to form a separated elite group apart from politics, business, culture, or the arts. Elite status in the Swedish context is thus internally reproduced and less dependent on external status recognition.

Tese fndings have importance for how we can understand the stratifcation of European civil societies, suggesting that prizes and awards are an element of the formation of feld relations and modes of internal stratifcation. We encourage further studies that explain why certain groups of civil society leaders receive a prize (or several prizes), while others do not.

**Acknowledgement** Tis research was supported by Riksbankens Jubileumsfond (project grant M17-0188:1) for the project titled 'Civil Society Elites? Comparing Elite Composition, Reproduction, Integration and Contestation in European Civil Societies'.

# **References**


**Open Access** Tis chapter is licensed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/ by/4.0/), which permits use, sharing, adaptation, distribution and reproduction in any medium or format, as long as you give appropriate credit to the original author(s) and the source, provide a link to the Creative Commons licence and indicate if changes were made.

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# **6**

# **Elite Integration Through Volunteerism: The Case of a New York City Parent-Teacher Association**

**Andrea Voyer**

# **Introduction**

Volunteerism is essential to civic life, but it is also key to the processes whereby economic, social, and cultural elites become civil society elites. Research emphasising the value of civic engagement generally assumes that inequality is not endemic to volunteerism and is instead merely something that arises on account of inadequate rules and management or as a result of the substitution of paid membership for in-person civic participation (Skocpol, 2013). However, others have observed that civic involvement often amplifes the voices of and supports the interests of wealthier and better-educated individuals and groups (Verba et al., 1995). Furthermore, elite integration through civic involvement can reproduce status and power diferentials within civil society organisations by leading to hierarchies of types of civic engagement. For example, in the case of parents volunteering in the Parent-Teacher Association (PTA) discussed

A. Voyer (\*)

© Te Author(s) 2024 **117**

Department of Sociology, Stockholm University, Stockholm, Sweden e-mail: andrea.voyer@sociology.su.se

H. Johansson, A. Meeuwisse (eds.), *Civil Society Elites*, Palgrave Studies in Tird Sector Research, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-40150-3\_6

below, diferent types of parental involvement (e.g., directing PTA communications vs donating signifcant sums of money to the PTA) are not equivalent and have a diferent relationship to elite integration.

In this chapter, I examine elite integration through the case of involvement in a PTA in a New York City public elementary school I call Bricks School. I show how parents with elite standing outside of their children's school become elite PTA volunteers within the school. Following the defnition of civil society elite motivating this volume, I see PTAs as civil society organisations with signifcant and increasing control over educational resources and decision-making. Te elite parents studied in this research parlay their elite social positions into leadership positions in the PTA. Tese parents solidify their standing in the PTA and the school by accessing more 'do good' capital (Dean, 2020).

# **Methods**

Data were collected as part of a broader study of civil society organisations in New York City. Te research was conducted by me and a research assistant. We carried out feldwork at Bricks School between Fall 2015 and Spring 2018. We attended PTA meetings, volunteered at events, participated in organising committees, and socialised with parents before and after school. We identifed ourselves as researchers and openly took notes and recorded the meetings. After the frst year of feldwork, we supplemented ongoing observations with 24 interviews of a purposive heterogeneous sample of parents. Te interviews focused on parental involvement, including parents' fnancial contributions and time commitments to the school and the PTA. Troughout interviews, pseudonyms are used for the school and all research participants. Only the real names of public fgures and government ofcials are retained. NVIVO qualitative data analysis software was used to organise the data, which were frst index coded and then coded for emergent topics, and fnally thematically coded for additional topics important for the present article (Deterding & Waters, 2021).

# **Background**

Elite integration through PTA volunteerism unfolds in the broader context of school-supporting civil society organisations, including PTAs, becoming more embedded in public school systems. Tis embedding process took a particular form in New York City and in the school where this research was conducted.

#### **The Growing Power of the PTA**

PTAs are important school-based civic associations (Christensen et al., 2016; Crawford & Levitt, 1999; Murray et al., 2019; Putnam, 2000). PTAs also provide funds and other necessary resources. Furthermore, they represent parents in school governance, and they can act as an advocate for the school through their visibility and the participation of their members in broader social and governmental institutions such as school boards and city councils. Like other civil society organisations, PTAs foster participation. Parent volunteers in the PTA can take an active role in school governance, and they build social capital through opportunities for socialisation, civic training, and the development of helpful parent networks (Christensen et al., 2016; Putnam, 2000; Small, 2009). Te literature on volunteerism and civil society tends to assume that PTAs and their parent volunteers produce social capital with a salubrious efect that extends beyond parents and the school to democracy and civil society in general (Christensen et al., 2016; Crawford & Levitt, 1999; Putnam, 2000).

Parents have long joined together to form PTAs and other schoolsupporting organisations. However, research in the United States documents a dramatic increase in the money fowing into schools through such organisations (Brunner & Imazeki, 2004; Christensen et al., 2016; De Leon et al., 2010; Haar, 2002; Murray et al., 2019; Nelson & Gazley, 2014). Te number of PTAs in the United States tripled between 1995 and 2010 (Nelson & Gazley, 2014), and PTA revenues have also risen by 3.9 times over the same period, topping \$400 million in 2010 (Nelson & Gazley, 2014). Tis amount may seem small compared to the combined \$593.7 billion that states, municipalities, and the federal government spent on public elementary and secondary education in the United States in the same year (Brunner & Sonstelie, 2003; Dixon, 2012). However, PTA fundraising is concentrated in schools and districts with higherincome families (Addonisio, 2000; Brown et al., 2017; Brunner & Imazeki, 2004), and in 2010 only 20% of school districts had at least one revenue-generating PTA (Nelson & Gazley, 2014). Tere is also statebased variation in the relationship between PTA revenues and urbanicity, school size, and school diversity.1 Due to the uneven distribution of PTAs and revenue-generating PTAs in particular, and because PTAs and other school-supporting organisations are independent of the schools they support, parent volunteer hours are not reported and their monetary contributions are not typically included in the schools' records of educational expenditures (Haar, 2002). As a result, measures of investments in education likely underestimate parental inputs through school-supporting civil society organisations as a source of educational inequality (Addonisio, 2000; Brown et al., 2017).

Te onset of rising PTA fnancial contributions to public schools occurred in the mid-1990s as a result of policy changes (Sattin-Bajaj & Roda, 2020). During this period, education policy in the United States began emphasising parental volunteerism in schools as a key component of school quality. In 1994, President Bill Clinton revised national education policy, and parents and communities were the focus of the new policy (Schwartz et al., 2000; Superfne, 2005). Prompted by the national reforms, many states and municipalities increased outreach to parents. Following this, New York State introduced the requirement that all New York City schools have an active parent association or PTA, a school leadership team including parents, and a community education council made up of local citizens.2 Tese laws were implemented in a New York

<sup>1</sup>Brunner and Imazeki (2004) fnd a positive relationship between PTA fundraising and diversity and urbanicity in California and a negative relationship between parent fundraising and school and district size. Meanwhile, Murray et al. (2019) fnd that North Carolina schools with more students are more likely to have high-revenue PTAs, but the percentage of minority students within the school is negatively related to PTA revenues.

<sup>2</sup> See the Laws Of New York Consolidated Laws Education Title 2: School District Organisation Article 52-A: New York City Community School District System, Section 2590-C.

City school reform emphasising improving communication between schools, parents, and communities (Henig et al., 2011; O'Day et al., 2011). Each school received a full-time parent coordinator—a paid administrative staf member responsible for managing school-parent relationships and coordinating with PTAs and other community organisations that work with and serve the city's public schools (Henig et al., 2011). Schools were also directed to expand their collaboration with education-supporting civil society organisations (Henig et al., 2011). Solicitation of parent input was formalised through the development of an annual survey of parents. Additionally, an annual quality review of schools was established. Te parent survey is included in the quality review.

Tese reforms directly integrated PTAs and other civil society organisations into the governmental apparatus of public education. Te reforms mandated parent volunteerism and required close ties between civil society organisations and the school. Tey also made parents and the satisfaction of parents very important to school principals and other educational administrators. With the reforms, New York City schools were now evaluated partly based on their relationships with parents and their ties to the school PTA. To understand the practical signifcance of this elevation of PTA organisations for elite integration, we turn to the case of Bricks School.

#### **Bricks: A Segregated School with an Integrated PTA**

Bricks School sits amid public housing projects in a Manhattan neighbourhood that has undergone rapid gentrifcation. Te school serves children between the ages of 4 and 11 years old. Te socio-economic extremes of New York City are represented in the school. In 2016, about 25% of people in the school's post code lived below the poverty line; meanwhile, more than 20% of people lived in households with an annual income greater than \$200,000, putting them in the top 2% of households in the United States, and in the top 5% of households even in well-of New York City (US Census Bureau, 2017).

Bricks ofers a 'gifted and talented' (gifted) program, an accelerated academic track with admission by examination, which is most popular for students from wealthier and more educated families. Te school also serves 'general education' (GenEd) students who live within the immediate neighbourhood, including low-income public housing. Te school is racially and economically segregated along these two academic tracks. In 2016, approximately 40% of students came from families receiving public assistance. In the same year, about 30% of students were Hispanic, about 25% Asian, 25% White, and 15% Black. In 2016, around half of approximately 600 students had a low-enough family income to qualify for free or reduced-priced lunch.3

Despite the segregation of educational tracks, there is only one PTA at Bricks. As previously mentioned, New York City public schools are required to have a PTA, and all parents are automatically members. According to the city regulations, PTAs are charged with advocating for students and their families, facilitating communication between parents and the school, organising activities, and supporting the school through fundraising, volunteerism, and educational programming for parents.4

## **The Rise of the Bricks PTA**

Te power of the Bricks PTA grew as a result of a funding crisis. After the introduction of the gifted program, half of the seats in the school were flled by children who received top scores on the New York City gifted and talented examination. Children taking and scoring well on the exam were more likely to be Asian and White than Black or Latino, to be residents of wealthier neighbourhoods, and to have access to paid exam preparation (Gootman & Gebelof, 2008). Te infux of 'gifted' students shifted the school's demographics. As a result, the school lost \$250,000 in funding when the percentage of low-income students dropped below

<sup>3</sup>Data on New York City Schools is available through the City of New York

https://tools.nycenet.edu/dashboard/, the State of New York https://data.nysed.gov/, and the National Center for Education Statistics https://nces.ed.gov/ccd/schoolsearch/

<sup>4</sup>For more information, see New York City Schools guidelines for Parent and Parent Teacher Associations https://www.schools.nyc.gov/school-life/get-involved/parent-associations

Manhattan's 60%5 eligibility threshold for special funds for low-income schools. According to multiple parents who were in the school at that time, the principal addressed the parents at a PTA meeting and announced that unless parents raised additional money, she would discontinue the music program and curtail spending on school supplies. At that time, the Bricks PTA did not prioritise fundraising. According to the records of the PTA, the organisation had not raised more than \$12,000 in any given year for which records were available. Now, galvanised by the loss of funds, a group of PTA parents held a fundraiser. Tey raised about \$80,000 and saved the music program.

In subsequent years, PTA fundraising continued and accelerated. Just a few years later, in 2016–2017, the revenue of the Bricks PTA was almost twice the amount of the lost special funding. In 2016 the Bricks PTA budget was approximately \$450,000.6 Te Bricks PTA raises funds through classic PTA fundraisers such as rafes, bake sales, coin drives, and book fairs (see Putnam, 2000, pp. 55–57, 302). However, the organisation's largest sources of income are a \$150-per-person black-tie gala and auction, a direct-appeal fundraising campaign that targets parents, aggressive pursuit of corporate matches,7 and a walk-a-thon. Troughout this research, the PTA continuously expanded its oferings of educational and enrichment activities and requested even larger fnancial contributions from parents. While this research was ongoing, the requested contribution increased substantially, from just a few hundred dollars per

<sup>5</sup>For more information on title I, see the Archived Tip Sheet https://cecdistrictone.fles.wordpress. com/2016/03/title-1-tip-sheet.pdf

<sup>6</sup>NYC public schools' per pupil expenditures in 2016–2017 were \$20,724. But when you pull out the children who receive special education services, per pupil expenditures are \$15,736. In the same year, Bricks per student expenditures were about \$18,000. Tis means that the PTA funds approximately \$750 per child—is a 4% increase in per pupil expenditures. However, that base number includes physical plant, busing, meals, and other fxed costs. Considering expenditures on instruction only, NYC per pupil expenditures for typical students are \$9034. Tis means that the Bricks PTA money is an 8% increase over the average expenditures on instruction. Spending on student activities is about \$424 per for typical students in New York City. Because most Bricks PTA money goes to enrichment, that would more than double the average spending on enrichment. New York City expenditure data are available here: https://infohub.nyced.org/reports-and-policies/ fnancial-reports/fnancial-data-and-reports/new-york-state-school-funding-transparency-forms

<sup>7</sup>When a company makes a charitable contribution to organisations that their employees support independently.

child to \$2000. Fundraising totals increased by more than 30% over the same period.

Te loss of special funding transformed the Bricks PTA from a low-key civic organisation into an elite school-supporting civil society organisation with substantial infuence. However, in actuality the resulting change in fundraising activity brought the Bricks PTA in line with other highrevenue PTAs (Brown et al., 2017). Te PTA money was spent on community activities such as school talent shows, holiday performances, community dinners, and a neighbourhood fair. Te PTA also provided an assistant teacher for each classroom, ofered supplementary allowances for the teachers and principal, secured preparatory courses for the required standardised tests, and purchased materials for music, theatre, and robotics classes, among other things.

# **Elite Integration through the PTA**

Consistent with elite integration in other civil society organisations, the central position of the PTA and parent volunteerism at Bricks led to the centralisation of power in the hands of just a few parents, most particularly parents who were members of the economic, social, and cultural elite and who tended to have children in the gifted program. Tese individuals raised hundreds of thousands of dollars to support the school. Trough their involvement, they had a disproportionate impact on the operation of the school and were able to use their position to translate their elite status outside of the school into elite status within the school. Although they were not the only parent volunteers, a status hierarchy emerged in which elite parents were able to convert their greater economic, social, and cultural capital into more 'do good' capital that they leveraged to build their social networks and gain access to leadership positions.

Elite integration through PTA volunteerism unfolded through attaching symbolic value to high-budget PTAs, using PTA involvement to hoard opportunities, and policing elite boundaries in access to PTA networks and leadership.

#### **The Symbolic Value of the PTA**

Te policy emphasis on parental participation made the connection between parent volunteerism and school success clear—a good school was defned as a school with engaged parents. Given the emphasis on involvement, PTA fundraising totals and the programs funded by the parents provide easy-to-read metrics of school quality.

In interviews, parents discussed how they used information about the PTA budget and PTA-funded programs to evaluate and select schools. Many parents discussed attending an information night for prospective families. At those events, a member of the PTA leadership was there to present information about the PTA budget and PTA-funded amenities at the school. In the interviews, parents discussed comparing the Bricks PTA budget with PTA budgets of other schools they considered for their child. Some parents admitted that Bricks had been their second choice after the gifted program at a nearby school known throughout the district for its, as one parent put it, 'million-dollar PTA'.

Tis monetary value provided by the PTA is partly symbolic. Even parents who did not believe their fnancial support or volunteering would impact their own children's education directly had an incentive to be engaged in order to ensure that the school retained its reputation. In interviews, some parents explained that their children did not participate in supplementary school activities, but all the same a PTA budget, a list of parent-provided enrichment activities, and the smaller child-to-teacher ratios resulting from parent-funded assistant teachers provided easy-toread metrics of just how wealthy and connected other Bricks parents were.

#### **Opportunity Hoarding**

Elite integration through parent volunteerism in public schools leads to opportunity hoarding because the resources that the PTAs and other school-supporting civil society organisations provide confer school-based advantages not available in schools without such support (Murray et al., 2019). Furthermore, elite parents who donate their time and money to the school are in a better position to exert infuence *within* the school to secure specifc advantages for their children. Past research has observed that infuential parents leverage their power to ensure that the school places their children with highly regarded teachers or disregards teachers' placement recommendations regarding access to accelerated and advanced courses (Lewis & Diamond, 2015). Past research has also observed that the children of parents who support the school may receive preferential treatment in the classroom (Posey-Maddox, 2014).

Te use of PTA funds could also facilitate opportunity hoarding as many PTA-provided programs and resources were selected specifcally by the PTA leadership and were intended to provide an academic edge to Bricks students. Parents discussed the advantages resulting from the introduction of teaching assistants who decreased the teacher-student ratio. PTA funds provided after-school test prep courses for children in the grades that take the New York State educational exams, which are a determining factor in middle school placement in New York City's competitive and high-stakes school environment. Most of the additional enrichment activities provided by the PTA—activities such as track and feld, theatre, music, chess, and robotics—may not have such an explicit academic component, but will still help students to appear 'well-rounded', a characteristic that can be an advantage for students in competition with other academically qualifed peers (Dumais, 2006).

Within-school opportunity hoarding is evident in the way these activities were often directed towards the 'gifted' students. In an interview, the PTA treasurer, Nora, describes ongoing challenges in ensuring that the immense resources of the PTA are used to beneft all the children at Bricks, not just the children in the 'gifted' program:

We try very hard to make grade-wide enrichment, but the problem, for example, is CloudPerfect [a large technology company] comes in for robotics in the 3rd and 4th grade. Te GenEd teachers just don't want it. Tey are so focused on getting their students to pass the [basic New York State] tests that they just don't have time. So, enrichment sometimes steers more to the "gifted" kids…

Opportunity hoarding was also evident in the way parents who were active in the PTA expected that their ability to leverage their economic, social, and cultural resources on behalf of the PTA and the school would yield infuence and preferential treatment. For example, Nancy is a wealthy parent in her late 40s. She has two children who attend the 'gifted' program at Bricks and another child who attends an elite private school. She and her husband have brought signifcant money to the school through direct donations and their infuence in another schoolsupporting private foundation that awarded a substantial grant to Bricks. She acknowledges that their status in the school is elevated by these fnancial inputs, and this means they have greater access to the school principal and receive preferential treatment. According to Nancy, this is to be expected. She told me, 'Yeah, you do get extra because you are doing more. Yeah, the people at the PTA should get their ticket frst, and if you want your ticket frst, show up'.

#### **Elite People Become Elite Volunteers**

In reality, it was not the simple 'do more, get more' conversion of inputs into 'do good' capital, as Nancy described. Among the parent volunteers at Bricks, it is the social, cultural, and economic elites who become PTA elites. Although all parents are members of the PTA and many Bricks parents make substantial commitments to the school, boundary processes produce a stratifed membership. Parent inclusion in the PTA leadership, networking, and friendships develop unevenly, reproducing the boundaries of class and race.

*Forming friendships and building networks*. Many parents expressed a strong sense of collectivism. Tey referred to the school as a 'community' or a 'family'. But this sense of community was diferent from the establishment of friendships among parents in a position to volunteer more. According to Nancy, PTA 'involvement is a way to fgure out who you are going to be friends with. One of the things I really appreciate about the school is I have made friends with people that I just so admire'.

Te limits of inclusion for involved parents who were not from the elite are most clear in the case of Nicole. A native New Yorker in her mid-30s, Nicole is a single parent and college graduate with health issues that keep her from working. She and her son live in public housing, and she collects welfare and child support to make ends meet. Her child is a GenEd student. In her frst year at Bricks, Nicole was encouraged by some of the board members to run for a leadership position. She was elected and served in diferent capacities for many years, often as the selfdescribed 'unicorn' standing out as the only GenEd parent, black parent, and resident of public housing in the PTA leadership. After her frst year on the PTA, Nicole was asked to run for a position on the School Leadership Team (an elected representative of Bricks parents who deals with curricular issues at the school level). She was elected to that position. At the time of our interview, Nicole was also on the citywide ballot for the Community Education Council (CEC, an elected representative of parents in the school district parents). She was not elected to the CEC, but would consider running again in the future.

Nicole says she is too involved at school. When she described her volunteer work, she listed her tasks:

I go [to the PTA ofce] probably like two or three times a week, and then if I don't have a doctor's appointment or if there are other things going on, then more. Like if there is the bake sale, then I have to take care of that. And if people are dropping of money, I have to collect the money, and I have to email parent reminders. We have the PTA meeting at the beginning of the month. I prepare for that and help out with that. We have executive board meetings. Prepare for that and be there for that. And then, of course, if we need to backpack anything [sending home notices], I'll have to make copies and backpack them out… Sending out emails. Reminders, reminders, reminders: make sure the kids have their money, because if they don't bring their money, how are you going to sell? Ten I have the school leadership team meeting every third Wednesday.

Nicole struggled to estimate her time commitment to the school but noted that on a busy week she spent nearly as many hours there as her son did.

We see in Nicole's case that volunteerism provided some benefts for parents who are not members of the elite. Nicole's involvement connected her to other parents and facilitated further civic engagement in the school and potentially in the district. However, there were limits to Nicole's inclusion. Her volunteer commitment did not allow her to enter the elite circles that were being reproduced among the elite parents. When I asked what friendships she had formed through the PTA, she mentioned that she felt Nancy was a great friend. However, when I asked Nancy this same question, she did not say she counted Nicole as a friend. When I asked specifcally about Nicole, Nancy said that Nicole is 'a good person, but not someone I have much in common with'.

*Fundraisers* vs *Friendraisers.* Te PTA's emphasis on fundraising also helped ensure the reproduction of status hierarchies among the parents. 'Fundraiser' and 'friendraiser' were terms used by PTA leaders to designate the purpose of activities. Friendraisers had the primary purpose of fostering community. Even though those events included things like bake sales and coin drives that also focused on raising money, the income from friendraisers was not substantial enough for them to be considered fundraisers, which brought in much more revenue. Although members of the PTA leadership reported being concerned by the organisation's lack of inclusivity, considerations of inclusivity and equity were sidelined for fundraisers. In my early days at Bricks, I met with Clara, the PTA vice president. Clara explained that the PTA leadership would let me observe them, but I could not attend the gala unless I purchased a \$150 ticket. Tere were limited tickets, she explained, and the revenue from the event was crucial to the liquidity of the PTA. It was difcult to deny people the opportunity to attend, she said, but it was necessary.

Te division between fundraisers and friendraisers produced a clear boundary between elite and non-elite parents and shaped their volunteer work in the PTA. Namely, the gala was just for the elite. Nicole, the 'unicorn' of the PTA, explained that the gala set the limits of her substantial participation. When asked in an interview what events she participates in, she replied, 'everything, but not so much the gala cause I don't have connections [laugh]' 'so they are covered with that… If you have connections, you should be on the gala'. Te boundary extended to her attendance at the gala as well. 'I went to the gala once', Nicole said wistfully as we chatted one day. In her frst year in the PTA leadership, a 'gifted' parent gave her a spare ticket she had purchased. Nicole had a great time and would love to go again, but the \$150 cost of the ticket was beyond her. Every year she hoped someone would give her another ticket, but, apart from that frst year, Nicole's tireless eforts on behalf of the PTA and the school had never been recognised with a ticket to the gala.

*Leadership.* Tere were no other parents like Nicole in the PTA leadership because the emphasis on fundraising led parents with social, economic, and cultural capital to acquire and hold on to the positions in PTA leadership. It was widely acknowledged that there was a tremendous representation gap in the Bricks PTA. Many PTA leaders described eforts and planned eforts to encourage more involvement among GenEd parents. However, during PTA elections each year this research was ongoing multiple GenEd parents ran for PTA leadership positions but very few were elected.

Observing just one election match-up demonstrates the reality of elite integration in PTA leadership. On the day of the Spring 2015 election, approximately 90 parents were seated in the auditorium as candidates for PTA leadership stood before them. In the frst four rows, centre, a group of about 30 parents, the existing networks of PTA leaders and their friends, sat closely together. Other parents were scattered throughout the auditorium, mainly sitting alone or in pairs.

When she was announced as a candidate for the entry-level memberat-large position, Victoria approached the microphone. She had been sitting alone at the side of the room. A Latinx woman in her late 60s, Victoria read a prepared statement, her eyes rarely rising from the paper:

My name is Victoria Gonzalez. I'm a mother of 3 and a grandmother of 7. I have 2 grandchildren that I have full custody of that are here at Bricks. I also have two kids who are 27 and 28 and they also graduated from Bricks, so that makes me a little familiar with Bricks. So, this year I am running for member at large. I know that some of you may probably be wondering why it took me so long to join the PTA. One answer would be that I had no time to come to any of the meetings let alone to join the PTA. I've worked so much and I have always had two, three a few or several jobs at a time. I lived around this neighbourhood for around 24–25 years. I've been involved in the community, and I am a fast learner. What I don't know I will learn. I have more time now because I am retired. Te time I have I can use to be helpful to the PTA…

Next up was Victoria's competitor, Jamie. A white woman in her mid- or late 30s, Jamie had been sitting with the PTA group, front and centre. She rose, stood tall, spoke without notes, and mostly trained her eyes on the crowd at the front of the auditorium. She said, 'I'm Jamie Mellan and I know most of you down front'. She smiled at the PTA leadership.

I am very committed to this school, and I want it to be as good as it could be. I have a frst grader in this school and next year my middle son will be in kindergarten G&T [gifted and talented] as well. A bit about myself: I'm [in television] and I serve on the board of [an important organisation for people in the entertainment industry]. I also run a charity that works to bring the arts to children. I've been very active in the school. I try to fundraise for Teaching Assistants and think we should have full-time TAs for every class. Regardless of how things go today, I will be involved with the school. I will fundraise and I will be there for events.

Later, when I asked members of the PTA leadership why Victoria was not elected and Jamie was despite the lack of GenEd representation on the board, I received a variety of responses such as it being safer to choose the person you knew, diferences in style of addressing the audience made Jamie look more like 'leadership material', and Jamie's experience with fundraising and outside connections would be an asset to the organisation as it pursued its fundraising goals. When you plan to raise \$450,000 with a team of volunteers, considerations of inclusivity only carry so much weight. In general, elite parents chose other elite parents for leadership roles.

Although they recognised their exclusion from the PTA elite, parent volunteers like Victoria and Nicole rarely complained. I asked Kayla, another very involved GenEd parent from a less privileged background, if she had ever been encouraged to run for a position on the board. She said she had not, but she didn't mind. Because she did not know a lot about running an organisation; she thought it was best to stick to volunteering. Xenia, a GenEd parent who was elected to a leadership position when a space opened unexpectedly at the beginning of the school year, was not re-elected to the position the following year. When I asked her why she was not re-elected, she shrugged, 'Tey have already told us our money isn't good enough, so why should I be surprised if my work for the PTA wasn't good enough?'

# **Conclusion**

In recent decades, civil society scholars have noted the concentration of power and resources in select civil society organisations taking a 'seat at the table' with the state and the business sector in assessing and addressing societal needs (Johansson and Meeuwisse, Chap. 1, this volume). In this chapter, I have described a case of the integration of civil society elite—frst through the concentration of infuence and power in civil society organisations that beneft from the political and economic resources of their members, and second through the increased infuence and power that members of the economic, social, and cultural elite gain when their volunteerism makes it possible to convert economic, social, and cultural capital into 'do good' capital (Dean, 2020).

Te integration of civil society organisations into government is an outgrowth of policy changes. In the case of PTAs, shifting educational policy in the United States emphasised parental participation in schools. In New York City and New York State, this policy position was reinforced by local decisions that gave PTAs a central role in school funding and in assessments of school performance. PTAs, which had once been independent civil society organisations made up of parents and teachers, are now school-based conduits of elite parent's labour, skills, and money into the school.

As a result, PTAs and other school-supporting civil society organisations supplant the democratic civic goals of volunteerism and public education, resulting in elite reproduction through volunteerism. Parents from the social, economic, and cultural elite use involvement in the PTA to convert their social, economic, and cultural resources into infuence within the school. Tey leverage their infuence to establish and maintain the reputation of the school, to access advantages for themselves and their children, and to build networks with other elite parents. Te civil society elites of the PTA engage in exclusionary boundary processes that ensure that non-elite parents, even those who also take on volunteer work in the school, are not fully included in the circle of elite PTA parents. Tese developments centralise the power and infuence of parents from the economic and cultural elite and supplant the PTAs' stated purpose.

**Acknowledgements** Tis research was supported by the Russell Sage Foundation (Award No. G-6849). Te author wishes to thank Lourdes Cifuentes for her research assistance.

# **Bibliography**


**Open Access** Tis chapter is licensed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/ by/4.0/), which permits use, sharing, adaptation, distribution and reproduction in any medium or format, as long as you give appropriate credit to the original author(s) and the source, provide a link to the Creative Commons licence and indicate if changes were made.

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# **7**

# **Reproduction of Elites in Hong Kong through the Hong Kong Jockey Club**

**Pui Chi Lai**

# **Introduction**

Tis chapter analyses the historical development of the reproduction of elites through a quasi-political organisation. Te research specifcally focuses on the Hong Kong Jockey Club (HKJC), encompassing a timespan from the mid-nineteenth century until the present. Tis study shows how an elite civil society organisation (hereafter CSO) can play a key role providing a platform for the elite to meet and to reproduce.

While the HKJC is a well-known organisation in Hong Kong, vividly active and noticeable across the territory throughout its existence, there are no existing studies on the role and infuence of the organisation in Hong Kong. Because of the absence of political development plans in this colonial territory, other than the colonial bureaucracy, there were no signifcant political institutions in Hong Kong. Te absence of political parties in colonial Hong Kong has been taken for granted by existing studies

P. C. Lai (\*)

Leiden, Te Netherlands

e-mail: yb37368@um.edu.mo

on the governing of Hong Kong (e.g. Harris, 1978; Lau, 1982; Ma, 2007; Scott, 1989). Tis chapter will show that the HKJC found the ability to fll this institutional void in colonial Hong Kong and functioned as a mechanism of elite consolidation. Subsequently, it not merely functioned as an instrument, but it also benefted from the mechanism of elite reproduction itself, achieving a powerful elite position and infuencing signifcant political and economic decisions in society. Eventually, the HKJC had the ability to become one of the world's largest providers of charity funding.

Furthermore, the analysis on the composition of the top elite members of the HKJC gives insight into the reproduction of the elites through a CSO in a political transitional society. Te aim is to gain an understanding of important infuential factors on the elite reproduction process. Te following research questions will be answered in this chapter: How does an elite CSO infuence the mechanism of the reproduction of the elite in society? What factors have a decisive impact on the position of the elite in a CSO?

Tis chapter will show how a charitable organisation serves as a place for the reproduction of elites and how this mechanism also impacts the social status of the organisation itself in society and the organisation's clout. While this chapter is thus mainly focused on the reproduction of elites, the analysis of the top elite membership at the HKJC will show that this also touches upon the integration of the elite from several sectors within this organisation.

# **Methodology**

Tis study is based on analyses of empirical and archival data. Direct entrance into the HKJC network and its archives was impossible, as requests for interviews with members were either ignored or declined and several requests for access to its archival data were dismissed with a simple reference to their website. Tis study is therefore based on analyses and comparison of sources such as interviews with journalists, academics, and (former) employees of the organisation, audio recordings and transcripts of interviews, ofcial government records, minutes, letters, ordinances, statements from ofcials, newspapers, bye-laws, and the annual reports of the HKJC.

## **Theoretical Framework**

Mills (1956/2000) argues that political power in modern societies is controlled by a group of political, military, and corporate leaders who occupy key positions in governmental and societal organisations and who share interwoven interests. Most of the power elite come from the upper social hierarchy, have a similar education, have a high degree of social cohesion through personal networks and intermarriage, are member of the same social clubs, and occupy top positions on interlocking boards of powerful institutions. Here they can exercise their power to run the state, while they also enjoy privileges and wealth. Teir position in these institutions is crucial for having money, power, and prestige, and at the same time these privileges are also required to have access to the powerful institutions. Wealth is indistinguishably bound to positions in powerful organisations. However, decisions of the ruling elite are motivated by their overlapping and common goals, and their power position leads to and maintains wealth inequality. But as Mills also points out, in order to actually have power, the elite also need to have a stable and unchanging mass society to secure their power position. As this chapter will show, this perspective largely applies to the elite members of the HKJC.

Fogarty and Zimmerman (2019) explain that elites need to legitimise their position for future generations. Tis legitimation comes with the admittance to an exclusive group, where they enjoy certain benefts and privileges, which will also lead them to an advantaged position. Te rules and conditions for admission to the particular group are created by the elites themselves and may be based on several diferent factors. Furthermore, legitimation of the reproduction of the elites can also be achieved through an existing elite institution that favours particular elite members to be accepted into the group. Tis exclusiveness creates a unique position of symbolic capital for the institution, and subsequently gives a certain status to the individual because of the particular relationship with this institution. Tis case study on the HKJC will provide a further understanding of the importance of an institution for enjoying exclusive benefts and the legitimation of elite reproduction.

According to Szelényi and Szelényi (1995), the elite reproduction theory explains how the elites uphold their position at the top, despite changes in society. Te elite can still reproduce if they adjust their principles to legitimate their power and privileges. A higher success rate may be achieved in a technocracy where the elite enjoy the cooperation of people with key positions in the administration, or when the elite do not have to face a counter-elite. Consequently, political changes may not lead to a revolutionary change in the composition of the elite, other than causing a setback of the social structure in society. In addition to the cooperation and relationship with key fgures, other factors that may also infuence the legitimacy of power and privileges of the elite, and therefore their reproduction process, are having a specifc educational background, political connections, wealth, personal qualities, and involvement in certain marriages, but also skin colour and luck (see also Chen, 2012; Zweigenhaft & Domhof, 2006, for infuential factors on elite formation). However, the analysis on the HKJC in Hong Kong shows how a transitioning society can have an impact on the elite position.

Te study of Lu and Fan (2021) describes the legitimacy of state power in a transitional society that is faced with two types of ideals: namely, one that believes that political power is useful and one that relies on economic power. Tey argue that interaction between the elite groups and the rest of society infuences whether the elites will incorporate or remain separated from each other. Subsequently, the reproduction of the elites also depends on their control and distribution of resources. As Lu and Fan further argue, when political power is dominant in a society, there will be a reproduction of political/state elites, and when economic power is dominant, market elites are reproduced. However, cross-sector reproduction will not happen because both have fundamentally diferent perspectives. When political power is dominant, it will not be overthrown by the reproduction of economic elites, simply because the economic elites are not given the opportunity to gain the ruling position. Tis chapter applies this approach on the changing role of the HKJC for the elite following the transition of Hong Kong.

Hung (2008) argues that elite reproduction entails more than simply maintaining the elite position, as it also requires the expansion of their size and power over generations. Te analysis of the interrelated elite network through the HKJC supports this perspective. However, what is generally missing in these existing studies on the mechanism of elite reproduction is the perspective of how an elite institution profts from elite reproduction in order to uphold its own status and existence in society.

# **The Hong Kong Jockey Club: Sports, Gambling, and Charity**

Te British colonised Hong Kong in 1841 (see e.g. Endacott, 1964, for the historical development of Hong Kong), and a few years later the Happy Valley Racecourse on Hong Kong Island was inaugurated for horse racing (Adams, 2010, p. 84). In 1884, 34 elite members from the business and governmental sector established the HKJC to pursue improvements in horse racing in colonial Hong Kong (Moss, 2000, p. 12). In its frst 40 years, the races were arranged by the Racing Committee (Somers, 1975, p. 34) Ten in 1930 the HKJC was incorporated under the Hong Kong Companies Ordinances 1911 (applicable to every company registered in Hong Kong before or after the commencement of this Ordinance (see Article 2 of the Hong Kong Companies Ordinance, 1911), making it a 'limited organisation'. However, because the HKJC did not pay dividends or bonuses to organisation members, the word 'limited' was not actually added to the name. It was established as a non-proft organisation, and its proft from its gambling activities was designated for charitable projects and activities (Te Hong Kong Jockey Club, 1955). Consequently, in 1959 the organisation established the separate company the Hong Kong Jockey Club (Charities) Ltd. to better manage and distribute donations to charitable and community projects (Te Royal Hong Kong Jockey Club, 1996, p. 4).

Te separation between the racing activities and the charitable activities may also be seen as an efort to keep these two moral areas separate so that the elite could have the option of being specifcally afliated to the charitable branch of the organisation in order to maintain a good image. In 1960, the HKJC was granted the Royal prefx, and it held the name Royal Hong Kong Jockey Club until 1996, one year before the handover of Hong Kong from the British to the Chinese (Moss, 2000, p. 41).

However, the HKJC was not the only organisation that arranged sports and charitable activities and ofered exclusive membership (Knowles & Harper, 2009). Compared to other large and well-known institutions in Hong Kong,1 the HKJC was the most open organisation, as it accepted both British and Chinese business elite members (Adams, 2010, p. 90). It was also not restricted to elites from specifc sectors (such as the business, banking, or sports sector), as required by other organisations. Tis openness made it attractive for the elite to join the HKJC in order to be integrated in an extensive elite network. In addition, because it provided entertainment for the public with its horse races and gambling activities, and because it also contributed to the social and cultural development of the public and Hong Kong society through its charitable projects, the HKJC also gained respect from the public (Lai, 2021).

# **Elite Formation in Colonial Hong Kong**

Te elite in colonial Hong Kong had diverse backgrounds, and they could be divided into two camps. On the one side, the elites were formed by members of Johnson, Stokes & Master (a full-service law frm that acted on behalf of the Swire company), the Hongkong Shanghai Banking Corporation (HSBC), and all the businesses that sided with this camp. On the other side, the elites were formed by Deacon (another full-service law frm that acted for the company Jardines), the Standard Chartered Bank, and the businesses which lined up along with this camp (England,

<sup>1</sup>Comparable organisations to the HKJC are, for example Jardine, Matheson & Co. (respectively Jardines), Hongkong Shanghai Banking Corporation (HSBC), John Swire & Sons (the Swire company), Hong Kong General Chamber of Commerce, the Hong Kong Club, the Kowloon Cricket Club, and the Tung Wah Hospital.

2016, p. 187). Common characteristics of the elites from both camps were that most of them had the same prestigious Oxbridge educational background, which is consistent with Fogarty and Zimmerman's (2019) study, and they were also members of the HKJC (Welsh, 1993, p. 495). What made the HKJC attractive for both camps? To understand how the HKJC gained this respected position and eventually provided the elite the opportunity to achieve a certain status, a brief elaboration on the emergence of the elite in Hong Kong is needed.

Te arrival of the British in Hong Kong brought with it the emergence of the elite in this territory. Te elites were socially and politically segregated wealthy expatriates, generally bureaucrats, senior civil servants, and business leaders. Tey also had a seat in the Executive Council (Exco), a policymaking organ, and the Legislative Council (Legco), an advisory body to the legislature, which were set up to advise and assist the governor of colonial Hong Kong. Te British government went into negotiations with members of these councils. Te elites were aware that having a seat in one of the councils would give them the ability to infuence government policies and law-making decisions that could beneft their own interests (Chui, 2000, p. 379). Te council members only interacted with other wealthy people in the territory, and they kept their distance from the Chinese public (Davies, 1977, p. 61). One of the reasons why the British did not interact with the Chinese was that the British did not have the intention to expand their empire and exploit the territory, and they foremost wanted to use Hong Kong as a trading port and gateway to China. Tere was one exception, as there was a strong business collaboration between the British and the Chinese merchants during the colonial rule of the British in Hong Kong. With the Chinese merchants serving as middlemen, the British had easier access to businesses in China, while at the same time the Chinese merchants had the opportunity to develop business experiences and gain material privileges and social welfare, thus providing them with an elite status in colonial Hong Kong (Carroll, 2007; Lau, 1982).

While the elites developed the desire to have a higher degree of selfgovernance, Colonial Secretary Lord Ripon noted that the Chinese community was not represented by the powerful British merchant elites. However, it was not until after the General Strike in 1925–1926 that the Chinese were acknowledged and became involved in the governance of Hong Kong. Te General Strike from 1925 to 1926, which is also known as the Canton strike-boycott, was fuelled by the violence of the Sikh police under British command towards Chinese demonstrators in Shanghai on 30 May 1925. Te local Chinese in colonial Hong Kong became aware of this event, and they joined the strike against the British in the occupied territory. During the strike, local people fed colonial Hong Kong following the boycott against the British colonials, but the Chinese business elite stayed behind and actively battled against the strike to secure their own position in the colony (Welsh, 1993). Subsequently, their battle also kept the colony functioning. Te British then saw the value of the Chinese business elite, and they started to reward them with the opportunity to represent the Chinese within the colonial administration in Hong Kong (Loh, 2004, p. 6). Additionally, the HKJC, membership in which was previously reserved for the British elites, also opened up its membership to the Chinese to show its appreciation for their support during the General Strike (Adams, 2010, p. 90). Te expansion of its membership network could also be seen as a great opportunity for the HKJC to grow and obtain a frm position relative to other comparable organisations.

With the acceptance of the Chinese business elite into the membership of the HKJC, the colonial government also saw the opportunity to control the Chinese masses in Hong Kong society. It was thus important to have Chinese elite members in the HKJC who supported the ideals of the colonial government. Te opening up for the Chinese business elite cemented the support from and relationship between the colonial and British governments and the HKJC, and it may be argued that this provided the organisation a privileged position to become an important player in Hong Kong society. Subsequently, Colonial Governor Sir John Davis and the British government in the United Kingdom saw the races at the HKJC as great opportunities to provide a platform to facilitate a network for commerce and trade in the colonial city (Adams, 2010, p. 86; Ching, 1965, p. 39). Tis practice was consistent with Mills' (1956/2000) theory that political power comes from occupation of key positions in governmental and societal organisations with shared interwoven interests. Tus, in order to have a stable mass society and to secure their power, the British elite shared key positions with Chinese elite members, which also expanded the reach of the power of the British elite.

## **The Entangled Network of the Top Elite Members**

Membership in the HKJC indeed became very popular among both the British and Chinese business elites because of its open and extended network, and the horse races developed into a venue for the Hong Kong community for socialisation, which selected elite members could be part of. Because the colonial government and the HKJC were in line with each other in creating strong relationships with each other, they had a similar pool of networks of elite members. Consequently, it may be argued that the HKJC served as a platform for the government where it could select political members into the governmental apparatus because the organisation had already selected and screened its elite members. Membership in the HKJC thus paved the way for leading elite fgures in the business or banking sector to gain a powerful political position in Hong Kong (Lai, 2021, pp. 163, 166, 201). As Fogarty and Zimmerman (2019) have noted, the elite seek acceptance through an existing elite institution that favours particular elite members being accepted into the group.

Te entanglement between the elite members of the HKJC and the governmental apparatus can be seen in membership data for this organisation and involvement in the Exco and Legco. Table 7.1 shows an overview of the chairmen of the HKJC and their membership in the Exco and/or Legco. Te chairman heads the Board of Stewards, which is elected from among the voting members of the HKJC and develops the strategy of the organisation (Te Hong Kong Jockey Club, 2023). Looking at the dates of afliation with one or more of these institutions, it can be concluded that prior to their positioning as a chairman of the HKJC the majority of them had already been members of the Legco and/or Exco.


**Table 7.1** Chairmen of the Hong Kong Jockey Club and their membership in the Legislative Council/Executive Council

Source: Author´s calculation based on Lai 2021

#### **7 Reproduction of Elites in Hong Kong through the Hong Kong…**

Tere have been some chairmen who were not afliated with the Exco and Legco, and they held their posts at critical junctures in the HKJC's historical development. Henry Percy White (1926–1929) had his seat just after the General Strike, Percy Tester (1945–1946) just after the Second World War, Donovan Benson (1953–1967) during the industrial growth in Hong Kong, Gordon Macwhinnie (1989–1991) when the Basic Law was about to be accepted, and Wong Chung Hin (1996–1998) during the handover in 1997. It may be interpreted as a strategy to uphold the neutral image of the HKJC during sensitive periods by having a separation between this organisation and the government. Furthermore, Table 7.1 also demonstrates that during the transitional period there were either overlaps or consecutive periods of afliation with the institutions, while in the postcolonial time the afliation periods with the HKJC and the councils were separated, thus refecting political developments in Hong Kong society. It is arguable that in the transitional and post-colonial period the organisation has been wavering a bit more as it still has not fgured out what position it should take in the newly political environment in Hong Kong, thus explaining the inconsistent link of the chairmen with the Exco and Legco.

Overall, Table 7.1 shows the interaction between the recruitment and membership of the HKJC and the government apparatus in the colonial period as the periods of afliation with both institutions overlap. According to Dalton and Wattenberg (2000), recruitment of political leadership is one of the most basic functions of a political party. It includes the search for and formation of political elites to lead the political party to control the governing apparatus. It may be argued that the HKJC functioned as a mechanism for political recruitment in Hong Kong society through its entangled network and exclusive membership. Tis made the organisation valuable to the colonial British government, putting it in an important and respected position where it could govern society (Lai, 2021, p. 258).

However, unlike Mills' (1956/2000) theory of who maintains political power in society, this case study of the HKJC shows that it may be argued that the political power is not controlled by a group of top elite members, but rather by the organisation itself. Te status and power of the HKJC in Hong Kong society is the crucial point. Tus, not only did the government rely on the HKJC, but the HKJC also benefted from its close connection with the colonial government. Both may deem the preselection done by the other party sufcient to meet its own high standards for membership. Furthermore, looking more closely into Table 7.1, during the colonial period the chairmen only held British names, but a shift to chairmen with Chinese names is noticeable from the transitional period onwards. Tis refects the change of political infuence from the British to the Chinese in Hong Kong following the handover of Hong Kong in 1997 that also afected the elite composition in society. Nevertheless, the connection between the governmental apparatus and the HKJC remains (Lai, 2021, pp. 166–169, 201–202).

# **The World's Largest Provider of Charity Funding**

Te HKJC developed into an elite organisation, and analysing the role of this organisation as an elite consolidation, meaning an organisation that is functioning as an instrument to form a platform for the elite where they can forge alliances with each other (Scott, 2008), provides us with new insights into the reproduction of elites through a CSO.

Te HKJC earned respect from the elite not only because it could gain them a seat in the governmental apparatus and achieve certain power in society but also because it gave the elite the occasion to show their wealth, because wealth is an important condition to be admitted to the HKJC. Indeed, wealth is often considered to be an important characteristic to determine elite status and give access to powerful institutions (Mills, 1956/2000; Pareto, 1897). But there could also be a practical reason for the HKJC to have wealthy members, namely for the maintenance and status of the organisation. Te lowest membership fee is HK\$148,000 (US\$19,000), paired with a monthly subscription of HK\$1400 (US\$180) (reference date 2 January 2023). Nomination from voting or club members is not required for this level of membership. Tis hints that wealth is more important than being part of a certain network because nomination for other membership levels of the HKJC is necessary (Te Hong Kong Jockey Club, 2022).

Ching (1965) believes that the HKJC members may have felt embarrassed about their wealth and therefore devoted the surpluses of this organisation resulting from its gambling activities to charitable projects benefcial to people in need in colonial Hong Kong (p. 217). However, it may be argued that instead of easing the conscience of the rich, the investment of the revenue in Hong Kong society can also be regarded as another way for the elite to show their power, as they contributed to the social welfare development of society, receiving respect from the public (Lai, 2021, pp. 226–227). In addition, this acknowledged their afliation with the HKJC, confrming their wealthy elite status. It is also in line with Mills' (1956/2000) perspective that wealth is indistinguishably bound to positions in powerful institutions.

Te HKJC worked closely together with government departments for consultation in the judgement of the practicality and value of charitable projects. Tis may not be surprising considering the interlocked positions of the chairmen of this organisation with the Legco and/or Exco, as Table 7.1 shows. Financial investments were made in many projects from the colonial government in areas such as medical and health care, family values, education and training, sports, and recreation and culture that targeted the well-being of the general community (Lawrence, 1984, p. 14). Additionally, some charitable projects of the HKJC also supported the geographical expansion of Hong Kong as they made urban development fnancially possible (Somers, 1975). Not only the government benefted from the charitable support of the HKJC to develop Hong Kong and keep the masses satisfed, but also the business sector, CSOs, district organisations, and other parties. Te funded projects created opportunities for them to expand and reach certain results and profts (School of Public Health, Te University of Hong Kong, 2014, p. 5). Te HKJC thus played a crucial role in the development of other actors in Hong Kong.

Trough its charitable donations to social welfare projects in Hong Kong, the HKJC also fulflled the interests and needs of the local community. Terefore, it contributed to political stability in Hong Kong, but it may also be argued that this provided stability for its own further existence in Hong Kong society. According to Mills (1956/2000), the elite need to have a stable society to secure their power, and this is supported by Adam and Tomšič (2002) and Parry (1969), who argue that there indeed must be a certain power relation between the elite and the public to sustain the existence of the ruling elite in a society. Subsequently, representing the mainstream norms and values and expectations in the community is an important characteristic for an organisation to become a strong institutional base in society (Lee, 2006).

Consequently, the success of the colonial government had become very dependent on the fnancial support from the HKJC for civic and social developments in Hong Kong society (Lawrence, 1984, p. 14). Te charitable need of both the government and the society paved the way for the HKJC to become one of the world's largest providers of charity funding (Moss, 2000, p. 37).

Te crucial role and position of the HKJC for the elite and Hong Kong society did not go unnoticed by the organisation itself. Te organisation has adhered to the philosophy that if children are introduced to the HKJC when they are young, they will have fond memories of the organisation and it will unconsciously become an important element in their lives and membership in this organisation will become a desire when they are adults (Weldon, 2007, p. 183). Tis stimulation of participation in the activities of the HKJC at a very early age may be regarded as a commencement of the reproduction of the elite, but also as a strategy to generate symbols of identifcation and loyalty. Dalton and Wattenberg (2000) argue that political parties use this function to fnd political stability in a society. It thus may be argued that in the embryonic civil society of colonial Hong Kong the HKJC functioned as a quasi-political party in society, as it was not a formal political party but it did take up some of the functions of a political party. Besides supporting political stability in society, as argued earlier, the HKJC also recruited political leadership for the colonial government. It flled the institutional void, which was needed for the body politic to work efectively (Lai, 2021, pp. 58–59, 254).

In the run-up to the handover of Hong Kong in 1997, the stability of society faced disruption due to the forthcoming political and economic changes. In anticipation of this, Li Ka-Shing and Stanley Ho, well-known business tycoons in Hong Kong, established the Better Hong Kong Foundation in 1995, a new elite organisation seeking to boost the economy of post-colonial Hong Kong (Higgins, 1995). Contrary to the HKJC, this establishment is seemingly more focused on international rather than internal perspectives, anticipating a possible broader development of Hong Kong after the handover (Te Better Hong Kong Foundation, 2023). Tis may indicate a disruption in the trust of the elite in the HKJC and the legitimacy of the organisation in Hong Kong, thus jeopardising its role for elite reproduction. As the next section of this chapter will show, the role of the HKJC to fll the institutional void in Hong Kong society has indeed become more disputable since the transitional period. Te changed political situation in Hong Kong analysed against the elite membership of this organisation will provide us with a deeper understanding of the mechanism of the reproduction of the ruling elites in a changing society.

### **The Changing Role of the HKJC for the Elite**

Te elites in colonial Hong Kong played multiple roles as social and economic leaders-cum-politicians in the oversimplifed state-society dichotomy. However, in the run-up to the handover of Hong Kong from the British to the Chinese in 1997, the elite formation and composition in Hong Kong society started to change along with the political situation in the territory. Te emergence of political parties and a more politically involved public challenged the role of the HKJC in contemporary society, thus questioning its value for further existence in Hong Kong.

Te planned handover of Hong Kong from the British to the Chinese in 1997 also had an impact on the HKJC, and this in turn had an efect on both ofcials of the governmental apparatus and the top elite membership of the HKJC (see again Table 7.1). However, wealth remained an important element for gaining access to the exclusive services and facilities of the HKJC (Te Hong Kong Jockey Club, 2022). Despite the changes in society, wealthy business elites indeed can still uphold their position at the top (see Szelényi & Szelényi, 1995). However, at the same time the political changes in Hong Kong society also afected the role of the HKJC to function as a legitimated platform for elite reproduction in Hong Kong, and other institutions/political parties have been established where the elite may have better chances to retain their elite status in society. Tis may be interpreted as the HKJC on the one hand having lost its value in providing the elite with access to a network through which they can infuence government policies and on the other hand having to face a counter-elite, thus challenging the HKJC to remain attractive for the elite to reproduce via the organisation.

It may be argued that in colonial Hong Kong the elite relied on both economic and political power, which they could achieve through their membership in the HKJC. However, with the emergence of political parties and the growing interference of Beijing in contemporary Hong Kong, enjoying political power is limited. Tis is an interesting development impacting the HKJC because the HKJC claims not to be involved in politics (Taylor, 1995, p. 10). Te question is then whether the HKJC can still reproduce elite members and infuence state power as its role of flling the institutional void in Hong Kong has become unnecessary, thus undermining its role to expand the elite group and power over generation, following Hung's (2008) study. Te position and status of the HKJC depends on its plans to cooperate with the Hong Kong and Chinese government to expand its reach and power in contemporary and future Hong Kong and China. Te HKJC also faces the challenge of a legitimacy crisis in Hong Kong, where it no longer represents the public anymore, as it indirectly did during the colonial period through its charitable projects, thus losing support to uphold its stable position in society. All of these changes may afect the ability of the HKJC to integrate and reproduce elites through its organisation. However, the neutral position of this organisation may also be seen as an advantage and strength. Setting the political afrmations aside, the elite can still use it as a platform to mingle with other elite members and continuously focus on their mutual economic aims (Lai, 2021, p. 203). Following the theory of Lu and Fan (2021), this brings a split-of of the elites with economic power from elites with political power. Te question is whether economic power is stronger than political power.

# **Conclusion**

Tis case study on the HKJC shows that an elite CSO can infuence the mechanism of the reproduction of the elite society because it has achieved the most powerful position in society. Trough the political recruitment for the government and its charitable projects, the HKJC fulflled an important function in the political, economic, and social development of Hong Kong society. Even though the HKJC did not have ambitions to take up political and ruling power in colonial Hong Kong, taking the above characteristics and developments into account it did fulfl the role of a quasi-political party, structuring the societal development by providing elites with a prominent political, economic, and social position in society and by controlling the public to safeguard a peaceful public order (Lai, 2021, pp. 103–104, 128). Tis powerful position of the HKJC made it an important and steady organisation where the elite members could uphold their position at the top. In other words, through political, economic, and social power, an elite CSO can infuence the mechanism of the reproduction of the elite in society.

Because the HKJC had a strong and unique relationship with the government, it became desirable for the elites to be afliated with it. Tis relationship gave the HKJC a respected image and a crucial role as a platform for both the British and Chinese elite to gain business and/or professional benefts. Te elites could build and facilitate interrelated networks with members scattered across diferent sectors, professions, government ofces, and ethnic groups, which stimulated the integration of elites. It also gave them the opportunity to seek and maintain their status in society, providing them with institutional privileges and powerful positions. Tis case study shows that diferent factors such as wealth, occupation, academic achievements, and social capital may have a decisive impact on the position and reproduction of elites in a CSO.

Te case study of the HKJC shows that this organisation gained a powerful position in society and enjoyed high status. Te colonial Hong Kong government became dependent on the economic success of the HKJC because of its gambling and subsequent charitable activities. Despite inequality of wealth and status, the mass society could be kept satisfed by the elite members of the HKJC because the organisation invested in charitable projects benefcial for the social welfare development of Hong Kong society. It was therefore respected by the public, thus bridging the gap between the ruling regime of the British colonials and the public. Te HKJC was thus actively involved in the development of Hong Kong society. Tis contributed to the status and development of a strong and powerful position of the HKJC in society.

However, the HKJC is facing a legitimacy crisis since the handover in 1997. Consequently, the role of the HKJC is balancing on the edge to, on the one hand, continue to act as a CSO for the masses in Hong Kong, or, on the other hand, to become more supportive of the Chinese and Hong Kong government in order to secure its position in Hong Kong. Considering the current political developments in Hong Kong, it seems that the Hong Kong government is rapidly adopting the political perspectives of mainland China. According to Lu and Fan (2021), this implies that political power has become dominant in Hong Kong. Tis means that there will be a reproduction of political elites, and the economic elites will no longer gain a ruling position in society. Whether the HKJC can still function as an institutional base for the elite in Hong Kong depends on the selection criteria for its membership and whether it is still in accordance with the government's conditions. Tis will have an impact not only on the HKJC itself but also on the social structure in Hong Kong. Hence, will membership of the HKJC remain interesting and stimulate the integration and reproduction of the elite, and will it continuously contribute to the political stability in Hong Kong through its charitable projects? Tat will depend on the strategic plans and implementation agenda of the HKJC in contemporary and future Hong Kong.

# **References**

Adam, F., & Tomšič, M. (2002). Elite (Re)confguration and Politico-Economic Performance in Post-Socialist Countries. *Europe-Asia Studies, 54*(3), 435–454. Adams, H. (2010). *An A-Z of Hong Kong Horse Racing*. Bonham Books. Carroll, J. M. (2007). *A Concise History of Hong Kong*. Hong Kong University Press.


Te Royal Hong Kong Jockey Club. (1996). *Te Royal Hong Kong Jockey Club 1995–96*. Association (該會).

Weldon, E. (2007). Addendum, the Hong Kong Jockey Club case study. In S. J. DeKrey, D. M. Messick, & C. Anderson (Eds.), *Leadership. Experiences in Asia. Insight and Inspiration from 20 Innovators* (pp. 161–194). Wiley.

Welsh, F. (1993). *A History of Hong Kong*. Harper Collins Publisher.

Zweigenhaft, R. L., & Domhof, G. (2006). *Diversity in the Power Elite. How It Happened, Why It Matters*. Rowman & Littlefeld.

**Open Access** Tis chapter is licensed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/ by/4.0/), which permits use, sharing, adaptation, distribution and reproduction in any medium or format, as long as you give appropriate credit to the original author(s) and the source, provide a link to the Creative Commons licence and indicate if changes were made.

Te images or other third party material in this chapter are included in the chapter's Creative Commons licence, unless indicated otherwise in a credit line to the material. If material is not included in the chapter's Creative Commons licence and your intended use is not permitted by statutory regulation or exceeds the permitted use, you will need to obtain permission directly from the copyright holder.

# **Part III**

**Civil Society Elite Integration**

# **8**

# **Civil Society Boundary Crossing and Elite Integration**

**Malin Arvidson and Anders Uhlin**

# **Introduction**

It is common to conceptualise civil society as a societal space analytically distinct from the public sector (the state) and the private sector (business). Boundaries between sectors are both conceptual and tangible, and such boundaries may demarcate opposing approaches to societal challenges and diferent rules and regulations governing the sectors. Nevertheless, it is not uncommon that people cross sector boundaries. David Lewis (2008a, b, 2012) has termed this kind of movement between civil society and other sectors "boundary crossing" (see also Haryanto, 2020; Norén-Nilsson & Eng, 2020). In this chapter, we use this term to

A. Uhlin Department of Political Science, Lund University, Lund, Sweden e-mail: anders.uhlin@svet.lu.se

M. Arvidson (\*)

School of Social Work, Lund University, Lund, Sweden e-mail: malin.arvidson@soch.lu.se

refer to the case of elite actors in one sector moving to take up leading positions in another sector. Such boundary crossing may involve political and economic elite actors being recruited to leading positions within civil society organisations (CSOs) as well as civil society leaders taking up leading positions in politics or business.

Elite integration makes up an important research tradition within elite studies. For example, the question of how and to what extent political elites are integrated with business elites has generated a wealth of research over time and in diferent national contexts (Hofman-Lange, 2018). Elite integration may imply both similarity between elite groups and interdependence between elites (Engelstad, 2018: 441). Elites are considered integrated when they have similar characteristics, for instance in terms of shared class and educational background, and when they interact in the same networks. Elite integration can also be understood as shared values. Trough similar upbringings people come to share cultural capital, and through professional experiences based on leadership in high positions people come to develop a common frame of reference around leadership and organisation. Within elite integration studies, the exclusivity of the elite is also assumed to form the basis for value congruence, which can be understood as a common interest in preserving the status and power enjoyed by the elite group. What can the study of elite boundary crossing between civil society and other societal sectors—such as the state, party politics, and business—tell us about the possible integration of civil society elites with elites of other societal sectors? How do civil society elite individuals, whose careers include boundary crossing, contribute to elite integration? Researching elite integration is, we argue, particularly pressing for civil society because it concerns the formation and maintenance of structures of power and inequality. Elite integration both contributes to and can be seen as an indicator of the consolidation of horizontal, exclusive networks, which creates social distance and exclusion.

In this study we explore the topic of elite integration in a novel way, namely through work-histories of civil society elite actors with careers that include the crossing of sectoral boundaries. Complementing extant, mainly quantitative, research on elite integration, we suggest that indepth qualitative interviews with prominent boundary crossers can help us shed new light on what processes might contribute to elite integration. More specifcally, we understand inter-elite integration—that is, the integration of diferent distinct elite groups—to be related to social networks and value congruence based on power, privilege, and sovereignty linked to an elite status. Concerning elite integration as networking, we discuss how elite-level boundary crossing can be interpreted as either constituting or leading to elite integration. We argue, however, that networking in the form of boundary crossing in itself is not sufcient for elite integration, and instead we have to examine whether or not such elite-level contacts across sector boundaries lead to value congruence.

It is important to point out that a claim that sectors difer in terms of values regarding leadership and organisation is not only based on a theoretical model that identifes politics, business, and civil society as three distinct sectors. In all interviews, it is clear that civil society is experienced as a sector characterised by diferent ideals and practices compared to whatever sector from which the interviewees have moved. Exploring experiences of boundary crossing is therefore a highly relevant and valid approach to gain insight into diferent perspectives of value congruence.

We inductively identify three types of boundary crossers based on their motives for cross-sectoral movement and assess to what extent they are likely to contribute to value congruence, and thus elite integration, between sectors: (1) boundary crossers driven by professional motivations who move to another sector to impose values from their sector of origin; (2) boundary crossers driven by personal motivations who leave a sector where they no longer feel at home and seek out new and more attractive values in another sector; (3) boundary crossers driven by political motivations who move back and forth across sector boundaries to gain as much infuence as possible on "their" issues. We assess the likelihood that these types of boundary crossers contribute to value congruence and elite integration.

Te chapter is organised in the following way. After this introduction follows a theoretical and conceptual section situating our study in relation to research on elite integration and, more specifcally, on civil society elite boundary crossing. Ten follows a section on methods and data in which we discuss our methodological approach centred on biographical work-history interviews. Te analysis explores how the practice of boundary crossing may contribute to elite integration through social networks and value-congruence, distinguishing between three types of boundary crossers. Finally, we ofer some conclusions and suggestions for future research.

# **Theoretical Points of Departure**

In his seminal study of the American power elite, Mills (1956) argued that economic, political, and military elites constituted one cohesive power elite. Mills was not alone in arguing for this among classic elite theorists, but this perspective has been questioned. Taking a pluralist perspective, we assume that in today's societies we can fnd several diferent elite groups. Tese elite groups are formed by their respective institutional residency resulting in quite distinct bases for power, status, and values (e.g. Dahl, 1963). However, while they are diferent, and may represent conficting interests, they are not separate from each other. Researchers have long debated how and to what extent elite groups are interconnected, resulting in a wealth of research looking into diferent dimensions of elite interaction and integration (Hofmann-Lange, 2018). Te degree of elite unity however varies between diferent countries and therefore should be a question for empirical research.

Elite individuals can be identifed based on their superior abilities, extraordinary wealth, privileged positions, or social status. Moreover, elites refer to those with disproportionate power to infuence politics (Engelstad, 2018: 440). However, already at the stage of defning elites the concept of integration is central because it constitutes a prerequisite for a group to be regarded as an elite: an elite is not simply a collection of individuals but a group of people who "act together" as a "unifed body" (Ruostetsaari, 2015: 19), with the view to protect "the privileges associated with their positions of power and infuence" (Hofmann-Lange, 2018: 55). Hence, integration is central both to the defnition of an elite and to our understanding of how elite interrelations are structured.

Elite research has explored diferent forms of elite integration (Engelstad, 2018: 439–440), including between elites and society at large, within elite groups, and between elite groups. In focus for this chapter is integration *between* elite groups, that is, inter-elite integration. Tis may imply both similarities between elite groups and interdependence between elites (Engelstad, 2018: 441). Te experiences that come with a professional career, including movement across societal sectors, contribute to value congruence and consensus among elite actors from diferent sectors (Gulbrandsen & Engelstad, 2005; Miller-Stevens et al., 2015). However, elite integration also implies that elite actors complement each other and depend on each other for maintaining elite status. While a level of competition over power may be recognised, integration with other elite groups is also sought "by elite persons and groups to contain or ofset power dispersion" (Hofmann-Lange, 2018: 57). Cooperation across sectors serves the purpose of building trust among "heterogeneous elites" and thereby preventing "conficts of interest from turning into violent power struggles" (Hofmann-Lange, 2018: 56) that may jeopardise existing power structures. Although some types of elite integration are seen as normatively problematic because they may involve conspiracy and lead to corruption, elite integration is also seen by elite theorists as something normatively good and even necessary for a functioning democracy. In the words of Engelstad (2018: 454), "[e]lite integration is a *sine qua non* for stable, reasonably peaceful political governance".

Engelstad (2018: 447) identifes a network model of elite integration that relies on elite interaction in committees, commissions, and boards. Tis is often referred to as "interlocking directorates", a concept that captures interaction between individuals occupying multiple organisational memberships (Ma & DeDeo, 2017; Messamore, 2021; Mizruchi, 1996; Moore et al., 2002). Dogan (2003: 2) defnes elite interlock as "movements from one power summit to another, not movements within the same sphere", and hence emphasises that it assumes a society that contains several diferent elite groups and refers to interactions that go beyond a close circuit of organisations. Such interlock is also defned as diferent from elite interchangeability, which suggests "a common stock of undiferentiated elites" (ibid.). Interlocking directorates is mainly a business practice wherein a member of one company's board of directors also serves on another company's board. However, there are also interlocking directorates related to CSOs. Messamore (2021: 147) shows that interlocking directorates among community-based organisations is indicative of integration among civil society leaders, which may lead to the emergence of a "civic elite".

Networks in themselves do not necessarily imply elite integration. In the literature on elite interaction and integration, the concept of value congruence is often used. Te concept refers to both objectively and subjectively defned values that form the basis for group unity. One assumption is that value congruence follows early socialisation in similar environments, typically a privileged upbringing and private, elite schooling. Tis kind of value congruence is amply captured by Bourdieu's concept of "cultural capital", that is, capital that is fostered through the inclusion in privileged groups, by inheritance (family background), or by schooling (elite schools). Value congruence from this perspective is not measured directly, but is simply assumed based on objectively observed indicators such as socio-economic background (based on parents' income, for example) and school careers (private schools and elite universities). Te socialisation that follows from growing up under privileged circumstances and exclusive schooling has a profound efect on the cultural capital of the individual, both in terms of taste and cultural preferences and as a basis for expectations that guide career choices and how ambitions are pursued. Value congruence forms the basis for a sense of belonging based on distinctiveness and exclusivity. Tis may translate into a common interest to preserve the status quo regarding exclusivity, which in turn forms the basis for the maintenance of social structures characterised by principles of inclusion/exclusion.

Values can also be shaped through elite interaction later in life (professional career and leisure activities and networks associated with these). Shared values are formed by similar career experiences and through individuals moving in the same circles. Individuals are fostered by institutional logics that determine what gives status and power in diferent sectors such as politics, business, public administration, and the media. Hence, we use the term "values" in a broad sense alluding to the idea of overarching sector values; for example, justice and charity are assumed to be strong values in civil society, while efciency, efectiveness, and market values are associated with the private sector (cf. Brandsen & Karré, 2011; Lipsky & Smith, 1989). More specifcally, we refer to sector values that are translated into norms of leadership such as top-down management in commercial competitive business organisations versus collegial and participatory approaches in voluntary-based CSOs (cf. Miller-Stevens et al., 2015).

Our approach to studying civil society elite integration is to explore boundary crossing between civil society and other sectors. Te concept of boundary crossing assumes that civil society is diferent from other sectors in society because boundaries are believed to distinguish civil society from other spheres of human activity (cf. Khalil, 2013). Te literature on non-proft organisations conventionally distinguishes between the public, private, and third sector (Anheier & Seibel, 1990). Civil society theorists commonly construct boundaries between civil society on the one hand and the state and political and economic society on the other (Cohen & Arato, 1992). Te boundaries of civil society are "conceptual boundaries", but people may still experience boundaries as very real, with distinct rules of the game in diferent sectors (Lewis, 2008b: 139).

Tis chapter addresses core issues in the elite integration literature, namely how integration is indicative of networks and the nature of boundaries between diferent sectors and elite groups and how integration is implicated with the forging of value congruence across elite groups. From the perspective of civil society studies, these issues are of particular interest because institutional closeness and interaction across sectoral boundaries are linked to organisational isomorphism, implying that civil society values may be at risk of becoming diluted. Tis kind of reasoning resonates with theoretical assumptions in elite integration studies, where elite movement between diferent spheres of power is seen as indicative of institutional closeness and where such elite integration is expected to lead to value congruence across elite groups.

### **Methods and Data**

Elite integration has typically been studied based on large datasets, often gathered through surveys (e.g. Edling et al., 2014; Gulbrandsen, 2012; Higley et al., 1991). Quantitative methods for analysing elite integration include multiple correspondence analysis (Bühlmann et al., 2012) and various forms of social network analysis (Edling et al., 2014; Larsen & Ellersgaard, 2017). While such studies ofer valuable comparative overviews, they cannot provide more in-depth and nuanced accounts of the diversity of boundary crossing experiences. As a complement to established quantitative approaches, we rely on qualitative interviews.

In order to identify individual interviewees, we used a mix of positional and reputational methods. Our starting point was the identifcation of major CSOs in three countries (Italy, Sweden, and the UK) (see Appendix, this volume). We examined the career trajectory of presidents and directors of organisations with the highest "elite score" (ibid.) to fnd people with a background in leading positions in the public or private sector or in politics. In order to also capture civil society leaders who had moved into leading positions in the state, business, or politics, we compiled a list of key fgures with these characteristics frequently occurring in the media. In selecting interviewees, we aimed at diversity in gender, age, and civil society sector. For this chapter, we draw on eight interviews (two in Italy, four in Sweden, and two in the UK). Our sample is obviously not representative of any larger population, and this explorative study does not aim at empirical generalisations. Te interviewees were selected because we believed that they could provide important and unique insights into the experiences of boundary crossing to and from civil society.

We conducted life-work history interviews (Lewis, 2008b: 127), which are defned as a retrospective account of (part of) one's life with a particular focus on a person's professional career. Life histories have the advantage of providing historical depth and ethnographic detail (Lewis, 2008b: 561). Care had to be taken, however, to strike a balance between the need to focus on the boundary crossing experiences and the aim to create a narrative that is the interviewee's own with minimal researcher infuence. Te way to do this was to design semi-structured interviews that explored personal and professional perspectives on motivations, values, and experiences from engaging with diferent sectors. Te interviews began by introducing the research problem to the interviewee and asking about childhood experiences that motivated engagement in CSOs and then moved on to the interviewee's frst job (in civil society or other sectors) and continued to cover the interviewee's professional career. Our lifework history interviews lasted around 60 minutes.

While members of elites are typically not seen as being vulnerable in the same way as non-elite individuals, this kind of interview still requires important ethical considerations. Te disclosure of information and refections provided in the interviews could potentially be damaging for the interviewee. Tis could cause embarrassment, compromise professional relationships, and even lead to the loss of a job (Lancaster, 2017: 99), and hence it might make sense to speak about "vulnerable elites" (Smith, 2006: 650). In the case of civil society elites, some accounts linked to a specifc person could have damaging efects not only for the individual but also for the organisation they represent and possibly for the whole civil society sector. Tis kind of sensitivity or vulnerability is particularly acute in a time of strong populist anti-elite sentiments. We carefully considered such potential risks concerning each interview, and all interviewees were informed about the research and how we planned to use the interviews. While all of them gave their oral or written consent to be quoted in research publications, we still decided to not refer to them by name.

Te narratives created through the life-work history interviews were transcribed. We coded the data in order to map diferent aspects of boundary crossing, including motives behind the movement, views on networking and cross-sector contacts, and perceived diferences and similarities between sectors, especially in terms of dominant values. Te interview data were contextualised against a review of primary and secondary literature, including CVs and bios found on the internet when available (cf. Lewis, 2012: 161).

Our interviewees had diferent career trajectories, including movement both to and from civil society. Two persons had successful careers in business before taking up leading positions in civil society (Interviewee 1 and 2). One of our interviewees started a legal career, then switched to jobs in local and national government and took up leadership positions in several major CSOs (Interviewee 3). Another person started as a journalist, then joined the local and national government before moving on to become a leader of a major CSO (Interviewee 4). One civil society leader started her career as a student activist, then joined diferent CSOs before joining a political party and being elected to the national parliament. After serving as a parliamentarian, she returned to civil society as the president of a local branch of a major CSO while also being elected to a local parliament, and fnally became president of a major national CSO (Interviewee 5). Following a similar trajectory, another person served on leading positions in several development-oriented and international solidarity-oriented CSOs on the national and EU levels while also being active in a political party and being elected to the national parliament (Interviewee 6). One of our interviewees started his career as a leader of the student branch of a political party, then was elected to the national parliament. Temporarily stopping his political career, he became president of a major CSO, moving on to leading another major CSO before returning to party politics as a member of the European Parliament, while also serving in leading positions within national and international public authorities as well as an international think tank (Interviewee 7). Yet another person had a similarly varied career path, beginning in civil society, then moving to the public sector as a politically recruited government ofcial, then moving into the business sector when joining a PR company, to then be recruited to work at the EU Commission, and then back to civil society before being appointed as director of a new public authority (Interviewee 8).

# **Analysis**

## **Networks and Elite Integration**

Social networks across sector boundaries appear to be important in all of our interviews. First, the act of crossing sector boundaries in itself is an example of cross-border networking. Second, the most important enabling factor for boundary crossing appears to be personal contacts. All interviewees mentioned this when explaining why they were recruited to a leading position in a societal sector diferent from where they previously resided. What is stressed is informal personal networks. Tird, cross-sector networks are important not only for facilitating boundary crossing but also for the ability of the boundary crosser to lead in a new sector. For example, when entering formal politics, one boundary crosser believed that his networks and experiences from civil society were very important and gave him "disproportionate infuence" in the European Parliament (Interviewee 7). CSOs "saw me as a very important person in European politics. […] Tere you can really see the usefulness of networks and experiences [from civil society]" (Interviewee 7). Another interviewee stressed the advantages of bringing one's civil society networks to the state sector. When taking up the position as director of a public authority, the former civil society activist engaged civil society actors in various forms of cooperation with the public authority, including joint conferences and publications. She described this civil society participation as very valuable (Interviewee 8).

Te centrality of social networks and contacts across sector boundaries in the narratives derived from life-work history interviews with civil society elite boundary crossers is, however, not enough for us to conclude that networking in itself is indicative of elite integration. Networks between elite groups are a necessary condition for elite integration, but they are not sufcient. In order to draw (tentative) conclusions about elite integration, we also have to explore to what extent key values of the diferent elite groups converge. Does boundary crossing lead to elite-level value congruence? And if so, what kind of boundary crossers are likely to contribute to elite integration through value congruence? Tese are the questions addressed in the remaining part of this chapter. In the analysis of our interview transcripts, we identifed three types of boundary crossers with diferent motives for their cross-sector movement. First is the leader driven by professional motivations trying to impose values associated with her sector of origin in a new setting. Second is the leader driven by personal motivations whose boundary crossing is triggered by a wish to escape old values and embrace new ones. Tird is the leader driven by political motivations who moves back and forth between sectors navigating value diferences as he seeks to maximise infuence in a specifc issue area. We consider these types in turn.

## **Imposing Values in a New Setting**

Coming from the business sector to take up a leading position in a major CSO, a new leader applied business practices to the civil society sector.

We had to lay of and get rid of that administration. We were sitting with a fnancial management with far too low risk so we needed to increase the risk and think strategically. We had to get an external fnancial council that was qualifed and not only a bunch of [activists in the CSO in question] who had been in [the organisation] for four decades. (Interviewee 1)

Tis civil society leader noted many diferences between business and civil society, mostly, in her view, to the advantage of business. Te slowness and anchoring processes in civil society is a diference compared to the business sector. "Companies are quicker and more efcient" (Interviewee 1).

Tere is probably more tolerance of hierarchies and power in the business sector. You look up to and respect the bosses more. […] I think that [in civil society] there is actually alarmingly low respect for the bosses. (Interviewee 1)

According to this boundary crosser, many principles and practices from the business sector are applicable in civil society. "Debit and credit are the same in the [name of the CSO] as anywhere else. Having sound fnances is as important there, if not even more important" (Interviewee 1). However, there are also sector diferences that make it difcult to simply transfer practices from one sector to another. How to handle all the volunteers was described as very frustrating by this leader coming from the business sector. "In organisations where volunteering is big you have another type of leadership. Tere you have to add something to your leadership" (Interviewee 1).

While acknowledging that leadership values and practices cannot easily be transferred from one sector to another, this interviewee is a clear example of the type of boundary crosser who is primarily driven by professional motivations and who tries to impose values from their sector of origin to the new sector. Acting as a "value entrepreneur", this type of boundary crosser might contribute to value congruence between elite groups in diferent sectors, but only to the extent that eforts to impose values from another sector are successful. In this specifc case, there are indications that the former business leader managed to lead the large CSO at least partly based on leadership values from the business sector. Hence, this is a case of possible inter-elite integration that deserves more attention in future research.

#### **Escaping Old Values and Embracing New Ones**

Sometimes elite-level boundary crossing is mainly driven by personal motivations, for instance a move away from a sector where the leader no longer feels at home. One civil society leader with a career background in politics and government refected on the "formalised and bureaucratised" ways of operating within state departments. He explained that "I didn't think I could express myself in that language" and made the decision to move away from politics and public administration (Interviewee 4).

For some of our interviewees, the move into civil society was prompted by a wish to move away from the values dominating the proft-seeking business world. Tey perceived civil society as a sector where one can make a meaningful and valuable social contribution. One interviewee expressed dissatisfaction with his business career: "I got to a point with private equity, where I felt I'd sort of done enough, you know, I wanted to do something that had greater social value" (Interviewee 2). Tis combination of dissatisfaction with the current career and a will to "do good" was also expressed by another boundary crosser:

About fve years into my legal career I just thought I'm not enjoying this and so just gave up and sort of at the age of twenty-six started thinking, you know, what do I really want to do. And at the time I was earning quite a lot of money with the prospect of earning a huge amount of money, but I just wasn't particularly interested in it and I was a bit bored. (Interviewee 3)

However, moving to civil society is not always easy for a business leader. "It was difcult to take a charity salary, with having four kids and quite a lot of dependants… I didn't feel I could take what would have been such a dramatic cut in salary" (Interviewee 2). Also, in spite of an outstanding career as a business developer, he felt rejected by charities on the ground that he was not a "good ft" (Interviewee 2). "Tere are certain charities that I reached out to, that I basically got a fat no from" (Interviewee 2). Hence, this type of boundary crosser has to overcome considerable hurdles in order to get into a leading position in civil society. Tis means that they have a strong motivation to embrace or at least adjust to key values in the civil society sector. One interviewee said that while the CSO that took him on as its new director was keen to invite new perspectives, including commercial skills, he himself had to adapt his leadership style:

Some of the things that have worked very well in the commercial sector, I've had to modify, adjust, be more patient about. […] Te language of 'servant leadership' is used quite a lot here, and I see myself more like that. It's not my role to stand at the top as the big person who tells everyone this is what we are doing as an organisation, and everyone just jumps. (Interviewee 2)

Sympathising with the general values of the CSO made it easier to adapt to its leadership values. "One of the reasons I came to [name of the CSO] is because I really like our values. I didn't create them, so they're open, fair, connected, pioneering, and courageous" (Interviewee 2).

Tis type of boundary crosser, to the extent that old values are left behind and new values are embraced, does not contribute to value congruence between sectors and thus does not lead to the integration of different elite groups. However, in real life one is not likely to leave all previous values behind, even if the main driver behind boundary crossing is a personal dissatisfaction with the values dominating one's sector. As one interviewee put it, "As a leader you never stop learning, so each new environment you come into brings new perspectives" (Interviewee 2). Tis suggests that boundary crossing always entails some merging of values, even when the boundary crosser intends to escape old values and embrace new values.

## **Navigating Value Differences when Seeking Issue-Specifc Infuence**

A frequently mentioned driver behind boundary crossing both to and from civil society is to gain political infuence, "to make a diference" concerning issues that one fnds very important. Tis might be a particularly strong incentive to move from civil society to politics, but some also fnd that they can actually make more of a diference when moving to civil society. Several of our interviewees also moved back and forth between civil society and other sectors in order to maximise their infuence on their key issues.

One civil society leader who was also at times a leading politician valued the "greater freedom in civil society" (Interviewee 7). He viewed the benefts and challenges of party politics diferently depending on if he was in or out of politics:

When I have been outside of politics, then I have often felt that now I have to enter politics and fght and do something about this. And when I have been in politics I have just felt, oh God how narrow this system is. […] It is very difcult to get things done. (Interviewee 7)

Another boundary crosser expressed that a major diference between party politics and civil society activism is that the latter is more direct and practical:

I want to protect the environment and so I do "recycling", I don't use mineral water. […] I say that I defend Kurdistan, so we organised dinner in which we send money to Kurdistan. I say that I struggle against poverty, so I ofer dinner to poor people. Tis is the diference I think. (Interviewee 5).\

When moving across sector boundaries, one has to navigate value diferences. In civil society, one must adhere to the values of the organisation and of civil society at large. In the public sector, there is a form of "public authority integrity where you show that you do not allow yourself to be guided by your own feelings" (Interviewee 8). An advantage of moving to the public sector is that one typically has access to more resources than in civil society. "Tere are very diferent opportunities to develop leadership issues, employee issues, there are other resources" (Interviewee 8). Moving to the public sector is also a way of gaining more political infuence. "You don't have to stand on the barricades, you know, now there are other ways to gain infuence" (Interviewee 8).

Boundary crossers, especially those moving back and forth across sector boundaries or simultaneously holding leading positions in more than one sector, are manifestations of cross-border linkages. One boundary crosser who was both a civil society leader and a member of parliament expressed that she could act as an "intermediary" between civil society and party politics (Interviewee 6). For this type of boundary crosser, sector boundaries appear permeable. When moving across sector boundaries, the leader has to navigate value diferences. However, being active in more than one sector, the boundary crosser is also likely to contribute to the weakening of such value diferences, which might lead to value congruence between elite groups and, hence, inter-elite integration.

# **Conclusion**

Drawing on life-work history interviews with boundary crossers who move between civil society and other sectors, we sought to complement existing, mainly quantitative, research on elite integration. We considered that boundary crossing in itself could be seen as an expression of elite integration. If elites frequently and easily move between sectors, this could be seen as an indication that elite groups are relatively integrated. Moreover, boundary crossers bring values related to the principles of leadership and organisational operation from one sector to another, thus contributing to increasing cross-sector integration. However, we argue that while the networking indeed appears to be open for cross-sector integration of organisational or sectoral principles, this is not sufcient for elite integration. We have to examine whether or not such elite-level contacts across sector boundaries actually contribute to the convergence of elite values. By this, we mean not (only) the integration of sector values but also the development and consolidation of values that only concern elite groups and that, as Hofman-Lange (2018) suggests, relate to the exclusivity of their "positions of power and infuence" (p. 55).

Te interviewed boundary crossers share some important features, and they have for some time moved in the higher echelons of their respective societies, and although their motives for moving across sectoral boundaries vary, they experience how sectors represent diferent values, or institutional logics, that guide core attitudes regarding organisational management, power, status, and hierarchical orders. In their stories, we see how they refect on these diferences and make individual decisions regarding how to deal with institutional value conficts and the fact that their elite attributes do not easily ft into a new context. Based on their motives for cross-sectoral movement, we identifed three types of boundary crossers: (1) boundary crossers who move to another sector to impose values from their sector of origin; (2) boundary crossers who leave a sector where they no longer feel at home and seek out new and more attractive values in another sector; (3) boundary crossers who move back and forth across sector boundaries to gain as much infuence as possible on "their" issues.

Te frst type of boundary crosser is driven mainly by *professional* motivations. Tis leader (often from the business sector) believes that the management values of the sector of origin are superior and can be fruitfully applied in another sector (typically civil society). Tis boundary crosser has a mission to transform the CSO she is now leading into a more professional and efcient organisation. We argue that this type may contribute to value congruence if the boundary crosser succeeds in imposing values from their sector of origin on another sector. Moreover, beyond the integration of business sector values into the context of civil society, the boundary crosser creates an exclusive position for herself by forwarding leadership principles that she masters particularly well. Tis potentially gives the leader a role where bonds of loyalty and interest with other elite leaders are forged, rather than relations of afnity within the organisation.

Te second type of boundary crosser has *personal* motivations for moving across sector boundaries. Experiencing a discrepancy between personal ethical and political values and those prevailing in the sector where he is active (typically business or politics), this person moves to civil society, a sector believed to be shaped by values more in line with the individual's preferences. Te second type does not immediately contribute to value congruence, as old values are set aside, although over time we may expect a merging of principles that guide leadership and organisational operation. Because these boundary crossers seek to subsume to the values of civil society, they also appear to renounce their membership in an elite whose community of interests aims at preserving elite exclusivity.

Te third type of boundary crosser is driven by *political* motivations when seeking to maximise infuence through mobility across sector boundaries. From an elite integration perspective, this type is difcult to interpret. On the one hand, frequent mobility generates multifaceted and exclusive experiences and provides good insight into the essence of elite community values. On the other hand, this boundary crosser is also at risk of being a constant outsider.

Our analysis both confrms and problematises the idea of clear boundaries between civil society and the state, political parties, and the market economy. Boundaries are at once permeable and distinct. All interviewees perceive obvious diferences between sectors, suggesting that the boundaries of civil society are not just academic constructions. Although one of our interviewees noted that some boundaries can only be crossed once (from media to politics), the boundaries appeared relatively permeable, at least for this group of elites. Although frequent boundary crossing of elites suggests that boundaries between civil society and other sectors are permeable, this does not necessarily mean that the nature of boundaries are similar for all groups in civil society. Rather, this may be an expression of *elite* and not sector integration. Civil society elite actors may experience integration with other elite groups and therefore see sectoral boundaries as permeable, while for other, non-elite individuals, the boundaries remain distinct and difcult to cross and therefore the integration of values appears to be quite diferent

Te importance of making a distinction between levels of integration lies in the possible implications for civil society. Integration at organisational and sectoral levels is captured in the research theme of isomorphism, that is, the mainstreaming of civil society as a result of institutional closeness. Such integration afects more or less all those involved in civil society. However, elite integration refers to a process of diferentiation within the sector, where a group of highly infuential people in positions of power can be considered part of a social elite rather than part of civil society. Tis prompts questions regarding loyalties and solidarity within the sector because such horizontal integration risks increasing social distance between the majority of members, volunteers, clients, and employees of civil society and organisational leaders. While the integration of society's diferent elite groups may lay the foundation for a stable democracy (cf. Engelstad, 2018), elite integration that also incorporates civil society's elite leaders becomes problematic for a sector whose independence from dominant power structures is central. Furthermore, the permeability, or lack thereof, of civil society boundaries might lead to diferent patterns of civil society elite integration in diferent countries. We suggest that these are important topics for future research because characteristics of boundaries and integration are indicative of how power and infuence are dispersed in civil society.

**Acknowledgement** Tis research was supported by Riksbankens Jubileumsfond (project grant M17-0188:1) for the project titled "Civil Society Elites? Comparing Elite Composition, Reproduction, Integration and Contestation in European Civil Societies".

### **References**


Miller-Stevens, K., Taylor, J. A., & Morris, J. C. (2015). Are We Really on the Same Page? An Empirical Examination of Value Congruence Between Public Sector and Nonproft Sector Managers. *Voluntas, 26*, 2424–2446.

Mills, C. W. (1956/2000). *Te Power Elite*. Oxford University Press.


**Open Access** Tis chapter is licensed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/ by/4.0/), which permits use, sharing, adaptation, distribution and reproduction in any medium or format, as long as you give appropriate credit to the original author(s) and the source, provide a link to the Creative Commons licence and indicate if changes were made.

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# **9**

# **The Interstitial Elites of the Italian Foundations of Banking Origin**

**Paola Arrigoni**

# **Introduction**

Te foundations of banking origin (Fobs) are among the key sites where political, economic, and fnancial power is concentrated in present-day Italy. Te Fobs' growing infuence on public policymaking, their crucial role within the Italian fnancial system, and the profles of the individuals called to direct them make them a worthy focus for the study of elites, whether from a positional, decision-making, or reputational perspective. Nevertheless, Fobs have never been investigated in their own right, either as organisations or in relation to the actors who govern them.

Indeed, although the debate on Fobs' ambiguous positioning between the private and the public, between banks and electoral politics, and between philanthropy and business—has been raging since the foundations were frst brought into existence (e.g., Boeri, 2013; Guiso, 2013), it is only in the legal literature that they have been investigated more

Department of Cultures, Politics and Society, University of Turin, Torino, Italy

P. Arrigoni (\*)

H. Johansson, A. Meeuwisse (eds.), *Civil Society Elites*, Palgrave Studies in Tird Sector Research, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-40150-3\_9

closely (Pastori & Zagrebelsky, 2011). In contrast, political and sociological studies of Fobs are rare and mainly focus on how they operate (e.g., Barbetta, 2013; Burroni et al., 2017; Polizzi, 2021; Ravazzi, 2016), while failing to scrutinise their origins, development, and senior members. Tus, the aim of my own research has been to fll this gap by focusing on the leadership group of a specifc Fob, the Compagnia San Paolo (CSP) of Turin. Specifcally, this work considers the following questions. What are the features of the people who have been called to lead Fobs from their origins (1992) until today? Do they constitute an elite and, if so, what kind of ethos do they express? I use the term 'elite' operatively, critically, and fexibly, following a socio-historical approach informed by the Anglo-American pragmatist tradition of C.W. Mills (1956). Ethos is understood here as a grammar of justifcation (Boltanski & Tévenot, 1991) and as an expression of the spirit of capitalism as defned by Boltanski and Chiapello (1999).

Tis chapter illustrates how a set of people, who are already powerful in other felds (i.e., already belonging to elite formations in other contexts) can constitute themselves as a new political elite or a ruling group that seeks to establish itself as a legitimate actor in the domain of policymaking by virtue of its membership in a civil society organisation (CSO) with a specifc ethos.

I conduct my research from a socio-historical perspective, following tradition of C.W. Mills (1956) and adopting an interpretive framework informed by the principles of *histoire croisée* (Werner & Zimmermann, 2006). Indeed, the relational and processual framework of *histoire croisée* seems particularly suited to studying a multidimensional object such as the CSP and its elites. Combining diachronic and synchronic perspectives, this approach attributes a dynamic and active role to both the object under investigation and the researcher's intersecting of scales, categories, sources, and viewpoints. My study draws on original empirical material comprising (i) an analysis of documents such as the annual reports and fnancial statements of the CSP itself and Acri (an association that represents the Fobs) and legislation concerning Fobs; (ii) 36 semi-structured interviews with individuals both inside the CSP/Fobs (20) and external to them (16); (iii) ethnographic data gathered at public events organised by the CSP or attended by representatives of the CSP (2017–2021); and (iv) a prosopography based on 16 socio-demographic and other variables (e.g., types and number of felds worked in during their professional career and years of service in the CSP or afliated institutions) inferred from the career histories of the 129 members of the seven most recent boards of directors of the CSP (1991–2019). To assemble this information, I mainly draw on ofcial biographies such as CVs, post-appointment press releases, and accounts published in the media. After constructing the variables, I analysed them longitudinally, using the term of ofce (four years) of the seven boards as the independent variable.

Te chapter is structured as follows. First, I present the main characteristics of Fobs (and the CSP) while outlining how the theoretical underpinnings of interstitiality (as conceptualised by Eyal, 2013) helps me to unpack my object of inquiry. Next, I present and discuss my empirical fndings in relation to the rise and key features of the CSP's elite group and their associated ethos and the practices of integration and the role played by this kind of elite group 'in-between' the state, markets, and civil society. Finally, in the concluding section, I raise questions surrounding the social and analytical implications of my fndings.

## **Fobs as Interstitial Organisations**

We should feel proud to have been among the pioneers, to have opened up a path that abroad is seen as a model from which to learn about various aspects. We have done this not without difculty (…) as I think happens everywhere when you try to create something new. One might joke: while we may have been Frankenstein, the name we were called when the foundations of banking origin were created, today we are aware that we have 'clones' all over the world. (Giuseppe Guzzetti, 'Te humanism of philanthropy', Il Sole 24 Ore, 2 October 2014)

In this statement, Guzzetti—one of the most emblematic fgures in the history of the Fobs as a former president of Acri and of Cariplo Fob in Milan—brilliantly summarised the complex essence of the banking foundations. It is indicative of the Fobs' fuzziness that the frst person to coin the label 'Frankenstein' was Giuliano Amato, the main proponent of the reform from which the foundations were born (Corsico & Messa, 2011). Although it is not easy to sum up banking foundations, I will provide the reader with some key information before advancing my line of argumentation further: What are Fobs, where did they come from, and why is the concept of interstitiality useful in decoding them?

Perceived as 'strange creatures' from the outset, Fobs are an unforeseen outcome of the complex process of privatisation of the Italian banking sector that was initiated in the 1990s (Pastori & Zagrebelsky, 2011). More specifcally, in order to privatise the Italian public credit system which historically did not have a clear owner (Fiordiponti, 2013)—the Amato-Carli law (1990) assigned ownership of the shares of the former saving banks to new public subjects termed 'conferring bodies', which also inherited the philanthropic mission of the former public banks, while the banking business itself was entrusted to a 'conferee' jointstock bank.

Shares had to be created in order to privatise and had to be sold, but if you do not have an owner for the shares, how on earth can you do this? So, they split of another entity from the bank, which would later become the Fob, then called the conferring body. (Interview with Professor Emeritus of Administrative Law, University of Bologna, 2017)

Te privatisation of the banks initially only took place at the 'formal' level. Tis was because, at frst, control over their resources was left in the hands of political leaders via the conferring body. Otherwise, the politicians would have obstructed the reform. Only in 1998 (Ciampi Law No 461, 23 December 1998), following a further legislative process that was not without controversy, was the conferring body obliged to forgo control of the banks, shedding its original role of steering the privatisation process and becoming a private foundation.

From a legal perspective, Fobs are spinofs of public institutions. Tus, they have no founder other than an act of law, and this makes them unique compared to all other kinds of foundations in the world (corporate, familial, individual, communitarian). Legislation endowed the newly constituted Fobs with 'third-party' resources, namely the savings of investors who did not have any say in the setting up of the foundations nor in their subsequent activities (Pastori & Zagrebelsky, 2011). Essentially, the law replaced the investors with local communities ('*il territorio*'). Te core characteristics of the Fobs refect this origin—they are private but obliged by law to invest their assets in specifc policy areas that largely overlap with the brief of local government, they are independent of the banks they originated from, yet in many cases remain among their main shareholders, and both public actors (e.g., elected bodies, universities, and hospitals) and private bodies (e.g., chambers of commerce, foundations, and Catholic Church authorities) contribute to appointing their boards.

Te origin of the Fobs explains why they cannot be reduced to a single feld as conceptualised by Bourdieu and why, even today, they continue to be hybrid in nature, spanning the state, markets, and civil society. Indeed, they intercept multiple felds. First are the fnancial and business sectors, by virtue of their shares in the banks and the Cassa Depositi e Prestiti (CDP, a publicly controlled joint-stock company and traditional channel for fnancing public bodies), and their non-banking investments. Tis combined set of holdings makes them the leading investors in Italy's real economy (Greco & Tombari, 2020). Second are the political and public administration sectors. Tis is because a set number of Fob board members must be appointed by local authorities and because Fobs are required by law to invest their assets in policy areas that signifcantly overlap with those under the responsibility of local authorities such as social services, education, research, art, and culture (Ravazzi, 2016). Tird are the organised civil society and university sectors, which are involved in the appointment of the Fobs' governing bodies and can receive grant funding from the foundations. Fourth are Italian and European philanthropy sectors via the Fobs' links with Philea (Philanthropy Europe Association) and their networking with other types of foundations. Furthermore, over the past two decades Fobs have consistently occupied a key role in Italian policymaking—whether alongside, as equals to, independently of, and sometimes even in a position of supremacy over, 'traditional' elected or appointed political actors (Arrigoni, 2021). Tis position has been legitimised over time thanks to the Fobs' legislative underpinnings, the fact that they can make free use of their assets because they are private, their 'new' philanthropic nature, and last but not least the participation in their governing bodies of fgures who already enjoyed elite status in other felds and who circulate in and around the foundations, thus providing access to other resources (Khan, 2012). Tis mix of factors has enhanced the Fobs' capacity to steer the debate concerning problems and solutions of public interest, including via the dissemination of 'vehicular ideas' (Osborne, 2004), that is to say, discursive elements with the power to 'make things move' through the coalitions that adopt them. Tis is refected at the empirical level in the afrmation of imaginaries of 'social cohesion' and 'resilience' in which the Fobs have played a role (d'Albergo & Moini, 2018).

Tere are currently 86 Fobs in Italy (Acri, 2020), which vary greatly in terms of size, territorial scale, and the composition of their boards. A total of 77.4% of their assets are owned by only 16 Fobs, of which the two largest—Cariplo and the CSP—hold 32.7%. Te foundations are concentrated mainly in Northern Italy, with almost none based in the South. A diverse range of bodies appoint the members of their boards, and half are nominated by the banks that the foundations originated from while the other half are chosen by local community organisations or are coopted by the CSP Board of Directors itself. At the end of 2019, the Fobs reported a joint worth of EUR 40.3 billion (Acri, 2020). Between 2000 and 2019, they distributed over EUR 22 billion in grants, mainly to fund the arts, culture, social services, research, and education. Furthermore, MRIs—mission-related investments—represent 11.2% of their assets (with a monetary value of EUR 4.4 billion). Tese take the form of equities, bonds, and fund shares concentrated in the transport infrastructure, energy distribution, and construction sectors. Social housing falls under this last category and indeed is the only example of strong fnancialisation in Italian social welfare. In other words, the Fobs' housing policies in addition to actors and narratives also involve technical instruments, assets, contracts, and fows of money dictated by fnancial market logic (Chiappelo, 2019). A narrative is here understood as a form of human understanding that, by connecting diferent events and giving them an argumentative coherence, produces the meaning that the narrator wants to communicate to the outside environment (Moini, 2013).

As mentioned at the outset, my research is focused on the elites that may be observed in the CSP. I do not generalise from this case study, but rather propose it as an emblematic instance among the 86 contemporary Fobs. Te CSP comes from a long history, dating back to 1563, and the current foundation has played and continues to play a key role in local urban governance (Belligni & Ravazzi, 2013). However, its sphere of infuence goes beyond local borders; together with Fondazione Cariplo in Milan, it remains the main shareholder in the leading Italian banking group Intesa Sanpaolo and plays a decisive role in the appointment of the bank's top management. It is recognised as one of the most dynamic foundations in terms of its networking with other European foundations and is one of the largest foundations in Europe in terms of grants and assets (Salamon, 2014).

#### **The Notion of Interstitiality**

Given that Fobs are located in a murky space that straddles fnance, business, politics, philanthropy, and academia, it is not surprising that Eyal's (2013) notion of interstitiality—understood as a vector for the hybridisation and circulation of logics, grammars of justifcation, devices, and actors across felds—proves to be an excellent heuristic tool for studying the CSP and its leadership group. First, because unveiling the nature of these strange creatures requires us to consider the fuzziness of our object of inquiry right from the conceptualisation and design of our research. Second, because CSP elites draw their unique power precisely from their location at the crossroads between diferent felds in 'a space that is underdetermined, where things can be done, combinations and conversions could be established, that are not possible to do within felds. In short, it is a space that has been opened up by some abrupt change, and that can generate even more changes' (Eyal, 2013, p. 177).

I wished to assess interstitiality in the CSP as an organisation and, innovatively, directly in relation to its highest-ranking members. Indeed, not only do interstitial spaces appear increasingly key to the exercise of power by elites—see Dakowska (2014) on German political foundations and Medvetz on American think tanks (2012)—but also, expanding the original concept of interstitiality, I attribute an interstitial quality to the CSP elite per se. More specifcally, this group is not only situated in an interstitial space, but its infuence is legitimated by an interstitial ethos. Tis evocative ethos appears to be an intrinsic characteristic of an elite, given that the power of any elite grouping relies on a shared ethos or vocabulary of motives, to cite Mills (1940), as a basis for seeking consensus and status. Te next section illustrates the emergence of this elite and ethos.

# **The Emergence of an Interstitial Elite (and Ethos) Via Civil Society**

Te CSP is linked to, but also independent of, the felds it stemmed from (politics and fnance), and those it has interacted with throughout its evolution (philanthropy and academia). While its connections situate it within an *interstitial* humus that is propitious to the generation of *new things* that would be impossible to achieve in any individual feld, it is the CSP's positioning within the policymaking process that best enables it to leverage its interstitiality.

Indeed, in seeking to position itself as independent of politics and of the bank from which it originated, the CSP has confgured itself as a 'private' actor that takes part in policymaking in domains of public interest, thus legitimising its role via an interstitial ethos that mixes discursive regimes and fnancial, economic, and philanthropic logics. In other words, it is an ethos in which the values of altruism and voluntaristic solidarity are intertwined and confused with economic and fnancial value, and which, thus combined, guides or is said to guide the CSP's actions. Tis stance is complemented by the presumed neutrality of the technical knowledge generated by the CSP (which is why it is also a depoliticised ethos) and an insistence on the importance of using metrics to evaluate the policies the foundation fnances or implements.

How did the CSP's philanthropic-fnancial ethos and elite come to the fore? As summarised in Fig. 9.1, in the 1990s the CSP had not yet developed a distinctive ethical stance, but the bank's cultural legacy—which came with a staf that had been transferred entirely from the bank—featured discursive and justifying regimes surrounding fnance, which also

#### **9 The Interstitial Elites of the Italian Foundations of Banking…**

**Fig. 9.1** The CSP's ethos and elite formation at a glance. (Source: Figure made by the author)

touched loosely on philanthropy. Only between 2000 and 2006, when the CSP became a private body, did it begin to express its own ethos informed by strategic philanthropy and seek to establish a reputation for itself in the domain of public policy expertise. As stated by a former top executive in both the CSP and Intesa Sanpaolo: 'A fusion took place between those who came from the bank and those who came from other felds, a mix of cultures that created a new professional fgure, diferent from the classical politician-administrator' (Interview with the frst director general of CSP, 2017).

From 2008 onwards, the CSP began to recruit staf with diverse career backgrounds from outside the bank, while before they had hired schoolleavers or graduates with no prior work experience and trained them internally or hired people who were already employed by the bank. Tis process of professionalisation was given a boost around 2012 via the recruitment of new fgures more in tune with the new positioning of the CSP.

In the meantime, the CSP's ethos was becoming increasingly informed by new philanthropy principles, shifting—in discourse more than in policies—towards an impact fnance framework that added fnancial logics and instruments to those of New Public Management and strategic philanthropy (Greco & Tombari, 2020; Quaglia & Rosboch, 2018).

Te interplay of charity and business has been at the heart of contemporary philanthropy since the spread of venture philanthropy in the US in the 1990s (Frumkin, 2003). Its key traits—entrepreneurial dimension, measurability, capacity for innovation, and risk-taking—are captured by a new, and creative, set of labels, namely Efective Philanthropy, Catalytic Philanthropy, Strategic Philanthropy, or Philanthrocapitalism (Bishop & Green, 2008). 'New philanthropy' may be viewed as combining the logic of grantmaking with the logic of investment (Guillhot, 2006; McGoey, 2015), with 'philanthrocapitalism' as perhaps its most complete expression. Te inventor of the term has claimed:

Historically, many philanthropists have engaged in giving primarily to win public approval or to appease consciences guilty about how they made their money… Philanthrocapitalists … are diferent because they combine their head and their heart when they give. Tey don't feel guilty about how they made their money but realize that those same entrepreneurial skills that helped them thrive as capitalists can play a crucial role in helping to solve societies' problems… Tey don't do charity; they drive social change. (Bishop, 'Philanthrocapitalists needed in India', Mint, 17 March 2011)

Tis phenomenon has prompted conficting interpretations. Lester Salamon (2014), an enthusiastic supporter, calls philanthrocapitalism a revolution, and—in a similar vein—several other scholars hold a favourable view of the links between philanthropy, social justice, and social innovation (Moody & Breeze, 2016; Mosley & Galaskiewicz, 2015). On the other hand, equally numerous are those who criticise philanthrocapitalism as a self-reproducing strategy that serves the expansion of elite economic interests (Barman, 2017; Sklair & Glucksber, 2021), as dangerous to democratic processes (Guillhot, 2006), and of questionable efectiveness, for example, with regard to the deployment of distributive interventions to address poverty (Iason, 2017). Philanthrocapitalism was also the framework within which the CSP (in keeping with Fobs more generally) developed its current emphasis on social innovation. More specifcally, this is a frame whereby the fnancial ethos (debit/credit constraints) has entered new areas such as welfare, drawing on a set of devices to transfer competence acquired in the felds of fnance, marketing, and business to the domain of social policy (Arrigoni et al., 2020).

#### **9 The Interstitial Elites of the Italian Foundations of Banking…**

Although from a discourse and justifcation regimes perspective the CSP and the Fobs more generally have been anchoring themselves in developments in new philanthropy since the late 1990s, the fnancialisation of philanthropic policies still seems to be at the embryonic stage. Nevertheless, to date the Fobs remain the leading proponents and pioneers of the fnancialisation of social policies in Italy (Arrigoni et al., 2022). Specifcally, at the policymaking level they wield control via their earlier-mentioned social housing programme (Dagnes & Salento, 2022).

Te formation of a CSP elite is an emergent aspect of this process, and in the early 1990s, just as there was no distinctive positioning of the CSP, so there was no specifc CSP elite or associated ethos. Te people who were called to lead the foundation were closely linked to the bank, and it was not yet even clear whether or not the institution's lifespan would continue beyond the conclusion of the privatisation process. Next, between the second (1996–1999) and third (2000–2003) boards, as the CSP began to construct an identity of its own, a foundation elite emerged, which acquired 'fully fedged' status following judgements handed down by the Constitutional Court in 2003, which defnitively confrmed the foundation's private nature.

While interstitiality does not account for all of the characteristics of the CSP and its elites, I hypothesise that it is one of the foundation's most distinctive and original features. Furthermore, this process of hybridisation between felds, as we shall see shortly, is facilitated by some of the characteristics of the members of the CSP's steering group.

## **CSP Elites Between Civil Society and Other Fields: Interstitial, Political, and 'Solid'**

Te governance of the CSP comprises three distinct boards with the respective functions of steering (general council), management (board of management), and control (auditors). My analysis concerns the members of the general councils and boards of management.

What are the distinguishing characteristics of the CSP elite? In terms of their function, we are dealing with a new political elite. Indeed, although hardly any of the board members are professional politicians, the most senior individuals in the CSP engage in policymaking as a primary activity. Furthermore, although CSP (and Fob) elites are today relatively independent from politics in the strict sense, they are nevertheless linked to it—sometimes conditioning it, sometimes being conditioned by it—via appointments, subsidies, memorandums of understanding, the CDP, and Intesa Sanpaolo, as well as via prior relationships among the various elites circulating both inside and outside the foundation. To ofer numerical evidence for this, a high proportion of CSP board members—between 70% and 83%—may be defned as policymakers, in other words, as people who are typically not professional politicians but are or have been signifcantly involved in public policymaking via their membership in government or para-government agencies, including relatively lengthy afliations with the CSP.

In terms of board members' demographic profles, their mean age is around 60 years and most are local. Te women appointed to the governing bodies—who were non-existent up to 2000 and few in number between 2001 and 2007—have accounted for almost a third of the General Council since 2008, while there are still only seven on the Board of Management. It should be noted that the members of the latter are predominantly economists or lawyer-economists who previously held leading positions in politics and/or business and fnance: for example, Professor Elsa Fornero, former minister of welfare in the Monti government, 2011–2013, and the jewellery entrepreneur Licia Mattioli, former president of Federoraf and the representative association of Italian goldsmiths.

Examination of the board members' 'afliations' to diferent areas reveals the unquestionably 'broker-like' profles of individuals who are capable of bridging multiple felds, thus facilitating hybridisation between logics, discourses, practices, and actors from diferent spheres, organisations, and networks. On all the boards, the majority of appointees are afliated with three or more felds, while some 78% of all board members have been afliated with four or more felds in the course of their careers (see Key to Career Fields in the Appendix to this chapter).

**Fig. 9.2** Breakdown of affliations by macro area and individual feld (% of board members). (Source: Author's own calculation. Prosopography database made by the author)

Figure 9.2 represents the board members' total associations with the pinpointed ten felds, grouped by macro-area, over the seven council terms. Tis means that all the felds in a board member's career are included here, not just the main feld. Te plurality and consistency of the pattern of afliations displayed by the CSP elites is immediately apparent. Besides the political and the fnancial-economic felds, which are always relevant, the fgure further illustrates the importance of the domain of knowledge. Tis includes, in addition to academia, key positions in think tanks/research institutions, other cultural, artistic, and political foundations, and, to a lesser but non-negligible extent, the media sector. In contrast, political or religious associations have never constituted an elective pool for CSP board members.

In my analysis, I inferred a frst feld of afliation from the profession publicly attributed to each individual board member at the time of his or

**Fig. 9.3** Breakdown of frst and second career feld affliations (% of board members). (Source: Author's own calculation. Analysis of the prosopography database)

her appointment1 and a second data point by selecting a second feld that appeared to have been key to this board member's career in the frst feld. Tis was necessary because the frst feld did not always accurately refect board member's actual profles. For example, the frst president of the CSP, Gianni Zandano, who also chaired San Paolo Bank, was billed as an academic in the statement announcing his appointment. However, it was crucial for the purposes of my analysis to acknowledge his afliation with the feld of fnance. In this regard, comparison of the declared feld and the attributed second feld suggests that those who hold an academic position, although they may be primarily engaged in other activities, tend to report their academic work as their main occupation, likely because of the high standing associated with it.

Figure 9.3 ofers a summary of the four main felds identifed following the above procedure, rendering a more accurate picture of the board members' professional profles. Te pattern refects—due to the CSP's progressive independence from the bank—a weakening in its afliation to the fnancial sector over time. Nevertheless, fnance, far from disappearing, is still present but is camoufaged by the board members' other afliations and, above all, culturally difused among the organisation's permanent staf.

<sup>1</sup>Tese data concern the frst six boards of directors as listed in 'La Compagnia di San Paolo. Volume secondo 1853–2013', ed. Einaudi, 2013. For the last board, (2016–2020), the data were drawn from the press release issued by the CSP when the appointments were announced.

#### **9 The Interstitial Elites of the Italian Foundations of Banking…**

However, an even more relevant issue is the predominance of economist or lawyer-economist board members (46 out of 129), who are often also university professors. Tis seems to reveal the extent to which academia, in its more mainstream economic version (utilitarianism, marginalism, new public management), has acquired a pervasive role in the broader organisation of knowledge (in this case, the knowledge required for policymaking) and the extent to which academic economists place themselves at the service of everything that concerns the sustenance of humans and the ecosystem. More generally, this presence seems to signal how, even here, insofar as economists have been 'central actors' since the 1980s (Joignant, 2011), they also have been far more frequently integrated into the political elite. In practice, they endow strong legitimacy upon the organisations that recruit them, even more so if they are academics. Te afnity of the CSP's philanthropic discourse with the economic paradigm is therefore not a matter of chance. Vice versa, by bringing its economic-fnancial ethos under a new philanthropic guise, the CSP makes it more presentable.

Te CSP elites are brokers with a high degree of mobility across felds, but they may be also described as 'solid' (vs 'liquid' as defned by Bauman, 2007). Tis is because they tend to occupy permanent leadership positions in national or local policymaking bodies and/or within the San Paolo banking group. Teir solidity is borne out by the high proportion of members of the 'San Paolo circuit' among their ranks, meaning individuals who have served for periods ranging from 5 to 27 years in institutions that are closely afliated with the CSP (average 78%). It is also refected in the previously mentioned ongoing links of the majority of board members with public policymaking, especially via leadership positions in the governance of Turin. Due to generational turnover, the last board is the exception to the rule, with 'only' 35%. It is not yet clear whether this marks the beginning of a new pattern, and it will only be possible to establish this by monitoring the composition of future boards.

Interstitiality—which is broadly represented by individuals who simultaneously or consecutively belong to several felds and/or are members of an interstitial organisation and, above all, who function as agents of hybridisation among the logics, norms, tools, and practices of the diferent felds—thus appears to ofer an ideal interpretative key for this specifc elite segment. It is of particular value in reconstructing the modus operandi of an elite that, by virtue of being simultaneously both everywhere and nowhere, builds its power independently of its members' social backgrounds and ofcial positions. Such a group has the capacity to rapidly change its tactics and style in response to fuctuations in the new fnancial capitalism and, therefore, may also be ready to abandon its traditional communities and loyalties without too many regrets (Bauman, 2007). Such an elite also speaks to Simmel's (1908/2006) fgure of the stranger—someone who is here today and may remain again tomorrow. It is a potentially nomadic, interchangeable, and fuid elite, yet paradoxically, precisely due to its interstitial, connective, and anarchic nature, an elite whose occupation of key posts of command appears increasingly stable and solid.

# **A TwoFold Integration in the Blurring of Boundaries Between Fields**

Te CSP formally belongs to civil society, but it is also a point of convergence between elites from diferent felds and is a well-established player in Italian public policymaking. Tis begs the question: Who integrates whom? We might posit that the elites of civil society are assimilated into the political sphere as, for example, in the case of the philanthropic or CSO professionals appointed to the more recent boards. However, we might also speak of—and perhaps this more accurately describes the leading pattern to date—the political reintegration or integration of old and new political, business and fnance, and academic elites via philanthropic organisations. Unquestionably, it has been a success story, and overcoming early uncertainty surrounding its role as a Fob the CSP has gradually taken on increasingly political functions without giving the impression of doing so, thus replacing the mechanisms of representation with those of fnance and philanthropy, and becoming a key player in the policymaking arena (see, for example, its social housing policies). Concomitantly, an insider ruling group has formed and become hegemonically integrated into Turin's elites, legitimising itself by donning a new philanthropic guise and in exchange ofering the CSP the multiple capitals (professional, relational, positional, economic, cultural) of an elite formed by individuals who are already powerful in other felds.

Tis calls into question the political dimension taken on in recent decades by organised philanthropy (Skocpol, 2016), which is sheltered from the requirement of accountability proper to politics, but yet capable at times of exerting an infuence equal to or greater than that of public servants (Callahan, 2017; McGoey, 2015). Currently, the elites called to oversee the CSP enjoy the social legitimisation associated with contemporary philanthropy as discussed earlier, while they may further beneft from what McGoey (2015) terms 'perpetual immunity' from criticism due to the benefciaries' need for their fnancial support. In addition to this added 'philanthropic' value, a Fob, by virtue of its position inbetween felds, amplifes its elites' social networks, making it easier for them to move from one feld to another in times of crisis via the conversion of capital from one form to another (Bourdieu, 2010), or, in the absence of alternatives, ofering itself to them as a safe and prestigious 'refuge'.

Furthermore, the peculiar nature of this philanthropic organisation invites us to refect on the radical change in modes of governing that has occurred over recent decades. Indeed, the CSP and Fobs more generally seem to exemplify a growing set of non-elected authorities resulting from a process of depoliticisation whereby political issues are redefned as technical issues and transferred from the government arena to nondemocratically elected bodies and technocratic structures (Mastropaolo, 2011).

Te elites who belong to more than one feld (not a new phenomenon) and their interstitiality (arguably more novel) may also be read in relation to the dismantling of vertical power and the blurring of the boundaries between felds that is ongoing today. Across the fat horizon of a 'network' and within a strongly depoliticised scenario, being interstitial and institutionally fckle, rather than only one requirement among others, may actually be the quintessential quality of a power elite. Indeed, independently of the forms that depoliticisation can take, it should frst and foremost be seen as the outcome of undermining the vertical institutions of the modern era while advancing the metaphor of the network as the form of society itself (de Leonardis, 2007). It should come as no surprise, therefore, that within the fat landscape of the network, collective actors (organisations) and individual actors (elites) located in hybrid or interstitial spaces seem to gain in importance. Tis is a dynamic that could also be part of a more general shift from a 'government by laws' to a 'government by men' (Bobbio, 2005), within which 'the law continues to pursue its incessant claim to be valid as law, equipping itself to impose order on the "hybrid networks" that unceasingly form and unravel in the "brave new world" of globalized capitalism' (de Leonardis, 2007).

# **Conclusions**

Choosing large banking foundations as a site to observe elites allowed me, frst, to reconstruct the radical change in modes of governing that is underway in our contemporary era and, next, by focusing on a specifc Fob, to study its leading members. Ultimately, my study raises crucial questions concerning the future of democracy and of the state in light of the rising infuence on public afairs of private authorities such as foundations, think tanks, and expert networks. Te new institutional scenario that has been shaped by the passage from government to governance (Stoker, 1998) and by the blurring of boundaries between state, capital, and civil society (Wolin, 2008) seems to foster, as suggested by Wedel (2009, 2017), the emergence of a new elite of infuence—fragmented, varied, disintermediated, and fuzzy in nature—among whom position still matters but networking matters even more so. Te CSP ruling groups seem akin to this new kind of elite. Tey are fexible, they bridge and blur logics and actors from diferent felds, they exert their infuence by operating both within and outside of formal structures, they establish, mobilise, or adapt entities to structure their mode of infuence on policy and public opinion, and their power remains partly hidden because their 'inbetween' essence tends to make them and their actions less immediately visible and somewhat elusive. Wedel's overall argument is that 'another kind of power related to mobility of roles within and through command posts has arisen, and sometimes is the way policy is enacted' (2009, p. 157).

#### **9 The Interstitial Elites of the Italian Foundations of Banking…**

Tis fnal point obliges us to seriously engage with at least two further questions. First, how and to what extent has the power of relationships and the infuence of networks become central to understanding the functioning of elites in the twenty-frst century? Elites—we might add—that seem inherently characterised by the dimensions of interchangeability, interstitiality, and 'revolving doors'. Second, while there has been a revival of research interest in elites, it still appears to be a minor feld of inquiry within the social sciences, and the issue of *how* and, above all, *where* to study elites remains under-debated. Regarding 'where', so-called civil society ofers extraordinary opportunities for identifying observatories on the elites involved in policymaking, which fall outside of the classic institutional sphere and which deserve to be further explored. Tis is because within the rescaling of public authorities that has been ongoing since the late twentieth century (King & Le Galès, 2017), the state has outsourced government functions to civil society as well.

As for 'how' to go about studying elites, aside from the diferent methods and techniques available (Cousin et al., 2018), Mills' counsel remains of the utmost salience—it is vital that we focus our inquiry on 'fesh and blood' historically situated elites so that we will not fall into the trap of (re)producing caricatured images of them, as all too frequently occurs in the mainstream debate (Davis & Williams, 2017).

**Acknowledgement** Clare O'Sullivan is thanked for proofreading the English text.

# **Appendix**

#### **Key to Career Fields**


# **References**


Boeri, T. (2013). I politici ai vertici delle Fob. *Lavoce.info*, 27 Jan 2013.

Boltanski, L., & Chiapello, È. (1999). *Le nouvel esprit du capitalism*. Gallimard.


**Open Access** Tis chapter is licensed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/ by/4.0/), which permits use, sharing, adaptation, distribution and reproduction in any medium or format, as long as you give appropriate credit to the original author(s) and the source, provide a link to the Creative Commons licence and indicate if changes were made.

Te images or other third party material in this chapter are included in the chapter's Creative Commons licence, unless indicated otherwise in a credit line to the material. If material is not included in the chapter's Creative Commons licence and your intended use is not permitted by statutory regulation or exceeds the permitted use, you will need to obtain permission directly from the copyright holder.

# **10**

# **Networks of Interlocking Leaders: Exploring the Links and Identifying the Elites in four European countries**

**Jayeon Lee, Daniel Platek, and Roberto Scaramuzzino**

# **Introduction**

A myriad of Civil Society Organisations (CSOs) of various sizes and characteristics constantly interact with each other, for instance in building alliances and coalitions for policy work, collaborating for public campaigns, and coordinating for mobilisation of the masses (protests, petitions, etc.). Te organisational ties established by top-level leaders with multiple organisational afliations are crucial in that they mediate

D. Platek

R. Scaramuzzino (\*) School of Social Work, Lund University, Lund, Sweden e-mail: roberto.scaramuzzino@soch.lu.se

J. Lee

Department of Social Work, University of Gothenburg, Gothenburg, Sweden e-mail: jayeon.lee@socwork.gu.se

Institute of Political Studies, Polish Academy of Science, Warszawa, Poland e-mail: d.platek@isppan.waw.pl

interpersonal connections and interactions among the leaders of diferent organisations who are involved in strategic decisions (Willems et al., 2015). Yet, the leaders interlocking multiple CSOs through crossrepresentation in decision-making bodies, such as boards, have seldom been studied when it comes to the question of power and infuence in civil society (see a recent review by Yoon, 2020).

While there is a view of CSOs as 'diverse, highly specialised and horisontally integrated organisations' (Messamore, 2021), recent scholarly work has highlighted increasing hierarchisation in terms of resource concentration, as well as formalisation and centralisation within the institutionalised feld of civil society (Johansson & Uhlin, 2020; Santilli & Scaramuzzino, 2021; Scaramuzzino & Lee, forthcoming). By studying the networks of interlocking top-level leaders in the most resourceful CSOs operating at the national level, this chapter addresses the question of who the power elites are in the organisational feld of civil society in four European countries and how we can understand the connections between them.

We aim at identifying the most powerful actors in the networks of CSOs at national level, and also across diferent national contexts. By comparing four diferent countries we also want to understand diferences in networks across contexts. An underlying assumption in our approach is that the individual leaders who are in leading positions in more than one civil society organisation are conceived as central agents that facilitate information exchange and transmission of knowledge between the organisations (Haunschild & Beckman, 1998). Te information and knowledge, as well as the personal ties that are established through these agents by holding multiple positions in diferent organisations are deemed to generate strategic advantages for the organisations' capacities to be infuential within the feld of civil society as well as vis-àvis external actors (Granovetter, 1985). Tis perspective is in line with elite theory where access to resources, occupying strategic positions, and operating in networks of infuence are all considered as sources of social power (Domhof, 2002; López, 2013; Mills, 1956; Yamokoski & Dubrow, 2008).

Previous studies looking specifcally into the phenomenon of leader interlock in the civil society sector have found empirical evidences for the positive impact of board interlocks among CSOs and the likelihood for organisational collaborations (Guo & Acar, 2005; Ihm & Shumate, 2018), and that for instance such collaborative relations can lead to better organisational performance, such as accessing larger public grants (Faulk et al., 2017; Paarlberg et al., 2020). Others have found that organisations relying on similar funding sources, of similar sizes, and sharing similar operational activities, are more likely to be connected via interlocking boards (Willems et al., 2015).

In our study, we approach the networks of interlocking leaders among CSOs with a more agnostic position as to the reasons why the interlocks exist. We argue that there could be other than strategic reasons (i.e., that the interlocking leaders can lead to better organisational performance via networks) for the leader interlocks to emerge among CSOs. It could for example be historical or ideological bonds among certain organisations that lead to leader interlocks (Messamore, 2021), or simply by chance, through interpersonal networks where people invite others to be part of a board based on personal trust and confdence or people having interest and being engaged in multiple issues.

Once they are formed, however, the existence of multiple interlocking leadership positions among major CSOs could function as a way of coordinating a given civil society feld, a feld populated otherwise by a wide range of organisations with diverse characteristics. Studying the organisational links established through leader interlocks at the top level can therefore tell us something about how a civil society feld is structured and who the most powerful actors are, by means of occupying central positions in a network. Moreover, studying interlocking leaders can help us identify which organisations and individual leaders have strategically favorable positions, for instance by occupying broker positions.

Tis chapter aims at addressing the following research questions by studying a cross-sectional picture of organisational links among CSOs from a network perspective: (i) What network structures do we observe among the interlocking top-level leaders of the most resourceful CSOs in Italy, Poland, Sweden, and the UK? (ii) Who are the most powerful actors based on their network position?

Te top-level leaders in our study include the board members, chairs (including vice-chairs), and also the executive leaders (e.g., CEOs, chief directors and their deputies). As to the frst question all four country contexts are included, while regarding the second research question we delve into the two country contexts where we observe giant component network structure (i.e., a connected component of a network that includes a signifcant proportion of the entire nodes in the network) of interlocking leaders among CSOs: Sweden and the UK. Te four national contexts included in the study allow us to explore similarities and diferences across the contexts.

Te chapter is structured as follows. After the introduction, the next section includes our argument and purpose for country selection, the methodology used in identifcation of the most resourceful CSOs, the description of data for interlocking leaders, and the analysis methods used. Te chapter proceeds with a result section consisting of a frst part summarising basic network structures of the Italian and Polish cases, where we do not observe any giant components, and a second part where we identify the most central actors occupying the power positions in the networks in the Swedish and the UK cases. In the concluding section, we summarise the fndings and discuss possible interpretations of the fndings across countries.

# **Data and Method**

## **Country Cases and Sampling Elite Organisations**

Our study explores interlocking leaders between resourceful CSOs at national level in four diferent countries: Italy, Poland, Sweden, and the UK. Tese four countries have been associated with diferent 'civil society regimes' in previous research (e.g., Salamon & Sokolowski, 2018). Italy, an example of Continental or corporatist regime, is mostly serviceoriented with a large share of paid staf. Poland, as an example of the Eastern or post-communist regime, is also service-oriented, yet with smaller workforce and with a very small share of paid staf. Sweden, as an example of a Nordic or Social democratic regime has a mostly advocacyoriented civil society sector with a relatively large workforce mostly made up of volunteers rather than paid staf. Te UK, as an example of Anglo-Saxon or liberal regime, is characterised by the prominent role of civil society as service provider, with a large proportion of paid staf (Archambault, 2009; Salamon et al., 2017; Salamon & Sokolowski, 2018).

Tis regime-typology has been developed comparing the role of the civil society sector in each country and predominant resources that the organisations are equipped with. Te extent to which the interlocking leaders among CSOs and the networks they produce would difer following diferent civil society regimes is not self-evident. Te organisations in our sample, as will become evident in the following, are not representative of the whole civil society sector in each country. Tey are resourceful organisations in the sense that they control disproportionately large amounts of resources, both economic and political ones. Tey are also national-level organisations involved in coordination of regional and local actors, political representation of segments of civil society vis-à-vis the national government, as well as in service and capacity-building activities involving their members and constituencies.

For a systematic comparison, the populations of CSOs in all four countries have been identifed and delimited by a set of indicators of fnancial and political resources, while considering the contextual specifcities. Te organisations were identifed through a series of systematic screening procedures for each country, using the indicators measuring diferent types of fnancial and political resources according to the Multidimensional Measure of Resource Stratifcation in Civil society (MMRSC) (Scaramuzzino & Lee, forthcoming, see also Appendix to the volume).

Based on this sampling procedure, diferent internal structures in terms of coordination and resource stratifcation within the communities of national elite organisations in each country tend to appear. Te Italian and Swedish elite organisations follow a pattern of diferent levels of coordination with many umbrella organisations representing organisations active within specifc policy areas and even representing the whole civil society sector. Tis "Russian doll" structure corresponds to higher resource stratifcation with a few organisations controlling many types of resources and the majority controlling fewer resources. A less hierarchically structured pattern of coordination is observed in Poland and the UK, with fewer networks and umbrella organisations. Tis less hierarchical structure corresponds to a pattern of resource stratifcation with no organisations (or very few as in Poland) controlling all types of resources used in our method (Scaramuzzino & Lee, forthcoming; see also Appendix).

## **Mapping Boards and Interlocks**

Based on the systematic mapping method of CSOs (see Appendix, this volume), we identifed 293 national level CSOs for Italy, 447 for Poland, 394 for Sweden, and 434 for the UK. In the next step, we collected the names of leaders occupying the top-level positions in the identifed organisations, such as board members, chairs, and also the executive leaders. Te data was collected in 2019 for Italy, Sweden, and the UK and in 2020 for Poland. Te following table (Table 10.1) presents the sampling of data and the number of CSOs and leaders that were found to be interlocking diferent organisations in each context. Some patterns are evident. In Sweden and the UK, a substantial share of the organisations are interlocked by the leaders; 48% of the organisations for the UK and 40% for Sweden. For Italy, only about 28% of organisations were connected via interlocking leaders while for Poland even less, 17%. It is also relevant to notice that the share of leaders interlocking diferent organisations among all identifed leaders is even smaller, ranging from about 5% of the leaders for Sweden to 2% for Italy.

Multiple afliations among the top-level leaders of the most resourceful CSOs that we identifed in each country context is in other words a


**Table 10.1** Multiple affliations in four countries

Source: Civil society elite database. Authors' own data

phenomenon concentrated to a rather small clique of the civil society leaders, yet in the case of Sweden and the UK involving nearly half of all identifed CSOs. In the UK we fnd a particular type of leader that is not present in the other contexts. Tey tend to have the role of 'ambassadors' or 'patrons', not least including some individuals in the British Royal Family occupying positions in the boards of ten or more organisations.

Multiple afliations that a given individual leader has in more than one organisation are the basis of the data for bipartite networks for each country, entailing two types of nodes (organisations and leaders). From this we create one-mode networks, where the links between the organisations via interlocking leadership positions become the main data.

#### **Analytical Strategy**

Identifcation of power elites or leadership groups, whether local or national, has traditionally followed one of four distinct strategies: the positional, the decisional, the reputational, and the relational approach (cf. Hofman-Lange, 2017; see also chapter by Santilli and Scaramuzzino in this volume). In this chapter we employ the K-core algorithm, a method used to identify groups that can be considered elite in a relational perspective using social network analysis.

Te relational approach draws on the notion of social circles to fnd a central circle of actors within the elite. Te circle is identifed by prominent members naming others as key partners, thus allowing the inclusion of power brokers. Inclusion in the central circle of these power networks is viewed as an indicator of the power structure and membership of the elite social circle. For example, this method was used in the identifcation of Danish elites (Grau Larsen & Ellersgaard, 2017), where they constructed a list of state organisations, parliamentary circles, NGOs, corporations, and foundations which were connected through participation in events and used a special weighted version of the k-cores algorithm, taking into account the relationship values between individuals and comparing the integrative efect of their diferent heterogeneous afliations.

In this chapter, alongside other network centrality measures we employ the K-core algorithm in order to identify the organisations occupying the most powerful positions in the networks of interlocked leaders in Sweden and the UK. K-core measure is frequently used in identifying power elites in studies of elites (Corominas-Murtra et al., 2014; Huijzer & Heemskerk, 2021; Young et al., 2021). We apply this approach for studying the UK and Swedish cases in our study, where we can identify substantial network structures emerging from interlocking leaders among the CSOs. Te K-core algorithm locates parts of the graph that form sub-groups such that each member of a sub-group is connected to a given number of the other members. Tat is, groups are the largest structures in which all members are connected to all but some number (K) of other members. Each individual is assigned a 'coreness score' corresponding to the minimum degree of individuals they are connected to. By decomposing an entire component, or progressively removing individuals with the lowest degree until further removal of individuals from the component leads to a decrease in the minimum degree, we eventually arrive at the core group. For example, to construct the four-core of a network, one frst eliminates all nodes with three or fewer connections; this in turn leaves some nodes with fewer than four connections, so the process is iterated until those that remain have at least four connections each.

Besides the K-core algorithm we employ centralisation measures such as 'degree centralisation'. We employ this measure to demonstrate the degree of internal cohesion and top-down integration of actors. Centralisation 'measures the dispersion of centralisation scores relative to the most central score in the network' (Sinclair, 2011, p. 30). According to this notion, a star-shaped network is the network with the most unequal degree of centralisation for any number of actors. In such a network, all actors except the central actor have a relationship degree of one, and the central actor has a relationship degree equal to the number of all actors minus one. In the operationalisation adopted here, we use this understanding of centralisation to demonstrate the degree of organisational connections through leader interlocks. We use also the measure of 'betweenness centrality' (Freeman et al., 1991). Centralisation of this type is based on the assumption that the actors will use all the links that connect them, proportionally to the shortest paths between organisations. Te coefcient of centralisation of a given actor within the network is measured by the proportion of each pair of actors in the entire network (i.e., fowing through the shortest paths) (Borgatti, 2005). In addition, 'eigenvector centralization' (a measure of the infuence a node has on a network) will tell us about the extent to which a network is dominated by a single node (Borgatti et al., 2018, p. 184). We use normalised measures to be able to compare the two country contexts.

For Italy and Poland, instead of employing the K-core approach and the network measures introduced above we opt for focusing on qualitative commentaries in order to understand the relatively fewer ties we fnd among the organisations via leader interlocks. We explore possible mechanisms behind the observed organisational connections through leader interlocks, focusing specifcally on policy areas in which the organisations are active.

## **Results and Analysis**

Te comparative analytical lens through which we study the networks of interlocking leaders of CSOs provides an opportunity for understanding the diferent extent to which a given feld of national CSOs is consolidated (better connected) or fragmented (loosely connected). As it turns out, among the four countries we include in our study, we observe relatively loosely connected networks of CSOs linked through interlocking leaders in Italy and Poland, and relatively densely connected networks in Sweden and the UK. Only 4% of organisations are connected in the Polish case (Connectedness = 1 minus proportion of pairs of vertices that are unreachable), while 8% of organisations in the Italian case are connected. When it comes to Sweden 47% of all organisations in our sample are connected and 63% in the case of the UK. We therefore apply partly diferent approaches in understanding the networks of interconnected CSOs among our empirical contexts. We start frst with the Italian and Polish cases.

#### **Italy**

Looking at the network of Italian CSOs (Fig. 10.1), we fnd some components of organisations. In the following, we comment on the four components that have at least eight organisations linked to each other

**Fig. 10.1** Network of interlocking leaders in Italy. (Source: Authors' own analysis)

and try to explain these links focusing on policy areas, membership-based relations, and cultural/ideological afnity.

One of the components is clearly connected by the common policy area of "international cooperation" which is how international aid and development often is framed in Italy. Central for this component are two organisations: AOI and Focsiv. Tey are both umbrella organisations but AOI is at a higher organisational level. Hence, Focsiv is member of AOI. Focsiv is the umbrella organisation for CSOs working with international cooperation and that have a common cultural/ideological point of reference in the Catholic movement. In fact, all CSOs linked to Focsiv (except for AOI) are members of this umbrella organisation. On the other side of AOI we fnd another umbrella organisation for international cooperation, namely COCIS, which is the umbrella organisation for CSOs that belong to the secular post-communist tradition. Also Forum SAD is a member of AOI while CeSPI is not. However, CeSPI as a study centre for international politics is involved in international cooperation and linked to a humanitarian organisation like Amnesty. Another organisation in this component is MCL which shares with its link CEFA the common Cristian catholic culture/ideology.

Another component includes FISH, an umbrella organisation for disability organisations, and the disability movement linked with the civil service organisations and the volunteering organisations. FISH is a central actor here with nine links which can be understood in diferent ways. Some organisations are clearly representing people with specifc disabilities: AISLA, UILDM, FAIP, AIPD, and ANFASS. Many of these organisations are also members of FISH. Tree other links can be understood in terms of common policy area or interest. Te Teleton Foundation is funding research on rare diseases which would be relevant for FISH. ID is an organisation for control and accountability of the non-proft sector and in particular concerning private donations. Forum Nazionale Servizio Civile coordinates the civil service that conscientious objectors do instead of the military service. Many of these objectors are traditionally involved in volunteering. In this constellation, we also fnd CSV net, an organisation involved in organising volunteers. Forum Nazionale Servizio Civile is the other central actor in this component with fve links (including FISH and one of its members). Linked to this organisation we fnd a sports organisation like OPES, and two other organisations mobilising volunteers and civil service, MODAVI and AMESCI. In the same constellation we also fnd an umbrella organisation for youth organisations, Forum Nazionale dei Giovani.

Another cluster revolves around the cooperative movement with Legacoop as the central organisation. Legacoop is an umbrella organisation for the cooperatives traditionally linked to the secular postcommunist tradition. Many of the links are with organisations for the cooperative movement's diferent sectors: a member of Legacoop such as ANCC-COOP (for consumer cooperatives), an organisation for the Promotion of the Culture of Co-operation, and of Nonproft (AICON) research center for the cooperative movement (IRIAD), and lastly an organisation that promotes cooperatives using properties confscated from the organised crime (Libera). In the same constellation we also fnd the organisation for political and trade unionist representation of the cooperative sector (Federsolidarietà Confcooperative). Linked to Libera we also fnd Gruppo Abele, an organisation working against drug addiction and social exclusion with strong historical ties to Libera. In the same constellation we also fnd an institution for studies of peace and disarmament.

Te remaining larger component of Italian CSOs seems to be held together by a common focus on culture, tourism, and hobby. A central organisation holding together two smaller components is UNPLI an umbrella organisation for local associations for development, culture, and tourism. Linked to UNPLI we fnd an organisation for culture, tourism, and sports (FICTUS), which in its turn links to an organisation for culture and sports (AICS) and another for tourism (CTS). To UNPLI we also fnd a link to the civil service movement with organisations such as CESC, CNESC, and ARCI Servizio Civile as well as the volunteering with AVIS for volunteers for blood donors.

## **Poland**

Te network of Polish organisations via leader interlocks is the most fragmented, compared to the other three contexts in our study (Fig. 10.2). Tere is also a tendency to homophily at the global level of the entire network in terms of policy areas, and it is the only statistically signifcant

**Fig. 10.2** Network of interlocking leaders in Poland. (Source: Authors' own analysis)

result among our cases. In relation to policy area categories there are more of them, but Environment, Sport, Coops are very much responsible for the efect, as some of them are simply in 'diads', which means that if one node from a given category is connected with another node in the same category and there are no other nodes from the same category, we have 100% homophily. It concerns mainly Disability and Health, Environment, Sport, Coops, Religious organisations, and to a lesser extent Ethnic and Cultural organisations.

Te Polish network thus resembles many archipelagos of islands of organisation and they are integrated within separate components. Tese groups are connected mainly by the policy areas they occupy. Te largest of these components belongs to the evangelical church. Tere we have, for example, actors such as the Polish Evangelical Church, Pentecostals and the Ecumenical Council. Te largest group of actors revealing homophily in the policy areas are patient advocacy and health organisations. Tese include intellectual disability organisations, breast cancer associations, and deaf associations (the Polish Association of the Deaf), associations which advocate for people with diabetes, and many more. However, this may mean that our sample did not include the organisations through which the organisations shown in the graph are connected, and therefore due to this missing data we should treat the conclusions here with caution.

In other small components of the Polish network, we also fnd organisations promoting sports and ethnic minority organisations grouped around the same policy areas. Te largest component of sports organisations includes four actors—the National Federation of Sports for All, the Society for the Promotion of Physical Culture, the Polish Association of Athletics, and the School Sports Association. Within the ethnic minority organisations we fnd the Union of Tatars in Poland—a Muslim minority and several German minority organisations.

#### **Sweden and the UK**

In this part of our analysis including the cases with relatively betterconnected networks ('giant components', a connected component of a network that includes a signifcant proportion of the entire nodes in the


**Table 10.2** Giant components in networks of leader interlocks in the UK and Sweden

Source: Civil society elite database. Authors' own data and analysis Note: The centralisation of the network was done on binarised data, because it can be represented as a normalised measure. The interval is from 0 to 1 and can be interpreted as a percentage

network) of CSOs through interlocking leaders, we address the following question: *Who are the most powerful actors based on their network position?* Here we make comparative commentaries on Swedish and British cases instead of presenting the networks separately (see Table 10.2).

When it comes to the global network level, the British network is a bit denser, meaning that there are more connections between the organisations via leader interlocks compared to Sweden. Also, the average degree (the average number of connections each node in a network has) is twice as high in the UK. Average distance tells us the average path between every pair of nodes in the network and nodes are slightly farther from each other in Sweden. While the British network is more strongly centralised in terms of degree, the Swedish network has stronger Betweenness centralisation, because paths between the nodes are longer, meaning that there are organisations occupying stronger betweenness positions. Tis can be also seen in individual measures below.

Regarding the eigenvector centralisation, it should be explained that Eigenvector centralisation is high when positions with high-degree centrality are connected to each other. Eigenvector centrality is increased by connections to high-degree neighbours, so when high-degree nodes are preferentially directly connected to one another, and low-degree nodes are preferentially connected to one another, eigenvector centralisation will be high. In other words, increases in assortativity—a preference for a network's nodes to attach to others that are similar—are refected in increases in eigenvector centralisation. Tis type of centralisation is higher in Sweden, because there are more such nodes that link to other nodes with the same number of links. Compared to the pure 'star' network, the degree of concentration in the Swedish sector is 66% of the maximum possible. Tis means that Swedish organisations are more than British ones concentrated around a few actors, who are the center around which other actors are concentrated.

Comparing the K-scores, we see that they are much stronger in the UK than the Swedish ones. Te strongest red cluster contains actors that have twelve connections each, followed by the orange cluster containing eleven connections and then the yellow with nine connections (Fig. 10.3). However, the network in the UK has weaker assortativity than the Swedish network. Tis means that although there are strong K-cores they tend to connect to weaker nodes. So, in the English case there are strong

**Fig. 10.3** Network of interlocking leaders in UK. (Source: Authors' own analysis)

**Fig. 10.4** Network of interlocking leaders in Sweden. (Source: Authors' own analysis)

elites within elites, but they do not claim exclusivity for their elitism, or at least to a lesser extent than the Swedish network.

In the Swedish case we have much weaker K-cores, the strongest links are three—red, two—orange and one link—blue (Fig. 10.4). But nevertheless, this network has a stronger tendency for elites of elites.

We now turn to the analysis of characteristics at the node level using individual measures such as betweenness centrality, degree centrality and eigenvalue. Tese measures have been normalised so that they can be compared across the two country contexts (Table 10.3). For example, the strongest Swedish actor in Betweenness is almost twice as strong as the English actor, etc. Of course, the group of actors distinguished here are also identifed in the K-core measures.

In other words, these are the organisations in Sweden and in the UK who occupy the most powerful network positions. Tere is relatively high variability in betweenness centralities among organisations occupying the strongest network positions in Sweden (standard deviation 7.09) around the mean (27.3) in relation to the British sector (mean 17.6, standard deviation 4,1). Tis suggests that, overall, there are great inequalities in


**Table 10.3** Organisations occupying central network positions in the UK and Sweden

Source: Civil society elite database. Authors' own data and analysis

actor centrality or power, when measured in this way. Te same applies to the eigenvalue measure (Sweden: mean 46.6, st. dev. 12,3, Britain: mean 34.9, st. dev. 7.2) but not the degree centrality measure which is almost the same within the most central actors in both countries (Sweden: mean 0.07, st. dev. 0.012, Britain: mean 0.11, st. dev. 0.016). Among elites of the elites, betweenness and eigenvector signifcantly diferentiate the two countries studied here.

Te Swedish side is more strongly varied in terms of organisational strength but also has stronger organisational actors at the top overall. However, this does not apply to the measure of degree, where there is no inequality between major organisations in our countries, but British organisations have, on average, more connections to other organisations in the network.

Looking at the identifed organisations in the UK, using the three measures in Table 10.3 there is a consistent overlap between them. One important group includes the charities active within disability and health care (Blind Veterans, King's Fund, St'Johns Ambulance and International Red Cross). We fnd also a group of charities involved in environment issues (Tusk trust, Wildlife Trusts and World Wildlife Fund). Other actors work with historical conservation (Societies of antiquities), culture (National Youth Teatre) and sports (Royal Yachting Association). Interesting to notice is that what these actors have in common is to have members of the royal family in their board as patrons or other honorary positions (e.g., honorary vice president).

Looking at the identifed organisations in the Swedish case in the same table, we fnd a large number of umbrella organisations organising and representing CSOs across policy areas (Forum—ideburna organisationer med social inriktning and CIVOS) or as employers (KFO and Arbetsgivaralliansen). Another important group of actors is engaged in adult education with the umbrella organisation Studieförbunden and some of its members (ABF—Arbetarnas bildningsförbund, Sensus). Another relevant group is active in sports with the umbrella organisation Riksidrottsförbundet and its partner working with training and capacity building (SISU) and some of its members (Ishockeyförbundet and Gymnastikförbundet). Two other actors are involved in international development (We Efect) and consumers' rights (Sveriges konsumenter). Also here we fnd an interesting pattern that these organisations tend to be linked by membership in each other.

### **Conclusions**

In this chapter we have analysed the networks emerging from interlocking leaders among the most resourceful, national-level CSOs in four European countries. Te analysis focused on the observed organisational links via interlocking leaders and we have identifed primarily those related to communities of tightly connected organisations and the organisations that seem to bridge diferent communities of CSOs. Te analysis included diferent national contexts, aiming to draw comparative insights informed by contextual knowledge.

For Italy and Poland, we found fragmented networks comprising of smaller components. While in Italy policy areas and ideological afnities between organisations explain the links between CSOs, in Poland we only fnd policy areas as a possible mechanism behind the organisational links. Contrast to the cases of Italy and Poland, in Sweden and in the UK we found giant components connecting a signifcant number of CSOs in each context. For Sweden we fnd that it is through the membership relations the leader interlocks occur, which means that the actors occupying the most powerful positions are the ones that have interest representation for the civil society sector either as a specifc type of employers or as an agent for interest aggregation and political participation of CSOs at the national level for various issues. Tis interpretation rhymes well with the corporatist tradition of Swedish interest representation and advocacy culture (Arvidson et al., 2018). For the UK case we fnd that the network of interlocking leaders is upheld mainly by a particular type of leaders in this context, namely the 'ambassadors' and 'patrons' who have a rather symbolic function in the leadership of organisations and with a wider reach to multiple organisations, compared to the leaders with executive or representative roles. Te organisations that occupy the central network positions in the UK are thus connected by these symbolic leaders with frequent linkages to the British royal family, an important source of power for accessing funding and other opportunities despite certain reluctance and ambivalence expressed around it by civil society leaders (Johansson & Ivanovska Hadjievska, 2022).

Te case of the UK opens up of course for an understanding of linkages more related to the individuals than the organisations. Although our analysis has been mostly focused on the organisations, the symbolic role of the patrons and ambassadors in the UK seems almost self-evident due to membership in a high number of boards in combination with royal titles.

Based on our analysis, the civil society feld in the UK and Sweden seems to be more consolidated and integrated via interlocking leaders compared to the Italian and Polish civil society with more fragmented characters. However, one important limitation of our study is that the organisations are selected using a set of criteria in identifying the most resourceful CSOs in each context, and therefore we do not capture potentially existing leader interlocks between the organisations included in our analyses with smaller organisations or organisations active at local/ regional level or those with fewer resources. Te fragmented characteristics of the Italian and Polish networks compared to the Swedish and British cases, which tend to mirror that fewer organisations are interlocked by leaders with multiple afliations, might be understood as a consequence of other practices being employed for connecting organisations in civil society. In the Italian case, for instance, the presence of one large umbrella organisation for the whole civil society sector recognised both in civil society and by the state (Santilli & Scaramuzzino, 2021), might reduce the need of creating networks through cross-representation of leaders. Tese types of ties are not captured by our research method, whereas our method allowed us to identify the mechanisms of leader interlocks among the organisations in the Swedish and British cases.

**Acknowledgement** Tis research was supported by Riksbankens Jubileumsfond (project grant M17-0188:1) for the project titled 'Civil Society Elites? Comparing Elite Composition, Reproduction, Integration and Contestation in European Civil Societies'.

### **References**


**Open Access** Tis chapter is licensed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/ by/4.0/), which permits use, sharing, adaptation, distribution and reproduction in any medium or format, as long as you give appropriate credit to the original author(s) and the source, provide a link to the Creative Commons licence and indicate if changes were made.

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# **Part IV**

**Contestation of Civil Society Elites**

# **11**

# **Contestation of Civil Society Elites: Targets, Sources, and Depths in Four National Contexts**

**Sara Kalm and Anna Meeuwisse**

# **Introduction**

Conditions for civil society actors have changed markedly in recent decades in most countries in Europe and beyond. After a period of rapid growth in both scale and scope during the 1990s, accompanied by growing political expectations, resources, and capacity, the environment for civil society organisations (CSOs) has become more complex and challenging since the turn of the millennium (Anheier, 2017; Poppe & Wolf, 2017).

Tese changing conditions are the subject of an emerging literature on the 'shrinking space' for civil society. Researchers have shown that in many countries, governments now use legal and administrative means to

A. Meeuwisse (\*)

© Te Author(s) 2024 **233** H. Johansson, A. Meeuwisse (eds.), *Civil Society Elites*, Palgrave Studies in Tird Sector Research, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-40150-3\_11

S. Kalm

Department of Political Science, Lund University, Lund, Sweden e-mail: Sara.Kalm@svet.lu.se

School of Social Work, Lund University, Lund, Sweden e-mail: anna.meeuwisse@soch.lu.se

diminish the infuence of CSOs, and they often try to delegitimise them (Chaudhry, 2022; Glasius et al., 2020; della Porta & Steinhilper, 2021). A parallel trend afecting civil society is marketisation, which has led to new demands and tougher competition for resources among CSOs (Harris, 2018; Maier et al., 2016). While these macro trends indicate that the role of civil society is now questioned in more ways than one, so far few have studied how its key representatives experience these challenges.

In this chapter, we turn to the civil society leaders themselves. Tat is, instead of investigating macro-level developments, as most of the literature does, we focus on how the current situation for civil society is experienced by some of its key leaders—with the ambition to contribute to a more multifaceted understanding of the trends mentioned above. Te leaders of resource-rich CSOs are the target of much of today's questioning of civil society. Tey operate in a sector that is sensitive to social, economic, and political challenges, where they must respond to and navigate the various drivers of change (Hodges & Howieson, 2017). It is therefore important to understand how these 'civil society elites' (see Chap. 1 in this volume) experience contemporary developments and challenges. Here, we want to fnd out about their experiences of being contested, specifcally what the points of critique concern, from where they originate, and how thoroughgoing they are.

We have two interrelated research aims. One is empirical, to map experiences of contestation among civil society elites in four diferent European countries with a view to trace similarities and diferences among the countries. To our knowledge, no such study has been conducted. We want to examine both challenges directed at civil society elites in their capacity as leaders and the challenges directed at the organisations that these elites represent. In order to fulfl our empirical aim, our other ambition is to create an analytical framework for studying instances of civil society elite contestation because we have not been able to fnd one that is readily available. As will be detailed below, we will distinguish between the *target of contestation*, the *source of contestation*, and the *depth or degree of contestation*.

Te data that we use have been generated by a large survey conducted with civil society elites in Italy, Poland, Sweden, and the United Kingdom (UK) (see Appendix in this volume). As we will explain below, these countries represent diferent civil society regimes and have distinct political histories and cultures with regard to civil society.

Te outline of our chapter is as follows. First, we describe the current macro-level civil society processes (shrinking civic space and marketisation) in some detail. We then move on to briefy present the diferent national contexts. Next, we introduce the analytical framework, followed by a brief methods section. We then present the fndings of our empirical study. In the concluding section, we discuss the main results and possible avenues for future research.

## **Current Macro-Level Trends Affecting Civil Society**

### **Shrinking Space for Civil Society**

In the last 10–15 years, civil society has been hit by intensifed ideological resistance from outside actors. From having been accepted and even celebrated political actors at both the national and international levels, leading CSOs are now often the targets of diferent forms of contestation (Chaudhry, 2022; Ruzza & Sanchez Salgado, 2021). CSOs in countries around the globe are accused of not representing the will of the people and are experiencing a shrinking civil space (Bill, 2020; van der Borgh & Terwindt, 2012; Howell et al., 2008; Toepler et al., 2020). Some of the CSOs' leaders experience threats and harassments, particularly those who are young, female, or foreign-born and those who are active in gender policy areas (Scaramuzzino & Scaramuzzino, 2021). Moreover, many governments have taken steps to limit external resources and support for CSOs, dismissing such aid as foreign political interference (Carothers, 2016). Tis is mainly done through legal measures to restrict or ban foreign fnancing of domestic CSOs (Rutzen, 2015). Such campaigns can be understood as part of a broader trend of attacks on independent civil society and the contraction of political space for activism (CIVICUS, 2016; Poppe & Wolf, 2017).

Glasius et al. (2020) investigated the situation in 96 countries in different world regions in 1992–2016. Te researchers found that restrictions against CSOs began to rise in 1997 and have continued to grow since then. In autocracies and hybrid regimes, restrictions have increased fourfold. In democracies, restrictions have also increased, but more modestly. Tey see this development of restrictive and repressive measures as an 'illiberal norm cascade' as states learn from each other's practices and over time come to regard it as legitimate to restrict the activities of CSOs (Ibid: 466).

CIVICUS, a global alliance of CSOs, monitors the space for civil society and each year classifes countries' civic spaces. Among the four countries that we compare, Sweden is the only 'open' one. In Italy and the UK, civic space is 'narrowed', which means that while 'the state allows CSOs to exercise their rights to freedom of association, peaceful assembly and expression, violations of these rights also take place'. In Poland, civic space is classifed as 'obstructed', meaning that it 'is heavily contested by power holders, who impose a combination of legal and practical constraints on the full enjoyment of fundamental rights' (CIVICUS Monitor, 2022).

Te loudest attacks on liberal civil society are mobilised by right-wing populists who have gained ground in a number of countries in Eastern Europe and elsewhere (Brechenmacher & Carothers, 2018; Graf & Korolczuk, 2021; Kravchenko et al., 2022; Ploszka, 2020). Such attacks do not, however, afect all CSOs to the same extent (Roggeband & Krizsán, 2021). According to Suparna Chaudhry, '[s]tates would not be repressing NGOs if these groups were not successful in spreading democratic norms by challenging electoral irregularities, corruption, and a lack of rule of law and respect for human rights' (Chaudhry, 2022: 36). While such CSOs are increasingly silenced, other parts of civil society may instead experience an expanding space, for instance, the more apolitical actors whose services are needed to deliver welfare services and the CSOs that voluntarily align with illiberal regimes for religious or nationalistic reasons, providing a hotbed for 'uncivil' society (Toepler et al., 2020). Some scholars therefore now talk about a 'shifting' or 'changing' space for civil society rather than just a shrinking space (Anheier et al., 2019; Toepler et al., 2020).

#### **Marketisation, Professionalisation, and New Roles for Civil Society**

Conditions for CSOs have also changed in other ways*.* Te economic crisis in 2008 contributed to austerity measures, reduced resources, and increased competition for fnancial resources among CSOs.

Te waves of privatisation and the introduction of new public management principles in many countries has led to tougher competition for resources and new demands and expectations on CSOs (Hvenmark, 2013; McMullen, 2020; Maier et al., 2016). Te roles of CSOs have become more complex as they are expected to fulfl diferent, sometimes contradictory, roles. In addition to increased expectations that they will contribute to welfare service delivery, they are expected to partner up in solving societal challenges through partnership arrangements (Aiken & Bode, 2009). Such partnerships are often justifed by CSOs' contributions to democratic and civic renewal, but they have also raised concerns about governmental co-optation and a de-radicalisation of the sector (Eikenberry & Kluver, 2004; Howell et al., 2008).

In some countries, the civil society sector has developed into its own labour market, with internal career opportunities and specialised services and positions. Concepts such as 'professionalisation', 'bureaucratisation', and 'NGOisation' capture current trends towards widening distances between CSO leaders and their members and between major CSOs and grassroots organisations (Eagleton-Pierce, 2018; Hwang & Powell, 2009; Kreutzer & Jäger, 2011; see also Heylen et al., 2020).

### **Four Civil Society Contexts**

While most of the challenges mentioned so far are present across Europe (and beyond), the political and cultural context in which national civil society is embedded infuences how these tendencies and debates are played out and what consequences they have. Countries have diferent types of 'civil society regimes' that are distinguished, among other things, on the basis of the kind of welfare state they are part of and diferences with regard to the role of CSOs in service production and advocacy (Anheier & Salamon, 2006).

Te *liberal* civil society regime, represented by the UK, is characterised by a strong tradition of charity, low government spending, and a large civil society sector. Te sector has a service-provision orientation and is dominated by large charitable organisations with professionalised management boards (Maclean et al., 2021) that have signifcantly greater access to political and economic resources compared to other civil society actors. Today, many CSOs in the UK are struggling with the impact of shrinking government funding and sharply increased competition for these funds. UK CSOs are also subject to tighter regulation along with pressure to adopt more formal organisational structures and more business-like management systems (Harris, 2018).

Sweden represents the *social democratic* civil society regime type, traditionally characterised by broad popular movements in collaborative arrangements with the state. Service provision is mainly provided by the state while CSOs have traditionally fulflled expressive and advocacy functions, including a watchdog task in relation to public policy (Lundström & Wijkström, 1997; Meeuwisse & Scaramuzzino, 2017; Mota & Mourao, 2014). However, Swedish civil society is increasingly professionalised and is engaged in service provision to a greater extent than before—and this has been described as a shift 'from voice to service' (Kings, 2022; Lundström & Wijkström, 2012). Tis is partly an efect of the privatisation and deregulation of care services that has taken place in Sweden (Feltenius & Wide, 2019; Petersen & Hjelmar, 2014), which has also intensifed competition between CSOs and between for-proft and non-proft organisations.

Italy is usually considered a *corporatist* civil society regime type, distinguished by many welfare services carried out by CSOs through collaborative agreements and contracts with the state. Many CSOs combine advocacy with social services (Borzaga, 2004), and the civil society sector has a pillarised structure marked by ideological afliation at the local and national levels (Bassoli, 2017; Santilli & Scaramuzzino, 2021). Te sector is shaped by CSOs belonging to either one or the other of two main cultural and political groups, or pillars, namely the Catholic group and the post-communist secular group. Te political climate has heated up in recent years as populist parties have gained more infuence in government, and some CSOs have been subjected to delegitimisation campaigns. Italian civil society has also been afected by a national reform in which only a few meta-organisations are to represent the entire civil society sector.

Like in Italy, Poland's civil society is polarised in ideological terms with the Catholic church playing a signifcant role in this battlefeld. Te country has a recent past of a repressive political system and is considered to be marked by low levels of civic participation as well as dependence on public funding. It is therefore generally regarded as a *statist* or *postcommunist* civil society regime type (Cinalli & Giugni, 2014). However, the number of CSOs increased rapidly after 1989, as did more informal forms of activism (Jacobsson & Korolczuk, 2017). Since the beginning of the twenty-frst century, a polarisation between conservative and liberal civil society has gradually intensifed (McGee, 2020). When the populist Law and Justice Party (PiS) came to power in 2015, it developed strategies to replace the so-called liberal 'establishment elite', allegedly representing foreign interests, by what was called the 'counter-elite' who are committed to the promotion of national interests (Bill, 2020; Korolczuk, 2022 and Korolczuk in this volume). Te new government's policies and the shrinking civic space have been met with a series of large-scale demonstrations.

## **Analytical Framework: Three Dimensions of Civil Society Contestation**

Te objective of this section is to elaborate a model for analysing civil society elites' experiences of contestation in civil society. We have identifed three main dimensions to this question, which we refer to as the target, the source, and the depth of contestation.

Te *target of contestation* concerns, quite simply, who is on the receiving end of the critique. In the literature on social movements, CSOs are approached as being engaged in 'contentious politics' targeting governments and other power holders (Tilly & Tarrow, 2015). But here they fnd themselves at the receiving end of critique—themselves being the targets. We distinguish between challenges directed at individual *leaders*, and the challenges aimed at the *organisations* that they represent.

Te *source of contestation* concerns from where the contestation is articulated. Tere are three main categories of contestation sources that seem relevant in our case. Te contestation may be *internal* and directed from people within the same organisation. It may also be *sectorial*, that is, directed from people and organisations outside one's own organisation but inside the civil society sector. Finally, contestation may be *external* to the sector, as is the case with critique directed by the media, by the government, by politicians, and so on.

Te *depth of contestation* has to do with how thoroughgoing the contestation is. Te legitimacy of civil society rests on a great number of grounds (Matelski et al., 2021), and CSOs and their leaders can be accused on just as many grounds for failing to live up to expectations. For analytical purposes we diferentiate between three diferent levels of contestation—drawing inspiration from Robert A. Dahl who distinguished between diferent types of political opposition in a similar fashion (Dahl, 1966: 341–344; cf. Kalm & Uhlin, 2015: 48–49). What we refer to as *minor* degree of contestation has to do with competition over resources or positions, disappointments with leadership, etc. Such struggles can be tough indeed, especially if resources are limited, and the word 'minor' is not meant to trivialise but to indicate the type of contestation that is more or less part of the normal operation of civil society. A *medium* degree of contestation refers to deeper-going dissatisfactions that nevertheless do not amount to wholesale delegitimation of the leadership or the CSO. Examples may include disagreements over policy positions or accusations of the leadership for defcient representativeness or tenuous bonds with their constituency. *Major* contestation, fnally, refers to ideological delegitimation and wholesale rejection of an organisation, or even of civil society as a whole.

# **Method and Data**

We examined the experiences of leaders of resource-rich CSOs operating in diferent social and political national contexts. Te data were collected through a cross-country survey ('Te Civil Society Elite Survey') with leaders of prominent CSOs, as defned by elite scores (see the Appendix in this volume). Te leaders who responded to the survey were from Italy (N = 133), Poland (N = 175), Sweden (N = 308), and the UK (N = 123). While the leaders all represented organisations of some signifcance, these were diverse in terms of issue areas, missions, constituencies, and relations with public authorities and other stakeholders.

For our analysis, we focused on the answers to a set of closed and openended survey questions about the leaders' experiences of contestations of their leadership position and of contestations directed at the organisation. For the questions with fxed response options, it was possible to enter more than one answer and to provide additional or alternative answers. Te questions are presented below:


We coded the data using our analytical framework in which experiences are examined in terms of the target, the source, and the depth of contestations, and we also paid attention to whether experiences difered across countries. In the following, we report on our main fndings and begin with contestations directed at the leaders of resource-rich CSOs.

# **Challenges Aimed at Civil Society Elites in Their Capacity as Leaders**

One of the dimensions of our model for analysing experiences of contestations among civil society elites concerns the *target* of contestation, that is, to whom the criticism is directed. Te majority of our respondents answered that they had never experienced that their position as a leader in the organisation was questioned. However, slightly more than 40% of the leaders in Italy and Sweden and just over a third in the UK answered that they had such experiences (Cramer's V = 0.181). Among the Polish leaders, only one-ffth agreed with that statement.

Is it a high fgure if up to 40% of the civil society elites in three out of four countries have experienced questioning of their position as a leader? Does this indicate a shrinking civil space and/or lack of legitimacy? Reasonably, the answers depend on the type of objections directed at the leaders and if they come from within the leaders' organisations or from the outside. Te answers to the follow-up questions contributed with some clarifcations.

#### **Mainly Internal Opponents and Contestations at a Minor Level**

Te response options to the question concerning the *sources* of contestation were based on the premise that it makes a diference whether the criticism is internal (stemming from within the same organisation), sectorial (from elsewhere within the civil society sector), or external (from outside actors). Te literature on shrinking civil space focuses mainly on outside actors such as governments, public authorities, and news media (see, e.g., Ploszka, 2020; Toepler et al., 2020), while we wanted to capture a wider range of potential challengers.

As shown in Table 11.1, the civil society elites in all of the surveyed countries perceived themselves to be questioned primarily by people from *within* their own organisation (categories mentioned were individual employees, ofce staf, union representatives, board members, and the founders). However, the UK leaders stood out from the others by


**Table 11.1** Sources of contestation of leadership positions. Answers are in percentages among civil society elites in the four countries (N = 264)

Source: The Civil Society Elite Survey (see Appendix)

Note: The measure of association between the variables is Cramer's V. *(Sig. †: P = <0.1 \*: P = <0.05 \*\*: P = <0.01 \*\*\*: P = <0.001, n.s. = not signifcant*)

more often claiming to also be questioned by other CSOs, news media, and representatives of public organisations.

Te question concerning the grounds on which the leadership position was challenged is related to the *depth of contestation*. Te response options available to the survey respondents were based on previous research on the reasons for questioning the legitimacy of civil society leaders, which in Table 11.2 are categorised in accordance with our three levels of contention as minor, medium, or major.

As can be seen from Table 11.2, the civil society elites in all four countries indicated that they were mainly challenged on grounds that we have described as minor levels of contestation, that is, the type of contestation that can be expected in most organisations and which does not mean that the very basis for the operation is called into question. It is also clear that the leaders more often perceived themselves as challenged because of decisions they had made or their ideas about organisational development than because their expertise was called into question. It can furthermore be noted that leadership style was more often cited as a reason for challenge among Polish and Italian civil society leaders than among the others.

Many of the responses to the open-ended question about possible other reasons for challenging the position of leaders can also be considered minor levels of contestation, for example, competition due to diferent perceptions of recruitment policies or 'jealousy'. Tese answers refect tensions and value conficts about recruitment principles within many


**Table 11.2** Grounds for contesting leadership positions (N = 262)

Source: The Civil Society Elite Survey (see Appendix)

Note: The measure of association between the variables is Cramer's V. *(Sig. †: P = <0.1 \*: P = <0.05 \*\*: P = <0.01 \*\*\*: P = <0.001, n.s. = not signifcant*)

CSOs today, reinforced by an increased degree of professionalisation. Should the leaders represent the constituencies and be recruited from within the (member) organisation, or should they be recruited in open competition and selected based on their professional skills? Tese are two diferent types of leaders based on diferent sources of legitimacy (Meeuwisse & Scaramuzzino, 2023). Both externally recruited civil society leaders and those who were internally recruited reported that they had been questioned for obtaining their position in the 'wrong' way.

Te UK leaders claimed more often than the others (especially in comparison to Italian and Polish leaders) that their position had been challenged due to contestation at a medium level, such as discrimination. Tey were also more likely to say that their leadership position had been challenged because of a lack of representativeness. In the open-ended answers, some of the leaders mentioned ageism or that their position as a leader was challenged by virtue of being 'an outspoken working-class woman', while another claimed that it was because 'I had a leadership style that was more inclusive than the other senior managers'. Issues of discrimination and representativeness (for instance, related to race, gender, or age) are currently the subject of heated debate in the UK, and the civil society sector in several reports has been found to be lacking in these respects (Chapman, 2020; Estwick, 2021; Ivanovska Hadjievska, 2022). Leaders of key CSOs have been accused of being a closed group with a similar background through the #charitysowhite Twitter campaign. Te civil society elites in the other national contexts did not (yet) seem to be subject to such scrutiny and criticism, although there may be grounds for this in some countries (e.g. in Italy, see Chap. 3 by Lee and Scaramuzzino in this volume).

Overall, relatively few of the civil society elites in the four national contexts surveyed had experiences of being challenged on ideological grounds, which we categorise as major contestations.

## **Challenges Aimed at the Organisations that the Elites Represent**

More than half of the Swedish respondents (55%) answered yes to the question whether there were organisations, institutions, or groups that challenged the organisation that they represented, while only one ffth of the Polish leaders (Cramer's V = 0.270) answered yes. In Italy and the UK, about a third of the leaders answered the question in the afrmative. It is important to remember that the survey was aimed at leaders of organisations in civil society who have a strong position (in terms of resources, members, access to policy processes, etc., i.e. those with high elite scores) in their respective countries. From that point of view, it is quite remarkable that such a large proportion of leaders—not least in Sweden—perceived that their organisations were challenged from the outside.

#### **A Mix of Opponents and Contestations at Both Minor and Major Levels**

A total of 198 respondents specifed who the challengers were, and this testifed to both sectorial and external sources of contestation. Te type of challengers most often reported by elites in all the countries surveyed were either rival organisations (other CSOs or private organisations) competing for resources, members, or attention, or ideological opponents of various kinds (politicians, social media actors, or CSOs with other values). Government agencies were also mentioned, but it was primarily Polish leaders who singled out the government as the main challenger of their organisations' position. Nationalist, populist, and right-wing extremist groups of various kinds were the most frequently stated as ideological opponents.

Te Swedish leaders testifed to ferce sectorial competition for resources and members between CSOs, and to an increasing degree with for-proft actors. Some also stated that the competition had increased because the state subsidy had decreased or was becoming more and more uncertain. Ideological divisions within diferent movements were also addressed. Furthermore, some representatives of religious organisations stated that they were opposed in Swedish society at large by both secular organisations and by the state and the general public 'in the form of opposition to everything religious, such as independent religious schools and clerical education'. Some external sources of contestation were also mentioned. Several Swedish leaders of CSOs advocating for rights and justice stated that the position of their organisations was being challenged by right-wing nationalist actors. Some Swedish leaders also reported that their organisations were challenged by government agencies that seized upon CSOs' issues:

Actors who believe that the issues we work with and for, above all with a focus on women's rights to participate on equal terms and with the same conditions as men, are not needed today in Sweden, but are better managed by them, such as bureaucracy and administrative authorities who want to steer these issues from the top down without dialogue with knowledgeable civil society actors.

Te answers from the UK leaders were similar to those from Sweden, that is, the positions of the CSOs were reportedly challenged by competitors within or outside the civil society sector as well as by ideological opponents. Here, too, religious organisations were said to be opposed by 'secularists'. One leader claimed that the conficts were about 'disagreements on the veracity of climate change, moon landings, and other conspiracy theories'. Some leaders perceived that their organisation was challenged by government agencies that preferred to support those who are less critical: 'Government sometimes tries to fnd more benign, less challenging organisations to elicit support.' Unlike in the Swedish material, one UK leader also mentioned that government ofcials did not appreciate the role that CSOs play as an umbrella body.

Several of the responses from the Polish leaders refected experiences of being actively opposed by the government (the Law and Justice [PiS] party). Te comments were less about competition for resources and more about ideological conficts. In addition to controversies on, for example, religious and family-related issues, the answers testifed to disagreement over migration and educational issues.

Te comments from the Italian leaders were, just as in the other countries, both about competition for resources with CSOs engaged in the same area of activity (e.g. addiction, migration, and international organisations for helping children) and about ideological conficts. Several of the responses refected experiences of being actively opposed by far-right populist actors and of being challenged by political parties critical of CSO activities. Civil society umbrella networks were also mentioned by some respondents as challengers, as were local and regional administrations.

Te fnal survey question was about the grounds for challenging the organisations, which was also touched on in the open-ended answers mentioned above. As shown in Table 11.3, we chose to categorise competition for access to political processes as well as competition for status in civil society as cases of a medium degree of contestation because they might involve disagreements over policy positions.

Two types of contestations against the organisations seem to dominate in all four countries. On the one hand, there are ideological diferences, which we have categorised as a profound type of confict (major), and on the other hand there is competition over resources, which we have defned as less wide-ranging (minor). Medium levels of contestation were mentioned less frequently, except in the UK and Poland where over half of the leaders mentioned one or both examples of such grounds.


**Table 11.3** Grounds for contesting the organisation's position (N = 289)

Source: The Civil Society Elite Survey (see Appendix)

Note: The measure of association between the variables is Cramer's V. *(Sig. †: P = <0.1 \*: P = <0.05 \*\*: P = <0.01 \*\*\*: P = <0.001, n.s. = not signifcant)*

Te respondents from the UK agreed to most statements except 'personal diferences', suggesting that there are many diferent kinds of tensions in the British civil society sector. One UK leader mentioned that yet another ground for questioning the organisation was that 'we are seen as a threat to investments made by wealthy individuals', while another stated that the organisation was challenged because of 'our stated position of collaborating rather than competing'. Polish leaders considered 'ideological diferences' to be as important a cause as those in the UK, but mentioned 'competition for resources' to a lesser extent than leaders in the other countries. However, they believed as much as the British respondents that their organisations were challenged due to competition over status within civil society.

# **Conclusion**

We have pursued two aims in this chapter. One was to create an analytical framework with which to study experiences of contestation among civil society elites. Our suggestion is to analytically distinguish between three diferent dimensions, namely the *target*, the *source*, and the *depth* of contestation. We acknowledge that in other historical and geographical contexts, other dimensions might be relevant. For instance, we did not include the *means* of contestation, that is, whether or not violence is used, because we did not think it applicable for our particular cases. Te other goal was to use the analytical framework that we developed to compare experiences of contestation among civil society elites in four European contexts where CSOs operate under partly diferent conditions.

An overall result of our study is that many civil society elites in Italy, Poland, Sweden, and the UK had neither experienced that their position as leaders nor their organisations had been challenged. In other words, not all CSOs seem to be afected by the questioning of civil society that the literature describes. Tis result may have to do with the fact that it is the leaders of the most resource-rich CSOs who were surveyed, and the answers may have been diferent if the survey had been addressed to leaders of more average-sized CSOs. On the other hand, much of the criticism directed at civil society refers precisely to leaders and organisations that enjoy elite status. Although not the majority, it should however be noted that a non-negligible proportion of the civil society elites who responded had indeed been challenged in their leadership position and that the percentage rose signifcantly when the question concerned the organisations they represented, particularly among the Swedish respondents. Te diferences in the response patterns further refect how macrolevel developments such as shrinking civil space and marketisation have impacted civil society in diferent ways in our four diferent European contexts.

A common pattern across the countries is that the civil society *leaders* seem to be mostly challenged by 'their peers' as a form of internal contestation. Challenges from outside (from external actors or from other CSOs) seem to be less prevalent in all contexts compared to challenges from within the organisation. Te grounds for challenging individual leaders appear more professional than ideological, concerning issues such as their ideas about organisational development, their decisions, or their leadership style. Civil society elites from the UK stood out from the others by more often reporting cases of a medium degree of contestation, such as lack of representativeness and discrimination within the sector. Tese issues refect a currently lively debate regarding diversity in the UK, which has so far not been as intense in the other countries.

In Sweden and the UK, challenges against the *organisation* seemed to be largely driven by competition over resources with other non-proft and for-proft organisations, while such challenges were mentioned less often by Polish and Italian civil society elites. Polish leaders, in particular, more often emphasised ideological conficts and reported challenges by external actors—not least the government. Given what research has shown about the state of civil society in Poland, political challenges of this kind are hardly surprising. However, in Sweden and the UK as well, many respondents told of ideological challenges from either external populist and right-wing groups or from ideological opponents within civil society. We had expected family issues and religious issues to be bones of contention in Italy and Poland, but were more surprised that they were battlegrounds in secularised countries such as Sweden and the UK.

Our study provides some insights into country-specifc conditions for civil society elites in terms of perceived challenges and challengers, the grounds of contestation, and how profound these contentions are, but more research is needed. It would be interesting, for example, to examine the diferences in experiences between civil society elites who represent service delivery organisations and those who advocate for rights and justice and are considered particularly threatening to many regimes.

**Acknowledgement** Tis research was supported by Riksbankens Jubileumsfond (project grant M17-0188:1) for the project titled 'Civil Society Elites? Comparing Elite Composition, Reproduction, Integration and Contestation in European Civil Societies'.

# **References**


https://doi.org/10.5018/economics-ejournal.ja.2017-29. (2017-29). Accessed 19 Sept 2022.


*Society Organizations, Unemployment, and Precarity in Europe. Work and Welfare in Europe* (pp. 85–106). Palgrave Macmillan.


**Open Access** Tis chapter is licensed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/ by/4.0/), which permits use, sharing, adaptation, distribution and reproduction in any medium or format, as long as you give appropriate credit to the original author(s) and the source, provide a link to the Creative Commons licence and indicate if changes were made.

Te images or other third party material in this chapter are included in the chapter's Creative Commons licence, unless indicated otherwise in a credit line to the material. If material is not included in the chapter's Creative Commons licence and your intended use is not permitted by statutory regulation or exceeds the permitted use, you will need to obtain permission directly from the copyright holder.

# **12**

# **The State as a Challenger to Civil Society Elites: The Case of Poland**

**El**ż**bieta Korolczuk**

# **Introduction**

In recent decades we have seen signifcant changes in states' approaches towards civil society in countries all around the globe (Alizada et al., 2021). Tese changes include increased eforts to control civil society and non-governmental organisations (NGOs), closing communication channels between the state and citizens, and redirecting fnancial support towards organisations co-opted by or loyal to the ruling party (Dawson & Hanley, 2016; Roggeband & Krizsán 2021). Politicians target specifc groups within civil society based on their demographic characteristics and/or ideological positions, seeing these groups as either contenders for power or as a danger to social cohesion and the homogeneity of the nation (Bill, 2020; Graf & Korolczuk, 2022). As shown by Conny Roggeband and Andrea Krizsán (2021) in Central and Eastern Europe,

E. Korolczuk (\*)

Warsaw, Poland

e-mail: elzbieta.korolczuk@sh.se

we see the process of reconfguring civil society space, and this process is gendered: women and sexual minorities are targeted as the enemies of the right-wing populist parties, while nationalist and socially conservative organisations become the privileged allies of the state (see also Krizsán & Roggeband, 2019). Te degree of autonomy of civil society actors, the possibility to voice critiques and concerns vis-à-vis the state, and the degree of support for independent organisations can be interpreted as a litmus test of democracy. Tus, the changes introduced by the state in countries such as Poland, which result in curtailing the civil rights of a substantial portion of the population, should be seen as part and parcel of the process of transformation of a liberal democracy into an autocratic regime.

To justify the restrictions in the civil society sphere, right-wing politicians give diferent explanations, claiming that they are 'protecting state sovereignty; promoting transparency and accountability in the civil society sector; enhancing aid efectiveness; or pursuing national security' Roggeband & Krizsán, 2021, p. 24). In countries where right-wing populist parties are in power, it is the notion of 'elite' that serves to legitimise the need for sweeping reforms. Te charge of being an elite—as corrupted and alienated from the people and fnanced by foreign powers—is routinely used by the right-wing populists in Poland in relation to liberal and left-leaning civil society actors. In 2015, the representatives of the ruling coalition led by PiS (the Law and Justice party) started to change the infrastructure regulating the relations between state and civil society in order to facilitate the emergence of a new elite group within civil society (Bill, 2020; Korolczuk, 2022). Tus, the Polish context is suitable for analysing the ways in which the state becomes civil society's biggest challenger in autocratising countries.

Tis chapter examines the changes in state–civil society relations in contemporary Poland, focusing on the increased pressure on the liberal and left-leaning actors exerted by the state from 2015 onwards. Te aim is to analyse key strategies employed by the ruling party to marginalise the position of some civil society actors, especially those who are publicly accused of being detached from the people and 'elitist', which usually means being disloyal to or opposing the Law and Justice party and its coalition partners. Previous studies have identifed several strategies of pressure and promotion employed by the Polish state to promote elite change in the feld of civil society, including smear campaigns and channelling of fnancial support towards socially conservative organisations (Bill, 2020; Bill & Stanley, 2020; Pospieszna & Pietrzyk-Reeves, 2022; Szuleka, 2017). Tis chapter focuses specifcally on the patterns of cooperation and communication between the state and civil society actors. Te analysis suggests that the state has limited tools to promote elite change within civil society, but challenging independent civil society organisations (hereafter CSO) by state actors efectively contributes to the process of democratic erosion, which undermines democratic values and practices not only in Poland, but globally (Bormeo, 2016; Carothers, 2016; Haggard & Kaufman, 2021).

### **Data and Methods**

Tis chapter employs a process-tracing method to examine the ways in which the relations between CSOs and the Polish state have developed between 2015 and 2022. I focus on the patterns of cooperation and collaboration between state institutions and civil society by examining (a) the functioning of the institutions or bodies, which were set up before 2015 to facilitate such cooperation; (b) the inclusion/exclusion of CSOs in decision-making processes (the process of preparing and consulting the bill on the National Freedom Institute introduced in 2017); and (c) the existing (post-2015) patterns of cooperation or the lack of thereof between state representatives and civil society actors on a day-to-day basis.

Te study is based on a qualitative textual analysis of the content published between 2015 and 2022 in the media (both mainstream media, e.g., *Gazeta Wyborcza* and *Rzeczpospolita*, and online media, including specialised online portals such as Ngo.pl), opinions and reports published by civil society actors on their social media, and documents published on ofcial governmental sites in relation to the process of preparing and debating the 2017 Act on the National Freedom Institute—Centre for the Development of Civil Society (henceforth: the Act) in the parliament. Data set included also 15 interviews conducted between 2019 and 2022 with representatives of Polish CSOs. Interviewees included representatives of foundations or associations that belonged to the cluster of 31 most resource-rich and infuential Polish CSOs, some of which were liberal/left while others were conservative/right leaning. Tis cluster was identifed based on the results of a survey conducted in 2021, and the elite position of specifc entities was identifed based on factors such as material and human resources, voice vis-à-vis the state, and internal recognition within civil society (Altermark et al., 2022; Korolczuk, 2022). Te data were gathered within the research programme 'Civil Society Elites? Comparing Elite Composition, Reproduction, Integration and Contestation in European Civil Societies', which aimed to develop the frst systematic and cross-country comparative analysis of civil society elites in four countries (Poland, Italy, Sweden, and the United Kingdom) and in the European Union (for more details on the method, see Appendix to this book).

# **The Shifting Relations between the State and Civil Society in Poland**

Historically, civil society emerged as an intermediary between the polity and the private sphere of citizens' lives, in other words, as a sphere of autonomy from absolutist rule. As observed by Michael Bernhard, a critical component of this process was 'the establishment of legal boundaries that protected the existence of an independent public space from the exercise of state power, and then the ability of organizations within it to infuence the exercise of power' (2020, p. 308). Following this historical development, the contemporary ideal of a liberal democracy rests on the assumption that civil society and the state occupy separate spheres, but the relation between them should be more or less harmonious: the state supports civil society actors, and the latter sometimes act as service providers for the state, while simultaneously monitoring the state's actions (Pietrzyk-Reeves, 2016).

In the post-socialist countries, a shift occurred from a 'civil society against the state' model towards a view of CSOs as partners of public institutions that the state should support both fnancially and organisationally (Chimiak, 2016; Cohen & Arato, 1992; Jacobsson & Korolczuk, 2017). In the newly regained liberal democracy, the 'rebellious civil society' (Ekiert & Kubik, 2001) was to be replaced by apolitical service providers, self-help groups, and organisations specialising in advocacy and lobbying that are able and willing to negotiate with state institutions and political elites. In the frst decade of the twenty-frst century the view of civil society as organisations providing social services has become widespread among Polish think-tanks, efectively overshadowing other frames such as civil society as a moral blueprint or a check against power (Jezierska, 2020).

Researchers and practitioners alike have observed that such a close collaboration between the state and civil society may result in the latter losing autonomy, value orientation, and the capability to respond to the authentic needs of local populations (Jacobsson & Korolczuk, 2017; Jezierska & Sörbom, 2021; Toje, 2013). When the state budget becomes the main source of fnancial support for civil society, CSOs are expected to work towards politically defned policy objectives, which may signifcantly limit their ability to control power holders and set their own agenda. Critics of civil society's dependence on state funds and the subsequent bureaucratisation and alienation of CSOs do not undermine the central assumption that collaboration between the state and civil society is conducive to civic engagement and efectively strengthens democracy, but highlight the eminent imbalance of power inscribed in the relations between power holders and civil society actors.

Ideally, resource-rich CSOs should be able to infuence politics, for example, by lobbying for specifc solutions, advising the authorities, or ofering expert knowledge on specifc issues. In practice, the level of participation depends on the good will of political elites and the existence and relative openness/closeness of communication and cooperation channels. Tese channels may include consultative bodies placed at the level of ministries and other state institutions, deliberative spaces such as conferences or meetings of diferent stakeholders, and platforms that can be used for information sharing and advice (Arnstein, 1969; Roggeband & Krizsán, 2021). Te analysis of the Polish context shows that between 2015 and 2022 signifcant changes occurred regarding the functioning of the existing cooperation and communication channels with CSOs, the possibilities for participation of civil society actors in the process of social consultations, and the level of state control over CSOs. Te present analysis focuses on these three key areas of participation, highlighting changes in discourses, regulations, and practices that took place between 2015 and 2022: (a) closing the existing cooperation and communication channels between the state and civil society; (b) closing space for social consultations; (c) centralisation of power over civil society organisations.

# **Closing the Existing Cooperation and Communication Channels between the State and Civil Society**

In its electoral programme in 2015, the Law and Justice party claimed that major reform was needed because many CSOs lacked access to decision-making processes and were fnancially over-dependent on the state. Allegedly, at the heart of the problem was the lack of inclusive consultative bodies, the low level of autonomy of civil society actors, and insufcient state funding. Te analysis of the patterns of cooperation between the state and civil society prior to 2015 and after the elections suggests that while the amount of money available to civil society is indeed bigger, the patterns of cooperation shifted signifcantly.

Polish regulations included provisions that enabled CSOs to cooperate with the state and with local authorities over issues regarding civil society, such as tax provisions, planned reforms, and state supervision over public welfare work. Te 2003 Act on Public Beneft and Volunteer Work (with a 2010 amendment) established the Public Beneft Works Council, an advisory and consultative body, consisting mainly of the leaders of big and infuential organisations, whose role was to express opinions about how the government's plans might afect civil society and to propose reforms or changes on behalf of the Polish third sector (Gumkowska et al., 2006, p. 49). Te council included representatives of umbrella bodies such as the Polish Federation of Non-Governmental Organizations (OFOP) and the Non-Governmental Organizations Supporting Network (SPLOT), large religious organisations (e.g. Caritas), and resource-rich foundations and associations, including the Stocznia Foundation, the Voluntary Fire Brigades Associations, and the Polish Scouting Association. Local authorities were also encouraged to set up social consultation bodies, and according to reports published annually by the Ministry of Labor and Social Policy by 2015 most local governments had submitted plans of cooperation with the leaders of CSOs. Not all organisations had the material resources, skills, and personnel that such cooperation requires, but quite a few had participated in eforts to infuence the state on matters regarding the third sector during the previous two decades (e.g. Charycka et al., 2021; Domaradzka, 2016; Garpiel, 2014; Klon Jawor Association, 2017, 2020).

Resource-rich CSOs promoted greater cooperation between diferent CSOs as well as between the third sector and the state. To facilitate such cooperation, work on the Strategic Roadmap for the Development of Civil Society (Strategiczna Mapa Drogowa Społeczeństwa Obywatelskiego) was initiated in 2014 under the lead of nationwide umbrella organisations OFOP and SPLOT. Te goal was to map Polish civil society, to discuss and address the main obstacles to the development of the Polish third sector, and to enable closer collaboration between organisations, which would strengthen their voice vis-à-vis the state. Intense debates, meetings, and consultations continued over the period of three years and included over 2500 individuals representing a wide range of CSOs, including large national and local federations and those focused on single issues such as civic education, voluntary work, advocacy, rural development, and more. Te initiators of the roadmap continuously discussed the project with politicians, hoping to integrate the conclusions and goals into policies and institutional practices concerning civil society in Poland. Tis group included well-known civil society leaders, such as Jakub Wygnański, Piotr Frączak, and Tomasz Schimanek, who were often mentioned in my interviews as key representatives of civil society elites and as people who have signifcant infuence also within the political sphere:

Wygnański is an icon … he is 'the pope of civil society', and indeed, he has fought for this position. Piotr Frączak also … I think that such people can certainly be found in every big city, a group that sometimes is able to put pressure on power, these people are known for operating in this feld and have enough authority … Tere is this group of people at the national level, so when someone wants to talk to civil society, they will call Wygnański, for example. (Warsaw, 28.10.2021)

After Law and Justice came to power, the collaboration over the roadmap came to an end. Te representatives of state institutions were no longer interested in or able to continue consultations, and the ruling party had its own plan to redefne the relations between the state and the third sector. In the eyes of Law and Justice, people representing existing umbrella networks and infuential organisations, which engaged in dialogue with the previous regime, represented contenders to power rather than potential collaborators. In 2016, the public television news (TVP) initiated a smear campaign targeting Jakub Wygnański and the people who sat on the Stocznia advisory council, suggesting that they illegally received fnancial support from the then Mayor of Warsaw Hanna Gronkiewicz-Waltz, an oppositional politician from the liberal Civic Platform (Platforma Obywatelska, PO) (Orzechowski, 2016). Similarly to attacks on Jurek Owsiak, the head of the well-known charitable organisation WOŚP, the smear campaign targeting Wygnański portrayed civil society leaders as shady characters seeking fnancial gains and political infuence under the pretence that they work for the common good (Bill, 2020).

CSOs enjoy the trust of Polish society, and in 2021, 56% of respondents declared that they trust them, compared to a mere 28% of people who trust public media and 26% who trust the government (Poniatowski, 2021). Because trust is a form of social capital, the question of legitimacy is of key importance for civil society actors (Altermark et al., 2022). Te strategy of the ruling coalition in Poland, which included closing the channels for cooperation and engaging in attacks on specifc organisations and people active in the public sphere should be seen as an attempt to challenge the infuence of elite civil society actors and to undercut their social standing and legitimacy.

## **Closing Space for Social Consultations**

Te shift in state–civil society relations initiated in 2015 included institutional and legal initiatives as well as changes in institutional practices that negatively afected the degree of openness of state institutions in regard to some civil society actors. Initially, the representatives of the ruling coalition promised to strengthen the collaboration with civil society and its infuence on decision-making processes by replacing existing institutions with new, more efective, and inclusive ones. To facilitate this process, the role of overseeing the state's relations with the third sector was assigned to the newly established ofce of the Plenipotentiary for Civil Society and Equal Treatment, positioned at the Chancellery of the President of the Council of Ministers.1 A close analysis of the activities undertaken by the three consecutive Plenipotentiaries shows however, that all Plenipotentiaries kept a relatively low profle and ceased to engage in wide social consultations or broad cooperation with CSOs, except for those with close ties to the ruling parties.

By mid-2016 then-Prime Minister Beata Szydło announced a new plan that included establishing an administrative body fully in control of communication and cooperation between the state and the third sector. A key element of the reform was the act on the National Freedom Institute—Centre for the Development of Civil Society (e.g. wPolityce, 2017). Te leaders of liberal CSOs interviewed for this project were unanimous in their view that the reform led to the closing of existing communication and cooperation channels between the state and many civil society actors. Te trend to exclude organisations seen as representing the 'liberal elite' from social consultations and to dismiss their attempts to communicate with the authorities emerged already in 2016 and continues today. As observed by one of the interviewees, the tendency to exclude some actors is part of a broader strategy of 'divide and conquer' applied by the right-wing coalition against CSOs:

<sup>1</sup>Until 2016 it was the ofce of the Plenipotentiary for Equal Treatment, a key institution for implementing gender equality in Poland, but because the new government saw 'gender equality' as a problematic and potentially dangerous concept, both the name of the institution and the focus of the Plenipotentiary's work has changed.

Te previous authorities left this environment aside and sometimes when someone jumped the line, they would show you your place. Te current authorities say that 'everything is political', but only they represent the right way of doing politics, and you are supposed to support them …. Te intensity of the involvement of politicians in what we do has changed. And they are very destructive now as they divide [civil society], incite hatred against one another, attempt to destroy the image [of civil society organisations] and trust between organisations. (Warszawa, 11.02.2019)

Te ways in which new legislation was introduced is illustrative of the process of a selective closure of civil society space (McMahon & Niparko, 2022). Te speed of introducing change is indicative of the key role attributed by the new regime to reforming civil society sphere. Te act on the National Freedom Institute passed in the Sejm and Senate with very limited time for consultations and with no public hearings, and President Andrzej Duda signed the bill on October 12, 2017 (ISAP, 2017). Such haste was not uncommon also in the case of other bills. According to the report published by the Batory Foundation in 2019 over a quarter of all legislative proposals were debated for less than two weeks in Polish parliament, which is against the regulations requiring at least two weeks for parliamentary proceedings (Fundacja…, 2019).

Key umbrella organisations and the infuential actors of liberal orientation were not invited to consult on the project. Two main umbrella bodies representing thousands of Polish CSOs—OFOP and SPLOT—as well as thinks-tanks such as the Klon/Jawor Association submitted their opinions to the ministry, but their critiques and suggestions were left unaddressed. Te government ofcials and minister Gliński, who were responsible for the project, also did not respond to the concerns of the Commissioner for Human Rights, Adam Bodnar, who pointed to the fact that the lack of wide social consultations suggests the undemocratic nature of the procedures leading to the establishment of the National Freedom Institute.

In a series of texts and open letters, civil society actors expressed their concerns (e.g. Batko-Tołuć, 2017; OFOP, 2017). In mid-2017, an open letter of CSOs was sent to the Polish president asking him to veto the new law. Te authors of the letter pointed to the fact that most organisations that submitted their opinions on the draft of the new bill were very critical of the new provisions: 'Out of 48 opinions that were submitted, 33 were against creating the National Freedom Institute, 15 assessed the current project critically, and only 2 were overtly positive' (List do prezydenta RP 2017). Tey warned the public that the National Freedom Institute would be controlled solely by the state, not civil society representatives. Te reform was a move towards centralisation of power, leaving control over activities and fnancial resources of CSOs in the hands of the state ofcials and civil society leaders loyal to the ruling party, thus seriously diminishing the autonomy of the third sector.

As shown by Roggeband and Krizsán (2021), the process of closing civil society space was uneven and selective. While liberal and leftoriented CSOs especially the ones that focused on women's rights, sexual minorities, and migrants, were marginalised or subjected to smear campaigns and harassment by right-wing actors, the conservative and patriotic CSOs enjoyed a privileged position vis-à-vis the state. Te representatives of the latter see it as an obvious consequence of a regime change:

First of all, we must make it clear, of course, with the currently ruling coalition it is certainly easier for us and our supporters now than it was when the previous [liberal coalition] was in power. On the other hand, we experienced an opposite situation before the [current] coalition was in power, when other NGOs had greater support and infuence on what was happening in national politics. (Warsaw, 8.06.2021)

Within this new context, liberal and left-oriented organisations seek new ways to use cultural capital such as trust and other resources to strengthen their organisational capacity and to mobilise wider audiences. Interviewees mentioned that they use international contacts and informal channels to inform their partners in other countries and at the EU level about the changes taking place in Poland and the people who are taking over positions in various international bodies:

I was at this meeting with EU Commissioner, who … said, 'Listen, we at the Commission level can't do anything. We need to engage in dialogue with all representatives who meet the defnition of NGOs. We can't treat various organisations diferent in any way … but you can tell us who is who … knowing the context, we know who is who, and that is a lot'. (Warsaw, 22.12.2020)

Undercutting the infuence of CSOs on the international arena turned out to be difcult also because between 2015 and 2022 Poland had become a widely discussed case of de-democratisation due to reforms concerning the judicial system and the media (Alizada et al., 2021). Tus, civic activism in Poland is shifting as people focus on new issues and employ new mobilisation tactics, and it is strengthening as various networks and groups join forces (McMahon & Niparko, 2022).

# **Centralisation of Power over Civil Society Organisations**

Despite the reservations and negative opinions, the Act on the National Freedom Institute—Centre for the Development of Civil Society (NIW) was submitted to the Polish parliament on June 5, 2017 as a governmental project, and it was accepted by the Parliament by mid-September (Sejm, 2017). Te people responsible for creating the National Freedom Institute were handpicked by the representatives of the ruling right-wing coalition with no signifcant input from civil society. Te Institute's Director and the majority of the Director's Council were appointed by Minister Gliński in his role as the Chair of the Committee for Public Beneft Activity, a new body established by the bill. Gliński himself argued that creating such an institution should be seen as just a minor change that shifted some responsibilities and tasks from the Ministry for Work, Family and Social Afairs to the Chancellery of the Prime Minister (PAP, 2017). In light of the new provisions, however, the Committee, whose 22 members are recruited solely from ministries and state departments, has become a key institution tasked with overseeing and coordinating the relations between civil society and the state (Narodowy…, 2017).

#### **12 The State as a Challenger to Civil Society Elites: The Case…**

Te Act stipulates that the members of the Committee are responsible for preparing programmes to support civil society development, which serve as a key source of funding, and they are to draft new regulations in this feld and coordinate the process of public consultations. Furthermore, the Chair—Minister Gliński—has full control over appointing the director of the National Institute and monitoring its activities, he approves the budget of the institution, and he controls all public beneft activities. While the Public Beneft Council—an institution facilitating cooperation between civil society and the state—has continued to exist, it is no longer seen by civil society actors as infuential and open to all organisations. As one of the interviewees representing liberal-leaning organisations explained:

Te Council has no meaning now, no real infuence. Te signal that comes from the Committee is decisive. And the Council can discuss the matter, it can submit dissenting opinions, whatever, it doesn't matter anyway, because if there is a specifc order, it has to be carried out. … It is just a fg leaf. …. So they can always say 'After all, we consulted with you, with your representatives, so if you have any complaints, it's not against us, but against them, right?' … If all bodies, such as the Council, were to be liquidated, then everyone would recognise it as a power grab … but now it looks ok, sort of. …. After a while, no one remembers. (Warsaw, 22.12.2020)

Leaving some of the institutional infrastructure intact supports the ruling party's claim that the reform was oriented towards enhancing the efectiveness of the existing institutions, rather than aimed at overhauling the whole structure. As explained by one of the interviewees, Law and Justice wanted to have full control over decisions made by bodies such as the Public Beneft Council or Council of the National Institute of Freedom, and thus they invited leaders sharing socially conservative and patriotic views and assigned key roles to people from small towns and less infuential organisations:

In order to have a majority in the Council you need to have enough votes to be able to vote in accordance with such a need, so … suddenly people appeared there, who were never seen in the civil society space. … the narrative was that we need to include these people from small towns to speak, which is cool. But later, when we checked who they are, well… there is this guy, a local regionalist … who publishes … all kinds of nationalistic, unpleasant stuf. (Warsaw, 22.12.2020)

Te representatives of the Law and Justice party claim that the reform was introduced in a fair and balanced manner, even if its efectiveness was sometimes achieved at the expense of inclusiveness. When asked in an interview about the controversial provisions included in the new bill and the lack of extended social consultations, Minister Gliński, the architect of the reform, dismissed the critiques:

Perhaps an immature democracy, and this is still Poland, this is what it looks like - one government comes and the system is bent in one way, there comes the other, and it can be bent in the other. We will try to build a fair system, maintaining the right proportions, and the sector will monitor the process. (in: Dudkiewicz, 2017, translated by the author)

Gliński dismissed the critiques and shunned the process of democratic deliberation as an obstacle in implementing changes that in his view were both urgently needed and normatively justifed. Tis interview as well as public utterances of the ruling party politicians suggest that the democratic procedures, such as wide social consultations, close collaboration with various civil society actors, and achieving consensus, were not seen as needed when introducing major reforms. To the contrary, they were perceived as a hindrance in the process of building a new, authentic civil society and promoting its new elite.

Law and Justice perceive the existing civil society elite as a contender to power, potentially willing and able to challenge the right-wing regime. Tis view was expressed in the opening speech by Gliński, delivered during the annual conference of the National Freedom Institute in November 2020. Te minister claimed that there were two types of civil society: one that supports democracy and one that endangers it. Te people who took to the streets to oppose the government 'are of populist and anarchist nature, they lack some core features that are constitutive for civil society. Tus, this is not the type of civil society that should be functioning in a democracy' (19.11.2020, author's notes and translation). In other words, in the eyes of the right-wing politicians, civil society is vital for democracy, but only if its activities meet specifc criteria, such as loyalty towards the government, thus the mass resistance against the reforms introduced by the populist coalition was neither truly grassroots nor democratic by defnition. Te protests are presented as inauthentic, for example, initiated and staged by politicians from oppositional parties, who transformed CSOs into pawns in the political game. Te quote is illustrative of the logic that drives the changes regarding civil society in contemporary Poland. Jarosław Kaczyński, the leader of the Law and Justice party, went on record claiming that his ultimate goal is 'the establishment of a "new social hierarchy" that would reach deep into civil society [because] only a total reconstruction of Poland's social elites can complete the country's "unfnished" post-1989 transition' (Bill, 2020, p. 2). Under the rule of the Law and Justice coalition the state emerges not only as the rightful challenger to the civil society actors who allegedly strayed away from their mission and were manipulated by the opposition, but also as an institution that is bestowed with the mission of moulding new elites.

Tis mission legitimises not only the exclusion of specifc CSOs from social consultations and public debate, but also the use of direct violence. Centralisation of power includes a range of diferent strategies, many of which aim to limit citizen's participation. Tese strategies range from withholding information, to handpicking members of the bodies designed to facilitate cooperation between the state and civil society, to violence. In recent years researchers and practitioners have noted an increase in discursive and physical violence against protesters and activists. Te sweeping reforms introduced by the Law and Justice-led government, such as the reform of judiciary, seizing control over the media, and attempting to further limit access to abortion, indeed led to an awakening of Polish civil society and the rise of contentious activism (Korolczuk et al., 2019; Majewska, 2017; McMahon & Niparko, 2022). On the October 30, 2020 an unprecedented number of over 400,000 demonstrators protested in the streets of over 600 cities, towns, and villages to protest against the ruling of the Constitutional Tribunal, which decided that abortions for foetal abnormalities violate the Polish Constitution. Tese were the biggest protests in the country since 1989, and reports published by various organisations and media outlets, including Amnesty International and Szpila Collective (an informal network of lawyers helping the people who have been arrested during demonstrations), show that physical violence, detention, and legal harassment were used by the state during protests, signifcantly limiting freedom of assembly and freedom of speech (Kolektyw Szpila & Sukiennik, 2021). During protests against the abortion ban and against the homophobic rhetoric of the government and the Catholic Church, the police have used excessive violence, detaining dozens of participants, including minors (Amnesty International, 2022; Jędrzejczyk, 2021). Te media also reported on police harassment, for example, when police ofcers were visiting people in their homes for 'ofences' such as posting their support for protests online, as in the case of a 14-year-old boy who posted words of solidarity with the women's march on his Facebook page only to fnd police ofcers at his doorstep (Ambroziak, 2020). Analysis of the charges brought against the protesters published by the ofce of the Commissioner for Human Rights shows that at least 60% of the charges against the protesters were later dismissed by the courts, which confrms the view that the use of violence was excessive and politically motivated (Jędrzejczyk, 2021). In the hands of the ruling elite, state violence has become a powerful tool to limit citizen's rights and freedoms, efectively limiting space for participation in peaceful demonstrations and other forms of contentious politics.

# **Conclusions**

Te circulation of elites is often conceptualised as a natural consequence of social mobility, political developments, and socio-cultural change. Te change of elites often occurs in the sphere of politics, but can be also observed in other areas including culture and civil society when diferent groups compete and clash. In contemporary Poland, it is the state that has become the biggest challenger to the civil society elite. Tere are several key strategies of state-sponsored elite change in the civil society sphere. Tese include: (i) the (dis)continuation of existing forms of collaboration between the state and civil society, (ii) the closing of existing channels for communication and social consultations or limiting access to these channels for some groups, (iii) the tendency to privilege civil society actors loyal to the ruling party as state partners, (iv) redirecting funds towards this privileged group, and (v) using smear campaigns or political violence against civil society actors seen as potential challengers to the new political elite. Each of these strategies can be analysed regarding the degree of openness/closeness of the political system for civil society actors and the degree of pressure/promotion of specifc CSOs vis-à-vis the state. Illiberal states tend to reconfgure rather than close civil society space, and the core mechanism that steers the selective dynamics of inclusion and exclusion is 'the convergence or divergence between the ideology of civil society organizations and governments or political elites' (Roggeband & Krizsán, 2021, p. 24). In autocratising contexts, such as Poland, the closure afects mostly those organisations that are identifed as liberal or left-leaning, of cosmopolitan orientation, and which promote liberal values such as equality, pluralism, and minority rights.

Te present analysis shows that the regulations and practices aimed to foster elite change in the sphere of civil society are often intertwined with processes of democratic backsliding. Politicians who want to centralise power treat representatives of civil society elites (experts, leaders of infuential CSOs, and umbrella organisations) as contenders who should be kept in check and de-legitimised in the eyes of a broader public. While the process of privileging certain civil society actors by the state can be interpreted as part of a process of elite circulation, not uncommon to healthy democracies, in autocratising countries it is accompanied by exerting pressure on lay citizens engaged in diferent forms of contentious politics who are seen as disloyal to the power holders and thus are subjected to state violence.

When autocrats gain power, they need to fnd ways to continue to be seen as outsiders in the system of power, and to this end they need to redirect people's anger and frustration towards groups that can be presented as foreign and potentially dangerous. Existing civil society elites, which consist of people representing relatively privileged organisations, cooperating with transnational and global actors, and mostly of liberal persuasion, are the ideal target of the right-wing populist anti-elitist *resentment*. Simultaneously, the anti-elitist discourse is employed to legitimise violence against minority groups and oppressed individuals, including women, youth, and LGBTQ people. Despite the fact that protesters often represent marginalised communities and groups lacking substantial resources, they are also vilifed as members of or the pawns of global elites. Consequently, their right to political participation is limited, indicating the anti-democratic nature of the anti-elitist discourses and politics introduced by the right-wing coalition in Poland.

**Acknowledgement** Tis research was supported by Riksbankens Jubileumsfond (project grant M17-0188:1) for the project titled 'Civil Society Elites? Comparing Elite Composition, Reproduction, Integration and Contestation in European Civil Societies'.

# **References**


wPolityce. (2017). NASZ WYWIAD. Wicepremier Gliński: Mądre państwo powinno wzmacniać słabszego. Z funduszy publicznych zaczną korzystać małe, lokalne organizacje. *wPolityce*, 30 March. https://wpolityce.pl/ polityka/333701-nasz-wywiad-wicepremier-glinski-madre-panstwopowinno-wzmacniac-slabszego-z-funduszy-publicznych-zaczna-korzystacmale-lokalne-organizacje?strona=1. Accessed 21 Dec 2020.

**Open Access** Tis chapter is licensed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License (http://creativecommons.org/ licenses/by/4.0/), which permits use, sharing, adaptation, distribution and reproduction in any medium or format, as long as you give appropriate credit to the original author(s) and the source, provide a link to the Creative Commons licence and indicate if changes were made.

Te images or other third party material in this chapter are included in the chapter's Creative Commons licence, unless indicated otherwise in a credit line to the material. If material is not included in the chapter's Creative Commons licence and your intended use is not permitted by statutory regulation or exceeds the permitted use, you will need to obtain permission directly from the copyright holder.

# **13**

# **Who Gets a Seat at the Table? Civil Society Incumbents and Challengers in the European Parliament's Consultations**

**Laura Landorff**

# **Introduction**

Te European Union (EU) has the 'most comprehensive and advanced animal welfare legislation in the world' although animal welfare does not fall within its exclusive competence (Simonin & Gavinelli, 2019, p. 68). EU animal welfare legislation is developed within the framework of EU policies 'where the EU has the legal base to act' such as in agriculture, fsheries, or the internal market (Simonin & Gavinelli, 2019, p. 60). Most of the legislation covers the welfare of 'food producing animals and […] animals used for experimental purposes' (European Commission, 2020, p. 1).

As a result, animal welfare is a fercely contested policy area that is shaped by the interests of various individual and collective actors from

L. Landorf (\*)

© Te Author(s) 2024 **279**

Department of Political Science, Lund University, Lund, Sweden e-mail: laura.landorf@svet.lu.se

H. Johansson, A. Meeuwisse (eds.), *Civil Society Elites*, Palgrave Studies in Tird Sector Research, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-40150-3\_13

adjacent policy felds such as farmers, consumers, and animal welfare organisations. Te recently adopted European Parliament (EP) report on on-farm animal welfare (2022) met major criticism from animal welfare civil society organisations (CSOs) such as the Eurogroup for Animals and Compassion in World Farming for favouring 'farmers' economic needs' in many paragraphs and for ignoring 'much of the scientifc knowledge gained in regard to the welfare of animals' (Eurogroup for Animals, Compassion in World Farming – EU & Four Paws, 2022, p. 1). As co-legislator, the Parliament plays a crucial role in adopting new EU laws on animal welfare. Tus, it can be an important ally for animal welfare CSOs in pushing for EU animal welfare policies.

In asking who gets a seat at the table when EU parliamentarians consult civil society on animal welfare-related policies, this chapter pursues two aims:

First, it compares two institutional venues for civil society participation and deliberation on animal welfare in the Parliament, namely EP public hearings and the Intergroup on the Welfare and Conservation of Animals, to identify which types of civil society actors act as *incumbents* and *challengers* in the EP's animal welfare policy. While EP public hearings are ofcial bodies of the Parliament, the Intergroup constitutes an unofcial grouping that is formed by Members of the European Parliament (MEPs) for the purpose to, among other things, 'promote contact between parliamentarians and civil society' (European Parliament, 2019, p. 29).

Second, the chapter aims to show how the Intergroup on the Welfare and Conservation of Animals functions as an arena to gather animal welfare CSOs, to concentrate expertise, and to facilitate access to political elites for animal welfare organisations. In this context, particular attention is paid to the Eurogroup for Animals, a Brussels-based animal welfare CSO that acts as the secretariat of the Intergroup. Regarding this position, the Eurogroup speaks of 'a position envied by many, […] a unique position to infuence the Parliament from within' (Eurogroup for Animals, 2016, p. 44). Furthermore, it describes itself as a 'privileged partner of many parliamentarians (MEPs) [who works] hand in hand with all political groups to generate better animal welfare policy and legislation' (Eurogroup for Animals, 2016, p. 44). Tese statements point to a potential elite status of the Eurogroup in terms of having a key position in the Intergroup and enjoying privileged access to political elites, which this chapter aims to explore in greater depth.

To accommodate these aims, the chapter combines a feld-analytical approach in its conceptual framework (Fligstein & McAdam, 2012) with the analysis of 84 agendas of the Intergroup on the Welfare and Conservation of Animals and 43 agendas of EP public hearings during the eighth (2014–2019) and frst half of the ongoing ninth European Parliament (2019–2024). Te EP is conceptualised as a Strategic Action Field (SAF), that is, as a mesolevel social order (Fligstein & McAdam, 2012). Applying the SAF framework's key components of *incumbents* and *challengers,* those animal welfare CSOs that are invited to EP public hearings are perceived as *incumbents.* As such they occupy a privileged position in the feld as they are invited to a formal EP structure that is part of the ofcial policy deliberations and processes. In contrast, those animal welfare CSOs that participate in Intergroups are conceived of as *challengers.* Tey are perceived as occupying a less privileged position in the feld as they conduct their deliberations in an institutional setting that is not part of the ofcial EP structure. To gain insight into the sources of power of *incumbents* and *challengers*, the organisational capacities of CSOs invited to Intergroup meetings and EP public hearings are also briefy examined.

In line with the feld-analytical framework of this chapter, the analysis of civil society consultation on animal welfare in the EP is perceived as an initial struggle for access and voice. It is a struggle for access to institutional venues and thus to political elites in the EP. Tis struggle is expressed through the institutional regulation of EP Intergroups. It is also a struggle for voice in a policy area that is developed within the context of other EU policies, such as agriculture, and thus is shaped by feld struggles in the broader feld environment.

Te chapter starts with a brief introduction to EP public hearings and Intergroups. Tereafter, the conceptual framework of the Parliament as a SAF is developed. Te subsequent analysis examines the participation of animal welfare CSOs in public hearings and in the EP Intergroup on the Welfare and Conservation of Animals and outlines the organisational capacities of *incumbents* and *challengers*. Te chapter ends with concluding remarks and refections on how to defne civil society elites' position in the EP.

# **Public Hearings in the European Parliament**

Te EP parliamentary committees frequently hold public hearings to obtain independent expertise and advice on specifc topics linked to their legislative, oversight, and appointment activities (Corbett et al., 2016; Díaz Crego & Del Monte, 2021). In these contexts, hearings fulfl various purposes, for example, epistemic, coordinative, and participatory functions (Coen & Katsaitis, 2019). During the eighth EP, 585 public hearings were organised by the parliamentary committees (Sabbati, 2019). According to Ripoll Servant (2018, p. 142), public hearings encourage a 'broader dialogue' between parliamentarians, experts, and civil society 'than one-to-one meetings with selected groups'.

For CSOs, legislative expert hearings provide an opportunity to present their views and expertise to key EU decision-makers, and thus to be part of 'the evidence-gathering process that prepares the ground for a report' (Corbett et al., 2016, p. 186). However, the participation in expert hearings requires prior invitation by the parliamentary committee or rather the committee's secretariat that oversees the organisation of expert hearings (European Parliament, 2003/2014). Tereby, a parliamentary committee may invite 'a maximum of 16 guests each year whose expenses will be covered' (European Parliament, 2003/2014, p. 1).

Because animal welfare is predominantly discussed within the scope of the EU's agricultural policy (though not exclusively), the parliamentary committee on Agriculture and Rural Development (AGRI) and its public hearings are of particular interest to animal welfare CSOs. Terefore, the analysis in this chapter focuses on the 25 AGRI hearings of the eighth EP and the 18 AGRI hearings of the current ninth EP.

## **Intergroups in the European Parliament**

Intergroups have existed since the early 1980s in the EP. Tey are unoffcial cross-party, cross-committee groupings that gather MEPs across political groups and parliamentary committees, representatives of other EU institutions (e.g., the European Commission), and civil society and interest groups in their meetings. Te current ninth EP (2019–2024) registered 27 Intergroups dealing with issues such as animal welfare, climate change, disability, trade unions, and urban areas, to name just a few.1 In the literature, Intergroups have been analysed as informal legislative membership organisations (Ringe et al., 2013), as 'more or less strong policy networks' (Nedergaard & Jensen, 2014, p. 9), and as *bridging* social capital of EU parliamentarians (Landorf, 2019).

In response to concerns about Intergroups being too close to certain lobby groups (Corbett et al., 2016), the Parliament established in 1999 internal rules governing the establishment, operation, and fnancial declarations of Intergroups (European Parliament, 1999/2012). Tese rules defne Intergroups as not being 'organs of Parliament' (European Parliament, 1999/2012, p. 1). Consequently, Intergroups may not express the opinion of the EP (European Parliament, 1999/2012). Furthermore, the regulation entails that Intergroups must seek their (re)establishment as an ofcial EP Intergroup at the beginning of each parliamentary term. Te ofcial recognition as an EP Intergroup requires the support of at least three political groups and comes with the provision of technical facilities (e.g., rooms, interpreters, and translation facilities) for Intergroup meetings by the political groups. Due to the regulation, the number of EP Intergroups is limited. Likewise, the themes on which Intergroups are established are subject to change because they need to align with the policy priorities of the political groups. Hence, as a venue for civil society participation and deliberation Intergroups are dependent on the political groups in the Parliament.

<sup>1</sup>For an overview of all 27 Intergroups of the ninth EP, see https://www.europarl.europa.eu/aboutparliament/en/organisation-and-rules/organisation/Intergroups (Accessed: 14 July 2022).

#### **The Intergroup on the Welfare and Conservation of Animals**

Te Intergroup on the Welfare and Conservation of Animals exists since 1983 (Corbett et al., 2016, p. 248) and is one of the oldest Intergroups of the EP. Te Intergroups 'Disability', 'Minority', 'Extreme Poverty', and 'Trade Union' were established in the early 1980s and are still active in the ninth EP (Landorf, 2019). At the beginning of the ninth parliamentary term, 99 MEPs were registered as members of the Intergroup on the Welfare and Conservation of Animals (European Parliament, n.d.).

Te Intergroup meets monthly for a one-hour meeting during the Parliament's plenary sessions in Strasbourg, usually on a Tursday morning.2 On average more than 20 MEPs attended Intergroup meetings at the end of 2019 (Eurogroup for Animals, 2020, p. 10). Te Intergroup on the Welfare and Conservation of Animals covers a broad range of animal welfare issues such as animal welfare during transport, animal welfare in experiments and medical research, animal welfare labelling, the welfare of companion animals, and cage-free farming (Intergroup on the Welfare and Conservation of Animals, n.d.). Tereby, the Intergroup functions as a 'forum for debate and actions' on animal welfare-related legislation (Intergroup on the Welfare and Conservation of Animals, 2019a, p. 1). Its members work on parliamentary reports (e.g., the report on organic production and labelling of organic products or the implementation report on on-farm animal welfare), resolutions (e.g., on a new animal welfare strategy for 2016–2020), and amendments and parliamentary questions to the plenary (Eurogroup for Animals, 2016, p. 20; Intergroup on the Welfare and Conservation of Animals, n.d.).

Among the Intergroups of the ninth Parliament, the Intergroup on the Welfare and Conservation of Animals represents one of the most formalised groups in terms of its organisational structure. It is chaired by a president and several vice-presidents, has a secretariat, and follows its own rules of procedure that guide the actions of the Intergroup (Intergroup on the Welfare and Conservation of Animals, 2019a). As of 2022, it

<sup>2</sup>Te move to online meetings in April 2020 has occasionally extended the meetings to up to two hours.

comprised six ad hoc working groups covering, for instance, animal transport, animals in science, and cage-free farming (Intergroup on the Welfare and Conservation of Animals, n.d.).

#### **The Eurogroup for Animals**

Te Eurogroup for Animals presents itself as the 'only pan-European animal advocacy organisation' (Eurogroup for Animals, 2019, p. 2). It was founded in 1980 on the initiative of the UK-based Royal Society for the Prevention of Cruelty for Animals and 'similar national societies' (Corbett et al., 2016, p. 248). At the end of 2021, the Eurogroup represented over 80 animal advocacy organisations in 25 EU member states and several non-EU countries (Eurogroup for Animals, 2022, p. 56). Te Eurogroup's portfolio covers fve policy areas, among them trade and animal welfare, animals in science, and farm animals. Tese are covered by 15 (out of 34) staf members as of May 2022 (Eurogroup for Animals, 2022, pp. 45–46).

Te Eurogroup has served as the Intergroup's secretariat since 1983 and thus draws on nearly 40 years of experience in liaising with MEPs in the Intergroup (Intergroup on the Welfare and Conservation of Animals, 2019b). As its secretariat, the Eurogroup is responsible for 'administrative, organisational, and advisory tasks' (Intergroup on the Welfare and Conservation of Animals, 2019a, p. 3). Tese include, for instance, the organisation of the monthly meetings in Strasbourg, the invitation of guests, the preparation and distribution of the meeting agendas, the coordination of Intergroup initiatives, and regular updates of the Intergroup website (Intergroup on the Welfare and Conservation of Animals, 2019a, p. 3).

## **The European Parliament as a Strategic Action Field for Animal Welfare CSOs**

Inspired by feld-analytical approaches in EU and EU civil society studies (e.g., Georgakakis & Rowell, 2013; Johansson & Kalm, 2015; Johansson & Uhlin, 2020; Kauppi, 2011; Lindellee & Scaramuzzino, 2020; Michel, 2013), this chapter employs the notion of Strategic Action Fields (SAFs) as a heuristic device to construct the Parliament as a 'meso-level social order', that is, as a social arena that is shaped by competition and cooperation between collective actors (Fligstein & McAdam, 2012, p. 9).

In this way, the chapter applies an institutionalist-inspired approach to feld analysis as opposed to an orthodox habitus-inspired feld approach (for a good discussion, see Gengnagel, 2014). Its strong and parsimonious focus on the strategic actions of individual and collective actors, on the interplay of cooperation and competition within and across the feld, and its account of the broader feld environment, makes the SAF framework suitable for the analysis of EP institutional settings. Te framework is utilised to map and identify the positions of animal welfare CSOs within the EP and to disclose processes of resource accumulation and concentration that are fostered through the cooperation of animal welfare CSOs in diferent parliamentary venues.

As a SAF, the Parliament is composed of diferent sets of actors 'who can be generally viewed as possessing more or less powers' (Fligstein & McAdam, 2012, p. 11). Tereby, two types of actors are distinguished, namely *incumbents* and *challengers. Incumbents* are those actors 'who occupy privileged positions within the feld in terms of 'material and status reward' and who wield disproportionately infuence within the SAF (Fligstein & McAdam, 2012, p. 13). *Challengers* are those actors who 'occupy less privileged positions' within the SAF and therefore exert less infuence over the functioning of the feld (Fligstein & McAdam, 2012, p. 13). Drawing on positional approaches to civil society elite identifcation (Johansson & Lee, 2015; Lindellee & Scaramuzzino, 2020; Mills, 1956/2000), the privileged position of *incumbents* shall be defned as an elite position that is tied to a formal and ofcial organisational position in the Parliament. Hence, those civil society actors invited to ofcial public hearings are defned as *incumbents*. As such, they are ofcially recognised as partners to provide expertise and opinions on animal welfarerelated policies and legislation. Teir position, resources, and powers are institutionally and formally embedded in the organisation, that is, the EP. In contrast, those civil society actors who are invited to Intergroup meetings are defned as *challengers* whose powers and resources are not formally embedded in the EP.

Incumbents and challengers interact with each other based on shared understandings of 'what the purpose of the feld is', of what the rules are that govern legitimate actions within the feld, and of their relationships to others in the feld (Fligstein & McAdam, 2012, p. 9). Tus, they share the understanding of the EP's role as co-legislator in EU animal welfare policies. Both understand the tactics and strategies that are possible and legitimate in the Parliament with regard to civil society consultation and participation. In other words, they understand that ofcial civil society consultation takes place in the EP public hearings as part of recognised and established formal EP policy processes, while civil society consultation in EP Intergroups is recognised by the Parliament though not as part of formal EP policy discussions. Both groups understand how their position in EP public hearings and Intergroups relate to each other and to other collective and individual actors in the SAF (Fligstein & McAdam, 2012, p. 11). Tis means that *incumbents* and *challengers* know who their friends and competitors are and where these actors are positioned in the Parliament.

Despite their less privileged positions as *challengers* within the parliamentary SAF, they 'can be expected to conform to the prevailing order' of the SAF (Fligstein & McAdam, 2012, p. 13); that is, that civil society consultation is practiced in ofcial EP public hearings, while EP Intergroups serve as unofcial venues for civil society deliberation. *Challengers* conform to the order that EP Intergroups are deprived of the right to speak in the name of the Parliament and are not part of the legislative process. However, as *challengers* they also confront the established working order of the SAF in terms of how, where, and with whom interactions and deliberations on animal welfare policies are practiced in the EP.

# **Who Is Involved? Public Hearings of the Committee on Agriculture and Rural Development**

In the eighth EP (November 2014–March 2019), the AGRI committee conducted 25 hearings (European Parliament, 2014–2019). Te hearing on 'Cloning of animals for farming purposes' was the only hearing explicitly dedicated to animal welfare (see Table 13.1). It was jointly organised with the parliamentary committee on Environment, Public Health and Food Safety. Additionally, the hearing on 'European – Level playing feld: state of implementation of the EU agricultural legislation in diferent Member States' in April 2016 featured a presentation on animal welfare and environmental requirements in the European pig sector (European Parliament, 2016; see Table 13.1). Not a single animal welfare CSO was invited to any of the 25 AGRI public hearings of the eighth Parliament. In the frst half of the ongoing ninth EP (November 2019–March 2022), the AGRI committee has organised 18 hearings (European Parliament, 2019–2022). Two hearings in June and September 2021 were explicitly dedicated to animal welfare (Table 13.1).

Te analysis of AGRI hearings shows that animal welfare is one topic among many on which the committee organises its public hearings. Overall, AGRI hearings cover the EU's Common Agricultural Policy and global agricultural policies. Hearings are organised on the EU's dairy and sugar markets, the EU's Forest Strategy, and its Farm to Fork Strategy.3 All subjects, including animal welfare, are discussed in relation to the EU's agricultural policy. Tis fnding is interpreted as refecting the overall division of powers within EU animal welfare policies. As mentioned at the beginning of this chapter, EU animal welfare legislation is developed within the context of policies where the EU has the legal right to act, that is, within the EU's agricultural, environmental, or internal market policies. Hence, animal welfare denotes a dominated policy feld. As a dominated policy area, animal welfare is not discussed in its own right in the Parliament, that is, in a separate, stand-alone parliamentary committee,

<sup>3</sup>For a full overview of topics, see the website of the EP committee on Agriculture and Rural Development.


**Table 13.1** Panellists of animal welfare-related hearings organised by AGRI 2014–2022

Source: European Parliament (2014–2019), European Parliament (2019–2022)

but as a sub-theme of agriculture, environment, or the internal market.4 As a result, civil society actors advocating animal rights need to compete for a voice and for access to the EP legislative agenda.

Conceptualising those animal welfare CSOs that attend ofcial EP hearings as *incumbents* shows that the globally operating, UK-based charity Compassion in World Farming is the only animal welfare organisation invited to these hearings (Table 13.1). Compassion in World Farming campaigns for the end of extensive farming practices and advocates, among other things, for a sustainable food system (European Commission, 2022). In the hearing in September 2021, Compassion in World Farming was represented by the head of its Brussels branch, Olga Kikou (European Parliament, 2021). Kikou outlined in her presentation citizens' expectations regarding the welfare of farm animals, current animal welfare policies in the EU, and Compassion in World Farming's demands concerning changing food systems, the caging of animals, live exports, etc. (Compassion in World Farming, 2021).

As outlined in Table 13.1, a broad group of stakeholders is consulted for expertise and opinions on animal welfare policies in AGRI hearings. Tese include representatives of the responsible Directorate-Generals of the European Commission (e.g., Agriculture, Health and Food Safety), the EP, national and EU research/academic institutions, representatives of the European farmers' lobby (e.g., the European farmers and European agri-cooperatives, COPA-COGECA), EU member state authorities, consumer group organisations (e.g., the European Consumer Organisation, BEUC), and animal welfare CSOs such as Compassion in World Farming. While representatives of the farmers' lobby feature in every hearing, animal welfare CSOs have only been invited once, at the meeting in September 2021. Measured in terms of attendance, animal welfare CSOs are valued as consultative partner as much as consumer organisations, though not as much as farmers' organisations. From the perspective of animal welfare CSOs, Compassion in World Farming is

<sup>4</sup>However, the establishment of a Committee of Inquiry on the Protection of Animals during Transport during the ninth EP can be interpreted as animal welfare gaining status on the parliamentary agenda, see also Eurogroup for Animals (2021, p. 9).

said to have an elite position because it is the only animal welfare CSO invited to an ofcial policy consultation process.

Overall, it is argued that the organisation and composition of AGRI public hearings on animal welfare refect the power structures and dominant actors in EU animal welfare policies, as well as the evidence-based policy-making approach of the EU. As a result, consultations on animal welfare in EP AGRI public hearings are primarily shaped by representatives of the European Commission, the farmer's lobby, and scientifc experts.

## **Who Is Involved? The Intergroup on the Welfare and Conservation of Animals**

Te organisation of Intergroup meetings and the invitation of guest speakers falls under the responsibility of the Intergroup secretariat, that is, the Eurogroup for Animals (Intergroup on the Welfare and Conservation of Animals, 2019a, p. 3). Te Intergroup's rules of procedure outline the qualities of a good speaker. Accordingly, 'speakers should possibly be experts who are able to inspire and to engage in lively indepth discussions with MEPs' (Intergroup on the Welfare and Conservation of Animals, 2019a, p. 16). Tus, expert knowledge, good presentation and communication skills are valued by the Intergroup's organisers. Moreover, the rules refer to 'EU ofcials or representatives from NGOs who cover their own expenses' (Intergroup on the Welfare and Conservation of Animals, 2019a, p. 16). Tus, guests need to have sufcient economic resources to cover their participation in Intergroup meetings in Strasbourg. In contrast, the expenses for attending EP public hearings are covered by the parliamentary committees (European Parliament, 2003/2014, p. 1). Te Intergroup as such lacks its own independent budget (Intergroup on the Welfare and Conservation of Animals, 2019a).

Based on these criteria, 153 speakers were invited to 56 Intergroup meetings throughout the eighth Parliament (September 2014–March 2019). On average, the Intergroup hosted two to three guests during their meetings. Out of the 153 invitees, 73 speakers represented 33 different animal welfare CSOs (incl. wildlife conservation organisations), 33 speakers were MEPs, and 18 speakers were European Commission representatives.5 Tus, representatives of animal welfare CSOs constitute the largest individual social group among the invited guests.

Among participating animal welfare CSOs, representatives of the Eurogroup for Animals gave 22 presentations at 22 meetings. Tus, the Eurogroup is the animal welfare CSO with the most interventions. In distant second, Compassion in World Farming6 follows with fve presentations, and World Horse Welfare and Four Paws7 follow with four and three presentations, respectively, during the 56 Intergroup meetings.

In the frst half of the ninth parliamentary term, that is, from September 2019 to July 2022, the Intergroup has organised 28 monthly meetings8 to which 79 guests were invited. Of these, 32 invitees spoke on behalf of 21 diferent animal welfare CSOs, while academics/scientists9 and European Commission10 representatives had 13 presentations each, followed by MEPs with 11 presentations.

Among attending animal welfare CSOs, the Eurogroup for Animals presented seven times, while Compassion in World Farming11 gave four presentations. Four Paws12 and Cruelty Free Europe gave two presentations each. Together these four CSOs are the most invited individual animal welfare CSOs in the Intergroup.

Overall, these fgures show that the Intergroup serves as a venue for animal welfare CSOs. In contrast to AGRI public hearings in which animal welfare CSOs play a marginal role, animal welfare CSOs are the largest social group among invited speakers in the Intergroup. Te Eurogroup for Animals stands out as the most frequently speaking

<sup>5</sup> Including European Commissioners.

<sup>6</sup>Represented by its EU (3) and international/UK branch (1).

<sup>7</sup>EU and Austrian ofce.

<sup>8</sup>Additionally, two side-events and a webinar were organised. Between April 2020 and March 2022 meetings were conducted online.

<sup>9</sup>From universities and research institutes.

<sup>10</sup> Including European Commissioners.

<sup>11</sup>Represented by its EU (1) and international branch/UK (3).

<sup>12</sup>Represented by staf members of its European policy ofce in Brussels.

animal welfare CSO in the eighth and ninth parliamentary term. Tis position is strengthened when considering the presentations by Eurogroup members. In the eighth EP, Eurogroup members delivered 28 presentations. Tese included presentations by Compassion in World Farming and Four Paws. Both are Eurogroup members. Overall, the Eurogroup and its members delivered two-thirds of all CSO presentations in the Intergroup from 2014 to 2019 (49 out of 73 interventions).

In the frst half of the 9th EP, Eurogroup members delivered 14 presentations, including interventions by Compassion in World Farming and Four Paws. In other words, 21 out of 79 presentations in the Intergroup were provided by the Eurogroup and its members. In this way, the Eurogroup provides its members with a platform to voice their interests to MEPs and representatives of the European Commission and provides them with access to political elites.

## **Organisational Capacities of Incumbents and Challengers**

To engage in EP public hearings and Intergroup meetings requires *incumbents* and *challengers* to have sufcient organisational capacities. A good indicator to assess the professional resources of organisations is the number of staf available for EU lobbying. Financial resources can be assessed in terms of available lobbying costs. Moreover, being a membership/ umbrella organisation and having one's headquarters in Brussels are interpreted as an organisational source of power. A head ofce in Brussels implies being close to the EU institutions. However, while EP public hearings are organised in Brussels, the meetings of the Intergroup take place in Strasbourg, France. Here, a head ofce in Brussels is not necessarily of advantage. For the Eurogroup and participating CSOs, additional time and fnancial resources are required to attend Intergroup meetings in Strasbourg.

Te comparison of the organisational capacities shows the dominance of the union of farmers and agri-cooperatives in the EU (COGECA) and the European Consumer Organisation (BEUC) in terms of lobbying

**Table 13.2** Organisational Capacities of Panellists in AGRI Public Hearings and the Intergroup (as of Spring 2019)


Source: European Commission (2022), LobbyFacts (2022/2019)

costs, full-time employees available for EU lobbying, the number of EP pass holders, and the number of meetings with the European Commission (see Table 13.2). Te Eurogroup for Animals ranks third in terms of lobbying costs, EP passes, and meetings with the Commission. Tus, it outranks panellists on AGRI public hearings, including the European Council of Young Farmers (CEJA) and Compassion in World Farming Brussels (Table 13.2).

Among the animal welfare CSOs that are invited to the Intergroup, the Eurogroup for Animals stands out as the only membership organisation. Tus, the Eurogroup draws on its representational mandate that it has been given by its members, among these are Compassion in World Farming and Vier Pfoten International (Four Paws). Although Compassion in World Farming has more full-time staf available for EU lobbying than the Eurogroup, this is not refected in the number of registered EP pass holders or meetings with the European Commission. Despite having fewer staf members available for EU lobbying, the Eurogroup has more frequent access to and interactions with EU decisionmakers. In addition to its engagement in the EP Intergroup, the Eurogroup has been a member of '36 expert consultative bodies of the European Commission' as of 2019 (Eurogroup for Animals, 2020, p. 12). Overall, the Eurogroup outranks both of its fellow animal welfare CSOs from the Intergroup in terms of lobbying costs, EP access passes, and meetings with the Commission.

Te invitation of Compassion in World Farming Brussels to EP public hearings and the Intergroup on the Welfare and Conservation of Animals can be interpreted as a privileged position. Judging from the fnancial resources and the number of staf, this privileged position might rather be based on Compassion in World Farming's professional expertise on farm animals, and the fact that policies on farm animals fall within the EU's agriculture policy, than on its economic resources.

Te comparison shows that the Eurogroup can challenge animal welfare CSOs that are invited to EP public hearings on the grounds of lobby costs, its membership base, meetings with the European Commission, and EP accreditation passes. However, it cannot compete with representatives of the EU farmer's lobby and consumers' organisation. Because EP public hearings on animal welfare are less frequently organised than Intergroup meetings on animal welfare and consequently feature less participation by animal welfare CSOs, the comparison is hampered.

However, this chapter argues that the Eurogroup fosters an accumulation and concentration of policy expertise in the Intergroup that is valued by EU parliamentarians and representatives of the European Commission given their regular attendance in the Intergroup. In 20 out of 29 Eurogroup presentations during the eighth and ninth EP, either an MEP13 or representative of the European Commission was also present on the panel. Hence, a direct exchange of views and expertise between the Eurogroup and EU decision-makers takes place in the Intergroup. For this exchange, the Eurogroup draws strategically on its members and its own professional programme staf to provide input on EU legislative dossiers, such as the EU Regulation on Invasive Alien Species, the implementation of the EU's Zoo Directive, or the EU's Common Agricultural Policy. With regard to the EP's implementation report on on-farm animal welfare, the Eurogroup used the Intergroup to present its demands concerning the inclusion of a fve-domain model on animal well-being and species-specifc rules in the AGRI-report as well as the tackling of

<sup>13</sup>Also, in their function as rapporteurs.

non-compliance issues.14 In this way, the Eurogroup and its members are also part of an 'evidence-gathering process', similar to the processes observed at the level of EP public hearings, that accompanies the preparation of EP legislative reports.

# **Conclusion**

In asking who gets a seat at the table, this chapter shows that animal welfare CSOs play a marginal role when EU parliamentarians consult civil society on animal welfare in ofcial AGRI public hearings. Compassion in World Farming is the only animal welfare CSO to receive the status of a recognised partner in an ofcial EP consultation process, and this is interpreted as an *incumbent* and elite position from the perspective of animal welfare CSOs. However, the analysis shows that animal welfare CSOs predominantly engage as *challengers* in unofcial groupings, such as the Intergroup on the Welfare and Conservation of Animals.

In line with the SAF framework, this engagement is interpreted as a strategic action of animal welfare CSOs that is necessitated by the overall power structure of EU animal welfare politics. As a dominated policy feld, animal welfare plays a subordinate role on the EP's legislative agenda. Tus, it is granted limited time and space within the EP's ofcial organisational structures. Tis chapter shows how animal welfare CSOs make use of the fexible and dynamic nature of the EP as a SAF to foster the emergence of new organisational practices and of alternative social spaces for civil society beyond the ofcial parliamentary practices for civil society consultation. Admittedly, these social spaces are denied the recognition as an ofcial EP structure. However, this chapter also shows that the status of an unofcial grouping does not necessarily result in a less privileged position within the SAF.

On the contrary, as a collective actor the Intergroup facilitates the concentration and cooperation of animal welfare CSOs that goes hand in

<sup>14</sup> See meeting in July 2021. Available at: https://www.animalwelfareintergroup.eu/fles/default/ meetings-events/agendas/en/AGENDA%20378%20Implementation%20report%20on-farm%20 animal%20welfare%20.pdf (Accessed 27 October 2022).

hand with the accumulation, pooling, and exchange of policy expertise and the provision of access to political elites. While individual animal welfare CSOs cannot compete with consulted stakeholders in ofcial EP public hearings in terms of their organisational capacities, their expertise is valued and demanded by EU parliamentarians and representatives of the European Commission. Te regular presence of these political elites in Intergroup meetings confers status and recognition to those civil society actors active in the Intergroup irrespective of the unofcial status of the Intergroup and their organisational capacities.

Tus, the Eurogroup for Animals occupies a pivotal role in the Intergroup. As the Intergroup's secretariat and the animal welfare organisation with the most individual presentations during Intergroup meetings, the Eurogroup occupies an *incumbent* position, and thus an elite position, within the Intergroup. Te fnding that Compassion in World Farming occupies both an *incumbent* and *challenger* position within the SAF, as an invited speaker to EP public hearings and the Intergroup, might be a sign of a civil society actor moving from a *challenger* to *incumbent* position or of a civil society actor occupying multiple positions within the SAF. Further research is needed to draw a fnal conclusion on this observation.

As a result of the analysis, this chapter suggests discussing the term of civil society elites not solely based on civil societies' embeddedness in and ties to formal and ofcial organisational positions in the EP, but with regard to their possession of and control over valued policy expertise, as well as the status and recognition that is conferred to them on the basis of regular interactions with political elites. Future research should focus on how the possession and access to valued resources is used by these CSOs to infuence EP policymaking on animal welfare.

Overall, this chapter provides an important contribution to the discussion of civil society's position in EP policymaking and its access to political elites. It provides original insights into the establishment of alternative, and potentially elitist, arenas of civil society deliberation and networking beyond the ofcial parliamentary structures that are based on processes of resource pooling and resource concentration.

**Acknowledgement** Tis research was supported by Riksbankens Jubileumsfond (project grant M17-0188:1) for the project titled 'Civil Society Elites? Comparing Elite Composition, Reproduction, Integration and Contestation in European Civil Societies'.

# **References**


Report%202021%20Eurogroup%20for%20Animals\_online\_singles\_1.pdf. Accessed 24 July 2022.


**Open Access** Tis chapter is licensed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/ by/4.0/), which permits use, sharing, adaptation, distribution and reproduction in any medium or format, as long as you give appropriate credit to the original author(s) and the source, provide a link to the Creative Commons licence and indicate if changes were made.

Te images or other third party material in this chapter are included in the chapter's Creative Commons licence, unless indicated otherwise in a credit line to the material. If material is not included in the chapter's Creative Commons licence and your intended use is not permitted by statutory regulation or exceeds the permitted use, you will need to obtain permission directly from the copyright holder.

# **14**

# **Michels, Mills and Civil Society Elites: Concluding Refections and Avenues for Future Research**

**Håkan Johansson and Anna Meeuwisse**

# **Introduction**

Tis book introduces the concept of civil society elites and examines civil society elites as an elite group alongside political and economic elites. Contributors address questions like who holds top positions in civil society, where they come from, what factors explain their power and privileged position, and by whom and on what grounds are they challenged. Te book engages with established debates in civil society studies, but in an original way. Te image of an inclusive and pluralistic civil society sector stands in sharp contrast with the evidence of the dominance of a small number of organisations and movements. Although we know that civil society is a highly heterogeneous feld, with a broad and vast range of different types of actors, this coincides with patterns of monopolisation. For instance, calculations from the UK show that there are more than 160,000

**303**

H. Johansson • A. Meeuwisse (\*)

School of Social Work, Lund University, Lund, Sweden e-mail: hakan.johansson@soch.lu.se; anna.meeuwisse@soch.lu.se

<sup>©</sup> Te Author(s) 2024

H. Johansson, A. Meeuwisse (eds.), *Civil Society Elites*, Palgrave Studies in Tird Sector Research, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-40150-3\_14

voluntary organisations and charities, but many of them are small and only a few succeed in hoarding substantial resources (e.g. volunteers, members, donors, and money) forming so-called super-major charities (NCVO, 2022, see also Altermark et al., 2022). Although trends of professionalisation and NGOisation have been widely researched (Heylen et al., 2020; Jordan & Maloney, 2007; Skocpol, 2004) and competition and polarisation between civil society actors is increasingly observed (Graf & Korolczuk, 2021; Ivanovska Hadjievska, 2022; Johansson & Kalm, 2015; Kalm & Meeuwisse, 2020), few have addressed these phenomena as manifestations of elitisation processes in civil society. Instead, this sector has been considered unafected due to its special mission and limited resources (see, however, Johansson & Uhlin, 2020; Lindellee & Scaramuzzino, 2020; Norén-Nilsson et al., 2023).

In this concluding chapter, we analyse the main fndings in the book using a classic debate in elite research, that is, the distinction between 'oligarchic elites' (Michels, 1968) and a 'power elite' (Mills, 1956). Tese theories allow us to explore the paradoxical meaning of the concept of civil society elites because such elites derive their status, legitimacy, and infuence from 'standing on the shoulders' of members, benefciaries, and constituencies, while at the same time benefting from being socialised into elite circles as they are integrated with other elite groups in society. We use these theories to distinguish between the elites *of* civil society ('oligarchic elites') and the elites *in* civil society ('power elites').

## **Oligarchs, Power Elites, and Civil Society**

Te theory of oligarchic elites connects with studies of professionalisation, NGOisation, and the institutionalisation of social movements (Heylen et al., 2020; Jordan & Maloney, 2007; Skocpol, 2004). Oligarchy is a well-known phenomenon regarding the relationship between individual and collective power, or even better, between those leading collective eforts and those participating in such eforts. Te concept derives from Michels' investigation of socialist parties and trade unions in which he argues that organisations committed to egalitarian ideals and democratic forms of governance also develop oligarchic modes of leadership because organisational bureaucracy inevitably leads to the domination of a small group of leaders. An organisation 'gives birth to the dominion of the elected over the electors, of the mandataries over the mandators, of the delegates over the delegators. Who says organization, says oligarchy' (Michels, 1968, p. 365). Michels argued that although leaders of socialist parties, trade unions, and social movements derive their power from leading democratic organisations working for egalitarianism, equality, and social justice, their leadership tends to raise 'itself above the people' (ibid., p. 75). Te iron law of oligarchy thus gives birth to an organisational elite that makes it to the top through a long career within its own ranks and whose main source of power comes from being seen as a legitimate spokesperson and representative of the cause.

Mills' (1956) theory of a power elite ofers a diferent approach, and he defnes elites as a group socially integrated at the top across societal spheres and sectors. Te notion of a power elite suggests a coherent and socially integrated social group of political, corporate, and military leaders formed by their shared economic, cultural, and political interests and backgrounds. While Michels pointed to changes within organisations as mechanisms of elitisation, Mills considered control and coordination across institutions as the main factor driving elite formation. Although political, corporate, and military elites beneft from operating at the top of major institutions, the power elite also uphold their power through social reproduction and interaction across institutional domains.

Te power elite thus includes people with diferent professions and titles, but Mills argued that they still share a common social, cultural, and ideological background. Elite integration starts at a young age because privileged groups attend similar or even the same schools, and later in life they share social networks, both professionally and privately, for instance, through membership in social clubs and cultural and artistic associations. Tey become socialised into common circles 'composed of men of similar origin and education, of similar career and style of life' (Mills, 1963, p. 29). Te theory of a power elite leaves little room for civil society leaders, but Mills stressed the signifcance of voluntary, philanthropic, and charitable activities as a means for political, corporate, and military elites to meet and to legitimise their privileged and powerful position in other sectors.

Teories of oligarchic elites and power elites allow us to distinguish between two ideal-typical civil society elite positions: an elite *of* civil society and an elite *in* civil society. In combination with the themes outlined in this book (composition, reproduction, integration, and contestation), we can theorise on the factors that lead to the concentration of power and resources at the top. Tese refections are summarised in Table 14.1.

As explored in the introduction to this volume, composition refers to the socio-demographic characteristics of those in positions of power and infuence in civil society, but the composition difers between elites *of* and elites *in* civil society because the former must at least to some extent refect the members, while the latter is socially shaped in connection with political and business elites. Reproduction refers to the ways in which actors in positions of power and control exclude others in order to maintain their privileged roles. Reproduction is vertically shaped when the oligarchic elite exerts control over those who seek their position within the organisation, while it is horizontally shaped when the power elite seek to control the access of newcomers to the top of the power structure. Elite integration relates to principles and practices of mobility across sectors into positions of power and infuence within or beyond civil society. Tis is an obvious feature of the power elites, because they move across sectors, while oligarchic elites tend to stay within their sectors or even within their particular organisations. Contestation refers to the ways diferent


**Table 14.1** Types of civil society elites

Source: Table made by the authors

actors challenge civil society elites, which can happen both from inside and outside civil society.

### **Civil Society Elites, Members, and the Masses**

Tis volume addresses the relationship between elites and 'the masses', a dichotomy that cuts through Michels' and Mills' writings. Te idea of elites as vertically shaped in relation to the masses, for example members or citizens, comes to the fore in Michels' writings because he considered this a key element of organisational growth, complexity, and specialisation. Mills also made similar observations and claimed that as organisations grow larger, members become less interested in participating and the 'desire for democratic participation is lowered' (Mills, 1948, pp. 64–65). Tis, among other things, leads to leaders being 'personally remote from the rank and fle' (ibid., p. 104). Although diferently conceptualised, oligarchic elites and power elites can thus be defned based on their social distance to citizens, members, and constituencies because they occupy positions 'from which they can look down upon, so to speak, and by their decisions mightily afect, the everyday worlds of ordinary men and women' (Mills, 1956, p. 3). However, while oligarchic elites need to moderate their social distance to members in order to avoid excessive gaps, and legitimacy losses, the power elite do not face similar challenges because social distance to ordinary citizens actually constitutes the foundation for their position.

Te relationship between civil society elites and the general public is explored by Lee and Scaramuzzino (Chap. 3) in their study of the composition of the civil society elites. Tey investigate the socio-demographic characteristics of leaders of major civil society organisations (hereafter CSOs) in Italy, Poland, Sweden, and the UK, and at the EU level. Teir fndings point to oligarchic tendencies in European civil societies; for instance, they show that leaders tend to remain for a long time in their position, and many have been engaged in the same organisation for even longer. Tis is an evident feature across country contexts but is particularly apparent in countries with a corporatist legacy (e.g. Italy and Sweden).

Lee and Scaramuzzino also fnd that civil society elites difer from the population in general. Civil society elites are predominantly older white men (a gender balance was only seen in Sweden) and thus resemble the composition of elites in other sectors of society. Tey moreover fnd that civil society elites to a much higher degree than the general population have a university background; for instance, in Poland almost all leaders have a university degree. Studies into civil society elites in the UK similarly fnd that UK leaders often have an Oxbridge background, thus refecting societal patterns of elite reproduction (Arvidson & Ivanovska Hadjievska, 2021).

Tese elitist patterns stand in contrast to the ideals of civil society representing its members, at least if we assume that civil society leaders gain some legitimacy from being socially similar to those they aim and/or claim to act on behalf of as a form of descriptive representation (Altermark et al., 2022). However, Lee and Scaramuzzino also fnd that civil society elites are more progressive than the general population in all countries surveyed. Te civil society elites studied are supportive of social change and social justice. Although this book does not ofer comparable data for other elite groups, it would be surprising if they came out as more progressive than the general population. Tis provides some insight into the value profle of civil society elites and contributes an interesting theoretical observation because elite theory posits that elites try to cling to power and maintain the status quo rather than change societies.

We gain further insight into the relationship between elites and the masses in Sevelsted and Lunding's study of the Danish power elite (Chap. 2). Similar to Lee and Scaramuzzino, they fnd that civil society elites largely come from highly educated social classes, having parents with positions such as high judges, politicians, higher civil servants, leading doctors, or military leaders. However, they also fnd that the segment of the Danish power elite with an engagement in civil society difers from the power elite in general because it includes more women, but with fewer people born abroad. Tis suggests that although civil society elites might hold progressive values linked to social justice, they nonetheless tend to come from a privileged background.

# **Civil Society Elites and the Power Elite**

Te concept of a power elite draws attention to the dichotomy between insiders and outsiders because it considers the dynamic between the integrated elite recruited through the powerful institutions in society (insiders) and the leaders of subordinate societal institutions (outsiders). Mills assumed that to become an insider and a member one had to pass 'the criteria of admission, of praise, of honor, of promotion that prevails' (Mills, 1956, p. 281). His theory assumes that civil society plays a subordinate function by primarily providing the social glue that holds the powerful together, for instance, through philanthropic engagement or membership in exclusive clubs and associations.

Several contributions to this volume demonstrate the signifcance of a Millsian approach in the exploration of an elite in civil society, but they also show that civil society serves more functions than just as a sphere for the integration of business and corporate elites. Chi Lai (Chap. 7), for instance, argues that the Hong Kong power elite to a large extent originated from civil society and large charities because these have a longer history than modern political parties and constituted the social space in which societal leaders met and interacted. Charities functioned as a neutral arena for political and economic elites to socialise, recruit, and confrm each other across sectors and competences while they at the same time formed a charity that provided social stability counteracting social change.

A similar argument can be found in Voyer's (Chap. 6) study of what wealthy New York families gain from volunteering in elementary schools. She shows that wealthy elite parents convert their economic (but also social and cultural capital) into a particular 'do good' capital (cf. Dean, 2020) that comes through voluntary engagement, which reinforces and reproduces status hierarchies. Social stratifcation based on class and wealth spillover into the sphere of civil society as elite volunteers engage in exclusionary boundary processes that ensure that non-elite parents are not given key roles or posts in the voluntary organisation. Tis study demonstrates that engagement in civil society serves a purpose for the power elite because volunteering legitimises elite status.

Contributions to this volume also challenge the Millsian assumptions. Sevelsted and Lunding (Chap. 2), for instance, fnd a structural divide within the power elite. Members of the Danish power elite who lack engagement in civil society often have a social background in the economic feld (their parents are economic elites or industrialists) while those with an engagement in civil society originate from professional and political elites. Tis fnding indicates that in a Social Democratically shaped country like Denmark, the economic elites do not need civil society to legitimise their wealth and positions of power, while professional and political elites do.

In their study of drivers and motivations related to a boundary-crossing career, Arvidson and Uhlin (Chap. 8) moreover draw attention to the fact that elite integration is not only about social networking, but is a more complex process that involves varying degrees of value congruence between elites.

Arrigoni fnds that civil society provides a sphere for the formation of an alternative power elite, diferent from the established power elite. In her investigation of Italian banking foundations (Chap. 9), she shows that they bring together elites from a wide range of sectors but that these develop a joint political agenda and start to act as an elite alongside the power elite. Teir philanthropic activities are not only driven by an ambition to legitimise personal wealth or elite status, but also by an ambition to bring about social change. Instead of primarily seeing civil society as a subordinate feld for the integration of other elites, Arrigoni contends that civil society contributes to the emergence of so-called interstitial elites—operating between states, markets, civil society, and academia who build an ethos for social change.

While these authors explore civil society elites and the power elite, others address connections between an elite *of* and an elite *in* civil society. Altermark and Johansson (Chap. 5) investigate elite integration and feld separation through a study of who praises civil society elites. Tey fnd that some civil society leaders are praised by the state and gain extensive societal recognition through royal honours or presidential medals. Such recognition places them on par with political, corporate, and administrative elites because they all have done extraordinary services to the country and thus, at least in a symbolic sense, become members of a power elite despite diferent social and educational backgrounds. Praising through prizes difers across country contexts as leaders in Sweden are mainly praised by their peers, while they are mainly praised by the state in Italy (presidential medal), Poland (presidential medal), and the UK (royal honours). In this respect, civil society elites in Sweden are less integrated into a power elite than elites in Italy, Poland, and the UK. Te latter can beneft more from the social advantages that such prizes provide them with because we know that symbolic resources can be turned into economic, political, or social gains.

Lee, Platek, and Scaramuzzino (Chap. 10) investigate elite integration within civil society through a study of interlocking boards. Tey fnd that in countries like Italy and Poland civil society elites are mainly integrated through policy areas, but that the sector is highly fragmented with no or only a few central actors. However, they fnd civil society elites in Sweden and the UK to be highly integrated through mutual board membership across organisational divides. Despite such similarity, elite networks in Sweden and the UK difer substantially. Civil society elites in the UK are largely integrated through the connection with the royal family because members of the royal family often act as patrons of major UK charities. In contrast, civil society elites in Sweden are integrated through membership in large umbrella associations and capacity-building organisations. While patterns of elite integration in the UK thus follow Mills' assumptions, elite integration in Sweden is more in line with Michels' reasoning of an oligarchic elite. Coordination mainly takes place in broad areas such as adult education or capacity building that are not directly linked to the organisation's main mission or issue. Tis can result in oligarchic tendencies when organisations and their leaders come together in factions in order to become stronger while still defending their particular interests (cf. the blocs and factions pointed out by Michels).

## **Civil Society Elites and Counter-Elites**

Elites and their challengers constitute a key theme in elite research and in this book. Civil society leaders are often seen as opposed to other elite groups, constituting a counter-elite. Michels (1968) viewed counter-elites as the newcomers who aspired to the position that the oligarchs occupied and, in his view, successfully protected. Although he recognised that oligarchs could be contested, he assumed them to be adept in handling such insider challengers. Mills (1948) rather viewed civil society leaders, especially union leaders, as a counter-elite against a power elite. He considered civil society leaders to be the 'managers of discontent' because they can stir up social and political unrest in order to gain infuence. However, due to their inability to mobilise across blocs and factions, civil society elites are unable to gain more substantial power (partly confrmed in Chap. 10). If organisations grow and gain power, Mills asserted that leaders will become part of the power elite. When associations become 'large enough to count', leaders tend to see themselves not as delegates, 'but as a member of "an elite" composed of such men as himself' (Mills, 1948, p. 307).

Tis book shows that civil society elites are highly contested in several countries, which can be interpreted as a sign of their position of power and infuence. Te contributions in this book also show that they are challenged both as an elite *of* and an elite *in* civil society. Korolzcuk (Chap. 12) contributes a timely analysis of the strategy by the Polish right-wing political party and government to worsen the conditions for CSOs that disapprove of the government. Te party's accusations against progressive CSOs echo Mills' characterisation of a power elite because the government favours CSOs that are loyal subjects and hence integrated into a power elite, while others are excluded and subjected to smear campaigns by the government (e.g. Korolczuk, 2022).

Kalm and Meeuwisse's analysis of a cross-country survey among civil society elites (Chap. 11) shows variation in the targets, sources, and depths of contestation. However, in their capacity as leaders, civil society elites seem to be most often challenged by 'their peers'. Like oligarchs, they are challenged by those seeking to replace them as leaders of the organisation they all seek to represent. Grounds for challenging individual leaders appear more professional than ideological, concerning issues such as their ideas about organisational development, their decisions, or their leadership style. Te social distance to members that Michels assumed to be a defning feature of oligarchs can also be observed in connection with the contestation of elites. Especially leaders in the UK are challenged by their lack of social similarity to their constituencies and due to a lack of diversity at the top. Tey are accused of having a privileged and elitist profle due to their lack of representativeness from their organisations' own members (see also Ivanovska Hadjievska, 2022). External challenges are more often directed at the leaders'organisations and are driven by competition for resources or by ideological conficts.

Contestation over positions within the feld of civil society is further explored by Landorf (Chap. 13) who examines who gets a seat at the table when EU parliamentarians consult civil society. She fnds that civil society actors who occupy incumbent elite positions (oligarchs in the feld and in their organisation) tend to remain in such positions of power, despite being challenged by other civil society actors who act as contenders for the position they occupy.

## **Civil Society Elites Across Regime Differences**

Tis book draws on empirical studies of civil society elites in national contexts like Denmark, Hong Kong, Italy, Poland, Sweden, the UK, and the United States, and at the EU level. It is a clear observation that the concept of civil society elites makes sense in all country contexts despite diferences both in terms of external regulation and funding patterns of civil society and in the governance models and types of organisations that predominate. It is far too complex a task to try to analyse how exogeneous and endogenous diferences shape national civil society elites, but we nonetheless seek to ofer some brief refections.

Te notion of civil society regimes is at times used to refect endogenous diferences in civil society in diferent countries (e.g. Arvidson et al., 2018; Salamon & Anheier, 1997, 1998). Such frameworks ofer some guidance, for instance, in terms of the distinction between corporatist and liberal civil society regimes. Several chapters in this volume address Nordic civil society (e.g. Sweden and Denmark), in which we fnd a tradition of popular movements, large membership-based organisations, and close connection to the state based on hierarchical modes of representation. Similar corporatist structures can be found in Italy, which despite the long tradition of the Catholic Church has developed hierarchical modes of representation from the local to national levels. Civil society elites in Italy and the Scandinavian countries are also found to share similar features. Tey are largely reproduced and integrated as an oligarchic elite. Civil society elites in these countries are natives because they are mainly shaped by internal routes of access and advancement, and they are reproduced through internal organisational processes based on ideological alignment. In the Scandinavian countries they are neither praised by the state nor integrated with an economic elite.

Other chapters address civil society elites in liberal contexts, for example, the UK, the United States, and Hong Kong, and the patterns observed by the authors point to the signifcance of a Millsian civil society elite logic. Civil societies in such countries and contexts tend to be dominated by large professionalised charities that provide services and organisations with huge turnovers. Staf are recruited based on professional merit, and many civil society leaders have experience from the business and corporate sector. Civil society ofers a ground for elite integration and the exchange of economic capital in return for legitimacy of acting for the common good (Ostrower, 1995, 2004). Although elite integration is observed in most countries, in liberal countries it includes civil society and economic elites, while in corporatist contexts it largely involves civil society and political elites. While Michels and Mills thus have signifcance for capturing the divide between liberal and corporatist contexts, countries like Poland are harder to ft in, suggesting the need for additional theoretical frameworks.

## **Towards a New Research Agenda**

Te contributions in this book show that the concept of civil society elites is meaningful both in terms of Michels' theory of oligarchs and Mills' theory of power elites. Te analytical themes of composition, reproduction, integration, and contestation of civil society elites that structure this book have been heuristically useful, but it has often proven difcult to distinguish the themes from one to the other. Instead, they should reasonably be treated as parts of intimately intertwined relational processes that can help us interpret the rules that shape access to elite positions and the power associated with being an elite in civil society. Te relationships between processes and practices of elite reproduction, integration, and contestation thus require further investigation, especially in terms of how they infuence the composition of civil society elites.

Another point for further exploration is the power associated with a civil society elite. Civil society comes with the assumption of political and normative power, and there seems to be good reason to regard civil society elites as a kind of 'moral elite' claiming a special 'civil society ethic' (see, e.g., Chaps. 3 and 8). Civil society elites then have access to a specifc resource that provides status (symbolic capital to exercise normative power), which can reinforce or be exchanged for other types (cf. Chap. 5). It is an important future research task to investigate how civil society elites difer from other elite groups in terms of specifc resources and how these are used and to examine whether the value of their resources varies in diferent contexts and for diferent types of CSOs (e.g. across serviceproviding organisations and advocacy organisations).

More research is also needed on the advantages and disadvantages of diferent methodological approaches and on what can be gained from a multi-methodological approach. Arvidson and Uhlin (Chap. 8) illustrate how qualitative life-work history interviews provide an important complement to established quantitative approaches to the study of elite integration. Also, Scaramuzzino and Santilli's comparison of the results of two classic methods in elite theory and in social movement theory (Chap. 4) shows that a small group of individuals 'tick all the boxes' regardless of methodological approach. Although this book shows that classic methodological approaches in elite research have signifcance also for the study of civil society, there is nonetheless a risk when adapting methods developed for the study of other sectors. While elite research and methods largely assume an institutionalised elite, the real power holders within civil society might also be informal leaders, movement icons, or social media champions who manage to gain attention without leading major organisations.

Lastly, the democratic consequences of civil society elites and elitisation require further discussions. Scholars have long observed socioeconomic and demographic inequalities and entry barriers to civil societies (e.g. Eimhjellen, 2022; Hustinx et al., 2022) as well as gaps of democratic representation within CSOs (e.g. Johansson & Lee, 2014), but few have interpreted such shortcomings as due to elitisation or strategic closures on the part of those at the top. Tis suggests that there is still much to explore regarding the inner life of major CSOs as well as within felds of civil society with regard to how people come to and remain in positions of power and infuence.

**Acknowledgement** Tis research was supported by Riksbankens Jubileumsfond (project grant M17-0188:1) for the project titled 'Civil Society Elites? Comparing Elite Composition, Reproduction, Integration and Contestation in European Civil Societies'.

# **References**


**Open Access** Tis chapter is licensed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/ by/4.0/), which permits use, sharing, adaptation, distribution and reproduction in any medium or format, as long as you give appropriate credit to the original author(s) and the source, provide a link to the Creative Commons licence and indicate if changes were made.

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# **Appendix: The Civil Society Elite Survey Study**

**Roberto Scaramuzzino and Jayeon Lee**

# **Introduction**

Some chapters in this volume draw on a large dataset developed in the research programme 'Civil Society Elites? Comparing Elite Composition, Reproduction, Integration and Contestation in European Civil Societies'. Tis dataset has been developed in three stages, and each stage has produced empirical data that can be used in the study of civil society elites. Te stages are the following:


Te following appendix describes the data collection methods used to produce the data used in several empirical studies included in the volume. Te research concerned with the frst and second stages was approved by the Regional Board for Ethical Review (Dnr 2018/852). Te third step of our research was approved by the Swedish Ethical Review Authority (Dnr 2019-04400).

# **Mapping Resource-Rich Civil Society Organisations**

Following the positional method in elite research (see Chap. 3 by Santilli and Scaramuzzino), we have mapped resource-rich civil society organisations at the national level in Italy, Poland, Sweden, and the UK as well as at the EU level.

Te mapping of civil society organisations was guided by the following criteria:


Because we aimed for the most resource-rich civil society organisations in each context, we used a set of indicators of resources to be able to exclude organisations that met the above-mentioned criteria but could not be considered 'resource-rich'. Tese indicators allowed us to capture diferent dimensions of resources, infuence, and status in civil society.

Internal to civil society, we considered resources that can be used by the organisations to achieve their goals (members, staf, volunteers, and money). In addition to these, we considered participation in umbrella organisations and networks through which civil society organisations can infuence the agenda of the organisations that have the task of representing the sector (within a specifc policy feld or the civil society sector as a whole). More specifcally, the indicators were:


Among external resources, we considered access to public funding as well as posts on public committees and public consultation, which give the organisations access to and possible infuence on decision-making in policy processes. More specifcally, the indicators were:


Te indicators were operationalised diferently in each context, and some indicators were not able to be used in some of the contexts as shown in Table A.1. Te criterion to be included in our mapping of resource-rich civil society organisations was to fulfl at least one of the conditions set up by our indicators. Tis mapping resulted in a large dataset of resourcerich civil society organisations, including 294–434 organisations in each context (see Table A.2).

# **Identifying Civil Society Leaders**

As a continuation of the positional method, we used the database of resource-rich civil society organisations to identify the civil society elites, that is, the individuals who occupy top positions in the identifed organisations. Tree types of positions were included in our mapping of the civil society elites:


Operationalisation of elite indicators


Source: Table made by the authors

#### **324 Appendix: The Civil Society Elite Survey Study**


**Table A.2** Mapping of CSOs in each national context

Source: The Civil Society Elite Survey


We identifed between 1330 and 5198 leaders in each of the national contexts. Te diferences depended mostly on the average size of the boards, the number of deputy leaders, and the availability of data (see Table A.3).

Tis database of leaders was used, for instance, for the social network analysis of interlocking boards (see Chap. 10 by Lee, Platek, and Scaramuzzino).

# **Surveying Civil Society Elites**

Te survey study was based on the mapping of resource-rich civil society organisations. For the civil society elite survey study, we chose to exclude the third type of positions identifed, that is, 'Te board members (including honorary positions)', thus we only included:



**Table A.3** Mapping of leaders in each context

**Table A.4** Population and respondents to the survey of civil society elites


Source: The Civil Society Elite Survey

Accordingly, a smaller population of leaders was identifed and targeted as our survey population, ranging between 680 individuals and 1005 in the diferent national contexts. Te survey studies were conducted between January 2020 and June 2021 using a questionnaire with questions on the background, networks, and collaboartions as well as past and present organisational positions of civil society leaders. Te questions also delved into the motives for engagement, views on leadership, personal values, and views on power and status in civil society.

For the survey we used the digital platform Sunet survey. A link to the survey was sent out to the leaders either to their personal e-mail address or through their organisation when a personal e-mail address was not available. Due to the lower response rate when approaching leaders through their organisations, we also used LinkedIn to reach out to leaders for whom we could not fnd a personal e-mail address. Te response rate ranged between 12% and 37% (see Table A.4). In total we reached out to 4425 leaders, and the number of respondents was 897, giving us an overall response rate of 20%.

We were able to perform a non-response bias analysis of the study based on three variables for which we knew the distribution in the survey population:



**Table A.5** Non-response bias analysis of the survey based on three variables (percentages)

Source: The Civil Society Elite Survey

Te analysis of non-response bias showed very small diferences in all of the contexts in terms of the distribution of the population and the respondents concerning these three variables (see Table A.5). We found a relatively larger bias when it comes to the organisational position. It is, however, important to keep in mind that the respondents answered the survey as individuals, not as leaders of the organisation they were selected from. When asked to state their role in the organisation they led, they were instructed as follows: 'If you are leading more than one CSO, this refers to the organisation in which you are most active.' Hence, the selfreported organisational position of the respondents might be diferent from the organisational position the leaders were sampled from in the population.

Te survey data provided a large dataset that allows cross-national comparisons of civil society elites' composition, reproduction, integration, and contestation (see Chap. 3 by Lee and Scaramuzzino).

# **Index1**

#### **A**

Autocracy autocratic regime, 258 autocratising countries, 258, 273 democratic backsliding, 273 democratic erosion, 13, 259 smear campaign, 259, 264, 267, 273, 312 *See also* Civic, shrinking civic space; Liberal elite

#### **B**

Boundary crosser, 11, 162–164, 171–178 crossing, 10, 11, 161–179 spanning, 10 Bourdieu, P., 10, 38, 100, 101, 166, 187, 199, 311

*See also* Capital; Field British elite, 144, 145, 153 *See also* Civil society regime, liberal regime

#### **C**

Capital civic, 119 cultural, 55, 124, 130, 132, 162, 166, 199, 267, 309 economic, 101, 103, 110, 124, 130, 132, 199, 309, 314 social, 25, 55, 110, 119, 124, 130, 132, 153, 264, 309 symbolic, 10, 101, 103, 107, 109–113, 139, 315 *See also* Bourdieu, P.; Field

1Note: Page numbers followed by 'n' refer to notes.

© Te Author(s) 2024

H. Johansson, A. Meeuwisse (eds.), *Civil Society Elites*, Palgrave Studies in Tird Sector Research, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-40150-3

Career professional, 43, 165, 166, 168, 169, 185 trajectory, 60, 67, 69, 168, 169 Charismatic leaders, 85, 87, 90 Charity, 2, 10, 25, 35, 44, 104, 109, 131, 138, 141–142, 148–151, 166, 174, 192, 224, 238, 290, 304, 309, 311, 314 *See also* Economic, business sector; Philanthropy Civic engagement, 27, 117, 128, 261 participation, 117, 239 shrinking civic space, 12, 235, 239 *See also* Autocracy; Volunteering Civil society ethos, 69 Civil society regime corporatist regime, 58, 104, 210, 238, 313 liberal, 4, 6, 58, 104, 236, 238, 239, 313 liberal regime, 58, 104, 211, 238, 313 post-communist regime, 58, 210, 239 post-socialist regime, 260 social democratic regime, 27, 57–58, 104, 210, 238 Claims-making analysis, 76, 80, 87, 89, 91, 93 *See also* Visibility method Consecration honours, 9, 107–110, 112, 113 medals, 9, 107, 108, 110–113 prizes, 9, 99–108

*See also* Bourdieu, P.; Capital; Elite integration; Elite reproduction Counter-elite, 12, 140, 152, 239, 311–313 *See also* Elite contestation

**D**

Denmark, vi, 8, 26, 28, 29, 34, 41, 43–45, 310, 313 *See also* Civil society regime, social democratic regime Depoliticisation, 199 *See also* Autocracy Descriptive representation, 53, 308 *See also* Michels, R.; Elite reproduction Discrimination, 3, 68, 244, 249 *See also* Elite reproduction

#### **E**

Economic business sector, 43, 85, 108, 132, 149, 170, 172, 173, 177, 187 capital, 101, 103, 110, 124, 130, 132, 199, 309, 314 elite, 4, 6, 10, 117, 127, 140, 154, 162, 164, 303, 309, 310, 314 merchant elites, 143 power, 140, 152 *See also* Charity; Economic, capital; Philanthropy Elite biography life-work history interview, 168, 169, 171, 176, 315 prosopography, 32–44, 185

*See also* Bourdieu, P. Elite composition elite-masses gap, 8, 51–53, 55, 58, 61, 64, 66, 68 gender gap, 62, 63 homogeneity, 9, 55, 68, 257 Elite contestation anti-elitist discourse, 273, 274 depth of, 233–248, 312 source of, 233–248, 312 target of, 233–248, 312 *See also* Autocracy; Counter-elite; Populism Elite integration elite unity, 164 interlocking boards, 11, 139, 209, 311 interlocking directorates, 165, 166 Oxbridge, 143, 308 pantoufage, 10 power elite, 10, 13, 30, 139, 164, 199, 208, 213, 214, 304–312, 314 revolving doors, 10, 43, 201 *See also* Who's Who Elite reproduction diploma democracy, 41, 43, 45 elite circulation, 9, 189, 272, 273 elite consolidation, 138, 148 historical elites, 9 Oxbridge, 143, 308 *See also* Career Elites in civil society, 13, 25, 31, 38, 44, 91, 304, 306, 309, 310, 312, 315 *See also* Mills, C. W.; Power elite

Elites of civil society, v, vi, 1–13, 25–40, 51–65, 75–88, 99–108, 117, 118, 132, 162, 163, 167, 169, 171, 178, 179, 198, 233–248, 257–274, 282, 286, 297, 303–306, 319–322 *See also* Michels, R.; Oligarchy Elitisation elite and institutional change, 261, 265 elite causes, 26, 32–36, 44 elite change, 13, 26, 43, 259, 272, 273 European Parliament (EP), 13, 170, 171, 279–289 Intergroup, 13, 280, 281, 283–285, 287, 291–297 European Union (EU), v, 4, 5, 11, 53, 54, 60–66, 85, 86, 170, 260, 267, 279–283, 285, 287, 288, 290, 291, 292n6, 292n7, 292n11, 293–297, 307, 313, 320

## **F**

Field analysis, 286 cultural, 101, 102 *See also* Bourdieu, P.; Strategic action feld (SAF) Foundations, v, 11, 35, 86, 127, 179, 183–202, 213, 260, 263, 307, 310 *See also* Philanthropy

#### **H**

*Histoire croisée*, 184 Hong Kong, vi, 5, 137–146, 309, 313, 314

#### **I**

Illiberal civil society, 1 norms, 236 states, 273 *See also* Autocracy; Civic, shrinking civic space Interstitial elite, 11, 183–202, 310 ethos, 190–193 *See also* Elite integration Italy, v, 5, 8, 12, 53, 54, 58, 60–68, 78, 83, 87, 90, 93, 100, 101, 103, 104, 106, 107, 109–113, 168, 183, 187, 188, 193, 209, 210, 212, 215–218, 225, 234, 236, 238, 239, 241, 242, 245, 249, 250, 260, 307, 311, 313, 314, 320 *See also* Civil society regime, corporatist regime

#### **L**

Legitimacy, 29, 80, 81, 102, 140, 151, 152, 154, 197, 240, 242–244, 264, 304, 308, 314 Liberal civil society regime, 238, 313 Liberal elite, 12, 265 Lobbying, 261, 293–295

#### **M**

Marketisation, 12, 234, 235, 237, 249 Matthew efect, 106 Michels, R., 3, 6, 9, 13, 25, 26, 54, 68, 77, 81, 303–306 *See also* Elite reproduction; Oligarchy Mills, C. W., 8, 10, 13, 25, 26, 30, 77, 139, 144, 147–149, 164, 184, 190, 198, 201, 208, 286, 303–306 *See also* Elite integration; Power elite Moral elite, 45, 315

#### **N**

Network K-core, 30, 213–215, 221, 222 K-score, 30, 31, 221 social network analysis, 11, 26, 168, 213, 324 structure, 209, 210, 214 New public management, 191, 197, 237 *See also* Privatisation NGOisation, 3, 237, 304 *See also* Professionalisation Non-proft organisation, 167, 238, 250, 320

#### **O**

Oligarchy oligarchic elite, 13, 304–307, 311, 314 organisational elite, 305

*See also* Elite reproduction; Michels, R. Opportunity hoarding, 125–127 *See also* Capital

**P**

Party politics, 41, 162, 170, 175, 176 Philanthropy organised, 199 philanthrocapitalism, 192 *See also* Interstitial, elite; Mills, C. W.; Power elite Poland, v, 5, 8, 12, 53, 54, 58, 60–67, 100, 101, 103, 104, 106, 108–113, 209–212, 215, 218–219, 225, 234, 236, 239, 241, 247, 250, 257–274, 307, 308, 311, 313, 314, 320 *See also* Civil society regime, post-socialist regime; Civil society regime, postcommunist regime Policy expertise, 191, 295, 297 Policymaking, 143, 183, 184, 187, 190, 193, 194, 197, 198, 201, 291, 297 Political elites, 4, 6, 10, 11, 13, 52, 54, 55, 76, 140, 147, 154, 162, 164, 184, 193, 197, 261, 273, 280, 281, 293, 297, 303, 309, 310, 314 Political leaders, v, 6, 85, 186 Political power, 139, 140, 144, 147, 152–154 Populism, 2, 6, 12 populist challengers, 4

*See also* Autocracy; Elite contestation Positional method, 8, 76–80, 82, 84–86, 89, 168, 320, 321 *See also* Reputational method; Visibility method Power elite elites in civil society, 13, 25, 31, 38, 44, 77, 91, 304, 306, 309, 310, 312, 315 inner core, 92, 93 *See also* Mills, C. W. Privatisation, 186, 193, 237, 238 *See also* New public management Professionalisation, 3, 28, 52–55, 58–60, 66, 69, 104, 191, 237, 244, 304 *See also* Michels, R.

**Q**

Quangos, 42 Quasi-political party, 150, 153

#### **R**

Relational approach, 213 *See also* Field; Strategic Action Field (SAF) Reputational method, 29, 76, 78–80, 84–86, 89, 91, 168 *See also* Positional method; Visibility method

#### **S**

Social movement, 7, 28, 29, 67, 76, 77, 81, 239, 304, 305, 315 Soft power, 76

Strategic Action Field (SAF), 281, 285–287, 296, 297 incumbents, 281, 286, 287, 296, 297 *See also* Field Sweden, v, 5, 8, 11, 12, 53, 54, 57, 58, 60–67, 100, 101, 103, 104, 106, 109, 111–113, 168, 209, 210, 212–215, 219–226, 234, 236, 238, 241, 242, 245, 246, 249, 250, 260, 307, 308, 311, 313, 320 *See also* Civil society regime, social-democratic regime Symbolic capital, 10, 101, 103, 107, 109–113, 139, 315

#### **T**

Transmission belt, 52

#### **U**

Uncivil society, 236 *See also* Autocracy, Civic, shrinking civic space Te United Kingdom (UK), v, 5, 8, 11, 12, 53, 54, 58, 60–65, 67, 100, 101, 103, 104, 106–113, 144, 168, 209–215, 219–226,

234, 236, 238, 241, 242, 244–250, 260, 285, 290, 292n6, 292n11, 303, 307, 308, 311–314, 320 *See also* Liberal civil society regime United Nations, 4 United States (US), vi, 5, 27, 119–121, 132, 148, 192, 313, 314 *See also* Liberal civil society regime

#### **V**

Visibility method, 76, 77, 80–82 *See also* Positional method; Reputational method Volunteering elite volunteers, 127–132, 309 voluntary organisation, 304, 309 voluntary sector, 7, 109 volunteerism, 104, 117–133

#### **W**

Wealth, 10, 139, 140, 148, 149, 151, 153, 162, 164, 309, 310 *See also* Economic, capital; Economic, elite Who's Who, 8, 26, 29–33, 37–41, 44