GEORGE H. VAN KOOTEN

Paul's Anthropology in Context

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George H. van Kooten

Paul's Anthropology in Context

The Image of God, Assimilation to God, and Tripartite Man in Ancient Judaism, Ancient Philosophy and Early Christianity

Mohr Siebeck

George H. van Kooten, born 1969; studied Theology at the University of Leiden (MA 1995; PhD 2001), New Testament Studies at the University of Durham (MA 1995), and Judaism of the Graeco-Roman Period at the University of Oxford (MSt 1996). He has been Professor of New Testament and Early Christianity at the Faculty of Theology & Religious Studies of the University of Groningen since 2006. He is currently also Editor-in-Chief of the Themes in Biblical Narritive Series (Brill), Director of the Research Institute for Culture, Religion And Society – Interdisciplinary Studies (CRASIS) in Graeco-Roman Antiquity at the University of Groningen, and Dean of the Faculty of Theology & Religious Studies.

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To the memory of my father Geurt H. van Kooten (1919–2005)
To my mother Annie van Kooten-Kok (1928)

And to Nenna van Maastricht (1923)

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Introduction

In this book I wish to trace the development of Paul's anthropology, against the background of both ancient Judaism and pagan Graeco-Roman philosophy. Within Paul's anthropology, the notion of man as the image of God takes an important place. For this reason I start my research with a detailed chapter on the image of God in ancient Judaism. As I note in my first chapter, monographs which deal with the image of God tend to focus exclusively on either the Old or the New Testament. An important exception is Jacob Jervell, *Imago Dei: Gen 1, 26f. im Spätjudentum, in der Gnosis und in den paulinischen Briefen* (1960) which contains extensive discussion of the image of God in Second Temple Judaism. But this study is now outdated, as John Levison, *Portraits of Adam in Early Judaism* (1988) has shown. Levison's own study offers one of the best treatments of the notion of man as God's image, though the range of writings he discusses is limited. Although I agree with Levison that the views on Adam and, more specifically, the views on the 'image of God' are not unified in ancient Jewish literature, I believe he underestimates the thematic potential of the notion in various writings. Against his reductionism, I shall argue that some distinctive motifs are already constructed in Jewish reflections upon Adam and the image of God (chap. 1).

This ancient Jewish background to Paul, instructive and important as it is, appears to be circumscribed and not sufficient for a full explanation of Philo's and Paul's anthropology. Although they take their starting point from Jewish texts, and are not out of tune with particular Jewish thoughts about the close relation between man and God, both Philo and Paul seem to owe a lot to contemporary anthropological debate in Graeco-Roman philosophy (chap. 2). Paul's view, for instance, that man needs to be transformed into the image of God does not seem to have any Jewish antecedents, but reflects the pagan philosophical notion of man's assimilation to God. This notion is also particularly important to Philo. This will be argued in the second chapter, in which I trace both how pagan anthropology saw man in general, or some type of man in particular, as the image of God, and how they thought that man should be assimilated to God. The relevance of the notions of image of God and assimilation to God in contemporary Graeco-Roman philosophy for our understanding of Philo and Paul seems to have gone largely unnoticed in scholarly literature, with the exception of Hubert Merki's classical study on *Homoiōsis Theōi* (1952). Many important stud-

ies on the image of God – such as Jervell, *Imago Dei* (1960) and Peter Schwanz, *Imago Dei* (1979) – were written from the perspective of Gnosticism. However, this background proves too late, and the early Graeco-Roman context is more illuminating. Other studies – such as Edvin Larsson, *Christus als Vorbild* (1962) but also Udo Schnelle, *Neutestamentliche Anthropologie* (1991), one of the few recent anthropologies of the New Testament – lack a proper contextualization of Paul's anthropology. The latter study even flatly denies the relevance of a contemporary Greek context for Paul.

The present conditions for putting Paul's anthropology into its Graeco-Roman context have been greatly improved because recently, from the end of the 1990s onwards, classicists have revived their interest in the issue of man's assimilation to God in ethics. This revival is due notably to David Sedley and Julia Annas, and their findings and analyses will be applied to Pauline anthropology. This all lends renewed and further emphasis to the attention which John Dillon has repeatedly drawn to the 1st cent. BC figure of Eudorus, who is to be credited with shaping and introducing the Platonic doctrine of man's assimilation to God through virtue. As I shall argue, both Philo and Paul should be understood in the wake of this major impetus in the development of ancient ethics and ethical anthropology.

Apart from this contextualization of Philo's and Paul's anthropology in Platonic ethics, I also wish to contextualize Paul's writings in particular Graeco-Roman settings which prompted Paul to develop his anthropology in a certain direction. In this, my approach resembles that of Robert Jewett's *Paul's Anthropological Terms: A Study of their Use in Conflict Settings* (1971), but his contextualization now seems outdated. The main writings for a reconstruction of Paul's view on man as the image of God are his Corinthian correspondence and his letter to the Romans, because these are the only works in which the terminology of image occurs. Following Bruce Winter's study on *Philo and Paul Among the Sophists* (1997), I shall draw attention to the importance of the sophistic movement for our understanding of Philo and Paul. Unlike Winter, however, I emphasize that Philo used *the narratives* of the Mosaic Pentateuch to give his Jewish public a frequent and sustained warning against contemporary sophists (chap. 3), and that Paul – in addition to his criticism of the Corinthian sophists – supplemented (and buttressed) this criticism with an anthropology which called for inner transformation (chap. 4).

Despite the importance of the notion of the image of God, derived from the first account of man's creation in Genesis 1 (Gen 1.26–27), Paul's anthropology is also based partly on the second account, from Genesis 2, which speaks of the installation of God's spirit in man (Gen 2.7). As I shall argue in chap. 5, this comes to the fore already in the brief, but revealing trichotomy in 1 Thess 5.23, which distinguishes in man between spirit, soul and body. Such a trichotomic anthropology is paralleled in Paul's Jewish near-contemporaries Philo and Josephus, and is in essence a particular Greek philosophical interpretation of

Gen 2.7; in this interpretation, Jewish and Graeco-Roman contexts merge into an organic compound. After its appearance in 1 Thess, this anthropology is fully developed in Paul's Corinthian correspondence, as will be shown in chap. 5. In his Corinthian correspondence, both anthropologies – that of the image of God and that of the trichotomic composition of man – become intertwined, with the sole purpose of offering an alternative to the outward, superficial, physiognomic anthropology of the sophists. The terminology which Paul employs to shape such an anti-sophistic anthropology includes that of 'image of God', 'inner man' and 'metamorphosis'. Paul's stress on the need for inward transformation will be the central focus of chap. 6.

Whereas the sophistic context in which the Corinthian correspondence arose prompted Paul to develop his anthropology in a particular direction, a different context presents itself for his letter to the Romans. As I shall contend in the final chapter, chap. 7, Paul's anthropology entered yet a different stage when he wished to address the ethnic tensions between Christian Jews and former pagans within the Christian community of Rome. Written from Corinth, this letter contains several important anthropological key-words which he has already applied in his Corinthian letters, notably 'image of God', 'inner man' and 'metamorphosis'. As regards the Platonic term 'inner man' I can draw on important research on this concept by scholars such as Theo Heckel (1993), Christoph Markschies (1994, 1998), Walter Burkert (1998), and Hans-Dieter Betz (2000). My own approach is perhaps closest to that of Burkert, since he acknowledges the congeniality of Paul and Plato more than the others, who ultimately seem to isolate Paul too much from his contemporary world.

As I shall argue, the circumstances in Rome were what gave Paul the impetus to rework his anthropology into a truly comprehensive, wide-ranging, universalistic anthropology, in which ethnic tensions were combated and overcome. In this I fully agree with Alain Badiou's remarkable study *Saint Paul: The Foundation of Universalism* (1997; English trans. 2003). Yet whereas Badiou bases his interpretation on a rather technical analysis of the internal logic of Paul's reasoning in this letter, I argue on the basis of a radical contextualization of Paul's vocabulary and concepts within the Graeco-Roman discourse of his day. This is characteristic of my methodological approach. In this way, I try to withstand the enormous pressure which the full weight of the history of biblical scholarship exerts on an individual scholar when one tries to map the extent and relief of Paul's anthropology as expressed in his various letters. At the same time, such a firm contextualization of Paul among the Jewish and pagan Graeco-Roman movements and literature of his day does also safeguard one from many of the pitfalls of anachronism.

The present study took shape from 2002 onwards, when my post-doctoral VENI Innovational Research proposal was accepted by the Netherlands Organization for Scientific Research. Although I did not take up this award, since I was

simultaneously appointed to a tenured position as university lecturer at the University of Groningen, I continued to work on this research project. I owe a great deal to many colleagues and friends with whom I have discussed various parts of my developing work. I first wish to mention the late Professor Michael Frede (Oxford – Athens) who always took a lively interest in my work from my days at Oxford. He read the entire research proposal and was willing to take a lead in the supervision of my post-doctoral work; it is a great sadness and loss that he is no longer present to discuss the outcome of a project in which his initial input was inspirational. I remain enormously grateful for his stimulus to explore the common denominator behind early Christian and pagan philosophical discourses, which has been fundamental in shaping my scholarly and methodological approach. I also wish to thank Prof. Frederick E. Brenk (Pontifical Biblical Institute, Rome) for some very illuminating comments on my initial research proposal.

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Chapter 3, on Philo's anti-sophistic strategy, was first read at the 2005 Themes in Biblical Narrative colloquium at Groningen (June 2005) and profited from

the interdisciplinary approach to the figure of Balaam, whom Philo regarded as a definite sophist.

Chapter 4, on the sophistic setting of Paul's Corinthian correspondence, was first presented at a workshop at the Institute of Classical Studies in London in March 2006, devoted to 'The Greek City in the Post-Classical Age, IV: Cults, Creeds and Contests in the Post-Classical City', and chaired by Prof. Richard Alston (Royal Holloway, University of London) and Prof. Onno van Nijf (Groningen). I am very grateful for the stimulating comments from the various participants.

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A note is in order concerning my use of translations: those from the Bible are normally taken from the New Revised Standard Version, and those from Classical authors, including Philo and Josephus, are derived from the Loeb Classical Library (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press) whenever available. Translations from Aristotle are in principle taken from J. Barnes (ed.), *The Complete Works of Aristotle: The Revised Oxford translation* (Bollingen Series 71.2; Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984, repr. 1995). Translations of Jewish pseudepigrapha are taken from J.H. Charlesworth (ed.), *The Old Testament Pseudepigrapha*, 2 vols (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1983–1985). Those of the Dead Sea Scrolls are normally derived from F. García Martínez, *The Dead Sea Scrolls Translated: The Qumran Texts in English* (Leiden: Brill, 1994). The translation of the Septuagint is quoted after L.C.L. Brenton, *The Septuagint with Apocrypha: Greek and English* (London: Samuel Bagster, 1851, repr. Hendrickson). Translations of Patristic literature are, as a rule, quoted from the Ante-

Nicene Fathers & the Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers series (Edinburgh: T&T Clark), with the main exceptions of Origen's *Against Celsus* which is quoted after H. Chadwick, *Origen,Contra Celsum: Translated with an Introduction & Notes* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1953) and Augustine's *The City of God*, quoted after R.W. Dyson, *Augustine: The City of God against the Pagans* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998). In all cases small alterations were made where necessary.

I end with a personal note. I dedicate this study to the memory of my father, Geurt van Kooten, and to my mother, Annie Kok, because in the course of this study I have come to realize how much my interest in this issue of anthropology has been nourished by them. My father, a minister of the Dutch Reformed Church in Delft, always emphasized the importance of Calvin's understanding of man's sanctification. Essentially, this is not far removed from the Platonic stress on assimilation to God, which – according to the *Theaetetus* – consists in becoming righteous and holy (176b). Indeed, as Calvin himself notes, 'the holy apostles (…) were simply concerned to say that when we have put off all the vices of the flesh we shall be partakers of divine immortality and the glory of blessedness, and thus we shall be in a way one with God so far as our capacity allows. This teaching was not unfamiliar to Plato, because he defines the highest human good in various passages as being completely conformed to God' (Com. II Pet. 1.4; *Corpus Reformatorum* 55, 446–447, trans. C. Partee – I owe this reference to Calvin to my friend Dr Aza Goudriaan, Rotterdam/Amsterdam; cf. also Augustine, *The City of God* 8.5). This study is also dedicated to my mother, on the occasion of her 80th birthday on June 28, 2008. She has explored the meaning of 'spirit, soul and body', one of the topics of this book, in an intuitive way throughout her life, and she imparted this interest and curiosity to me from childhood. For all these reasons, it makes sense to me to dedicate this study to both my parents. In one breath with them, I also mention Nenna van Maastricht, who, as my nanny, taught me to read and to write. I hope that I will always use this education for the better and not, like some modern sophist, for the worse.

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Chap. 1.3
'Image, Form and Trans-formation: A Semantic Taxonomy of Paul's "Morphic" Language', in: J. Tromp, H. W. Hollander & R. Buitenwerf (eds), *Jesus, Paul, and Early Christianity: Studies in Honour of Henk Jan de Jonge* (Supplements to Novum Testamentum), Leiden/Boston: Brill, 2008, *forthcoming*.

Chap. 3
'Balaam as the Sophist *Par Excellence* in Philo of Alexandria: Philo's Projection of an Urgent Contemporary Debate onto Moses' Pentateuchal Narratives', in: G. H. van Kooten & J. van Ruiten (eds), *The Prestige of the Pagan Prophet Balaam in Judaism, Early Christianity and Islam* (Themes in Biblical Narrative 11), Leiden/Boston: Brill, 2008, 131–61.

Chap. 4
'Conflict and Rhetorical Competition within the Christian Community at Corinth: Paul and the Sophists', in: R. Alston & O. M. van Nijf (eds), *Cults, Creeds and Contests in the Greek City after the Classical Age* (Groningen-Royal Holloway Studies on the Greek City after the Classical Age 3), Louvain: Peeters, *forthcoming*.

Chap. 5
'The Two Types of Man in Philo of Alexandria and Paul of Tarsus: The Anthropological Trichotomy of Spirit, Soul and Body', in: Ch. Jedan & L. Jansen (eds), *Philosophische Anthropologie in der Antike* (Themen der Antiken Philosophie/Topics in Ancient Philosophy), Frankfurt/Paris/Ebikon/Lancaster/New Brunswick: Ontos Verlag, *forthcoming*.

'The Anthropological Trichotomy of Spirit, Soul and Body in Philo of Alexandria and Paul of Tarsus', in: M. Labahn & O. Lehtipuu (eds), *Anthropology in Context: Studies on Anthropological Ideas in the New Testament and its Ancient Context*, Louvain: Peeters, *forthcoming* (an abridged version of the fuller paper in Ch. Jedan & L. Jansen, *Philosophische Anthropologie in der Antike*, Frankfurt, see above).

Chap. 6
'Why did Paul include an Exegesis of Moses' Shining Face (Exod 34) in 2 Cor 3? Moses' Strength, Well-being and (Transitory) Glory, according to Philo, Josephus, Paul, and the Corinthian Sophists', in: G.J. Brooke, H. Najman & L.T. Stuckenbruck (eds), *The Significance of Sinai* (Themes in Biblical Narrative 12), Leiden/Boston: Brill, 2008, 149–81.

Chap. 7.1
'Pagan and Jewish Monotheism according to Varro, Plutarch and St Paul: The Aniconic, Monotheistic Beginnings of Rome's Pagan Cult – Romans 1.19–25 in a Roman Context', in: A. Hilhorst, É. Puech & E. Tigchelaar (eds), *Flores Florentino: Dead Sea Scrolls and Other Early Jewish Studies in Honour of Florentino García Martínez* (Supplements to the Journal for the Study of Judaism 122), Leiden/Boston: Brill, 2007, 633–51.

Chap. 7.2
'St Paul on Soul, Spirit and the Inner Man', in: M. Elkaisy and J. Dillon (eds), *The Afterlife of the Platonic Soul: Reflection on Platonic Psychology in the Monotheistic Religions*, Leiden/Boston: Brill, *forthcoming*.

Chapter 1

The ‘Image of God’ in Ancient Judaism

Introduction: The ‘image of God’ in the Jewish scriptures

The concept of ‘the image of God’ was to attract considerable attention in certain ancient Jewish and early Christian traditions. Although much work has been done on the notion in the Jewish scriptures, on the one hand, and in early Christian texts, particularly Paul and patristic authors, on the other, to date there has been hardly any systematic treatment of the way it is understood in Second Temple Judaism.[1] Before focusing on the interpretation of the concept in ancient Judaism, I shall briefly discuss its occurrence in the Hebrew Bible and reflect on whether it was restricted to a limited corpus of texts, or rather linked up with a broader understanding of God in the Jewish scriptures.[2] This background will form the basis for assessing whether ancient Jewish interpretations remain close to the original meaning of this notion or develop it further.

In the Hebrew bible, the concept of ‘the image of God’ first occurs in the creation account in Genesis 1:

> Then God said, ‘Let us make humankind *in our image* (נַעֲשֶׂה אָדָם בְּצַלְמֵנוּ), *according to our likeness* (כִּדְמוּתֵנוּ); and let them have dominion over the fish of the sea, and over the birds of the air, and over the cattle, and over all the wild animals of the earth, and over every creeping thing that creeps upon the earth’. So God created humankind *in his image* (בְּצַלְמוֹ), *in the image of God* (בְּצֶלֶם אֱלֹהִים) he created them; male and female he created them. (Gen 1.26–27)

[1] Monographs dealing with the ‘image of God’ tend to focus exclusively on either the Old or the New Testament. Only Jervell 1960 contains extensive discussion of the image of God in Second Temple Judaism; see § 2.1, 15–51: ‘Das vor- und außerrabbinsiche Spätjudentum’ and § 2.2, 52–70: ‘Philo Alexandrinus’; this study is now outdated – for a criticism see Levison 1988, 15–16. Eltester 1958 also discusses the Septuagint and Philo, but not Second Temple Judaism at large; see 1st part, C3, 13–22: ‘Der Sprachgebrauch im hellenistischen Judentum: a) Die LXX; b) Philo’; and 2nd part, B, 30–59: ‘Philo’. The best recent treatment of this topic is Levison, *Portraits of Adam in Early Judaism* (Levison 1988), although the scope is limited to Sirach, Wisdom, Philo, *Jubilees*, Josephus, 4 Ezra and *2 Baruch*. Apart from some studies on Philo, there are hardly any relevant thematic articles on the image of God in Second Temple Judaism. This shortage does not exist in studies on Rabbinical Judaism.

[2] For the history of research on this notion in the Old Testament, see Jónsson 1988 and Gross 1993.

The current scholarly consensus regarding what 'the image of God' means seems to be that the whole person is considered to be the image of God, and not a particular part, such as his spiritual nature. The 'image of God' is understood in terms of representation; the image is the place where the deity manifests himself and is present. The context of Gen 1.26–27 highlights the way in which man functions as God's image: by representing God he is given dominion over the rest of creation. If compared with the Ancient Near East, in which the notion of the image of God had already emerged, its distinctively Israelite feature seems to be that *all* human beings, and not just the king in his capacity as the earthly manifestation of the deity, are considered to constitute God's image.[3]

Within the book of Genesis this view is repeated several times, and 'image' and 'likeness' appear to be synonyms.[4] When narrating the birth of Adam and Eve's third child Seth, who took Abel's place after the latter had been murdered by Cain, Genesis stresses that Seth was born in *Adam*'s likeness and image:

> When *Adam* had lived one hundred thirty years, he became the father of a son *in his likeness* (בִּדְמוּתוֹ), *according to his image* (כְּצַלְמוֹ), and named him Seth. (Gen 5.3)

The narrative continues with a full list of all descendants from Adam to Noah, clearly implying that each time Adam's likeness and image, which were the likeness and image of God (Gen 1.26–27), were imparted to posterity.[5] This is even made explicit at the beginning of the pericope which, by way of heading, reads as follows:

> This is the list of the descendants of Adam. When God created humankind, he made them *in the likeness of God* (בִּדְמוּת אֱלֹהִים). (Gen 5.1)

This reproduction of God's and Adam's image and likeness is assumed to continue after Noah, as God's commandments directly after the Flood also contain a prohibition against murder because that would infringe man's status as God's likeness:

> Whoever sheds the blood of a human, by a human shall that person's blood be shed; for *in his own image* God made humankind – כִּי בְּצֶלֶם אֱלֹהִים עָשָׂה אֶת־הָאָדָם. (Gen 9.6)

But after this commandment the theme of man as the image of God seems to disappear, at least terminologically, from the Jewish scriptures.

Perhaps one could detect a terminological resonance in the book of Ezekiel, where the idea seems to occur in reversed order. Not man is described as reflecting God's likeness, but God is said to appear as 'something that seemed like a human form':

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[3] See Curtis 1992. On the Ancient Near Eastern setting of this notion, see Curtis 1984. On the 'democratization' of this notion, see also Wittenberg 1975.

[4] On the notion in the context of the Priestly Source in Genesis, see recently: Schüle 2005, 1–11; Janowski 2004; Garr 2003; Firmage 1999. Cf. also Hinschberger 1985; Gross 1981.

[5] Cf. Wallace 1990.

> And above the dome over their heads there was something like a throne, in appearance like sapphire; and seated above the likeness of a throne was *something that seemed like a human form* – וְעַל דְּמוּת הַכִּסֵּא דְּמוּת כְּמַרְאֵה אָדָם עָלָיו מִלְמָעְלָה. (Ezek 1.26)

This appearance is understood as 'the appearance of the likeness of the glory of the Lord':

> Like the bow in a cloud on a rainy day, such was the appearance of the splendour all around. This was the appearance of *the likeness of the glory of the LORD* – הוּא מַרְאֵה דְּמוּת כְּבוֹד־יְהוָה. (Ezek 1.28)

But in Ezekiel not only God is said to appear in human form, the four living creatures which appear in Ezekiel's vision during his calling to prophethood also are of human form: דְּמוּת אָדָם לָהֵנָּה (Ezek 1.5). One of each's four faces has the appearance of a human face: וּדְמוּת פְּנֵיהֶם פְּנֵי אָדָם (1.10).

It is difficult to assess Ezekiel's use of the term 'likeness' in these passages, as his writing abounds in visionary references to things which are 'something like' or 'have the appearance of' other things (Ezek 1.5, 13, 16, 22; 10.1, 21–22; cf. also 23.15). Yet his description of God in terms of 'something that seemed like a human form' seems significant and not unrelated to the view in Genesis that man is created after God's likeness.[6]

This seems all the more the case, as both Ezekiel and Genesis are considered to be part of, or related to the Priestly Source, with its stress on monotheism and monotheistic cult within the Jewish Scripture.[7] For that reason, their views on man as created after God's likeness, and on God as appearing in the likeness of man could well mirror each other. It might even be tempting to read one version as the modification of the other. As Ezekiel is considered to be older than (the redaction of) Genesis, one could assume that Ezekiel's anthropomorphic definition of God (God appears in the likeness of man) is re-emphasized in a theomorphic way in Genesis: man is created in the likeness of God.

At the same time, both can be read as polemicizing against the cult of images, a theme which also occurs elsewhere in the Jewish scriptures. Isaiah, for instance, criticizes the fabrication of pagan idols because there is no likeness (דְּמוּת) for God:

> To whom then will you liken God, or *what likeness compare with him*? – וְאֶל־מִי תְּדַמְּיוּן אֵל וּמַה־דְּמוּת תַּעַרְכוּ לוֹ׃ An idol? – A workman casts it, and a goldsmith overlays it with gold, and casts for it silver chains. (Isa 40.18–19)

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[6] For the congruence between Genesis and Ezekiel in this respect, see also, among others, Von Rad 1961, 150; Miller 1972, 291–2, 298 and, esp., 302–3; and Kutsko 2000*a*, 129–34: 'The Image of God in Ezekiel'. For other hints to the 'image of God' in Ezekiel, see Callender 2000 (on Ezek 28.11–19) and Kutsko 2000*b*, chap. 4 (on Ezek 36–37).

[7] Milgrom 1992; Boadt 1992, esp. section J4 about connections to priestly traditions, 717–18 at 717: 'many passages in Ezekiel show strong priestly concerns'.

It is not unlikely that the assertion that man is created 'in God's image (בְּצֶלֶם אֱלֹהִים)' could bear anti-idolatrous overtones, as the term 'image' (צֶלֶם) is one of the terms used to refer to idols (Num 33.52; 2 Kgs 11.18; 2 Chron 23.17; Ezek 7.20, 16.17, 23.14; Amos 5.26). It can scarcely be a coincidence that the notions of *man* as the (only) image of God, and of God as appearing in the likeness of man occur precisely in writings related to the Priestly Source, which is characterized by its reformulation of 'the message of the Pentateuch according to a theology of monotheistic holiness and the importance of the cult' (Milgrom).[8] When, after the Babylonian exile, the Israelite religion turned against the worship of images, as A. Schüle puts it,

the end of these cultic images did not put an end altogether to the idea of 'Image of God'. It is remarkable that very much at the same time when prophets like Deutero-Isaiah and Ezekiel poured scorn on the *idols*, the idea of the 'Image of God' was very much alive in another strand of biblical tradition that is probably about contemporaneous with these prophets: according to the priestly telling of creation in Gen 1,1–2,4a it is not lifeless matter, not a man-made statue, but humans as living beings that are envisioned to be indeed the true image of God. It is important to see these different approaches as part of the same time and of the same historical discourse.[9]

This discourse, as Schüle emphasizes, polemicized, in a rather profound and transformative way, against the idols of Ancient Near Eastern cults:

the idea of Man as the 'Image of God' in Gen 1–9 has been developed on the background of this ancient view of divine presence in the shape of images. This view, however, has been so transformed that not a material object, a statue, but Man as a living being took on the role of the image.[10]

Indeed, for polemical, anti-idolatrous and anti-iconic reasons, both Genesis and Ezekiel seem to emphasize the mutual and exclusive relation between God and man, being each other's likeness. This kind of criticism of pagan iconic idolatry fits well with priestly concerns which defend the Israelite cult over against idolatrous practices outside, but also within Israel.[11] We may conclude, on the one hand, that Ezekiel shares a deep reluctance with Isaiah to speak of God's likeness, Isaiah refusing to compare the likeness of anything with God altogether, Ezekiel using the word 'likeness' but with the utmost reserve. As M. Miller puts it:

Both Second Isaiah and Ezekiel use the term *d^{e}mût* in reference to God's appearance. Second Isaiah scoffs at the idea that God could be adequately represented in plastic form, 'to whom then will you liken God, or what likeness (*d^{e}mût*) compare with him?' And

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[8] Milgrom 1992, 454.

[9] Schüle 2005, 1–2 at 2. For Ezekiel's criticism of the idols, Schüle refers to Kutsko 2000*b*, 63–70. For man as a living image of God, cf. also Janowski 2004, 190.

[10] Schüle 2005, 9–11 at 11.

[11] On the worship of images of Yahweh, see Pfeiffer 1926.

Ezekiel, in the description of his vision, uses *d^e^mût* to create the impression that God's glory actually defied description in spite of the vague resemblance to a human form.[12]

On the other hand, however, Ezekiel shows a resemblance to Genesis, in the shared conviction that God does indeed have a likeness which he shares with man. To quote Miller again:

> The priestly writer seems to have held a position very similar to that of Ezekiel. Just as Ezekiel, in spite of his realization that God's glory defied adequate description, indicates that it 'had the appearance as it were of a human form' (*d^e^mût k^e^mar'ēh 'ādām*), so the priestly writer, well known for his otherwise anti-anthropomorphic tendencies, contends that man was created in the *d^e^mût* of God.[13]

This conclusion, that ultimately the positions of Ezekiel and Genesis are very similar, is shared by J. Kutsko in his comments on the 'image of God' in Ezekiel:

> Thus in [Ezek] 1.26–28, Ezekiel struggles to find appropriate language that indicates both human likeness and divine incomparability. The prophet directs his efforts in several directions: he is at once attempting to align himself with Priestly theology, to contradict Mesopotamian ideology, and to refrain from language that would explicitly legitimize the notion of other gods. Fundamentally, however, P and Ezekiel are dealing with the same answer, approached from different angles: humans are like God, and God is like humans. In this answer, both P and Ezekiel remove other gods from the equation.[14]

Somewhat similar to Ezekiel's portrayal of God's appearance in the likeness (דְּמוּת) of a human form might also be the way in which the book of Daniel describes an angelic apparition to Daniel, the angel assuming 'the likeness (דְּמוּת) of the sons of Adam':

> Then one *in the likeness of the sons of Adam* (כִּדְמוּת בְּנֵי אָדָם) touched my lips, and I opened my mouth to speak, and said to the one who stood before me, 'My lord, because of the vision such pains have come upon me that I retain no strength'. (Dan 10.16)

In this case not only God, but also his angelic messengers are said to have taken on the 'likeness of the sons of Adam'. Perhaps it is at this level that one should understand the notoriously difficult passage concerning 'one like a human being', the 'son of man', in Dan 7.13. In his night visions, Daniel saw 'one like a human being coming with the clouds of heaven' – וַאֲרוּ עִם־עֲנָנֵי שְׁמַיָּא כְּבַר אֱנָשׁ אָתֵה הֲוָה. But in Daniel it is far from clear whether this 'like', 'like a son of man', 'like a human being', is an echo of man's created likeness, even though Dan 10.16 seems to play with the notion of the 'likeness of the sons of Adam'.

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12 Miller 1972, 303.
13 Ibidem.
14 Kutsko 2000*a*, 132.

These findings allow us to develop the following position within the debate between Old Testament scholars about the notion of man as God's image. In a minimalist view, this notion is only present in Genesis and altogether absent from the rest of the Jewish scriptures. According to C. Westermann,

> Gn 1 26 f. [ist] im AT selbst offenbar nicht als eine grundlegende allgemeingültige Aussage über das Wesen des Menschen aufgefaßt worden (…), sonst müßte doch von dieser Gottesebenbildlichkeit öfter die Rede sein. Das ist aber nicht der Fall.[15]

Some view Psalm 8, with its assertion that God made mankind 'a little lower than God, and crowned them with glory and honour' (Ps 8.5), as reflecting the exalted position of man as God's image, although there are no similarities in wording between Ps 8.5 and Gen 1.26–27.[16]

If one takes a maximalist view, however, the notion may be traced from Genesis through Psalm 8 to Daniel 7. L. F. Hartman, for instance, in his commentary on Daniel, considers it 'quite possible that the writer of Dan 7.13 was conscious of the phrase "the son of man" in Psalm 8, for in this psalm and in Genesis 1 the status of man and woman in God's design is represented'.[17] On this basis, Hartman draws the following parallel between Dan 7 and Gen 1:

> The first man and woman (original mankind, Hebrew *'ādām*) were created in the divine image and likeness (Gen 1.26–27) and were commissioned by God to have dominion over the fish of the sea, the birds of the air, and all living creatures that move on the earth (Gen 1.28). In somewhat the same manner, 'the one in human likeness' – symbol of 'the holy ones of the Most High,' i. e. the men, women, and children who remain true and faithful to the Covenant – receives everlasting dominion, glory, and kingship (Dan 7.13–14, 18, 22, 27). Thus, the Israel of faith is called to become what the Creator intended the human being to be, viz. the image and likeness of God.[18]

Another maximalist view on the impact of Gen 1 traces its development through Ezekiel and considers it possible that Ezekiel's description of God as humanlike in Ezek 1.26 and 8.2 influenced the humanlike figure of Daniel 7.13.[19]

In my view, the link between Ezekiel 1 and Daniel 7 is weak, although there may be a hint in Dan 10.26 that Daniel is indeed familiar with the language of 'the likeness of (the sons of) Adam'. Stronger, however, and still insufficiently recognized, is the link between Ezekiel 1.26–28, on the one hand, with its talk of 'something that seemed like a human form' and 'the likeness of the glory of the LORD', and Gen 1.26–27, on the other hand. As we shall see in due course, in the history of reception this link seems to be present already in the Dead Sea

[15] Westermann 1974, 214.

[16] See, e. g., Seebass 1996, 79: 'Das Motiv ist auf P beschränkt (…) und hat in Ps 8,5 ff einen nur indirekten Reflex'.

[17] Hartman & Di Lella 1978, 98.

[18] Hartman & Di Lella 1978, 107.

[19] See Goldingay 1989, 149–50, with reference – for the relation between Dan and Ezek – to Procksch 1920.

Scrolls (see § 1.1.3 [a] below). If that is the case, the notion of the image of God is not restricted in the Jewish scriptures to the book of Genesis; rather in both Genesis and Ezekiel, traditions which are part of, or related to the Priestly Source stress the reciprocal likeness of God and man. In opposition to pagan idolatry, they regard man as such, and not idols, as the likeness of God.

Even so, important as the priestly theology may be within the Jewish Scripture, the language of likeness and imagery is not much drawn upon. According to Curtis, it is exactly the polemical anti-idolatrous nature of this theology which may have held back its full development:

> It seems likely that the danger presented to Israel's religion by idolatry precluded that use until after the Exile had eliminated idolatry as a major problem. In the new religious context created by the Exile and return, the 'image of God' motif was again taken up and developed both in the intertestamental period and in the NT.[20]

It is to this development we now turn. First, we shall see that in ancient Jewish texts the reference to God's image is made in very different contexts. Sometimes it amounts to little more than a paraphrase, but in other cases the application of this notion is coloured by the specific setting of each particular writing, which will be discussed in thematic clusters (§ 1.1). Although the concept occurs in several ancient Jewish texts, its occurrence in any given text is generally limited to one or two passages.

Subsequently, we shall study two notable exceptions, the writings of Philo and Paul (§§ 1.2–1.3). Here, the motif becomes an issue of central importance. In order to explain this phenomenal rise, in the subsequent chapter I shall draw on a development in contemporaneous Greek ethics (see chap. 2 below). As J. Dillon has demonstrated, from the first century BC onwards Greek ethics tended to be founded less on the Stoic maxim of 'living in accordance with Nature', and increasingly on the Platonic ideal of assimilation to God.[21] As I shall argue, in Philo and Paul this process of assimilating to God came to be mediated through the image of God. God's image, in this line of thought, is a model on which individuals' lives are reshaped and conformed to God.

1.1 The interpretation of God's image (Gen 1.26–27) in ancient Judaism

In view of the sources to be used, the search for the 'image of God' in ancient Judaism raises the methodological question of the provenance of the so-called Old Testament pseudepigrapha. There is an increasing awareness that some of them are indeed Jewish, but others Christian; others again may perhaps be the

[20] Curtis 1992, 391.
[21] Dillon 1996, index, s. v. 'Likeness to God'.

product of God-fearers.[22] For this reason I have chosen to arrange the sources within seven thematic clusters and to follow a chronological line, within each particular cluster, from certainly Jewish to very probably Christian pseudepigrapha. The clusters deal, respectively, with (1) mere paraphrases of Gen 1.26–27; (2) clearly contextualized colourings of the notion of the image of God; (3) the 'image and likeness of God' in the Dead Sea Scrolls; (4) an anti-idolatrous application of this notion by which this image (singular) is contrasted with the images (plural) of pagan cult; (5) a particular ethical understanding of this notion; and, finally, (6) explicitly spiritual or intellectual and (7) bodily or physical interpretations of the 'image'.

1.1.1 Paraphrases

There are several instances in which the text from Genesis regarding the image of God is merely paraphrased. As we shall see, in the *Wisdom of Jesus Son of Sirach* and *Jubilees*, the paraphrase is taken from Gen 1, whereas Pseudo-Philo, in his *Biblical Antiquities*, alludes to the passage on the image of God in Gen 9.

(a) The Wisdom of Jesus Son of Sirach

In the *Wisdom of Jesus Son of Sirach*, dating from between 190–175 BC, the author sings the praises of God's creation of human beings:

> The Lord created human beings out of earth, and makes them return to it again. 2 He gave them a fixed number of days, but granted them authority over everything on the earth. 3 He endowed them with strength like his own, and made them *in his own image*. 4 He put the fear of them in all living beings, and gave them dominion over beasts and birds. [5 They obtained the use of the five faculties of the Lord; as sixth he distributed to them the gift of mind, and as seventh, reason, the interpreter of one's faculties.] 6 Discretion and tongue and eyes, ears and a mind for thinking he gave them. 7 He filled them with knowledge and understanding, and showed them good and evil. He put the fear of him into their hearts. (17.1–8a)

This passage contains the idea that God 'made them [i. e. human beings] in his own image' (17.3). The preceding context very much suggests that this likeness has to do with the authority granted to them 'over everything on the earth' (17.2). This is repeated in the immediately succeeding line that God 'gave them dominion over beast and birds' (17.4). In this way *Sirach* 17.3 is in line with the original account of Gen 1.26–27, which also seems to stress that, having been created in God's image and in accordance with his likeness, man was given 'dominion over the fish of the sea, and over the birds of the air, and over the cattle, and over all the wild animals of the earth, and over every creeping thing that creeps upon the earth'.[23]

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[22] See now particularly Davila 2005.
[23] Cf. Levison 1988, 36–37, 47–48.

Yet at the same time, the broader context in *Sirach* suggests that man as God's image also has something to with the 'knowledge and understanding' which God imparted to them: ἐπιστήμην συνέσεως ἐνέπλησεν αὐτοὺς (17.7; no extant Hebrew text). Although this is no more than a hint, and remains merely implicit, it seems that the author is reflecting on the possible meaning of the image of God in terms of knowledge and understanding. We shall also encounter this interpretation in the Dead Sea Scrolls (§ 1.1.3 [a] below). This understanding of the image of God in terms of knowledge and understanding is strengthened in the expanded Greek translation of *Sirach* which also comprises *Sirach* 17.5, enumerating the various faculties which God bestowed on man, including the gift of mind and reason. As A. A. Di Lella notices: 'This purely Greek gloss seems to have been prompted by the five items enumerated in v 6 and by the subsequent text of vv 7–10'.[24] Although Di Lella is right that '[i]t has nothing to commend it', the gloss does demonstrate a development towards an increasingly intellectual understanding of the image of God. This spiritual or intellectual colouring of the image of God would appear to be part of a general tendency in the interpretation of this notion in ancient Jewish and early Christian sources, even to the point of provoking a counter-movement which emphasized the (at least partly) bodily nature of the image of God (see § 1.1.6–7 below).

(b) Jubilees

In *Jubilees*, dating from the second century BC, there is a brief paraphrase of Gen 1.26–27. At the beginning of the work, in his description of the six days of creation, the author writes:

> And on the sixth day he made all of the beasts of the earth and all of the cattle and everything which moves upon the earth. And after all of this, he made man – male and female he made them – and he gave him dominion over everything which was upon the earth and which was in the seas and over everything which flies, and over beasts and cattle and everything which moves upon the earth or above the whole earth. And over all this he gave him dominion. And these four kinds he made on the sixth day. (*Jubilees* 2.13–14)

The most remarkable feature of this passage is that it does not mention the image of God, and regards man's dominion over the rest of creation very important, given the fact that it is mentioned twice. In this, the author remains very close to the emphasis in Gen 1.26–28, without employing the terminology of image of God.[25] In line with *Jubilees*' overall attention for calendrical issues and festivals, the author continues by elaborating on the significance of the sabbath. The preceding days of creation are mainly of interest for him from a chronological perspective.

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[24] Skehan & Di Lella 1987, 279.

[25] Cf. Levison 1988, 90–1.

(c) Pseudo-Philo, Biblical Antiquities

When, in his *Biblical Antiquities* (commonly dated to the first century AD), Pseudo-Philo mentions the image of God, he does so, not in his retelling of Genesis 1 (which he hardly covers), but in his account of the Flood. As we have seen in our discussion of Genesis, in his speech to Noah after the Flood God forbids murder because it destroys God's image (Gen 9.6). This passage from Genesis is reiterated in a literal quotation in *Biblical Antiquities* 3.11: 'whoever sheds the blood of a man, his own blood shall be shed, because man was made after the image of God'. Likewise, in his description of the birth of Samuel, the author renders Hannah's discussion with Eli the priest at God's house at Shiloh as follows: 'I am the wife of Elkanah; and because God has shut up my womb, I have prayed before him that I do not go forth from this world without fruit and that I do not die *without having my own image*' (50.7). This is reminiscent of Gen 5.3, where Adam is said to 'become the father of a son in his likeness, according to his image, and named him Seth' although, strikingly, this logic is now applied to female reproduction. These instances are very much literal paraphrases of Genesis.

What these brief paraphrases of passages in Genesis about the image of God have in common is that they elaborate very little on the meaning of this notion. Two of them remain close to the text of Gen 1, with its stress on man's dominion over creation, the other bases his paraphrase on God's commandment in Gen 9 not to destroy his image by murdering one's fellow human-being. There may be a hint of an understanding of the image of God in terms of knowledge and understanding in *Sirach*. In these paraphrases, the notion of 'image of God' is reduced to a single reference, as in *Sirach*, or is even omitted from the paraphrase entirely, as in *Jubilees*. Only Pseudo-Philo applies the concept a second time, in a different context and in a rather creative, independent way, when he uses the expression 'not having one's own image' in describing Hannah's state of infertility. On the whole, in these writings the notion of the 'image of God' remains rather unimportant and / or is merely part of a paraphrase from the Jewish scriptures.

1.1.2 Contextualized interpretations

In a second group of writings, the notion of man as God's image is heavily contextualized and coloured by one of the overall concerns of the writing or, as John Levison calls it, 'according to its *Tendenzen*'.[26] This is the case in *1 Enoch* and *4 Ezra*. Although the term 'image' only occurs once in each writing, the way in which it is used supports the overall aim of the writing concerned. The conceptual contents of this notion are only rendered explicit through its integration into

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[26] Cf. my discussion of Levison, *Portraits of Adam in Early Judaism* (Levison 1988), in the concluding observations in § 1.1.8 below.

the surrounding context. In *1 Enoch* this context is a particular concern about the dangerous intercourse of fallen angels with female human beings. In *4 Ezra* the notion is implemented to support the author's construction of a theodicy in the aftermath of the disastrous outcome of the Jewish War against Rome. In this sense the contents of the notion are heavily dependent, not on a mere paraphrase of the biblical text, but on the general thrust of the writings in which they occur.

(a) 1 Enoch 106

An allusion, rather than a clear reference, to the image of God is found in *1 Enoch*, chap. 106. This chapter is regarded as belonging to a book of Noah, extracts from which have been inserted into *1 Enoch*. Chaps 105–106, at the very end of *1 Enoch*, look forward to Noah who will succeed Enoch and transmit his antediluvian wisdom to posterity. These chapters are also attested among the Dead Sea Scrolls in 1Q19 and 4QEn^{c}; the latter is dated to the first century BC but naturally the composition of the work must have been earlier.[27] The following discussion is based on the Ethiopic and Greek versions of *1 Enoch*, chap. 106, as the part of the chapter which is most relevant for our present purpose has not been preserved among the Dead Sea Scrolls.[28] Fragments in 1Q19 and in 4QEn^{c} only cover chap. 106.1–2 (4QEn^{c} 5 i), 106.2–6 (1Q19 frag. 3) and 106.13–19 (4QEn^{c} 5 ii), but not the most relevant passage in 106.3–12, so that it is necessary to work with the Ethiopic and Greek versions.[29]

1 Enoch, chap. 106 focuses on the portentous birth of Noah and reads as a reverse of the story of the Watchers, the fallen angels of Genesis 6 (Gen 6.1–4). The passage is cast in the terminology of the image of God of Genesis 1. The passage narrates the birth of Enoch's great-grandchild Noah:

> His body was white as snow and red as a rose; the hair of his head as white as wool and his 'demdema' ['long and curly hair combed up straight'] beautiful; and as for his eyes, when he opened them the whole house glowed like the sun – (rather) the whole house glowed even more exceedingly. And when he arose from the hands of the midwife, he opened his mouth and spoke to the Lord with righteousness. (*1 Enoch* 106.2–3)

This birth distresses Noah's father Lamech so much that he consults his own father Methuselah and reports the incident in the following words:

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[27] Milik 1976, 48–49, 178.

[28] For the Greek version see Black 1970.

[29] For the Hebrew fragment of the book of Noah in 1Q19, see Barthélemy & Milik 1955 (DJD 1), 84–86 at 85: 1Q19 frag. 3 = *1 Enoch* 106.2–6; and, for the Aramaic fragments of the books of Enoch in 4QEn^{c} 5 i (= *1 Enoch* 106.1–2) and 4QEn^{c} 5 ii (= *1 Enoch* 106.13–19), Milik 1976, 206–9, 209–17 and 352–3. The English translation is taken from E. Isaac, '1 (Ethiopic Apocalypse of) Enoch', in: *OTP*, vol. 1, 5–89, with references to the Greek text in the edition of M. Black (see previous note) whenever relevant.

> I have begotten a strange son (τέκνον ἐγεννήθη μου ἀλλοῖον): He is not like an (ordinary) human being, but he looks like the children of the angels of heaven to me (οὐχ ὅμοιον τοῖς ἀνθρώποις ἀλλὰ τοῖς τέκνοις τῶν ἀγγέλων τοῦ οὐρανοῦ); his form is different, and he is not like us (καὶ ὁ τύπος ἀλλοιότερος, οὐχ ὅμοιος ἡμῖν). His eyes are like the rays of the sun, and his face glorious. It does not seem to me that he is of me, but of angels (καὶ ὑπολαμβάνω ὅτι οὐκ ἔστιν ἐξ ἐμοῦ ἀλλὰ ἐξ ἀγγέλου). (*1 Enoch* 106.5–6)

In the context of *1 Enoch*, the suspicion that Noah might have been engendered by an angel is very serious, as the Book of Watchers (*1 Enoch* 1–36) is concerned with the fallen angels of Gen 6 who mixed with the daughters of man (*1 Enoch* 6); from their union, 'the union of the spirits and the flesh', giants were born: 'Evil spirits have come out of their bodies. Because from the day that they were created from the holy ones they became the Watchers' (*1 En* 15.8–9). No wonder Lamech is concerned that his wife might have become pregnant by an angel. He implores his father Methuselah to consult grandfather Enoch on his behalf, 'and learn from him the truth, for his dwelling place is among the angels' (*1 En* 106.7). Methuselah, having tracked Enoch down 'at the ends of the earth', gives him the following account of this distressing birth:

> Now, my father, hear me: For unto my son Lamech a son has been born, one whose image and form are not like unto the characteristics of human beings (καὶ ὁ τύπος αὐτοῦ καὶ ἡ εἰκὼν αὐτοῦ οὐχ ὅμοιος ἀνθρώποις); and his colour is whiter than snow and his eyes are like the rays of the sun; and (when) he opened his eyes the whole house lighted up. And (when) he rose up in the hands of the midwife, he opened his mouth and blessed the Lord of heaven. Then his father, Lamech, became afraid and fled, and he did not believe that he (the child) was of him (καὶ οὐ πιστεύει ὅτι υἱὸς αὐτοῦ ἐστιν) but of the image of the angels of heaven (ἀλλὰ ὅτι ἐξ ἀγγέλων). And behold, I have come to you in order that you may make me know the real truth. (*1 Enoch* 106.10–12)

Enoch, in his answer, explicitly refers to the story of the fall of the angels and synchronizes this story from Genesis 6 with the life of his father Jared (Gen 5.18–20; *1 En* 106.13–14). He brings up this issue in order to deny that Noah is the offspring of such an encounter between fallen angels and mortal women: 'Now, make known to your son Lamech that the son who has been born is indeed righteous' (*1 En* 106.18). Noah is confirmed to be Lamech's own son, but his wondrous appearance, which gave rise to such grave concerns, is now disclosed to signal that he 'shall be left upon the earth', whereas the entire offspring of the giants, together with the rest of the polluted earth, shall be washed away by the Flood (*1 En* 106.15–18).

At first sight, this passage does not seem to be primarily about the image of God, but rather about angelomorphism, the likeness between angels and man which results from the fact that some human beings are either transmuted into angels (2 En 22.8–10) or, in the context of *1 Enoch*, have been fathered by an-

gels. Noah is not regarded as an ordinary human being, but 'looks like the children of the angels of heaven' (*1 En* 106.5 οὐχ ὅμοιον τοῖς ἀνθρώποις ἀλλὰ τοῖς τέκνοις τῶν ἀγγέλων τοῦ οὐρανοῦ); 'his form is different, and he is not like us' (*1 En* 106.5 καὶ ὁ τύπος ἀλλοιότερος, οὐχ ὅμοιος ἡμῖν); he is 'of an angel' (*1 En* 106.6 ἐξ ἀγγέλου) or 'of the angels' (*1 En* 106.12 ἐξ ἀγγέλων). Yet, at the basis of all this is an interpretation of the image of God in Gen 1.26, as Methuselah's account to Enoch shows: 'For unto my son Lamech a son has been born, one whose image and form are not like unto the characteristics of human beings' – καὶ ὁ τύπος αὐτοῦ καὶ ἡ εἰκὼν αὐτοῦ οὐχ ὅμοιος ἀνθρώποις (*1 En* 106.10)'. The double expression 'image and form' is a clear allusion to the image and likeness of Gen 1.26.

The message of *1 Enoch* 106 is a very complex one. Although Noah's 'image and form are not like unto the characteristics of human beings', he is nevertheless not angelomorphic, in the sense that he, like the offspring of the Watchers, was engendered by an angelic being: 'the son who has been born is indeed righteous'. His abnormal appearance seems rather to be a symbol of a new creation of man: 'The Lord will surely make new things upon the earth' (*1 En* 106.13). This new period is inaugurated with Noah: 'call his name Noah, for he shall be the remnant for you; and he and his sons shall be saved from the corruption which shall come upon the earth' (*1 En* 106.18).

In this instance in *1 Enoch* we have, I would argue, an interpretation of the image and likeness of Gen 1.26 in a characteristically Enochic context, that of a criticism of the fallen angels which play such a dominant role in Enoch's worldview; Noah's birth signals the creation of the new, post-diluvian man, who – like Adam before him – is apparently created in the image and form of God (cf. Gen 9.6).

(b) The Fourth Book of Ezra

An equally strongly contextualized interpretation of the 'image of God' is found in *4 Ezra*, dating from the late first century AD. In this writing, the reference to the image of God occurs in a dialogue between Ezra and the angel Uriel, in which Ezra questions the appropriateness of a parable which Uriel uses to explain why so many people perish and so few are saved. According to Ezra, God is under a moral obligation to save all his people, because they have been created in his own image. Elsewhere in *4 Ezra*, too, creation is taken as 'the basis on which God should save man' (7.134; 8.7–14; cf. 8.24).[30] In the dialogue between Uriel and Ezra, the angel advances the following parable on behalf of God:

[30] Thompson 1977, 191; and 331: 'The lengthy discourses by Ezra on creation in 6.38–59 and 8.4–14 appeal to God's very act of creation as the reason why he should intervene now. Direct links between God and his creatures are established by Ezra in 6.55; 8.7, 13, 24, 44–45, with the most explicit statements being those which say that man is a creature of God's own hands (8.7, 44)'.

> 'For just as the farmer sows many seeds upon the ground and plants a multitude of seedlings, and yet not all that have been sown will come up in due season, and not all that were planted will take root; so all those who have been sown in the world will not be saved'.
>
> I answered and said, 'If I have found favour before you, let me speak. For if the farmer's seed does not come up, because it has not received your rain in due season, or if it has been ruined by too much rain, it perishes. But man, who has been formed by your hands and *is called your own image because he is made like you*, and for whose sake you have formed all things – have you also made him like the farmer's seed? No, O Lord who are over us! But spare your people and have mercy on your inheritance, for you have mercy on your own creation'. (*4 Ezra* 8.41–45)

As Thompson notes, 'Ezra vigorously objects to the illustration, for it implies an impersonal relationship between God and his creatures; as far as Ezra is concerned, man is a creature of God's own hand (8.44)'.[31] A similar plea for God's mercy, because man is his image, is encountered in the Greek version of the *Life of Adam and Eve* (33.5, 35.2). There, the angels intercede for Adam because he is God's image and the work of his hands (see § 1.1.4 [c] below).

Ezra's intercession is unsuccessful. In reply to his supplications, he receives a final answer from Uriel, in which Ezra's concern about 'the multitude of those who perish' is silenced:

> Do not ask any more questions about the multitude of those who perish. 56 For they also received freedom, but they despised the Most High, and were contemptuous of his Law, and forsook his ways. 57 Moreover they have even trampled upon his righteous ones, 58 and said in their hearts that there is no God (…). 59 (…) For the Most High did not intend that men should be destroyed; 60 but they themselves who were created have defiled the name of him who made them, and have been ungrateful to him who prepared life for them. 61 There my judgment is now drawing near. (*4 Ezra* 8.55–61)

In the discussions about theodicy, in the grave circumstances of the aftermath of the destruction of Jerusalem and its temple in AD 70, the universalistic notion of the image of God appears to be in need of clarification.[32] It is balanced with a particular understanding of human freedom and responsibility. As we shall see, this discussion is echoed in the *Apocalypse of Sedrach* and the *Vision of Ezra*.

(c) Echoes of 4 Ezra in the Apocalypse of Sedrach and the Vision of Ezra

Both of these writings, the *Apocalypse of Sedrach* and the *Vision of Ezra*, were composed quite late and are best regarded as Christian writings which are dependant on *4 Ezra*. The *Apocalypse of Sedrach*, which perhaps dates in essence

[31] Thompson 1977, 224–5.

[32] See Thompson 1977, 157 for a discussion of the author's universalistic tendencies and Idem, 206 for the question of whether the author speaks through Ezra or through the angel. For *4 Ezra*'s application of Adam language to humanity, cf. Levison 1988, 115, 125, 126.

from 150 to 500 AD but only received its final form shortly after AD 1000,[33] contains a reference to the image of God in a prayer of supplication. Sedrach, after understanding from God that man needs to repent for a full three years before a life lived in sin is forgiven, offers the following supplication for man:

> Three years are too many, my Lord. His death perchance will arrive and he will not fulfil his repentance. Have mercy, Lord, *upon your image* and be compassionate, because three years are too many. (*Apocalypse of Sedrach* 13.1–3)

The passage seems to echo Ezra's supplication in *4 Ezra* on behalf of the majority of men that perish (see § 1.1.2 [b] above). Indeed this confirms the scholarly consensus that the *Apocalypse of Sedrach* is much indebted to *4 Ezra*.[34] The application of the notion of the image of God to the question of theodicy seems to be characteristic of *4 Ezra* and the *Apocalypse of Sedrach*, and, finally, of the *Vision of Ezra*.

Like *4 Ezra*, the *Vision of Ezra*, probably dating from AD 350 to 600,[35] is about the figure of Ezra. As Ezra receives a guided tour of hell, each time he encounters a new group of people he enquires who they are and, when told, prays: 'Lord, have mercy on the sinners'. God's final reply, like in *4 Ezra*, refers to the abuse of man's own free will: 'And the Lord said, "In my image I formed man and I commanded that they not sin and they sinned; therefore they are in torment"' (*Vision of Ezra* 63). In Christian adaptations of *4 Ezra*, the image of God remained an important issue in the questions of theodicy. In these later adaptations, however, the interpretation of the notion no longer reflected the personal experience of the delusion after the first Jewish War, but was due rather to literary dependence on the writing of an author who lived through that period.

1.1.3 The Dead Sea Scrolls

(a) 4Q504: Adam, fashioned in the likeness of God's glory

Despite their voluminous contents, the Dead Sea Scrolls only contain one explicit mention of the 'image of God', or rather his 'likeness' (דְּמוּת), in 4Q504; this text will be discussed in section *a*. Yet this single passage opens up a very interesting theme, that of the 'glory of Adam', which occurs repeatedly within the scrolls, and might be relevant to the present topic, as I shall explain in section *b*. Finally, the scrolls also contain an allusion to the 'image' of Gen 1.26–27, understood as 'the pattern of the holy ones' (i. e. of the angels), on which mankind had or has been modelled; this passage in 4Q417 will be discussed in section *c*.

The text which contains an explicit use of the term 'likeness' is the *Words of the Luminaries* (4QWords of the Luminaries*ᵃ*; 4QDibHam*ᵃ*), 4Q504:

[33] Agourides 1983, 606.
[34] Agourides 1983, 607.
[35] Mueller & Robbins 1983, 583.

> [… Adam,] our father, you fashioned *in the likeness* (דְּמוּת) *of your glory* […] [… a breath of life] you blew into his nostril, and intelligence and knowledge […] [… in the gard]en of Eden, which you had planted. You made him govern […] and so that he would walk in a land of glory. (Frag. 8 4–7)

The 'likeness of your glory' is a clear reference to Gen 1.26, which speaks of the image and likeness of God. 4Q504's summary of this is remarkable, because it qualifies this likeness of God in terms of 'glory', a term never used in Gen 1. As the editor, M. Baillet, notes, and C. H. T. Fletcher-Louis has emphasized, the concept of the 'likeness of God's glory' parallels Ezekiel 1.28, where 'the likeness of the glory of YHWH' occurs in full.[36] According to Fletcher-Louis, 'it would be fair to say that in 4Q504 frag. 8 Adam is identified in some way with the Glory occupying God's throne in Ezekiel 1'. Although Fletcher-Louis uses this interpretation as a foundation stone in his somewhat forced construction of a 'divine anthropology' in the Dead Sea Scrolls,[37] it seems undeniable that in 4Q504 there is a fusion of man as 'the image and likeness of God' (Gen 1.26) and 'the likeness of the glory of YHWH' (Ezek 1.28 דְּמ֖וּת כְּבוֹד־יְהוָ֑ה), which, as we have seen in the introduction, is synonymous with 'something that seemed like a human form' (Ezek 1.26 דְּמ֕וּת כְּמַרְאֵ֥ה אָדָ֖ם). The fusion of these terms from Gen 1 and Ezek 1 shows that, as early as the Dead Sea Scrolls, these passages were read together, and, in my understanding, are indeed part of the same world-view. The notions of man's creation in the image and after the likeness of God (Gen 1) and God's apparition in the likeness of man (Ezek 1) both express the idea that man and God are related, and entail a profound criticism of images and idols which distort this unique and reciprocal relationship. In this sense, Fletcher-Louis' terminology of 'divine anthropology' can be fully justified.

Despite the fragmentary state of 4Q504, it seems clear that the 'likeness of God's glory' also has something to do with 'knowledge and understanding': '[… a breath of life] you blew into his nostril, and intelligence and knowledge […]' (4Q504 frag. 8 5). This reminds us of a similar link in *Sirach* 17.7 where, in the context of a reference to God's image, the author says that God filled man with 'knowledge and understanding': ἐπιστήμην συνέσεως ἐνέπλησεν αὐτοὺς (see § 1.1.1 [a] above).

What light does the context of 4Q504 throw on frag. 8? What possible role does the reference to the likeness of God's glory play in the whole of 4Q504? The entire document contains prayers and confessions, refers to creation, the covenant, exile and conversion, and mentions figures such as Adam, Moses and David. In the prayers, God is exhorted to act – in accordance with himself, in accordance with his great power (frags 1–2 Col. II 7) – to withdraw his wrath and rage 'from us' (frags 1–2 Col. VI 10) and to free his people from exile: 'free

[36] Baillet 1982 (DJD 7), 162–3; Fletcher-Louis 2002, 93.
[37] Fletcher-Louis 2002, 92.

your people Isr[ael from all] the countries, both near and far, [to which you have exiled us]' (frags 1–2 Col. VI 12–13); in this exile God has not forgotten them:

> You remembered your covenant, for you redeemed us in the eyes of the nations and did not desert us amongst the nations. You did favours to your people Israel among all the countries amongst whom you had exiled them, to introduce into their heart turning to you (…). For you have poured your holy spirit upon us. (Frags 1–2 Col. V 9–15)

Confessions of sin are followed by the statement that God has purified them from their sin. The author, on behalf of the community, says that they repent of their sin and wish to heed God's covenant:

> And now, on this very day on which our heart has been humbled, we atone for our sin and the sin of our fathers, together with our disloyalty and rebellion. We have not rejected your trials and punishments; our soul has not despised them to the point of breaking your covenant. (Frags 1–2 Col. VI 4–8)

This liturgical practice ('on this very day …') is characteristic for the text, which also contains references to 'hymns for the sabbath day' (frags 1–2 Col. VI 4), and a '[prayer for the] fourth day' (frag. 3 col. II 5). The daily liturgical focus seems to be echoed in the work's title, found on the reverse of our frag. 8: 'Words of the Luminaries'.

What is important for our understanding of the reference to the likeness of God's *glory* in frag. 8 is the statement in 4Q504 that '*for your glory* you have created us' (frags 1–2 Col. III 4). According to the author, the covenant which God established with David ensured that 'all the countries would see *your glory*, for you have made yourself holy in the midst of your people, Israel' (frags 1–2 Col. IV 8–9). During the prayer of the fourth day, the community exclaims: 'you are made holy *in glory*' (frag. 3 Col. II 6). The community itself seems to be the locus of God's glory: 'You are in our midst, in the column of fire and in the cloud […] your holiness, which walks in front of us, and *your glory in our midst*' (frag. 6 10–11). When frag. 8 expresses the thought that '[Adam,] our father, you fashioned *in the likeness of your glory*' (frag. 8 4) and that Adam was equipped with 'intelligence and knowledge' and was made by God to govern 'so that he would walk *in a land of glory*' (frag. 8 5–7), it seems as if the author refers back to God's initial creation of man in the likeness of God's glory as the background against which the present glory of the community is to be understood: 'your glory in our midst' (frag. 6 11). Fletcher-Louis may be going just too far when he depicts the relation between God's glory, on the one hand, and the human and communal glory, on the other, in terms of an 'ontological affinity between God and his own humanity':

> given that the liturgy starts with Adam in the land of Glory, as one made in the likeness of God's glory, there seems also here to be a priestly theology which grounded the prayer for God's restoration (…) in (…) a pre-fall relationship of ontological affinity

between God and his own humanity, now summed up in Israel. The liturgy calls for the remembrance of Adam's original state as the basis for future restoration of the true Adam-in-Israel.[38]

Nevertheless, the function of the reference to the creation in the likeness of God's glory seems to remind the community of the present restoration of this glory in the community.

Studying other passages in the Dead Sea Scrolls which talk about 'all the glory of Adam' will confirm that this present restoration is precisely what the author has in mind. It is very likely that the phrase 'all the glory of Adam' functions as a brief, contracted form of the thought, expressed in 4Q504, that Adam was created 'in the likeness of God's glory'. Adam's glory is an effulgence of God's own glory. According to the passages on 'all the glory of Adam', this Adamic, but simultaneously also divine glory, is renewed in the Qumran community.

(b) 'All the glory of Adam'

Although 4Q504 contains the only reference to the image of God in the Dead Sea Scrolls, the topic of Adam's creation in the likeness of God's glory opens up the broader issue of 'Adam's glory', as it is called in several Dead Sea Scrolls writings, including some very important ones, such as the *Rule of the Community* and the *Damascus Document*. According to the *Rule of the Community* (1QS), 'all the glory of Adam' shall be granted to those who hold to God's covenant:

> In this way the upright will understand knowledge of the Most High, and the wisdom of the sons of heaven will teach those of perfect behaviour. For these are those selected by God for an everlasting covenant and *to them shall belong all the glory of Adam*. There will be no more injustice and all the deeds of trickery will be a dishonour (1QS IV 22–23).

In the context of 1QS, however, the notion of 'all the glory of Adam' is quite complex. The stress seems to be on the adjective 'all': *all* the glory of Adam. Earlier in 1QS, as part of his instruction in 'the history of all the sons of man' (Col. III 13), the author has already addressed the original creation of man. According to 1QS,

> He [God] created man to rule the world and placed within him *two spirits* so that he would walk with them until the moment of his [i. e. God's] visitation: they are the spirits of truth and of deceit. In the hand of the Prince of Lights is dominion over all the sons of justice; they walk on paths of light. And in the hand of the Angel of Darkness is total dominion over the sons of deceit; they walk on paths of darkness. (Col. III 17–21)[39]

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[38] Fletcher-Louis 2002, 94.
[39] Cf. Wegner 1975.

After the author has emphasized that it is God who 'created the spirits of light and of darkness' (Col. III 25), and having dwelled extensively on the aforementioned 'paths in the world' of both spirits (Col. IV 2–14), the author, in a perfect inclusio, concludes: 'In these lies the history of all men' (Col. IV 15; cf. III 13). Subsequently he turns to the end of time, 'the last day', at the time of God's 'visitation', at 'the time appointed for judgment' (Col. IV 16–20), when this dual composition of man will end:

> God will refine, with his truth, all man's deeds, and will purify for himself *the configuration of man*, ripping out all spirit of injustice from the innermost part of his flesh, and cleansing him with the spirit of holiness from every irreverent deed. He will sprinkle over him the spirit of truth like lustral water (in order to cleanse him) from all the abhorrences of deceit and from the defilement of the unclean spirit. (Col. IV 20–22)

Man's dual configuration is re-configured so that the unclean spirit of deceit and darkness is no longer present within him, in his innermost part. As a result, he will now, for the first time, receive '*all* the glory of Adam' which will turn the members of the Qumran community into just human beings:

> In this way the upright will understand knowledge of the Most High, and the wisdom of the sons of heaven will teach those of perfect behaviour. For these are those selected by God for an everlasting covenant and to them shall belong *all the glory of Adam*. There will be no more injustice and all the deeds of trickery will be a dishonour. (Col. IV 22–23)

This acquisition of 'all the glory of Adam' is nothing less than a 'new creation' which ends the dual configuration of man which has held until now, i. e. until the foundation of the Qumran community:

> Until now the spirits of truth and of injustice feud in the heart of man and they walk in wisdom or in folly. In agreement with man's birthright in justice and in truth, so he abhors injustice; and according to his share in the lot of injustice he acts irreverently in it and so abhors the truth. For God has sorted them into equal parts *until the appointed end and the new creation*. (Col. IV 23–25)

It is immediately after this 'history of all the sons of man', that 1QS continues with the rule of the community proper: 'This is the rule for the men of the Community …' (Col. V 1). This clearly implies that, within the community, the new creation has started and that 'all the glory of Adam' has become available for those admitted to God's covenant with the Qumran community.

The concept of 'all the glory of Adam' in 1QS ties in nicely with the notion of Adam's creation in 'the likeness of God's glory' in 4Q504. In the latter document, too, there is a hint that man's primordial possession of God's glory is restored within the community: 'Your [i. e. God's] glory in our midst'. There is some inconsistency between the two documents. 4Q504 works on the assumption that man's present divine glory within the community is the restoration of

what was already fully available to Adam. The first man was created in the likeness of God's glory. In 1QS, however, the presentation is somewhat more complex, due to the document's dual anthropology. Since the 'configuration of man' was dual from the outset (Col. IV 20–21), when God placed two spirits in Adam (Col. III 17–18), it seems to be only the latter-day Qumranic Adam who has the evil spirit ripped out 'from the innermost part of his flesh' (Col. IV 20–21); to *him* belongs '*all* the glory of Adam', i. e. a glory exceeding the still limited glory of the first Adam. In this case, in 1QS, there is not just talk of a restoration of Adam's likeness to God's glory, but even of a glory transcending that of Adam. This is just a matter of emphasis, however.

The notion of 'all the glory of Adam' also occurs in other documents, testifying to the importance of this way of thinking in the Dead Sea Scrolls. In the *Damascus Document*, the author explains that 'all the glory of Adam' is destined for those who distance themselves from those Israelites who went astray:

> But God, in his wonderful mysteries, atoned for their failings and pardoned their sins. And he built for them a safe home in Israel, such as there has not been since ancient times, not even till now. Those who remained steadfast in it will acquire eternal life, *and all the glory of Adam is for them*. (CD-A, p. III 18–20)

The identity of those who gain 'all the glory of Adam' is further disclosed by a quotation and subsequent interpretation of Ezekiel 44.15:

> As God established for them by means of Ezekiel the prophet, saying: 'The priests and the Levites and the sons of Zadok who maintained the service of my temple when the children of Israel strayed far away from me, shall offer the fat and the blood' (Ezek 44.15). The priests are the converts of Israel who left the land of Judah; and 'the Levites' are those who joined them; and the sons of Zadok are the chosen of Israel, 'those called by name' who stood up at the end of days. (Pp. III 20 – IV 4)

The 'safe home in Israel' (p. III 19) is the new eschatological community of Qumran, established 390 years after the Babylonian exile and ministered by the 'Teacher of Righteousness' (p. I 5–7, 11). Just as in 4Q504 and 1QS, the community is the place where 'all the glory of Adam' is fully realized. After the wilderness of the exile, the community is portrayed as a sort of Paradise Regained.[40] This is also rendered explicit in one of the commentaries on the Psalms in 4QPsalms Pesher*a* (4Q171 [4QpPs*a*]), which describes the members of the Qumran community in the following way:

> [Ps 37.19 They shall not] be ashamed in [the evil time. Its interpretation concerns …] those who have returned from *the wilderness*, who will live for a thousand generations, in safety; *for them there is all the inheritance of Adam* and his descendants ever. (4Q171 Col. II 27 – III 2)

[40] Cf. Fletcher-Louis 2002, 97: 'the idea that the community already has Adam's glory is consistent with the fact that the community have also returned to the pre-lapsarian world of Eden'.

In this text, the notion of all the glory of Adam is now formulated in terms of 'all the inheritance of Adam'.

The conviction that the members of the community are the recipients of Adam's glory is also expressed in the hymns of the Dead Sea Scrolls. In 1QHymns[a] (1QHodayoth[a] [1QH[a]]), God's glory is praised as follows:

> [You protect] the ones who serve you loyally, so that their posterity is before you all the days. You raise an [eternal] name for them, [forgiving them all] sin, eliminating from them all their depravities, *giving them as a legacy all the glory of Adam* and plentiful days. (1QH[a] Col. IV 14–15)

As the *Words of the Luminaries* (4Q504) already showed, the notion of Adam's glory is expressed in the community's liturgy. But not only liturgical texts, but – as we have seen – also foundational documents as the *Rule of the Community* and the *Damascus Document* contain this notion. In that sense, the theme is deeply rooted in the Dead Sea Scrolls. Although there is only one explicit reference to Adam's creation in the likeness of God's glory in 4Q504, the theme of 'all the glory of Adam' and 'all the inheritance of Adam' is clearly dependent upon it; this phrase, 'all the glory of Adam', is indeed the contracted form of the view that Adam's glory reflects the brilliance of God's glory and is being restored at present within the boundaries of the Qumran community.

I would agree with Fletcher-Louis's conclusion that

> the notion of Adam's glory is best understood as an affirmation of a particular theological anthropology, rooted, not in the *Endzeit*, but the *Urzeit*: because the true Israel are the true Adam and the Qumran community are the true Israel they possess all that Adam possessed before his departure from paradise.[41]

Yet his interpretation goes too far when, on the basis of 4Q504's talk of the creation of Adam in the likeness of God's glory, he construes the glory of Adam as the embodiment of God's own glory:

> it ['all the glory of Adam'] should also now be read through the lens provided by 4Q504 frag. 8 where, again in a liturgical context, Adam possesses a glory which is then transferred to the true Israel. Here (…) it is not simply a human 'honour' or 'dignity' that is in view, but a Glory which is God's own. The Qumran community believed then, that it was their vocation to fulfil the responsibility given to Adam *to embody God's own Glory*'.[42]

Here Fletcher-Louis glosses over the fact that 4Q504 does not talk about Adam as identical with God's glory, but as created 'in the likeness of God's glory'. He allows 'the likeness of the glory of YHWH' from Ezek 1.28 – which is certainly conflated with Gen 1.26 in 4Q504 – to bear too heavily on the meaning of this

[41] Fletcher-Louis 2002, 97.
[42] Ibidem, italics mine.

fragment so as to point to an 'ontological affinity between God and his own humanity', which entails a responsibility 'to embody God's own glory'.[43] The fragment, however, talks only of fashioning Adam '*in* the likeness of God's glory', not as its likeness. Although only a small difference, it cautions us against detecting a fully developed 'divine anthropology' in the Dead Sea Scrolls.[44] Yet there is no denying that, in the Dead Sea Scrolls, we have a very interesting reflection on the godlikeness of man, which constitutes a further development of that which is already entailed in the Priestly Source-type of anthropology and theology that lies behind both Gen 1.26 and Ezek 1.26, 28 (see the introduction above). This shows the potential of Gen 1.26 for the development of a divine anthropology. It is this development, as I shall argue in chap. 2, that gained important momentum when it was fused with an independent development in Greek ethics, the notion of assimilation to God. When these views met, they forged an impressive synthesis, which seems to have been recognized also on the pagan side, as we shall see in due course (see § 2.1.5 below).

(c) 4Q417: Humanity's formation according to the patterns of the angels

Finally, I wish to draw attention to a passage in 4QInstruction (4Q417) which was inspired by Gen 1.26–27. Unlike 4Q504, it does not use the same terminology of דְּמוּת, 'likeness' (4Q504 Frag. 8 4: '[… Adam,] our father, you fashioned *in the likeness* (דְּמוּת) *of your glory*'), which occurs in Gen 1.26–27. Instead, 4Q417 uses the terminology of תבנית, 'pattern':

> He gave it [i. e. the vision of the meditation] as an inheritance to Man / Enosh (אנוש) together with a spiritual people (עם רוח). F[o]r according to the pattern (כתבנית) of the Holy Ones (קדושים) is his [i. e. man's] fashioning (יצרו). But no more (ועוד לוא) has meditation been given to a (?) fleshly spirit (רוח בשר), for it [sc. flesh] knew / knows not the difference between [goo]d and evil according to the judgement of its [sp]irit. (Frag. 1 i lines 16–18; trans. DJD 34)[45]

Before briefly commenting on this passage, it should be noted that there is no consensus regarding the translation of this text. The meaning of several terms and phrases in this short passage is highly debated, especially the meaning and reference of אנוש ('man' or 'Enosh'), עם רוח ('spiritual people'), תבנית ('pattern'; 'figure', 'image'), קדושים ('the Holy Ones'), יצרו ('his fashioning' or 'his inclination', the pronominal suffix referring back to אנוש), ועוד לוא ('and no more') and רוח בשר ('spirit of flesh'). Recently, B. G. Wold has published a monograph on 4QInstruction, in which he discusses six different interpretations before giv-

[43] Fletcher-Louis 2002, 94 and 97.

[44] For the term 'divine anthropology', see Fletcher-Louis 2002, 92.

[45] For text, translation and commentary of 4Q417, see Strugnell, Harrington, Elgvin & Fitzmyer 1999 (DJD 34), 143–210: 4QInstruction^{c}, with no relevant changes of frag. 1 i in Tigchelaar 2001, chap. 4, 51–60 at 52–4.

ing his own.[46] Different decisions about the meaning and reference of some of these terms prove to result in radically different understandings of the text as a whole.

I shall merely discuss what seems to be the most contentious term in the discussion, that of אנוש, as it will provide an impression of the difficulties involved and because its meaning is directly relevant for our topic, answering the question *who* has been created after the pattern of the holy ones. As regards קדושים, I shall state only, with A. Lange, J.J. Collins and Wold,[47] that it refers to angels. To be created כתבנית קדושים means to be created after the pattern of the angels and is clearly an interpretation of God's exhortation in the first person plural in Gen 1.26: 'Then God said, 'Let us make humankind in our image (נַעֲשֶׂה אָדָם בְּצַלְמֵנוּ), according to our likeness (כִּדְמוּתֵנוּ)'. Especially since Gen 1.27 subsequently turns to the singular form, 'So God created humankind in his image (בְּצַלְמוֹ), in the image of God (בְּצֶלֶם אֱלֹהִים) he created them', the plural of Gen 1.26 calls for an explanation. In a particular reading, the plural is also maintained in Gen 1.27, if בְּצֶלֶם אֱלֹהִים is translated as 'in the image of the gods', the angels.[48] In 4Q417, it is not God but the angels who are understood as providing the model after which אנוש is created. The main question now is what, in 4Q417, the identity is of this אנוש, created after the pattern of these angels.

The term אנוש is understood in three different ways:

(a) Some understand it as a reference to Enosh, the son born to Adam and Eve's third son Seth (Gen 4.26); this interpretation – supported by Lange, G.J. Brooke and mentioned as a possible translation by D.J. Harrington and J. Strugnell in their edition in DJD 34[49] – considers the passage as a historical narrative statement about Enosh: 'Enosh and a spiritual people of that time'.[50] Yet, as the DJD editors acknowledge, this interpretation is countered by the facts that the reader 'would be completely unprepared for a reference to the individual Enosh'; that 'Enosh' is not frequent in Qumran literature; and that 'in general proper names are exceedingly rare in 4Q415 ff.'.[51]

(b) Others take אנוש as a reference to the first man, Adam. This is the position defended by Collins and M.J. Goff.[52] This interpretation turns the passage into

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[46] Wold 2005, § 4.2, 124–49; cf. also § 3.2.6, 97–102 for a first presentation of the fragment.

[47] Lange 1995, chap. 2, 45–92 at 86; Collins 1999, 609–18 at 613–14; Wold 2005, 141 and 145–9. *Pace* Elgvin 1998, 113–50 at 142, who understands קדושים as a reference to the members of the Qumran community and as synonymous with עם רוח, the 'spiritual people'.

[48] Cf. Collins 1999, 615.

[49] Lange 1995, 87–8; Brooke 2001, 201–20 at 213; Harrington & Strugnell in Strugnell 1999 (DJD 34), 155 (trans.), 164–5 (comm.).

[50] Wold 2005, 101.

[51] Harrington & Strugnell in Strugnell 1999 (DJD 34), 164.

[52] Collins 1999, 610–12; Goff, 2003, chap. 3: 'The "Spiritual People" and the "Fleshly Spirit": The Instruction of 4Q417 1 i 13–18', 80–126 at 95–9.

an anthropological statement which expresses a strongly dualistic anthropology primarily based on creation: if vision is given to Adam, together with the spiritual people, because Adam's fashioning or inclination is according to the pattern of the holy ones, then a dualism is construed between, on the one hand, Adam and the spiritual people (the creation of the spiritual people according to the patterns of the holy ones, i. e. the angels, described in Gen 1) and, on the other, the spirit of flesh (the second creation from Gen 2). The statement about Adam and the spiritual people who have been created after the pattern of the angels is not a general anthropological statement but is rather restricted to Adam and the עם רוח. It is not all humanity that is created in the likeness of the angels, but only Adam and the spiritual people, as opposed to the רוח בשר, the spirit of flesh. As a result, humanity is dualistically divided from the moment of creation. The readers of 4Q417, then, are invited to share in the pattern of the angels.

This dualism is gleaned by Collins from a parallel in *The Tractate of the Two Spirits* in 1QS where it is said that God 'created אנוש ('man' in the sense of 'humanity', or the first man, i. e. Adam) to rule the world and placed within him two spirits (וישם לו שתי רוחות) so that he would walk until the moment of his visitation' (1QS iii 17–18).[53] Collins further supports this dualistic understanding by drawing an analogy with Philo's supposed dualism, underlying his notion of a double creation in Gen 1 en 2. As Collins puts it:

> Philo understands the two Adams in his own philosophical framework. The Qumran Sapiential text [i. e. 4Q417] understands them as two types of humanity, a spiritual people in the likeness of the Holy Ones and a 'spirit of flesh'. The duality of human existence is formulated differently in the Instruction on the Two Spirits in the Community Rule: God created *'ĕnôš* [אנוש] to rule the world and appointed for him two spirits. The two formulations, however, are attempting to express the same conviction, that humanity is divided dualistically right from creation.[54]

In this, Collins is followed by Goff. Like Collins, Goff roots the contrast between 'the spiritual people' and the 'fleshly spirit' in 4Q417 in the creation of two distinct types of people.[55] This dualism is based on a particular understanding of Gen 1–3 as distinguishing between 'the god-like Adam of Genesis 1' and the 'Adam made of dust in Genesis 2–3':

> In contrast to the god-like Adam of Genesis 1, Adam in chapters 2–3 is creaturely. While Genesis 1.27 emphasizes Adam's affinity with the divine realm in 2.7 his base and earthly nature is stressed: 'then the Lord God formed man (האדם) from the dust of the ground, and breathed into his nostrils the breath of life; and the man became a living being (נפש חיה)'. (…) The god-like Adam of Genesis 1 corresponds to the 'spiritual people'. The Adam made of dust in Genesis 2–3 accords with the 'fleshly spirit'. 4QIn-

53 Collins 1999, 616–17.

54 Collins 1997, 123–5 at 124–5; cf. also Collins 1999, 617: 'As in Philo, the two accounts of the creation of Adam are taken to reflect the creation of two different types of humanity'.

55 Goff 2003, § 3.2.4, 94–9.

struction's presentation of two different types of humankind appeals to the two contrasting portrayals of Adam in Genesis 1–3.[56]

Although Goff reckons with the possibility 'that the author of 4QInstruction did not believe that two separate types of humankind were fashioned *at creation* but rather that they *became* two groups *later in time*', a position to be defended by Wold and outlined below, Goff considers this to be 'an interpretative possibility' but rules against it in favour of the view that the formation of these types is rooted in the creation of humankind.[57] Like, Collins, Goff also stresses the similarity between 4Q417's two types of humankind and the 'double creation' in Philo: 'Both 4QInstruction and Philo base a dualistic understanding of humanity in Gen 1–3'.[58] Despite the more philosophical character of Philo's treatment, this similarity is regarded as being so close that Goff suggests 'that Philo reshapes Palestinian sapiential traditions that are attested in 4QInstruction in the light of Hellenistic philosophy'.[59]

In the understanding of both Collins and Goff, the dualism of 4Q417 is based on a dual creation of man. Although I shall return below to a criticism of Collins and Goff's dualistic anthropological reading of 4Q417, I shall already point out here that it seems wrong to label Philo's view of a dual creation as dualistic. As I shall argue in § 5.1 below, from Philo's perspective the concrete creation of the earthly man in Gen 2 does not stand in dualistic opposition to the idealistic fashioning of the heavenly man in Gen 1, but rather constitutes its further realization. It is only those who sever the link between the heavenly and the earthly man and remain content with the latter, distancing themselves from the former, who bring about an opposition between two types of man.

(c) A third option, proposed by T. Elgvin, listed by the editors of the DJD and further substantiated by Wold, regards אנוש as a reference to man, in the sense of 'mankind', 'humanity'.[60] Unlike the previous option, this understanding implies an anthropological statement of general scope, since it is not limited to Adam and the עם רוח, but concerns all humanity. Therefore, this anthropology is not dualistic in the sense that 'humanity is divided dualistically right from creation' (Collins).[61] This identification of אנוש with humanity is much more probable. I agree with Wold that Collins's interpretation of אנוש as Adam is unlikely because, 'if the author(s) of 4Q417 1 i truly had in mind an allusion to the creation of two types of Adam, he would likely have not used such an ambiguous term'.[62] Wold

[56] Goff 2003, 98–9.

[57] Goff 2003, 99 (italics mine); cf. 95.

[58] Goff 2003, § 3.2.5.3, 120–1 at 121.

[59] Ibidem.

[60] Elgvin 1998, 142–3; Harrington & Strugnell in: Strugnell 1999 (DJD 34), 155 (trans.), 164–5 (comm.); Wold 2005, §§ 4.2.7–4.2.11, 138–49.

[61] Collins 1997, 125.

[62] Wold 2005, 131.

rightly states that 4Q417 1 i 'does not need to be read as excluding all humanity from creation in the likeness of the holy ones', and asks: 'Are we to assume that those of the second creation, that is a segment of humanity derived from earth, were not a part of the first creation (…)?'[63] For this reason Wold wishes to reconsider the portrayal of two creations as proposed by Collins and Goff. If אנוש is more likely to refer to all humanity, the following interpretation of 4Q417 emerges. Indeed, 4Q417 presents a clear distinction between two peoples, between the 'spiritual people' and the 'fleshly spirit' but

> the division between the עם רוח and humanity is a delineation between a dualism at the present time that was not part of primordial creation. Both the original state of creation without a division and the present reality of two types of humanity are woven together in 4Q417 1 i lines 15–18. The designation 'fleshly spirit' is given to those who 'knew not the difference between good and evil' (l. 17) and for whom revelation is *no longer* available. (…) The creation of all humanity in the image of קדושים and the bequeathing of divine revelation to them were followed by a subsequent failure of a segment of humanity to know and adhere to a pursuit of wisdom. The condemnation of this group of humanity follows their failure to seek wisdom, the result of which was the loss of access to revelation for these people and their designation as the 'spirit of flesh'.[64]

This dualism does not reach back to the very moment of creation; it is 'a dualism based upon behaviour and revelation rather than creation'.[65] I fully subscribe, then, to Wold's conclusion, against Collins and Goff, that it 'is not necessary to read 4Q417 1 i lines 15–18 dualistically as referring to a "spiritual people" created in the likeness of the holy ones and a "fleshly spirit" that is not'.[66] Neither Philo (as I already suggested above) nor indeed 4Q417 are testimony to a dualistic anthropology dating back to creation.

The importance for the topic of this section as a whole is that, according to 4Q417, it is all humanity that has been formed כתבנית קדושים, after the pattern of the holy ones, the angels. This text shows that, here at least, there is not only a connection between man and God, but also between man and angels. Angelology and anthropology are intertwined in this text, since God's exhortation in Gen 1.26 – 'God said, "Let us make humankind in our image (נַעֲשֶׂה אָדָם בְּצַלְמֵנוּ), according to our likeness (כִּדְמוּתֵנוּ)"' – is clearly thought to be addressed to the angels: man's fashioning is 'according to the pattern of the holy ones', i.e. the angels. Whereas all human beings were created according to the pattern of the angels, only the 'spiritual people' continue to receive God's vision, whereas the others, those who are called 'the fleshly spirit', have ceased to model themselves on the angelic pattern after which they were once created.

63 Wold 2005, 133 and 134.
64 Wold 2005, 139–40.
65 Wold 2005, 141; cf. further 146 and 148–9.
66 Wold 2005, 148.

Unlike 4Q417, the 4Q504 fragment of the *Words of the Luminaries*, as we have seen above (§ 1.1.3 [a]), expressed the idea that humanity was even fashioned in the likeness (דמות) of *God*, of his glory. In this understanding, there is not just a similarity between human beings and angels, an angelic anthropology, but even a type of divine anthropology. This glorious identity of Adam, 'all the glory of Adam', as we saw in other Dead Sea Scrolls (§ 1.1.3 [b]), is thought of as being re-established within the Qumran community. As has been argued in the present section, this community could also regard itself as the spiritual people that, siding with Adam, was modelled on the pattern of the angels. For this reason, the Dead Sea Scrolls are evidence of both a divine and an angelic anthropology based on Gen 1.26–27.

1.1.4 Anti-idolatrous application: the image of God and other images

A different perspective on the image of God is present in the *Sibylline Oracles*. As we have already seen in the introduction, the original development of the notion of the image of God in the Priestly Source might already have occurred in opposition to the images of pagan cult. This contrast also occurs in the *Sibylline Oracles*. It is implicit in the Jewish part of the *Sibylline Oracles* and is rendered explicit in book VIII, which is considered to be of Christian origin. Finally, the full consequences of the idea that man is the image of God, and not the idols, seem to be drawn in the *Life of Adam and Eve* (*LAE*), which is probably also Christian. According to *LAE*, Adam, as God's image, was the proper object of angelic worship. All these interpretations concern the antithesis, whether explicit or implicit, between man as the image of God and other (idolatrous) images.

(a) The Sibylline Oracles, book III/II: An implicit antithesis in the Jewish material

The contrast between man as God's image and the images of pagan cult is already present, albeit in implicit form, at the beginning of book III of the *Sibylline Oracles*. Neither the date nor the origin of III 1–45 are known, although its contents show similarities to Jewish material.[67] In a passage denouncing idolatry, mankind is addressed as follows:

> Men, who have the form which God moulded in his image
> (ἄνθρωποι θεόπλαστον ἔχοντες ἐν εἰκόνι μορφήν),
> Why do you wander in vain, and not walk the straight path
> ever mindful of the immortal creator? (III 8–10)

[67] Goodman 1986*a*, 639–40 and 630–1. The present introduction to book III (III 1–96) is generally thought to derive from the original book II, which is not, however, identical with the extant book II.

As the passage continues by criticizing man-made idols (III 29–35), it is possible that this sentence hints at an opposition between image and images, although here the latter are not called *eikones* but *eidōla*, so that a deliberately intended antithesis is not clear. Just such an explicit antithesis, however, occurs in book VIII.

(b) The Sibylline Oracles, book VIII: An explicit antithesis in the Christian material

The following passage in book VIII of the *Sibylline Oracles*, which is generally taken to be of Christian origin,[68] is highly relevant. The passage is part of a denunciation of idolatry (8.359–428) spoken by God himself, and develops an explicit antithesis between the images (εἰκόνες) used in pagan idolatry and man, as God's image (εἰκών):

> Godless ones also call their images (τὰς εἰκόνας αὐτῶν) gods,
> abandoning the Creator, thinking to have
> all hope and life from them. Trusting
> in dumb and speechless things with evil result, they are ignorant of good end.
> I myself proposed two ways, of life and death,
> And proposed to the judgment to choose good life.
> But they turned eagerly to death and eternal fire.
> Man is my image (εἰκών ἐστ' ἄνθρωπος ἐμὴ), having right reason.
> (VIII 395–402)

Here, we encounter an explicit opposition between man, as God's proper image, and the other idolatrous images which, I believe, is the same as that already found within the Jewish scriptures (see the introduction above).[69] As I have suggested, God's image is contrasted with the images of pagan cults in the Priestly Source. This contrast occurred in an implicit form already in the Jewish material of Book III / II of the *Sibylline Oracles*, but is now rendered explicit.

(c) The Life of Adam and Eve

The fullest, most radical consequence of this reflection on man as the image of God seems to be drawn in the *Life of Adam and Eve* (*LAE*).[70] The Jewish origins of this apocryphon are increasingly questioned and the writing is probably Christian.[71] According to *LAE*, if Adam is the true image of God, he constitutes the proper object of worship, not by fellow human beings, but by the angels. In

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[68] See Goodman 1986*a*, 645.
[69] This similarity is also noted by Kutsko 2000*a*, 134n49.
[70] A synopsis of the various versions (Greek, Latin, Armenian, Georgian and Slavonic) is presented, with translation, in Anderson & Stone 1999.
[71] See De Jonge 2003, chap. 12, 181–200: 'The Christian Origin of the Greek *Life of Adam and Eve*'; and Davila 2005, 232–3. But cf. Vermes & Goodman 1987*a*, 758–9, who defend the Jewishness of the original work and assume a dating in the first or early second century AD.

LAE, the phrase 'image of God' becomes wholly identical with Adam. The remark of Gen 1.26 that Adam is created *in* the image and *after* the likeness of God is passed over in silence. Adam simply *is* God's image and, within this mind-set, he is the object of worship by the angels. In the Latin version of *LAE*, Satan gives Adam the following account of his expulsion from heaven:

> 13.1 The devil replied, 'Adam, what are you telling me? It is because of you that I have been thrown out of there. 2 When you were created, I was cast out from the presence of God and was sent out from the fellowship of the angels. 3 When God blew into you the breath of life and your face and likeness were made *in the image of God* (*et factus est vultus et similitudo tua ad imaginem dei*), Michael brought you and made (us) worship you in the sight of God, and the LORD God said, "Behold Adam! I have made you *in our image and likeness* (*ad imaginem et similitudinem nostram*)."
>
> 14.1 And Michael went out and called all the angels, saying, "Worship *the image of the LORD God* (*adorate imaginem domini dei*), as the LORD God has instructed." 2 And Michael himself worshipped first, and called me and said, "Worship *the image of God*, Yahweh (*adora imaginem dei Jehova*)." 3 And I answered, "I do not worship Adam." And when Michael kept forcing me to worship, I said to him, "Why do you compel me? I will not worship one inferior and subsequent to me. I am prior to him in creation; before he was made, I was already made. He ought to worship me."
>
> 15.1 When they heard this, other angels who were under me refused to worship him. 2 And Michael asserted, "Worship *the image of God* (*adora imaginem dei*). But if now you will not worship, the LORD God will be wrathful with you." 3 And I said, "If he be wrathful with me, I will set my throne above the stars of heaven and will be like the Most High."' (*LAE – Vita* 13.1–15.3)

Whereas the devil and God are still quoted as saying, respectively, that God has made Adam's face and likeness '*in* the image of God' and that 'I', God, 'have made you [Adam] *in* our image and likeness' (13.3), Michael takes Adam to *be* 'the image of the LORD God' and commands all the angels to worship this image (14.1–2; 15.2).

Levison is probably correct when he also deduces from *LAE* 13 that the nature of the 'image of God' is physical here:

> the *imago dei* is the visible image of God in Adam, as the author's adaptation of Gen 1.27 and 2.7 reveals. (…) The inbreathing (Gen 2.7) is the act by which Adam became God's image (Gen 1.27). The image itself consists of physical similarity to God. The 'man' does not become a 'living being' (MT and LXX); according to Vita his face and likeness take on the image of God.[72]

This view is unique to the Latin version. The passage is altogether absent from the Greek and Slavonic versions. The relevant part of the parallel passage in the Armenian version runs as follows: 'God said to Michael: "Behold I have made

[72] Levison 1988, 177–8 at 178.

Adam in the likeness of my image"', leaving out the reference to Adam's face. The Georgian version, however, does refer to Adam's face, but as part of a paraphrase of Gen 2.7 ('the LORD God formed man from the dust of the ground, and breathed *into his nostrils* the breath of life'): 'when God breathed a spirit *onto your face*, you had the image and likeness of divinity'. Thus the view that Adam's face and likeness have been made in the image of God is unique to the Latin version.[73]

D. Steenburg, too, proposes a physical interpretation of God's image in this passage:

> the use of 'face' in this passage is an irregular departure from the standard idiom of 'image', a departure occasioned by the concern to relate God's image in Adam directly to his physical shape or visible appearance (…). 'Image' is somewhat general and ambiguous with regard to the nature of the representation; the *imago dei* is generally applicable to all human beings in *Vit. Ad.* 'Face' relates more specifically to physical, visual appearance.[74]

If indeed 'the image is actually the physical representation of God',[75] then this view is similar to other physical interpretations of the 'image of God' (see, for a more detailed discussion, § 1.1.7 below). At the same time, the explicit statement that this likeness between God and man concerns *the face* is remarkably similar to a particular view on the divine and human face in *2 Enoch*, where it serves as the basis for a universalistic ethic focused on 'the face of the other' (see § 1.1.5 below).

According to the Latin version of *LAE*, the fact that Adam is the image of God which, at the command of Michael, is therefore to be worshipped by all the angels constitutes the reason for Satan's disobedience and subsequent fall. When Satan refuses to worship someone who is 'inferior and subsequent' to him and threatens to revolt against God and to become like him, he is cast down from heaven. Levison rightly concludes that the '*imago dei* is extremely important for the author of Vita because it is the basis for Satan's enmity against the human race'.[76]

Later in the Latin version of *LAE*, the motif of Satan's refusal to worship Adam reoccurs when Satan attacks Seth and is cursed for it by Seth's mother, Eve: 'Cursed beast! How is it that you were not afraid to throw yourself at the image of God, but have dared to attack it?' (*LAE – Vita* 37.3). In this case, Satan's subjection to man is emphasized even more strongly in the parallel passage in the Greek *LAE*: 'O you evil beast, do you not fear to attack the image of God? (…) How did you not remember your subjection, for you were once subjected

[73] For translations of the versions, see Anderson & Stone 1999, 16E.
[74] Steenburg 1990, 96–7.
[75] Thus Levison 1988, 185.
[76] Ibidem.

to the image of God?' (*LAE – Apocalypse* 10.3). Seth, too, addresses the beast and says:

> 'May the LORD God rebuke you. Stop; be quiet; close your mouth, cursed enemy of truth, chaotic destroyer. Stand back from *the image of God* until the day when the LORD God shall order you to be brought to judgment'. And the beast said to Seth, 'See, I stand back from the presence of *the image of God*, as you have said'. Immediately he left Seth, who was wounded by (his) teeth. (*LAE – Vita* 39.1–3 = *Apocalypse* 12.1–2)

The passage shows that it is not just Adam but his youngest son Seth, too, who represents the image of God. As Levison notes, 'The *imago dei* belongs to Seth, and the author intends the reader to infer that all humanity "until the day of judgment" possesses the image as well'.[77]

In the Greek *LAE*, Adam's identity as God's image is also reason for the angels to plead for God's mercy on Adam after his transgression:

> And the angels fell down and worshipped God, crying out and saying, 'Holy Jael, forgive, *for he is your image*, and the work of your (holy hands)'. (*LAE – Apocalypse* 33.5)[78]

The continuation of this passage suggests that this image is understood in a physical sense as Eve draws Seth's attention to the body of his father in heaven:

> She said to him: 'Look up with your eyes and see the seven heavens opened, and see with your eyes how *the body* of your father lies on its face, and all the holy angels are with him, praying for him and saying, 'Forgive him, O Father of all, *for he is your image*'. (*LAE – Apocalypse* 35.2)

As far as the intercession for God's image is concerned, the Greek *LAE* very much resembles *4 Ezra*, where we have seen that Ezra intercedes for mankind because man 'has been formed by your hands and is called your own image because he is made like you' (8.44; see § 1.1.2 [b] above).[79]

Although *LAE* is probably Christian, the motifs of the exaltation of Adam and of the command to worship him do also occur in Jewish literature[80]. Despite the fact that this Jewish literature is probably later than *LAE*, this does suggest that the motif is already Jewish and that the Christian author of *LAE* did not invent this topic, but drew on existing Jewish traditions to this effect. This remarkable view – that Adam, in his capacity as the image of God, was to be worshipped as an idol by angels – could be taken as the most radical consequence of the extraordinary position accorded to man in the Priestly Source, and of a kind of

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[77] Ibidem.

[78] Cf. Levison 1988, 171–3.

[79] This congruence between *LAE* and *4 Ezra* has also been noticed by Levison 1988, 186.

[80] For these traditions, see Anderson 2000. Cf. Orlov 2005, 220n35; Fletcher-Louis 2002, 99.

divine anthropology also expressed in the Dead Sea Scrolls.[81] It highlights the potential of a divine anthropology already implicit in the view of the Priestly Source that man, as a living being, fulfils the role of the image of God. According to Schüle, this way of thinking in P differed greatly from common Ancient Near Eastern views on the relation between human beings and cultic images. According to Schüle,

> The cultic image is in fact the medium of manifest divine presence and action in the world and as such part of the divine person. It is, to put it pointedly, 'god on earth'. According to a common motif of ancient mythology, human beings are destined to serve the gods who are present in the form of their images. P, however, takes a different approach. Adam (…) does not occur in the role of a servant but is himself associated with the image. It is not for 'pragmatic' reasons that humans are created, they rather assume divine dignity in that they represent God in the created world as the cultic image would do.[82]

Against this background, *LAE*'s notion of Adam being worshipped by angels is less surprising than it appears at first sight.

1.1.5 A particular ethical understanding of the 'image of God': 2 Enoch

A distinctively ethical interpretation of the 'image of God' is characteristic of *2 Enoch*. Although there is no consensus about *2 Enoch* with regard to its origins, its date, or its contents in its first published form,[83] it seems probable that it is Christian, as I shall point out again below. In *2 Enoch*, the image of God provides the foundational notion for ethics. Enoch teaches his sons that it is forbidden to insult fellow human beings because man has been created 'in a facsimile of God's face':

> The LORD with his own two hands created mankind; *in a facsimile of his own face*, both small and great, the LORD created them. And whoever insults a person's face, insults the face of a king, and treats the face of the LORD with repugnance. He who treats with contempt the face of any person treats the face of the LORD with contempt. (44.1–3)

The term 'image' has here been replaced with 'face'. In the preceding chapter, Enoch has just pointed to the many differences which distinguish one man from another:

> For, just as one year is more honourable than another year, 'so one person is more honourable than another person' – some because of much property; some again because of wisdom of the heart; some again because of singular intelligence; some again because of craftiness; some again because of silence of the lips; some again

[81] Cf., but differently, Fletcher-Louis 2002, 99–101.

[82] Schüle 2005, 6.

[83] Andersen 1992, 520–1. But cf. Vermes & Goodman 1987*b*, 747–9, favouring a Jewish origin and complying with a dating in the first century AD.

> because of purity; some again because of strength; some again because of handsome appearance; some again because of youth; some again because of a penetrating mind; some again because of bodily appearance; some again because of abundant feelings. (*2 En* 43.2)

Despite these profound dissimilarities between human beings, *2 Enoch* detects a common denominator in their being created in a facsimile of God's face, regardless of whether they are small or great (44.1). This stress on God's creation of man 'in a facsimile of his own face' is remarkably similar to the Latin version of the *Life of Adam and Eve* which states that man's 'face and likeness were made *in the image of God*' (*LAE – Vita* 13.3; see § 1.1.4 [c] above). Yet in *2 Enoch* the author draws important ethical conclusions from this fact. This is reminiscent of the ethical connotations of the notion of the image of God in Gen 9.6, where murder is prohibited because man has been created 'in the image of God'.

In *2 Enoch*, the replacement of 'image' with 'face' seems a deliberate attempt to personalize the language of Gen 1.26. A shorter passage about the image of God near the end of *2 Enoch* does read 'image':

> And after all that he created man *according to his image*, and put in him eyes to see, ears to hear, heart to think, and reason to argue. (65.2)[84]

By substituting 'face' for 'image' in 44.1–3, the author lays the basis for a practical and universalistic system of ethics which reads, as it were, as a contracted, ancient version of the ethical phenomenology of the Jewish philosopher Emmanuel Lévinas, with its emphasis on 'the face of the other' ('le visage de l'autre'). However, it seems likely that this notion of God's face being reflected in the face of the other is Christian, and has patristic overtones. During the Anthropomorphite Controversy of 399 AD, for instance, the Patriarch Theophilus of Alexandria successfully addressed an angry mob of ascetics, who held strongly anthropomorphic views of God, as follows: 'In seeing you, I behold the face of God' – Οὕτως ὑμᾶς εἶδον, ὡς Θεοῦ πρόσωπον (Socrates, *Historia Ecclesiastica* VI.7.22; cf. Sozomen, *Historia Ecclesiastica* VIII.11.3).[85]

There is also a close analogy in the 2nd/3rd cent. AD Aristotelian commentator Alexander of Aphrodisias. Commenting on a passage in Aristotle's *Metaphysics* (1074b1–14), Alexander writes that

> wanting to turn men from beating one another (βουλόμενοι γὰρ ἀποτρέψαι τοὺς ἀνθρώπους ἀπὸ τοῦ τύπτειν ἀλλήλους), they [i. e. the forefathers, the myth-makers] have made the gods in the form of man (πεποιήκασι τοὺς θεοὺς ἀνθρωποειδεῖς), intimating in this way that *he who beats a fellow human being beats and insults wantonly the divine form*: αἰνιττόμενοι διὰ τούτου ὅτι ὁ τύπτων ἄνθρωπον τὸ θεῖον

[84] This is the text of the shorter recension. The longer recension reads: 'he constituted man in his own form, in accordance with a similarity'.

[85] See Golitzin 1998. On the discussion about the image of God in this controversy, see Gould 1992.

> εἶδος τύπτει καὶ περιυβρίζει. (Alexander of Aphrodisias, *In Aristotelis metaphysica commentaria* 710, trans. mine; cf. also § 1.2.4 below)

Just as the author of *2 Enoch* argues that, because God created mankind 'in a facsimile of his own face (…) whoever insults a person's face insults the face of a king, and treats the face of the LORD with repugnance', in the same way Alexander states that 'he who beats a fellow human being beats and insults wantonly the divine form (τὸ θεῖον εἶδος)'. However, the analogy between *2 Enoch* and the statement of Theophilus of Alexandria is closer, inasmuch both use the term 'face'.

The author of *2 Enoch* also emphasizes that, by being endowed with invisible and visible substances, man outshines all other creatures. He is created of seven visible components:

> his flesh from earth; his blood from dew and from the sun; his eyes from the bottomless sea; his bones from stone; his reason from the mobility of angels and from clouds; his veins and hair from grass of the earth; his spirit from my spirit and from wind. (30.8)

In addition, man has also received seven invisible properties: hearing, sight, smell, touch, taste, endurance and sweetness (30.9). This inspires the author to write the following poem, in which the word 'image' surfaces again:

> From invisible and visible substances I created man.
> From both his natures come both death and life.
> And (as my) image he knows the word like (no) other creature.
> But even at his greatest he is small,
> And again at his smallest he is great. (30.10)

This figure is indeed incomparable to all other existing creatures:

> And on the earth I assigned him to be a second angel, honoured and great and glorious. And I assigned him to be a king, to reign [on] the earth, [and] to have my wisdom. And there was nothing comparable to him on the earth, even among my creatures that exist. (30.11–12)

A.A. Orlov has recently argued that Enoch, the nominal author of *2 Enoch*, portrays himself as the new Adam, inasmuch as he, Enoch, is clothed with the clothes of God's glory.[86] This theory is a convincing one. In *2 Enoch* 22, God gives Michael the following command:

> 'Go, and extract Enoch from [his] earthly clothing. And anoint him with my delightful oil, and put him into the clothes of my glory'. And so Michael did just as the LORD had said to him. He anointed me and he clothed me. And the appearance of that oil is greater than the greatest light, and its ointment is like sweet dew, and its

[86] See Orlov 2005, chap. 5: 'Adamic Polemics in 2 Enoch', esp. 219–22: 'Angelic Veneration' and 227–9: 'The Motif of the Divine Face'.

> fragrance myrrh; and it is like the rays of the glittering sun. And I looked at myself, and I had become like one of his glorious ones, and there was no observable difference. (22.8–10)

Enoch has 'become like his glorious ones', i.e. the angels. Adam, too, is an angelic being; he is called God's 'second angel' (30.11). By becoming like the angels, Enoch also enters into a kind of competition with the angelic Adam. No difference remains between the newly dressed Enoch and the angels: 'and I had become like one of his glorious ones, and there was no observable difference' (22.10). If this interpretation is correct and Enoch is portrayed as being transformed into a new Adam, then Enoch's adoption of the 'glory of Adam' is far more exclusive than the comparable adornment of the members of the Qumran community with the glory of Adam, which we have studied above (see § 1.1.3 above). There, the bestowal of 'all the glory of Adam' is not confined to one figure, but destined for all the members of the community. However, the ethics of 2 Enoch are not restricted in scope, but based on a far-reaching application of the notion of God's image or face to the field of universal ethics.

1.1.6 A spiritual/intellectual understanding of the 'image of God'

Already earlier above, we have seen glimpses of a spiritual or intellectual understanding of the 'image of God'. I shall briefly summarize the relevant passages in *Sirach* and in the Qumranic writing *Words of the Luminaries* (4QWords of the Luminaries[a]), before tracing the full development of this interpretation.

(a) Sirach

Although *Sirach* seems at first sight to remain very close to the text of Gen 1 in its emphasis on man's dominion over the rest of creation (see § 1.1.1 [a] above), at the same time there is an intimation that the image of God has something to do with the 'knowledge and understanding' with which God has filled human beings: ἐπιστήμην συνέσεως ἐνέπλησεν αὐτοὺς (17.7; no extant Hebrew text). A very similar impression is conveyed in the *Words of the Luminaries*.

(b) 4Q504

As we have seen above, the *Words of the Luminaries* contains the only literal reference to the image and likeness of God in the Dead Sea Scrolls (see § 1.1.3 [a] above). According to 4Q504, man was created 'in the likeness of God's glory'. Despite its fragmentary state, this writing suggests that this likeness concerns 'knowledge and understanding': '[… a breath of life] you blew into his nostril, and intelligence and knowledge […]' (4Q504 frag. 8 5). This is very similar to what we find in *Sirach* 17.7. Yet this spiritual or intellectual colouring of the image of God occurs more explicitly in other writings of Second Temple Judaism and continues to manifest itself in Christian writings.

(c) The Wisdom of Solomon

The *Wisdom of Solomon* reveals a clearly spiritual, intellectual interpretation of the 'image of God'. Despite some debate about its origins, the writing is probably Jewish and is regarded as dating from between 200 BC and 50 AD.[87] Having explained, at the beginning of his work, that God intended human beings for immortality (1.12–15), the author quotes the speech of a materialist, who argues, among other things, that death is the end of existence (1.16–2.24). According to the author, however, this is contradicted by the fact that man has been made in the image of God's eternity:

> Thus they reasoned, but they were led astray, for their wickedness blinded them, and they did not know the secret purposes of God, nor hoped for the wages of holiness, nor discerned the prize for blameless souls; *for God created us for immortality, and made us in the image of his own eternity*. (2.21–23)

In his opposition to materialists, the author of the *Wisdom of Solomon* regards the immortality of the soul as a consequence of man's creation in God's image. As Levison points out, the author not only argues against his Epicurean opponents that immortality is accessible to humans, but also 'betrays his adoption of Greco-Roman anthropology when he states that the soul alone is capable of procuring immortality by living a holy life (2.22c; 3.1)'.[88] A similar Greek view, connecting the 'image' with the soul, is taken in Pseudo-Phocylides.

(d) Pseudo-Phocylides

It might well be that the *Sentences* of Pseudo-Phocylides are not the work of a Jew, but of a God-fearer with Jewish inclinations.[89] The context in which the author discusses the image of God is remarkable. In his attack on the anatomical dissection of corpses, Pseudo-Phocylides urges that the remains of the departed be left undisturbed, and suggests that the fate of their souls is far more important:

> Do not dig up the grave of the deceased, nor expose to the sun
> What may not be seen, lest you stir up divine anger.
> It is not good to dissolve the human frame;
> For we hope that the remains of the departed will soon come to light (again)
> out of the earth; and afterwards they will become gods.
> For the souls remain unharmed among the deceased.
> For *the spirit is a loan of God to mortals, and (his) image*.
> For we have a body out of earth, and when afterwards we are resolved again into earth
> We are but dust; and then the air has received our spirit. (ll. 100–108)

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[87] On the debatable Jewish origins of the *Wisdom of Solomon*, see Davila 2005, 219–25. On matters of dating, see Goodman 1986*b*.

[88] Cf. Levison 1988, 50–1 at 51; cf. 52, 54, 61.

[89] Cf. Davila 2005, 36–7, 232, 234.

Like in the *Wisdom of Solomon*, the image of God is related to man's soul. Interestingly, it is in opposition to other world-views and practices – materialism in the *Wisdom of Solomon*, the practice of dissection in Pseudo-Phocylides – that the image of God acquires a Hellenistic interpretation and points to the soul's ultimate identity. Whereas the Jewish origins of *The Wisdom of Solomon* may be debatable, and Pseudo-Phocylides may be of God-fearing rather than Jewish background, Philo of Alexandria provides abundant proof that Jews could subscribe to a spiritual, intellectual interpretation of the 'image of God'. Philo's evidence will not be presented here, but is the subject of § 1.2. Yet it is important to stress here that there are firmly Jewish examples of an intellectual understanding of God, because the next writings to be discussed, known as the Hellenistic Synagogal Prayers, are probably not Jewish but Christian. Philo, thus, is evidence that Jews were familiar with a spiritual interpretation of God's image, as *Sirach* (see § 1.1.6 [a] above) and 4Q504 (see § 1.1.6 [b] above) perhaps also suggest.

(e) The Hellenistic Synagogal Prayers

The work known as the Hellenistic Synagogal Prayers also contains a spiritual or intellectual understanding of the 'image of God'. Yet these prayers, which are found in Book VII and VIII of the fourth-century AD *Apostolic Constitutions*, are best taken as Christian; it seems too speculative to argue that these prayers, now interspersed in a Christian liturgy, are remnants of Jewish synagogal prayers.[90] In a prayer that meditates upon God's manifold creative power, Gen 1.26 is quoted and subsequently explained:

> And the goal of the creative work – the rational living creature, the world citizen – having given order by your Wisdom, you created, saying, 'Let us make man according to our image and likeness'; having declared him a (micro-)cosm of the cosmos, having formed for him the body out of the four elements; 21 and having prepared for him the soul out of non-being, and having given to him fivefold perception, and having placed over the perceptions a mind, the holder of the reins of the soul. (*Hell. Syn. Prayers* III [*Apostolic Constitutions* 7.34.1–8] 18–21; *OTP*, vol. 2, 678–80)

The image of God is associated with the soul or, even more specifically, with the 'mind, the holder of the reins of the soul'. This passage is closely paralleled by the following passage from another prayer, which is a prayer of praise to God and rehearses the grounds in creation which make such praise fitting for man:

> And you not only made the world, but you also made the world citizen in it, declaring him (to be) a (micro-)cosm of the cosmos. For you said by your Wisdom: 'Let us make man according to our image, and according to (our) likeness; and let him rule the fish of the sea, and the winged birds of the heaven'. Therefore also you have made him out of immortal soul, and out of a body that may be scattered; the one indeed out

[90] For a discussion of the Jewish origins of some prayers, see D.A. Fiensy in *OTP*, vol. 2, 671–3. For the Greek text of the *Constitutiones Apostolorum*, see Metzger 1985–1987.

> of that which is not, but the other out of the four elements. And you have indeed given to him, with reference to the soul, rational discrimination, distinguishing of piety and impiety, observation of right and wrong. While with reference to the body, you have given (him) five senses, and the movement involving change of place. (*Hell. Syn. Prayers* XII [*Apostolic Constitutions* 8.12.6–27] 35–40; *OTP*, vol. 2, 690–94)

This stress on 'rational discrimination' (XII 39) as a characteristic of the image of God is also similar, for instance, to what we have seen in the *Sibylline Oracles*, book VIII (of Christian origin) where, in opposition to the idolatrous images of the gods, man is called God's image because he has right reason: 'Man is my image, having right reason: εἰκών ἐστ' ἄνθρωπος ἐμὴ λόγον ὀρθὸν ἔχουσα' (VIII 402; see § 1.1.4 [b] above).

Although these prayers in the *Apostolic Constitutions* are unlikely to be of Jewish origin, their contents very much resemble the kind of reflection on the image of God present in the *Wisdom of Solomon*, the *Sentences of Pseudo-Phocylides* and the writings of Philo, an understanding which is influenced by the Greek concept of soul and mind. It seems, however, that an increasingly intellectual interpretation of the image of God also gave rise to a counter-movement, as we shall see in the following section.

1.1.7 A bodily understanding of the 'image of God'

It is important to note that, concomitantly with the rise of a spiritual or intellectual interpretation of the 'image of God', we discern a kind of counter-movement which stresses the bodily, physical nature of this image. It is perhaps also noteworthy that, at present, this opposing view can only be detected in what are likely to be Christian, not Jewish writings.

(a) Life of Adam and Eve and 2 Enoch

Before adducing new instances of physical interpretations of the 'image of God', I shall first refer back to what might be a physical understanding of God's image in the *Life of Adam and Eve*, which is most probably a Christian text. As we have seen above, according to scholars such as Levison and Steenburg (§ 1.1.4 [c] above), the view that man's '*face* and likeness were made in the image of God' (*LAE – Vita* 13.3) should be understood in a physical way. If this is correct, then it holds true also for *2 Enoch*'s belief that man was created by God 'in a facsimile of his own face' (44.1), and for his stress on the correspondence between the human and the divine face (44.2–3; see § 1.1.5 above). This correspondence then is, in some sense, physical although it is almost metaphorical and designed as the basis for a universalistic ethic which forbids harming the divine dignity of the other's face. Compared to *2 Enoch*, a physical interpretation of the 'image of God' in the Latin version of *LAE* is more cogent. In the Greek version, a similar physical understanding seems to surface in a passage in which Eve draws her

son Seth's attention to the body of Adam which lies in heaven, face-down, while angels implore God to forgive him because he is God's image (*LAE – Apocalypse* 35.2; see § 1.1.4 [c] above).

(b) Sibylline Oracles, books I and VIII

An instance of a bodily understanding of the 'image of God' might be present in book I of the *Sibylline Oracles*, which is probably Christian in origin.[91] In a retelling of the creation account, the author writes:

> And then later he again fashioned an animate object,
> Making a copy from his own image (εἰκόνος ἐξ ἰδίης), youthful man,
> Beautiful, wonderful. (I 22–24)

The passage is merely a short paraphrase of Gen 1.26–27, but by adding man's youthful, beautiful, wonderful qualities, the author may imply that he understands this image first and foremost in a bodily sense. A similar bodily colouring of the image of God might also be present in a paraphrase of Gen 1.26 in book VIII, which is also of Christian origin. In this paraphrase the author uses the word μορφή instead of εἰκών:

> Look, let us make a man like in all respects to our
> form, and let us give him the life-supporting breath to have.
> ποιήσωμεν ἰδοὺ πανομοίιον ἀνέρα μορφῇ
> ἡμετέρῃ καὶ δῶμεν ἔχειν ζωαρκέα πνοιήν·
> Though he is mortal all the things of the world will serve him;
> When he is fashioned of clay we will subject all things to him
> ᾧ θνητῷ περ ἐόντι τὰ κοσμικὰ πάντα λατρεύσει
> καὶ χοικῷ πλασθέντι τὰ πάνθ' ὑποτάξομεν αὐτῷ. (VIII 442–445)

This talk of man being made wholly like God in form suggests that a physical understanding of God's image is at play,[92] just as might be the case in I 22–24. This bodily understanding comes to the fore explicitly in two other writings.

(c) The Testament of Naphtali

The *Testament of Naphtali* is one of the *Testaments of the Twelve Patriarchs* and is probably to be considered as a Christian text.[93] The contents relevant to the discussion of the 'image of God' are characteristic of the *Testament of Naphtali* as contained in the *Testaments of the Twelve Patriarchs* and do not occur in other writings attributed to Naphtali, such as the medieval Hebrew writing attributed to

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[91] See Goodman 1986*a*, 645.

[92] Cf. Steenburg 1990, 97. I disagree with him, however, that λατρεύω takes on the meaning of 'serve' in the sense of religious service and worship, thus rendering Adam into an object of worship as in the *Life of Adam and Eve* (see § 1.4 [c] above). Rather λατρεύω has the meaning of 'to be subject to' (LSJ 1032 s. v. λατρεύω), as it runs parallel with the notion that all things are subjected by God to man in the following line (VIII 445).

[93] See De Jonge 1953; De Jonge 2003, part two, 71–177; and Davila 2005, 5, 232.

him, the *Hebrew Testament of Naphtali*,[94] or the *Testament of Naphtali* attested in 4Q215 among the Dead Sea Scrolls.[95] The latter two writings are irrelevant for the passage on the image of God in the *Testament of the Twelve Patriarchs*.[96]

Taking its departure from Jacob's blessing of Naphtali in Gen 49.21 – 'Naphtali is a hind let loose that bears lovely fawns' – the testament elaborates on it in the following manner:

> Since I was light on my feet like a deer, my father, Jacob, appointed me for all missions and messages, and as a deer he blessed me. For just as a potter knows the pot, how much it holds, and brings clay for it accordingly, so also *the Lord forms the body in correspondence to the spirit* (οὕτω καὶ ὁ Κύριος πρὸς ὁμοίωσιν τοῦ πνεύματος ποιεῖ τὸ σῶμα), and instils the spirit corresponding to the power of the body. And from one to the other there is no discrepancy, not so much as a third of a hair, for all the creation of the Most High was according to height, measure, and standard. And just as the potter knows the use of each vessel and to what it is suited, so also the Lord knows the body, to what extent it will persist in goodness, and when it will be dominated by evil. For there is no form (πλάσμα, 'anything formed or moulded') or conception which the Lord does not know (Ὅτι οὐκ ἔστι πᾶν πλάσμα καὶ πᾶσα ἔννοια ἣν οὐκ ἔγνω Κύριος) since *he created every being according to his own image* (πάντα γὰρ ἄνθρωπον ἔκτισε κατ' εἰκόνα ἑαυτοῦ). (*Testaments of the Twelve Patriarchs – Naphtali* 2.1–5)

This passage suggests there is a close correlation between body and soul: 'the Lord forms the body in correspondence to the spirit, and instils the spirit corresponding to the power of the body. And from one to the other there is no discrepancy, not so much as a third of a hair' (2.2–3). In the case of Naphtali, his bodily features ('I was light on my feet like a deer') make him suitable for 'missions and messages'. This is taken as an argument for something like physiognomics. Such physiognomic views are well-attested in Jewish texts, including the Dead Sea Scrolls, and also occur several times in the *Testaments of the Twelve Patriarchs*.[97] The outward appearance of a human being reflects his inner character because of the correspondence (ὁμοίωσις) between body and soul. Remarkably, this correspondence is not the likeness between God and man, as in Gen 1.26–27, but the way in which the body corresponds to the soul: πρὸς ὁμοίωσιν τοῦ πνεύματος ποιεῖ τὸ σῶμα (2.2).

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[94] For the 'Hebrew Testament of Naphtali', see Charles 1908*a*, 239–44: 'Appendix II: Late Hebrew Testament of Naphtali' (text in Hebrew); and, for a translation, Charles 1908*b*, 221–7: 'Appendix I: Translation of a Late Hebrew Testament of Naphtali, Which Contains Fragments of the Original Testament'.

[95] For 4Q215 Testament of Naphtali, see M. E. Stone in Brooke 1996 (DJD 22), 73–82; discussion in Stone 1996.

[96] Cf. Korteweg 1975; Hollander & De Jonge 1985, 296–7: 'Note on Hebrew T. Naphtali'.

[97] Popović 2007. On physiognomy in the *Testaments of the Twelve Patriarchs*, see Popović 2007, 288–90. The physiognomic nature of the passage in the *Testament of Naphtali* goes unnoticed in Hollander & De Jonge 1985, 303.

According to the author, this correspondence varies from person to person and is due to God's intimate fore-knowledge of man (2.4b–5a) because 'he created *every* being according to his own image' (2.4–5). It almost seems as if 'according to his own image' here does not refer only to God himself, but also, simultaneously, to the particular image of each individual man, so that God could arrange the way his body and soul correspond: 'he created *every man* according to the image *of himself*', i. e. *of man himself*. God is able to do so because he knows the form (πλάσμα) of the body[98] (2.5a πλάσμα; cf. 2.4b 'the Lord knows *the body*') and the conception (the degree to which the body will be the site of goodness or evil, 2.5a + 4b) which men, in their bodily existence, will possess (2.4–5). Just as the 'likeness' of Gen 1.26 appears to be the likeness between body and soul, so the 'image' seems to be the (ethical) use made by man of his body.

As regards the rationale underlying this passage, M. Popović notes that this particular

> understanding of the connection between body and soul could have been suggested by a reading of the second creation narrative where God after having formed man from the dust of the earth instils the breath of life in man by which he becomes a living being (Gen 2.7). Perhaps this verse prompted the theological justification given by the *Testament of Naphtali* for the correspondence between body and spirit as being in resemblance to each other.[99]

At the same time, however, according to Popović, this 'articulated mutual relationship between body and spirit (…) is remarkably similar to the basic premise governing Greco-Roman physiognomics'.[100] The physiognomic interpretation of Gen 1.26 in the *Testament of Naphtali* comes close to an understanding of the image in terms of the body.

(d) The Testament of Isaac

A similarly physical understanding of the 'image of God' is found in the *Testament of Isaac*, the second part of the *Testament of the Three Patriarchs*, which is late in date and again probably of Christian origin. In it, the image is identified with the body, and not with the soul, even though the latter concept does occur in the text. The relevant scene described in the *Testament of Isaac* bears a resemblance to the narrative of Genesis 49, where Jacob, having been reunited with Joseph in Egypt, delivers his farewell speech to his sons and requests them not to bury him in Egypt, but to take his body back with them and bury it in the grave of his forefathers (Gen 49.29–31). This narrative now seems to be projected back onto the figure of Isaac who, on his deathbed, requested something

[98] The term πλάσμα means 'anything formed or moulded, image, figure' and, in *PMag.Par.* I.212, stands for the body, as fashioned by the Creator (LSJ 1412 s. v. πλάσμα).

[99] Popović 2007, 107.

[100] Popović 2007, 289, with reference to Pseudo-Aristotle, *Physiognomonica*.

similar. Although Isaac does not request the transferral of his body from a foreign land, the favour which he explicitly asks concerning the care of his body after death is reminiscent of Genesis 49:

> And our father Isaac said, 'Jacob, my beloved son, keep my injunction which I lay down today that you preserve my body. Do not profane *the image of God* by how you treat it; for the image of man was made like the image of God; and God will treat you accordingly at the time when you meet him and see him face to face. He is the first and the last, as the prophets have said'. When Isaac had said this, the Lord took his soul from his body and it was white as snow. (6.33–7.1)

This passage offers a remarkably explicit interpretation of the image of God in bodily terms. If Isaac's body is not preserved, the image of God will be profaned by this lack of respectful treatment: 'Do not profane the image of God by how you treat it' (6.34a). In substantiating his request, Isaac also uses the term 'the image of man', almost as if it is a substantivized cast of God's image: 'the image of man was made like the image of God' (6.34b). Respect for this bodily image is so important that God's final judgement also concerns its treatment, and consequently the readers are warned that God will treat them accordingly (6.34c). It is not clear what the author has in mind when Isaac is said to ask: 'keep my injunction which I lay down today that you preserve my body' (6.33). In view of a dating of the *Testament of Isaac* to the period after at least 200 AD, one could perhaps think of the burial practice which many Jews had adopted since the mid-first century BC of collecting the bones of the decomposed corpses after a period of interment and storing them in ossuaries.[101] It might be the case that the author's bodily understanding of the image of God reflects this practice, although this seems a less likely explanation if the text is Christian.

It is more probable then that the author wishes to criticize the increasing intellectual understanding of man as the image of God. Or perhaps he was just passing on an existing bodily interpretation of the image of God, since, as we have seen, the physiognomic understanding of the image and likeness of God in the *Testament of Naphtali* (see § 1.1.7 [c] above) comes close to such an interpretation (cf. also the possibly bodily interpretations discussed in § 1.1.7 [a] and [b] above). When discussing Philo's criticism of an anthropomorphic interpretation of the image of God in § 1.2, we shall see that Philo, too, was acquainted with bodily interpretations and fiercely resisted them (see § 1.2.4 below). Philo denounces both Greek myths and Epicurean philosophy for holding that God possessed a body.

The interpretation in the *Testament of Isaac* is remarkable because despite its identification of the image of God with the body, it does nevertheless entertain the concept of a soul: 'the Lord took his soul from his body' (7.1). Perhaps the author's insistence on the body as God's image is best explained as a criticism of

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[101] See Goodman 2007, 259–60.

an *exclusively* spiritual understanding of God's image. The same strategy seems to be in evidence in contemporary Christian authors such as Irenaeus (*c.* AD 130–*c.*202) and Tertullian (AD *c.*160–*c.*240). This seems all the more relevant as the texts discussed above which entail, or seem to entail, a bodily understanding of God's image – the *Life of Adam and Eve*, *2 Enoch*, the *Sibylline Oracles*, books I and VIII, the *Testament of Naphtali* and the *Testament of Isaac* – are all probably Christian. Irenaeus, in his anti-Gnostic *Adversus haereses*, questions the absolute synonymy between the image of God and the soul, and argues that man as a whole, and not just his soul, was made in the image of God:

> man, and not [merely] a part of man, was made in the likeness of God. Now the soul and the spirit are certainly a *part* of the man, but certainly not *the* man; for the perfect man consists in the commingling and the union of the soul receiving the spirit of the Father, and the admixture of that fleshly nature which was moulded after the image of God. (*Against Heresies* 5.6.1)

Similarly, Tertullian in his *On the Resurrection of the Flesh*, addressed against the Gnostics, summarizes his thoughts as follows:

> To recapitulate, then: Shall that very flesh, which the Divine Creator formed with His own hands in the image of God; which He animated with His own *afflatus*, after the likeness of His own vital vigour (…), [shall that flesh, I say], so often brought near to God, not rise again? (*On the Resurrection of the Flesh* 9)

The Gnostic contempt for the body leads both these Christian authors to assert that the body, too, was created in God's image.[102] A similar, or perhaps even the same polemic context – if the *Life of Adam and Eve*, *2 Enoch*, the *Sibylline Oracles*, books I and VIII, the *Testament of Naphtali* and the *Testament of Isaac* are Christian – might account for the stress which these authors place on man's body as the image of God. In this sense, these writings seem to act as a counterbalance in an increasingly spiritual understanding of God's image.

In the face of so much possible Christian evidence for a physical interpretation of the 'image of God' it is important to stress that there is the suggestion in Philo of Alexandria that some Jews may have subscribed to such a bodily understanding of God's image (see § 1.2.4 below), and that these views also are implied in later Rabbinical writings.[103] Although this physical interpretation now

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[102] On the anti-Gnostic emphasis in these early Christian interpretations of the 'image of God' see also Hamman 1987, 55–7, 66 (Irenaeus); 88, 91 (Tertullian). For the discussion about the relation between body and soul within the image of God, cf. also McLeod 1995, 23–53.

[103] For Philo, see his *De opificio mundi* 69: 'Let no one represent the likeness as on to a bodily form; for neither is God in human form, nor is the human body God-like – τὴν δ' ἐμφέρειαν μηδεὶς εἰκαζέτω σώματος χαρακτῆρι· οὔτε γὰρ ἀνθρωπόμορφος ὁ θεὸς οὔτε θεοειδὲς τὸ ἀνθρώπειον σῶμα. Cf. further *De posteritate Caini* 2–4, addressed against Epicurean, 'Egyptian' and general mythical forms of anthropomorphic views on the gods (for Epicurean views on 'the form of man' which the gods possess, see Cicero, *De natura deorum* 1.48–49). For Rabbinical authors, see Goshen-Gottstein 1994.

mainly surfaces in Christian sources, and the pagan philosopher Celsus attacks it as a Christian view (Origen, *Against Celsus* 6.63–64), we know from Philo that it existed in Judaism. Nevertheless, its preponderance in Christian sources calls for an explanation and might point to increased debate and heightened sensitivity about an image of God which is either physical or intellectual. This intensified debate should then be understood as a result of the fact that the notion as such seems to be far more important in early Christianity than in ancient Judaism and, therefore, far more likely to arouse controversy.

1.1.8 Concluding observations

The above overview of the ancient Jewish interpretations of the concept of man as the image of God has shown a variety of understandings. In none of the sources is the concept very important. To some extent, we can confirm the findings of Levison's study *Portraits of Adam in Early Judaism* (1988), which also comments on the image of God. Against previous research Levison stresses that, in the early Jewish sources, there is no coherent, unified Adam mythology: 'There exists no putative Adam mythology which spans the writings of distinct authors. Shared views occur only in those writings which share a tradition'.[104] The diversity of portraits of Adam is more striking than their unity:

> Portraits of Adam in Early Judaism are characterized more by diversity than by unity. The diversity is due to the incorporation of the Genesis narratives into the *Tendenzen* of individual authors. The unity is due, on the one hand, to the biblical narratives which provide the raw material for interpretations and, on the other, to shared perspectives, traditions which control the individual *Tendenzen* of certain authors. Nearly all unifying features occur *within* the wisdom and apocalyptic traditions or in authors who consciously adopt Greco-Roman concepts.[105]

Although I agree with Levison that the views on Adam and, more specifically, the views on the 'image of God' are not unified, and 'we cannot speak of an Adam mythology or broad motifs',[106] his analysis shows traces of reductionism where he emphasizes, again and again, that all views on the 'image of God' are wholly incorporated into the *Tendenzen* of a particular author, so that the notion almost ceases to have any substance of its own. It is indeed the case that some writings have a largely contextualized understanding of the image of God, as I have shown in § 1.1.2 with regard to *1 Enoch* 106 and *4 Ezra*. In the former, the 'image of God' is totally absorbed within the Enochic emphasis on fallen angels and their offspring. In the latter, the notion is strongly coloured by the writing's theodicy. Together they indeed show that their authors understood the notion of God's image according to the main tenor of their writings.

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[104] Levison 1988, 154.
[105] Levison 1988, 159.
[106] Levison 1988, 160.

Yet this is not the whole picture. Levison's focus on *Tendenzen* may be fruitful for texts such as *1 Enoch* 106 and *4 Ezra* (although he does not discuss the former), but is less relevant when applied to other writings. Levison's methodology is somewhat artificial, as he only applies it to a limited number of texts, specifically chosen on the basis of the criterion that they 'must have an adequate number of allusions and references to *adam* to allow for a sufficient basis of determining an author's portrait'.[107] As a consequence many texts are not included in his study. I strongly contend that not everything can be explained in terms of the principal purport of a writing. In *2 Enoch*, for example, we find a very idiosyncratic understanding of the image of God which can hardly be subsumed under a specific slant of the work. Its interpretation of the creation of man as a facsimile of God's own face expresses a strong universalistic ethical awareness (see § 1.1.5 above), which does not necessarily uphold the author's main tendencies. His ethical understanding of this notion is remarkably similar to the ethical implication which Gen 9.6 draws in its prohibition against murder: 'for in his own image God made humankind'. Apparently, the author of *2 Enoch*, in his own way, is exploring the ethical potential which the notion of man as God's image seems to possess or is at least able to evoke.[108]

Furthermore, it is my view that in other Jewish writings Levison makes either too much of the notion of God's image, or too little. On the one hand, in the case of the *Wisdom of Jesus Son of Sirach*, *Jubilees* and Pseudo-Philo's *Biblical Antiquities*, discussed in § 1.1.1, I believe that the concept can hardly be said to be interpreted as serving a particular agenda of the individual authors, as it only occurs in mere paraphrases. In this case, Levison makes too much of the notion. In these writings, the concept is simply not as important as in *1 Enoch* or *4 Ezra*.

On the other hand, Levison seems to underestimate the thematic potential of the notion in other writings; there is no denying that some motifs are already being constructed. There is surely more to this than the mere colouring of an empty notion in line with the author's purpose. It seems artificial to allow only specific similarities within particular genres of writings, the genres of 'wisdom authors', 'authors of the apocalypses', to be supplemented with authors who express a Greco-Roman interpretation of the image of God.[109] I believe that the following motifs emerge which are not limited to particular genres: (a) the antithesis between the image of God and other images; (b) a spiritual or intellectual understanding of God's image, which is not only attested in Hellenized sources, and which involves a kind of divine anthropology; and, finally, (c) a physical

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[107] Levison 1988, 29.

[108] According to Miller 1972, 299–302 at 301, Gen 9.6 reveals 'the pre-priestly core' of the passages on the 'image of God' in Genesis; this core lies in 'an old saying which prohibited murder on the grounds that man was created in the "likeness" (*d^{e}mût*) of God'.

[109] Levison 1988, 159–60.

understanding of the image of God, which seems to function as a kind of counterbalance to an intellectual understanding.

(a) Antithesis between the image of God and other images

The assumption that the original image of God theology in Genesis and Ezekiel, both of which are part of, or related to, the Priestly Source, developed an antithesis between man as the only image of God and the iconic images of idolatrous practice might be confirmed by the fact that the opposition between the two also occurs in later sources. As we saw in § 1.1.4, this antithesis between God's image and man-made idols is still largely implicit in the probably Jewish introduction to the *Sibylline Oracles*, book III; in book VIII, however, the opposition between the images of the gods and the image which is man, endowed with right reason, is rendered explicit. The final consequence of this way of thinking, that man, in his capacity of God's image, is the only image of God and as such merits worship, is drawn in the *Life of Adam and Eve*. This motif of the innate antagonism between humanity, as the image of God, and idolatrous images of pagan gods is present in various genres and shows a remarkable continuity with the original setting of the notion of God's image in the Jewish scriptures.

(b) A spiritual, intellectual understanding of God's image – a divine anthropology?

Another recurrent motif is that of a spiritual understanding of God's image. This view is not limited to what are considered to be strongly Hellenized writings. Indeed, as we saw in § 1.1.6, the *Wisdom of Solomon*, Pseudo-Phocylides' *Sentences* and the liturgical prayers of the *Apostolic Constitutions* interpret the notion of God's image with the aid of Greek anthropological views about the soul; this also holds true for Philo of Alexandria. But even in *Sirach* and 4Q504 one observes the association between the 'image of God' and the concepts of knowledge, intelligence and understanding. Apparently, the notion of man as God's image is expressed in ways which find a particular common denominator between God and man, and which stress man's elevation above the rest of creation. The question arises of whether such an understanding does not in fact imply a kind of divine anthropology. This seems to be the case, not only in strongly Hellenized sources which emphasize that man and God share in the same rationality – 'Man is my image, having right reason: εἰκὼν ἐστ' ἄνθρωπος ἐμὴ λόγον ὀρθὸν ἔχουσα' (*Sib. Or.* VIII 402) – but also in the Dead Sea Scrolls. As we saw in § 1.1.3, Adam is considered to have been fashioned in God's glory. Although it seems unwarranted to talk of an 'ontological affinity between God and his own humanity' (as Fletcher-Louis puts it), it is nevertheless clear that Adam's glory, which is thought of as being restored in the Qumran community, is an effulgence of God's glory, demonstrating the elevated status

of human beings above the rest of creation. This divine anthropology is to be differentiated from a more angelic anthropology which is also attested among the Dead Sea Scrolls and which entails the belief that man was created after the pattern of the angels. A divine anthropology also dovetails nicely with the motif of man as the only worshipable image of God which we encountered in the *Life of Adam and Eve*.

Both motifs, that of the innate antagonism between God's image and idolatrous images and that of a divine anthropology, in some ways articulate the potential of the notion of man as the image of God. I do not wish to suggest that these articulations are directly dependant upon the original meaning of the 'image of God' as set out in the introduction. New contexts of Judaism in the Graeco-Roman period shaped the form which these motifs took. Yet the polemic against idols which was part of the earliest Jewish development of the notion of God's image, stressed the singularity of man as God's image. This singularity was again emphasized in ancient Judaism in repeated polemics against idolatry, in the assertion that mankind is God's image, and in the belief that man is the true image of God and as such – if taken to extremes – to be worshipped. The extraordinary status accorded to human beings as God's image in the Priestly Source received various expressions in ancient Judaism, either in the sense of the possession of God's glory, or in the sense of a share in God's spiritual nature and immortality.

(c) A physical understanding of God's image

The latter, spiritual understanding contrasts sharply with those interpretations which take the image of God in a bodily sense. As we have seen in § 1.1.7, this type of interpretation is implicitly present in the *Life of Adam and Eve*, *2 Enoch* and the *Sibylline Oracles*, books I and VIII; it is explicitly discussed by Philo of Alexandria, who opposes it, and in the *Testament of Naphtali* and the *Testament of Isaac*. Although the original meaning of God's image in the Ancient Near East will have had strongly corporeal overtones and already met with disapproval and critical modifications in Isaiah, Ezekiel and the Priestly Codex,[110] it is remarkable that the explicit expression of such a bodily understanding in the Graeco-Roman period is not found in Jewish texts but, with the exception of Philo, in what appear to be Christian writings. The reason for this seems to be that, on the whole, the notion of the image of God, despite its vibrant potential, remains rather infrequent and unimportant in Jewish writings, again with the exception of Philo. When it rose to dominance in Christianity, a predominantly intellectual and spiritual interpretation apparently engendered renewed debate about its true nature.

[110] On this, see Miller 1972, 291–3.

1.2 The 'image of God' in Philo

In this section I shall study Philo's understanding of the notion of the image of God as it occurs in Genesis 1.26–27.[111] There seem to be five different aspects to his interpretation of this passage. First of all, Philo comments on the plural form which God applies when he says: 'Let *us* make humankind in *our* image, according to *our* likeness (Ποιήσωμεν ἄνθρωπον κατ' εἰκόνα ἡμετέραν καὶ καθ' ὁμοίωσιν); and let them have dominion over the fish of the sea, and over the birds of the air, and over the cattle, and over all the wild animals of the earth, and over every creeping thing that creeps upon the earth' (Gen 1.26). Even though the passage continues with a summarizing comment which refers to this image as 'his image', i.e. the image of God only ('So God created humankind in his image, in the image of God he created them': καὶ ἐποίησεν ὁ θεὸς τὸν ἄνθρωπον, κατ' εἰκόνα θεοῦ ἐποίησεν αὐτόν; Gen 1.27), Philo draws his readers' attention to the plurality implied in the divine speech (§ 1.2.1).

Secondly, Philo devotes much attention to the exact meaning of the phrase κατ' εἰκόνα θεοῦ, arguing that man is not identical with God's image, but was created in, or after his image (§ 1.2.2). Thirdly, it is not only man, as we shall see, who is taken to have been created after God's image; the same holds true, according to Philo's Platonizing understanding, for the entire cosmos, which is 'a copy of the divine image'. It is in this context that the 'image of God' appears to be synonymous with the 'Logos'. This synonymy also makes it possible to detect particular similarities between the Pauline and Johannine corpus (§ 1.2.3).

Fourthly, we shall focus on Philo's comments on the phrase καὶ καθ' ὁμοίωσιν, 'and according to our likeness', which, according to Philo, should be taken as a qualification of the preceding phrase κατ' εἰκόνα ἡμετέραν, 'according to our image'. This likeness between God and man, Philo asserts, is certainly not of a bodily nature. We shall see how Philo, in emphasizing this, distances himself from particular Greek views on this issue (§ 1.2.4).

Finally, we shall also study how Philo's interpretation of the first account of man's creation, about man as created after the image of God (Gen 1.26–27), intersects with his reading of the second account, according to which 'God formed man from the dust of the ground, and breathed into his nostrils the breath (or spirit) of life' (Gen 2.7). Philo bases his view of two types of man on a synthesis between these two passages (§ 1.2.5). Philo's distinction between various types of man will surface again later, in chap. 5, when we study Philo's trichotomic anthropology and draw comparisons between his anthropology and that of Paul.

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[111] On the term 'image' in Philo, cf. Willms 1935 and Lorenzen 2008.

1.2.1 'Let us make humankind ...': The creation of the different parts of man

As Philo notes, 'the words "let us make" [in Gen 1.26] imply plurality' (*De confusione linguarum* 169). In his interpretation of this plurality, Philo closely follows the creation account of Plato's *Timaeus*, which regards the highest part of man as created by the Demiurge, but the lower part of his soul and his body as produced by the planetary gods (*Timaeus* 42d–e).[112] In the same vein, Philo writes:

> Moses, when treating in his lessons of wisdom of the Creation of the world, after having said of all other things that they were made by God, described man alone as having been fashioned with the co-operation of others. His words are: 'God said, let us make man after our image' (Gen 1.26), 'let us make' indicating more than one. So the Father of all things is holding parley with His powers, whom he allowed to fashion the mortal portion of our soul by imitating the skill shown by Him when He was forming that in us which is rational, since He deemed it right that by the Sovereign should be wrought the sovereign faculty in the soul, the subject part being wrought by subjects. (*De fuga et inventione* 68–69)

Thus, according to Philo the creation of the highest part of man, the non-mortal portion of the soul, 'that in us which is rational', 'the sovereign faculty in the soul', is undertaken by God himself. It is in this part that man is congenial with God, as Philo explains elsewhere:

> it was most proper to God the universal Father to make those excellent things [i. e. mind and reason by Himself alone, ἕνεκα τῆς πρὸς αὐτὸν συγγενείας, because of their kinship to Him. (*De opificio mundi* 73–74)

In line with the previous passages, but with a slightly different emphasis, in his *De mutatione nominum*, Philo does not write that God only made the highest part of the soul, but that He only made certain types of man.

> He did not form the soul of the bad, since wickedness is at enmity with Him, and in framing the soul which is in the intermediate stage He was not the sole agent according to the holiest of men, Moses, since such a soul would surely admit like wax the different qualities of noble and base. And therefore we read, 'Let us make man after our image' (Gen 1.26), so that according as the wax received the bad or the noble impress it should appear to be the handiwork of others or of Him Who is the framer of the noble and the good alone. (*De mutatione nominum* 30–31)

Here, as D. T. Runia observes, 'no mention is made of different *parts* of the soul, only of different *types*'.[113] Below, in chap. 5 on Philo's anthropological trichotomy, we shall indeed see that he is able to regard the different parts of the soul as indicative of different types of man, who are dominated by the hegemony of one aspect of their human constitution, whether spirit, soul, or even body.

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[112] Cf. Runia 1986, 243–4.
[113] Runia 1986, 244.

1.2.2 'Created in, or after the image of God'

According to Philo, man is not *identical* with the image of God. He is not himself God's image, but has only been created in, or after the image of God. As we shall see in chap. 2, this is an important difference between Philo and Paul on the one hand, and pagan philosophical traditions on the other. Both Philo and Paul try to do justice to the exact formula in Gen 1.26 that man was created κατ' εἰκόνα θεοῦ, after the image of God. In some instances Philo does call man God's image, but then he distinguishes explicitly between the invisible and the visible image of God. Man, according to Philo, is only the latter. Thus, Philo says of God's creation of man:

> He breathed into him from above of His own Deity (ἄνωθεν ἐνέπνει τῆς ἰδίου θειότητος). The invisible Deity stamped on the invisible soul the impress of Itself, ἵνα μηδ' ὁ περίγειος χῶρος εἰκόνος ἀμοιρήσῃ θεοῦ: to the end that not even the terrestrial region should be without a share in the image of God. But the Archetype is, of course, so devoid of visible form that even his image could not be seen (καὶ ἡ εἰκὼν οὐχ ὁρατή). Having been struck in accord with the Pattern, it entertained ideas not now mortal but immortal. (*Quod deterius potiori insidiari soleat* 86–87)

In Philo's view the actual of image of God is invisible, implying however that there is also room for a *visible* image of God. This image is man, as Philo explains elsewhere. Speaking about the kinship (συγγένεια) which all the descendants of the first-made man still share with this first man, however distantly, Philo asks what this kinship consists of:

> Now what is this kinship? Every man, in respect of his mind, is allied to the divine Reason, having come into being as a copy or fragment or ray of that blessed nature, but in the structure of his body he is allied to all the world, for he is compounded of the same things, earth, water, air, and fire, each of the elements having contributed the share that falls to each, to complete a material absolutely sufficient in itself for the Creator to take, ἵνα τεχνιτεύσῃ τὴν ὁρατὴν ταύτην εἰκόνα: in order to fashion *this visible image*. (*De opificio mundi* 145–146)

Thus, man is the *visible* image of God, and is not identical with the invisible image. Yet he does derive from it, as the following passage makes clear. Writing about the rekindling of mankind after the great Flood, Philo speaks of mankind as

> that highest form of life, which has received dominion over everything whatsoever upon earth, born to be the close imitation of God's power (ἀντίμιμον γεγονὸς θεοῦ δυνάμεως) and *the visible image of God's invisible nature* (εἰκὼν τῆς ἀοράτου φύσεως ἐμφανής), the created of the eternal (αἰδίου γενητή). (*De vita Mosis* 2.65)

It almost seems as if Philo is here repeating, on an anthropological level, what Plato says, at the end of his *Timaeus*, about the cosmos. There, Plato calls the cosmos 'a visible living creature embracing the visible creatures, an image of the intelligible, a perceptible God' – ζῷον ὁρατὸν τὰ ὁρατὰ περιέχον, εἰκὼν

τοῦ νοητοῦ θεὸς αἰσθητός (*Timaeus* 92c; cf. § 2.1.1 below). In Philo, it is not only the cosmos but man, too, who is the visible image of God's invisible nature (εἰκὼν τῆς ἀοράτου φύσεως ἐμφανής). But it is only in this sense, according to Philo, that man *is* God's image. Otherwise it would be more appropriate to regard man as having been created *in*, or *after the image of God*, as the text of Gen 1.26 puts it. Man is only the *visible* image of God. Yet at the same time, through this identity, man reflects the fact that he has been modelled on the pattern of the *invisible image*, has been created *after the image*, which, in turn, is based on God. This emerges clearly from several passages. In one of them, Philo explains that

> just as God is the pattern of the image (παράδειγμα τῆς εἰκόνος) (…), even so the image becomes the pattern of other beings (ἡ εἰκὼν ἄλλων γίνεται παράδειγμα), as the prophet made clear at the very outset of the Law-giving by saying, 'And God made man κατ' εἰκόνα θεοῦ, after the image of God' (Gen 1.27), implying that the image had been made such as to represent God (ὡς τῆς μὲν εἰκόνος κατὰ τὸν θεὸν ἀπεικονισθείσης), but that the man was made *after the image* when it had acquired the force of a pattern (τοῦ δὲ ἀνθρώπου | κατὰ τὴν εἰκόνα λαβοῦσαν δύναμιν παραδείγματος). (*Legum allegoriarum libri* 3.96)

The phrase 'after the image of God' clearly points out that man was modelled on a divine paradigm, the true image of God. Phrased differently, as Philo does in the next passage, man is 'the cast of that image'. This cast, according to Philo, is identical with man's mind, the highest part of his soul. This mind is the reason *within us*. This corresponds with the reason *above us*, which is identical with the image of God. From this perspective there are two forms of reason:

> One is the archetypal reason above us (ἕνα μὲν ἀρχέτυπον <τὸν> ὑπὲρ ἡμᾶς), the other the copy of it which we possess (ἕτερον δὲ μίμημα τὸν καθ' ἡμᾶς ὑπάρχοντα). Moses calls the first the 'image of God' (καλεῖ δὲ Μωυσῆς τὸν μὲν ὑπὲρ ἡμᾶς εἰκόνα θεοῦ), the second the cast of that image (τὸν δὲ καθ' ἡμᾶς τῆς εἰκόνος ἐκμαγεῖον). For God, he says, made man not 'the image of God' but 'after the image' (Gen 1.27). And thus the mind in each of us (ὥστε τὸν καθ' ἕκαστον ἡμῶν νοῦν), which in the true and full sense is the 'man' (ὃς δὴ κυρίως καὶ πρὸς ἀλήθειαν ἄνθρωπός ἐστι), is an expression at third hand from the maker (τρίτον εἶναι τύπον ἀπὸ τοῦ πεποιηκότος), while between them is the Reason which serves as model for our reason, but itself is the effigy or presentment of God. (*Quis rerum divinarum heres sit* 230–231)

This passage clearly sketches the hierarchy of (1) God; (2) the image of God, i. e. the archetypal reason above man; and (3) the cast of that image, i. e. man who has been created after that image, or more precisely, *the mind* (νοῦς) of each man, 'which in the true and full sense is the "man"' (ὃς δὴ κυρίως καὶ πρὸς ἀλήθειαν ἄνθρωπός ἐστι). This identification of the man created after the image as νοῦς ('mind') and κυρίως καὶ πρὸς ἀλήθειαν ἄνθρωπός ('man in the true and full sense') will prove very important in this monograph, because it provides an excellent background for our understanding of Paul. The 'man in the true and full

sense' is the Philonic version of the Platonic and Pauline notion of the 'inner man',[114] as shall be shown in § 7.2.2, where the history of the notion of the inner man shall be traced.

In Paul, too, the mind and the inner man are synonymous (see Rom 7.22–25). And like in Philo, man himself does not become identical with the image of God but experiences a metamorphosis *in accordance with* the image of God (2 Cor 3.18: τὴν αὐτὴν εἰκόνα μεταμορφούμεθα). This metamorphosis takes place in the mind, through the renewal of the mind (Rom 12.2: μεταμορφοῦσθε τῇ ἀνακαινώσει τοῦ νοός), which is a renewal of the inner man (2 Cor 4.16: ὁ ἔσω ἡμῶν ἀνακαινοῦται ἡμέρᾳ καὶ ἡμέρᾳ). Precisely as in the passage from Philo under consideration, man himself is not the actual image of God, but is created or recreated after the image of God, the effects of which are visible in 'man in the true and full sense', the 'inner man', the mind. It is the mind which, as it were, contains the image of God like an image in a shrine, the innermost part of a temple. As we shall see in § 2.4, it seems to be for that reason that Philo and Paul talk about man as a temple of God, because man carries the image of God around within him (see § 2.4.1).

In many passages, Philo confirms his view that man has been created 'after the image of God'. Although man is not himself the image of God, even by being created *after* that image he enjoys an elevated, godlike, sacrosanct status. For this reason, Philo, following Gen 9.6 ('Whoever sheds the blood of a human, by a human shall that person's blood be shed; for in his own image God made humankind'), is convinced that the act of killing a human being is in truth nothing less than

> sacrilege, and the worst of sacrileges, seeing that of all the treasures which the universe has in its store there is none more sacred and godlike than man (οὐδὲν οὔτε ἱεροπρεπέστερον οὔτε θεοειδέστερόν ἐστιν ἀνθρώπου), the glorious cast of a glorious image, shaped according to the pattern of the archetypal form of the Logos (παγκάλης εἰκόνος πάγκαλον ἐκμαγεῖον ἀρχετύπου λογικῆς ἰδέας παραδείγματι τυπωθέν). (*De specialibus legibus* 3.83)

The notion of the image of God thus has far-reaching ethical consequences, according to Philo. In this, Philo resembles Pseudo-Philo who, as we have seen, gives a literal quotation of Gen 9.6 in his *Biblical Antiquities*. The passage from Genesis is reiterated verbatim in *Biblical Antiquities* 3.11: 'whoever sheds the blood of a man, his own blood shall be shed, because man was made after the image of God' (*Biblical Antiquities* 3.11; see § 1.1.1 [c] above). The same attitude is encountered in *2 Enoch*, in which an ethical conclusion is also drawn from the fact that God created man – as the author puts it – 'in a facsimile of his own face' (see § 1.1.5 above):

[114] Cf. Markschies 1998, 276–7.

> The LORD with his own two hands created mankind; *in a facsimile of his own face*, both small and great, the LORD created them. And whoever insults a person’s face, insults the face of a king, and treats the face of the LORD with repugnance. He who treats with contempt the face of any person treats the face of the LORD with contempt. (44.1–3)

Independently from one another, Philo and the authors of the *Biblical Antiquities* and *2 Enoch* seem to understand Gen 9.6 in a similar, ethical sense. At the same time, Philo also bases another interpretation on this text from Genesis. According to Philo, God’s referring, in the monologue of Gen 9.1–7, to the ‘image of God’, instead of simply to ‘my image’ (Gen 9.6: ‘Whoever sheds the blood of a human, by a human shall that person’s blood be shed, ὅτι ἐν εἰκόνι θεοῦ ἐποίησα τὸν ἄνθρωπον: for in the image of God I made humankind’), clearly shows that God views his image as the second God:

> Why does (Scripture) say, as if (speaking) of another God, ‘in the image of God He made man’, and not ‘in His own image’? (Διὰ τί ὡς περὶ ἑτέρου θεοῦ φησι τὸ «ἐν εἰκόνι θεοῦ ἐποίησα τὸν ἄνθρωπον», ἀλλ’ οὐχὶ τῇ ἑαυτοῦ;) Most excellently and veraciously this oracle was given by God. For nothing mortal can be made in the likeness of the most high One and Father of the universe but (only) in that of the second God, who is his Logos. For it was right that the rational (part) of the human soul should be formed as an impression by the divine Logos, since the pre-Logos God is superior to every rational nature. But He who is above the Logos (and) exists in the best and in a special form – what thing that comes into being can rightfully bear His likeness? Moreover, Scripture wishes also to show that God most justly avenges the virtuous and decent men because they have a certain kinship with His Logos, of which the human mind is a likeness and image. (*Quaestiones in Genesim* 2.62)

The image of God, after which man is created, is depicted as the second God, the Logos. According to Philo, it would even be impossible to be created in the likeness of the highest God. Philo appears here to be part of the development in contemporary Middle Platonism in which, as Dillon has shown, the Demiurge is no longer regarded as the highest God, as was still the case in Plato’s *Timaeus*. Instead the function of Creator is increasingly thought to be fulfilled by a second God:

> Initially, the Demiurge seems to have been taken as the supreme principle, active in the world, but when under Neopythagorean influence the One, as a totally transcendent first principle, was placed above the active principle, the Demiurge came to be seen as a second God, Intellect (*nous*), the agent or *logos* of the Supreme God, and this is the view that prevails during the period [of the Middle Platonists, 80BC – AD 220].[115]

In passing, I note that this is also the view of Paul, as we can deduce from 1 Cor 8.6: ‘yet for us there is (…) one Lord, Jesus Christ, through whom are all things

[115] Dillon 1996*a*, 7.

and through whom we exist' – ἀλλ' ἡμῖν (…) εἷς κύριος Ἰησοῦς Χριστός, δι' οὗ τὰ πάντα καὶ ἡμεῖς δι' αὐτοῦ, and of the Pauline School (Col 1.15–17).[116]

As regards Philo, as we shall see in more detail in § 2.3 below, he emphasizes that the likeness between God and man is not direct, but intermediated by the Logos. In Philo's understanding, the rational part in man, his mind, has been 'formed as an impression by the divine Logos', but the pre-Logos God, the first God, 'the most high One and Father of the universe', is 'superior to every rational nature' (*Quaestiones in Genesim* 2.62; see § 2.3.4 [e] below). We shall encounter the same way of thinking later in Middle Platonists such as Alcinous, who draw the full consequence of this emphasis on the transcendence of the highest God and state that, for this reason, man's assimilation to God can only take place with regard to the second God (see § 2.2.7). It seems that both Philo and Paul come close to a similar position because the statement of Gen 1.26–27 – that man was created *after* the image of God – suggests this to them.

If the text of Genesis 1.26–27 had not spoken of the creation of man 'after the image of God', it would have been far more natural for Philo to have spoken of human beings as *being the images* of God. In two passages where Philo does not have to worry about the exact wording of Gen 1.26–27, he says that men indeed possess, or even are, images which are based on noble role-models. In *De praemiis et poenis* 114, he states that 'to gaze continuously upon noble models imprints their images in souls which are not entirely hardened and stony': αἱ γὰρ συνεχεῖς τῶν καλῶν παραδειγμάτων φαντασίαι παραπλησίας εἰκόνας ἐγχαράττουσι ταῖς μὴ πάνυ σκληραῖς καὶ ἀποκρότοις ψυχαῖς. In this way, as a passage in *Quod omnis probus liber sit* suggests, men themselves are rendered into images:

> In the past there have been those who surpassed their contemporaries in virtue, who took God for their sole guide and lived according to a law of nature's right reason, not only free themselves, but communicating to their neighbours the spirit of freedom: also in our own time there are still men who are, as it were, images of the original picture (καὶ ἐφ' ἡμῶν αὐτῶν ἔτ' εἰσὶν ὥσπερ εἰκόνες ἀπὸ ἀρχετύπου γραφῆς) supplied by the high excellence of sages. (*Quod omnis probus liber sit* 62)

It seems that it is only Philo's wish to do justice to the expression '*after* the image of God' in Moses' text that prevents him from depicting man as the image of God.

1.2.3 The cosmos as a copy of the divine image

The exact wording of Gen 1.26–27, that man is not the image of God but created after the image of God, also influences Philo's cosmology. According to Philo, not only man, but the cosmos, too, is a copy of the divine image. As such, Philo

[116] On this background to the cosmic Christology of Paul and the Pauline School, see Van Kooten 2003, esp. 126 including note 30.

seems to adopt Plato’s characterization of the cosmos as ‘an image of the intelligible, a perceptible God’ – εἰκὼν τοῦ νοητοῦ θεὸς αἰσθητός (*Timaeus* 92c; see, extensively, § 2.1.1 below). Yet, as we shall see, it is the phrase κατ’ εἰκόνα θεοῦ, ‘after the image of God’, from Gen 1.27 which renders it impossible for Philo to depict the cosmos as identical with the image of God. Like man, the cosmos is not directly an image of God; it is *a copy* of the divine image. Commenting on Moses’ view that man was moulded after the image of God, Philo continues as follows:

> Now if the part is an image of an image, it is manifest that the whole is so too (εἰ δὲ τὸ μέρος εἰκὼν εἰκόνος [δῆλον ὅτι] καὶ τὸ ὅλον εἶδος); (…) the whole creation, this entire world perceived by our senses (seeing that it is greater than any human image) is a copy of the divine image (σύμπας οὗτος ὁ αἰσθητὸς κόσμος, εἰ μείζων τῆς ἀνθρωπίνης ἐστίν, μίμημα θείας εἰκόνος). (*De opificio mundi* 25)

It is not only man that is ‘an image of an image’ (εἰκὼν εἰκόνος); the visible cosmos, too, is ‘a copy of the divine image’ (μίμημα θείας εἰκόνος). Philo appears to take remarkable care to avoid the Platonic statement that the cosmos itself is an image of God. Throughout various passages he clings to his own view, informed by Gen 1.27, that the cosmos was created after the divine image. For this reason, Philo does not state that the cosmos is an image of God, but only that it is an image of the Logos, the second God:

> The world has come into being, and assuredly it has done so under the hand of some Cause; and the Word of Him who makes it is Himself the seal, by which each thing that exists has received its shape. Accordingly, from the outset, form in perfection accompanies the things that come into being, for it [i. e. the cosmos] is an ἐκμαγεῖον καὶ εἰκὼν τελείου λόγου, an impress and image of the perfect Logos. (*De fuga et inventione* 13)

Indeed, as Philo explains elsewhere, God’s image, the ideal form, and the Logos are all synonymous entities by which the cosmos was stamped: God ‘stamped the entire cosmos with His Image and an ideal form, even His own Word’ – τὸν ὅλον ἐσφράγισε κόσμον εἰκόνι καὶ ἰδέᾳ, τῷ ἑαυτοῦ λόγῳ (*De somniis* 2.46). Or, phrased differently, ‘the image of God is the Logos through whom the whole universe was framed’ – λόγος δ’ ἐστὶν εἰκὼν θεοῦ, δι’ οὗ σύμπας ὁ κόσμος ἐδημιουργεῖτο (*De specialibus legibus* 1.81). Philo asserts this synonymy between the ‘image of God’ and the ‘Logos’ in many passages.[117]

[117] See further *De confusione linguarum* 97 (‘ … his image, the most holy Logos’: τὴν … εἰκόνα αὐτοῦ, τὸν ἱερώτατον λόγον); *De confusione linguarum* 147 (‘we may be sons of his invisible image, the most holy Logos. For the Logos is the eldest-born image of God’: ἀλλά τοι τῆς ἀειδοῦς εἰκόνος αὐτοῦ, λόγου τοῦ ἱερωτάτου· θεοῦ γὰρ εἰκὼν λόγος ὁ πρεσβύτατος); *De fuga et inventione* 101 (‘The divine Logos … – He is Himself the image of God, chiefest of all Beings intellectually perceived, placed nearest, with no intervening distance, to the Alone truly existent One’: ὁ δ’ ὑπεράνω τούτων λόγος θεῖος … – αὐτὸς εἰκὼν ὑπάρχων θεοῦ, τῶν νοητῶν ἅπαξ ἁπάντων ὁ πρεσβύτατος, ὁ ἐγγυτάτω, μηδενὸς ὄντος μεθορίου διαστήματος,

The fact that the 'image of God' is the equivalent of 'Logos' is extremely significant, as it shows a fundamental similarity between Pauline and Johannine theology. In Philo, Paul's language of the image of God and John's terminology of the Logos meet. The similarity between John and Philo also extends to the Platonic concept of the true, invisible light (see *Phaedo* 109E). According to Philo, this invisible light is not equivalent to the Logos, but is 'an image of the divine Logos'.[118] In John, however, the two terms have become synonymous because Christ is both characterized as the Logos (e.g., John 1.1) and the true Light (John 1.9).[119] Using the Philonic writings as a sort of 'conversion table', it now becomes possible to see that the way in which John phrases his Christology in terms of Logos and the true light is essentially the same as the manner in which Paul talks of Christ as the image of God. It is Philo who shows that the image of God is closely related to the true, invisible light (*De opificio mundi* 31) and equivalent to 'the Logos by whom the whole universe was framed' (*De specialibus legibus* 1.81).

This cosmic Logos, on which reasoning is based, can either be depicted in a Platonic way, as the soul of the cosmos (cf. *Timaeus* 30a–c) or, more appropriately, in view of Philo's Jewish predilections, as the divine image:

> Now 'reasoning' (λογισμός) as a name is but a little word, but as a fact it is something most perfect and most divine, a piece torn off from the soul of the universe (τῆς τοῦ παντὸς ψυχῆς ἀπόσπασμα), or, as it might be put more reverently following the philosophy of Moses, a faithful impress of the divine image (εἰκόνος θείας ἐκμαγεῖον ἐμφερές). (*De mutatione nominum* 223)

As we have seen, Philo consistently refers to both man and the cosmos not as an image of God but, following the phraseology of κατ' εἰκόνα θεοῦ, as created 'after the image of God' (Gen 1.27); he regards them as an *impress* (ἐκμαγεῖον)

τοῦ μόνου, ὅ ἔστιν ἀψευδῶς, ἐφιδρυμένος); *De somniis* 1.239 (' … the image of God, His angel the Logos': … τὴν τοῦ θεοῦ εἰκόνα, τὸν ἄγγελον αὐτοῦ λόγον); *De specialibus legibus* 1.81 ('… the immortal soul, which we are told was fashioned after the image of the Self-existent. And the image of God is the Logos through whom the whole universe was framed': … ψυχὴν τὴν ἀθάνατον, ἥν φασι τυπωθῆναι κατὰ τὴν εἰκόνα τοῦ ὄντος· λόγος δ' ἐστὶν εἰκὼν θεοῦ, δι' οὗ σύμπας ὁ κόσμος ἐδημιουργεῖτο); and *De specialibus legibus* 3.207 ('A man's soul is a precious thing, and when it departs to seek another home, all that will be left behind is defiled, deprived as it is of the divine image. For it is the mind of man which has the form of God, being shaped in conformity with the ideal archetype, the Logos that is above all': ψυχὴ γὰρ ἀνθρώπου τίμιον, ἧς μετανισταμένης καὶ μετοικιζομένης τὰ ἀπολειφθησόμενα πάντα μιαίνεται στερόμενα θείας εἰκόνος, ἐπειδὴ θεοειδὴς ὁ ἀνθρώπινος νοῦς πρὸς ἀρχέτυπον ἰδέαν, τὸν ἀνωτάτω λόγον, τυπωθείς).

[118] See *De opificio mundi* 31: 'Now that invisible light perceptible only by mind has come into being as an image of the divine Logos Who brought it within our ken: it is a supercelestial constellation, fount of the constellation obvious to sense' – τὸ δὲ ἀόρατον καὶ νοητὸν φῶς ἐκεῖνο θείου λόγου γέγονεν εἰκὼν τοῦ διερμηνεύσαντος τὴν γένεσιν αὐτοῦ· καὶ ἔστιν ὑπερουράνιος ἀστήρ, πηγὴ τῶν αἰσθητῶν ἀστέρων.

[119] On the concept of the true Light in John and Plato, see Van Kooten 2005.

of the divine image. This impress is called ἐμφερές, i. e. ‘answering to’, ‘resembling’: it is a faithful, accurate print of the divine image. This is important to Philo, as we shall see in the next section.

1.2.4 ‘Created according to the likeness of God’: The non-bodily likeness between God and man

The likeness in accordance with which man has been created is an accurate, faithful likeness, as we have just seen (Philo, *De mutatione nominum* 223). The reason for Philo to stress this is as follows. According to Philo, in Gen 1.26 (‘Let us make humankind in our image, according to our likeness’: Ποιήσωμεν ἄνθρωπον κατ’ εἰκόνα ἡμετέραν καὶ καθ’ ὁμοίωσιν), Moses supplemented the phrase κατ’ εἰκόνα ἡμετέραν, ‘in, or after our image’, with the clause καὶ καθ’ ὁμοίωσιν, ‘and according to our likeness’. Moses did so because, generally speaking, images are often unlike their archetype:

> Since images do not always correspond to their archetype and pattern, but are in many instances unlike it, the writer further brought out his meaning by adding ‘after the likeness’ to the word ‘after the image’, thus showing that an accurate cast, bearing a clear impression, was intended: ἐπεὶ δ’ οὐ σύμπασα εἰκὼν ἐμφερὴς ἀρχετύπῳ παραδείγματι, πολλαὶ δ’ εἰσὶν ἀνόμοιοι, προσεπεσημήνατο εἰπὼν τῷ κατ’ εἰκόνα τὸ καθ’ ὁμοίωσιν εἰς ἔμφασιν ἀκριβοῦς ἐκμαγείου τρανὸν τύπον ἔχοντος. (*De opificio mundi* 71)

On this understanding, the phrase ‘according to our likeness’ emphasizes the fact that man is an εἰκόνος θείας ἐκμαγεῖον ἐμφερές, ‘a faithful impress of the divine image’ (*De mutatione nominum* 223). This must be stated explicitly because, as Philo puts it elsewhere in a sharper, more absolute sense: ‘every image by its deceptive resemblance falsifies the original’ – πᾶσα δὲ εἰκὼν ὁμοιότητι εὐπαραγώγῳ ψεύδεται τὸ ἀρχέτυπον (*De praemiis et poenis* 29). In contrast with this general rule, however, the image of God has been accurately copied in man. There is a true likeness between man and God’s image.

Yet, though man’s existence is corporeal, the likeness between man and God’s image is not of such a nature. After quoting Gen 1.26 Philo emphasizes that man, more than all other things generated on earth, resembles God, but that this resemblance does not concern his body:

> Moses tells us that man was created after the image of God and after his likeness (Gen 1.26). Right well does he say this, for nothing earth-born is more like God than man (ἐμφερέστερον γὰρ οὐδὲν γηγενὲς ἀνθρώπου θεῷ). Let no one represent the likeness as one to a bodily form: τὴν δ’ ἐμφέρειαν μηδεὶς εἰκαζέτω σώματος χαρακτῆρι. For neither is God in human form (οὔτε γὰρ ἀνθρωπόμορφος ὁ θεὸς), nor is the human body God-like (οὔτε θεοειδὲς τὸ ἀνθρώπειον σῶμα). No, it is in respect of the mind, the sovereign element of the soul, that the word ‘image’ is used (ἡ δὲ εἰκὼν λέλεκται κατὰ τὸν τῆς ψυχῆς ἡγεμόνα νοῦν). (*De opificio mundi* 69)

This passage is clearly polemical, but the passage does not inform us of the intended recipients of Philo's warning against conceiving of the likeness between man and God in a bodily sense. Perhaps he is concerned with what he regards as a misconception among some Jews. Indeed, in § 1.1 above we saw that a bodily concept of God's image occurs in the *Life of Adam and Eve*, *2 Enoch*, books I and VIII of the *Sibylline Oracles*, the *Testament of Naphtali*, and the *Testament of Isaac* (see § 1.1.7 above). However, given the fact that these writings might well be Christian compositions, I suggested that the antithesis between a bodily and a spiritual-intellectual understanding might be the result of the increasing importance of the notion of the image of God in early Christianity and the growing tensions between Gnosticizing or spiritual interpretations on the one hand, and bodily, anti-Gnostic interpretations on the other. This picture arises in 2nd cent. AD Christian authors such as Irenaeus and Tertullian (see § 1.1.7 [d] above). If that is true, Philo's polemics are not primarily addressed against Jews.

There is another possible interpretation of Philo's polemic which has to do not with divergent opinions within the Christian community, which postdate Philo, but with a difference between Judaism and Christianity on the one hand, and pagan Antiquity on the other. It seems to be the case that, whereas Jews and Christians were unanimous in criticizing the pagan use of images, the pagans themselves differed strongly on this issue. As we shall see, some pagan philosophers, such as the Epicureans, believed that the gods were in human form, although imperceptible to sense, whereas others, such as Celsus, vehemently criticized anthropomorphic views of God; others again tried to provide some justification for popular anthropomorphism. We shall come across many of these views in chap. 2, when I discuss the pagan views on 'the image of God' (see § 2.1 below) and on man's assimilation and likeness to God (see § 2.2 below), but I shall outline them briefly here.

Philo himself suggests that his criticism of a bodily understanding of God's image is directed against the Greeks – both the views of philosophers such as the Epicureans and anthropomorphic representations of the gods in Greek mythology in general – and against the animal-worship of the Egyptians, which takes the misconception of God one step further. This slant of Philo's criticism becomes apparent when he comments on Gen 4.16, 'Then Cain went away from the face of the Lord'. Philo discusses the question of whether God has indeed a face and then vehemently denies it:

> For if the Existent Being had a face, and he that wished to quit its sight could with perfect ease remove elsewhere, what ground would we have for rejecting the impious doctrines of Epicurus, or the atheism of the Egyptians, or the mythical plots of plays and poems of which the world is full? (Philo, *De posteritate Caini* 2)

Philo opposes the anthropomorphic understanding of God because then one would no longer be in a position to criticize Epicurean views, Egyptian animal-

worship, or Greek mythology. As regards these 'doctrines of Epicurus', Philo perhaps had in mind the rather ambiguous Epicurean position also described by Cicero: 'the gods possess the form of man. Yet their form is not corporeal, but only resembles bodily substance; it does not contain blood, but the semblance of blood' (Cicero, *De natura deorum* 1.46–49 at 48–49).

In general one would expect Greek philosophers to criticize anthropomorphic views of the gods. Yet such criticism is by no means universal. The Greek position seems to be highly ambiguous, even among Platonic philosophers. On the one hand, a Platonist such as Celsus argues, as we shall see in §§ 2.1.4 and 2.2.9 below, that a likeness between man and God would compromise the latter's transcendence. As Origen informs us, Celsus strongly polemicized against a bodily understanding of this likeness and wrongly believed that such a view was held among Christians when they spoke about man as the image of God. According to Origen, Celsus

> failed to understand to what characteristic of man the words 'in the image of God' apply, and that this exists in the soul which either has not possessed or possesses no longer 'the old man with his deeds', and which, as a result of not possessing this, is said to be in the image of the Creator. He says: *Nor did he make man his image; for God is not like that, nor does he resemble any other form at all.* (Origen, *Against Celsus* 6.63)

Celsus' own conviction is that God does not resemble any bodily form. Yet there are others among his fellow philosophers who do indeed hold that there is a bodily side to the likeness between God and man. In § 2.1.3 below, we shall encounter the view of the Neo-Pythagorean author Pseudo-Erytus, who, according to a passage in Clement of Alexandria,

> in his book *On Fate*, having said that the 'Creator, on making man, took Himself as an exemplar', added, 'And the body is like the other things, as being made of the same material, and fashioned by the best workman, who wrought it, taking Himself as the archetype'. (Clement of Alexandria, *Stromateis* 5.5.29)

In this passage, Pseudo-Erytus seems to entertain a physical interpretation of God's image, inasmuch as he says that the body is made by God, who took Himself 'as the archetype' (see further § 2.1.3 [b] below).

Other pagan Greeks, such as Dio Chrysostom, stressed the similarity in shape between the gods and man. In a discourse on man's conception of God, Dio attributes his own view to Phidias (*Orations* 12.55–83), the famous Greek sculptor, who was trying to justify his great statue of Zeus as an appropriate statue of the god. According to Phidias, since the mind and intelligence of the gods cannot be represented in art, artists need to resort to the human body in their representations of the gods, for the following reason:

> Mind and intelligence in and of themselves no sculptor or painter will ever be able to represent. For all men are utterly incapable of observing such attributes with their

> eyes or of learning of them by inquiry. But as for that in which this intelligence manifests itself, men, having no mere inkling thereof but actual knowledge, fly to it for refuge, attributing to God a human body as a vessel to contain intelligence and rationality, in their lack of a better illustration, and in their perplexity seeking to indicate that which is invisible and unportrayable by means of something portrayable and visible, using the function of a symbol and doing so better than certain barbarians, who are said to represent the divine by animals – using as their starting-point symbols which are trivial and absurd. (Dio Chrysostom, *Orationes* 12.59)

In Dio's way of reasoning, the human body is an appropriate symbolic starting-point for a representation of the gods, because in the case of human beings, their intelligence and rationality are housed in a body. For this reason, Dio presumes from the point of view of art, 'the kinship between gods and men [is intended to be shown] by the mere similarity in shape, being already in use as a symbol' (12.77).[120]

In a similar vein, as we shall see in more detail in § 2.2.10 below, Maximus of Tyre also justifies the representation of the gods in an anthropomorphic way:

> the judgement of those who established images (ἀγάλματα) in human form is anything but unreasonable. If the human soul is something very close to God and like Him in its nature, it is surely not reasonable to clothe what is most similar to it in an entirely foreign covering. (Maximus of Tyre, *The Philosophical Orations* 2.3)

In some way, thus, the likeness between the human soul and God reflects upon the body, which is taken either as an appropriate 'symbolic' starting-point (in Dio's case) or as not 'entirely foreign' (in Maximus's case). To these justifications of a bodily likeness between the gods and men one may also add the reflections of Alexander of Aphrodisias on this issue, which I referred to in § 1.1.5 above. In his commentary on Aristotle's *Metaphysics*, where Aristotle defends the forefathers' opinion that the gods 'are in the form of men' (Aristotle, *Metaphysics* 1074b1–14), Alexander explains their view as follows:

> They [i. e. the forefathers] formed myths, such as that today Zeus was born from Rhea, and that for that reason it is necessary that all gather together and celebrate the birthday of the god and feast together in their houses. But having made them [i. e. the gods] in human form (ἀλλὰ καὶ ἀνθρωποειδεῖς αὐτοὺς ποιήσαντες), they [i. e. the forefathers, the myth-makers] had not done so in vain but for the advantage of hoi polloi, the multitude. Because wanting to turn men from beating one another they [i. e. the forefathers, the myth-makers] have made the gods *in the form of man* (πεποιήκασι τοὺς θεοὺς ἀνθρωποειδεῖς), intimating in this way that *he who beats a fellow human being beats and insults wantonly the divine form* (αἰνιττόμενοι διὰ τούτου ὅτι ὁ τύπτων ἄνθρωπον τὸ θεῖον εἶδος τύπτει καὶ περιυβρίζει). And not only did they make them [i. e. the gods] in human form (καὶ οὐ μόνον ἀνθρωποειδεῖς αὐτοὺς ποιοῦσιν), but for the extra help of the human

[120] On Dio's views on images of God, compared to those of Philo, see further Hartman 1998. The ambivalence of Philo's attitude towards statues is emphasized in Sandelin 2001.

race, they make the gods also similar to some of the other living beings (ἀλλὰ πρὸς περισσοτέραν ὠφέλειαν τοῦ ἀνθρωπείου γένους ποιοῦσι τοὺς θεοὺς ὁμοίους καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ζῴων τισίν). (Alexander of Aphrodisias, *In Aristotelis metaphysica commentaria* 710, trans. mine)

In this way, Alexander provides a powerful ethical justification for an anthropomorphic representation of the gods. In his understanding, the notion of the divine form (τὸ θεῖον εἶδος) functions in a very similar way to the understanding of the notion of the image of God in *2 Enoch*, as we saw above (see § 1.1.5). The close resemblance assumed between 'the divine form' (τὸ θεῖον εἶδος) and 'the form of man' (ἀνθρωπο – ειδής: 'like a man, in human form') implies that somehow the likeness between the gods and men is also bodily.

It seems that Porphyry stands in this pagan tradition when he, too, emphasizes the rationality of an anthropomorphic depiction of the gods. In a passage which we shall study in more detail in § 2.1.3 below, Porphyry writes:

It is reasonable that the forms of the statues (ἀγάλματα) are in the manner of a man because man, which is the finest of creatures, is thought also to be the image (εἰκών) of God – ἀνθρωποειδῆ δὲ τῶν ἀγαλμάτων εἰκότως εἶναι τὰ σχήματα, ἐπεὶ τὸ κάλλιστον τῶν ζῴων ἄνθρωπος εἶναι νομίζεται καὶ εἰκὼν θεοῦ. (Porphyry, *Against the Christians*, frag. 76 edn von Harnack[121]; = frag. 207 trans. Berchman[122]; = Macarius, *Apocriticus seu* Μονογενής, book 4, pp. 200–201 edn Blondel)

According to Porphyry, it is reasonable that the forms of the statues are anthropomorphic because man, unlike the rest of creation, 'is thought also to be the image of God': ἄνθρωπος εἶναι νομίζεται καὶ εἰκὼν θεοῦ. For further support of his anti-Christian polemics, as we shall see, Porphyry even refers to the Jewish scriptures. In Porphyry's view too, thus, the notion of man as the image of God comprises a bodily aspect.

Finally, I should like to point to the slightly different approach taken by the sophistic author Himerius, whose views on the image of God will also be studied in § 2.1.3. According to Himerius, in a physiognomic way, the positive qualities of someone's soul are reflected in his body. Such a soul 'shapes its body, bringing it into conformity with its nature' and, in this way, 'may let that body show itself forth to the human race *as the image of a god*' (Himerius, *Declamationes et orationes* 48.13; trans. Penella). Implicitly, thus, Himerius, too, works on the assumption of some sort of congeniality between the soul and the body.

Against this background of pagan philosophical justifications of divine anthropomorphism, Philo's criticism gains more relief. Philo's warning that no one should represent the likeness between God and man of which Genesis 1.26–27 speaks as 'one to a bodily form' (*De opificio mundi* 69) seems to be addressed first and foremost against pagan conceptions of God. As Philo showed in his

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121 Edn von Harnack 1916, 92.23–25.

122 Berchman 2005, 216–17.

De posteritate Caini, these conceptions included the philosophical views of the Epicureans and Greek mythology (*De posteritate Caini* 2). The latter position, that of the mythological anthropomorphism of the gods, however, was widely defended, as the sources above show. Alongside critics of anthropomorphic views, such as Celsus, who emphasized that God does not resemble any bodily form, other philosophers, including Platonists, nevertheless pointed out senses in which the likeness between God and man may be perceived as bodily. Criticism of the latter position by Philo shows his characteristically Jewish stance. Such criticism was indeed perceived as Jewish, as Tacitus' description of the Jews makes clear:

> the Jews conceive of one God only, and that with the mind alone: they regard as impious those who make from perishable materials representations of gods in man's image – … profanos qui deum imagines mortalibus materiis *in species hominum* effingant. (Tacitus, *Histories* 5.5)

Anthropomorphic depiction of the gods amounts to representing the gods 'in species hominum'.

As I already concluded, Philo's warning that no one should represent the likeness between God and man as 'one to a bodily form' (*De opificio mundi* 69) seems aimed primarily at *pagan* conceptions of God. This means that this anthropomorphic conception was not current among Jews although they could have been exposed to it. In this light, we can further refine our conclusions about the explicit differentiation between a spiritual-intellectual and a bodily-physical understanding of the image of God in §§ 1.1.6 and 1.1.7 above. There I suggested that the articulation of a bodily-physical view of God's image is due to anti-Gnostic polemics (see § 1.1.7 [d]). On the basis of Philo and the pagan material just discussed, however, it seems necessary to supplement this explanation with a further reason. The formation of a distinctively bodily interpretation of man's likeness to God is also due to the pagan philosophical discourse about the images of the gods. To some extent, particular philosophers were willing to justify an anthropomorphic approach in this and they may well have influenced some Jewish and/or Christian authors in their view on man's likeness with God.

1.2.5 'Image' and 'Spirit': The intersection and overlap of the first and second account of man's creation in Gen 1–2

Introduction

The last feature of Philo's interpretation of the notion of the image of God in Gen 1.26–27 is that this passage from the first account of man's creation from Genesis 1 is conflated with the second account of his creation from Genesis 2. The relevant passage from the latter account is Gen 2.7, 'And God formed the man of dust of the earth, and breathed upon his face the breath of life (καὶ ἐνεφύσησεν

εἰς τὸ πρόσωπον αὐτοῦ πνοὴν ζωῆς), and the man became a living soul (καὶ ἐγένετο ὁ ἄνθρωπος εἰς ψυχὴν ζῶσαν)'. As we shall see in chap. 5, this passage gave rise to the trichotomic interpretation of man in Philo, Paul and Josephus, to the effect that man was understood as consisting of spirit, soul, and body. Furthermore, it will become clear that both in Philo and in Paul the man of the first creation account is regarded as the heavenly man, whereas the man of the second creation account is seen as the earthly man. Philo understands the differentiation between these two types of man as a Platonic type of distinction between the conception of the ideal man in heaven and the formation of the individual man on earth. In the present chapter, however, I shall limit myself to pointing out that the first and second account of man's creation in Gen 1–2 intersect and overlap in Philo's treatment. Whereas the key term in the first account is the 'image of God', the second account revolves around the concept of spirit.

(a) Two types of man

Philo bases his doctrine of two types of man on the two creation accounts. In his *Legum allegoriarum libri*, for instance, Philo argues that 'there are *two* races of men, the one made after the (divine) image, and the one moulded out of the earth': δύο γὰρ ἀνθρώπων γένη, τό τε κατὰ τὴν εἰκόνα γεγονὸς καὶ τὸ πεπλασμένον ἐκ γῆς (*Legum allegoriarum libri* 2.4). The first type of man, that of Genesis 1, is 'the man after the image'. Because he has been created 'after the image' (κατ' εἰκόνα), 'he yearns for the image. For the image of God is a pattern on which copies are made, and every copy longs for its original': ἐφίεται γὰρ τῆς εἰκόνος· ἡ γὰρ εἰκὼν τοῦ θεοῦ ἀρχέτυπος ἄλλων ἐστί· πᾶν δὲ μίμημα ποθεῖ τοῦτο (*Legum allegoriarum libri* 2.4).

(b) The defining characteristics of the second type

The characteristics of the two types of man are clearly set out in *De opificio mundi*. After quoting Gen 2.7, Philo spells out the differences between the two types in the following way:

> He [i.e. Moses] says that 'God formed man by taking clay from the earth, and breathed into his face the breath of life' (Gen 2.7). By this also he shows very clearly that there is a vast difference between the man thus formed and the man that came into existence earlier after the image of God: for the man so formed is an object of sense-perception (ὁ μὲν γὰρ διαπλασθεὶς αἰσθητὸς), partaking already of such or such a quality, consisting of body and soul (ἐκ σώματος καὶ ψυχῆς συνεστώς), man or woman, by nature mortal; while he that was after the (divine) image was an idea or type or seal, an object of thought (only), incorporeal (ὁ δὲ κατὰ τὴν εἰκόνα ἰδέα τις ἢ γένος ἢ σφραγίς, νοητός, ἀσώματος), neither male nor female, by nature incorruptible. It says, however, that the formation of the individual man, the object of sense, is a composite one made up of earthly substance and of Divine breath: τοῦ δ' αἰσθητοῦ καὶ ἐπὶ μέρους ἀνθρώπου τὴν κατασκευὴν σύνθετον εἶναί φησιν ἔκ τε γεώδους οὐσίας καὶ πνεύματος θείου. (*De opificio mundi* 134–135)

The defining characteristic of the second type seems to consist in the fact that he is composite (σύνθετος), made up of earthly matter and of God's πνεῦμα, God's Spirit. As we shall see, however, as soon as Philo focuses on the spirit-part of this second type of man, he is in fact speaking of the first type of man, although this might occur in an ambiguous way. Sometimes he seems to identify the Spirit – which influences the uppermost part of the second type, man's spirit – with the image after which the first type of man was created. On other occasions, however, the two creation accounts seem to be conflated without a full identification of Spirit and image. In those cases, the Spirit / spirit seems to be hierarchically subordinated to the image of God and to be regarded as having been shaped by the image of God. In Philo's understanding the two types of man intersect and overlap, as do the accounts of their creation. The overlapping area consists of the uppermost part of the second type, into which he has been inbreathed by God's Spirit. What is particularly characteristic of this second type of man is that he is a composite, synthetic being: he is made up not only of God's Spirit but also of earthly substance. I shall discuss first those passages in which Philo stresses the area in which both types of man coincide despite their differences, and subsequently those in which Philo highlights their hierarchical relation.

(c) The overlapping area between both creation accounts

In another passage of his *Legum allegoriarum libri*, Philo also states that there are two types of man and briefly discusses their differences:

> There are two types of men; the one a heavenly man, the other an earthly (διττὰ ἀνθρώπων γένη· ὁ μὲν γάρ ἐστιν οὐράνιος ἄνθρωπος, ὁ δὲ γήϊνος). The heavenly man, being made after the image of God (ὁ μὲν οὖν οὐράνιος ἅτε κατ' εἰκόνα θεοῦ γεγονὼς), is altogether without part or lot in corruptible and terrestrial substance, but the earthly one was compacted out of the matter scattered here and there (ὁ δὲ γήϊνος ἐκ σποράδος ὕλης … ἐπάγη), which Moses calls 'clay'. For this reason he says that the heavenly man was not moulded, but was stamped with the image of God (διὸ τὸν μὲν οὐράνιόν φησιν οὐ πεπλάσθαι, κατ' εἰκόνα δὲ τετυπῶσθαι θεοῦ),while the earthly is a moulded work of the Artificer, but not His offspring. (*Legum allegoriarum libri* 1.31)

In the following passages, these differences are emphasized. Philo differentiates between 'the mind which had been created after the original, and after his [i. e. God's] image' on the one hand, and 'the earthly and body-loving mind' on the other (1.33); between 'the one that was made after the image and archetype' and the 'moulded being' (1.53); between 'the mind that was made after the image', which is not earthly but heavenly, and 'the earthly and perishable mind' (1.90); between, on the one hand, 'the being created after his [i. e. God's] image and after the original idea', who possesses virtue instinctively (1.92), the 'perfect man formed after the (divine) image', and, on the other hand, 'the bad man'.

Yet in the following passage Philo suggests there is some overlap between these types of man. He does so by characterizing the mind of the earthly, second type as 'the mind that was made out of matter', which – following the exact terminology of Gen 2.7 ('and He breathed upon his face the breath of life': καὶ ἐνεφύσησεν εἰς τὸ πρόσωπον αὐτοῦ πνοὴν ζωῆς) – only partakes of πνοή, a light and less substantial form of air (*Legum allegoriarum libri* 1.42). Only here, in this particular passage does Philo stick to the exact wording of Gen 2.7 and point out that the 'breath (πνοή) of life' is not of the highest quality. Elsewhere, throughout his oeuvre, he reads Gen 2.7 as if the text refers to the πνεῦμα of God, the Spirit of God which instils itself in man as his spirit (see § 5.1.1 [b] [ii] below). In the present passage, however, Philo constructs a difference between on the one hand 'the mind that was made out of matter' and, on the other hand, 'the mind that was made after the image and original', which 'might be said to partake of πνεῦμα, spirit': ὁ μὲν οὖν κατὰ τὴν εἰκόνα γεγονὼς καὶ τὴν ἰδέαν νοῦς πνεύματος ἂν λέγοιτο κεκοινωνηκέναι (1.42). It is in the description of the latter type that the description of the first and second account of man's creation are conflated and Philo suggests an overlap. In accordance with the first account, Philo states that the heavenly type of man was made 'after the image and original', but in accordance with the second account – at least as Philo normally reads it – he adds that this type partakes of πνεῦμα, Spirit. This seems to indicate that, in Philo's view, the Spirit which is inbreathed into the highest part of (the individual, earthly) man is virtually identical with the image of God after which (the heavenly) man is created.

This seems to be confirmed in a passage in *Quis rerum divinarum heres sit*. In a Pauline sounding passage, Philo says that 'we have two kinds of men, one that of those who live by reason, the divine Spirit, the other of those who live by blood and the pleasure of the flesh': ὥστε διττὸν εἶδος ἀνθρώπων, τὸ μὲν θείῳ πνεύματι λογισμῷ βιούντων, τὸ δὲ αἵματι καὶ σαρκὸς ἡδονῇ ζώντων (*Quis rerum divinarum heres sit* 57; cf. 1 Cor 15.45–50). In the broader context of this passage, he immediately links the first and second creation account. Taking the second account as his starting point, he writes:

> He [i. e. Moses] did not make the substance of the mind depend on anything created, but represented it as breathed upon by God. For the Maker of all, he says, 'blew into his face the breath of life, and man became a living soul' (Gen 2.7); just as we are also told that he was fashioned after the image of his Maker (Gen 1.27): «ἐνεφύσησε» γάρ φησιν «ὁ ποιητὴς τῶν ὅλων εἰς τὸ πρόσωπον αὐτοῦ πνοὴν ζωῆς, καὶ ἐγένετο ὁ ἄνθρωπος εἰς ψυχὴν ζῶσαν» (Gen. 2.7), ᾗ καὶ κατὰ τὴν εἰκόνα τοῦ ποιητοῦ λόγος ἔχει τυπωθῆναι. So we have two kinds of men, one that of those who live by reason, the divine inbreathing, the other of those who live by blood and the pleasure of the flesh. This last is a moulded clod of earth (τοῦτο τὸ εἶδός ἐστι πλάσμα γῆς), the other is the faithful impress of the divine image (ἐκεῖνο δὲ θείας εἰκόνος ἐμφερὲς ἐκμαγεῖον). (*Quis rerum divinarum heres sit* 56–57)

In this passage, Philo clearly defines the overlap between the two types of man. The description of the installation of God's Spirit in man from Gen 2.7 is directly linked with the account of man's creation after the image of God from Gen 1.26–27. In this sense, Spirit and image appear to be synonymous or, as we shall see later in other passages, near-synonymous. The defining difference between the first and second type of man is above all the fact that the second type is composite because he consists of Spirit and body. Focusing on this difference, Philo is even able to define this type, in a reductionist way, as 'a moulded clod of earth', overlooking the fact that this type has been inbreathed with God's Spirit. This helps us to understand that the intersection and overlap between the two types lies in the highest part of the second type of man, his spirit or mind.

The two creation accounts are also conflated in a passage in *De Plantatione*. Although focusing on the fashioning of the (individual) reasonable soul as narrated in the second account, Philo also draws on the terminology of the first account:

> Our great Moses likened the fashion of the reasonable soul to no created thing, but averred it to be a genuine coinage of that dread Spirit, the Divine and Invisible One, signed and impressed by the seal of God, the stamp of which is the Eternal Word. His words are 'God in-breathed into his face a breath of Life' (Gen 2.7), so that it cannot but be that he that receives is made in the likeness of Him who sends forth the breath (ὥστε ἀνάγκη πρὸς τὸν ἐκπέμποντα τὸν δεχόμενον ἀπεικονίσθαι). Accordingly we also read that man has been made after the image of God (Gen 1.27). (*De plantatione* 19)

He that receives the Spirit of God, the second type of man, is depicted as someone who experiences the act of πρὸς τὸν ἐκπέμποντα ἀπεικονίσθαι, of being represented in an image (ἀπ – εικονίσθαι) which is that of the One who sent this Spirit. This language echoes the term 'image' of the first creation account and is thoroughly imbued with the imagery of the second one. And a quotation from the first account follows suit. Again, Philo makes us think that 'image' and 'Spirit' are synonymous, or at least near-synonymous, thus indicating how the two accounts intersect.

(d) The hierarchical relation between the two creation accounts

Perhaps it is indeed better to speak of the near-synonymy of the terms 'image' and 'Spirit'. There are indications that Philo does not think them equivalent, but views them in a hierarchical relation. In *Quod deterius potiori insidiari soleat*, for example, Philo defines the Spirit which is instilled in man according to the second creation account as follows:

> To the faculty which streams forth from the fountain of reason Spirit (τὸ πνεῦμα) has been assigned, not moving air, but, as it were, an impression stamped by the divine power, to which Moses gives the appropriate title of 'image' (τύπον τινὰ καὶ χαρακτῆρα θείας δυνάμεως, ἣν ὀνόματι κυρίῳ Μωυσῆς εἰκόνα καλεῖ), thus

> indicating that God is the archetype of rational existence, while man is a copy and likeness (δηλῶν ὅτι ἀρχέτυπον μὲν φύσεως λογικῆς ὁ θεός ἐστι, μίμημα δὲ καὶ ἀπεικόνισμα ἄνθρωπος). By 'man' I mean not the living creature with two natures, but the highest form in which the life shows itself; and this has received the title of 'mind' and 'reason' (οὐ τὸ διφυὲς ζῷον, ἀλλὰ τὸ τῆς ψυχῆς ἄριστον εἶδος, ὃ νοῦς καὶ λόγος κέκληται). (*Quod deterius potiori insidiari soleat* 83)

The Spirit in this passage is defined as a τύπον τινὰ καὶ χαρακτῆρα θείας δυνάμεως, ἣν ὀνόματι κυρίῳ Μωυσῆς εἰκόνα καλεῖ, 'an impression stamped by the divine power, to which Moses gives the appropriate title of "image"'. If the 'image' is identical with 'the divine power', it follows that the Spirit is not so much identical with this divine power but rather the effect of the pressure of this power: it is the impression (τύπος) or impress (χαρακτήρ) of it. In this way, Philo is able to explain how the two types of man intersect and, at the same time, to accord them a place in the hierarchy which he envisages. The Spirit which is instilled in the highest, rational part of the second type of man is an effect of the Image of God.

Despite this hierarchical clarification, even in this passage Philo remains ambiguous inasmuch as he continues to describe this man in terms directly borrowed from the first creation account: this man is 'a copy and likeness'. Philo then, however, seems to clarify his position further by stating that he is indeed thinking of the second type of man, but only insofar as the highest part of his soul is concerned. He does not think of the second type of man in his entirety, in his composition of Spirit and body, as a 'living creature with two natures', but only of this man's mind or reason, the highest part of his trichotomic composition of spirit (or mind or reason), soul, and body (see further chap. 5). Although he tends to regard 'Spirit' and 'image' as synonymous, he adds a subtle note to his depiction of their relationship by defining the latter as the driving force behind the formed; the Spirit is 'an impression stamped by the divine power', exerted by the Image of God. In this way Philo also harmonizes the two creation accounts.

A hierarchical relationship of this kind also seems to be behind a passage in Philo's *De plantatione*. Due to the exegetical demands of a particular passage in Genesis, Philo needs to forge an antithesis between, on the one hand, 'the man made after God's image' and, on the other, 'the man stamped with the Spirit which is after the image of God': ὁ μὲν γὰρ τῷ κατὰ τὴν εἰκόνα θεοῦ χαραχθεὶς πνεύματι (*De plantatione* 44–45). The latter phrase clearly shows the kind of hierarchical definition which we have just seen above. The second type of man differs from the first type because he is not made after God's image, but 'stamped with the Spirit which is after the image of God'. Although the intersection and overlap with the first type is clear, at the same time it is apparent that 'image of God' and 'Spirit' are not synonyms, but only near-synonyms. In the present passage, the 'man stamped with the Spirit which is after the image of God' is clearly the second type of man and can, for this reason, be equated with

'the man fashioned out of earth', who possesses an 'earthly composite body'; he is 'the earthly man' (44).

The ambiguity of this man is nicely captured in Philo's characterization of him as 'the middle or neutral mind, played upon by forces drawing it in opposite directions and given the high calling to decide between them' (45). In this passage Philo focuses on the ambiguity of the second type of man: on the one hand, he is a being 'stamped with the Spirit which is after the image of God' and, in this way, closely linked with the first, heavenly type of man; on the other hand, however, he is fully embedded in a composite existence which renders him into an earthly man. Yet, since the focus of this passage is different from that in *Quis rerum divinarum heres sit*, just discussed above, this does not necessarily include him among 'those who live by blood and the pleasure of the flesh' (*Quis rerum divinarum heres sit* 56–57). If he does not reduce himself to 'a moulded clod of earth', but lives in accordance with 'the Spirit which is after the image of God', Philo contends, this man will be able to make the right decisions. In this respect, Philo's and Paul's anthropologies seem to be very similar.

Philo's hierarchical definition of the way in which Spirit and image interrelate also comes to the fore, finally, in *De specialibus legibus*. Here Philo depicts 'our dominant part' (τὸ ἡγεμονικὸν), the highest, leading part of the human soul, as τὸ ἐν ἡμῖν λογικὸν πνεῦμα, ὅπερ ἐμορφώθη πρὸς ἀρχέτυπον ἰδέαν εἰκόνος θείας, 'the rational spirit within us, which was shaped according to the archetypal form of the divine image' (*De specialibus legibus* 1.171). Again, the spirit which dwells in the highest part of the second type of man is seen as receiving its shape from the divine image. The Spirit and the image of God are near-synonyms but not fully identical. This means that both the overlap and the continuing difference between the two types of man have been clearly described by Philo.

There is one passage in Philo about the image of God which is difficult to understand and must be seen, I believe, as deficient or at least deceptive. In *De virtutibus* 204–205, Philo writes of 'the first and earth-born man':

> His father was no mortal but the eternal God, whose image he was in a sense in virtue of the ruling mind within the soul (τοῦ δὲ πατὴρ [μὲν] θνητὸς οὐδείς, ὁ δὲ ἀίδιος θεός· οὗ τρόπον τινὰ γενόμενος εἰκὼν κατὰ τὸν ἡγεμόνα νοῦν ἐν ψυχῇ). Yet though he should have kept that image undefiled and followed as far as he could in the steps of his Parent's virtues (δέον ἀκηλίδωτον τὴν εἰκόνα φυλάξαι καθ' ὅσον οἷόν τε ἦν ἐπακολουθήσαντα ταῖς τοῦ γεννήσαντος ἀρεταῖς), when the opposites were set before him to choose or avoid, good and evil, honourable and base, true and false, he was quick to choose the false, the base and the evil. (*De virtutibus* 204–205)

It is puzzling that the first and earth-born man, i. e. the first representative of the second type of man, Adam, is called the 'image' of God. As we saw above in § 1.2.2, Philo criticizes the identification of man with the image of God, as man was only created 'after the image of God'. Yet, we have also seen that at least

once Philo also calls man the 'visible image' (*De opificio mundi* 146). It must be in this sense, of a *visible* image, that in the present passage Philo calls Adam the 'image' of the eternal God.

At the same time, this passage gives insight into how Adam 'should have kept that image undefiled'. This would have been possible by following 'as far as he could' in the footsteps of God's virtues. As we shall see in chap. 2 below, Philo here applies the Platonic doctrine of assimilation to God. Having been created after the image of God, man should remain so by assimilating himself to God as far as possible. Before turning to these pagan notions of image of God and assimilation to God in the next chapter, we shall finally explore the way in which Paul uses the language of the image of God.

1.3 Image, form and trans-formation: A semantic taxonomy of Paul's 'morphic' language

Introduction

This section examines Paul's language of the image of God. The notion of the image of God in Paul is, of course, part of his Adam Christology, which has been highlighted by J.D.G. Dunn, especially in his *Christology in the Making* and his *The Theology of Paul the Apostle*.[123] The most explicit occurrences of this Adamic Christology, in which Adam and Christ, the second Adam, are put on a par, are found in 1 Cor 15.21–22, 45–47 and Rom 5.12–19, where Adam is mentioned by name.[124] The first passage reads:

> For since death came through a human being, the resurrection of the dead has also come through a human being; for as all die in Adam, so all will be made alive in Christ. (1 Cor 15.21–22)

This contrast is elaborated upon in Rom 5. There Paul sketches a similar opposition between the man through whom sin and death came into the world, and the other man, of whom the first was a type or prototype; through this latter man grace, righteousness and life were imparted to many (Rom 5.12–19). This reads like an elaboration of 1 Cor 15.21–22. At the end of 1 Cor 15, it is precisely the contrast between Adam and Christ that is further highlighted. In this second Corinthian passage, the contrast between both human beings is repeated, but now worded explicitly in terms of the first and second man, the man from the earth and the man from heaven:

> Thus it is written, 'The first man, Adam, became a living being'; the last Adam became a life-giving spirit. But it is not the spiritual that is first, but the physical,

[123] Dunn 1989; Dunn 1998.
[124] See 1 Cor 15.22, 45 and Rom 5.14.

> and then the spiritual. The first man was from the earth, a man of dust; the second man is from heaven. As was the man of dust, so are those who are of the dust; and as is the man of heaven, so are those who are of heaven. Just as we have borne the image of the man of dust, we will also bear the image of the man of heaven. (1 Cor 15.45–49)

This passage reveals that the notion of the image of God also belongs to the core of Paul's Adam Christology. Dunn has argued that Paul develops his Adam Christology not only in the above passages from 1 Cor 15 and Rom 5, but throughout his letters. I agree with him that 'Adam plays a larger role in Paul's theology than is usually realized', that 'Adam is a key figure in Paul's attempt to express his understanding both of Christ and of man', and that 'it is necessary to trace the extent of the Adam motif in Paul if we are to appreciate the force of his Adam Christology'.[125]

In this section I wish to contribute to this search by focusing on the semantic field of the image of God, which is part of Paul's Adam Christology. It seems that the semantic-conceptual field of the notion of the image of God is larger and more coherent than is often realized. I shall argue that the notion of the image of God not only comprises the terminology of 'image' (εἰκών; § 1.3.1), but also that of μορφή ('form') and its cognate terms μορφόομαι ('take on form, be formed'), σύμμορφος ('having the same form, similar in form'), συμμορφίζομαι ('be conformed to, take on the same form as'), and, last but not least, μεταμορφόομαι ('be transformed, be changed into the same form'; § 1.3.2 [a]). As regards the latter word, Dunn does not seem to realize that this verb is part of the image of God language. Instead, as we shall see in due course, he refers to a triple background of this notion in (1) the idea of metamorphosis which is deemed 'common to many religious strands of the ancient world', (2) the language of moral transformation, and (3) a Jewish apocalyptic usage of the idea of transformation.[126] Yet, as I shall suggest after a comparison between Paul and Philo (§ 1.3.2 [b]), it is far more likely that Paul's use of the concept of metamorphosis does not owe much to either Greek or Jewish-apocalyptic ideas of transformation, but should be seen in the context of his reflections on God's image. In general terms, the simple background seems to be that images have forms (as will be argued in § 1.3.2 [c]).

This approach gives rise to a more precise semantic taxonomy of Paul's concept of the image of God. As regards Paul's Adam Christology, G. D. Fee, in his recent *Pauline Christology*, convincingly concludes:

> So Adam Christology there is in Paul's thought, to be sure; but in terms of actual language and echoes from Gen 1–2, it is limited to two kinds of passages: first, explicit contrasts between Christ and Adam (…); and, second, where the incarnate Christ is

[125] Dunn 1989, 101.
[126] See Dunn's commentary on Rom 12.2; Dunn 1988, 713.

seen as the true bearer of the divine image, who is also re-creating a people who bear that image with him.[127]

Fee himself adopts the centre ground between ‘a *minimalist* position, which deals only with the three passages where Adam is specifically mentioned’ (see above) and ‘a *maximalist* position, such as one finds in the work of J. D. G. Dunn or N. T. Wright’; Fee’s position is ‘based on what appear to be *certain* connections made by Paul between Christ and the actual *language* of Gen 1–3’.[128] This language consists of the terminology of the image of God.

Yet even if one agrees with Fee that Paul’s Adam Christology should be based (primarily) on this language, the extent of this semantic field still remains to be charted. In his polemics with Dunn, Fee disputes, for instance, that in Philippians 2.6–8 μορφή is virtually synonymous with εἰκών. This issue will be discussed below, but let me point out in passing that Fee’s criticism is ill-founded, since, on the contrary, the language of μορφή is intrinsically linked with that of εἰκών. As will be argued, the extent of the semantic and conceptual field of the divine image is larger than might be assumed at first glance; the scope of Paul’s Adam Christology is extensive. The extent of this field is so large, and especially its inclusion of morphic language so important that, without much exaggeration, one could characterize Paul’s Christology and anthropology as ‘morphic’. This semantic taxonomy of only a part of Paul’s Adam Christology shows that this type of Christology is indeed very dominant in Paul.

The emphasis in this section is on the detailed mapping of the semantic and conceptual field of ‘image of God’. I shall, however, draw on my previous overview of the interpretation of the image of God in ancient Judaism (see § 1.1 above), either by way of comparison or contrast, wherever this seems appropriate.

1.3.1 The terminology of image

I shall first give a brief survey of the actual occurrences of the terminology of εἰκών in Paul’s extant writings, roughly according to what seems to be the most likely chronological order. As we shall see, the term εἰκών occurs in those letters, 1–2 Cor and Rom, which also contain Paul’s explicit mentions of Adam.

In 1 Cor 11, in his discussion of the need for women to veil their heads, Paul states that a man ought not to have his head veiled, since he is the image and glory of God: εἰκὼν καὶ δόξα θεοῦ ὑπάρχων. This language clearly refers back to the image of God mentioned in Gen 1.26–27. Later in 1 Cor 15, Paul again draws on this language when he explains that ‘Just as we have borne the image (εἰκών) of the man of dust, we will also bear the image (εἰκών) of the man of heaven’

[127] Fee 2007, chap. 13: ‘Jesus as Second Adam’, 513–29 at 523.
[128] Fee 2007, 513.

(1 Cor 15.49): καὶ καθὼς ἐφορέσαμεν τὴν εἰκόνα τοῦ χοϊκοῦ, φορέσομεν καὶ τὴν εἰκόνα τοῦ ἐπουρανίου. As we learn from 2 Cor, where the language of εἰκών is employed once again, this bearing of the image of the second Adam is not only an eschatological event. Rather, it involves a transformational process in the present, based on man's transformation into, or in accordance with, the image of Christ in his capacity – as 1 Cor 15 implies – as the heavenly man: ἡμεῖς δὲ πάντες ἀνακεκαλυμμένῳ προσώπῳ τὴν δόξαν κυρίου κατοπτριζόμενοι τὴν αὐτὴν εἰκόνα μεταμορφούμεθα ἀπὸ δόξης εἰς δόξαν, καθάπερ ἀπὸ κυρίου πνεύματος – 'And all of us, with unveiled faces, seeing the glory of the Lord as though reflected in a mirror, are being transformed into the same image from one degree of glory to another; for this comes from the Lord, the Spirit' (2 Cor 3.18). The fact that this image and glory are indeed Christ's is rendered explicit in the immediately succeeding passage, when Paul refers to τὸν φωτισμὸν τοῦ εὐαγγελίου τῆς δόξης τοῦ Χριστοῦ, ὅς ἐστιν εἰκὼν τοῦ θεοῦ – 'the light of the gospel of the glory of Christ, who is the image of God' (2 Cor 4.4). The glory of this Christ (2 Cor 3.18, 4.4), thus, is the glory of the second Adam, just as the first Adam was God's image and glory (1 Cor 11.7).

The notion of the glory of Adam is reminiscent of the importance of this notion in the Dead Sea Scrolls. The language of Adam, whom God 'fashioned in the likeness of [his] glory' and destined to 'walk in a land of glory' (4Q504 frag. 8 4–7), is applied to the members of the Qumran community: '*to them* shall belong *all the glory of Adam*' (1QS 4.23; cf. CD-A 3.20, 1QH^{a} 4.15). Adam's glory is being re-established in their community (see § 1.1.3 [a] and [b]). Something similar is happening in the Christian community, according to 2 Cor 3–4. If people convert to Christ, the second Adam, and reflect his glory (2 Cor 3.16, 18; 4.4), they experience a transformation ἀπὸ δόξης εἰς δόξαν, 'from one degree of glory to another' (2 Cor 3.18). The language of the image and glory of God in 1–2 Cor is thus rooted in an ancient Jewish understanding of the image of God.

At the same time, as can be deduced from 1 Cor 15, Paul's mode of expression has been borrowed to some extent from pagan references to the images of the gods. When Paul writes that 'Just as we have borne the image (ἐφορέσαμεν τὴν εἰκόνα) of the man of dust, we will also bear the image (φορέσομεν καὶ τὴν εἰκόνα) of the man of heaven' (1 Cor 15.49), he avails himself of the imagery of carrying round a statue of a god. There are close analogies in the Greek Stoic philosopher Epictetus, for instance, according to whom man carries a god within him:

> But they [i.e. all creatures other than man] are not of primary importance, nor portions of divinity. But you are a being of primary importance; you are a fragment of God; you have within you a part of Him. Why, then, are you ignorant of your own kinship? (…) You are bearing God about with you (θεὸν περιφέρεις), you poor wretch, and know it not! Do you suppose I am speaking of some external God? It *is within yourself that you bear him* (ἐν σαυτῷ φέρεις αὐτὸν), and do not perceive that

> you are defiling him with impure thoughts and filthy actions. Yet in the presence of even an image of God (καὶ ἀγάλματος μὲν τοῦ θεοῦ παρόντος) you would not dare to do anything of the things you are now doing. (*Dissertationes* 2.8.11–14)[129]

The internal act of carrying (the image of) God within oneself is contrasted with the external reverence paid to the visible statue of a god.

Another particularly instructive example can be found in Philo who, in his *Legatio ad Gaium*, explains in everyday pagan language what the Jews are doing:

> Holding that the laws are oracles vouchsafed by God and having been trained in this doctrine from their earliest years, they carry as a statue (ἀγαλματοφοροῦσι) the images (εἰκόνας) of the commandments enshrined in their souls. Then as they contemplate their shapes and forms (τύπους καὶ μορφὰς) they always think of them with awe – νόμους εἶναι ὑπολαμβάνοντες καὶ τοῦτο ἐκ πρώτης ἡλικίας τὸ μάθημα παιδευθέντες ἐν ταῖς ψυχαῖς ἀγαλματοφοροῦσι τὰς τῶν διατεταγμένων εἰκόνας· εἶτα ἐναργεῖς τύπους καὶ μορφὰς αὐτῶν καθορῶντες ἀεὶ τοῖς λογισμοῖς αὐτῶν τεθήπασι. (*Legatio ad Gaium* 210–211)

Philo applies the language of the pagan practices of carrying round idols in a metaphorical way to the way in which Jews carry round the image of the law within their minds. In a similar way, I would suggest, Paul speaks of human beings carrying the image of God: first the distorted image of the first Adam, which is only in a remote sense still an image of God, but subsequently the image of the second Adam.

A similar antithesis between the images of idols and the image of God may be present in Paul's letter to the Romans, which contains the other occurrences of εἰκών in Paul's extant letters.[130] In Romans 1, Paul criticizes those who have degenerated into idol-worshippers: 'they exchanged the glory of the immortal God for images resembling a mortal human being (ἐν ὁμοιώματι εἰκόνος φθαρτοῦ ἀνθρώπου) or birds or four-footed animals or reptiles' (1.23). In Romans, these images of idols contrast sharply with the image of God's son, whose form God has predestined the readers to resemble: προώρισεν συμμόρφους τῆς εἰκόνος τοῦ υἱοῦ αὐτοῦ (Rom 8.29). Whereas exchanging the glory of God for images

[129] Cf. Haussleiter 1957, 807 with reference to Epictetus (2.8.11–14) and Marcus Aurelius, *Meditations* 12.23.6: 'Auch das Adjektiv θεοφόρητος, von Gott getragen, verwendet Marc[us Aurelius] einmal (12, 23, 6), das passive Korrelat zum Gottragen des Epiktet'; and 810–811 with reference to Iamblichus, *De mysteriis* 3.5: θεοφορία; cf. also 3.25: ἡ δὲ θεοφορία τελειότης καὶ σωτηρία τῆς ψυχῆς – 'divine θεοφορία is a perfection and deliverance of the soul' (trans. Clarke, Dillon & Hershbell 2003). Haussleiter takes the phrase 'bearing God about with you (θεὸν περιφέρεις)' in Epictetus, *Dissertationes* 2.8.12 as a possible reference to the bearing of amulets. See Haussleiter 1957, 807: 'Nach Dölger, ACh 4 (1934) 72 wird Epiktet hier an den "Gott" als Amulett gedacht haben'.

[130] For the Ps-Pauline letters see also Col 1.15 about Christ, ὅς ἐστιν εἰκὼν τοῦ θεοῦ τοῦ ἀοράτου; and Col 3.10 about the restoration of the new man who is renewed εἰς ἐπίγνωσιν κατ' εἰκόνα τοῦ κτίσαντος αὐτόν.

of idols is a sign of mankind's decline, its restoration takes place when man is conformed to God's image (see further chap. 7 below).

This antagonism between the image of God and idols seems already to be part of the Old Testament background to the notion of the image of God. As we have seen in the introduction to § 1.1 above, it is not unlikely that the assertion that man is created 'in God's image (בְּצֶלֶם אֱלֹהִים)' (Gen 1.26–27) could bear anti-idolatrous overtones, as the term 'image' (צֶלֶם) is one of the words used to refer to idols (Num 33.52; 2 Kgs 11.18; 2 Chron 23.17; Ezek 7.20, 16.17, 23.14; Amos 5.26). In this respect the priestly author of Genesis is resembled by Ezekiel (see Ezek 1.26–28). As Kutsko notes in his comments on the 'image of God' in Ezekiel:

> Ezekiel struggles to find appropriate language that indicates both human likeness and divine incomparability. The prophet directs his efforts in several directions: he is at once attempting to align himself with Priestly theology, to contradict Mesopotamian ideology, and to refrain from language that would explicitly legitimize the notion of other gods. Fundamentally, however, P and Ezekiel are dealing with the same answer, approached from different angles: humans are like God, and God is like humans. In this answer, both P and Ezekiel remove other gods from the equation.[131]

This polemical anti-idolatrous understanding of man as the image of God also surfaces in later sources, as we saw in § 1.1.4 above. In a passage denouncing idolatry, the author of book III of the *Sibylline Oracles* addresses mankind as follows:

> Men, who have the form which God moulded in his image
> (ἄνθρωποι θεόπλαστον ἔχοντες ἐν εἰκόνι μορφήν),
> Why do you wander in vain, and not walk the straight path
> ever mindful of the immortal creator? (III 8–10)

This sentence seems to hint at an opposition between the image of God and the other images of idolatrous cults. A full-blown antithesis comes to the fore in book VIII of the *Sibylline Oracles*. The passage in question is part of a denunciation of idolatry (8.359–428), spoken by God himself; it develops an explicit antithesis between the images (εἰκόνες) used in pagan idolatry and man, as God's image (εἰκών):

> Godless ones also call their images (τὰς εἰκόνας αὐτῶν) gods,
> abandoning the Creator, thinking to have
> all hope and life from them. Trusting
> in dumb and speechless things with evil result, they are ignorant of good end.
> I myself proposed two ways, of life and death,
> And proposed to the judgment to choose good life.

[131] Kutsko 2000*a*, 132. On the idea of the image of God and the polemic against the idols of Ancient Near Eastern cults, see also Schüle 2005, esp. 1–2, 9–11. On P and Ezekiel, see also Miller 1972, 303.

But they turned eagerly to death and eternal fire.
Man is my image (εἰκών ἐστ' ἄνθρωπος ἐμή), having right reason.
(VIII 395–402)

Here, the opposition between the images of the gods and the image which is man, endowed with right reason, is rendered explicit. In essence it is the same opposition as that already found within P and Ezekiel. The logical conclusion of this way of thinking, that man, in his capacity as God's image, is the only image of God and as such merits worship, is drawn in the *Life of Adam and Eve* (*LAE*). According to *LAE*, if Adam is the true image of God, he constitutes the proper object of worship, a worship to be performed by the angels (*LAE – Vita* 13.1–15.3; 37.3; 39.1–3). This remarkable view could be taken as the most radical consequence of the extraordinary position accorded to man in the Priestly Source, and shows the inherent antithesis between this image and the alternative images of pagan cult.

This appears to be very similar to the antithesis which Paul draws between the images for which God's glory was exchanged and Christ, as the proper image of God, to which the Christians are being conformed.

From this overview it emerges that in Paul's extant letters the language of εἰκών appears in 1–2 Cor and Rom, precisely the letters in which the contrasting pair Adam and Christ occur, constituting Paul's explicit Adam Christology. This is no coincidence. The letters in which an explicit Adam Christology is unfolded also contain the designation of Adam as the image of God, be it Adam I or Adam II. Nor is it coincidental that these letters are addressed to largely pagan communities; in a letter within a Judaizing context, as Paul's letter to the Galatians shows, it is not Adam but rather Abraham who is the focus of attention.

1.3.2 The terminology of forms

(a) A survey of morphic language in Paul

Let me first draw attention to the two passages in Paul which explicitly link the terminology of εἰκών with the terminology of forms. In 2 Cor 3.18, a passage already quoted above, Paul posits that 'all of us', i. e. all Christ-believers, 'with unveiled faces, seeing the glory of the Lord as though reflected in a mirror, are being transformed into the same image from one degree of glory to another' – ἡμεῖς δὲ πάντες ἀνακεκαλυμμένῳ προσώπῳ τὴν δόξαν κυρίου κατοπτριζόμενοι τὴν αὐτὴν εἰκόνα μεταμορφούμεθα ἀπὸ δόξης εἰς δόξαν. Here, the language of image and form is linked inasmuch as a transformation or metamorphosis takes place into, or in accordance with, the image of God (cf. 2 Cor 4.4). We shall return to the concept of metamorphosis below, in the discussion of Rom 12.2, where this concept reoccurs. For now, it will suffice to highlight that the terminologies of image and form do indeed intersect.

This also appears to be the case in Rom 8.29, also quoted above, when Paul says that God has predestined the Christ-believers to be similar in form to the image of his son, Christ: προώρισεν συμμόρφους τῆς εἰκόνος τοῦ υἱοῦ αὐτοῦ. The reason *why* these terminologies overlap has not yet been fully explored in scholarly debate, and will be established further below. First we shall continue with a survey of Paul's morphic language, identifying any particular features or exegetical problems encountered in a kind of inventory.

The notion of becoming similar in form to Christ that features in the passage in Romans just discussed also occurs, in reverse order, in Gal 4.19: here it is not the believers who are said to be conformed to Christ, but rather Christ who will 'receive form in you', the Galatians: μορφωθῇ Χριστὸς ἐν ὑμῖν.

A very different use of morphic language seems to be involved in Philippians 2.6–7, in the well-known piece of hymnic prose referred to as the Philippian hymn. The readers are exhorted to be of one mind with Christ Jesus, 'who, though he was in the form of God (ἐν μορφῇ θεοῦ ὑπάρχων), did not regard equality with God as something to be exploited, but emptied himself, taking the form of a slave (μορφὴν δούλου λαβών), being born in human likeness' – ὅς ἐν μορφῇ θεοῦ ὑπάρχων οὐχ ἁρπαγμὸν ἡγήσατο τὸ εἶναι ἴσα θεῷ, ἀλλὰ ἑαυτὸν ἐκένωσεν μορφὴν δούλου λαβών, ἐν ὁμοιώματι ἀνθρώπων γενόμενος (2.6–7).

Paul's talk about God's form is closely matched by that of Josephus in his *Against Apion*. In a passage on the first commandment, in explaining the Jewish conception of God, Josephus writes:

> What, then, are the precepts and prohibitions of our Law? They are simple and familiar. At their head stands one of which God is the theme. The universe is in God's hands; perfect and blessed, self-sufficing and sufficing for all, He is the beginning, the middle, and the end of all things. By His works and bounties He is plainly seen, indeed more manifest than ought else; but His form (μορφή) and magnitude surpass our powers of description (μορφὴν δὲ καὶ μέγεθος ἡμῖν ἄφατος). No materials, however costly, are fit to make an image (εἰκών) of Him (πᾶσα μὲν ὕλη πρὸς εἰκόνα τὴν τούτου κἂν ᾖ πολυτελὴς ἄτιμος); no art has skill to conceive and represent it. The like of Him we have never seen, we do not imagine, and it is impious to conjecture (οὐδὲν ὅμοιον οὔτ' εἴδομεν οὔτ' ἐπινοοῦμεν οὔτ' εἰκάζειν ἐστὶν ὅσιον). We behold His works … (*Against Apion* 2.190–191)

According to Josephus, God does indeed possess a form, but this is ἄφατος, inexpressible. For this reason, no image of Him can be made in the form of a statue. Josephus also emphasizes this later, in a passage in which he attacks the Greeks' gross and immoral ideas about the gods:

> They have even deified Terror and Fear [i.e. Deimos and Phobos, attendants of Ares, *Iliad* XV.119], nay Frenzy and Deceit – which of the worst passions have they not transfigured into the nature and form of a god (την καὶ τί γὰρ οὐχὶ τῶν κακίστων παθῶν εἰς θεοῦ φύσιν καὶ μορφὴν ἀνέπλασαν)? –, and have induced cities to offer sacrifices to the more respectable members of this pantheon. (*Against Apion* 2.248)

The ineffable form of the Jewish God is placed in sharp contrast with the form of idolatrous statues of the gods. Although Josephus does apply the term 'form' to God, it seems to be for polemical, anti-idolatrous reasons that he avoids speaking of God's εἰκών. As Jervell noted and Levison emphasized, Josephus never uses the concept of God's image, even not in his retelling of Genesis 1.[132] In this, he differs from both Philo and Paul. Yet his passage about the ineffable form of God shows that the terminology of form as such is related to that of image, even if the terms are contrasted in this particular context in Josephus' work. Josephus' view that no visual image can be made of God because his form surpasses our powers of description shows that, despite the opposition between the true God and idols, the language of form and image is inherently connected. There is talk about the form and image of God, even if the first is beyond description and the possibility of the latter is denied. Josephus' use of the term 'form' seems to be an instance of his metaphorical use of language, similar to the cases in which he speaks of the forms of the visual statues of the gods, such as the second passage from his *Against Apion*.

The manner in which the terms of form and image intersect will be explored later, but it is important to stress that they do overlap and are part of the same semantic and conceptual field. This is important because the synonymy (or near-synonymy) or semantic-conceptual closeness of μορφή and εἰκών has become a bone of contention in the scholarly debate about Christology in the Philippian hymn. On the one hand, scholars such as Dunn claim that the phrase ἐν μορφῇ θεοῦ is part and parcel of Paul's Adam Christology, and point to Christ's being in the image of God. On the other hand, scholars such as Steenburg and Fee strongly contest this synonymy between form and image.[133] The polemics have become heated, Fee making a philippica against those scholars who regard both terms as synonymous:

> There has been a veritable groundswell in the NT academy that has argued (or more often simply asserted) that Paul's use of μορφή in the opening phrase of the Christ story (v. 6 [=Philipp 2.6]) is virtually synonymous with εἰκών. But (…) this is a piece of scholarly mythology that needs to be laid to rest.[134]

It is true, I think, that Dunn and others have often emphasized that the terms μορφή and εἰκών are synonymous without ever clearly explaining why. Dunn almost takes the near-synonymy for granted, stating: 'it has long been recognized that μορφή and εἰκών are near synonyms', with particular reference to the work of R. P. Martin.[135] However, Martin before him also seems to be content with

[132] Jervell 1974, 200–4; Levison 1988, 101, 109, 147.

[133] See Steenburg 1988; and Fee 2007, 522–3 and 377–9.

[134] Fee 2007, 522–3 at 522; cf. 377–9.

[135] Dunn 1989, 115 and 117; Dunn 1998, §8.6, 199–204. Dunn does clearly relate μορφή and εἰκών, see Dunn 1998, 284–5 in §11.4 (pp. 281–8) on Philipp 2.6–11; this is also a majority view, see 284n83: 'the semantic fields of the two terms overlap considerably'.

demonstrating that μορφή and εἰκών are interchangeable, without explaining why they belong to the same semantic-conceptual field: 'because the terms appear to be used interchangeably in various contexts their meanings are to be regarded as equivalent'.[136] No specific background for this statement is given, except for a general reference to the Septuagint. This means the claim that μορφή and εἰκών are near-synonyms lacks precision.

On the other hand, however, it seems unwarranted to emphasize a conceptual difference between the terms to the extent that Fee does. The passage from Josephus' *Against Apion* discussed above shows that μορφή and εἰκών belong to the same semantic-conceptual field (*Against Apion* 2.190–191). This should obviously be noted in our inventory of problems, and in the next section we shall compare Paul's morphic language with that of Philo to establish whether Philo's use of morphic language can throw any light on the issue. Before that, however, we shall continue our survey of morphic passages in Paul.

Morphic language is also important in two other passages in Philippians. These passages also contain the notion of 'having the same form, being similar in form' (σύμμορφος) and 'being conformed to, taking on the same form as' (συμμορφίζομαι), as encountered already in both Rom 8.29 and, in reverse form, in Gal 4.19. In Philipp 3.10, Paul expresses his ardent wish 'to know Christ and the power of his resurrection and the sharing of his sufferings by taking on the same form as his death (συμμορφιζόμενος τῷ θανάτῳ αὐτοῦ)'. This Christ, as Philipp 3.21 explains, 'will transform the body of our humiliation so that it may have the same form as the body of his glory (μετασχηματίσει τὸ σῶμα τῆς ταπεινώσεως ἡμῶν σύμμορφον τῷ σώματι τῆς δόξης αὐτοῦ), by the power that also enables him to make all things subject to himself'. Together with the passages from Rom 8.29 and Gal 4.19, these passages are testimony to the great importance which Paul attaches to the notion of having or taking on the same form as that of Christ. This is indeed a conformity to the form of Christ's εἰκών, as Rom 8.29 makes explicit.

The last relevant morphic passage in Paul is Rom 12.2.[137] Here again, as in 2 Cor 3.18, Paul mentions the phenomenon of metamorphosis. He exhorts his readers in the following manner: 'Do not be conformed to this world, but be transformed (μεταμορφοῦσθε) by the renewing of your minds, so that you may discern what is the will of God: what is good and acceptable and perfect' – καὶ μὴ συσχηματίζεσθε τῷ αἰῶνι τούτῳ, ἀλλὰ μεταμορφοῦσθε τῇ ἀνακαινώσει τοῦ

[136] Martin 1967, 102–120 at 118.

[137] The only morphic passage which I leave out of consideration in this survey is Rom 2.20. In this passage Paul describes the self-image of his Jewish opponent, who is confident that he is 'a guide to the blind, a light to those who are in darkness, a corrector of the foolish, a teacher of children, having in the law the embodiment, the 'bringing into shape' (μόρφωσις) of knowledge and truth (ἔχοντα τὴν μόρφωσιν τῆς γνώσεως καὶ τῆς ἀληθείας ἐν τῷ νόμῳ)' (Rom 2.19–20). This morphic term seems to stand on its own. Cf. for the later Pauline letters, 2 Tim 3.5.

νοός, εἰς τὸ δοκιμάζειν ὑμᾶς τί τὸ θέλημα τοῦ θεοῦ, τὸ ἀγαθὸν καὶ εὐάρεστον καὶ τέλειον. If the similar passage in 2 Cor 3.18 is adduced, this metamorphosis appears to be a metamorphosis into, or in accordance with, the image of God. This link between metamorphosis and image seems to be crucial and is another point for our inventory of problems, since the background of the notion of metamorphosis and its link with the terminology of image is not sufficiently clear.

Dunn, in his comments on metamorphosis in Rom 12.2, refers to a threefold background of 'metamorphosis'.[138] (1) First, Dunn points out that the 'idea of metamorphosis is common to many religious strands of the ancient world, including the classic myths about the gods changing into earthly form, and accounts of individuals being transformed through mystery ritual or Gnostic release'. (2) Subsequently, he specifies that this language ought not to imply 'that Paul here is using "mystery-conceptions"', as Richard Reitzenstein proposed, but that 'the language could be used in the sense of a moral transformation'. (3) Finally, Dunn draws upon the idea of metamorphosis in Jewish apocalyptic writings (*1 Enoch* 104.6; *4 Ezra* 7.97; *2 Apoc. Bar.* 51.5). Surprisingly, Dunn does not consider the possibility that the language of metamorphosis in Paul is strongly related to the semantic-conceptual field of 'image', even though the comparable passage of 2 Cor 3.18 hints in this direction.

The problem is that the background of the notion of metamorphosis in ancient mythology and Jewish apocalyptic is not sufficiently convincing.[139] The Jewish apocalyptic sources do perhaps contain the idea of metamorphosis, but hardly the explicit terminology, whereas the specific terminology of metamorphosis in Greek is rather late, with only a limited number of occurrences before the first century AD. As T. Ballauff notes,

> Das Wort 'Metamorphose' begegnet uns in der griechischen Literatur spät. Die lateinische Sprache hat dafür das Wort 'transfiguratio', das zuerst bei Plinius vorkommt; Seneca kennt schon 'transfigurari'. Die Vorstellung von der Verwandlung göttlicher oder menschlicher Wesen in Tiere, Pflanzen, Steine ist, wie in anderen Ländern, so auch in Griechenland uralt. P. Ovidius Naso ist nicht der erste gewesen, der in Rom Verwandlungssagen poetisch behandelte, sondern die Metamorphose-Dichtung hatte dort längst ihren Einzug genommen.[140]

If we look at Ovid's *Metamorphoses*, for instance, there are indeed some parallels with 2 Cor 3.18 which are worth noting. In his account of the creation of

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[138] Dunn 1988, 713.

[139] See *1 Enoch* 104.6: 'Now fear not, righteous ones, when you see the sinners waxing strong and flourishing'; *4 Ezra* 7.97: 'their face is to shine like the sun, and (…) they are to be made like the light of the stars, being incorruptible from then on'; *2 Apoc. Bar.* 51.5: 'those over whom they are exalted now will then be more exalted and glorified than they; (…) both these and those will be changed, these into the splendour of angels and those into startling visions and horrible shapes'.

[140] Ballauff 1980, 1177–9 at 1177.

man, Ovid stresses both the fact that man is made of the divine substance of the creator or, alternatively, that man is moulded into the form of the gods:

> Natus homo est, sive hunc divino semine fecit
> ille opifex rerum, mundi melioris origo,
> sive recens tellus seductaque nuper ab alto
> aethere cognati retinebat semina caeli.
> quam satus Iapeto, mixtam pluvialibus undis,
> finxit in effigiem moderantum cuncta deorum.
>
> Then man was born: whether the god who made all else, designing a more perfect world, made man of his own divine substance, or whether the new earth, but lately drawn away from heavenly ether, retained still some elements of its kindred sky – that earth which the son of Iapetus mixed with fresh, running water, and moulded into the form of the all-controlling gods. (I.78–83)

Whereas the view that man is made of the creator's own divine substance comes close to the Jewish creation account of Gen 1, according to which man was created 'in the image of God', the other view that 'the son of Iapetus', Prometheus, moulded man from earth into the form of the gods resembles the creation account of Gen 2. These views are so compatible that, from the third century onwards, the iconography of Prometheus moulding man out of the earth was taken over by Christians and applied to the creation of Adam by God and Christ.[141]

Yet the inference which Paul draws from the Jewish creation accounts that man is being reshaped and experiences a transformation into the image of God has virtually no parallel in Ovid's anthropology. First of all, there are alternative, very different anthropologies in Ovid which seem to push aside the anthropology of I.78–83. According to these alternative anthropologies, offspring in 'human form' was generated by Mother Earth from the blood of the slain Giants (I.156–160) or human beings evolved from the stones thrown by Deucalion and Pyrrha to produce a new human race after the Flood (I.400–415). These anthropologies in Ovid are in competition with one another. More importantly, however, the notion that human beings experience transformation seems to be limited to particular human beings, such as the emperor, or Heracles, son of a mortal woman and a god. At Heracles' death

[141] See the Prometheus-sarcophagus of Rome / Arles (*c.* AD 270/280), now in the Louvre, and the biblical sarcophagus of Rome / Arles (*c.* AD 325), now in Arles, discussed in Engemann 2007, 282–3. For Prometheus' creation of mankind, see Aristophanes, *Aves* 686; Plato, *Protagoras* 320d; Philemon, frag. 93 and *Poetae Comici Graecae* – Adespota, frag. 1047; Menander, frag. 508; Heraclides Pontus, frag. 66a–b; Callimachus, frag. 493; Herondas 2.28; Horace, *Carmina* 1.16.13–6; Pausanias, *Graeciae descriptio* 10.4.4. For Late Antiquity see Kaiser-Minn 1981; add now Pap.Lugd.Bat. XXV.16 (a fourth-century wax tablet with an alphabetic acrostic on Prometheus' creation of mankind); Balty & Briquel Chatonnet 2000, 39–41; Bowersock 2001; this bibliography was kindly provided by my colleague Jan N. Bremmer (Groningen), drawing on his forthcoming *Greek Religion & Culture, the Bible and the Ancient Near East*. See Bremmer 2008*a*, 33n65.

> … nec cognoscenda remansit
> Herculis effigies, ne quicquam ab imagine ductum
> matris habet, tantumque Iovis vestigia servat.
> …
> sic ubi mortales Tirynthius exuit artus,
> parte sui meliore viget, maiorque videri
> coepit et augusta fieri gravitate verendus.
>
> … no shape of Hercules that could be recognized remained, nor was there anything left which he derived from his mother's image. He kept traces only of his father (…); so when the Tirynthian put off his mortal frame, he gained new vigour in his better part, began to seem of more heroic size, and to become awful in his godlike dignity. (IX.263–270)

Apart from Heracles, only the emperor, Julius Caesar, seems to experience a metamorphosis. It is Julius Caesar who is 'changed to a new heavenly body, a flaming star' (XV.745; cf. XV.840–851), a fate which still awaits Augustus (XV.868–870).

From this it is clear that Ovid's *Metamorphoses* can render only a partial explanation for the concept of metamorphosis as adopted by Paul. For Ovid, the notion of metamorphosis constitutes a connecting link between various mythological cycles, and is supported by the philosophical or Pythagorean view that the soul 'passes into ever-changing bodies' (XV.60–478 at 171–172). It does not sufficiently explain Paul's thoughts about the metamorphosis of Christ-believers into, or in accordance with, the image of God. What Ovid's *Metamorphoses* do demonstrate, however, is that, in Ovid, too, the terminologies of image and form belong to the same semantic-conceptual field. In III.455–463, for instance, in a vivid description of Narcissus' self-obsession, the terminology switches easily between 'forma' and 'imago'.

The survey of morphic language in Paul leaves a few unresolved issues which we have listed in our inventory. First, the concept of metamorphosis in Paul cannot be sufficiently explained from a supposed profusion of this concept in Graeco-Roman or Jewish-apocalyptic sources. Secondly, scholars either claim or deny the near-synonymy of μορφή and εἰκών, especially in the Philippian hymn, but have failed to supply good grounds. Finally, the extent and coherence of Paul's morphic language call for elucidation. All these issues may profit from a comparison between Paul's morphic language and that of Philo, Paul's near-contemporary fellow-Jew, no less Hellenized than Paul. An analysis of morphic language in Philo will show, on the one hand, that the language of μορφή is too diverse to provide clear parallels for Paul's morphic language, but, on the other hand, that it is the specific link between μορφή and εἰκών which may provide a way forward. Perhaps Paul's emphasis on Christ-believers being or becoming similar in form (σύμμορφος) to the image of God will then also become more understandable.

(b) Morphic language in Philo

The terminology of form in Philo does not constitute a single, coherent theme, nor is 'metamorphosis' a philosophical technical term in his writings. However, it is possible to detect five different applications of morphic language in Philo. In the following, I shall not give an exhaustive survey of all passages, as in Paul, but distinguish between the various applications and illustrate them with the most important examples.

(i) Anthropomorphism. The broad range of applications of Philo's morphic language becomes clear immediately from the first cluster of passages. Their common theme is the criticism of an anthropomorphic understanding of God. As we have seen in § 1.2.4 above, in his commentary on the image of God in Gen 1.26 Philo warns his readers against interpreting the likeness between God and man wrongly: 'Let no one represent the likeness as one to a bodily form; for neither is God in human form (οὔτε γὰρ ἀνθρωπόμορφος ὁ θεὸς), nor is the human body God-like' (*De opificio mundi* 69). According to Philo, 'God is not only not in the form of man, but belongs to no class or kind' (*Legum allegoriarum libri* 1.37). A clear polemic is visible in Philo's writings against pagan anthropomorphic concepts of God, which threaten a proper understanding of God. In his commentary on Numbers 23.19, 'God is not a man', Philo states: '… we think of the blessed and the immortal in terms of our own natures. We shun indeed in words the monstrosity of saying that God is of human form (ὅτι ἀνθρωπόμορφον τὸ θεῖον), but in actual fact we accept the impious thought that He is of human passions' (*De sacrificiis Abelis et Caini* 95). In very emphatic terms, Philo turns against anthropomorphic statements about God: 'They are utterly monstrous inventions of men who would overthrow great virtues like piety and reverence by representing Him as having the form and passions of mankind' (*De plantatione* 35).[142] The equally despicable opposite of such anthropomorphism is for a human being to claim to possess the form of a particular god, as Gaius Caligula did: 'Falsely does he call himself Paean, let him cease once and for all to mimic the true Paean, for a form of a god (θεοῦ μορφὴ) cannot be counterfeited as a coin can be' (*Legatio ad Gaium* 110–111).

There is only one form of anthropomorphism which Philo describes in a positive way, and that is where God reveals himself to human beings in the form of an angel or even in the form of man, the mode in which he appears in particular Old Testament narratives:

> To the souls indeed which are incorporeal and are occupied in His worship it is likely that He should reveal Himself as He is, conversing with them as friend with

[142] For Philo's criticism of anthropomorphic views on God, see further *De posteritate Caini* 2–4; *Quod deus sit immutabilis* 55–56, 59; *De confusione linguarum* 135; *De congressu eruditionis gratia* 115; *De mutatione nominum* 54–55.

> friends; but to souls which are still in a body, giving Himself the likeness of angels, not altering His own nature, for He is unchangeable, but conveying to those which receive the impression of His presence a semblance in a different form, such that they take the image to be not a copy, but that original form itself (ἀλλὰ δόξαν ἐντιθέντα ταῖς φαντασιουμέναις ἑτερόμορφον, ὡς τὴν εἰκόνα οὐ μίμημα, ἀλλ' αὐτὸ τὸ ἀρχέτυπον ἐκεῖνο εἶδος ὑπολαμβάνειν εἶναι). Indeed an old saying is still current that the deity goes the round of the cities, in the likeness now of this man now of that man, taking note of wrongs and transgressions. (*De somniis* 1.232–233, 238)

Interestingly, in support of this anthropomorphic, or rather angelomorphic revelation of God to human beings, Philo clearly alludes to *Odyssey* 17.485. Similarly, the strangers who visit Abraham are transformed εἰς ἀνθρωπόμορφον ἰδέαν, into anthropomorphic shape (*De Abrahamo* 113). But for comparison with the notion of metamorphosis in Paul, this is a transformation in the 'wrong direction', from God or angel to man, and for this reason these instances do not provide a useful parallel for Paul's notion of human beings transforming into the image of God.[143]

(ii) The forms of the soul. A further, different, application of Philo's morphic language is revealed in his discussion of the forms or forming of the human soul. In one passage Philo refers to the manifold forms and divisions of the soul, in which it is virtually impossible for the divine Spirit to abide (*Quod deus sit immutabilis* 2). In another, he talks about God forming the rational part of the soul: τὸ λογικὸν ἐν ἡμῖν ἐμόρφου (*De fuga et inventione* 68–69). Indeed, in Philo's view, this forming was in accordance with the divine image: the dominant part of the soul, 'the rational spirit-force within us (…) was shaped according to the archetypal form of the divine image' – ἐμορφώθη πρὸς ἀρχέτυπον ἰδέαν εἰκόνος θείας (*De specialibus legibus* 1.171). Yet, despite these similarities, there is no talk in Philo of metamorphosis back into the image of God. For this reason Philo's application of morphic language does not throw sufficient light on that of Paul. To be sure, Philo does say something about moulding and forming 'the soul into the approved standard, into the form of true goodness itself' (*De specialibus legibus* 4.196), but does not link this with the image of God.

(iii) The forms of the cosmos. Philo speaks not only of the forms of the soul, but also, in a cosmological-philosophical way, of the forms of the cosmos. This is not surprising, as this fits Philo's Platonizing style. In *De specialibus legibus*

[143] For such transformations, see further *De Abrahamo* 118. For the allegorical figure of nobility taking on human shape, see *De virtutibus* 195. Yet another aspect of Philo's use of the language of anthropomorphism, which serves to underline the variety of his morphic language, is his description of the bad man as a beast with anthropomorphic features. See *De vita Mosis* 1.43; and *De Abrahamo* 32–33.

he clearly conducts a polemic against those who question the validity of Plato's doctrine of the incorporeal ideas or forms:

> Just as anything crushed has lost its quality and form and may be literally said to be nothing more than formless matter (ἄμορφος ὕλη), so the creed which abolishes the Forms confuses everything and reduces it to the pre-elemental state of existence, that state devoid of form and quality (πρὸς τὴν … οὐσίαν τὴν ἄμορφον καὶ ἄποιον ἐκείνην). Could anything be more preposterous than this? For when out of that confused matter God produced all things, He did not do so with His own handiwork, since His nature, happy and blessed as it was, forbade that He should touch the limitless chaotic matter. Instead He made full use of the incorporeal potencies well denoted by their name of Forms to enable each kind to take its appropriate form (πρὸς τὸ γένος ἕκαστον τὴν ἁρμόττουσαν λαβεῖν μορφήν). (*De specialibus legibus* 1.327–329)

In this way Philo defends Plato's theory of forms, and in several cosmological passages in Philo this language can be seen at work. In *De fuga et inventione* 12, for instance, Philo reflects on the divine Logos, 'by which each thing that exists has received its form (μεμόρφωται). Accordingly from the outset form in perfection accompanies the things that come into being, for it is an impress and image (εἰκών) of the perfect Logos'. Despite the occurrence here of the terminology of form and image, this specific philosophical language does not really help us to understand Paul's reflection on the metamorphosis of human beings into the image of God.[144]

(iv) The specific language of metamorphosis. The lack of true parallels to Paul's concept of metamorphosis is highlighted by the fact that, in Philo, there is as yet no specific fixed technical terminological meaning of metamorphosis. As noted above, the terminology of metamorphosis in Greek is late, and its occurrence before the first century AD rather limited.

This state of affairs is reflected in Philo's unspecific and vague use of the terminology of metamorphosis. Along the lines of his positive use of anthropomorphism outlined above, Philo speaks about angels who, despite their spiritual substance, often 'imitate the forms of men and transform themselves for immediate purposes': πρὸς τὰς ὑποκειμένας χρείας μεταμορφούμενοι (*Quaestiones in Genesim* 1.92). However, Philo equally talks about the metamorphosis of Moses into a prophet (μεταμορφούμενος εἰς προφήτην) when he becomes inspired (*De vita Mosis* 1. 57); about the undesirable metamorphosis of the works of na-

[144] For morphic language in a cosmological context in Philo, see further also *De somniis* 2.45. See also the language of transmutation of the cosmos and its forms, inspired by Euripides' line 'Naught that is born doth ever die, | Its severed parts together fly, | And yield another form' (Euripides, frag. 839), in *Legum allegoriarum libri* 1.7 and *De aeternitate mundi* 5–6. For the decline of the forms and faculties of mankind throughout this cosmic process, see *De opificio mundi* 140–141 but without any hint at man's reconfiguration through a metamorphosis into the image of God.

ture by defiled hand (*Quaestiones in Exodum* 2, frag. 1); about the transformation of piety into either superstition or impiety (*De specialibus legibus* 4. 147); and, finally, about Gaius Caligula transforming his figure and dress into Apollo's: εἰς δὲ Ἀπόλλωνα μετεμορφοῦτο καὶ μετεσκευάζετο (*Legatio ad Gaium* 95). Such is Philo's usage of the terminology of metamorphosis, and this confirms the impression that neither his morphic language in general, nor his specific usage of metamorphosis, is really parallel to that of Paul. As we shall see, it is rather his everyday, down-to-earth discourse about the 'forms of images' which seems to be useful for understanding what is going on in Paul's morphic language.

(v) The forms of images. In a very natural way, Philo repeatedly talks of the forms of images. He speaks of men who employ

> sculpture and painting to form innumerable forms (μυρίας γὰρ ὅσας διὰ γραφικῆς καὶ πλαστικῆς μορφώσαντες ἰδέας) which they have enclosed in shrines and temples and after building altars have assigned celestial and divine honours to idols of stone and wood and suchlike images, all of them lifeless things. (*De decalogo* 7)[145]

In most passages such as this, Philo does not use the term εἰκών for images, but rather ἄγαλμα.[146] Nevertheless, some passages do indeed contain the terminology of both εἰκών and μορφή. On one occasion in his *Legato ad Gaium* already quoted earlier, Philo talks about the Jews who 'carry (ἀγαλματοφοροῦσι) the images of the commandments (τὰς τῶν διατεταγμένων εἰκόνας) enshrined in their souls. Then as they contemplate their forms thus clearly represented (τύπους καὶ μορφὰς) they always think of them with awe' (*Legatio ad Gaium* 210–211).[147] In this passage, the terminology of εἰκών, μορφή and ἄγαλμα clearly intersects, and it does so because of the ordinary manner of speaking about images having forms.

The same occurs in another passage in Philo's *Legatio ad Gaium*, when Philo describes how Gaius Caligula

> took possession of the synagogues in the other cities after beginning with those of Alexandria, by filling them with images and statues of himself in bodily form (καταπλήσας εἰκόνων καὶ ἀνδριάντων τῆς ἰδίας μορφῆς). (*Legatio ad Gaium* 346)

Here, too, images and bodily forms are mentioned in one breath. This common language of the forms of images and statues is present in many authors, as will be demonstrated in the next section. After that, I shall show how this non-philosophical, general morphic language throws light on that of Paul.

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[145] Cf. further *De decalogo* 66 and 72; *De specialibus legibus* 2.255–256; *De vita contemplative* 7.

[146] Cf. Bremmer 2008*b*.

[147] Cf. also *Legatio ad Gaium* 290 and 299.

(c) The images and their forms

The view that images have forms is attested in many Greek sources, which show that εἰκών and μορφή do indeed belong to the same semantic-conceptual field.[148] Dionysius of Halicarnassus (1st cent. BC), for instance, gives a description of the procession of a Roman festival in which images appear to have *morphai*:

> Last of all in the procession came the images of the gods (αἱ τῶν θεῶν εἰκόνες), borne on men's shoulders (ἐπόμπευον ὤμοις ὑπ' ἀνδρῶν φερόμεναι), showing the same likenesses (μορφάς θ' ὁμοίας) as those made by the Greeks and having the same dress, the same symbols, and the same gifts which tradition says each of them invented and bestowed on mankind. (Dionysius Halicarnassensis, *Antiquitates Romanae* 7.72.13)

We may note in passing that the idea of the images (εἰκόνες) being 'borne on men's shoulders' (ἐπόμπευον ὤμοις ὑπ' ἀνδρῶν φερόμεναι) again emphasizes the observation above that Paul's talk of 'bearing the image' of the earthly and heavenly man in 1 Cor 15.49 has its background in the pagan practices of carrying around statues of the gods. However, what is key here is that these images of the gods are said to possess forms (μορφάς).

This is also apparent from several passages in Plutarch. In *De Alexandri magni fortuna aut virtute*, Plutarch describes the proposal of Stasicrates, the master-sculptor, to cut out Alexander's image in Mount Athos, which has an almost human form:

> 'But I, your majesty,' said he, 'have conceived the project of placing your likeness in living and imperishable material, with roots that are everlasting and weight immovable and unshakable. For Mount Athos in Thrace, in that part where is its highest and most conspicuous summit, has well-proportioned surfaces and heights, limbs and joints and proportions that suggest the human form (μορφοειδῆ). When it has been properly carved and worked into shape (σχηματισθεὶς), it can be called Alexander's image (εἰκὼν), and Alexander's statue it will be'. (*De Alexandri magni fortuna aut virtute* 335C–D; cf. Lucian, *Pro imaginibus* 9)

In another passage, Plutarch uses the phrase 'image of the form' when he remarks that the Spartan king Agesilaus did not leave behind any statue or picture of himself :

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[148] For that reason I strongly disagree with Fee 2007, 378, who claims, on the basis of J. H. Moulton and G. Milligan's *The Vocabulary of the Greek Testament* (London 1930): 'Μορφή (…) denotes "form" or "shape" not usually in terms of the external features by which something is recognized but of those characteristics and qualities that are essential to it. Hence, it means *that which truly characterizes a given reality*'. Cf. also 379n29: 'The improbability of genuine semantic overlap can especially be seen in the fact that the two words [εἰκών and μορφή] never occur together in the several entries for each in Louw and Nida's *Greek-English Lexicon of the New Testament Based on Semantic Domains*'. However, it would be better practice to decide the question of their synonymy or semantic-conceptual overlap on the basis of the TLG.

> We have no image of the form [of him] (τῆς δὲ μορφῆς εἰκόνα μὲν οὐκ ἔχομεν), for he himself would not consent to one, and even when he lay dying forbade the making of 'either statue or picture' of his person, but he is said to have been a little man of unimposing presence. (*Agesilaus* 2.2)

In this case, 'form' does not refer to the form of the image itself, but to the form of the person whom it represents. Normally, however, 'form' would refer first and foremost to the forms of the image.

The terms 'image' and 'form' concur not only in pagan Greek writings,[149] but also in Jewish writings,[150] and in a plethora of early-Christian sources.[151] Among the Jewish sources, there is a very telling example in book III of the *Sibylline Oracles*, in which the terminology of image and form is bound up with an allusion to the passage on the image of God in Gen 1.26–27. In this instance the readers are addressed as follows:

> Men, who have the form which God moulded in his image
> (ἄνθρωποι θεόπλαστον ἔχοντες ἐν εἰκόνι μορφήν)
> why do you wander in vain, and not walk the straight path
> ever mindful of the immortal creator? (III.8–10)

The phrase θεόπλαστον ἔχοντες ἐν εἰκόνι μορφήν ('having the form which God moulded in his image') clearly shows that 'form' and 'image' belong to the same semantic-conceptual field.

I finish with a very striking example from Celsus, which demonstrates that, from his pagan perspective, Celsus could easily draw the language of God's image from Gen 1.26 into the ordinary parlance of images which are endowed with forms. In this passage, which has come down to us through Origen, Celsus criticizes the Christians because

> they cannot bear to see temples and altars and images (οὐκ ἀνέχονται νεὼς ὁρῶντες καὶ βωμοὺς καὶ ἀγάλματα). (…) … they openly dishonour the images. If what they mean is that an image of stone or wood or bronze or gold which some man or other has wrought cannot be a god, their wisdom is ludicrous. Who but an utter infant imagines that these things are gods and not votive offerings and images of gods? But if they mean that we ought not to suppose that images (εἰκόνας) are divine (εἰ δ' ὅτι μηδὲ θείας εἰκόνας ὑποληπτέον), because God has a different form (ἄλλην γὰρ

[149] For other examples of the concurrence of 'image' and 'form', see: Aristotle, *Politica* 1340a 25; Aristotle, *Poetica* 1448b 11; Plutarch, Frag. 158 (edn Sandbach); Lucian, *Adversus indoctum et libros multos ementem* 21; Alexander of Aphrodisias, *In Aristotelis metaphysica commentaria* 417; Julian, Εἰς τὸν βασιλέα Ἥλιον πρὸς Σαλούστιον 8 (134C); Julian, *Epistulae* 59 (edn Bidez-Cumont = Wright [Loeb] 48, 443B).

[150] Philo, *Legatio ad Gaium* 210–211 and *Legatio ad Gaium* 346, already discussed above; Josephus, *Jewish Antiquities* 6.333 and, already referred to above, *Against Apion* 2.190–191.

[151] See, e. g., *Oracula Sibyllina* 8.378–379; *Acta Joannis* 28; Justin Martyr, *Apologia* 63.16 and 64.5; Irenaeus, *Adversus haereses* 1.1.15, 1.8.1, 1.16.3; Ps-Clement, *Homiliae* 11.5.1; Origen, *Commentariorum series in evangelium Matthaei* 161; Hippolytus, *Refutatio omnium haeresium* 6.14.5, 5.16.10, 6.20.1, 6.42.6.

> εἶναι θεοῦ μορφήν), as the Persians also maintain [cf. *Against Celsus* 7.62: Herodotus 2.131], they [i. e. the Christians] have unwittingly refuted themselves. For they say that 'God made man his own image' («ὁ θεὸς ἐποίησε τὸν ἄνθρωπον» ἰδίαν «εἰκόνα») and made man's form like his own (τὸ δὲ εἶδος ὅμοιον ἑαυτῷ)'. (Celsus apud Origen, *Against Celsus* 7.62; cf. 6.63)

As in the passage from Josephus' *Against Apion* 2.190–191 quoted earlier (see § 1.3.2 [a]), the images of the gods are contrasted with the form of God, which is different from the forms of these images. Here, too, the forms are those which belong to images. It is within this common sense of images and their forms that Celsus also understands the Greek wording of Gen 1.26–27 and, for this reason, believes that the Christians contradict themselves. If the form of God is different from the forms of the images of the gods, then the Christians refute themselves by holding that God made man in his own image and form.

Later on in his *Against Celsus*, Origen answers Celsus' criticism in exactly the same language of image and form. According to Origen,

> we [i. e. the Christians] do not suppose that the images are divine likenesses (Ἀλλ' οὐδὲ θείας εἰκόνας ὑπολαμβάνομεν εἶναι τὰ ἀγάλματα) because we do not depict in any form a God who is invisible and incorporeal (ἅτε μορφὴν ἀοράτου καὶ ἀσωμάτου μὴ διαγράφοντες θεοῦ). But Celsus supposes that we fall into contradicting ourselves when we say that God does not possess human form and when we believe that God made man His own image and made him in the image of God. My reply to this, as I also said earlier [6.63], is that the part which is 'in the image of God' is to be found preserved in the rational soul which has the capacity for virtue. And yet Celsus, failing to see the difference between God's image and that which is made *after* the image of God, says that we affirm 'God made man his own image and made man's form like his own'. To this we replied earlier. (*Against Celsus* 7.66)

Celsus' attack and Origen's reply show that, in a very natural, fluid way, both pagans and Christians share the same language of images and their forms, even when talking about the image of God.

1.3.3 Concluding observations

The parallels for Paul's morphic language do not seem to lie in philosophical reflections on forms, whether the forms of the soul, or the forms of Plato's theory. Nor is the Greek concept of metamorphosis sufficient to explain Paul's notion of transformation into the image of God. It seems, rather, that it is the commonplace, daily understanding of images being endowed with forms which can throw light upon the three problematic issues identified in our inventory of Paul's morphic language: (a) the issue of the 'form of God', (b) the issue of transformation, and, finally, (c) the issue of the coherence of Paul's morphic language in general. In each case, as I shall briefly argue, the conventional manner of speaking about images and their forms seems to furnish the appropriate background.

(a) 'Being in the form of God'

Against the background of the common idiom of the forms of images, the depiction of Christ as the one ὃς ἐν μορφῇ θεοῦ ὑπάρχων, 'who was in the form of God' (Philipp 2.6) can have two meanings.

(1) First, indeed, as Dunn believes, 'form' here could be the form of the image of God. This meaning is best illustrated by the rendition of Gen 1.26–27 in the already quoted passage from *Sibylline Oracles* III.8: 'Men, who have the form which God moulded in his image (ἄνθρωποι θεόπλαστον ἔχοντες ἐν εἰκόνι μορφήν)'. In this sense, Fee's distinction between 'form' and 'image' runs contrary to the way in which (the combination of) these terms would have been commonly understood in Antiquity.

This, however, in no way decides the matter of whether this Adam Christology in Philipp 2.6 applies only to Christ's post-incarnational, earthly existence, as Dunn believes, or also to his pre-existence. I am inclined to think that acknowledging that Adam Christology is present in Philipp 2.6 does not preclude the possibility that this passage refers to the pre-existent Christ. After all, Adam II in 1 Cor 15 is the ὁ ἄνθρωπος ἐξ οὐρανοῦ, the man *from* heaven (15.47), which seems to imply that Paul took this heavenly man as pre-existent. In this case, the phrase ὃς ἐν μορφῇ θεοῦ ὑπάρχων (Philipp 2.6) is synonymous with the phrase ὅς ἐστιν εἰκὼν τοῦ θεοῦ in 2 Cor 4.4. I do not regard it as compelling that the latter phrase should only apply to Christ on the basis of his earthly life.[152] As in Col 1.15, this phrase could well refer to the pre-existent state of the man from heaven. This view that Adam II, in his capacity as the heavenly man, was pre-existent also accords very well with Philo's thoughts about the heavenly man, who is created after the image of God and precedes the earthly man (see § 1.2.2 above and § 5.1 below). In Philo, however, the heavenly man, being created *after* the image of God, is distinct from the image, which is identical with the Logos, the second God. Here the hierarchy thus runs as follows (from the top down): (i) God, (ii) Image = Logos, and (iii) heavenly man, created *after* the image. In Paul, however, the heavenly man and the image seem to coincide, and for this reason Paul can speak of 'bearing the image of the heavenly man' (1 Cor 15.49).

(2) Secondly, however, it could also be the case that the term μορφὴ θεοῦ in the phrase ὃς ἐν μορφῇ θεοῦ ὑπάρχων does not point to the image of God, but refers to the form of God in precisely the same way as we have seen it used in Josephus and Celsus. According to Josephus, God's 'form (μορφή) and magnitude surpass our powers of description (μορφὴν δὲ καὶ μέγεθος ἡμῖν ἄφατος). No materials, however costly, are fit to make an image (εἰκών) of Him (πᾶσα μὲν ὕλη πρὸς εἰκόνα τὴν τούτου κἂν ᾖ πολυτελὴς ἄτιμος)' (*Against Apion* 2.190–

[152] *Pace* Fee 2007, 519–20. Cf. Fee 2007, 522–3: 'Paul uses this language [the language of εἰκών] with regard to Christ *only* with regard to his being the divine image-bearer in his incarnation, not with regard to his pre-existence'.

191). And according to Celsus, the Christians 'mean that we ought not to suppose that images (εἰκόνας) are divine (εἰ δ' ὅτι μηδὲ θείας εἰκόνας ὑποληπτέον), because God has a different form (ἄλλην γὰρ εἶναι θεοῦ μορφήν), as the Persians also maintain' (Celsus apud Origen, *Against Celsus* 7.62). Here too, however, I would contend, the language of God's form is occasioned by an explicit contrast between the form of God and the images of the gods, so that the same semantic-conceptual field of images and their forms is still at work. It is true, as Fee suggests, that in this case the 'form of God' in Philipp 2.6 takes on the meaning of his divinity, so that the pre-existent Christ is said to share in God's form of divinity.[153] But that again, I believe, is not so very different from the language of being the image of God. However one understands Philipp 2.6, the essential fact remains that this passage is part of Paul's Adam Christology, although the emphasis here seems to be on the pre-existent Adam from heaven.

(b) Metamorphosis

As we have seen, one specific component of Paul's morphic language, the notion of metamorphosis into God's image, is only insufficiently explained by the background of Greek mythology and philosophy. The terminology of metamorphosis is late, with only a few occurrences before the first century AD. As a survey of the instances of this term in Philo shows, metamorphosis had not acquired a specific technical meaning for Philo. Nor is the notion of metamorphosis in Jewish apocalyptic texts fully parallel. The best way to understand metamorphosis in Paul is to regard it as a natural part of Paul's reflections on the image of God. As images and their forms are part of a common, everyday idiom in the Greek world, Paul's application of metamorphosis does not derive from a fixed concept, but rather evolves naturally from his focus on the image of God.

As I shall demonstrate in chap. 2 below, the view that, by way of metamorphosis into the image of God, the Christ-believer is conformed more and more to the divine image does have an analogy in the Platonic ideal of becoming as much like God as possible (see, e. g., Plato, *Theaetetus* 176b). This progressive conformation seems to be without parallel in ancient Jewish thought. I would emphasize, however, that the terminology of metamorphosis is best understood as a natural consequence of the important place which Paul accords to the language of the image of God. In 2 Cor 3.18 we have the full, explicit expression of Paul's idea of the metamorphosis into the image of God; this transforming process – as 2 Cor 4.16 explains – takes place in the 'inner man'. In Rom 12.2, Paul highlights that this metamorphosis comes to pass through the renewal of the mind (νοῦς), which – as is apparent from Rom 7.22–25 – is synonymous with the 'inner man' (see further chap. 7 below). Although the term 'image' is not repeated in Rom 12, it is presupposed, since already in Rom 8.29 Paul refers to

[153] Fee 2007, 376–81.

the process of taking on the same form as Christ's image. Both passages, 2 Cor 3 and Rom 12, are based on the logic of transforming into, or in accordance with, God's image (see further § 2.4 below).

(c) The extent and coherence of Paul's morphic language

If indeed Paul's morphic language is rooted in his reflections on the image of God, it is also reversely the case that the full extent of Paul's conception of the image of God becomes visible in his morphic language. As we have seen, in the common idiom of images and their forms, 'form' refers either to the form of the image itself, or to the form which the image represents. Both meanings are possible and depend upon the context. Similarly, Paul's morphic language is equally ambiguous. His notion of metamorphosis into the image of God refers both to the form inherent in the divine image and to the form which the subject takes on as its own. This ambiguity is nicely captured in the compound terms σύμμορφος ('having the same form, similar in form') and συμμορφίζομαι ('be conformed to, take on the same form as'); in Greek they occur almost exclusively in Paul and in literature dependent upon him,[154] and – as we can deduce from our survey – constitute the most frequent expression of Paul's morphic language (Philipp 3.10, 21; Rom 8.29). If man takes on the same form as Christ, Christ can reciprocally also be said to take form within man: μορφωθῇ Χριστὸς ἐν ὑμῖν (Gal 4.19). It cannot be otherwise than that this process has something to do with the dynamics of Christ's alternation between ἐν μορφῇ θεοῦ ὑπάρχων (Philipp 2.6) and μορφὴν δούλου λαβών (2.7–8), and back (2.9–11). This metamorphosis of Christ now seems to be mirrored in the metamorphosis of Christ-believers into the image of God (2 Cor 3.18; Rom 12.2). Paul's morphic language is remarkably coherent and extensive. Whereas the terminology of form in Philo does not constitute a single, coherent theme but has rather diverse applications, in Paul it seems to support one of the central tenets of his theology – his Adam Christology and, more precisely, his reflections on the image of God.

[154] The main exceptions among the more than 700 occurrences in the extant Greek literature are Nicander, *Theriaca* 321; Heraclitus, *Allegoriae* 77.3; and Pseudo-Lucian, *Amores* 39.

Chapter 2

The 'Image of God' and 'Being Made Like God' in Graeco-Roman Paganism

Introduction

In the overview about the 'image of God' in ancient Judaism in chap. 1, we already noted that there are no real parallels for Philo's and Paul's belief that God's image is a model on which individuals' lives are (re-)shaped and conformed to God. The closest one gets in ancient Judaism, as chap. 1 shows, is the notion of 'all the glory of Adam' in the Dead Sea Scrolls: all the glory of Adam is granted to those who enter the Qumran community (1QS and 4Q504; see § 1.1.3 above). The *Rule of the Community* (1QS) was a particularly fruitful source given its detailed anthropology: God will purify '*the configuration of man*, ripping out all spirit of injustice from the innermost part of his flesh' (IV 20–21), but even here there is no talk of being conformed to an image, model or ideal. At the same time, we also observed in § 1.3 that some of Paul's expressions, such as that of bearing the image of God (1 Cor 15.49), are derived from the pagan practice of carrying around images of the gods. Indeed, Paul's notion of being conformed to the image of God proved to be dependent on the common parlance in the Graeco-Roman world about images having forms (see § 1.3.1 above). For this reason, we will now move on to take a closer look at the way the expression 'image of God' itself was used among the pagans (§ 2.1).

This survey will yield interesting instances which point to a broader issue, that of 'forming oneself in the likeness of God through virtue' (§ 2.2). This notion functions as a natural extension of the notion of the image of God. Being the image of God entails the endeavour to form oneself in the likeness of God. The notion of assimilation to God will be studied in detail, to show that it was part of an important development in Hellenistic and Roman ethics. The notion of assimilation to God has its roots in the writings of Plato and became particularly popular in the first century BC. As Dillon has demonstrated, from the first century BC onwards Greek ethics tended to be founded less on the Stoic maxim of 'living in accordance with Nature', and increasingly on the Platonic ideal of becoming as like God as possible (see, e. g., Plato, *Theaetetus* 176b).[1]

[1] Dillon 1996*a*, index, s. v. 'Likeness to God'.

The impact of this ideal on Philo, and on his thoughts about the similarity between God and man, will be studied separately (§ 2.3). After that, the findings of the study of this contemporary development will be applied to our studies of Paul (§ 2.4). I shall argue that Paul's view that, by way of metamorphosis into the image of God, the Christ-believer is conformed more and more to this divine image and is induced, in this way, to lead a moral life, is indeed best explained against the background of pagan philosophical ideas about the image of God and forming oneself in the likeness of God. Paul's reflections about transformation into the image of God and becoming united with Christ bear the marks of this mode of thought which, in turn, is greatly enhanced by Paul's appropriation. In Paul, one could argue, the *homoiōsis theōi* develops into a *homoiōsis Christōi*. Because of Christ's identity as the image of *God*, unification with Christ is part of the process of becoming like God.[2]

2.1 The 'image of God' in Graeco-Roman paganism

In Graeco-Roman pagan texts, the 'image of God' occurs in various meanings. It is applied in the setting of cosmology (§ 2.1.1), Hellenistic kingship ideology (§ 2.1.2), anthropology (§ 2.1.3), and of course also as a reference to the physical statues of the gods, both in a literal and in a metaphorical sense (§ 2.1.4).

2.1.1 The 'image of God' in cosmology: The cosmos as the image of God

At the end of his dialogue about creation, the *Timaeus*, Plato comes close to the concept of the 'image of God', and to applying this concept to man. In the final section of his dialogue Plato calls the cosmos 'a visible living creature embracing the visible creatures, an image of the intelligible, a perceptible God' – ζῷον ὁρατὸν τὰ ὁρατὰ περιέχον, εἰκὼν τοῦ νοητοῦ θεὸς αἰσθητός (*Timaeus* 92c). As A. O. Lovejoy has shown, this passage demonstrates that the commonplace of 'Platonic dualism' is ill-founded and that, in Plato's mind, there is 'a great chain of being'.[3] The visible cosmos is, as a matter of fact, a perceptible god (θεὸς αἰσθητός) and, in that sense, an image, an expression or representation of the underlying intelligible, paradigmatic reality (εἰκὼν τοῦ νοητοῦ). Within the perceptible reality of the cosmos, as Plato had just argued in the *Timaeus*, it is man who most resembles the cosmos because he is able to contemplate the revolution of the entire cosmos and rectify his own thoughts accordingly:

> For the divine part within us the congenial motions are the intellections and revolutions of the Universe. These each one of us should follow, rectifying the revolutions within our head, which were distorted at our birth, by learning the harmonies and rev-

[2] Cf. also Samra 2006, esp. chaps 4 and 5.
[3] Lovejoy 1964, chap. 2.

olutions of the Universe, and thereby making the part that thinks like (ἐξομοιῶσαι) unto the object of its thought, in accordance with its original nature, and having achieved this assimilation (ὁμοιώσαντα) attain finally to that goal of life which is set before men by the gods as the most good both for the present and for the time to come. (*Timaeus* 90c–d)

Already earlier in the *Timaeus*, Plato had drawn attention to the fact that the cosmos reflects a higher reality and, inasmuch as it has been brought into order out of disorder, nearly resembles God. The cosmos is an image (εἰκών) which is modelled upon the paradigm (παράδειγμα) of the eternal (and not upon the paradigm of that which has come into existence) and thus 'has been construed after the pattern of that which is apprehensible by reason and thought' (*Timaeus* 28c–29b); it is desired by God to 'be, so far as possible, nearly resembling Him' (29e: πάντα ὅτι μάλιστα ἐβουλήθη γενέσθαι παραπλήσια ἑαυτῷ), in respect of his goodness.

By imitating this cosmos, man models himself on, and becomes similar to the intelligible reality.[4] Implicitly, thus, Plato believes that man has to be remodelled, after his birth, on the εἰκὼν τοῦ νοητοῦ, the θεὸς αἰσθητός, in this way acquiring the features of the divine image and being made similar to the created god of the world soul. Later, in § 2.2 below, we shall see that in Platonism the language of the image of God is indeed intrinsically related to that of forming oneself in the likeness of God and becoming like God. Plato himself stops short of linking these terms explicitly but they clearly already belong to the same train of thought. Man is almost regarded as the final link in the chain of images which reflect the eternal. The following images can be distinguished. (a) The cosmos itself is the image which is modelled upon the underlying paradigmatic reality of the eternal (*Timaeus* 29a–b) and, by virtue of this, it is the image of the intelligible, a perceptible god (*Timaeus* 92c). (b) Within this cosmos, time is regarded as 'a movable image of eternity', an 'eternal image' (*Timaeus* 37d). (c) Moreover, in Plato's *Republic*, the sun is viewed as the image (εἰκών) of the Good (*Republic* 509a); just as the Good is the source of knowledge and truth, so the sun is the source of light and vision (508e–509a): 'as the Good is in the intelligible region to reason and the objects of reason, so is this [i. e. the sun] to vision and the objects of vision' (508b–c). In line with this passage, later Platonists, such as Proclus, call the sun the 'image of the all-creating God'. Proclus' *Hymn to Helios* contains the following relevant lines:

ἀλλά, θεῶν ὤριστε, πυριστεφές, ὄλβιε δαῖμον,
εἰκὼν παγγενέταο θεοῦ, ψυχῶν ἀναγωγεῦ,
κέκλυθι καί με κάθηρον ἁμαρτάδος αἰὲν ἁπάσης

But, you the best of gods, crowned with fire, blest daemon,
Image of the all-creating God, uplifter of souls,

[4] On this, see Sedley 1999, 316–24.

> Hearken and always purify me of every fault. (Proclus, *Hymni* 1.33–35; trans. Van den Berg)

As R. M. van den Berg remarks,

> As has been commemorated in the first half of the hymn, Helios holds absolute power over the universe and its inhabitants, including the divine beings in it like the planets and the Moirai. Hence he is now called the best of these gods in the universe (θεῶν ὤριστε), not, of course, of all gods in general for he is just an image of a superior god who produces everything (vs. 34).[5]

Indeed, the invocation of Helios as an ‘image of the all-creating God’ is dependent upon Plato’s designation of the sun as the image of the Good in Republic 509a.[6]

In passing, I note that, from a Greek point of view, a god can indeed be regarded as the image or expression of a higher god. From this perspective there is no need to read Paul’s characterization of Christ as the ‘image of God’ as a reference to a quality which Christ could only achieve on the basis of his earthly life (see discussion above in § 1.3). After all, in Paul’s view Christ is the man *from heaven*, and parallels such as these from Proclus show that in Greek religio-philosophical language, gods could be perceived as the image of a superior god. This meaning certainly applies to the depiction of the cosmic Christ as the image of the unseen God (εἰκὼν τοῦ θεοῦ τοῦ ἀοράτου) in Col 1.15.

The descending order of images in Plato – the cosmos, time, and the sun all being images of God and eternity, whereas man tries to achieve likeness to them, and thus almost becomes an image himself – is nicely captured in the following passage from the *Corpus Hermeticum*:

> ἐστὶ τοίνυν εἰκὼν τοῦ θεοῦ ὁ αἰών, τοῦ δὲ αἰῶνος ὁ κόσμος, τοῦ δὲ κόσμου ὁ ἥλιος, τοῦ δὲ ἡλίου ὁ ἄνθρωπος.
>
> Eternity, therefore, is an image of god; the cosmos is an image of eternity; and the sun is an image of the cosmos. The human is an image of the sun. (*Corpus Hermeticum* 11.15; trans. Copenhaver)

It shows that Plato’s chain of images was thought to include man himself.

2.1.2 The ‘image of God’ in Hellenistic kingship ideology: The king as the image of God

An unambiguous identification of the ‘image of God’ with a human being is found in texts which develop a Hellenistic kingship ideology, in which not man in general, but only the king is regarded as the image of God. Epigraphical evidence shows that, in Greek, kings were called ‘image of God’. The Hellenistic

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[5] Van den Berg 2001, 178.

[6] Cf. Van den Berg 2001, 178.

king Ptolemy V Epiphanes (210–180 BC), for instance, is called εἰκὼν ζῶσα τοῦ Διός, a living image of Zeus.[7] It does indeed seem true that what underlies this is an Ancient Near Eastern understanding of the political ruler as representation of God, a view which we already encountered in the introduction to chap. 1 when dealing with the image of God in ancient Judaism. The distinctively Israelite feature of the notion of the image of God, in comparison with the general Ancient Near Eastern view, seems to be that all human beings constitute God's image and not just the king.

As we shall see, in written Greek texts the notion of the image of God appears to occur on a sliding scale from identification of this image with the ruler, through identification with the wise and virtuous, to recognition, similar to that in Jewish thought, that *every* human being is, in principle, an image of God. We shall first explore the 'image of God' in Hellenistic kingship ideology before discussing a less or more widely applied anthropological understanding of this notion in the next section.

The oldest preserved Greek text to contain the phrase εἰκὼν θεοῦ is a fragment from the fourth-cent. BC philosopher Phaenias of Eresus (fl. 320 BC), a pupil of Aristotle, which has been preserved in Plutarch. In this fragment, which exudes the Ancient Near Eastern atmosphere in the wider setting of the struggles between Greeks and Persians in the Persian Wars, Phaenias describes the exchanges between the Athenian politician Themistocles (*c.*524–459 BC) and Artabanus the Chiliarch, Grand Vizier to either the Persian king Xerxes or his son Artaxerxes. Themistocles, in his efforts to arrange an audience with the king,

> said that he was a Hellene, and that he desired to have an audience with the King on matters which were of the highest importance and for which the monarch entertained the liveliest concern. Whereupon the Chiliarch replied: 'O Stranger, men's customs differ; different people honour different practices; but all honour the exaltation and maintenance of their own peculiar ways. Now you Hellenes are said to admire liberty and equality above all things (ὑμᾶς μὲν οὖν ἐλευθερίαν μάλιστα θαυμάζειν καὶ ἰσότητα λόγος); but in our eyes, among many fair customs, this is the fairest of all, to honour the King, and to pay obeisance to him as the image of that God who is the preserver of all things – τιμᾶν βασιλέα καὶ προσκυνεῖν ὡς εἰκόνα θεοῦ τοῦ πάντα σώζοντος. If then, you approve our practice and will pay obeisance, it is in your power to behold and address the King; but if you are otherwise minded, it will be needful for you to employ messengers to him in your stead, for it is not a custom of this country that the King give ear to a man who has not paid him obeisance'. (Phaenias, Fragment 26 [edn Wehrli][8]; = Plutarch, *Themistocles* 27.1–3)

In this passage, the Near Eastern background of the notion of the king as God's image shines through and is clearly contrasted, in Phaenias' account, with the Greek values of liberty and equality. The two political systems, that of the Greeks

[7] See Dittenberger 1903–1905, 90.3 (1.142.6).
[8] Wehrli 1969, 10–21.

and the Persians, differ, according to Phaenias, because the Persians have strict ideas about the divine nature of kingship, which is understood to represent God on earth.

Yet, subsequent Greek texts are also willing to take this view on kingship.[9] In the *Sententiae* of Ps-Menander, the king is said to be a living image of God: Εἰκὼν δὲ βασιλεύς ἐστιν ἔμψυχος θεοῦ (Menander, *Sententiae e codicibus Byzantinis* 264)[10]; the same can be said of the queen: Βασίλεια δ' εἰκών ἐστιν ἔμψυχος θεοῦ (Menander, *Sententiae* – Mono 1.79)[11].

Strikingly, Plutarch, who preserves the fragment from Phaenias just discussed, also employs the concept himself in his treatise *To an Uneducated Ruler*. Plutarch's passage is very relevant as he links this concept of the image of God with the notion of forming oneself in the likeness of God, a notion which, as we shall see, goes a long way to explain Paul's thought about metamorphosis into the image of God (see further §§ 2.2 and 2.4 below). Having just spoken about the harvest of the earth, Plutarch continues as follows:

> But these gifts and blessings [i.e. of the harvest of the earth], so excellent and so great, which the gods bestow cannot be rightly enjoyed nor used without law and justice and a ruler. Now justice is the aim and end of law, but law is the work of the ruler, and the ruler is *the image of God who orders all things* (ἄρχων δ' εἰκὼν θεοῦ τοῦ πάντα κοσμοῦντος). Such a ruler needs no Phidias nor Polyclitus nor Myron to model him, but *by his virtue he forms himself in the likeness of God* (ἀλλ' αὐτὸς αὑτὸν εἰς ὁμοιότητα θεῷ δι' ἀρετῆς καθιστὰς) and thus creates a statue most delightful of all to behold and most worthy of divinity (καθιστὰς καὶ δημιουργῶν ἀγαλμάτων τὸ ἥδιστον ὀφθῆναι καὶ θεοπρεπέστατον). Now just as in the heavens God has established as a most beautiful image of himself the sun and the moon, so in states a ruler 'who in God's likeness | Righteous decisions upholds' (Homer, *Odyssey* 19.109 and 111), that is to say, one who, possessing God's wisdom, establishes, as his likeness and luminary, intelligence in place of sceptre or thunderbolt or trident, with which attributes some rulers represent themselves in sculpture and painting. (Plutarch, *Ad principem ineruditum* 780E–F; cf. Stobaeus, *Anthologium* 4.5.99)

According to Plutarch, the ideal ruler 'needs no Phidias nor Polyclitus nor Myron to model him', Phidias being a 5th cent. BC Athenian sculptor who was as famous as Polyclitus, the 5th or 4th cent. BC Greek bronze sculptor to whom he was often compared. As R. Neudecker points out:

> Like Polyclitus, Phidias is mentioned time and again as one of the very best sculptors. In ancient literature, Phidias was considered inspired in his portrayals of the gods, creating works whose magnitude and splendour evoked religious fervour. Phidias' colossal statues of Athena Parthenos and Zeus in Olympia, executed in the gold-ivory tech-

[9] On Hellenistic kingship ideology, see Goodenough 1928; Scott 1929; Bringmann 1993; Herz 1996; Chaniotis 2003.

[10] Edn Jäkel 1964, 33–83.

[11] Edn Meineke 1841, 340–62.

nique, were regarded as embodying the idea of art itself, more so than his relatively few other works.[12]

Myron, finally, was also a bronze sculptor from the 5th cent. BC, who was equally regarded as one of the greatest sculptors and had works throughout Greece and Asia Minor. Plutarch's point is clear: the ideal ruler cannot be constructed by human hands, not even by the greatest sculptors, 'but by his virtue he forms himself in the likeness of God (ἀλλ' αὐτὸς αὑτὸν εἰς ὁμοιότητα θεῷ δι' ἀρετῆς)'.[13] In this way, the ruler is indeed 'the image of God who orders all things' (ἄρχων δ' εἰκὼν θεοῦ τοῦ πάντα κοσμοῦντος).[14]

The particularly Platonic background of the notion of forming oneself in the likeness of God and, in this way, being rendered similar to God, will be discussed later, in § 2.2. As regards the view that *the ruler* is the image of God, Plutarch seems to draw not only on the same notion which we encountered in Phaenias, in a passage which Plutarch preserved, but perhaps also on contemporary Neo-Pythagorean views to this effect which were voiced in treatises on kingship. Although the dating of the Pythagorean treatises on kingship is still disputed, a consensus seems to have emerged that they date from the Roman imperial period, rather than the Hellenistic period.[15] In one of these treatises, that of Pseudo-Ecphantus, the king is said to outdo the rest of mankind because he was directly modelled on the archetype of God himself:

> On the earth and among us man has the best nature of all; however the king is more divine, and within the common nature has a larger share of the good. In his body he is similar to the others, as having come into being out of the same *hyle*, but he was made by the best craftsman, who wrought him using himself as a model – ὑπὸ τεχνίτα δ' εἰργασμένος λῴστω, ὃς ἐτεχνίτευσεν αὐτὸν ἀρχετύπῳ χρώμενος ἑαυτῷ. Thus the king is the one and only creature to represent the king of heaven, being always known to his Creator and by those ruled by himself seen in his royalty as if in light. (Pseudo-Ecphantus, *De regno* apud Stobaeus 4.7.64; = Thesleff, *The Pythagorean Texts* [1965], p. 80; = Stern, No. 564b)

As we shall see later, at the end of this section, both W. Burkert and M. Stern assume that this passage in Pseudo-Ecphantus has been influenced by the no-

[12] Neudecker, 'Phidias', in: *New Pauly Online*.

[13] A similar view is reflected in Pliny's eulogy on Trajan, the ideal prince, in his *Panegyricus* 55.10–11, although without mention of the assimilation to God: the emperor 'need not seek a lasting reputation (it will last in spite of him) but a good one; and this is preserved not in portraits and statues but in virtue and good deeds (*ea porro non imaginibus et statuis, sed virtute ac meritis prorogatur*). His forms and features too, so short-lived as they are, are not so well expressed and retained in silver and gold as by his people's love. That happy fortune is yours to enjoy in every way you could desire, for your radiant face and beloved countenance dwell in the words, the looks, the thoughts of all your subjects'.

[14] For Stoic interpretations of Phidias' Zeus, see Algra 2007, 37–41.

[15] For an overview see Stern, vol. 3 (1984), 33n1. See also O'Meara 2003, 97.

tion in Gen 1.26–27 that man was created in the image of God (see § 2.1.5).[16] If this is correct, this means that the Neo-Pythagoreans will have seen their view – that man, or rather the king in particular, was the image of God – as confirmed independently by the Jewish text of Genesis. This understanding of the image of God will have been viewed by them as part and parcel of ancient wisdom, in a similar way to Numenius regarding Moses and Plato as being in harmony on the nature of God, Moses even being the older, and thus more venerable source (see also § 2.1.5).

The view that the king is God’s image is also encountered in later writings, such as that by the author known as the Anonymus de Scientia Politica (probably 6th cent. AD), who reflects in his *De scientia politica dialogus* on the quality of a good king, who carries in himself God’s image, and on how he arranges the political conditions and rights of citizens through imitation of the gods: οἶμαι (…) ἔδειξεν ὁ λόγος ὅπερ ἐβούλου μαθεῖν, ὁποῖός τε ἂν εἴη βασιλεὺς ἀγαθὸς θ(εο)ῦ εἰκόνα ἐν αὐτῷ φέρων καὶ πῶς ἂν τῇ τῶν θείων μιμήσει τάττοι τὴν πολιτεὶαν (*De scientia politica dialogus* 50).[17]

In these Oriental and Neo-Pythagorean kingship traditions, however, it is only the king who functions as the image of God. Other Greek traditions regard the wise and the virtuous, or even man in general, as the image of God. They develop not so much a political theory but an anthropology, focusing either on the wise and the virtuous as an ideal type of man, or even on man as such.

2.1.3 The ‘image of God’ in anthropology: The wise and the virtuous, and man in general, as the image of God

(a) The wise and the virtuous

It is difficult to assess whether the Greek traditions which regard not the king, but the virtuous and wise, and even man in general, as God’s image are a widening of the Oriental and Neo-Pythagorean traditions or an independent development. The latter seems more likely, if Diogenes Laertius’ report on Diogenes the Cynic (*c.*412/403 – *c.*324/321 BC) is reliable. According to Diogenes Laertius, Diogenes the Cynic called good men images of the gods: Τοὺς ἀγαθοὺς ἄνδρας θεῶν εἰκόνας εἶναι (*Vitae philosophorum* 6.51). In the context of Diogenes’ views, his characterization of good men as the images of the gods may fit in with his criticism of religion. ‘In religion’, as M.-O. Goulet-Cazé remarked, ‘he professes a form of agnosticism and opposes all types of religious practice of his day, since he believes religion to be an expression of origin, and to present a

[16] Burkert 1972. See also Stern, vol. 3 (1984), 33–7.

[17] *De scientia politica dialogus (olim sub auctore Petro Patricio) (e cod. Vat. gr. 1298)*; edn Mazzucchi 1982, 1–55. On the anonymous dialogue *On Political Science*, see O’Meara 2003, § 13.2, 171–84.

barrier on the path toward apathy due to the inhibition it arouses'.[18] Within this programme, Diogenes' definition of good men as the true images of the gods can be readily understood.

The characterization of the good and wise as images of God occurs not only in Cynicism, but also in the *Sententiae* of Clitarchus. Although the date of these *Sententiae* is unknown, H. Chadwick has shown that 'the Christian note is wholly absent from Clitarchus' (otherwise than is the case in the *Sententiae* of Sextus, for example).[19] Chadwick argues against the opinion that 'the collection of Clitarchus is only an epitome of Sextus'. If Clitarchus is indeed a pagan author, the following passage is proof of a pagan understanding of the righteous man as image of God. According to Clitarchus, δίκαιος ἀνὴρ εἰκὼν θεοῦ (Clitarchus, *Sententiae* 9). This view is also echoed in the *Sententiae* of the Christian compilator Sextus, in which he encourages the readers to feel awe for the wise man as a living image of God: σέβου σοφὸν ἄνδρα ὡς εἰκόνα θεοῦ ζῶσαν (*Sententiae Sexti* 190). Importantly, in view of our previous observation that, with regard to the king, the 'image of God' was applied by Neo-Pythagoreans, Chadwick argues that the internal evidence of the *Sententiae* of Sextus shows that they were compiled by a Christian from a previous pagan collection which was Neo-Pythagorean in character.[20] This, then, suggests that the view that the wise are the image of God may also have a Neo-Pythagorean background, which would mean that the stipulations of the king and the wise as images of God may be closely related in Neo-Pythagorean traditions.

Finally, in the 5th cent. AD pagan Neo-Platonist philosopher Hierocles, too, it is the virtuous man who bears the image of God in his soul. Here again the Neo-Pythagorean background is in evidence, inasmuch as Hierocles wrote a commentary on the anonymous 'Golden Poem of the Pythagoreans'. In a passage relevant to our present purpose, Hierocles argues that

> Virtue is in fact an image of God in the rational soul (ἔστι γὰρ ἡ ἀρετὴ εἰκὼν θεοῦ ἐν ψυχῇ λογικῇ), and every image needs a model for its genesis (εἰκὼν δὲ πᾶσα τοῦ παραδείγματος δεῖται πρὸς γένεσιν), and the acquired image does not suffice unless it looks to that by the assimilation to which it will acquire its beauty (καὶ οὐκ ἀρκεῖ τὸ κτώμενον, ἐὰν μὴ καὶ ἐκεῖσε βλέπῃ, οὗ πρὸς ὁμοίωσιν τὸ καλὸν κτήσεται). (Hierocles, *In aureum carmen* 21.5; trans. Schibli)

This passage is particularly relevant because it links the terminology of image of God with that of model (παράδειγμα) and assimilation (ὁμοίωσις): 'every image needs a paradigm for its genesis' (εἰκὼν δὲ πᾶσα τοῦ παραδείγματος δεῖται πρὸς γένεσιν), and the modelling of the image upon the paradigm is only sufficient when a real assimilation (ὁμοίωσις) is forged through which the image

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[18] Goulet-Cazé, 'Diogenes [14] of Sinope', in: *New Pauly Online*.

[19] Chadwick 1959, 157–8 at 158.

[20] See also the 'Pythagorean Sentences' in Chadwick 1959, part I, chap. 5.

becomes like its paradigm. According to Hierocles, such an assimilation takes place in an ethical sense in man’s rational soul when virtue renders the soul into an image of God.

This runs very similarly to what we have already seen in Plutarch’s reflection on the ruler as the image of God: because ‘by his virtue he [i. e. the ruler] forms himself in the likeness of God (ἀλλ’ αὑτὸς αὑτὸν εἰς ὁμοιότητα θεῷ δι’ ἀρετῆς)’, he becomes the image of God (Plutarch, *Ad principem ineruditum* 780E–F; see § 2.1.2 above). Strikingly, this shows that the language of image (εἰκών) is easily connected with that of assimilation (ὁμοίωσις); the latter signifies the process through which an image becomes similar to its paradigm.[21] We shall study this concept, in its form of assimilation to God, the *homoiōsis theōi*, in more detail below (see § 2.2). There we shall see, as can already be surmised here in the passages from Plutarch and Hierocles, that the extension of the taxonomy of the language of image to embrace the notion of assimilation has a thoroughly Platonic background.

Later echoes of the view that the virtuous man is the image of God are also found in the Rhetorica Anonyma’s *Epitome artis rhetoricae*, of uncertain date. In a passage about the virtues in the various parts of the soul, the anonymous author states that it is the work of the virtue of love to surrender herself to each image of God, as well as to the prototype of this image, i. e. to God himself: ἀγάπης δὲ [ἔργον] τὸ πάσῃ εἰκόνι τοῦ θεοῦ τοιαύτην ἑαυτὴν ἐμπαρέχειν, οἷον καὶ τῷ πρωτοτύπῳ σχεδόν (Rhetorica Anonyma, *Epitome artis rhetoricae*, vol. 3, p. 666).[22] But, although the discussion here is about the virtues in the soul of the virtuous man, it may be the case that the phrase ‘each image of God’ refers here to each man in general who, in principle, is an image of God. This general use of ‘image of God’ also occurred in Greek thought, as we shall see presently, from the 4th cent. BC Pythagorean philosopher Diodorus of Aspendus onwards.

(b) Man in general

Diodorus of Aspendus is the first known representative of a fully anthropological understanding of the image of God among the Greeks. Inasmuch as he is a Pythagorean philosopher, from the 4th cent. BC, it comes as no surprise that he takes the step of viewing every man as the image of God. As we have just seen,

[21] As Schibli rightly remarks in his comments on the passage from Hierocles, ‘The artistic metaphor of image (εἰκών) and model (παράδειγμα) goes back to Plato (cf. *Tim*. 29b3–4, *Rep*. 484c8, 500e3)’; see Schibli 2002, 284n7.

[22] Edn Walz 1834, 617–69 at 666: ἀγάπης δὲ [ἔργον] τὸ πάσῃ εἰκόνι τοῦ θεοῦ τοιαύτην ἑαυτὴν ἐμπαρέχειν, οἷον καὶ τῷ πρωτοτύπῳ σχεδόν· κἂν μὴ ἐνῆν, αὐτὴν ἐπιχειρῶσιν οἱ δαίμονες – ‘(The work of) love is to surrender herself to each image of God [i. e. all fellow human beings], such as to the prototype [i. e. God]; and when that is impossible for her [i. e. love], the demons would put their hand on her’. (Trans. mine)

fellow Pythagoreans regarded the king as such. In this light, it seems likely that, at least in Pythagorean traditions, the view of each man as the image of God is a widening of the Pythagorean kingship ideology so that it includes every man.

The relevant passage from Diodorus is very short indeed and consists of a fragment published in F.W.A. Mullach's *Fragmenta philosophorum Graecorum*. According to Diodorus, some are of the opinion that with regard to the invisible part of his soul man has been formed after the image of God: Τινὲς κατ' εἰκόνα θεοῦ τὸν ἄνθρωπον ἐνόμισαν κατὰ τὸ τῆς ψυχῆς ἀόρατον (πεπλάσθαι) (Diodorus Aspendius, *Fragmentum*).[23] This fragment is the only piece of writing by Diodorus which has survived; it is preserved in the *Quaestiones in Octateuchum*, more particularly the *Quaestiones in Genesin*, of Theodoret of Cyrrhus (*c.* AD 393–466), in the edition of J. Sirmond (1642). The ascription of the passage to Diodorus rests on the marginal indication of his name in manuscript *Paris, Bibl. Nat. Gr.* 842, on which Sirmond's edition was based, and is not repeated in the edition by J.L. Schulze in J.P. Migne's *Patrologia Graeca* and in the modern critical edition by N.F. Marcos and A. Sáenz-Badillos (1979).[24] It would be too easy to discard the marginal indication of Diodorus' name as not authentic, because, as H. Chadwick and M.J. Edwards state, Theodoret's '*Graecarum Affectionum Curatio* supplies unique testimonia on the lives and teachings of pagan philosophers. (…) His *Eranistes* is notable for its marginal indications of speakers' names'.[25] For this reason, it is not impossible that the marginal indication of Diodorus of Aspendus' name in Theodoret's *Quaestiones in Genesin* is indeed accurate. Given his other writings, Theodoret clearly had the competence to refer to pagan philosophers, and the practice of doing so in marginal indications is well attested. Yet, even if the passage in Theodoret is dependent upon Diodorus, it is doubtful, I believe, whether its precise wording is authentic. The passage is part of an answer to the question of what the phrase 'after the image' in Gen 1.26–27 means:

> Τί ἐστι τὸ «κατ' εἰκόνα»;
> Τινὲς τὸ ἀόρατον τῆς ψυχῆς εἰκόνα Θεοῦ κεκλήκασιν· ἀλλ' οὐκ ἀληθῶς εἰρήκασιν· εἰ γὰρ εἰκὼν τοῦ Θεοῦ τῆς ψυχῆς τὸ ἀόρατον, μᾶλλον ἂν εἰκόνες τοῦ Θεοῦ κληθεῖεν ἄγγελοι καὶ ἀρχάγγελοι, καὶ πᾶσαι αἱ ἀσώματοι καὶ ἅγιαι φύσεις· ἅτε δὲ παντάπασι σωμάτων ἀπηλλαγμέναι, καὶ ἀμιγὲς τὸ ἀόρατον ἔχουσαι. τινὲς δὲ ὑπὸ πολλῆς εὐηθείας τὸ σῶμα τὸ ἀνθρώπινον «κατ' εἰκόνα Θεοῦ» γεγενῆσθαί φασιν. (*Quaestiones in Genesis* 20, p. 23.15–21 edn Marcos & Sáenz-Badillos)

[23] Mullach 1867, 112 (= edn J. Sirmond, *Beati Theodoreti Episcopi Cyri Opera omnia in qvatvor tomos distribvta*, Paris: Cramoisy, 1642, vol. 1, p. 19: Διοδώρου. Τινὲς κατ' εἰκόνα κτλ.). On Diodorus, see Riedweg, 'Diodorus [3] of Aspendus', in: *New Pauly Online*.

[24] See Migne 1860, 104B, without ascription in margin to Diodorus; and Marcos & Sáenz-Badillos 1979, 23.

[25] Chadwick & Edwards 1996.

What does 'according to the image' mean?

Some have called *the invisible of the soul* the image of God; but they were not right in so saying because if the image of God is the invisible of the soul, angels and archangels, and all the unbodily and holy natures would have been called images of God, because they are wholly free of bodies and possess the invisible in an unmixed way. Others, with much simplicity, declare that *the human body* has been made 'according to the image of God'.

Given the seamlessness with which the passage from Diodorus is integrated into Theodoret's commentary on Gen 1.26–27, it seems likely that the wording has been adapted to its new context. This means that the original wording must remain uncertain, particularly with regard to the term 'image'. As regards the application of the definition of the image of God to the invisible of the soul, it seems as if Diodorus, if the opinion is his, is making a general anthropological statement about the nature of every man, and does not limit himself to the figures of the king or the virtuous and wise. That would constitute a digression from the Pythagorean statements studied above, which focus specifically on the king as the image of God.

A similar Pythagorean anthropological statement, comparable to that of Diodorus, which also applies without discrimination to man in general, is made by Eurytus the Pythagorean in a passage preserved in Clement of Alexandria.[26] He was regarded as having been one of the teachers of Plato (Apuleius, *De Platone et eius dogmate* 1.3; Diogenes Laertius, *Vitae philosophorum* 3.6). He was probably born *c*.450/440 BC, and lived until somewhere in the second decade of the 4th cent.[27] If this is correct, then Plato's reflections about the living cosmos as the image of God, which – as we have seen in § 2.1.1 – also have a bearing upon his anthropology but stop short of saying that man in particular is God's image, may owe much to Pythagorean views on man as the image of God. According to H. Thesleff, however, the writing of Eurytus (or Eurysus) referred to by Clement of Alexandria is a Neo-Pythagorean forgery.[28] In his *Stromateis* Clement writes the following about Eurytus:

ἄξιον ἡγοῦμαι καὶ τὴν Εὐρύσου τοῦ Πυθαγορείου παραθέσθαι φωνὴν οὕτως ἔχουσαν, ὃς ἐν τῷ Περὶ τύχας τὸν δημιουργὸν φήσας αὐτῷ χρώμενον παραδείγματι ποιῆσαι τὸν ἄνθρωπον ἐπήγαγεν· «τὸ δὲ σκᾶνος τοῖς λοιποῖς ὅμοιον, οἷα γεγονὸς ἐκ τᾶς αὐτᾶς ὕλας, ὑπὸ τεχνίτα δὲ εἰργασμένον λῴστω, ὃς ἐτεχνίτευσεν αὐτὸ ἀρχετύπῳ χρώμενος ἑαυτῷ.» (Clement of Alexandria, *Stromateis* 5.5.29)

I think it worthwhile also to adduce the utterance of Eurysus [= Eurytus] the Pythagorean, which is as follows, who in his book *On Fate*, having said that the 'Creator, on making man, took Himself as an exemplar', added, 'And the body is like the other

[26] Cf. Stern, vol. 3 (1984), 37.
[27] Riedweg, 'Eurytus', in: *New Pauly Online*.
[28] See Thesleff 1965, 87–8.

> things, as being made of the same material, and fashioned by the best workman, who wrought it, taking Himself as the archetype'.

In this passage from Pseudo-Eurytus' *On Fate*, each human being as such is clearly regarded as having been modelled on God as the archetype. It seems that Pseudo-Eurytus' view comes close to a physical understanding of the image of God, inasmuch as it is the body which is said to have been 'fashioned by the best workman, who wrought it, *taking Himself as the archetype*'. But perhaps the passage is taken out of context by Clement of Alexandria, with the unintended consequence that it now seems to promote a physical understanding of God's image. As regards the word 'image' itself, Pseudo-Eurytus does not use the actual term, but on the whole his anthropological views seem very similar to those of Diodorus of Aspendus, who does use it.

So far we have seen ample and growing evidence for Pythagorean reflections on the image of God. Pseudo-Ecphantus, although he does not use the terminology of image but rather of archetype, considered the king as directly modelled on God; the wise man is considered to be God's image in the Neo-Pythagorean collections of the *Sententiae* of Clitarchus and Sextus; and, finally, Diodorus of Aspendus and Pseudo-Eurytus view man in general as God's image or wrought after God's archetype. Together the above authors furnish impressive evidence for a pagan understanding of the 'image of God'. In the conclusion to this section, we shall tackle the difficult question of whether their views betray an acquaintance with the Septuagint text of Gen 1.26–27 about man being created after the image of God (see § 2.1.5 below). Although most of the passages just referred to are Neo-Pythagorean, the passage from Diodorus of Aspendus in particular seems to preclude a dependence upon the Septuagint because of its early dating in the 4th cent. BC, before the translation of the Septuagint began. By this evidence, Jewish and Pythagorean reflections on the image of God seem to be independent from one another.

Apart from Pythagorean and Neo-Pythagorean authors, other authors also employ the anthropological concept of the image of God, some using the exactly similar wording of εἰκών (or, in Latin, *imago*), others the synonym ἄγαλμα or μίμημα (or, in Latin, *exemplum*, *similitudo* or *simulacrum*). In his *Astronomica*, Manilius, a Roman didactic poet from the time of Augustus and Tiberius, derives the true identity of man, his being the image of God, from man's ability to penetrate the heavens with his understanding:

> Now nature holds no mysteries for us; we have surveyed it in its entirety and are masters of the conquered sky; we perceive our creator, of whom we are part (… *nostrumque parentem | pars sua perspicimus*; 4.884–885), and rise to the stars, whose children we are. Can one doubt that a divinity dwells within our breasts (*an dubium est habitare deum sub pectore nostro*; 4.886) and that our souls return to the heaven whence they came? Can one doubt that, just as the world, composed of the elements of air and fire on high and earth and water, houses an intelligence which, spread

throughout it, directs the whole, so too with us the bodies or our earthly condition and our life-blood house a mind which directs every part and animates the man? Why wonder that men can comprehend heaven, when heaven exists in their very beings and each one is in a smaller likeness the image of God himself? – ... *quid mirum, noscere mundum | si possunt homines, quibus est et mundus in ipsis | exemplumque dei quisque est in imagine parva* (4.893–895)? (Manilius, *Astronomica* 4.883–895; trans. Goold)

Perhaps the Loeb translation by G. P. Goold makes too much of the notion of the image of God in Manilius and translates it in an almost 'Biblicizing' way; a literal translation should not emphasize that each man 'is in a smaller likeness the image of God himself', as Goold does, but rather that each man 'is an example (or imitation) of God *in imagine parva*, in a small, little likeness'.

In Manilius' account of the intelligence which pervades both the macro- and microcosms, which is Stoic first and foremost, the term *imago* hardly acquires the meaning of image in a Pythagorean-anthropological sense, but simply denotes the likeness which results from the fact that man is an *exemplum dei*, an imitation of God. The term *exemplum* is the Latin rendition of the Greek μίμημα which is employed by Stoics to express the correspondence between the intelligence of man and that of God. The Stoic nature of this concept can be gleaned from, for instance, Cleanthes' famous Stoic *Hymn to Zeus*, the opening of which reads:

… For it is right for all mortals to address you:
for we have our origin in you, bearing a likeness to God (μίμημα λαχόντες)
(Cleanthes, *Hymn to Zeus*, lines 3–4; trans. Thom)[29]

J. C. Thom, in his commentary on Cleanthes' hymn, even regards these lines as the source of Manilius' statement that man is an *exemplum dei*. He also suspects that Manilius' influence extended to later Stoics such as Musonius Rufus and Cicero.[30]

Indeed, according to Musonius Rufus (1st cent. AD),

καθόλου δὲ ἄνθρωπος μίμημα μὲν θεοῦ μόνον τῶν ἐπιγείων ἐστίν, ἐκείνῳ δὲ παραπλησίας ἔχει τὰς ἀρετάς· (…) οὕτω καὶ τὸ ἐκείνου μίμημα τὸν ἄνθρωπον ἡγητέον, ὅταν ἔχῃ κατὰ φύσιν, ὁμοίως ἔχειν.

In general, of all creatures on earth man alone is an imitation of God (μίμημα θεοῦ) and has almost the same virtues that He has. (…) So man, as the imitation of Him, when living in accord with nature, should be thought of as being like Him. (Gaius Musonius Rufus, *Dissertationum a Lucio digestarum reliquiae* 17; edn Hense, frag. 17, p. 90.4–6, 13–14, trans. Lutz)

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29 For commentary, see Thom 2005, 54–64 and 65–6 with many references to Stoic sources.

30 Thom 2005, 66: 'The formulations regarding the likeness between human beings and God found in Musonius Rufus, frag. 17 and Cicero, *Leg.* 1.25 are sufficiently close that we may suspect them to be influenced by Cleanthes. The same may be true of Manilius, *Astron.* 4.895'.

Musonius' view that man is a μίμημα θεοῦ clearly seems to echo the anthropology of Cleanthes' hymn. We see how much the predominantly Pythagorean-Platonic language of image of God resembles the predominantly Stoic language of imitation of God. Thom also refers to Cicero's *Laws* 1.25 for another passage which seems to reflect Cleanthes' notion of man as imitation of God, now rendered in Latin as 'similitudo':

> Moreover, virtue exists in man and God alike, but in no other creature besides; virtue, however, is nothing else than nature perfected and developed to its highest point; therefore there is a likeness between man and God – *est igitur homini cum deo similitudo*. (Cicero, *Laws* 1.25)

For this view, one could also point to another passage in Cicero's *Laws*, in which Cicero argues that knowledge of ourselves leads to the acknowledgement that man 'has a divine element within him'; for this reason man will perceive his inner nature as a kind of consecrated likeness, a *simulacrum aliquod dicatum*:

> [Philosophy] alone has taught us, in addition to all other wisdom, that most difficult of all things – to know ourselves. This precept is so important and significant that the credit for it is given, not to any human being, but to the god of Delphi. For he who knows himself will realize, in the first place, that he has a divine element within him, and will think of his own inner nature as a kind of consecrated image of God (*nam qui se ipse norit, primum aliquid se habere sentiet divinum ingeniumque in se suum sicut simulacrum aliquod dicatum putabit*); and so he will always act and think in a way worthy of so great a gift of the gods. (Cicero, *Laws* 1.58–59)

It is important to note that in this Stoic reasoning, too, the insight that something in man resembles God is an incentive for ethical behaviour. If man thinks of his inner nature 'as a kind of consecrated image of God', 'so he will always act and think in a way worthy of so great a gift of the gods'. As we shall see in the course of the present chapter, the claim that man is the image of God implies the essential godlikeness of man which can be reactived by a process of assimilation to God through virtue (see § 2.2 below). The Stoic notion of imitation of God is indeed comparable with the Platonic concept of assimilation to God.[31]

A Pythagorean-anthropological understanding of the image of God again seems to be present in Lucian of Samosata, a Greek rhetorical-satirical writer of the 2nd cent. AD. In his *Essays in Portraiture Defended* (*Pro imaginibius*), Lucian outlines a discussion about whether it is permissible to compare a particu-

[31] Cf. Roloff 1971, 309: 'In *stoischem* oder der Stoa verpflichtetem Denken erscheint die Angleichung an Gott als Nachahmung der Götter (imitatio). Sie gründet auf der durch göttliche Herkunft des Menschen oder gemeinsamen Besitz der Vernunft umschriebenen Übereinstimmung menschlichen und göttlichen Wesens und besteht in der Verwirklichung dessen, was im Menschen dergestalt von vornherein angelegt ist. Sie gipfelt in der als Gottähnlichkeit (similitudo) bezeichneten tugendgemäßen und darum glückseligen Lebensführung. So bei Cicero [De leg. I, 25], Seneca [De prov. I, 5; Ep. 48, 11; 59, 14; 73, 15], Epiktet [Diatr. II, 14], Marc Aurel [X, 8] und Boethius [De cons. I, 4; II, 5]'.

lar human being, Panthea, a girl from Smyrna and the favourite of the emperor Verus, with particular gods. Lucian paid her an elaborate compliment in his *Essays in Portraiture*. Because Panthea objected to such a comparison with the gods, Lucian needs to defend his writing and does so in his *Essays in Portraiture Defended*. In it Lucian counters Panthea's criticism as follows:

> It is not incumbent upon you, then, to be thus timorous in respect of praise. If any offence at all has been perpetrated against divinity in that essay you are not accountable for it – unless you think that to listen makes one accountable; it is I whom the gods will punish, after first punishing Homer and the other poets! But to this day they have not punished the best of the philosophers for saying that man was God's image: ἀλλ᾽ οὐδέπω οὐδὲ τὸν ἄριστον τῶν φιλοσόφων ἠμύναντο εἰκόνα θεοῦ τὸν ἄνθρωπον εἰπόντα εἶναι). (Lucian, *Pro imaginibus* 28)

Here we have a clear assertion, on the authority of 'the best of the philosophers' that man is an image of God. The philosophers whom Lucian had in mind could include Plato who, as we have seen (see § 2.1.1 above), argues that the cosmos is a perceptible God, an image of the intelligible, and comes close to an understanding of man as God's image par excellence among the other visible creatures (*Timaeus* 92c). But Lucian might also be alluding to (Neo-)Pythagoreans, who expressed the notion of man as God's image explicitly, or to Cynic philosophers such as Diogenes, who is also recorded to have held this view (see the present § 2.1.3).

The view that man is the image of God is also voiced by later philosophers. In a very interesting passage in the 3rd cent. AD Neo-Platonic philosopher Porphyry, we read that man is regarded as being the image of God. Remarkably, however, this view is now thought of as implying that God himself has human form, so that it is right for statues of the gods to be anthropomorphic. Or, to put it more precisely, although God remains the transcendent God, it is not unreasonable to portray him in an anthropomorphic way. Porphyry turns this view against the Christians who, in his view, are wrong to criticize the pagans for setting up images as objects for worship. According to Porphyry,

> Those who make a suitable object for divine worship do not think the god is in the wood or the stone or bronze from which the object is made. Nor do they think if any part of the statue (ἄγαλμα) is cut off that it detracts from the god's power. For statues (ξόανα) and temples were built for the sake of remembrance in order that those who frequent those places meditate when they arrive there. And for divine comprehension they approach employing prayers and supplications, asking what each one is in need of. For if a man makes an image (εἰκών) of a friend, he does not assume he is in it, nor that the body's limbs are included in the many parts of the image. But honour is given through this image (εἰκών). But in the case of sacrifices brought to the gods, these are not to give honour to them. Rather they are a sign of the worshipper's intentions, and to show they are not ungratefully disposed. It is reasonable that the forms of the statues (ἀγάλματα) are in the manner of a man because man, which is the finest of creatures, is thought also to be the image (εἰκών) of God – ἀνθρωποειδῆ δὲ τῶν

ἀγαλμάτων εἰκότως εἶναι τὰ σχήματα, ἐπεὶ τὸ κάλλιστον τῶν ζῴων ἄνθρωπος εἶναι νομίζεται καὶ εἰκὼν θεοῦ. It is possible to confirm this doctrine from another passage which asserts by that which is written in it that God has fingers: 'And he gave to Moses the two tablets which were written by the fingers of God' (Ex 31.18) – Ἔνι δ' ἐξ ἑτέρου λόγου τοῦτο κρατῦναι τὸ δόγμα, διαβεβαιουμένου δακτύλους ἔχειν τὸν Θεόν, οἷς γράφει, [καὶ φάσκοντος]· «Καὶ ἔδωκε τῷ Μωσῇ τὰς δύο πλάκας τὰς λιθίνας γεγραμμένας τῷ δακτύλῳ τοῦ Θεοῦ». (Porphyry, *Against the Christians*, frag. 76 edn von Harnack[32]; = frag. 207 trans. Berchman[33]; = Macarius, *Apocriticus seu* Μονογενής, book 4, pp. 200–201 edn Blondel)

This passage from Porphyry is particularly interesting for two reasons. (1) First, as I have already briefly indicated, in his justification of the use of images in pagan cult, Porphyry stresses that it is reasonable that the forms of the statues are anthropomorphic because man, unlike the rest of creation, 'is thought also to be the image of God': ἄνθρωπος εἶναι νομίζεται καὶ εἰκὼν θεοῦ. In order to convince the Christians of their inconsistency, he refers to the Septuagint text of Exodus 31.18 where God is spoken of in an anthropomorphic manner, inasmuch as he is said to possess fingers, like man. This quotation, in Porphyry's mind, confirms this doctrine (τοῦτο τὸ δόγμα), i. e. the doctrine of the anthropomorphic nature of God, because man is his image. In this way, the notion of man as the image of God is understood to comprise a bodily aspect.

This is reminiscent of the Greek opponents of Philo, whom we encountered in § 1.2.4 above. There it appeared, remarkably enough, that the debate about whether the image of God refers to the body or to the soul is mainly a Greek and early Christian affair, and not primarily a concern of ancient Jewish texts. According to Philo, the Epicureans believe that God has a human form, so that the notion of image of God is taken in a physical sense. Although some pagan Greeks, such as Celsus, vehemently denied that God's image could be physical, other pagan Greeks such as Dio Chrysostom stressed the similarity in shape between gods and man (Dio Chrysostom, *Orationes* 12.59, 77),[34] or said – in very much the same wording as Porphyry – that 'the judgement of those who established images (ἀγάλματα) in human form is anything but unreasonable' (to quote Maximus of Tyre, *The Philosophical Orations* 2.3; see also § 2.2.10 below). The present example from Porphyry is particularly relevant because it demonstrates that the identical word εἰκών was used for this discussion. As we have seen, Porphyry emphasizes how reasonable it is that the forms of the statues (ἀγάλματα) should be anthropomorphic by pointing to the fact that man is thought to be the image (εἰκών) of God. In the next section, § 2.1.3 (c), we shall study another example of such a physical understanding of the εἰκών of God in pagan authors.

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[32] Edn von Harnack 1916, 92.12–93.27.

[33] Berchman 2005, 216–17.

[34] On Dio's views on images of God, see Hartman 1998.

(2) Secondly, the passage from Porphyry also provides abundant evidence of the semantic-conceptual fields in which the expression εἰκὼν θεοῦ, 'image of God', is used. In Porphyry's discussion, the term εἰκών, 'image', proves to be synonymous with terms which denote idols, statues of the gods used in pagan cult: in our text εἰκών is synonymous with ἄγαλμα, 'statue', and ξόανον, 'image'. This shows that in ordinary pagan language the term 'image of God' (singular) would have been immediately associated, either positively or negatively, with the images (plural) of the gods. In this sense, the discussion of the 'image of God' in a pagan Graeco-Roman setting is no different from the old antithesis between the 'image of God' in Genesis and the images of the gods in the Ancient Near East (see chap. 1, introduction, and § 1.3 above). To remind us of this state of affairs, in § 2.1.4 below we shall examine the 'normal', non-anthropological meaning of εἰκὼν θεοῦ in Graeco-Roman texts before reaching our final conclusions.

Finally, a last word about Porphyry. Whereas in his *Against the Christians* Porphyry talks about man in terms of the εἰκὼν θεοῦ, elsewhere, in his *Ad Marcellam*, he also uses the terminology of ἄγαλμα in close connection with a verb which contains the term εἰκών. It is the wise man, according to Porphyry,

> by whom the divine must be honoured through wisdom and by whom, in the organ by which he knows, the temple must, through wisdom, be adorned with a living statue, i. e. with the mind, because God has erected himself in him as his image (ἐν-εικονι-σαμένου … θεοῦ), and thus has adorned him – … τὸν σοφόν, ᾧ τιμητέον διὰ σοφίας τὸ θεῖον καὶ κατακοσμητέον αὐτῷ διὰ σοφίας ἐν τῇ γνώμῃ τὸ ἱερὸν ἐμψύχῳ ἀγάλματι τῷ νῷ ἐνεικονισαμένου ἀγάλλοντος θεοῦ. (*Ad Marcellam* 11)

Unlike the previous passage from Porphyry, in which every man was considered to be the image of God, in his *Ad Marcellam* Porphyry is thinking of the wise man who houses in his mind, as in a shrine, the statue of God.

In this metaphorical sense of the mind as accommodating, or even being the statue of God, the notion returns in the writings of the 5th cent. AD Neo-Platonist Proclus. According to him, it is the mind in us which is, in truth, a statue of a particular god, that of Dionysus: ὁ ἐν ἡμῖν νοῦς Διονυσιακός ἐστιν καὶ ἄγαλμα ὄντως τοῦ Διονύσου (Proclus, *In Platonis Cratylum commentaria* 133).[35] Although Porphyry, like Proclus, associates the statue or image of God with the mind, in his *Against the Christians* he shows that at the same time the image of God also has a physical component. It is to this physical understanding of the εἰκὼν θεοῦ that we now briefly return.

(c) A physical, sophistic interpretation of man as the image of God

The anthropological explanations of the image of God in pagan authors, as we have just seen, identify this image of God with the invisible part of man, his

[35] For a commentary on this passage, see Van den Berg 2008, 194.

soul. Diodorus of Aspendus states this explicitly: some believe that with regard to the invisible part of his soul man has been formed after the image of God – Τινὲς κατ' εἰκόνα θεοῦ τὸν ἄνθρωπον ἐνόμισαν κατὰ τὸ τῆς ψυχῆς ἀόρατον (πεπλάσθαι) (Diodorus Aspendius, *Fragmentum*). Yet, as we have also seen, there are exceptions to this rule, and Porphyry, for instance, is among those who assume there is a bodily side to man being the image of God. For that reason, this group believe that anthropomorphic images of the gods are not unreasonable, if man himself is the image of God.

In the present section I shall give another example of this view. This time, the purpose of the author is not to justify the use of images of the gods, as was the case with Porphyry in his criticism of the Christians. The example is late, from the 4th cent. AD Greek rhetorician Himerius (*c.* AD 310 – *c.*390), the pagan teacher of the church fathers Gregory of Nazianzus and Basil of Caesarea, and shows a particular sophistic application of the notion of man as the image of God. Despite its late date, this example opens our eyes to a specific line of thought, that of the Second Sophistic. This movement was highly influential in the first three centuries AD and, in line with the Classical sophists, emphasized the importance of literary skills and outward performance. We shall study the movement in detail in chaps 3 and 4, because, as I shall argue there, it constitutes the background to Paul's endorsement of the notion of the image of God: in opposition to the outward *modus operandi* of the sophists, Paul advocated the importance of an inward transformation into the image of God which was to take place in the 'inner man'. The passage of Himerius, however, shows us that the terminology of the image of God can also be employed in a rather different, sophistic sense.

The passage from Himerius is altogether remarkable because it seems to start off in a philosophical, even Platonicizing sense, the very opposite of a sophistic approach. The philosophical interest evidenced in this passage, which occurs in Himerius' 48th oration, is uncharacteristic even for Himerius himself. In general, as R. Browning puts it, Himerius is

> untouched by philosophy. His eloquence is an end in itself, like poetry. His style is marked by wealth of imagery, care for euphony, avoidance of the concrete, and frequent quotations from classical poetry. Though the school orations are of some interest, Himerius in the main displays a talent for saying nothing gracefully and at length.[36]

Himerius' 48th oration is an address to Hermogenes, a pagan imperial official at the court of Constantine the Great, who was probably appointed proconsul of the Roman province of Achaia after AD 337.[37] It is in the latter capacity that Himerius addresses him. As R.J. Penella explains,[38] many of Himerius' ora-

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[36] Browning 1996.

[37] See Redies, 'Hermogenes', in: *New Pauly Online*.

[38] Penella 2007, 207; on the 48th Oration, see 209–10 (introduction) and 258–71 (translation with notes).

tions addressed to Roman officials, 'address and honour proconsular governors of Greece (Achaia), the province in which Himerius taught, while they were in office'. In the course of his eulogy on Hermogenes, Himerius includes a kind of excursus on the soul of Hermogenes (48.12–15). Hermogenes' soul is praised at great length, in language derived from Plato, and in particular from Plato's *Phaedrus*. Yet suddenly Himerius' praise for Hermogenes' soul develops into a tribute to his body. In a physiognomic way, the qualities of Hermogenes' soul are seen to be reflected in his body. Hermogenes' soul

> shapes its body, bringing it into conformity with its nature (σῶμα δὲ διαπλάττει πρὸς τὴν ἑαυτῆς φύσιν ἁρμόζουσα); what it seeks for it are dark eyes, a dignified face (πρόσωπον ἐμβριθές), and true symmetry of limbs (μελῶν συμμετρίαν ἀληθῆ), which wise men call beauty, so that, having put together a body that is beautiful and noble on both sides (καλόν τε καὶ γενναῖον ἐξ ἀμφοῖν τὸ σῶμα πήξασα), it may let that body show itself forth to the human race *as the image of a god*: οἷον θεοῦ τινος εἰκόνα τοῖς ἀνθρώποις παρέχῃ ἰνδάλλεσθαι. (Himerius, *Declamationes et orationes* 48.13; trans. Penella)

In Himerius' sophistic encomium of Hermogenes, the qualities of the latter's soul are thought to express themselves in a perfect body, which is characterized by a dignified face and full bodily symmetry. For this reason his body presents itself as the image of a god. As we shall see in chaps 3 and 4, this is a true example of sophistic physiognomics: the perfect orator can be recognized by his literary style ánd bodily performance. Despite his dependence on Plato's language of the soul, Himerius gives a decisively sophistic twist to the whole passage by defining the body of Hermogenes as the image of a god. He does so with the aid of physiognomy. Penella astutely remarks that in Himerius' description of the body he 'may have something from the science of physiognomy in mind rather than from Plato',[39] and refers to a similar text in the *Panegyrici Latini* from the 3rd and 4th cent. AD which deliberates 'whether that divine soul, before entering a body, first marks out a home worthy of it, or whether, when it has entered a body, it moulds its habitation according to its image, or whether one develops from the other': *sive enim divinus ille animus venturus in corpus dignum prius metatur hospitium, sive cum venerit pro habitu suo fingit habitaculum, sive aliud ex altero crescit* (*Panegyrici Latini* 2.6.3).[40] This clearly goes against Plato's conviction, as expressed in Alcibiades' praise of Socrates in Plato's *Symposium*, that Socrates is ugly on the outside, but beautiful on the inside (Plato, *Symposium* 215a ff., esp. 216d–e, 215a–b; see further § 7.2.2 [d] below).

The kind of sophistic perspective on the body which also surfaces in Himerius' text was so influential that, as we shall see in chap. 6, even Philo presented the

[39] Penella 2007, 264.

[40] Translation derived from Nixon & Rodgers 1994. Yet the translation 'it moulds its habitation according to its image' is misleading insofar as the Latin does not contain a reference to 'image': *... sive cum venerit pro habitu suo fingit habitaculum*.

bodies of Abraham and Moses in a similar way, despite his profound and philosophical criticism of the sophists (see § 6.3.1 below). In the case of Abraham, 'the divine spirit which was breathed upon him from on high made its lodging in his soul, *and invested his body with singular beauty*' (Philo, *De virtutibus* 217). The same happens with regard to Moses: Moses 'grew in grace, first of mind, then of body also through the soul' – τὴν μὲν διάνοιαν τὸ πρῶτον, ἔπειτα δὲ καὶ τὸ σῶμα διὰ τῆς ψυχῆς ἐβελτιοῦτο (*De vita Mosis* 2.69). The mind influences the soul which, in turn, renders the body nearly perfect. As a result of Moses' inward growth, his outward condition flourishes and increases in strength (ἰσχύς) and well-being (εὐεξία) (2.69). As I shall argue in chap. 6, Philo is influenced here by the sophistic, rhetorical interest of his days in physical prowess.

The passage from Himerius shows us that the bodily perfection of public figures such as Hermogenes could be likened to the image of a god. It raises our awareness for the varying discourses in which the terminology of image of God could be used, and especially for the polemics going on between those discourses. At least four discourses can be distinguished on the basis of the material which we have just studied. In the sequence of the present chapter, we have distinguished between (1) a philosophical-Platonic discourse about the cosmos as a perceptible image (or expression) of the paradigmatic reality of God; (2) a (Neo-)Pythagorean political-ideological discourse about the ruler as the image of God; (3) an anthropological discourse about wise and virtuous men, or even all men, as the images of God; and, finally, (4) a discourse about the ideal sophistic man, whose outward physiognomy resembles the image of a god. Especially the latter two discourses conflict, as Himerius makes us aware. There is, however, one final discourse which has been frequently alluded to above, but needs to be treated in a separate section.

2.1.4 The 'image of God' as a reference to statues and pictures of the gods, literal and metaphorical

The last discourse in which the 'image of God' occurs, is that of references to the statues and pictures of the gods. As we shall see shortly, the term 'image of God' is indeed used in such a sense in pagan sources. First, however, I shall point out examples in the various discourses we have already distinguished. They suggest that the discourse of tangible physical statues, pictures and representations of the gods is the most profound, since it occurs everywhere in the Ancient world in daily life. The last example we saw was the synonymy which Porphyry established between the image of God, i. e. man, and the anthropomorphic statues of the gods (see § 2.1.3 [b] above). But there are other examples. If, for instance, in Hellenistic kingship ideology, the king is called an εἰκὼν ζῶσα τοῦ Διός, 'a living image of Zeus' (see § 2.1.1 above), the expression εἰκὼν ζῶσα, 'living image', already implies that he is not a physical, tangible statue of

the god, but a living one. The same is implied in the anthropological statement about the image of God in the *Sententiae* of Sextus: 'Feel awe for the wise man as a *living image* of God' – σέβου σοφὸν ἄνδρα ὡς εἰκόνα θεοῦ ζῶσαν (see § 2.1.3 [a] above). Here, as in the previous example, 'living image' is implicitly contrasted with the concrete, material images of the gods. A similar expression is that of εἰκὼν ἔμψυχός, 'a besouled, animate image', again in contrast with lifeless, inanimate, material images. So in the *Sententiae* of Ps-Menander, both the king and queen are said to be an εἰκών ἔμψυχος θεοῦ, an animate image of God (see § 2.1.2 above). And if Plutarch says that the ideal ruler, in his capacity as the image of God, 'needs no Phidias nor Polyclitus nor Myron to model him, but by his virtue he forms himself in the likeness of God', the very comparison with the best-known sculptors among the Greeks again implies that the 'image of God' is set off against such images as that of Phidias' statue of Zeus in Olympia (see § 2.1.2).

Likewise, the Anonymus de Scientia Politica, who reflects on the good king who carries around in himself God's image (εἰκόνα ἐν αὑτῷ φέρων), distinguishes, indirectly, between the carrying around of physical images of the gods in processions and the carrying around of God's image in the inner self of the king as an political-ethical act (see § 2.1.2 above). The same reference to the practice of carrying images in procession was also alluded to in § 1.3 above, in our discussion of Paul's language of carrying around the image of the first and second Adam in 1 Cor 15.49 (see § 1.3.1 above). There, Paul too appeared to avail himself of the common imagery of carrying round a statue of a god. This is also true of the Anonymus de Scientia Politica. In line with Hellenistic kingship ideology, he portrays the good king as the image of God, because he carries around in himself God's image. By this characterization the author uses the terminology of the image of God in a metaphorical sense, derived from the general practice of processions with images of the gods.

All these examples seem to prove that the language of physical, material images was indeed the most fundamental and pervasive discourse in which the expression 'image of God' was used; it is very important for us to bear this in mind when studying the expression in pagan, Jewish and Christians texts in Greek. If Diogenes the Cynic calls good men images of the gods (see § 2.1.3 [a] above), his metaphor, too, seems to employ a deliberate contrast with physical images. Given his agnostic criticism of religious practices, Diogenes seems to view *good men* as the true images of the gods. Similarly, Hierocles' view that 'virtue is in fact an image of God in the rational soul', and that 'every image needs a model for its genesis' (see § 2.1.3 [a] above) seems to make use of the common jargon of the fabrication of images of the gods after a particular model.

This interconnection of the anthropological discourse about the image of God with that of the physical, tangible statues of the gods is also present in many other instances. It is present in Cicero's stipulation of man's inner nature as a 'simu-

lacrum aliquod dicatum', 'a kind of consecrated image of God' (Cicero, *Laws* 1.58–59; see § 2.1.3 [b] above) and in Lucian's *Essays in Portraiture Defended*, in which the assertion that 'man is God's image' is voiced alongside references to the production of physical statues of the gods (*Pro imaginibus* 7–8, 13, 18 and, esp., 23; see further § 2.1.3 [b] above). Finally, if the anthropological discussion of man as God's image is so heavily influenced by the common discourse of the cultic and religious statues of the gods, then it becomes easier to understand why an author such as Porphyry – in describing the wise man as God's animate, living statue (ἔμψυχον ἄγαλμα)[41] – simultaneously speaks of this man as a temple, which must be adorned with a living statue, the mind (*Ad Marcellam* 11; see § 2.1.3 [b] above). As I shall argue below, when dealing with Paul in § 2.4, this is very similar to Paul's language in 1 and 2 Cor, which also alternates between the imagery of man as God's *image* (1 Cor 11.7, 15.49; 2 Cor 3.18, 4.4) and that of man as God's *temple* (1 Cor 3.16–17, 6.19; 2 Cor 6.16). In Greek discourse, this comes as no surprise: temples house the images of the gods.

All this abundantly shows that the political-ideological and anthropological discourses about the identity of the good ruler or of the true man as the image of God are almost intrinsically linked to the most common, basic discourse, that of material images and representations of the gods. Although the political-ideological and anthropological modes of discourse overlap with the basic discourse of physical images of the gods, they are partly also in conflict with it. The tension can be mild and take the form of a simple contrast between physical images and living, animate images. But it can also take the form of an antithesis, for instance in the anti-establishment polemics of Diogenes the Cynic, according to whom good men are the true images of the gods. Such an antithesis also comes to the fore explicitly in the polemics between Porphyry and the Christians. As we have seen, according to Porphyry these Christians misunderstand the reason why pagans construct images of the gods. Against their criticism, Porphyry maintains that it 'is reasonable that the forms of the statues are in the manner of a man because man, which is the finest of creatures, is thought also to be the image (εἰκών) of God' (see § 2.1.3 [b] above). In Porphyry's view the anthropological discourse and the language of physical images of the gods are not in opposition but overlap, whereas according to the Christians these discourses conflict. Interestingly, the latter view was also taken by the pagan philosopher Celsus, as was already briefly indicated in § 1.2.4. According to Origen, Celsus criticized the Jewish-Christian belief that man is created in the image of God (Gen 1.27–27) in the following way, and for the following reason:

> he [Celsus] failed to understand to what characteristic of man the words 'in the image of God' apply, and that this exists in the soul which either has not possessed or pos-

[41] For this expression, see also Plutarch, *Aetia Romana et Graeca* 290C: the priest of Zeus is, as it were, the animate and holy statue (ἔμψυχον καὶ ἱερὸν ἄγαλμα) of the god.

sesses no longer 'the old man with his deeds', and which, as a result of not possessing this, is said to be in the image of the Creator. He says: *Nor did he make man his image; for God is not like that, nor does he resemble any other form at all*. (Origen, *Against Celsus* 6.63)

Celsus clearly misunderstands the reference to the image of God as a reference to a bodily, physical image, and for this reason denies that this can be true. In his Platonic view, God is spiritual and not material. In this sense, the pagan philosophers Porphyry and Celsus flatly contradict each other. As a matter of fact, Celsus and the Christians resemble each other more than Celsus and Porphyry, inasmuch as Porphyry believes that it is not unreasonable to portray God is an anthropomorphic way (for a detailed analysis, see § 2.2.9 below). This enables Porphyry to mingle the anthropological discourse of man as the image of God with the common discourse of the physical statues and portraits of the gods. The Christians and Celsus, on the other hand, strongly differentiate between these two discourses. On both sides of this debate, in any case, it is clear that the anthropological discourse of man as the image of God is compared, either in a positive or in a negative way, with the dominant discourse of the multiple physical images of the gods in everyday life.

The need to understand the expression 'image of God' in the context of the pagan discourse about the material images of the gods is highlighted by the many instances in which 'image of God' occurs, in an unambiguous sense, as a reference to such images, either in a literal or a metaphorical sense.

In a literal sense, for instance, the phrase occurs in the *Sententiae* attributed to Menander, in the following maxim: Γέροντα τίμα τοῦ θεοῦ τὴν εἰκόνα – 'Hold an old man in honour as an image of God' (Menander, *Sententiae* 2; edn Jäkel[42]; see also *Sententiae* 8).

Likewise the phrase 'image of (a) god' is used by Plutarch, when he writes that Numa 'forbade the Romans to revere *an image of a god* which had the form of man or beast' – οὗτός τε διεκώλυσεν ἀνθρωποειδῆ καὶ ζῳόμορφον εἰκόνα θεοῦ Ῥωμαίους νομίζειν (Plutarch, *Numa* 8.7; on Numa's view on the images of the gods, see further, in detail, § 7.1 below). Elsewhere, Plutarch uses the same expression to state that 'In old times men did not choose to hack a stone into a hard, awkward, lifeless image of a god' – πέτραν μὲν γὰρ εἰς θεοῦ κόπτειν εἰκόνα σκληρὰν καὶ δύσεργον καὶ ἄψυχον οὐκ ἐβούλοντο (Plutarch, Fragment 158; edn Sandbach). In both passages, εἰκὼν θεοῦ is a literal reference to a physical statue of a god.

A very interesting case is presented by a guidebook to the seven wonders of the world, the *De septem orbis spectaculis* (4th/6th cent. AD), attributed to Philon of Byzantium, a 2nd cent. BC writer on technology. It describes the colossal bronze statue of Helios at Rhodes – one of the seven wonders, constructed by the

[42] Jäkel 1964.

3rd cent. BC Greek sculptor Chares of Lindus – in terms of an image of the god. According to the author of *De septem orbis spectaculis*, the identity of 'the image of the god [i. e. of Helios] could be deduced from its symbols': ἡ γὰρ εἰκὼν τοῦ θεοῦ συμβόλοις ἐγινώσκετο τοῖς ἐξ ἐκείνου (Philon, *De septem orbis spectaculis* 4.1). It was Zeus, in his view, who 'gave the Rhodians a divine amount of wealth with the purpose of spending it to the honour of Helios, by making the image of the god (τὴν εἰκόνα τοῦ θεοῦ) arise, layer after layer, from earth to heaven' (*De septem orbis spectaculis* 4.2). Again, the expression εἰκὼν τοῦ θεοῦ clearly refers to a physical statue of a god.

The direct continuation of this passage is also relevant to the discussion as it gives us an interesting insight into the semantic-conceptual field in which this terminology was used. In § 1.3 above, we studied Paul's language of the image of God and concluded that it was closely connected to the semantic-linguistic field of forms. According to a common ancient understanding, images have forms. Thus, Paul's talk about Christ being in *the form* of God in Philipp 2.6 was also understood as a statement about *the image* of God (see § 1.3.3 [a] above). This can now be further underpinned by the passage under consideration from *De septem orbis spectaculis*. According to the author, by constructing the image of Helios out of 500 bronze talents and 300 talents of iron, the sculptor, Chares of Lindus, 'made the god equal to the God', i. e. he made the image of the god equal to Helios himself: τῷ θεῷ τὸν θεὸν ἴσον ἐποίησεν; 'in this way he accomplished a great work with courage because he established a second Helios for the world' (4.6). This is exactly the same semantic-conceptual field as that of Philipp 2.6. Christ's being in the form or image of God is described there as a state of τὸ εἶναι ἴσα θεῷ, of being equal to God. Apparently, the semantic-conceptual field of image of God also involves the terminology of that which is represented ('God' according to Paul, and 'the god Helios' according to Philon) and, in particular, the relationship of equality which exists between them.

The language of physical images of a god is also present in (Neo-)Pythagorean traditions, despite the fact that, as we have seen, in these traditions it is the ruler or man in general who is regarded as the (actual, true) image of God. Reference to physical statues of the gods is made in Diogenes Laertius' description of specific Pythagorean rules. Among them is the prohibition on putting the image of a god on the circle of a ring: ἐν δακτυλίῳ εἰκόνα θεοῦ μὴ περιφέρειν (Diogenes Laertius, *Vitae philosophorum* 8.17). Although Diogenes Laertius goes on to give the meaning of many of these rules, he remains silent about this specific prohibition on wearing an εἰκὼν θεοῦ on a ring. It is Iamblichus, in his *De vita Pythagorica*, who tells us the meaning of this precept:

> ἐν δακτυλίῳ μὴ φέρειν σημεῖον θεοῦ εἰκόνα, ὅπως μὴ μιαίνηται· ἄγαλμα γάρ, ὅπερ δεῖ φυτεῦσαι ἐν τῷ οἴκῳ. (Iamblichus, *De vita Pythagorica* 18.84)
>
> Do not wear a god's image as signet on a ring, so that it may not be polluted; for it is an image which ought to be set up in the house. (Trans. Dillon & Hershbell)

Whatever the exact meaning of this ruling, it is relevant to note that besides their stipulation of the ruler or man in general as the image of God, Pythagoreans could use the same term as a reference to a physical statue of a god. This demonstrates that the same term belongs to different discourses, the political-ideological and anthropological discourses about the true nature of the ideal king, wise and virtuous men, or even all men, and the religious-cultic discourse of concrete, physical images of the gods. It is particularly in ancient Judaism and early Christianity, I would suggest, that the anthropological and religious-cultic discourses clash in a forceful way.

The 'image of God' as a reference to a physical statue of a god also occurs in a metaphorical sense. In the *Corpus Hermeticum*, for instance, it is argued that God is visible through the entire cosmos, but that it is impossible to have a vision of *the image* of God:

> For the lord, who is ungrudging, is seen through the entire cosmos. Can you see understanding and hold it in your hands? Can you have a vision of the image of God? (καὶ λαβέσθαι αὐταῖς ταῖς χερσὶ δύνασαι καὶ τὴν εἰκόνα τοῦ θεοῦ θεάσασθαι;) If what is in you is also invisible to you, how will god reveal his inner self to you through the eyes? (*Corpus Hermeticum* 5.2; trans. Copenhaver)

The Hermetic philosophy offers to open up a way to a vision of this image:

> Such then, Tat, is God's image, as best I have been able to sketch it for you (αὕτη οὖν, ὦ Τάτ. κατὰ τὸ δυνατόν σοι ὑπογέγραπται τοῦ θεοῦ εἰκών). If your vision of it is sharp and you understand it with the eyes of your heart, believe me, child, you shall discover the road that leads above or, rather the image itself will show you the way. For the vision of it has a special property. It takes hold of those who have had the vision and draws them up, just as the magnet stone draws iron, so they say. (*Corpus Hermeticum* 4.11, trans. Copenhaver; = Stobaeus, *Anthologium* 1.10.15)

In these passages, the expression 'image of God' is used in a metaphorical way, but the original reference to a physical statue of the gods still shines through.

These passages also make us aware, that, as a matter of fact, the political-ideological and anthropological meanings of image of God studied above are equally metaphorical references to a physical statue of a god. For that reason it is very important to understand the expression 'image of God' in the context of the pagan discourse about the material images of the gods. As in the Jewish scriptures and ancient Jewish writings (see the introduction to chap. 1 and, esp., § 1.1.4), in Greek sources, too, there is a constant implicit competition between, on the one hand, the ruler, the wise and virtuous, or even man in general, and, on the other hand, the common images of the pagan cults. The various discourses about the image of God are, at their core, strongly linked to the most basic discourse, that of physical, tangible images of gods, used in pagan cult. This basic discourse of cultic images reflects the everyday importance of such images in Antiquity and permeates all other discourses. Whereas modern ears are no longer

attuned to notice this clash of discourses, for the ancient listeners and readers it could not be ignored. It dominated the pagan understanding of the notion of the image of God.

Before we move on to study a further specific aspect of this understanding, that of the related notion of assimilation to God (§ 2.2 below), we should pause for a brief assessment of the suggestions of scholars such as Burkert and Stern that the Pythagorean interpretation of the ruler as the image of God took its lead from the Jewish scriptures.

2.1.5 Cross-fertilization between pagan and Jewish anthropology of the image of God?

In their comments about Pseudo-Ecphantus (as we have seen above in § 2.1.2), both Burkert and subsequently Stern ventured the hypothesis that in his characterization of the ruler as the image of God, Pseudo-Ecphantus was dependent upon the Septuagint narrative in Gen 1.26–27. Their view is repeated by J. G. Cook in his study on the interpretation of the Old Testament in Graeco-Roman paganism.[43] As Pseudo-Ecphantus puts it, the king 'was made by the best craftsman, who wrought him using himself as a model' (Pseudo-Ecphantus, *De regno* apud Stobaeus 4.7.64; = Thesleff, *The Pythagorean Texts* [1965], p. 80; = Stern, No. 564b). Burkert, followed by Stern and Cook, believes that this passage refers to Gen 1.26–27. For this reason, in his view, Pseudo-Ecphantus 'gehört nicht mehr in die "rein griechische Entwicklungslinie", sondern zu der griechischen Literatur, die bereits durch die Berührung mit dem Judentum geprägt ist'.[44]

In this passage Burkert sees his impression confirmed that already in Stobaeus there is a passage from Pseudo-Ecphantus' treatise on kingship which reflects possible Jewish influence. According to this passage,

> Ἐπὶ δὲ γᾶς ἄνθρωποι ἀπῳκισμένον χρῆμα καὶ πολὺ τᾶς καθαρωτέρας φύσιος ἐλαττούμενον καὶ πολλᾷ τᾷ γᾷ βαρυνόμενον, ὡς ἀπὸ τᾶς ματρὸς αὐτὸ μόγις ἐπᾶρθαι <ἄν>, αἰ μὴ θεόμοιρός τις ἐμπνοίησις ἐλέῳ ζῴω συνᾶψεν αὐτὸ τῷ κρέσσονι μέρει δεικνῦσα τὰν ἱερὰν τῶ γεννάτορος πότοψιν.
>
> On the earth man is an immigrant, falling much short of his purer nature, and he is weighted down by the greatness of the earth (καὶ πολλᾷ τᾷ γᾷ βαρυνόμενον). Thus he would have been raised from his mother only with difficulty but for some sort of divine inspiration (αἰ μὴ θεόμοιρός τις ἐμπνοίησις), which attached him to the eternal living being, displaying to his better part the holy aspect of the Creator. (Pseudo-Ecphantus, *De regno* apud Stobaeus 4.6.22; = Thesleff, *The Pythagorean Texts* [1965], p. 79; = Stern, No. 564a; trans. Stern).

In the description of man first lying on the earth before being vitalized by God's breath, Burkert reads a reference to Gen 2.7 about God breathing the breath of

[43] Cook 2004.
[44] Burkert 1972, 52–3 at 53.

life into man. Although he grants that the phrase θεόμοιρός τις ἐμπνοίησις, 'some sort of divine inspiration', might refer to the Stoic notion of the all-pervasive *pneuma*, as Thesleff believes,[45] Burkert is finally of the opinion that the passage as a whole presupposes acquaintance with the Septuagint:

> des Menschen Mutter ist die Erde, der Mensch liegt auf der Erde, bis ein göttlicher Atem in ihn fährt: jetzt kann er sich aufrichten, jetzt sieht er Gott, seinen Vater. Gibt es hierführ Parallelen in der rein griechischen Literatur? Was jedem einfällt, ist der Bericht des Jahvisten von der Erschaffung Adams, des Menschen (*Gen.* 2,7): Gott schuf den Menschen aus Erde und blies ihm den Atem des Lebens ins Gesicht.[46]

As regards the latter passage of Pseudo-Ecphantus, I tend to agree with Thesleff that the θεόμοιρός ἐμπνοίησις, 'divine inspiration', reflects the Stoa's pneumatic terminology rather than the Septuagint, particularly as elsewhere, as Thesleff indicates, Pseudo-Ecphantus uses the similar concept of συμπνέω, 'to breath together with', 'to coalesce, to achieve unity'.[47] If this passage is read in a Stoic sense, there is very little which points conclusively into the direction of the Septuagint. This means that the passage does not provide any confirmation for the supposedly Jewish meaning of the other passage from Pseudo-Ecphantus, which speaks about the king being 'made by the best craftsman, who wrought him using himself as a model'. This passage can be understood independently from the Septuagint since, as our overview of the pagan understanding of the image of God has shown, there is a common and widespread Pythagorean understanding of the ruler, the wise and virtuous, or even man in general as the image of God. Although most passages are Neo-Pythagorean, thus probably dating from after the Septuagint, which makes Burkert's scenario of a Jewish influence on Pythagorean authors such as Pseudo-Ecphantus a possibility, it seems likely, as shown above, that the 4th cent. BC Pythagorean Diodorus of Aspendus already regards man in general as the image of God (see § 2.1.3 [b] above; Diodorus Aspendius, *Fragmentum* in Mullach, *Fragmenta philosophorum Graecorum*, vol. 2, 112).

Nevertheless, the passage attributed to Diodorus is fraught with difficulties. As we have seen, it is only preserved in the 5th cent. AD Christian writer Theo-

[45] Thesleff 1961, 68: 'At least there is one point where the Stoic influence is difficult to explain away: the apparent reflection of the πνεῦμα idea in Ekphantos 4.271.16 συμπνείουσα (sc. the φύσις of all beings) γὰρ αὐτῷ (sc. the universe) καὶ συνδεδεμένα τὰν ἀρίσταν τε ἅμα καὶ ἀναγκαίαν ἀκολουθίαν ὀπαδεῖ ῥυμᾷ τῶ παντός, and 244.17 … αἰ μὴ θεομοιρής τις ἐμπνοίησις αἰδίῳ ζῴω συνᾶψεν αὐτό (= man) … (Delatte p. 165–167, 191–194)' [= edn Delatte 1942].

[46] Burkert 1972, 50.

[47] See Thesleff 1961, 68: Ecphantus 4.271.16 = Thesleff, *The Pythagorean Texts*, p. 79.11–12 = Stobaeus 4.7.64. For Stoic applications, see *SVF* 2.543 line 19 (σύμπνοια; Diogenes Laertius 7.140) and 2.912 line 8 (σύμπνους; Pseudo-Plutarch, *On Fate* 574E); cf. also *SVF* 2.792, line 43 (ἔμπνους; Pseudo-Alexander of Aphrodisias, *De anima libri mantissa* [= *De anima liber alter*] 117).

doret of Cyrrhus, the ascription to Diodorus only occurs as a marginal indication in a particular manuscript, and the specific wording might be due to Theodoret's comments on the word 'image' in Gen 1.26–27 (see § 2.1.3 [b] above). If this passage is indeed from the 4th cent. BC and predates the formation of the Septuagint, it shows that the notion of image of God was used in Pythagorean anthropology prior to Neo-Pythagoreanism and that, in their characterization of the ruler as the image of God, Neo-Pythagoreans such as Pseudo-Ecphantus were following Pythagorean reflections rather than the Septuagint text of Gen 1.26–27.

Even if the passage attributed to Diodorus is not authentic, other early occurrences of the notion of the king, or man, as the image of God – in authors such as the fourth-cent. BC philosopher Phaenias of Eresus (see § 2.1.2 above) and Diogenes the Cynic (see § 2.1.3 [a] above) – show that this notion was in evidence early in pagan literature. Though one cannot exclude the possibility that Pseudo-Ecphantus is indeed indebted to Gen 1.26–27, one cannot agree with Cook that the concept of being created in the image, or after the archetype of God is 'so unusual in Greco-Roman literature'.[48] Cook is apparently unaware of the full evidence of pagan use of the notion of the ruler, the wise, the virtuous, and man in general as God's image, which we have studied above. There is no need, therefore, to suggest that Neo-Pythagoreans such as Pseudo-Ecphantus were dependent for this notion on the Septuagint.

Having said that, it is eminently possible that Neo-Pythagoreans recognized the potential of the image of God notion in Genesis once they had read it. Although their reflections upon the image of God were not initiated by the Septuagint, Neo-Pythagoreans could project their own understanding of the image of God onto their reading of the creation account in Genesis. Indeed, if Neo-Pythagoreans, informed by Pythagorean views such as those of Diodorus of Aspendus that 'with regard to the invisible part of his soul man has been formed after the image of God', came to read the Septuagint version of the book of Genesis, it would be natural for them to understand Gen 1.26–27 in a congruent way. Moreover, either based on such experiences of recognition, or prompting them, Greeks regularly draw attention to the supposedly Jewish background of Pythagoreanism. I shall briefly focus on three examples of a Judaizing understanding of Pythagoreanism by Greeks, which was part of a widespread tendency among the Greeks to fabricate foreign, i. e. ancient origins for Greek philosophy.[49] The three examples extend from the third century BC, through early imperial times to the third century AD.

(1) The 3rd cent. BC Greek biographer Hermippus of Smyrna closely links Pythagoras and the Jews (see Stern, Nos. 25 & 26). Hermippus' views have been

48 Cook 2004, 35 (italics mine).
49 Cf. Boys-Stones 2001.

preserved in Josephus and Origen. According to Josephus, in his *De Pythagora*, Hermippus refers to an incident in which Pythagoras remarks that Calliphon, a deceased disciple of Pythagoras, admonished him 'not to pass a certain spot, on which an ass had collapsed, to abstain from thirst-producing water, and to avoid all calumny'. This, as Hermippus added, was Jewish practice: 'In practising and repeating these precepts he [i. e. Pythagoras] was imitating and appropriating the doctrines of Jews and Thracians. In fact, it is actually said that that great man introduced many points of Jewish law into his philosophy' (Josephus, *Against Apion* 1.163–165; cf. 1.14, 1.162 and 2.168, and Aristobulus, frags 3 and 4).[50] In a similar vein, Origen says that 'Hermippus in his first book on "Lawgivers" related that Pythagoras brought his philosophy to the Greeks from the Jews' (1.15). Both reports on Hermippus mention Pythagoras' contact with the Jews.[51]

(2) The close link between Pythagoras and the Jews is also established in other sources. According to Antonius Diogenes, an early imperial Greek writer of an encyclopaedic novel, 'Pythagoras came also to the Egyptians, the Arabs, the Chaldaeans and the Hebrews, from whom he learnt the exact knowledge of dreams' (Diogenes apud Porphyry, *The Life of Pythagoras* 11; Stern, Nos. 250 & 456a).[52]

(3) Finally, according to the Neoplatonist philosopher Iamblichus (*c.* AD 235–*c.*325), Pythagoras is closely linked to the Jews because he is said to have studied with 'the descendants of Mochus'. Iamblichus, in his book *On the Pythagorean Way of Life*, describes this Mochus in a way which is reminiscent of Moses. According to Iamblichus, the philosopher Pythagoras, sent by his teacher Thales from Miletus to the Egyptian priests for further studies, first sailed to Sidon in Phoenicia (2.11–3.13). There, 'he joined the descendants of Mochus, the prophet and natural philosopher, and other Phoenician hierophants, and was initiated into all sacred rites of the mysteries celebrated especially in Byblos and in Tyre, and in many parts of Syria' (3.14; trans. Dillon & Hershbell).[53] It is the setting of this passage in Iamblichus which gives the figure of Mochus or Mochos a particularly Jewish aura[54] and seems to warrant Dillon's surmise that Mochos in this passage 'does sound suspiciously like a garbled form of Moses himself'.[55]

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[50] The Thracians seem to be mentioned in one breath with the Jews, because the Thracians 'worshipped the god Sabazius, who was identified with the Jewish God' (Stern 1974, vol. 1, 96).

[51] Cf. Van Kooten 2006*a*, 123. The admonition 'not to pass a certain spot, on which an ass had collapsed' could be an allusion to the ass in the narrative of Balaam. See Van Kooten 2008, 140–1.

[52] Cf. Van Kooten 2006*a*, 124.

[53] Text quoted in Stern 1980, vol. 2, 443–4, but not as a separate number. Stern refers briefly to Mochos in Stern 1974, vol. 1, 129, mentioning Iamblichus merely in passing.

[54] See further Van Kooten 2006*a*, 121–6.

[55] Dillon 1996*a*, 143. Cf. also, more cautiously, Clarke, Dillon & Hershbell 2003, 41: 'The connection of "Mochus" with Moses is tenuous'.

It is not just due to Jewish apologetics, then, that Pythagoras and the Jews are closely associated. As is well known, the 2nd cent. BC Jewish philosopher Aristobulus claimed not only that 'Plato followed the tradition of the law that we use and is conspicuous for having worked through each of the details contained in it' – on the basis of an earlier Greek translation of the Mosaic law, predating the Septuagint – , but also that 'Pythagoras, having borrowed many of the things in our traditions, found room for them in his own doctrinal system' (Aristobulus, frag. 3 [edn and trans. Holladay]; = Eusebius, *Praeparatio Evangelica* 13.12.1 [cf. 9.6.6–8]; cf. Clement of Alexandria, *Stromateis* 1.22.150.1–3). Besides Aristobulus, Josephus, in turn, compares a particular strand of Judaism, that of the Essenes, with Pythagoreanism: Essenes constitute 'a group which follows a way of life taught to the Greeks by Pythagoras' (*Jewish Antiquities* 15.371).[56]

For our present purposes, however, the most important thing is that it was only not Jewish apologists who pointed to the congruence between particular aspects of Judaism and Pythagoreanism, and suggested – explicitly in the case of Aristobulus – that Pythagoras derived them from Judaism. Pagan Greeks themselves noted particular parallels and, what is more, confirmed, from their perspective, that Jewish thinking and laws preceded their own. It is against this background, I suggest, that one may understand Neo-Pythagorean awareness of Jewish image-of-God anthropology. In this light, Pseudo-Ecphantus' knowledge of the Septuagint is not unlikely, all the more since, as Burkert shows, Pseudo-Ecphantus' account of the creation of man shows some peculiarities which it shares with the Septuagint (Stobaeus 4.6.22; = Stern, No. 564a). For this reason, his description of the king being 'made by the best craftsman, who wrought him using himself as a model' (Stobaeus 4.7.64; = Stern, No. 564b) could well reflect acquaintance with the Septuagint. In light of all the pagan evidence of an image-of-God kingship ideology or anthropology adduced in the present chapter, however, I would emphasize that there is no *factual dependency* of Neo-Pythagoreans on the Septuagint, but only parallels which contributed to a *perceived dependency*. Although the Neo-Pythagoreans may have perceived themselves to be dependent, what actually happened was that they found other, allegedly more ancient, confirmation of ideas which they already entertained.

In this way, Neo-Pythagorean views rather resemble the historiography of another well-known Pythagorean philosopher of the 2nd cent. AD, Numenius of Apamea. According to Numenius, who is frequently referred to in the sources as a Pythagorean,[57] for philosophical enlightenment on particular issues, one should not only consult Plato,

> But when one has spoken upon this point, and sealed it by the testimonies of Plato, it will be necessary to go back and connect it with the precepts of Pythagoras, and

[56] Cf. Van Kooten 2006*a*, 124.

[57] See Numenius, *Fragments* (edn Des Places), frags 1a, 1b, 1c; 4b, 24, 29, 52, 53.

> to appeal to the nations of good repute, bringing forward their rites and doctrines, and their institutions which are formed in agreement with those of Plato (Πλάτωνι ὁμολογουμένως), all that the Brachmans*, and Jews*, and Magi, and Egyptians arranged. (Frag. 1a; = Eusebius, *Praeparatio Evangelica* [*PE*] 9.7.1, trans. Gifford)

Within this perspective, Moses is singled out because Plato – Numenius' standard for true Pythagorizing (frag. 24.57: ὁ δὲ Πλάτων πυθαγορίσας; Eusebius, *PE* 14.4.16–59) – is referred to as none other than Moses expressing himself in Attic: 'What is Plato but Moses talking Attic?' – Τί γάρ ἐστι Πλάτων ἢ Μωσῆς ἀττικίζων; (Frag. 8.13; = Eusebius, *PE* 11.10.14; cf. 9.6.9). M.F. Burnyeat has advanced two relevant arguments for our proper understanding of this passage.

(1) First, the contrast here is not primarily between Plato's Attic and Moses' Hebrew, 'but between two dialects of Greek, the Attic used by the Athenian Plato and the Doric of the Pythagorean writings'.[58] Given 'the inherent obscurity of the Doric dialect', Attic is seen as the language of clarity. It is also clearer than the Greek of the Septuagint. For this reason, in Numenius' understanding, Burnyeat says, 'the Jews and other peoples of good repute share an understanding of God which is most clearly expressed in Plato's Attic prose. Hence his pointed exclamation, "What is Plato but Moses talking *Attic*?"'[59]

(2) Secondly, the reason why Moses is singled out from among the other 'peoples of good repute', and is accorded a special status, is that it is Moses who has the correct understanding of God's identity as ὁ ὤν, 'He that is' (frag. 13.4; = Eusebius, *PE* 11.18.13–14; cf. Exodus 3.14). For this reason, as Burnyeat puts it, 'in Numenius' eyes Moses did indeed excel other foreigners as a Pythagorean / Platonist *avant la lettre*'.[60] Burnyeat makes it plausible that Numenius, who elsewhere shows explicit knowledge of the Septuagint (see frag. 30.5–6, quoting Genesis 1.2), also draws extensively on the Septuagint text of Exodus 3.[61] Reading this passage with its characterization of God as ὁ ὤν, 'the LXX expression struck him [i. e. Numenius] as an exceptionally advanced point of agreement with Plato's conception of the first principle of everything'.[62]

This, I would suggest, offers an excellent model for understanding what is going on in Neo-Pythagorean authors such as Pseudo-Ecphantus. For their stipulation of the king, the wise and virtuous, or man in general as the image of God, they may also have found in Genesis 1.26–27 an ancient corroboration of their reflections. In that sense, on the level of Pseudo-Pythagorean literature, a cross-fertilization takes place between Genesis and Greek philosophy. Ideas developed within Pythagorean and other Greek traditions are recognized in the

[58] Burnyeat 2006*a*, 141.
[59] Burnyeat 2006*a*, 142.
[60] Burnyeat 2006*a*, 145–9 at 145.
[61] Burnyeat 2006*a*, 145–6, 148, 159.
[62] Burnyeat 2006*a*, 148–9.

Jewish scriptures. At this point there is a natural conjunction between Greek and Jewish concepts.

Nevertheless, it seems that, prior to Philo and Paul, it was only the Greeks who developed the anthropological notion of man as the image of God further by broadening its semantic-conceptual field to include the notion of forming oneself in the likeness of God. According to Plutarch, as we have seen, the ruler, who is characterized as the image of God, needs no famous sculptor to model him, 'but by his virtue he forms himself in the likeness of God (ἀλλ' αὐτὸς αὑτὸν εἰς ὁμοιότητα θεῷ δι' ἀρετῆς) and thus creates a statue most delightful of all to behold and most worthy of divinity' (Plutarch, *Ad principem ineruditum* 780E–F). Here the concept of image of God is joined with that of becoming like God, the *homoiōsis theōi*. As I shall argue in the next section (§ 2.2), it is this latter concept which provides Philo and Paul with the notion of individuals modelling themselves on the image of God, a notion still absent in Jewish literature before them (cf. § 1.1 above).

2.2 The 'image of God' and 'being made like God': The traditions of *homoiōsis theōi* in Greek philosophy from Plato to Plotinus

Introduction

In the previous section, we studied the development of a Greek anthropology which centres on man as the image of God (§ 2.1). In this understanding, either the wise and virtuous, the good, or even men in general are considered to be the image of God with regard to the invisible part of their soul. But even if all men are regarded as God's image, the tacit implication seems to be that though they were formed after the image of God, man's similarity to God does not necessarily hold in the present. So only the wise and virtuous have realized their potential, as it were. The wise and virtuous, in this sense, constitute an idealized type of man.

We saw the same ambiguity at work in kingship ideology as perceived by Plutarch. On the one hand, 'the ruler *is* the image of God who orders all things'. Yet on the other hand, he must form himself in the likeness of God δι' ἀρετῆς, 'through virtue' (Plutarch, *Ad principem ineruditum* 780E–F; see § 2.1.2 above). This seems to be implied in all instances of the view that man (or the ruler) is the image of God; it is not a static, factual, unchanging truth, but refers to a process of becoming the image of God. Apart from in Plutarch, this is also rendered explicit in Hierocles. As he phrases it, it is not so much the rational soul itself, but *virtue* which is the image of God: 'Virtue is in fact an image of God in the rational soul, and every image needs a model for its genesis, and the acquired

image does not suffice unless it looks to that by the assimilation (ὁμοίωσις) to which it will acquire its beauty' (Hierocles, *In aureum carmen* 21.5; see § 2.1.3 [a] above). The assimilation between the soul and its object is not a matter of course, but an extended process of becoming like the archetypal virtue; the more the soul looks to that archetype, the more it is rendered into an image of God.

This confirms what É. Des Places states in his monograph on the broader issue of the kinship between man and God from Homer to patristic literature. With regard to Plato, Des Places makes the observation that the initial congeniality between the soul and God needs to remain intact or be restored through a process of assimilation (ὁμοίωσις): 'Pour conserver ou retrouver la parenté de l'âme avec l'élément divin (…), il faut (…) tendre à l'imitation de Dieu, ὁμοιοῦσθαι θεῷ' (*Republic* 613b).[63] The notion of assimilation to God, ὁμοίωσις θεῷ and ὁμοιοῦσθαι θεῷ, thus, is the natural extension of the semantic-conceptual field of the image of God. As I shall argue, this notion is highly relevant for our understanding of Philo's and Paul's anthropology (resp. §§ 2.3 and 2.4). In particular, it will provide the necessary background to Paul's view concerning the assimilation of the believers to Christ (§ 2.4).

This is especially welcome because, as I noted at the beginning of chap. 2, a comparable notion seems to be lacking in ancient Judaism. As shown in chap. 1, there seems to be no mention in ancient Jewish texts of the life of individuals being remodelled on a model. True, all those who enter the Qumran community receive 'all the glory of Adam' (1QS and 4Q504; see § 1.1.3), and according to *The Rule of the Community* (1QS), God will purify '*the configuration of man*, ripping out all spirit of injustice from the innermost part of his flesh' (IV 20–21). But unlike in Greek philosophy, there is no mention of the re-establishment of the image of God through a process of assimilation to God (ὁμοίωσις θεῷ). This latter notion only surfaces in Philo and Paul, apparently because they were aware of it and applied it in their anthropology. For this reason it is very relevant to sketch the history of the Greek anthropological notion of *homoiōsis theōi* and to show that, at the time of Philo and Paul, it was indeed a well-known hallmark of Greek, and particularly Platonic, anthropology.

It is necessary to trace the full history of this notion because, until recently, it was not recognized by classicists themselves as a characteristic feature of Platonic anthropology and ethics. As D. Sedley notes in the introduction to his 1997 article on the ideal of godlikeness, in which he draws fresh attention to the significance of the issue of assimilation to God in Plato, there is a remarkable difference in awareness of the importance of this issue among modern and ancient readers of Plato's ethics:

Ὁμοίωσις θεῷ κατὰ τὸ δυνατόν, 'becoming like god so far as is possible', came in antiquity to be universally acknowledged as the Platonic goal in life. In modern stud-

[63] Des Places 1964, 84.

ies of Plato, ὁμοίωσις θεῷ is rarely even to be found in the index. Who is right, the ancients or the moderns?[64]

Or, as he phrases it in the 1999 revision of his article:

Try asking any moderately well-educated citizen of the Roman empire to name the official moral goal, or *telos*, of each major current philosophical system. Among others, you will hear that Plato's is *homoiōsis theōi kata to dunaton*, 'becoming like god so far as is possible'. Few people today, even those well informed about Plato, would come up with the same answer. *Homoiōsis theōi*, universally accepted in antiquity as the official Platonic goal, does not even appear in the index to any modern study of Plato known to me, nor as far as I am aware does it play a part in any modern reconstruction of Plato's thought.[65]

Sedley's surprise is shared by J. Annas who, in her *Platonic Ethics, Old and New* (1999), devotes an entire chapter to the issue.[66] Annas stresses that, 'Given its fame in the ancient world, the almost total absence of this idea from modern interpretations and discussions of Plato is noteworthy'.[67] She warns that we should not regard the ethical virtue of assimilation to God as a rhetorical overstatement: 'it may be tempting to write off the idea as fantastic, or rhetorical overstatement, something not worth philosophical attention. This would be a mistake, however'.[68] In this light, it does not seem correct to regard the ancient depiction of someone as assimilated to God merely as a way of saying that he is 'a great chap'[69]. The idea of assimilation to God is indeed very distinctive according to Annas, because it differs from the ethics of 'the alternative ancient tradition, that of Aristotle (in the main [but see § 2.2.3 and 2.2.4 below on Aristotle and the Aristotelian commentators[70]]) and the Stoics and Epicureans, who see our final end as lying in the fulfilling of human nature, rather than in an attempt to become some other kind of thing'.[71] Plato's ethics differ from this tradition. Whereas the alternative texts 'contain the idea that virtue transforms a human life, by revising our values and priorities, we seem here [i. e. in Plato] to have the idea that virtue turns a human life into something of a different kind'.[72]

64 Sedley 1997, 327.
65 Sedley 1999, 309.
66 Annas 1999, chap. 3, 52–71: 'Becoming Like God: Human Nature and the Divine'.
67 Annas 1999, 53.
68 Annas, 54.
69 I am quoting the opinion of a member of the audience in the Hellenistic Moral Philosophy and Early Christianity section of the 2007 Annual Meeting of the Society of Biblical Literature in San Diego, where a draft version of this chapter was presented.
70 Annas is aware of the different view expressed in book 10.7–8 of Aristotle's *Nicomachean Ethics*; see Annas 1999, 52–3n4. As we shall see in § 2.2.3 below, this point is particularly emphasized by Sedley 1999, 324–8.
71 Annas 1999, 52–3.
72 Annas 1999, 53.

Both Annas and Sedley drew attention in the late 1990s to the lack of modern scholarly awareness of this issue. Even the only studies known to Sedley which take the topic seriously and are devoted to it do not offer a comprehensive history of the notion under consideration. H. Merki's 1952 study *Homoiōsis Theōi: Von der Platonischen Angleichung an Gott zur Gottähnlichkeit bei Gregor von Nyssa*[73] has, on the whole, an excellent section on the issue, but does not sufficiently distinguish the Platonic notion of assimilation from the somewhat comparable Stoic notion of imitation of God; it is also not very accessible for English readers.[74] D. Roloff's *Gottähnlichkeit, Vergöttlichung und Erhöhung zu seligem Leben: Untersuchungen zur Herkunft der platonischen Angleichung an Gott* (1970)[75] deals only with the prehistory of Plato's notion of assimilation to God.[76] J. Passmore's *The Perfectibility of Man* (1970),[77] which traces the question of whether man is perfectible throughout the history of ideas, right up to the ideological movements of the modern time, does include chapters on Plato's notion, but the best studies by classicists are the publications of Sedley (1997, 1999) and Annas (1999). Both Sedley and Annas limit themselves mainly to the interpretation of what *homoiōsis theōi* means in Plato and, in Sedley's case also Aristotle. Other studies on the assimilation to God in Plato, by D. C. Russell, J. M. Armstrong and S. Lavecchia, followed suit, whereas R. M. van den Berg and D. Baltzly studied this issue in Neo-Platonists.[78] Of the studies not specifically devoted to the notion of *homoiōsis theōi*, Dillon's history of Middle Platonism is important, in which he highlights the afterlife, or rather the flourishing of this notion in Middle-Platonist philosophy from Eudorus in the first century BC onwards.[79] Neglected but worth mentioning is also the 1946 thesis by C. G. Rutenber on the issue of the imitation of God in Plato.[80]

As these studies have not yet been sufficiently connected to map out an uninterrupted history of the notion of *homoiōsis theōi*, and the full awareness of its

[73] Merki 1952.

[74] For a treatment of the classical tradition, see Merki 1952, 1–35.

[75] Roloff 1970.

[76] See Roloff 1970, chap. 4, 198–206 for an 'Ausblick auf die platonische Angleichung an Gott'.

[77] Passmore 1970, chap. 2, 28–45: 'From Olympus to the form of the Good', esp. 39–45 on Plato, the author of 'the first systematic theory of perfectibility' (39); and chap. 3, 46–67: 'The Godlike man: Aristotle to Plotinus'.

[78] See Russell 2004 (including a comparison with Seneca); Armstrong 2004; Lavecchia 2005, 2006; Van den Berg 2003; and Baltzly 2004. For the notion in Epicurus, see Erler 2002. I was also privileged to read an unpublished paper by Prof. Michael Morgan (Indiana University, Bloomington, USA), who, taking his starting point in Plato's *Republic*, discusses the notion of assimilation to God in later Jewish writings, such as the Palestinian Talmud, the writings of Maimonides and Levi Ben Gershom, and Martin Buber's essay 'Imitatio Dei' from his *Israel and the World* (1948) (see Morgan 2008).

[79] Dillon 1996*a*, see index s. v. 'Likeness to God'.

[80] Rutenber 1946.

importance for Plato's ethics and anthropology has only recently been emphasized, I shall first give a chronological account of the notion's development from Plato till Plotinus (§ 2.2) before commenting on its influence upon Philo (§ 2.3) and Paul (§ 2.4). With regard to Philo and Paul it will transpire from this overview, as Dillon has already shown, that the notion of *homoiōsis theōi* was propagated in the first century BC as a central tenet of Plato's ethics. In that sense, both Philo and Paul, who lived shortly after this introduction, can be shown to be examples of its growing popularity. It is from that time onwards that the *homoiōsis theōi* is explicitly formulated as the goal (*telos*) of Platonic ethics. In the following overview I shall also repeatedly stress the *ethical* nature of reflections on assimilation to God.

There is, however, a difference in emphasis between scholars on whether the Platonic doctrine of assimilation to God is genuinely ethical or whether it is more an intellectual enterprise which detaches itself from the world and becomes, in a sense, otherworldly.[81] Indeed, as we shall see, among Platonists themselves there is a difference between, for instance, Alcinous, on the one hand, and Albinus and Apuleius on the other hand (see § 2.2.7 below). Whereas the former stresses the intellectual nature of assimilation to God, the latter two are convinced that assimilation to God is achieved not only through the intellectual contemplative life, but also through the practice of ethical and political truths, which belong to the active life. This discussion is also reflected in Philo, who exhibits the same view as Albinus and Apuleius (see § 2.3.4 [d] below). Although there were strongly intellectual interpretations of the assimilation to God, such as the one given by Alcinous, it would be wrong to generalize and accentuate the otherworldly essence of this doctrine among Platonists. This also applies to Plotinus. Although his ethics have been characterized as otherworldly, it is Plotinus himself who warns against the otherworldliness of the Gnostics, which leads – Plotinus claims – to indifference to virtue (Plotinus, *Enneads* 2.9.15).[82] Virtue, however, is pivotal, according to Plotinus: 'In reality it is virtue which goes before us to the goal (*telos*) and, when it comes to exist in the soul along with wisdom, shows God; but God, if you talk about him without true virtue, is only a name' (*Enneads* 2.9.15).

[81] The otherworldly, intellectual, not genuinely ethical character of the Platonic doctrine of assimilation to God is emphasized by Dillon 1996*c* and Annas 1999; Dillon's characterization relates to Plotinus, but Annas applies it retrogressively to Plato himself. Sedley 1997 and 1999 put much emphasis on the intellectual, non-moral aspects of becoming like God, especially in the *Theaetetus* and *Timaeus* accounts and in Plotinus, but without downplaying its genuinely ethical features. The 'conventional' view of Dillon and Annas is criticized by, among others, O'Meara 2003 (see esp. O'Meara 2003, §1.1, 3–5) and Baltzly 2004 who highlight the ethical, even political applications of the doctrine in Neo-Platonism.

[82] Cf. also Dillon 1996*c*, 324: 'Plotinus is not suggesting, of course, toleration of any form of antinomianism, or disregard for the norms of decent society, such as commended itself to certain contemporary Gnostic sects. Any such suggestion would have appalled him'.

In addition to my emphasis on the ethical side to the doctrine of assimilation, the notion appears to be applied in an *anti-sophistic* sense. Both characteristics, the ethical and anti-sophistic mode in which the notion was understood, will prove relevant for Paul. In these and other cases I shall already point out relevant parallels with the Pauline writings.

2.2.1 Plato

As Passmore remarks in his *The Perfectibility of Man*, Plato can be considered the author of 'the first systematic theory of perfectibility',[83] which is based upon the likeness which exists between God and man. Yet, as we shall see below, it is the 1st cent. BC philosopher Eudorus who first formulates a coherent Platonic doctrine of man's assimilation to God (§ 2.2.5). Already in one of Plato's early dialogues, the *Lysis*, the language of likeness comes to the fore, even if it is as yet applied only to relationships between human beings. In a discussion about the nature of friendship – which in the end is left unexplained – a number of speculations are given, among which the following. In *Lysis* 214–215 the relation of likeness is experimented with as a means to shed light on the nature of friendship, and one of the characters voices the need to

> be guided by the poets; for they are our fathers, as it were, and conductors in wisdom. They, of course, express themselves in no mean sort on the subject of friends, where they happen to be found; even saying that God himself makes them friends by drawing them to each other. The way they put it, I believe, is something like this: 'Yea, ever like and like together God doth draw': αἰεί τοι τὸν ὁμοῖον ἄγει θεὸς ὡς τὸν ὁμοῖον (Homer, *Odyssey* 17.218), and so makes them acquainted; or have you not come across these verses? (*Lysis* 214a–b)

Although this passage is still about the relation of likeness which exists in the friendship between human beings, effected by God, it is very important because later, in *Laws* 716c–d, Plato uses the same quotation from Homer and applies it to the relation between God and man, thus defining their relation also in terms of likeness.

The *locus classicus* for Plato's view on becoming like God is *Theaetetus* 176a–b. Having stated that 'it is impossible that evils should be done away with, (…) for there must always be something opposed to the good; and they cannot have their place among the gods, but must inevitably hover about mortal nature and this earth' (176a), Plato draws the following conclusion:

> ἐκεῖσε φεύγειν ὅτι τάχιστα. φυγὴ δὲ ὁμοίωσις θεῷ κατὰ τὸ δυνατόν· ὁμοίωσις δὲ δίκαιον καὶ ὅσιον μετὰ φρονήσεως γενέσθαι – Therefore we ought to try to escape from earth to the dwelling of the gods as quickly as we can; and to escape is to become like God, so far as this is possible; and to become like God is to become righteous and holy, with wisdom. (*Theaetetus* 176b)

[83] Passmore 1970, 39.

It is noteworthy that the process of becoming like God is thoroughly ethical in content, since 'to become like God' is defined as 'to become righteous'. At the same time this process renders man holy, in his relation to God, and wise. Interestingly, the addition 'so far as this is possible' (κατὰ τὸ δυνατόν) points to the dissimilarity which remains between God and man, despite their basic similarity; the process of becoming like God is, according to Plato, limited by human nature. Plato's statement is, to use Dillon's phrase, 'a modest disclaimer of human capabilities': 'For Plato, "*kata to dynaton*" meant "as far as possible (for a mere mortal)"'.[84] As we shall see, the meaning of this phrase will change with the rediscovery of this Platonic phrase by Eudorus in the 1st cent. BC. Then the phrase 'so far as this is possible' will be taken to refer to the organ of man where this likeness can be achieved, man's mind; assimilation to God is not possible in man's body, but in his mind it is, by way of virtue.

It is also important to point out that Plato, in this passage from the *Theaetetus*, stresses the internalization of the virtues of righteousness and holiness; they do not remain external, but are internalized in the process of becoming like God, as they are appropriated 'with wisdom' (μετὰ φρονήσεως): 'to become like God is to become righteous and holy, with wisdom'. In several translations this emphasis is lost because the translators add wisdom in the form of a adjective, 'wise', as a third item following 'righteous' and 'holy'. Thus H.N. Fowler in the Loeb translation formulates: 'to become like God is to become righteous and holy and wise'. However, the phrase μετὰ φρονήσεως, 'with wisdom', alludes to the fact that virtues such as righteousness and holiness must be guided by wisdom. As Sedley remarks in his commentary on the *Theaetetus*:

In Plato's view, those popular or 'demotic' (…) virtues which consist in nothing more than externally good habits learnt by rote – little more than what Socrates (…) calls merely *seeming* good – fall short of genuine goodness precisely because they are not guided by wisdom. Hence his standard marker-phrase for authentic, because intellectualized, virtues is 'with wisdom' (*meta phronēseōs*; sometimes *meta nou*, 'with intelligence') – exactly as here in the *Theaetetus*, where to become like god is to become 'just and pious, *with wisdom*'.[85]

In Plato's *Theaetetus*, the process of becoming like God is further explicated in the immediately following passage, in which Plato gives 'the true reason' for the pursuit of virtue and the avoidance of vice:

> Let us give the true reason. God is in no wise and in no manner unrighteous, but utterly and perfectly righteous, and there is nothing so like him as that one of us who in turn becomes most nearly perfect in righteousness (θεὸς οὐδαμῇ οὐδαμῶς ἄδικος, ἀλλ' ὡς οἷόν τε δικαιότατος, καὶ οὐκ ἔστιν αὐτῷ ὁμοιότερον οὐδὲν ἢ ὃς ἂν ἡμῶν αὖ γένηται ὅτι δικαιότατος). It is herein that the true cleverness (ἡ ὡς ἀληθῶς

[84] Dillon 1996*a*, 123.
[85] Sedley 2004, 75.

> δεινότης) of a man is found and also his worthlessness and cowardice; for the knowledge of this is wisdom or true virtue (ἡ μὲν γὰρ τούτου γνῶσις σοφία καὶ ἀρετὴ ἀληθινή), and ignorance of it is folly or manifest wickedness. (*Theaetetus* 176c)

The whole issue of the deeply moral nature of the *homoiōsis theōi* returns in Plato's *Republic* 613a–b. In this passage, Plato voices his optimism that the fate of 'the just man' is not dependent on his circumstances: 'This, then, must be our conviction about the just man, that whether he fall into poverty or disease or any other supposed evil, for him all these things will finally prove good, both in life and in death' (613a). This passage very much reads like a parallel of Paul's Romans 8.28–29: 'We know that all things work together for good for those who love God, who are called according to his purpose. For those whom he foreknew he also predestined to be conformed to the image of his Son' (οὓς προέγνω, καὶ προώρισεν συμμόρφους τῆς εἰκόνος τοῦ υἱοῦ αὐτοῦ). As in Paul, the reason for Plato's optimism is grounded in God and, again as in Paul, the 'just man' is caught up in a process of conformation to God:

> For by the gods assuredly that man will never be neglected who is willing and eager to be righteous, and by the practice of virtue to be likened unto god so far as that is possible for a man – οὐ γὰρ δὴ ὑπό γε θεῶν ποτε ἀμελεῖται ὃς ἂν προθυμεῖσθαι ἐθέλῃ δίκαιος γίγνεσθαι καὶ ἐπιτηδεύων ἀρετὴν εἰς ὅσον δυνατὸν ἀνθρώπῳ ὁμοιοῦσθαι θεῷ. (*Republic* 613a–b)

This passage makes it particularly clear that becoming like God is the result of man's willingness and eagerness to become righteous, and proceeds via the practice of virtue. In reply to this, the partner in dialogue cannot but confirm that it 'is reasonable (…), that such a one should not be neglected by his like', i.e. God: Εἰκός γ', ἔφη, τὸν τοιοῦτον μὴ ἀμελεῖσθαι ὑπὸ τοῦ ὁμοίου.

In a different dialogue, Plato's *Phaedrus*, the topic of *homoiōsis theōi* returns, but now in the form of the assimilation of souls to a specific god. It is important to note that Plato's incentive to reflect on the souls in this dialogue is decidedly anti-sophistic. The main theme of the *Phaedrus* is rhetoric; whereas the sophists believe that the goal of rhetoric is to persuade, and that knowledge of the truth of the topic spoken about is irrelevant, Plato disagrees. Instead he argues that to be persuasive one ought to understand the souls of those who are to be persuaded.

The nature of the soul is also explored in Plato's description of a procession of the gods from visible reality to the outer rim of the cosmos, where they can gaze on the region above the heaven, true reality (246a ff.). On their way upwards, the gods lead human souls with them in procession. Among these souls are notably the souls of teachers and their pupils (παῖδες), and the former lead the latter onwards in a pedagogical movement towards true reality. They do so by trying to resemble the gods ahead in the procession, such as Zeus, Apollo, and others. In this way, true reality is not only accessible to the gods, but also to the soul, 'that which best follows after God and most resembles him': ἡ μὲν

ἄριστα θεῷ ἑπομένη καὶ εἰκασμένη (248a). Implicitly there is reference here to the image of God: the soul resembles God (εἰκασμένη) because, apparently, God is represented by an image in the soul (LSJ 484 εἰκάζω I. *represent by an image or likeness, portray*; II. *liken*, Pass., *to be like, resemble*). At the same time this process of resembling God is cast in the terminology of Pythagoras' adage Ἕπου θεῷ, 'Follow God' (cf. Eudorus apud Stobaeus, vol. 2, p. 49.16 in § 2.2.5 below, and Plutarch, *De sera numinis vindicta* 550D in § 2.2.6 below; see also Philo, *De opificio mundi* 144 in § 2.3.4 below).

In *Phaedrus* 252c–253c, the souls in the procession are portrayed in their aspiration to become more and more like the particular gods whom they revere, by adopting their particular customs, habits and way of living (τὰ ἔθη καὶ τὰ ἐπιτηδεύματα; 253a). Each of the souls who follows a particular god in the procession 'lives, so far as he is able, honouring and imitating that god' – καὶ οὕτω καθ' ἕκαστον θεόν, οὗ ἕκαστος ἦν χορευτής, ἐκεῖνον τιμῶν τε καὶ μιμούμενος εἰς τὸ δυνατὸν ζῇ (252c–d); the clause 'so far as he is able' (εἲς τὸ δυνατὸν), already shows that the language of ὁμοίωσις θεῷ κατὰ τὸ δυνατόν (*Theaetetus* 176b) is at work.[86] This imitating of the god works via introspection, fixation on the god, and memorization;[87] in this manner the human souls become inspired by their god and gain his character traits, thus starting to have part in the god:

> when they search eagerly within themselves to find the nature of their god, they are successful, because they have been compelled to keep their eyes fixed upon the gods, and as they reach and grasp him by memory they are inspired and receive from him character and habits, so far as it is possible for a man to have part in God – ἰχνεύοντες δὲ παρ' ἑαυτῶν ἀνευρίσκειν τὴν τοῦ σφετέρου θεοῦ φύσιν εὐποροῦσι διὰ τὸ συντόνως ἠναγκάσθαι πρὸς τὸν θεὸν βλέπειν, καὶ ἐφαπτόμενοι αὐτοῦ τῇ μνήμῃ ἐνθουσιῶντες ἐξ ἐκείνου λαμβάνουσι τὰ ἔθη καὶ τὰ ἐπιτηδεύματα, καθ' ὅσον δυνατὸν θεοῦ ἀνθρώπῳ μετασχεῖν. (…) they (…) make him [= the soul of the beloved], so far as possible, like their god – ἐπὶ τὴν τοῦ ἐρωμένου ψυχὴν ἐπαντλοῦντες ποιοῦσιν ὡς δυνατὸν ὁμοιότατον τῷ σφετέρῳ θεῷ. (*Phaedrus* 253a)

At the end of this passage, the language of ὁμοίωσις θεῷ is fully present and indeed, as its continuation emphasizes, 'they [i. e. the teachers] exhibit no jealousy or meanness toward the loved one [i. e. the soul of the παῖς, the boy whom they teach], but endeavour by every means in their power to lead him to the likeness of the god whom they honour – ἀλλ' εἰς ὁμοιότητα αὐτοῖς καὶ τῷ θεῷ ὃν ἂν τιμῶσι πᾶσαν πάντως ὅτι μάλιστα πειρώμενοι ἄγειν οὕτω ποιοῦσι (253b).

[86] On the issue of imitating God in Plato, see also Rutenber 1946, esp. 24–5 with reference to *Phaedrus* 252d.

[87] For memorization cf. *Phaedrus* 249c: 'he [i. e. the philosopher] is always, *so far as he is able*, in communion *through memory* with those things the communion with which causes God to be divine. Now a man who employs such memories rightly is always being initiated into perfect mysteries and he alone becomes truly perfect'.

Thus, ‘by imitating the god themselves (μιμούμενοι αὐτοί) and by persuasion and education (τε καὶ τὰ παιδικὰ πείθοντες καὶ ῥυθμίζοντες) they lead the beloved to the habit of life and the nature of the god (εἰς τὸ ἐκείνου ἐπιτήδευμα καὶ ἰδέαν ἄγουσιν; 253b)’. These passages from Plato’s *Phaedrus* are particularly relevant for our present purposes, for at least two reasons.

First, the persuasion and education through which the teachers lead the pupils to the conduct and nature of the god (253b) are similar to Paul’s, who both (a) inspires his readers to follow him, Paul, as he, in turn, follows Christ (1 Cor 11.1; cf. 1 Thess 1.6, 1 Cor 4.16), and (b) labours μέχρις οὗ μορφωθῇ Χριστὸς ἐν ὑμῖν, until Christ receives shape and form in the believers (Gal 4.19).

Secondly, the contents of the passages under consideration also very much resemble Paul’s anthropological concerns to become like Christ (Rom 6.5–11) and share in his image and forms (2 Cor 3.18, Rom 8.29) or – in the terminology of the *Phaedrus* – to receive from the god ‘customs / habits and ways of living’ (τὰ ἔθη καὶ τὰ ἐπιτηδεύματα; 253a) or, phrased differently, ‘the habit of life and the nature’ [of the god] (τὸ ἐπιτήδευμα καὶ ἰδέα; 253b). Plato’s idiom here is that of the general practice of becoming like one particular god. Plutarch, for instance, talks in a very similar way about Antony’s reverence for a particular god, when he writes:

> Those who sought the meaning of the sign were of the opinion that the god to whom Antony always most likened and attached himself (ὁ θεὸς …, ᾧ μάλιστα συνεξομοιῶν καὶ συνοικειῶν ἑαυτὸν) was now deserting him. (Plutarch, *Antonius* 75.6)

It is this language of becoming like a particular god that – to my knowledge – provides the best explanation for Paul’s view about Christ-believers sharing the image and forms of Christ and becoming like him. The main difference is that the multiplicity of gods has now been limited to Christ, on whom believers are being modelled. It might seem strange that Christ, and no longer directly God, is used as a model, but for that, as we shall see later, there is an analogy in the Platonist philosopher Alcinous, according to whom not the highest, transcendent God, but the second God acts as a model for assimilation with God.

Plato’s *Phaedrus* shows that the process of becoming like God is a moral one. Perhaps the version Plato gives here seems hard to understand because rather than souls becoming like God, Plato talks here about souls becoming like particular gods. In this way, he seems to endorse a polytheism of values, since the characters of the various gods differ from one another. As Sedley remarks: ‘It might seem hard to imagine that Plato would ultimately endorse so radical a form of polytheism (…). But the myth has made it clear that all these different gods are alike guided by a complete grasp of the moral Forms’.[88]

[88] Sedley 1999, 315.

The final passage from Plato to be discussed here is Plato's *Laws* 716d. I shall not comment on Plato's *Timaeus* here, although *Timaeus* 90c–d, as we shall see in the course of this section, became, after *Theaetetus* 176b–c, the second *locus classicus* on assimilation to God. I have already briefly commented on this passage in § 2.1.1 above, and will do so in more detail when commenting on the reception of this passage by Eudorus and Plutarch (see §§ 2.2.5–2.2.6 below). I shall now conclude with Plato's *Laws* 716d. This passage is important for two reasons. First, it shows that Plato now interprets the line from Homer 'Yea, ever like and like together God doth draw' (*Odyssey* 17.218) in terms of the likeness between God and man. In his *Lysis*, the line still supported the definition of friendship in the relation between human beings; although this friendship was understood as God-given, the ensuing relation did not include God himself (*Lysis* 214a–b). Now, in Plato's *Laws*, Homer's line is applied to the relation between God and man.

Secondly, the passage from the *Laws* is noteworthy inasmuch as it reveals that Plato's doctrine of the *homoiōsis theōi* also has a sharply anti-sophistic edge. This is already the case in the *Phaedrus*, but is now even articulated at the level on which Plato deals with man's assimilation to God. Having stated that God 'as old tradition tells, holds the beginning, the end, and the centre of all things that exist' (ὁ μὲν δὴ θεός, ὥσπερ καὶ ὁ παλαιὸς λόγος, ἀρχήν τε καὶ τελευτὴν καὶ μέσα τῶν ὄντων ἁπάντων ἔχων; 715e), Plato adds that this God is followed by Justice (Δίκη) and by 'every man who intends to be happy' (ὁ μὲν εὐδαιμονήσειν μέλλων; 716a). For all men, then, it seems necessary 'to be minded like those who follow in the steps of God': ὡς τῶν συνακολουθησόντων ἐσόμενον τῷ θεῷ δεῖ διανοηθῆναι πάντα ἄνδρα (716b). Here Plato alludes to Pythagoras' exhortation Ἕπου θεῷ, 'Follow God', which, as a consequence, was regarded by later Platonists such as Eudorus (see Eudorus apud Stobaeus, vol. 2, p. 49.16 in § 2.2.5 below) and Plutarch (see *De sera numinis vindicta* 550D in § 2.2.6 below) as the equivalent and precursor of Plato's urging that one should assimilate oneself to God. If it is indeed necessary for men 'to be minded like those who follow in the steps of God', the question arises as to what it means to follow God:

> What conduct, then, is dear to God and in his steps (Τίς οὖν δὴ πρᾶξις φίλη καὶ ἀκόλουθος θεῷ;)? One kind of conduct, expressed in one ancient phrase, namely, that 'like is dear to like' when it is moderate (μία, καὶ ἕνα λόγον ἔχουσα ἀρχαῖον, ὅτι τῷ μὲν ὁμοίῳ τὸ ὅμοιον ὄντι μετρίῳ φίλον ἂν εἴη), whereas immoderate things are dear neither to one another nor to things moderate. In our eyes God will be 'the measure of all things' in the highest degree – a degree much higher than is any 'man' they talk of (ὁ δὴ θεὸς ἡμῖν πάντων χρημάτων μέτρον ἂν εἴη μάλιστα, καὶ πολὺ μᾶλλον ἤ πού τις, ὥς φασιν, ἄνθρωπος). He, then, that is to become dear to such a one must needs become, so far as he possibly can, of a like character (τὸν οὖν τῷ τοιούτῳ προσφιλῆ γενησόμενον, εἰς δύναμιν ὅτι μάλιστα καὶ αὐτὸν τοιοῦτον ἀναγκαῖον γίγνεσθαι); and, according to the present argument, he amongst us that

> is temperate is dear to God, since he is like him (καὶ κατὰ τοῦτον δὴ τὸν λόγον ὁ μὲν σώφρων ἡμῶν θεῷ φίλος, ὅμοιος γάρ). (*Laws* 716c–d)

The 'ancient phrase', that 'like is dear to like' is a clear reference to Homer, *Odyssey* 17.218, which had become proverbial. Taking the truth of this statement as a starting point, and given the fact that God is 'the measure of all things', it follows that, indeed, 'He, then, that is to become dear to such a one [i. e. to God] must needs become, so far as he possibly can, of a like character'. Becoming like God, thus, is the opposite of holding man to be 'the measure of all things'. In this, Plato clearly takes issue with the sophist Protagoras, whose dictum he alludes to (cf. also *Cratylus* 386a ff.; *Theaetetus* 152a). Sedley regards this as the culmination of Plato's development of the notion of assimilation to God:

> That the object of our emulation should be god, more directly than the transcendent Forms, is an idea which, once ignited in the *Theaetetus*, continued to dominate Plato's thinking to the end (…). It culminates in the celebrated dictum of *Laws* IV, in unmistakable paraphrase of the *Theaetetus*: 'It will be god who, par excellence, is the measure of all things for us, rather than a man, as some people claim' (716c4–6).[89]

Plato's anti-sophistic inference from the notion of assimilation to God did not remain isolated. As we shall see later, Plutarch, too, combines his plea in favour of becoming like God with an anti-sophistic stance (Plutarch, Fragment 143 [edn Sandbach]).

2.2.2 Pseudo-Plato

The doctrine of *homoiōsis theōi* was recognized as a relevant theme by those who wrote works in Plato's name. In Pseudo-Plato's *Minos*, Socrates is depicted as warning that the practice of blaming or praising a fellow human being is precarious and that very great precaution should be taken,

> because God feels resentment when one blames a man who is like himself (νεμεσᾷ γὰρ ὁ θεός, ὅταν τις ψέγῃ τὸν ἑαυτῷ ὅμοιον), or praises a man who is the opposite; and the former is the good man. For you must not suppose that while stones and pieces of wood and birds and snakes are sacred, men are not; nay, the good man is the most sacred of all these things, and the wicked man is the most defiled. (*Minos* 318e–319a)

The passage also makes clear that the *homoiōsis theōi* continued to be understood in moral terms; the man who is like God is 'the good man', and 'most sacred'. This is also apparent from the *Alcibiades I*. The idea that human beings are transformed by their actions in a particular direction, and in the case of unjust actions into the direction of the godless (τὸ ἄθεον) and dark so that these acts will become like them (ὅμοια τούτοις), is present in the following warning:

[89] Sedley 2004, 81.

> But if you act unjustly, with your eyes on the godless and dark, the probability is that your acts will resemble these through your ignorance of yourselves – Ἀδίκως δέ γε πράττοντες, εἰς τὸ ἄθεον καὶ σκοτεινὸν βλέποντες, ὡς τὰ εἰκότα, ὅμοια τούτοις πράξετε ἀγνοοῦντες ὑμᾶς αὐτούς. (*Alcibiades I* 134e)

In this writing, thus, the author emphasizes that the acts of those who act unjustly will become like the godless (τὸ ἄθεον) and dark (*Alcibiades i* 134e). This is the very opposite of becoming like God.

2.2.3 Aristotle

Plato's pupil Aristotle reveals himself as rather ambivalent towards the doctrine of the *homoiōsis theōi*. On the one hand, Aristotle seems to stress that God is wholly similar to himself:

> For God is equal and like to himself, admitting neither slackening towards the worse nor tautening towards the better – ἴσος γὰρ αὐτὸς ἑαυτῷ καὶ ὅμοιος ὁ θεός, μήτε ἄνεσιν πρὸς τὸ χεῖρον μήτ' ἐπίτασιν πρὸς τὸ βέλτιον δεχόμενος. (Frag. 21, edn Rose = Philo, *De aeternitate mundi* 39–43 at 43).

This view is also discussed in Ps-Aristotle's *De Xenophane, de Zenone, de Gorgia*. In this writing Aristotle declares that in every respect of his nature God is 'eternal and one and similar and spherical'.[90]

In line with this, particularly in his *Ethica Eudemia*, Aristotle makes a point of the incomparable, unique nature of the relationship between God and man. The love between a man and a god, according to Aristotle, is necessarily unequal:

> For it would be ridiculous to accuse a god because the love one receives in return from him is not equal to the love given him (οὐχ ὁμοίως τὸ ἀντιφιλεῖσθαι ὡς φιλεῖται), or for the subject to make the same complaint against his ruler. For the part of a ruler is to receive, not to give love, or at least to give love in a different way. (Aristotle, *Ethica Eudemia* 1238b27–30)

Indeed, the difference between man and God is so excessive that the claim of human beings that their love 'should be returned or equally returned' (δεῖ ἢ ἀντιφιλεῖσθαι ἢ ὁμοίως ἀντιφιλεῖσθαι) is unwarranted (*Ethica Eudemia* 1239a19). Although in his explorations of the nature of friendship Aristotle does quote Homer's line 'God ever draws like to like' – αἰεὶ τὸν ὅμοιον ἄγει θεὸς ὡς τὸν ὅμοιον (Homer, *Odyssey* 17.218), he certainly does not apply it to the relation between God and man (*Ethica Eudemia* 1235a7; cf. Aristotle, *Magna moralia* 2.11.2) because he seems to be of the conviction that the two are entirely unequal.

On the other hand, however, a passage from Aristotle's *Protrepticus* does use the topos of becoming like God. In this passage, preserved in Iamblichus' *Pro-*

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[90] Ps-Aristotle, *De Xenophane, de Zenone, de Gorgia* 977b19; cf. 977b1.

trepticus, Aristotle clearly states that man, if he abides by reason, does indeed become god-like:

> Man deprived of sense is reduced to the condition of a plant; deprived of reason alone he is returned into a brute; deprived of irrationality but abiding by reason he becomes like God – Αἰσθήσεως μὲν οὖν καὶ νοῦ ἀφαιρεθεὶς ἄνθρωπος φυτῷ γίγνεται παραπλήσιος, νοῦ δὲ μόνου ἀφῃρημένος ἐκθηριοῦται, ἀλογίας δ’ ἀφαιρεθεὶς μένων δ’ ἐν τῷ νῷ ὁμοιοῦται θεῷ. (Aristotle, *Protrepticus*, frag. 28 [edn and trans. Düring, B 28]; = Iamblichus, *Protrepticus* 35)

Here the terminology of assimilation to God is explicitly used: ‘abiding by his mind, man becomes similar to God’ – μένων δ’ ἐν τῷ νῷ ὁμοιοῦται θεῷ. One might even suspect that the actual wording is due to Iamblichus,[91] who quotes the *locus classicus* from Plato’s *Theaetetus* elsewhere in his *Protrepticus*: φυγὴ δὲ ὁμοίωσις θεῷ κατὰ τὸ δυνατόν· ὁμοίωσις δὲ δίκαιον καὶ ὅσιον μετὰ φρονήσεως γενέσθαι (Iamblichus, *Protrepticus* 76). However, as Sedley and Annas have pointed out, there are some passages in Aristotle which do reflect the notion of assimilation to God even if not the full terminology. Both Sedley and Annas refer to the following passage in book 10.7 of Aristotle’s *Nicomachean Ethics*:[92]

> If intellect is divine, then, in comparison with man, life according to it is divine in comparison with human life (εἰ δὴ θεῖον ὁ νοῦς πρὸς τὸν ἄνθρωπον, καὶ ὁ κατὰ τοῦτον βίος θεῖος πρὸς τὸν ἀνθρώπινον βίον). But we must not follow those who advise us, being men, to think of human things, and being mortal, of mortal things, *but must, so far as we can, make ourselves immortal* (ἀλλ’ ἐφ’ ὅσον ἐνδέχεται ἀθανατίζειν), and strain every nerve to live in accordance with the best thing in us (καὶ πάντα ποιεῖν πρὸς τὸ ζῆν κατὰ τὸ κράτιστον τῶν ἐν αὑτῷ); for even if it be small in bulk, much more does it in power and worth surpass everything. This would seem, too, to be each man himself, since it is the authoritative and better part of him. (…) for man, therefore, the life according to intellect is best and pleasantest, since intellect more than anything else *is* man (καὶ τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ δὴ ὁ κατὰ τὸν νοῦν βίος, εἴπερ τοῦτο μάλιστα ἄνθρωπος). This life therefore is also the happiest (οὗτος ἄρα καὶ εὐδαιμονέστατος). (*Nicomachean Ethics* 1177b30–1178a8)

Because the mind is divine, life according to the mind is also divine, according to Aristotle. For that reason one should strive to immortalize oneself. Indeed, as Sedley remarks with regard to the phrase ἀλλ’ ἐφ’ ὅσον ἐνδέχεται ἀθανατίζειν (‘so far as we can, to become immortal’): ‘This phrase comes in heavy disguise. It studiously avoids any hint of the Platonic wording *homoiōsis theōi kata to dunaton*, “becoming like god so far as is possible” (*Tht.* 176b); yet it accurately reproduces its meaning’.[93] On the one hand this heightens suspicion concerning

[91] On Iamblichus’ methodology in quoting from the *Protrepticus*, see Hutchinson & Johnson 2005.

[92] Sedley 1999, 325; Annas 1999, 63–4.

[93] Sedley 1999, 325.

the authenticity of the wording of Aristotle's *Protrepticus*, but on the other hand it shows that Aristotle did apply the concept as such. Sedley even believes that, on closer scrutiny, the main structure of Aristotle's ethics neatly reflects Plato's mode of thinking.[94]

A comparable passage about the likeness between God and man is found in Aristotle's *Nicomachean Ethics* in the immediately following chapter of book 10 (10.8):[95]

> Now he who exercises his intellect and cultivates it (ὁ δὲ κατὰ νοῦν ἐνεργῶν καὶ τοῦτον θεραπεύων) seems to be both in the best state and most dear to the gods (θεοφιλέστατος). For if the gods have any care for human affairs, as they are thought to have, *it would be reasonable* both *that they should delight in that which was best and most akin to them, i.e. intellect* (καὶ εἴη ἂν εὔλογον χαίρειν τε αὐτοὺς τῷ ἀρίστῳ καὶ συγγενεστάτῳ, τοῦτο δ' ἂν εἴη ὁ νοῦς), and that they should reward those who love and honour this most, as caring for the things that are dear to them and acting both rightly and nobly. And that all these attributes belong most of all to the wise man is manifest. He, therefore, is the dearest to the gods (θεοφιλέστατος). (*Nicomachean Ethics* 1179a22–30)

Here again, according to Aristotle those who use their mind are most dear to the gods (θεοφιλέστατος) because the mind is that which is most akin to them (συγγενέστατον). Indeed, as he had argued in 10.7, the mind is divine and, consequently, the wise man, who lives according to the mind, is beloved by the gods. If these passages come so close to Plato's notion of *homoiōsis theōi*, it is easy to see why Aristotelian philosophers came to apply it in their commentaries on Aristotle. Before continuing with the history of Plato's notion in chronological order, I shall briefly draw attention to the use of *homoiōsis theōi* by three Aristotelian philosophers.

2.2.4 Post-Aristotelian views

(a) Aspasius

The three Aristotelian philosophers whom we shall study are Aspasius (early 2nd cent. AD), Alexander of Aphrodisias (around the turn of the 3rd cent. AD), and Themistius (4th cent. AD). As we shall see, they did not hesitate to apply the Platonic notion of *homoiōsis theōi* in their studies of Aristotle and to show, in this way, the congruence, as they saw it, between Plato and Aristotle.

In his commentary on Aristotle's *Nicomachean Ethics*, Aspasius (*c.* AD 100–150), states that

> Aristotle says that both [to do a good and to be done a good] are the mark of a virtuous and liberal person, but that virtue is both spoken and thought of in relation to

[94] See Sedley 1999, 324–8.
[95] Cf. Sedley 1999, 314–15n12.

doing a good more than being done a good, and *that is why virtue seems to be a divine thing and a kind of assimilation to God*. For what is divine is thought of not in relation to being done a good but to doing a good.

Ἀριστοτέλης δὲ λέγει μὲν ἀμφότερα εἶναι τοῦ ἐναρέτου καὶ ἐλευθερίου, ἀλλὰ τὴν ἀρετὴν καὶ λέγεσθαι καὶ νοεῖσθαι κατὰ τὸ εὖ ποιεῖν μᾶλλον ἢ κατὰ τὸ εὖ πάσχειν, διόπερ καὶ δοκεῖ θεῖόν τι εἶναι ἡ ἀρετὴ καὶ ὁμοίωσίς τις τῷ θεῷ· τὸ γὰρ θεῖον οὐ κατὰ τὸ εὖ πάσχειν ἀλλὰ κατὰ τὸ εὖ ποιεῖν νοεῖται. (Aspasius, *In ethica Nichomachea commentaria* 99.1–7)

Virtue is defined as doing a good (τὸ εὖ ποιεῖν), rather than as being done a good (τὸ εὖ πάσχειν) and this precisely makes a virtue a kind of assimilation to God (ὁμοίωσίς τις τῷ θεῷ), according to Aspasius' commentary. Interestingly, his comments relate to *Nicomachean Ethics* 1120a31–34, where Aristotle explains, again in Aspasius' words,

that it is characteristic of the liberal person that he will not receive 'whence one ought not: for receiving' contrary to what is proper 'is not the mark of a person who does not honour commodities; nor would he be given to asking for things, either: for to be done a service unscrupulously is not the mark of one who does a good thing' (*Nicomachean Ethics* 1120a31–4), he says. (Aspasius, *In ethica Nichomachea commentaria* 98.33–37; trans. Konstan)

But neither in Aspasius' actual rendition of this passage from the *Nicomachean Ethics* nor in Aristotle's original does the phrase ὁμοίωσίς τις τῷ θεῷ occur. It is Aspasius who, in his fuller commentary on Aristotle, imports this Platonic phrase, thus testifying to the fact that Aristotle was understood, by Aristotelian philosophers, in a Platonizing way.

(b) Alexander of Aphrodisias

The passage from Aspasius on the difference between doing a good and being done a good – only the former qualifying as a virtue by which one assimilates to God – has a full analogy in Alexander of Aphrodisias (2nd/3rd cent. AD). He, too, applies the Platonic notion of assimilation to God in a similar discussion, although in this case not in a commentary on the *Nicomachean Ethics*, but on Aristotle's *Topics*. Similarly to Aspasius, according to Alexander being similar to God results from doing good: ἐπεὶ τῷ μὲν εὖ ποιεῖν ἕπεται τὸ ὅμοιον θεῷ (Alexander, *In Aristotelis topicorum libros octo commentaria* 243.25).

The same practice of adding the terminology of the Platonic notion of assimilation to God when commenting on Aristotle can be shown to operate in another commentary by Alexander of Aphrodisias, this time on Aristotle's *Prior Analytics*. In a passage in which he sets out to demonstrate the value of theorizing Alexander writes:

Now, for the gods, theorising about truth is continuous and uninterrupted. But for men it is not possible to be continuously active in this way – for many of the conditions of life (αἱ κατὰ τὸν βίον περιστάσεις) which were allotted to them lead

> them away from things of higher value. Yet if a man emerges, as far as he can, from the emotions and conditions of human life, he may see the things of highest value and be active in a theorising which is divine and worthy of its name (οὐ μὴν ἀλλὰ ἐφ' ὅσον οἷός τέ ἐστιν, ἀνακύψας ἀπὸ τῶν παθῶν τε καὶ τῶν ἀνθρωπίνων περιστάσεων κατὰ τὴν θείαν τε καὶ δικαίως καλουμένην θεωρίαν ἐνεργεῖ ὁρῶν τὰ τιμιώτατα). Now when he is active with this faculty of his soul and exercises activities like those of the gods, then he will become like the gods (ὅταν δὴ κατὰ ταύτην τὴν δύναμιν τῆς ψυχῆς ἐνεργῇ ὁμοίας ἐνεργείας ἐνεργῶν θεοῖς, ὁμοιοῖτ' ἂν αὐτοῖς). Thus if becoming like God is the greatest Good for men (εἰ δὴ τὸ θεῷ ὁμοιοῦσθαι μέγιστον ἀγαθὸν ἀνθρώπῳ), and if this is attained by the theory and knowledge of what is true, and if the knowledge of what is true comes by way of demonstration, then demonstration will rightly be held most valuable and worthy of most study. (Alexander, *In Aristotelis analyticorum priorum librum i commentarium* 6.1–14; trans. Barnes, Bobzien, Flannery & Ierodiakonou, *On Aristotle Prior Analytics 1.1–7*)

By distancing himself from the conditions and emotions of life, *as far as he can*, man is able to attain to the divine art of theorizing. Just as in Aristotle's *Nicomachean Ethics*, the phrase 'as far as he can' (ἀλλὰ ἐφ' ὅσον οἷός τέ ἐστιν; cf. ἀλλ' ἐφ' ὅσον ἐνδέχεται ἀθανατίζειν in Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics* 1177b33) should be read as a reference to Plato's assimilation to God *kata to dynaton*. According to Alexander, the activity of theorizing, which is a faculty of man's soul, renders his activities similar to those of the gods, to the extent that he himself becomes like the gods. This, according to Alexander, is the process of τὸ θεῷ ὁμοιοῦσθαι, the process of becoming like God, which constitutes man's greatest Good. Again, as in Aspasius, for the interpretation of Aristotle recourse is taken to the Platonic notion of *homoiōsis theōi*.

(c) Themistius

Finally, the congruence which Aristotelian philosophers detect between Plato and Aristotle can also be demonstrated in the case of the 4th cent. AD philosopher Themistius. In his commentary on Aristotle's *De anima*, Themistius, in his reflections upon the importance of the mind within the soul, refers back to Plato's view on the soul's similarity to God. From his Aristotelian perspective, this argument, among others, is still considered 'particularly credible':

> And most of the weightiest arguments concerning the immortality of the soul that [Plato] propounded essentially refer back to the intellect: the one based on self-motion (it was shown, that is, that only the intellect was self-moved, if we could think of movement in place of activity); the one that takes the processes of learning to be [acts of] recollection; *and the one* [*positing*] *the similarity to God* (καὶ ὁ τὰς μαθήσεις ἀναμνήσεις εἶναι λαμβάνων καὶ ὁ τὴν πρὸς τὸν θεὸν ὁμοιότητα). It would also not be difficult to apply to the intellect those of his other arguments thought particularly credible, as also the more credible of those elaborated by Aristotle himself in the *Eudemus*. (Themistius, *On Aristole's 'On the Soul'* 106.29–107.3 [trans. Todd] = Aristotle, frag. 38 [edn Rose])

These instances from Aspasius, Alexander of Aphrodisias and Themistius show that from the 1st cent. AD onwards Aristotelians can be shown to have used the Platonic notion of assimilation to God in a positive, affirmative way, even though Aristotle himself seems not to have condoned this terminology, but to have ‘studiously’ avoided it, as Sedley puts it. This is the case despite the fact that Aristotle can be shown to come close to the contents of this Platonic notion. The question which imposes itself is where these Aristotelians got this notion from. Perhaps their knowledge resulted from their own reading of Plato, but, as will be suggested in the following section, the notion seems to have been freshly introduced in the 1st cent. BC, and much of its later popularity will have been due to this development.

2.2.5 Eudorus and the introduction of homoiōsis theōi as the goal of Platonic ethics

It seems that the Platonist Eudorus, from 1st cent. BC Alexandria, was the one whose definition of the goal of Platonic ethics in terms of *homoiōsis theōi* became very influential. The text in which he undertakes this definition is so central for our understanding that I shall give it in full and comment on it in some detail. It certainly raises awareness of, and heightens sensitivity to, the fact that Philo and Paul, as we shall see in §§ 2.3 and 2.4, were influenced by a forceful contemporary movement in ethics. The relevant text of Eudorus has been preserved in Stobaeus’ early 5th cent. AD *Anthology*. As Stobaeus’ excerpts owe much to earlier collectors, the passage from Eudorus comes to us in an extensive excerpt which Stobaeus took from Arius Didymus, the 1st cent. BC philosopher from Alexandria and adviser to Augustus.[96] Indeed, book II, chapter 7 in Stobaeus, which is devoted to ethics, and in which the excerpt from Eudorus is found, was mediated through Arius Didymus in its entirety, as the chapter heading makes clear: Περὶ τοῦ ἠθικοῦ εἴδους τῆς φιλοσοφίας. Ἐκ τῆς Διδύμου ἐπιτομῆς (Stobaeus, *Anthologium* 2.7, p. 37.15–16). Arius Didymus is an exact contemporary of Eudorus and it seems possible that Arius took this material from him. This is also implied in Arius’ comments on the usefulness of Eudorus’ book on ethics, which Arius strongly recommends. Arius refers to it in the following words:

> Ἔστιν οὖν Εὐδώρου τοῦ Ἀλεξανδρέως, Ἀκαδημιακοῦ φιλοσόφου, διαίρεσις τοῦ κατὰ φιλοσοφίαν λόγου, βιβλίον ἀξιόκτητον, ἐν ᾧ πᾶσαν ἐπεξελήλυθε προβληματικῶς τὴν ἐπιστήμην, ἧς ἐγὼ διαιρέσεως ἐκθήσομαι τὸ τῆς ἠθικῆς οἰκεῖον. (Stobaeus, *Anthologium* 2.7.2, p. 42.7–11)
>
> There is a *Division of Philosophical Reasoning* (*Diairesis tou kata philosophian logou*), written by Eudorus the Alexandrian, an Academic philosopher, a book worth getting (βιβλίον ἀξιόκτητον), in which he discusses all knowledge as a problem to

[96] On Arius Didymus, see Runia, ‘Arius, 1’ and ‘Arius, 2’, in: *New Pauly Online*.

inquire into, and from which *Division* I shall set out those things which belong to ethics.

Arius then proceeds to present a division of philosophy into ethics, physics and logic, and then a further subdivision, as promised, of ethics. Interestingly, Arius refers to Eudorus’ work on philosophy as a βιβλίον ἀξιόκτητον, a book worth getting. This implies that the book is available, and Arius’ recommendation of it will have done much to enhance its popularity. It is from this work that the following passage is believed to derive (Stobaeus, *Anthologium* 2.7.3, section f, pp. 49.8–50.10; edn Wachsmuth & Hense 1884–1912, 5 vols). I shall break it down into units and briefly comment upon each.

(3 f.) Σωκράτης, Πλάτων ταὐτὰ τῷ Πυθαγόρᾳ, τέλος ὁμοίωσιν θεῷ. Σαφέστερον δ’ αὐτὸ διήρθρωσε Πλάτων προσθεὶς τὸ «κατὰ τὸ δυνατόν» (Theaet. p. 176B), φρονήσει δ’ ἐστὶ μόνως δυνατόν, τοῦτο δ’ ἦν τὸ κατ’ ἀρετὴν <ζῆν>.

Socrates and Plato agree with Pythagoras that the goal (*telos*) is assimilation to God (ὁμοίωσις θεῷ). Plato defined this more clearly by adding: ‘according as is possible (κατὰ τὸ δυνατόν)’, and it is only possible by wisdom (φρόνησις), that is to say, as a result of (living) in accordance with virtue. (Trans. Dillon 1996*a*)

There are several remarkable features of this passage in which Eudorus gives assimilation to God as the definition of the goal (τέλος) of Platonic ethics.

First of all, as Dillon remarks, ‘Pythagoras is brought in as the originator of the definition, with Plato portrayed as agreeing with and amplifying him’.[97] Pythagoras is mentioned here, at the beginning of the passage, as the norm for true philosophy, but also twice later. The importance which Eudorus attaches to Pythagoras is very much in accordance with the general thrust of Eudorus’ philosophy. According to Dillon, Eudorus ‘seems to have turned the very Stoicized Platonism of Antiochus of Ascalon in a more transcendental direction, under the influence of Neopythagoreanism’.[98] If this is true, Eudorus’ emphasis on the notion of assimilation to God (which he will connect later on in this text with Pythagoras’ ‘following God’) accords very well with the Neo-Pythagorean interest in man as the image of God, which we have studied above (§ 2.1.2). As we shall see below, in the discussion of Plutarch, both strands, Neo-Pythagorean anthropology, with its description of man (or the ruler) as the image of *God*, and Neo-Pythagorean and Platonic ethics, with its emphasis on following *God* and assimilating to *God*, seem to move into conjunction.

Secondly, this is the first time that the assimilation to God is defined as the *telos*, the ultimate goal of (Platonic) ethics. From now on, this will become standard practice, and both the 2nd cent. AD Platonist philosopher Alcinous and the 3rd cent. AD historian of philosophy Diogenes Laertius regard assimilation to God in this way.

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[97] Dillon 1996*a*, 122.
[98] Dillon 1996*b*, 565.

Thirdly, although Plato is portrayed as agreeing with Pythagoras, he is credited with providing a clearer definition of what Pythagoras had in mind: 'Plato defined this more clearly by adding: "according as is possible (κατὰ τὸ δυνατόν)"'. Eudorus refers here to Plato's *Theaetetus*: 'to escape is to become like God, so far as this is possible' – φυγὴ δὲ ὁμοίωσις θεῷ κατὰ τὸ δυνατόν (Plato, *Theaetetus* 176b). The reason why Eudorus regards Plato's addition, 'according as is possible', as so important is that, in his mind, it points to the manner in which assimilation to God is realized. But by interpreting Plato in this way, Eudorus seems to go beyond what Plato actually said. As Dillon explains,

> For Plato, '*kata to dynaton*' meant 'as far as possible (for a mere mortal)'; Eudorus takes it to mean rather 'according to that part of us which is capable of this', that is to say, the intellect, and its particular virtue, Wisdom. Of course, Plato also believed this, but what is in fact in the text a modest disclaimer of human capabilities becomes to the more dogmatic mind of Eudorus a specification of precisely the faculty by which we become like God.[99]

Plato's phrase 'according as is possible (κατὰ τὸ δυνατόν)', thus, is understood to mean that 'it is only possible through wisdom (φρόνησις), that is to say, as a result of (living in accordance with) virtue'. In this way, Eudorus gives his own creative interpretation of the phrase μετὰ φρονήσεως, 'with wisdom', at the end of Plato's definition of assimilation to God in the *Theaetetus*. If Plato writes that φυγὴ δὲ ὁμοίωσις θεῷ κατὰ τὸ δυνατόν· ὁμοίωσις δὲ δίκαιον καὶ ὅσιον μετὰ φρονήσεως γενέσθαι ('to escape is to become like God, so far as this is possible; and to become like God is to become righteous and holy, with wisdom'), Eudorus clearly reads the second line as explaining the former: assimilation to God occurs in accordance with what is possible, i.e. in accordance with φρόνησις, wisdom. Assimilation to God, as the goal of ethics, is thus only possible through this wisdom (φρονήσει δ' ἐστὶ μόνως δυνατόν), which is understood as a life in accordance with virtue (τοῦτο δ' ἦν τὸ κατ' ἀρετὴν <ζῆν>). This, again, must be Eudorus' summary of the *Theaetetus*: 'living in accordance with virtue' must be similar to 'becoming righteous and holy' (ὁμοίωσις δὲ δίκαιον καὶ ὅσιον … γενέσθαι).

The need to lead such a consciously ethical life is subsequently based by Eudorus on the analogy between the microcosm of man's soul and the macrocosm of the creator; the former needs to imitate the latter, and it is the wise man who accomplishes this:

> Ἐν μὲν γὰρ θεῷ τὸ κοσμοποιὸν καὶ κοσμοδιοικητικόν· ἐν δὲ τῷ σοφῷ βίου κατάστασις καὶ ζωῆς διαγωγή· ὅπερ αἰνίξασθαι μὲν Ὅμηρον εἰπόντα (ε 193) κατ' ἴχνια βαῖνε θεοῖο· Πυθαγόραν δὲ παρ' αὐτὸν εἰπεῖν· Ἕπου θεῷ· δῆλον ὡς οὐχ ὁρατῷ καὶ προηγουμένῳ, νοητῷ δὲ καὶ τῆς κοσμικῆς εὐταξίας ἁρμονικῷ.

[99] Dillon 1996*a*, 123.

> Because in God there is the activity of creating the world and that of governing the world; in the wise, the activity of the establishing of a[n well-organized intellectual and ethical, virtuous] mode of life and that of the maintenance of [such] a way of life – the very thing which Homer spoke about in riddles when he said: 'Walk in the footsteps of God' (Homer, Odyssey 2.406; 3.30; 5.193; 7.38), and what Pythagoras, in addition to him, said in the following way: 'Follow God'. Clearly they meant not a visible god who was leading the way but an intelligible one who harmonizes the world's orderliness. (Trans. mine)

In this passage, as I already suggested, Eudorus gives the reason (γάϱ) why assimilation to God takes place through wisdom, as a result of living in accordance with virtue. This is the case because the wise man, in his activities of establishing and maintaining an intellectual and ethical mode of life, in fact resembles the activities of the Creator himself in creating and governing the cosmos. This view clearly derives from the end of Plato's *Timaeus*, which we discussed in § 2.1.1 above, and which concerns the rectification of the distorted revolutions within man's head by looking at the harmonies and revolutions of the cosmos (*Timaeus* 90c–d).[100] Later in his text, Eudorus returns explicitly to Plato's *Timaeus*. The life which man organizes in imitation of God is first and foremost intellectual. It is the imitation of 'an *intelligible* [God] who harmonizes the world's orderliness'. Yet, as we shall see below, Eudorus' doctrine of assimilation to God contains the idea 'that we should live *in accordance with virtue*'. A well-organized intellectual life is accompanied by an ethical, virtuous life.

The resemblance between the lives of man and God is now cast in terminology drawn from Homer and Pythagoras. As regards the former, Eudorus quotes a part of the familiar Homeric lines which follow speeches uttered by Pallas Athene: … ὣς ἄρα φωνήσασ᾽ ἡγήσατο Παλλὰς Ἀθήνη / δῖα θεάων | καρπαλίμως· ὁ δ᾽ ἔπειτα μετ᾽ ἴχνια βαῖνε θεοῖο, 'With these words, Pallas Athene (or: the gracious goddess) moved swiftly away, and he [i. e. either Odysseus or his son Telemachus] followed in the steps of the goddess' (*Odyssey* 2.406; 3.30; 5.193; 7.38). The narrative description of someone, either Odysseus or his son, following in the footsteps of the goddess Pallas Athene is now understood as a commendable act, which can be supplemented with Pythagoras' imperative Ἕπου θεῷ, 'Follow God'.

This is the second time Pythagoras is referred to by Eudorus. In this way Eudorus shows that he believes that Plato is 'in agreement with Pythagoras that the *telos* is assimilation to God (ὁμοίωσις θεῷ)'; the reason for this is that the Platonic notion of assimilation to God is the equivalent of the Pythagorean notion of following God. This is actually only an explication of what Plato had already implicitly said himself. As we saw above, in his *Laws*, for instance, Plato clarified his thoughts about assimilation to God by stressing that 'it is necessary

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[100] Cf. Sedley 1999, 316–24.

that every man should be minded like those who follow in the steps of God': ὡς τῶν συνακολουθησόντων ἐσόμενον τῷ θεῷ δεῖ διανοηθῆναι πάντα ἄνδρα (716b), a clear allusion to Pythagoras' adage 'Follow God' (cf. further *Phaedrus* 248a). Platonists after Eudorus, such as Plutarch, as we shall see below, also explicitly understand Plato's injunction to assimilate oneself to God as a development of Pythagoras' exhortation to follow God.

To avoid misunderstandings, Eudorus adds that the apparently literal language of Homer's 'walking in the footsteps of God' and Pythagoras 'following God' is not to be understood literally but metaphorically. It relates to the invisible reality of the mind and the corresponding reality of the cosmos: 'this does not relate to the visible and to what is first and leads the way, but to what falls within the province of mind and the harmony of the good arrangement of the cosmos'.

Eudorus now continues by explaining that what Homer and Pythagoras stated was clearly (σαφῶς) endorsed by Plato, too. The implication, of course, as at the beginning of the passage, is that Plato did so σαφέστερον, even more clearly. The problem for Eudorus, however, is that, because he ascribes to Plato a coherent doctrine of assimilation to God as the *telos* of ethics, he has to account for what seems to be the incohesiveness of isolated passages dispersed throughout the Platonic corpus. For this reason, Eudorus feels bound to emphasize that Plato not only explained the notion of assimilation to God clearly (σαφῶς), but also, at the same time, 'abundantly' (ἅμα καὶ πλουσίως). It seems necessary for him to delineate the vast extent of Plato's reflections on this issue, as the following passage indicates:

> Εἴρηται δὲ παρὰ Π0λάτωνι κατὰ τὸ τῆς φιλοσοφίας τριμερές, ἐν Τιμαίῳ μὲν φυσικῶς (προσθήσω δὲ καὶ Πυθαγορικῶς, σημαίνοντος ἀφθόνως τὴν ἐκείνου προεπίνοιαν)· ἐν δὲ τῇ Πολιτείᾳ ἠθικῶς· ἐν δὲ τῷ Θεαιτήτῳ λογικῶς· περιπέφρασται δὲ κἂν τῷ τετάρτῳ περὶ Νόμων ἐπὶ τῆς ἀκολουθίας τοῦ θεοῦ σαφῶς ἅμα καὶ πλουσίως.
>
> This has been said in the work of Plato, in accordance with the threefold division of philosophy: in the Timaeus in a physical way (and, I shall add, in a Pythagorean way, because Plato generously indicates what that man [i.e. Pythagoras] has conceived before him); in the Republic in an ethical way; and in the Theaetetus in a logical way; and it has been expressed periphrastically in a clear and at the same time abundant way also in the fourth book of the Laws, when he speaks about following God. (Trans. mine)

Eudorus' introduction of assimilation to God as the *telos* of Platonic ethics, thus, is accompanied by the need to give the full evidence for it. Eudorus indeed lists many of the passages we discussed in our overview of Plato above, such as those from the *Timaeus*, the *Republic*, the *Theaetetus*, and the *Laws*. The passage from the *Timaeus* was discussed in § 2.1.1, in our treatment of the cosmos as the 'image of the intelligible, a perceptible god' (*Timaeus* 92c); in that context, we saw that immediately previously Plato argues that, within the cosmos, it is man

who most resembles the cosmos (90c–d). It is this passage which Eudorus goes on to quote at the end of his present section and which highlights the intellectual aspects of becoming like God:

> For the divine part within us the congenial motions are *the intellections* (αἱ διανοήσεις) and revolutions of the Universe. These each one of us should follow, rectifying the revolutions within our head, which were distorted at our birth, by learning the harmonies and revolutions of the Universe, and *thereby making the part that thinks like unto the object of its thought* (τῷ κατανοουμένῳ τὸ κατανοοῦν ἐξομοιῶσαι), in accordance with its original nature, and having achieved this likeness (ὁμοιώσαντα) attain finally to that goal (τέλος) of life which is set before men by the gods as the most good both for the present and for the time to come. (Plato, *Timaeus* 90c–d)

This passage was read by Eudorus as the expression of Plato's doctrine of assimilation to God, but now seen through a cosmological lens. As Sedley remarks, 'In Antiquity this passage became, after *Theaetetus* 176b, the second *locus classicus* on *homoiōsis theōi*'.[101] The other passages, from the *Republic* (613a–b),[102] the *Theaetetus* (176b–c), and the *Laws* (716c–d), were studied in § 2.2.1 above. The trouble which Eudorus must have gone to in compiling such a list of sources highlights his interest in establishing the Platonic doctrine of assimilation to God. By distinguishing between the usual branches of philosophy, i. e. physics, ethics and logic, Eudorus was able to show the comprehensiveness of Plato's doctrine as well as to explain the different forms it could take within the distinct branches. In line with the latter emphasis, he finishes by focusing on the basic concordance of all the passages he has adduced.

> Τὸ δέ γε πολύφωνον τοῦ Πλάτωνος.[103] Εἴρηται δὲ καὶ τὰ περὶ τοῦ τέλους αὐτῷ πολλαχῶς. Καὶ τὴν μὲν ποικιλίαν τῆς φράσεως ἔχει διὰ τὸ λόγιον καὶ μεγαλήγορον, εἰς δὲ ταὐτὸ καὶ σύμφωνον τοῦ δόγματος συντελεῖ. Τοῦτο δ' ἐστὶ τὸ κατ' ἀρετὴν ζῆν. Τοῦτο δ' αὖ κτῆσις ἅμα καὶ χρῆσις τῆς τελείας ἀρετῆς.
>
> Speaking with multiple voices is characteristic of Plato, and even the subject of the *telos* is expressed by him in several ways. He uses a variety of expressions because of his lofty eloquence, but he is contributing to a single concordant item of doctrine. That doctrine is that we should live in accordance with virtue. And that, in turn, is both the possession ánd the employment of perfect virtue. (Trans. mine)

The variety of forms which Plato's doctrine of assimilation to God took on in his writings should not obscure their basic uniformity, Eudorus warns his readers. There is indeed only one *telos* of Plato's ethics, even though Plato has expressed it πολλαχῶς, in many ways. The variety of expressions which Plato uses should be taken to reflect his impressive eloquence, which rests not only on rhetorical

[101] Sedley 1999, 319.

[102] The editor of Stobaeus, C. Wachsmuth, refers to *Republic* IX 585b ff. and X 608c ff. (see Wachsmuth & Hense 1884–1912), but Dillon believes the reference is to *Republic* 613a–b, the same passage as Alcinous quotes (see below); see Dillon 1993, 172.

[103] Omitting the supplement <οὐ πολύδοξον>.

skills, but also on the sound concord of his doctrine of living in accordance with virtue. Together, these factors constitute the appeal of Plato's definition of man's ethical goal.

Finally, Eudorus draws attention to the fact that this way of life cannot ever be seen as accomplished. It is an ongoing process. Living in accordance with virtue, as the basis of one's assimilation to God, consists not only in possessing perfect virtue, but also in the continuous exercising of it. This virtue is the goal of ethics, as Eudorus underlines by quoting a passage from the *Timaeus* in which the term *telos* occurs:

> Ὅτι δὲ τέλος αὐτὴν ἡγεῖται, τέταχεν ἐν Τιμαίῳ (l.s.) <εἰπὼν> καὶ τοὔνομα· φράσω δὲ καὶ τἀκροτελεύτιον τῆς περιοχῆς· ἔχει δ' οὕτως· «ὁμοιώσαντα δὲ τέλος ἔχειν τοῦ προτεθέντος ἀνθρώποις ὑπὸ θεῶν ἀρίστου βίου πρός τε τὸν παρόντα καὶ τὸν μέλλοντα».
>
> That he regards this virtue as the *telos*, he established in the *Timaeus* by using the actual word. I will quote the end of the passage, which runs as follows: '… and having achieved this likeness [each one of us should] attain finally to that goal of life which is set before men by the gods as the most good both for the present and for the time to come'. (Trans. mine with *Timaeus* 90d quoted from Loeb)

In the quotation from the *Timaeus*, the assimilation Plato talks of is only an assimilation between man and the cosmos, and the goal of life is only set before men by the gods and does not consist in assimilating to them. Yet as we have seen above, Eudorus interprets this passage as evidence for the assimilation of man to God, read from a cosmological perspective, and there is something to be said in favour of this interpretation. If man can be assimilated to the cosmos, and the cosmos is 'an image of the intelligible, a perceptible god' (92c), then – in the final analysis – a *homoiōsis kosmōi* is an intermediary stage in *homoiōsis theōi*.[104] Indeed, if the cosmos, in having been brought into order out of disorder, shares in God's goodness and is wished by God to 'be, so far as possible, nearly resembling Him' – as Plato argues earlier in the *Timaeus* (29e) –, then man, in being assimilated to this cosmos, is in the process of being assimilated to God himself. In this sense, Eudorus is right to include the *Timaeus* among his evidence for a Platonic doctrine of *homoiōsis theōi*. His reason for finishing this section with a reference to *Timaeus* 90d in particular is undoubtedly that here assimilation as such is explicitly designated as the *telos* of the best life, the τέλος τοῦ ἀρίστου βίου.

Given the ardent character of Eudorus' promulgation of the doctrine of assimilation to God in his *Division of Philosophical Reasoning* (*Diairesis tou kata philosophian logou*), it is easy to understand why Arius Didymus was struck

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[104] Scholars such as Sedley may regard this as importantly understating the case because the *Timaeus* at 34a–b, 55d, 68e and 92a (plus the opening page of the *Critias*, where Timaeus' speech ends) says that the world *is* a god.

by this and other issues in this contemporary work and promoted it as 'a book worth getting (βιβλίον ἀξιόκτητον)'. It made an important impact on the history of philosophy and left its mark on Platonists and philosophers of other denominations. As we have seen, Aristotelians, such as the 2nd cent. AD philosopher Aspasius, were also influenced by the notion of assimilation to God as a central concept, even to the extent that they imported it into their interpretation of Aristotle's writings although the terminology was absent there (see § 2.2.4 [a]). One can easily imagine how, as a result of this development in the definition of the *telos* of ethics, we can see – as Dillon puts it – 'a growth in religiosity in philosophical speculation'.[105] The first philosopher after Eudorus to show awareness of this concept, however, is the Jewish author Philo of Alexandria. I shall deal with his views on the similarity between God and man later, in § 2.3, before commenting upon Paul's interest in the likeness between believers and Christ (in § 2.4). As we shall see, Philo and Paul, too, seem to be part of the new movement which starts with Eudorus; they reflect extensively on man's assimilation to God or Christ, God's image. Both profited from a new direction in ethics which suited their own purposes. After Philo and Paul, chronologically speaking, others, such as the Middle Platonist philosophers Plutarch and Alcinous, followed suit. To them we now turn.

2.2.6 Plutarch

The 2nd cent. AD Middle Platonist Plutarch is an important testimony to the appropriation of Plato's doctrine of assimilation to God. Plutarch is significant for various reasons.

First, Plutarch shows that the notion of assimilation to God goes hand in hand with that of man, or rather the ruler, as the image of God. In a passage already studied above in § 2.1.2, in dealing with the pagan evidence for the notion of the image of God, Plutarch considers the ideal ruler as God's image:

> The ruler is *the image of God* who orders all things (ἄρχων δ' εἰκὼν θεοῦ τοῦ πάντα κοσμοῦντος). Such a ruler needs no Phidias nor Polycleitus nor Myron to model him, but *by his virtue he forms himself in the likeness of God* (ἀλλ' αὑτὸς αὑτὸν εἰς ὁμοιότητα θεῷ δι' ἀρετῆς καθιστὰς) and thus creates a statue most delightful of all to behold and most worthy of divinity (καθιστὰς καὶ δημιουργῶν ἀγαλμάτων τὸ ἥδιστον ὀφθῆναι καὶ θεοπρεπέστατον). Now just as in the heavens God has established as a most beautiful image of himself the sun and the moon, so in states a ruler 'who in God's likeness | Righteous decisions upholds' (Homer, *Odyssey* 19.109 and 111), that is to say, one who, possessing God's wisdom, establishes, as his likeness and luminary, intelligence in place of sceptre or thunderbolt or trident, with which attributes some rulers represent themselves in sculpture and painting. (Plutarch, *Ad principem ineruditum* 780E–F)

[105] Dillon 1996*a*, 123.

Here the notion of the image of God and that of forming oneself in the likeness of God appear to belong to the same semantic-conceptual field. In Plutarch both notions seem to have a Pythagorean background. As we saw above in § 2.1.2, Plutarch's designation of the ruler as the image of God is Neo-Pythagorean practice, while – as we shall see below in another passage from Plutarch – his concept of assimilation to God is underpinned with references to both Plato and Pythagoras.

It is noteworthy that the concept of assimilation to God is understood in a very active sense. Although the ruler *is* the image of God, he apparently still needs to form himself in the likeness of God by virtue – αὑτὸς αὑτὸν εἰς ὁμοιότητα θεῷ δι' ἀρετῆς καθιστὰς. His being the image of God is not so much a factual truth but rather the result of living a virtuous life. The explicit addition of virtue as the way to achieve assimilation to God seems to refer to the passage from Plato's *Theaetetus*. There assimilation to God is defined as 'to become righteous and holy, with wisdom' (ὁμοίωσις δὲ δίκαιον καὶ ὅσιον μετὰ φρονήσεως γενέσθαι, *Theaetetus* 176b), and this process of becoming more and more knowledgeable of God's righteousness is also explicitly called 'true virtue' (ἀρετὴ ἀληθινή): 'the knowledge of this is wisdom or true virtue' – ἡ μὲν γὰρ τούτου γνῶσις σοφία καὶ ἀρετὴ ἀληθινή (*Theaetetus* 176c). Indeed, as Plato stresses in the *Republic*, it is 'by *practicing* virtue' (ἐπιτηδεύων ἀρετὴν) that a man is 'to be likened unto God so far as that is possible for a man' (ἐπιτηδεύων ἀρετὴν εἰς ὅσον δυνατὸν ἀνθρώπῳ ὁμοιοῦσθαι θεῷ, *Republic* 613a–b). This stress on virtue as the mode by which one is assimilated to God is taken over in Eudorus' definition, according to which assimilation to God 'is only possible by wisdom (φρόνησις), *that is to say, as a result of (living in accordance with) virtue* – φρονήσει δ' ἐστὶ μόνως δυνατόν, τοῦτο δ' ἦν τὸ κατ' ἀρετὴν <ζῆν> (Stobaeus, vol. 2, chap. 7, section 3f, p. 49.9–12).

This is nicely captured in Plutarch's description of what it means to be an image of God. This is not achieved by having a master sculptor such as Phidias, Polycleitus or Myron model one. Such an image is only erected by actively forming oneself in the likeness of God (αὑτὸς αὑτὸν εἰς ὁμοιότητα θεῷ … καθιστὰς). This is not a passive process in which one is made like God, but a course of action δι' ἀρετῆς, through virtue. Only in this way can one succeed in 'creating a statue most delightful of all to behold and most worthy for a god' (δημιουργῶν ἀγαλμάτων τὸ ἥδιστον ὀφθῆναι καὶ θεοπρεπέστατον), in other words, an 'image of God' (εἰκὼν θεοῦ). Clearly the language of image of God and assimilation to God intersect. This is important, because we shall see the same junction in Paul's reflections on Christ as the image of God and the believers' transformation into that image, as a result of which Christ and the believers resemble one another.

Apart from the Platonic notion of assimilation to God, Plutarch's language of forming oneself in the likeness of God also seems to reflect the general practice

of modelling oneself on one particular god on the religious market of Antiquity. It is in this sense that Plutarch can talk equally about the god to whom a historical figure such as Antony always most likened and attached himself: ὁ θεὸς …, ᾧ μάλιστα συνεξομοιῶν καὶ συνοικειῶν ἑαυτὸν (Plutarch, *Antonius* 75.6).[106] This emphasizes that assimilation is a process in which the acting subject is fully engaged and models himself on the god to whom he wishes to assimilate.

Secondly, it appears that Plutarch, like Plato and Eudorus before him, understands the process of assimilation to God as the equivalent of Pythagoras' method of following God. In a passage in *De sera numinis vindicta*, Plutarch states that assimilation to God is 'accessible to all who can "follow God"' (550D). Here Plutarch is referring to Pythagoras' admonition to follow God (ἕπεσθαι θεῷ). This reference to Pythagoras had already been made by Plato himself (see *Laws* 716b, and *Phaedrus* 248a, already referred to above in § 2.2.1), but the emphasis on the consonance between Plato and Pythagoras was a hallmark of Eudorus' introduction of assimilation to God as the *telos* of Platonic ethics (see § 2.2.5 above). It is this emphasis which the passage from Plutarch seems to reflect. At the same time the full passage is also of interest because it shows again that the process of assimilation involves the whole subject totally. Man only becomes 'settled in virtue through copying and aspiring to the beauty and the goodness that are His', i. e. God's. The entire passage reads as follows:

> Consider first that God, as Plato says, offers himself to all as a pattern of every excellence (πάντων καλῶν ὁ θεὸς ἑαυτὸν ἐν μέσῳ παράδειγμα θέμενος), thus rendering human virtue, which is in some sort an assimilation to Himself (ἐξομοίωσιν οὖσαν ἁμωσγέπως πρὸς αὑτόν), accessible to all who are able 'to follow God' (τὴν ἀνθρωπίνην ἀρετήν … ἐνδίδωσι τοῖς ἕπεσθαι θεῷ δυναμένοις).
>
> Indeed this was the origin of the change whereby universal nature, disordered before, became a 'cosmos' through resemblance and some form of participation in the form and virtue of God (ὁμοιότητι καὶ μεθέξει τινὶ τῆς περὶ τὸ θεῖον ἰδέας καὶ ἀρετῆς; cf. *Timaeus* 29e).
>
> The same philosopher says further that nature kindled vision in us so that the soul, beholding the heavenly motions and wondering at the sight, should grow to accept and cherish all that moves in stateliness and order, and thus come to hate discordant and errant passions and to shun the aimless and haphazard as source of all vice and jarring error (cf. *Timaeus* 90c–d). For man is fitted to derive from God no greater blessing than τὸ μιμήσει καὶ διώξει τῶν ἐν ἐκείνῳ καλῶν καὶ ἀγαθῶν εἰς ἀρετὴν καθίστασθαι, to become settled in virtue (εἰς ἀρετὴν καθίστασθαι) through copying and aspiring (μιμήσει καὶ διώξει) to the beauty and the goodness that are in Him. (*De sera numinis vindicta* 550D–E)

As we have already observed, Plutarch links the Platonic doctrine with the Pythagorean command to follow God, just as Eudorus had done. Furthermore,

[106] On divine assimilations in Plutarch's *Lives* of Demetrius and Antonius, see Brenk 1998.

Plutarch shows the same interpretation of the *Timaeus* as Eudorus proposed. Whereas Plato argues that the cosmos, in having been brought into order out of disorder, shares in God's goodness and is wished by God to 'be, so far as possible, nearly resembling Him' (*Timaeus* 29e), Plutarch even emphasizes that, in this way, the cosmos is assimilated to, and participates in God's *virtue*: the change of the primordial chaotic universe into an ordered cosmos takes place ὁμοιότητι καὶ μεθέξει τινὶ τῆς περὶ τὸ θεῖον ἰδέας καὶ ἀρετῆς, 'through assimilation and some sort of participation in the form *and virtue* of God'. The assimilation of man to God is read by Plutarch into *Timaeus* 90c–d. By modelling himself upon the regularity of the cosmos, man is taken 'to become settled *in virtue* (εἰς ἀρετὴν καθίστασθαι) through copying and aspiring (μιμήσει καὶ διώξει) to the beauty and the goodness that are in Him', i.e. in God. This is the same interpretation as that proposed by Eudorus, which turned the *Timaeus* into evidence for Plato's doctrine of assimilation to God. Plutarch even introduces the terminology of virtue (ἀρετή) into his reading of these passages from *Timaeus*, despite the fact that this term is absent from them.[107] Plutarch clearly derives this stress on ἀρετή from those passages in other dialogues of Plato where the notion of assimilation to God is linked with 'virtue', notably in Plato's *Theaetetus* (176b–c) and *Republic* (613a–b), or from the definition of assimilation to God in authors such as Eudorus, where it is part of the definition. Plutarch then imports the new interpretation into his discussion of the relevant passages of the *Timaeus* (29e; 90c–d).

In the passages from *Ad principem ineruditum* (780E–F) and *De sera numinis vindicta* (550D–E), thus, we see that Plutarch's reflections on the image of God and assimilation to God clearly have a Pythagoreanizing character. His assertion that the ruler is the image of God is dependent upon Neo-Pythagorean kingship ideology, which we was studied in § 2.1.2, and his treatment of the Platonic doctrine of assimilating oneself to God is supported by reference to Pythagoras' adage 'Follow God'. Plutarch will prove very important for our enquiry into the background of Paul's thoughts about image of God and likeness between man and Christ, because the notions of the image of God and assimilation to God appear to be part of the same linguistic-conceptual field in Paul. Moreover, as Plutarch shows, both notions are connected with the emergence of Neo-Pythagoreanism and its merging with Platonism from the 1st cent. BC onwards. Indeed,

[107] Cf. ἀρετή in *Timaeus* 34b: God 'established one sole and solitary Heaven, able of itself – because of its excellence / goodness / virtue (δι' ἀρετὴν) – to company with itself and needing none other beside, sufficing unto itself as acquaintance and friend' and 34c about the soul of the universe in comparison to the cosmic body: 'God (…) constructed Soul to be older than Body and prior in birth and excellence / goodness / virtue (καὶ γενέσει καὶ ἀρετῇ), since she was to be the mistress and ruler and it the ruled'. These are only faint parallels, which show that Plutarch really has an ethicizing interpretation of the *Timaeus* which takes its starting point in the otion of assimilation to God.

Neo-Pythagorean anthropology, with its stipulation of man (or the ruler) as the image of *God*, and Neo-Pythagorean and Platonic ethics, with its emphasis on following *God* and assimilating to *God*, become intertwined. Since this development only began in the 1st cent. BC, Paul, flourishing in the 50s AD, appears to be part of a trend of his times, which he draws on to express his own anthropological, Christological and theological convictions.

Thirdly, Plutarch is important because the way he applies the doctrine of assimilation to God is also anti-sophistic. This was already true of Plato insofar as his reflections, notably in the *Laws*, have an anti-sophistic edge. There, as we have seen above, Plato strongly argues against the view of the sophist Protagoras that man is the measure of all things. In deliberate opposition to Protagoras, Plato contends that

> In our eyes God will be 'the measure of all things' in the highest degree – a degree much higher than is any 'man' they talk of (ὁ δὴ θεὸς ἡμῖν πάντων χρημάτων μέτρον ἂν εἴη μάλιστα, καὶ πολὺ μᾶλλον ἤ πού τις, ὥς φασιν, ἄνθρωπος). (*Laws* 716c)

Plato's ideal man, by contrast, models himself on God and 'must needs become, so far as he possibly can, of a like character'; only this man is like God (ὅμοιος; *Laws* 716c–d). This anti-sophistic attitude is taken over by Plutarch. In a passage preserved in Stobaeus, Plutarch shows that Platonic reflections on the *homoiōsis theōi* entail a fierce, inherent criticism of sophistic philosophy. Plutarch develops this criticism in his praise of quietude, which he contrasts with the sophistic market place of crowded towns:

> How wise a thing, it would seem, is quietude! In particular it serves for studying to acquire knowledge and wisdom, by which I do not mean the wisdom which is characteristic of a petty trader and of the market place (λέγω δ' οὐ τὴν καπηλικὴν καὶ ἀγοραίαν), but that mighty wisdom which makes him that acquires it like to God (ἀλλὰ τὴν μεγάλην, ἥτις ἐξομοιοῖ θεῷ τὸν αὐτὴν ἀναλαβόντα). Those forms of study that are practised in towns among the crowds of humanity exercise the so-called shrewdness that is really knavery (…). But solitude, being wisdom's training-ground, is a good character-builder, and moulds and sets in order men's souls. (Plutarch, Fragment 143 [edn Sandbach]; = Stobaeus, vol. 4, § 16.18, p. 398)

Plutarch's criticism of the wisdom which is characteristic of a petty trader and of the market place (τὴν καπηλικὴν καὶ ἀγοραίαν) seems to be a reference to Plato's attack on Protagoras in the dialogue of the same name, in which Socrates urges Hippocrates:

> We must see that the sophist in commending his wares does not deceive us, like the wholesaler and the retailer who deal in food for the body. (…) So too those who take the various subjects of knowledge from city to city, and sell them by retail (οἱ τὰ μαθήματα περιάγοντες κατὰ τὰς πόλεις καὶ πωλοῦντες καὶ καπηλεύοντες) to whoever wants them, commend everything that they have for sale. (*Protagoras* 313d–e)

The petty traders sell knowledge and wisdom by retail, on the markets of the cities; techniques of persuasion and marketing are more important for them than the quality and content of their wares. As we shall see in our treatment of Paul' second letter to the Corinthians in chaps 4 and 6 below, the same opposition between strongly rhetorical, petty market business, on the one hand, and true knowledge and inner conviction, on the other, is made by Paul when he distinguishes between selling the word of God by retail and the need for inner transformation. Paul, intent on spreading the knowledge of God throughout the Eastern Mediterranean (2.14), flatly denies that his working methods are comparable with the practices of those 'who sell the word of God by retail': οὐ γάρ ἐσμεν ὡς οἱ πολλοὶ καπηλεύοντες τὸν λόγον τοῦ θεοῦ (2.17). Instead, his knowledge of God entails the notion of inner transformation into the image of God, a transformation which takes place in the inner man (2 Cor 3.18–4.4, 4.16; see §§ 4.5 and 6.2 below).

Fourthly, Plutarch is relevant because he also characterizes the opposite of assimilation to God. Assimilation to God, as we have seen, is perceived as something which is achieved through virtue (δι' ἀρετῆς). The more one copies and aspires to the beauty and the goodness that are in God, the more one becomes settled in virtue. This assimilation is clearly based on a movement from lower to higher, from the visible world to the higher, paradigmatic reality of God himself. The reverse direction was taken, according to Plutarch (in his history of Roman cult), when the Romans started 'to liken higher things to lower' (ἀφομοιοῦν τὰ βελτίονα τοῖς χείροσιν). Whereas in the first 170 years of Roman cult, established by Numa, the Romans 'made no statues in bodily form' and only apprehended God by the intellect, the situation changed drastically when Numa's ideal aniconic cult started to disintegrate:

> While for the first hundred and seventy years they were continually building temples and establishing sacred shrines, they made no statues in bodily form for them, convinced that it was impious to liken higher things to lower, and that it was impossible to apprehend deity except by the intellect (ὡς οὔτε ὅσιον ἀφομοιοῦν τὰ βελτίονα τοῖς χείροσιν οὔτε ἐφάπτεσθαι θεοῦ δυνατὸν ἄλλως ἢ νοήσει. (Plutarch, *Numa* 8.8)

As we shall see in our discussion of Roman religion in chap. 7 below, Paul draws the same antithesis between an original aniconic cult of God and its deterioration when man ἤλλαξαν τὴν δόξαν τοῦ ἀφθάρτου θεοῦ ἐν ὁμοιώματι εἰκόνος φθαρτοῦ ἀνθρώπου, 'exchanged the glory of the immortal God for the likeness of an image of mortal man shaped like mortal man' (Rom 1.23; see § 7.1 below). This development in the wrong direction is only stopped, Paul contends, when man experiences a transformation by which he is rendered σύμμορφος τῆς εἰκόνος τοῦ υἱοῦ αὐτοῦ, of the same form as the image of God (8.29).

Plutarch, thus, is a particularly relevant author. As we have seen, the language of forming oneself in the likeness of God by one's virtue and that of being the

image of God are clearly related, and this seems to suggest that the twin notions of image of God and assimilation to God do indeed constitute the background of Philo's and Paul's reflections on the image of God.

2.2.7 Alcinous

In Eudorus and Plutarch we found a profound interest in establishing evidence for Plato's doctrine of assimilation to God. This seems to be a sign of the innovativeness with which this doctrine was being explored. Plutarch's contemporary Alcinous, author of *The Handbook of Platonism*, is still engaged in the same project. Yet, in a sense, his approach seems to be more technical, in the sense that he regards assimilation to God as a rigid philosophical exercise. Plato, too, views assimilation as the activity of philosophers. In the *Phaedo*, for instance, as we shall see shortly, Plato distinguishes between several classes of human beings. Only the class of philosophers is allowed to enter into 'the community of the gods', whereas even the next group down, those who have practised particular virtues, but 'without philosophy or reason', are barred from this community (*Phaedo* 82a–c). Alcinous' rules about who qualifies for assimilation to God seem to be even stricter and more technical. Already at the very beginning of his *Handbook*, Alcinous makes clear – in a fashion which, in a sense, is reminiscent of Aristotle's stress on the exercise of good reason (see § 2.2.3 above) – that only the contemplative life, and not the active life is a guarantee for assimilation to God:

> Contemplation (ἡ θεωρία), then, is the activity of the intellect (ἐνέργεια τοῦ νοῦ) when intelligizing the intelligibles, while action (ἡ δὲ πρᾶξις) is that activity of a rational soul which takes place by way of the body (ψυχῆς λογικῆς ἐνέργεια διὰ σώματος γινομένη). The soul engaged in contemplation (θεωροῦσα) of the divine and the thoughts of the divine is said to be in a good state, and this state of the soul is called 'wisdom' (φρόνησις), which may be asserted to be no other than *assimilation to the divine* (ὅπερ οὐχ ἕτερον εἴποι ἄν τις εἶναι τῆς πρὸς τὸ θεῖον ὁμοιώσεως). (Alcinous, *Handbook of Platonism*, § 2.2, 153.2–9; trans. Dillon)

This strict definition of assimilation to God as part of the contemplative life is mirrored at the end of chap. 28, in which Alcinous discusses the assimilation to God as man's goal. In the first three quarters of the chapter Alcinous presents his evidence for Plato's doctrine of assimilation to God (§§ 28.1–3) very similarly to Eudorus before him, as we shall see below. At the end of the chapter Alcinous answers the question of who can attain likeness to God, and it is here that the strict definition from the beginning of the book returns in expanded form (§ 28.4):

> We can attain likeness to God (Ἐφικοίμεθα δ' ἂν τοῦ γενέσθαι ὅμοιοι θεῷ), first of all, if we are endowed with a suitable nature (φύσει τε χρησάμενοι τῇ προσηκούσῃ), then if we develop proper habits, way of life, and good practice according to law (ἔθεσί τε καὶ ἀγωγῇ καὶ ἀσκήσει τῇ κατὰ νόμον) and, most importantly, if we use reason, and education, and the correct philosophical tradition (καὶ τὸ κυριώτατον

> λόγῳ καὶ διδασκαλίᾳ καὶ θεωρημάτων παραδόσει), in such a way as to distance ourselves from the great majority of human concerns (ὥστε ἐξίστασθαι μὲν τὰ πολλὰ τῶν ἀνθρωπίνων πραγμάτων), and always to be in close contact with intelligible reality (ἀεὶ δὲ εἶναι πρὸς τοῖς νοητοῖς). (Alcinous, *Handbook* 28.4, 182.3–8)

Here, the distinction between the contemplative, theoretical life and the active, practical life is brought up again in the way Alcinous differentiates between the correct traditions of θεωρήματα on the one hand, and the plenitude of human πράγματα on the other hand. Alcinous clearly limits the accessibility of the experience of assimilation to God to a very small group who, having finished preliminary studies in music, arithmetic, astronomy, and geometry and, at the same time, having cared for their body by means of gymnastics (28.4, 182.8–14), now live the contemplative life and use their reason to the full; they are well educated and possess the correct tradition concerning the things which are to be contemplated.

Alcinous’ emphasis on the technical nature of the path towards assimilation to God is shared by Theon of Smyrna, the 2nd cent. AD Platonist mathematician and author of the *Aspects of Mathematics Useful for the Reading of Plato*.[108] At the end of his introduction to *De utilitate mathematicae*, Theon explains that purification is achieved through the fourfold tradition of philosophical θεωρήματα and of logical, political and physical principles, through ἡ τῶν κατὰ φιλοσοφίαν θεωρημάτων παράδοσις, τῶν τε λογικῶν καὶ πολιτικῶν καὶ φυσικῶν (*De utilitate mathematicae* 15). Only after that, in a fifth and final stage, can one achieve the true happiness which consists in assimilation to God: πέμπτον δ’ ἂν εἴη καὶ τελεώτατον ἡ ἐκ τούτων περιγενομένη εὐδαιμονία καὶ κατ’ αὐτὸν τὸν Πλάτωνα ὁμοίωσις θεῷ κατὰ τὸ δυνατόν (*De utilitate mathematicae* 15–16). On the one hand it is telling that even in such an elementary, technical work, which is concerned with arithmetic (especially with the types of numbers), the theory of musical harmony, and astronomy, assimilation to God is stipulated as the final, ultimate stage of education. On the other hand, the limited access to this fifth stage is equally clear. This limited accessibility is also characteristic of assimilation to God as perceived by Alcinous. Assimilation is only possible through instruction in the correct tradition concerning the θεωρήματα, the things to be theorized about.

Although according to Alcinous, too, theorizing is an assimilation *to God* (§ 2.2), and the contemplators even become *similar to God* (§ 28.4: γενέσθαι ὅμοιοι θεῷ), one can nevertheless imagine that part of what Dillon calls the ‘growth in religiosity in philosophical speculation’,[109] which the new attention for Plato’s thought about the assimilation to God engendered, is hindered by such formal and technical qualifications. It is interesting that Middle Platonists seem

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[108] Edn Hiller 1878, 1–205. For a French translation, see Dupuis 1892.
[109] Dillon 1996*a*, 123.

to have disagreed among themselves about the accessibility of the experience of assimilating to God. Whereas Alcinous and Theon of Smyrna limit access to those who lead a contemplative life, his contemporary Albinus clearly broadens it to the active life as well. Albinus discusses the matter in his differentiation between various types of Plato's dialogues. According to Albinus, some of them are fitted for testing (πειραστικοί), whereas others are suitable for 'midwifery' (μαιευτικοί), i. e. for eliciting from others what was in their minds without their knowing it, or suitable for argumentation (ὑφηγητικοί). As regards the latter type,

> τοῦτο γάρ ἐστιν αὐτῶν ἴδιον, εἴ γε ἐν τούτοις ἐστὶ μὲν τὰ φυσικὰ δόγματα, ἐστὶ δὲ καὶ τὰ ἠθικὰ καὶ τὰ πολιτικὰ καὶ οἰκονομικά, ὧν τὰ μὲν ἐπὶ θεωρίαν καὶ τὸν θεωρητικὸν βίον ἔχει τὴν ἀναφοράν, τὰ δ' ἐπὶ πρᾶξιν καὶ τὸν πρακτικὸν βίον, ἄμφω δὲ ταῦτα ἐπὶ τὸ ὁμοιωθῆναι θεῷ. (Albinus, *Introductio in Platonem* 6, 150.37–151.4)[110]

> This is their characteristic that in these dialogues one finds, on the one hand, the physical doctrines and, on the other, the ethical, political and domestic ones; the former are concerned with contemplation and the contemplative life, the latter with practice and the active, practical life, but both have to do with the process of assimilating to God. (Trans. mine)

According to Albinus, thus, assimilation to God is achieved not only through studying the physical doctrines, which constitutes the contemplative way to assimilation to God, but also through the practice of ethical, political and domestic truths, which is part of the active life.

Annas, who refers to this passage in Albinus, also mentions Apuleius.[111] Having explained, in terms derived from Plato's *Theaetetus*, that the goal of wisdom is to elevate oneself to God and resemble the conduct of the gods by being righteous, pious and wise, Apuleius continues by stating that not only through contemplative study, but also through practice one should follow what is agreeable to gods and men, because the supreme God does not limit himself to observing the totality of these activities by means of the intellect, but also inspects all of them, the primary, intermediary and most remote activities, and includes them in his universal and providential government:

> Sapientiae finis est, ut <ad> dei meritum sapiens provehatur hancque futuram eius operam, ut aemulatione vitae ad deorum actus accedat. Verum hoc ei poterit provenire, si virum perfecte iustum, pium, prudentem se praebeat. Unde non solum in perspectandi cognitione, verum etiam agendi opera sequi eum convenit, quae diis atque hominibus sint probata, quippe cum summus deorum cuncta haec non solum cogitationum ratione consideret, sed prima, media, ultima obeat conpertaque in-

[110] For a German translation, see Reis 1999. For Albinus, *Introductio in Platonem*, chap. 6, see Reis 1999, 316–19.

[111] Annas 1999, 59n19.

time providae ordinationis universitate et constantia regat. (Apuleius, *De Platone*, chap. 23, 252–253)[112]

These views of Albinus and Apuleius clearly diverge from Alcinous in broadening the accessibility of assimilation to God so as to include the active life, and not only the contemplative life. Indeed, as Annas observes, according to both Albinus and Apuleius, ‘we can achieve our end of becoming like God in the practical as well as the theoretical life’.[113] The debate about the intellectual contemplative or the ethical practical nature of the assimilation to God is already reflected in Philo, whose views resemble those of Albinus and Apuleius (see § 2.3.4 [d] below). As we shall see in our discussion of Paul, he widens the accessibility of assimilation to God even more radically to all human beings in all modes of life: everybody who experiences a metamorphosis into the image of God is caught up in a process of becoming similar to him, a process which is very much comparable to the assimilation of those carried along in the procession of the gods in Plato’s *Phaedrus*.

As regards the Platonic texts which Alcinous adduces to support his section on assimilation to God (§§ 28.1–3), they are the customary ones, also used by Eudorus. Alcinous refers to the *Theaetetus* (176a–b), the *Republic* (613a), and the *Laws* (715e). Unlike Eudorus and Plutarch, however, Alcinous does not explicitly refer to the *Timaeus*, perhaps because he regards the detour through Plato’s physical doctrine less convincing when it comes to establishing a solid foundation for the notion of assimilation to God. Instead he has two extra references which are not in Eudorus: one to the *Phaedrus* (248a) and the other to the *Phaedo* (82a–b). The passage from the *Phaedrus*, about the true reality which is not only accessible for the gods, but also for the soul ‘which best follows after God and most resembles him’: ἡ μὲν ἄριστα θεῷ ἑπομένη καὶ εἰκασμένη (248a) was already studied above in § 2.2.1 on Plato, and is aptly chosen.

The reference to the *Phaedo*, however, is an odd one. In this passage, in which there is no reference, terminologically speaking, to the *homoiōsis theōi*, Plato distinguishes between several classes of human beings (*Phaedo* 81a–82c), only the class of philosophers being allowed to enter into ‘the community of the gods’ (82b–c). The next in rank, however, those who have practised only the so-called social and civil virtues, but ‘without philosophy or reason’, are barred from this community (*Phaedo* 82a–c). Oddly enough, it is to this group that Alcinous refers when he says:

In the *Phaedo*, further, he [i. e. Plato] declares that assimilation to God consists in becoming self-controlled and just (ὁμοίωσιν θεῷ λέγει τὸ σώφρονα ἅμα καὶ δίκαιον γενέσθαι), in more or less these words: ‘So then, said he, the happiest and

[112] For the Latin text with a French translation and commentary, see Beaujeu 1973, 100, 301–2.

[113] Annas 1999, 59.

> (truly) blessed, and those who go to the best place, are those who have practiced the social and civil virtues, which they call self-control and justice (οἱ τὴν δημοτικήν τε καὶ πολιτικὴν ἀρετὴν ἐπιτετηδευκότες, ἣν δὴ καλοῦσι σωφροσύνην τε καὶ δικαιοσύνην)'. (*Phaedo* 82a–b; Alcinous, *Handbook*, § 28.2)

This must be a complete misreading of the passage in Plato's *Phaedo*, because it does not deal with those who go to 'the community of the gods', but with the group of people below that, who – despite their partially virtuous life – do not attain assimilation to God.[114] It is quite ironic that Alcinous mixes up the two distinct groups from Plato's *Phaedo*, because he himself wishes to emphasize that assimilation to God is only accessible through a contemplative life, which is led by the supreme group of men.

Alcinous' exposition is important for a further reason. Following his proofs for the doctrine of assimilation to God, Alcinous hastens to emphasize that assimilation to God is of course concerned not with the highest God, but with the God *in* the heavens:

> … the end would be likening oneself to God – by which we mean, obviously, the god *in* the heavens, not, of course, the God above the heavens, who does not possess virtue, being superior to this – τὸ τέλος εἴη ἂν τὸ ἐξομοιωθῆναι θεῷ, θεῷ δηλονότι τῷ ἐπουρανίῳ, μὴ τῷ μὰ Δία ὑπερουρανίῳ, ὃς οὐκ ἀρετὴν ἔχει, ἀμείνων δ' ἐστὶ ταύτης. (Alcinous, *Handbook*, § 28.3, 181.43–45)

Assimilation to God, thus, takes place in relation to Alcinous' second God.[115] As we shall see, this is very similar to Philo's and Paul's view that assimilation to God is mediated through the second God, the image of God, which in Philo's case is the Logos (see § 1.2.2 above with reference to *Quaestiones in Genesim* 2.62; and § 2.3.4 [e] below), and in Paul's case Christ (see § 2.4 below). Although the reasons for the intermediary role of this second God may be different – Alcinous arguing that assimilation to the highest God is impossible because he is above virtue –, such intermediate stages appear to be part of a process of assimilation. A similarly intermediary process is, of course, already present in Plato's *Phaedrus* when the several gods in the procession all act as intermediaries. Each of the souls in that procession 'lives, so far as he is able, honouring and imitating that god' – καὶ οὕτω καθ' ἕκαστον θεόν, οὗ ἕκαστος ἦν χορευτής, ἐκεῖνον τιμῶν τε καὶ μιμούμενος εἰς τὸ δυνατὸν ζῇ (252c–d) and, in this way, 'by becoming inspired by the god, receive[s] from him character and habits, so far as it is possible for a man to have part in God' – ἐνθουσιῶντες ἐξ ἐκείνου λαμβάνουσι τὰ ἔθη καὶ τὰ ἐπιτηδεύματα, καθ' ὅσον δυνατὸν θεοῦ ἀνθρώπῳ μετασχεῖν (*Phaedrus* 253a). By following a particular god, they have part in God. This mediation is now limited, in Alcinous, as in Philo and Paul, to the second God.

[114] Cf. Annas 1999, 60n23.
[115] Cf. Dillon 1996*a*, 299–300; Dillon 1993, 173–4.

2.2.8 Platonizing influence on Stoics

It is now time to look briefly at Stoic parallels and to repeat what we already saw in § 2.1 when we dealt with the anthropological notion of the image of God: although independent, the Stoic notion of man as an *exemplum dei*, an imitation of God, comes closes to the Neo-Pythagorean notion of man as the image of God (see § 2.1.3 [b]). The same holds true for the notion under discussion, that of assimilation to God. As Roloff has pointed out, the Stoic notion of imitation of God is the equivalent of the Platonic notion of assimilation to God.[116] This we see clearly, for instance, in Seneca. In his *Epistles*, Seneca first criticizes those who, for allegedly pious reasons, regard moral progress in the direction of the gods impossible:

> But some say: 'Only to the immortal gods is given virtue and the happy life; we can attain but the shadow, as it were, and semblance (*similitudo*) of such goods as theirs. We approach them, but we never reach them'. – *'Dis', inquit, 'inmortalibus solis et virtus et beata vita contigit, nobis umbra quaedam illorum bonorum et similitudo. Accedimus ad illa, non pervenimus'.*

But this is not true, in Seneca's view:

> Reason, however, is a common attribute of both gods and men; in the gods it is already perfected, in us it is capable of being perfected. – *Ratio vero dis homnibusque communis est; haec in illis consummata est, in nobis consummabilis*. (Seneca, *Epistles* 92.27)[117]

According to Seneca, who follows the Stoic doctrine of the imitation of God, there is a *similitudo*, likeness, between God and man. We even get the impression that the Platonic doctrine of assimilation to God has become so wide-spread that Stoics use it to further underpin their own views. Merki, in his pioneering work on the *homoiōsis theōi*, lists many Stoic passages which contain the terminology of 'similitudo', but unfortunately he blurs the distinction between the Platonic notion of assimilation to God and the Stoic notion of imitation of God.[118] To my mind, the clearest proof for the Platonizing influence on Stoics is provided by Epictetus, the mid-1st to 2nd cent. AD Stoic philosopher from Hierapolis in Phrygia. In his *Dissertationes*, Epictetus argues that, having proven that there is a God, one must explore the nature of this God so that we can resemble him:

> Now the philosophers say that the first thing we must learn is this: That there is a God (ὅτι ἔστι θεὸς), and that he provides for the universe, and that it is impossible for a man to conceal from Him, not merely his actions, but even his purposes and his thoughts. Next we must learn what the gods are like (εἶτα ποῖοί τινες εἰσίν). For

[116] Roloff 1971, 307–10 at 309.

[117] For this and other theories of perfection and progress, see Trapp 2007, chap. 2 and Lee 2008.

[118] Merki 1952, 7–17.

> whatever their character is discovered to be (οἷοι γὰρ ἂν ἐκεῖνοι εὑρεθῶσιν), the man who is going to please and obey them must endeavour *as best he can to become assimilated to them* (κατὰ δύναμιν ἐξομοιοῦσθαι ἐκείνοις). If the deity is faithful, he also must be faithful; if free, he also must be free; if beneficent, he also must be beneficent; if high-minded, he also must be high-minded, and so forth. Therefore, in everything he says and does, he must act as an emulator, a zealous admirer and follower (ζηλωτής) of God (ὡς θεοῦ τοίνυν ζηλωτὴν τὰ ἑξῆς πάντα καὶ ποιεῖν καὶ λέγειν). (Epictetus, *Dissertationes* 2.14.11–13)

The phrase κατὰ δύναμιν ἐξομοιοῦσθαι ἐκείνοις, 'to become assimilated to them [i. e. to the gods] as best as one can', is a clear application of Plato's notion of assimilation to God as far as possible.[119] Given the enormous popularity of this Platonic doctrine after Eudorus, it comes as no surprise that Stoic philosophers indeed also apply it in their ethical theories.

2.2.9 Celsus

What is surprising, however, is that Platonic philosophers such as Celsus were very unwilling to recognize the doctrine of becoming like to God in the Jewish statement, taken over by Christians, that man was made in the likeness of God. Whereas it seems likely that Neo-Pythagorean philosophers recognize the potential of the Jewish scriptures for the anthropological view of man as God's image, as we saw above (§ 2.1.5), Celsus has become so entangled in his polemics with Christianity that he is not prepared to understand the statement of Genesis 1.26 that God wanted to created man 'according to our image and likeness' (καὶ εἶπεν ὁ θεός Ποιήσωμεν ἄνθρωπον κατ' εἰκόνα ἡμετέραν καὶ καθ' ὁμοίωσιν) in a philosophical way. Rather, Celsus seems deliberately to understand it as a statement about the physical resemblance between God and man, which he then criticizes for philosophical reasons. According to Origen,

> Celsus says: Nor did he make man his image; for God is not like that, nor does he resemble any other form at all – Εἶτά φησιν ὁ Κέλσος … τό· οὐδ' ἄνθρωπον ἐποίησεν εἰκόνα αὐτοῦ· οὐ γὰρ τοιόσδε ὁ θεὸς οὔτ' ἄλλῳ εἴδει οὐδενὶ ὅμοιος. (Celsus apud Origen, *Against Celsus* 6.63)

This physical interpretation of the image and likeness of God, however, Origen replies, is totally wrong:

> Is it possible to suppose that the part in the image of God is located in the inferior part of the composite man, I mean the body, and that, as Celsus interpreted it, the body should be that which is in His image? If the nature that is in the image of God is in the body alone, the superior part, the soul, is deprived of being in the image, and this exists in the corruptible body. Not one of us holds this view. (Origen, *Against Celsus* 6.63)

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[119] Cf. Merki 1952, 11.

Celsus' interpretation of the likeness between God and man is indeed deliberately obtuse, as, at another point in his criticism of Christianity, he puts the likeness down to the grotesque exaggeration of human beings who, despite being nothing more than worms, claim to have a likeness with God. According to Origen,

> in the words which he [i. e. Celsus] invents he asserts that we are like worms who say: 'There is God first, and we are next after Him in rank since He has made us entirely like God (ὁ θεός ἐστιν, εἶτα μετ' ἐκεῖνον ἡμεῖς ὑπ' αὐτοῦ γεγονότες πάντῃ ὅμοιοι τῷ θεῷ), and all things have been put under us, earth, water, air, and stars; and all things exist for our benefit, and have been appointed to serve us'. (Celsus apud Origen, *Against Celsus* 4.23)

Celsus' criticism of the notion that man is similar to God is not surprising only because of his unwillingness to interpret it in accordance with the Platonic notion of becoming like God, but also because some of his fellow Platonists entertained the view, which we have already encountered before (see § 1.2.4), that there is also indeed some physical likeness between God and man. Among them is Maximus of Tyre.

2.2.10 Maximus of Tyre

According to Maximus of Tyre, the 2nd cent. AD Middle Platonist author of lectures delivered in Rome, images of the gods used in cult are a useful aid to human worship, even if they do not embody God's essential nature. Maximus sets out this view in his 2nd oration, on the images of the gods. In it, he also shows that the Greeks 'made it their practice to honour the gods with the most beautiful things the earth affords: pure materials, the human form, and the precise craftsmanship of the artist' (Maximus of Tyre, *The Philosophical Orations* 2.3). The human form, especially, is not inappropriate, as Maximus emphasizes:

> And indeed the judgement of those who established images in human likeness is anything but unreasonable (Καὶ οὐκ ἄλογος ἡ ἀξίωσις τῶν τὰ ἀγάλματα εἰς ἀνθρωπίνην ὁμοιότητα καταστησαμένων). If the soul of man is something very close to God and like him in its nature (εἰ γὰρ ἀνθρώπου ψυχὴ ἐγγύτατον θεῷ καὶ ἐμφερέστατον), it is surely not reasonable to clothe what is most similar to man, the god [i. e. the divine soul], in an entirely foreign covering (οὐ δήπου εἰκὸς τὸ ὁμοιότατον αὐτῷ περιβαλεῖν, τὸν θεόν, σκήνει ἀτοπωτάτῳ). One needs instead a form that is light and sufficiently easily moved to make a comfortable garment for immortal souls. (*Orations* 2.3; trans. Trapp, with minor alterations)

Maximus thus stresses that the similarity which exists between the soul and God must also be reflected in the soul's covering, its body, which, in his view, cannot be entirely unnatural. In other words, the likeness between the human soul and God also extends, in a sense, to the body. This is further underpinned by what M. Trapp calls an extensive 'laudatory account of the human physique

and faculties'. This account finishes with the following conclusion: 'Such was the body through whose forms the Greeks chose to honour the gods' (*Orations* 2.3). This entire section affirms that the human form is appropriate as an image of the divine. We encountered similar views in § 1.2.4 above, and Trapp refers to relevant passages in Dio Chrysostom (*Orationes* 12.55–59) and Cicero (*De natura deorum* 1.46–47, 76). However – as Trapp rightly remarks – the 'idea is again contested by Jewish and Christian thinkers' (Strabo, *Geography* 16.2.35 = Stern, No. 115; Justin, *First Apology* 9.1–3; Clement of Alexandria, *Protrepticus* 4.53.4–6, 4.57.1–4), 'as also within pagan tradition, famously, by Xenophanes' (Diels-Kranz, *Fragmente der Vorsokratiker* 21 B14–16).

Given the critical attitude of Jews and Christians towards anthropomorphic views on the nature of God, and the simultaneous affirmation of the aptitude of the human form as an image of God among philosophers such as Maximus of Tyre, Celsus' misinterpretation of the Christian understanding of man's creation according to God's image and likeness (see § 2.2.9 above) seems to be deliberate and polemical. The only other possible explanation is that he had indeed encountered those Jews and/or Christians who, as we saw in § 1.1.7, did indeed promote a physical understanding of man as God's image.

I shall now conclude my treatment of the Platonic notion of assimilation to God by discussing the threefold outcome of its development in the 2nd and 3rd cent. AD in pagan literature. At the end of the 3rd cent. AD, we find it in (a) the *Sententiae Pythagoreorum*, a collection of Pythagorean texts probably dating to the 2nd and 3rd centuries AD; (b) the *Vitae philosophorum* by Diogenes Laertius, a general 3rd cent. AD compendium of ancient philosophy; and (c) the *Enneads*, the writings of the 3rd cent. Platonist Plotinus which, composed in the second half of the third cent. AD but published by his pupil Porphyry around the turn to the 4th cent., came to influence later generations of Neo-Platonists and others. This threefold path is in itself significant, because it shows that by the end of the 3rd cent. AD Plato's doctrine of assimilation to God has been appropriated in Pythagorean writings, general compendia such as that of Diogenes Laertius, and, naturally, also in Platonist writings.

2.2.11 The Sententiae Pythagoreorum – the Pythagorean path

The *Sententiae Pythagoreorum* contain various sentences which are devoted to the issue of assimilation to God. In *Sententiae* 102, the reader is exhorted to assimilate his thinking faculty to God in the following way:

> τιμήσεις τὸν θεὸν ἄριστα, ὅταν τῷ θεῷ τὴν διάνοιαν ὁμοιώσῃς· ἡ δὲ ὁμοίωσίς ἐστι διὰ μόνης ἀρετῆς· μόνη γὰρ ἀρετὴ τὴν ψυχὴν ἄνω ἕλκει πρὸς τὸ συγγενές. (*Sententiae Pythagoreorum* 102)

God is best honoured, according to this sentence, when one assimilates one's thinking faculty to God. Such an assimilation of the thinking faculty results in

ethical, moral considerations. Assimilation to God only occurs through virtue, for only virtue draws the soul upwards to what is of like kind.

This illustrates nicely what was already said by Des Places in his comments on the kinship between God and man in Plato, as we saw at the beginning of the present § 2.2 above. The initial affinity between the soul and God needs to remain intact or be restored through the process of assimilation (ὁμοίωσις): 'Pour conserver ou retrouver la parenté de l'âme avec l'élément divin (…), il faut (…) tendre à l'imitation de Dieu, ὁμοιοῦσθαι θεῷ' (*Republic* 613b).[120] This is exactly the same view as is expressed here in the *Sententiae Pythagoreorum*. Apparently, God is already τὸ συγγενές, that what is of like kind to man. Fundamentally, man and God possess συγγένεια, kinship. Yet, at the same time this kinship needs to be restored because only through the ethical process of assimilation to God can the soul be drawn upwards to the God it is akin to. As we shall see, the same logic underlies Paul's anthropology. Essentially, each man *is* the image of God: ἀνὴρ …, εἰκὼν καὶ δόξα θεοῦ ὑπάρχων (1 Cor 11.7). Yet it is only through metamorphosis into Christ, the image of God (2 Cor 3.18, 4.4; see §§ 4.5 and 6.2 below), through the metamorphosis in one's mind (Rom 12.1–2), that man is restored and acquires the right sort of ethical reflections (Rom 12.2); this process consists in acquiring likeness (ὁμοίωμα) to Christ's death and renewed life (Rom 6.5–6; for Romans, see chap. 7 below).

According to the *Sententiae Pythagoreorum*, that man lives in like manner as God who is self-sufficient; he is not even dependent upon the bare minimum of life but feeds on not doing wrong:

> ζῇ ὡς ἀληθῶς θεῷ ὁμοίως ὁ αὐτάρκης καὶ ἀκτήμων καὶ φιλόσοφος καὶ πλοῦτον ἡγεῖται μέγιστον τὸ μὴ δεῖσθαι τῶν ἁπάντων καὶ ἀναγκαίων· οὐ γὰρ παύσει ποτὲ ἐπιθυμίαν ἡ τῶν κτημάτων ἐπίκτησις· αὔταρκες δὲ πρὸς εὐζωΐαν τὸ μηδὲν ἀδικεῖν. (*Sententiae Pythagoreorum* 30)
>
> The one who is self-sufficient and without property and loving wisdom and does regard it as the greatest wealth not to need anything whatsoever, not even the necessaries of life, lives truly in like manner to God. For further acquisition of possessions never stops desire, but it is sufficient for well-living to do no wrong at all. (Trans. mine)

This ethical assimilation to God has two important features, according to the *Sententiae*. First, the doctrine of assimilation has an anti-sophistic edge, similar to what we have seen in Plato and Plutarch. According to Plato, the endorsement of the process of becoming of like character to God is the opposite of the sophistic claim that man himself is the measure of all things (*Laws* 716c–d; see § 2.2.1 above). Plutarch, in his turn, contrasts the wisdom which is characteristic of the sophistic retail trader with 'that mighty wisdom which makes him that acquires it like to God' (Plutarch, Fragment 143 [edn Sandbach]; see § 2.2.6

[120] Des Places 1964, 84.

above). The *Sententiae Pythagoreorum* express themselves in the same vein, when they state:

> θεῷ ὅμοιον ἔχει ἄνθρωπος τὸ εὖ ποιεῖν, ἐὰν τὸ εὖ ποιεῖν μὴ καπηλεύῃ. (*Sententiae Pythagoreorum* 43)
>
> Man has in common with God to do what is good, if he doesn't sell this doing good by retail, as a petty trade.

Secondly, apart from this anti-sophistic stance, the doctrine of assimilation to God is, at least in Pythagorean understanding, also anti-cultic. Offerings are of no worth and it is only through the mind that man can unite with God:

> δῶρα καὶ θυηπολίαι θεὸν οὐ τιμῶσιν, ἀναθήματα θεὸν οὐ κοσμεῖ· ἀλλὰ τὸ ἔνθεον φρόνημα διαρκῶς ἡδρασμένον συνάπτει θεῷ· χωρεῖν γὰρ ἀνάγκη τὸ ὅμοιον πρὸς τὸ ὅμοιον. (*Sententiae Pythagoreorum* 20)
>
> Offerings and sacrifices do not pay honour to God; votive offerings set up in a temple do not embellish God. But the mind which is full of God and has been sufficiently established unites with God, for it must be that like comes to like.

The fundamental similarity between God and man only becomes visible through a process in which the mind is filled with God and becomes united with Him. This unification with God is not achieved through sacrificial cult, but through the mind. It is important to point out that, as we shall see in chap. 7 below, a similar anti-cultic inference is drawn by Paul in his reflections on the metamorphosis which takes place in the mind. Instead of a cultic form of worship, such as that of Judaism (cf. Rom 9.4), the emerging Christian religion is best understood, according to Paul, as a logical, non-cultic form of worship (see § 7.3 below). In this worship, no sacrifices are offered apart from one's own life in a metaphorical sense. It is a worship which consists in the metamorphosis of one's mind:

> Παρακαλῶ οὖν ὑμᾶς, ἀδελφοί, διὰ τῶν οἰκτιρμῶν τοῦ θεοῦ, παραστῆσαι τὰ σώματα ὑμῶν θυσίαν ζῶσαν ἁγίαν εὐάρεστον τῷ θεῷ, τὴν λογικὴν λατρείαν ὑμῶν· καὶ μὴ συσχηματίζεσθε τῷ αἰῶνι τούτῳ, ἀλλὰ μεταμορφοῦσθε τῇ ἀνακαινώσει τοῦ νοός, εἰς τὸ δοκιμάζειν ὑμᾶς τί τὸ θέλημα τοῦ θεοῦ, τὸ ἀγαθὸν καὶ εὐάρεστον καὶ τέλειον. (Romans 12.1–2)
>
> I appeal to you therefore, brothers, by the mercies of God, to present your bodies as a living sacrifice, holy and acceptable to God, which is your logical worship. Do not be conformed to this world, but experience a metamorphosis through the renewing of your mind, so that you may discern what is the will of God – what is good and acceptable and perfect.

This is very similar to the views which we have seen expressed in *Sententiae Pythagoreorum* 102 and 20, according to which God is best honoured when one assimilates one's thinking faculty to God and starts to live a fully ethical life. Only in this way, through a mind which is filled with God, and not through sacrifices, can one become united with God. This anti-cultic stance was characteristic of Pythagoreanism and also constituted the revolutionary nature of early Christiani-

ty.[121] It is noteworthy that, in the course of the present chapter, we have seen that Neo-Pythagoreanism and Paul share very similar ideas about the image of God, the process of assimilation, and the anti-sacrificial nature of true worship.[122]

2.2.12 Diogenes Laertius – the general path

As we have seen, the emergence of the notion of assimilation to God as an explicit goal of ethics was due to Eudorus' general work entitled *The Division of Philosophical Reasoning (Diairesis tou kata philosophian logou*), which, as we saw in Arius Didymus' characterization of it as 'a book worth getting', was very popular in the 1st cent. BC. In the first half of the 3rd cent. AD, the notion was recorded in another philosophical compendium, that of Diogenes Laertius, entitled *Vitae philosophorum*. In this work, in the section on Plato and his philosophy, Diogenes starts his description of Plato's ethics in the following way:

> Περὶ δὲ ἀγαθῶν ἢ κακῶν τοιαῦτα ἔλεγε. τέλος μὲν εἶναι τὴν ἐξομοίωσιν τῷ θεῷ. τὴν δ' ἀρετὴν αὐτάρκη μὲν εἶναι πρὸς εὐδαιμονίαν.
>
> On good and evil he [i. e. Plato] would discourse to this effect. He maintained that the end to aim for is assimilation to God, that virtue is in itself sufficient for happiness. (*Vitae philosophorum* 3.78)[123]

As in Eudorus and Alcinous, assimilation to God is described as the τέλος, the goal of Platonic ethics.

Before this passage, Diogenes has drawn attention to the similarity which Plato established between the cosmos and the Creator:

> τοῦ (…) καλλίστου τῶν γεννητῶν τὸ ἄριστον εἶναι τῶν νοητῶν αἴτιον. ὥστε ἐπεὶ τοιοῦτος ὁ θεός, ὅμοιος δὲ τῷ ἀρίστῳ ὁ οὐρανὸς κάλλιστός γε ὤν, οὐθενὶ ἂν ὅμοιος εἴη τῶν γεννητῶν ἀλλ' ἢ τῷ θεῷ.
>
> The most beautiful of created things [i. e. the cosmos] is due to the best of intelligible causes; so that, as God is of this nature, and the universe is similar (ὅμοιος) to the best in its perfect beauty, it will not be similar (ὅμοιος) to anything created, but only of God. (*Vitae philosophorum* 3.72)

This is a clear echo of *Timaeus* 29e–30a, where Plato explains that the cosmos, in having been brought into order out of disorder, shares in God's goodness and is wished by God to 'be, so far as possible, nearly resembling Him' (29e). Diogenes' reference to the *Timaeus* follows that of Eudorus and Plutarch, but unlike

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[121] Cf. Stroumsa 2005. On the 'cult-centred nature of the religious tradition' and philosophical views on cult, see Algra 2007.

[122] On the (neglected) importance of Neo-Pythagoreanism for New Testament scholarship in general, see Thom 1994.

[123] In Diogenes' history of philosophy, Plato's assertion of the similarity between man and God remains at odds with Xenophanes' statement that God in no way resembles man, the reason for this being that the substance of God is spherical: οὐσίαν θεοῦ σφαιροειδῆ, μηδὲν ὅμοιον ἔχουσαν ἀνθρώπῳ (*Vitae philosophorum* 9.19).

them Diogenes does not use the *Timaeus* as explicit evidence for the doctrine of assimilation to God. It is only later, after his description of Plato's physics, that Diogenes turns to Plato's ethics, without using the resemblance between cosmos and God to underpin the definition of ethics as assimilation to God. Nevertheless, Diogenes' definition of it as *the goal* (τέλος) of ethics shows he is familiar with the doctrine.

2.2.13 Plotinus – the Platonic path

The third outcome at the end of the third century, as one might expect, is the further interpretation of the Platonic notion of assimilation to God among the Platonists themselves. In the second part of the third century, an interpretation of this kind was formulated by Plotinus. At the beginning of his treatise on virtues, Plotinus quotes the famous passage from Plato's *Theaetetus*:

> Ἐπειδὴ τὰ κακὰ ἐνταῦθα καὶ τόνδε τὸν τόπον περιπολεῖ ἐξ ἀνάγκης, βούλεται δὲ ἡ ψυχὴ φυγεῖν τὰ κακά, φευκτέον ἐντεῦθεν. Τίς οὖν ἡ φυγή; θεῷ, φησιν, ὁμοιωθῆναι. Τοῦτο δέ, εἰ δίκαιοι καὶ ὅσιοι μετὰφρονήσεως γενοίμεθα καὶ ὅλως ἐν ἀρετῇ. (Plotinus, *Enneads* 1.2.1)
>
> Since it is here that evils are, and 'they must necessarily haunt this region', and the soul wants to escape from evils, we must escape from here. What, then, is this escape? 'Being made like god', Plato says. And we become godlike 'if we become righteous and holy with the help of wisdom,' and are altogether in virtue.

The entire treatise is devoted to the subsequent questions of what virtue renders us similar to God, where this assimilation takes place in man, and how this assimilated part of man relates to the other layers of his person. The last two questions are particularly relevant, as they reveal a kind of anthropology which we will recognize in Paul when, in later chapters, we deal with the structure of his anthropology (see chap. 5 on the trichotomy of spirit, soul and body) and with terms such as 'the inner man' (see esp. § 7.2 below).

According to Plotinus, the lesser virtues, the so-called πολιτικαὶ ἀρεταί, the civic virtues, constitute a preparatory phase in the process of assimilation to God, in the sense that they impose order on the still chaotic soul (1.2.2). Plotinus claims that Plato distinguished between two sorts of virtues, and that only the latter kind of virtue purifies the soul and renders it similar to God:

> Plato (…) makes clear that he postulates two kinds of virtues and does not regard the civic ones as producing likeness (… δῆλός τέ ἐστι διττὰς τιθεὶς καὶ τὴν ὁμοίωσιν οὐ κατὰ τὴν πολιτικὴν τιθείς). What then do we mean when we call these other virtues 'purifications', and how are we made really like by being purified? Since the soul is evil when it is thoroughly mixed with the body (Ἢ ἐπειδὴ κακὴ μέν ἐστιν ἡ ψυχὴ συμπεφυρμένη τῷ σώματι) and shares its experiences and has all the same opinions, it will be good and possess virtue when it no longer has the same opinions but acts alone (ἀλλὰ μόνη ἐνεργοῖ) – this is intelligence and wisdom – and does not share the body's experiences – this is self-control – and is not afraid of departing

> from the body – this is courage – and is ruled by reason and intellect (νοῦς), without opposition – and this is justice. One would not be wrong in calling this state of the soul *likeness to God*, in which its activity is intellectual, and it is free in this way from bodily affections – Τὴν δὴ τοιαύτην διάθεσιν τῆς ψυχῆς καθ' ἣν νοεῖ τε καὶ ἀπαθὴς οὕτως ἐστίν, εἴ τις ὁμοίωσιν λέγοι πρὸς θεόν, οὐκ ἂν ἁμαρτάνοι. (*Enneads*1.2.3)

In this passage, Plotinus gives an elaborate rewriting of Plato's definition of assimilation to God in the *Theaetetus*. Plotinus in fact operates with a trichotomic view of man, according to which man consists of intellect (νοῦς), soul (ψυχή) and body (σῶμα). We shall explore this trichotomic anthropology in detail in chap. 5. According to Plotinus in this passage, assimilation only takes place when the soul is no longer mixed with the body but is ruled by the intellect or mind, as its highest part. Further on in the same treatise, Plotinus describes the highest part of man as 'a sort of place of its own, away from the body', in which the soul can gather itself. This becomes clear in Plotinus' discussion of the extent to which the soul is purified:

> But we must state the extent of the purification. (…) The question is substantially this: how does the purification deal with passion and desire and all the rest, pain and its kindred, and how far is separation from the body possible (καὶ τὸ χωρίζειν ἀπὸ σώματος ἐπὶ πόσον δυνατόν)? We might say that the soul draws together to itself in a sort of place of its own away from the body (Ἀπὸ μὲν δὴ σώματος ἴσως μὲν καὶ τοῖς οἷον τόποις συνάγουσαν πρὸς ἑαυτήν), and is wholly unaffected, and only makes itself aware of pleasures when it has to, using them as remedies and reliefs to prevent its activity being impeded; it gets rid of pains or if it cannot, bears them quietly and makes them less by not suffering with the body. It gets rid of passion as completely as possible, altogether if it can, but if it cannot, at least it does not share its emotional excitement; the involuntary impulse belongs to something else (ἀλλ' ἄλλου εἶναι τὸ ἀπροαίρετον), and is small and weak as well. (*Enneads*1.2.5)

As we shall see later, in chap. 7, Plotinus' reflections closely parallel those of Paul (see § 7.2.3). The 'place of its own away from the body', in which the soul draws together when it is purified and assimilated to God, is in all likelihood the 'inner man'. In his previous treatise, Plotinus had explained that the true, proper virtues, which belong to the sphere of the intellect, have their seat in the 'true man'(ὁ ἀληθὴς ἄνθρωπος), the 'inner man' / the 'man within' (ὁ ἔνδον ἄνθρωπος), or the 'separate soul', as he also calls it – that which transcends human life and is different from the body and its affections. The other, lesser virtues, however, which result from habit and training, are located in what Plotinus calls 'the joint entity' of soul and body, which is the seat of the vices (*Enneads*1.1.10). It seems that now, in his treatise on the virtues, Plotinus points to the entity of the true and inner man and calls it 'a place of its own away from the body' in which the purification of the soul and its assimilation to God takes places; the so-called involuntary impulse (τὸ ἀπροαίρετον) does not belong to it. This is particularly relevant, as according to Paul, too, the transformation into

the image of God takes place in the inner man (2 Cor 3.18–4.4, 4.16), in the intellect or mind (Rom 12.1–2). And Paul, too, in Romans 7, distinguishes between, on the one hand, the inner man, and, on the one hand, the involuntary impulse which belongs to something else (and not to the true man) and constitutes the source of sin (Rom 7.15–24). Like Plotinus, Paul considers the body as the seat of the vices: 'Who will rescue me from this body (σῶμα) of death?' (Rom 7.24; cf. 7.14, 18, 23).

Yet, according to Plotinus, the fact that there is still an involuntary impulse in man does not preclude the possibility that the purified man tries to cause the rest of his being to become like him:

> The soul will be pure in all these ways and will want to make the irrational part, too, pure, so that this part may not be disturbed; or, if it is, not very much; its shocks will only be slight ones, easily allayed by the neighbourhood of the soul: just as a man living next door to a sage would profit by the sage's neighbourhood, either by becoming like him (ὅμοιος γενόμενος) or by regarding him with such respect as not to dare to do anything of which the good man would not approve. So there will be no conflict. (*Enneads* 1.2.5)

The purified soul, thus, exerts a beneficial influence on the irrational part of the soul, which is dominated by the body, and tries to assimilate it to God. As we shall see in chap. 5, the trichotomy of spirit / mind, soul, and body and the logic of its top-down effect is also present in Philo's and Paul's anthropology.

Through this influence of the purified soul upon the irrational part of man, the remaining involuntary impulse is gradually squeezed out, according to Plotinus. But the explicit purpose is not so much phrased in a negative way as being free of sin, but rather, in a positive way, as being god, as a result of assimilation to God:

> Our concern (…) it not to be out of sin, but to be god (ἀλλ' ἡ σπουδὴ οὐκ ἔξω ἁμαρτίας εἶναι, ἀλλὰ θεὸν εἶναι). If, then, there is still any element of involuntary impulse of this sort, a man in this state will be a god or spirit who is double (διπλοῦς ὤν),[124] or rather who has with him someone else who possesses a different kind of virtue: if there is nothing, he will be simply god, and one of those gods who follow the First. For he himself is the god who came Thence, and his own real nature, if he becomes what he was when he came, is There. When he came here he took up his dwelling with someone else, whom he will make like himself to the best of the powers of his real nature (καὶ τοῦτον αὐτῷ ὁμοιώσει κατὰ δύναμιν τὴν ἐκείνου). (*Enneads* 1.2.6)

Plotinus here picks up the imagery of the procession of the gods and souls from Plato's *Phaedrus*, which we studied above (see § 2.2.1). The soul who is fully assimilated to God becomes, in Plotinus' terminology, a god, 'one of those gods

[124] Cf. the twofold nature of the soul in Philo's anthropology; see Philo, *Who is the Heir* 55–56, in § 5.1.1 (c) below.

who follow the First'. If there is still an involuntary impulse remaining in him, man still needs to assimilate the rest of his being to his true nature, which is modelled on the gods, as much as he can.

The life of the purified man, as Plotinus points out at the end of his treatise, is not just the kind of life which has been modelled on good men, who function as role-models. Rather it is a life which has been grounded on the paradigmatic life of the gods themselves. The purified man

> will not make self-control consist in that former observance of measure and limit, but will altogether separate himself, as far as possible,[125] and will not at all live the life of the good man (τὸν ἀνθρώπου βίον τὸν τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ) which civic virtue requires. He will leave that behind, and choose another, the life of the gods (τὸν τῶν θεῶν): for it is to them, not to good men, that we are to be made like (πρὸς γὰρ τούτους, οὐ πρὸς ἀνθρώπους ἀγαθοὺς ἡ ὁμοίωσις). Likeness to good men (Ὁμοίωσις δὲ ἡ μὲν πρὸς τούτους) is the likeness of two pictures of the same subject to each other; but likeness to the gods is likeness to the model, a being of a different kind to ourselves (Ἡ δὲ πρὸς ἄλλον ὡς πρὸς παράδειγμα). (*Enneads* 1.2.7)

Plotinus' emphatic denial that assimilation to God is similar to assimilation to the life of good men shows that the notion of assimilation to God is not a periphrastic way of saying that whoever is assimilated to God is 'a great chap', but that assimilation to God is indeed assimilation to 'a being of a different kind to ourselves'. Indeed, as Annas emphasizes with regard to the Platonic notion of assimilation to God, this notion is not about 'the fulfilling of human nature', but rather 'an attempt to become some other kind of thing'.[126] Or as she puts it elsewhere, 'The form of the claim is clear enough: it is in transcending our human nature, not fulfilling it, that we find happiness'.[127] In this sense, the notion of man assimilating himself to God is in fact what one could call a 'superhuman anthropology': one only realizes one's full human potential by transcending one's original identity and becoming like God. This is an expression of a kind

[125] I disagree with A.H. Armstrong's addition 'from his lower nature' ('but will altogether separate himself, as far as possible, from his lower nature'), which has no basis in the Greek text and seems to go against Plotinus' remarks in 1.2.5 about the purification of the irrational part by the purified soul, also described as the influence of the sage on the man living next door, who endeavours to become like him, and in 1.2.6 on the downward movement of the soul in order to take up 'his dwelling with someone else, whom he will make like himself to the best of the powers of his real nature'. My interpretation is that which Annas regards as a possibility but does not choose herself; see Annas 1999, 69: 'the person with both the higher and the civic virtues will be alive to, and perform, the actions that civic virtue requires, but will not regard this as being his real *life*; his real life, in which he strives to become like God and achieve intellectual grasp of the world of Being, is lived on a different level, which accompanies the so-called life consisting of the activity of the civic virtues'. Annas 1999 follows Dillon 1996*c* in his emphasis on the otherworldly, intellectual, not genuinely ethical character of Plotinus' doctrine of assimilation to God. This view is now being criticized by O'Meara 2003; cf. also Baltzly 2004 and my remarks at the end of the introduction to § 2.2 above.

[126] Annas 1999, 53.

[127] Annas 1999, 58.

of Übermensch-anthropology which, as V. Gerhardt has shown, became particularly important in early Christianity: 'Im frühen Christentum drückt sich durch den Begriff «Übermensch» ein zentrales Theologumenon aus: Der in Christus 'erhöhte und vollendete Mensch (in Anlehnung an Ps. 82, 6; Joh. 10, 34; 3, 2; 2. Kor. 4, 16) wird bei den frühen Patristikern als «Übermensch» bezeichnet'.[128] One could argue, however, that the origins of such a superhuman anthropology are already present in the Platonic definition of the goal of ethics as assimilating oneself to God.

Plotinus, as an important 3rd cent. AD representative of the Platonists, constitutes one of the three paths along which the Platonic notion of assimilation to God was handed down to posterity. The other paths were those of the Pythagoreans and the compilers of general histories of philosophy such as Diogenes Laertius. This threefold outcome shows the enormous popularity of the notion, a popularity which started with the notion's revival by Eudorus in the 1st cent. BC. The notion was further promoted in the compendium of Arius Didymus, who regarded Eudorus' writing on the matter very highly and, as an adviser to Augustus, was perhaps in a position to promote it in the Graeco-Roman world. It is against this background, and within this development, that we can best understand both Philo and Paul, as I intend to show in the next sections (§§ 2.3 and 2.4).

Before doing so, however, I shall draw attention to the fourth outcome in the development of the notion of assimilation to God by the end of the 2nd and 3rd centuries AD. The fourth path is that of ante-Nicene Christianity. Soon we shall find out how Philo and Paul fit into the general development, but as we have already focused on the threefold pagan outcome around the end of the third century, it may be appropriate to point to the Christian acquaintance with this issue around this time.

2.2.14 The fourth, Christian path in the time leading up to the Council of Nicaea

(a) Assimilation as the explicit goal of ethics in Justin Martyr, Clement of Alexandria and Hippolytus of Rome

As we have seen, assimilation to God was depicted as the explicit goal (τέλος) of Platonic ethics in such authors as Eudorus (see § 2.2.5 above), Alcinous (2.2.7) and Diogenes Laertius (2.2.12). Interestingly, already in the 2nd and 3rd centuries AD this technical definition is taken up by Christian authors such as Justin Martyr, Clement of Alexandria and Hippolytus of Rome. All of them regard assimilation to God as the goal of Platonic ethics. Some of them, as we shall see, even regard it as the goal of Christian ethics.

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[128] See Gerhardt 2001, 46, with reference to E. Benz, 'Das Bild des Übermenschen in der europäischen Geistesgeschichte', in Benz 1961, chap. 1, 19–161 at 29–51. Cf. Badiou 2003, 71–2.

The technical definition of assimilation in the sense of τέλος seems to be present already in Justin Martyr (2nd cent. AD). According to a fragment preserved in Antonius Melissa, Justin states:

> Τέλος τῷ φιλοσοφοῦντι ἡ πρὸς θεὸν ὁμοίωσις κατὰ τὸ δυνατόν.
>
> The end for a philosopher is likeness to God, so far as that is possible. (Justin Martyr, *Fragmenta operum deperditorum*, frag. 18)[129]

This definition must stem from Justin's attachment to Middle Platonism before his conversion.

The same definition of assimilation to God as the goal of ethics is found in Clement of Alexandria. In a chapter in which he argues that the true Gnostic is an imitator of God, especially in beneficence ('He is the Gnostic, who is after the image and likeness of God, who imitates God as far as possible' – Οὗτός ἐστιν ὁ «κατ' εἰκόνα καὶ ὁμοίωσιν», ὁ γνωστικός, ὁ μιμούμενος τὸν θεὸν καθ' ὅσον οἷόν τε; *Stromateis* 2.19.97), Clement explicitly mentions assimilation as the Platonic goal of ethics and subsequently clarifies that this assimilation is the same as that which the law of Moses calls 'following'; this concurrence between Plato and Moses is either explained by Plato's intuition or by his acquaintance with the writings of Moses:

> Πλάτων δὲ ὁ φιλόσοφος, εὐδαιμονίαν τέλος τιθέμενος, «ὁμοίωσιν θεῷ» φησιν αὐτὴν εἶναι «κατὰ τὸ δυνατόν», εἴτε [καὶ] συνδραμών πως τῷ δόγματι τοῦ νόμου («αἱ γὰρ μεγάλαι φύσεις καὶ γυμναὶ παθῶν εὐστοχοῦσί πως περὶ τὴν ἀλήθειαν», ὥς φησιν ὁ Πυθαγόρειος Φίλων τὰ Μωυσέως ἐξηγούμενος), εἴτε καὶ παρά τινων τότε λογίων ἀναδιδαχθεὶς ἅτε μαθήσεως ἀεὶ διψῶν. φησὶ γὰρ ὁ νόμος· «ὀπίσω κυρίου τοῦ θεοῦ ὑμῶν πορεύεσθε καὶ τὰς ἐντολάς μου φυλάξετε.» τὴν μὲν γὰρ ἐξομοίωσιν ὁ νόμος ἀκολουθίαν ὀνομάζει. (*Stromateis* 2.19.100)
>
> Now Plato the philosopher, defining the end of happiness, says that it is assimilation to God as far as possible; whether concurring with the precept of the law – for great natures that are free of passions somehow hit the mark respecting the truth, as the Pythagorean Philo says in his exegesis of Moses –, or whether instructed by certain oracles of the time, thirsting as he always was for instruction. For the law says, 'Walk after the Lord your God, and keep my commandments' (Deuteronomy 13.4). For the law calls assimilation 'following'; and such a following to the utmost of its power assimilates.

Elsewhere, too, Clement refers to the goal of Platonic ethics. Book 2, chapter 22 is devoted to Plato's opinion that the chief good consists in assimilation to God, and the agreement of this view with Scripture. Plato, according to Clement, considers happiness to consist

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[129] Edn Otto 1879, vol. 3, 250–64 at 262, with reference to Antonius Melissa, book 2, sermon 43. For a comparable definition, see Joannes Damascenus, *Sacra parallela (recensiones secundum alphabeti litteras dispositae, quae tres libros conflant) (fragmenta e cod. Vat. gr. 1236)*, edn J.-P. Migne, *Patrologia Graeca*, vol. 96, p. 360.42: Τέλος φιλοσοφίας τῷ φιλοσοφοῦντι ἡ πρὸς Θεὸν ὁμοίωσις κατὰ τὸ δυνατόν.

ἐν ἐξομοιώσει τῇ πρὸς τὸν θεόν, ὁμοίωσιν ἀποφαινόμενος «δίκαιον καὶ ὅσιον μετὰ φρονήσεως εἶναι». ἢ γὰρ οὐχ οὕτως τινὲς τῶν ἡμετέρων τὸ μὲν «κατ' εἰκόνα» εὐθέως κατὰ τὴν γένεσιν εἰληφέναι τὸν ἄνθρωπον, τὸ «καθ' ὁμοίωσιν» δὲ ὕστερον κατὰ τὴν τελείωσιν μέλλειν ἀπολαμβάνειν ἐκδέχονται;

in likeness to God, demonstrating likeness to be justice and holiness with wisdom. For is it not thus that some of our writers have understood that man straightway on his creation received what is 'according to the image', but that what is according 'to the likeness' he will receive afterwards on his perfection. (*Stromateis* 2.22.131)

Clement's interpretation of becoming similar to God (ἐξομοίωσις πρὸς τὸν θεόν) is linked, first, with an implicit reference to the *Theaetetus* and, secondly, with a quotation of the phrase καθ' ὁμοίωσιν from Gen 1.26 (καὶ εἶπεν ὁ θεός Ποιήσωμεν ἄνθρωπον κατ' εἰκόνα ἡμετέραν καὶ καθ' ὁμοίωσιν – 'Then God said, "Let us make humankind in our image, according to our likeness"). Whereas man is created according to the image at the very moment of his creation, his similarity to God will only be the outcome of a process in which he is gradually perfected. This mention of assimilation to God is now underpinned with explicit references to the classical passages in Plato's *Laws* (715e–716d) and *Theaetetus* (176b) which we have studied above (see § 2.2.1). It is after these references that Clement characterizes this process of assimilation as man's τέλος and explicitly links it with the occurrence of the term τέλος in a particular passage from Paul:

But on us it is incumbent to reach the unaccomplished *goal* (ἡμῖν δὲ αὐτοῖς εἰς τέλος ἀτελεύτητον ἀφικέσθαι πρόκειται) obeying the commands – that is God – and living according to them, irreproachably and intelligently, through knowledge of the divine will; and assimilation as far as possible in accordance with right reason is *the goal* – ἥ τε πρὸς τὸν ὀρθὸν λόγον ὡς οἷόν τε ἐξομοίωσις τέλος ἐστὶ (…). And the apostle, succinctly describing *the goal* (συντόμως τὸ τέλος), writes in the Epistle to the Romans: 'But now, being made free from sin, and become servants to God, have your fruit unto holiness, and *the end* everlasting life (τὸ δὲ τέλος ζωὴν αἰώνιον)' (Rom 6.22). (*Stromateis* 2.22.134)

Strikingly, the notion of assimilation is also linked with the chain of imitation by which the believers, Paul and Christ are linked with God; this, in essence, Stoic doctrine of the *imitation* of God (see § 2.1.3 [b] above) is now merged with the Platonic notion of *assimilation* to God. The merge is accomplished through a quotation from Plato's *Theaetetus* which is fully identified, at the end of the chapter, with what Paul defines as the goal of faith:

And openly and expressly the apostle, in the first Epistle of the Corinthians, says, 'Be followers of me, as also I am of Christ' (1 Cor 11.1), in order that that may take place. If you are of me, and I am of Christ, then you are imitators of Christ, and Christ of God (cf. 1 Cor 11.3). *Assimilation to God, then, so that as far as possible a man becomes righteous and holy with wisdom,* he [i. e. Paul] lays down as the aim of faith – «τὴν ἐξομοίωσιν» τοίνυν «τῷ θεῷ εἰς ὅσον οἷόν τε ἦν δίκαιον καὶ ὅσιον μετὰ φρονήσεως γενέσθαι» σκοπὸν τῆς πίστεως ὑποτίθεται, and *the goal* to be

> that restitution of the promise which is effected by faith – τέλος δὲ τὴν ἐπὶ τῇ πίστει τῆς ἐπαγγελίας ἀποκατάστασιν. From these doctrines gush the fountains, which we specified above, of those who have dogmatized about 'the end' (τῶν περὶ τέλους δογματισάντων). (*Stromateis* 2.22.136)

In the end, the Platonic notion of assimilation to God appears to agree fully with Paul's understanding of the ultimate goal.

In book 5 of his *Stromateis*, Clement further develops what he has said about assimilation to God; now he is no longer content merely to demonstrate the agreement of Plato and Scripture but, in chapter 14, seeks to demonstrate the fact that the Greeks plagiarized from the Hebrews and, hence, that the 'barbarian' Jewish philosophy, which the Christians inherited, is superior to Greek philosophy. As we have seen above, in § 2.1, this debate also raged between Greeks, Jews, and Christians with regard to the notion of man as the image of God, and even some Greeks, notably the Pythagoreans, were prepared to regard their anthropology and theology as deriving from the Jews (see § 2.1.5 above). Clement participates in the same discussion and, at the outset of book 5, chap. 14, formulates his intention as follows: 'Let us add in completion what follows, and exhibit now with greater clearness the plagiarism of the Greeks from the Barbarian philosophy' – τὰ δ' ἑξῆς <προσ>αποδοτέον καὶ τὴν ἐκ τῆς βαρβάρου φιλοσοφίας Ἑλληνικὴν κλοπὴν σαφέστερον ὕδη παραστατέον (*Stromateis* 5.14.89).

In the following passage Clement once again shows the accord between, on the one hand, Gen 1.26 about man's creation after God's image and likeness, and, on the other, Plato's notion of becoming like God. He underpins this accordance further by quoting again from Deuteronomy 13.4 about 'walking after God'. Those who walk after God and follow him are the virtuous, according to Clement. This, he emphasizes, is in agreement with what the Stoics and the Platonists regard as the goal of life. The Stoics are dependent in these matters on Plato who, in turn, is influenced by the 'barbarian philosophy':

> man is said 'to have been made in [God's] image and likeness' (διὸ καὶ «κατ' εἰκόνα καὶ ὁμοίωσιν τὸν ἄνθρωπον» γεγονέναι). For the image of God is the divine and royal Word, the impassible man; and the image of the image is the human mind. And if you wish to apprehend the assimilation by another name, you will find it called, in Moses, a divine following or conformity (ἑτέρῳ δ' εἰ βούλει παραλαβεῖν ὀνόματι τὴν ἐξομοίωσιν, εὕροις ἂν παρὰ τῷ Μωυσεῖ [τὴν] ἀκολουθίαν ὀνομαζομένην θείαν). For he says, 'Walk after the Lord your God, and keep His commandments' (Deuteronomy 13.4). And I reckon all the virtuous to be followers and servants of God (ἀκόλουθοι δ', οἶμαι, καὶ θεραπευταὶ θεοῦ πάντες οἱ ἐνάρετοι). Hence the Stoics say that *the goal of philosophy* is to live in agreement with Nature; and Plato [defines the goal as] assimilation to God, as we have shown in the second Miscellany (ἐντεῦθεν οἱ μὲν Στωϊκοὶ τὸ τέλος τῆς φιλοσοφίας τὸ ἀκολούθως τῇ φύσει ζῆν εἰρήκασι, Πλάτων δὲ ὁμοίωσιν θεῷ (ὡς ἐν τῷ δευτέρῳ παρεστήσαμεν Στρωματεῖ). And Zeno the Stoic, borrowing from Plato, [who in turn borrowed]

> from the Barbarian philosophy, says that all the good are friends of one another. (*Stromateis* 5.14.94–95)

Clement's reflection on Plato's notion of assimilation to God as the goal of life is thus very extensive. He concludes this passage by again quoting several proof-texts for the Platonic doctrine of assimilation to God, including the passage from *Timaeus* 90c–d which Eudorus (see § 2.2.5 above) and Plutarch (§ 2.2.6) also applied and which explicitly designates assimilation as the goal of the best life, the τέλος τοῦ ἀρίστου βίου.

Finally, in the ante-Nicene writings, the technical definition of assimilation to God as the goal of life also occurs in the 3rd cent. AD writer Hippolytus of Rome. In his *Refutation of all Heresies*, in a summary of Plato's philosophy, Hippolytus gives the following characterization of Plato's ethics:

> He [i.e. Plato] says that there are four virtues (…). And that these virtues, when inherent in a man, render him perfect, and afford him happiness. And happiness, he says, is assimilation to the Deity, as far as this is possible (τὴν δὲ εὐδαιμονίαν εἶναί φησιν ὁμοίωσιν θεῷ κατὰ τὸ δυνατόν); and that assimilation to God takes place when any one combines holiness and justice with prudence (τὴν δὲ ὁμοίωσιν τῷ θεῷ, ὅταν τις ὅσιός τε καὶ δίκαιος γένηται μετὰ φρονήσεως). For this he supposes the end (τέλος) of supreme wisdom and virtue. (Hippolytus, *Refutatio omnium haeresium* 1.19.17)

This summary shows that Hippolytus is well acquainted with the tradition which regards assimilation to God as the goal of Platonic ethics. Yet, the general purpose behind Hippolytus' summary of Greek philosophy is to show that heretical movements have been influenced by pagan Greek philosophy. Although Hippolytus does not make clear what undesirable conclusions heretics drew from Plato's doctrine of assimilation to God, and which heretics in particular were involved, his interest in the goal of Platonic ethics is a far cry from Clement's, who juxtaposed it with Paul's goal of faith.

(b) Assimilation to God according to other ante-Nicene Christians

In addition to Justin Martyr, Clement of Alexandria and Hippolytus of Rome, who were all familiar with the notion of assimilation to God as the goal of ethics, other ante-Nicene fathers were familiar with it. In the text *Selecta in Psalmos*, for instance, attributed to Origen, the author mentions the process of assimilation to God in his commentary on Psalm 48.13 LXX, 'Humans, held in honour, did not have understanding. They resembled senseless beasts and became assimilated to them (καὶ ὡμοιώθη αὐτοῖς)'. This negative process of assimilation to the senseless beasts is contrasted by the author of the *Selecta in Psalmos* with the good process of assimilating to God: Καλὸν δὲ τὸ ὁμοιοῦσθαι Θεῷ (Origen, *Selecta in Psalmos*, edn J.-P. Migne, *Patrologia Graeca*, vol. 12, p. 1448).[130]

[130] For Origen, see further Merki 1952, 60–4.

Similarly Sextus, the 2nd–3rd cent. AD Christian compiler of the *Sententiae Sexti*, has several sentences which are concerned with assimilation to God.[131] According to Sextus, the wise man without property is similar to God: σοφὸς ἀκτήμων ὅμοιος θεῷ. The greatest honour paid to God, according to another sentence, consists in knowledge of God and similarity to Him: τιμὴ μεγίστη θεῷ θεοῦ γνῶσις καὶ ὁμοίωμα (44). And, according to the following sentence, nothing is similar to God, but that which has become assimilated as much as it can is dearest to God: ὅμοιον μὲν οὐδὲν θεῷ, προσφιλέστατον δὲ τὸ εἰς δύναμιν ἐξομοιούμενον (45). Indeed, Sextus exhorts his readers by stating that he shall honour God best who adapts his own thought as much as possible to God: τιμᾷ θεὸν ἄριστα ὁ τὴν ἑαυτοῦ διάνοιαν ἐξομοιώσας θεῷ εἰς δύναμιν (381). Consequently, the right way of reasoning is considered similar to God, and therefore – in good anti-sophistic fashion – priceless: λόγος ὀρθὸς ὅμοιος θεῷ, διὰ τοῦτο καὶ ἄπρατος (533). Assimilation to God, according to Sextus, is such a radical process that it is the escape from all that is opposite to it: ὁμοίωσις θεοῦ παντὸς τοὐναντίου ἀποφυγή (579). In this sentence, of course, Plato's *Theaetetus* shines through.

Another Christian who should probably be dated to the ante-Nicene period is the Pseudo-Clementine author of the *Homiliae*.[132] In the 10th homily, Peter is said to exhort his audience at Tripolis as follows:

> Therefore approach with confidence to God, you who at first were made to be rulers and lords of all things. You who have His image in your bodies, have in like manner the likeness of His judgement in your minds (οἵτινες ἔχετε αὐτοῦ ἐν μὲν τῷ σώματι τὴν εἰκόνα, ὁμοίως τε ἔχετε ἐν τῷ νῷ τῆς γνώμης τὴν ὁμοιότητα). Since, then, by acting like irrational animals, you have lost the soul of man from your soul, becoming like swine, you are the prey of demons. If, therefore, you receive the law of God, you become men. For it cannot be said to irrational animals, 'You shall not kill, you shall not commit adultery, you shall not steal', and so forth. Therefore do not refuse, when invited, to return to your first nobility, for it is possible, if you are assimilated to God by good works – δυνατὸν γάρ ἐστιν, ἐὰν τῷ θεῷ διὰ τῶν ἀγαθῶν πράξεων ἐξομοιωθῆτε. And being accounted to be sons by reason of your likeness to Him (διὰ τὴν ὁμοιότητα … ἐκείνου), you shall be reinstated as lords of all. (Pseudo-Clement, *Homiliae* 10.6)

Remarkably, the image of God has strongly physical overtones as it is located in the body (ἐν μὲν τῷ σώματι; cf. similar views in §§ 1.1.7 and 1.2.4), whereas the likeness is indeed something which is located in the mind (ἐν τῷ νῷ) and can be restored through the practice of virtue.

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[131] Edn Chadwick 1959.

[132] Cf. Wirbelauer, 'Clemens of Rome', in: *New Pauly Online*: the oldest reconstructed version of the Pseudo-Clementines, the Basic Writings, was probably composed in Syria *c.*230 AD. The Greek version, the *Homiliae*, derived from them.

As the ideal of assimilating to God is so important to the author, in another homily he explicitly warns against those who have misconceptions of God. Therefore, in the wrong belief that God

> deceived and spoke falsely, and did every thing that is unjust, they themselves did things like to what their God did, and thus sinning, asserted that they were acting piously. Wherefore it was impossible for them to change for the better, and when warned they took no heed. For they were not afraid, since they became like their God through such actions – οὐ γὰρ ἐφοβοῦντο, ὡς τῷ θεῷ διὰ τῶν τοιούτων πράξεων ἐξομοιούμενοι. (*Homiliae* 18.19)

The importance of the ideal of assimilation to God emphasizes the necessity of fostering the right conceptions about God, according to Pseudo-Clement.

The occurrence of the notion of assimilation to God in such diverse authors as Origen, Sextus and Pseudo-Clement shows how widely this notion had been appropriated already in the period before Nicaea. We shall now have a closer look at two authors, Justin and Clement, who – as we have already seen (see § 2.2.14 [a] above) – spoke about the assimilation to God in terms of the goal of ethics.

(c) Justin Martyr (continued): 'Those who lived like Christ shall become akin to God'

There is an interesting passage in Justin in which Christians are defined as those who lived like Christ and shall become akin to God. Justin gives this definition in the context of the persuasion that

> τοὺς ἀδίκους καὶ ἀκολάστους ἐν αἰωνίῳ πυρὶ κολασθήσεσθαι, τοὺς δ' ἐναρέτους καὶ ὁμοίως Χριστῷ βιώσαντας ἐν ἀπαθείᾳ συγγενέσθαι τῷ θεῷ (λέγομεν δὲ τῶν γενομένων Χριστιανῶν).
>
> the unjust and intemperate shall be punished in eternal fire, but the virtuous and those who lived like Christ shall become akin to God in a state that is free from suffering – we mean, those who have become Christians. (*Apologia secunda* 1.2)

Given the relative novelty of the name 'Christians', Justin still needs to explain what it stands for. For this reason, it is highly significant that in the current passage Justin defines Christians in terms of the doctrine of assimilation. The definition of Christians as the virtuous and those who have lived similarly to Christ, the ὁμοίως Χριστῷ βιώσαντες, and shall, for that reason, become akin to God and reside in ἀπάθεια, i. e. in a state of complete absence of injury and emotion, provides considerable insight into the logic of the Christian assimilation to God. It is through Christ, through becoming similar to him, that one becomes akin to God. In this way Christians come to share in God's impassibility, his incorruption, freedom of pain and grief, and his immortality; they are οἱ ἐν ἀπαθείᾳ καὶ ἀφθαρσίᾳ καὶ ἀλυπίᾳ καὶ ἀθανασίᾳ συνῶσιν (Justin, *Dialogus cum Tryphone* 45.4; cf. 46.7). Clement of Alexandria outlines a similar link between assimilation to God and the acquisition of ἀπάθεια (see *Stromateis* 7.3.13; 7.14.84)

and, as we shall see, his thoughts reflect the same logic of assimilating to God through Christ.

(d) Clement of Alexandria (continued): 'Created according to the image and likeness'

The most elaborate reception of the doctrine of assimilation to God in the ante-Nicene fathers is found in Clement. Like Justin and Hippolytus, he speaks explicitly of assimilation to God as the goal (τέλος) of ethics and, as we have also seen, he even identifies it with the goal defined by Paul. Like Justin and Hippolytus, he is familiar with Plato's *Theaetetus*, as we have already noted (see *Stromateis* 2.22.133; 2.22.136). His knowledge of the *Theaetetus* is also apparent from the concluding section of his *Exhortation to the Pagans* (*Protrepticus*) which reads as follows:

> It is time, then, for us to say that the pious Christian alone is rich and wise, and of noble birth, καὶ ταύτῃ εἰκόνα τοῦ θεοῦ μεθ' ὁμοιώσεως, καὶ λέγειν καὶ πιστεύειν «δίκαιον καὶ ὅσιον μετὰ φρονήσεως» (*Theaetetus* 176b) γενόμενον ὑπὸ Χριστοῦ Ἰησοῦ καὶ εἰς τοσοῦτον ὅμοιον ἤδη καὶ θεῷ, and thus call him, and believe him to be, God's image, and also His likeness, having become righteous and holy, with wisdom, by Jesus Christ, and so far already like God. Accordingly this grace is indicated by the prophet, when he says, 'I said that you are gods, and all sons of the Highest' (Psalm 82.6). (*Protrepticus* 12.122.4)

In this passage it also becomes clear that assimilation to God is established via Christ: one becomes righteous and holy, with wisdom, ὑπὸ Χριστοῦ Ἰησου, through Christ Jesus. As we have already seen in Clement's interpretation of the double expression κατ' εἰκόνα καὶ καθ' ὁμοίωσιν in Gen 1.26, by this assimilation to God man's *likeness* to God is restored, whereas his *being the image of God* is a given. Or rather, by becoming righteous and holy, with wisdom (Plato, *Theaetetus* 176b), man is an image of God μεθ' ὁμοιώσεως, along with / with the aid of / in co-operation with / together with / in conjunction with likeness: the truth that he is the image of God is now fully realised and the image is a true representation of God with genuine semblance.

As a result, man, in this respect, is similar to God, according to Clement: καὶ εἰς τοσοῦτον ὅμοιον ἤδη καὶ θεῷ. This likeness to God is underpinned by a reference to Psalm 82 in which, in Clement's understanding, particular human beings are addressed as gods: 'I said that you are gods, and all sons of the Highest' (Psalm 82.6 LXX = John 10.34)'. Below, too, we shall see that Clement's interpretation of assimilation to God implies man's deification. However, what is most important in the present passage, for our present purposes, is the fact that assimilation to God is realised through Christ: one becomes righteous and holy, with wisdom, by modelling one's life on Christ, and it is in this way that one is assimilated to God. Elsewhere Clement argues that the wisdom and righteousness through which one is assimilated to God derive from the Mosaic

law, as the source of all ethical behaviour, and that the Greeks are dependent on it, too:

> From the commandments spring both wisdom, which follows God who enjoins (ἑπομένη τῷ διατεταγμένῳ θεῷ φρόνησίς), and the righteousness which imitates the divine condition (ἡ μιμητικὴ τῆς θείας διαθέσεως δικαιοσύνη), by virtue of which, in the exercise of self-restraint, we address ourselves in purity to piety and the course of conduct thence resulting, in conformity with God (καθ' ἣν ἐγκρατευόμενοι καθαροὶ πρὸς εὐσέβειαν καὶ τὴν ἑπομένην ἀκολούθως τῷ θεῷ πρᾶξιν στελλόμεθα), being assimilated to the Lord as far as is possible for us (ἐξομοιούμενοι τῷ κυρίῳ κατὰ τὸ δυνατὸν ἡμῖν), inasmuch as we are beings who are mortal in nature. And this is being just and holy with wisdom – τοῦτο δέ ἐστι «δίκαιον καὶ ὅσιον μετὰ φρονήσεως γενέσθαι». (*Stromateis* 2.18.80)

The passage, which is heavily influenced by, and even ends with a quotation from, Plato's *Theaetetus*, shows that man is involved in a comprehensive process of being assimilated to the Lord Christ, conforming to God and imitating the divine.

For Clement, the notion of assimilation to God is so important that it is one of the defining characteristics of θεοσέβεια, religiousness (*Protrepticus* 9.86: Θεοσέβεια δὲ ἐξομοιοῦσα τῷ θεῷ κατὰ τὸ δυνατὸν τὸν ἄνθρωπον), reverence towards God, εὐσέβεια (*Stromateis* 2.9.45), and θεοπρέπεια, what is meet for God (*Stromateis* 7.1.3). Assimilation is seen as *the result* of the training of Christ, in his capacity as the Word:

> Our superintendence in instruction and discipline is the office of the Word, from whom we learn frugality and humility, and all that pertains to love of truth, love of man, and love of excellence. And so, in a word, being assimilated to God by a participation in moral excellence (μετ' οἰκειότητος ἀρετῆς ἐξομοιούμενοι τῷ θεῷ), we must not retrograde into carelessness and sloth. (*Paedagogus* 1.12.99)

In this way man is transformed. Clement understands this as a transformation of man 'into a holy and heavenly being', which is a result of his training by Christ, and a fulfilment of God's intention at creation to create man κατ' εἰκόνα καὶ καθ' ὁμοίωσιν (Gen 1.26):

> The view I take is, that He himself formed man of the dust, and regenerated him by water; and made him grow by his Spirit; and trained him by His word (παιδαγωγῆσαι δὲ ῥήματι) to adoption and salvation, directing him by sacred precepts; in order that, *transforming earth-born man into a holy and heavenly being by His advent* (τὸν γηγενῆ εἰς ἅγιον καὶ ἐπουράνιον μεταπλάσας ἐκ προσβάσεως ἄνθρωπον), He might fulfil to the utmost that divine utterance: 'Let Us make Man in our own image and likeness'. And, in truth, Christ became the perfect realization of what God spoke, whereas the rest of humanity is conceived as being created merely in His image – ὁ δὲ ἄλλος ἄνθρωπος κατὰ μόνην νοεῖται τὴν εἰκόνα. (*Paedagogus* 1.12.98)

This anthropological state of having merely being created κατ' εἰκόνα must change, and for this reason Clement exhorts his readers, as disciples of Christ the

παιδαγωγός, to become fully transformed by 'meditating on the heavenly mode of life according to which we have been deified' (τὴν ἐπουράνιον μελετῶντες πολιτείαν, καθ' ἣν ἐκθεούμεθα; *Paedagogus* 1.12.98).

According to Clement, assimilation to God is so central that assimilation is not only a *result* of Christ's teaching but even constitutes its very *contents*. In his commentary on Paul's warning to the Colossians to 'see to it that no one takes you captive through philosophy and empty deceit, according to human tradition, according to the elements of the cosmos, and not according to Christ' (Col 2.8), Clement emphasizes that here Paul is not criticizing philosophy as such, but only specific types of philosophy, such as that of the Epicureans and the Stoics.[133] There is, however, according to Clement, a philosophy which is agreeable to Christ, and this philosophy has as its central tenet assimilation to God:

> For the teaching which is agreeable to Christ deifies the Creator, and traces providence in particular events, and knows the nature of the elements to be capable of change and production, *and teaches that we ought to aim at rising up to the power which assimilates to God* (καὶ πολιτεύεσθαι εἰς δύναμιν ἐξομοιωτικὴν τῷ θεῷ διδάσκει), and to prefer dispensation as holding the highest rank, superior to all training. (*Stromateis* 1.11.52)

Moreover, Clement also portrays assimilation to God as part of a life-style, also characterized as the contemplative life (*Stromateis* 4.23.152), which is diametrically opposed to a superficial, outward, cosmetic life. It is by knowing oneself and by knowing God that one is assimilated to God:

> It is then, as is apparent, the greatest of all lessons to know oneself. For if someone knows himself, he will know God; and knowing God, he will be made like God (θεὸν δὲ εἰδὼς ἐξομοιωθήσεται θεῷ), not by wearing gold or long robes, but by well-doing, and by requiring as few things as possible. (*Paedagogus* 3.1.1)

Like Paul, as we shall see in due course (see § 7.2 below), Clement emphasizes that this process takes place in ὁ ἄνθρωπός ὁ ἔνδον, in 'the inner man' (*Paedagogus* 3.1.1). Such a man has no desire to change his outward appearance by cosmetics to make a deceptive impression on others:

> But man with whom the Word dwells does not alter himself, does not get himself up: he has the form which is of the Word; he is assimilated to God (μορφὴν ἔχει τὴν τοῦ λόγου, ἐξομοιοῦται τῷ θεῷ); he is beautiful; he does not ornament himself: his is beauty, the true beauty, for it is God; and that man becomes God, since God so wills – θεὸς δὲ ἐκεῖνος ὁ ἄνθρωπος γίνεται, ὅτι βούλεται ὁ θεός. (*Paedagogus* 3.1.1)

Interestingly, by assimilating to God, Clement shows, man himself becomes God, although only because God so wills: θεὸς δὲ ἐκεῖνος ὁ ἄνθρωπος γίνεται, ὅτι βούλεται ὁ θεός. From this point of view, assimilation to God and the dei-

[133] This interpretation is a convincing one. See Van Kooten 2003, 11–12, 129–46.

fication of man are closely related.[134] This is the same perspective which we already encountered in Plotinus (see § 2.2.13 above), in his *Enneads* 1.2. There Plotinus emphasizes that the process of assimilation to God should not be characterized in negative terms, as avoiding sin, but rather in positive terms, as becoming God:

> Our concern (…) it not to be out of sin, but to be god (ἀλλ' ἡ σπουδὴ οὐκ ἔξω ἁμαρτίας εἶναι, ἀλλὰ θεὸν εἶναι). If, then, there is still any element of involuntary impulse of this sort, a man in this state will be a god or spirit who is double (διπλοῦς ὤν), or rather who has with him someone else who possesses a different kind of virtue: if there is nothing, he will be simply god, and one of those gods who follow the First (εἰ δὲ μηδέν, θεὸς μόνον· θεὸς δὲ τῶν ἑπομένων τῷ πρώτῳ). (*Enneads* 1.2.6)

This view can, of course, be found already in Plato, inasmuch as the guardians from Plato's *Republic* do not only become *theosebeis* ('god-fearing') but also *theioi* ('divine') (see Plato, *Republic* II 383c).[135] In the passage from Plotinus under consideration, it is the *Phaedrus* which supplies Plotinus with the notion that man becomes a god. Plotinus adopts Plato's imagery of the procession of the gods and souls; the souls in this procession strive to imitate the particular god whom they revere and adopt his customs and way of living, and also lead other souls to the likeness of this god (*Phaedrus* 252c–253c; see § 2.2.1 above). In Plotinus' terminology, the soul who is fully assimilated to God becomes god, 'one of those gods who follow the First'.

This talk of divinization cannot be dismissed as pagan mythology. It is the consequence of the notion of assimilation to God as the goal of ethics. For this reason, it also occurs in a Christian author such as Clement of Alexandria. Clement demonstrates that this mode of thinking, about the divinization of man, is not merely pagan but can also be accommodated within a Christian mindset. I shall conclude this section with a passage in which Clement clearly shows the interrelation between assimilation to God and man becoming like God. Having said that the true Christian is no longer in a state of ignorance but in a state of knowledge because he has been assimilated as far as possible to God (ὁ δ' ἐν γνώσει καθεστώς, ἐξομοιούμενος θεῷ εἰς ὅσον δύναται; *Stromateis* 4.26.168), Clement exhorts this true Gnostic Christian as follows:

> The Gnostic must, *as far as is possible*, imitate God (θεὸν χρὴ μιμεῖσθαι εἰς ὅσον δύναμις τῷ γνωστικῷ). And the poets call the elect in their pages godlike and gods, and equal to the gods, and equal in sagacity to Zeus, and 'having counsels like the gods', and resembling the gods (ἐμοὶ δὲ καὶ οἱ ποιηταὶ τοὺς ἐκλεκτοὺς παρὰ σφίσι θεοειδέας προσαγορεύειν δοκοῦσι καὶ δίους καὶ ἀντιθέους καὶ Διὶ μῆτιν ἀταλάντους καὶ «θεοῖς ἐναλίγκια μήδε' ἔχοντας» καὶ θεοεικέλους), nibbling, as seems to me, at the expression 'in the image and likeness': τὸ «κατ' εἰκόνα καὶ ὁμοίωσιν» περιτρώγοντες. (*Stromateis* 4.26.171)

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[134] On the notion of man's deification in early-Christian writings, see Russell 2004.

[135] Cf. Annas 1999, 62–3n29.

In early Christians such as Clement of Alexandria, the double expression κατ' εἰκόνα καὶ καθ' ὁμοίωσιν from Gen 1.26 has become the biblical linguistic basis for the notion of *homoiōsis theōi*, which, in the last instance, is thought to imply the divinization of man.

This conclusion is not yet (fully) drawn in Philo and Paul. However, as we shall see, Philo's and Paul's anthropological ethics or ethical anthropologies appear to fit neatly within the entire development from Eudorus' stipulation of assimilation to God as the goal of ethics in the 1st cent. AD towards the fourfold outcome of this development at the end of the 3rd cent. AD: a general, a Pythagorean, a Platonic, and a Christian branch.

2.3 Philo and man's similarity and assimilation to God

In the previous section, we saw the development of the Platonic notion of man being assimilated to God. The deliberate introduction of this notion as the explicit goal of ethics by Eudorus in the 1st cent. BC emerged as crucial in this development. It is against this background that we shall now study Philo of Alexandria.

2.3.1 'Nothing is similar to God'

On the one hand, Philo is very critical of any likeness between man and God. In this, he resembles Flavius Josephus, and both seem to express Jewish sensitivities which go back to the first commandment (Exodus 20.4–6), an uneasiness with the making of anthropomorphic images which portray a supposed likeness between man and God. In his commentary on the first commandment (already adduced earlier in § 1.3.2 [a] above), Josephus explicitly states that nothing similar to God has ever been seen:

> What, then, are the precepts and prohibitions of our Law? They are simple and familiar. At their head stands one of which God is the theme. The universe is in God's hands; perfect and blessed, self-sufficing and sufficing for all, He is the beginning, the middle, and the end of all things. By His works and bounties He is plainly seen, indeed more manifest than ought else; but His form (μορφή) and magnitude surpass our powers of description (μορφὴν δὲ καὶ μέγεθος ἡμῖν ἄφατος). No materials, however costly, are fit to make an image (εἰκών) of Him (πᾶσα μὲν ὕλη πρὸς εἰκόνα τὴν τούτου κἂν ᾖ πολυτελὴς ἄτιμος); no art has skill to conceive and represent it. The like of Him we have never seen, we do not imagine, and it is impious to conjecture (οὐδὲν ὅμοιον οὔτ' εἴδομεν οὔτ' ἐπινοοῦμεν οὔτ' εἰκάζειν ἐστὶν ὅσιον). We behold His works … (*Against Apion* 2.190–191)

The emphatic statement that 'the like of Him we have never seen' (οὐδὲν ὅμοιον οὔτ' εἴδομεν) seems to characterize Philo's attitude towards the question whether man and God are similar also. According to Philo, 'like God there

is nothing', as he explains in his commentary on Gen 2.18, 'It is not good that the man should be alone':

> Why (…) is it not good that the man should be alone? Because, he [i.e. Moses] says, it is good that the Alone should be alone: but God, being One, is alone and unique (μόνος δὲ καὶ καθ' αὑτὸν εἷς ὢν ὁ θεός), and like God there is nothing (οὐδὲν δὲ ὅμοιον θεῷ). Hence, since it is good that He Who IS should be alone – for indeed with regard to Him alone can the statement 'it is good' be made – it follows that it would not be good that the man should be alone. (Philo, *Legum allegoriarum libri* 2.1)

In this sense, man and God are put in sharp opposition. Indeed, as Philo says elsewhere, 'God has no likeness even to what is noblest of things born (ὁ θεὸς οὐδὲ τῷ ἀρίστῳ τῶν φύντων ὅμοιος). That was created in the past, it will be passive in the future, but God is uncreated and ever active' (*De gigantibus* 42).

It may well be that Philo's view is particularly formed by his Jewish background. At the same time he shows the same kind of emphasis on God's dissimilarity which we have noted in Aristotle's writings (see § 2.2.3 above). Aristotle also seems to stress the dissimilar nature of the relationship between God and man. It is very striking that indeed one of the fragments in which Aristotle stresses that God is wholly similar to himself (and hence dissimilar to all else) has been preserved in Philo. According to Aristotle,

> God is equal and like to himself, admitting neither slackening towards the worse nor tautening towards the better – ἴσος γὰρ αὐτὸς ἑαυτῷ καὶ ὅμοιος ὁ θεός, μήτε ἄνεσιν πρὸς τὸ χεῖρον μήτ' ἐπίτασιν πρὸς τὸ βέλτιον δεχόμενος. (Philo, *De aeternitate mundi* 39–43 at 43 = Aristotle, Frag. 21, edn Rose)

For this reason, it may also be the case that Philo's Jewish reservations towards a likeness between God and man were strengthened by such passages from Aristotle. Philo has also encountered this emphasis on God's similarity only to himself in other pagan authors such as Philolaus, a Pythagorean philosopher of the 5th cent. BC, whom he quotes in support of his own views in another treatise:

> Evidence of what I say is supplied by Philolaus in these words: 'There is, he says, a supreme Ruler of all things, God, ever One, abiding, without motion, Himself (alone) like unto Himself, different from all others – αὐτὸς αὑτῷ ὅμοιος, ἕτερος τῶν ἄλλων'. (Philo, *De opificio mundi* 100)

This emphasis on God being similar only to himself comes up in some other passages in which Philo says that God abides 'in what is similar'. God is 'the master and Sovereign of the Universe, without undergoing any change in His own nature, but remaining in what is similar' – ὁ δεσπότης καὶ ἡγεμὼν τῶν ὅλων οὐδὲν τῆς ἑαυτοῦ φύσεως μεταβάλλων, μένων δὲ ἐν ὁμοίῳ (*De plantatione* 91). He is the one who stands in what is similar and remains there:

> This I, the manifest, Who am here, am there also, am everywhere, for I have filled all things. I stand ever the same immutable, before you or anything that exists came into being: οὗτος ἐγὼ ὁ ἐμφανὴς καὶ ἐνταῦθα ὢν ἐκεῖ τέ εἰμι καὶ πανταχοῦ,

> πεπληρωκὼς τὰ πάντα, ἑστὼς ἐν ὁμοίῳ καὶ μένων, ἄτρεπτος ὤν, πρὶν ἤ σὲ ἤ τι τῶν ὄντων εἰς γένεσιν ἐλθεῖν. (*De somniis* 2.221)

Although Philo thus seems to emphasize the absence of any likeness between God and even 'what is noblest of things born', on the other hand Philo grants that there are two exceptions. Philo addresses his readers as follows:

> Marvel not if the sun, in accordance with the rules of allegory, is likened to the Father and Ruler of the universe (μὴ θαυμάσῃς δέ, εἰ ὁ ἥλιος … ἐξομοιοῦται τῷ πατρὶ καὶ ἡγεμόνι τῶν συμπάντων); for although in reality nothing is like God (θεῷ γὰρ ὅμοιον πρὸς ἀλήθειαν μὲν οὐδέν), there have been accounted so in human opinion two things only, one invisible, one visible, the soul invisible, the sun visible. The soul's likeness the lawgiver [i. e. Moses] has shown elsewhere, by saying 'God made man, after the image of God made He him' (τὴν μὲν οὖν ψυχῆς ἐμφέρειαν δεδήλωκεν ἐν ἑτέροις εἰπών· ἐποίησεν ὁ θεὸς τὸν ἄνθρωπον, κατ' εἰκόνα θεοῦ ἐποίησεν αὐτόν, Gen 1.27) …; while the sun's likeness to God he has indicated in a symbolic way (διὰ συμβόλων). (*De somniis* 1.73–74)

As regards the latter remark, concerning the sun's likeness to God, Philo must have in mind Plato's view that, as we saw in § 2.1.1 above, the sun is the image (εἰκών) of the Good (*Republic* 509a); just as the Good is the source of knowledge and truth, so the sun is the source of light and vision (508e–509a): 'as the Good is in the intelligible region to reason and the objects of reason, so is this [i. e. the sun] to vision and the objects of vision' (508b–c). For this reason, as we have also seen, later Platonists call the sun the 'image of the all-creating God'. According to Philo, Moses referred to this likeness between the sun and God symbolically at several points in his writings.

What concerns us most here, however, is the fact that apparently, 'although in reality nothing is like God' (θεῷ γὰρ ὅμοιον πρὸς ἀλήθειαν μὲν οὐδέν), there are exceptions, of which the invisible soul is one. Philo argues this on the basis of the reference to the creation of man κατ' εἰκόνα θεοῦ in Gen 1.27. It would have been more apt for him to have quoted Gen 1.26, for there the double expression κατ' εἰκόνα καὶ καθ' ὁμοίωσιν would have given him a more suitable linguistic basis. Yet he does so in another passage which we shall treat shortly (see § 2.3.2 below), and in which he unambiguously states that 'nothing earth-born is more like God than man'. The passage in *De somniis* 1.73–74, however, continues to be dominated by the feeling of the dissimilarity between God and man, as Philo shows at the end of the passage, when he again stresses that God himself 'resembles none of the things which have come into being (αὐτὸς δὲ οὐδενὶ τῶν γεγονότων ὅμοιος)' (*De somniis* 1.76).

2.3.2 'Nothing earth-born is more like God than man'

As the treatise *De opificio mundi* shows, Philo was well aware of the importance of the double expression κατ' εἰκόνα καὶ καθ' ὁμοίωσιν in Gen 1.26 for fur-

ther reflection on the similarity between God and man. We also observed this in Clement of Alexandria (see § 2.2.14 above), but it may well be that Clement is dependant on Philo in this, since he mentions Philo's writings regularly among his sources.[136] According to Philo,

> Moses tells us that man was created after the image of God and after His likeness (τὸν ἄνθρωπόν φησι γεγενῆσθαι κατ' εἰκόνα θεοῦ καὶ καθ' ὁμοίωσιν, Gen 1.26). Right well does he say this, for nothing earth-born is more like God than man (ἐμφερέστερον γὰρ οὐδὲν γηγενὲς ἀνθρώπου θεῷ). Let no one represent the likeness as one to a bodily form (τὴν δ' ἐμφέρειαν μηδεὶς εἰκαζέτω σώματος χαρακτῆρι); for neither is God in human form, nor is the human body God-like. No, it is in respect of the Mind, the sovereign element of the soul, that the word 'image' is used; for after the pattern of a single Mind, even the Mind of the universe as an archetype, the mind in each of those who successively came into being was moulded. It is in a fashion a god to him who carries and enshrines it as an object of reverence. (*De opificio mundi* 69)

This passage is important for several reasons. First, the statement from Genesis 1.26 that man was created after the image of God *and after His likeness* (καὶ καθ' ὁμοίωσιν) seems to authorize Philo to state that 'nothing earth-born is more like God than man', a statement which counterbalances, and perhaps outweighs, Philo's other statements to the contrary, which we have just studied above. Secondly, as we already saw in § 1.2.4, Philo emphasizes, probably particularly against specific pagan views, that this likeness does not relate to physical characteristics, but to the mind. Finally, this mind, which is considered similar to God, is also viewed as a god. This is the same reasoning as we have found in pagan philosophers such as Plotinus, but also in Clement of Alexandria; likeness to God and deification prove to be related notions (see §§ 2.2.13 and 2.2.14 [d] above).

Nevertheless, whereas in Clement the expression καὶ καθ' ὁμοίωσιν constitutes a solid linguistic basis for further reflection upon assimilation to God, in Philo it is viewed first and foremost as a further comment on the phrase κατ' εἰκόνα, the first part of the double expression, in order to emphasize that this refers to a trustworthy image and representation:

> Since images do not always correspond to their archetype and pattern, but are in many instances unlike (ἀνόμοιοι) it, the writer further brought out his meaning by adding 'after the likeness' (καθ' ὁμοίωσιν) to the words 'after the image', thus showing that an accurate cast, bearing a clear impression, was intended.
>
> ἐπεὶ δ' οὐ σύμπασα εἰκὼν ἐμφερὴς ἀρχετύπῳ παραδείγματι, πολλαὶ δ' εἰσὶν ἀνόμοιοι, προσεπεσημήνατο εἰπὼν τῷ κατ' εἰκόνα τὸ καθ' ὁμοίωσιν εἰς ἔμφασιν ἀκριβοῦς ἐκμαγείου τρανὸν τύπον ἔχοντος. (*De opificio mundi* 71)

[136] See the references to Philo in, e. g., *Stromateis* 1.5.31, 1.15.72, 1.23.153 and 2.19.100. The double expression κατ' εἰκόνα καὶ καθ' ὁμοίωσιν is also reflected upon in Irenaeus, *Adversus haereses* 1.1.10 but does not yet seem part of a discussion on similarity and assimilation to God.

It is indeed necessary to stress that in this case the similarity is not deceptive but trustworthy, since in general, as Philo states elsewhere, 'every likeness by its deceptive resemblance falsifies the original': πᾶσα δὲ εἰκὼν ὁμοιότητι εὐπαραγώγῳ ψεύδεται τὸ ἀρχέτυπον (*De praemiis et poenis* 29). In the case of man's creation after the image of God, however, there is a real similarity, which reflects the underlying paradigm in an accurate way.

Philo continues to discuss the exact nature of the similarity between God and man. Four different aspects seem to be mentioned by Philo in several instances. (1) First of all, God and man are similar to one another, and different from plants and animals, in that both of them possess the faculty of voluntary movement as opposed to being ruled by fate; they are capable of voluntary acts:

> But the soul of man alone has received from God the faculty of voluntary movement, and in this way especially is made like to Him (μόνη δὲ ἡ ἀνθρώπου ψυχὴ δεξαμένη παρὰ θεοῦ τὴν ἑκούσιον κίνησιν καὶ κατὰ τοῦτο μάλιστα ὁμοιωθεῖσα αὐτῷ), and thus being liberated, as far as might be (ὡς οἷόν τε ἦν ἐλευθερωθεῖσα), from that hard and ruthless mistress, necessity, may justly be charged with guilt, in that it does not honour its Liberator. (*Quod deus sit immutabilis* 48)

Indeed, it is man's capacity for voluntary acts which creates the possibility of guilt and its opposite, moral excellence. This leads to a second aspect which Philo distinguishes in the similarity between God and man.

(2) Secondly, man's rare capability for voluntary acts also renders moral excellence possible and this moral excellence is rewarded by God because it resembles Himself:

> These are the blessings invoked upon good men, men who fulfil the laws by their deeds, which blessings will be accomplished by the gift of the bounteous God, who glorifies and rewards moral excellence (τὰ καλὰ) because of its likeness to Himself (διὰ τὴν πρὸς αὑτὸν ὁμοιότητα). (*De praemiis et poenis* 126)

Apart from the faculty of voluntary acts, the similarity between God and man also consists in the moral excellence which man and God share when this faculty is put to good use.

(3) Thirdly, if the likeness between God and man is not physical but relates to the mind, as we have seen above (see *De opificio mundi* 69), it makes sense that Philo regards the mind, the reasonable soul, as something separate from the natural order of created things. According to Philo, whereas philosophers such as Aristotle regard the human mind as 'a particle of the ethereal substance' and, for this reason,

> have claimed for man a kinship with the upper air, our great Moses likened the fashion of the reasonable soul to no created thing (ὁ δὲ μέγας Μωυσῆς οὐδενὶ τῶν γεγονότων τῆς λογικῆς ψυχῆς τὸ εἶδος ὡμοίωσεν), but averred it to be a genuine coinage of that dread Spirit, the Divine and Invisible One, signed and impressed by the seal of God, the stamp of which is the Eternal Word. (*De plantatione* 18)

In short, the reasonable soul is not similar to, and therefore cannot be likened to, created things, but bears the characteristics of the divine Logos.

(4) Fourthly and finally, and in close relation to the previous point, the similarity between God and man consists in the fact that 'the reasoning power within us' is indivisible, in the same way as the Logos above us is indivisible:

> So then the two natures, the reasoning power within us and the divine Word or Reason above us, are indivisible (ἄτμητοι μὲν οὖν αἱ δύο φύσεις, ἥ τε ἐν ἡμῖν τοῦ λογισμοῦ καὶ ἡ ὑπὲρ ἡμᾶς τοῦ θείου λόγου), yet indivisible as they are they divide other things without number. The divine Word separated and apportioned all that is in nature. Our mind deals with all the things material and immaterial which the mental process brings within its grasp, divides them into an infinity or infinities and never ceases to cleave them. This is the result of its [the mind's] likeness to the Father and Maker of all (τοῦτο δὲ συμβαίνει διὰ τὴν πρὸς τὸν ποιητὴν καὶ πατέρα τῶν ὅλων ἐμφέρειαν). For the Godhead is without mixture or infusion or parts and yet has become to the whole world the cause of mixture, infusion, division and multiplicity of parts. And thus it will be natural that these two which have been assimilated to God, the mind within us and the mind above us (τὰ ὁμοιωθέντα, νοῦς τε ὁ ἐν ἡμῖν καὶ ὁ ὑπὲρ ἡμᾶς), should subsist without parts or severance and yet be strong and potent to divide and distinguish everything that is. (*Quis rerum divinarum heres sit* 234–236)

Both the Logos and the human mind, then, have been assimilated to God. Both are similar to God in that they are indivisible. Interestingly, Philo argues from the top down. The mind is not similar to God because it is indivisible and is capable of dividing others things mentally, but the reverse is the case: these characteristics of the mind are 'the result of its likeness to the Father and Maker of all'.

Philo's reflections about the similarity between God and man prove to be quite extensive and it is not surprising that, as some passages show, he is familiar with the passage in the *Theaetetus* on assimilation to God (§ 2.3.3), reflects on the doctrine of assimilation (§ 2.3.4), and applies it in different contexts (§ 2.3.5).

2.3.3 Philo's acquaintance with Plato's Theaetetus

In one of the passages in which Philo shows himself knowledgeable of Plato's *Theaetetus*, he quotes the relevant passage on assimilation to God in full. This passage in a work by a Jewish author seems to be the earliest known occurrence of Plato's *Theaetetus* after Eudorus. In his comments on Gen 4.15, which is about God's assertion to Cain 'that no man that found him should kill him', Philo explains why it is that Cain will not die. In his view this has to do with Cain 'being the symbol of wickedness, which must of necessity ever live among men in the race that is mortal'. This conclusion is reached and supported by the famous passage from Plato's *Theaetetus*, which is embedded as follows:

> That which is good is a thing upward-soaring (…), but that which is evil stays here (τὸ δὲ κακὸν ἐνταυθοῖ καταμένει), removed as far as possible from the Divine

> Company, making our mortal life its haunt, and incapable of quitting the human race by dying. This truth found noble utterance in the *Theaetetus*, where a man highly esteemed, one of those admired for their wisdom, says: 'Evils can never pass away (ἀλλ' οὔτ' ἀπολέσθαι τὰ κακὰ δυνατόν); for there must always remain something which is antagonistic to good. Having no place among the gods in heaven, of necessity they hover around the mortal nature and this earthly sphere. Wherefore we ought to fly away from earth to heaven as quickly as we can; and to fly away is to become like God, as far as this is possible; and to become like Him is to become righteous and holy, with wisdom' (Plato, *Theaetetus* 176a–b). Naturally, therefore, Cain will not die, being the symbol of wickedness (τὸ κακίας σύμβολον), which must of necessity ever live among men in the race that is mortal. (Philo, *De fuga et inventione* 62–64)

Strangely, in this passage the quotation from the *Theaetetus* is not rooted in reflections about assimilation to God. The quotation is applied because it is thought to shed light on the persistent presence of evil on earth, symbolized by the figure of Cain. Later on in his *De fuga*, Philo also quotes the direct continuation of this passage from Plato's *Theaetetus*. Having argued just before that 'the treasuries of evil things' are not with God, as with Him 'are good things only' and that – for this reason – it is utterly wrong 'to assert that the Deity is the cause of evil things as of all others' (*De fuga* 79–80), Philo introduces the quotation by stating that the point he has just made is confirmed by Plato:

> In daring and noble language one of the wise men of old has brought out the truth which I am enforcing: 'In no case and in no way', he says, 'is God unrighteous: He is absolute righteousness; and nothing exists more like Him than whoever of us in his turn attains to the greatest possible righteousness. It is by his relation to Him that a man's real attainment is determined , as well as his worthlessness and failure to attain real manhood. For to know Him is true wisdom and virtue, and ignorance of Him is manifest stupidity and wickedness. All other seeming attainments and proofs of wisdom so called, if displayed in gaining political power, are merely vulgar; if in practicing handicrafts, merely mechanical' (Plato, *Theaetetus* 176c). (Philo, *De fuga* 82)

In two separate passages in Philo's *De fuga*, thus, we find the *locus classicus* of the Platonic doctrine of assimilation to God.

In other treatises, Philo also shows that he is aware of the logic of assimilation to God through virtue. As Philo explains, 'all the doings of the good are laudable, gaining merit through the virtues of the agents in accordance with the general law that τὰ γινόμενα τοῖς δρῶσιν ἐξομοιοῦσθαι, that the results of actions assimilate themselves to the actors' (*De specialibus legibus* 3.209). The virtues, according to Philo, are so powerful that they transform the agents who perform them. Even a minimum of virtue is capable of this, Philo says, drawing an analogy with the capacity of a smouldering spark to cause a blazing fire:

> For a smouldering spark, even the very smallest, when it is blown up and made to blaze, lights a great pile; and so the least particle of virtue (…) recovers to prolific fertility all that were barren by nature and therefore without offspring. Even so scanty goodness (τὸ σπάνιον ἀγαθὸν) by God's favour expands and becomes abundant,

> assimilating all else to itself (ἐξομοιοῦν τὰ ἄλλα ἑαυτῷ). (*De migratione Abrahami* 124)

2.3.4 Assimilation to God

The interest which Philo takes in the notion of assimilation to God is not only apparent from the extensive verbatim quotations of Plato's *Theaetetus* in his *De fuga*, but is further confirmed by elaborate reflections upon this doctrine. As we shall see, in line with the tradition which seems to start with Eudorus and is further found in Alcinous, Diogenes Laertius and, on the Christian side, Clement of Alexandria (see § 2.2 above), Philo regards assimilation to God as the explicit goal of ethics. Philo's own understanding of this assimilation gains relief in passages in which he reflects upon the assimilation and God's solitude, the relation to both the active and the contemplative life, the intermediary function of the second God, and the cosmos.

(a) Assimilation as the goal of ethics

According to Philo, man is akin to God because God shares his Spirit with man. For this reason, man ought to entertain reciprocal relations with God and to please Him by striving after the goal of assimilation to Him:

> And being akin to and of like seed as the Ruler (συγγενής τε καὶ ἀγχίσπορος ὢν τοῦ ἡγεμόνος), since the divine Spirit had flowed into him in full current (ἅτε δὴ πολλοῦ ῥυέντος εἰς αὐτὸν τοῦ θείου πνεύματος), he earnestly endeavoured in all his words and actions to please the Father and King, following Him step by step in the highways (ἑπόμενος κατ' ἴχνος αὐτῷ ταῖς ὁδοῖς) cut out by virtues (ἀρεταί), since only for souls who regard it as their goal to be fully assimilated to God who begat them is it lawful to draw nigh to Him – διότι μόναις ψυχαῖς θέμις προσέρχεσθαι τέλος ἡγουμέναις τὴν πρὸς τὸν γεννήσαντα θεὸν ἐξομοίωσιν. (*De opificio mundi* 144)

As in Eudorus, Alcinous, Diogenes Laertius and Clement of Alexandria, assimilation to God is clearly depicted as the goal of human ethics. In passing, one may note that Philo is also familiar with the Pythagorean terminology of following God, as the clause 'following Him step by step in the highways (ἑπόμενος κατ' ἴχνος αὐτῷ ταῖς ὁδοῖς)' clearly shows. The terminology of Pythagoras' maxim Ἕπου θεῷ, 'Follow God' is also found in Plato's *Phaedrus* (248a; see § 2.2.1 above), in Eudorus (apud Stobaeus, *Anthologium* 2.7.3, p. 49.16 in § 2.2.5 above), and in Plutarch (see his *De sera numinis vindicta* 550D in § 2.2.6 above).

(b) True wealth

Assimilation to God can also be regarded as the higher, nobler form of wealth, which differs notably from the wealth of normal riches and is only possessed by 'truly noble and divinely gifted men', as Philo explains at the beginning of *De virtutibus*, his treatise on the virtues:

> We must mention also the higher, nobler wealth, which does not belong to all, but to truly noble and divinely gifted men. This wealth is bestowed by wisdom through the doctrines and principles of ethic, logic and physic, and ἐξ ὧν φύεσθαι τὰς ἀρετὰς συμβέβηκεν, αἳ τῆς ψυχῆς ὑποτέμνονται τὴν πολυτέλειαν εὐκολίας καὶ ὀλιγοδεΐας ἔρωτας ἐντίκτουσαι κατὰ τὴν πρὸς θεὸν ἐξομοίωσιν; from these spring the virtues, which rid the soul of its proneness to extravagance, and engender the love of contentment and frugality, as befits its assimilation. For God has no wants, he needs nothing, being in Himself all-sufficient to Himself, while the fool has many wants (…). But the man of worth has few wants, standing midway between mortality and immortality. Some wants he has because his body is mortal, many he has not in virtue of his soul, which desires immortality. (*De virtutibus* 8–9)

Interestingly, the virtues which assimilate man to God derive from the doctrines and principles of ethic, logic, and physic. This is reminiscent of the discussion of the necessary preparations for assimilation to God in philosophers such as Alcinous (see § 2.2.7 above). Yet, as we shall see below, unlike Alcinous, Philo believes that assimilation to God can be achieved not only in the contemplative life, but in the active life as well.

In his *De virtutibus*, Philo also emphasizes that endeavouring to imitate God and assimilate to Him is absolutely crucial for a full ethical life:

> Many persons try to do to others the opposite of the good which they have experienced. (…) Rather should the wise man, as far as possible, impart to his neighbours his sagacity, the continent his temperance, the valiant his gallantry, the just his justice, and in general the good his goodness. (…) Especially does he give this lesson as most suitable to the rational nature that a man should imitate God as much as may be and leave nothing undone that may promote such assimilation as is possible – μιμεῖσθαι θεὸν καθ' ὅσον οἷόν τε, μηδὲν παραλιπόντα τῶν εἰς τὴν ἐνδεχομένην ἐξομοίωσιν. (*De virtutibus* 166–168)

(c) Assimilation, the multitude and God's solitude

According to Philo, assimilation to God very much depends on the possibility of distancing oneself from the masses; for this reason, solitude is important. We saw a similar argument in Plutarch (see § 2.2.6 above), according to whom quietude (ἡσυχία), which sharply contrasts with the sophistic atmosphere of the cities, is a prerequisite for assimilation to God:

> How wise a thing, it would seem, is quietude! In particular it serves for studying to acquire knowledge and wisdom, by which I do not mean the wisdom which is characteristic of a petty trader and of the market place (λέγω δ' οὐ τὴν καπηλικὴν καὶ ἀγοραίαν), but that mighty wisdom which makes him that acquires it like to God (ἀλλὰ τὴν μεγάλην, ἥτις ἐξομοιοῖ θεῷ τὸν αὐτὴν ἀναλαβόντα). Those forms of study that are practised in towns among the crowds of humanity exercise the so-called shrewdness that is really knavery (…). But solitude, being wisdom's training-ground, is a good character-builder, and moulds and sets in order men's souls. (Plutarch, Fragment 143 [edn Sandbach]; = Stobaeus, *Anthologium* 4.16.18, p. 398)

In a very similar way, Philo praises the life of Abraham, a life 'without association with the multitude' which therefore rendered assimilation to God possible – God who himself loves solitude. Abraham, according to Philo, was convinced

> that no life was so pleasant as one lived *without* association with the multitude. And that is natural, for those who seek God and yearn to find Him love the solitude which is dear to Him, and in this way first of all hasten to assimilate themselves to His blessed and happy nature – οἱ γὰρ ζητοῦντες καὶ ἐπιποθοῦντες θεὸν ἀνευρεῖν τὴν φίλην αὐτῷ μόνωσιν ἀγαπῶσι, κατ' αὐτὸ τοῦτο σπεύδοντες πρῶτον ἐξομοιοῦσθαι τῇ μακαρίᾳ καὶ εὐδαίμονι φύσει. (*De Abrahamo* 87)

Although Philo's passages in this section and the previous one might give the impression that Philo's understanding of assimilation to God is perhaps elitist or antisocial, because it is possible through the virtues which issue from the doctrines and principles of ethic, logic, and physic, and is best achieved in solitude, the following passage from his *De decalogo* shows that this is not the whole picture.

(d) Assimilation and the active and contemplative life

Philo seems to be one of the earliest attestations for the ancient philosophical discussion about whether assimilation to God can only be achieved in the contemplative life, or is also possible in the active life. In our treatment of Alcinous, we have seen that Alcinous was convinced that only the contemplative life rendered assimilation possible, but on this matter his fellow Platonists Albinus and Apuleius, his contemporaries of the 2nd cent. AD, clearly disagreed (see § 2.2.7 above; cf. also the introduction to § 2.2 above). According to Albinus, the process of assimilating to God involves both the active and the contemplative life, and Apuleius states that one should follow what is agreeable to gods and men not only through contemplative study, but also through practice.

Philo exhibits the same view as Albinus and Apuleius, thus showing that this specific discussion predated these authors from the 2nd cent. AD. Philo tackles the question in an extensive passage on why one should observe the decalogue's fourth commandment to keep the Sabbath day holy. He exhorts his readers as follows:

> (97–98) We are told that the world was made in six days and that on the seventh God ceased from His works and began to contemplate what had been so well created (τὰ γεγονότα καλῶς θεωρεῖν), and therefore He exhorted those who would live as citizens under this world-order to follow God (ἕπεσθαι θεῷ) in this as in other matters. (…) (100) 'Always follow God', it says (ἕπου φησίν αἰεὶ θεῷ), 'find in that single six-day period in which, all-sufficient for His purpose, He created the world, a pattern of the time set apart to you for activity (πρᾰ́ξεις)'. Find, too, in the seventh day the pattern of your duty to study wisdom, that day in which we are told that He surveyed what He had wrought, and so learn to meditate yourself on the lessons of nature and all that in your own life makes for happiness' (ὅπως καὶ αὐτὸς

ἐπιθεωρῇς τὰ φύσεως καὶ τὰ ἴδια ὅσα συντείνει πρὸς εὐδαιμονίαν). (101) Let us not then neglect this great archetype of the two best lives, the active-practical and the contemplative-theoretical, but with that pattern ever before our eyes engrave in our hearts the clear image and stamp of them both, so assimilating mortal nature, as far as may be, to the immortal by saying and doing what we ought – τοιοῦτον οὖν ἀρχέτυπον τῶν ἀρίστων βίων, πρακτικοῦ τε καὶ θεωρητικοῦ, μὴ παρέλθωμεν, ἀλλ' αἰεὶ πρὸς αὐτὸ βλέποντες ἐναργεῖς εἰκόνας καὶ τύπους ταῖς ἑαυτῶν διανοίαις ἐγχαράττωμεν ἐξομοιοῦντες θνητὴν φύσιν ὡς ἔνεστιν ἀθανάτῳ κατὰ τὸ λέγειν καὶ πράττειν ἃ χρή. (*De decalogo* 97–101)

In this extraordinary interpretation of the fourth commandment Philo argues that it is both in the active life, during the normal days of the week, and in the contemplative life, on the Sabbath, that assimilation to God is achieved. Given the mere fact that there are six days assigned to the active life, and just one day for the contemplative life, Philo goes to great lengths to ensure that the active life is also lived in a ethical way and can be part of the process of assimilating to God. In Philo's view, God himself experienced an active, practical life during the six days of creation, and a contemplative life on the seventh day of the Sabbath. In this way Philo seems to take issue with traditions such as that in Alcinous, in which assimilation to God is taken as an intellectual, non-moral enterprise. According to Philo, paralleling another tradition found in philosophers such as Albinus and Apuleius, we should 'engrave in our hearts the clear image and stamp of them both', i. e. of the active and the contemplative life. Only in this way shall we be 'assimilating mortal nature, as far as may be, to the immortal by saying and doing what we ought'.[137]

(e) Assimilation to God only possible through the second God

At one specific point in his writings, Philo draws attention to his view that assimilation to God is only possible through assimilation to the second God, the Logos. This view, that (direct) assimilation to the highest God is impossible, is also encountered in Alcinous. As we have seen (see § 2.2.7 above), according to this philosopher, reflecting on the goal of ethics,

the end would be likening oneself to God – by which we mean, obviously, the god *in* the heavens, not, of course, the God above the heavens, who does not possess virtue, being superior to this – τὸ τέλος εἴη ἂν τὸ ἐξομοιωθῆναι θεῷ, θεῷ δηλονότι τῷ ἐπουρανίῳ, μὴ τῷ μὰ Δία ὑπερουρανίῳ, ὃς οὐκ ἀρετὴν ἔχει, ἀμείνων δ' ἐστὶ ταύτης. (Alcinous, *Handbook*, § 28.3, 181.43–45)

[137] Cf. *De decalogo* 108, where this tension between mortal nature and the immortal is said to be symbolized by parents who 'by their nature stand on the border-line between the mortal and the immortal side of existence, the mortal because of their kinship with men and other animals through the perishableness of the body; the immortal διὰ τὴν τοῦ γεννᾶν πρὸς θεὸν τὸν γεννητὴν τῶν ὅλων ἐξομοίωσιν, because the act of generation assimilates them to God, the generator of the All'.

According to this perspective, the highest God is above virtue, so that assimilation to God through virtue is only possible with respect of the second God, who is still a valid model for ethical emulation by man. A similar argument is developed by Philo in his comments on the ethical inference which is drawn from Gen 1.26–27 in Gen 9.6 LXX, 'He that sheds man's blood, instead of that blood shall his own be shed, for in the image of God I made man' – ὁ ἐκχέων αἷμα ἀνθρώπου ἀντὶ τοῦ αἵματος αὐτοῦ ἐκχυθήσεται, ὅτι ἐν εἰκόνι θεοῦ ἐποίησα τὸν ἄνθρωπον. Philo is puzzled by the way in which God, the speaker, seems to distance himself from the God in whose image man is made:

> Why does Scripture say, as if (speaking) of another God, 'in the image of God He made man', and not 'in His own image'? Most excellently and veraciously this oracle was given by God. For nothing mortal can be made in the likeness of the most high One and Father of the universe but (only) in that of the second God, who is His Logos. For it was right that the rational (part) of the human soul should be formed as an impression by the divine Logos, since the pre-Logos God is superior to every rational nature. But He who is above the Logos (and) exists in the best and in a special form – what thing that comes into being can rightfully be assimilated to Him: τῷ δὲ ὑπὲρ τὸν λόγον ἐν τῇ βελτίστῃ καί τινι ἐξαιρέτῳ καθεστῶτι ἰδέᾳ οὐδὲν θέμις ἦν γενητὸν ἐξομοιωθῆναι? Moreover, Scripture wishes also to show that God most justly avenges the virtuous and decent men because they have a certain kinship with His Logos, of which the human mind is a likeness and image. (*Quaestiones in Genesim* 2.62)

Like Alcinous, Philo is convinced that assimilation to God must mean assimilation to the second God. Their reasons for believing this are slightly different, however. Whereas Alcinous says that the highest God is above virtue, Philo appears to operate with the sharp distinction between the immortal God and mortal creatures: 'nothing mortal can be made in the likeness of the most high One and Father of the universe but (only) in that of the second God'. This recalls the tensions which we noted at the beginning of § 2.3. On the one hand, Philo often stresses the fact that 'nothing is similar to God' (§ 2.3.1), whereas on the other hand he claims that 'nothing earth-born is more like God than man' (§ 2.3.2). In the passage under consideration from his *Quaestiones in Genesim*, Philo tries to solve this tension by developing the view that indeed 'nothing mortal can be made in the likeness of the most high One and Father of the universe but (only) in that of the second God'. Assimilation, for that reason, must proceed via the second God.

(f) Assimilation to the cosmos and to God

Philo also shows himself acquainted with the Platonic notion of assimilation to God in those passages in which he talks about the involvement of the cosmos in this process. This involvement consists both in the assimilation of the visible cosmos to the world of ideas and to God himself, and in the assimilation of man to

the cosmos. We have already encountered these notions in Plato's *Timaeus* (see §§ 2.1.1 and 2.2.1 above) and in the ensuing Platonic tradition in philosophers such as Eudorus (see § 2.2.5) and Plutarch (see § 2.2.6). As regards the assimilation of the cosmos to God's ideas, Philo gives the following analogy:

> And like a good craftsman he [i.e. a trained architect] begins to build the city of stones and timber, keeping his eye upon his pattern (ἀποβλέπων εἰς τὸ παράδειγμα τὴν ἐκ λίθων καὶ ξύλων ἄρχεται κατασκευάζειν) and assimilating the visible and tangible objects in each case to the incorporeal ideas (ἑκάστῃ τῶν ἀσωμάτων ἰδεῶν τὰς σωματικὰς ἐξομοιῶν οὐσίας). Just such must be our thoughts about God. (*De opificio mundi* 18–19)

This passage in Philo is dependent on the *Timaeus*, where Plato argues that the cosmos is an image (εἰκών) which is modelled upon the paradigm (παράδειγμα) of the eternal and 'has been construed after the pattern of that which is apprehensible by reason and thought' (*Timaeus* 28c–29b); it is desired by God to 'be, so far as possible, nearly resembling Him' (29e: πάντα ὅτι μάλιστα ἐβουλήθη γενέσθαι παραπλήσια ἑαυτῷ).

Later in his *De opificio mundi*, Philo again focuses on the assimilation of the cosmos to God, but now as part of his argument – equally derived from the *Timaeus* (31a–b) – that the cosmos is one as God is one, addressed against Democritus and the Epicureans who conceive of multiple worlds.[138] According to Philo,

> By his account of the creation of the world, of which we have spoken, Moses teaches us among many other things (…) that the world too is one as well as its Maker, who assimilated His work to Himself in its uniqueness (ὅτι καὶ εἷς ἐστιν ὁ κόσμος, ἐπειδὴ καὶ εἷς ὁ δημιουργὸς <ὁ> ἐξομοιώσας αὑτῷ κατὰ τὴν μόνωσιν τὸ ἔργον), who used up for the creation of the whole all the material that exists; for it would not have been a whole had it not been formed and consisted of parts that were wholes. For there are those who suppose that there are more worlds than one, while some think that they are infinite in number. Such men are themselves in very deed infinitely lacking in knowledge of things which it is very good to know. (*De opificio mundi* 170–172)

At the end of his treatise on the creation, Philo summarizes this view, saying that the man who believes, among other things, that

> God is and is from eternity, and that He that really IS is One, and that He has made the world and has made it one world, assimilating it to Himself in its uniqueness (ὅτι πεποίηκε τὸν κόσμον καὶ πεποίηκεν ἕνα, ὡς ἐλέχθη, κατὰ τὴν μόνωσιν ἐξομοιώσας ἑαυτῷ), and that He ever exercises forethought for His creation, will lead a life of bliss and blessedness, because he has a character moulded by dogmas of piety and holiness (μακαρίαν καὶ εὐδαίμονα ζωὴν βιώσεται δόγμασιν εὐσεβείας καὶ ὁσιότητος χαραχθείς). (*De opificio mundi* 172)

[138] Cf. Runia 1986, 175.

It is clearly part of a pious and holy world-view, according to Philo, to regard the cosmos as being assimilated by God to Himself, also in respect of his solitariness.

As the cosmos is assimilated to God, man, too, needs to be assimilated to Him, via the cosmos. The most appropriate narrative figure from the Jewish scriptures in this respect is Abraham, inasmuch as he is said to have contemplated the stars (Gen 15.5), an episode to which Philo seems to allude in his *De Abrahamo*:

> Abraham (…) was eager to follow God and to be obedient to His commands, understanding by commands not only those conveyed in speech and writing but also those made manifest by nature with clearer signs, and apprehended by the sense which is the most truthful of all and superior to hearing. (*De Abrahamo* 60)

It is by reading the commands 'made manifest by nature' that Abraham is exhorted to assimilate himself to the cosmos:

> For anyone who contemplates the order in nature and the constitution enjoyed by the world-city whose excellence no words can describe needs no speaker to teach him to practise a law-abiding and peaceful life and to aim εἰς τὴν τῶν καλῶν ἐξομοίωσιν, at assimilating himself to its beauties. (*De Abrahamo* 61)

Yet at the same time Philo issues a warning that this cosmos should not be mistaken for a god, as did the Chaldeans, among whom Abraham was brought up; in that sense the Chaldeans were wrong in assimilating and comparing the created cosmos to the Creator:

> They [i. e. the Chaldeans] concluded that the world itself was God, thus profanely likening the created to the Creator (τὸν κόσμον αὐτὸν ὑπέλαβον εἶναι θεόν, οὐκ εὐαγῶς τὸ γενόμενον ἐξομοιώσαντες τῷ πεποιηκότι). In this creed Abraham had been reared, and for a long time remained a Chaldean. (*De Abrahamo* 70)

Although one should assimilate oneself to the cosmos, at the same time one should be aware of the fact that the cosmos itself is not God. One should assimilate not only to the cosmos, but, through the cosmos, also to God Himself, as Philo explains in the following passage in his *De opificio mundi*.

The ideal figure who assimilates both to the cosmos and to God is Adam, the first man, in the circumstances in which he was still in a state of solitude and not yet distracted by erotic love, desire and bodily pleasure, and possessed an open, undisturbed mind for the whole reality of the world and for God. He was being assimilated to both:

> For so long as he was by himself, as accorded with such solitude, he went on assimilating to the cosmos and to God (μέχρι μὲν γὰρ εἷς ἦν, ὡμοιοῦτο κατὰ τὴν μόνωσιν κόσμῳ καὶ θεῷ), and receiving in his soul the impressions made by the nature of each, not all of these, but as many as one of mortal composition can find room for (καὶ τῆς ἑκατέρου φύσεως ἐναπεμάττετο τῇ ψυχῇ τοὺς χαρακτῆρας, οὐ πάντας ἀλλ' ὅσους χωρῆσαι δυνατὸν θνητὴν σύστασιν). (*De opificio mundi* 151)

The reference to assimilation to God, and the further stipulation that this assimilation takes place only insofar as 'one of mortal composition can find room for' the impressions which God makes on the soul, is a clear resonance of the notion of assimilation to God as far as possible in the *Theaetetus*. Philo's view that this assimilation also takes place with regard to the cosmos is, of course, reminiscent of the view of Plato's *Timaeus*, a writing with which Philo is also profoundly familiar,[139] to the effect that 'the divine part within us' should follow

> the intellections and revolutions of the Universe (…), rectifying the revolutions within our head, which were distorted at our birth, by learning the harmonies and revolutions of the Universe, and thereby making the part that thinks like (ἐξομοιῶσαι) unto the object of its thought, in accordance with its original nature, and having achieved this likeness (ὁμοιώσαντα) attain finally to that goal (τέλος) of life which is set before men by the gods as the most good both for the present and for the time to come. (*Timaeus* 90c–d)

As we have seen, Eudorus (see § 2.2.5 above) and Plutarch (§ 2.2.6 above) already included this passage among the proof-texts for the Platonic doctrine of assimilation to God. Plutarch also referred to an earlier passage in the *Timaeus*, according to which the cosmos, in having been brought into order out of disorder, shares in God's goodness and is wished by God to 'be, so far as possible, nearly resembling Him' (29e). According to Plutarch, universal nature, disordered before, became a 'cosmos' through resemblance to, and some form of participation in, the form and virtue of God (ὁμοιότητι καὶ μεθέξει τινὶ τῆς περὶ τὸ θεῖον ἰδέας καὶ ἀρετῆς; Plutarch, *De sera numinis vindicta* 550D–E). Philo now clearly conflates the passages from the *Theaetetus* and the *Timaeus* by talking of assimilation to the cosmos and to God. Indeed, the *homoiōsis kosmōi* is an intermediary stage of the *homoiōsis theōi*.

(g) Assimilation and the ideal ruler

As we have seen in § 2.2, assimilation to God is also an activity characteristic of the ideal ruler. According to Plutarch, the true ruler, who is the image of God, models himself by his virtue in the likeness of God: αὑτὸς αὑτὸν εἰς ὁμοιότητα θεῷ δι' ἀρετῆς καθιστὰς (Plutarch, *Ad principem ineruditum* 780E–F; see §§ 2.1.2 and 2.2.6 above). In this passage, Plutarch combines the Neo-Pythagorean designation of the ruler as image of God with the Platonic notion of assimilation to God. Although he does not employ the terminology of image of God, Philo also appears to apply the notion of assimilation to God in a similar discussion of the ideal ruler. Reflecting on the king's 'power both for good and for bad', Philo states:

> The better is to benefit instead of injuring as many as they possibly can. For this is to follow God (τὸ γὰρ ἕπεσθαι θεῷ τοῦτ' ἐστίν) since he too can do both but wills

[139] Runia 1986. On *De opificio mundi* 151, see esp. Runia 1986, 342.

> the good only. This was shown both in the creation and in the ordering of the world. He called the non-existent into existence and produced order from disorder, qualities from things devoid of quality, similarities from dissimilars, identities from the totally different fellowship and harmony from the dissociated and discordant, equality from inequality and light from darkness. For He and His beneficent powers ever make it their business to transmute the faultiness of the bad wherever it exists and convert it to the better. These things good rulers must imitate if they have any aspiration to be assimilated to God: ταῦτα μιμεῖσθαι προσήκει τοὺς ἀγαθοὺς ἄρχοντας, εἴ γέ τις αὐτοῖς φροντίς ἐστιν ἐξομοιώσεως τῆς πρὸς θεόν. (*De specialibus legibus* 4.187–188)

In his description of the ruler's assimilation to God, Philo clearly employs the Pythagorean language of following God (ἕπεσθαι θεῷ). Further, like Plutarch in his reflections upon assimilation to God, Philo, too, refers to the assimilation of the cosmos to God at the creation, when God overcame the primordial chaos of the cosmos by ordering it and making it resemble him. As we have seen in § 2.2.6 above, according to Plutarch,

> God, as Plato says, offers himself to all as a pattern of every excellence, thus rendering human virtue, which is in some sort an assimilation to Himself (ἐξομοίωσιν οὖσαν ἁμωσγέπως πρὸς αὐτόν), accessible to all who are able 'to follow God' (τὴν ἀνθρωπίνην ἀρετήν … ἐνδίδωσι τοῖς ἕπεσθαι θεῷ δυναμένοις). Indeed this was the origin of the change whereby universal nature, disordered before, became a 'cosmos' through resemblance to, and some form of participation in, the form and virtue of God (ὁμοιότητι καὶ μεθέξει τινὶ τῆς περὶ τὸ θεῖον ἰδέας καὶ ἀρετῆς; cf. *Timaeus* 29e). (*De sera numinis vindicta* 550D)

In the same way as Plutarch, Philo links assimilation to God with the assimilation of the cosmos to God in creation. According to Philo, it is this creational assimilation which 'good rulers must imitate if they have any aspiration to be assimilated to God': ταῦτα μιμεῖσθαι προσήκει τοὺς ἀγαθοὺς ἄρχοντας, εἴ γέ τις αὐτοῖς φροντίς ἐστιν ἐξομοιώσεως τῆς πρὸς θεόν. In this application of the notion of assimilation to God in his discussion of the ideal ruler, too, Philo resembles Plutarch.

2.3.5 Specific applications of the doctrine of assimilation

Philo appears to have reflected extensively on the doctrine of man's assimilation to God, as we have just seen in § 2.3.4. He agrees with other ancient philosophers that assimilation to God is the goal of all ethics; that the virtues which assimilate man to God derive from the doctrines and principles of ethic, logic, and physics; that solitude is a prerequisite for the attainment of assimilation to God; that the discussion about assimilation relates to the assessment of the active and contemplative life; that assimilation is only possible to the second God; that assimilation to God proceeds via assimilation to the cosmos; and that assimilation to God should also be practised by good rulers. In these respects,

Philo is very similar to other philosophers who took the doctrine of assimilation to God seriously.

I shall now, finally, discuss several applications of this doctrine in which Philo seems to be distinctive. Two of them are clearly related to Philo's position as a Jew in the Graeco-Roman world. Depending on the setting, Philo takes varying stances as regards polytheism. On the one hand, he draws anti-idolatrous conclusions from the doctrine of assimilation to God by showing the absurd consequences if this doctrine is appropriated in a context which permits the fabrication of physical images of the gods. On the other hand, in the historical circumstances of the conflict between the emperor Gaius and the Jews, Philo can criticize the claim of Gaius to be divine as a wrongful, unwarranted claim to have been assimilated to particular gods whereas in fact Gaius is greatly inferior to them.

The first application occurs in Philo's *De decalogo*, in a passage in which he utters severe criticism of those who fabricate idols. He does so by showing the undesirable consequences if they were to follow the maxim of assimilating to God and become like their gods:

> Horrible as all this is, we have not reached the true horror. The worst is still to come. We have known some of the image-makers offer prayers and sacrifices to their own creations (…). Surely to persons so demented we might well say boldly,
>
> 'Good sirs, the best of prayers and the goal of happiness is to assimilate to God (εὐχῶν ἀρίστην εἶναι συμβέβηκεν, ὦ γενναῖοι, καὶ τέλος εὐδαιμονίας τὴν πρὸς θεὸν ἐξομοίωσιν). Pray you therefore that you may be assimilated to your images and thus enjoy supreme happiness (ὔχεσθε οὖν καὶ ὑμεῖς ἐξομοιωθῆναι τοῖς ἀφιδρύμασιν, ἵνα τὴν ἀνωτάτω καρπώσησθε εὐδαιμονίαν) with eyes that see not, ears that hear not, nostrils which neither breathe nor smell, mouths that never taste nor speak, hands that neither give nor take nor do anything at all, feet that walk not, with no activity in any parts of your bodies but kept under watch and ward in your temple-prison day and night, ever drinking in the smoke of the victims. For this is the one good which you imagine your idols to enjoy'.
>
> As a matter of fact, I expect that such an advice would be received with indignation as savouring of imprecations rather than of prayers and would call forth abusive repudiations and retorts, and this would be the strongest proof of the wide extent of impiety shown by men who acknowledge gods of such a nature that they would abominate the idea of becoming similar to them (οἷς ὅμοιοί ποτε τὰς φύσεις ἀπεύξαιντ' ἂν γενέσθαι). Let no one, then, who has a soul worship a soulless thing, for it is utterly preposterous that the works of nature should turn aside to do service to what human hands have wrought. (*De decalogo* 72–76)

In this passage Philo develops his argumentation from the assumption that 'the best of prayers and the goal of happiness is to assimilate to God'. As in his *De opificio mundi*, Philo even defines assimilation to God as the goal of ethics (*De opificio mundi* 144; see § 2.3.4. [a] above). Taking his starting point in the general acceptance of this goal, Philo draws the ironic consequence that the image-makers, on this basis, should become assimilated to their idols. Philo trusts

that even they 'would abominate the idea of becoming similar to them'. This is a clearly Jewish, anti-idolatrous application of the doctrine of assimilation to God.

The second application which reflects Philo's position as a Jew is a passage in his *Legatio ad Gaium*. In the serious conflict between the Jews and Gaius, who wanted to have his statue placed in the Jerusalem temple, Philo, for the sake of argument, sides with the polytheistic religion of Graeco-Roman paganism, and argues that Gaius wrongly claims to be divine. According to Philo, Gaius

> began first of all to liken himself / to assimilate himself to the so-called demigods (ἤρχετο γὰρ ἐξομοιοῦν τὸ πρῶτον τοῖς λεγομένοις ἡμιθέοις ἑαυτόν), Dionysus and Heracles and the Dioscuri, treating Trophonius and Amphiaraus and Amphilochus and their like and their oracles and celebrations as laughing-stocks compared with his own power. (*Legatio ad Gaium* 78)

Gaius' assimilation to one of the gods in particular, Ares, the Greek god of war, seemed preposterous:

> Surely the last thing one would expect is that such a body and soul as his, both of them feeble and nerveless, could ever be assimilated to the prowess of Ares in both (πάντα γε μὴν ἐλπίσειεν ἄν τις <μᾶλλον> ἢ τοιοῦτον σῶμα καὶ ψυχήν, ἄμφω μαλακὰ καὶ κατεαγότα, τῇ περὶ ἑκάτερον Ἄρεως ἀλκῇ δυνηθῆναί ποτε ἐξομοιωθῆναι). Yet like an actor wearing in turn many kinds of masks he beguiled the spectators with the deceptive appearances he assumed. (*Legatio ad Gaium* 111)

Philo explicitly denies Gaius the right to assimilate himself to the gods because he is so greatly inferior to them:

> Need we more than these proofs to teach us that Gaius has no right to assimilate himself to any of the gods or demigods either, for his nature, his substance, and his purpose in life, is different from theirs? – Ἆρά γε ἤδη μεμαθήκαμεν ἐκ τούτων, ὅτι οὐδενὶ θεῶν ἀλλ᾽ οὐδὲ ἡμιθέων ἐξομοιοῦσθαι δεῖ Γάιον, μήτε φύσεως μήτε οὐσίας ἀλλὰ μηδὲ προαιρέσεως τετυχηκότα τῆς αὐτῆς; (*Legatio ad Gaium* 114)

The polemical way in which Philo applies the notion of assimilation to God, first against the making of idols, and secondly against the emperor Gaius, shows that he assumes that the notion is widespread and commonly accepted.

Finally, there is one more distinctive application of the notion of assimilation in Philo's writings: it serves as an argument in the discussion about whether the cosmos is eternal or destructible, in Philo's *De aeternitate mundi*. One particular argument in favour of the eternity of the cosmos is the view that the products of a craftsman resemble the maker:

> The works of us mortals will rightly be destructible, while those of Him the immortal may surely be expected to be indestructible. For it is reasonable to suppose that what the craftsmen have wrought should be assimilated to the nature of those who wrought them – τῇ γὰρ φύσει τῶν τεχνιτῶν εὔλογον τὰ δημιουργηθέντα ἐξομοιοῦσθαι. (*De aeternitate mundi* 44)

Philo, then, is indeed one of the earliest attestations for the Platonic doctrine of assimilation to God after Eudorus, and is probably evidence of the influence which the latter exerted in introducing this doctrine as the explicit goal of ethics. Philo attests to the growing influence of the doctrine which, as I will argue, can also be discerned in Paul.

2.4 Paul, the image of God and likeness to Christ

In §§ 2.1 and 2.2 I have already referred, whenever applicable, to the relevance of the pagan background of Paul's use of the notions of image and likeness. Now I shall bring together the results of this analysis and render them into a coherent whole, expanding on particular issues when necessary. In this exercise, I shall also draw upon my analysis of Paul's 'morphic language' in § 1.3, in which I commented on the common pagan vocabulary of 'image', 'form', and 'transformation'. For this reason, the present section offers a synthesis of many things already explored before. First, I shall focus on the notion of image and exemplify what pagan background there might be to Paul's understanding of this notion (§ 2.4.1). Then I shall comment on Paul's notion of likeness and try to establish its pagan colouring (§ 2.4.2), before going to discuss the way in which the two notions, that of image and that of likeness, are intertwined (§ 2.4.3). As we shall see, the developments of pagan views on 'image' and 'likeness' tune in nicely and constitute an interpretative framework for much of what is going on in Paul's anthropology. Finally, I shall give a preview of the remainder of this book, in which Philo's and Paul's anthropology will be further contextualized against the background of particular movements contemporary with them (§ 2.4.4).

2.4.1 The 'image of God' in Paul

Three features of Paul's use of 'image' seem to be pagan in nature. Not only does Paul's use of 'image' appear to reflect the broader semantic field of images as possessing forms (μορφαί), but the notion of bearing the images of particular gods, and the implication that man is not only God's image, but simultaneously the temple in which this image is housed, also bear pagan overtones.

First of all, the combination of the term 'image' with morphic language seems due to the common pagan parlance about images having forms. The two passages which show this combination at work are 2 Cor 3.18, which talks about a metamorphosis into, or with regard, to the image of God (ἡμεῖς δὲ πάντες ἀνακεκαλυμμένῳ προσώπῳ τὴν δόξαν κυρίου κατοπτριζόμενοι τὴν αὐτὴν εἰκόνα μεταμορφούμεθα ἀπὸ δόξης εἰς δόξαν) and Rom 8.29, which speaks about Christians assuming the same form as the image of Christ (οὓς προέγνω, καὶ προώρισεν συμμόρφους τῆς εἰκόνος τοῦ υἱοῦ αὐτοῦ). The combination

of 'image' with morphic terminology seems best explained as deriving from the widespread discourse in the Graeco-Roman world that images have forms (see § 1.3.2 [c]).

Moreover, I also note in passing that, as regards the latter passage from Rom 8.29, the present chapter has also shown a close parallel between the optimistic views of Paul and of Plato. Paul believes that for those caught up in the process of assuming the same form as the image of Christ 'all things work together for good' (Rom 8.28). Plato, for his part, posits that for 'the just man', who will 'by the practice of virtue be assimilated unto God so far as that is possible for a man' (*Republic* 613a–b), 'whether he fall into poverty or disease or any other supposed evil, (…) all these things will finally prove good, both in life and in death' (613a; see further § 2.2.1 above).

Secondly, as we have seen in § 1.3 above, Paul's depiction, in 1 Cor 15.49, of Christians as bearing the images of the earthly and heavenly man (καὶ καθὼς ἐφορέσαμεν τὴν εἰκόνα τοῦ χοϊκοῦ, φορέσομεν καὶ τὴν εἰκόνα τοῦ ἐπουρανίου) seems to derive from the pagan practice of carrying the images of the gods around in processions (see § 1.3.1 above). In this case, Paul's reference to this practice is metaphorical; instead of referring to the carrying of material images he transfers this vocabulary to the metaphorical carrying of God's image by man. As we have seen in § 2.1.4, there are also pagan analogies for a metaphorical use of this kind. According to the writer known as the Anonymus de Scientia Politica, 'the good king (…) carries around in himself God's image (εἰκόνα ἐν αὑτῷ φέρων)'. Like Paul, the author uses the terminology of the image of God in a metaphorical sense, derived from the general practice of pagan processions with images of the gods.

Thirdly, from the fact that man is God's image, Paul seems to draw a particular conclusion which is also drawn in pagan philosophy. I have in mind the inference that, if man is God's image, then he is also a temple, which houses this image of the god. In § 2.1.3 (b) above we encountered the view, expressed by Porphyry, that it is the wise man

> by whom, in the organ by which he knows, the temple (τὸ ἱερὸν) must, through wisdom, be adorned with a living statue (ἐμψύχῳ ἀγάλματι), i.e. with the mind, because God has erected himself in him as his image (ἐνεικονισαμένου ἀγάλλοντος θεοῦ), and thus has adorned him. (*Ad Marcellam* 11)

Porphyry clearly portrays the wise man as housing the statue of God in his mind, as in a shrine. Indeed, as I concluded in § 2.1.4, if the anthropological talk of man as God's image is so heavily influenced by the common discourse of the cultic and religious statues of the gods, then it is understandable why, in his stipulation of the wise man as God's animate, living statue (ἔμψυχον ἄγαλμα), an author such as Porphyry also speaks of this man as a temple which must be adorned with a living statue, the mind.

Many further passages from ancient philosophers could be adduced here. Similar views circulate in Stoicism, to the effect that one should not build temples but hold the divine in one's mind only: Ζήνων ὁ Κιτιεὺς ὁ Στωϊκὸς ἔφη μὴ δεῖν θεοῖς οἰκοδομεῖν ἱερά, ἀλλ' ἔχειν τὸ θεῖον ἐν μόνῳ τῷ νῷ, μᾶλλον δὲ θεὸν ἡγεῖσθαι τὸν νοῦν (*SVF* 1.146; Zeno apud Epiphanius, *Panarion* 3.508). Such views are also echoed in Nemesius of Emesa, according to whom man is a temple of God (Nemesius, *De natura hominis* 1.433 edn Einarson; 1.15.19 edn Morani). Other Christians also reflect these traditions. In his *Sententiae*, the Christian compilator Sextus, whom we encountered in § 2.1, expresses views derived from a pagan, Neo-Pythagorean collection: not only that the wise man is a living image of God (*Sententiae Sexti* 190; see § 2.1.3 [a] above), but also that one should treat the body as a temple of God (35).

Philo already is testimony to these traditions that man's true identity can be compared to the dwelling of an image of a god in a shrine. In a passage on Moses' contemporaries, Philo describes the awe they felt with regard to the mind of Moses. They

> considered earnestly what the mind which dwelt in his body like an image in its shrine (ὁ ἐνοικῶν αὐτοῦ τῷ σώματι καὶ ἀγαλματοφορούμενος νοῦς) could be, whether it was human or divine or a mixture of both, so utterly unlike was it to the majority, soaring above them and exalted to a grander height. (Philo, *De vita Mosis* 1.27)

The Loeb translation here renders explicit what is actually only implicit in the passage, which simply speaks of the mind as being ἀγαλματοφορούμενος, carrying an image in one's mind. In another passage, however, it is rendered explicit that ὁ ἀγαλματοφορούμενος νοῦς, the mind which carries an image (see apart from *De vita Mosis* 1.27 also *De mutatione nominum* 21), is, for that reason, indeed a holy temple:

> A sacred dwelling-place or shrine was being fashioned for the reasonable soul, which man was to carry as a holy image, of all images the most God-like: οἶκος γάρ τις ἢ νεὼς ἱερὸς ἐτεκταίνετο ψυχῆς λογικῆς, ἣν ἔμελλεν ἀγαλματοφορήσειν ἀγαλμάτων τὸ θεοειδέστατον. (*De opificio mundi* 137)

According to Philo, when Moses says that man was created 'after the image of God' (Gen 1.26), the word 'image' (εἰκών) should clearly be understood as an ἄγαλμα, a statue of a god:

> It is in respect of the mind, the sovereign element of the soul, that the word 'image' is used (…). It [i.e. the mind] is in a fashion a god to him who carries and enshrines it as an object of reverence (τρόπον τινὰ θεὸς ὢν τοῦ φέροντος καὶ ἀγαλματοφοροῦντος αὐτόν); for the human mind evidently occupies a position in men precisely answering to that which the great Ruler occupies in all the world. (Philo, *De opificio mundi* 69)

The underlying logic of these passages is that because man carries in his soul an image of God, he is, as a matter of fact, turned into a temple or shrine of God.

Man's true identity lies in the fact that he is a priest in the soul, which – because in this soul he carries the image of God – is a temple:

> There are, as is evident, two temples of God (δύο γάϱ, ὡς ἔοικεν, ἱεϱὰ θεοῦ): one of them this universe, in which there is also as High Priest, His First-born, the divine Logos, and the other the rational soul, whose Priest is the real man (ἕτεϱον δὲ λογικὴ ψυχή, ἧς ἱεϱεὺς ὁ πϱὸς ἀλήθειαν ἄνθϱωπος); the outward and visible image (μίμημα αἰσθητὸν) of whom is he who offers the prayers and sacrifices handed down from our fathers. (Philo, *De somniis* 1.215)

In these passages, it becomes particularly clear that Philo, in line with particular pagan philosophers, regards man as the image of God, and for this reason is able to depict him as a temple which houses this image, a temple in which man (or rather the 'real man', Philo's version of the Platonic and Pauline 'inner man', as we shall see in § 7.2.2 [e]) officiates.

This pagan philosophical inference that man, by housing God's image, is himself a temple is also drawn by Paul, I suggest. The logic which we detected in the ancient philosophical passages above, and saw echoed in Philo, is very similar to that underlying Paul's language in 1 and 2 Cor. Paul also alternates between imagery of man as God's image (1 Cor 11.7, 15.49; 2 Cor 3.18, 4.4) and as God's temple (1 Cor 3.16–17, 6.19; 2 Cor 6.16). I shall now briefly discuss the latter three passages in which man is regarded God's temple.

In the first passage, Paul asks the Corinthians:

> Do you not know that you are God's temple (ναὸς θεοῦ ἐστε) and that God's Spirit dwells in you (τὸ πνεῦμα τοῦ θεοῦ οἰκεῖ ἐν ὑμῖν)? If anyone destroys God's temple, God will destroy that person. For God's temple is holy, and you are that temple. (1 Cor 3.16–17)

In this passage, the Corinthians are called God's ναός, God's temple, or, also possible as a more precise translation, God's shrine, the innermost part of a temple which contains the image of the god (see LSJ 1160 s. v. ναός II). In this passage, the temple is inhabited by the Spirit of God: τὸ πνεῦμα τοῦ θεοῦ οἰκεῖ ἐν ὑμῖν. It is unclear whether this metaphorical depiction of Christians as the temple or shrine of God refers collectively to the Christian community, or to Christians individually. The latter meaning seems to be central in the second passage, where Paul depicts the individual body as the site of God's temple:

> Or do you not know that your body is a temple of the Holy Spirit within you (τὸ σῶμα ὑμῶν ναὸς τοῦ ἐν ὑμῖν ἁγίου πνεύματός ἐστιν), which you have from God, and that you are not your own? For you were bought with a price; therefore glorify God in your body (δοξάσατε δὴ τὸν θεὸν ἐν τῷ σώματι ὑμῶν). (1 Cor 6.19–20)

Unlike the previous, ambiguous passage, this one contains a clearly anthropological statement. The body functions as God's temple, and it is a temple because the holy Spirit dwells within it. Unclear, however, is where exactly this Spirit

dwells. If the body in Paul's understanding is the entity which also comprises soul and spirit (1 Thess 5.23), as we shall see in chap. 5 below, it seems likely that the holy Spirit touches upon the human spirit (1 Cor 2.10–16) and that it is involved in man's metamorphosis into, or in accordance, with the image of God (2 Cor 3.18).

A connection between man being God's temple and his being God's image is made in the third passage under consideration. The connection is not made by way of straightforward identification of the two, however, but through a contrast between the individual believer as the temple of God, on the one hand, and εἴδωλα, idols, on the other:

> Do not be mismatched with unbelievers. For what partnership is there between righteousness and lawlessness? Or what fellowship is there between light and darkness? What agreement does Christ have with Beliar? Or what does a believer share with an unbeliever? What agreement has the temple of God with idols? (τίς δὲ συγκατάθεσις ναῷ θεοῦ μετὰ εἰδώλων;) For we are the temple of the living God (ἡμεῖς γὰρ ναὸς θεοῦ ἐσμεν ζῶντος). (2 Cor 6.14–16)

This contrast does not come as a surprise in 2 Cor, as in the immediately preceding passage, 2 Cor 3–4, Paul has talked about the transformation of the believers into, or in accordance with, the image of Christ (2 Cor 3.18, 4.4), resulting in the gradual growth of the 'inner man' (2 Cor 4.16). I shall comment on these notions in chap. 6 below, but for now it is sufficient to note that the reference in 2 Cor 6.14–16 to εἴδωλα, idols, belongs to the same discourse as that of the image of God, idols being the pagan images of their gods.[140]

The same antithesis can be observed in Paul's letter to the Romans. Whereas pagans have 'exchanged the glory of the immortal God for the likeness of an *image* (ἤλλαξαν τὴν δόξαν τοῦ ἀφθάρτου θεοῦ ἐν ὁμοιώματι εἰκόνος) of a mortal human being or birds or four-footed animals or reptiles' (Rom 1.23), it is through being predestined to become of the same form as the *image* of Christ, God's Son (Rom 8.29: προώρισεν συμμόρφους τῆς εἰκόνος τοῦ υἱοῦ αὐτοῦ), that man is able to overcome the downfall of humanity. Here, the images of the idols and the image of God are put on a par. The terminology of idols, the images of the pagan gods, belongs to the same vocabulary as the term 'image of God'.

When the Corinthian Christians are depicted as the temple of God and contrasted with idols (2 Cor 6.14–16), it seems very likely then, that these Christians are styled thus because they themselves are the image of God, as Paul has just emphasized (2 Cor 3.18–4.4). In this way Paul shows the same logic as the ancient philosophical and Philonic texts discussed above: by housing God's image in himself, man himself is rendered into a temple of God, a shrine, which, in its innermost part, contains the image of God.

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[140] For a comparison of the terminology of images and idols, see Bremmer 2008*b*.

This logic, finally, also underlies the passage in Rom 12.1–2, which we shall study in more detail in § 7.3 below, but will refer to in passing here. If man's body is a temple of the Holy Spirit, as Paul says in 1 Cor 6.19–20, it makes sense that he urges the readers of Rom 12.1–2 to present their bodies as a sacrifice to God, and to experience a metamorphosis within their minds, which are encompassed by their bodies:

> I appeal to you therefore, brothers, by the mercies of God, to present your bodies as a living sacrifice (παραστῆσαι τὰ σώματα ὑμῶν θυσίαν ζῶσαν), holy and acceptable to God, which is your logical worship (τὴν λογικὴν λατρείαν). Do not be conformed to this world, but be transformed by the renewing of the mind (μεταμορφοῦσθε τῇ ἀνακαινώσει τοῦ νοός), so that you may discern what is the will of God – what is good and acceptable and perfect. (Rom 12.1–2)

If the body is indeed the temple of God (1 Cor 6.19–20), then presenting their bodies as a living sacrifice is indeed most appropriate for Christians. From the entire passage of Rom 12.1–2, it is clear that Paul is not thinking merely of the body as body, but also of the body as the site of the soul and spirit or mind. It is by presenting their bodies in this broader sense, that they will experience metamorphosis within their mind. This worship is indeed a logical form of worship, because it takes place within the mind. It is the mind, as pagan-philosophical analogies show, that is the living image which renders man into a shrine or temple of God. If the spiritual transformation affects the inner man (2 Cor 3.18–4.4, 4.16) and the mind (Rom 12.2), and that is the place where the image of God takes shape (2 Cor 3.18), then clearly the body, which encompasses that mind, is God's temple.

From these three issue – (1) the combination of the term 'image' with morphic language which derives from the common pagan discourse of images having forms, (2) the metaphorical depiction of Christians as bearing the image of God in the same way as the images of the gods are carried in pagan processions, and (3) the logic, also attested in ancient philosophy, that man, because he houses God's image, functions as its shrine or temple – it seems to follow that Paul's way of talking about God's image is partly rooted in the semantic-conceptual field in which pagans, too, discuss the images of their gods.

There might be a fourth issue which demonstrates Paul's command of pagan concepts and which even extends to the notion of God's image as such. A fascinating and skilful paper by B. Burrowes on the origin of Paul's image and Adam Christologies, presented at the 2008 Annual Meeting of the Society of Biblical Literature in San Diego, made a convincing case for a pagan origin of these Christologies. Burrowes argues against the position of Dunn and N.T. Wright that the natural connection between Christ and Adam as the divine image derives from Jewish sources, and against the position of S. Kim[141] and C.C. Newman,[142]

[141] Kim 2002, chap. 5.
[142] Newman 1992.

that such a connection was made because of Paul's vision of Christ. Instead, according to Burrowes,

> Paul's conception of Christ as the image of God derives from the Hellenistic ruler ideology (…). In his vision of Christ, Paul experienced Jesus as the risen and enthroned kurios, since his most basic confession of faith is 'Jesus is Lord' (Rom 10.9, 1 Cor 12.3). The exaltation of Jesus to universal lordship would naturally have brought comparison to secular rulers, specifically to the Roman emperors and the Seleucid kings of Antioch. In Hellenistic political philosophy, the ideal king was an image of the divine in the exercise of his power and in his moral character. As the only true Lord in contrast to the mere Roman and Seleucid pretenders, it is Jesus who is the true and faithful image of the divine. Only after Paul's identification of the risen kurios as the divine image, was he led to identify Christ in terms of Genesis 1.27 and subsequently conceive of Christ as the eschatological Adam.[143]

As is evident from § 2.1 above, and especially § 2.1.2 on the 'image of God' in Hellenistic kingship ideology, Burrowes's and my own approach are very similar. Indeed, since our research was undertaken independently from one another, our results confirm each other's findings. Both in Burrowes's paper and a paper by myself at the same meeting, in which I presented preliminary findings of my own study, the passage from Plutarch's *Ad principem ineruditum* occupies a central place in the argumentation. In the relevant passage, Plutarch states:

> The ruler is *the image of God who orders all things* (ἄρχων δ' εἰκὼν θεοῦ τοῦ πάντα κοσμοῦντος). Such a ruler needs no Phidias nor Polyclitus nor Myron to model him, but *by his virtue he forms himself in the likeness of God* (ἀλλ' αὐτὸς αὑτὸν εἰς ὁμοιότητα θεῷ δι' ἀρετῆς καθιστὰς) and thus creates a statue most delightful of all to behold and most worthy of divinity. (Plutarch, *Ad principem ineruditum* 780E–F; cf. Stobaeus, *Anthologium* 4.5.99)

It is against this background that both Burrowes and I interpret Paul's interpretation of the notion of the image of God. Yet, Burrowes goes one step further and suggests that Paul's interest in the very notion of the image of God itself was only awakened when he identified Christ as the Lord and accepted the implication of Hellenistic kingship ideology that the κύριος is the image of God. From this perspective, it was only in the second instance that Paul became interested in the notion of image of God in Gen 1.26–27. I recognize the potency of Burrowes's argumentation, yet I believe that Paul's interest in Adam, and in the qualification of this Adam as the image of God, is not secondary, but is rather to be explained from the fact that this figure, more than Abraham, and differently from Moses, is the ideal focal point of Paul's universalism. It is no coincidence that Abraham and Moses take an important place in Paul's discussion with the ethnocentric Judaizing movement in Galatia, whereas in his correspondence with predominantly pagan communities in Corinth and Rome Adam becomes the focal point

[143] Burrowes 2007.

of attention. Moreover, this is backed up by the fact that before he talks about Christ as the image of God in 1 Cor 15.49 and 2 Cor 3.18, 4.4, Paul already depicts man as such as the image of God in 1 Cor 11.7. Paul is not only interested in the image of God for Christological reasons, but for anthropological reasons as well. Nevertheless, and in this I fully agree with Burrowes, Paul's interpretation of this notion also has a pagan side to it.

2.4.2 Homoiōma between Christians and Christ

Paul's view on the likeness between man and Christ also reflects his indebtedness to Greek philosophy. While in pagan philosophy the notions of image of God and becoming like God are intertwined, as the passage from Plutarch just quoted demonstrates, the same applies to Paul's anthropology. The process of becoming like God here takes the form of becoming like Christ. As we have seen in § 1.1, ancient Judaism offers no real analogy for the modelling of believers on the paradigm of Adam, in this way becoming similar to him. It is rather the ancient philosophical ideas about the image of God and assimilation to him, as outlined in §§ 2.1 and 2.2 above, that prove relevant here. I shall come back to the passage from Plutarch's *Ad principem ineruditum* (780E–F) in § 2.4.3, but will first draw attention to what seems to be an important analogy for Paul's discourse about the likeness between Christians and Christ.

There seem to be three different aspects to the notion of *homoiōma* between Christians and Christ. First, the chronological point at which the identification between man and Christ is made is located in man's baptism. That is the point at which man starts the process of assimilation to Christ. Secondly, the beginning of this process is the reversal of the decline of religion which took place when the glory of God vanished because he was forced into the likeness of idol images. Thirdly, the assimilation of man to Christ was rendered possible when Christ first took on the likeness of man, thus enabling man to assimilate to him.

(a) The homoiōma of Christians with Christ through baptism: Acquiring the ethos of a god

According to Paul's classic passage on baptism, through this rite man is buried with Christ and subsequently experiences a resurrection, in the present, into a new ethical life; in this way believers become fused with the likeness of Christ's death, as they will be with the likeness of his resurrection:

> All of us who have been baptized into Christ Jesus were baptized into his death (ὅσοι ἐβαπτίσθημεν εἰς Χριστὸν Ἰησοῦν εἰς τὸν θάνατον αὐτοῦ ἐβαπτίσθημεν). Therefore we have been buried with him by baptism into death (συνετάφημεν οὖν αὐτῷ διὰ τοῦ βαπτίσματος εἰς τὸν θάνατον), so that, just as Christ was raised from the dead by the glory of the Father, so we too might walk in newness of life (ἵνα ὥσπερ ἠγέρθη Χριστὸς ἐκ νεκρῶν διὰ τῆς δόξης τοῦ πατρός, οὕτως καὶ ἡμεῖς ἐν καινότητι ζωῆς περιπατήσωμεν). For if we have become grown together with the

likeness of Christ's death (εἰ γὰρ σύμφυτοι γεγόναμεν τῷ ὁμοιώματι τοῦ θανάτου αὐτοῦ), we will certainly be grown together with the likeness of his resurrection (ἀλλὰ καὶ τῆς ἀναστάσεως ἐσόμεθα). We know that our old man was crucified with him (τοῦτο γινώσκοντες, ὅτι ὁ παλαιὸς ἡμῶν ἄνθρωπος συνεσταυρώθη) so that the body of sin might be destroyed, and we might no longer be enslaved to sin (ἵνα καταργηθῇ τὸ σῶμα τῆς ἁμαρτίας, τοῦ μηκέτι δουλεύειν ἡμᾶς τῇ ἁμαρτίᾳ). (Rom 6.3–6)

The pivotal expression in this, is the line σύμφυτοι γεγόναμεν τῷ ὁμοιώματι τοῦ θανάτου αὐτοῦ, ἀλλὰ καὶ τῆς ἀναστάσεως ἐσόμεθα in Rom 6.5: 'we have become grown together with the likeness of Christ's death, and we will certainly be grown together with the likeness of his resurrection'. The first clause, σύμφυτοι γεγόναμεν τῷ ὁμοιώματι τοῦ θανάτου αὐτοῦ ('we have become grown together with the likeness of Christ's death'), is difficult to interpret, but has a close analogy in Philipp 3.10–11 where Paul expresses his wish to

want to know Christ and the power of his resurrection and the sharing of his sufferings (τοῦ γνῶναι αὐτὸν καὶ τὴν δύναμιν τῆς ἀναστάσεως αὐτοῦ καὶ κοινωνίαν παθημάτων αὐτοῦ) by becoming of the same form with his death (συμμορφιζόμενος τῷ θανάτῳ αὐτοῦ), if somehow I may attain the resurrection from the dead (εἴ πως καταντήσω εἰς τὴν ἐξανάστασιν τὴν ἐκ νεκρῶν).

The expression σύμφυτος τῷ ὁμοιώματι τοῦ θανάτου αὐτοῦ ('grown together with the likeness of his death') from Rom 6.5 is similar to the phrase συμμορφιζόμενος τῷ θανάτῳ αὐτοῦ ('becoming of the same form with his death') from Philipp 3.10. In short, the difficult, periphrastic phrase σύμφυτος τῷ ὁμοιώματι ('grown together with the likeness') means nothing else than συμμορφιζόμενος ('becoming of the same form as') and is thus part of the semantic-conceptual field of Paul's morphic language which we studied in § 1.3 above. Strictly speaking σύμφυτος is a physiological and biological term, but is also metaphorically applied in the sense of 'congenital' and 'innate'.[144] Given the demonstrable synonymy of σύμφυτος τῷ ὁμοιώματι with συμμορφιζόμενος, the term συμμορφιζόμενος underlines the high degree of likeness which Paul envisages between the Christians and Christ; they assimilate to Christ in a very innate way and, through this process, acquire the forms of his death.

According to Rom 6.5 the result of this process of becoming similar to Christ's death is the prospect of also becoming similar to his resurrection: 'if we have become grown together with the likeness of Christ's death (εἰ γὰρ σύμφυτοι γεγόναμεν τῷ ὁμοιώματι τοῦ θανάτου αὐτοῦ), we will certainly be grown together with the likeness of his resurrection (ἀλλὰ καὶ τῆς ἀναστάσεως ἐσόμεθα)'. The same view is expressed in chap. 3 of Philippians. If man be-

[144] The term is particularly useful for referring to innate processes. Plato, for instance, uses it in the following ways: the corporeal has become grown together with the soul (*Phaedo* 81c), sensation has become innate in the soul (*Timaeus* 42a–c); cf. also *Republic* X 609 for the concept of congenital, engrafted evil.

comes of the same form as Christ's death (3.10: συμμορφιζόμενος τῷ θανάτῳ αὐτοῦ), man is assured that Christ 'will change the body of our humiliation so that it may be of the same form as the body of Christ's glory (μετασχηματίσει τὸ σῶμα τῆς ταπεινώσεως ἡμῶν σύμμορφον τῷ σώματι τῆς δόξης αὐτοῦ), by the power that also enables him to make all things subject to himself' (Philipp 3.21). The expression σύμφυτος τῷ ὁμοιώματι ('grown together with the likeness') is thus clearly part of Paul's morphic language which comprises the terminology of image, of form and, as is now apparent, also of likeness. Christians, according to Paul's passage on baptism in Rom 6, become assimilated to Christ or, to be more precise, to his fate in death and resurrection. As we shall see, this notion of assimilating to *the ethos* of a god, to his distinctive customs and habits, is part and parcel of the Platonic notion of assimilation to God / the gods.

But before we address this notion, I shall comment briefly on another short phrase in Paul's baptismal passage in Romans 6 which has to do with the identification of Christians with Christ, and point to its occurrence elsewhere in the Pauline corpus. Not only is man said to have become grown together with the likeness of Christ's death (Rom 6.5: σύμφυτοι γεγόναμεν τῷ ὁμοιώματι τοῦ θανάτου αὐτοῦ), but, as Paul also writes, 'our old man was crucified with him': ὁ παλαιὸς ἡμῶν ἄνθρωπος συνεσταυρώθη (Rom 6.6). This identification with Christ, through which the characteristics of his death are imitated, had already been discussed twice in Paul's letter to the Galatians. As he had written in Gal 2.19–20,

> I have been crucified with Christ (Χριστῷ συνεσταύρωμαι). And it is no longer I who live, but it is Christ who lives in me (ζῶ δὲ οὐκέτι ἐγώ, ζῇ δὲ ἐν ἐμοὶ Χριστός). And the life I now live in the flesh I live by faith in the Son of God, who loved me and gave himself for me.

In imitating Christ, Paul even, metaphorically, adopts Christ's way of dying and living. This identification is brought up again at the end of Galatians, when Paul expresses his conviction that through Christ's death, with which Paul has identified himself, it is Paul himself to whom the entire cosmos has been crucified and he to the cosmos:

> May I never boast of anything except the cross of our Lord Jesus Christ, through whom the cosmos has been crucified to me, and I to the cosmos (ἐμοὶ κόσμος ἐσταύρωται κἀγὼ κόσμῳ). For neither circumcision nor uncircumcision is anything; but a new creation (καινὴ κτίσις) is everything! (Gal 6.14–15)

Whatever the exact meaning of this passage in the context of the entire letter,[145] it is clear that Paul emulates Christ's death and, through this, also participates in his new life, the life of the new creation.

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[145] For the cosmological side involved, see Van Kooten 2003, § 2.1, 59–79, esp. 78; cf. 129.

Both passages from Galatians, like the baptismal passage from Romans, show the believer's close identification with Christ, emphasizing the extent to which, and the respects in which, Christians become similar to Christ. They assimilate to his ethos so much, that they can be depicted as experiencing the same death as Christ: they have been crucified with Christ. The notion of following the ethos of a god seems to be part of the Platonic notion of assimilation to the gods, particularly as spelled out in Plato's *Phaedrus*.

As we saw in our discussion of Plato's notion of assimilation in § 2.2.1 above, in the *Phaedrus* Plato describes a procession of the gods from visible reality to the outer rim of the cosmos, where they contemplate true reality (246a ff.). The souls in this procession are portrayed in their aspiration to become more and more like the particular gods whom they revere (*Phaedrus* 252c–253c). This they do by adopting the gods' particular customs, habits and ways of living. They 'keep their eyes fixed upon the gods, and as they reach and grasp him by memory they, by being inspired by the god, are inspired and receive from him character and habits (ἐνθουσιῶντες ἐξ ἐκείνου λαμβάνουσι τὰ ἔθη καὶ τὰ ἐπιτηδεύματα)' (253a). The souls which follow in this procession can be divided into teachers and pupils, the former leading the latter: 'by imitating the god themselves (μιμούμενοι αὐτοί) and by persuasion and education (τε καὶ τὰ παιδικὰ πείθοντες καὶ ῥυθμίζοντες) they [i.e. the teachers] lead the beloved [i.e. the soul of their pupil] to the habit of life and the nature of the god (εἰς τὸ ἐκείνου ἐπιτήδευμα καὶ ἰδέαν ἄγουσιν)' (*Phaedrus* 253b).

As I have already indicated, the efforts of the teachers to lead their pupils to the conduct and the nature of the god very much resemble Paul's dealings with his readers, when he labours μέχρις οὗ μορφωθῇ Χριστὸς ἐν ὑμῖν, until Christ receives shape and form in the believers (Gal 4.19). Moreover, on the basis of our discussion of Romans 6 in the present chapter, we can now see that the state of Christians who 'have become grown together with the likeness of Christ's death' (Rom 6.5), have been crucified with him (Rom 6.6), and will certainly be grown together with the likeness of his resurrection in the future (Rom 6.5), is very similar to that of the participants in Plato's procession, who have received from their gods 'customs/habits and ways of living (τὰ ἔθη καὶ τὰ ἐπιτηδεύματα; 253a) or, phrased differently, 'the habit of life and the nature' [of the god] (τὸ ἐπιτήδευμα καὶ ἰδέα; 253b).[146] In Plato's *Phaedrus*, assimilation to God, or rather to the gods, appears to consist in the reception of particular customs, habits and ways of living; thus they become ἐνθουσιῶντες, inspired by the particular god whom they follow.

This is indeed comparable to the believer taking on Christ's defining character traits and ways of living in the Pauline corpus; like the participants in the proces-

[146] Cf. Vollenweider 1998, 139: 'Die Partizipationsvorstellungen entstammen letztlich der platonischen Philosophie', with reference to Sellin 1996.

sion of the *Phaedrus*, the Christians become ἐνθουσιῶντες, in the sense that – as Paul phrases it – 'it is no longer I who live, but it is Christ who lives in me (ζῶ δὲ οὐκέτι ἐγώ, ζῇ δὲ ἐν ἐμοὶ Χριστός; Gal 2.19–20)'. The particulars of Christ's ethos and way of living clearly include his death and resurrection. These features are taken over by the believers. They become 'grown together with the likeness of his death' (σύμφυτοι … τῷ ὁμοιώματι τοῦ θανάτου αὐτοῦ).

This assimilation to Christ, the imitation of his ethos, is not only a theme in Romans and Galatians, but also explicitly in Philippians 2.5–11, where the readers are exhorted to follow the ethos of Christ by having in them the same understanding which was in Christ: τοῦτο φρονεῖτε ἐν ὑμῖν ὃ καὶ ἐν Χριστῷ Ἰησοῦ (Philipp 2.5). I shall return to the contents of this hymnic passage below in section (c), but will point out in passing that following the ethos of Christ implies a morphic assimilation to Christ: Christ takes on the form of man, according to the hymn in 2.6–7, and man, in his turn, must, even in the present, be of the same form as Christ's death (Philipp 3.10: συμμορφιζόμενος τῷ θανάτῳ αὐτοῦ). In the future, at the end, he will become entirely of the same form as Christ's body of glory (Philipp 3.21: μετασχηματίσει τὸ σῶμα τῆς ταπεινώσεως ἡμῶν σύμμορφον τῷ σώματι τῆς δόξης αὐτοῦ). This notion of the imitation of Christ should be understood, I suggest, along the model of the Platonic notion of assimilation to a particular god. Through this assimilation, the ethos of the god becomes engrained in the follower of this particular god.

Naturally there are differences, but they do not concern the concept of assimilation as such, but rather the nature of the gods to whom believers assimilate, and the accessibility of the practice of assimilating to God. As regards the first difference, the Platonic interpretation of the gods in the procession of the *Phaedrus* will have a hard time in establishing their sound ethical nature if these gods are the common mythological gods. As we have already seen in § 2.2.1, in his simile of the procession of the gods in the *Phaedrus*, Plato runs the risk of endorsing a polytheism of values. There may be much truth in Sedley's remark: 'It might seem hard to imagine that Plato would ultimately endorse so radical a form of polytheism (…). But the myth has made it clear that all these different gods are alike guided by a complete grasp of the moral Forms'.[147] Yet the ethical nature of the mythological gods was a contested issue, also among philosophers.

It is in that light that the Philippian hymn offers a very interesting characterization of Christ's ethos by emphasizing his highly moral nature: 'Let the same mind be in you that was in Christ Jesus, who, though he was in the form of God, did not regard equality with God as something to be exploited (ἐν μορφῇ θεοῦ ὑπάρχων οὐχ ἁρπαγμὸν ἡγήσατο τὸ εἶναι ἴσα θεῷ), but emptied himself' (Philipp 2.5–7). The refusal of him who 'was in the form of God' to regard his being equal to God as a ἁρπαγμός, a 'booty', 'robbery' or 'rape', clearly distin-

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[147] Sedley 1999, 315.

guishes him from the behaviour of the mythological gods of the Greeks. Robbery and rape (ἁρπάγη or ἁρπαγμός), booty and prey (ἁρπάγμα) and snatching away and carrying off (ἁρπάζειν) are typically associated with the mythological gods. According to Apollodorus' *Library*, for instance, the famous Sisyphus, founder of Corinth, was condemned to his endless labour in Hades because he revealed that Zeus had 'snatched away' Aegina:

> Sisyphus is punished in Hades by rolling a stone with his hands and head in the effort to heave it over the top; but push it as he will, it rebounds backwards. This punishment he endures for the sake of Aegina, daughter of Asopus; for when Zeus had secretly snatched her away (ἁρπάσαντα γὰρ αὐτὴν κρύφα Δία), Sisyphus is said to have betrayed the secret to Asopus, who was looking for her. (Apollodorus, *The Library* 1.9.3 = 1.85 edn Wagner)

In contrast to mythological gods such as Zeus, Christ, according to Paul's polemical stance, behaves in a fully moral way. He did not even snatch away and seize the position which was naturally his, that of being in the form of God; instead of holding on to it, he vacated the place he occupied, leaving it empty.[148]

The second difference has to do with the accessibility of the practice of assimilation to God. As we saw in our discussion of the notion of assimilation in § 2.2, there was debate between philosophers as to whether assimilation to God could be achieved only in the theoretical contemplative life, or also in the active, practical life. As we saw in § 2.2.7, philosophers such as Albinus and Apuleius clearly hold the later belief, but in this they diverge from Alcinous who restricts assimilation to God to the contemplative life. Against this background, Paul appears to grant maximal access to assimilation to God, as every person who experiences the rite of baptism is caught up in the process of becoming like Christ, regardless of his or her intellectual capacities. In this, Paul is very similar to Philo, who also emphasizes that assimilation is possible in the active, practical life (see § 2.3.4 [d] above).

Despite this difference between Alcinous on the one hand, and Philo and Paul on the other, in another respect they agree in a remarkable way. As we saw in § 2.3 above, Philo agrees with Alcinous that assimilation is only possible to the second God (see § 2.3.4 [e]). The same applies to Paul. Assimilation to God, as we have seen in the present chapter, is the process of becoming σύμφυτοι τῷ ὁμοιώματι τοῦ θανάτου αὐτοῦ, grown together with the likeness of Christ's death. Further below we shall examine the specific reasons why Philo and Paul, too, believe that assimilation to God is assimilation to the second God.

As we have just seen, Romans 6 is a pivotal passage for Paul's understanding of assimilation to Christ. It gains further relief against the background of other passages within the Pauline corpus on *homoiōma*. As we shall see, man's

[148] Cf. Vollenweider 1999, who also understands Philipp 2.6 as a polemical text. According to him, the text is addressed against self-elevating rulers.

becoming like Christ seems to be a reversal of the reduction of God's glory to the likeness of an image, and seems only to be possible because Christ took on the likeness of man.

(b) The decline and restoration of true religion

The likeness between man and Christ is in fact a reversal of the process described in Romans 1.22–23. In this passage Paul explains the degeneration of primordial religion when man became foolish:

> Claiming to be wise, they became fools; and they exchanged the glory of the immortal God for *the likeness* of an *image* of a mortal human being or birds or four-footed animals or reptiles: καὶ ἤλλαξαν τὴν δόξαν τοῦ ἀφθάρτου θεοῦ ἐν ὁμοιώματι εἰκόνος φθαρτοῦ ἀνθρώπου καὶ πετεινῶν καὶ τετραπόδων καὶ ἑρπετῶν. (Rom 1.22–23)

Noteworthy here is the combination of 'likeness' and 'image',[149] and the general view that religion deteriorated when it ceased to be monotheistic and aniconic. In § 7.1 we shall see that through this historiography Paul seems to link up with his Roman audience, but here I would like to emphasize that Paul depicts the decline of pure religion in terms of an alteration of the glory of the immortal God into *the likeness of an image* of mortal, perishable man. The reversal of this decline, both of religion as such and of man's fate in particular, seems to come about, according to the general line of argument of Paul's letter to the Romans, when man takes on the same form as *the image* of Christ (Rom 8.29). This, in turn, results from the fact that, in baptism, man has become grown together with *the likeness* of Christ's ethos in death and resurrection (Rom 6.5).

(c) The homoiōma between Christ and man

Whereas the crucial event for man is the process in which he grows together with the likeness of Christ's ethos, it seems in Paul's view that Christ makes such an assimilation fully possible by himself first taking on a likeness with man. Just as the souls in the procession of Plato's *Phaedrus* follow the particular gods whom they revere and 'keep their eyes fixed upon the gods' at the head of the procession (*Phaedrus* 253a), as if they were all part of one and the same visible, physical movement, in the same way Christ appears among the believers, in the likeness of a visible human being, in order to render assimilation to him possible. Christ's *homoiōma* with man is emphasized over and over again.

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[149] Perhaps this is an allusion to the double expression 'after the image and in the likeness' in Gen 1.26–27. In Patristic sources, however, it seems that the second part of this expression, 'in the likeness', attracts attention; see also § 2.2.14 above. Perhaps a faint echo of the terminology of likeness in Gen 1.26–27 is also found in Romans 5.14, though it is applied in a wholly different context, that of 'those who did not sin in the likeness of the transgression of Adam (ἐπὶ τῷ ὁμοιώματι τῆς παραβάσεως Ἀδάμ), who is a type of the one who was to come'.

In the Philippian hymn already referred to above in section (a), the pre-existent Christ, the one who was in the form of God, is said to have taken on the likeness of man: ἐν ὁμοιώματι ἀνθρώπων γενόμενος (Philipp 2.7). This is also expressed in terms of μορφή, the synonym of ὁμοίωμα: instead of remaining in *the form* of God (ἐν μορφῇ θεοῦ ὑπάρχων), the pre-existent Christ has taken on *the form* of a slave (μορφὴν δούλου λαβών; Philipp 2.7). Probably Paul is here drawing on the pagan conception of anthropomorphic gods, which – in a different context – also occurs in the Book of Acts. According to the crowds at Lystra, who have just witnessed Paul healing someone who has been crippled from birth, both Paul and Barnabas are gods in anthropomorphic disguise, and they shout: 'The gods have become similar to men and have come down to us!' – Οἱ θεοὶ ὁμοιωθέντες ἀνθρώποις κατέβησαν πρὸς ἡμᾶς (Acts 14.11). It is this language of becoming similar to man (Philipp 2.7: ἐν ὁμοιώματι ἀνθρώπων γενόμενος) and acquiring anthropomorphic form (Philipp 2.6–7) which Paul applies to Christ. The purpose of this is to render man and Christ 'adaptable'; Christ becomes accommodative for man and, for this reason, man becomes alterable and changeable towards him. Christ, in modern-day language, is a role-model for man and, to that end, needs first to model himself on man. Just as man is said to become grown together with *the likeness* of Christ (Rom 6.5) and to become of *the same form* as Christ (Philipp 3.10, Rom 8.29), prior to that, Christ has become *in the likeness* of man and taken on *the form* of man.

This parallelism becomes also very clear in Romans 8.3. Just as the believers, according to Romans 6.5–6, have become grown together with the likeness of Christ's death with the purpose that 'our old self was crucified with him so that the body of sin might be destroyed, and we might no longer be enslaved to sin' (ἵνα καταργηθῇ τὸ σῶμα τῆς ἁμαρτίας, τοῦ μηκέτι δουλεύειν ἡμᾶς τῇ ἁμαρτίᾳ), in the same way Christ is said to have been sent by God ἐν ὁμοιώματι σαρκὸς ἁμαρτίας, in the likeness of sinful flesh (Rom 8.3). Christ taking on the likeness of man seems to be fundamental for the possibility for man to become like Christ. This mutual similarity is necessary – to put it in the imagery of Plato's *Phaedrus* – for man and Christ to be able to move in the choreography of the same procession. The choreography opens when, in baptism, man becomes grown together with the *homoiōma* of Christ's death (Rom 6.5). The background for this seems to be the Platonic *homoiōsis theōi*, which in Paul takes the form of *homoiōsis Christōi*. As Christ is the image of God, and man, by becoming of the same form as Christ participates in this image, the *homoiōsis Christōi* is the intermediary stage in the process of assimilation to God.

Apart from the notion of assimilation to Christ and, in that way, to God, Paul also knows of the equivalent concept of imitating and following Christ. In Plato's *Phaedrus*, too, the notion of imitation is present, inasmuch as the teachers in the procession, 'by imitating the god themselves (μιμούμενοι αὐτοί) and by persuasion and education (…) lead the beloved [i. e. the soul of the pupil] to the

habit of life and the nature of the god' (253b). The teachers are clearly said to be μιμούμενοι αὐτοί, themselves imitating the gods. In their capacities as teachers they start off a 'mimetic' chain: imitating the gods themselves, they persuade their pupils to follow them.

The same mimetic chain can be detected in Paul's writings. Paul exhorts his readers to become his imitators: παρακαλῶ οὖν ὑμᾶς, μιμηταί μου γίνεσθε – 'I appeal to you, then, be imitators of me' (1 Cor 4.16). This imitation appears to be centred not on Paul himself, but on Christ, inasmuch as Paul, in his turn, is an imitator of Christ: μιμηταί μου γίνεσθε, καθὼς κἀγὼ Χριστοῦ – 'Be imitators of me, as I am of Christ' (1 Cor 11.1). For that reason he can state that the Thessalonians, for instance, have become imitators of him and of the Lord: καὶ ὑμεῖς μιμηταὶ ἡμῶν ἐγενήθητε καὶ τοῦ κυρίου – 'And you became imitators of us and of the Lord' (1 Thess 1.6). This mimetic chain also includes other churches. The Thessalonians are said to have become imitators of the churches of God in Judea: ὑμεῖς γὰρ μιμηταὶ ἐγενήθητε, ἀδελφοί, τῶν ἐκκλησιῶν τοῦ θεοῦ τῶν οὐσῶν ἐν τῇ Ἰουδαίᾳ ἐν Χριστῷ Ἰησοῦ – 'For you, brothers, became imitators of the churches of God in Christ Jesus that are in Judea' (1 Thess 2.14). In this sense, the Pauline movement is conceived of as a mimetic movement, based on the imitation of Christ. As we saw above in §§ 2.1.3 (b) and 2.2.8, the notion of imitating seems to have become the Stoic equivalent of the Platonic notion of assimilation to God. Paul appears to be acquainted with both.

2.4.3 'Image' and 'homoiōsis': intertwined notions

If I am not mistaken, Paul's notions of the image of God and assimilation to Christ have distinctive features which are characteristic of the pagan Greek concepts of image and assimilation. Moreover, the notions of image and assimilation seem to be intertwined, not only in Paul, but also in pagan Greek philosophy, with both notions revealing the same underlying logic. I shall focus on this in the present section, taking as my starting point a passage in Plutarch, in order to emphasize that the notions of image and assimilation are intertwined. Subsequently, I shall comment briefly on the logic which underlies both Plutarch's and Paul's application of these twin notions.

(a) The twin notions of image and assimilation

The passage from Plutarch which best demonstrates the interrelatedness of the notions of image and assimilation is the one from *Ad principem ineruditum* discussed in §§ 2.1.2 and 2.2.6 above. In line with Pythagorean theories about the ideal ruler, Plutarch depicts him as the image of God; the ruler forms himself in the likeness of God through virtuous behaviour:

> The ruler is *the image of God who orders all things* (ἄρχων δ' εἰκὼν θεοῦ τοῦ πάντα κοσμοῦντος). Such a ruler needs no Phidias nor Polyclitus nor Myron to model

> him, but *by his virtue he forms himself in the likeness of God* (ἀλλ᾽ αὐτὸς αὑτὸν εἰς ὁμοιότητα θεῷ δι᾽ ἀρετῆς καθιστὰς) and thus creates a statue most delightful of all to behold and most worthy of divinity (καθιστὰς καὶ δημιουργῶν ἀγαλμάτων τὸ ἥδιστον ὀφθῆναι καὶ θεοπρεπέστατον). (Plutarch, *Ad principem ineruditum* 780E–F; cf. Stobaeus, *Anthologium* 4.5.99)

In this passage, the language of image of God and assimilation to God intersects. In Plutarch, the two concepts seem to have a Pythagorean background, as I suggested in § 2.2.6. Not only is the notion of the image of God applied to the ruler, as in Neo-Pythagorean kingship ideology, as we saw in § 2.1.2; Plutarch also supports his treatment of the Platonic doctrine of assimilation to God with reference to the Pythagorean maxim of following God. As I concluded in § 2.2.6, both notions have to do with the emergence of Neo-Pythagoreanism and its merging with Platonism from the 1st cent. BC. Plutarch is a particularly relevant author, as for him the concept of forming oneself in the likeness of God by one's virtue, and the concept of being the image of God are clearly related.

In Paul, too, the notions of image of God and assimilation to God are intertwined. As we have seen in the present chapter, the phrase σύμφυτοι γεγόναμεν τῷ ὁμοιώματι τοῦ θανάτου αὐτοῦ ('grown together with the likeness of Christ's death') from Rom 6.5 runs parallel with the phrase συμμορφιζόμενος τῷ θανάτῳ αὐτοῦ ('of the same form as Christ's death') from Philipp 3.10, and this morphic language is due, as we concluded in § 1.3, to the general discourse of forms which characterize the dimensions of images. This is confirmed by Romans 8.29, where Paul talks about man being of the same form as the image of Christ (σύμμορφος τῆς εἰκόνος τοῦ υἱοῦ αὐτοῦ). For this reason, the terminologies of likeness, image and forms appear to belong to the same conceptual-linguistic field. Paul's morphic theology of the image of God and his reflections about the *homoiōma* between man and Christ through baptism, and between Christ and man through the former's incarnation, are part of the same complex of ideas.

The final consequence of this kind of reasoning is that Christians rid themselves of ὁ παλαιὸς ἄνθρωπος, 'the old man' (Rom 6.6; cf. Col 3.9, Eph 4.22) and – as Paul's pupils add to complete the symmetry – put on 'the new man' (Col 3.10, Eph 4.24). Paul himself talks of being part of the new creation (2 Cor 5.17, Gal 6.15) and of bearing 'the image of the heavenly man' (1 Cor 15.49). This bearing is not wholly a future act because, insofar as Christians already experience a transformation into, or in accordance with, the image of God (2 Cor 3.18, 4.4), they grow in 'the inner man' (2 Cor 4.16). The view that Christians bear the image of the heavenly man, or grow within the inner man is the direct sequel to Paul's morphic theology, which is based on the mutual *homoiōma* of Christ and Christians. Although Paul shares with Philo the same view about the difference between the earthly and heavenly man (see § 1.2.5 above and chap. 5 below), there is a difference in emphasis from Philo, whose heavenly man, un-

like Christ, does not really come down from heaven. By emphasizing the descent of the heavenly man, his incarnation, and assimilation to man, Paul seems to enhance man's ability to become of the same form as him. Christ, the image of God, and assimilation to Christ are clearly intertwined concepts.

(b) The underlying logic

The logic which underlies Plutarch's concepts of the image of God and assimilation to God seems, at first sight, to be contradictory. On the one hand, Plutarch states that 'the ruler *is* the image of God'; yet, on the other hand, this ruler simultaneously needs 'to form himself in the likeness of God by his virtue' (Plutarch, *Ad principem ineruditum* 780E–F). Apparently, his being the image of God is not an uncontested fact, as he still needs to assimilate himself εἰς ὁμοιότητα θεῷ, to the likeness of God. This seems contradictory, but the clear message seems to be that only by assimilating himself to the likeness of God can man, or the ruler, continue to be the image of God. In § 2.2.11, we have seen the same logic at work in the Pythagorean sentences. Although man is congenial with God, it is only through assimilating to God, through virtue, that the soul is drawn upwards to what is congenial with it, God:

> τιμήσεις τὸν θεὸν ἄριστα, ὅταν τῷ θεῷ τὴν διάνοιαν ὁμοιώσῃς· ἡ δὲ ὁμοίωσίς ἐστι διὰ μόνης ἀρετῆς· μόνη γὰρ ἀρετὴ τὴν ψυχὴν ἄνω ἕλκει πρὸς τὸ συγγενές.
>
> You shall hold God best in honour when you shall assimilate to God with regard to your thinking faculty. Such an assimilation only takes place through virtue, for only virtue draws the soul upwards to what is congenial with it. (*Sententiae Pythagoreorum* 102)

Indeed, as I remarked before, the initial congeniality between the soul and God needs to remain intact or be restored through the process of assimilation. Although, fundamentally, man and God *are* congenial, this kinship still needs to be maintained or restored through a process of assimilation which takes place through virtue.

The same logic as in Plutarch and the Pythagorean sentences also applies to Paul. On the one hand, Paul can state that man in general *is* the image of God: ἀνὴρ …, εἰκὼν καὶ δόξα θεοῦ ὑπάρχων (1 Cor 11.7). Yet, on the other hand, man needs to be transformed into, or in accordance with, the image of God (2 Cor 3.18, 4.4) and to become of the same form as the image of God (Rom 8.29). This is the same logic as in Plutarch and underlines the fact that the two notions, that of the image of God and assimilation to God or Christ, belong together. It is only by assimilating to God that one *is* the image of God.

There is, however, one small but significant difference between Plutarch on the one hand, and Paul and Philo on the other, which seems due to the Jewish background of the latter two. Although in 1 Cor 11.7 Paul indeed identifies man with the image of God (man *is* the image of God), in all other occurrences of the

'image of God' in the Pauline writings, properly speaking, the image of God is Christ (2 Cor 4.4, Col 1.15). Man is only said *to bear*, not *to be* this image (1 Cor 15.49). He is not so much transformed *into the image of God* (although this translation is grammatically possible), but rather *in accordance with the image of God* (2 Cor 3.18). He becomes *of the same form as the image of God* (Rom 8.39). He is indeed renewed κατ᾽ εἰκόνα τοῦ κτίσαντος αὐτόν, according to the image of his Creator (Col 3.10). This is in tune with what we have seen in Philo who, time and again, emphasizes that man is not created *as* the image of God, but *after* the image of God (see § 1.2.2 above). In this, both Philo and Paul are trying to do justice to the exact phrasing of Gen 1.26–27, which talks of the creation of man κατ᾽ εἰκόνα θεοῦ, after the image of God. This is why, for Paul, the assimilation takes place with regard to Christ. Since man has been created after the image of God, i. e. Christ, assimilation to God must also take place via Christ. In both Philo and Paul, the image of God fulfils an intermediary role. Interestingly, as we have seen in § 2.2.7, Alcinous, too, albeit for different reasons, stresses that assimilation to God means assimilation to the second God. This shows that despite Philo's and Paul's Jewish divergence from general Platonic doctrine in this respect, they are still in line with minority views within Platonism.

In full agreement with mainstream Platonism, however, Paul understands man's assimilation to God or Christ in a profoundly ethical sense. Just as in Platonic doctrine assimilation to God is realized through virtue (see § 2.2 above), Paul, too, shows his ethical understanding of this process by emphasizing that by experiencing transformation within the mind, man becomes able to discern 'what is the will of God – what is good and acceptable and perfect': μεταμορφοῦσθε τῇ ἀνακαινώσει τοῦ νοός, εἰς τὸ δοκιμάζειν ὑμᾶς τί τὸ θέλημα τοῦ θεοῦ, τὸ ἀγαθὸν καὶ εὐάρεστον καὶ τέλειον (Rom 12.2). Like a position proposed in Plato's *Euthyphro*, Paul's view seems to be that something is not good because God wills it, but rather that God wills it because it is good (cf. *Euthyphro* 9e–10a). The metamorphosis of the mind, according to Paul, results in, or is accompanied by, ethical conduct (see further § 7.3 below). This is exactly the same as the Platonic doctrine of assimilation to God *through virtue*.

Likewise, in Paul's baptismal passage in Romans 6, the fusion with Christ's death and resurrection results in an ethical mode of life, which is no longer dominated by the passions, but by a strong commitment to strive for righteousness (Rom 6.4–14). As one of Paul's pupils phrases it, in his address of pagan converts to Christianity:

> You were taught to put away your former way of life, the old man, corrupt and deluded by its lusts, and to be renewed in the spirit of your *mind* (ἀνανεοῦσθαι δὲ τῷ πνεύματι τοῦ νοὸς ὑμῶν), and to clothe yourselves with the new man, created according to God *in true righteousness and holiness* (ἐνδύσασθαι τὸν καινὸν ἄνθρωπον τὸν κατὰ θεὸν κτισθέντα ἐν δικαιοσύνῃ καὶ ὁσιότητι τῆς ἀληθείας). (Eph 4.21–24)

This is indeed very similar to the concepts and terminology of Plato's *Theaetetus*, according to which the escape from evil consists in 'becoming like God, so far as this is possible; and to become like God is to become righteous and holy, with wisdom': ὁμοίωσις δὲ δίκαιον καὶ ὅσιον μετὰ φρονήσεως γενέσθαι (*Theaetetus* 176b). Both from a Platonic and a Pauline perspective, the process of assimilating to God is marked by the virtues of righteousness and holiness. Indeed, as I suggested in the introduction to chap. 2, Paul's view that, by way of metamorphosis into the image of God, the Christ-believer is increasingly conformed to this divine image and induced, in this way, to lead a moral life, is best explained against the background of Platonic ideas about the image of God and forming oneself in the likeness of God. Like Philo before him, Paul seems to be influenced by the forceful contemporary movement in ethics which started with Eudorus' introduction of the Platonic doctrine of assimilation to God as the goal of ethics in the 1st cent. BC. As we saw in § 2.3 and the present § 2.4, both Philo and Paul profited from a new direction in ethics which suited their own purposes well.

Although the relevant terminology in Philo and Paul is clearly Platonic, their thoughts on man's assimilation to God were congruent, or compatible, with the modest development of a divine anthropology in ancient Judaism. Although, as we saw in § 1.1, there were no analogies in ancient Judaism for the view that God's image is a model on which the individual's life is (re-)shaped and conformed to God, we also saw that the notions of man's creation in the image and after the likeness of God (Gen 1) and God's apparition in the likeness of man (Ezek 1) express the idea that man and God are related (see the introduction to chap. 1 above). This view was echoed in the Dead Sea Scrolls (see § 1.1.3 above). Moreover, the author of the *Life of Adam and Eve* believes that Adam, as God's image, was to be worshipped by the angels (see § 1.1.4 [c]). Similarly exalted views of man are expressed in writings such as the *Sibylline Oracles*, according to which man and God share in the same rationality: 'Man is my image, having right reason' – εἰκών ἐστ' ἄνθρωπος ἐμὴ λόγον ὀρθὸν ἔχουσα (*Sib. Or.* VIII 402; see §§ 1.1.4 [b] and 1.1.8 [b]).

In this sense, Philo's and Paul's interest in man's assimilation to God is not incompatible with the contours of a divine anthropology within various traditions of Judaism. Philo and Paul did not introduce anything essentially foreign to Judaism when they adopted the Platonic doctrine of assimilation to God. Yet, it seems that their views on man as the image of God, and his assimilation to God, owe more to Greek philosophy than is usually assumed. These views were not incompatible with the anthropology implied in the statements of Genesis about man as the image of God. It seems, however, that it was only in the Hellenistic-Roman period that the full potential of this anthropology became realized, notably in Philo and Paul.

2.4.4 Preview

So far I have argued that the ancient Jewish background is insufficient to account for Philo's and Paul's understanding of the notions of the image of God and assimilation to God; it needs to be supplemented with a Graeco-Roman context (see chap. 1 above). I hope to have raised awareness of the pagan philosophical use of the notion of image of God (see § 2.1 above). In order to appreciate this in full, one also needs to understand the way this notion is intertwined with the issue of assimilation to God which, from the 1st cent. BC onwards, was increasingly viewed as the goal of ethics (see § 2.2 above). In our discussion of the notion of assimilation to God, we have already seen that this ethical notion was directly employed against the movement of the sophists, who seemed more concerned with rhetorical performance than with an ethical life and a love of truth.

In the following two chapters, I shall demonstrate that this movement, which experienced a revival in the time of Philo and Paul, is very important for understanding their genuine concerns. In chap. 3, it will be argued that throughout his commentaries on the Mosaic Pentateuch Philo was intent on confronting the sophists. In chap. 4, it will be shown that the sophists were also Paul's main opponents at Corinth.

In order to understand Paul's campaign against the sophists, the structure of Paul's and Philo's anthropology will be studied in chap. 5. It will be argued that their anthropology is very similar indeed and is based on a trichotomic understanding of man as consisting of spirit, soul, and body. This appears to be very similar to Platonic anthropology, although with a Jewish twist. Whereas ancient philosophers distinguish between mind, soul and body, Philo and Paul, like their fellow-Jew Josephus, also designate the mind as spirit. This chapter raises awareness of the fact that, for a proper understanding of Philo's and Paul's anthropology, not only the first creation account of Gen 1 – about man's creation after the image and the likeness of God – is important (Gen 1.26–27), but also the second creation account, in Gen 2, about the involvement of God's Spirit in the creation of man (Gen 2.7). It is on the basis of the latter passage that man is understood as consisting of spirit, soul and body.

The two anthropologies, that of the image of God and that of spirit, soul and body, will be brought to bear in chap. 6, in examining how Paul applies his anthropological views against the sophists and emphasizes the need for the transformation of the inner man, in accordance with the image of God. In chap. 7, finally, I shall analyze how Paul develops these views further in a different context, that of Rome, in a situation which challenges him to emphasize the universal applicability of his anthropology.

Chapter 3

Philo's Anti-Sophistic Interpretation of the Narratives of Moses' Pentateuch

Introduction: Balaam as the sophist *par excellence*

In Philo's commentaries on Moses' Pentateuch, one of the figures dealt with in some detail is Balaam. As we shall see, Philo regards Balaam as quite an important figure. He portrays him as a sophist, for reasons which we shall explore in the first section (§ 3.1). From the fifth century BC on, the word 'sophist' was applied, in a technical sense, to the itinerant professors of higher education who travelled widely through the Greek world and gave lectures for which they could charge a large fee. According to a definition by C. C. W. Taylor,

> They pioneered the systematic study of techniques of persuasion and argument, which embraced various forms of the study of language, including grammar, literary criticism, and semantics. Protagoras was reputedly the first person to write a treatise on techniques of argument, and was notorious for his claim to 'make the weaker argument the stronger'. The sophists aroused strong reactions, both positive and negative. On the positive side, the highly successful careers of the most celebrated testify to a considerable demand for their services, especially in providing rhetorical training for aspiring politicians. On the negative, they were regarded, especially by those of conservative views, as subversive of morality and tradition, in view (…) of their teaching (especially to the young) of techniques of argument. (…) Plato (…) depicts the sophists predominantly as charlatans, in contrast to Socrates, the paradigm of the true philosopher.[1]

The same antithesis between sophistry and true philosophy runs through Philo's writings. By anachronistically attributing the term 'sophist' to past opponents of Israel, Philo rewrites the history of Israel in philosophical terms. Balaam is but one example of the sophists whom Philo mentions. As a sophistic adversary of Israel, who appears during Israel's voyage through the wilderness, Balaam is, chronologically speaking, the last representative of sophistic philosophy in Moses' Pentateuch and takes his place in a long succession of sophists who contend with the ancestors and descendants of the Jewish people. The way in which Philo construes this archetypal conflict between sophistry and Israel will be discussed in the second section (§ 3.2).

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[1] Taylor 1996.

In his treatment of Balaam and other sophists, Philo shows himself to be anything but detached. As a matter of fact, Philo's grave concerns about the threat posed to true philosophy by sophists in his own day repeatedly emerge from the text in a very vivid manner. The attention Philo pays to sophistry is not the expression of an antiquarian interest in Greek philosophy, but rather reflects his concern about the contemporary movement known as the Second Sophistic, which, in the first three centuries AD, revived the spirit of the classical sophists. The Second Sophistic, which has recently been put on the scholarly agenda by many classicists,[2] flourished in Rome and in the cities of the Eastern Mediterranean, including Alexandria where Philo worked and lived. It was a public phenomenon:

> Rhetors (ῥήτορες), whether resident teachers of rhetoric or touring eminences, would draw aficionados in large numbers to private or imperial mansions, lecture halls in libraries, *bouleuteria*, *odeia*, and even theatres.[3]

These rhetoricians were active in public declamation and teaching, but also in the arena of civic and political life:

> Many sophists (…) were influential in their cities and even provinces, intervening to check civic disorder or inter-city rivalry (…), or dispatched as envoys to congratulate emperors on their accession or to win or secure privileges for their cities (and often themselves).[4]

The distinctions they could procure in the public sphere rendered their profession quarrelsome and very competitive. It is against the lure of this rhetorical movement that Philo wishes to warn his readers. It may well be that Philo's treatment of contemporary sophistry offers an important key to his entire oeuvre – commentaries which may otherwise appear to be abstract, monotonous, difficult and unfocused philosophical musings on the books of Moses. As I shall argue, Balaam, along with other adversaries from Israel's past, functions as a chiffre of the (perceived) attack of sophistry on Philo's Platonic philosophy, thus giving a concrete and realistic urgency to Philo's scholarly work. Philo's application of Moses' writings to his own polemical circumstances, and the way he transposes the philosophical controversies of his day back into narratives contained in those writings will be examined in the third section (§ 3.3).

The issue of Philo and the sophists of contemporary Alexandria was already taken up by B.W. Winter in his exemplary study *Philo and Paul Among the Sophists* (1997).[5] To my mind, the study constituted a breakthrough in Philonic and Pauline studies by applying the new insights into the movement of the

[2] See, e.g., Whitmarsh 2005; Borg 2004; Anderson 1993; Bowersock 1969.
[3] Bowie 1996, 1377.
[4] Bowie 1996, 1377.
[5] Winter 2002.

Second Sophistic to contemporary Judaism (Philo) and Christianity (Paul) and contextualizing the opponents in both Philo's writings and Paul's Corinthian correspondence. Prior to Winter's study we lacked a thorough survey of Philo's discussion of the sophists.[6] Before pointing out a desideratum not fulfilled by Winter's study, I shall briefly outline the structure of his book. In the chapters devoted to Philo, Winter first raises the question 'Who are Philo's Sophists?' Before Winter, views varied considerably in scholarly literature. Winter carefully reviews all existing definitions by modern scholars, deals with the relevant passages from Philo's writings and, on the basis of that, criticizes most modern definitions, to conclude 'that Philo denotes *contemporary*, professional orators and sophists in Alexandria. Other first-century writers such as Plutarch, Epictetus and Dio Chrysostom likewise refer to both groups as a sort of contemporary, identifiable and professional guild'.[7]

In his final conclusion, Winter offers the following assessment, in which he underscores the specialized, technical, literal meaning of the term 'sophist' in Philo and its reference to the actual contemporary movement of the Second Sophistic:

> Orators and sophists comprised an identifiable grouping in Alexandrian society (…). Within the educational system of the first century, the term 'sophist' was not a fluid one: it excluded philosophers, dialecticians, grammarians, musicians, geometricians and any other specialized group. Philo's 'sophists' comprised a specific group within *paideia* (…). Philo does not use the term 'sophist' to stigmatise philosophers (…). The term in Philo's corpus is neither a 'symbol' nor a pejorative label applied to Greek or Jewish teachers or Greek philosophers. (…) the word should be read literally. Philo may well speak of the sophists in a pejorative way, but like Dio, he does not use it pejoratively of non-sophists. A distinct vocabulary of invective, drawn from Plato and well suited to its purpose, was used of the actual sophists in the first century.[8]

On the basis of this terminological clarification, Winter is able to take two further steps in the following chapters. First, Winter studies Philo's critique of the Alexandrian sophistic tradition by offering a systematic analysis of Philo's characterizations and criticism of the sophists, and commenting on their misuse of *paideia* for vice, deception, and personal gain.[9] Whereas Winter's analysis of the comments themselves is systematic, he fails to pay sufficient attention to the original narrative setting of Philo's criticisms within his commentaries on the Mosaic Pentateuch, so that the full import of Philo's criticism is lost.

Secondly, having now established both the definition of 'sophists' and Philo's criticism of these sophists, Winter shows how Philo prepared himself and

[6] Cf. Winter 2002, 59, 59n1, 62.

[7] Winter 2002, chap. 3, 59–79 at 66. Earlier modern definitions are listed on pp. 60–2 and critically reviewed on pp. 62–78.

[8] Winter 2002, 78–9.

[9] Winter 2002, chap. 4, 80–94.

the ablest among his readers for the arduous debate with and defeat of the sophists.[10]

Despite the ground-breaking qualities of Winter's study, one important aspect of Philo's polemics with the sophists is not sufficiently illuminated: the scope and range of Philo's projection of the contemporary debate with the sophists onto the narratives of the Mosaic Pentateuch, on which his writings offer a running commentary. My own research into the sophists in Philo's corpus of texts has made me more aware of this aspect. Apart from yielding some extra passages on the sophists not drawn upon by Winter,[11] my enquiry into the narrative context of Balaam the sophist and into that of other 'sophists' in Philo's commentaries on the Pentateuch shows that Philo envisaged an uninterrupted threat posed to Israel's history by sophistry. Winter occasionally refers to the narrative settings of Philo's criticism of the sophists and to the way these narratives function,[12] but never highlights them, due to his systematic, non-narrative treatment of the contents of this criticism. By divorcing the polemic from its narrative, biblical context he also fails to point out important narratives and does not mention the anti-sophistic contestants by their biblical names.[13]

Within the Mosaic writings the sophistic threat reached its climax, in Philo's eyes, in the figure of Balaam (see § 3.1 below), as the culmination of sophistic encounters right from the start of creation (§ 3.2). By constructing a persistent sophistic threat throughout the narratives of the Mosaic Pentateuch, Philo seems to warn his (Jewish) readers not to yield to the attractions of contemporary sophistry (chap 3.3). It shows another side, and therefore a more complicated picture, of Philo of Alexandria. This is the picture, not of a Hellenizing, 'secularizing' Jew, but of a Jew who, by adopting Greek philosophy, draws some demarcation lines against the prevailing forces of the Second Sophistic.

3.1 Balaam in Philo's thought

In his commentary on Cain's murder of Abel, Philo draws a parallel between the conduct of Cain and that of Balaam. According to Philo, God's question to Cain, 'What have you done?' (Gen 4.10),

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[10] Winter 2002, chap. 5, 95–108.

[11] See, e. g., *De confusione* 39; *Legum allegoriarum libri* 1.74, 3.41, 3.54; *De migratione* 171–172; *De praemiis* 8; *De providentia*, frag. 1.1; *De somniis* 1.102.

[12] Winter 2002, 80, 94, 105, 107.

[13] See, e. g., the narratives about the creation (*De opificio mundi* 45; passage not in Winter), Abraham (*De praemiis* 58; passage in Winter 2002, 89n50 but without name of Abraham), Rebecca (*De posteritate Caini* 150; in Winter 2002, 92 but without reference to section on Rebecca), Joseph (*De Josepho* 104, 125; passages in Winter 2002, 88 and 64 but without reference to Joseph), Moses (*De confusione* 33–35; passage not in Winter) and the Amorites (*Legum allegoriarum libri* 3.232–233; passage in Winter 2002, 91 but without reference to the Amorites).

> is tantamount to 'You have done nothing, accomplished nothing'. It was so with Balaam also. He was a sophist, an empty conglomeration of incompatible and discordant notions (ὁ σοφιστὴς Βαλαάμ, μάταιος ὢν ὄχλος ἐναντίων καὶ μαχομένων δοξῶν). It was his desire to do harm to the goodly one by laying curses upon him. But he could not, for God turned his curses into a blessing. (*Quod deterius potiori insidiari soleat* 70–71)

Apparently, Philo reads the story of Balaam as that of a conflict between Balaam's evil intentions ('his curses') and the outcome (their being turned into blessings by God). In his exegesis of the Balaam narrative in Numbers 22–25, Philo is heavily dependent on its earliest interpretation in Deut 23.4–6. There is an unresolved tension between the positive picture of Balaam in Numbers 22–24 (he refuses to be paid and wishes to speak only as God commands [22.7, 17–18, 37–38; 23.12, 26; 24.11–13]) on the one hand, and the unanticipated reference in Numbers 31 to Balaam's harmful advice (31.16; cf. 31.8) to weaken the Israelites by seducing them and inviting them to idolatry (25.1–3a) on the other. Because of this tension, the author of Deuteronomy assumes that Balaam had in fact been hired and intended to curse Israel for gain, but was prevented by God who turned the curse into a blessing (Deut 23.4–6; cf. Neh 13.2, Jude 11, 2 Pet 2.15). This interpretation turned Balaam into a figure which, in a different context, could be easily understood as a sophist avant la lettre.

This conflict of opposing movements of cursing and blessing in Balaam renders him 'an empty conglomeration of incompatible and discordant notions' – a periphrastic definition of what Philo understands sophists to be. And indeed, as Philo continues:

> Sophists are bound to find the powers within them at strife, words running counter to ideas and wishes to words, in absolute and utter discord (πεφύκασι δὲ οἱ σοφισταὶ πολεμίοις χρῆσθαι ταῖς ἐν αὑτοῖς δυνάμεσι, λόγων ἐνθυμήμασι καὶ βουλημάτων λόγοις ἀντιστατούντων καὶ μηδαμῇ μηδαμῶς συνᾳδόντων). (*Quod deterius potiori insidiari soleat* 72)

Although the sophists invest much energy in demonstrating both the social character of righteousness and the unsociability of injustice, the advantageous nature of moderation and self-control as well as the loss of health due to a licentious life, the great benefits conferred by piety as well as how irreligion makes one into a pariah, and the power of virtue in bringing health and safety as well as the harm occasioned by wickedness, the sophists themselves

> nevertheless (…) all the time entertain sentiments quite at variance with the things they say. At the very moment that they are singing the praises of good sense and moderation and righteousness and piety, they are found more than ever to be practising foolishness, licentiousness, injustice, and impiety, to be confounding and overturning, you may well nigh say, every ordinance of God or man. To these men one might rightly put the question (…) 'What benefit have all these harangues on the subject of virtue conferred on your own souls? (…) Have you not furnished true charges against

yourselves, in that, while you have shown yourselves lecturers of the highest order as far as understanding of beautiful things and philosophical discourses are concerned, you are invariably caught cherishing sentiments and indulging in practices that are utterly base?' (*Quod deterius potiori insidiari soleat* 73–75)

This sophistic ambivalence is symbolized in Balaam, who is characterized as 'an empty conglomeration of incompatible and discordant notions'. Balaam is no doubt called 'vain, empty, idle' because of the idle words he intended to speak. Philo is keen to stress Balaam's vanity in a number of passages in other treatises, even when he does not explicitly repeat his charge that Balaam is a sophist in those writings. In *De confusione linguarum*, Philo calls Balaam 'that dealer in auguries and prodigies and in the vanity of unfounded conjectures' (τὸν γοῦν οἰωνόμαντιν καὶ τερατοσκόπον περὶ τὰς ἀβεβαίους εἰκασίας ματαιάζοντα), and relates this to the etymology of his name: 'vain' (καὶ γὰρ μάταιος ἑρμηνεύεται Βαλαάμ; 159). Balaam's vanity is demonstrated by the fact

that he cursed the Man of Vision [i. e. Moses], though in words he uttered prayers of blessing, for it [i. e. Moses' law-book] considers not what he actually said, words restamped under God's providence, like a true coin substituted for the false, but his heart, in which he cherished thoughts of injury rather than of benefit. There is a natural hostility between conjecture and truth, between vanity and knowledge, and between the divination which has no true inspiration and sound sober wisdom. (*De confusione linguarum* 159)

Balaam's vanity is clearly contrasted with true knowledge.

In *De migratione Abrahami*, this vanity is explained by an antithesis between factual truth and rhetorical abilities. Philo argues that the practice of praising someone in encomiums and the opposite act of blaming are often not based on 'the truth of fact', but rest rather on the falsely exercised rhetorical abilities of speakers and authors:

Do you not see the flatterers who by day and night batter to pieces and wear out the ears of those whom they flatter, not content with just assenting to everything they say, but spinning out long speeches and declaiming and many a time uttering prayers with their voice, but never ceasing to curse with their heart? (*De migratione Abrahami* 111)

This, of course, is a description of what Philo regards as Balaam's hallmark and it is no surprise that he continues by referring to him. In so doing Philo tries to make sense of the positive oracles of Balaam, recorded in Numbers 23–24. Particularly striking, in Philo's eyes, is Balaam's statement: 'God is not as man' (Num 23.19) – a statement Philo could only approve of. Yet, Balaam is to be blamed for his evil intentions and these justify his being called 'empty':

Accordingly, that empty one, Balaam (ὁ μάταιος Βαλαὰμ), though he sang loftiest hymns to God, among which is that most Divine of canticles 'God is not as man'

> (Num 23.19), and poured out a thousand eulogies on (…) Israel, has been adjudged impious and accursed even by the wise lawgiver, and held to be an utterer not of blessings but of curses. For Moses says that as the hired confederate of Israel's enemies he became an evil prophet of evil things, nursing in his soul direst curses on the race beloved of God, but forced with mouth and tongue to give prophetic utterance to most amazing benedictory prayers: for the words that were spoken were noble words, whose utterance was prompted by God the Lover of Virtue, but the intentions, in all their vileness, were the offspring of a mind that looked on virtue with loathing. (*De migratione Abrahami* 113–114)

In other treatises Philo repeats his explicit characterization of Balaam as a sophist. In *De mutatione nominum*, Philo highlights Balaam's contradictory performance vis-à-vis Israel. Although Balaam, 'that dealer in augury' (τὸν οἰωνοσκόπον Βαλαὰμ), is described, in the Septuagint, as 'hearing the oracles of God and knowing knowledge from the Most High' (Num 24.16), Philo points out that Balaam himself did not profit from such knowledge but eventually perished in his own madness because with his prophetic, oracular sophistry (σοφιστείᾳ μαντικῇ) he was intent upon 'defacing the stamp of heaven-sent prophecy' (202–203).

As such it was no insult for the sophists of Philo's day to be compared with oracular prophets. Philostratus, the 2nd cent. AD author of a biographical compendium of sophists and himself a sophist, also drew this comparison at the beginning of his work:

> The sophistic method resembles the prophetic art of soothsayers and oracles. For indeed one may hear the Pythian oracle say: 'I know the number of the sands of the sea and the measure thereof', and 'Far-seeing Zeus gives a wooden wall to the Trito-Born', and 'Nero, Orestes, Alcmaeon, matricides', and many other things of this sort, just like a sophist. (*Lives of the Sophists* 481)

The contrast Philo makes is rather between oracular sophistry and prophecy concerned with real knowledge. It is apparent from Philo's other works that he views true prophecy – such as that uttered by Balaam at God's prompting – as Platonic in nature.

In his treatise *De vita Mosis*, for instance, in which he explicitly represents Balaam as a sophist, there is an extensive paraphrase of the Balaam narrative (1.263–293), even if Balaam is not mentioned by name. He is only described as 'a man living in Mesopotamia far-famed as a soothsayer, who had learned the secrets of that art in its every form, but was particularly admired for his high proficiency in augury'.[14] In this retelling, Philo also gives the contents of some of Balaam's oracles, after he has said that Balaam

[14] This aspect of Philo's characterization of Balaam is spotlighted in Remus 1996; Feldman 2003; and Seland 2006. According to Feldman, Philo 'sought to elevate the figure of Moses through contrasting him, the true prophet, with this, the greatest of pagan prophets, who was actually a mere technician' (Feldman 2003, 317). Philo's *De vita Mosis* 'serves to rescue Moses

> became possessed and there fell upon him the truly prophetic Spirit (προφητικοῦ πνεύματος ἐπιφοιτήσαντος) which banished utterly from his soul his art of oracular prophecy (ὃ πᾶσαν αὐτοῦ τὴν ἔντεχνον μαντικὴν ὑπερόριον τῆς ψυχῆς ἤλασε). For the inspiration of the Holiest and magical sophistry might not live together (θέμις γὰρ οὐκ ἦν ἱερωτάτῃ κατοκωχῇ συνδιαιτᾶσθαι μαγικὴν σοφιστείαν). (*De vita Mosis* 1.277)

Under this influence Balaam speaks:

> From Mesopotamia has Balak called me, a far journey from the East, that he may avenge him on the Hebrews through my cursing. But I, how shall I curse them whom God has not cursed? (…) I shall not be able to harm the people (…). Who has made accurate discovery of how the sowing of their generation was first made? Their bodies have been moulded from human seeds, but their souls are sprung from *divine seeds*, and therefore their stock is *akin to God* (διὸ καὶ γεγόνασιν ἀγχίσποροι θεοῦ). (1.278–279)

As F. H. Colson pointed out, Philo probably derives this appraisal of the Jews in terms of 'divine seeds' and 'being akin to God' from Plato,[15] who, in his *Republic*, quotes the following lines from Aeschylus:

> The near-sown seeds of gods (οἱ θεῶν ἀγχίσποροι), | Close kin to Zeus, for whom on Ida's top | Ancestral altars flame to highest heaven, | Nor in their life-blood fails the fire divine. (Aeschylus, *Niobe*; Plato, *Republic* III 391e)

The passage in Philo about the origin of 'the Hebrews', which the Septuagint lacks, may serve as a nice illustration of how the wording of Balaam's oracles is slightly Platonized so as to forge an antithesis between Balaam the sophist and the God-inspired Balaam, who speaks the language of Plato, the great anti-sophistic philosopher.

In his use of the Balaam narrative, Philo is predominantly interested in the character of Balaam, and hardly mentions the episode of the speaking ass. The speaking ass is only of minor importance to Philo, since his interest is focused on Balaam. This focus on Balaam the sophist becomes more understandable if one realizes that Philo's invective against Balaam is part of his comprehensive programme of refuting the sophists. In many passages Philo gives characteristics of these sophists. In his view, the issues of sophistry date back to the very beginning of creation and have accompanied Israel ever since.

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from possible misunderstandings of Moses as a mere thaumaturge or as a magician, a reputation attested in a variety of [pagan] sources' (Remus 1996, 665). Remus (Remus 1996, 666, 671, 674), Feldman (Feldman 2003, 309) and Seland (Seland 2006, 345–6) suggest 'that Philo sees contemporary Balaams as practicing their arts in the streets and marketplaces of Alexandria' (Feldman). However, they seem to lose sight of Philo's depiction of Balaam as a sophist (only briefly mentioned by Remus 1996, 668, 672n34 and Feldman 2003, 304, 318).

[15] Colson 1935, 420–1 note *b*.

3.2 Philo's anti-sophistic programme

3.2.1 Characteristics of the sophists

In his work, Philo characterizes the sophists as mere lovers of words:

> While most people deem the man prudent who can find sophistical arguments, and is clever at expressing his ideas (οἱ μὲν γὰρ πολλοὶ φρόνιμον νομίζουσι τὸν εὑρετὴν λόγων σοφιστικῶν καὶ δεινὸν ἑρμηνεῦσαι τὸ νοηθέν), Moses knows such an one to be a lover of words (Μωυσῆς δὲ λογοφίλην μὲν αὐτὸν οἶδε) indeed, but a prudent man by no means. (*Legum allegoriarum libri* 1.74)

Their rhetorical capacities and specious sophistic arguments ([κατα]λόγοι σοφιστικοὶ) belong to the sphere of the body and the sense organs from which the mind must withdraw (*Legum allegoriarum libri* 3.41). We have to abandon excessive, sophistic quibbling about the meaning of words: παυσόμεθα τῆς ἄγαν σοφιστείας (*Legum allegoriarum libri* 3.206) and be led away from 'the sophistries of deceitful word and thought': ἔξω … τῶν κατὰ τὸν ἀπατεῶνα λόγον σοφιστειῶν (*Quis rerum divinarum heres sit* 85). Sometimes the sophists are criticized for their literalism and their failure to apply the rules of allegory (*De somniis* 1.102); on other occasions they, like the poets, are portrayed as obsessed with myths (*De opificio mundi* 157; cf. *De vita contemplativa* 4), the obsession of 'those whose way is to deal in marvels and cultivate sophistry rather than wisdom' (*De praemiis et poenis* 8).

Sophistry is to be censured because

> Sophists (σοφισταί), impelled at once by mercenary motives and by a grudging spirit, stunt the natures of their pupils by withholding much that they ought to tell them, carefully reserving for themselves against another day the opportunity of making money. (*De posteritate Caini* 150)

They, 'the multitudes of sophists', wrongly imagine 'that wisdom consists in finding specious arguments, and not in appealing to the solid evidence of facts': καθάπερ μυρίοις συνέβη τῶν σοφιστῶν, οἵτινες ᾠήθησαν σοφίαν πιθανὴν εἶναι λόγων εὕρεσιν, ἀλλ' οὐ πραγμάτων ἀληθεστάτην πίστιν (*De migratione Abrahami* 171–172). Whereas Philo leaves 'the invention of ingenious arguments and perverse pretexts to the sophists, the task of wisdom is to investigate all that nature has to show': ἀλλὰ γὰρ σοφιστείας μὲν ἔργον εὑρεσιλογεῖν, σοφίας δὲ ἕκαστα διερευνᾶν τῶν ἐν τῇ φύσει (*De providentia*, frag. 1.1). The origins of this impious, sophistic way of thinking Philo attributes to 'an ancient sophist named Protagoras', who regarded the human mind as the measure of all things: τίς οὖν ἐστιν ἀσεβοῦς δόξα; μέτρον εἶναι πάντων χρημάτων τὸν ἀνθρώπινον νοῦν· ᾗ καὶ τῶν παλαιῶν τινα σοφιστῶν ὄνομα Πρωταγόραν φασὶ χρήσασθαι (*De posteritate Caini* 35).

Sometimes Philo can even attribute the title of sophists to all philosophers insofar as they do not agree in their solutions to particular problems,[16] although among them he singles out the sophistic position proper of 'those who argue at length that man is the measure of all things'. Yet, since the history of philosophy is full of discordance, 'because truth flees from the credulous mind which deals in conjecture' and eludes discovery and pursuit, all scientific quarrellings can be characterized as 'wranglings of the sophists on questions of dogma' (*Quis rerum divinarum heres sit* 246). In certain respects, the sophists resemble the sceptics, who 'spend themselves on petty quibbles and trifling disputes'. Indeed, 'in philosophy there are men who are merely word-mongers and word-hunters' (*De congressu eruditionis gratia* 51–53).

Sophists are also encountered among the audiences of philosophers, who fill the lecture-halls and theatres on a daily basis. Among the audience, there is also a class of people

> who carry away an echo of what has been said, but prove to be sophists rather than philosophers (σοφισταὶ δὲ ἀντὶ φιλοσόφων ἀνευρίσκονται). These people's words deserve praise, but their lives censure, for they are capable of saying the best, but incapable of doing it. (*De congressu eruditionis gratia* 67)

Sophists profess an extremely sceptical philosophy and love arguing for argument's sake, thus opposing all other representatives of the sciences (*De fuga et inventione* 209). They are not interested in what is authentic, but rather mimic and debase it by juxtaposing it with spurious matters (*De mutatione nominum* 208), just as Balaam wished to deface the stamp of genuine, heaven-sent prophecy with his oracular sophistry (*De mutatione nominum* 203). At the end of the day, Philo regards the sophists as poorly as he does the uneducated. In this, they contrast sharply with 'the saintly company of the Pythagoreans' and 'all genuine votaries of philosophy', who,

> rising above the opinions of the common herd (…) have opened up a new pathway, which the outside world can never tread, for studying and discerning truths, and have brought to light the ideal forms which none of the unclean may touch.

Both, the uneducated and the sophists, are regarded as 'unclean':

> By unclean I mean all those who, without ever tasting education at all, or else having received it in a crooked and distorted form, have changed the stamp of wisdom's beauty into the ugliness of sophistry (κάλλος τὸ σοφίας εἰς τὸ σοφιστείας αἶσχος μεταχαράξαντες). These, unable to discern the conceptual light through the weakness of the soul's eye, which cannot but be beclouded by the flashing rays, as dwellers in perpetual night, disbelieve those who live in the daylight, and think that all their tales of what they have seen around them, shown clearly by the unalloyed radiance of the sunbeams, are wild phantom-like inventions no better than the illusions of the puppet show. (*Quod omnis probus liber sit* 1–5)

[16] Cf. Winter 2002, 72–3.

In this passage, the sophists are clearly identified with the dwellers in Plato's cave (*Republic* VII 514 ff.), Socrates' sophistic opponents and all other uneducated. The inability of the cave-dwellers 'to discern the conceptual light through the weakness of the soul's eye' is also exhibited by Balaam: 'not even when the closed eye of his soul received its sight and "beheld the angel of God standing in his way" (Num 22.31) did he turn aside and refrain from evil-doing, but let the stream of his folly run full course' (*Quod deus sit immutabilis* 181).[17] Balaam is indeed a sophist *par excellence*.

3.2.2 The 'history' of the sophists and Israel

Balaam is not the only sophist which Israel encountered, however. According to Philo, the entire history from creation to the voyage of Israel through the wilderness was full of sophistic attacks on the 'true philosophy'. The main episodes of this unceasing tension are (a) the creation and the life of the first human beings, Adam and Eve, Cain and Abel, (b) the period of the patriarchs and the matriarchs, (c) the period of Israel in Egypt from Joseph to Moses, both of whom were confronted with 'the sophists of Egypt', and (d) the period of Israel in the wilderness, where Moses and the Israelites encountered the Amorites and Balaam. Together, these episodes cover the entire narrative span of Moses' Pentateuch, from the creation to the exodus and the voyage through the wilderness.

(a) The creation and the life of the first men

(i) Creation's anti-sophistic order. With an eye to the future attacks by sophists, God, according to Philo, already built into the very set-up of the original creation a reminder that it is not wise to trust created phenomena rather than God. This is how Philo tries to explain why God created the earth on the third day, whereas the sun and moon were only created on the fourth day, despite the fact that the plants and fruits on the earth were dependent upon them for their growth:

> being aware beforehand of the ways of thinking that would mark the men of future ages, how they would be intent on what looked probable and plausible, with much in it that could be supported by argument, but would not aim at sheer truth; and how they would trust phenomena rather than God, admiring sophistry more than wisdom (ὅτι πιστεύσουσι μᾶλλον τοῖς φαινομένοις ἢ θεῷ σοφιστείαν πρὸ σοφίας θαυμάσαντες); and how they would observe in times to come the circuits of sun and moon (…) and would suppose that the regular movements of the heavenly bod-

[17] Yet, with regard to *the contents* of his oracles, Balaam is described more favourably by Philo. In his introduction to Balaam's third and (in Philo's representation) final oracle, Balaam is described as 'the one who saw in sleep a clear presentation of God *with the unsleeping eyes of the soul*' (*De vita Mosis* 1.289; italics mine). On this, see Hayward 1999, 20–4, esp. 22. In this way, according to Hayward, 'Something extraordinary has happened. By so speaking of Balaam, Philo has invested him with the character of Israel, (…) "the one who sees God"' (Hayward 1999, 22–4 at 22; cf. 35).

> ies are the causes of all things that year by year come forth and are produced out of the earth; that there might be none who (…) would venture to ascribe the first place to any created thing, 'let them', said He, 'go back in thought to the original creation of the universe, when, before sun or moon existed, the earth bore plants of all sorts and fruits of all sorts'. (*De opificio mundi* 45–46)

The unexpected order of creation serves, Philo agues, to show the unfoundedness of sophistry which bases itself only on superficial phenomena. The force of sophistry already revealed itself in the lives of the first men, particularly in those of Eve, Cain and Abel.

(ii) The Serpent versus Eve. Philo ascribes the first sin to the influence of sophistry, to the serpent, 'emitting a human voice and arguing like a sophist (ἐνσοφιστεύων) to an utterly guileless character, and cheating a woman with seductive plausibilities' (*De agricultura* 96).

(iii) Cain versus Abel. Moreover, the first murder, of Abel by Cain, was due to Cain's sophistic inclinations, against which Abel, untrained in the arts of rhetoric, could not protect himself. It is noteworthy that in his interpretation of this episode, Philo is not only critical of Cain, but also of Abel for his excessive naivety in meeting up with Cain. The sophists, like Cain,

> when they have covered the dreary length of a long-distance course of talk (…) are held to have defeated men unaccustomed to arguing like sophists (σοφιστεύειν). But their victory lies not in the strength of those who have won, but in their opponents' weakness in this sort of thing. For those who apply themselves to the pursuit of virtue may be placed in two classes. (1) Some, making the soul alone the treasure-house of the good at which they aim, devote themselves to praiseworthy actions, without having so much as dreamt of juggling with words. (2) The others are doubly successful; their mind is secured by wisdom in counsel and good deeds, their speech by the arts of eloquence. Now to encounter the wranglings in which some folk [i.e. the sophists] delight is eminently fitting for these latter, ready and equipped as they are with the means of withstanding their enemies, but for the former class it is not at all safe to do so. (…) Now Abel had never learned arts of speech, and knew the beautiful and noble with the mind only. For this reason he should have declined the meeting on the plain, and have paid no regard to the challenge of the man of ill-will. (*Quod deterius potiori insidiari soleat* 35–37)

The hidden message of this passage is, no doubt, that one should be trained in eloquence and speech so as to be able to counter-attack the sophists, lest one suffer the fate of Abel. As we shall see in § 3.3, it is exactly this message that Philo wants to communicate to his own readers. The need to train both mind and speech is emphasized by numerous other examples from Israel's history. Cain is in fact the instructor of all sophists, and the sophist Protagoras is in fact 'an offspring of Cain's madness'. Cain 'proved the strength of his creed by unmistakable deeds in his victory over Abel, the champion of the opposite opinion, and

in getting rid of both him and his opinion' (*De posteritate Caini* 35), so serious is the struggle between sophists and non-sophists. Cain's strategy, according to Philo, consists in building demonstrative arguments, delivering lengthy expositions and perorations, and 'forging plausible inventions contrary to the truth': sophistic devices (αἵ σοφιστικαι τέχναι) which are used by 'the wise in their own conceit, devotees of impiety, godlessness, self-love, arrogance, false opinion, men ignorant of real wisdom' (*De posteritate Caini* 53). The other instances in which the strife between sophists and non-sophists comes to the fore cover most key narratives in Moses' Pentateuch, among them the narratives about the patriarchs and matriarchs.

(b) The period of the patriarchs and matriarchs

(i) Abraham versus the Chaldeans. Abraham, forsaking Chaldean astrology when called by God, 'changes by instruction from sophist to sage': ἀντὶ σοφιστοῦ γενόμενος ἐκ διδασκαλίας σοφός (*De praemiis et poenis* 58).

(ii) Hagar and Ishmael versus Sarah and Isaac. The sophistic struggle reiterates itself among his children, Ishmael and Isaac. Whereas Sarah, Isaac's mother, represents virtue, Ishmael's mother, Hagar, symbolizes only preliminary studies.[18] Her child can but be a sophist who has to be banished:

> The most perfect types of being and the secondary acquirements are worlds apart, and wisdom has no kinship with the sophist's culture (σοφία σοφιστείας ἀλλότριον). For the latter has for the fruits of all its labour only those persuasions which tend to establish the false opinion, which destroys the soul; but wisdom studies truth and thus obtains that great source of profit to the mind, knowledge of right reason. (…) the sophist, who is ever sophist, and his mother, instruction in preliminary learning, are expelled and banished by God from the presence of wisdom and the wise, on whom he confers the titles of Sarah and Abraham: ὁπότε καὶ <κατὰ> πάντα σοφιστὴν καὶ μητέρα αὐτοῦ, τὴν τῶν προπαιδευμάτων διδασκαλίαν, ἐλαύνει καὶ φυγαδεύει ἀπὸ σοφίας καὶ σοφοῦ, ὧν ὀνόματα Ἀβραάμ τε καὶ Σάρραν καλεῖ. (*De cherubim* 9–10)

Hagar's child represents 'the soul just beginning to crave after instruction', because Hagar herself only offers incomplete education so that her child, 'when grown to manhood, becomes a sophist' (*De posteritate Caini* 131). As a sophist he has only covered 'the school subjects', and not the 'sciences which deal with virtues' (*De sobrietate* 9–10). Interpreting the assertion, made by the angel of the Lord, that Ishmael 'will be a wild man; his hand will be against all' (Gen 16.12), Philo argues:

> Now this picture clearly represents the sophist (…). (He is) like those who are now called Academics and Sceptics, who place no foundation under their opinions and

[18] See Bos 2009.

doctrines and do not (prefer) one thing to another, for they admit those as philosophers who shoot at (the doctrines) of every school, and these it is customary to call 'opinion-fighters'. (*Quaestiones in Genesim* III.33)

(iii) Rebecca's non-sophistic attitude. It is Isaac's wife Rebecca who again symbolizes the correct non-sophistic attitude. Commenting on Rebecca's generosity in giving a servant abundant water to drink, Philo remarks:

> When she saw how readily receptive of virtue the servant's nature was, she emptied all the contents of her pitcher into the drinking-trough, that is to say, she poured all the teacher's knowledge into the soul of the learner. For, whereas sophists (σοφισταί), impelled at once by mercenary motives and by a grudging spirit, stunt the natures of their pupils by withholding much that they ought to tell them, carefully reserving for themselves against another day the opportunity of making money, virtue is an ungrudging thing, fond of making gifts, never hesitating to do good. (*De posteritate Caini* 150–151)

After the narratives of the patriarchs and matriarchs, Philo also weaves the struggle with the sophists into Israel's sojourn in Egypt. Both Joseph and Moses are confronted with 'the sophists of Egypt'. This, of course, is very relevant to Philo and his public. Being resident in Alexandria in Egypt himself, in a subtle way he equates the contemporary sophists of Alexandria with their Egyptian predecessors from the times of Joseph and Moses.

(c) Israel in Egypt: Joseph and Moses versus 'the sophists of Egypt'

(i) Joseph versus the sophists of Egypt. In Philo's representation, the history of Israel and the sophists continues with Joseph. Philo is not entirely positive about Joseph, whose 'coat of varied colours' (Gen 37.3) is interpreted by Philo as

> the woven robe of statecraft (πολιτεία), a robe richly variegated, containing but a most meagre admixture of truth, but many large portions of false, probable, plausible, conjectural matter, from which sprang up all the sophists of Egypt (οἱ Αἰγύπτου πάντες σοφισταί). (*De somniis* 1.220)

This passage also reveals that Philo is very much aware of the power which rhetorically trained sophists exert in the political arena, a power he may have experienced in the tensions in Alexandria between the Jews and the Greeks, which resulted in each side sending a delegation to the emperor Gaius.[19] Winter, who also draws a parallel between Philo and Plato in this respect, notes:

> The role of the sophists in the political life of the city also drew criticism from Philo, for the deception of the sophistic tradition inevitably spilt over into that arena. 'All the

[19] Cf. Winter 2002, 96: 'The Greeks were well represented by these men [Isidorus, Apion and Lampon] who, needless to say, possessed the rhetorical training needed to present their case'. Cf. Winter 2002, 96–8 about Philo's rhetorical ability as can be discerned from the *captatio benevolentiae* still extant in his *Legatio ad Gaium*.

sophists of Egypt' were said to have sprung up in the area of *politeia* from 'a meagre mixture' of truth and 'many large portions of false, probable, plausible, conjectural matter'. They became experts 'in decoying, charming, and bewitching' their hearers, *Somn.* I.220. Plato's view was that among the sophists, those who attempted to direct the *polis* through deliberative oratory were the greatest sorcerers and most practiced in charlatanism. (*The Statesman* 291c, 303c)[20]

Despite his critical note about Joseph's sophistic garment, Philo portrays Joseph as the one who succeeds over the Egyptians sophists in interpreting the dreams of the Egyptian king. As the king anticipates, 'Joseph will reveal the truth, and as light disperses darkness his knowledge will disperse the ignorance of our sophists': διακαλύψει τὴν ἀλήθειαν, οἷα φωτὶ σκότος ἐπιστήμη τὴν ἀμαθίαν τῶν παρ' ἡμῖν σοφιστῶν ἀποσκεδάσει (*De Josepho* 104). Joseph distinguishes himself favourably from the 'sophistic praters who show off their cleverness for hire and use their art of interpreting the visions given in sleep as a pretext of making money' (*De Josepho* 125).

(ii) Moses versus the sophists of Egypt. These Egyptian sophists are the same group whom Moses confronts at the court of the Egyptian king (*De vita Mosis* 1.92). It is of course no coincidence that the Egyptian magicians are called 'sophists' by Philo. In this way, Philo places his own struggle with sophistic circles in Alexandria in the wider perspective of the age-long controversy between Israel and the sophists, both within Egypt and beyond. Moses is only able to confront the sophists because he has first been thoroughly trained after admitting his inexperience in speech. Unlike Abel, Moses is not naive about the tricks of the sophists and avails himself of the help of Aaron, who acts as his spokesman:

> Do you not see that Moses declines the invitation of the sophists (σοφισταί) in Egypt (…)? He calls them magicians, because good morals are spoiled by the tricks and deceptions of sophistry (σοφισμάτων … τέχναις καὶ ἀπάταις) which act on them like the enchantments of magic. Moses' plea is that he is not 'eloquent' (Exod 4.10), which is equivalent to saying that he has no gift for oratory, which is but specious guesswork about what seems probable. Afterwards he follows this up by emphatically stating that he is not merely not eloquent but absolutely 'speechless' (Exod 6.12). He calls himself 'speechless', not in the sense in which we use the word of animals without reason, but of him who fails to find a fitting instrument in the language uttered by the organs of speech, and prints and impresses on his understanding the lessons of true wisdom, the direct opposite of false sophistry (ἀντίθετός … ψευδεῖ σοφιστείᾳ). And he will not go to Egypt nor engage in conflict with its sophists (σοφισταί), until he has been fully trained in the word of utterance, God having shown and perfected all the qualities which are essential to the expression of thought by the election of Aaron who is Moses' brother. (*Quod deterius potiori insidiari soleat* 38–39)

[20] Winter 2002, 90.

Thus trained, Moses is able to meet the Egyptian king at the edge or mouth of the river (Exod 7.15), Philo says. This place of encounter is taken, in an allegorical sense, to point to the lips through which the stream of speech passes:

> Now speech is an ally employed by those who hate virtue [i. e. by the sophists] (…), and also by men of worth for the destruction of such doctrines (…). When, indeed, after they have shaken out every reef of fallacious opinions, the opposing onset of the sage's speech [i. e. the speech of Moses] has overturned their bark and sent them to perdition, he [Moses] will (…) set in order his holy choir to sing the anthem of victory. (*De confusione linguarum* 33–35)

This triumph of Moses over the sophists at the 'lip of the river', reminds Philo of the even greater triumph of Israel over the Egyptians who attempted to pursue them through the Red Sea, but drowned and were seen dead at the edge of the sea (Exod 14.30). Their death symbolizes 'the destruction of unholy doctrines and of the words which their mouth and tongue and the other vocal organs gave them to use' (*De confusione* 35). As Philo puts is elsewhere: 'the scene of their death is none other than the lips of that fountain bitter and briny as the sea, those very lips through which poured forth the sophist-talk which wars against virtue (δι᾽ ὧν ὁ πολέμιος ἀρετῆς σοφιστὴς λόγος ἐξεκέχυτο)' (*De somniis* 2.281–282).

As we have seen before, Philo warns his readers that there are many who 'have not the capacity to demolish by sheer force the plausible inventions of the sophists (τὰς πιθανὰς τῶν σοφιστῶν), because their occupation has lain continuously in active life, so they are not trained in any high degree to deal with words' (*De confusione* 39). Such rhetorical training is crucial if one is to succeed in defeating the sophists, as Moses' life shows.

This counter-attack against the sophists naturally also colours the Mosaic laws. According to Philo, Moses' anti-sophistic intentions can be noted in his decrees concerning the holy seventh day on which one should abstain 'from work and profit-making crafts and professions and business pursued to get a livelihood'. The leisure of this day

> should be occupied (…) by the pursuits of wisdom only. And the wisdom must not be that of the systems hatched by the word-catchers and sophists (οἱ λογοθῆραι καὶ σοφισταὶ) who sell their tenets and arguments like any bit of merchandise in the market, men who for ever pit philosophy against philosophy (οἳ φιλοσοφίᾳ κατὰ φιλοσοφίας … χρώμενοι) without a blush (…), but the true philosophy which is woven from three strands – thoughts, words and deeds. (*De vita Mosis* 2.211–212)[21]

[21] A further instance of Moses' anti-sophistic codifications is found in *De specialibus legibus* 3.54 where accusers who appear before the judges are warned that they should draw up their formal challenges 'not in the spirit of a false accuser or malicious schemer, set on winning at any cost, but of one who would strictly test the truth without sophistry (ἄνευ σοφιστείας)'. Although closely following Num 5.12–31 the phrase ἄνευ σοφιστείας is lacking from the Septuagint.

(d) Israel in the wilderness: Moses and the Israelites versus the Amorites and Balaam

(i) Israel versus the Amorites. The attacks suffered from the sophists do not stop once Israel leaves Egypt. Even during the voyage through the wilderness, the sophists continue to plague them. Philo mentions them by name: the Amorites and Balaam.

The name 'Amorites', Philo argues, should be etymologically understood as 'men fond of talking', who 'symbolize the uttered word' (τοῦ γεγωνότος λόγου σύμβολον ὄντες). Philo draws here on the Stoic distinction between *logos prophorikos* ('speech') and *logos endiathetos* ('thought').[22] The Amorites represent only the former, the uttered word, without it being the vehicle of the internal word. The problem here, in the Amorites' case, is that their uttered word does not function in harmonious cooperation with the internal word (a harmony which, as we shall see, is advocated by Philo), but is in fact devoid of internal reason. As A. Kamesar has convincingly shown, in Philo's view the training of the *logos prophorikos* should be assigned to the discipline of rhetoric, and that of the *logos endiathetos* to philosophy. This view is also upheld in Greek writers such as Plutarch, Hermias of Alexandria and Sopater. The setting of this assignment of the two *logoi* to these two disciplines, Kamesar shows, is that of the conflict between rhetoric and philosophy. These two *logoi* are meant to function harmoniously: 'A *paideia* that is concerned with both τὸ φρονεῖν and τὸ εὖ λέγειν, the educational ideal that goes back to Isocrates, would entail the cooperative synergy of the *logos endiathetos* and the *logos prophorikos*, if Stoic terminology is employed'.[23] By portraying the Amorites as only in command of the *logos prophorikos* without the backing of the *logos endiathetos*, Philo characterizes them as sophists. Their king, according to Philo,

> is the sophist clever at searching after verbal artifices (ὁ σοφιστής ἐστι καὶ δεινὸς λόγων ἀνερευνᾶν τέχνας); and those who transgress the boundary of truth place themselves at the mercy of his quibbling. (*Legum allegoriarum libri* 3.232)

He, the Amorite king, is concerned with sophistic riddles (τὰ αἰνίγματα τὰ σοφιστικὰ), probabilities and plausible arguments which involve no knowledge of the truth (233).

(ii) Balaam. The threat which the Amorites pose to Israel in the wilderness is a clear instance of the sophists' onslaught against knowledge and truth. Philo found this episode narrated in Numbers 21, just before Balaam takes centre-stage

[22] See Verbeke 1980, 495–6n4 with reference to Sextus Empiricus, *Adversus Mathematicos* 8.275 (= *Adversus Dogmaticos* 2.275): 'Man does not differ in respect of uttered reason from the irrational animals (…), but in respect of internal reason'; = *SVF* 2.135.

[23] Kamesar 2004, 163–81, esp. 170–3 at 173, with an extensive bibliography on the *logos endiathetos* and the *logos prophorikos* in 163–4n1.

in Numbers 22–24. In this sense, the appearance of Balaam the sophist, already discussed in § 3.1 above, constitutes the climax of Israel's manifold encounters with the sophists.

3.3 Philo's application to the philosophical discussion of his day

An intriguing question which arises when one takes in the multitude of Philo's comments on sophists is why he devoted so much attention to them. There are clear indications in his writings that Philo views the sophists of his day as a clear threat which he wishes to tackle head-on. I take my starting-point in another passage on the Amorites, whose name, as we have just seen, Philo explains as 'men fond of talking', and whose king he referred to as a sophist. In *Quis rerum divinarum heres sit*, Philo, having introduced the Amorites and identified them as 'talkers', remarks that the gift of speech 'has been marred by thousands of the recipients (…). These are impostors, flatterers, and inventors of cunning plausibilities'. Their practice is contrasted with 'the man of worth' whose speech 'should be transparent and true. But the speech which most strive for is obscure and false' (302–303). Philo clearly experiences this as a problem of his own day:

> So long then as 'the sins of the Amorites', that is of sophistical arguments, 'are not fulfilled' (Gen. 15.16) because of the fact that they are difficult to disprove and criticize (οὖν οὐκ ἀναπεπλήρωται τὰ ἁμαρτήματα τῶν Ἀμορραίων, τουτέστι τῶν σοφιστικῶν λόγων διὰ τὸ ἀνεξέλεγκτον), but still in virtue of their powers of attraction seduce us (ἡμᾶς ἐπάγεται) with their plausibilities, while their enticements make us powerless to turn from and leave them, we remain powerless. But if ever all the plausible fallacies are refuted by true beliefs (…), we shall (…) slip our cable and sail clean away from the land of falsehood and sophistry (ἀράμενοι τῆς τῶν ψευσμάτων καὶ σοφισμάτων χώρας) (…) Such is the lesson expressed in the problem here presented. For it is impossible to turn back from, to hate, to leave the plausible falsehood, unless the sin involved in it be revealed complete and consummated. And this revelation will be made when, confronted by the firm evidence of truth, it receives the much-needed refutation (κατὰ τὴν τοῦ ἀληθοῦς ἀντίταξιν καὶ βεβαίωσιν). (*Quis rerum divinarum heres sit* 304–306)

In this passage, Philo shows his concern that the sophistic powers of attraction may 'seduce us' (ἡμᾶς ἐπάγεται), that is him and his contemporary readers. It demonstrates that even in a passage about the Amorites of long ago, who tried to seduce Israel in the wilderness, Philo recognizes the sophists of his own day. He also acknowledges that the sophistic arguments are difficult to disprove and criticize, yet emphasizes that their refutation is much-needed. We encounter here a vivid interest is the philosophical discussion of his own day.

That Philo regards the sophists as a present-day phenomenon and not only as a literary motif derived from Plato's anti-sophistic dialogues is shown by the fact that he talks explicitly about 'the orators or sophists *of today*': οἱ ῥήτορες ἢ οἱ νῦν σοφισταὶ (*De vita contemplativa* 31). They are contrasted with the senior leader of the Jewish sect of the Therapeutae who, every seventh day,

> gives a well-reasoned and wise discourse. He does not make an exhibition of clever rhetoric like the orators or sophists of today but follows careful examination by careful expression of the exact meaning of his thoughts, and this does not lodge just outside the ears of the audience but passes through the hearing into the soul and there stays securely. (*De vita contemplativa* 31)

Elsewhere, too, Philo explicitly makes the link with contemporary sophists, the sophistic throng of people of the present day: ὁ νῦν ἀνθρώπων σοφιστικὸς ὅμιλος. The road which leads to God, Philo argues, one must take

> to be philosophy, not the philosophy which is pursued by the sophistic throng of people of the present day (ὁ νῦν ἀνθρώπων σοφιστικὸς ὅμιλος), who, having practised arts of speech to use against the truth, have given the name of wisdom to their rascality, conferring on a sorry work a divine title. (*De posteritate Caini* 101)

A further indication that Philo, in his discussion of the sophists, is thinking primarily of the sophists of his own day, is the lively portrait of everyday life of which the throng of sophists is part:

> Day after day the throng of sophists, which is to be found everywhere (ὁ πανταχοῦ τῶν σοφιστῶν ὅμιλος), talks the ears off any audience they happen to have with disquisitions on minutiae, unravelling phrases that are ambiguous and can bear two meanings and distinguishing among circumstances such as it is well to bear in mind – and they are set on bearing in mind a vast number. (*De agricultura* 136)

They are the ones who, though professing to be philosophers, fill the lecture-halls and theatres almost every day, 'discoursing at length, stringing together their disquisitions on virtue without stopping to draw breath. Yet what profit is there in their talk?' (*De congressu* 64).[24]

In a passage in which Philo criticizes the hectic and indulgent, passionate lifestyle of the sophists, the sheer size of the sophist movement is also highlighted:

> And so multitudes of those who are called sophists (μυρίοι … τῶν λεγομένων σοφιστῶν), after winning the admiration of city after city (θαυμασθέντες κατὰ πόλεις), and after drawing well-nigh the whole world to honour them (καὶ τὴν

[24] I agree with Winter that this passage is about sophists. See Winter 2002, 74: 'Philo comments that hardly a day goes by but lecture-halls and theatres fill with οἱ φιλοσοφοῦντες. Various classes of people listen with different but inadequate responses. But to whom does Philo refer? While οἱ φιλοσοφοῦντες can be translated as "philosophers", it often means sophists in the Philo corpus. In *Post.* 34 Philo mentions that many who have "professed" philosophy arrive at conclusions belonging to the ancient sophist, Protagoras.'

> οἰκουμένην σχεδὸν ἅπασαν ἐπὶ τιμὴν ἐπιστρέψαντες) for their hair-splitting and their clever inventiveness, have with all their might worn their life out, and brought it to premature old age, by the indulgence of their passions. (*De agricultura* 143)

This movement spreads through the cities like wildfire and, Philo fears, is influencing the young: 'Vanity (…) with its sophisms (σόφισματα) and trickery beguiles every city and loses no time in capturing the souls of the young' (*De praemiis* 25).

It is in this world that Philo wants to shoulder his philosophical responsibilities and there are several passages in his writings which express his personal commitment to refuting sophistry. Philo does not regard himself as Abel, who had never learned the arts of speech and for whom it was not safe to encounter the wranglings of the sophists (*Quod deterius potiori insidiari soleat* 35), but likens himself to Moses, who only engaged in conflict with the sophists once he had been fully trained in rhetoric (*Quod deterius* 38–39). As he makes plain:

> It will be well for us to counter in this manner those who are pugnacious over the tenets which they maintain; for when we have been exercised in the forms which words take, we shall no more sink to the ground through inexperience of the tricks of the sophistic wrestling (οὐκέτ' ἀπειρίᾳ σοφιστικῶν παλαισμάτων ὀκλάσομεν), but we shall spring up and carry on the struggle and disentangle ourselves with ease from the grips which their art has taught them. (…) But if a man, though equipped in soul with all the virtues, has had no practice in rhetoric, (…) when like Abel he steps out for a sophistic contest (εἰς σοφιστικὸν ἀγῶνα), he will fall before he has obtained a firm footing. (*Quod deterius* 41–42)

Philo clearly regards himself as fully up to the job. This is no task for those who are just beginning their studies, those making progress, and those who have reached perfection without having established firm roots. All these should refuse 'to engage in the war waged by the sophists' (καὶ μὴ τῷ τῶν σοφιστῶν ἐπαποδύεσθαι πολέμῳ); if they, mere amateurs, engage 'trained and seasoned fighters, they will undoubtedly get the worst of it' (*De agricultura* 159; 162). Therefore,

> It will, then, be the business of him who fully apprehends and understands the subject, and thoroughly knows his own powers, to go to war with the strife-loving band of sophists (πολεμῆσαι τῷ φιλέριδι καὶ σοφιστικῷ στίφει). (*De agricultura* 162)

Philo's strong advice not to engage lightly in the strife with sophists probably reflects his experience of the ongoing clash between sophistry and philosophy in his own days. His own ideal is to integrate rhetoric, intentions and virtuous deeds in one coherent whole. In support of this ideal he quotes Moses:

> In a thoroughly philosophical way he [Moses] makes a threefold division of it, saying: 'It is in thy mouth and in thy heart and in thine hand' (Deut 30.11–14), that is, in words, in plans, in actions. For these are the parts of the good thing, and of these it is compacted, and the lack of but one not only renders it imperfect but absolutely

> destroys it. For what good is it to say the best things but to plan and carry out the most shameful things? This is the way of the sophists (σοφιστῶν οὗτος ὁ τρόπος), for as they spin out their discourses on sound sense and endurance they grate on the ears of those most thirsting to listen, but in the choices that they make and the actions of their lives we find them going very far wrong. (*De posteritate Caini* 85–86)

It is equally wrong, however, to have good intentions but fail in deeds and words, or to practice the right things 'without understanding and explicit speech'.

> But if a man succeeded, as if handling a lyre, in bringing all the notes of the thing that is good into tune, bringing speech into harmony with intent, and intent with deed, such an one would be considered perfect and of a truly harmonious character. (*De posteritate Caini* 88).[25]

In order to achieve this synthesis, and avoid one-sidedness of whatever kind, Philo also reflects on the Stoic distinction between *logos prophorikos* ('speech') and *logos endiathetos* ('thought'), as we saw in the case of the sophistic Amorites who only possessed the former *logos* (see at the end of § 3.2 above). Philo stresses that one should master both *logoi*:

> 'Logos' has two aspects, one resembling a spring, the other its outflow; 'logos' in the understanding resembles a spring, and is called 'reason', while utterance by mouth and tongue is like its outflow, and is called 'speech'. That each species of logos should be improved is vast wealth, understanding having good reasoning at its command for all things great and small, and utterance being under the guidance of correct training. For many reason excellently, but find speech a bad interpreter of thought and are by it betrayed through not having had a thorough grounding in the ordinary subjects of culture. Others, again, have shown great ability in expounding themes, and yet been most evil thinkers, such as the so-called sophists (οἱ λεγόμενοι σοφισταί). (*De migratione Abrahami* 71–72)

Abel is adduced as an example of the first category, those who 'reason excellently' but lack 'a thorough grounding in the ordinary subjects of culture', and is contrasted with the sophists. Moses, however, once he has been trained in knowledge and wisdom, is a perfect example of those who command both *logoi*. This is in accordance with God's intentions:

> God bestows on those who obey Him no imperfect boon. All His gifts are full and complete. And so, in this case also, He does not send the blessing or 'logos-excellence' in one division of logos, but in both its parts, for He holds it just that the recipient of His bounty should both conceive the noblest conceptions and give masterly expression to his ideas. For perfection depends, as we know, on both divisions of logos, the reason which suggests the ideas with clearness, and the speech which gives unfailing expression to them. (*De migratione Abrahami* 73)

[25] This threefold enterprise is also discussed in *De agricultura* 144; *De congressu eruditionis gratia* 67–68; and *De vita Mosis* 2.212.

Moses was led to look into knowledge and wisdom 'with a view to getting the better of the sophists in Egypt (οἱ ἐν Αἰγύπτῳ σοφισταί)'. It was Aaron who acted as Moses' logos in utterance (ὁ προφορικὸς λόγος).[26] To be versed in both *logoi* is extremely important:

> It is a vital matter, then, for one about to face a contest with sophists (πρὸς ἀγῶνα σοφιστικὸν) to have paid attention to words with such thoroughness as not only to elude the grips of his adversary but to take the offensive in his turn and prove himself superior both in skill and strength. (*De migratione Abrahami* 82)

In *De ebrietate*, Philo emphasizes what happens if one is dominated by the uttered word only. The uttered word (ὁ κατὰ προφοράν … λόγος) implants in us

> through the specious, the probable and the persuasive (…) false opinions for the destruction of our noblest possession, truth. Why, then, should we not at once take vengeance on him too, sophist (σοφιστής) and miscreant that he is, by sentencing him to the death that befits him – that is to silence, for silence is the death of speech? Thus will he no longer ply his sophistries within the mind (ἵνα μηκέτ' ἐνσοφιστεύοντος ὁ νοῦς μεθέλκηται), nor will that mind be led astray, but having been absolutely released from (…) the sophistries of speech (τῶν κατὰ τὸν … λόγον σοφιστειῶν ἐλεύθερος) (…), the mind will be able to devote his unhampered liberty to the world of mental things. (*De ebrietate* 70–71)

Only if one is versed in both *logoi*, as Philo makes clear in *De migratione*, can one defeat those who 'bring their sophistic trickery into play against the divine *logos* (ἀντισοφιστεύοντες τῷ θείῳ λόγῳ)'. Philo is optimistic, however, that this contest with the sophists will be successful:

> All the arguments of sophists (πάντες οἱ σοφιστικοὶ λόγοι) are devoured and done away with by Nature's many-sided skill (…). Sophistry is ever defeated by wisdom (ἀεὶ σοφιστείαν ὑπὸ σοφίας ἡττᾶσθαι). (*De migratione Abrahami* 72–85)

It is to underpin this view, that sophistry has indeed always been defeated by wisdom, that Philo retells the story of the sophist Balaam who planned in vain to attack Israel with his sophistic oracles.

3.4 Epilogue: The function of Moses' Pentateuchal narratives in Philo

Philo not only takes action against contemporary sophistry in general but seems particularly concerned that the Jewish youth, receiving a Greek education at Alexandria, may be prone to non-philosophical, sophistic influences. Speaking about the Jewish race, 'our race', Philo observes that many have used their edu-

[26] Cf. also *De gigantibus* 52.

cation not for the better ('for day and light') but for the worse ('for night and darkness'), and have effectively extinguished the enlightenment of their souls by striving after a life of luxury and high offices:

> Many (…) have acquired the lights in the soul for night and darkness, not for day and light; all elementary lessons for example, and what is called school-learning and philosophy itself when pursued with no motive higher than a life of luxury, or from desire of an office under our rulers. (*Legum allegoriarum libri* 3.166–167)

This concern is recognized already very clearly by A. Mendelson in his study *Secular Education in Philo of Alexandria* (1982):

> Neither political activities nor practical applications of the arts and sciences were condemned as inherently evil, although both were fraught with danger. But Philo drew the line when secular education compromised the integrity of the individual or the solidarity of the Jewish community. It is not coincidental that in *LA* [*Legum allegoriarum libri*] iii.167–68 the most explicit instances of miseducation are students who use the encyclia to serve pretentious ends or to curry favor with the Roman rulers.[27]

This observation is further spelled out in Mendelson's final conclusion, in which he underscores 'the social and political lures of total assimilation' and 'the real dangers' exerted by the sophistic movement (although, writing prior to Winter, he does not sufficiently address the issue of the sophists in the Philonic reflection on secular education):

> Taking it for granted that the elite Jewish youth of Alexandria would be enrolled in Greek institutions, he [Philo] appears to have asked himself in what way their secular education could be turned to account. Jews, he insisted, should utilize the encyclia in their strivings toward divine knowledge instead of exploiting the acquisition of Greek culture simply to further their social and political ambitions. (…) In this environment, the social and political lures of total assimilation must have loomed large. Philo was particularly sensitive to this issue, perhaps because his nephew, Tiberius Julius Alexander, had already shown signs of disloyalty to Judaism. (…) Philo continued to draw clear lines between what was acceptable and what was not acceptable for his coreligionists. (…) Philo encourages a certain devotion to the encyclia, but he places them within a Jewish framework, and he repeatedly warns against their seductive charms. On the latter point, I cannot emphasize too strongly the real dangers which Philo saw in the disciplines, dangers which ranged from sophistry to heresy.[28]

If Philo is indeed gravely concerned about the dangers the sophistic movement poses to the Greek-educated Jewish youth at Alexandria, I believe this apprehensiveness accounts for the anti-sophistic slant of his commentaries on Moses' Pentateuch. Philo's anti-sophistic stance and his concern about the possible misuse of secular education puzzled F. H. Colson in an important article 'Philo on Education' (1917). Since all in all 'very little systematic or formal writing on the

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[27] Mendelson 1982, 46. Cf. also Winter 2002, 93 with 93n72.
[28] Mendelson 1982, 82.

subject' of education survives from pagan Graeco-Roman sources, despite the importance which Antiquity attached to it, Colson deems it 'strange to find one of the most vexed questions of classical antiquity most fully discussed in the work of this semi-hellenized Jew [i. e. Philo] – to find the old issue between the sophist and the philosopher stated to us in terms of the Old Testament.'[29]

However, it is not strange at all if Philo is determined to guard the Jewish youth against the influence of the sophist movement. Indeed, as Winter writes in reply to Colson's statement: 'If it is strange (as F. H. Colson maintains), it is also highly informative that Philo evaluated the Alexandrian sophistic tradition by means of OT incidents imported into the structure of Plato's critique.'[30] Winter's emphasis, however, is on the final part of the sentence, 'OT incidents *imported into the structure of Plato's critique*', and it seems he takes Philo's evaluation of the sophistic tradition 'by means of OT incidents' almost for granted. What Winter sets out to demonstrate and clarify in response to Colson is Philo's Platonizing tendency, not his use of narratives from the Mosaic Pentateuch. After quoting Colson, Winter continues: 'Although Philo conducts his discussion of the sophistic tradition within a framework of OT characters and texts, we will see that his critique of it depends heavily on Plato's evaluation of the sophists'.[31] However, it may also be informative that Philo criticizes the sophistic tradition 'by means of OT incidents' if he is indeed trying to warn the Greek-educated Jewish youth. If that is the case, warning them through anti-sophistic commentaries on the Mosaic Pentateuch is far more effective than through general treatises.

Occasionally Winter seems to be aware of this anti-sophistic function of the Old Testament narratives in Philo. Commenting on *De migratione Abrahami* 76–85, where Philo states that 'all the arguments of the sophists are devoured and done away with' by the rhetorically gifted Aaron, the *logos prophorikos*, the 'Finger of God', Winter states: 'This narrative functions as a divine rescript which declares that "sophistry is ever defeated by wisdom"'.[32] Here, Winter explicitly reflects on the function which Philo attributes to a particular Old Testament narrative. Similarly, later on Winter argues that 'Philo's war against contemporary sophistic activity was an outworking of' his high esteem for Moses as '"*the* wise man" (πάνσοφος), exceeding in age and wisdom even the Seven Wise Men of the Greeks', in congruence with the rhetorical question posed by the Greek philosopher Numenius: 'What else is Plato, but Moses speaking Attic Greek?'[33] Consequently, according to Winter, Philo 'believed that conflicts in

[29] Colson 1917, esp. 151, 153, 162, with quotation from 162.
[30] Winter 2002, 94.
[31] Winter 2002, 80.
[32] Winter 2002, 105.
[33] On Numenius' view on Moses, see now Burnyeat 2006*a*, 139–68. On Graeco-Roman views on Moses in general, see Van Kooten 2006*a*.

which noted OT characters engaged provided the paradigm for his evaluation of the sophists'.[34]

I agree with this and believe that the narrative emphasis of the present chapter, which focuses on the Old Testament narrative contexts of the polemic concerning the sophists in Philo's oeuvre, shows abundantly that there is an uninterrupted anti-sophistic reading of these narratives in Philo's commentaries, spanning the entire line from the creation to Moses. The scale and scope of this undertaking suggests that Philo deliberately chose the Mosaic Pentateuch as the vehicle to convey his warning to the Greek-educated Jewish youth concerning the dangers of the anti-philosophical, social and political lures of the sophist movement.

Philo's intention in interpreting the narratives from Moses' Pentateuch is clearly anti-sophistic. However, as we shall see in chap. 6, Philo is sometimes inconsistent and seems to be influenced, in a negative sense, by his competition with contemporary sophists: despite his polemic attitude, his interpretation of Abraham's and Moses' bodies acquires some sophistic, physiognomic characteristics (see § 6.3.1 below). In this there is a small but notable difference with Paul, who gives a different, decisively anti-sophistic, interpretation of the narrative of Moses' resplendent, glorious body in 2 Cor 3 (see chap. 6 below). In this sense Paul will prove to be more consistent in his criticism of the sophists than Philo. Despite this (slight) difference, however, in the following chapter, we shall first note the basic concurrence between Philo and Paul. Paul takes an anti-sophistic stance which, as an urgent reply to a contemporary movement, very much resembles Philo's attitude. It is in the anti-sophistic setting of his Corinthian correspondence that Paul seems to develop his anthropology of man's inner transformation into, or in accordance with the image of God.

[34] Winter 2002, 107.

Chapter 4

Paul versus the Sophists: Outward Performance and Rhetorical Competition within the Christian Community at Corinth

Introduction

In order to appreciate Paul's interest in transformation into the image of God (2 Cor 3.18), which takes place within the inner man (2 Cor 4.16), it is important to be aware of the competitive setting of Paul's correspondence with Corinth. Paul's letters written to Corinth show that, even within the Christian community, Paul was involved in a discussion with his Corinthian public which reflects the kind of competition which continues to go on in the post-Classical city, that between philosophers and sophists. As we have seen in chap. 3 above, the movement of the Second Sophistic has recently received much scholarly attention. I shall base my analysis particularly on the writings of Paul, Plutarch, Epictetus, Dio Chrysostom, Lucian and Philostratus, all of whom are witnesses to this debate.

First, I shall outline the competitive nature of this debate, and the factions, quarrels and tensions it encompassed, as well as the loyalty of the disciples involved (§ 4.1). Secondly, I shall focus on an important characteristic of sophistic rhetoric, the ability to speak extempore, i. e. to improvise, which – according to the Corinthians with whom Paul is quarrelling – is very important (§ 4.2). Thirdly, I shall deal with other characteristics of sophists which fuelled the debate between Paul and the Corinthian communities, such as the importance they attach to outward performance and physiognomy, and their custom of self-praise and commendation by themselves and by others (§ 4.3). Fourthly, in order to understand the context in which these sophists operated in the city, we shall have a look at their intended audience, the construction of their self-image as Greeks rather than barbarians, and their daily life in the schools (§ 4.4). Finally, we shall explore one of the most relevant issues in Paul's debate with the Corinthian sophists, that of the antithesis between rhetorical sophism and the philosophical, ethical, inward life (§ 4.5). By way of conclusion, I shall highlight the role of Corinth in this debate, which started as early as Diogenes the Cynic's stay at Corinth in the 4th cent. BC (§ 4.6).

4.1 Competition in the Christian communities in Corinth

4.1.1 Paul and Corinth

It becomes very clear from the correspondence which Paul conducted with the Corinthians in the first half of the fifties AD, when he was in Ephesus, that he perceived factions, quarrels and tensions in Corinth. Paul exhorts the Corinthians that

> all of you should be in agreement and that there should be no divisions among you (ἵνα τὸ αὐτὸ λέγητε πάντες, καὶ μὴ ᾖ ἐν ὑμῖν σχίσματα), but that you should be united in the same mind and the same purpose. For it has been reported to me by Chloe's people that there are quarrels among you (ὅτι ἔριδες ἐν ὑμῖν εἰσιν). (1 Cor 1.10–11)

As a consequence, in Paul's theological language, Christ is divided: μεμέρισται ὁ Χριστός – Christ himself has become divided by parties and factions (1.13). Paul makes the observation that there is jealousy and quarrelling (ζῆλος καὶ ἔρις) among them, and that they are 'of the flesh' and behave according to human inclinations (1 Cor 3.3). These factions become apparent when the Corinthians come together in their Christian assemblies:

> For, to begin with, when you come together as a church (συνερχομένων ὑμῶν ἐν ἐκκλησίᾳ), I hear that there are divisions among you (ἀκούω σχίσματα ἐν ὑμῖν ὑπάρχειν); and to some extent I believe it. Indeed, there have to be factions among you, for only so will it become clear who among you are esteemed (δεῖ γὰρ καὶ αἱρέσεις ἐν ὑμῖν εἶναι, ἵνα [καὶ] οἱ δόκιμοι φανεροὶ γένωνται ἐν ὑμῖν). (1 Cor 11.18–19)

In the last line, Paul is probably taking the Corinthians' perspective, according to which those who profile themselves in these faction quarrels are the δόκιμοι, those who need to be respected; they are not, as the NRSV translates, those who are 'genuine' or 'trustworthy' (as though Paul regarded the faction-building process as particularly useful) but, in a ironic sense, those who are approved of and esteemed, those who meet the expectations of excellence according to the standards which influence the emergence and development of the factions within the community. While this conflict between Paul and the Corinthians continues, after he has already rendered them an extra visit from Ephesus, Paul thinks it better not to call again:

> For I fear that when I come, I may find you not as I wish, and that you may find me not as you wish; I fear that there may perhaps be quarrelling (μή πως ἔρις), jealousy, anger, selfishness, slander, gossip, conceit, and disorder (ζῆλος, θυμοί, ἐριθεῖαι, καταλαλιαί, ψιθυρισμοί, φυσιώσεις, ἀκαταστασίαι). (2 Cor 12.20)

These kinds of tensions and factions within the Christian communities at Corinth resemble the factions in the post-Classical cities between competing sophistic

groups and between these sophists and their counterparts, the philosophers. This background to Paul's Corinthian correspondence has been highlighted by Winter in his pioneering study entitled *Philo and Paul Among the Sophists* (1997).[1] In his view, the sophistic movement was so forceful that it influenced members of the Jewish communities, as we have seen in the previous chapter on Philo and the sophists (see chap. 3 above), and also affected the emerging Christian communities. I take Winter's line of approach but re-examine the sources and add many references – especially to Philostratus, but also to Dio Chrysostom and Plutarch – which are not included in Winter's book.

4.1.2 Sophistic factionalism

Factions and tensions appear to be a common feature of sophistic discourse in the Greek city in the post-Classical age. According to Philostratus, the 2nd cent. AD author of the *Lives of the Sophists*, his own teacher Proclus of Naucratis was particularly successful in controlling the competitive nature prevalent in sophistic schools:

> To prevent us from hissing or jeering at one another, as so often happens in the schools of the sophists, we were summoned to come in all together, and when we had obeyed the summons we sat down, first the boys, then the pedagogues in the middle, and the youths by themselves. (Philostratus, *Lives of the Sophists* [=*LS*] 604)

Yet, competition between different groups of sophists seems to have been common. According to Dio Chrysostom, 'one could hear crowds of wretched sophists around Poseidon's temple shouting and reviling one another, and their disciples, as they were called, fighting with one another' (*Orationes* 8.9–10).[2] The sophists' behaviour also provoked the reaction of philosophically-minded people like Diogenes the Cynic, as Dio Chrysostom makes clear: 'it was against the sophists, who wanted to be looked up to and thought they knew more than other men, that he [i. e. Diogenes] railed in particular' (6.21). Diogenes is said to have deliberately avoided the sophists' company: 'from public affairs, lawsuits, rivalries, wars, and factions he kept himself clear. He tried especially to imitate the life of the gods (καὶ μάλιστα ἐμιμεῖτο τῶν θεῶν τὸν βίον), for they alone, as Homer asserts, live at ease' (6.31). Imitation of the life of the gods is a philosophical answer to the practice of the sophists. This attitude, as we shall see in due course, also seems characteristic of Paul's view on the sophists within the Christian communities. Paul, too, contrasts the sophistic life-style with the inner values of a spiritual-ethical transformation of the inner man into the image of God.

[1] See Winter 2002.
[2] Cf. Winter 2002, 54, 55, 124–5, 129, 168.

The sophists' reputation for quarrelling and factionalism also transpires from Plutarch. According to Plutarch,

> public speakers and sophists (…) are led on by repute and ambition (ὑπὸ δόξης καὶ φιλοτιμίας) (…) to competition in excess of what is best for them (ἐξαγόμενοι παρὰ τὸ συμφέρον ἀγωνίζεσθαι). (*De tuenda sanitate praecepta* 131A)

He is particularly concerned about the pseudo-learned, sophistic after-dinner disputations, 'which have as their goal an ostentatious or stirring rivalry' (133E). He fears discussions that deteriorate 'into an unpleasant squabble or a contest in sophistry' (εἰς … ἀγῶνα σοφιστικὸν)[3] and into what I on purpose (mis-)translate as 'ecclesiastical strife', i.e. the type of strife going on in the ἐκκλησία, the (political) assembly, and into strife belonging to the *agora* (πρὸς ἀγῶνας ἐκκλησιαστικοὺς καὶ ἀγοραίους), hence, as E.L. Millar translates in the Loeb Classical Library, 'in the direction of political and legal controversy' (*Quaestiones convivales* 713F). Plutarch has in mind the ἐκκλησία in the sense of the political meeting of the δῆμος which continued to meet in the post-Classical period up to Roman times,[4] and clearly fears that the kind of strife characteristic of this political body is now being transported by the sophists to other fields of life. Yet it is interesting that, according to Paul, such factionalist 'ecclesiastical' strife now also extends, through the influence of Christian sophists, to the meetings of the Christian ἐκκλησία. Plutarch suggests that often only musical entertainment can check this kind of competition (*Quaestiones convivales* 713F).

Elsewhere, too, Plutarch draws an all but flattering picture of these ambitious, antagonistic sophists and describes their pupils as follows:

> the young men, paying these persons a large amount of money, were getting themselves filled full of self-conceit and sham-wisdom and were zealous for discussion of arguments and for disputation futile in wranglings and ambitious rivalries but not for anything fair and serviceable at all. (*Platonicae quaestiones* 999E)

Philostratus' *Lives of the Sophists*, too, is full of examples of rivalries between competing groups of sophists and points out how 'in their quarrel with one another they went to extremes that are alien to the philosophic temper' (*LS* 488). He mentions, for example, the quarrel that arose between the sophists Polemo and Favorinus, which

> began in Ionia, where the Ephesians favoured Favorinus, while Smyrna admired Polemo; and it became more bitter in Rome; for their consulars and sons of consulars by applauding either one or the other started between them rivalry (φιλοτιμία) such as kindles the keenest envy (φθόνος) and malice. (…) they are to be blamed for the speeches that they composed assailing one another. (…) When people called

[3] For the terminology of ἀγών σοφιστικός see also Philo, *Quod deterius potiori insidiari soleat* 42; *De migratione Abrahami* 82.

[4] On the continuation of this institution, see, e.g., Dmitriev 2005.

> Favorinus a sophist, the mere fact that he had quarrelled with a sophist was evidence enough. (*LS* 490–491)

Similar inner-sophistic rivalries and critical attitudes are recorded between (a) Marcus of Byzantium, who 'looked too boorish to be a learned man' and Polemo, who expressed this impression of him (*LS* 529); (b) between Timocrates, who is being described as 'proud and haughty', and Scopelian (the youths of Smyrna taking either side; *LS* 536); (c) between Philagrus and Herodes, because the latter's pupil Amphicles misbehaved towards Philagrus when he met him on the road and elicited 'an outlandish word' from him, thus causing this respected sophist to fall into the pits of barbarisms (*LS* 578); (d) between a pupil of Chrestus of Byzantium and Hadrian: the former, having had 'some training in the curriculum of the sophists', insulted the latter, who 'used to put up with all his insults, and would call the slanders of such men "flea-bites"; but Hadrian's pupils could not tolerate the behaviour of the man and gave orders to their own slaves to trash him', resulting in his death (*LS* 587–588); (e) between Athenodorus and Pollux when they taught in the same city, the former in his discourses habitually ridiculing the latter as puerile (*LS* 595); (f) between Aspasius and Philostratus of Lemnos, their quarrel beginning in Rome but becoming 'more serious in Ionia where it was fomented by the sophists Cassianus and Aurelius' (*LS* 627). Similarly, the sophist Scopelian was by some deemed 'unworthy of the sophistic circle'. According to Philostratus, however, this criticism is unjustified because Scopelian's critics themselves

> are quibblers and sluggish and are not inspired with extempore eloquence; for man is by nature a creature prone to envy. (…) We must not be surprised if certain persons (…) should sneer at and revile one whose style of eloquence was the readiest, the boldest, and the most elevated of any Greek of his time. (*LS* 514–515)

This long list of accounts about specific inner-sophistic struggles illustrates the kind of sophistic factionalism which manifested itself in the Greek cities.

4.1.3 Loyalty of disciples

Noteworthy also is the loyalty of the disciples involved. According to Dio Chrysostom, the sophists are 'like gorgeous peacocks, (…) men who are lifted aloft as on wings by their fame (δόξα) and disciples' (*Orationes* 12.5). The disciples play an important role in the building of factions between sophists.

This atmosphere also becomes tangible in Paul's Corinthian letters, inasmuch as the disciples claim their adherence to either Paul, Apollos or Cephas: 'each of you says, "I belong to Paul", or "I belong to Apollos", or "I belong to Cephas", or "I belong to Christ."' (Ἐγὼ μέν εἶμι Παύλου, Ἐγὼ δὲ Ἀπολλῶ, Ἐγὼ δὲ Κηφᾶ, Ἐγὼ δὲ Χριστοῦ) (1 Cor 1.12). Paul tries to counter this factionalism by pointing out that this leads to Christ himself becoming divided: 'Has Christ been divided? (μεμέρισται ὁ Χριστός;) Was Paul crucified for you? Or were

you baptized in the name of Paul?' (1 Cor 1.13). In Paul's view all important speakers who had visited the Corinthian Christian communities were united in the same, common goal:

> When one says, 'I belong to Paul', and another, 'I belong to Apollos' (Ἐγὼ μέν εἰμι Παύλου, ἕτερος δέ, Ἐγὼ Ἀπολλῶ), are you not merely human? What then is Apollos? What is Paul? Servants through whom you came to believe, as the Lord assigned to each. (1 Cor 3.4–5)

From Paul's perspective there is no need to play them off against one another:

> Let no one boast about human leaders (ὥστε μηδεὶς καυχάσθω ἐν ἀνθρώποις). For all things are yours, whether Paul or Apollos or Cephas (πάντα γὰρ ὑμῶν ἐστιν, εἴτε Παῦλος εἴτε Ἀπολλῶς εἴτε Κηφᾶς) … – all belong to you, and you belong to Christ, and Christ belongs to God. (1 Cor 3.21–23)

Whereas the pupils of the respective teachers of the Christian communities show themselves loyal to their own teacher, Paul tries to find a common denominator between them so as to establish a stable Christian community which leaves factionalism aside.

4.2 The technique of improvising speeches

In the discussion among the Corinthian Christians, the ability to improvise, to speak extempore (σχεδιάζειν or αὐτοσχεδιάζειν) is very important. Extempore speaking was the hallmark of experienced and gifted sophists. In his *Lives of the Sophists*, Philostratus almost gives a running commentary on whether this or that sophist was able to improvise. Favorinus 'improvised with ease and fluency' (*LS* 491). 'As an extempore speaker' Aeschines 'was easy and fluent' (*LS* 509). Philostratus describes how this extempore speaking took place in practice. After someone had proposed a theme, Polemo

> fixed his gaze, as was his custom on the thoughts that were already taking their place in his mind, and then flung himself into his speech and delivered a long and admirable discourse (…). As the prooemium of his speech he declared that not without a divine impulse (μὴ ἀθεεὶ) was he inspired to speak on that theme. (*LS* 533)

This kind of extempore speaking was particularly important on a sophist's first visit to a particular city, as it gave a first impression of his abilities. Thus Philostratus describes how Polemo, who is characterized as 'arrogant', gave a display of extempore oration to the Athenians 'on first coming to Athens' (*LS* 535). Other examples in Philostratus of gifted extempore rhetors include Ptolemy of Naucratis, who 'spoke extempore with marvellous ease and fluency' (*LS* 595).

By way of contrast, Philostratus also remarks when a particular sophist is less gifted at this art. Isaeus' declamations, for instance, 'were not actually extem-

pore, but he deliberated from daybreak till midday' (*LS* 514). Herodes 'cared only for extempore speaking, though he had not enough confidence for it, since he had not yet studied with Scopelian, nor learned the vigour that extempore eloquence requires' (*LS* 521). The worst thing which could happen was for the orator to break down during an extempore speech as happened to Heracleides the Lycian:

> In the presence of the Emperor Severus he broke down in an extempore speech (…). For an extempore speaker is disconcerted by an single hearer whose features have a supercilious expression, or by tardy applause, or by not being clapped in the way to which he is accustomed. (*LS* 614)

To avoid this, sophists, especially the less gifted, practise long and hard. Marcus of Byzantium, e. g., 'was always training himself in the methods that prepare one for extempore speaking. This was evident from the steady gaze of his eyes' (*LS* 528). Such training could profit a sophist, as in the case of Aspasius: 'Though he had no natural ability for extempore speaking, he made good the deficiency by hard work' (*LS* 627). Plutarch also mentions the hard work some sophists had to put in. Commenting on a particular sophist, he reports: 'He studied night and day, since he had no natural gift for extemporaneous speaking' (*Vitae decem oratorum* 842C). It shows the high esteem in which extempore speaking was hold in the ancient city. This is also demonstrated in the case of Aristeides, whose 'natural talent', according to Philostratus, 'was not in the line of extempore eloquence'. Although 'in his discourses this sophist used to disparage extempore speakers' (and characterized them as 'those who vomit their speeches'), 'nevertheless he (…) greatly admired extempore eloquence'. As Philostratus puts it, 'extempore eloquence is the crowning achievement of a fluent and facile tongue' (*LS* 582–583).

This kind of eloquence, however, was precisely what Paul lacked, judging from the sophistic criticism he encountered from his Corinthian opponents. According to Paul,

> they say, 'His letters are weighty and strong (Αἱ ἐπιστολαὶ μέν, φησίν, βαρεῖαι καὶ ἰσχυραί), but his bodily presence is weak (ἡ δὲ παρουσία τοῦ σώματος ἀσθενὴς), and his speech contemptible (καὶ ὁ λόγος ἐξουθενημένος)'. (2 Cor 10.10)

Taking their perspective, Paul depicts himself as one 'who is humble when face to face with you (ὃς κατὰ πρόσωπον μὲν ταπεινὸς ἐν ὑμῖν), but bold towards you when I am away (ἀπὼν δὲ θαρρῶ εἰς ὑμᾶς)!' (2 Cor 10.1). He seems to go along with their criticism of his poor extempore qualities as he decides not to return to the Corinthian communities at present:

> I fear that when I come, I may find you not as I wish, and that you may find me not as you wish; I fear that there may perhaps be quarrelling, jealousy, anger, selfishness, slander, gossip, conceit, and disorder. I fear that when I come again, my God may

> humble me before you (μὴ πάλιν ἐλθόντος μου ταπεινώσῃ με ὁ θεός μου πρὸς ὑμᾶς). (2 Cor 12.20–21)

Paul grants, albeit in an ironic way, that given his opponents' sophistic standards he may be perceived as humbling himself again because of his lack of extempore qualities.

Yet, the opponents' depiction of Paul's letters as 'weighty and strong' (βαρεῖαι καὶ ἰσχυραί) seems to be a genuine compliment. For some sophists, too, poor or average extempore qualities may coexist with excellent other rhetorical skills. According to Philostratus, for instance,

> Aeschines did indeed improvise more often than any other speaker (…), but I think that he left behind him only such speeches as he had composed with care, for fear that he might fall far short of the elaborate speeches of Demosthenes. (*LS* 482)

As we have already seen, Aristeides' 'natural talent was not in the line of extempore eloquence' (*LS* 582), and the same could be said of Paul. Yet at the same time, Aristeides' erudition (εὐπαιδευσία), force (ἰσχύς) and power of characterization (ἦθος) were praised:

> His strength lay in the elaborate cogitation of a theme (ἐν θεωρήμασι); for which reason he refrained from extempore speaking. For the desire not to produce anything except after long cogitation (τὸ κατὰ θεωρίαν βούλεσθαι) keeps the mind too busy and robs it of alertness. (*LS* 585)

It is to a sophist's credit if he knows his own strengths and abandons extempore speaking if he commands other rhetorical skills better. This is well illustrated by the case of Aelian:

> Though he received the title of sophist at the hands of those who award that honour, he did not trust to their decision, but neither flattered his own intelligence nor was puffed up by this appellation, exalted though it was, but after taking careful stock of his own abilities, he saw that they were not suited to declamation, and so he applied himself to writing history and won admiration in this field. (*LS* 624)

This shows that poor extempore speakers could be praised in other respects. In a similar way, the sophist Antipater, although he was considered to have 'a talent for speaking extempore', was praised above all for his *written work*, particularly his letter writing: 'though there were many men who both declaimed and wrote historical narrative better than Antipater, yet no one composed letters better than he' (*LS* 607). So if Paul, despite being criticized for his art of speaking in public, was at the same time praised for his 'weighty and strong' letters (2 Cor 10.10), this judgement by the Corinthian sophists was probably sincere. This becomes particularly clear from the fact that sophists could also criticize one another for their lack of skill in letter writing. According to Philostratus, there was a controversy between Philostratus of Lemnos and Aspasius over how to write letters:

> The epistle composed by Philostratus called *How to write Letters* is aimed at Aspasius, who on being appointed Imperial Secretary wrote certain letters in a style more controversial than is suitable; and others he wrote in obscure language, though neither of these qualities is becoming to an Emperor. (*LS* 628)

Against this background, it seems as if Paul's critics are indeed paying him a compliment for his letter writing, whereas at the same time criticizing his extempore qualities as a speaker. It shows that in Corinth Paul was evaluated as a sophist and attracted the same kind of criticism other sophists would experience.

4.3 Invention of themes, physiognomy and self-praise

Sophistic criticism also extended to two related issues, the ability to invent themes, and actual performance and physiognomy. Apart from the art of speaking itself, the skill of devising suitable themes (γνῶναι) to speak about was also part of rhetoric. According to Philostratus, Antiphon of Rhamnus, for instance, 'was held to be the most able of men, both in the art of speaking and in the invention of themes (ἱκανώτατος ἀνθρώπων ἔδοξεν εἰπεῖν τε καὶ γνῶναι)' (*LS* 498). For this reason, 'they apply the term "clever rhetorician" to τοὺς ἱκανῶς μὲν συνιέντας, ἱκανῶς δὲ ἑρμηνεύοντας, to those who show skill in the invention of themes and their exposition' (*LS* 499). Consequently, Philostratus himself, in his exposition of the lives of the sophists, passes over particular sophists, because they 'showed no skill either in invention or in the expression of their ideas' (*LS* 511).

From Paul's correspondence, one can discern that the Corinthians also criticized him for his lack of variety in the choice of topics. Paul seems to respond to this in the following way:

> When I came to you, brothers, I did not come proclaiming the mystery of God to you in lofty words or wisdom (οὐ καθ' ὑπεροχὴν λόγου ἢ σοφίας). For I decided to know nothing among you except Jesus Christ, and him crucified (οὐ γὰρ ἔκρινά τι εἰδέναι ἐν ὑμῖν εἰ μὴ Ἰησοῦν Χριστὸν καὶ τοῦτον ἐσταυρωμένον). (1 Cor 2.1–2)

In this respect, Paul adopts the kind of reply which a philosopher would adopt when confronted with this sort of rhetorical criticism. This is apparent from the third oration of Dio Chrysostom, who was initially a sophist hostile to philosophy but later converted to Stoicism.

Dio encountered the same sort of criticism as Paul:

> If anyone shall say that I always say the same things, this will be the same charge that was laid against Socrates. For the story runs that once Hippias of Elis, who had been listening for some time to the words of Socrates about justice and virtue (…), finally made the exclamation natural to a sophist, 'The same things once more, Socrates!' to which the other replied with a laugh, 'Yes, and on the same subjects. Now

> you by reason of your wisdom (ὑπὸ σοφίας) probably never say the same about the same things, but to me this appears a thing most excellent. We know that liars say many things and all different, while those who stick to the truth cannot find anything else to say than just the truth'. So too with me: if I knew of any subject more serious or more suited to you, that is the subject that I should attempt to handle. But as it is, (…) I maintain that the proper subject for the ruler and king is the government and control of men. (*Orationes* 3.27)

In a similar way, Paul also sticks to his proper subject, that of 'Jesus Christ, and him crucified' and does not yield to his opponents' call for rhetorical variation in subject matter.

Finally, Paul's physiognomy, too, is scrutinized by his opponents in Corinth. Not only are his extempore speaking and his lack of rhetorical variation the object of contempt, but his bodily presence is considered weak (2 Cor 10.10: ἡ δὲ παρουσία τοῦ σώματος ἀσθενὴς). By sophistic standards, this is quite serious criticism, because performance and physiognomy do matter. Favorinus, for instance, is said to have fascinated even those in Rome who did not understand Greek 'by the tones of his voice, by his expressive glance and the rhythm of his speech' (*LS* 491). Similarly, in Athens, Antiochus' appearance and costume were thought to be 'so exquisite that before he spoke a word a low buzz of approval went round as a tribute to his perfect elegance. (…) he made a further wonderful display of his marvellous powers (θαυμασίαν δὲ ἰσχὺν ἐνεδείξατο) in what now took place' (*LS* 572).[5] As Plutarch puts it,

> the discussions and exercises of most sophists not only use words to conceal their thoughts, but they so sweeten their voice by certain harmonious modulations and softenings and rhythmic cadences, as to ravish away and transport their hearers. It is an empty pleasure they give, and an even more empty renown they acquire. (*De recta ratione audiendi* 41D)

If the first impression they made was poor, some sophists were able to make up for it by their further appearance. Though Hippodromus the Thessalian

> was somewhat rustic in appearance, yet an extraordinary nobility shone out of his eyes, and his glance was at once keen and good-natured. Megistias of Smyrna also says that he noticed this characteristic of his, and he was considered second to none as a physiognomist. (*LS* 618)

In addition to the qualities of extempore speaking and the invention of themes, physiognomy, too, was a factor in the overall sophistic evaluation of a speaker. In a speech at Olympia, Dio Chrysostom, as a philosopher, deliberately counters the sophistic expectations of his audience, who had come to witness the games, and contrasts himself with the sophists in the following way: 'I declare to you that, great as is your number, you have been eager to hear a man who is neither

[5] Cf. Winter 2002, 114, 222.

handsome in appearance nor strong, and in age is already past his prime, one who has no disciple, who professes (…) no ability (…) as a sophist' (*Orationes* 12.15). Like Paul's appearance, Dio's is 'not strong'. As we shall see in more detail later, on the competitive market of the ancient city both Paul and Dio prefer to portray themselves as philosophers, who suffer all kinds of hardships, than as sophists.

The strategy which Paul adopts in order to counter the sophistic criticism which he experiences is to strike at the very heart of the self-image of the sophists, their δόξα – their praiseworthiness, honour, and fame. This image of the sophist is rendered explicit by Dio Chrysostom who likens the sophists to 'gorgeous peacocks' and depicts them as 'men who are lifted aloft as on wings by their fame (δόξα)' (*Orationes* 12.5). The sophists, according to Dio, gain this reputation because 'When a lot of young men with nothing to do go leaping about a man with cries of admiration, as the Bacchants leap about Dionysus, inevitably that man after no great lapse of time will gain a reputation with many others for talking sensibly' (35.8). In his definition, sophists are those 'who wanted to be looked up to and thought they knew more than other men' (6.21).

Philostratus, in his *Lives of the Sophists*, agrees with this and is keen to list the exceptions among the sophists who did *not* care for honour and fame. Chrestus of Byzantium, for instance, 'made himself especially obnoxious to youths of the foolish boasting sort, in spite of the fact that they are more profitable than the rest for the payment of fees' (*LS* 591). Another sophist, Hippodromus the Thessalian,

> in his public declamations (…) displayed an admirable mildness. For though he had adopted a profession that is prone to egotism and arrogance (τὴν τέχνην φίλαυτόν τε καὶ ἀλαζόνα), he never resorted to self-praise (ἔπαινον ἑαυτοῦ), but used to check those who praised him to excess. (*LS* 616)

Aelian, 'though he received the title of sophist at the hands of those who award that honour, (…) did not trust to their decision, but neither flattered his own intelligence nor was puffed up by this appellation, exalted though it was' (*LS* 624).

The general impression of sophistic self-praise and renown is confirmed by Plutarch. Although he does not exclude the possibility of inoffensive self-praise, and devotes an entire treatise to this subject ('De laude ipsius'), he is very critical about the 'empty renown' acquired by the sophists, as we have just seen above (see esp. *De recta ratione audiendi* 41D).

In his Corinthian correspondence, Paul seems to address this issue of self-praise and honour. Twice he quotes the prophet Jeremiah, 'Let the one who boasts, boast in the Lord' (Ὁ καυχώμενος ἐν κυρίῳ καυχάσθω – Jer 9.22–23), the first time in 1 Cor 1.31 (cf. further 2 Cor 10.17). In itself, Paul's choice of appropriate quotations could be regarded as a sign of sophistic rhetoric. In sophism, suitable, apt quotations from Homer or Euripides were greatly valued. Polemo,

for instance, is said to have applied particular verses from Homer's *Iliad* very aptly in a specific situation (*LS* 521). Similarly, Pausanias the sophist once 'concluded his address to the Athenians by quoting very appropriately [a particular] verse of Euripides' (*LS* 594). Paul seems to use the same technique of apt quotations by choosing Jeremiah's line on (proper) boasting. As the contents of his quotation suggest ('Let the one who boasts, boast in the Lord'), in his letter to the Corinthians Paul stresses that 'each one will receive commendation from God' (1 Cor 4.5) and that, for that reason, they should 'not pronounce judgement before the time'.

In this way, Paul warns them 'that none of you may be puffed up in favour of one against another (ἵνα μὴ εἷς ὑπὲρ τοῦ ἑνὸς φυσιοῦσθε κατὰ τοῦ ἑτέρου). For who sees anything different in you? (τίς γάρ σε διακρίνει;)' (1 Cor 4.6–7). The latter question of course implies the suggestion, unacceptable to sophists, that their divisions, quarrels and factions cannot be justified because there is no difference between the various members of the community. Paul picks up the theme of self-commendation, boasting and honour but turns it against the sophists themselves and, in so doing, modifies and inverts it. Paul also boasts, but his boast is 'moralized' inasmuch as

> this is our boast (Ἡ γὰρ καύχησις ἡμῶν αὕτη ἐστίν): the testimony of our *conscience* (τὸ μαρτύριον τῆς συνειδήσεως ἡμῶν) that we have behaved in the world with simplicity and godly sincerity (ὅτι ἐν ἁπλότητι καὶ εἰλικρινείᾳ τοῦ θεοῦ), not with earthly wisdom (οὐκ ἐν σοφίᾳ σαρκικῇ). (2 Cor 1.12)

Instead of the earthly wisdom of sophistry, Paul resorts to a philosophical-ethical vocabulary of conscience (συνείδησις), simplicity (ἁπλότης), and godly sincerity (εἰλικρίνεια τοῦ θεοῦ). This ethical conduct is important to Paul as he continues to define acceptable self-commendation in terms derived from the semantic field of truth and conscience:

> We have renounced the shameful things that one hides; we refuse to practise cunning or to falsify God's word (μηδὲ δολοῦντες τὸν λόγον τοῦ θεοῦ); but by the open statement of the truth (ἀλλὰ τῇ φανερώσει τῆς ἀληθείας) we commend ourselves to the conscience of everyone (συνιστάνοντες ἑαυτοὺς πρὸς πᾶσαν συνείδησιν ἀνθρώπων) in the sight of God. (2 Cor 4.2)

This ethical self-commendation is different from sophistic self-praise, and Paul criticizes the sophistic practice of letters of recommendation by which sophists are introduced to new cities and audiences: 'Are we beginning to commend ourselves again? (Ἀρχόμεθα πάλιν ἑαυτοὺς συνιστάνειν;) Surely we do not need, as some do, letters of recommendation to you or from you, do we? (ἢ μὴ χρῄζομεν ὥς τινες συστατικῶν ἐπιστολῶν πρὸς ὑμᾶς ἢ ἐξ ὑμῶν;)' (2 Cor 3.1). Paul turns against this practice. Having again very appropriately quoted the line of Jeremiah: 'Let the one who boasts, boast in the Lord' (Ὁ καυχώμενος ἐν κυρίῳ καυχάσθω – Jer 9.22–23; 2 Cor 10.17, cf. 1 Cor 1.31), he gives the

reason why self-recommendation is not permissible: ‘For it is not those who commend *themselves* that are approved (οὐ γὰρ ὁ ἑαυτὸν συνιστάνων, ἐκεῖνός ἐστιν δόκιμος), but those whom *the Lord* commends (ἀλλὰ ὃν ὁ κύριος συνίστησιν)’ (2 Cor 10.18).

Paul continues by inverting the sophistic practice of boasting in the following way: ‘If I must boast, I will boast of the things that show my *weakness*’ – Εἰ καυχᾶσθαι δεῖ, τὰ τῆς ἀσθενείας μου καυχήσομαι (2 Cor 11.30). Paul’s boasting concerns τὰ τῆς ἀσθενείας, the things that reveal his weakness, not his success. He emphasizes his ἀσθένεια (‘weakness’), even his ἀσθένειαι (plural; 12.5, 12.9–10), by listing a full catalogue of hardships that he has experienced (2 Cor 11.23–33).[6] This catalogue lists imprisonments, beatings, and all the other mishaps that have befallen him:

> Three times I was beaten with rods. Once I received a stoning. Three times I was shipwrecked; for a night and a day I was adrift at sea; on frequent journeys, in danger from rivers, danger from bandits, danger from my own people, danger from Gentiles, danger in the city, danger in the wilderness, danger at sea, danger from false brothers; in toil and hardship, through many a sleepless night, hungry and thirsty, often without food, cold and naked. (2 Cor 11.25–27)

He repeats his willingness to boast of his weaknesses:

> So, I will boast all the more gladly of my weaknesses (ἥδιστα οὖν μᾶλλον καυχήσομαι ἐν ταῖς ἀσθενείαις μου), so that the power of Christ may dwell in me. Therefore I am content with weaknesses (διὸ εὐδοκῶ ἐν ἀσθενείαις), insults, hardships, persecutions, and calamities for the sake of Christ; for whenever I am weak, then I am strong (ὅταν γὰρ ἀσθενῶ, τότε δυνατός εἰμι). (2 Cor 12.9–10)

These hardships, which Paul, together with his fellows, has experienced, are explicitly contrasted with the honour which the Corinthian sophists experience:

> We have become a spectacle to the world, to angels and to mortals. We are fools for the sake of Christ, but you are wise in Christ. We are weak, but you are strong (ἡμεῖς ἀσθενεῖς, ὑμεῖς δὲ ἰσχυροί). You are held in honour, but we in disrepute (ὑμεῖς ἔνδοξοι, ἡμεῖς δὲ ἄτιμοι). To the present hour we are hungry and thirsty, we are poorly clothed (γυμνιτεύομεν) and beaten and homeless (καὶ ἀστατοῦμεν), and we grow weary from the work of our own hands (καὶ κοπιῶμεν ἐργαζόμενοι ταῖς ἰδίαις χερσίν). When reviled, we bless; when persecuted, we endure; when slandered, we speak kindly. We have become like the rubbish of the world, the dregs of all things, to this very day. (1 Cor 4.9–13)

Sophistic values are deliberately challenged by Paul. The sophists are ἔνδοξοι, they are held in honour, i. e. in accordance with sophistic values, whereas Paul and his co-workers are ἄτιμοι, held in disrepute. In Paul’s inversion of sophistic values, Paul is proud of being poorly dressed, in direct opposition to the sophistic

[6] Cf. Fitzgerald 1988.

stress on the right sort of performance. Similarly he boasts of working with his own hands, in contradiction of the sophistic practice of being paid high fees.

This humble stance is also adopted by the philosopher Dio Chrysostom in his dealings with the sophists. Speaking of particular orators before the people of Alexandria in their great theatre, Dio says:

> For they are clever persons, mighty sophists, wonder-workers; but I am quite ordinary and prosaic in my utterance, though not ordinary in my theme. For though the words that I speak are not great in themselves, they treat of topics of the greatest possible moment. (*Orationes* 32.39)

Dio's words betray the same mixture of humility, anti-sophistic vigour and proud self-awareness about his meaningful themes as Paul's Corinthian correspondence. Where Paul refers to Christ's story of power and weakness, Dio, in a similar way, points to the figure of the demi-god Heracles, whose biography has a similar anti-sophistic ring to that of Christ according to Paul.[7] In Dio's view, Heracles released Prometheus from the bounds of sophism: 'Prometheus, whom I take to have been a sort of sophist, he [i. e. Heracles] found being destroyed by popular opinion (δόξα); for his liver swelled and grew whenever he was praised and shrivelled again when he was censured' (*Orationes* 8.33). As one of his twelve labours, Heracles frees Prometheus from his subjection to sophistry. Similarly, according to Dio,

> to avoid creating the opinion that he [i. e. Heracles] did only impressive and mighty deeds, he went and removed and cleaned away the dung in the Augean stables, that immense accumulation of many years. For he considered that he ought to fight stubbornly and war against opinion (δόξα). (*Orationes* 8.35; cf. 47.4)

In Dio's view, Heracles' labours reflect the battle against the sophistic obsession with public opinion.

Dio and Paul indeed resemble each other closely. With the same studied attitude of inferiority as Paul, Dio asks his audience: 'I beg you not to expect from me at present any high-minded, sage address, but rather one which is amateurish and commonplace' (*Orationes* 47.8). Moreover, Dio Chrysostom lists the same catalogues of hardships as Paul. In contrast with the participants in the contests of the Isthmian and Nemean games, the contest of the noble man, Dio claims, is not limited to temporary games:

> The noble man holds his hardships to be his greatest antagonists, and with them he is ever wont to battle day and night, not because of a sprig of parsley as so many goats might do, nor because of a bit of wild olive, or of pine, but *because of happiness and virtue* throughout all the days of his life (ἀλλὰ ὑπὲρ εὐδαιμονίας καὶ ἀρετῆς παρὰ πάντα τὸν βίον), and not merely when the Eleans make proclamation, or the Corinthians, or the Thessalian assembly. He is afraid of none of those opponents nor does

[7] On this issue, see my inaugural lecture, Van Kooten 2006*b*.

> he pray to draw another antagonist, but challenges them one after another, grappling with hunger and cold, withstanding thirst, and disclosing no weakness even though he must endure the lash or give his body to be cut or burned. Hunger, exile, loss of reputation (ἀδοξία), and the like have no terror for him. (*Orationes* 8.15–18)[8]

Dio's inversion of sophistic values parallels that of Paul. Unlike the sophists, neither of them is concerned about ἀδοξία, loss of reputation. Such a non-sophistic man, however, is difficult to find, according to Dio, and is much more rare than sophists:

> To find a man who in plain terms and without guile speaks his mind with frankness, and neither for the sake of reputation nor for gain makes false pretensions, but out of good will and concern for his fellow-men stands ready, if need be, to submit to ridicule and to the disorder and the uproar of the mob – to find such a man as that is not easy, but rather the good fortune of a very lucky city, so great is the dearth of noble, independent souls and such the abundance of toadies, mountebanks, and sophists. (*Orationes* 32.11)

In their clearly anti-sophistic intentions, Dio and Paul have much in common and both are testimony to the competition between sophists and philosophically-minded orators within the cities of the Roman empire. To understand the urban context in which the sophists operated, we shall look at their intended audience, their cultural self-image and their daily life in the schools.

4.4 The sophists' daily life in the cities

In order to win the Corinthians back, Paul tries to release them from the sophists' influence in the following manner. Through the way in which he endeavours to achieve this, Paul gives corroborating evidence that his opponents in the Corinthian correspondence are indeed the sophists:

> Consider your own call, brothers: not many of you were wise by common human standards (οὐ πολλοὶ σοφοὶ κατὰ σάρκα), not many were powerful (οὐ πολλοὶ δυνατοί), not many were of noble birth (οὐ πολλοὶ εὐγενεῖς). (1 Cor 1.26)

The 'wise' (σοφοὶ), 'powerful' (δυνατοί) and 'those of noble birth' (εὐγενεῖς) constitute a typical sophistic audience. The sophists, although they were hostile to philosophers, still considered themselves 'wise', as Dio Chrysostom makes clear:

> Any man who in spite of his ignorance (ἀμαθεῖς ὄντες) deludes himself with the belief that he is wise (σοφοὶ εἶναι) is in a much sorrier plight than anyone else. And such is the tribe of sophists (καὶ ἔστι τοιοῦτον τὸ τῶν σοφιστῶν γένος). (*Orationes* 10.32)

[8] Fitzgerald 1988, 22, 99.

They are also the powerful and the well-to-do from important backgrounds. According to Philostratus, Protagoras, for instance, ‘used to hunt out well-born youths and those who came from wealthy families’: ἀνίχνευε δὲ οὗτος τοὺς εὐπατρίδας τῶν νέων καὶ τοὺς ἐκ τῶν βαθέων οἴκων (*LS* 496). This noble background is important, as Philostratus shows in the case of Hermocrates of Phocaea:

> In his public declamations Hermocrates was aided in the first place by his great-grandfather’s renown, since it is human nature to set a higher value on abilities that have been handed down from father to son; and for this reason more glory is won by an Olympic victor who comes of a family of Olympic victors; (…) there is a keener pleasure in pursuits that have been followed by one’s fathers and forefathers. (*LS* 611–612)

And in the case of Marcus of Byzantium Philostratus traces his genealogy as far back as possible (*LS* 528). Similarly, Plutarch tells that a particular sophist ‘was an outspoken speaker on account of his good birth (διὰ τὴν εὐγένειαν)’ (*Vitae decem oratorum* 842D). The Jewish-Christian sophists active in the Corinthian communities also share this interest in honourable genealogy. This emerges clearly from Paul’s invective against them: ‘But whatever anyone dares to boast of – I am speaking as a fool (ἐν ἀφροσύνῃ λέγω) – I also dare to boast of that. Are they Hebrews? So am I. Are they Israelites? So am I. Are they descendants of Abraham? So am I’ (2 Cor 11.21–22).

This atmosphere of ambitious sophists is captured nicely in Lucian’s *Rhetorum praeceptor*:

> You ask, my boy, how you can get to be a public speaker, and be held to personify the sublime and glorious name of sophist; life, you say, is not worth living, unless when you speak you can clothe yourself in such a mantle of eloquence that you will be irresistible and invincible. (…) Just see how many who previously were nobodies have come to be accounted men of standing (ἔνδοξοι), millionaires (πλούσιοι), yes, even gentlemen (εὐγενέστατοι), because of their eloquence (ἀπὸ τῶν λόγων). (*Rhetorum praeceptor* 1–2)

These strong ambitions go together with an increased sense of Greek cultural superiority. According to Philostratus, the sophist Gorgias,

> seeing that Greece was divided against itself, (…) came forward as the advocate of reconciliation, and tried to turn their energies against the barbarians and to persuade them not to regard one another’s cities as the prize to be won by their arms, but rather the land of the barbarians (…), making it evident to them the while that victories over barbarians call for hymns of praise, but victories over Greeks for dirges. (*LS* 493)

Philostratus also shows, in a story about a ‘pure Greek’, Agathion, from the interior of Attica, still ‘untainted by barbarians’, that there was a fear that the Greeks’ own speech would deteriorate due to the influence of barbarians (*LS* 552–554). For this reason, it is a hall-mark of true sophistic rhetoric to avoid bar-

barisms (*LS* 541) and to speak Greek in a Atticizing manner, although it would be equally wrong to overdo it: hyperatticisms of obsolete and rare words were to be avoided. Critias the sophist, for instance, 'Atticized, but in moderation, nor did he use outlandish words – for bad taste in Atticizing is truly barbarous – but his Attic words shine through his discourse like the gleams of the sun's rays' (*LS* 503; cf. 592, 598).

Given their emphatic Greek self-image, sophists easily took offence at figures such as the Cynic philosopher Peregrinus Proteus, who provoked the reaction of sophists such as Herodes. Peregrinus, who (on the religio-philosophical market of Antiquity) briefly converted to Christianity before returning to Cynicism and finishing as an adept of the cult of Heracles (Lucian, *De morte Peregrini* 11–12, 35–39),[9] angered Herodes the sophist in the following way: 'he used to dog the steps of Herodes and insult him in a semi-barbarous dialect. So once Herodes turned round and said: 'You speak ill of me, so be it, but why in such bad Greek?' (*LS* 563).

Against this background, it seems highly significant that Paul explicitly criticizes the relevance of the distinction between Hellenism and barbarism for the Christian community, which is united in Christ. Both Jews and Greeks are called into the community (1 Cor 1.23) and, Paul admonishes his Corinthian audience, 'in the one Spirit we were all baptized into one body – Jews or Greeks': καὶ γὰρ ἐν ἑνὶ πνεύματι ἡμεῖς πάντες εἰς ἓν σῶμα ἐβαπτίσθημεν, εἴτε Ἰουδαῖοι εἴτε Ἕλληνες (1 Cor 12.13). This is the very opposite of the procedure followed by the sophist Favorinus in his Corinthian oration. Instead of denying the validity of the Hellenism – barbarism divide, Favorinus sets himself, a sophist of Gallic-Celtic descent, up as a role-model for barbarians who wish to turn Greek, 'so that no one even of the barbarians may despair of attaining the culture of Greece when he looks upon this man' (Pseudo-Dio Chrysostom [= Favorinus], *Orationes* 37.27).[10]

In the competition between cults, creeds, and contests within post-Classical Greek cities, Christianity seems to have offered a new sense of community which transcended the divide between Greeks and barbarians. At Corinth, this Christian principle was now being threatened by the dominance of particular sophistic teachers within the Christian communities there. One ought to think of these sophists as Christians with an ethnic Jewish background (see 2 Cor 11.22). As we have seen in chap. 3 on Philo and the sophists, the sophistic movement was such a powerful force that it also influenced Jews, and – as we can discern from Paul – Christian Jews, too.

These Jewish-Christian sophists, like all sophists, were paid for the instruction they gave. According to Philostratus, Protagoras 'was the first to introduce

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[9] On Peregrinus, see now Bremmer 2007.
[10] Cf. Winter 2002, 132.

the custom of charging a fee for lectures, and so was the first to hand down to the Greeks a practice which is not to be despised' (*LS* 494–495).[11] Some sophists were rather lenient in this respect. Although a sophist such as Scopelian 'charged a fee for declaiming, it was not the same for every pupil, and depended on the amount of property possessed by each' (*LS* 519). Yet, the general image of the sophists was that they charged considerable sums for teaching. As Dio Chrysostom puts is, 'Both sophists and demagogues are purely mercenary leaders' (*Orationes* 4.132).

In his Corinthian correspondence, Paul deliberately criticizes this aspect of sophism. As we have already seen, as part of his hardships catalogue, he presents himself as labouring and 'growing weary from working with [his] own hands': καὶ κοπιῶμεν ἐργαζόμενοι ταῖς ἰδίαις χερσίν (1 Cor 4.12). Paul emphasizes that, although he would have the right to refrain from working for a living (1 Cor 9.6), he nevertheless makes no use of it at Corinth (1 Cor 9.12–15) but wishes to 'proclaim the gospel free of charge (ἵνα εὐαγγελιζόμενος ἀδάπανον θήσω τὸ εὐαγγέλιον), so as not to make full use of my rights in the gospel (εἰς τὸ μὴ καταχρήσασθαι τῇ ἐξουσίᾳ μου ἐν τῷ εὐαγγελίῳ)' (1 Cor 9.18). The Corinthians have apparently taken offence at Paul's behaviour because he did not conform to the sophistic rules, as becomes clear from Paul's ironic questions:

> Did I commit a sin by humbling myself (Ἢ ἁμαρτίαν ἐποίησα ἐμαυτὸν ταπεινῶν) so that you might be exalted, because I proclaimed God's good news to you free of charge? (ὅτι δωρεὰν τὸ τοῦ θεοῦ εὐαγγέλιον εὐηγγελισάμην ὑμῖν;). (2 Cor 11.7)

Paul seems to deliberately refrain from payment 'in order to deny an opportunity to those who want an opportunity to be recognized as our equals in what they boast about' (2 Cor 11.12). By contrast, Paul's sophistic opponents are being paid for their instruction in the Christian communities. It seems as if Paul's anti-sophistic strategy has led the Corinthians to question Paul's actual motives: 'Let it be assumed that I did not burden you. Nevertheless (you say) since I was crafty, I took you in by deceit (ἀλλὰ ὑπάρχων πανοῦργος δόλῳ ὑμᾶς ἔλαβον)' (2 Cor 12.16). Yet, it is the sophists who are to be mistrusted, as Paul explains in a passage which draws on Plato's philosophical criticism of the sophists. This antithesis between philosophy and sophism will be discussed in the next section.

4.5 Philosophy versus sophism

According to Paul, he is involved in spreading the knowledge (γνῶσις) of God throughout the Mediterranean (2 Cor 2.14). In this, Paul distances himself from the sophists:

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[11] Cf. Winter 2002, 49, 167.

> For we are not like so many who sell God's word by retail (οὐ γάρ ἐσμεν ὡς οἱ πολλοὶ καπηλεύοντες τὸν λόγον τοῦ θεοῦ), but in Christ we speak as persons of sincerity (ἀλλ' ὡς ἐξ εἰλικρινείας), as persons sent from God and standing in his presence. (2 Cor 2.17)

This contrast between knowledge and sincerity, on the one hand, and mercenary sophism, on the other, is drawn from Plato's *Protagoras*. In this dialogue Socrates urges Hippocrates:

> We must take care, my good friend, that the sophist, in commending his wares, does not deceive us, as both the whole-saler and the retailer do in the case of our bodily food. (…) And in the same way, those who take the various subjects of knowledge from city to city, and sell them by retail (οἱ τὰ μαθήματα περιάγοντες κατὰ τὰς πόλεις καὶ πωλοῦντες καὶ καπηλεύοντες) to whoever wants them, commend everything that they have for sale. (Plato, *Protagoras* 313d–e)

The sophistic practice of selling knowledge by retail is criticized not only by Plato, but also by Paul. Instead of tampering with God's word Paul portrays himself as seeking truth:

> We have renounced the shameful things that one hides. We refuse to practise cunning or to tamper with God's word (μηδὲ δολοῦντες τὸν λόγον τοῦ θεοῦ), but by the open statement of the truth (ἀλλὰ τῇ φανερώσει τῆς ἀληθείας) we commend ourselves to the conscience of everyone (συνιστάνοντες ἑαυτοὺς πρὸς πᾶσαν συνείδησιν ἀνθρώπων) in the sight of God. (2 Cor 4.2)

By contrast, the sophists are implicitly portrayed as not interested in truth. As Philostratus remarks, 'The Athenians when they observed the too great cleverness of the sophists, shut them out of the law courts on the ground that they could defeat a just argument by an unjust, and that they used their power to warp men's judgement' (*LS* 483). The same antithesis between philosophical truth and deceitful, empty sophism is applied by Plutarch when he describes those who make the transition from philosophy to sophism:

> Young men (…) try to desert philosophy – they turn away their ears toward the agreeable and gentle converse of sundry flatterers or sophists, who enchant them with useless and unprofitable but nevertheless pleasant utterances. (*De recta ratione audiendi* 46E)

Philostratus describes the conversion from Aristocles of Pergamum from philosophy to sophism in similar terms:

> Though from boyhood to early manhood he had devoted himself to the teachings of the Peripatetic school, he went over entirely to the sophists, and at Rome regularly attended the lectures of Herodes on extempore oratory. Now, so long as he was a student of philosophy he was slovenly in appearance, unkempt and squalid in his dress, but now he began to be fastidious. (*LS* 567)

This antithesis between philosophy and sophism is also highlighted by Lucian in his account of the fiercely anti-sophistic stance taken by Demonax. The latter, according to Lucian, 'made war on those who cultivate philosophy in the spirit of vainglory (ἐπίδειξις) and not in the spirit of truth (ἀλήθεια)': Μάλιστα δὲ ἐπολέμει τοῖς οὐ πρὸς ἀλήθειαν ἀλλὰ πρὸς ἐπίδειξιν φιλοσοφοῦσιν (Lucian, *Demonax* 48; Loeb edn, vol. 1, pp. 164–165). In another treatise, Lucian introduces the figure of Philosophy herself who laments that 'the sophist tribe' only pretend to be interested in her, whereas in fact they are 'neither profoundly interested in my teaching nor altogether at variance, but like the Hippocentaur breed, something composite and mixed, astray in the interspace between quackery and philosophy'. Having characterized their convictions as 'that useless and superfluous "wisdom" of theirs, in their own opinion invincible' Lucian continues by describing that, in the end, the sophists became indignant against Philosophy's comrades 'and combined against them, at length bringing them before courts and handing them over to drink the hemlock' (*Fugitivi* 10). In the end, sophists are dangerous to philosophers, as they did indeed prove to be by having Socrates sentenced to death.

This competition between genuine philosophy and 'that useless and superfluous "wisdom"' is also further spelled out by Paul. Having emphasized that he preaches the gospel 'not with words of eloquent wisdom (οὐκ ἐν σοφίᾳ λόγου)' (1 Cor 1.17), he appropriately quotes a line of Isaiah and applies it rhetorically to his own circumstances:

> For it is written, 'I will destroy the wisdom of the wise, and the discernment of the discerning I will thwart'. (Ἀπολῶ τὴν σοφίαν τῶν σοφῶν, καὶ τὴν σύνεσιν τῶν συνετῶν ἀθετήσω – Isaiah 29.14) Where is the one who is wise? (ποῦ σοφός;) Where is the scholar? (ποῦ γραμματεύς;) Where is the debater of this age? (ποῦ συζητητὴς τοῦ αἰῶνος τούτου;). (1 Cor 1.19–20)

Paul continues by rendering explicit the antithesis between 'the wisdom of the world' and 'the wisdom of God' (1 Cor 1.20–24). Paul again denies that his proclamation of God's mystery was 'in lofty words or wisdom' (οὐ καθ' ὑπεροχὴν λόγου ἢ σοφίας) (1 Cor 2.1) nor with persuasive words or wisdom, like those of the popular speakers: οὐκ ἐν πειθοῖ[ς] σοφίας [λόγοις] (1 Cor 2.4), nor 'in words taught by human wisdom': οὐκ ἐν διδακτοῖς ἀνθρωπίνης σοφίας λόγοις (1 Cor 2.13). He continuously stresses the difference between this human wisdom and God's wisdom (1 Cor 2.5–16; 3.18–20). Paul is clearly not interested in arrogant, sophistic talk:

> Some of you have become arrogant (ἐφυσιώθησάν τινες). But I will come to you soon, if the Lord wills, and I will find out not *the talk* of these arrogant people but their power (καὶ γνώσομαι οὐ τὸν λόγον τῶν πεφυσιωμένων ἀλλὰ τὴν δύναμιν). For the kingdom of God depends not on *talk* but on power: οὐ γὰρ ἐν λόγῳ ἡ βασιλεία τοῦ θεοῦ ἀλλ' ἐν δυνάμει. (1 Cor 4.18–19)

It is important to note that Paul does not portray the gospel as anti-philosophical, as is often assumed,[12] but that he constructs an opposition between the gospel and the sophists, as Clement of Alexandria already surmised.[13] Paul turns against the sophistic teachers who are so successful in the Corinthian communities, but claims that his knowledge (γνῶσις) makes up for his deficiencies in extempore speaking:

> I think that I am not in the least inferior to these super-apostles (λογίζομαι γὰρ μηδὲν ὑστερηκέναι τῶν ὑπερλίαν ἀποστόλων). I may be untrained in speech (εἰ δὲ καὶ ἰδιώτης τῷ λόγῳ), but not in knowledge (ἀλλ' οὐ τῇ γνώσει); certainly in every way and in all things we have made this evident to you. (2 Cor 11.5–6)

Paul's depiction of himself as an ἰδιώτης τῷ λόγῳ, as an amateur in speech, is very similar to Socrates' feigned humility in Plato's *Phaedrus*. When Phaedrus requests Socrates to speak, he responds:

> But, my dear Phaedrus, I shall make myself ridiculous if I, a mere amateur (ἰδιώτης), try without preparation to speak on the same subject in competition with a master of his art. (*Phaedrus* 236d)

Moreover, Paul's antithesis between genuine, trustworthy knowledge and superficial sophistic wisdom mirrors the same kind of contrast as that which emerges from Dio Chrysostom, who distinguishes between two kinds of education, the one from heaven, and the other human. It was with regard to the heavenly education, according to Dio,

> that men of old called those persons 'sons of Zeus' who received the good education and were manly of soul (…). Whoever, then, being noble by nature, possesses that higher education, readily acquires this other also. And thenceforth nothing can rob him of any of these things, neither time nor any tricky sophist. (*Orationes* 5.28, 33, 35)

Likewise, Plutarch distinguishes between, on the one hand, 'rhetorical speeches and sophistic doctrines (λόγοι ῥητόρων καὶ δόγματα σοφιστῶν), which the spiritual power prevented Socrates from begetting', and, on the other hand, that which 'Socrates held to be alone wisdom, that which he called passion περὶ τὸ

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[12] See, e.g., Schrage 1991, 185: the gospel is 'die Desillusionierung und Kritik aller anderen Religiosität und "Theologie"'; Strobel 1989, 52: the gospel is opposed to the Greeks' 'ganzheitlicher Erklärung des Wesens der Welt' and their religious 'Weltbewältigung' – 'Wir propagandieren nach Paulus nicht eine philosophische Weltanschauung als Heilsweg oder als Heilsmöglichkeit, sondern wir machen gerade dadurch derlei Illusionen und Ideologien zunichte'; Fascher 1975, 103: 'Dieser gekreuzigte Christus ist Gottes Kraft und Weisheit! Mit diesem aus Glauben erwachsenden Bekenntnis ist alle menschliche Weisheit abgetan, sind alle menschlichen Werturteile erledigt, ist die Tradition des Gesetzes ebenso überwunden wie der heidnische Polytheismus und *die philosophische Spekulation*' (italics mine); and Conzelmann 1969, 63: the gospel 'ist nicht die Propagierung einer Weltanschauung, sondern die Zerstörung jeder Weltanschauung als Heilsweg'. Cf. Badiou 2003, 27–8, 45–7, 58.

[13] Clement of Alexandria, *Stromateis* 1.24.1–4 and 5.8.1; cf. Origen, *Against Celsus* 3.47.

θεῖον καὶ νοητόν, passion for the divine and intelligible' (*Platonicae quaestiones* 1000D). Socrates, according to Plutarch,

> embraced a manner of teaching and speaking that had more of the true philosophic stamp, choosing that simplicity (τὸ ἀφελὲς τοῦτο) and sincerity (καὶ ἄπλαστον) of his for its manliness and great affinity to truth (ἀλήθεια); as for humbug, the mere vapour as it were of philosophy, he sent it flying to the sophists. (*De genio Socratis* 580B)

This is exactly the way Paul portrays himself. Like Socrates, Paul, as his conscience testifies, behaved in the world ἐν ἁπλότητι καὶ εἰλικρινείᾳ, 'with simplicity and sincerity' (2 Cor 1.11). Within the competitive spectrum of the ancient city, Paul fears to be understood as a sophist and to be judged and criticized accordingly. In reply, Paul fiercely criticizes 'those who think we are walking according to the flesh (ἐπί τινας τοὺς λογιζομένους ἡμᾶς ὡς κατὰ σάρκα περιπατοῦντας)', those who mistake him for a sophist:

> I ask that when I am present I need not show boldness by daring to oppose those who think we are acting according to the flesh. Indeed, we live in the flesh, but we do not wage war according to the flesh; for the weapons of our warfare are not merely fleshly, but they have divine power to destroy strongholds. We destroy arguments and every proud obstacle raised up against the knowledge of God (λογισμοὺς καθαιροῦντες καὶ πᾶν ὕψωμα ἐπαιρόμενον κατὰ τῆς γνώσεως τοῦ θεοῦ), and we take every thought captive to obey Christ (καὶ αἰχμαλωτίζοντες πᾶν νόημα εἰς τὴν ὑπακοὴν τοῦ Χριστοῦ). (2 Cor 10.2–5)

In this passage, Paul unfolds his anti-sophistic strategy, which is very similar to that of Epictetus:

> To meet sophistic arguments (πρὸς τοὺς σοφιστικοὺς λόγους) we must have the processes of logic and the exercise and the familiarities with these; against the plausibilities of things (πρὸς τὰς τῶν πραγμάτων πιθανότητας) we must have our preconceptions clear, polished like weapons, and ready at hand. (*Dissertationes* 1.27.6)

Paul's concern about the sophistic inclinations of his Corinthian audience also seems to have had an ethical dimension which we have not yet discussed so far. When he writes the Corinthians: 'I fear that when I come again, my God may humble me before you', thus hinting at his poor extempore qualities as a speaker, he continues as follows: 'I may have to mourn over many who previously sinned and have not repented of the impurity, sexual immorality, and licentiousness that they have practised' (2 Cor 12.21). This link between rhetorical sophism and lack of ethical concerns seems also to be established by Plutarch. In his treatise *De recta ratione audiendi*, he equally contrasts sophistic lectures with the purpose of really amending one's life:

> The sincere and single-minded student ought to regard flowery and dainty language and theatrical and spectacular subject matter as the pasturage of drones who practise

> the sophistic lecture; these he should leave alone and use all diligence to sound the deep meaning of the words and the intention of the speaker, drawing from it what is useful and profitable, and remembering that he has not come to a theatre or music-hall, but to a school and classroom *with the purpose of amending his life* by what is there said. (Plutarch, *De recta ratione audiendi* 42A)

True philosophical lectures have ethical implications and these are missing from sophistic lectures. In Plutarch's view, 'in the real pursuits of life they [i.e. the sophists] are small men and rank lower than the average' (43F). The right way of listening to lectures consists in cultivating

> independent thinking along with our learning, so that we may acquire a habit of mind that is not sophistic or bent on acquiring mere information, but one that is deeply ingrained and philosophic, as we may do if we believe that *right listening* is the beginning of *right living*. (48D)[14]

This stress on the decisively ethical nature of non-sophistic lectures is also present in Synesius' comments on Dio Chrysostom's conversion from rhetorical sophism to Stoicism:

> Under full sail he was swept away from the calling of a sophist. (…) he seems to have profited from the Porch in all that pertains to character, and to have become more manly than any person of his own day; furthermore, he applied himself to the task of admonishing mankind (…), to which end he utilized the training in oral expression which he had acquired previously. (Synesius, *Dion* 1; Dio Chrysostom, vol. 5 [Loeb], pp. 364–387 at 372–5)

Interestingly, according to Synesius, it is Dio Chrysostom's conversion which leads him to appreciate the philosophical life of the Jewish Essenes:

> Dio somewhere praises the Essenes, a community of complete happiness, situated beside the Dead Sea in the interior of Palestine somewhere near Sodom itself. For when once he had started on his career as a philosopher and had turned to admonishing mankind, Dio never produced any discourse at all which was fruitless (ὁ γὰρ ἀνὴρ ὅλως, ἐπειδὴ τοῦ φιλοσοφεῖν ἀπήρξατο, καὶ εἰς τὸ νουθετεῖν ἀνθρώπους ἀπέκλινεν, οὐδένα λόγον ἄκαρπον ἐξενήνοχεν). (Synesius, *Dion* 3; Dio Chrysostom, vol. 5 [Loeb], pp. 378–379)

After his conversion, Dio's discourse is no longer fruitless, in an ethical sense, as it used to be when he was a sophist. Judaism (whether the Judaism of the Essenes or Paul's Christian Judaism) and particular philosophical movements such as Stoicism, could be seen as opposed to sophism.

[14] Cf. also Epictetus, *Dissertationes* 3.23.17, for which see Winter 2002, 118–21 at 121.

4.6 Concluding remarks: Paul 'at the cross-roads of Greece'

Paul resembles both Dio Chrysostom and Plutarch in their 'task of admonishing mankind' and in their exhortations to 'right living'. In Corinth these intentions were not so easily put into practice, as Paul was misunderstood as a sophistic speaker. Paul deliberately settled in Corinth for a period of one and a half years (Acts 18.11). His choice of Corinth may have been motivated by the same observation as the Cynic philosopher Diogenes made, according to Dio Chrysostom, when settling down at Corinth in the 4th cent. BC:

> For he observed that large numbers gathered at Corinth on account of the harbours and the hetaerae, and because the city was situated as it were at the cross-roads of Greece. Accordingly, just as the good physician should go and offer his services where the sick are most numerous, so, said he, the man of wisdom should take up his abode where fools are thickest in order to convict them of their folly and reprove them. (Dio Chrysostom, *Orationes* 8.4–5)

The way in which Dio Chrysostom describes Diogenes also reflects Dio's own views on the antithesis between sophism and philosophy.[15]

That Paul applies this same antithesis need not surprise us. Paul came from Tarsus, a Cilician town whose inhabitants Strabo, immediately prior to Paul, singles out for their devotion 'not only to philosophy, but also to the whole round of education in general'. In this, Strabo adds, perhaps not without exaggeration, Tarsus surpasses 'Athens, Alexandria, or any other place that can be named where there have been schools and lectures of philosophers'. He also mentions the fact that the city has 'all kinds of schools of rhetoric' (*Geography* 14.5.12–15). The antithesis between rhetoric and philosophy will have been known to Paul.[16] He comes to express it fully within his own theology, when, in Corinth, he comes into full competition with the sophistic movement.

In Paul's time, Corinth – destroyed by the Romans in 146 BC and rebuilt as a Roman colony – was still in the process of re-establishing its Greek past and its position within Greek networks. Corinth's repute from the past gave it high potential for being successfully re-Hellenized. For this reason, sophists at Corinth would have been particularly fierce and competitive in jostling for rank, and it is no wonder that it is especially here in Paul's correspondence that the sophistic movement becomes visible. As we shall see over the next chapters, it seems to be this atmosphere which prompted Paul to develop an anthropology which was based not on outward but inner values, which were shaped in 'the inner man' and set off an inner transformation.

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[15] Cf. Winter 2002, 123–4.

[16] On the likelihood that Paul profited from a training at Tarsus, see now Vegge 2006, § 10.1, 457–62.

Chapter 5

The Two Types of Man in Philo and Paul: The Anthropological Trichotomy of Spirit, Soul and Body

Introduction

Today probably the best known expression of philosophical anthropology in Antiquity is Plato's differentiation between body and soul.[1] It is perhaps less well-known that already in Plato the features of a tripartite anthropology shine through alongside this dichotomic anthropology. What is virtually unknown, however, is that by the first century AD this tripartite anthropology, which distinguishes between mind, soul and body, was being received and reworked by Jewish and Jewish-Christian authors such as Philo, Paul and Flavius Josephus. Especially for Philo and Paul, this type of anthropology, reshaped by their Jewish interpretation, strongly coloured their understanding of man.

The further differentiation of soul into soul and mind already takes place, if only incipiently, in Plato. In several passages Plato points out that mind (νοῦς) is a quality of the soul (ψυχή): mind (νοῦς) is one of the good aspects of the soul, together with other virtues such as courage (ἀνδρεία) and self-restraint (σωφροσύνη) (*Philebus* 55b).[2] In Plato's *Phaedrus*, the mind even rises to prominence within the soul, since it is called 'the pilot of the soul', the ψυχῆς κυβερνήτης (*Phaedrus* 247c).

In a cosmological context, Plato remarks that the 'by no means feeble cause which orders and arranges years and seasons and months' is justly called 'mind' (*nous*) and that this mind could never come into being without soul (*psychē*)[3]: 'in the nature of Zeus you would say that a kingly soul (*psychē*) and a kingly mind (*nous*) were implanted (…). It confirms the utterances of those who declared of old that mind (*nous*) always rules the universe' (*Philebus* 30c–d). In the *Cratylus*, these utterances are attributed to Anaxagoras: 'Do you not believe the doctrine of Anaxagoras, that it is mind (*nous*) and soul (*psychē*) which orders and holds the nature of all things?' (*Cratylus* 400a). According to Plato, it is the cosmic soul,

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[1] On the mind-body dichotomy in Plato, see, e.g., Robinson 2002.

[2] For mind as a quality of the soul, see further *Laws* XII 961d, 967b.

[3] Cf. *Timaeus* 46c: 'the one and only existing thing which has the property of acquiring *nous* is Soul'.

'in conjunction with mind', which 'runs aright and always governs all things rightly and happily' (*Laws* X 896d–897b). In his *Timaeus*, Plato clearly locates this cosmic mind within the cosmic soul, which is again constructed within the body of the cosmos: 'mind cannot possibly belong to any apart from soul. So because of this reflection He [i. e. the Demiurge] constructed mind within soul and soul within body as He fashioned the All. (…) This cosmos has verily come into existence as a living creature endowed with soul and mind' (*Timaeus* 30b–c).

Implicitly, then, Plato states here that a living human being also consists of mind, soul and body. The dominance of the mind within this tripartite anthropology is confirmed by the above passage from the *Phaedrus*, where Plato explicitly calls it 'the pilot of the soul'. In this way, already in Plato the outline of a tripartite anthropology begins to emerge.[4] The aim of this chapter is to show how this trichotomy was adopted by Philo and Paul, Jews living in the first century AD, and how they reworked it on the basis of the Jewish scriptures.

In Paul, these anthropological views on the constitution of man are unfolded in a notoriously difficult chapter of his first letter to the Corinthians, the well-known passage on the nature of the post-resurrection body (1 Cor 15). Paul had briefly expressed his view on man's trichotomous constitution prior to that, as we shall see (in 1 Thess 5.23), but it is in 1 Cor 15 that he has reason to expound his views on the issue and it is here that we can grasp the full range of his thought. In this chapter, Paul gives us an insight into his anthropological views by distinguishing between 'the first man' (ὁ πρῶτος ἄνθρωπος), Adam, and 'the second man' (ὁ δεύτερος ἄνθρωπος), Christ.

Following a quotation from the narrative about the creation of man in Genesis 2.7 LXX, which tells of God blowing into man's face a breath of life by which man 'became a living soul' (καὶ ἐνεφύσησεν εἰς τὸ πρόσωπον αὐτοῦ πνοὴν ζωῆς, καὶ ἐγένετο ὁ ἄνθρωπος εἰς ψυχὴν ζῶσαν), the 'first man' is identified as 'soul' (ψυχή) and, for that reason, is regarded as belonging to the sphere of 'that which is psychic' (τὸ ψυχικόν). The 'second man', however, is identified as 'spirit' (πνεῦμα) and belongs to 'that which is pneumatic' (τὸ πνευματικόν). The first man, moreover, is characterized as 'earthly' (χοϊκός), whereas the second man is depicted as 'from heaven' (ἐξ οὐρανοῦ) and 'heavenly' (ἐπουράνιος). The first man has a 'psychic body' (σῶμα ψυχικόν), whereas the second man possesses a 'pneumatic body' (σῶμα πνευματικόν). Their bodily status seems to differ in accordance with their characterization as 'psychic' and 'pneumatic' respectively. Until now, according to Paul, we have worn the image of the earthly man, and only after the resurrection shall we (fully) wear the image of the heavenly man – καὶ καθὼς ἐφορέσαμεν τὴν εἰκόνα τοῦ χοϊκοῦ, φορέσομεν καὶ τὴν

[4] Scholars have pointed out that this incipient trichotomic anthropology is boosted by Aristotle who clearly distinguished between mind and soul. See, e. g., Dillon 2001, 36–7; Roig Lanzillotta 2005, 445–7.

εἰκόνα τοῦ ἐπουρανίου (1 Cor 15.44–49). It is important to note that in the last part of this passage, too, Paul alludes to the creation narrative, this time not to Gen 2.7 but to Gen 1.26–27 which speaks about the image (εἰκών) in which man was created. Although Paul's prime concern in this section on the resurrection is the bodily status of man before and after the resurrection, his full anthropological views can easily be discerned, although they remain difficult to understand in the absence of analogies.

There is general consensus in current scholarship that the earthly, 'psychic' and the heavenly, 'pneumatic' pair distinguished in 1 Cor 15 does not derive from proto-Gnosticism.[5] Considerable debate continues, however, about the relevance of Philo's differentiation between the two types of man, a heavenly and an earthly man, for a proper understanding of 1 Cor 15. Most of those who do regard Philo's writings as relevant for discerning the meaning of 1 Cor 15 construe a *difference* between Paul and Philo, assuming that Paul is in fact arguing *against* a Corinthian version of the two types of man anthropology also known from Philo.[6] On this understanding, Paul's Corinthian opponents are 'Philonic'. This argument is based on the fact that Paul seems to deliberately invert Philo's sequence of the first, pneumatic-heavenly man and the second, psychic-earthly man: 'Observe, the pneumatic does not come first but the psychic, and only subsequently the pneumatic' – ἀλλ' οὐ πρῶτον τὸ πνευματικὸν ἀλλὰ τὸ ψυχικόν, ἔπειτα τὸ πνευματικόν (1 Cor 15.46). This line is read as an expression of Pauline polemic against a Philonic, ontological priority of the ideal, heavenly man over the earthly man – a priority which, it is believed, is deliberately reversed by Paul. The ontological priority is turned into a chronological order in which the earthly man comes first and is followed, eschatologically, by the heavenly man, who comes last.[7]

In this chapter I wish to show, however, that Philo (see § 5.1) and Paul (§ 5.2) do not differ in their understanding of the heavenly and earthly man, but both adopt the same tripartite anthropology which distinguishes between body, *psychē* and *pneuma*. Philo, too, is of the opinion that man has become subject to degeneration because he lost the pneumatic-noetic part of his soul and turned into a merely psychic being. For this reason, the psychic man should be restored to his original ideal, the pneumatic, heavenly man. This transition from psychic to pneumatic man is fundamentally identical to that in Paul. Both thinkers develop a soteriological tripartite anthropology which aims at man's re-spiritualization. We shall first look in detail at Philo's view on the relation between the heavenly and earthly man at creation, as expressed in his exegesis of the creation narratives of

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[5] For a profound criticism of a Gnosticizing interpretation of Philo's notion of the heavenly man, see Wedderburn 1973, esp. 301, 310–11, 323–6.

[6] For an extensive bibliography on those 'who argue that the Corinthians with whom Paul argues are significantly guided by a Philonic type of thinking', see Hay 2004, 127n1.

[7] Cf. a similar critical reconstruction of these common views in Schaller 2004, 149–51.

Gen 1–2 (§ 5.1.1). Subsequently, we shall focus on Philo's thoughts about the degeneration of man (§ 5.1.2), to be followed by his views on the restoration of man (§ 5.1.3). Finally, we shall compare Philo's view of the two types of man with that of Paul as developed in 1 Cor (§ 5.2).

5.1 Philo on the two types of man

5.1.1 The relation between the heavenly and earthly man at creation

(a) Double creation – Gen 1 & 2

Before we look at Philo's interpretation of the creation of man, and at his detailed views on the anthropological constitution of man, it is important to examine the general framework of Philo's understanding of creation in Gen 1–2. In Paul we have already encountered two important anthropological passages from Gen 1 and 2 respectively. According to Gen 1.26–27 LXX, man was created 'in the image of God' (1 Cor 15.49); Gen 2.7 LXX tells how 'God formed man by taking clay from the earth, and breathed into his face the breath (πνοή) of life, so that he became a living soul' (1 Cor 15.45).

As we have already briefly seen in § 1.2 above, the same key passages from Gen 1–2 are constitutive for Philo's anthropology (see § 1.2.5). The creation of man in Gen 1 is taken as the creation of the *heavenly man*, whereas Gen 2 is understood as an account of the creation of the *earthly man*. In Philo's Platonizing interpretation, the creation in Gen 1 is about the creation of the *invisible*, ideal, 'archetypical' man, whose *visible* creation is then narrated in Gen 2 – a double creation. Gen 1, in Philo's view, still concerns the design phase, the creation of models, as he says explicitly:

> He [God] conceived beforehand *the models* of its parts, and (…) out of these He constituted and brought to completion *a world discernible only by the mind*, and then, with that for a pattern, the world which our senses can perceive. (*De opificio mundi* 19)

The remark at the beginning of Gen 2, 'Thus the heavens and the earth and everything in them were completed' (Gen 2.1), is understood as a remark about the completion of the ideal, paradigmatic world, on the pattern of which the visible world was created:

> He [Moses] does not say that either the individual mind or the particular sense-perception have reached completion, but that *the originals* (ἀλλ᾽ ἰδέας …) have done so, that of mind and that of sense-perception. (*Legum allegoriarum libri* 1.1)

Philo's reading of Gen 1 and 2 is not entirely the product of his own Platonizing interpretation. The LXX text of Gen 1.1–2 already speaks of the earth as 'invisible', ἀόρατος, thus suggesting a Platonic interpretation of the first creation

account of Gen 1 in terms of the creation of a paradigmatic, true reality, to be followed by the creation of a visible reality, narrated in Gen 2.[8]

(b) The heavenly man – Gen 1.26–27

It is within this framework that Philo understands the creation of the heavenly and the earthly man. According to Philo, the creation of the former is the subject of Gen 1.26–27, which speaks of God's deliberations to 'make human beings in our image, after our likeness': Ποιήσωμεν ἄνθρωπον κατ' εἰκόνα ἡμετέραν καὶ καθ' ὁμοίωσιν. Philo's understanding of Gen 1.26–27, about man's creation in God's image and after his likeness, was already studied above in §§ 1.2 ('image') and 2.3.2 ('likeness'). This passage from Gen 1 formed the basis for Philo's image of God anthropology, which we shall briefly rehearse here before commenting in detail on his spirit anthropology, which is based on Gen 2.7. Philo comments on the phrase 'after the image of God and after His likeness' as follows:

> After all the rest (…), man was created after the image of God and after His likeness (Gen 1.26). (…) nothing earth-born is more like God than man. Let no one represent the likeness as one to a bodily form (…). No, it is in respect of the Mind, the sovereign element of the soul, that the word image is used; for after the pattern of a single Mind (…) the mind in each of those who successively came into being was moulded. (*De opificio mundi* 69)

Philo explains that the common denominator between man and God, which establishes the likeness between them, is the mind (νοῦς), which he calls 'the sovereign element of the soul'. The underlying view is that man consists of three parts – body, soul, and mind, as becomes clear from the following comparison:

> For indeed the wise man is the first of the human race, as a pilot in a ship or a ruler in a city or a general in war, or again as a soul in a body and a mind in a soul (καὶ ψυχὴ μὲν ἐν σώματι, νοῦς δ' ἐν ψυχῇ), or, once again, as heaven in the world or God in heaven. (*De Abrahamo* 272)

The basic distinction is that between body and soul, but within the soul the dominating principle is that of the mind, which rules the lower, irrational soul, made up of the senses:

> The soul (…) is a whole consisting of two parts, the rational and irrational, as if it were a property shared by two persons, who have partitioned it out between them. One class has taken as its portion the rational part, that is the mind (νοῦς); the other has taken the irrational, which is subdivided into the senses. (*De specialibus legibus* 1.333)

[8] This is how Gen 1–2 was interpreted by Philo and Clement of Alexandria, but also by John the Evangelist, as his terminology of 'the true light' indicates. See Van Kooten 2005.

Mind is what God and man have in common. At the level of man, mind is located in the top part of the soul, and modelled on the single Mind of God:

> After the pattern of a single Mind (…), the mind in each of those who successively came into being was moulded. (*De opificio mundi* 69)

As a consequence, man is indeed closer to God than is anything else created on earth:

> But man, the best of living creatures, through that higher part of his being, namely, the soul, is most nearly akin (…) to the Father of the world, possessing in his mind (νοῦς) a closer likeness and copy than anything else on earth of the eternal and blessed Archetype. (*De decalogo* 134)

This is what constitutes the likeness between God and man. Our reason is modelled on the divine reason (*logos*) and, for that reason, is not itself 'the image of God', but is created 'in, or after the image'. There are two forms of reason (*logoi*):

> One is the archetypal reason (*logos*) above us, the other the copy of it which we possess. Moses calls the first the 'image of God', the second the cast of that image. For God, he says, made man not 'the image of God' but 'after the image' (Gen 1.27). And thus the mind (νοῦς) in each of us, which in the true and full sense is the 'man', is an expression at third hand from the Maker, while between them is the Logos which serves as model for our reason, but itself is the representation of God. (*Quis rerum divinarum heres sit* 230–231)

In this view, (the cast of) the divine image is born within the upper part of the soul, the mind, mediated by the Logos by which it is shaped.

> For a man's soul is a precious thing, and when it departs to seek another home, all that will be left behind is defiled, deprived as it is of the divine image. For it is the mind (νοῦς) of man which has the form of God, being shaped in conformity with the ideal archetype, the Logos that is above all. (*De specialibus legibus* 3.207)

At this point, let me draw attention to the broad similarities with several aspects of Paul's anthropology in 1 Cor: (a) the same ascending hierarchy of man – Logos / Christ – God is found in 1 Cor 11: 'every man has Christ for his head', and 'Christ's head is God' (11.3). Within this hierarchy, 'man is the image of God, and the mirror of his glory' (11.7). This implies that this image and glory are mediated through Christ. (b) The mediating role of Christ (Philo's Logos) in the creation of man is also explicitly expressed in 1 Cor 8: 'there is one Lord, Jesus Christ, through whom are all things, and we exist through him' (8.6). As the preposition 'through' in the formula 'through him' should be taken against the background of the language of prepositional metaphysics, as G. E. Sterling has convincingly argued,[9] Christ's role is indeed that of Philo's paradigmatic

[9] Sterling 1997.

Logos on which the human mind is modelled. (c) For this reason, it can scarcely be a coincidence that Christians not only possess a human *nous* (1 Cor 1.10) but are also said to possess 'the *nous* of Christ': ἡμεῖς δὲ νοῦν Χριστοῦ ἔχομεν (1 Cor 2.16). This is not just a manner of speaking, but makes sense if indeed, in Philo's wording 'it is the mind (νοῦς) of man which has the form of God, being shaped in conformity with the ideal archetype, the Logos that is above all' (*De specialibus legibus* 3.207). It seems that Paul and Philo share basic anthropological convictions. This shall become clearer as we now address Philo's view on the creation of the earthly man and his composition.

(c) The earthly man – Gen 2.7

Although the creation of the heavenly man does indeed precede that of the earthly man, it is important to understand that Philo, without exception, calls the *earthly* man 'the *first* man', ὁ πρῶτος ἄνθρωπος. As in Paul, 'the first man' means 'the first man fashioned'. Despite many scholarly claims to the contrary,[10] the expression 'the first man' in Philo does *not* refer to the heavenly man.[11] The first insight which will transpire from a close reading of Philo's passages on the creation of the earthly man is that Philo and Paul use the expression 'the first man' in the same sense. The second insight is that, for their views on the constitution of the first man, both authors equally focus on Gen 2.7 LXX, the text about God breathing his breath into man: καὶ ἔπλασεν ὁ θεὸς τὸν ἄνθρωπον χοῦν ἀπὸ τῆς γῆς καὶ ἐνεφύσησεν εἰς τὸ πρόσωπον αὐτοῦ πνοὴν ζωῆς, καὶ ἐγένετο ὁ ἄνθρωπος εἰς ψυχὴν ζῶσαν – 'And God moulded the man of dust from the earth and blew into his face a breath of life, and man became a living soul (ψυχή)'. This passage serves as the basis for Philo's spirit anthropology, on which we shall focus in this chapter (for a brief indication of the overlap between Philo's image and spirit anthropologies, see already § 1.2.5 above).

We shall look at two extensive passages in Philo about the constitution of the first man, one from *De opificio mundi*, the other from *Legum allegoriarum libri*. The first passage will be of help in establishing the meaning of 'the first man' in Philo, the second in drawing a more detailed outline of Philo's anthropology.

(i) Taking his starting point in Gen 2.7, Philo first points out the difference between the creation of the heavenly man, already narrated in Gen 1.26–27, and that of the earthly man:

[10] For such claims, see, e.g., Sellin 1986; cf. Betz 2001, 51n32.

[11] Cf. Schaller 2004, 149: 'Macht man sich die – nicht einmal große – Mühe, den philonischen Sprachgebrauch zu verfolgen, dann zeigt sich, dass bei Philo an keiner einzigen Stelle der himmlische, "der pneumatische Urmensch" als ὁ πρῶτος ἄνθρωπος bezeichnet wird. Das wird zwar in der Forschung immer wieder behauptet, trifft aber nicht zu. Erst in späteren gnostischen Texten lässt sich dieser Gebrauch nachweisen. Im philonischen Schrifftum selbst begegnet ὁ πρῶτος ἄνθρωπος durchgehend als *terminus technicus* für den irdischen Adam, für den γηγενής'.

> By this also he [Moses] shows very clearly that there is a vast difference between the man thus formed [as described in Gen 2.7] and the man that came into existence earlier after the image of God [as described in Gen 1.26–27]. (*De opificio mundi* 134)

Whereas 'he that was after the (divine) image' was by nature incorruptible (ἄφθαρτος), the earthly man, who consists of body and soul, is by nature mortal (θνητός). The formation of the latter is 'the formation of the individual man'. In his description of this formation Philo replaces the LXX term 'breath' (πνοή; Gen 2.7 LXX) with πνεῦμα, which better suits his anthropological interest. The formation of the earthly man is

> a composite one made up of earthly substance and of divine breath [πνεῦμα, rather than the πνοή of Gen 2.7 LXX]; for it says that the body was made through the Artificer taking clay and moulding out of it a human form, but that the soul was originated from nothing created whatever, but from the Father and Ruler of all: for that which He breathed in was nothing other than a Divine breath (πνεῦμα θεῖον) that migrated hither from that blissful and happy existence. (*De opificio mundi* 135)

Having alluded to Gen 2.7, Philo states that 'that first man (ἐκεῖνος δ' ὁ πρῶτος ἄνθρωπος), earthborn (ὁ γηγενής), ancestor of our whole race, was made (…) most excellent in each part of his being, in both soul and body' (*De opificio mundi* 136). Philo proposes several reasons why the first man was excellent both in soul and body. The Creator excelled in skill to bestow on man a body with a beautiful form, 'desiring the first man (τὸν πρῶτον ἄνθρωπον) to be as fair as could be to behold' (138). But also the soul of the first man was most excellent:

> For the Creator (…) employed for its making no pattern taken from among created things, but solely, as I have said, His own Word / Reason (*logos*). It is on this account that he says that man was made a likeness and imitation of the Word (*logos*), when the Divine Breath was breathed [ἐμπνευσθέντα, a form of the verb ἐμπνέω, instead of the verb ἐμφυσάω, 'to blow in', in Gen 2.7 LXX] into his face (…). Such was the first man (ὁ πρῶτος ἄνθρωπος) created, as I think, in body and soul (κατά τε σῶμα καὶ ψυχὴν), surpassing all the men that now are. (*De opificio mundi* 139–140)

In this passage Philo also links the creation of the heavenly man with that of the earthly man and shows how they relate from the perspective of the latter (cf. § 1.2.5 above). When the divine *pneuma* is breathed into the face of the first man (Gen 2.7) he is made a likeness of the divine image (Gen 1.26–27), the Logos. This interconnection between the two men is also highlighted elsewhere in Philo's oeuvre, in a passage in which Philo criticizes the Aristotelian view 'that our human mind (*nous*) is a particle of the ethereal substance'[12]. This would render

[12] See also Philo, *De specialibus legibus* 4.123: 'And clearly what was then thus breathed (Gen 2.7) was ethereal spirit, or something, if such there be, better than ethereal spirit, even an effulgence of the blessed, thrice blessed nature of the Godhead'; *Legum allegoriarum libri* 3.161: 'The body, then, has been formed out of earth, but the soul is of the upper air'; and *Quod deus sit immutabilis* 46–47: the mind 'was allotted something better and purer, the substance, in fact, out of which divine nature [i. e. the stars] was wrought'.

man only 'a kinship with the upper air', which is still part of creation. Instead, Philo argues, Moses

> likened the fashioning of the reasonable soul (τῆς λογικῆς ψυχῆς τὸ εἶδος) to no created thing, but averred it to be a genuine coinage of that dread Spirit (*pneuma*), signed and impressed by the seal of God, the stamp of which is the eternal Logos. His words are 'God in-breathed [again the verb ἐμπνέω, instead of the LXX verb ἐμφυσάω] into his face a breath of life' (Gen 2.7); so that it cannot but be that he that receives is made in the likeness of Him who sends forth the breath. Accordingly we also read that man has been made after the image of God (Gen 1.26–27), not however after the image of anything created. (*De plantatione* 18–20)[13]

As in *De opificio mundi*, Philo shows how, in his understanding, the creation of the first, earthly man relates to that of the heavenly man: by receiving God's *pneuma* (Gen 2.7) the first man 'is made in the likeness (Gen 1.26–27) of Him who sends forth the *pneuma*'. We also note, in passing, that in Philo, the terminology of 'mind' (*nous*), 'reasonable soul' (*logikē psychē*), and 'spirit' (*pneuma*) are near-synonyms.

What is clear from the extensive passage from *De opificio mundi* is that Philo here understands the phrase 'the first man' in the sense of the 'ancestor of our whole race' (136). Or, as he explicitly says further on in *De opificio mundi*, as 'the man first fashioned' (140 – ὁ πρῶτος διαπλασθεὶς ἄνθρωπος), 'the first-made man' (145 – τοῦ μὲν οὖν πρώτου φύντος ἀνθρώπου …). In this, there is no difference between Philo and Paul. The latter also takes 'the first man' to mean 'the first man, Adam', the ancestor of the entire human race. Despite the fact that Philo uses the expression 'the first man' frequently, he remains consistent in its meaning and application.

There is only one passage in Philo that seems to contravene this otherwise consistent usage. When Philo's interpretation reaches the story of the creation of Eve, and he needs to comment on Gen 2.18, 'It is not good that *any* man should be alone', Philo applies this passage to both men we have so far encountered, the heavenly and the earthly man:

> For there are two races of men, the one made after the (divine) image (Gen 1.26–27), and the one moulded out of the earth (Gen 2.7). For *the man made after the image* it is not good to be alone, because he yearns after the Image (…). Far less is it good for *the man moulded of the earth* to be alone. Nay, it is impossible (…). With *the second man* (τῷ δὲ δευτέρῳ ἀνθρώπῳ) a helper is associated. (*Legum allegoriarum libri* 2.4–5)

In this passage, the earthly man is referred to as 'the second man'. This, however, is no breach of Philo's consistent reference to Adam as 'the first man' but is due

[13] Cf. perhaps also Philo, *Quod deterius potiori insidiari soleat* 90: 'the mind of man … [is] an inseparable portion of that divine and blessed soul'. But it could also be that, as in *Quod deus sit immutabilis* 46–47, Philo has the divine nature of the stars in mind (see previous footnote).

to the specific order of the two men in this specific exposition. 'Second' here clearly means the second of both men which were enumerated in this passage. That Adam is called 'the second man' in this context cannot be used as evidence that, as a matter of fact, 'the first man' is the heavenly man in Philo. The contextual nature of the need to call Adam this time 'the second man' is confirmed by the fact, that further on in Philo's *Legum allegoriarum libri*, Adam is again called 'the first generated [man]', ὁ πρῶτος γενόμενος (2.15). At the same time, it is telling that the passage just discussed is the only instance, in Philo's entire oeuvre, in which he uses the phrase 'the second man'. As the extensive passage from *De opificio mundi* has shown, Philo, like Paul, applies the phrase 'the first man' to the first generated man, Adam. And, as another extensive passage from *Legum allegoriarum libri* will show, again like Paul, Philo refers to the two men as the 'heavenly' and the 'earthly' man respectively. This passage will also deepen our understanding of Philo's anthropology.

(ii) In his *Legum allegoriarum libri*, Philo gives a detailed interpretation of Gen 2.7, 'And God formed man by taking clay from the earth, and breathed into his face a breath (πνοή) of life, and the man became a living soul'. According to Philo,

> There are two types of men; the one a *heavenly* man, the other an *earthly* (διττὰ ἀνθρώπων γένη· ὁ μὲν γάρ ἐστιν οὐράνιος ἄνθρωπος, ὁ δὲ γήϊνος). *The heavenly man*, being made after the image of God (Gen 1.26–27), is altogether without part or lot in corruptible and terrestrial substance; but *the earthly one* was compacted out of matter (…). For this reason he [Moses] says that *the heavenly man* was not moulded, but was stamped with the image of God (Gen 1.26–27); while *the earthly* is a moulded work. (*Legum allegoriarum libri* 1.31)

In his subsequent interpretation of Gen 2.7 proper, Philo rather bluntly states that we 'must account the man made out of the earth εἶναι νοῦν εἰσκρινόμενον σώματι, οὔπω δ' εἰσκεκριμένον, to be mind mingling with, but not yet blended with, body' (1.32). The 'body' is of course implied in the 'clay of the earth', from which the first man was formed (Gen 2.7), but it remains unclear whence Philo derives 'the mind', which he regards as being, at the point of Gen 2.7, in the yet unfinished process of 'mingling with (…) body'. Philo calls this mind the 'earthlike mind'. It is, in all likelihood, the mind which is modelled on the 'heavenlike' mind of the heavenly man, which functions as its archetype. Yet, interestingly, Philo makes clear that, during its formative phase, this earthlike mind is still corruptible as long as it has not yet been breathed into by God:

> But this earthlike mind is in reality also corruptible, were not God to breathe into it a power of real life (ὁ δὲ νοῦς οὗτος γεώδης ἐστὶ τῷ ὄντι καὶ φθαρτός, εἰ μὴ ὁ θεὸς ἐμπνεύσειεν αὐτῷ δύναμιν ἀληθινῆς ζωῆς); when He does so, it no longer undergoes any moulding, but becomes a soul (τότε γὰρ γίνεται … εἰς ψυχήν), not

> an inefficient and imperfectly formed soul, but one endowed with mind and actually alive (ἀλλ' εἰς νοερὰν καὶ ζῶσαν ὄντως). (*Legum allegoriarum libri* 1.32)

This means that at his creation, the first man was breathed into by God. As Philo explains, this expression, 'breathed into',

> implies of necessity three things, (1) that which inbreathes, (2) that which receives, (3) that which is inbreathed: that which inbreathes is God, that which receives is the mind (*nous*), that which is inbreathed is the spirit / breath (*pneuma*). What, then, do we infer from these premises? A union of the three comes about, as God projects the power that proceeds from Himself through the mediant breath till it reaches the subject. (1.37)

From this passage it becomes possible to determine the exact relation between 'mind' (*nous*) and 'spirit' (*pneuma*) in Philo. The 'mind' is the highest part of the soul, as it is in contemporary Greek philosophy: man consists of body and soul, and within the soul the leading part, the *nous*, is differentiated from the lower soul, made up of the senses. This tripartite thinking is adopted by Philo, but under the influence of his exegesis of Gen 2.7 he is able to link the *nous* with the *pneuma*.[14] Properly speaking, the *nous* is not identical with the *pneuma* (*nous* ≠ *pneuma*). Rather the *pneuma* is greater than or equal to the *nous* (*pneuma* ≥ *nous*) because, in Philo's view, it is within the *nous* that the *pneuma* is received; the *nous* is the receptacle. The *nous*, in turn, mediates this *pneuma* to the rest of the soul so that this spirit dominates both *nous* and (the rest of the) *psychē*:

> The mind [is] the dominant element of the soul (ψυχῆς ἡγεμονικόν ἐστιν ὁ νοῦς): into this only does God breathe (τούτῳ μόνῳ ἐμπνεῖ ὁ θεός). (…) the mind imparts to the portion of the soul that is devoid of reason a share of that which it has received from God, so that the mind was besouled by God (ὥστε τὸν μὲν νοῦν ἐψυχῶσθαι ὑπὸ θεοῦ), but the unreasoning part by the mind (τὸ δὲ ἄλογον ὑπὸ τοῦ νοῦ). (*Legum allegoriarum libri* 1.39–40)

If the *nous* is indeed inbreathed by, and filled with the divine *pneuma* it becomes synonymous with the *pneuma*. This shows that Philo not only knows the triad *nous*, *psychē* and *sōma*, in accordance with Greek philosophy, but also, under the influence of his exegesis of Gen 2.7, the similar triad *pneuma*, *psychē* and *sōma*. This latter triad does not occur in Greek philosophers,[15] but is found in Jewish authors such as Philo, Flavius Josephus, and Paul. Its occurrence in Paul will be the subject of § 5.2, but I should like first to look briefly at the situation in Josephus. He, too, appears to understand Gen 2.7 in terms of the dichotomy of

[14] This has also been noted by Festugière 1932, 212–17.

[15] 'Pneuma' does occur in relation to *nous* and *psychē* in *Corpus Hermeticum* X.16, but there *pneuma* is not equivalent with *nous* and not superior but inferior to *psychē* since, as Dillon explains, it is taken 'in the sense of the basic life-force, which forms a sort of "cushion" for the soul when united to a body (the "pneumatic vehicle" of later Platonism)'; Dillon 2001, 42. On the doctrine of the soul's pneumatic vehicle, see Bos 2003, esp. 281–6.

pneuma and *psychē*. In his retelling of the Pentateuch in the *Jewish Antiquities*, Josephus even explicitly inserts the term πνεῦμα in his alleged quotation of Gen 2.7: 'Moses begins to interpret nature, writing on the formation of man in these terms: "God fashioned man by taking dust from the earth and instilled into him πνεῦμα and ψυχή." Now this man was called Adam' (1.34; cf. 3.260).

This shows that the triad *pneuma, psychē* and *sōma*[16] is the Jewish equivalent of the Greek tripartite division of man in terms of *nous, psychē* and *sōma*,[17] which is read from the perspective of Gen 2.7. Since this passage from Genesis is explicitly quoted by Philo, Paul and Josephus, their interpretation seems to reflect a common Jewish understanding of Gen 2.7 LXX in the 1st cent. AD.[18] This is an important finding, I believe, which indicates that the allegedly Gnostic distinction between the pneumatic, psychic and sarkic man (see further below in § 5.2.2) is not a Gnostic invention, but rather a development of this Jewish-Hellenistic interpretation of Gen 2.7 and its consequent tripartization of man.

According to Philo, the reason why God breathes the *pneuma* into the human *nous* is as follows:

> And for what purpose save that we may obtain a conception of him? For how could the soul have conceived of God, had He not breathed into it and mightily laid hold of it? For the mind of man would never have ventured to soar so high as to grasp the nature of God, had not God Himself drawn it up to Himself. (*Legum allegoriarum libri* 1.37–38)

As we have seen, Philo's reflections on the relation between *pneuma* and *nous* are based on his interpretation of Gen 2.7. There is, however, one complication which threatens to blur Philo's exegesis: the fact that the text of Gen 2.7 LXX – as I have already pointed out in passing – does not read *pneuma* ('breath' or 'spirit') but *pnoē* ('breath'). Only here in his *Legum allegoriarum libri* does Philo raise awareness of this textual problem. Everywhere else Philo interprets Gen 2.7 LXX as if the text read *pneuma*. The reason that Philo draws attention to the actual Septuagint reading is that, in his understanding of Gen 1–2, it is only

[16] For another early Christian differentiation between *pneuma* and *psychē*, see the author of Hebrews 4.12 about the word of God 'piercing so deeply that it divides soul and spirit' – διϊκνούμενος ἄχρι μερισμοῦ ψυχῆς καὶ πνεύματος.

[17] For another Jew differentiating between *nous* and *psychē*, see the Jewish author of the *Pseudo-Orphica*, Recension C, lines 11–12: '… and him [God] no one among | Mortals sees *with the soul, but he is seen with the mind*' – οὐδέ τις αὐτὸν εἰσοράᾳ ψυχὴν θνητῶν, νῷ δ' εἰσοράαται (edn Holladay 1996, 194–5).

[18] For pagan philosophical familiarity with Gen 2.7, see Porphyry, *Ad Gaurum* 11: 'the animation takes place after the conception and formation of the body. The theologian of the Hebrews [Moses] also seems to signify this when he says that when the human body was formed, and had received all of its bodily workmanship, God breathed the spirit into it to act as a living soul' – ὅταν πεπλασμένου τοῦ ἀνθρωπίνου σώματος καὶ ἀπειληφότος πᾶσαν τὴν σωματικὴν δημιουργίαν ἐμφυσῆσαι τὸν θεὸν αὐτῷ εἰς ψυχὴν ζῶσαν λέγῃ τὸ πνεῦμα (Stern, No. 466).

in the case of the creation of the earthly man (Gen 2.7), and not in that of the heavenly man (Gen 1.26–27), that Moses seems to speak of the inbreathing of the divine *pneuma*. Given the importance of this *pneuma* it would seem odd that Moses fails to mention it when describing the creation of the *heavenly* man:

> The question might be asked, why God deemed the earthly and body-loving mind (τὸν γηγενῆ καὶ φιλοσώματον νοῦν) worthy of divine breath (ἠξίωσεν … πνεύματος θείου) at all, but not the mind which had been created after the original (τὸν κατὰ τὴν ἰδέαν γεγονότα). (*Legum allegoriarum libri* 1.33).

This question is answered, Philo suggests, when closer scrutiny reveals that Moses, in speaking of the creation of the earthly man, does not speak of the divine *pneuma*, but rather of the divine *pnoē*:

> He uses the word 'breath' (*pnoē*) not 'spirit' (*pneuma*), implying a difference between them; for 'spirit' is conceived of as connoting strength and vigour and power, while a 'breath' is like an air of peaceful and gentle vapour. The mind that was made after the image and original (Gen 1.26–27) might be said to partake of spirit (*pneuma*), for its reasoning faculty possesses robustness; but the mind that was made out of matter (Gen 2.7) must be said to partake of the light and less substantial air. (*Legum allegoriarum libri* 1.42)

In this way, Philo makes sense of the LXX reading 'pnoē' in Gen 2.7 (see already § 1.2.5 [c] above). In his view, the qualitative difference between the mind of the heavenly man and that of the earthly man is reflected in the fact that the latter is said to have received the divine *pnoē*, whereas the former 'might be said to partake of *pneuma*'.[19] In his *Legum allegoriarum libri* Philo offers an unusual, very close reading and interpretation of Gen 2.7. The problem-generating, rather than problem-solving nature of the passage just discussed serves to show that Jewish authors such as Philo did indeed face textual difficulties when they tried to develop the Graeco-Roman trichotomy of *sōma – psychē – nous* into a Jewish trichotomy of *sōma – psychē – pneuma*. Normally, however – in other writings but also elsewhere in his *Legum allegoriarum libri* – Philo does not hesitate to say that God's *pneuma* (not his *pnoē*) was received by the *earthly* man: 'that which inbreathes is God, that which receives is the mind (*nous*), that which is inbreathed is the spirit (*pneuma*)' – τὸ μὲν οὖν ἐμπνέον ἐστὶν ὁ θεός, τὸ δὲ δεχόμενον ὁ νοῦς, τὸ δὲ ἐμπνεόμενον τὸ πνεῦμα (*Legum allegoriarum libri* 1.37).

This is confirmed by many other passages which suggest that it is the divine *pneuma* which is breathed into man. Man is akin (συγγενής) to God,[20] 'since the divine Spirit (*pneuma*) had poured into him in full flow' (*De opificio mundi*

[19] Cf. Philo, *De plantatione* 44: 'the man stamped with the Spirit (…) is after the image of God'.

[20] On the notion of man's kinship (συγγένεια) with God, see Des Places 1964 and Thom 2005, 61, 62–7.

144). The human mind (*nous*) is closely linked to the divine *pneuma*: 'it would be strange if a light substance like the mind (*nous*) were not rendered buoyant and raised to the utmost height by the native force of the divine Spirit (*pneuma*)' (*De plantatione* 24). An interesting case in this respect is a passage in *De specialibus legibus*, in which Gen 2.7 and Gen 1.26–27 are merged into a single view: 'our dominant part [is] the rational *pneuma* within us (ἐν ἡμῖν λογικὸν πνεῦμα), which was shaped according to the archetypal form of the divine image' (1.171).

(d) A third anthropological key text: Lev 17.11 – The soul and the blood

In a special set of passages in Philo, the *pneuma*, as the substance of the *nous*, is clearly and persistently contrasted with the blood, which is considered to be the substance of the rest of the soul. In these passages Philo aims to do justice to what he regards as another important anthropological assertion in the Jewish scriptures, that of Leviticus 17.11: 'the soul of every flesh is his blood' – ἡ γὰρ ψυχὴ πάσης σαρκὸς αἷμα αὐτοῦ ἐστιν. We shall now consider these passages, as the contrast which Philo draws between 'pneuma' on the one hand, and 'flesh' and 'blood' on the other is very similar to Paul's language.

Philo's challenge is to reconcile two different, and seemingly contradictory views on the substance of the soul – (1) that of Gen 2.7, according to which, at least in Philo's understanding, the soul consists of *pneuma*; and (2) that of Lev 17.11, which contends that the soul consists of blood. Philo's solution is to distinguish between two types of soul: the leading part of the soul, the *nous*, and the rest of the soul, which is simply called 'soul'. This is brought out in the following passage in *Quis rerum divinarum heres sit*, which also shows that Philo, in the construction of his anthropology, refers to the three key texts of Gen 1.26–27, Gen 2.7, and Lev 17.11:

> We use 'soul' in two senses (ψυχὴ διχῶς λέγεται), both for the whole soul (ἥ τε ὅλη) and also for its dominant part, which properly speaking is the soul's soul (καὶ τὸ ἡγεμονικὸν αὐτῆς μέρος, ὃ κυρίως εἰπεῖν ψυχὴ ψυχῆς ἐστι). (…) And therefore the lawgiver [Moses] held that the substance of the soul is twofold[21] (ἔδοξε … διττὴν καὶ τὴν οὐσίαν εἶναι ψυχῆς), blood being that of the soul as a whole (αἷμα μὲν τῆς ὅλης), and the divine spirit (*pneuma*) that of its most dominant part (τοῦ δ' ἡγεμονικωτάτου πνεῦμα θεῖον). Thus he says plainly 'the soul of every flesh is the blood' (Lev 17.11). (…) On the other hand he did not make the substance of the mind (τοῦ δὲ νοῦ τὴν οὐσίαν) depend on anything created, but represented it as breathed upon by God (ὑπὸ θεοῦ καταπνευσθεῖσαν). For the Maker of all, he says, 'blew into this face the breath of life, and man became a living soul' (Gen 2.7); just as we

[21] Cf. the term *dipsychos* in James 1.8 and 4.8 which probably also reflects the differentiation between the whole *psychē* (1.21, 5.20) and its dominant part, the *pneuma* (2.26, 4.5). In this I differ from Seitz 1944, 1947, 1958 and Marcus 1982, who understand *dipsychos* primarily against the background of the Hebrew concept of 'double-heartedness'. Cf. also the double nature of man according to Plotinus, *Enneads* 1.2.6; see § 2.2.13 above.

> are also told that he was fashioned after the image of his Maker (Gen 1.26–27). (*Quis rerum divinarum heres sit* 55–56)

The *pneuma* is clearly depicted as the substance of the *nous*, the leading part of man's soul. Basing himself on the three Scriptural passages from Genesis and Leviticus, Philo reaches the following conclusion:

> So we have two kinds of man (ὥστε διττὸν εἶδος ἀνθρώπων), those who live by reason, the divine *pneuma* (τὸ μὲν θείῳ πνεύματι λογισμῷ βιούντων), and those who live by blood and the pleasure of the flesh (τὸ δὲ αἵματι καὶ σαρκὸς ἡδονῇ ζώντων). This last is a moulded clod of earth, the other is the faithful impress of the divine image. (*Quis rerum divinarum heres sit* 57)

As we shall see in due course, Philo's distinction between 'those who live by the divine *pneuma*' and 'those who live by blood and the pleasure of the flesh' resembles that in Paul between the *pneumatikoi* ('those who live by the *pneuma*') on the one hand and the *psychikoi* ('those who live by the lower *psychē*') or the *sarkinoi / sarkikoi* ('those who live by the flesh') on the other (see § 5.2.2 below). Although, as Philo clearly indicates, the substance of the soul is twofold (*Quis rerum divinarum heres sit* 55–56) and consists of *pneuma* (for the *nous*) and blood (for the rest of the soul), the two layers which are as such present in *every* man are nevertheless exemplified in *two distinct types of man* (*Quis rerum divinarum heres sit* 57). 'Those who live by the *pneuma*' have their soul directed by the divine *pneuma* which has been breathed into man's *nous*, whereas 'those who live by the flesh' limit the effectiveness of their soul to its lower part, that of the senses.

This might be a good point to note that, whereas in *Quis rerum divinarum heres sit* Philo distinguishes between *two* types of man, elsewhere, in *De gigantibus*, the tripartite nature of man is made manifest in *three distinct types of man*:

> Some men are earth-born, some heaven-born, and some God-born (οἱ μὲν γῆς, οἱ δὲ οὐρανοῦ, οἱ δὲ θεοῦ γεγόνασιν ἄνθρωποι). The earth-born are those who take the pleasures of the body (σῶμα) for their quarry (…). The heaven-born are the votaries of the arts and of knowledge, the lovers of learning. For the heavenly element in us is the mind (τὸ γὰρ οὐράνιον τῶν ἐν ἡμῖν ὁ νοῦς), as the heavenly beings are each of them a mind. (…) But the men of God are priests and prophets who (…) have risen wholly above the sphere of sense-perception and have been translated into the world of the intelligible (τὸ δὲ αἰσθητὸν πᾶν ὑπερκύψαντες εἰς τὸν νοητὸν κόσμον μετανέστησαν). (…) But the sons of earth have turned the steps of mind out of the path of reason (οἱ δὲ γῆς παῖδες τὸν νοῦν ἐκβιβάσαντες τοῦ λογίζεσθαι) and transmuted it into the soulless and inert nature of the flesh (καὶ μεταλλοιώσαντες εἰς τὴν ἄψυχον καὶ ἀκίνητον σαρκῶν φύσιν). (*De gigantibus* 60–61, 65)

This passage, together with the combined evidence of the previous passage from *Quis rerum divinarum heres sit*, shows that Philo's tripartition of man develops into a theory of three kinds of man.[22] As Dillon has shown, this scheme of three

[22] Cf. Mendelson 1982, chap. 3 on 'Philo's typology of mankind', esp. §§ 3.1 and 3.2.

classes of man predates but is essentially similar to schemes in ancient philosophers such as Plutarch (*De genio Socratis* 591D–592C) and Plotinus (*Enneads* 5.9.1), schemes which have also been adopted in Gnostic anthropology (Clement of Alexandria, *Excerpta ex Theodoto* 54; see further § 5.2.2 below).[23] One illustration of the similarity between Philo and Plutarch can be found in the latter's *De genio Socratis*:

> Every soul partakes of *nous* (ψυχὴ πᾶσα νοῦ μετέσχεν); none is irrational or unintelligent. But the portion of the soul that mingles with the flesh (ἀλλ' ὅσον ἂν αὐτῆς σαρκὶ μιχθῇ) and passions suffers alteration and becomes in the pleasures and pains it undergoes irrational. Not every soul mingles to the same extent: some sink entirely into the body (ἀλλ' αἱ <μὲν> ὅλαι κατέδυσαν εἰς σῶμα) (…). Others mingle in part, but leave outside what is purest in them. This is not dragged in with the rest, but is like a buoy attached to the top, floating on the surface in contact with the man's head, while he is as it were submerged in the depths (…). Now the part carried submerged in the body is called soul (τὸ μὲν οὖν ὑποβρύχιον ἐν τῷ σώματι φερόμενον ψυχὴ λέγεται), whereas the part left free from corruption is called by the multitude the *nous* (τὸ δὲ φθορᾶς λειφθὲν οἱ πολλοὶ νοῦν καλοῦντες ἐντὸς εἶναι). (*De genio Socratis* 591D–E)

On this basis, Plutarch distinguishes between three classes of man. In ascending order, (1) 'the souls that sink entirely into the body' (591F); (2) the souls that do not coincide with their bodies but have difficulty in pulling on 'the tie which is like a bridle inserted into the irrational part of the soul' (592B); (3) and the souls that really 'possess *nous*' (591F). This differentiation between various types of man can clearly be recognized in the passages from Philo examined above – the three types of man in *De gigantibus*, and the two types of man in *Quis rerum divinarum heres sit.* In Philo, the difference between the highest type of man and the lower one is buttressed by his references to Gen 2.7 and Lev 17.11 respectively: whereas *pneuma* is the substance of the *nous*, blood is the substance of the (lower, irrational) *psychē* which is devoid of *pneuma*.

In another similar passage dealing with Lev 17.11, Philo states: 'the fleshly nature (ἡ σαρκῶν φύσις) has received no share of mind (νοῦς)'. Man is a 'living creature with two natures (τὸ διφυὲς ζῷον)'; he is a 'composite mass', which consists of (1) 'the highest form in which life shows itself', the mind (*nous*), reason or spirit (*pneuma*), 'that God-like creation with which we reason', whose 'nourishment [is] celestial and imperishable (ἄφθαρτος), not perishable (φθαρτός) and earthly', and of (2) 'the fleshly nature', whose life is the blood (Lev 17.11) (*Quod deterius potiori insidiari soleat* 83–85).

This lower part of the soul, as another passage makes clear, is the soul which 'gives the life which we and the irrational animals possess in common' and 'op-

[23] Dillon 2001, 40–1 with 40n22.

erates through the senses'.[24] This passage merits quoting in full because it combines various important notions outlined so far. The divine *pneuma* is clearly depicted as the substance of the mind. And at the same time, the 'first man' unambiguously stands for the 'founder of our race', Adam:

> Blood is prohibited for the reason which I have mentioned that it is the essence of the soul (Lev 17.11), not of the intelligent and reasonable soul, but of that which operates through the senses (οὐσία ψυχῆς ἐστίν – οὐχὶ τῆς νοερᾶς καὶ λογικῆς ἀλλὰ τῆς αἰσθητικῆς), the soul that gives the life which we and the irrational animals possess in common. For the essence or substance of that other soul is divine spirit (*pneuma*), a truth vouched for by Moses especially, who in his story of the creation says that God breathed a breath of life upon the first man (ἀνθρώπῳ τῷ πρώτῳ) (Gen 2.7), the founder of our race (καὶ ἀρχηγέτῃ τοῦ γένους ἡμῶν), into the lordliest part of his body, the face, where the senses are stationed like bodyguards to the great king, the mind (*nous*). (*De specialibus legibus* 4.123)

The *pneuma*, then, is the substance of the human *nous*, as other passages confirm:

> Now the divine Spirit is the substance of the rational (part) according to the theologian [i. e. Moses], for in (the account of) the creation of the world, he says, 'He breathed the breath of life into his face' (as) his cause. But blood is the substance of the sense-perceptive and vital (soul) (…). (…) the substance of the soul is truly and infallibly spirit. (*Quaestiones in Genesim* 2.59)

Before we come to the next section, on the disintegration and downfall of man, it is important to underline that what we have seen of Philo's anthropology in key passages presented so far is confirmed in many other, often short passages in which his anthropological views come to the surface. Despite their brevity, we can recognize in them the anthropology outlined above. In these passages Philo differentiates between 'a man, this compound animal in which soul and body are woven or intertwined or mingled (use any word you will)', the earthly man of Gen 2.7, and 'the mind pure and unalloyed', the heavenly man of Gen 1.26–27 (*De ebrietate* 101). The heavenly man is called 'the real man', the Philonic equivalent of the Platonic concept of the inner man, as we shall see in § 7.2 (see § 7.2.2 [e]); this man 'is absolutely pure mind (νοῦς καθαρώτατος)', 'he who is man in the special sense', 'that invisible reasoning faculty free from admixture' whereas the earthly man is the 'man so-called, one that has an ad-

[24] For the differentiation of the soul into (a) a rational and intelligent soul and (b) a sense-perceptive and vital soul, see also Philo's *Quaestiones in Genesim* 2.59, a commentary on Gen 9.4 ('Flesh in the blood of the life you shall not eat'): 'the blood is the substance of the soul, but of the sense-perceptive and vital soul, not of that which is called (soul) *katexochen*, (namely) that which is rational and intelligent. For there are three parts of the soul: one is nutritive, another is sense-perceptive, and the third is rational'. See also *De specialibus legibus* 3.99: 'the baser kind of soul, the irrational, which the beasts also share', as opposed to reason, 'the better part of the soul'; without the latter, man is 'transformed into the nature of a beast, even though the outward characteristics of his body still retain their human form'.

mixture of sense-perception', he 'in whom an irrational and rational nature are woven together' (*De fuga et inventione* 70–72). Consequently, 'the mind (…) is the real man in us' (*De plantatione* 42); it is 'the man within the man, the better part within the worse, the immortal within the mortal' (*De congressu eruditionis gratia* 97), 'the man in us, the ruling mind' (*De somniis* 2.267), 'the invisible man', 'the veritable man' (*Quod omnis probus liber sit* 111).

In some passages Philo focuses only on the basic dichotomy between body and soul:

> For there are two things of which we consist, soul and body. The body, then, has been formed out of earth, but the soul is of the upper air, a particle detached from the Deity: 'For God breathed into his face a breath of life, and man became a living soul' (Gen 2.7). (*Legum allegoriarum libri* 3.161)

In other passages Philo is more detailed in his description of man and distinguishes between the soul and its leading part, the mind: 'To crown all (…) He made man and bestowed on him mind *par excellence*, the soul of the soul (νοῦν ἐξαίρετον ἐδωρεῖτο, ψυχῆς τινα ψυχὴν)' (*De opificio mundi* 66). This mind, 'the ruling part of the soul' (*De somniis* 2.207), is 'a fragment of the Deity':

> Among created things, that which is holy is, in the universe, the heavens (…); in man it is mind, a fragment of the Deity (νοῦς, ἀπόσπασμα θεῖον ὤν), as the words of Moses in particular bear witness, 'He breathed into his face a breath of life, and man became a living soul' (Gen 2.7). (*De somniis* 1.34)

In some passages Philo even distinguishes between three layers within the soul:

> Our soul, we are told, is tripartite, having one part assigned to the mind and reason, one to the spirited element and one to the appetites – τριμεροῦς ἡμῶν τῆς ψυχῆς ὑπαρχούσης τὸ μὲν νοῦς καὶ λόγος, τὸ δὲ θυμός, τὸ δὲ ἐπιθυμία κεκληρῶσθαι λέγεται. (*De confusione linguarum* 21).

This is a further differentiation of the human soul under the influence of Plato's *Timaeus*:

> They [i. e. the philosophers] had made researches into the nature of the soul and observed that its components were threefold: reason, high spirit and desire (τὸ μὲν λόγου, τὸ δὲ θυμοῦ, τὸ δ' ἐπιθυμίας). (*De specialibus legibus* 4.92; cf. Plato, *Timaeus* 69c–e)[25]

[25] See further Philo, *Legum allegoriarum libri* 1.70: 'our soul is threefold, and has one part that is the seat of reason, another that is the seat of high spirit, and another that is the seat of desire: ἐστὶν ἡμῶν τριμερὴς ἡ ψυχὴ καὶ ἔχει μέρος τὸ μὲν λογικόν, τὸ δὲ θυμικόν, τὸ δὲ ἐπιθυμητικόν'; and cf. also *De somniis* 1.25. On this tripartition in Philo, see Whittaker 1996. For reflections on 'the truth of tripartition' of the soul in Plato, see Burnyeat 2006*b*. For the tripartite soul in Plato, see, e. g., *Timaeus* 69c–e, 87a, 89e–90d.

In these passages, the differentiation between, on the one hand, the mind (*nous*) and reason (*logos*), and, on the other, the faculties of the lower soul are still discernible.

Now we have seen the manifold expressions of Philo's anthropological views, I shall demonstrate that, according to Philo, man has been subject to degeneration because the pneumatic-noetic part of his soul has been lost. For this reason, the soul (i. e. the lower soul) should be restored to its original archetype, the heavenly man.

5.1.2 The degeneration and fall of man

Speaking about the current descendants of the first earthly man, Philo is both positive and critical. Having described 'the beauty of the first-made man (Τοῦ μὲν οὖν πρώτου φύντος ἀνθρώπου τὸ … κάλλος) in each part of his being, in soul and body', Philo remarks:

> It could not but be that his descendants, partaking as they did in the original form in which he was formed, should preserve marks, though faint ones, of their kinship with their first father. Now what is this kinship? Every man, in respect of his mind (διάνοια), is allied to the divine Reason, having come into being as a copy or fragment or ray of that blessed nature. (*De opificio mundi* 145–146)

Despite this positive resemblance between us and the first earthly man, in other passages Philo stresses the degeneration and fall of man. This degeneration is partly due to natural developments since creation. In this Philo follows particular views on the physical degeneration of the world and its inhabitants due to the ageing of the world (*mundus senescens*).[26] According to Philo,

> Such was the first man created, as I think, in body and soul, surpassing all the men that now are, and all that have been before us. (…) the man first fashioned was clearly the bloom of our entire race, and never have his descendants attained the like bloom, forms and faculties ever feebler having been bestowed on each succeeding generation. (*De opificio mundi* 140)

To illustrate this natural process of degeneration, Philo points to the received wisdom in the arts, in sculpture and painting, that 'the copies are inferior to the

[26] Cf. Aulus Gellius, *Attic Nights* 3.10.11: 'the men of old were larger and taller of stature, but now, because the world is ageing, as it were (*et nunc, quasi iam mundo senescente*), men and things are diminishing in size'. On this theme of the loss of the world's original vitality, see Bartelink 1970 & 1983, who characterizes this view as Epicurean, with reference to Lucretius, *On the Nature of Things* 2.1173–1174: '… all things gradually decay, and go to the reef of destruction, outworn by the ancient lapse of years (*spatio aetatis defessa vetusto*)' (Bartelink 1970, 91–3). Otherwise than Bartelink, I believe the concept is also Stoic. Unlike Plato and Aristotle, the Stoics regarded the world as admitting of deterioration and destruction (cf. Furley 1999, esp. § 12.3.2, 434–9). Cf. also Paul, 1 Cor 7.31: παράγει γὰρ τὸ σχῆμα τοῦ κόσμου τούτου; see Adams 2000, 134–6 for a cosmological interpretation.

originals'. He also uses the example of the magnet which gradually looses its hold over the objects which depend from it:

> Much the same appears in the case of the magnet: for the iron ring which touches it is held most forcibly, but that which touches this one less so. A third hangs on to the second, and a fourth on to the third, and a fifth on to the fourth, and so on in a long series, all held together by one attracting force, only not all alike for those removed from the starting-point get looser all the time, owing to the attraction being relaxed and losing its power to grip as it did before. (*De opificio mundi* 141)

This illustrates his point that mankind goes through a similar process in which the original force diminishes through time:

> Mankind has evidently undergone something of the same kind. As generation follows generation the powers and qualities of body and soul which men receive are feebler. (*De opificio mundi* 141)

Although 'the sovereignty with which that first man was invested was a most lofty one', many generations later, 'owing to the lapse of ages, the race had lost its vigour' (*De opificio mundi* 148).

But Philo does not give only physical reasons for the degeneration of man. He also speaks about the first *moral* lapse of man in the garden of Eden. In Philo's view, at the very beginning, the garden was populated by two men, the heavenly man and the earthly one, and it was the latter who was cast out. Philo justifies this view of two different inhabitants of Eden by referring to two different phrases in the account of Gen 2 on the garden. According to Gen 2.8 LXX, God 'placed there *the man whom He had moulded*' (καὶ ἔθετο ἐκεῖ τὸν ἄνθρωπον, ὃν ἔπλασεν), whereas Gen 2.15, at least according to Philo, reads as follows: 'The Lord God took *the man whom He had made*, and placed him in the garden to work on it and to guard it' – ἔλαβε κύριος ὁ θεὸς τὸν ἄνθρωπον ὃν ἐποίησε καὶ ἔθετο αὐτὸν ἐν τῷ παραδείσῳ, ἐργάζεσθαι αὐτὸν καὶ φυλάσσειν (*Legum allegoriarum libri* 1.53).[27] According to Philo, the latter

> is a different man, the one that was made after the image and archetype, so that two men are introduced into the garden, the one a moulded being, the other 'after the image'. (*Legum allegoriarum libri* 1.53)

Whereas the latter is received by God, the former is cast out of the garden of Eden: 'the moulded mind (ὁ δὲ πλαστὸς νοῦς) (…) soon runs away and is cast out' (*Legum allegoriarum libri* 1.55); he is 'the more earthly mind', as opposed to the less material, pure mind (1.88–89). Because of his constitution, it is the earthly man, Adam, 'the earthly and perishable mind',[28] who needs to be com-

[27] As a matter of fact, however, Gen 2.15 LXX also reads ἔπλασεν (like Gen 2.8), not ἐποίησε: Καὶ ἔλαβεν κύριος ὁ θεὸς τὸν ἄνθρωπον, ὃν ἔπλασεν, καὶ ἔθετο αὐτὸν ἐν τῷ παραδείσῳ ἐργάζεσθαι αὐτὸν καὶ φυλάσσειν.

[28] Cf. *Quis rerum divinarum heres sit* 52: … 'the earthly mind, called Adam'.

manded by God. This is not necessary for the 'mind that was made after the image', which is 'not earthly but heavenly' – 'the being created after [God's] image and after the original idea (1.90–92). In a passage which is highly relevant for our study of 1 Cor in § 5.2 below, this heavenly mind is called 'the perfect man' and contrasted with the bad man and the child, who do need commandments and instruction:

> There is no need, then, to give injunctions or prohibitions or exhortations to the perfect man formed after the (divine) image (τῷ τελείῳ τῷ κατ' εἰκόνα), for none of these does the perfect man (ὁ τέλειος) require. The bad man[29] has need of injunction and prohibition, and the child (τῷ νηπίῳ) of exhortation and teaching. (*Legum allegoriarum libri* 1.94)

This way of thinking is very similar to that of Paul who, as we shall see in § 5.2.2 below, considers his Corinthian opponents as 'children' (νήπιοι; 1 Cor 3.14), and not as 'perfect men' (τέλειοι; 1 Cor 2.6), because they fail to live up to their pneumatic potential and are therefore not *pneumatikoi* (2.13, 15; 3.1) but simply *psychikoi* (2.14) and *sarkinoi* (3.1, 3).

Philo subsequently explains how the earthly mind can experience downfall if it fails to give heed to God's commandments:

> Quite naturally, then, does God give the commandments and exhortations before us to the earthly mind who is neither bad nor good but midway between these. (…) Should he obey the exhortations, he may be deemed worthy by God of His benefactions; but (…), should he rebel, he may be driven from the presence of the Lord. (*Legum allegoriarum libri* 1.94)

The last option, that of a rebellious earthly mind, is the one which materializes, as Philo makes clear in another writing. Despite the 'nobility of birth' of the 'first and earth-born man', 'moulded with consummate skill into the figure of the human body by the hand of God (…), and judged worthy to receive his soul (…) through the breath of God (ἐμπνεύσαντος θεοῦ)' (*De virtutibus* 203), he made the wrong moral choice:

> His father was no mortal but the eternal God, whose image he was in a sense in virtue of the ruling mind within the soul (οὗ τρόπον τινὰ γενόμενος εἰκὼν κατὰ τὸν ἡγεμόνα νοῦν ἐν ψυχῇ). Yet though he should have kept that image undefiled and followed as far as he could in the steps of his Parent's virtues, when the opposites were set before him to choose or avoid, good and evil, honourable and base, true and false, he was quick to choose the false, the base and the evil and spurn the good and honourable and true, with the natural consequence that he exchanged mortality for immortality, forfeited his blessedness and happiness and found an easy passage to a life of toil and misery. (*De virtutibus* 204–205)

[29] Cf. *De somniis* 2.237: … 'the wicked mind (ὁ φαῦλος … νοῦς)'.

This moral lapse is repeated every time the mind comes to love the body and the passions:

> There is a different mind which loves the body and the passions (φιλοσώματος καὶ φιλοπαθὴς νοῦς) and has been sold in slavery to (…) pleasure. (*Quod deus sit immutabilis* 111)

Following his tripartite division of man into body, soul, and mind, Philo portrays the degeneration of man as a consequence of the soul which wavers in the middle, to the detriment of the mind:

> When the soul (*psychē*) is swaying and tossing like a vessel, now to the side of the mind (*nous*) now to that of the perception by the senses (αἴσθησις), owing to the violence of the passions and misdeeds that rage against her, and the billows rising mountains high sweep over her, then in all likelihood the mind (*nous*) becomes waterlogged and sinks; and the bottom to which it sinks is nothing else than the body (σῶμα). (*De agricultura* 89)

Or, alternatively, Philo can portray the earthly mind as the medial or neutral mind, as we have already seen in his *Legum allegoriarum libri*: 'the earthly mind (…) is neither bad nor good but midway between these' (1.94). This mind is played upon by the opposing forces of good and evil:

> The middle or neutral mind (ὁ μέσος νοῦς) [is] played upon by forces drawing it in opposite directions and given the high calling to decide between them, that it might be moved to choose and to shun, to win fame and immortality should it welcome the better, and incur a dishonourable death should it choose the worse. (*De plantatione* 45)[30]

In many passages Philo sketches the negative outcome of this strife between body and mind, 'the cycle of unceasing war ever revolving round the many-sided soul' (*De somniis* 2.14) – the κύκλος περὶ τὴν πολύτροπον ψυχὴν αἰδίου πολέμου. In one of them, he talks, in a 'Pauline' fashion, about 'the order of the flesh':

> When that which is superior, namely Mind, becomes one with that which is inferior, namely Sense-perception, it resolves itself into the order of the flesh (τὸ σαρκὸς γένος) which is inferior. (*Legum allegoriarum libri* 2.50)

Philo sees the downfall of the mind illustrated in many stories in the Bible. The ground which opened to receive the blood of Abel (Gen 4.11), shed by Cain, symbolizes how 'the mind, swallowed up by the huge inpouring (Gen 4.11), is found at the bottom, unable so much as to rise to the surface and look out' (*Quod deterius potiori insidiari soleat* 100). And in his commentary on the fall of the

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[30] Cf. also *De praemiis et poenis* 62 ff. in a passage which reads like a Philonic counterpart to the *Treatise of the Two Spirits* in *The Community Rule*, *1QS* III–IV.

angels in Gen 6, Philo highlights God's decision that his 'Spirit will not remain in a human being for ever':

> Nothing is harder than that it [i. e. the divine Spirit] should abide for ever in the soul with its manifold forms and divisions (ἐν πολυσχιδεῖ καὶ πολυμόρφῳ ψυχῇ) – the soul which has fastened on it the grievous burden of this fleshly coil. It is after that spirit [i. e. after the Spirit has gone] that the angels or messengers go in to the daughters of men. (*Quod deus sit immutabilis* 2)

This story of the fall of the angels is about the souls of those who

> have abandoned themselves to the unstable things of chance, none of which has aught to do with our noblest part, the soul or mind, but all are related to that dead thing which was our birth-fellow, the body, or to objects more lifeless still (…). The children of the earth have turned the steps of the mind (*nous*) out of the path of reason and transmuted it into the lifeless and inert nature of the flesh – οἱ δὲ γῆς παῖδες τὸν νοῦν ἐκβιβάσαντες τοῦ λογίζεσθαι καὶ μεταλλοιώσαντες εἰς τὴν ἄψυχον καὶ ἀκίνητον σαρκῶν φύσιν. (*De gigantibus* 15, 65)

This is the third class of man, which, as we have seen before, takes the lowest rank in Philo's tripartite division of man (see § 5.1.1 [d]).

Furthermore, Philo also sees the downfall of the mind at work in the story of Sodom (*De sacrificiis Abelis et Caini* 122) and in the story of the Midianites, who 'flood the ruling mind and sink it to the lowest depths, so that it cannot float up to the top or rise ever so little' (*De mutatione nominum* 107). In another context, the pagan gods are considered 'obstacles and the cause of stumbling, by which the mind is lamed and falls short of the natural road (…) which ends in the Father' (*Quaestiones in Exodum* 2.26).

The main threats to the human mind, in Philo's view, are posed by false opinions and the bodily senses:

> The human mind [is] imprisoned as it is amid all the thronging press of the senses, so competent to seduce and deceive it with false opinions, or rather entombed in a moral body which may be quite properly called a sepulchre. (*De specialibus legibus* 4.188)

Philo's repetitive remarks on the loss of man's pneumatic-noetic identity also serves a concrete polemical purpose. This becomes clear in two passages in which Philo attacks the sophists (and Protagoras in particular), who are of the opinion that the human mind is the measure of all things. As we have seen in chap. 3 above, in Philo's time the Second Sophistic movement was just taking off and becoming a dominant cultural force. Philo poses the following rhetorical question and immediately answers it:

> Of what sort than is an impious man's opinion? That the human mind is the measure of all things (μέτρον εἶναι πάντων χρημάτων τὸν ἀνθρώπινον νοῦν), an opinion held they tell us by an ancient sophist named Protagoras, an offspring of Cain's madness. (*The Posterity of Cain* 35–37)

This opinion is contrasted with that of Moses: 'But Moses held that God, and not the human mind, is the measure and weighing scale and numbering of all things' (*De somniis* 2.193–194). As I shall suggest below, it is perhaps no coincidence that Paul's polemic in 1 Cor 1–4 and his criticism of the *psychikoi*, who lack inner pneumatic identity, seem also to be addressed against sophists.

5.1.3 Restoration of the human mind and spirit

As we have already seen in § 5.1.1 (c) above on the creation of the earthly man, 'the earthly and body-loving mind' was inbreathed by God's *pneuma* at the very moment of creation. The reason stated for this was that 'the mind of man would never have ventured to soar so high as to grasp the nature of God, had not God Himself drawn it up to Himself' (*Legum allegoriarum libri* 1.37–38). One could argue that here there is already a primordial restoration of the human mind while its creation is still taking place (1.32). The earthlike mind, which in Philo's view is modelled on the mind of the heavenly man, would have remained corruptible if God's *pneuma* had not breathed into it. This sets the model for Philo's considerations about the restoration of the mind in other parts of his writings: the earthlike mind needs the breath of God's *pneuma* to become 'a soul, not an inefficient and imperfectly formed soul, but one endowed with mind and actually alive' (1.32).

The biblical narrative which, according to Philo, is all about the restoration of the human mind, is the story of Abraham's migration from Haran; this migration symbolizes the mind's departure from the dominance of the lower soul and the senses:

> When the mind (*nous*) begins to know itself and to hold converse with the things of mind, it will thrust away from it that part of the soul (*psychē*) which inclines to the province of sense-perception, the inkling which among the Hebrews is entitled 'Lot'. Hence the wise man [i. e. Abraham] is represented as saying outright, 'Separate thyself from me' (Gen 13.9). For it is impossible for one who is possessed by love for all that is incorporeal (ἀσώματα) and incorruptible (ἄφθαρτα) to dwell together with one who leans towards the objects of sense-perception doomed to die. (*De migratione Abrahami* 13)

Abraham and Lot are presented as contrasting figures which symbolize, respectively, the mind and the soul. According to Philo, the migration of the mind occurs in several stages, the most important of which are accurate self-knowledge and knowledge of God himself (*De migratione Abrahami* 194–195). This is a gradual process of migration:

> The mind gradually changing its place will arrive at the Father of piety and holiness. (…) It will stay no longer in Haran, the organs of sense, but withdraw into itself. For it is impossible that the mind whose course still lies in the sensible rather than the mental should arrive at the contemplation of Him that Is. (*De migratione Abrahami* 194–195)

Indeed, as Philo summarizes his account of Abraham's migration, towards the end of his treatise: 'To resume, the mind (…) has gone forth from the places about Haran …' (216). The entire migration of Abraham is interpreted as a restoration of the mind and its journey towards God.

From some passages in Philo, one gets the impression that his soteriology, his view on how the human mind is restored, is closely related to education. In one passage, for instance, Philo states that parents benefit their children by having their bodies trained in the gymnasium, and that they

> have done the same for the soul by means of letters and arithmetic and geometry and music and philosophy as a whole *which lifts on high the mind* (*nous*) *lodged within the mortal body* and escorts it to the very heaven and shows it the blessed and happy beings that dwell therein. (*De specialibus legibus* 2.230)

The educational nature of this soteriology is confirmed by Philo's somewhat elitist remark about the small number of those who despise vanity:

> This kind is few in number. (…) After investigating the whole realm of the visible to its very end, it straightway proceeds to the immaterial and conceptual, not availing itself of any of the senses but casting aside all the irrational parts of the soul (*psychē*) and employing only the part which is called mind (*nous*) and reasoning. (*De praemiis et poenis* 26)

This selective attitude differs considerably from the popularizing potential of Paul's theory about Christ as the heavenly man, in whose identity all are invited to join and experience a transformation of the mind.

Yet, Philo's educational drive clearly serves an ethical purpose. As we have already seen,

> There is no need, then, to give injunctions or prohibitions or exhortations to the perfect man formed after the (divine) image, for none of these does the perfect man require. The bad man has need of injunction and prohibition, and the child of exhortation and teaching. (*Legum allegoriarum libri* 1.94)

Instead of describing Philo's soteriology as 'educational', it is perhaps more appropriate to call it a 'psychological soteriology', which aims at the formation of the soul. This soteriology is built on the tripartite definition of man in terms of mind (or spirit), soul and body, and entails the view that the mind, purified and restored by the divine spirit, influences (the rest of) the soul which, in its turn, transforms the body. This soteriology comes to the fore in various passages. In his commentary on Gen 28.14, 'in thee shall all tribes be blessed', Philo says:

> If the mind which is in me (ὁ ἐν ἐμοὶ νοῦς) has been rendered pure by perfect virtue, then the 'tribes' [Gen 28.14: 'in thee shall all tribes be blessed'] of that which is earthly in me are sharers of its purifying, those I mean which pertain to the senses (αἱ αἰσθήσεις) and to that chiefest container, the body (τὸ σῶμα). (*De somniis* 1.177)

In this passage the purified mind clearly influences and purifies the lower soul of the senses, and also the body. For this reason, Philo warns against the dominance of the concerns of soul and body over what should be the guiding principle, the mind:

> If we hold that moral beauty is the only good, the end we seek is contracted and narrowed, for it is bound up with only one of our myriad environments, namely, with the dominant principle, the mind (*nous*). But if we connect that end with three different kinds of interests, the concerns of the soul (*psychē*), those of the body (*sōma*) and those of the external world, the end is split up into many dissimilar parts and thus broadened. (*De sobrietate* 60)

That God's spirit influences both soul and body is also shown in a passage about Abraham:

> The divine spirit which was breathed upon him from on high made its lodging in his soul, and invested his body with singular beauty. (*De virtutibus* 217)

That Philo uses the language of Gen 2.7 about the inbreathing of God's Spirit not only with regard to Adam, but also with regard to his descendants, such as Abraham, shows that his reflections on the creation of Adam are applicable to all mankind. Although the singular beauty of Abraham's body is doubtlessly exceptional, it nevertheless demonstrates that, in Philo's anthropology, *pneuma* influences the soul, and the soul, in turn, the body (on the interpretation of Abraham's body, and that of Moses' body, see § 6.3.1 below).

Once this psychological soteriology is understood, it can easily be recognized in Paul. Already in 1 Thess, Paul warns the Thessalonians not to suppress the Spirit (5.19: τὸ πνεῦμα μὴ σβέννυτε) and wishes that God himself may keep them sound in spirit, soul, and body, free from any fault: καὶ ὁλόκληρον ὑμῶν τὸ πνεῦμα καὶ ἡ ψυχὴ καὶ τὸ σῶμα ἀμέμπτως … τηρηθείη (5.23). As in Philo, the link between God's Spirit (*Pneuma*) and the spirit of man (*pneuma*) is not coincidental but shows that man's spirit was inbreathed by God's Spirit.[31]

Against the ancient philosophical and Philonic background outlined in the present chapter, it is clear that Paul's trichotomy of *pneuma*, *psychē* and body in 1 Thess 5.23 is equally technical. This triad has been misunderstood by U. Schnelle in one of the few anthropologies of the New Testament which have recently been written. Schnelle explicitly denies that the triad should be taken in a technical Hellenistic sense:

> The trichotomous *sounding* phrase τὸ πνεῦμα καὶ ἡ ψυχὴ καὶ τὸ σῶμα reflects no Hellenistic anthropology according to which a person is divided into body, soul, and spirit. Paul is merely emphasizing that the sanctifying work of God concerns the whole person.[32]

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[31] On the issue of the identity, or rather correspondence between the human and divine *pneuma*, cf. Vollenweider 2002.

[32] Schnelle 1996, 104–5 at 104 (italics mine).

Schnelle is apparently unaware of the parallels which Paul's contemporary fellow-Jews Philo and Josephus provide in differentiating between *pneuma* and *psychē* on the basis of Gen 2.7, in this way establishing a Jewish counterpart to the Greek differentiation between *nous* and *psychē*. In this light, Schnelle's comments on the meaning of *pneuma* in 1 Thess 5.23 become artificial and incomprehensible:

In 1 Thessalonians πνεῦμα is for Paul not a component of the human essence but the expression and sign of the new creativity of God in humankind. With ψυχή and σῶμα Paul is only adding what constitutes each person as an individual. What is actually new and determinative is the Spirit of God.[33]

This is clearly untrue, even though it may reflect a common view in New Testament scholarship. In Paul's triad *pneuma*, *psychē* and *sōma*, the *pneuma* is a component of man, as the comparisons with Philo unequivocally show. It is part of the triad which characterizes man as a trichotomous being. Of course is it true that elsewhere in 1 Thess the *pneuma* does denote the spirit *of God*. As Paul reminds the Thessalonians, God has given them his holy *Pneuma*: anyone who flouts particular ethical rules 'is flouting not man but the God who bestows on you his holy Spirit' – … ἀλλὰ τὸν θεὸν τὸν διδόντα τὸ πνεῦμα αὐτοῦ τὸ ἅγιον εἰς ὑμᾶς (1 Thess 4.8). Therefore, at the end of the letter, the Thessalonians are warned not to suppress the spirit, i. e. the Spirit of God: τὸ πνεῦμα μὴ σβέννυτε (1 Thess 5.19). But the gift of the Spirit *results* in the reconstitution of man's own *pneuma*, and for this reason he should keep sound 'in *pneuma*, *psychē* and *sōma*' (1 Thess 5.23). By partaking in the Spirit of God, man possesses a *pneuma* which is part of his own constitution. Against the background of Philonic and Hellenistic trichotomous anthropology, this is perfectly clear. Classicists, incidentally, have no difficulty in recognizing the philosophical nature of Paul's anthropology. A.-J. Festugière, for instance, devotes an extensive excursus to the ancient philosophical background of 1 Thess 5.23 in his *L'idéal religieux des grecs et l'évangile* (1932).[34]

The presupposition at work in Schnelle's interpretation is that 1 Thess, as Paul's first letter, contains only a simple, rudimentary theology which will be developed further over the years:

As the oldest document of Pauline theology, the First Letter to the Thessalonians shows rather that the continuing passage of time was of great significance in the formation of the apostle's anthropology. This letter lacks all the important anthropological terms of

[33] Schnelle 1996, 104. Heckel 2000, 130n36 seems to be aware of the Greek background of 'the tripartite body-soul-pneuma synthesis in 1 Thess. 5.23', but stresses Paul's free interpretation of it, without further explanation.

[34] Festugière 1932, Excursus B, 196–220.

later letters, such as σάρξ ("flesh"), ἁμαρτία ("sin"), θάνατος ("death"), ἐλευθερία ("freedom"), ζωή ("life")'.[35]

Yet although 1 Thess is indeed Paul's first preserved letter, this view neglects the fact that, prior to his visits to the cities of the Eastern Mediterranean, Paul had already spent about fourteen years in the Roman provinces of Syria and Cilicia, in cities such as Antioch and Tarsus, where he must already have tested the reception of his gospel by the Hellenized world (Gal 1.21–2.2). It is misleading to state that in 1 Thess 'all the important anthropological terms are lacking',[36] as the important trichotomy *pneuma*, *psychē* and *sōma* does occur. In a later letter, 1 Cor, Paul shows that he is able to expand on it when he distinguishes between different classes of man, those who have a *pneuma*, the *pneumatikoi*, and those who have not, the *psychikoi* (1 Cor 2.13–3.1).

It is far more natural then, to interpret the triad of spirit, soul and body in Paul's first letter in the technical, Hellenized sense in which is was also used by Philo. Likewise, against the background of Philo, the descending hierarchical order of *pneuma*, *psychē* and body is not haphazard either, but implies that the restored and purified spirit-mind influences the rest of man's soul and his body.

In Philo, the purification of the mind is an important motif. We have already seen that the mind which has been rendered pure by perfect virtue, in its turn, purifies the lower soul of the senses and the body (*De somniis* 1.177). To phrase it differently,

> the wholly purified mind (…) disregards not only the body, but that other section of the soul which is devoid of reason and steeped in blood, aflame with seething passions and burning lusts. (*Quis rerum divinarum heres sit* 64)

As a consequence, 'the purified mind (ὅ κεκαθαρμένος νοῦς) of the wise man preserves the virtues free from breach or hurt' (*De fuga et inventione* 112).

This complex of ideas can be rightly called a soteriology, a doctrine of salvation. As a matter of fact, Philo himself stresses that the mind (*nous*) is 'brought back by the mercy of its Saviour (σωτήρ)':

> The mind (*nous*) which has strayed everywhere in prolonged vagrancy, maltreated by pleasure and lust, the mistresses it honoured so unduly, may well be brought back by the mercy of its Saviour (σωτήρ) from the pathless wild into a road wherein it is resolved to flee straight on, a flight (…) of one banished from evil to salvation. (…) This mind (…) has been honoured with the gift of quietude by God, who willed that it should be undistracted, never affected by any of the troublesome sensations which the distresses of the body engender. (*De praemiis et poenis* 117, 121)

Only then, when the mind has been granted quietude, can there be an end to the κύκλος περὶ τὴν πολύτροπον ψυχὴν ἀιδίου πολέμου, 'the cycle of unceasing

[35] Schnelle 1996, 41.
[36] Schnelle 1996, 44.

war ever revolving round the many-sided soul', the strife between body and mind (*De somniis* 2.14). That war 'the mind (*nous*) is wont to leave, when, filled with the divine, it finds itself in the presence of the Existent Himself and contemplates the incorporeal ideas' (*De ebrietate* 99).

This psychological soteriology is implied in many shorter passages throughout Philo's writings. Again, despite their brevity, they are an expression of Philo's thoughts about the restoration of man. In several passages, Philo talks about the mind leading the soul and being followed by the senses. In one passage, which we have already quoted on the matter of the disintegration of man, Philo goes on to state the opposite, salutary development:

> When that which is superior, namely Mind (*nous*), becomes one with that which is inferior, namely Sense-perception, it resolves itself into the order of the flesh (τὸ σαρκὸς γένος) which is inferior (…). But if Sense the inferior follows Mind the superior, there will be flesh (σάρξ) no more, but both of them will be mind. (*Legum allegoriarum libri* 2.50)

In a similar passage Philo explains:

> Most profitless is it that Mind should listen to Sense-perception, and not Sense-perception to Mind: for it is always right that the superior should rule and the inferior be ruled; and Mind is superior to Sense-perception (…). Just so, when Mind, the charioteer or helmsman of the soul, rules the whole living being as a governor does a city, the life holds a straight course. (*Legum allegoriarum libri* 3.222–224)

For that reason, the Mind (*nous*) is characterized as 'the ruler of the flock, taking the flock of the soul (*psychē*) in hand' (*De agricultura* 66). The road along which the mind travels is that of wisdom – a road derided by those who are fleshly:

> Wisdom is a straight high road, and it is when the mind (*nous*)'s course is guided along that road that it reaches the goal which is the recognition and knowledge of God. Every comrade of the flesh (πᾶς ὁ σαρκῶν ἑταῖρος) hates and rejects this path and seeks to corrupt it. (*Quod deus sit immutabilis* 143)

When the mind decides to follow this path, it 'turns away from pleasure and cleaves to virtue' (*De sacrificiis Abelis et Caini* 45). This is clearly characterized as a conversion:

> If the mind be safe and unimpaired, free from the oppression of the iniquities or passions which produce the frenzy of drunkenness, it will renounce the slumber which makes us forget and shrink from the call of duty. (*De sobrietate* 5)

It shows that the mind does not necessarily 'remain for ever deceived nor stand rooted in the realm of sense' (*De Abrahamo* 88), but that it can be 'mastered by the love of the divine' (*De somniis* 2.232). Those who turn back to God have the image of God in them restored. They are those 'who do not deface with base practices the coin within them which bears the stamp of God, even the sacred mind (*nous*)' (*Quod deus sit immutabilis* 105).

5.2 Paul on the two types of man

5.2.1 The 'soul' in Paul

Before we come to a more detailed discussion of Paul's views in 1 Cor on the two types of man, and against the background of what has just been said in § 5.1, I shall first address the more general issue of whether Paul had a 'Jewish' or a 'Greek' understanding of the human soul. I shall argue that, despite some distinctively Jewish features – which Paul shares with his contemporary fellow-Jews Philo and Flavius Josephus –, his conceptuality of the soul is basically Greek, even to a greater extent than is commonly thought.

Until the present day, many biblical scholars continue to emphasize the distinctively Jewish or distinctively Pauline aspects of Paul's psychology and anthropology. To demonstrate the Jewish essence of his psychology, they point to the preponderance of allegedly Semitic concepts such as heart (καρδία) and flesh (σάρξ), often choosing to ignore the more 'noetic' language (e.g. νοῦς) which Paul also employs.[37] Similarly, they call attention to the Semitic expressions which have left their mark on the Greek translation of the Jewish bible, the Septuagint: the so-called Septuagintisms. Paul's use of the very word ψυχή, for instance, can be reduced to a mere Septuagintism if one focuses on such expressions as 'every soul' (πᾶσα ψυχή) which only function, it is supposed, as a Semitic way of referring to each individual person. And to highlight the distinctiveness of Paul's own thoughts about the human soul, distinct from both Jewish and Greek thought, they highlight the antitheses which Paul forges between spirit (πνεῦμα) and flesh (σάρξ), for instance, and between spirit (πνεῦμα) and body (σῶμα).

My own position is that one should not be too quick to assume that Paul uses distinctively Jewish-Semitic concepts when writing Greek. Although σάρξ is an important concept in the Jewish scriptures, in pagan Greek, too, it can denote the flesh as the seat of the affections and lusts, the fleshly nature, or man in his vulnerability (LSJ 1585 σάρξ II.1). The word is employed in this sense by Philo in a passage which otherwise develops a genuinely Greek psychology (*Quis rerum divinarum heres sit* 55–57), as we have seen above (see § 5.1.1 [d]). Seen in this light, there is nothing *distinctively* Jewish about Paul's use of σάρξ, nor anything *specifically* Pauline about his antithesis between σάρξ and πνεῦμα.

If this is true of the concept of flesh, the same applies to Paul's use of the term ψυχή. In my discussion of this term throughout the present chapter, I hope to do justice both to Paul's Jewish colouring of his discourse of the soul, and to his own theological emphasis. Neither the Jewish nor the Pauline angle to this discourse should come as a surprise, as normally every thinker contextualizes

[37] See, e.g., Schnelle 1996, chap. 3 on Pauline anthropology, esp. §§ 3.7, 59–63 on σάρξ and 3.13, 102–7, esp. 102–4 on καρδία and 104–5 on ψυχή.

'general' topics within his or her own train of thought. In essence, however, Paul's discussion of the soul is inseparable from its larger setting in the Graeco-Roman period.

There are certainly some instances of Septuagintisms in Paul's use of ψυχή. At the beginning of his letter to the Romans, for example, Paul warns both Greek and Jews:

> For those who are self-seeking and who obey not the truth but wickedness, there will be wrath and fury. There will be anguish and distress *for every soul of man* (ἐπὶ πᾶσαν ψυχὴν ἀνθρώπου) who does evil, the Jew first and also the Greek. (*Rom* 2.8–9)

The expression 'every soul of man' occurs only in the Septuagint (Numbers 19.11; Isaiah 13.7) and not in any other extant Greek literature.[38] In a periphrastic way, it refers to every individual human being, 'everyone'. Yet, one should not overemphasize the Semitic background of this Septuagintism, since in non-Jewish Greek, too, similar periphrastic descriptions of individual human beings do exist. Plato, for instance, in his *Laws*, speaks of 'every soul of all citizens' (πᾶσα ψυχὴ πολίτου παντὸς), clearly denoting each individual citizen, as the context makes clear:

> When *the soul of every citizen* (πᾶσα ψυχὴ πολίτου παντὸς) hangs upon this [i. e. upon his own private property], it is incapable of attending to matters other than daily gain. Whatsoever science or pursuit leads to this, every man individually (ἰδίᾳ πᾶς) is most ready to learn and to practise; but all else he laughs to scorn. (*Laws* 831c).

The resemblance between Paul's use of ψυχή and general Greek usage is even closer when Paul just speaks about 'each soul' (πᾶσα ψυχή), without further qualification, in Rom 13.1; there are many parallels in the Septuagint, but at the same time the phrase frequently occurs in non-Jewish Greek literature, especially in Plato and Aristotle and in literature dependent upon them, and not always in a strictly technical sense. This should warn us against stressing the Semitic background of Paul's alleged Septuagintisms too much. At the very least, it is clear that these Septuagintisms were not incomprehensible in a non-Jewish Greek context and, more importantly, did not preclude Paul from developing a Greek understanding of the soul.

There are some peculiar Septuagintisms, but their number is limited indeed. The most important example consists of a Septuagint quotation which entails the expression 'seek one's soul' (ζητεῖν τὴν ψυχήν τινος; Rom 11.3 quoting 1 Kings 19.10 LXX), which in the Septuagint stands for the intention of murdering someone. This particular meaning seems to be absent from Classical Greek, where

[38] Observations with regard to the occurrence of particular linguistic terms in this section are based on consultation of the TLG.

it means rather the opposite (see, e. g., Plato, *Phaedrus* 252e: 'The followers of Zeus *desire the soul* of him whom they love to be like Zeus' – οἱ μὲν δὴ οὖν Διὸς δῖόν τινα εἶναι ζητοῦσι τὴν ψυχὴν τὸν ὑφ' αὑτῶν ἐρώμενον).

An interesting case is the expression 'risking one's soul' in Paul's letter to the Philippians 2.30: παραβολευσάμενος τῇ ψυχῇ. This expression is not common in Greek, but is not found in the Septuagint either, so that its meaning seems rather to be dependent on the context, and to be a Pauline adaptation of the phrase's general Greek meaning of 'exposing oneself in one's soul', i. e. risking one's life.

Further instances of ψυχή in Paul can also be understood in the word's Greek meaning of ψυχή as 'life' (LSJ 2026 ψυχή I) or 'the conscious self or personality as centre of emotions, desires, and affections' (LSJ 2027 ψυχή IV), rather than in its philosophical meaning of 'the immaterial and immortal soul' (LSJ 2027 ψυχή III). Thus, particular fellow-workers of Paul's are said to have risked their own necks 'for my life' (ὑπὲρ τῆς ψυχῆς μου; Rom 16.4); Paul calls God for a witness 'to my own self' (ἐπὶ τὴν ἐμὴν ψυχήν; 2 Cor 1.23); he tells the Corinthians that he will gladly spend and be spent 'for your lives' (ὑπὲρ τῶν ψυχῶν ὑμῶν; 2 Cor 12.15) and, as he and his co-authors tell the Thessalonians, 'to impart their own soul and life to them' (μεταδοῦναι ὑμῖν …τὰς ἑαυτῶν ψυχάς; 1 Thess 2.8).

In short, one should allow the possibility that various Greek meanings of ψυχή are present in Paul, including non-technical ones, rather than concluding that Paul employs this terminology in Septuagintist or idiosyncratic ways.

Paul also uses common Greek expressions which contain the word ψυχή or some cognate terms when he talks about (a) 'striving with one soul' (μιᾷ ψυχῇ; Philipp 1.27, from which he seems to develop the neologism σύμψυχοι in 2.2); (b) 'being of good courage' (εὐψυχεῖν; Philipp 2.19); (c) 'being of equal spirit, of like soul or mind' (ἰσόψυχος; Philipp 2.20); or about (d) τὰ ἄψυχα, the soulless, lifeless, material things (1 Cor 14.7), a term which, in the Septuagint, occurs only once in *The Wisdom of Solomon* (13.17; 14.29), a writing from the Hellenistic period. Later Pauline writings also speak of working, or of doing the will of God ἐκ ψυχῆς (Col 3.23; Eph 6.6), 'of one's own self', an expression which does not occur only in the Septuagint but is abundant in Greek literature. In 'Semiticizing' translations of these writings, this expression is wrongly translated as 'from the heart' or 'heartily'.

If we review all the ψυχ-passages in Paul, there are only a few examples of terms which are limited to the Septuagint and its subsequent Christian adaptation, probably the best example being the term ὀλιγόψυχος, faint-hearted or feeble-minded; this term occurs in the Septuagint and is predominantly used in the Christian tradition and hardly at all in pagan Greek literature. Paul uses it in his exhortation to 'encourage *the faint-hearted*, support the weak, and be patient toward all' (1 Thess 5.14). This only serves to emphasize our findings

that, generally speaking, Paul's use of the term ψυχή reflects its broad application in Greek.

Paul is less idiosyncratic than is often assumed, as will become particularly clear from a few ψυχ-passages which will be discussed in the course of the present § 5.2. Although we shall see in these instances that the language is indeed coloured by specific Pauline and Jewish concerns and predilections, they also show that these are merely shades and tints in an otherwise Greek picture of man. In his discussion of the future resurrection of the body in 1 Cor 15, for example, Paul argues that the future human body will be characterized as a σῶμα πνευματικόν, a pneumatic body, whereas the present body, which will be buried, is a 'psychical body', a σῶμα ψυχικόν. Although the latter expression seems to be a neologism, forged by Paul, the former expression, σῶμα πνευματικόν, is a term which is applied in Stoicism to characterize the abiding nature of God. Whereas God, insofar as he is material, is perishable and liable and subject to change, as becomes clear in the process of conflagration, the authoritative part of God's soul (τὸ ἡγεμονικὸν), the governing part of the universe, is a σῶμα πνευματικόν, a pneumatic and ether-like body (*SVF* 2.1054; = Origen, *Commentary on John* 13.21.128). As Origen puts it: the Stoics 'are not ashamed to say that since God is a body he is also subject to corruption, but they say his body is pneumatic and like ether, especially in the reasoning capacity of his soul' – οὐκ αἰδοῦνται λέγειν ὅτι καὶ φθαρτός ἐστιν σῶμα ὤν, σῶμα δὲ πνευματικὸν καὶ αἰθερῶδες, μάλιστα κατὰ τὸ ἡγεμονικὸν αὐτοῦ.[39] Although it is just possible that the terminology of σῶμα πνευματικόν is due to Origen, who preserved this passage, I regard it as an authentic Greek expression, as it is also attested elsewhere.[40] Paul regards this term as suitable to express the specific corporeality of the future, post-resurrection body.

This Stoic term is now placed in antithesis to σῶμα ψυχικόν, which combination Paul seems to have constructed himself. It is still possible to see where he derived his inspiration from, as his antithesis is followed by a quotation from Gen 2.7 LXX: 'So also it is written: "The first man, Adam, became a living soul"' – οὕτως καὶ γέγραπται,Ἐγένετο ὁ πρῶτος ἄνθρωπος Ἀδὰμ εἰς ψυχὴν ζῶσαν (1 Cor 15.45). As we have seen in § 5.1 above, this text was also interpreted by fellow-Jews such as Philo and Josephus as a passage about the human soul. The contrast between a σῶμα πνευματικόν and a σῶμα ψυχικόν is developed by Paul to differentiate between (a) a life which is so dominated by the πνεῦμα that even the body becomes spiritual, and (b) a life dominated by the ψυχή, which is the entity in the middle between body and spirit.

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[39] Trans. Heine 1993, 94, with a small alteration.

[40] Comarius (1st cent. AD?), *De lapide philosophorum* 2.290; cf. also Zosimus (3rd/4th cent. AD), Ζωσίμου τοῦ Πανοπολίτου γνησία γραφὴ περὶ τῆς ἱερᾶς καὶ θείας τέχνης, τῆς του χρυσοῦ καὶ ἀργύρου ποιήσεως κατ' ἐπιτομὴν κεφαλαιώδη 2.146; and Damascius (5th/6th cent. AD), *In Phaedonem (versio 1)* 551.

In the context of his discussion about the corporeality of the resurrection in 1 Cor 15, Paul understandably focuses on the σῶμα and distinguishes between a pneumatic *body* and a psychic *body*. But the implied antithesis between πνεῦμα and ψυχή, which now manifests itself at the level of adjectives qualifying the sort of body involved, already comes to the fore in 1 Cor 2 where, already in the present life, Paul distinguishes between two groups: on the one hand, there are the ψυχικοί (2.14) – whom we may assume to live only by their ψυχή and who are, therefore, effectively only σαρκίνοι (3.1) as their soul is lacking any guiding principle and gives in to the flesh; on the other hand, there are the πνευματικοί (2.15; 3.1; cf. Gal 6.1), who are able to receive and inquire into the things of God's πνεῦμα and possess the 'mind (νοῦς) of Christ' (2.16). We shall now turn to a more detailed analysis of Paul's anthropological views in 1 Cor.

5.2.2 Paul's differentiation between various types of man

Introduction

As we have already seen in § 5.1 above, there are many similarities between Philo and Paul with regard to the differentiation between the heavenly man, who is identified with *pneuma*, and the earthly man, who is identified with the *psychē*. Moreover, in both authors the 'first man' is the earthly Adam. Nevertheless, many scholars have assumed that there is an implicit criticism of Philonic views in Paul's statement that 'the pneumatic does not come first but the psychic, and only subsequently the pneumatic' – ἀλλ' οὐ πρῶτον τὸ πνευματικὸν ἀλλὰ τὸ ψυχικόν, ἔπειτα τὸ πνευματικόν (1 Cor 15.46).[41]

However, as we have seen above, for Philo too the term 'first man' (ὁ πρῶτος ἄνθρωπος) refers to the earthly Adam. This being the case, the chances are slim that the phrase 'the pneumatic does not come first' (ἀλλ' οὐ πρῶτον τὸ πνευματικὸν) entails a criticism of Philonic views on this matter. It is important to note that the discussion in 1 Cor 15 is not about the psychic (τὸ ψυχικόν) and the pneumatic (τὸ πνευματικὸν) in general, but about the psychic and pneumatic *body*. What is at issue is the σῶμα ψυχικόν and the σῶμα πνευματικόν. In Paul's view, it is not that the pneumatic reality (τὸ πνευματικὸν) as such belongs to the future, but rather that the pneumatic *body* only becomes a reality after the eschatological resurrection. Paul's reflections have wrongly been taken to mean that, in opposition to Philonic ideas, the pneumatic (τὸ πνευματικὸν) is only a future reality. This cannot be true, since the pneumatic (τὸ πνευματικὸν) already occurs in the present, as Paul makes clear in a different polemical setting in 1 Cor 1–4.

In this section of 1 Cor Paul already reckons with the existence of the *pneumatikoi*, those who are characterized by *pneuma* (1 Cor 2.13, 15; 3.1; cf. Gal 6.1).

[41] Cf. Schaller 2004, 149–51, already referred to above.

This is Paul's designation of true, mature men, as opposed to the *psychikoi* (1 Cor 2.14) and *nēpioi* (the children; 1 Cor 3.14). This is reminiscent of the passage from Philo discussed in § 5.1.2 above, in which Philo, on the basis of his tripartite division of man, calls the mind (*nous*) 'the perfect man' and contrasts it with the bad man and the child, who need commandments and instruction:

> There is no need, then, to give injunctions or prohibitions or exhortations to the perfect man formed after the (divine) image (τῷ τελείῳ τῷ κατ' εἰκόνα), for none of these does the perfect man (ὁ τέλειος) require. The bad man has need of injunction and prohibition, and the child (τῷ νηπίῳ) of exhortation and teaching. (*Legum allegoriarum libri* 1.94)

As in Philo, in Paul, too, those who have had their *nous* or *pneuma* restored, the *pneumatikoi*, are a present type of man, not a future one. In response to this view on the restoration of man's *pneuma*, however, one could object that according to Paul there is no question of the *restoration* of man's *pneuma*: in 1 Cor 15, the passage from Gen 2.7 is applied in such a way that, whereas the first Adam possesses only a *psychē*, the last Adam will be granted a *pneuma*: οὕτως καὶ γέγραπται· ἐγένετο ὁ πρῶτος ἄνθρωπος Ἀδὰμ εἰς ψυχὴν ζῶσαν (Gen 2.7 LXX: καὶ ἐγένετο ὁ ἄνθρωπος εἰς ψυχὴν ζῶσαν), ὁ ἔσχατος Ἀδὰμ εἰς πνεῦμα ζῳοποιοῦν – 'It is in this sense that Scripture says: "The first man, Adam, became a living soul", whereas the last Adam has become a life-giving spirit' (1 Cor 15.45). If the passage is read this way, man's *pneuma* is not *restored*, but rather *pneuma* is bestowed for the first time in man's existence. Whereas the first man possessed *psychē*, only the second man will possess *pneuma*.

This, however, cannot be true. It would imply that whereas the original anthropology was dipartite, consisting of *psychē* and body, only future anthropology will become tripartite, consisting of *pneuma*, *psychē* and body. This, in turn, would imply that man was created as an incomplete human being. Although the context in 1 Cor 15 is indeed a debate about the future – or, more specifically about the future, post-resurrection constitution of the body – the underlying logic must be that, as a consequence of the birth and apparition of Christ, the second and last man from heaven, man's *pneuma* is *restored* to him, not granted for the first time. Although theoretically the first man had a tripartite structure, effectively man failed to keep his *pneuma*, so that it needs to be restored. That man as such does possess *pneuma* is confirmed by Paul in 1 Cor 2.11 where, in a generalizing way, he speaks about man's *pneuma*: τίς γὰρ οἶδεν ἀνθρώπων τὰ τοῦ ἀνθρώπου εἰ μὴ τὸ πνεῦμα τοῦ ἀνθρώπου τὸ ἐν αὐτῷ; οὕτως καὶ τὰ τοῦ θεοῦ οὐδεὶς ἔγνωκεν εἰ μὴ τὸ πνεῦμα τοῦ θεοῦ – 'Who knows what a human being is but the human spirit (*pneuma*) within him? In the same way, only the spirit (*pneuma*) of God knows what God is'.[42] In this generalizing passage, Paul

[42] I owe this observation to Dr Edward Adams, London.

reveals his view about the standard composition of man in general, a constitution which also encompasses *pneuma*. Naturally, in Paul's view, whereas, technically speaking, every human being has *pneuma*, only the Christians can have their *pneuma* really and effectively restored.

As we have already seen in § 5.1 above, the same ambiguity is found in Plutarch when, in *De genio Socratis*, he reflects on the three kinds of man. Although Plutarch emphasizes that 'every soul (*psychē*) partakes of mind (*nous*); none is irrational or without mind (*a-nous*)' (591D: ψυχὴ πᾶσα νοῦ μετέσχεν, ἄλογος δὲ καὶ ἄνους οὐκ ἔστιν), he nevertheless goes on to state that the lowest class of man sinks entirely into the body (αἱ <μὲν> ὅλαι κατέδυσαν εἰς σῶμα), as if into the depths of the terrible, deep, water-filled abyss of the Styx (see § 5.1.1 [d]). Unlike the intermediate class, whose *nous* 'is not dragged in with the rest, but is like a buoy attached to the top, floating on the surface in contact with the man's head, while he is as it were submerged in the depths' (591E), the lowest class seems, in the words of Dillon, 'to have souls that are completely immersed in the body, *in such a way as to leave no "nous" floating as a "buoy" above them*'.[43] As Dillon asks: 'Does this mean that they have effectively no *nous*?' Indeed, he answers, 'they have no *nous* remaining above'.[44] In this way a picture emerges of 'souls breaking loose on their own, quite devoid of intellect'; 'some souls are left wholly devoid of *nous*'.[45]

Plutarch thus shows the same ambiguity as Paul: although, strictly speaking, all souls possess *nous*,[46] effectively some have none. To put it in Paul's terminology: although originally man was created with a trichotomous identity of *pneuma*, *psychē* and body, effectively, after the degeneration and fall of man, man had no *pneuma* till it was restored to him by means of his unification with Christ, the second man from heaven. It is from this perspective of restoration that Paul quotes Gen 2.7 in 1 Cor 15.45: 'It is in this sense that Scripture says: "The first man, Adam, became a living *psychē*", whereas the last Adam has become a life-giving *pneuma*'. Paul does not mean that man was originally created as a dichotomic being, consisting only of *psychē* and body, but rather that, though man was created as a trichotomic being, made up of *pneuma*, *psychē* and body, it is only Christ who restores the *pneuma* which had effectively become lost. In his quotation of Gen 2.7, Paul forgets about the temporary and very brief period in which, between his creation and almost instantaneous fall, man did effectively possess *pneuma*. Rather he attributes the bestowal of *pneuma* to its definitive endowment by Christ as an act of recreation (cf. 2 Cor 5.14–17). This gift of

[43] Dillon 2001, 39 (italics mine).
[44] Dillon 2001, 40.
[45] Dillon 2001, 42, 43.
[46] Cf. De Lacy & Einarson 1959, 473 note *a*: 'All souls, strictly speaking, possess understanding' (*nous*).

pneuma is a fruit of realized eschatology. The restoration of man's *pneuma* is a result of the eschatological gift of the Spirit which is already operative (e. g. 1 Thess 4.8; 2 Cor 1.22, 5.5; Rom 5.5, 8.15, 8.23). In the context of 1 Cor 15, however, Paul stresses that, although already at work, the Spirit is not yet fully effective. Only at the end of time will the Spirit also transform the psychic body into a pneumatic body (1 Cor 15.44–49).

For a proper understanding of 1 Cor 15, it is important to distinguish the different kinds of oppositions which Paul addresses throughout 1 and 2 Cor, as well as the positions with which Paul agrees in principle, but still deems necessary to modify. At least three kinds of oppositions and of positions in need of further modification can be distinguished in 1 Cor alone, (a) those who 'say there is no resurrection of the dead', (b) the *psychikoi*, and (c) those *pneumatikoi* who are too excessive in their spiritualization.

(a) Those who 'say there is no resurrection of the dead'

To start with 1 Cor 15, the first kind of opposition consists of 'some' of the Corinthians who 'say there is no resurrection of the dead' (15.12) and are concerned with the questions of how the dead are raised and in what kind of body (15.35). Who are these 'some'? For the moment we shall leave this question open, and return to it later. As we have seen, what is clear is that in his polemic Paul focuses on the body. His answer is about the pneumatic body (σῶμα πνευματικόν), not about the pneumatic (τὸ πνευματικὸν) as such. Due to a particular kind of opposition, in 1 Cor 15 the focus is on the body, the third and lowest layer of tripartite man. Apparently what Paul is saying is that it is only eschatologically that the *pneuma* influences the *psychē* to such an extent, and the *psychē*, in its turn, the body, that the body will turn into a *pneuma*-dominated body, a pneumatic body. Only then we will bear the image of the heavenly man to the fullest extent – καὶ καθὼς ἐφορέσαμεν τὴν εἰκόνα τοῦ χοϊκοῦ, φορέσομεν καὶ τὴν εἰκόνα τοῦ ἐπουρανίου (1 Cor 15.44–49).

2 Cor provides confirmation for the supposition that in 1 Cor 15 Paul focuses on the future body, but that this does not preclude the present manifestation of the pneumatic (τὸ πνευματικὸν) and the present relevance of bearing the image (εἰκών) of the heavenly man. In 2 Cor it is clear that the bearing of the image of the heavenly man is *not* a future event, but already a present reality. Already before the end of time, man may experience a gradual transformation into God's image, Christ: ἡμεῖς δὲ πάντες … τὴν αὐτὴν εἰκόνα μεταμορφούμεθα ἀπὸ δόξης εἰς δόξαν, καθάπερ ἀπὸ κυρίου πνεύματος (2 Cor 3.18–4.4 at 3.18; see further § 6.5 below). At present we carry the image of the first man (1 Cor 15.59a), but, as 2 Cor suggests, also increasingly the image of the heavenly man, although not to such an extent that the *pneuma* already transforms *the body* into a *pneumatic* body, a σῶμα πνευματικόν. That, but only that, is a future reality according to 1 Cor 15.

(b) The sophists/psychikoi versus the pneumatikoi

As was already indicated at the very end of § 5.2.1 above, also a different polemical section of 1 Cor, chapters 1–4, shows that the pneumatic body (σῶμα πνευματικόν) but not the pneumatic (τὸ πνευματικὸν) as such is a future reality. In this section Paul differentiates between two, or even three types of man and assumes that the *pneumatikoi* are already present now and differ from the *psychikoi* and the *sarkinoi*. As was demonstrated in chap. 4 above, the section of 1 Cor 1–4 is addressed to the sophists who advocate an outward rhetorical *modus operandi*; they are interested in the public impression they make and in public opinions, not primarily in inner conviction or truth.[47] It is therefore very apt for Paul to characterize them as *psychikoi* who lack the inner spirit.

This is again reminiscent of Philo, according to whom, as we have seen, the main threats to the human mind are posed by false opinions and the bodily senses: 'the human mind [is] imprisoned (…) amid all the thronging press of the senses, so competent to seduce and deceive it with false opinions' (*De specialibus legibus* 4.188). Philo, too, applied his thoughts about the loss of man's pneumatic identity in his polemics with the sophists: 'Of what sort then is an impious man's opinion? That the human mind (τὸν ἀνθρώπινον νοῦν) is the measure of all things, an opinion held they tell us by an ancient sophist named Protagoras' (*De posteritate Caini* 35–37). Like Philo, Paul criticizes those who forget their inner pneumatic identity and limit their existence to their lower soul. For that reason, they are well characterized by Paul as 'psychikoi', as opposed to the 'pneumatikoi' whose life is dominated by the *pneuma*. This comes out in 1 Cor 2.13–3.4 in particular.

In this passage, Paul compares his opponents to a *psychic man*, a ψυχικὸς ἄνθρωπος, who 'refuses what belongs to the Spirit of God; it is folly to him; he cannot grasp it, because it needs to be judged in the light of the Spirit' (2.14). Paul, however, aims to communicate 'spiritual truths to those who have the S/spirit', the πνευματικοί (2.13). Unlike a psychic man, the spiritual person (ὁ πνευματικὸς) 'can judge the worth of everything, yet is not himself subject to judgement by others' (2.15). The way Paul continues this passage is most revealing: 'Scripture asks, "Who can know the mind of the Lord (τίς γὰρ ἔγνω νοῦν κυρίου), which will advise him?" (Isaiah 40.13 LXX as quoted by Paul in contracted form) Yet we do possess the mind (*nous*) of Christ – ἡμεῖς δὲ νοῦν Χριστοῦ ἔχομεν' (2.16). This bold, confident statement makes sense in the context of Philo's and Paul's thinking about tripartite man, whose mind (*nous*) is inbreathed by God's *pneuma*. The *pneumatikoi* have their *nous* restored and, according to Paul, by being modelled on the heavenly man, Christ, they are in fact in the possession of his *nous*: ἡμεῖς δὲ νοῦν Χριστοῦ ἔχομεν.

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[47] Cf. Winter 2002, chaps 8–10.

Paul criticizes his opponents for the fact that he is not able to speak to them as 'pneumatikoi' (πνευματικοί), persons who are dominated by the S / spirit, because they are 'sarkinoi' (σαρκίνοί) or 'sarkikoi' (σαρκικοί), dominated by the flesh, and are still infants (νηπίοι) (3.1–3). This all neatly fits the tripartite model which we have explored in Philo. The ambiguity about whether we should translate *pneumatikoi* (πνευματικοί) as 'those who are dominated by the *Pneuma*' or 'those who possess *pneuma*' (in addition to their lower *psychē*) seems to be intrinsic to Philo's and Paul's tripartite anthropology. The human *pneuma* is called *pneuma* because it has been bestowed by, and, for this very reason, corresponds with the divine *Pneuma*. It is both simultaneously. Philo, like Paul, depicts the opposite lifestyle as a life dominated by the flesh and as childish (see § 5.1.1 [d]: *Quis rerum divinarum heres sit* 57, and § 5.1.2: *Legum allegoriarum libri* 1.94).

At this stage it is perhaps important to note that Paul's tripartite division of man into *pneumatikoi*, *psychikoi* and *sarkinoi / sarkikoi* is neither Gnostic nor proto-Gnostic,[48] but precedes Gnosticism, so that the dependence is the other way around. As E. H. Pagels stated, 'Some of what has been described as "Gnostic terminology" in the Pauline letters may be explained more plausibly instead as Pauline (…) terminology in the *Gnostic* writings'.[49] This certainly applies to the division of man into *pneumatikoi*, *psychikoi* and *sarkinoi / sarkikoi*. As we have seen from Philo, the differentiation between *pneuma* and *psychē* is nothing other than the Jewish interpretation of the Greek opposites of *nous* and *psychē* (see § 5.1.1 [c] above). Philo and Plutarch, too, distinguish three classes of man (see § 5.1.1 [d] above). When Gnostics, in turn, also use this distinction they reveal their dependence on this debate.[50] Moreover, by referring to these three classes in terms of the pneumatic, psychic and sarkic man, they demonstrate particular acquaintance with Paul's specific colouring of this tripartite classification.[51]

The expressions of this tripartite anthropology can be discerned in several passages in 1 Cor. The word 'pneuma' is used, in a double sense, to depict both the divine *pneuma* (1 Cor 2.4, 10–14; 3.16) and the human *pneuma* (1 Cor 2.11). Likewise, the word 'nous' can refer either to the human *nous* (1 Cor 1.10; 14.14–15, 14.19) or to the *nous* of Christ (1 Cor 2.16). These passages also show that, as in Philo, in Paul too the words 'pneuma' and 'nous' can be synonymous.

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[48] For Paul's alleged dependence on Gnosticism in this respect, see, e. g., Winter 1975.

[49] Pagels 1975, 164.

[50] Cf. also Pearson 1973, 82–3.

[51] See the Valentinian-Gnostic distinction in Celsus apud Origen, *Against Celsus* 5.61; Irenaeus, *Adversus haereses* (edn Harvey 1857) 1.1.9, 11, 13–14, 16 (with explicit evidence that the Valentinians claim Paul as their authority); Clement of Alexandria, *Stromateis* 2.3.10.3 and *Excerpta ex Theodoto* 54. See also Clement of Alexandria, *Paedagogos* 1.6.31.2. It is equally anachronistic to draw upon rabbinic literature as Hultgren 2003 does.

To conclude, the present reality of the pneumatic (τὸ πνευματικὸν) is visible in the type of men referred to as *pneumatikoi* (πνευματικοί). Paul contrasts this type with that of the *psychikoi* (ψυχικοί), who have forgotten their highest and most important constituent, that of *pneuma* (πνεῦμα). Paul is prompted to apply this contrast by the fact that his opponents, the Corinthian sophists, are only interested in outward, public opinion and appearance and not in man's inner self. It need not surprise us that Paul develops such a full tripartite anthropology, since, as we saw in § 5.1.3 above, 1 Thess 5.23 already shows that he was familiar with it. In the context of Corinth, however, there is a need to apply it further.

(c) The excessive pneumatikoi

Although Paul's ideal type of man is that of the *pneumatikos* (πνευματικός), he recognizes the dangers inherent to this concept. The danger is posed by *excessive pneumatikoi*. To this threat, which results from his own endorsement of the *pneumatikoi*, Paul devotes 1 Cor 10–14. In this section he makes clear that one should beware of excessive spirituality. Although the sophists are rightly portrayed as *psychikoi* and the right attitude is that of the *pneumatikoi*, the latter should not overdo it. They are not opponents of Paul, but do represent a position which needs modification.

Indeed, they should learn about pneumatic things: Περὶ δὲ τῶν πνευματικῶν, ἀδελφοί, οὐ θέλω ὑμᾶς ἀγνοεῖν (12.1) – 'About the pneumatic things (τὰ πνευματικά), my friends, I want there to be no ignorance'. But at the same time, Paul warns them that even those who have experienced pneumatic gifts such as pneumatic food (τὸ πνευματικὸν βρῶμα) and pneumatic drink (τὸ πνευματικὸν πόμα), as the Israelites did during their journey through the wilderness, may in the end nevertheless not be accepted by God and may perish (10.2–5). Even if, as *pneumatikoi*, they are eager for the pneumatic things (τὰ πνευματικά), they should not forget love, which is more important than trust and hope: δὲ μένει πίστις, ἐλπίς, ἀγάπη, τὰ τρία ταῦτα· μείζων δὲ τούτων ἡ ἀγάπη. Διώκετε τὴν ἀγάπην, ζηλοῦτε δὲ τὰ πνευματικά (13.13–14.1).

That Paul, despite his promotion of the *pneumatikos*-type of man, finds fault with a possible excess of *pneuma*, is clear from what follows. Although the pneumatic things (τὰ πνευματικά) also include speaking in tongues, Paul strongly dissuades the *pneumatikoi* from exercising this spiritual activity to the detriment of *nous*: 'If I pray in tongues, my *pneuma* prays, but my *nous* is barren' – ἐὰν [γὰρ] προσεύχωμαι γλώσσῃ, τὸ πνεῦμά μου προσεύχεται, ὁ δὲ νοῦς μου ἄκαρπός ἐστιν (14.14). The juxtaposition of *pneuma* and *nous* in this passage fits what we have seen in Philo's tripartite anthropology, in which *pneuma* and *nous* are near-synonyms: *pneuma* is greater than or equal to *nous* because the divine *pneuma* is received within the human *nous*.

According to Philo, in the case of prophecy the influence of the *pneuma* upon the *nous* is even greater. The *nous* is then inspired (*De migratione Abrahami*

84) or guided (*De vita Mosis* 2.265) by the *pneuma*: 'prophecy finds its way to what the *nous* fails to reach' (*De vita Mosis* 2.6).[52] Moses is even depicted as 'the mind of purest quality' (ὁ καθαρώτατος νοῦς) who, by divine inspiration, received the art of prophecy:

> This is Moses, the mind of purest quality (ὁ καθαρώτατος νοῦς), the truly goodly, who, with a wisdom given by divine inspiration, received the art of legislation and prophecy alike. (*De congressu eruditionis gratia* 132)[53]

In one passage, however, Philo even describes prophecy not merely as inspiration or guidance of the *nous* by the *pneuma*, but as the complete withdrawal of the *nous* in favour of the *pneuma*:

> While the radiance of the mind (νοῦς) is still all around us, when it pours as it were a noonday beam into the whole soul (εἰς πᾶσαν τὴν ψυχὴν), we are self-contained, not possessed. But when it [i. e. the mind, the *nous*] comes to its setting, naturally ecstasy and divine possession and madness fall upon us. For when the light of God shines, the human light sets; when the divine light sets, the human awakes and rises. This is what regularly befalls the fellowship of the prophets. The mind (*nous*) is removed from his home (ἐξοικίζεται; LSJ 596 ἐξοικίζω *remove from his home, eject, banish*; *empty*) at the arrival of the divine Spirit (*pneuma*), but when that departs, the mind (*nous*) returns to its tenancy. (*Quis rerum divinarum heres sit* 264–265)

The complete withdrawal of the nous, however, is exactly the position which Paul criticizes. For this reason, he urges the *pneumatikoi* to pray with the *pneuma*, but also with the *nous*; to sing hymns with the *pneuma*, but at the same time with the *nous*: τί οὖν ἐστιν; προσεύξομαι τῷ πνεύματι, προσεύξομαι δὲ καὶ τῷ νοΐ· ψαλῶ τῷ πνεύματι, ψαλῶ δὲ καὶ τῷ νοΐ (14.15). The use of *pneuma* should be balanced with *nous*, because this is what the ideal *pneumatikos*-type of man is about: not annihilating one's *nous* but receiving the *pneuma* within one's *nous*. This is why, in the congregation, Paul prefers to speak five words with his *nous* rather than thousands of words in tongues: ἀλλὰ ἐν ἐκκλησίᾳ θέλω πέντε λόγους τῷ νοΐ μου λαλῆσαι, ἵνα καὶ ἄλλους κατηχήσω, ἢ μυρίους λόγους ἐν γλώσσῃ (14.19). Although Paul promotes the way of life of the *pneumatikoi*, the *pneumatikos* should acknowledge that there are limits to his independence within the community: 'If anyone claims to be a prophet or a *pneumatikos*, let him recognize that what I write has the Lord's authority' (14.37).

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[52] On the *pneuma* and prophecy in first-century Judaism and Graeco-Roman conceptions of prophecy, see Levison 2002, chaps 5, 99–130 and 10, 244–54.

[53] See also *De gigantibus* 24, 27: 'Such a divine spirit, too, is that of Moses. (…) The spirit which is on him is the wise, the divine, the excellent spirit'; and *De vita Mosis* 2.40: '… the purest of spirits, the spirit of Moses'. Cf. also *De mutatione nominum* 123: 'For we have read "there was another spirit in him" (Num 14.24), as though the ruling mind in him was changed to supreme perfection'.

From this perspective, the position which Paul modifies in 1 Cor 12–14 is the corrective supplement to his endorsement of the *pneumatikos* way of life in 1 Cor 1–4 in the face of the influence of the sophists.

Now that we have defined the various types of opponents in 1 Cor 1–4 (the sophists, labelled 'psychikoi' and 'sarkinoi' or 'sarkikoi') and 1 Cor 12–14 (the opposite extreme of *pneumatikoi* who overdo it), we return to the still undecided question of who the opponents of Paul are in 1 Cor 15. These are the 'some' who 'say there is no resurrection of the dead' (15.12) and raise questions about how the dead are raised and in what kind of body (15.35).

It seems that those who deny the resurrection in 1 Cor 15 could be either the sophistic *psychikoi* or the excessive *pneumatikoi*. The former, in Paul's view, could be falsely content with their present *psychic body* (σῶμα ψυχικόν), which they, in their rhetorical performance, wished to be strong and not weak (cf. their criticism of Paul's weak physical appearance and performance in 2 Cor 10.10).[54] The latter, in overrating their spiritual existence, might perhaps be inclined to deny their bodily existence altogether. This inclination might be illustrated by reference to Philo, who also has a tendency to be critical about the body and to subsume it into a spiritual reality, that of the mind. This is nicely illustrated in a passage on the transformation of Moses' body at his death, a passage in which Philo argues that the dichotomy of body and soul is resolved in death. According to Philo,

> Afterwards the time came when he [i. e. Moses] had to make his pilgrimage from earth to heaven, and leave this mortal life for immortality, summoned thither by the Father Who resolved his twofold nature of soul and body into a single unity (αὐτὸν δυάδα ὄντα, σῶμα καὶ ψυχήν, εἰς μονάδος ἀνεστοιχείου φύσιν ὅλον δι' ὅλων), transforming his whole being into mind, pure as the sunlight (μεθαρμοζόμενος εἰς νοῦν ἡλιοειδέστατον). (*De vita Mosis* 2.288)

This view comes close to annihilation of the body, although Philo uses the language of resolving and changing the twofold nature of man into a single unity. To some extent, Paul, too, goes in the same direction, since the psychic body (σῶμα ψυχικόν) is said to be transformed into a pneumatic body (σῶμα πνευματικόν). Although he continues to talk of 'body', it is not entirely clear what a 'pneumatic body' is. Perhaps we should draw on Stoic views to explain it, as this term is used by Chrysippus to describe the pneumatic and ethereal body of God himself (σῶμα δὲ πνευματικὸν καὶ αἰθερῶδες), which is entirely dominated by his πνεῦμα (Chrysippus, *SVF* 2.1054 apud Origen, *Commentary on the Gospel of John* 13.21.128; see § 5.2.1 above).[55]

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[54] On the sophists' insistence on the importance of physical performance, see Philostratus, *Lives of the Sophists* 492, 572, 618; Plutarch, *De recta ratione audiendi* 41D.

[55] Origen, *Commentary on the Gospel of John* 13.21.127–128: ἀνάγκη καὶ τὸν θεὸν ὑλικὸν ὄντα τρεπτὸν εἶναι καὶ ἀλλοιωτὸν καὶ μεταβλητόν. Καὶ ἐκεῖνοι μὲν οὐκ αἰδοῦνται λέγειν

This would accord very well with Paul's Stoicizing description of the eschaton in 1 Cor 15.28, when finally God will be 'all in everything'.[56] If all of creation is ultimately identified with God, it is no wonder that the psychic body (σῶμα ψυχικόν) is turned into a pneumatic body (σῶμα πνευματικόν). This seems to constitute a small but not insignificant difference between Philo and Paul. Whereas Philo, following his Platonic predilections, seems to abrogate the body and to conceive of the afterlife only in terms of mind, Paul seems to apply the Stoic terminology of a pneumatic body to express both: the enduring existence of the body and its spiritual transformation.[57]

Despite this difference, Philo's and Paul's anthropology of tripartite man is very similar. Inasmuch as they call the highest part of man not only νοῦς but, on account of their exegesis of Gen 2.7, preferably πνεῦμα, one might also suggest that they stressed the identical, pneumatic nature of God and man in a far more egalitarian and accessible way than is the case in the Greek equivalent anthropology. In order to experience fellowship with God, man did not have to improve the intellectual abilities of his *nous* but felt connected through the *pneuma*. In Plutarch, as Dillon explains, the highest class of people, who possess *nous*, is rather restricted: 'Intellect [*nous*] thus becomes something rather special, not readily accessible to the mass of humankind'.[58] Both Philo and Paul make transition from *nous* to *pneuma*, although, as we saw in § 5.1.3, Philo's soteriology still remains somewhat elitist, in line with its ancient philosophical counterparts. According to Festugière: 'Du νοῦς au πνεῦμα, voilà toute la différence, ce qui (…) distingue spécifiquement le christianisme'.[59] More than in pagan philosophy, participation in God himself is open to all:

> Notre âme est déjà son πνεῦμα. Tout naturellement, dès lors, elle devient siège de la grâce, ἡ χάρις μετὰ τοῦ πνεύματος ὑμῶν, – ainsi s'achèvent les lettres aux Galates, VI, 18, aux Philippiens IV, 23, à Philémon 25, – habitacle de l'ἅγιον πνεῦμα, du saint-Esprit. (…) Ainsi, grâce à Paul, grâce au christianisme, ce qu'il y eut de meilleur dans l'âme païenne trouve enfin son vrai sens. (…) L'intelligence devient esprit.[60]

ὅτι καὶ φθαρτός ἐστιν σῶμα ὤν, σῶμα δὲ πνευματικὸν καὶ αἰθερῶδες, μάλιστα κατὰ τὸ ἡγεμονικὸν αὐτοῦ· φθαρτὸν δὲ ὄντα μὴ φθείρεσθαι τῷ μὴ εἶναι τὸν φθείροντα αὐτὸν λέγουσιν. – 'God, too, if he is material, must be mutable and subject to variation and change. Those who hold this view are not ashamed to say that since God is a body he is also subject to corruption, but they say his body is spiritual and like ether, especially in the reasoning capacity of his soul. Furthermore, they say that although God is subject to corruption he is not corrupted, because no one exists who might corrupt him' (trans. Heine 1993).

[56] For this translation and its philosophical background, see Van Kooten 2003, § 2.2.4 (b), 104–7.

[57] Cf. Lorenzen 2008.

[58] Dillon 2001, 44.

[59] Festugière 1932, 217.

[60] Festugière 1932, 219–20.

The free accessibility of this pneumatic identity is an aspect of Paul's 'Adam Christology', as Dunn calls it (cf. § 1.3 above).[61] By participating in Christ's death and resurrection in baptism (Rom 6.3–11), the human identity starts to fuse with that of Christ, the second Adam, the second man who, in contrast to the first man, is from heaven. Whereas man still bears the image of the first, earthly Adam (1 Cor 15.49), Christians increasingly bear the image of the heavenly man and are increasingly transformed into his likeness (2 Cor 3.18). In this way their *pneuma* is restored and they turn again into trichotomous human beings, the *pneumatikoi*. For this reason they can boldly claim to possess the *nous* of Christ (1 Cor 2.15–16), the *nous* of the heavenly, archetypal man. Whereas in Plutarch the highest class of human beings, who possess *nous*, is sparsely populated, this possession is within reach for all Christians. The more they share in the *pneuma* and *nous*, the more their outer man decreases and their inner man, the ἔσω ἄνθρωπος, develops. This is pointed out in 2 Cor and in Romans, which will be studied in chaps 6 and 7 below, respectively. Paul's use of the Platonic notion of the inner man, applied in 2 Cor 4.16 and Rom 7.22,[62] further underlines what we have already found, that Paul's anthropology is truly addressed to the Graeco-Roman world. Here, in Paul's anthropology, more than anywhere else, Nietzsche's description of Christianity as 'Platonismus fürs Volk' is fully justified.[63]

[61] See Dunn 1998, §§ 4, 8.6, 10.2.
[62] Cf. Heckel 1993; Markschies 1994, 1998; Burkert 1998; Betz 2000.
[63] See his *Jenseits von Gut und Böse* (1885).

Chapter 6

Paul's Anti-Sophistic Interpretation of the Narrative of Moses' Shining Face (Exod 34) in 2 Cor 3: Moses' Strength, Well-being and (Transitory) Glory, according to Philo, Josephus, Paul, and the Corinthian Sophists

Introduction: Why does Paul draw on Exod 34 in 2 Cor 3?

In chap. 3 above, we have seen that, in his commentaries on Moses' Pentateuch, Philo offers a consistent anti-sophistic reading of many of its narratives. He does so because he is concerned that the Greek-educated Jewish youth of Alexandria may be influenced by 'the sophists of today'. As I argued in chap. 4, in Corinth Paul operates in the same atmosphere of the sophistic movement. Having explored the composition of Philo's and Paul's anthropology in chap. 5, I shall now try to show that in 2 Cor Paul gives an anti-sophistic interpretation of a particular narrative about Moses which could be misused for sophistic ends. The narrative concerned is the episode of the second giving of the Torah to Moses. As a consequence of Moses' close encounter with God on Mount Sinai, Moses' face is said to shine and reflect God's glory (Exod 34). The question I shall deal with in the present chapter is why Paul drew so extensively on this episode in 2 Cor 3. Although Paul does not even mention the fact that the first tablets of the law were replaced, Exod 34 is terribly important to him because of a particular feature of the narrative. The question is: why did Paul consider Exod 34 so important?

One might point out that the narrative of the giving of the Torah would have been of importance to any Jew. Indeed, in another letter, too, Paul refers to the way the Law was handed down to Moses. In his letter to the Galatians, as part of an intense polemic against Judaizing parties within Christianity which wish to uphold the Law in every respect, Paul emphasizes the secondary nature of the Law: it only arrived on the scene of Israel fairly late on, 430 years after Abraham, the founding father of Judaism (Gal 3.17); its secondary nature is also evident from the fact that 'it was ordained through angels by a mediator' (Gal 3.19). Here, Paul applies Jewish traditions about the association of angels in the giving of the law.[1] Yet, for all his criticism of the Mosaic law in Galatians, Paul

[1] Dunn 1993, 191.

is very brief about the actual giving of the Torah. In this light, the sheer length of Paul's passage on the giving of the law in 2 Cor 3 requires further explanation and might have to do with the specific setting of 1–2 Cor.

Indeed, Paul has already alluded to specific narratives about the journey of Israel through the wilderness in 1 Cor. In chapter 10 Paul writes about Israel's escape through the Red Sea and talks about the Israelites' itinerary through the desert:

> I do not want you to be unaware, brothers and sisters, that our ancestors were all under the cloud, and all passed through the sea, and all were baptized into Moses in the cloud and in the sea, and all ate the same spiritual food, and all drank the same spiritual drink. For they drank from the spiritual rock that followed them, and the rock was Christ. (1 Cor 10.1–4)

Paul draws on these narratives because he wants to counter his opponents' experience of the sacraments, which leads them to regard themselves as invincible. Partaking in the same baptism, spiritual food, and spiritual drink, Paul explains, did not render the Israelites invulnerable to God's judgement:

> Nevertheless, God was not pleased with most of them, and they were struck down in the wilderness. Now these things occurred as examples for us, so that we might not desire evil as they did. (1 Cor 10.5–6)

In this case, it is very likely that Paul himself draws on the narrative of Israel's journey through the wilderness in order to criticize his opponents' way of life. In line with this, it could be assumed that in 2 Cor, too, Paul continues to allude to this story, now commenting on the giving of the Law. Yet, this time there are clear signs that it is not Paul himself, but his opponents within the Christian community at Corinth who were the first to refer to this episode of Moses on Mount Sinai.

There may have been a simple reason for Paul's opponents in Corinth to focus on Moses. They were Christians of Jewish background, as 2 Cor 10–13 makes clear, but their approach seems to have been very different from the Judaizing Christians among the Galatians, because in 2 Cor there is neither ethnocentric Jewish discourse nor straightforward commendation of the Jewish law.[2] The Corinthians seem simply to have brought up the issue of Moses as legislator, whose writings would also have been read as Scripture in the Christian community. As we shall see, in a pagan context, with pagan outsiders being introduced to the meetings of the Christian community (1 Cor 14.16, 23), there was abundant reason to talk about Moses, since his image among the pagans was ambiguous and not necessarily positive and, for that reason, stood in need of clarification.

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[2] Cf. also Georgi 1987, 248: 'The fact that the concept of νόμος is wholly lacking from 2 Cor. 3 argues against a conflict with Jewish nomism'.

6.1 Moses in pagan-Jewish relations

One of the first pagan Greeks to draw a negative portrayal of Moses as a lawgiver is Hecataeus of Abdera (3rd cent. BC). Although his overall attitude to the Jews is not unsympathetic, the following features in his account are critical about Moses' legislation for the Jews:

> In addition [Moses] (…) instituted their forms of worship and ritual, drew up their laws and ordered their political institutions. (…) The sacrifices that he established differ from those of other nations, *as does their way of living, for as a result of their own expulsion from Egypt he introduced an unsocial and intolerant mode of life*. (…) And at the end of their laws there is even appended the statement: 'These are the words that Moses heard from God and declares unto the Jews'. (Hecataeus apud Diodorus Siculus, *Library of History* 40.3.3–6; Stern, No. 11)

The Jewish legislation is explicitly linked with the name of Moses, who is understood to have presented his own words as the word of God. His institutions are characterized as 'unsocial' and 'intolerant'.

The passage from Hecataeus just quoted is preserved in a work by Diodorus Siculus, who is equally critical about Moses' law elsewhere in his writings. According to Diodorus (1st cent. BC), Moses is just one of the many lawgivers who have claimed divine origins for their own legislation. Other examples include Mneves, among the Egyptians, and Zathraustes, among the Arians:

> And among the Jews Moyses referred his laws to the god who is invoked as Iao. They all did it either because they believed that a conception which would help humanity was marvellous and wholly divine, or because they held that the common crowd would be more likely to obey the laws if their gaze was directed towards the majesty and power of those to whom their laws were ascribed. (Diodorus, *Library of History* 1.94.1–2; Stern, No. 58)

Tacitus (56–120 AD) is even more critical about the giving of the Jewish law. He draws a sharp contrast between the Jewish law and the laws of 'all other religions':

> To establish his influence over this people for all time, Moses introduced new religious practices, quite opposed to those of all other religions. The Jews regard as profane all that we hold sacred; on the other hand, they permit all that we abhor. (Tacitus, *Historiae* 5.4.1; Stern, No. 281)

This opposition between Jewish and other religious laws is also emphasized by Juvenal (60–130 AD), all the more since he has noted that some pagans are attracted by Judaism:

> Having been wont to flout the laws of Rome, they learn and practise and revere the Jewish law, and all that Moses handed down in his secret tome, forbidding to point out the way to any not worshiping the same rites, and conducting none but the circumcised to the desired fountain. (*Saturae* 14.100–104; Stern, No. 301)

In this light it becomes understandable that Jewish Christians at Corinth would feel the need to come to Moses' defence and portray him in a positive way, partly with a view to the pagan outsiders who, as we have seen, visited the Christian meetings (1 Cor 14.16, 23).

That is not to say that pagan outsiders would only have encountered a negative portrayal of Moses among their fellow pagan authors. The negative views outlined above contrast with more favourable views, such as those of Strabo, who is quite positive about Moses himself, his peaceable reputation and his non-oppressive legislation and governmental organization, and only blames Moses' successors of later days for corrupting his legacy:

> Moses, instead of using arms, put forward as defence his sacrifices and his Divine Being, being resolved to seek a seat of worship for Him and promising to deliver to the people a kind of worship and a kind of ritual which would not oppress those who adopted them either with expenses or with divine obsessions or with other absurd troubles. Now Moses enjoyed fair repute with these people, and organised no ordinary kind of government (…). His successors for some time abided by the same course, acting righteously and being truly pious toward God; but afterwards, first superstitious men were appointed to the priesthood, and then tyrannical people. (*Geography* 16.2.36–37; Stern, No. 115)

We find unambiguously positive views on Moses in Numenius (2nd cent. AD), who likened Plato to Moses, as is captured in the much-quoted one-liner 'What is Plato but Moses talking Attic?'[3] This kind of perspective, in which Plato is even dependent on Moses, is shared by Jewish authors such as Aristobulus (2nd cent. BC), who claims that even prior to the Septuagint parts of the Jewish writings, including the detailed account of Moses' entire legislation, had already been translated into Greek, so that

> the Greeks begin from the philosophy of the Hebrews; from the (books) of Aristobulus dedicated to King Ptolemy: It is evident that Plato imitated our legislation and that he had thoroughly investigated each of the elements in it. (…) So it is very clear that the philosopher mentioned above [Plato] took many things (from it). For he was very learned, as was Pythagoras, who transferred many of our doctrines and integrated them into his own system of beliefs'. (Aristobulus, frag. 3; Eusebius, *Praeparatio Evangelica* 13.12.1–2, cf. § 2.1.5 above)

These different voices, both negative and positive, provide sufficient indication that the figure of Moses was an issue in pagan-Jewish relations and that, for this reason, Jewish Christians, too, would have wanted to present a positive picture of Moses wherever possible. This necessity is also emphasized by Philo. In the introduction to his biography of Moses, Philo explains that whereas the Jewish laws are well known, the giver of these laws, Moses, seems to be largely neglected:

[3] Numenius, frag. 8.13 (edn Des Places). On Numenius and Moses, see Burnyeat 2006*a*.

> While the fame of the laws which [Moses] left behind him has travelled throughout the civilized world and reached the ends of the earth, the man himself as he really was is known to few. Greek men of letters have refused to treat him as worthy of memory, possibly through envy, and also because in many cases the ordinances of the legislators of the different states are opposed to his. (*De vita Mosis* 1.1–2)

This complaint resembles that of Origen, some time later, when he censures Celsus for having omitted Moses from the list of wise men (Celsus apud Origen, *Against Celsus* 1.16; Stern, No. 375). Although this background may explain why Jewish Christians in Corinth felt a need to repaint a pagan picture of Moses,[4] there is more at issue here. It seems that, in their attempts to defend Moses, they have depicted him in terms of a powerful, glorious kind of sophist whose reputation and success should not be ignored by the pagans. Not only can this Moses compete with the pagan sophists in the Mediterranean world, but should also provide a role-model for rhetoric and performance within the Christian communities, it seems. It is this picture of Moses which Paul attempts to redress in 2 Cor. Such an interpretation of the polemics in Corinth does full justice to the fact that Paul's re-reading of the episode of Moses on Mount Sinai in 2 Cor 3 is firmly anchored in an anti-sophistic setting (cf. chap. 4 above).

6.2 The anti-sophistic setting of 2 Cor 3

The extensive passage on Moses is embedded in Paul's criticism of his opponents at Corinth who – as Winter has convincingly argued – behave like sophists. At the end of 2 Cor 2 Paul openly criticizes them and distances himself by emphasizing that he is not like 'the many who sell the word of God by retail':

> For we are not like so many *who sell God's word by retail* – οὐ γάρ ἐσμεν ὡς οἱ πολλοὶ καπηλεύοντες τὸν λόγον τοῦ θεοῦ; but in Christ we speak as persons of sincerity, as persons sent from God and standing in his presence. (2 Cor 2.17)

As has been noted by scholars such as R. P. Martin, D. Georgi and Winter, the phrase οὐ γάρ ἐσμεν ὡς οἱ πολλοὶ καπηλεύοντες τὸν λόγον τοῦ θεοῦ, 'For we are not like so many who sell God's word by retail', is an echo of Plato's criticism of the sophists in the *Protagoras*.[5] In this dialogue Socrates cautions Hippocrates in the following way:

> We must see that the sophist in commending his wares does not deceive us, like the wholesaler and the retailer who deal in food for the body. (…) So too those who take the various subjects of knowledge from city to city, *and sell them by retail* (οἱ τὰ μαθήματα περιάγοντες κατὰ τὰς πόλεις καὶ πωλοῦντες καὶ καπηλεύοντες)

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[4] On this see further Gager 1972; and Van Kooten 2006*a*.
[5] Martin 1986, 50; Georgi 1987, 234; and Winter 2002, 168, cf. 91, 167.

to whoever wants them, commend everything that they have for sale. (Plato, *Protagoras* 313d–e)

This image is used in the context immediately preceding 2 Cor 3 (in 2 Cor 2.17), and straight after 2 Cor 3 Paul resumes this theme as a kind of 'inclusio' (in 2 Cor 4.2). Instead of tampering with God's word, Paul portrays himself as interested in truth:

> But we have renounced disgraceful, underhanded ways. We refuse to practice cunning *or to tamper with God's word* (μηδὲ δολοῦντες τὸν λόγον τοῦ θεοῦ), but by the open statement of the truth (ἀλλὰ τῇ φανερώσει τῆς ἀληθείας) we would commend ourselves to everyone's conscience (συνιστάνοντες ἑαυτοὺς πρὸς πᾶσαν συνείδησιν ἀνθρώπων) in the sight of God. (2 Cor 4.2)

In this way the entire passage devoted to the giving of the Torah to Moses in 2 Cor 3 appears to be embedded right in the middle of anti-sophistic polemics.

Moreover, it is not only the periphery of 2 Cor 3 that belongs to this setting; the contents of 2 Cor 3 can also be shown to arise gradually from this debate. In order to demonstrate this, I shall divide 2 Cor 3 into four parts and comment upon them. I shall argue (1) that the entire chapter evolves from a reference to 'letters of recommendation', which were part of sophistic practice in real life and provided the incentive for Paul to write the chapter (see § 6.2.1 below); (2) that the pivotal terms around which the entire passage subsequently revolves are 'letter' (*gramma*; see § 6.2.2) and 'splendour, radiance, fame, renown' (*doxa*; see § 6.2.3); (3) that the specifically Pauline antithesis between letter and spirit is not simply inserted into, or applied to this passage but is being construed throughout it (see § 6.2.2); and (4) that it is in this context that Paul draws on the narrative of Exod 34 (see §§ 6.2.3 and 6.2.4). 2 Cor 3, then, does not contain an autonomous, unsolicited exegesis of Exod 34. On the contrary, the exegesis is deliberately drawn into a specific polemical context and is wholly intertwined with this situation. I shall now pay close attention to the composition of 2 Cor 3, with a focus on how its train of thought reveals the underlying discussion.

6.2.1 Reference to written letters of recommendation and a slow development towards an implicit antithesis between 'letter' and 'spirit' (2 Cor 3.1–3)

Having stated that he is not selling the word of God by retail but speaks from sincerity (2 Cor 2.17), Paul subsequently criticizes the practice of employing συστατικαὶ ἐπιστολαὶ, letters of recommendation (2 Cor 3.1). Introductory, commendatory letters were not confined to sophistic circles. Aristotle already remarks that personal appearance is a better introduction than any letter (Aristotle apud Diogenes Laertius, *Vitae philosophorum* 5.18), apparently referring to a widespread phenomenon (cf. Diogenes Laertius, *Vitae philosophorum* 8.87). Interestingly, this testimony of Aristotle in Diogenes Laertius also demonstrates criticism of this phenomenon at the hands of philosophers: personal appearance

is more telling than (deceptive, highly styled) letters of recommendation. Similar criticism is recorded in Epictetus, who has a chapter addressed 'to those who recommend persons to the philosophers'. He refers with approval to Diogenes the Cynic, who critically questions a man who requests γράμματα συστατικά, a written recommendation:

> That is an excellent answer of Diogenes to the man who asked for *a letter of recommendation* from him (πρὸς τὸν ἀξιοῦντα γράμματα παρ' αὐτοῦ λαβεῖν συστατικά): 'That you are a man,' he says, 'he [i.e. the prospective addressee of this letter] will know at a glance; but whether you are a good or a bad man he will discover if he has the skill to distinguish between good and bad, and if he is without that skill he will not discover the facts, even though I write him thousands of times'. (Epictetus, *Dissertationes* 2.3)

Such letters also very much fit the sophistic atmosphere of appraisal, repute and self-commendation criticized by Paul, who writes:

> (3.1) Ἀρχόμεθα πάλιν ἑαυτοὺς συνιστάνειν; ἢ μὴ χρῄζομεν ὥς τινες συστατικῶν ἐπιστολῶν πρὸς ὑμᾶς ἢ ἐξ ὑμῶν; (2) ἡ ἐπιστολὴ ἡμῶν ὑμεῖς ἐστε, ἐγγεγραμμένη ἐν ταῖς καρδίαις ἡμῶν, γινωσκομένη καὶ ἀναγινωσκομένη ὑπὸ πάντων ἀνθρώπων· (3) φανερούμενοι ὅτι ἐστὲ ἐπιστολὴ Χριστοῦ διακονηθεῖσα ὑφ' ἡμῶν, ἐγγεγραμμένη οὐ μέλανι ἀλλὰ πνεύματι θεοῦ ζῶντος, οὐκ ἐν πλαξὶν λιθίναις ἀλλ' ἐν πλαξὶν καρδίαις σαρκίναις. (2 Cor 3.1–3)
>
> Are we beginning to commend ourselves again? Surely we do not need, as some do, letters of recommendation to you or from you, do we? [2] You yourselves are our letter, written on our hearts, to be known and read by all; [3] and you show that *you are a letter* of Christ, prepared by us, *written* not with ink but with the Spirit of the living God, *not on tablets of stone* but on tablets of human hearts.

The passage starts off with a reference to letters of recommendation, συστατικαὶ ἐπιστολαὶ (3.1). Paul criticizes this phenomenon, employed by his opponents, and refers to the Corinthian community as his letter, written in his heart (ἡ ἐπιστολὴ ἡμῶν ὑμεῖς ἐστε, ἐγγεγραμμένη ἐν ταῖς καρδίαις ἡμῶν; 3.2), written not with ink but with the Spirit (ἐγγεγραμμένη οὐ μέλανι ἀλλὰ πνεύματι θεοῦ ζῶντος; 3.3b), not on tablets of stone but on the tablet of the human heart (οὐκ ἐν πλαξὶν λιθίναις ἀλλ' ἐν πλαξὶν καρδίαις σαρκίναις; 3.3c).

Although the word 'letter' (ἐπιστολὴ) is now used as a metaphor ('You yourselves are our letter'), its characterization as 'written' (ἐγγεγραμμένη) is still meant, within the imagery, in a literal sense, with reference to the writing of actual letters, and not yet with reference to *gramma* in the sense of the written Mosaic law. It only acquires the latter meaning as the chapter unfolds. This sense – the *gramma* of the Mosaic law – is only implicitly present in this first section, when Paul draws an antithesis between 'written with ink' and 'written with the Spirit'. The direct opposition is still between 'ink' and 'Spirit', not yet between 'letter' (*gramma*) and 'Spirit'. It shows that the full-blown antithesis between the *gramma* of the Mosaic law and the Spirit develops out of an earlier reference to

a letter which is *written* (ἡ ἐπιστολὴ …, ἐγγεγραμμένη) in 2 Cor 3.2, which alludes to a reality behind the text, the letters of recommendation mentioned in 3.1. The antithesis is not yet between two nouns, *gramma* and Spirit, but between a past participle (ἐγγεγραμμένη) and a noun (πνεῦμα). The undeveloped status of the antithesis in question is also confirmed in the last phrase of the first section. The letter is explicitly said to be written '*not* on tablets of stone' (ἐγγεγραμμένη …. οὐκ ἐν πλαξὶν λιθίναις; 3.3). Here the way is being paved for the *gramma* in the sense of the Torah, written on tablets of stone; but the law is still not unambiguously mentioned, only alluded to.

The point of departure for the entire passage is still the practice of giving letters of recommendation, which is contrasted with Paul's metaphorical letter writing, on the hearts of his community.

6.2.2 The antithesis between 'letter' and 'spirit' becomes explicit (2 Cor 3.4–6)

It is not until the second section of 2 Cor 3 that the implicit antithesis between *gramma* and Spirit is rendered explicit and develops into the pair of opposites for which Paul has become famous (see, besides 2 Cor 3.6, Rom 2.29 and 7.6).

> (3.4) Πεποίθησιν δὲ τοιαύτην ἔχομεν διὰ τοῦ Χριστοῦ πρὸς τὸν θεόν. (5) οὐχ ὅτι ἀφ' ἑαυτῶν ἱκανοί ἐσμεν λογίσασθαί τι ὡς ἐξ ἑαυτῶν, ἀλλ' ἡ ἱκανότης ἡμῶν ἐκ τοῦ θεοῦ, (6) ὃς καὶ ἱκάνωσεν ἡμᾶς διακόνους καινῆς διαθήκης, οὐ γράμματος ἀλλὰ πνεύματος· τὸ γὰρ γράμμα ἀποκτέννει, τὸ δὲ πνεῦμα ζῳοποιεῖ.
>
> 4 Such is the confidence that we have through Christ toward God. 5 Not that we are competent of ourselves to claim anything as coming from us; our competence is from God, 6 who has made us competent to be ministers of a new covenant, *not of letter but of spirit*; for *the letter kills, but the Spirit gives life*.

After mentioning the 'letters of recommendation' in 3.1, and contrasting them in 3.2–3 with the metaphorical letter made up by the community, written in Paul's heart and legible for all (ἡ ἐπιστολὴ … , ἐγγεγραμμένη …, γινωσκομένη καὶ ἀναγινωσκομένη), written not with ink (ἐγγεγραμμένη οὐ μέλανι) but with the Spirit of the living God, now, in 3.6, Paul goes on to express the full antithesis between 'letter' (γράμμα) and 'Spirit' (πνεῦμα). The new covenant and its ministers are characterized as a covenant and as ministers 'not of letter but of spirit' (3.6a–b).

These features are further elaborated in two short sentences: 'for the letter kills, but the Spirit gives life' – τὸ γὰρ γράμμα ἀποκτέννει, τὸ δὲ πνεῦμα ζῳοποιεῖ (3.6c–d). Because this phrase sounds so quintessentially Pauline,[6] it is

[6] The link between Spirit and giving life had already been established in 1 Cor 15.45. But the statement that the letter kills is now added and seems to reflect a general psychological experience, also attested in Classical sources. According to Dio Chrysostom, the written law 'by threats and violence maintains its mastery' and may be likened 'to the power of tyranny, for it

important to be aware of the fact that this Pauline theologoumenon is not dropped into the text but develops naturally from the reference to the 'letters of recommendation' in 3.1. In the course of 2 Cor 3.1–6 Paul's thought crystallizes into the statement of 3.6 about the antagonism between letter and Spirit. The letters of recommendation have now become (almost intrinsically) linked to the Mosaic 'gramma'. The reason for this equation will be explored later, but already we can conclude that the term 'letter' (γράμμα) is indeed a pivotal term in 2 Cor 3, but only because it serves Paul's criticism of the practice of letters of recommendation. In the following section of 2 Cor 3 Paul describes the most important feature of this 'gramma', its temporary, transient glory.

6.2.3 Moses' 'gramma': glorious, but only transient glory (2 Cor 3.7–11)

The most remarkable feature of Moses' 'gramma' is its glorious nature, its δόξα, the second key term in 2 Cor 3. Though on closer reflection, this glory relates not to the law, but the law-giver himself, Moses. In this, Paul clearly draws upon Exod 34, which talks about Moses' radiance. Paul is surprisingly positive about Moses and does not deny his glory, but merely contrasts it with the still greater glory of the new covenant. The glory of Moses' *gramma* is only temporary, yet undoubtedly radiant:

> (3.7) Εἰ δὲ ἡ διακονία τοῦ θανάτου ἐν γράμμασιν ἐντετυπωμένη λίθοις ἐγενήθη ἐν δόξῃ, ὥστε μὴ δύνασθαι ἀτενίσαι τοὺς υἱοὺς Ἰσραὴλ εἰς τὸ πρόσωπον Μωϋσέως διὰ τὴν δόξαν τοῦ προσώπου αὐτοῦ τὴν καταργουμένην, (8) πῶς οὐχὶ μᾶλλον ἡ διακονία τοῦ πνεύματος ἔσται ἐν δόξῃ; (9) εἰ γὰρ ἡ διακονία τῆς κατακρίσεως δόξα, πολλῷ μᾶλλον περισσεύει ἡ διακονία τῆς δικαιοσύνης δόξῃ. (10) καὶ γὰρ οὐ δεδόξασται τὸ δεδοξασμένον ἐν τούτῳ τῷ μέρει εἵνεκεν τῆς ὑπερβαλλούσης δόξης· (11) εἰ γὰρ τὸ καταργούμενον διὰ δόξης, πολλῷ μᾶλλον τὸ μένον ἐν δόξῃ. (2 Cor 3.7–11)
>
> [7] Now if the ministry of death, chiselled in letters on stone tablets, came in glory so that the people of Israel could not gaze at Moses' face because of the glory of his face, a glory now set aside, [8] how much more will the ministry of the Spirit come in glory? [9] For if there was glory in the ministry of condemnation, much more does the ministry of justification abound in glory! [10] Indeed, what once had glory has lost its glory because of the greater glory; [11] for if what was set aside came through glory, much more has the permanent come in glory!

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is by means of fear and through injunction that each measure is made effective'; 'the written law is harsh and stern' and 'the laws create a polity of slaves … For the laws inflict punishment upon men's body' (Dio Chrysostom, *Orationes* 76.1–4). In the same way as Paul contrasts Spirit and the written Mosaic law, Dio sets off customs against written laws: 'while laws are preserved on tablets of wood or of stone, each custom is preserved within our own hearts' (76.3). Paul's differentiation between written law and Spirit comes close to that between the letter and the intention of the lawgiver (Libanius, *Declamations* 31.35; both texts in *Neuer Wettstein*, vol. 2.1 (1996), 425–7.

We now have the fullest explication that the 'gramma' is indeed the Mosaic law, 'chiselled in letters on stone tablets' (3.7). Paul characterizes this 'gramma' as glorious and tells us that 'the people of Israel could not gaze at Moses' face because of the glory of his face' (3.7). For this characterization and anecdote, Paul alludes to Exod 34. There we find the story that Moses, after the second reception of the law, came down from Mount Sinai. While he was descending

> Μωυσῆς οὐκ ᾔδει ὅτι δεδόξασται ἡ ὄψις τοῦ χρώματος τοῦ προσώπου αὐτοῦ ἐν τῷ λαλεῖν αὐτὸν αὐτῷ [30] καὶ εἶδεν Ααρων καὶ πάντες οἱ πρεσβύτεροι Ισραηλ τὸν Μωυσῆν καὶ ἦν δεδοξασμένη ἡ ὄψις τοῦ χρώματος τοῦ προσώπου αὐτοῦ καὶ ἐφοβήθησαν ἐγγίσαι αὐτοῦ [31] καὶ ἐκάλεσεν αὐτοὺς Μωυσῆς καὶ ἐπεστράφησαν πρὸς αὐτὸν Ααρων καὶ πάντες οἱ ἄρχοντες τῆς συναγωγῆς καὶ ἐλάλησεν αὐτοῖς Μωυσῆς [32] καὶ μετὰ ταῦτα προσῆλθον πρὸς αὐτὸν πάντες οἱ υἱοὶ Ισραηλ καὶ ἐνετείλατο αὐτοῖς πάντα ὅσα ἐλάλησεν κύριος πρὸς αὐτὸν ἐν τῷ ὄρει Σινα [33] καὶ ἐπειδὴ κατέπαυσεν λαλῶν πρὸς αὐτούς ἐπέθηκεν ἐπὶ τὸ πρόσωπον αὐτοῦ κάλυμμα [34] ἡνίκα δ' ἂν εἰσεπορεύετο Μωυσῆς ἔναντι κυρίου λαλεῖν αὐτῷ περιῃρεῖτο τὸ κάλυμμα ἕως τοῦ ἐκπορεύεσθαι καὶ ἐξελθὼν ἐλάλει πᾶσιν τοῖς υἱοῖς Ισραηλ ὅσα ἐνετείλατο αὐτῷ κύριος [35] καὶ εἶδον οἱ υἱοὶ Ισραηλ τὸ πρόσωπον Μωυσῆ ὅτι δεδόξασται καὶ περιέθηκεν Μωυσῆς κάλυμμα ἐπὶ τὸ πρόσωπον ἑαυτοῦ ἕως ἂν εἰσέλθῃ συλλαλεῖν αὐτῷ. (Exod 34.29–35 LXX)
>
> [29]… Moses knew not that the appearance of the skin of his face was glorified, when God spoke to him. [30] And Aaron and all the elders of Israel saw Moses, and the appearance of the skin of his face was made glorious, and they feared to approach him. [31] And Moses called them, and Aaron and all the rulers of the synagogue turned towards him, and Moses spoke to them. [32] And afterwards all the children of Israel came to him, and he commanded them all things, whatsoever the Lord had commanded him in the mount of Sinai. [33] And *when he ceased speaking to them*, he put a veil on his face. [34] And whenever Moses went in before the Lord to speak to him, he took off the veil *till he went out*, and he went forth and spoke to all the children of Israel whatsoever the Lord commanded him. [35] And the children of Israel saw the face of Moses, that it was glorified; and Moses put the veil over his face, *till he went in* to speak with him.

This narrative – which describes how Moses descends from Mount Sinai, unaware of his radiant appearance, and meets with the fearsome elders, rulers and children of Israel to transmit to them the commandments of God – contains a striking inconsistency. According to Exod 34.33, when Moses '*ceased* speaking to them, he put a veil on his face'. In Exod 34.34–35, however, Moses is said to put the veil over his face as soon as he communicates with the Israelites: 'whenever Moses went in before the Lord to speak to him, he took off the veil till he went out … ; and Moses put the veil over his face, till he went in to speak with him'.

It seems that the narrative describes two different instances. The first time, when Moses came down from the mountain, he first addressed the Israelites without veil. Only afterwards, once he had ceased talking, he put on a veil (34.33). Thereafter, however, when Moses goes into the tabernacle, which from

now on replaces Sinai as the place of the revelation of God's commands, he covers himself with a veil as soon as he leaves the tabernacle (34.34). The report in Exod 34 is somewhat awkward as it concludes as follows: 'And the children of Israel saw the face of Moses, that it was glorified; and Moses put the veil over his face, till he went in to speak with him' (34.35). The first part seems to summarize the first experience of the Israelites, when Moses came down from Mount Sinai; only on that occasion did they see Moses' face glorified. The second part then summarizes the normal procedure when Moses used the tabernacle for further encounters with God; on those occasions he was equally unveiled, but he put on a veil as soon as he left the tabernacle to communicate with the Israelites.

6.2.4 The superiority of the Lord's permanent, inward glory (2 Cor 3.12–18)

This slight inconsistency or ambiguity in the text is now fully exploited by Paul in the next and final section of 2 Cor 3. The fact that the first time Moses only covered himself after he had ceased talking to the Israelites suggests – in Paul's view – that they must have seen the glory on Moses' face gradually fading away. It was in order to protect them, not against fear of Moses' glory, but against the painful awareness that Moses' glory was only transitory, that Moses covered himself. This temporary, transitory glory contrasts with the permanence of the glory of the Lord himself, into which all believers are being transformed:

> (3.12) Ἔχοντες οὖν τοιαύτην ἐλπίδα πολλῇ παρρησίᾳ χρώμεθα, (13) καὶ οὐ καθάπερ Μωϋσῆς ἐτίθει κάλυμμα ἐπὶ τὸ πρόσωπον αὐτοῦ, πρὸς τὸ μὴ ἀτενίσαι τοὺς υἱοὺς Ἰσραὴλ εἰς τὸ τέλος τοῦ καταργουμένου. (14) ἀλλὰ ἐπωρώθη τὰ νοήματα αὐτῶν. ἄχρι γὰρ τῆς σήμερον ἡμέρας τὸ αὐτὸ κάλυμμα ἐπὶ τῇ ἀναγνώσει τῆς παλαιᾶς διαθήκης μένει μὴ ἀνακαλυπτόμενον, ὅτι ἐν Χριστῷ καταργεῖται· (15) ἀλλ' ἕως σήμερον ἡνίκα ἂν ἀναγινώσκηται Μωϋσῆς κάλυμμα ἐπὶ τὴν καρδίαν αὐτῶν κεῖται· (16) ἡνίκα δὲ ἐὰν ἐπιστρέψῃ πρὸς κύριον, περιαιρεῖται τὸ κάλυμμα. (17) ὁ δὲ κύριος τὸ πνεῦμά ἐστιν· οὗ δὲ τὸ πνεῦμα κυρίου, ἐλευθερία. (18) ἡμεῖς δὲ πάντες ἀνακεκαλυμμένῳ προσώπῳ τὴν δόξαν κυρίου κατοπτριζόμενοι τὴν αὐτὴν εἰκόνα μεταμορφούμεθα ἀπὸ δόξης εἰς δόξαν, καθάπερ ἀπὸ κυρίου πνεύματος. (2 Cor 3.12–18)
>
> [12] Since, then, we have such a hope, we act with great boldness, [13] not like Moses, who put a veil over his face to keep the people of Israel from gazing at the end of the glory that was being set aside. [14] But their minds were hardened. Indeed, to this very day, when they hear the reading of the old covenant, that same veil is still there, since only in Christ is it set aside. [15] Indeed, to this very day whenever Moses is read, a veil lies over their minds; [16] but when one turns to the Lord, the veil is removed. [17] Now the Lord is the Spirit, and where the Spirit of the Lord is, there is freedom. [18] And all of us, with unveiled faces, seeing the glory of the Lord as though reflected in a mirror, are being transformed into the same image from one degree of glory to another; for this comes from the Lord, the Spirit.

Whereas in the previous section Paul has explained the reason for (or rather the consequence of) Moses' veil as ὥστε μὴ δύνασθαι ἀτενίσαι τοὺς υἱοὺς

Ἰσραὴλ εἰς τὸ πρόσωπον Μωϋσέως διὰ τὴν δόξαν τοῦ προσώπου αὐτοῦ – 'so that the people of Israel could not gaze at Moses' face because of *the glory* of his face' (3.7), the reason given now in the last section of 2 Cor 3 is πρὸς τὸ μὴ ἀτενίσαι τοὺς υἱοὺς Ἰσραὴλ εἰς τὸ τέλος τοῦ καταργουμένου – 'to keep the people of Israel from gazing at *the end of the glory* that was being set aside' (3.13). This temporary glory is subsequently contrasted with the permanence of the Lord's glory, which Moses himself experienced in a direct, immediate, unveiled way: 'when one turns to the Lord, the veil is removed' (3.16) – ἡνίκα δὲ ἐὰν ἐπιστρέψῃ πρὸς κύριον, περιαιρεῖται τὸ κάλυμμα.

This is an almost verbatim quotation from Exod 34.34: ἡνίκα δ' ἂν εἰσεπορεύετο Μωυσῆς ἔναντι κυρίου λαλεῖν αὐτῷ περιῃρεῖτο τὸ κάλυμμα – 'whenever Moses went in before the Lord to speak to him, he took off the veil'. However, the small differences between the LXX and 2 Cor 3.16 are very revealing. By dropping the name 'Moses' Paul is able to generalize the subject of 'went in before the Lord'. Not Moses, but every one who goes in before (or rather: turns to) the Lord experiences the Lord's glory. In this way, the stress shifts from Moses' exclusiveness to Moses as an example for the possibility of direct acquaintance with God. As, in Paul's view, this possibility comes about through conversion, it is noteworthy that Paul also drops the phrase ἡνίκα δ' ἂν εἰσεπορεύετο … ἔναντι κυρίου, 'whenever [he] went in before the Lord', and replaces it with the phrase ἡνίκα δὲ ἐὰν ἐπιστρέψῃ πρὸς κύριον, περιαιρεῖται τὸ κάλυμμα: 'but when one turns, or converts to the Lord, the veil is removed', the verb ἐπιστρέφειν expressing the conversion involved (cf. 1 Thess 1.9; Gal 4.9). Everyone is eligible for such a conversion. It is no longer that Moses alone has the privileged position of direct contact with God's transforming glory, but

> ἡμεῖς δὲ πάντες ἀνακεκαλυμμένῳ προσώπῳ τὴν δόξαν κυρίου κατοπτριζόμενοι τὴν αὐτὴν εἰκόνα μεταμορφούμεθα ἀπὸ δόξης εἰς δόξαν.
>
> *All of us*, with unveiled faces, seeing the glory of the Lord as though reflected in a mirror, *are being transformed into the same image* from one degree of glory to another. (3.18)

This passage highlights both the similarity between Christian believers and Moses in Paul's mind and, at the same time, the difference. The similarity consists in the fact that Christians resemble Moses insofar as they, like Moses in his contact with God, do not need to cover their faces (ἀνακεκαλυμμένῳ προσώπῳ). The dissimilarity, however, has to do with the permanent and still increasing nature of the glory into which the Christians are transformed. Whereas the glory on Moses' face was only temporary and diminished, and was only refreshed for a time after a new encounter with God, the transformation which the believers experience does not diminish, but, on the contrary, gradually increases: 'all of us … are being transformed into the same image *from one degree*

of glory to another' (ἡμεῖς δὲ πάντες … τὴν αὐτὴν εἰκόνα μεταμορφούμεθα ἀπὸ δόξης εἰς δόξαν).

There is a further important difference, which Paul brings out in the following chapter, 2 Cor 4; this transformation only concerns the inner man, and not the outer man (4.16): 'So we do not lose heart. Even though our outer man is wasting away, our inner man is being renewed day by day' – Διὸ οὐκ ἐγκακοῦμεν, ἀλλ' εἰ καὶ ὁ ἔξω ἡμῶν ἄνθρωπος διαφθείρεται, ἀλλ' ὁ ἔσω ἡμῶν ἀνακαινοῦται ἡμέρᾳ καὶ ἡμέρᾳ. Whereas Moses' glory was visible on his face, the Spirit-worked glory is not visible on the outside. This is an important issue which will bring us to the heart of the polemics in Corinth; I shall return to this in due course.

So far, we have seen that Paul's exegesis of Exod 34 in 2 Cor 3 hinges on two key words, 'gramma' and 'glory'. The first term 'gramma' emerges from a description Paul gives of the practice, current among his sophistic opponents, of using written letters of recommendation. Strangely, these written letters somehow develop into the Mosaic *grammata*, which are characterized as 'glorious' because of the 'glory' of their author, Moses. Here a link is being forged between sophistic letters of recommendation and a particular understanding of Moses and his *grammata*. But what exactly is this link? Why does Paul choose to link Moses with 'glory'? The train of thought running through 2 Cor can be apprehended more easily, I shall suggest, if we compare this to the way in which Moses was understood as a glorious, powerful figure by authors such as Philo and Josephus. This approach has already been taken in some respects by L. Bieler (1935–36), W.A. Meeks (1967) and Georgi (1987),[7] but I believe some further progress can be made.

In other Jewish texts, too, Moses is portrayed as a powerful, almost divine figure. In Ezekiel the Tragedian, Moses, in a dream, appears to be worshipped on God's throne by the whole of creation (ll. 68–89; cf. Gen 37). And among the Dead Sea Scrolls, *4Q Apocryphon of Moses A* emphasizes that Moses was made like God: 'And he made him like God for the powerful ones, and a fright for the Pharaoh' (4Q374, frag. 2, col. II.6), showing dependence on the biblical text of Exod 7.1 which reads 'The LORD said to Moses, "See, I have made you like God to Pharaoh"'. Although such passages show the high estimation which Moses often received, Philo and Josephus, especially, show what kind of discourse was involved in the positive representation of Moses in the Graeco-Roman world. Let us now turn to them.

[7] Bieler 1935–36, vol. 2 (1936), § 1.1, 3–36, esp. 25–36; Meeks 1967, chap. 3, 100–175, esp. 100–31: Philo, and 131–46: Josephus; and Georgi 1987, chap. 3, 229–313, esp. 254–8.

6.3 Philo and Josephus on Moses the legislator

6.3.1 Philo – Moses' strength and well-being

In Philo's biography of Moses, *De vita Mosis*, in which he aims to show that 'Moses is the best of all lawgivers in all countries' (2.12), he includes the following description of Moses' descent from Mount Sinai. This passage shows important similarities and differences with 2 Cor 3 and provides the setting in which the figure of Moses featured in contemporary debate. Moses' descent is described in the following way:

> As for eating and drinking, he had no thought of them for forty successive days, doubtless because he had the better food of contemplation, through whose inspiration, sent from heaven above, *he grew in grace, first of mind, then of body also through the soul* (τὴν μὲν διάνοιαν τὸ πρῶτον, ἔπειτα δὲ καὶ τὸ σῶμα διὰ τῆς ψυχῆς ἐβελτιοῦτο), *and in each singly* so *advanced in strength and well-being* (καθ' ἑκάτερον πρός τε ἰσχὺν καὶ εὐεξίαν ἐπιδιδούς) that those who saw him afterwards could not believe their eyes. For we read that by God's command he ascended an inaccessible and pathless mountain, the highest and most sacred in the region, and remained for the period named, taking nothing that is needed to satisfy the requirements of bare sustenance. Then, after the said forty days had passed, *he descended with a countenance far more beautiful than when he ascended* (κατέβαινε πολὺ καλλίων τὴν ὄψιν ἢ ὅτε ἀνῄει), *so that those who saw him were filled with awe and amazement; nor even could their eyes continue to stand the dazzling brightness that flashed from him like the rays of the sun* (καὶ μηδ' ἐπὶ πλέον ἀντέχειν τοῖς ὀφθαλμοῖς δύνασθαι κατὰ τὴν προσβολὴν ἡλιοειδοῦς φέγγους ἀπαστράπτοντος). (*De vita Mosis* 2.69–70)

In their retelling of the giving of the Law to Moses and his descent from Mount Sinai, both Philo and Paul agree that Moses' appearance was indeed dazzling and bright, and that the Israelites were incapable of looking at him. Both also allude to the inward, spiritual process. According to Paul, Moses, when unveiled, was caught in a process of spiritual transformation, a process which is now experienced by all believers (3.18) and comprises a growth in their 'inner man' (4.16). Philo, similarly, emphasized that 'Moses grew in grace, first of mind (διάνοια), then of body (σῶμα) also through the soul (ψυχή)' (2.69).

Yet, at the same time Philo's characterization of this process reveals an important difference. Implicit in Philo's depiction of Moses' spiritual growth in mind (or spirit), soul and body, is the anthropological trichotomy, known from Greek philosophy, of mind, soul and body (see chap. 5 above). As I have argued before, Paul's anthropology is also best understood as trichotomous. The difference, however, is that according to Paul the spiritual transformation only affects the inner man, whereas the outer man, the body, decreases in strength. Only after the resurrection, as Paul has explained in 1 Cor 15, does the Spirit also transform the human body into a spiritual body (1 Cor 15.44–49; see § 5.2.2

above). According to Philo, however, Moses' growth in mind and soul already affects his body during his lifetime: 'Moses grew in grace, first of mind, then of body also through the soul' – τὴν μὲν διάνοιαν τὸ πρῶτον, ἔπειτα δὲ καὶ τὸ σῶμα διὰ τῆς ψυχῆς ἐβελτιοῦτο (2.69). The mind influences the soul which, in turn, changes the body. In Philo's view, the physical effect of Moses' growth in mind, soul and body is perceptible inasmuch as he 'in each singly so advanced in strength and well-being (καθ' ἑκάτερον πρός τε ἰσχὺν καὶ εὐεξίαν ἐπιδιδούς) that those who saw him afterwards could not believe their eyes' (2.69). Moses' inward growth affects his outward condition; he increases in strength (ἰσχύς) and well-being (εὐεξία).[8] As a result, he 'descended with a countenance far more beautiful than when he ascended (κατέβαινε πολὺ καλλίων τὴν ὄψιν ἢ ὅτε ἀνῄει)' (2.70). Moses is not only a spiritual hero; he is also a physical superstar and makes a powerful impression. The Israelites are simply overwhelmed by Moses' strength and well-being; they cannot 'believe their eyes'. It is the beauty of his face which makes an impact on them. Philo describes the effect as follows: 'those who saw him were filled with awe and amazement; nor even could their eyes continue to stand the dazzling brightness that flashed from him like the rays of the sun' (2.70).

Elsewhere, Philo applies the same logic to the figure of Abraham: 'The divine *Spirit* which was breathed upon him [i.e. Abraham] from on high made its lodging *in his soul*, *and invested his body with singular beauty*' – τοῦ θείου πνεύματος, ὅπερ ἄνωθεν καταπνευσθὲν εἰσῳκίσατο τῇ ψυχῇ, περιτιθέντος τῷ μὲν σώματι κάλλος ἐξαίρετον (Philo, *De virtutibus* 217; see § 5.1.3 above). Here, too, the S / spirit influences the soul which, in turn, renders the body beautiful. This is reminiscent of the kind of sophistic-physiognomic strategy applied by the rhetorician Himerius in his eulogy about Hermogenes' soul, which develops into praise for his body: his soul 'shapes its body, bringing it into conformity with its nature' (Himerius, *Declamationes et orationes* 48.13; see § 2.1.3 [c] above). Despite the anti-sophistic tendency of Philo's interpretation of many of the narratives from Moses' Pentateuch (see chap. 3 above), it seems that Philo's representation of the bodies of Moses and Abraham was heavily influenced by sophistic physiognomics (cf. § 3.4 above).

In this respect, the difference between Philo and Paul is noteworthy. In his Corinthian polemics, Paul is critical of the language of strength and bodily well-being, hallmarks of sophistic rivalry. According to his opponents, Paul's letters maybe powerful, but his bodily appearance is weak: Αἱ ἐπιστολαὶ μέν, φησίν, βαρεῖαι καὶ ἰσχυραί, ἡ δὲ παρουσία τοῦ σώματος ἀσθενὴς καὶ ὁ λόγος ἐξουθενημένος (2 Cor 10.10). In their emphasis upon strength and bodily well-being, Paul's Corinthian opponents seem to constitute the opposite end of the

[8] Cf. Georgi 1987, 254–5.

scale,[9] with Philo balancing the scales in the middle. The latter seems to combine philosophical and sophistic values. Moses' growth affects not only his mind and soul, but also his body. The sophists, at one extreme, emphasize the importance of strength and well-being, while Paul, at the other extreme, denies the importance of outward well-being and draws attention to inward, spiritual growth.

This debate about strength (ἰσχύς) is already present in 1 Cor. The term ἰσχυρός, 'strong', is important in the polemics of (a) 1 Cor 1.25: 'God's weakness is stronger than human strength' – τὸ ἀσθενὲς τοῦ θεοῦ ἰσχυρότερον τῶν ἀνθρώπων; (b) 1 Cor 1.27: 'God chose what is weak in the world to shame the strong' – τὰ ἀσθενῆ τοῦ κόσμου ἐξελέξατο ὁ θεὸς ἵνα καταισχύνῃ τὰ ἰσχυρά; and (c) 1 Cor 4.10: 'We are fools for the sake of Christ, but you are wise in Christ. We are weak, but you are strong. You are held in honour, but we in disrepute' – ἡμεῖς μωροὶ διὰ Χριστόν, ὑμεῖς δὲ φρόνιμοι ἐν Χριστῷ· ἡμεῖς ἀσθενεῖς, ὑμεῖς δὲ ἰσχυροί· ὑμεῖς ἔνδοξοι, ἡμεῖς δὲ ἄτιμοι.

In 2 Cor, this polemic reaches its zenith in the opponents explicitly criticizing Paul's weak physical and rhetorical performance which is in sharp contrast with the strength they detect in his letters (2 Cor 10.10). What seems to be at issue in 2 Cor 3, when understood in such a polemical setting, is the nature of Moses' body, which is healthy, dazzling and resplendent and, as such, provides an exemplar for the Corinthian sophists: this perfect physical appearance contrasts with Paul's weak stature. It seems very likely, then, that the strength and glory of Moses, as described in Exod 34, was understood as an example of sophistic strength. Paul's sophistic opponents, who were of Jewish background (2 Cor 11.22), and manifested themselves in the largely ex-pagan Christian community of Corinth, might easily have been tempted into a sophistic appreciation of the importance of physiognomy. Indeed in Judaism, too, – as M. Popović has shown[10] –, physiognomics was not uncommon. The similarities between Jewish and sophistic physiognomics may well have facilitated the adoption of pagan sophistry by Paul's Jewish-Christian opponents in Corinth.[11] By shedding sophistic light on the strength and glory of Moses, Jews – Christian and non-Christian alike – could not only defend Moses in their encounter with pagans, but also compete with the sophistic ideals beyond the Jewish and Christian community. As we shall see, Josephus was very much involved in the same struggle.

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[9] On the importance of physiognomy and bodily performance in the Second Sophistic, see, e. g., Whitmarsh 2005, chap. 2, 23–40, esp. 26–32.

[10] Popović 2007.

[11] I owe this observation to Prof. George Brooke. Paul would have been able to adopt a critical stance towards (Jewish) physiognomics because of the enduring influence of Jesus' compassion for the physically unwell and impaired. On this, see Avalos 1999; Pilch 2000; and, for a comparative research into Qumran and the New Testament, Berthelot 2006.

6.3.2 Josephus – Moses' glory, honour and rivals

According to Josephus, at the Burning Bush already God predicted to Moses 'the glory (δόξα) and honour (τιμή) that he would win from men, under God's auspices' (*Jew. Ant.* 2.268). When, however, glory and honour started to materialize, Moses' integrity did not diminish. Josephus is keen to give several examples. When Raguel, Moses' father-in-law, invented a legal system, Moses did not claim it as his own, but openly avowed

> the inventor to the multitude. Nay, in the books too he recorded the name of Raguel, as inventor of the aforesaid system, deeming it meet to bear faithful witness to merit, *whatever glory* (δόξα) *might be won* by taking credit for the inventions of others. Thus even herefrom may one learn the integrity of Moses. (*Jewish Antiquities* 3.74)

In a similar vein, Moses even paid due homage to Balaam, the pagan prophet, and did not claim Balaam's glory for himself:

> This was the man to whom Moses did the high honour of recording his prophecies (μεγάλως ἐτίμησεν ἀναγράψας αὐτοῦ τὰς μαντείας); and though *it was open to him to appropriate and take the glory for them himself* (σφετερίσασθαι τὴν ἐπ' αὐτοῖς δόξαν καὶ ἐξιδιώσασθαι), as there would have been no witness to convict him, he has given Balaam this testimony and deigned to perpetuate his memory. (*Jewish Antiquities* 4.158)

Whereas Moses is an example of integrity, others did become envious of Moses' glory and honour. Josephus describes this rivalry in terms of sophistic in-fighting. He takes Korah's rebellion against Moses, as narrated in Numbers 16, as an example and depicts Korah as Moses' rival in establishing honour and glory. From Korah's perspective Moses was 'hunting round to create glory for himself':

> Korah, *one of the most eminent of the Hebrews by reason both of his birth and of his riches* (τις Ἑβραίων ἐν τοῖς μάλιστα καὶ γένει καὶ πλούτῳ), *a capable speaker and very effective in addressing a crowd* (ἱκανὸς δ' εἰπεῖν καὶ δήμοις ὁμιλεῖν πιθανώτατος), *seeing Moses established in the highest honours* (ἐν ὑπερβαλλούσῃ τιμῇ), was sorely envious; for he was of the same tribe and indeed his kinsman, and was aggrieved at the thought that *he had a greater right to enjoy all this glory* (δόξα) *himself, as being richer than Moses without being his inferior in birth*. So he proceeded to denounce him among the Levites, who were his tribesmen, and especially among his kinsmen, declaring that *it was monstrous to look on at Moses hunting round to create glory for himself* (λέγων Μωυσῆν δόξαν αὑτῷ θηρώμενον κατασκευάσαι) and mischievously working to attain this in the pretended name of God. (*Jewish Antiquities* 4.14–15)

Josephus depicts Korah as a sophist rival to Moses and represents him in terms also used in the Corinthian rivalry in which Paul is engaged:

(1) Korah is 'one of the most eminent of the Hebrews by reason both of his birth and of his riches' (τις Ἑβραίων ἐν τοῖς μάλιστα καὶ γένει καὶ πλούτῳ).

Similarly, Paul warns the Corinthians that not many of them are wise by worldly standards, not many are powerful, not many are of noble birth – οὐ πολλοὶ σοφοὶ κατὰ σάρκα, οὐ πολλοὶ δυνατοί, οὐ πολλοὶ εὐγενεῖς (1 Cor 1.26; cf. § 4.4 above).

(2) According to Josephus, Korah is competent (ἱκανὸς) to speak (δ' εἰπεῖν) and very persuasive (πιθανώτατος) in addressing a crowd (δήμοις ὁμιλεῖν).

(a) The whole issue of 'competence' is also central to the dispute in 2 Cor 2–3. As regards the dissemination of God's knowledge, Paul rhetorically asks himself, probably mirroring the ongoing debate between himself and his rivals: 'Who is competent for these things?' – καὶ πρὸς ταῦτα τίς ἱκανός; (2 Cor 2.16, cf. 2.6). And in 2 Cor 3 he brings up the issue once again; this passage is saturated with the language of competence and uses it in the adjectival, substantival and verbal forms:

> Not that we are competent (ἱκανοί) of ourselves to claim anything as coming from us; our competence (ἱκανότης) is from God, who has made us competent (ὅς καὶ ἱκάνωσεν ἡμᾶς) to be ministers of a new covenant, not of letter but of spirit; for the letter kills, but the Spirit gives life. (2 Cor 3.5–6)

The theme of 'competence' permeates 2 Cor 2–3 and is very similar to the issue which Josephus describes between Korah and Moses.

(b) Josephus also describes Korah as 'very persuasive (πιθανώτατος) in addressing a crowd'. This word, 'persuasive' (πιθανός) is especially used of popular speakers.[12] Paul, too, employs this semantic field in his polemics with the Corinthians when he denies that his speech and proclamation are filled 'with plausible words of wisdom': καὶ ὁ λόγος μου καὶ τὸ κήρυγμά μου οὐκ ἐν πειθοῖ[ς] σοφίας [λόγοις] (1 Cor 2.4; cf. Gal 1.10).[13]

Unlike Paul, however, Josephus is eager to draw Moses into this competition with the sophists and stress Moses' glory and honour. Not only Korah's competence in rhetoric and public performance is described, but that of Moses as well: his glory and honour have already been predicted by God, he is established in the highest honours and, although less wealthy than Korah, by no means his inferior in birth. The distinctive features of Moses, in comparison with Korah, are his integrity and the fact that he, 'having declined every honour which he saw that the people were ready to confer on him, devoted himself solely to the service of God' (*Jew. Ant.* 3.212). At the same time, however, Moses is portrayed as meeting sophistic standards. In his final encomium of Moses in *Jewish Antiquities* 4.327–331, Josephus heralds Moses as 'having surpassed in understanding all men that ever lived and put to noblest use the fruit of his reflections. In speech and in addresses to a crowd he found favour in every way' (4.328). Particularly

[12] LSJ 1403 s.v. πιθανός.

[13] LSJ 1353 πειθός = πιθανός.

the last description portrays him as not inferior to figures such as Korah, who, as we have seen, is also 'a capable speaker and very effective in addressing a crowd' (ἱκανὸς δ' εἰπεῖν καὶ δήμοις ὁμιλεῖν πιθανώτατος; 4.14).

Josephus also draws this picture of a powerful, glorious Moses in his description of Moses' ascent of, and descent from Mount Sinai: Moses ascends Mount Sinai although it is beyond men's power to scale (3.76), and when he returns he is radiant (γαῦρός) and high-hearted (3.83). An extensive eulogy on Moses is also found at the very end of book III of the *Jewish Antiquities*. According to Josephus, 'the admiration in which that hero [i.e. Moses] was held for his virtues and his marvellous power (ἰσχύς) of inspiring faith in all his utterances were not confined to his life-time' (3.317). Subsequently, Josephus remarks that it is possible to adduce many 'proofs of his superhuman power' – τεκμήρια τῆς ὑπὲρ ἄνθρωπόν ἐστι δυνάμεως αὐτοῦ (3.318). Moses' powerful authority is still felt to the present day: 'to this very day the writings left by Moses (τὰ καταλειφθέντα ὑπὸ Μωυσέος γράμματα) have such power (ἰσχύς) that even our enemies admit that our constitution was established by God himself, through the agency of Moses and of his merits' (3.222). Josephus' last remark contrasts sharply with Paul's remark at the end of 2 Cor 3, that 'to this very day whenever Moses is read' he is misunderstood (3.15).

Josephus' remark about the acknowledgement of Moses' merits by non-Jews also draws attention to the (alleged) impact of the power and authority of Moses' writings among the Greeks. As we have seen in § 6.1 above, the evaluation of the figure of Moses was indeed an issue in pagan-Jewish relations and also seems to have played a role in the Corinthian controversy. Josephus' attempt to raise awareness for Moses and depict him in a favourable way is also part of this debate. In order to achieve this aim, Josephus also emphasizes that Moses could hold his own in the face of sophistic rivalry and that he was in no way the inferior of his competitors. For this reason, Josephus stresses Moses' glory, honour, power and superhuman identity as among his chief merits. In so doing, however, he runs the risk of turning Moses himself into a kind of sophist. This will become clear as we now briefly study the language of power, glory and superhuman identity among the sophists. It seems that the same debate is going on here, dominated by the same concerns and obsessions.

6.4 The language of power, glory and *theios anēr* among the sophists

6.4.1 Power

To show the sophistic nature of this debate, I shall limit myself here mainly to Philostratus' *Lives of the Sophists*. Here the semantic fields of power, glory and

the superhuman are the natural territory of the sophists. For instance, Philostratus mentions the sophist Carneades of Athens. He

> was also enrolled among the sophists, for though his mind had been equipped for the pursuit of philosophy, yet in virtue of *the power* (ἰσχύς) *of his orations* he attained to an extraordinarily high level of eloquence. (*Lives of the Sophists* 486)

The inner-sophistic tensions come to the fore in rivalries such as those between the sophists Polemo and Dionysius. The latter attended a speech in court by the former, and Philostratus narrates their ensuing confrontation as follows:

> Dionysius heard Polemo defend the suit, and as he left the court he remarked: 'This athlete possesses strength (ἰσχύς), but it does not come from the wrestling-ground'. When Polemo heard this he came to Dionysius' door and announced that he would declaim before him. And when he had come and Polemo had sustained his part with conspicuous success, he went up to Dionysius, and leaning shoulder to shoulder with him, like those who begin a wrestling match standing, he wittily turned the laugh against him by quoting: 'Once O once they were strong, the men of Miletus'. (Philostratus, *Lives of the Sophists* 525)

This anecdote shows how in daily life the sophists confronted one another and were engaged in continuous wrangling, demonstrating their power and readiness to compete. Polemo quotes an iambic response of Apollo which has become proverbial (cf. Aristophanes, *Plutus* 1003) as a reference to degeneration, thus challenging his rival sophist. This is the atmosphere at Corinth, in which Moses too is turned into a powerful competitor, who 'in speech and in addresses to a crowd (…) found favour in every way' (Josephus, *Jew. Ant.* 4.328). In this way, Moses also functions as a role model for performance within the Jewish-Christian community. Quotation from his writings should be apt, and declamations about his life fresh and persuasive.[14]

Another story about inner-sophistic struggles relates to the sophists Alexander and Herodes. Alexander, born at Seleucia in Silicia, exercised his profession in cities such as Antioch, Rome and Tarsus, indicating that the sophists were very much part of life in the cities which Paul, too, visited. Alexander, having already performed in Athens before the arrival of Herodes, outdid the latter in the following way:

> He made a further wonderful display of his marvellous power (θαυμασίαν δὲ ἰσχὺν ἐνεδείξατο) in what now took place. For the sentiments that he had so brilliantly expressed before Herodes came he now recast in his presence, but with such different words and different rhythms, that those who were hearing them for the second time could not feel that he was repeating himself. (*Lives of the Sophists* 572)

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[14] For the importance of improvisations in the Second Sophistic, see Philostratus, *Lives of the Sophists* 496, 499, 511; see further § 4.2 above.

Again we experience the atmosphere of sophistic competence and performance, the command of which is described by Philostratus as a 'marvellous power'. Many other passages could be adduced which mention the erudition, force and powerful eloquence of particular sophists (e.g. 483; 585). One of these figures is lauded for 'his natural display of sophistic power' – φύσεως δὲ ἰσχὺν σοφιστικωτάτην ἐνδεικνύμενος (585).

6.4.2 Glory and physical appearance

The language of power often overlaps with that of 'glory'. Public speakers and sophists, according to Plutarch, are often 'led on by glory (δόξα) and ambition (φιλοτιμία) (…) to competition (ἀγωνίζεσθαι) in excess of what is best for them' (*De tuenda sanitate praecepta* 131A). This sophistic striving for glory is explicitly criticized by Dio Chrysostom, in a way very similar to Paul. According to Dio, sophists 'are lifted aloft as on wings by their glorious fame (δόξα) and disciples' (*Orationes* 12.5). He complains, however, that 'not one of the sophists is willing to take me on' (12.13). In deliberate contrast to the sophists, Dio presents himself to his audience at Olympia 'as neither handsome in appearance nor strong', and in age (…) already past his prime, one who has no disciple, who professes (…) no ability as a prophet or a sophist' (12.15).

This anti-sophistic talk clearly resembles Paul's. Like Dio, Paul stresses that he is not concerned with the outward man but only with the inward man (2 Cor 4.16); he himself is not strong but weak and vulnerable:

> ἐν παντὶ θλιβόμενοι ἀλλ' οὐ στενοχωρούμενοι, ἀπορούμενοι ἀλλ' οὐκ ἐξαπορούμενοι, διωκόμενοι ἀλλ' οὐκ ἐγκαταλειπόμενοι, καταβαλλόμενοι ἀλλ' οὐκ ἀπολλύμενοι, πάντοτε τὴν νέκρωσιν τοῦ Ἰησοῦ ἐν τῷ σώματι περιφέροντες, ἵνα καὶ ἡ ζωὴ τοῦ Ἰησοῦ ἐν τῷ σώματι ἡμῶν φανερωθῇ.
>
> We are afflicted in every way, but not crushed; perplexed, but not driven to despair; persecuted, but not forsaken; struck down, but not destroyed; always carrying in the body the death of Jesus, so that the life of Jesus may also be made visible in our bodies. (2 Cor 4.8–10)

Indeed, Paul is not ashamed to repeat his opponent's judgment that his bodily, physical appearance is weak (2 Cor 10.10). Yet he rejoices in his weakness (2 Cor 11.30; 12.5, 9–10; cf. 1 Cor 2.3). In this catalogue of afflictions and in his acknowledgement of being weak,[15] Paul shows the same philosophical, antisophistic pride as Dio (cf. § 4.3 above). His statements are not naïve, but deliberately construed to counter sophistic talk of strength, glory and repute.

[15] Cf. Fitzgerald 1988.

6.4.3 Superhuman identity

Apart from the vocabulary of power, glory and physical performance, sophists also apply the concept of superhuman beings. This is nicely illustrated by a report in Philostratus about the sophist Hippodromus the Thessalian. According to Philostratus,

> on one occasion when the Greeks were acclaiming him with flatteries, and even compared him with Polemo, 'Why,' said he, 'do you liken me to immortals?' (Homer, *Odyssey* 16.187). This answer, while it did not rob Polemo of *his reputation for being a divine man* (οὔτε τὸν Πολέμωνα ἀφελόμενος τὸ νομίζεσθαι θεῖον ἄνδρα), was also a refusal to concede to himself any likeness to so great a genius. (*Lives of the Sophists* 616)

This anecdote shows that sophists indeed claimed divine inspiration for their competence (cf. also Philostratus, *Lives of the Sophists* 521, 554, 570, 590; Lucian, *Philopseudes sive incredulus* 16); they even regarded themselves as 'divine men', θεῖοι ἄνδρες. This background to the Corinthian dispute was already highlighted by Georgi,[16] but he did not yet integrate his remarks about the concept of the θεῖος ἀνήρ into what Winter has noted about the sophistic setting of Paul's polemics in 1 and 2 Cor.[17]

As regards the concept of θεῖος ἀνήρ, Josephus also uses it twice to characterize Moses.[18] On both occasions, it is noteworthy that he employs it in an apologetic context, once in his *Jewish Antiquities*, and once in his *Against Apion*.[19] In the former he states:

> One may well be astonished at the hatred which men have for us and which they have so persistently maintained, from an idea that we slight the divinity whom they themselves profess to venerate. For if one reflects on the construction of the tabernacle and looks at the vestments of the priest and the vessels which we use for the sacred ministry, he will discover that *our lawgiver was a divine man* (τόν τε νομοθέτην εὑρήσει θεῖον ἄνδρα) and that these blasphemous charges brought against us by the rest of men are idle. (*Jewish Antiquities* 3.180)[20]

Given the ambiguous evaluation of Moses in the pagan Graeco-Roman world, outlined in § 6.1 above, there was clearly a perceived need to defend the power-

[16] Georgi 1987, chap. 3, 229–313, esp. 236, 254–5, 258, 274.

[17] Winter 2002; cf. Tiede 1992, 373. Georgi only mentions the sophists in his comments on 2 Cor 2.17; see Georgi 1987, 234.

[18] For Philo's portrayal of Moses as divine, see Meeks 1967, 103–5; Meeks 1968; and Runia 1988, 53–63.

[19] Cf. Du Toit 1997, § 14.3, 382–99.

[20] Cf. Meeks 1967, 138. Philo comes close to such a depiction of Moses in *De vita Mosis* 1.28 in which he emphasizes the distinctiveness of Moses' mind compared to that of his contemporaries: they 'considered earnestly what the mind which dwelt in his body like an image in its shrine could be, *whether it was human or divine or a mixture of both* (πότερον ἀνθρώπειος ἢ θεῖος ἢ μικτὸς ἐξ ἀμφοῖν), so utterly unlike was it to the majority, soaring above them and exalted to a grander height'.

ful, superhuman stature of Moses.[21] And, as Georgi rightly remarks, 'the biblical accounts of Moses' glorification, especially Exod. 34.29–35, lent themselves well to the full presentation of the Apologetic conception of the θεῖος ἀνήρ'.[22] The same defence is offered in *Against Apion*, where Josephus claims that the Egyptians regarded Moses as a marvellous, admirable, divine man:

> It remains for me to say a word to Manetho about Moses. The Egyptians, who *regard that man as remarkable, indeed divine* (τοῦτον δὲ τὸν ἄνδρα θαυμαστὸν μὲν Αἰγύπτιοι καὶ θεῖον νομίζουσι), wish to claim him as one of themselves, while making the incredible and calumnious assertion that he was one of the priests expelled from Heliopolis for leprosy. (*Against Apion* 1.279)

The apologetic setting of Josephus' use of the concept of θεῖος ἀνήρ emerges clearly. It is in this setting that I would understand the incentive experienced by Paul's Corinthian opponents. Like Philo and Josephus, these Jewish Christians felt the need to defend Moses and show his strength and glory. Yet by taking up the challenges of the Graeco-Roman world they, to a significantly higher degree than Philo and Josephus, surrendered to the standards of their sophistic environment, adopted them, and even implemented them as benchmarks for performance *within* the Christian community. By so doing, they changed the figure of Moses and – as I shall explain briefly – as a further consequence, also that of Christ.

6.5 Concluding observations: Paul's definitive answer to the Corinthian sophists

Paul needs to confront the portraits of Moses current among Christian sophists at Corinth, designed as they are to compete with general Greek culture. There might be a justifiable apologetic concern behind those portraits. Yet, in Paul's view, they are very dangerous inasmuch as they also – implicitly and perhaps only inadvertently – change the attitudes within the Christian communities with regard to the importance of outward, rhetorical competence and bodily, physical strength and performance. For this reason, it is vital for Paul to discuss Moses' glory after his descent from Mount Sinai as narrated in Exod 34. As we have seen, this passage is discussed right in the middle of anti-sophistic polemics in 2 Cor and evolves from Paul's reference to letters of recommendation, a sophistic practice which has been adopted to recommend powerful rhetoricians to other Christian communities.

Because of this, Paul's view of Moses differs significantly from those of both Philo and Josephus. According to Philo, Moses' spiritual growth in mind

[21] Cf. Georgi 1987, 257; cf. 126, 133.

[22] Georgi 1987, 257–8.

and soul is reflected in his body. It affects his outward condition; Moses increases in strength (ἰσχύς) and well-being (εὐεξία) (*De vita Mosis* 2.69). Paul, on the contrary, denies that strength and physical well-being are the result of spiritual metamorphosis. Similarly, where Josephus emphasizes the ongoing strength of Moses' writings – 'to this very day the writings left by Moses (τὰ καταλειφθέντα ὑπὸ Μωυσέος γράμματα) have such power (ἰσχύς) that even our enemies admit that our constitution was established by God himself, through the agency of Moses and of his merits' (*Jew. Ant.* 3.322) – Paul highlights their possible relative obscurity. He points out that 'to this very day, when they [the people of Israel] hear the reading of the old covenant, that same veil' – which keeps them 'from gazing at the end of the glory that was being set aside' (3.13) – 'is still there, since only in Christ is it set aside. Indeed, to this very day whenever Moses is read, a veil lies over their minds' (2 Cor 3.14–15). Paul needs to qualify the glory and strength of Moses (and his writings) because he fears their shortcomings and temporariness are being overlooked.

Paul not only criticizes his opponents' image of Moses. It is clear that their portrayal of Moses also has consequences for their view on Jesus. Georgi has already paid attention to the opponents' false Christology in this respect.[23] Although Georgi is right about the Christological nature of Paul's controversy with his opponents, which resulted from a *theios anēr*-interpretation of Moses, we need Winter's analysis if we are to be more specific about the identity of these opponents. They are not just protagonists of a *theios anēr*-movement; their views, as is evident from 1–2 Cor, have clearly *sophistic* overtones. It is against this background that Paul emphatically denies, in 2 Cor 5.16, that their claim about the character of the historical Jesus is correct: Ὥστε ἡμεῖς ἀπὸ τοῦ νῦν οὐδένα οἴδαμεν κατὰ σάρκα· εἰ καὶ ἐγνώκαμεν κατὰ σάρκα Χριστόν, ἀλλὰ νῦν οὐκέτι γινώσκομεν – 'From now on, therefore, we regard no one from a human point of view; even though we once knew Christ from a human point of view, we know him no longer in that way'. And in 2 Cor 11 he asserts that their gospel is a different gospel because their Jesus is a different Jesus:

> For if someone comes and proclaims *another Jesus* than the one we proclaimed (εἰ μὲν γὰρ ὁ ἐρχόμενος ἄλλον Ἰησοῦν κηρύσσει ὃν οὐκ ἐκηρύξαμεν), or if you receive a different spirit from the one you received, or a different gospel from the one you accepted, you submit to it readily enough. I think that I am not in the least inferior to these super-apostles. I may be *untrained in speech*, but not in knowledge (εἰ δὲ καὶ ἰδιώτης τῷ λόγῳ, ἀλλ' οὐ τῇ γνώσει). (2 Cor 11.4–6)

This passage shows that the opponents' view on, and proclamation of Jesus (4.4) have to do with their stress on being not 'untrained in speech' (4.6a). Their image of Jesus and of Moses would have been very similar, highlighting these figures' powerful rhetorical performance.

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[23] Georgi 1987, 271–7, 278.

In some ways, their *theios anēr*-type of Christology might be reflected in Josephus' testimony of Jesus (*Jew. Ant.* 18.63–64).[24] This passage, in portraying Jesus as 'a wise man, if indeed one ought to call him a man' (σοφὸς ἀνήρ, εἴγε ἄνδρα αὐτὸν λέγειν χρή) stops short of calling him a *theios anēr*, a divine man. Yet the phrase 'if indeed one ought to call him a man' seems to imply this meaning. In this sense, this characterization of Jesus comes very close to Josephus' explicit depiction of Moses as a *theios anēr*. As we have already seen, Josephus claims that if his anti-Jewish opponents would but spare a moment, they would be able 'to discover that [Moses] is *a divine man*' (*Jew. Ant.* 3.179–180) and that indeed the Egyptians did regard 'that man as remarkable, indeed *divine*' (*Against Apion* 1.279).

Although it initially seems remarkable that Josephus should depict Jesus in the same way as he depicted Moses, against the background of the contemporary interest in *theioi andres*, divine men, this assertion becomes less astounding. This part of Josephus' testimony of Jesus might well be authentic insofar as it gives a *theios anēr*-interpretation of Jesus, who 'wrought surprising feats and was a teacher of such people as accept the truth gladly' (ἦν γὰρ παραδόξων ἔργων ποιητής, διδάσκαλος ἀνθρώπων τῶν ἡδονῇ τἀληθῆ δεχομένων; 18.63). This portrayal of a powerful and rhetorically skilled Jesus, a wise, divine man, may well have been very similar to the Christology of Paul's opponents in Corinth; we know that, at least from an outside perspective, some pagans viewed Jesus as a sophist, albeit a crucified, i. e. unsuccessful one (Lucian, *De morte Peregrini* 13). Although Paul is convinced that the heavenly Christ, the second Adam, possesses full glory, he has a very different understanding of the earthly Jesus. This Jesus, according to Paul, defies description in the sophistic language of powerful strength, physiognomic perfection and competitive glory.

In a very philosophical way, Paul counters his opponents' emphasis on rhetoric with the claim that, although untrained in speech, he possesses *knowledge* (2 Cor 11.6b). To strengthen his case, he also deliberately resorts to the Platonic notion of the inner man in his criticism of his opponents. This notion of ὁ ἔσω or ὁ ἐντὸς ἄνθρωπος is found in Plato's *Republic* (589a). We shall study the notion of the inner man in full detail in § 7.2 below. Here I wish to highlight that Paul's application of this notion, following his criticism of the sophists' stress on *outward* performance, seems deliberately chosen. For the sophists, such an inner being was altogether unimportant. As T. Whitmarsh emphasizes, 'Identity was not an *inner being* fixed *inside* the sophist: it was, rather, linked to his *public persona*, and shifted with his fortunes'.[25] Paul's use of the Platonic notion of the inner man is the logical next step, then, in his debate with

[24] On the question of the authenticity of Josephus' testimony, see, among others, Whealey 2003; see also Mason 2003, 225–36.

[25] Whitmarsh 2005, 34 (italics mine).

the Corinthian sophists.[26] Paul applies it in the following manner. Whereas his Corinthian opponents sell the word of God by retail (2 Cor 2.17), Paul stresses the need to experience an inward transformation which affects the inner man and puts him through a process of a steady, glorious growth by which he is gradually transformed into, or in accordance with, the image of God, Christ (2 Cor 3.18–4.4; 4.16).[27] In marked contrast with a sophisticizing emphasis on Moses' bodily well-being, Paul holds the view that the condition of the outward man is altogether irrelevant. The *outward* man is wasting away, whereas only the *inner* man is being progressively renewed: 'Even though our outer man is wasting away, our inner man is being renewed day by day' – εἰ καὶ ὁ ἔξω ἡμῶν ἄνθρωπος διαφθείρεται, ἀλλ' ὁ ἔσω ἡμῶν ἀνακαινοῦται ἡμέρᾳ καὶ ἡμέρᾳ (2 Cor 4.16).

This progressive renewal of the inner man is synonymous with man's transformation into, or in accordance with, God's εἰκών, Christ. Christ is portrayed here as Adam, the second Adam that is. Already in 1 Cor, Paul has designated man as being the 'image (εἰκών) and glory (δόξα) of God': εἰκὼν καὶ δόξα θεοῦ ὑπάρχων (1 Cor 11.7), and has explained that 'Just as we have borne the image (εἰκών) of the man of dust, we will also bear the image (εἰκών) of the man of heaven' (1 Cor 15.49). As we learn from 2 Cor, this bearing of the image of the second Adam is not only an eschatological event, but rather involves a transformational process in the present, based on transformation into the image of Christ in his capacity as the heavenly man (2 Cor 3.18–4.4). The glory of this Christ (2 Cor 3.18, 4.4), thus, is the glory of the second Adam, just as the first Adam was God's image and glory (1 Cor 11.7).

This notion of the glory of Adam reminds us of the importance of this notion in the Dead Sea Scrolls (see § 1.1.3 above). The language of Adam, whom God 'fashioned in the likeness of [his] glory' and destined to 'walk in a land of glory' (4Q504 frag. 8 4–7), is applied to the members of the Qumran community: '*to them* shall belong *all the glory of Adam*' (1QS 4.23; cf. CD-A 3.20, 1QH[a] 4.15). Adam's glory is being re-established in their community. Something similar is happening in the Christian community, according to 2 Cor 3–4. If people convert to Christ, the second Adam, and reflect his glory (2 Cor 3.16, 18; 4.4), they experience a transformation ἀπὸ δόξης εἰς δόξαν, 'from one degree of glory to another' (2 Cor 3.18).

Despite this similarity between Paul and the Dead Sea Scrolls, Paul is different, in that he moves beyond the Jewish terminology of the image or likeness of God and the glory of (the second) Adam. In the course of 2 Cor 3–4, the language of image (εἰκών) is supplemented with the notion of the ἔσω ἄνθρωπος, the

[26] This has not been noted by Winter 2002, perhaps mainly because he focuses on 1 Cor. Paul's criticism of the sophists and his resort to the Platonic notion of the inner man supplement one another very effectively and reveal Paul's full strategy.

[27] Cf. Nguyen 2008.

inner man: man's transformation into the εἰκών of the second Adam, the heavenly ἄνθρωπος (1 Cor 15.47–49), results directly in a gradual and progressive renewal of the inner ἄνθρωπος (2 Cor 4.16). In this way, Paul recasts the Jewish terminology of the image of God in terms of a Platonic anthropology.[28] To his sophistic opponents, Paul admits that the wasting away of the outer man causes affliction, but only momentarily as the growth of the inner man prepares him for 'an eternal weight of glory (αἰώνιον βάρος δόξης) beyond all measure' (2 Cor 4.17). This eternal glory is the final outcome of the steadily increasing glory which results from man's metamorphosis into the εἰκών of the second Adam; it is his glory into which man is changed.

If this lasting glory of the second Adam is contrasted with the transitory glory of Moses, Paul's thinking very much resembles the kind of Moses-Adam polemics present in *2 Enoch*.[29] In this writing, Enoch, appearing before the face of God in the highest heaven, is extracted from his earthly clothing and dressed in the clothes of God's glory (22.8), similar to that of the angels (22.10) and the glorious figure of Adam (30.10–11). In the understanding of the author of *2 Enoch*, Enoch's newly achieved glory competes with that of Moses. This becomes clear from what happens when Enoch is sent back to earth after completing his transcriptions from God's heavenly books of wisdom (22.11), which Enoch is to reveal to mankind (33.5, 8; 47.2; 48.6–7). God calls one of the senior angels and orders him to chill Enoch's face with ice, because, God tells Enoch, 'if your face had not been chilled here, no human being would be able to look at your face' (37.2). This clearly recalls the setting of Exod 34.[30] In this way, the author of *2 Enoch* contrasts the figures of Moses and Enoch, as well as their respective revelations. Whereas Moses needs to veil his head to cover his glory, the heat of Enoch's Adam-like glory is cooled down by an angel.

A similar antithesis is clearly discernible in 2 Cor 3–4 in the antagonism between Moses' transient glory, misunderstood and overrated by Paul's Corinthian sophistic opponents, and the true, permanent glory of the second Adam. Paul's opponents seem to have found the portrayal of Moses' glory in Exod 34 very apt for their apologetic purposes. For this reason Paul has to focus at length on Exod 34; this chapter is pivotal for a glorious interpretation of Moses. Involved in a competition with sophistic outsiders, as they sold their wares at the religio-philosophical market of Antiquity, Paul's opponents overemphasized Moses' strength and bodily well-being. It is this picture which Paul sets out to rebalance. He does so by developing an anthropology which emphasizes the importance of the inner man.

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[28] After this turn at the end of 2 Cor 4 in 4.16, Paul's anthropology and eschatology in 2 Cor 5.1–10 are thoroughly Hellenistic, according to Peres 2003, § IV.2.2.3, 155–62; and Vogel 2006.

[29] I owe this suggestion to Dr Andrei Orlov. On Adam-Moses polemics, see Orlov 2005, chaps 5 and 6, esp. 279–83 and 289–91; Orlov 2007, 327–43; and Bunta 2007.

[30] Cf. Orlov 2005, 289–90.

Chapter 7

The Renewal of the 'Discredited Mind' Through Metamorphosis: Paul's Universalist Anthropology in Romans

Introduction

As we have seen in chap. 6, in his Corinthian correspondence Paul develops his anthropology of the inner man. In the context of 1–2 Cor this anthropology acquires anti-sophistic features. It is sophistic rhetoric, with its emphasis on outward performance and physiognomy, which is to be countered by an anthropology which focuses instead on man's inner being, which is strengthened through a metamorphosis in accordance with the image of God. After the conclusion of his correspondence with Corinth as we know it, Paul moves to Corinth for a final stay before returning to Jerusalem.

During that final stay in Corinth, Paul conceived his letter to the Romans, and in this letter he continues to write about the metamorphosis within the inner man. As I shall show, he develops his anthropology of the inner man further, but now in a different context. No longer is sophism the main target of his letter, but rather the ethnic tensions between Jews and former pagans within the Christian community of Rome, and their complex relations with non-Christian Judaism.

As I shall argue in § 7.1, the tensions between the synagogue and the Christian community date back to at least 49 AD, when these tensions reached a climax and resulted in Claudius' expulsion of the Jews, both Christian and non-Christian, from Rome. When these Jews were allowed to return after Claudius' death in 54 AD, the tensions reappeared but were now supplemented with inner-Christian tensions as the ex-pagan Christians and the Jewish Christians within the Christian community now entered into a difficult process of adjustment, since the ex-pagan Christians at Rome had dominated the Christian community for the past five years.

In this context, which differs notably from the Corinthian setting, Paul again applies his anthropology of the inner man, and now presents it not to combat sophism but to offer a universalist approach which transcends the ethnic tensions in which Christians in Rome were involved. He does so by offering an entire history of the distortion and possible renewal of the human mind (νοῦς). In Romans 1–3, Paul criticizes the ethnic positions of the (Christian) Jews and

the (ex-)pagans. We shall focus on Romans 1 where Paul explains, to the former pagans who now form the majority in the Christian community, that the human mind, which first acknowledged the existence of the one God (Rom 1.20: τὰ … ἀόρατα αὐτοῦ ἀπὸ κτίσεως κόσμου τοῖς ποιήμασιν νοούμενα καθορᾶται), became distorted through the decline of the original monotheistic and aniconic religion when

> they became futile in their thinking (ἐματαιώθησαν ἐν τοῖς διαλογισμοῖς αὐτῶν), and their senseless minds were darkened. Claiming to be wise, they became fools (φάσκοντες εἶναι σοφοὶ ἐμωράνθησαν); and they exchanged the glory of the immortal God for the likeness of an image of a mortal human being (καὶ ἤλλαξαν τὴν δόξαν τοῦ ἀφθάρτου θεοῦ ἐν ὁμοιώματι εἰκόνος φθαρτοῦ ἀνθρώπου) or birds or four-footed animals or reptiles. (Rom 1.21–23)

Man started to worship multiple gods, who were represented by images. In this way the human mind deteriorated into a debased, discredited mind:

> Since they did not think fit to acknowledge God, God gave them up to a debased mind and to things that should not be done: καθὼς οὐκ ἐδοκίμασαν τὸν θεὸν ἔχειν ἐν ἐπιγνώσει, παρέδωκεν αὐτοὺς ὁ θεὸς εἰς ἀδόκιμον νοῦν. (Rom 1.28)

They did not think fit (οὐκ ἐδοκίμασαν), hence refused, to hold God in recognition (τὸν θεὸν ἔχειν ἐν ἐπιγνώσει) and were delivered εἰς ἀδόκιμον νοῦν, to their own unsatisfactory and discredited mind. This we shall study in § 7.1.

However, the ἀδόκιμος νοῦς, the 'unsatisfactory, discredited mind', as Paul claims in his universalist anthropology, can be renewed in a religion which is to be characterized as a logical form of worshipping God, a λογικὴ λατρεία (Rom 12.1). In this religion, which is universalist and accessible for all ethnic groups, Jews and Greeks alike (see Rom 1.16, 2.10), the renewal of one's debased mind takes place. The readers are exhorted to experience a metamorphosis through the renewal of the mind, so that their renewed mind is again able – because it is no longer an ἀδόκιμος νοῦς, a discredited mind – τὸ δοκιμάζειν … τί τὸ θέλημα τοῦ θεοῦ, to discern the will of God:

> μεταμορφοῦσθε τῇ ἀνακαινώσει τοῦ νοός, εἰς τὸ δοκιμάζειν ὑμᾶς τί τὸ θέλημα τοῦ θεοῦ, τὸ ἀγαθὸν καὶ εὐάρεστον καὶ τέλειον – Be transformed by the renewing of your minds, so that you may discern what is the will of God, what is good and acceptable and perfect. (Rom 12.2)

The beginning of this process of metamorphosis is signalled in Romans 6 and takes place when man, through baptism, grows together with what is similar to Christ's death and resurrection (Rom 6.5). This has already been described in detail in § 2.4.2 above, on the *homoiōma* between Christians and Christ. This anthropology of assimilation to Christ dominates Romans 6–8 and culminates, near the end of Romans 8, in Paul's statement that, through this process, man becomes of the same form as the image of Christ (Rom 8.29). Romans 6–8 constitutes a unit in which Paul develops his view on man's *restoration*, having out-

lined *the decline* of man's mind in Romans 1; it fits into the letter's composition in the following way.

The first chapter of Romans introduces a section which spans Romans 1–3, in which Paul focuses on the decline and / or malfunction of both pagan and Jewish religion. After that, in Romans 4, Paul reflects on the figure of Abraham, but it is not until he introduces the figure of Adam in Romans 5 that he has sufficient grounding for his universalist anthropology, which he develops in Romans 6–8. This universalist approach seeks to overcome the ethnic divisions between pagans and Jews within the Christian community. Central to Paul's paving the way for Romans 6–8 is the depiction of Christ as the second Adam, of which the first Adam is a τύπος, a prototype which already points to the second Adam (Rom 5.12–14). Here Paul introduces the kind of Adam Christology which he has already expressed in 1 Cor 15.45–49, when he distinguishes the first Adam, the man from the earth, from the second Adam, the man from heaven. If Adam I is the historical prototype of mankind so far, Adam II is depicted as the ideal type of man from heaven, a heavenly model on which man can be recast.

Having introduced this antithesis between Adam I and II in Romans 5.12–21, Paul now opens his extensive anthropological section which runs from Romans 6–8. Man can be assimilated to Adam II by growing together with the likeness of his death and resurrection. This unit of Romans 6–8 will be explored in § 7.2.

First, in § 7.2.1, I shall summarize the findings of § 2.4.2 above about the assimilation of Christians to Christ in baptism (Romans 6). Subsequently, in § 7.2.2, I shall explore some of the anthropological terms used in Romans 6–7, notably those of mind and inner man. In order to describe how assimilation to Christ takes place in man, Paul gives a detailed geography of man. This geography seems to be essentially trichotomic, distinguishing between mind (or inner man), soul, and body, as we have already seen in chap. 5, but as is now further confirmed. In this geography, the term 'inner man', already used previously in Paul's Corinthian anthropology (2 Cor 4.16), seems to take an important place. We look first at the history of this term in Graeco-Roman literature before moving on, in § 7.2.3, to assess its meaning in the context of Rom 7.22 and to explore the close similarity between Paul and a Platonic thinker such as Plotinus. In § 7.2.4 I shall give a summarizing overview of Paul's geography of good and evil in man, and also locate, within this geography, the movement which is implied in Paul's notion of the *summorphōsis* of man with the image of God (Rom 8.29).

In § 7.3, finally, we shall study the ultimate outcome of the formation of Paul's anthropology. Having developed a universalist anthropology of this kind in Romans 6–8, through which both Christian Jews and ex-pagan Christians can be fully united, Paul seems to be faced with the question of how one ought to relate to the non-Christian Jews in the synagogue (Romans 9–11), just as later the question arises of how to relate to the pagan State (Romans 13). Straight after the intermezzo of Romans 9–11, Paul returns to a definition of the Christian religion

which allows the renewal of man's debased, discredited mind. According to Rom 12.1–2, the mind, through the assimilation to Christ described in Romans 6–8, is again enabled to 'discern what is the will of God, what is good and acceptable and perfect'. In this way the assimilation to Christ and the *summorphōsis* with his image are characterized as a thoroughly ethical process, exactly as assimilation to God is in Platonic doctrine (cf. § 2.2 above). With the definition of the Christian religion as the logical form of worship of God, through which the mind is transformed and renewed, the development of Paul's '(trans)morphic anthropology' reaches its climax.

Already working with a trichotomic anthropology in 1 Thess, in tune with other Jews such as Philo and Josephus (see chap. 5 above), it is in the sophistic atmosphere of Corinth that Paul experiences the need to develop this anthropology further and stress man's inner life and striving for truth as opposed to the outward performance of the sophists (see chaps 4, 5, 6). The ethnic tensions within the Christian community in Rome, finally, lead him to develop it further into a universalist anthropology with strongly ethical overtones.

7.1 Pagan and Jewish monotheism according to Varro, Plutarch, and Paul: The aniconic, monotheistic beginnings of Rome's pagan cult – Romans 1.19–25 in a Roman context

In the opening to his letter to the Romans, Paul argues that current pagan thinking in Rome and elsewhere in the Graeco-Roman world is a distortion of an aniconic and monotheistic religion, originally shared by all. As we shall see, the notion of a monotheistic past particularly resonates with an audience in Rome. By differentiating between the golden age of Roman religion and current practice, Paul presents his own religion as a 'logical [i. e. non-ritualistic] form of worship' (Rom 12.1–2; cf. 9.4) which restores the ideal. In this way, by invoking the authority of a respectable pagan monotheism in the past, Paul seeks to undermine current polytheistic thinking.[1] At the same time, his approach renders Jewish monotheism less exclusive, as it is not without pagan analogies. This seems to be Paul's double strategy, as in his letter he aims to reduce tensions between Jews and former pagans within the Christian communities at Rome.

These tensions were the result of the fact that for the past five years the pagan converts to what we label 'Christianity' in Rome had been without the fellowship of their Christian Jews. The latter, together with the non-Christian Jews from the synagogue, had suffered expulsion by Claudius who, according to Suetonius,

[1] On pagan monotheism, see Athanassiadi & Frede 1999, and esp. Frede 1999. On the issue of pagan monotheism, see also Mitchell & Van Nuffelen 2009*a* and 2009*b*.

had expelled the Jews from Rome because they 'constantly made disturbances at the instigation of Chrestus' [i. e. of 'Christus', Christ] (*Claudius* 25.4). As this had happened in 49 AD, over these five years the ex-pagan Christians had begun to develop a Christian identity separate from the Jewish Christians. When the former exiles (both non-Christian and Christian Jews) started to return to Rome after Claudius' death (54 AD),[2] and Christian Jews again met their ex-pagan co-religionists, tensions arose, which Paul set out to address in his letter. His answer to these challenges is not simply to bolster the Jewish monotheistic identity of the returning Christian Jews, but to point at the pagans' own distant monotheistic golden age. Paul tries to build common ground between the Jews and pagans which lies not in *Jewish* monotheism, but in monotheism as such. It is not surprising then that Paul sketches the outlines of this monotheism not by reference to the Jewish scriptures but with the aid of general Greek philosophy.

7.1.1 Paul

Although Paul broadens the scope of monotheism beyond Judaism, he is very critical of contemporary paganism because it deviates from original monotheism. The conduct of pagan polytheists is clearly 'indefensible' to him.

> For what can be known about God (τὸ γνωστὸν τοῦ θεοῦ) is plain to them, because God has shown it to them. Ever since the creation of the world his eternal power and divine nature, invisible though they are, have been understood and seen through the things he has made (τὰ γὰρ ἀόρατα αὐτοῦ – ἀπὸ κτίσεως κόσμου τοῖς ποιήμασιν νοούμενα – καθορᾶται). So they are without excuse; for though they knew God (γνόντες τὸν θεὸν), they did not honour him as God or give thanks to him, but they became futile in their thinking (ἐματαιώθησαν ἐν τοῖς διαλογισμοῖς αὐτῶν), and their senseless minds (ἡ ἀσύνετος αὐτῶν καρδία) were darkened. (Rom 1.19–21)

Although German protestant scholarship has been very reluctant to grant that Paul employs Greek natural theology, this is beyond question for those trained in ancient philosophy. Anglo-American biblical scholars have pointed out this prejudice among German and German-influenced continental scholars. Commenting on Rom 1.19–20, Dunn, for instance, states unequivocally:

> Also clear is the fact that some sort of natural theology is involved here. (…) we still have to speak of a "natural theology" – that is here, of a revelation of God through the cosmos, to humankind as a whole, and operative since the creation of the cosmos. (…) Paul is trading upon (…) the Greek (…) understanding of an invisible realm of reality, invisible to sense perception, which can be known only through the rational power of the mind. (…) it is scarcely possible that Paul did not intend his readers to think in terms of some kind of rational perception of the fuller reality in and behind the created cosmos. (…) the extent to which Paul was prepared to build his argument on what was

[2] Cf. the fate of Aquilla and Prisca / Priscilla according to Acts 18.2, 18, 26; 1 Cor 16.19; and Rom 16.3.

not a traditional Jewish world-view (…) reveals a breadth and a boldness in his apologetic strategy.[3]

Paul is not the first in Judaism to employ this Greek mode of thinking. As is generally acknowledged, the beginning of Romans much resembles the Jewish-Hellenistic work entitled *The Wisdom of Solomon*. In this first-century BC writing, which was included in the Septuagint, the author develops a similar line of thought:

> For all people who were ignorant of God were foolish by nature; and they were unable from the good things that are seen to know the one who exists (καὶ ἐκ τῶν ὁρωμένων ἀγαθῶν οὐκ ἴσχυσαν εἰδέναι τὸν ὄντα), nor did they recognize the artisan while paying heed to his works (οὔτε τοῖς ἔργοις προσέχοντες ἐπέγνωσαν τὸν τεχνίτην); but they supposed that either fire or wind or swift air, or the circle of the stars, or turbulent water, or the luminaries of heaven were the gods that rule the world. If through delight in the beauty of these things people assumed them to be gods, let them know how much better than these is their Lord, for the author of beauty (ὁ τοῦ κάλλους γενεσιάρχης) created them. And if people were amazed at their power and working (δύναμιν καὶ ἐνέργειαν ἐκπλαγέντες), let them perceive from them how much more powerful is the one who formed them. For from the greatness and beauty of created things comes a corresponding perception of their Creator (ἐκ γὰρ μεγέθους καὶ καλλονῆς κτισμάτων ἀναλόγως ὁ γενεσιουργὸς αὐτῶν θεωρεῖται). (*Wisd. Sol.* 13.1–5)

The author clearly shows himself dependent on Greek philosophy.[4] Especially the last line, that 'from the greatness and beauty of created things their Creator can be perceived *by way of analogy* (ἀναλόγως)' shows the author's acquaintance with Greek terminology.[5] In a similar way, Alcinous argues in his *Handbook of Platonism*: 'The second way of conceiving God is that of analogy, as follows: the sun is to vision and to visible objects (it is not itself sight, but provides vision to sight and visibility to its objects) as the primal intellect is to the power of intellection in the soul and to its objects; for it is not the power of intellection itself, but provides intellection to it and intelligibility to its objects, illuminating the truth contained in them' (10.5, 165.20–26; trans. Dillon).

Both Paul and the author of *The Wisdom of Solomon* appear to be well-versed in the Greek, mainly Platonic and Stoic discussions of 'intelligent design' in

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[3] Dunn 1988, 56–8. Cf. also Fitzmyer 1992, 274: 'some commentators have subconsciously reacted by denying the capability of the human mind to attain some knowledge of God. As a result, they have taken refuge in a form of fideism. In doing so, they have been reluctant to admit what Paul himself actually says about natural theology; they deny that God makes himself known in any other manner than in Christ'. These commentators are particularly found among the adherents of Luther and Barth. See Wilckens 1978, 118–21.

[4] On this dependence, see in detail Kepper 1999, 170–87; Larcher 1985, 748–67; Winston 1979, 247–57; Gilbert 1973, 13–35; Reese 1970, 50–62; Lange 1936, 293–302.

[5] See further Reese 1970, 56–8; Winston 1979, 252–3; Gilbert 1973, 25–30; Larcher 1985, 763–4; Kepper 1999, 179–185.

which the existence of the one God is deduced from physical reality. For the present purpose it is not necessary to follow these traditions in detail,[6] nor to focus on the heated discussions between Platonists and Stoics on the one hand, and Atomists, Materialists and Epicureans on the other.[7] Paul and the author of *The Wisdom of Solomon* should be read in this context.[8] In contrast with Graeco-Roman philosophers, however, the two Jews are far more critical of the practice of worshipping images. Although we shall see that Greek philosophers also criticized this popular custom, they never exhibit the same outspokenness as Paul and the author of *The Wisdom of Solomon*. After some initial doubts, the latter eventually draws firm conclusions about those who fail to deduce the Creator from the created things:

> Yet these people are little to be blamed, for perhaps they go astray while seeking God and desiring to find him. For while they live among his works, they keep searching, and they trust in what they see, because the things that are seen are beautiful. Yet again, not even they are to be excused; for if they had the power to know so much that they could investigate the world, how did they fail to find sooner the Lord of these things? But miserable, with their hopes set on dead things, are those who give the name 'gods' to the works of human hands, gold and silver fashioned with skill, and likenesses of animals, or a useless stone, the work of an ancient hand. (*Wisd. Sol.* 13.6–10; cf. 13.2 and 13.11–15.19)

Those who worship images are inexcusable. Paul reaches the same conclusions. Those who know God with the eye of reason but have refused to honour him as God became fools:

> Claiming to be wise, they became fools (φάσκοντες εἶναι σοφοὶ ἐμωράνθησαν); and they exchanged the glory of the immortal God for the likeness of an image (καὶ ἤλλαξαν τὴν δόξαν τοῦ ἀφθάρτου θεοῦ ἐν ὁμοιώματι εἰκόνος) of a mortal human being or birds or four-footed animals or reptiles. (…) they exchanged the truth about God for a lie (οἵτινες μετήλλαξαν τὴν ἀλήθειαν τοῦ θεοῦ ἐν τῷ ψεύδει) and worshipped and served the creature rather than the Creator (καὶ ἐσεβάσθησαν καὶ ἐλάτρευσαν τῇ κτίσει παρὰ τὸν κτίσαντα). (Rom 1.22–23, 25)

Although Paul and the author of *The Wisdom of Solomon* venture the same Jewish criticism against images, there is nevertheless an important difference. Whereas the author of *The Wisdom of Solomon* simply describes the pagans as they are (and presumably always have been), Paul, in his description, stresses the fact that the pagans have fallen away from their original knowledge of the one

[6] On 'intelligent design' theories in ancient philosophy, see Pease 1941 and Theiler 1965.

[7] Excellent, detailed descriptions by Furley 1999; Mansfeld 1999; Gerson 1990; Irwin 1989 (see Index s. v. 'design, cosmic').

[8] For parallels between Paul and Graeco-Roman philosophy, see also *Neuer Wettstein*, vol. 2.1 (1996), 13–21; detailed treatment of Greek philosophical background to Rom 1.20 also in Cook 1994. See also Guerra 1995, 49–52 and the commentaries on Romans, esp. Dunn 1988, 56–9, 71 and Fitzmyer 1992, 272–4, 278–81.

God, have *changed* the glory of the immortal God into an image (καὶ ἤλλαξαν τὴν δόξαν τοῦ ἀφθάρτου θεοῦ ἐν ὁμοιώματι εἰκόνος) and have *altered* the truth of God into a lie (μετήλλαξαν τὴν ἀλήθειαν τοῦ θεοῦ ἐν τῷ ψεύδει). This clearly implies that Paul postulates an initial golden age of pure, intellectual worship of God without images. He sketches the development of pagan religion as a history of decline, drastically moving away from its original monotheistic and aniconic stance. Originally, the invisible God was visible to the eye of reason in the things he had made, but man has long since exchanged the glory of the immortal God for human and animal images. Paul acknowledges that pagan religion started off well but suffered deterioration. This historiography is remarkably similar to that of the antiquarian of Roman religion, Varro.

7.1.2 Varro

(a) Varro on pure Roman religious beginnings

In his book *Antiquitates Rerum Divinarum*, Varro expresses his view that

> for more than 170 years, the Romans of old worshipped the gods without an image. If this practice had remained down to the present day (…), the gods would have been worshipped with greater purity. (…) those who first set up images for the people both diminished reverence and increased error in their cities. (Frag. 18 Cardauns; Augustine, *The City of God* 4.31)[9]

The pure, monotheistic era of 170 years mentioned by Varro represents the timespan from the foundation of Rome in 753 BC, through the first kingship of Romulus, the following kingship of Numa up to the reign of Tarquinius Priscus, the fifth king of Rome (616–579 BC), who is reported to have started the building of the temple of Jupiter on the Capitoline.[10] Varro clearly regards the initial period of Rome's religion as aniconic and, for that reason, more pure than the subsequent phase of Rome's religion when images were introduced.[11] Although Varro is able to interpret images in a positive, allegorical way (frag. 225 Cardauns), the development from an aniconic to an iconic religion is seen as a decline of Rome's religious golden age.

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[9] Cf. further Augustine, *The City of God* 4.9: 'Why has he [i. e. the one God] been treated so insultingly at Rome, and among other peoples also, by having an image erected to him? This fact displeased Varro so much that, though he was himself in thrall to the perverse customs of so great a city, he did not in the least hesitate to say and write that those who had set up images for the people had both diminished reverence and increased error'; 7.5: 'you [Varro] once soberly judged that those who first set up images for the people diminished the reverence of their citizens and added error, and that the ancient Romans honoured the gods more purely when they were without images'.

[10] Cf. O'Daly 1999, 93 n34; Cardauns 1976, vol. 2, 147, with reference to Pliny, *Natural History* 35.37 for the construction of the Capitoline temple.

[11] On Varro's aniconism, see Lehmann 1997, 182–93; Cancik & Cancik-Lindemaier 2001; Ross-Taylor 1931.

By speaking of the first 170 years Varro also implies the importance of Numa, Rome's legendary second king (715–673 BC), who was credited with the fundamental design of Rome's public religion and instituted cults, rituals, priesthoods, and calendars (Ennius, *Annales* 113–119 Skutsch).[12] As we shall see, it is Plutarch who explicitly mentions Numa in connection with the religiously pure period of 170 years. Varro, however, leaves Numa's importance implicit, although he does refer to him in other fragments.[13] In one of them, which was part of his *Curio de cultu deorum*, Varro relates the story of the books of Numa which had been buried with him[14]:

> The plough turned up from the ground the king's books, in which were written down the reasons for the sacred institutions. He [a certain Terentius] took these to the praetor of the city. He, having perused the first part, referred so important a matter to the Senate. But when the leading senators had read some of the reasons given as to why each part of the sacred rites had been instituted, the Senate declared itself in agreement with the dead Numa, and the assembled fathers, as religious men, required the praetor to burn those same books. (Cardauns 1976, vol. 1, 36, frag. III; Augustine, *The City of God* 7.34)[15]

Augustine, who preserved this passage, explains the books' destruction by the fact 'that the reasons for those rites (…) were not fit to become known' because 'Numa Pompilius had attained to these secrets of the demons by an unlawful curiosity' (7.34).[16] Augustine emphasizes, however, that this demonological interpretation is his own: 'Let each man believe as he sees fit; indeed, let every egregious defender of such impiety say whatever mad contentiousness may suggest. For my part, it is enough to point out that …' (7.34). As Cardauns has suggested, it is far more likely that Varro himself would have assumed that Numa's books were destroyed because they revealed the philosophical, aniconic foundation of Rome's original cults.[17] It is Plutarch who stresses the philosophical nature of the contents of Numa's books (*Numa* 22), but Cardauns is probably right that Varro already held this opinion, although he does not highlight Numa's role in Rome's primeval aniconic religion.

According to Varro, the reason for the decline of Roman religion was the influence of the poets:

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[12] On Numa's religious reforms, see Hooker 1963; Scheid 1985.

[13] Varro, *Antiquitates Rerum Divinarum*, frags 37–38 Cardauns. Varro, *Curio de cultu deorum*, Cardauns 1976, vol. 1, 36, frags III–IV; vol. 1, 39–40, frag. B.

[14] On Numa's books, see Peglau 2000; Willi 1998; Rosen 1985.

[15] Cf. the reports in Livy 40.29; Plutarch, *Numa* 22; and Pliny 13.84–87.

[16] See further Cardauns 1976, vol. 1, 36, frag. IV = Augustine, *The City of God* 7.35: 'Numa himself (…) was compelled to practise hydromancy, and saw in the water the images of gods, or, rather, the mocking images of demons, from whom he heard what rites he should establish and observe'.

[17] Cardauns 1960, 27; cf. Hagendahl 1967, vol. 2, 618–19.

> People are on the whole more inclined to follow the poets than the natural philosophers in their beliefs concerning the genealogies of the gods. (Frag. 19 Cardauns; Augustine, *The City of God* 4.32)[18]

The deterioration of Rome's religion is due to the poets. Their role is contrasted with that of the natural philosophers (*physici*). Here one catches a glimpse of the distinction Varro makes between 'physical theology', 'mythological theology' and 'civic theology' (frags 7–11 Cardauns; Augustine, *The City of God* 6.5–6). O'Daly briefly summarizes these three types of theology:

> The 'genus mythicon' is found in myth and especially in literature. It is anthropomorphic in tendency. The 'genus civile' has to do with worship rites, and sacrifices: it enshrines the beliefs to which Varro does not subscribe, but whose [social] utility he commends. The 'genus physicon' is philosophical, and deals with the origins, identity, and nature of the gods in a speculative and often controversial way: but it is more appropriate to a school than to the public arena (6.5). Yet Varro approves of this third kind of discourse.[19]

In his regret that 'people are on the whole more inclined to follow the poets than the natural philosophers', Varro indeed expresses his own preference for natural philosophy. For this reason, in Augustine's words,

> It is not by his own judgment that he follows the institutions established by the city of Rome. For he does not hesitate to confess that, if he were founding the city anew, he would consecrate the gods, and give them names, according to the principles of nature (*ex naturae potius formula*) rather than following what is done now. As it is, however, finding himself among a people already ancient, he says that he must adhere to the names and titles of the gods traditionally received from antiquity, and that the purpose of his writing and study is to encourage people to worship the gods rather than to despise them. (Frag. 12 Cardauns; Augustine, *The City of God* 4.31)[20]

Ideally speaking, religion should be physical, defined 'according to the principles of nature'. Yet, the Roman religion no longer accords with the ideal type of theology, since it has deteriorated. This ideal, physical theology consists of a monotheistic understanding of God as the 'soul of the world':

> The only men who have truly understood what God is are those who have believed Him to be the soul of the world, governing it by movement and reason. (Frag. 13 Cardauns; Augustine, *The City of God* 4.31)

This one God is Jupiter, 'the king of all the gods and goddesses' (frag. 14 Cardauns; Augustine, *The City of God* 4.9), 'the supreme God', as Augustine

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[18] Cf. Augustine, *The City of God* 6.6; and 6.1.

[19] O'Daly 1999, 103. Cf. also Hagendahl 1967, vol. 2, 610–17. On this *theologia tripertita* in Varro, Augustine and others, and its traces in Rom 1.18–25, see also Klauck 2007.

[20] Cf. Augustine, *The City of God* 6.4: 'if he were himself founding a new city, he would have written according to the rule of nature, but since he found himself to be a member of an old one, he could do nothing but follow its custom'.

interprets Varro (*The City of God* 19.22). Although identified as 'Jupiter', the name of the supreme God is unimportant to Varro[21]:

> Varro believes that he [i.e. Jupiter] is worshipped, though called by another name, even by those who worship one God only, without an image. (Frag. 15 Cardauns; Augustine, *The City of God* 4.9)

Although Persians, Scythians and others were believed to have aniconic cults,[22] Varro also points to the Jews as a present-day example of those who, unlike the Romans, have preserved their pure, original religion and 'worship one God only, without an image'. Varro's estimation of Jewish monotheism will be treated in detail in the next section.

(b) Varro on the Jews

In the fragment in which he praises the purity of aniconic religion, from which Rome had lapsed after 170 years, Varro also refers to the Jews:

> For more than 170 years, the Romans of old worshipped the gods without an image. 'If this practice had remained *down to the present day*', he [Varro] says, 'the gods would have been worshipped with greater purity' (*castius dii observarentur*). In support of this opinion, he cites, among other things, the testimony of *the Jewish nation*. (Frag. 18 Cardauns; Augustine, *The City of God* 4.31)

The Jews are referred to as a present-day example of pure, uncontaminated aniconic religion. As we shall see presently, Varro's high estimation of the Jews was already preceded by that of philosophers before him, and others followed suit. The Jews are also mentioned in other passages in Varro. He identifies the God of the Jews as 'Jupiter'[23], but also gives his name as 'Iao', the Greek form of 'Yahweh'.[24] It was the aniconic religion directed towards this god that Varro

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[21] On the issue of the interchangeability of the name of the supreme God according to ancient philosophers, see Celsus apud Origen, *Against Celsus*. 5.41 and Van den Berg 2006.

[22] Cf. Cardauns 1976, vol. 2, 146: 'bildloser Kult bei Persern, Skythen, Serern und anderen: Herod. 1.131 und 4.59; Strabo 15C 732; Celsus ap. Orig. 7.62 (zit. Heraklit VS 22 B5); Dino ap. Clem. Alex. Protr. 5 p. 65.1; Diog. Laertius prooem. 6 und 9; Cic. Rep. 3.14; Tac. Germ. 9. Zur Literatur vgl. fr. 18'.

[23] Frag. 16 Cardauns; Augustine, *Harmony of the Gospels* 1.22.30, 31, 42: 'Varro (…) thought that the God of the Jews was Jupiter (…); when he observed that the Jews worshipped the supreme God, he could not think of any object under that title other than Jupiter himself. (…) but we revere that Jupiter of whom Maro says that 'All things are full of Jove' [Vergil, *Eclogues* 3.5.60], that is to say, the spirit of life that vivifies all things. It is not without some reason, therefore, that Varro thought that Jove was worshipped by the Jews'.

[24] Frag. 17 Cardauns = Lydus, *De mensibus* 4.54. Apart from Varro, in the first century BC Diodorus Siculus, too, gives the Jewish God's name as 'Iao' (Diodorus, *Library of History* 1.94.1–2; Stern, No. 58). To judge from the surviving evidence, Varro and Diodorus are the first Graeco-Roman authors to mention 'Iao'. On Graeco-Roman views on the name and identity of the Jewish God, see, extensively, Van Kooten 2006*a*.

praised. In this he followed philosophers like Theophrastus and Hecataeus of Abdera before him.

Theophrastus is only in part a precursor to Varro. He characterizes the Jews as 'philosophers by race' because of their behaviour during sacrifices, but says nothing of their aniconic cult:

> During this whole time, being philosophers by race, they converse with each other about the deity, and at night-time they make observations of the stars, gazing at them and calling on God by prayer. (Theophrastus [372–288/7 BC] apud Porphyry, *On Abstinence* 2.26; Stern, No. 4)

A full concurrence with Varro is exhibited by Hecataeus of Abdera (*c.*300 BC). Commenting on the figure of Moses, Hecataeus portrays the cult which Moses established as aniconic:

> Moses, outstanding both for his wisdom and his courage (…) established the temple that they hold in chief veneration, instituted their forms of worship and ritual, drew up their laws and ordered their political institutions. (…) But he had no images whatsoever of the gods made for them, being of the opinion that God is not in human form; rather the Heaven that surrounds the earth is alone divine, and rules the universe. (Hecataeus of Abdera [*c.*300 BC] apud Diodorus Siculus, *Library of History* 40.3.1–4; Stern, No. 11)

This passage from Hecataeus shows that Varro was not the first to appreciate the Jews for their aniconic and monotheistic cult. In the past, scholars have also referred to Posidonius as a forerunner of Varro, but the Posidonian origins of the passages in Strabo and Tacitus adduced to this end are not conclusive. I shall therefore ascribe them to Strabo and Tacitus themselves and treat them below. Nevertheless, it is clear that Varro formed part of a tradition of authors who were favourable towards Jewish aniconic and monotheistic cult.

One of the most important representatives of the tradition after Varro is Strabo. As I have just briefly indicated, there seem to be no grounds to assume that Strabo is dependent on Posidonius. According to Strabo, again in a passage on Moses,

> Moses (…) was accompanied by many people who worshipped the Divine Being (τὸ θεῖον). For he said, and taught, that the Egyptians were mistaken in representing the Divine Being by the images of beast and cattle (…); and that the Greeks were also wrong in modelling gods in human form. For, according to him, God is this one thing alone that encompasses us all and encompasses land and sea – the thing which we call heaven, or universe, or the nature of all that exists (καὶ τὴν τῶν ὄντων φύσιν). What man, then, if he has sense, could be bold enough to fabricate an image of God resembling any creature amongst us? Nay, people should leave off all image-carving and (…) should worship God *without an image* (ἕδους χωρίς). (Strabo, *Geography* 16.2.35; Stern, No. 115)[25]

[25] Strabo, *Geography* 16.2.35 in the context of 16.2.35–37. Edelstein & Kidd's edition of Posidonius, frag. 279 only includes 16.2.43, but not the passage before (Edelstein & Kidd 1972–1999). See Edelstein & Kidd, vol. 1, 244 = frag. 279 = Strabo 16.2.42–43; vol. 2.2,

The passage shows that Varro's high esteem for Judaism did not remain an exception. Like Varro, Strabo compares Jewish aniconism with Graeco-Roman image-centred religion.

Another relevant passage is the one in Tacitus' *Histories* in which he not only points to the aniconic nature of Jewish religion, but also to the fact that, consequently, the Jewish God is conceived of 'with the mind only':

> The Jews (…) conceive of one god only, and that with the mind only ('Iudaei *mente sola* unumque numen intellegunt'): they regard as impious those who make from perishable materials representations of gods in man's image; that supreme and eternal being is to them incapable of representation and without end. Therefore they set up no statues in their cities, still less in their temples. (Tacitus, *Histories* 5.5.4; Stern, No. 281)[26]

This passage is particularly relevant to our discussion of the beginning of Paul's letter to the Romans. It shows that the Jews do what, in Paul's view, was also characteristic of pagan physical religion in the past, i.e. 'conceive of one god only, and that with the mind only (*mente sola*)'. As Paul puts it:

> Ever since the creation of the world his eternal power and divine nature, invisible though they are, have been understood *with the mind* and seen through the things he has made: τὰ γὰρ ἀόρατα αὐτοῦ – ἀπὸ κτίσεως κόσμου τοῖς ποιήμασιν νοούμενα – καθορᾶται. (Rom 1.20)

This overview may suffice to show that Varro's high appreciation of Jewish aniconic religion was no exception among Graeco-Roman philosophers.[27] Among Graeco-Roman authors, however, Varro is the exception in tracing Roman religion itself back to aniconic beginnings. In this he is followed by Plutarch, who also taught at Rome, and who referred to Varro (Βάρρων) by name in various

951–953 at 952: 'There is nothing to link [Strabo 16.2.]35–39 with the citation of Posidonius in [Strabo 16.2.]43 (…). There is nothing else explicitly in the Moses fragment with Posidonius'; and vol. 3, 354–355, with special attention to the disputed nature of the extent of this fragment (Norden: Strabo 16.2.34–43; Jacoby, frag. 70: 16.2.34–35; Reinhardt: 16.2.35–39; Theiler, frag. 133: 16.2.35–39). Despite the previous scholarly consensus about the Posidonian background of the passage, according to Edelstein & Kidd 'Posidonius is only mentioned for a specific point in 43'. For this reason I follow Edelstein and Kidd's minimalist approach and treat the passage in 16.2.35 as Strabo's own.

[26] Tacitus, *Histories* 5.5.4 is not included among the fragments of Posidonius in Edelstein & Kidd. *Pace* Theiler 1982, vol. 2, 283.

[27] See further Livy in *Scholia in Lucanum* 2.593: 'nor is any image found there, since they do not think that God partakes of any figure' (Stern, No. 133); and Cassius Dio, *Historia Romana* 37.17.2: 'they do not honour any of the usual gods, but show extreme reverence for one particular divinity. They never had any statue of him, even in Jerusalem itself, but believing him to be unnameable and invisible, they worship him in the most extravagant fashion on earth' (Stern, No. 406).

writings. Plutarch seems to be dependent on Varro in his passages about the origin of Rome's religion.[28]

7.1.3 Plutarch on pure Roman religious beginnings with Numa

Plutarch's remarks about Rome's originally aniconic religion are found in his *Life of Numa*.[29] Unlike Varro, Plutarch explicitly connects this phase with the figure of Numa. Numa Pompilius, requested to become king of Rome after Romulus' ascension into heaven (2–6), sets out to 'soften the [recently founded] city', 'as iron is softened in the fire, and to change its harsh and warlike temper into one of greater gentleness and justice. For if a city was ever in what Plato calls a "feverish" state, Rome certainly was at that time' (7–8 at 8.1). Numa achieves this softening effect by means of religion. He 'calls in the gods to aid and assist him' (8.2). Plutarch does not repeat Varro's comparison between Rome's original aniconic cult and the contemporary cult of the Jews. Rather, he points to the alleged Pythagorean background of Numa's religious institutions:

> Furthermore, his [Numa's] ordinances concerning images are altogether in harmony with the doctrines of Pythagoras. For that philosopher maintained that the first principle of being was beyond sense or feeling, was invisible and uncreated, and discernible only by the mind. And in like manner Numa forbade the Romans to revere an image of God which had the form of man or beast. Nor was there among them in this earlier time any painted or graven likeness of Deity, but while for the first hundred and seventy years they were continually building temples and establishing sacred shrines, they made no statues in bodily form for them, convinced that it was impious to liken higher things to lower, and that it was impossible to apprehend Deity except by the intellect. (*Numa* 8.7–8)

Plutarch clearly takes over from Varro the information about the time-span of 170 years of aniconic cult, but he renders the role of Numa explicit and adds the remarks about the Pythagorean nature of Numa's philosophical convictions.[30] Plutarch stresses that iconic reverence for God is inappropriate as the first principle of being is considered, by Pythagoras, as 'beyond sense or feeling, invisible and uncreated, and discernible only by the mind' (οὔτε γὰρ ἐκεῖνος αἰσθητὸν ἢ παθητόν, ἀόρατον δὲ καὶ ἄκτιστον καὶ νοητὸν ὑπελάμβανεν εἶναι τὸ πρῶτον; *Numa* 8.7). Paul's language in Rom 1 closely resembles this mode of thinking. According to Paul, too, God's invisible attributes (τὰ ἀόρατα) become visible when reflected upon by the *nous* (νοῦς): τὰ γὰρ ἀόρατα αὐτοῦ … νοούμενα καθορᾶται (Rom 1.20).

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[28] On Plutarch's dependence on Varro, cf. also Cardauns 1976, vol. 2, 147: 'Bei Plutarch Numa 8 ist die Notiz aus Varro [about the time-span of 170 years of aniconic cult in Rome; frag. 18] in einen Bericht eingeschoben, der vielleicht aus Kastor v. Rhodos stammt (v. Borries 64 ff.)'.

[29] On Plutarch's Numa, see Buchheit 1991 and 1993; De Blois & Bons 1992.

[30] On Numa and Pythagoras, see Panitschek 1990 and Prowse 1964.

Plutarch exceeds Varro by portraying Numa's Pythagorean background, but at the same time he de-emphasizes the subsequent degeneration when Rome's cult became iconic. Varro remarks that 'if this [aniconic] practice had remained down to the present day (…), the gods would have been worshipped with greater purity', and that 'those who first set up images for the people both diminished reverence and increased error in their cities (frag. 18 Cardauns; Augustine, *The City of God* 4.31); Plutarch, on the other hand, does not sketch this degeneration but simply states that Numa, following Pythagoras' views on God, 'forbade the Romans to revere an image of God which had the form of man or beast'. The Romans

> made no statues in bodily form for them, convinced that it was impious to liken higher things to lower, and that it was impossible to apprehend Deity except by the intellect (νόησις): οὔτε ἐφάπτεσθαι θεοῦ δυνατὸν ἄλλως ἢ νοήσει. (Plutarch, *Numa* 8.8)

Unlike Varro and several other Graeco-Roman philosophers,[31] Plutarch does not explicitly criticize the use of images and limits himself to noting the philosophical background of Numa's religious legislation.

For that reason, Plutarch probably also drops Varro's reference to the Jews' exemplary maintenance of their aniconic cult.[32] Moreover, such a reference to contemporary Jews was compatible with Varro's programme, but was probably out of place in Plutarch's biography of Numa, who was part of a twin biography of Lycurgus, on the Greek side, followed by Numa on the Roman side, and concluded with a comparison between the two. As such, a reference to the Jews would have been compatible with Plutarch's elaboration of the Pythagorean background of Numa's ideas, as several philosophers in Antiquity voiced the opinion that, eventually, Pythagoras himself was dependent on the Jews (cf. § 2.1.5 above).[33] In any case, compared with Varro, Plutarch is less interested in the decline of aniconic religion after Numa.

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[31] For pagan criticism of images, see also Cardauns 1976, vol. 2, 146–7: 'Zum bildlosen Kult bei Barbaren und Juden vgl. fr. 15–17; die philosophische Kritik an den Götterbildern ist bekanntlich alt: Xenophanes VS 21B 15; Heraklit VS 22B 5, B 128; Antisthenes ap. Clem. Alexandr. Protr. 46c, strom. 5 p. 601A; Zeno de Rep. SVF 1.264 ff.; Chrysipp SVF 2.1076; Diogenes Babylonius SVF 3.33 (…). Ablehnung der Götterbilder durch Varro findet sich noch fr. 22 (…). Dennoch hat er RD SVI eine allegorische Deutung der Bilder gegeben (fr. 225)'. See also Stern 1974, vol. 1, 207.

[32] For Plutarch on the Jews in other writings, see Plutarch, *De Iside et Osiride* 363D (Typhon and the Jews); *De superstitione* 169C (Jewish scruples on the Sabbath); *Regum et imperatorum apophthegmata* 184E–F (armistice on a Jewish festival); *Quaestiones convivales* 669C, 669E, 670D, 671C (who the god of the Jews is); *De Stoicorum repugnantiis* 1051E (Jewish preconceptions of the gods).

[33] On Pythagoras and the Jews, see Burnyeat 2006*a*, 140–1n6: 'The idea that Plato's philosophy, and Pythagoras' too, derives from the Jews goes back to a commentary on the Pentateuch (standardly dated 2nd cent. BC) by the Jewish Peripatetic Aristobulus, who claims they studied the *Exodus* story and "our" law in translation (Eusebius, *Praeparatio Evangelica* IX.6.6,

7.1.4 Ideas of decline

Before returning to Paul's view on pagan aniconic religion, I shall just pause to reflect on the type of historiography that Varro invokes in his description of the fate of Rome's religion. His historiography espouses the model of a golden age and subsequent decline. In this model, after a period of over 170 years the Roman religion ceased to be aniconic and became less pure, as, under the influence of the poets, religion ceased to be organized according to the principles of nature, true reverence to the gods diminished, and error increased.

A similar historiography, positing religious decline after a golden age, is also employed by Theophrastus and Posidonius. According to Theophrastus, between the animal-like primeval era and the beginning of moral degeneration there was a rational golden age (Theophrastus, frag. 584 Fortenbaugh, vol. 2, 405 ff.). Posidonius, too, expresses the belief that after a golden age of Stoic perfection, religion and morals declined (Posidonius, frag. 284 Edelstein & Kidd, vol. 1, 248–252 text; vol. 2.2, 960–971 comm.; vol. 3, 359–366 trans.).[34] Theophrastus and Posidonius apply their historiography to the history of mankind in general.

Varro, however, makes a very specific statement about the degeneration of *Roman* religion. It is interesting to note that Strabo is equally specific about such a degeneration when he deals with the history of *Jewish* religion and sketches its development into superstition. We have already seen Strabo's great admiration for Moses and his institution of a Jewish religion in which the Divine Being is worshipped without an image, as the nature of all that exists (16.2.35). However, Strabo is far from positive about Moses' successors:

> His successors for some time abided by the same course, acting righteously and being truly pious toward God; but afterwards, in the first place, superstitious men were appointed to the priesthood, and then tyrannical people; and from superstition arose abstinence from flesh, from which it is their custom to abstain even today, and circumcisions (…) and other observances of the kind. (*Geography* 16.2.37)[35]

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followed by Numenius' λόγιον; XIII.12.1). Pythagoras' borrowing of Jewish (and Thracian) ideas is already found in the third-century biographer Hermippus, quoted in Josephus, *Against Apion* I.165. Such claims are but one symptom of a widespread ancient tendency (anxiously combated in the opening chapters of Diogenes Laertius) to find foreign origins for Greek philosophy. By the early modern period some were ready to believe that Pythagoras was himself a Jew: J.B. Schneewind, *The Invention of Autonomy: A History of Modern Moral Philosophy*, Cambridge 1998, 536–40'. See also Van Kooten 2006*a*, 121–6 on Pythagoras, the descendants of Mochos and the Jews.

[34] See also Dölle-Oelmüller 2004.

[35] This similarity between Strabo and Varro causes Cardauns to assume that Posidonius is the source of Varro's views, taking it for granted that Strabo, too, is dependent on Posidonius. See Cardauns 1976, vol. 2, 146: 'Für Posidonius als Quelle Varos kann sprechen, dass bei Strabo eine Entstellung der reinen Lehre des Moses angenommen wird und Varro diese Vorstellung mit der ältesten römischen Religion verbindet'. It is far from sure, however, that Strabo is dependent on Posidonius here. See above.

Both Strabo and Varro employ the historiography of decline. Strabo does so to account for particular Jewish customs such as abstinence from pork and the practice of circumcision, Varro to explain the introduction of iconic cult in Rome.

7.1.5 Conclusion

It appears that Paul makes use of a Varronian view of the development of Roman religion in his letter to the Romans. After 170 years of pure aniconic cult, the Romans started to worship with images. As a result, the Roman religion lost something of its initial purity because, by erecting images, the people both diminished reverence and increased error in their cities (Varro, frag. 18 Cardauns).

Paul emphasizes this transition from aniconic cult to the worship of images by stating that the worshippers changed the glory of the immortal God into an image (καὶ ἤλλαξαν τὴν δόξαν τοῦ ἀφθάρτου θεοῦ ἐν ὁμοιώματι εἰκόνος; Rom 1.23). Like Varro, he stresses the error which results from this, saying that they altered the truth of God into a lie (μετήλλαξαν τὴν ἀλήθειαν τοῦ θεοῦ ἐν τῷ ψεύδει; Rom 1.25). Although Plutarch does not explicitly speak of degeneration, he implies it by stating that Numa forbade the Romans to revere images and instilled in his people the conviction 'that it was impious to liken higher things to lower, and that it was impossible to apprehend Deity except by the intellect (οὔτε ἐφάπτεσθαι θεοῦ δυνατὸν ἄλλως ἢ νοήσει; (*Numa* 8.7–8).

The same view is expressed by Paul when he speaks about the *decline* of Roman religion. By inaugurating images in their cult, the Roman religion has become impious because the Romans offer reverence and worship to created things instead of to the Creator (καὶ ἐσεβάσθησαν καὶ ἐλάτρευσαν τῇ κτίσει παρὰ τὸν κτίσαντα; Rom 1.25). This type of worship diminishes the perception of the invisible God by the mind (Rom 1.20). For this reason, Paul contrasts the Romans' pagan religion with his own, which he characterizes as a logical form of worship, a λογικὴ λατρεία, which consists in the transformation of one's mind (*nous*): μεταμορφοῦσθε τῇ ἀνακαινώσει τοῦ νοός (Rom 12.1–2; see further § 7.3 below). What Paul suggests is that by accepting his Jewish-Christian monotheistic convictions, the Romans have not so much crossed the boundary into Judaism, as reverted to their own originally aniconic religion.[36] This seems to be his strategy to solve the tensions about identity which were marring relations between the Jews and former pagans within the Christian communities of Rome. In some way, he seems to put the two groups on a equal footing, by granting the pagans a glorious past of which Christianity is the restoration. This restoration takes shape when their ἀδόκιμος νοῦς, their discredited, debased mind (Rom 1.28), is being transformed. This transformation is the topic of Romans 6–8 and 12, to which we now turn.

[36] On other apologetic early Christian views on Roman religion, see Rüpke 2006.

7.2 Assimilation to Christ and the geography of good and evil in man: Romans 6–8

7.2.1 Assimilation to Christ in Romans 6

The process of the renewal of one's debased mind starts in baptism, when the person receiving baptism becomes grown together with what is similar to the death and resurrection of Christ (Rom 6.5). We studied this passage in § 2.4.2 (a) above.

As we saw, the expression σύμφυτος τῷ ὁμοιώματι τοῦ θανάτου αὐτοῦ ('grown together with the likeness of his death') from Rom 6.5 is similar to the phrase συμμορφιζόμενος τῷ θανάτῳ αὐτοῦ ('becoming of the same form as his death') from Philipp 3.10. On this basis we can conclude that the phrase σύμφυτος τῷ ὁμοιώματι ('grown together with the likeness') has the same meaning as συμμορφιζόμενος ('becoming of the same form as'). The latter terminology is also used in Romans, as in Rom 8.29, near the end of the entire anthropological unit of Romans 6–8, Paul speaks of man's destination to become σύμμορφος τῆς εἰκόνος τοῦ υἱοῦ αὐτοῦ, of the same form as Christ, the image of God.

At the same time, we have seen that Plato's *Phaedrus* offers the best religious-historical background to the notion of assimilation to Christ. In the *Phaedrus*, the souls who follow a particular god are said to be 'inspired and receive from him character and habits (ἐνθουσιῶντες ἐξ ἐκείνου λαμβάνουσι τὰ ἔθη καὶ τὰ ἐπιτηδεύματα)' (*Phaedrus* 253a). Teachers, 'by imitating the god themselves (μιμούμενοι αὐτοί) and by persuasion and education (τε καὶ τὰ παιδικὰ πείθοντες καὶ ῥυθμίζοντες) (…) lead the beloved [i. e. the souls of the pupils] to the habit of life and the nature of the god (εἰς τὸ ἐκείνου ἐπιτήδευμα καὶ ἰδέαν ἄγουσιν; 253b)'. In a similar way baptism is understood as an imitation of Christ, through which those who are baptized assimilate themselves to the ethos of Christ as shown in his death and resurrection. In this way they become involved in the process which will render them of the same form as the image of God.

As a result of this baptism and assimilation to Christ, anthropologically speaking, 'the old man of us (ὁ παλαιὸς ἡμῶν ἄνθρωπος) was crucified with him so that the body of sin (τὸ σῶμα τῆς ἁμαρτίας) might be destroyed' (Rom 6.6). In this line, it seems, 'the old man' (ὁ παλαιὸς ἄνθρωπος) is identified with the sinful existence in the body, τὸ σῶμα τῆς ἁμαρτίας. This body is also characterized as τὸ θνητὸν σῶμα, the mortal body (Rom 6.12). In the new existence entered into by the person who receives baptism (Rom 6.4), man still possesses a body, but is now called – in metaphorical military language – no longer to present his bodily limbs (or his bodily frame: τὰ μέλη) to sin 'as *weapons* of wickedness', but to present them to God 'as *weapons* of righteousness': μηδὲ παριστάνετε τὰ μέλη ὑμῶν ὅπλα ἀδικίας τῇ ἁμαρτίᾳ, ἀλλὰ παραστήσατε … τὰ μέλη ὑμῶν ὅπλα δικαιοσύνης τῷ θεῷ (Rom 6.13). Using a different metaphor, Paul ex-

plains that the baptised should no longer present their bodily limbs '*as slaves* to impurity and to greater and greater iniquity' but '*as slaves* to righteousness for sanctification' (Rom 6.19). Although in baptism they have entered the process of becoming like Christ, Paul still needs to explain the consequences of this new situation with forceful metaphorical language διὰ τὴν ἀσθένειαν τῆς σαρκὸς, 'because of the innate weakness of the flesh': 'I am speaking in human terms because of the weakness of your flesh' – ἀνθρώπινον λέγω διὰ τὴν ἀσθένειαν τῆς σαρκὸς ὑμῶν (Rom 6.19).

In Romans 7, the terminology of flesh (σάρξ), body (σῶμα) and limbs (τὰ μέλη) reoccurs (σάρξ: Rom 7.5, 18, 25, cf. 7.14; σῶμα: Rom 7.24; τὰ μέλη: Rom 7.5, 23). These terms are now supplemented with other anthropological terms: 'spirit' (πνεῦμα: Rom 7.6), 'mind' (νοῦς: Rom 7.23, 25), and 'the inner man' (ὁ ἔσω ἄνθρωπος: Rom 7.22). All these terms together constitute the anthropological coordinates between which Paul locates the strife between good and evil within man.

It seems that this anthropology is very similar to the trichotomic anthropology which we encountered in chap. 5. To demonstrate this, I shall focus in the next section on the terminology of 'mind' (νοῦς) and 'the inner man' (ὁ ἔσω ἄνθρωπος) which are used interchangeably in Rom 7.22–25. The latter term, as we saw in chap. 6, also occurs in 2 Cor 4.16, where Paul speaks of the growth of the inner man and perceives this growth as the result of man's metamorphosis in accordance with the image of God (2 Cor 3.18; see § 6.5 above). The antisophistic context in which Paul applies the notion seems to suggest that this term is very similar to the philosophical, Platonic notion of the inner man, but – as we shall see below – this interpretation has met with criticism. Before establishing the proper meaning of 'inner man' in Romans 7, we shall therefore first briefly trace its various meanings in pagan Graeco-Roman texts (§ 7.2.2). Only then shall we consider its meaning within the context of Romans 7 and point to a remarkable similarity with Plotinus (§ 7.2.3).

7.2.2 The inner man – the history of a concept

In this section I shall trace the history of the notion of the inner man as the background to its occurrence in Rom 7.22. The terminology under consideration consists not only of ὁ ἔσω ἄνθρωπος, but also its synonyms ὁ ἔνδον ἄνθρωπος and ὁ ἐντὸς ἄνθρωπος. Moreover, we shall also look at the Philonic equivalent ὁ πρὸς ἀλήθειαν ἄνθρωπος, 'the man who is truly a man'. As regards the first three phrases, it should be noted that, although we tend to translate the terms ἔνδον, ἐντὸς and ἔσω as adjectives, in fact, they are adverbs.[37] For this reason

[37] LSJ 561 s. v. ἔνδον: Adv. *Within*; LSJ 577 s. v. ἐντὸς: II. Adv. *Within*; LSJ 700 s. v. ἔσω: Adv.

we should really translate the relevant phrases in question as ‘the man within’, ‘the man inside’.

Rather than representing a unified notion, the phrases seem to have various meanings, depending on the context. We can distinguish (a) a literal meaning; (b) a physiological or medical meaning; (c) a metaphorical meaning; (d) and, as a variant of this metaphorical meaning, a philosophical meaning. We shall discuss these different meanings, before enquiring into (e) the Philonic meaning. Instead of a chronological discussion I have arranged the material into distinct semantic categories, although within each category I shall follow a chronological line.

(a) A literal meaning

The relevance of emphasizing the adverbial meaning of ἔνδον, ἐντὸς and ἔσω in the phrases ὁ ἔνδον ἄνθρωπος, ὁ ἐντὸς ἄνθρωπος, and ὁ ἔσω ἄνθρωπος becomes clear in those cases where the phrases have a literal meaning, referring to ‘the man within’, ‘the man inside’, i. e. the man within a particular building or place.

Xenophon, for instance, in his *Anabasis*, describes a military siege of a city and the attack on the men inside a citadel:

> When those who were tumbling out were questioned, they said that there was a citadel within, that the enemy were numerous, and that they had sallied forth and were dealing blows upon the men inside (οἳ παίουσιν ἐκδεδραμηκότες τοὺς ἔνδον ἀνθρώπους). (Xenophon, *Anabasis* 5.2.18)

The ‘men inside’, οἱ ἔνδον ἄνθρωποι, clearly refers in a literal sense to men within the citadel. It is important to note this, as it shows that the phrase ὁ ἔνδον ἄνθρωπος is not necessarily philosophical at all, but that the latter meaning is rather a specific figurative use of what is in essence a literal expression. Consequently, the philosophical use seems to be easily construed and perhaps does not even require a specific philosophical tradition, as it is so easily derived from a common, literal meaning.

The same literal use of the phrase can be seen in Artemidorus of Ephesus, the mid / late 2nd cent. AD author of the *Onirocriticon*, a work on the interpretation of dreams. In it Artemidorus offers the following interpretation of a specific dream:

> Frogs signify cheats and beggars. But they are auspicious for those who earn their living from the crowd. I know of a household slave who dreamt that he struck some frogs with his fist. The man became overseer of his master’s house and took charge of the men in the house (καὶ προέστη τῆς τοῦ δεσπότου οἰκίας ἄρχων τῶν ἐν τῇ οἰκίᾳ, ἀνθρώπων). For the pond represented the house (ἡ μὲν γὰρ λίμνη τὴν οἰκίαν ἐσήμαινεν); the frogs, the men inside (οἱ δὲ βάτραχοι τοὺς ἔνδον ἀνθρώπους); the punch, his command over them. (Artemidorus, *Onirocriticon* 2.15; trans. White)

The phrase 'the men inside', οἱ ἔνδον ἄνθρωποι, clearly refers to the men inside the household, the servants, over whom the household slave who had this dream gained command. Again, the phrase ὁ ἔνδον ἄνθρωπος is used in a literal sense.

The same usage is also found in Pseudo-Lucian's *Asinus*, which contains the following passage in the narrative of Lucian's wanderings in the form of an ass:

> When it was now about evening, we stopped at a rich man's estate (καὶ πρὸς ἑσπέραν ὕδη καταλύομεν εἰς ἀγρὸν πλουτοῦντος ἀνθρώπου). He was inside (καὶ ἦν οὗτος ἔνδον), welcomed the goddess very gladly to his house, and brought her sacrifices. (Pseudo-Lucian, *Asinus* 39)

Although this passage does not contain the phrase 'the man inside', like the previous passages from Xenophon and Artemidorus, the same literal meaning of the adverb 'inside' is at play here. The man who is 'inside', is the man who is 'at home'. All these passages heighten our sensitivity to the fact that such a literal meaning can, in particular instances, easily be transferred to other contexts.

(b) A physiological or medical meaning

Another literal meaning of the phrases under consideration is the physiological or medical meaning. Like the previous, locative meaning, this meaning also refers to a particular place inside, in this case, a place inside the human body. Hippocrates, for instance, talks of τὰ ἔσω τοῦ ἀνθρώπου, particular organs 'within man', or 'inside man', in the following anatomical passage:

> Of the parts within man (the parts within the human frame), a constitution and a form of this kind have been given to the bladder, the head, and the womb: Τῶν δ' ἔσω τοῦ ἀνθρώπου φύσις καὶ σχῆμα τοιοῦτον· κύστις τε καὶ κεφαλὴ, καὶ ὑστέρα γυναιξί. (Hippocrates, *De prisca medicina* 22)

The phrase τὰ ἔσω τοῦ ἀνθρώπου is used here in a physiological sense, in a medical context. This medical meaning of ὁ ἔσω ἄνθρωπος is currently a topic which is covered in a research project on ancient medical texts and the New Testament at the University of Heidelberg, being undertaken by A. Weissenrieder.[38]

A similar physiological meaning is also attested in Plato. In his *Protagoras*, Plato distinguishes between the outward parts of man's body and the inward parts, both taken in a physiological sense:

> The good [i.e. the oil] is such an elusive and diverse thing that in this instance it is good for the outward parts of man's body (τοῖς μὲν ἔξωθεν τοῦ σώματος), but at the same time as bad as can be for the inward (τοῖς δ' ἐντὸς): οὕτω δὲ ποικίλον τί ἐστιν τὸ ἀγαθὸν καὶ παντοδαπόν, ὥστε καὶ ἐνταῦθα τοῖς μὲν ἔξωθεν τοῦ σώματος

[38] Cf. Weissenrieder 2007.

> ἀγαθόν ἐστιν τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ, τοῖς δ' ἐντὸς ταὐτὸν τοῦτο κάκιστον. (Plato, *Protagoras* 334b–c)

The phrase is also used in this sense by Aristotle, in his *History of Animals*, when talking of man's organs, both internal and external:

> These are the organs, internal and external, of man, and such is their nature and such their local disposition: Τὰ μὲν οὖν μόρια καὶ τὰ ἐντὸς καὶ τὰ ἐκτὸς τοῦ ἀνθρώπου ταῦτα καὶ τοιαῦτα, καὶ τοῦτον ἔχει τὸν τρόπον. (Aristotle, *Historia animalium*, edn Bekker 497b)

I shall give a final example from Pausanias. Although this instance is clearly physiological, it also demonstrates how easily the terminology could also be applied in the context of a philosophical anthropology. In his *Graeciae descriptio*, Pausanias gives a description of various forms of earthquakes and suddenly draws an analogy between one particular form of earthquake and a particular medical-physiological condition:

> The original inquirers into such matters and their pupils have been able to discover the following forms of earthquake. (…) The most destructive kind of earthquake the experts are wont to liken to the symptoms of a man suffering from a non-intermittent fever, the breathing of such a patient (τὸ ἐντὸς τοῦ ἀνθρώπου πνεῦμα – literally: the spirit inside of the man, hence the breath or breathing inside the man) being rapid and laboured. There are symptoms of this to be found in many parts of the body, especially at each wrist. In the same way, they say, the earthquake dives directly under buildings and shakes up their foundations, just as molehills come up from the bowels of the earth. It is this sort of shock alone that leaves no trace on the ground that men ever dwelt there. (Pausanias, *Graeciae descriptio* 7.24.9–11)

The expression τὸ ἐντὸς τοῦ ἀνθρώπου πνεῦμα, 'the spirit inside of the man', in this medical-physiological context refers to the breath or breathing inside the man. Although this meaning is uncontested, at the same time it alerts us to the fact that this terminology can easily be adapted for anthropological purposes, as we shall see below.[39] Together with the locative meaning studied above, the medical-physiological meaning attested in authors such as Hippocrates, Plato, Aristotle and Pausanias shows the basic literal meaning of the adverbs ἔνδον, ἐντὸς and ἔσω which seem to be very suitable for application in a metaphorical sense.

(c) A metaphorical meaning

A clear instance of a metaphorical meaning is offered by a fragment of the 4th–3rd BC comic writer Menander, who states that from the outside (ἔξωθέν) those who are well-known and illustrious seem to be prosperous and fortunate, but that with regard to what is inside (τὰ δ' ἔνδον) all people are equal: ἔξωθέν

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[39] For another physiological passage containing the phrase ὁ ἐντὸς ἄνθρωπος, see Physiologus, *Physiologus (diversarum versionum capita disiecta in vulgare lingua)* 16.

εἴσιν οἱ δοκοῦντες εὐτυχεῖν λαμπροί, τὰ δ' ἔνδον πᾶσιν ἀνθρώποις ἴσοι (Menander, *Fragmenta* 669 (edn Kock), 122 (edn Meineke, *Fragmenta comicorum Graecorum*, vol. 4 – Play FIF fragm. 122), 627 (edn Thierfelder & Körte). This is a particular interesting passage because it moves midway between a literal physiological meaning and a philosophical meaning. As such, Menander construes an antithesis between the external appearance of man, and τὰ δ' ἔνδον, that what is inside him. But this inside does not merely refer to the organs, as do the physiological-medical texts listed above, but probably also to man's inner life, his psyche. In that sense, this instance from Menander borders on a philosophical-anthropological use of the term ἔνδον, 'inside'. To the latter use we shall turn shortly.

Menander's metaphorical use of the term seems to show that even when the term is used in a philosophical way its philosophical application is but a further metaphorical use to which the literal term so easily lends itself. For this reason, we need to be careful not to outline an autonomous philosophical tradition which is wholly independent from this basic, literal meaning. It seems that one could almost spontaneously apply this meaning in a metaphorical sense, as the fragment from Menander shows, irrespective of any previous metaphorical or philosophical application. I believe that this explains the fact that we do not find a single, coherent, uniform philosophical tradition between Plato and Paul, with a wholly fixed terminology. I do suggest, however, that both Plato and Paul use the terminology of the man inside in a philosophical sense.

(d) A philosophical meaning

Although Plato knows of the physiological concept of the parts within man (Plato, *Protagoras* 334b–c: 'the inward parts of man's body'), as we have seen above, the term ὁ ἐντὸς ἄνθρωπος, 'the man inside', does occur in a decisively philosophical sense in Plato's *Republic*. In the language of ancient fables, Plato draws 'a symbolic image of the soul' (*Republic* IX 588b–589d). This soul is said to consist of (1) 'a manifold and many-headed beast that has a ring of heads of tame and wild beasts', (2) a lion, and (3) a man. These three are joined together, and around them, from the outside (ἔξωθεν), is moulded the likeness of one of them, that of the man:

> Then mould about them outside the likeness of one, that of the man, so that to anyone who is unable to look within (τὰ ἐντὸς) but who can see only the external sheath (τὸ ἔξω μόνον ἔλυτρον) it appears to be one living creature, the man. (*Republic* IX 588d–e)

This fable is now interpreted in a psychological sense. Two possibilities present themselves, according to Plato. Either one believes that it profits this man 'to feast and make strong the multifarious beast and the lion and all that pertains to the lion, but to starve the man' (588e–589a). Or one is of the opinion that

> all our actions and words should tend to give the man within us (ὁ ἐντὸς ἄνθρωπος) complete domination over the entire man (ὅθεν τοῦ ἀνθρώπου ὁ ἐντὸς ἄνθρωπος ἔσται ἐγκρατέστατος) and make him take charge of the many-headed beast (…) and he will make an ally of the lion's nature. (589a–b)

In this passage the term 'the man within' (ὁ ἐντὸς ἄνθρωπος) is clearly used in a philosophical-anthropological sense. In Plato's psychology 'the man within' stands for the highest part of man's soul.[40]

In later Platonism, this notion surfaces in authors such as Plotinus, Porphyry and Proclus. Plotinus, for instance, distinguishes between 'the soul within' and 'the outside shadow of man':

> Here in the events of our life it is not the soul within (ἡ ἔνδον ψυχή) but the outside shadow of man (ἡ ἔξω ἀνθρώπου σκιὰ) which cries and moans and carries on in every sort of way on a stage which is the whole earth where men have in many places set up their stages. Doings like these belong to a man who knows how to live only the lower and external life (τὰ κάτω καὶ τὰ ἔξω μόνα ζῆν) and is not aware that he is playing in his tears, even when they are serious tears. For only the seriously good part of man is capable of taking serious doings seriously; the rest of man is a toy. (Plotinus, *Enneads* 3.2.15)

In line with Plato's *Republic*, Plotinus differentiates between the external and internal side of man. In another Ennead, Plotinus does indeed refer to 'the soul within' also as 'the man within' (ὁ ἔνδον ἄνθρωπος), whom he also characterizes as ὁ ἀληθὴς ἄνθρωπος, 'the true man' (*Enneads* 1.1.10). The latter depiction, that of the true man, is important because, as we shall see below, this is very similar to the term which Philo uses (see § 7.2.2 [e]). A detailed treatment of Plotinus' view on the inner man will be given in the next section, § 7.2.3, when I draw some comparisons between Paul and Plotinus. Here it will suffice to show that Plotinus moves in line with Plato, and that further echoes occur in Neo-Platonist authors such as Porphyry and Proclus.[41]

It is in this philosophical sense that I take the terminology of ὁ ἔσω ἄνθρωπος when it occurs in Paul, both in 2 Cor 4.16 and Rom 7.22. In this I disagree with C. Markschies and H.-D. Betz, who tend to isolate Paul from his contemporary world. According to Markschies, Paul's interpretation of the terminology of inner man 'kann (…) nicht aus platonisch-philonischer Begriffstradition abgeleitet werden', 'ist (…) radikal uminterpretiert worden', and is consequently

[40] For an interpretation of Plato, *Republic* IX 588b–589d, see Heckel 1993, § 2.1, 11–26; Burkert 1998, 79–80.

[41] See, e.g., Porphyry, *Fragmenta* (edn Smith), frag. 275 (=Porphyry apud Stobaeus, *Anthologium* 3.21.28: … ἵνα καὶ ὁ ἐντὸς ἀθάνατος γνωσθῇ ἄνθρωπος καὶ ὁ ἐκτὸς εἰκονικὸς μὴ ἀγνοηθῇ καὶ τὰ τούτοις διαφέροντα γνώριμα γένηται) and Proclus, *In Platonis Timaeum commentaria* 3.204 (ἐφ' ἡμῶν διττὸς ὁ ἄνθρωπος, ὃ μὲν ἐντὸς κατὰ τὴν ψυχήν, ὃ δὲ φαινόμενος ὃν ὁρῶμεν). For a quotation of Plato's *Republic* 589a–b, see Stobaeus, *Anthologium* 3.9.62 (ὅθεν τοῦ ἀνθρώπου ὁ ἐντὸς ἄνθρωπος ἔσται ἐγκρατέστατος).

not identical with the highest part of man's soul, the mind.[42] Markschies's view was met with criticism by Burkert, who emphasizes 'the indebtedness of Paul to Hellenistic philosophy': 'Markschies holds that Paul coined the term afresh by himself, without knowing about Plato. This seems hardly credible'.[43]

Betz, in turn, stresses the idiosyncratic way in which Paul interpreted the – in Betz's mind, thoroughly dualistic – terminology of the inner and outer man in accordance with his own non-dualistic theological anthropology. In Betz's view, because the pagan converts to Christianity continued to hold 'popular views regarding a dualistic anthropology of body and soul', Paul needed to formulate

> a Christian alternative to the predominant religio-philosophical dualistic anthropology of body and soul. We should realize (…), that initially Paul's theology did not include an anthropology that had adequately come to terms with Greek anthropological dualism. It was Paul who first raised the problem that the conventional dualistic anthropology of body and soul was not compatible with the Christian gospel as he understood it.[44]

I do not agree with Markschies's and Betz's segregation of Paul from his Graeco-Roman context; they wrongly believe that Paul's use of the term 'inner man' is not philosophical. As we have seen, the occurrence of *the term itself* is not decisive in this respect, as it could also be taken in a different, either literal, physiological medical or merely metaphorical sense. Yet *the context* does require such a philosophical meaning, both in 2 Cor and in Romans.

In 2 Cor, as we have seen in chaps 4 and 6, Paul polemicizes against the sophists of Corinth and, like Plato in his anti-sophistic discourse in the *Protagoras*, criticizes those who sell the word of God by retail (2 Cor 2.17; Plato, *Protagoras* 313d–e; see §§ 4.5, 6.2 and 6.5 above). Given the similarities between Paul's and Plato's discourse it seems very likely that Paul's use of the terminology of the man within should also be considered philosophical, as it is part of his anti-sophistic strategy (see § 6.5 above). Instead of outward appearance and physiognomy, Paul is concerned with building up a strong inner identity, which takes shape through the metamorphosis resulting in the growth of the inner man. This view is very similar to Alcibiades' praise of Socrates in Plato's *Symposium*: Socrates is depicted as ugly on the outside, but beautiful on the inside (Plato, *Symposium* 215a ff., esp. 216d–e, 215a–b). As Burkert notes:

> Plato makes the corporeal appearance the 'outside' in opposition to what is 'within'; and the 'interior' alone is valuable, even divine. It is the 'soul' of Socrates which has the unique effect on others, teaching and effecting the 'good'. Plato thus has created the concept of 'inner values' – a formula often misused and ridiculed since.[45]

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42 Markschies 1998, 280–2.
43 Burkert 1998, 59–60, with note 2. Burkert comments on Markschies 1994 and Markschies 1997 (=Markschies 1998).
44 Betz 2000, 316.
45 Burkert 1998, 76

The concept of 'inner values', and particularly that of 'inner man', is what Paul needed in his correspondence with the Corinthians. As we shall see in the next section, the discourse in Paul's letter to the Romans seems to be equally philosophical and presupposes a highly developed anthropology (see § 7.2.3 below). For this reason, the terminology of the man inside in Rom 7.22 seems to reflect a kind of philosophical anthropology. Whereas Paul used it in his Corinthian correspondence to combat the sophistic movement, in Romans he seems to employ it as a tool to solve the ethnocentric tensions which arose in the Christian community in Rome after Jewish Christians and ex-pagan Christian were once again united when the former returned after Claudius' death in 54 AD (cf. § 7.1 above). It seems that the term 'inner man' is suitable for substantiating Paul's assertion in the opening part of Romans, that

> a person is not a Jew who is one outwardly (οὐ γὰρ ὁ ἐν τῷ φανερῷ Ἰουδαῖός ἐστιν), nor is true circumcision something external and physical (οὐδὲ ἡ ἐν τῷ φανερῷ ἐν σαρκὶ περιτομή). Rather, a person is a Jew who is one inwardly (ἀλλ' ὁ ἐν τῷ κρυπτῷ Ἰουδαῖος), and real circumcision is a matter of the heart – it is spiritual and not literal. Such a person receives praise not from others but from God. (Rom 2.28–29)

Paul's criticism of an outward ethnic identity (ἐν τῷ φανερῷ) and his endorsement of an inner identity (ἐν τῷ κρυπτῷ) is subsequently supported by his development of a universalist anthropology in Romans 6–8 which includes the term 'inner man'.

It cannot be wholly ruled out that Paul also knew the term from physiological medical jargon, or applied a common literal term in a metaphorical way, as Menander did. Yet it is clear that the use he made of it, in the contexts of 2 Cor and Rom, is to be deemed philosophical, and consistent with a Platonizing type of anthropology. Indeed, as E. Wasserman has argued with regard to Paul's anthropology in Romans 7, 'the images, language, and argument of Romans 7 fit Platonic traditions of moral psychology'.[46] At the same time, my overview of the different meanings of the terminology of the man inside may explain why there is no single, fixed terminology, but that even the philosophical term is either ὁ ἐντὸς ἄνθρωπος (Plato), ὁ ἔσω ἄνθρωπος (Paul), or ὁ ἔνδον ἄνθρωπος (Plotinus); in the latter the term is also equivalent with ὁ ἀληθὴς ἄνθρωπος, 'the true man'.

Despite what this overview may suggest, the notion is not wholly absent between Plato and Paul, as the terminology of the true man (ὁ πρὸς ἀλήθειαν ἄνθρωπος), which occurs in Philo, also seems to be an equivalent. We shall first discuss this term, before turning to a detailed comparison between Paul's and Plotinus' Platonizing reflection upon the inner man, and in particular upon

46 Wasserman 2007, 802n26.

the relation between the inner man and the involuntary impulse which remains in him.

(e) A Philonic interpretation

The Philonic equivalent of the terminology of the man inside seems to be 'the true man', ὁ πρὸς ἀλήθειαν ἄνθρωπος,[47] or, as he twice calls it, ὁ ἀληθινὸς ἄνθρωπος (*De fuga et inventione* 131; *Quod deterius potiori insidiari soleat* 10).

As we have seen in passing, this terminology very much resembles the term ὁ ἀληθὴς ἄνθρωπος which occurs in Plotinus (see Plotinus, *Enneads* 1.1.7 and 1.1.10) where it is synonymous with 'the man inside'. In later Platonists, such as Proclus and Simplicius, the term is used to summarize Socrates' statement to Alcibiades in Plato's *Alcibiades I*, that

> since neither the body nor the combination of the two is man, we are reduced, I suppose, to this: either man is nothing at all, or if something, he turns out to be nothing else than soul. (Plato, *Alcibiades I* 130c)

In the summaries of Proclus and Simplicius, neither the body, nor the combination of body and soul, but the soul alone is ὁ ἀληθινὸς ἄνθρωπος, the 'true man'.[48]

There is, however, yet another background to Philo's notion of the true man which I shall relate before discussing the various passages in Philo in which this notion occurs. Remarkably, the terminology of the true man is also used in ancient Jewish sources and applied to ideal figures such as Job and Enoch. According to the Septuagint translation of the book of Job, Job was a true and truthful man: καὶ ἦν ὁ ἄνθρωπος ἐκεῖνος ἀληθινός (Job 1.1 LXX; cf. 1.8, 2.3). Similarly, Enoch, in the *Book of Enoch* is addressed as 'the true man': Καὶ ἀποκριθεὶς εἶπέν μοι, Ὁ ἄνθρωπος ὁ ἀληθινός, ἄνθρωπος τῆς ἀληθείας, ὁ γραμματεύς· καὶ τῆς φωνῆς αὐτοῦ ὕκουσα· μὴ φοβηθῇς, Ἑνώχ, ἄνθρωπος ἀληθινὸς καὶ γραμματεὺς τῆς ἀληθείας (*Liber Enoch*, *Apocalypsis Enochi* 15.1). It seems as though Philo, in his use of the terminology of the true man, combines the Platonic concept of the inner man and the Jewish talk of the true, truthful man as applied to figures such as Job and Enoch.

According to Philo, the man who has been created after the image of God (Gen 1.26–27) is the mind, the highest part of man, which – in the hierarchy of beings – comes third after God and the Logos, who *is* the image of God; man is only created *after* the image of God (see § 1.2.2 above). Philo seems to echo Plato's belief

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[47] Cf. Markschies 1998, 276–8.

[48] Proclus, *In Platonis Alcibiadem* 1.37; Simplicius, *Commentarius in Epicteti enchiridion* 3: Ἀλλ', ὅτι μὲν οὗτός ἐστιν ὁ ἀληθινὸς ἄνθρωπος, ὁ κατὰ τὴν λογικὴν ψυχὴν οὐσιωμένος, προηγουμένως μὲν ὁ τοῦ Πλάτωνος Σωκράτης ἔδειξεν, Ἀλκιβιάδῃ τῷ καλῷ, τῷ Κλεινίου, διαλεγόμενος.

– which we saw expressed in his *Alcibiades I* – that not the body, nor the combination of body and soul, but the soul alone is the actual man (Plato, *Alcibiades I* 130c). Similarly, in Philo's view, it is the mind who is the actual true man:

> The mind in each of us, which in the true and full sense is the 'man', is an expression at third hand from the maker, while between them is the Reason which serves as model for our reason – ὥστε τὸν καθ' ἕκαστον ἡμῶν νοῦν, ὃς δὴ κυρίως καὶ πρὸς ἀλήθειαν ἄνθρωπός ἐστι, τρίτον εἶναι τύπον ἀπὸ τοῦ πεποιηκότος, τὸν δὲ μέσον παράδειγμα μὲν τούτου. (Philo, *Quis rerum divinarum heres sit* 231)

Indeed, as Philo confirms in many passages, the mind is the real man in us: 'God established the real man in us, that is the mind' – τὸν ἐν ἡμῖν πρὸς ἀλήθειαν ἄνθρωπον, τουτέστι τὸν νοῦν, ἔθηκεν (Philo, *De plantatione* 42). If the 'true man' is synonymous with the 'man inside', Philo's depiction of the 'true man' as 'mind' is similar to the equivalence between 'inner man' and 'mind' in Rom 7.22–25.

This 'true man' Philo contrasts with 'the man so-called', the composite man whom God has produced in co-operation with other makers, like the Demiurge in Plato's *Timaeus* (cf. § 1.2.1 above):

> While in the former case the expression used was 'let *us* make *man*' (Gen 1.26: Ποιήσωμεν ἄνθρωπον), as though more than one were to do it, there is used afterwards an expression pointing to One, '*God* made *the man*' (Gen 1.27: καὶ ἐποίησεν ὁ θεὸς τὸν ἄνθρωπον). For of the real man, who is absolutely pure mind, One, even the only God, is the Maker (τοῦ μὲν γὰρ πρὸς ἀλήθειαν ἀνθρώπου, ὃς δὴ νοῦς ἐστι καθαρώτατος, εἷς ὁ μόνος θεὸς δημιουργός); but a plurality of makers produce man so-called, one that has an admixture of sense-perception (τοῦ δὲ λεγομένου καὶ κεκραμένου μετ' αἰσθήσεως τὸ πλῆθος). That is why he who is man in the special sense (ὁ μὲν κατ' ἐξοχὴν ἄνθρωπος) is mentioned with the article. The words run 'God made *the* man', that invisible reasoning faculty free from admixture («ἐποίησεν ὁ θεὸς τὸν ἄνθρωπον», τὸν ἀειδῆ καὶ ἄκρατον ἐκεῖνον λογισμόν). The other has no article added; for the words 'let us make man' point to him in whom an irrational and rational nature are woven together (τὸ γάρ· «ποιήσωμεν ἄνθρωπον» ἐμφαίνει τὸν ἐξ ἀλόγου καὶ λογικῆς συνυφανθέντα φύσεως). (Philo, *De fuga et inventione* 71–72)

Philo's approach here is extraordinarily complex. As we saw in § 1.2.5 and subsequently in § 5.1, Philo distinguishes between two types of man, following the two accounts of man's creation in Gen 1 and Gen 2, respectively. According to Philo, the creation of the heavenly, ideal man is narrated in Gen 1, and that of the earthly, composite man in Gen 2. In the passage under consideration, however, he scrutinizes the account of Gen 1 in so much detail, that, for exegetical reasons, he differentiates sharply between Gen 1.26, which is linked to the creation of the composite man, 'in whom an irrational and rational nature are woven together', and Gen 1.27, which is coupled with the creation of the true man. In this way, Philo is able to implant the Platonic notion of the true, inner man into

the text of Gen 1.26. In his interpretation, the words 'God made *the* man' (Gen 1.27) refer to the creation of the true man, the man in the special sense of the word, the mind.

This true man is the mind endowed with reason, which dwells in the soul of each of us (Philo, *Quod deterius potiori insidiari soleat* 22–23). Within the human soul, Philo explains, the inner man also functions as man's conscience:

> The true man [is] the conscience, set over the soul, who, seeing its perplexity, its inquiring, its searching, is afraid lest it go astray and miss the right road – ὁ ἀληθινὸς ἄνθρωπος, ὁ ἐπὶ ψυχῆς ἔλεγχος, ὃς ἀποροῦσαν καὶ σκεπτομένην καὶ ζητοῦσαν αὐτὴν ἰδὼν εὐλαβεῖται, μὴ πλανηθεῖσα διαμάρτῃ τῆς ὀρθῆς ὁδοῦ. (*De fuga et inventione* 131)

According to Philo, the true man is clearly not the man who is compounded of soul and body (Philo, *De gigantibus* 34). Philo identifies this true man with the man whom the Cynic philosopher Diogenes was looking for: 'it was of him that one of the ancients spoke, when he lit a candle at midday and told them who asked his meaning that he was seeking a *man*' – ὄντως γὰρ ὁ ἀληθινὸς οὗτός ἐστιν, ὃν καὶ τῶν παλαιῶν λύχνον τις μεσημβρίας ἁψάμενος πρὸς τοὺς πυνθανομένους ἄνθρωπον ἔφη ζητεῖν (Philo, *De gigantibus* 34). This is a clear allusion to the symbolic quest of Diogenes the Cynic as we know it from Diogenes Laertius, who describes this search as follows: 'He lit a lamp in broad daylight and said, as he went about, 'I am looking for a man'' (*Vitae philosophorum* 6.41).

Although the true man is the heavenly, ideal type of man, who is not compounded of soul and body, he can nevertheless be depicted as being present in composite man insofar as he is identical with the mind, the highest part of man's soul. In this case, however, he, the real man, officiates as priest in the temple of the rational soul:

> There are, as is evident, two temples of God: one of them this universe, in which there is also as high priest His First-born, the divine Logos, and the other the rational soul, whose priest is the real man, the outward and visible image of whom is he who offers the prayers and sacrifices handed down from our fathers – ἕτερον δὲ λογικὴ ψυχή, ἧς ἱερεὺς ὁ πρὸς ἀλήθειαν ἄνθρωπος, οὗ μίμημα αἰσθητὸν ὁ τὰς πατρίους εὐχὰς καὶ θυσίας ἐπιτελῶν ἐστιν. (Philo, *De somniis* 1.215)

Remarkably, in this passage, the Jewish (high) priest in the Jerusalem temple is seen as the embodiment, 'the outward and visible image' of the 'real man'. There are other passages in Philo in which he identifies the ideal type of the true man with particular figures.

In two instances, Philo identifies him with Enos, the son of Adam and Eve's third son Seth:

> And Adam knew Eve his wife, and she conceived and bore a son, and called him Seth, saying, 'For God has raised up to me another seed instead of Abel, whom Cain

> slew'. And Seth had a son, and he called his name Enos: he hoped to call on the name of the Lord God. (Gen 4.25–26 LXX)

It is because of this characterization of Enos as the first man who 'hoped to call on the name of the Lord God', that Philo regards him as (an example of) the true man:

> For what could be found more in keeping with one who is truly a man (ἀνθρώπῳ γὰρ τῷ γε πρὸς ἀλήθειαν) than a hope and expectation of obtaining good things from the only bountiful God? This is, to tell the truth, men's only birth in the strict sense (ἡ μόνη κυρίως γένεσις ἀνθρώπων), since those who do not set their hope on God have no part in a rational nature (ὡς τῶν μὴ ἐλπιζόντων ἐπὶ θεὸν λογικῆς φύσεως οὐ μεμοιραμένων). (Philo, *Quod deterius potiori insidiari soleat* 138)

Again, the true man is closely connected with rational nature (because, as we have seen in previous passages, the true man is identical with the mind), but now also identified with a specific figure, that of Enos, because of his specific qualities.

In another treatise, Philo returns to this figure and repeats that 'Moses called the first lover of hope "man"'. Enos now also appears to represent all humankind because, according to Philo, 'Enos' is the Chaldean name for 'man' (Philo, *De Abrahamo* 7–8). This passage also shows that Philo is familiar with the imagery of the man who comprises a beast, a lion and a man within from Plato's *Republic* (IX 588b–589d): Philo contrasts Enos, the true man, with an ἀνθρωποειδὲς θηρίον, a beast in human shape (*De Abrahamo* 8). Philo's reference to the true man in this context seems to be an allusion to Plato's notion of the inner man. Commenting on the figure of Enos mentioned in Gen 4.25–26 LXX, Philo believes this passage continues with Gen 5.1 which reads: 'This is the genesis of men' – Αὕτη ἡ βίβλος γενέσεως ἀνθρώπων; Philo understands this genesis as the genesis of the true man. Although this line is actually the introduction to a new section, Philo connects it with the preceding passage on Enos, and concludes:

> He [i.e. Moses] did well, too, in speaking of the book of the coming into being of the true man: εὖ μέντοι καὶ τὴν βίβλον γενέσεως τοῦ πρὸς ἀλήθειαν ἀνθρώπου προσεῖπεν. (Philo, *De Abrahamo* 11)

Interestingly, this seems to imply that Philo believes that man can develop into a true man if, following the example of Enos, he fully employs his rational nature, sets his hope on God, and expects to receive from Him good things (cf. Philo, *Quod deterius potiori insidiari soleat* 138). This is, as Philo states in *Quod deterius*, 'men's only birth in the strict sense (ἡ μόνη κυρίως γένεσις ἀνθρώπων)'. For this reason, the book of Genesis is actually about the birth of the true man.

Philo not only identifies the true man with Enos, the symbolic representative of the human race, but also with the Israelites in general. According to Philo,

> out of the whole human race He chose as of special merit and judged worthy of preeminence over all, those who are in a true sense men, and called them to the service of Himself: ἐξ ἅπαντος ἀνθρώπων γένους τοὺς πρὸς ἀλήθειαν ἀνθρώπους ἀριστίνδην ἐπιλέξας εἵλετο καὶ προνομίας ἠξίωσε τῆς πάσης, ἐπὶ τὴν θεραπείαν καλέσας ἑαυτοῦ. (Philo, *De specialibus legibus* 1.303)

Remarkably, all Israelites, as a chosen race, represent the 'true men'. Anthropologically speaking, 'the true man' is the mind. This also shines through in the identification of the true man with Enos, as this name symbolizes all humankind. Yet in a very concrete way, 'the true man' is also represented by the Jewish race, or, as we saw in *De somniis* 1.215, by the Jewish (high) priest in the Jerusalem temple.

All these passages show clearly that Plato's notion of the true inner man was known to Philo, and that he reflected upon it quite extensively and tried to read it back into Moses' Pentateuch. This is immediately relevant to our study of the notion of inner man in Paul because if Philo could be acquainted with the Platonic notion of the inner man in the 1st cent. AD, it is very likely that Paul would have known it, too. In the next section I shall argue that Paul's use of the notion of the inner man is indeed philosophical. Paul's use of this term in 2 Cor 4.16 already conveys this impression, as the term is applied in a philosophical, anti-sophistic context, as we have seen in chap. 6. This impression will be further confirmed with regard to its occurrence in Rom 7.22. To this end, I shall also draw a comparison between Paul and Plotinus.

7.2.3 The mind and the inner man in Romans 7

Introduction: The inner man and his vices

The same antithesis between the outer and inner man, which we encountered in 2 Cor 4.16, is present in Plotinus. My choosing to compare Paul with Plotinus, who flourished about two hundred years later, may be justified by the vast corpus of Plotinus' writings, which facilitates a careful analysis between philosophical-Platonic and Pauline anthropology. Of course, Plotinus himself contributed to the further development of Platonic thought, yet the significant terminological similarities between Paul and Plotinus must be due, in no small part, to a shared philosophical heritage. This heritage includes their extensive reflections on the Platonic 'inner man'. In Plotinus' view,

> it is not the soul within (ἡ ἔνδον ψυχή) but the outside shadow of man (ἡ ἔξω ἀνθρώπου σκιά) which cries and moans and carries on in every sort of way on a stage which is the whole earth where men have in many places set up their stages. Doings like these belong to a man who knows how to live only the lower and external life (τὰ κάτω καὶ τὰ ἔξω μόνα ζῆν). (Plotinus, *Enneads* 3.2.15)

'And even if Socrates, too,' Plotinus adds, 'may play sometimes, it is by the outer Socrates (ὁ ἔξω Σωκράτης) that he plays' (3.2.15). In 2 Cor, Paul seems

to employ this notion of the 'inner man' because it is very suitable as a supplement to his criticism of the sophists' outer *modus operandi*; as a matter of fact, it substantiates his criticism of their position. For him it expresses, in a positive, emphatic, and constructive way, what the Christian message is about.

Comparison with Plotinus is especially worthwhile for the letter to the Romans. It shows very clearly that Paul has a genuine command of the notion of the inner man and does not use this terminology only superficially: both Paul and Plotinus appear to dwell on the question of how the inner man relates to virtues and sin. I shall first focus on Plotinus' view on this relation, in order to provide a context in which Paul's reflections on the inner man can be appreciated more clearly. To this end, we shall now first address the question of what Plotinus thinks of the vices which, despite the process of becoming god-like, remain in man. Plotinus devotes much discussion to this specific topic, and his deliberations help us to understand the ins and outs of the notion of the 'inner man'. As we shall see subsequently, it is highly remarkable that this topic is also discussed in Paul, in an extensive passage in the letter to the Romans.

(a) Plotinus on the inner man, virtues and sin

According to Plotinus, the real, proper virtues, which belong to the sphere of intellect, have their seat in the 'true man'(ὁ ἀληθὴς ἄνθρωπος; cf. for the Philonic expression § 7.2.2 [e] above), the 'inner man' / the 'man within' (ὁ ἔνδον ἄνθρωπος), or the 'separate soul', as he also calls it – that which transcends the human life and is different from the body and its affections. The other, lesser virtues, however, which result from habit and training, are located in what Plotinus calls 'the joint entity' of the lower soul and the body; this entity is also the seat of the vices (1.1.10).[49] The proper virtues are those which effect the purification of the soul and make it similar to God (1.2.3). Plotinus is interested in the question of how this purification deals with 'passion and desire and all the rest (…), and how far separation from the body is possible'. In his view, the soul 'gets rid of passion as completely as possible, altogether if it can', but the reason why it cannot lies in 'the involuntary impulse' (τὸ ἀπροαίρετον). This impulse, which is not under the control of the will, belongs to something other than the soul, and is small and weak (1.2.5).

On the one hand, Plotinus is optimistic about the soul's possibility to be pure and to achieve its aim of making the irrational part, too, pure. This part profits from the soul's purification,

[49] Cf. Sorabji 2004, vol. 1, 348–9 and 93–9 at 95: 'he [i. e. Plotinus] maintains that only the undescended soul is free from emotion (…). (…) the soul is not sinless, because the lower soul compounded with the body is what sins' (95).

> just as a man living next door to a sage would profit by the sage's neighbourhood, either by becoming like him or by regarding him with such respect as not to dare to do anything of which the good man would not approve. (1.2.5)

Insofar as this is the case, the soul is sinless. Yet Plotinus stresses that he is not obsessed, in a negative way, by trying to avoid sin. Rather, his concern, in a positive way, is to become god-like, to be a god (cf. § 2.2.13 above).

Nevertheless, although he is optimistic about the soul's potential, at the same time Plotinus does have to concede that there may still be an element of involuntary impulse in man, which causes him to be not *simply god* (θεὸς μόνον), but 'a god or spirit who is *double*' (διπλοῦς)[50] (1.2.6).

As Plotinus says elsewhere, one can argue that the soul is sinless if one assumes the soul to be 'a single completely simple thing and identifies soul and essential soulness'. Yet, the soul is regarded to be sinful if one 'interweaves with it and adds to it another form of soul (…): so the soul itself becomes compound (…) and is affected as a whole, and it is the compound which sins'. This 'other form of soul' is also called the soul's image (εἴδωλον). In order to illustrate his views on the compound soul, Plotinus uses two metaphors, one drawn from Plato, the other from Homer.

The first image relates to the sea-god Glaucus, who is likened to the soul because its real nature is only seen if one knocks off its encrustations (Plato, *Republic* X 611d–612a). Similarly, the soul's image – the other, added, encrusted form of soul – is abandoned and 'no longer exists when the whole soul is looking to the intelligible world'.

The other image, taken from Homer, concerns the figure of Heracles: 'The poet seems to be separating the image with regard to Heracles when he says that his *shade* is in Hades, but he *himself* among the gods' (Homer, *Odyssey* 11.601–602). Heracles is above inasmuch as he is a contemplative person, but, insofar he is an active person, 'there is also still a part of him below' (1.1.12; cf. 4.3.27 and 6.4.16). In this respect, Plotinus also speaks of 'the two souls' (4.3.27).[51]

(b) Paul on the inner man and sin

It is highly remarkable that this specific discussion in Plotinus about the relation between the 'inner man' and his vices, which do not belong to the 'inner man' but to something else, and about the 'involuntary impulse' which causes these vices, also seems to occur in Paul's letter to the Romans.[52] According to Paul,

[50] Cf. also 'the other form of soul' in 1.1.12 and 'the two souls' in 4.3. Perhaps the notion of a 'double soul' also occurs in the letter of James, which speaks of δίψυχος in 1.8 and 4.8.

[51] See bibliography on this interpretation of Heracles in Armstrong 1984, 121n2. Cf. also Lamberton 1986, 100–3.

[52] For an analysis of Rom 7 against the background of Graeco-Roman culture and philosophy, see also Engberg-Pedersen 2002, who draws on Stoic material, despite the fact that, as

man is 'fleshly', exported for sale under sin (7.14). The word 'exported for sale' (πεπραμένος) is usually used of deporting captives to foreign parts for sale as slave (LSJ 1394 πέρνημι) and it is difficult to neglect the overtones of deportation from the heavenly fatherland (cf. Philipp 3.20).

Being deported, Paul does not acknowledge his actions as his own, because what he does is not what he wants to do, but what he detests (7.15). He acts against his will, and for this reason, Paul does not regard himself as the one who performs the action, but rather the sin that dwells in him (7.16–17):

> For I know that nothing good dwells within me, that is, in my flesh. I can will what is right, but I cannot do it. For I do not do the good I want, but the evil I do not want is what I do. Now if I do what I do not want, it is no longer I that do it, but sin that dwells within me. (Rom 7.18–20)

These ideas clearly share Plotinus' insistence that it is the compound soul which sins, and not the inner man; if this compound soul does sin, it does so involuntarily. Like Plotinus, Paul contrasts the 'flesh', his 'unspiritual self', with the 'inner man', which is regarded as sinless:

> For I delight in the law of God in the inner man (κατὰ τὸν ἔσω ἄνθρωπον), but I see in my members another law at war with the law of my mind (νοῦς), making me captive to the law of sin that dwells in my members. (…) So then, with my mind (νοῦς) I am a slave to the law of God, but with my flesh I am a slave to the law of sin. (Rom 7.22–23, 25b)

Although Paul puts it in a more dramatic fashion, he and Plotinus basically seem to agree that the true self, the inner man, is sinless and rejoices in God's law. This compliance with divine law is also brought out in Plotinus. According to him,

> when a man (…) comes to the divine, it stand over him and sees to it that he is man; that is, that he lives by the law (νόμος) of providence, which means doing everything that its law says (ὃ δή ἐστι πράττοντα ὅσα ὁ νόμος αὐτῆς λέγει). But it says that those who have become good shall have a good life, now, and laid up for them hereafter as well, and the wicked the opposite. (3.2.9)

Wasserman notes, 'Romans 7 consistently uses images and terms that fit with Platonic representations of inner conflict, not with Stoic ones' (Wasserman 2007, 797n9; cf. 802n26); and von Bendemann 2004, esp. 55–61 on Epictetus. Von Bendemann, however, scarcely mentions the 'inner man' (see briefly von Bendemann 2004, 52, 59, 61–2) and does not refer to Plotinus' discussion of the inner man and the involuntary impulse within man. An excellent approach is taken by Wasserman 2007, who argues that 'Romans 7 appropriates a Platonic discourse about the nature of the soul and describes what happens to its reasoning part when the bad passions and appetites get the upper hand' (Wasserman 2007, 800; see also Wasserman 2008, *forthcoming*). I differ from her only in that I do not believe that Romans 7 is about 'the *death* of the soul' (italics mine). Rather, as I argue in § 7.2.4 below, in Romans 6–8 Paul draws a map of the *proper* functioning of the restored mind. For an excellent overview and discussion of the history of exegesis of Romans 7, see Lichtenberger 2004.

There is fundamental agreement between Plotinus and Paul about the ethical nature of the inner man, and of the real possibility that man rejoices in God's law, the law of providence. To acknowledge that there is still an involuntary impulse operative in man is, for them, not to justify unethical conduct. Quite the opposite, since the driving force behind the notion of 'inner man' is the idea that man should be transformed into God's image and become as god-like as possible: Plato's notion of the ὁμοίωσις θεῷ κατὰ τὸ δυνατόν (*Theaetetus* 176b; see § 2.2 above). The Lutheran interpretation of Paul's view on man as 'simul iustus et peccator', as if this were a steady, static mixture, leads to a severe misunderstanding of Paul's anthropology.[53] Paul and Plotinus regard the 'inner man' as progressive in nature: 'The soul gets rid of passions *as completely as possible*, altogether if it can, but if it cannot, at least it does not share its emotional excitement' (1.2.5); 'we are being transformed into God's image *with ever-increasing glory*' (2 Cor 3.18), and 'the inner man is renewed *day by day*' (4.16).

Paul's deliberations in Romans 7 about the relation between the 'inner man' and the vices which involuntarily remain in man show that he is indeed very well acquainted with the Platonic notion of the 'inner man'. Later on in this letter, Paul's line of thought again closely resembles the ideas already expressed in 2 Cor. Man is destined to acquire the same form as the image of God's Son, so that he becomes συμμόρφος τῆς εἰκόνος τοῦ υἱοῦ αὐτοῦ (Rom 8.29). As is the case in 2 Cor, this form (μορφή) is the result of his transformation.

This transformation is effected by the renewing of one's mind, Paul explains in Romans 12. There, Paul exhorts his readers to be transformed by the renewing of the mind (μεταμορφοῦσθε τῇ ἀνακαινώσει τοῦ νοός), so that they can examine the will of God, which – as in Plato's Euthyphro – is not arbitrary, but is characterized as that which is good, pleasant and perfect: μεταμορφοῦσθε τῇ ἀνακαινώσει τοῦ νοός, εἰς τὸ δοκιμάζειν ὑμᾶς τί τὸ θέλημα τοῦ θεοῦ, τὸ ἀγαθὸν καὶ εὐάρεστον καὶ τέλειον (12.2; see further § 7.3 below). According to Paul, this inward transformation is in fact a λογικὴ λατρεία, a 'logical', intellectual, i.e. non-cultic worship of God (12.1). That this transformation is effected within the mind (νοῦς) is consistent with Paul's view, expressed earlier in the letter, that the 'inner man' is located within, or identical with, the mind. This follows from Paul's saying that he rejoices in the law of God κατὰ τὸν ἔσω ἄνθρωπον, in the inner man (7.22), and serves God's law τῷ μὲν νοΐ, with the mind (7.25). This anthropological terminology allows Paul to sketch a detailed geography of good and evil in man.

[53] For this Lutheran interpretation, see Lichtenberger 2004, § 3.3, 24–8, esp. 27.

7.2.4 The detailed geography of good and evil in man[54]

By means of such specific terms as ‘inner man’ and ‘mind’, Paul appears to sketch a very detailed anthropology which enables him to show how the strife between good and evil takes place in man, where evil comes from, how it can be resisted and how man’s assimilation to Christ’s death and resurrection in baptism (Rom 6.5) and his continuing *summorphōsis* with the image of God (Rom 8.29) come about. I shall now give a summarizing overview of Paul’s ‘geography of good and evil’.

I take my starting point in the anthropology of Romans 6–8, but at the same time summarize what we have detected before of Paul’s anthropology, notably what we have seen of its trichotomic character (see chap. 5 above). Paul’s notion of the inner man accords very well with this trichotomy, since in Rom 7.22–25 the term ‘inner man’ is synonymous with the ‘mind’. The history of the term and its philosophical use in Plato and Plotinus, and of the equivalent notion of the true man in Philo (see §§ 7.2.2 and 7.2.3) do indeed show that ‘inner man’ and ‘mind’ are equivalent. Paul uses the term ‘inner man’ in the same technical, philosophical sense, as is confirmed by all the related terms, which belong to the same semantic-conceptual anthropological field. As a matter of fact, the notions of inner man and mind suggest, and even necessarily imply, a trichotomic anthropology, because the material discussed above shows that the inner man and the mind are perceived as the highest part of man’s multi-layered constitution, which consists at least of mind, soul, and body. The inner man, being identical with the mind, is regarded as the leading part of the soul. I shall summarize the anthropology of Romans 6–8 within such a trichotomic framework and also refer to other passages in Paul’s writings.

For a graphic presentation, I refer to the table included in the present section. In this table I include all the relevant terms and give references to the passages in which they occur, although of course not exhaustively. The list of terms shows how extensive Paul’s anthropological terminology is. I have printed the principal terms, which have attracted special attention in the course of this book, in small capitals.

The most remarkably feature of Paul’s anthropology is that it consists of two separate anthropologies, which can be distinguished as a ‘spirit anthropology’ and an ‘image anthropology’. This comes as no surprise, as we have seen that Philo, too, knows of these two anthropologies and derives them respectively from the second and first account of man’s creation in Gen 1–2 (see for Philo esp. §§ 1.2 and 5.1 above). The spirit anthropology is based on Gen 2.7, whereas the image anthropology follows from Gen 1.26–27. As I shall show further below,

[54] The terminology of ‘geography of good and evil’ has been derived from the title of Kinneging 2005.

Table: The Outline of Paul’s Anthropology

<table>
<tr><td>Theology</td><td colspan="3">God</td></tr>
<tr><td>Pneumatology / Christology</td><td colspan="2">The Spirit of God & Spirit of Christ:
πνεῦμα θεοῦ & πνεῦμα Χριστοῦ
(For intersection of Divine Spirit – human spirit, see 1Cor 2.10–11)</td><td>The Mind of Christ: νοῦς Χριστοῦ (1Cor 2.16, Rom 11.34; Is 40.13 LXX)</td></tr>
<tr><td></td><td colspan="2">↕</td><td>↕</td></tr>
<tr><td colspan="4">Spirit (Pneuma) anthropology – anthropological activities:</td></tr>
<tr><td colspan="3">– To walk according to the spirit: κατὰ πνεῦμα περιπατεῖν (Rom 8.4)
– To contemplate the things of the spirit: φρονεῖν τὰ τοῦ πνεύματος (Rom 8.5)
– To be in the spirit: ἐν πνεύματι εἶναι (Rom 8.9);
– To have the Spirit of Christ: πνεῦμα Χριστοῦ ἔχειν (Rom 8.9);
– To mortify the actions of the body through the spirit: πνεύματι τὰς πράξεις τοῦ σώματος θανατοῦν (Rom 8.13)</td><td>To have the mind of Christ: νοῦν Χριστοῦ ἔχειν (1Cor 2.16)</td></tr>
<tr><td></td><td colspan="2">↑</td><td>↑</td></tr>
<tr><td rowspan="4">Spirit (Pneuma) Anthropology based on Gen 2.7, and echoed in 1Cor 15.45 (Ἐγένετο ὁ πρῶτος ἄνθρωπος Ἀδὰμ εἰς ψυχὴν ζῶσαν) and 1Thess 5.23 (καὶ ὁλόκληρον ὑμῶν τὸ πνεῦμα καὶ ἡ ψυχὴ καὶ τὸ σῶμα ἀμέμπτως … τηρηθείη)</td><td>– Spirit: πνεῦμα (1Thess 5.23, Rom 7.6)</td><td>– Pneumatikoi (1Cor 2.13–3.1);
– Those of the spirit: οἱ κατὰ πνεῦμα (Rom 8.5)</td><td>– Mind, Reason, Intellect: νοῦς (Rom 1.28; 7.23,25; 12.2)</td></tr>
<tr><td>– Soul: ψυχή (1Thess 5.23, 1Cor 15.45)</td><td>– Psychikoi (1Cor 2.14)</td><td>–</td></tr>
<tr><td>– Body: σῶμα (1Thess 5.23; Rom 6.6,12; 7.24, 8.10, 12.1)</td><td>–</td><td rowspan="2">– Bodily limbs or frame: μέλη (Rom 6.13,19; 7.5,23)</td></tr>
<tr><td>– Flesh: σάρξ (Rom 7.5,18,25)</td><td>– Sarkinoi (1Cor 3.1, 3)</td></tr>
<tr><td></td><td colspan="3">↑
– ‘Involuntary impulse’ (Rom 7.14–21), cf. Plotinus: τὸ
– Sufferings, misfortunes, emotions, affections: παθήματα
– Desire: ἐπιθυμία (Rom 6.12, 7.7–8)</td></tr>
</table>

<table>
<tr><td colspan="2">GOD</td><td>Theology</td></tr>
<tr><td>The man from heaven: ὁ ἄνθρωπος ἐξ οὐρανοῦ (1Cor 15.47)</td><td>The IMAGE OF GOD: εἰκὼν τοῦ θεοῦ (2Cor 3.18; the one in the form of God: ὁ ἐν μορφῇ θεοῦ ὑπάρχων (Ph 2.6)</td><td>Christology</td></tr>
<tr><td colspan="3">↕</td></tr>
<tr><td colspan="3">Image (Eikōn) anthropology – anthropological activities:</td></tr>
<tr><td colspan="3">– To bear or carry constantly the image of the heavenly man: φορεῖν τὴν εἰκόνα τοῦ ἐπουρανίου (1Cor 15.49);
– To be transformed in accordance with the image of God: τὴν αὐτὴν εἰκόνα μεταμορφοῦσθαι (2Cor 3.18, 4.4);
– To become of the same form as the image: σύμμορφοι τῆς εἰκόνος τοῦ υἱοῦ αὐτοῦ εἶναι (Rom 8.29);
– To be the temple or shrine of God: ναὸς θεοῦ εἶναι (1Cor 3.16, 2Cor 6.16; cf. 1Cor 6.19)</td></tr>
<tr><td colspan="2">↑</td><td></td></tr>
<tr><td colspan="2">– The bearer of the image of the heavenly man: ὁ φορέων τὴν εἰκόνα τοῦ ἐπουρανίου ἀνθρώπου (1Cor15.47–49);</td><td rowspan="4">IMAGE (Eikōn) ANTHROPOLOGY
based on Gen 1.26–27, and echoed in 1 Cor 11.7 (ἀνὴρ …, εἰκὼν καὶ δόξα θεοῦ ὑπάρχων)</td></tr>
<tr><td colspan="2">– THE MAN INSIDE: ὁ ἔσω ἄνθρωπος (2Cor 4.16, Rom 7.22);</td></tr>
<tr><td colspan="2">– The bearer of the image of the earthly man: ὁ φορέων τὴν εἰκόνα τοῦ χοϊκοῦ ἀνθρώπου (1Cor 15.47–49)</td></tr>
<tr><td colspan="2">– The old man: ὁ παλαιὸς ἄνθρωπος (Rom 6.6);
– The outward man: ὁ ἔξω ἄνθρωπος (2Cor 4.16)</td></tr>
<tr><td colspan="2">↑
ἀπροαίρετον (Enneads 1.2.5);
(Rom 7.5, 8.18);</td><td></td></tr>
</table>

each kind of anthropology in Paul engenders specific anthropological activities in man, which I have also listed in the table.

To the spirit anthropology, naturally, belongs the terminology of spirit, soul and body. The latter term, 'body' (Rom 6.6,12; 7.24, 8.10, 12.1), can also be equivalent with 'flesh' (Rom 7.5,18,25) and with the μέλη, the 'bodily limbs' or 'bodily frame' (Rom 6.13,19; 7.5,23). As we have seen in chap. 5, each of the three entities – spirit, soul and body – depending their dominance on man, leads to a specific type of man, either the 'pneumatikoi' (in Rom 8.5 also called 'those of the spirit' – οἱ κατὰ πνεῦμα), 'the psychikoi', or the 'sarkinoi' (see §§ 5.1.1 [d] and 5.2.2 above). The highest part of this trichotomy, the spirit, is equivalent with the mind. Both man's spirit and mind, if they are in place and behave properly, communicate directly with the Spirit of God (or the Spirit of Christ) and the mind of Christ respectively. All these terms belong to a coherent spirit anthropology.

To the image anthropology, equally unsurprisingly, the term 'image' is attached. As was seen in § 1.3.1 and was repeated in § 2.4.1, Paul also uses this term in the expression 'bearing or carrying' the image of God. In this, he is referring, metaphorically, to the pagan practice of carrying the images of the gods around in processions. The image which man bears, according to Paul, is either the image of the earthly man, Adam, or the image of the heavenly man, Christ (1 Cor 15.47–49). Paul emphasizes the enduring condition of these anthropological acts, as he uses the verb φορεῖν, the frequentative verb of φέρειν, 'implying *repeated* or *habitual* action' (LSJ 1950). These acts are characteristic of very different conditions in which man can find himself. One could argue that the condition of the bearer of the image of the earthly man is equivalent to that of the soul in Paul's spirit anthropology. As is implied in 1 Cor 15.45, through Adam I one possesses only a soul, whereas it is only through Adam II that one acquires a spirit. As I argued in chap. 5, naturally Paul would have believed that Adam was also inbreathed with God's spirit, according to Gen 2.7, but this life was short-lived, and only through Adam II can one again participate in the Spirit which Adam I lost so quickly (see § 5.2.2 above).

Apart from this terminology, which is characteristic of either anthropology, Paul also uses some different terminology. First and foremost among these additional terms is the term 'inner man'. In my table I have listed it in the category 'image anthropology', but it is not as such a constituent part of it. It is certainly not synonymous with 'image' because, as we have also seen in Philo, man was perceived as having been created *after* the image; he is not the image itself (for Philo, see §§ 1.2.2 and 7.2.2 above). This also applies to Paul. Even though he does once identify man with the image of God (1 Cor 11.7), properly speaking only Christ is the image of God (2 Cor 3.17, 4.4; Rom 8.29). Rather than being synonymous with 'image of God', the term 'inner man' is equivalent – as we

have seen in the present chap. 7 – with 'mind'. For this reason the terms are listed at the same level in the table.

Another term which Paul adds to the terminology of both anthropologies is the term 'the old man' (Rom 6.6). Because in Rom 6.6 this term is equivalent with 'the sinful body', it can be allocated to the same level as 'body'. This level also seems to feature the 'outward man', whom Paul, in his criticism of sophistic physiognomics, places in antithesis to the 'inner man' (2 Cor 4.16; see § 6.5 above).

Between these anthropological coordinates, Paul describes the strife between good and evil. As we have seen in § 7.2.3, in this geography he also locates the 'involuntary impulse', which – as Plotinus confirms – does not manifest itself at the level of the mind and the inner man, but at the level of the body. In this anthropology the body is checked by the inner man and the mind, so that the onslaught of sin on the body is withstood and its attack foiled. The inner man and the mind themselves are focused on the good, which they continuously contemplate, and it is in this manner that they are able to oust sin from the body. Otherwise, with a malfunctioning mind, the body would be prone to the affections and desires. Hence the warning in Rom 6.12 'not to let sin exercise dominion in your mortal bodies, to make you obey their passions': Μὴ οὖν βασιλευέτω ἡ ἁμαρτία ἐν τῷ θνητῷ ὑμῶν σώματι εἰς τὸ ὑπακούειν ταῖς ἐπιθυμίαις αὐτοῦ, as had happened to the readers in their pre-baptismal existence. Because the inner man and the mind contemplate the good, man wills only what is good (Rom 7.15–21), since his will is guided by the inner man and mind. Within this anthropology it would be impossible to actively *will* what is evil. Evil only manifest itself as a threat to the body.

It is clear that in Romans 7 Paul in fact draws a map of the proper functioning of the mind.[55] The mind is no longer the ἀδόκιμος νοῦς, the 'unsatisfactory, discredited mind' (see the introduction to the present chapter), which – according to Romans 1 – was the result of the degeneration of the original monotheistic aniconic religion into polytheism (see § 7.1 above):

> Since they did not think fit to acknowledge God, God gave them up to a debased mind and to things that should not be done: καθὼς οὐκ ἐδοκίμασαν τὸν θεὸν ἔχειν ἐν ἐπιγνώσει, παρέδωκεν αὐτοὺς ὁ θεὸς εἰς ἀδόκιμον νοῦν. (Rom 1.28)

The remarkable thing about Romans 7 is that the mind is no longer debased but functioning again. This must be the result of man's assimilation to Christ in baptism (Rom 6.5). The assimilation causes him, anthropologically speaking, no longer to function on the level of the body and the flesh, but on the level of the inner man, which is equivalent to the spirit or mind. Sin no longer exercises dominion in man's mortal body (ἐν τῷ θνητῷ σώματι). Therefore man is no

[55] For an extensive history of exegesis of Romans 7, see Lichtenberger 2004.

longer forced to obey the παθήματα, the passions (Rom 6.12). In baptism, the body of sin (τὸ σῶμα τῆς ἁμαρτίας) is indeed destroyed when the old man (ὁ παλαιὸς ἄνθρωπος) is crucified with Christ (Rom 6.6). In repetitive statements Paul makes clear that those who have been assimilated to Christ have been freed from sin:

> But now (νυνὶ δέ) that you have been freed from sin (ἐλευθερωθέντες ἀπὸ τῆς ἁμαρτίας) and enslaved to God, the advantage you get is sanctification. The end is eternal life. (Rom 6.22)

This clearly defined change is the result of the believer's assimilation to the death and resurrection of Christ, as Paul emphasizes:

> You have died (…) through the body of Christ, so that you may belong to another, to him who has been raised from the dead in order that we may bear fruit for God: καὶ ὑμεῖς ἐθανατώθητε (…) διὰ τοῦ σώματος τοῦ Χριστοῦ, εἰς τὸ γενέσθαι ὑμᾶς ἑτέρῳ, τῷ ἐκ νεκρῶν ἐγερθέντι, ἵνα καρποφορήσωμεν τῷ θεῷ. (Rom 7.4)

The phrase 'you have died … through the body of Christ' (ὑμεῖς ἐθανατώθητε … διὰ τοῦ σώματος τοῦ Χριστοῦ) must refer back to the growing together with the likeness of Christ's death and resurrection (Rom 6.5). This assimilation is an assimilation to the ethos of Christ, that which Christ experienced in his body, in death and resurrection (see § 7.2.1 above).

The present state of those who have been baptized is contrasted with their previous life, which was limited to life 'in the flesh', the lowest level of trichotomic anthropology:

> While we were living in the flesh, our sinful passions, aroused by the law, were at work in our members to bear fruit for death. But now … : ὅτε γὰρ ἦμεν ἐν τῇ σαρκί, τὰ παθήματα τῶν ἁμαρτιῶν τὰ διὰ τοῦ νόμου ἐνηργεῖτο ἐν τοῖς μέλεσιν ἡμῶν εἰς τὸ καρποφορῆσαι τῷ θανάτῳ· νυνὶ δὲ … (Rom 7.5–6)

Here, in Rom 7.5, Paul refers back to the converts' pre-Christian existence. It is only in Rom 7.7–13 that he elaborates further on their past, by explaining the short phrase that the sinful passions which were active in man's bodily frame, were 'aroused by the law' (Rom 7.5). This arousal, however, is clearly a thing of the past, since Paul describes his awareness of the law's enhancement of the passions in the pluperfect, expressing a completed action in the past time: 'I would not have known what it is to covet if the law had not said, "You shall not covet"' – τήν τε γὰρ ἐπιθυμίαν οὐκ ᾔδειν εἰ μὴ ὁ νόμος ἔλεγεν, Οὐκ ἐπιθυμήσεις (Rom 7.7).[56] The entire passage, Rom 7.7–13, is a footnote to the short remark

[56] The phrase 'I was once alive apart from the law' (Rom 7.9: ἐγὼ δὲ ἔζων χωρὶς νόμου ποτέ) must then be a reference, within this now completed past, to the early stages of it, either to the stage of being a child (in the case of Paul's biography and that of the other Jews in the Christian community of Rome), or to the stage before the pagans, who are characterized as 'those who know the law' (Rom 7.1), became God-fearers in the Roman synagogues and got

in Rom 7.5 that the sinful passions, which characterized the pre-Christian life 'in the flesh', were aroused – during that existence – by the law. At present, however, those who have been baptized are no longer subject to these passions, as they have died to their past existence and are now enslaved in the new life of the Spirit: ἀποθανόντες ..., ὥστε δουλεύειν ἡμᾶς ἐν καινότητι πνεύματος (Rom 7.6).

This break with the past, as Paul explains, has radically changed their anthropological constitution, and they are no longer ἐν τῇ σαρκί, 'in the flesh' (Rom 7.5). They may still be fleshly, as Paul admits, but that is something wholly different: 'I am fleshly' – ἐγὼ δὲ σάρκινός εἰμι (Rom 7.14). Within a trichotomic anthropology, this is a rather restricted statement. It does not say that man *is* flesh, but only that there is a 'fleshly' level in him. Man is no longer only 'in the flesh', but as the inner man and mind are operative again, there is a new dynamic in man, which, at first sight, may be difficult to understand, as Paul confesses: 'I do not understand my own actions' – ὃ γὰρ κατεργάζομαι οὐ γινώσκω (Rom 7.15).

Yet the dynamics which Paul subsequently describes (Rom 7.15–23) are those we have studied in § 7.2.3 and are based on the fact that, whereas the involuntary impulse tries to exert an influence upon the body, the inner man and mind keep contemplating the good: 'I can will what is right' (Rom 7.18: τὸ γὰρ θέλειν παράκειταί μοι); 'I want to do what is good', the 'I' being characterized as ὁ θέλων ποιεῖν τὸ καλὸν, the one who wants to do what is good (Rom 7.21); 'I delight in the law of God in the inner man' (Rom 7.22: συνήδομαι γὰρ τῷ νόμῳ τοῦ θεοῦ κατὰ τὸν ἔσω ἄνθρωπον). The only problem, confusing as it may be, is that

> I see in my bodily limbs another law at war with the law of my mind, making me captive to the law of sin that dwells in my bodily limbs: βλέπω δὲ ἕτερον νόμον ἐν τοῖς μέλεσίν μου ἀντιστρατευόμενον τῷ νόμῳ τοῦ νοός μου καὶ αἰχμαλωτίζοντά με ἐν τῷ νόμῳ τῆς ἁμαρτίας τῷ ὄντι ἐν τοῖς μέλεσίν μου. (Rom 7.23)

The mind, which – as § 7.2.2 has shown – should be taken as synonymous with the inner man, is clearly distinguished from the bodily limbs, the bodily frame, in which the deceiving force of sin presents itself. It is noteworthy that in this passage Paul carefully distinguishes between the multiple layers of trichotomic anthropology. He refrains from absolute anthropological statements and remains very nuanced. Even when he makes the bold statement that 'I know that nothing good dwells within me' (Rom 7.18: οἶδα γὰρ ὅτι οὐκ οἰκεῖ ἐν ἐμοί ... ἀγαθόν) he appears to remain fully within the framework of his detailed anthropology, as he clarifies that this statement applies only to the level of his flesh, the lowest level of his trichotomy: 'I know that nothing good dwells within me, *that is, in*

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to know the Mosaic law, before finally starting to attend the meetings of the Christian community at Rome.

my flesh' – οἶδα γὰρ ὅτι οὐκ οἰκεῖ ἐν ἐμοί, τοῦτ' ἔστιν ἐν τῇ σαρκί μου, ἀγαθόν (Rom 7.18). Indeed, the body poses the main and only threat to man, as it might be the gateway of sin. Hence, Paul's exclamation:

> Wretched man that I am! (ταλαίπωρος ἐγὼ ἄνθρωπος) Who will rescue me from this body of death? (τίς με ῥύσεται ἐκ τοῦ σώματος τοῦ θανάτου τούτου;) (Rom 7.24)

This exclamation is fully understandable in a multi-layered anthropology. Likewise Plato, in a summarizing statement in his *Phaedo*, emphasizes that purification from evil consists in τὸ χωρίζειν ὅτι μάλιστα ἀπὸ τοῦ σώματος τὴν ψυχὴν, in 'separating, so far as possible, the soul from the body':

> And does not the purification consist in this (Κάθαρσις δὲ εἶναι ἆρα οὐ τοῦτο συμβαίνει) which has been mentioned long ago in our discourse, in separating, so far as possible, the soul from the body (τὸ χωρίζειν ὅτι μάλιστα ἀπὸ τοῦ σώματος τὴν ψυχὴν) and teaching the soul the habit of collecting and bringing itself together from all parts of the body (καὶ ἐθίσαι αὐτὴν καθ' αὑτὴν πανταχόθεν ἐκ τοῦ σώματος συναγείρεσθαί τε καὶ ἁθροίζεσθαι), and living, so far as it can, both now and hereafter, alone by itself, freed from the body as from fetters (καὶ οἰκεῖν κατὰ τὸ δυνατὸν καὶ ἐν τῷ νῦν παρόντι καὶ ἐν τῷ ἔπειτα μόνην καθ' αὑτήν, ἐκλυομένην ὥσπερ [ἐκ] δεσμῶν ἐκ τοῦ σώματος;)? (*Phaedo* 67c–d; cf. 64a–67e, esp. 64e, 65a, 65d, 66a–b, 67a)

The phrases 'so far as possible' and 'so far as it can' (κατὰ τὸ δυνατὸν) clearly return in Plato's description of assimilation to God 'so far as possible' in his *Theaetetus*:

> Therefore we ought to try to escape from earth to the dwelling of the gods as quickly as we can; and to escape is to become like God, *so far as this is possible* (κατὰ τὸ δυνατόν); and to become like God is to become righteous and holy, with wisdom. (*Theaetetus* 176b; see § 2.2.1 above)

The separation between soul and body which Plato recommends in his *Phaedo* appears to consist, in his *Theaetetus*, in assimilation to God.

In his exclamation 'Who will rescue me from this body of death?' (τίς με ῥύσεται ἐκ τοῦ σώματος τοῦ θανάτου τούτου; – Rom 7.24), Paul expresses the same anthropology, and the ensuing answer to his rhetorical question confirms that this is a fully trichotomic anthropology:

> Thanks be to God through Jesus Christ our Lord! (χάρις δὲ τῷ θεῷ διὰ Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ τοῦ κυρίου ἡμῶν) So then, with the mind I am a slave to the law of God, but with the flesh I am a slave to the law of sin (ἄρα οὖν αὐτὸς ἐγὼ τῷ μὲν νοΐ δουλεύω νόμῳ θεοῦ, τῇ δὲ σαρκὶ νόμῳ ἁμαρτίας). (Rom 7.25)

Paul's relief and thankfulness are genuine, as he is now able to interpret his confusing experience. It is through Jesus Christ, i. e., in the context of Romans 6–7, through man's assimilation to Christ's death and resurrection (Rom 6.5)

and through man's death διὰ τοῦ σώματος τοῦ Χριστοῦ and his belonging to the resurrected Christ (Rom 7.4), that man's mind once again becomes operative. Through Jesus Christ, through assimilation to him, the fully trichotomic constitution of man has been re-established. The mind is no longer ἀδόκιμος, 'a debased, unsatisfactory or discredited mind' (Rom 1.28) but is again enslaved to God. Man is no longer only 'in the flesh', as he was in his pre-baptismal state (Rom 7.5), but is now furnished with a fully operative inner man and mind, in which he delights in (Rom 7.22), and is enslaved to, the law of God (Rom 7.25). In this new state, he is equipped to wage war against the temptation which sin poses in the bodily frame (Rom 7.23). Thus the inner man and mind are able to restrict the effectiveness of the involuntary impulse.

Now that the dominion of mind and inner man has been re-established, it is possible, as Paul shows in Romans 8, to exert the anthropological functions which belong to such a trichotomic anthropology of spirit (or inner man and mind), soul and body. I shall briefly list the various functions which the re-established spirit or mind ought to bring into play. First, though, let me point out that at the beginning of Romans 8 Paul explicitly shows that he operates with a trichotomic spirit anthropology.

As he puts it, 'the law of *the Spirit of life* in Christ Jesus has set me free': ὁ γὰρ νόμος τοῦ πνεύματος τῆς ζωῆς ἐν Χριστῷ Ἰησοῦ ἠλευθέρωσέν με (Rom 8.2). This is a very enlightening statement because of the specific combination τὸ πνεῦμα τῆς ζωῆς, 'the Spirit of life'. It does not occur elsewhere in Paul's writings. It is specific to the present passage and alludes, I would suggest, to the Spirit of life inbreathed in man according to the second creation account in Gen 2.7, the foundational text for Philo's and Paul's spirit anthropology (cf. for Paul 1 Cor 15.45). As we noted in chap. 5 above, the LXX text of Gen 2.7 reads πνοὴ ζωῆς instead of πνεῦμα ζωῆς (see § 5.1.1 [c] above). Yet elsewhere the Septuagint alternates between the two expressions and seems to regard them as synonymous.

On the one hand, the 'breath of life' (πνοὴ ζωῆς) is mentioned in Gen 2.7 and Gen 7.22; the latter passage is about 'all things which have the breath of life' (πάντα, ὅσα ἔχει πνοὴν ζωῆς) and died because of the Flood. On the other hand, the 'spirit of life' (πνεῦμα ζωῆς) is used when God heralds this Flood: 'And behold I bring a flood of water upon the earth, to καταφθεῖραι πᾶσαν σάρκα, ἐν ᾗ ἐστιν πνεῦμα ζωῆς, to destroy all flesh in which is the spirit of life' (Gen 6.17). Likewise, also those who enter the ark possess the spirit of life: they 'went in to Noah into the ark, pairs, male and female of all flesh in which is the spirit of life' – εἰσῆλθον πρὸς Νωε εἰς τὴν κιβωτόν, δύο δύο ἀπὸ πάσης σαρκός, ἐν ᾧ ἐστιν πνεῦμα ζωῆς (Gen 7.15). Besides the book of Genesis, it is particularly the book of Ezekiel which contains the phrase πνεῦμα ζωῆς (1.20–21, 10.17, 37.5 LXX; cf. further Judith 10.13). It is to these πνεῦμα ζωῆς passages in Genesis and Ezekiel that the commentaries refer as the background to the occurrence

of the phrase πνεῦμα ζωῆς in Rom 8.2.[57] Yet, implicitly the two phrases πνοὴ ζωῆς and πνεῦμα ζωῆς seem already to be synonymous in the Septuagint version of Genesis.

More importantly, as we have already seen in chap. 5, in most passages Philo understands this breath of life (πνοὴ ζωῆς) as the *spirit* of life (πνεῦμα ζωῆς). For this reason Philo even varies between the two readings when he quotes Gen 2.7. In most passages he reads, in accordance with the Septuagint, πνοὴ ζωῆς, 'breath of life',[58] but also, on other occasions, πνεῦμα ζωῆς, 'spirit of life'.[59] It is this key word of spirit anthropology, I would suggest, which Paul applies in Rom 8.2 when stating that 'the law of *the Spirit of life* in Christ Jesus has set me free' (ὁ γὰρ νόμος τοῦ πνεύματος τῆς ζωῆς ἐν Χριστῷ Ἰησοῦ ἠλευθέρωσέν με). This Spirit of life is the Spirit which God breathed into man at his creation and now again at his re-creation; in this way it becomes man's own, innate spirit. This fully fits the trichotomic anthropology which also seems to underlie Romans 6–8.

Once man's mind, the inner man, the spirit, has been fully restored to him, it is again possible to exert the anthropological functions which such a man possesses. In his reflections on this spirit of life, in the subsequent passage, Paul mentions several of such functions, both implicitly and explicitly. I limit myself to the functions which are put to use by man alone (the anthropological functions), and do not highlight the equally numerous functions which are fulfilled by God or the Spirit of God.

First of all, the fully equipped, trichotomic man is said to walk not according to the flesh, but to the spirit; he belongs to οἱ μὴ κατὰ σάρκα περιπατοῦντες ἀλλὰ κατὰ πνεῦμα (Rom 8.4; cf. Gal 5.16: πνεύματι περιπατεῖν). I am very hesitant to write the 'spirit' (πνεῦμα) here with a capital S, as does the NRSV, among others. The use of the term 'spirit' here is ambiguous, and, I would argue, deliberately so. Anthropologically speaking, from a trichotomic perspective such as we have explored in chap. 5 above, the distinction here is between, on the one hand, those who walk according to the lowest possible level of their anthropological constitution, the *sarkinoi* of 1 Cor (1 Cor 3.1, 3), and, on the other, those who walk according to their highest possible level, the *pneumatikoi* (1 Cor 2.13–3.1; see §§ 5.1.1 [d] and 5.2.2 above). In Rom 8.5 the latter are called οἱ κατὰ πνεῦμα, those who live according to the spirit. Again, I do not translate 'spirit' with a capital S as the NRSV does. Of course it is clear, as we have just seen in Rom 8.2, that the human spirit is the result of the inbreathing of God's Spirit of life. Yet this Spirit becomes fully part of man's constitution, and it is

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[57] See, e. g., Dunn 1988, 418.

[58] Philo, *De opificio mundi* 134; *Legum allegoriarum libri* 1.31; *De plantatione* 19; *Quis rerum divinarum heres sit* 56; *De somniis* 1.34; *De specialibus legibus* 4.123 (allusion); *Quaestiones in Genesim* 2.59.

[59] Philo, *Legum allegoriarum libri* 3.161; *Quod deterius potiori insidiari soleat* 80.

better, therefore, to retain the ambiguity by writing 'spirit' with a small s. The first anthropological function, thus, is to κατὰ πνεῦμα περιπατεῖν, to walk according to the spirit.

Secondly, such a man is characterized by contemplating the things of the spirit. As Paul says,

> For those who live according to the flesh set their minds on the things of the flesh, but those who live according to the spirit set their minds on the things of the spirit (οἱ γὰρ κατὰ σάρκα ὄντες τὰ τῆς σαρκὸς φρονοῦσιν, οἱ δὲ κατὰ πνεῦμα τὰ τοῦ πνεύματος). To set the mind on the flesh is death, but to set the mind on the spirit is life and peace (τὸ γὰρ φρόνημα τῆς σαρκὸς θάνατος, τὸ δὲ φρόνημα τοῦ πνεύματος ζωὴ καὶ εἰρήνη). For this reason, the mind that is set on the flesh is hostile to God (διότι τὸ φρόνημα τῆς σαρκὸς ἔχθρα εἰς θεόν); it does not submit to God's law – indeed it cannot, and those who are in the flesh cannot please God (οἱ δὲ ἐν σαρκὶ ὄντες θεῷ ἀρέσαι οὐ δύνανται). (Rom 8.5–8)

Trichotomic man belongs to οἱ δὲ κατὰ πνεῦμα, those of the spirit, who contemplate the things of the spirit. They exert the function of φρονεῖν τὰ τοῦ πνεύματος, which is proper to a man who consists of spirit, soul and body. Again, differently from the NRSV, I translate 'spirit' in Rom 8.6 with a small s: 'To set the mind on the flesh is death, but to set the mind on the spirit is life and peace (τὸ γὰρ φρόνημα τῆς σαρκὸς θάνατος, τὸ δὲ φρόνημα τοῦ πνεύματος ζωὴ καὶ εἰρήνη)'. Again, the word is very ambiguous, as the spirit and the Spirit do communicate in Paul's anthropology and Pneumatology (see the table above), but this ambiguity is best retained by stressing its anthropological side.

Or phrased differently: the tension between the flesh and the Spirit is reflected in the anthropological tension between the flesh and the spirit of trichotomic man. The phrase τὸ φρόνημα τῆς σαρκὸς, 'the mind (or thought) that is set on the flesh', or 'the mind (or thought) whose subject is the flesh' (Rom 8.6, 7) refers to the ἀδόκιμος νοῦς, the 'debased, unsatisfactory, discredited mind' of Rom 1.28. The anthropological status criticized is that of οἱ δὲ ἐν σαρκὶ ὄντες (Rom 8.8), those who are in the flesh, the position of man's pre-baptismal existence (Rom 7.5); they cannot please God. The φρόνημα τῆς σαρκὸς, 'the mind that is set on the flesh', is contrasted with the τὸ φρόνημα τοῦ πνεύματος, 'the mind (or thought) that is set on the spirit' or, if understood as a genitivus subjectivus, 'the mind (or thought) of the spirit', which does indeed contemplate the things of the Spirit / spirit.

That τὸ φρόνημα τοῦ πνεύματος must also be the mind whose subject is the human spirit, becomes clear from Rom 8.26–27 where the Spirit is said to help man in his weakness,

> for we do not know how to pray as we ought, but that very Spirit intercedes with sighs too deep for words. [27] And He who searches the heart, knows what is the mind of the spirit (ὁ δὲ ἐραυνῶν τὰς καρδίας οἶδεν τί τὸ φρόνημα τοῦ πνεύματος), because the Spirit intercedes for the saints according to the will of God (ὁ δὲ ἐραυνῶν

> τὰς καρδίας οἶδεν τί τὸ φρόνημα τοῦ πνεύματος, ὅτι κατὰ θεὸν ἐντυγχάνει ὑπὲρ ἁγίων). (Rom 8.26–27)

Unlike the NRSV, I do not translate Rom 8.27a as follows: 'And *God*, who searches the heart, knows what is the mind of *the Spirit* (ὁ δὲ ἐραυνῶν τὰς καρδίας οἶδεν τί τὸ φρόνημα τοῦ πνεύματος)'. The text simply speaks of 'the one who searches the heart' (ὁ δὲ ἐραυνῶν τὰς καρδίας), and this subject is best taken to be the Spirit, in line with the preceding line (i. e. 'that very Spirit [which] intercedes with sighs too deep for words'), and not God himself. The one who searches the human heart is the Spirit, who helps man in his weakness and intercedes for him. If this is true, the phrase τὸ φρόνημα τοῦ πνεύματος does not refer to the mind of *the Spirit*, as the NRSV has it, but to the way of thinking characteristic of the human spirit. It is the Spirit who, because he is inbreathed in man's highest constituent part as the Spirit / spirit of life, knows what is going on in this human, restored spirit or mind, the mind of the saints, on whose behalf the Spirit prays.

Thirdly and fourthly, trichotomic man exercises the following functions: to be in the spirit (ἐν πνεύματι εἶναι), and to have the Spirit of Christ (πνεῦμα Χριστοῦ ἔχειν), as Paul explains:

> But you are not in the flesh; you are in the spirit, since the Spirit of God dwells in you (ὑμεῖς δὲ οὐκ ἐστὲ ἐν σαρκὶ ἀλλὰ ἐν πνεύματι, εἴπερ πνεῦμα θεοῦ οἰκεῖ ἐν ὑμῖν). Anyone who does not have the Spirit of Christ (εἰ δέ τις πνεῦμα Χριστοῦ οὐκ ἔχει) does not belong to him. [10] But if Christ is in you, though the body is dead because of sin, the Spirit is life (τὸ μὲν σῶμα νεκρὸν διὰ ἁμαρτίαν, τὸ δὲ πνεῦμα ζωὴ) because of righteousness. If the Spirit of him who raised Jesus from the dead dwells in you, he who raised Christ from the dead will give life to your mortal bodies also through his Spirit that dwells in you. (Rom 8.9–10)

As regards the function of being in the spirit, again I do not follow the NRSV in rendering 'spirit' with a capital S. This would make the second part of the statement of Rom 8.9a–b redundant. The statement reads: 'But you are not *in the flesh*; you are *in the spirit*, since *the Spirit of God* dwells in you – ὑμεῖς δὲ οὐκ ἐστὲ ἐν σαρκὶ ἀλλὰ ἐν πνεύματι, εἴπερ πνεῦμα θεοῦ οἰκεῖ ἐν ὑμῖν (Rom 8.9a–b)'. If we translate the phrase ἀλλὰ ἐν πνεύματι ('you are in the spirit') as 'you are in the Spirit' (with a capital S), the following explanation 'since the Spirit of God dwells in you' would be tautological. It is only because the phrase ἀλλὰ ἐν πνεύματι ('you are in the spirit') describes the anthropological category of the spirit as the highest part of man's trichotomic constitution, that it makes sense to add, by way of explanation, that man possesses this highest level because of the Spirit of God who indwells him. The contrast in Rom 8.9 is being ἐν σαρκὶ, 'in the flesh' (the pre-baptismal condition of Rom 7.5) and being ἐν πνεύματι, 'in the spirit' with a small s.

And indeed, those who have been baptized with Christ are no longer 'in the flesh': ὑμεῖς δὲ οὐκ ἐστὲ ἐν σαρκὶ (Rom 8.9; cf. Rom 7.5). Because of that, they do in fact 'have the Spirit of Christ' (Rom 8.9c). This is only stated implicitly, as actually the reverse is said of the non-spiritual type of man: 'Anyone who does not have the Spirit of Christ (εἰ δέ τις πνεῦμα Χριστοῦ οὐκ ἔχει) does not belong to him' (Rom 8.9). The function of having the Spirit of Christ (πνεῦμα Χριστοῦ ἔχειν) is identical with that of having the mind of Christ (νοῦν Χριστοῦ ἔχειν), described in 1 Cor 2.16. One could argue that both the spirit and mind of man, as the highest part of man's trichotomic constitution, reflect the Spirit and mind of Christ.

If a man has the Spirit of Christ, Paul continues in Romans 8, Christ is in him: 'But if Christ is in you, though the body is dead because of sin, the Spirit is life' – εἰ δὲ Χριστὸς ἐν ὑμῖν, τὸ μὲν σῶμα νεκρὸν διὰ ἁμαρτίαν, τὸ δὲ πνεῦμα ζωὴ (Rom 8.10). Again, it is tempting to write 'spirit' in lower case, because here, too, the Spirit of Christ is thought to have become innate in man, as the anthropological distinction body – spirit suggests: the body is dead because of sin, the spirit is life. Yet since the statement 'the Spirit is life' seems to be a clear echo of the 'Spirit of life' in Rom 8.2, it may be wise to understand the spirit in Rom 8.10 primarily as the Spirit of life with a capital S, although the anthropology under discussion implies that this Spirit of life becomes wholly intrinsic to man.

Fifthly, the final function of Paul's spirit anthropology explicated is that of mortifying the deeds of the body through the spirit:

> So then, brothers, we are debtors, not to the flesh, to live according to the flesh – for if you live according to the flesh, you will die; but if by the spirit you put to death the deeds of the body, you will live (εἰ δὲ πνεύματι τὰς πράξεις τοῦ σώματος θανατοῦτε ζήσεσθε). (Rom 8.12–13)

Trichotomic man is also called to πνεύματι τὰς πράξεις τοῦ σώματος θανατοῦν, to mortify the actions of the body through the spirit (Rom 8.13). Again, it would do injustice to Paul's anthropology to translate 'spirit' with a capital S. Because trichotomic man also possesses a spirit (the recipient or result of the inbreathing of God's Spirit of life), he is excellently equipped to mortify the deeds of the body. As in previous instances, the primary distinction is between the human spirit (or mind or inner man) and the body. Man's repossession of the spirit or mind is the reason why Paul is so grateful to God, because he is now no longer limited to a life in the flesh (7.24–25, 8.9). It is through one's spirit that one is able to mortify the deeds of the body.

So far, Paul has listed functions of man's spirit or mind which are characteristic of a spirit anthropology. At the end of Romans 8, there is finally also mention of a function of the image anthropology, when he speaks about Christians becoming σύμμορφοι τῆς εἰκόνος τοῦ υἱοῦ αὐτοῦ, of the same form as the image of God (Rom 8.29). This is a function which is characteristic of Paul's

image Christology. It is fully in line with what he has said in 1 and 2 Cor about bearing the image of the heavenly man (1 Cor 15.49: φορεῖν τὴν εἰκόνα τοῦ ἐπουρανίου) and about being transformed in accordance with the image of God (2 Cor 3.18, 4.4: τὴν αὐτὴν εἰκόνα μεταμορφοῦσθαι). Through this anthropological activity of becoming or being of the same form as the image (Rom 8.29: σύμμορφοι τῆς εἰκόνος τοῦ υἱοῦ αὐτοῦ εἶναι) man is assimilated to Him who is the image of God, the εἰκὼν τοῦ θεοῦ (2 Cor 3.18), the one who is in the form of God, ὃ ἐν μορφῇ θεοῦ ὑπάρχων (Philipp 2.6).

The entire assimilation of Romans 6–8, which started with man's assimilation to Christ's death and resurrection in baptism, finally leads to a complete *summorphōsis* with the image of God. Whereas man's mind had become debased and discredited (Rom 1.28), it is now restored through assimilation to Christ and again starts to exercise functions which Paul describes both in terms of a spirit anthropology and an image anthropology. In the terminology of a spirit anthropology, man walks according to the spirit, contemplates the things of the spirit, is in the spirit, and mortifies the actions of the body through the spirit. In the terminology of an image anthropology, he acquires the same form as the image of God. These dynamics cannot be captured in a rather static *simul iustus et peccator* anthropology, but only become clear when one realizes the trichotomic structure of Paul's anthropology. Through these dynamic activities, as we shall see in the following section, man experiences a metamorphosis which renders him into a fully ethical being.

7.3 The metamorphosis of man's mind and the restitution of true religion: Romans 12 – the climax of Paul's anthropology

By applying his trichotomic anthropology in such a wide-raging, universalist way, Paul is able to provide in Romans 6–8 an anthropological solution to the ethnic tensions which divide Jews and former pagans in the Christian community at Rome. As I have suggested before (see the introduction to the present chapter), after Paul has commented upon the non-Christian Jews in Romans 9–11, he feels the need to summarize his universalist anthropology at the beginning of Romans 12. There Paul exhorts his readers as follows:

> I appeal to you therefore, brothers, by the mercies of God, to present your bodies as a living sacrifice, holy and acceptable to God, which is your rational worship (παραστῆσαι τὰ σώματα ὑμῶν θυσίαν ζῶσαν ἁγίαν εὐάρεστον τῷ θεῷ, τὴν λογικὴν λατρείαν ὑμῶν). Do not be conformed to this world, but be transformed by the renewing of your minds, so that you may discern what is the will of God – what is good and acceptable and perfect: καὶ μὴ συσχηματίζεσθε τῷ αἰῶνι τούτῳ, ἀλλὰ μεταμορφοῦσθε τῇ ἀνακαινώσει τοῦ νοός, εἰς τὸ δοκιμάζειν ὑμᾶς τί τὸ θέλημα τοῦ θεοῦ, τὸ ἀγαθὸν καὶ εὐάρεστον καὶ τέλειον. (Rom 12.1–2)

Paul talks here explicitly of the metamorphosis which takes place in the mind. Whereas at the beginning of his letter to the Romans, Paul has explained that as a result of the decline of Rome's original monotheistic and aniconic religion (see § 7.1 above), the human mind has deteriorated into an ἀδόκιμος νοῦς, a 'debased, unsatisfactory, discredited mind' (Rom 1.28), as a result of the assimilation to Christ described in the anthropological reflections in Romans 6–8, the mind can be said to experience a renewal.

The passage in Romans 12 in fact reads as a synthesis of what Paul has said in 2 Cor 3–4 and Romans 6–8. Whereas in the former text, Paul has explained that man's metamorphosis in accordance with the image of God results in the growth of the inner man (2 Cor 3.18, 4.4, 4.16; see § 6.5 above), in the latter text he shows that – in line with particular strands of philosophical reflection – he considers the inner man as equivalent with the mind (Rom 7.22–25) and defines man's assimilation to Christ as a *summorphōsis* with the image of God. Hence, Paul is able to summarize these views in Rom 12.1–2 in terms of a metamorphosis which takes place through the renewal of the mind.

As a result of this renewal of the ἀδόκιμος νοῦς, the 'discredited mind', which was incapable of ethical scrutiny (Rom 1.28–31), the renewed mind is now again able τὸ δοκιμάζειν … τί τὸ θέλημα τοῦ θεοῦ, τὸ ἀγαθὸν καὶ εὐάρεστον καὶ τέλειον, 'to discern what is the will of God – what is good and acceptable and perfect (Rom 12.2). This is the outcome of man's identification with Christ. As in the Platonic doctrine of assimilation to God (see § 2.2 above), the nature of this assimilation is ethical.

The renewal not only transforms the debased mind into an ethically functioning mind, it also renders religion into a λογικὴ λατρεία, a logical, intellectual, rational form of worshipping God, as Paul makes clear in Rom 12.1. Naturally this religion is called λογική, 'logical, intellectual or rational', because of the involvement of the mind, which becomes visible in ethical decision-making. It seems that Paul's definition serves a double polemical purpose. On the one hand, this rational religion is contrasted with Greek polytheism, which is a deterioration from its original monotheistic and aniconic beginnings (see § 7.1 above). On the other hand, this rational form of worshipping God seems to be implicitly contrasted with the mere depiction of Judaism in Rom 9–11 as a λατρεία, a worship of God (Rom 9.4), without any further defining characteristic. It seems that in this way Paul contrasts Christian Judaism as a non-cultic, rational worship of God with non-Christian Judaism as a form of worship which still involves a temple cult. This difference which Paul perceives between non-Christian and Christian Judaism can be nicely illustrated by a passage from Philo, already studied before, which comes very close to Rom 12.1–2.

According to Philo, in one of his comments on the 'true man', the Philonic equivalent of the Platonic 'inner man', man's rational soul is in fact a temple of God:

> For there are, as is evident, two temples of God: one of them this universe, in which there is also as High Priest His First-born, the divine Logos, and the other the rational soul, whose priest is the real man (ἕτερον δὲ λογικὴ ψυχή, ἧς ἱερεὺς ὁ πρὸς ἀλήθειαν ἄνθρωπος), the outward and visible image of whom is he who offers the prayers and sacrifices handed down from our fathers (οὗ μίμημα αἰσθητὸν ὁ τὰς πατρίους εὐχὰς καὶ θυσίας ἐπιτελῶν ἐστιν). (Philo, *De somniis* 1.215; cf. § 7.2.2 [e] above)

As we have seen in chap. 2 on the pagan notion of 'image of God', pagan philosophers also regarded man as a temple of God, since man bears in the inner shrine of his mind the image of God (see §§ 2.1.3 [b], 2.1.4 and 2.4.1 above). Against this background, Philo and Paul agree. Yet differently from Paul, Philo views the Jerusalem cult as of enduring importance because the 'real man', 'the inner man', who officiates as priest in the rational soul, is at the same time represented by the (high) priest at the Jerusalem temple, 'the one who offers the prayers and sacrifices handed down from our fathers', ὁ τὰς πατρίους εὐχὰς καὶ θυσίας ἐπιτελῶν. It seems that against such an enduring cultic and / or traditional view of religion, which is – in Josephus' terminology – a πάτριος θρησκεία (Josephus, *Jewish Antiquities* 8.229, 12.269, 12.385, 19.284), Paul defines his own religion deliberately as a λογικὴ λατρεία, a rational worship of God. This seems to imply – to quote the well-known phrase from J. Z. Smith – that Paul's definition of true religion is even less 'locative' and more 'utopian' than Philo's and probably also than that of most Greek philosophers. The only analogy which presents itself, and which we have already encountered in § 2.2 above, is that between Paul and the anti-cultic reflections on man as the image of God in the *Pythagorean Sentences* (see § 2.2.11 above). As we have seen, according to this Pythagorean collection:

> Offerings and sacrifices do not pay honour to God; votive offerings set up in a temple do not embellish God. But the mind which is full of God and has been sufficiently established unites with God, for it must be that like comes to like: ἀλλὰ τὸ ἔνθεον φρόνημα διαρκῶς ἡδρασμένον συνάπτει θεῷ· χωρεῖν γὰρ ἀνάγκη τὸ ὅμοιον πρὸς τὸ ὅμοιον. (*Sententiae Pythagoreorum* 20)

Indeed, it seems that Neo-Pythagoreanism and Paul share very similar ideas about the anti-sacrificial nature of the true worship of God.

In Paul's non-locative and utopian, universalist and rational, ethical understanding of religion, the exclusive site of the worship of God becomes the believer's own body. Hence he exhorts his readers 'to present [their] bodies as a living sacrifice, holy and acceptable to God, which is [their] rational worship': παραστῆσαι τὰ σώματα ὑμῶν θυσίαν ζῶσαν ἁγίαν εὐάρεστον τῷ θεῷ, τὴν λογικὴν λατρείαν ὑμῶν (Rom 12.1). Against the background of the trichotomic anthropology which we explored in chap. 5 and applied to Romans in the present chapter, it may be clear that the bodies presented as a sacrifice in this rational worship are not merely viewed as bodies, but as bodies which harbour man's

soul and mind. This is also clear from the immediate context, as Paul continues by talking about the metamorphosis which takes place through the renewal of the mind (Rom 12.2).

Seen in this way, Paul's exhortation to present one's body as a sacrifice as part of a rational worship of God, and to experience a metamorphosis in the mind so that one is able to contemplate God's will, which – in a Euthyphronian sense – is equated with 'what is good and acceptable and perfect' (cf. Plato, *Euthyphro* 9e–10a; cf. § 2.4 above), reads as the climax of the development of his anthropology. Already in 1 Thess Paul appears to share the Jewish variant of Greek trichotomic anthropology by distinguishing – like his Jewish near-contemporaries Philo and Josephus – between spirit, soul, and body (see § 5.1.3 above).

In his Corinthian correspondence, this spirit anthropology is supplemented with an image anthropology, which emphasizes man's gradual metamorphosis in accordance with the image of God. The setting in which Paul develops these anthropologies is that of the sophistic competition which also affects the Christian community at Corinth (see chaps 3, 5 and 6 above). It is in this context that he adopts the Platonic notion of the inner man, which enables him to offer an alternative for the sophistic focus on outward rhetorical performance and physiognomy. The growth of the inner man is seen by Paul as the result of man's ongoing metamorphosis, in which he assimilates himself to the image of God, Christ, the ideal man from heaven. This notion of assimilation was not present in the ancient Jewish understanding of the image of God (cf. § 1.1 above) but was derived from Greek philosophy, which had also reflected on man as the image of God (§ 2.1) and on the need to maintain or regain this position by assimilating to God (§ 2.2).

Paul's Jewish background, however, is not altogether irrelevant. Indeed, the contrary is the case. We have seen that the trichotomy of spirit, soul and body is based on the Greek philosophical reading of the Jewish account of man's creation in Gen 2.7 (see chap. 5 above). Furthermore, the Greek notion of assimilation to God is not incompatible with a Jewish divine anthropology, in which man and God are related (see § 1.1.8 [b] above). Moreover, Neo-Pythagoreans themselves seem to draw upon the Jewish account of man's creation in Gen 1.26–27 for their reflections on man, or the ruler, as the image of God (see § 2.1.5 above). And in their development of an image and spirit anthropology, it is important Jewish *texts* which Philo and Paul apply in a Graeco-Roman *context*.

It is the sophistic environment in Corinth that prompts Paul to further contextualize his anthropology alongside his Christology. In 1–2 Cor, Paul presents his ideal figure, Christ, as a clearly anti-sophistic model. Christ was not concerned about public opinion, and his true glory went unnoticed by the (political) rulers of this age (1 Cor 2.8). Moreover, Paul writes to the Corinthians, 'though he was rich, yet for your sakes he became poor, so that by his poverty you might become rich' (2 Cor 8.9). The glory of Christ, the man from heaven, in which man par-

ticipates by bearing the image of this heavenly man, and by being transformed into this image of God, is currently only an *inner* value (cf. 2 Cor 4.16–18). In this way, both in his Christology and in his anthropology, Paul undermines the attraction of sophistic rhetoric and outward performance.

Yet in another context Paul develops his anthropology still further, as we have seen in the present chapter. The Christian community in Rome, ridden by ethnic tensions, is offered a universalist anthropology which overcomes the relevance of ethnicity in the community. Man's assimilation to Christ is now further reflected upon. It is in baptism that the process of growing together with the death and resurrection of Christ starts. Baptism is the starting point for a renewal of man's individual, debased mind, and for a new understanding of true religion. The two converge in the definition of true religion as a rational form of worshipping God, which takes place through the renewal of one's mind and becomes tangible in a reflective rational-ethical examination of what is good and acceptable and perfect.

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ANF	Ante-Nicene Fathers series, Edinburgh: T&T Clark.
DJD	Discoveries in the Judaean Desert series, Oxford : Clarendon Press.
LSJ	H. G. Liddell, R. Scott & H. S. Jones, *A Greek-English Lexicon, with a revised Supplement*, Oxford : Clarendon Press, 1996.
Neuer Wettstein	Strecker, G. & U. Schnelle (with the cooperation of G. Seelig). 1996. *Neuer Wettstein: Texte zum Neuen Testament aus Griechentum und Hellenismus*, vol. 2.1: *Texte zur Briefliteratur und zur Johannesapokalypse*, Berlin / New York: Walter de Gruyter.
New Pauly Online	*Der neue Pauly = Brill's New Pauly*, edited by H. Cancik, H. Schneider & M. Landfester; managing eds English edn: C. F. Salazar & F. G. Gentry, Leiden: Brill, 2005- ; Brill Online: Rijksuniversiteit Groningen. Digital version of *Der neue Pauly: Enzyklopädie der Antike*, Stuttgart: Metzler, 1996–2003; *Brill's New Pauly: Encyclopaedia of the Ancient World*, Leiden / Boston: Brill, 2000–.
NRSV	New Revised Standard Version
OCD	S. Hornblower & A. Spawforth, *The Oxford Classical Dictionary – Third Edition*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996.
OTP	J. H. Charlesworth (ed.), *The Old Testament Pseudepigrapha*, 2 vols, Garden City, N. Y.: Doubleday, 1983–1985.
Stern	Stern, M. 1974–1984. *Greek and Latin Authors on Jews and Judaism: Edited with Introductions, Translations and Commentary* (Publications of the Israel Academy of Sciences and Humanities, Section of Humanities; Fontes ad res Judaicas spectantes), 3 vols, Jerusalem: Israel Academy of Sciences and Humanities.
SVF	H. von Arnim (with an index by M. Adler), *Stoicorum veterum fragmenta*, 4 vols, Leipzig: Teubner, 1903–1924.
TLG	*Thesaurus Linguae Graecae (TLG®) Online Digital Library of Greek Literature*, University of California, Irvine, CA.

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